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The operational organisation of WEU –
Reply to the forty-first annual report of the Council

REPORT

submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee
by Mr Schloten, Rapporteur

The operational organisation of WEU

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1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee:* Mr *Baumel* (Chairman); MM. *De Decker, Horn* (Vice-Chairmen); MM *Alloncle, Beaufays, Mrs Beer, MM Bianchi, Briane, Cox, Dees* (Alternate: *Blaauw*), Mrs *Fernández Ramiro*, MM *Hardy, Jacquat, La Russa, Legendre, Mrs Lentz-Cornette, MM López Valdivielso, Marten, Medeiros Ferreira, Lord Newall, MM Parisi, Pavlidis, Pereira Coelho, Petruccioli* (Alternate: *Guidi*), *Pottakis, Schloten, Sir Dudley Smith, Mr Solé Tura* (Alternate: *de Puig*), Mrs *Soutendijk van Appeldoorn* (Alternate: *van der Linden*), Sir *Keith Speed* (Alternate: *Marshall*), MM *Speroni, Valkeniers, Vázquez, Vrettos, Wolter, Zierer*.

Associate members: MM *Gül* (Alternate: *Akcali*), *Gürel, Yürür*.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation
on the operational organisation of WEU

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming the fact that the United Kingdom has adopted as the main theme of its WEU Presidency the development of the Organisation's operational capability and effectiveness;
- (ii) Satisfied that the document "European security: a common concept of the 27 WEU countries" has clearly spelled out not only the common interests of Europeans, the risks and potential threats, but also Europe's new responsibilities in a post-cold war world;
- (iii) Noting that the United States has made it sufficiently clear that there is no longer a guarantee that it will intervene militarily in European regional crises;
- (iv) Welcoming the conclusion of a security agreement between WEU and NATO on 6 May 1996 which will greatly strengthen ties and improve working relations between the two organisations while contributing to the enhancement of WEU's operational capabilities;
- (v) Satisfied that an agreement has been reached in NATO on the implementation of CJTF, which is vital for European-led operations without United States participation;
- (vi) Regretting, however, that the solution now agreed to, with a European supported commander and a US supporting commander, still leaves room for doubt as to the availability of NATO or US assets for European-led operations at all times;
- (vii) Aware that since the decisions made at the May 1995 meeting in Lisbon, the Politico-Military Group and the Intelligence Section of the Planning Cell have become operational, while the Situation Centre will be fully operational by June 1996;
- (viii) Noting that the recent enlargement of the Planning Cell's staff will have no effect if too many vacancies are left unoccupied;
- (ix) Welcoming the fact that by June 1996, WEU will have established all the politico-military structures which will provide it with a comprehensive basic crisis-management system, including procedures for force generation and assembly, and command and control mechanisms and that all the technology for command, control and communications will be in place by the end of the year;
- (x) Aware that, as a result of the progress made, WEU should be able to provide, by the end of 1996, a strategic management structure for smaller-scale humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking;
- (xi) Noting that the reconstruction effort in Bosnia, which was promised as part of the Dayton peace agreement, has fallen badly behind schedule;
- (xii) Noting that in view of the above, the crisis in Bosnia will not end on 20 December 1996, the expiry date of the IFOR presence, and that, as a consequence, preparations have to be made for a continued peacekeeping presence, whatever its form, after that date;
- (xiii) Aware that the WEU Planning Cell is developing a coherent WEU exercise programme extending to the year 2000 to develop progressively FAWEU's operational capabilities in implementing the above-mentioned tasks;
- (xiv) Considering that WEU's operational capabilities should enable it to undertake the full range of Petersberg tasks, but stressing at the same time that these capabilities should eventually also enable it to perform its basic task of mutual defence as stipulated in the modified Brussels Treaty;
- (xv) Welcoming the Council's efforts to facilitate participation in WEU operations by observer nations, and to involve associate partners more fully in the work on WEU's operational role;
- (xvi) Aware, however, that a clear distinction between members and associate members on the one hand and non-NATO observers and associate partners on the other, must inevitably be maintained in order to ensure the closest possible links with NATO, which are crucial for the development of WEU's operational capability;

(xvii) Welcoming the first results of the WEU Strategic Mobility Study which should enable it to establish coordination measures and procedures for the pooling of national transport assets, but convinced that early decisions are needed to go ahead with the further development of the Future Large Aircraft, in order to rejuvenate Europe's ageing military transport fleet in good time;

(xviii) Convinced that a serious discussion on the role and future of nuclear weapons in Europe's security and defence policy cannot be postponed much longer,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Continue to enhance the operational capabilities of WEU in order to ensure that eventually WEU will also be able to conduct larger-scale operations at higher levels of conflict;
 2. Start preparations at an early stage in order to extend, for as long as necessary, IFOR's mandate in Bosnia, making use, if need be, of the possibilities offered by combined joint task forces (CJTF);
 3. Continue to make an energetic effort to give strategic mobility a high priority, not only by asking the WEU Strategic Mobility Study Group to continue its work, but also by promoting the further development and early commissioning of a future large aircraft;
 4. Reinforce the Planning Cell qualitatively and quantitatively for the purpose of preparing the possible deployment of FAWEU in order to ensure that WEU's operational role can be fully developed;
 5. Ensure that the strengthening of WEU's operational capabilities are continued and improved, especially in the field of standardisation and interoperability;
 6. Engage in a debate on a European defence possibly consolidated by concerted deterrence, initially by establishing a strategic study group within WEU:
 - to examine the role and future of nuclear weapons for European security including the different aspects of intra-European extended nuclear deterrence;
 - to examine the role all the WEU member states might play in defining a future European nuclear strategy;
 - to study the possibility of creating a nuclear coordination body within WEU;
- as was recommended previously in Recommendations 564 and 590, and:
- to consider whether European nuclear forces should be closely linked with NATO's nuclear capabilities, and especially those of the United States;
 - to analyse effective means of cooperation between a WEU nuclear coordination body and NATO's Nuclear Planning Group;
7. Make clear that if European security architecture, including a common defence, is to be cohesive, it requires a process leading to congruence between European organisations such as WEU, the EU – or its CFSP – and the European part of NATO.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr Schloten, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. Since the Petersberg Declaration, WEU has seriously started to improve and enhance its operational capabilities. Indeed, it makes no sense talking about a European defence identity and the "defence arm" of the European Union, if WEU lacks the operational capabilities which should enable it to mount and control a military operation.

2. Compared to what was indeed a very modest start, much has been accomplished since 1991 and, at present, WEU is expected to have a full operational capability with the required politico-military infrastructure in June 1996.

3. Why worry about WEU's operational capabilities? The United Kingdom's Foreign Secretary and Chairman of the WEU Council struck the right chord when he said:

" We need to make better use of WEU. Regrettably, so far the debate about WEU has been too abstract, too little related to the realities of military life. I want to change this. European countries need to have the option to act if our North American Allies choose not to participate in peacekeeping, humanitarian or crisis-management operations. WEU is the vehicle for this, working with NATO, not competing with it. Making WEU more operational is the key priority for the United Kingdom Presidency between now and June. We want to make the Western European Union an organisation which works.

This will not be easy. Anybody can draft some ringing declarations about European defence. The real challenge is to develop the structures to allow us to deploy our forces quickly and effectively; to find ways to use NATO assets rather than duplicating them; to ensure satisfactory systems of command and control.

Success will require closer collaboration between WEU and the European Union. John Major put forward specific proposals last spring which would enable the two organisations to work increasingly closely together – for example through holding back-to-back summits. This is a practical response to a practical problem"¹.

1. Address at the Institut Français des Relations Internationales, Paris, 5 March 1996.

Indeed, it seems that after so many abstract and institutional debates, also in preparing the intergovernmental conference, the time has come for a down-to-earth practical approach to solve the shortcomings of WEU.

4. Moreover, the states participating in WEU know full well that the development of operational capabilities for WEU is not a theoretical activity. The situation in Bosnia hovers in the background of almost every single security discussion in Europe.

5. At present, the situation in Bosnia with the presence of 60 000 IFOR troops, is relatively quiet, but this may change rapidly after the withdrawal of IFOR. A recent report of the United States Defense Intelligence Agency stated that the prospects for a viable unitary Bosnia beyond the life of IFOR deployment were "dim" without a large international programme to revive Bosnia's economy. This international civilian reconstruction programme has only just started with substantial promises for financial assistance having been decided at a Brussels meeting as late as April 1996. According to the abovementioned report, the strategic goals of the warring factions in the region have not fundamentally changed since the war that ended with the Dayton Accords, and tensions may grow further as the deadline for IFOR's withdrawal draws nearer².

6. Although not one of the states participating in IFOR wishes to talk about it openly, all concerned are well aware that after 20 December 1996, the date of expiry of IFOR's mandate when United States troops will start withdrawing from Bosnian territory, there may be the huge problem of Bosnia not having sufficiently normalised its situation to be able to live without protection from foreign troops. In that event, the European allies will have to make the choice of whether they leave together with the United States troops or stay, literally in order to keep the peace – an operation which would certainly require a considerable deployment of troops, weaponry and other equipment, support and logistics.

7. The main question to be solved at short notice is indeed whether, and under what circumstances, the Europeans will be able to conduct a serious peacekeeping operation on European territory without the active participation of the Americans.

2. *International Herald Tribune*, 21 March 1996.

8. Five years after the treaty on European Union was signed, triumphantly announcing a bright and secure future for an integrated Europe, Europeans may have to demonstrate that these were not empty words. Hopefully, the Berlin meeting of the North Atlantic Council will by then have given the green light for implementation of the CJTF concept, which should enable NATO and in particular European member states, to employ NATO logistics and other assets in a military operation even if the United States preferred not to participate.

9. With all the politico-military and support structures established, one can hardly imagine that Western European states will renounce their responsibilities for peace and security in Europe.

10. If Europe is convinced that the international community cannot leave Bosnia to its own fate, then it should make preparations to stay. It has enough troops and resources to do so. At the moment, it has not yet made up its mind. There are still six months left.

11. Indeed, if Europe did not intervene in a new crisis in Bosnia, it would most probably lose its credibility in foreign and security matters for a long time to come.

II. Recent WEU operations

12. Recent crises and conflicts have provided WEU and its member states with various opportunities to test their capabilities in military or combined civilian-military operations.

13. In 1987-88, after the Iran-Iraq war, Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom conducted a joint mine-clearance operation codenamed "Cleansweep" to help with the clearance of a 300-mile sea lane in the Strait of Hormuz. This operation, with its coordination mechanisms approved by the nine WEU member states, heightened awareness of their capability to conduct joint operations.

14. After Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, the WEU Council decided to coordinate possible operations in that area, emphasising that coordination within WEU could facilitate cooperation with the forces of other countries in the region. However, due to the absence of a WEU staff headquarters or even an experienced planning staff, few practical decisions emerged. This experience also showed that there is a requirement for speed in reacting to such crises, making out a strong argument in favour of appropriate permanent structures.

15. In July 1992, maritime forces operating under WEU and NATO and working in strict coordination, started monitoring compliance with United Nations Security Council sanctions

against former Yugoslavia in the Adriatic. Later, on 8 June 1993, a concept of combined operations for the implementation of Security Council Resolution 820 was approved by the Councils of WEU and NATO. Under the codename "Sharp Guard", a unified command was established with the WEU and NATO Councils exerting joint political control. The Council's guidelines were translated into military instructions through the appropriate bodies of the two organisations, cooperating within a joint ad hoc headquarters, MILCOM Adriatic.

16. The resulting combined operation started on 15 June 1993 with the mission to conduct operations to monitor and enforce compliance with United Nations sanctions in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions 713, 757, 787 and 820.

17. The WEU force consisted of the following naval elements:

- five ships under the command of the Commander of WEU maritime forces;
- one French AWACS aircraft;
- six maritime patrol aircraft;
- Italian aircraft and helicopters.

18. Italy also provided, at national level, two vessels for surveillance operations in the Adriatic, one frigate for the surveillance of fishing vessels, coastal patrol boats and vessel inspection teams; eight fighter aircraft were also available on standby. United Kingdom and United States forces provided round-the-clock support to these forces. A WEU staff unit of three officers operated in the Headquarters Naval Forces Southern Europe (COMNAVSOUTH). Since 23 November 1995, Operation Sharp Guard has been readjusted in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1021 and 1022.

19. At about the same time, WEU mounted a police and customs operation on the Danube to help Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania control the implementation of the weapons embargo and the economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro. This mission comprised some 240 agents from seven member states, with control points having seven patrol vessels at their disposal. Implementation of the economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro has been suspended since 23 November 1995, in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1021 and 1022.

20. At the request of the European Union for a contribution to a future European Union administration in Mostar, member states made individual contributions to a WEU police contingent, which is considered crucial for restoring public order and building confidence between the Croat and

Muslim parts of the city. In addition to the contributions from WEU member states, there were also contributions from Austria, Finland and Sweden to the WEU police contingent. Around 180 WEU police officials are now active in Mostar. It should be noted that they do not carry arms and that they have no powers of arrest. The unification of the local Croat and Muslim police forces, which is the objective of the operation, has not been a great success until now, mainly because of continuing resistance from the Croat side.

III. Improving operational capabilities

21. The Assembly adopted a number of recommendations, in particular after the Petersberg Declaration, regarding the improvement of WEU's operational capabilities.

22. Initially, the Council was still struggling with the consequences of the transfer of both the Council and the Secretariat-General from London to Brussels and the establishment of the Planning Cell. At the same time, the rapidly deteriorating situation in former Yugoslavia and the building of a good working relationship with the central European states in particular, required a great deal of attention.

23. Nevertheless, the Council agreed with the Assembly that an improvement in WEU's operational capabilities was vital for the eventual implementation of Petersberg tasks. Recent operations, even if most of them were conducted successfully, had revealed shortcomings requiring the Organisation to adapt. The Council has clearly given its opinion on this subject in a number of recent declarations.

24. In their Noordwijk Declaration of 14 November 1994, the WEU Ministers "underlined the importance of developing further the operational role of WEU in accordance with the Petersberg Declaration and the operational considerations of the Document on a Common European Defence Policy".

25. In the preliminary conclusions on the formulation of a common European defence policy, adopted by the Council on 14 November 1994, it was recognised that "WEU will need appropriate mechanisms for political decision-making and military command and control".

26. The preliminary conclusions then continued, painting a full picture of what structures WEU needed in the fields of decision-making, command and control. It was said that:

"The Council needs to have appropriate information and consultation mechanisms and procedures and more support, in particular to enable prompt reactions to crises, inter alia through a politico-military work-

ing group in Brussels which can be reinforced as necessary according to the specific nature of the contingency. The support capacities of the Secretariat in the politico-military field need to be reinforced accordingly so that the Secretariat can fully support the work done by the Council and its politico-military working group. The Secretariat and Planning Cell need to be complemented by capacities in the area of intelligence and crisis management in order to fulfil the tasks mandated by the Petersberg Declaration: for instance, a situation centre and an intelligence section, which are already under study. The tasks of the Military Delegates in support of the Chiefs of Defence Staff as well as the members of the Council also need to be defined more clearly in this context.

During operations, WEU command and control structures and arrangements will have to allow for the use by WEU of collective assets and capabilities made available by the Alliance and for the use of national assets of non-WEU members, as well as for the participation of non-WEU nations in WEU operations, where appropriate. WEU should aim at the highest possible degree of multinationality at all levels of the command chain, particularly at the level of force and operations headquarters. Multinational headquarters should be available for use by both WEU and NATO. At the level of force headquarters, the consequences of the CJTF concept are already under consideration. A similar approach to multinationality should be developed for operations headquarters."

27. It was further stated that participation in a specific operation is and will remain based on a sovereign decision of each member state.

28. What has been accomplished since November 1994?

29. On 15 May 1995, the Council, meeting in Lisbon, approved a decision which inter alia:

"provides WEU with new decision-making mechanisms and structures, in particular the establishment of a new politico-military group in support of the Council, a Situation Centre, and an Intelligence Section in the Planning Cell."

30. On 14 November 1995 in Madrid, the Council "took note of and welcomed the Secretary-General's study on the Situation Centre and the Intelligence Section in the Planning Cell, as well as the preparatory measures for its implementation, such as the setting-up of a project team, and the necessary budgetary provisions". It further looked forward to the establishment of the

Situation Centre and to it being fully operational in time for Phase II of WEU Crisex 95-96.

31. In the document on "European security: a common concept of the 27 WEU countries", approved by the WEU Council on 14 November, a large section is devoted to a discussion of the gaps and deficiencies in European capabilities and possible responses to enhance these capabilities.

32. In particular, the document identifies gaps and deficiencies in the following areas:

- (i) crisis-management mechanisms, including procedures for force generation and assembly, and command and control procedures;
- (ii) reconnaissance and intelligence;
- (iii) strategic and in-theatre transport capabilities;
- (iv) standardisation and interoperability;
- (v) the European defence industrial base.

33. The present report will in particular discuss the capabilities mentioned under item (i) and briefly mention some of the activities undertaken in other fields, especially those mentioned under items (ii) and (iii).

34. Drawing lessons from experience in the conflict in former Yugoslavia, the common concept makes a number of specific recommendations.

35. In general, the concept recommends among other things that:

- the political aims of the mission must be set out clearly from the start; the mission should be reviewed continually to ensure that tasks are not gradually taken on in theatre which deviate from the overall political aim;
- adequate capabilities and an effective decision-making structure to undertake the Petersberg tasks must be available to WEU;
- WEU needs to develop mechanisms for close consultation with the European Union on both political and operational matters. This will be particularly important for WEU missions of humanitarian assistance and reconstruction which, as in Mostar, are likely to involve overall political guidance by the European Union, if not actual participation by civilian agencies coordinated by the European Union.

36. In operational terms, the concept states that WEU's capabilities should be enhanced in the following fields:

- there must be a clear channel of communication between the WEU Council and

WEU forces. Experience indicates that, besides the role of liaison played thus far by the WEU Presidency, there needs to be a proper channel of communication linking WEU elements involved in an operation with the WEU Council;

- for each WEU operation, there must be a single chain of command for all WEU military forces involved, in order to avoid confusion and delay in carrying out tasks;
- arrangements need to be devised for ensuring efficient coordination in the theatre of operations between the military and civilian elements of an operation, in particular where the civilian elements are provided by another organisation, such as the United Nations;
- the need for WEU to establish or have access to an adequate observation capability and to develop an intelligence-processing capability, which are decisive for the conduct of operations in complex, shifting politico-military environments;
- the need to have transport capabilities available permitting the rapid projection of forces and their deployment to the theatre of operation as required.

37. In the following chapters, the various issues at stake will be discussed separately.

IV. Which Petersberg operations?

38. In the Petersberg Declaration of 19 June 1992, it was stated that:

"Apart from contributing to the common defence in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty respectively, military units of WEU member states, acting under the authority of WEU, could be employed for:

- humanitarian and rescue tasks;
- peacekeeping tasks;
- tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking."

39. Although since then the WEU member states have never revoked this inventory of Petersberg tasks, they understand that it would be a tall order for WEU to implement the full range of tasks in the near future, particularly because of the Organisation's limited operational capabilities. At the same time, it is to be noted that it has become common usage to label only those three tasks mentioned at the end of the preceding paragraph as Petersberg tasks. The beginning of the para-

graph states clearly, however, that military units of WEU member states, acting under the authority of WEU, also contribute to the common defence in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty. In general, however, it is assumed that the common defence of allied territory is the primary task of NATO.

40. It can be noted that in recent years the Council has not always followed a logical or consistent line of thought as regards its priorities in the implementation of Petersberg tasks. On the other hand, it has to be admitted that the course of events in former Yugoslavia may have helped to assess the serious problems connected with peacekeeping, crisis management and peacemaking.

41. In the Luxembourg Declaration of November 1993, Ministers were still requesting "that work on planning for the tasks defined in the Petersberg Declaration be continued, especially on peacekeeping and crisis management, including peacemaking". The Planning Cell was tasked, in completing the list of FAWEU (forces answerable to WEU) incorporating national inputs, with identifying forces especially suited for humanitarian tasks.

42. The Kirchberg Declaration of 9 May 1994 mentioned that:

"Ministers noted the work of the Planning Cell on the forces answerable to WEU, and requested it to develop further an inventory of force packages which will enable WEU to carry out the tasks conferred to it, particularly in the field of humanitarian missions, peacekeeping and crisis management. They also took note of the report of the role of WEU in peacekeeping."

43. In 1994, the Planning Cell started to prepare a strawman paper on the operational aspects of the third Petersberg mission, following the same structures as for the existing humanitarian and peacekeeping documents. The final paper defined the possible "missions of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking". In that document, "peacemaking" was understood in the sense of the general concept of peace enforcement in the context of peace operations.

44. In the Noordwijk Declaration of 14 November 1994, however, the Council stated that in the Planning Cell's tasks "priority should be given to the development of appropriate plans and procedures for humanitarian and rescue operations, including evacuation operations". Apparently, the third Petersberg task of combat forces in crisis management had become less urgent and may have been considered over-ambitious in the light of the conclusions of the abovementioned Planning Cell document.

45. On 15 May 1995, the WEU Council took note of documents on "WEU's role in evacuation operations". At the same time, the Council endorsed a document on "emergency responses to humanitarian crises: a role for a WEU humanitarian task force", which was based on an Italian/United Kingdom proposal on the principles and arrangements for establishing a WEU humanitarian task force and on the use of military assets in humanitarian crises. The Permanent Council was asked to complete its work on this subject as a priority while the Planning Cell was requested to take forward its generic planning in this area as a matter of urgency.

46. In Recommendation 566³, the Assembly had asked the Council to:

"Actively support the creation of a multinational African peacekeeping force which should be able to act rapidly under a United Nations mandate, by encouraging WEU member states to preposition equipment on the African continent and to take responsibility to train African units for such tasks;"

47. In its reply⁴, the Council stated that this issue would be "included in due time on the Council's agenda, taking into account other reflections on that subject, namely in the European Union and in the Organisation of African Unity".

48. Only a few months later, in the Lisbon Declaration of 15 May 1995:

"Ministers also marked their interest in the initiative by France and the United Kingdom on peacekeeping and conflict-prevention in Africa. In this connection, they welcomed the preliminary reflections taking place in WEU in parallel with the discussions within the European Union and against the background of the debate in progress at the United Nations; they instructed the Permanent Council to take forward its reflections on this subject."

49. Finally, meeting in Madrid on 14 November 1995:

"Ministers endorsed the document "Steps to take in implementing an operation of a WEU Humanitarian Task Force (Part II)" and welcomed the significant work in WEU since the adoption of documents in Noordwijk and Lisbon on WEU Humanitarian Missions and Emergency Responses to Humanitarian Crises."

Ministers further stated that:

"These documents will provide a framework for effective use of a WEU Humanitarian Task Force for WEU operations. It

3. Adopted on 29 November 1994.

4. Communicated to the Assembly on 27 February 1995.

will also allow WEU to contribute to efforts of other International Organisations in Humanitarian and Emergency Relief Operations. Ministers requested the Permanent Council to ensure that the Planning Cell take forward as a matter of priority its generic planning in this area."

50. The United Kingdom, at the start of its presidency of WEU in January 1996, planned to use WEU's experience in peacekeeping to help African nations build up an indigenous capacity to carry out peacekeeping operations themselves. This initiative, however, seems to have received only a lukewarm response and at present politico-military discussions are still continuing on the question of whether this is feasible at all.

51. The possible establishment of a standing humanitarian task force was originally proposed in July 1994 by the Italian Government in both WEU and NATO. NATO reacted with a reference to the future implementation of the CJTF concept. In WEU, as mentioned earlier, documents on this subject were endorsed by the Ministerial Council at its Lisbon and Madrid meetings. A number of member states, among others Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, are not in favour of establishing a standing humanitarian task force, but there is growing consensus on procedures to provide troops and equipment for an ad hoc task force. The Planning Cell is now drafting criteria and procedures aimed at the rapid composition and deployment of a humanitarian task force in emergencies, based on preconceived force packages. In response to a British initiative, the Chiefs of Defence staff met on 18 April 1996 to discuss crisis management, in particular humanitarian aid operations.

52. When taking over the presidency of WEU, the United Kingdom announced as one of its main objectives that WEU should have the ability to perform "lighter Petersberg tasks by the end of 1996". Under the present circumstances, most WEU member states agree that WEU should first concentrate on the lower end of the spectrum of Petersberg operations, in particular humanitarian missions and evacuation operations.

53. At the same time, it is thought that developments in the Balkans will oblige WEU to prepare for peacekeeping missions. Given existing capabilities, it seems realistic to admit that WEU would have trouble in carrying out combat missions in crisis management, including peace-making. On the other hand, given the text of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty and the increasing reluctance of the United States to intervene militarily in crises on European territory, such tasks cannot be excluded.

54. Although it is not easy to assess the numbers of armed forces that might be involved in

possible WEU operations, it should be understood that the lighter Petersberg operations will only involve limited numbers of troops. This is understandable given WEU's as yet modest planning capability. SHAPE, with its planning staff, took more than a year to draft plans for the 60 000-troop operation in Bosnia, now being conducted by IFOR. It was recently suggested that implementation of the CJTF concept, to be endorsed by the North Atlantic Council in Berlin in June 1996, would allow for European-led medium-sized operations.

V. The WEU Planning Cell

55. At Petersberg it was also decided to establish a Planning Cell as from October 1992 with the following three main tasks:

- keeping an updated list of units and combinations of units which would be allocated to WEU for specific operations;
- preparing contingency plans for deployment of forces under WEU auspices;
- preparing recommendations for the necessary command, control and communication arrangements, including standing operating procedures for headquarters which might be selected.

56. The newly-appointed director and a limited number of staff members did indeed start preparing the work of the Planning Cell in temporary premises in October 1992. The Planning Cell then moved to its permanent premises within WEU headquarters in June 1993 and was declared fully operational on 1 April 1994. The Defence Committee, attaching great importance to the work of the Planning Cell, adopted a report on this subject in May 1994⁵.

57. In June 1994, the Assembly adopted a number of recommendations with the primary objective of enabling the Planning Cell to concentrate on tasks which were considered to be vital at that time⁶. In its reply to Recommendation 561⁷, the Council assured the Assembly that it would enable the Planning Cell to focus its activities on the three main tasks as formulated in the Petersberg Declaration.

58. At the time of writing this report, it can be concluded that much progress has been made as regards the first of the three main tasks.

59. The Planning Cell has at its disposal a full and updated list of units and combinations of units which would be allocated to WEU for specific

5. See Document 1421: "The WEU Planning Cell", report submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee by Mrs Baarveld-Schlaman, Rapporteur.

6. Recommendation 561, adopted on 15 June 1994.

7. Communicated to the Assembly on 26 October 1994.

operations – the forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU). A separate list includes units which associate members, associate partners and observers consider suitable for such operations⁸.

60. Implementation of the second task, preparing contingency plans for the deployment of forces under WEU auspices, was initially discussed at great length in the Permanent Council. As a result of these discussions, the Planning Cell is to develop generic plans for possible operations where some of the planning factors have not yet been fully identified or cannot be assumed. They include the identification of typical force packages for such operations. At the Council's request, the Planning Cell will draw up contingency plans for possible operations in cases where the planning factors have been identified or can be assumed. As soon as the Council decides to mount a specific operation, it will designate an Operations Commander, who is responsible for drafting an operations plan normally in cooperation with the Planning Cell and based on earlier generic and contingency plans. Generic planning for humanitarian crises, including a full array of force packages, has now been completed. Existing generic planning can be taken off the shelf in order to update it, but the Planning Cell is not allowed to do any formal contingency planning without having been mandated by the Council.

61. The Planning Cell is also implementing its third and probably most complicated task because of the large number of different political and military authorities involved. Most of the basic work in the fields of command, control and communications arrangements, and operating procedures for the headquarters have now been completed. When the Situation Centre becomes operational at the end of June 1996, WEU will have a full politico-military infrastructure at its disposal. The only basic decision still to be taken by the Council concerns who will serve as the point of contact between the Council and the operational commander of a WEU operation. Until now, the nomination of a point of contact has been an ad hoc decision, depending on the circumstances, mostly based on a choice between a representative of the Presidency of WEU and the Director of the Planning Cell. It would seem appropriate, however, to decide that for all operations, the Director of the Planning Cell should be the point of contact. The Planning Cell Director would have the advantage of being familiar with earlier generic and contingency planning for WEU operations, including force packages. The list of FAWEU is drafted under his responsibility. He is used to working with the headquarters of national armed forces and has inside knowledge of all WEU procedures and the full Planning Cell staff at his command.

8. See also the Reply of the Council to Recommendation 566, communicated to the Assembly on 27 February 1995.

The different elements of this infrastructure will be discussed in chapter VIII of the present report.

62. In fact, the frustrations that came to light in the early days of the Planning Cell's existence, many of which were due to teething problems, have disappeared. The staff are no longer in doubt over their tasks and responsibilities and, in contacts with other organisations, suspicions have disappeared and have been replaced by good working relations. The total number of the Planning Cell's staff, including the staff of the Intelligence Section, has been increased to 54, which is considered sufficient for the work to be done. It compares with SACEUR's reaction force planning staff of 50, which was sufficient to play its part in organising IFOR planning. The only remaining practical problem is that member states sometimes have trouble in agreeing on the staff posts to be filled. In March 1996, there were six vacancies in the Planning Cell's staff.

63. As a result of direct contacts with national defence ministries, discussions with the military delegates and through the WEUCOM network, good cooperation between national capitals and the Planning Cell has now been established.

64. Two associate member states, Norway and Turkey, have nominated officers to the Planning Cell.

65. An Automated Data Processing Plan has been drawn up in the Planning Cell and the Secretariat-General and has now been implemented⁹. This plan will most probably be approved in the very near future and installation of the equipment needed to implement the plan is expected to take place before the end of 1996.

VI. Forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU)

66. The concept of forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU) was established in the Petersberg Declaration of 19 June 1992:

“ WEU member states declare that they are prepared to make available military units from the whole spectrum of their conventional armed forces for military tasks conducted under the authority of WEU.

Decisions to use military units answerable to WEU will be taken by the WEU Council in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter. Participation in specific operations will remain a sovereign decision of member states in accordance with national constitutions.

Military units will be drawn from the forces of WEU member states, including forces

9. See also the Reply of the Council to Recommendation 561, communicated to the Assembly on 26 October 1994.

with NATO missions – in this case after consultation with NATO – and will be organised on a multinational and multi-service basis.

All WEU member states will soon designate which of their military units and headquarters they would be willing to make available to WEU for its various possible tasks. Where multinational formations drawn from the forces of WEU nations already exist or are planned, these units could be made available for use under the authority of WEU, with the agreement of all participating nations.”

67. The existence of FAWEU counteracts the long-standing argument used by many critics of WEU as an operational organisation that WEU has no troops to be deployed for a military operation.

68. On 22 November 1993, WEU approved a report on relations between forces answerable to WEU which established two different categories of FAWEU:

“ – national FAWEU, military units and headquarters designated by states which can be made available to carry out tasks conducted under the authority of WEU;

“ – multinational FAWEU, established multinational military units and headquarters, existing and future, jointly designated for the same purpose by the participating states.”

69. The word “ answerable ” suggests a rather strong institutional and hierarchical link between such units and WEU, but this should be interpreted as “ at the disposal of WEU ” or “ available on demand ” and not “ assigned to ”, as is the case in NATO with the national armed forces of its member states.

70. The Planning Cell recently finished its 1996 annual update of forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU), comprising one list specifying the forces of member states, associate member states and observers, and a separate list referring to the forces proposed by the associate partners. The FAWEU lists were used in the WEU Crisex 95-96 exercise and, according to the Planning Cell, they clearly passed the test. Over 2000 units have now been made available to WEU ranging from ship, battalion and air squadrons to larger units.

71. At its Madrid meeting on 14 November 1995, the Council endorsed the document on the “ Creation and Assembly of Forces for WEU Operations ” which defines the mechanisms and procedures for the creation and assembly of a WEU force in times of crisis to conduct a Petersberg mission, providing WEU with a useful tool for the

rational exploitation of operational capabilities built on assets to be drawn from the FAWEU list.

72. In March 1996, the French Prime Minister, Alain Juppé, addressing a meeting of European conservative parties, suggested that five major European countries could between them put substantial numbers of troops at the disposal of the European Union, and come up with the means necessary for this force. The European Union would then have a force of 250 000 to 350 000 men managed by WEU and serving under an appropriate command which could act either autonomously or in liaison with the forces of the United States in the framework of a NATO operation. Mr Juppé’s proposal was not received with any enthusiasm in other European Union member states and no official reaction was given.

73. Unofficially, it was said that NATO would be happier to see the European allies able to deploy 30 000 to 40 000 troops together, rather than speak in terms of a European army proper. In Germany, it was noted that a German contribution of around 50 000 troops was very unlikely given an earlier statement by the Defence Ministry that it would make no more than 12 000 troops available for operations outside the NATO area.

74. Recently, however, in an interview¹⁰, the German Defence Minister categorically rejected Mr Juppé’s suggestion, arguing that a European army was out of the question because it would destroy transatlantic relations. He added that Germany wanted a development within NATO structures, creating flexibility and an operational capability for Europe, which took France into account, and that he did not want to duplicate NATO or compete with it.

VII. Cooperation between the WEU Planning Cell and multinational FAWEU (Forces answerable to WEU)

75. After the establishment of the European Corps in 1992, the participating states – Belgium, France and Germany – adopted a “ Joint Declaration stating the conditions for the use of the European Corps in the framework of Western European Union ” which was also endorsed by both Spain and Luxembourg when they formally became participants.

76. This Joint Declaration envisaged close cooperation between the European Corps and the WEU Planning Cell, stipulating that the Commander of the European Corps would keep the Planning Cell regularly informed about issues such as the manpower, equipment and weapons of the corps units that might act in WEU operations, the assets and infrastructure to be used for logistic

10. *Der Spiegel*, 16 April 1996.

support, training objectives and exercise programmes, and operational capability. It was further stipulated that the Planning Cell Director would inform the states participating in the European Corps of his assessment and proposals regarding the training of units, preparation and conduct of exercises, organisation of communications and logistic support and operability.

77. Meanwhile, after an initial phase in which both sides sounded out each other's position, a good working relationship has been established. This is also demonstrated by the success of WEU Crisex 95-96, Phase I, carried out in December 1995 in close cooperation with the European Corps, which was declared fully operational on 30 November 1995.

78. The definition of and arrangement for a permanent liaison between the European Corps and the WEU Planning Cell have now been incorporated in a Memorandum of Understanding agreed by the Council on 7 May 1996.

79. In 1994, joint declarations were adopted setting out the conditions for use of the Belgian/German/Netherlands/United Kingdom multinational division (Central) and the United Kingdom/Netherlands amphibious force in the framework of WEU, together with the relevant arrangements. On 14 November 1995, the WEU Council endorsed the adoption of similar joint declarations for the use of EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR in the framework of WEU.

80. MOUs for these four multinational forces have been drafted and were to be adopted by the Council on 7 May 1996. They are similar to the abovementioned MOU establishing a permanent liaison between the WEU Planning Cell and the European Corps. Basically, the MOUs are intended to provide the Planning Cell with detailed advice and information for drawing up generic planning, one of its main tasks.

81. In March 1996, Germany and the Netherlands agreed to declare the German-Netherlands army corps as FAWEU. It is expected that the Joint Declaration will be signed in the near future, followed by a MOU similar to those mentioned above.

VIII. Politico-military infrastructure, command and control

82. Much of the criticism regarding WEU as an operational organisation has always focused on the argument that it did not have the adequate politico-military structures for command and control over a military operation.

83. The Council, well aware of this significant shortcoming in the Organisation, has slowly but steadily worked to fill this gap and the full poli-

tico-military infrastructure has now been put into place.

84. The Petersberg Declaration confirmed the authority of the WEU Council to take decisions for WEU to deploy military forces, but indicated at the same time that the actual forces would always be provided by a "coalition of the willing", when it said:

"Decisions to use military units answerable to WEU will be taken by the WEU Council in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter. Participation in specific operations will remain a sovereign decision of member states in accordance with national constitutions."

85. At their meeting in June 1994, the military delegates agreed that a military Command and Control Working Group (CCWG) chaired by the Planning Cell, would carry out a study on the details of the interface between the WEU Council and the Operations Commander. In one of the conclusions of this study, a recommendation was made to establish a new Politico-Military Group in support of the Council, a Situation Centre and an Intelligence Section in the Planning Cell.

86. At its Lisbon meeting in May 1995, the Council decided to establish the structures recommended in the abovementioned study.

87. A comprehensive review of the various other elements of the WEU politico-military structure is given in the following paragraphs.

(a) The Situation Centre

88. The purpose of the Situation Centre, located in WEU headquarters in Brussels, is to enable the Council to monitor and control a WEU operation in any theatre on the basis of real-time information on its development.

89. The general mission of the Situation Centre is to monitor the situation in crisis areas designated by the Council, as well as the progress of WEU operations, and to produce the information required for the Politico-Military Group's preparation of Council decisions on crisis management and the politico-military control of operations. It does not give assessments or prepare recommendations.


90. All member states agree that this mission includes the following general tasks:

- in cooperation with the Planning Cell's Intelligence Section, monitor any crisis designated by the Council and support the Politico-Military Group in the formulation of its initial assessment;
- provide an overview of the situation for the Planning Cell, to facilitate the performance of its tasks;

- provide facilities for communications between the Operations Commander and the Council-designated "Point of Contact" and ensure continuity for the benefit of the Point of Contact;
- monitor the progress of the operation, in liaison with the designated operation headquarters, and provide the Council and the Politico-Military Group with concise but full information;
- provide support to the Politico-Military Group in the conduct of other tasks related to WEU operations.

91. A rudimentary form of Situation Centre was set up in time for Crisex 95-96, Phase I, in December 1995.

92. The Centre is expected to be fully operational by the end of June 1996, when it will operate in the framework of Crisex 95-96, Phase II. In peacetime there will be a staff of five running the Centre. The Situation Centre is a WEU organ in its own right, answerable to the Secretary-General of WEU.



MILDEL CAPITALS = Military delegates in the capitals

INT = Intelligence

SITREP = Situation report

SITCEN = Situation Centre

POC = Point of Contact

COMCEN = Communications Centre

OHQ = Operation headquarters

PMG = Politico-Military Group

93. In the diagram, the Situation Centre comes under the direct responsibility of the Secretary-General of WEU and is not part of the Planning Cell.

94. As discussed in paragraph 61 of the present report, a decision has still to be taken as to who should serve as the point of contact between the operational headquarters of a WEU operation and the Council. It seems that this choice cannot be made until different solutions have been tested in the framework of Crisex 95-96, Phases II and III.

(b) The Intelligence Section

95. The Intelligence Section in the Planning Cell started its work in September 1995 and now has a staff of six, including the chief officer.

96. Seven member states are at present providing intelligence on a voluntary basis.

97. The work and further development of the Intelligence Section are discussed in the report on "A European intelligence policy" submitted by Mr Baumel¹¹.

(c) Operational communications

98. Much attention is being paid to the establishment of an operational communications network and infrastructure. This is considered vital, among other things for secure communications between the WEU Council and the operational headquarters of a WEU operation.

99. WEU has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with NATO on a communications network, but this cannot take effect before the conclusion of a security agreement between WEU and NATO – a first priority for the WEU military – which is expected to take place in June 1996.

(d) Rules of engagement

100. The establishment of WEU rules of engagement also hinges on this security agreement between WEU and NATO. In fact, WEU's objective is to use and apply the same rules of engagement as NATO. Understandably NATO, which in principle can agree to this objective, is reluctant to provide the documents concerned because there is no guarantee as to their protection as long as there is no WEU-NATO security agreement.

(e) Exercise policy

101. Petersberg missions are a new phenomenon for many WEU forces and there is a need to prac-

tise these new tasks with different formations in field exercises. At the top end, decision-making exercises should be performed at least once a year involving the Council, military headquarters and operational communications.

102. The Planning Cell has completed a document on a future WEU exercise policy. An exercise programme is being developed, making active use of exercises which have been proposed by member states in order to circumvent the time-consuming problem of drafting and designing exercises from scratch, which would cause a few years' delay. A coherent exercise programme is now being developed, extending to the year 2000.

103. In order to test WEU's crisis-management instruments from the planning of a WEU operation to the implementation of the operation in a specific crisis area, WEU is now implementing the Crisex 95-96 exercise in three phases. The general framework of the exercise is a peace-keeping operation in accordance with Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter.

104. Phase I, which took place on 15-21 December 1995, concerned decision-making and procedural mechanisms inside WEU and between the WEU headquarters and the capitals.

105. Phase II, which will take place in June 1996, will test cooperation between WEU decision-making bodies, capitals and an operational headquarters in France.

106. Phase III, planned for December 1996, will test cooperation between operational headquarters and field headquarters.

107. It should be noted that in the meantime France, Italy and Spain are continuing their common exercise programme which they have clearly associated with WEU and the operational development of a European defence identity. After the "Farfadet 92", "Ardente 93" and "Tramontana 94" exercises, 1996 sees "Eolo 96". This exercise, with a total of 7 000 troops in a multi-service configuration, will simulate a peacekeeping operation mounted by a multinational force. This force will have to resist hostile activities and guarantee security and freedom of movement for itself and for civilians belonging to both sides in the conflict. EUROMARFOR, the quadrilateral maritime force (France, Italy, Portugal and Spain), which is also a declared FAWEU, has participated in this exercise as its first operational activity.

(f) Politico-Military Group (PMG)

108. At their meeting in Noordwijk on 14 November 1994, ministers considered:

"that the Council needs to have appropriate information and consultation mechanisms and procedures and more support, in

11. "A European intelligence policy", report submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee by Mr Baumel, Rapporteur, Document 1517.

particular to enable prompt reactions to crises, inter alia through a politico-military working group in Brussels which can be reinforced as necessary according to the specific nature of the contingency.”

They further said that:

“ The support capacities of the Secretariat in the politico-military field need to be reinforced accordingly so that the Secretariat can fully support the work done by the Council and its politico-military working group. ”

109. As a consequence of Council decisions taken in Lisbon, in May 1995, a Politico-Military Group was established in order to discuss current politico-military affairs. This group has now drafted a basic document on the future role of WEU in humanitarian operations. It has also done important work for the enhancement of WEU's operational capabilities, in particular with regard to the establishment of a Situation Centre and an Intelligence Section in the Planning Cell. The Politico-Military Group has also been instrumental in discussing a number of important issues regarding WEU operations in former Yugoslavia and their adaptation to the consequences of the Dayton Accords.

110. It should be noted that in the relatively short period of its existence, the Politico-Military Group has become an important forum which is playing a substantial role in preparing the essential discussions and decisions of the Council. In fact, this group has also partly taken over the role of the military delegates in the earlier WEU configuration.

(g) Politico-Military Working Group (PMWG)

111. In the second half of 1994, the Council agreed on the text of the terms of reference for a Politico-Military Working Group (PMWG) which is operating under the Council's authority as part of the follow-up to the Luxembourg Declaration and to the NATO summit meeting in Brussels.

112. The PMWG has been instrumental in drafting a document on criteria and arrangements for the effective use of CJTF by WEU. In this framework, it has also drafted a document on mechanisms and procedures for WEU use of Alliance assets and capabilities as well as a report on assets and capabilities required for WEU operations.

(h) Command and control

113. At their meeting in June 1994, the military delegates agreed that a military Command and Control Working Group (CCWG), chaired by the Planning Cell, would carry out a study on the details of the interface between the WEU Council and the Operations Commander.

(i) Procedures for the deployment of forces in a WEU operation

114. In the light of the preceding review of the existing politico-military structures in WEU, it seems useful to summarise below the procedures for setting up a WEU operation.

115. In a crisis situation, as soon as the Council takes the decision that FAWEU may have to be deployed in order to implement one of the Petersberg tasks, it asks the Planning Cell to draft a contingency plan with a possible force package, drawing on the generic planning available.

116. On the basis of a contingency plan, the Planning Cell will then use the force generation request procedure in order to ask the various categories of states participating in WEU which forces, on the basis of proposed force packages in the contingency plan, would be available for this specific mission. After receiving their replies, the Planning Cell will present a final version of its contingency plan to the WEU Council.

117. The Council will then have to give final approval to go ahead with the operation, nominate an operations commander who will draft an operations plan and designate a headquarters. This may be the national headquarters of one of the member states or the operational headquarters of multinational FAWEU. At WEU, it is thought that this solution would be more flexible and efficient than establishing one permanent multinational WEU headquarters. The chain of command in such operations flows from the Council via the point of contact to the operations commander and eventually the force commander. The operations commander is in command of the operation in accordance with the abovementioned procedure, but it is to be noted that each member state will always retain ultimate control over troops they have put at the disposal of WEU for a specific operation.

118. Meanwhile, satisfactory arrangements have been worked out to ensure efficient coordination in the theatre of operations between the military and civilian elements of an operation, in particular where the civilian elements are provided by another organisation such as the United Nations.

IX. Position of associate partners

119. It should be recalled here that in the document on “ A status of association with WEU for the Republic of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Romania and the Slovak Republic ”, adopted on 9 May 1994, the following documents were established in connection with associate partner status:

“ 1. They may participate in the meetings of the Council subject to the following provisions:

- they may take part in discussions but may not block a decision that is the subject of consensus among the member states;
- to enable WEU to perform to the full its role as the defence component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and also to address any other questions in an appropriate configuration, meetings of the Council according to present arrangements will be convened on the basis of the provisions agreed in Rome on 20 November 1992 in the Document on Associate Membership of WEU and the Declaration on WEU Observers.

They will be regularly informed at the Council of the activities of its working groups and may be invited to participate in working groups on a case-by-case basis.

They may have a liaison arrangement with the Planning Cell.

2. They may associate themselves with decisions taken by member states concerning the following tasks envisaged in paragraph II.4 of the Petersberg Declaration, i.e. ‘humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking’.

They will be able to participate in their implementation as well as in relevant exercises and planning unless a majority of the member states, or half of the member states including the Presidency, decide otherwise. They will be invited to provide information on forces. They will also be able to offer forces for specific operations.

When it is agreed that they join such WEU operations by committing forces, they will have the same obligations as other participants, as well as the right of involvement in the command structures and in the Council’s subsequent decision-making process. The precise modalities of their participation, including their rights and obligations, in each such WEU operation will be agreed on a case-by-case basis”.

120. From the abovementioned, especially as regards the operational side of WEU, it can be concluded that once the Council has taken a deci-

sion to mount a Petersberg operation, associate partners can participate in the implementation of this decision unless a majority of the member states, or half the member states including the Presidency, decide otherwise. Once it is agreed that they may participate in an operation by committing forces, they have rights and obligations similar to other participants. The precise arrangements for participation are agreed on a case-by-case basis. An informal arrangement has now been established aimed at informing associate partners about developments in the Planning Cell’s activities. If required, bi- or multilateral consultations can take place between the Planning Cell and the associate partners.

121. The associate partners have been invited to provide details of forces they consider suitable for participation in humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. Such units have now been designated and will be taken into consideration alongside the FAWEU list. Furthermore, if the associate partners participate in any of the abovementioned operations, they will, together with the other participating states in that operation, define the practical arrangements for the conduct of such operations.

122. To date, no security agreement has been concluded between WEU and the associate partners and, as a consequence, associate partners do not receive any information which carries a confidential or higher classification. It is no surprise that the conclusion of the WEU-NATO security agreement has taken such a long time in view of the participation of associate partners in WEU activities.

123. The IFOR operation in Bosnia, in which the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland are participating in their role as associate partners, is considered an important test-bed for cooperation with associate partners in possible future WEU operations. Associate partners also cooperated actively in drafting the document “European security: a common concept of the 27 WEU countries”.

124. At its Madrid meeting, the Council welcomed the progress made with regard to implementation of the liaison arrangements between associate partners and the Planning Cell. Ministers agreed that, on the basis of the common ground developed in joint reflections on the new European security conditions and within the context of their present status, the associate partners should be more involved in the ongoing work on developing the operational role of WEU with regard to Petersberg missions. They tasked the Permanent Council to give priority to the ways and means of achieving this objective.

125. At this stage, a serious effort is being made to inform associate partners as thoroughly as pos-

sible about the activities of the Planning Cell without involving them directly in its work, which would jeopardise the future security agreement between WEU and NATO.

X. Eurolift

126. For a number of years, especially in the wake of the Gulf war, the Assembly of WEU has attached great importance to the establishment of independent European strategic mobility. A bilateral Franco-German post-Gulf war study on European requirements for strategic mobility was not given any follow-up until the Council decided on 27 April 1993 that, under the aegis of the Planning Cell, a WEU strategic mobility study should be initiated.

127. A WEU strategic mobility working group started work in the second half of 1993. Following an evaluation of existing strategic mobility capabilities in WEU in Phase I, which was presented to the Ministers in November 1994, the working group has now concluded its work on Phase II, which includes a WEU strategic mobility concept, and will submit its study to the Council for approval in May 1996.

128. In the strategic mobility concept, consensus has been reached on the principle of coordinating national assets. The concept establishes coordination measures and procedures for the pooling of national transport assets and for circumstances where WEU would have to have recourse to the civil transport market, in particular to avoid competitive bidding. There have been proposals for the Planning Cell to be the coordinating authority, but member states consider strategic lift a national responsibility which can only be coordinated on an ad hoc basis. The Planning Cell could certainly provide help in that context, but once the Council decided to initiate a military operation, coordination, including national strategic lift assets, would be in the hands of the operations commander.

XI. A European nuclear deterrent?

129. On several occasions in the past, the Assembly of WEU has discussed the role of nuclear weapons in the defence of Europe.

130. The Council has almost consistently dodged recommendations to discuss the role of nuclear weapons in the defence of Europe.

131. Concluding a report on "WEU: the operational organisation", the Assembly in June 1992 recommended that the Council:

"Encourage France and the United Kingdom, in cooperation if possible, to maintain an effective and credible minimum nuclear

deterrent and, in parallel, consider the desirability of instituting a WEU "nuclear consultation group" to give practical expression to the principles of nuclear deterrence reiterated in The Hague Platform as well as helping to define a European opinion on nuclear disarmament and anti-proliferation measures."¹²

132. The Council replied dryly:

"Questions pertaining to the "maintenance of an effective and credible minimum nuclear deterrent" and to the desirability of instituting a WEU "nuclear consultation group" are not at present on the agenda of the Council and its working groups"¹³.

133. When in Recommendation 540¹⁴ the Assembly recommended that the Council:

"Re-examine the role of both United States and European nuclear weapons in European security in conjunction with a parallel re-examination in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance;"

the Council replied that it again took note of the Assembly's recommendation, this time more generally, pointing out that "nuclear questions are not at present on the agenda of the Council or its working groups"¹⁵. In 1994, the Assembly, convinced that sooner or later the role of nuclear weapons in Europe and in a European defence policy would have to be discussed, adopted an extensive recommendation on the role and future of nuclear weapons¹⁶.

134. In particular, the Assembly recommended that the Council:

"Establish a strategic study group within WEU:

- to examine the role and future of nuclear weapons for European security including the different aspects of intra-European extended nuclear deterrence;
- to examine the role all the WEU member states might play in defining a future European nuclear strategy;
- then to study the possibility of creating a nuclear coordination body within WEU."

135. In its reply, the Council did not comment on these specific recommendations, but instead delivered a barrage of platitudes such as "under the present circumstances there is for European

12. Recommendation 518, adopted on 2 June 1992.

13. Communicated to the Assembly on 16 October 1992.

14. Adopted on 15 June 1993.

15. Communicated to the Assembly on 14 October 1993.

16. Recommendation 564, adopted on 16 June 1994.

defence, for the foreseeable future, no alternative for a strategy ... based on conventional and nuclear weapons” and “nuclear weapons make a unique contribution in rendering the risks of any aggression incalculable and unacceptable”.

136. It also quoted NATO’s new strategic concept of 1991, which recognised that “the independent nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent role of their own, contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies”.

137. In the document “European security: a common concept of the 27 WEU countries” adopted by the Council on 14 November 1995, one paragraph discussed the “Role of nuclear forces in deterrence”. Disappointingly, even this single paragraph did virtually no more than repeat hackneyed phrases from the 1987 Hague Platform and the 1991 new strategic concept of the Alliance. It also repeated a phrase from the preliminary conclusions on the formulation of a common European defence policy of June 1994 according to which “Europeans have a major responsibility with regard to defence in both the conventional and nuclear field”. As could have been expected, Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden, recalled in a footnote that they were not party to these decisions.

138. One seriously wonders what use it is to state that “Europeans have a major responsibility with regard to defence in ... the nuclear field” if no further explanation is forthcoming.

139. After resuming its nuclear tests, France proposed that its European partners, in the framework of instituting a common defence, think about the availability of its nuclear deterrent forces. President Chirac suggested on 31 August 1995 that: “As it builds up its defence, the European Union might wish the French deterrent to play a role in that defence”. Later, the Prime Minister, Mr Juppé, added that cooperation in defence questions could no longer overlook the nuclear dimension of Europe’s common security. The proposal to start discussing the possibility of a concerted European nuclear deterrent was in particular directed at the United Kingdom and Germany.

140. Against the background of the French nuclear tests then taking place, it is understandable that the German Government reacted politely and diplomatically. Among other things, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, Klaus Kinkel, stated that the idea of concerted deterrence was interesting and should be discussed and studied closely. He also said that after the end of the tests, Germany would be prepared to re-examine the status of French and British deterrent forces in order to facilitate the creation of a European defence identity and give it credibility.

141. The United Kingdom, being itself one of the official nuclear weapon states, has no problem in discussing nuclear issues with France. Since 1992, a Joint Commission on Nuclear Policy and Doctrine established by France and the United Kingdom has proved to be a useful instrument in improving relations between the two countries in military nuclear matters. On the other hand, Prime Minister John Major declared that the United Kingdom does not see any room for a new deterrent organisation in Europe outside NATO¹⁷.

142. It should be noted, however, that it is increasingly unlikely that, within the framework of a common European security and defence policy, nuclear forces would be an asset for the defence and security of the national territory of only one specific country.

143. Other serious considerations when discussing the possibility and role of a concerted European deterrent are the position of those central European states that are now associate partners of WEU and the changes in European security that will result from selective enlargement of NATO. Will the new NATO member states be protected unconditionally by NATO’s, i.e. the United States’, nuclear umbrella? What security arrangements will be agreed for those central European states which have been selected for future European Union membership but which, as regards security, will be left in the cold after enlargement of NATO to take in only Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary?

144. In the end, an adequate discussion of European possession of nuclear weapons, their structure and their tasks, is only possible if there is common agreement on why nuclear weapons should remain available now that the East-West conflict has ended. Apart from this, it must be clear into which security and defence political framework they should be inserted. On this framework will depend whether WEU’s operational capabilities can be organised in a purposeful, rational and effective way.

145. Therefore, but also for basic political considerations, it must be made clear soon what specific shape European security architecture is to take. This presupposes that the institutional links between WEU and the EU, and between the EU’s common foreign and security policy and NATO, be determined. When taking this decision, account must be taken of the fact that some central European states have decided, in accordance with the rules of self-determination and democracy, that they wish to become members of the EU and NATO.

17. *Le Monde*, 29-30 October 1995.

146. As regards the creation of the future European security architecture, decisions of the EU, NATO and WEU, as well as recommendations of the European Commission exist:

- "Resolved to implement a common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common defence policy which might in time lead to a common defence." (Preamble to the Treaty on European Union, 7 February 1992)
- "In accordance with the decision contained in the Declaration of member states of WEU at Maastricht on 10 December 1991 to develop WEU as the defence component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance." (Petersberg Declaration, 19 June 1992)
- "The enlargement of NATO is a parallel process with and will complement that of the European Union." (NATO: study on NATO enlargement, September 1995)
- "Parallel processes of enlargement of EU, WEU and NATO are desirable and would alleviate the complexities connected with differing memberships of these organisations." (Communiqué of the WEU Council, Madrid, 14 November 1995)
- "The majority view equally shares the desire to make maximum use of the existing treaty provisions for operational reinforcement of the ESDI and strengthening of cooperation between the EU, WEU and NATO, but, in addition to this, advocates the gradual integration of WEU into EU with the purpose of achieving greater coherence than at present of European action in the security and defence field." (Madrid, 14 November 1995)
- "The (intergovernmental) conference should therefore evaluate the task of WEU with regard to its integration in the Union according to a fixed time schedule." (European Commission: Opinion of the Commission: Reinforcement of the political union and preparation of its enlargement, Brussels, 28 February 1996).

147. Within WEU Europeans can no longer afford to ignore the issue of nuclear deterrence even if they are *at present* – a convenient qualifier used by the Council – not ready to establish a European nuclear deterrent. Nuclear deterrence is playing a role in the defence security of Europe and will continue to do so for the foreseeable

future, whether one likes it or not. If WEU considers itself to be a defence and security organisation, it should at least start to include the issue of the role of nuclear weapons in its discussions, unless it can prove that in security and defence matters, nothing will ever change.

XII. Conclusions

148. Contrary to what was hoped and expected at the time of German reunification, the present-day world, Europe included, has not become a place where threats to security, such as armed conflict, ethnic strife and even genocide, can be relegated to the annals of history.

149. On the other hand, it is encouraging to see that an increasing number, if not all, European states consider the European unification process as the only viable course for the future and the best guarantee for security on the continent. But although this is beyond doubt, there is still a long way to go before the final objective will be attained.

150. Meanwhile, Europe will have to muddle through a period in which the EU, WEU and NATO will coexist with different memberships. For some time to come, not all European countries will be covered by the same security blanket or protected by the same socio-economic safety net. In some parts of Europe the possibility of regional conflicts cannot be excluded and the United States has made it sufficiently clear that it is not planning to play the role of fire-fighter or peace-keeper in any such conflicts if they erupt.

151. Therefore most European governments, and in particular the member states of WEU, agree that there is a need to develop a specific European security capacity, not competing with, but complementary to NATO. Experience in Bosnia has made this requirement even more pressing.

152. After finalisation of the Treaty on European Union in December 1991, the WEU Council established a new basis for the development of WEU's role in the security of Europe, including the strengthening of its operational role, in its Petersberg Declaration of June 1992.

153. In bygone years the Assembly has often criticised the Council for its inertia, lack of political will and courage, delaying tactics and protracted debates on institutional matters. The present report, however, provides an opportunity to pay tribute to the Council for what it has achieved in enhancing WEU's operational capabilities. Apparently, years of dogged work behind the scenes and the pragmatic focus of the British Presidency have paid off.

154. The long-awaited basic politico-military infrastructure for the conduct and the command

and control of WEU military operations has now been established.

A Politico-Military Group has been set up to support the Council and help it to react promptly to crises. The Planning Cell's staff has been enlarged and it has been reinforced with a modest Intelligence Section. From the end of June, an operational Situation Centre in WEU headquarters will be able to monitor the situation in crisis areas as well as the progress of WEU operations. Clear channels of communication between the WEU Council and WEU forces are guaranteed, and a single chain of command for all WEU military forces involved in an operation has been established. Arrangements have been made to ensure efficient coordination between military and civilian elements in the theatre of operations.

155. The Planning Cell has at its disposal a full and updated list of forces answerable to WEU, units and combinations of units of member states which could be allocated to WEU for specific operations. A separate list includes units which associate members, associate partners and observers would assign to such operations. The machinery and procedures for the rapid creation and assembly of a WEU force in times of crisis have been defined. Generic planning for humanitarian

crises, including a full array of force packages, has now been completed.

156. Finally, a security agreement between WEU and NATO has been concluded making provision for the exchange of intelligence data, the use of an operational communications network and the establishment of WEU rules of engagement. The endorsement of an agreement concluded on Combined Joint Task Forces by the North Atlantic Council in June 1996 will enable WEU to use NATO collective assets and capabilities in a European-led operation where the United States chooses not to participate.

157. Not all the work has been done yet, and much attention needs to be paid to the strengthening of WEU's operational capabilities in such fields as reconnaissance and intelligence, strategic and in-theatre transport capabilities, and standardisation and interoperability. European cooperation on defence equipment and the maintenance of a European defence industrial base are other areas requiring careful study. The conclusion of the CJTF agreement, however, will enable WEU to make good these shortcomings for the time being. The tools for WEU operations are available – it is now up to the Council to use them, if need be.

