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on shared European interests, risks and requirements in
the security field

PART B: EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

Rapporteur: Mr Egon KLEPSCH

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EXPLANATORY STATEMENTI. Introduction

1. The European Community is a Community of and for peace. The very first paragraphs of the preamble of the Treaty of Paris read:

"Considering that world peace can be safeguarded only by creative efforts commensurate with the dangers that threaten it,

Convinced that the contribution which an organised and vital Europe can make to civilisation is indispensable to the maintenance of peaceful relations".

2. Much more frequently quoted and thus much better known is the 5th paragraph of the preamble to the Treaty which proclaims that the Heads of State of the signatory Governments were: "Resolved to substitute for age-old rivalries the merging of their essential interests; to create, by establishing an economic community, the basis for a broader and deeper community among peoples long divided by bloody conflicts; and to lay the foundations for institutions which will give direction to a destiny henceforward shared".

3. Similarly the preamble of the Treaty establishing the EEC states that the Heads of State of the signatory Governments were: "Determined to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe" and were "Resolved by thus pooling their resources to preserve and strengthen peace and liberty, and calling upon the other peoples of Europe who share their ideal to join in their efforts".

4. If many aspects of the operation of the European Community are controversial and subject to criticism, looking back over the history of the Community one fact is undisputed

and clear. This is that the creation and working of the European Community has knit together the interests of the individual Member States so closely that a war between the present members is inconceivable. The Community has, therefore, changed the course of history for the better by ruling out the possibility of wars between Member States, for instance between France and Germany.

5. Amongst the official statements that have been made defining the role of the Ten in the world and in preserving peace, it seems particularly useful to quote paragraph 9 of the Document on European Identity, agreed by the Foreign Ministers of the Nine in December 1973: "The Nine intend to play an active role in world affairs and thus to contribute, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, to ensuring that international relations have a more just basis; that the independence and equality of states are better preserved; that prosperity is more equitably shared; and that the security of each country is more effectively guaranteed. In pursuit of these objectives the Nine should progressively define common positions in the sphere of foreign policy".

It should also be recalled that the London Report on EPC which was adopted by the Foreign Ministers of the Ten on 13 October 1981 stated: "As regards the scope of European Political Cooperation, and having regard to the different situations of the Member States, the Foreign Ministers agree to maintain the flexible and pragmatic approach which has made it possible to discuss in Political Cooperation certain important foreign policy questions bearing on the political aspects of security".

6. It is important to note that the proposal for a "European Act" put forward in November 1981 by the German and Italian Governments, and known as the Genscher-Colombo Plan, stated: "convinced that the security of Europe must

also be guaranteed by joint action in the field of security policy which at the same time helps to maintain the common security of the partners in the Atlantic Alliance". It also stated that one of the aims of the Heads of State and Government was: "the coordination of security policy and the adoption of common European positions in this sphere in order to safeguard Europe's independence, protect its vital interests and strengthen its security".

7. It should be recalled that in the preamble to the solemn declaration on European Union signed by the Heads of State and Government on 19 June 1983 in Stuttgart, the signatories set out their conviction: "that, by speaking with a single voice in foreign policy, including political aspects of security, Europe can contribute to the preservation of peace". Amongst the objectives adopted by the Heads of State was the strengthening and development of "European Political Cooperation through the elaboration and adoption of joint positions and joint action, on the basis of intensified consultations, in the area of foreign policy, including the coordination of the positions of Member States on the political and economic aspects of security, so as to promote and facilitate the progressive development of such positions and actions in a growing number of foreign policy fields". In the declaration the signatories stated that European Political Cooperation must be reinforced by, amongst other things, "coordination of the positions of Member States on the political and economic aspects of security".

8. If the European Community has been successful in creating a Western European security zone, it is the North Atlantic Alliance that has, since its creation in 1949, deterred external aggression against Western Europe.

9. It is in this context that the present report lists some "shared European interests, risks and requirements in the security field" as suggested in the motion for a resolution

tabled by Mr Mommersteeg and others (DOC 1-1294/82). The security interests, risks and requirements listed do not constitute a comprehensive list. In the nature of things they cannot do so. Your rapporteur would therefore be grateful if members of the Political Committee would draw his attention to any particularly significant security interests of the Ten which are not examined in this document. Further, the present report does not "analyse" these interests, risks and requirements, as requested by the Mommersteeg motion, quite simply because any single security interest of the Ten would require a full and separate report of its own to do justice to the subject. The present report is therefore a kind of blueprint for the future. It is suggested that the new European Parliament which is due to be elected in June of this year could develop the suggestions made in the present report and devote a series of reports to the main security problems mentioned here. But, in the meantime, it is to be hoped that all proposals made by Parliament in any resolution it adopts accompanying this report should immediately receive serious consideration from the Council and the Foreign Ministers meeting in Political Cooperation.

II. The Atlantic Alliance

10. The main security interest of the Member States of the European Community is the protection of their territory against an external attack. Since the Member States of the European Community would find it difficult if not impossible to ensure their own defence against the main potential aggressor, the Soviet Union and the Member States of the Warsaw Pact, they have historically entrusted the task of their common defence to the Atlantic Alliance in which they are joined by a number of other European states, Canada and the US.

11. It still remains the case that the deterrence provided by the Alliance depends very largely on the US conventional and nuclear commitment to the defence of Western Europe. Although there have been, in the past, political and economic tensions between the Western European members of the Alliance and the US, and although there are differences and tensions today, it is not feasible to conceive that the defence of Western Europe can be secured, at least in the near future, outside the framework of the Alliance or without the active commitment of the US. This commitment is expressed through the stationing of some 350.000 US servicemen in Western Europe, through the deployment of different types of intermediate and short-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe, and through the targeting of US-based strategic missiles on the Soviet Union. US conventional forces stationed in Europe can be reinforced by air and sea from the US. If the integrated military command structure of NATO were to be demolished or if the American conventional and nuclear guarantee were to be withdrawn the Member States of the European Community would be poorly placed to resist major military aggression and would be relatively much more subject to external military, political and diplomatic pressure from the Soviet Union.

12. Whatever reservations some individual Member States of the European Community might have about their own participation - or full participation - in the work of the Alliance, it is hard to see how, either in the present or in the near future, the security shield provided by the Alliance could be replaced by an alternative security system for the West. It is, therefore, a major security interest of the Ten that the North Atlantic Alliance should continue in an effective form. This said, there are ways in which the working of the Alliance could be modified so as to ensure that the interests of the Member States of the European Community are more strongly reflected within the

North Atlantic Council and within the Alliance as a whole. Proposals to this effect are put forward in the conclusions.

13. Although the countries of Western Europe depend heavily on the US conventional and nuclear commitment for their security, within the framework of the North Atlantic Alliance, this does not mean that interests of the Ten and those of the US are always identical or even similar with regard to problems of international policy. The tendency of President Reagan's Administration to take dramatic policy initiatives without prior consultation with the European members of the Alliance has caused widespread concern within Western Europe.

III. Eastern Europe

14. The countries of Western Europe are linked to those of Eastern Europe by geography, history and in some cases language and culture. It is, therefore, an interest of Western Europe to reduce, as far as possible, political, military and other tensions between the two parts of divided Europe. The continuing CSCE procedures which include, for instance, the Stockholm Conference on confidence-building measures and security and disarmament in Europe, which opened on 7 January 1984, provide an opportunity for the Ten to play an active role in this process.

IV. World Security

15. The security of Western Europe is not, however, limited to the problems of its relations with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe and those of its relations with the US. The security of Western Europe is part of world security. Since the Community is the world's largest trading block its Member States cannot remain indifferent to threats to world security wherever these may appear. The possibility that a regional conflict in the Middle East or in the Caribbean might escalate into a world war involving the super powers and Western Europe itself cannot be ignored. The maintenance of world security as well as the security of Western Europe is therefore another major European interest. Suggestions as to how the Ten could play a role in helping to maintain world security are made in the conclusions.

16. One aspect of world security which has already given rise to concern on the part of the Ten is the field of human rights. One of the main destabilizing factors in international affairs is the suppression or limitation of human rights by authoritarian regimes. Within the European Community it is the European Parliament that has taken the lead that the Ten should defend, with other like-minded countries, human rights throughout the world, and should oppose racism and apartheid. It has also emphasized the need to promote forces working for democracy wherever this is feasible. In its debates and resolutions Parliament has already made a certain impact on the external relations of the Ten in this sense. Parliament's repudiation of the Colonels led to the freezing of the Association Agreement between the Community and Greece, and Parliament played a useful role in encouraging the democratic political parties which replaced the Franco and Salazar regimes in Spain and Portugal. Thus one of the most useful contributions Member States of the Community can make towards a more secure

world is the further development of an active policy in the human rights field. Parliament itself needs little encouragement in moving towards this aim but it should give more thought to ways and means of putting pressure on the Council, the Commission, and the Foreign Ministers meeting in EPC to implement its own human rights goals in the conduct of the external relations of the Community and of EPC.

17. As the United Nations is the major international organization concerned with world security, it is an interest of the Member States of the European Community to make effective use of their joint influence within the UN in encouraging that body to be as effective as possible in its attempts to maintain world peace.

18. The Ten have developed, over the years, a tradition of effective cooperation concerning major political issues discussed in the General Assembly. Thus the President in Office of the Council of Ministers regularly speaks for the Ten as a whole, and the Political Directors of the Ten regularly coordinate national attitudes concerning agenda items at the General Assembly before debates and votes take place.

19. It seems therefore that a significant interest of the Ten, acting within the framework of EPC, is to continue to strengthen its collective action within the UN. In particular attempts should be made to increase still further the proportion of occasions on which the Ten vote unanimously on major issues in the General Assembly.

V. The Developing World

20. There is little doubt that the creation and maintenance of economic prosperity is one of the main forces working

for international security. Political unrest and violence thrive in those countries or regions where poverty and malnutrition prevail. As an economic and trading grouping the European Community is well placed, and indeed has a great responsibility, to help the promotion of higher living standards in the developing world. The operation of the LOME Convention, which links more than 60 African, Caribbean and Pacific countries to the Community, demonstrates the seriousness with which the Community has taken up this challenge. Consideration might usefully be given by the Member States, particularly within the framework of EPC, as to whether it might not be possible to develop closer political links between the ACP/EEC countries with a view to the development of joint attitudes to major international problems, including problems with security implications. The ACP/EEC Consultative Assembly has already taken a stand on apartheid in South Africa and has dealt with other human rights issues. The question might also be posed as to how far the ACP/EEC institutions might usefully concern themselves with questions of human rights within the participating countries.

Quite apart from the possible development of a political role by the ACP/EEC institutions, it would seem to be a major interest of the Ten to continue to build further on the LOME Convention in the future with the aim of trying to increase not only economic prosperity but also the overall stability of the countries involved, as well as of developing closer mutual understanding between them.

VI. Shipping routes

21. In the context of the Community's trade links not only with the ACP countries but with other trading partners throughout the world, the question is posed of the protection of the shipping routes used to transport imports to the Community.

A high proportion of the Community's imports travel by sea, and this is particularly so in the case of oil and important raw materials such as manganese, chrome, cobalt, platinum, tungsten and vanadium. The situation concerning the Community's dependence on imports of oil and these primary materials has been pointed out in the oral question to the Commission by Mrs Moreau, Mrs Lenz, Mr Filippi, Mr Jonker and Mr de Keersmaecker (European Parliament sitting 14/1/1980). In his report for the Political Committee adopted in November 1981 (DOC 1-697/80) Mr Diligent analysed the problems concerning the surveillance and protection of shipping routes for supplies of energy and strategic materials for the countries of the European Community. The Diligent report pointed to the vulnerability of the sea routes on which the Community depends for such imports. In order to prevent a blockade of sea borne imports or the cutting of sea routes by armed intervention, Parliament, in its resolution of 19/11/1981 pointed out: "that one of the European Community's main concerns is to promote the economic development of the Third World, which would be seriously and permanently jeopardized if interruption of deliveries were to lead to a scarcity of oil and a succession of price increases". Most notably, the resolution called: "on the Member States with naval forces to coordinate their patrols outside the zone covered by the North Atlantic Treaty and to strengthen their naval forces, and to do so within the framework of European Political Cooperation".

22. NATO itself is powerless to take action to protect Western Europe's sea supply routes outside the geographical area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. The task of protecting sea lanes in the South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean could, therefore, most appropriately be carried out by those of the Ten possessing adequate naval resources and willing to undertake this obligation.

In normal times of peace it would be sufficient for the Member States directly involved to establish contingency plans and to hold occasional exercises. Proposals concerning the protection of supply routes at sea are set out in the conclusions.

VII. East-West arms control negotiations

23. This section of the report concentrates mainly on the INF negotiations in view of the impact on the security of the Ten of the issues under negotiation. It should be recalled, however, that other important East-West arms control negotiations have been in progress for a number of years. After more than 10 years the MBFR¹ talks have not yet led to substantive results, for reasons explained by Mr Haagerup in his recent report on EPC and European Security. The START² negotiations which have been in progress in Geneva since June 1982 continue, as Mr Haagerup also explains in his report, the earlier Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). These negotiations have run into trouble both because of the deployment of Pershing-IIIs and in part because whereas the Soviet Union wishes to freeze existing levels of nuclear weapons, the US Administration wishes to achieve reductions in existing levels of ballistic missile warheads. The INF talks were broken off by the USSR on 23 November 1983 without a date being set for their resumption. No date was set by the USSR for the resumption of the START talks when the last round ended on 8 December 1983. Subsequently the MBFR talks were also suspended, but they should resume in March 1984.

24. Since arms control and arms reduction clearly constitute important elements of European security, the Ten have an interest in the resumption and successful conclusion of all three sets of negotiations. But the results of

¹ Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction

² Strategic Arms Reduction Talks

both sets of talks can only be useful if they are balanced and mutual. It is also essential that the Ten are fully consulted and informed by the US of all developments in these negotiations. Thus the Ten should insist on prior consultation before the US Government takes major initiatives in these or other arms control negotiations. Whereas the START talks are limited to the US and the USSR, a number of Member States of the Community participate in the MBFR negotiations at Vienna. Although the European Member States of NATO are involved in a special consultative group which exists in NATO and which is responsible for allied concertation of the INF talks, and informal arrangements of a similar kind apply to the START talks, it is by no means clear whether this machinery really provides for effective consultation of its allies by the US.

25. The negotiations which have continued between the US and the Soviet Union in Geneva since November 1981 and which were broken off in November 1983 without a date being fixed for their resumption - the INF¹ talks - have made little progress but are of great potential significance to European security. The core of the negotiations is to what extent the Soviet Union is prepared to reduce or end the deployment of its SS-20 missiles, targeted on Western Europe, and to what extent the US will deploy Pershing-II and cruise missiles in the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom in 1983, and in Belgium and the Netherlands in subsequent years.

26. Britain and France, which possess independent nuclear forces, have not taken part in the Geneva talks. Whereas the Soviet Union has insisted that French and British nuclear weapons should be taken into account in the talks, the US has formally maintained (though the sincerity of this attitude has been questioned by the USSR) that the British and French

¹ Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces

nuclear weapons are "strategic" in nature and do not, therefore, qualify for inclusion in negotiations which are solely concerned with intermediate-range nuclear weapons¹.

27. Despite the breakdown at Geneva it would perhaps be unduly pessimistic to write off the talks as a failure. A number of serious proposals have been made, and given a better political atmosphere some results might be obtained in the future either on the basis of these proposals or new ones. The most important of the proposals put forward so far include: first, the US "zero option"; second, the Soviet proposal to withdraw SS-20s into the eastern part of the USSR; third, the "walk-in-the-woods", suggested by the chief US and Soviet negotiators; and, fourth, another alleged proposal of the same negotiators, which has been called the "walk-in-the-park".

The "zero option" called for the destruction of all SS-20s (and also the earlier, less sophisticated SS-4s and 5s) in exchange for an agreement not to deploy Pershing-IIIs and cruise missiles in Western Europe. An original Soviet offer to withdraw all their SS-20s east of the 80° longitude line, in exchange for an agreement not to deploy Pershing-II or cruise missiles, has now been replaced by a more recent offer to move any SS-20s in Northern Russia considerably further to the East, in response to an American objection that because of the curvature of the earth missiles based close to the 80° line in Northern Russia would be much nearer to Western Europe than those based further south. The "walk-in-the-woods" proposal made by Paul Nitze and Yuli Kvitsinsky, the two chief negotiators, but rejected by their governments, was that the Soviet Union should be allowed to deploy 75 SS-20s in "European Russia" and

¹ Both the British and French Governments plan to modernize their nuclear forces and to increase substantially the numbers of nuclear warheads available to them. Thus Britain's new trident submarines will carry up to 16 missiles with 14 warheads each, totalling 896 warheads. The French Government plans to increase its land-based missiles to 54 and its submarine-borne warheads to 576.

90 in the eastern part of the USSR; neither side was to deploy in Europe more than 150 of certain specified types of aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons; NATO was to be permitted to deploy 75 cruise missile-launchers with 4 missiles each, but no Pershing-II missiles; and fresh negotiations were to open on further reductions immediately this agreement was signed. The "walk-in-the-park" proposal, attributed by Mr Nitze to his Soviet negotiating partner, but subsequently disclaimed by the Soviet Government, suggested that if the US proposed equal reductions of 572 warheads on each side this would be acceptable to the Soviet Government which would also end its insistence, that British and French nuclear weapons be included in an initial INF agreement. The European allies were not, apparently, immediately informed of this plan, but in any event it was not acceptable to the US Administration and was later disowned by the Soviet Government. Since the breakdown of the INF talks, immediately following the decision to start the deployment of Pershing-II's, the USSR has started to deploy new submarine-launched missiles and new SS-20s in the DDR and Czechoslovakia.

28. The summary given above is necessarily simplistic, and no reference is made to a number of important elements in the talks. After assessing the state of play at Geneva your rapporteur wishes to make some personal observations. First, the way in which the Soviet Union has conducted the talks gives the impression that it is seeking to force its own view of European security on the US and Europe. European security, in Soviet thinking, is subordinated to that of the Soviet Union. As US Assistant Secretary of State for European affairs Richard Burt has written, in the "Herald Tribune" of 15 April 1983: "This Soviet view of European security makes the Soviet reaction to the NATO decision of 1979 to deploy American intermediate-range missiles to Europe much more comprehensible.

The current objective of Soviet policy is to employ its geopolitical advantage and its regional nuclear superiority to intimidate Western Europe and force West European accommodation to Soviet interests".

29. In the same article the writer goes on to set out, admittedly from the US viewpoint, a very clear perception of Western Europe's interests in the deployment of Pershing-IIIs and cruise missiles: "The deployment of 572 new American missiles, capable of reaching only limited areas of the Soviet Union, has little impact upon the US - Soviet balance, at a time when both sides have more than 10.000 warheads, deliverable on short notice to any location in the other's country. Yet by firmly linking US power to European security, this deployment will prevent Moscow from making Western Europe a nuclear hostage and thus achieving its objective of enforcing the subordination of European security to its own".

30. At this point it is necessary to recall that when NATO decided to deploy the new nuclear weapons in 1979 it also decided to withdraw 1.000 nuclear warheads. In October 1983 it decided to remove a further 2.000 warheads from Western Europe over a 5 year period. If the 572 new missiles are deployed there will still be an overall reduction of 1.428 missiles - or about 2.500 since 1979 - which will bring the total of nuclear warheads deployed in Western Europe down to its lowest for some 20 years. It is, therefore, not in the West that the number of nuclear warheads is growing.

31. The main long-term interest of the Ten, and of Western Europe as a whole, in the Geneva negotiations is that there can be mutual agreement between East and West on the limitation and progressive elimination of intermediate-range missiles in Europe. But until this aim can be achieved the immediate interest of the Ten, and of the West, is that deployment of Pershing-IIIs and cruise missiles should continue, as agreed

in NATO in 1979, to provide Western Europe with a nuclear balance to the Soviet SS-20s targeted on Western Europe. The key vote taken by the Bundestag on 22 November 1983 permitted the all-important deployment of Pershing-IIIs in the Federal Republic of Germany. Your rapporteur greatly regrets the fact that, despite ex-Chancellor Schmidt's powerful arguments in favour of the deployment of new missiles in Western Europe, the SPD voted against, thus creating doubts about Germany's reliability as a member of the Alliance. On his side President Mitterand has been most firm in supporting the deployment of nuclear forces in Western Europe, and his comment on the overall situation is most pertinent: "Les missiles sont à l'Est: les pacifistes sont à l'Ouest".

32. It should be noted that in turning down, on its side, the "walk-in-the-woods" formula the US Administration did not consult its European allies, nor did it do so, apparently, concerning the "walk-in-the-park" suggestion.

33. In the context of the missile debate it should be noted that President Reagan, earlier this year, revived the idea of developing, in the US, new weapons designed to destroy incoming Soviet missiles with the objective of substituting a defensive for a retaliatory nuclear strategy. Not only would this violate the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty but it would do much to destabilize, even further, the present tense relationship between the US and the Soviet Union. Your rapporteur considers that it is a clear interest of the Ten to discourage President Reagan from going ahead with the development of a new nation-wide ABM-system. Initiatives should be taken, within the framework of EPC, to put pressure on the US Administration in this sense.

34. The MBFR negotiations are due to start up again in March 1984. Your rapporteur hopes that it will be possible to resume the INF and START talks before too long, despite the negative East-West mood that still persists following the decisions to

deploy Pershing-IIIs and cruise missiles and to break off the INF talks. It might be, however, that the East-West nuclear arms reduction negotiations could be resumed in a new form, that of a single global negotiation covering both strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons.

VIII. CSCE follow-up

35. The results of the Madrid CSCE follow-up conference held between November 1982 and September 1983 were extremely limited. The next follow-up conference is due to be held in Vienna, opening in November 1986. Before then a number of follow-up and preparatory meetings will be held.

36. On the economic, scientific, technical and environmental sides of CSCE - generally known as "Basket 2" - it now seems as though the UN Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) will prove to be the main forum in which initiatives proposed by the participating countries might be discussed and handled. Thus although the European Community provides the main input into the preparation and negotiation of agenda items of CSCE, on the Western side, the scope for its direct involvement in follow-up activities would appear to be limited.

37. However, as European states, the Ten have a clear interest in the security aspects of CSCE treated in "Basket 1". At Madrid it was agreed that a special conference should be held, within the framework of CSCE, on confidence-building measures and security and disarmament in Europe and also that the first part of this conference should be held in Stockholm, beginning in January 1984. Any progress achieved at Stockholm will be evaluated at the overall Vienna follow-up meeting.

38. The Stockholm meeting, which began in January, as foreseen, is examining confidence-building measures covering the whole of Europe together with the neighbouring sea and air

spaces. It was agreed in Madrid that these measures should be military significant and politically binding and should be accompanied by adequate forms of verification. The aim, agreed on at Madrid, is that these confidence-building measures should reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe. The Stockholm conference is empowered to provide for the appropriate ways and means by which agreements reached there would enter into force. It should be noted that the West has already published a considerable amount of information on the holding of military manoeuvres etc. since transparency of this kind is natural within the open, democratic societies of the West.

29. However, the Stockholm talks constitute only one strand in a complex pattern in which the suspended parallel negotiations on conventional force reductions (MBFR) and on intermediate-range nuclear weapons (INF) also constitute important elements. The aim of the Ten should therefore be to encourage the US and USSR to resume the INF talks at Geneva and to revitalize the wilting MBFR negotiations at Vienna when these begin again in March 1984. All this depends not only on the interest and political will of the Ten, but also on the interest and political will of the US and the Soviet Union. The Ten should therefore join the US Administration in trying to convince the Soviet Union that its own vital security interests - as well as those of the US and of Western Europe - would be best served by a rapid resumption of the INF talks, possibly in a modified form linked to the START talks. Taken together these negotiations could lead to a better climate of international confidence. The long-term aims of CSCE follow-up should be to reduce levels of offensive weapons and military forces to the minimum and, also, to create conditions in which real progress can be made concerning the protection of human rights and concerning the development of East-West economic cooperation.

41. The Middle East has presented a continuing danger to world, and therefore European, security over a period of years.

42. The main recent stand taken by Parliament on the Middle East was the resolution it adopted accompanying the Penders report (DOC 1-786/82). Although the Penders report examined the situation in the Middle East in a searching and comprehensive way this situation has changed dramatically in recent months. Not only has violence within Lebanon continued to escalate, but the international security situation surrounding Lebanon has deteriorated and the US Administration has become directly involved in cross-frontier military operations. An alignment of European with US policies in the Middle East, which seemed appropriate at the end of 1982, is certainly no longer reasonable as far as Lebanon is concerned.

43. In general terms the Ten should not allow themselves to be drawn into a situation of polarization in which they become allies of Israel and the US against members of the Arab League and Palestinian independence movements. This is not to say that the Ten should disown Israel or take sides with the Arabs against it. It merely means that the Ten should continue to work for a settlement of the Middle East problem in which both the territorial integrity of Israel and the rights of the Palestinians are recognized and guaranteed.

44. Since President Reagan seems to have departed from a policy of impartiality as between Israel and the Arab States, the time might be ripe for diplomatic initiatives by the Ten, acting through EPC, directed at obtaining a solution to the Middle East problem based on the Resolutions 242 and 338 of the UN Security Council, the Venice Declaration of the Nine, of June 1980, and the main principles and key

points of the peace plan for the Middle East proposed by Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia in 1981 and also those contained in the resolution of the Conference of Arab Heads of State adopted at Fez in 1982. These texts, together with other relevant official documents, are annexed to the Penders report. It is clear, however, that the emphasis placed on the role of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) by the Fez resolution is no longer relevant. In preparing diplomatic initiatives the Ten should seek to involve Egypt as well as the members of the Arab League.

45. The Ten should attempt, through EPC, to restrict the US military role in Lebanon to one of internal peace-keeping involving no further cross-frontier military operations and should also seek to influence the US Administration to return to a more measured Middle East policy aiming at a solution in which the recognition and integrity of Israel are balanced by self-determination for the Palestinian people.

46. The establishment of an independent Turkish Cypriot state in November 1983 was denounced immediately by the Foreign Ministers of the Ten. The Ten cannot allow the status quo in Cyprus to continue without trying to promote a negotiated settlement of the Cyprus problem within an international framework. It is suggested that under this and the next Presidencies the Foreign Ministers, within EPC, should attempt to prepare and convene an international conference on Cyprus at which the Cypriot Government and the Turkish Government, together with representatives of the Turkish community should participate along with the Ten. Of the three Guarantor Powers, which are responsible for ensuring the application of the Agreements of Zurich and London, Britain and Greece are members of the Community, and Turkey is the third. Although a conference of this kind would be

difficult to prepare it would seem as though the Ten might be able to make a useful contribution to a mutually acceptable and lasting solution to the Cyprus problem. Such a conference could only be successful if all the directly interested parties agreed to take part. It would also seem useful to involve the UN in the preparation of such a conference. In the absence of a solution to the Cyprus problem acceptable to the three Guarantor Powers, the Government of Cyprus and the Turkish community in Cyprus, the situation on the island will continue to constitute a danger to European security.

47. Within the limited confines of a single report it is not possible to analyse the security problems posed to the Ten by other geographical areas. All that is possible is to list some regional problems and to suggest that the next directly elected Parliament should carry out individual studies concerning them, as appropriate. Apart from the Middle East and Cyprus problems, which have been examined above, the principal areas raising problems for European security would seem to be the following. First, the Horn of Africa, concerning which it would not be appropriate to comment in detail in view of the forthcoming report of Mr Ripa di Meana. But, in general terms, the Ten, in EPC, might try to counter Soviet involvement in Ethiopia and to strengthen Somalia and Djibouti. The Foreign Ministers might also examine the possibility of trying to create an EPC approach to the Red Sea States (Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Djibouti and Somalia) along the lines of the (as yet unsuccessful) Gulf States approach. The Foreign Ministers should also be urged to follow up the resolution adopted by Parliament in 1981, accompanying the report by Mrs Wieczorek-Zeul, on the Gulf States.

Second, the South Atlantic. Follow-up to the Diligent report concerning the protection of sea routes is suggested elsewhere in this report. Further, West African countries participating in the North-South Dialogue could be encouraged, by the Foreign Ministers, to prevent further Soviet supply facilities being offered beyond those in Mali and Angola. The Foreign Ministers should study the political and security implications for the Ten of the new military airport constructed by the British Government on the Falklands, including the effects on Argentina and Brazil and the possibility of using this airport for South Atlantic and Antarctic security.

Third, Iberia. Here the Foreign Ministers, in EPC, should examine the security implications of Portuguese and Spanish accession to the Community, particularly as concerns the North and South Atlantic. The Foreign Ministers might also examine what action might usefully be taken to counter Libyan intervention in Morocco and Mauretania. The entry of Spain would provide a useful opportunity for the Foreign Ministers, in EPC, to study long-term and mutually acceptable solutions to the Gibraltar question.

Fourth, the Balkans. The CSCE follow-up meetings provide an opportunity for the Ten, within EPC, to examine, particularly in view of Greek membership, ways and means of encouraging the search for greater political and military stability in the Balkan area. Fifth, the Nordic area. Likewise, the Ten have an interest to prepare, within EPC, initiatives, which could be taken within CSCE follow-up meetings to promote political and military stability in Northern Europe.

48. The situation in Northern Ireland has constituted a threat to security over a long period of years. Comment on Northern Ireland in the present report would be inappropriate in view of Mr Haagerup's report on this matter.

49. It is not difficult to think of other areas of the world, such as Afghanistan, the Caribbean, and Poland, which at present constitute or are potential threats to world security and thus to the security of the Ten. However, your rapporteur considers that it would not be useful to try to examine, within a single document of limited length, every existing or potential threat to European security. He has therefore attempted to concentrate on some of those problems which seem to have the greatest or the most immediate impact on the security of the Ten.

X. Parliament and European security

50. As far as Parliament itself is concerned, it might develop its concern with matters directly affecting the security of the Ten in the following ways. First, it should intensify oral and written questions addressed to the Foreign Ministers meeting in EPC under rules 44 and 46 of the Rules of Procedure. In this respect it would be helpful if the Foreign Ministers were represented on at least two days per session, as Lady Elles suggested in her report on EPC of 1981. Second, it should ensure that all significant security aspects of international issues directly affecting the Ten should be fully covered by reports from the appropriate committees of Parliament, and subsequently in debates in plenary session¹. Although a number of Parliament's committees, for instance the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, the Committee on Energy and Research, and the Committee on External Economic Relations, clearly have interests in certain security aspects of the work of the Community, it is evident

¹ This requirement, together with similar requirements on the part of a number of Parliament's committees to cover fully subjects of concern to them, might necessitate longer and/or more plenary sessions.

that it is the Political Affairs Committee which has the main interest and responsibility. The Political Affairs Committee is already in a position to question the Foreign Ministers meeting in EPC on the security aspects of their activities, in the quarterly colloquies. Further, the Political Affairs Committee has, over the years, submitted a series of reports to Parliament on the security aspects of foreign policy, the operation of EPC and other matters related to security, including for instance the reports by Mr Fergusson and your present rapporteur dealing with armaments procurement cooperation and arms sales to third countries¹.

In order to permit the Political Committee, and Parliament as a whole, to hold adequately and professionally prepared discussions on the security aspects of the work of the Community and of the Ten the Political Committee could usefully establish a subcommittee on the political aspects of security.

51. It has been suggested by some Members of the Political Affairs Committee that a permanent sub-committee dealing with the political and economic aspects of security could include the following tasks in its range of activities. First, the identification and analysis of shared interests, risks and requirements in security matters. Second, to send fact-finding missions to the capitals of the Member States. Third, to invite prominent security experts to make statements to it during the course of hearings which it would organize. Fourth, to maintain contacts with NATO, WEU and other relevant organizations. Fifth, to draft and submit to Parliament Opinions concerning matters relevant to security being reported on by the various committees of the European Parliament. This list of tasks is obviously neither an all-embracing nor exclusive one.

52. The question arises of whether the European Parliament might usefully, following the European elections that are due to be held in June of this year, examine the possibility of establishing flexible links with the Assembly of Western European Union (WEU), which has defence competences and a long-standing tradition of excellent reports on security matters.

¹ The Political Affairs Committee has also held hearings on security problems in London in 1981 and in Brussels in 1982.

XI. Conclusions

(A) Relations between the Ten and the Atlantic Alliance¹

53. There are good reasons for the Ten developing closer links with the North Atlantic Alliance. It is thus desirable that the policy of Member States should be more closely coordinated concerning security matters.

54. A practical way of achieving this aim would be for the Ten to prepare joint attitudes concerning selected issues in advance of meetings of the North Atlantic Council or of other organs of the Alliance. This could be done within EPC and this process would not require new or formal institutional links between the EEC and NATO. Although Ireland is not a member of the Alliance there is no reason why she should not cooperate in these matters if she wishes to do so.

55. The hope would be that the Ten could make the same sort of joint impact on the work of the Atlantic Alliance, within certain limits, as they already have when acting in unison within the General Assembly of the United Nations, or when they are represented by a single spokesman at CSCE follow-up meetings. Developments in this sense could lead to the strengthening of the European and of the Transatlantic partnership, not least through the linkage of the economic and political policies of the Ten in dealing with the outside world, friendly or otherwise.

56. Because the EEC is the largest trading and productive block in the world, and therefore potentially the most influential global economic force, it is essential that its economic and political strategies, especially in regard to security, do not pull in opposite or different directions.

¹ The proposals made in section (A) of the conclusions have been drafted in close cooperation with Mr Fergusson.

Just as the Community has to organize its political and economic tactics together in dealing with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, so it is necessary that the West as a whole should marshal its economic and political strength to the same ends.

57. Since the Alliance and the Community are both closely concerned in the economic situation of the Soviet bloc as a whole, and the Soviet Union in particular, it seems absurd for the Alliance and the Community not to pool specialized information on this matter.

58. As one means of preventing undue divergences between the security and economic policies of the Ten vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc it is suggested that the development of informal links between the Economic Directorate of NATO, the Commission and the Foreign Ministers meeting in EPC should be encouraged.

59. The need for Community coordination in security matters points to the meeting of Ministers responsible for security within EPC on occasions when the Foreign Ministers do not have the expertise to deal with the security aspects of problems discussed - a proposal already explored in the Blumenfeld report of 1977, and in the Elles report of 1981.

60. A suitable means of achieving general cooperation in security matters and the consequent ability for Community policy to be expressed by a single voice, would be for the Permanent Representatives of the Nine (the Ten minus Ireland) to the North Atlantic Council to maintain contact with the EPC structure (which includes Ireland), with the objective of identifying the issues on

which a joint approach would be helpful. Thereafter the Ten's collective position could normally be presented in the North Atlantic Council by a representative of the State holding the Presidency of the Council of Ministers. When Ireland holds the Presidency the position of the Ten could be stated by a representative of the preceding and/or following Presidency.

61. Equally, officials from national Ministries responsible for security might usefully take part in meetings of Political Directors or of EPC working parties in which foreign policy matters with complex or technical security aspects are examined.

62. If the existing restricted "Troika" team of officials serving the Presidency of EPC were to be expanded or become a permanent secretariat it should almost certainly include security experts. This is not an innovation in terms of cooperation. Foreign Ministry officials working within the EPC framework developed close links with NATO when preparing the CSCE and its sequels. The Commission itself was also partly involved in that process.

63. Greater cooperation between the Alliance and the Community could also lead to significant improvements in security contingency planning, including: the conversion of certain European industries for defence purposes in the event of an immediate threat of war; food and agriculture planning; and stockpiling of essential supplies.

64. As regards conventional armaments procurement cooperation, the general ideas set out in the report which accompanied the resolution adopted by Parliament on 14 June 1978, for which your present rapporteur was also the rapporteur, should be developed and carried through in the form of the precise proposals more recently

made by Parliament in the resolution it adopted on 26 October 1983, accompanying the Fergusson report.

(B) Relations between the Ten and the United States

65. In order to promote better mutual understanding, as concerns international affairs, between the US Government and the Ten and so as to avoid or at least minimize significant divergences between the Transatlantic partners over major world issues some form of high-level contact body is needed to link the US Government and the Foreign Ministers meeting in EPC. Its main function would be to ensure effective consultation between the Ten and the US concerning major foreign policy initiatives, including those with security implications.

66. A more dynamic procedure than the present "Gymnich Formula" for consulting third countries on EPC matters is needed. The appropriate solution could be that the US be involved in EPC, in two or three successive stages, as are applicant countries for EEC membership, for instance Greece in the past, and Spain and Portugal at present. In the first stage such countries are informed of EPC discussions and decisions after the event, as is the case with Norway at present. In the second stage they are informed in advance of discussions and likely decisions. In the third and final stage they are consulted in advance of EPC meetings which gives them an opportunity to influence discussions and decisions. Had a "super-Gymnich Formula" of this kind been applied to the US Administration it is at least possible that some of the major divergences between the Ten and the US that have occurred in recent years could have been avoided.

(C) Relations between the Ten and Eastern Europe

67. One way of trying to reduce tensions and of encouraging the growth of confidence between Eastern and Western European countries would be for the Ten to examine with the COMECON countries - either collectively or individually - ways in which economic, technical and scientific contacts could be developed, to the mutual long-term benefit of both sides in years to come. Apart from the central issue of trade relations between the EEC and COMECON, where there has been little progress in recent years (despite the efforts made at the Madrid CSCE follow-up conference), mainly because of a cooling of the general temperature of East-West political and strategic relations, there are a number of subjects which could be discussed.

68. These include the aims agreed at Madrid, such as: the development of trade relations and industrial cooperation; reduction or elimination of obstacles to trade; creation of better conditions to encourage business negotiations and operations; development of contacts between sellers and buyers; the development of better business communications, including telecommunications, and the improvement of facilities for businessmen; the publication and diffusion of economic and business information; the improvement of economic and commercial statistics, on a comparable basis; the development of means to settle international business disputes; etc. The framework in which contacts of this kind would be developed is the UN's Economic Commission for Europe (ECE).

69. The Ten might also re-examine some of the proposals made before the first Helsinki CSCE in view of the possibility of making progress, on an East-West basis in these fields. These include: improvement of East-West

transport communications; the development of an East-West electric power grid and the coordination of East-West freight traffic, together with East-West cooperation in medical research and cooperation in trying to improve the purity of European seas.

70. Whereas major EEC - Eastern European economic and trading initiatives seem likely to continue to be inhibited by political and strategic factors in the immediate future, the Commission and the Ten (within the framework of CSCE follow-up) could usefully examine what practical progress might be made in furthering East-West cooperation concerning subjects such as those listed above.

(D) The Ten and world security

71. The Ten should strengthen the UN in its peace-keeping role by contributing contingents to peace-keeping forces in troubled areas. Some Member States within the Ten already have a most creditable record in this respect. As Mr Haagerup pointed out in his recent report to Parliament the participation of some Community countries in the peace-keeping force in Sinai is significant since this force, unlike previous peace-keeping forces, is not a UN one. Equally significant has been the presence of British, French and Italian troops in the Lebanon, once more in a non-UN force. The question arises of whether a contingent officially representing the Ten as such, even if it is not composed of elements from all Member States, might not be a useful contribution in the future.

72. Quite apart from contributing to the peace-keeping activities of the UN, the Ten could examine what further steps it might take concerning the maintenance of world security.

(E) The Ten and the missile problem

73. As a long-term aim the Ten should seek the reduction and eventual elimination of intermediate-range nuclear forces, on a balanced, mutual and verifiable basis, in Western and Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union. They should therefore, within the framework of EPC, give every encouragement to the US and the Soviet Union to resume the INF negotiations at Geneva or to develop new and more comprehensive negotiations covering both strategic and intermediate-range nuclear missiles.

74. The Ten should improve consultation with the US Administration, through EPC, possibly through a 'super-Gymnich Formula' as outlined earlier, to ensure

that they are fully informed and consulted concerning American decisions in all major arms control and reduction negotiations before these are taken.

75. In the immediate future and until such time as mutually acceptable agreements are reached at any resumed Geneva talks the Ten should support the deployment of Pershing-II's and cruise missiles in Western Europe.

(F) The Middle East

76. The Ten, in EPC, should consider taking diplomatic initiatives directed at obtaining a solution to the Middle East problem based on Resolutions 242 and 338 of the UN Security Council, the Venice Declaration of the Nine and the main principles and key points of the peace plans proposed by Prince Fahd in 1981 and by the Conference of Arab Heads of State, at Fez, in 1982. In preparing such initiatives the Ten should seek the support of Egypt as well as the Arab League. Acting through EPC the Ten should attempt to restrict the US military role in Lebanon to one of internal peace-keeping involving no further cross-frontier military operations. The Ten should seek to influence the US Administration to return to a balanced Middle East policy aiming at a solution in which the recognition and integrity of Israel are balanced by self-determination for the Palestinian people.

(G) Cyprus

77. The Foreign Ministers, acting in EPC, should try to promote a negotiated settlement of the Cyprus problem within an international framework. They should attempt to prepare and convene an international conference on Cyprus at which the Cypriot and Turkish Governments, together

with representatives of the Turkish community, should participate along with the Ten. It would seem useful to involve the UN in the preparation of such a conference.

(H) Parliament and European security

78. Apart from intensifying its questions, under Rules 44 and 46, to the Council and the Foreign Ministers meeting in EPC on the security aspects of their work, and intensifying its examination of the security aspects of the work carried out in EPC, within the framework of the colloquies, Parliament's Political Committee should set up a permanent subcommittee on the political aspects of security in order to prepare adequately regular discussions on significant security matters directly affecting the Community or the Ten both in the Political Committee and in plenary.

European Communities

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

Working Documents

1982-1983

17 February 1983

Document 1-1294/82

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

tabled by Mr MOMMERSTEEG, Sir James SCOTT-HOPKINS,
Mr SPINELLI, Mr C JACKSON, Mr R JACKSON,
Mr BLUMENFELD, Mr HUTTON, Mr CROUX, Mr PRAG,
Mr J.M. TAYLOR, Mr PURVIS, Mr EISMA, Sir Henry PLUMB,
Mr SÄLZER, Mr SAYN-WITTGENSTEIN, Mr DELOROZOY,
Mr PENDERS, Mr GEURTSSEN, Mr PROVAN, Mr CALVEZ,
Miss HOOPER, Mrs RABBETHGE, Mrs SCRIVENER, Lord O'HAGAN,
Mr HERMAN, Mr DE GUCHT, Mr PRICE, Mr GEROKOSTOPOULOS,
Mr de GOEDE, Mr BATTERSBY, Mr DONNEZ, Mr NOTENBOOM,
Mr MARSHALL, Mr LOUWES, Mr JANSSEN VAN RAAY,
Mr SPENCER, Mr SIMMONDS, Mr IRMER, Mr BORD,
Mr FERGUSSON, Lord BETHELL, Mr MERTENS, Mr HARRIS,
Mr HAAGERUP, Mr DIANA, Mr ISRAEL, Mr SHERLOCK,
Mr RINSCHÉ, Mr PÖTTERING, Mrs GAIOTTI DE BIASE,
Mr NORD, Mr PINTAT, Mr REMILLY, Mr SCHALL,
Mr BERKHOUWER, Mr MAHER, Mr d'ORMESSON, Mr GAWRONSKI,
Mr PAULHAN, Mr CECOVINI, Mr VANKERKHOVEN, Mr GALLAND
and Lord HARMAR-NICHOLLS

pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure

on an inventory of shared European interests, risks
and requirements in the security field

The European Parliament,

- A. having regard to the resolution on European political cooperation and European security (Doc. 1-946/82),
- B. having regard to the importance and topicality of the data relating to European security and the influence of such data on progress in the construction of Europe,

Requests the relevant Committee, on the basis of the principles set out in the HAAGERUP report, to draw up an inventory and carry out a thorough analysis of shared European interests, risks and requirements in the security field and to draw up a report on this subject by 1 January 1984.

European Communities

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

Working Documents

1983-1984

15 July 1983

DOCUMENT 1-587/83

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

tabled by Mr MARSHALL and 29 others

pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure

on the sale of arms to Argentina by France

The European Parliament,

- A. deploring the Argentinian invasion of the Falklands and the loss of life caused by the Exocet Missiles,**
 - B. mindful of the undemocratic nature of the Argentinian Government,**
 - C. noting the deplorable failure of the Argentinian Government to renounce the use of force against the Falklands,**
 - D. remembering that the citizens of the Falklands do not want to be colonized by the Argentinians,**
 - E. condemning reports that France is going to supply Argentina with weapons even deadlier than Exocets,**
- 1. Calls upon the French and all EC Governments to renounce this trade which is destructive of intra-Community feeling and could be destructive of both life and freedom;**
 - 2. Demands a Community wide policy in respect of arms sales;**
 - 3. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to both the Council and the Commission of the European Communities.**

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

Working Documents

1983-1984

12 September 1983

DOCUMENT 1-644/83

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

tabled by Mr KYRKOS

pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure

on postponing the deployment of Pershing

and Cruise missiles in Europe

The European Parliament,

- A. whereas the nuclear arms race brings the threat of a thermonuclear disaster closer instead of averting it,
- B. believing that a basis can be found at the Geneva talks for an agreement guaranteeing the balance of forces and setting out the stages of a progressive reduction in missiles and nuclear warheads in Europe, until such time as a general disarmament agreement is achieved,
- C. whereas lack of time must not occasion the taking of steps which will lead inevitably to fresh and higher stages in the arms race, with unforeseeable and extremely grave consequence for East-West relations over Europe,
- D. sensitive to the anxieties and expectations of public opinion,
 - 1. Recommends the interested governments to postpone the deployment of Pershing and Cruise missiles on European territory for six months to give the parties to the Geneva talks time to reach agreement;
 - 2. Appeals to the two greatest powers to adopt the language of self-control and moderation, to refrain from any attempt to secure supremacy in the military field, since such a thing is unattainable and merely exacerbates the arms race, and to cooperate with the other European countries in a programme of progressive, balanced disarmament to rid Europe of the threat of becoming the theatre of a nuclear war;
 - 3. Instructs its President to forward this motion for a resolution to the Council of Ministers meeting in political cooperation, the governments of the Member States and the governments of the USA and the Soviet Union.

European Communities

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

Working Documents

198₃-198₄

9 January 1984

DOCUMENT 1-1253/83

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

tabled by Mr MARKOPOULOS and Mrs VAN DEN HEUVEL

on behalf of the Socialist Group

pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure

on peace movements in the Member States
of the Community

The European Parliament,

A. Whereas

- the arms race has reached a particularly dangerous stage and the nuclear weaponry already installed is, in theory, sufficient to destroy our planet ten times over,
- the SS 20 missiles based in Europe and the Pershing and Cruise missiles being installed on Community territory now create the conditions for a direct nuclear confrontation on European soil of which the one certain outcome would be the total destruction of Europe,
- the technological precision of the new Cruise missiles enables them to locate their target whilst evading the enemy's tracking systems, and for this reason the latter could be induced to retaliate under no more than the psychological influence of a 'fear of attack',
- the eagerness with which the installation of these missiles is demanded strengthens the view that the idea of a localized nuclear war (with Europe as the probable theatre) has already taken hold and is within the bounds of possibility,

B. Recognizing, for the reasons set out above, that:

- the nations of Europe are increasingly disturbed at the possibility - now perfectly plausible - of a nuclear conflict and have expressed their concern more and more strongly in recent years in the form of movements and demonstrations with a purely pacific character,
- the inevitable consequence of this state of mind was the formation, in most European countries, of various genuinely independent peace movements determined to denounce any action, from whichever side, that increases tension and to strive to rid Europe of all weapons of mass destruction,

C. Noting that:

- it is not possible for the people of Europe to express their desire and their demand for an end to nuclear armament through the political will by which they are guided when voting for the political party of their choice, since various other internal and external socio-political factors are involved in shaping their political outlook,
- the peace movements, standing over and above all party-political considerations, are therefore the only true outlets for the genuine expression of the popular desire and demand for peace,
- the contribution of these movements to the cause of peace is growing daily, and that they already constitute a means of exerting pressure to dissuade cold-war actions and to create a climate of rapprochement between East and West,

D. Whereas:

- the governments of all the Member States profess a desire to play their part in improving East-West relations and consolidating peace, which would allow grave and pressing social problems to be resolved and would result in prosperity for their countries,
 - in theory no government of the Member States of the Community denies the legitimacy of the people's demand to participate in the endeavours that need to be made to achieve peace,
 - the prime minister of one of the ten Member States has already officially recognized the peace movement in his country as a necessary link between the people and the government for directly conveying the wishes of the former to the latter and also for ensuring that the government's endeavours to establish peace in the world meet with the response of popular support,
1. Calls on the governments of the Member States to bear in mind that the existence, operation and action of the peace movements in the Member States of the Community are the consequence of the situation that has arisen and serve the cause of peace;

2. Calls on the governments of the Member States therefore to establish intensive contact with the peace movements;
3. Decides to organize as soon as possible, during one of its forthcoming part-sessions, a hearing on which representatives of the peace movements will be invited to take part;
4. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Foreign Ministers and the governments of the Member States of the Community.