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REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL

**ON THE APPLICATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL PRODUCER LIMITS IN
THE ANNUAL EWE AND SUCKLER COW PREMIUM SCHEMES**

REPORT ON THE APPLICATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL PRODUCER
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I. INTRODUCTION

Council Regulations (EEC) No 3013/89 and No 805/68 require that the Commission make a report, before 1 July 1996, on the application of the arrangements laid down in the individual producer limits in the annual ewe and suckler cow premium schemes respectively, together with, where appropriate, any necessary proposals. This report fulfills that obligation. The report is designed to look at the administrative experiences of applying the premium quota systems since the 1992 Reform. Its preparation began before the current BSE crisis and it does not represent the Commission's views over how the beef regime shall be adapted following the crisis. It does, nevertheless, form part of the background which will need to be taken into account when ideas for changing the beef regime are assessed.

The origins of the premium quotas can be traced to the 1992 CAP Reform when solutions to two problems common to the Community's sheep and beef sectors were sought: the trend of increasing internal production coupled with escalating Community expenditure. In the sheep sector, rising production in the 1980's, stimulated by readily available premiums, was undermining Community prices and, owing to the price compensatory method of calculation of the ewe premium, causing a dramatic growth in Community expenditure. In the beef sector, after several years of greater surpluses, the Reform provided the opportunity to shift policy, in the light of the necessary adjustments of production to internal consumption trends and export possibilities, in particular those relating to the approaching GATT commitments, away from beef price support through costly intervention mechanisms and more towards direct payments to producers as premia.

In the sheep sector, the Commission's response to these pressures was to propose, in the context of the 1992 Reform, to replace the stabilizer, which had proved incapable of controlling production, with the requirement that a producer must hold a right to each Ewe Premium and to establish individual producer limits to the number of those rights, a policy more commonly known as the introduction of 'individual quotas'. The aim of this measure was to limit the number of animals kept by individual producers since stockrearing without premium, in most circumstances, is unprofitable.

For the beef sector, the compromise on the whole of the 1992 Reform extended this idea of individual quotas to suckler cows. The reasons for this were that the Council compromise included a bigger increase on the Suckler Cow Premium than the Commission had already proposed and that Council wanted to ensure that this increase did not lead to an uncontrolled increase in the suckler cow herd. Furthermore, the introduction of limits on the eligibility to premia in the beef sector proved valuable in the final stages of the negotiation of the GATT agreement which followed the 1992 Reform.

The basic regulations establishing individual quotas in the two sectors¹, similar in their main outline, laid down that the quotas be allocated to each active producer, on the basis of the number of premiums paid in a past "reference" year², particular to the sector involved. Member States were

¹ Articles 5a - 5d of Regulation (EEC) No 3013/89 for the sheep sector and Articles 4e and 4f of Regulation (EEC) No 805/68 for the beef sector.

² From 1995 onwards, in the sheep sector, owing to the introduction of individual quotas, the Council's former 'headage limit' rule, by which the payment of ewe premium was made at the full rate for producers with no more than 1000 ewes in LFA's and 500 ewes in non-LFA's, became superfluous and was abolished. The net

also given some latitude in choosing the reference year. General rules to accommodate the case of producers who did not claim premium in the reference year and the distribution of rights within producer groups were also made.

As a consequence, the total sum of all the individual producer limits in each of these two sectors constitutes a virtual ceiling to their productive capacities and sets a maximum Community expenditure for their support. Furthermore, fixing a total number of ewe and suckler cow premium rights in each of the new Member States which entered the Union in 1995, decided as part of the Accession agreements, maintained the philosophy of limiting productive capacity in the two sectors.

Council legislation also gave producers the opportunity to adjust each year the number of rights they hold to premium through the provisions for transfer and, should the Member State so choose, temporary leasing of quota. Member States were given the option of setting up a "commercial" system of transfers which allows producers to deal directly between themselves or an "administrative" system in which rights are transferred via the national reserve. Only one Member State, France, chose the latter option. Except for certain demarcated zones in each Member State out of which rights may not be transferred because sheep or beef production is especially important, a producer is allowed to transfer rights to another producer, either with his holding or without. However, transfers without the holding must surrender up to 15% of the transferred rights to the national reserve, a procedure more commonly known as the 'siphon'.

The national reserve of premium rights in each Member State was set up by retaining between 1 and 3% of the initial individual allocation of rights and was used to reallocate rights amongst suggested priority categories of producers, determined according to each Member State's own criteria. In addition, Council agreed to the creation of a non-forfeitable initial reserve equal to 1% of the sum of the rights in less-favoured areas (LFA's).

Council subsequently instructed the Commission to make detailed rules for the application of the quota systems³ which, due to the similarity between the sectors in the Council policy, followed a common philosophy in their initial conception and subsequent refinement.

This report, within the limits already indicated above, addresses the production and budgetary consequences of the policy and the outcomes of the main Council provisions laid down in what has been a preliminary period of setting up the system. It is based on the information supplied to the Commission by Member States and any comments will be confined to those items on which data are available.⁴ For the most part, the measures described only affected those Member States which were part of the Union before the CAP reform. However, where appropriate, new Member States will be included in the appraisal. In addition, a brief review of the detailed implementing rules, adopted by the Commission, is presented.

effect on a producer's quotas was that those rights held above the 'headage limits' (on which the producer had been able to claim premium at half the full rate) were converted into full-rate rights at half the number.

³ Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3567/92 for the sheep sector and Regulation (EEC) No 3886/92 for the beef sector.

⁴ For example, since it is not a statutory requirement from Member States, the Commission is not in possession of any official data concerning aspects of quota trading such as the number of rights leased or the value of rights on the open market.

II. THE NECESSARY CONTROL ON PRODUCTION AND COMMUNITY SPENDING

a) Production

Annex I shows the trends in sheepmeat and beef production in the 5 years prior to the 1992 Reform, and the evolution of those parameters subsequent to the introduction of the individual quota policy.

It can be seen clearly that the quota policy has brought an effective stabilisation of Community sheepmeat production, at around 1.15m tonnes/year, a result which would not have been achievable under the stabiliser mechanism operating previously for the same purpose.

On the other hand, in the beef sector, the data do not show the same degree of curtailment in production. The Reform came into effect towards the end of a period with a downward trend in production (1991-1994). Production has now recovered again, and is set to continue upwardly because, although dairy cow numbers have fallen, there has been a sustained growth in the EU suckler cow herd in recent years (Annex II). This expansion in suckler cow numbers has occurred because, despite the introduction of individual quotas, there have been notable increases to the total number of premium rights fixed at the outset of the system, namely:

- i) the increase in the total claims in 1992 witnessed in practically all Member States⁵ who took the option available to them of fixing 1992 as the reference year (i.e. the same year as the introduction of the quotas themselves), as producers responded to the fact that premium rights were now in limited supply. The effect of this decision was to raise premium claims by 1.3 million, that is by 15%, in 1992 compared with 1991, in the Member States concerned, which added an equivalent number of rights to the EU total, and to create a situation where there was enough quota available across the Union to sustain an increase in suckler cow numbers of 9% between 1992 and 1995.
- ii) the raising of the milk ceiling from 60.000 to 120.000 litres per holding in the mixed suckler/dairy cow enterprises responded to the request of certain Member States, made during the CAP Reform, to extend the quota scheme to medium-sized mixed herds. Acceptance of such holdings resulted in 821.160 extra rights being created.

Thus, the control ('maitrise') of production and expenditure that was expected from the introduction of individual producer limits for suckler cow premium can only begin to take effect once the EU suckler cow herd has approached the limit set by the total number of rights available (Annex II). Given that around one million rights still remain unused and that the other support mechanisms which operate in the beef sector may allow producers to keep more stock than they have quota for, complete stabilization of the EU suckler cow herd, and the Community budget which supports it, is not likely to occur in the near future.

⁵ Only Greece did not choose 1992 as the reference year.

b) Community expenditure

The other principal objective of the introduction of individual limits in the ewe and suckler cow premium regimes was to control spending.

In the sheep sector, this task was relatively straightforward: putting a limit to the potential number of ewes in the Community would limit total expenditure, save for those fluctuations which arise due to changes in average Community market price, a parameter used in the calculation of the annual ewe premium.

Annex III shows that the quota regime has indeed had the desirable result of constraining spending in ewe premium to around 1.700 MECU.

For the beef sector, the introduction of individual quotas for suckler cow premium was part of an overall reform which brought a reduction in market price support measures (intervention), compensated by increases in the level of premiums and a revised export refund policy. Therefore, Annex III shows that expenditure in suckler cow premium has increased substantially in the past 15 years. The increase in the cost of the suckler cow premium regime is partly due to the increase in the level of the premium ⁶ and partly due to the increases in the number of rights available, in line with the argument on cow numbers already given, but expenditure could be expected, from current information, to stabilise at a maximum of 1.800 MECU per year once the unused and additional rights mentioned in section (i) above have been taken up.

III. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE COUNCIL'S IMPLEMENTING PROVISIONS WHICH FALL UNDER MEMBER STATE COMPETENCE

Within the Council's implementing rules, certain decisions concerning the application of the producer limits were delegated to Member States. This measure of flexibility operated in five main areas:

a) The reference year and the initial allocation of rights.

The reference year chosen in each Member State may be found in Annex IV for the sheep sector (for the most part, 1991) and Annex V for the beef sector, where 1992 was most generally adopted. In addition, Annex IV shows for the sheep sector a 'coefficient' calculated for those Member States where the total number of ewes decreased between 1989 and 1991 and where this coefficient was used to calculate an extra number of rights to be added to the individual limit of each producer. This was the case in Spain, France, Portugal and the United Kingdom.

⁶ The suckler cow premium was programmed in 1992 to rise from 70 ECU in 1993, 90 ECU in 1994 and to 120 ECU per head in 1995.

Resulting from these calculations, Annex VII for the sheep sector, and Annex VIII for the beef sector, show the potential, or sum total, of premium rights available in each Member State for allocation to individual producers upon the introduction of the quota system. The figures presented have been verified for the sheep sector ⁷ by the Commission on the basis of the reference year chosen by each Member State. The figures for suckler cow premium rights await the Commission's approval. The potential rights for the new Member States are also included, these totals having been agreed upon Accession and incorporated into each sector's base regulation.

Aside from the problem mentioned above concerning premium claims in 1992 in the beef sector and the notable administrative effort required in the exercise, no particular difficulties were encountered with this measure in most Member States. In general, the provisions made for producers who had not made claims or who had been penalised in the reference year were successful in their implementation because they permitted Member States to deal equitably with those hardship cases which arose. However, in the sheep sector, Italy and Greece did express to Council the problems which they had experienced in fixing individual limits amongst producers who, for various reasons, had underclaimed in the reference year and were not covered by the existing provisions. Consequently, in 1995, Council agreed that, subject to verification by the Commission, ⁸ Italy and Greece should be allowed to distribute up to 600.000 additional rights from the national reserve to accommodate those producers who had not received their correct initial quota.

b) The initial national reserves.

Annexes IV, V and VI again show the approach taken by each Member State, within the limits of the Council legislation, for the setting up of the initial national reserves in both sectors. While globally the measures taken supplied the national reserve in each Member State with 1 to 3% of the total sum of the individual limits, the tables illustrate that the percentage of rights forfeited in relation to the size of the individual producer limit varied appreciably. Annexes VII and VIII illustrate the numbers of rights which were available to establish the national reserves, including the extra rights resulting from the additional 1% LFA reserve .

In this respect, it must be noted that, from the outset, the national reserves in the different Member States have been under varying pressure from the demand of producers. The limited United Kingdom national reserves, in both sectors, originally set at 1% of the total rights, have particularly high demand and considerable administrative difficulties have been experienced in satisfying applications from producers. On the other hand, the Netherlands, after fixing a relatively high percentage forfeit of rights to the national reserve (3%) under circumstances of low suckler cow premium demand, had to refix the forfeit at 1% and subsequently return the surplus rights to producers.

⁷ Final verification still awaited for the figure for Germany and Italy (Sicily).

⁸ In the verification carried out in April 1996, the Commission agreed to an increase to the national reserves in Italy and Greece by 600.000 rights.

c) The system of quota transfers and leasing.

In general terms, the operation of the system of quota transfer is uniform across the Community with most Member States opting for the direct producer-to-producer transfers while also permitting temporary leasing of rights. The two notable exceptions to this norm are to be found in France, which only allows direct transfers to occur between producers when the entire holding is also transferred, all other operations taking place as transfers from a producer to the national reserve and the Netherlands, where no temporary leasing is permitted.

No insuperable problems in the operation of the transfer system have been experienced by Member States and producers appear to have adapted well to the obligations placed on them by the administrative procedures put in place to effect such transfers. The French authorities have registered the difficulties they have faced due to the extra effort and complications associated with the "administrative" system which they adopted. The Commission has responded to these requests with a series of adjustments to the detailed rules aimed at simplifying as far as possible the transfer procedures,⁹ while at the same time avoiding an excessive divergence between the two systems.

The level at which the 'syphon' is applied in each Member State may be seen, in Annexes IV, V and VI to vary between the 1% operating in the Netherlands to the 15% applied in the majority of Member States. In this respect, the 'syphon' has proven itself to be an acceptable and workable policy instrument for supplying a certain number of right to the national reserve which may be redistributed to priority groups by the Member States (see below).

d) Management of the national reserves.

In numerical terms, the supply of rights to the national reserve by the 'syphon' may be seen in Annexes X-XIII, which show the functioning of the national reserves in both sectors for 1993 and 1994. The data for 1995 have only been supplied by a few Member States.

Although the 'syphon' was rather insignificant in the first year of the operation of the national reserves, in comparison with the initial number of rights, in 1994 it contributed around a third of the rights available from the national reserve to sheep producers each year, upon request to the national authorities.

In the beef sector, the contribution of rights from the 'syphon' to the national reserve remains at a lower level (4% in 1994), though it makes an important contribution to the rights available in the national reserves in Belgium and Portugal. The relatively minor rôle of the 'syphon' is probably a reflection of the smaller number of transfers without holding which take place in the beef sector, in comparison to the sheep sector where transactions are, generally speaking, more mobile.

The same tables (Annexes X-XIII) also illustrate the functioning of the national reserves in terms of the attribution of rights to producers.

⁹ These measures, forming part of the 1994 Simplification Exercise of the CAP Reform, are described in Chapter IV below.

In the sheep sector in 1993, over 90% of the initial reserve was allocated to producers though this percentage fell to around 38% in 1994, with Spain, Italy and the Netherlands having the lowest percentage allocations. Furthermore, the data in Annex XII suggest that, in 1994, several Member States (in particular Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland and Portugal) withdrew rights from producers as a result of transfers without holding (the 'syphon') and then 'recycled' those rights to other producers from the national reserve with respect to the same marketing year.

In the beef sector, the demand on the initial national reserve was relatively low in 1993 (48%) but remained more constant the following year, a Community average of 53% of the rights being attributed to producers in 1994. Furthermore, an analysis of the data with respect to the 1994 calendar year indicate that the practice of 'recycling' rights is much less widespread in the beef sector than the sheep sector: only Belgium attributed to producers all the rights which were available in its 1994 national reserve. At the other end of the spectrum, Spain did not attribute any rights from the national reserve in 1994 because of difficulties in making a fair allocation of rights which would satisfy the extremely high demand.

In general terms, the management of the national reserves has not posed unsurmountable complications for national administrations, given the important extent to which decision-making was delegated to Member States in this area. However, in the United Kingdom, there has been a significant problem with some producers in both sectors of the so-called 'developers' priority category who, owing to the insufficient number of rights available in the 1993 national reserve, were not initially allocated all the rights they requested. Following a judgment in a national court, the UK authorities decided to reallocate part of the national reserve for this category of producers which has caused a delay in closing definitively the allocation exercise for 1993 and subsequent years.

e) Sensitive Zones

A further measure within the competence of Member States is illustrated in Annexes IV, V and VI which indicate the zones designated as particularly important for sheep and beef production and, therefore, out of which premium rights may not be transferred. This designation has been more colloquially known as 'ring-fencing'.

Most Member States have 'ring-fenced' the LFA's of their territory, a decision which is coherent with their policy priorities for such areas. The two notable exceptions to this norm are found in France and the United Kingdom. Firstly, the French authorities have nominated the entire French territory a Sensitive Zone. Secondly, the United Kingdom authorities have divided their whole territory into seven Sensitive Zones, based on regional and LFA criteria. The only other exceptions are Belgium, divided for these purposes into two zones according to land classification, and Germany which specified the dykelands, as well as the LFA's of its territory, as a Sensitive Zone.

The designation of these Sensitive Zones has widespread acceptance from all interested parties and the Commission has received no evidence, to date, to suppose that the measure, within the terms in which it was originally conceived, has been misused or misapplied.¹⁰

¹⁰ However, some Member States have expressed their concern that within certain 'ring-fences' rights may be accumulating and having a negative impact of an environmental nature (see Evaluation below) .

IV. THE FUNCTION OF THE COMMISSION'S DETAILED RULES FOR THE APPLICATION OF INDIVIDUAL PRODUCER LIMITS

The most pertinent rules in the Commission Regulations for applying individual producer limits in the sheep and beef sectors have the following basic structure:

a) Individual limits

In order to make the administration of the producer limits as workable as possible, for the ewe premium, only those producers with a minimum of 10 ewes were allocated an initial quota. In suckler cow premium, owing to the greater economic value of each animals, no lower limit was set.

b) Usage rules

Several rules were introduced in the regulations by which a producer would forfeit to the national reserve a certain proportion of his rights if he did not claim premium on those rights during determined periods. The aim of these rules was to increase the mobilization of rights by avoiding an excessive number of rights staying with producers who did not use themselves and, furthermore, did not choose to transfer or lease those rights to another producer.

For this purpose, a general usage rule was defined whereby a producer, who has not made use of at least 50% of his rights during two consecutive years, would forfeit the part not used during the last year to the national reserve. Moreover, with the intention of deterring speculative acquisition of rights by producers who did not intend to use them immediately, a more stringent usage rule was placed on those producers who receive rights free of charge from the national reserve. At the outset of the quota system, if such a producer did not make use of all his rights during the three years following the receipt of rights from the national reserve, he would forfeit the part not used ¹¹. Furthermore, the same producer was not authorized to transfer or lease any rights during that three year period.

The latest change to be made in the usage rules, which came into force in 1996 as part of the 1994 simplification exercise, unified these two rules into one, such that the minimum percentage usage has been raised to 70% each year. This measure aims to prompt producers to mobilize the rights which they could retain under the existing, relatively lenient, general usage rule. On the other hand, such a simplification of the rules was justified because the risk posed by speculative requests for rights from the national reserve had not been fulfilled.

¹¹ A couple of years into the system, it became evident that producers who had received rights from the national reserve and, in the extreme case a small number, were under an excessively heavy obligation in having to use all the rights they owned during the following three years: even natural fluctuations in flock size could cause them to have to surrender part of their rights. Therefore, it was decided to relax the rule to an average usage of 90% over the same three year period. This relaxation was subsequently taken further in 1996 by the introduction of a single usage rule (70% every year).

c) The transfer and leasing mechanisms

For clarity and ease in the operation, the Commission legislation introduced a minimum to the number of rights which may be transferred or leased¹² at any one time, with both parties involved having an obligation to notify the competent authorities of the transfer within a deadline, two months before the premium claim was made. However, once the transfer system was set up and running, Member States became aware that simplification in some of the associated procedures was necessary, particularly in France where the 'administrative' system is operated. In time for the 1995 premium claims, the minimum number of rights involved in a transfer without holding were simplified by rewording the previous formula which was based on percentages of the producer's quota.

At the same time, the deadline for notification of a transfer was redefined so as to allow producers to notify the authorities up until the day on which they made their premium claim. It therefore gives producers and administrations more time to organize and to process transfers and reduces the confusion between the deadline for transfer notification and the deadline for premium claim which had arisen amongst producers.

However, where the Commission legislation provided the most significant concessions to the rules on transfers has been on the opening of second trading periods in both sectors in both 1993 and 1994¹³. These derogations were justified because of transitional problems at the outset of the regime, in particular, producers across the whole Community experienced appreciable difficulty in trading quota or acquiring from the national rights sufficient rights to cover their premium claims within the deadlines originally set.

Finally, as an example taken from the sheep sector, the various deadlines for applications and notifications which have resulted from the application of the Commission rules in each Member State, are summarized in Annex XIV for the 1995 marketing year.

¹² In order to avoid a producer holding onto rights by leasing them out to another producer for an unlimited length of time, a rule was instituted which obliges producers to use all their rights during at least two consecutive years over a five-year period. Since this rule means that producers could lease out rights from the beginning of the quota system in 1993 for three years, 1996 is, in effect, the first year of its application.

¹³ A second trading period was admitted for 1995 and 1996 but does not apply to all Member States: only Italy and Greece were given this provision to assist in the allocation of the 600.000 extra ewe rights conceded by Council Regulation (EC) No 1265/95 and the UK may open a second period for 1995 in both sectors (and for 1996 in sheep) in order to accommodate those producers affected by delays in the distribution of the 1993 national reserve.

V. EVALUATION OF THE QUOTA REGIMES AND CONCLUDING REMARKS

At what is still a relatively early stage in the implementation of the policy of individual producer limits in the ewe and suckler cow premium schemes, the Commission has a number of comments to make on the development of the regime and the progress made so far.

- a) Controlling production and spending
 - i) The most important consequence of introducing producer quotas for ewe premium has been the control effected on sheepmeat production and Community expenditure in the sector.
 - ii) In the beef sector, for the reasons indicated above, the same degree of control in production and expenditure has manifestly not been attained.
- b) National reserves and their management
 - iii) The lighter pressure on the beef national reserves than on the sheep reserves, in the first two years of the operation, is consistent with the Commission's concern that, even before the BSE crisis, the current state of the suckler cow premium quotas is failing to exert the necessary control on production. The most important reasons why the beef national reserves are not under pressure is that most Member States adopted 1992 as the reference year for suckler cow quota, which meant that herd sizes did not evolve substantially by 1993 and that most producers had sufficient rights in 1993 based on their 1992 claim. Secondly, the obligations for quota usage placed on producers who receive rights from the national reserve and the introduction of the density factor in suckler cow eligibility may have dissuaded producers initially from applying. However, since census data show that suckler cow numbers are increasing across the Union, information on the development of the national reserves in 1995, not yet made available to the Commission by all Member States, will be particularly indicative of the current state of the quota policy across the Union.
 - iv) With regard to the management of the national reserves, in general terms, the system can be said to operate well. However, the data available to the Commission suggest that, particularly in the sheep sector, there is some divergence in the criteria for attribution of rights in that some Member States are operating a 'recycling' of rights, i.e. withdrawal and reallocation of rights to other producers in the same year while others are not. The reasons for this difference may be that in some Member States there is a known lack of demand from producers for rights and recycling would presumably not be necessary while other Member States may have chosen administrative procedures which result in the 'recycling' of rights being made in the year following withdrawal.
 - v) For reasons of controlling production and reducing quota speculation, the Commission wishes to comment that, in its opinion, 'recycling' of rights can encourage inflated applications for premiums¹⁴. The Commission recognizes that the current Council legislation

¹⁴ In effect, with this approach, the number of rights to 'recycle' will only be known after the end of the application period for premium. Producers must therefore make their premium claim without knowing to what extent the Member State can meet their request for supplementary rights free from the national reserve. Certain

leaves the management of the national reserves largely in the hands of the Member States and that there are no provisions covering deadlines for the distribution of the national reserves. However, the Commission invites Member States to take the necessary implementing measures in order to distribute the national reserve before the end of the application period for premium, that is, before the end of the transfer and leasing period.

c) Systems of quota transfer

- vi) Notwithstanding the comments made above with reference to national reserves, the Commission draws Council's attention to the fact that the second trading periods, justifiably conceded to Member States in the past, are related to this issue in that they permitted producers to optimize, in effect, their quota usage in 1993 and 1994. Consequently, the Commission announces that, from now on, it will take a far harder line against second trading periods, confident that the initial problems experienced by producers and administrations with the setting up of the quota regime are now overcome.
- vii) Concerning the national systems for the transfer of rights, the Commission emphasizes that major efforts have been made to accommodate the requests of Member States for more flexible transfer procedures but that measures which would lead to too great a divergence between the 'commercial' system and the 'administrative' system, have been refused. For this reason, the Commission has not been prepared to admit leasing of rights through the national reserve since, under the 'administrative' system, this would mean that individual quotas would tend to operate as regional ceilings, with all the inconveniences in terms of control ("maitrise") of production that such ceilings incur.
- viii) In relation to the same question of national systems for transfers, the Commission notes the fact that the low monetary value attributed to rights by the French administration is causing producers to retain unused rights. The Commission hopes that the changes made to the usage rules from 1996 onwards will help alleviate the problem of low quota availability.

d) Sensitive Zones

- ix) The Commission reaffirms that the direct consequence of 'ring-fencing' of premium rights is to limit the transfer of rights within a Member State. However, the Commission remarks that, due to the different criteria which have been used to establish Sensitive Zones in each Member State, a practical consequence of this provision is that rights may not be transferred between all zones or all Member States of the Union.
- x) The Commission is aware that, in certain instances, it has been suggested that the 'ring-fencing' of quota within a Member State is beginning to exert a negative impact on the rural environment, by accumulating rights within their boundaries, which is an undesirable consequence of this provision. Therefore, the Commission draws Member States' attention to this topic, with a view to finding a better balance between the socio-economic objectives of this provision and certain objective criteria of environmental protection.


producers, in the hope of receiving the supplementary rights they have requested, will tend to inflate their premium claim and therefore retain more animals than their individual quota.

e) **Concluding remarks**

In view of the above evaluation, the Commission concludes that individual producer limits have so far been a successful policy tool for controlling production and expenditure in the sheep sector but not in the suckler cow segment of the beef sector. Therefore, given that changes in the ewe premium regime are not justified and that the whole beef regime is under review in the light of the current BSE crisis, the Commission considers that it is not an appropriate moment to make any proposals in respect of the quota regimes in either of the premium schemes.

BEEF AND SHEEPMEAT PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION - EU15 (1986-1996)
 PRODUCTION ET CONSOMMATION DES VIANDES BOVINE ET OVINE - UE15 (1986-1996)
 ERZEUGUNG UND VERBRAUCH VON RIND- UND SCHAFFLEISCH - EUR15 (1986-1995)


ANNEX I



14-16

SUCKLER AND DAIRY COW NUMBERS - EC12 (1989-1995)
NOMBRES DE VACHES ALLAITANTES ET LAITIÈRES - CE12 (1989-1995)
MUTTERKUH- UND MILCHKUHBESTÄNDE - EUR12 (1989-95)


ANNEX II



FL

COMMUNITY EXPENDITURE IN EWE AND SUCKLER COW PREMIUM (1980-1995)
 DEPENSES COMMUNAUTAIRES POUR LES PRIMES A LA BREBIS ET A LA VACHE ALLAITANTE (1980-1995)
 GEMEINSCHAFTSAUSGABEN FÜR MUTTERSCHAF- UND MUTTERKUHPRÄMIEN (1980-1995)

ANNEX III



18

APPLICATION OF INDIVIDUAL PRODUCER LIMITS FOR EWE PREMIUM - EC12 APPLICATION DE LIMITES INDIVIDUELLES POUR LA PRIME A LA BREBIS - CE12 ANWENDUNG DER ERZEUGERSPEZIFISCHEN OBERGRENZEN MUTTERSCHAFFPRÄMIE - EUR12												
	Belgique/België	Danmark	Deutschland	Ellas	España	France	Irland	Italia	Luxemburg	Nederland	Portugal	United Kingdom
Decision concerning												
a) Reference year	1991	1991	1991	1991	1990	1989	1991	1991	1991	1991	1989	1990
b) Coefficient	1	1	1	1	1,00239	1,02157	1	1	1	1	1,06	1,0116
c) Supply of rights to National Reserve due to coefficient > 1	no	no	no	no	yes	partially	no	no	no	no	partially	partially
d) Percentage of rights retained for the initial National Reserve in relation to the size of the initial producer limit	Globally = 1% < 33 rights = 0% > 33 rights = 1,5%	< 13 rights = 0 rights 13-60 rights = 1 right > 60 rights = 2 rights	> 17 rights = 3%	< 200 rights = 3% > 200 rights = 2%	2%	1%	10-100 rights = 0% 101-200 rights = 1% 201-300 rights = 2% 301-400 rights = 3% 501-1000 rights = 4% > 1000 rights = 5%	3%	< 17 rights = 0 > 17 rights = 3%	3%	3%	1%
e) Percentage of rights to be surrendered to National Reserve in case of transfer without holding ("syphon")	10%	10%	15%	15%	10%	15%	15%	15%	15%	1%	15%	15%
f) Method of transfer of rights without holding	Between producers	Between producers	Between producers	Between producers	Between producers	Via national reserve	Between producers	Between producers	Between producers	Between producers	Between producers	Between producers
g) Leasing of rights	Between producers	Between producers	Between producers	Between producers	Between producers	Via national reserve	Between producers	Between producers	Not permitted	Not permitted	Between producers	Between producers
h) Definition of Sensitive Zones out of which rights may not be transferred	2 zones	None	LFA's; dykes zone	None	LFA's	The whole country	LFA's	Not decided	The whole country	LFA's	LFA's	7 zones covering the whole country

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APPLICATION OF INDIVIDUAL PRODUCER LIMITS FOR SUCKLER COWS - EC12 APPLICATION DES LIMITES INDIVIDUELLES POUR LA PRIME A LA VACHE ALLAITANTE - CE12 ANWENDUNG DER ERZEUGERSPEZIFISCHEN OBERGRENZEN MUTTERKUHPRÄMIE - EUR12												
	Belgique/België	Danmark	Deutschland	Ellas	España	France	Irland	Italia	Luxemburg	Nederland	Portugal	United Kingdom
Decision concerning												
a) Reference year	1992	1992	1992	1990	1992	1992	1992	1992	1992	1992	1992	1992
b) Potential rights	443.588	135.937	651.122	149.778	1.462.527	3.886.366	1.106.528	787.993	14.765	98.006	286.554	1.805.323
c) Percentage of rights retained for the initial National Reserve in relation to the size of the initial producer limit	1%	< 20 rights = 0 rights 20-49 rights = 1 right 49 rights = 2 rights	3%	2%	2%	3%	1%	3%	3%	1%	1%	1%
d) Percentage of rights to be surrendered to National Reserve in case of transfer without holding ("syphon")	10%	10%	15%	5%	10%	15%	5-14%	15%	15%	1%	5%	15%
e) Method of transfer of rights without holding	Between producers	Between producers	Between producers	Between producers	Between producers	Via national reserve	Between producers	Between producers	Between producers	Between producers	Between producers	Between producers
f) Leasing of rights	Between producers	Between producers	Between producers	Between producers	Between producers	Via national reserve	Between producers	Between producers	Not permitted	Not permitted	Between producers	Between producers
g) Definition of Sensitive Zones out of which rights may not be transferred					Whole country				Whole country	LFA's	LFA's	

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INDIVIDUAL PRODUCER LIMITS IN THE NEW MEMBER STATES - EWE AND SUCKLER COW PREMIUM ¹						
LIMITES INDIVIDUELLES DANS LES NOUVEAUX ETATS-MEMBRES - PRIME A LA BREBIS ET A LA VACHE ALLAITANTE ¹						
ERZEUGERSPEZIFISCHE OBERGRENZEN IN DEN NEUEN MITGLIEDSTAATEN - MUTTERSCHAF- UND MUTTERKUHPRÄMIEN ¹						
	Ewe Premium			Suckler Cow Premium		
	Österreich	Suomi/Finland	Sverige	Österreich	Suomi/Finland	Sverige
d) Percentage of rights retained for the initial National Reserve in relation to the size of the initial producer limit	Rights remaining after attribution of individual limits were sufficient	1%	Rights remaining after attribution of individual limits were sufficient	Rights remaining after attribution of individual limits were sufficient	1%	Rights remaining after attribution of individual limits were sufficient
e) Percentage of rights to be surrendered to National Reserve in case of transfer without holding ("syphon")	15%	10%	15%	15%	10%	15%
f) Method of transfer of rights without holding	Between producers	Between producers	Between producers	Between producers	Between producers	Between producers
g) Leasing of rights	Under discussion	Between producers	Between producers	Under discussion	Between producers	Between producers
f) Definition of Sensitive Zones out of which rights may not be transferred	Under discussion	LFA's	The whole country	Under discussion	LFA's	The whole country

1 Information as received from Member States

INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS TO EWE AND GOAT PREMIUM - EU15¹
DROITS INDIVIDUELS A LA PRIME A LA BREBIS ET A LA CHEVRE - UE15¹
INDIVIDUELLE ANSPRÜCHE AUF MUTTERSCHAF- UND MUTTERZIEGENPRÄMIE - EUR15¹

Rights X 1000	A			B	C	D=A+B+C	E	F	G	H	I = G - (H/2)
	Premiums paid in reference year			Extra	Additional	Total potential	Initial individual	Initial National	Rights available	Of which:	Conversion to
	Ewes	Goats	Total ²	LFA reserve	rights	rights ³	limits	Reserve	(1993 and 1994)	at 50%	full rights (1995) ³
Belgique/België	69	0	69	0	1	70	69	1	70	0,10	69,95
Danmark	103	0	103	0	1	104	101	3	104	0,50	103,75
Deutschland ⁴	1.313	0	1.313	8	9	1.330	1.344	98	1.442	19,30	1.432,35
Ellas	6.585	3.728	10.311	78	1	10.990	9.564	877	10.441	7,70	11.037,15
España	17.004	2.492	19.496	161	8	19.665	18.195	1.468	19.663	530,10	19.397,95
France	7.581	174	7.755	64	31	7.850	7.100	742	7.842	0,14	7.841,93
Ireland	4.869	0	4.869	36	54	4.959	4.755	208	4.963	13,80	4.956,10
Italia	7.861	1.032	8.893	68	0	9.561	7.381	1.706	9.087	193,40	9.590,30
Luxemburg	4	0	4	0	0	4	4	0	4	0,00	4,00
Nederland	836	0	836	0	30	866	839	92	931	2,40	929,80
Portugal	2.229	478	2.705	23	14	2.742	2.541	169	2.710	40,30	2.689,85
United Kingdom	19.791	0	19.791	128	109	20.028	18.985	826	19.811	639,00	19.491,50
Sub-total EC-12	68.245	7.900	76.145	566	258	78.169	70.878	6.190	77.068	1446,74	77.544,63
Österreich ⁵						206					
Suomi/Finland ⁵						80					
Sverige ⁵						180					
Total EU-15						78.635					

1 Based on information supplied by Member States

2 Verified by the Commission with exception of Deutschland and Italy (Sicily)

3 Including 600.000 additional rights for Italy and Greece

4 Excluding New Länder

5 Art 5e (1) of Reg. 3013/89

INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS TO SUCKLER COW PREMIUM - EU15 (1)
DROITS INDIVIDUELS A LA PRIME A LA VACHE ALLAITANTE - UE15
INDIVIDUELLE ANSPRÜCHE AUF MUTTERKUHPRÄMIE - EUR15

ANNEX VIII

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	
	Reference year total	Additional rights (mixed herd) (3)	Additional rights (non-payment) (4)	Additional rights for extensification (5)	Less favoured areas (@ 1%) (Add.reserve)	Total potential rights (A-E)	1. Initial individual ceilings (non-less favoured)	2. Initial individual ceilings (less favoured)	Additional rights allocated (mixed herd) (6)	National initial reserve	Total available rights (G+H+I+E)
Belgique/ België	403.029	36.080	3.022		1.457	443.588	255.495	145.700	36.080	4.856	443.588
Danmark	121.099	13.320	1.518		0	135.937	134.144	0	837	956	135.937
Deutschland(2)	354.931	111.240	2.674		2.277	471.122	119.813	224.174	31.378	91.207	468.849
Deutschland-NBL (7)						180.000					180.000
Eltas (1990)	137.775	10.520	411		1.072	149.778	13.353	107.225	250	27.878	149.778
España	1.363.610	84.320	2.462		12.135	1.462.527	135.475	1.192.906	9.916	112.095	1.462.527
France (8)	3.616.219	242.480	3.443		24.224	3.886.366	1.086.431	2.422.477	242.480	110.754	3.886.366
Ireland	1.024.757	63.400	10.247		8.124	1.106.528	212.319	812.438	18.611	55.036	1.106.528
Italia	690.609	90.160	2.000		5.224	787.993	163.097	506.793	2.968	107.910	785.992
Luxembourg	11.648	3.000	0		117	14.765	0	11.592	2.398	658	14.765
Nederland	67.444	30.560	0		2	98.006	66.587	183	6.829	24.405	98.006
Portugal (9)	240.099	17.760	26.741		1.954	286.554	23.858	240.875	517	20.684	285.934
United Kingdom	1.669.538	118.320	6.382		11.083	1.805.323	551.639	1.097.217	11199	123.776	1.794.914
TOTAL	9.700.758	821.160	58.900		67.669	10.828.487	2.762.211	6.761.580	363.463	- 680.215	10.813.184

1) Except for those in column B, all figures are provisional; figures are based on information supplied by Member States (TO BE VERIFIED BY THE COMMISSION).

2) Former Länder only.

3) Regulation (EEC) 805/68, Art.4d(6) and Annex II.

4) R. (EEC) 805/68, Art.4d(3) and R.(EEC) 3886/92, Art.29.

5) Regulation (EEC) 3886/92, Art.38(3). Estimated figures (in the case of FR +/- 15.000).

6) R.(EEC) 3886/92, Art. 29.

7) Not including rights resulting from the former German Länder switch. Regulation (EEC) 805/68 Art. 4k(1)(b).

8) Not including additional rights destined to DOM (fewer than 35.000 rights). Regulation (EEC) 3763/91 Art.5(3) as amended by R.(EC) 2598/95.

9) Not including up to 78.740 rights for extensive livestock after collectivisation. Regulation (EC) 1017/94 Art. 2 as amended by R. (EC) 1461/95.

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EVOLUTION IN EWE AND SUCKLER COW PREMIA GRANTED - (1992-1995)
EVOLUTION DES PRIMES OCTROYEES A LA BREBIS ET A LA VACHE ALLAITANTE - (1992-1995)
ENTWICKLUNG DER GEWÄHRTEN MUTTERSCHAF- UND MUTTERKUHPRÄMIEN - (1992-1995)

EVOLUTION IN EWE AND SUCKLER COW PREMIA GRANTED - (1992-1995)														
EVOLUTION DES PRIMES OCTROYEES A LA BREBIS ET A LA VACHE ALLAITANTE - (1992-1995)														
ENTWICKLUNG DER GEWÄHRTEN MUTTERSCHAF- UND MUTTERKUHPRÄMIEN - (1992-1995)														
Premia x 1000														
	EWE AND GOAT PREMIA GRANTED						SUCKLER COW PREMIA GRANTED							
Member State	Potential Rights ¹	1992	1993	1994	1995 *	MS	Potential Rights ²	1992	1993	1994	1995 *			
Belgique/België	70	70 *	69 *	64 *	64	BE	444	403	435	424	427			
Danmark	104	106	85	81	72	DK	136	121	102	104	101			
Deutschland	1.330	1.876	1.742	1.721	1.753	DE	651	447	413	506	535			
Ellas	10.990	10.972	9.640 *	11.974 *	11.974	EL	150	132	126	117	120			
España	19.665	19.788 *	17.818 *	17.009 *	19.232	ES	1.463	1.364	1.243	1.171	1.380			
France	7.850	7.393	7.292	7.306 *	7.237	FR	3.886	3.616	3.603	3.492	3.600			
Ireland	4.959	5.024	4.825	4.656	4.674	IR	1.107	1.025	884	910	955			
Italia	9.561	9.737	9.541 *	10.652 *	11.365	IT	788	691	674	807	783			
Luxemburg	4	4	4	3 *	4	LX	15	12	13	13	15			
Nederland	866	854	735	715 *	727	NL	98	67	50	52	60			
Portugal	2.742	2.652	2.675 *	2.840 *	2.695	PT	287	240	226	238	286			
United Kingdom	20.028	19.543	18.526 *	20.416 *	20.077	UK	1.805	1.670	1.558	1.552	1.591			
Subtotal EC-12	78.169	78.019 *	72.952 *	77.437 *	79.874	EC-12	10.830	9.788	9.327	9.386	9.853			
Österreich	206				160	ÖST	325				267			
Suomi/Finland	80				64	SU	55				26			
Sverige	180				152	SV	155				127			
Total EU-15	78.635				80.250	EU-15	11.365				10.273			

* Information provided by Member States

(figures in italics are provisional or estimated claim data)

1 From Annex VI

2 From Annex VII

OPERATION OF THE NATIONAL RESERVES IN 1993 - EWE PREMIUM
FONCTIONNEMENT DES RESERVES NATIONALES EN 1993 - PRIME A LA BREBIS
BEWIRTSCHAFTUNG DER EINZELSTAATLICHEN RESERVEN 1993 - MUTTERSCHAFPRÄMIE

	Initial	Rights ceded to National Reserve due to			Rights attributed	Of which: rights	Balance of
Member State	National Reserve	(a)	(b)	(c)	free of charge	from supplementary	National Reserve
		Transfers w/o holding	Insufficient usage	Total	from NR	LFA reserve ²	(end 1993)
Belgique/België	801	192	0	192	972	99	21
Danmark	2.576	1.247	0	1.247	2.290	0	1.533
Deutschland	98.730	10.264	0	10.264	88.948	6.650	20.046
Ellas	876.775	17.760	0	17.760	817.956	78.597	76.579
España	1.425.329	46.076	0	46.076	1.462.625	152.632	8.780
France	742.061	0	0	0	662.958	-	79.103
Ireland	204.581	6.981	0	6.981	188.464	36.513	23.098
Italia	1.533.633	2.647	0	2.647	1.404.482	25.222	131.798
Luxemburg	444	0	0	0	390	390	54
Nederland	58.091	0	0	0	27.614	0	30.477
Portugal	166.065	4.545	0	4.545	169.132	-	1.478
United Kingdom ³	815.137	27.581	0	27.581	782.137	127.940	60.581
TOTAL EU-12	5.924.223	117.293	0	117.293	5.607.968	428.043	433.548

1 Based on information provided by Member States following Art 5 (2) of Reg. 3567/92

2 Derived from Art 5c of Reg. 3013/89

3 Figures liable to change as a result of reassessment of national reserve attribution

OPERATION OF THE NATIONAL RESERVES IN 1993 - SUCKLER COW PREMIUM
FONCTIONNEMENT DES RESERVES NATIONALES EN 1993 - PRIME A LA VACHE ALLAITANTE
BEWIRTSCHAFTUNG DER EINZELSTAATLICHEN RESERVEN 1993 - MUTTERKUHPRÄMIE

Member State	Initial	Rights ceded to National Reserve due to			Rights attributed free of charge from NR	Of which: rights from LFA reserve ²	Balance of National Reserve (end 1993)	Of which: rights from LFA reserve	
	National Reserve	(a) Of which: LFA Reserve	(b) Transfers w/o holding ("syphon") ¹	(c) Insufficient usage ³ Total					
Belgique/België	6.313	1.457	376	0	376	6629	1457	60	-
Danmark	956	-	1.389	0	1.389	1.372	-	973	-
Deutschland ⁴	93.484	2.277	379	0	379	38.763	480	55.100	1.797,50
Ellas	28.950	1.072	-	0	-	25.646	1.072	3.304	-
España	124.230	12.135	708	0	708	74.651	12.135	50.287	-
France	134.978	24.224	-	0	-	58.925	43.325	76.053	-
Ireland	63.160	8.124	550	0	550	20.557	-	43.153	8.124,00
Italia	113.134	5.224	-	0	-	54.777	-	58.357	5.224,00
Luxemburg	775	775	-	0	-	172	172	603	602,80
Nederland	24.407	2	-	0	-	7.933	-	16.474	2,00
Portugal	20.684	1.954	144	0	144	20.308	1954	520	-
United Kingdom ⁵	134.859	11.083	1.943	0	1.943	50.127	16.807	86.675	-
TOTAL EU-12	745.930	68.327	5.489	0	5.489	359.860	77.402	391.559	16.750,30

1 Based on information provided by Member States following Art 30 (2) of Reg. 3886/92

2 Derived from Art 4e (1) of Reg. 805/68

3 Art 33 of Reg. 3886/92

4 Former Länder only

5 Figures liable to change following reassessment of attribution

OPERATION OF THE NATIONAL RESERVES IN 1994 - EWE PREMIUM ¹
FONCTIONNEMENT DE RESERVES NATIONALES EN 1994 - PRIME A LA BREBIS ¹
BEWIRTSCHAFTUNG DER EINZELSTAATLICHEN RESERVEN 1994 - MUTTERSCHAFFPRÄMIE ¹

Member State	Balance of	Rights ceded to National Reserve due to			Rights attributed	Of which: rights	Balance of
	National Reserve	(a)	(b)	(c)	free of charge	from LFA	National Reserve
	(end 1993)	Transfers w/o holding ("syphon")	Insufficient usage	Total	from NR	reserve ²	(end 1994)
Belgique/België	21	223	0	223	244	0	0
Danmark	1.533	10.199	0	10.199	7.682	0	4.050
Deutschland	20.046	7.594	0	7.594	25.758	1.308	1.882
Ellas	76.579	18.784	0	18.784	91.102	0	4.261
España	8.780	86.589	0	86.589	6.297	0	89.072
France	79.103	37.126	0	37.126	41.721	-	74.508
Ireland	23.098	14.751	0	14.751	34.741	0	3.108
Italia	131.798	7.444	0	7.444	0	0	139.242
Luxemburg	54	-	-	-	-	-	-
Nederland	30.477	1.025	0	1.025	3.574	0	27.928
Portugal	1.478	2.858	0	2.858	4.308	0	28
United Kingdom ³	60.581	27.184	0	27.184	27.184	0	60.581
TOTAL EU-12	433.548	213.777	0	213.777	242.611	1.308	404.660

¹ Based on information provided by Member States following Art 5 (2) of Reg. 3567/92

² Derived from Art 5c of Reg. 3013/89

³ Figures liable to change following reassessment of the national reserve attribution

OPERATION OF THE NATIONAL RESERVES IN 1994 - SUCKLER COW PREMIUM ¹
FONCTIONNEMENT DES RESERVES NATIONALES EN 1994 - PRIME A LA VACHE ALLAITANTE ¹
BEWIRTSCHAFTUNG DER EINZELSTAATLICHEN RESERVEN 1994 - MUTTERKUHPRÄMIE ¹

Member State	Initial	Rights ceded to National Reserve due to			Rights attributed free of charge from NR	Of which: rights from LFA reserve ²	Balance of National Reserve (end 1993)	Of which: rights from LFA reserve
	National Reserve	(a)	(b)	(c)				
	Of which: LFA Reserve	Transfers w/o holding ("syphon") ²	Insufficient usage ³	Total				
Belgique/België	60,00	0,00	995,00	0,00	995,00	-	0,00	-
Danmark	973,00	0,00	58,00	375,00	433,00	-	584,00	-
Deutschland ⁴	55.100,20	1.797,50	996,60	0,00	996,60	-	8.705,60	1797,5
Ellas	3.304,20	-	83,60	385,20	468,80	1.064,40	608,00	-
España	50.287,00	0,00	1.799,70	0,00	1.799,70	0,00	52.086,70	-
France	76.053,00	-	11.326,00	0,00	11.326,00	-	18.382,00	-
Ireland	43.153,00	-	660,00	0,00	660,00	-	24.717,00	8124
Italia	58.357,00	-	219,60	0,00	219,60	0,00	16.096,60	5224
Luxemburg	602,80	602,80	31,60	0,00	31,60	-	104,60	602,8
Nederland	16.474,10	2,00	31,50	0,00	31,50	-	16.450,30	2
Portugal	520,10	0,00	292,40	0,00	292,40	-	322,90	-
United Kingdom ⁵	86.675,00	0,00	2.339,00	0,00	2.339,00	-	56.799,00	-
TOTAL EU-12	391.559,40	2.402,30	18.833,00	760,20	19.593,20	1.064,40	194.856,70	15.750

¹ Based on information provided by Member States following Art 30 (2) of Reg. 3886/92

² Derived from Art 4e (1) of Reg. 805/68

³ Art 33 of Reg. 3886/92

⁴ Former Länder only

⁵ Figure liable to change following reassessment of 1993 attribution

CALENDAR FOR EWE PREMIUM APPLICATIONS IN 1995 - EU15
 CALENDRIER POUR LES DEMANDES DE PRIME A LA BREBIS EN 1995 - UE15
 ZEITPLAN FÜR DIE BEANTRAGUNG DER MUTTERSCHAFPRÄMIE - EUR15

ANNEX XIV

MEMBER STATE	Deadline for Permanent Transfers (a)	Deadline for Temporary Leasing (a)	Period for Application for Rights from N Reserve	Deadline for attributing rights from N reserve	Period for Premium Application (b)	Retention Period (inclusive)	Period for Application for Fattened Lamb Premium
Belgique/België	14 Oct 1994	14 Oct 1994	15 Dec - 16 Jan		15 Dec 1994 - 16 Jan 1995	17 Jan - 26 Apr 1995	15 Dec - 16 Jan
Danmark	31 Mar 1995	31 Mar 1995	31 Dec 1994	1 Mar 1995	1 - 31 Mar 1995	1 Apr - 9 Jul 1995	not applicable
Deutschland	1 Jun - 31 Oct 1994	1 Jun - 31 Oct 1994	1 - 31 Jan 1994	none	1 - 31 Jan 1995	1 Feb - 11 May 1995	
Ellas	1 Feb 1995	1 Feb 1995	1 Dec 1994 - 15 Feb 1995		1 Dec 1994 - 15 Feb 1995	16 Feb - 26 May 1995	1 Dec 1994 - 15 Feb 1995
España	31 Mar 1995	31 Mar 1995	before 31 Oct 1994	15 Jan 1995	1 - 31 Mar 1995	1 Apr - 9 Jul 1995	1 - 31 Mar 1995
France	6 Jan 1995	31 Mar 1995	before 30 Nov 1994		6 - 31 Jan 1995	31 Jan - 10 May 1995	6 - 31 Jan 1995
Ireland	23 Jan 1995	23 Jan 1995	before 18 Dec 1994	31 Oct 1995	1) 3 - 23 Jan 1995 2) 1 - 16 Mar 1995 (c)	1) 23 Jan - 2 May 1995 2) 16 Mar - 23 Jun 1995 (c)	not applicable
Italia	24 Mar 1995	24 Mar 1995	before 15 Feb 1995	16 Apr 1995	15 Feb - 24 Mar 1995	25 Mar - 2 Jul 1995	15 Feb - 24 Mar
Luxembourg	20 Jan 1995	20 Jan 1995			1 Feb - 15 Feb 1995	15 Feb - 25 May 1995	not applicable
Nederland	14-Dec-94	not applicable	5 Dec - 30 Dec 1994	20 Feb 1995	20 Feb - 23 Mar 1995	23 Mar - 30 Jun 1995	not applicable
Österreich	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	7 - 31 Jan 1995	1 Feb - 11 May 1995	
Portugal	15 Dec 1994	15 Dec 1994	15 Jan - 28 Feb 1995	7 Sep 1995	15 Jan - 28 Feb 1995	1 Mar - 8 Jun 1995 ¹	15 Jan - 28 Feb 1995
Suomi	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	not applicable	13 - 31 Mar 1995	1 Apr - 9 Jul 1995	not applicable
Sverige	9 Mar 1995	9 Mar 1995	1 - 31 Jan 1995	20 Feb 1995	1 - 31 Mar 1995	1 Apr - 9 Jul 1995	1 - 30 Apr 1995
United Kingdom - GB	20 Feb 1995	20 Feb 1995	1 Dec - 31 Jan 1996	not yet known	1) 15 Nov - 15 Dec 1994 2) 15 Jan - 20 Feb 1995	1) 16 Dec 1994 - 25 Mar 1995 2) 21 Feb 1995 - 31 May 1995	15 Nov - 15 Dec 1994
- NI	20 Feb 1995	20 Feb 1995	1 Dec - 31 Jan 1996	not yet known	1) 15 Nov - 15 Dec 1994 2) 15 Feb - 15 Mar 1995	1) 16 Dec 1994 - 25 Mar 1995 2) 16 Mar 1995 - 23 Jun 1995	15 Nov - 15 Dec 1994

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Subscripts: a=or until the date of premium application; b=or up to 20 days later, with 1%/day reduction; c=second application period only for producers failing to receive rights from NR

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