



Eastern Borders Risk Analysis Network Annual Overview 2011

European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union



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Executive summary

When compared to 2009, the overall situation at the common borders between the Eastern Borders Risk Analysis Network (EB-RAN) members (Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, the Russian Federation) and neighbouring Frontex Risk Analysis Network (FRAN) members (Poland, Slovakia, Finland, Norway, Lithuania, Romania, Latvia, Hungary and Estonia) did not change significantly.

Analysis of the available statistical data, additional information provided by the EB-RAN countries and relevant Frontex-coordinated Joint Operations (JOs) clearly indicate that the single largest threat to border security at the common borders between EU Member States and EB-RAN countries (henceforth referred to simply as “the common borders”) remains smuggling of excise goods, especially cigarettes and fuel, followed by stolen vehicles on exit from the EU and the localised smuggling of household goods ranging from groceries to electronics. This is mostly due to significant price differences between EU Member States and Eastern European Countries.

Frontex-coordinated JO Focal Points data indicate that the suppliers of cigarettes smuggled through the common borders are, in order of quantity smuggled, Ukraine, the Russian Federation, Belarus and Moldova. The workload of border guards does not vary considerably, however, as a meaningful number of cigarettes is smuggled by the green border and through rivers and the price gap is very similar along the entirety of the common borders.

Data collected by Frontex indicates that the Russian Federation, Belarus and Ukraine remain markets with a significant purchasing power and high demand for second-hand and (to a lesser extent) new vehicles such as motorbikes, cars, heavy machines (agricultural and construction machines) and lorries. Due to market needs the *modi operandi* of smugglers of vehicles are varied and rapidly changing.

Despite the small amount of seizures, there are indications of drug trafficking routes from Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan or Uzbekistan) to the Russian Federation for the domestic market as well as to be further smuggled to the EU. The Odessa seaport appears as a point of entry for cocaine smuggled from South America, whereas Russian ports such as Saint Petersburg and Murmansk are used as entrance points for synthetic drugs from EU countries.

In 2010 two routes of trafficking in human beings (THB) which affect both EU Member States and/or EB-RAN countries were particularly visible. The first was a trafficking route between Moldova and Romania used for trafficking Moldovans (including minors) to Romania and other EU Member States. A second THB route takes Moldovans and Belarusians from their respective countries to Turkey or through Turkey to Arab countries such as Lebanon and the United Arab Emirates.

The risk of irregular migration is considered somewhat smaller in its magnitude when compared to the cross-border crime phenomenon. Frontex analysis clearly points to the existence of two migratory systems affecting both EB-RAN countries and neighbouring FRAN members. The first one links CIS* migrants to the Russian Federation as their main destination country while the other brings both CIS and non-CIS migrants into the EU. Relative differences in earning potential between source (mainly in south Caucasus, Central Asia and Africa) and destination countries (the EU and the Russian Federation) are the key motivators for both movements.

* The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is a regional organisation established in 1991 whose participating countries are former Soviet Republics.

During 2010 the Slovakia-Ukraine border remained the most affected section of the common borders in terms of irregular migration (more than 40% of the total detections of illegal border-crossings at the common borders took place there). As was the case in 2009, detections there still point to two distinct flows of migration composed of CIS and non-CIS nationals. The two flows differ in terms of composition, *modus operandi* and need for facilitation (or lack thereof). CIS nationals (mainly from Moldova and Georgia) represented the largest share of irregular migrants detected (more than 50%).

Migration of non-CIS nationals to the EU consists mainly of Afghans, Somalis and Palestinians. Detection figures from Ukraine suggest three main ways CIS migrants use to arrive to Ukraine: (a) direct arrival using legal travel channels (business, student or tourism visa), (b) indirect arrival, transiting the Russian Federation, and (c) via Ukraine's Black Sea ports.

Ukraine remains the main transit country for both CIS and non-CIS irregular migrants aiming at reaching the EU through its eastern borders. In addition, Ukraine is also the major route for migrants from the Caucasus region and Central Asian countries travelling towards (or from) the Russian Federation. It remains difficult to ascertain to what extent the two flows are linked.

In terms of yearly trends (which can only be ascertained for FRAN members, as there is no previous data from EB-RAN countries), the overall number of refusals issued by FRAN members alone decreased marginally from around 36 200 in 2009 to around 34 000 in 2010. The decrease was largely due to a 15% drop in Polish refusals and occurred despite a 33% increase in Hungary's refusals. Both developments are an indication of changes in the composition of regular passenger flows (less Georgians attempting to enter Poland) and possible changes in border checks procedures (Hungary).

Poland and Ukraine will host the Euro Cup from June to July 2012. Networks organising irregular migration as well as smuggling activities may try to take advantage of the simplified border-crossing rules that will apply during the competition.

1. Background and methodology

The European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (Frontex) created in August of 2008 a concept of Eastern Borders Conference (EBC). The EBC was designed as a regular activity/forum where specific challenges related to irregular migration at the eastern borders of the EU could be addressed by FRAN (Frontex Risk Analysis Network) representatives and the relevant neighbouring third countries.

By 2009 Frontex signed Working Arrangements (WA) with Ukraine, the Russian Federation, Moldova and Belarus. Subsequently, Frontex proposed to set up a permanent Eastern Borders Risk Analysis Network (EB-RAN), to be comprised of the competent Border Control Authorities from the mentioned four countries and the Risk Analysis Unit of Frontex.

Additional agreements were later signed allowing for the establishment of regular information exchange and joint analytical activities: with Moldova in March 2009 (Cooperation Plan), with Ukraine in November 2010 (Mechanism on information exchange for risk analysis cooperation) and with Belarus in November 2010 (Memorandum on regular exchange of information and joint analytical activities).

When proposing to set up EB-RAN, Frontex also proposed to draft a joint risk analysis each year, based in part on monthly statistical information exchange. However, the monthly statistical data exchange between Frontex and the EB-RAN countries had not yet been fully established at the time. This in turn made drafting of a joint annual analysis impossible. Nevertheless, an Annual Overview covering 2009 was delivered by Frontex in November 2010.

By 4 June 2011, Moldova, Belarus and Ukraine provided monthly statistical data for 2010. As this data still have not provided enough information for a joint annual analysis, the following document is to be considered as the second EB-RAN Annual Overview.

1.1 Data collection and additional information

This document utilises the relevant Frontex Risk Analysis Network (FRAN) data from the common borders between EU Member States and the EB-RAN countries (hereafter referred to as 'the common borders') in 2009 and 2010 and the available monthly statistical data from Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova (2010 only, no trend analysis yet possible). In addition, it draws on information from other Frontex reports such as the Annual Risk Analysis 2011, FRAN bi-monthly analytical reports and relevant Frontex Tailored Risk Analyses. Information collected during different Frontex coordinated Joint Operations (JOs) and reports issued by specialised agencies or international actors (e.g. INCB, EUBAM) also played an important part in this analysis. Finally, EB-RAN and FRAN members were able to provide additional information during the last EB-RAN expert meeting, which took place in Warsaw in June 2011.

The monthly statistics provided by the EU Member States along the eastern border within the framework of FRAN and monthly statistics from Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova focus on six key indicators of irregular migration: (1) detections of illegal border-crossing, (2) refusals of entry, (3) detections of illegal stay, (4) asylum applications, (5) detections of facilitators and (6) detections of forged documents. Summary tables for statistical data are attached at the end of the document.

1.2 Quality of the available data

The quality of statistical data on irregular migration depends on several factors. The number of detections of illegal border-crossings, for example, is not only a function of the number of persons attempting to cross the border illegally, but also of the effort of border control authorities to detect them. Increasing detections might be due to a rise in persons attempting illegal crossings or be a result of enhanced resources to detect such crossings.

Similar issues should be taken into account regarding the number of detections of cross-border crimes at the borders. Higher numbers of detections at a particular Border Crossing Point (BCP) might indicate a surge of criminality, but may also be the result of more efficient border control and/or the presence of specialists whose expertise in a certain area (the identification of stolen vehicles, for instance) may lead to a high number of detections.

The statistical data used for this analysis should not be considered as official statistics but as management of information to support the planning of joint operational activities. The data might therefore occasionally vary from data published officially by national authorities.

2. Overview of the main threats affecting common border security

Data collected within EB-RAN, as well as obtained from Frontex-coordinated JOs and various open sources clearly indicate that one of the largest threats to border security at the eastern borders of the EU remain cross-border smuggling of excise goods and stolen vehicles exiting the EU. In terms of its negative human impact, trafficking in human beings (THB) is still a sizeable problem.

Price differences between the two sides of the common borders are the main driver of the demand for cheaper goods which in turn fuels smuggling activities across the eastern border of the EU. The smuggling of goods also occurs due to specific legal limitations in the number of items a person is allowed to carry across the border. The types of items that are smuggled depend on the direction of travel. On exit from the eastern EU countries smuggled goods range from groceries (such as meat, vegetables and fruits), clothes and shoes to cars, agriculture machines (including spare parts for cars) and electronic goods such as mobile phones. On entry to the EU smuggled goods consist mainly of excise goods such as cigarettes, petroleum products and, in smaller amounts, drugs, alcohol and small arms (including ammunition).

The risk of irregular migration is considered somewhat smaller in its magnitude when compared to the above mentioned cross-border smuggling and can largely be divided in three parts: (a) illegal flow through green borders (common between EB-RAN countries); (b) flow of would-be migrants through BCPs and; (c) flow by air from the EB-RAN countries' main airports. The three flows are quite distinct, both in terms of size and composition.

Statistical indication of the size of the problem is best represented through an analysis of several FRAN and EB-RAN indicators (see Table 1). When 2010 detections at the common borders are compared to those made at external borders elsewhere, it becomes clear that refusals of entry are by far most significant at the eastern borders. This is indicative of specific border control challenges in terms of effective management of *bona fide* regular passenger flows and the reduction of overstaying and/or illegal work at the same time.

Table 1: SUMMARY OF FRAN, EB-RAN* AND EB NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES INDICATORS FOR 2010**

	FRAN	EB-RAN	EB neighbouring countries	Share of EB neighbouring countries in FRAN
Illegal entries between BCPs	104 049	4 796	1 043	1.0%
Clandestine entries at BCPs	242	2 167	123	51%
Facilitators	8 629	115	149	1.7%
Illegal stay	348 666	28 953	3 306	0.9%
Refusals of entry	108 500	37 524	34 039	31%
False travel-document users	9 439	455	1 083	11%


* 2010 data from Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine

** Norway, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania

Source FRAN and EB-RAN data as of 17 June 2011

In terms of cigarette smuggling activities, the most heavily affected BCPs involved in Frontex-coordinated JO Focal Points were Dorohusk, located at the land border between Ukraine and Poland, Terespol, found at the Poland-Belarus border, Zahony, located between Hungary and Ukraine and Galati and Sculeni, both found along the Romania-Moldova border (Fig. 2).

Figure 2: Seizures of cigarettes at the eastern borders of the EU during JO Focal Points 2010 indicate that the Poland-Ukraine border is the most affected



Source: JO Focal Points 2010

The substantial number of seizures of cigarettes in Poland, Hungary and Romania are most likely the result of changes in customs regulations in 2009 that limited the amounts of cigarettes and alcohol allowed into the EU. The introduction of local border traffic agreements allowing residents of borderland regions to enjoy visa-free travelling may be an additional incentive for small-scale cigarette smugglers to cross the EU borders with Ukraine even more frequently.*

* Local border agreements are in force between Ukraine and Poland, Slovakia, Romania and Hungary.

The *modi operandi* of cigarette smugglers continue to be extremely diverse and dynamic. They range from 'ant' smuggling operations carried by isolated individuals to large-scale enterprises. The natural conditions of the border and the infrastructure of BCPs affect specific strategies applied by cigarette smugglers.

At BCPs cigarettes enter the EU concealed in cars and lorries, as well as in public transportation vehicles such as buses and trains. They are hidden in floors, walls or seats of the vehicle in question, as well as in its wheels or petrol tank. Professional smugglers frequently use specially prepared vehicles with concealed compartments for smuggled cigarettes. At green (or river) borders the *modi operandi* are significantly influenced by the season of the year.

In terms of the size of each shipment, at the Belarus-Lithuania, Moldova-Romania and Ukraine-Romania borders cigarettes are smuggled in large quantities mainly through BCPs. The Belarusian and Ukrainian borders with Poland, on the other hand, are mainly affected by small scale, fragmented smuggling operations where cigarettes are transported through checkpoints by petty traders.

It is important to note that some smugglers are becoming a physical security threat, a fact that has been confirmed by several security incidents in 2010. Poland reported a case in which two smugglers (Polish and Lithuanian) were using private cars to break through a patrol outpost to avoid being stopped. Of even greater concern is the fact that a Lithuanian patrol controlling the green border with Kaliningrad Oblast was attacked by a smuggler who opened fire at the officers, resulting in injuries to the border guards and the smuggler's death.


Stolen vehicles (on exit)

Data collected by Frontex suggest that the Russian Federation, Belarus and Ukraine remain markets with a significant purchasing power and high demand for second-hand and (in a lesser extent) new vehicles such as motorbikes, cars, heavy machines (agricultural and construction machines) and lorries.

JOs coordinated by Frontex in 2010 point to an increase in the detections of stolen vehicles at the external land borders of the EU compared to 2009. The trend is most likely an indication of strengthened border checks and better equipment used to detect stolen vehicles.

In 2010 the highest number of detections were reported at the Belarusian border with Poland (Terespol) and at the Ukrainian borders with Hungary, Slovakia and Poland (Zahony, Vysne Nemecke and Dorohusk BCPs, respectively) (Fig. 3).

Figure 3: Detections of stolen vehicles during JO Focal Points 2010




Source: JO Focal Points 2010

Detected vehicles were mainly stolen in Belgium, Germany, France and Italy. The *modi operandi* of criminal groups trafficking vehicles across the external borders of the EU evolve quickly in response to the legal and economic situation of the affected regions and to the degree of expertise of border guards and customs officers in identifying stolen vehicles.

Petroleum products

Trafficking of petroleum products is mainly reported at the eastern European borders with the Russian Federation, Belarus and Ukraine. Smuggling is motivated by the price difference between EU Member States and their immediate third-country neighbours (see Fig. 4). Queues created by fuel smugglers with extended fuel tanks impact the border control of BCPs by increasing waiting time, while vehicles modified for fuel smuggling raise the security risk at the borders, as they may catch fire or even explode.

Figure 4: Average prices of 95-octane petrol in selected Member States and third countries differ extensively (December 2010)



Trafficking in human beings (THB)

In 2010, two routes of THB which affect both EU Member States and/or EB-RAN countries were particularly visible. The first and most immediately relevant is the trafficking route that exists between Moldova and Romania, which includes not only the movement of trafficked Moldovans (including minors) but also of documents which are used in the trafficking process. Romania is both a final destination for THB victims and a transit country through which victims pass on the way to other EU Member States.

A second THB route takes Moldovans and Belarusians from their respective countries to Turkey, which will either be their final destination or the transit point towards Arab countries such as Lebanon and the United Arab Emirates. This use of Turkey as a transit country in the THB process is particularly relevant given that Turkey is still the main transit country for irregular migration towards the EU.

Other criminal activities affecting the security of the common borders

Smuggling of **alcoholic beverages** has become a less profitable activity for traffickers due to stricter EU regulations and a lower price disparity across borders (with the exception of the Scandinavian Member States). Nevertheless, some seizures of alcohol were reported during Frontex-coordinated JOs, especially luxury brands. The biggest seizures of alcohol at the external borders of the EU were reported at the Ukrainian border with Hungary (Zahony BCP), the Romania-Moldova border (Galati BCP) and the Poland-Belarus border (Terespol BCP).

Routes of **drug trafficking** vary depending on the kind of drug, its origin and the specific criminal organisation involved. Statistical data collected during Frontex-coordinated JOs in 2010 indicate that only small amounts of drugs were detected at the eastern borders, the majority of them at the Hungary-Romania* (Nagyak) and Romania-Moldova (Galati) border. This may indicate that Romania is being used by drug traffickers as a transit route to Western European countries.

Data obtained from EB-RAN, JOs and open sources indicate two main patterns of drug trafficking in the eastern part of Europe. Heroin and opium are smuggled via Central Asia (through Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan or Uzbekistan) to the Russian Federation mainly for the domestic market. It is reported, however, that a part of these drugs is further transported to the EU, moving through Belarus and Ukraine to Poland from where they are distributed further. A particular route has drugs being transported to Lithuania, from where they are distributed to the Scandinavian countries.**

Cocaine from South America is being smuggled through the Odessa seaport (Ukraine). This has been confirmed by three major seizures which took place within a few days in June–July 2010 and resulted in a total seizure of about two tonnes of cocaine.*** Synthetic drugs and drug precursors are usually being smuggled from the EU to large Russian ports such as Saint Petersburg and Murmansk.

* Although Hungary and Romania are both EU Member States, the Hungary-Romania border is considered to be an external border of the EU because Romania is not yet part of the Schengen area.

** INCB annual report 2010

*** EUBAM, Common Border Security Assessment Report Overview Of The Moldova-Ukraine State Border 2010

Box 1: Cross border crime at Ukraine-Moldova border

“In comparison with 2009, detected smuggling [in 2010] on the border increased by 13% in terms of number of cases, and by 31% in terms of value. The pattern in smuggling remained opportunistic, with smaller amounts of high excise goods (cigarettes, alcohol) and other consumer goods being moved more frequently across the [Moldova-Ukraine] border. Nevertheless cigarette and ethanol smuggling had become more organised by the end of 2010, with larger consignments being moved by vehicles and by boats in the border area or over the green/blue border”.

Source: EUBAM, Common Border Security Assessment Report Overview of the Moldova-Ukraine State Border 2010

2.2 Flow of irregular migrants through common green borders

In 2010 the Slovakia-Ukraine border remained the most affected section of the eastern borders, accounting for 40% of the total detections of irregular migrants at the common borders. In line with the general decreasing trend at the eastern borders in 2010, Slovakia detected 12% less irregular migrants when compared to 2009. Given the climatic and geographical features of this section of the common borders, detections on both sides of the border (54% Slovakia, 46% Ukraine) followed a clear seasonal pattern with winter lows and summer highs.

By and large, there continue to exist two distinct flows of irregular migrants: one of CIS and one of non-CIS nationals. The two flows differ in terms of composition, *modi operandi* and need for facilitation (or lack thereof). CIS nationals (mainly from Moldova and Georgia*) represent the largest share (more than 70%). They are usually well prepared for illegal border-crossings (food, clothes) and are able to enter Ukraine legally (visa-free). Their transit towards the border with Slovakia is usually not facilitated, given the knowledge of the local language and the fact that they often travel with detailed maps. When detected, migrants are often in possession of their national travel documents (hidden in clothes or luggage).

* For the purpose of this document, Georgian nationals are considered as CIS nationals regardless of the fact that Georgia formally ended its membership in CIS on 18 August 2009.

Migration of non-CIS nationals (consisting mainly of Afghans, Somalis and Palestinians) appears to be different. Almost all above mentioned nationals are detected during late night hours in small groups of two to five members. The groups consist of nationals from the same country; however mixed groups were also reported during 2010. When detected, migrants very often do not have any documents, which in turn complicates identification and return procedures.

Detection figures from Ukraine suggest three main ways CIS migrants use to reach Ukraine: (a) direct arrival, using legal travel channels (business, student or tourism visa), (b) indirect arrival, transiting the Russian Federation, and (c) via Ukraine's Black Sea ports.

Ukrainian detections of illegal border-crossings at its border with the Russian Federation confirm the existence of a constant flow of migrants declaring themselves as Afghans and Somalis, albeit one low in numbers. A preliminary analysis of detection data from Belarus indicates that Afghans, detected only on exit towards Lithuania, were in fact all coming from the Russian Federation.

Detections of Afghans and Somalis at Ukraine's border with Slovakia were more than double the figure detected at the border with Russia, which allows for multiple explanations. This is either an indication that:

- (1) The majority of non-CIS migrants prefer to enter Ukraine directly by air, a hypothesis corroborated in part by refusal figures at Ukrainian air borders; or
- (2) Detections at different border sections of Ukraine reflect possible variable amounts of surveillance efforts, making thus detection figures less indicative of the size of respective flows.

In conclusion, Ukraine (and to a much lesser extent Belarus) is the main transit country for both non-CIS and CIS irregular migrants aiming at reaching the EU through its eastern borders. In addition, Ukraine is also on route for migrants from the Caucasus region and Central Asian countries travelling towards (or from) the Russian Federation. It remains difficult to ascertain to what extent the two flows are linked.

When compared to other migration routes towards the EU, the flow routing through Ukraine should be considered as modest. For example, overall detections at the common borders in 2010 roughly amounted to detections made in one week at the Greece-Turkey border during the peak period in October and November 2010. However, a worrying trend emerged in 2010 when Slovak authorities reported that of all detected migrants, between 20% and 30% were unaccompanied minors who crossed the green border illegally between Ukraine and Slovakia.

2.3 Flow of would-be migrants through BCPs

The flow of would-be migrants through BCPs is best represented through refusals of entry figures. Jointly, EB-RAN (Moldova and Ukraine) and EU neighbouring countries refused entry to almost 64 000 persons in 2010. Most travellers were refused entry in the third quarter of 2010, in line with seasonal travel patterns.


In terms of yearly trends (which can only be ascertained for FRAN members, as there is no previous data from EB-RAN countries), the overall number of refusals issued by FRAN members alone decreased marginally from around 36 200 in 2009 to around 34 000 in 2010. The decrease was largely due to a 15% drop in Polish refusals and occurred despite a 33% increase in Hungary's refusals. Both developments are an indication of changes in the composition of regular passenger flows (less Georgians attempting to enter Poland) and possible changes in border checks procedures (Hungary). Authorities there have been improving their capacity to detect persons staying in the territory of the EU for more than 90 days in any given six months period, resulting in increasing numbers of refusals for this reason (reason F of the Schengen Border Code – Regulation EC No 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006, OJ L 105/1 – Annex V, Part B).

Box 2: Improved IT system in Hungary and increases in refusals

In September 2007 a new IT system was introduced in Hungary that allowed border authorities to automatically calculate the total period of stay for each traveller. The system saw additional improvements with inclusion of the local border traffic data, extending thus its use also to local border traffic permits. The newest version of the supporting IT system was introduced at the Hungary-Ukraine border section in January 2010, which resulted in an abrupt increase in the number of refusals of Ukrainian nationals in possession of Local Border Traffic Permits who have already stayed in Hungary more than three months during a six months period.

Polish authorities still issued most of the refusals at the common borders, largely at the border with Ukraine and Belarus. Importantly, more than 50% of all refusals at the common borders were issued to Ukrainian nationals, followed by nationals of other neighbouring countries (the Russian Federation and Belarus) (see Fig. 5).

Figure 5: FRAN indicator 4 – refusals of entry in 2010 in FRAN and neighbouring EB-RAN countries. The thickness of the border line (green) represents the number of refusals of entry; the pink background colour shows the main affected countries in the region. Pie-charts show the share (%) of the top nationality refused at the main affected border sectors



Source: FRAN and EB-RAN data as of 17 June 2011

Refusal data from Moldova and Ukraine suggest a different profile of refused persons. In Moldova, most refusals were issued to nationals of the Russian Federation.

Ukraine refused entry to more than 28 000 persons, most of them at its border with the Russian Federation, followed closely by the border with Moldova. Overall, at the Ukrainian border Moldovans were the most refused nationality, with refusals predominantly issued at their national border (90% of refused Moldovans). Moldovans were also refused at the borders with the Russian Federation and Belarus, although at these two borders sectors the main refused nationalities consist of nationals from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan.

Nationals from CIS countries were refused by Ukraine mostly for reasons linked to means of subsistence or purpose of their travel. According to the Ukrainian authorities some were in search of temporary employment in the agricultural and construction industry in Ukraine, while a portion of the would-be-migrants from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan were most likely trying to legalise their stay in the Russian Federation. These migrants need proof that they left the Russian Federation (passport stamps) if they want to renew their Russian migration cards, allowing them to temporarily stay in the country. In the majority of cases their intention is not to stay in Ukraine or move towards the EU, but merely to extend their stay in the Russian Federation.

Interestingly, during the third quarter of 2010, the numbers of refusals for the mentioned three Central Asian nationalities almost doubled when compared to the previous quarter. This development was most likely linked to increased efforts of Russian authorities to reduce the illegal stay and illegal work problems, prompting many migrants to try to legalise their stay in the Russian Federation.

In contrast to refusals at the land borders of Ukraine, sea borders refusals were issued mainly to non-CIS nationals. Ukraine issued more than 3 200 refusals in 2010 at its sea borders, mainly to nationals of Myanmar, Syria, Turkey, Sri Lanka, India, Georgia and Bangladesh (75% share of the total). More than two thirds of refusals were issued to crew members due to invalid or forged documents.

The number of refused persons at the Ukrainian sea borders is relatively high and reflects intense commercial links between seaports in the Odessa region and other Black Sea ports, including those in Turkey. According to Ukrainian authorities there were almost 723 000 passengers crossing Ukraine's sea borders in 2010 (359 000 on entry and 364 000 on exit). Refusals at the Ukrainian sea borders are most likely not indicative of a possible new Black Sea transit route for irregular migration to the EU. So far there is little or no overlap between the nationalities of detected non-CIS irregular migrants at the Slovakia-Ukraine border and those refused at Ukrainian Black Sea borders.

Flow by air from EB-RAN countries' main airports

Frontex-coordinated JO Hubble 2010, which was implemented at the main EU airports, was focused on flights coming from the major African airports. Despite the focus of the operation, Moscow's Sheremeteyevo airport was identified as the most used hub by irregular migrants entering the EU after Istanbul. Russian nationals flying from Moscow airports constituted 44% of the share of detections. Their flight destinations were the main European cities (Amsterdam, Stockholm, Athens, Brussels, Prague, Warsaw, and Paris).

In 2011 an increasing number of Afghans were reported after their arrival from Moscow claiming asylum in different European airports.

African migration from Estonia

Estonian authorities have started to detect an emerging trend of irregular migrants coming from Africa (mostly the Democratic Republic of Congo or Cameroon). With previous legal residence in the Russian Federation, they try to enter Estonia, Finland or Latvia using false documents.

Estonian authorities believe that the migrants' travel from the Russian Federation to the EU is facilitated by the African community network in the Russian Federation which supplies forged travel documents, gives advice about routes and is also purchasing train tickets or flights to reach the destination Member States.

3. Factors impacting regional migratory movements

The preceding overview of available statistical data clearly points to the existence of two migratory systems, affecting both EB-RAN countries and neighbouring FRAN members. The first one links CIS migrants to the Russian Federation as their main destination country while the other brings both CIS and non-CIS migrants into the EU. The state of the economy in general and relative differences in earning potential in particular are the driving force behind both movements.

3.1 Economic factors

Destination: the Russian Federation


In the case of the Russian Federation, statistical data published by its Federal Migration Service (FMS) suggest that the number of illegal stayers present on Russian territory in December 2010 was 3.5 million (down from an estimated 10 million in 2001). Illegal stayers are counted on the basis of Migration Cards given on entry and taken back on exit from the Russian Federation. The number is calculated as the difference between the two.

In addition, FMS also estimates that at the end of 2010 around 10% of the whole working pool in the Russian Federation (about 9 million people) were nationals of other CIS countries. Migrants staying legally on the Russian territory are mainly living in Moscow, Saint Petersburg and selected regions (Kaliningrad, Briansk, Belgorod and Rostov Oblasts).

As Figure 6 opposite clearly shows, the Russian Federation, with its average salaries of more than EUR 500 (in big cities like Moscow and Saint Petersburg), is an attractive place for non-qualified workers from CIS countries. Moreover, non-qualified workers from CIS countries can enter the Russian Federation legally and can immediately adapt to living in the country given their knowledge of the language and the existence of large diasporas there.

To reduce the number of illegal stayers and illegal workers, the Russian Federation introduced new legislation prohibiting foreigners from working in retail trade and open markets. The decision was considered by the Ukrainian media as targeting particularly non-qualified legal and illegal workers from Ukraine, Tajikistan, and Kirghizstan. The impact of the new legislation is yet to be observed.

Figure 6: Comparison of the average wages in CIS countries and selected FRAN members (including all eastern border neighbouring countries). Average salaries are valid as for February 2011



Source: CISSTAT, Eurostat, CIA The World Factbook, national statistic authorities from EU countries

Box 3: Azerbaijan as a destination?

Starting from 2011 Azerbaijan's appeal for workers from the neighbouring countries has increased as the Government has decided to liberalise its labour legislation due in part to labour shortages. However, only 10 000 labour vacancies were published for foreigners in 2011.

Destination: the European Union

This migratory system is driven by economic realities and seasonal demand for labour. The destination countries in the EU can be divided into those in immediate proximity (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania) and those hosting significant diasporas from Ukraine and Moldova (Italy, Spain, the UK, Germany). This distinction is important in terms of intended duration of migration, with those preferring neighbouring EU countries clearly engaged in a more circular migratory pattern.

Italy, Spain, the UK, Germany and France are the traditional destination countries for non-qualified workers from Ukraine and Moldova (construction and domestic services).

The Czech Republic has become an attractive country for Ukrainians and Moldovans working in different industries and the construction sector. The Czech Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MPSV) reported that by the end of 2009 there were around 75 000 Ukrainians legally present in the country. Open source data suggest that the number of Ukrainians residing and working (legally and illegally) in the Czech Republic is much higher.

Poland introduced a liberalisation in its labour market for nationals from several CIS countries (Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and the Russian Federation) in 2008. In that year approximately 156 000 CIS nationals were working seasonally in Poland under this new regulation, a number which increased to 190 000 legal workers in the following year. According to the Polish Ministry of Labour 90% of these workers were Ukrainians. During the first six months of 2010 entrepreneurs registered 120 000 CIS workers, which could indicate an increased demand for both legal and illegal work in Poland (particularly in the construction industry).

When compared to 2009, there were more than twice the number of Ukrainian nationals trying to enter Poland with fraudulent travel documents in 2010. Ukrainian nationals used mainly Polish fraudulent documents (51% of the total) followed by Ukrainian (24%) and Slovakian (3%) ones. Poland also reported cases of passports with stamps that were added or altered by Ukrainian nationals in order to validate travel history.

3.2 Legal factors

Visa liberalisation process

The EU is currently engaged in visa dialogues with the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the Republic of Moldova. The European Commission will draft an impact assessment of the possible migratory and security impacts of future visa liberalisations in the framework of these dialogues.

Georgia recently signed a visa facilitation agreement with the EU, which will substantially simplify the visa application procedure for certain categories of persons and make the whole process cheaper and quicker. It entered into force on 1 March 2011 together with the EU-Georgia readmission agreement.


Visa issuing trends for nationals of the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus remain relatively stable. They usually apply for visas in EU countries where their communities are well-established and where they have opportunity to work (mainly the closest neighbouring countries). In 2009 the average visa refusals rates for nationals of Belarus, the Russian Federation, Moldova and Ukraine was below the EU-wide average refusal rate of 7% (see Fig. 7 overleaf).

Local border traffic agreements (LBTA)

A series of LBTAs between Ukraine and most of its EU neighbours (Poland, Hungary and Slovakia) came into force in 2009. In 2010 a LBTA was implemented between Romania and Moldova in March, while another was implemented between Lithuania and Belarus in October.

In addition, the Polish-Belarusian and Norwegian-Russian agreements were signed in 2010 and are expected to enter into force during 2011. The LBTAs will allow certain groups of border-area residents to cross the border without visas, using special local border traffic permits instead. Holders of such permits will be entitled to stay on the territory of the other country (in the border zone of 50 km) for up to 90 days per half-year.

Figure 7: Visas issued for EB-RAN nationals in 2009 by EU countries (excluding Ireland, the UK, Malta and Cyprus). The majority of Ukrainians, Moldovans and Belarusians chose neighbouring countries as the visa issuers



Source: Council of the European Union

Box 4: Future Local Border Traffic Agreements

On 24 February 2010 Prime Minister Vladimir Putin affirmed that the Russian oblast of Kaliningrad would have a visa-free regime with Poland, with the corresponding area covered on the Polish side (including the seaside city of Gdansk, which is 70 km from the border). The Russian side proposed the same visa-free arrangement for Klaipeda and Kaunas to the Lithuanian government. In both cases, negotiations are still ongoing.

Hungary has reported that in 2010 there were more than 1.5 million of border crossings (entry-exit) by persons with local border traffic permits (see Fig. 8). This in turn represented a 50% increase in comparison to 2009.

In the case of Poland-Ukraine, roughly 6% of the total number of passenger crossing the border are doing so under the LBT agreement rules. The evidence so far does not point to abuse of the LBT for illegal migration purposes.

In terms of potential impact of local border traffic agreements for border control, available reports suggest that local smugglers use local border traffic agreements (LBT) to daily smuggle cigarettes from EB-RAN countries to the neighbouring EU Member States. Such activities were reported particularly in Romania and Ukraine. The potential impact of LBTAs on the situation at the borders needs to be further developed in future reports.




Figure 8: A specimen of local border traffic permit issued by Hungarian consular authorities to Ukrainian nationals

Schengen enlargement

During the 24 February 2011 JHA Council meeting, Member States failed to agree on a compromise as to the way to proceed, both in terms of enlarging the Schengen area and introducing amendments to the Schengen evaluation mechanism (Scheval). The earliest possible date for Romania and Bulgaria to join the Schengen area has therefore been pushed beyond 2012.

Box 5: Belarusian plans to introduce visa regime for Georgians

Apart from repercussions due to a possible Schengen enlargement, Georgian migratory patterns could also change due to Belarusian plans to introduce a visa regime for Georgians. This would make Belarus less attractive as a transit country for Georgians travelling to the EU.

Tbilisi has very good air connections to Odessa and Kiev provided by Ukrainian air carrier Aerosvit, with ticket prices which are comparable to the prices for the Tbilisi-Minsk route (TBS-ODS – EUR 250, TBS-MSQ – EUR 250). A possible new migration route could then lead from Odessa via the Moldovan Transnistria region and from there towards the Moldova-Romania border.

3.3 Mass sports events

The sports event that will have the most significant impact on border security at the common borders between the EU and EB-RAN countries is the Euro Cup 2012. Other events, like the Euro Basket 2011 or the London 2012 Olympics will probably have a less pronounced and more indirect impact.

Euro Cup 2012 Poland-Ukraine

Poland and Ukraine will host the Euro Cup from June to July 2012. Networks organising illegal migration as well as smuggling activities may try to use this event. The entry to Poland by claiming to be a sports fan and further migration to other EU countries with original or counterfeit Ukrainian travel documents could become a new *modus operandi* used by Ukrainians and nationals of other countries during Euro-2012. Another credible risk is overstaying after entering Poland with a fast-track visa.

At the beginning of June 2011 Poland and Ukraine's UEFA branches announced that 41% of the total tickets had been sold (580 000 out of 1.4 million) and that from this number 80% had been purchased by Poles and Ukrainians. According to Markian Lubkivsky, the Tournament Director for Ukraine, Poles are buying tickets for matches in Lviv, while Russians are buying tickets for matches to be held in Kharkov. This suggests that for would-be-spectators the distance is the most important factor when applying for the tickets.

4. Conclusions

Cross-border crime

Cross-border crime is a phenomenon significantly burdening border guards at the eastern borders of EU. It mostly consists of small to large-scale smuggling activities, mainly of cigarettes, petrol and stolen vehicles and in a lesser extent of drugs, alcohol and small weapons.

Although some countries are introducing higher excise tariffs for cigarettes and alcohol (Moldova, Ukraine)* the difference in prices should remain large enough to attract smugglers. In the case of crisis-ridden Belarus, the number of cases of cigarette smuggling dropped significantly in the last months because of the lack of money to buy goods for smuggling.** However, smuggling activities may return to their previous level in the short-term as the current price difference makes cigarette smuggling a lucrative business.

* An increase in excise duty rates for tobacco and alcohol started to take place in Ukraine in January 2011 and was followed by increasing prices for these products in Moldova in April.

** Citizens do not have foreign currency and are not able to pay for goods.

In terms of its negative impact, smuggling of excise goods is linked with significant revenue losses for Member States where the goods are sold and distortions of market conditions at the borderland. It feeds the existing grey and black economy in those regions and maintains structural unemployment as it proves to be more lucrative than legitimate work (e.g. Poland). Smuggling of cigarettes also undermines public health policy objectives in respective Member States, as high tobacco prices are designed in part to reduce cigarette consumption and associated health problems. On the other hand, it brings revenue to economically underdeveloped regions, the greatest part of which is injected into the legitimate economy.

The Libyan conflict, a significant price gap between eastern border countries, shortages of fuel reserves in the Russian Federation and limitations in the quantity of fuel sold to citizens in Belarus are reasons which create incentives for fuel smuggling through the common borders and among eastern border countries.

Eastern neighbouring countries remain markets with significant purchasing power and a high demand for stolen vehicles from Western Europe (luxury cars, motorbikes, cars, heavy machinery and lorries). The fact that currently the number of stolen vehicles identified is not very high at some BCPs does not mean that vehicle trafficking did not occur.*** New trends are emerging, such as the smuggling of vehicles from Lithuania to Moldova and to Central Asia.

*** The small number of detections might be linked to many factors such as shortage of equipment, staff which are insufficiently trained or prepared to identify cases of car theft, limited human resources at border-crossing points, as well as cases of corruption.

Drug trafficking routes from Central Asia (via Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan or Uzbekistan) to the Russian Federation and then on to EU markets are still in use, as are routes which smuggle synthetic drugs out of the EU through large seaports in the Russian Federation. The Ukrainian Black Sea port of Odessa has been used as a transit point for cocaine smuggled from South America, indicating a possible shift in the cocaine trade away from the Iberian Peninsula towards the Black Sea region.

In regards to THB, one cannot exclude the possibility that the Eastern Europe-Turkey-Arab countries THB route may morph into an Eastern Europe-Turkey-EU countries route at some point in the future. This topic requires more thorough analysis and additional data collection.

Clearly, there is a need to target cross-border crime increasingly as a part of Frontex-coordinated JOs at the eastern borders of the EU. This activity should also include a systematic and more detailed data collection that would result in a better understanding of this phenomenon.

Irregular migration

Although irregular migration is not as significant in terms of numbers at the eastern borders as it is in other EU border sections such as the Mediterranean and the Greece-Turkey border, it is still an issue that needs to be closely monitored.

The majority of illegal detections at the common borders occur between BCPs. This means that the joint surveillance activities at the green and river borders should be a priority for EU Member States and their eastern neighbours. The majority of irregular migrants detected at the common borders are national from EB-RAN countries, followed by nationals of other CIS countries. Outside BCPs, the number of Afghans and Somalis detected is also quite significant. From late 2010 onwards a significant rise in the number of irregular migrants from Africa identified at BCPs has been detected.

Migrants are making use of the current political situation to facilitate their entry into the EU. Not only have a relatively meaningful number of Afghan and Somali migrants been detected (especially at the Ukrainian borders), but nationals from the Caucasus region have been claiming Afghan nationality at the borders to try to obtain refugee status. Particular attention needs to be paid to this and similar “nationality swapping” *modi operandi* as they might result in fraudulent asylum applications.

Refusals at the Ukrainian sea borders are most likely not indicative of a possible new Black Sea transit route for irregular migration to the EU. So far there is little or no overlap between nationalities of detected non-CIS irregular migrants at the Slovakia-Ukraine border and those refused at the Ukrainian Black Sea borders, which is mostly related to the refusal of entry to undocumented ship crew members.

The establishment of a visa regime between Belarus and Georgia might impact the migration flows from the latter country. The Georgia-Belarus-Poland/Lithuania route for irregular migration will most likely be supplanted by a Georgia-Ukraine-Romania route.

A possible Schengen enlargement will likely have an impact on the migration routes in the region. The route between Moldova and Romania will gain in importance facilitated by the fact that Moldova has good air and train connections to all parts of Ukraine, the Russian Federation and Georgia.

Past experiences (Euro Cup 2008, Ice Hockey Championships 2011) show that sport events have a very limited impact on the risk of irregular migration. Still, the Euro Cup 2012 is likely to produce new challenges for border control authorities of Poland and Ukraine in terms of facilitating the increased flow of *bona fide* travellers and fans while minimising the risk of abuse by identifying those that will use the Euro Cup to enter Poland and subsequently overstay.

5. Statistical annex

Legend: Symbols and abbreviations **n.a.** not applicable
: data not available

Source: FRAN and EB-RAN data as of 2 June 2011

Note: For all indicators, excluding Asylum and Facilitators, detections reported for EU countries are detections on entry at the land borders with EB countries. For Asylum, all applications (land, sea, air and inland) are included. Facilitators also include detections on exit at the land borders with EB countries.

For EB countries, all indicators – save for Refusals of entry – include detections (applications) on exit and entry at the land, sea and air borders.

The group of 'Non-EU Countries' in the tables only includes data for Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine.

Table A1: ILLEGAL BORDER-CROSSING BETWEEN BCPs

Detections by top ten nationalities

	2009				2010				2009	2010	% change on year ago	per cent of total
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4				
Top Ten Nationalities For EU Countries												
Moldova	43	141	150	62	39	132	134	88	396	393	-0.8	38
Georgia	36	52	51	34	8	55	50	31	173	144	-17	14
Afghanistan	44	53	28	38	11	39	48	34	163	132	-19	13
Ukraine	17	31	31	24	26	42	27	12	103	107	3.9	10
Russia	29	29	38	25	26	20	15	22	121	83	-31	8.0
Somalia	27	3	19	15	0	15	26	7	64	48	-25	4.6
Viet Nam	0	0	4	27	2	4	33	0	31	39	26	3.7
Armenia	10	14	10	1	6	17	4	1	35	28	-20	2.7
Belarus	4	7	11	6	0	8	9	7	28	24	-14	2.3
Pakistan	42	16	7	8	2	5	2	1	73	10	-86	1.0
Other	54	31	27	34	4	12	7	12	146	35	-76	3.4
Total	306	377	376	274	124	349	355	215	1 333	1 043	-22	100
<i>% in total EU LAND</i>	<i>3.1%</i>	<i>2.2%</i>	<i>2.2%</i>	<i>2.2%</i>	<i>1.1%</i>	<i>1.5%</i>	<i>1.2%</i>	<i>0.9%</i>	<i>2.3%</i>	<i>1.2%</i>		
<i>% in total EU</i>	<i>1.3%</i>	<i>1.3%</i>	<i>1.3%</i>	<i>1.2%</i>	<i>0.8%</i>	<i>1.3%</i>	<i>1.0%</i>	<i>0.8%</i>	<i>1.3%</i>	<i>1.0%</i>		
Top Ten Nationalities For Non-EU Countries												
Ukraine	:	:	:	:	415	561	468	413	:	1 857	n.a.	39
Moldova	:	:	:	:	251	433	386	221	:	1 291	n.a.	27
Russia	:	:	:	:	143	177	161	111	:	592	n.a.	12
Georgia	:	:	:	:	30	59	120	78	:	287	n.a.	6.0
Belarus	:	:	:	:	48	69	46	50	:	213	n.a.	4.4
Afghanistan	:	:	:	:	38	42	15	32	:	127	n.a.	2.6
Somalia	:	:	:	:	9	17	28	25	:	79	n.a.	1.6
Armenia	:	:	:	:	5	23	10	11	:	49	n.a.	1.0
Pakistan	:	:	:	:	4	4	3	5	:	16	n.a.	0.3
Romania	:	:	:	:	0	3	5	7	:	15	n.a.	0.3
Other	:	:	:	:	65	78	96	31	:	270	n.a.	5.6
Total	:	:	:	:	1 008	1 466	1 338	984	:	4 796	n.a.	100

Table A2: ILLEGAL BORDER-CROSSING AT BCPs

Detections by top ten nationalities

	2009				2010				2009	2010	% change on year ago	per cent of total
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4				
Top Ten Nationalities For EU Countries												
Ukraine	27	28	36	37	21	23	21	27	128	92	-28	75
Belarus	0	1	1	2	3	1	4	2	4	10	150	8.1
Georgia	0	3	0	0	3	0	2	3	3	8	167	6.5
Moldova	22	5	12	8	1	0	5	0	47	6	-87	4.9
Russia	3	0	2	2	1	0	1	2	7	4	-43	3.3
China	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	n.a.	0.8
Armenia	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	n.a.	0.8
Iran	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	n.a.	0.8
Not specified	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	n.a.	0
Turkey	11	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	11	0	n.a.	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	n.a.	0
Total	63	37	51	50	30	25	33	35	201	123	-39	100
% in total EU LAND	45%	47%	32%	44%	29%	32%	15%	39%	41%	25%		
% in total EU	30%	28%	24%	22%	23%	20%	14%	28%	26%	20%		

Top Ten Nationalities For Non-EU Countries												
Ukraine	:	:	:	:	221	289	368	274	:	1 152	n.a.	53
Moldova	:	:	:	:	78	95	87	78	:	338	n.a.	16
Russia	:	:	:	:	36	37	81	31	:	185	n.a.	8.5
Tajikistan	:	:	:	:	26	18	42	32	:	118	n.a.	5.4
Kyrgyzstan	:	:	:	:	8	23	33	35	:	99	n.a.	4.6
Belarus	:	:	:	:	7	14	20	18	:	59	n.a.	2.7
Not specified	:	:	:	:	4	11	20	13	:	48	n.a.	2.2
Kazakhstan	:	:	:	:	2	3	2	5	:	12	n.a.	0.6
Turkey	:	:	:	:	3	1	2	5	:	11	n.a.	0.5
Poland	:	:	:	:	4	2	2	3	:	11	n.a.	0.5
Other	:	:	:	:	34	39	34	27	:	134	n.a.	6.2
Total	:	:	:	:	423	532	691	521	:	2 167	n.a.	100

Table A3: FACILITATORS

Detections by top ten nationalities

	2009				2010				2009	2010	% change on year ago	per cent of total
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4				
Top Ten Nationalities For EU Countries												
Romania	8	5	1	2	0	2	3	49	16	54	238	36
Ukraine	1	1	5	9	8	5	8	5	16	26	63	17
Moldova	1	0	0	1	3	2	1	11	2	17	750	11
Poland	1	14	5	7	3	0	9	3	27	15	-44	10
Russia	0	4	0	2	0	2	3	4	6	9	50	6.0
Lithuania	0	0	4	9	1	3	0	4	13	8	-38	5.4
Belarus	0	1	0	0	1	0	2	1	1	4	300	2.7
Armenia	0	1	0	2	3	0	0	0	3	3	0	2.0
Afghanistan	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	3	n.a.	2.0
Congo (DR)	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0.7
Other	9	4	17	13	1	0	3	5	43	9	-79	6.0
Total	20	30	33	45	20	14	32	83	128	149	16	100
% in total EU LAND	9.3%	11%	8.0%	17%	7.6%	5.1%	9.2%	29%	11%	13%		
% in total EU	0.9%	1.3%	1.4%	2.1%	0.8%	0.6%	1.5%	4.8%	1.4%	1.7%		

Top Ten Nationalities For Non-EU Countries												
Ukraine	:	:	:	:	13	27	16	10	:	66	n.a.	57
Russia	:	:	:	:	4	7	1	3	:	15	n.a.	13
Moldova	:	:	:	:	3	4	4	1	:	12	n.a.	10
Afghanistan	:	:	:	:	1	0	3	0	:	4	n.a.	3.5
Lithuania	:	:	:	:	0	0	0	2	:	2	n.a.	1.7
Georgia	:	:	:	:	0	0	1	1	:	2	n.a.	1.7
Armenia	:	:	:	:	0	0	2	0	:	2	n.a.	1.7
Netherlands	:	:	:	:	1	1	0	0	:	2	n.a.	1.7
Poland	:	:	:	:	1	0	0	0	:	1	n.a.	0.9
Not specified	:	:	:	:	0	0	1	0	:	1	n.a.	0.9
Other	:	:	:	:	6	1	1	0	:	8	n.a.	7.0
Total	:	:	:	:	29	40	29	17	:	115	n.a.	100

Table A4: ILLEGAL STAY

Detections by top ten nationalities

	2009				2010				2009	2010	% change on year ago	per cent of total
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4				
Top Ten Nationalities For EU Countries												
Russia	185	145	399	205	284	364	576	299	934	1 523	63	46
Ukraine	384	173	229	159	117	127	193	298	945	735	-22	22
Belarus	78	53	123	138	105	131	267	137	392	640	63	19
Moldova	97	54	72	21	48	49	54	57	244	208	-15	6.3
Kazakhstan	21	18	21	27	6	13	27	34	87	80	-8.0	2.4
Kyrgyzstan	8	13	9	12	9	8	8	27	42	52	24	1.6
Uzbekistan	3	1	3	4	2	7	1	5	11	15	36	0.5
Tajikistan	3	1	2	4	1	2	2	7	10	12	20	0.4
Armenia	0	2	6	1	1	3	2	6	9	12	33	0.4
Israel	2	1	1	1	7	0	0	2	5	9	80	0.3
Other	9	15	12	2	3	5	6	6	38	20	-47	0.6
Total	790	476	877	574	583	709	1 136	878	2 717	3 306	22	100
% in total EU LAND	55%	39%	39%	40%	46%	47%	50%	45%	43%	47%		
% in total EU	0.7%	0.4%	0.8%	0.6%	0.7%	0.8%	1.3%	1.0%	0.7%	0.9%		

Top Ten Nationalities For Non-EU Countries

Georgia	:	:	:	:	892	1 432	1 305	2 480	:	6 109	n.a.	21
Russia	:	:	:	:	735	761	1 407	892	:	3 795	n.a.	13
Ukraine	:	:	:	:	363	970	1 144	1 018	:	3 495	n.a.	12
Moldova	:	:	:	:	743	762	942	901	:	3 348	n.a.	12
Azerbaijan	:	:	:	:	268	319	381	399	:	1 367	n.a.	4.7
Armenia	:	:	:	:	238	228	361	473	:	1 300	n.a.	4.5
Uzbekistan	:	:	:	:	232	197	393	442	:	1 264	n.a.	4.4
Lithuania	:	:	:	:	156	191	249	218	:	814	n.a.	2.8
China	:	:	:	:	143	161	124	295	:	723	n.a.	2.5
Turkey	:	:	:	:	188	151	179	190	:	708	n.a.	2.4
Other	:	:	:	Other	1 209	1 279	1 990	1 552	:	6 030	n.a.	21
Total	:	:	:	:	5 167	6 451	8 475	8 860	:	28 953	n.a.	100

Table A5: REFUSALS OF ENTRY

Detections by top ten nationalities

	2009				2010				2009	2010	% change on year ago	per cent of total
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4				
Top Ten Nationalities For EU Countries												
Ukraine	4 427	3 728	5 026	4 404	4 805	4 321	4 587	3 623	17 585	17 336	-1.4	51
Russia	1 181	1 074	1 699	1 708	1 144	1 291	1 827	1 708	5 662	5 970	5.4	18
Belarus	1 403	1 090	1 066	1 263	1 164	1 401	1 409	1 566	4 822	5 540	15	16
Georgia	10	466	4 435	852	595	622	663	1 151	5 763	3 031	-47	8.9
Moldova	492	334	376	358	378	333	368	326	1 560	1 405	-9.9	4.1
Kazakhstan	20	27	30	15	21	30	24	48	92	123	34	0.4
Armenia	14	16	126	88	11	23	19	68	244	121	-50	0.4
Kyrgyzstan	6	10	16	21	12	32	16	36	53	96	81	0.3
Uzbekistan	4	3	22	9	4	13	12	20	38	49	29	0.1
Not specified	7	10	23	13	13	5	7	20	53	45	-15	0.1
Other	91	91	99	116	73	75	101	74	397	323	-19	0.9
Total	7 655	6 849	12 918	8 847	8 220	8 146	9 033	8 640	36 269	34 039	-6.1	100
% in total EU LAND	68%	64%	70%	72%	64%	64%	61%	64%	69%	63%		
% in total EU	29%	26%	38%	34%	31%	32%	32%	31%	32%	31%		


Top Ten Nationalities For Non-EU Countries

Moldova	:	:	:	:	1 731	2 301	2 093	1 672	:	7 797	n.a.	21
Uzbekistan	:	:	:	:	1 946	1 462	1 735	1 080	:	6 223	n.a.	17
Lithuania	:	:	:	:	456	722	649	645	:	2 472	n.a.	6.6
Tajikistan	:	:	:	:	675	370	594	448	:	2 087	n.a.	5.6
Russia	:	:	:	:	287	319	716	360	:	1 682	n.a.	4.5
Azerbaijan	:	:	:	:	487	416	386	354	:	1 643	n.a.	4.4
Georgia	:	:	:	:	389	492	326	430	:	1 637	n.a.	4.4
Armenia	:	:	:	:	446	393	386	321	:	1 546	n.a.	4.1
Ukraine	:	:	:	:	206	439	448	394	:	1 487	n.a.	4.0
Kyrgyzstan	:	:	:	:	195	228	488	535	:	1 446	n.a.	3.9
Other	:	:	:	:	1 786	2 422	3 052	2 244	:	9 504	n.a.	25
Total	:	:	:	:	8 604	9 564	10 873	8 483	:	37 524	n.a.	100

Table A6: PERSONS USING FALSE DOCUMENTS

Detections by top ten nationalities

	2009				2010				2009	2010	% change on year ago	per cent of total
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4				
Top Ten Nationalities For EU Countries												
Ukraine	155	59	118	107	198	216	258	162	439	834	90	77
Russia	10	12	12	11	13	15	20	14	45	62	38	5.7
Moldova	15	23	23	16	25	7	5	12	77	49	-36	4.5
Belarus	3	2	1	4	4	11	7	25	10	47	370	4.3
Georgia	0	2	4	0	6	4	1	1	6	12	100	1.1
Turkey	4	2	4	0	4	0	5	2	10	11	10	1.0
Armenia	1	0	1	0	2	5	1	1	2	9	350	0.8
China	0	4	6	5	4	4	0	0	15	8	-47	0.7
Congo	4	1	0	1	0	2	1	1	6	4	-33	0.4
Egypt	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	2	1	4	300	0.4
Other	16	19	12	19	8	11	16	8	66	43	-35	4.0
Total	208	125	181	163	264	276	315	228	677	1 083	60	100
<i>% in total EU LAND</i>	<i>74%</i>	<i>51%</i>	<i>53%</i>	<i>54%</i>	<i>60%</i>	<i>57%</i>	<i>66%</i>	<i>69%</i>	<i>58%</i>	<i>62%</i>		
<i>% in total EU</i>	<i>10%</i>	<i>6.5%</i>	<i>9.2%</i>	<i>8.6%</i>	<i>12%</i>	<i>12%</i>	<i>13%</i>	<i>8.6%</i>	<i>8.6%</i>	<i>11%</i>		
Top Ten Nationalities For Non-EU Countries												
Ukraine	:	:	:	:	50	71	73	64	:	258	<i>n.a.</i>	57
Moldova	:	:	:	:	30	15	23	13	:	81	<i>n.a.</i>	18
Syria	:	:	:	:	0	0	1	19	:	20	<i>n.a.</i>	4.4
Georgia	:	:	:	:	7	4	5	2	:	18	<i>n.a.</i>	4.0
Russia	:	:	:	:	5	2	6	2	:	15	<i>n.a.</i>	3.3
Turkey	:	:	:	:	5	1	1	3	:	10	<i>n.a.</i>	2.2
Azerbaijan	:	:	:	:	2	1	3	2	:	8	<i>n.a.</i>	1.8
Uzbekistan	:	:	:	:	3	1	0	1	:	5	<i>n.a.</i>	1.1
Iraq	:	:	:	:	5	0	0	0	:	5	<i>n.a.</i>	1.1
Iran	:	:	:	:	1	1	1	1	:	4	<i>n.a.</i>	0.9
Other	:	:	:	:	6	10	9	6	:	31	<i>n.a.</i>	6.8
Total	:	:	:	:	114	106	122	113	:	455	<i>n.a.</i>	100



FRONTEX

LIBERTAS SECURITAS JUSTITIA

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at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union

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