



ISSUE **25** LIBRARY
POLITICS OF
SOUTHERN EUROPE

*European
Community
Studies*

for teachers and students

Published under the auspices of the
Centre for Contemporary European Studies, University of Sussex

in association with the
Commission of the European Communities, London office



The Politics of Southern Europe

Spain, Portugal, Greece, Italy and the EEC

The area rather loosely called 'Southern Europe' or 'Mediterranean Europe' has recently become one of the most mutable parts of the European continent. Broadly, Southern Europe includes Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece, that is, the countries peripheral to the European industrial heartland, but there is no clear agreement on its limits.

The interest in Southern Europe centres principally on two things. Firstly, by Western European standards there are very few democracies in the world – probably only about twenty-eight – and of these, seventeen or so are in Western Europe. Any move away from authoritarian regimes towards more open or pluralistic regimes in countries on the fringe of Western Europe is therefore of great importance. Secondly, because the EEC is a powerful economic grouping which admits new members, it has a magnetism for Southern Europe – most notably Spain, Portugal, and Greece – and this puts the Community in a unique strategic and diplomatic position.

Economic similarity

Unity is often imposed on Southern Europe externally, for example by the EEC and by NATO, but there are some important features that the countries have in common. All are dependent economically on their northern neighbours, they all export workers to the north, they bring in tourists, and they import investment from the north. Exports from Southern Europe tend to be similar and mainly agricultural; oranges, tobacco, wine, tomato paste, etc. All the Southern European countries have benefited from the general world economic boom since the Second World War and have increased their *per capita* gross national product (GNP) substantially. The growth rates from 1960-1973 have been: for Spain, 5.8%; for Portugal, 5.4%; for Greece, 7.2%; for Italy, 4.4%. (These compare well with Britain's 2.3%.) Productivity in the manufacturing sector has been much higher than in other sectors and this has profoundly transformed these countries, although they still all have a lower *per capita* income than Britain. In all these states the drift from the land is such that now fewer people are employed in agriculture than ever before and they are beginning to reach Western European levels of prosperity. This trend has encouraged more open and less rigid structures in society and may have influenced the move towards democratisation. It has certainly raised the standard of living of the majority, a feature which has resulted not only in increased expectations, but also in increased relative disparities between income groups.

Political Structure

Southern Europe has been, in a broad sense, politically conservative since the war, and although the *status quo* is more robust than it appears at first sight the forces making for change are strong. In political terms the Southern European countries appear to be unstable, threatened by extremist factions and by the left, or with only a very loose grip on constitutional government.

This is partly explained by a general human attribute – the tendency for people to become less satisfied with a given social set-up as time passes, especially if it moves out of line with societies close by.

Though there is a marked difference between the political structures of the countries of Southern Europe (in some there are no legal parties while in others there is a long tradition of open political democracy) one of the most spectacular factors, and one of the most difficult for Northern Europeans to comprehend, has been the general re-emergence of the communists into open politics. The exact significance of this development is a subject of some debate, and varies from country to country. In Portugal it meant, on November 25th 1975, a defeat for the old-fashioned Leninism which has been the basis of most communist strategy since the war. The disciplined hierarchical organisation with an elite at the top telling the mass at the bottom what to do, has crumbled. This is particularly so in Italy.

In Spain, the communist party is very similar to the Italian communist party and insists on the maintenance of human rights, freedom of speech, assembly and private property – the so-called 'bourgeois' freedoms – for its own vulnerability is such that it cannot afford to offend the norms of the Western European democratic tradition. A feature of communist parties in Southern Europe is their poor showing in authoritarian, post-civil war states such as Spain, Portugal and, to a lesser extent, Greece. The collapse of the Colonels in Greece did not mean the triumph of the left – let alone the communists – but the victory of the de Gaulle-like figure of Karamanlis. Greece thus re-affirmed the monopoly of the right/centre right, which has been a feature of Greek politics for the last half century.

In Spain, Portugal and Greece, although flamboyantly evident, the communists are in fact weak. The situation is different in Italy, where the communists (PCI) are a major force largely because the Italian political system faces two intractable problems. One is the collapse of the state as a modern organisation, for Italy is an advanced country heavily influenced by an under-developed south, a situation which ultimately stems from the lack of success of the northern Italians in setting up an effective centralised administration. The second problem results from the collapse of the Christian Democrats (CD) as one of the main anti-communist forces, a fact in part due to its failure to meet the needs of the

urban population for social justice and efficiency in government and administration. With the Italian political system thus disintegrating internally the PCI appears a relatively effective administrative party. Fundamentally the Italian crisis is one of political civilisation within Italy and the adaptation of the PCI to Western European norms is essentially a problem for Italy, though it affects foreign affairs.

It should also be noted that for many centuries now Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece have been used to seeing major decisions affecting their economy, society, and politics being taken elsewhere (in the USA, Germany, the UK or the EEC). In political terms these societies are reactive and expect to be buffeted and moved by the major industrial and social forces of the outside world. The idea of total control of the political and economic environment is not one which is normal in Southern Europe.

Strategy

In strategic terms it is difficult to separate Southern Europe from the Mediterranean as a whole. The security of pro-Western countries is based on the NATO alliance and even France, which is not in the NATO organisation, cooperates with the USA in the Mediterranean. But the possible increase of communist influence may present problems, particularly in Italy (which guards NATO's southern flank), though the PCI has commented that when Italy has communists in government 'that will be time when it needs NATO most'.

In the Mediterranean naval power is, of course, vital, as any contemplated invasion or disruption would depend on naval superiority. Since 1964 there has been an entry of the Soviet fleet into the Mediterranean and this fact has added to super-power rivalry in the area. However, although the Soviet Navy has a considerable presence in the Middle East and Mediterranean, it needs local bases and supplies, both of which (as the recent capricious eviction of the Soviet Navy from Egypt has shown) are very vulnerable. The Soviets cannot expect the kind of help the Americans received to boost Israel in the 1973 crisis in the Middle East.

Southern Europe is an area where detente and the relaxation of tension between the two super-powers can generate difficulties. The possibility of a direct super-power confrontation is remote and the stable balance has allowed national conflicts (e.g. between NATO allies Greece and Turkey) and social problems to become more salient. The movement of super-power conflict away from central fronts and out of direct confrontation can be said to have transferred 'competition' to the peripheries and has thus increased the danger of conflict in Southern Europe.

In Southern Europe there is no really distinct NATO strategy although a flexible American presence acts as a substitute for alliance strategy, despite an un-coordinated military policy and disagreements amongst the allies. This multilateral alliance structure is incapable of imposing a policy in Southern Europe and the political and economic institutions are weak; no attempt has been made to use NATO in the Greek/Turkish disputes.

The US relationship with Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece is changing. Portugal has experienced a revolution; in Italy the PCI seem ready for government; Greece has suspended its participation in NATO and Spain is changing regimes. In the wider

Mediterranean, Malta is politically turbulent, Cyprus is divided, and Turkey is intensifying relations with the USSR and Arab countries. NATO's bi-lateral framework of American relationships with Southern Europe has seen an increasing concentration of power in US hands. The military situation is also deteriorating as new problems arise in the Mediterranean. These include the oil problem, fishing and offshore rights, nuclear proliferation, and social problems affecting military stability (budgetary shortcomings, internal strife, ordinary soldier's political affiliations, etc.). Stability and security, both internal and international, no longer seem to be guaranteed in the area.

Another aspect of strategy in Southern Europe is the problem of the delegation of initiative, either to the USA or to Europe. The USA has the intervention capabilities, internal cohesion, and a global outlook. Bilateral negotiations, however, mean that the Americans can arrive at contradictory decisions and that they do not have efficient instruments to cope with an overall Mediterranean crisis as well as maintaining East-West balances of power. What is happening is that the US is yielding to ever more demanding requests (e.g. on nuclear reactors for Spain) and seeing its freedom of action limited.

The alternative possibility is of delegation of initiative to the Europeans, but they lack the instruments for effective military intervention, although the economic instruments at the EEC's disposal are important. The most relevant European answer to the Mediterranean crisis is the possibility of offering a new stable framework of international relations in which the Southern European countries could find their place, through the processes of association and integration. This has worked already in Italy, Portugal and Greece.

The EEC in Southern Europe

The dominance of the super-powers has led the Southern Europeans to seek alternative political structures. The EEC emerges as a natural focus – an organisation to which they can aspire and where as members they can get first class citizenship. Because the EEC figures as an organisation that they can possibly join, the Community has an influence on internal politics. Thus in Portugal the EEC put conditions on loans in a way that the super-powers could not have done.

In Italy, the PCI tends to insist on the importance of the development of the EEC in a democratic direction and on the need to bring European points of view (on subjects varying from strategy to multinationals) to bear on the USA. There is a divergence of the PCI's attitudes from the old-fashioned communist parties and the Italian communists are in some ways quite close to the founding fathers of the EEC. The chance of political success gives the Italian and Spanish communists a greater interest in being unorthodox communists within an EEC – Western European context than if they were operating in Eastern Europe, where the Russian presence would force them to behave in a more traditional manner. One cloud on the horizon is that the close links between the Italians and the Yugoslavs may mean that if there were a major crisis in Yugoslavia (there has been a *remise en ordre* by Tito but the crisis is still potential) and that if this upheaval were exploited by the USSR to bring Yugoslavia into the Russian sphere, then it would be severely disruptive over a wide range of European interests.

Compared with Italy, Iberia is at the other end of the political spectrum, but the EEC has exerted considerable influence there of late. In Portugal the EEC's influence was seen through a clear statement (in July 1975) that the funds being sought by the Portuguese were dependent on a Western European style democratic outcome to the revolution. This was not, of course, the dominant factor in the outcome of the events of summer 1975, for more was done through the Social Democratic parties than through European politics. Nevertheless, the EEC

was able to make statements about internal politics that neither super-power could have done. In Spain, the desire for West European approval and EEC membership is much more public and it is almost official policy that the Spanish government tailor their regime to fit it for EEC entry.

The EEC, whatever its many weaknesses, has a rôle thrust upon it and the belief that it might be possible to join at sometime in the future is pervasive in Greece, Spain and Portugal.

COMPARATIVE DATA

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J
Portugal	9.01	93	12	9.6	29.9	92	49	67	98	7
Spain	35.5	69	31	38	27.6	151	132	94	134	8
Italy	55.36	182	27	59.9	18.2	188	191	228	182	16
Greece	8.96	68	29	9.7	35.7	137	11	25	162	11
UK	56.2	230	58	58.1	3	289	298	234	129	12

A - Population in millions

B - Population density/sq.km

C - % in cities over 100,000

D - Projected population (millions) 1985

E - % of labour force in Agriculture

F - Telephones per '000 of population

G - TV per '000 of population

H - Private cars per '000 of population

I - Doctors per 100,000 of population

J - % of 20-24 year olds in Higher Education

Source: Eurostat 1973/4 - Bartholomew Warne Atlas of Europe 1974

Iberia

Though Spain and Portugal are often bracketed together there is some doubt as to how far similarities really extend, for despite superficial historical resemblances, differences often outweigh similarities. Nevertheless, the two states of the peninsula both suffered considerable economic backwardness relative to the rest of Europe and until very recently they both experienced the most old-fashioned (quasi-fascist) regimes in the West. Portugal and Spain also both endured personal dictatorships instituted in the inter-war period, regimes totally out of line with the general European political experience since 1945. Spain was ruled by General Franco whose side had won the internally disruptive Spanish Civil War in 1939, and Portugal was ruled by the dictator Salazar who, like Franco, had fascist support.

Portugal

Summary of political developments

In Portugal the political problem amounts to the fact that the military coup d'état which overthrew the dictatorship of Dr. Caetano (Salazar's successor) on April 25th 1974 effectively destroyed the discredited old regime but did not usher in any successor. Throughout the 1960's the Salazar government tried to maintain a hold over its African colonies, despite general decolonisation by other European powers, the increasing military support for local guerilla movements, and the enormous drain on the country's limited resources. This situation led to the formation of the armed forces movement (MFA), a group of officers who came to see the war as ultimately unwinnable but who could see no prospect of an end to the fight if the Salazar regime continued in power. This conclusion was not particularly perspicacious as the war was so obviously impossible to win and hence the MFA originally included officers of different political persuasions, many of whom were conservative, united only in their opposition to the 'unwinnable' war. The titular head of the April 25th coup d'état was

General Spínola, who had written a book about the Portuguese colonial wars implying that the government's strategy was misguided. The Caetano government permitted the publication of the book, probably to test public opinion, but in so doing they misjudged the extent and depth of the opposition, particularly within the army. Spínola's book became a detonator for political events and he thus became an obvious leader for the first government of the military coup that he had - probably unwittingly - inspired.

Spínola's supporters were moderates who wanted a negotiation of some sort of African colonial independence and who at home wanted to reform the system into a conservative democracy. However, Spínola ran into the opposition of the Communist Party and the socialists who, working together, encouraged certain MFA officers to block his path. At that time the programme of the MFA was of a Western 'democratic' sort and one of the milestones on the road to Spínola's fall was the installation of Vasco Gonçalves as Prime Minister.

It was this move which put a radical at the heart of the country's affairs and blocked the appeal to any silent majority that Spínola might have hoped to call on. Radicalisation proceeded apace after the April 1975 elections and reached its high spot in the summer of that year before tapering off, following communist inspired events (described below) and an attempted radical take-over on November 25th 1975.

The revolution which overthrew the old regime also changed land and property distribution. During the events of the summer of 1975 the agricultural workers seized some of the land they worked on the great plain, Alentejo, south of Lisbon. These were big latifundia (estates), often out of production, where cooperatives, run by the Portuguese Communist Party, replaced landowners. The six great banks which dominated the economy of the country were nationalised and the state now owns almost all the important sectors of the economy. This does not mean a modern social democracy (a mixed economy with government-directed industry playing a big rôle) because the state apparatus contains many people elevated as a result of Salazar's political appointments, leaving the administration weak and under-trained. From the top there is little direction, government interference, or policy. However, now that the 1976 municipal and Presidential elections are over, effective, if unpopular, action can be taken providing the political will exists.

The Regions and Social Structure

Since the turmoils of summer 1974, political developments have been rapid, but whoever is in power has to deal with certain intractable economic problems. The country has a population of 9,014,000 (including one million in Lisbon) with two million immigrants, an illiteracy rate of between 30 and 40% (inland it may reach 70%), 2,300,000 unemployed, an active working population of 36.5% of the total population (of which about one-third are in agriculture, 32% in industry and 36% in tertiary employment), a *per capita* income of \$780, a huge trade deficit, and a steeply increasing cost-of-living. The whole Portuguese economy is heavily dependent on the outside world (particularly West Germany and Britain), exporting textiles, wood pulp and fish.

Portugal is a small and homogeneous country but there are important regional differences, the principal one being the north/south split. The north is Catholic, the south is dechristianised and has been so for a very long time – i.e. the people are neither baptised, confirmed, nor married in church. There is a system of strip agriculture in the north, producing diverse, yet small quantities of crops, with such backward methods as the Roman hoe and oxen. In the south, wheat and cork trees are farmed extensively, though not intensively as in southern Italy. In the south the economy only gives partial employment every year and the inefficiency of agriculture means that Portugal imports such staples as flour and sugar. Nevertheless over a third of the people still work the land, and live in country where there is no access by roads. By all indicators, therefore, Portugal is the most backward state in Western Europe.

Political Groups

There are four broad political groups in Portugal; the socialists, the communists, the leftists and the

right/centre. The Portuguese Socialist Party (the PSP) emerged in 1972 and gets the bulk of its support from the middle-classes in the industrial centres of Lisbon, Oporto, Faro, and Marinha Grande, though it has working-class support as well. The PSP has been in favour of planned economic control of the main sectors of the economy through state approval of all investment. It has supported the public ownership of land, public investment programmes, anti-trust legislation, and has condemned attacks on freedom of expression.

The Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) was founded in 1921 and survived clandestinely despite vigorous persecution. It has large working-class and trade union support and a big party organisation with a party press. PCP tactics seem to have been to try to share power by backing the provisional government and to build up its support for elections, but it refused to enter into a debate with the PSP in the early revolution.

There is a whole plethora of leftist groups, but the other main political force is the PPD, a liberal-centrist party which has acted as a hold-all party for the conservative and non-socialist voters. The PPD has distinct regional differences, especially in the north, where it tends to be a Catholic-conservative party and where it gets its biggest vote.

Portugal since the Coup

Since the revolution (1974 until 1976) Portugal has lived through uninterrupted chaos with various factions fighting for control of the MFA as the economy collapsed. There have been two military presidents and six successive cabinets while outside forces have competed with each other to try to influence the course of events within the country.

On May 15th the first provisional government was formed by Spínola, with a liberal as Premier and a cabinet including several socialists, two communists, and other 'personalities'. However, by late autumn 1974 deterioration had started, with the communists and their close allies taking over municipal councils (simply because they were the only organised force) and then taking over Intersindical, the newly created Labour confederation. The PCP was also infiltrating the press, radio, and TV. Parallel to this the Armed Forces Assembly (240 officers) had begun to usurp cabinet power and this body too became vociferously radical. All over Portugal chaotic acts of *de facto* nationalisation by the government and worker's commissions began to take place. On the last day of September 1974 Spínola resigned the Presidency and he was replaced by General Costa Gomes (nominated by the Armed Forces) with Vasco Gonçalves as Premier.

On March 11th 1975, Spínola participated in an attempted coup of obscure design and he was forced to flee from Portugal after its failure.¹ The coup led to an enormous increase of influence by the left and the communists, but the MFA assumed overall control of politicians, setting up a Supreme Council of the revolution, which effectively became the leadership. This new council did not halt the elections, which were held to schedule on April 25th 1975.

Within a matter of days after the election there was a new crisis when the MFA allowed the communists to take-over the pro-socialist newspaper

¹ Spínola was allowed to return in August 1976.

Republica. *Republica*'s seizure raised issues about the freedom of the press in Portugal but the efforts of the socialists to get the paper returned to the owners met with initial failure. The event highlighted the fact that Portugal, with numerous opposition papers of all persuasions except fascist, whilst not a left dictatorship, was still not a complete democracy.

July 1975 saw the most serious political crisis since the Spínola coup, with the resignation of the socialist leader Soares over the *Republica* affair (still in dispute) and Premier Vasco Gonçalves announcing that the MFA would rule indefinitely, excluding intermediaries such as political parties. Soares concluded, in a note to Gomes, that the communists were 'trying to conquer power by undemocratic means' despite electoral defeat. The socialists started their war against the communists and later in summer 1975 the communist leader Cunhal concluded that his moment to bid for power had arrived. The communists started lining up their supporters in the armed forces and unions ready for a take-over. As the crisis developed Vasco Gonçalves refused to resign, Antunes (the last moderate in the cabinet) was dismissed, and the government virtually ceased to function. The socialists could at this time have paralysed the country with strikes

and the communists were in no position to carry out a coup; meanwhile the moderate officers were rallying around Antunes. With communist influence in the unions waning and with attacks on their offices in the north starting, Cunhal decided to try a coup. This was beaten off and the communists put on the defensive. Shortly afterwards Gonçalves was forced to resign and in mid-September a new cabinet was sworn in with seats distributed on the basis of the April percentage vote. (See Table I.)

The revolution itself produced two leaders in Soares and Major Antunes. Cunhal turned out to be vastly overrated whilst Costa Gomes emerges from the history of both the Salazar years and the years since the coup as a master politician, as does the new President Eanes, who, although still largely unknown, may prove to be a very tough figure.

Portugal after the 1976 elections faces the task of rebuilding the country on the basis of a socialist government, led by Soares, which just failed to get an overall majority in parliament. However, severe economic problems remain unsolved and it may be doubted whether the government can tackle them. Furthermore, the nature of the new Portuguese regime is not fully established; it may become a Presidential regime under the figure of Eanes or something even less democratic.

Brief political chronology

1968	September	- Salazar (dictator) suffers incapacitating stroke. - Dr. Marcello Caetano nominated 'acting' Prime Minister.
1970	July	- Salazar dies.
1973	October	- Rumbling discontent. Threat of mass resignation by officers in army.
1974	February	- General Spínola's book <i>Portugal and the Future</i> is circulated.
	April	- Army coup d'état. Caetano deposed.
	May	- Liberal/centrist party (PPD) formed.
	September	- Spínola critical of direction of revolution.
1975	March	- Attempted counter-coup. Spínola and his supporters flee Portugal.
	April	- Elections: Socialist 38%, PPD 28%, PCP 13%, Social Democratic Centre 8%, PDP 5%.
	May	- Typographers (PCP backed) prevent printing of <i>Republica</i> . Socialists leave government.
	June	- Cunhal (PCP leader) states: "There will be no Parliament in this country."
	August	- Northern peasants attack PCP offices.
	September	- Gonçalves (an ex P.M.) becomes head of state.
	October	- Balance of payments deficit (Jan-Sept.) is \$2.9 milliard Francs.
	December	- MFA dissolved as military recognises civilian supremacy.
1976	April	- Second legislative elections (Table I)
	June	- Eanes elected president (Table II)
	November	- Split in the Socialist Party. Soares leadership challenged.

Table I

Portugal 1976 Legislative elections

	Vote	%	Deputies
Socialist	1,887,180	34.97	106
Popular Democratic	1,296,432	24.03	71
Social Democratic Centre	858,432	15.91	41
Communist	785,620	14.56	40
Popular Democratic Union	91,383	1.69	1
Popular Socialist Front	41,954	0.78	
Movement for the reorganisation of the Party of the Parliament	36,237	0.67	
Leftist Socialist movement	31,065	0.58	
Christian Democratic	28,226	0.52	
Monarchist	28,163	0.52	
International Communist League	16,235	0.30	
Portuguese Communist			
Marxist-Leninist	15,801	0.29	
Workers	15,671	0.29	
Revolutionary Workers	5,182	0.10	

Table II

Portuguese Presidential Elections June 1976

(No Party) General António Eanes	61.5%
(Far left) Otelo de Carvalho	16.5%
(Prime Minister) José Pinheiro de Azevedo	14.4%
(Communist) Octávio Pato	7.6%

Spain

Spain, as the tourist advertisements used to say, 'is different'. It is certainly one of the least understood of modern European states. Unlike Portugal, the possibility of a civil war seems remote. There is no colonial conflict because Spain has managed to divest itself of its one outstanding colony (the Spanish Sahara) and the army itself, unlike the Portuguese army, will not be the power base for any faction unless the internal situation gets wildly out of hand. The government in Spain has evidently determined to move slowly and carefully, steering between the extreme right (who are not demoralised in Spain as they are in the rest of Western Europe) and the left opposition forces, who believe that their hour has come and who want to see definite evidence of reform. The dangers are that the government will either end up by steering into one of these rocks or by being crushed between them, though it has so far shown great resolution.

Contemporary Spain

Recent political developments in Spain have come at a time of rapid economic development. In 1940 Spain's *per capita* income was about \$200 per year, but Spain is now in the top ten of the industrial league and *per capita* incomes are approaching \$1,500 per year. Spain has participated in the general Western boom; in 1973 tourism brought in \$2,386m, \$1,718m in remittances came from overseas workers and some \$852m entered Spain as investment, which cash flow overcame the trade deficit of \$2,939m. Exports were transformed in kind and quantity through the '50s and '60s by participation in the boom, rather than by Franco or his regime, which simply presided over the operation. Political behaviour in Spain may also have become more similar to Western European norms owing to a social structure which has been transformed since the Civil War. There is now a new managerial middle-class which views the EEC as a means of development, and a working-class which seems to be conscious that the achievement of full democratic rights, rather than violent transformation, is the important aim. Since Franco's death there has been an awareness of the lack of legitimacy of the regime. Franco did have a certain sort of charismatic power but there is now a recognition of the impossibility of using the Franco institutions indefinitely. There is a growing pressure for democracy, evidenced by the waves of strikes which lost the country eight million working days in the first two and a half months of 1976 (more than in 1974 and 1975 together and including as many as 700,000 people at a time). Spain in many respects seems to be ripe for democracy and all forces except the extreme left and right are aware of this fact.

One of Spain's most developed institutions is the army, about which it is difficult to get accurate information, but its dominant characteristic seems to be the view of itself as a strictly professional body (unlike the Portuguese army) and this may mean a predisposition towards non-intervention in politics.

Franco's Spain

Franco's Spain, whilst undemocratic, was not a fully grown fascist political system but an authoritarian regime, insofar as power was based on the apathy of the masses and not on their mobilisation as under the fascist model. Franco counted on the support of the traditional rulers and had to adjust to their interests. There was a modicum of pluralism and opposition, but no parties and no open political groups. Demands were put through a vast number of pressure groups, from the army, to

the Church, the Chamber of Commerce, and Falange.¹

If the Franco regime was a balancing of interests among the conservative supports of the system it was also directionless and a regime in which Franco had the final say: crucial decisions were taken on obscure, if not capricious, bases. There was, for example, no clear determination to modernise the economy until the mid-1950s. Reluctance to change was very great, but eventually took place both because of US pressure and to ensure the regime's survival. Sometime after the 1951 wave of strikes, the Franco regime abandoned most of its early (proto-fascist) economic ideas and turned to orthodox public sector management, with an open economy and free market.

Political Forces on the Right

Spain is now faced with three forces. On the right, there are those (sometimes called, after Hitler's last supporters, 'the bunker') who want to return to right wing principles and, whilst they would be obliterated in any free elections, they are still strong within the institutions, notably the Cortes (the Parliament), the police, and the Commission of the Realm and hence could be capable of halting reform. The extreme right is willing to employ violence to provoke disorder and make Spain hesitate before democratising any further. Disorder in Spain would be far more damaging and bloody than in Portugal where there were no deaths during the April revolution. The Francoist die-hards would like to give the impression that democracy and stability are incompatible. The second force, represented by Arias Navarro, wishes to respect the Franco heritage, yet evolve. The third tendency is that shown by Ibarne and Arielza, who want controlled reform towards democracy. At present there is a tug-of-war between the right wing 'immobilists' and the conservative movement, the outcome of which will depend on a number of imponderables, mainly whether the government can keep its nerve and whether the terrorist incidents frighten people away from reforms. The Prime Minister, Sr. Suarez, was an admirer of Franco and a member of Falange but was associated with the February 1974 'liberalisation'.

Opposition in Spain

One of the paradoxical features of the left has been the presence of a 'moderate' Spanish Com-

¹ The Falange are the Fascist National Socialist, anti-capitalist, Spanish nationalists. They include the blueshirt veterans of the Spanish divisions who fought with the Germans on the Russian front. Associated with them are the right wing terrorist groups, such as the 'Warnors of Christ the King', who have been responsible for various attacks on left or opposition supporters and perhaps even bombings.

munist Party (PSE). The PSE has long been one of the least orthodox of European communist parties and it has often (at least since it became any kind of political presence) stood for moderate reform, the protection of human rights and the 'democratic bourgeois' freedoms. The leader of the PSE, Santiago Carrillo, is a skilful politician who has succeeded in bringing his party into friendly relations with 'bourgeois' liberals. The PSE heavily criticised Russia's subjection of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and has a strong foothold in the Workers' Commissions, the illegal trade unions.²

On the non-communist left the Spanish socialists are split into several branches although moves are in progress to unite them under one banner. The PSOE, the Socialist Labour Party, is affiliated to the Socialist International and is the largest of the socialist parties. However, for many years the PSOE was run by Spanish socialists in exile and the party atrophied, losing contact with the militants in Spain. Within the country the party is now less well organised and active than the communists. The PSOE are influential in white-collar and lower middle-class unions rather than in the manual working-class where the PSE predominates. There are also other socialist groups and regional socialist movements whose support is difficult to estimate, but probably the most important is *Confederacion Socialista*, the Popular Spanish Socialist Party of Tierno Galvan which is social democratic in tendency, but with a Marxist wing.

The exact support for the parties of the left is difficult to estimate in the absence of legal opinion polls but the probability is that the PSOE is the largest party on the left.³ There are also very large Christian Democrat opposition groups (led by Gil Robles) and liberal groups of indeterminate size. Some thirteen groups including all the opposition parties of the left and some Christian Democrats have now amalgamated to form the Alliance of Democratic Co-ordination, which has agreed on the necessity to bring in a liberal-democratic regime as soon as possible – though it has reached consensus on very little else.

Problems of Development

Spain also has severe regional problems, concentrated on Catalonia and the Basque country, but also appearing in the Canaries, Galicia and other areas. Probably some form of devolution will be introduced and the levelling out of regional inequalities may have lessened this problem since the 1930s. It is important to note that Spanish regionalism stems from the industrialisation and over-development of Catalonia and the Basque country *vis-à-vis* Madrid, not underdevelopment (i.e. the reverse of regional disequilibrium elsewhere in Europe). There is already an illegal Catalan Assembly in existence and Basque terrorists (ETA) have increased the political pressure in the north to such an extent that over-reaction by the central government would easily provoke a separatist backlash.

Of the other problems facing Spain, apart from liberalisation, one of the most pressing is that of fiscal reform. Spain is one of the least and most

inefficiently taxed countries in Europe. A measure of fiscal reform is needed to bring in more revenue to pay for welfare benefits and cushion the unemployment which will stem from recession. This is consistent with the belief held by many that the real threat to Spain comes not from the communists, or the Falangists, or from regional separatism, but from severe and lasting unemployment. Fiscal reform, too, will be a pre-requisite for Spanish entry into the EEC, a move which would expose Spain to the full competition of the most modern states in Europe. The restructuring of the Spanish bureaucracy will also be placed high on the list of the priorities of any new government.

One further unresolved problem is the possibility that workers will put a strain on the economy of Spain through increased wage demands. The rate of inflation was 22% for the first few months of 1976 and it has been suggested that the demands of the working-class will be such as to destroy any form of Spanish democracy. However, the left is well aware of this problem and the introduction of democracy in Spain would probably mean an effort on behalf of the opposition parties to gain consent for a wages policy, though this is not yet clear.

Conclusion

Spain of the 1970s has little in common with the Spain of the pre-war period. A new country, comparable to Italy after the war in 1944, with perhaps the qualification that it is slightly better placed economically, has aligned itself with Western European democracies. Regional demands still exist, but these (with the exception of ETA) are demands for more local autonomy rather than claims which are incompatible with the existence of the Spanish state itself, and these demands will probably not tear the state apart unless things go very wrong.

Juan Carlos has a difficult position as King of a state which expects rapid and visible changes but who is supported by groups who oppose change. A particularly acute problem for Juan Carlos is that the parties of the left in Spain have stated that they will not accept a partially democratic system in which the communists are not legal. Thus the King could easily scare that part of his support afraid of change if he legalises the PSE, although this is in turn a pre-requisite for the participation of the other parties in any democratic elections that Spain may hold in the future. Repression and tolerance have been the features of post-Franco policy so far, but the impatience of the country is demonstrated by the number of shootings – more since Franco's death than in the two years before.

Juan Carlos' second government was headed by a new Premier, Adolfo Suarez. Suarez was a young and relatively unknown man who in 1974 founded the Union of the Spanish People, a political association (not a political party, which would have been illegal) based on respect for the constitution and the maintenance of order, but open to reform. Suarez accepts the left-wing opposition, though the climate in which the second government took over was one in which left-wing meetings were still liable to be banned or broken up.

² The Workers' Commissions are clandestine associations of workers who refuse to accept the government-run trade unions. They are extremely efficient at organising strikes and demonstrations, though their actual numbers are unknown. Their prestige is such that they may persist after the legalisation of the clandestine trade unions, particularly if the latter are split between rival factions.

The two clandestine trade unions are Union Sindical Obrera (USO) and UGT, the historic socialist union structure, some sections of which are fiercely anti-communist. Neither of these two union federations has the mobilising power of the Workers' Commissions and because of rivalry may be unable to combine in the future.

³ It is difficult to estimate what the possible support of any parties would be in elections. Some opinion polls have been taken but these are unreliable – the communists might get anything between 8 and 22%, the socialists 14-46%, the Christian Democrats 15-19%, the extreme right 4%, and the Francoist establishment from 9-12%.

SPAIN – Brief political chronology

1939	End of Civil War – Franco, as dictator, keeps Spain neutral in Second World War.	1973 June	– Carrero Blanco made Prime Minister.
1957 February	– Opus Dei, a Catholic technocratic group, enters government.	December	– Blanco assassinated. Arias Navarro appointed Prime Minister.
1962 February	– Spain negotiates with EEC.	March	– Puig (anarchist) garotted.
1963 September	– US-Spain agreements.	1975 November	– Franco dies. Juan Carlos becomes head of state.
1963 December	– Spain's first economic plan.	1976 January	– General strike.
1969 January	– State of Emergency.	March	– Vitoria: 4 killed, 100 wounded by police.
July	– Juan Carlos presented as successor to Franco.	March	– <i>Junta Democrática</i> (communist led) and <i>Platforma</i> merge to form a new opposition group – Democratic Co-ordination.
1970 June	– EEC and Spain trade agreement.	August	– New government under Suarez formed by Juan Carlos.
December	– State of Emergency in Biscay.	November	– Cortes approves reforms and its own abolition by 425 to 59. Ineffectual extreme right demonstrations on the anniversary of Franco's death.
1971 July	– Juan Carlos instructed to take over in case of Franco's illness.	December	– Referendum on government reforms.
1972 July	– Carrero Blanco designated future head of government under Juan Carlos.		

Italy

Since the Second World War Italian politics have been dominated by the big conservative Catholic party, the Christian Democrats (CD). After the late 1940s when the Cold War split Italian politics and when Christian Democrat, De Gasperi, expelled the socialists and communists from government, the CD went on to win a majority victory at the polls. Since that time, however, there has been a steady decline of the CD vote, though all governments have been dominated by them and many have involved other political parties, including the socialists. Italy has in effect been characterised by chronic governmental instability, as government after government has struggled to cope with Italian problems. There have been ten governments and five different Prime Ministers since Italy's 1968 election. The present position is such that all forces in Italian politics recognise that democracy is so weak that the CD must, of necessity, be an essential element of any coalition for the foreseeable future.

Present Political Scene

Despite the post-war economic miracle Italy's problems remain, for they are deep rooted. Firstly, the economic benefits of the boom have been unevenly spread and secondly the reform of tax laws, housing, social welfare, the health service, and public facilities has made virtually no progress. The problems are compounded by the general Western European social ferment – the growth of working-class militancy since 1968, increasing trade-union militancy, and mounting social tensions, all of which have hit Italy very hard. Lack of money, coupled with the unwillingness and incapacity of the public administration to make measures work, show that simply putting laws on the statute book in Italy does not mean reform. Moreover, even mild measures of reform can be enough to frighten segments of the middle-class away from the CD and force the party to adopt a more rigid line.

Italian politics have not recovered from the blow dealt by the result of the referendum on divorce in 1974. The referendum involved a straight yes/no vote without the complicating factor of the preference vote which encourages factionalism and clientalism.¹ The result was an enormous 60% for the pro-divorce forces – principally the socialists and communists – and a setback for the CD. The Christian Democrats were put on the defensive not only by this referendum result, but also by a series of scandals and by local elections which showed that the communists had made great gains. Voices

have begun to be heard calling for an alliance of the left (as in France) between the socialists and communists, but basically the alliance between the CD and the socialists (PSI) still holds.

Though fascism has been illegal in Italy since 1945 the CD are flanked on the right by a small quasi-fascist group, the MSI, some of whose members are willing to employ violence in an attempt to prevent communists gaining at the polls or in government. The MSI, which gains votes when the CD appears to waver in its anti-communism, recruits from among army and military officers, the civil service, and the secret service, all areas which were hardly touched by the ineffectual 'cleansing' of fascists after the war.

Italy has always been a country for political experiment and a nation that gave the world fascism is quite likely to vote a communist representative into government at sometime in the future. Although various parties in Italian politics have been concerned since the war to prevent just such an outcome, the local elections of June 1975 and general elections of June 1976 show that the Italian Communist Party (PCI) has made a major breakthrough by winning votes from the habitual supporters of the CD – the middle and lower-middle class. (It should be noted though, that in the 1976 legislative elections the PCI and CD made their advance in votes at the expense of the smaller parties.) People hit by inflation have turned to the PCI and away from the ruling CD partly because the PCI adopts a social democratic approach – moderate, technocratic, and socially conscious. Except for a slight slump in their vote in 1956 the PCI is the only Italian

¹ Italian politics are pervaded with the institution of clientalism – the patron-client relation – which makes politics quite distinctively different and unpredictable by Northern European standards

party to have steadily increased its vote since the war – from 22% to over 30% – a vote which was higher than the combined socialist/communist vote at the 1948 general election. The CD have, by contrast, declined to around 38% of the poll and are under attack from within, keeping power through a precarious balancing of abstentions by other parties. However, even if the PCI does achieve the unlikely feat of becoming Italy's largest party, they may still be kept out of government because they would need an extra 12% of the vote to deny the centre parties the possibility of forming a coalition themselves. So far the PSI, the small partner in the centre-left coalition, has not been tempted to go in for a popular front with the PCI largely because Sr. de Martino – the leader – has resisted pressure from the base to this effect.

The historic compromise

The fundamental communist call at the moment is for the 'historic compromise' (*compromesso storico*), which would be a coalition of Italy's three major political forces: PCI, PSI, and Christian Democrats. Berlinguer, the leader of the PCI, has rejected a popular front coalition of socialists and communists as too divisive and has noted that the CD are a 'great popular force' whose participation in government is essential. Like most political doctrines the 'historic compromise' has different definitions but it could mean something similar to a constructive opposition in which the party is consulted on major issues. However, PCI and CD policies are starkly opposed in many areas and the PCI has for years been denouncing the CD power structure. One obstacle is the CD itself, which grew up largely to keep the PCI out of power and any 'historic compromise' would undoubtedly split Italian social democracy irreparably.

The exact nature of the PCI is a subject of some discussion. It is one of the most interesting Western communist parties and, with the Spanish, one of the most liberal-democratic. One big asset of the Italian communists is their leader, Sr. Enrico Berlinguer. A very popular party leader, Berlinguer has proved tactically subtle in the past and has kept the dissent within his own party to a minimum. The party is frequently making avowals of democratic intent and is not afraid to be called revisionist in its outlook. It has a vote of about ten million, and members who believe in its democratic credentials. It seems to be a natural opposition party and its electoral strategy has given it a whole host of policies drafted simply for electoral appeal; moderate economic policies, respect for foreign policy commitments, etc. The party is not, however, monolithic and there are different factions within it such that it is always possible that the old working-class revolutionary tradition on which it draws could reappear if conditions changed.

The present PCI policy is mildly reformist, calling for a tightening of the tax laws (vital in Italy), social reform, reform in agriculture, housing, transport, and health, and it puts a high priority on job creation. The PCI believes that Italy can recover through the guarantee to Italian industry of a new market deriving from planned government expenditure in social fields. They would also like to use government credit policy to help small firms, from whom they get much support, but they have no plans for nationalisation or even an extension of the public sector. Indeed, the PCI blames Italy's large and cumbersome state industries for many economic problems.

Italian local government has been the laboratory for testing PCI efficiency in administration and there is plenty of evidence from the socialist-

communist coalitions which now rule Naples, Milan, and Turin and some 30 million city dwellers. The coalitions came to power when these cities were badly in debt and when the central government was in no position to help them, which accounts for some criticisms that the communists have been no better than their predecessors. However, the PCI has brought a breath of fresh air into the atmosphere of corruption and stagnation of city administrations without antagonising the national strategy of reassuring the middle-class of the party's good intentions.

The 1976 election

The 1976 Italian general election was a bad one for the smaller parties, and in particular for the PSI, who had decided to provoke it. However, the PSI are still the key to government formation although their leaders suffer from indecision. The old leader, Francesco de Martino, sticks to the election line that the PCI must be brought into any centre-left government whilst others want to squeeze reforms out of the CD and want an alliance with them. Because the election was so indecisive and failed either to confirm the CD in power or give the PCI its chance, Italy is likely to continue in its present state of instability.

ITALY – Brief political chronology

1861	Proclamation of Italian kingdom (birth of Italian state).
1880s-1900	Beginning of heavy industry in the north but lack of development of Mezzogiorno.
1911	Universal suffrage.
1915	Italy enters First World War.
1919	PPI (Italian people's party), precursor of CD, founded.
1921	Split of PCI and PSI (Communists and Socialists).
1922-1945	Mussolini dictatorship.
1945-1947	National government with PCI ministers.
1947 May	Government without PCI.
June	Referendum votes for a Republic by 12,717,923 to 10,719,824.
1948	Electoral victory for CD and defeat of PCI-PSI which ushers in centre-centre/right era under de Gasperi.
1957	Beginning of Italian 'economic miracle'.
1963	Centre-left era begins as PSI enters government.
1967	Student and worker unrest, progress of left in elections.
1974 May	Referendum on divorce results in defeat for CD.
1975 June	Strong PCI vote in regional elections.
1976	Legislative elections, PCI progress.

ELECTION RESULTS – % of VOTES

	Regional (1970)	National (1972)	Regional (1975)	National (1976)
PCI (Communists)	27.9	28.3	33.4	34.4
PSI (Socialists)	10.4	9.8	12.0	9.6
Revolutionary Left	3.2	3.0	1.9	
CD (Christian Democrats)	37.8	38.4	35.3	38.7
PSDI (Social Democrats)	7.0	45.2	5.5	
PRI (Republicans)	2.9	22.9	3.2	3.1
PLI (Liberals)	4.8	95.9	2.5	1.3
MSI (Extreme Right)	5.9	8.1	6.3	6.1

Divorce Referendum May 1974 – 41% against divorce
59% pro-divorce laws.

Greece

In many respects Greece is the most interesting of the Southern European countries under consideration here. It is not a country which can be called 'Latin' but its politics partake of certain Latin features, including a strong individualism, concern with personality in politics, and (until recently) chronic political instability capping a phenomenal rate of economic growth. The fact that Greece is not a fully-fledged industrial country, but a land of small individualistic property holders, indicates why leadership and personality have assumed an important rôle in Greek politics. Only as Greece modernises will this feature decline in importance.

Greek ties with the external world are undergoing re-adjustment as the country rids itself of military dictatorship and it is this particular re-orientation which brings the country into the orbit of the EEC. Karamanlis, the Prime Minister, also views Greek entry into the EEC as a potential guarantee of democracy, given the chequered history of Greek politics in the past.

Greece – political background

Greek history, since independence from the Ottomans in 1827, has seen considerable instability. From 1833 to 1967 one dynasty was deposed, five kings fled, there were ten coups d'état, five constitutions, forty-eight dissolutions of the parliament, 148 governments, and a Civil War from 1946-49. Associated with this instability has been the nationalist search for a greater Greece, a search which has often brought the army into politics and brought the state into conflict with Turkey as boundaries were expanded. These two themes, persistent in Greek political history, have been compounded by a cleavage between left and right, not obscured even in the resistance.

The elections of 1946 gave the monarchists a majority and brought King George II back to the throne, but they also signalled the beginning of the Civil War between the communists and the Greek National Army. From 1950, when the communist challenge was beaten off, until 1967, Greece lived under a parliamentary monarchy with an outlawed Communist Party. The period was one of conservative rule first by the National Rally, and then later the National Radicals, but in 1963 Karamanlis, the then Prime Minister, compromised by the King's meddling in politics, resigned. In 1964, following growing discontent, the left-inclined Giorgios Papandreou obtained a 53% vote. There then followed a period of considerable turmoil as King Constantine (unconstitutionally) dismissed Papandreou but could not find a stable alternative Assembly majority.

The military took power in April 1967 in an atmosphere of doubt and a belief by the right that the Centre Union would win the elections scheduled for that year. The King attempted a counter-coup later in 1967 but failed miserably and had to escape from the country. Within the military junta George Papadopolous, the Prime Minister, began to establish an ascendancy as the junta drew up a new constitution at the end of the 1960s. There was talk about elections, but although martial law was lifted in 1972 there was no sign of the military returning the country to civilian rule. Indeed, they simply increased their hold on the country until mis-handling of the Cyprus situation (see below) forced them to change their own methods.

A consequence of the Cyprus debacle was that the Karamanlis government replaced the military junta and in the somewhat rushed 1974 elections (the first free elections for ten years) he was confirmed in power. There was a good deal of voting for personalities, with the electorate indicating, by

sticking with old experienced MP's rather than going for newer faces, that it did not want drastic changes. 1974 also saw a referendum on the monarchy in which only 30% voted in favour of keeping Greece a kingdom. The monarchists and the anti-monarchists both appealed to strong emotions but it would seem that the argument that in Greek politics the monarchy ensured the stability of institutions no longer carried conviction for the majority of voters. After the junta collapsed the Karamanlis government released the prisoners held by the Colonels and made moves to ensure the army's political neutrality.

In May 1975 the new constitution worked out by Karamanlis' New Democratic Party was put into force and the first President was elected in June 1975. The constitution gave the President supreme command of the armed forces, a highly controversial move criticised by Papandreou (socialist) and Mavros (centre), and one which will probably be revised in future. That this was a quiet change-over was due to the Turkish threat of war, which enabled Karamanlis to anticipate demonstrations by calling-up students and young people under emergency and martial laws. Legislation also allowed numerous communists to return, though only certain categories of them, a tight control which helped to avoid major disruption.

Economic background

Greece is a land of small property owners and as such tends to be conservative politically and economically. The country's economic problems stem mainly from the large numbers of small holdings, emigration, slow industrialisation, lack of education, lack of cooperation among farmers, and bad communications. Greece has some important natural resources (such as bauxite) but its exports are mainly agricultural and light industrial products, as well as the enormous invisible export of shipping. The trade balance has not been favourable because of the turn in the terms of trade after the oil crisis of 1973 and because of higher raw material prices. However, after a decline in the rate of growth (2.7% in 1974), the economy expanded again by 6.5% in 1975, according to OECD figures. Because of the good performance of cereal farming, agricultural exports grew 14.2% in 1975. Manufacturing output grew at 17.6% in 1975, which position was generally satisfactory, with exports growing faster than imports in value. There remains a big trade gap, however.

Greece and the Balkans

For historical, cultural and geographical reasons, it is important to recognise that Greece has extensive and indissoluble ties with the other Balkan countries, ties which pull the country in a direction somewhat away from the EEC. Despite the fact that the bulk of Greek trade is with the EEC, a significant proportion is with Bulgaria, Romania (both in the Russian orbit), Albania, Yugoslavia and Turkey.¹

The background to Greek relations with the Balkan states is the 1954 Treaty of Alliance for Political Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between Turkey, Yugoslavia and Greece. The early 1970s saw the flourishing of new and closer relations between these Balkan states despite their apparently opposed ideologies. The rapprochement between the strongly anti-communist regime of the Colonels and the widely different communist states of the Balkans flourished, even despite Greek-Bulgarian reservations on Macedonia.

The Greek dispute with Turkey centres on two main areas; Cyprus and the Aegean Islands. The Cyprus situation led to the eventual disposal of the Colonels' regime which had thrust Greece into a position for which it was militarily unprepared. The Colonels fomented the Enosis (Union with Greece movement) in Cyprus, thus de-stabilising the balance maintained by Archbishop Makarios, but they were ultimately unable to aid Greek Cypriots. Greece was somewhat disappointed by the reaction of NATO to the Turkish invasion of Cyprus and the inadequacy of that organisation to cover Greece's defence problem made the Greek withdrawal from NATO a possibility. Such a withdrawal in fact took place under Karamanlis, though this does not affect Greek links with the EEC (in which Ireland, for example, has never been a NATO member and from which France has withdrawn).

Conflict in the Aegean dates back to the days of the Ottoman Empire when the Greek state was being created. The inclusion of many of the islands in the Aegean, some of which are very close to Turkish shores, caused disquiet because of the Turkish view that the Dodecanese form a barrier restricting their sea outlets. A dispute about the limits of the continental shelf, the extent of territorial waters, and rights over the Aegean is at present before the International Court, but this may not settle the matter. Within both countries there are voices exhorting their respective governments to more active foreign policies, and these pressures are likely to increase if oil is discovered in the sea. The Turks have already sent exploration vessels to conduct research in disputed areas. For Greece, conflict with Turkey could well be the crucial test of its stability, and for NATO any conflict would present a serious problem, for NATO values Turkey (an ally in a crucial strategic position on the Russian border), more highly than Greece. A very dangerous situation could thus still develop from a dispute between Greece and Turkey, and the position in the Mediterranean is by no means stable.

Recent political developments

The elections which produced the Karamanlis government in 1974 were disadvantageous to the left and probably under-state the opposition strength. They produced a solidly conservative government by the exploitation of Karamanlis' de Gaulle-like charisma - 'the man who ousted the

Colonels'. The left itself was divided and lacked the most meagre basis of a party organisation. Since it is the left that opposes Greek entry into the EEC it is consequently easy to under-estimate the opposition that the move would evoke in Greece. The communists, although not numerically strong, would fight entry through the unions, if the union organisation (smashed by the Colonels but anyway always weak) were revived. New strike laws, outlawing certain kinds of strikes, especially 'political' ones, make this most improbable however. Communist youth movements and party organisations, though not extensive, are beginning to be organised.

The Greek election of November 1974 produced the most successful campaign result for any single party in Greek election history, with Karamanlis' party winning 54.5% of the vote. The election came after a curious series of events which started after November 1973, when the then military junta was preparing Greece for the first free elections since 1964 and was overthrown by an army faction bitterly opposed to these developments. President Gizikis, the military leader, appointed the 'most incompetent government in Greek history' (and there is fierce competition for this title) which included the 'hard' Brig. Ionnides, a man who eventually became the symbol of the military regime's intransigence. Unfortunately for this (anti-politician) army coup, the Ionnides government soon got into trouble by meddling in internal Cypriot affairs and their power was ended when the chiefs of staff were forced to call in politicians to find a solution. Karamanlis was called upon to return from exile in Paris, but he substantially dictated his own conditions and decided to more or less restore the 1952 constitution.

Karamanlis in exile had gained (and cultivated) the image of himself as a strong man and he combined the adroit handling of the transition to democracy on his return with the credible implication that if he failed the tanks would return to the streets. Similar personal style aside, here is the basis of the comparison with de Gaulle, a leader who stepped in to get his country out of the Algerian war crisis and who was also thought to be the only barrier between democracy and chaos or a military coup.

By contrast, the complete failure of the Greek centre-left is striking. The opposition has never really been successful in Greece and the short period of success that it knew in 1964 was the direct result of the personal charisma of Giorgios Papandreou, father of the present left leader Andreas. The former tended not to emphasise references to economics in his socialism but rather legal and social equality, a mixture that suited the property conscious Greek electorate. The opposition in 1974 was unorganised and uninspired and although there was no lack of talent there were no really conspicuous leaders in the group. The left and centre, anyway itself split, generally had no alternative programme to Karamanlis, and Papandreou often appeared too radical in his financial views, hinting at a degree of disruption for which the Greek electorate was unprepared.

The period of the Colonels from 1967-1974 has left a morass of problems which are not yet solved. Parliamentary democracy is not yet absolutely secure and Karamanlis' handling of legal and constitu-

¹ Trade between Greece and Turkey tripled in the years 1972-1975 mainly because of increased production and improved trade conditions. The growth is much higher if value rather than volume is reckoned (9% as opposed to 7.6%).

tional issues has not always been impeccably correct or consistent. If his personal charismatic authority is enough to cement the new elements together this last point could be overlooked, especially if there is a de Gaulle-like acceptance of the

new balance based on the personal stature of one outstanding leader. Nevertheless, such authority may herald long-term difficulties or even the collapse of the present system due to bitter opposition.

GREEK GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS (300 seats)

	VOTE	Right		Centre/Right		Centre/Left		Left		Others	
		% of vote	% of seats	% of vote	% of seats	% of vote	% of seats	% of vote	% of seats	% of vote	% of seats
1958	3,847,765	41.16	57 ¹	10.62	3.33 ²	20.67	12 ³	24.47	26.33	3.10	1.33
1961	4,626,751	50.80	58.66 ¹	33.65	—	33.33 ⁴	—	14.62	8	0.88	0
1963	4,667,159	39.37	44 ¹	3.73	0.16	42.04	46 ⁵	14.34	9.33	0.52	0
1964	4,589,839	35.26	35.66 ¹	—	—	52.71	57.58 ⁵	11.80	7.33	0.23	0
1974	4,912,356	54.5	73.3 ¹	20.4	20	13.6	4 ⁷	9.3	2.6	2.2	0

¹Karamanlis

²Markensinis

³G. Papandreou and Venizelos

⁴G. Papandreou and Markensinis

⁵G. Papandreou

⁶Karamanlis and Markensinis

⁷A. Papandreou

GREECE – Brief political chronology

- 1827 – Independence from Ottoman Empire.
- 1831 – Becomes monarchy.
- 1862 – House of Gluckbörg, 'King of Hellenes'.
- 1943 – Internal, but divided, resistance against the Germans and Italians.
- 1946 – Elections give monarchy a majority but many non-voters. Civil War between (communist) Free Democratic Government and British/American backed Greek National Army.
- 1947 – American involvement in Greece replaces that of UK.
- 1949 – Communists defeated.
- 1950 – Outlawed Communist Party but parliamentary system.
- 1955-63 – Karamanlis Prime Minister.
- 1964 – Centre Union government under Giorgios Papandreou.
- 1967 March – Military coup.
Abortive counter-coup by King.
- 1970 – Legislative advisory council set up as an alternative to open elections.
- 1972 March – Papadopolous becomes Regent.
- 1974 July – Collapse of military regime/ Cyprus crisis.
- 1974 November – Karamanlis wins elections.
- 1975 – Withdrawal of troops from NATO. Application to join EEC.

The EEC and Southern Europe

Although EEC relations with the countries considered here are fragmented, the possible action of the EEC as a stabilising influence in Southern Europe cannot be neglected.

New members

The EEC acts internationally through trade agreements and by admitting new members. The first EEC agreement with Greece was signed in 1962, and eventual membership, after a twenty-two year period, was envisaged. This agreement made rapid progress in the years up to 1967 but was suspended at the time of the Colonels' coup, which ended Greek democracy, and only minor adjustments were made from 1967 to 1974. There were personal and emotional ties involved in freezing the agreement since the former negotiators (from the Greek Centre Union Party) were imprisoned and the Commission made formal protests. When the Colonels' regime collapsed in 1974 and the first Greek post-coup government appeared, it received a warm welcome in Brussels, and this was followed by the quick acceptance of Greece as a member of the "democratic community of Western nations", as Callaghan put it. In June 1975 the Greeks applied to join the EEC but there were reservations within the Commission such that the Greeks felt that they had received a rebuff.

Portugal had relations with the EEC via EFTA. A Portuguese application to the EEC is now out of the question without massive aid to bring the economy up to Western European standards. Substantial EEC loans through the European Investment Bank have gone to Portugal, though they were delayed until the criteria set by the Council of Ministers for political evolution were fulfilled.

Spain had an agreement with the EEC in the course of negotiation in autumn 1975 which was interrupted by the execution of political prisoners by Franco. The re-negotiation of a new trade agreement with the Community has not yet begun and the stalling could be due to the desire to bring the Spanish into the EEC when a new regime has been established. On this point Spain will have a powerful sponsor (France), but membership will only come when the political position is decided.

Enlargement

France has a grand strategy of a Mediterranean vocation and the redressing of the balance of the EEC before any northern enlargement (to Scandinavia) takes place. The French are in favour of new entrants from Southern Europe as they will obviously make France more central. Spain especially is seen as a natural ally to strengthen 'Latin power', and France is the nearest thing to a Greek 'friend at Court'. The German government has long had a close concern with Turkey and there is a 'symbiotic relationship' between Germany and Turkey. Germany is an arms supplier to Turkey, has a strategic interest in NATO's Eastern flank and Turkish migrant labour is 'exported' in significant numbers to Germany. Germany has also sponsored Spanish membership of the EEC, and Genscher, leader of the FDP and Foreign Minister, has stated that there is a special relationship with Spain (the SPD is close to the Spanish PSOE Socialist Party). Spain is regarded as important by

the UK – hence the British government minister at Franco's funeral – although there are sections on the left who have grave reservations about Spain, dating from civil war days.

The Commission's luke-warm reaction to Greek membership caused a stir, as it is the first time the Council has been enthusiastic (on the politics of the entry) and the Commission unenthusiastic (on the economics). Enlargement presents many difficulties, not least in terms of administration, for the various institutions are only just beginning to settle down after the last enlargement. Taking on board Greece and Spain would present great difficulties to the bureaucracy and to the Council. Choices also have to be balanced with the report on European Union suggested by the Belgian Premier Tindemans, for enlargement would make Union more difficult.

Depending on how many new states join the EEC, when, how and at what level (whether there are long or short transition periods) there are two broad roads which the Community can take: a unitary or two tier approach. The unitary approach involves the coordination of policies of ten or eleven member states, a method which barely works with nine. More states merely compound the difficulties. If the two tier approach is adopted then a directorate will result, a choice which many think will have divisive results and which could even spell the end of the EEC as it now stands. The likely impact of new members has certainly not been positively thought out, either in Brussels or elsewhere, and indeed is very hard to estimate given all the uncertainties. The EEC does not even have a coherent foreign policy in the Mediterranean (on Cyprus for example), so a whole range of problems will be raised in this sector alone.

The implications of Spanish entry are much greater than those posed by Greek membership. Spain has a population of thirty-five million and a diverse series of industries. The UK would look with doubt on competition from textiles and cars, and the French would want protection from wine imports which would compete directly with that part of the French wine trade most in need of help – the low-quality wine producers in Languedoc. Given either Spanish, Greek or Portuguese entry, France could well become a net contributor to the EEC and the newcomers would force a re-thinking of the agricultural policy (CAP). This will be more than a slight re-shuffling and there could be real shocks in store for the EEC. Potential communist ministers in governments in Spain, Portugal and Italy, could turn domestic problems into wider issues involving the EEC as a whole, though this is unlikely. Furthermore, the potential upset in post-Tito Yugoslavia threatens to draw the EEC onto dangerous ground, via the Italian and (possibly) Greek relations with the area. The EEC likewise does not want to become a party to any conflict between Greece and Turkey, but if the Greeks do join the EEC will be involved in the Aegean dispute, where large oil finds could make the sea an important prize.

Conclusion

Several points emerge concerning the rôle of the EEC in Southern Europe. Though the EEC is one of the biggest external influences in Southern Europe, it is clear that it is not equipped to move rapidly or to deal with crises, nor has it the capacity to influence critical security issues, as have the super-powers.¹ The EEC can, however, shape the environment of the regional periphery of Europe to some extent and its capacity is very high even where the ability to mobilise heavy resources is low, e.g. in Greece and Spain. One point of EEC influence, and consequently one difficulty, arises from the finance of entry. If, for example, the Greeks join the EEC, some 500m units of account (71m dollars) will be necessary to accommodate an indefinitely long entry period. Access to funds, especially via the CAP, will upset the present balance and the new members will start to compete in

¹ In security terms, relations are via NATO and the Eurogroup, though not for Portugal, France or (yet) Spain. It is likely that Spanish membership of the EEC will coincide with that of NATO

Further Reading

General

The EEC and the Mediterranean Area. G. Yanopoulos. Cambridge, 1976.

Portugal

Insight on Portugal. Sunday Times 'Insight'. Deutsch, 1975.

History of Portugal. A. de Figueiredo. Penguin, 1975.

Spain

Franco and the Politics of Spain. E. de Blaye. Penguin, 1976.

Spain in Crisis. P. Preston. Harvester, 1976.

Spain under Franco. M. Gallo. Unwin, 1974.

Italy

Italy-Republic without Government. P. Allum. Unwin, 1974.

Italy Chooses Europe. F. Willis. Stanford, 1971.

trade and labour with Italy and the south of France. The Germans may be unwilling to pay out even more for the Community budget and demands on existing wealth will anyway become greater as the EEC is enlarged. The underdeveloped regions will shift from the north of Europe (the UK) to the south, and will pose severe problems for an already strained regional policy.

What would happen to the EEC if new members became undemocratic? About this there can be no clear answer. Pluralist party democracy in Italy may be hesitant, but it is difficult to see Italy being thrown out of the EEC as a result of a reversal of regime. Although the question of the long term acceptability of the new entrants is a vexed one, *time* is a potential solution. However, to mobilise resources it will be necessary to reinforce decision-making in the EEC to firm up political will. For all these reasons the issue of the entry of Southern Europeans is a major problem for the EEC and likely to remain so.

Greece

Politics in Modern Greece. K. Legg. Stanford, 1967.

The Greek Passion. K. Young. Dent, 1969.

Greece without columns. R. Campbell. Holden, 1975.

Articles

Wider but Weaker: The continued enlargement of the EEC. World Today. W. Wallace. March 1976.

Spain's Long Road to Europe. World Today. D. Rudnick. April 1976.

Portugal's Free Choice. World Today. A. de Figueiredo. August 1976.

Greece and the Community. Times Special Report. September 27 1976.

Portugal. Times Special Report. August 12 1976.

Europe. Financial Times Survey. December 6 1976.

Spain. Financial Times Survey. June 29 1976.


Greece. Financial Times Survey. June 15 1976.

Italy. Financial Times Survey. April 12 1976.

Italy's Communists. Economist. February 28 1976.

Greece and the EEC. Economist. August 14 1976.

Spain and Portugal Economic resources



Key

- Towns of over 500,000 inhabitants
- Towns of under 500,000 inhabitants
- 🏭 Oil refinery
- 🚰 Canals
- 🛢️ Mineral oil pipelines
- 🐟 Fishing port
- 🐟 Fish processing
- 🏠 Food processing
- 🍷 Sugar refinery
- 🚗 Car industry
- 🚢 Shipbuilding
- 🧵 Textile industry
- U Uranium
- ⚙️ Heavy industry
- 🧪 Chemical works
- 🚂 Locomotives
- C Copper
- L Lead
- LZ Lead/zinc
- F Iron
- ☑️ Coal
- B Coal (lignite)
- Z Zinc
- ⚡ Atomic power station
- ⚡ Hydro-electric power station
- ⚡ Power station
- 🏭 Metal processing
- 🏭 Iron and steel works
- 🏭 Aluminium smelting
- 🏭 Mixed mineral ores
- 🌾 Sugarbeet
- 🍊 Citrus fruit
- 🌲 Wood, pasture and meadow
- ☑️ Irrigated areas
- ☑️ Low or non productive land
- 🌿 Olives
- 🍷 Vines
- 🍷 Cork
- 🌴 Dates
- 🌾 Rice

BASIC STATISTICS : Spain

Area	194,885 sq. miles
Population	35.5m.
GNP (1973)	Ptas.3,543bn.
Per capita	Ptas.101,635
Trade (1975)	
Imports c.i.f.	Ptas.932.3bn.
Exports	Ptas.441.5bn.
Imports from U.K.	£294.8m.
Exports to U.K.	£277.8m.
Currency: Pesetas.	
£1 = Ptas.120.6.	

BASIC STATISTICS : Portugal

Area	35,553 sq.ml.
Population 1974	9,0m.
GNP (1973)	276,639 m.Escudos.
Trade (1975)	
Imports	97,588 m.Escudos.
Exports	49,335 m.Escudos.
Imports from U.K.	£8,498m.
Exports from U.K.	£10,468m.
Currency: Escudos	
£1 = 52 Escudos	

Greece

Economic resources

BASIC STATISTICS

Area	50,944 sq. miles
Population (1974)	8.96m.
GNP (1974)	Dr.593.3bn.
Per capita	Dr.66,216
Trade (1975)	
Imports	Dr.172bn.
Exports	Dr.74.2bn.
Imports from U.K.	£117.21m.
Exports to U.K.	£65.24m.
Currency = drachma	
£1 = Dr.62.83	

0 50 100 150 200 250km

Key

■ Towns of over 500,000 inhabitants	● Towns of under 500,000 inhabitants	☞☞☞ Fruit
⚡ Hydro-electric power station	⚙ Shipbuilding industry	▨ Vines
⚙ Power station	🏠 Food processing	○○○○ Olives
🏠 Oil refinery	🏠 Tobacco processing	☞☞☞ Tobacco
🏠 Chemical works	🐟 Fishing port	▨ Rice
🏠 Distillery	⊠ Coal (lignite)	☞☞☞ Cotton
🏠 Textile industry	B Bauxite	☞☞☞ Citrus fruit
🏠 Iron and steel works	C Chromium	■ Wood, pasture and meadow
🏠 Aluminium smelting	LZ Lead/zinc	□ Irrigated areas
		□ Low or non productive land

