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The NATO Summit and its implications for Europe

REPORT

submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee
by Mr Cox, Rapporteur

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¹ Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

² *Members of the Committee.* Mr De Decker (Chairman); MM Zierer, Schloten (Vice-Chairmen); MM Baumel, Beaufays, Blaauw. Mrs Calleja (Alternate: Martínez), MM Cioni, Contestabile (Alternate: Aleffi), MM Cox, Davis, Dhaille, Díaz de Mera (Alternate: López Henares), MM Dreyfus-Schmidt, Goulet, Imer (Alternate: Kolb), MM Leers, Lemoine, Mrs Lentz-Cornette, MM Maginas, Mardones Sevilla, Medeiros Ferreira, Micheloyiannis (Alternate: Pottakis), MM Mota Amaral, Neumann (Alternate: Behrendt), MM Pereira Coelho, Polenta, Robles Fraga, Lord Russell-Johnston (Alternate: Colvin), MM Selva, Ms Shipley, MM Siebert, Speroni, Valk, Valkeniers, Verivakis, Wilshire.

Associate member: Mr Godal.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

3. Framework agreement for the transfer of NATO assets to WEU
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Draft Recommendation
on the NATO Summit and its implications for Europe

The Assembly,

- (i) Hoping the Washington Summit will be a success, thanks to the adoption of a new Strategic Concept, tailored to meet the requirements of the changing situation and making possible the enhancement and expansion of the Atlantic Alliance as a key element of Europe's security;
- (ii) Stressing the fundamental consequences of the decisions on the new Strategic Concept to be taken at this summit for the role that the European Union will be able to play on the international stage;
- (iii) Considering, like the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that "NATO must retain the flexibility to respond to the real problems we recognise as real challenges to our security. But equally, of course, that cannot be a purely open-ended commitment";
- (iv) Stressing the fundamental difference in nature between, on the one hand, collective defence, founded on solidarity and an automatic procedure and, on the other hand, participation in crisis management, based on the readiness of individual nations on a case-by-case basis;
- (v) Noting that NATO, as a matter of principle, can only concern itself with the management of crises emerging on its periphery, but that it may be desirable in certain cases for Europeans and Americans to consult each other on out-of-area security matters;
- (vi) Noting that some allies hold the view that NATO can give itself a mandate for missions calling for the use of force, while other allies consider that all out-of-area military action should in principle be founded on a UN or OSCE mandate, save in such exceptional cases as the threat of a humanitarian disaster or serious violations of human rights;
- (vii) Noting the determination of the United States not to change the Alliance's nuclear strategy, given that such a change would in its eyes only weaken the Alliance, and recalling that the "nuclear umbrella" is a *sine qua non* for the presence of American troops in Europe;
- (viii) Recalling the proposals made in Assembly Document 1420 on the role and future of nuclear weapons (Rapporteur Mr De Decker, June 1994);
- (ix) Welcoming the impressive progress made in the field of NATO-WEU cooperation on the development of the ESDI within the Alliance since the 1996 NATO Berlin Summit and the July 1997 Madrid Declaration on security and Euro-Atlantic cooperation;
- (x) Noting nevertheless that although the ESDI currently being developed within NATO is very useful, it does not give Europe a "capacity for autonomous action" (Saint Malo Franco-British Declaration) under all circumstances;
- (xi) Noting that the ESDI within NATO means that the United States can leave Europe to take action on the ground while retaining political control of crisis management through the North Atlantic Council;
- (xii) Emphasising the real difficulties involved in defining a European chain of command within the Alliance;
- (xiii) Noting that the negotiations on a NATO-WEU framework agreement on the use of Alliance assets and capabilities by WEU have not yet been completed and that all the partners are resolved to finalise this agreement before the Washington Summit;

- (xiv)* Aware that the United States, which is planning to increase its defence expenditure by 10% this year, takes the view that a stronger ESDI would be a means of allaying its concerns about the insufficient burden that is shouldered by its European allies;
- (xv)* Noting that the United States supports the Saint Malo Franco-British Declaration, provided that the achievements of the Berlin Summit are not lost and that the “3D” concept – no decoupling, duplication or discrimination – is applied;
- (xvi)* Taking the view that the North Atlantic Council’s determination to control the use of NATO assets made available to WEU, through the requirement that it approve the planning by NATO military staffs, strongly impinges on the autonomy of an operation conducted “under the political control and strategic direction of WEU” (Berlin Declaration, June 1996);
- (xvii)* Noting the American desire to develop a common vision and operational capability founded on the RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs) concepts and taking the view that this objective is practically impossible to attain for many European countries;
- (xviii)* Noting that Europeans are being realistic in pursuing their efforts to adapt their military capability to peacekeeping missions, involving forces that can be projected and achieve interoperability by means of NATO procedures;
- (xix)* Stressing that the priority for European defence industries, before seeking to conclude transatlantic agreements, is their restructuring at European level;
- (xx)* Considering the growing risk to European territories from the weapons of mass destruction held by certain states on the periphery of Europe and also American determination to develop counter-proliferation within the NATO framework;
- (xxi)* Noting that Western European Union has developed good relations with its 28 member and associate countries, some of which are neither European Union nor NATO members and that such relations must be retained, in particular those with the countries of central Europe, and also that these countries must not be excluded from participation in both NATO and CFSP discussions;
- (xxii)* Noting the valuable role played by Turkey and concerned that as this country is not a member of the European Union, its future role in European defence and security affairs must be safeguarded;
- (xxiii)* Welcoming the recent enlargement of the Atlantic Alliance to take in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland;
- (xxiv)* Recalling the links that exist between any decision of the Atlantic Alliance on the future “open door” policy and Europe’s fundamental interest in seeing all central European countries which are WEU associate partners included in the security area from which the countries of western Europe currently benefit;
- (xxv)* Aware of the desire of certain European countries to reach the level required for future accession to the Alliance and supporting the considerable efforts they have made to that end;
- (xxvi)* Welcoming, pending further enlargement of the Alliance, the essential role of WEU in involving the observer and associate partner countries in decisions taken on European defence;
- (xxvii)* Noting the importance for Europe’s stability of relations in the field of security and defence policy between NATO and Russia, on the one hand, and NATO and Ukraine, on the other;
- (xxviii)* Welcoming both the smooth way in which the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) is operating as a forum for exchanging information and the ties being developed with Ukraine in the framework of the 1997 NATO-Ukraine Charter;
- (xxix)* Recognising the role of the North Atlantic Assembly in providing for parliamentary scrutiny of NATO decisions and liaison between national parliaments.

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Contribute, with a view to the forthcoming Atlantic Alliance Summit, to the framing of a European position founded on the following principles:

(a) support for a new Strategic Concept whose aim is to maintain and strengthen the transatlantic ties essential to Europe's security and stability, through full participation in the development of the new NATO;

(b) ensuring that the new NATO and the ESDI – inside and outside NATO – lead to greater responsibilities for Europeans matched by a greater contribution towards their own security, by achieving a better balance vis-à-vis the United States, in particular by contributing a larger share to the budget;

(c) no change to the Alliance's core function, which must remain exclusively the collective defence of its members, with crisis management to be added only as a complementary activity;

(d) no unlimited extension of the missions of NATO which must remain those of a military coalition and which must not be superimposed on those of other international organisations;

(e) no extension of the NATO "area", but provision to be made for transatlantic consultations on all "out-of-area" matters deemed to be of common interest on a case-by-case basis and with no obligations attached;

(f) more extensive dialogue within the Alliance on the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction;

(g) complete evaluation of the future risks and threats in the field of weapons of mass destruction and assessment of their implications for the doctrine of nuclear deterrence;

(h) making it clear that, as a matter of principle, the use of out-of-area force in the framework of NATO or other military action must be founded on a specific mandate from the United Nations or the OSCE, save in exceptional cases of humanitarian disasters or serious violations of human rights;

(i) deepening NATO-WEU cooperation in order to promote the development of the ESDI within NATO, in particular by the conclusion, prior to the Washington Summit, of a framework agreement on the use by WEU of NATO assets and capabilities;

(j) making clear to "non-WEU" allies that the development of the ESDI within NATO is not enough to give the European Union the "capacity for autonomous action" called for in the Saint Malo Franco-British Declaration;

(k) gaining general acceptance among the Allies for a declaration on the ESDI to complete the Berlin Declaration (1996) so as to allow Europe (European Union or WEU), in times of crisis, to take a decision outside the NATO framework on the measures, including military measures, to be taken;

(l) calling, in order to guarantee the autonomy of a European chain of command within NATO, for the appointment of a general in charge of managing the European pillar within the Alliance in normal times, and for the designation of a dedicated military staff;

(m) taking measures in order to establish, for WEU-led operations, a chain of command within the European pillar of NATO, avoiding the designation of Deputy SACEUR as Operations Commander;

(n) supporting the idea of extensive membership of the Alliance based on an analysis of its long-term strategic and general interests and on enhancement of overall European stability;

(o) helping countries aspiring to join the Alliance by setting up with them major cooperation programmes in the framework of the Partnership for Peace;

(p) continuing to develop relations with Russia and Ukraine in order to involve those major countries in decisions on which the stability of the European security area depends;

(q) ensuring that there is no reduction in parliamentary scrutiny and liaison between national parliaments in the arrangements for European security and defence;

2. Formalise, with a view to achieving full transparency in transatlantic relations, the present WEU Council's regular contacts or those of its equivalent in the future with the United States and Canadian representatives in Brussels.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr Cox, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is making preparations to celebrate its 50th anniversary in Washington from 23 to 25 April 1999.

2. This will be an occasion for the Alliance to define for itself a new Strategic Concept adapted to the changes which have taken place in the international environment since the fall of the Berlin wall.

3. The document published on this occasion will form the framework for the "new Alliance" which our American allies have in mind for the 21st century.

4. The United States' ambition is to make NATO a major player on the world stage under American leadership. The Europeans, for their part, must bear in mind a number of key principles in order to preserve the Alliance's European mission of collective defence and its role of guardian of the transatlantic link, while allowing the emergence of a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) which can provide Europeans with "a capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces" in order to support the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy, as clearly stated in the Saint Malo Franco-British declaration.

5. The agenda of the Washington Summit has been drawn up. Numerous communiqués and other documents have been published in the press, particularly at the time of NATO's last ministerial meeting in December 1998, from which it emerges that current discussions among the Alliance partners are focusing on the following issues:

- the new Strategic Concept, for which the aim essentially is to define the Alliance's "core functions", acknowledging its role of responding to crises which affect the general interest, to recall its nuclear strategy and to find a formula with regard to the UN man-

date which may be required for any military intervention;

- the European Security and Defence Identity, the implementation of which must be considered within, but possibly also, outside the Alliance;
- a common operational vision, in order to define the military capabilities required to perform Alliance tasks as they arise out of the new Strategic Concept, and the ways and means of acquiring such capabilities, which raises the question of cooperation among defence industries;
- the threats which must be considered: weapons of mass destruction and even terrorism and drug trafficking;
- finally, everything concerning relations with eastern European countries: the Partnership for Peace and specific relations with Russia and Ukraine.

II. Questions for discussion at the Washington Summit

1. The new Strategic Concept

6. The Strategic Concept, along with the Washington Treaty itself, is one of the fundamental texts of the Alliance. It has a dual function: to explain NATO's tasks to the public at large and to lay down guidelines providing a working framework for the civilian and military authorities of the Alliance.

7. The current concept was adopted in 1991, following the fall of the Berlin wall. As a result of the fundamental changes that have affected the geostrategic environment since that date, it was decided by the Heads of State and of Government, meeting in Madrid in July 1997, to work out a new Strategic Concept in time for the next summit in Washington.

8. These new circumstances – the developments in central European countries and Russia and in the field of the CFSP, the emergence of new risks for the stability of Europe – and the changes set in motion within the Alliance – en-

largement, crisis-management missions, organisation of the ESDI, reform of the command structure – have prompted the call from the United States to redefine NATO's role as a major player on the international stage. Indeed, for the Americans this is the main aim of the Washington Summit.

1.1. Core functions: collective defence and non-Article 5 crisis response

9. In practical terms, the first issue that is currently being debated is that of the Alliance's core functions. The question is whether the members of the Alliance will decide to redefine its scope and core functions to include, in addition to the "collective defence" of its members, peace-keeping and crisis-response missions in defence of the common interests of the Alliance partners, as proposed by the United States.

10. Many European countries consider it important to draw a clear distinction between collective defence and crisis management. They see them as different kinds of task which cannot be grouped together on an equal footing as core functions of the Alliance. While collective defence is a mutual obligation arising out of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, states have the sovereign right to decide whether to participate in crisis-management missions. Here the principle of self-defence, which must not be treated as a catch-all notion, does not apply.

11. The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr Cook, made this point quite clear at the NATO ministerial meeting of 8 December 1998:

"NATO must retain the flexibility to respond to the real problems we recognise as real challenges to our security. But equally, of course, that cannot be a purely open-ended commitment – we cannot have an unlimited commitment for NATO".

12. This also raises the question of the geographic boundaries for NATO involvement in crises outside Europe, as currently defined by Article 6 of the Washington Treaty. The solution will probably be to adopt a principle of consultation roughly similar to that of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty. The members of the Alliance, anxious not to limit their own freedom of decision, will not wish to make

an obligation out of such consultations. Moreover some states, in particular France, are against extending NATO's responsibilities to include the Middle East and Africa. It appears to be difficult to do away with the principle of such consultations altogether, but it should not be tied to precise obligations.

1.2. Nuclear strategy

13. When NATO adopted its Strategic Concept in Rome in 1991, setting out its current nuclear strategy, the nuclear arsenal was characterised as a "last resort" intended to deter a potential aggressor from using weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, biological or chemical weapons). First use of nuclear weapons was not ruled out by the members of the Alliance.

14. Until last autumn there was no question among the Alliance partners of deviating from this doctrine, to which NATO's three nuclear powers are particularly attached.

15. A debate was sparked off last November by German Foreign Affairs Minister Joschka Fischer, when he made a statement challenging, in the long term, the very existence of nuclear weapons, but calling in the immediate future for NATO to adopt a "no-first-use" doctrine.

16. Shortly after, on the occasion of a visit to Washington, German Defence Minister Rudolf Scharping qualified that statement, explaining that this was only a long-term aim of the German Government. During a joint press conference, however, US Defense Secretary William Cohen left no doubt about the American position:

"I made it clear that the USA opposes any change in this policy because we believe the current doctrine serves to preserve the peace and enhance deterrence. In particular, the Alliance's nuclear forces continue to fulfil an essential role by ensuring uncertainty in the mind of any aggressor about the nature of the Allies' response to military aggression, and because the strategy continues to serve NATO's interests, there is no reason to consider changing it".

Furthermore, during recent meetings, the nuclear powers have pointed to a huge reduction over the past ten years in the number of nuclear

warheads in Europe, and to the impressive arsenal which remains in Russia.

17. Finally, during a colloquy held on 6-7 February 1999 in Munich, the German Chancellor stated that he continued to defend the notion of "no-first-use", while accepting that there was very little likelihood of this becoming the NATO doctrine.

18. One can deduce from all this that NATO will not change its nuclear posture at the Washington Summit. It would not, in any case, be in Europe's interests to oppose its major American ally on this point since, for the United States, the Alliance's nuclear strategy, as it stands at present, is a *sine qua non* for American involvement in Europe's defence.

1.3. The question of mandates (UN, OSCE)

19. The United States' wish to redefine the Alliance's role among the international institutions was expressed in the "Triple Crown" concept, which has the aim of integrating European and transatlantic organisations (NATO, the EU and the OSCE) in a new Euro-Atlantic system in which the tasks of each organisation would be clearly delimited. Under such a system, NATO would defend security interests, the European Union would be responsible for promoting prosperity, while the OSCE would stand up for human rights and democratic values. The OSCE would be the organisation responsible for ironing out differences before they degenerated into open conflict and for the reconstruction of civil society in the aftermath of an armed conflict.

20. The European desire to see the Union develop a Common Foreign and Security Policy supported by "a capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces" (Saint Malo declaration) does not seem to be compatible with the Triple Crown concept.

21. Another question arising in this debate concerns the legal basis for NATO peacekeeping operations. The United States wants recognition of NATO's right to take action on its own initiative, while some European countries stress the need for an explicit UN Security Council mandate.

22. Last December, French Foreign Affairs Minister Hubert Védrine insisted that missions

calling for the use of force should be placed under the authority of the United Nations, while US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright asserted that, although NATO would continue to act in compliance with the UN Charter, the Alliance must have the right, on a "case-by-case" basis, to take action without the authorisation of the Security Council.

23. The United States would like to generalise the approach adopted recently by the North Atlantic Council in the Kosovo crisis, when it decided to threaten Belgrade with punitive air strikes without a mandate from the UN Security Council, while the German Foreign Affairs Minister, Mr Fischer, made it clear that such tactics may only be used in exceptional circumstances.

24. Chancellor Schröder made Germany's position clear at the conference held in Munich on 6 February 1999:

"But the readiness to assume more responsibility also means that international, out-of-area military missions must be based on an unequivocal mandate under international law. As a rule, this would be a mandate from the UN Security Council or action under the aegis of the OSCE. A community defined by values, such as our transatlantic Alliance, cannot afford to be complacent on this issue. This principle may only be abandoned in exceptional cases: to prevent humanitarian catastrophes and grave violations of human rights, i.e. when immediate action is urgently called for on humanitarian grounds."

1.4. The European Security and Defence Identity

25. The development of the European Security and Defence Identity within the Alliance was given new impetus by the Berlin Declaration of June 1996. However, difficult negotiations were required for the members of the Alliance to reach agreement on this issue. The position of the United States was reflected in a diplomatic telegram sent by the American Ambassador Reginald Bartholomew, which was recently quoted in an Assembly report on "New prospects for transatlantic cooperation in security and defence" (submitted by Mr Blaauw on

9 November 1998). The concerns expressed at that time can be summed up as follows:

- “ (...) efforts to construct a European pillar by redefining and limiting NATO’s role, by weakening its structure, or by creating a monolithic bloc of certain members would be misguided (...)”;
- “ (...) we are concerned over the proposals that WEU should be subordinated to the European Council”;
- “ (...) it would accentuate the separation and independence of the European pillar from the Alliance”;
- “ Such an arrangement could give non-NATO members a voice in the NATO Council via the WEU”;
- “ The reverse would also tend to be the case – that NATO would assume an implicit or indirect security commitment through European Council influence over WEU for states which, while not NATO members, were part of the European Union and might call upon WEU forces.”

26. The Berlin Declaration can thus be considered as an important step forward for the concept of the European Security and Defence Identity, since all the members of the Alliance agreed on the possibility of operations being conducted “ *under the political control and strategic direction of WEU*”.

27. They stipulated that such WEU-led operations would be founded on three principles:

- *prior identification* of the NATO assets and capabilities – in particular the HQs, HQ elements and command positions – that would be made available to the Europeans;
- *elaboration of European command arrangements* for conducting WEU-led operations. This principle implies designating and training appropriate personnel – the European elements within the HQs – who would perform a dual function (“double-hatting”);
- *peacetime planning and training* in respect of the different assets and ca-

pabilities in order to ensure that they function effectively as a coherent military whole.

28. These principles are in the process of being implemented within the Alliance and relations between NATO and WEU have evolved considerably over the past two years. There are a number of outstanding issues, as will be seen from the detailed presentation of these points in the relevant section of this report, but overall the situation is satisfactory and it can be said that a form of the European Security and Defence Identity has emerged within the Alliance for WEU-led operations using NATO assets.

29. All recent contacts with the American authorities would seem to indicate that the United States does not wish the European Union to become the pole of attraction for the concept of the European Security and Defence Identity. Rather, they insist on the need for WEU to maintain its decision-making autonomy and wish to avoid the formation of a European Union bloc within the Alliance which would constitute a *de facto* European caucus. The Americans reluctantly agreed to the development of the ESDI on the essential condition that it be formed solely within the Alliance. Moreover, they are opposed to any automatic procedure for making NATO assets available to WEU.

30. When questioned about the recent Saint Malo Franco-British declaration, the American representatives highlighted the necessarily progressive nature of any transfer of WEU functions to the EU and the pitfalls to be avoided, as summed up by Madeleine Albright’s “3 Ds”¹: “No decoupling, duplication or discrimination”:

- firstly, NATO is the essential embodiment of the transatlantic link and must remain an organisation of sovereign allies. This means that decisions by its European members should not be taken in advance, in a wider framework (in other words, no European caucus);
- secondly, there must be no duplication of military structures for the planning

¹ Article in the *Financial Times* of 7 December 1998.

and conduct of operations and procurement of military equipment;

- finally, it is not acceptable that there should be discrimination towards those Alliance members which are not members of the European Union.

Provided that these conditions are met, the United States declares itself ready to discuss with the Europeans how to strengthen Europe's capacity for action.

31. The American attitude shows above all a desire to see Europe assuming greater responsibilities within the Alliance by shouldering a bigger share of the European defence burden, which means increasing, or at least rationalising, its defence spending, in order to make more efficient use of resources.

32. The Americans consider that the consultation process in the event of a crisis should continue to take place within the Alliance framework, and that the Europeans can only decide to take action on their own if there are no formal objections on the part of the United States. They take the view that under this arrangement a European-led operation using NATO assets can always be envisaged, and that such an operation would require only limited "military expertise" within the EU, such as that currently available within the WEU Military Staff through the "double-hatted" NATO-WEU military delegates.

33. When questioned about the rules which they would apply in response to European requests to use NATO, or even specifically American, military assets, the Americans told your Rapporteur that the decisions would be taken on a case-by-case basis, in the same conditions as those that apply to an *ad hoc* coalition or to any such request made to the United States by a member of the Alliance, and that there was therefore no need to set up a specifically European structure for that purpose.

34. In practice, today it is the creation of a chain of European commands in NATO enabling Europeans – in cases where the Americans do not wish to be involved – to take action on their own, backed up by NATO forces and assets, that constitutes the European identity within the Alliance. But the effect of such a so-

lution will merely be to consolidate the United States' dominant position in NATO: unless there is an adequate European identity outside NATO, there cannot be a proper European identity within the Alliance. The main effect of the latter will be to make any European action subordinate to a prior decision by NATO, which would have the opposite effect of what the Europeans are seeking, since it would give the United States the possibility of making NATO act under the authority of the Americans without their actually taking part in any such action, while the Europeans would find themselves in a situation in which action without US support would prove impossible. It is worth noting that although the French insisted that American troops, albeit few in number, should be subordinate to the command NATO conferred upon the French in FYROM, with a view to being able to extract OSCE monitors from Kosovo if necessary, their purpose was to avoid giving any impression that action taken by Europe on the ground was following a policy laid down by the United States.

35. Moreover, even if we accept that our American allies are genuine about their willingness to see NATO assets and capabilities being loaned to WEU, they have nonetheless raised the issue, as was confirmed at the NATO/WEU crisis-management seminar held on 3 February 1999, of controlling the use of such assets during a crisis. They in fact want the NATO staffs to be responsible for planning the use of these assets, which would subject such planning to the approval of the North Atlantic Council. Where, under such circumstances, is Europe's autonomy for an operation which is supposed to be conducted under the "political control and strategic direction of WEU"?

36. Finally, it has to be admitted that there is little chance of the European members of NATO reaching agreement on joint initiatives in which the Americans would not participate, and for the moment such "WEU-led" operations will remain rare. The European identity, thus perceived as being exclusively within NATO, can hardly be anything more than an *ad hoc* coalition that will have to be formed on a case-by-case basis, as for Bosnia and Kosovo. This would by no means be sufficient, since such an "ESDI" could not develop into a permanent

institution which could redress the balance in the Alliance.

37. In conclusion, we may have serious doubts as to whether an ESDI within NATO would enable Europe to realise its legitimate ambition of European autonomy in the field of defence. Clearly, the European structure in charge of military matters, which at the moment is WEU, must have a military staff, situation-monitoring centre and planning cell in order to provide a minimum level of autonomy for assessing the situation and choosing the military options in times of crisis. This, however, is not enough: to be credible in the field of the CFSP, Europe must have a genuinely autonomous military tool comprising a chain of command, and hence an operations HQ and force HQs which would not depend on the approval of a non-European country. The ESDI must develop outside the Alliance, in parallel to its development within NATO.

2. The common operational vision

2.1. Development of common operational capabilities

38. Another US goal for the summit is agreement on a defence capabilities initiative: "The aim is to match capabilities to the new requirements by agreeing on a common concept of operations that prepares the Allies for the 21st century battlefield in which mastery of new technologies will be critical to success"².

"Our goal is to enhance Allied capabilities: most Allied nations do not need to spend more – but just to spend more wisely".

39. The problems facing the Alliance in connection with the preparation of forces for NATO missions were pinpointed by M. R. Laird in *Defense News*³:

"... For the United States, there is a strong belief the core challenge is to build forces for high-intensity warfare around new technologies. The US definition of the revolution in military affairs (RMA) focuses upon the development of a global

force appropriate for a wide variety of missions.

Interdependence with allied forces is defined in terms of how Allies can plug into an overall American architecture.

America's Joint Vision 2010 draws together a number of key trends – dominant manoeuvre, precision engagement, focused logistics, full-dimension protection and information superiority – to give the joint forces full-spectrum dominance in peacetime engagements, deterrence and conflict prevention.

It is the capability to blend various new technologies into broad-spectrum dominance, which is the goal of the RMA.

For most Europeans, such a goal simply is out of reach. Europeans say peacekeeping and expeditionary warfare are the dominant requirements for the period ahead, not full-spectrum dominance in high-intensity warfare.

Even more telling, European strategists say the forces most relevant to peacekeeping and expeditionary warfare are not those built for high-intensity warfare.

This does not mean Europeans are not seeking to enhance joint or coalition capabilities. Rather, the desire is to enhance useful joint or coalition capabilities within a peacekeeping or expeditionary warfare context.

The United States must not confuse failure to plug into its systems with the failure to innovate. Europeans clearly are interested in pursuing national and coalition efforts – European as well as transatlantic – to provide for specialised capabilities where possible. Choices available from current trends include :

- Britain and France could develop joint maritime strike forces;
- France, the United States and Britain could coordinate cruise missile strikes against targets threatening to their vital national interests;
- European army cells could be linked via information and communication

² Statement by the American Ambassador to NATO in an address to the North Atlantic Assembly.

³ *Defense News*, 30 November 1998.

systems into a connected joint force for peacekeeping operations:

- the Eurosam *Sol-Air Moyenne-Portée/Terre (SAMP)* variant of the Medium Extended Air Defence System to be deployed early next century could provide significant protection against ballistic missiles for European expeditionary forces.

The key states in Western Europe all have adopted force mobility and power projection as the new motif for the transformation of their militaries. But a European RMA supporting force mobility and power projection will be different from that pursued by the United States.

(...) The Alliance faces the challenge of combining American and European efforts for strategic redesign, not simply fitting European militaries into the American model. Meeting such a challenge requires considerable effort, understanding and patience on both sides of the Atlantic.”

2.2. Cooperation among defence industries

40. The so-called “defence capabilities initiative” proposed by US Defense Secretary William Cohen is intended to create a stronger and more effective Alliance by focusing on more efficient defence equipment spending and improved forces interoperability, to be achieved by means of coordination, or even standardisation of the defence procurement policies of Alliance partners and enhanced industrial cooperation among them.

41. Indeed, recent developments on the European defence industry scene show that the aim of most European countries is to consolidate their industrial capacity, with a view to achieving strategic autonomy and a critical mass in order to build for themselves an economically viable future. Such mergers will have a positive impact on costs and European-level standardisation.

42. Thus the American proposals must be given cautious consideration in the light of these principles. A point worth noting is that European companies can normally achieve the interoperability which is so essential, by comply-

ing with NATO standardisation agreements (STANAG) which are regularly updated by the Alliance, provided that all the members of the Alliance apply them scrupulously.

43. It should be recalled that in their Declaration on Western European Union appended to the Amsterdam Treaty, the European countries specified that WEU, through the Western European Armaments Organisation (WEAO) and Western European Armaments Group (WEAG), is the framework that has been chosen for the implementation of this European armaments co-operation policy.

3. The new threats: weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and drugs

44. In an article in the *Financial Times* in December 1998, Madeleine Albright explained US policy with regard to nuclear, biological and chemical weapons:

“One challenge in particular the Washington Summit must address is the very real threat to our people, our territory, and our military forces posed by weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. We must improve overall Alliance efforts both to stem proliferation and to deter, prevent and protect against such attacks. NATO’s efforts should complement, not supplant, the existing regimes and efforts under way to control proliferation.”

45. For this purpose, the Americans have proposed to the Allies a global initiative on weapons of mass destruction with a view to setting up a joint “center for weapons of mass destruction”⁴:

“The center will be a clearinghouse for increased intelligence-sharing by Washington intended to produce a more unified assessment of the threats posed both by states like Iran or Iraq and ‘non-state actors’, like terrorist groups of the kind led by Osama bin Laden.

But the Americans are also pushing greater Alliance collaboration to deter weapons of mass destruction and to defend allied populations and territory against

⁴ *Herald Tribune*, 7 December 1998.

them. Proposals include Alliance vaccines, advanced protective outfits for the military, detective equipment and other collaborative research and development, so each country of the Alliance does not have to bear the cost of covering every contingency on its own.”

46. This has, however, triggered a broad debate on what NATO's stance should be with regard to such weapons, for the European Alliance partners by no means unanimously support the American proposal. Some consider that it entails a risk of turning the Alliance into a collective security organisation in the broad sense of the term, with terms of reference that have been enlarged to include non-military threats.

47. Indeed, Mrs Albright's reference in a memorandum to the American Ambassadors to a development of the role of the Alliance towards a “broader concept of the defense of our common interests” has given rise to concern among some Alliance members that they will be involved, through the efforts to combat this type of weaponry, in US policy in the Middle East, and that NATO will find itself combating terrorism or even international crime, thereby running the risk of competing with other international organisations which have more competence in these areas.

4. Enlargement of the Alliance and the Partnership for Peace

48. Among the issues on the agenda of the Washington Summit, the question of enlargement is extremely sensitive in that NATO membership is a cherished goal for many potential candidates currently associated with WEU through several categories of status which they value highly as they enable them to take part in the WEU Council meetings held every fortnight in Brussels and thus involve them in the development of the European Security and Defence Identity.

49. In the Madrid Declaration, issued at the close of the July 1997 NATO Summit, the Allies defined a very open policy on enlargement, formally inviting three countries to begin accession talks and affirming the following:

“... NATO remains open to new members under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The Alliance will continue to

welcome new members in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and contribute to security in the Euro-Atlantic area. The Alliance expects to extend further invitations in coming years to nations willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and as NATO determines that the inclusion of these nations would serve the overall political and strategic interests of the Alliance and that the inclusion would enhance overall European security and stability.”

50. In accordance with these intentions, a first group of countries – the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland – joined the Alliance very recently (March 1999) and, similarly to Iceland, Norway and Turkey, have acquired associate member status in WEU. In the opinion of members of the NATO Secretariat-General, the Allies will leave the door open in Washington but there is unlikely to be any specific invitation to a particular candidate.

51. However, all applicant countries must be encouraged to prepare for accession to the Alliance. They need help, in particular in setting up programmes designed to make their forces interoperable with those of NATO and drawn up in close consultation with NATO in the framework of the Partnership for Peace. An extensive list of applications must therefore be left open with a view to further enlargement, without seeking to specify any candidates by name for the time being.

52. Furthermore, all the observer and associate partner countries must continue to be involved within WEU in the development of the European Security and Defence Identity, in particular by allowing their full participation in all the seminars and crisis-management exercises planned in the WEU framework.

5. Russia and Ukraine

53. NATO's relations with Russia and Ukraine have considerably evolved in recent years, in particular since the adoption of the fundamental texts of 1997.

54. The *Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation*, signed in Paris on 27

May 1997, opened a new era in European security relations by providing a framework for cooperation between NATO and Russia. The NATO-Russia Joint Permanent Council established under the Founding Act holds regular meetings, giving full satisfaction to all sides. Indeed, these regular talks at the level of the Ambassadors to NATO provide an opportunity to clarify and enhance understanding for the different positions. They have been particularly useful in providing a forum for the parties to consult each other on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Kosovo crisis.

55. The *NATO-Ukraine Charter* signed in July 1997 formalised ties with Ukraine by developing practical cooperation in the framework of the Partnership for Peace and strengthening political cooperation. Ukraine has made a major effort to establish permanent relations with NATO, as can be seen from its "State programme for cooperation with NATO until the year 2000", the setting-up of a NATO information centre in Kiev and the presence in that city of two NATO liaison officers.

6. Conclusions: Implications of the Washington Summit for Europe

56. The Washington Summit will be of major importance for Europe, given that the development of the European Security and Defence Identity will depend on how much room for initiative is left for Europe in the Alliance's new Strategic Concept.

57. The United States' wish to globalise security and defence issues could run counter to European interests. Indeed, if NATO were to be transformed into the "world's policeman" under American leadership, this would leave little room for the development within the EU of a Common Foreign and Security Policy founded on specifically European interests. Europe must always have the possibility of dealing with crisis management within its own institutions and must have at its disposal a genuinely autonomous military tool, enabling it to intervene if it so decides.

58. The European Union is, of course, the organisation around which a true European identity is emerging. The creation of a single currency will be a powerful force for cohesion, leading to the development of a common policy

in numerous areas. This process will lead to a situation in which Europe's specific interests will become more clearly demarcated from those of the western world in general.

59. When embarking on the preliminary negotiations in the run-up to the Washington Summit, Europe should bear in mind the following major principles:

- it must decide whether it wishes to live in a mono-polar world with the United States at its centre, or, on the contrary, to become a major player in a multi-polar world which is independent of American hegemony;
- the ESDI must give Europe a genuinely autonomous capacity for action in the field of crisis management: European participation in NATO operations will not always be sufficient;
- the ESDI must be developed both within and outside the Alliance in order to give rise to a specifically European defence capability. This means that some duplication of military staffs will have to be accepted so that Europe can have its own, autonomous chain of command;
- the ESDI must take account of the interests of those central European countries which will not benefit from NATO's eastwards enlargement;
- Europeans must remain aware that other international organisations (UN, OSCE, EU, WEU), which may have a broader membership than NATO, will be in a better position than the Alliance to deal with certain security issues.

60. For all these reasons, Europeans should adopt an extremely cautious attitude with regard to some of the issues which will be tackled in Washington and should:

- recall that the only core function prompting an automatic response is that of collective defence;
- not accept the notion of extending NATO's geographic limits, except for the purpose of consultations, in order

- to avoid being dragged into out-of-area operations alongside the Americans;
- obtain clarification on the notion of “common interests”, which is much too vague;
- adopt the German position on the issue of mandates, recalling the need for UN authority for any use of force, except in exceptional cases for humanitarian purposes;
- promote the development of the ESDI within the Alliance, while making it clear that it must also develop outside NATO;
- not accept the programme for standardising operational capabilities proposed by the Americans, but rather insist on the need for interoperability of weapons systems, which will be considerably improved thanks to the restructuring under way in European armaments industries;
- accept cooperation in the field of information on weapons of mass destruction, but not the involvement of the Alliance in non-military issues such as combating terrorism or drugs trafficking.

III. Implementation of the ESDI within the Alliance

1. Reminder of the decisions taken by the Ministerial Council in Berlin (1996)

61. The objective of developing the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within the Alliance was clearly expressed in the final communiqué issued following the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council, meeting in Berlin in June 1996:

“this identity will (...) permit the creation of militarily coherent and effective forces capable of operating under the political control and strategic direction of WEU”.

62. Furthermore, this communiqué lays down three guiding principles for the implementation of the ESDI:

- prior identification of the NATO assets and capabilities – in particular the HQs, HQ elements and command positions – that would be made available to the Europeans;
- elaboration of European command arrangements for conducting WEU-led operations. This principle implies designating and training appropriate personnel – the European elements within the HQs – who would perform a dual function (“double-hatting”);
- peacetime planning and training in respect of the different assets and capabilities in order to ensure that they function effectively as a coherent military whole.

2. WEU/NATO consultation procedures

63. The implementation of the ESDI calls for a considerable amount of work to be done in common by NATO and WEU, to prepare cooperation both in normal times and in times of crisis. Since June 1996, the two organisations have been making major efforts to consult each other in this field:

- in normal times, regular joint meetings are held at various levels between the relevant bodies of the two organisations: the two Councils, the WEU Council Working Group and NATO’s Political Committee (PC) etc. On the military side, there are regular joint meetings between NATO’s Military Committee in permanent session and WEU’s Military Delegates Group, as well as frequent meetings between the military staffs of the two organisations (NATO’s International Military Staff and WEU’s Military Staff);
- furthermore, a reciprocal agreement has been concluded between WEU and NATO with regard to participation by the Chairmen of the NATO Military Committee and the WEU Military Delegates Group in certain meetings of each other’s committee. This reciprocal arrangement will provide an opportunity to observe and comment on items of interest to both organisations, including, *inter alia*, those aspects of

CJTF implementation which affect NATO-WEU cooperation and any other point which, by nature, is relevant to both WEU and NATO. Moreover, this arrangement will ensure that decisions of common military interest will be taken by each organisation in full knowledge of the state of play in the other organisation, most importantly, during crises and operations;

- in the case of an emerging crisis, the plan is for various working groups of the two organisations to jointly assess the situation and prepare military options. Moreover, it may be decided to convene additional joint meetings of the relevant bodies:
 - at the level of the CHODs;
 - WEU's Council Working Group and NATO's Political Committee (PC);
 - WEU's Politico-Military Group and NATO's Policy Coordination Group (PCG/NATO);
 - the WEU Military Delegates Group and the NATO Military Committee in permanent session;
 - the WEU Military Staff and the NATO International Military Staff;
 - the WEU Planning Cell and the NATO Combined Joint Planning Staff.

64. A NATO/WEU joint document is currently under preparation, while the WEU document on crisis-management mechanisms and procedures, which is regularly updated, clearly defines the areas and arrangements for consultation between NATO and WEU.

3. Framework agreement for the transfer of NATO assets to WEU

65. The two organisations are still negotiating a framework agreement on the transfer, monitoring and return of NATO assets. This would provide the model for an agreement to be signed by NATO and WEU each time an operation is launched entailing use by WEU of NATO

assets. Indeed, the complexity of the financial and legal issues linked with such an agreement calls for a whole gamut of solutions to be examined. The possibility for WEU to conduct operations at the direct behest of the EU, in accordance with the provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty, makes the issue even more complex.

66. Whatever the ultimate solution, the framework agreement, which should be finalised in time for the Washington Summit, must preserve WEU's decision-making autonomy and its unified chain of command, and define a procedure approved by both organisations for NATO to monitor the use of its assets and possibly to recall them before the end of the WEU-led operation.

67. The difficulty is not so much of a practical nature, given that in the event of a real crisis the two organisations, which to a large extent have overlapping memberships, would be able to find a solution. However, the existence of such a framework agreement does have political implications, in that it would clearly mark NATO's commitment to supporting WEU – albeit with no guarantee of automatic support – and would protect WEU against any last-minute demands on the part of NATO which could threaten its autonomy, which probably explains the difficulties encountered so far in the negotiations. However, the political problems raised by some NATO members should be resolved in time for the Washington Summit. The officials questioned during the drafting of this report were, in any case, optimistic on this point.

4. NATO assets which can be made available to WEU – CJTF HQs

68. The development of the European Security and Defence Identity, as stated in the final communiqué of the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Berlin in 1996, must be founded on the:

“identification, within the Alliance, of the types of separable but not separate capabilities, assets and support assets, as well as, in order to prepare for WEU-led operations, separable but not separate HQs, HQ elements and command positions, that would be required to command and conduct WEU-led operations and

which could be made available, subject to decision by the NAC.”

69. We note that good progress has been made within the Alliance in this area. The preparations for exercises to implement the CJTF (Combined Joint Task Forces) concept, as well as Crisex-type exercises, have served to draw up a list of those NATO assets which could be made available to WEU. These assets consist essentially of:

- American heavy assets: logistic transport aircraft, observation satellites (although Europe has access to Helios images through the Torrejón Satellite Centre);
- specific NATO assets, which are rare: AWACS (although some WEU countries also have such aircraft);
- NATO command assets, communication equipment, HQ or HQ-support elements, known as CJTF (Combined Joint Task Forces) HQs.

70. In order to have combined joint headquarters deployable in the theatre of operations and ready to be made available to WEU, on the basis of a decision by the North Atlantic Council, the Alliance has decided to designate among its “parent HQs” a core staff composed of European officers which could be beefed up on request using elements supplied by other NATO or national bodies. Such a CJTF HQ concept allows a flexible, multinational approach which could, if required, be extended to include countries which are not full members of WEU. This was the principle used for the IFOR/SFOR HQ in Bosnia.

71. The CJTF HQs would be set up in the same way as a NATO CJTF and placed under the orders of an Operations Commander who would come under the political control of the WEU Council. As the operation continued, replacement of headquarters personnel would allow the CJTF HQ to reflect those nations taking part in that particular WEU-led operation. However, NATO nations have already agreed, in principle, that these designated NATO CJTF HQs will in fact be provided regardless of the national contribution

72. The main “parent HQs” have been selected, but according to NATO officials, a number of practical problems remain to be resolved before a CJTF HQ can be swiftly and efficiently set up in a crisis: designation and training of staff, taking into account the need for staff rotation, their deployment, their upkeep over long periods, communication equipment etc.

73. The relevant NATO military staffs, in particular the International Military Staff and the Combined Joint Planning Staff are working on all these questions in close cooperation with the WEU Military Staff. From the European point of view, a sufficient number of exercises now needs to be organised in order to demonstrate the possibility of “separating” and then deploying those CJTF for operations under WEU’s “political control and strategic direction”.

5. Arrangements for a European chain of command within NATO

74. The Berlin final communiqué of June 1996 is also very clear on this issue and it is important to establish whether the intentions stated at that time have been put into practice. It refers to the:

“elaboration of appropriate multinational European command arrangements within NATO, consistent with and taking full advantage of the CJTF concept, able to prepare, support, command and conduct the WEU-led operations. This implies double-hatting appropriate personnel within the NATO command structure to perform these functions. Such European command arrangements should be identifiable (...)”.

75. According to your Rapporteur’s information, the two organisations have agreed on the principle of the European General appointed Deputy SACEUR at SHAPE (Mons) playing a specifically European role, considering him, in particular, as an ideal candidate for the post of Operations Commander for a WEU-led operation. If he was not chosen for that job, Deputy SACEUR would remain in charge of coordinating the NATO support provided to WEU. However, it would appear that no follow-up has, as yet, been given to the plan for setting up within SHAPE and the CJPS a chain of European offi-

cers under Deputy SACEUR's command in order to perform the tasks set out in the Berlin communiqué, and that the role of Deputy SACEUR himself has not yet been finalised. All this is essential for establishing a genuinely European chain of command.

76. These doubts as to whether NATO really intends to let Deputy SACEUR (D/SACEUR) be designated WEU Operations Commander were confirmed during the recent visit by the Assembly's Political and Defence Committees to SHAPE (Mons). It was clear to the members of our Assembly that D/SACEUR considered this to be a secondary role and that he had other things on his mind than preparing to assume it. Moreover, he himself pointed out that during an emerging crisis he would have a part to play in SHAPE which he could probably not abandon, even for an operation conducted in the WEU framework.

77. Thus the problem of WEU Operations Commander needs to be solved, since it cannot be D/SACEUR. Moreover, steps must be taken to see to it that a European general other than D/SACEUR is designated to be in charge of the organisation and operation of the European military pillar of the Alliance.

6. Defence planning (assets planning)

78. The purpose of NATO's "defence planning" process, consisting of two-year cycles, is to define the military resources required for missions and their distribution among the members of the Alliance. The process was established with a view to the implementation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and it was not considered appropriate for WEU to carry out the same work.

79. For WEU's Petersberg missions or NATO's peace support operations (PSO), the participation of states is decided at national level on a case-by-case basis.

80. It was therefore decided, following the declaration adopted in Berlin in 1996, to adapt the Alliance's defence planning process to take account of WEU's operational requirements for Petersberg missions, and to involve WEU in that process. This raises two questions:

- the arrangements for WEU's participation;

- how to involve WEU observer countries which are not members of the Alliance (Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden).

81. NATO finalised its work on the integration of WEU's requirements in its defence planning process in 1998, taking account, in particular, of the contribution of the observer countries by means of the Partnership for Peace procedures. The arrangements agreed between the organisations would seem to be satisfactory:

- drafting of an *ad hoc* report on the forces of the members of the Alliance and observer countries which could participate in WEU-led operations;
- joint NATO/WEU meeting, attended by the observers, in order to assess that report before NATO's annual defence planning review;
- numerous arrangements allowing WEU to intervene at various stages in NATO's two-year defence planning cycle and the possibility for the WEU Military Staff to take action on behalf of the "18".

Further progress is required on a number of points, in particular as regards taking into account the specific requirements of Petersberg-type missions in the defence planning questionnaire that member countries are required to fill in every two years.

82. Above and beyond these procedural matters, for which satisfactory solutions seem to have been found, what are the fundamental issues raised by "forces planning" for WEU missions?

83. It is important for WEU to have sufficient forces to conduct an operation. However, there is no obligation for member countries to make forces available for Petersberg-type missions and existing forces may need to be relieved after a certain period of time. For these reasons, it is important to be able to draw on a sufficiently large "pool of forces" on a case-by-case basis. The role of WEU's observer countries and associate partners is particularly important in that regard.

84. Finally, experience gathered during recent peacekeeping missions has demonstrated

the importance of a number of requirements for the implementation of the CJTF concept:

- deployable communication/command/intelligence resources (C4I);
- strategic mobility;
- logistic support, transport and engineering resources;
- availability of forces consisting, for example, of police officers, customs officials or observers.

85. Lastly, at the end of 1998 the NATO International Military Staff submitted a report on available forces and capabilities for WEU-led operations, on the basis of the forces designated by WEU member countries and some observers as being available, in principle, for Petersberg-type operations, and on an evaluation of the assets required for illustrative missions on the basis of information submitted by WEU at the end of 1996.

86. This evaluation showed that, in principle, the forces and capabilities made available by the countries concerned are largely sufficient, even for those illustrative missions requiring the greatest resources. The evaluation, of course, also revealed a number of weak points, the essential ones relating to the requirements mentioned above.

87. The key question, in addition to that of the CJTF HQs, is whether the command, communication and intelligence resources the Americans usually supply to NATO would also be made available to WEU.

7. Military planning

88. At their meeting in Berlin in June 1996, the ministers of the NATO countries agreed that the Alliance would, at the request of WEU, carry out military planning for the illustrative mission profiles proposed by WEU. These illustrative missions are theoretical examples of WEU-led Petersberg-type missions for which WEU wishes to avail itself of NATO assets. They do not cover the whole range of missions which may be conducted by WEU, in particular those using its own assets and procedures. The three main illustrative mission profiles that have been chosen are: assistance to civilians, separation of parties by force and conflict prevention.

89. Accordingly, in 1996 six illustrative mission profiles were conveyed to NATO for their evaluation and military planning, known as "preliminary planning" within NATO and WEU. The first results were submitted to WEU in spring 1997 and your Rapporteur is very pleased to see how well the procedure worked.

90. Following this first experience, it was decided within NATO to draft a specific document on operational planning covering WEU's requirements and to bring about convergence between those requirements and the ones arising out of NATO's non-Article 5 peace support operations (PSO), by adapting NATO's PSO planning procedures to take account of WEU-led operations.

91. In order to secure close cooperation between NATO and WEU, it was agreed that contacts between the relevant bodies, essentially the WEU Planning Cell and NATO's Combined Joint Planning Staff, would take place on a regular basis. Finally, in connection with the development of consultation procedures between WEU and NATO for a WEU-led operation using NATO assets, close cooperation is planned between the various planning bodies of the two organisations.

8. Training and exercises

92. Implementation of the Berlin agreements on the ESDI calls for preliminary training founded on crisis scenarios. The most simple exercises to organise were the ones aimed at testing the concept of CJTF HQs, which started in 1997. However, training for coordinated decision-making throughout the politico-military chain of the two organisations is much more difficult to organise and requires agreements to be concluded in order to harmonise the crisis-management mechanisms and procedures of the two organisations, albeit in the form of interim arrangements which can be fine-tuned on the basis of the exercises.

93. In this area, the recent joint seminar of the WEU and NATO Councils, held on 3 February 1999, was an important step towards performing a practical study of the different stages involved in the consultation and decision-making processes. While progress may seem slow, given that the first joint training efforts date

back to 1995, events are moving forward. Indeed, a major exercise called CMX/Crisex 2000 is planned next year, while planning conferences are due to be held in 1999. It is important when organising the process to take account of the desire to involve all 28 members of the WEU family. This exercise would be a crucial step towards harmonising the NATO and WEU operational planning structures.

94. As regards the CJTF HQs, the NATO exercises Allied Effort 97 and Strong Resolve 98 served as full-scale exercises in a crisis scenario, the first involving the deployment of a CJTF HQ on land, the second at sea, aboard the American command ship *Mount Whitney*.

95. The evaluation of these two exercises focused on HQ structuring, in particular, the method of forming the CJTF HQs, operational planning, command and control capabilities, and aspects relating to the deployment and support of the HQs, as well as requirements in the field of information and command systems (ICS).

96. Rapid progress is currently being made, drawing also on the experience gathered in Bosnia. In autumn 1999, the Allied Forces for South Europe (AFSOUTH) will be conducting a major exercise involving, *inter alia*, the deployment of a CJTF HQ (Allied Mix 99).

97. It is, then, essential that CMX/Crisex 2000 should be prepared and conducted with the utmost attention by all the staff of the numerous bodies involved in this exercise, both from NATO and WEU.


9. Conclusions

98. The European Security and Defence Identity is in the process of being established at military level within the Alliance, in accordance with the decisions taken in Berlin in June 1996. The efforts being made for that purpose should be encouraged, in particular by means of all the work conducted jointly by NATO and WEU. For the system to work, it is necessary to:

- solve the problem of the WEU Operations Commander, who cannot be D/SACEUR;
- appoint a second – European – Deputy SACEUR in charge of the European military pillar of the Alliance;
- rapidly finalise the framework agreement;
- convince our American allies that the use of NATO assets and capabilities made available to WEU cannot be controlled by the North Atlantic Council and that even if the planning for their deployment is conducted by NATO military staffs, the ultimate authority for that planning must lie not with the North Atlantic Council, but the Council of WEU.

However, there are doubts in the minds of most members of the Assembly regarding the “political autonomy” of this “separable but not separate” instrument within the Alliance.



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