



# Assembly of Western European Union

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FORTY-SECOND SESSION

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## Security in the Mediterranean region

### REPORT

submitted on behalf of the Political Committee  
by Mr de Lipkowski, Rapporteur



*Security in the Mediterranean region*

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1. Adopted in Committee by 18 votes to 0 with 1 abstention.

2. *Members of the Committee.* Mr de Puig (Chairman); Mr Roseta (Vice-Chairman), MM Antretter, de Assis, Blaauw, Sir Andrew Bowden, MM Buhler, Caputo (Alternate: *Arata*), Mr Cioni (Alternate: *Dionisi*), MM Dias, Ehrmann, Eyskens, Fassino (Alternate: *Benvenuti*), Mr Irmer, Sir Russell Johnston, MM Jurgens, Kaspereit (Alternate: *Baumel*), Lord Kirkhill (Alternate: *Marshall*), MM Koschyk, Liapis, van der Linden, de Lipkowski, Maass, Van der Maelen (Alternate: *Staes*), Mr Martinez Casan (Alternate: *Martínez*), MM Pottakis, Pozzo, Puche Rodríguez, Recoder, Rippinger, Rokofyllos, Rodeghiero, Seitlinger, Sir Keith Speed, MM Urban, Vinçon, N ... (Alternate: *Davis*).

*Associate members.* MM Godal, Kamhi, Külahli.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

5. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of conveyance
6. Promoting arms control and disarmament
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*Draft Recommendation**on security in the Mediterranean region*

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that there can be no security in Europe unless lasting peace is established in the Mediterranean region;
- (ii) Considering that relations between the peoples in the northern and southern Mediterranean are handicapped by unequal economic and social development, insufficient cultural and religious exchanges, a poor understanding of the political objectives pursued by various parties and, in many cases, an unjustified view of the armed forces;
- (iii) Taking the view that respect for the right of a people to self-determination, the rights of ethnic, cultural and religious minorities, human rights and democratic principles constitutes the fundamental basis for establishing an order of peace and cooperation in the Mediterranean,
- (iv) Welcoming the initiatives taken by the Mediterranean coastal states, the European Union, and particularly the Barcelona Conference, with a view to establishing a lasting order of peace in the region, while regretting that WEU has so far not been involved in them,
- (v) Considering, however, that a dialogue on economic, social and cultural measures will not suffice to establish such an order and must also extend to foreign and security policy;
- (vi) Regretting that the WEU Mediterranean Group has not yet managed to engage effectively in such a dialogue;
- (vii) Considering further that many local problems and conflicts that are still unresolved constitute serious obstacles to the establishment of the abovementioned order of peace and are prone to arouse in the southern Mediterranean populations hostile feelings towards the West, and that the persistence of such conflicts complicates the efforts of many governments to establish an order of peace and cooperation in the region;
- (viii) Taking the view that the direct interest of the European Union lies in the solution of problems and the abatement of conflicts given that it is the main trading partner of the countries of the region and that it provides them with substantial economic aid;
- (ix) Considering, in addition, that the United States has a considerable military and naval presence in the Mediterranean, making it an essential partner for Europe in the search for such solutions;
- (x) Recalling that WEU has been given a remit to complement NATO activities to further international peace, and that in Petersberg it decided it would act on behalf of the European Union as soon as the latter has defined a common foreign and security policy leading to the intervention of armed forces;
- (xi) Observing with concern that the reductions the rest of Europe is making in defence budgets, armed forces and armaments are not being made in many countries south and east of the Mediterranean,
- (xii) Recalling the need for effective means to combat terrorism, criminal organisations and drug trafficking in the form of coordinated action on the part of all the Mediterranean countries;
- (xiii) Stressing how sensitive the Muslim world is to the fate of Muslims in Europe and particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina;

(xiv) Recalling Assembly Recommendation 538 and reaffirming, with a view to a global security concept, its interest in the development and well-being of all the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries and in the maintenance of peace and stability in the region,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Submit specific proposals to the European Union with a view to including security matters in the consultation process it initiated in Barcelona with the Mediterranean countries, and play an active part in that process,
2. Include in its proposals provisions for the controlled limitation of armaments and the wholesale elimination of weapons of mass destruction in the region, mainly through
  - (a) non-proliferation of nuclear weapons,
  - (b) a limitation on the number and range of missiles deployed in the region,
  - (c) the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons production and storage,
  - (d) the prohibition of anti-personnel mines,
  - (e) the ratification of international instruments concerning these matters,
3. Develop and intensify for this purpose the contacts its Mediterranean Group has begun to make,
4. Promote the negotiation of a stability pact taking in the Mediterranean region as a whole,
5. Propose to that end and in a first phase:
  - (a) confidence- and transparency-building measures whose application would be voluntary,
  - (b) the notification of manoeuvres,
  - (c) an exchange of information on the military forces deployed and the armaments held,
  - (d) the adoption of measures to prevent armed conflict,
6. Specify and publicise those missions that are likely to be entrusted to WEU-dependent forces in the Mediterranean region so as to reassure the southern Mediterranean countries as to any use that might be made of them;
7. Support the efforts of the Council of Europe to help the people of Cyprus find a solution to their problems and secure the reunification of Cyprus in pursuance of the London and Zurich Agreements,
8. Seek, possibly within NATO, to act in concert with the United States with a view to promoting
  - (a) dialogue and consultation between Greece and Turkey for the purpose of enabling the treaties in force to be applied satisfactorily,
  - (b) the end of the blockade on Iraq as soon as there is evidence that the United Nations resolutions concerning that country have been applied,
  - (c) the rapid and full application of the 1995 agreements between Israel and the Palestinian Authority,

(d) the guarantee in the medium term of compliance with the Dayton Accords in Bosnia and Herzegovina and of respect for the peaceful co-existence of the communities of that state,

9. Accommodate Turkey's participation in WEU forces in the Mediterranean with a view to preparing for its accession in the near future to WEU and, in due course, to the European Union;

10. Seek to establish lasting agreements and cooperation between WEU and the countries on the southern shore of the Mediterranean.

## *Explanatory Memorandum*

*(submitted by Mr de Lipkowski, Rapporteur)*

### *I. Introduction*

1. A security analysis of the entire Mediterranean basin might seem an extremely ambitious exercise owing to the vastness of the geographic area in question, the diverse and complex nature of the problems arising there and the large number of countries involved, each with its own specific characteristics. Given the repercussions on the situation in the Mediterranean of the crises and conflicts that could break out in regions bordering upon the area, examples of these being the Gulf, the conflict affecting the Kurd populations and the one in former Yugoslavia, they cannot be excluded from the present analysis. Equally, although the problems that arise in the areas north, south, east and west of the Mediterranean differ, their many interrelated aspects would seem to indicate the need for a comprehensive analysis.

2. There is no doubt whatsoever that the political situation on the southern flank of Europe, which was relegated to the sidelines during the cold war period on account of East-West confrontation which had central Europe as its main theatre, has become increasingly important since the end of the East-West divide. The second Gulf War, the conflict in former Yugoslavia and their impact on the Islamic world, have undoubtedly had an influence here. But what other factors are contributing to the sharp increase in interest on the part of both Europe and North America in developments in the Mediterranean region, as compared with preceding decades? Are the risks to peace, stability and security in the region now thought to be greater or is there more awareness than previously of opportunities for cooperation and partnership between Europe and the Mediterranean and the advantages they could bring?

3. The purpose of this report, which will attempt to answer these questions, is to identify the range of political problems the region presents, as they relate to the security of Europe and the non-European countries along the shores of the Mediterranean. It will then be necessary to consider appropriate ways in which they might

be resolved and the prospects for establishing a system of security and stability acceptable to the entire region.

4. In this connection, two types of issue can be distinguished. The first relates to Euro-Mediterranean relations generally and their development to the north, south, east and west. Yet confining our study to a description of such problems, however important in themselves, carries a risk of becoming enmeshed in general, theoretical considerations that are unlikely to lead to specific, practical recommendations, as the growing number of seminars and colloquies on Mediterranean issues organised by specialist institutions serves to illustrate.

5. It is necessary therefore to start by pinning down the flashpoints for particular crises and conflicts in order to determine whether their resolution requires specific responses or inputs or whether the problems raised can be dealt with in a more general framework. On the results of such an analysis, taking in both general and specific factors, will depend the role that Europe, and certain international organisations, can and should play in the region and the form that their involvement in the Mediterranean should take.

6. It is important to bear in mind that there is not just *one* Mediterranean. Attitudes in the eastern Mediterranean are very different from those in the western Mediterranean where they are far more akin to European-held views.

7. WEU, for its part, has not been idle. In the Petersberg Declaration of 19 June 1992, the Council of Ministers entrusted WEU with the task of establishing a gradual and phased dialogue with the Maghreb countries. This dialogue began with Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia and gradually extended to Egypt, Mauritania and Israel. The main purpose of the meetings with these countries, which were organised through the intermediary of their embassies in Brussels, was to conduct an exchange of views on developments in security and defence issues affecting the Mediterranean region, with a view to establishing transparency and bolstering confidence on both sides. It has to



be said that given that WEU has not become involved in the political aspects, the limited dialogue on which it has embarked with these countries has not produced any tangible results and is given a different reception depending on the viewpoint of individual states - some, such as Morocco, welcome it whereas others, such as Egypt and Turkey, are disappointed by it.

8 It is difficult to produce an exhaustive list of the initiatives taken by various parties to try to address the problem of cooperation in the Mediterranean area. They have generally been unsuccessful in overcoming the political problems that have plagued the international scene both in the Maghreb and in the Mashreq. Thus, the initiative taken by France in 1985 to group the countries on both shores of the western Mediterranean, the "Five plus Five", came to nothing because of the Libyan issue and the Algerian crisis. The countries participating in the *Forum for Dialogue and Cooperation in the Mediterranean*, which was initiated by Egypt in 1994, are Algeria, Egypt, Italy, Malta, Morocco, Portugal, Spain, Tunisia and Turkey. It was set up to establish political, economic and social cooperation and promote international dialogue among the participant countries. It can be regarded as a useful body for such dialogue, which should develop in a more structured way. In contrast, American initiatives such as the 1993 *Donors' Conference* and the *Economic Summit Meetings* at Casablanca in 1994 and Amman in 1995 were considered by many participants to be too closely associated with United States policy.

9 In this context it is also important to take account of the initiatives taken by the CSCE, now the OSCE, whose Committee of Senior Officials decided in March 1994 to extend regular invitations to Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Morocco and Tunisia to attend ministerial meetings held in the framework of the conferences on the organisation's reform. A few years earlier, in 1990, Italy and Spain had launched a project to set up a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM). This initiative was taken up by the Interparliamentary Union with a view to giving the parliaments of 24 Mediterranean coastal states<sup>1</sup> a central role in the process, which also

<sup>1</sup> Albania, Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Cyprus, Egypt, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, France, Greece, Israel, Italy,

involves the parliaments of the United States, the United Kingdom and Russia as well as seven international parliamentary assemblies, including that of WEU. The most valuable feature of this endeavour is that it brings together all the Mediterranean partners, including Israel and the Palestinians, on an equal footing pending the creation of intergovernmental institutions.

10 After two plenary conferences, in Malaga in 1992 and La Valette in 1995, the Interparliamentary Union is preparing to hold the third one - which will concentrate on the CSCM - in Tunis in 1999, by organising thematic meetings, with the next one due to take place in Monaco on 3 and 4 July 1997. After the pattern of the CSCE, the CSCM, in its capacity as an interparliamentary body, has defined three areas on which to focus its work:

- (i) political cooperation on security regional stability,
- (ii) economic cooperation, co-development and partnership,
- (iii) dialogue between civilisations and human rights.

In view of this choice, your Rapporteur can only hope that the WEU Assembly will continue to play an active part in this process, particularly as regards the first of the three areas, which ties in closely with WEU's responsibilities.

11 A purely parliamentary organisation such as the Interparliamentary Union cannot of course be expected to draw up agreements committing governments. Its competence, moreover, is based on the authority vested in the national parliaments of individual countries - this obviously varies from one country to another and is not the same north and south of the Mediterranean. Yet the fact that elected members of parliament representing all the peoples of the Mediterranean region have succeeded in reaching agreement on the principles on which a lasting peace in that region can be built is no mean feat and gives grounds to hope that the parliaments will bring all their weight to bear on efforts to

Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Monaco, Morocco, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Yugoslavia and the Palestinian Authority as an associate participant

organise a new order of peace, and that the peoples' representatives have foreshadowed agreement among their governments and opened up new avenues. Support from the international community cannot but increase respect for parliamentary institutions in the Mediterranean countries and at the same time will spur on the quest for a just and lasting peace throughout the region.

12. In the field of security, the endeavours *NATO* has been making since December 1994 to establish a dialogue with six southern Mediterranean countries<sup>2</sup>, have not achieved the objective of a partnership for peace in the Mediterranean, while it would appear that contacts made with certain countries by the *WEU Mediterranean Group* have not convinced the participants and are currently at a standstill. It is probably these unsuccessful attempts that led the European Union to address the Mediterranean problem as a whole at the Barcelona Conference.

13. On 27 and 28 November 1995, the European Union organised a Euro-Mediterranean Conference in Barcelona attended by 27 countries: the 15 member states of the European Union and 12 countries from the southern shore of the Mediterranean, namely, Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey and the Palestinian Authority. The main objective of the Conference was to define the essential elements of a very wide-ranging Euro-Mediterranean political, economic, social and cultural partnership. Neither Libya (because of the embargo imposed on it by the international community in response to its stance on terrorism) nor the countries of former Yugoslavia were invited to the Conference. Although the United States attended as an observer only, it had put very strong pressure on the Europeans to gain admittance as a participant. It was granted observer status only and agreed to it on the understanding that the Conference would not cover conflicts which had not been resolved, particularly the one in the Middle East. It became perfectly clear in this context that the United States did not want to lose its monopoly in the negotiations on the Middle East peace process. Furthermore, if the United States had been admitted to the Conference as a participant, it is probable that Russia would have requested the same status

<sup>2</sup> Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia.

14. The Barcelona Conference agreed on the following three main aspects for a Euro-Mediterranean partnership:

- a political and security partnership;
- an economic and financial partnership with particular emphasis on the progressive establishment of a free-trade area, and financial assistance in the form of appropriations amounting to some 4.7 million ecus for the period 1995-99;
- a partnership in social, cultural and human affairs with a view to promoting understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil societies

This is the most ambitious project ever undertaken by Europe to help non-European Mediterranean countries by adopting an overall approach that should contribute to security in the region

15. It should be stressed that there has been a major development in the Arab nations over the last decade. After being tempted for too long by a simplistic interpretation of contemporary reality, seeing therein an extension of the "colonial pact", and having considered themselves to be the victims of sheer exploitation by international capitalists pleased at finding low-priced raw materials in the Arab countries, the latter are becoming increasingly sensitive to the need to join a worldwide economic order which puts the proper value on their manpower and the fruits of its labour while at the same time investing considerable capital in the necessary equipment. This change is leading them to view Europe in a new and infinitely more realistic light and they now see it as an essential partner in relation to their new acceptance of a worldwide economic order. In this context, an event such as the Barcelona Conference takes on all its significance because it represents not only Europe's response to Arab aspirations but also the opening of a dialogue, the development of exchanges and the promise of aid of a wholly different nature from any assistance afforded when relations were on a colonial footing

16. This does not mean that the southern Mediterranean countries are satisfied with the Barcelona outcome. Your Rapporteur heard a great deal of criticism of it in Turkey, Syria, Egypt and Morocco. The essence of such criticism is directed at:

- the relatively modest effects of the financial package, i.e. the fact that the transfers of funds do not really reflect the stated objectives. While it is necessary to listen to the criticism voiced, it does not invalidate the endeavour as a whole. Indeed, it has been given a very favourable reception by countries that wish to become part of the world economy but at their own pace and according to policies that suit their own national characteristics, so that they can remain in control of their own destinies,
- the Moroccan Prime Minister did not mince his words when he expressed regret that no progress had been made in any area since the Barcelona Conference: the meetings of experts had not produced anything and he was intending to complain about this at the meeting planned for April 1997, its specific purpose being to take stock of follow-up action since the Conference.

17. Barcelona is not a Euro-Arab event but rather an attempt to establish a new order for the Mediterranean region as a whole. A country such as Israel has everything to gain from the resolve expressed at the Conference being given practical effect, not only because the transformation of neighbouring countries constitutes the prime condition for maintaining peace in the region and, consequently, for its long-term security, but also because its economic and internal social balance, and therefore the independence of its foreign policy, can clearly only benefit from such a transformation if short-term political initiatives do not jeopardise the peace process that began following the Oslo Accords.

18. With regard to security aspects proper, one of the undertakings given in the Barcelona Declaration by the participants in the Conference was to

"consider any confidence- and security-building measures that could be taken between the parties with a view to the creation of an area of peace and stability in the Mediterranean, including the long-term possibility of establishing a Euro-Mediterranean pact to that end".

19. This initiative is obviously of interest to WEU but it was not invited to attend the Conference or be involved in any European Union action to be taken on the Barcelona Declaration in respect of security in the Mediterranean. Thought therefore needs to be given to ways of harmonising the various initiatives of international organisations. The Atlantic Alliance for its part launched an initiative on the Mediterranean in December 1994 with a view to establishing a dialogue with such countries as Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia, although there is as yet no clear consensus on the content or ultimate aim of this initiative<sup>3</sup>. It should be noted in passing that NATO did not invite Algeria to take part in the dialogue.

20. Despite the fact that WEU has achieved little in its dialogue with the southern Mediterranean countries, the WEU Ministers, at the close of their Birmingham meeting on 7 May 1996, stressed the importance of better coordination of the European Union's and NATO's Mediterranean initiatives with WEU's, taking into account the results of the Euro-Mediterranean Conference in Barcelona. They tasked the Permanent Council to reflect further on measures to improve the content of the dialogue and, at their next Ministerial Council meeting to be held in Ostend on 19 November, to report progress on such reflection, particularly with a view to the Conference to be organised by the European Union in the first half of 1997 as part of the Barcelona follow-on process. But any decision on appropriate models for establishing an area of peace, stability and security in the Mediterranean depends on a prior analysis of the nature of the problems affecting regional security.

## *II. Assessment of the situation throughout the Mediterranean*

21. The situation is characterised by a number of widely-varying regional conflicts on top of general problems affecting the Mediterranean as a whole.

<sup>3</sup> See Ronald D. Asmus, F. Stephen Larrabee and Ian O. Lesser: Mediterranean security: new challenges, new tasks, *NATO review*, May 1996.

## A. Regional conflicts affecting security in the Mediterranean

### 1. Developments in the Middle East peace process

22 Among the conflicts that continue to cause havoc throughout the Mediterranean region as a whole, but which have implications that go far beyond it, developments in the process for establishing peace between Israel and the Arab countries are of the utmost importance, especially in the wake of the parliamentary elections held on 29 May 1996. Most observers regard the new policies being followed by the government of Mr Netanyahu - who was elected Prime Minister by universal suffrage beating his predecessor, Shimon Peres, by a very small majority - as a threat to the peace process. Various factors have brought it to a virtual standstill, the new government's declaration that Israel's vital security interests come before peace and its negation of the principle of an exchange of the occupied territories for peace - coupled with a resumption of its deliberate policy of establishing Jewish settlements in those territories - its refusal to withdraw Israeli troops from Hebron, the fact that Mr Netanyahu's meeting with Mr Arafat produced nothing, and, lastly, the opening of the tunnel beneath the al-Aqsa mosque. Tension between Israel and Syria in particular rose to such a point that in September 1996, Syria increased troop movements in Lebanon and moved closer to the Golan Heights

23. In this context it is important to remember that negotiations between Syria and Israel, in particular as regards the terms of an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights and southern Lebanon (in return for disarmament of the Hizbollah Shiite militia), had progressed to such an extent by the start of 1996 that some observers hoped that a peace settlement between the two countries would only be a matter of time<sup>4</sup>. But after Mr Rabin's assassination, Mr Peres requested a freeze in the negotiations until he could secure an endorsement of his peace policy through early elections. The result was a defeat for the Labour-led majority and the return to power of the Likud.

4. *International Herald Tribune*, 15 January 1996, *Le Figaro*, 24 January 1996, *The Financial Times*, 2 February 1996.

24 Until the beginning of the year, considerable progress had also been made towards settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict following the conclusion of the Oslo Accords on the status of the Palestinian territories and relations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Following the Palestinian elections in January 1996, the PLO organised a meeting in May of the Palestinian National Council, which deleted the article in its national charter calling for the destruction of the State of Israel. In response, the government of Shimon Peres declared that Israel would no longer oppose the creation of a Palestinian State. Finally, the Palestinian Authority set up a Palestinian police force in its territory which proved effective in preventing the continuation of acts of terrorism. Since the Israeli election, meetings between Mr Netanyahu and Mr Arafat have made no progress and Israeli initiatives have resulted in a question mark hanging over the continued implementation of the provision of the Oslo Accords.

25 In the wake of renewed violent clashes between Palestinians and Israelis following the opening of a new access gate to a tunnel running under east Jerusalem, which resulted in the death of over 75 people with a further 400 or so injured, there is a case for asking whether hopes for a resumption of the peace process have not been dashed. But consideration must be given among other things to the fact that public opinion in Israel is divided and that almost half the Israeli population opted for peace based on a compromise between Palestinian aspirations and Israel's legitimate security concerns. In addition, the Israeli Government is subject to constant pressure both within the country and from the United States. The fact that President Clinton convened a meeting between Mr Netanyahu and Mr Arafat in Washington implies that the US Government will do its utmost to prevent a total breakdown of the peace process. It is true that the President's hands were somewhat tied in the run-up to the presidential elections. It is also to be hoped that the Israeli Government does not ignore the position of the Arab countries, among which Egypt in particular acts as an arbiter. It has to be in the interest of Israel, which was beginning to emerge from its isolation vis-à-vis the Arab world, - 13 Arab heads of state attended Mr Rabin's funeral - not to let its relations with its Arab neighbours deteriorate any further. There was never any sense, and certainly no future, in the existence of Israel as a fortress

constantly under siege and relying for its security solely on its military superiority when no-one knows how long that will last, as Mr Netanyahu's predecessors were well aware. They opened up promising prospects for Israel's economic cooperation with neighbouring countries, this being a far better guarantee of lasting security because it would involve all the region's inhabitants.

26. A freeze in the peace process therefore has to be reckoned with for some time. But with renewed Palestinian violence in the occupied territories giving rise to serious concern, the question is: how long can the freeze go on without provoking a dangerous escalation of tension in the region?

27. As far as Europe is concerned, it is clear that its political stability and security depend on the parallel situation in the Mediterranean basin. However, there can be no guarantee of such stability and security there without a just and stable peace in the Middle East. In this respect, relations between Israel and the Palestinians are a key issue that could decide the future of the overall peace process in the Middle East.

28. The future of that process is currently shrouded in uncertainty, particularly as regards compliance with the agreements already concluded and any future progress.

29. To salvage the peace process, both parties must honour all the commitments into which they freely entered – this includes the timetable set by the agreements – and must also take them as a basis for making further progress. Compliance with the agreements means that Israel must continue to redeploy its forces, which also implies withdrawing them from the Hebron region. Your Rapporteur is well aware of the extent of Israel's security concerns and for this reason suggests that redeployment should take place on the basis of an objective assessment – clearly explained to the international community – of those concerns and taking into account lessons learnt from cooperation with the Palestinian Authority.

30. The Assembly roundly condemns the acts of terrorism perpetrated against Israel which have injured or claimed the lives of many victims and have aroused concern among the Israeli population. While understanding the serious

security concerns of the Israeli Government, it nonetheless considers that Israel must continue to redeploy its forces in accordance with the agreements concluded. Mr Chirac's recent visit to the Middle East, and in particular the outcome of his talks with Mr Netanyahu, give grounds to hope that this redeployment will take place soon, despite the incidents that occurred during the French President's visit to East Jerusalem.

## *2. Crises involving Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran*

31. The situation in the Mediterranean is further complicated by its being influenced by the development of other conflicts in surrounding areas. Reference should be made for instance to tensions between Turkey and Syria and to the Kurdish problem, which involves those countries, Iran and Iraq whose military action in the northern part of the country in early September 1996 led to reprisals from the Americans.

32. In this context it should be noted that the reservations expressed by the Arab world and by Europe to the United States' action, coupled with strong criticism from Moscow, could have unforeseeable consequences in relation to Iraq, which now seems to be less politically isolated than before. There would appear to be an increasing risk in maintaining the economic blockade on Iraq.

33. Turkish policy under Mr Erbakan's government is another important factor. It is not yet possible to pin it down given the conflicting signals coming out of the country. Two military cooperation agreements were signed, in February and August 1996, between Turkey and Israel, which is a source of concern to Syria and the Arab countries among others. The agreements have led some observers to predict a new move towards strategic convergence between the United States, Turkey and Israel, which might even include Jordan. When questioned by your Rapporteur, the Turkish authorities strongly refuted any such suggestion and played down the scope of the agreements, which they maintained were similar to those concluded with other countries and were intended solely for defence purposes. Nevertheless, Syria and some Arab countries are worried by this development. In addition, Turkey has also signed a major agreement with Iran on natural gas supplies, causing deep annoyance to the United States.

Ankara has tried to minimise its importance, stressing that Turkey sees it as no more than a trade agreement.

34 As for relations between Turkey and Europe, your Rapporteur's various contacts made a point of telling him how much frustration and disappointment was felt as regards the European Union's attitude to their country. Turkey considered itself to be a loyal ally that had made a considerable effort during the cold war to protect the southern flank of the Alliance and it now had the impression that it was not reaping the rewards. Despite all its pledges to fully integrate with Europe, it had no prospect of becoming a member of the European Union in the near future or of receiving support from Europe to help it solve its problems.

35. Regarding WEU in particular, the Turks consider their associate-member status to be so humiliating that the Turkish Parliament refused to authorise the involvement of Turkish troops in a WEU exercise carried out in Portugal. The Turks do not accept the argument that they have to belong to the European Union in order to be a full member of WEU, when they are already a member of NATO. As such, they consider it wrong that the security guarantee provided by the North Atlantic Treaty might one day be extended to new NATO members (from central Europe) when Turkey is refused the guarantees of the modified Brussels Treaty. They also object to having been left out of the third phase of Crisex and fear they will not be allowed to participate in Euromarfor whereas Greece, on the other hand, could be given a role in it. The Turks are seeking a significant gesture that would allow NATO members to become full members of WEU as well. This would only affect Turkey since Iceland and Norway are content with their associate-member status. In the framework of the intergovernmental conference, Turkey has sent a memorandum to the EU member countries requesting that there should be no link between membership of the European Union and membership of WEU. It is believed that the only favourable response has come from the British.

36. Relations between Turkey and the Arab countries have always been sensitive, not least because of memories of the Ottoman Empire's dominion over many of them. Furthermore, the Egyptian Foreign Affairs Minister told your Rapporteur that, in his opinion, Turkish-Arab

relations had deteriorated since Turkey signed the former Baghdad Pact. From then on, according to the Minister, Turkey had ceased to make common cause with the Arab countries. Ankara and the Arab world had drawn a shade closer following Turkey's commitment to the Bosnian Muslims in recent years. However, certain issues have created a climate of distrust and could lead to tensions. Bilateral problems between Syria and Turkey fall into this category. Apart from the two countries' conflicting policies with regard to Israel, Syria has never abandoned its claim for Hatay province to be returned to it. Syria also charges Turkey with endangering its water supply with the series of dams the latter has built on the Euphrates, while Turkey for its part accuses Syria of harbouring Kurdish PKK terrorists and even of supporting PKK action against Turkey. The severity of these tensions, which placed a strain on relations between the two countries throughout the summer of 1996, led to both of them deploying troops along their borders. Nevertheless, the Vice-President of the Republic of Syria, Mr Khaddam, made a point of telling your Rapporteur that he had no wish to see a serious deterioration in relations between Syria and Turkey. This was why President Assad had decided to invite the new Prime Minister, Mr Erbakan, who was viewed in a favourable light in Syria, to come to Damascus for a meeting.

37. But the cooling of relations all round between Turkey and the Arab countries has become more pronounced as a result of their fear of Turkey establishing a security zone in northern Iraq by stationing troops there as protection against the PKK. Assurances from the Turkish President to President Mubarak to the effect that Turkey did not envisage any deployment of its forces on Iraqi territory have not sufficed to date to reassure the Arab countries, particularly Egypt, which has reaffirmed its resolve to preserve Iraq's territorial integrity and sovereignty. This hard-line position is to be understood in the context of American punitive strikes against southern Iraq in early September 1996 following Iraqi troops' intervention in the civil war being waged between the Kurdish factions in the north. This action on the part of the United States met with serious challenge from Egypt and other Arab countries. A new conflict over Iraq would therefore carry a major risk. Some Arab countries might dissociate themselves from the coalition against Iraq.

established during the Gulf War. Such a development would serve only to strengthen President Saddam Hussein's position while creating tension with the United States.

38. With regard to the Syrian position, government representatives and in particular the Vice-President of the Republic of Syria, Mr Khaddam, told your Rapporteur how much they appreciated President Chirac's efforts to give Europe a renewed political role in the Middle East. Mr Chirac's visit to the Middle East in October 1996 will undoubtedly have reinforced that appreciation. The Syrian Government wants the European Union, spurred on by the French, to take on more responsibilities in the region, in particular by giving fresh impetus to the peace process, so as to counterbalance American influence and exert the necessary pressure on Israel.

39. Besides this, the Syrians have some reservations about the Barcelona process. They fear they will be forced to adopt a European economic model based on ultra-liberalism for which Syria is particularly ill prepared because of the way in which its economy has been nationalised, a process that has produced mixed results. The Barcelona process does indeed imply that liberalising the Syrian economy is a prerequisite for access to funds and accompanying financial packages. According to the Syrian Government, the problem needs to be tackled the other way round: now is the time to help the Syrian economy adapt to a free market. On the subject of the peace process, Mr Khaddam was extremely critical of Mr Arafat, pointing out that he had received nothing in return for all the concessions he had made. Referring to the Golan Heights, the Vice-President said an agreement with Israel had been on the horizon in which the State of Israel would have agreed a return to the 4 June 1967 line. Now, the whole peace process was blocked. Mr Khaddam was very guarded when speaking about Mr Netanyahu and said things would have to wait until Mr Clinton was re-elected President of the United States before there could be any hope of a change in Israeli policy.

### *3. Crises between countries in North Africa*

40. Among other crisis flashpoints to be borne in mind as likely to have an impact on security in

the Mediterranean is the continuing tension between Egypt and Sudan – Egypt depends on the latter for 80% of its water supply. Furthermore, Egypt has on several occasions accused Sudan of providing training (particularly military training) for Egyptian Islamist groups, notably in connection with the attempt to assassinate President Mubarak at the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) summit meeting in Addis Ababa in June 1995. Political instability in Libya could have repercussions on Egypt, which is faced with the problem of its relations with Colonel Gaddafi, who is intent on seeking a special relationship with Egypt to counter his country's isolation from the international community.

41. The Political Committee's visit to Morocco from 27-29 October 1996 gave it an opportunity to put together some extremely interesting information on developments in the Maghreb and, in particular, on the position of Morocco itself. The Committee was particularly satisfied to see that the Moroccan authorities wholeheartedly support the political and security dimension of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership envisaged by the Barcelona Conference, which might eventually lead to the implementation of a Euro-Mediterranean pact.

42. As mentioned in Chapter III of this report, the Moroccans were much more receptive to the dialogue WEU has begun with the Maghreb countries than were either Egypt or Turkey. They had no objection to the creation of Eurofor and Euromarfor and welcomed the fact that Morocco had been invited to send observers to watch exercises carried out by those forces. The general impression was that the situation was assessed very differently depending on whether countries lay to the west or east of the Mediterranean.

43. As regards relations between the Maghreb countries, it would seem that the Algerian problem and differences between Morocco and Algeria are obstacles to the harmonious development of real cooperation between Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria which would enable the three countries to form a coherent economic and political partnership.

44. Yet no progress has been made on finding a solution to the dispute over the western Sahara, which has been going on for years between

Morocco and Algeria. Algeria is accused of continuing to support the Polisario Front and of not showing any willingness to settle the problem. Morocco has agreed to the plan drawn up by the United Nations, which, among other things, makes provision for a referendum on self-determination for the western Saharan people. As the referendum has been postponed several times, Morocco has frozen its relations with Algeria

45. Furthermore, in view of the internal situation in Algeria where outright civil war is being waged on extreme fundamentalist movements such as the GIA (Armed Islamic Group), there is little hope at present of any political cooperation between Algeria and its two neighbours, they being more concerned about protecting their societies from infiltration by Algerian Islamist movements than about establishing close ties with the regime in Algiers

46. The members of the Political Committee asked their Moroccan contacts to what extent they thought WEU could help solve the problem and, more generally, whether the first part of the Barcelona process for the peaceful settlement of conflicts could not be used in this connection. They were told that neither WEU nor the Barcelona process could intervene to play a mediating role in the matter. The Moroccans more or less gave the impression that they were counting on some sort of international pressure that would force Algeria to enter into serious negotiations with its neighbours.

47. For the time being, Moroccan parliamentarians and members of the Political Committee agree in their thinking that the example of strengthened economic and political cooperation with Morocco and Tunisia could persuade Algeria to embark on a process leading to democracy and reform, which would qualify it to join the ranks of those countries able to enjoy genuine cooperation with Europe.

48. In this respect Morocco sets a very positive example on account of the progress it has made towards a system of political pluralism and a democratic Constitution, and because of its efforts to improve its human rights record

49. As for Tunisia, it deserves special mention for its economic reforms and has rightfully won recognition from the IMF and the World Bank in

this connection. Its economic growth rate corroborates this very significant development. Tunisia's economic boom has protected it from the advance of Islamism, although it still has some way to go as far as its democratic institutions are concerned.

50. Partnership with Europe must not be allowed to eclipse the importance of inter-Arab relations. It is, for instance, disappointing that, after a promising start, the UMA (Union of Arab Maghreb countries, comprising Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Mauritania) has now reached stalemate. In addition to the problems of the western Sahara and the Polisario Front, there is also the embargo against Libya that was imposed by the United Nations following Libyan attacks on American and French aircraft

51. Nevertheless, despite this period of inertia, Morocco and Tunisia as partners continue to set great store by the guiding ideas behind both the UMA and, even more so, the Maghreb. Europe can but regret that the current situation has led to the suspension of the "Five plus Five" dialogue. The Committee's general impression was that its Moroccan contacts took the view that stability in the Mediterranean depended first and foremost on the solution of economic and social problems.

#### *4. Cyprus and disputes between Greece and Turkey*

52. Among the interstate conflicts affecting security in the Mediterranean, two specific crises should be mentioned: the first concerns Cyprus, and the second the problems between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean Sea. These differ sharply from the problems referred to above in that European countries are directly involved.

53. The Cyprus problem, because of the prospect of the Cypriot state's accession to the European Union, is a sensitive issue – in the same way as is the dispute between Greece and Turkey – because it involves two members of the Atlantic Alliance. The negotiations, scheduled to start in the six-month period following the conclusion of the intergovernmental conference, to prepare for Cyprus's accession to the European Union threaten to give rise to serious conflict between the European Union and Turkey, and perhaps also between the EU and Greece, if it proves impossible to agree on



arrangements acceptable to all the interested parties for this state's entry to the European Union. It is not immediately obvious at present of what such arrangements might consist.

54. However it is no secret that other long-standing differences divide Turkey and Greece, for example over the Aegean Sea, western Thrace, etc., in relation to which neither the European Union nor WEU are organisations suited to act as impartial mediators, if only because one party to the conflict, Greece, is a full member of both organisations, while the other, Turkey, is not a member of the European Union and has only associate-member status in WEU, not having been invited to accede to the modified Brussels Treaty. Some members of the Committee expressed the view that the Council of Europe was an appropriate forum in which this problem should be discussed. However, not all of them agreed. The Assembly can do no more than note the information it received, according to which the WEU Council, at the time of Greece's accession, formally declined to deal with this matter. The Assembly cannot, therefore, request it to revoke its decision which, in view of the circumstances, would appear to be sound. During his visit to Turkey, your Rapporteur was told of deep-rooted opposition in the country to the accession of the state of Cyprus, as it currently exists, to the European Union. Any such move would bring together two states with Greek populations and your Rapporteur's Turkish contacts said this would make any agreement between the Union and Turkey impossible. It would therefore seem necessary to find a solution to the Cyprus problem that is acceptable to the two communities on the island and to the states that are guarantors under the London and Zurich Agreements, before envisaging the accession of a Cypriot state, which in reality controls only part of the island, to a European Union claiming to have a common foreign and security policy.

##### *5. The impact of the conflict in the Balkans on Euro-Mediterranean relations*

55. A lasting accommodation between Greece and Turkey is all the more desirable given that continuation of the dispute could undermine the credibility of the initiative Europe took in Barcelona with a view to contributing to the formation of areas of peace and stability in the region of the Mediterranean subject to tension. For the non-European countries of the Mediterranean, Europe's credibility has already been eroded by its inability to

avoid an outbreak of war in former Yugoslavia and put an end to it without the United States having to intervene. However, while the repercussions of the conflict on Euro-Mediterranean relations carry risks, they also offer signs of hope. The risks stem from the distrust the Islamic countries have of Europeans whom they suspect of not having done enough to support the cause of the Bosnian Muslims. The hopeful signs, on the other hand, lie in the participation of military forces from some Arab countries of the Mediterranean region in efforts by the United Nations and NATO to restore peace in Bosnia and in the implementation of the Dayton Accords. The Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs told your Rapporteur that the participation of troops from Arab countries such as Egypt in the peacekeeping forces in former Yugoslavia could serve as a model for Euro-Mediterranean cooperation in crisis-management situations in other regions and pave the way for cooperation in other areas.

56. But identifying the main crisis flashpoints likely to affect security in the Mediterranean basin is only one factor in analysing the situation in the region since it is equally affected by the existence of problems of a more general nature which must also be taken into consideration before formulating ideas as to how to meet present and future challenges.

#### *B. General problems in Euro-Mediterranean relations*

##### *1. The repercussions of economic, social and demographic change on Euro-Mediterranean relations*

57. The difference in terms of economic development between the northern and southern Mediterranean is an important factor to be borne in mind. The area to the north is largely made up of prosperous, highly developed European countries united in the European Union common market and bound by military alliances such as NATO and WEU.

58. In contrast, the situation to the south, particularly in economic terms, is more uneven. There is clearly a wide gap between countries which export natural resources, such as the Gulf states, Libya and Algeria, and the other southern Mediterranean Arab countries with their weak economies, huge social problems due to the population explosion and enormous foreign debt obligations.

59. The economic development of the Mediterranean countries is closely linked to environmental factors in the region. The deterioration of the environment is increasingly threatening its economic development. The problem was made abundantly clear at the Barcelona Conference, where participants highlighted their interdependence in environmental matters and the need for a regional approach and increased cooperation. They decided to set up priority action programmes. Water supplies are an issue of such importance as to be the cause of numerous bilateral disputes between countries to the south and east of the Mediterranean and those attending the Barcelona Conference rightly recognised this as a priority issue for all Mediterranean partners and agreed on the need to extend cooperation in this field

60. The energy sector is of similar importance, particularly as far as oil and natural gas are concerned. Approximately 40% of Europe's oil and natural gas supplies are routed through the Mediterranean and there are major pipelines crossing Algeria and Morocco which supply Europe via Spain. However countries such as Italy are also dependent in large measure on oil and natural gas supplies from Algeria and Libya

61. It has not yet proved possible to establish a form of regional common market in the southern Mediterranean. Attempts to create an economic community bringing together Middle Eastern and North African countries (MENA) were made under the aegis of the Presidents of the United States and Russia by organising an economic summit held on 30 October and 1 November 1994 in Casablanca, which was followed by a second, convened in Amman on 29 October 1995. A third conference in the series is to take place in Cairo from 12 to 14 November. However, the connection between progress on this initiative – involving a large number of Middle Eastern countries including Israel and the North African states – and the peace process between Israel and its neighbours, cannot be ignored and is evident from Egypt's threat to cancel the conference if Israel refuses to comply with its undertakings towards the Palestinians, particularly as regards the withdrawal of its troops from Hebron.

62. Another serious problem is the unemployment rate in most of the southern Mediterranean countries, which exceeds 25% in some cases and affects young people in particular.

The impoverishment of the peoples concerned, together with exponential demographic growth is leading to increased migration, particularly towards the European countries. According to some estimates, the population of the Arab countries is likely to go up by 90% from 1990 to 2025 as against a rise of only 6% in European countries

63. The problem of northward migration is likely to worsen in years to come, unless ways can be found of creating equally advantageous economic, social and cultural conditions in the south which will relieve migratory pressures and even cause them gradually to disappear. One of the main features of this problem is its psychological dimension, inasmuch as it is closely linked to the perceptions both the European and non-European populations on the southern shores of the Mediterranean have of it. It is no secret that many Europeans regard the problem of migration from the south not only as a social and economic challenge and a problem of organisation but also as a threat to the cultural identity of the northern countries, and the unease felt in those countries has reached such a point as to precipitate protests that migration is a danger to the internal security and stability of some European countries

64. Such views, which are given a hostile reception in the countries of the south, hardly help to establish mutual trust, still seriously undermined by the profound differences which persist between North and South in terms of their cultural and religious traditions as well as their political systems. History in particular has done little to contribute to the development of a climate of trust between Europe and the Arab world. From the conquest of Islam to colonialism and the crusades to decolonisation, the relationship between Europe and the Muslim world has for centuries been based on antagonism, punctuated nonetheless by periods when both civilisations have managed to live side by side in peace and prosperity.

## *2. Political Islamism*

65. The way in which Europe and the countries around the Mediterranean basin view each another is a source of real difficulty and in many respects relations are still marked by distrust, not to mention fear. On the European side there are very strong apprehensions about militant Islamic fundamentalism as a hostile force seeking to overturn the existing political order not merely in certain

southern Mediterranean countries but even in Europe itself. There are two types of Islamist movement: those seeking to transform the existing political order by using violence and those trying to achieve that goal through democratic means such as parliamentary elections. However, some fear that once in power, the Islamist movements will take advantage of their position to abolish the entire system of democratic elections.

66. Anxieties on this score tend to be expressed mainly in European countries and are viewed askance by political circles in the countries of the South, which see in them, *inter alia*, an additional sign of European lack of understanding of the specific nature of the Muslim world and its problems. Arguments such as those voiced by the former NATO Secretary-General, Willy Claes, to the effect that Islamic fundamentalism was western Europe's greatest challenge since the ending of the cold war, have helped to fuel Muslim countries' suspicion and distrust of the West.

67. However, some Muslim countries themselves admit that the activities of extreme Islamist movements rank among the dangers that threaten their security and stability, as the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs acknowledged during his talks with your Rapporteur. Egypt appears to count itself among those countries that would be open to joint development of ideas by both European and Muslim countries wishing to find ways of responding together to the challenges facing them that would not be seen as interference in the internal affairs of the countries involved. An example of Egypt's cooperative attitude is the initiative taken by President Mubarak in 1991 towards creating a Mediterranean forum for developing dialogue and cooperation in all fields between a number of Mediterranean countries.

68. How to respond to Islamic fundamentalism is undoubtedly one of the issues on which information is most seriously lacking and which leads to the greatest number of misunderstandings between European countries, the United States and Islamic countries. While fundamentalist Islamist forces already hold power in countries such as Iran, Pakistan, Sudan and Mauritania, Islamist movements are trying to impose fundamentalist regimes elsewhere by violent means, particularly in Algeria and Egypt, with some degree of support from Iran (in

Algeria's case) and Sudan (in the case of Egypt). Other countries, such as Tunisia and Morocco, have followed a programme of emancipation and progress for women which makes them less vulnerable to the threats inherent in fundamentalism.

69. It would be wrong to conclude that the followers of Islam constitute a homogenous force determined to act as part of a universal conspiracy against the existing political order. The fact is that Islam is made up of highly diversified groups. Some fundamentalist movements advocate violence in the name of Islam and are roundly condemned by most Muslim political leaders who consider that this does not conform to the principles of Islam as a religion and merely brings it into discredit throughout the world. One example of such groups is the Islamic Army of Salvation (AIS). It was founded in Algeria in 1992 as the armed branch of the FIS (Islamic Salvation Front), which was dissolved in March 1992.

70. The civil war that broke out in Algeria because of the cancellation of the results of the parliamentary elections in December 1991, which were won by the FIS, did not end with the presidential elections of 16 November 1995 that gave General Zeroual a resounding victory despite threats to the electorate from Islamist extremists. According to information in the *Ramses 97* review, armed groups belonging to the opposition destroyed no less than 200 town halls, more than 600 schools and a number of local administrative buildings, thus raising serious doubts as to whether the elections could be held normally. Again according to *Ramses 97*, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) had issued a clear warning advising electors not to vote unless they wanted to see the ballot box become a "coffin".

71. The GIA is accused of being behind all the assassinations of foreigners which have taken place in Algeria, the highjacking of the Air France Airbus, the 1995 wave of bomb attacks in France and the death of seven European monks in Algeria. Since then, the regime led by Mr Zeroual has been trying to bring together all the various political groups throughout the country. A huge "reconciliation" conference designed to pave the way for democratic reforms and establish the conditions necessary for holding parliamentary elections took place in Algiers on 15 September this year but many political

movements and parties refused to take part and it is not certain that the conference was able to make any progress towards restoring peace

72. Egypt has the Gamaat al-Islamiya movement to which responsibility has been attributed for attacks against Copts, policemen and tourists. There is also the Islamic Jihad group, which was responsible for the assassination of President Sadat in 1991. The En-Nahda or Renaissance Party, whose leader is in exile in London, operates in Tunisia.

73. While it is important not to confuse the activities of terrorist groups with those of radical Islamist movements seeking to take power in some countries, it is not always easy to distinguish between them as there is often some interaction between the two. But a radical movement which seeks election to government without committing or supporting violent action cannot be regarded as a terrorist group.

74. During a seminar in Paris in June 1996 organised by the WEU Institute for Security Studies, it became clear that the various governments had adopted different approaches in their relations with Islamist political movements. This analysis distinguishes the "eradicators" who are in favour of the total exclusion of radical Islamists from the political arena (as is currently the practice in Algeria and, to a more subtle degree, in Egypt and Tunisia) from those who adopt a policy of "assimilation", or the controlled and limited involvement of Islamists in political life, although not to the point of their taking part in elections. Such is the case in Morocco. Lastly, resort may be had to the "integration" model, which is not applied at present in any of the countries concerned. The latter moreover responded less than enthusiastically to a conference of Islamic fundamentalists held in London last September and organised by a group seeking the creation of a worldwide Islamic order and the overthrow, using violent means, of all the present governments in the Middle East.

75. The burning question for European countries in this context is whether and to what extent they should regard themselves as required to intervene in the problems of the countries on the opposite shore of the Mediterranean. Intervention by Europe would undoubtedly be problematic if it were based exclusively on

considerations as to whether the security of the continent was threatened by the activities of political Islamist movements.

76. After all, it cannot be asserted as a general principle that a country led by a fundamentalist government is bound to follow policies hostile to Europe and the western world. What then are the values shared by Europe and the Muslim countries on the opposite shore of the Mediterranean that give them good reason to work out a common conception of the problem of political Islamism? In the Barcelona Declaration adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference held on 27 and 28 November 1995, all the participants subscribed to such shared values as democracy and respect for human rights and hence supported action that was likely to strengthen democratic institutions, the rule of law and civil society. In order to develop a conception common to Europe and the non-European Mediterranean countries on the basis of this initial consensus – assuming Europe does not impose it on the other participant countries – it would be necessary to reach a point where those values are properly recognised and respected by the Islamic countries.

### *3. The fight against terrorism and organised crime*

77. Despite all these efforts, the need to protect a nation against terrorism and combat it in all its forms remains a major problem confronting Europe, the United States and the Muslim countries alike. In order to fight terrorism, it will be essential to identify its origins, which are extremely diverse. Terrorism cannot be put on the same footing as radical Islamism. In the fight against terrorism, the main points to note are the fragmented nature of any initiatives and the lack of any common assessment and thinking, particularly in Europe and the United States. Although a summit meeting held at Sharm-el-Sheikh in March 1996 brought together the Arab countries and Israel with a view to the participants declaring their determination to fight terrorism together, the pursuit of that initiative is likely to depend on the progress of the Middle East peace process. In any event, it is clear that breaking off the peace process will probably trigger a wave of terrorism in the occupied territories and in Israel.

78. Europe and the United States differ in their views on how to deal with state terrorism and on sanctions to be imposed against states alleged to

support terrorism. The United States was ready to identify and expressly name countries which, in its view, encourage terrorism, such as Iraq, Iran, Libya and Sudan, and to impose economic sanctions on them. The criteria taken by the United States as a basis for drawing up this list are, however, not clear and it is sometimes difficult to understand the principles underlying its policy of assisting the Taliban (radical Islamist movement) in Afghanistan or certain Kurd factions, and cutting off such countries from the international community. Congress has been encouraged to pass anti-terrorist legislation aimed at firms in allied countries that continue to trade with countries on the United States "black list". It may be asked why that list does not include Pakistan, which has openly encouraged the Taliban who took control of Kabul in September 1996. It is remarkable that the United States should have encouraged this movement.

79 In contrast, European countries, especially France, have expressed strong reservations about the idea of such a list and even opposition to it. However, countries represented at the G7 anti-terrorism conference held in Paris in late July of this year succeeded in reaching agreement on a series of measures to fight terrorism, both inside their own borders and in a framework of international cooperation. Strengthening cooperation to prevent and fight terrorism is, furthermore, one of the objectives to which those attending the Barcelona Conference subscribed. However there is still a long way to go before effective joint strategies can be developed to counter this persistent threat. It should be borne in mind in this connection that there is as yet no joint policy, even within the European Union, with regard to either the internal aspects of the problem or the areas covered by the CFSP, that is, action to be taken outside the Union.

80 Like many other regions of the world, the Mediterranean has been hit by the spread of organised crime and its diversification into new areas and by drug trafficking. The fight against these two evils was included on the agenda for the Barcelona Conference.

#### 4. Trends in military expenditure in the region

81. The prevailing military situation in the Mediterranean region must be analysed from several angles. It should be noted from the outset that the Mediterranean is no longer the potential

theatre of East-West confrontation. The naval presence of the countries that emerged from the former Soviet Union has all but disappeared from the area while Russia's role in the region is not comparable to that of the former Soviet Union. Conversely, the military presence of NATO and in particular of the United States means that the latter is the only superpower left in the region. This situation is leading those Mediterranean countries which are not members of the Alliance to question the aims and purposes of that presence in view, *inter alia*, of the change in the doctrine of the Atlantic Alliance. Indeed, NATO activities are no longer restricted to defending an area defined by the Washington Treaty but may extend to regions which were formerly "out of area", as illustrated for example by NATO's intervening to put an end to the armed conflict in the Balkans. The dialogue partners of the southern Mediterranean countries are also questioning the aims served by the creation of rapid reaction forces and the purpose of general NATO enlargement.

82. Moreover the aim of establishing forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU) in the Mediterranean, such as Eurofor and Euomarfor, as agreed by France, Italy and Spain with Portugal's involvement, is far from clear to the non-European Mediterranean countries. They wonder what these units are to be used for. Are they to intervene in an inter-Arab conflict or will they be made available as necessary to Arab countries for peacekeeping tasks?

83. Essential as it may be to reflect on and explain the role of the western alliances in the Mediterranean region, consideration must also be given to forces and armaments development in countries involved in conflicts or bilateral disputes in the region.

84. Iraq provides no information regarding its military expenditure, hence the SIPRI yearbook does not put any figure on the country's financial outlay for the purpose of rebuilding its armed forces following losses during the Gulf War. However, according to *The Military Balance 1995/96*, edited by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the percentage rate allocated to military expenditure in Iraq's budget has risen since 1993. There are in any event signs indicating that, over the five years that have elapsed since the Gulf War, the country has succeeded in rebuilding an impressive conven-

tional force numbering some 350 000 regular soldiers and 650 000 reserves and roughly 2 700 battle tanks, including a large number of T-72s, assigned specifically to the Republican Guard and the presidential guard. Moreover, since the Gulf War, Iraq has set up a kind of rapid-action force of some 30 000 crack troops<sup>5</sup>.

85. Regarding countries involved in the Middle East conflict, the percentage figures given for their respective military expenditure as compared to gross domestic product vary according to the sources of different information. According to SIPRI's 1996 yearbook, Israel has steadily reduced its expenditure from 16% of GDP in 1986 to 9.5% in 1994. The same trend is apparent in the case of Syria (down from 14.4% in 1986 to 8.5% in 1994). Egypt reduced its military expenditure from 7.8% to 3.3% over the same period, although according to the IISS's *The Military Balance* an increase was recorded for Egypt from 5.7% to 5.9% between 1993 and 1994. *The Military Balance* shows Jordan reducing expenditure between 1993 and 1994 whereas SIPRI maintains there was a slight increase over the same period.

86. Trends in Iran's military expenditure are more difficult to assess. In terms of GDP, spending fell from 3% to 1.8% in 1993 according to the 1996 SIPRI yearbook, which takes as its basis statistics supplied by public sources which perhaps underestimate the country's actual defence outlay. *The Military Balance* maintains that Iran's military spending rose from 3.4% to 3.8% of GDP between 1993 and 1994. It should also be borne in mind that, as expressed in American dollars, expenditure by Iran, which fell until 1989, picked up again year on year between 1990 and 1994. However, there are differences between the estimates given in the SIPRI yearbook and in the IISS's *The Military Balance*.

87. While the 1996 SIPRI yearbook provides no data on Libya, *The Military Balance* refers to a slight increase in the country's military expenditure, which rose from 3.3% of GDP in 1993 to 3.7% in 1994. *The Military Balance* records a fall in Algeria's defence spending from 2.9% in 1993 to 2.7% in 1994, while the 1996 SIPRI yearbook shows a steady rise from 1991 onwards (1.3% in 1991, 2% in 1992, 2.7% in

1993 and 3.3% in 1994). For Morocco, SIPRI records defence spending as down from 3.9% in 1993 to 3.8% in 1994 whereas *The Military Balance* puts the figures at 4% in 1993, rising to 4.3% in 1994. According to both sources Tunisia has held military spending steady at a low level in recent years.

88. Among NATO member states, two countries – Turkey and Greece – have not, unlike other members, reduced their military spending. In the case of Greece, military expenditure as a percentage of GDP has been held constant since 1992 at 5.6% (SIPRI). According to *The Military Balance* it stood at 5.7% in 1994. SIPRI puts Turkey's spending at 4.2% of GDP between 1988 and 1994 (*The Military Balance*, however, records a fall, from 4% in 1993 to 3.2% in 1994).

89. Among the main conventional armaments importers from 1991-95, SIPRI ranks Turkey number one, followed by Egypt and Saudi Arabia in second and third positions. Greece follows in fifth place, Israel in eighth, Kuwait twelfth, with Algeria ranked as 31st and Syria and Morocco in 33rd and 44th places respectively.

90. Conventional arms imports follow a universal downward trend, Kuwait and Syria being the exceptions, and generally speaking there is no evidence of any new conventional arms race in the Mediterranean region. Trends in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of conveyance in both the Middle East and North Africa are an issue of far greater concern.

##### ***5. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of conveyance***

91. Given the relatively short distances between the countries involved in the Middle East peace process, the development of relatively short-range ballistic missiles may already be assuming major importance for the way in which each country concerned perceives the intentions of the others. While Israel has developed its Jericho 1, 650 km-range and Jericho 2, 1 500 km-range missiles, Saudi Arabia has Chinese CSS 2 missiles with a range of 2 700 km. Iran and Syria have taken delivery of North Korean Scud C, 500 km-range missiles, while Libya, Iran and Egypt have Scud B, 300 km-range missiles. Work on developing ballistic

5. *The Military Balance 1995/96 and International Herald Tribune*, 10 September 1996.

missiles in the 600 to 2 500 km-range is being carried out mainly by Pakistan, North Korea, India and Israel. In this area, North Korea in particular is pursuing a very aggressive export policy in relation to its ballistic missile technology.<sup>6</sup>

92. The significance of this trend in the proliferation of ballistic weapons is linked to the question of the type of explosive charge they are able to carry. Given Israel's nuclear capability and its refusal to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, Egypt, *inter alia*, has redoubled its efforts to acquire a capability in ballistic missiles and chemical charges, for the exclusive purpose, according to information provided by your Rapporteur's Egyptian contacts, of preserving the country's vital interests and not with any intent to reach a particular enemy, such as Israel

93. In this connection, when asked whether Egypt was about to procure Scud B or C missiles from North Korea, your Rapporteur's Egyptian contacts were somewhat evasive in their reply but stated that the range of both fell within the limits set by the MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime) – meaning that it must be below 300 km. The Egyptians also refused to state outright whether they were in the process of acquiring a chemical capability.

94. In a broader context, it should also be noted that according to Turkish estimates, Iran may already have biological and chemical capabilities and be in a position to produce nuclear weapons within 15 years without foreign assistance and even within 10 with such assistance. Again according to Turkish sources, within 5-7 years, when Iraq is no longer bound by UN Security Council Resolutions, it too could produce nuclear weapons. Libya may be trying to procure nuclear weapons from Russia and would be capable of producing the chemical weapons it may have used in Chad.

95. Syria, on the other hand, was unlikely to have either nuclear weapons or the capability to manufacture them. It seemed only to be working on civilian applications of nuclear technology. Algeria was in all probability receiving nuclear technology assistance from Argentina and China.

6. For details see *The Military Balance 1995-96*, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).

96. However, even though there are sure signs in the region of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of conveyance, it is a matter of conjecture as to whether this development is inevitably a direct threat to Europe. This raises questions as to the relevance of the following comment in the May 1996 issue of the *NATO review*.

"The southern members of NATO will be the first to feel the political and military consequences of proliferation trends on Europe's periphery (major Turkish cities are already within range of missiles deployed in Iran and Syria). These countries will become increasingly vulnerable to attacks and pressure from across the Mediterranean. Faced with these new threats, they may be less willing to offer support and facilities for contingencies in the Middle East and the Gulf, thus undercutting US strategy. But even if they do provide access to such facilities, the dialogue with the US on these matters is likely to be quite different if Madrid, Nice or Naples are at risk."

97. Although it does not do to minimise the dangers of developments in ballistic missile technology, it appears that the countries primarily threatened by such developments are the Middle Eastern and North African countries on account of the various regional conflicts between them. Hence there is no cause for fear of a conflict between those countries and Europe.

#### 6. *Promoting arms control and disarmament*

98. Nevertheless an appropriate starting point must be the consensus reached at the Barcelona Conference where all those attending agreed to

- "promote regional security by acting, *inter alia*, in favour of nuclear, chemical and biological non-proliferation through adherence to and compliance with a combination of international and regional non-proliferation regimes, and arms control and disarmament agreements such as NPT, CWC, BWC, CTBT and/or regional arrangements such as weapon-free zones including their verification regimes, as well as by fulfilling in good

faith their commitments under arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation conventions;

- ...
- pursue a mutually and effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems;
  - consider practical steps to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons as well as excessive accumulation of conventional arms."

99. It remains to be seen whether such aims may not prove too ambitious for it to be possible, for example, to relaunch initiatives whose original purpose was to put an end to the Israeli-Arab conflict. Since the Madrid peace conference in 1991, a working group on Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) has been set up comprising all countries involved in the conflict. However, its work is still subject to a boycott by Syria and is being hindered by differences between Egypt and Israel on how nuclear issues should be dealt with. Since Mr Netanyahu took over as head of government in Israel, the entire process has been suspended.

### 7. *The importance of public opinion*

100. No analysis of the political situation in the countries bordering on the Mediterranean can be complete without mentioning the important role played by public opinion, which does not necessarily reflect government policies or options pursued by political parties in the parliaments of those countries. During the Gulf War in particular, decisions by governments, especially of those countries belonging to the Arab League, moved way out of step with popular feeling. The governments concerned were divided as to what position to adopt with regard to Iraqi action against Kuwait. Only Egypt, Morocco and Syria took part in the multinational coalition, while Tunisia pleaded in vain for an Arab solution to the conflict. Algeria and Libya took no part in the anti-Iraq coalition, while Mauritania supported Iraq. Jordan also

provided Iraq with political support as did Yasser Arafat's PLO.

101. However in all these countries, the wider public – which felt ignored and considered that the "new international order" advocated by the then US President George Bush was unjust – stood by Iraq in condemning operation "Desert Storm", which was seen as an attempt to destroy an Arab sister-state. The public demonstrations of support for Iraq which took place, especially in Algeria, Tunisia and Mauritania, took on an anti-western or nationalist character. Hence radical Islamist movements could draw support from the feelings of the man in the street. This distrust of the West and of Europe in particular was reinforced by the conviction among a large section of the Muslim public that Europeans had little or no concern for what happened to the Bosnian Muslims during the war in former Yugoslavia.

102. Generally speaking, Arab public opinion points to the West's use of double standards and accuses it of showing shocking partiality towards Israel. The Arabs point out that the State of Israel has violated United Nations resolutions on over two hundred occasions without sanctions ever having been imposed. In contrast, it is common thinking among the Arab public that the West treats their countries with a casualness, scorn and partiality they find humiliating.

### *III. Policy options for Europe and for WEU*

103. If it is hoped to establish a coherent European policy for dealing with the Mediterranean region, several basic factors must be taken into account from the outset:

- first, there are a number of regional conflicts which, while they have varying origins and involve different countries, are constantly threatening to deteriorate and spread even further, there is always the risk they will sabotage the search for global solutions for the region as a whole.
- second, there is the fact that Europe has so far been unable to agree on a common policy towards the Middle East because European countries have different priorities when it comes to dealing with the problems in that region.



104 Consequently, neither Europe, as organised in the framework of the European Union, nor its members acting singly or as a group of states, are major players in the Middle East, where the United States has had virtually sole dominance over the situation since Russia, the Soviet Union's principal successor, all but withdrew from the scene. Conversely, it would seem that Turkey, a major factor in the management of security issues in the eastern Mediterranean, is bound to take on more importance

105 Some observers maintain that when US politicians refer to the Mediterranean basin, they think first and foremost of the eastern Mediterranean – especially the Gulf, Greece and Turkey – and the Black Sea area. Basically, the Americans appear to regard the Mediterranean as a spring-board to the Middle East and the Gulf, while European policy-makers have the western Mediterranean, especially the Maghreb countries, uppermost in their minds.<sup>7</sup> However, the European Union Barcelona Conference, to which all the Mediterranean coastal states with the exception of Libya were invited, is evidence that Europe has begun to see the Mediterranean basin as a region forming a whole and has tried to apply solutions accordingly.

106. But the crucial question is what contribution the Barcelona process, with its wide and ambitious remit spanning the entire range of political, security, economic and cultural issues, can make towards resolving the highly specific conflicts raging along the perimeter of the Mediterranean. Does the Conference's stated intention to create an area of peace and stability throughout the region mean that the European Union is preparing to take specific initiatives to develop and implement solutions for dealing with:

- the Arab-Israeli conflict,
- the problems in the Gulf,
- the question of Cyprus and disputes between Greece and Turkey,
- the effects of the conflict in the Balkans on security in the Mediterranean, and

- the other bilateral conflicts that divide certain North African countries?

107 The Conference itself offered a partial answer to this question by "stressing that this Euro-Mediterranean initiative is not intended to replace the other activities and initiatives undertaken in the interests of the peace, stability and development of the region, but that it will contribute to their success". Only one conflict, the Arab-Israeli one, is expressly mentioned in this context in the following terms: "the participants support the realisation of a just, comprehensive and lasting peace settlement in the Middle East based on the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions and principles mentioned in the letter of invitation to the Madrid Middle East Peace Conference, including the principle of land for peace, with all that this implies"

108 But could and should Europe play a more specific role in the Middle East peace process? This leads to another question should Europe play its part in or outside the Barcelona process? Until now, the United States has virtually "gone it alone" in acting as a mediator between Israel and the Arab countries, particularly in seeking to bring about a resumption of the dialogue between Israel, Syria and the Palestinian Authority, which ground to a halt after Mr Netanyahu's party won the elections in Israel. Of the European countries, only France has made any effort of substance to help continue the peace process. President Chirac's visit in October 1996 to Syria, Israel, Palestine, Jordan and Egypt was further evidence of French resolve. It also confirmed that the European Union was still very divided over its own role and the aim of any involvement. All the EU did was to issue joint declarations committing it to little action, even in the diplomatic arena.

109. There is no doubt that the United States' ambition to be the only player in the negotiations on the Middle East peace process is provoking increasing irritation and even annoyance in the Arab countries

110. Your Rapporteur was struck by the virulence of Arab leaders when denouncing this desire to dominate on the part of the United States.

111. They are appealing to Europe to act as a counterweight but note that, with the exception of

<sup>7</sup> See Mediterranean security: New challenges, new tasks, *NATO review*, May 1996.

France, Europe is extremely reticent and that the United States is intent upon keeping it out of any political initiative in the Middle East. The cavalier way in which Mr Warren Christopher sought to rebuff the efforts of the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, using every possible means at his disposal in order to keep France out of the talks aimed at solving the Lebanese crisis was not lost on Arab leaders. It took a concerted effort by Syria, Lebanon and Egypt before the Americans agreed to France co-chairing the commission given a remit to monitor the border between Israel and Lebanon. Your Rapporteur would stress that such violent denunciation of "American hegemony" is also prevalent in countries such as Egypt, despite it being – along with Israel – the main beneficiary of American aid. Your Rapporteur received the same impression of anti-American feeling during an earlier visit to the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia. These countries, which received protection from the United States during the Gulf war, nonetheless denounce American policy which considers them to be protectorates.

112. They believe that this explains the serious attacks on American installations that occurred in Dharhan, Saudi Arabia.

113. Mr Clinton's caution, for electoral reasons, in exerting pressure on Mr Netanyahu may well stoke more anti-American feeling at a time when there is no serious sign from the Likud Government that it intends to implement the Oslo Accords. Actions such as the opening of the tunnel under the al-Aqsa mosque can even be interpreted as provocation.

114. Europe therefore has an imperative duty to intervene and prevent the West as a whole from becoming the object of this rising tide of aggressiveness from an Arab world whose frustrations are beginning to come to the surface. It must beware of such sentiments provoking a ground swell of anti-western Islamism and threatening the stability of existing moderate regimes. Confirmation of a European presence is all the more necessary given that the US air strike against Iraq in September 1996, roundly condemned by Russia, may possibly have given the latter an opening to make a come-back on the Middle Eastern stage. Some Arab contacts go so far as to advocate strengthening coordination between Europe and Russia in an effort to redress the balance in the negotiations to put the Middle East peace process back on track.

115. In any event, Europe should be bolder in any move it makes in respect of the conflict. It is, undeniably, Arab countries such as Egypt and Syria, the Maghreb and the Palestinian Authority that are pressing Europe to make a more active commitment to the Middle East in order to redress the balance of the negotiations. For most of the Arab countries, the United States' role in the Middle East is connected with its interest in oil resources in the Gulf and its close ties with Israel, made closer still by the very considerable influence the various Jewish lobbies exert on American politics. The Arab countries are moreover aware of the almost total absence of any Russian policy towards the region since the break-up of the Soviet Union, while Europe's role there has been, at most, secondary. During his visit, Mr Chirac was made aware of the Arabs' desire for Europe to be more involved in the peace process. In this connection, the decision taken by the Fifteen to designate a representative is a sign to the Arab countries that Europe is not indifferent to the peace process. It is very interesting to note that Israel, for its part, regarded this EU initiative as a positive gesture.

116. However, it is necessary to keep a sense of proportion as regards the hostility of many Arab countries to what they see as the United States' desire for domination. Their appeals to Europe or even Russia contain a good deal of rhetoric and they use words to work out their frustrations. In actual fact, they are perfectly well aware that the United States is the only country that can get things moving and, in particular, exert pressure on Mr Netanyahu. Proof of this lies in the fact that, like Mr Arafat, the Israeli Prime Minister responded to President Clinton's summons on 1 October 1996 for the purpose of restoring the dialogue between the Israelis and the Palestinians under the aegis of the United States.

117. There is clearly no question of allowing Mediterranean affairs to damage the precious mutual trust that has been carefully built up between Europe and the United States as it is both indispensable for Europe's security and essential for finding a solution to the problems of the Middle East and establishing a new order of peace and stability in the region. There can be no advantage to be gained by Europe setting out to exploit the current of hostility the United States appears to have engendered in certain Arab countries, as this would be damaging to the Americans. But by drawing attention to the European mark stamped on any action, particularly in connection with the economic

development aid it brings to the region, Europe can lay the basis for genuine consultation with the United States on all the problems. Such consultation, which became difficult in the run-up to the American presidential elections because the authorities were very sensitive to the influence of certain elements of American society interested in Middle East matters, should become easier once the United States is in a better position to act in accordance with the objective it shares with Europe, namely, the establishment of a just and lasting peace on the basis of the Resolutions adopted by the United Nations, to which the various parties have subscribed.

118. But Europe must also heed Israel's legitimate security requirements. The state's boundaries, as recognised by the United Nations, make it extremely vulnerable and the weakness the PLO has displayed in the territories it is supposed to control does nothing to portray it as a reliable dialogue partner in negotiations with Israel. Europe must take account of these realities, which make it hard to see how there can be a satisfactory settlement without very clear and binding international guarantees to assure Israel that any territorial concession it makes brings it closer to peace and does not increase the threat to its security.

119. If Europe wants to play a real part in the settlement of the military aspects of the Middle East conflict, several conditions must be met. First of all, a common political resolve has to be generated, along with common thinking on the issue within the framework of the CFSP and WEU. An effort could be made, for example, to draw up a mandate for a "Mr CFSP", who would have to be a politician with irrefutable personal authority, to act as the European spokesman recognised as such by the parties to the conflict. The designation by the Fifteen of the Spanish Ambassador to Israel is a first, though far more modest, step in the right direction. Moreover, action on the part of Europe would imply securing the agreement not only of the Arab countries but also of the Palestinian Authority, which seems willing to give it, and above all of Israel, which will have major reservations. The fact that Mr Arafat held talks with the foreign affairs ministers of the Fifteen is an encouraging sign that would seem to prove that Europe is aware of the need for a harmonised policy on the Middle East crisis.

120. Furthermore, the fact that on 30 September 1996, on his way to Washington to hold talks with

Mr Netanyahu and President Clinton, Mr Arafat made a deliberate stopover in Luxembourg to meet the members of the Troika representing the European Union shows that Europe is still able to exert some influence because it is less suspect than the United States as having already taken sides in Middle Eastern affairs. This was confirmed by the joint appeal from Mr Chirac, Mr Kohl and Mr Major to Mr Netanyahu and Mr Arafat for "an immediate resumption of the negotiations at the highest level" and by the vote by France and the United Kingdom in the UN Security Council in favour of restoring the situation prior to the events of September 1996. This is an encouraging sign of more awareness on Europe's part. But even if it is now able to act as a counterweight to American influence, what is even more essential is proper cooperation between Europe and the United States over task-sharing. Initiatives taken by Europe that are uncoordinated, or even in competition with those of the United States, will not serve the cause of peace in the Middle East.

121. However, there are those who say that if Europe sought to coordinate its policy in the Middle East with that of the United States, it would automatically become totally dependent on the Americans. In response to that view it can be said that everything depends on Europe's political will. If that will exists, Europeans can work out a specific policy but if it does not, Europe will never be anything more than a political and military satellite of the United States.

122. To engender the necessary resolve, Europe must pursue the Barcelona process in the three areas discussed at the Conference, regardless of how the situation develops on the ground. If the objective of the Barcelona process is genuinely to promote peace, this could be achieved indirectly, mainly by way of economic development and through practical measures designed to foster understanding between cultures and exchanges between the civilian populations of the countries concerned. In this context dialogue between the region's three main religions must be strengthened.

123. The deadlock reached in the Arab-Israeli dialogue must not therefore prevent further development of the Barcelona process, especially in the areas referred to above. With regard to the problems that most closely affect security, a dialogue in the extremely broad framework of the Barcelona Conference must be conducted cautiously, that is to say, step by step.

124 However there are undoubtedly other forums where Europe can play a more active role in promoting Euro-Mediterranean dialogue and partnership in more selective areas. One example is the initiative taken by the Egyptian President, Mr Mubarak, in creating a Mediterranean forum which at present comprises France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Turkey from the north shore and Egypt, Malta, Morocco and Tunisia from the south shore. At the forum's third ministerial meeting held at Ravello on 9-10 May 1996, the participants reaffirmed their determination that it should become an informal framework for dialogue between the countries of the Mediterranean basin on matters of common interest.

125. The Egyptians in particular have expressed their resolve to galvanise this forum for dialogue and to include security matters in its agenda. The composition of the grouping is interesting, but does not take in the main countries involved in the Israeli-Arab conflict and its purpose in relation to the more wide-ranging Barcelona process is unclear. Given that all the countries in the forum are also involved in the Barcelona process, it could be regarded as a subgroup that might usefully deal with a number of particularly sensitive topics of a more general nature, without necessarily becoming embroiled in disputes connected with conflicts in the region.

126. It might, for instance, be an appropriate place to deal with such subjects as co-existence of the various civilisations and cultures living cheek by jowl around the Mediterranean, the problems of political Islamism and the possibility of strengthening the dialogue between Christianity, Islam and Judaism with a view to closer ties between countries and peoples. Nevertheless, Europeans must make clear in these various discussion forums that their aim is to listen to and talk with their non-European Mediterranean partners but without any intention of imposing their ideas on them.

127. In the sphere of security and defence matters, it is widely acknowledged that Europe is not under any military threat from the opposite shore of the Mediterranean and will not be in the near future. However the risk of proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of conveyance has been identified as a major danger to *all* the countries in the region. This subject is one of the topics to be discussed in the dialogue WEU has begun with certain North African countries.

128. It would appear however that it is primarily the Arab countries that want a more structured dialogue with Europe on security matters as they themselves feel more directly threatened by regional conflicts than do Europeans. However, they fail to see the point of the offer of a stability pact as envisaged by the Barcelona Conference. Moreover, the Egyptians clearly told your Rapporteur that the dialogue established in Brussels between the WEU Secretariat-General and certain non-European countries was of no interest. Your Rapporteur received similar impressions from his Turkish contacts who told him they were convinced that the will to make further progress in this area was lacking in the Council.

129. A major shortcoming in this dialogue would appear to be the lack of consensus between the European Union and WEU over a division of their various responsibilities in relation to Mediterranean developments. Most of the subjects mentioned in the Barcelona Declaration with a view to creating a Euro-Mediterranean political and security partnership have already been raised in the dialogue initiated by WEU with Egypt, Israel and the Maghreb countries. Yet WEU was not invited to the Barcelona Conference. The question that now arises is whether the European Union is resolved to give WEU a mandate to take charge of the security dimension for which Article J4 of the Maastricht Treaty makes provision.

130. This question takes on even more significance given that the activities of WEU's Mediterranean Group have been mothballed since the Barcelona Conference. If the total exclusion of WEU from security problems in the Mediterranean is to be avoided, a request must be made for the Organisation to be asked to submit proposals at the next ministerial meeting, to be held in April 1997 in the framework of the Conference follow-up. The alternative approach, i.e. WEU developing proposals to submit to the Conference itself, does not seem to have found favour with a majority within the Council.

131. Although most of the items on the agenda of the follow-up to the Barcelona Conference fall more properly within the remit of the European Union and the CFSP, there are nevertheless a fair number of questions that could provide material for a much more substantial and structured dialogue between WEU and the non-European Mediterranean countries than is presently the case.

132. WEU should, for example, seriously consider the extent to which it might use its good offices to resuscitate the activities of the Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group (ACRS), which has continued, since the Madrid peace conference, to bring together the countries involved in the conflict in the Middle East. The group, boycotted by Syria from the outset, has reached a stalemate since the recent change of government in Israel.

133. The most sensitive issues in these negotiations are undoubtedly Israel's nuclear capability and the conditions under which that country would be prepared to accede to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, but the group discusses many topics to which WEU, with its experience, could make a contribution, namely:

- exchange of military information
- notification of future military activity
- military contacts and visits
- the creation of Regional Security Centres/Conflict Prevention Centres
- maritime confidence-building measures
- communications

134. It should also be noted that Egypt has made various proposals such as joint military exercises, assistance in the event of military accidents and, most importantly, a major mine clearance programme in areas of Egypt still strewn with huge quantities of mines from the second world war.

135. However among all the other tasks, the most important one for WEU as far as the countries of the Middle East and North Africa are concerned is that it should provide detailed, constantly updated information on the reasons for establishing forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU) – such as Eurofor and Euromarfor, formed by France, Italy, Spain and Portugal in the framework of WEU – which continue to be a source of concern to the countries in the south. If these forces are to carry out Petersberg-type missions (humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping and peace-enforcement missions, prevention of armed conflict, etc.) without excluding military operations under Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty, the southern

countries may well speculate as to whether such missions are in anticipation of possible conflict between North and South or, on the contrary, whether they too could benefit from the assistance of these forces should the need arise, and even take part in their activities.

136. All these uncertainties tend to distract attention from the essential question mark hanging over the role WEU and Europe wish to and should play in the Mediterranean region. Even after the Barcelona Declaration, there is no clear answer to the question of whether Europe should give priority to the Mediterranean. One of the reasons for this stems from differing views within the European Union on the geographic priorities to be assigned when it comes to working out future membership of the Union. Should it concern itself primarily with its enlargement to the east or should it also concentrate on the Euro-Mediterranean partnership? In this context, the increasing importance Turkey will assume in Europe's Mediterranean policy over the coming decades must not be overlooked. Turkey is becoming increasingly frustrated by the European Union's refusal to admit it as a member state and WEU's decision not to invite it to become a full member and participate in Eurofor and Euromarfor. Maintaining this attitude towards Ankara could have damaging repercussions for the prospects for a settlement of the Cyprus problem and the disputes outstanding between Turkey and Greece. Even more worryingly, it could strengthen the cause of Turkish Islamist movements, which want to distance Turkey from Europe and the West.

137. The non-aligned Mediterranean countries also have doubts about NATO's future role in the region and especially about its future political intentions in the Mediterranean basin, the deployment of its forces and the reorganisation of its command structures. What implications does the CJTF concept have for the Mediterranean? According to the May 1996 issue of the *NATO review*:

"NATO's current command structure is largely a function of the cold war and remains too heavily oriented toward the Central Front. However, many of the main security threats which the Alliance will face in the future are likely to be on Europe's periphery, both in the East and the South, as

well as beyond Europe's borders NATO's command structure needs to be reorganised to better deal with these threats

This reorganisation should include a new look at AFSOUTH, NATO's principal subordinate command in the Mediterranean. Since the end of the cold war the responsibilities of the commander of AFSOUTH have significantly expanded and become more complex. Today, he spends about 90 per cent of his time worrying about Bosnia. He also has an area of strategic interest that covers nearly the entire Mediterranean up into the Caucasus. If the Alliance is going to be able to address effectively the security challenges in the Mediterranean region, AFSOUTH's resources and capabilities must be updated. Alternatively, the Alliance could divide up the Mediterranean region into two separate subordinate commands - one for the western Mediterranean and the other for the eastern Mediterranean<sup>8</sup>

Although these are not official Alliance proposals, the language in which they are couched may cause concern among the southern countries unless the Alliance at the same time makes clearer what its political role is to be in the 21st century.

138 NATO could for example give more active consideration than it has to date to ways in which it could mediate with a view to settling various aspects of the disputes between Greece and Turkey, possibly under the aegis of a "contact group", similar to that provided for in the Dayton Accords. This might consist of the United States, Greece, Turkey, Cyprus and a small number of Alliance members, particularly those that guaranteed the agreements giving Cyprus independence. Organisation under NATO auspices of a conference of this small group would have the advantage of bringing all the participants together on an equal footing within an Alliance where they shared the same values.

139 It is clear that the full membership of Greece in the European Union and in WEU, to which Turkey has been admitted as an "associate member" only, disqualifies both organisations from acting as mediators in disputes between Greece and Turkey

8 See Mediterranean security: New challenges, new tasks, *NATO review*, May 1996.

and also motivates Turkey to request full membership and threaten reprisals in areas in which they are feasible. A specific example in which this might apply would be if the Republic of Cyprus, a second Greek state, were to join the European Union, WEU or both. Turning a deaf ear to Turkish protests would only serve to accentuate the Turkish population's impression that it is being rejected by the West and by Europe, which could have extremely serious and damaging repercussions. It is for this reason that your Rapporteur considers it essential for NATO, and any other organisation in which Greece and Turkey are represented on an equal footing, to apply pressure on both countries so as to oblige them to embark on a serious search for a settlement to their bilateral problems - multilateral in the case of Cyprus - on the basis of application of the existing treaties. Such a settlement has become urgent now that the differences between Greece and Turkey may well prevent the establishment of an order of peace and security in the Mediterranean, and even development of the cooperation that is needed between NATO, WEU and the European Union.

140 As regards the OSCE's Mediterranean role, it should be remembered that this organisation, which now has over 53 members and covers a geographic area stretching from San Francisco to Vladivostok, was designed to manage East-West conflict, totally different in nature to the problems arising in the Mediterranean basin. Moreover, given the very large number of non-Mediterranean countries, such as Russia, which might use the OSCE as a way of interfering in the affairs of the region, it is hard to see how that organisation could really help to resolve difficulties in the Mediterranean. The revival of a regional initiative, such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) - an idea floated by Spain and Italy in 1990 - might, however, be considered. Nevertheless, the aim of that particular project was not conflict settlement but rather the creation of a forum where agreement could be reached on general principles and rules to be followed in the event of crisis. This initiative appears to have been largely superseded by the Barcelona process.

#### IV. Conclusions

##### 1. The conditions for a Mediterranean policy

141 It is perhaps premature to draw firm conclusions at this stage of the study, if only

because further information on certain points is still lacking. However, the following observations are in order.

- although the stagnation of the Middle East peace process and uncertainties over developments in the situation in the Gulf and along the borders of Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran dominate the concerns of those responsible for peace and security in the region, the risk of further military confrontation in this area does not appear to be imminent. On the other hand, a wave of violence and terrorism, triggered by radical movements such as Hamas, may be unleashed in the occupied territories. The danger of such violence spreading to other areas, such as Saudi Arabia or even Jordan, cannot be ruled out

142. It is too early to say whether the success of the process initiated by the European Union with the Barcelona Conference hinges on developments in the situation in the Middle East and in particular on the outcome of the peace process. This apart, the Barcelona Conference offers too general and diverse a framework to be able to provide rapid solutions to the conflicts and crises in various parts of the Mediterranean basin

143. However, many Arab countries are most anxious for Europe to play a major role in handling the Arab-Israeli conflict and restoring balance in the negotiations, which are marked by far too much domination by the United States. A prerequisite for this is agreement among the European countries on a common policy towards the region. No such agreement has been achieved to date. However, certain signs, such as the hearing of Mr Yasser Arafat on 30 September 1996 by the ministers forming the EU Troika, are encouraging. Even though the Arab countries are waiting for Europe to take a firmer stance, Europeans must not be under any illusion that this might mean they want the United States excluded from a settlement to the conflict altogether. Whatever their feelings towards Washington, they know full well that only the United States can influence Israeli policy.

144. The differences between Europe and the United States over the policies to be pursued in

Palestine and in relation to Iraq and also over ways of combating state terrorism, increasingly threaten to disrupt the entire Euro-American security policy edifice. When Europe eventually manages to define a common policy, close cooperation between the European countries and the United States would be highly desirable and profitable.

145. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of conveyance, destined for non-European Mediterranean countries, continues to be a danger, first and foremost for the countries involved in conflicts in the region, but there is nothing to suggest that there is any military threat to Europe from the countries on the southern shore of the Mediterranean.

146. The greatest challenges for the future of Euro-Mediterranean relations are not therefore of a military nature. They lie mainly in

- differences in economic development – a proper partnership can only be established between countries whose economies are geared to reach the same level. This is true of the problems posed by the entry of eastern European states to the European Union and is even more relevant in the case of the partnership with the countries along the southern shore of the Mediterranean especially since the objective set by the Barcelona Conference is to establish a free-trade area between the countries to the north and south of the Mediterranean by 2010. At France's insistence, substantial funding (4.7 million ecus, or 6 million dollars, for the period 1995-99) was earmarked by the Cannes summit meeting of the European Council to help the southern Mediterranean countries improve their economies. It is essential for this venture to succeed, otherwise the strongest economies will dominate those of the weakest countries. The European Union has never before agreed to make such a huge financial investment outside its own area;
- the development of cultural and social ties to promote better understanding

between two civilisations, one of which – in the south – too often feels misunderstood, humiliated and even scorned. It is important to show that Europe respects and seeks to understand Islamic civilisation provided the latter rejects the dark forces working against the West from within Islam and seeking to destabilise it through acts of terrorism:

- a permanent dialogue showing that Europe long ago discarded the sombre remnants of imperialism and that it is not seeking to impose solutions inspired by its own systems on its neighbours in the south;
- on the economic front, more care must be taken not to impose an economic model with a worldwide perspective that does not take account of local situations in such countries. They can only adapt gradually to a market economy and will wish to maintain state control in some sectors,
- the search for a charter for stability, where the same cautious approach is necessary. Your Rapporteur was struck by the fact that because it is advocating a stability pact, Europe is suspected of wanting to exercise some sort of tight control over the region as a whole. Only a modest European approach will bring success and would seem to be the most appropriate course of action in a first phase that could consist of
  - confidence-building and transparency measures whose application would be voluntary,
  - the notification of manoeuvres, and
  - an exchange of information among military staff.

147. At this stage it is not possible to establish a collective security system. To begin with, countries in the south involved in a dispute should simply have the option of recourse to Europe. This cautious approach will develop into something more substantial as confidence is gradually built up.

## 2. *An Arab policy for Europe*

148. A concerted European policy towards the Arab world must be one of the essential ingredients making for stability in the Mediterranean.

149. First principle: a dialogue must be conducted on the basis of understanding and esteem among equal partners. This dialogue must develop in mutual appreciation of what we are and what gives us our identity. Our respect for human rights and universal values of justice, tolerance and liberty, coupled with our desire to see them applied to women too, must not prevent us from conceding that these values many be given expression in different ways through our respective cultures and traditions.

150. Second principle: we uphold the right of a people to freely determine its destiny, assert its independence and exercise its right to security. This essential principle must apply to all peoples without exception. Some members of the Committee stressed that the notion of a people was not very clear and that many factions of the Mediterranean population as a whole were not averse to various forms of irredentism, not all of which commanded the same respect. In this connection, alongside the Kurds and the western Saharan people, they mentioned Gibraltar, Corsica and claims concerning Padenia. In your Rapporteur's opinion, the democratic practices of western Europe leave room for the expression of regionalist claims and in some cases even allow them to create too much of a stir. Freedom of expression and the exercise of the right to vote fully sanction the expression of popular feeling and produce a majority in favour of existing local and regional state institutions. If states agree to give some satisfaction to minority points of view, particularly where these concern economic, linguistic and cultural areas, and where this is compatible with the maintenance of national unity and public order, they have the right – and even the duty – to quell any recourse to violence.

151. Besides this, every state's right to security obviously applies to the state of Israel and this makes it impossible not to draw a parallel between the Palestinians' right to independence and security guarantees for Israel, as the international community has unceasingly affirmed since the adoption, in 1967, of United Nations Resolution 242, which establishes a link



between the Palestinians' right to "self-determination" and the devolution of "secure and recognised boundaries" for the state of Israel. The French President, Mr Chirac, and the Italian Prime Minister, Mr Prodi, spelt out this message yet again when they visited the Middle East in October 1996.

152. Third principle: we support the Arab peoples' aspirations to solidarity and unity. As in Europe, independence and closer union can co-exist, which implies that Europe should support both the Arab League and the regional groups that are taking shape in the region stretching from the Maghreb to the Mashreq.

153. Fourth principle: we support the Arab world's aspirations to openness and peace. We stand with all those who fight extremism, fanaticism and the forces of hate, wherever they erupt in the world. No-one is safe from them as the bloody tragedies in both the Arab and European countries have shown.

154. It is necessary first to take stock of our mutual interests. The European Union is the Arab world's foremost trading partner and the second most important source of foreign investment. In addition, Europe is its largest donor and the biggest region for Arab foreign investments. It can do much more much better. We must be ambitious and fully exploit our complementary assets.

155. Ambitions must not be confined to the economic sphere. Relations must not be ordinary or banal. Any tendency to shy away and any instinctive mistrust must be overcome. The Arab and European countries must understand that they have common interests and a common destiny.

156. Alongside what is already an intricate network of cultural and economic relations, more emphasis needs to be given to a grand political design. In the embryonic multi-polar world that is taking shape, the development of powerful political links between the European and Arab poles can be a source of common strength and can create a balance in the relations that have been forged with the world's other major communities.

157. The momentum for peace is irreversible. But it can be slowed down and beset by obstacles

thrown down by extremists of all shades, as recent tragedies show only too well. We must pool our efforts, as we did in response to the impetus given by President Mubarak at Sharm-el-Sheikh, to ensure that this peace to which all the peoples of the region aspire moves forward, and to defeat terrorism.

158. At this critical juncture, Europe must shoulder its responsibilities. It is already doing this in economic terms by supporting the Palestinian people as part of a huge financial package to help the region as a whole, representing almost half the total amount of aid it receives.

159. However, Europe cannot just be a provider of funds. More than it has done in the past, it must make a political contribution to a peace settlement and must also be a co-sponsor in the process. In this respect, the decision by the Fifteen to designate a representative in the person of the Spanish Ambassador to Israel is to be welcomed. It was given a favourable reception by Israel, which did no more than express the hope that Mr Martino would coordinate his task with all the parties involved, particularly Israel. The European Union played a crucial role in the multilateral negotiations on the preparation and supervision of the Palestinian elections, which were a major success for democracy. But it must go even further and give fresh impetus to the peace process, taking account of everybody's interests and the aspirations to security which are shared by one and all. The commitments that have already been entered into must be honoured and the agreed timetable kept to. The peace process cannot stop at the half-way stage. All the parties involved must reach a just and balanced agreement on the final status of the Palestinian territories, on the basis of the principle of land for peace. This agreement should also cover the most difficult issues such as Jerusalem, the situation of refugees and the future of the settlements. There will be no lasting peace unless the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and its legitimate aspirations to self-government are respected.

160. Finally, a lasting peace must be based on the premise that Israel can live in security. Only progress towards recognition of a Palestinian identity will wipe out once and for all terrorist threats nurtured by isolation, bitterness and frustration. In addition to the necessary fight

against terrorism, only mutual recognition and gradual confidence-building can instil a climate of security.

161 In the field of security proper, Europe should fully support President Mubarak's proposal to establish a zone free from weapons of mass destruction. This plan will naturally have to include control procedures. It could be accompanied by confidence-building measures and procedures for resolving conflicts.

162 But peace in the Middle East must also include setting up an economic community. An integrated economic area needs to be built up step by step, following the example of Europe after the war. In this respect Europe can usefully share its experience and must also help by providing assistance, capital and technological know-how.

163. The objective should be to create a zone of prosperity as a result of the free movement of goods and persons. Such a zone, which will help close gaps in development, can only be built gradually and the project must be carried out with a great deal of pragmatism. This is why, as a first step, the role of the working group for regional economic development should be strengthened.

164 Other regional projects should also materialise so that the economic area gradually becomes a coherent and unified entity. Following the Casablanca and Amman summits, the economic conference of Middle Eastern and North African countries, to be held in Cairo towards the end of the year, will mark a further step in the right direction.

165. The WEU Assembly should now submit a proposal bearing on an extremely sensitive area, that of water. From a source of conflict, water could turn out to be a factor for cooperation. The fight for land must on no account become a battle over water. This is why the countries concerned should be asked to draw up a regional charter defining agreed measures for the joint management of water supplies and why a proposal should be made for the creation in the Middle East of an international institute for the management and development of water resources.

166. Arabs, Israelis and Europeans must combine their skills to define and carry out together other projects, in areas such as agronomic research and tourism for example, that will gradually move towards regional

integration and bring about a greater degree of harmony in the hearts and minds of all those involved.

167. Contrary to what is often said, the Mediterranean is a new idea in politics. Since the collapse of the Roman Empire, the region has been the focus of military and commercial rivalry. Europe's ambition now is to turn a page in political terms and make this one of the European Union's fundamental goals. After destroying a wall in eastern Europe, Europe must now build a bridge in the south. This is why it had no hesitation in supporting the Egyptian initiative to create a "Mediterranean forum". It also explains why it launched the idea of the Euro-Mediterranean Conference, held in Barcelona in November 1995.

168. The ground has now been cleared for construction work on the Mediterranean to begin. Europe's ambition must be to build a new partnership around a sea that will once again fulfil its purpose as a focal point where people can meet, exchange views and live in peace with one another. The great civilisations, which have the Mediterranean as their cradle, must once again learn to know and understand each other.

169 This Euro-Mediterranean area as described does not yet exist – it has to be built. Its construction will require a great deal of resolve and tenacity from all the parties involved – states, businesses and citizens alike. The stakes are huge as they hold the key to future peace, stability, freedom and prosperity on both shores of the Mediterranean. The objective is clear: to reduce divisions, misunderstandings and differences – whether they be demographic, economic, cultural or political – between the states and populations in the region.

170. Last June in Cannes, the European Union set aside the funding necessary to achieve this objective: almost 5 million ecus over 5 years, which could be increased twofold through loans from the European Investment Bank and supplemented by bilateral contributions from each EU member state. This is an indication of the effort to be made between now and the end of the century. The distinctive feature in the Union's approach to the problem is to deal head on with all the aspects of a partnership that will be a valuable complement to the bilateral relations uniting our countries.

171. With the political aspect its main feature, this partnership is to define a common area of peace. By making a proposal at Barcelona for a Euro-Mediterranean stability pact to be established on a voluntary basis, Europe has shown that it wishes to bring states that observe common rules closer together. Such states must agree among themselves on confidence-building measures and be determined to pursue them in their good-neighbourly relations and through the peaceful settlement of disputes. Security in the Mediterranean depends first and foremost on the internal stability of the states in the region and on their ability to engage in preventive diplomacy, among other measures.

172. To mark the importance of this partnership, the next conference on the Mediterranean should be held at the level of heads of state or government. As a primarily political, but also of course an economic grouping, the Euro-Mediterranean partnership should in due course see the emergence of a zone of shared prosperity.

173. Taking bilateral association agreements a step further, the Euro-Mediterranean area must eventually lead to the creation of a free-trade zone, thus complementing the process of open regionalism that is developing throughout the world. This process can temper the harsh effects of the phenomenon of run-away globalisation that is a mark of the times.

174. An overall economic approach of this sort must be accompanied by many specific partnership projects in the fields of industry and finance, environmental protection and the management of resources.

175. Last but not least there is the cultural dimension of the partnership, which should be given to promoting dialogue between peoples, and primarily among young people. Cooperation between the major universities north and south of the Mediterranean must be developed and courses harmonised so as to increase possibilities for student exchanges. Teaching staff should meet to write course books together, particularly in the case of history, and there should be an increase in the number of joint audiovisual projects.

176. Building peace in the Middle East, consolidating the unity of the Arab world and its

ties, creating a genuine Euro-Mediterranean partnership – these are ambitions within our reach, projects representing a wealth of promise and shared hopes

### 3. *A cautious approach*

177. The implications of Europe's desire, as expressed in Barcelona, to play a role in the establishment of stability in the Mediterranean and the settlement of conflicts are that it is now looking for mutual commitments that will progressively be put into effect

The first of these is:

- to adopt confidence-building and transparency measures whose application would be voluntary

178. It would also be desirable to take as an example what has already been done in Europe in this connection, particularly as regards.

- the notification of manoeuvres, and
- an exchange of information among military staff.

179. This procedure is complicated by the fact that issues are discussed first by the Fifteen and then by the Twelve. The EU member states have not yet agreed on a joint position either at 15 or at 12.

180. In practice, a series of sufficiently credible measures will have to be worked out as a very first step towards commitments on stability. This implies that to begin with, Europe's approach should be a modest one, even though its ultimate objective is to go much further.

181. It will take time to set up a collective security system. At this stage, the best that can be done is to offer those southern countries involved in a dispute the option of recourse to Europe.

182. This cautious approach will develop into something more substantial as confidence is gradually built up. For the time being, Europe must prove to the Arab countries that they can rely on its determination to shoulder its responsibilities as regards stability in the Mediterranean, for if it fails to do so, the United States will take on the task alone.

## APPENDIX I

*Joint letter from the President of the French Republic,  
Mr Jacques Chirac, the German Chancellor, Mr Helmut Kohl, and  
the British Prime Minister, Mr John Major,  
to the President of the Palestinian Authority, Mr Yasser Arafat*

*(Paris, Bonn, London, 27 September 1996)*

Mr President,

As you know, only this week we received the Prime Minister of the State of Israel, Mr Benjamin Netanyahu, in order to examine with him the prospects for the Middle East peace process. He informed us of his wish to comply with the undertakings signed and to continue the talks with the Palestinian authorities

We have since expressed our grave concern at the tragic events which have just unfolded in the Palestinian territories and which could jeopardise the Middle East peace process

We wish, by way of this joint formal appeal, to encourage you to continue to take all measures necessary to restore calm. We are making the same emphatic appeal to the Prime Minister of the State of Israel.

We consider that in the current circumstances both sides must show moderation and assume their responsibilities in full

We strongly wish to see an immediate resumption of negotiations at the highest level between you and Mr Benjamin Netanyahu, on the basis of terms agreed by the two sides. Such negotiations would provide an opportunity to examine all the outstanding issues, and should enable the agreements signed to be implemented in full with a view to agreement being reached on the final status of the Palestinian territories.

This appears to us to be the only approach capable of bringing lasting calm back to the territories and of ensuring the safety of all the peoples in the region

We know that your commitment to the continuation of the peace process will lead you to do all that you can to ensure that common sense and reason prevail.

Please accept, Mr President, the expression of our highest consideration

## APPENDIX II

*Joint letter from the President of the French Republic,  
Mr Jacques Chirac, the German Chancellor, Mr Helmut Kohl, and  
the British Prime Minister, Mr John Major,  
to the Israeli Prime Minister, Mr Benjamin Netanyahu*

*(Paris, Bonn, London, 27 September 1996)*

Dear Prime Minister,

We were pleased to receive you this week and to reemphasise our friendship towards the State of Israel as well as to examine with you the prospects for the peace process. You informed us of your concern to respect the undertakings agreed and to pursue talks with the Palestinian authorities. We have since expressed our grave concern at the serious events which have just occurred in the autonomous territories and which risk endangering the Middle East peace process.

Following on from our conversations with you, we wish to make a joint and formal appeal to you to take the necessary steps to restore calm. We welcome the announcement of the decision to close the tunnel under the Holy City and wish other measures to be taken in the same spirit.

We consider that everyone involved should show moderation and carry out their responsibilities.

We strongly wish to see an immediate resumption of the negotiations at the highest level between yourself and Mr Yasser Arafat, on the basis of terms agreed by the two sides. We are making the same appeal to the President of the Palestinian Authority. Such negotiations would provide the opportunity to examine all the outstanding issues. They should enable the signed agreements to be implemented in full, in preparation for an agreement on the final status of the Palestinian territories.

We regard this as the only way of restoring lasting peace in the territories and guaranteeing Israel's security.

We are counting on your authority and your vision as a statesman to ensure that wisdom and peace prevail, for the sake of all the peoples in the region.

Please accept, Prime Minister, the assurance of our highest consideration

## APPENDIX III

*Morocco's approach to security and defence in the Mediterranean*

*Briefing given by Divisional General Abdelhak El Kadiri  
of the Permanent Secretariat  
of the Higher National Defence Council  
on 29 October 1996*

Morocco has always, and more especially so since the 1980s, been a strong advocate of a regional cooperation and development area being established in the Mediterranean and warmly welcomed the success of the Barcelona Conference which, after a number of initiatives and several false starts, was held on 27 and 28 November 1995. There, for the first time it was possible to grasp the full complexity of Euro-Mediterranean issues, with particular note being taken of economic and social imbalances and the need to promote the process of regional integration through new decentralised cooperation arrangements, and with pride of place being given to the concept of partnership

This would be a partnership rooted in the following three principles:

- a common area where peace and stability would prevail;
- an area of shared prosperity;
- development of human resources and understanding between cultures

However, the WEU Assembly's very considerable interest in the problems of our region predates the Barcelona Conference and the WEU Mediterranean Group is engaged in dialogue with Mediterranean countries that are not members of the Organisation, on security and defence matters in which there is common interest. We feel that such dialogue is greatly to be welcomed for the contribution it makes to regional security and better mutual understanding, supplementing and enhancing similar activities taking place in other institutional frameworks. It also provides a vehicle for the useful contribution WEU and its member countries, as the defence component of the European Union, can make to a new approach to European and Mediterranean security issues

*I. The common requirement for a security policy*

Morocco considers that peace, stability and security in the Mediterranean region should be a strategic aim, a common good to be promoted and strengthened. It is of little use, in my view, to expect to develop a partnership between our two opposite Mediterranean shores unless the principles of peace and stability are the cornerstones of any new regional identity.

The Kingdom of Morocco, under the leadership of His Majesty King Hassan II, has, as you are aware, long made this philosophy and method of approach its own. As a country which seeks to emulate the "golden mean", Morocco believes wholeheartedly in the virtues of negotiation and consultation and, by the same token, has always been an advocate of close and regular political dialogue among the states along the shores of the Mediterranean and, more generally, among the Euro-Mediterranean countries

Such dialogue must be based on the principles and precepts of international law, and implies commitment to tenets such as:

- compliance with the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
- consolidation and stability of a state under the law practising democracy in a freely chosen economic and socio-political system,
- respect for human rights and basic liberties,

- acceptance of the sovereign equality of states;
- respect for the independence and territorial integrity of states;
- no direct or indirect interference in the internal affairs of other states,
- peaceful settlement of disputes and abnegation of the threat or use of force

Europe can naturally contribute a great deal in these areas. After a string of earlier attempts – for example the Five plus Five dialogue and the Mediterranean Forum – fragmented approaches to Mediterranean security have finally given way to a global initiative on this issue within the boundaries of our region. A framework and a formula along the same lines of thinking as for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM), drawing on the methods and machinery employed by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) but adapting them to the particular features and requirements of the Mediterranean, are not to be rejected out of hand. They could point the way ahead or at the very least help concentrate initiatives in this area.

Seen in this light, WEU – which you all represent – can provide a useful framework for discussions and suggestions as part of the thought-sharing process.

As you are aware, it was after the Petersberg meeting in June 1992 that contacts were established with Morocco and three other Maghreb countries (Mauritania, Algeria and Tunisia). The process was extended to Egypt after the WEU Ministers' Kirchberg Declaration on 9 May 1994.

As you also know, the resulting dialogue has dealt with security issues of common concern, on the basis of what have become known as the seven Petersberg principles: dialogue, transparency, confidence, conflict prevention, operational adequacy, peaceful settlement of disputes and non-proliferation of armaments. Through its positions, commitments and actions, the Kingdom of Morocco has demonstrated that it fully subscribes to all these principles.

In this connection we noted with interest the decision taken by the WEU Council of Ministers on 15 May 1995 to create two intervention forces - one land-based (Eurofor) and the other sea-based (Euromarfor) – thus attesting to a new perception of security problems in the Mediterranean. However WEU must not allow itself to fall prey to the suspicions of those who frequently refer to the "threat from the south".

It would be to delude oneself completely to suppose that peace and security in the Mediterranean can be maintained simply by bringing some kind of policeman into the region. What the Mediterranean needs to do is to set up a conflict-prevention and crisis-management system, especially as these are areas where existing regional systems (UMA and the Arab League) have shown little sign of being effective, at any rate up to now.

But Morocco's approach to security cannot be confined solely to the above aspects. It also takes on board other security aspects connected with crimes such as smuggling, drug trafficking, the various forms of traffic in human labour, terrorism etc. As an observer member of the "K4" (formerly the Trevi Group) the Kingdom of Morocco has on many occasions set out its strategy in the struggle against narcotics. It hopes for more solidarity and cooperation from Europe in exterminating such evils and helping meet the conditions required for agricultural conversion in the Rif district. In the fight against terrorism, Morocco's efforts to marshal its forces to combat the illegal arms trade, organised crime, terrorist intrigue and the threat of destabilisation through Islamist extremism and violence are unremitting. The situation in Algeria is inevitably a cause of concern to us because of possible links with gangs outside the country, especially in Europe. Here again, there is patently a need for close Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, since, in view of the international character of such networks, it is the only way for us to identify, define and resolve the security problems of the region. Moreover, this is also the intention behind the ongoing dialogue with the Atlantic Alliance that Morocco initiated early in 1995, taking care to ensure that discussions are not confined to fears about

fundamentalism and armaments proliferation in the region (as former NATO Secretary-General Willy Claes originally wanted) but also deal with military and security issues of common concern.

## *II. Morocco's defence policy*

Morocco's defence policy flows logically from its national security doctrine, its aim being to defend the territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of the Kingdom. This task also implies the defence of the country's most hallowed institutions. Ever since Parliament was established, there has been a very wide consensus throughout the nation as to the role and function of the Royal armed forces. Thus national defence budgets have invariably been adopted unanimously by the House of Representatives. Similarly, the national political parties – whether of the majority or the opposition – have been unremitting advocates of strengthening the nation's military potential to counter any risk of destabilisation and ward off deviationist subversion fomented abroad against Morocco's recently recovered Saharan provinces. Consolidating its territorial integrity is one of Morocco's major concerns.

You, as distinguished members of the Assembly of WEU, do not need me to remind you that for the last thirty years or so Morocco has had to cope with threats, tension, aggression even, from neighbouring countries pursuing covert action calculated to destabilise the region, or with an eye to supremacy. However due to the strength of the bond between His Majesty, King Hassan II and his people, the loyalty of the Royal armed forces which are held in a constant state of readiness and also to the patriotism of the Moroccan people, the country has been able, and has had the wherewithal, to safeguard its territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence.

Strengthening our military capability as required has thus been one of our national priorities and places a heavy burden on the country's finances. Building a climate of confidence and security in the region is bound to put an end to an arms race which is our major concern in connection with the Euro-Mediterranean area.

Stemming directly from the Barcelona Declaration and the Palma Declaration, resulting from the CSCE in September 1990, a number of proposals have been put forward to give form and content to the Mediterranean Security Basket. At its meeting on 8 April 1991, the European Council referred to this in positive and unambiguous terms.

Arrangements for regional cooperation in defence matters cannot be drawn up until the underlying causes of insecurity have been effectively dealt with. This can be achieved only by agreeing at the same time to curtail the more destabilising effects of military competition.

In this connection Morocco attaches great weight to the development and interpretation of European security concepts and especially to WEU's perception of external threats from the southern Mediterranean.

Bilateral military cooperation agreements have been concluded with most western European countries. In substance, they deal with aspects of a process Morocco is anxious to develop in specific fields of action: officer training, multiservice and joint exercises, technical assistance and various forms of military exchange with France, Italy, Spain and Portugal (with reference to existing defence agreements).

To the fullest extent that such cooperation permits, Morocco spares no effort to meet the requirements of its European partners' armed forces – both with regard to intelligence and certain operational facilities.

An operational brigade-size military force, held in constant readiness for action outside the country in the framework of humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping and security enforcement tasks, and trained to be interoperable, has been established by His Majesty the King, Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Armed Forces, for action beyond the country's borders, whenever required, under the auspices of either the UN (Zaire, Somalia or the Gulf) or NATO (Bosnia), in accordance with the spirit and the letter of the 1996 Constitution, and in particular the Preamble thereto, in which Morocco reaffirms its determination to work to maintain peace and security throughout the world.



Morocco, for its part, attaches great weight to this policy, which seeks to promote a climate of confidence and security in the Mediterranean area.

In this same perspective, Morocco can but welcome with interest any proposal designed to secure arms control, thus subordinating purely military considerations to a wider policy directed towards a search for peace in a framework of security and confidence.

Similarly, Morocco has supported measures taken in international bodies to prevent the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons by subscribing unreservedly to all relevant agreements.

We regard ourselves as bound by a commitment of solidarity to achieve peace, cooperation, stability and security in our region. To this end, we have unremittingly pressed for consensus in order to guarantee the conditions under which security, stability, cooperation and development between the two shores of the Mediterranean can be safeguarded. Partnership and Euro-Mediterranean joint development are inseparable from and complementary to political and military detente.

The idea of a Mediterranean stability pact is a compelling one. It has its attractions for us and yet requires profound thought and more detailed study in view of its many political consequences, but it could also have the advantage of encouraging a fresh approach to security and defence problems in the region.

