



# Assembly of Western European Union

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## FORTY-SECOND SESSION

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### **The future role of WEU – reply to the annual report of the Council**

## **REPORT**

submitted on behalf of the Political Committee  
by Mr Liapis, Rapporteur



*The future role of WEU –  
reply to the annual report of the Council*

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1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee* Mr de Puig (Chairman); Mr Roseta (Vice-Chairman); MM Antretter, de Assis, Bianchi, Blaauw, Sir Andrew Bowden (Alternate: Sir Anthony Durant), MM Brancati, Bratina, Brunetti, Bühler, Cusimano, Dias, Ehrmann, Eyskens, Mrs Fischer, Mr Irmer, Sir Russell Johnston (Alternate: Sir John Cope), MM Jurgens, Kaspereit, Lord Kirkhill (Alternate: Davis), MM Liapis, van der Linden, de Lipkowski, Van der Maelen, Martinez Casan (Alternate: Martinez), Mr Pottakis (Alternate: Micheliogiannis), Puche Rodríguez, Recoder, Rippinger, Rokofyllos, Seitlinger, Sir Keith Speed, MM Urbain, Vinçon, Zierer.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

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*reply to the annual report of the Council*

The Assembly,

- (i) Recalling the pivotal role WEU must play so that Europe can establish an efficient and credible security system,
- (ii) Acknowledging that sovereign states are central to the process of framing and implementing a European defence policy;
- (iii) Recalling that although the European Union's CFSP implies a decision-making process by a qualified majority, compliance with the principle of unanimity is essential for the protection of the vital security interests of every member state, wherever these may be called into question;
- (iv) Stressing that Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty implies the guarantee of the territorial integrity of the member states and solidarity among them as soon as there is any violation of the frontiers of any one of their number, and recalling that any organisation of European security requires a guarantee as to compliance with this principle;
- (v) Noting with satisfaction that the Atlantic Alliance has recognised the existence within it of a European security and defence identity (ESDI), the principal component of which is WEU,
- (vi) Stressing the need to strengthen working relations and cooperation with European states that are members or about to become members of NATO,
- (vii) Recalling that under the modified Brussels Treaty, an essential objective assigned to WEU is that of organising member countries' involvement in the Atlantic Alliance;
- (viii) Noting, moreover, that WEU is increasingly directing its efforts towards the tasks it set forth in its 1992 Petersberg Declaration;
- (ix) Stressing that any WEU action taken under Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty to maintain peace in the world and establish an order of peace and security in Europe cannot be confined to the execution of Petersberg tasks;
- (x) Noting that involvement in Petersberg tasks is open to countries that have not subscribed to collective defence commitments;
- (xi) Noting the progress made in making WEU more operational with a view to it.
  - (a) fulfilling its collective defence commitment under Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty, and
  - (b) carrying out Petersberg tasks using its own assets or drawing on CJTFs once they have actually been set up;

(xii) Expressing the wish that member states should continue with their endeavour to pool military and technological resources and make them available to WEU, which would enable the Organisation to:

- (a) strengthen the European security and defence identity within the Alliance, and
- (b) make a practical contribution to framing a European security policy in the framework of the CFSP,

(xiii) Noting with concern the difficulty European Union member states are having in reaching a consensus in the IGC on the working of the CFSP;

(xiv) Regretting that a year after its submission in November 1995 of the "WEU contribution to the intergovernmental conference of the European Union in 1996", the Council of Ministers has not seen fit to update its text to take account of new facts such as recognition of the need to develop the European security and defence identity within NATO.

(xv) Noting that a majority of WEU governments are in favour of the gradual integration of the Organisation in the European Union and reaffirming the Assembly's consensual view, expressed at the London extraordinary session in February 1996, that such integration cannot take place until membership of WEU and the European Union is identical;

(xvi) Stressing that for this process to work, there must be an unequivocal political and financial commitment on the part of WEU and EU Governments to clearly defined and shared common foreign and defence policy objectives.

(xvii) Considering that Europe's defence is at present primarily assured by NATO, which makes permanent consultation and dialogue on an equal footing with the United States and Canada essential on all matters relating to security and defence structures in Europe;

(xviii) Stating its willingness to continue and develop its exchanges with the European Parliament, on an equal and reciprocal basis, in areas in which they have common responsibilities, particularly the CFSP;

(xix) Stressing the need for the Council to clearly state its views on the effect European Union and NATO enlargement to include certain central European countries will have on their status in WEU and their rights and obligations in relation to it.

(xx) Taking the view that WEU should pay particular attention to its relations with those associate partners that will not be admitted in the near future to the structures of the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union, and also to its contacts with Ukraine;

(xxi) Considering that the *status quo* in Cyprus is not acceptable and that an early and just settlement of the Cyprus issue would strengthen security and peace in the Mediterranean;

(xxii) Considering further that the accession of Cyprus to the European Union, the negotiations for which are scheduled to take place within six months of completion of the work of the IGC, will have a direct impact on the institutional status of Cyprus within WEU;

(xxiii) Fervently hoping that the WEU Council will intensify its efforts regarding African issues in order to contribute to the search for a solution to the crisis taking place on the border between Zaire and Rwanda;

(xxiv) Regretting that the Council's replies to the recommendations adopted at the extraordinary session in London in February 1996 have been dilatory and lacking in substance,

(xxv) Deeply regretting that in spite of numerous requests, no specific information has been made available by the Secretary-General, the WEU Presidency or the European Union Presidency regarding discussions on those aspects of the EU intergovernmental conference which are at present the prerogative of WEU and its Parliamentary Assembly;

(xxvi) Reminding all concerned that it will be for national parliaments to ratify whatever conclusions are reached by the IGC;

(xxvii) Noting once again the delay in forwarding the first part of the Council's 42nd Annual Report, whose dispatch, within a reasonable period of time, is one of the terms of application of Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty,

### RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Make an inventory of every type of asset the signatory states of the modified Brussels Treaty are able to deploy in a common defence, with a view to drawing up a European programme for sharing defence costs equitably between those countries;
2. Make a similar inventory of assets that can be deployed by WEU in any Petersberg tasks, with a view to it gradually acquiring the capabilities necessary to carry out these tasks;
3. Strengthen to this end all those organs of WEU likely to be involved in such tasks;
4. Expedite the establishment of the Western European Armaments Organisation (WEAO) so as to bring together WEU activities in this field, integrate the European Armaments Agency and provide Europe with the necessary structure for a proper common armaments policy,
5. Continue to strengthen operational cooperation with NATO, starting with implementation of the decisions taken by NATO in January 1994 and June 1996 concerning the CJTF but without slackening efforts to mobilise WEU's own capabilities for independent action,
6. Promote, for this purpose, the creation of permanent representations of the United States and Canada to WEU and of WEU to those states;
7. Enhance its ability, within WEU, to implement Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty in order to respond to emergencies and in particular to take the necessary decisions without waiting for such requests as may come from the European Union, the United Nations or the OSCE;
8. Ensure application of the principle of the inviolability of the territorial integrity and borders of the European Union as constituting one of the objectives of the CFSP, based on criteria that are generally accepted in international relations;
9. Ensure, furthermore, that the relevant European Union authorities are fully informed about the assets WEU can make available to the Union for the purpose of carrying out tasks entrusted to it under the CFSP;
10. Ask that the body of the Treaty which is to be drafted by the IGC include the principle to which the Parliamentary Reflection Group on the 1996 intergovernmental conference referred in Athens on 4 December 1995, according to which the WEU Assembly would be invited to contribute to the work of the Conference of European Affairs Committees (CEAC) when matters concerning European security were under discussion;
11. Make clear what rights and obligations the associate member, associate partner and observer countries have in security and defence matters, prior to NATO and European Union enlargement;

- 12 Make representations to the international organisations with responsibility for the Cyprus problem, with a view to achieving an early settlement;
- 13 Ask the member states to make clear their intentions about a possible revision of the modified Brussels Treaty that would take account of the decisions taken by NATO in Berlin in June 1996, and of the results of the IGC,
- 14 Develop cooperation on security matters with those associate partners that will not be admitted in the near future to the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union;
- 15 Update, in time for the WEU May 1997 ministerial meeting, the "WEU contribution to the intergovernmental conference of the European Union in 1996" which it adopted in Madrid in November 1995, taking into account intervening developments such as the recognition by all WEU member states that the European security and defence identity should be developed within NATO";
- 16 Step up relations on both a political and practical level with the Russian Federation and with Ukraine and those CIS member states that so wish, so as to help attenuate fears and defuse tension that might result from NATO enlargement;
- 17 Urgently establish a mechanism for keeping the Assembly fully informed of discussions and developments in the EU intergovernmental conference, on subjects which are at present the prerogative of WEU,
- 18 Re-examine Recommendations 589 and 590 on the political and defence aspects of the organisation of security in Europe, adopted at the extraordinary session in London in February 1996, with a view to seeking the same consensus as the Assembly on the course to be followed for the future of WEU;
- 19 Comply with Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty by keeping the Assembly informed, by the proper time limit, of all Council activities and all aspects of Treaty implementation



*Explanatory Memorandum**(submitted by Mr Liapis, Rapporteur)**I. Introduction: WEU in a changing world*

1. The three years remaining to the end of the 20th century will see a great many events whose consequences for the future of WEU no doubt present the Organisation with the greatest challenge it has had to face for 50 years. The most striking fact that emerges from any examination is that the decisions behind these events are being and will continue to be taken by two other institutions with which WEU has close links, namely, the European Union and NATO. This state of affairs may well be disconcerting to those who would like WEU to play a pivotal role in the debate on European security and defence policies but it is the result of an institutional tug-of-war that can only develop through a gradual reinforcement, in coordination with NATO, of WEU's operational capabilities and its adaptation to the new geostrategic situation in Europe and the world as a whole. The success of that process will enable WEU to play a more active role in improving security and stability on the European continent and anywhere else in the world where the interests of the member states are at stake.

2. We are currently in a crisis period marked by a great number of situations entailing conflict and armed struggle. Some experts believe these to be domestic matters for the individual states involved rather than issues concerning international relations. The causes of some of these situations are essentially domestic in that they relate to political issues (acts of terrorism, claims for independence, disputes of an ethnic or religious nature) or disrupt public order (drug trafficking, organised crime) while others are regional and international problems (Bosnia, Cyprus and the Middle East for instance). In fact there is no clear dividing line between these different cases in terms of their impact on worldwide security. The instability born of a domestic conflict in a state affects the political and regional security environment and possibly the international climate. This is the situation in central Europe with regard to former Yugoslavia where an internal war of secession within the former Federation turned into an international conflict involving first United Nations then NATO intervention, the latter through air strikes followed

by the IFOR operation. This same conflict has repeatedly given rise to differences between European states as to whether armed intervention would have been appropriate in the initial stages of the conflict and has served to highlight present deficiencies in terms of a common foreign and security policy.

3. The Mediterranean region is also the scene of an increasing number of national, regional and international flashpoints. Terrorism by Muslim fundamentalists, the proliferation of all kinds of weapons, political and economic instability and ongoing territorial conflicts such as that in the western Sahara, where no lasting solution has yet been found, are but a few examples where developments will have consequences for European security and defence. Some of these conflicts have already been extended to the territories of member states of WEU and the European Union and have revealed differences between European states in the way they perceive them. Although the conflict in former Yugoslavia has been contained over the last five years and neighbouring countries spared, it has nevertheless demonstrated the need for an appropriate security system and defence capabilities to prevent a renewed outbreak of violence on the same scale or to deal with it on the European continent or in neighbouring regions. WEU, the European Union and NATO each have a responsibility in creating the necessary conditions for establishing a security system in Europe. They cannot achieve that objective through competition but only by cooperating with one another and with other institutions and states in order to avoid a return to a policy of spheres of influence on the continent.

4. To adapt to changes in the geostrategic situation, the European Union and NATO have embarked on a series of reforms, the purpose of which in every case, similarly to that of industrial restructuring, is to do more and do it better with fewer resources. The impetus given to implementation of the CJTF concept at the NATO ministerial summit meeting in Berlin and preparations for the first wave of enlargement come at a time when budget constraints, even in the United States, are inflicting heavy cuts on defence budgets which, in their turn, entail big reductions in

the manpower and equipment employed in each country's military systems, their purpose being to concentrate resources on those areas considered most effective in strategic terms. In practice a considerable share of resources is allocated to increasingly costly high-technology items of equipment. They are available in lower quantity than equipment used previously and their use requires more specialised and better trained staff. The result of this technological constraint is a considerable reduction in manpower in the armed forces and a move towards professional armies or a high proportion of volunteers, as well as the closing down of military installations including nuclear facilities.

5. This is only one of the factors to be borne in mind in the decisions on NATO reforms. Enlarging NATO to take in new members is a highly political decision that takes account of the change in the geostrategic landscape of Europe since the collapse of the Soviet Union. It was never the intention that the Alliance should be a select club and it is only natural that sovereign states applying to join should wish not only to take part in its development but also to benefit from the security and stability NATO has for almost 50 years afforded its European members and which have made a vital contribution to their economic and social progress. However, the success of NATO enlargement is yet to come and the process must be open and clear if crisis situations and the emergence of "grey areas" of security in Europe are to be avoided. Implementation of the CJTF concept meets an operational need that has arisen from the significantly lower numbers of US forces in Europe and from recognition that only the United States currently has the logistics and intelligence capabilities necessary for the effective execution of medium- or large-scale military operations of all types in a part of the European continent or elsewhere.

6. Turning to the European Union, there are three aspects in the debate going on in the IGC which will also have repercussions for WEU. The process of "deepening" appears to be based mainly on a concept of integration linked to the introduction of the euro. Adopting the single currency will have significant political consequences, in security and defence among other areas, as a result of the budget policies of the states participating in the venture. It raises many unknowns but the resolve of France and Germany, which are determined to persevere with this course of action, makes it virtually

inevitable unless either country does a major U-turn on European policy. Enlargement too would seem to be close to becoming a reality even though the European Union has only recently taken in three new countries and the debate continues as to the reforms that are needed to give it political clout equal to its economic clout. Because of their geostrategic situation, the accession of Cyprus, and then of certain central European countries requires the establishment of a genuine common foreign and security policy so that enlargement brings security and stability to those countries that are to join the Union and to those around them that do not qualify for membership for the time being.

7. The framing of the common foreign and security policy, and eventually of a European defence policy, primarily concerns WEU as the European Union's defence component which also has responsibility for defining and implementing a European defence policy in coordination with the Atlantic Alliance. The issues described above call for a revised role for the Organisation in the European political and military context. The enlargement of the European Union and NATO, implementation of the CJTF concept and the future of the CFSP will in the long run involve major changes in the composition of WEU and in its working methods both in political terms and – for the first time – in military terms with reference to the use of NATO assets for conducting its own operations (peacekeeping, humanitarian and, indeed, peace enforcement, and operations specifically intended to defend member countries' interests). By demonstrating its ability to adjust to this changing environment, WEU can prove that it is still highly relevant – even though the situation justifying its creation in 1954 has changed radically – and that the defence of its members and helping to maintain peace, security and stability on the European continent and beyond are still its main purpose.

## *II. The current situation of European security and defence*

8. The period of change and reform the continent of Europe is experiencing at present has brought uncertainty at every level. Initiatives have burgeoned into a welter of proposals from one or more states, international organisations or pressure groups, in areas ranging from security to the economy. Stimulating debate is, in itself, a positive strategy, provided it does not lead to paralysis and the kind of entrenched political and institutional

*status quo* that has been all too apparent throughout the crisis and war in former Yugoslavia, to mention but one example. Today's challenges: economic integration within the European Union (the advent of the euro), the enlargement of the Union and of NATO to include the central European countries, future relations with the Russian Federation and with Ukraine, not to mention the need to frame a rational European policy – encompassing both economic cooperation and security – on the Mediterranean and the Middle East, call for practical responses that are politically visible and, most important of all, credible. Whether the choices to be made in those areas will prove correct can be judged only by the results.

9. Europe as embodied by the European Union and WEU must, if it wants to be able to mount an effective defence of its interests in the world, assume the political responsibilities that are commensurate with its economic strength. This means clarifying the respective areas of responsibility of both organisations when it comes to implementing the common foreign and security policy and ultimately developing a European defence policy. At the same time, they need to assert themselves in relation to other organisations which are taking an ever more public stand on security issues, regardless of the fact that they have no legal authority for doing so or the means of action to match their ambitions. They cannot succeed in this without the agreement of the member states of both organisations in order to avoid internal divisions which would hinder the progress of reforms, both present and future. Identification of the common interests of the member states and their political solidarity are very important when it comes to defence as this is an area which is closely linked with perceptions of nationhood, as expressed by the governments and parliaments in whom power of decision in Europe is vested.

*(a) WEU and the defence of Europe*

10. On the continent of Europe, two organisations, NATO and WEU, have defence responsibilities and capabilities. Both are engaged in reforms to enable them to adapt fully to changes in the European and world geopolitical context. NATO has the leading role both because it has the military means to be effective, as its action in Bosnia has served to illustrate, and because it is the embodiment of the United States' commitment to the defence of Europe. These are the plain facts and the

two considerations that will govern the types of change wrought by enlargement and reorganisation of the NATO command structures, both of which must be carried out in such a way as to preserve the delicate balance between strengthening what is termed a "European identity" in NATO and retaining the transatlantic link. WEU, in its more unobtrusive development, gives priority to enhancing its operational capabilities to enable it in due course to carry out those military operations referred to as "Petersberg-type" missions, if necessary drawing on defence assets made available to it by the Alliance within the framework of the CJTF agreement. At the same time, WEU is involved in developing a European defence policy in conjunction with the European Union.

11. Apart from having similar areas of responsibility, the two organisations have in common the fact that they are managed on an intergovernmental basis. General policies are defined by the member states on the basis of the widest possible consensus and subsequently implemented by the Secretariats-General and the military commands. This approach, which may help explain the degree of hesitation, lack of action even, in the face of crisis remains the only valid one when dealing with defence issues, given that national governments and parliaments are primarily responsible for defining the overall direction of policy and allocating the resources necessary for implementation. The primacy of the nation state does not rule out the development of bilateral cooperation or cooperation within organisations with a political and military remit, in an effort to rationalise countries' defence commitments at a time when budget cut-backs in that area are the order of the day. This is a reality all WEU members are facing and one that is concentrating minds in military and industrial circles on the need for Europe and its traditional political allies, both on the continent and across the Atlantic, to forge a true defence policy backed by credible means.

*1 The framing of a defence concept for Europe*

12. Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty provides that "if any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51<sup>1</sup> of the

<sup>1</sup> "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the

Charter of the United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power". As the main justification for WEU's existence, this provision holds good even today, despite the changes that have occurred since 1954, but it has to be given a political and military content. It is in this light that it must define its place in the continent's security structures as a whole by reaffirming its aims (as set out in broad terms in Article V of the Treaty) and acquiring the means necessary for it to fulfil its obligations towards its members and, as necessary, to respond to requests for assistance from other European and international institutions. While the creation of the Satellite Centre and the conduct of military operations are clear evidence of progress at operational level, WEU has still not clearly stated what its intentions are as far as European defence policy goes and the most that can be said is that it is supposed to be the European pillar of the Alliance and be regarded as the defence component of the European Union<sup>2</sup>.

13 Efforts have been made in recent years to meet expectations, in particular at the Petersberg ministerial meeting, where a range of cases were presented in which WEU might possibly intervene<sup>3</sup>, and in Madrid with the adoption of a "common concept" of European security. That document attempts to identify present and future challenges Europe and WEU may have to face, listing the main risks as potential armed conflicts, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of conveyance, international terrorism, organised crime, drug-trafficking, uncontrolled and illegal immigration and environmental risks<sup>4</sup>. The considerations extend to any part of the world where European interests are involved and proposals as to the means of contending with the problems referred

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United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security "

2 However, at meetings between the Assembly's Presidential Committee and the WEU Permanent Council in Brussels on 15 October 1996, parliamentarians were informed that the expression "European security and defence identity" is currently being used more than "European pillar".

3. Namely, humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking, Petersberg Declaration, II.4, Bonn, 19 June 1992

4 European security a common concept of the 27 WEU countries, Chapter I I C., WEU Council of Ministers, Madrid, 14 November 1995.

to be advanced for adapting national defence forces while maintaining their effectiveness, strengthening WEU's politico-military structures, reinforcing European assets and capabilities and enhancing the European defence industrial base<sup>5</sup>. Details are also given of the operational needs of the Organisation, for example "a clear channel of communication between the WEU Council and WEU forces" and a "single chain of command", for efficient coordination in the theatre of operations, for access to "an adequate observation capability" and development of "an intelligence processing capability" and for appropriate transport capabilities<sup>6</sup>.

14. The document also lists in full WEU's inadequacies in terms of its command and control procedures, intelligence, strategic lift capabilities, interoperability and weapons policy. Nevertheless it raises at least two issues that give rise to a degree of confusion as to WEU's role in relation to its founding Treaty.

- the collective defence task, which is the very essence of the modified Brussels Treaty, is not mentioned at all,
- reference is made to the "27 WEU countries", while only ten of them are party to the Treaty and participate fully in all the Organisation's activities;

It may also be mentioned in passing that no reference is made to central Europe when listing the regions where political circumstances and risks have implications for the continent's security and no details are given of the security and defence obligations and entitlements of countries with WEU associate member, associate partner or observer status.

15. While it by no means has the scope of the Rome Declaration of 1984 or The Hague Platform of 1987, the document gives a fair indication of the political indecision and uncertainty which have until now prevented WEU from playing a key role in the European security and defence architecture. The WEU Assembly has for its part endeavoured for years to contribute to the development of a political concept of Europe's defence, having gone so far as to propose, in 1991, that the modified Brussels

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5 Idem, Chapter II, II D

6. Idem, Chapter II II B.

Treaty should be redrafted<sup>7</sup>. At the extraordinary session in London in February 1996, the Assembly made an important contribution to the debate, by affirming that "the purpose of the modified Brussels Treaty is to ensure the defence of member countries, promote European unity and strengthen both collective security in Europe and world peace"<sup>8</sup> – a most important reminder that WEU's task cannot merely be reduced to the so-called Petersberg operations, notwithstanding the emphasis placed on them in the "common concept of the 27 WEU countries"<sup>9</sup>, as the Assembly notes when it stresses that "WEU's activities cannot be confined to Petersberg tasks, ignoring the core functions of collective defence as defined in Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty"<sup>10</sup>.

16. Such are the topics that must be addressed when considering the future role of the Organisation if the latter is genuinely to be the real European pillar of NATO, the embodiment of the European defence identity and the defence arm of the European Union. For this to be achieved, one basic condition has nevertheless to be met: an unambiguous and unconditional commitment from present and future member states to the building of a collective security and defence system for the continent as a whole. The link between the defence of individual nations and that of Europe as a whole has to be developed and strengthened if it is hoped ultimately to achieve the goal of an integrated European defence which takes as its starting point the identification of national security and defence interests and development of the coordination necessary to bring about policy convergence. WEU can and must be the natural framework for such coordination, notwithstanding dialogue and cooperation with the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union, since the intergovernmental nature of its method of operation implies, first and foremost, taking account of national perceptions as regards defence and of national defence assets

7 Recommendation 504 on the revision of the modified Brussels Treaty, Paris, 6 June 1991.

8. Recommendations 589 and 590 on organising security in Europe; recital (i), London 22-23 February 1996

9. Chapter II of the Madrid document is almost exclusively devoted to the prevention and management of crises; collective defence is not dealt with separately in the text

10. Recommendation 590 on organising security in Europe, recital (xv); London, 22-23 February 1996.

## 2. *Interaction between national and European defence systems*

17. National defence lies at the heart of the prerogatives of state and government, in Europe as elsewhere. Intervention by armed forces is essentially a response to safeguard state interests, even when part of bilateral and multilateral initiatives and action. In the minds of decision-makers and the public at large, notions of defence, territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders remain inextricably linked but the concept has now widened beyond these confines to include, for example, economic interests and humanitarian considerations. It is to the latter that WEU's Petersberg document refers, while defence of economic interests is alluded to in Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty<sup>11</sup>, although this aspect seems to have been neglected somewhat in relation to WEU's activities despite the impact of economic competition, or "economic warfare" as it is known, on countries' security and stability, and hence on the Organisation as a whole.

18. In terms of national defence thinking in recent years, the economy has become one of the main areas for consideration. In the majority of WEU member countries, the end of the cold war has led to major budget reductions and reforms within the armed services. The crisis and war in the Gulf accelerated the process, producing a model of warfare based on a combination of high-tech equipment and highly mobile human resources comparatively fewer in number than in the past, although it is true that that particular war was waged a long way from national borders against a country whose means were not comparable to those of the multinational coalition where resources in terms of men and fire-power were far greater. War in former Yugoslavia, Somalia and Haiti and the Rwanda crisis put great pressure on European countries' armed forces, sent to take part in operations under United Nations auspices or in national operations such as operation "Turquoise" in the case of France, in relatively distant lands where the interests at stake were somewhat ill-defined. Economic constraints are imposing what often amount to difficult choices, particularly for the

11. "At the request of any of the High Contracting Parties the Council shall be immediately convened in order to permit them to consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise, or a danger to economic stability".

larger countries, between maintaining defence arrangements that would allow them to cope with a major confrontation endangering their territorial integrity and an alternative system enabling them to intervene for shorter or longer periods in conflicts beyond their borders<sup>12</sup>.

19. This form of intervention is possible only if the armed forces have projection and intervention capabilities that are suited to the terrain, such as tactical and strategic lift, highly-trained and mobile military units with a large volunteer component and modern intelligence systems in the form of satellites, aircraft and drones. The ever more costly array of equipment is beyond the means of any one country, which has the beneficial effect of promoting bilateral and multinational cooperation, even though this also presents disadvantages in that the partners have different requirements, which stem from their various national views on defence, not to mention budget constraints, as the Eurofighter 2000, FLA and Helios 2 programmes all go to show. Some countries, such as Belgium, France and Portugal, have made drastic choices. The first two have decided to abolish conscription and the third to cut down the period of compulsory military service to four months, with the emphasis in all three cases being placed on the need for the armed services ultimately to be made up entirely of volunteers, as in the United Kingdom or the United States. Austerity dictates that hardware requirements be met with increasing frequency through international cooperation, in parallel with defence-industry restructuring around a small core of major industrial groups specialising in specific fields such as aeronautics, missiles or space.

20. The formation of multinational units is to some extent part of this streamlining process in the drive to achieve efficiency with reduced resources, making it possible for individual countries to pool them in such a way as to avoid weakening the defence structures in which various states are involved within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance and of WEU. The European Corps epitomises this form of organisation, as do Eurofor and Euromarfor, the Anglo-Dutch amphibious force and the central multinational division, all of which units form part of what are known as the forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU)<sup>13</sup>. These initiatives

12 For example, British, Belgian and French military units have been operating in or around the territory of former Yugoslavia since 1991-92.

13 These forces are also available to NATO.

have snowballed, spreading into central Europe, as the example of the Baltic battalion serves to illustrate, and experience gained in the past and still to come contributes to the success of NATO's Partnership for Peace programme and also, most certainly, to the smooth running of the IFOR mission in Bosnia. Indeed, present arrangements may foreshadow the defence systems of the next century, where conventional armies, scaled down to their optimum size on the basis of the priorities of each state, would be made up of units "twinned" for joint intervention with those of other countries, and would encompass, if not all, at least some of the members of WEU and NATO, without detriment to the cohesion of the whole.

21. This increasing interpenetration and interdependence of national armed forces does not however imply any loss of control on the part of national authorities. These remain central to the decision-making process since they alone are responsible to their national parliaments and their citizenry for all forms of military deployment. This is a most important point which needs to be highlighted as any attempt to create an army to defend Europe is doomed to failure as long as certain countries, and among them some of the largest, are not prepared to hand over the command of their armed forces to external authorities, be they intergovernmental or Community authorities (in the sense of the European Union). Nuclear weapons are an even more sensitive area. Their use cannot be contemplated other than as a last resort when territorial integrity is under serious threat. These are the realities that have to be taken into account in building a credible collective European security and defence system, while safeguarding the power of decision of each member state.

22. At the same time, those countries that wish should be able to make defence arrangements, integrated to a greater or lesser extent as befits their interests – a European defence *à la carte* which all states can join and which allows them the necessary flexibility to maintain an adequate military capability at a time when budgets, staff and equipments are constantly being cut back. Anglo-French cooperation between air forces and on nuclear submarine patrols, and the creation of a Benelux joint airborne intervention force<sup>14</sup> are recent developments that illustrate the trend towards structures with varying degrees of integration, and

14. *Atlantic News*, No 2850, 27 September 1996.

the resolve and need to act together to compensate for the inadequacies of individual countries taken in isolation. At the same time it is essential that the political will is there to support such initiatives, as they will otherwise fail to move beyond their experimental stage or else will remain limited in their practical scope. The European Corps and Euromarfor have been declared operational, although none of the governments involved has to date made a clear statement as to their real use, for example in the context of a post-IFOR operation in Bosnia.

23. The intergovernmental nature of WEU, where no one country is in a position to impose choices on other members, could allow the Organisation to play a leading role in coordinating initiatives for bilateral and multilateral cooperation, provided the wishes of all members, as to whether or not to participate in joint arrangements with varying degrees of integration, are taken into account, without this however holding up the entire process. This would avoid a situation in which some governments felt obliged to set up parallel structures independently, including arrangements for equipment, even though the modified Brussels Treaty presents no obstacle to the development of this type of initiative and WEAG's job is to deal with armaments-related matters. As far as WEU's role is concerned, the governments must express their political will clearly and unambiguously, avoiding clichés like "defence component of the European Union . . . and means to strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance"<sup>15</sup>. Otherwise WEU will remain on the sidelines of the debate on Europe's defence and its place in the world, which is being conducted essentially within the European Union and NATO, and will end up by being indistinguishable from the plethora of organisations and regional initiatives, with or without proper legal standing, that deal directly or indirectly with such questions.

*(b) The search for a coherent European security system.*

24. The profusion in Europe of institutions for political and security cooperation can be regarded as an advantage in that it allows for permanent dialogue at all levels between the countries of that continent, which to a degree acts to defuse crises

15. Birmingham Declaration, paragraph 2; WEU Council of Ministers, Birmingham on 7 May 1996

and enables progress to be made in disputes between different states. Nevertheless it can also be synonymous with a confusion of roles, fragmentation of human and material resources and can even bring to the surface a spirit of rivalry between institutions, which, far from bringing organisations and states closer together, becomes a source of division. There is a need, therefore, to clarify the situation if Europe is to be able to assume responsibility for its interests in the world in cooperation with its partners and allies on other continents, without being vulnerable to external pressure. With regard to security, it is clear that only four institutions are, and will continue to be, centre-stage, namely NATO, WEU, the European Union and the OSCE. Our own Organisation occupies an intermediary position between the Alliance and the Union but has not yet clearly defined its options in relation to the OSCE, which – there is no doubt – lacks powerful enough means to be much more than an elections and human rights monitor, a Council of Europe role that goes back many years, even pre-dating the collapse of the Berlin Wall.

25. In fact, it is around the European Union and NATO that the debate on future European security and defence structures will revolve, regardless of those who advocate all manner of regional initiatives but who, themselves lacking the means and political commitment, will end up leaving the field clear for the two institutions referred to. Nowadays, virtually all European countries have ties with them and many aspire to full membership, although the expression of that wish is at times hedged about by qualifications and reservations with regard to their aims and mode of operation. Two factors are basically responsible for this: the United States' presence in and commitment to the Atlantic Alliance, and the economic power represented by the European Union – in other words the political, military and economic security that flows from membership of the two organisations, even though it is not always easy for states to meet the obligations, particularly the financial commitments, that it implies. WEU for its part will, hopefully in the near rather than distant future, be required to define its role in specific terms in relation to its two "elder sister" organisations with which it is already inextricably linked.

*1 WEU and the European Union*

26. "WEU will be developed as the defence component of the European Union and as a means

to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance" This statement appears in the Declaration by WEU member states on the role of Western European Union and its relations with the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance, adopted at Maastricht in 1991, and is ritually intoned in every declaration by the Council of Ministers. It summarises, albeit not without ambiguity, the dilemma the Organisation is facing today in relation to the reforms being made in the other two institutions. Although definite progress has been or is on the way to being achieved in terms of relations with NATO, no consensus has as yet emerged, with regard to the Union, as to the course WEU is to take in order to carry out the role of "defence component". The issue is a sensitive one as it brings to the fore the policies of individual governments towards the European Union itself, and each one's views of the future in store for political cooperation in Europe and the Union's place in the world.

27 The legal basis of the European Union's remit for security and, indirectly, for defence is laid down in Article J 4 of the Maastricht Treaty, the first two paragraphs of which state:

- "1 The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy which might in time lead to a common defence
2. The Union requests the Western European Union (WEU), which is an integral part of the development of the Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications. The Council shall, in agreement with the institutions of the WEU, adopt the necessary practical arrangements".

28 Application of this text, cited in the Maastricht Declaration by the member states of WEU and effective from 1 January 1993, has proved difficult, mainly on account of governments' differing views over the content of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP). Denmark's refusal to subscribe to the security and defence provisions of Article J.4 and the accession in 1995 of three countries whose policies in the regard had evolved outside the framework of NATO or WEU membership have markedly complicated implemen-

tation of the CFSP as it was envisaged in 1991. Even now, in spite of the efforts of certain EU member states, the Union's foreign policy either finds expression in official statements that supposedly present a common position adopted by the Fifteen in response to events occurring in various parts of the world or translates into economic assistance and cooperation, which are nonetheless an important form of leverage. In one or two instances, for example former Yugoslavia and the Middle East, the Union has endeavoured to take on a more political role, in assuming responsibility for the administration of Mostar in cooperation with WEU, or by appointing a European "mediator" in order to be more actively involved in negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, but its major contribution is still an economic one.

29 The intergovernmental conference is meant to give the CFSP its second political wind, but there is no denying the fact that progress to date has been minimal. The introduction of the single currency (the euro), which is absorbing the attention and energies of most European Union and WEU member states, and the issue of EU enlargement to include Cyprus, then the central European countries, have pushed discussion of the common foreign and security policy into the background. To these factors might be added the differences that have traditionally existed between some states over the European Union's role in the world – a mere club for promoting the market economy or an integrated economic and political system. Relations with WEU, which, since the Maastricht Treaty was signed, is supposed to "elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications" reflect the vicissitudes of the prevailing situation within the Union and are suffering as a result of the differing memberships of the two organisations. Political clarification is called for in this connection before further accessions under consideration have the effect of compounding the stalemate both organisations have reached.

30 At the time of signature of the Maastricht Treaty, only three signatory states, Denmark, Greece and Ireland, were not WEU members. Denmark, a member of NATO, posed no problem as far as development of cooperation between WEU and the Union in security and defence matters was concerned; Greece, for its part, was shortly to become a member of WEU, and Ireland, avowedly neutral with regard to the military alliances, signed



and ratified the Treaty in its entirety. Deadlock over the application of Article J.4.2 set in with the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden, as none of these countries, all NATO non-members, openly expressed any desire to join WEU. There were one or two political declarations from Austria and Finland, which were not followed up by an official approach, the only one that in fact carries any weight. Their observer status provides no solution to the dilemma over implementing the provisions of Article J.4, since in practical terms it would amount to non-members instructing an organisation in respect of which they had no legal rights or obligations. Moreover, difficulties would almost certainly arise over establishing military cooperation with NATO – already embodied in principle in Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty<sup>16</sup> and the very aspect that constitutes a major stumbling block to convergence between WEU and the European Union.

31. It is in fact the actual worth of the WEU security guarantee that is thus called into question. Because of an overlap in the membership of WEU and NATO, any major aggression against a WEU member would, in principle, activate the NATO security guarantee, in other words the practical enactment of the United States' commitment to Europe's defence. This is the crucial element in the guarantee mechanism, which would probably not be able to function in the same way if countries that were not members of the Alliance were admitted to our own Organisation. Factors such as these must be taken into consideration before any commitment is made in terms of WEU moving towards integration with the European Union because it is patently clear that no European state is in a position to assume the United States' role and responsibilities in defending the continent. When integration takes place, it must be the expression of the shared political resolve of WEU and European Union member states, and be followed not by a solemn declaration but by a specific commitment to set up European defence arrangements, commensurate in

16 "In the execution of the Treaty, the High Contracting Parties and any organs established by them under the Treaty shall work in close cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Recognising the undesirability of duplicating the military staffs of NATO, the Council and its Agency [for the Control of Armaments] will rely on the appropriate military authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters."

financial and industrial terms with those of our transatlantic ally

32. This is not in any sense an argument against integration, but rather an analysis which is essential for taking forward the ongoing debate in WEU and the Union on the relations that should exist between them. A security and defence policy is not built around declarations which may or may not produce effects, it has to be the outcome of day-to-day effort over the medium and longer term, which requires a financial commitment and unqualified support from all states party to the process. If this last condition is not met, any attempt to transform WEU into an instrument of European Union foreign policy will cause political tensions to emerge in relations with the United States and NATO. That would also carry the risk of the disappearance of our own Organisation as an independent body, notwithstanding the fact that WEU is alone capable of embodying the European security and defence identity within the Alliance, and would also be tantamount to strengthening United States influence over Europe's defence. Politically, it is essential to approach the relationship between the two European institutions with caution, avoiding half-measures that might damage the coherence of European security structures.

33. The *status quo* is no longer acceptable but reform and adjustment to the new world geo-strategic order also demand extensive mobilisation of resources, especially in terms of budgets, together with a strong political commitment. This makes some states hesitant about any change in the existing position, where costs and the extent of any commitments are known and can be controlled. Therefore it is natural enough that WEU member states find themselves divided as to the course relations with the European Union should take, as is clear from the Organisation's contribution to the intergovernmental conference. In that document<sup>17</sup>, three options are studied without any one actually being chosen.

- reinforced partnership between WEU and the European Union, thus preserving the autonomy of the Organisation and its Treaty<sup>18</sup>.

17. WEU contribution to the European Union inter-governmental conference of 1996. WEU Council of Ministers; Madrid, 14 November 1995

18. *Idem*. II.A

- institutional convergence according to any one of three possibilities<sup>19</sup> (i) a political commitment from WEU stressing its readiness to follow European Council guidelines on defence matters, (ii) WEU would be politically and operationally subordinate to the EU, although this would not entail any juridical commitment, and would regard itself as a body with a remit to implement EU decisions; (iii) WEU would commit itself, through a legally binding agreement, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions with defence implications which may be entrusted to it by the Union.
- integration of WEU into the EU and the disappearance of the modified Brussels Treaty, this would mean that WEU would also cease to exist as an international organisation<sup>20</sup>

34. This third option, which has the support, albeit with reservations about the arrangements and time-frame involved, of a majority of WEU and European Union member states, can be envisaged only in the medium and longer term, but before it can happen, the intergovernmental conference has to arrive at a broad definition of a credible European security and defence policy; one that is either accepted by all members or developed within a framework of strengthened cooperation between some countries, as in the case of monetary union. At the present stage in the discussions, there are no definite proposals and Union enlargement to include Cyprus, followed by certain central European countries, also has to be taken into account, further complicating the debate. Logically, transatlantic relations ought to be redefined on the basis of a direct relationship being formed between NATO and the European Union<sup>21</sup> but this would be bound to create tensions with some European countries that are members of the Alliance but do not yet belong to the Union. Moreover, affirmation of the principle of collective defence in a future Treaty on European Union must not duplicate obligations already entered into within NATO as this would lead to conflicting commitments. It is important, therefore, for WEU and European Union member states to retain their freedom of choice as to whether

or not to join a collective defence for as long as there is no established framework for EU/Alliance relations. At the same time, thought should be given to the effects of integration on other security structures coexisting in Europe.

## 2. *The role of the OSCE*

35. Since the end of the cold war, Europe's institutions have grown in size and number as never before. It became necessary to fill the political vacuum in central and eastern Europe that arose as a result of the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the break-up of the Soviet Union. At the same time, organisations for political and economic cooperation bringing together the countries of western Europe or spanning Europe as a whole initiated a process of reform and enlargement that also led them to consider security and defence matters, often without their having any legal basis for doing so. Almost ten years later, regional initiatives, some of which were intended to be provisional, have become an essential part of the continental political scene and play an important role in promoting political stability and reducing tensions in central and eastern Europe. Nevertheless, it has to be acknowledged that some degree of rationalisation is essential, especially in terms of security and defence, if a fragmentation of resources and institutional paralysis occasioned by so many decision-making centres are to be avoided. At the same time, as states gradually join the European Union and NATO, such initiatives are likely to decrease in number, as in many cases their purpose is precisely to prepare their members for accession to those two organisations under optimum conditions.

36. Some regional organisations operate within the European Union, an example being the Benelux Committee of Ministers, while others bring together Union members and non-members alike, such as the Nordic Council, the Council of Baltic Sea States, the Central European Initiative and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation. The Euro-Mediterranean Conference held in November 1995 might also one day follow the same pattern of development as the OSCE with the creation of a "Council of Mediterranean States", a possibility suggested in a report by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the French National Assembly<sup>22</sup>. This profusion of institutions for regional cooperation makes an

19. *Idem*, II B.

20. *Idem* II.C.

21. *Idem*, II C.I.

22. France and the Mediterranean: new challenges, page 39 of information report No. 2373, Rapporteur, Mr Jacques Myard, 16 November 1995.

important contribution to the stability of the continent by encouraging dialogue between states at all levels, but such cooperation refers essentially to general, economic or environmental policy issues and rarely ventures into the realms of security and defence. Here, progress is slower and the climate of mistrust inherited from the cold war period or earlier conflicts has not been entirely dispelled. There is also the fact that within a particular organisation some states may have differences with one another that hinder the effectiveness of its work as a whole

37 In the security field, the paradoxical nature of this situation is best illustrated in the OSCE where, on the one hand, states seek to create frameworks for cooperation and dialogue but, on the other, fail for political and economic reasons to provide the resources necessary for achieving the objectives they themselves have set. Created in 1994, the organisation was the outcome of the process involving the series of Conferences on Security and Cooperation in Europe, initiated in 1972. Today, it plays an important role in the debate on security structures in Europe and its membership has the advantage of comprising almost all the states of the continent in addition to the United States and Canada. Nevertheless, it has to be acknowledged that, given the lack of resources for its implementation, the success of its work is largely due to the goodwill of its member states and therein lies its greatest weakness

38. The document on "European Security: a common concept of the 27 WEU countries" states that "the OSCE ... plays a fundamental role in creating an enduring cooperative security space in Europe ..." and points out that "WEU has offered to support, on a case-by-case basis and in accordance with its own procedures, conflict prevention and crisis-management measures undertaken under the OSCE aegis. WEU should now envisage what expertise or logistical and personnel contributions could be made available for OSCE activities in this field"<sup>23</sup>. This is an important commitment but one whose practical consequences will not immediately be visible, since in reality WEU does not yet have the appropriate military means to take over from NATO in Europe and meet a request for assistance from the OSCE, or indeed the United Nations. Moreover, neither the Birmingham Declaration of 7 May, nor the annual report of the Council for the

23. European Security: a common concept of the 27 WEU countries, Madrid, 14 November 1995.

period 1 July to 31 December 1995, in which the OSCE is not even mentioned once, appear to confirm that cooperation with this organisation is a matter of priority.

39. This is, however, an area in which WEU can play a leading role, since the OSCE needs military cover in order to carry out its tasks. Account must also be taken of the fact that within that organisation decisions are taken unanimously, implying the agreement of states which might well themselves be on the receiving end of an OSCE mission. To date, in the absence of the appropriate means, such operations have met with varying success, particularly so in the case of the elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which were certified despite the irregularities observed<sup>24</sup> and the fact that they confirmed a *de facto* partition. The presence of the United States and the Russian Federation within the OSCE and the influence they have in that organisation are not unconnected with the certification decision, since the United States needed to ensure that the Dayton Accords were implemented as planned and Russia was intent on securing the lifting of the United Nations embargo against former Yugoslavia. As it had no police force or military means to ensure that voters had real freedom of movement and that the electoral campaign was conducted properly, the OSCE had no option other than to validate the results. Similarly, in Chechnya, it could do no more than record violations of human rights and of the many cease-fires agreed between both parties to the conflict

40. All this experience would suggest that if the OSCE is to maintain its credibility, it urgently needs to be able to call on a military force which could only be that of WEU if the latter had every freedom to take action as part of a mission entrusted to it by the OSCE. In addition, the Russian Federation will not agree to NATO being asked to intervene, on behalf of the OSCE, in the territory of the CIS. Moreover, the area in which the OSCE is likely to be required to intervene is not Belgium or Spain but central Europe, the Balkans, the CIS and the Caucasus, regions bringing WEU, NATO, European Union and other countries into contact with the Russian Federation. Recourse to WEU, so

24. According to Robert Frowick, who was in charge of the OSCE mission overseeing elections in Bosnia, the results were imperfect and debatable but on the whole acceptable, *Bulletin Europe* No 6822, page 3, 30 September-1 October 1996.

long as it maintains its independence of NATO, entails fewer political disadvantages for the OSCE and would provide it with the means it needs to implement its own decisions. But this option can only be contemplated if WEU develops its operational capabilities and actually commits itself to working alongside the OSCE, for example by means of a protocol on cooperation, creating a tie between the two organisations and specifying the procedures to be followed for providing assistance. Failing this, there will be no progress beyond political declarations that do not produce any practical effect, and NATO will once again be able to point to the lack of coherence in European security and defence thinking that comes to light as soon as the United States no longer has the upper hand.

### *III. The development of NATO and the future of WEU*

41 Notwithstanding speeches and declarations about the role of WEU, the progress it has made in terms of its operational capability and its contribution to Europe's defence, there is no denying that security and defence matters continue for the most part to be dealt with in NATO. This mainly has to do with resources and political will as embodied by the United States, with its dominant role in the Alliance, since other countries have not yet managed to reconcile their differing perceptions and form a genuine European platform within the Alliance, in the shape of WEU. WEU must unequivocally assume the mantle of the European security and defence identity called for in the North Atlantic Council Declarations<sup>25</sup>. In order to do so, the CJTF concept must be implemented within a reasonable period, and this in turn implies political cooperation between the two organisations at the highest level so as to avoid stalemate. The best way would be for Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Turkey, which have observer or associate member status, to be more closely involved in the work of WEU and that of all its bodies.

42. At the same time it is obvious that the enlargement of NATO to include central European countries will change the position of some of the WEU associate partners. The practical effect of enlargement will be a degree of confusion since a central European country will be able, for example,

<sup>25</sup> Final communiqué of the North Atlantic Council, paragraph 7, Berlin, 3 June 1996.

to contribute within NATO to the security and collective defence of Europe in a transatlantic framework, while Europe itself, as represented by WEU and the European Union, will not guarantee that particular state's security. This can only increase the influence the United States already exerts upon existing security and defence structures both directly, through NATO, and indirectly by making the latter's human and logistical resources available to WEU. To be free of such paradoxes, WEU and the European Union must make a major political effort to clarify these issues, which can perhaps be solved by coordinated enlargement of the Alliance, the Union and our own Organisation, on the basis of arrangements and time schedules that could be different. Security in Europe must encompass all its countries in a long-term perspective and not be crafted to suit the short-term interests of some larger countries, at the risk of recreating past divisions and areas of political and economic influence that might be the cause of new conflicts.

#### *(a) Reform and enlargement of NATO*

43 The Atlantic Alliance is going through a period that is crucial for its future and the decisions to be taken in the coming months represent a qualitative advance of major significance for the future European security and defence architecture. NATO in 1996 exemplifies a transition from the structures that emerged from the cold war and from contained confrontation between the two superpowers to a new configuration better adapted to the new geostrategic situation in Europe and the world at large. The crisis in former Yugoslavia gave it an opportunity to demonstrate that it can exercise its military prowess on condition that it has the firm political resolve of governments behind it and that their objectives are clearly stated. The success to date of missions assigned to IFOR and work undertaken within the framework of the Partnership for Peace are evidence of the Alliance's ability to deal with present-day challenges and thus contribute to the political stability of the continent. At the same time it has embarked on a major reform of military and political structures which takes account of the cuts in member states' defence budgets and the restructuring of national defence systems.

44 Enlargement to include the countries of central Europe is, nevertheless, an initiative whose outcome is uncertain in security terms as it directly involves relations between the United States and the

Russian Federation, whose exchanges of views are at times reminiscent of the atmosphere during the cold war. The European members of the Alliance, who are, on the whole, in favour of enlargement, nonetheless have views about the conditions governing the process, especially when it comes to membership criteria and the choice of one country rather than another. The debate is a sensitive and complex one, with a somewhat secretive political and economic agenda, but WEU must be involved in it, if only because the new members will have their own views on whether the CJTF should intervene in support of the European Union or the OSCE, in the context of European military operations not covered by the terms of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty. It is not for our Organisation to meddle in the internal affairs of the Alliance, but the interaction between the two organisations, recently enshrined in a security agreement<sup>26</sup>, demands at least a degree of mutual coordination, unless the intention is for WEU to remain in the shadow of the Alliance without being able to fulfil its natural role as NATO's European pillar.

#### *1. Implementation of the CJTF concept*

45. In January 1994, in Brussels, the North Atlantic Council took the decision to allow European members of the Alliance and WEU to draw on NATO military assets for operations not covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. To this end, specific structures would be created, known as combined joint task forces (CJTF), composed of "separable but not separate" support units<sup>27</sup> made available to WEU. However, it was not until the Alliance's June 1996 summit meeting in Berlin that any real progress was made in applying the concept, since negotiations at political and military level fairly quickly ran up against a number of obstacles. In actual fact, the American concept of the CJTF did not correspond to that held by Europeans when it came to who should have the real political and operational control over CJTF operations. It should also be emphasised that the United States created a precedent in the conduct of NATO/WEU joint operations when, in 1995, the American government decided, under pressure from Congress, unilaterally to withdraw from its

26 WEU Security Agreement, Brussels, 28 March 1995

27. North Atlantic Council, Declaration of heads of state and of government, paragraph 6; Brussels, 10-11 January 1994

involvement in operations in the Adriatic to monitor the embargo imposed by the United Nations on former Yugoslavia.

46. The problems over implementing the CJTF are also linked in part to the reform of NATO command structures, an area of disagreement between the French and Americans<sup>28</sup>. In theory, two main scenarios are possible

- the WEU Council can decide, in response to a request from one or more member states, to mobilise the CJTF to deal with a crisis in the framework of its activities under Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty, or at the request of the United Nations or the OSCE,
- the European Council, in application of the common foreign and security policy, can ask the WEU Council for military assistance in carrying out a Petersberg-type operation. The WEU Council assents and instructs its military bodies to initiate the action. At the same time it contacts the North Atlantic Council to obtain from NATO the assets WEU does not have such as airborne surveillance and strategic lift capabilities (AWACs and C-17 aircraft for example). NATO gives the go-ahead and the military authorities make the necessary arrangements to supply WEU with the required assets.

Nevertheless two questions remain unresolved: (i) how to avoid a political stalemate arising from the fact any decision taken within NATO must be unanimous; (ii) who has overall command of the CJTF - WEU by itself or the NATO military structures, namely the supreme commander, who is an American general?

47. From a political point of view, the presence of all the members of WEU in the North Atlantic Council is a virtual guarantee that the mechanism will function as described. It is difficult to imagine that a country would approve WEU undertaking a mission only to deny it access to NATO assets. However, things become more complicated when approval or positive abstention must be secured from states with associate member or observer

28. *Atlantic News*, No 2852, 2 September 1996.

status. One such is Turkey, some of whose recent public statements show that it is genuinely irritated by the European Union and WEU<sup>29</sup>, which cannot fail to have repercussions on the implementation of the CJTF when the time comes for it. Consideration of this matter cannot be put off for much longer, with NATO enlargement soon to go ahead with the accession of no less than three countries which are members of neither the European Union nor WEU. In the absence of an appropriate political solution, the CJTF are unlikely to get further than the general planning stage. This would further accentuate dependence on the United States, which would be the only country able to get things moving again.

48. The United States itself has yet to clarify its position in the matter, especially with regard to the issue of military command, which raises US domestic policy considerations, mainly in terms of relations between Congress and the Administration. Some WEU members, France foremost among them, would prefer command of the CJTF to be assigned in its entirety to a European general, who would be a deputy to the American SACEUR, carry out tasks on behalf of WEU and NATO and represent the European security and defence identity within the Alliance. As far as the United States is concerned, this would amount to a transfer, albeit temporary, of command over US equipment and manpower to European structures. In principle, this should be no more than a technicality, in line with the Administration's public advocacy of Europe having more involvement in its own defence and of strengthening the European component of NATO, but in reality this type of transfer would probably be vetoed by the United States Congress<sup>30</sup>, which has already on several occasions openly opposed the idea of transferring command over US assets to outside bodies, the United Nations first among them.

49. The solution as far as the Americans are concerned is to leave ultimate control over NATO assets with SACEUR, with the option of withdrawing them should he judge it appropriate or if the operation's aims depart from those originally set for it, so as to avoid the sort of situation in which UNPROFOR found itself trapped in former Yugoslavia, or UNSOM's experience in Somalia. This is not acceptable to Europeans, who would

29 "Turks threaten to block NATO's eastern push", *The Independent*, 15 October 1996.

30 "France wants top NATO post for European"; Reuters world report, 12 September 1996.

thus be deprived of their independent power of decision and evaluation if the situation on the ground made it necessary to alter the nature of the operation as envisaged at the outset, for example by converting a peacekeeping mission into a peace-making operation. Nevertheless, WEU and European Union members have little room to manoeuvre because of their almost total lack of the logistical and surveillance capabilities necessary for a major operation. This problem can only be resolved through enhanced European cooperation over equipment, which in practical terms means strengthening the remit of the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG) and, ultimately, creating a European Armaments Agency, as foreshadowed by the Franco-German Agency, which also cooperates with other WEU member states, such as the United Kingdom and the Netherlands<sup>31</sup>. Without a joint funding commitment to procure force projection (FLA project) and surveillance means (satellites, aircraft and drones), logistical dependence on the United States will significantly restrict the scope of CJTF operations.

50. In principle, a solution must be found to these problems at the forthcoming ministerial meetings WEU and NATO are to hold in November and December of this year<sup>32</sup>. This is essential in view of the fact that the IGC is to complete its work in June 1997, precisely when NATO is due to start enlargement proper. From WEU's standpoint, the CJTF concept obliges it to strengthen its operational capabilities and establish a general consultation mechanism enabling the Councils of the two defence alliances to deal with any crises in advance<sup>33</sup>. The success of the process is essential for the future of Europe's defence, since it has the virtue of promoting joint cooperation between NATO, WEU and the European Union without duplicating existing Alliance structures or involving further expenditure on hardware at a time when budgets are limited and constraints associated with the introduction of a single currency are significantly reducing the room for manoeuvre available to states. Nevertheless, this is no excuse for WEU member states not to give detailed thought to the nature of the relationship it should develop with

31. *Atlantic News*, No 2847, 18 September 1996.

32 NATO/WEU/European security and defence identity: towards a framework agreement next December; article in French in *Europe* No. 6828, page 4, 9 October 1996.

33 Idem.

some of its partners that will become members of the Alliance in the very near future

2. *NATO enlargement. a political decision with uncertain implications*

51. Accession to NATO by some central European countries is the logical extension of the Alliance's policy of cooperation with that region, which has until now taken the form of the Partnership for Peace launched in 1994. WEU, by creating an associate partner status, and the European Union, by developing the Europe Agreements, have also shown they are taking on board the region's security problems and economic difficulties. IFOR's Bosnia operation served to demonstrate the interest and relevance of the PfP programme, especially in terms of future politico-military cooperation between NATO and the Russian Federation. But such initiatives have not for all that drastically changed the post-cold war European geostrategic *status quo*, since the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union have not led to any extension of the NATO Treaty's territorial application beyond its inclusion of a unified Germany, and the Russian Federation has fallen in with that position although it has insisted on a special status in its relationship with the Alliance. Today the question of enlargement is causing concern, not only in Russia but also in all those other applicant countries that are not being invited to join immediately.

52. These problems, which are explored in some detail in another Political Committee report<sup>34</sup> and also in a report from the Assembly's Defence Committee<sup>35</sup>, are once again linked in various ways to United States domestic and foreign policy, including trade policy. In spite of the difficulties their decision threatens to create in terms of relations with the Russian Federation or with regard to situations of instability that may arise, both Congress and the Administration have committed themselves legally and in practice to three or even four central European states becoming full members of the Alliance by 1999 at the latest. This is only the start – the long-term aim is for most of the

region's countries to join, apart from the Russian Federation. Reaction from Europe has so far been favourable but there has still not been any real debate, except to express support for enlargement, often with reservations. In reality, the United States has made a much firmer commitment than its allies, as is clear from a recent speech President Clinton made during his election campaign in Detroit on 22 October, in which he stated "By 1999 – NATO's 50th anniversary and 10 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall – the first group of countries we invite to join should be full-fledged members of NATO"<sup>36</sup>.

53. For its part, Congress adopted an act on 23 July 1996, the "NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act of 1996", setting out the aims of enlargement in reasonable detail and including financial provisions to facilitate accession by central European countries. Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic are referred to as among the first to qualify (Section 6: Designation of countries eligible for NATO enlargement assistance) and Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine are supposed to be included in subsequent "waves" of admission, depending on their political and economic development (Section 4: Sense of the Congress regarding further enlargement of NATO). A sum of 60 million dollars has been earmarked to prepare for the first accessions, 20 million in subsidy costs of direct loans, 30 million in assistance on a grant basis and 10 million for the military education and training of officers in the first three countries. This falls a long way short of the total cost of enlargement, which runs to billions of dollars over the shorter or longer term depending on the number of countries envisaged. According to a study by three Rand Corporation researchers, costs could rise to 110 billion dollars (maximum option) over a period of 10 to 15 years<sup>37</sup>, while according to the Congressional budget office (CBO) it could reach 125 billion over 10 years (with the United States meeting some 10% of costs)<sup>38</sup>.

54. In a period of lower defence budgets and major budget constraints for most of the European countries that are members of WEU and NATO, and bearing in mind the relative precariousness of central and eastern European economies, the sums mentioned in pro-enlargement official or non-governmental documents should be viewed with

34. The eastern dimension of European security – Document 1542; Rapporteur, Mr Antretter, 42nd session of the Assembly of WEU; December 1996.

35. Defence and security in an enlarged Europe – reply to the annual report of the Council; Document 1545; Rapporteur Mr Marten, 42nd session of the Assembly of WEU; December 1996

36. *International Herald Tribune*, 23 October 1996

37. *Financial Times*, 28 August 1996

38. *Idem*

caution. This perhaps explains why, if one leaves aside the rhetoric about stability and the extra security gains to be had from enlargement, there have not yet been any parliamentary debates or official reports in European capitals. Within the Alliance itself, the study on NATO enlargement does not put a figure on any of its estimates; it simply observes in this connection that "when to deal with budgetary and administrative issues will need to be decided"<sup>39</sup>. However, the United States has unilaterally fixed 1998-99 as the deadline for at least three countries, implying that such matters must be discussed and resolved by 1997, if the ratification process for accessions is to be completed in 1999. This is only one of the controversial aspects of the question, since the political problems raised by selecting only a few countries and the implications of those choices for relations with Ukraine and the Russian Federation will also have to be dealt with.

55. The choice of Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic is based on the fact that it is in those countries that political and economic reforms have made most progress. They are also the first in line for accession to the European Union and it is only logical that WEU is likely to come next on their list of preferences. Nevertheless, their geostrategic position is not such as to present immediate dangers that would justify speeding up the process of enlargement. In contrast, there are varying degrees of instability in the situations of the Baltic states, Albania, Romania and Bulgaria. The first group are prey to political developments in the Russian Federation while the second are affected by their location in the Balkans, on the borders of Bosnia, where the situation has temporarily become more settled. The three Baltic states would seem to be in the most sensitive position, because, over and above NATO relations, they bring into play relations between the United States and the Russian Federation. Proposals have been made for strengthening the Partnership for Peace<sup>40</sup>, but the heads of state of Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia, Mr Brazauskas, Mr Meri and Mr Ulmanis, stated in a joint communiqué on 28 September 1996, that they were to intensify diplomatic efforts to obtain support for their security from all the relevant countries through NATO membership and bilateral security arrangements with western countries<sup>41</sup>. In

point of fact, their common border with Russia and (in the case of Estonia and Latvia) the presence on their territory of large Russian-speaking communities serve partly to explain the reluctance of NATO, and especially the United States, to provide them with a security guarantee that also covers nuclear aspects – a fact which tends to be overlooked.

56. Ukraine is in a similar situation and its government has taken a very moderate line by stating that it does not oppose other countries joining and, for the time being, choosing not to declare itself as an applicant. It is something of a paradox that in spite of this stance, Congress refers to the country as being on the list of future candidates when it comes to NATO enlargement, which will do nothing to instil calm in discussions with the Russian Federation. This is not preventing Ukraine from developing contacts over security and defence matters with NATO and WEU, or with its neighbours who will shortly be joining, as the recent exercise carried out in that country in September 1996, involving British, Polish and Ukrainian forces, and the existence of a tripartite military cooperation agreement both go to show. The signature of a joint declaration with the WEU Secretary-General, on 20 September 1996, putting relations between Ukraine and our own Organisation on an official footing, is in line with the policy of proceeding step by step which, while it does not provide the same level of security as NATO membership, does not seem to cause tensions with other states in the region. Without powerful military assets, WEU is obviously not as attractive a proposition as the Alliance but it does have an important role to play by cooperating actively with the central European countries and enabling them to be more closely involved in its activities and the work of its various bodies, without this giving rise to objections or the formation of "grey areas".

#### *(b) WEU after Berlin*

57. NATO reform and enlargement will have a major impact on the working and composition of WEU. Implementation of the CJTF concept means that operational structures will have to be strengthened and the chain of command from politicians to the military clearly defined, a subject which has scarcely been touched upon in Council declarations and documents published to date. The first operation of this kind will be a decisive test of

39. Study on NATO enlargement, page 36, September 1995

40. *Atlantic News*, No 2853, 4 October 1996

41. *Idem*.



the entire organisation's credibility, which perhaps explains why member states are in no hurry to concern themselves with what happens when IFOR pulls out, even though the American authorities have not committed themselves to maintaining a force on the ground and are withdrawing their troops while pursuing their programme of helping the Muslim-Croat Federation to rearm. Added to this, there are difficulties of a political complexion arising from disagreement between France and the United States over the Alliance commands<sup>42</sup>, which threatens to delay the establishment of a European security and defence identity which the North Atlantic Council called for in the Declaration it adopted in Berlin on 3 June 1996

58. The cost of enlargement threatens to absorb resources that might be necessary for strengthening operational assets and structures. The constraints resulting from the preparations being made for a single currency are slowing down some hardware programmes in areas where member states have limited resources, such as airlift and observation satellites, and are casting uncertainty over anti-missile defence projects at a time when the number of missile delivery systems being developed outside Europe is on the increase<sup>43</sup>. From a political point of view, there is extreme uncertainty as to the conclusions the IGC will reach on security and defence matters, no options having yet been formulated as regards the inclusion of a security guarantee in the new Treaty on European Union, which is bound to lead to a conflict over areas of responsibility with NATO and the United States, or even of the Petersberg missions<sup>44</sup>. Faced with these deadlines set by NATO and the European Union, it is becoming necessary for WEU, through its Council and in cooperation with the Assembly, to make a balanced, practical and determined contribution to Europe's security, while continuing to strengthen its capabilities.

### *1. Development of operational capabilities*

59. Under the Portuguese and Spanish Presidencies, WEU undertook a consultation exercise, "European Security – a common concept of the 27 WEU countries", on the development of a

42. On 25 September 1996, AFP reported difficulties in progress towards the creation of a European pillar of the Alliance.

43. "Europe faces rising threat from global missile stock", *The Times*, 10 October 1996

44. *Europe*, No 6829, page 3; 10 October 1996.

European defence policy which has led, albeit in a modest way, to some practical achievements. The British Presidency distinguished itself in this field, in spite of the doubts sometimes raised by its views on European security and defence issues, as set out in the "Memorandum on the United Kingdom Government's approach to the treatment of European defence issues at the 1996 intergovernmental conference". The emphasis placed on the inter-governmental nature of the CFSP and WEU should not be interpreted as an anti-Europe stance, in other words as hostile to integrating the policies of WEU and European Union member countries, but as an acknowledgement of the reality of the existence of nation states in Europe and an awareness of the fact that until the states in the two organisations can reach agreement on the aims of a European security and defence policy and make a specific commitment to provide the assets required for implementing it, the main effort will have to be made by states themselves, either alone or in bilateral or multilateral frameworks

60. Hence, out of a concern for efficiency, the British Presidency made strengthening WEU's operational capabilities, in other words the military and intelligence assets which give it "politico-military control of European operations"<sup>45</sup>, its priority. An important step in this direction was taken with the Crisex exercises which took place in 1995 and 1996 and the setting-up of a permanent Situation Centre and an Intelligence Section within the Planning Cell. In parallel, the United Kingdom took the decision "to make its operational sea training facilities available for national or collective use by WEU nations"<sup>46</sup> – an initiative of not inconsiderable importance since it spared WEU from having to make the investment required for setting up this type of structure at a time of budget restrictions across the board. In another area, that of force projection capabilities, the Council reached agreement on "a WEU concept for strategic mobility to facilitate the conduct of Petersberg missions"<sup>47</sup>. This package of practical measures is helping strengthen WEU's hand in its relations with NATO and the European Union.

61. Nevertheless, in what is essentially a political sphere, the member states have still not managed to reconcile their differing views. There is no doubt

45. WEU Council of Ministers, Birmingham Declaration, point 2; Birmingham, 7 May 1996.

46. *Idem*, point 5.

47. *Idem*, point 4.

that strengthening military structures intended for use in operations carried out by the CJTF, while significantly consolidating WEU's ties with NATO, does not give the European Union any real support, through WEU, in implementing CFSP decisions. For as long as the issue of final control over the CJTF remains unresolved and questions concerning relations with the other European members of the Alliance have not been settled, WEU will not have the necessary autonomy to respond to a request from the Union. The security agreement reached with the Alliance raises a further problem – deciding how WEU can transmit information to the European Union in the event of an operation requiring mobilisation of the CJTF when four of the fifteen EU members are not members of NATO.

62. Armaments cooperation is another important area where further impetus is necessary. The Western European Armaments Group (WEAG) is obviously a long way off being able to fulfil the functions of a European Armaments Agency, if only because its membership includes countries that are not members of the European Union and might obstruct any development intended to compensate for the latter's inadequacies in this area. Denmark is not involved either in elaborating or implementing decisions or actions of the Union which have defence implications<sup>48</sup>, Norway is not an EU member and relations between the Union and Turkey are difficult. This may perhaps explain why certain states have decided to deal with these matters elsewhere, in the Franco-German Agency WEU, which should have had the leading role in armaments policy and project coordination, has to an extent been sidelined from all the major programmes such as the future large aircraft (essential for boosting projection capability), the modular armoured vehicle (to be built by Germany, France and the United Kingdom) or the Helios 2 and Horus observation satellites (involving France, Germany and possibly Italy and Spain). This analysis is confirmed by the scant attention such matters receive in the Birmingham Declaration<sup>49</sup>.

48. European Council, Edinburgh, section C; 11-12 December 1992

49. "Ministers recognised that enhanced cooperation in the field of European armaments will be an important part of a European security and defence identity. Ministers noted that work was continuing to follow up the report on options for a European armaments policy and on the scope for the establishment of a European armaments agency" (point 10)

63. The project to create a Western European Armaments Organisation (WEAO), adopted by the National Armaments Directors in The Hague on 18 October, and due to be considered by the WEAG ministers in Ostend on 18 November, on the fringe of the meeting of the Council of Ministers<sup>50</sup>, will, if adopted, represent a major qualitative advance in this area. WEAO, which would be a subsidiary body, would have the power to award equipment and programme contracts on behalf of member states. Its director would report to the Council and the National Armaments Directors on the organisation's activities. The structure must be fairly flexible to allow for incorporation of the Franco-German Agency and other bilateral or multilateral armaments cooperation arrangements, as it is most important for countries wishing to commit themselves to programmes of common interest to be able to do so, and not be held back by other members with different priorities. Conversely, states would still be free to decide whether or not to become involved in joint projects. Such an arrangement may not seem very rational from a political point of view, but must be accepted as long as cooperation takes place in an intergovernmental framework, if only to avoid gridlock situations, which, more often than not, lead to cooperation developing outside rather than within WEU.

64. Given the profusion of peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations being carried out within multilateral frameworks in countries often very far away from base, it is important, urgent even, to start addressing the issue of standardising equipment. To do so, an effort must be made to secure the closest possible involvement of both military authorities and political decision-makers. It would be highly desirable for discussions – to be held within a WEU framework – to include the Commanders-in-Chief, WEAG – or its successor organisation – and the Planning Cell. In parallel, links should be established with the associate partners, which could possibly contribute to carrying out Petersberg operations, and with the European Union authorities responsible for telecommunications and advanced technologies. WEU should assert itself as the European framework for discussion and decision-making on armaments-related matters, at least while the European Union has no genuine common foreign and security policy. This last requirement is essential if the intention is for the Union one day to

50. *La Tribune Desfossés*, 22 October 1996

have a say in armaments-related matters<sup>51</sup>. In any absence of resolve on Europe's part, American industry will step into the breach, with the implications this will have for sovereignty and the economy. It is to be hoped that the Council, at its Ostend meeting, will pay a little more heed to these issues, which are not mentioned directly as being among the aims of the current presidency.

65. Under a seven-point programme announced in Brussels at a press conference of foreign affairs and defence ministers on 24 June<sup>52</sup>, Belgium committed itself to pursuing the development of WEU's operational capabilities as follows:

- implementation of the CJTF concept in close coordination with NATO,
- joint use of elements of FAWEU units, with enhancement of the necessary technical, legal and statutory means;
- sharing of training facilities;
- strengthening peacekeeping capabilities with a "generic plan" to be drawn up by the Planning Cell;
- harmonisation of mechanisms and procedures with a view to WEU operations;
- cooperation with the European Union and possibly with the OAU on peacekeeping in Africa;
- cooperation with the European Union on mine-clearance and use of anti-personnel mines.

66 The WEU Council's ministerial meeting, which is to be held in Ostend in November 1996, will doubtless close the current presidency with congratulations all round on the achievement of the above objectives. The constant strengthening of operational capabilities is a necessary condition for WEU to be able to meet its commitments with regard to collective defence and Petersberg tasks, but it is also essential for issues of a political nature

51. The Union is essentially concerned for the time being with defence industry transformation (under the KONVER II aid programme).

52. *Vox*, No. 9624, page 15, 31 July 1996.

that have a bearing on relations with the European Union and NATO to be resolved before the two organisations go ahead with their respective enlargement processes and changes in working procedures, all of which will undoubtedly affect our own Organisation. This tendency to "wait and see", frequently decried in our Assembly, is also a reflection of WEU's intergovernmental way of working, where consensus is required before any position is taken. As far as the future of the Alliance and the Union is concerned, there is no unanimity and each individual country sets its own agenda – although this does not preclude countries from making joint proposals which eventually gain the support of the other states. However the time for prevarication is past as major commitments have been made regarding the future of the Alliance and the Union and their security implications are impossible to foresee. WEU – in other words the Council and its organs, including the Assembly – must prepare itself to meet any challenges arising from these developments.

## *2. The need for WEU to adapt to geostrategic developments in Europe*

67. As the fiftieth anniversary of the 1948 Brussels Treaty approaches, marking the fifty-year timeframe – as interpreted by the Council of Ministers – for which Article XII<sup>53</sup> of the 1954 modified Brussels Treaty makes provision, WEU as a whole must give thought to its role in European security and defence structures. To seek to embody Europe's identity within NATO and at the same time be the defence component of the European Union is a delicate balancing act and one laden with contradictions which, if not resolved in the very near future, are likely to paralyse any action WEU attempts to take when it is finally put to the test. One important question to which a clear answer must be given concerns the area covered by the very notion of WEU. Indeed, several WEUs are apparent in the workings of its ministerial organs:

53. "... It (the Treaty) shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of the last instrument of ratification and shall thereafter remain in force for 50 years. After the expiry of the period of fifty years, each of the High Contracting Parties shall have the right to cease to be a party thereto provided that he shall have previously given one year's notice of denunciation to the Belgian Government. ...".

- WEU consisting of ten full members (which meets only infrequently<sup>54</sup>);
- WEU at 18 (the Ten plus the three associate members and five observers<sup>55</sup>);
- WEU at 13 (WEAG),
- WEU at 28 (the 18 plus the ten associate partners<sup>56</sup>).

The secretariat comprises a Secretary-General, his Deputies, political and security sections, a planning cell with analysis and intelligence capabilities, operating alongside several working groups, consisting of officials of the various countries, which meet at 13, 18 or 28 (the Politico-Military Group operates in two variants as does the Council Working Group)

68. This complex situation is the outcome of decisions taken in the aftermath of Maastricht and at the Petersberg meeting, in an effort to make it possible for virtually all western and central European countries to be involved in WEU's work, but without those states (other than Greece and the NATO allies) being required to subscribe to all the security and defence obligations arising from the modified Brussels Treaty. It is essential to revert to a stricter application of the Treaty and clarification of the rights and obligations of each country in respect of the Organisation, instead of granting one status or another on the basis of individual ties with the Alliance or the European Union, if paralysis is to be avoided in the event of a major difference of opinion as to whether a Petersberg mission is appropriate in a given case. The question has the greatest bearing on those European members of NATO that are associate members of WEU since they have a power of decision as to whether recourse should be had to the CJTF. If NATO enlargement does not take place in parallel with that of the European Union, it will create a further factor of uncertainty.

69. There is no ready solution to the problem but the logical implication of a more careful reading of

54. WEU programme of forthcoming meetings, October-December 1996.

55. Iceland, Norway and Turkey; Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland and Sweden.

56. Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia.

Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty is that accession to WEU should be open to the European countries in the Alliance. Because the WEU Declaration annexed to the Maastricht Treaty did not make a clear choice in this connection, WEU's original *raison d'être*, of guaranteeing the collective defence of its members, has become distorted. The Petersberg missions and the CJTF are mere subsidiary elements and aspects of the main aim of the Treaty. As far as the European Union is concerned, one must be realistic and stress that until it succeeds in establishing effective CFSP procedures which are either accepted by all its members or established in the framework of enhanced cooperation between those states that want to forge ahead in this field, as is already the case with monetary union, integration will not be feasible. European security is not piecemeal and comes at a price, in legal, political and above all financial terms.

70. Convergence between WEU and other European members of the Alliance and the establishment of enhanced cooperation with the European Union are two challenges that have to be met for WEU to become both the European security and defence identity within NATO and the defence component of the European Union. There are implications here for transatlantic relations, which, it is often forgotten, are intended to be a two-way street. The United States presence in Europe is not merely confined to NATO but includes major political and economic involvement. Europe is a stable market for American investment and has a trade balance that normally tips in the United States' favour, unlike the Pacific region where the opposite applies. In political terms, the Americans need "legal" back-up from the Europeans to secure the international community's acquiescence to certain unilateral US foreign policy actions. A recent example of this was US Secretary of State Warren Christopher's mini-trip to Europe in September to enlist support for missile strikes against Iraq.

71. The absence of a real common foreign policy gives the United States a position of supremacy in European security and defence matters. Nevertheless, that country has neither the means nor the inclination to act as the "world's policeman" and has need of Europe, if only to take on a number of political and economic tasks that would place an additional burden on the US budget. Europe is the one paying for the reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina, while the Americans rearm it, and for the peace process in the Middle East to succeed in

the face of the US failing to make headway<sup>57</sup>. And yet the European allies do not always get a "fair return", as the position with regard to NATO's regional commands goes to show, or as was evident in the past when Ruud Lubbers was nominated for the post of Secretary-General. However, it is also true that a comparison of some statistics would suggest that American "domination" is justified<sup>58</sup>.

	Europe (NATO)	Europe (NATO and EU)	U S	U S and Canada
GNP (1994, \$ billions)	6 846	7 649	6 737	7 286
Defence (1995, \$ millions)	163 565	178 992	252 600	260 742
R&D (1995, \$ millions)	13 597	13 779	35 400	35 541

Without a real joint effort in terms of defence budgets, investment in research and development and in the industrial sector, transatlantic relations will clearly go on being dominated by the United States, which will continue to dictate security and defence choices. It is therefore important for the European members of the Alliance to endeavour to strengthen the European security and defence identity's influence within NATO, in cooperation with Canada, in order to ensure Europe emerges from any reorganisation of military structures with a fair share of the responsibilities and a say in the enlargement arrangements, given that the European states are, after all, in the "front line" should tensions arise with the Russian Federation or the other central European countries not involved, for the time being, in the enlargement process.

72. In its relations with the central European countries, Ukraine and the Russian Federation, WEU should place emphasis on their involvement in the preparation of joint military exercises and possibly their participation in Petersberg-type operations. Bilateral or multilateral cooperation on security and defence matters should be encouraged

57. "US Mideast envoy fails to seal pact", *Financial Times*, 29 October 1996, "US envoy suspends Mideast role", *International Herald Tribune*, 29 October 1996.

58. *L'Année stratégique – Les équilibres militaires 1996*; edited by Pascal Boniface, page 283.

between member states and these countries – and this includes the Russian Federation – so as to help ease tensions that will undoubtedly surface upon selective enlargement of the Alliance. WEU is not in a position, given the modest resources it commands, to extend its security guarantee in the years to come, but it can and must – in so far as it is able – establish close working relations with all the countries in that part of Europe, without exception, paying particular attention to the Russian Federation. The latter is experiencing a period of political instability of uncertain outcome, making it difficult to discern what its reaction to NATO enlargement might be. The proposed special relationship with the Alliance on the basis of a Charter or cooperation agreement might be a positive factor in defusing any crisis that may break out, but without knowing the content and legal standing of such a document, it is difficult to form an opinion on how the discussions will develop, despite the optimistic statements of the Secretary-General, Mr Solana<sup>59</sup>.

73 With regard to the Mediterranean, coordination of WEU and European Union action is desirable. The Union is the south shore countries' largest trading partner and in 1995 initiated a political dialogue with them through the Euro-Mediterranean Conference. It furthermore committed itself to negotiating Cyprus's accession in the six months following completion of the work of the IGC. An early settlement of the Cyprus issue will strengthen security and stability in the Mediterranean. It goes without saying that the solution to this issue as set out in the decision of 6 March 1995, taken by the Council of the European Union<sup>60</sup>, cannot be considered as a precondition for accession.

74. With Euromarfor and Eurofor as multinational task forces open to all WEU full members and constituting instruments enabling it to intervene in the event of a crisis in the Mediterranean, WEU could make an active

59. "NATO to reach formal deal with Russia", *The Independent*, 30 October 1996.

60. "In connection with the preparation of the position to be adopted at the 36th meeting of the EC-Turkey Association Council, the Council unanimously agreed on the components of a global package concerning the general political framework for developing future relations between the European Union and Turkey, on the one hand, and Cyprus, on the other hand, and the customs union with Turkey; ..."

contribution to promoting stability in the region by agreeing to let the countries in that area play a full part in those forces. In the event of protracted delay, it would again fall to the United States to find a solution to a problem that is primarily a European responsibility. Nevertheless, even now WEU does not seem to be in a position to give a clear response in this connection and it is surprising that the Council's Mediterranean Group should have decided to suspend activities pending the decisions the European Union will take in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue, given that both organisations have complementary responsibilities in this area – in the Union's case, they are economic and political and in WEU's case they concern security and defence. This implies that there should be greater cooperation between them in a region which has just as high a priority in terms of European interests as central and eastern Europe.

75. The WEU Assembly must continue to assert itself in its capacity as the only interparliamentary component of European defence. The way forward lies through strengthened ties with national parliaments, but there is also the problem of the wording of Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty, linking the Assembly with the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. In fact, the latter bears a closer resemblance to the OSCE Assembly in terms of the number of full members and no longer has much in common with our own institution, which rather has to act as a counterweight to the influence the European Parliament wields in framing the CFSP, even though the latter still falls within the intergovernmental sphere. While this is a complex issue involving institutional relationships, it would nevertheless be desirable to find some solutions. The Assembly is the only institution which is made up of national parliamentarians and has a statutory remit to debate European security and defence issues. As such, its composition should reflect that fact, in other words it must represent the views of the defence, foreign affairs and European affairs committees of the parliaments of its member states working together within it

76. Reviewing the composition of the Assembly is not, however, enough. It has to be supported by a real political and indeed financial commitment on the part of the national parliaments enabling them to contribute to the framing of a security and defence policy for Europe within what essentially remains an intergovernmental process, and giving them the means of exercising supervision in an area where

they rarely have an opportunity to influence government choices. There is no consensus on this issue because, to put it frankly, parliamentarians are scattered about the Assemblies of the Council of Europe, the North Atlantic Council, the OSCE and other regional and international institutions where security issues are continually being discussed, directly or indirectly. Nevertheless each national parliament stands alone in its dealings with its own government and interparliamentary supervision is non-existent in the intergovernmental sphere (the WEU Assembly has no supervisory powers vis-à-vis the Council). This deficiency must be made good and the modified Brussels Treaty allows for this, subject to amendment of Article IX, provided that national parliaments pledge their support for the Assembly, which is the legal instrument they have for making their views known and the vehicle enabling them to contribute actively to the process of building Europe's security and defence in the 21st century.

#### *IV. Conclusions*

77. In this period of European history characterised by ever more rapid change, decisive choices have already been or are in the process of being made. It will no longer do to refer vaguely to "the longer term" or the "years to come", since this ultimately comes down to maintaining a *status quo* that cannot meet the challenges that lie ahead. These no longer take the guise of a major (and final?) world war but are of a different order – economic, technological, ecological or even social. What can be described as "low key" conflicts, advances in telecommunications technology which are also contributing to the rise in worldwide organised crime and drugs and armaments trafficking, massive migratory movements – such as those in Africa – that are destabilising whole continents, and entrenched ballistic missile and endemic nuclear proliferation are but some of the – already apparent – manifestations of new threats to world security. WEU and the European Union, in their present or future configurations, cannot claim to play a "fire-fighting" or "policing" role on their own, or sit back as mere spectators of international political developments. They must actively undertake to influence the course of events and promote the basic values they share – human rights, rejection of the use of force (except of course in legitimate self-defence) and respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of national communities.


78. WEU must now strive to focus its endeavours on the dual need to anticipate crises and hold itself in readiness to act if so required. This calls for a sustained effort on the part of the member states to ensure that the Organisation is better resourced in military and technological terms, which requires a clear and unambiguous political commitment framed on the objectives defined in the modified Brussels Treaty and on the new peacekeeping and humanitarian missions WEU is to

undertake in the years to come, providing support to the United Nations, the European Union and the OSCE, and above all, acting on its own initiative. When it can claim to have met this last challenge, there is no doubt that WEU will have reached maturity, in that it will have become a major player in international relations, in the service of its member states and even of the European Union, making a decisive contribution to peace, security and prosperity in the world.





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