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The state of affairs in disarmament
(CFE, nuclear disarmament)

REPORT

submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee
by Lord Newall, Rapporteur

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¹ Adopted unanimously by the Committee

² *Members of the Committee:* Mr De Decker (Chairman), MM Schloten, Marten (Vice-Chairmen), Mr Alloncle (Alternate *Debarge*), MM Baumel, *Beaufays*, Mrs Beer, Mrs Calleja, Mr Cioni (Alternate *Leoni*), MM Davis, Dees, Dhaille, Díaz de Mera, *Giannattasio*, Horn, Lemoine, Mrs *Lentz-Cornette*, MM Magginas, Mardones Sevilla, McNamara, Medeiros Ferreira, *Micheloyiannis*, Mitterrand, Mota Amaral, Lord *Newall*, MM Pereira Coelho, Polenta, Robles Fraga, Lord Russell-Johnston (Alternate: *Colvin*), Mr Selva, Ms Shipley (Alternate: Lord *Judd*), Mrs Soutendijk van Appeldoorn, MM *Speroni*, Valk, Valkeniers, Verivakis, Zierer
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Rapporteur's Preface

In preparing the present report, the Rapporteur was extremely fortunate to receive a great deal of assistance from the authorities consulted and would like to take this opportunity to publicly thank all concerned for their cooperation.

On 11 July 1997, the Rapporteur met Mr Bill Hopkinson, Assistant Under-Secretary, Policy, at the Ministry of Defence, London.

The Rapporteur also had discussions with the following permanent representatives to the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe and their staff, in Vienna on 2 and 3 September 1997:

H.E. Ambassador Hansjörg Eiff, Head of the German Delegation;
 H.E. Ambassador Alexander Gruchko, Head of the Russian Delegation,
 H.E. Ambassador Adam Kobieracki, Head of the Polish Delegation;
 H.E. Ambassador Johannes Landman, Head of the Netherlands Delegation,
 General Greg Govan, United States Delegation;
 Mr Paul Flaherty, Counsellor, United Kingdom Delegation;
 Mr Graham Paul, Counsellor, French Delegation;

At a dinner on 2 September 1997 hosted by Mr Paul Flaherty of the United Kingdom Delegation, a discussion took place with the following participants:

Mr Gabor Brodi, Head of the Hungarian Delegation;
 Mr Namik Erpul, Counsellor, Turkish Delegation,
 Mr Oystein Hovdkinn, Minister, Norwegian Delegation,
 Mr Ivo Petrov, Head of the Bulgarian Delegation;
 Mr Vagif Sadykhov, Head of the Azerbaijan Delegation,
 Mr Lamberto Zannier, Counsellor, Italian Delegation

At a luncheon on 3 September 1997 hosted by H.E. Ambassador Eiff of Germany, a round table discussion took place with the following participants:

H.E. Ambassador Antonio Cosano, Spanish Delegation,
 H.E. Ambassador Hervé Ladsous, French Delegation;
 H.E. Ambassador Johannes Landman, Netherlands Delegation;
 Mr Evangelos Denaxas, Greek Delegation,
 Mrs Maria da Graca Queiroz Goncalves Pereira, Portugese Delegation;
 Mr Nigel Haywood, United Kingdom Delegation,
 Mr Gérard Philipps, Luxembourg Delegation,
 Mr Jean-Joel Schittecatte, Belgium Delegation;
 Mr Klaus Zillikens, German Delegation

In Geneva on 9 October 1997, the Rapporteur met the following representatives from delegations of the United Nations Conference on Disarmament

Mr Klaus Achenbach, Counsellor, German Delegation,
 Mr Jean-Michel Despax, First Counsellor, and Mr François Rhein, Counsellor, French Delegation;
 Mr Frank Majoor, Permanent Representative, and Mr Onno Kervers, Counsellor, Netherlands Delegation,
 Mr Richard Tauwhare, Deputy Permanent Representative, United Kingdom Delegation,
 Mr Valery Zemskov, Deputy Permanent Representative, Russian Delegation.

At the request of the Rapporteur, the Defence Counsellor also met Mr Crispin Hain-Cole, Head of disarmament, arms control and cooperative security, NATO, who had formerly been a member of the United Kingdom Delegation to the OSCE in Vienna

Draft Order

on the state of affairs in disarmament (CFE, nuclear disarmament)

The Assembly,

- (i) Aware of the negotiations in Vienna to adapt the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE);
- (ii) Convinced that an adapted CFE Treaty, no longer based on the cold war bloc-to-bloc approach but rather on a system of national and territorial ceilings for treaty-limited equipment, will be an essential step towards enhanced security in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals;
- (iii) Taking into account the international efforts to draw up a treaty to ban anti-personnel landmines;
- (iv) Aware of the many bilateral and multilateral efforts to reduce nuclear arms arsenals and to promote nuclear disarmament;
- (v) Worried over reports mentioning the risks of a deterioration of Russia's nuclear forces,

INSTRUCTS ITS DEFENCE COMMITTEE

To keep itself fully informed about all the abovementioned issues and report to the Assembly if any important new developments require the latter to take action.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Lord Newall, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. In spring 1990, your Rapporteur prepared a report on the negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe. These negotiations were concluded that same year with the signature of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE).

2. Since then many new developments have taken place. East-west relations have seen a huge improvement but, at the same time, a number of violent conflicts have taken place both in Europe and elsewhere – such as the Gulf war, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Great Lakes and Chechnya.

3. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that in the civilised world there is a growing conviction that fewer arms are needed to maintain and guarantee peace and security in the world. This growing conviction has resulted in unexpected progress in the field of disarmament. A number of new disarmament treaties and agreements have been concluded to reduce the numbers of both conventional and nuclear weapons and to control the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

4. In the present report an effort has been made to describe succinctly the most important recent developments in the field of disarmament, without claiming to be exhaustive. The report does not discuss the Treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems (ABM Treaty), the missile technology control regime (MTCR) and the Wassenaar Arrangement which succeeded COCOM, since these have been discussed in reports of the Technological and Aerospace Committee¹. No recommendations to the Council have been proposed since the Council as such is not involved in any of these negotiations. The

¹ Anti-ballistic missile defence, submitted by Mr Lenzer, Rapporteur (Assembly Document 1339); Anti-missile defence for Europe – guidelines drawn from the symposium, submitted by Mr Lenzer, Rapporteur (Assembly Document 1363); Transatlantic cooperation on European anti-missile defence – Part I, submitted by Mr Atkinson, Rapporteur (Assembly Document 1435) and Part II, submitted by Mr Atkinson, Rapporteur (Assembly Document 1588).

possibility cannot, however, be excluded that in the future the disarmament process will have direct consequences for the maintenance of peace and security in Europe. The Defence Committee is therefore obliged to monitor the disarmament process closely and give its opinion on those consequences, if it is deemed necessary.

II. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and its adaptation

(i) The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty)

5. On 14 November 1990 in Paris, the 16 member states of NATO and the 6 member states of the Warsaw Pact signed the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe. This Treaty, which entered into force on 17 July 1992, established a balance of conventional armed forces at lower levels. It contained comprehensive provisions for transparency and information exchange backed up by a verification regime which would make it impossible for an aggressor to launch a surprise attack and begin a large-scale offensive.

6. The CFE Treaty operates through agreed and verified limits on five systems of heavy military equipment, in particular tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters, known collectively as Treaty Limited Equipment (TLE). In accordance with the Treaty, States Parties have mostly reduced their weapon holdings to bring them down to agreed levels. The Treaty area is divided into four zones and, to prevent an excessive concentration of conventional weapons systems in central Europe and the flank region², there are limits on the number of TLE items which may be held in any one zone.

7. On 14 June 1991, the Soviet Union entered into two accompanying commitments – one legally binding and one political. The first details of the Soviet reduction obligation related to

² The flank region covers Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Iceland, Moldova, Norway, Romania, north-western and southern parts of Russia, northern parts of Turkey and part of southern Ukraine.

equipment of treaty-limited types in naval infantry and coastal defence forces. The second agreement committed the Soviet Union to destroy more than 14 500 pieces of military equipment of treaty-limited types east of the Ural Mountains, a region outside the Treaty area of application. This political commitment resulted from NATO concerns about Soviet military equipment moved out of the Atlantic-to-the-Urals (ATTU) application zone of the Treaty during the negotiating period prior to signature.

8. The Treaty includes unprecedented provisions for detailed information exchanges, on-site inspections, challenge inspections, and on-site monitoring of destruction. NATO has established a system to cooperate in monitoring the Treaty. Parties have rights to monitor the process of destruction without quota limits. A Protocol on Notification and Exchange of Information stipulates an annual exchange of mandated data that helps ensure verification of compliance with the Treaty.

9. A Protocol on Inspection details procedures for verification. Inspections are conducted routinely during the (indefinite) duration of the Treaty, they focus on "objects of verification" (e.g. military organisations), and are conducted at "declared sites" (e.g. military facilities). These OOVs and sites are listed in each information exchange.

10. After the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the former Warsaw Pact states concluded a legally binding agreement at Budapest, in spring 1991, allocating the equipment entitlements of the Central and East European Group of States Parties. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, eight of the former Soviet Union successor states – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine – had territory covered by the Treaty provisions and thus became Treaty members. They negotiated the allocation of weapon entitlements among themselves and the resulting Tashkent Agreement of 15 May 1992 set out agreed individual ceilings. These allocations and the rights and obligations of the new States Parties were recognised by all Treaty members at their extraordinary meeting in Oslo, on 5 June 1992. Also, when the Czech and Slovak Republics became separate States Parties, on 1 January 1993, their accession to the CFE Treaty was approved on 5 Feb-

ruary 1997 and details of the division of the obligations of former Czechoslovakia were formalised accordingly.

11. The weapons reduction process imposed by the CFE Treaty required 25% completion by November 1993, 50% by November 1994, and 100% by November 1995, after which the CFE limits were to be fully implemented.

12. Although all the States Parties made efforts to destroy, or disable their equipment as provided for in the Protocol on Reductions, it was noted that by the 16 November 1995 deadline, several states had not fulfilled some treaty obligations.

13. Russia had the greatest number of liabilities. In the area beyond the Urals, it had destroyed only one third of its liabilities in conventional armaments and equipment. The unresolved dispute with Ukraine over the division of the Black Sea Fleet and the status of the Sevastopol base had caused delays in the destruction of infantry and coastal defence equipment. Liabilities beyond the Urals are not subject to verification but at the CFE Treaty Review Conference in Vienna in May 1996, Russia stated that it would demonstrate that all holdings on its territory had been destroyed or rendered militarily unusable. Russia also made other specific pledges to meet its destruction obligations and Western teams were given the task of verifying that it had abided by the terms of those pledges³.

14. Belarus, which failed to meet an April 1996 and a November 1997 deadline, was declared to have completed its reductions as of 1 January 1997. Minor problems were reported regarding Ukraine, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Georgia. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan have long failed to declare their equipment holdings and accept any formal destruction liability. By the official deadline for the destruction process, Armenia had surplus armoured combat vehicles while Azerbaijan claimed that it could not account for some 700 TLE items lost to rebel forces in Nagorno-Karabakh⁴. For some years now the two countries have been rearming more or less officially and sometimes in violation of the ceilings set by the CFE Treaty (and confirmed by the 1992 Tashkent Agreement). In the

³ *SIPRI Yearbook 1997*, pages 472-473

⁴ *Ibid.*, page 472

case of Armenia, the Russian Federation has been its largest supplier, sometimes in excess of all inter-state agreements and even without the official permission of the government, which is tantamount to acknowledging that such transfers of equipment have not been notified, as they should be under the rules binding on the signatories of the CFE Treaty. According to Armenia, Azerbaijan is receiving equipment from Ukraine not all of which has been the subject of a declaration as the Treaty also requires.

15. All these questions were discussed and recommendations were made in both the Joint Consultative Group and at the 1996 Review Conference in Vienna. The JCG was urged to resolve implementation issues in parallel with the CFE adaptation negotiations in Vienna.

16. As mentioned above, settlement of the problem of the Russian Federation and Ukraine sharing the Black Sea Fleet was a factor that blocked full application of the provisions of the CFE Treaty. It should be noted that the signature on 31 May 1997 of the Treaty of friendship, cooperation and partnership between the two countries has, in principle, resolved this issue. Russia undertook to hire the installations necessary for the fleet's operation, in Sevastopol and other areas of the Crimean peninsula, for a period of 20 years. Ukraine took control of about 18% of the original fleet, i.e. about 162 ships of all types

17. By the end of 1996, more than 51 300 items of treaty-limited conventional weapons equipment had been destroyed or permanently converted to non-military use in order to meet reduction liabilities. In addition, another 9 900 items were notified by Russia for destruction or conversion beyond the Treaty area of application, and the States Parties notified another 2 400 items as voluntarily reduced below their specified limits. Over 2 700 on-site inspections had been conducted. These inspections, conducted by representatives from both groups of states, examined weapons destruction events, as well as sites or areas reported or suspected to contain military equipment.

18. A detailed survey of CFE ceilings, liabilities, reductions and holdings is given in Appendices I and II⁵.

19. In accordance with Article XVI of the CFE Treaty, the States Parties established a Joint Consultative Group (JCG) in order to promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of the Treaty. Article XVI provides a full catalogue of subjects to be dealt with in the framework of the Joint Consultative Group, which is composed of representatives from all 30 CFE States Parties.

20. The JCG takes decisions or makes recommendations by consensus. It holds sessions twice a year in Vienna, with each session lasting four weeks unless otherwise agreed. In practice, the JCG has been in virtually continuous session ever since late 1990. It has, among other things, negotiated a number of agreements to facilitate and ensure the implementation of the CFE Treaty. Altogether, it can be noted that the JCG has played an essential role in the implementation of the CFE inspection and reduction regimes, including the development of standard inspections, notification forms and new, streamlined arrangements for equipment destruction. At present, the JCG is negotiating CFE adaptation.

(ii) Other commitments related to the CFE Treaty

21. Three politically binding declarations were agreed to when the CFE Treaty was signed on 19 November 1990. These commitments consolidate the provisions of the Treaty

(i) Declaration by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany on the Personnel Strength of German Armed Forces

In this unilateral declaration, the Federal Republic of Germany pledged to reduce the personnel strength of the armed forces of a united Germany to 370 000 within three to four years of the entry into force of the CFE Treaty.

(ii) Declaration of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe with Respect to Personnel Strength

In order to facilitate follow-on negotiations as called for in Article XVIII of the CFE Treaty, which led to the CFE-1A Agreement on 6 July 1992, the Parties to the

⁵ SIPRI Yearbook 1997, pages 470-471.

Treaty agreed not to increase the peacetime personnel strength of their conventional armed forces in the region during these negotiations.

(iii) Declaration of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe with respect to Land-Based Naval Aircraft

The mandate under which the CFE Treaty was negotiated expressly includes all conventional armaments and equipment permanently based on land in the ATTU area. The Russians adamantly opposed counting their land-based naval aircraft (LBNA) as coming under CFE aircraft ceilings, since US and other Western carrier-based aircraft would not be counted. It was finally agreed that a political commitment would cap LBNA separately outside the Treaty

According to this declaration, each group of states commits itself to hold no more than 430 LBNA combat aircraft in the CFE zone, of which no more than 400 may belong to any one state. It also bans the subordination of attack helicopters to land-based naval forces

(iii) *The CFE-1A Agreement*

22 In Article XVIII, the CFE Treaty called for a continuation of negotiations on conventional armed forces with the same mandate and in order to "conclude an agreement on additional measures aimed at further strengthening security and stability in Europe and [...] including measures to limit the personnel strength of their conventional armed forces within the area of application". These negotiations were wound up on 6 July 1992 with the conclusion of an agreement called CFE-1A whose implementation began on 17 July 1992

23 CFE-1A constitutes a political commitment by its signatories to limit and, where applicable, reduce the personnel strength of their conventional armed forces. In contrast to the CFE Treaty, CFE-1A is not a legally binding agreement and thus not subject to ratification by parliaments

24. The core of the CFE-1A agreement is a "ceiling" on the military personnel of each par-

ticipating state within the CFE Treaty's area of application. Each participating state determined its own ceiling, taking into consideration its national defence plans and security interests. These numerical ceilings were not subject to negotiation among the participants, although the levels were open to discussion prior to adoption of the agreement. In general terms, the CFE-1A limitation applies to land-based military personnel in the area of application.

25. The CFE-1A agreement also provides for a broad, detailed exchange of information on the military manpower of the participating states. In general, information provided for most categories is broken down to show the strength of individual units at the level of brigade or regiment and higher.

26. To further enhance security and promote transparency among the participating states, the CFE-1A agreement includes three stabilising measures, requiring the notification of significant increases in unit strength, call-up of reserves or resubordination of units.

(iv) *The 1996 Review Conference in Vienna*

27. Article XXI 1 of the CFE Treaty provides for periodic review conferences, the first to be held 46 months after its entry into force and at five-year intervals thereafter.

28. The first CFE Review Conference was held from 15 to 31 May 1996 in Vienna. This conference dealt in particular with an examination of the implementation of the limitation and reduction provisions of the Treaty and with an assessment of the application of its verification and information provisions

29 The most important results of the Review Conference were

- the signature of a Flank Document Agreement to the CFE Treaty (see Chapter VI),
- the decision to start the process of adapting the CFE Treaty to the new security situation in Europe by defining the "scope and parameters" of Treaty adaptation as a matter of priority. The final objective of its adaptation was to permit the CFE Treaty to sustain its

key role in the European security architecture;

A progress report on the intermediate results of this adaptation process, including recommendations on the way forward was to be considered at the OSCE summit in Lisbon in December 1996.

30. It should be pointed out that the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact challenged many of the premises which had been the basis of the CFE Treaty. Parties to the Treaty can no longer be divided into a NATO and a Warsaw Pact group, cold war arms concentration in central Europe has lost its meaning, the zone system is less relevant and the Treaty may have to be opened to new parties. Moreover, Russia has grown increasingly worried about the prospect of NATO enlargement, pointing out that the ratio of Russian to NATO forces has changed considerably to NATO's advantage.

31. In preparing the scope and parameters document for the Lisbon agreement, Russia proposed a large number of subjects for the negotiations to adapt the CFE Treaty. Its many proposals included a revision of the group structure with a system specifying national levels, regulation of the status of conventional armed forces stationed on foreign territory, revision of regional limitations and the possibility of using armed forces for peacekeeping purposes. Central European countries were particularly keen on adapting the Treaty to their expectations regarding future membership of NATO. NATO's approach was rather cautious and limited because it wanted to respond to Russian demands but at the same time have enough room for manoeuvre. It was keen to maintain the integrity of the Treaty, but was prepared to review the group structure and consider voluntary accession by other states.

(v) The Flank Document Agreement

32. Soon after the entry into force of the CFE Agreement, both Ukraine and Russia complained that they had problems with the implementation of the Article V limitation on Treaty Limited Equipment that can be located in the flank area of a country.

33. In September 1993, the representative of Ukraine pointed out to the Joint Consultative

Group that it considered the flank limits imposed upon it completely unjustified. He noted that this would force Ukraine to ensure the defence of one quarter of its territory with only 17% of its available tanks, 7% of its armoured combat vehicles and 22% of its artillery. It should be noted that at the time Ukraine also needed to confirm and emphasise its sovereignty and that the flank limits would also oblige it to abandon existing infrastructures and build new ones at considerable cost.

34. Soon afterwards, the Russian President, Boris Yeltsin, wrote to all NATO leaders requesting the removal of Article V of the CFE Treaty. His main reasons were: the drastic changes that had occurred in the political situation on the continent, the increased turmoil along Russia's borders, and the complex economic and social problems the Russian Federation was contending with owing to the redeployment of massive numbers of troops from eastern Europe. President Yeltsin also observed that the two districts constrained by Article V (Leningrad and North Caucasus) comprised over half the territory of European Russia, and that the restraints laid down were discriminatory as they were not imposed in a similar fashion on any Western state.

35. Russia also had other important considerations. As a result of the implosion of the former Soviet Union, the North Caucasus Military District had been transformed from a rear area into a border district. Moreover, Russia noted a rising threat to stability on its southern flank, due to such factors as independence movements within its borders and Muslim fundamentalism at its borders.

36. While the United States and the United Kingdom in particular were prepared to react positively and constructively, others were less enthusiastic. In particular, Norway and Turkey, which both border the flank area, initially opposed any compromise on the flanks. Turkey strongly believes that Russia maintains imperialist ambitions in the Caucasus region and is the prime mover behind hostilities in Georgia as well as behind the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. An increase in Russian forces in the flank area would also reduce the warning time available to Turkey and Norway and thus run counter to their security.

interests. Finally, these countries argue that a change in the CFE Treaty or its overall demise could pave the way for a renewed European or regional arms race due to new tensions brought about by the end of the cold war.

37. The United States, showing understanding for the problems facing Ukraine and Russia, made great efforts to conclude an agreement which was finally signed at the CFE Review Conference in Vienna on 31 May 1996.

38. In the Flank Document Agreement, certain territory has been removed from the original flank zone, resulting in a "map realignment" which reduces the size of the zone. Additional constraints are imposed upon equipment in the areas removed from the flank zone and additional transparency measures apply to both the flank zone and those areas removed from the flank zone.

39. The Flank Document Agreement allows the Russian Federation the right to utilise "to the maximum extent possible" the CFE Treaty provisions that allow temporary deployment of equipment within and outside its territory, to be achieved through free negotiations and with full respect to states' sovereignty. In addition, the Russian Federation has the right to utilise "to the maximum extent possible" the reallocation of current quotas for equipment, to be achieved through free negotiations and with full respect for sovereignty of the States Parties involved. In addition, Russia must lower its force levels in the region so that its equipment holdings in the old and new flank zone meet all CFE obligations by 31 May 1999.

40. The Baltic states, which in the autumn of 1991 had decided to dissociate themselves from the CFE regime, were not pleased with the Flank Document Agreement which allowed Russia to raise its ceiling for armoured combat vehicles in the Pskov enclave from 180 to 600. They deplored the fact that security in their region was diminished through an increased military presence near their borders.

41. On 8 April 1997, Azerbaijan, Ukraine and Moldova announced their intention not to ratify the Flank Document Agreement, arguing that in their view the text legitimised the presence of Russian forces in the former Soviet republics. But in the end they did ratify it, under consider-

able United States pressure, thereby enabling the Flank Document Agreement to come into force on 15 May 1997.

(vi) The OSCE summit meeting in Lisbon

42. In the context of the OSCE summit meeting in Lisbon on 2 and 3 December 1996, the 30 CFE states agreed on a scope and parameters document. This document contains the terms of reference for negotiations to adapt the CFE Treaty to the political and military changes that have occurred in Europe since the Treaty was signed in November 1990.

43. For these negotiations, it was agreed to retain all categories of TLE, the information and verification regimes and the area of application. The parties would discuss the evolution of the group structure and the possibility of other states acceding to the Treaty. They would also discuss a possible system of national limits for Treaty Limited Equipment, the development of redistribution mechanisms and provisions on zonal and aggregate numbers preserving the principles of zonal limitations and avoiding any destabilising accumulation of forces. The parties would also consider means to make sure that the Treaty functioned during crises and examine conflicts and rules for the involvement of forces in UN or OSCE peacekeeping operations and for temporary deployments which would exceed the agreed limits. Finally, it was agreed that the parties would address the possibility of including new or expanded categories of conventional weapons or equipment.

44. Negotiations in the Joint Consultative Group were to start in Vienna on 21 January 1997 and a progress report was to be submitted to the OSCE ministerial meeting in Copenhagen at the end of 1997. The scope and parameters document mentioned mid-1998 as a rough deadline for completion of the CFE adaptation negotiations.

*(vii) The Founding Act
on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security
between NATO and the Russian Federation*

45. When it became clear that its enlargement policy might easily resuscitate the antagonistic rhetoric of the cold war days, NATO realised

that a substantial gesture had to be made in order to meet Russia's demand that it participate extensively in the Euro-Atlantic security discussion. NATO accordingly proposed the elaboration of what was called a "Charter" on its relations with Russia. After intensive negotiations on both form and substance, a Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation was signed in Paris on 27 May 1997. This Founding Act based relations between NATO and Russia on a number of principles and stipulated the creation of a NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council with the aim of progressively building up trust, unity of purpose and the habit of consultation and cooperation between NATO and Russia. It enumerated a large number of areas for such consultation and cooperation.

46. In Chapter IV on politico-military matters, specific attention was paid to the importance of the adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe for the broader context of security in the OSCE area. It was further stipulated that:

"NATO and Russia believe that an important goal of CFE Treaty adaptation should be a significant lowering in the total amount of Treaty-Limited Equipment permitted in the Treaty's area of application compatible with the legitimate defence requirements of each State Party. NATO and Russia encourage all States Parties to the CFE Treaty to consider reductions in their CFE equipment entitlements, as part of an overall effort to achieve lower equipment levels that are consistent with the transformation of Europe's security environment.

The member states of NATO and Russia propose to other CFE States Parties to carry out such adaptation of the CFE Treaty so as to enable States Parties to reach, through a transparent and cooperative process, conclusions regarding reductions they might be prepared to make and resulting national Treaty-Limited Equipment ceilings. These will then be codified as binding limits in the adapted Treaty to be agreed by consensus of all States Parties, and reviewed in 2001 and at five-year intervals thereafter. In doing so, the States

Parties will take into account all the levels of Treaty-Limited Equipment established for the Atlantic-to-the-Urals area by the original CFE Treaty, the substantial reductions that have been carried out since then, the changes to the situation in Europe and the need to ensure that the security of no state is diminished."

Finally,

"The member states of NATO and Russia [reaffirmed] that States Parties to the CFE Treaty should maintain only such military capabilities, individually or in conjunction with others, as are commensurate with individual or collective legitimate security needs, taking into account their international obligations, including the CFE Treaty."

(viii) The present CFE-adaptation negotiations in Vienna

47. In the negotiations which started in Vienna on 21 January 1997, Russia again made it clear that it was not pleased by the forthcoming NATO enlargement, which would expand one of the two blocs which had played such an important role in the negotiations and establishment of the CFE Treaty. It is indeed true that one of the objectives of the CFE adaptation process was to do away with the bloc-to-bloc approach

48. When it appeared that negotiations in Vienna were close to deadlock, NATO countries made it clear that they were prepared to make unilateral reductions to their Treaty-allocated armaments ceilings that went further than those announced earlier. On 26 June 1997, NATO declared that it was willing to eliminate 80% of the armaments it is authorised to store. This involved materiel that the British, Americans and Germans could have kept in warehouses as reserves in the event of a major crisis. In all, NATO would be lowering its global weapons ceilings by 10%. This meant it would only have a right to 16 794 tanks and 17 372 artillery pieces, compared to 20 000 each for these two categories under the CFE Treaty. It would also have a right to 27 718 armoured combat vehicles, against 30 000 originally. The United States, the United Kingdom, France and Italy said they were willing to lower, on a national basis, the ceilings

on weapons they could deploy within their operational units. France announced a drop of about 5% in its national land weapons ceiling; the United Kingdom made a similar offer for the categories of equipment covered by the Treaty (tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, helicopters and fighter planes). The United States agreed to a ceiling of 1 812 tanks (against 4 006), 3 037 armoured vehicles (against 5 372), 1 553 artillery pieces (against 2 492) and 404 helicopters (against 431). Italy would agree to an average 6% drop in its ceilings. However, these countries were not willing to reduce the number of fighter planes they can station in Europe (784). Earlier, on 14 March 1997, NATO had already declared that it did not foresee permanent or additional stationing of large fighting forces in new member states after its enlargement.

49. On 23 July 1997, the Joint Consultative Group, in which all 30 CFE States Parties participate, decided to adopt a number of basic elements for treaty adaptation. The most important was the decision to replace the bloc-to-bloc structure by a system which will set national and territorial ceilings for each country. National ceilings will determine the number of Treaty Limited Equipment (TLE) items each State Party is allowed to have in the Treaty's area of application. Territorial ceilings will replace the existing structure of zones. These territorial ceilings will cover the number of weapons of national forces and of foreign forces deployed or likely to be deployed in a specific country (the so-called stationed forces)

50. The CFE zone of application will no longer be subdivided into geographic zones with regional sub-ceilings, instead, according to Article 13 of the JCG's decision:

“The adaptation process will include consideration of the possibility of establishing specific stabilising measures, which might include measures of restraint or constraints in particular regions and areas of the Treaty's area of application, including central and eastern Europe, in order to prevent any potentially threatening build-up of conventional forces ”

51. As regards stationed forces, it was also decided to “develop additional information requirements and measures of transparency in re-

spect of stationed forces, including pre-notification of changes in the equipment holdings of a stationed forces unit”.

52. Russia is determined to limit the possibilities for permanent stationing and temporary deployment of NATO forces on the territory of its member states. Discussions on this contentious issue have not yet led to a final settlement. As mentioned earlier, NATO had already declared on 14 March 1997 that it did not foresee permanent and additional stationing of large fighting forces in new member states after its enlargement, partly in order to allay Russian security concerns about NATO's expansion

53. In connection with this declaration, however, NATO is proposing a “specific stabilising measure” which would freeze the territorial ceilings of a number of central and eastern European states at the level of national ceilings, thus restricting the capacity of these states to accept stationed forces. In NATO's view, this measure should not only apply to the territory of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, but also to parts of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. Both Russia and Belarus strongly objected to being included in this measure and further discussion was postponed until a later date.

54. Russia has also complained that the air component has been omitted from NATO proposals on territorial limits, although it represents the main strike force of contemporary armed forces. NATO argues that it relies on the ability to increase air power as a deterrent in areas such as Turkey and it is not about to give this up⁶

55. No firm decision was taken on the flank issue. Some States Parties had proposed fully integrating the 1996 Flank Document Agreement of 31 May 1996 in the adapted CFE Treaty. Russia, with some support from Ukraine, Bulgaria and Romania, argued however that the flank concept was outdated and that restrictions on the southern flank endangered Russia's ability to meet security requirements in the Caucasus. In particular, Turkey fiercely opposed any relaxation in the flank regime and further discussions on this were postponed

56. The States Parties have decided to include in the adapted CFE Treaty provisions to allow a

⁶ *Defense News*, 28 July-3 August 1997

State Party to receive, with its express consent, forces on its territory that would exceed its territorial ceiling for notified military exercises or as temporary deployments, provided that both are consistent with the objectives of an adapted Treaty. It was also decided that any states requesting to accede to the adapted Treaty would be allowed to do so. Accession would take place on a case-by-case basis and would require the agreement of all the States Parties.

57. Russia is also demanding the inclusion of a sufficiency rule for military alliances with the aim of setting legally-binding collective ceilings for NATO as a whole, irrespective of the number of its members. In Russia's view, this could offer some protection against any further NATO enlargement.

III. The United Nations Disarmament Conference in Geneva

58. The United Nations Disarmament Conference has been meeting in Geneva since 1979. There are 61 UN member states participating in the negotiations, which are based on the principle of consensus.

59. At its 1997 session which lasted from 20 January to 10 September, the following issues were on the Conference agenda:

- cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament;
- prevention of nuclear war, including all related matter,
- prevention of an arms race in outer space;
- effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,
- new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: radiological weapons,
- comprehensive programme of disarmament,
- transparency in armaments;
- consideration and adoption of the annual report and any other report, as ap-

propriate for submission to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

60. The Conference's report to the UN General Assembly mentions that throughout the session, intensive consultations were conducted with a view to reaching consensus on the programme of work. It then declares that it was not possible to establish any negotiating mechanism on any of the substantive items on the agenda. A large number of states which were not members of the Conference were invited to participate in its work. Since 1982, 20 states have applied for membership of the Conference. Given that the present consensus rule may increasingly cause problems with expanded membership, special coordinators have also been appointed to look into the question of the expansion of membership and the improved and effective running of the Conference.

(i) Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament

61. A number of delegations submitted a proposal for a mandate for an *ad hoc* committee to start negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified timeframe and envisaged the creation of working groups to negotiate: (a) as a first step, a universal and legally-binding multilateral agreement committing all states to the objective of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, (b) an agreement on further steps required in a phased programme with timeframes leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons, and (c) a convention on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices taking into account the report of the special coordinator on these items and the views relating to the scope of the Treaty. The Conference did not reach the consensus required for a decision on this subject.

(ii) Anti-personnel landmines

62. The Conference on Disarmament appointed a special coordinator to conduct consultations

⁷ An extensive report on this subject "The fight against the proliferation of anti-personnel mines" submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee by Mr Van der Maelen, Rapporteur, was discussed at the June 1997 session of the Assembly (Document 1572)

about a possible mandate on the issue of anti-personnel landmines. In an initiative to force a breakthrough in the deadlock in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, a conference held in Oslo in September 1997 and attended by delegates from 106 countries, prepared the text of a treaty on the total ban, use, production, storage and transfer of anti-personnel mines, to be adopted in Ottawa in December 1997. The so-called "Ottawa Process" was initiated by Canada in order to exert pressure on the UN Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to make some progress on this subject. Russia and China, which are among the main manufacturers and exporters of anti-personnel mines did not participate. President Yeltsin declared on 10 October 1997, however, that Russia supported the objective of a ban on anti-personnel mines and that it wanted to see the signature of such a treaty.

63. The United States took part in the conference but did not agree with the final draft text because it did not obtain satisfaction on three conditions it had set. Its first condition was that anti-personnel mines at the border between the two Koreas would not have to be removed for another nine years. It further demanded a waiver on the use of anti-personnel mines connected with anti-tank mines and a clause to the effect that in the event of aggression, a country would be able to withdraw from the treaty after six months. It also wants self-destructive "smart mines" to be excluded from the negotiations.

64. A NATO-sponsored workshop in Moscow in July 1977 on "advanced research and technologies for detection and destruction of buried/hidden anti-personnel landmines" brought together an international group of experts in order to initiate collaborative research efforts. At this conference, it was stated that multi-sensor systems currently in use have proved inadequate under some conditions, especially in steep and hilly regions, areas with dense, resistant vegetation, and regions affording natural and artificial camouflage. In addition, it was noted that the degree of metallic content in targets varies, creating difficulties in sharing meaningful data concerning the effectiveness of mine detectors, and efforts to set international testing and operating standards for mine detectors have been stymied by differing national standards

(iii) A ban on the production of fissile materials

65. A proposal was made to re-establish the *ad hoc* committee on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, but the Conference did not reach consensus on this issue.

66. It will not be easy to start negotiations on this subject in the Conference on Disarmament. A number of developing countries are demanding a direct link between such negotiations and a binding obligation on the nuclear states to destroy all their nuclear weapons. The nuclear states are not willing to meet that requirement. On the other hand, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States have already declared a moratorium on the production of fissile materials. On 23 September, Russia and the United States concluded an agreement under which the United States would provide money and assistance to convert Russia's most recent plutonium production sites into uranium production sites before the year 2000. They also agreed to limit their stockpiles of plutonium. The idea of negotiating the so-called "cut-off" treaty was launched in 1993 as a logical sequel to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). In particular, India and Pakistan are now strongly opposed to the start of negotiations – having failed to oppose the start of negotiations on a CTBT, they discovered later on that once the procedure had started, it could not be stopped. It finally led to the adoption of the CTBT by the UN General Assembly and its deposition for ratification

(iv) Chemical Weapons Convention

67. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and/or their Destruction which was signed by 165 states, has now been ratified by almost 100 states and entered into force on 29 April 1997. The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which is based in The Hague (Netherlands) and became operational on 29 April 1997, is monitoring the implementation of the Convention. According to the Convention, chemical weapons are to be eliminated by the year 2007.

68. The United States Congress ratified the Convention in April 1997. With a stockpile of

around 30 000 metric tonnes of unitary chemical weapons agents, the United States is actively involved in large-scale destruction operations. Russia, which has the world's largest officially declared stockpile of 40 000 metric tonnes of chemical weapons agents, ratified the Convention at the beginning of November 1997. In doing so, the Russian Duma also adopted legislation establishing a system for periodic reports to it on the status of the chemical weapons stockpile and financial and environmental issues, as well as on conversion of the chemical facilities to other uses. The main problem which had delayed ratification was the high cost of the chemical demilitarisation programme, for which Russia expects concrete contributions from other states. The total cost of the destruction of Russia's chemical weapons stockpile is estimated at between \$3.3 billion and \$5 billion⁸. Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United States are already involved in programmes for the destruction of Russian chemical weapons. Following ratification, Russia will now be able to participate in the second session of the Conference of States Parties to be held in The Hague on 1-5 December 1997. This international conference will also discuss and decide the future of the chemical weapons inspection system. Russia's ratification is also considered important because it may trigger ratification by other countries. Iran deposited its instruments of ratification just before Russia.

IV. Nuclear arms reductions and nuclear disarmament

(i) Introduction

69 The collapse of the Warsaw Pact and dismantling of the Soviet Union have radically changed the political landscape and, as a corollary, the way in which nuclear armaments are perceived. Now that the massive-scale threat has ceased to exist, nuclear weapons have lost their immediate military function which was based on east-west confrontation. They may not seem appropriate to meet the new challenges of the post-cold war period.

70. At the same time the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Gulf War have directed international attention to the new dangers of proliferation, with nuclear anarchy threatening to replace the nuclear order of the cold war. Major efforts are still under way with a view to reducing nuclear arsenals and preventing further proliferation.

71. The countries of Latin America, south-west Asia and southern Africa have pledged never to develop or use nuclear weapons. The nuclear powers for their part have considerably reduced their arsenals and demonstrated their commitment to continuing along the road towards disarmament by approving the prolongation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Yet we are far from living in a denuclearised world. Indeed, Russia and the United States are still each keeping more than 3 500 strategic nuclear warheads operational and will hold as many again in strategic reserve. Even if the START II Treaty is ratified, proliferation may continue and tactical nuclear weapons are still excluded from any reduction treaty. Moreover, not only has Russia not reduced, it has even strengthened, the role of nuclear weapons in its defence concept. The world's fifth declared nuclear power, China, remains totally aloof from the disarmament process and is even in the process of modernising and expanding its nuclear arsenal.

72. Nuclear armaments have always had an important role as a political instrument. During the cold war they were symbolic, within the Alliance, of the absolute guarantee by the United States of security in Europe, while France and the United Kingdom used the possession of nuclear weapons to assert their national sovereignty. Nuclear armaments remain a key component of western security, even if they are considered to be the very last bastion against the resurgence of major conflicts. If Europe wishes to build a European defence identity, the nuclear dimension will necessarily be part of the debate.

73. Doubts about the significance and ultimate purpose of nuclear armaments are gaining ground among the political classes. The fragility of the nuclear consensus is all the more worrying given that the new strategic role of nuclear weapons remains to be defined.

74. Thus it may become increasingly difficult to justify nuclear armaments. There is a strong

⁸ SIPRI Yearbook 1997, page 447

possibility that the five-yearly NPT review conferences and annual meetings of the preparatory committee will turn into a quasi standing tribunal in the focus of media attention at which nuclear countries will have to justify themselves to non-nuclear countries. The Group of 21 and countries like Australia, New Zealand and Sweden, will not tire of calling for the total elimination of nuclear weapons and will make skilful use of the various UN fora such as the Geneva Conference on Disarmament to promote this aim. While Russia, China and non-declared nuclear countries such as Israel, Pakistan and India are unlikely to let themselves be swayed by such demands, the role and utilisation of such weapons has become an issue in many western countries for whom a world without nuclear weapons is not a wild fancy. The question of whether such weapons serve a useful purpose is once again very much on the agenda.

(ii) *The START Treaties*

75 In the light of these new developments, the United States and Russia realised that their nuclear armaments levels were too high and this prompted them to negotiate agreements on strategic nuclear armaments reductions. The START I and START II Treaties were the result of these negotiations.

76 The first START Treaty was signed in Moscow on 20 July 1991 by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev after more than six years of negotiations. The Treaty made provision for a reduction in nuclear forces to no more than 1 600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and 6 000 treaty-accountable warheads, of which no more than 4 900 may be deployed on intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles by the end of the treaty implementation period on 5 December 2001. It cut back considerably on intercontinental ballistic missiles and their associated launchers and charges, on the launchers for submarine-launched ballistic missiles and their warheads, and on heavy bombers and their weapons systems, including long-range nuclear cruise missiles

77. Ratification of the START I Treaty was delayed by the collapse of the Soviet Union and by the Supreme Soviet dissolving itself on 26 December 1991. On 1 October 1992, the US Senate agreed to ratify the Treaty pending final

settlement of the provisions for its application by four newly independent republics (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine). Russia ratified the Treaty on 4 November 1992 but held up the exchange of the instruments of ratification until Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan had subscribed to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and made arrangements for implementation of the Treaty. For the purposes of the NPT, Russia took over from the USSR as the state with a nuclear weapons holding (Lisbon Protocol, 23 May 1992). The START I Treaty was ratified by Kazakhstan on 2 July 1992, by Belarus on 4 February 1993 and by Ukraine in November 1993. Notwithstanding the complications in implementing the Treaty owing to the economic, technical and political problems involved in repatriating Ukraine's nuclear arsenals to Russia, the Treaty has already resulted in a substantial reduction in the number of strategic weapons. On the occasion of the 15th session of the Russian-American Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC), which took place in Geneva in May and June 1997, it was declared that the implementation of the START I Treaty was "ahead of schedule"⁹.

78. The START II Treaty was the subject of "common agreement" at the Bush-Yeltsin summit on 17 June 1992 and provided for a two-thirds reduction of strategic force levels as against those which existed at the beginning of the 1990s. It was signed on 3 January 1993.

79. Besides the considerable quantitative reductions foreseen by the Treaty, its most important component from the American standpoint was the elimination of all land-based strategic ballistic missiles with Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs). Under the Treaty, the production and deployment of MIRV missiles would be banned as of 1 January 2008 and all the launchers of such missiles, including those used for training and tests, would have to be destroyed or converted into single-warhead missile launchers

80. This complied with an American demand making strategic stability contingent on a concerted reduction of surface-to-surface multiple warhead missiles which it considered to be the

⁹ *Atlantic News*, 20 June 1997

most destabilising weapons in the nuclear arsenals.

81. There are two exceptions to this rule which take account of Russia's particular situation and should facilitate the reconstruction of its strategic potential, the backbone of which is its surface-to-surface MIRV missiles.

82. First of all, all Minuteman 3 missiles (three warheads) and 105 of the 170 SS-19 missiles (six warheads) may be maintained, provided that they are converted to single-warhead missiles. Furthermore, 20 launchers remain available to both parties in order to put spacecraft into orbit, and the Russians are authorised to convert 90 SS-18 missile silos to house missiles carrying warheads of the SS-25 type. The configuration of the new silos will be such that they cannot be used in the future to launch intercontinental ballistic missiles. Inspections will provide firm guarantees in this respect.

83. The START II verification procedure, involving a wide range of remote-sensing and on-the-spot observation techniques, will ensure that commitments are complied with. However, almost two years elapsed before the entry into force of the START I Treaty on 5 December 1994, and it was only in 1995 that the START II ratification procedure started. The American Senate ratified the Treaty on 26 January 1996 and ratification by the Duma in Russia is still posing problems (see next chapter).

84. The signing of the START II Treaty in Moscow on 3 January 1993 was hailed as a decisive breakthrough on the nuclear disarmament front and its entry into force was to be the first step in a process of transforming relations between the two protagonists of the cold war. Once it had been completed, the security of Russia and the United States would no longer depend on holding gigantic arsenals that had to be regularly modernised but would rather result from a process of "cooperative denuclearisation", with the ultimate aim of establishing strategic parity at sufficient levels of armaments. However, it has to be admitted that these promises have not been kept and that strategic arms reductions are still a far cry from the aims of the START negotiators.

85. The dissolution of the USSR and the problems connected with eliminating strategic armaments deployed on the territories of Ukraine,

Belarus and Kazakhstan have delayed entry into force of the START I Treaty, which in turn means that ratification of the START II Treaty, which was the next step in the procedure, could only enter an active phase at the beginning of 1995.

(iii) The reasons for Russia's reluctance to ratify the START II Treaty

86. The START II Treaty has stirred controversy within Russia's political classes and parliament. Many politicians and experts consider that it constitutes a threat to Russian security. For instance, the Director of the geopolitical and military forecasting centre in Moscow, Alexei Arbatov, has pointed out that the START II Treaty means destroying surface-to-surface intercontinental MIRV missiles which are the core of Russian strategic forces, while the United States is authorised to maintain its Trident 2 sea-to-surface ballistic missiles which also constitute a counter-force capability. Given that Russia does not possess sea-to-surface systems equivalent to the Trident and that its submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) fleet is more vulnerable than that of the United States to anti-submarine warfare techniques, the dismantling of its surface-to-surface MIRV missiles would deprive it of a counter-force capability.

87. The second element of the debate concerns the financial consequences of the Treaty. The Russians claim that it is expensive to destroy nuclear warheads and that there is pressure on their financial resources. Moreover they are obliged to restructure their strategic arsenal in order to comply with the obligations of the START II Treaty, and to replace, at an exorbitantly high cost, their SS-18 and SS-19 missiles with single-warhead SS-25 missiles. In order to maintain an armaments level compatible with the final ceilings of START II, Russia would have to produce and deploy nearly 500 new surface missiles at a rate of 80 or 90 a year until 2008. At the moment it deploys about ten a year and is unlikely to exceed this limit. Furthermore the maintenance costs for additional mobile surface-to-surface missiles would be six times higher than those of the surface-to-surface intercontinental missiles that they would be replacing.

88. Finally, according to the most optimistic forecasts, Russian GDP will grow by 25 to 30%

over the next five years and military budgets will hardly exceed the level of 20 billion dollars. Since one third of that sum will have to be spent on improving the situation of Russian army personnel, the amount of money available for converting the strategic arsenal is likely to be insufficient.

89. Military experts contend that the START II Treaty will not only emasculate Russian strategic forces but that their response capability will also be weakened by the concomitant development of an American anti-missile defence system. Their observation that six of the eleven radar that used to be available to the USSR are now outside Russian territory, while the Krasnoyarsk radar would have to be dismantled, is a point that must be taken on board in any assessment of the balance of power. In the same vein, Admiral Rudolf Golosov has remarked that one cannot ignore the vulnerability of Russian strategic forces to strikes by high-precision conventional weapons such as the Tomahawk cruise missiles that the Americans have already deployed on ships and submarines. Moreover, as the Russians see it, parity must be based on a qualitatively equivalent strategic capability on either side, and on the possibility of responding effectively to an offensive attack by enemy forces.

90. These difficulties shed uncertainty on the ratification of the START II Treaty, although some people have pointed out that the cost of the operation could be offset by later savings on strategic forces running costs. An unofficial estimate of the cost of implementing START I sets the figure at 30 billion roubles, to which must be added a further 7 to 10 billion roubles for START II. However, the cost of maintaining the strategic forces would be brought down from its present level of 20 billion roubles per year to 15 billion, once the agreed reductions had been implemented.

91. In order to assist Russia with the implementation of the START Treaties, the United States has established a financial programme bearing the same name as the Nunn-Lugar amendment. The prevailing attitude in Russia, however, is one of scepticism, given that the funds are meted out very sparingly and that the main beneficiaries are American consultants and service companies

92. Another area of concern for the Russian leadership is the possible American deployment of an antimissile defence system to protect the national territory. Indeed, the Republican opposition has expressed approval for such a project, and the fact that the date of deployment of the hypothetical NMD (2003) coincides with that of the planned completion of the reductions under START II only aggravates Russian fears of an erosion of their response capability by the end of the disarmament process. Furthermore, while accepting the legitimacy of setting up a system of defence against theatre missiles under the ABM Treaty, the Kremlin authorities are concerned that the performance of high-velocity anti-missile missiles will constitute a threat to their strategic missiles. This explains their insistence upon a clear dividing line between theatre missile defence systems, which would be authorised, and strategic missile defence systems, which would have to comply with the restrictions of the ABM Treaty.

93. NATO enlargement may also jeopardise ratification of the Treaty. Russia will have to adopt special measures to accommodate the fact that 80% of its strategic potential will be within the range of NATO bombers and that the credibility of its nuclear response capability will be limited by the planned START II reductions.

94. In conclusion, the Duma has laid down two conditions for ratifying the START II Treaty:

- (i) the allocation of sufficient resources for the reconstitution of a credible deterrence within the framework of the Treaty;
- (ii) strict compliance with the spirit and letter of the ABM Treaty, which means drawing a clear dividing line between theatre missile defence systems and strategic missile defence systems.

95. In order to adapt the rate of reductions to Russia's economic circumstances, the deadlines were recently prolonged by five years following an agreement concluded between Russia and the United States on 26 September 1997

96. On that date, the United States agreed to push back the effective date of the START II Treaty by five years, thereby clearing the way for negotiating a further reduction of strategic arse-

nals in the framework of a START III Treaty. The agreement signed with Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Russia allowed the United States to develop missile defence systems not exceeding a speed of 3 km/second under the 1972 ABM Treaty. Such systems include Theatre High Altitude Area Defence Systems.

(iv) The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

97. On 24 September 1996, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was opened for signature in New York. This Treaty imposes a total ban on the explosion of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, in space, under water and under the ground. It takes over the main provisions of the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, prohibiting the carrying out of "any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion" and urging each party "to prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control". Each party must furthermore refrain from causing, encouraging or in any way participating in such explosions (Article I). In recognition of the difficulty of such an undertaking, it was further stipulated that should the Treaty not take effect on the third anniversary of its opening for signature, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, with whom the Treaty is deposited, would convene a conference at the request of the majority of states already having deposited their ratification instruments, and attended by them, at which it would be decided by consensus which measures could be adopted, in compliance with international law, to speed up the ratification process. This procedure would be repeated each year in the hope of persuading recalcitrant countries to accede to the Treaty. Threshold countries could resist international pressure, as indeed they did when they opposed the NPT. However, a CTBT signed and ratified by a large number of states would be an international reference even before its entry into force. As is the case for other arms control agreements, there is provision for a state wishing to withdraw from its obligations, but only in the event of extraordinary circumstances which jeopardise its supreme interests. The party wishing to withdraw must in that case give advance notice of its intentions and justify its course of action. Russia announced that it would withdraw from the Treaty in order

to carry out tests if it had no other means at its disposal of checking the security and reliability of its nuclear weapons. Such interpretations of a country's "supreme" interests could lead to arbitrary decisions outside of international verification procedures.

98. In order to ensure implementation of the Treaty and organise a framework within which signatory states can consult and cooperate with each other, a Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organisation is to be established in Vienna. It is to be composed of the Conference of Participating States, an Executive Council and a Technical Secretariat. The Executive Council, which is to play a leading political role in the decision-making process, will be composed of 51 members from six different geographic regions. The Technical Secretariat will consist of a Director General plus the requisite scientific, technical and other staff.

99. The international monitoring system responsible for checking compliance with the Treaty will include seismic, radionuclide, hydroacoustic and infrasonic equipment. The system will be supported by an International Data Centre attached to the Technical Secretariat. The synergy between these different technologies will make it possible to verify activities below the power of one kilotonne, which is the seismic detectability threshold that was adopted.

100. On-the-spot international verification can be called for with regard to any state carrying out suspicious and non-justified activities. Such a request must be backed up by information collected by the international monitoring system, by any relevant technical information obtained by means of national verification systems in accordance with the generally recognised principles of international law, or by a combination of both.

101. Ten years after entry into force of the Treaty, a conference of signatories will be convened in order to examine its mode of operation and effectiveness. The Conference of Participating States, the main body of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organisation, will hold regular annual meetings to review any points, questions or problems within the scope of the Treaty. A preparatory committee comprising representatives of all signatories will be responsible for preparing CTBT implementation and for organising the first session of the Conference of

Participating States. It will have international organisation status.

102. The Treaty, which has unlimited duration, will enter into force 180 days after the deposit of the instrument of ratification of all the states listed in its annex, but in no case earlier than two years after its opening for signature. The annex contains a list of 44 states which participated in the Conference on Disarmament on 18 June 1996 and in the preparatory work for the 1996 session, and which possess nuclear power stations or research centres. The "threshold" states are included in the list because they match the stated criteria.

103. On 10 September 1996, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the CTBT as negotiated at the Conference on Disarmament and instructed the UN Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements for governments to sign the Treaty. The decision was adopted by 158 votes for, 3 against (India, Bhutan and Libya) and 5 abstentions (Cuba, Lebanon, Mauritius, Syria and Tanzania). Nineteen delegations from UN member countries were absent or not authorised to vote due to late payment of their dues to the Organisation. To date, 146 countries have signed the Treaty. The ratification process has started, but none of the five superpowers has ratified it yet.

104. India has announced that it does not subscribe to the planned Treaty and will not participate in the envisaged monitoring system. It does not consider the Treaty to be a step towards universal nuclear disarmament. Moreover, it considers that the terms of the Treaty are unacceptable in that they impinge on its sovereign right to decide, in light of its national interests, whether or not to accede to it. Pakistan approved the Resolution but specified that it would only sign the Treaty if India did likewise. The procedure which was followed, unprecedented in the history of the Conference on Disarmament, will certainly have an impact on the future of the Conference.

105. The international community's main concerns about nuclear tests relate to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the race for a qualitative improvement of nuclear arsenals and radioactive contamination of man's environment.

106. These days it is possible, with no prior testing, for any state with its own technology

base or with sufficient financial resources to acquire the technology to manufacture relatively simple atomic fission systems. However, by imposing a test ban on all signatories, the CTBT may strengthen the NPT, since it rectifies a major imbalance between the rights and obligations of nuclear and non-nuclear states. This balance cannot be appreciated until all threshold countries have officially acceded to the CTBT.

107. Testing is necessary not only to modernise the first two generations of nuclear weapons, but also to develop "third generation" nuclear weapons, which aim for a new degree of perfection in the nuclear fission and fusion techniques used, with a view to providing such weapons with special effects.

108. Thus an end to nuclear tests will be beneficial in terms of arms control in that it will prevent any substantial qualitative improvements of nuclear weapons. A test ban will also make it highly unlikely that completely new and unforeseen phenomena will arise in the nuclear weapons field.

109. On 15 May, then on 17 August 1995, China performed two underground nuclear tests, its 42nd and 43rd since 1964, on the Lop Nor site in Xinjiang province. These tests were condemned by the United States, the United Kingdom and Russia as well as by Australia, Japan and South Korea. China has now developed a new intercontinental ballistic missile, the Dongfeng 31, with an estimated range of 8 000 km, which means that it is capable for the first time of reaching Europe and the east coast of the United States. France carried out six nuclear tests from 5 September 1995 onwards in Mururoa, in order to check the security of its deterrent force. The third explosion, detonated on 28 October, had a force equivalent to 110 000 tonnes of TNT. The French tests were criticised by New Zealand, Australia, the Pacific states, Japan, Russia and the United States.

*(v) Prolongation of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)*

110. The representatives of the 175 signatories of the NPT, which was signed in 1968, met from 17 April to 12 May 1995 in order to review and prolong the Treaty. The five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council

(China, France, Russia, the United States and the United Kingdom) unanimously adopted Resolution 984 providing for assistance to non-nuclear states which might be victims of a nuclear attack. The United States and the United Kingdom announced that they would stop the production of plutonium and of uranium enriched for military purposes. The decision to prolong the Treaty indefinitely was taken on 11 May by 175 of the 178 signatories of the NPT. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Kiribati and Taiwan were absent from the Conference. Three documents were adopted. The first imposed additional obligations on member states, including nuclear disarmament, and called on all parties to put an end to nuclear tests once and for all in 1996. The second established a disarmament monitoring procedure. The third, at the initiative of 14 Arab states, called for the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East and the accession "without exception" of all states of the Middle East to the NPT. In order to obtain an unlimited prolongation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the nuclear powers agreed to several obligations. *Inter alia* they specified – and to a large extent harmonised – their "negative security guarantees" and pledged to refrain from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against those countries which did not possess such weapons. Strong pressure is currently being brought to bear in the framework of the Geneva disarmament negotiations to move from these unilateral commitments to the stage of a more legally binding multilateral agreement.

(vi) Nuclear arms reduction in Europe

111. By comparison with the cold-war situation, the numbers of nuclear weapons in Europe have been substantially reduced. Russia has withdrawn from the European theatre all the tactical nuclear weapons belonging to the former Soviet Union, and the United States now only has 150 B-61 nuclear gravity bombs left in Europe. The United Kingdom is in the process of dismantling its WE-177 bombs, while France has decided to scrap all its ground-to-ground nuclear systems

112. The new geopolitical realities in Europe have considerably reduced the likelihood of a conflict involving nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future

113. Atlantic Alliance members have adapted their defence arrangements to the new reality. Nuclear forces have been scaled down and re-structured from a conceptual and operational point of view. The doctrinal differences of the cold war have practically disappeared and the three Alliance nuclear powers are in agreement over the broad thrust of nuclear deterrence. The United States, the United Kingdom and France regard nuclear weapons more than ever as political instruments within the framework of deterrence based on a smaller arsenal. Their functions are limited to counterbalancing nuclear arsenals elsewhere in the world and offering a supplementary option to dissuade possible proliferants from using NBC weapons. To compensate for any inadequacies in nuclear deterrence in the face of rudimentary NBC arsenals, the three powers are seeking ways of conventionalising the lower stages of deterrence by deploying high-precision conventional weapons with high-powered explosive charges which are capable of producing satisfactory results, without the undesirable effects of their nuclear counterparts.

114. Despite the reductions, the West's deterrence system has survived the end of the cold war. NATO's collective potential still consists of American and British nuclear weapons. The United States still maintains 150 sub-strategic weapons in western Europe. These symbolise the Allies' nuclear solidarity and maintain the strategic coupling between Europe and the United States. The United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Greece and Turkey have the installations and infrastructure to accommodate American nuclear weapons

115. The United Kingdom has now abandoned its WE-177 nuclear bombs. It intends to rely solely on submarine-launched ballistic missiles and thus will be the only nuclear power whose deterrent force is made up of a single component. The British Navy is in the process of modernising its fleet of submarines by acquiring four "Vanguard" class vessels. The submarines are equipped with Trident missiles whose accuracy, range and flexibility are far superior to those of their Polaris predecessors. Because of these characteristics, Trident can be used for both substrategic and strategic missions. The number of nuclear warheads on board each submarine will be reduced from 128 to a maximum of 96

116. France has also abandoned the Hades missile and medium-range ground-to-ground missiles. Its deterrent force will in future be based solely on submarine and air components. Under the nuclear-powered guided-missile submarine programme, France is to commission four "Triomphant" class submarines, with the first coming into service around 2005. Each submarine will be equipped with 16 M-45 missiles carrying 6 nuclear TN-75 warheads. The M-51 missile, fitted with a new nuclear warhead, is to replace the M-45 from 2010. The airborne component consists of three Mirage 2000N squadrons and two Super Etendard Navy flotilla, equipped with medium-range air-to-ground missiles (ASMP). From 2000, these aircraft will be phased out and replaced by Rafales. From 2008, the ASMP-Plus will take over from the ASMP. It will have a range of 100 km at low altitude and 500 km at high altitude (as against 80 and 300 km for the ASMP).

117. On 26 July 1994, France and the United Kingdom decided that the joint Anglo-French Committee on Nuclear Policy and Doctrine, established provisionally in October 1992, should have permanent status. The Committee, which brings together senior civil servants from the French and British Foreign and Defence ministries, has made a comparison of the two countries' attitudes to the role of deterrence, nuclear doctrines and ideas, anti-missile defence, disarmament and non-proliferation.

118. In Germany, Alliance nuclear weapons were regarded in the past as essential for protecting national territory but, at the same time, as symbolic both of a threat to the nation's existence in the event of east-west conflict and of its dependence on other powers – contrary to the United Kingdom or France where nuclear weapons were felt, on the whole, to be an instrument of national independence and political power in international relations. The major debate that deployment of "Euro-missiles" aroused in Germany showed that even under Soviet threat, consensus on deterrence could not be taken for granted. When the Berlin Wall fell and Germany was reunited, nuclear weapons became even more difficult to justify in the eyes of many Germans. The security agreement signed between France and Germany in December 1996 represented a step forward. The German Government

stated that it was ready to "enter into a dialogue on the function of nuclear deterrence, in the context of the European defence policy"¹⁰. The Franco-German axis was to be the basis of European defence. Germany's participation is therefore essential to it and could bring about that of other European countries. Moreover, the two countries have already established close co-operation in the field of conventional weapons and have, in the Defence Council, an institution where consultation on nuclear matters could take place on a regular basis.

119. Although the United Kingdom, as a nuclear power, is in quite a different position to Germany, the Anglo-French Committee held the mirror up to what Franco-German dialogue could be. At the start of any consultation, there must be a search for a consensus on the role of nuclear weapons in European security.

(vii) Are Russia's nuclear forces deteriorating?

120. After the break-up of the Soviet Union, Russia was confronted with the challenge of carving out a place for itself that allowed it to fill the void left by its predecessor and regain its position in the world.

121. Uncertainty as to the future role of the armed forces in a Russia no longer involved in global confrontation with a strategic adversary, combined with a substantial reduction in the defence budget, brought about a decline in the political and social status of the army, which could only lead to tension and discontent among the military. Material considerations are also tending to make the situation worse. Low wages or delays in their payment, the lack of decent housing for officers' families returning home from abroad, particularly from Germany, notwithstanding the fact that that country financed the building of thousands of homes in Russia, were circumstances that were exploited by a variety of political forces seeking to take advantage of anger and disappointment felt within the army.

122. Some of the military have taken advantage of the situation to increase their influence in the political domain. Such was the case in Moldova where General Lebed, who had command of the Russian army units there, conducted policies of

¹⁰ *Relations internationales et strategiques*, No 25, Spring 1997, pages 177-183.

his own in defiance of the Government. It was also the case in Georgia, where Russian soldiers set themselves up as the defenders of Russia's geostrategic interests.

123. Although it would seem that Russia's proposals directed towards encouraging convergence between its own and European and Atlantic security and defence structures, and improving the quality of its involvement in the decision-making processes are having some success, there is still a possibility that Russia will come to feel increasingly isolated, which cannot be in anyone's interest.

124. The fear of isolation and of being sidelined by European institutions, an abiding distrust of NATO and dissatisfaction with the latter's enlargement into central Europe, together with a desire for greater recognition by the West, explains Russia's reluctance to dismantle its nuclear arsenal.

125. After lengthy discussions, NATO and Russia have finally reached agreement on setting up enhanced cooperation within the framework of the Founding Act signed in Paris on 27 May 1997. The fact that Kremlin leaders have just approved a massive security plan setting out Russia's role in the 21st century is greatly to be welcomed. This represents a new military doctrine purporting that the major threat for Russia comes not from enemies beyond the country's borders but from social and economic problems within them. The successful involvement of Russian troops in IFOR and SFOR operations in Bosnia, and the fact they performed well there, therefore proves that the present dilemma is one that can be resolved.

126. Notwithstanding these positive developments, it should be noted that the Russian armed forces are still deeply demoralised. The Chairman of the Defence Council, Mr Yuri Baturin, complaining of inadequate funding, has stated that "if things continue as they are now for another two years, we are likely to end up with a navy without ships, an airforce without aircraft and a defence industry incapable of producing up-to-date weapons", while the former Defence Minister, Igor Rodionov, has warned against the risk of headquarters losing command of their armies: "Russia could soon reach a threshold

beyond which its nuclear missiles and systems will be out of control".

127. The Chairman of the State Duma's Defence Committee, Lev Rokhlin, who as a General commanded Russian troops in Chechnya during the recent conflict, has warned President Yeltsin that Russia's nuclear forces are heading towards "extinction" because of lack of funds and maintenance. He stated that there was no money for the work to extend the life of the missiles that are on combat duty and have exhausted their guaranteed term of service, and the necessary funds were not being allocated for work on new types of weapons. Western sources have taken these warnings seriously, especially regarding a deterioration in vital command and control systems and in readiness and reliability¹¹

128. Indeed, the frustrated and undisciplined Russian military undeniably represent a threat not only to their own government and their fellow countrymen, but are also a latent danger for neighbouring states and, in view of the presence of strategic weapons, a nightmare for the whole world.

129. The situation poses serious problems in terms of troop morale and desperation in the national defence industry, leading to a rise in crime and illegal trade, including widespread and potentially dangerous trafficking in armaments, not to mention nuclear components, which could complicate military reform and nuclear non-proliferation.

130. It is impossible to ascertain how many weapons are in circulation in the civilian sphere and whether they include tactical nuclear weapons. It is claimed that Russia still has some 10 000 such weapons in its possession¹². The former General, Alexander Lebed, accused the government of concealing the truth over the disappearance of more than 80 nuclear "mini weapons" which according to him had been unaccounted for since they were left behind in a number of former Soviet Republics¹³. Experts have confirmed the existence of such "mini nukes", which are similar to the United States' nuclear demolition munitions, all of which were destroyed in 1991. Thefts of material used in the

¹¹ *The International Herald Tribune*, 27 June 1997.

¹² *The Financial Times*, 24 September 1997

¹³ *NRC-Handelsblad*, 27 September 1997

manufacture of nuclear weapons, such as plutonium or enriched uranium, have already been noted.

131. The Russian Government has repeatedly declared that it is in full control of its nuclear arsenal and this assertion has been confirmed by United States security experts. It should, however, be noted that the export of military nuclear know-how through the emigration of nuclear experts from the territory of the former Soviet Union is a long-term risk.

132. The potential consequences of the existence of large quantities of nuclear waste and disused nuclear submarines have also begun to arouse major concern. The case of the Northern Fleet, analysed in the Bellona report (the Bellona report on the Northern Fleet was the first document to be banned in Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union) is an excellent illustration of the problem. According to the report, there are at least 21 067 cubic metres of solid radioactive waste and at least 75 423 cubic metres of radioactive effluent in naval bases, shipyards and storage installations used by the Northern Fleet. More than 24 000 fuel rods and nine reactor cores are stored in temporary deposits. Of over 130 nuclear submarines that Russia has withdrawn from service, 88 belong to the Northern Fleet and 52 of them have been decommissioned, still with their load of nuclear fuel. Most of the installations used by the Northern Fleet are allo-

cated on the Kola peninsula, affecting an area with a population of over 100 000 inhabitants. The largest temporary storage depot of irradiated nuclear fuel is Andreeva Bay, 40 km from the Norwegian border. Here, 21 000 irradiated fuel rods, equivalent to 90 nuclear reactors, are stored in very poor conditions. Serious leaks of radioactivity were detected in the 1980s. To a very large extent, the transport and reprocessing of nuclear waste do not comply with safety regulations and the situation is aggravated by a lack of funds for maintaining existing storage and processing plants, and for building safer, more modern installations. In 1994, only 35 % of the funds allocated were actually paid over to the Northern Fleet. The amounts received were basically used to pay the salaries of and provide social assistance to Fleet staff. Over the last two years, nothing whatsoever has been done to guarantee the safety of the nuclear waste.

133. Until 1991, Russia practised Arctic dumping of its radioactive naval waste. The one train used for transporting waste to the reprocessing plant at Chelyabinsk called at the ports only three times a year. Full containers of irradiated fuel have been stored in the open for years on end and accidents have occurred. In September 1996, a memorandum of understanding on cooperation on environmental matters was signed between the United States and Russian defence ministers following accidents of this nature.

APPENDIX I

Total TLE liabilities and reductions as of 1 January 1997

State ¹	Reductions		
	Total liability	Reduction	% of total
Armenia	65	18	0.04
Azerbaijan ²	..	126	0.26
Belarus	3 247	3 247	6.75
Belgium	370	370	0.77
Bulgaria	1 630	1 636	3.40
Canada	0	0	0.00
Czech Republic	3 800	3 806	7.91
Denmark	146	147	0.31
France	824	824	1.71
Georgia	0	0	0.00
Germany	8 586	8 586	17.85
Greece	1 518	2 144	4.46
Hungary	782	1 379	2.87
Italy	1 098	1 137	2.36
Moldova	0	59	0.12
Netherlands	342	411	0.85
Norway	201	201	0.42
Poland	2 223	2 855	5.93
Portugal	0	3	0.01
Romania	5 065	5 065	10.53
Russia ³	10 362	10 395	21.61
Slovakia	1 730	1 730	3.60
Spain	458	569	1.18
Turkey	1 182	1 302	2.71
United Kingdom	218	218	0.45
Ukraine ³	4 069	4 075	8.47
United States	192	644	1.34
Former WTO	32 973	34 391	71.49
NATO	15 135	16 556	34.41
Total	48 108	50 947	105.90

Source. Consolidated matrix on the basis of data available as of 1 January 1997, Joint Consultative Group, 18 March 1997

¹ Iceland, Kazakhstan and Luxembourg have no weapon limits in the application zone.

² Reduction continues.


³ TLE belonging to the Black Sea Fleet is not included.

APPENDIX II
C/E ceilings, liabilities, reductions and holdings, as of 1 January 1997

State ¹	Tanks				ACVs				Artillery				Aircraft				Helicopters			
	Ceil	Liab	Red.	Hold	Ceil	Liab	Red	Hold	Ceil	Liab	Red	Hold	Ceil	Liab.	Red	Hold.	Ceil.	Liab.	Red.	Hold
Armenia	220	0	0	102	220	65	18	218	285	0	0	225	100	0	0	6	50	0	0	7
Azerbaijan ²	220	0	13	270	220	0	71	557	285	0	42	301	100	0	0	48	50	0	0	15
Belarus	1 800	1 773	1 773	1 178	2 600	1 341	1 341	2 518	1 615	3	3	1 533	294	130	130	286	80	0	0	71
Belgium	334	28	28	334	1 099	284	284	678	320	58	58	312	232	0	0	166	46	0	0	46
Bulgaria	1 475	794	794	1 475	2 000	332	332	1 985	1 750	404	410	1 750	235	100	100	235	67	0	0	43
Canada	77	0	0	0	277	0	0	0	38	0	0	0	90	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Czech Rep	957	1 123	1 123	952	1 367	1 217	1 217	1 367	767	1 409	1 409	767	230	51	57	143	50	0	0	36
Denmark	353	146	146	343	316	0	0	286	553	0	0	503	106	0	1	74	12	0	0	12
France	1 306	39	39	1 156	3 820	570	570	3 574	1 292	149	149	1 192	800	0	0	650	396	66	66	326
Georgia	220	0	0	79	220	0	0	102	285	0	0	92	100	0	0	6	50	0	0	3
Germany	4 166	2 566	2 566	3 248	3 446	4 257	4 257	2 537	2 705	1 623	1 623	2 058	900	140	140	560	306	0	0	205
Greece	1 735	1 013	1 099	1 735	2 534	0	449	2 325	1 878	505	517	1 878	650	0	79	486	30	0	0	20
Hungary	835	510	510	797	1 700	65	531	1 300	840	207	207	840	180	0	31	141	108	0	0	59
Italy	1 348	300	324	1 283	3 339	537	537	3 031	1 955	205	205	1 932	650	0	0	516	139	56	71	132
Moldova	210	0	0	0	210	0	59	209	250	0	0	155	50	0	0	27	50	0	0	0
Netherlands	743	0	0	722	1 080	261	261	610	607	59	59	448	230	0	0	181	50	22	91	12
Norway	170	127	127	170	225	57	57	199	527	17	17	246	100	0	0	74	0	0	0	0
Poland	1 730	1 120	1 130	1 729	2 150	301	900	1 442	1 610	741	770	1 581	460	61	94	384	130	0	0	94
Portugal	300	0	0	186	430	0	0	346	450	0	0	320	160	0	3	105	26	0	0	0
Romania	1 375	1 591	1 591	1 375	2 100	973	973	2 091	1 475	2 423	2 423	1 466	430	78	78	372	120	0	0	16
Russia ¹	6 400	3 187	3 188	5 541	11 480	5 416	5 419	10 198	6 415	658	660	6 011	3 416	1 002	1 029	2 891	890	99	99	812
Slovakia	478	578	578	478	683	443	443	683	383	679	679	383	115	30	30	113	25	0	0	19
Spain	794	371	481	725	1 588	0	0	1 194	1 310	87	88	1 230	310	0	0	200	90	0	0	28
Turkey	2 795	1 060	1 060	2 563	3 120	0	5	2 424	3 523	122	122	2 843	750	0	115	362	103	0	0	25
UK	1 015	183	183	521	3 176	30	30	2 411	636	0	0	436	900	0	0	624	384	5	5	289
Ukraine ³	4 080	1 974	1 974	4 063	5 050	1 545	1 551	4 847	4 040	0	0	3 764	1 090	550	550	940	330	0	0	294
US	4 006	192	639	1 115	5 372	0	0	1 849	2 492	0	5	612	784	0	0	220	431	0	0	126
For WTO	20 000	12 650	12 764	18 639	30 000	11 698	12 855	27 517	20 000	6 524	6 574	18 868	6 800	2 002	2 099	5 592	2 000	99	99	1 469
NATO	19 142	6 025	6 692	14 101	29 825	5 996	6 450	21 464	18 286	2 825	2 843	14 010	6 662	140	338	4 218	2 026	149	233	1 221
Total	39 142	18 675	19 456	32 740	59 825	17 694	19 305	50 438	38 286	9 349	9 417	32 878	13 462	2 142	2 437	9 810	4 026	248	332	2 690

Source Consolidated matrix on the basis of data available as of 1 January 1997, Joint Consultative Group, 18 March 1997.

¹ Iceland, Kazakhstan and Luxembourg have no weapon limits in the application zone ² Reduction continues. ³ TLE belonging to the Black Sea Fleet is not included.

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