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A European crisis reaction force –  
reply to the annual report of the Council

**REPORT**

submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee  
by Mr Zierer, Rapporteur

**ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION**  
43, avenue du Président-Wilson, 75775 Paris Cedex 16  
Tel. 01.53.67.22.00 – Fax: 01.53.67.22.01  
E-mail: [assembly@weu.int](mailto:assembly@weu.int)  
Internet: <http://www.weu.int/assembly/welcome.html>

*A European crisis reaction force – reply to the annual report of the Council*

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*submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee<sup>2</sup>  
by Mr Zierer, Rapporteur*

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<sup>1</sup> Adopted in Committee by 10 votes to 3 with 4 abstentions.

<sup>2</sup> *Members of the Committee:* N ... (Chairman); MM Zierer, Schloten (Vice-Chairmen); MM Baumel, Blaauw, Mrs Calleja, MM Cioni, Colla, Contestabile, Cox, Davis, Dhaille, Díaz de Mera, Dreyfus-Schmidt, Goris, Goulet, Henry, Irmer, Leers, Lemoine, Maginas, Mardones Sevilla, McNamara, Medeiros Ferreira, Mota Amaral (Alternate: Mrs Aguiar), Neumann, Pereira Coelho, Polenta, Pottakis, Robles Fraga, Lord Russell-Johnston, MM Selva, Siebert, Speroni, Theis, Valk (Alternate: Dees), Verivakis (Alternate: Micheloyiannis), Wilshire (Alternate: Townend).

*Associate members:* MM Bársony, Godal, Mutman, Yürür, Tanik (Alternate: Kalkan).

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

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The Assembly,

- (i) Noting, in the light of the conflicts in former Yugoslavia, the need for Europe to acquire military capabilities in order to respond to similar crises;
- (ii) Pointing to the efforts to formulate a policy for giving the European Union “the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces”;
- (iii) Noting that the present European structure for the autonomous control of operations is based on national headquarters which are made available on a case-by-case basis;
- (iv) Noting that the member countries have made various headquarters available to WEU, the two most credible operation headquarters being Northwood (UK) and Creil (France);
- (v) Taking note also of the possibility of NATO CJTF HQs being made available to Europeans<sup>1</sup>;
- (vi) Recalling the considerable number of forces available for use by Europeans<sup>1</sup>, either as forces declared “answerable to WEU” (FAWEU) or as European multinational forces;
- (vii) Considering the lessons learnt from peace-support operations, which enable the requirements of a European crisis reaction force (ECRF) to be more clearly identified;
- (viii) Strongly regretting the current European shortcomings in the fields of decision-making structures, intelligence gathering and analysis, and planning;
- (ix) Considering that Europeans<sup>1</sup> may have recourse either to an operation headquarters proposed by a framework nation or to Alliance capabilities, which provides Europeans neither with sufficient visibility nor the autonomy they desire;
- (x) Considering that European headquarters which could serve as a core for a force headquarters are sufficient in number but that they do not have the capability for joint operations;
- (xi) Noting, as regards forces, that many units are designed essentially for territorial defence operations and that they are therefore ill-adapted to Petersberg missions;
- (xii) Regretting the numerous shortcomings of European forces, in particular as regards their strategic mobility, interoperability and capacity for long periods of deployment outside their national territory;
- (xiii) Noting the shortage of European high-tech assets in the fields of tactical intelligence acquisition (aircraft, UAVs), electronic warfare (jamming etc.) and precision-guided munitions;
- (xiv) Noting that the European Corps was designed to be part of Europe’s collective defence machinery, while its missions encompass humanitarian and peacekeeping operations;
- (xv) Observing nonetheless that an effort is being made to adapt the European Corps to Petersberg missions by means of the concepts of Light Intervention Force (LIF) and Mechanised Intervention Force (MIF);
- (xvi) Stressing the engagement of some FAWEU (forces answerable to WEU) headquarters in Bosnia;
- (xvii) Pointing out that the FAWEU headquarters, even though they do not have a joint component, are nonetheless capable of operating in a joint environment;

<sup>1</sup> “Europeans” means the 28 WEU countries.

(xviii) Noting finally that shortfalls remain with regard to computerised command systems for European force (FAWEU) headquarters and as regards the composition of pre-designated forces, which are made up almost exclusively of heavy units,

#### RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Invite the 28 members, associate members, associate partners and observers to consider establishing a genuine European crisis reaction force (ECRF), permanently available at very short notice, as well as a parallel decision-making body;
2. Establish, for the command of operations, a permanent combined joint headquarters which can work in close liaison with the WEU/EU Military Staff;
3. Encourage the development of the intelligence, analysis and planning capabilities of potential headquarters in the European autonomous chain of command;
4. Organise the joint training of potential forces and headquarters necessary for the command of a European crisis reaction force for autonomous operations, as well as the joint training of the various European multinational forces;
5. Improve the procedures for WEU's cooperation with NATO and member countries in the field of intelligence acquisition and analysis, in particular by framing a genuine European policy on satellite intelligence;
6. Establish agreements with NATO on the possible use of Alliance assets by the European crisis reaction force with a view to resolving crisis situations in Europe;
7. Draw up a proper inventory of the types of forces able to be deployed for a catalogue of Petersberg missions;
8. Develop a proper European military strategic transport capability and the pooling of existing transport assets, while maintaining the possibility of having recourse to civilian assets;
9. Enhance the deployability of European reaction forces by acquiring a range of deployable equipment such as the shelters required for installing headquarters in the field, or mobile units for the analysis of air- and space-based imagery;
10. Consider the possible construction of a European command ship to accommodate a deployed force headquarters for the purpose of a common operation;
11. Encourage the member countries of the European Corps to continue their efforts to adapt it to the missions of a rapid reaction corps;
12. Have WEU draw up a list of illustrative missions of the Petersberg type to enable the European Corps to produce a catalogue specifying the size and composition of the various types of deployable forces emanating from the European Corps.

## *Explanatory Memorandum*

*(submitted by Mr Zierer, Rapporteur)*

### *I. Introduction*

1. The appalling events which have been unfolding in former Yugoslavia for nearly ten years have brought home to western nations the need for military resources to carry out peace-support operations. In particular, as clearly confirmed by the declaration issued at the Cologne Summit on 3-4 June 1999, citing the Saint Malo Franco-British Declaration of 4 December 1998, Europe "must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so in order to respond to international crises (...)". The Saint Malo Declaration further stated that "the Union must have at its disposal the appropriate capabilities and instruments (European capabilities pre-designated within NATO's European pillar or national or multinational European means outside the NATO framework)".

2. Enactment of those declarations would also contribute to strengthening the European pillar within the Atlantic Alliance, in line with NATO's new Strategic Concept as defined at the Washington Summit on 23-24 April 1999: "In order to enhance peace and stability in Europe and more widely, the European Allies are strengthening their capacity for action, including by increasing their military capabilities. The increase of the responsibilities and capacities of the European Allies with respect to security and defence enhances the security environment of the Alliance<sup>1</sup>".

3. This clearly shows the need for a real European crisis reaction force (ECRF) immediately deployable for Petersberg missions in an autonomous European context. However, this in itself would be of no use without the necessary headquarters for fielding such a force, which is why this report examines the issue of headquarters before that of forces work-up.

4. In this connection the recent decision, on the part of the countries from which the European Corps is drawn, to turn the latter into a rapid reaction force is a move in the right direc-

tion. Consequently there is a need to prepare Europe for genuine strategic autonomy, involving a permanent military crisis-management capability instead of the present *ad hoc* system. In order to draw up a real programme for building a defence Europe, it was decided to proceed with an audit of existing forces, a task currently in hand in WEU. Additionally it would be helpful to define real convergence criteria, along the lines of those drawn up for Economic and Monetary Union.

### *II. Existing assets*

5. Since the 1992 Petersberg Declaration, WEU has put in place the various military components – headquarters, forces and operating procedures – required to conduct Petersberg operations.

#### *1. The question of headquarters*

6. Since WEU does not have a permanent military structure for conducting operations, it has to set up an *ad hoc* chain of command for each of its operations. It is essential to have a unified chain of command under the political control and strategic direction of the Council of WEU and to have headquarters available at short notice at each of the necessary levels:

- *Operation Headquarters (OHQ)*, a combined joint structure at strategic level, located in a WEU member country and responsible for operational planning. It is the command structure during an operation and provides an interface between the political authorities – in this instance the Council of WEU – and the forces on the ground;
- *Force Headquarters (FHQ)*, also a combined joint structure, situated at operational level, capable of being deployed in or close to the theatre of operations. It is the equivalent of NATO's CJTF HQ concept. It takes orders from the operation headquarters;
- *Component (Land, Air or Naval) Command Headquarters (CC)*, which are multinational and deployed locally. For

<sup>1</sup> Strategic Concept, (24 April 1999), Part II, paragraph 18.

ordinary peacekeeping operations, this will normally be a land component HQ (the case of IFOR/SFOR in Bosnia and KFOR in Kosovo). A land component headquarters like the European Corps or the ARRC (ACE Rapid Reaction Corps) is the ideal size for this function.

7. In order to successfully mount an autonomous operation under the authority of the WEU Council, potential headquarters must be pre-designated and undergo training in lifelike situations in order to achieve the necessary level of expertise and to become familiar with WEU procedures.

*(i) FAWEU (forces answerable to WEU) headquarters*

8. WEU has asked its member countries to identify those headquarters which they are prepared to make available to the Organisation:

- those countries have designated three *multinational force headquarters* as available to WEU (FAWEU), either as operation headquarters (OHQ) or force headquarters (FHQ), and three others as force headquarters (FHQ). However, it should be pointed out that these combined headquarters are not joint HQs (European Corps, ARRC, Euro-for etc.);
- furthermore, numerous *national headquarters* have been declared as being available to WEU:
  - eight joint and three land component headquarters at OHQ level;
  - two joint and three land component headquarters at FHQ level;
- in fact it is not yet possible to identify those headquarters which are really suited to the roles of OHQ or FHQ, for this is the purpose of the audit currently being carried out by the WEU Military Staff (MS). Clearly, if we apply realistic criteria such as those for an operation HQ at SFOR or IFOR level, there are few European headquarters which have all the necessary characteristics:

- joint HQs able to plan and command an operation involving 30 000-strong troops;
- capable of being made multinational, in other words with sufficient premises to accommodate foreign delegations;
- with signalling and computerised command systems at the requisite level and if necessary also deployable (FHQ);
- available at 30 days' notice.

9. For the moment, your Rapporteur can see only two possibilities, namely, the British and French joint operation HQs in Northwood and Creil (near Paris) respectively. Other European countries are in the process of setting up similar headquarters.

*(ii) CJTF (NATO Combined Joint Task Forces) headquarters*

10. At NATO's June 1996 Berlin ministerial meeting, the members of the Alliance agreed on the possibility of making CJTF (Combined Joint Task Forces) available to Europe for operations conducted "under the political control and strategic direction of WEU". The Berlin Communiqué explicitly makes provision for the elaboration of European command arrangements for conducting WEU-led operations. This principle implies designating and training appropriate personnel, with the European elements within the HQs performing a dual - Atlantic and European - function ("double-hatting"). This principle was recently endorsed at the Washington Summit, although the necessary arrangements between the two organisations for making the assets available have not yet been finalised (question of the "framework agreement").

11. For practical purposes, so that combined joint HQs deployable in the theatre of operations can be made available to WEU by decision of the North Atlantic Council, the Alliance has decided to designate, within so-called "parent headquarters", a core staff which can be strengthened on request by adding elements supplied by other NATO bodies or by the member states. This CJTF HQ concept allows a flexible, multinational approach. Indeed this was the principle



applied in the case of the IFOR/SFOR force in Bosnia.

12. The WEU CJTF HQ would have the same composition as a NATO one and be placed under the orders of an Operation Commander, who in turn would come under the political authority of the WEU Council. For the purposes of conducting a WEU-led operation, replacement of staff on the basis of nationality could ensure that the composition of the CJTF HQ reflected the countries participating in that operation. However, the NATO member countries have already agreed in principle that these NATO CJTF HQs – which are pre-designated – would be made available regardless of the national contributions to the operation in question.

13. With regard to the European chain of command within NATO, the two organisations are, according to your Rapporteur's information, trying to reach agreement on the principle of the European general appointed to the post of Deputy SACEUR at SHAPE (Mons) assuming specifically European responsibilities, which would make him a prime candidate for the job of Operation Commander in the case of a WEU-led operation. If he was not chosen for that role, D/SACEUR would still be in charge of coordinating the support supplied by NATO to WEU.

14. If D/SACEUR were to be chosen for the job of Operation Commander, the operation HQ (OHQ) would be the SHAPE headquarters within which "double-hatted" European officers would be designated.

15. Furthermore, a number of permanent NATO headquarters have been designated as "parent headquarters". In other words they will supply the core staff for a CJTF HQ deployable in the theatre of operations: the headquarters concerned are CINCENT, CINSOUTH etc.

## 2. Forces

### (i) European multinational forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU)

16. The forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU), founded on a well-established concept dating back to 1993, offer a whole range of military resources to meet a broad spectrum of operational requirements. The multinational FAWEU, of which there are now seven, provide a major pool of forces which are available for WEU.

These multinational units and their HQs are: the European Corps, the UK/Netherlands Amphibious Force, the Multinational Division (Centre), Eurofor (Rapid Deployment Euroforce), Euro-marfor, the Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force and the 1st German-Netherlands Corps.

17. The European Corps (Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and Spain), designated a FAWEU in May 1993, is composed of the 1st Belgian Mechanised Division, the Franco-German Brigade, the 1st French Armoured Division, the 10th German Armoured Division, the 10th Spanish Mechanised Infantry Brigade and a Luxembourg reconnaissance company. At full strength this force is composed of some 80 000 troops.

18. The UK/Netherlands Amphibious Force, designated a FAWEU in May 1993, is composed of four infantry battalions (three British and one Dutch), an Anglo-Dutch artillery brigade and two boat troops. It is a rapidly deployable fast landing force with some 6 500 troops.

19. The Multinational Division (Centre), (Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) was designated a FAWEU in November 1993. This force, composed of a Belgian airborne brigade, the 31st German Airborne Brigade, the 11th Dutch Airmobile Brigade, the 24th British Airmobile Brigade and five battalions of division-level troops, is some 20 000 strong.

20. Eurofor (Rapid Deployment Euroforce), with French, Italian, Portuguese and Spanish elements, became a FAWEU in November 1995. It is composed of three units: one 1 000 strong at battalion level, one 3 000 strong at brigade level and one 10 000 strong at division level, making a total of some 14 000 troops.

21. Euromarfor (France, Italy, Portugal and Spain) also became a FAWEU in November 1995. This prestructured, non-standing naval force with both maritime and amphibious capabilities is composed of operational elements in a constant state of readiness so that they can regroup at short notice. A typical configuration might be: one aircraft carrier, four to six escort units, one landing force of at least brigade size, amphibious vessels for the landing force and one combat resupply vessel.

22. The Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force, designated a FAWEU in November 1997, is another prestructured, non-standing force. In the

event of its deployment, its amphibious elements would retain their own chains of command. The naval component is composed of units from the Italian Naval Division and the Spanish Delta Group. Further naval units are available, depending on operational requirements. The amphibious component must be designed and put together around a structure to be set up by common agreement, so that either country could supply the command structure and base units which could then be supplemented with headquarters staff and units from the other country. This force, which is some 4 000 strong, must be brigade size. Overall command would be assumed by each country in turn on a two-year rotating basis. The permanent multinational element would be composed of a few officers only.

23. The 1st German-Netherlands Corps, which became a FAWEU in November 1997, is composed of a German armoured division, a Dutch mechanised division and one support group. Its headquarters is in Münster and it can supply planning assistance and 40 000-strong troops for WEU missions.

*(ii) Other European multinational forces*

24. Numerous other European multinational forces have recently been set up. Even if they have not officially been declared forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU), they are prepared and trained for operations in a multinational framework such as WEU.

25. The European multinational forces set up in the NATO framework are:

- the Multinational Division (Centre), (Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom), the UK/Netherlands Amphibious Force and the 1st German-Netherlands Corps, all of which have been designated FAWEU and have already been described above;
- the Mediterranean mine counter-measures force MCM FORMED.

26. Other European forces have been set up at regional level:

- Multinational Army Corps North East (Denmark, Germany, Poland);
- European Air Group (France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom);

- Benelux Deployable Air Task Force
- Baltic Naval Group;
- Hungarian-Romanian Battalion.

27. Finally, a number of those forces are devoted specifically to peacekeeping operations:

- Nordic Peacekeeping Brigade;
- Nordic Logistics Battalion (NORBAT);
- Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion (BALTBAT);
- Polish-Ukrainian Battalion;
- Multinational United Nations Standby Forces High-Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG)<sup>2</sup>;
- Lithuanian-Polish Battalion;
- South East European Brigade (SEEBRIG)<sup>3</sup>.

28. The process of creating multinational forces is ongoing and some fifteen multinational units are in the process of being set up. Almost all the countries of Europe are involved: Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Italy, Moldavia, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Sweden, Ukraine etc.

*(iii) European "national" forces*

29. European countries have a large number of forces, most of which they are prepared to make available for European multinational operations, even if not all of them have been officially designated FAWEU. Furthermore, some of them have experience of deploying forces at great distance for operations abroad. France, for example, has intervened 22 times in Africa since 1962 and the United Kingdom also has a lot of experience in

<sup>2</sup> SHIRBRIG was set up on 15 December 1996 to conduct humanitarian and peace-support operations under a UN mandate in pursuance of Chapter VI of the UN Charter. The 11 participating countries are: Argentina, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania and Sweden. It entered into its operational phase on 1 January 1999.

<sup>3</sup> On 26 September 1998, 7 states (Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Macedonia, Romania and Turkey) signed the founding act of this 5 000-strong European multinational brigade. It is intended for peace-support operations under UN or OSCE auspices, essentially in the Black Sea region. Slovenia and the United States have observer status within this force.

this field, in particular from the Falklands war. Most European countries have been involved in various UN operations (Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Cyprus, Cambodia, Africa, Yugoslavia etc.).

30. Even though the navies of European countries no longer rule the oceans of the world, most European countries are naval powers: the UK and French navies are the third and fourth in the world respectively, and the Mediterranean countries and Scandinavia have a strong naval tradition.

31. All the efforts currently under way in Europe to reorganise and restructure armed forces are geared towards enhancing the flexibility and mobility of those forces so that they can be deployed in operations outside the national territory. The abolition of national military service, Germany's creation of a crisis reaction force and the UK's desire to acquire aircraft carriers are just some illustrations of that trend.

32. By virtue of their presence all over the world, their experience of deploying expeditionary forces over great distances, their naval power and a land forces organisation increasingly geared towards multinational operations outside the national territory, European countries have an international strategic dimension. Indeed they are the only countries, after the United States, if a modest comparison may be permitted, to be able to boast of such a dimension.

33. On the basis of the experience acquired during recent peace-support operations under UN and NATO auspices, engaged forces can be divided into five categories:

- *battalion*, of 500-600 men;
- *task force*, 1 000 to 1 200 strong, formed around a regiment supplemented with support elements (artillery, signalling, engineering, helicopters etc.). This is the system most commonly used for participation in peace-support operations;
- *brigade*, 3 000 to 5 000 strong, composed of three to five regiments, with its own support (artillery, engineering, helicopters etc.) and capable of autonomous action. Even a cautious evaluation (Germany has the only crisis reaction force, half the forces of the countries concerned have an exclu-

sively territorial organisation) indicates that there are over 60 brigades for the ten full members of WEU alone;

- *division*, the level generally used to integrate national forces in a multinational framework, with a variable composition and configuration. Generally a division is composed of two or three brigades and some 10 000 to 18 000-strong troops, according to NATO standards. For example:
  - IFOR (60 000) and SFOR (30 000) were created from three divisions, each covering a specific geographic area. European countries together can set up about 15 division-level structures;
  - *army corps*, some 50 000 strong, composed of two or three divisions. This is the unit to engage in regional conflicts or peacekeeping operations (IFOR, SFOR, KFOR etc.). The ten full WEU members together can provide six headquarters at army corps level.

34. Thus we see that Europe has at its disposal a theoretically sufficient pool of forces to react rapidly to crises and provide reinforcements over a period of time. However, only a few countries, mainly France and the United Kingdom, have the necessary forces and structures (joint headquarters at strategic level, air and sea task forces etc.) to conduct joint operations during a regional-level conflict calling for the involvement of an army corps.

35. In fact the problem is not so much one of the capacity of forces, as of their availability.

### *III. Shortcomings of European forces – desirable improvements*

36. In response to a request from the WEU ministers at the end of 1998, the German Presidency launched an audit of the assets and capabilities available for European-led operations. A first report was presented to the ministers at their meeting in Bremen in May 1999.

37. The initial findings may be summarised as follows:

- WEU member countries theoretically have sufficient assets to conduct Pe-

tersberg missions. However, in view of the shortcomings noted with regard to the decision-making structures, intelligence and planning, it was recommended that any autonomous WEU-led missions should be confined to simple operations. For larger-scale operations it is currently necessary to call on Alliance capabilities;

- to make European assets sufficiently effective, certain capabilities need to be developed, particularly for the preparation of operations (intelligence, analysis, planning etc.);
- the assets and capabilities required for autonomous WEU-led operations need to be developed. Particular attention should be paid to joint training and information exchange among forces and multinational headquarters answerable to WEU (FAWEU);
- finally, European forces must evolve in order to adapt to crisis-management tasks, particularly with regard to force readiness, mobility, deployability, interoperability, sustainability and flexibility of composition.

#### *1. Headquarters*

38. In parallel, the WEU Military Staff is carrying out a study of the actual capacities of the headquarters proposed by the various WEU member countries for conducting WEU-led operations. This study, which is under way at the moment, shows that some offers are unrealistic and apparently motivated more by political considerations than by a concern for military effectiveness. The Military Staff is therefore endeavouring to draw up a list of those headquarters which satisfy a number of criteria, so as to be sure that they have a real operational capability. The main criteria would seem to be: the ability to conduct joint operations, the possibility of adding a sufficient number of officers to turn a national HQ into a multinational HQ and the presence of a sufficiently extensive command, control and communications system (numerous links, contacts with the NATO networks, satellite capabilities etc.).

39. In order to set up its chain of command, in the absence of permanent structures, WEU uses

the concept of a "framework nation (or group of nations)". This means that the basic infrastructure and core staff for the headquarters is supplied by one member country, or possibly, by a group of countries, on the basis of an existing multinational headquarters.

#### *(i) Operation headquarters (OHQ)*

40. Europe is able to set up the appropriate command structures for planning, organising, deploying and conducting operations, using existing structures such as the French and British joint central headquarters (PJHQ in Northwood and COIA/AMIA in Creil near Paris), which on many occasions have proven their ability to mount operations abroad. Moreover, other European countries are in the process of setting up joint headquarters.

41. The alternative is to use Alliance assets and capabilities, which means, for the purposes of setting up the OHQ, a pre-designated European chain of command within SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe), in Mons. However this is linked with the choice of Operation Commander in the case of an operation using Alliance assets and capabilities.

42. The Assembly has already expressed doubts about the feasibility of designating Deputy SACEUR (D/SACEUR) Operation Commander for a European-led (WEU or EU) operation, since this general has many problems to deal with other than preparing himself for such a function. Moreover, he himself pointed out that during an emerging crisis, he would have other tasks within SHAPE which he could probably not abandon. If the commander of the WEU/EU-led operation cannot be D/SACEUR, another European general must be appointed within SHAPE with the sole task of preparing for that role. That officer would therefore be responsible for organising and running the European military pillar within the Alliance, in particular by setting up the European chain of command. All this would appear to be in line with the 1996 Berlin decisions, recently reaffirmed at NATO's Washington Summit, and is essential for establishing a genuinely European chain of command.

43. However, any decision to use a European chain of command within SHAPE must be approved by SACEUR himself. He will always have very valid reasons, during a crisis in or

around Europe, not to part with his military staff, which may be needed to plan possible NATO intervention. Clearly then, in order to set up a European operation headquarters, a solution contingent on the availability of NATO capabilities is not reliable and does not give Europe sufficient autonomy. Europe must therefore be able to avail itself of the "framework nation" concept to set up a headquarters swiftly.

44. However, this "framework nation" solution, based on national cores which can be turned into multinational HQs, has two drawbacks. Firstly, it takes some time to activate a core HQ which is not permanently multinational and to integrate the reinforcing elements, which are not necessarily pretrained to work with that core. Secondly, there may be political problems in connection with the choice of "framework nation", which may also delay the decision-making process.

45. To offset these drawbacks, a permanent multinational headquarters, or at least the core of such a headquarters, must be set up. Its task would be to commence military planning at the earliest possible stage during an emerging crisis, which would mean its being in close contact with the WEU/EU Military Staff in charge of preparing the strategic options. It must therefore be located in the same place as the MS and if possible, backed up by the same administrative services.

46. For an operation headquarters to be efficient it must have facilities for gathering and merging intelligence and data and for situation analysis. In this field the recent WEU audit of European forces has revealed serious gaps. There is no overall policy for European intelligence gathering and management, especially for classified intelligence. Before there can be any form of discussion of the shortage of intelligence-gathering means, the necessary agreements must be developed for WEU member countries to pool intelligence.

47. In this area the WEU Satellite Centre capability is still limited by the fact that it depends on purchases of commercial imagery or the supply of Helios images over which a small group of countries have power of decision. Procedures for cooperation between the Centre and other international organisations, such as the European Union and NATO, again need to be developed.

48. As regards the crisis-management planning capability of those European Operation Headquarters (OHQs) liable under the present circumstances to be selected, the WEU audit draws attention to the difficulties that might arise from turning the existing HQs into multinational HQs, in the absence of systematic training of such HQs in the framework of WEU's exercise policy to familiarise them with European forces (FAWEU) work-up procedures.

*(ii) Force headquarters (FHQ)*

49. The concept of a combined joint European force headquarters that can be deployed in the theatre of operations is very close to NATO's Combined Joint Task Force Headquarters (CJTF HQ) concept. With its 1996 Berlin decision, the Alliance agreed to the possibility of making CJTF HQs available to WEU. The main "parent HQs" around which these headquarters, deployable in the theatre of operations, are to be built, have been chosen within NATO (AFCENT, AFSOUTH). Now the concept needs to be validated and the headquarters staff must be trained in lifelike conditions of deployment. Many new problems arise in connection with the need to project these NATO HQ elements which up until now were fixed. Finally, the issue of the nationality of the officers within such a headquarters remains to be clarified. NATO has decided that – in principle – the NATO CJTF HQ would be made available to WEU without replacing its officers on the basis of nationality. It is doubtful whether a strict application of this rule would be possible in the theatre of operations, if some nations did not wish to participate.

50. The problem is more straightforward in the case of European headquarters which can be used to provide a core for a force headquarters, since there are more HQs available at this level than at that of Operation Commander, and a number of permanent European multinational headquarters already exist. However, the headquarters being proposed by member countries as possible force headquarters are not joint structures.

51. In fact, we have learned from experience in recent years that it is possible for peacekeeping missions of the Petersberg type to deploy a land component headquarters on the ground, and to add to it the necessary air and naval components to manage the air and naval support activi-

ties for that type of force (IFOR/SFOR, KFOR etc.). The operational command of the forces assigned to such support activities (airlift, sealift, etc.) can be exercised at operation HQ level.

52. It is true that the joint nature of the force HQ remains a problem for joint operations of combat forces. What is needed, therefore, are operational European air and naval components which can be used to reinforce existing European multinational headquarters such as Euromarfor or the European Air Group.

53. The case of a European sea-based headquarters for the command of a landing operation followed by a land-based operation (evacuation mission, ensuring security in a troublespot, peacekeeping etc.) poses a particular problem, since ideally, to accommodate a joint headquarters with a staff of 200, a real command ship such as the United States' "Mount Whitney" would be required. However, the UK and France possess some capability in the field of specialised transport vessels, such as "Ocean" (UK) and "Foudre" (France). Europe's EOLE 98 exercise demonstrated that it is feasible to place a headquarters with about 100 staff on board ship and to perform command operations under satisfactory command and control arrangements. However, the ideal solution would be to build a European command ship on a collaborative basis.

## 2. Forces

54. The purpose of the audit being conducted by the WEU Military Staff is to get a precise idea of the capacity of European forces to carry out the full range of Petersberg missions. However, it is encountering some difficulties with obtaining all the relevant information from countries about the national and multinational forces designated as FAWEU. Generally speaking, we can imagine that some of them – such as the European Corps and the Multinational Division (Centre) – are equipped and organised as combat units for the purpose of collective defence, and that they are therefore not well adapted to Petersberg missions which call for light, deployable equipment.

55. The creation of a multinational force for a WEU-led crisis-management operation calls for the designation of both national and multinational units during the course of a "forces generation conference". The current system is for the vari-

ous countries to propose units with reference to their size and capabilities, and the force composition is determined by a process of "negotiation" among the participating states, which all have specific, politically-motivated demands, in particular with regard to transparency. Like the process of designating the force and operation headquarters, this has the effect of delaying decision-making during a crisis. Hence, the availability of a large multinational unit in which each participating state's "share" has been decided in advance can save lot of time.

56. In 1998, NATO performed an evaluation of WEU assets and capabilities for Petersberg missions on the basis of six illustrative mission profiles submitted by WEU. The main criteria for analysing forces were: strategic mobility, force readiness, deployability, interoperability and sustainability.

57. It was concluded from that evaluation that the forces of the WEU countries are more than adequate to meet those requirements. However, there are a number of restrictions, given that the illustrative missions considered did not call for high-intensity combat operations and that missions in certain specific areas could require equipment which is not available in sufficiently large quantities in WEU countries.

### (i) *Qualitative shortcomings of the forces*

58. Peace-support operations in recent years, in whatever framework the forces were engaged, have revealed a number of shortcomings:

- *strategic mobility*: Europe's heavy airlift capability is not sufficient for an emergency operation. In terms of assets, there has been some progress as a result of bilateral agreements or agreements with WEU. The Franco-Belgian, Franco-British and Franco-German agreements on air projection, the agreement reached on 30 June 1997 between Ukraine and WEU on the provision of long-haul strategic lift capability and the exchanges of information between Russia and WEU on the use of Ilyushin aircraft for in-flight fuelling do not provide Europe with real strategic mobility capability but at least make it possible to manage existing capabilities better. Naval military assets must be

supplemented by civilian transport (United Kingdom and France during the Gulf War), and even then not all civilian assets are suitable for the transport of heavy equipment. WEU must keep a close eye on this issue of Europe's sealift capability;

- *state of readiness*: up until now this was defined by NATO members in terms of the forces' readiness for collective defence. A number of units among the allied reaction forces have a high degree of readiness, but are placed under NATO command in peacetime. WEU needs to be better informed with regard to the readiness of the forces of its member countries;
- *deployability*: for some time now, this aspect has been a criterion for the restructuring of the member countries' forces and it is a major objective for all the European multinational forces that have been set up recently;
- *interoperability*: this question is being tackled by NATO. As a result of the experience gathered during peacekeeping operations in former Yugoslavia, the interoperability of the communication and command systems of the Alliance member states actively involved in operations has considerably improved in practice. However, at the level of Europe as a whole – WEU full members, associate members and associate partners – the situation varies considerably;
- *sustainability*: since rotation of staff is essential – in general the period of service for such operations is from four to six months – provision must be made for a reserve force which is three times as large as the initial force, which is not always the case when member countries propose forces at the beginning of a crisis. Moreover, logistic support for forces deployed far from their home base is a major undertaking which generally remains the responsibility of the contributing country. Some countries have a lot of progress to make in this area. This issue calls for stronger co-

operation among European countries. Indeed, the Scandinavian countries have set the example with their "Nordic Common Logistic Battalion".

(ii) *Capabilities required by forces*

59. An analysis of recent peace-support operations reveals that European forces fall short as regards a number of capabilities that are essential for genuine autonomy in the field of Petersberg missions. This can be explained by the fact that these capabilities include all the assets needed for generating forces for collective defence purposes, hitherto always organised in a NATO framework, or, more rarely, in a national framework for some countries conducting missions abroad. These shortcomings are particularly acute in the field of headquarters, deployable command systems, intelligence, reconnaissance and target-acquisition systems.

60. In the intelligence field, the efforts under way to frame a genuine European space-based intelligence policy and to develop the use of the Torrejón Satellite Centre must be pursued. Intelligence is extremely important for peace-support operations and the headquarters of the deployable forces must be equipped with truly multinational intelligence-processing units. As far as command capabilities are concerned, efforts must focus on CIS (communications and information systems) interoperability in accordance with NATO standards, and on developing deployability through the acquisition of the shelters needed for installing headquarters and their command systems on the ground. The European EOLE exercise referred to earlier provided an opportunity for the real-scale training of such a deployable headquarters. Finally, the Kosovo operation highlighted the usefulness of UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) for reconnaissance and target-acquisition purposes. Major efforts are required, if possible in cooperation, in order to equip European forces with systems of this kind.

61. NATO's air campaign in Kosovo also revealed *Europe's weakness in the field of high-tech equipment*. US Defense Secretary Cohen recently explained<sup>4</sup>:

<sup>4</sup> Address before the IISS, San Diego, 9 September 1999.

“The United States conducted virtually two-thirds of all the support sorties that were flown and half of the combat missions. And because we were the only country with precision-guided munitions that can operate in all weather, heavy cloud cover in the initial stage of this campaign made it almost an exclusively American operation”.

62. At the present time, the shortage of “all-weather” assault aircraft equipped with “precision-guided munitions” puts European countries at a considerable disadvantage. However, the recent decisions to equip the British-Italian Tornado and the French Mirage and Rafale aircraft with Apache-Storm Shadow missiles should offset that major drawback in a few years’ time. However, in view of the high consumption rate of modern weaponry, and of laser-guided bombs in particular, during the 78-day campaign of air strikes, it is necessary to ensure that the funding earmarked for the munitions will be sufficient.

*(iii) Strengthening European cooperation*

63. In addition to the abovementioned efforts to equip European forces, a number of collaborative projects should improve Europe’s capacity for setting up groups of forces in times of crisis. First of all, joint training of the various existing European multinational forces is essential to enhance their interoperability. The exercises policy currently directed by the WEU Military Staff must be systematically pursued in full awareness of the particular financial effort that it requires from the participant nations. Moreover, this policy will enable the WEU Military Staff to assess the real capacity of those nations for generating forces during a crisis. Finally, it will help the various participating states to realise that European assets, when pooled, constitute a genuine capability for conducting Petersberg missions.

64. Furthermore, these forces must be used as soon as possible for real operations, for this is crucial for motivating personnel and giving them the sense of belonging to a single European structure, a prerequisite for its operational efficiency.

65. In addition, a set of “convergence criteria” needs to be drawn up in order to help European countries determine which forces they are pre-

pared to make available to WEU (FAWEU). Mr Solana recently stated<sup>5</sup> in this connection that:

“These convergence criteria should focus less on the money governments put into defence budgets and more on what they get out in terms of flexible forces”.

66. Although most European countries these days are not prepared to give up whole sections of their military production in favour of a division of labour among European countries, there is still scope for more efficient use of defence budgets by systematically seeking economies of scale in the fields of support and training and by doing away with unnecessary duplication through combined European, as opposed to national, solutions.

67. The agreement between the Belgian and Dutch navies to set up a joint military staff and support service is a positive step on the way to eliminating costly duplication.

68. The most promising approach is the pooling of logistic support services for equipment developed in the framework of collaborative European programmes, such as Eurofighter and perhaps also Airbus A 400-M. In the naval area one could imagine creating a pool of support vessels, for instance tankers, and the construction of a collaborative European command ship, as already suggested earlier.

69. Furthermore, there could be systematic pooling of elements of military forces among several willing nations. The best example currently is probably the Franco-German agreement on military airlift, which involves pooling Transall aircraft. Similar agreements could be reached for transport helicopters, in particular the future NH90.

70. Finally, in the field of training on certain items of equipment common to several countries, there is a need for joint schools and training centres such as the Franco-German school for Tiger helicopter pilots.

*(iv) The case of the European Corps*

71. The underlying idea of the European Corps is to provide Europe with its own military capability. This idea was already affirmed in the La Rochelle report of 22 May 1992, which stated

<sup>5</sup> Interview with the *Financial Times*, September 1999.



that "the setting-up of the European Corps reflects the resolve of the participating countries to shoulder, jointly and by common agreement, in the context of a European Union which will eventually have a common defence policy, their responsibilities in the field of security and peacekeeping"<sup>6</sup>.

72. In their joint declaration published at the Cologne Summit on 3-4 June 1999, the five states participating in the European Corps announced their decision to transform it into a "European rapid reaction force" capable of large-scale deployment outside of the Union's borders.

(a) *Tasks*

73. The La Rochelle report of 22 May 1992 gives that force three major tasks:

- common defence of the allies in the WEU/NATO framework;
- peacekeeping and peacemaking;
- humanitarian operations.

The European Corps, originally conceived as a component of Europe's collective defence, is organised as an army corps equipped with heavy armaments. Its conversion into a rapid reaction force entails changing the current organisation of its headquarters and setting up units more adapted to the new tasks while maintaining its initial capability.

(b) *Current configuration*

74. In addition to its initial configuration as an army corps adapted to territorial defence, the European Corps, in order to adjust to its various humanitarian and peacekeeping tasks, can form, from its component units:

- either a *light intervention force (LIF)* of brigade size (3 000 to 5 000 strong), essentially for low-intensity humanitarian operations. Such a force can become operational within a few weeks and must be capable of assuring its own protection and accomplishing its mission even if the situation deteriorates. The link between the Operation

HQ and the deployed force is provided by a brigade headquarters, preferably that of the Franco-German Brigade. Other units may be added to that force as required by the circumstances;

- or a *mechanised intervention force (MIF)* of division size (15 000 to 20 000 strong), for peacekeeping or peacemaking operations. The Commander of the European Corps would be personally in charge of deploying such an MIF and in that case, the Corps headquarters would play the part of parent HQ for the land component command (LCC)<sup>7</sup>. An MIF can be set up within 20 to 60 days and is based on a core composed of five brigades. It is necessary, when using such a force for mobile operations, to have a headquarters at division level.

75. The European Corps has received regular training since 1994, by means of a major annual main defence exercise (of the Pegasus type) under NATO auspices and various other exercises for missions of the Petersberg type in the WEU or NATO framework<sup>8</sup>.

(c) *The engagement in Bosnia*

76. Since June 1998, the European Corps headquarters has participated in SFOR by seconding staff to the SFOR HQ in Bosnia. The constituent nations of the European Corps had the following objectives:

- to participate in a credible and visible fashion;
- to maintain their participation until the end of the mission or for a maximum duration of two years;
- to be involved in the planning process in the same capacity as any other NATO headquarters;
- to make the maximum contribution to the SFOR HQ that is acceptable to NATO;

<sup>6</sup> La Rochelle report, 22 May 1992, on the missions of the European Corps.

<sup>7</sup> LCC: Land Component Command

<sup>8</sup> See Appendix.

- to focus the activities of its personnel essentially on management of operations and CIMIC<sup>9</sup> activities.

A total of 147 staff from the European Corps HQ, including 33 officers, have been seconded to SFOR in Sarajevo. They represent 37% of the total staff of the NATO HQ in Bosnia.

*(d) Desirable developments*

77. Discussions are currently under way among the component states of the European Corps concerning its transformation into a European rapid reaction force, in accordance with the Cologne decisions. The European Corps must have the capacity to fulfil the following functions:

- land component command (LCC) in the role of headquarters for an operational or peace-support force of the SFOR or KFOR type;
- rapid reaction corps during crises, involving all or some of the pre-designated forces as well as other units, on request, including those of non-member nations. It would make sense to use the present MIF or LIF organisational set-up as a basis, adapting it as necessary to rapid reaction missions. There is a need furthermore to draw up a catalogue of deployable forces stemming from the European Corps by size and composition;
- army corps for collective territorial defence, using all pre-designated forces.

*(e) Headquarters*

78. The Corps headquarters will need to be adapted to give it the structure of an LCC headquarters for out-of-area operations and for civil-military operations.

79. The present headquarters is not a joint headquarters in any real sense, but it could be capable of operating in a joint environment, thanks to its "air" element. The role of that element could range, theoretically, from that of an AOCC<sup>10</sup> to that of a proper air component com-

mand<sup>11</sup>, but the present air element can only perform the tasks of an AOCC.

80. The structure that is set up must enable the force to be activated according to the most demanding scenario (LCC), using the principle of a core element. Furthermore, due account must be taken of the deficiencies revealed by the NATO Cooperative Guard 1999 exercise in the fields of civil-military activities, engineering, planning capabilities etc.

81. The headquarters battalion must have a structure that is sufficient to support an LCC headquarters. The current battalion is not the right size for certain functions that must be performed during operations abroad (energy supply, food supplies in the field etc.). Life-support and protection functions need therefore to be strengthened.

82. The present (German and French) communications and information systems (CIS) are not compatible, hence a means must be found to achieve interoperability, so that they can be used by the Corps HQ under all circumstances. A good initiative would be to set up a multinational signalling brigade. It is a priority, with a view to achieving real mobility, for the European Corps to procure shelters equipped with CIS. This would allow the headquarters to be installed swiftly in any theatre of operations.

83. Finally, an essential point to which very careful attention must be paid, is the fact that the European Corps does not have an autonomous intelligence capability. However, it will soon be linked up to NATO's BICES and CRONOS networks.

*(f) Forces*

84. The principle of pre-designated forces or declared capabilities must be maintained. It is important that states should make available to the European Corps divisions composed not only of heavy, but also lightweight units, in order to introduce the element of flexibility that is necessary for a rapid reaction corps.

85. Furthermore, it should be noted that the rule of unanimity applies to any decision taken

<sup>9</sup> CIMIC: civil-military cooperation.

<sup>10</sup> AOCC: air operation coordination centre.

<sup>11</sup> Directive No. 5 to the Corps Commanding general, 1995.

by the Joint Committee<sup>12</sup>, which means that non-participation by one member state will have consequences for the very organisation of the rapid reaction corps. A possible solution would be to make certain key elements redundant, so that several functional modules of the same type would be available.

86. Moreover, in case of need, member states can generally provide the European Corps with non-allocated forces for certain exercises or operations. One possibility envisaged, for example, was that of making Belgian paratrooper units available.

*(g) Conclusions*

87. The European Corps is an excellent example of flexible and modular European cooperation, for although its basic structure is limited to forces from its five member states, units from other states can nonetheless be added for certain specific operations. These days the prevailing approach is one of pragmatism, and indeed flexibility based on multinational military cooperation is the general rule for the forces answerable to WEU.

88. One may regret the lack of a legal and institutional status for the European Corps headquarters and the Corps itself<sup>13</sup>. Indeed, for the moment it cannot procure equipment in its own right, which means going through the national budgetary channels, with the considerable delays that this entails. The future rationalisation of armaments programmes at European level will doubtless make it possible to move from interoperable to identical equipment.

89. In short, it is essential to reorganise the European Corps headquarters with a view to equipping it with deployable command structures, suited to its role of headquarters for crisis reaction forces engaged outside EU territory in an environment of peace-support operations. Furthermore, its composition – in terms of forces

capable of projection – must be very flexible so that it can adapt to specific crisis situations case-by-case.

*IV. A genuine European crisis reaction force*

90. In fact, the only way to drastically shorten response time, given the time it takes to organise forces on an *ad hoc* basis, is to set up a European standing force answerable to WEU, which could be called the European Crisis Reaction Force (ECRF). This is not a new idea. Indeed, the Assembly report of 1 December 1997 on “The WEU Military Committee”<sup>14</sup> recommended that the Council should “establish an immediate WEU reaction force consisting of a multinational light infantry division supported by an air and naval component, available at very short notice (...);”.

91. Indeed, the abovementioned report showed that Operation Alba owed its success to the rapid reaction of a force that was limited in size, but which was deployed before the crisis got out of hand.

92. For such a force to be effective, it would need to be composed of units made available by individual states for a substantial period of time and placed from the outset under the authority of a European Chief-of-Staff, who would execute orders from the WEU Council in the event of a crisis. Thus this force would have a permanent multinational headquarters, which would solve the problem of the absence of a permanent European force headquarters at Force Commander level in the theatre of operations. This multinational headquarters would be supported by a European General Staff which would develop out of the present WEU Military Staff, and which would exercise at European level the same organisational and operational functions as a general staff at national level.

93. With such a European reaction force, WEU member countries would have at their disposal a pool of forces which they could call on immediately. The level of participation of the different countries would have to be calculated on the basis of objective and generally accepted criteria (such as “convergence criteria”), in such

<sup>12</sup> Each country has two representatives on this Committee. They are the political directors of the foreign affairs ministries and the chiefs of defence staffs. The Committee informs the political authorities of the different countries of the possibilities for deploying the European Corps.

<sup>13</sup> See the report on “European armed forces”, Assembly Document 1468, submitted by Mr de Decker on behalf of the Defence Committee, 12 June 1995.

<sup>14</sup> Report submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee by Mr Giannattasio, Rapporteur, Assembly Document 1591.

a way as to have a force of army corps size, some 50 000 strong, with a pre-designated support and transport capability at its disposal. Its funding would be shared equitably among the member countries.

94. This type of pre-organised force has often been criticised on the grounds that if one country decides not to participate, this may upset its whole organisation at the last minute. This is why such a force must be designed for redundancy of the key elements in order to provide functional modules (comprising infantry, signalling, headquarters support, mechanised units, attack or support helicopters etc.) of different nationalities so that it cannot be disrupted by the failure of some member countries to participate.

95. To enable this crisis reaction force to be set up swiftly, it would be very useful to draw up a catalogue of illustrative missions of the Petersberg type and, on the basis of the audit of assets currently under way in WEU, to produce an inventory of the forces required for those missions. Thus the ECRF would be organised in the form of a pool of forces available at the shortest possible notice, according to the specific mission requirements, under the responsibility of the ECRF Commander.

96. Since the main element of the ECRF would be its headquarters, the latter must be deployable in the theatre of operations as a force headquarters and would require, as a priority, the following assets:

- *capability for gathering and processing intelligence in the field*: efforts must focus on facilities for collecting human intelligence and processing aerial (UAVs) and satellite images. It is very important in this respect that the ECRF should be equipped with a satellite image receiver station deployable in the theatre of operations for the real-time processing of such imagery. Such equipment exists, for example the Helios mobile station which was demonstrated during the Crisex 98 exercise;
- *means of civil-military action*: given the environment in which Petersberg missions take place, due account must be taken of relations with the local civilian population and of the need for

coordination with the civilian organisations present in the field. The ECRF should therefore be equipped to deal with humanitarian aid and the protection of the civilian population (helicopter transport, emergency medical equipment, ground-based logistics for delivering food and medicines or protecting convoys etc.). Furthermore, the ECRF, in coordination with governmental bodies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), should be capable of action for the reconstruction or repair of damaged infrastructure such as bridges. For that purpose it requires engineering components, which could be in the form of reserve forces specialised in engineering.

#### V. Conclusions and prospects

97. The creation of a European military instrument for crisis management would not only free Europe from its unilateral dependence on the United States, improve the possibilities for controlling and managing crises and thereby strengthen NATO as a whole, but would also open up possibilities and prospects for a European defence force. The old idea of a European army would be given new and lasting impetus by the creation of a European crisis reaction force. Although we have not even started creating the conditions for such an army, it would nonetheless be useful, by way of conclusion, to briefly review the advantages of such a European defence component:

- maximum interoperability;
- standardisation of weapons systems, training and principles of engagement;
- single command;
- possibility of a broad-based division of the military tasks;
- considerable savings and synergy effects.

98. However, for the moment, we see no signs of the political will to give closer consideration to the idea of a European army. On the contrary, the fear is not totally unjustified that the creation of a crisis reaction force might for some considerable time to come temper the desire for military

commonality, and that any further-reaching plans for a European military infrastructure would be shelved. We therefore need to use our powers of persuasion to bring about more comprehensive military cooperation among partner countries. The time does not appear ripe, following the renunciation of national economic and monetary sovereignty in accordance with the Maastricht Treaty, for further sovereign rights to be sacrificed on the altar of European unity. However, it is urgent to act, for the longer we put off European military integration, the more costly this process – which at the end of the day is inevitable – will become.

99. On the other hand, the creation of a European crisis reaction force is a first important step towards that integration, since such a formation can be expected to develop its own dynamic and lead to technical constraints which can only be mastered jointly. However, a prerequisite for that is a readiness on the part of the partner countries to make available the considerable sums required to build up such a force and make available the relevant military capabilities. Such readiness does not appear to exist for the moment. On the

contrary, European military capabilities seem to be in decline. National defence budgets are being misused to balance budgets and offset deficits elsewhere. Many national governments do not seem at the moment to attach much value to security. Only a few existing units are suitable for creating such a crisis reaction force and it is therefore essential to re-equip and restructure existing national armed forces and enhance their combat effectiveness. *Immediate* steps should be taken to deal with this task.

100. Parliamentary scrutiny of an independent European military component is essential and will, to begin with, and until such time as the European Parliament's powers are extended accordingly, depend on the votes of the national parliaments and of the WEU Assembly.

101. Finally, a European crisis reaction capability is necessary and possible. It would be a further milestone on the road towards European unity and give new impetus to the idea of a global European defence. Its achievement will be a test of the resolve of WEU states to strengthen their defence capabilities and fully to restore their standing as alliance partners at the highest level.

## APPENDIX I

*Declaration<sup>1</sup> issued by the member states of the European Corps  
on the occasion of the Cologne European Council Summit on 3 June 1999*

On the occasion of the Cologne European Council, which showed the determination of the European Union to acquire the autonomous assets needed to take decisions and action in response to crises, Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg and Spain agreed to adapt the European Corps, in particular its headquarters, to the new strategic environment, in order to transform it into a European rapid reaction corps available for EU- and NATO-led operations.

This army corps, thus adapted, will meet the desire of the European Union for its members to have at their disposal forces suitable for crisis-management operations.

This decision, which should be executed within a year, constitutes a practical contribution to creating the assets that will one day enable the European Union to play in full its role on the international stage.

<sup>1</sup> Unofficial translation

## APPENDIX II

*Exercises of the European Corps*

The aim of the exercises conducted by the European Corps, apart from the Pegasus series of exercises, concerned with the common defence of the allies, is to develop the Corps' operational assets in the field of peacekeeping or peacemaking operations (Cobra exercise, June 1997) or that of humanitarian activities (Pelican exercise, June 1999).

Exercises conducted in the framework of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty under NATO auspices	Peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations, Petersberg missions	Exercises conducted in the framework of a humanitarian operation under WEU auspices
Pegasus 1994 Pegasus 1995 Pegasus 1996 Pegasus 1998 Pegasus 2000 Cooperative Guard 1999	Cobra 1997	Eurotransitex 1995 Crisex 1996 Pelican 1999

- Exercises of the *Pegasus* type correspond to main allied defence operations. The aim in each case is to test the interoperability of the headquarters and troops of the European Corps over large areas, in joint combat operations characterised by rapid changes of attitude. Although the scenarios for the *Pegasus* exercises have always been NATO-based, the 1996 exercise was the first in which a NATO HQ actually participated. This was LANDCENT<sup>2</sup>, which played an active role as the upper echelon of the Corps.
- During the *Cooperative Guard* exercise (May 1999), the European Corps played the part of LCC<sup>3</sup> parent headquarters, which meant that the European Corps Commander played the part of Commander of all the land forces.
- *Cobra* 1997 provided an opportunity to test the deployment concept for an MIF of the size of a strengthened division.
- The aim of *Eurotransitex* 1995, conducted under WEU auspices, was to test the procedures for the long-distance strategic deployment of the Corps and for an evacuation operation in a crisis zone. The joint nature of this exercise, which involved land, air and naval transport, was particularly striking.
- *Crisex* 1996 tested the procedures for restoring conditions in which humanitarian aid can be transported to a fictitious country. This exercise, with a strong joint element, involved the deployment of forces at a distance of 5 000 km from Strasbourg. Its multinational character was extended to include all full member states of WEU.
- *Pelican* 1999 provided the opportunity to test the LIF concept. Its aim was to check the Corps' capacity for projecting forces into a conflict zone in order to carry out humanitarian operations.

<sup>2</sup> LANDCENT: Allied Land Forces Central Europe.

<sup>3</sup> LCC: Land Component Command.

