

The European Union's EDF Programme for ACP Countries

**CAPITALISATION STUDY ON CAPACITY  
BUILDING SUPPORT PROGRAMMES FOR  
NON STATE ACTORS UNDER THE 9<sup>TH</sup> EDF**

**Letter of Contract N°2008/162532**

**FINAL REPORT**

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## Foreword

The capitalisation study on capacity building programmes under the 9th EDF, sponsored by the European Commission, took place between September 2008 and April 2009. It was undertaken by independent experts, namely Maurizio FLORIDI – sociologist and specialist in the dynamics of non state actors in the ACP countries -, Beatriz SANZ CORELLA – socio-economic and management expert, specialist in support and advisory services for civil society experts and training, formulation and monitoring of EDF programmes -, and Stefano VERDECCHIA, a participatory local development expert.

Being a capitalisation study, the team in charge with the study focused their attention on the concrete experiences which characterised the NSA support programmes under the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF and, in particular, on best practices. A selection of the latter is presented herein, by way of example, in order to illustrate possible solutions to the problems that affect the majority of NSA support programmes.

The team was confronted with various problems; theoretical and methodological on the one part and, on the other, organisational.

In terms of theory and methodology, the study required the adoption of two approaches: quantitative and qualitative, each involving different analytical logics and methods. In addition, the needs of the qualitative approach forced the team to increase the number of field missions. As such, in addition to the 3 missions foreseen in Ethiopia, Uganda and Dominican Republic, a further 5 missions were added with a view to enriching the overall quality of the study, which took place in Suriname, Malawi, Burkina Faso, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mali.

As to the constraints of the organisational side of the project, the major problem was, firstly, the collection of documents relating to the 40 NSA support programmes and, secondly, the analysis of a quite significant number of pages, not an easy task when the time and budget considerations are taken into account.

The team would like to highlight the importance of the restitution seminar held in Brussels on 1-3 April, which allowed the team to meet with a large number of actors (35 representatives of the ECDs in the ACP countries, 15 members of the PMU and AIDCO, DEV and RELEX representatives) on the themes and first results of the study.

The team would, in particular, like to thank the services of the European Commission Delegation in the 38 studies involved in the study, as well as the PMUs of the 40 NSA support programmes for their cooperation and availability in the collection of the documents needed for the analysis.

Lastly, we would like to offer a sincere thanks to the members of Unit E4, notably Ms. Susana El-Kum Molina, the in house Commission study coordinator and her support staff for the invaluable assistance and advice provided.

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## Acronyms

ACP	Africa, Caribbean and Pacific
CfP	Call for Proposals
CSCBP	Civil Society Capacity Building Programme
CB	Capacity Building
CS	Civil Society
CSF	Civil Society Fund
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CSP	Country Strategy Paper
EC	European Commission
ECD	Delegation of the European Commission
EDF	European Development Fund
EU	European Union
FA	Financing Agreement
GRO	Grassroots organisation
IEC	Information, Education and Communication
INGO	International Non Governmental Organisation
IO	Intermediary Organisation
LA	Local Authority
NSA	Non State Actor
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
NAO	National Authorizing Officer
NGO	Non governmental Organisation
NIP	National indicative Programme
OCA	Organisational Capacity Assessment
PCC	Project Coordination Committee
PMFU	Programme management and Facilitation Unit
PMU	Project/Programme Management Unit
PRMT	Participatory Resource Monitoring Tool
PRSP	Poverty Reduction strategy paper
PS	Private Sector
RCA	Regional Corresponding Agencies
SC	Steering Committee
SMC	Steering and Monitoring Committee
TA	Technical assistance

TAU	Technical Assistance Unit
TC	Technical Cooperation
TFG	Task Force Group
TFP	Technical and Financial partners
ToR	Terms of Reference
WP	Work programme

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## Executive summary

The capitalisation study on the NSA capacity building programmes under the 9th EDF, involving around 40 programmes in 38 ACP countries, has allowed identifying strong and weak points in the EC strategy under the Cotonou era.

The results of the implementation of this first generation of NSA support programmes confirm the significant added value brought by the Community to the development process in ACP countries, and the positive role of EC programmes in increasing public sector's accountability *vis a vis* citizens.

While there is no such a thing as a theoretical or methodological formula for the identification, implementation and evaluation of these programmes, it is nonetheless possible, on the one hand, to identify common tendencies and, on the other, to select a certain number of positive experiences which can act as a reference point for the continuation of NSA support in the framework of the implementation of the 10<sup>th</sup> EDF.

### *Types of NSAs*

In the identification phase, a NSA support programme must address the question of what are the characteristics and added value of each family of non state actors, with regard to the goals of the programme and, in general, to the implementation of the Community strategy in the country.

At a general level, a **distinction** must be made between the different NSAs' structures in order to refine **the methodologies aimed at** comprehending their *modus operandi* and, above all, their differences. In essence, the notion of non state actor is quite broad, and it includes **multiple families** of actors which are not homogenous and which have complementary, yet fundamentally different vocations. This difference has a very concrete value to the extent that belonging to one family or another can determine an organization's **eligibility for access to programme resources**.

While different NSAs families may share **similar objectives**, each family can bring, on the basis of its own specialisation, skills, and experience, a specific contribution to the ACP countries' strive in the direction of sustainable development through good governance and enhanced citizenship.

In order to ensure that each family of actors can fully contribute, it is important to enable them to **play their roles by taking into account their specific vocation and individual technical skills**, all while bearing in mind the different organisational levels (grass roots, intermediary and advisory, and 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> level umbrella organisation). Secondly, capacity building must be carried out on the basis of a **clear distinction between the individual, organisation and institutional level**.

It is thus necessary to adopt a differentiated strategy that takes **three aspects** into account: differentiation between families of actors, differentiation between organisational levels of NSAs, and differentiation between spheres of capacity building.

Support to NSAs poses a certain number of problems, both in relation to **the efficiency and impact of supported activities, and for what concerns the respect of EDF procedures**. The paradox in some cases is that organisations which, in principle, provide the most guarantees with regard to their adherence to rules and procedures are not necessarily those that will ensure viable medium to long term results. In reality, the less well-equipped organisations often represent the most active forces of society, notably at the local level, where the majority of collective actors do not possess formal structures or official recognition.

A project or programme intending to provide support to NSAs cannot ignore the existence of these new actors, which represent relevant and emerging social instances, and that tend to act according to their profound sense of social responsibility while they work to provide efficient and innovative solutions to the question of sustainable development.

In this sense, it is imperative to acknowledge – as foreseen under the Cotonou Agreement – the organisational structures of those NSAs that escape the models traditionally recognised in the juridical

and political framework. In sub-Saharan Africa, for instance, one has to deal with a new generation of NSAs created by the structural and democratic adjustment process, that often refuse labels and formal operational rules and that are, by contrast, no less effective in their social action.

At a concrete level, it is necessary to ensure that the **eligibility criteria** for access to funding provide these emerging actors the opportunity to participate, and that the types of actions that can be undertaken be kept as **broad as possible**. In other words, it is necessary for the support programme or project to be **based on the demand** of actors, rather than being supply-driven.

### *The aim of NSA support programmes and their strategic positioning*

If certain programmes under the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF were focused on capacity building as a goal in itself, or were generically aimed to the overarching goal of fighting poverty, those conceived under the 10<sup>th</sup> EDF **cannot afford to neglect the new contexts characterised by profound changes in the formulation and management of public affairs**.

Important political and institutional changes are in fact already underway in most ACP countries. These changes, at the national as well as, more importantly, the local level, include a progressive political and administrative decentralisation that opened up **new perspectives** in terms of governance and, more in general, new forms of relationships between the State and its citizens.

All NSA support programmes and, in particular, those supporting civil society, must therefore face the **question of the relevance and strategic positioning of different types of organisations, vis a vis the new challenges raised by governance in all its forms**. In other words, the civil society capacity building programmes conceived in the framework of the 10<sup>th</sup> EDF must incorporate a basic element of the new cooperation agreement: the **political dimension**. This means that a NSA capacity building programme cannot be limited to the strengthening of individual actors, but must as well focus on the links between the actors themselves and, above all, between the actors, their contexts, and their institutional partners, notably the State in all its manifestations.

NSA support programmes should therefore promote a **stronger connection between** NSA and their context of reference. Due attention must be paid to the relevance of supported NSAs' activities, which must not be too distant from the social and political problems that the countries are experiencing, and which should provide a relevant contribution in terms of governance best practices. In order to achieve this, the NSA support programmes under the 10<sup>th</sup> EDF must take into account five main principles.

The first is that each programme needs to be **strategically positioned in the social, economical, institutional, cultural, as well as political context of the country in which it is implemented**.

In other words, an NSA support programme **cannot in any case be “neutral”** as regard to the context in which it is intervening and, more importantly, in the context of civil society. The “neutrality” of a programme is actually neither a strong point nor an indicator of objectivity, but a flaw to the extent that it prevents the programme from positioning itself in an explicit way.

This strategic positioning should necessarily take into account 1) the main principles at the basis of EC's development policies, with particular focus on the Cotonou Agreement; 2) the policy choices made by the Community and expressed in the CSP; 3) the concrete reality of **NSAs, their role within the context and, above all, the interests and strategic issues they deal with**.

The second principle concerns the positioning of the programme as regards the often-evoked question of its neutrality. A programme can **never be neutral**, due to that fact that it must, above all, place itself strategically in the context of governmental and Community policies, of the technical and financial partners present in the country, as much as within the dynamics of the NSAs themselves. In this regard, the programme in its different stages will inevitably cause a perturbation in existing social dynamics. In fact, such perturbation comes into existence already at the stage of DSP discussions.

The third principle is linked to the **pluralistic nature** of NSAs. A NSA support programme dealing with the internal dynamics of civil society must at all costs avoid any intervention modality that aims to ensure a **monopolistic position** for umbrella organisations with regard to the policy dialogue with the government and donor organisations. The programme must, instead, support the current dynamics within civil society, respecting the vocations of each actor, and in coherence with national development strategies, the community strategy outlined in the CSP, the principles of EC development policy and, above all, the social and economic issues NSAs are asked to deal with.

The fourth principle is the need to recognise the **specific nature** of NSA support programmes, which should be based on a process approach, where actors guided through long-term coaching and mentoring and to avoid the project/micro-project approach, that emphasizes immediate outputs. The idea of a process which requires adequate time to produce a visible impact is actually at the very core of the capacity building concept.

The fifth principle is that NSAs should not be considered as an alternative to existing power. On the contrary, their added value should be seen in terms of what NSAs can offer in terms of creative and innovative solutions in the direction of sustainable development.

In fact, the **governance approach foresees** the active and responsible participation of all stakeholders, with their specific vocations and mission, in the development processes. Participation is not limited to the contribution of beneficiaries, it is an **interactive process of dialogue and cooperation**, along which each actor, on the basis of its proper specialisation and prerogatives, must attempt to integrate the perceptions of others.

#### *Identification of capacity building programmes and mapping exercises*

Under the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF mapping exercises have often been limited to a statistical survey of NSAs, and have been generally informed by a static and descriptive logic. On the contrary, the establishment of a programme requires a **dynamic framework** where, aside from the quantitative and qualitative information on the actors themselves, key elements are provided to understand the actual social and political challenges in the context of which non state actors are asked to operate.

These **fundamental elements** include: 1) a classification of **NSAs based on their characteristics**, the strategic issues and challenges they face given **the country social, economical and political contexts**, and their future perspectives; 2) the identification of **key actors among NSAs**, the assessment of their **capacity building needs**, according to which category and structural level they belong to; 3) the analysis of the country **juridical and institutional framework with respect to NSAs, as well as of the areas for cooperation between governmental and non governmental actors**; 4) the review of the **existing cooperation framework between NSAs and EC**; 5) a **map of stakeholders** in the domain of NSAs support, including the different approaches they adopt.

In addition to this, mappings must also include local capacity building resources (universities, private sector, local NGOs, research centres, etc.) in order to provide an exhaustive analysis in terms of both demand and supply. Regarding **NSAs' involvement** in the mapping exercise, several modalities have been experimented in the whole of the ACP states over the course of the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF. In general, the choice of including NSAs in the mapping was linked to the specific situation in the country at the time, taking into account the advantages and disadvantages of each option.

The mapping exercises of the 10<sup>th</sup> EDF will require a **significant change of mentality**. If, during the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF, it was mainly aimed at updating knowledge in order to better identify or implement specific programs, under the 10<sup>th</sup> EDF mapping must, imperatively, be linked to the identification of a **global strategy for NSAs' inclusion** in all forms of European cooperation and, in particular, in political dialogue, bearing in mind the new aid modalities. In other words, it is necessary to evolve from a sectoral to an integral vision of NSA support, which raises the question of what is the role of NSAs in EC cooperation as a whole, and not just in specific programs.

Today's challenge is that of mainstreaming the theme of NSAs into all European cooperation, according to a governance approach. This also involves undertaking **sectoral mapping** exercises. This new approach, already tested by other donors with an established sector policy, is of fundamental importance to the extent that the exercise can provide precious indications for the implementation of the Community strategy outlined in the CSP on the basis of sector priorities.

*Institutional set-up, programme management modalities, role and profile of TA, cooperation with donor organisations*

As regards management modalities, five possible options exist, within two general types of management (centralised or decentralised), namely: **indirect centralised management by a private company** (article 23.6 of annex IV of the Cotonou Agreement); **joint centralised management with other donors (pool fund system) and/or International Organisations**; **indirect centralised management by a NGO -through grant contracts** – (article 23.6 of annex I of the Cotonou Agreement); **direct decentralized management (with or without TA)**; **indirect decentralized management by a private entity (consulting firm) or NGO**.

The “**direct decentralized management**” modality is, on the whole, the preferred option under the NSA support programmes of the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF, followed by the “direct centralized management” one. The other mentioned modalities have revealed much less practical.

With regard to the management modality of the programme, it is **up to the different Delegations**, on the basis of the mapping study's results (or, in absence of that, of the feasibility study), to consider which category the country belongs to, and to agree with the NAO on the approach to be adopted. The cost of certain management modalities is an important factor and, sometimes, a constraint to the implementation of NSA support programmes. The choice of how to manage a programme is usually linked to **3 factors**: the national **context**, the **goals** of the project and the **skills** required.

With regard to the responsibilities of the Monitoring and Steering Committee, the experience of NSA support programmes under the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF shows a **large variability** when it comes to interpretation, as well as some common trends.

The variability is typically exemplified by the **frequency of the Committee's meetings**, which can vary from one to four times a year and, secondly, by the **different interpretations of the Committee's duties and prerogatives**. These go from the simple validation of work undertaken by the PMU to the Committee's being made part in every decision of the programme, including the selection of activities or, in some cases, even the recruitment of support personnel.

The **common tendency is however** for the Monitoring and Steering Committee to be nothing more than the place where decisions taken elsewhere (subject of a prior agreement between the programme, the NAO and the EC ) are formalized. In short, the MSC is usually not a forum for assessing the programme development but, rather, an occasion for validation. Such a situation risks of jeopardizing the relations with stakeholders as much as the programme institutional set-up.

For what concerns the inclusion of NSAs in the programme monitoring and steering bodies, independently of the chosen formula, the fundamental question is how to ensure, on the one hand, the **representativity** of members who are there in the name of NSAs, and, on the other, to avoid conflicts of interest. The experiences show that the most appropriate procedure in certain contexts is that of including resource persons linked to the NSA world rather NSA representatives themselves.

Several actors intervene in the implementation of NSA support programmes, each with a very precise role. In this sense, non state actors are, at the same time, actors and beneficiaries. As such it is fundamental that the NSAs are not considered as a single block, but as a relatively heterogeneous entity. In essence, as much in the role of actor as in that of beneficiary, NSAs must be considered according to a differentiated approach in order to be able to distinguish the different missions and vocations and, by consequence, the various capacity building needs.

The NAO should play a double role: the **programme supervisor** through the Monitoring and Steering Committee, as well as the **facilitator in the dialogue between NSAs and government** at the level of the programme activities, especially those involving State-NSA cooperation, in all of its dimensions.

The role of EC Delegations involves **two aspects; they are “critical observers”**, ensuring that the appropriate and competent NSAs are identified and included in the new cooperation framework according to the principles of the Cotonou Agreement; and **“facilitators”**, in the sense that they guarantee access to clear and transparent information, and that they contribute to the development and capacity building of NSAs.

Lastly, as regards **RCAs or Intermediary Organisations**, it is important to note that there is a risk of **tying- up collaboration** under the programme **with the specific logic of service contracting**. In reality, RCAs should not be seen as mere programme antennas, but as opportunities for the creation of new focal points for civil society at the regional level, something that is perfectly consistent with the mission of most umbrella organisations operating at such scale.

Another fundamental aspect is the role and profile of the technical assistance responsible for the implementation of NSA support programmes. Experiences under the NSA support programmes of the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF revealed a widespread tendency to consider **Technical Assistance as almost exclusively dealing with administration and book keeping**, while NSA support programmes should adopt a different approach. TA in these new programmes must first and foremost have the role of **facilitating the social processes which are underway**, by making available their capacity building tools, in the respect of the different missions and vocations of NSAs.

In a general sense, the drafting of ToR (in the procurement note phase) and the criteria for the integration of skills are also key aspects of the **selection phase** of TA.

It would be interesting **to link European NGOs, which have a significant experience in supporting Southern NSAs , in providing technical assistance**. These NGOs could actually bring a significant added value to the implementation of a new generation of capacity building programmes with which large scale European consulting firms are often not familiar enough .

One of the reasons why European NGOs are often left out is that EDF procedures for TA contracts require not only the **direct financial responsibility** of the contractor but also its capital adequacy, documented by bank guarantees.

These findings, which denote a feeble presence of International NGOs (INGOs), not only in technical assistance but also as partners in NSA/civil society support programmes, **strongly contrast with the presence and dynamism of INGOs in a significant number of ACP countries**.

In fact, European and International NGOs have, historically, had a significant role in the **emerging and strengthening of** civil society organisations in ACP countries, notably in the domain of the promotion and protection of human rights.

Recently, some international and European NGOs have started to experiment alternative forms of fund-raising by positioning themselves directly within the ACP countries for the implementation of programmes and projects, either in collaboration with local actors (often as sub-contractors) or by competing with national actors. At the other extreme, an **increasing number of international NGOs are progressively getting involved in the capacity** building of local NGOs. Therefore, a stronger coordination among different actors involved in capacity building programs (including INGOs), and that share the same vision on how to support civil society organizations, would represent an efficient way to: 1) capitalise on the experiences underway or already completed and; 2) create synergies to the benefit of CSOs and their strengthening. It is thus necessary for the new programmes to take INGOs into account as technical and financial partners already rooted in the country and, on the basis of a critical analysis of their visions, approaches and *modus operandi*, **establish a partnership with them**.

As regards management aspects, **backstopping** is a very important aspect of TA. The role of backstopping can be extremely beneficial for supporting local staff, at the condition that a **distinction is made between two types of backstopping: administrative and technical**.

From the analysis of the NSA support programmes under the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF, it emerges that only **a minority of programmes adopted a proactive and institutionalised approach to the cooperation** with other donor organisations, besides the implementation of a few punctual activities and the routine consultation events. The situation is however changing, and it is hoped that cooperation among donors, notably the Member States as well as international organisations, will increase under the 10<sup>th</sup> EDF. In essence, as donors begin to seek an increased harmonisation in the spirit of the Paris Declaration and other initiatives, we will assist to the emergence of new **common financing systems, aimed at making funding more reliable and independent from the day-to-day donors' management**. This is the case, for example, of the new pool funding systems.

### *Capacity building: operational approaches and modalities in the framework of the 9th EDF programmes*

The NSA support programmes under the 9<sup>th</sup> EDG generally integrated **several components**, from strengthening the capacity of individual organisations and their representatives to the relational aspects of networking, and to the questions of political dialogue with the State.

The multi-dimensional nature of programmes strictly follows the **systemic nature of capacity building**. In effect, capacity building needs to be conceived as a **process** that seeks, with the active participation of concerned actors, to consolidate their capacities in order for them to evolve and adjust to new context-specific demands. Programs should therefore encompass three dimensions: the strengthening of individual capacities, including strategic leadership skills; the **organisational** dimension, with a particular attention to the aspects of identity, as well as to the efficiency and efficacy criteria; and, finally, the strengthening of the **relational dimension**, which means the organizations' capacity to cooperate with other actors, but also the establishment of a judiciary and institutional framework appropriate to respond to the needs of organisations and to their demand of participation in public policy. Such regulatory environment should be conceived not only as an external factor constraining or enabling NSA development, but also as an element that can be reformed and transformed in the process.

**Four main approaches** were identified within the NSA support programmes of the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF. These can be placed on a continuum, from a purely reactive approach, based on the call for proposals instrument, to a programmatic and proactive approach, based on the elaboration of a capacity building plan, on the basis of a strategic analysis. The majority of programmes currently rely on a fundamentally reactive approach, where the **calls for proposals are the preferred mechanism** for addressing NSAs' capacity building needs. In this respect, the experience of 9<sup>th</sup> EDF programmes showed how the call for proposal mechanism, but above all the logic and approach often underlying it, may impoverish the nature of a programme, by generating a number of scattered, stand-alone and poorly coordinated initiatives that are managed according to the same logic of the “pre-Cotonou” micromanagement projects and/or thematic programmes.

On the other hand, some recent experiences have shown that the call for proposals instrument can be **adapted to the capacity building needs** of NSAs, on the condition that it is considered as a tool and not as an end in itself.

As regards alternative tools, the **proactive capacity building plan** presents some interesting aspects. Whereas the adoption of this tool is somewhat recent, there is already some evidence of NSAs' positive reaction as, on the one hand, the tool is more effective in targeting their capacity building needs, and, on the other, it generates a less intense competition among NSAs.

Experience has showed that at least five conditions must be met in order for this tool to be effective, namely: **an in-depth knowledge of NSAs and their context, as well as of their capacity building needs and the strategic issues they deal with**; a significant investment in human resources; the set up of an



often complex information gathering system; the PMU's strong capacity to communicate the relevance and innovative nature **of the tool**, and its differences in comparison to calls for proposals; in this case the PMU must not only have an administrative and book keeping role within the programme, but it should be able to support and facilitate **the dynamics of the actors**; the PMU should therefore possess **the appropriate technical skills**.

### *The question of procedures*

The specificity of NSA support programmes, **due to the peculiar characteristics of non state actors and the nature itself of capacity building**, poses a series of procedural problems that deserve not only to be evoked but also concretely analysed in order to identify short and medium-term solutions.

Thanks to the active participation of a number of programmes and delegations in the restitution workshop on 1<sup>st</sup> -3<sup>rd</sup> April 2009 in Brussels, some operational issues and recommendations have been identified.

### *The programme monitoring and evaluation system*

The monitoring and evaluation of NSA support programmes presents a twofold **challenge**: on the one hand, the NSA support programmes deal with social dynamics that are not easily measurable and, on the other, there is neither a history nor a tradition of EC intervention in this area and, thus, no lesson learned to benefit from.

In reality, the major difficulty in evaluating a process, and not an activity, such as NSA capacity building, **is that it can only have an impact in the medium to long term**. This contrasts with the needs of the monitoring and evaluation exercise, which is usually carried out during and immediately after the programme.

The evaluation of this type of programmes has to do with long-term social dynamics, by their nature **difficult to quantify**, and must therefore identify the appropriate impact indicators, relevant to the nature of NSA capacity building. One promising direction is the use of impact indicators that capture the **institutional and organisational changes generated within the beneficiary organisation**. The time factor is decisive, bearing in mind that such changes can only be measured 6-12 months after the end of a programme.

Evaluators should also be ready to overthrow the standard evaluation logic, by recognizing that apparent failures can actually turn into successes.

A capacity building activity that is judged today a failure, as the planned amount in the WP has not been spent, could be considered tomorrow a success, thanks to the long-term positive dynamics that it generated. In fact, NSA support programmes intervene in a complex context where no **one can master or foresee all the long-term effects of a given activity**.

There are also effects that were not foreseen by the programme but which, by contrast, bear a significant importance to the ends of NSA capacity building. The capacity building activity must be therefore evaluated not only against its intended objectives, but, more broadly, in terms of the wide range of **dynamics that it produced**.

### *Information and communication within NSA support programmes*

Communication with all concerned actors is a **transversal capacity building instrument** of any programme. It should be a **"two-way"** process between the programme and non state actors, particularly those belonging to the third and fourth level organisations.

Communication should include the **sharing of experiences and good practices** between non-state actors, technical assistance experts, staff of the Delegations, and all national actors concerned, including

donor organisations. To maintain and strengthen the ties between the programme and the social and political challenges NSAs face, communication tools should be adapted **to the context** and the intended target groups.

In essence, the role of communication should be, on the one hand, to express the coherence of the programme with EC country strategies, and, on the other, to strengthen the strategic **positioning** of NSAs in the country socio-political framework.

The programme experiences in many countries clearly show the importance of transparency. To inform the public opinion, notably NSAs, about programme management modalities, as well as about the management tools adopted by the PMU, is an important transparency factor, and it is facilitating element in the PMU's work, particularly for what concerns its interaction with NSAs. Disseminating information on the progress and challenges during implementation confers more strength and legitimacy to the programme.

Finally, all NSA support programmes and, in particular, civil society programmes, should draw a clear distinction between **visibility** and **external communication**.

## Part A. Context and presentation of the study

## 1. THE CONTEXT: LEGAL RECOGNITION OF THE ROLE OF NSA AND THE OBJECTIVE OF CAPACITY BUILDING

One of the great innovations of the Cotonou Agreement lies in the **legal and political recognition** of the participation of non state actors (NSA) in the development and cooperation process. On the one hand, this participation is defined as one of the fundamental principles of cooperation (Article 2 – Fundamental principles). On the other hand, and for the first time in the history of EU-ACP (European Union – African Caribbean and Pacific) cooperation, a new chapter on the actors in this partnership recognises the **complementary roles** played by civil society, the private sector and decentralised local communities together with the central administration in the development and cooperation process.

The definition of national development strategies, however, remains the responsibility of the ACP governments; but it is imperative that Non-State Actors (NSA) are involved at every stage of the process; consultation, programming, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. Thus, the Cotonou Agreement introduces new measures to promote **participatory approaches** in order to ensure the involvement of civil society and of economic and social actors, especially:

- through the provision of **appropriate information** on the ACP-EC partnership agreement;
- by ensuring **consultation** with NSA on the economic, social and institutional reforms and policies to be supported by the EC ;
- by facilitating the **participation** of NSA in the implementation of programmes and projects;
- by providing non state actors with the necessary **capacity building support**

These objectives express the desire of the European Commission not to limit the role of NSA to a technical contribution to the struggle against poverty. The reinforcement of NSA is seen as an objective in itself for the foundation of a civic culture, enhanced democracy and good governance.

## 2. CAPITALIZATION STUDY ON THE SUPPORT PROGRAMMES FOR NSA UNDER THE 9TH EDF

In order to support NSA in their role as **responsible, informed and competent partners** in the political, economic, social and cultural life of the country and thereby reinforce the country's democratic foundations, a large proportion of the National Indicative Programmes (NIPs) of the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF included a capacity building programme for NSA.

Under the 9th EDF, **42 NSA capacity building programmes** were approved in **38 ACP countries** for a total of approximately **€202 million**.

Within the framework of the 10<sup>th</sup> EDF, even though not all the NIPs have yet been signed, the sum earmarked for the capacity building of NSA confirms the **fundamental necessity** of this sector in order to ensure that NSA are able to fulfil their roles both in the development of their country and in the implementation of the Community's strategy.

The execution of a review of these programmes highlights the **importance** of this issue, both for the countries which have not yet initiated the identification of programmes under the 10th EDF as much as for those already implementing or preparing to do so.

The first mid-term evaluations are underway. These have already highlighted a series of problems which should be taken into consideration to ensure that **effective solutions** can be

identified: notably the risk that these capacity building programmes may, on the one hand, turn into micro projects, or even **micro-realisations** and, on the other, into technical assistance programmes focused on **administrative and financial tasks** (limited to dealing with calls for proposals), and neglecting their **essential role of facilitator**.

This shows, as reported in the Terms of Reference of the study, that the implementing strategy for Community support of NSA is still centred on the **logic of financing projects** and has not really progressed towards the **logic of guiding actors through the national processes of transformation at political, institutional, economic and social levels**. In order to ensure a stronger impact and a greater degree of viability in Community support, it is no longer necessary to manage a series of calls for proposals and tendering projects, but to actually implement the new political and cooperation agenda of the EC; one which invites collaboration alongside NSA as indispensable players in the global development process, recognising the diversity of NSA, their different roles and the added value in each sector, as well as in each phase of cooperation.

The capacity building programmes for NSA, which will be developed in the framework of the 10th EDF, will need to integrate the lessons learned from the 9th EDF programmes, while placing themselves at the centre of the **Community's global strategy**, building bridges between these programmes and the other sectors supported to promote effective participation by NSA in the definition of public policy (building their capacity as actors in the governance sphere).

## 2.1. Objectives and scope of the study

The **global objective** of this study was to capitalise on the various experiences gathered from the NSA capacity building programmes financed under the 9th EDF in order to improve the approach logic and strategic use of these programmes with a view to enhancing the impact of EC support to NSA in their role as governance actors.

In order to attain this global objective, **a threefold specific objective was determined:**

<p style="text-align: center;"><b>OBJECTIVE OF CAPITALIZATION</b></p>	<p>(i) To produce a <b>conceptual, methodological and operational document to support the NSA correspondents</b> within the Delegations in ACP countries and the units at Head Office responsible for support to NSA, along the entire strategic programming chain as well as management of cooperation programmes (strategic programming at a national level, identification and formulation of programmes and initiatives in support of NSA, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of these programmes and dialogue on cooperation).</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>OBJECTIVE OF DISSEMINATION</b></p>	<p>(i) On the basis of the conceptual, methodological and operational review, to produce a training <b>module (in PowerPoint)</b> aimed at the NSA correspondents in the Delegations in ACP countries and the units at Head Office responsible for support to NSA.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>OBJECTIVE</b></p>	<p>(ii) To organise a <b>three-day restitution and training workshop</b> in Brussels for the NSA correspondents within the responsible delegations and the Head Office staff to <b>inform them of the</b></p>


<p><b>OF TRAINING</b></p>	<p><b>key concepts and challenges relating to support for NSA.</b> This workshop had the twofold objective of presenting the main conclusions and recommendations contained in the study and testing the training module that has been developed.</p>
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In terms of scope, as specified in the terms of reference, the analysis of the capacity building programmes focused on a number of **key questions concerning the different stages in the strategic programming cycle of cooperation.** At the same time, two levels of analysis must be defined:

- (i) a first level of analysis which looks beyond the capacity building programmes of NSA in order to **place the review of these programmes within a wider context, exemplified by the participatory approaches adopted, as much by the EU** in its intervention strategy, in terms of **dialogue and monitoring of cooperation,** as by the ACP governments.
- (ii) a second level of analysis **consisting of the review of key questions regarding the identification, teaching, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the NSA capacity building programmes** that have been financed under the 9th EDF.

The following diagram illustrates **these two levels of analysis** and the principal stages related to them:

Figure 1 : The two levels of analysis



Source: the authors

## 2.2. Research timetable

<b><i>Inception phase</i></b>	October – November 2008	The research team collected all the necessary documentation regarding the 42 NSA capacity building programmes (NIPs, financing arrangements, ToRs and reports on mapping studies, identification of topics, feasibility studies, involvement of and recruitment by the Project Management Unit (PMU), evaluation studies, reports on PMU activity, audit and external monitoring reports, guidelines for calls for proposals, the minutes of meetings of the Pilot Committee and the Selection Committee, evaluation reports, monitoring reports, final reports on seminars, and any other document relevant to this research). This information was collected by mail or by means of telephone interviews, whether through the services of the Commission's Head Office or in the ACP countries. On the basis of the documentation collected, it has been possible to analyse 40 programmes carried out in 38 countries <sup>1</sup> .
<b><i>Execution phase</i></b>	November 2008 – January 2009	<p>The analysis of the 40 programmes was carried out in two stages:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A first stage of <b>rationalisation and synthesised analysis</b> (based on a selection of key questions entered on a synthesised analysis slip) of all the existing capacity building programmes in ACP countries, with an initial identification of possible good practices, innovative experiences and lessons learned. At the end of this stage, a definitive selection of countries for an analysis in greater depth was made.</li> <li>• A second stage of <b>in depth analysis of the 16 selected countries</b> (based on the key questions grouped in an in-depth analysis file) and identification and recording any good practices, innovations and lessons learned, in order to illustrate the methodological approach of the document as a guide for each of the proposed phases.</li> </ul> <p>In addition to the analysis of the available documentation, 7 field trips were carried out (in Ethiopia, Uganda, the Dominican Republic, Surinam, Burkina Faso, Mali and Malawi) with the aim of collecting more data on "good practices" in different contexts. These countries were chosen because of their relevance as regards to the study's goals and because of the absence of detailed information on them in Europe. The experts in charge of the study conducted interviews, either on the spot or in Europe, with the various stakeholders: representatives of NSA, representatives of national and local government, other interested parties, NSA correspondents and other members of the delegations responsible for other projects as well as for Community support programmes for NSA, and members of the administrative bodies.</p>
<b><i>Phase for the preparation</i></b>	March –	Organisation of a three-day workshop in Brussels (1 <sup>st</sup> -3 <sup>rd</sup> April) for the NSA correspondents in Delegations and in the Head Office to inform

<sup>1</sup> In the case of 2 programmes the analysis was not possible due to incomplete documentation

<i>and organisation of the restitution seminar</i>	April 2009	them of the key concepts and challenges regarding support to NSA. The main conclusions and recommendations of the review were presented. The workshop was held on the Commission premises. Among participants, on top of representatives from 35 Delegations, there were 15 PMU members responsible for the NSA support programmes (especially to civil society) in all the relevant geographical areas.
<i>Phase for the preparation of the draft report</i>	March – April 2009	The team of experts drew up a report which includes both a general section on the involvement of NSA in Community cooperation and an account of the lessons learnt and their recommendations according to the different cyclic stages of the project (identification, formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation). The report gives concrete examples (case studies) to exemplify best practices, difficulties encountered and lessons learnt.
<i>Phase for the finalisation of the report and the training module</i>	April - May 2009	At the end of the workshop, the team of experts provided a final version of their study and a training module for the NSA correspondents, including the principal key points to be taken into account when 'identifying, formulating and implementing programmes'.

Regarding the choice of 16 countries for the in-depth analysis, **4 criteria** were adopted for the sake of a framework that is generally representative of the problems addressed and the different national contexts. In particular, these were:

- The distribution of the 16 chosen countries among **three different contextual categories (see table below)**. From the 16 selected countries, seven belong to Category I, six to Category II and three to Category III.
- **The progress made by the different programmes;** in this instance the team chose to analyse programmes at different stages of development (inception, mid-term or completed). It must be stressed that the team gave preference to programmes which were well advanced, so as to obtain as many indications and examples of best practices as possible. As such, 8 programmes are in their final phase, 5 are under-way and 3 are in their inception phase.
- **Geographical zones;** 5 of the countries are in West Africa, 4 in East Africa, 2 in Southern Africa, 1 in Central Africa, 2 in the Caribbean, and 2 in the Pacific.
- **Linguistic contexts;** language is important insofar as, where certain subjects are concerned, – in the first instance capacity building, – the cultural context, and even the approach, will change according to the different schools of thought that have developed in an English-speaking or French-speaking environment. Thus, of the 16 countries, 7 are Anglophone, 6 are Francophone (including Cameroun, some of whose regions are also English-speaking), and the last three 3 are respectively Spanish, Portuguese and Dutch.



Below is a list of the 16 countries according to the **first criterion**, i.e. their grouping in three contextual categories according to the degree to which NSA are involved in political dialogue<sup>2</sup>:

<b>Countries with a culture of participation by NSA in the development process</b>	<b>Countries with a somewhat limited tradition of dialogue with and participation by NSA</b>	<b>Countries with very limited NSA participation</b>
Benin Mali Senegal Uganda Dominican Republic Malawi Tanzania	Angola Niger Cameroon Suriname Vanuatu Papua New Guinea	Mauritania Somalia Ethiopia

**The synthesised analysis** extended to **22 other countries** (with 24 project analyses) on which the team already had adequate documentation. These are the following:

<b>Countries with a culture of participation by NSA in the development process</b>	<b>Countries with a somewhat limited tradition of dialogue with and participation by NSA</b>	<b>Countries with very limited NSA participation</b>
Botswana Burkina Faso Cape Verde Mauritius Zambia	Burundi Democratic Republic of the Congo Gabon Guinea-Conakry Jamaica Kenya Lesotho Mozambique Nigeria Seychelles Sierra Leone Zimbabwe	Djibouti Equatorial Guinea Gambia Guinea-Bissau Namibia

<sup>2</sup> The team in charge of the study would like to note that the proposed distribution of countries into the three categories must be considered on the basis of a changing definition. It does not therefore reflect more than a subjective evaluation for a small period and is susceptible to changes depending on the evolution of the context.

## 2.3. Methodological approach

### 2.3.1. *The methodological framework*

In terms of the methodology of the study, the team undertook two approaches, quantitative and qualitative.

For the **quantitative approach**, the study took the following into account:

- Statistical processing of the information collected through the use of a grid for in depth analysis of the 16 NSA support programmes;
- Statistical processing of the information gathered through the use of a grid for global analysis of the 24 NSA support programmes;
- Statistical processing of the information gathered through the use of a grid for the analysis of the websites of NSA support programmes and the websites of the ECDs.

The **qualitative approach** took the following into consideration:

- Analysis of the documentation of the NSA support programmes, with a special emphasis on the identification of best practices;
- In depth interviews with stakeholders of the NSA support programmes in the field (7 countries) and by telephone or email;
- Content analysis of the websites of the NSA support programmes and the ECDs.

### 2.3.2. *Technical tools*

As far as the technical instruments are concerned, 3 grids were used for the analysis of the documentation collected. These include:

- A grid for the in depth analysis of the 16 NSA support programmes (see annexe 1);
- A grid for the global analysis of the 24 NSA support programmes (see annexe 2);
- A grid for the analysis of the NSA support programme web sites (see annexe 3).

### 2.3.3. *Sources*

As regards sources, the team used **primary** and **secondary** sources.

**Primary sources**, or direct sources, included:

- The NSA support programme managers within the ECDs;
- The NAO services of the countries included in the implementation of NSA support programmes under the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF;
- The PMU responsible for NSA support programmes;
- The Technical Assistance contract holders for the implementation of PMUs in NSA support programmes;
- The responsible geographic members of AIDCO Unit E4;
- Key personnel (or resource personnel).

As regards **secondary source**, or **indirect sources**, the team consulted the following documents:

- The 10<sup>th</sup> EDF CSPs/NIPs;
- The PRSPs;
- The Financing Agreements; the programme identification files and the Financing Proposals;

- The ToRs of the programme identification studies;
- The identification studies (including mapping where available);
- The Tender Dossier for the recruitment of the TA;
- The Programme Estimates;
- The guidelines of the Calls for Proposals, the evaluation reports and the list of selected projects (including project fiches);
- Programme reports;
- Evaluation reports (mid-term and final);
- All other documentation related to the implementation of programmes;
- The websites of programmes and ECDs

## 2.4. Key notions adopted by the research

### 2.4.1. *The notion of NSA and Civil Society*

In a general sense, the Cotonou Agreement defines non state actors as a large range of development actors outside government circles, in which the private sector, economic and social partners (as well as trade unions) and civil society in all of its forms are included, according to the characteristics of each country.

In essence, the definition of non state actors or civil society is a question that runs the risk of being too complicated if this definition has to have an unequivocal, universal character. As affirmed by the Cotonou Agreement, each of the ACP countries can themselves define, according to their own contexts, which are the collective actors belonging to civil society or, more in general, which enter into the category of non state actors.

It is this that a great disparity appears in the ACP countries. While the trade unions in Guinea, for example, are considered as a part of civil society, in the majority of ACP states they belong to the social and economical partners grouping. By the same token, faith-based organisations in DRC and Zambia are considered to be among the most active actors, while in Niger, for example, these organisations are not at all considered as civil society actors and, as a consequence, are not eligible for community funding. Again, the Unions in Guinea are considered as a civil society actor, while in DRC they are seen as economic and social partners.

The question of the composition of non state actor families is, in any case, not a theoretical exercise, but an extremely practical and operational one, as it on the basis of these definitions of NSAs and CSO that the eligibility criteria for community financing are formed in each country.

Bearing in mind the restrictions linked to the great variability in terms of the notion of NSAs and civil society in each ACP country, it is fundamental that a single notion based on elements and characteristics that transcend each individual context is established. This notion must take a dual necessity into account; on the one hand the inclusive capacity of the notion of NSAs and Civil Society in order to avoid excluding key actors from the development process and, on the other, the selective capacity of the notion itself.

As regards **inclusion**, the concept must bear in mind the plurality, in terms of multiplicity and heterogeneity, of organisational structures unique to non state actors and, more importantly, civil society, where associations, often informal, at a grass roots level, have the same social and political legitimacy as platforms, networks and NGOs (women, development, human rights etc.) placed at an intermediary level which should not include a superior level in a hierarchy that shouldn't exist.

Nonetheless, the concepts of non state actors and civil society must, equally, have a **selective capacity**. In effect, if, on the one hand, the concept must include all collective actors working

in the field of social, economical and cultural development of any given country, then, on the other, one must be able to operate an objective selection process to the detriment of all those who, within the same society, work solely for a particular goal.

This second selective nature of the concept allows for a distinction to be made between the different collective actors focused on social responsibility and the entities which, without any real associative assize, are just the manifestation of the actions of several individuals, often motivated by their own interests.

While the actions of individuals are entirely legitimate in the social and political domain, they have no real relation to collective actions and, for all that, cannot be considered in a context where non state actors are borne in mind the key issues in the case of social and economical development.

According to this approach, non state actors and, in particular, civil society, are made up of the entirety of actors active on a local, regional or national level and who are the bearers of a **focus on social responsibility**, that is to say that they express an intention and operate in favour of social and economical development in their own territory in the interest of the collective, often through the creation of public good or services of public interest.

When it comes to the nature of actors, it is important to remember that, at the heart of civil society, there are, equally, forces other than collective actors at work. These include social actors who are more undetermined and, despite the fact that they are the holders of a high degree of subjectivity and innovation in the sense of public and social change, do not have the necessary stable organisational structure. This category often includes women, youth, peasant movements and union movements, etc.

These social actors, therefore, by virtue of their propulsive force, working in a transversal way through society, represents the fertile ground for the birth of collective actors who, with a strong institutional and organisational capacity, can solidify and implement the aspirations and changes in society according to a self development and governance perspective, often on a local level.

#### *2.4.2. The notion of capacity building*

Capacity building has become a recurring theme, even a “buzz word” in institutional literature and the agenda of the leading public administrations, international agencies and nongovernmental organisations. In effect, one can note a revitalised presence of terms such as capacity development, institutional modernisation or good governance in the different policy or strategy documents of these organisations, as much as in their progressive integration into the list of objectives of a plethora of cooperation programmes and projects. Still, regardless of its rising importance from the point of view of dialogue and organisational practice, it **does not, at this point in time exist a single and unequivocal definition of the concept of “capacity building”**.

Originally, the concept was associated, notably within the multilateral organisations of the World Bank, to the macroeconomic stability goals and sustainable growth objectives in the countries undergoing development. Today, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), defines capacity building in terms of the creation of an appropriate model of society for the pursuit and/or achievement of human development objectives, summed up in the Millennium Declaration.

In a stricter “institutional” sense, capacity building refers to the process of ameliorating the skills of individuals and the institutional support of one or several organisation<sup>3</sup>. This definition may be enhanced by two key concepts<sup>4</sup> :

- On the one hand, the **notion of mission**: capacity building must contribute to aiding the organisation fulfil its mandate
- On the other hand, the **notion of the greater good**: capacity building must aim to optimise the living conditions of the commune and its populace, that which forms the keystone of social movements.

In the framework of the present study, and in respect of the Cotonou Agreements, the adopted notion of capacity building is the following: “**Contributing to the facilitation of the consolidation, in unison with the actors, of their capacities on an individual, organisational and sectoral level to allow them to evolve and adapt themselves to the new demands of the context in order to play their part in the structure of a partnership**”.

This capacity building notion implies a certain number of considerations:

- There must, above all, **be a core of skills** that can be reinforced;
- Capacity building must be done through **direct participation** (on all levels) with the persons and organisations involved;
- The concept of **means**, capacity building must not be considered an end in itself;
- The idea of **processes**: capacity building needs sufficient time to have an impact;
- Its **multidimensional** nature: capacity building can, and should by preference, **be applied to four different levels** from a holistic viewpoint: the institutional level, the organisational level, the relational/sectoral level and the institutional level;
- Capacity building focuses on the attainment of a **concrete objective**, even a contribution to the changing of attitudes within the concerned organisations and individuals. In this sense, the capacity building programmes must integrate monitoring and evaluation systems into their results;
- The importance of the **environment**, in a first instance as a conditional factor (positive or negative) on the capacity building possibilities and, in a second, as an element that one can hope to transform;
- Finally, adaptation to the **local context** and the essential need for **flexibility and the ability to adapt**: there are no “magic formulas”, nor a single formula for capacity building. The different approaches that exist are based on a plethora of strategies, methodologies and resources focused as much on changing mentalities as to the development of certain key technical skills and the transmission of knowledge and skills.

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<sup>3</sup> Clark, John: Democratizing Development: The Role of Voluntary Organizations. West Hartford, CN: Kumarian Press; 1991.

<sup>4</sup> McPhee y Bare dans De Vita & Fleming: Building capacity in non-profit organizations. The Urban Institute; 2001.

## **Part B. The results of the study**

## 1. DEFINITIONS AND TYPES OF NSA

Aside from the terminological questions concerning the definitions of non state actors and civil society, one of the main problems for the NSA support programmes under the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF was that of how to choose the family of actors to support. In reality this question presents a great difficulty in the sense that numerous types of actors from many different families enter into the category of “non state actors”.

As of its identification, an NSA support programme must face up to the question of the characteristics and the added value that each family of non state actors brings to the objectives of the programme and, more generally, the implementation of the community strategy of the country. The following paragraphs try and provide some initial response on the methodological and operational plan on the basis of the experiences garnered under the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF.


### 1.1. The private sector/civil society dialectic

On the grand scheme of things, it is useful to make a **preliminary distinction** between the different components of NSAs. In reality, it is not about asking oneself on what NSAs are, a subject already discussed ad infinitum, but to **hone the methodologies** for comprehension of their modus operandi and, above all, their differences.

In essence the notion of NSA is quite large and the entity is composed of **several families** of actors which are by no means homogenous and which have vocations that, however complementary, are entirely different. The importance of this difference has uniquely useful application. Indeed, at the level of National Indicative Programmes, much mention is made to the notion of NSAs when, in reality, it is civil society that is considered, in the majority of projects, to be the beneficiary of the support and capacity building programmes.

This can bring problems, especially as regards to the **expectations** of different actors, as can be observed in a few countries where the representatives of patrons and, on the whole, the private sector, has posed a plethora of problems regarding their **exclusion** in terms of certain NSA support programmes. On the other hand, the attempts to create platforms representative of all of the families of NSAs, in some cases, unfortunately under the direct initiative and support of the Delegations, failed due to divergent vocations and interests, as is the case with patron and trade unions.

In addition, the panorama offered by the 40 programmes analysed shows how a significant percent, 20%, of these programmes explicitly address themselves as well to civil society as to the private sector, as demonstrated below.



Apart from one or two, that is to say “limited”, experiences, the nature and logic of the support to the private sector and civil society are not really **compatible** within such a capacity building programme if they are approached in this way. If, for example, the aspect of democratic or associative life, or even that of action in favour of the poor is one of the fundamental criteria even at the level of eligibility for CSOs, these aspects do not bear much relevance for the private sector.

While the private sector is **of critical importance** to the goals of sustainable development, an importance evidenced and underlined at the level of the new elaborations in terms of EU development policy and at the level of the new Community strategy for the African continent, its role is purely linked to the economic sphere and much less to that of social development and the democratisation process underway in the majority of ACP states, notably sub-Saharan Africa.

## 1.2. The principle of differentiated analyses

It is becoming increasingly usual to identify NSAs as NGOs, especially development NGOs. Indeed, while their importance may be fundamental in a large number of countries as regards the goals of the democratisation, legitimisation and multiparty process, there is a risk that other collectives of actors on the same level as the non profit private sector or the associative grass roots movements will be forgotten. As regards the latter, it often appears with no formal structure or official recognition on the part of the State, despite their vital role in terms of identifying **efficient solution for sustainable development and local governance**.

By contrast, the reality of umbrella organisations, which often have a **role that cannot be ignored** in the lobbying activities *vis a vis* the State and, above all, in terms of the elaboration of sector policy, cannot afford to be omitted.

This typology, suggested equally by the “Users Manual for NSAs<sup>5</sup>” promoted by the ACP Secretariat, allows, among others, the avoidance of all confusion as to the role and positioning of each actor within civil society, the aim being to avoid competition between actors unable to share the same starting point. **The values, mission, technical skills, functioning, and**

<sup>5</sup> ECDPM and ACP Secretariat, Cotonou Agreement – User Manual for Non State Actors, Brussels, February 2004 (page 32: “Definition of non state actors” and page 101: Information flow between non state actors”.




**leadership of a grassroots organisation** cannot be compared with that of a higher-level umbrella organisation, even if they are of the same area or field.

The typology is founded on **four levels of analysis** (or structure) which are presented in the following diagram. In this diagram each of the four arrows in the left hand column represents one of the four structural levels of NSAs, which are (from top to bottom): Fourth-tier organisations made of platforms and consultations forums; third-tier organisations made of umbrella organisations such as networks, federations and coordination bodies; second-tier organisations made up of formally constituted actors with an advanced structural level and finally, grass-roots organisations.

As regards the small black arrows, these represent the **communication flows** and the **horizontal and vertical relations** between organisations.

Figure 2 : Differentiated actor analysis



Source : Maurizio Floridi and Beatriz Sanz Corella

As regards the four levels of analysis of NSAs, the **first level** is made up of *grassroots organisations*, cooperatives, socio-economic organisations, farmers' unions, women's and youth groups, faith-based organisations, clubs, radio programme audience groups, cultural and sports groups, community interest groups, etc. These are created in rural and urban areas by groups of people who get together in order to suggest joint solutions to problems of the immediate local context, defend their rights or improve their living conditions and access to basic public services (health, education, etc.). These organisations, of limited geographical and thematic scope, are often largely informal and financed by their members' contributions (membership based organisations).

The **second level** is made up of formally constituted actors with an advanced structural level, oriented towards social responsibility, that work for the benefit of the population and of its accompanying organisational forms on the first level. Development NGOs, non-profit organisations that accompany development dynamics, human rights organisations, union organisations, religious entities, etc., belong to this typology.

Of course, this category contains very varied entities in terms of size or degree of establishment in the territory. One can find development NGOs that act locally or a large national organisation such as a union. However, beyond the size or reach at the local, national, provincial or regional levels, the same principles govern these organisations, which usually operate in a similar way. For example, a large number of actors on this level receive external funds in order to carry out specific or one-off actions within the framework of programmes and development projects.

The **third level** is made up of "umbrella" organisations — basically, coordinated groups, federations and networks — consisting of a group of organisations that decide to get together and collaborate along a thematic and/or geographic rationale. The organisation arising out of this collaboration is usually conceived of as a forum for exchange, communication and consultation between the member organisations, as well as a tool for offering services to the member organisations in areas such as capacity building, external projection, defence of collective interests, etc.

**Platforms and consultation forums:** designed as consultation forums, platforms constitute real "groupings of umbrella organisations" (that is, composed of networks, coordinated groups, collectives, etc.) that are often characterised by their degree of flexibility and permeability. They are created in order to take a common stance with respect to common external problems, public authorities, donor policies, etc.

This typology of NSA enables an understanding, from the mapping exercise, as it will be further analysed in the chapter on identification of capacity building programmes and mapping exercises, **the positioning of the various organisations**, as well as the problems linked to each level and **the solutions to be recommended** in the framework of a support and capacity building programme.

### 1.3. The question of differing vocations and the differentiation between actors

While the experiences gained in several countries have, until now, revealed important convergence points for all NSAs, 9<sup>th</sup> EDF programmes have always brought about a need **for differentiation in terms of their particularities**.

The differentiation strategy must take **three aspects** into account: differentiation by family of actors, differentiation by organisational level of NSAs and the differentiation as regards the spheres of capacity building.

### *1.3.1. Differentiation of families of actors*

The analysis of the 40 NSA support programmes has shown that, beyond the common aspects, especially in terms of the stakes, it would be useful to take certain particularities into account. In effect, **each family can provide a specific contribution** to the process of sustainable development.

In terms of the membership of the **types of actors** to the three NSA families, **significant differences** can be found on a **national basis**. In general, membership of civil society consists of the associations and organisations linked to religious movements, sporting group, cultural associations and the media. Trade unions, orders and professional or socio-professional associations, research centres and, in some countries, universities are part of social and economic partners.

This general tendency must, of course, be **nuanced**: in Guinea Conakry, for example, the syndicates and professional orders are considered to belong to the family of civil society and in Niger, to point out another example, religious movements - thanks to a questionable choice of the ECD, which goes against the practice of most member States in the country, for example the Danish Cooperation - are not at all considered as NSAs. Finally, in some countries chambers of commerce and agriculture are considered as actors belonging to civil society, while in others actors are considered a Para State reality.

It is the same for local authorities, for which ambiguity as to their positioning is reinforced by the presence of **thematic financial lines** that address NSAs and local authorities<sup>6</sup> at the same time, or through a trend, no doubt positive, of supporting partnering (according to the multi actor approach) between NSAs and local authorities in the decentralisation support programmes.

It is important to note that this discussion is not a theoretical exercise or abstract from development sociology. Quite the opposite, the question acquires a very concrete sense that the membership of an actor to one or other family can determine its **eligibility in terms of access to resources** under the programme. The question also concerns the programmes focusing solely on the civil society family, seeing as in a few states some relatively varied and different actors are entered into this category.

Although the objectives of the three NSAs families are **similar**, each family can bring, on the basis of its own specialisation, its skills and experiences to efforts that the ACP states are in the process of deploying so as to attain sustainable development through good governance and control by the citizens.

In this sense, the contribution of the **civil society** family is priceless in terms of the experience in development policy that it brings, as well as the consideration of marginalised groups, whereas the **employers** (or private sector) can offer their experience and expertise in terms of the vision of economic dynamism focusing on the increase of wealth, as well as the resources for diversification and the valorisation of economic activities. When it comes to **trade unions**, their contribution is fundamental not only for as a vehicle for the notion of citizenship which surpasses the logic of demand but also for mobilising the informal sector.

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<sup>6</sup> The reference made is to the thematic line "Non state actors and local authorities".

So that each family of actors can contribute to its full potential, it is important to implant the condition that each actor **plays its role in respect of its specific vocation and its respective technical skills.**

### 1.3.2. *The differentiation by organisational level*

If the vocations and characteristics of the 4 organisational levels of NSAs differ considerably, the analysis and intervention strategies of support must therefore take into account the **role that each level plays and can more actively play** in the development of countries.

In effect, if the **grassroots organisations** of the 1<sup>st</sup> level can guarantee **social mobilisation and territorial ownership**, **2<sup>nd</sup> level organisations** (with their strong points, especially on the level of civil society) can place their **skills and capabilities** at the disposal of the development efforts.

When it comes to **umbrella organisations of the 3<sup>rd</sup> level**, they can facilitate access to the resources of their members, information and, above all, the capitalisation of experiences. This level is equally important in the assurance of **a national vision regarding the problems of governance and development**, as well as the actions of lobbying as much on the level of policy as in regards to the operational conditions of their member organisations.

Finally, the **umbrella organisations of the 4<sup>th</sup> level** have a primordial role not only in terms of **political dialogue on national development strategies**, but also on the level of **coordination between the different families of NSAs.**

Each structural level, therefore, thanks to its specific role and strategic positioning, can bring its **own contribution** to the efforts of a country when it comes to good governance and the fight against poverty.

The **differentiation strategy therefore proves useful and necessary to ensure that each level is reinforced in the exertion of its role and prerogatives at the service of the collective interest and the development of a country.**

By contrast it is important to recognise the major differences for all that concerns the organisation of each NSA family according to the level of organisation, as shown in the table below.


*Table 1 : NSA families and levels of organisation*

	CIVIL SOCIETY	EMPLOYERS / PRIVATE SECTOR	TRADE UNIONS / ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PARTNERS
	NSA Platforms		
<b>4th Level</b>	Coalitions, collectives		Inter-trade unions
<b>3rd Level</b>	Networks, federations, unions, etc	Umbrella organisations	Trade Unions
<b>2<sup>nd</sup> Level</b>	NGOs, associations	Employers Organisations	Workers organisations
<b>1st Level</b>	Grassroots organisations		Workers grassroots organisation

As one can see, it is often impossible to distinguish on the first level between the civil society family and that of the employers or private sector. It is rare still to find organisations of the fourth level in the private sector.

### 1.3.3. The differentiation by level of capacity building

The capacity building of NSAs cannot be done without **making a distinction and a clear analysis of the beneficiaries**, while often the analysis of the 40 programmes highlighted a tendency to consider NSAs as **a single bloc**. The following graph shows the categories of beneficiaries to which the 40 programmes were aimed.



The capacity building actions must be **individualised** in terms of the needs of the beneficiary organisation. In order to achieve this, it is fundamental to know the level of intervention: the actions concerning the level of the organisation differ in fundamental ways from those that concern the sectoral level.

In other words, what is required is a conception of NSA capacity building in terms of facilitating **support and accompaniment to** enable endogenous processes of association. This understanding of Capacity Building should underpin the needs' identification phase as much as the implementation of capacity building actions. In terms of the first, it is vital to remember that the capacity building needs perceived by an organisation can differ considerably from the real needs. Only an activity that guides the actor through this delicate phase can, therefore, guarantee an efficient analysis and a correct targeting of the actions to be taken.

When it comes to the second aspect, it is about guaranteeing the institutional support of actors through the development process of their capacity starting with a **clear distinct between the individual level, the organisational level or the institutional level**, as analysed in chapter 2.4.1. on the composition of programmes and the approaches and tools deployed for capacity building.

The importance of a **differentiation strategy concerns objectives as much as needs**. An organisation can have need solely of reinforcement on certain limited technical skills for which specific reinforcement methods must be adopted or better yet a global intervention for example through a strategic planning exercise that involves the verification of the mission on the part of the organisation itself.

#### 1.4. The question of grassroots organisations and emerging actors

Support to NSAs poses a certain number of problems **in the scheme of efficiency and the impact of the action as much as in adherence to EDF procedures**. These two elements present several paradoxical aspects in the sense that the organisations that, in principle, provide the most guarantees on the level of adherence to the regulations and procedures are not always those that ensure viable results in the mid-long term.

In effect, the resources placed at the disposition of NSAs by the donor organisations (this applies particularly to the European Union of which the intervention instruments, notably the EDF, are quite heavy on the procedural side) **prioritise** the more structured levels of organisations to the **detriment** of the other actors and, in particular, grassroots organisations (1<sup>st</sup> level organisations).

Yet it is they that are often the more active forces of society, especially on the local level, where the majority of collective actors engaged do not have the formal structures nor are they officially recognised. It is on this level, in effect, where the **great changes** take place, in terms of social and economic developments, as well as in terms of the promotion of free public political expression, the promotion of human rights, the promotion of the right to security, the promotion of the right to education and health, in the management and prevention of conflicts, the fight against impunity and corruption, in the promotion of the rights of workers and manufacturers.

On top of this is a consideration of the **tendency** of “traditional” actors of civil society, NGOs and development associations. While they may have had an essential role over the last two decades in the management of environmental crises (the great droughts of the 80s and the local food crises); the social crises (the prevention of conflicts and poverty); and political crises (the democratisation process, multipartite systems and the respect of human rights), these organisations still only represent a very limited part of the associative and collective movement which is present in the societies of ACP states.

A project or programme which aims to support NSAs cannot ignore the existence of new actors who, **by channelling social energy** at its base, are always more focused on action according to a profound consciousness as regards their social responsibility all while identifying efficient and innovative solutions to the question of sustainable development.

These new grassroots actors (women, youth, traditional and religious leaders, retired businessmen, teachers, churches as well as thematic networks at local and regional levels), that the world of NGOs and development associations, as well as the State and donor community, have a tendency to consider as subject to “educate” and “train”, are the bearers of **great social and technical innovation** in the field of economic and social development.

Of course it is necessary to have the courage to **recognise**, as was foreseen in the Cotonou Agreement, on the **juridical and political level**, NSAs which often escape the traditional modes

of association, as is in fact happening on a few programmes (for example Niger and DRC). In sub-Saharan Africa there is, in effect, a new generation of NSAs spawned by the structural adjustment of democratisation that often reject the internal etiquettes, as much as the internal operating rules, and yet are not less efficient in their social action.

In general, the priority of these emerging actors is not to endow themselves with a statute or to be officially recognised to obtain the funds of international donor organisations, but to find the most **efficient solutions** to **eliminate the constraints that hinder development** in their territory such as the degradation of the environment, poverty, exclusion of women from social society, the prevention of conflicts, religious intolerance, the violation of human rights, security, youth unemployment, access to land and the basic needs regarding health and education.

As for the difference of “traditional” NSAs, above all NGOs and development associations as well as umbrella organisations concentrated in the capital cities, which often have the habit of accepting “the rules of the game” set by donor organisations, the role of emerging actors in our eyes is often **unequal and anti-democratic**. For these actors a community organisation based on a hierarchy, competition, egalitarianism and the mastery of one sole activity is not necessary a condition of success, as certain capacity building programmes often lead one to believe, through the adoption of an ideological approach and a messianic logic, neither of which are pertinent or efficient.

Focusing on these emerging actors requires a reconnaissance of who they are and what they do. To ensure they are **eligible** within the framework of a capacity building programme, they are either adapted to the rules and procedures by significantly changing them, or even distorting them, or the rules and procedures are adapted to their identities and their characteristics. In this sense, every capacity building programme which aims to “structure” them or help them “evolve” towards mature associative forms is doomed to **fail**.

On the concrete project or programme implementation plan for support to NSAs, it is necessary that the **eligibility criteria** for access to funds allow these emerging actors to reach them and that the type of implementable actions are not restricted, but are as **large as possible**. In other words, it is necessary that the support programme or project is **based on the demand** of these grassroots actors **and not the supply of capacity building formulas**.

### 1.5. Towards a new approach to NSAs

This approach must be based firstly on the **three families of NSAs**, which are civil society, employers or the private sector and trade unions. Indeed, all diagnostics, actions and analyses need to bear in mind the different missions and vocations that are at the foundation of these three families of actors.

If it is evident that the totality of NSAs have a fundamental role to play in **good governance** and the sustainable development of the country, as previously recognised by the Cotonou Agreement, it is always necessary that each family of actors can play the role that it is suited to in the public arena according to its characteristics and, above all, bring its own added value.

This differentiation by family of actors cannot suffice. In effect, within the same family, there needs to be a distinction between the **different levels of organisation**. A grassroots organisation does not function the same way as an umbrella organisation, nor with the same

mission. In addition to this the contributions that each level of structure can provide for good governance, the control of citizens and the fight against poverty differ in a fundamental way in relation to the technical skills, methods and positioning of each type of organisation.

In other words, this new approach replies to the need of differentiation as the analysis and inclusion of NSAs in the public arena of each country is taken into account. This necessity is even more important if one takes into consideration the policies and strategies of NSA support and **capacity building**.

Indeed, a large employers umbrella organisation, which could include several times the personnel of the civil services considering member organisations and the total turnover of affiliated companies, which could come close to or surpass the national budget, has the capacity for an impact on public policy that is completely different compared to a small development association that operates on a local scale in a department or rural community. The two organisations have a **common vocation** to put their know-how and tools at the service of the community to contribute to the country's development, but it is evident that their missions and their capacities are completely **different**.

This reflexion is of fundamental strategic importance when it comes to capacity building. Indeed, if the inclusion of NSAs and, in particular CSOs, in the EU strategies and programmes can be traced back to the Lomé Convention, which recognised (through decentralised cooperation, the micro-realisation programmes of the 6<sup>th</sup> EDF and the old budget lines, since then thematic programmes) a significant **added value** in these actors in terms of the execution of certain tasks (awareness raising, animation, training, etc equally within the framework of the realisation of large socio-economic infrastructures), the Cotonou Agreement opens large perspectives for NSAs not only as service contractors but also as **actors of dialogue and development** by the same token as governmental actors.

This new juridical and political role of NSAs is accompanied by a **renaissance** in the importance of capacity building which needs to allow these actors to better play this part as actors on the whole. Yet each family of actors and each structural level within the same family must be able to profit from opportunities which are offered by the Cotonou Agreement as much in the specific role plan in social and political dialogue as in the allocation of resources.

It is thus on the basis of these reflexions that it is important to identify an approach that it is both theoretical and methodological and allows all of the families and types of actors **to benefit from the opportunities offered by new orientation** in terms of the development policies and protocols of EU-ACP partnerships.

This approach should, therefore, be taken in terms of reconciling the needs on the one hand of assembling NSAs as legitimate actors and gifted with intentions regarding the themes **of good governance and equitable and sustainable development** and, on the other, to avoid neglecting families or types of actors that are less familiar with the procedures of Community intervention and, in particular, those of the EDF.

It is evident, as in the experience currently underway in several countries (notably in Senegal, as well as DRC, Gabon, etc.) in the framework of the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF showed, that certain families of actors, trade unions as well as employers, not used to projects' formulation that require limited support without achieving mastery of EDF procedures, run the risk of being **discriminated against** by the competition of other civil society actors, such as NGOs, which have a long tradition and in-depth technical knowledge in terms of the presentation and formulation of projects.



By contrast, it is important to note that this tendency may be **replicated** within the same family of actors. Indeed, the experiences mentioned and the numerous testimonies gathered on the ground by the team to this effect have evidenced that the competition between organisations belonging to the second level of the civil society family (NGOs and intermediary associations) and organisations of the first level (grass roots organisations) risks to be detrimental to the latter, doubtless less equipped in terms of the formulation of projects and, above all, with the completely different capacity building needs in relation to other actors in their same family.


The present approach therefore proposes a process that takes into account this **double necessity**: on the one hand the need to recognise the totality of NSAs as actors bearing positions and points of view that need to integrate themselves into those of the governmental decision makers and, on the other hand, to recognise the specifications and differences within the same NSAs of a country.

## 2. THE PURPOSES OF NSA SUPPORT PROGRAMMES AND THEIR STRATEGIC POSITIONING

Every NSA support programme must have a **clear purpose and satisfy a set of guiding principles** to which the programme's strategies, methods and activities, as well as the actors involved, must conform whether at the level of the programme's supposed beneficiaries or of agents of institutions. This is a basic fact, since monitoring and evaluation cannot be carried on without reference to certain parameters, notably that of the programme's relevance.

### 2.1. Analysis of purposes

Analysis of the purposes of the 40 programmes studied, in terms of **thematic contents** of the specific aims pursued, yields the following chart:



As denoted by the graph above, the themes contained within the objectives of the programmes are relatively **general** and, on the whole, refer to aspects linked either solely to the life of organisations (for example the institutional and technical capacity building of NSA) without defining their role (development actors vs. “service delivery” contractors), or themes that could be defined as too vague, even ambitious (for example the contribution to development and the fight against poverty). By contrast, the precise, focused themes, linked as much to questions of national governance (for example the improvement of dialogue with the State and the participation in the process of elaboration and monitoring of public policies) as to questions of local governance, democracy, human rights and dialogue with the State, **remain limited**. This observation remains paradoxical considering the ultimate aim of these programmes, as regards the Cotonou Agreement; to reinforce the capacities of NSA and enable them to participate fully in the restructuring of governance, as much on a national level as on a local level, implicating a real **institutional, political and social transformation process**.

If certain programmes under the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF focused on themes linked to capacity building in itself and/or were conceived in an overly general manner, taking development and the fight against poverty as a final goal, those in the framework of the 10<sup>th</sup> EDF cannot **neglect the new**

**contexts characterised by profound changes in the concept and management of public space and affairs.**

In effect, significant institutional and political changes are already taking place in most of the ACP countries. These changes, on a national and, more importantly, on a local level, starting with processes such as the political and administrative decentralisation, have opened new perspectives in terms of governance and, more generally, new relationships between the State and its citizens.

The following table briefly exemplifies some of these changes on a national and local level, as well as their implications for NSA.

*Table 2: Institutional and political changes taking place on a national and local level and major implications for NSA*

The governance challenges for civil society on a local level: the changes brought about by the decentralisation <sup>7</sup>	The governance challenges for civil society on a national level: The changes brought about by the new agenda of donors and sector wide approaches <sup>8</sup>
<p>Decentralisation and democratisation reforms cannot succeed without the active participation of NSA, which are essential to assure the promotion of a better harmonisation with populations while prioritising best practices. Nonetheless, the participation of NSA will be ineffective unless it inspires and promotes a change of mentality and approach in the management of public affairs, conceived through meetings and public dialogue, necessitating:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The participation of different actors in the management of public affairs via the new rules and modus operandi pertaining to communal democracy (following a voter – elected logic which is, above, political).</li> <li>▪ The different actors tackle the construction and, ultimately, the management of a new public affairs identity, delimited by the new system, where each actor is called upon to play its role, which includes a redefinition exercise regarding economical, social and cultural relations.</li> </ul> <p>Within this setting the onus falls to NSA, in their role of support and mentoring, to surpass the purely administrative logic and systems to be an active actor and fill the local development plans with relevant content, in line with social responsibility and the collective interest, as well as within the logic of governance. In effect, local administration alone cannot fulfil this role; partners, as well as civil society and the</p>	<p>Current aid strategies are based on the premise that donors need to support the development of nationally owned policies rather than impose externally defined policies on recipient governments. At the same time, donors, including the EC, are focused on being more strategic and focused on results. The MDGs articulate results which require the development of national policies for their achievement, and most major donors have signed up to supporting countries in their pursuit of these goals. The harmonisation process is related to this approach, whereby donors elect to harmonise processes and, where possible, align with country policies and procedures.</p> <p>This change of emphasis, focusing on <b>the importance of local development and ownership of policies</b>, has led to a change in expectations about the role that can be played by civil society. Civil society is now seen to have an important role in helping build country ownership of policies (by being engaged in discussions and dialogue about those policies), and also an important role in holding governments to account – in ensuring that policy commitments are met. This is in addition to the more traditional roles that many civil society groups play in the implementation of policies (service delivery activities).</p> <p>These new roles, as evinced in the report of McGee &amp; Norton<sup>9</sup> on the experience of civil society participation in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Document (PRSD) process, are:</p>

<sup>7</sup> Further information on the role of civil society in the decentralisation process can be found in the document “Support to decentralisation and local governance in third countries” Collection Tools and Methods, Reference Document n°2, European Commission, January 2007 (pages 33-35).

<sup>8</sup> “The participation of NSAs in poverty reduction strategies, sector approaches and monitoring of policy implementation”. Draft January 2009. AIDCO/E/4. European Commission.

<sup>9</sup> “Participation in poverty reduction strategies: a synthesis of experience with participatory approaches to policy design, implementation and monitoring”. IDS Working paper n. 109 (2008)

<p>local private sector will be necessary.</p> <p>In order to achieve this, civil society organisations will have to promote social and political dialogue with all of the other actors (administrative and private sector) in exercising their rights and duties; the basis of the notion of citizenship.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Representation of the interests of specific groups in relation to government and other sectors of society;</li> <li>• Mobilisation of social actors to increase their consciousness and impact;</li> <li>• Regulation and monitoring of state performance and the behaviour and actions of public officials;</li> <li>• Developmental or social action (service delivery) to improve the well being of their own or other constituencies</li> </ul>
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All NSA support programmes and, in particular, those in support of CSOs, will, therefore, need to confront **the question of the relevance of their strategic positioning regarding new stakes and challenges posed by governance in all of its dimensions**. In other words, the civil NSA building programmes conceived within the framework of the 10<sup>th</sup> EDF programme, in the era of the Cotonou Agreement, must have a link to a basic element of the new cooperation agreement: the **political dimension**. This means that a NSA capacity building and support programme cannot limit itself to the individual actors, but should rather focus on reinforcing the existing links between the actors themselves and, above all, between the actors, their context and the institutional partners (notably the State in all of its guises).

Programmes’ goals, objectives, strategies and methodologies must, to this effect, be oriented to promote an optimised anchoring of NSA to their context of reference. This must be ensured through the relevance of the supported activities, which cannot be conceived independently from the precise social and political issues characterising the country and for which NSA contribution, and civil society participation in particular, will be essential especially as regards the deployment of governance best practices.

## 2.2. Analysis of guiding principles of 9th EDF programmes and orientations for the 10th EDF

In terms of the main principles, experience shows how an NSA support programme must respect a number of principles to remain coherent in terms of its vocation to support an **institutional, political and societal transformation process**, namely:

### 2.2.1. The strategic positioning of a programme

The first main principle concerns the need for each programme, as described above, to have its **own strategic positioning in a precise context which reflects the social, institutional, economic, cultural and political reality of the country in which the programme is implemented**. This positioning clearly concerns not only the national context, but also the civil society context and, more generally, that of NSA, which is defined by the stakes identified, by the dynamics in place and by the principles of the Country Strategy Paper (CSP) and the

National Indicative Programme (NIP), which are the foundations of Community intervention, with the latter reflecting the indications and priorities of the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS).

In other words, an NSA support programme **may not, in any case, be “neutral”** as regards the context in which it is intervening and, more importantly, in the context of civil society. In this sense, the “neutrality” of the programme is neither an asset nor an indicator of impartiality but a mistake to the extent that this neutrality impedes the programme in placing itself in a clear and distinct manner.

A programme must, therefore, research its position for **three basic reasons**.

- The first reason is that **each NSA support programme must take its inspiration from the major principles that constitute the basis of the EU’s development policy**. Supporting NSA for the sole reason that they require assistance runs the risk of representing not only a tautology, but also resulting in inefficiency if this support is not in relation to the end goals of NSA interventions. In other words, programmes must **devote themselves to reinforcing NSA not from a generic stance but by formulating the support in line with the spirit of the Cotonou Agreement**, therefore allowing NSA to soundly fulfil their role in terms of the development of their country and, in particular, in the management of public affairs on a variety of levels: national, regional and local.

This must be done in harmony with the need to take into account the often neglected aspects in NSA support programmes: the **cross cutting issues**. In reality, these cross cutting issues (gender, human rights, environment etc.), which are strongly linked to the overarching principles at the foundation of the EU’s development policy, are often briefly mentioned in the preparatory documents and, subsequently, disappear in the implementation phase. It is interesting to note to this effect that the in depth analysis of the 16 NSA support programmes has shown that the **cross cutting issues were only taken into account properly on 3 programmes** (Nigeria, Burkina Faso and Ethiopia) **while a further 2 paid a token tribute to them** (Mauritania and Botswana); **the other 11 programmes, in general, neglected these cross cutting issues**.

- The second reason is that, apart from the major principles influencing EU development policy, the positioning of NSA support programmes must face up to the **political choices made by the EU strategy in the CSP**. It is not only a question of coherence or harmonisation with the Community strategy, but rather a shared vision of the end goals and mid to long term strategies promoted by the EU cooperation in a given country. This requires the programme, often for the sake of its neutrality, **that it is not a detached reality, autonomous as regards the CSP but rather, thanks to its precise positioning, an integral part of the broader strategy**.
- The third reason why this positioning is essential is that the **mission of a programme is to support NSA in the context of their role and, above all, in terms of the stakes at hand**. In other words, a NSA support programme cannot be generic, but must be targeted and selective, and must, first and foremost, tackle the question of what is at stake. In this sense, the relevant criteria, be it for the activities of the programme or regarding the choice of actions and aid to actors, is of fundamental importance.

By contrast, the effects of neutrality are often the cause of the **transformation** of NSA support programmes into micro-project programmes, or even micro-realizations, targeting only the accomplishment of a certain number of projects across a broad thematic spectrum, sometimes even in the framework of service-delivery and the realisation of basic socioeconomic infrastructures executed (often only partially) by NSA and financed according to a “convenience store” mentality.

### *2.2.2. The inevitable disruption of social dynamics and fictitious neutrality*

These reflections upon the necessity of strategically positioning NSA support programmes bring us to a seldom made objection, one which happens to be the refuge of neutrality's partisans: with its clear positioning the programme will, in and of itself, be **an active factor in the disruption of social dynamics**. As such, it is important to highlight the fact that social dynamics in general and, more specifically in terms of NSA, is disrupted by the simple fact that an NSA support programme exists.

In reality, this disruption is **already coming to fruition** well before a programme is launched. In many cases, it has led to a veritable flourishing of NSA and, in particular, CSOs (as in Niger, Mali, Chad and the DRC), or to a profound reorganisation of the networks, simply through the announcement of an identification mission for an NSA support mission. However, if we push the analysis a little deeper, it is possible to see that the most important changes in a country occur during the discussion regarding the **CSPs** which are, by nature, the precursor of the future programme strategic positioning.

In effect, this change process at the heart of the NSA networking is a product of the CSP discussions, in the sense that the initial analyses determine the distribution of resources, and formulate the NIP. In a fair few countries the simple choice of decision makers to support NSA can **favourise or accelerate the internal dynamics** through the creation of new structures, especially as regards associative organisations. This is the case of the NSA platform for the monitoring of the Cotonou Agreement in Senegal, the Chad NSA Organisation (OANET), the Cotonou Task Force in Ethiopia, the NSA-Task Force Group in Tanzania and the Non State Actors Forum (NSAF) in Zimbabwe.

It is thus possible to state that **disruption is inevitable** and that it follows a course strictly limited to the stages that characterise the implementation of an EU cooperation system. The latter, **which is never neutral**, obliges all NSA support programmes to place themselves strategically within the context of government policies and the Technical and Financial Partners (TFP), as much as the respective dynamics of NSA.

### *2.2.3. Plurality and diversity of NSA and the distinction between structuring and networking processes*

In many countries assistance is provided in order to establish platforms and other associative organisations, each one with the aspiration of being the **sole intermediary** between the State and donor organisation, while hoping to represent the entirety of civil society and, even, NSA<sup>10</sup>.

This trend, which NSA support programmes will have to confront, is often linked to the necessity of several figureheads of civil society to gain a more important **political foothold** and, thereby, a more legitimate ground upon which to open negotiations with the State.

If on the one hand this is true of States which, on most occasions, find it hard to acknowledge **the sovereignty of NSA**, then, on the other hand, one cannot forget that fundamental components of the ACP NSA sectors, such as trade unions, people's movements, human rights organisations and women's organisations, may have problems positioning themselves in a

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<sup>10</sup> This phenomenon concerns the large majority of Sub-Saharan Africa.

single structure that runs the risk, at least in terms of formalities, of becoming **a clone of the one party state** present in a fair amount of countries up until the 90s.

By contrast, NSA support programmes must take into account the **distinction between the coordination or networking process and the structuring process**. Too often the latter does not result from the NSA dynamics but represents the will of donors to use a set number of focal points at the heart of the NSA movement or even, as mentioned before, to facilitate the creation of a super structure.

In effect, numerous NSA support programmes set, as part of their objectives, that of **structuring**. Although the process of regrouping NSA has existed for more than a decade, especially in African countries, it must be recalled that the regrouping and networking processes are a response to a coordination logic which functions fundamentally on a thematic and/or geographical basis.

As such, most of the networking experience, such as that of thematic NGO groups and geographical NSA coordination mechanisms, concern actors which have several **points in common and thus share a common agenda**: either they operate in similar thematic spheres, or they are operating in the same geographical area.

As such the NSA support programmes run the risk of poor positioning in the fact that they seek to structure and organise NSA **independently of their own free will and the existing dynamism**. This explains why the attempt of some donor organisations (primarily the UNDP, but the EU as well) to create national representative platforms in each country, promoted as of the year 2001, has utterly failed.

It is important to note how this tendency and desire to structure ACP NSA from the outside began to manifest itself under the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF in the form of **direct grants** (sometimes of significant size), often provided without competition mechanisms and under the pretext of a monopoly that these actors began to take a hand in the national political spectrum (*sensu lato*). In reality, these actors often hold a very limited and partial representation of national NSA and, as a result, their legitimacy of institutional assizes at a governmental level remains questionable.

The NSA support programme of Senegal is relatively **noteworthy** in that, to this effect, it not only significantly financed the “NSA platform for monitoring the Cotonou Agreement” (direct core grant for the operation and structure as well as the execution of activities related to its mission), but also included this organisation in all stages of the programme (Steering and Monitoring Committee, Selection Committee etc.) raising some noteworthy issues regarding conflicts of interest. This grant clearly raised some criticism among Senegalese NSA which, for the most part, do not feel represented by the platform. Similar situations have become apparent in other countries; Chad, Ethiopia and Cape Verde to name but a few.

Unfortunately, despite the experiences of the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF, the use of direct core funding to support national ad-hoc platforms does not appear to have been omitted in a number of programmes under preparation for financing under the 10<sup>th</sup> EDF. Although in some special circumstances this tool may be of great use, it is always important to remain aware of the fact that the utilisation of direct funding may represent a tool at the service of a **misplaced strategic positioning** on the part of the NSA support programme. This, as a result, brings an inevitable **distancing** from all of the NSA which are not represented within these platforms (often the large majority of NSA in any given country) and, in turn, brings the opinion that these platforms are “**made in the EU**”; ergo representing an alien intrusion into their dynamics.

As such, in this case, although the programme will have avoided the danger of being neutral, it will, by contrast, have positioned itself favourably towards an actor with which it may be able to establish privileged relations on the technical and political scheme of things, provoking a sentiment of rejection among the marginalised NSA. Their options are, thus, twofold: boycotting the programme and the opportunities therein (as occurred in Chad, as well as Mali), or adherence to a programme seen as little more than a means to access the resources of the programme as, lamentably, occurred in Senegal.

In reality, a sound position of the NSA support programme on the internal dynamic scheme in relation to the associative movement of a country should abstain from any choice which would create a **monopolistic position** for organisations participating in political dialogue with the government and donor organisations. Instead, such a programme should focus on supporting the dynamics in place, obviously respecting the callings of the actors and the synergy with national development strategies, as well as the Community strategy outlined in the CSP, with the principles of the EU's development policies and, above all, the socio-economic issues at stake which engage the different families of NSA in the specific national contexts.

This can be done through the provision of support to the various and heterogeneous dynamics embedded in NSA **endogenous networking efforts and processes of association**, which characterise the societies themselves within the ACP states, as opposed to the award of direct grants to a unique umbrella actor which will inevitably tend towards a reproduction of the central scheme of the States.

#### *2.2.4. The evolving approach: putting the actor in the centre and understanding the systemic nature of CB*

The NSA support programmes appear to be vast and complex endeavours, as regards their aims, which seek **profound changes across a variety of sectors** as much as in the attitudes, behaviour and even the « *raison d'être* » of NSA; the existing visions for development, aid and the prerogatives of different families of actors; the new roles of NSA (including watchdog roles), far above the sole service delivery of basic services; the promotion of a new mode of public affairs management and the promotion of a responsible and active citizenry, aware of its rights and duties; the creation of new spheres of participation, at a local and national level and learning new ways to elaborate, manage and implement public policies, where the NSA act as much as assist; the representation of specific interest groups as regards the government and other sectors of society; the mobilisation of social actors to heighten the awareness of their impact; etc.

From this complexity follows the need to recognise the specific nature of NSA support programmes as programmes based on **an actor approach and centered around the understanding that capacity building efforts need to be considered from a systems perspective**, rather than the classical project approach, based on the action and following a “convenience store” logic, typified through the example of micro-realizations.

Indeed, the strengthening of NSA, as much individually as collectively (in terms of sector support), cannot succeed without the adoption of a gradually and evolving approach, which requires sufficient time to allow for an impact. This same idea of evolution is at the foundation of the notion of capacity building. True, Capacity Building does not mean working towards a clearly-defined end situation, or following a single standard plan. On the contrary, the main



drive is to facilitate or enable endogenous processes of association among citizens in the South and linking and mobilising support for these processes at the national and international levels.

### 2.2.5. *Opposing forces, inter-actor dialogue and governance*

We are increasingly observing a tendency among certain programmes to consider NSA as a fundamental actor in establishing a counterweight to the State. As it is, this approach is contradictory to the Cotonou Agreement, which overtly states that it is essential to **reconcile responsibility** of national policies as regards development, which legitimately falls to central government, with the need to assure a **better participation** from NSA.

In other words, it is about **recognising the added value** of NSA not in terms of their opposition but in terms of what these actors can provide in the identification of creative and innovative solutions to the problems of sustainable development. This is what is called a **governance course**, based on the participation of all relevant actors, both public and private, in respect of their values and missions, in the development process. From this perspective, participation is not limited to the contribution of beneficiaries, it is an **interactive dialogue and cooperation process**, during which each actor, according to its characterisations and prerogatives, must try to integrate the perceptions of others. The experience shows how dialogue with the respect to the character of each actor can bring positive synergies. By the same token this requires that development is everyone's business, that everyone lives up to their responsibilities, in terms of their abilities, their possibilities and their engagement.

## 3. IDENTIFICATION OF CAPACITY BUILDING PROGRAMMES AND MAPPING EXERCISES

### 3.1. Quantitative analysis of mapping exercises and identification studies

The identification of NSA support programmes holds particular importance due to the fact that it is over the course of this phase that the main choices can be made. These choices are able to **significantly influence** not only the scope and institutional arrangements of the programme but also its implementation modalities. In this phase the mapping exercise represents, without a doubt, a basic element of the NSA support strategy to be assured in the future programme.


From the analysis undertaken by the study, it turns out that 27 of the 40 programmes taken into consideration -that is to say 67,5%- were preceded by a mapping study, whereas 13 of the 40 programmes analysed, 32,5%, did not rely on a mapping exercise. Nonetheless, it is useful to nuance this observation, as certain countries did not benefit from a mapping exercise financed by the EC, by the fact that feasibility studies were undertaken, on the basis either of mapping exercises undertaken by other donors (this is the case, for example, of the Dominican Republic with the identification of PRIL – Programa de Apoyo a Iniciativas Locales based on the heritage left by the Inter American Development Bank (IADB) FOSC<sup>11</sup>) or the evaluations of previous NSA support programmes (as is the case for Vanuatu).

Likewise, it is also useful to highlight the fact that certain programmes, during their implementation phase, undertook mapping exercises, either comprehensive or focused on a number of particular questions, out of a desire to update the results of previous mapping


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<sup>11</sup> Fortalecimiento de las Organizaciones de la Sociedad Civil


studies and/or to promote a greater understanding of the social dynamics, as much on the level of technical assistance of the programme as on the level of NSAs themselves, for a better anchorage of the capacity building strategies.



In terms of the year in which the mapping exercise was undertaken, as the graph below shows, they were, on the whole, undertaken in 2004 and 2005 (14 mappings out of a total 27 analyses, i.e. 52%), coinciding with the inception of a significant number of 0<sup>th</sup> EDF NSA support programmes. Only 29.5% of the mappings were undertaken before or after this period. Unfortunately, in 18.5% of cases, the information on the date of the mapping was unavailable.



In terms of feasibility studies, either undertaken as a second programmed step in the identification phase: sometimes being regarded as an integral part of the mapping (as in the case of Zambia, Mauritania, Papua New Guinea, Uganda or Mali, among others), other being conducted independently, and subsequently to the mapping exercise (for example the case of Niger and Cameroon), of the 40 programmes analysed, 12 countries, or 30% of the total, undertook this exercise, while 28 countries, or 70% of the total programmes analysed, did not, as demonstrated by the graph below.



It is useful to underline the fact that the motivation for undertaking feasibility studies has, sometimes, been guided by the need to surmount the shortfalls, as much on the conceptual side as on the methodological and operational sides, of the mapping exercises undertaken. This is the case, for example, in Cameroon, where in order to overcome the shortcomings noted in the mapping and identification study, a new feasibility study was launched in 2007.

A first conclusion in this respect would, thus, be that the mapping was an important instrument and widely used, and that its use had been that of a pre feasibility study, on occasion even a feasibility study proper, in terms of identification and formulation of NSA support programmes under the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF, with respect to the agreements reached in the Country Strategy Papers.

Nonetheless, as evidenced in the year of realisation for the mappings, it is necessary, for most of the exercises dated (over 50% of the mappings were undertaken in 2004 and 2005), that an update is carried out, either in the framework of an NSA support programme (for those programmes under way); either on the initiative of the European Commission Delegation and the National Authorising Officer as a preliminary step towards the definition of the NSA strategy for the 10<sup>th</sup> EDF. If this update is not undertaken, the NSA support programmes underway, as much as the Delegations, run the risk of adopting approaches that have little bearing on actual dynamics. NSAs change, evolve, develop new *modus operandi* and new structures to respond to new situations and programmes, as much as the EC, must be conscious of these changes in order to continue to engage themselves in a pertinent, efficient and constructive manner.

### 3.2. Qualitative analysis of mapping exercises and identification studies

In terms of the weaknesses of mapping exercises one can note that they are often limited either to a **statistical and static census of NSA**, or to an exercise conducted on a purely descriptive and static basis, while the need for the establishment of a programme is to have, at one's disposition, a **dynamic framework** which, in addition to quantitative and qualitative information (the presence of NSA throughout the territory, sectors of intervention, networking experiences, political dialogue with NSA), the key elements are represented through a comprehension of the concrete gains and socio-political challenges which will engage NSA.

In effect, the NSA support programmes do not intervene in an institutional void on the fringes of the current development and governance processes. Quite the contrary, as demonstrated by the strategic positioning of programmes, **the mission of an NSA support programme is that of supporting NSAs as regards their role at the heart of any given context and, above all, as regards the stakes of their endeavours**. It is for this reason that it is fundamental that the mapping exercise can take this context into account in order to anchor the analysis of NSAs, as much on the level of their double role both as low level contractors and as development and governance actors as on the level of inventory and comprehension of the capacity building needs.

#### 3.2.1. Fundamental elements a mapping exercise should take into account

An analysis of the programmes shows that the **fundamental elements** and even the goals that the mapping exercise must take into account to be effective are as follows:

- **“Map out”** the NSA sector, on the basis of **major trends**. It is useful to note, on this matter, that mapping exercises can have different approaches in terms of the scope of the study, able to cover both the entirety of NSAs as well as particular categories (for example solely on civil society, without considering the private sector, development NGOs, one sector in particular, etc.)
- Outside the chosen range, it is important and worth remembering that it is the nature of the exercise to evolve from a static logic (which sees mapping as a treatise or monograph on NSAs) to a dynamic logic, according to which mapping is a living exercise, which must be periodically updated, in order to take account of the social, political, economic and institutional dynamics that it seeks to explain. As analysed in the document “The participation of NSAs in poverty reduction strategies, in sector wide approaches and the monitoring of policy implementation”<sup>12</sup>: *“It is also essential to consider inventory as a regular exercise, to be maintained and updated, rather than as a one-off exercise that sets the tone for all future endeavours with civil society organisations (...) The EC must adopt a ‘diagnostic approach’ in its views and relations with civil society, while constantly bearing in mind the changing structures, the emergence of organisations and the role that it can play in supporting the processes underway. In its analysis of CSOs, their roles, capacities and weaknesses, the EC can discover new institutions and potential drivers of change that could be supported”*.
- Identify the national **stakes and future perspectives for NSA in the social, political and economical contexts**. As demonstrated above, the “directory” approach must be avoided. Mapping exercises must serve to identify and analyse the processes underway according to a systematic perspective. Such a perspective must serve to explore, in any given context, the relations and interrelations between the NSAs themselves, and with other fundamental

<sup>12</sup> « La participation des acteurs non-étatiques aux stratégies de réduction de la pauvreté, aux approches sectorielles et au suivi de la mise en œuvre de la politique ». Projet mai 2008. AIDCO/E/4. Commission Européenne

actors such as the government and donors. By contrast, it is important that the mappings can also adopt a historical perspective, from the need to understand the origin of the processes *status quo*, including those underlying the values, the links and operations of NSAs.

- Identify the **key actors at the heart of NSA** (at the centre of each family and structural level). It is important to remain realistic and to realise that it is impossible to undertake a complete mapping of all of the NSAs present in a country. A selection should, nonetheless, be made on the basis of criteria such as the levels of structure, the areas of operation and the community cooperation, etc.
- Evaluate their **capacity building needs** (in terms of the different levels and families). In this regard, the exercise should base itself on a **differentiated analysis of the actors** which needs to allow for a distinction between the different actors (grass roots organisations; second-tier organisations and third and fourth-tier organisations)

The need to have an articulated typology of NSA and, in particular, of civil society, is, equally, linked to the need to avoid, at the level of the support of programmes and project, of placing grass roots organisations with limited means and capacity **into competition with** more structured organisations such as development NGOs and networks.

The **methodological principle of differentiated analysis** of NSA must, therefore, allow the consideration of different NSA typologies, in order to better define the differences in terms of mission and vision, vocation and intervention methodologies of organisations present in the country, with the aim of differentiating between the capacity building needs and, therefore, actions that will require funding under future programmes.



### The mapping and identification study in Mali

The mission, which took place in 2004, held, as an **objective**, that of identifying, through a highly participatory approach, : **salient constraints** that NSAs face, **primary intervention themes**; and (pilot) systems of **direct support** to Malian civil society. In order to achieve this, **three groups of activities** were undertaken:

1. A **mapping study** of the civil society organisations in the form of a **diagnostic** that took into consideration:
  - The legal framework;
  - The types of civil society actors present in Mali and their areas of operation;
  - Functional analysis of civil society organisations with a particular attention to the different types of umbrella organisation (platforms, networks, federations, consortia etc.) active on the national level as much as on the local level;
  - The capacity building needs of civil society organisations;
  - The cooperation systems and other existing opportunities for civil society organisations;
  - The activities of donor organisation in Mali that favour civil society, with a special attention paid to the development cooperation programmes of the EU member states;
  - Analysis and hierarchy of the main areas of intervention (following the 4 regional

workshops).

2. **Identifying the institutional and management arrangements** for the civil society support programme on the basis of the mapping study and the results of the participative consultation with non state via the four regional workshops (in Sikasso, Mopti, Gao and Bamako) and a national synthesis workshop (in Bamako). Civil society organisations from other regions of the country were present at the four seminars, notably those of Ségou and Timbuktu at the Mopti workshop; the Koulikoro region at the Bamako workshop, and Kidal at the Gao workshop.
3. A **financing proposal project** for a multi-year programme according to the simplified procedure and on the basis of the absorption capacity of civil society organisations.

The three groups of activities were, for the most part, based on a comprehensive **participative approach**, implemented notably through the organisation of four regional workshops and a national synthesis workshop and two meetings with bilateral and multilateral donors and INGO, as well as through the numerous interviews and meetings held with all of the relevant stakeholders.

- Analyse the **juridical and institutional framework and environment in which the NSAs are evolving; and the grounds for cooperation between governmental and nongovernmental actors** (grounds for cooperation available to different scales: local, regional and national). Here, the key questions to which mapping must seek to provide answers are, on the one part, what are the judicial, social, political and economical areas in which NSAs may act, notably as regards CSOs, and, on the other, what is the vision that the government has of NSAs and their role regarding the main processes and debates at work (for example in the area of design, implementation and monitoring of a poverty reduction strategy, the reform of administration, governance systems and accountability etc.). In addition, mapping must ask questions as regards the obstacles, windows of opportunity, the stakes etc. that call out at NSAs from the seat of government.
- Analyse the **cooperation framework that exists between NSAs and European cooperation**, according to the principles advanced by Cotonou in terms of information, including NSAs in the political dialogue for monitoring and evaluation of cooperation strategies and programmes and including NSAs in the implementation of programmes.
- Identify a **map of stakeholders** (including the adopted approaches) in the domain of support to NSA (donors, programmes, NGOs, universities, private contractors etc.). Again it is essential that mapping adopt a qualitative approach, while avoiding the descriptive and static nature of a “directory”, in order to explore the existing options and increase the coherence of interventions, with respect to the Agenda on Aid Effectiveness and the potential establishment of synergies between the different stakeholders as regards support to NSAs. Moreover, mappings must also bear the local offer into account as regards capacity building (universities, private sector, local NGOs and research centres, etc.) in order to have an exhaustive analysis of the situation, as much on in terms of demand as in terms of offer.



### The two-phased identification process in Papua New Guinea (PNG)

The identification process, conducted between 2005-2006, was conceived in two phases:

- Phase 1: **Identification study**, where the consultant prepared a comprehensive overview of CSOs in PNG and based on this study propose a strategy for how EU may best support the civil society in PNG;
- Phase 2: **Feasibility study/project formulation phase**: detail and appraise the chosen support strategy with a view of preparing a financing proposal for an EU funded support programme.

The identification study (first phase) covered the following elements:

- A **descriptive overview of the existing civil society organisations and their present networks in PNG** – both at district and central level, and their mission or the mandate they have *vis-à-vis* members, including to what extent they can be considered representative of the members.
- **An appraisal of the capacity of these institutions to contribute to the development process in terms of policy dialogue and advocacy, and service delivery**, including an analysis of the extent to which NSAs are currently partaking in implementation of service delivery for Government
- **An overview of PNG legislation pertaining to CSOs**
- **An overview of the institutional mechanisms currently in place guiding the interaction between Government and NSA**, and an analysis of Government's views and strategies for involvement of NSA in the development process.
- **An overview of other donor initiatives related to funding capacity building of civil society**, and options for synergies and development of coherence. In this connection it might be interesting for the consultant to analyse what added-value (actual or potential) civil society actors see for the EC in the business of supporting civil society.
- **Suggestions for mechanisms to be put in place** in order for civil society to be involved in the programming, reviewing and evaluation of EC-PNG development co-operation.

The feasibility study (second phase) delivered the following:

- A **reasoned strategy for how the EU may contribute to strengthening the role and functioning of the NSA sector in PNG**, outlining the rationale for such a strategy and ensuring complementarity with other donor funded interventions.
- **Identification of indicators and sources of verification** for project objectives, results and activities and incorporate required resources.
- The institutional structure required for project implementation stipulating the responsibilities of various bodies. Different modalities for providing assistance may be required for different elements of the programme.
- A proposed implementation plan with annual and overall cost estimates. This would have to be based on an assessment of the absorption capacity of the sector, taking other donor interventions into account.
- A logical framework planning matrix
- 

In conclusion, in terms of mapping characteristics, the following apply:



### Mapping characteristics

- Be **dynamic and not static**. Moreover, the programmes, as much as the delegations, should have more of a “diagnostic approach” or what could be called a “mapping attitude” as a precondition for a relevant and efficient engagement with NSA;
- Be a tool that **facilitates the identification** of the programme, but also the **ends of the European Cooperation Strategy**. In effect, a good understanding of NSAs and, more concretely, civil society will allow the EC to think about the preferred mechanisms and instruments for the development of the sector in its different roles beyond the NSA support programme;
- Deliver a **qualitative and quantitative** approach:
  - Quantitative approach: (i) evolution of the association movement in the country ; (ii) presence of NSA in the different regions of the country ; (iii) presence of typological and thematic NSA (on a national and regional level if possible)
  - Qualitative Approach: (i) identification of the stakes; (ii) the positioning of different typological actors at the heart of the socio-political fabric of the country ; (iii) the capacity building needs of different NSA typologies ; (iv) the legal and institutional framework which governs NSA. As well as classifying non state actors in all of their diversity, **mappings must regularly include sections on the legislative environment** for associations and citizens groups, the regulatory systems in place, the grounds for cooperation and the working relationship between the State and NSA, the possibility for citizens groups to receive grants or subsidies etc.
- Adopt a **guiding logic** for the actor and respect **the spirit of the Cotonou Agreement**;
- **Capitalise on the existing studies and sources** (for fear of “reinventing the wheel”) and bearing **new systemic analysis approaches developed by a number of donors** such as as DfID (“Drivers for Change) or ASDI (“Power Analysis). While not strictly focused on NSAs or civil society, these analyses form an interesting point of departure for the comprehension of the processes and stakes that call to the development actors, including NSAs. In addition, considering the number of donors wishing to understand civil society, it might also be possible to undertake communal mapping studies.

#### 3.2.2. NSA involvement in the mapping exercise

Concerning the **involvement of NSA** in the mapping exercise, several experiences have been undertaken across the ACP. In general, the choice to include NSA in the mapping has been linked to the particular situation in each country and, as such, advantages and disadvantages can be expected; a few of these are:

Advantages	Les contraintes
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Shared analysis and choice</li> <li>▪ Better understanding of the general context</li> <li>▪ Better understanding of the stakes</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Arbitrary choice of actors</li> <li>▪ Risk of distancing a number of key typologies and/or actors</li> <li>▪ Excluding grassroots NSA</li> </ul>



<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Better understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of NSA</li> <li>▪ Facilitation of contact with NSA</li> <li>▪ Logistical facilitation (e.g. workshops)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Including actors who turn out to be ineligible in the programme</li> <li>▪ Risk of causing confusion on the role of involved actors in this phase and their participation in the future programme</li> <li>▪ Creation of expectations that risk not remaining unachieved.</li> </ul>
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In terms of **possible options regarding the inclusion of NSA** in the mapping phase, the following examples may be considered:



**Options regarding the involvement of NSA in the mapping exercise**

- The creation of a **Task Force or Working Group** charged with monitoring the process (from the preparation of the ToRs to the creation and validation of results), for example in Niger, Tanzania, Senegal etc.;
- Creation of an **informal group for consultation and verification** (e.g. Mali, Chad etc.);
- **Workshops on a regional basis** (Mauritania, Mali, Guinea, Uganda, Somalia, Zambia, Malawi, etc.);
- **A national review workshop** (Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Zambia, Ethiopia, etc.);
- **A public restitution workshop** (Senegal, CAR, etc.).

The participative approach taken in Somalia merits elaboration:



**The participatory approach of the mapping study undertaken in Somalia within the framework of the Strengthening Somali Civil Society programme**

<http://somal-civilsociety.org/home/>

The ‘**Strengthening Somali Civil Society**’ project (implemented by Novib) was a new project in a new area of programming for Somaliland, South Central Zone and Puntland. In order to develop the programme consultatively and to enhance understanding and visibility of Somali civil society, **Oxfam Novib** undertook a ‘mapping’ of Somali civil society organizations. The purpose of this mapping

exercise was **to understand better the nature of civil society organisations (CSOs) in Somalia and Somaliland and their links with Somali culture, tradition, history and language, links among themselves and with INGOs, UN and donor bodies**, so as to strengthen their role in the development of Somali society and to inform the international community on the status of social change within civil society in Somalia and Somaliland.

The mapping exercise entailed **identifying, interviewing and recording civil society organisations (CSOs) and assessing their capacity, organisational structures, goals and mission, the relations** among themselves and with international NGOs, United Nations and donor agencies, and **examining core issues, such as human rights, peace and the tension between tradition and modernity**. In order to undertake this, the technique of sampling was used, as it was not realistic to assess every Somali organisation. However it is felt that a representative sample from both Somalia and Somaliland was achieved.

This activity proved to be an enormous undertaking. Oxfam Novib was and continues to be committed to using Somali skills and developing Somali capacity in activities as much as possible and also chose a participatory research methodology. **A team of 21 Somali enumerators were identified by the lead consultant, Professor Mohamed Abdi Mohamed ‘Gandhi’, a respected Somali academic and peace activist**. The team of enumerators were dispatched to all regions of Puntland, Somaliland and South Central Zone and in total, the enumerators interviewed nearly 500 organisations and this information from the questionnaires and focus group discussions was discussed and analysed in Nairobi. Oxfam Novib produced an analytical report; key findings were translated into Somali and the original team of enumerators took the translation back to the original informants for their comment.

This information and the report were presented at a civil society symposium to civil society representatives. Substantial comments were made on both the report and the database of organisations, leading to a thorough revision and consultation process. The mapping report was then published.

### 3.2.3. *Methodological principles*

On the basis of **methodological principles**, which should influence the decision to undertake a mapping exercise, the following are noteworthy:



#### **Methodological principles**

##### **Capitalisation on previous studies** (secondary or indirect sources)

- Official reports of the EC (HQ) and the ECD;
- Official reports from other technical and financial partners in the country
- Grey literature (universities, research centres, embassies, etc.)

##### **Quantitative analysis** (secondary or indirect sources)

- The Ministries and the concerned state services (as regards each typological NSA) ;
- Official publications and statistics;
- Grey literature and publications;

##### **Qualitative analysis** (direct or primary sources)

- The reports and official acts of NSA (statutes, reports, annual reports, balance sheets, brochures

etc.);

- The leaders and directors of NSA;
- The members of NSA;
- The beneficiaries of NSA actions;
- Qualified informants (or key persons).

When it comes to **qualitative analysis**, recourse may be found in these tools;



### Qualitative analysis

- The **rapid diagnosis** (based, for example, on a system of indicators of the life of an organisation which should analyse such aspects as the institutional dynamism and democratic management; the relevance of the mission and synergy with the action; the constitution of the structure; the plurality and transparency of financing; the transparency of financing; the transparency and accountability; the attitude of the programming and the planning; etc).
- **In depth analysis** (interviews with leaders and directors; analysis of statutory texts and regulations; analysis of the written produce (reports, accounts etc.); interviews with the beneficiaries of NSA actions; interviews with qualified informants; analysis of the positioning of the organisation).
- The **focus groups** (to debate over such issues as the social and political stakes and the mission of NSA; the strong and weak points of the organisation of NSA in their entirety; the forms of partnership with the public sector; social and political dialogue; agreement and collaboration with NSA; networking).

### 3.3. Final thoughts as regards the mapping exercises under the 10th EDF

It is essential to note that the mapping exercise under the 10th EDF requires a **significant change in** mentality. In essence, if, over the course of the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF, the exercise was fundamentally linked to the identification (in the majority of case) or the implementation (in cases where the mapping was not undertaken in the identification phase, as in Senegal, Somalia and the Dominican republic), or as a requirement of a re-launch in the framework of the implementation of the programme (as in DRC, Ethiopia and Surinam), over the course of the 10<sup>th</sup> EDF the exercise will, instead, have to be linked to the identification of a **global NSA inclusion strategy** in European cooperation (merging all modalities and instruments) and, in particular as regards political dialogue, bearing in mind the new aid modalities foreseen (notably budget and sector support etc.). This statement is further reinforced by the conclusions of the recently accomplished evaluation of EC aid through civil society organisations<sup>13</sup>.

<sup>13</sup> Evaluation of EC AID delivery through civil society organisations. Final report. Service Contract for the Evaluation (sectoral and thematic) of European Commission Programmes and Policies in Third Countries, relating to Social and Human Development issues. Contrat number EVA/116-833. Drafted by a consortium composed of PARTICIP, Cideal, Channel Research and South Research

In other words, it is about evolving a sector vision as regards support to NSA with an integral vision, in which one asks one's self about the position of NSA, in a cross cutting manner, across the entire sphere of European Cooperation (as much on a geographical basis as on a thematic one). The challenge is, thus, posed today in terms of mainstreaming the NSA theme into the ensemble of European cooperation, according to a governance approach<sup>14</sup>.

To this end the experience, until now unique, brought by the initiative of the ECD in the Central African Republic must be noted; this consisted of the realisation of a mapping exercise focused not on the identification of a capacity building programme but, rather, to the formulation of a **mid to long term global strategy** for supporting NSA.

In the same reflection upon the need to have a change of mentality under the 10th EDF, it must be mentioned that there is an opportunity to conduct exercises in **sector mapping**. This new approach, already tested by other donors with an established sector policy (in terms of health, education, rural development etc.), acquires significant importance to the extent that they exercise can provide precious indications for the implementation of a Community strategy contained in the CSP on the basis of sector priorities.

## 4. THE INSTITUTIONAL ORGANISATION, INTERNAL PROGRAMME GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS, THE ROLE AND PROFILE OF THE TA AND THE COOPERATION WITH DONOR ORGANISATIONS

### 4.1. The management system: feasible options and cost analyses

#### 4.1.1. Analysis of management modalities

In the majority of cases the Commission undertakes the financial implementation of 9th EDF resources allocated to NSA support programmes by means of decentralised management with the ACP States in accordance with the provisions set out in the ACP-EU Agreement and applying notably the breakdown of responsibilities provided for in Article 57 of the Agreement and Articles 34, 35 and 36 of Annex IV thereto;


Nevertheless, in certain contexts, where no cooperation with the government exists (substituting the National Authorising Officer for a General Authorising Officer) or the arena of NSA is severely reduced, **specific solutions**, according to the circumstances in the country, are researched (e.g. Guinea Bissau, Somalia etc.).

Besides, the new aid harmonisation agenda, in compliance with the Paris Declaration and the effervescence of the whole new set of common financing systems (basically pool funds and trust funds) in a fair few countries, also requires forethought on the question of the **management modalities** and the scope of participation of the National Authorising Officer and the State in general. Their participation is also variable, depending equally on the national situation and ranges from large-scale participation and full-fledged involvement (whereby the NAO guarantees the contracting of the programme and a Ministry or technical department takes charge of the management of the programme) to a small scale participation (whereby the NAO delegates programme management and contracting below a certain threshold).

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<sup>14</sup> To deepen the role of NSAs and, in particular, that of Civil Society in governance, see "Handbook on promoting good governance in EC development and cooperation"; draft 2004 and the evaluation report "Thematic evaluation of the EC support to good governance" June 2006

The following table is based on an analysis of the 40 capacity building programmes undertaken by the team:



As one can see, the “**externalised direct labour operations**” modality is the preferred option chosen out of the 40 programmes analysed, in 65% of cases, followed by the “**direct labour operations**” modality, in 15% of cases. The other modalities are far less common, pool fund/joint management was applied in 7,5% of the cases; **externalised labour operations through an NGO** (international or national, via a grant scheme) was applied in 5% of the cases; **indirect centralised management** was applied in 2,5% of cases; **indirect centralised management through an NGOs** in 2,5% of cases; and mixed systems, **firstly externalised direct labour operations and then direct labour operations** in 2,5% of cases. This was true in the case of the Vanuatu programme, where the management was initially confined to the national NGO platform (VANGO). Unfortunately this structure was not aligned with the vision of the programme and did not possess the necessary capacities to implement an EDF programme. A year after the start of the project, the decision to transfer management of the programme to the NAO was taken.



**Lessons learnt from the management structure adopted by the programme in Vanuatu**

Albeit being in line with the philosophy underpinning Cotonou agreement provisions as regards NSA, the **foreseen management structure (with VANGO, the Vanuatu Association of NGO acting as the implementing agency)** underplayed the fragility and limitations of NSA structures in Vanuatu. It was based on the presumption that the NGO partner had/would acquire the managerial and financial capacity and the determination to carry out the project.

The reality proved different since VANGO saw itself as a beneficiary rather than the driving force of the project. Externalized management Labour Operations required management skills that VANGO was unable to provide. Besides, modalities and constraints inherent to this mode of operation imposed financial stress on an already fragile and barely solvent organization.

As a consequence, it was decided then, after consultation with the NSA partners and other stakeholders, **to revert to Direct decentralized operations, implemented through the Department of Foreign Affairs/NAO Office and with a National Coordinator (NC) directly employed by the NAO** and authorized as the impresst administrator, but based within VANGO's offices.

**VANGO is therefore no longer the implementing agency** and is only indirectly involved in the project by participating in the Steering and Evaluation Committees.

It is useful to highlight that the responsibility **falls to the respective Delegations**, on the basis of the results of the mapping study (or, failing that, the feasibility study), to consider the category into which the country falls and to examine and agree upon the approach to be taken with the NAO. The five different modalities, with an indication of their modus operandi, their strong points and their associated risks, as well as an indication of the relevance according to the national context, are elaborated below.

	CENTRALISED MANAGEMENT			DECENTRALISED MANAGEMENT	
<b>MODALITIES</b>	<b>Modality 1: Indirect Centralisation, by a private company</b>  (article 23.6 of annex IV of the Cotonou Agreement)	<b>Modality 2: Joint management with other Donors (pool fund system) and/or International Organisations<sup>15</sup></b>	<b>Modality 3: Indirect Centralisation by an NGO (through grant contracts)</b>  (article 23.6 of annex IV of the Cotonou Agreement)	<b>Modality 4: Direct Labour Operation (with or without TA)</b>	<b>Modality 5: Externalised direct labour operations (delegation to a private consulting company or an NGO)</b>
<b>OPERATIONAL DESCRIPTION</b>	<p>The rules regarding centralised management apply.</p> <p>The tasks liable to be entrusted by the European Commission, through contractual channels, to external private sector entities or organisations are technical or administrative tasks, preparatory or accessory, which require neither public support nor the exercise of discretionary powers.</p> <p>Technical assistance conducted outside of</p>	<p>The EDF contributions to a communal fund with other donors constitute a different modus operandi as regards cooperation with NSA.</p> <p>The appropriate rules for managing these communal funds (or baskets) depend on the potential partner, if it will be an international organisation, for example the UN Organisations or the World Bank, with which agreements have been established, or, if it is to be an EU member State, to which the Cotonou Agreement accords a certain flexibility in the management modalities.</p>	<p>The rules concerning centralised management apply.</p>	<p>The rules regarding direct labour operations apply.</p> <p>The programme is implemented directly through public departments of the ACP State concerned by means of the signature of a financing agreement between the EC and the NAO.</p> <p>Direct labour operations are implemented in the form of a programme of measures to be carried out and an estimate of their cost, referred to as the programme estimate.</p> <p>Each programme estimate has to be prepared by the</p>	<p>In the case of externalised direct labour operations, the (recipient ACP State or States) entrusts tasks relating to the implementation of projects or programmes to public, semi-public or private bodies that are legally distinct from the ACP State concerned.</p> <p>The body concerned assumes responsibility for the management and implementation of the programme or project in place of the National Authorising Officer. Tasks so delegated may include the power to conclude contracts and manage contracts and the supervision of works on behalf of or for the account of the ACP State or States concerned</p> <p>Direct labour operations are implemented in the form of a programme of measures</p>

<sup>15</sup> This modality is analysed in greater depth in the chapter on cooperation and technical and financial partners (§2.24) within the current document.

	the Delegation may be involved in the execution or management of the programme.			<p>impres administrator and the accounting officer and shall then approved by the National Authorising Officer and the Head of Delegation before the activities it provides can commence.</p> <p>A PMU may be established in a given Line Ministry, responsible for the implementation of the programme.</p>	<p>to be carried out and an estimate of their cost, referred to as the programme estimate.</p> <p>Each programme is prepared by the third party organisation and shall then be approved by the National Authorising Officer and the Head of Delegation before the activities it provides can commence.</p> <p>Establishment of an autonomous PMU</p>
<b>STRENGTHS</b>	<p>This modality allows for a reinforcement of NSA in the contexts <b>where there are pre or post conflict situations</b>, or a systematic lack of will and/or capacity on the part of the NAO to engage with NSA</p>	<p><b>Focalisation of a larger quantity of aid in a geographical or thematic area.</b></p> <p>Establishment of <b>more ambitious and structured programmes</b>, integrating several components (core funding, block grants, financing of project, actions targeting capacity building, information awareness, strategic dialogue, etc.).</p> <p><b>Reduction of transaction costs</b>, flexibility in administration of funds for donor organisations</p>	<p>This modality allows the reinforcement of NSA in <b>the context which cooperation with the country is suspended due to political or other reasons and/or there exist pre or post conflict situations.</b></p>	<p><b>High engagement on the part of government</b> in terms of the political dialogue with NSA and their capacity building.</p> <p>High degree of programme ownership by the NAO and the government, on the whole.</p>	<p>This is the standard modality, as it allows (at least in principal) <b>a balance to be found between engagement and ownership on the part of the government, and the competence, neutrality and lack of interference that must guide programme management.</b></p>




		<p>(particularly as regards the constituent donors, delegating administration of their funds).</p> <p><b>Promotion of coordination and the harmonisation</b> of donor policies and strategies, in respect to the Paris Declaration.</p> <p><b>Unification and simplification of the criteria and demands of monitoring,</b> reporting/etc prescribed to beneficiary organisations.</p>			
<p><b>RISKS AND WEAKNESSES</b></p>	<p><b>Absence of engagement on the part of the government</b> and the lack of programme ownership on the side of the NAO. To mitigate this, it is recommended that the NAO participate in every possible way in all stages of the process, for example the NAO must be represented at the Steering Committee and could, equally, be represented as an observer of the evaluation committee of the call for proposals, or the selection of proactive capacity</p>	<p><b>Little contact between the NSA and the constituent donors.</b></p> <p><b>Lack of interest on the part of NSA</b> for the policies of constituent donors and their solicitations for dialogue on their strategies, consequently financing is not directly allocated by these donors.</p> <p><b>Limiting the control of constituent donors</b> on the basis of the choice of themes and sectors to be financed.</p>	<p>This modality is only possible <b>if international NGOs embrace support to and through NSA on a reciprocal cooperation</b> basis and of a partnership based on a vision of strategic processes over the mid to long term which focuses primarily on the capacity building of NSA.</p> <p>This requires a bypassing of both the subcontracting logic, in terms of relations with local actors, and the</p>	<p>This modality is only possible <b>if there is no risk of interference or co-option on the part of the government.</b></p> <p>In addition, <b>for such a modality to function a solid civil society must be present;</b> there must be a consolidated space for dialogue between the State and NSA; there must be confidence between the government and NSA and the government must have at its disposition the specific ability to provide capacity building support.</p>	<p>In order for such a modality to work, there must be excellent cooperation with the NAO.</p> <p>If the grant contracts are signed in the framework of the work programmes (not like individual engagements), <b>the organisation becomes responsible for the management and execution of the programme,</b> and will be responsible for the finances also. This responsibility runs the risk of constraining the offices to protect themselves from risks, knowing that their role is not just “financing” the NSA.</p> <p>Several <b>limitations to the management associated with work programmes</b> can become constraints (WP limited to 12-18 months; financial ceilings etc.).</p>

	building actions.		objective of “service delivery” to integrate governance questions.	<p>One risk is posed by the <b>underestimation of the human resources</b> required for programme implementation (considering that responsibility for programme managements is on the government side). <b>The lack of familiarity with EDF procedures</b> may also pose a risk, one which may provoke delays in the distribution of resources. To reduce this risk a prompt call for TA proposals, alongside the structure responsible for implementation of the programme, with the necessary competences for programme management according to the EDF procedures.</p>	<p>This can occasionally be a <b>costly modality</b>. Everything hinges on the role of the TA: if this holds a guiding role and not just one of administrative management, the costs will be justified by the results the programme could achieve (e.g. a capacity building component managed directly by the contractor and not the WP).</p> <p><b>Difficulty finding companies</b> that have technical and backstopping expertise in terms of NSA support.</p> <p>Difficulty interesting international NGOs with expertise in the field of support to civil society, seeing as they prefer grant contracts and are not used to (sometimes even refuse to) service contracts.</p>
<b>IN WHICH CONTEXTS IS THE MODALITY APPROPRIATE ?</b>	<b>Category III</b> countries where the scope of association for NSA is strongly limited.	<b>Category I, II and III</b> countries in which there is a good coordination between donor organisations and <i>pool fund</i> systems are in place.	<b>Category III</b> countries in which cooperation with the country has been suspend for political or other reasons.	<b>Category I</b> countries in which there is active participation with NSA in the development processes, and there exists an organised civil society.	<b>Category I</b> countries where there is a strong conflict at the heart of NSA or a lively political dialectic. The presence of a third party (the PMU) could, in this case, be a guarantee of impartiality and coherence with the policies of the country and the goals and strategies of community intervention (CSP) in the country.

					<p><b>Category II</b> countries with a tradition of dialogue and limited or more or less limited participation.</p> <p><b>Category III</b> countries where the room for association with NSA is limited.</p>
EXAMPLES	Ethiopia	Seychelles and Kenya (with the UNDP), Sierra Leone (agreement with DFID)	Somalia	<p>Cape Verde, Vanuatu (after the Financing Agreement addendum), Papua New Guinea (with TA support), Djibouti, Jamaica, Malawi (with 200 days of TA), Tanzania (with TA as a support for the application and respect of EDF procedures).</p>	<p>By a private company and the constitution of a PMU: Angola, Benin, Uganda, Mali, Tanzania, Dominican Republic, Botswana, Lesotho, Kenya. Mauritius, Mauritania, Mozambique, Burkina Faso, Guinea Conakry (AISCHA et PACNOP), etc.</p> <p>By an NGO: Guinea Bissau (International NGO, cascade financing), Namibia (national platform: NANGOF).</p>

#### 4.1.2. Cost Analysis

As regards cost analysis, the exercise must be relativised as much in regard of the role of the available envelope as in terms of the system adopted on a case by case basis. As it stands, the analysis of available sums for the 40 programmes, when taken into consideration, **vary considerably** from country to country. The chart below shows the numbers relative to the sums allocated to analysed programmes. The average sum is €5.27 million.



As one can see, there is a strong difference in terms of allocated funds and thus it is not possible to identify **real trends**. The amount destined for a programme does not follow a particular logic in terms of programming, nor are there experiences from which lessons can be drawn prior to the 10<sup>th</sup> EDF.

In terms of chapters, it is important to pay special attention to the costs of the PMU, particularly in those programmes which will adopt the “externalised direct labour operations” approach. In essence, the costs of the PMU, under an externalised direct labour operations mode, run the risk of **being significant** for programmes with sums smaller than €3 million (e.g. Guinea, Benin etc.), while its existence is, without doubt, much less important to programmes with greater sums at their disposal.

In reality, the question of costs must be subordinated, at a certain point (in this case between €3-4 million) to take account of **3 preconditions**:

- The national **context**;
- The **goals** of the programme;
- The necessary **skills**.

True, if for a programme of €1-2 million the choice falls on a modality other than externalised direct labour operations, and this due to the incidental costs of a PMU, the consideration that must be made to choose one or other form of management modality must concern one of the three aspects above mentioned.

The **first aspect**, that of the national context, obliges us to ask ourselves questions on the attitude of the government towards remaining impartial in the management of the Programme, above all in countries belonging to Category III and, in a few cases, even to Category II. Where the conditions are not met, the presence of a third party (the PMU) can mitigate a negative government attitude *vis a vis* NSA and, in particular, civil society.

The **second aspect**, linked to the goals of the programme, requires consideration of the most appropriate organisational structure as regards costs. If the NSA support programme adopts a logic based on support to development initiatives led by NSA through a call for proposals scheme, it needs to be asked if it isn't worth renouncing the role to the PMU, as its role would limit solely to administration. By contrast, if the programme was based on a logic of providing support and mentoring to the actors instead of assuming a purely “project approach”, so the role of the PMU would become fundamental in terms of process facilitation.

Finally, in terms of **technical skills**, the NSA support programmes focused on more complex issues, for example the capacity building of NSA in a context of decentralisation and management of the public space and/or focused on a rights-based approach require a certain know-how which is often not available in the country. It is thus that the reliance on a PMU in the framework of the externalised direct labour operations mode can effectively satisfy this need in terms of very specific technical skills.

While being an important factor, and occasionally limiting, for the implementation of an NSA support programme, the question of costs regarding certain management modalities must, therefore, be put into perspective with **other basic factors** for the success of this sort of programmes.

## 4.2. The Steering Committee

The question of a steering system for an NSA support programme concerns several fundamental aspects: its roles and prerogatives and the inclusion modalities of NSA.

As regards the first, the experiences garnered by the NSA support programmes under the 9th EDF demonstrate a **significant variation** when it comes to interpreting the functions of a Steering and Monitoring Committee (SMC)<sup>16</sup> as well as a common trend.

This variation among the SMCs is illustrated firstly by the **frequency of their meetings**, which can vary from 3 to 12 months, as has been noted from the in depth analysis of 16 programmes and, subsequently, by the **different interpretations of their roles and prerogatives**: from the simple validation of the work undertaken by the PMU (for example in Benin, the Dominican Republic<sup>17</sup> and Uganda) to inclusion in every decision regarding the programme, including the selection of activities or, in some cases, even the approval of the support personnel to be recruited (DRC, Burkina Faso, etc.).

As regards the **communal trends**, in the majority of programmes the SMC meeting is just a formal moment to rule on subjects that have already made it through the preliminary agreements between the programme, the NAO and the ECD. In other words, the discussions at the heart of the SMC are relatively limited by the fact that, in reality, the decisions have already been taken informally.

If this trend could be seen in a **positive** light, as it bears witness to a continuing “tripartite” (Programme, ECD and NAO) exchange, in reality the Committee runs the risk of redundancy, both in terms of its role and prerogatives, but it risks, above all, of **marginalising** the contribution of all of the members of SMC except the NAO (usually, although there are exceptions, the ECD holds the status of a non-executive observer and the PMU only acts as a technical secretariat).

In reality, in the majority of NSA support programmes under the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF the SMC is a decision making body that **has never been valued and its role has often remained very much on paper**,

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<sup>16</sup> By Steering and Monitoring Committee we refer to the programme institution, notwithstanding the varied terminology as regards different programmes and national contexts, in charge of general supervision and coordination of the programme, approval of work programmes and official reports, etc.

<sup>17</sup> The case of the Dominican Republic is noteworthy, as this “de facto” role of simple validation of the PMU’s outputs has garnered significant criticism on the part of CSOs directing the Steering Committee. They have even demanded a name change from Steering Committee to “Directing Committee” or “Consultation Committee”, in light of their incapacity to influence the programme decisions.

especially the fundamental ones of strategic programme orientation and monitoring. In summary, the SMC is, in general, not a place for progress monitoring of programmes, but more often a decision making body responsible for validation.

Such a situation runs the risk of **endangering** the internal dialectics of the stakeholders as much as the institutional organisations. In effect, it is not rare to find situations where the Steering and Monitoring Committee does not meet at all, as well as cases where the Committee, in the form of its president (almost exclusively the NAO) passes a ruling on subject for which the PMU is responsible (in the cases of indirect decentralised management which represents the majority of management modalities for NSA support programmes) by virtue of the powers passed unto it.


The **roles and prerogatives**, which should be in the hands of the Steering Committees, are the following:



**Roles and prerogatives of the Steering Committee**

- supervise and approve the **global coordination and strategy** of the programme;
- verify and approve **annual programming** proposals
- analyse and approve **work programmes**;
- receive and approve the **execution, technical and financial** reports submitted by the PMU, presenting the achievements of the programme;
- guarantee necessary **judgements** and make decisions on future **reorientations**.

As regards the second aspect, that of the **inclusion modalities of NSA** in the programme SMCs, the analysis undertaken brings to light evidence that in only 7,5% of the programmes analysed where NSA not represented.



Out of the various inclusion modalities there is a variety of options that were adopted by the 40 programmes within the scope of the study. Certain programmes adopted complex formulas, proposing, alongside the SMC, a second committee composed entirely of NSA (as is the case

with the NSA Coordination Committee, a product of the NSA Task Force Group, in Tanzania, or the NSA Steering Committee in Uganda), with a consultative role, often in conflict with the roles of the PMU and SCM. The case of Tanzania is particularly illustrative of this paralyzing situation resulting from the confusion of roles and the regular confrontations between the PMU and the NSA Project Coordination Committee.



### **Lessons learnt from the conflicting relationship between the PMFU and the NSA Project Coordination Committee in Tanzania**

The relationship between the PMFU and the PCC has continued to be adversarial and even, at times, antagonistic. This has adversely affected the morale, and consequently the performance, of PMFU staff, with negative implications for the overall effectiveness of programme management. The underlying cause of this problem appears to be **contested authority, with the PCC having been accorded 'ownership' of the programme, while management responsibility is vested in the PMFU**. As the designated 'owners', the PCC has felt entitled to adopt a more hands-on role in programme decision-making and supervision than is implied in its designated role of providing guidance and advice. The result has been considerable tension between the two entities.

The mid-term Evaluation team identified the problem and made a series of constructive recommendation, including, in the short run:

- **To reduce the frequency of PCC meetings,**
- **To strengthen PCC transparency and accountability,** via: (i) the redefinition of PCC's mandate, reorientation of its responsibilities and alteration of its composition; (ii) Regular and formal reports on programme activities undertaken; (iii) Evidence of improved programme-related communication with constituency members. Additionally, the PCC should network with existing CSO networks.
- **To prohibit PCC members** from being also PSC members, thus requiring PCC members to resign if appointed to the PSC to avoid conflicts of interest and allow for new blood within the PCC

And in the long run, for new programmes in support of NSA:

- **Demarcate, articulate and formalise the allocation** of authority from the start (particularly as regards the PMFU, PCC and PSC) and **ensure each structure has clear governing rules** (e.g. renewal of mandate by representative bodies)
- **Be realistic about the motivation of stakeholders**

As concluded by the Mid-term evaluation report, the effectiveness, coherence and confidence of programme management should greatly benefit from the implementation of these recommendations and the building of a more constructive, mutually supportive relationship between the PMFU and the PCC.

In any case, independent of the chosen formula, the fundamental question is how to guarantee on the one hand the representation of members attending the Committee on behalf of NSA and on the other, to avoid situations that would create a conflict of interest. Experience shows that the most used formula in certain contexts is to include resource personnel from the world of NSA (without any operational inclusion in an organisation, bearing in mind the problems of

conflicts of interest that often arise during the selection of actors and beneficiary organisations and projects following the call for proposals) as opposed to NSA representatives.

It is important to note that, in a fair few countries, the choice of NSA “representatives” for the Steering Committee has **often paralysed** the Committee itself, in light of the difficulties of identifying a solution acceptable for all of the stakeholders and, more importantly, the NSA (in DRC the NSA support Programme is still without a SMC 18 months after the initiation of the project).

Concretely, the **different options** as regards the choice of NSA representatives to the SMC can be summarised as follows:

- The **cooption** of representatives by the NAO or by the Government (especially in countries belonging to category III). This solution has the drawback that it will not necessarily be accepted by NSA.
- The **designation** of representatives by NSA members. The adoption of this option requires, in general, a large amount of time and is viable in the context of limited conflict at the heart of the associative movement (for example in Mali, Ethiopia, Surinam, Tanzania, Uganda, DRC, Zimbabwe, Vanuatu).
- The **mixed formula**, where representatives are co-opted, in part by the government and in part by the NSA (e.g. Dominican Republic).
- The **selection** made by the PMU of the Programme, following a **call for candidates** (for example in Benin). In this case the candidates are individuals. The candidates should not have any operational role within the organisation.

Finally, two other aspects need to be taken into account: the rotation of NSA within the SMC and the level of structuring. In effect, these two aspects need to be taken into account when the members are attending the Committee in the role of **NSA representatives**, and not as resource personnel from the world of NSA.

As regards the **rotation**, several programmes planned the rotation of members to avoid creating a monopoly of certain NSA to the detriment of others (in Niger, for example). In reality this option could lead to non-viability to the extent that there would be an absence of capitalisation of experiences. To avoid this risk, some programmes opted for a mixed formula, that is to say a mix of permanent and rotating members (as in Burkina Faso for example, with 2 fixed members and 3 rotating members changing on an annual basis).

When it comes to the level of intervention and structuring, the majority of programmes turned to **third-tier organisations** (or even the platform, sometimes created for the purpose of the programme, as in the case of Senegal or Tanzania), which were required, in principle, to be more representative than individual organisations. In reality, this option runs the risk of distancing itself from the grass roots organisations, which poses a problem in instances where the programme is specifically addressing this type of actor (as in the programmes of DRC, Niger or Vanuatu). To this end, it is important to highlight the fact that in certain countries (such as Niger) it was decided that there would be representation from the four levels of NSA organisations.

While it may involve a different role, the members of the **Selection Committees** often happen to be the same as the **Monitoring and Steering Committees**, which could cause confusion with



the CSO beneficiaries. In reality, members of the Selection Committee should be independent experts and should have a technical role, while the Monitoring and Steering Committee should, instead, have a far more politically and generally oriented role as regards the programme strategies.

In other words, **Selection Committees should answer directly to the PMU** or, in any case, to the entity charged with execution of the programme activities and not to a political entity and, this, in order to avoid interference in the awarding of CSO grants.

As concerns NSA participation in Selection Committees, it is not a common occurrence in light of the fact that those who are members of NSAs could find themselves in a conflict of interest situation.

### 4.3. The role of actors involved

An NSA support programme is a complex mechanism within which several actors intervene, each one with a precise set of roles and prerogatives.

#### 4.3.1. *The role of NSA*

In each programme, NSA are **both beneficiaries and actors**. To this end it is fundamental that NSA are not considered a single unit, but a relatively heterogeneous entity. True, as much in their role as actors as in their role as beneficiaries, NSA must be considered according to a differentiated approach in terms of the ability to distinguish their different missions and vocations and, thereby, the different capacity building needs.

This differentiation must, firstly, be done in terms of the **typology of the actor and its appartenance to one of the distinctive NSA families** (whether the actor belongs to civil society, the private sector or the economic or social partners). Following this, a **differentiation must be applied based on the different structural levels: grass roots and first-tier organisations** (organisations of limited geographical and thematic scope, often largely informal and financed by their members' contributions); **second-tier organisations** (formally constituted actors that work for the benefit of the population and of its accompanying organisational forms on the first level), **third-tier organisations** (umbrella organisations: basically, coordinated groups, federations and networks) and **fourth-tier organisations** (platforms and consultation forums, which constitute real "groupings of umbrella organisations")

Each of the three families and each of the four structural levels **should play a different role** within the programme. As such, capacity building activities and, more in general, programme activities need therefore to be set taking account of the values, mandates and particularities of each group of actors. In this framework, grassroots organisations have a vital role in the experience of local governance and in the creation and management of the public forum at a communal level; second-tier organisations have a key role in the support to grass-roots organisations and dynamics; third-tier organisations have specific thematic and sectoral skills in support of their constituencies; while fourth-tier organisations have a primordial role in terms of dialogue with the State as regards national policy.

#### 4.3.2. *The role of NAO and of governments*

The importance of the NAO is generally underestimated as regards the implementation of NSA support programmes. In effect the NAO must have a double role: on the one hand that of a **programme supervisor**, through the SMC, and on the other hand that of **facilitation of dialogue between the NSAs and governmental agencies** at the level of programme activities, in particular those that concern cooperation between the State and NSAs, in all dimensions. All in all, the programmes that do not confer a precise role to the NAO (this should not be understood however as writing a “blank cheque” for the NAO and the government) run the risk of provoking an absence of engagement on the part of the government and a lack of ownership of the vocation and strategy of the programme. To reduce this it is advisable, even in cases where the programme management is centralised (as in Ethiopia), to include the NAO to the greatest possible extent in all stages of the process; for example the NAO must be represented in the SMC and could equally be represented as an observer of the committee in charge of the evaluation of the calls for proposals or the selection of proactive capacity building actions.

#### 4.3.3. *The role of the ECD*

The inclusion strategies of NSA and, in particular, civil society presuppose that the Delegations of the European Commission take an **active role** and a very precise one at that to ensure that they have, at their disposal, the necessary intervention mechanisms and tools. In effect, while the layout concerning new actors requires a collective responsibility on the part of all the concerned parties, it is the mandate of the Delegations to play a proactive role, sometimes even an arbitrary one, which is adapted to and compatible with the complex reality in each country and, more specifically, of the NSAs.

In this sense, bearing in mind the “Programming Guidelines Note N°6”, dated 09/03/2001, of the EC’s DG Development on the role of the Delegations, in terms of integrating new actors into development cooperation, their role can cover two aspects

The first aspect concerns their role as “**critical observers**”, which in essence constitutes an assurance that the relevant and competent NSAs are identified and included in the new cooperation framework according to the principles of the Cotonou Agreement. In this framework, **the eligibility of new actors** is a key question which needs to allow the Delegations to orient themselves among those who claim to belong to civil society and, thereby, to make decisions on the basis of three levels of inclusion: a) Informing NSAs; b) Dialogue or consultation with NSAs in the definition and monitoring of cooperation policies and strategies; c) Inclusion in the implementation of Programmes.


When it comes to the second aspect, it is up to the Delegations to fulfil their role as “**facilitators**”, as much in the sense of ensuring access to clear and transparent information as towards the contribution to the development and capacity building of NSAs.

In order to guarantee these two basic roles and with the goal of **respecting the impartiality and transparency** of relations with all types of NSAs, it will be important for Delegations to take the necessary measures to ensure that they have the necessary human and technical resources, tools and working instruments, among others, at their disposal to ensure a short to midterm programming phase.

In effect, this involves **prioritising the creation of a culture of dialogue** between NSAs and the government, and the concerned regional and international parties, including the ECD and the


member states, in order to ensure that the contribution of NSAs to the development process is more permanent.

Unfortunately, as regards tools, it is **very rare** to find information initiatives for NSAs and CSOs. Even if there are communication tools available, such as a bulletin, a newsletter, or a website, the information useful to the inclusion of NSAs does not hit its mark. This is the general sense of the results that have emerged from the analysis of the 40 programmes and which have been displayed in the chart below regarding inclusion in the elaboration of the CSPs of the 10<sup>th</sup> EDF and/or in the information circulars pertaining to this type of fundamental exercise for the Community cooperation cycle.



As can be seen, in **29% of cases, NSAs have not been included at all in the preparation of the CSP**, nor are they included in a constant or satisfactory exchange of information on this exercise; a rather paradoxical result considering the role that these actors should be playing in the framework of the Cotonou Agreement.

If one takes into account the consultation in the countries where this is active, **only in 46% of cases is this consultation regular and structured**, as indicated in the chart below.



This situation has, without a doubt, an effect on the success of NSA support programmes to the extent that the consultation exercise reinforces the attitude of NSAs to fulfil their **roles as development actors** (especially as regards their participation in the political dialogue and watchdog roles) and not just in terms of basic service deliverers.

When it comes to the role of the ECD in these programmes, it is important that the **facilitation process** can **accompany the TA** in the implementation of the programme, especially in relation to the **adaptation of procedures** to the reality of the specific context. On the other hand, it is essential that the programme can support the ECD in its NSA inclusion strategy in the cooperation cycle (elaboration of a CSP, annual review, midterm review, sectoral consultations etc.). Therefore, the need is for a **virtuous cycle** to be instilled into the relations between the ECD and the programme.



### Consultation with NSAs for the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF EC Senegal Country Strategy Paper<sup>18</sup>

The whole process took 2 years. The EC Delegation worked with the government to develop a mechanism **for involving NSAs in both the planning and identification phases**. Five 'young experts' were recruited for five months to organise and co-ordinate the consultation process of the planning phase, and two were retained for two-year contracts to see the whole process through.

<sup>18</sup> "The participation of NSAs in poverty reduction strategies, sector approaches and monitoring of policy implementation". *Draft January 2009. INTRAC on behalf of AIDCO/E/4.Commission Européenne*

**Planning phase:** in this phase, five technical working groups were set up to develop proposals around the following themes, identified by a Central Working Group: trade/transport; macro/budget support; social sectors; good governance; NSAs. Each working group was to have representatives the Delegation, the Government and NSAs, and would meet over a period of three months before reporting back to the Central Working Group. The next six months saw the refining of the analysis, ending with a feedback workshop for NSAs.

**Identification Phase:** Seven Working Groups were set up to identify areas of work within the following areas: Good governance; Transportation; Hygiene; Budgetary support; Trade; Culture; NSAs. These groups met four or five times, concluding with three day workshop for each of the groups, (except for the Budget Support group) where a strategy for the particular area was developed with the assistance of a facilitator with experience in developing logical frameworks.

It is interesting to note that the start of this process was being conducted at the same time as the PRSP consultation process.

The **Central Group** co-ordinated the process. Six Dakar based NGOs were invited to be members of this group, including one which had regional cells around the country, and would be well set up to involve its constituency organisations. However, this NGO did not disseminate information to its regional bodies, stating that it was lack of resources that prevented them doing this. The NGOs organise two seminars on the Cotonou process for CSOs. However, these initiatives were not followed up, and there were no moves to create any Platform Organisation, or other co-ordination body which could support and provide cohesion for CSOs involvement in the process.

Other civil society organisations were involved in the **Working Groups**, although there was a high drop out rate over time. It was clear that many of the NGOs were there because they were hoping for funding opportunities.

#### 4.3.4. *The role of Programme Antennas, Regional Correspondence Agencies (RCA) and Intermediary Organisation (IO).*

Several programmes have resorted to the use of regional antennas, often called regional correspondence agencies or, simply correspondent agencies (CA), or intermediary organisations (IO).

The role of these correspondent agencies is to represent the programme in all of its activities at a local level; ranging from the identification of local actors to the provision of support through mentoring and coaching and from the identification and even the selection of projects (through the bias, for instance, of a Regional Selection Committee) to their technical and financial monitoring. Their tasks are diverse and include the following:



#### **The role of Programme Antennas, Regional Correspondence Agencies (RCA) and Intermediary Organisations (IO)**

- **Divulging information on existing opportunities** (calls for proposals, calls to tender, access to financing etc.);
- **Assisting local actors wishing to submit a proposal** in the preparation of it (both on the technical and financial side);

- **Collecting the proposals to be sent** to the entities and committees charged with the selection of actions and candidates;
- **Performing Secretariat duties** for the meetings of the committees charged with the selection of actors and actions;
- **Networking;**
- **Technical and financial monitoring of actions** (such as support to the PMU personnel);
- **Targeted (mentoring and coaching) to the organisations** in their areas of intervention and support to the PMU on the basis of an individual diagnostic in terms of capacity building;
- **Continued information of the PMU** on the capacity building needs of CSOs in their intervention areas
- **Dissemination of information** in terms of capitalisation of experiences;
- **Contribution to monitoring actions;**
- **Assistance in terms of the implementation**, especially as regards the administrative and accounting aspects;
- **Capitalisation of best practices and exchange of information.**

It is important to highlight the risk of transforming the **cooperation between the Programme management Unit and the RCA/IOa into mere contractual relations**, whereby RCA/IO act as outsourced providers to perform a number of administrative and technical tasks. Evidence shows how RCAs/IOs should not be seen simply as programme antennae but as support opportunities to the creation of focal points for civil society on a regional level, which enters perfectly into the mission of the majority of umbrella organisations operating on a regional scale.

According to this approach, RCAs **are not exclusively charged with secretarial tasks** (for example the collection of grant requests) but, above all, are required to act in an active and proactive manner, even in terms of the preparation of different proposals and in direct assistance to the organisations requesting funds.

In reality, the involvement of NSAs on the regional level of a programme in the form of RCAs/IOs does not satisfy an organisational necessity to obtain correspondents or low cost antennas, but rather a NSA **support and capacity building** logic.

In light of this, with the RCAs/IOs the programme prioritises the **creation of expertise and services** not just for itself, but for all NSAs on the regional scale, as well as for the national technical and financial partners. RCAs/IOs, therefore, should be seen as centres of expertise and support, which can perform not only within the framework of the programme, but in all of the programmes of other TFPs.

It is possible to identify some **successful examples** of this approach in a number of programmes like ARIANE in Mali, the Civil Society Capacity Building Programme in Uganda and the PAANE in Angola.



### Lessons learnt from the use of IO in the CSCBP in Uganda

The CSCBP took an institutional mentoring approach using the PMU and Intermediary Organizations. As stated in the **Assessment of Capacity building inputs by CSCBP**, this approach had some pros and cons.

#### Pros

IOs built relationship with Grantees through On-site assistance/training  
IOs shared hands-on experiences and practices

IOs had other relationships with the grantees that created familiarity and or resurrected earlier differences....both of which undermined delivery of services.

Cost effective way mentoring grantees who are geographically widely spread  
over IOs work was unclear

Many IOs were too busy and not readily available

CSCBP control over IOs work was unclear

As indicated before, IOs **performed better when:**

- Were financially dependant on the programme (the contract represents more than 10% of the IO total budget)
- The mandate of the IO includes CB provision
- Organised more grantees meetings
- The key resources person was really dedicated to the programme (not performing too many other tasks)

## 4.4. The role and profile of TA

### 4.4.1. The role of TA

The experience garnered from the NSA support programmes under the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF have revealed a clear tendency that consist of the **conception of TA tasks focused almost exclusively on administrative and accounting aspects**, while the NSA support programmes must, in fact, adopt a different approach. In reality the TA of these new programmes must, first and foremost, hold the role of **facilitation of social processes that are underway**. This means that the TA team cannot simply limit itself to the simple administration of programme resources, but must stand up as a facilitating agent of the process and dynamics at the heart of the society by making available capacity building tools that can be used in respect of the different missions and vocations of NSAs.

This facilitation task of TAs in the NSA support programmes is by definition linked to one of the characteristics of the Cotonou Agreement, namely the **apprenticeship process** that new

dimensions, in particular the political dimension, of Community cooperation must hold in terms of relations between different actors.

It is useful to note that this **catalysing and facilitating role of TA** is aligned with the directions that must guide the provision of TA financed by the EC, according to the backbone strategy for technical cooperation. The table below gathers all of the main principles evinced under the strategy framework<sup>19</sup>:



### Main principles of Technical Cooperation

1. **Emphasis on capacity building** – The primary objective of technical cooperation is to support national internal processes focusing on the promotion of capacity building at individual level, organisational level and country-wide levels. Where relevant, technical cooperation can be called upon to fulfil other roles, such as the provision of advice, support to implementation and facilitation or preparation of EC cooperation.

2. **Approach based on demand when technical cooperation is not provided by default** – The provision of technical cooperation must depend on the demand and requirements of the partner country. The costs and options available must be transparent. Appropriate support and dialogue may be needed in order to allow a partner state to clearly formulate its request for technical cooperation.

3. **Adoption of a results-based approach** – The conception of technical cooperation should ensure that inputs and activities of technical cooperation are linked to research products, which in turn provide results towards the goal of sustainable development. The necessary indicators can be determined beforehand to guarantee the monitoring and implementation of technical cooperation.

4. **Appropriation and management of the technical cooperation process on a national basis** – The national appropriation by partner countries is a key principle that supports the structure of technical cooperation financed by the European Commission. In the identification phase of the implementation, partner countries are strongly included in the conception of the implementation modalities of projects and programmes supported by technical cooperation, including the services contracts of technical cooperation as well as the management, analysis and the ownership of the results of this technical cooperation.

5. **Taking into account the sectoral and national needs** – Technical cooperation applies to an in depth comprehension of the political, socio-cultural and environmental context. It seeks to avoid standard approaches.

6. **Harmonisation and alignment of actions** – Support to cooperation is strictly coordinated with the other donors and aligned upon the strategies and national programmes based, preferably, on the mechanisms that place resources at the disposal of all or to other harmonised approaches, much like delegated cooperation.

7. **Avoid resorting to the use of parallel project execution units and promote efficient project implementation modalities** – It is strongly advisable to avoid relying on parallel project execution units

<sup>19</sup>« Backbone strategy on Reforming technical cooperation and project implementation units for external aid provided by the European Commission and related work plan ». July 2008. European Commission.



and to prioritise efficient project implementation modalities clearly integrated and « indebted » to national structures.

**8. Bear different or untried options in mind as regards the provision of technical cooperation** – The conception of technical cooperation support envisages alternatives to the use of international consultants on short and long term missions. These alternatives encompass the use of national and regional resources, twinning agreements and exchange of best practices transcending the classical approaches of training.

#### 4.4.2. *The profile of TA*

The definition of the role brings us to the basic question of the profile of TA, which needs to be answered when the recruitment and selection process starts. In effect, the selection process to determine the TA in charge of NSA support programme management is a delicate step in the overall implementation. Despite the **theoretical and methodological interest that these programmes may raise among European NGOs they have, until now, been absent**. All in all, European NGOs can bring significant added value to the implementation of these programmes, for which the large European consultancies have, more often than not, an insufficient in-depth knowledge and understanding.

One of the fundamental reasons for the marginalisation of NGOs are that the EDF procedures contain not only a **direct fiscal responsibility** on the part of the contractor that will carry out the TA within the programme, but also require a significant **financial capacity and credit strength** considering that the contractor must also provide bank guarantees to manage the resources of work programmes.

Furthermore, European NGOs often **prefer a grant contract to a service provision contract**. Certain NGOs even refuse service contracts, which involve their automatic exclusion from the international calls for tenders for technical assistance under these programmes.

It is thus the case that often the only contractors that could possibly implement these NSA support programmes are **the large-scale European consultancies**, which are able to satisfy the requirements and financial conditions necessary to be granted the bank guarantees. Yet these consultancies do not always have the necessary skills to implement an NSA support programme, since they often hold, for evident entrepreneurial and strategic reasons, a far **more generalist approach**.

In order to master the potential risks linked to a lack of skills and to this propensity of interpreting their role as a general administrative management and accounting entity, in certain countries the ECD has opted for **partnering between national and European cabinets** (for example in Niger, Mali and the Dominican Republic) or for the **promotion of partnering** (international expert/national expert) as in the Comoros, which has the advantage of adding value to national expertise through the capacity building of NSAs. Nevertheless, the relation between international cabinets and national cabinets or institutions has not been exempt from difficulty, sometimes even incomprehensibility (such as in the Dominican Republic and Mali) by virtue of divergent vocations and logic, particularly when the national institution has a vocational, non profit goal.



## The Technical Assistance partnering system adopted for the Decentralised Cooperation Programme (DCP) in the Comoros

### Observations/Justification

- The International Technical Assistance (ITA) missions, demanded by the PMUs of projects merit, through expertise they bring as well as through the capacity of the PMU, **appropriation of the conclusions and an implementation of the recommendations.**
- However, **the projects have a limited life span** and the development process must be included during their duration. Time is one of the factors in shortest supply and, as such, it is necessary to **include these missions in the timeframe through permanent local expertise**; or through resorting to universities (national experts ITA counterparts) that can, on the one hand, guarantee the monitoring of the mission and, on the other, promote the outputs of the missions in their lessons. The contribution of the national expert allows, other than a better understanding of the context, a significant time saving for the mission.
- **ITA missions are also worth the methods and tools that the expert implements:** it is thus important that a transfer occurs and these joint missions are an excellent conduit for them.
- **It is also a way to ensure greater visibility of the programmes actions.**

### How does the system work in practice ?

- Short term ITA is included in the ITA contract. It is necessary to highlight the fact that this short term ITA contract, in the case of the DCP, was negotiated in retrospect, following the situation, which pointed to a lack of human resources that could be locally mobilised
- The costs associated with the national expert are included in the PE (provisions, transport etc.) for the duration of the mission .

Example:

#### **A- Training mission for local NGOs in the design of Communal Development Plans (CDP) and the conception of a practical guide.**

Step 1: research of bibliography and executive summary by the national expert; inventory of local experiences; pool on arrival of the ITA.

Step 2: co-piloting of the field mission (visits, interviews etc.); the training workshop and the elaboration of the “practical guide”

Step 3: Joint drafting of the analysis; end of the ITA mission

#### **B- Elaboration of CDPs**

The programme send on mission the trained NGOs to support communities in the elaboration of the CDPs and works on a contract with the national expert to ensure the monitoring of processes.

### And does it work ?

Despite the lack of hindsight due to the recent creation of this system, it is already greatly appreciated by the partners, and the added value of this set-up is real in the anchorage of its missions to the field reality and in the duplication of tools or methods for knowledge transfer.

In addition, whenever possible, the programme links young graduate Comorians, undertaking their first professional experience, to these missions.

In other cases, the **selection criteria of the evaluation grid for the choice of candidates was focused on devoting, for example, a strong value to the methodology and implementation strategy** proposed (for example in Guinea, with between 30-50 points out of 100), sometimes resorting to external expertise – national or international – to assist the evaluation commission

to better understand and evaluate the technical aspects linked to the methodology (as, for example, in Niger).

Other countries **prioritised the experience of the expert (between 10 and 15 years) in the area of support to civil society** and in the management of EDF projects. In reality, all of the countries have found themselves confronted with new problems regarding the implementation of programmes in new domains which have never been the subject of Community intervention and for which there is a total lack of references as regards prior experiences. It is thus important that the profile of experts is very specific but, at the same time, it must remain realistic, bearing in mind the novelty of this type of programmes. In this sense the criteria often needed for a head of mission with 15 years of experience in the implementation of NSA support programmes (as is the case in Burkina Faso), occasionally entirely under the EDF (in Mauritania, for example), can reveal an obstacle so great that it is practically impossible to fulfil the condition due to the fact that programmes only began under the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF.

The experience of PASOC in Mauritania shows how the work of a TA can be prepared in an adequate manner through a **preparatory phase** of several months, managed by the team that undertook the mapping, over the course of which the basic documents and sensitisation activities have already been done. Of course this option runs the risk of not resolving the problem of a rift between the approach adopted and the activities carried out during the preparatory and the inception phases.

In order to tackle these risks it would be opportune if a TA was assisted during the inception phase of a programme through a **guidance** that could consist of the support of a short term expert during the 3<sup>rd</sup>, 6<sup>th</sup> and 9<sup>th</sup> months of the life of a programme. This would allow to support the TA in the most delicate stages of the inception of a programme, that is: the drafting of an operational plan, the drafting of the start work plan and the formal launching of the programme: the drafting of the first work plan and the establishment of the required committees (SMCs and Selection Committees); and the launching and implementation of the first planned activities.

In a general sense, the drafting of the ToRs (as from the forwcast phase) and the criteria of integrating competences, are key aspects of the **selection phase** of the TA.

As regards the ToR, it is essential that they clearly contain the **roles that the TA is supposed to take on**, which should conform to the principles of the Cotonou Agreement in terms of support to NSAs (with a view to their capacity building). In this sense it is useful to define the role of a TA as “facilitation” of the process rather than execution of the administrative and accounting tasks.


When it comes to the second aspect, it would be interesting to **associate European NGOs to these programmes, since they would be able to provide significant experience in the field of support to the NSAs of the South**. In reality, European NGOs can have an added value in various aspects of the operational life of a programme. In this sense one can affirm that their competences can perfectly complement those of the private companies, as shown in the table here-after:

*Table 3 : The added value of cooperation actors*

Added value of the cooperation actors		
	Private consulting companies	EU NGOs

Financial Capacity	X	
Responsibility to endorse an externalised direct labour operations mode	X	
Knowledge and expertise in multi-stakeholder engagement		X
Knowledge and expertise in provision of capacity building to NSA		X
Technical competence of the personnel		X
Mastery of social dynamics		X
Knowledge of the country	X	X
Knowledge of EDF procedures	X	X (?)
Ability to mobilise civil society experts		X
North-South Networking		X

**Specifically concerning the capacity building process and activities**, the role of the TA in an NSA support programme must be centred around:



**TA role in capacity building**

- **Initiating reflexion within NSAs** on their mission in relation to the local, regional and countrywide stakes
- **Prioritising self analysis within the organisation**
- **Facilitating the capacity building needs identification exercise** through organisational and institutional assessments
- **Providing support**, where and when needed, for the organisation **of a strategic planning exercise**
- **Making the programme resources available** (in expertise, equipment, and networking)
- **Accompaniment of the actor** (not just the action)
- Ensuring the monitoring **and evaluation of the results of the support provided by the programme.**

Finally, there is one last aspect that needs to be noted, one that is strictly related to the role of TA: **the role of backstopping**. Although it was not foreseen in the majority of the 40 programmes analysed, this role has a primordial importance as regards the goals of efficiency of the TA and, in general, the success of the programme.

Indeed, the complexity of NSA support programmes includes a series of **skills** that are not easily found in the two or three experts that work within the PMU. Other than the question of skills,

these experts, due to the complexity of the context and EDF procedures, rarely have the capacity to distance and detach themselves from the daily problems and, as such, determine whether or not the intervention of the programme is **relevant**.

The role of backstopping could therefore prove itself to be of fundamental importance to supporting the onsite personnel on the condition that **a clear distinction is drawn between the two types of backstopping: administrative backstopping and technical backstopping**. If the first type of backstopping, involving a support to the central administration of the contractor in all that concerns adherence to the procedures and contractual obligations, is fairly common, the second type of backstopping is **relatively rare**.

In reality, a programme cannot expect a midterm review to adjust its strategy or to reorient it. It is necessary that **constant technical support is provided** from the headquarters and that, at the same time, best practices or solutions brought in by other programmes in the same sub region or elsewhere, are explored and eventually adapted to the context of the programme.

It must be noted that, up until now, the subject has been characterised by a **certain improvisation** and the different contractors have proceeded in a **very scattered way**: while some have invested in this basic backstopping function (often required due to the gravity and complexity of the administrative and financial problems), others have judged this role to have been omitted in the ToR and, as such, considered it to be pointless or even an extra burden to their formal requirements.

In reality, the question of the role of backstopping must be settled in a far more **formal** manner and needs to be institutionalised from the outset of the programme identification phase and, clearly, as a **fundamental aspect of the TA selection process**. In this sense the ToRs must, on the one hand, foresee the need to provide the profiles responsible for backstopping and, on the other, this role must be recognised in the budget in terms of person/days allocated (as much in Europe as on the ground).

It must be noted that, to this effect, the 40 programmes registered **one single case** (Burkina Faso) where the role of technical and administrative backstopping was recognised as much on the level of operational mechanisms of the programme as it was in terms of resources allocated (54 person/days on site). It is interesting to reveal that the offer of the winning consortium had envisaged, at its own cost, double the days initially allocated by the Contracting Authority for field visits.

Yet, this role can prove fundamentally useful to the success of a programme, as is shown in the case of the ARIANE programme in Mali.



#### **The reorientation of the ARIANE programme through backstopping missions**

In September 2007, the contractor in charge of the execution of the ARIANE programme in Mali, in cooperation with the services of the NAO and the ECD, bearing in mind the difficulties encountered by the programme during the first 18 months of its existence, **decided to call upon, at its own costs, an external consultant in support of African civil society capacity building who, among other things, indentified the programme in 2004 through a mapping study on Malian civil society**. The ARIANE programme, in September 2007, could count on some significant strengths, as well as

some problems that demanded a strategic reflexion and a reorientation of the choices made in terms of approach, as well as intervention modalities.

Among the strengths that can be noted **are the significant mobilisation of civil society organisations** as of the first phase of the programme and, in particular, in the launch of the first call for proposals and the **establishment of tools and procedures for the selection of activities to be funded**.

As regards problems, the institutional spokespersons of the programme (in a first instance the ECD) had highlighted several weaknesses, notably the **information and communication strategy of the programme** which was of particular importance bearing in mind the solicitations and needs expressed during the ARIANE participative identification exercise (through regional workshops and the national synthesising workshop).

As for the programme team, it had been noticed early on, after a few months, that there was a problem **with the conception and allocation of resources relating to the “capacity building”** component of Malian civil society. In this sense a reflexion document proposing different scenarios **was drafted with the aim of identifying solutions on the strategic level** (in terms of the role that the component should have within the programme) as well as **on the financial level**.

The drafting of the second work programme (for the two components: “support to development initiatives” and “capacity building”), the launch of the second call for proposals, as well as the need for a clear and efficient information communication strategy, in essence sped up the internal programme reflexion. **It was this reflexion, initiated within the programme that was the point of departure for the backstopping mission of 2007.**


It is thus that the mission, however short (barely 7 days), allowed for **the detection of a series of risks that became the object of an in depth analysis in light of a strategic reorientation of ARIANE**, which consisted of:

- **Accentuating the capacity building character of the programme while avoiding the adoption of the pre-Cotonou era micromanagement logic;**
- Focusing on the **guidance of actors as opposed to the execution of activities;**
- Researching, by preference, **the contextual link on the bases of the stakes that Malian civil society face; a fundamental contribution to the definition of pertinence criteria** to adopt for the selection of actors and their proposals;
- Adopting a **“make-do” approach over a “do” approach**, something which involves acknowledgement of the civil society dynamics, as well as the different vocations of CSOs;
- **Inciting RCAs to act in an active and proactive manner**, even during the establishment of different files and in direct assistance to the applicants and not merely considering their role as that of a simple secretariat (for example the collection of grant applications);
- **Focusing the activities of the ARIANE TA, notably the standard administrative tasks, on the facilitation of social process** underway within Malian civil society and capacity building through the guidance of actors;
- Increasing **the relevance of funded grants**, differentiating between call for proposals **on the basis of organisational levels with Malian CSOs and revising the maximum grant envelopes down;**
- Increasing **the gamut of possible activities in terms of capacity building** all while avoiding limiting one’s self to training activities for EDF procedures;
- **Placing the programme resources at the disposition of the cooperation process** between civil society and the State;
- Making a **clear distinction between Programme visibility activities and information communication activities;**
- Searching, above all, for a **positive synergy between the activities of other technical and financial partners present in the country in the area of civil society.**

Following this backstopping and strategic reorientation mission, the different measures suggested were effectively adopted and the programme was able to resolve its difficulties.

#### 4.5. The role of international NGO (INGO)

From the analysis of the 40 NSAs support programmes, the following table has been produced:



As it can be seen, **63% of the programmes do not involve International Non Governmental Organisations (INGOs)** and only 27% give a role to these organisations, either as beneficiaries or as partners and local actors. For 10% of the programmes, there is no information available. Two countries (Guinea Bissau and Somalia) must be added to these results, as evoked in the chapter on management modalities and, later on, regarding technical assistance, where INGOs have a heightened role in the management of programmes.

These results, which bear witness to the feeble participation of INGOs, not only on the level of TA but also as partners on NSA support programmes and, in particular, civil society support programmes, contrast **strongly with the present and dynamism of INGOs in a fair amount of ACP countries.**

In effect, European and International NGOs have a historically significant role in the **emergence** and **support** of CSOs in ACP countries, notably in the domain of development and the promotion of human rights. However, these important actors in the world of cooperation and development have, lately, seen financial difficulties due to a considerable decrease in public aid to worldwide development as well as changes brought upon the aid structure (opening funding to actors other than NGOs; decentralisation of grant lines; etc.).

It is thus that some European and International NGOs have started to examine alternative ways to obtain funds, placing themselves directly in the ACP countries for the execution of donor programmes and projects; either in direct collaboration with local actors (often in the form of subcontractors), or in a **competitive** manner alongside national actors. At the other extreme, an **increasing number of INGOs are progressively engaged** in strengthening local actors and through the provision of capacity building.



### On the role of INGOs providing support to local CSO

Key lessons learnt as proposed in the guidelines developed by the partners supporting the Civil Society Support net

[http://www.civilsocietysupport.net/doc/civil\\_society - guidelines october 07 final.pdf](http://www.civilsocietysupport.net/doc/civil_society_-_guidelines_october_07_final.pdf)

- International NGOs have been an important channel of support to CSOs for many years, acting as intermediaries for development partners. Different types of northern NGOs such as faith based and human rights organisations or solidarity movements, support sister organisations. They use their own experiences from their development processes as a source for capacity exchange and added value. Development INGOs that come from a tradition of charity organisations often have a sizeable capacity for mobilizing poor communities and vulnerable groups as well as supporting smaller, weaker and more rural based CSOs.
- **The INGOs play the role of both partner and donor - a potentially difficult position due to the powers invested in the latter.** They can have great freedom from development partners, with substantial budgets in long-term funding arrangements to suit the diverse character of civil society. There is however, a growing concern among national NGOs that the INGOs are competing unfairly for resources, and may undermine the growth of an independent civil society.
- Development partners need to show an interest **in understanding better if and how the INGOs complement their strategies, and what value they are adding, apart from funding local organisations.** INGOs are therefore encouraged to be more transparent in line with the general strategy of civil society support in Tanzania.
- The work and contribution of INGOs needs to be an integral part of the overall picture of support to civil society, and therefore seen in the same light as support given by development partners. This is particularly important in the current culture which demands transparency and coordination. The principles of the Paris Agenda should also be followed.

Whatever the cause, the global trend among INGOs seems to be that of enlarging and entrenching the inclusion of local CSOs in their policies and programmes, with the exception of humanitarian NGOs, where the interventions are often characterised by an overly “interventionist” approach as regards local partners. By the same token, the approaches and practices of partners in terms of civic engagement vary considerably.

**Three categories of factors** (i. Underlying visions; ii. Motivations and; iii. Objective and extent of relations) are necessary to understand this diversity:

#### *4.5.1. The underlying view on civil society*



In terms of underlying views on civil society, it is possible to distinguish two conceptions that are almost entirely at odds with one another. They nevertheless need to remain nuanced, as certain partners can take a mixed approach:

- An **instrumental vision of NSAs and, notably, of civil society**, which considers the actors as providers of basic services to local populations (in the fields of health, education, water, security, food etc.) while complimenting the national **development policies, led by the government** and supported by the community of donors. In this framework, CSOs are fundamentally seen as subcontractors for the provision of a number of social and productive services, thus replacing the capacity-lacking State;
- A concept of civil society as **an autonomous development entity**, with its own agenda, which can integrate service provision roles, in line with the existing institutional systems and structures, with governance functions in the realm of civic education, social mobilisation and watchdog mechanisms, aimed to promote the establishment of a culture of justice, the emergency of a citizenry and a greater degree of transparency and accountability in the governance institutions regarding its citizenship.


#### *4.5.2. The motivations*

In terms of motivations, engagement with national CSOs can be summarily grouped into three categories:

- **Resorting to CSOs to implement activities or components of a project or programme.** In this framework, the intervention strategy and modalities are unilaterally defined by the INGOs, the CSOs relegated to the role of contractors for which they foresee some financing. It is, in essence, a contractual relation which emanates from an instrumental vision of civil society as mentioned above, where often the CSOs are selected based on their skills and their price, through a call for proposals or call to tender mechanism;
- **Providing grants** and other forms of financial support to **CSOs** to allow them to implement their own initiatives. In this scenario, INGOs act as classical donor organisations, supporting individual projects, often without a strategic or global vision;
- **Supporting CSOs in a reciprocal cooperation and partnering logic** based on a mid-to-long term strategy that hinges **fundamentally on the capacity building of CSOs.**

The following diagram illustrates these three relation modalities.

Figure 3: Relation modalities between partners (INGOs) and CSOs



#### 4.5.3. The objective and scope of relations

In terms of the **scope of the relationship**, the initiatives to involve and engage with local CSOs can be classified into three main categories:

- **Ad hoc practical relationships**, in which CSOs act as sub-contractors for the delivery of services and/or receive ad hoc funds for the execution of their own initiatives;
- **Operational partnerships**, which include a degree of skills transfer on the side of partners as a complement to the activity;
- **Strategic associations and partnerships**, in which partners provide technical assistance and advice in order to build the capacity of CSOs to stimulate a constructive engagement of CSOs with the government, themselves and/or with other key actors. In order to do this,

INGOs place specific funds and resources at the disposal of CSOs aimed, first and foremost, at building capacity. **Several modus operandi** are adopted:

- **Technical assistance** through the provision (on a mid to long term basis) of human resources (volunteers or technical assistants), or financial resources destined for the recruitment of local expertise;
- **Institutional support** in terms of financial resources, with a view towards contributing to the role of local organisations;
- **Grants for financing micro-initiatives** formulated by CSOs in order to allow for an acquisition of professional experience in the management of projects;
- **Institutional mentoring** of local organisations through the elaboration of institutional diagnostics, trainings, consultative support for actions etc.



### About the partnering work between INGO and local CSO in Somalia

**How INGOs interact with Somali CSO partners is largely determined by the ECSU strategy.** Indeed, the EC insists on a **partnership approach** between INGOs and CSOs and does so for two reasons:

- Somali CSOs are embedded in society and thus far better placed to reach out to the local population;
- A partnership approach, moreover, can be an effective way of strengthening the local CSO 'biotope'.

Most international CSOs therefore work with local partners and many of them clearly invest a lot in capacity development of their counterparts. The work of InterPeace is exemplary in this regard, and their three regional partners are now considered to be among the best CSOs in Somalia.

Certain local service delivery CSOs, however, complained that they are still viewed as mere subcontractors, executing activities but not necessarily benefiting from capacity development.

Bearing in mind the novelty of the EC intervention in the themes linked to the support of NSAs and, in particular, to civil society, the capitalisation of experiences on the part of other technical and financial partners, notably INGOs for which the accompaniment and support of CSOs follows a **reciprocal cooperation and partnering logic**, can play a **fundamental role** in the implementation of the new programmes under the 10th EDF programmes.

To this end, coordination on the level of different stakeholders, and working in cooperation with INGOs established in the country that share the same vision on building the capacity of CSOs, represents an efficient way to: i) capitalise on the experiences underway or already completed and; ii) creates synergies to the benefit of CSOs and their reinforcement. It is thus a proven necessity, for the new programmes to take INGOs into account and bring them on board as

technical and/or financial partners, when and where they have been established in the country. On the basis of a critical evaluation of their visions, approaches and modus operandi, as described above, partnering agreements should, when appropriate, be established within the framework of the programme.

#### 4.6. Cooperation with donor organisations and the new common funding systems (pool funding)

##### 4.6.1. Cooperation with donor organisations

From the analysis of the 40 NSA support programmes, it is clear that only **a minority of programmes adopted a proactive approach**, supported and institutionalised in terms of cooperation with other donor organisations, which surpassed the implementation of a few ad-hoc actions and holding regular cooperation meetings.

On the one hand, as evinced in the chapter on management modalities, only the programmes in the Seychelles (with UNDP), in Kenya (also with UNDP) and in Sierra Leone (with DFID) foresee joint and/or delegated implementation arrangements<sup>20</sup>. Other programmes, such as those in Lesotho, Uganda or Angola, have envisaged a mode of cooperation with other donors which surpasses the anecdotal and ad hoc level, to become more institutionalised and regular, without arriving, notwithstanding the effort, at the formulation of a strategic collaboration. Finally, in the majority of cases, cooperation has been limited to the attendance of regular meetings with other technical and financial partners active in the support of NSAs and to a number of improvised exchanges for the coordination of particular initiatives (from the moment that an organisation supported by the programme is also financed by other donors; for initiatives involving the whole sector, such as the support for drafting deontological codes for the sector, support for the drafting of legal texts concerning CSOs; etc.). It is useful to mention that coordination with other partners often depends on the will and the capacity of the Programme Manager, without omitting, as far as is possible, the importance of the general country framework for institutional cooperation, inspired by the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.



#### The Civil Society Support Net in Tanzania

<http://www.civilsocietysupport.net/>

##### Objectives and contents of the website:

The **website** was created by a number of development partners (DPs) in Tanzania to share information on their support to civil society. It contains a database on development partners' support to civil society (both to service delivery as well as advocacy work), background information on this joint initiative, and details of the development partners contributing to the website. The **database** covers three types of information:

- an introduction of the individual development partners, their work in Tanzania, and their approach to supporting civil society
- information on ongoing projects, and other types of support

<sup>20</sup> It must be noted that such arrangements were not possible before 2006

- information on grant / support facilities available to civil society organisations.

The creation of a joint database on civil society support aims at creating more transparency and allowing better co-ordination amongst development partners, while at the same time making it easier for civil society organisations to identify potential partners. This initiative is a component of the *Guidelines on Development Partners' Support to Civil Society*. These Guidelines were endorsed by the main coordinating Development Partners' Group in June 2007 as a framework to guide DPs in their planning and provision of support to civil society.

Both the Website and Database were launched by the **EC and CIDA in Dar es Salaam**, Tanzania, on 11 April 2008.

**Background and Gist of the 'Development Partners' Guidelines for Support to Civil Society'**, which gave rise to the website and database:

A number of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in Tanzania approached development partners in 2006 and asked that guidelines and/or a common framework be written to help coordinate and make more transparent development partners' (DPs) support to CSOs engaging in advocacy and policy work. They felt that whilst having put a tremendous effort into coordinating their support to, and relations with government under the Joint Assistance Strategy, development partners tended to be more fragmented in their approach to supporting civil society, uncoordinated, short-sighted and often lacking a clear strategic focus.

The **Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (EKN) led the process of drawing up such guidelines in collaboration with other development partners**. Consultations with civil society organisations were key throughout the process. Their combined efforts define a common framework for support to civil society organisations working mainly in advocacy and engaging in policy processes. The underlying guidelines which depict this common framework follow principles similar to those of the Paris Declaration. The aim is to improve development partner co-ordination and strategic focus, and ultimately to strengthen the demand side of accountability, and thus make a greater, and more sustainable impact on development in Tanzania.

[http://www.civilsocietysupport.net/doc/civil\\_society - guidelines october 07 final.pdf](http://www.civilsocietysupport.net/doc/civil_society_-_guidelines_october_07_final.pdf)

#### *4.6.2. New common funding systems (pool funding)*

Changes to this effect are already occurring and one can hope that the collaboration with other donors, notably the member states as well as international organisations, will see an increase under the 10<sup>th</sup> EDF. In effect, from the moment that donors prioritise an increased harmony, in line with the Paris Declaration, they are contributing to the emergence of new **common financing systems, conceived to** enable more secure funding arrangements which are independent of day to day management by donors<sup>21</sup>. This is the case, for example, of:

- The "Foundation for Civil Society" in Tanzania
- The "Independent Development Fund" in Uganda
- The "Civil Society Support Programme" in Ethiopia (in preparation)
- The "Civil Society Support Mechanism" in Mozambique.

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<sup>21</sup> "The participation of NSAs in poverty reduction strategies, sector approaches and monitoring of policy implementation". Draft January 2009. AIDCO/E/4. European Commission.

Let us take a close look at two of these common financing arrangements:



### **The Foundation for Civil Society” in Tanzania**

[www.thefoundation-tz.org](http://www.thefoundation-tz.org)

The Foundation for Civil Society is a Tanzanian non-profit company, designed and funded by a group of like-minded development partners, and governed by an independent Board. It was previously known as the Civil Society Program (CSP). The Foundation was registered in September 2002 and started operations in January 2003.

#### **Vision**

To become a sustainable model of excellence that contributes to the development of a vibrant, effective and innovative civil society sector that enables citizens to engage in the democratic process, promote human rights and contribute to poverty reduction and a better quality of life for all Tanzanians.

#### **Mission**

To provide grants and other capacity building support to civil society organisations to enable economically disadvantaged and vulnerable citizens to:

- Access information and understand policies, laws and their rights
- Engage effectively in policy formulation and monitoring on poverty reduction
- Contribute to social development and to constructively hold the government and private sectors to account.

#### **What is the aim of the Foundation?**

The Foundation aims to establish an intermediary support mechanism for civil society organisations in Tanzania which will enable effective engagement in poverty reduction efforts as set out in the Government of Tanzania policies: Vision 2025, the Tanzania Assistance Strategy, and the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP). The Foundation is one of the largest support mechanisms for civil society in Tanzania, and is committed to delivering grant aid and supporting capacity-building initiatives as a means of strengthening effective engagement in poverty reduction.

#### **What is the Structure of the Foundation?**

The Foundation for Civil Society is operated by the Secretariat and governed by an independent Board and Members.

The secretariat which is located in Dar es salaam, is responsible for day-to-day activities of the Foundation. It comprises three departments; Grants Department, Development Department and Administration & Finance Department.

#### **Grants Department**

The Grants department is primarily responsible for issues regarding grants. It is responsible for grants information dissemination through information sessions, grants application processing and contract management of the projects. The department is implementing these activities through site visits, information sessions in the regions and reports analysis.

#### **Development Department**

The Development Department has the overall responsibility of developing and monitoring the Foundation’s policies and procedures. It is a resource centre for the organisation. Specifically, the department’s role is to make sure that the intended outputs and impacts of the Foundation’s services are realised effectively through impact assessments, grantees auditing, information gathering and dissemination, enhancing partnership and networks, conducting participatory research on CSOs,

capacity development for CSOs and public engagement through public policy dialogues.

#### **Administration and Finance Department**

The Administration and Finance department is responsible for ensuring that the organisation is providing quality services by managing recurrent expenses and maximising value for money within the allocated budget. It has the responsibility to prepare financial reports and ensure sources of funds. The administration and finance department is also charged with the role of updating human resource systems and developing staff related policies.



### **The Civil Society Support Mechanism (CSSM) (Mozambique)**

The **Civil Society Support Mechanism (CSSM)** is in the process of being established by DFID and Irish Aid. It aims to improve governance and accountability for ordinary Mozambican citizens through strengthening and diversifying the engagement of civil society organisations with monitoring and advocacy on governance. Over time, the expected outcome of the proposed intervention will be more effective and accountable operation of the key institutions of governance.

The primary target groups of CSSM are civil society organisations that have an existing focus on areas of governance or are in a position to respond to opportunities to engage in governance issues when they arise such as in the case of elections or the revision of the PRSP.

A combination of support through capacity development, funding and improved access to information will be provided through an independently managed mechanism. The main function of this professional management body is “to facilitate, catalyse, support civil society activity and capacity development in the areas of economic and political governance; not become a civil society organisation in its own right.

The Management Agent appointed to implement CSSM will be responsible for the internal financial management and will be expected to provide Irish Aid and DFID, with quarterly and annual financial reports in an agreed format. Irish Aid and DFID will jointly be responsible for ensuring one annual external audit of CSSM and have the right to carry out other joint audits at any time.

Other key structures include a Management Board that will be responsible for overall policy and strategic development of CSSM, including overseeing financial, policy and administrative directions. Members of the Board will be drawn from donors, civil society and people independent from, but with an understanding of, government. The Board may draw periodically upon an expanded technical group of individuals who can provide strategic and policy updates and analysis.

In order for CSOs to be eligible for a grant, proposals will need to include an outline of the governance intervention, a monitoring and evaluation plan for the CSO and a capacity development plan for the CSO. Where possible, CSOs’ financial and reporting systems will be used. This may put an extra burden on the Managing Agent who will have to deal with a range of systems, but it will avoid the scenario of overly stringent reporting systems being imposed on grantees. As a result, in the first instance finance will only go to strong organizations with the capacity to develop the necessary documents. Weaker organizations will be able to engage through standard packages of training (sub-contracted to existing CSOs) and exchange visits. CSOs will be responsible for evaluating themselves, in order to shift from the idea of evaluation carried out by donors for donors, as CSOs never see the results. Ultimately it is trying to shift the balance of where the responsibility for a grant lies.

**Capacity development is a key focus area for the CSSM.** Provision of capacity development will not be restricted to civil society organisations that receive grants but will be open to all interested and appropriate CSOs engaged with governance in various locations.

It is too early to assess these types of mechanisms, the reason being that their genesis is too recent. Nevertheless, it is possible to describe a number of advantages, as well as risks and constraints, some still in the realm of possibility, from observing them.

In terms of the **advantages** of such a common financing system, one can note:



#### **Advantages of a common financing system**

- **The system entails a reduction in transaction costs and a larger flexibility in the administration of donor funds** (particularly the constituent donors, delegating administration of their funds) and promotes a **greater degree of efficiency in the use of funds**.
- **The system promotes a greater coordination and harmonisation of the policies and strategies of donors**, in accordance with the Paris Agenda.
- **The system unifies and simplifies the criteria and requirements for monitoring/reporting/etc. prescribed to beneficiary organisations**, which allows NSAs to devote more time to the programme and the consecutive realisation of the anticipated results.
- **The system has the potential to allow the establishment of more ambitious and structured programmes, integrating various components** (“core funding”, “block grants”, project financing, targeted capacity building actions, information activities, strategic dialogue etc.).
- **Generally, transparent structures** for the management of funds, as well as performances systems for technical and administrative monitoring are established.
- The system **heightens the predictability of NSA resources** and allows for **strategic associations** in the long term with other organisations.
- The donors **have the potential to shift focus onto strategic dialogue** and political dialogue with NSA, as the administrative tasks linked to monitoring will have been delegated.
- The system facilitates the reduction of the **duplication phenomenon/overlap of financing, activities**, etc.
- In general, the absorption capacity of individual NSAs is reduced; a **limitation that the pool financing system can help bypass**.
- It is very probable that donors are in a position to donate more important funds to the support of NSAs, **as both the leading donor organisation and the constituent donor organisations will benefit from economies of scale**.

In terms of the constraints and risks associated with common financing systems, one can note:



#### **Constraints and risks associated with common financing systems**

- **Small NSAs (especially small CSOs) will not have the capacity to compete with larger organisations**, well established and more stable. **If the system does not integrate a targeted**



**approach** (in terms of financing windows, eligibility criteria and distinct selections etc.) by category and type of actor (e.g. according to the level of NSA intervention, the dimension of the organisation, influence etc.) it is very likely that it will end up by favouring large urban organisations, well established and recognised, to the detriment of smaller organisations, informal and/or distanced from the capital and/or ignorant of donor procedures.

- **The existence of one sole source of financing**, which focuses all of the donor support, **runs the risk of an over dependence**, particularly for the poor organisations, which do not have relations with technical or financial partners (notably INGOs), political and strategic changes engendered by the donors and/or the government.
- NSAs fear that donor harmonisation will **lead to a reduction in financing for support to NSAs**.
- The system brings with it the risk of **a reduced contact between NSAs and constituent donors and their demands for dialogue on their strategies, as the financing is not directly doled out by these donors**.
- **The system limits the control of constituent donors on the choice of sectors and themes that can be financed**.
- Some donors, such as **USAID and JICA** are opposed to this system and stake the claim that it does not allow for “every dollar to be donated to a specific activity”.

## 5. CAPACITY BUILDING: DEFINITION, APPROACHES AND MODUS OPERANDI

### 5.1. The programme components and the approaches and tools deployed for capacity building

As mentioned in the chapter on the goals of programmes, as regards the main principles, NSA support programmes often appear to be **vast and complex endeavours** with regard to the nature of the objectives sought, which seek profound changes across a plethora of domains. It is thus common that NSA support programmes integrate **several components** that stretch from the capacity building of individual organisations and their representatives to the relationship aspects of networking and to questions of political dialogue with the State in its different dimensions.


This multi dimensional nature of programmes conforms precisely, as highlighted in the introductory chapter of the study, with the **systemic nature of capacity building**. In effect the reinforcement (better than building) of capacities, conceived as a **process** that focuses on facilitating the consolidation, in conjunction with the actors, of their capacities to allow them to evolve and adapt to the new contextual needs in order to fulfil their role within a partnering scheme or model, has a multi dimensional manner, in the sense that it focuses on three dimensions:

- The dimension of **reinforcing individual skills** where the questions linked to strategic leadership are also handled;
- The dimension of **the organisation**, with specific attention paid to the aspects of identity, as well as the criteria of efficiency and effectiveness;
- The dimension of **reinforcement of relations** and of the **context** where the vital questions are those of the development of skills and capacities for collaboration with other actors and the elaboration of a legal and institutional framework adapted to the needs of organisations and the demands in terms of participation in management of public policy. The environment is thereby conceived not only as a conditioning factor (in

a positive or negative manner) for the institutional reinforcement of actors, but also as an element that one can aspire to transform.

The figure below illustrates this.

Figure 4 : A reminder of the capacity building dimensions



A second observation regarding capacity building is that of its **necessary adaptation to the existing contexts**. In other words, there is no “magic formula” or “blue print” for capacity building. The different current approaches are the product of a plethora of strategies, methods and resources focused on changing mentalities such as the development of certain technical skills and the exchange of knowledge and skills.

It is thus that the **instruments are significantly diversified** and comprise, among others: training, access to and dissemination of information, exchange fora, facilitation and guidance, consultative support, tutoring and twinning systems, inter organisational collaboration and networking, feedback and capitalisation of experiences, tested institutional approaches, etc.



### About capacity building

**Key lessons learnt as proposed in the guidelines developed by the partners supporting the Civil Society Support net**

[http://www.civilsocietysupport.net/doc/civil\\_society\\_-\\_guidelines\\_october\\_07\\_final.pdf](http://www.civilsocietysupport.net/doc/civil_society_-_guidelines_october_07_final.pdf)

There has been a widespread, vivid discussion on capacity development for a number of years. Different development agencies define capacity in different ways. However there are some basic principles that are accepted by the majority:

- Capacity development **is about *enhancing learning* rather than transferring knowledge, and puts a great emphasis on ownership.**
- The starting point for capacity development **is building on what already exists.**
- Good capacity development **aims at sustainable learning and accepts that there are no blueprint solutions.** Each capacity development initiative must be seen in its own context and specifically designed for individual needs.

In terms of support for capacity building, a number of requirements can be drawn from the principles above:

- **Any initiative must be based on an analysis of the present situation.** People working in the organisation need to be involved. They are responsible for their own change and must therefore express their own needs. The capacity development must be demand driven.
- **The objectives and methods will and should vary depending on which level,** individual, organizational, relational or enabling environment is addressed.
- **Quality capacity development is not about sending in technical assistance,** it is about *unleashing* the potential capacity that already exists.

The following table gathers some of the most used instruments, all the while putting them into context as much with the objectives sought as with the capacity building dimensions.

*Table4 : Capacity Building instruments in relation to objectives and dimensions*


Capacity Building Dimension	Objectives of the capacity building	Instrument examples and methods
<b>Individual Dimension</b>	Improving the leadership of NSAs.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Trainings on leadership development;</li> <li>▪ Consultative support/technical assistance in strategic planning of organisations;</li> <li>▪ Consultative support/technical assistance for the clarification of roles in the steering and administration/management of organisations;</li> <li>▪ Etc.</li> </ul>
	Creation or improvement of the formulation, management and monitoring capacities for cooperation programmes and projects	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Consultative support/technical assistance/guidance of organisations (by a partner organisation – mentoring and coaching systems-, a specialised cabinet etc.) in the formulation and implementation of programmes;</li> <li>▪ Trainings on project management;</li> <li>▪ Internships/exchange programmes/"twinning" within the partner organisations;</li> <li>▪ Short term missions by technicians of a partner organisation;</li> <li>▪ Financial means for project prospection;</li> <li>▪ Training to recycle and specialize employees;</li> <li>▪ Support to the implementation of concrete projects responding to the needs of the populations;</li> <li>▪ Etc.</li> </ul>
<b>Organisational Dimension</b>	Improvement of the analytical capacities in terms of public policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Support to the organisation of local, regional or national workshops and seminars;</li> <li>▪ Trainings on public policy analysis and donor cooperation strategies and programmes;</li> <li>▪ Promotion of dialogue fora with donor organisations;</li> <li>▪ Etc.</li> </ul>
	Improvement of the lobbying and negotiation capacities of NSAs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Support to the organisation of local, regional or national workshops and seminars ;</li> <li>▪ Trainings on public policy analysis and donor cooperation strategies and programmes;</li> <li>▪ Trainings on negotiation and advocacy (lobbying) techniques</li> <li>▪ Networking and support/consultation on the part of partners specialised in the domain of advocacy (lobbying);</li> <li>▪ Diffusion of best practices;</li> <li>▪ Etc.</li> </ul>
	Improving the management and administration capacities of organisations according to transparency criteria	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Consultative support/technical assistance/guidance of organisations (by a partner organisation – mentoring and coaching systems-, a specialised cabinet etc.);</li> <li>▪ Financing organisational and institutional assessments;</li> <li>▪ Short term missions by technicians of a partner organisation;</li> <li>▪ Organisation and financing of national and international exchanges;</li> <li>▪ Implementation of systems and procedures within the organisation;</li> <li>▪ Trainings on accounting, financial management etc.;</li> <li>▪ Etc.</li> </ul>

	Improving the degree of specialisation of organisations and coherence of the mission and actions.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Consultative support/technical assistance/guidance of organisations (by a partner organisation – mentoring and coaching systems-, a specialised cabinet etc.);</li> <li>▪ Financing organisational and institutional assessments and strategic planning exercises and/or organisational repositioning;</li> <li>▪ Financing and/or organisation of assessments aiming to identify and listing existing capacities within the NSA;</li> <li>▪ Short term missions by technicians of a partner organisation;</li> <li>▪ Organisation and financing of national exchanges;</li> <li>▪ Etc.</li> </ul>
	Reinforcing the institutional and financial stability of NSA organisations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Financing organisational and institutional assessments and strategic planning exercises and/or organisational repositioning;</li> <li>▪ Implementation of systems and procedures within the organisation;</li> <li>▪ Financial means for project prospection;</li> <li>▪ Training to recycle and specialize employees;</li> <li>▪ Support to the implementation of concrete projects responding to the needs of the populations;</li> <li>▪ Etc.</li> </ul>
<b>Relational and Institutional Dimension</b>	Enhancement of the representativeness and legitimacy of umbrella organisations (3 <sup>rd</sup> and 4 <sup>th</sup> tier organisations)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Organisation and financing of national and international exchanges;</li> <li>▪ Promotion of dialogue fora (with donor organisations) on sector policies;</li> <li>▪ Action-Research activities on experiences of cooperation and coordination within the region/international level;</li> <li>▪ Financial support for the capitalisation of local and national coordination experiences;</li> <li>▪ Support and core funding for the establishment of umbrella entities;</li> <li>▪ Support/consultation/guidance for the improvement of accountability systems within umbrella organisations</li> <li>▪ Etc.</li> </ul>
	Improvement of access to information.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Creation of a bulletin (paper and/or electronic);</li> <li>▪ Establishment of a web site “portal” for the totality of NSAs organisations;</li> <li>▪ Organisation of regular meetings;</li> <li>▪ Networking between NSAs (local, regional, national and international level, South-South, North-South);</li> <li>▪ Integration of organisations into the thematic and/or regional, national or international networks;</li> <li>▪ Etc.</li> </ul>
	Improvement of the coordination of NSA organisations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Organisation and financing of national and international exchanges;</li> <li>▪ Promotion of dialogue fora (with donor organisations) on sector policies;</li> <li>▪ Action-Research activities on experiences of cooperation and coordination within the region/international level;</li> <li>▪ Support and core funding for the establishment of umbrella entities;</li> <li>▪ Support to the draft of a deontological code;</li> <li>▪ Etc.</li> </ul>
	Improvement of the legal and regulatory framework of NSAs on different national levels	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Support and funding for drafting of legal texts; administrative provisions regarding registration of NSA, etc;</li> <li>▪ Promotion of exchanges with the government (line ministries and departments in charge of relations with non state actors);</li> <li>▪ Support and TA to government departments in charge of NSA relations</li> <li>▪ Etc.</li> </ul>


## 5.2. Approaches deployed by the programmes for the prioritisation of NSA access to capacity building activities

**Four main approaches** were identified within the programmes analysed. They can be placed on a continuum, going from a purely reactive approach, based on the call for proposals tool to a programmatic and proactive approach, based on the elaboration of a capacity building plan, starting from a strategic analysis, as the figure below shows.

Figure 5: The four approaches adopted by the programmes for capacity building



The analysis of approaches deployed in the 40 programmes produces the following results:



In total, 85% of programmes analysed rest on a fundamentally reactive approach, where **the call for proposals constitutes a prioritised mechanism**, sometimes the only mechanism, to provide capacity building to NSAs; their role being thus comparable to that of a thematic programme (such as the “Non State Actors and Local Authorities” programme). Only 15% of programmes relied exclusively on a capacity building plan based on the analysis of demands, while 42% of programmes sought a mixed approach, which combines the calls for proposals with a programming process in terms of capacity building. This is the case, for instance, of the NSA support programmes in Uganda and Dominican republic as briefly presented below:



**A number of innovative features of the mixed approach used in the CSCBP in Uganda**

The programme combined a “**learning by doing**” approach (by giving grants for implementation of service delivery and advocacy projects) with tailor-made institutional mentoring by IOs and general training, peer education and networking and socialising initiatives promoted by the PMU with the support of external expertises. The grant system acted both as **an incentive and direct input into the CSO work**, with demonstrable effects:

- Giving grants as **a way of putting into practice the knowledge through the implementation of the projects granted.**
- **Giving grants + CB as a way of building trust:** CB based on a strategic partnership that the grant scheme created (according to the PMU Manager, more than 80% of the grantees understood that they were not only being given funds, as with other donors)

Equally important was the **top-down support provided by the PMU and the IOs (based on a thorough OCA)**. This integrated model provided a useful and effective capacity building model, allowing a more programmatic and strategic view of the CBP and allowing the programme to be more proactive and not only demand-driven.

In addition to that, the programme also included a promotion Fund, intended to reach groups and CSO’s that were not enough qualified for the grants. The programme identified 15 of those groups and a specific IO was assigned to work with them to provide basic CB (direct funding).

Here-after are presented a number of innovative tools and mechanisms used by the programme:

**Peer education mechanism:** Ten competent accountants were selected given training to agree on the methodology and also to groom them in training adults. The trained accountants were placed for 3 to 4 days in other grantee organizations to train their accountants.

**Pros**

Team building and collaboration between and among grantee personnel  
 Training for accountants engaged to become Trainers

**Cons**

Concept was not marketed well...it required to be appreciated by both the trainer and trainee if it were to be successful  
 Tended to duplicate the IOs assignment  
 Some of the Grantees felt not in need of training

**Field visits to the grantees before disbursement of funds:** Such visits allowed to detect NGO that had given fake information and were removed from the programme and, at the same time, to gather information on the level of capacity of the grantees and the common capacity gaps in order to draft a training strategy

**Presentation of the projects in their communities:** Grantees had to present their projects in the communities they were going to work in before receiving the funds. This enhanced more accountability from the part of CSOs and allowed them to gained credibility among communities, local authorities and other partners.

**Best Practice Awards :** they were aimed at all CSO, not only grantees and nominated by people; they enhanced visibility of the programme (TV documentary, reports at the newspapers...); and were a tool for dissemination of good practices (grantees visit awarded organisations). One major criterion for selection of the Best Practice Award winner was the degree of creativity, innovation and possibility of adapting or replicating the practice in other places.

**Best grantee Award:** the CSP in Uganda gave some awards for outstanding CSO in different categories. One of them was aimed at recognising the work of grantees by selecting the one with better performance. The selection process had two phases: the 1<sup>st</sup> phase was undertaken by the PMU which pre-selected 17 grantees among 49 and the 2nd phase was undertaken by 5 teams consisting of a member from the CSSC, a Key Resource Person from an Intermediary Organisation and a staff from the PMU. The teams administered a questionnaire developed by the PMU in consultation to the grantees to assess them, focusing on 6 areas: Planning and Budgeting / Reporting / Financial Management and accountability / Leadership and Governance / Organisational Capacity Building / Resource Mobilisation. Each team member scored independently.

The award system helped: (i) to give recognition to the grantees; (ii) to enhance visibility for the programme; (iii) to gather information on the grantees progresses and; (iv) to gather specific information on their accountability and reporting systems and other aspects, helping to identify gaps that could be addressed later on by the programme. The exercise was a wake-up call to all grantees to strengthen their record keeping, management and documentation system

**Other general CB activities to all Ugandan CSOs implemented by PMU:**

- Study tours to visit some of the projects funded by the rest of grantees. Grantees with a best practice in an specific area received visits from other grantees working in the same field.
- General training activities on issues such as PRMT (Participatory Resource Monitoring Tool)
- 2 CSO Leaders Retreat were developed, bringing together 29 representatives from national and international organisations working at different levels. The retreats provided an opportunity for the CSO leaders to reflect on recent developments in the country and their impact on the sector and the collective voice and action
- Publication of bulletin “In Focus” periodically to disseminate achievements of the programme among CSOs and other stakeholders.





### Some innovative elements of the mixed system adopted by the PRMT in the Dominican Republic

- **Balance in the approach between a reactive strategy** (implemented through the FONDESIN (Funds for support of CSO initiatives, to support the initiatives coming directly from CSOs) and a **proactive strategy** (through the initiatives proposed directly by the PRMT in response to the diagnostic elaborated and the priorities identified, not necessarily undertaken by the CSOs themselves but in the form of propositions submitted to FONDESIN).
- **Differentiation between the lines for calls for proposals** – with separate budgets, possibly addressed to differentiated groups of CSOs (on the distinct levels of institutionalisation and intervention).
- **Mechanism for the promotion of CSO association (forming consortiums)** in a way that integrates the weakest organisations in terms of quality partners and/or end beneficiaries of the different grant projects so as to avoid their exclusion under the strict eligibility and selection criteria imposed by EDF rules in the tender process. In this sense the PRMT would seem to have succeeded in finding a “pivot” in the FONDESIN mechanism to guarantee on the one hand the minimalistic technical capacities with strong and capable organisations and, on the other, with the need to reach the weakest CSOs and those most in need of capacity building.
- **A guided CSO system**, through the implementation of limited expertise, financed by the programme, to assist organisations in the preparation of their projects in light of the call for proposals.

Below is an analysis of the 2 extremes of the continuum (“Call for proposals” approach vs. the approach based on a capacity building programming plan), with an indication of their strengths, weakness and associated risks.

	Call for Proposals Approach	Capacity Building Plan
STRENGTHS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ A competitive system adapted to EDF procedures that <b>guarantees objectivity and transparency in the award of financial support to NSA.</b></li> <li>▪ It prioritises the <b>proposition capacity of organisations and, in principle, their excellence.</b> However, this system is only efficient if the organisation has a minimum of capacity (technical and administrative) and masters the necessary procedures;</li> <li>▪ Approach adapted to the provision of support through NSA to:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Provide civic education and encourage citizens to claim their rights,</li> <li>- organisations who monitor government performance, and demand that obligations and commitments towards all citizens are fulfilled o</li> <li>- local development initiatives</li> <li>- Etc</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p>In this case, as in the framework of a Thematic Programme, <b>the approach is solely guided by the “demand”, the ultimate goal being to support NSA through the work they do.</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The notion of a <b>“programme”</b> that integrates a plethora of diverse and complementary actions, aiming to reinforce the organisations and existing support systems in the framework of long term objectives, relying on the orientation of national poverty reduction strategies;</li> <li>▪ The existence of a coherent <b>strategic intervention plan</b> that is adapted to the context and the priorities in terms of capacity building;</li> <li>▪ The possibility of implanting a <b>progressive process</b> with a gradual autonomy of organisations;</li> <li>▪ The possibility to implant an <b>iterative process</b> bearing in mind technical capacities and dialogue with NSAs wherein the capacity building should follow flexible steps that are linked as much to the general political context as to the internal dynamics of NSAs;</li> <li>▪ The existence of a <b>central cell</b> that acts as much as an information relay of NSAs and contacts as an area of capitalisation and interface;</li> <li>▪ The possibility to gather a national and international <b>pool of expertise</b> across a variety of disciplines according to the needs of the programme;</li> <li>▪ The possibility of dedicating the necessary time to experiment in depth with <b>new dialogue and inter actor partnering modalities</b>, with a view towards the promotion of a sort of collective apprenticeship;</li> </ul>
WEAKNESSES AND ASSOCIATED RISKS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The “call for proposals” approach, despite its global predisposition, ends by <b>prioritising organisations which are solidly established and/or already supported and/or have strong experience in the drafting of projects</b>, to the detriment of organisations deprived of such support and experience, despite the relevance of the organisations and projects presented. The more a selective approach is need, bearing in mind the limited means and the existence of a plethora of organisations, some very rarely operational, the more an excessive, even restrictive selection risks mitigating the impact of the programmes in terms of the number of organisations assisted;</li> <li>▪ In the absence of a defined strategic plan, the call for proposals approach <b>results in the dissipation of isolated, poorly coordinated initiatives and/or an excessive concentration on certain themes</b> (notably training to the detriment of other lesser</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ If the capacity building plan is not elaborated on the basis of a <b>good participative diagnostic, shared by NSAs</b>, and if it is not <b>implemented in cooperation with and with the competition of beneficiary organisations</b>, it runs the risk of being seen as an external imposition, disconnected from the local reality;</li> <li>▪ The <b>management of such a plan is more complex than the management of a call for proposals</b> and, as such, requires specific skills. In effect, the development and implementation of such a plan requires <b>very strong skills</b> on the part of the PMU in terms of institutional development, monitoring and evaluation, as well as the EDF procedures. By contrast, its implementation also relies on the good selection of actors and actions that follow;</li> <li>▪ It is often a <b>costly modality</b>. Much hinges on the role of the TA, if it has an</li> </ul>

	<p>known tools) and/or certain geographic regions (notably the capital);</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ There are a great number of <b>organisations who are not able to correctly identify and precise their demand in terms of capacity building</b> let alone meet the formal requirements in terms of project formulation, as directed by the call for proposals. Some of these organisations, having succeeded in presenting an acceptable and financeable then find problems when it is time to implement the capacity building project, bearing in mind the complex needs in terms of technical and financial monitoring;</li> <li>▪ In terms of the length of project, <b>12 to 18 months is normally too short a period for the implementation of initiatives in the field of capacity building</b> to ensure that they have a real impact;</li> <li>▪ If there is no <b>differentiation strategy</b> (for families of actors and/or by structural level), organisations with a very different vocation and, thus, distinct approaches will find themselves <b>“in the same basket”</b> and this despite their various skills and degree of institutionalisation;</li> <li>▪ In order that the system might perform there <b>needs to be a consolidate “offer” in terms of capacity building</b>, an aspect often neglected;</li> <li>▪ <b>Calls for proposals often exclude INGOs</b> that partner with local actors, even though these have the vocation of “guiding local actors”. In the context where the national offer in terms of capacity building is not consolidate, this exclusion will always pose problems;</li> <li>▪ <b>Capitalisation and Innovation</b> are rarely taken into account;</li> <li>▪ NSAs, to obtain funding, often <b>call upon consultancies</b> (that work on the logic of “the market”) to prepare their dossiers without there being an appropriation in terms of the proposed action. The priority, thus, lies on the level of access to financing and not at the level of appropriateness of the action and institutional development of the actor.</li> <li>▪ Other additional constraints to the participation of NSAs in the call for proposals linked to the eligibility criteria and the needs of formulation and presentation of request for grants are:             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>PADOR</b> registration requirements.</li> <li>- The mobilisation of the counterbalance for the sum of the project, due to the</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<p>accompanying role and not just an administrative management role, then the costs are justified by the results that the programme could attain (e.g. a component reinforcing the capacities directly managed under the service contract and not via the WP);</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Some <b>limits to the management associated with the WP</b> can become constraints (length of work programme 12-18 months; financial ceilings, etc.)</li> </ul>
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	<p>weak financial capacity of the majority of NSAs;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Collecting all of the necessary data for the formulation of actions, notably those related to the creation of the action profile;</li><li>- The lack of expertise within the leading teams in the majority of NSAs is a factor that limits internal development of the formulation of the project;</li><li>- The lack of financing to rely on outside expertise to assist the heads of an organisation in the preparation of a dossier;</li><li>- General ignorance of EC procedures, as well as poor knowledge of the use of and difficult access to internet;</li><li>- Tendency to make a proposition corresponding to the maximum budget allocated, even if the organisations do not have either the absorption capacity of the management capacity;</li><li>- A significant section of NSAs (especially grassroots organisations) do not have a bank account and, as a result, cannot provide bank details. Matching the financial needs to open a bank account is not possible for a large amount of NSAs, particularly the grassroots organisations.</li></ul>	
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Of course, in the light of the above analysis, one must ask if the call for proposals is the tool best suited to the implementation of capacity building activities. The experiences of the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF showed how the adoption of such a tool but, above all, the approach and underlying logic, often include the **distortion of the programme**, and risks ending in the dissipation of isolated and poorly coordinated initiatives, according to the logic true of the micro-realisation programmes from the “time before Cotonou” and/or thematic programmes that prioritise individual projects. It is equally true that recent experiences have shown, for example under the ARIANE programme in Mali (following its strategic reorientation), the CSSP programme in Uganda (based on a mixed approach) and in Ethiopia (based on a confirmed will to place projects in a larger programming context), that the call for proposals may be **adapted to the needs of capacity building** of NSAs on the condition that they are considered as a tool and not an end in themselves.

### 5.3. Concrete experiences and lessons learnt from the adoption of the capacity building plan

As concerns the experimentation of the “capacity building plan” some programmes have started to adopt it. These are, primarily, the programmes of Angola and Mali, whereas the programmes in Niger, Guinea and the Democratic Republic of Congo, the activities linked to this tool have only just been launched. At this point in time, therefore, we have only limited information for the programmes mentioned.

The first results linked to the programmes in Angola and Mali can still provide precious information on the basis of the trends that have emerged several months after the application of this capacity building modality. In general, the adoption of a “capacity building plan” has been hailed positively by the NSAs as, firstly, it is adapted to their needs in the sense of an optimised targeting of their needs in terms of capacity building and, secondly, it involves far less competition.

The experience has shown, across the board, that at least 5 conditions need to be present in order for the tool to be effective.

- The first condition is that **such a tool needs an in depth knowledge of the NSAs and their context, as well as their capacity building needs and the stakes they raise**. This presupposes the availability of a series of up to date information on NSAs, which is linked to the second condition.
- In effect, the **availability of this information cannot be left to chance, but must be the result of an intensive activity focused on understanding the reality of the social dynamics that characterise the NSAs of any given country**. This of course requires a significant investment in personnel and a system that is often difficult to implement, consisting of reliance on non state actors at the regional level with a role of correspondent to the programme. In Angola and Mali, without a significant personnel investment on the part of the PMU, the two programmes were effectively forced to resort to organisations active on a regional level that guaranteed an in depth knowledge of the dynamics of NSAs and, above all, their capacity building needs.
- The third condition required for the capacity building plan to work is represented by, on the one hand, **a strong attitude on the part of the PMU to communication and ensure comprehension of the novelty of the tool and the difference with the call for proposals and, on the other, to explain the need for a proactive role within the PMU in the definition of the annual priorities in terms of capacity building**.

- As regards the fourth condition, **it is necessary that the PMU has not only a programme management and human resources management role, but also one for guiding the dynamism and the actors.**
- Finally, the fifth **requires the PMU to have the necessary technical skills to work with the capacity building plan tool.** These skills can, obviously, be available both at the international and national short term level upon which the PMU may rely. However, for that to happen the adequate resources must be foreseen.

#### 5.4. Concrete experiences and lesson learnt from the adaptation of the "Call for proposals" mechanism

As affirmed in the previous paragraph, the "call for proposals" tool must, above all, be adapted as much to the context as to the nature of the capacity building programmes under the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF. In essence, one must, on the one hand, ensure that the call for proposals does not adopt the logic of the micromanagement programmes from the pre-Cotonou days and, on the other, that the competition is open to all types and levels of structures among the collective actors.

One example of a successful adaptation was recently undertaken by the ARIANE programme in Mali, through a better definition of the guidelines (on the level of eligible themes) and a focus on the call for proposals on the basis of the beneficiary. It is thus that call for proposals 3 was addressed solely to grass roots organisations and intermediary and guiding organisations, even though call for proposals 4, launched at the same time as 3, had, as potential beneficiaries, umbrella organisations alone ([www.ariane-ml.org](http://www.ariane-ml.org)).

Another example of the adaptation of the tool to proposals to avoid the risk of the "micromanagement" effect is linked to the PASOC experience in Niger. In effect, the programme was able to define the grant through the theme of capacity building. In this sense, the funded action is not only defined as an instrument for guiding the actor through the capacity building process, but is equally able to resort to physical investments on the condition that they do not surpass 20% of eligible costs.

Of course the role of these guidelines in the adaptation of the call for proposals for the achievement of capacity building actions becomes primordial as this document can orient the possible beneficiaries in the conception thereof. Again the PASOC programme in Niger illustrates, in a very pertinent and efficient way, the problems of physical achievements, as mentioned below.



#### Two pertinent examples of the guiding lines of the CP in Niger

The development of a green space contributes to the achievement of the duty to the environment but is not, in itself, an activity for the promotion of this duty. By contrast, undertaking sensitization and awareness raising activities are eligible. Thus, the development of a green space, conceived as a sensitization and pedagogical tool for information and awareness arising on the duty to the

environment is eligible.

A street cleaning activity, taken on its own, is not in itself a civic education activity and thus, is ineligible. It becomes however eligible when it is conceived as a starting point, or is even the result of IEC activities around the benefits of an improved lifestyle and the need for each citizen to contribute to it. This action can also include lobbying activities towards the authorities for public action on waste collection and treatment.

#### 5.4.1. *The question of grassroots organisations*

The question of grassroots organisations deserves elaboration, as **the problem these organisations face with the “Call for Proposals” mechanism is twofold:**

- On the one hand, the problem involves **access to the programme’s information and resources about the call for proposals**; in other words, do the grassroots organisations have access to the information and are they, moreover, able to prepare their proposals according to the standards dictated by EC?
- On the other hand, there is **the problem of the will and availability of private companies** (in case of externalised direct labour operations), **or Contract and Finance services within the Delegations and National Authorising Officers ECD/NAO** (in the case of direct labour operations or even externalised direct labour operations whereby grant contracts are signed as specific commitments, thus falling outside the Programme-Estimates) **to take on the risk (notably as concerns private companies) and/or manage these micro-grants** considering the burden of work that this entails.

As regards the first question (access to information and the capacity to draft these proposals according to the criteria), the experience led under these programmes shows that if there is not an adaptation in the CP tool (which would involve an infringement of the procedures and standard forms) it is very likely that these organisations will, without a doubt, face exclusion. In order to lessen this, certain programmes, such as those in Mali, Niger and Guinea, have put in place call for proposal systems adapted to the idiosyncrasy of the grassroots organisations.



#### **The question of the eligibility of the Niger grassroots organisations**

In Niger we attempted to resolve the **question of eligibility as regards grassroots organisations that do not have, at their disposal, statutes or official papers** (for example the receipt of their registration with the local authorities). In essence, the question for these grassroots organisations is the weakness of their legal status, often nonexistent on a formal level, even if the organisation is made up of a dozen members and has been doing business for quite some time.

The solution identified in Niger was that of demanding organisations as yet deprived of statutes and receipts for a simple statement of existence written out by the mayor. As concerns the bank account, it is satisfactory that two members of the organisation open a bank account in their name into which the funds from the grant can be paid.

A second possibility, also used by several programmes, is to limit the sums to grants of €10,000, which allows a bypass of the standard call for proposal procedures, even resorting to a simplified competitive procedure for the granting of funds. The example of Promotion Funds in the framework of the programme in Uganda, or the funds for supporting local initiatives in terms of social entrepreneurship in the framework of the programme in Zambia represent examples of this eventuality.

As concerns the second question; namely the will and ability, within the Consultancies as well as the Delegations and NAO services, to take on the risks and workload for management of these micro-grants, a solution could be that of regrouping the projects through the bias of a cascading financing system (“Block Grants”), a mechanism that has already been tested by other donors and technical partners<sup>22</sup>. Unfortunately this formula remains underdeveloped in the framework of European cooperation, and strict limits exist in terms of the sums allowed (with a maximum of €100,000 allowed per grant and a maximum of €10,000 per delegated grant).



### The Block Grant system.

#### The experience acquired by a number of donors

Lately, some technical and financial partners, including donor organisations from countries such as Sweden or Norway, have experimented with a **new approach, block grant financing**, which aims to reach grassroots organisations indirectly, through the financing of intermediary organisations. It is these intermediary organisations which in turn finance, with the funds received, a certain number of organisations as sub beneficiaries.

Once more, as mentioned in relation to the common financing mechanism (pool funding), in light of the recent genesis of this modality in terms of capacity building, it is premature to assess their relevance, efficiency and impact. The experiences are still relatively limited and, to the present day, **one single evaluation** (to our knowledge) of this modality was carried by SIDA (Swedish International Development Agency), in the framework of its Civil Society Support Programme in Ethiopia. The programme, conceived as a pilot programme, financed nine umbrella organisations, which in turn financed grassroots organisations (a total of 155) established around the more vulnerable groups in Ethiopia (street children orphans and vulnerable children, the sick infected with AIDS, victims of dangerous traditional practices etc.).

According to the evaluation the programme was a **success**, as much in terms of results acquired on the ground as from the point of view of the block grant financing modality and the relation between umbrella organisations (acting with the double role of financiers and guides) and the beneficiary grassroots organisations (their propositions having been selected from a call for proposals).

In terms of the first result, it is clear that this modality **allows access to grassroots actors** who would, otherwise, be distanced, even neglected, the reasons being either their isolation and lack of information on the financing possibilities, often accessible in the capital, or their lack of skills for the preparation of solid proposals, acceptable from the point of view of the donor procedures, or lastly because of the reduced nature of their projects, often underneath the financial floors of fixed by donor

<sup>22</sup> It is already a consolidated modality in terms of the fight against AIDS (this is the approach of UNAIDS, for example, for the financing of micro-projects emanating from civil society through the provision of block grants to a number of umbrella organisations) and for INGO financing micro-projects



organisations.

In terms of the second result (that of the relationship between umbrella organisations and the grassroots organisations benefiting from block grant financing), we are somewhat more reserved on the pertinence, efficiency and potential impact of this modality, bearing in mind the associated risks. On the one hand the disbursement of funds to these umbrella organisations for their ultimate distribution entails the risk of transforming these organisations into donor organisations, **all the while distancing them from their vocations and primary mandates**. On the other hand, the conflicts can appear due the fact that only the member organisations of the umbrella organisation are eligible for financing, which represents a form of discrimination vis-a-vis capable and eligible organisations which do not belong to the umbrella organisations. The criteria for access to funding, as well as the selection procedures, therefore become a fundamental aspect that necessitates prior reflexion. Thirdly, such a mechanism can accentuate competition between the organisations, to the detriment of their cooperation. Lastly, when efficient accountability mechanisms (notably of the umbrella organisations towards its constituency) are absent, there is a risk of falling into a **clientele logic**, thereby transforming relations between the umbrella organisation and its members into a quest for financing, thus inverting accountability relationships and distorting bases for legitimacy.

A final solution to answer this second question is that of counting indirectly on grassroots organizations, through national and international organizations with a mandate and mission to support grassroots capacity building. In this scenario well established organizations, experienced in guiding grassroots organisations (in this sense referring to NGOs or other national CSOs with a guiding vocation, with the committees and federative organizations integrating capacity building into their mission as well as international NGOs considered as important vectors for the support of grassroots organizations) propose, in cooperation with the grassroots organizations, capacity building programmes, for which they would become responsible and which they would manage. Differing from the cascading financing system (which involves a system for delegated financing), in this scenario the organizations work as much as intermediaries managing, on behalf of the grassroots organizations with these organizations as beneficiaries, the capacity building initiatives.

#### 5.4.2. *Some operational conclusions on the use of the call for proposals tool*

Finally, and by way of a conclusion, hereafter a series of lessons learned on the call for proposals tool are presented, elaborated by the Ethiopian Civil Society Support Programme, which could well serve for an adaptation of the tool on the basis of the definition of management and the parameters as much as on the procedure (restricted vs open call, scope of the grants, length of project, eligibility of NGOs, workload etc.)



**Lessons learnt from the use of the CFP mechanism in the CSF in Ethiopia<sup>23</sup>**

<sup>23</sup> Drafted on the basis of the matrix « **CFP parameters final** » elaborated by the CSF PMU in Ethiopia.

Restricted vs open CfP (1 or 2 phases)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Restricted CfP (2 phases) has advantage that less work for applicants and evaluation committee. Full proposals only need to be drafted by and assessed for short-listed applicants. Disadvantage is time frame. It is unrealistic to finalise a restricted CfP (from launching to award of contracts) in less than 9 months.</li> </ul>
Regional allocations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>An open CfP without regional ear-marking probably results in many CSOs investing much in full proposals with only limited funding available. This could give rise to serious criticism, e.g. if grant size was same as previously and only 5 to 10 projects were awarded following an open, nationwide CfP. If funds were ear-marked for a limited number of regions only and/or only national projects, open CfP could be implemented, though it may still not be preferable.</li> <li>Principles of the large CfPs so far: 2006: No regional earmarking; best overall projects won. 2007: Targeted lots to address under-served regions &amp; objectives. 2008: Regional lots. For CfP 2009: Only 1.3 MEURo, thus regional lots (of same size) only possible for 1 project @ 100 KEURO/region.</li> <li><b>Disadvantages of regional allocations:</b> Spreading resources too thinly; lower capacity in some regions means lower quality projects are funded; regionalisation may disincentive networking across regions; difficulty in justifying size of regional envelopes. <b>Advantages:</b> CSF displaying coverage in all regions.</li> </ul>
Wider/Narrower objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>The wider the objectives, the less advisable it would seem to have an open CfP</b> since number of proposals would presumably be higher and thus more CSOs would invest much resources in vain. Narrowing down the objectives potentially reduces the number of applicants, thus making an open CfP more feasible, if at all considered.</li> <li><b>The CfP can be targeted/earmarked regionally, as well as in terms of sectoral objectives.</b> A regional targeting (if less than all regions were targeted) would be a narrowing of objectives. A different scenario would be to limit the number of eligible regions but allow for wide objectives in terms of sub-sectors.</li> <li><b>Financing Agreement is broad frame;</b> authority with PSC to phrase objectives for each CfP. Wide/open objectives allow submission of diversity of applications but results in dispersed mosaic of projects. The narrower the objectives, the more coherent the portfolio, but with other areas under-served. New legislative environment might influence decision, i.e. support for adaptation to CSO law, or support to specific intervention areas (which might be conceived as legal in the CSF framework but might be difficult to fund under other programmes). PSC could also prioritise activity areas by analysing the focuses of previous CSF projects and by taking into account current topical NSA needs. E.g., apart from support to PANE/CTF, no actions aimed at producing expected results of improved coordination and networking amongst NSA supported so far. Also, despite relevance, no direct actions/projects for conflict transformation supported. PSC could narrow CfP to these themes and also earmark selected regions.</li> </ul>
Project duration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>It takes longer to implement a restricted CfP process,</b> since it involves one additional round of evaluation, drafting of evaluation report, notification of applicants etc. Thus, the longer the CfP process, the shorter the period of implementation becomes, if grants are to finalise and be closed by a certain date, e.g. the end date of the TAU contract.</li> <li>CSF experience that <b>projects/organisations in peripheral and emerging regions often have comparably lesser capacity and often face external challenges that affect timely implementation as per agreed schedule.</b> Thus, they need more time and more support both for start-up and implementation. Projects in peripheral regions should thus be of adequate duration to avoid problems in implementation and failure to implement within the allocated time..</li> <li><b>If the CfP in general, or individual projects specifically, had a limited objective, the project duration could be shorter, e.g. 12-18 months.</b> In the current context, such a scenario could be considered e.g. for projects to support adaptation of CSOs to the new legislative environment. Since the adaptation has to happen rapidly, short durations could be deemed appropriate. For any project design that is more complex, however, from a technical and programme management perspective durations of less than 18 months are not deemed appropri.</li> <li>From TAU experience, <b>even if tax/duty issue is solved, ideal duration of grants so far are 18-24 months.</b> &lt; 18 months is difficult for CSO projects, as start-up is always delayed. 24 months &gt; encourages slow implementation. Extensions of 15-30% of time are common; closure period of at least 5-6 months is realistic. Current TAU contract ends Dec 2011. Thus, 2-phased CfP launched in April 2009 could only support 18 months projects extension project if TAU support was required until end of programme. Alternative would be extension of TAU contract (using FA contingency.)</li> </ul>

<p><b>Eligibility of INGO ; former grantees</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Especially in peripheral regions, the number of CSOs with a strong presence is limited.</b> Thus, if previous grantees are to be made in-eligible for further funding, this would be reduction of the number of (relatively) capacitated potential applicants and might give rise to weak projects being funded for inadequately capacitated CSOs. Also, some CSF projects specifically aim at establishing institutions in such regions. Disallowing the possibility for continued funding could jeopardise the very presence of these institutions. One of findings of the 2008 NSA Mapping was about the emergence of various regional NSA networks. For maximum coverage and effect the new call could focus on these NSA structures. .</li> <li>• <b>If Capacity Building of local CSOs through/by INGOs was an objective, than INGOs should be eligible to be lead applicants.</b> Eligibility of previous grantees has to be considered for specific objectives to be defined for the CfP. If an objective was, e.g. to continue supporting CSO fora that have been supported within the CSF framework so far (regional - APDF, SPDF; or sectoral - CTF), then previous grantees should be eligible for funding under the 2009 CfP.</li> <li>• <b>2006 and 2007 CfPs allowed INGOs as lead applicants; 2008 did not. Technically, excluding INGOs reduces opportunities to use INGO capacity for implementation and CB of LNGOs.</b> Politically, "nationalisation" of the CSF may be seen as positive. Eligibility of previous grantees as lead applicants was not allowed in 2008. Technically, it robs CSF of opportunity to "reward" positive cases and continue support to good initiatives. Politically, benefiting a wider group may be seen as positive.</li> </ul>
<p><b>2009 Small grants ?</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>It takes longer to implement the entire CfP process, if a small grants CfP was to precede the large grants CfP.</b> A combination of launching a small grants CfP and a restricted CfP would be the lengthiest procedure; while omitting a small grants CfP and implementing an open CfP would be the quickest procedure.</li> <li>• <b>Small grants in 2008 were instrumental in providing information and training in all regions, including the periphery, to enable submission of an adequate number of satisfactory proposals.</b> TAU can organise such events, if adequate budget is provided to TAU. If the number of regions eligible under the CfP were to be limited, the CfP for Small Grants could also be limited to projects in those regions and/or the TAU activity (and budget) to organise such events could be limited.</li> <li>• <b>In 2006 and 2008, small grants were used to prepare the ground for large grants CfP through info&amp;training.</b> Procedurally, <b>these are service agreements camouflaged as grants.</b> Advantage: More CSOs build capacity through participation in EC CfP procedure and project implementation. Disadvantage: Huge administrative burden for limited output. Adds another 4-5 months to CfP process. Alternative would be to have TAU organise info&amp;training sessions; TAU budget for this would have to be made available.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Grant size</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>If the CfP in general, or individual projects specifically, had a limited objective, the grant size could also be limited.</b> E.g., if grants had the exclusive objective of supporting adaptation to the new CSO legislation, a limited amount per organisation might suffice, as additional staff costs and mobility costs as well as duration might be limited. However, the capacity of EC (especially FCS) to administer a large number of grants will have to be taken into consideration in determining grant size. If objectives were to be similar to the 2006-2008 CfP objectives, the TAU would advise against a grant size of less than 100 KEURO.</li> <li>• <b>If the CfP in general, or individual projects specifically, had a limited objective and a correspondingly limited grant size, the project duration could also be limited.</b> The less complex and smaller in terms of funding projects are, the shorter the duration necessary to implement them. For the type of projects supported so far, TAU would advise against project durations of less than 18 months. However, should the PSC decide on limited objectives and grant sizes, durations could subsequently be shorter.</li> <li>• <b>Grant sizes so far have been &lt; 100 KEURO - 200/250 KEURO &gt;. Smaller grant sizes are less</b></li> </ul>

	<p><b>efficient</b> (as core costs for staff and office e.g. are multiplied) and cause high transaction costs at TAU and EC levels. Grants below 100 KEURO carry more risk for EC as no intermediate payment, thus less monitoring and control. Smaller grant sizes satisfy needs of less capacitated CSOs and stand-alone projects but also discourage networking and collaboration with other CSO.</p>
Subgranting	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>The objective to cover all regions of Ethiopia with this CFP while limited funding is available could be ensured if sub-granting to a fixed number of regions in different lots was made mandatory.</b> Thus, organisations would have to find subgrantees in the respective regions. However, the amount per region/sub-grantee would be rather limited (subgrant size of 10 KEURO max).</li> <li>• <b>Subgranting could be an option to support narrower objectives for a larger number of CSOs.</b> E.g. more capacitated CSOs could thus be entrusted with on-granting smaller amounts to less capacitated CSOs to facilitate the latter's adaptation measures. With wider objectives, subgranting has so far not been seen as a favourite solution as it entails a loss of control of the Contracting Authority.</li> <li>• <b>Subgranting could be an option to expedite implementation, thus allowing to implement projects with limited duration.</b> However, as sub-granting also increases the complexity of projects, only well capacitated organisations should be entrusted with the responsibility for such sub-granting. Since the sub-grants can each only be up to 10 KEURO, this tool is relevant only for very narrowly defined objectives.</li> <li>• <b>INGOs with their established capacity could arguably play a role in sub-granting as intermediary organisations.</b> Sub-granting could also be an option to support partnerships and networks established within previous CSF projects; hence, there could be a link between eligibility of previous grantees and sub-granting. However, allocating the responsibility for sub-granting to one of many partners could also lead to disturbing/disrupting established partnerships.</li> <li>• <b>Sub-granting can be used as a tool to allocate management responsibility to intermediary organisations (lead applicants).</b> Within their grants, they on-grant parts of the project budget to subgrantees. Thus, projects of larger size can be supported while the number of contracts to be managed by EC remains lower.</li> <li>• <b>Re/Sub-granting is allowable as per PRAG for up to 10x up to 10 KEURO each.</b> PSC decided against in past, wanting more time to assess possibility. Advantage: Greater # of CSOs benefit from CSF programme; permits support to activities of limited scope. Disadvantage: Risk increases as EC loses control of decision whom to support and how to monitor.</li> </ul>
Programme management resources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>While a two-phased CFP is a lighter burden on applicants, evaluation committee members and external assessors,</b> it creates greater work load for the Chair of the evaluation committee. In terms of timeline, a two-phased procedure takes longer, thus the award of grants will be closer to the end of the TAU contract than with a 1-phase CFP.</li> <li>• <b>While a spread over many/all regions places demand on programme management in terms of monitoring,</b> this can be maintained with the current TAU contract.</li> <li>• <b>While narrower objectives would create "economies of scale" in terms of technical assistance to grantees,</b> TAU and EC are used to and coping well with the wide portfolio of objectives of current CSF contracts.</li> <li>• <b>A two-phased CFP takes min 9 months,</b> a 1-phase 6 months. Closure of projects takes approx. 6 months. To support projects of 18 months <b>without extension,</b> a 2-phase CFP would have to be launched in April 2009. Only shorter durations are possible with later launch dates. Projects could be supported/closed after Dec 2011 if TAU contract was extended.</li> <li>• <b>INGOs have demonstrated their value in 2006 CSF grants.</b> From a technical point of view, nothing supports their exclusion. In terms of programme management, it is preferable to allow previous grantees to participate; both b/c they will bring increased capacity and also as an incentive to successfully implement 2006/7 projects.</li> <li>• <b>Small grants place a relatively heavy management burden on TAU and EC</b> (including evaluation committee). If regional info sessions were to be considered indispensable, TAU could facilitate these without small grants. However, TAU does not have resources for trainings/help desks.</li> <li>• <b>For programme management, a miniscule grant creates almost an equal amount of work to a</b></li> </ul>

	<p><b>huge grant.</b> Thus, it is preferable if grants are not too small.</p>
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## 6. PROGRAMME MONITORING AND EVALUATION SYSTEMS AND PROCESSES

The question of monitoring and evaluation systems and process for NSA support programmes is a **crucial question**, as much for the comprehension of the effects of the programme activities, following its completion, on the associative dynamism as for the possibility of reorienting a programme still underway.

The problem present is characterised by a **double difficulty**: on the one hand the NSA support programmes have dealings with social dynamics that are very hard to measure and on the other hand there is no history or tradition of previous Community intervention and the experience from which one may take inspiration.

To this it must be added that the adoption of the project logic, and not the process logic, as would be advisable, by a good number of the NSA support programmes under the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF often involved the utilisation of monitoring and evaluation systems **that were not at all appropriate**. These systems indeed were based on indicators conceived to measure the pertinence, efficiency, efficacy, impact and viability of the completed activity or to be undertaken **without taking the actor into consideration**.


As such, the NSA capacity building support programmes in the Cotonou agreement should base themselves primarily on **accompaniment of the actor** towards its roles, like that of the dialogue, which have nothing, or very little to do, with the completion of the action. In summary, the risk is always that of adopting the typical programme logic of micro-management, even in the monitoring and evaluation.

In reality, the major difficulty to focus the evaluation on a process and not on an action, in terms of NSA capacity building, is that the process **only becomes meaningful in the mid-long term**. This contrasts with the need of the monitoring and evaluation exercise, which necessitates immediate intervention, often during the implementation of a programme.

**Nevertheless, these arguments do not justify the fact that monitoring and evaluation systems were rarely adopted** by the NSA support programmes under the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF.

### 6.1. The situation for 9th EDF programmes

Indeed, in terms of monitoring and evaluation systems, **only 10% of programmes** analysed had any internal systems (on the scale of M&E plans and tools and/or on the scale of a specialist position within the PMU) as noted in the graph below.



In 5% of cases, the systems are in the process of elaboration (notably in the framework of the programmes that are still in a relatively preliminary phase, but also in the framework of the more advanced programmes where the needs in terms of internal monitoring were often raised following the midterm evaluation or following a ROM mission) and in another 5% of cases the systems, even when foreseen, have not yet been implemented.

What is **relatively worrying** is that nearly half of the programmes do not have, and did not plan for such a system, beyond the standard reporting procedures (technical and financial reports of the TA, technical and financial reports of the grantee organisations in the framework of the calls for proposal etc).

However, the team was able to identify a number of **innovative experiences** in terms of the monitoring and evaluation that deserve to be capitalised, notably because of the complexity of monitoring such capacity building programmes which, as already mentioned several times in this document, have proven to be vast and complex endeavours, oriented towards the promotion of profound changes that go far beyond the immediately tangible results. One can refer oneself, for example, to the matrix system used by the CSF in Ethiopia to link the anticipated results of the funded projects to the global results envisaged by the programme; to the monitoring database developed in Tanzania, which allowed a real time monitoring of the results of the programme or to the organisational capacity assessment approach of beneficiary organisations (before and after the activity) used by the CSP in Uganda, among others.



#### About the M&E systems set up by the NSA support programmes in Tanzania and Ethiopia

The NSA support programme in Tanzania has developed a M&E system, which links the log-frame with activities planned and realized for each result area. Such a **comprehensive monitoring and evaluation system has been put in place to track the progress of programme implementation and to quickly**

**identify any aspects of the programme approach that might need to be reviewed.** The system aims at keeping track of intervention activities, ensuring that the approved work-plan is adhered to, and records details such as the location of events, the topics covered and the number and type of NSAs participating. As activities are carried out, often by consultants, the information contained in their reports is entered into the monitoring data base

**The CSF in Ethiopia has developed, as part of its M&E plan, a specific CSF reporting matrix (as part of the M&E plan.** All grantees are required to annex the CSF reporting matrix to each interim report submitted to the programme. This generates a body of data which is invaluable to the CSF in analysis the impact that it is making in specific result areas. The five results of the CSF have been extrapolated for the purposes of the matrix into 8 monitoring themes, under which each of the grantees and their partners are expected to provide information, as indicated below:

<u>Question</u>	<u>Monitoring Theme</u>	<u>Key Indicator</u>
What impact has the CSF made on...? Arena	<b>CSO Visibility</b>	Increased Profile of CSO in Public
What impact has the CSF made on...? in decision making processes on policy and delivery	<b>Consultation of CS in Policy &amp; Planning</b>	Increased inclusion of CSOs
What impact has the CSF made on...? CSOs in service delivery to Ethiopians	<b>Involvement of CS in service delivery</b>	Increased participation of
What impact has the CSF made on...? government-civil society partnerships to address rights	<b>Government-CSO partnership on rights</b>	Increased number of
What impact has the CSF made on...? among public	<b>Increased awareness of rights</b>	Increased awareness raising of rights
What impact has the CSF made on...? partnerships and networking amongst CSOs	<b>CS Networking</b>	Increased and stronger
What impact has the CSF made on...? and consultation with target constituency by CSOs	<b>Constituency Accountability</b>	Improved accountability to
What impact has the CSF made on...? capacity and resource management	<b>CSO Sustainability</b>	Improved institutional

## 6.2. Impact Indicators

All monitoring and evaluation systems must be based on the selection of a battery of impact indicators through which to observe and identify the **changes induced by the programme**. As such, in an NSA support programme, the fundamental question is to understand, in order to have any idea of the results and subsequent impact of the project, what needs and can be measured.

While the logical framework, particularly on the level of the results obtained, can orient an evaluation exercise, the difficulty remains that of resolving the contradiction of immediately measuring what is not the completion of an action but a **process**, which needs to be analysed from a mid-to-long term perspective.

Being concerned with changes that are linked to social dynamics, **by nature notoriously hard to measure and master**, the evaluation exercise must take into consideration the impact indicators that could be pertinent with the themes which are the object of the programme intervention, namely NSA capacity building.



Indeed, measuring the impact of an NSA capacity building programme starting with the changes produced in the social or political context in which these NSAs operate runs the risk of being a **useless exercise**, seeing as it is almost impossible to establish the **direct causality links** between the programme and the NSA beneficiaries and between the NSA beneficiaries and the social reality.

The **paradox** would be to attach to a programme, the objective of which is the reinforcement of NSAs so that they can better fulfil their role as regards the socio-political context, changes which have nothing, or very little to do with it, as for example the reduction of cases of poverty, or the diminution of school re-sits, or the amelioration of the sanitary conditions of populations.

Even if the analysis of the 40 programmes has shown how the research in this domain was still in its early steps, a **possible path for experimentation** could be found in the application of impact indicators on the **institutional and organisational changes produced within the beneficiary organisations**. To this end, the time fact is decisive, seeing as the changes could not be measure until 6-12 months after the end of the support programme received by the organisation.

In order to do this it is important, as the experience within the Ugandan programme shows (although DRC and Niger will also be true soon enough), to undertake an **institutional diagnostic** of the beneficiary organisation both before and after the receipt of support.



### The use of innovative tools such as OCA in the CSCBP in Uganda

A first capacity assessment exercise was conducted for the first 33 grantees as well as at a later stage for the 16 grantees which were contracted later. This exercise was conducted by intermediary organisations using the Organisational Capacity Assessment Tool on which they had been trained by the PMU. A second OCA was conducted at the end of the programme, implemented by an external consultant.

This allowed:

- ii) To make a comparison between the capacity of the grantees as reflected in OCA 1 and the capacity as assessed in OCA 2.
- iii) To identify facilitating and inhibiting factors for the progress of each organization
- iv) To recommend further specific changes needed to strengthen each grantee.
- v) To identify the best methodologies to use for CB

#### Pros

The OCA process enabled the CSCBP to crystallize on the priority capacity gaps and needs. The OCA was undertaken by IOs and there is uncertainty as to whether it captured and presented priorities for all the grantees. Key concern is that grantees presented gaps in context of qualifying to participate in the CSCBP programme and tended to “shy” away from disclosing other institutional capacity gaps.

The capacity building effort prepared grantees to become effective implementers of the CSCBP

Grantee specific needs were not adequately attended to partly due to shortcomings of the IOs, but also, due to lack of follow up actions either by PMU or IOs.

#### Cons

Grantees benefited from the OCA as it revealed some of the gaps that would otherwise not be recognized (e.g., internal administrative and governance issues) Some of the trainings focused on CSCBP procedures and requirements (e.g., proposal writing, log-frame development), as such, grantees are not able to directly apply them elsewhere.

It is important to underline the fact that in this perspective the interest does not need to be exclusively centred on the changes brought within the organisation, but also on the changes that have been **programmed**. In this sense, an organisation that has programmed for the review of its internal organisation to be more efficient in its action is without doubt an element that needs to be taken into account in the evaluation exercise, even if the changes have not yet taken place.

It is evident that this process cannot, at least for the time being, bring about **univocal solutions**, considering the existing rift between the time requirements of the evaluation and the temporal context in which the social process operates. The objective in every case cannot ever be that of **"grasping" the reality, but to get closer to it, thus bridging the gap between the CB discourse and strategies and the current facts**. This is the great contribution that the epistemology of social sciences has provided to all of those who try to read and interpret the changes promoted and channelled by social processes, an epistemology where the theme of support to NSAs needs to be included.

In addition, on the methodological scale the impact evaluation exercise is even harder, due, on hand, to the fact that it is not possible to use **"proxy indicators"** and, on the other hand, as a result of the disruption of the **evaluation logic** which characterises NSA capacity building interventions.



### **An innovative evaluation tool : outcome mapping**

<http://www.idrc.ca/>

Outcome Mapping focuses on **one particular category of results - changes in the behaviour of people, groups, and organizations with whom a program works directly. These changes are called "outcomes."** Through Outcome Mapping, development programs can claim contributions to the achievement of outcomes rather than claiming the achievement of development impacts. Although these outcomes, in turn, enhance the possibility of development impacts, the relationship is not necessarily one of direct cause and effect. Instead of attempting to measure the impact of the program's partners on development, Outcome Mapping concentrates on monitoring and evaluating its results in terms of the influence of the program on the roles these partners play in development.

**Defining outcomes as "changes in behaviour" emphasizes that, to be effective, development research programs must go further than information creation and dissemination;** they must actively engage development actors in the adaptation and application. Such engagement means that partners will derive benefit and credit for fulfilling their development roles whereas development programs will be credited with their contributions to this process. With Outcome Mapping, programs identify the partners with whom they will work and then devise strategies to help equip their partners with the tools, techniques, and resources to contribute to the development process. Focusing monitoring and evaluation on changes in partners also illustrates that, although a program can influence the achievement of outcomes, it cannot control them because ultimate responsibility for change rests with its boundary

partners, and their partners and other actors. The desired changes are not prescribed by the development program; rather, Outcome Mapping provides a framework and vocabulary for understanding the changes and for assessing efforts aimed at contributing to them.

### 6.3. The disruption of the evaluation logic: when failure turns into success

It is not rare for NSA support programmes to assess a number of actions in terms of failures **when in reality they should be deemed real successes**, as much for the programme as for the beneficiary organisation. Indeed, the course of capacity building, especially when it touches on fundamental internal organisational and leadership issues, is not always linear. Often, progress is not attained without tense internal discussions, tensions and conflicts. As such, the strengthening of organisations frequently encompasses situation of crisis.

Yet the question is still that of the temporal aspect, as the result of the evaluation exercise will ultimately depend on the specific moment at which it is carried out. If the exercise takes place during the internal discussion phase of the organisation, one might be tempted to see the programme as a failure, and not a success. In reality, **one can never know in the short term** whether the actions of a reinforcement programme have produced the expected results or not.

**As an example**, one can criticise the case of support to Malian umbrella organisations under the ARIANE programme for the creation of a web portal destined for the totality of CSOs, for which a sum had been foreseen in the PE. Yet, because of difficulties, the web portal could not be realised and the programme management preferred instead to avoid the discussions thereon.

In this case the evaluation analysis would have **two options**: either consider the action as a failure or take into account the positivity of the internal debate of the organisations on the necessity of a fundamental communication tool for representing its activities and even establishing partnerships outside the country.

The solution is a mere question of the **point of view**; on the one hand it is undeniable that the action was not realised and the resources remained unused; on the other the debate and confrontation undertaken within the umbrella organisations can be considered as a fundamental asset, as much for the knowledge that they developed on the importance of communication tools over the web, as for the fact that all of the umbrella organisations active on the national level finally found themselves united over a common issue, something not among their normal habits.

In reality, it cannot be forgotten that the goal of this action was to build capacity in terms of the Malian umbrella organisations' communication through the creation of a web portal for civil society. Yet we do not know if this initiative will be realised before the end of the ARIANE programme, through to its support and resources, or if it will be realised in a few years through to the **dynamism that was created around the initiative**.

Once more the evaluation requires as much time as possible but, above all, **to face the dynamics and processes and not the isolated** actions that run the risk of being misinterpreted and, as such, misevaluated. A capacity building action evaluated today as a failure, as the corresponding funding in the PE was not used, can by contrast be considered, tomorrow, as a very positive action, and a success thanks to the dynamism unleashed by the programme.

#### **6.4. Taking into account the “inferred effects” or the “unexpected effects”**

The question of the dynamics unleashed represents an ulterior challenge for the evaluation. In effect, an NSA support programme intervenes in a complex context where one cannot know all of the implications linked to social dynamics.

Sometimes there are effects that are not considered and, by contrast, prove to be of significant importance regarding the goals of NSA capacity building. These are effects that can be defined as “inferred effects” or “unexpected effects”.

In this framework one can cite the case of a Central African organisation supported a few years ago by an EU NGO through the bias of a capacity building programme that foresaw a strategic planning exercise. This strategic planning exercise, at the time, provoked a very hard conflict within the organisation (a small development NGO) and, in particular, between the founding leaders. The internal dissidence that was unleashed led to a break up in the organisation that led to the cessation of activities.

In this case one can without doubt conclude that the capacity building initiative did not only fail to achieve the expected results, but caused the beneficiary organisation to disappear from the scene. The evaluation exercise could, therefore, only give a very negative verdict.

In reality, the situation is not that simple. Indeed, the leaders promoting internal dissidence, having learned of the political stakes over the course of the planning exercise, founded another NGO, the NGO Echelle, which to this day, only four years from its creation, is the most important Central African development NGO and, as such, is the organisation that trains the leading personnel of the Central African Republic associative movement.

Today, the NGO Echelle has become not only the contact point of the national associative movement, but the most solicited Central African collective actor, thanks to its vision and skills, extremely well honed, as much by the government as by the donor community.

At the roots of the success of Echelle there is, therefore, the determination of several leaders who emerged from the crisis of a small organisation; a crisis undeniably provoked by internal factors, but severely magnified through the capacity building initiative.

This is exactly what would be termed an “inferred effect” or “unexpected result”. However it is also the proof that CSO capacity building can be evaluated not only in terms of the mid to long term, but also that sometimes the dynamics produced around the beneficiary organisation are more interesting than the action itself.

The act of capacity building must therefore be evaluated not only for the results produced but for the dynamism that it could spark off.

### **7. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION WITHIN NSA SUPPORT PROGRAMMES**

#### **7.1. The role of communication and the superimposition with the need of visibility**

The Cotonou Agreement clearly highlights how a continuous information flow and an appropriate communication strategy are two incontrovertible elements for the implementation of a coherent and permanent consultation process with non state actors, for the building of their capacity and to ensure their active participation in the dialogue on economic, social and institutional policy.

On the basis of the analysis of 400 NSA support programmes it has been noted that, more and more, there is confusion over, on the one hand, the role of communication and information in the programme and, on the other, the relative aspect of the programme’s visibility itself.

The analysis undertaken focuses first and foremost on the communications aspect, being an integral part of the fundamental principles of the capacity building strategy as was previously mentioned in Chapter ( of this report.

Now, if communication is a fundamental aspect of NSA support programmes, it is necessary that a strategy is identified during the design phase of the programme, and that all of the appropriate technical tools for its implementation are taken into account. In reality, the documentary analysis shows how rarely the financing proposals contain a structured communications strategy component with the budgets devoted to this end.

Among other things, it is noteworthy that a certain monotony exists as far as communication instruments are concerned under most programmes, which could reveal a weak reflection as regards communications strategies that are adapted to different types of programmes, to the actors concerned and, of course, to the socio-political context in which the programme is taking place. Of the 40 programmes analysed only 18 had a website, whereas under the remaining programmes there was no real attempt to experiment with efficient forms of communication at all. It must be noted that some programmes, for example PASOC in Mauritania (figure 1 below), ARIANE in Mali and the OSCAR programme in Benin, were granted interesting instruments to ensure a broad overview of the life of the programme, much like a bulletin board, in all three cases downloadable from the website.

Figure 5 : Visualisation of the on line bulletin of the “Civil Society and good governance support programme” (PASOC) in Mauritania.




## 7.2. Communication as a capacity building instrument


As was mentioned, if the role of the communication component is considered as an important transversal instrument for the capacity building of a programme vis-a-vis the actors concerned, then, by the same token, it is important to remember which of the operational aspects must be considered under a communications strategy, on the basis of the concrete experiences undertaken in different programmes.

In a first instance communication must be a “two way” capacity building instrument, based on an interaction between the programme and the non state actors, “above all the third and fourth tier organisations) and vice versa. In the case where the tool is a website, this interaction is possible through the creation of a message board and thematic contributions on specific subjects to animate virtual forums which, generally, can cover the primary stakes for NSAs. An interesting example is the NSA support programme website in Somalia, as indicated in the figure below, or the PAANE website in Angola. In this last case, for example, where the dialogue between non state actors and public institutions is somewhat strained, the programme represents an interesting facilitation instrument, being an ulterior forum for exchange and dialogue.

Figure 6 : Visualisation of a page from the website of the “Strengthening Somali Civil Society” Programme”.




The analysis undertaken by the team clearly shows that only 31% (that is to say 5 of the 16 still active) of the programmes used a website as a two way communication tool through a forum that allows CSOs to communicate and position themselves in relation to different stakes.



A second aspect concerns the importance of facilitating dialogue and information exchanges between NSAs and between the latter and public institutions, through the creation of a favourable environment for the exchange of information and opinions. This aspect becomes more and more unavoidable, especially when one refers to the programmes that have, as a “mission”, that of promoting and “building” fora for dialogue and influence as regards national policy.

Communication, in terms of capacity building, cannot avoid the development and sharing of experiences between non state actors, technical assistance operators in the context, Delegation officials and the national actors concerned, including the donor organisations. This sharing of experience concerns, above all, the promotion of best practices. Unfortunately it must be noted how, in almost all of the websites of NSA capacity building programmes analysed, best practices are rarely taken into account, and the same tendency can be observed on the EC websites.

In the vein of communication, it must be mentioned how the aspect that concerns the presentation of a section on the analysis of the dynamics of NSAs in a country, which would be of great relevance as mentioned in the paragraph concerning the fundamental criteria of mapping, only in 19% of cases do the programme websites offer an adequately clear section on the dynamics, as indicated by the graph below.



**7.3. Communication as an instrument for the promotion of strategic position of a programme and its “mission” as regards the stakes of NSAs.**


As was explained in the previous paragraphs, in many cases the strategic positioning of NSA support programmes is not sufficiently clear and even in the cases where some of the

mentioned positioning elements are more explicit, they are not well demonstrated in the communication plan.


This raises the need for a programme to have communication instruments adapted to the context and, above all, to its goals in order to efficiently represent the anchorage of the programme to the social and political challenges to which the NSAs must face up.

In essence, communication must be conceived in a manner so as to facilitate and shed light upon, on the one hand, the coherence of the community strategy in the country and, on the other, to reinforce the positioning of NSAs in the socio-political framework of the country.

Furthermore, from the scenario offered by the analysis of the internet sites of the NSA programmes, it can be noted that only in 19% of cases can programmes show strategic positioning and the long term framework within which their programme falls.



Keeping the goal of clarifying the strategic positioning of the programme and, thereby, the community intervention strategy in the country, it can be noted hereafter that only 44% of programmes have, in their website, a link to the Delegation, as noted in the following graph, whereas 56% of these sites simply do not have this link.



It must also be mentioned that some Delegations still do not have their own website, which makes it very hard for the NSA support programme to represent its strategic positioning in an efficient way.



## 7.4. Communication for the promotion of transparency

All NSA support programmes must guarantee not only the maximum transparency in all phases of their life cycle, but also continuous access to all of the information stakeholders in the cooperation cycle.

In general, the Cotonou agreement foresees the involvement of NSAs as much in the definition exercise of the CSP as more in general in the whole community cooperation cycle (annual cooperation, midterm review, sectoral and thematic reviews etc.). This exercise requires a transparent communication to allow not only information exchange but also an efficient exchange between NSAs and decision makers. The analysis of the NSA support programme and concerned Delegation websites brings to light a general deficit in communication in this area, as well as a significant failing on the matter of communication tools adapted to this task.

On the level of the Programmes lifespan, communication favours transparency on three basic aspects, namely: (i) the management of normal Work Programme activities; (ii) the management of calls for proposals; (iii) the management of the regular PMU activities.

As regards the management of standard Work Programme activities, the analysis undertaken within the framework of the capitalisation study shows that the information is not always promoted. In essence, the information on meetings, training seminars and thematic documents should always be published according to the principle already expounded for the promotion of access to information by the general public, something which seems quite rare under the 40 NSA support programmes, save for one or two interesting experiences, such as in Tanzania. The following figure is an example of how the internet site of the Tanzanian NSA support programme dedicated an ad hoc space to the annual work plan, with the aim of raising awareness of the activities that the programme will achieve in the coming months.

Figure 7: Visualisation of a page of the Tanzanian NSA Support Programme website

The screenshot shows the website for Non State Actors (NSAs) in Tanzania. The header includes the logo 'AZISE' and the text 'NON STATE ACTORS ASASI ZISIZO ZA SERIKALI'. A navigation menu includes 'HOME', 'ABOUT US', 'DOCUMENTS', 'FUND', 'NEWS AND EVENTS', 'GALLERY', and 'WEBMAIL'. The main content area is divided into two columns. The left column has a 'News and Events' section with a sub-heading 'VIEWS BY NSAs ON POVERTY POLICY---MKUKUTA' dated 1 December 2008, and another section 'EAC-EPAs Issues of Interest to NSAs' dated 30 November 2008. The right column features a 'Members database' search form with fields for 'Keyword', 'District', and 'Region', and a 'Search' button. Below the search form is a 'NOTICE BOARD' section with a link for 'NSA PROGRAMME WORKPLAN II' and a link for 'NSASP Summary Report of March-Sept 08'.

When it comes to the general transparency of a call for proposals, in the majority of programme websites that adopt this tool for financing agreements, there is a space devoted to the publication of the call for proposal guidelines, as well as the submission form, often downloadable. By contrast, analysis of the 40 programmes shows that the publication of the applicant lists, the titles of current projects, scores received and synthesis files for the projects retained are still a rarity.

The tendency apparent from the analysis provokes thoughts on the efforts to which these programmes must aspire to reach the satisfactory levels of transparency. The left hand side of the figure below shows an interesting example as regards NSA support programmes.

Figure 8 : Visualisation of a web page from the site of the Mauritius NSA Support Programme



As one can see, several pages on the site provide detailed information on the operation of the calls for proposals.

By the same token, the website of the Beninese Civil Society Organisation Support Programme (OSCAR) contains clear and complete information for possible tenderers as regards the call for proposals procedure.

In terms of best practices, the table below demonstrates another example of efficient and comprehensive communication as regards the attribution of grants under the call for proposals of the ARIANE project in Mali.

Table 5 : Visualisation of a page of the website of the Malian NSA Support Programme, relative to the grants given under the "Support for development initiatives" component.

<p><b>GRANT CONTRACTS ALLOCATED IN FEBRUARY 2009</b></p> <p><b>FINANCING SOURCE: 9 ACP MLI 017</b></p> <p><b>Grants allocated under call for proposals ARIANE/2008-2009/AP3, published on 12<sup>th</sup> June 2008</b></p>
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File No.	Beneficiary: Name and Address	Title of the Action	Location of the activity Implementation	Length of the activity (months)	Sum of the grant (< FCFA >)	Percentage of the total eligible costs for the activity (%)
AP3/1/001	Œuvre Malienne pour le Développement des Zones Arides (OMADEZA)	Women and Local Governance	<i>Kayes Region</i>	6	13 496 445	90.00%
AP3/1/004	Association Guidimakha Jikke	Prevention and management of conflicts linked to the exploitation of natural resources in the Djélébou, Karakoro and Sahel communities	<i>Kayes Region</i>	6	12 398 870	90.00%
AP3/1/009	CPCD - Association Diombougou	Training project for female association leaders from Diombougou, conception and management of associated micro projects	<i>Kayes Region</i>	6	8 412 500	76.39%

For the third aspect, lastly, that of the ordinary activities of the programme carried out by the PMU, the experience led in several countries clearly demonstrates the importance of the element of transparency. Making an external public understand, notably NSAs, the management modalities adopted by the programme, as well as the management tools adopted by the PMU, is an important factor as regards transparency, as well as an element that facilitates the work of the PMU even in the interaction with NSAs. The information on the state of progress of a programme and the difficulties as regards the implementation confers more strength and legitimacy on the operators of the programme. Even in this case, the bulletin of the ARIANE programme can be considered a best practice to be replicated by other programmes.

### 7.5. Communication instruments

As regards the analysis of the communication instruments adopted by the 40 programmes studied in the capitalisation study, it must be highlighted that there was a certain monotony in the approach and, as was mentioned, a certain deficit in terms of appropriate tools for the end goals and the target public of the programmes.

In effect, the analysis revealed that the website is the tool most used by the programmes, even if only 18 of the 40 programmes in fact have one, revealing an insufficient appreciation of the need for an efficient and transparent communication strategy for the inclusion of NSA and for their access to community resources.

This raises serious thoughts on access to information: according to the experiences underway it seems relevant to adopt a website, especially for the programmes which have strong components involving:

- Support of dialogue between public institutions and NSA;

- Influence on public policy and lobbying;
- Support to 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> level organisations which are well enough equipped and have an internet site, and have the necessary IT skills.

An ulterior problem is that of the presentation of information, which seems to be rarely taken into account, either by the technicians or by the programme managers. The case of support to civil society in Uganda is a clear example of this lack of vision and long term strategy. In this specific case, for example, the end of the project also signified the end of the website and, as such, the information and capitalisation of the experience garnered was lost.

This shows that the question of information conservation following the end of a programme must absolutely be taken into account from the start of the programme. To this end, there can be two possible scenarios to avoid wasting important information and experience.

The first possibility concerns the storage of the information and the establishment of a link to the website of the programme in the Delegation of the country concerned. This option would appear to be the easiest to achieve, as well as the least expensive in economical terms.

The second option concerns the storage of information at the heart of the Commission, for example at Unit E4, or other units.

The following table shows the list of websites of NSA support programmes analysed in this study.

*Table 6: The list of websites of 9th EDF NSA Support Programmes*

Botswana	<a href="http://www.nsabotswana.org">www.nsabotswana.org</a>
Cameroun	<a href="http://www.pasoc-cameroun.org">www.pasoc-cameroun.org</a>
Mali	<a href="http://www.ariane-ml.org">www.ariane-ml.org</a>
Guinée Bissau	<a href="http://www.apoiosociadadecivilgb.org">www.apoiosociadadecivilgb.org</a>
Ethiopie	<a href="http://www.deleth.ec.europa.eu">www.deleth.ec.europa.eu</a>
Tanzanie	<a href="http://www.nsatz.org">www.nsatz.org</a>
Rép. Dominicaine	<a href="http://www.pril.org.do">www.pril.org.do</a>
Angola	<a href="http://www.paane.com">www.paane.com</a>
RDC	<a href="http://www.projet-ane.org">www.projet-ane.org</a>
Niger	<a href="http://www.pasoc-niger.org">www.pasoc-niger.org</a>
Bénin	<a href="http://www.oscarbenin.org">www.oscarbenin.org</a>
Ouganda	<a href="http://www.societyfund.or.ug">www.societyfund.or.ug</a>
Mauritanie	<a href="http://www.pasoc-mauritanie.org">www.pasoc-mauritanie.org</a>
Mauritius	<a href="http://www.gov.mu">www.gov.mu</a>
Sénégal	<a href="http://www.ugp-ane.org">www.ugp-ane.org</a>
Suriname	<a href="http://www.suriname-ngo-strenghtening.org">www.suriname-ngo-strenghtening.org</a>
Malawi	(en phase de réalisation)
Somalie	<a href="http://www.somali-civilsociety.org">www.somali-civilsociety.org</a>

As mentioned, the website represents a useful tool but there are also other interesting experiences that should be explored, for example the Rural Organisation Support Programme in Guinea (PACNOP). Bearing in mind the fact the beneficiaries of this programme are rural organisations, the programmes used proximity, that is to say through the rural radios present in the different sub-prefectures in the country, allowing for a significant territorial coverage.


### 7.6. Institutional visibility and communication

All NSA support programmes and, in particular those supporting civil society organisations, must therefore face the question of visibility and institutional communication.

If on the one hand communication is a capacity building instrument that must accompany the programme during its life and, even, afterwards through the capitalisation and storage of the information produced, then on the other institutional communication has more of a communicative role as regards external stakeholders.

In this sense institutional communication is important not only on the country level where the programme is being implemented, but also on the international level. The implementation of the sub-regional network, for example, is becoming essential in the framework of interaction where, as is increasingly the case, NSAs participate in sub-regional thematic platforms.

From the analysis undertaken, it has emerged that, apart from a few minor cases, the existence of links on similar programme websites on a sub-regional level represent a mere 25% of the total.



Among the best practices in these domains, the Niger NSA support programmes (PASOC) and the ARIANE programme in Mali, as indicated below, must be noted.

*Figure 9 : CSO Support Programme in Niger and the webpage of the ARIANE programme in Mali*

**PASOC**  
Programme d'Appui à la Société Civile du Niger

Accueil | Présentation | Documents | Activités | L'équipe | Contact

**Bienvenue sur le site du PASOC**

Bienvenue sur le site du **Programme d'Appui à la Société Civile du NIGER (PASOC)**. Ce site en construction est un espace d'informations, d'échanges et de documentation sur le programme et sur les thématiques qui y sont liées.

Les thématiques prioritaires du PASOC sont celles liées à la promotion des droits humains et de la citoyenneté, que cela soit l'éducation, la santé, l'éducation civique, le dialogue entre les acteurs ou le droit à l'environnement par exemple.

Il vise à favoriser la transparence et la circulation de l'information à propos du programme et à communiquer sur ses bonnes pratiques et résultats. Les étapes suivantes seront la mise à disposition d'espaces d'information pour les structures de la société civile désireuses de partager leurs informations et les événements qu'elles organisent.

Dans le cadre de son Programme Indicatif National, le Gouvernement de la République du Niger et la Délégation de la Commission européenne ont décidé de financer sur les ressources du **9ème Fonds Européen de Développement (FED)** le Programme d'Appui à la Société Civile (PASOC). La date limite de sa mise en oeuvre opérationnelle

**Liens utiles**

- Délégation de la Commission européenne
- Organisations de la Société Civile Appuyées et Renforcées
- Programme ANE en RDC
- Programme Ariane au Mali
- Programme d'Appui à la Société Civile et à la Bonne Gouvernance
- Réseau des plates-formes nationales d'ONG d'Afrique de l'Ouest et du Centre
- Société civile au Maroc
- Société civile au Rwanda
- Société civile en RDC

**Liens utiles**

**\*Afrique.**

N'hésitez pas à nous contacter et nous communiquer d'autres liens que vous jugez utiles pour les Organisations de la Société Civile.

*Des initiatives remarquables des Organisations de la Société Civile dans nos pays voisins à voir et à consulter*

**MALI**

Forum des peuples : [www.forumdespeuples.org](http://www.forumdespeuples.org)  
 Initiatives Mali Gateway : [www.initiatives-mali.info](http://www.initiatives-mali.info)  
 Institut de recherche et débat sur la bonne gouvernance : [www.institut-gouvernance.org](http://www.institut-gouvernance.org)  
 Réseau Plaidoyer Lobbying : [www.rplmali.org](http://www.rplmali.org)

**AFRIQUE**

Société civile en RDC : [www.societecivile.cd](http://www.societecivile.cd)  
 Société civile au Maroc : [www.tannia.ma](http://www.tannia.ma)  
 Société civile au Rwanda : [www.rwandagateway.org](http://www.rwandagateway.org)  
 Penser pour agir : [www.penserpouragir.org](http://www.penserpouragir.org)  
 Organisations de la Société Civile Appuyées et Renforcées (OSCAR) : [www.oscarbenin.org](http://www.oscarbenin.org)  
 Réseau des plates-formes nationales d'ONG d'Afrique de l'Ouest et du Centre : [www.repaoc.org/](http://www.repaoc.org/)  
 Programme d'Appui à la Société Civile et à la Bonne Gouvernance : [www.pasoc-mauritanie.org](http://www.pasoc-mauritanie.org)  
 Projet d'Appui au Renforcement des Capacités des Acteurs Non Etatiques en République Démocratique du Congo : [www.projet-ane.org](http://www.projet-ane.org)  
 Programme d'Appui à la Société Civile du Niger : [www.pasoc-niger.org](http://www.pasoc-niger.org)  
 Forum Civil Sénégal : [www.forumcivil.sn](http://www.forumcivil.sn)

**RESTE DU MONDE**

Forum européen de coopération internationale : [www.euforic.org](http://www.euforic.org)  
 Coordination Sud : [www.coordinationsud.org](http://www.coordinationsud.org)  
 Diplomatie Non Gouvernementale : [www.ong-ngo.org](http://www.ong-ngo.org)  
 Examen périodique universel : [www.upr-info.org/-rubrique11-.html](http://www.upr-info.org/-rubrique11-.html)

*Au Mali la société civile bénéficie de l'appui de plusieurs bailleurs de fonds et programmes de coopération*

**INSTITUTIONS ET AGENCES DE COOPERATION OEUVRANT AU MALI**

When it comes to visibility, its fundamental role is that of bringing to light not only the community financing, but also the belonging to a global EU strategy in the country. To this end it is important to note that the aspects concerning the visibility strategy and the concrete tools to be foreseen in the programmes are paid due attention in the "Communication and Visibility Manual for the External Actions of the European Union, published by the EuropeAid Cooperation Office.

## ANNEXES

## Annex 1 : Grid for the in-depth analysis

COUNTRY :
PROGRAM TITLE :
DURATION :
SITUATION :
BUDGET :

Level 1 of analysis – EU and ACP States participatory approaches		
PHASE	ISSUES	COMMENTS
<b>1.0 PREFACE</b>	<b>1.0.1. Country Categorisation</b> (i. Country with a culture of NSA participation in the development process; ii. country with a rather limited tradition of dialogue and participation; iii. Very limited space for NSA and LA involvement)	
<b>1.1. NSA INFORMATION AND INVOLVEMENT IN THE STRATEGIC PROGRAMMING CYCLE</b>	<b>1.1.1. NSA participation in the elaboration of CSP</b> (consultation & engagement process and major tools deployed; evolution from 9 <sup>th</sup> to 10 <sup>th</sup> EDF)	
	<b>1.1.2. CB /NSA support programmes within the CSP</b> Relevance of CB programmes & other CS-targeted interventions / evolution (9 <sup>th</sup> to 10 <sup>th</sup> EDF) in terms of resources, strategic positioning, etc	
	<b>1.1.3. Mainstreaming CB in the EU cooperation strategy:</b> How is SC considered within other NIP programmes (not directly targeting CS – “service provision vs. development actor”) and what mechanisms are developed to ensure the association of NSA in the definition of sectoral policies and strategies? / Complementarity with initiatives under thematic programmes (NSA & LA, EIDHR, etc)	
<b>1.2. NSA INVOLVEMENT IN THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS AND MAJOR NATIONAL DEBATES</b>	<b>1.2.1. NSA involvement in the development process and major national debates ANE (PRSP; decentralisation, etc) –</b> (who, how, when, engagement leverage capacity to influence policies, etc)	
	<b>1.2.2. Brief analysis of major umbrella organisations in the country</b> (number, strengths, constituencies, legitimacy, etc)	

Level 2 of analysis “Project management cycle” of CB programmes		
PHASE	ISSUES	COMMENTS
	<b>2.1.1. Analysis and capitalisation of mapping studies (pre-feasibility studies) :</b> · Objectives, purpose and expected results of the Mapping study	



<p><b>2.1</b> <b>PROGR</b> <b>AMME</b> <b>IDENTIF</b> <b>ICATION</b> <b>N</b> <b>STAGE</b></p>	<p><b>goals</b> (a tool to spell out &amp; understand the challenges faced by CSO? a cartography?)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Theoretical framework</b> (notion and categorization of NSA, operational definition of CB)</li> <li>• <b>Scope of the study</b> (information covered and structure of the report ; categories of NSA included in the study, role of the private sector and LA other donors, CB efforts and INGO, institutional mechanisms between government and CS; etc)</li> <li>• <b>Methodological approach</b> (quantitative vs. qualitative; tolls and sources of information; participatory approach, time-span and phases; etc)</li> <li>• <b>Participation of NSA and other relevant stakeholders in the study</b> (deployed tools)</li> <li>• <b>Use of the results of the study</b> (in the definition of a CB program ; in the drafting of a general EU strategy in support of NSA in the country ; etc)</li> <li>• <b>Lessons learnt</b></li> </ul>	
	<p><b>2.1.2. Analysis and capitalisation of feasibility studies</b> (when different from mapping studies):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Analysis of their relevance and added value</b> ( vis-à-vis the results of the mapping or when a mapping is not conducted)</li> <li>• <b>Use of the results of the study</b> (in the definition of a CB program ; in the drafting of a general EU strategy in support of NSA in the country ; etc)</li> </ul>	
<p><b>2.2.</b> <b>PROGR</b> <b>AMME</b> <b>INSTRU</b> <b>CTION</b> <b>STAGE</b></p>	<p><b>2.2.1. Analysis and capitalisation of strategies in support of NSA particularly in the sphere of CB :</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Guiding principles of the programme</b> (CB as a process; CS legitimate roles ; diversity of CS, multi-layered partnership ; relevance of the context ; etc);</li> <li>• <b>Overall and specific objectives and expected results</b></li> <li>• <b>Target groups</b> (families of SC; sectors, rural vs. urban; service delivery vs. lobbying and advocacy; levels of structuration; the role of the private sector; the role of LA; etc)</li> <li>• <b>Major components &amp; activities under the programme</b> (institutional strengthening, empowerment of local communities ; institutional and regulation framework development, consultation space ; etc)</li> <li>• <b>Assumed risks and major assumptions</b></li> <li>• <b>Coherence of the strategy</b> in support of CS vis-à-vis the development and national challenges identified in the CSP (level 1 of analysis) + other donor/national/INGO interventions.</li> <li>• <b>Complementarity between the mix of instruments</b> (mainly geographical instruments vis-à-vis thematic lines: EIDHR, NSA&amp;LA )</li> </ul>	
	<p><b>2.2.2. Analysis and capitalisation of the institutional and management arrangements of the programme:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Duration and geographical coverage</b></li> <li>• <b>Steering and monitoring arrangement</b> (layers, by who, what role for CSO?)</li> <li>• <b>Management arrangements</b> (PMU vs. DEC vs. national government formulas; direct or indirect labor; type of structure -consultancy vs. INGO vs. national platform ; number and profile of TA; etc). SWOT analysis of major options and analysis of financial implications</li> <li>• <b>Analysis of the role of the TA</b></li> <li>• <b>The role of national technical expertise</b></li> <li>• <b>Cost analysis</b> (budget repartition, activity funds vs. Administrative costs; TA contract coverage; etc)</li> </ul>	

	<p>2.2.3. Analysis of the <b>operational notion of CB</b> and the typology, entwining and complementarity of the mix of deployed instruments and tools –foreseen and used- for CB purposes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Work programme tools vs. call for Proposals.</b> Strengths and</li> <li>• The use of <b>Intermediary organisations</b></li> <li>• <b>CB mechanisms</b> (tutoring, funding, formal and informal training, etc) and addressed topics</li> </ul>		
	<p>2.2.4. <b>Mainstreaming cross-cutting issues :</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Gender, environment, HR, indigenous rights, etc</li> </ul>		
<p><b>2.3.</b></p> <p><b>PROGR AMME IMPLE MENTA TION STAGE</b></p>	<p>2.3.1. <b>The role of the various stakeholders</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• EC role throughout programme implementation. The notion of facilitation.</li> <li>• <b>National government role</b> (NAo and line ministries; involvement in programme implementation)</li> <li>• <b>INGOs</b> role (beneficiaries vs. supporters of local CSO vs. excluded from the programme ...; How to associate them and establish partnerships?)</li> <li>• <b>LA and line technical national services</b> role</li> <li>• <b>Multi-actor dialogue</b></li> </ul>		
	<p>2.3.2. <b>National vs international expertise and the issue of the existing capacity building supply.</b></p>		
	<p>2.3.3. <b>Analysis of the Cfp mechanism:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Objectives, priorities and target groups</b> (first and second generation programmes; consistency with the priorities identified in the mapping exercise and national challenges)</li> <li>• <b>Eligibility criteria</b> (focus on the actor : Who's eligible ?)</li> <li>• <b>Selection criteria</b> (focus on the action; the question of relevance)</li> <li>• <b>Information</b> dissemination and access</li> <li>• The issue of the <b>contribution of CSO grantees</b></li> <li>• The issue of <b>financial responsibility</b></li> <li>• <b>Associated risks</b> (service delivery major focus; incomplete or overlapping proposals; rural gap; grassroots organisations lack of capacity; etc)</li> <li>• <b>Positive discrimination</b> mechanisms (geographical focus; sectoral considerations; gender ; etc)</li> <li>• <b>The use of distinctive approaches to target diverse categories (CS, private sector, etc) &amp; levels of intervention</b> (umbrella organisations, 2<sup>nd</sup> level, grassroots organisations, etc) in respect of their distinctive vocations and mandates.</li> </ul>		
	<p>2.3.4. <b>Coordination mechanisms</b> with other CSP/NIP programmes (monitoring of SWAPs and budget support, ; CS engagement in the implementation of programmes etc) and other donors</p>		
	<p>2.3.5. <b>The room for innovation</b></p>		
	<p>2.3.6 <b>Major constraints and obstacles faced by the programme</b></p>		
	<p>2.3.7. <b>Visibility of the programme</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Communication systems and tools (website; newsletters; etc)</li> <li>• Visibility mechanisms</li> </ul>		
	<p><b>2.4.</b></p> <p><b>PROGR AMME EVALUA TION AND CAPITA</b></p>	<p>2.4.1. <b>Monitoring and evaluation mechanisms</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A results vs. a process approach</li> <li>• Indicators of process, performance and impact</li> <li>• Objective sand scope of the evaluations (mid-term reviews and final evaluations)</li> <li>• Stakeholder engagement in the monitoring and evaluation of the programme (who and how)</li> </ul>	

<b>LIZATION STAGE</b>	<b>2.4.2. Information, capitalisation and institutional learning mechanisms</b>	
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Conclusions framed as good and innovative practices and lessons learnt	
ISSUES	COMMENTS
Identified Best/Good practices	
Innovative practices	
Lessons learnt	

## Annex 2 : Grid for the synthetic analysis

COUNTRY :
CB PROGRAMME :
LENGTH :
SITUATION :
AMOUNT :

Analysis Level 1 The participative approaches of the EU and the ACP State		
PHASE	QUESTIONS	ANSWERS
<b>1.0</b> PRECONDITIONS	<b>1.0.2. Country Categorisation</b>	
<b>1.1.</b> INFORMATION AND INCLUSION OF NSAs IN THE STRATEGIC PROGRAMMING	<b>1.1.4. Inclusion of NSAs in the definition of the CSP and information dissemination:</b> How does the ECD articulate dialogue with the NSAs and facilitate information exchange? (Main instruments)	

Analysis Level 2 The project management cycle of the NSA CB programmes		
PHASE	QUESTIONS	ANSWERS
<b>2.1</b> IDENTIFICATION OF NSA CB PROGRAMMES	<b>2.1.2. Mapping exercise:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· The objectives of the mapping exercise</li> <li>· The scope of the study</li> <li>· Other notes on the study</li> </ul>	
	<b>2.1.3. The feasibility studies/formulation</b> (when they exist outside the mapping study) Analysis of <b>their relevance and added value</b> , as regards the results of the mapping study or when a mapping study has not been undertaken	
<b>2.2.</b> FORMULATION OF NSA CB	<b>2.2.4. The support strategies for NSAs/CS in terms of capacity building:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· The general and specific objectives sought</li> <li>· The target actors (direct or indirect programme beneficiaries, types of NSAs and structure level)</li> <li>· The position of the private sector</li> <li>· The components of the programme (institutional support, institutional framework, partner cooperation framework, information etc.)</li> <li>·</li> </ul>	

<b>PROGR AMMES</b>	<b>2.2.5. The institutional set-up and the management systems of the TA:</b>	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· The length of the programme and the geographical coverage</li> <li>· The piloting system</li> <li>· The management system (direct governance or indirect governance) and the formula used</li> </ul>	
	<b>2.2.6. The instruments for the NSA/SC supprt in terms of capacity building:</b> Elaboration of a capacity building plan vs call for proposals (the “supply vs demand” logic).	
<b>2.3. IMPLE MENTA TION OF CB PROGR AMMES</b>	<b>2.2.7. Taking transversal themes into account</b>	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· Type</li> <li>· Environment</li> <li>· Human Rights</li> <li>· Indigenous People</li> </ul>	
	<b>2.3.1. The roles of the actors involved</b>	
<b>2.4. EVALUA TION</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· The <b>role of European NGOs</b> within the programme</li> <li>· The role of local authorities and decentralised technical services</li> </ul>	
	<b>2.3.2. The guidelines of calls for proposals:</b>	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· The <b>eligibility criteria of actors</b>. The question of institutional reliability and establishment</li> <li>· The <b>activity selection</b> criteria. The question of relevance</li> </ul>	
<b>2.4. EVALUA TION</b>	<b>2.3.3. Information and visibility</b>	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>· The Programme communication tools and systems</li> <li>· The set up in terms of visibility of the Programme</li> </ul>	
<b>2.4. EVALUA TION</b>	<b>2.4.2. The systems and set-up of the monitoring and evaluation of programmes</b>	
	<b>2.4.3. The nature and characterstics of backstopping</b>	

Conclusion in terms of best practices/innovative experiences/lessons learned	
QUESTIONS	ANSWERS
Best Practices Identified	
Innovative Experiences	
Lessons Learned	

**Annexe 3 : Grid for the quality analysis of information and communication**

Country	Web address of the European Commission Delegation	Web address of the programme	Web address of the NAO	Is the website linked to the ECD website?	Does the programme website contain the guidelines for tenderers to the calls for proposals?	Does the programme website have links to other similar NSA support programmes?	Does the programme website offer NSAs the chance to participate through the posting of messages, contributions etc.?	Does the programme website contain a clear section on the dynamics of NSAs?	Is the strategic position of the programme demonstrated by the website?	Does the programme website evince best practices?

## Annexe 4 : Agenda of the workshop 1-3 April 2009

### Restitution Seminar of the « Capitalisation Study on capacity building support programmes for Non State Actors under the 9th EDF »

Brussels, 1st to 3rd April 2009

Address: April 1: 54 Rue Joseph II, 1000 Brussels

April 2-3: 36 Rue Froissart, 1040 Brussels

#### - Seminar agenda -

#### Wednesday 1st April 2009

08:30-09:00	<b>Registration of the participants</b> <i>(Rotonde 01/01)</i>
09:00-10:45	<b>Introduction</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Welcome and opening of the seminar</li><li>- Study and Seminar Presentation: objectives, scope and targeted results</li><li>- Presentation of the participants</li></ul>
10:45-11:15	<b>Presentation of the study</b>  <u>Presentation of the study methodology and key concepts</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- The Study's key concepts:<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>o The Non-State Actors and Civil Society concepts;</li><li>o Actors typology and structuring levels;</li><li>o The concept of capacity building and levels (individual, organisational and sectoral);</li></ul></li><li>- Categorisation of the context: typology per country;</li></ul>
11:15-11:30	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Methodology used in the study: deep analysis and synthesis analysis of the NSA Capacity-Building programmes.</li></ul> <b>Coffee break</b> <i>(Room 1/3)</i>

<p>11:30- 13:00</p>	<p><b>1st Session : « Objectives of NSA Support programmes and their strategic positioning : from the project elaboration to the mapping exercise »</b> (plenary session – <i>Rotonde 01/01</i>)</p> <p><b>Topics for discussion</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <i>The principles of the Cotonou Agreement related to NSA participation into the social and political dialogue.</i></li> <li>- <i>Coherence with the aid effectiveness principles related to role and participation of the CS</i></li> <li>- <i>Finalities and guiding principles of the capacity building programmes:</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o <i>The question of neutrality and strategic positioning of the NSA capacity- building programmes;</i></li> <li>o <i>The concept of governance and multi-actors partnership (democratic and political governance and the CSO role ; local governance and public sphere management);</i></li> <li>o <i>The process approach and difference with the micro-project programmes and thematic lines: what is the added value of the Capacity-Building programmes?</i></li> <li>o <i>The respect of the mission and role of CSO in the Programme : how to support the process in progress without creating “artificial social dynamics”;</i></li> <li>o <i>« First » and « second generation » Programmes: capacity-building and anchoring to the concrete stakes of development.</i></li> </ul> </li> <li>- <i>General and specific objectives and strategy relevance:</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o <i>Programme relevance and coherence in relation to the country’s issues and context. Relation to PRSP and sector strategies and policies and policies of good governance;</i></li> <li>o <i>The programme’s coherence, relevance and complementarities with principles and instruments of the EU development policy and its role in CSP;</i></li> <li>o <i>Synergies and possible complementarities between geographical programs and thematic programs.</i></li> </ul> </li> <li>- <i>Identification of NSA Capacity-building Programmes and the mapping exercise:</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o <i>The objectives and the mapping/diagnosis exercise and the undertaking of feasibility studies;</i></li> <li>o <i>How to perform a mapping and its fundamental aspects;</i></li> <li>o <i>Involvement of the beneficiaries in the identification phase of the Programmes.</i></li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<p>13:00-14:00</p>	<p><b>Lunch break</b></p>
<p>14:00-14:30</p>	<p><b>Working sessions on specific issues upon request by the Delegations</b></p>
<p>14:30-16:00</p>	<p><b>Presentation of 3 good practices related to strategic positioning and/or identification and formulation of NSA Support programmes (by the ECD /TA programmes) (Rotonde 01/01)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <i>The Somalia example : implementation of a strategy with variable geometry with the support of the INGO</i></li> <li>- <i>The example of the PAANE in Angola : the positioning requirement in a difficult context</i></li> <li>- <i>The elaboration of a mapping in order to identify a strategy to support civil society in the middle and long term in Central Africa Republic.</i></li> </ul>
<p>16:00-16:15</p>	<p><b>Coffee break</b></p>



16:15-17:15	<b>1st session ctd.: working groups' discussions on the positioning of these programmes in the frame of the 10th EDF</b> (Group 1: Rotonde 01/01) (Group 2: Room 02/73)
17:15-17:45	<b>Restitution of the 1st session working groups</b>
17:45-18:00	<b>1st day operational conclusions : recommendations and tools</b> (Rotonde 01/01)
18:00	<b>Welcome cocktail (J54 Cafeteria)</b>

### Thursday 2<sup>nd</sup> April 2009

9:00-10:00	<p><b>2<sup>nd</sup> session : « the institutional set-up, the Programme internal governance institutions, role and profile of the TA and consultation with the donors»</b> (plenary session – Room 1A)</p> <p><b>Topics for discussion</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Management system and options to be considered (centralised management vs. decentralised management ; direct decentralised operations and indirect decentralised operation) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o Financing of activities by programme estimate or by TA contract</li> <li>o The issue of the TA financial responsibility</li> </ul> </li> <li>- The steering set-up <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o Role of NSAs in the programme management and monitoring</li> </ul> </li> <li>- Role of relevant stakeholders (role of the NSAs – actors and beneficiaries -; role of the TA ; role of the ECD; role of the NAO and of governments; role of local/regional contacts and correspondents; INGO role)</li> <li>- Profile and role of the TA : functions of administrative management, facilitation and accompaniment <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o Backstopping role and definitions</li> <li>o ToR drafting and selection systems</li> </ul> </li> <li>- Coordination with other donors : coordination and consultation mechanisms with other donors <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o Multi-actors funds system. Examples.</li> </ul> </li> <li>- Costs analysis</li> </ul> <p><b>Presentation of 5 examples of modalities of institutional set-up</b> (by ECD/TA programmes)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- System of direct decentralised operations and the « Civil Society Support net » initiative in Tanzania (<b>Videoconference</b>)</li> <li>- System of indirect decentralised operation in Guinea Conakry</li> <li>- System of indirect decentralised operation in Mali</li> <li>- The delegation agreement signed with DFID in Sierra Leone</li> <li>- The institutional setting of the NSA Support Programme in PNG: the Department For Community Development (DFCD) as the implementing agency and role of the TA</li> </ul>
10:00 – 11:00	
11:00-11:15	<b>Coffee break (1<sup>st</sup> floor)</b>
11:15-12:15	

	<p><b>2<sup>nd</sup> session ctd.: working groups' discussions</b>  <b>(Group 1 Room 1A)</b>  <b>(Group 2 Room 1B)</b>  <b>(Group 3 Room 4C)</b></p>
12:15-13:00	<b>Restitution of the 2<sup>nd</sup> session working groups</b>
13:00-14:00	<b>Lunch break</b>
14:00-14:30	<b>Working sessions on specific issues upon request of the Delegations</b>
14:30-15:15	<p><b>3rd Session : «Concrete experiences with NSAs, other than CSO » (Plenary session – Room 1A)</b></p> <p><b>Topics for discussion</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The issue of different missions and actors' differentiation</li> <li>- The role of mapping in the identification of the actors</li> <li>- The risk of narrowing CS to NGOs</li> <li>- Eligibility of private sector organisations</li> <li>- The issue of community-based organisations</li> </ul>
15:15 – 15:45	<p><b>Presentation of 2 good practices in matters of Community-based Organisations and non-CS actors (by ECD/TA programmes)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Potentialities of trade unions and private sector organisations as well as confessional organizations in DRC</li> <li>- The targeting on the peasant organizations in Guinea Conakry</li> </ul>
15:45-16:15	<b>Coffee break (1<sup>st</sup> floor)</b>
16:15-16:45	<b>Presentation on: « Information, Communication and Visibility of NSA support programmes: concrete experiences » (plenary session – Room 1A)</b>
16:45-17:00	<b>Operational conclusions of the second working day : recommendations and tools</b>
17:30- 19:00	<b>Possible working sessions on specific programmes (upon request of interested delegations)</b>
20:00	<p><b>Dinner</b>  <b>RESTAURANT "Les Larmes du Tigre"</b>  <b>Rue de Wynants 21, 1000 Brussels</b>  <b>Tel.: 322/512 18 77</b></p>

**Friday 3 April 2009**

9:00 – 10:15

**4<sup>th</sup> session: “Capacity building: definitions and operational modalities”**  
(Plenary session – Room 1A)

**Topics for discussion**

- *The programmes’ components*
- *Tools used for capacity-building and their relevance in relation to missions and structuring CSO levels*
- *The elaboration of capacity-building scheme versus calls for proposals and mixed approaches*
  - *The pro-active approach: elaboration of a capacity-building scheme*
    - *Standardised actions and individual paths of capacity building*
    - *CSO’s Tutoring and accompanying systems*
  - *The calls for proposals (thematic priorities of guidelines: targeting by CSO’s structuring level and by themes/targeted sector: the Programme’s role in setting-up proposals)*
    - *Risks associated to calls for proposals-based approach*
    - *Mechanisms promoting the association between CSOs*
    - *The actors’ eligibility criteria and the actions’ selection criteria (the relevance criteria and the criteria’s grid)*
    - *The centralised and decentralised selection*
    - *The function of pre-selection*
    - *The role of assessors/evaluators*
    - *The sub-granting funding*
    - *How concretely calls for proposals contributed to the RC*
- *The introduction of new procedures*

**Presentation of different approaches (by ECD/TA programmes) :**

- *The “call for proposal” approach in Ethiopia. The guidelines*
- *The support from the NSAs for the RC: the two-pillar approach in South Africa and priorities of the European cooperation, in particular in support to the justice sector*
- *“The capacity-building scheme” approach undertaken in Mali*
- *The adaptation of the tool for call for proposals in Mali*
- *“The capacity-building scheme” approach undertaken in Angola*

10:15-11:00

11:00-11:15	<b>Coffee Break (1<sup>st</sup> floor)</b>
11:15-12:40	<b>4<sup>th</sup> session ctd.: Discussion in working groups</b> <i>(Group 1: Room 1A)</i> <i>(Group 2: Room 1B)</i> <i>(Group 3: Room 4C)</i>
12:40-13:00	<b>Restitution of the 4<sup>th</sup> session working groups</b>
13:00-14:00	<b>Lunch</b>
14:00-14:30	<b>Discussions on participants' request</b>
14:30-16:00	<b>5<sup>th</sup> session: « Systems and arrangements for programmes' monitoring and evaluation » (Plenary session – Room 1A)</b>  <b>Topics for discussion</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <i>The results approach vs. the process approach</i></li> <li>- <i>The monitoring tools and the definition of the indicators of monitoring and impact</i></li> <li>- <i>The definition of objectives and the impact of evaluations</i></li> <li>- <i>The involvement of stakeholders</i></li> </ul> <b>Presentation of identified good practices (by ECD/TA programmes) :</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <i>The monitoring system undertaken in Ethiopia linking projects' results to the programme's results (CSF reporting matrix)</i></li> </ul>
16:00-16:15	<b>Coffee Break (1<sup>st</sup> floor)</b>
16:15-17:00	<b>General conclusions and closing of the seminar</b>

	<b><i>(Room 1A)</i></b>
17:30- 19:00	<b><i>Possible working sessions on specific programmes (upon request from interested delegations)</i></b>

## Annexe 5 : Participants of the Brussels Seminar (1-3 April 2009)

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