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Security and defence: the challenge for Europe after Cologne

REPORT

submitted on behalf of the Political Committee
by Mr Marshall, Rapporteur

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION
43, avenue du Président-Wilson, 75775 Paris Cedex 16
Tel. 01.53.67.22.00 – Fax: 01.53.67.22.01
E-mail: assembly@weu.int
Internet: <http://www.weu.int/assembly/welcome.html>

Security and defence: the challenge for Europe after Cologne

REPORT¹

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by Mr Marshall, Rapporteur*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION

on security and defence: the challenge for Europe after Cologne

DRAFT ORDER

on the parliamentary dimension of security and defence: the challenge for Europe after Cologne

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Mr Marshall, Rapporteur

APPENDIX

Message from the WEU Assembly to the Governments and Parliaments of Europe

¹ Adopted in Committee by 20 votes to 1

² *Members of the Committee: Mr Baumel (Chairman); Mr Urbain (Alternate: Clerfayt), Mr Blaauw (Vice-Chairmen); MM de Assis, Bianchi, Behrendt, Brancati, Sir Sydney Chapman, MM Cusimano, Dias, Mrs Dumont, Mrs Durrieu (Alternate: About), MM Ehrmann, Evangelisti, Eyskens (Alternate: De Decker), MM Fayot, Haack, Hornhues (Alternate: Buhler), Lord Kirkhill, MM Lemoine, Liapis, Van der Maelen, Marshall, Martínez Casañ, Micheloyannis, Lord Ponsonby, MM Puche Rodríguez, Recoder, Roseta, Schmitz, Skoularikis (Alternate: Agourakis), MM Sterzing, Timmermans, Van der Linden, Volcic (Alternate: Mrs Squarzialupi), Mr Wray (Alternate: Vis), Mr Yañez-Barnuevo.*

Associate members: MM Adamczyk, Kosmo, Ostrowski, Pastusiak, Zielinski.

N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.

*Draft Recommendation**on security and defence: the challenge for Europe after Cologne*

The Assembly.

- (i) Welcoming the resolve shown in Cologne by the EU heads of state and government to give the European Union a capacity for autonomous action backed up by credible means in order to respond to international crises, in accordance with the Plan for Action adopted by the WEU Assembly on 16 March 1999;
- (ii) Concerned nonetheless that the Fifteen are at present no longer thinking in terms of building a common defence within the European Union as envisaged in the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties and as the WEU Assembly had strongly advocated;
- (iii) Stressing the utmost importance of strengthening the member countries' military capabilities for carrying out Petersberg missions, and accordingly providing its unreserved support for the British-Italian proposal for a European defence capabilities initiative.
- (iv) Considering, however, that European capabilities can be strengthened on the basis of existing European institutions and treaties.
- (v) Convinced on the other hand that the path mapped out by the European Council, which consists in giving the European Union the decision-making capacity necessary for it to take on WEU's responsibilities in the field of Petersberg missions, will inevitably lead to difficult institutional negotiations that are unlikely to produce results in the short term, as shown by the varied responses to the action plan submitted by France and its proposal to create a hard core of countries prepared to make a specific commitment to defence Europe.
- (vi) Convinced, therefore, that the WEU Assembly's proposal whereby, in the first instance, WEU's decision-making and operational capabilities should be placed under the direct authority of the European Council for the political control and strategic direction of EU-led Petersberg operations, is still fully relevant.
- (vii) Recalling that WEU is an essential element of the development of the ESDI within the Alliance, involving all the European allies, whereas the CFSP comprises those matters concerning the security of the European Union, as the Council confirmed in its reply to Recommendation 626;
- (viii) Stressing in consequence the importance of the mission of WEU, which is indispensable as an instrument for developing the ESDI with the full participation of countries whose accession to the European Union and/or NATO still poses problems.
- (ix) Convinced equally that transferring certain functions from an organisation bringing together 28 countries including ten with powers of decision to an organisation with fifteen will not resolve the fundamental difficulties Europe has with taking joint decisions, if there is no change to the rule on consensus;
- (x) Considering that the course of action proposed by the European Council should induce the WEU Council to examine the consequences it entails for the future application of the modified Brussels Treaty and the way in which the Council will carry out its obligations under Articles V, VIII and IX thereof;
- (xi) Welcoming, therefore, the Council's reply to Recommendation 644 in which it expresses the opinion that the modified Brussels Treaty continues to form a valuable part of the European security architecture and that the obligations arising therein should continue to constitute an element in the development of European security and defence;
- (xii) Welcoming also the Council's statement in the same reply to the effect that it is conscious of the importance of the parliamentary dimension to the debate on European security and defence, continues to

attach importance to the contribution of the WEU Assembly and its Committees to the Organisation's work and considers that the Assembly's input is all the more relevant at this stage of the debate;

(*xiii*) Concerned, however, that the problem of the parliamentary dimension is not even mentioned in the Cologne Declaration while recalling that, for 45 years, the modified Brussels Treaty has placed the WEU Council under an obligation to make an annual report on its activities to the WEU Assembly;

(*xiv*) Recalling that the path mapped out by the European Council for it to be able to achieve its aims in the framework of the CFSP poses the problem of the 13 WEU associate members' and associate partners' participation in the decision-making process under the new arrangement, which will prove difficult to resolve;

(*xv*) Recalling also that the course of action proposed by the European Council will require new arrangements to be set up for direct cooperation between the European Union and NATO, the practical aspects of which remain to be negotiated in detail, given that the EU does not want to have to be bound by the model that currently applies to cooperation between WEU and NATO;

(*xvi*) Recalling further that the Cologne programme does not resolve the problem of the place of European armaments cooperation in the new arrangements or that of how the WEU associate countries can continue to be involved in such cooperation;

(*xvii*) Repeating its fundamental reservations about a policy that gives WEU observer countries an unrestricted right of decision regarding military aspects of crisis management without obliging them in exchange to participate fully in a common defence;

(*xviii*) Considering that the way forward proposed in Cologne implies revision of the Amsterdam Treaty, which will require an intergovernmental conference to be convened in order to adopt the amendments, followed by a ratification procedure in the national parliaments;

(*xix*) Considering in conclusion that the Cologne programme does not resolve the main institutional or fundamental problems but that it nonetheless provides an opportunity that must be grasped and constitutes the starting point for a process whose successful outcome is in the fundamental interest of all the countries concerned,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Continue to apply the modified Brussels Treaty and use WEU as an organisation which continues to be both an indispensable instrument for fulfilling all the obligations arising from the Treaty, particularly Article VIII thereof, and also an essential element of the development of the ESDI;
2. Urge the member countries to make every effort to ensure that the second phase of the audit of the assets and capabilities available for European-led operations can be completed in time for the Ministerial Council meeting in November and will result in joint recommendations;
3. Maintain and strengthen the involvement of the associate member and associate partner countries in this work and in that of the subsidiary bodies;
4. Prepare the European Union for the tasks of resolving the problems it will inevitably face when it takes over WEU's functions regarding Petersberg missions, and of establishing direct cooperation with NATO by taking advantage of the arrangements which already exist between NATO and WEU;
5. Ensure in particular that the ESDI and the CFSP develop in harmony and full transparency, in accordance with the Cologne programme;
6. Continue to keep the Assembly informed about the activities of the Council even if responsibility for their exercise is transferred to the European Union or NATO;
7. Appoint Mr Solana, Secretary-General of the EU Council and High Representative for the CFSP, as the new Secretary-General of WEU;

- 8 Urge the WEU member governments, as members of the European Union, to:
- (a)* ensure that the 15 EU members actively pursue the project given shape in the Amsterdam Treaty of including collective defence in the European Union in the spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity to which they gave a commitment;
 - (b)* ensure that the European Union provides the WEU associate members and associate partners with a guarantee that under the CFSP they will keep all the rights of participation they currently enjoy in WEU;
 - (c)* make arrangements so that pending a definitive decision on how democratic scrutiny of the European Union's future activities under the CFSP is to be organised, the WEU Assembly, bringing together the delegations of the 28 nations in the WEU family, can continue to carry out that task without prejudice to the provisions of the Treaty on European Union governing the European Parliament's right of information

Draft Order
on the parliamentary dimension of European security and defence:
the challenge for Europe after Cologne

The Assembly.

- (i) Stressing that in future it will be necessary to maintain and strengthen the democratic scrutiny of any European activities for which WEU is currently responsible that are transferred to the European Union;
- (ii) Concerned, therefore, that there is no reference whatsoever in the Cologne Declaration to the problem of the parliamentary dimension while recalling that, for 45 years, the modified Brussels Treaty has placed the WEU Council under an obligation to make an annual report on its activities to the WEU Assembly;
- (iii) Considering the opposition of certain governments to the idea of giving the European Parliament powers of scrutiny in the field of the CFSP;
- (iv) Stressing also the importance it attaches to the representatives of the parliaments of the WEU associate member and associate partner countries which are not represented in the European Parliament being able to continue to take part in the democratic debate on European security and defence policy;
- (v) Considering it essential for this reason to ensure that pending a definitive decision on how democratic scrutiny of the European Union's future activities under the CFSP is to be organised, the WEU Assembly, bringing together the delegations of the 28 nations in the WEU family, can continue to carry out that task;
- (vi) Convinced nevertheless that the areas of competence of the WEU Assembly and the European Parliament are complementary and that it is essential to seek appropriate arrangements for the European Parliament to be involved in this debate and for cooperation to be established between the Assembly and the Parliament, taking account of the latter's prerogatives in the sphere of industrial policy and control over the Community budget, including certain items of non-military expenditure under the CFSP.
- (vii) Convinced also that the time has come to consolidate democratic scrutiny of security and defence in Europe, which might entail a revision of the procedures for appointing members and of the rules governing the composition of the Assembly of WEU,

I INSTRUCTS ITS POLITICAL COMMITTEE

To draw up options for maintaining and strengthening proper democratic scrutiny at European level of future activities of the European Union which are at present the responsibility of WEU, such scrutiny meeting the following conditions:

- (a) it must continue to be based on the modified Brussels Treaty until such time as the conditions have been met for that Treaty to be replaced by the Treaty on European Union;
- (b) for as long as the Treaty on European Union does not replace the modified Brussels Treaty and WEU's full integration into the European Union is not achieved, the Assembly of WEU, whose particular feature is that it includes parliamentarians from 28 European countries, should continue to exercise its remit subject to the changes necessary for it to be better adapted to the new institutional framework in which decisions will be taken;
- (c) in the framework of such adaptation, provision will have to be made for appropriate cooperation between the WEU Assembly and the European Parliament on the basis of their complementary areas of competence;

(d) once WEU is fully integrated in the European Union and the Treaty on European Union replaces the modified Brussels Treaty, it will be necessary to review the organisation of democratic scrutiny of the European Union's future activities in the field of security and defence, taking into account the fact that the governments consider that competence for this area must remain with the nation states.

II. INSTRUCTS ITS PRESIDENTIAL COMMITTEE

1. To take any measures compatible with the Assembly's Charter and Rules of Procedure with a view to submitting to the European Parliament proposals for cooperation arrangements consistent with the specific mandates of the two assemblies;
2. To transmit this Order, together with the message from the Assembly to the Governments and Parliaments of Europe that is annexed to this report, to the Council, the European Council, the member governments and parliaments of the 28 WEU nations, and to the European Parliament.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr Marshall, Rapporteur)

1. Following the NATO Summit in Washington, the European Council decided, at its meeting in Cologne on 3-4 June, to embark on a new course designed to give Europe credible means for taking autonomous action in response to international crises, by means of a strengthened Common Foreign and Security Policy. In this respect the objective it set is perfectly consistent with the proposals put forward in the Assembly's Plan for Action.

2. However, to achieve this declared objective, the European Council changed tack completely compared to the direction the European Union and WEU had been following in their common endeavour to take forward European integration in their respective areas of competence:

since Cologne it has become clear that the European Council is no longer thinking in terms of building a common defence within the European Union even though that was an objective for which the Amsterdam Treaty, which had entered into force only a few weeks earlier, had paved the way. In contrast, it is now clear that the European Union itself will have to be able to carry out what are known as Petersberg tasks without having to avail itself of WEU. To this end the European Council declared that it intended to give the EU a capacity for autonomous action "backed up by credible military forces" without prejudice to action undertaken by NATO. In order to do so, it is no longer planning to integrate WEU in the EU, as envisaged in the Amsterdam Treaty, but to include those functions of WEU that concern Petersberg missions. For that purpose it proposes to create within the European Union certain decision-making bodies and structures in parallel to those which currently exist in WEU.

3. The decisions required to achieve these objectives are to be taken by the end of the year 2000. The European Council considers that "in that event, the WEU as an organisation would have completed its purpose". It envisages spe-

cific arrangements for offering WEU associate members and associate partners a possibility of participation but the details remain to be decided. In contrast, the European Council says nothing at all about a number of outstanding problems, in particular the following questions:

- who in future is to monitor application of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty?
- what fate is in store for the Treaty, particularly Article VIII creating the WEU Council?
- which organisation will monitor armaments cooperation?
- what provision will be made for democratic scrutiny in the new arrangements?

4. It is clear that no practical arrangements can be made in keeping with the new direction the European Council has decided upon without the involvement and consultation of the respective bodies that exercise democratic scrutiny of the executive in the field of security and defence or without thorough public debate of the consequences of this change of course for a project Europe has been trying to launch for several decades, namely that of building the defence dimension it still lacks.

5. After making a preliminary assessment of the Washington and Cologne decisions in the report submitted on 10 June 1999 by Mr Baumel on behalf of the Political Committee¹, the Assembly decided to instruct the Committee to carry out a more detailed analysis for the December session by preparing a report entitled "The future of European defence and its democratic scrutiny - reply to the annual report of the Council". But since then a number of things have happened. At the end of July the French President, Mr Chirac, forwarded an action plan to all the EU member states, proposing the setting up of a number of new institutions - concerning

¹ See Recommendation 644 on WEU after the Washington and Cologne Summits - reply to the annual report of the Council.

which a decision of principle had been taken in Cologne – as soon as Mr Solana takes office, on 18 October 1999, as Secretary-General of the EU Council and High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy

6. Following up a German proposal which was supported by the WEU Assembly, the French President said he was in favour of Mr Solana, Secretary-General of the EU Council and High Representative designate for the CFSP, being appointed the new Secretary-General of WEU. The European Union is planning to invite the defence ministers of its member states to take part in the meeting of the General Affairs Council to be held on 15 November and the Finnish Presidency has proposed a specific timetable for finalising the report it will be submitting to the Helsinki Summit which is to describe the progress made in implementing the Cologne decisions. Following the recent elections, a new European Parliament is getting ready to make full use of the increased powers it has under the Amsterdam Treaty and intends to become increasingly involved in the area of the CFSP.

7. At the same time the WEU Council is continuing with its informal reflection on the future of security and defence Europe and, with a view to its ministerial meeting on 22-23 November, is making preparations for the submission of the second part of the audit of assets and capabilities available for European-led operations, together with a report on requirements and possibilities for strengthening European capabilities. Italy and the United Kingdom have also proposed setting criteria to improve and strengthen capabilities.

8. Although the process of reinforcing European defence capabilities does not involve institutional matters as a matter of priority, the path mapped out by the European Council, consisting in giving the European Union the decision-making capability necessary for carrying out Petersberg missions, will inevitably lead to difficult negotiations that will not produce any results in the short term, as can be seen from the varied responses to the action plan submitted by France and its proposal to create a hard core of countries prepared to enter into specific commitments regarding European defence.

9. Given this situation, it is clear that the Plan for Action adopted by the Assembly, which

proposes proceeding in stages and in the first instance placing WEU's decision-making and operational capabilities under the direct authority of the European Council, is still fully relevant.

10. The Assembly is convinced that the Cologne programme is a starting point and an opportunity to be grasped. But it is important to begin work now in order to steer the Cologne formula in a direction that will bring success and to prevent it from leading to no more than an ambiguous and minimalist compromise by abandoning what is essential, in particular the project of a defence Europe subject to democratic scrutiny

11. It was for all these reasons that the Presidential Committee considered it essential for the Assembly to express its views on the impact of the new direction being taken in European security and defence policy well before its ordinary session to be held in Paris from 29 November to 2 December. It therefore decided to hold a special session of the Assembly in Luxembourg on 18-19 October on the theme "Security and defence: the challenge for Europe after Cologne".

12. A number of recent events have made it more necessary than ever for the Assembly to hold an initial debate now with the representatives of the national parliaments and the European Parliament:

- there is continuing uncertainty about the future development of relations between the European Union and Turkey, and all the various facets of this problem come to light in the most recent debate in the European Parliament on the conditions for Turkish accession to the EU;
- the conflict in East Timor and the latest war in Chechnya are a reminder to Europe that Kosovo will not be the last crisis for which Europe will have to be prepared.
- in the framework of its National Missile Defence programme, the United States has successfully tested a missile that can destroy another missile; it has also warned Europe against any weakening of the Atlantic Alliance while at the same time stressing that Americans

are becoming increasingly frustrated about having to bear the major share of the burden when it comes to ensuring transatlantic security.

13. The draft recommendation and draft order contained in this document are therefore intended

to make the Assembly's voice heard, before the decision-making process on which the governments have embarked moves too far ahead, with a view to giving a public focus to the problems that remain to be resolved and the areas in which deficiencies must be made good in order to ensure that the Cologne project is a success.

APPENDIX

Message from the WEU Assembly to the Governments and Parliaments of Europe

Building defence Europe is a task that calls for cooperation on the part of all the appropriate European bodies and must include proper parliamentary scrutiny of all the preparatory stages. This is why the WEU Assembly decided to hold a special session in Luxembourg on 18 and 19 October 1999 with the participation of representatives of the European Parliament, the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees of the 28 WEU nations and a delegation from the Russian Parliament, in order to make a first assessment together of the implications for parliamentary activity of the decisions the European Council took at its Cologne Summit on 3 and 4 June.

The WEU Assembly considers that the Cologne Summit is a very important starting point and an opportunity to be grasped. It welcomes the European Council's resolve to see that the European Union plays its full role on the international stage and to give it the credible means for taking autonomous action in response to international crises affecting European security. The Council's statement about the need to strengthen European military capabilities and give the European Union full powers of decision in this area represents a major step forward which has been made possible by a fundamental change in British policy.

The decision to transform the European Corps into a European rapid reaction force, Mr Solana's appointment as High Representative for the CFSP and the fact that the European Union is to take responsibility for certain functions of WEU are all signs of undeniable progress.

While some aspects of the Cologne programme are therefore perfectly consistent with the Assembly's Plan for Action adopted on 16 March 1999, it nonetheless contains others points that give cause for deep concern:

- By not making a commitment to a common defence an obligation for the European Union, as the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties envisaged for the longer term, the Cologne programme runs the risk of radically changing the very purpose of EU construction.
- By assigning the main responsibility for collective defence to the Atlantic Alliance without making provision for a European forum with a remit to oversee the application of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty, and without incorporating this article in the Treaty on European Union, it is to be feared that the scope for honouring the commitment it contains will be reduced to such an extent that it will henceforth exist only on paper.
- In order to provide the EU with the necessary capabilities for crisis management, the European Council has no plans for the time being to integrate WEU into the European Union as envisaged in the Amsterdam Treaty and is now thinking in terms of dismantling WEU structures and creating parallel decision-making bodies in the EU, which is already involving it in difficult institutional discussions and which will require major changes to the Treaty on European Union.
- In deciding that the objectives set are to be achieved under the CFSP, the European Union is confronted with the problem of the WEU associate members' and associate partners' participation in the decision-making process. This problem will be difficult to resolve given that responsibility for developing the CFSP lies with fifteen countries, five of which have expressed strong reservations about a full commitment to defence.
- When establishing direct relations with NATO, the European Union does not want to be too closely bound by the arrangements that already exist between WEU and NATO. This will require fresh negotiations with NATO, whose working methods are very different from those of the European Union.

- The Cologne Declaration gives no indications as to the question of resources or the need to underpin the European Union's new ambitions with an appropriate budgetary policy.
- Neither does the Cologne Declaration mention the future organisation of European armaments cooperation, in which the non-WEU European members of the Atlantic Alliance participate fully.
- The Cologne Declaration makes no reference to the future organisation of democratic scrutiny in the new institutional arrangement. In this respect it must be remembered that for 45 years the parliamentary dimension has been embodied by the Assembly of WEU on the basis of the modified Brussels Treaty.

It is clear that in the light of the expectations raised in public opinion by the Pörschach, Saint Malo and Washington Summits, the heads of state and government wished to make an important gesture to allay concern and respond to criticism generated by Europe's weakness in the Kosovo crisis. This pressing need to make a public announcement about what might appear to be a major reform, when in fact not all the EU member states agreed on the objective of the project or how it should be achieved, resulted in a compromise which gives the appearance of collective success but which, without settling all the fundamental problems, actually creates additional difficulties.

In view of this situation, what needs to be done without delay is to steer the Cologne programme in the right direction to prevent it from leading to no more than an ambiguous and minimalist compromise by abandoning what is essential, in particular the project of a defence Europe subject to democratic scrutiny.

The Assembly therefore stresses the need for agreement on the following points:

1. European construction must encompass a common defence. The fifteen members of the European Union are urged actively to pursue this objective in the spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity to which they gave a commitment in Amsterdam. For as long as that is impossible within the framework of the Treaty on European Union, the modified Brussels Treaty and Article V in particular, must be preserved.
2. It is necessary to maintain WEU as an organisation for as long as it is not possible to transfer all its functions to the European Union. A particular feature of WEU is that it is an essential element of the development of the ESDI within the Alliance and an indispensable instrument for enabling countries whose accession to the European Union and/or NATO still poses problems to play a full part in such development.
3. In so far as some of WEU's functions are to be transferred to the European Union, the Council of WEU must examine in greater detail how such a transfer will affect compliance with its obligations under Articles VIII and IX of the modified Brussels Treaty.
4. With a view to ensuring unity of action between WEU and the European Union and overcoming any institutional problems arising from a transfer of certain WEU functions to the European Union, it is vital for Mr Solana, Secretary-General of the EU Council and High Representative for the CFSP, to be appointed Secretary-General of WEU.
5. WEU must prepare the European Union to face the problems that will arise when it takes over WEU's functions regarding Petersberg missions and to establish direct cooperation with NATO by taking advantage of the arrangements which already exist between NATO and WEU. It is on the basis of the expertise WEU can provide to the European Union that the EU will be able to assume its new responsibilities in the field of European security and defence.
6. It is up to WEU, as an essential element of the development of the European Security and Defence Identity, to ensure that the ESDI and CFSP develop in harmony and full transparency, in accordance with the Cologne programme.

7. The European Union and WEU must reach agreement on a budgetary policy to be followed by the member countries in order to provide a financial basis for the European Union's new responsibilities.
8. The European Union should organise the way in which the CFSP and its relevant structures will work so as to provide the WEU associate members and associate partners with a guarantee that they will preserve all the rights of participation they have acquired in WEU
9. The democratic scrutiny guaranteed by the parliamentary component cannot be allowed to disappear. For as long as defence and any decisions concerning the use of armed forces remain the exclusive prerogative of the states and defence policy implemented by the European Union remains in the inter-governmental sphere, the parliamentary dimension should be the responsibility of a chamber made up of representatives of the national parliaments.
10. So that the dimension of democratic scrutiny that is embodied by an assembly composed of the representatives of the member parliaments is not lost, and pending a definitive decision on how democratic scrutiny of the European Union's future activities under the CFSP is to be organised, the WEU Assembly must be able to continue to carry out that task without prejudice to the provisions of the Treaty on European Union governing the European Parliament's right of information. For that purpose, the WEU Council should include in its annual report all those activities falling within its area of competence where the exercise of that competence is transferred to authorities responsible for the CFSP.
11. The Assembly considers nevertheless that its areas of competence and those of the European Parliament are complementary and that it is essential to seek appropriate arrangements for the European Parliament to be involved in this debate and for cooperation to be established between the Assembly and the Parliament, taking account of the latter's prerogatives in the sphere of industrial policy and control over the Community budget, including certain items of non-military expenditure under the CFSP.
12. The WEU Assembly accordingly urges the governments of the European Union and WEU not to take any final decisions about the future democratic scrutiny of EU activities in the field of the CFSP, including any which result from the transfer of certain functions of WEU, without taking into account the options it intends to draw up and which should meet the following conditions:
 - (a) democratic scrutiny must continue to be based on the modified Brussels Treaty until such time as the conditions have been met for that Treaty to be replaced by the Treaty on European Union.
 - (b) for as long as the Treaty on European Union does not replace the modified Brussels Treaty and WEU's full integration into the European Union is not achieved, the Assembly of WEU, whose particular feature is that it includes parliamentarians from 28 European countries, should continue to exercise its remit subject to the changes necessary for it to be better adapted to the new institutional framework in which decisions will be taken:
 - (c) in the framework of such adaptation, provision will have to be made for appropriate cooperation between the WEU Assembly and the European Parliament on the basis of their complementary areas of competence:
 - (d) once WEU is fully integrated in the European Union and the Treaty on European Union replaces the modified Brussels Treaty, it will be necessary to review the organisation of democratic scrutiny of the European Union's future activities in the field of security and defence, taking into account the fact that the governments consider that competence for this area must remain with the nation states.

The Assembly wishes to point out that the most valuable asset of WEU and its Assembly is its staff. The men and women who work for the Organisation are its human capital whose services must be retained in any bodies which replace the existing institutions.

