EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

session documents

ENGLISH EDITION

27 January 1994 A3-0041/94

REPORT

of the Committee on institutional affairs

on the future relations between the European Union, WEU and the Atlantic Alliance

Rapporteur: Mr Karel DE GUCHT

DOC_EN\RR\244\244915

PE 202.482/fin.
NL - Or. EN

* Consultation procedure requiring a single reading
**I Cooperation procedure (first reading)
**II Cooperation procedure (second reading) requiring the votes of a majority of the current Members of Parliament
*** Parliamentary assent requiring the votes of a majority of the current Members of Parliament

C O N T E N T S

At the sitting of 15 May 1992 the President of the European Parliament announced that he had forwarded the motion for a resolution by Mr Bourlanges and Mr Roumeliotis on future relations between the European Community, the WEU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Procedure, to the Committee on Institutional Affairs as the committee responsible and to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security for its opinion.

At its meeting of 26 February 1992 the committee appointed Mr De Gucht rapporteur.

At its meetings of 27 and 28 April, 9 and 10 June, 28 and 29 June and 7 and 8 October 1993 and 24 and 25 January 1994 the committee considered the draft report.

At the last meeting it adopted the resolution by 11 votes to 1, with 1 abstention.

The following were present for the vote: Gil-Robles Gil-Delgado, chairman; Bru Puron, vice-chairman; De Gucht, rapporteur; Alber (for Lüster), Boissière, Brand (for Prag), Cheysson, De Giovanni, Ferrer (for Lamana), Froment-Meurice, Herman, Marinho and Schodruch.

The opinion of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security is attached to this report.

The report was tabled on 27 January 1994.

The deadline for tabling amendments will appear on the draft agenda for the part-session at which the report is to be considered.

A

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

Resolution on the future relations between the European Union, WEU and the Atlantic Alliance

The European Parliament,

- having regard to the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr Bourlanges and Mr Roumeliotis on future relations between the European Community, the Western European Union and the North Atlantic Alliance (B3-0276/92),

- having regard to its resolution of 10 June 1991[1], on the outlook for a European security policy: the significance of a European security policy and its institutional implications for European Political Union (A3-0107/91),

- having regard to its resolution of 24 October 1991[2] on the intergovernmental conference on a common foreign and security policy (B3-1703/91),

- having regard to its resolution of 7 April 1992[3] on the results of the intergovernmental conferences (A3-0123/92),

- having regard to Title V ("Provisions on a Common Foreign and Security Policy") of the Treaty on European Union signed in Maastricht on 7 February 1992[4],

- having regard to the Declaration of the countries that are members of WEU and also members of the European Union on "the role of WEU and its relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance" and to the Declaration of the countries that are members of WEU, signed in Maastricht on 7 February 1992[5],

- having regard to its resolution of 18 December 1992[6] on the establishment of the European Community's common foreign policy,

- having regard to the report of the WEU Assembly of 6 November 1992, Part 1, on "European Union, WEU and the consequences of Maastricht", (Doc. 1342),

---

[1] OJ C 183, 15.7.1991, pp. 18-24

[2] OJ C 305, 25.11.1991, pp. 98-99

[3] OJ C 125, 18.5.1992, pp. 81-87

[4] OJ C 224, 31.8.1992

[5] OJ C 224, 31.8.1992

[6] OJ C 21, 25.1.1993, pp. 503-508

- having regard to the final document of the CSCE Summit held on 9 and 10 July 1992 in Helsinki, signed by 51 countries, setting out fundamental guidelines for the prevention and peaceful settlement of conflicts and setting up a new CSCE forum for security cooperation,

- having regard to Rule 45 of its Rules of Procedure,

- having regard to the report of the Committee on Institutional Affairs and the opinion of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security (A3-0041/94),

A. whereas proposals on the future relationship between the European Union, WEU and the Atlantic Alliance need to be based on a thorough analysis of the changing European geopolitical landscape and security architecture,

B. whereas the end of bipolar East-West confrontation has resulted in a fundamentally different European geopolitical situation now characterized by a proliferation of conflicts and areas of instability; whereas such overt or latent conflicts are closely related to economic problems, the lack of stable regimes, the rights of minorities and the rise of nationalism and religious fanaticism,

C. whereas the Treaty on European Union establishes a new framework for a common foreign and security policy of which the WEU forms an integral part by virtue of its inclusion in Article J4 of the Treaty; notes, however, that this inclusion is only temporary until such time as the Treaty is revised to take into account the progress made and the experience acquired by then,

D. whereas a number of practical questions concerning the relationship between the Union and WEU have to be settled for the period before the revision planned from 1996 so that the development of the CFSP of the Union can proceed smoothly, with democratic supervision and transparency in accordance with the objectives of Maastricht,

E. whereas, especially since 1988, the European Community has further developed a European security policy of its own through its support for reforms in Central and Eastern Europe and through the adoption during the Yugoslav crisis of new instruments in its security policy, but whereas these latter developments are still proving insufficient in the absence of a framework of precise obligations for the Member States and proper democratic supervision of common policy,

F. whereas the Gulf and Yugoslav crises and the discussions during the IGC on European Union emphasized again the existence of different attitudes on the part of different EC Member States towards both security and the European security architecture,

Fa. whereas, despite the general failure of the initiatives taken on the occasion of the Yugoslav crisis, the European Union is responsible for making a strong, united contribution to a new European security architecture,

G. whereas the Yugoslav and Gulf crises have strengthened the de facto relationship between the European Union and WEU, with WEU, in several cases, holding meetings immediately after meetings of the European Council of Ministers and taking decisions on the basis of guidelines of the European Council,

H. whereas the military crises in the Gulf and in Yugoslavia have again underlined the difficulties experienced by WEU in assuming its responsibilities, which are the result of its not possessing military instruments of its own, of its decision-making process, and especially of the refusal of certain Member States to use WEU as an active and independent actor,

I. whereas the Atlantic Alliance has stressed in its declarations the importance of strengthening the European pillar and of the increasing role of the European Union and WEU with regard to defence and security,

J. whereas Franco-German military cooperation, since the La Rochelle meeting in May 1992, has assumed a potentially more European dimension, firstly, as France and Germany have decided to create a military corps with a European vocation, with other WEU countries being invited to join, enabling the Member States to take their responsibilities in the framework of the European Union, and secondly, as Belgium has decided in June 1993 to participate as an equal partner in this Eurocorps,

K. whereas de facto the role of the UN has increased as an organization that can intervene with peace-keeping forces of its own as well as legitimize actions, including even the use of force against aggressors in a conflict,

I. The European security architecture and the new challenges.

1. States its conviction that the fundamentally different European geopolitical landscape requires a set of instruments of security policy;

2. Considers that this new set of instruments implies, firstly, a restructuring of military forces enabling them to fulfil new tasks and, secondly, a greater emphasis on the non-military dimension (such as economic relations and measures, environmental protection, financial aid, diplomatic initiatives, support for the respect of human rights);

3. Stresses that future security policy should treat the closely inter-related military and non-military aspects in a coherent way and that, in order to be successful, such efforts require an efficient institutional framework that can swiftly take decisions on both military and non-military aspects of security;

4. Regards the procedures on a Common Foreign and Security Policy adopted in and since the "Treaty on European Union" as positive but insufficient steps; welcomes the fact that it provides a basis for the further development of both the non-military and military dimensions in the Union's security and defence policy;

5. Notes that under TEU Article J.4(1) CFSP shall from the outset include all questions related to the security of the Union, even though the establishment of a common defence policy will be subject of a longer-term development;

6. Notes that a dual structure is maintained in the Treaty on European Union, that the objectives of the Union are not formulated in a more binding way, that the possibility of using majority voting is very limited, that the EP and the Commission are not more involved, and that the political predominance of the Union over WEU is not formulated more clearly;

7. Sees the WEU Declaration adopted in Maastricht on 10 December 1991, and especially the "Petersberg Declaration" adopted by WEU on 19 June 1992, as important (though insufficient) steps towards the new task of WEU as the defence instrument of the Union and towards extending its operational possibilities;

8. Points out that WEU from now on has to develop from a protective alliance of its member states into a European security instrument through the Maastricht decisions and the subsequent decisions of WEU;

9. States its conviction that the Eurocorps, including French, German and Belgian forces, must be integrated within WEU and the European Union as much as possible;

10. Emphasizes the need to find procedures to prevent existing differences in opinion among the Member States blocking any progress in the fields of security and defence; calls, therefore, for a cautious approach to be adopted as regards the application of Article J.3(2) of the TEU;

II. The need for a coherent single institutional framework

11. Recognizes the need to define a long-term view and short- and medium-term measures to overcome the different attitudes of the Member States about the scope of European external, security and defence policy and structure as well as the pace to follow for developing them;

12. Emphasizes the importance of a coherent single institutional framework in view of, firstly, the coherence required by the Treaty on European Union and, secondly, the demands of the new security situation, which call for coherence between all aspects (military and non-military) of security policy, and, thirdly, the transparency and clarity of institutional structures necessary for public understanding and democratic control;

13. States its conviction that this basic principle of a coherent single institutional framework implies for the European Union that majority voting be more widely used in the field of external, security and defence policy, that one single uniform administrative structure be established, that the EP gain for itself alone the authority to exert democratic control over all aspects of this policy and that the Commission gets a larger role;

14. Welcomes the fact that all European Union Member States belong to the WEU either as full members (including Greece), or as observers (Denmark and Ireland), and emphasizes that the basic principle of a coherent single institutional framework also implies that the primacy of the European Union over WEU be confirmed unambiguously, with the European Union taking the political decisions concerning security and defence, with WEU implementing the decisions which have defence implications, and with WEU being incorporated within the European Union by 1998 when the period of fifty years mentioned in Article XII of the Modified Treaty of Brussels comes to an end;

14a. Expects associate members and states with observer status at the WEU to respect international law and UN resolutions and refrain from acts or omissions inconsistent with the legitimate rights and concerns of WEU members so as not to jeopardize the community spirit and functioning of the WEU;

15. Takes the view that this basic principle also implies that all aspects of the relationship with the United States should come under the responsibility of the same political authority, which implies that the European Union should become responsible for defining the European position in the Atlantic Alliance; considers that this will allow the development of a more consistent attitude towards the United States as well as a less ambiguous relationship between the Union and the USA;

III. The EU-WEU relationship and the institutional consequences of the putting into place of a coherent single institutional framework

16. Recognizes that the putting into place of a coherent single institutional framework for the external, security and defence policy of the Union requires a gradual approach in several stages;

17. Takes the view that:

- in a first stage, the Union should put order in its own institutional set-up, bearing in mind that WEU is already part of the Union as from now;

- in a following stage, the institutions of both the Union and WEU should define precisely their integrated relationship and merge at a practical level;

- in the final stage, as a result of a new IGC and the end of the period of 50 years mentioned in Article XII of the Modified Treaty of Brussels, the Union should fully incorporate WEU, taking full responsibility for external, security and defence policy as well as for the relations with the Atlantic Alliance;

18. Believes, therefore, that the institutions and procedures of CFSP should be developed on the basis of the following principles:

19. With regard to the Council

- the Council, composed of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of Defence, should make all the political decisions on security and defence on the basis of the overall guidelines defined by the European Council, with the WEU Council (which should meet immediately after the Union Council meetings) being asked to implement the military aspects of these decisions and with the European Commission being asked to implement the other aspects;

- representatives of the WEU Council should be regularly invited to report on its activities to the committee of the European Parliament responsible for security and defence matters;

- the Council should take as much as possible its decisions by qualified majority votes; the Political Committee provided for in Article J.8(5) of the Treaty on European Union will have to merge in practice with COREPER during this phase so as to be incorporated finally into COREPER in the following phase;

- in a following stage the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence should meet at the same time as the Union Council and the WEU Council, with the use of qualified majority voting becoming common practice for external, security and defence policy, taking into account the specific nature of this policy area

- in the final stage, the Council should - according the conditions defined by the IGC referred to in paragraph 17, third indent, above - take full responsibility for external, security and defence policy;

20. With regard to the European Parliament:

- the European Parliament should draw up its own proposals on security and defence policy and scrutinize the relevant decisions of the WEU Council.

- the European Parliament may address questions and recommendations to the WEU Council;

- the directly-elected European Parliament should scrutinize the decisions and actions under CFSP not only vis-à-vis the Council in the context of Article J.7 but also vis-à-vis the Commission, and should use all the instruments conferred on it by the Treaties;

- the EP's Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security and the WEU committees should intensify their cooperation and the EP should establish a full Committee on Security and Defence;

- in a second stage, the EP and the WEU Assembly should hold joint sessions, with their competent committees holding meeting simultaneously;

- the EP's rights of supervision should be further developed and become comparable to those available to national parliaments with respect to national security policy;

- the EP should adopt procedures to allow the Committee on Security and Defence or its Bureau to meet without delay in case of sudden international crises, to have consultations with representatives of the Council and Commission, and to make recommendations to the Council;

- the provisions of the TEU on the assent of the EP for international agreements should be broadly interpreted;

- in a third stage, the EP should replace entirely the WEU Assembly at plenary and committee level, the powers and voting conditions of the EP being defined by the IGC referred to in paragraph 17, third indent, above;

- its assent by absolute majority of its members should be required for fundamental decisions on external policy, security and defence (and especially on military intervention), and be extended to the conclusion of agreements between the Union and third countries or international organizations on disarmament and arms control as well as to defence agreements in which the Union is involved;

- given that security and defence will continue to grow in importance as a subject to which the European Union must address itself, the European Parliament should be equipped with adequate administrative support to deal with these matters;

21. With regard to the European Commission

- the Commission, and especially its new Commissioner assigned to the CFSP field, should further develop its contribution to the Union's CFSP, in view of the autonomous co-responsibility of the Commission for CFSP based on its right of initiative (Article J.8(3)), its full participation in the work connected with CFSP (Article J.9), its responsibility for the consistency of the Union's external activities as a whole in the context of its external relations, security, economic and development policies (Article C), and the participation of the Commission President in the European Council, (Article D);

- a DG for External Affairs and Security should be created and should gradually develop a close and trusting cooperation with the foreign affairs departments of the Member States as well as a working relationship with the WEU agencies to allow increased coherence between all aspects of security;

- the competent EC Commissioner and the Secretary General of WEU as well as the DG for External Affairs and Security and the WEU Secretariat-General should work even more closely together;

- ultimately, and according to the conditions defined by the IGC referred to in paragraph 17, third indent, above, the competent EC Commissioner assumes the powers of the WEU Secretary General, with the WEU Secretariat-General being incorporated within the Commission's DG for External Relations and Security, which should be renamed the Directorate-General for External Relations, Security and Defence;

22. Is aware that, with regard to security and defence, a gradual and differentiated development should be adopted, as is allowed by the possibility of non-participation in the implementation of joint actions for any Member State (Article J.3(7)) and the reference to the special nature of the security and defence policies of certain Member States (Article J.4(4)); calls on the Union nevertheless to retain the greatest possible unity in CFSP questions, a unity to which all the Member States have committed themselves under Article J.2(2) according to which each Member State has to ensure that national policies conform to the common positions;

23. Foresees therefore:

- the solution chosen for the EMU in Maastricht is adopted, with all Member States accepting the objectives and principles, but with some Member States preferring not to participate from the outset;

24. Points out that the participating Member States, under certain conditions and following prior deliberation in the Council, may choose, owing to major difficulties that are commonly acknowledged, not to participate in certain decisions or in the implementation of certain decisions, not preventing the other Member States from making decisions and properly implementing them (opting-out clause);

25. Emphasizes that the final objective should be to have all Member States participating fully in the Union's external, security and defence policy;

IV. The relationship with the Atlantic Alliance

26. Notes that, as WEU has to implement the political decisions of the European Union which have defence implications, it has to further strengthen its operational capabilities to enable it in time to act, if necessary, independently from NATO after consultation with the NATO allies;

27. Observes that the required operational independence of WEU implies that it has to be able to rely on its own military forces and that it must dispose of its own transport facilities (principally aircraft), observation facilities (particularly by satellite), research, information and planning facilities and command structures; believes, however, that in a first period this should be pursued in cooperation with NATO, through the development of a combined military command structure and of a double-hatting formula; considers, however, that a European security entity should not necessarily duplicate all NATO capabilities;

28. Takes the view that WEU, as it strengthens and supports the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, increasingly has to introduce joint positions into the process of consultation in the Atlantic Alliance on the basis of the political options adopted within the European Union;

29. Believes that the Union should take into account the policy laid down in the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty and that, if possible and appropriate, the European countries should make their decisions and act in the field of defence within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, but that if consensus cannot be found within the Alliance, the European Member States should be able to take decisions and actions within the Union's Council;

30. Considers it useful that a division of labour be adopted between the Atlantic Alliance and the Union, and that different categories of actions be defined, with some actions being under the exclusive authority of the Alliance, some under the exclusive authority of the Union, and other actions under their concurrent responsibility;

31. Considers it important that ultimately, together with the revision of the Treaties leading to the full incorporation of WEU in the European Union, the existing North Atlantic Treaty is adapted or a new treaty signed between the USA and the European Union to reflect better the new equal relationship between the two sides of the Atlantic;

V. The involvement of European non-Union countries

32. Repeats its request that it should be open to certain states with which the Community has concluded Europe Agreements to take on association with the Union in order to give them appropriate participation in the operation of CFSP;

33. States its conviction that the involvement of European non-Union countries has to be stimulated as this may have a significant stabilizing impact on the European security situation; suggest that these countries can be invited to participate in the implementation of the decisions taken by this Council;

34. Considers that the EC can pursue closer security and defence cooperation with other European states through common participation in the CSCE; believes that procedures to facilitate this cooperation within CSCE have to be elaborated; stresses its demand that the Union must become a participant in CSCE with full rights also in questions of security policy;

35. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Member States, the WEU, NATO, the CSCE, and the member states of the CSCE.

B

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

THE FUTURE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION, WEU AND THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE.

Proposals on the future relationship between the European Union, WEU and the Atlantic Alliance need to be based on a thorough analysis of the changing European geopolitical landscape and security architecture. This will provide us a better view on how this relationship could be developed in the future.

I. "LES DONNEES POLITIQUES"

A. The changing European geopolitical landscape

Resumé:

The fundamentally different threats that characterize the new European geopolitical landscape imply the use of a fundamentally different set of instruments in our security policy and, consequently, the involvement of a different mixture of international organizations.

1. Changing threats, conflicts and potential crises

(a) the end of the old European order

Both Western security policy and the Western defence policy were shaped during the forty years after World War II by the specific features which the European geopolitical landscape assumed during this period.

The predominance of the east-west conflict, the clearly defined and very strict east-west division of Europe and Germany, the impossibility of any constructive relationship between two fundamentally opposed blocks, and the militarization of this east-west conflict determined during more than 40 years the shape of the security policy of the West. This security policy was predominantly directed against the Warsaw Pact. It was largely confined to military measures, this means to the defence policy. The non-military aspects of security policy (e.g. political and economic contacts and measures, support for the respect of human rights) were barely taken into account.

Defence policy was determined by the presence on the European continent of the USSR as a nuclear superpower, by the clearly defined frontline and by the fear of a surprise attack by superior conventional Warsaw Pact forces. It was characterized by a heavy reliance on nuclear deterrence, a concentration of military forces in West Germany, and the leadership of the USA as nuclear superpower in the Atlantic Alliance.

The east-west conflict and the presence on the international scene of the two superpowers also had stabilizing effects as they prevented the outbreak of potential conflicts.

The developments in Europe since 1987 has created a fundamentally different European geopolitical situation, as we have witnessed the end of the east-west conflict and division, the disappearance of the communist regimes in Europe and of the USSR, the end of the arms race, the end of a clearly defined frontline and the fading away of fear of a Warsaw Pact offensive. The east-west crisis and the related threats which characterized for four decades European history have thus disappeared.

(b) the new threats

In the new European geopolitical landscape we are no more confronted with the stabilizing antagonism between two clearly defined blocks, but with a proliferation of geographically spread latent and manifest crises, conflicts and areas of instability which though not directed immediately against us, in the long run could undermine our security. There are conflicts among Central and East European countries and former Soviet republics, civil wars within these states, and threatening actions from non-democratic countries outside Europe. Hence, a multitude of countries, regions and people are in a position to become involved in a complex variety of both antagonistic relationships and ad hoc alliances and coalitions. The European security landscape has become rather chaotic.

The character of these latent and overt crises, conflicts and areas of instability implies that there is no longer one single, clearly defined frontline, but a multitude of potential frontlines and a multitude of conflicts where it is impossible to draw the potential frontline.

The situation is further complicated by the fact that the latent and overt crises, conflicts and areas of instability are closely related to economic problems, the lack of stable and democratic regimes, ethnic problems, the rise of nationalism and religious fundamentalism, and the fading away of integrating and controlling forces and of international organizations in these regions. The new challenges are no longer confined to traditional political and military aspects, but are related to fundamental changes in society and history.

Some old threats remain, even though they assume at present another form and have to be considered in a different context. These threats are related to the nuclear forces of the "new" nuclear powers in the former Soviet-republics and to the fact that Russia will remain a strong - also military - power despite the present difficulties. The security problems posed by the situation on the southern and south-eastern flank of Europe have also considerably increased.

2. Changing instruments of a European security policy

(a) the need for both military and non-military measures

The characteristics of this fundamentally different European geopolitical landscape imply that a fundamentally different set of instruments has to be used in our security policy. This means first, that the non-military dimension should receive a greater weight within security policy and, second, that the military dimension as such should also be thoroughly re-examined. Future security policy should make sure that military and non-military aspects are treated in a coherent way, which is essential in view of their very close interrelationship.

(b) military forces of a different kind

The nature of military conflicts in which we can now become involved requires a fundamentally different kind of military forces. These forces should be able to intervene in very different and unfamiliar environments and circumstances, and more emphasis should be given to mobility, readiness, adapted military equipment, and specialized and well trained military personnel. More attention will have to be given to the flanks of the European subcontinent.

Whereas deterrence and defence against a massive surprise attack were the central tasks in the past, future military forces will have to be able to control truces, to act as a buffer between fighting parties (after a military conflict, or to prevent a conflict), to intervene in a military conflict between several fighting parties, to intervene to drive back an aggressor.

Confidence building measures accepted within the Helsinki process should be further developed and introduced in the relationship between all countries in Central and Eastern Europe and in the former USSR.

The existence of Rapid Intervention Forces and a willingness obvious to everyone, to deploy these troops in areas of crisis will become the main instrument of conventional deterrence needed in the new European geopolitical situation. This conventional deterrence will increase the reluctance of antagonistic groups to resort to military force to solve a conflict. It will also give more weight to negotiations, warnings and sanctions from international organizations if it is known that this organization is able and willing, as a last resort, to use its Rapid Intervention Forces.

Nuclear deterrence is still needed too in view of the remaining nuclear power of Russia and other republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The position of Russia also implies that the possibility of an American military involvement remains important both as instrument of deterrence and as military instrument of last resort. Initially, US involvement will also remain necessary for reasons of strategic transport, logistics, strategic intelligence and air support.

This does not imply that a considerable presence of American troops in Europe is still needed. Efficient procedures and an adapted infrastructure are however required to assure the possibility of rapid military intervention by the Americans on European territory. This emphasizes the importance of a restructuring of the Atlantic Alliance.

(c) the non-military dimension of a security policy

The fact that a large part of the new challenges concern non-military problems (which however can take a military dimension), that the relationship with the countries involved in potential conflicts is not limited to an antagonistic military relationship and that we are in most cases not immediately involved in the potential conflicts, implies that there is a greater opportunity to use non-military instruments of security policy.

This non-military dimension includes economic relations and measures (sanctions or support), financial support, political relations, diplomatic initiatives, personal and cultural contacts, support for the respect of human rights, providing accurate information, mediation, etc. It implies that a security policy can no longer be largely based on what are largely unilateral decisions that effect these countries, but that cooperation with the countries concerned has to be pursued as much as possible.

The efficient and timely use of the whole spectrum of non-military aspects of security policy will help to put an end to a - military or non-military - conflict, to prevent in the short term the start of a military conflict, to remove in the long term the causes of potentially dangerous tensions between or within countries, to counter and influence potentially dangerous regimes, and to prevent the rise of such new regimes in and outside Europe.

(d) the changing "time"-factor

The non-military dimension of a security policy and the importance of pre-emptive military interventions call for a proactive and empathetic attitude rather than for the present reactive policy. This requires a more dynamic and creative attitude on the part of decision-makers and more attention to and better information on and analysis of the situation in the countries in potentially instable regions.

This emphasizes the importance of being able to rely on both efficient and swift decision-making processes and on an adapted non-military and military infrastructure and set of instruments.

(e) budgetary implications

Both the restructuring of military forces for their new tasks and objectives and the greater weight of the non-military dimension in security policy require a reallocation of financial resources. The greater importance of the non-military dimension implies a budgetary effort for security which will be at least as important as what the West has spent on defence in the past, even if the budget for defence will diminish. However, in contrast with the past, these financial resources will have to be used for more constructive and productive security efforts. The greater (budgetary) importance of the non-military dimension also implies that the debate on burden sharing will have to be tackled in a different way.

3. Consequences for the European security architecture

A first consequence of both the changing threats, conflicts and potential crises and the changing instruments of European security policy is the need for an institutional framework that can assure the coherence between both the military and non-military aspects of security policy. This implies that the past situation, in which decisions on military measures and non-military measures were treated independently, and in which there were specific organizations for both aspects of security, is no longer adequate.

A solution must be found, either through an organization that becomes competent for both the military and non-military dimensions of security or through a very close cooperation between different organizations. To guarantee the necessary coherence, however, it is essential that there is only one political entity responsible for both aspects of security, even if the implementation is in the hands of different organizations.

A second consequence of both the old threats to a large extent disappearing and of the nature of the new threats, is that the necessity for the United States to be involved in guaranteeing our security will diminish considerably. The remaining security problems, which are mainly related to the nuclear forces of especially Russia, can to a large extent be tackled in the bilateral relationship between the USA and Russia. The changing security situation for the USA, together with the pressure to pay more attention to internal problems, will further enhance the pressure to diminish the American financial and military contribution to our security.

This move towards increasing political and military disengagement of the USA and towards an increasing Europeanization of our security policy does however not imply that Washington will not continue to try and influence the developments within Europe and especially the decisions and actions of its European partners.

This implies that the European countries will have to take, more than before, their political and financial responsibility to guarantee their security and to decide themselves about the military as well as non-military dimension of our security policy.

Thirdly, diminishing American involvement implies too that American leadership will fade further away together with the cohesion in analysis and policy of the Western partners which was to a considerable degree assured by this leadership. This cohesion also threatens to decline as a result of the disappearing of the overriding threat and the rise of a multitude of different latent and overt conflicts and potential ad hoc alliances.

The different European countries may increasingly perceive this ambivalent European security situation in a different manner, set different priorities and propose different solutions. In short, there is a danger of an increasing reflex to behave as nations have always done, that is to listen to their national interests, and seek like-minded partners.

This danger points to the importance of having a European centre of analysis and to strengthen the process of political integration to be able to counter the development of different national responses to the present European geopolitical situation.

A fourth consequence of the new potential threats is that the Central and East European countries and the former Soviet republics will have to be involved in the new European security architecture if the new European security policy is to be effective. This implies a certain pan-Europeanization of Western and Western European organizations and institutions or the creation of new pan-European structures.

B. The changing European Security Architecture

The fundamental developments within Europe since 1987 resulted in gradual changes in the European security architecture. These changes already point to a gradual move towards the prudent tendency towards both a Europeanization and pan-Europeanization of the European security structure and an increasing linkage between the military and non-military dimension of security policy. This move is however slow and gradual when compared with the fundamental and far-reaching changes in the European security situation.

A short overview of these tendencies is given in the following paragraphs.

1. The European Union

Especially since 1988, the European Community has played a considerable part in the developing European security situation through its support for economic and political reforms in Central and Eastern Europe. The "European Agreements" which were concluded with Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia and the negotiations on association and other agreements with the other countries in the region further increase the influence of the Community. The extent to which the Community accepts to strengthen contacts with these countries depends on their fulfilling of several stabilizing conditions. The Association Agreements and the perspective of possible membership to the European Union also gives these states a wider political scope and has a stabilizing influence.

The European Union does also apply several criteria for the recognition of new states: the acceptance of the rule of law and the principles of democracy, guarantees of the rights of minorities and ethnic groups, respect for each other's frontiers and observance of existing commitments to disarmament and regional security. These so called Badinter-principles, which are aimed at stabilizing the European security situation, oblige the republics or people concerned to adapt if necessary their position.

The Union has managed to substantially develop the non-military dimension of security policy. However, the crisis in Yugoslavia showed that the influence of the European Community is often too limited as it cannot back its security policy, confined to non-military aspects, with military means. Nevertheless, the crisis in Yugoslavia also indicated a positive development in the security policy of the Union.

Remarkably, it was the European Union, and not NATO, WEU or CSCE, which assumed its responsibilities and which became involved as an external power in the military crisis in Yugoslavia. Furthermore, the Union employed new instruments in its security policy. The Twelve mediated in the conflict and initiated a peace conference in The Hague, they negotiated to achieve ceasefires, and sent observers to the disputed area to monitor the ceasefire agreements.

The crisis in Yugoslavia, just as the Gulf crisis, strengthened the inter-relationship between the Union and WEU, with the latter holding meetings immediately after meetings of the EC Council of Ministers (with non-WEU countries Denmark and Greece participating in these WEU meetings) and with WEU de facto taking decisions on the basis of guidelines provided by the EC.

As will be analysed in the next chapter, new measures were accepted in the "Treaty on European Union", adopted by the European Council in Maastricht in December 1991, to develop the military dimension of the security policy of the Union.

The "Report on the likely development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) with a view to identifying areas open to joint action vis-à-vis particular countries or groups of countries", accepted in June 1992 by the European Council in Lisbon further elaborates the Maastricht decisions. It mentions that the CFSP should contribute to ensuring that the Union's external action is less reactive, and should enable the Union to tackle problems at their roots in order to anticipate the outbreak of crises. This also appears from the examples of the Union's foreign policy objectives, which however also include "contributing to the prevention and settlement of conflicts".

2. NATO

Within the Atlantic Alliance there have been some moves towards a gradual Europeanization. First of all, the important "Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation" and "New Strategic Concept" issued at the NATO-summit in Rome in November 1991 emphasized the importance of the strengthening of the European pillar and of the increasing role of the European Union and WEU with regard to defence and security.

The Rome Declaration asserts that "the development of a European security identity and defence role, reflected in the further strengthening of the European pillar within the Alliance, will reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of the Atlantic Alliance. ... Recognizing that it is for the European Allies concerned to decide what arrangements are needed for the expression of a common European foreign and security policy and defence role, we further agree that... we will develop practical arrangements to ensure the necessary transparency and complementarity between the European security and defence identity as it emerges in the Twelve and the WEU, and the Alliance. ... We welcome the perspective of a reinforcement of the role of the WEU, both as the defence component of the process of European unification and as a means of strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance...".

It is however not at all clear to what extent the United States and some European NATO countries will allow this European pillar to become more than an appendix to NATO and to gain some degree of independence.

A second sign of the tendency towards a Europeanization of NATO was the creation within the NATO framework of an Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, which consists of four divisions from European NATO member states under the leadership of the United Kingdom. NATO can decide to put parts of this corps under WEU command.

The need to establish relations with the Central and Eastern European countries led to the creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in December 1991 which includes the NATO countries, the former Warsaw Pact countries and the former Soviet republics. Another important decision with regard to the development of a pan-Europeanization of our security structure was the decision of the North Atlantic Council on 4 June 1992 in Oslo that it be "prepared to support, on a case-by-case basis in accordance with our own procedures, peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of the CSCE". This implies that the Alliance might also intervene outside the traditional NATO area. This, however, requires that the CSCE asks NATO to do so and that no NATO member state is opposed to such action.

The Atlantic Alliance has also tried to assume a more than military role, and especially, to strengthen the political role of the Alliance. This means that the Alliance also emphasizes more than before the linkage between the military and non-military dimensions of security. The outcome to date of these attempts however also show clearly the limitations of the Alliance.

3. WEU

As the Europeanization of the Western security structure was considered essential, both NATO and the European Union saw WEU as a useful organization to obtain this aim and to assert their competence in the field of security and defence. In this context WEU was more an object than a subject in the discussions about the future European security architecture.

Moreover, the Gulf crisis and the crisis in Yugoslavia again emphasized the inability of WEU to assume its responsibilities and this is the result of not having its own military instruments and especially of the refusal of certain member states to use WEU as an active and independent actor in Europe. Its predominantly military approach to security problems further diminishes WEU's ability to act on its own as an important player in the field of security.

The Declaration of the countries which are members of the WEU and the European Union on "The role of the WEU and its relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance" which was issued together with the Treaty on European Union at the Maastricht Summit in December 1991 clarifies to some extent the position of WEU. The declared objectives are to build up WEU as the defence component of the European Union and to develop WEU as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. It was also accepted that WEU's operational role would be strengthened.

In the "Petersberg Declaration" adopted during their meeting in Bonn, 19 June, 1992, the Foreign and Defence Ministers of the WEU countries decided to create a military force that can intervene at the request of the CSCE or of the Security Council of the United Nations. It was, however, not indicated that WEU can also intervene on the request of the European Union. The declaration also states that WEU forces can be used for humanitarian missions, for peace keeping operations and for conflict management actions, included operations to re-establish peace.

The different declarations emphasize the remaining ambiguity concerning the position of WEU vis-à-vis the EC, NATO, CSCE and the UN.

With regard to WEU it is important to mention Article XII of the treaty establishing WEU: the Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence, signed in Brussels on March 17, 1948, as amended by the Protocol Modifying and Completing the Brussels Treaty. This article of this Modified Brussels Treaty notes that "[the present Treaty] shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of the last instrument of ratification and shall thereafter remain in force for fifty years" and that "after the expiry of the period of fifty years, each of the High Contracting Parties shall have the right to cease to be a party thereto...".

This "period of fifty years" refers to the period from 1948 on when the original Brussels Treaty was signed and ratified, and not to the period from 1954/55 on, considering the fact that in 1954/55 no new treaty was signed and ratified but only a "Protocol Modifying and Completing the Brussels Treaty". This also implies that 1998 is an appropriate year to accomplish a process of restructuring and rationalizing the European security structure.

4. Franco-German relationship

Franco-German military cooperation has assumed since May 1992 a potentially more European dimension: France and Germany decided during their La Rochelle meeting to create a military corps with a European vocation, and other WEU countries are invited to join. This European corps should contribute to give the European Union its own military capacities and show the will of the participating countries to assume their responsibilities concerning security and the preservation of peace in the framework of the European Union including the eventual framing of a common defence policy. The European corps is also considered contributing to the strengthening of the Atlantic Alliance.

The European corps can be used for the common defence of the NATO and WEU allies, for humanitarian and peace keeping missions and for the reinforcement of peace.

The relationship of this Eurocorps vis-à-vis the different organizations is still unclear. The same is true for the participation of the other WEU countries. Countries such as Spain and Luxemburg have already shown their interest whereas other countries such as the United Kingdom and the Netherlands have reacted rather negatively. Belgium, however, has just joined.

5. CSCE

Since the successful conclusion of the Follow-up Conference of Vienna in January 1989 and especially since the end of the east-west conflict, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe has been able to assume a new role as it finally could be used as an instrument to genuinely strengthen the relations between all European countries.

The new start was formalized by the Charter of Paris for a New Europe which was accepted by all CSCE countries during the November 1990 Paris Summit. The Charter of Paris also provided for the creation of a Conflict Prevention Centre in Vienna, which has the aim of reducing the risk of conflict by promoting openness and transparency in military matters.

The CSCE seems to have been used more and more as a legitimizing factor for action taken by other organizations, as was the case when the EC sent observers to Yugoslavia with the support of the CSCE. The crisis in Yugoslavia however has also indicated that the CSCE and the Conflict Prevention Center are not yet able to intervene efficiently in such a crisis. The large number of member states (now including the former Soviet republics), its intergovernmental character and the lack of an executive branch of its own undermine the possibilities of the CSCE.

However, through its competences in both the military and non-military dimension of security, the CSCE remains a valuable organization, the influence of which can increase further if the CSCE were to be declared a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter.

6. The United Nations

As a result of the crises in the Gulf, in Yugoslavia and in some former Soviet republics the role of the United Nations has been increased, both as the international organization that can legitimize and decide on action, including even the use of violence against aggressors in a conflict and as the organization that can send peace-keeping forces of its own.

7. Different attitudes of the EU Member States towards security and towards the European security architecture

The Gulf crisis, the crisis in Yugoslavia and the discussions during the Intergovernmental Conference on European Union emphasized again the existence of different attitude of different EU Member States towards both security and the European security architecture.

The EU countries have different ideas on the nature of threats and potential crises and on the nature of security. This also results in different opinions on the way to counter these threats and potential crises with regard to the combination of the military and non-military instruments of security policy. This obviously also has consequences for the choice of the (set of) organizations that are considered as most useful to implement security policy. This choice is also determined by other factors, such as traditional policy and the special relationships that certain countries enjoy.

The development of a European security policy and identity will require that procedures are found to align these sometimes fundamentally different views on European security and on the European security situation, that methods are devised to prevent the differences blocking any progress in this field.

8. Conclusion

No single organization is able to cope on its own with all the problems. A network of different institutions is thus necessary in view of the different nature of the threats and the different instruments required. However, there need to be one single political authority to assure the requisite coherence.

II. THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION AND THE WEU DECLARATION.

1. New objectives

The Treaty on European Union that was adopted by the European Council in Maastricht in December 1991 extends substantially the objectives of the European Union concerning external relations and defence.

Article B of Title I ("Common Provisions") gives as one of the five objectives "to assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence".

Article J.1 of Title V ("Provisions on a Common Foreign and Security Policy") mentions that "The Union and its Member States shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy ... covering all areas of foreign and security policy. The objectives of the common foreign and security policy shall be:
- to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union;
- to strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways;
- to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter;
- to promote international co-operation;
- to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms".

The objectives are much more far-reaching and specific than in the Treaty of Rome or the Single European Act. "Shall define and implement" is indeed more binding than "shall endeavour jointly to formulate and implement" as it was formulated in the Single European Act.

Whereas this obligation in the Single European Act was confined to "a European foreign policy", the Treaty on European Union also does refer to a common security policy. The provisions on the objectives provide a basis for the development of all - this means both the military and non-military - dimensions of the Union's security policy.

These objectives and the explicit mentioning of the defence aspect are an important development in view of the traditionally reluctant position of several Member States vis-à-vis defence and in view of the neutrality of Ireland.

2. The need for consistency and for a single institutional framework

The decision-making process provided for in Title V concerning the Common Foreign and Security Policy is different from the procedures foreseen in the other Titles of the Treaty on European Union. The different institutions do not have the same responsibilities in the Common Foreign and Security Policy as is the case in the other policy areas of the Union; and the Treaty on European Union therefore from an institutional point of view does not differ fundamentally from the Single European Act. The dual system with on the one hand the European Community (and its external policy) and on the other hand the Foreign and Security Policy thus remains in existence.

However, the Treaty emphasizes the need for unity and coherence between the common foreign and security policy and the other policies of the Union, both institutionally and for what concerns the contents of these policies.

Article C of Title I ("Common Provisions") mentions that "The Union shall be served by a single institutional framework which shall ensure the consistency and the continuity of the activities carried out in order to attain its objectives... The Union shall in particular ensure the consistency of its external activities as a whole in the context of its external relations, security, economic and development policies. The Council and the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring such consistency". The emphasis on "all areas" of foreign and security policy (Art. J1/1) also points to this required consistency.

Institutionally, there is an improvement as the Council is now also responsible for all issues concerning the Common External and Security Policy. There are thus no more special meetings of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Member States, as was still the case in the Single European Act. Negative, however, is the fact that this merger was not put through on a lower level. The EPC's Political Committee consisting of Political Directors will continue to function besides the EC's Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper), which is obviously not conducive to the required coherence.

3. A Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)

The Union shall pursue the above mentioned objectives by establishing systematic cooperation between the Member States and by gradually implementing joint action in the areas in which the Member States have important interests in common (Art. J.1/3).

Member States shall inform and consult one another within the Council on any matter of foreign and security policy of general interest in order to ensure that their combined influence is exerted as effectively as possible by means of concerted and convergent action. Whenever it deems it necessary, the Council shall define a common position. (Art. J.2/1-2)

Article J.8 sets out the general decision making process. The European Council shall define the principles of and general guidelines for the CFSP. The Council shall take the decisions necessary for defining and implementing the CFSP on the basis of the general guidelines adopted by the European Council. It shall ensure the unity, consistency and effectiveness of action by the Union. The Council shall act unanimously, except for procedural questions and in the case referred to in Article J.3(2). Any Member State or the Commission may refer to the Council any question relating to the CFSP and may submit proposals to the Council. A Political Committee consisting of Political Directors shall monitor the international situation in the areas covered by CFSP and contribute to the definition of policies by delivering opinions to the Council at the request of the Council or on its own initiative. It shall also monitor the implementation of agreed policies.

The Commission shall be fully associated with the work carried out in the CFSP field (Art. J.9). The European Parliament shall be consulted by the Presidency on the main aspects and the basic choices of the CFSP, and thus also of the development of the defence policy. The Presidency shall ensure that the views of the European Parliament are duly taken into consideration. The European Parliament shall be kept regularly informed by the Presidency and the Commission as to the development of the CFSP. The Parliament may ask questions of the Council or make recommendations to it. It shall hold an annual debate on progress made in implementing the CFSP. (Art. J.7)

The Presidency shall represent the Union in matters coming within the scope of CFSP and shall be responsible for the implementation of common measures. In these tasks, it shall be assisted by the previous and next Member State to hold the Presidency. The Commission shall be fully associated in these tasks. (Art. J.5/1-3)

The Member States shall support the Union's external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations (Art. J.1/4).

Member States shall coordinate their action in international organizations and at international conferences. They shall uphold the common positions in such fora. In international organizations and at international conferences where not all the Member States participate, those which do take part shall uphold the common positions and shall keep the latter informed of any matter of common interest. Member States which are also members of the UN Security Council will concert and keep the other Member States fully informed. Member States which are permanent members of the Security Council will, in the execution of their functions, ensure the defence of the positions and the interests of the Union, without prejudice to their responsibilities under the provisions of the UN Charter. (Art. J.2/3 & J.5/4)

The Treaty does not provide for sanctions in case a Member State does not live up to its obligations. Common foreign and security policy is, moreover, excluded from judicial control by the European Court of Justice.

The decision-making process as defined in Article J.8 is supplemented with another procedure in two cases, namely for the adoption of joint actions and for decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications.

4. "Joint actions"

One of the objectives of the Union is to gradually implement joint action in the areas in which the Member States have important interests in common. Article J.3 defines the procedure for adopting joint action in matters covered by the CFSP. The importance of this procedure is that, for the first time, the principle of majority vote is introduced in the field of external relations and security, even though the possible use of this principle will remain very limited.

The Council shall decide, on the basis of general guidelines set by the European Council, that a matter should be the subject of joint action. Whenever the Council decides on the principle of joint action, it shall lay down the specific scope, the Union's general and specific objectives in carrying out such action, if necessary its duration, and the means, procedures and conditions for its implementation.

The Council shall, when adopting the joint action and at any stage during its development, define those matters on which decisions are to be taken by a qualified majority. For their adoption, acts of the Council shall require at least fifty-four votes in favour, cast by at least eight members. Joint actions shall commit the Member States in the positions they adopt and in the conduct of their activity.

The proposal made at the Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union that decisions on implementation should be taken by a majority as a general rule was thus not retained. The possibility of decisions being taken by a majority consequently remains limited as it does not extend to defence questions (Art. J4/3), to policy issues that the Council does not explicitly designate as issues that may be the subject of joint actions (J8/2) and to general decisions concerning joint actions. Moreover, the decisions to take implementing decisions by a majority can still be blocked by a single Member State.

Nevertheless, the fact that the principle of majority votes appears for the first time in the procedures concerning external affairs and security constitutes an important symbolic change which can have practical consequences in the future. Moreover, the developments in the process of European integration indicate that the so-called right of veto is increasingly becoming a kind of "right of exile".

The limited extent to which majority voting can formally be used needs also to be seen in the context of the "Declaration on voting in the field of the CFSP" added by the European Council to the Treaty on European Union. This declaration says that "with regard to Council decisions requiring unanimity, Member States will, to the extent possible, avoid preventing a unanimous decision where a qualified exists in favour of that decision".

5. The European Union and defence issues

Article J.4 speaks of the defence component of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, defines some restrictions and introduces a new player in the decision-making and implementing procedures: the WEU. The inclusion of the defence aspect is one of the most significant innovations of the Treaty on European Union, just as the involvement of WEU in the policy of the Twelve constitutes an important institutional development. However, a considerable degree of ambiguity does remain.

First, one of the objectives mentioned in Article B of the Common Provisions is repeated: The CFSP shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence. However, issues having defence implications shall not be subject to the procedures set out in Article J.3.

Does this wording imply that the framing of a common defence policy is an obligation, whereas the development of a common defence is only an option?

The Union requests the WEU, which is considered to be an integral part of the development of the Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications. The Council shall, in agreement with the institutions of the WEU, adopt the necessary practical arrangements. (J4/2)

Doubts remain in this article on the nature of the relationship between the Union and WEU. On the one hand, WEU seems to be subordinated to the Union, with WEU only having a secondary role in the CFSP: it is an integral part of the development of the Union; it has to elaborate and implement the decisions that are already taken by the Council; and it is the Council and not WEU that shall adopt the practical arrangements.

On the other hand, the WEU also seems to retain its independence. It is only "part of the development of the Union" and thus not "part of the Union"; "request" can imply that WEU still can decide whether or not it accepts to implement the Union's request; and it has to give its agreement concerning the practical arrangements.

Article J.3 mentions that issues having defence implications shall not be subject to the procedures set out in Article J.3.

This may imply that the procedures worked out in the context of the application of the modified Brussels Treaty remain fully valid for what concerns WEU. On the other hand, it also means that the procedures on decision-making as laid down in Article J.8 do apply for defense matters and that the possible (though limited) involvement of the European Parliament and Commission is accepted.

Subdivision 4 and 5 of Article J.4 are meant to reassure both the Member States that want to prevent the existing organizations or policies from being undermined and the Member States that want to keep open the possibility of further cooperation in other fora and ad hoc alliances.

These two subdivisions read as follows: The policy of the Union in accordance with this Article shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework (Art J4/4). The provisions of this Article shall not prevent the development of closer cooperation between two or more Member States on a bilateral level, in the framework of the WEU and the Atlantic Alliance, provided such cooperation does not run counter to or impede that provided for in this Title (Art. J4/5).

Both subdivisions can be seen as a compromise between opposite concerns of certain Member States. First, there is the concern of the one neutral country in the European Union: Ireland. This provision can therefore be interpreted by candidate member states with a similar neutral statute as a proof that EC membership will not impede their traditional security and defence policy. Ambiguity concerning this "neutrality" might thus arise and complicate the further development of a security and defence policy.

Second, there is the policy of countries such as the United Kingdom that give priority to the Atlantic Alliance. Third, there are countries like France and Germany that want to be able to further develop their bilateral security and defence cooperation and to extend this cooperation to other countries if further security and defence cooperation and integration were to prove to be impossible in the framework of the Union or of WEU.

Finally, it is provided that with a view to furthering the objectives of this Treaty, and having in view the date of 1998 in the context of Article XII of the Modified Brussels Treaty, the provisions of this Article may be revised on the basis of a report to be presented in 1996 by the Council to the European Council, which shall include an evaluation of the experience gained until then (Art. J4/6).

Article J.4 does not give details about the relationship between the Union and WEU. A declaration on Western European Union added to the Treaty on European Union is in this context important as it further elaborates on the relationship of WEU with the European Union. The declaration also specifies the relationship between WEU and the Atlantic Alliance, which also can effect the relationship between the European Union and the Alliance.

6. The Declarations on Western European Union

A declaration on "The Role of the WEU and its Relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance" issued by the countries which are members of WEU and also of the European Union is added to the Treaty on European Union. Its Articles 1 and 2 contain general provisions on the relationship between the WEU and the European Union and the Alliance. Article 2 mentions that WEU will be developed as the defence component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. To this end, it will formulate common European defence policy and carry forward its concrete implementation through the further development of its own operational role.

Article 3 on "WEU's relations with European Union" states that the objective is to build up WEU in stages as the defence component of the European Union. To this end, WEU is prepared, at the request of the European Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications.

Similar remarks as those noted in the previous part on the ambiguity in the Union-WEU relationship do apply here. Doubts about the nature of this relationship are even strengthened through the involvement of a third partner: the Atlantic Alliance. Article 3 seems to imply a subordinate position of WEU vis-à-vis the Union, while Article 2 can be seen as an argument for WEU's independence as it has the competence to formulate a common European defence policy. Another interpretation could be that this formulation of a common defence policy and carrying forward its concrete implementation consists only in developing its operational role, and that WEU's own role and independence are thus limited to the operational aspects.

Article 3 foresees several measures to develop a close working relationship with the Union. As appropriate, the dates and venues of meetings will be synchronized and the working methods harmonized. Close cooperation between the Council and Secretariat-General of WEU and the Council of the Union and the General Secretariat of the Council will be established, and the harmonization of the sequence and duration of the respective Presidencies will be considered. Appropriate modalities will be arranged so as to ensure that the EC Commission is regularly informed and, as appropriate, consulted on WEU activities in accordance with the role of the Commission in the CFSP. Finally, closer cooperation between the Parliamentary Assembly of WEU and the European Parliament will be encouraged. The WEU Council shall, in agreement with the competent bodies of the European Union, adopt the necessary practical arrangements.

Significant in this paragraph is the fact that the aim is to develop a "working" relationship and not a "de jure" relationship, which points to an independent position of WEU. This also appears from the fact that the WEU and Union institutions are considered as equal partners. However, recent experience indicates that this synchronization and harmonization will imply that WEU adapt itself to the European Union. It is remarkable that the Commission of the European Communities will only be informed and consulted by the WEU institutions and that no "cooperation" is foreseen.

Article 4 on "WEU's relations with the Atlantic Alliance" declares that the objective is to develop WEU as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. Accordingly WEU is prepared to develop further the close working links between WEU and the Alliance and to strengthen the role, responsibilities and contributions of WEU member states in the Alliance. This will be undertaken on the basis of the necessary transparency and complementarity between the emerging European security and defence identity and the Alliance. WEU will act in conformity with the positions adopted in the Atlantic Alliance.

Article 4 further mentions that WEU member states will intensify their coordination on Alliance issues which represent an important common interest with the aim of introducing joint positions agreed in WEU into the process of consultation in the Alliance which will remain the essential forum for consultation among its members and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of the Allies under the North Atlantic Treaty.

Just as in the Union-WEU relationship doubt does arise on the nature of the WEU-NATO relationship, which is also important for the Union as it determines the EU-NATO relationship too. First, there are different interpretations as to the role of WEU linked to the different views on the nature of the "European pillar". Is this European pillar - and thus also WEU - meant to be a fairly independent actor within the Alliance or is it only designed as a symbolic annex to NATO? Do the required "transparency and complementarity" impair or allow independent positions and actions of WEU? How will the requirement "to act in conformity" with the positions of the Alliance and the possibility to "introduce joint positions" in the Alliance be reconciled?

Further questions arise in Article 4 when it indicates that, where necessary, dates and venues of meetings will be synchronized and working methods harmonized, and that close cooperation will be established between the Secretariats-General of WEU and NATO. How will this requirement of synchronization and harmonization be reconciled with a similar requirement in the Union-WEU relationship? Will it not be necessary to give priority to one of the two relationships?

The question about de facto implementation also appears in relation to Article 7 which mentions that Member States may draw on a double-hatting formula, to be worked out, consisting of their representatives to the Alliance and to the European Union. This should make possible that representation on the WEU Council is such that the Council is able to exercise its functions continuously in accordance with Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty.

Article 5 of the Declaration states that WEU's operational role will be strengthened, which is indeed necessary since the modified Brussels Treaty establishing WEU transferred most of WEU's military powers to NATO. WEU is to examine and define appropriate missions, structures and means, covering in particular a WEU planning cell, meetings of WEU Chiefs of Defence Staff, military units answerable to WEU, and closer military cooperation complementary to the Alliance in particularly in the fields of logistics, transport, training and strategic surveillance. As has been mentioned above, the June 1992 meeting of the WEU Council already decided on several of these matters.

The answer on the above mentioned questions on the nature of the WEU-NATO relationship will also determine the nature, degree of independence and size of the WEU planning cell and of its military units and infrastructure.

Arrangements aimed at giving WEU a stronger operational role will be fully compatible with the military dispositions necessary to ensure the collective defence of all Allies. Finally, this article states that it will examine whether cooperation can be enhanced in the field of armaments with the aim of creating a European armaments agency and whether the WEU Institute can be developed into a European Security and Defence Academy.

A second Declaration of the member states of the WEU organizes the relationship between the WEU members and those countries that are not a member of WEU, and foresees the unity of WEU and European Union membership: States which are members of the European Union are invited to accede to WEU on conditions to be agreed in accordance with Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty, or to become observers if they so wish. Simultaneously, other European Member States of NATO are invited to become associate members of WEU in a way which will give them the possibility of participating fully in the activities of WEU. The necessary treaties and agreements should be concluded before 31 December 1992.

The WEU declarations clearly do not define unambiguously the degree of dependence or independence of WEU vis-à-vis the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance. Nor is it clear what the implications will be for the relationship between the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance. However, WEU seems to be an excellent instrument to conciliate the European Union and NATO as well as European identity and Atlantic solidarity. It thus contributes towards avoiding a rift within the European Union and to allow further progress towards European Union.

As is often the case, it will be practice rather than the formal texts that will determine the nature of the mutual relations. The new texts do in any case provide new opportunities and a formal legitimation for an increasing role of the European Union. And this may become important when in 1996 WEU will, just as the Union, re-examine the present provisions.

III. "A COMMON DEFENCE POLICY, WHICH MIGHT IN TIME LEAD TO A COMMON DEFENCE": BASIC PRINCIPLES, THE RELATIONS WITH WEU AND THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE, AND INSTITUTIONAL CONSEQUENCES

In view of the conclusions concerning the changing European geopolitical landscape and security architecture, in view of the new formal basis provided for by the Treaty on European Union and by the WEU Declaration, and in view of the different attitudes of the Member States, it is necessary both to define the basic principles and characteristics of a future European security policy and structure and, in this context, of the relationship between the European Union, WEU and the Atlantic Alliance. It is necessary that a long-term view and basic principles are defined, that short-term and medium-term measures are proposed, and that transitional measures are provided to overcome the different attitudes of the Member States about both the scope of European security policy and structure and the pace to develop this policy and structure.

A. A single institutional framework as basic principle

(1) A single institutional framework is necessary in view of, firstly, the coherence required by the Treaty on European Union and, secondly, the demands of the new security situation which requires a coherence between all aspects (military and non-military) of a security policy.

The need for a single institutional framework has consequences for the European Union, for its relationship with WEU, and for the transatlantic relationship.

(2) This need for a single institutional framework has first of all consequences for the institutions of the European Union. Some general principles are laid down in this part, while detailed proposals are made in the next part.

With regard to the Council action should be taken to facilitate the adoption of common positions and common actions in the field of external relations, security and defence. It also implies the establishment of one single uniform administrative structure which handles all aspects of external relations and security, and does not any longer consider a part of this policy area as coming under the authority of a special administrative unit as was the case with EPS and as is also now the case with the Political Committee (consisting of the Political Directors).

A single institutional framework also implies one and the same institution exerting democratic control over this policy. The European Parliament thus has to receive the authority to scrutinize all aspects of external relations and security. Related to this principle is the need for increasing participation in the decision-making process in this policy area.

For the European Commission, a single institutional framework implies a growing role in all fields of external relations and security, as only this will guarantee a consistent policy and will allow that proposals are made and initiatives taken from a European point of view.

The need for a single institutional framework implies that the external, security and defence policy should become subject to judicial review by the European Court of Justice, whilst taking into account the specific nature of security and defence decisions. This will increase the pressure on Member States to implement and obey the decisions adopted by the Community or Union.

(3) The need for a single institutional framework also has consequences for the EU-WEU relationship. Being part of the same development towards European Union, the EU and WEU will gradually have to merge, with WEU eventually being incorporated within the European Union by 1998, when the period of fifty years mentioned in Article XII of the Modified Treaty of Brussels comes to an end. Such a move should be prepared earlier so as to ensure a smooth transition in 1998.

This implies the primacy of the European Union over WEU, with the EU taking the political decisions concerning security and defence, and the WEU implementing the decisions which have defence implications. The ambiguity which characterizes Title V of the European Union Treaty as well as the WEU Declaration has to disappear.

All EU Member States which are not members of WEU should accede to WEU or become observers. New member states of the EU will automatically become members or observers of WEU.

(4) Finally, the need for a single institutional framework implies that all aspects of the relationship with the United States come under the responsibility of the same political authority. This implies that the European Union will also be responsible for defining the European position in NATO.

This general responsibility of the Union will allow the development of a consistent attitude towards the USA and thus result in a less ambiguous relationship between the EU and the USA. This will contribute to improving the American-European relationship and be considered by the Americans as a positive change.

B. The implementation of the single institutional framework principle

As the putting into place of a single institutional framework for the external, security and defence policy of the Union clearly is a complicated enterprise, a gradual approach in several stages but with a clearly defined timetable should be taken.

In stage one, the Union should put order into its own institutional set-up, clarifying the ambiguities that remain in the Treaty of Maastricht. This is to be prepared as of now.

Stage two merges at a practical level the institutions of both the Union and WEU, thus preparing for their ultimate fusion.

Finally, in stage three, as a result of a new IGC and of the end of the period of fifty years mentioned in the Modified Treaty of Brussels, the Union absorbs WEU, taking full responsibility for external, security and defence policy as well as for relations with NATO.

This whole process should be completed before 2000.

(1) The creation of a European Security and Defence Council within the European Union

(1) As of now, the European Council defines the general guidelines, with the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs making the general political decisions concerning all aspects of security and defence, and with the WEU Council taking the further implementing decisions. Majority decisions should be taken as much as possible. The meetings of the WEU Council should take place immediately after the meetings of the Union Council.

(2) Stage I:

- A European Security and Defence Council should be created within the European Union, composed of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of Defence. This Council should make all the political decisions on security and defence, and ask the WEU institutions to implement the military aspects of these decisions and the European Commission to implement the other aspects. If necessary, a gradual and differentiated establishment of this European Security and Defence Council can be envisaged (see sub-division C).
- The Committee of Permanent Representatives should take over the responsibilities and competences of the Political Committee.

(3) Stage II:

The Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence should meet simultaneously as the European Security and Defence Council and as the WEU Council. The Joint Chiefs of Staff of the countries involved can be invited to join these meetings. The use of majority voting should become common practice for security and defence policy, taking into account the specific nature of this policy area.

(4) Stage III:

The European Security and Defence Council should have responsibilities for all tasks and functions of the WEU Council, and formally replaces the WEU Council.

(2) A growing role for the European Parliament in the security and defence policy

(1) Already now, the European Parliament puts forward its own proposals, a process which will be enhanced by the Treaty on European Union. By way of presenting a long-term view and proposing practical measures to realize these long-term objectives, the Parliament can increasingly influence the development of a European security and defence policy, and emphasize the need that Europe assumes its responsibilities concerning its own security and defence. The EP establishes close, though not binding contacts with the WEU Assembly.

(2) Stage I:

- Article IX of WEU's Modified Brussels Treaty has to be adapted so as to ensure that the WEU Assembly is composed of the Members of the WEU member states that are elected to the EP instead of the "representatives of the Brussels Treaty Powers to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe". The latter provision in the Brussels Treaty was a normal solution in 1954 when there was not yet a EP. This solution is however no longer acceptable as the WEU Assembly, unlike the EP, is under the current provisions not included in the normal process of European integration in which the EP's democratic control and joint decision-making power are steadily growing. The amending of Article IX will solve this problem and also assure consistency and coherence in democratic control.

- On the basis of an annual debate, the European Parliament should scrutinize the main aspects and the basic choices of the Union's external, security and defence policy as defined by the European Security and Defence Council, eventually accepting or rejecting the decisions taken, with the WEU Assembly, then composed of the MEPs of WEU member states, taking the decisions of the EP on defence issues.

- The Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security of the European Parliament and the Committees of WEU should intensify their cooperation. The European Parliament should establish a full Committee on Security and Defence.

(3) Stage II

- The European Parliament and the WEU Assembly, the latter made up of the MEPs from the WEU member states, should have joint sessions.

- By means of an interinstitutional agreement a compulsory procedure of consultation should be established between the European Security and Defence Council, the European Parliament and the Commission before decisions are made on external policy, security and defence. The EP Committee on Security and Defense should assume a central role in this consultation. (Poettering report, PE 146.269/fin., p. 10).

- The provisions of the TEU on the assent of the European Parliament for international agreements should be broadly interpreted.

- The WEU Committees and the EP Committees having competence for external, security and defence issues should meet simultaneously.

- In view of the frequent need to react quickly on certain international events procedures should be adopted by the EP to allow the Committee on Security and Defense or the Bureau of this Committee to meet without delay, to have consultations with representatives of the Council and Commission, and to make recommendations to the Council. The EP's representatives should be able to request the Council to act in a certain manner, or can give legitimacy to certain decisions or acts of the Council. This will strengthen the legitimacy of both Parliament and Council. (Verde I Aldea report, PE 201.471/B, pp. 9-11)

(4) Stage III:

- The European Parliament should replace fully the WEU Assembly at plenary and committee level.

- The assent of the European Parliament should be extended to the conclusion of agreements between the Union and third countries or international organizations on disarmament and arms control as well as to defence agreements wherein the Union is involved.

- The assent of the European Parliament by absolute majority of its members should be required for fundamental decisions on external policy, security and defence (e.g. accession to a military alliance, changes in the military-strategic options, decisions on common military action in conflicts). (Poettering report, p. 10)

- The European Parliament should receive a non-exclusive right of initiative.

3. The creation of a Directorate-General for Security and Defence within the European Commission and of the function of Commissioner for Security and Defence

(1) Already now, the Commission is increasing the cooperation with WEU's agencies, to allow an improve coherence between all aspects of security.

(2) Stage I:

Within the European Commission, a Directorate-General for External Affairs and Security and the function of Commissioner for External Affairs and Security should be created. This Directorate-General has to follow and analyse all aspects of external relations and security. This should make it possible to propose actions which can solve or de-escalate existing problems and crises. This also will make it possible to foresee potential problems and crises and to propose adequate measures by making use of the non-military instruments of the EC's security policy.

(3) Stage II:

The functions of the EU Commissioner for External Relations and Security and of the Secretary General of WEU should be exercised by one and the same individual. The Commission's Directorate-General for External Affairs and Security and WEU's Secretariat-General which is responsible for the defence aspects should remain formally separate, though the cooperation and interrelationship between both administrations should be intensively strengthened.

(4) Stage III:

The WEU Secretariat-General should be incorporated within the European Commission's Directorate-General for External Relations and Security, and the latter should be renamed DG for External Relations, Security and Defence. This Directorate-General should then have to analyse and submit proposals concerning both the military and non-military aspects of the European security situation and policy.

C. A gradual and differentiated development

Taking into account the different positions of the Member States concerning further cooperation and integration in the field of security and defence, and considering the solutions chosen in Maastricht for similar problems in the field of monetary integration, a gradual and differentiated development may be adopted, with not all Member States being obliged to participate at the same moment to the same extent in intensified integration in the security and defence area.

Three scenarios can be foreseen, with different degrees of participation both in the number of countries as in the commitment towards future participation:

(a) All Member States participate from the first stage on to the European Security and Defence Council: this scenario is to be preferred as it would guarantee clarity and transparency in the European integration process.

(b) If the first scenario proves to be impossible, the solution chosen for the EMU should be adopted: all Member States accept the objectives and principles, but some Member States may prefer not to participate from the beginning. If there is a majority of countries willing to participate, the European Security and Defence Council is created, with the other Member States being able to join later or have observer status.

(c) If the second scenario would prove to be impossible too, the following solution could be chosen: only some (a majority) of the Member States accept the objectives and principles and create the European Security and Defence Council, with the other Member States accepting that the EU's institutions, procedures, etc. can be used for this policy field.

(d) A fourth scenario might be that, in the event of the previous option not being possible either, certain Member States would feel obliged to create a European Security and Defence Council which would then have to formally act independently from the European Union. This Council would nevertheless try to coordinate its policy with the policy of the Union. It would make all necessary efforts to make possible the inclusion over time of the European Security and Defence Council within the formal EU framework. This ultimate scenario has to be avoided as it would have negative implications for the required consistency and institutional unity.

The Member States participating in the European Security and Defence Council may, under certain conditions, choose not to participate in certain decisions or in the implementation of certain decisions, not preventing the other Member States from making decisions and properly implementing them. This opting-out clause may facilitate the participation of all Member States.

The final objective should be to have all Member States participating, and to increasingly restrict the opting-out clause. In 1998, WEU should be completely incorporated within the European Union, with the Union assuming the responsibilities and competences of WEU.

D. The growing operational role of the WEU as implementing institution and the creation of a Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee

The mission of WEU is to implement the political decisions of the European Union which have defence implications.

To be able to implement the political decisions of the EU, WEU has to strengthen its operational capabilities, elaborating further on its "Petersberg Declaration" of 19 June 1992.

Though cooperation with NATO will be necessary at first, and will remain highly desirable, WEU has to aim at full operational independence so as to enable it in time to act independently from NATO after consultation with NATO allies. WEU thus has to be able to immediately implement decisions taken by the EU without having to depend on the approval of other international organizations, even though consultation and collaboration with other organizations such as the CSCE, the UN and especially NATO always will have to be pursued.

This implies that WEU must be able to rely on military forces of its own. Besides, it should also be able to rely - after approval of the authorities involved - on specific NATO forces, such as on the new Rapid Action Force, and on other bilateral or multilateral forces such as the Franco-German forces, which are intended to be transformed into a Eurocorps with other countries participating.

The required independence also implies that WEU dispose of information and planning facilities and command structures that can function independently. WEU can achieve this by making use of the experience gained by its member states in cooperating within the NATO structure and within the context of Franco-German military cooperation. The operational planning cell, foreseen in the WEU Declaration adopted in Maastricht, therefore must be considerably strengthened.

In a first period, operational independence should be pursued in cooperation with NATO, through the use of a combined military command structure and of a double-hatting formula, with a command structure and with military forces of the WEU countries that can be used in the WEU framework as well as in the NATO context.

A Committee of Joint Chiefs of Staff should be created and must assume the military leadership of the WEU forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff can be requested to participate in the meetings of the European Security and Defence Council.

G. The possible involvement of European non-EU countries in the external, security and defence policy of the Union

The involvement of these countries has to be stimulated as this will prepare them for possible future membership of the European Union.

The involvement of these countries is also important as participation in the EU's security and defence policy and actions may provide a wider perspective for the security and defence policies of these countries and can thus have a significant stabilizing impact on the European security situation. It indeed can help to ensure that destabilizing unilateral actions are not taken by countries involved in a conflict or crisis.

The clauses on "political dialogue" included in the European Agreements with Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia have to be further developed. These clauses provide for meetings at ministerial level within the Association Council, for meetings at lower levels and between the presidents of the three associated countries and the presidents of the European Council and Commission, and for a joint parliamentary committee.

More generally, the EU can pursue closer security and defence cooperation with other European states through the common participation of all European states to the CSCE. Procedures to facilitate this cooperation have to be elaborated, making use of the experience gained during the Yugoslav crisis, with the CSCE supporting the EC's decision to send monitors to the Yugoslav republics and with other CSCE countries deciding to provide people to join the EC observers team.

H. The relationship with the Atlantic Alliance

The WEU should become the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. It should increasingly introduce joint positions into the process of consultation in the Atlantic Alliance. This should happen on the basis of the political options adopted within the European Union.

If possible and appropriate, the European countries should make their decisions and act in the field of defence within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance. If consensus cannot be found within the Alliance concerning certain decisions and actions, the European member states should be able to take decisions and take actions within the European Security and Defence Council.

In practice, a division of labour should be found between the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union (and its European Security and Defence Council). Different categories of actions may be defined, with some actions being under the exclusive authority of the Atlantic Alliance, some under the exclusive authority of the European Community and its European Security and Defence Council, and other actions under the concurrent responsibility of both.

The European member states of the Atlantic Alliance which are not a member of the European Union may become associate members of WEU.

As from Stage II (see subdivision B), the European Security and Defence Council should meet as the WEU Council within the Atlantic Alliance.

As from Stage III (see subdivision B), with the incorporation of WEU within the European Union, the European Union should replace WEU as the European Pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.

Before Stage III the existing North Atlantic Treaty should be adapted or a new treaty agreed between the United States and the European Union to better reflect the new equal relationship between the two sides of the Atlantic. This will meet the increasing pressure in both Europe and the United States to adapt the transatlantic relationship to the new geopolitical landscape. It will also stop the Atlantic Alliance from being undermined as a result of the ambiguous situation which now exists.

ANNEX: TIMETABLE

Stage I:

- A European Security and Defence Council is created within the European Union, composed of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of Defence.
- COREPER takes over the responsibilities and competences of the Political Committee.
- Article IX of WEU's Modified Brussels Treaty has to be adapted so as to ensure that the WEU Assembly is composed of the Members of the WEU member states that are elected to the EP.
- The EP scrutinizes on the basis of an annual debate the main aspects and the basic choices of the Union's external, security and defence policy, eventually accepting or rejecting the decisions taken by the European Security and Defence Council.
- The EP's Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security and WEU Committees intensify their cooperation and the EP establishes a full Committee on Security and Defence.
- A DG for External Affairs and Security and the function of Commissioner for External Affairs and Security are created.

Stage II:

- The Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence meet simultaneously as the European Security and Defence Council and as the WEU Council, with the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the countries involved being possibly invited to join these meetings. The use of majority voting becomes common practice for security and defence policy taking into account the specific nature of this policy area.
- The European Security and Defence Council meets as the WEU Council within the Atlantic Alliance.
- The EP and the WEU Assembly have joint sessions, while the EP and WEU Committees having competence for external, security and defence issues also have joint meetings.
- By means of an interinstitutional agreement a compulsory procedure of consultation is established between the European Security and Defence Council, the EP and the Commission before decisions are made on external policy, security and defence.
- Procedures are adopted by the EP to allow the Committee on Security and Defense or its Bureau to meet without delay in case of sudden international crises, to have consultations with representatives of the Council and Commission, and to make recommendations to the Council.
- The functions of the EU Commissioner for External Relations and Security and of the Secretary General of WEU are exercised by one and the same individual.
- The Commission's DG for External Affairs and Security and WEU's Secretariat-General which is responsible for defence aspects remain formally separate, though the cooperation and interrelationship between both administrations are intensively strengthened.

Stage III

- End of the period of fifty years mentioned in Article XII of the Modified Brussels Treaty establishing WEU. Complete incorporation of WEU within the European Union, with the latter taking over all responsibilities and competences of WEU.
- The European Union replaces WEU as the European Pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, with the latter being based on an adapted North Atlantic Treaty or on a new treaty agreed between the United States and the European Union.
- The European Security and Defence Council has responsibility for all tasks and functions of the WEU Council, and formally replaces the WEU Council.
- The EP fully replaces the WEU Assembly at plenary and committee level.
- The EP's assent by absolute majority of its members is required for fundamental decisions on external policy, security and defence, and is extended to the conclusion of agreements between the Union and third countries or international organizations on disarmament and arms control as well as to defence agreements in which the Union is involved.
- The EP receives a non-exclusive right of initiative.
- The WEU Secretariat-General is absorbed within the EU's DG for External Relations and Security, which is renamed DG for External Relations, Security and Defence, and which has to analyse and submit proposals concerning both the military and non-military aspects of the European security situation and policy.

ANNEX I

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION tabled pursuant to Rule 45 (formerly 63) of the Rules of Procedure by Mr BOURLANGES and Mr ROUMELIOTIS
on future relations between the European Community, the Western European Union and the North Atlantic Alliance,

The European Parliament,

A. having regard to its resolutions on security policy within the terms of reference of a future European union,

B. having regard to the outcome of the Maastricht Summit as regards the development of a common foreign and security policy and particularly the new terms of the Treaty, whereby the WEU is charged with drafting and implementing the European Union's decisions and activities with defence policy implications,

C. in view of the Maastricht Declaration by the members of the WEU, whereby institutional provisions should be made with respect to relations between the WEU, the European Community and the North Atlantic Alliance, as well as between the Parliamentary Assembly of the WEU and the European Parliament,

1. Regrets the outcome of the Maastricht Summit as far as the European Parliament's scope for cooperation in foreign and security policy matters is concerned;

2. Believes that, in view of the new terms of the Treaty, the time has come for direct relations between institutions and organizations in Europe responsible for security and defence matters, including the North Atlantic Alliance, so as to take account of the new realities;

3. Is convinced that the development of a common foreign and security policy will result in coordination and cooperation with existing parliamentary assemblies;

4. Instructs its President to refer this matter to the appropriate committee.

O P I N I O N

(Rule 120 of the Rules of Procedure)

of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security
for the Committee on Institutional Affairs

Draftsman: Mr Hans-Gert POETTERING

At its meeting of 14 July 1993 the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security appointed Mr Poettering draftsman.

At its meetings of 18 February and 2 June 1993 the Subcommittee on Security and Disarmament considered the draft opinion.

At its meetings of 30 June 1993 and 7 October 1993 the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security considered the draft opinion.

At the latter meeting it adopted the conclusions and amendments contained therein by 25 votes to 4, with 4 abstentions.

The following were present at the vote: Baron Crespo, chairman; Poettering, draftsman; Aglietta, Apolinario (for Magnani Noya), Balfe, Barton (for Coates), Cheysson, Christensen (for Canavarro), Crampton, da Cunhan Oliveira (for Cravinho), Dillen, Elles (for Bethell), Fernández Albor, Ferrer (for Bernard-Reymond), Ford (for Newens), Günther, Habsburg, Hänsch, Jepsen, Lacaze, Langer, Llorca Vilaplana, Marck (for Lenz), Miranda de Lage (for Planas), Onesta, Penders, Pesmazoglou, Piecyk, Prag (for McMillan-Scott), Sakellariou, Salema (for Gawronski), Sonneveld (for Forte), Suárez González (for Cassanmagnago Cerretti), Titley, Verde i Aldea (for Trivelli), Visser (for Schmid), von Wechmar (for Holzfuss) and Woltjer.

I. DEVELOPMENT OF A COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

1. Provisions of the Treaty

Considering that a common security policy had long been fundamentally controversial, the provisions adopted in Maastricht together with the Declaration by the Western European Union (WEU) Member States annexed to the Treaty in this connection go further than expected. The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is to include 'all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy which might in time lead to a common defence' (Article J4(1)).

The WEU is upgraded to the status of an integral part of the development of European Union and the security policy of the Union is to be 'compatible' with that of the Atlantic Alliance (Article J4(2) and (4)). The incorporation of the WEU into the European Union integration process goes a long way to answering the concerns of the advocates of a self-contained European security policy (notably France), while the compatibility postulate vis-à-vis the Atlantic Alliance performs an equivalent service for advocates of a Euro-Atlantic security policy (notably Britain).

Pursuant to Article J4 of the provisions on CFSP, the WEU, as 'an integral part of the development of the Union', will, at the request of the Union 'elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications'. The Declaration by the WEU Member States (see Annex to Maastricht Treaty) nevertheless stresses the dual function of the WEU: it is to become both the 'defence component of the European Union' and a 'means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance'.

The two sets of joint proposals launched in October 1991 by Britain and Italy on the one hand and France and Germany on the other, representative as they are of two fundamental tendencies in the positions of the Member States, are a clear indication that different interpretations should be attached to each of these two components. The Franco-German proposal gives priority to the first, the Anglo-Italian to the second.

In the WEU Declaration overall a slight bias can be detected in favour of the Franco-German proposal, the structural and substantive principles of which have been incorporated. In addition, the proposed relations between the Union and the WEU are set out in greater detail that those between the WEU and the Atlantic Alliance. In general terms, the dates and venues of Union and WEU meetings are to be synchronized and their working procedures harmonized. On the development of working relations between the institutions of the Union and WEU, the following points are stipulated in particular:

- Close cooperation between the Councils and Secretariats-General of the Union and the WEU as well as between the European Parliament and the WEU Parliamentary Assembly;

- Possibly, harmonization of the sequence and duration of the two presidencies;

- The Commission to be kept informed and consulted on WEU activities.

The merger of the WEU with the European Community/Union urged by the European

Parliament and the Commission is alluded to cautiously where reference is made in the context of the Treaty review scheduled for 1996 to the expiry of the Brussels Treaty in 1998 (Article J4(6)). The President-in-Office of the Council, Mr De Deus Pinheiro, addressing the European Parliament's Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security on 19 February 1992, stated in reply to a Member's question that in the long term the WEU could certainly be expected to merge with the European Union.

In the more immediate future, however, it would appear that the WEU is consolidating around a strengthening of its operational role and establishing itself as a defence policy community alongside the 'CFSP' Community. The operational structuring of the WEU will include a WEU planning cell, closer military cooperation (in particular on logistics, transport, training and strategic surveillance), meetings of chiefs of general staff, with military units also 'being answerable' to the WEU.

2. Areas of controversy

Any such forced institutionalization of the WEU as a defence policy structure paralleling European Union would raise three fundamental problems: non-coincident membership; potential conflicts of terms of reference as between Union and WEU; and, in particular, lack of parliamentary supervision of WEU activities.

- The problem posed by non-coincident membership of the Union and the WEU was acknowledged by the WEU ministers when they issued a second declaration in which Greece, Denmark and Ireland were invited to accede to the WEU by the end of 1992 or to assume observer status. This was successful to the extent that at the WEU Council in Rome in November 1992 the decision was taken to admit Greece as a member of the WEU in 1993, but the positions of Ireland and Denmark continued to pose problems for a common defence policy on the basis of the WEU.

  The problem has if anything been compounded by the fact that since the Rome decisions of 20 November 1992 both countries now enjoy permanent observer status in the WEU, which means that they will not be involved to the same extent in the development of a common defence policy for the foreseeable future.

  In the case of Denmark, and subsequent to the 'no' vote in the referendum on the Treaty on European Union, a statement to that effect was even written into the conclusions of the Presidency of the Edinburgh Summit of 12 December 1992, with the Heads of State and Government acknowledging that the Treaty on European Union did not in any sense commit Denmark to acceding to the WEU, that Denmark would not be required to participate in drawing up and implementing decisions and actions of the Union having defence implications, and that Denmark would relinquish its right to hold the presidency of the Union in cases where decisions and actions of the Union having defence implications were to be drawn up or implemented.

This initial concession to 'variable geometry' for the purposes of CFSP, and in particular defence policy, may well set a precedent that could come into play should Austria, Sweden, and Finland, not to say Switzerland - all four of them traditionally neutral countries - apply to accede to the European Union in mid-decade, as, given the terms of the Edinburgh Summit, they may well be expected to do.

- Conflicts of competence between the Union and WEU could also arise in the area of armaments cooperation. This continues to be excluded from the obligations existing under the internal market and is now (possibly) to be strengthened in the WEU framework with the objective of creating a European armaments agency. Notwithstanding the safeguards clause provided by Article 223(1)(a) and (b), first phrase, of the EEC Treaty, the part of the armaments sector in which 'products which are not intended for specifically military purposes' that are not contained in the list drawn up pursuant to Article 223(2) is subject to the conditions of competition of the internal market. Assuming a real commitment to securing armaments cooperation, it would therefore be logical for the part of the armaments sector producing for military purposes also to be made subject to the conditions of the internal market and therefore to the authority of the Community or the Union (Asolo List). At the present time, even with armaments cooperation at WEU intergovernmental level, Community and CFSP monitoring mechanisms are being evaded.

- The inadequacy of supervision of the WEU by the Union is the central problem of cooperation between the two organizations. The fact that the WEU is to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union at the latter's request is not the same as saying that the WEU also has to answer to the Union for its actions. This again poses the problem that membership of the WEU Council of Ministers as the executive institution is well-nigh identical with the Council of the EC, the institution that holds decision-making powers. The proposed closer cooperation between the European Parliament and the WEU Assembly is insufficient, not least because the Assembly can exercise no supervisory powers over the WEU Council. At the very least the obligation to consult and inform the European Parliament should also apply to the WEU Council if the WEU is to act on behalf of the Union in any capacity.

  The European Parliament's requirements go significantly further. The European Parliament has specifically called for the creation of any military component of the EC to be made subject to its approval (B3-1703/91, paragraph 11). The European Parliament has also called for the power to oppose by a majority of its Members any resort to the use of (military) force (B3-1639/91 paragraph 6).

  Experience at national level generally points strongly to the conclusion that parliamentary supervision of any common security and defence policy will be absolutely essential.

  Looking ahead to the review of the Treaty in 1996, the European Parliament ought therefore to press for genuine parliamentary supervision of any future common security and defence policy.

3. Operational role of the WEU

As part of the process of strengthening the operational role of the WEU, military units are to be assigned to it. This provision is open to a variety of readings in the light of the Franco-German and Anglo-Italian proposals. France and Germany understand it as meaning ultimately a European army with the Franco-German corps at its centre and which could be operationally deployed over an unlimited area. Italy and Britain prefer to think in terms of a European 'reaction force' that would go operational only outside the NATO area.

As part of the 'closer military cooperation complementary to the Alliance' urged in the WEU declaration, the WEU is to become operationally meshed with NATO. Since the areas of cooperation specifically listed of logistics, transport (in particular long-distance transport with in-flight refuelling) and strategic surveillance involve precisely the kinds of capabilities without which an 'out of area' deployment of WEU forces would be technically impossible.

A possible compromise between the Anglo-Italian and Franco-German positions might take the form of so-called 'dual earmarking' of the Rapid Reaction Corps for Allied Command Europe approved in principle by NATO in June 1991 in Copenhagen according to operational geographical area ('NATO area': NATO; 'out of area': WEU).

However, before technical and organizational arrangements for constituting a West European intervention corps are taken, it will undoubtedly be essential to hold a fundamental debate on the conditions under which 'out of area' deployments would be authorized. Clarification will be needed in particular on the question of whose control (WEU, European Union, NATO) and under whose auspices (the Union, CSCE, United Nations) such operations would be mounted.

As regards the second role of the WEU as a European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, the following point should be made: WEU Member States are, 'on issues which represent an important common interest', in future to agree common positions through the Alliance's consultation procedure. In practice meeting dates and venues of the WEU and the Atlantic Alliance will where necessary be synchronized, their working methods harmonized and close cooperation established between their secretariats-general.

The (permanent) representation on the WEU Council is to be provided under a 'double-hatting' formula by the representatives to the Alliance and the European Union. To facilitate execution of the new dual role the WEU Council and Secretariat were transferred to Brussels at the beginning of 1993.

At the same time cooperation between the WEU Council and the European Union Council ought to be facilitated by synchronizing the presidencies, i.e. having the same country taking the chair in both bodies at any one time. A different arrangement would have to be found for Denmark and Ireland since these two countries only have observer status at the WEU.

It is also to be recommended that Commission representatives should attend meetings of the WEU Council to improve exchanges of information and cooperation.

II. POSITIONS TAKEN BY THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

In recent years the European Parliament has repeatedly taken a position on the structuring of future relations between the European Community on the one side and the Atlantic Alliance and the WEU on the other.

As regards the Maastricht Treaty of Union and the annexed Declaration on WEU, the report by the Committee on Institutional Affairs rightly concentrates on relations between the Community institutions and WEU bodies.

Looking back on the positions adopted hitherto by the European Parliament on this pattern of relations, it can clearly be seen that the conclusions of the report by the Committee on Institutional Affairs continue the logic of the positions previously adopted:

1. Parliament's resolution on the Helsinki II Conference (9 October 1990) notes that the Treaty of Rome may not stand in the way of transferring unrestricted powers in security and defence matters to the European Union, and that, far from being revived, the Western European Union should be integrated into the European Union.

2. In its resolution of 10 June 1991 on the prospects for a European security policy, highlighting the significance of a European security policy and its impact on European Political Union, the European Parliament advocates close cooperation and the coordination of the Community's activities and those of the future European Union in the area of foreign and security policy with the institutions of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and calls for the commitments entered into by the Member States under the WEU Treaty to be taken into account in drawing up a common foreign and security policy of the European Community and adjusted to Community policy.

3. In its resolution on the Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union (B3-1639/91) the European Parliament calls for:

   - the phased implementation of security and defence policy with a precise and binding timetable, taking into account the time limits laid down in the WEU Treaty,

   - the possibility of certain executive powers over Community decisions to be conferred on the WEU until 1996,

   - the powers of the WEU to be transferred to the Community after that date,

   - the formulation of security and defence policy to be regarded as falling within the Community's sphere of competence, taking due account of the various Member States' international commitments, particularly within NATO.

4. In its resolution of 7 April 1992 on the results of the Intergovernmental Conferences the European Parliament complains that the 'pillar' structure of the treaty of Union 'leaves the common foreign and security policy outside the European Community Treaty' and 'provides for defence matters to be delegated to WEU without providing for appropriate parliamentary control of the activities of this organization'.

5. The same criticism is repeated in the resolution on the establishment of the European Community's common foreign policy of 18 December 1992, in which the European Parliament takes the view that arrangements for implementing the mechanisms laid down in the Maastricht Treaty for interaction between Parliament, Commission and Council in the area of security policy must be developed. In that connection rules must be drawn up with the other participating institutions, in particular the WEU Council that are compatible with an efficient discharge of the duties of representation and democratic supervision incumbent upon the European Parliament.

6. And in the resolution on the structure and strategy of the European Union, looking ahead to its extension and the creation of a pan-European order, of 20 January 1993 the European Parliament takes a position on the structuring of relations with the WEU and NATO. In particular it calls for the WEU, as a mechanism of common defence policy, to be more closely linked with the institutions of the European Union during a transitional period and to be integrated into the Union in 1996. It also welcomes the WEU decisions of 19 June 1992 on the institutionalizing and structuring of dialogue, consultation and cooperation with the states of Central and Eastern Europe.

   In relation to NATO Parliament takes the view that that organization is going through a process of organizational and material redefinition from which it can be expected to emerge as a mechanism guaranteeing security for the whole of Europe and maintaining close ties between Europe on the one hand and the USA and Canada on the other. It expresses the hope that NATO will become the central element in a comprehensive non-aggression and mutual assistance pact to be concluded by all its Member States with all other European states, including Russia and possibly other states on the territory of the former USSR, together with the European Union.

7. The European Parliament again comments on cooperation between the WEU, the European Union, NATO, the CSCE and the United Nations in its resolution of 27.5.1993 on developments in East-West relations in Europe and their impact on European security, calling inter alia upon the European Community to commit itself at all levels to building up a common, concordant, pan-European security system involving the existing security organizations (NATO, WEU, NACC, etc.) within the framework of the CSCE (para. 19). EPC and the Member States are similarly asked to take initiatives along these lines within NATO and the WEU (para. 20). Parliament also calls for a policy of convergence and burden-sharing between the various European and Euro-Atlantic institutions (para. 37) and expresses the wish that organizations such as NATO and the WEU should act as far as possible only within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations and that an effort would be made towards the further development of the United Nations as a peacemaking organization (para. 36).

III. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE WEU ASSEMBLY AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

Several members of the WEU Assembly and its secretariat had expressed concern at the draft report by the Committee on Institutional Affairs on future relations between the European Community, WEU and the Atlantic Alliance, in particular on the grounds that it called for the WEU Assembly to be merged with the European Parliament.

The President of the WEU Assembly also stated in a circular letter in November 1992 that the WEU Assembly would invoke the subsidiarity principle to enable it to discharge to the fullest extent the responsibilities transferred to it by the Brussels Treaty, as supplemented by the Maastricht Treaty. In other words, the WEU Assembly advocates a division of responsibilities whereby the military aspects of the CFSP would remain within its terms of reference and the European Parliament would confine its attentions to isolated economic and political aspects of security.

The same political line is taken by the rapporteur to the WEU Assembly for parliamentary debates on the security policy laid down in the Maastricht Treaty (Nuñez report), who regrets that in a number of European Parliament texts it is urged that the latter should replace the WEU Assembly in the long term and exercise sole parliamentary supervision in the area of security and defence in the European Union. The rapporteur takes the view that the requirement of closer cooperation between the Parliamentary Assembly of the WEU and the European Parliament as laid down in the declaration on the WEU annexed to the Maastricht Treaty, would help to secure adoption of the controversial proposals contained in the European Parliament texts cited above.

In the WEU report on the European Union, the WEU and the impact of Maastricht (Goerens report) tabled at the last plenary sitting of the WEU Assembly in December 1992 in Paris, it is also regretted that one consequence of the positions adopted by the European Parliament has been to complicate closer cooperation between the Parliamentary Assembly of WEU and the European Parliament. The same report also contains information about the results of the talks held between President Klepsch and the then President of the WEU Assembly, Mr Soell on 23 October 1992, in which both presidents are said to have decided to meet regularly and to have considered the option of meetings between committees or subcommittees of the two assemblies.

The report points out that exchanges between the two assemblies must be based on the principles of equality and reciprocity and that consequently while there continues to be no observer status in the European Parliament, the WEU Assembly cannot grant Members of the European Parliament equivalent status (although it is free to grant such status).

In the Goerens report the position of the WEU Assembly is clearly set out and the view is taken that as long as defence continues to be subject to the sovereignty of the states only an assembly composed of delegations from the parliaments of those states will be in a position to discharge the duties that Article IX of the amended Brussels Treaty had transferred to the WEU Assembly in the context of European cooperation in the area of defence.

Despite obvious divergencies in the respective positions the signal has been given that members and the secretariat of the WEU Assembly are fully prepared to create closer links with the European Parliament and to pursue the objective of European Union jointly.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

The report by the Committee on Institutional Affairs clearly acknowledges the new security policy situation in Europe together with the terms of reference of the Maastricht Treaty and the Declaration by the WEU Member States contained in it. In that connection the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security considers the following points as meriting the highest priority:

1. With the Maastricht Treaty, the Western European Union (WEU) is acknowledged as an integral part of the process of development of the European Union and, in accordance with the Declaration by the WEU Member States, will make a fundamental contribution to solidarity within the Atlantic Alliance. The WEU will thus become the defence component of the European Union, at least for a transitional period.

2. The Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security urges that the WEU should be fully assimilated into the European Union not later than 1998, when the WEU Treaty comes up for renewal. A start must be made on achieving that objective at the Inter-Governmental Conference scheduled for 1996.

3. The Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security calls for the WEU reforms approved by the WEU Ministers at Petersberg (19 June 1992) and in Maastricht to be implemented consistently and without delay. They should include establishing a WEU military planning staff charged with complementing the efforts of the North Atlantic Alliance by pushing ahead, in close coordination with that organization, with military cooperation on logistics, transport, training and strategic reconnaissance. Meetings of Chiefs of Staff of WEU Member States should be held regularly and where necessary ad hoc. Armaments cooperation should be strengthened by setting up a European armaments agency.

4. The fact that since November 1992 all EC Member States belong to the WEU either as full members or as observers is essentially welcome; problems are nevertheless posed by the fact that the observer status assumed by Denmark and Ireland could tend to inhibit full participation by those two countries in CFSP activities.

5. The Petersberg decisions should be implemented immediately in the following areas:

   - humanitarian missions and rescue operations;
   - peace-keeping duties;
   - anti-crisis operations, including actions to restore peace.

6. The Franco-German Corps (Eurocorps) approved in May 1992 by President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl has the potential, given participation by other WEU Member States, to become an important factor in European integration and thus to function as a major operational component of European security in coordination with the Atlantic Alliance. The Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security welcomes in this connection Belgium's decision to participate in the Eurocorps and would welcome it if other Member States were to follow suit. The creation of combined France-Hispano-Italian airborne naval forces with the intention of helping to raise the profile of European security in the South of Europe, also points the way forward.

7. The European Community/European Union and WEU must create mechanisms for dialogue and cooperation on security matters, in particular with the EFTA States applying for membership, the Visegrad countries and the Baltic republics which have to be progressively incorporated into European unification policy. The process must be accelerated so as to strengthen the security of new democracies in the area formerly under Soviet domination.

8. The CSCE and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council established by NATO provide appropriate forums for security policy cooperation with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and with the republics of the former Soviet Union. As integration progresses, the European Community/European Union must contribute to the United Nations, the CSCE and the Atlantic Alliance in line with its growing responsibilities. Account must be taken here of the increasing responsibility of the United Nations and the CSCE for security matters as well as NATO's continuing role with regard to security policy and operations.

9. Even with ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and its implementation, the process of European unification will still be far from complete, nor will European Union thereby be concluded. The Common Foreign and Security Policy must not be confined to mere inter-governmental cooperation in the long term but must be raised to the status of a full Community policy subject to majority decision-making. It is there that the European Parliament must be allowed to exercise substantive powers of participation and supervision.

   The Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security calls on the Committee on Institutional Affairs to consider the above points when it next discusses its report.

The Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security also takes the view that, pending full integration of the WEU into the political system of the EC, more detailed arrangements should be made for stepping up cooperation between the bodies of the WEU and the institutions of the EC than are called for in the draft report by the Committee on Institutional Affairs. In particular the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security would propose the following amendments:

New paragraph, after paragraph 17:

Expects associate members and states with observer status at the WEU to respect international law and UN resolutions and refrain from acts or omissions inconsistent with the legitimate rights and concerns of WEU members so as not to jeopardize the community spirit and functioning of the WEU;

Paragraph 22 (Council) to be expanded as follows:

New indent after the first indent:

- representatives of the WEU Council should be regularly invited to report on its activities to the committee of the European Parliament responsible for security and defence matters;

Paragraph 23 (European Parliament) to be amended as follows:

First indent (new):

- The European Parliament should draw up its own proposals on security and defence policy and scrutinize the relevant decisions of the WEU Council.

Second indent (new):

- The European Parliament may address questions and recommendations to the WEU Council;

Third and fourth indents (De Gucht) to be deleted.

New indent after the fourth indent (De Gucht):

- The European Parliament should, in accordance with the mandate given in the Declaration on Western European Union annexed to the Treaty on European Union, pursue closer cooperation with the bodies of the WEU, in particular its Parliamentary Assembly. This should include the following practical measures:

(a) Reciprocal ad hoc invitations to rapporteurs at committee and sub-committee level to discuss reports on related subjects;

(b) Annual joint meetings of the committees of the European Parliament and the WEU Parliamentary Assembly responsible for security and defence matters in order to coordinate activities and exchange information;

(c) Creation of an interparliamentary delegation for relations with the WEU Assembly, the North Atlantic Assembly (NAA) and the CSCE Assembly. This delegation should as far as possible be drawn from members of the committee responsible for security and defence matters. Delegation members would as far as possible attend the half-yearly meetings of the WEU Assembly and the NAA and the annual meeting of the CSCE Assembly as observers with the right to speak. Conversely, representatives of these assemblies would be invited, under arrangements similar to those applicable to representatives of the Commission and Council, to follow the proceedings of the committee responsible for safety and defence matters;

(d) Stepping up cooperation at secretariat level, including automatic exchanges of working and session documents.

Followed by a further new indent:

- Given that security and defence will continue to grow in importance as a subject to which the European Union must address itself, the European Parliament should be equipped with adequate administrative support to deal with these matters.