

State Aid: Is Cohesion at the National Level Successful?



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Abstract

The entry of ten new countries in the EU has raised a number of questions about the type cohesion policies that the EU will need in the future and the kind of regional state aid that the EU should allow Member States to grant in the future. This paper examines the impact of regional state aid on regional disparities. It finds that the effect of state aid on regional cohesion is ambiguous, partly because state aid is not proportionally granted to the most needy regions. In the context of the forthcoming debate on reform of structural funds and regional policy it follows that Member States should limit the geographic coverage of regional aid and should take into account the possible negative effects of other types of state aid on regional development or cohesion.

Introduction

One of the fundamental objectives of the European Community is “economic and social cohesion” (see Articles 2, 3 & 158 of the EC Treaty). To achieve that objective the EC spends considerable funds in supporting structural actions – about EUR 30 billion in 2004. The EC also modulates its policies to take into account cohesion (see Article 159 TEC). This means that policies such as competition have to accommodate the goal of cohesion.

At the same time, Member States are required to conduct their own economic policies and coordinate them in such a way as to attain the objectives of development, cohesion and reduction of regional disparities (Article 159 TEC).

To facilitate the achievement of cohesion and to allow Member States to implement policies that comply with Article 159 TEC, the Treaty exempts certain kinds of regional aid from its general ban of state aid.

The purpose of this paper is to assess the record of Member States in using regional state aid as an instrument of national cohesion.² After all, cohesion within the Community will remain an elusive goal for as long as disparities within Member States persist. The paper reports findings of a longer study undertaken on behalf of DG Regional Policy of the European Commission. The study was one of the inputs for the Third Cohesion Report that was published on 18 February 2004.

The main findings of the paper are that, first, state aid in general does not show any significant correlation – either positive or negative – with regional disparities. Second, some types of state aid may worsen regional disparities as they appear to be granted to regions with higher per capita income. Third, although the overall amounts of state aid in the EU have recently declined, some regions have received larger amounts of aid. Fourth, the amounts of state aid received by regions

fluctuate considerably from year to year. Fifth, although most regional state aid goes to poorer regions, when examining just the poorer regions, there appears to be no precise correspondence between regional income and either the overall amount of state aid or the regional aid received by those regions. Sixth, and most importantly, the policy implication of these findings is that Member States need to limit the geographic spread of their regional state aid and, if indeed their intention is to contribute to regional development, they should give proportionally more to the poorest of the poor regions.

Impact of state aid on cohesion

In order to discover what may be the impact of state aid on cohesion it is necessary to define a testable relationship between the two. In other words, we need to form some expectations about the causality between the dependent variable (state aid) and the independent variable (cohesion).

In the cohesion literature there are two competing hypotheses on the effect of spending and investment on cohesion. The “neo-classical” hypothesis suggests that due to declining marginal productivity, regions converge because the impact of investment on the income of poorer regions is proportionally larger than the impact in richer regions with larger stocks of capital. This suggests that, even though the state aid granted in poor regions may be smaller in absolute amount than the state aid in richer regions, the higher marginal productivity of the former will have a compensatory effect.

On the other hand, some analyses based on the new theories of “economic geography” lead exactly to the opposite predictions, although even within these theories there are conflicting perspectives. On balance, a euro of state aid has a much smaller impact on the income of poorer regions because agglomeration effects and externalities are much stronger in rich or central regions.

This impact is attenuated further when the absolute amount of aid is larger in the rich regions.

On the whole, however, the empirical literature has found considerable evidence that there is some positive relation between regional investment and convergence of regional incomes. This suggests that, in general, neo-classical factors outweigh agglomeration factors. The implication of this is that, if there is a negative relationship between state aid and cohesion, then it is likely to be the result of too much state aid to rich regions, which overwhelms the higher marginal productivity of poorer regions.

Generally, we expect regional state aid and horizontal state aid (i.e. aid open to all industries) to have a positive effect on cohesion because most types of state aid allow for higher intensities in assisted areas.

State aid for agriculture (and fisheries) is likely to have a positive effect, since poorer regions tend to be more agriculturally oriented while aid for transport is likely to have neutral effects. Certain sectoral state aid, such as for shipbuilding, automobiles and textiles, is likely to have a positive impact, at least on employment, because most of the recipient industries are based in the old industrial regions many of which are classified as “assisted” areas.

In terms of the opportunity cost of state aid, since most aid is financed by revenue from taxation and since richer areas contribute a larger amount of tax revenue, state aid must also have an indirect positive effect on assisted areas because it imposes a smaller tax burden on them.

If there is a negative relationship between non-regional types of state aid and cohesion, then there is an invisible policy conflict. On the one hand, Member States grant regional aid so as to promote the development of less prosperous regions. On the other, they grant aid for other purposes (e.g. to support Research and Development – R&D) which may indirectly have a negative impact on cohesion because it makes other regions more attractive and eventually more prosperous. If this is the case, then Member States themselves neutralise, perhaps unwittingly, the effectiveness of their own policies.

The EU has a system of state aid control precisely in order to prevent this kind of policy conflict. Naturally, the aim of Community control of state aid is to prevent subsidy wars between Member States rather than between regions of the same Member State. Nonetheless, the Commission, in its various guidelines, tries to take into

account the possibly contradictory objectives of various state aid policies. The results of this study suggest that the Commission has not succeeded in eliminating the contradictory effects of those policies.

More importantly, if the Member States neutralise the impact of regional aid, then by implication, they must also weaken the effect of structural policies. This is indeed an issue of concern for the EU.

Empirical tests

In order to find out how Member States use state aid as a tool for combatting regional disparities, we have formulated the hypothesis that state aid is positively related to divergent rates of regional income (or positively related to disparities). This means that, other things being equal, more state aid is granted when disparities are larger and vice-versa.

More precisely the proposed test can be formulated as follows:

$Income\ Disparity(t+1) = \alpha + \beta(State\ Aid)(t) + \varepsilon$
meaning that differences in regional income in period $t+1$ are a function of state aid in period t plus an unknown error term. The independent variable is lagged by a year because state aid is a policy instrument that can be used proactively.

Data on state aid are divided into four categories each of which is tested separately:

- regional state aid,
- horizontal state aid other than regional aid (e.g. environmental aid),
- transport and agricultural (plus fisheries) aid,
- total state aid.

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We ran two types of regressions. The first type is over time for each Member State. The relevant period is 1990 to 2000. Given that we lag the independent variable, we lose one year so that we have only ten observations per country. The second type of regression pools data from all the Member States for two periods: 1999 and 2000.

We measure the independent variable (i.e. state aid) in terms of state aid per capita and state aid as a share of GDP (both expressed in real figures) to account for the fact that larger countries are more populous and grant larger amounts of state aid in absolute terms. We measure cohesion or differences in regional income in terms of deviations from national average income per capita expressed in Purchasing Power Standard (PPS).

Our most significant data problems are the

discontinuities in available statistics. For the time-series regressions, we have omitted Austria, Finland and Sweden because for them data on state aid start in the mid-1990s. We have also omitted Denmark, Ireland and Luxembourg because for Ireland the data on regional disparities do not go beyond the mid-1990s while for Denmark and Luxembourg we do not yet have data on disparities. For the same reason we have excluded Denmark and Luxembourg from the cross-country regressions.

Regression results

The regression results on time series are summarised in Table 1, and those on cross-country data in Table 2, at the end of the paper. The time series results indicate the following:

- In many cases, the sign of the slope of the independent variable is negative, implying that larger amounts of state aid are granted when regional disparities are smaller.
- The coefficient of correlation (R-squared) is in many cases very low.
- Regional aid has relatively high R-squared values only in two countries (Belgium and Spain – not shown in Table 1).
- Horizontal aid appears to be significantly related to disparities in only three countries (Belgium, Greece and the Netherlands), but in all three countries the correlation is negative.
- Agricultural and transport aid has a negative sign and is relatively significant only in one country (Spain).
- Total state aid appears to be significant but negatively related to regional disparities in only two countries (Belgium and Greece). Where it is positively related to disparities it does not appear to be significant.

The cross-country results for 1999 and 2000 indicate the following:

- In most cases, the sign of the slope of the independent variable is positive, implying that larger amounts of state aid go hand in hand with larger regional disparities.
- However, the coefficient of correlation (R-squared) is in almost all cases very low and lower than in the time series.
- Regional aid is negatively related to regional disparities, but the values of R-squared are very low.

Case studies³

The regression results obtained above are based on analysis of data from Commission sources – primarily the State Aid Scoreboard. We have also gathered data directly from national and regional sources. The data reported below reveal three features of national state aid schemes which are common in most countries. First, the amounts of state aid granted in each region vary considerably from year to year. This holds even when the national amounts appear to be either stable or declining over time. The implication is that the overall

reduction of state aid reported in the Commission's Scoreboard does not apply to all regions.

Second, the regional distribution of state aid varies, depending on the type of aid. Some types of aid, such as aid to R&D, appear to be granted mostly in richer regions. Some other types, such as aid for regional investment, go mostly to poorer regions.

Third, although most regional aid is granted to poorer regions, within the groups of these regions there is no precise correspondence between the allocated amount of aid and the need of each region as indicated by its level of income. This means that regional aid is not concentrated in the regions that need it the most.

Austria

The Commission's Scoreboard puts Austria's state aid at EUR 2.06 billion in 2001 (at 2000 prices). More than 70% of that aid goes to agriculture, fisheries and transport. Only 5% of total aid, or 20% of non-farm aid, aims to promote regional development.

Given the federal structure of the country, state aid may be granted by the federal authorities, by Länder authorities, and by local authorities such as municipalities. Länder authorities also co-finance expenditure under the European Union's common agricultural policy and structural funds.

As revealed by Tables 3, 4 and 5, Länder governments grant more state aid than the federal government. If richer Länder are able to grant larger amounts of state aid, this raises an important question concerning the impact of aid by lower tiers of government on regional cohesion within Austria.

Greece

The Scoreboard indicates that for 2001, Greece granted EUR 1.3 billion of state aid. Agriculture, fisheries and transport absorb EUR 840 million. Of the remaining aid, EUR 419 million, or 90%, went to regional development. Indeed the main state aid instrument in Greece is Law 2601/98 on investment incentives for economic and regional development. Under that law, 420 and 465 investment projects were approved in 2000 and 2001, respectively.

However, when the amount of state aid granted through the approved investment projects is quantified, the reported figures show only EUR 201.07 million and EUR 220.92 million for 2000 and 2001, respectively. That is about half of the amount shown in the Scoreboard.

Table 6 indicates that some regions experience considerable annual variability in the amount of state aid. The table also indicates that most investment incentives for regional development actually go to relatively richer regions which are economically more active.

Italy

The Commission's Scoreboard indicates that in 2001 Italy granted EUR 4.11 billion of aid (in 2000 prices) in sectors other than agriculture, transport and fisheries. Our data show a much higher amount for the same year, reaching EUR 5.2 billion. Of this amount the largest

category of aid was for “reduction of territorial inequalities” (46%). In this connection, it is worth noting that Germany and Italy accounted for 50% of all regional state aid granted in the EU in 2001.

The second and third largest categories of aid in Italy, other than for agriculture and transport, were aid to R&D and aid to investment, accounting for 24% and 10% of total aid to manufacturing and services, respectively. Apparently, Italy has introduced “automatic” incentives for R&D, investment and purchasing of new equipment. This raises the question whether all of these incentives can count as state aid. If they are state aid, then this may also explain the higher amount of aid recorded in the statistics we have obtained.

Of the aid that was granted to business in 2001, 62% went to SMEs. However, in the south, SMEs received 67% of aid while in the centre and north they accounted for only 53% of aid. This suggests that in richer regions of Italy, a higher proportion of aid is absorbed by large companies.

Table 7 presents the amounts of aid to businesses per region in the years 2000 and 2001. As is the case with other countries, larger amounts of aid are granted in the poor regions than in the richer regions. This is also indicated by the significance of the aid to the recipient regions. The proportion of aid in relation to non-farm valued-added was 0.20% in the centre and north while in the south it rose to 1.10%.

However, and in common again with other countries, there is significant variation of the amount of aid within poor and within rich regions, with no close correlation between the income of the region and the amount of state aid within each group. There is also variation from year to year in the reported amount of aid granted in each region.

Spain

In Spain, state aid may be granted by public authorities at different levels of government. Unfortunately, we have not been able to find data on state aid granted by each of Spain’s autonomous regions.

The regional distribution of regional state aid is shown in Table 8. Two things stand out from the Table. First, for some regions the amount of aid varies considerably from year to year. Second, there is no strict correlation between the prosperity of each region and the amount of state aid.

Main findings and policy implications

On the basis of the empirical testing and the data collected directly from national sources, we reach the following conclusions:

- There appears to be no overwhelming evidence that Member States grant more state aid when regional disparities grow larger or that state aid correlates with reduced regional disparities.
- Although the overall amounts of state aid in the EU have recently declined, some regions have received larger amounts of aid.
- The amounts of state aid received by regions fluctuate considerably from year to year.
- Some types of state aid like R&D aid are inversely related to regional income, with the richer regions receiving larger amounts of such aid.
- By and large, most regional state aid goes to poorer regions. However, when examining only poorer regions, there appears to be no precise correspondence between regional income and either the overall amount of state aid or regional aid received by the poorer regions.
- In Member States with federal structures, regional authorities grant significant amounts of state aid. Since richer regions can afford to grant larger amounts of aid, the policy decisions of sub-national governments may also have a considerable impact on national cohesion.

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These findings have at least one significant policy implication. Even though cohesion is one of the fundamental objectives of the Community and absorbs about 30% of the EU budget, the aid schemes that are implemented by Member

States have, at best, a neutral impact on cohesion. Nonetheless, they are more likely to have negative effects. This implies that Member States may be unwittingly acting contrary to both Community objectives and their own policy aims.

The results of this study suggest a natural solution to this policy problem. Since the purpose of regional state aid is to contribute to regional development and since the poorest regions are facing more handicaps than less poor regions, it follows that Member States should limit the geographic spread of aid so that it benefits proportionally more the poorest of the poor regions.

Conclusion

The European Union has just experienced its most ambitious enlargement ever. All of the ten countries scheduled which joined the EU in May 2004 are relatively poorer than the EU average. All of them, with the exception of Cyprus, will have their whole territories or significant parts of them designated as Objective 1 regions or convergence regions (see the article on reform of structural funds in this issue of *Eipascope*). This means that many assisted areas in the existing Member

States will lose their eligibility for state aid under Article 87(3)(a). Politically, Member States treat this as an adverse development. The findings of this study suggest that it should not necessarily be so.

The impact of state aid on regional cohesion is ambiguous, partly because state aid is not proportionally granted to the most needy regions. It follows, therefore, that Member States should limit the geographic coverage of regional aid. Some regions will not qualify to receive aid. “De-qualified” regions will resist that. In the context of the EU negotiations on structural funds, Member State governments will also resist that. But policy reform at the EU level may provide governments with an “excuse” to introduce similar reforms in national state aid policies. Such reforms that limit the geographic spread of aid are not necessarily contrary to national interests.

NOTES

- ¹ Professor, European Institute of Public Administration. I am grateful to Philip Buyskes for research assistance.
- ² This paper focuses on national cohesion; i.e. income and other discrepancies between regions within the same Member State. This should be contrasted to Community cohesion which refers to differences between regions across the EU.
- ³ The sources of data for the case studies are as follows. For Austria: ISIS Data Base, Statistik Austria. For Greece: Ministry of National Economy. For Italy: Ministry of Finance. For Spain: Ministerio de Hacienda: La programación regional y sus instrumentos. Informe Anual 2001 y 2002. □

Tables

Table 1: $Income\ Disparity(t+1) = \alpha + \beta (State\ Aid)(t) + \varepsilon$ (1990-2000)
(per capita GDP at PPS vs real state aid as % of GDP & real state aid per capita)
Sign of independent variable (* = significant at 90% level).

Aid expressed as % of GDP and as aid (euro) per capita; per country during 1990-2000

	Regional aid	Horizontal aid	Aid for agriculture & transport	Total aid
Belgium	+/+	-/- (*)	-/+	-/- (*)
France	-/-	+/+	+/+	+/+
Germany	+/+	-/-	+/+	+/+
Greece	+/+	-/- (*)	+/+	-/- (*)
Italy	-/-	-/-	-/-	-/-
Netherlands	-/-	-/- (*)	+/+	-/-
Portugal	-/-	-/+	-/+	+/+
Spain	+/+	+/+	-/- (*)	-/-
UK	-/-	-/-	+/+	+/+

Table 2: $Income\ Disparity(t+1) = \alpha + \beta (State\ Aid)(t) + \varepsilon$ (1999, 2000)
(per capita GDP at PPS vs real state aid as % of GDP & real state aid per capita)

Type of state aid	Intercept	Independent Variable	R-squared
2000			
Regional	26.134	- 18.294	0.107
	24.410	- 0.03	0.020
Horizontal	14.987	46.526	0.185
	12.35	0.29	0.379
Agric. & Transport	20.100	4.919	0.041
	18.94	0.03	0.112
Total	22.418	0.836	0.001
	24.61	- 0.01	0.023
1999			
Regional	24.946	- 9.584	0.059
	23.71	- 0.02	0.006
Horizontal	16.639	37.896	0.162
	14.83	0.24	0.289
Agric. & Transport	20.060	4.477	0.042
	19.14	0.03	0.105
Total	20.667	1.980	0.007
	15.39	0.03	0.145

Table 3: Austria: Federal state aid (EUR, million)

Region	GDP/head (2000, PPS)	Total aid		Total aid as % of regional GDP	
		2000	2001	2000	2001
Wien	157	132.84	113.61	0.24	0.20
Salzburg	131	41.11	33.58	0.28	0.22
Vorarlberg	118	47.96	42.46	0.55	0.46
Tirol	113	85.50	48.38	0.51	0.28
Oberösterreich	109	148.64	157.97	0.41	0.46
Niederösterreich	97	85.21	106.87	0.29	0.32
Kärnten	96	57.27	70.35	0.44	0.58
Steiermark	96	125.20	95.87	0.50	0.37
Burgenland	73	38.80	76.77	0.82	1.67
Total		770.08	748.28	0.37	0.36

Table 4: Austria: Länder state aid (EUR, million)

Region	GDP/head (2000, PPS)	Total aid		Total aid as % of regional GDP	
		2000	2001	2000	2001
Wien	157	141.524	110.632	0.25	0.19
Salzburg	131	67.774	65.666	0.44	0.43
Vorarlberg	118	43.490	46.578	0.47	0.50
Tirol	113	131.226	147.634	0.77	0.86
Oberösterreich	109	177.029	227.770	0.52	0.67
Niederösterreich	97	194.709	197.752	0.58	0.59
Kärnten	96	93.564	105.380	0.77	0.86
Steiermark	96	151.563	132.890	0.58	0.51
Burgenland	73	134.592	106.700	2.92	2.32
Total		1135.471	1141.002	0.54	0.54

Table 5: Austria: Total state aid (EUR, million)

Region	GDP/head (2000, PPS)	Total aid		Total aid as % of regional GDP	
		2000	2001	2000	2001
Wien	157	277.57	224.24	0.49	0.39
Salzburg	131	138.72	122.78	0.91	0.80
Vorarlberg	118	119.09	118.17	1.28	1.27
Tirol	113	241.01	218.71	1.41	1.28
Oberösterreich	109	355.13	420.25	1.04	1.23
Niederösterreich	97	353.33	354.03	1.05	1.05
Kärnten	96	187.34	222.40	1.53	1.82
Steiermark	96	350.84	306.22	1.35	1.18
Burgenland	73	185.71	197.42	4.04	4.29
Total		2208.74	2184.23	1.05	1.04

*Table 6: Greece: Aid to investment and regional development
(incentives granted through Law 2601/98) (EUR, million)*

Region	GDP/head (2000, PPS)	State aid		State aid as % of regional GDP	
		2000	2001	2000	2001
Notio Aigaio	80	8.36	11.05	0.17	0.22
Attiki	77	39.80	13.14	0.07	0.02
Stereia Ellada	76	45.22	23.02	0.39	0.20
Kentriki Makedonia	68	21.04	42.33	0.08	0.15
Dytiki Makedonia	67	1.80	1.43	0.04	0.03
Voreio Aigaio	66	5.45	5.22	0.20	0.19
Kriti	66	13.91	12.30	0.16	0.15
Thessalia	61	13.32	7.90	0.13	0.08
Ionia Nisia	59	4.34	5.19	0.16	0.19
Peloponnisos	57	3.98	14.02	0.05	0.16
Anatoliki Mak.-Thr.	55	22.70	62.51	0.33	0.90
Dytiki Ellada	51	11.21	9.91	0.13	0.12
Ipeiros	47	9.94	12.91	0.25	0.32

Table 7: Italy: Aid to business (EUR, million)

Region	GDP/head (2000, PPS)	Aid to business		Business aid as % of regional GDP	
		2000	2001	2000	2001
Trentino	136	11	8	0.04	0.03
Lombardia	135	309	541	0.11	0.20
Emilia-Romag.	129	180	214	0.15	0.18
Piemonte	120	196	230	0.17	0.20
Valle d'Aosta	123	1	2	0.03	0.06
Veneto	119	192	161	0.16	0.13
Friuli-Venezia	114	158	124	0.52	0.41
Toscana	114	147	144	0.16	0.16
Lazio	113	169	184	0.13	0.14
Liguria	108	102	173	0.26	0.44
Marche	102	75	68	0.22	0.20
Umbria	101	48	41	0.25	0.21
Abruzzo	84	143	123	0.59	0.51
Molise	79	49	40	0.84	0.69
Sardegna	76	218	246	0.78	0.88
Basilicata	73	101	147	1.01	1.47
Puglia	67	405	482	0.65	0.78
Campania	65	558	782	0.65	0.92
Sicilia	65	379	667	0.51	0.89
Calabria	62	224	382	0.78	1.33

Table 8: Spain: Regional aid (EUR, million, 2001, 2002)

Region	GDP/head (PPS, 2000)	Regional aid		Regional aid as % of regional GDP	
		2001	2002	2001	2002
Madrid	110				
Navarra	105				
Pais Vasco	102				
Catalunia	100				
Balearic IIs	98				
Rioja	91				
Aragon	88	18.5	8.8	0.08	0.04
Cantabria	80	15.7	10.3	0.16	0.11
Valencia	79	33.6	34.9	0.05	0.05
Canary IIs	78	27.6	33.3	1.28	1.54
Castilla Leon	76	38.0	26.7	0.09	0.06
Asturias	71	36.2	15.3	0.21	0.09
Murcia	69	12.9	48.0	0.07	0.27
Ceuta&Melilla	68	0	0	0.00	0.00
Castilla Mancha	67	4.6	7.7	0.02	0.03
Galicia	65	18.0	31.7	0.05	0.08
Andalucia	61	57.7	42.0	0.06	0.04
Extremadura	53	5.8	9.8	0.05	0.08

Annex: State aid in the EU

Country	State aid in 2001 (euro million, 2000 prices)				State aid as percentage of GDP (2000)			
	Regional	Horizontal	Agr.+ Trans.	Total	Regional	Horizontal	Agr. + Trans.	Total
A	108.2	403.7	1,509.5	2,056	0.05	0.15	0.77	0.99
B	273.8	495.2	2,551.9	3,330.3	0.11	0.21	1.04	1.37
DK	9.1	1,136.4	1,188.5	2,369	0.0	0.68	0.69	1.51
D	2,107.4	5,405.7	11,420.3	23,273.5	0.11	0.32	0.56	1.26
E	408.2	1,046.2	2,035.8	4,658.6	0.07	0.23	0.35	0.88
FIN	47.6	315.7	1,698.4	2,073.9	0.05	0.26	1.40	1.76
F	704.7	2,501.4	9,739.4	15,844.3	0.08	0.19	0.71	1.22
GR	419.2	42.9	840.4	1,305.7	0.48	0.02	0.56	1.07
I	684.8	3,252.7	7,878.1	11,998.6	0.12	0.24	0.66	1.06
IRL	429.9	117.1	595	1,300.7	0.48	0.06	0.62	1.33
L	10.1	18.7	240.3	273.3	0.09	0.10	1.20	1.41
NL	48	516.6	3,362.8	3,992.2	0.04	0.12	0.81	0.98
P	64.3	306.5	323.3	1,225.1	0.07	0.28	0.30	1.17
S	19.1	374.2	1,356.8	1,862.9	0.01	0.16	0.55	0.77
UK	526.4	1,874.5	7,910.8	10,550.1	0.05	0.13	0.21	0.41

Country	State aid per capita (2001)			
	Regional	Horizontal	Agri. & Trans.	Total
A	13.32	49.71	185.88	253.17
B	26.68	48.26	248.67	324.53
DK	1.70	212.45	222.19	442.89
D	25.64	65.77	138.94	283.16
E	10.34	26.49	51.55	117.97
FIN	9.19	60.93	327.81	400.29
F	11.84	42.03	163.63	266.20
GR	39.68	4.06	79.55	123.59
I	11.84	56.23	136.20	207.43
IRL	112.54	30.65	155.76	340.50
L	22.90	4240	544.90	619.50
NL	3.00	32.32	210.40	249.78
P	6.42	30.58	32.26	122.23
S	2.15	42.13	152.74	209.72
UK	8.80	31.33	132.33	176.33