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Peacekeeping and security in Africa –
conclusions drawn from the Lisbon Colloquy

REPORT

submitted on behalf of the Political Committee
by Mr Roseta, Rapporteur

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¹ Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

² *Members of the Committee:* Mr Baumel (Chairman); MM Urbain, Blaauw (Vice-Chairmen); MM de Assis, Bianchi (Alternate : Mrs Pozza Tosca), MM Behrendt, Brancati, Sir Sydney Chapman (Alternate: Hancock), Mr Cusimano (Alternate: Amoroso), Mr Dias, Mrs Dumont (Alternate: Dreyfus-Schmidt), Mrs Durrieu, MM Ehrmann, Evangelisti, Eyskens, Haack, Hornhues, Lord Kirkhill (Alternate: Lord Judd), MM Lemoine, Liapis Van der Maelen (Alternate: Staes), MM Marshall, Martínez (Alternate: Solé Tura), Mr Martínez Casañ, Micheloyiannis, Lord Ponsonby (Alternate: Vis), MM Puche Rodríguez, Recoder (Alternate: Arnau Navarro), MM Rippinger, Roseta, Schmitz (Alternate: Maass), MM Skoularikis, Sterzing, Timmermans, Verhagen, Volcic, Wray.

Associate members: MM Gundersen, Kosmo.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

*Draft Recommendation
on peacekeeping and security in Africa*

The Assembly,

- (i) Conscious of the historical ties and strategic interests binding Europe to Africa;
- (ii) Declaring its support for the framing of a European policy on Africa;
- (iii) Concerned about the absence of any reference to African problems in the Rome and Bremen ministerial declarations;
- (iv) Disappointed by the slowness some member countries are showing in responding to the Council's efforts to coordinate their cooperation programmes with Africa;
- (v) Deeply concerned by the proliferation of crises in sub-Saharan Africa;
- (vi) Welcoming the progress a number of countries have made in terms of their economic and social development and the establishment of democratic institutions;
- (vii) Aware that social and economic prosperity and the existence of democratic institutions are not only the most important factors for promoting peaceful international relations and the internal stability of individual countries but also help the culture and traditions of the peoples of those countries to flourish;
- (viii) Convinced that owing to its historical involvement in Africa, Europe has a special responsibility to promote social and economic development, peace and security on that continent;
- (ix) Recognising the crucial role incumbent on the OAU for the purpose of maintaining peace and security in Africa and the fact that subregional organisations have a stabilising influence in promoting cooperation between states and economic and social development;
- (x) Recalling that any action taken to settle conflicts and restore peace should be consistent with the Charter of the United Nations;
- (xi) Noting that many sub-Saharan conflicts are aggravated by illegal arms trafficking and the activities of mercenaries;
- (xii) Convinced that peacekeeping and security in Africa are closely linked to the economic and social development of the countries of the continent and to the strengthening of democratic institutions in sub-Saharan Africa;
- (xiii) Recognising the beneficial effects of the work churches, religious associations and NGOs are doing on the ground with a view to promoting civilian societies in African countries,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Continue to monitor African problems closely with a view to framing a proper European policy on sub-Saharan Africa;
2. Cooperate closely with the European Union in order to place such a policy in the context of the CFSP in the longer term while at the same time giving it an economic and social dimension, and – more particularly – enhance cooperation with the EU for the purpose of preparing for the Euro-African summit in 2000;
3. Continue to promote and support the transition to democracy in African countries, this being essential for the stabilisation of the continent as a whole in the perspective of a global concept of security;
4. Further the cooperation programmes each European country has with African countries;

5. Urge the member countries to become more involved in endeavours designed to coordinate their programmes of cooperation with the countries of sub-Saharan Africa so as to develop a European policy on Africa;
6. Establish a programme of cooperation with the OAU covering the following aspects in particular:
 - (a) cooperation with the Torrejón Satellite Centre mainly so that it can provide African authorities managing situations on the ground with reports on the development of crises;
 - (b) training programmes for OAU officials, armed forces and police forces in the sub-Saharan countries, with a view to making a bigger contribution to the prevention and settlement of crises;
 - (c) a programme to fight arms trafficking;
 - (d) cooperation between the WEU Planning Cell and the OAU conflict-management centre;
 - (e) greater WEU involvement in peacekeeping exercises organised in Africa, with the possible participation of the Planning Cell in their preparation;
7. Support any efforts made by WEU member countries in bilateral trade and international relations to fight the proliferation of, and trafficking in, arms with particular reference to anti-personnel mines;
8. Adopt, in cooperation with the OAU and the relevant countries, a programme of ongoing support for African endeavours to clear anti-personnel mines;
9. Study the possibility of European advisers providing support, under the auspices of WEU, for peacekeeping operations in Africa and envisage logistic support for such operations;
10. React without delay, within the framework of the resources available to WEU and in cooperation with the OAU, in order to support peace initiatives taken in response to emergency situations.

Explanatory Memorandum.

(submitted by Mr Roseta, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. The close ties forged by history, geographic proximity, common interests and, to a large extent, culture mean that Africa and Europe cannot afford to ignore each other. It therefore comes as no surprise that, since making its entrance on the world stage, Africa has been seen as being inextricably linked with Europe. Moreover, for a long time it was politically and of course economically dependent on Europe. Even though Africa is fortunately no longer under the yoke of colonialism, strong ties continue to exist between the two continents, one with its former colonial powers and the other with their colonies of old which in most cases share the language, religion, economic interests and quite often the democratic ideals of their former masters who, as we well know, very often exploited them. Furthermore, the presence of a very large number of Europeans on what was known for so long as the "Dark Continent" together with an increasing number of Africans in search of a better future in Europe has created a climate of Euro-African rapprochement based on personal ties and shared interests which compound the links between states and enhance the feeling of inter-dependence between these two continental neighbours¹.

2. Opening the colloquy held by the Assembly of WEU in Lisbon on 15 September 1998, the President of the Portuguese National Assembly stressed the obligations Europeans had towards Africans on account of slavery, the wrongs they suffered during the colonial period and the profound upheavals to which they were subjected through having had forced upon them a large dose of Western culture including the notion of ownership, the concept of the state, language and even religion. Mr António de Almeida Santos also pointed out that a number of the problems plaguing modern-day Africa could be attributed either to conquests by European countries (for instance, the artificial way in which borders were drawn up, dividing peoples between two and sometimes three states) or to illicit ac-

tivities in some sectors of Western society (arms trafficking in particular). He also argued that progress in advancing the cause of democracy throughout the continent and the economic and social development of its countries could make a decisive contribution to overcoming the present crises and promoting the continent's security. When drawing conclusions from the colloquy debates, the President of the Assembly stressed that all the European institutions, and more particularly the European Union and WEU, should be involved in a European policy on Africa. Mr de Puig added that one of the objectives of such a policy should be to promote the economic and social development of African countries and their transition to democracy².

3. Your Rapporteur shares this analysis: history has put an obligation on Europeans to concern themselves with African matters. Moreover, certain vital interests common to the two parties also make this a necessity and the former colonial powers – most of whom now regret past deeds – not only have a thorough knowledge of African problems but also possess the means necessary for taking action where circumstances so require – in cooperation, of course, with the Organisation of African Unity and in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

4. In this report, which draws on the extremely valuable debate at the Lisbon Colloquy, a considerable effort has been made to describe the main events since September 1998 that have influenced the present situation in Africa, in order to arrive at conclusions. However, in line with the rationale followed at the colloquy, this particular analysis of events focuses on sub-Saharan Africa which, from the historical, socio-cultural and economic angles, constitutes a somewhat special case. Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that Europe's strong ties and close relations with north Africa are also relevant in this connection as are the important relations existing between that region and sub-Saharan Africa – these aspects have already been discussed in two previous reports on security in the

¹ See Assembly Document 1566, *WEU's contribution to reinforcing peace in central Africa*, Rapporteur: Mr Masseret, 15 May 1997.

² See the official record of the colloquy on peace-keeping and security in Africa.

Mediterranean region, submitted to the Assembly by Mr de Lipkowski and your Rapporteur³.

5. It would be inappropriate to conclude this introduction without stressing that despite the proliferation of flashpoints in Africa, the existence of dictatorships and coups d'état, the succession of humanitarian disasters, endemic diseases such as malaria and the recent spread of AIDS, poverty and famine – all of which have brought and continue to bring endless suffering to many peoples, the overall image of the continent today is far from being entirely negative. The fact that countries as important as Nigeria have become democracies, that key states such as Mozambique and Uganda have restored a peaceful order and made substantial economic and social progress, that other countries such as Togo and Ghana have also improved their economies and that there are stable democratic institutions in Cape Verde, Burkina Faso, Botswana, Benin, Mali and South Africa gives cause for hope and shows that the peoples of Africa have both the resolve and ability to build a better future. Timid though this hope may be, there is nonetheless reason to describe it as realistic and justified by the progress the Organisation of African Unity has made in the field of peacekeeping and security. The task facing Europe, and more particularly WEU, is to fulfil what is a historical and humanitarian duty – within the limits of their possibilities. In so doing, Europeans will also be acting in full conformity with the interests they have to defend.

II. The general situation in Africa and its subregions

6. Unfortunately 1998 was a year that saw a fresh outbreak of conflicts in Africa, putting a damper on the cautious optimism experts whose job it is to analyse the situation on that continent and especially its sub-Saharan region had begun to show in recent years. The instability that is virtually ubiquitous is decimating populations and to a large extent undoing all the hard work put in over the last decade to promote economic development and political democratisation, the fruits of which are there to see in a number of countries. For although crises abound in and

among a very large number of states (a quarter of the sub-Saharan countries according to the 1998-99 annual report of the International Institute for Strategic Studies), this does not detract from the progress made in other countries. Furthermore, it has to be remembered that the fundamental cause of Africa's problems continues to be the low level of human development as defined by the United Nations (life expectancy, level of education and living standards). Most countries are caught up in this situation and, with some rare exceptions, the human development index in Africa is below 0.499, one of the lowest in the world⁴. An outline of the situation in each subregion and in more detail for each country will perhaps provide a clearer picture of the general state of affairs on the sub-Saharan subcontinent.

(a) West Africa

7. 1998 was not an easy year for West Africa – already affected by the devaluation of the CFA franc, the region had to contend with difficult climatic conditions (drought in a number of areas and too much rain in others) and the effects of the Asian crisis.

8. However, there were some positive developments such as in *Guinea* where, following an abortive putsch in 1996, peaceful elections were held in December 1998. The country's economy showed signs of picking up mainly in the agricultural and mining sectors.

9. *Senegal* also maintained growth at 5% but had a considerable economic burden to bear owing to its intervention in Guinea-Bissau. Its fishing industry was badly affected by the devaluation of the currencies of its Asian competitors.

10. *The Gambia* re-established normal relations not only with its neighbours but also with many non-African nations (such as the Commonwealth countries) and this enabled it to sustain its development drive.

11. Despite its isolated geographic position, *Cape Verde's* economic and social development in a context of well established democracy continues to be satisfactory. The government's decision to tie its currency to the Portuguese escudo (under the agreements of 13 March 1998 provid-

³ Documents 1543 of 4 November 1996 and 1371 of 24 May 1993.

⁴ United Nations Development Plan, 1997 report.

ing for a fixed exchange rate guaranteed by Lisbon) was an encouraging sign.

12. *Burkina Faso* can be taken as an example of sound public management and political stability even though it barely has an economy because of its unfavourable geographic position and scarce natural resources. Nevertheless there is an undercurrent of tension in the country mainly because of the suspect circumstances surrounding the death in December 1998 of the freelance journalist, Robert Zongo⁵.

13. *Mali* experienced political uprisings in 1997 and 1998 but they did not undermine the democratic process. From the economic point of view, it is now the biggest cotton-producing country in the region and has become self-sufficient in rice thanks to an effective irrigation programme.

14. Security, law and order have been restored in the north of *Niger* but the country still faces a worrying food shortage. The coup d'état by the presidential guard which toppled President Baré Mainassara and also resulted in his death could, if the international community applies pressure, lead to the country becoming a democracy given that the new, interim President, Mallan Wanké, has promised to hold general elections by the end of the year.

15. *Ghana* has managed to overcome its own shortages and the economy is starting to grow despite the drought and lack of electricity which have led to a considerable slowdown in output.

16. *Benin* has had to contend with the same problems but now that it has a democratic system which has already seen two changes of government, it is pushing ahead with economic reforms, particularly in the area of privatisation, with satisfactory results

17. *Togo* has managed to come back up to the level of income it had prior to the political crisis in the early 1990s, in spite of the impact of the drought and the political situation which is not problem-free⁶.

18. Since the death of President Abacha who brought in a military dictatorship, *Nigeria*, the

⁵ See *Le Monde*, 4 May 1999: "Robert Zongo dies in the afternoon".

⁶ See Amnesty International's report of 5 May 1999 in which it refers to serious human rights violations.

giant in West Africa, has fortunately at last entered a period of transition to democracy that holds promise for the entire region and is even of crucial importance for Africa as a whole. However, the country's economy is suffering because of shifting oil prices and the cost of peacekeeping operations in which it is involved.

19. The economy in *Côte d'Ivoire* picked up with a growth rate of 6% in 1998 even though the regional context is difficult and the effects of the Asian crisis have made themselves felt. But the country's huge public deficit is a millstone.

20. From this brief overview of the region, your Rapporteur believes he can draw the general conclusion that a certain degree of stability seems to have set in in West Africa despite one major crisis flashpoint, namely Sierra Leone.

(b) *Central Africa*

21. There is great instability in Central Africa, a region that is vital for the balance of the African continent. The main cause at present is the upheaval in the *Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)*. Yet other countries are continuing their efforts to promote economic development with some success, among them *Equatorial Guinea* whose oil-producing activities have taken on increasing importance. Still on the positive side, *Cameroon* and *Gabon* are politically and economically stable despite being surrounded by the crises in the DRC and the Central African Republic. In contrast, *Chad*, which recently emerged from a crisis lasting several years and whose government claims to want to tighten public spending in 1999, is on the brink of a fresh civil war. The relative degree of stability some states have achieved could be undermined by the serious conflicts in neighbouring countries such as the *DRC*, *Congo-Brazzaville*, or the *Central African Republic (CAR)*. Finally, there is the situation in *São Tomé e Príncipe* where a cohabitation arrangement, albeit seemingly precarious, is operating between the President and government and where the economy remains weak owing to a lack of natural resources in spite of the possibility of oil lying off shore.

(c) *Southern Africa*

22. There is no doubt that the *Republic of South Africa* dominates this region both on account of its size and economic power. The elec-

tions due to be held in 1999 could mark the end of the country's long period of transition following the disintegration of the apartheid regime. The economy was dealt a harsh blow by the 1998 financial crisis and growth has slowed to a rate of 0.2%. However, it should pick up again this year. The country also suffers from problems such as high levels of crime in some big cities. On the positive side, one of South Africa's noteworthy achievements is the major *Blue Crane* peacekeeping exercise that took place in the country in April under South African leadership. It involved 5 000 troops from 12 southern African countries and was considered a success⁷. Neighbouring *Botswana* can boast very good economic results and a stable political climate.

23. Conversely, *Namibia's* economy has suffered on account of its military intervention in the DRC and President Nujoma is facing growing resistance to such intervention. Following a period of tension in 1997 and early 1998, the political situation in *Zambia* appears to have returned to normal. *Zimbabwe* is experiencing political and social tension due to the structural weakness of its economy which has also been aggravated by military intervention in the DRC. In *Swaziland*, where the process of democratisation is at a standstill, economic problems are causing social tension. The country's growth rate (which stood between 2.5 and 3% in 1998) is still not sufficient to cope with the big increase in its population (the increase in the birth rate was close on 5% in 1998). In *Malawi* the political debate became tougher in the run-up to the May 1999 elections. But the country is pressing ahead with its reforms (in particular the privatisation programme) and economic growth stands at 4.5%.

24. Finally, in *Mozambique*, which has enjoyed stability since the conclusion of the 1992 peace accords, the economy is in full swing. This country could be described as a showcase of economic and political stabilisation in a climate of peace. Even the continuing tension between the Frelimo and Renamo rebel movements does not appear to be a threat to peace and internal security in the country which, though still very poor, is nonetheless beginning to look attractive to investors. In 1998, it was granted an excep-

tional reduction in its foreign debt. The agreement reached on creating the Maputo transport corridor and the continuing privatisation programme should draw new investments. Mozambique's growth rate in 1998 stood at 10%. Inflation is under control and industrial output is rising. A point worth noting is that the Cahora Bassa dam, built by Portugal, is beginning to export hydroelectric power to neighbouring countries.

25. Turning to the countries giving greater cause for concern, the political situation in *Lesotho* is very tense while in *Angola* the long-standing war between the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and Unita has flared up once again, even forcing UN troops to leave the country.

(d) East Africa

26. In recent years *Tanzania* has shown itself capable of sound economic management and its stability does not seem to be under threat, at least for the moment, from the large influx of refugees from Burundi or from the tension gripping the independent island of *Zanzibar* where the opposition is contesting the results of the 1995 elections. *Kenya* also enjoys great stability which does not appear to be undermined by the crises in neighbouring countries. The country was deeply shocked by the bomb attack against the American Embassy on 7 August 1998 which caused the death of 250 people and damages amounting to some US\$ 500 million. Kenya also has to contend with a huge public deficit (140 billion Kenya shillings in 1998). Although *Uganda* has been involved in the conflict in the DRC and has to address the problem of ethnically motivated rebel movements in the north (the Lord's Reform Army – LRA) and west (the Allied Democratic Forces – FDA) of the country, it has continued to implement economic reforms and appears to have consolidated political stability. It should however be noted that regular increases in the country's defence spending are beginning to put a strain on the economy.

27. Even though East Africa is fortunate in that there is no immediate crisis in the three countries referred to above, the region's overall balance appears to be somewhat fragile mainly because of the extremely worrying situation in neighbouring Rwanda, Burundi and Sudan.

⁷ See *Le Monde*, 25 April 1999.

(e) The Horn of Africa

28. This region of great strategic importance has traditionally been beset by conflicts. It was prey to rivalry between the colonial, then post-colonial powers and finally between the two superpowers during the cold war. The Horn of Africa is still prone to great instability as a result of the tribal war in *Somalia* that has been going on for a number of years and the conflict between *Eritrea* and *Ethiopia* (which itself has to contend with rebel Islamist movements and the Oromo Liberation Front). *Djibouti* has to get used to a smaller French military presence in the country but has seen a boom in its exports to Ethiopia (it provides landlocked Ethiopia with all-important access to the sea).

(f) The Indian Ocean

29. Fortunately, both the *Seychelles* and *Madagascar* have stable political climates, in contrast to the group of islands forming the *Republic of Comoros* which, following the secession of the island of Nzwani, is facing serious economic problems that threaten to undermine its stability. Indeed, they partly account for the crisis affecting the country's unity. The OAU is persisting with its efforts to find a peaceful solution to keep the country together by mediating between the Nzwani separatists – of whom it is critical – and the legal government. In 1998, the island of Nzwani adopted a constitution by referendum. The military expedition led by the federal authorities was a failure. Nzwani requested its re-attachment to France, which considered the request unrealistic. As the crisis threatened to escalate, the OAU appointed Mr Mandela to lead a mediation effort for the purpose of stabilising the situation. Despite a guarantee to the effect that the Comoros franc will continue to be indexed on the French franc after the transition to the euro, the country's economy remains very weak. On 23 April 1999, the representatives of the various islands in the archipelago concluded an agreement on a Union to replace the federal State but the Nzwani delegation refused to sign it. Protests and violent demonstrations in the capital, Moroni, ensued. Faced with this unstable situation the army, accusing the President and government of being too accommodating with the separatists, seized power under the command of its commander-in-chief, Colonel Assoumani, dissolved the country's constitution and disbanded

its institutions. Although a semblance of calm has returned to the Comoros, the prospects for future developments are not very good as Colonel Assoumani has said nothing about handing power back to the civil authorities⁸.

30. Another Indian Ocean island, *Mauritius*, has lost out in economic terms to Asian competitors. Its government is also under challenge from an opposition movement but despite these problems, the country continues to produce good economic results and its political stability does not appear to be under threat.

*III. The main flashpoints – a short historical review and the situation today**(a) Sierra Leone*

31. The head of state until 1991 was President Momoh. A series of coups d'état then brought civil war to Sierra Leone and it was at this time that F. Sankoh founded the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). Following elections in 1996, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah became President with the country still in the throes of conflict. In fact the President is in control of only a quarter of the country. The RUF, in alliance with a section of the army under the orders of Commander J. Koroma, invaded the capital, forcing President Kabbah to flee. In 1997, Sankoh was taken prisoner in Nigeria in circumstances that remain unclear and ECOMOG forces succeeded in taking back the capital in February 1998 and reinstating President Kabbah. But they did not manage to control the country areas where the RUF is based and in which it recruits its forces.

32. Early in 1999, S. Bockarie, Sankoh's second-in-command, launched a counter-offensive and is currently negotiating a truce in which he insists that the liberation of his leader is a *sine qua non* of a real ceasefire, whereas Nigeria and President Kabbah categorically reject that condition. Nigeria accuses Liberia and Burkina Faso of backing the rebels. It should also be noted that Nigeria, Ghana and Guinea (which provide ECOMOG forces) are lined up against the Côte d'Ivoire and Togo which are in favour of a diplomatic solution. But is ECOMOG capable of

⁸ However, E. Soussah, defending counsel for the Comoros State in the trial of the former mercenary, Robert Denard, has said that Colonel Assoumani intends to hold elections "over the next few months". See *Le Monde*, 7 May 1999.

handling the situation? At best, RUF troops will return to the countryside, which is where the movement has its support. Moreover, will Nigeria – a country in transition – be able to sustain its involvement? The observer mission the United Nations deployed in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) has since withdrawn to Conakry. On 18 May 1999, the warring parties signed a ceasefire which is to last for the duration of the peace talks that have now begun.

(b) Liberia

33. For eight years (1989-96) Liberia was devastated by a civil war that started with a revolt by the National Patriotic Front for Liberation (NPFL), under the leadership of Charles Taylor, against the regime of Samuel Doe. In 1990 an ECOMOG buffer force was deployed and regained control of the capital and surrounding areas. However, the rebel ULIMO liberation movement led by A. Kromah kept control of two areas in the north-west while the NPFL retained ten areas. President Doe was assassinated. Successive ceasefire agreements were concluded in 1991, 1993, 1994 and 1995 but never held. A United Nations Observation Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) was dispatched to the country in 1993. But the number of protagonists increased (ULIMO led by A. Kromah, ULIMO-J led by Prince Johnson for the Krahn ethnic group, the NPFL led by Charles Taylor, and forces loyal to Samuel Doe). In the end it was Charles Taylor who emerged victorious and was elected President in July 1997. However, after a period of relative calm, renewed clashes broke out in September 1998 with President Taylor intent upon destroying rival factions. The Liberian leader is also accused by the government of Sierra Leone, ECOMOG, the United States and the United Kingdom of supporting the rebellion led by the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone but he denies this.

(c) Somalia

34. In 1969 a coup d'état brought Siad Barré to power. Civil war raged in Somalia throughout the 1980s and President Barré then had to contend with an uprising by the Somali National Movement (SNM) and the CSU led by Ali Mahdi Mohammed who, after successfully driving out the President and taking the capital in 1991, was himself proclaimed interim President. But the

SNM challenged this appointment and went on to demand independence for Somaliland (under the leadership of I. Egal), a claim not recognised by the international community. Furthermore, a dispute between Ali Mahdi Mohammed and Mohammed Aideed, who belonged to internally opposed factions within the Hawiye tribe, divided the CSU and led to further clashes. Tribal war devastated the country and famine became widespread.

35. In late 1991, the UN Security Council decided to come to the aid of the population and disarm the militia. It mounted two successive operations – UNSOM I (in 1992) and UNSOM II (in 1993) – to provide the population with urgent humanitarian aid but also to separate and disarm the militia. But the UN's disarmament attempts led to clashes, in particular with General Aideed's militia, and UNSOM II troops left Somalia on 31 March 1995 without having restored peace.

36. In 1997, two agreements were concluded, the first at Sodere (Ethiopia) under Ethiopian auspices – but without Aideed – and the second in Cairo under the aegis of the Egyptians. The latter agreement made provision for the appointment of an interim government, the holding of parliamentary elections and the setting-up of an independent judiciary. However, fighting continued mainly between Aideed's SNM and the RRA.

37. In August 1998, Aideed – who has since died – and the government in Addis Ababa managed to overcome some of their differences (Ethiopia accused Aideed of supporting the Islamist rebels in the south). Ethiopia was given a mandate by the United Nations and the Inter-Government Authority on Development (IGAD) – consisting of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia Sudan and Uganda – to lead a peace initiative. A conference bringing together all the leaders of the various factions is scheduled to take place in Baidowa in the first half of 1999 to address the issue of a federation in Somalia and the establishment of a central authority involving all the faction leaders.

(d) Sudan

38. The majority of the population of Sudan is Muslim (75% concentrated in the north of the country) but Christians accounting for 15% and

animists for 10% live in the south. Sudan has been an Islamic republic since 1989 and has been led by Hassan El Tourabi since 1996. Sudan has a number of rebel movements, the main one being active in the southern part of the country which has a Christian majority. A bloody civil war between Christian and animist forces belonging to the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) led by John Garang and Muslim government forces has been raging in Sudan since 1983. But despite a number of attempts to draw closer together, the various rebel movements remain divided and no single one of them is capable of overthrowing the Islamist government in Khartoum. In April 1997 a charter for peace was signed in southern Sudan but a few months later government forces attacked SPLA positions. The ceasefire agreed by the two sides in July 1998 was nonetheless renewed for three months on 15 January 1999. Since April 1989 the United Nations has been present in Sudan through Operation Lifeline Sudan, a purely humanitarian campaign.

(e) Lesotho

39. Since September 1998, the Opposition has challenged the results of elections that strengthened the party in power, the Democratic Congress of Lesotho under the leadership of Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili. A section of the army has gone over to the Opposition and a climate of insurrection has set in. Invoking the South African Development Community (SADC) treaty, government authorities requested South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe to intervene to restore law and order. In doing precisely that, South Africa was lambasted by the local population and its initiative was given a lukewarm reception by its own citizens. The rebels withdrew to the mountains and since then, the general situation regarding law and order has been fragile.

(f) Congo-Brazzaville

40. From 1979 to 1992 the Congo – as it was then known – was led by the pro-Marxist government of President Daniel Sassou Nguesso. In 1992, Pascal Lissouba was elected President by a sovereign national conference. But a year later civil war broke out between Lissouba's Zulu and Cocoye militia, Sassou Nguesso's Cobra soldiers and the Ninjas led by Bernard Kolelas. In June

1997, Sassou Nguesso launched an all-out attack with the support of Angola and became self-appointed President in October. Since then the fighting has gone on sporadically and flared up again in December 1998. Nevertheless, a restructuring agreement was concluded with the IMF in July 1998 to help Congo-Brazzaville as it is now known rebuild its economy which has been badly hit by the conflict (in which some 10 000 people died over the period June to October 1997 alone). In addition, the price of oil – the country's main source of income – has become unstable while Asia, the country's main outlet, is in the grips of a crisis. The objective of the national reconciliation programme initiated by Sassou Nguesso is to restore peace in Congo-Brazzaville.

(g) Angola

41. After gaining independence from Portugal in 1975, Angola was locked in a civil war between the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) loyal to José Edouardo dos Santos and initially backed by Cuba and the former Soviet Union, and Unita – the rebel movement led by Jonas Savimbi and supported at the time by the United States and South Africa. A peace agreement was concluded at Bicesse (Estoril) between the warring factions in 1991 as a result of mediation by Portugal, the United States and the then Soviet Union. Elections held the following year were won by the MPLA but Unita refused to accept the outcome and war returned to plague the country. In 1993, the UN Security Council imposed an embargo on oil, diamonds and arms reaching Unita. The United Nations spent a year mediating between the parties and deployed troops for the UNAVEM III peacekeeping mission and the UNAOM monitoring mission. In 1994, the Lusaka peace treaty was signed. But the United Nations did not manage to disarm Unita or establish a dialogue between the protagonists. As things stand today, both parties accuse UNAOM of taking sides. The MPLA appears to take the view that it can get rid of Savimbi once and for all. Between late December 1998 and January this year two UN C-130 aircraft were shot down in a zone controlled by Unita although it was not possible to pin the blame on anyone in particular. The government asked the United Nations to leave the country and this was also recommended by Sec-

retary-General Kofi Annan in the report he submitted on 17 January 1999. However, since the Security Council, and more particularly the troika made up of the United States, Portugal and Russia, were not in favour of the United Nations pulling out altogether, a non-military UN presence in Angola has been maintained. The parties to the conflict have so far been all for continuing what has become a never-ending war and this is without doubt the main reason why the country, for all its wealth of natural resources, cannot manage to feed or educate the population and still less embark on the work of reconstruction and economic and social development.

(h) Ethiopia and Eritrea

42. For many years Meles Zenawi and Issaias Afwerki, the respective Presidents of Eritrea and Ethiopia, fought together to bring down the Mengistu dictatorship. Following their victory, Ethiopia agreed in 1991 to Eritrean independence. But some questions were left open, such as the borders issue. In any event the two states opted for different political and legal economic systems. In November 1997, Eritrea began minting its own currency and the conflict of interests became evident. Armed conflict broke out in May 1998 because of a border dispute over a few pockets of territory. A truce was declared on 15 June as a result of Italian arbitration but no solution was found despite further efforts at mediation on the part of Egypt, Libya, Rwanda, Sudan the United States and Zimbabwe. The Organisation of African Unity also failed to persuade the parties to compromise. In January 1999, with the situation on the ground deteriorating, the United States renewed its mediation efforts through its special envoy to the region, Anthony Lake, describing his mission as part of the package of proposals made by the OAU (withdrawal of Eritrean troops and deployment of a peacekeeping and monitoring force for six months). The UN Secretary-General also decided that same month to dispatch an envoy in an attempt to find a way of averting the war lurking beneath the surface. Renewed violent clashes in February and March forced the Eritreans to accept the principles of the OAU's proposals (the withdrawal of troops and recognition of international boundaries). Further outbreaks of fighting prompted President Mubarak to embark on a mediation mission early in May.

(i) Guinea-Bissau

43. In June 1998 an army uprising led by General Mané against President João Bernardo Vieira plunged the country into chaos. Senegal and Guinea intervened at the President's request (on the basis of a 1975 defence agreement). A ceasefire was secured in late August through the mediation of the CPLP (Community of Portuguese-speaking countries) and the Bishop of Bissau, Monsignor Settimio Ferrazetta, who has since died. However, hostilities resumed early in October. A summit meeting of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), held on 30-31 October 1998, resulted in the signing of an agreement in Abuja on 1 November. It made provision for the withdrawal of foreign troops, the deployment of an ECOMOG (the ECOWAS Monitoring Group) buffer force of 1 400 troops provided by the ECOWAS states, the appointment of a government of national union (to be set up jointly by the President and the rebel junta) and the holding of parliamentary and presidential elections by the end of 1999. The ceasefire which was agreed in August 1998 and the resulting Abuja agreement signed in November were confirmed in Lomé in December under the auspices of ECOWAS. A solution therefore seemed to be taking shape in which a government of national union would steer the country through an interim period culminating in fresh elections. However, fighting broke out again just as ECOMOG was on the point of being deployed. Following negotiations in which Emma Bonino, the EU Commissioner for humanitarian affairs, acted as peace broker, the first stage of ECOMOG's deployment was able to go ahead – albeit with some difficulty – in February this year. For a time it seemed a rather fragile *status quo* was holding. A disarmament and billeting commission was set up to oversee the return to peace and the organisation of elections for November. However, the ceasefire was broken yet again on 6 May 1999. Renewed clashes led to a military junta seizing power. Nevertheless, elections are still scheduled for November and the National Assembly and government continue to function.

(j) The Great Lakes Region

1. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

44. The Rwandan crisis and the massive exodus of civilians destabilised the eastern part of

the *Democratic Republic of Congo* (formerly Zaire) and the Mobutu regime. Laurent Désiré Kabila, a former rebel proclaimed President in 1997, took advantage of the upheaval in the country's *status quo* to march on Kinshasa and eventually to topple Mobutu and his followers who were forced into exile. Although Kabila was supported in his march to victory by Rwanda and Uganda (and to a lesser extent by Burundi), he very quickly wanted to break away from them. However, his decision to send Rwandan troops back to their country in July 1998 triggered an uprising by the Banyamulenge (Congolese Tutsis of Rwandan extraction) supported by Rwanda. In fact, Kampala and Kigali saw in Kabila's decision to break off relations a loss of their *de facto* control over the fertile region of Kivu, an area which, among other things, has traditionally been a breeding ground for Ugandan and Rwanda anti-government movements.

45. In August a sustained rebellion looked as though it was threatening the Kinshasa government. But just as the situation began to look bleak for Kabila, Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe came to his aid by sending their élite troops into Zaire and stopping the rebels' advance. Chad, Libya and Sudan also intervened to support Kabila while the Central African Republic tried to bring about conciliation. There was a series of attempts at mediation over a number of months on the part of the SADC, the OAU and the United Nations.

46. Finally, in January 1999 it looked as though a ceasefire had been agreed at a summit meeting in Windhoek, Namibia, and a request was made to the UN Security Council to form a peacekeeping force. But neither President Kabila nor the rebel leaders of the Rally for a Democratic Congo attended the meeting and on 18 January, in an interview with DRC state radio, President Kabila expressed the view, as the rebels were to do later on, that he was not bound by the agreement reached. Towards the end of April, he signed a truce with Uganda, which promised to withdraw its troops from DRC territory. However, neither Rwanda nor the two main rebel movements have said they will abide by this agreement, which was concluded mainly as a result of Libyan mediation⁹.

⁹ See *Le Monde* and *Libération* of 21 April 1999.

2. Burundi

47. The civil war in Burundi began in 1993 following the assassination of the elected President, Mr Ndadaye (a Hutu), during a coup d'état carried out by the Tutsi-dominated army. In 1994, the new President, Mr Ntariamyra (also a Hutu) was killed together with the Rwandan President when the aircraft in which they were travelling was shot down over Kigali in circumstances that have never been explained. In 1996, Major Buyoya (a Tutsi) seized power and has since had to contend with a rebellion by the Hutus. Former President Nyerere of Tanzania, who has been a prime mover in mediation efforts, has drawn up a timetable for negotiations envisaging an agreement by the end of 1999. In January a regional summit was held to consider the possible lifting of sanctions imposed by the countries of the region in the event of progress in the intra-Burundi negotiations. A decision was taken to suspend the sanctions and President Buyoya undertook to do everything possible to reach a peace agreement with the armed opposition by the end of the current year. Some 200 000 people are said to have died since the beginning of the civil war.

3. Rwanda

48. The current Tutsi-dominated government, which came to power in 1994 following the civil war and genocide, is trying to put down the (Hutu) rebellion being waged by the former Rwandan Armed Forces and the Interhamwe militia operating in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo. However, these rebel activities have fallen off since the start of the war in the DRC. All the same, Rwanda is still a highly unstable country. There has been some improvement in its economy (in 1998 GDP stood at 85% of the 1994 rate) but defence spending accounts for 50% of the overall budget. According to various estimates, between 500 000 and a million people been killed since 1994 in Rwanda and Kivu, the eastern part of the DRC.

(k) *The Central African Republic (CAR)*

49. Since 1996, violent rebellions against the regime led by Ange-Felix Patassé have divided the country and weakened its economy. However, the Bangui Agreements signed in March 1998 put an end to the fighting and led to the holding of parliamentary elections under the watchful eye

of MISAB (inter-African mission to monitor the implementation of the Bangui Agreements), consisting of troops from a number of African countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Gabon, Mali, Senegal and Togo) with logistic support provided by France. In April 1998 the mission handed over to MINURCA (United Nations mission in the Central African Republic). In the elections that were held in late 1998 the Opposition won by a narrow majority (55 seats compared with 47 for the government coalition). However, President Patassé's MPLC obtained the support of two parliamentarians belonging to a small allied party and of five independent members, bringing the balance in parliament to 55 seats for the Opposition as against 54 for the President. But this balance was upset in a dramatic turn of events when a member of the UFAP went over to the government side in circumstances that were somewhat unclear.

50. The Opposition, which considers it was robbed of its majority, is now calling for a protest against the government which also has to cope with the growing discontent of the population due, among other things, to long-standing arrears in the payment of civil servants' salaries and concern over the presence of troops from the DRC in connection with operations mounted against the Kivu rebels. Despite MINURCA's efforts to promote national dialogue, a fresh upsurge in the fighting cannot, unfortunately, be ruled out.

IV. The role of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and subregional organisations

51. The OAU was founded by the Charter of 25 May 1963 which was signed in Addis Ababa by 32 African states. Today the Organisation has 53 member countries, that is, all the countries of Africa with the exception of Morocco which withdrew for a few years as from 1984 in protest at the admission of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (Western Sahara). The OAU takes as its basis the principles of member states' sovereignty, non-interference in their internal affairs and respect for their independence and territorial integrity. From the outset it stressed the importance it attached to the immutability of borders, a principle it has stoutly defended to this day in a concern – not given official expression but accepted in practice – not to promote interminable conflicts which would most likely be

provoked by changes to the, often arbitrary, territorial arrangements in Africa that are a legacy of the colonial period.

52. However, it has to be said that since it was founded some 35 years ago, the OAU has had difficulty in achieving African unity and, as is unfortunately the case in other international organisations, it has often found itself unable to do more than record the differences between its members. Thus, although the search for peaceful solutions to crises is one of the Organisation's declared objectives (as set forth in Articles 3 and 19 of the 1963 Charter), the OAU has in fact done little in this area, at least until recently. While some of its attempts at mediation have produced results, its peacekeeping record up to the beginning of the 1990s was fairly mediocre. Until then the OAU had neither the appropriate structures nor resources and, what is more, there appeared to be no real political will among its members for it to become the proper forum for settling conflicts among the African countries which often preferred to submit their disputes to bodies outside the continent, such as the International Court of Justice¹⁰.

53. In 1964 an additional protocol to the Charter made provision for the creation of a Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration within the OAU. However, for many years the member states eschewed recourse to this commission, preferring to set up *ad hoc* committees, appoint special mediators or rely on the Secretary-General of the OAU to intervene to settle crises. Furthermore, the protocol specified that "the Commission shall have jurisdiction over disputes between states only"¹¹ and not therefore over internal conflicts.

54. Moreover, for a very long time peacekeeping in the strict sense was considered the exclusive prerogative of the United Nations. The only occasion on which an African peacekeeping force was deployed was a failure (Chad, 1981). However, early in the 1990s, the African countries acknowledged that they needed to become more involved in the security of their continent. Thus, in March 1991, a mission consisting of

¹⁰ Such disputes mainly concerned borders and the continental shelf.

¹¹ Article 12 of the 1964 protocol creating the Commission.

120 observers was dispatched to Rwanda under the authority of the OAU Secretary-General.

55. But it was not until the Cairo Summit in 1993 that the heads of state and government of the OAU adopted a declaration establishing a proper Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. The objectives were to anticipate and prevent conflicts and, where necessary, to restore and consolidate peace. The Cairo Declaration, paragraph 9 of which stresses the concerns of the states regarding *internal conflicts*, also set up a "central body" with a decision-taking remit. This body is known as the *Bureau of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government*. Its members are elected annually in accordance with the principles of fair regional representation and rotation. However, the Bureau is subject to the rule of consensus.

56. In your Rapporteur's opinion, particular importance should be given to paragraph 130 of the Cairo Declaration which stipulates that in cases of blatant violation of law and order, the OAU not only has a right but also a duty to intervene even before appealing to the international community for assistance. In similar cases, reference may be made to the Organisation's central body by parties other than the sole parties to the conflict, and indeed without their consent. Two years after the Cairo Declaration, the OAU called upon its member states to develop and strengthen their peacekeeping capabilities and to form units of troops specifically designated for this type of mission. Finally, in 1996 a *conflict management centre* was set up at the Organisation's headquarters consisting, *inter alia*, of an early warning section, an operations room and a logistics centre. Regular meetings of the chiefs-of-staff were envisaged with a view to defining an African peacekeeping doctrine and discussing problems of organisation, command, logistics and exercise training. A "fund for peace" was also set up but unfortunately it relies on foreign aid for most of its funding.

57. Everything would appear to suggest that some sharing of tasks between the OAU and subregional African organisations is beginning to emerge. In practice, the Organisation is concentrating mainly on preventive diplomacy (by mediating and proposing its good offices) while the formation of peacekeeping forces and intervention by them is being left to regional groups of

countries such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) or the South African Development Community (SADC) which operate under the auspices of the OAU and the United Nations. Here again, these subregional organisations seem to find it extremely difficult to do without foreign aid, as shown by ECOMOG's repeated calls for assistance to the United Nations and wealthy non-African countries. The President of Togo has proposed the creation of subregional force units which could receive equipment and financial support from abroad (the UN, WEU, states with bilateral agreements, major powers, etc.) while operations proper should be "wholly funded by the United Nations".

58. Many African countries are currently grouping together in this way. As has already been said, such groups can – for a number of reasons – make a very important contribution to peacekeeping. In the first place, they are directly concerned by the crises affecting their members or the region whose peace and economic and social development they are striving to safeguard. It should also be remembered that their main objective is development and integration on a regional level while at the same time they want to be more involved in settling conflicts.

59. To date, action has been taken by ECOWAS whose peacekeeping force, ECOMOG, intervened as early as 1990 first in Liberia and then in Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau. The SADC is also endeavouring to resolve conflicts mainly through mediation (in the Comoros and the DRC) but also by sending in troops to restore peace (Lesotho). Similarly, the East African Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is making proposals for peaceful solutions to the conflicts affecting its members (Sudan, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Somalia). Last but not least, there is the Economic Community of Central African States, which could turn out to be a valuable political instrument for security in central Africa if the Libreville Summit in April 1998 is anything to go by.

V. The peacekeeping requirements of the OAU, subregional organisations and ad hoc coalitions of certain states

60. There is certainly a case for being critical about the effectiveness of the OAU in the field of

African peacekeeping. Yet it also has to be said that the United Nations itself is no more effective, except when the major powers decide otherwise¹². At the Lisbon Colloquy the Assembly of WEU held on 15 September 1998, Ambassador António, Deputy Secretary-General of the Organisation of African Unity, and Mr Pere, President of the Togolese National Assembly, left no one in doubt as to the Africans' resolve to take the security of their continent into their own hands. But both stressed that considerable support from other countries was also necessary for the success of peacekeeping operations¹³. Furthermore, the director of the OAU's office in Brussels, with whom your Rapporteur talked at length when preparing this report, stressed the possibilities for developing the existing machinery, while confirming the political will of Africans to become even more active in the field of peacekeeping.

61. It is quite clear that the main requirements of African peacekeeping forces are of a logistic and financial order. The lack of sufficiently well trained troops for peacekeeping missions is also a major problem, though secondary compared with the need for better transport, telecommunications, information and troop commands. In addition, the cost of such operations is in itself a heavy burden to bear for African countries whose resources are clearly very limited. By way of example, the cost to Nigeria, whose troops form the bulk of the ECOMOG force, of the intervention in Sierra Leone can be estimated at about US\$ 1 million¹⁴. It would consequently seem that foreign support for the African states is more crucial today than ever before given that the OAU does not have the necessary funds, since arrears of contributions and their irregular payment by the member states prevents the Organisation from fulfilling the role of an African-style UN.

62. In all these cases the problems are almost always the same. Political will and the practical means to take action are often lacking while foreign support, at least in terms of logistics and funding, would appear essential if only in the

medium term. Some peacekeeping missions can in fact be handled by all-African contingents with the support, in logistic and other areas, of a non-African country. An example of this is the inter-African mission to monitor the implementation of the Bangui Agreements (MISAB), which ended in April 1998 and was replaced by MINURCA, in which the troops involved were all-African with France providing logistic support. It would be very difficult for such operations, undertaken by coalitions of the willing or organised at a genuinely subregional level, to do without foreign support when it comes to arms and a number of areas in which logistic support is vital.

VI. The United Nations and peacekeeping in Africa

63. By virtue of its status and history, the United Nations should be considered as the guarantor *par excellence* of the maintenance of peace in Africa as in the rest of the world. It was upon the United Nations, or to be more precise, the Security Council that its founders conferred "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security" (Article 24 of the UN Charter). There is no doubt that since it was established, the UN has been of crucial importance for the African continent. It firmly supported the process of decolonisation in the 1960s and 1970s¹⁵, and also provided a forum in which the African countries could make their voices heard in the concert of nations, initially through their representation in the General Assembly and subsequently in the Security Council as elected members. Finally, the UN has played a vital role for many years in providing development and humanitarian aid via its specialised agencies (UNDP, UNICEF, HCR).

64. With specific reference to peacekeeping, the United Nations was the main coordinator of the operations that proved necessary as from the early 1960s and demonstrated its resolve in this respect by creating the United Nations Operation in the Congo (UNOC), under Resolution 169 of 24 January 1961, in order to tackle the Congolese conflict. However, the cold war prevented the United Nations from carrying out its role to the full, both in Africa and elsewhere. It was not

¹² See A. Bourgi, *Voyage au coeur de l'OUA in Politique étrangère* 1998, Vol. 4.

¹³ See the official record of the colloquy.

¹⁴ See Anthony Lloyd, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, quoted in *Jeune Afrique*.

¹⁵ See UN General Assembly Resolution AG/1514/XV of 14 December 1960 and its Declaration of 24 October 1970.

until 1989 that the UN was able to become more active in the field of peacekeeping by sending missions to Namibia (United Nations Transition Assistance Group – UNTAG) and Angola (United Nations Angola Verification Mission – UNAVEM). As Mr Miyet, United Nations Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, reminded participants at the Lisbon Colloquy in September 1998, of the 32 peacekeeping operations the United Nations carried out throughout the world between 1989 and 1998, 16 were on the continent of Africa.

65. However, the international community was so shocked by the failure of the UN missions in Somalia (UNSOM I and II) that it subsequently showed great reluctance, and even refused, to become involved in African affairs. UNSOM, which was deployed in Somalia from 1992, was the first UN operation that did not go through to the end of its mandate. In taking its decision to terminate the operation¹⁶, the UN Security Council noted that fighting and clashes between some factions and UN forces were continuing, thus admitting that its peacekeeping forces had virtually become a party to the conflict. Although the mission was a success in humanitarian terms, it failed in its crucial task of disarming the warring parties, namely, the clans.

66. Since that unnerving experience, the Security Council appears to have reacted very cautiously to African crises and in some cases has avoided taking the requisite decisions. It can thus be said to have stopped intervening actively in certain situations – with terrible consequences in the case of the Rwandan tragedy. Although the part some countries played in the crisis is extremely controversial, it does nothing to alter the fact that the United Nations, though sufficiently well informed, showed itself to be incapable of preventing the tragedy from unfolding. In point of fact, once the genocide was under way, and despite the alarming information and repeated warnings from the head of the UN observer mission to Angola (UNAOM), the Security Council did not take the necessary decisions or deploy the means that would have enabled the appropriate troops to have been sent to the scene to stop the massacres. Quite to the contrary, the Security Council decided, in response to the Secretary-

¹⁶ UN Security Council Resolution 954 of 4 November 1994.

General's recommendations, to reduce the size of its mission. Coming after Somalia, the Rwandan experience merely added to the United Nations' feeling of unease and reluctance to become involved in African crises, with the result that it lost a great deal of credibility in the eyes of the countries of that continent.

67. The fact that UNAOM's effectiveness was called into question and that both the Angolan authorities and even the Unita rebels wanted the mission to leave the country were proof of the United Nations' loss of influence in Africa, undeniably a potentially dangerous development. In an attempt to rectify this state of affairs, the United Nations has for some time been trying to promote the idea of African peacekeeping operations being led by the OAU, subregional organisations (such as ECOWAS, the SADC or IGAD) or by groups of states belonging to the region affected by a particular crisis (for instance, MISAB in the Central African Republic). This new policy was first outlined by Mr Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his *Agenda for Peace*, before being developed in his report to the Security Council of 1 November 1995. The proposals in it were taken up by his successor, Mr Kofi Annan¹⁷.

68. Chapter VIII of the UN Charter makes provision (in Articles 52 to 54) for peacekeeping operations to be dealt with by *regional agencies* provided they are consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. It is also clear that the UN does not have the human and financial resources for managing all the crises that erupt on the African continent. Moreover, the particularity of such crises, which for the most part involve conflicts between states with grievances against each other, often calls for regional action to be taken by the forces of countries with a better knowledge of the causes, determining factors, terrain and general political context. However, in his report referred to above, Mr Annan is certainly not against the United Nations continuing to intervene directly in Af-

¹⁷ "The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa", the Secretary-General's report to the Security Council of 16 April 1998, which the Council endorsed in Resolution 1170 of 28 May 1998.

rica¹⁸. The UN is currently directly involved in three African crises: in Sierra Leone (with UNOMSIL), the Central African Republic (with MINURCA) and Angola (with UNAOM).

69. Your Rapporteur's general conclusion is that, without actually divesting itself of its overall responsibility, the United Nations would like the African countries to be more involved in peacekeeping and security on their continent. It should therefore, at least according to its Secretary-General, support regional and subregional initiatives to promote peace, while encouraging the enhancement of African peacekeeping capabilities. The United Nations has accordingly decided to strengthen cooperation with regional organisations by taking a series of steps including the creation of a special trust fund for conflict prevention in Africa, the setting-up of a liaison office at the seat of the OAU, annual meetings of representatives of the UN and OAU Secretariats-General and establishing closer relations with ECOWAS, the IGAD and the SADC. The UN's declared aim is to coordinate initiatives to promote peace while ensuring there are not too many of them and that they do not contradict each other. In addition, on the military side the UN has set up training programmes (training assistance teams, train the trainers) and provided support for a number of exercises. Furthermore, its missions, such as UNOMSIL in Sierra Leone and UNOMIL in Liberia (where the main operation was led by ECOMOG) have been organised as a backup or complement to action taken by regional forces.

70. Finally, the United Nations would like to coordinate the various initiatives being taken outside Africa, such as the United States ACRI programme, the French RECAMP project and aid programmes being implemented by the United Kingdom or Portugal. As Mr Miyet pointed out at the Lisbon Colloquy, all this calls first and foremost for "a genuine readiness to share information and expertise" as well as "ongoing political support from member states" and "adequate financial resources". It is also worth noting that, in his address, Mr Miyet stressed that WEU

could provide the United Nations with very valuable support for the efforts it was making.

VII. Action taken by the West

(a) Europe

71. A number of WEU member countries have a long association with Africa. The paragraphs that follow outline some of the national programmes providing aid to African countries. It is a matter for regret that most of them are carried out on a bilateral basis.

72. *France* has traditionally maintained a strong presence in Africa where it wielded considerable influence throughout the post-colonial period. However, its experience in Rwanda seems to have had the same effect on the French authorities as Somalia had on the United States in that, since 1995, France has been increasingly less inclined to become involved in peacekeeping operations in Africa on its own, preferring instead to be part of a multinational endeavour. At the same time it appears to want to readjust its relations with Africa by breaking away from the mould of its special influence over the African French-speaking countries and moving towards a policy of aid for all African states regardless of whether they are French-, Portuguese- or English-speaking. This fundamental shift has gone hand in hand with a reduction in the number of French troops pre-positioned in Africa. By 2000 France will have reduced a total of 8 400 troops stationed at six bases in 1998 to 5 500 spread over five bases.

73. To offset or complement this measure, France has implemented a concept known as RECAMP – standing for the reinforcement of African peacekeeping capabilities. As Admiral Borgis stressed at the Lisbon Colloquy, RECAMP is based on three pillars: training, equipment and exercises and field training to enable African troops to carry out peacekeeping operations. The first practical examples of how this concept is being applied can be seen in the Central African Republic with MISAB (now replaced by MINURCA) and in the logistics and transport facilities supplied to ECOMOG in Guinea-Bissau. Similarly to the American ACRI programme, the RECAMP concept operates in a UN framework and is open to any African countries wishing to take part in it. Its main purpose is to form and train national units which can be

¹⁸ According to paragraph 44 of Mr Annan's report to the Security Council, "Regional organisations can face political, structural, financial or planning limitations. At times the impartiality or neutrality of their member states may be questioned ...".

mobilised at speed for peacekeeping operations authorised by the United Nations. Under the French project – and this is perhaps its most positive feature – logistics can be made available by establishing pre-positioned equipment depots such as the one in Dakar. It is planned to set up a training centre at Zambankro, Côte d'Ivoire, in the near future. The RECAMP concept gave rise to the first large-scale African exercise, involving 3 500 troops from eight countries (Cape Verde, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania and Senegal). Dubbed "Guidimakha 98", this exercise was also supported by the United Kingdom and the United States and was monitored by observers from WEU.

74. The Francophone movement emerged in the 1960s as a result of France's desire to bring together its former colonies in a community in which the French language was the common denominator – hence the involvement also of Belgium, Canada, Luxembourg and Switzerland. At the same time the movement reflects a resolve to promote the French language and culture as a counterbalance to the influence of Anglo-American culture. The Agency for Cultural and Technical Cooperation (ACCT) was established in 1970 and became the Francophone Agency in 1996. Mainly funded by France, the activities of this intergovernmental agency were for a time limited to education and training programmes. It was principally during the 1980s under the Mitterrand Presidency that the Francophone movement was given a new lease of life, with the first summit of French-speaking countries being held in 1986 along the lines of Franco-African summit meetings. Since then, conferences of the heads of state and government have been held every two years. Over the years France has given the movement a more political slant: one only has to think back to François Mitterrand's *Chaillot* speech in 1991, in which he urged Africa to go down the path of democracy, or the refusal to hold the 1993 Francophone summit in Zaire as a sign of protest against the blocking of the process of transition to democracy. Today, the Francophone movement is making quite considerable headway in its relations with African countries¹⁹

¹⁹ Of its 52 member states, 28 are African countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo-Brazzaville, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic

through various aid and cooperation programmes. In addition to its summits, it has a Permanent Council (15 members representing the heads of state and government) and a Secretariat-General, which was created in 1997 with Mr Boutros Boutros-Ghali appointed as its head. In the same way as in the Commonwealth, security and defence issues are addressed more in a bilateral framework between France and the other member countries. Thus the Francophone movement is neither a military alliance nor a defence organisation. Similarly, although its members are very active in the field of peacekeeping, the movement does not participate as such in peacekeeping operations. Despite the shift of emphasis in the 1980s, the Francophone movement's activities have for the most part remained cultural. Nevertheless, they now also extend to economic aspects, as shown by the Monaco Conference on 14-15 April 1999 which was attended by the finance ministers of the member states. The declared aim of the Secretary-General is for the movement to become an international organisation in the true sense, able to make its voice heard in the major international institutions such as the IMF or WTO.

75. In 1994, the then Prime Minister, John Major, confirmed the *United Kingdom's* support for African peacekeeping initiatives by proposing assistance with the formation, equipment and training of African units. This offer has been maintained by the present British Government. In the meantime, the UK aid programme has been put into effect through bilateral partnerships, in particular with Ghana (training courses for Ghanaian officers) and Zimbabwe (training course held at the military academy in Harare). In October 1994, the *Blue Caucus* exercise was held at a British military academy near London for officers from Zimbabwe, Kenya, Ghana and Egypt. The United Kingdom is also providing logistic and financial aid to the ECOMOG force in Sierra Leone.

76. The *Commonwealth* has an important part to play in Africa since no fewer than 19 African

of Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Togo, Tunisia.

countries²⁰ (out of a total of 54) are members. Its activities cover a range of areas: the economy and trade, ecology, education and training, health, democracy and human rights, and security and defence – although the Commonwealth is neither a military alliance nor a defence organisation. Defence cooperation and arrangements for strengthening African peacekeeping forces are organised on a wholly bilateral basis between the United Kingdom and other member countries or else between the United Kingdom and the OAU. In contrast, the Commonwealth is much more active in the civil and political spheres and since 1965 has had a Secretariat-General which manages three special funds: Technical Cooperation, the Youth Programme and the Science Council. The United Kingdom contributes 30% to the Commonwealth budget with the remaining contributions being paid by each member country on a *pro rata* basis according to its means. Since the early 1990s, the Commonwealth has stepped up its activities to further peace, democracy and human rights. Between 1990 and 1997 for instance, it supervised some 20 or so elections and referendums. Similarly, recourse has been had on several occasions to the Secretary-General's good offices in the settlement of crises (such as in Tanzania and Zambia). In addition to its strong opposition to the apartheid system in South Africa until 1994, the Commonwealth has often exerted pressure on a number of its members in order to restore peace or safeguard democracy. In 1995, for example, it decided to ban Nigeria from membership following the execution of Ken Saro-Wisa, who opposed the regime. It marginalised the Gambia after the 1994 coup d'état and took action against Sierra Leone following the coup d'état by Commander Koroma in 1997. From an institutional point of view it is interesting to note the decision taken in 1995 at the Auckland Summit in New Zealand, whereby the Commonwealth created the Ministerial Action Group for the purpose of fighting serious and repeated human rights violations.

77. *Portugal*, which has had a presence in Africa for centuries, is today again involved in a

²⁰ Botswana, Cameroon, the Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

wide spectrum of activities ranging from education and culture to the economy, and initiatives to promote development, health and management training through to the setting-up of a democratic system of public administration. The WEU Assembly's Lisbon Colloquy and Portugal's preparations to host a Euro-African summit, also in Lisbon, in 2000 amply demonstrate its active involvement. In the context of the bilateral cooperation it has developed with each of the five Portuguese-speaking African countries, Portugal has supported a change in legislation on defence, particularly as regards the structures and operation of the armed forces, with a view to making them more democratic and strengthening their links with the political institutions. It has developed a number of programmes for the reorganisation of the defence and armed forces ministries and the training of senior officers, mainly in military colleges catering for higher education. Another significant item is the programme to help reorganise those services and units which will soon be capable of participating in peacetime missions in the public interest (*inter alia* construction work, communications), thereby enhancing the social development and professional qualifications of conscripts.

78. After several years of sections of the military personnel of the five countries concerned having been trained either in Portugal or at their own training centres, all the parties have arrived at a certain convergence of doctrines and have developed common concepts, making for better all-round military cooperation among them. The result is that the five countries are now far better equipped to take part in peace missions on the African continent under the auspices of the United Nations or the subregional organisations in which each of them is involved, again in accordance with a UN mandate. This situation may help to strengthen African conflict-prevention and peacekeeping capabilities as a whole. Finally, the participation of military observers and small contingents from the five Portuguese-speaking countries in combined exercises in Portugal is a fact also worth noting as is Portuguese logistic support for exercises carried out under the aegis of the SADC, involving forces from Angola and Mozambique.

79. The setting-up of a network of multilateral relations across the community of Portuguese-speaking countries brings another dimension to

relations between Africa and Portugal. Indeed, the CPLP (Community of Portuguese-speaking countries), which was established in 1996²¹ and comprises five African countries (Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and São Tomé e Príncipe), works in fields such as education, culture and training, particularly of managerial staff. It is a new international organisation which has quickly acquired a political dimension. To its credit, the CPLP has already taken a number of diplomatic and political initiatives to restore peace, such as those which led to the cessation of hostilities in Guinea Bissau.

80. *Belgium* has also been engaged in Africa for a long time but in recent years has become increasingly cautious – again as a result of the Rwandan crisis – and now prefers to take part in programmes and operations conducted under United Nations auspices. Since 1994, Belgium has contributed with funds and assistance to various UN initiatives such as the UNAMIR II (Rwanda) and OMIB (Burundi) African peacekeeping operations. On the diplomatic front, it has also supported the OAU's mediation efforts in Burundi led by J. Nyerere, contributed to the OAU peace fund and put up funding for Burkina Fasso's participation in ECOMOG operations in Liberia. It has helped the IGAD with its project aimed at settling the Sudanese conflict.

81. *Italy* is another country whose traditional involvement in Africa transcends its colonial past and today it too is active in a number of areas. In referring to his country's policy on Africa at the Lisbon Colloquy, Ambassador Melani stressed that Italy was putting the focus on training in its African programme. Indeed, in addition to its contribution to OAU activities, Italy has set up a cooperation programme with Ethiopia. It is providing funds for African officers to attend courses at police-training centres and also for peacekeeping seminars given at the United Nations Staff College in Turin²².

82. Finally, *Denmark's* cooperation programme (via its special fund for peace in Africa) and in particular the action it has taken to set up

a peacekeeping training centre in Zimbabwe are worthy of mention.

83. This list is by no means exhaustive. Generally speaking, the European countries are very much involved in Africa and their efforts clearly go further than peacekeeping alone. Many European nations provide Africa with development aid and economic cooperation which is particularly valuable given that crises will not disappear for as long as Africa does not make any headway in achieving social and economic development and sustained political stability. However, all these European initiatives unfortunately have only limited effect partly because there are too many of them and partly because of the risk of overlap and contradiction between them. Your Rapporteur considers it worth paying heed to a comment by the Senegalese army spokesman after a training session organised in 1997 by US special forces when he said that Senegalese troops "had learnt nothing the French had not already taught them"²³. This was perhaps one of the reasons that led to the conclusion of the tripartite initiative coordination agreement between the United States, France and the United Kingdom in 1997. A further development is Anglo-French rapprochement on Africa as illustrated by the meetings Mr Robin Cook and Mr Hubert Védrine had in Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire in March 1999. The clear objective of those meetings was to put an end to the rivalry between France and the United Kingdom on the African continent. The two governments intend to cooperate closely to the point of having joint diplomatic missions and taking action together to promote human rights and economic development²⁴. This is to be welcomed as it can only have positive effects for the continent as a whole.

84. To avoid contradiction and duplication in European initiatives, WEU could quite clearly take on the job of liaising between the various actions of its member countries designed to strengthen African peacekeeping capabilities. Moreover, as it is plain that most WEU member countries no longer wish to intervene in Africa in an individual capacity, WEU could provide them

²¹ The way in which this community is organised is very similar to the precedents set by the Commonwealth and the Francophone movement.

²² See the official record of the Lisbon Colloquy.

²³ *The Economist*, "An African answer to African wars", 18 October 1997.

²⁴ See *Le Figaro*, "Entente cordiale en Afrique", 10 March 1999 and the *Financial Times*, "UK, France push for Africa fair deal", 12 March 1999.

with a framework for various forms of participation or at least for their contributions to the peacekeeping operations which unfortunately continue to be necessary in Africa.

(b) The United States

85. History shows that compared with its involvement in other parts of the world, the United States appears to take only limited interest in Africa. To begin with, it has never been a colonial power – at least not on that continent. During the cold war it preferred to leave the main responsibility for defining Western interests to the Europeans and chose to focus its own efforts on areas it considered were strategically important. It is worth noting that no President of the United States went to Africa between Mr Carter's visit in 1978 and Mr Clinton's in 1998. This absence, which was also symbolic, naturally had a corollary and one of the events that marred President Clinton's first term in office was the failure of US intervention in Somalia. It was virtually the only initiative he took on Africa during his first four years in power.

86. However, the American administration was aware of a vacuum and in 1995 decided to do something about it. This is the context in which the President's tour of Africa in March/April 1998 is to be seen. The idea of a "new partnership" between the United States and Africa gained currency, its aim being mainly to secure a more sustained trade and funding commitment. At the same time, the United States wanted to promote efforts to bring about political stability in Africa. Washington accordingly decided to support a "new generation" of leaders who would open up the possibility of an "African renaissance" covering an area stretching from Uganda to South Africa. However, because the Americans were disappointed by their failure in Somalia, they no longer wished to become directly involved in crises even though they realised that their investment growth depended on political and economic stabilisation of the region.

87. It was precisely to meet this concern that in 1996 the State Department came up with the idea of the ACRI (African Crisis Response Initiative) which was intended to support and strengthen African peacekeeping capabilities. The main points of the programme, a typical way of demonstrating renewed American interest, were clearly described by Ambassador McCallie,

ACRI Coordinator at the US State Department, at the Lisbon Colloquy. In keeping with the proposals submitted by the UN Secretary-General in his 1995 report, the ACRI proposes a programme for *training African troop contingents* for peacekeeping and humanitarian aid operations. It also makes provision for *supplying appropriate equipment* to meet the contingents' needs (telecommunications in particular). A number of African countries (Senegal, Uganda, Malawi, Mali and Ghana) have already benefited from the programme.

88. The Americans stress that the ACRI is not intended to undermine European influence on the African continent, despite the widely held view to the contrary. Furthermore, it seems that this concern not to make Africa the butt of rivalry between Europeans and Americans led to the signing of an agreement between the United States, France and the United Kingdom in New York in May 1997. This important document, dubbed the tripartite initiative, makes provision for coordination between three of the main Western countries with a view to helping the Africans develop their peacekeeping capabilities.

VIII. Action taken by religious associations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs)

(a) Religious associations

89. Throughout history, religious associations have had a strong presence in Africa. Their activities are often vital to African populations and they provide a great deal of aid in regions which are sometimes ignored by the media and where the international community is under-represented. Among other things, the missions run by these associations provide shelter and first aid as well as distributing food and medicines to people displaced by conflicts. For example, in Sierra Leone today, religious orders continue to support the civilian population whereas the NGOs and UN agencies involved in humanitarian relief operations have left the country. It sometimes happens that members of religious associations are taken hostage or even killed. Among the activities worthy of mention are those of the orders of the Saverians, Mother Theresa, Saint Joseph and the missionaries of the MISNA, whose press agency is often the last source of information present in crisis areas. While the Roman Catholic Church has long been actively involved in Africa, it is

important not to forget the other faiths and their associations which are also extremely active, particularly the various branches of the Reformed Church which have played a not inconsiderable part in opposing regimes that practise racial segregation.

90. Although evangelism and humanitarian aid are their main priorities, the various Churches and religious associations do not confine their activities to these areas alone. They occasionally act as mediators, bringing to bear their good offices in a number of crises thanks to the influence they wield over African peoples and their leaders. The results of this type of mediation can be seen in countries such as Benin, Congo-Brazzaville, Guinea-Bissau, Angola and the Central African Republic. A recent example of this type of mediation is the work the Sant' Egidio Community is doing in the Democratic Republic of Congo in an effort to establish a dialogue between the rebels and President Kabila. The Community was also directly involved in restoring peace between the Frelimo government and Renamo in Mozambique. Because of their impartiality and the moral values they defend, religious associations can play a significant role in the process of restoring peace and bringing about reconciliation.

(b) Other types of NGO

91. Mention must also be made of the work done by humanitarian relief agencies which, perhaps in Africa more than anywhere else, often have a crucial part to play. Their activities range widely from the supply of emergency aid to education programmes. These NGOs often provide first aid or initial food supplies and are extensively involved in the publicity campaigns which now appear to be essential for all international action of any scope. However, it has to be stressed that their activities entail a long-term commitment. Emergency aid should not be allowed to eclipse all the work NGOs do behind the scenes over a long period in order to try and rebuild civil societies and promote sustainable development in African countries. Moreover, there is no doubt that these organisations are becoming increasingly important in international relations and are winning more and more recognition from international institutions. The United Nations, for instance, has conferred an advisory status on some NGOs. The World Bank frequently has recourse to their services for devel-

opment missions and their activities are increasingly being co-financed by international bodies (such as AID or the UNPD). Relief agencies are extremely effective because they provide more flexibility for action and have a detailed knowledge of the local situation. Staff doing humanitarian relief work in crisis areas therefore provide a link with the international community and are an important source of information. The present crisis in Kosovo illustrates, as if proof were necessary, the role NGOs can play in bringing emergency relief to refugees. Whereas it is the states which take charge of the military aspect of international actions, more often than not it is the NGOs that provide most of the humanitarian aid. As a result of their expertise and independence, these organisations have therefore become virtually indispensable for the success of peacekeeping and security initiatives.

IX. The role of WEU

92. Since the 1992 Petersberg Declaration, issues of peacekeeping have officially become a major, if not the main, concern of WEU. There is no doubt that problems of this type are of particular relevance in Africa, whose geographic proximity and economic, cultural and historical ties with Europe are undeniable. It was therefore impossible for WEU to ignore them and, indeed, no overall analysis of European security can fail to take Africa into account. Thus, at a WEU Council meeting in Lisbon in 1995, Ministers considered African problems and made a point of setting down the action that could be taken "to support Africans' own efforts, including through regional and subregional institutions and structures, to promote the preservation of peace, the search for reconciliation and the achievement of sustainable and socially balanced development through good governance"²⁵.

93. Today, this continues to be the line WEU is endeavouring to follow since it considers that it is up to the Africans themselves to ensure peace and stability on their continent. However, despite the obvious logic of this strategy, your Rapporteur takes the view that Europe cannot do without an overall policy on Africa, formulated at a high political level in an all-European framework. It is clear that no peacekeeping ini-

²⁵ See section II.5 of the *Common reflection on the new European security conditions*.

tiative can be effective unless it is backed up by a proper policy and action to help maintain law and order, promote economic and social development and so on. Conversely, as events in recent years have shown, development aid can have only limited effect if it is not accompanied by measures designed to stabilise Africa's political and security landscape. It is also important to bear in mind that Europe's Africa policy is bound to have enormous humanitarian consequences.

94. Let us not forget that it was the Great Lakes crisis, and in particular the terrible civil war in Rwanda, that pushed the Council into giving thought to the matter for the first time in June 1994. WEU offered member states its support on that occasion by proposing that the Planning Cell act as the coordination point for their contributions. The Satellite Centre for its part responded to a number of task requests concerning the region, as the Centre's Deputy Director, Mr Asbeck, informed participants at the Lisbon Colloquy. This action by WEU was supported by the Council of the European Union which in November 1995 requested WEU to elaborate and implement specific actions that could contribute to the mobilisation of African peacekeeping capabilities and also reserved the possibility of requesting WEU to contribute to the implementation of any action taken by the EU. A few days later, the WEU Council, meeting in Madrid, "studied" the possibility of supporting African peacekeeping initiatives. As everyone knows, Europe's response to the Great Lakes crisis fell a long way short of what was required under the circumstances. However, the need for joint action was clearly felt and could have led to a constructive debate.

95. In summer 1996, officials from the WEU Secretariat-General and Planning Cell went on a fact-finding visit to the OAU and various African countries (Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi and Tanzania) to establish exactly what African peacekeeping requirements entailed. The visit led to the submission of a number of proposals on two options: action that WEU could take on its own and action it might be asked to take in support of EU initiatives.

96. The report, appended to the Ostend Declaration of 19 November 1996, proposed establishing contacts with the OAU and African subre-

gional organisations (such as ECOWAS, the SADC and IGAD) for the purpose of reflecting on how to support African peacekeeping initiatives (with communications, logistics and training) and giving WEU the role of coordinating national contributions from European countries. It also advocated strengthening cooperation with and supporting action taken by the European Union.

97. Furthermore, the deterioration in the Great Lakes crises prompted the WEU ministers to task the Permanent Council to establish what contribution the Organisation could make to settling it. This desire for action was encouraged by the Council of the European Union which, on 22 November 1996, requested WEU, on the basis of Article J.4.2 of the Treaty on European Union, "to examine as a matter of urgency how it can, for its part, contribute to the optimum use of the operational resources available". We now know that this action was limited to finding out what offers of assistance the member states could make and compiling the information in a database. The consensus necessary for carrying out a joint European mission was not forthcoming. While Europe was clearly not prepared to use all its resources, WEU nevertheless continued to support African peacekeeping missions and sent observers to the Nangbeto 97 and Guidimakha 98 exercises which were part of the tripartite initiative (France, the United Kingdom and the United States) to strengthen African peacekeeping capabilities. As the WEU Secretary-General was the first to admit, in his address to the Lisbon Colloquy, WEU's record is one of mixed achievement. But without the political will of its member countries, the Organisation can do little.

98. It is common knowledge that there is some reluctance among those countries to use WEU either as a point of coordination or for other initiatives. In December 1997, WEU was represented at a meeting held by the UN Department for Peacekeeping. Following the meeting a questionnaire was sent out for the purpose of identifying and collating existing offers of aid so as to avoid duplication and make good any shortcomings. In February 1998 member states were invited to supply the Planning Cell with copies of the UN questionnaire²⁶. It is disappointing that,

²⁶ Report by the Politico-Military Group approved by the WEU Council on 26 February 1998.

according to information given to your Rapporteur, the Cell has received only five replies to date (from France, Germany, Italy, Norway and the United Kingdom). It should also be said that it has at times been difficult to take action in support of EU initiatives because the machinery for cooperation between the EU and WEU was totally or partially ineffective and this may still be the case today.

99. However there is no denying – as the WEU Secretary-General pointed out at the colloquy – that the Great Lakes crisis in 1996 did at least reveal the limits of the existing arrangements and enabled WEU to improve them, in particular by drawing up more effective procedures to respond to future requests to WEU from the EU in pursuance of the Treaty on European Union. In 1996, the Council of Ministers, meeting in Ostend, said WEU was ready to respond to requests from the EU whenever recourse to military means appeared necessary. At their meeting in Rhodes in March 1998, the Ministers recalled their desire for enhanced cooperation with the European Union and tasked the Council to explore further possibilities to promote WEU's contribution to peacekeeping in Africa (paragraph 52 of the Rhodes Declaration). It is however to be regretted that the Rome Declaration does not mention African problems.

100. What conclusions can be drawn? For almost five years now, our Organisation has been looking into the issues surrounding peacekeeping in Africa and has a good idea of African requirements in this field: information, communications, logistics, transport and training including the organisation of joint exercises. For all their resolve to take responsibility for their security, there is no denying that the African countries still need help. Indeed, it is perhaps today that they have the greatest need of support from Europe. We believe that WEU can meet that need to a large degree and not just by rationalising and coordinating offers from its member countries. It is imperative for far more use to be made of the Torrejón Satellite Centre, whose assistance is requested by our African partners.

101. Mine-clearing is another important area and one in which WEU has already accumulated valuable experience. Your Rapporteur considers it important to stress the role the Organisation could play in this field as there can be no return

to security and stability for the vast majority of countries emerging from a crisis without mine-clearing operations. Mines continue to maim and kill even when the fighting itself is over. In addition, the existence of mined areas can block the process of returning refugees to their homes. The fact that mines are relatively cheap, in terms of their destructive effect, encourages the parties to a conflict to use them extensively, particularly in Africa. The effect of the excessive use of anti-personnel mines can be seen in Angola and Mozambique where large tracts of land have been rendered uninhabitable despite the fact, in the case of Mozambique, that political stability has been restored. The cost of neutralising these weapons makes it impossible for African countries to take effective action on their own. Moreover, mine-clearing requires sophisticated equipment and expertise. In view of the scale of the task, Africa needs our support. There are a number of ways in which WEU could take action in this field. Many of its member states have gained practical experience in mine-clearing operations, particularly in Africa (Angola, Eritrea, Mozambique and Somalia). The main focal points for action, as approved by the WEU Council of Ministers in Ostend, are as follows:

- provide information and advice to the authorities conducting a demining operation;
- provide military training and advice in order to train instructors and help develop local capabilities;
- disseminate information and maintain contacts with other institutions and bodies engaged in mine-clearing operations.

102. Measures such as these could be implemented on the basis of the Petersberg Declaration, in support of action taken by the European Union, United Nations or any other international organisation, for instance the OAU, or under civilian humanitarian programmes. In accordance with the Ministers' Ostend Declaration, WEU could take a more active part in mine-clearing operations both in military terms (by opening up safe routes) and humanitarian terms (through the systematic clearance of mines). The relevant WEU bodies, mainly the Planning Cell in this case, could draw up an inventory of member states' capabilities, encourage and coordinate

their initiatives and circulate the relevant data to countries or bodies requesting information. The agreement signed in Brussels on 22 April 1999 between WEU and Croatia at the request of the European Council could serve as a model for mine-clearing operations in African countries.

103. The problem now is how to become more actively involved. While our desire to strengthen African peacekeeping capabilities is to be encouraged, it must not serve as an excuse for Europe to reduce its commitments to Africa.

X. Problems involved in peacekeeping

(a) The role of the United Nations

104. Since 1989 half the UN peacekeeping operations have been conducted on the African continent. For all the promises of an "African renaissance", the 1990s have been plagued by war with its catalogue of massacres and misery. But can the UN really be blamed for weakness and a lack of resolve? While it has come in for a great deal of criticism, the UN has also had a measure of success, for example in Namibia and Mozambique. In most instances where there has been failure, it was probably due to a lack of will on the part of those involved rather than to any malfunctioning in the United Nations.

105. In the majority of cases, the Security Council invokes the provisions of Chapter VI of the UN Charter which presupposes that the parties to a dispute will genuinely wish to bring any fighting to an end. In the absence of such resolve, peacekeeping forces can be no more than observers with no power to act unless the Council decides to "maintain or restore" peace (Chapter VII of the UN Charter).

106. However, this solution has its limits as conflicts in Africa have shown. The failure of the UN mission in Somalia made the Security Council very reluctant to take up such an option again. The operation never succeeded in disarming the warring parties despite the deployment of an impressive number of troops from armed forces that are among the most modern in the world. In addition, UN blue helmet troops were killed and the way in which some other peacekeeping soldiers behaved came in for severe criticism. This failure, which left the United Nations deeply shocked, does much to explain why the Council was so reluctant to take any action

during the Rwandan crisis in 1994. The operation in Somalia also showed that any peace-enforcement missions require a clear mandate setting out specific objectives.

107. The UN's operations in Somalia and Rwanda were nonetheless a success in humanitarian terms with many lives saved. However, as far as peacekeeping proper is concerned, any intervention without the agreement of the parties to a dispute has proved to be an extremely sensitive matter especially where the issues do not justify the effort involved in mobilising considerable resources. In such circumstances it is hard to persuade public opinion that soldiers' lives should be put at risk in countries where the issues at stake appear confused and have limited scope, particularly in the case of Africa where the terrain is difficult and suited to guerrilla activity.

108. Scenes of horror never fail to generate legitimate outrage and a call for armed intervention to enforce peace but here again the issues, as seen from the point of view of individual countries, are out of all proportion to the resources that must be deployed to have any positive effect. Furthermore, public opinion clamours for troops be brought home at virtually the first sign of any loss of life. In point of fact, such operations, though conducted on behalf of the international community, always entail war with all its human, material and financial sacrifices. Very often then, the main problem the Security Council faces is a lack of will on the part of its member states to accept the consequences. Even where that will exists, the complexity and ambiguity of African crises hold up decisions and prevent the international community from acting swiftly.

109. The Security Council's reluctance to have recourse to Chapter VII of the UN Charter is therefore understandable and the United Nations generally opts for Chapter VI: securing a peace agreement between the parties and deploying a small force to ensure compliance with it. But this brings us back to the question of whether the parties to a dispute really want peace, since a return to stability depends on the answer. Nevertheless, there is no denying that the difficulties the Security Council faces in taking an initiative are due not so much to the decision-making procedure itself as to a lack of political will.

110. Clearly, the United Nations and the powers with a traditional involvement in Africa are deterred from taking action by the sheer scale of such operations and prefer to leave it to the African countries to take the initiative given that the security of the continent is first and foremost an African responsibility and is in their own interest. However, it is important for the United Nations not to give the impression that it is abandoning Africa, particularly since it has lost credibility there owing to the failure of its Angola mission.

(b) African peacekeeping initiatives

111. The African countries are keen to play a bigger peacekeeping role while it would suit the United Nations to be less involved. In the early 1990s, the OAU set up a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution and ECOWAS established the first all-African peacekeeping force (ECOMOG). These initiatives are consistent with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and have been supported by the United Nations²⁷. In addition, in 1996 France, the United Kingdom and the United States offered their support for the procedure for strengthening African peacekeeping capabilities.

112. Over and above the practical requirements already mentioned, there are many questions still to be answered when it comes to African peacekeeping forces. The first concerns the OAU, which has been left on the sidelines in the main African peacekeeping initiatives so far. These have instead been taken either by subregional organisations (such as ECOMOG in Sierra Leone) or by *ad hoc* groups of states (MISAB). Also, although the OAU has led a large number of mediation missions on a diplomatic level, the parties in the various African crises seem to prefer having their views heard in other bodies.

113. This state of affairs is all the more regrettable in that impartiality, which is essential for the purposes of peacekeeping, is not always endemic to subregional organisations, and this is even truer in the case of military units which come from countries bordering on crisis areas and participate in peacekeeping missions. ECOMOG, for instance, is sometimes accused of being a front for Nigerian hegemony. Intervention in Sierra Leone has led to rivalry between

Nigeria, which supplies troops for ECOMOG and advocates a military solution, and other states (Côte d'Ivoire and Togo) which do not contribute to the force and are in favour of a diplomatic solution. While some countries (Liberia and Burkino Faso) accuse Nigerian troops of committing acts of cruelty, the Nigerian Government claims those same countries are supporting the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). In your Rapporteur's opinion, this type of intervention should take place in a UN and OAU framework with a view to guaranteeing impartiality and preventing interference. South African intervention in Lesotho, which was based on the SADC treaty but also caused tension in the region, was a response to the same concern for legitimacy and impartiality. It can be inferred from all this that what needs to be done is to strengthen the authority of the pan-African organisation, but this does not depend on the Africans themselves. The instrument exists but there has to be a desire to use it. Nevertheless, the fact that the OAU central decision-making body takes decisions by consensus is clearly not conducive to the organisation's being able to take action swiftly. The international community can do nothing to help the OAU and its member states in this respect as the underlying cause of the problem is a question of political will.

114. Yet the Africans do seem to have a preference for the subregional framework. For as long as this is the case, any action by subregional organisations should be taken on the basis of a mandate issued by the UN Security Council in order to guarantee its legitimacy. The same questions can also be asked about operations conducted by groups of states such as MISAB. While such initiatives are to be encouraged in every sense, the international community should nevertheless ensure they have a proper basis.

115. Last but not least, the process of strengthening African peacekeeping capabilities raises the question of the role of armies in Africa. For many years, and this is still the case today, the national armies of African countries have had a destabilising influence on the continent either because they have upheld despotic regimes or supported rebel movements. Today, some find themselves involved in peacekeeping missions. A great deal of awareness-raising work, training and education is needed to ensure that these forces comply with peacekeeping requirements

²⁷ See the reports of Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1995) and Kofi Annan (1998) to the Security Council.

and observe human rights. What must not be allowed to happen is for them to use the equipment they receive as part of the effort to strengthen African peacekeeping capabilities in order to turn against the civilian authorities and overthrow the government. While such a comment may seem trivial, the danger of such a possibility occurring is all too real.

116. Under British and Portuguese aid plans, assistance and funding for African countries should therefore be used to educate and reform their armies so that they acquire a more healthy respect for human rights and democracy. Similarly, under the French plan, equipment is to be provided but for the time being will be stored under the supervision of French armed forces and made available to African troops only for specific operations lasting for a limited period. Once a mission ends, the equipment is to be handed back. While the strengthening of African peacekeeping capabilities is therefore to be encouraged, it is by no means the answer to all the problems. The Africans continue to need the support of the international community in general and Europe in particular. Their armed forces still have too little experience of peacekeeping operations and need assistance and training from countries with the proper expertise to prevent things getting out of hand.

117. For the United Nations to want the Africans to become more involved in the security of their continent is a good thing. The African countries should be encouraged and supported in their desire to do so. This means that the international community must not leave Africa to cope with what is a huge task on its own. The institutional machinery exists and must be improved, particularly as regards the OAU which should be able to act as a guarantor of peace and democracy in Africa. Good intentions apart, the Africans have virtually no other means of making headway in what will inevitably be a lengthy process. It is therefore important for those intentions not to be frustrated by Europe, which is in a position to provide the equipment and financial and political support necessary to improve the Africans' lot.

XI. Conclusions

118. The need for Europe to have a coordinated, coherent, dynamic and realistic policy on

Africa is widely recognised. This was the message that emerged from debates at the Lisbon Colloquy and from all the talks your Rapporteur had with OAU officials in Addis Ababa and Brussels, representatives of the WEU Secretariat-General and a number of European and African politicians. It is also clear that a European policy on Africa has to take account of the continent's requirements for the purposes of promoting the wellbeing of its peoples, peace, human rights and economic and social development, supporting the process of democratisation and last but not least strengthening African security and peacekeeping capabilities. Under no circumstances should such support help to keep totalitarian regimes in power against the will of the vast majority of the people, who are exploited in favour of small minorities. Consequently, a European policy requires first and foremost some degree of coordination – starting with a meeting of minds – between the European Union and WEU and also between the activities of WEU and the remarkable efforts made by the OAU. It goes without saying that all this work should be legitimated by the United Nations. Furthermore, it is very important to remember that a European policy on Africa should under no circumstances take account solely of European or even African interests. The universal concept of human rights and the right of each individual to live, *inter alia*, in freedom and dignity must without question form the basis of any European policy worthy of its name even if, at the same time, it also serves what Europe and its constituent states consider to be their main and well founded interests.

119. Fortunately, there are now many ways in which WEU can take practical steps to cooperate with African peacekeeping forces. In the first place, its Satellite Centre could provide the intelligence that is essential for OAU crisis monitoring and planning. WEU's considerable experience in the field of mine clearing could also be used to help Africans in their fight against the proliferation of landmines, which continue to inflict terrible damage, especially on unsuspecting civilians and above all on children. Part of the resources Europe has for training both peacekeeping forces and police forces in Africa could quite easily be made available to the sub-Saharan states under the auspices of WEU. Logistic support and a degree of supervision of African forces by the European military could also be

envisaged, again under WEU auspices, with a view to helping improve the level of training. In short, there are many possibilities for cooperation.

120. The political need for and practical feasibility of Euro-African cooperation has not gone unnoticed in the WEU Council of Ministers. The Ostend and Rhodes Declarations gave the impression that the Ministers wanted WEU to embark on a process of implementing a tangible and realistic African policy in accordance with the principles and mandates of the United Nations and working in conjunction with the OAU as its main partner. But it would seem that nothing has come of this as yet. Africa appears to have been forgotten in the most recent declarations issued by the WEU Ministers, particularly at Bremen. Moreover, your Rapporteur has learnt that a number of member states have not even informed the Secretariat-General of the content of their aid programmes for Africa. This is all the more regrettable given that liaison between the various programmes under the auspices of WEU, entail-

ing a definition of clear objectives and avoiding duplication, would enable those states to provide more specific and effective assistance and therefore to be seen, in the eyes of their own public as well, to be more involved in African issues.

121. In your Rapporteur's view it is time to stop dithering. We readily acknowledge that the development of a European policy designed to strengthen security in Africa, contribute to the process of democratisation, economic and social development, modernisation and better organisation in African countries, and create the institutions which underpin a civilian society is beyond the possibilities of WEU as an organisation. But WEU does have the practical resources and is under an obligation, as Europe's sole security and defence organisation, to help build a safer, more stable and humane Africa. In so doing, it would be defending Europe's legitimate interests while at the same time acting in accordance with Africa's own wishes. It is up to our Organisation not to shirk the responsibilities assigned to it by history.



