

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

THIRTY-SEVENTH ORDINARY SESSION

(First Part)

The Gulf crisis –
lessons for Western European Union

REPORT

submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee
by Mr. De Hoop Scheffer, Rapporteur

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1. Adopted in committee by 17 votes to 3 with 0 abstentions.

2. *Members of the committee* Sir Dudley Smith (Chairman); Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Mr. Uyttendaele (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Alloncle, Bassinet, Borderas (Alternate: *Bolinaga*), Cariglia, Chevalier, Cox (Alternate: *J. Thompson*), De Decker, Dees (Alternate: *Tummers*), Ewing (Alternate: *Lord Newall*), Fernandes Marques, *Fiandrotti*, Fillon, Fioret (Alternate: *Mezzapesa*), Fourré, Irmer, Jung, Mrs. *Lentz-Cornette*, MM. Maris (Alternate: *De Hoop Scheffer*), Marten, Mota Torres, Moya, Pecchioli (Alternate: *Mesoraca*), Perinat (Alternate: *de Puig*), Scheer, Sinesio, *Speed*, *Steiner*, Sir John Stokes (Alternate: *D. Thompson*), MM. *Vazquez*, Vieira Mesquita, Zierer.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Rapporteur's Preface

In preparation for this report, *the Rapporteur* met or received evidence from the following:

Washington DC – 5th to 8th February 1991

State Department

Mr. Reginald Bartholomew, Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs;

Mr. Raymond G.H. Seitz, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs;

Mrs. Avis Bohlen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs;

Mr. Michael Moodie, Assistant Director for Multilateral Affairs, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

National Security Council

Mr. David Gompert, Senior Director for Soviet and European Affairs.

The Pentagon

Mr. Henry Rowen, Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs;

Mr. Bruce Weinrod, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security Policy;

Lieutenant General Edward Loland, Director, Strategic Planning Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The committee as a whole was briefed as follows:

Paris – 21st January 1991

General Maurice Schmitt, Chief of the French Defence Staff and Chairman of the WEU Chiefs of Defence Staff Committee;

Admiral Doniol, Military Counsellor to the French Government and Liaison Officer to the WEU Assembly;

Captain Combarieu, WEU Desk Officer in the French Ministry of Defence.

Toulon – 26th February 1991

Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean

Vice-Admiral Merlot, Deputy to the Commander-in-Chief;

Rear Admiral Gazaneau, Head of Operations;

Captain Cluzel, CECMED staff;

Commander Gassier, CECMED staff.

The committee embarked in and was briefed by the commanding officers of the:

– aircraft carrier *Clemenceau* (Captain Fourreaux);

– frigate *Montcalm* (Captain Wybo);

– frigate *Dupleix* (Captain Pézard).

The committee and the Rapporteur extend their thanks to those ministers, officials and senior officers who met the Rapporteur or committee and replied to questions.

The opinions expressed in the report, unless otherwise attributed, are those of the committee.

Draft Recommendation*on the Gulf crisis – lessons for Western European Union*

The Assembly,

- (i) Congratulating the WEU Council of Ministers on what has been achieved by the forces of member nations to help the coalition resolve the crisis in the Gulf and in particular applauding the initiatives taken by the Chairman-in-Office to co-ordinate WEU activities;
- (ii) Seconding the Council's prompt action in helping to provide the military support necessary to take aid to and ensure the protection of the Kurdish refugees;
- (iii) Welcoming the German decision to join current WEU mine-clearing operations in the Gulf;
- (iv) Believing that a longer-term WEU maritime presence in the Gulf area would considerably strengthen the chances of maintaining peace and stability in the region;
- (v) Supporting the idea of regular meetings of WEU chiefs of defence staff;
- (vi) Dismayed that there is no certainty that the excellent arrangements made by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council to co-ordinate WEU activities both in the Gulf area and between national capitals, as well as in the WEU operational cells, will continue beyond the end of June;
- (vii) Convinced that the time is now ripe formally to associate Denmark, Greece, Norway and Turkey, if they wish, with the work of WEU,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Establish, in co-operation with the United Nations and especially with the relevant Gulf states, a WEU maritime presence in the Gulf area in accordance with Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty with as many member countries as possible contributing assets at least on an occasional basis, to help maintain peace and stability in the region and support diplomatic efforts directed towards the same ends;
2. Invite the governments of Denmark, Greece, Norway and Turkey to be associated on a permanent basis with the work of WEU at all levels and in all bodies;
3. Instruct the chiefs of defence staff to meet regularly and to examine the feasibility of co-ordinating national assets to establish WEU rapid action forces for extra-European operations;
4. Ensure the continuity, as long as may be necessary, of WEU co-ordination of:
 - (a) the application of the United Nations embargo on arms, etc., for Iraq;
 - (b) mine-clearing operations in the Gulf;
 - (c) support for aid to the Kurds and their protection,both on the spot and between national capitals, by either transferring the total task from Paris to Bonn with the change of Chairman-in-Office of the Council on 1st July 1991, or mandating the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. De Hoop Scheffer, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. This is the third report of the Defence Committee to be dedicated to the Gulf crisis since it began on 2nd August 1990. The great difference with the previous two reports¹, however, is that the immediate United Nations aim to free Kuwait which inspired co-ordinated action by Western European Union has been achieved with the provisional cease-fire of 25th February 1991 and the acceptance by Iraq of the conditions governing a permanent cease-fire².

2. Your Rapporteur's first reaction is therefore to congratulate all those countries, members of the coalition, who through their mutual solidarity demonstrated a resolve to apply the guiding principles of the United Nations Charter. The outward and visible sign of this solidarity is represented by the men and women who sought firstly through peaceful means and latterly by feat of arms to achieve a successful conclusion to the crisis and by all those who supported their endeavours, both at home and abroad. Our admiration for each individual concerned is especially well-merited, as is our acknowledgement of the undoubted leadership qualities of the United States.

3. There has been considerable criticism of the lack of positive European action in the face of Iraq's blatant aggression against Kuwait and while there is room for such criticism in the context of the Twelve in the framework of European political co-operation, it is definitely without foundation where Western European Union is concerned, as readers of the Assembly's Documents 1243 and 1248 will be more than aware. No formal response to the specific recommendations made in these two reports has yet been received from the Council, but your Rapporteur has been assured by many a senior officer that the right questions were asked at the right time. In addition, most of the recommendations have actually been implemented which is in itself a compliment to the Assembly. And not only member countries have taken note of what was discussed, as the Chairman of the Defence Committee and your Rapporteur discovered when they visited Washington in February.

4. Concern in the United States, as well as centring on progress in the Gulf, focused also on

1. Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: operations in the Gulf, Document 1243, and Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: continuing operations in the Gulf region, Document 1248, Rapporteur: Mr. De Hoop Scheffer.

2. See Appendix I.

the future shape of European security and defence. Fears that the United States might be marginalised in future arrangements were very prevalent. Our interlocutors had dusted off their copies of the modified Brussels Treaty, discovering the organic link with NATO contained in Article IV, but were worried about moves to create such links with the European Community as well, risking a weakening of the Atlantic partnership. The American démarche before the last WEU ministerial therefore came as no surprise.

5. WEU is generally perceived as the basis for creating the European pillar within the Atlantic Alliance – which pleases the Americans, provided of course that the other, European non-WEU members of NATO, Denmark, Greece, Norway and especially Turkey, are not left out of the equation...

II. WEU and Denmark, Greece, Norway and Turkey

6. Building on what was achieved between August and December 1990, the WEU Council of Ministers met in Paris on 17th January 1991 and again on 22nd February. The first meeting, continuing the practice begun at the end of last year, included observers from Denmark, Greece, Norway and Turkey, specially invited because of the context. This latter point is of double significance now given the occasional criticism of WEU as being too exclusive an organisation. Including the four non-members, two of whom are EC members, all of whom are NATO members, is a pragmatic solution to the charges of exclusivity. Interestingly enough, two of the four have already applied formally for WEU membership (Greece and Turkey), but the Council, while agreeing to give special briefings to both countries after WEU ministerial sessions, has been slow to reply mainly because of those two countries' "local difficulty" which has the potential to stalemate the provisions of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty. Therefore, this recent pragmatic attempt by the Council to produce a kind of observer status for the countries concerned is to be welcomed (although it should be emphasised that the Assembly itself has been inviting and welcoming observers from Denmark, Greece, Norway and Turkey for the past five years or so!).

7. It is hoped that the WEU Council of Ministers will now address itself to the particular problem of enlargement; as far as the Assembly

is concerned, the problem of associating non-Community members with the work of WEU is a non-problem and the Assembly has never insisted on making membership of the European Community a prior condition for membership of WEU. The present machinations by some who would prefer to invite neutral Ireland to join WEU rather than Norway or Turkey defy common sense. The only present logical imperative for admission to WEU is a commitment to common defence through parallel membership of the Atlantic Alliance. Indeed, as the queue of those countries wishing to be associated with the European Community lengthens and becomes decidedly esoteric and markedly neutral/non-aligned at best (Austria, Sweden, Finland, Switzerland, maybe, let alone many of the recently-democratic, erstwhile members of the Warsaw Pact), it seems increasingly obvious that the main criterion for joining WEU should be a demonstrated willingness to commit oneself wholeheartedly to the defence ideals which have shaped European defence, viz: the Brussels and Washington treaties, coupled with the strong restatement of faith which is the Hague platform. The two countries which merit the earliest consideration in this context are therefore Norway and Turkey.

8. The former is still very much in the front line when it comes to the traditional East-West axis which has governed NATO responses for the past forty years (a front line where the potentially-opposing elements have never ceased to grow and be reinforced, in spite of fine words and a shining-bright, if as yet unratified, Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe).

9. The latter country has proved its resolve as a front-line state both in East-West terms, but more importantly now in the North-South orientation and is deserving of more recognition and consideration than has sometimes been apparent. Recent mutterings in the ranks questioning the relevance of Article V of the Washington Treaty should Turkey have been attacked by Iraq are symptomatic of a particular insensitivity.

10. Of course your Rapporteur realises that the question of enlargement is only part of the current debate on the future shape of European security and both the Presidential and Political Committees are addressing the issues, but the Gulf crisis has served to concentrate minds and also to emphasise the growing links between WEU and other European states – in a pragmatic and particularly positive way.

11. The Gulf crisis has shown the mettle of Turkey as a loyal member of the Atlantic Alliance: Denmark, Greece and Norway have all demonstrated common cause with the allies in sending ships to help enforce the United Nations embargo and in other humanitarian

ways also. The Assembly should now urge the WEU Council to seek a way of associating all four countries, if they wish, with the work of WEU.

III. The Brussels and Washington treaties

12. Mention of the Brussels and Washington treaties brings to mind another myth which your Rapporteur considers should be laid to rest. Certain commentators, and indeed prime actors in the negotiations currently being pursued on European Union, have implied that the modified Brussels Treaty is due to end in 1998 which is not true. Quite apart from the debate as to whether the period of 50 years before a state may give a year's notice of wishing to leave WEU dates from the signing of the Brussels Treaty in 1948 or from the ratification of the modified Brussels Treaty in 1955, the whole issue is nothing more than a red herring designed to support the contention that WEU is soon to be wound up and its attributes taken over by the European Community!

13. To make an interesting parallel: did any state announce its intention to leave the Washington Treaty when a similar opportunity arose to quit NATO – in 1969, only twenty years after the signing of the treaty? Even the vicissitudes suffered by NATO in 1966 did not induce any member nation to leave totally! Why should it be any different for WEU in either 1998 or 2005? For completeness, the full text of the relevant articles of the Brussels and Washington treaties is given at Appendix II.

IV. Lessons from the Gulf

14. In European terms a certain number of lessons are immediately obvious:

1. the need for more heavily-equipped, mobile and flexible forces;
2. Europe does not possess sufficient land, air or especially sea transport for this sort of strategic deployment;
3. electronic warfare capabilities must be considerably improved;
4. missile launchers have proved to be far more mobile than originally expected;
5. missile proliferation and increasing ranges mean that Europe needs an anti-ballistic missile capability;
6. Europe was confronted with risks in the Mediterranean area which had not been forecast and should show the same solidarity with Mediterranean countries as hitherto with the Federal Republic of Germany on the Central Front;

7. chemical weapons were a specific threat to the coalition forces and much time and effort was spent in preparing to counter them;
 8. the debate concerning conscription has been reopened in countries where it is still practised;
 9. all possible solutions regarding peace in the Gulf and the part to be played by WEU remain open;
 10. what should be the future rôle of WEU forces?
15. Of course there are other lessons also, which will gradually emerge as the various analyses of the action are carried out. The implications of the above first conclusions merit further consideration:
1. It is generally true that rapid action forces are likely to be more lightly-equipped: that is why they are able to respond quickly in an emergency. Such deployment is usually a deterrent in itself and if more heavily-equipped force is required it is a question of "holding on" until reinforcements arrive. In the recent conflict both United States and French quick reaction forces, which were first to arrive in Saudi Arabia, were not equipped to fight a land battle but were symbolic of a commitment for defence. British forces were slower to arrive, but brought heavy armour with them. What is required ideally is a heavy airlift capability, which can prove very expensive. Otherwise it is a question of coming by sea with the built-in delay that entails.
 2. Transport and indeed logistics generally are vital for victory. Previous reports for the Defence Committee have highlighted the alliance's shortcomings and even although certain governments now have specific procedures for taking up ships or aircraft from civilian operators, the situation is still fraught with difficulty. In his parallel report, on Arms control: force reductions and the rôle of multinational units, Mr. Uyttendaele, Rapporteur, suggests that a WEU study be carried out for a possible joint air transport fleet. The C-130 Hercules will need replacing in the not too distant future and perhaps the already extant European Airbus (340 M) might fit the bill? Wholly-dedicated aircraft and ships for transport in general are not really necessary but a specific organisation for identifying what is required and keeping track of assets is essential.
 3. Electronic warfare capabilities ranging from interpretation of Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) challenges through to sophisticated decoying of missiles are increasingly important and often more cost-effective than shooting off anti-missile missiles (this would prove a very worthwhile subject for a future report to the Assembly).
 4. Confrontation with mobility of missiles equals only one determining factor: effective intelligence and therefore a satellite capability. On occasion in the Gulf conflict the Europeans were completely blind – hence the need for an early decision to create the WEU observation satellite agency, as recommended in the previous report on the Gulf crisis (Document 1248, Rapporteur: Mr. De Hoop Scheffer).
 5. It is certainly correct that Europe badly needs an anti-ballistic missile capacity. As ranges lengthen and accuracy increases, more and more European territory will become liable to attack if we are not able to remain in the forefront of technology ourselves. The time is fast approaching when the requirement for observation satellites, open skies régimes, etc., will become especially pressing.
 6. The balance has certainly shifted from East-West confrontation to North-South problems, with the Mediterranean now forming part of the European front line. Hence the importance of maintaining strong forces-in-being in the area and, for example, altering the basis of NATO's naval on-call force Mediterranean from month-long activation twice a year to a permanent status. Hence also the need for WEU and NATO to support proposals for a confidence- and security-building régime for the Mediterranean area, as recommended in the forthcoming report on European security and threats outside Europe, Rapporteur: Mr. Martinez.
 7. Chemical weapons in the Middle East were already a problem during the Iran-Iraq war. Our nations must

redouble their efforts to achieve a global ban on the production, possession and use of such devices and produce an effective verification arrangement to ensure that they remain banned. The Defence Committee will be meeting at the United Nations Conference on Disarmament in Geneva in June to consider the best way of giving a definite impetus to the negotiations.

8. The debate on conscription or not is well open in the majority of WEU countries where national service still exists. Countries such as Spain and Italy did not take the same stance as France ("no national servicemen in the Gulf area, not even on board ship" – hitherto regarded as "national soil"). The "professionalising" of the forces may be attractive for some but it is doubly frustrating for others if done on an ad hoc basis (i.e. both for those who "sign on" and are not sent and for those who do not sign and are then forced to quit (their team, unit or ship). Also affecting this debate is the associated issue of the rôle of women in the armed forces (see the recommendations suggested by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Rapporteur).
- 9/10. The future rôle of WEU forces in the Gulf region, in the first instance, as discussed by ministers recently and then by the chiefs of defence staff at their meeting in Paris on 10th April, is to:
- (a) contribute to the continuing selective embargo decreed by the United Nations against Iraq;
 - (b) clear the vast numbers of mines laid off Kuwait;
 - (c) help provide military support for aid to the Kurds and their protection.

In the longer term WEU forces could play a vital rôle in helping to keep the peace in this troubled part of the globe. In co-operation with the Gulf states, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, WEU should consider building on traditional French (Indian Ocean) and British (Armillar patrol) presence in the area. A system of roulement between the other member countries who were willing to contribute ships would mean that nothing would be imposed on any one country. It is

understood by your Rapporteur that a number of WEU member nations are already responding positively to this idea and proposing to make ships available, at least on an occasional basis, to join such a force.

V. Embargo, mine-clearance and logistic support

16. It is not generally realised by the public at large that the United Nations embargo against Iraq is continuing. Although food and medicines may be made available, all war material, spare parts, etc., etc., are subject still to embargo. Because of the mine problem in the Gulf itself, commercial traffic there has almost come to a halt. Not so however in the Bab el-Mandab strait and at Tiran where WEU frigates are as active as ever. Overall, more than 70% of challenges to ships in the various areas since August 1990, have been made by the WEU ships present (see Appendix III).

17. As detailed in the last report on the Gulf crisis, Iraq had the potential stocks to wreak havoc through mine-warfare. It is estimated that some 1 200 mines were laid in the general area of sea off Kuwait and it is now a question of clearing these mines and ensuring safety of navigation in the area once again. At the time of writing some 25 mine-clearance vessels are working in the Gulf under WEU auspices. They will have work for some time to come, even though Iraq has made available its theoretical mining plans. The particular breakthrough which has occurred in this context is the arrival of the German mine-clearance task group. Initially based in the Mediterranean only, in Crete, it was thought that German interpretation of their constitution forbade any operations out of area. Apparently not, although Bonn has been at pains to stress the humanitarian nature of current operations: "freedom of the sea lines of communication". Whatever the reasoning, this is now a precedent which will be seized on when the debate on taking part in United Nations operations is initiated in Bonn. Your Rapporteur trusts that his colleagues will encourage the Chairman-in-Office-designate to exploit WEU extra-European actions to the full. WEU's rôle in providing the military logistics for the aid dispatched by the European Community to help Kurdish refugees is welcome and results from direct contact between the European Community and the WEU Ministerial Council.

18. It is obvious that these aspects of WEU co-operation must continue and be co-ordinated effectively for as long as is necessary. The present Chairman-in-Office of the WEU Council, France, is to be congratulated for the various initiatives taken on co-ordination both on the spot in the Gulf, between national cap-

itals through regular meetings of the naval and military points of contact and by creating the WEU operational cells to keep all concerned fully informed.

19. At present it is not yet clear whether all these arrangements will be transferred to Bonn from Paris when the Presidency of WEU changes on 1st July 1991. Your Rapporteur believes that what has now been achieved by way of WEU co-operation must not be lightly abandoned and he suggests that the Assembly should now seek the Council's assurance that the good work will continue.

20. Failing a transfer of co-ordinating competences lock, stock and barrel to Bonn, consideration should be given to mandating the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements for the work to be done within his own empire (if necessary through the secondment of appropriate individuals from national ministries).

21. Of course if the WEU Permanent Council in the future is composed of the same permanent representatives as are accredited to NATO, then organisation of such considerations may be somewhat easier. Meanwhile, the WEU ministers should begin to rely on and use their own chiefs of defence staff, meeting within the WEU context.

22. In the immediate future, the Chiefs of Defence Staff Committee should be convened on a regular basis (and similar meetings of chiefs of naval, military and air staffs also organised) and be invited now to determine the feasibility of establishing WEU rapid action forces for extra-European operations. Such an exercise

should of course take account of the various vital parameters involved: overlap with NATO, plans for multinational rapid reaction forces, prepositioning perhaps, air and sea transport requirements, the logistics of potential operations, command and control aspects, intelligence-gathering, etc., etc. – in fact the very considerations which led to the joint specific guidelines for co-ordinating actions by WEU countries to control of the embargo at sea and previous and subsequent guidelines in other areas also.

23. The sooner we may establish some sort of planning arrangements for present and future WEU action, the more prepared and capable will we be in "expecting the unexpected".

VI. Conclusions

24. There is little doubt that a post-mortem of any military operation proves fascinating and may provide pointers for the future. The day-by-day chronology of Gulf crisis events annexed to the two previous reports has been continued up to the cease-fire and is available to members as an information document. Some of the conclusions reached are elaborated in Appendix IV, but your Rapporteur is sure that generations to come will be poring over the Gulf crisis and continuing to draw their own conclusions for years hence. As far as we are concerned in Western European Union this is now the beginning of a new era: the Gulf crisis has marked the way forward and provided WEU with a reinvigorated *raison d'être*.

APPENDIX I

***United Nations Security Council Resolution 686
on conditions for a permanent cease-fire***

The Security Council,

Recalling and reaffirming its Resolutions 660 (1990), 661 (1990), 662 (1990), 664 (1990), 665 (1990), 666 (1990), 667 (1990), 669 (1990), 670 (1990), 674 (1990), 677 (1990) and 678 (1990),

Recalling the obligations of member states under Article 25 of the Charter,

Recalling paragraph 9 of Resolution 661 (1990) regarding assistance to the Government of Kuwait and paragraph 3 (c) of that resolution regarding supplies strictly for medical purposes and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs,

Taking note of the letters of the Foreign Minister of Iraq confirming Iraq's agreement to comply fully with all of the resolutions noted above (s/22275), and stating its intention to release prisoners of war immediately (s/22273),

Taking note of the suspension of offensive combat operations by the forces of Kuwait and the member states co-operating with Kuwait pursuant to Resolution 678 (1990),

Bearing in mind the need to be assured of Iraq's peaceful intentions, and the objective in Resolution 678 (1990) of restoring international peace and security in the region,

Underlining the importance of Iraq taking the necessary measures which would permit a definitive end to the hostilities,

Affirming the commitment of all member states to the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq and Kuwait, and noting the intention expressed by the member states co-operating under paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 678 (1990) to bring their military presence in Iraq to an end as soon as possible consistent with achieving the objectives of the resolution,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,

1. Affirms that all 12 resolutions noted above continue to have full force and effect;
2. Demands that Iraq implement its acceptance of all 12 resolutions noted above and in particular that Iraq:
 - (a) Rescind immediately its actions purporting to annex Kuwait;
 - (b) Accept in principle its liability under international law for any loss, damage, or injury arising in regard to Kuwait and third states, and their nationals and corporations, as a result of the invasion and illegal occupation of Kuwait by Iraq;
 - (c) Immediately release under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross, Red Cross Societies, or Red Crescent Societies, all Kuwaiti and third country nationals detained by Iraq and return the remains of any deceased Kuwaiti and third country nationals so detained; and
 - (d) Immediately begin to return all Kuwaiti property seized by Iraq, to be completed in the shortest possible period;
3. Further demands that Iraq:
 - (a) Cease hostile or provocative actions by its forces against all member states including missile attacks and flights of combat aircraft;
 - (b) Designate military commanders to meet with counterparts from the forces of Kuwait and the member states co-operating with Kuwait pursuant to Resolution 678 (1990) to arrange for the military aspects of a cessation of hostilities at the earliest possible time;
 - (c) Arrange for immediate access to and release of all prisoners of war under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross and return the remains of any deceased personnel of the forces of Kuwait and the member states co-operating with Kuwait pursuant to Resolution 678 (1990); and

- (d) Provide all information and assistance in identifying Iraqi mines, booby traps and other explosives as well as any chemical and biological weapons and material in Kuwait, in areas of Iraq where forces of member states co-operating with Kuwait pursuant to Resolution 678 (1990) are present temporarily, and in the adjacent waters;
4. Recognises that during the period required for Iraq to comply with paragraphs 2 and 3 above, the provisions of paragraph 2 of Resolution 678 (1990) remain valid;
 5. Welcomes the decision of Kuwait and the member states co-operating with Kuwait pursuant to Resolution 678 (1990) to provide access to and commence immediately the release of Iraqi prisoners of war as required by the terms of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949, under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross;
 6. Requests all member states, as well as the United Nations, the specialised agencies and other international organisations in the United Nations system, to take all appropriate action to co-operate with the Government and people of Kuwait in the reconstruction of their country;
 7. Decides that Iraq shall notify the Secretary-General and the Security Council when it has taken the actions set out above;
 8. Decides that in order to secure the rapid establishment of a definitive end to the hostilities, the Security Council remains actively seized of the matter.

APPENDIX II

Modified Brussels Treaty
(signed in Paris on 23rd October 1954)

ARTICLE XII

The present Treaty shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Belgian Government.

It shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of the last instrument of ratification and shall thereafter remain in force for fifty years.

After the expiry of the period of fifty years, each of the High Contracting Parties shall have the right to cease to be a party thereto provided that he shall have previously given one year's notice of denunciation to the Belgian Government.


The Belgian Government shall inform the Governments of the other High Contracting Parties of the deposit of each instrument of ratification and of each notice of denunciation.

Washington Treaty
(signed in Washington on 4th April 1949)

ARTICLE 13


After the treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

APPENDIX III


*WEU co-ordination of the United Nations embargo against Iraq and mine-clearance operations in the Gulf**(a) WEU forces in the Middle East (situation on 19th April 1991)*

DD = Destroyer
 EF = Frigate/Frégate
 AG = Supply ship/Navire auxiliaire
 AOR = Supply ship/Pétrolier ravitailleur d'escadre
 LST = Tank landing ship/Grand bâtiment de débarquement de chars

(b) Naval actions (reconnaissance) linked to the application of the UN embargo (at 17th April 1991)




ALL COUNTRIES/
TOUTES NATIONS



*(c) Naval actions linked to the application of the United Nations embargo
(at 17th April 1991)*

Countries	Number of merchant ships			
	Challenged	Boarded	Diverted	Warning shots
Belgium	3 009	18	0	0
France	8 269	216	6	1
Italy	2 315	9	0	0
Netherlands	485	1	0	0
Spain	4 368	204	3	1
United Kingdom	3 139	36	2	1
Total WEU	21 585	484	11	3
United States	8 779	595	53	10
Other allies	130	142	2	1
Total allies	8 909	737	55	11
Overall total	30 494	1 221	66	14


*(d) Number of mines destroyed by the Group MCM/WEU/FR/BE
(since 4th March 1991)*




*(e) Principal types of mine destroyed off Kuwait
(at 18th April 1991)*

Type of mine destroyed	Number destroyed
Drifting mines	132
Moored mines	320
Ground mines	131
Beached mines	79
Total destroyed	662
Drifting mines	2
Moored mines	325
Ground mines	125
Total WEU/FR/BEL	452

Total mines destroyed: 662



(f) Mine-warfare operations in the north of the Persian Gulf
(at 19th April 1991)



MCM = Mine-countermeasures
MHC = Mine-hunter/Chasseur de mine côtier
AG = Supply ship/Navire auxiliaire

Note. to arrive/en ralliement

2 MHC + 1 AG (FR) (25th April/25 avril)
2 MHC + 1 AG (GE) (25th April/25 avril)
1 MHC (NL) (21st April/21 avril)

APPENDIX IV

*A few figures (Desert Storm)*¹*(a) A few facts*

The scale, speed of planning and implementation of recent Gulf operations stunned the world, have caused the Soviets to re-examine policy and will lead to a revision of many nations' defence spending. In the Middle East, in particular, defence ministries will be looking towards quality rather than quantity. The figures involved in the whole of the Middle East conflict are impressive.

At the peak of the land battle, the United States had more than 540 000 personnel in the Gulf area. Other coalition forces contributed 205 000 soldiers, sailors and airmen from 33 nations.

Out of the 68 army divisions available to Saddam Hussein on 15th January, air, ground and naval assault rendered 42 of them "combat ineffective", as the expression goes. In addition, large numbers of Iraqi soldiers were taken prisoner.

The coalition forces rapidly achieved air superiority, then air supremacy, suffering no losses in air-to-air combat. Iraqi aircraft frequently could not be brought to combat and would abandon operations rather than press home an attack.

Iraq lost 36 fixed-wing aircraft and six helicopters in combat. No figures are yet available for the number of Iraqi aircraft destroyed in air attacks on airfields in Iraq and Kuwait. In addition, at least 137 Iraqi aircraft flew to Iran where the aircraft, including MiG-29 Fulcrum and Il-76 Candid are still interned.

The coalition lost relatively few aircraft to the sortie rate: 116 000 air sorties, including transport, air refuelling, casevac and communications flights were flown. With the bulk of the air assets, the United States lost 28 fixed-wing aircraft in combat and five helicopters. Non-combat (mainly training) flying accounted for a further 10 fixed-wing aircraft and 17 helicopters.

The United Kingdom Royal Air Force, Royal Saudi Air Force, the Italian air force and the Kuwaiti air force lost nine combat aircraft and two in training.

During Desert Storm and the ground offensive, Desert Sabre, the statistics of damage to the Iraqi forces are impressive:

- 3 700 out of 4 280 main battle tanks destroyed;
- 2 400 out of 2 870 armoured fighting vehicles destroyed; and
- 2 600 out of 3 110 artillery pieces destroyed.

At sea from early August until the time of writing, the coalition forces have intercepted ships and carried out boardings with WEU nations taking the lion's share. The coalition forces also diverted 46 merchant ships for allegedly breaking the United Nations' sanctions by carrying Iraqi-bound cargo (see Appendix III for further details).

Although chemical and biological weapons did not play a part in the conflict, the Iraqi forces used SS-1 Scud and Scud-derived missiles against Israel, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. A total of 81 short/intermediate-range ballistic missiles were launched from fixed and mobile sites in western and southern Iraq, 38 of them against targets in Israel. None reached its intended target but debris from seven Iraqi missiles caused damage, including the United States logistics complex near Dhahran. Eleven missiles impacted harmlessly. The United States Patriot missile system intercepted 29 of the missiles.

(b) Success from the air

There was little doubt that the coalition would win the air war. Where virtually everyone was wrong was in the margin of victory and its consequences. The Iraqi air and missile forces were not just overpowered, they were never able to prevent air attacks on Iraqi targets or to significantly damage coalition targets.

1. Drawn from the Jane's Defence Weekly article, After the storm (JDW, 6th April 1991).

This meant that General Schwarzkopf could hold the line on the ground while pouring a continuous stream of air attacks on Iraqi forces.

The USAF dominated the planning and execution of the attack. USAF flew 59% of the coalition combat sorties, operated all but a handful of the aircraft capable of delivering precision-guided munitions (PGMs) autonomously, or at night; provided virtually all tanker support and the command and control system.

By 8th November, when coalition forces were told to build up for an offensive against Iraq, both sides were in place on the ground and the chances of an Iraqi land offensive were minimal. The air forces did not have to provide direct air support for coalition ground forces until the ground offensive started.

Desert Storm Phase 1 threw the full weight of the coalition air force against the Iraqi air defences, the air force and its Scud missiles. There were two objectives: to open the skies for subsequent attacks and to prevent retaliatory attacks by Scud missiles and Su-24 Fencers, perhaps with chemical weapons. Parallel attacks were aimed at every chemical and nuclear plant in Iraq.

Phase 2 was shorter, concentrating on the air defences around Kuwait. Phase 3 was aimed at cutting off the forces in Kuwait. Phase 4 was close air support for the ground war. However, Phase 1 was such an overwhelming success that Phases 2 and 3 moved ahead and merged.

On paper, Iraq should have done better. It had a modern, integrated air defence system in the Soviet pattern. A protected command and control (C²) network, based on jam-resistant microwave and ground links, controlled 300 interceptors, 600 surface-to-air missile (SAM) units and 9 000 to 10 000 anti-aircraft-artillery (AAA) pieces. Air defence radars included an early-warning chain on the frontier and larger radars inside Iraq.

The air defence system performed a chain of functions. It could detect and track attacking aircraft, assign a fighter, SAM or AAA system to each target, and cue the fighter or SAM to the point of engagement. Such a system provides the commander with positive control and a clear overview of the air battle. Its weakness is rigidity. Pilots and SAM crews come to rely on the C² system to tell them where to look and what to shoot. The system is crippled if one or more links in the functional chain are broken.

In Iraq, the system fell victim to the Soviet doctrine of radio-electronic combat: "Kill one third, jam one third, and the rest will collapse by itself".

During the 1980s, USAF adopted and practised an offensive electronic combat (EC) doctrine. In Green Flag exercises all EC assets trained together, testing tactics which would inflict the greatest possible damage on enemy air defence systems. These assets included stand-off jammers (EC-130 Compass Call) to scramble communications, escort jammers (EF-111A Ravens) and F-4G Wild Weasels, operating in hunter-killer teams with F-16s.

The Iraqi air defence system was designed to provide "graceful degradation": the system would continue to function after many parts had been jammed or destroyed. However, its designers assumed that some parts could not be disabled without, at least, enough time to switch to back-up facilities. The F-117A Stealth Fighter, however, could disable such targets without warning.

In the early hours of 17th January, F-117As headed for Baghdad, while others closed in towards the early-warning line and the main strike force with the support of hundreds of tankers, stayed just beyond the detection threshold of Iraqi radar. Early-warning radars, microwave communications links and primary control sites were hit simultaneously.

The Iraqi air defences received virtually no targeting information from the crippled C² system. Some units could still find targets with their own radars, as long as they were not jammed, but the more they used their radars, the more they were exposed to direct attack by anti-radar missiles (ARMs). Within a few days, the surviving Iraqi SAMs could transmit for no more than 20 seconds at a time.

In air warfare theory, 18th January would have seen the coalition re-arming while the Iraqis identified damage, patched together their back-ups and relocated SAMs.

The first night's wave of 1 000 plus sorties was the start of a campaign that threw more than 2 500 sorties a day against Iraq for 43 days. Ground forces, air bases and weapons plants were hit by a constant stream of concentrated airpower.

Many factors contributed to the high sortie rate. Night-capable strike aircraft could sustain the campaign around the clock. Most of the aircraft types used in Desert Storm have been in service for eight years or more, and are much more reliable and maintainable than earlier aircraft: mission capable rates in the 60% plus range are now standard.

Tankers allowed aircraft from many bases and from aircraft carriers to strike throughout the theatre. A unified C² system made it possible to prepare a massive, detailed air tasking order for each day, encompassing every combat and support sortie.

Turnround and briefing times were cut by computerised mission planning systems; the pilots walked to their aircraft with data cartridges and loaded complex flightplans in seconds.

Training, training and more training, both before Desert Shield and in the pre-war build-up period, was vital. Never has an air force gone into combat with so much realistic training behind it. Units had time to become accustomed to desert conditions before the war started. The no-rotation policy kept this learning undiluted.

Above all, what made the sustained intensity of Desert Storm possible was the low rate of losses. The coalition lost 38 aircraft in combat, out of 109 876 sorties flown. The loss rate was 0.35/1 000 sorties, or one-thirtieth of one per cent.

None of the losses was caused by Iraqi fighters, kept on the ground by direct attacks on their airfields and coalition fighters. The only effective fighter control system in Iraqi airspace was provided by United States and Saudi AWACS aircraft.

Only on the second day did the Iraqi air force fly more than half as many sorties per day as it had done, on average, from 1st to 15th January. Around the ninth day of the war, sorties against coalition aircraft ceased, and a day later the Iraqi Air Force began to withdraw to Iran.

There were only four days on which Iraqi aircraft – including support and combat types – flew more than 40 sorties. About half the Iraqi fixed-wing aircraft shot down (16 out of 35) were destroyed in the first three days. Most of the rest were bounced by USAF F-15s while attempting to escape to Iran.

Coalition combat losses were caused by SAMs and AAA (anti-aircraft-artillery). The USAF relied on avoidance, suppression and jamming to protect its aircraft from larger fixed-site SAMs, and on offensive counter-air fighters (F-15Cs) to keep fighters off the strike aircraft. USAF aircraft went in at around 20 000 ft (6 000 m), above the effective altitude of SA-8s, Rolands, smaller SAMs and AAA. Since these systems are more mobile, they cannot be easily tracked or avoided. The USN and the RAF increased their altitudes after taking losses from AAA in low-altitude operations.

There were two aspects in which the campaign did not proceed as planned. One was the weather, which was the worst in 14 years, as emphasised by the French Chief of Defence Staff, General Maurice Schmitt, when he briefed the Defence Committee in January. Low cloud hampered F-117A operations, shielding targets from their IR sensors.

The other unpleasant surprise was the number of mobile Scuds. After the first hours of operations, it was claimed that all the Scud launchers had been destroyed. However, the mobile launchers had escaped. They could emerge, fire and remask before a counter-attack could reach them.

Scud-chasing tactics based on coalition air supremacy sharply reduced launches after 27th January. A-10s performed armed reconnaissance of major highways leading to areas from which Scuds could be fired at the most important targets: Dhahran, Riyadh, Haifa and Tel Aviv.

Without the Scuds, Iraq no longer had any means of influencing the war. Iraqi ground forces were passive targets. Because Iraq was embargoed and transport had become hazardous, the air campaign had a simple escalatory effect. Coalition air strikes rendered replacement, repair and resupply, virtually impossible.

The objectives of the coalition ground assault were achieved with incredibly low casualty figures. It was airpower that made this imbalance of damage possible, because airpower alone could attack every part of the Iraqi military – every one of the 500 000 troops, every factory, every ammunition dump, and every vehicle – while putting only a few hundred coalition aircraft and their crews at risk.

(c) Lessons for Moscow

It is generally accepted in Washington that after Desert Storm, the Soviets will place greater Research and Development (R & D) emphasis on smart weapons, stealth and counter-stealth.

Moscow may have to restore the military R & D budget, cut by 13.7% only last year.

When coalition pilots flew into action on the night of 15th/16th January, their knowledge of Saddam Hussein's largely Soviet-supplied air defence system helped pave the way to the decisive victory.

Soviet advisors left Iraq knowing that the coalition's insight into the performance of Iraq's Soviet equipment was all but total.

TV shots of laser-guided bombs dropping through the ventilation shafts of Iraqi bunkers must have provided a jolt to the Soviet High Command.

Compounding this concern was the fact that the fourth biggest army in the world was unable to ride out the coalition's air attacks, due in no small part to the devastating impact of smart weaponry on lines of supply and infrastructure targets.

From the coalition's point of view, this achievement is even more remarkable when, according to intelligence sources, only 9% of weapons dropped were smart.

The Soviet military, which had put its trust in numbers over quality, now lives with the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and its premise of numerical parity in forces between East and West.

In the light of Desert Storm, Soviet military leaders are doubtless questioning both the cost of CFE and Moscow's abandonment of an offensive defence doctrine.

Marshal Dimitri Yazov, the Soviet Defence Minister, has called for a complete overhaul of the nation's air defences as a result of Desert Storm.

Acknowledging the failure of Iraq's command and control network and its missile batteries to work effectively, Marshal Yazov told the Soviet Parliament: "What happened in Kuwait necessitates a review of our attitude to the country's entire air defence system." This admission appears to be an indictment of four decades of Soviet investment in radar, C³I and SAM technology.

In 1990, in its publication *Soviet Military Power*, the Pentagon predicted that Moscow could take a decision to "concentrate on the less costly research phase to help produce a technologically superior product in the next generation".

There are several key military technologies in which the Soviets are ahead of the United States. The Pentagon cites research into pulsed power and energy storage as two such areas. Direct military applications of these include electrothermal guns, electromagnetic launchers, neutral particle beam systems, a variety of lasers, charged particle beams and ultra-wide band radars.

(d) Naval forces

Although naval forces clearly played a secondary rôle to land and air units during Operation Desert Storm, they achieved a number of combat firsts during the campaign. Included in the list are:

- use of the Tomahawk Land-Attack Missiles (TLAM) in combat by submarines and surface ships;
- combat use of the Standoff Land Attack Missile (SLAM);
- tandem deployment of battleships for the first time since the Korean War with the USS *Missouri* and *Wisconsin*;
- combat employment of the Pioneer remotely-piloted vehicle (RPV) from battleships;
- conduct of USMC AV-8B combat missions from a Landing Helicopter Assault Ship, the *Nassau*;
- combat use of several classes of ships including AEGIS cruisers, MCMVs and air-cushioned landing craft, as well as first employment of two squadrons of maritime pre-positioning ships.

Six aircraft carriers detailed to the Gulf and the Red Sea provided highly mobile platforms from which scores of tactical combat aircraft were launched. Around 18 000 United States marines in 31 amphibious ships in the northern Gulf were a critical tool in convincing Saddam Hussein that invasion would come from the sea.

The two most striking lessons for smaller navies are that anti-air warfare and naval air superiority are crucial; and that naval mining is the most cost-effective alternative available to harass and delay the operations of a larger naval force.

Analysts in the United Kingdom have pointed out the value of helicopter-borne anti-ship weapons such as BAE Dynamics' *Sea Skua*, used by RN *Lynx* helicopters to attack and sink several Iraqi vessels. However, with virtually unchallenged naval air supremacy, the coalition's naval technology may not have been fully tested.

United States carrier-based naval aviation clearly played a dominant rôle. In close co-operation with land-based fighter aircraft and E-3 AWACS airborne command and control aircraft, the naval forces in the Gulf set up a watertight, layered air defence system, covering the naval units as well as providing a defensive buffer zone on the eastern flank of the Gulf.

Carrier-based E-2C Hawkeyes provided additional airborne early-warning (AEW) with carrier-based fighters mounting combat air patrols as well as surface combat air patrols.

USN strike aircraft flew 23% of combat missions, in direct proportion to their numbers in the total theatre inventory. Navy and USMC forces had flown 28 929 sorties by 6th March, of which approximately 36% were strike missions and 30% were fleet/defence and combat air patrol.

However, with seven navy and eight USMC aircraft lost, one of the early lessons of the war was that aircraft had to remain at high altitudes out of range of the more than 27 500 Iraqi AAA sites.

The navy is still studying the overall success of its weapons in hitting their targets. There was an estimated 85% success rate for the 291 TLAMs launched. At least two were shot down.

In the first combat employment of the SLAM, four out of seven missiles fired during the campaign hit their target. Like the USAF, the navy feels one of the most significant lessons learned was the value of precision-guided munitions.

The navy may reconsider its on-board electronic identification (ID) methods. United States rules of engagement called for aircraft to make two electronic forms of ID before shooting an air-to-air missile, to ensure that no friendly aircraft would be hit.

Navy aircraft, however, only fly with a single electronic ID method, and have to rely on visual ID or a signal from another friendly aircraft for a second method of identification. So during the ground campaign, the navy had to co-ordinate with ground forces when firing Harm missiles. This ensured Harm would not home in on friendly emitters.

(e) Mine-sweeping operations

Although the Iraqis laid a broad variety of mines along the Kuwaiti and Iraqi coastlines, mine-clearing and sweeping was not a top tactical priority until after coalition victory.

One clear lesson for the United States as well as other nations facing regional conflicts, is the extent to which mine-countermeasure programmes must be adequately funded.

The United States Central Command decided to avoid mine-strewn waters by engaging in a land campaign instead of a direct amphibious assault by the marine corps.

Centcom was prepared to undertake a sea-based approach to Kuwait if the land campaign alone was not sufficient. However, as it was successful, the coalition will never know how successful it could have been in clearing a path through the mines.

Among the mines found by coalition forces were shallow water mines, such as the Soviet-based but indigenously-produced Al Muthena-35 and -45 mines (the numerical denotes kg), which could have been used in the surf against USMC amphibious landing craft.

In deeper water, the indigenous 400 kg warhead Sigeel moored mine was deployed as an outer barrier by the Iraqis. Even more dangerous were the Manta influence bottom mines, a few of which have been found.

An Iraqi moored mine with a 100 kg warhead was also discovered for the first time. In recent weeks, a second version, a 145-kg elliptically-shaped mine, has been found in great numbers. Several dozen mines were found floating further south after breaking mooring cables.

Before the post-war mine-clearing campaign started, many mines detected by coalition navies had floated south.

These were discovered by patrolling aircraft and by visual sightings from vessels. Destruction was primarily carried out by divers with explosives, as well as by machine guns mounted on the decks of naval vessels.


In the early stages of Operation Desert Shield, United States forces deployed three 1950s-era Aggressive-class ocean mine-sweepers and the new Avenger mine-countermeasures vessel to the Gulf.

The Avenger has reportedly experienced major mechanical problems which have kept it under repairs for at least half its time on task in the Gulf. Also deployed were six MH-53E Sea Dragon heavy mine-sweeping helicopters.

Early in the air campaign, coalition forces focused for over a week on destroying Iraq's navy. In this series of air attacks, most of Iraq's mine-laying capability was destroyed, including Soviet-made T-43 ocean mine-sweepers, a host of smaller mine-laying vessels, amphibious landing craft and hovercraft.

Ironically, with the war now over, mines are finally emerging as one of the central threats in the region – especially to shipping.

As mentioned above, a large-scale WEU mine-disposal effort is underway with mine-countermeasures (MCM) assets from the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy. The disposal effort is expected to take months, although lone mines will be found for years to come (as witness the fact that one mine destroyed was laid by the British in the 1940s).

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