

# NINETEENTH JOINT MEETING

of the Members of

## THE CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE

and the Members of

## THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

(STRASBOURG, 17 MAY 1972)

---

### *OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES*

STRASBOURG







# NINETEENTH JOINT MEETING

of the Members of

## THE CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE

and the Members of

## THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

(STRASBOURG, 17 MAY 1972)



### *OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES*

STRASBOURG

## NOTE

This edition contains the original texts of the English speeches and translations of those delivered in other languages.

The latter are denoted by letters as follows :

(*F*) = speech delivered in French.

(*G*) = speech delivered in German.

(*I*) = speech delivered in Italian.

(*N*) = speech delivered in Dutch.

The original texts of these speeches will be found in the separate editions which are published for each language.

## SUMMARY

Sitting of Wednesday, 17 May 1972

1. <i>Opening of the Joint Meeting</i> .....	7
2. <i>Apologies for absence</i> .....	8
3. <i>Political consequences of the enlargement of the European Economic Community</i> .....	8
<i>Mr. Reverdin, Rapporteur for the Political Affairs Committee of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe</i> .....	8
<i>Mr. Radoux, Rapporteur for the Political Committee of the European Parliament</i> .....	18
<i>Mr. Duncan Sandys, CA (United Kingdom — Cons.)</i>	32
<i>Mr. Berkhower, EP (Lib.)</i> .....	36
<i>Lord Gladwyn, CA (United Kingdom — Lib.)</i> .....	41
<i>Mr. Bousquet, EP (EDU)</i> .....	44
<i>Mr. Gratz, CA (Austria — SPÖ)</i> .....	48
<i>Mr. Deniau, Member of the Commission of the European Communities</i> .....	52
<i>Mr. van der Stoep, EP (Soc.)</i> .....	61
<i>Mr. Digby, CA (United Kingdom — Cons.)</i> .....	66
<i>Mr. Habib-Deloncle, EP (EDU)</i> .....	69

<i>Mr. Czernetz, CA (Austria — SPÖ)</i> .....	75
<i>Mr. Gordon Walker, CA (United Kingdom — Lab.)</i>	79
<i>Mr. Radoux, EP</i> .....	83
<i>Mr. Goëss, CA (Austria — ÖVP)</i> .....	83
<i>Mr. Leonardi, EP (NI)</i> .....	83
<i>Mr. Ryan, CA (Ireland — Fine Gael)</i> .....	86
<i>Mr. Peel, CA (United Kingdom — Cons.)</i> .....	88
<i>Mr. Goëss, CA (Austria — ÖVP)</i> .....	90
<i>Mr. Delforge, CA (Belgium — PLP)</i> .....	92
<i>Mr. Andersen, CA (Denmark — Lib.)</i> .....	94
<i>Mr. Joachim Weber, CA (Switzerland — Rad. Dem.)</i>	96
<i>Mr. Barry Jones, CA (United Kingdom — Lab.)</i> ....	98
<i>Mr. Karasek, CA (Austria — ÖVP)</i> .....	99
<i>Mr. Walder, CA (United Kingdom — Cons.)</i> .....	100
<i>Mr. Gislason, CA (Iceland — Progr.)</i> .....	102
<i>Mr. Treu, CA (Italy — Chr. Dem.)</i> .....	104
<i>Mr. Stewart, CA (United Kingdom — Lab.)</i> .....	106
<i>Mr. Molloy, CA (United Kingdom — Lab.)</i> .....	108
<i>Mr. Reverdin, CA</i> .....	111
<b>4. Closure of the Joint Meeting</b> .....	<b>114</b>



SITTING OF WEDNESDAY

17 MAY 1972

---

**IN THE CHAIR : Mr. VEDOVATO**

**President of the Consultative Assembly  
of the Council of Europe**

*The Sitting was opened at 9.10 a.m.*

**1. *Opening of the Joint Meeting***

**The Chairman (F).** — The 19th Joint Meeting of members of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe and members of the European Parliament is open.

May I remind you that the Rules of Procedure which will apply are those agreed jointly by the Bureau of the Consultative Assembly and the Bureau of the European Parliament.

I would ask those members who wish to speak to place their names on the list of speakers in Room A93.

It is customary in both the Consultative Assembly and the European Parliament for speeches to be limited to ten minutes, except in the case of Rapporteurs and spokesmen of political groups. I consider it would be wise to adopt this procedure for the Joint Meeting.

*(Murmurs of assent)*

The purpose of the Joint Meeting is to enable the members of the two Assemblies to hold an exchange of views without taking any vote.

## **2. Apologies for absence**

**The Chairman (F).** — MM. Dewulf, Martens and Meister have apologised for being unable to attend the meeting.

## **3. Political consequences of the enlargement of the European Economic Community**

**The Chairman (F).** — The agenda now brings us to a discussion, “The political consequences of the enlargement of the European Economic Community”.

I call Mr. Reverdin, Rapporteur of the Political Affairs Committee of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe.

**Mr. Reverdin, Rapporteur for the Political Affairs Committee of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe (F).** — Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, this, our 19th Joint Meeting, clearly marks the end of a stage. It is obvious that we shall need to review arrangements for co-operation

between our two Assemblies, but I am convinced that this co-operation will continue to be necessary, since the forthcoming enlargement of the European Community is but a step in a process.

In the quite understandable euphoria which followed the signing, in January, of the agreements which will shortly result in the enlargement of the Communities, there were many people on both sides of the English Channel who believed and proclaimed that a new great power had been born. It is always dangerous to take too short-sighted and indulgent a view of the past or the future. The enlargement of the Common Market is undoubtedly a major event, but it marks a stage—and one which is not yet decisive—on the road to European unity. Afterwards, Europe will still be incomplete. It is important that we should be aware of this. A battle won may have a stimulating effect, but it is only “a” victory, not “the” victory.

In the report which I have the honour to present to you on behalf of the Consultative Assembly, I have endeavoured to show in what respects Europe remains incomplete—not out of what the Germans call *Schadenfreude*, but because I believe it is realistic to do so and, hence, to identify clearly the points on which our joint efforts should now be concentrated, whether we be Ten or whether we be Six.

The Six did not constitute Europe ; nor will the Ten. First of all, there is the institutional problem. Those who imagined a quarter of a century ago that removing boundary posts—you will remember Garry Davis—would result in frontiers being abolished and the marks of history being effaced were deluding themselves. It has to be admitted that the enlarged Community will, geographically speaking, comprise only a part of Europe and that it will doubtless be a long time yet before Europe succeeds in setting up institutions that are capable of representing it effectively in all its diversity, in all its different cultural and social facets, in short in its infinite complexity : the joint responsibility which is ours is a responsibility for Europe in all its complexity and diversity.

Doubtless the Community of the Ten will be the foremost commercial power in the world. But power carries obligations. Unless the Community equips itself with suitable political institutions, it will be in danger of being but an economic giant without a political head and incapable of defending itself—in other words, a monster whose very survival is problematical. There are thus formidable tasks ahead. Many people are placing great hopes in the Summit Conference which the Ten are to hold this autumn. I fear that, in this process of unification, more patience will be needed than is often imagined at present. If this enlarged Community is to become a factor for stability and peace in the world, the part it will inevitably play in world affairs demands that it should provide itself with means of political expression and action.

It is also essential that there should be more effective democratic control within this Community than the control which you in the European Parliament at present exercise. I know that you yourselves are fully aware of this. We are conscious of the dangers that would arise for Europe from the existence of concentrations of bureaucratic, technocratic and other forms of power for which there was no counterweight or check in the form of genuine parliamentary control exercised by men appointed by our peoples for the purpose.

We are all aware of this, and we know too that much creative imagination will be needed if the Economic Community is to be given a political leadership as well as means of self-defence. Discussing this problem is not, of course, a matter for the Council of Europe, whose Statute specifically forbids it to concern itself with defence questions; it is even less a matter for a representative of a neutral country. May I nevertheless be permitted, as someone who is merely trying to look at things from a historical point of view, to express the opinion that there can be no hope for the survival of an economic giant which has not provided for its defence, as long as a precarious peace in the world continues to depend on a balance of military power.

What appears to me to be the natural concern of the Consultative Assembly, in which sixteen of the Council of Europe's seventeen member States are represented—Cyprus being unable at present to delegate to us parliamentarians whose credentials we can ratify—is the fact that the Community is geographically incomplete.

First of all there is the very serious problem of the Mediterranean. Indeed, I would say that this is the major political problem facing Europe at present, involving as it does the fate of the European peoples living in the Mediterranean area as well as the questions of relations between Europe and the peoples who inhabit the Mediterranean's southern shore.

Yesterday, at this rostrum, Mr. Masmoudi, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Tunisia, using language that was perhaps somewhat excessive but expressing what he genuinely felt—since he is most anxious that his country should maintain close relations with Europe—spoke of the complete eclipse of Europe in the Mediterranean and of the alarming vacuum which had been left there. He mentioned the presence of American and Soviet fleets in the Mediterranean and the absence of any European surveillance. A fortnight ago, in Malta, I heard Mr. Dom Mintoff, the Prime Minister, speak in exactly the same terms.

I believe that the way in which the Community is at present being enlarged, through the accession solely of countries washed by the cold seas—the Atlantic, the North Sea and the Baltic—raises in a particularly acute form this problem of Northern and Central Europe's relations with the Mediterranean area, which will now be ill-represented among the Ten—by Italy, which is wholly Mediterranean, and by France, which has only one Mediterranean coast.

We in the Council of Europe are still, however, fortunate enough to have colleagues from Turkey and Malta; Cyprus too belongs to the Council. And we observe that we are con-

fronted with the problem of the Europeans living on the shores of the Mediterranean.

Allow me, then, to say something quite candidly. There are, of course, a number of Mediterranean countries which are governed in a manner we find distasteful ; their regimes are authoritarian and often arbitrary, and as a result we keep them at arm's length. Nevertheless, these are peoples who are part of our family, and when a member of a family makes a mistake or misbehaves, I do not believe it is wise to expel him.

These peoples, who are European just like ourselves, have, I believe, a right to expect us to take a view of things that is not just a short-sighted one coloured by political prejudices ; they have a right to expect us to consider the need to associate them, as far as circumstances permit, with what we are trying to achieve, for without them we should have a Europe whose Mediterranean flank was completely exposed. If Europe were to abandon the very places from which it sprang—for we owe our origins to the Mediterranean—it would be utterly vulnerable to any forces that came from either the Urals or the Rocky Mountains.

We cannot accept such a situation. Whilst remaining inflexible in our fundamental devotion to parliamentary democracy, we should seek every means of associating these European peoples with what we are trying to achieve. This is what I consider to be at present the basic political problem confronting us in our task of creating the real Europe of tomorrow.

There is also the problem of the three neutral countries. In my report, I have dwelt on this problem at some length : I am sure you will forgive a Swiss for being rather sensitive in this regard. I shall not repeat what I have written in my report, except to make one point quite clear—and, in this connection, the Swiss can, I believe, speak from experience, since as long ago as the early 16th century they imposed a status of neutrality on the Canton of Basle, which they had just admitted to their Confederation, the idea being that it was desirable to

have people who were not institutionally involved in any dispute which might occur within the community and were available to act as arbiters.

These neutral countries have, I believe, succeeded in creating a certain type of men whose services the whole of Europe needs from time to time.

I do not think it was mere chance that, of the four men who have been elected to the post of Secretary General of the United Nations so far, two came from European neutral countries ; nor do I believe it was mere chance that another neutral European was chosen to try—so far in vain, alas—to settle the Middle East problems, or yet another to distribute United Nations aid in Bangla Desh.

I therefore feel that the neutrals can render specific services to the European Community. As a representative of a neutral country, I must say how gratified I am that in Brussels, thanks to the triumph of subtlety over rigidity, the arrangements which had been devised for the present phase with the European neutral countries are flexible enough to enable the new opportunities now available to be taken advantage of.

Then there is Iceland. Here too, as in the case of Malta, I believe that we in Europe have common duties to perform. Iceland is a Member of EFTA, the Atlantic Treaty and the Council of Europe and her only source of wealth consists of her fisheries on the continental shelf. She ought to be afforded arrangements somewhat similar to those we are making to protect some of our rural areas from increasing depopulation—mountain areas, for example, where the absence of agriculture is causing civilisation to recede.

The countries which are not at present joining the Community are, with the exception of Turkey, small ones with fairly low population densities. In the technological field, as in the political sphere, the three neutral countries have reached comparable levels of development. But we should not leave

out of our calculations the fact that, in the present pattern of international affairs, a small country can suddenly reveal itself as a formidable power. Malta and Mr. Mintoff have just proved this to us, and it would be highly dangerous to overlook these small countries in the process of European unification.

The subject we are debating is the political consequences of the enlargement of the Communities. The foremost political task, which is an internal European one, will be to regulate in an optimum manner relations between the Ten and the other countries which, for a variety of reasons, are either not joining the Community at present, or cannot yet join.

Yesterday, Mr. Masmoudi told us how dissatisfied he was at the treatment accorded to Tunisia within the Association. A fortnight ago, Mr. Mintoff spoke to me along exactly the same lines. Countries which are powerful should give special attention to their relations with the less powerful countries, even the smallest ones. Although there may be a quantitative difference between a small and a big country, there is basically no real difference in qualitative terms.

We need to ask ourselves what the tasks of our two parliamentary assemblies are likely to be in the forthcoming stages of European unification.

In this connection, I hope—and this leads me on to another aspect—that we will be fully aware of one particular hazard. In the unification of Europe, there are two models that may be followed. One is the unitary model. This was invented by France and developed by her into a State that was an admirably efficient one until its machinery became sluggish and cumbersome. France herself is at present suffering from the excesses of this unitary system. The problem of regionalisation is and will remain a burning issue until it has been solved.

The countries which based their own systems on this French unitary model are now turning away from it.



Italy has, somewhat hastily, carried out a programme of regionalisation, and you will perhaps have noticed during the Burgos trial that it was under the banner of *Unidad* that the regime, the Castilians, organised the mass demonstrations that were designed to foil the demonstrations by the Catalan and Basque autonomists.

When the discussions first began after the war, some people imagined that this unitary model could be applied to Europe. Nowadays, nobody believes this any more ; and it would, I think, be dangerous if such a model were to be followed in the various partial or sectorial solutions. If the regulations, laws, legislative texts and decisions adopted by the Ten were to be applied along the lines of the unitary model, some very great difficulties would, I think, be encountered.

In any event, when I cast my mind over the history of my own country, it is clear to me that if we had acted according to this model, our country would no longer be in existence today.

It is important to find arrangements that can encompass Europe in all its diversity.

In the last resort, I think, when we have finished creating the Europe of tomorrow—and this will take a long time yet—it will be more akin to the Germanic Holy Roman Empire than to the French type of unitary State.

It will be a highly subtle creation, especially with regard to the application of common measures, and it will be important for everyone to be able to apply them according to his own temperament.

We in the Council of Europe Assembly and in the Council of Europe in general possess, I think, a large fund of experience, which has perhaps been built up with some difficulty, for we are a disparate group, stretching as we do from Cyprus to Iceland, from the North Cape to Malta ; nevertheless we

do have a fund of valid experience which should be made use of in our task of unification.

In the second part of my report — I do not want to dwell on this now, since we shall doubtless have an opportunity to discuss it later, and I shall be reverting to it in any answer to the various speakers in this debate—I have endeavoured to imagine in what areas we might co-operate and what our respective activities would be, so that the fund of experience represented by our two Assemblies might be used for the benefit of Europe.

We must not forget that we share the responsibility which devolves on a parliament in this Europe in the making, and that it is essential that we should present a common front. We shall, I imagine, be required to make various suggestions to our governments for the sharing of activities. It is important that the place of parliamentary control should be emphasised very strongly both by you—the members of the European Parliament or, as the representative of the French Government still likes to say officially whenever he takes the floor, of the European Parliamentary Assembly—and by us—the members of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe.

I have attempted to identify certain areas in which we might work together, certain ways of sharing our tasks. I am convinced that there is work enough for everybody. I am also convinced that there are many areas in which it is essential that we should establish close co-operation.

Others will need to be turned to for help : wherever it is advantageous to have seventeen and not just ten countries working together, the Council of Europe will still be able to make a contribution. And I believe that joint meetings will continue to be useful by enabling us from time to time to compare our experiences, see what cases of overlapping there are and take steps to eliminate them. I do not want to dwell any further on this aspect.

I have made several proposals, which are purely exploratory in nature. We shall need to establish our machinery and see what the outcome will be.

I am sure that the Community's high ambition of playing a leading part in world affairs, especially in a rapprochement of Eastern and Western Europe, is a legitimate one. There is nothing aggressive about it. If, as it seems, the Soviet Union is afraid of the emergence of this concentration of power in Europe, that is her business. This is no immediate concern of ours. But I believe that Europe as a whole would be in danger if a rift of any kind should occur as a result of a failure to work out sufficiently flexible institutional arrangements between the Ten and the other peoples of Europe. And you would see then how these divisions and difficulties were exploited.

On Monday, the foundation stone of the new Council of Europe building was laid. This means that our governments have decided that Strasbourg should remain the parliamentary capital of Europe, that its role should be confirmed ; otherwise they would not have agreed to meet the cost of the large building which is designed to house not only the Council of Europe's Secretariat but also the European parliamentary assemblies.

We are thus firmly committed. Our governments recognise that Europe could not be unified without parliamentary control, without parliamentary activities.

Both our Assemblies can make a contribution of their own. The main requirement is that they should endeavour not to compete with each other but to complement each other's activities.

In the days when the Six, for reasons of which you are aware, were at times somewhat irritable, the Eighteen which became alas, the Seventeen—since Greece is no longer among us for the time being—behaved at times somewhat vaguely. We are now faced with other responsibilities which will compel us to clarify matters and which will be far more weighty, for

although the enlargement of the Community is a vital stage it is but a stage, and there are still many tasks which we shall need to carry out jointly.

*(Applause)*

**Chairman (I).** — It is not without significance that after presiding over this Consultative Assembly with distinction for a number of years, our colleague, Mr. Reverdin, having taken his place in the Chamber, has reported on a very important matter, enabling all of us to benefit from the fund of experience which the Consultative Assembly and the Council of Europe, under his guidance, have been able to acquire and in part utilise.

I believe I am speaking for all—and this is confirmed by your applause—in once more expressing thanks to Mr. Reverdin for the information given us.

I now call Mr. Radoux, the author of the working paper of the Political Committee of the European Parliament.

**Mr. Radoux, Rapporteur for the Political Committee of the European Parliament (F).** — Mr. Chairman, my dear colleagues, nobody will be surprised by the tremendous satisfaction we feel at the great political event marked by the accession of Great Britain, Denmark, Ireland and Norway to the Common Market. By coincidence, this week the foundation stone was laid of what will be the new Council of Europe building. I myself saw the building which houses this Chamber being erected, and the sound of those impassioned debates in the early days of modern Europe is still ringing in my ears. This will give an idea of how great my emotion is as I see us meeting here today just as we hoped we would more than twenty years ago. But, Mr. Chairman, I shall stifle my emotion: the initiators have already played their part, and we now look to the managers.

The reason why I have briefly recalled a bygone period is that a great idea must be borne in mind until such time as the task it inspired has been completed.

In discussing the subject on our agenda today, we must avoid engaging in prophecy or indulging in conjecture. Our discussions touch upon so many questions concerning the European Community's internal functioning and its relations with the outside world that they call for serious analysis and rule out any snap judgments.

If I had to preface what I wish to say, I would do so by making three observations.

The first one is that, after various successes and failures, the authors of the Treaty of Rome laid a wager. They have now won their wager.

The second observation is that the enlargement of the Common Market may be regarded as a further wager. It involves more responsibilities and heavier burdens, but holds out richer prospects. What is at stake is the very future of Europe and, to some extent, that of the world.

The third observation is connected with the previous one : with the creation of the Europe of the Ten, what I once called the "alibi of the Europe of the Six" is being demolished. This alibi consisted in treating the future enlargement of the Community as a reason for doing or not doing something. Within the present Community, it was convenient to use the unknown as a pretext. As for our external relations, they, although highly important, were still limited geographically and hence liable to be adjusted in the way that partial responsibilities tend to be.

Now, the alibi is being demolished. The wager has been laid. Provided that the ratification procedures pass off as we hope, the undertaking will begin in a few months' time.

Mr. Chairman, although the European Parliament's written report is a reflection of its Political Committee's deliberations, let me make it clear that what I am saying now commits no one but myself.

In order to facilitate my colleagues' task, I should like to talk about management.

I shall begin with the internal organisation of the Community of the Ten in order to place it in better perspective in relation to the outside world.

Any discussion of the internal functioning of the Common Market must begin with its institutions. As an outsider can judge a situation more soundly, I should like to quote the following passage from the excellent report presented by our Swiss colleague, Mr. Reverdin, one which he himself has just paraphrased. This is what he says :

“Power carries obligations : unless it acquires adequate political institutions, the Community is in danger of becoming an economic giant without a political head, incapable of defending itself, a monster whose very survival would be in question.”

In the present Community, political power lies first and foremost in the hands of the Council of Ministers. The documents which have just been published will enable thorough studies to be made. I hope that these studies will begin this summer, with the participation of the applicant countries, and that they will cover not only the Council of Ministers but also the Commission of the Communities and the European Parliament.

Already one thing seems clear to me. The Council of Ministers of the Ten will soon degenerate into a diplomatic conference unless its functioning is improved.

The Brussels Treaty on the accession of the four new Members, as signed on 22 January, has not made any alteration to the Treaty of Rome. Paragraph 3 of the treaty's first article reads as follows :

“The provisions concerning the rights and obligations of the member States and the powers and jurisdiction of the

---

institutions of the Communities as set out in the treaties referred to in paragraph 1 shall apply in respect of this treaty.”

I would add that the Treaty of Rome has not been altered either by the communiqué which the Ministers issued in Luxembourg in 1966. I am convinced that it would be a good thing to revert to Community legality as regards the system of voting in the Council of Ministers. I am not at all sure that certain habits which have gradually created a kind of tradition do not go beyond the wishes of politicians whose efforts gave rise to the communiqué in question. Be that as it may, there is a danger that the bogged-down state of the present Council will lead to the hamstringing of the new Council if the Ministers continue to work in the way they do at present.

As for the Commission, when its membership increases from nine to fourteen, it should be composed—as in the past and as at present—of highly qualified individuals.

Not only will the new Community be larger ; it will also be different in nature. Here a choice will need to be made : either each member of the Commission should be allocated a particular field of responsibilities or groups should be set up on each main category of problems, as in the case of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community.

It may be observed in passing that, in the Community of the Ten, six countries will have only one representative each on the Commission.

As for the European Parliament, a preliminary remark needs to be made : the democratic control which exists at present is plainly inadequate. Another remark is that some people fear that the enlargement of the Community will lead to a decline in the Parliament, whilst others hope that the Parliament will take on a new lease of life.

My own view is that facts will lead to the appropriate measures being taken.

By way of example, we may observe that no real powers are given to the Parliament because it is not elected by universal suffrage, and that the question of its members being directly elected gives rise to doubts because it does not yet have any powers.

The truth is that all prior conditions should be avoided. Efforts should be made to achieve the simultaneous introduction of these two improvements on which the proper functioning of the Parliament depends.

I would add that there are various legislative powers which the Council of Ministers could transfer to the Parliament forthwith. The Council could make its own task easier by relinquishing responsibility for examining certain subjects and issuing legislation on them.

It would be useful in the general interest to investigate between now and 31 December what subjects the Council might transfer in this manner.

Mr. Chairman, in concluding my remarks on the Community institutions, I should like to make one observation and issue an appeal.

The observation concerns the new character of relations among the Ten States. When a State decides to join a community with other States, it renounces any idea of forming coalitions with those States. That seems to me of cardinal importance.

My appeal is as follows: when the enlargement of the Community comes about, let us not begin again the doctrinal quarrels we had when there were only six of us. Wanting our institutions to function smoothly is one thing; discussing theories is another.

What have we learnt from the fifteen years during which the Common Market has been in existence? Mainly two things: first, that the unification of Europe provides a good example



of the application of the empirical method ; and secondly, that the institutions of modern Europe will not be satisfied with the ready-made conceptions of the traditional legal systems.

The European Community will have original institutions of its own, because it is itself a political phenomenon. Moreover, we shall not have time after 1 January next year to deal with much else than choosing a suitable programme. In the weeks and months ahead—since we have already been accustomed for some time to working as a group of Ten—that is what we shall have to think about, and I should like to mention a few points which I consider essential in such a programme.

The new Community will not get off to a good start unless the decision is taken to implement economic and monetary union as from 1 January.

This will be the backbone of our actions. It will place us in the psychological position where we shall feel capable of influencing events instead of merely reacting to the deeds of others.

But, above all, economic and monetary union will mark the beginning of the Common Market's second era ; it will set in motion a process leading to the achievement of the other common policies.

I am quite categorical on this subject. The launching of the enlarged Community will be a failure if it is not accompanied by the initiation of economic and monetary union.

Another important point in our programme is social policy. The Treaty of Rome is not very demanding in this matter. It is now essential that employers' organisations and trade unions should be associated with the Community's policy.

Associating the employers' organisations means offering employers the advantages they will stand to gain from helping to implement a Community programme which they accept and adhere to.

The trade unions should be associated, because the Community's economic policy ought not to be drawn up in circumstances that are less favourable than those in which the national economic programmes of the future Community's more progressive countries are drawn up.

The third aspect relates to regional policy. The logic of the Community's activities demands that political frontiers should not be an obstacle in the way of carrying out schemes for the planning, economic conversion and development of particular areas in the Community.

The question of regional policy is increasingly exercising the member States. There is every reason to believe that events will often lead the Community to take over from governments in meeting the needs of one or more countries concerned in projects of common interest.

Before I leave questions of policy, which I have merely touched on and not examined in any depth, I should like to add a word about the problem of Europe's defence.

Mr. Reverdin, being a rational politician, says in his report that the new Community must have a defence policy. It may be observed that, as a result of its enlargement, the Common Market will include two atomic powers. It may also be observed that the question of the defence of Europe cannot be separated from that of the defence of the West as a whole. The Atlantic Alliance nowadays fulfils a twofold function: it both deters would-be attackers and encourages co-operation. It is based on the dual concept of defence and détente. It ceases to be credible if divorced from the Atlantic context.

Lastly, it may be observed that an atomic force would not be European unless there was a European government, for the answer to the question: "Whose finger on the trigger?" is not a matter of inborn knowledge.

I would refer my colleagues to two reports of exceptional quality which Lord Gladwyn and Mr. Boyden presented last

November to the Assembly of Western European Union. They contain all the material for the preparation of a large-scale debate. It remains to be seen what will be an opportune moment for initiating such a debate.

If a European government were to be set up straightaway, there would immediately arise the problem of choosing between the status quo and a European force.

If a European force were adopted, it would be necessary to review Europe's position within the European group of the Atlantic Alliance. At the moment, however, I do not think we need do any more than recall the existence of this problem.

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, the second part of my remarks will be devoted to the enlarged Community's relations with the outside world.

It is not possible to conduct a comprehensive review. Besides, we have all read the reports of the Council of Europe and the European Parliament on this subject. Accordingly, I shall simply mention some individual cases.

I shall deal first of all with the Community and the other countries of Western Europe, especially those belonging to the European Free Trade Association.

In the report of the European Parliament's Political Committee, I referred to the special attention we were giving to our relations with non-member countries, especially with those which I described as being comparable to the Community's member States.

Enlargement must not be allowed to result in our relations being loosened ; on the contrary, it should be used as an opportunity to rectify a difficult situation, for the enlarged Community will offer a wider range of possibilities than the present Community.

The European Parliament's report also mentions the role which certain countries are destined to play in bridging the gap between East and West. I shall return to this in a moment.

That being said, the political aim vis-à-vis the countries which have not been able or do not wish to join the Community should be to bring the current negotiations to a conclusion so that the various agreements can come into force at the same time as the treaty of accession.

None of the countries in question challenges the Community's general approach. They are all prepared to conclude separate agreements with the Community which would deal, for the main part, with the liberalisation of trade in industrial products and, in certain cases, agricultural products, and would include a clause concerning the possibility of future adjustments to their terms.

This latter stipulation is not, however, acceptable to one of the States, whereas another wants the substantive part of its agreement to specify certain fields to which co-operation would be extended.

A special situation would arise for the EFTA countries which are not joining the Common Market, in so far as certain categories of goods for which they at present enjoy a nil tariff would once more be subjected to customs duty.

I now come to the situation of countries which do not belong to EFTA, that is to say, countries which have already signed an agreement with the Community or are conducting negotiations with it. It is in everyone's interests that the Community's relations with these countries should be as good as possible and hence that all the necessary adjustments should be made.

Finally, I would like to say a word about our hopes concerning further accessions to the Community.

To avoid any ambiguity, it seems to me worth recalling that accession to the Community is subject to a particular condi-

tion being satisfied. That condition is that the applicant State should be a parliamentary democracy of the traditional type. There is no need to argue about this. The provisions of the Treaty of Rome are not open to any doubt in this respect.

Let us now consider relations between the European Community, the Soviet Union and the other East European countries. There is no reason to be surprised, Ladies and Gentlemen, at the statement which Mr. Brezhnev made to the 15th Congress of Soviet Trade Unions on 20 March. This reaction to the enlargement of the Common Market is in line with the traditional pattern of Soviet diplomacy.

The treaty which created the Atlantic Alliance was signed on 4 April 1949. On the same day, Stalin put an end to the Berlin blockade. Later, because he realised that communism could not be imposed everywhere by force, Mr. Khrushchev invented the idea of peaceful co-existence. Today, confronted with the success of the West European countries' efforts to unify, the Russians recognise the existence of this grouping and are keeping a close watch on the Common Market's activities and development. I am using the same terms as those of the official translation of Mr. Brezhnev's speech.

With the application of the Treaty of Rome's provisions on the progressive conclusion of Community trade agreements a little more than two years away, this change of tactics on the part of the USSR offers an unquestionable advantage. A little further on, Mr. Brezhnev has this to say about the Common Market :

“Our relations with the participants in this grouping will naturally depend on the extent to which they, for their part, recognise the realities existing in the socialist part of Europe, especially the interests of the member countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, Comecon.”

While we are on the subject of realities, it must be said that the Common Market has for some time been responding to

requests for limited agreements from East European countries and has been doing its best to satisfy them.

At this very moment an application from one of these countries, which is much more extensive than any previous ones, is pending before the Council of Ministers. After consultation with the four applicant States, a decision might be taken on this by the end of the summer. I hope it will be a positive decision. I also hope that there will be a positive reaction to the passage I have just quoted. It calls for a great deal of clarification. The enlargement of the Community enables us to take initiatives because we have the resources to pursue an economic policy, in the modern sense of that term, with a power the size of the Soviet Union. The same applies to all the other East European countries, both collectively within Comecon and separately. And there are certain neutral countries which I mentioned a moment ago—such as Austria, Finland and Switzerland—which are in a position to foster this kind of rapprochement.

Then there are the Community's relations with China. As I wrote in my report, if China proves ready to grant the Community the degree of recognition that she herself hopes for, and also to replace the existing bilateral treaties by a treaty with the Community, relations between EEC and China might develop to the advantage of both sides.

I now come to our ties with the United States.

In our future relations with the United States, the fact that we both belong to the West will be the basis for all our actions. The interdependence of the two entities is obvious. The problem of what is called sharing the burden exists. Until further notice, it will continue to be necessary to take account of the state of health of the American economy when drawing up a medical bulletin for Western Europe. The oft repeated but less often practised concept of "talking as equals" will become effective with the enlargement of the Community, on the express condition, let me repeat, that economic and monetary union comes into force on 1 January next year.

We shall need to bear all these factors in mind when we embark on the large-scale negotiations that are due to take place between us and the Americans in 1973. With the help of other industrialised countries and other nations, we need to establish together a new international monetary system. Each partner needs to be convinced that the negotiations in 1973 are in the interests of both sides, that crises often act as a stimulus to action, and that the crisis which broke last year should be treated as an opportunity to create a new monetary system.

Another welcome effect of enlargement is the removal of what might be described as certain European complexes vis-à-vis America. A healthy attitude towards our transatlantic partner will depend on the policy we pursue within the Community, in other words on the building up of our power—in the good sense of the term, of course.

Lastly, in this sharing of the burden of the West's responsibilities the most effective way of achieving a balance will be to play a larger part in the provision of aid to the developing countries.

It is this problem I should now like to consider. Enlargement will enable the Community to adopt a quite different demeanour at meetings between the developed and the less developed ones. Because of its obligation to provide assistance almost throughout the world, Western Europe will replace the Commonwealth agreements by a Community agreement.

A moment ago, I implicitly placed economic and monetary union at the top of the list of problems to be discussed at the forthcoming conference of Heads of State and Government in Paris. I would unhesitatingly give second place to our policy towards the third world, as the success of this will partly depend on the achievement of economic and monetary union.

When stressing that it was with other countries that the industrialised world should produce a successor to the defunct

international monetary system, I also had the third world in mind, as new links of solidarity will be established.

There is another point which relates more specifically to the respective positions of the sterling area and franc area countries. In the course of the negotiations between the four applicant countries and the member States, relations with the third world were discussed. It was decided not to abolish the advantages granted by either side but to adjust existing policies.

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, before I conclude, allow me to say something about the Council of Europe.

Enlargement of the Community doubtless spells the completion of some of the Council's tasks. But it will give rise to new ones. The Council of Europe, besides having its own functions, forms an ideal adjunct to the Community, for under the provisions of the Treaty of Rome there are important aspects of European life which cannot yet be dealt with by the Community.

If we accept that events precede the law—I say this in order to avoid lengthy explanations—we may, for instance, visualise initiatives by the Council of Europe in the field of East-West relations.

With a dossier covering such varied aspects as collective defence and cultural relations, why should the Council of Europe not invite the East European countries to meet the Western countries here? The debate would take place between national representatives who were authorised to voice their countries' opinions. Of course, the timing of the debate would be extremely important as its purpose would be to help and not to hinder.

If all goes well, the ratification of the Moscow and Warsaw Treaties and the implementation of the agreement on Berlin and the pacts between the two German States will be followed



by multilateral conversations with a view to a conference on European security and co-operation.

The date of such a debate would therefore need to be chosen with great care.

Another suggestion I would like to make concerns the Middle East, about which Mr. Reverdin spoke.

This is a part of the world where Europe is absent, even though its presence is desired. The Council of Europe might take the initiative of convening a round-table conference at its particular level. It would be courageous, but also politically realistic, of parliamentarians to intervene in an area where, with the economic resources at our disposal, we could make an important contribution.

We should also consider whether there are not other places in the world where our absence is looked upon as an abdication of responsibility, places where the difficulties are great and where Europe is at present taking the somewhat facile course of simply offering some discreet advice.

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, I can conclude only by reiterating, in different terms, what I said at the beginning of my speech.

In 1949, when we were afraid, the will to survive induced Western Europe to make some good resolutions. Today, the will to live is inducing us to create a Community that is as wide as possible. As we know, the great unknown factor of the future is that of relations between the Northern and the Southern hemispheres of our planet. The great problem of European equilibrium, whose era is now drawing to an end, already has a successor in the problem of world equilibrium.

By virtue of the position it is about to occupy, Community Europe has a duty to help to establish this equilibrium. The

task is a formidable one, and will demand a keen sense of responsibility of us all.

It is true, Ladies and Gentlemen, that Europe's past is a distinguished one, but if the realities of the contemporary world are considered, it can be seen that the Community's ten member States and the States associated with them are now faced with opportunities for even greater achievements.

*(Applause)*

**The Chairman** (*F*). — Thank you, Mr. Radoux.

I call Mr. Duncan Sandys.

**Mr. Duncan Sandys.** — First I should like to congratulate Mr. Reverdin and Mr. Radoux on two remarkable reports and on the brilliant manner in which they have presented them. I should also like to take this opportunity to thank Mr. Reverdin for all that he did for Europe during his distinguished tenure of the presidency of the Consultative Assembly. We have lost an outstanding President but, as we have heard this morning, we have regained an equally outstanding contributor to our debates.

The enlargement of the Community marks an historic milestone in the progress of European unification. As a citizen of one of the new Members of the Community, I say to our colleagues in the European Parliament that we are eagerly looking forward to sending British representatives to sit with you in your august Assembly and to play our part with you in the inspiring task of creating a United States of Europe.

The Heads of Governments will be meeting shortly to examine the new situation and to make plans for the next stage. The decisions which will be taken at the Summit Conference will determine for a long time ahead the direction and speed of Europe's future development. We should therefore make the most of today's important debate to express our views and our

hopes on the main issues which will be discussed at that great conference.

First and foremost we should ask the Summit Conference to reaffirm unequivocally that the political union of Europe is the common objective of all the Members and the prospective Members of the Community.

We also look to the Summit Conference to recognise the need to strengthen the democratic control of the Community's institutions by increasing the powers of the European Parliament and by introducing direct popular elections as soon as practicable.

The increase in powers and the introduction of direct elections are both essential ; but I submit to you that if we insist on obtaining both simultaneously we shall endlessly delay progress. The realisation of the one should not therefore be made conditional on the realisation of the other.

The Vedel Report proposes an increase in the powers of the Parliament in two stages. I believe that the recommendations of this valuable report are generally on the right lines and deserve support. If accepted they would undoubtedly represent a very significant advance. There is, however, one additional improvement in the representative process which I would like to see adopted. It is one which would greatly increase the effective influence of the European Parliament and would require no amendment to the treaty.

As we know, if the Commission wished to strengthen the position of the European Parliament, it could do so quite simply by declaring its intention to present its legislative proposals in the first place to the Parliament for discussion. This would enable the Parliament to give its opinion before instead of after decisions were taken by the Council of Ministers and it would enable the Commission, if it thought fit, to amend its proposals in the light of the discussion in the Parliament before submitting its definitive recommendations to the Council of Min-

isters. This important change in the procedure would, as I have said, require no amendment of the treaty. In fact, it could be introduced immediately by a decision of the Commission acting on its own sole authority.

At the same time we must try to secure the direct election of the members of the European Parliament on the basis of a uniform European electoral system as provided in the treaty. We must, however, recognise that the adoption of a common system presents many practical problems and will inevitably take a number of years to accomplish. In the meantime, in order not to hold up progress, in my opinion each country should be free temporarily to adopt its own system for the popular election of its representatives to the European Parliament. Eventually a uniform European election system is essential ; but the introduction of direct elections in certain countries by means of different national procedures as a temporary measure would, I am sure, have a stimulating effect and would help to accelerate general agreement.

In addition to the strengthening of democratic control over decisions of the Commission and of the Council of Ministers, the creation of a politically united Europe requires the extension of the basic functions of the Community. In due course these must embrace not only economic and monetary affairs but also all aspects of international policy.

This would of course involve a major alteration of the Treaty of Rome and it would be unrealistic to imagine that the governments will agree to this at their forthcoming Summit Conference. But there is an important first step which could be taken without raising any fundamental constitutional issue. I refer to the proposal to set up a foreign policy secretariat. This should be composed of persons of high standing and experience and should of course be quite independent of direction from governments. Its function should be to carry out a continuous study of the problems of foreign affairs from a common European standpoint with a view to formulating proposals on which governments can base common European policies.

Having regard to the close connection between international commercial policies which is the responsibility of the Community and other aspects of international affairs, there should be a close and effective link between the Commission and the foreign policy secretariat, which should of course be sited in Brussels.

Having spoken about the future development of the Community, I turn to the future of the Council of Europe. Until such time as the Community embraces all the democratic European nations, the Council of Europe will continue to have an important role to perform. It will constitute an essential link between those of its Members which belong to the Community and those which do not. The Consultative Assembly will continue to provide the necessary forum for the regular exchange of views between our parliamentary representatives on all matters of common interest.

The Council of Europe will also continue to be the most appropriate body for tackling European problems which concern a wider group of countries than the Members of the Community. I am thinking in particular of such matters as human rights, the environment, and social and legal questions of various kinds.

In addition to these precise functional duties the Council of Europe will, I believe, have a growing opportunity to play a constructive part in promoting better relations and practical co-operation between the democratic and the non-democratic nations of Europe of all political complexions.

The Council of Europe will of course not be the same after the enlargement of the Community. It is well to recognise that. But, provided that it adjusts itself to the new situation, it will, I am sure, continue to play an important part, indeed an essential part, in the life of Europe and will be in a position to make a unique contribution to the evolving process of wider European unification.

**The Chairman (F).** — I call Mr. Berkhouwer, Chairman of the Liberal and Allied Group of the European Parliament.

**Mr. Berkhouwer (N).** — Mr. Chairman, the importance of the dialogue between the European Parliament and the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe has sometimes been underestimated in the past. I do not know what is going to happen to this tradition in the years to come. In any case we must acknowledge that today's meeting is outstandingly significant for it is taking place in a year of transition that is of vital importance for European development—1972, a year that must see the completion of Europe on the north-west side so far as the Common Market is concerned and on the eastern side by the ratification of the treaties between the Federal Republic of Germany, Poland and the Soviet Union.

This meeting is so important also because it is attended by a number of our colleagues from the Consultative Assembly who will, we hope, after ratification of the various treaties of accession, belong to the European Parliament of the Community of Ten—and to a real parliament.

As a rule the month of May is a very important one for Europe for there are some historic dates in this month : 5 May for the Council of Europe and 9 May for the European Communities, known as Robert Schuman Day, originally important for the European Coal and Steel Community and later for EEC. In passing I wonder whether the Europe of the future is going to retain two such Europe Days or whether we shall have to look for another solution. With all the European affairs that the ordinary man does not properly understand, he will certainly not understand why there are two Europe Days. Perhaps we can make a Europe week of it. In any event we shall undoubtedly need a lot of time to achieve for Europe what we have in mind.

Mr. Chairman, this present month of May has a further highlight in the recent visit of Queen Elizabeth II to Paris. We

are no longer living in the Europe of the *entente cordiale*, the reigns of Queen Victoria, Edward VII and so on, but are on the road to a Europe of ten equal partners.

Secondly, of course, a Summit Conference is to be held in Moscow on 22 May and once again Europe in the form of Western Europe will be out of it, just as we are often out of it when decisions are made in our countries, concerning us and without us. I do not even mean the big four burning issues which we watch from a distance. I am not speaking of Vietnam and I am passing over the Far East. So far as those problems are concerned, there is the contradiction that our absence is just as great as are the interests we have there. Where are we Six at the moment at UNCTAD III and where shall we Ten be soon at UNCTAD IV ?

At this moment we representatives must primarily have our eyes on what *The Times* described as "The kind of Europe we want to have". The paper writes : "The real debate that is going on in Europe is what kind of Europe we are trying to create." The decisions taken at the common Summit in Paris when the present and prospective Members of the Community will all meet together, will shape the European future for several years ahead. The kind of Europe we want to have.

This central point, "the kind of Europe we want to have", must be in the foreground when we talk about the political consequences of the enlargement of EEC. These consequences emanate not merely from geographical expansion, not merely from the fact that the club is to have more members. If this club with more members wishes to play its part in the world with greater success than at present, more teamwork will be necessary between the Six and between the Ten. The teamwork must also become more intensive both inside and outside. If our largest trading partners, the United States, should again adopt economic measures like those of August 1971, each of us must not again have separate meetings with the American executive. We must find means of defending our common interests in the monetary and other fields as a body.

As regards the internal development of our Community, we live in hopes concerning the Summit Conference between the Heads of State and Government which is to take place in Paris in the middle of October next.

What will be at stake then, what will come up for discussion regarding Europe ? It is desired to extend the Community of Ten into an economic and monetary union. What does all this involve ? Does it not begin for the ordinary man with the duty on cigarettes ? And does it not end with harmonisation of income tax, budgetary policy etc. ?

What does it all entail and what is it going to mean to us as European delegates in view of the still incomplete state in which European parliamentary representation operates ?

The second item on the agenda for the Summit Conference is to be the position of the Community institutions, the position, that is, of the four institutions. So far as we are concerned, we are primarily interested in the democratic, parliamentary organisation of the Community. In this connection the vital question—and I know this is the vital point for the representatives of Great Britain, Ireland, Norway and Denmark—is what is to take the place of national sovereignty that has to be given up. I can give you an answer straightaway : you will get nothing in your own parliaments to take its place. Executive powers are already being given up. We have got to think of all the other national executive powers that will have to be given up when we really form an economic and monetary union. Then everything at home will have to be given up and the only place where compensation can be offered for this is in genuine democratic European parliamentary representation. The gap left by national powers relinquished will have to be filled by the European Parliament, about the reorganisation of which Mr. Duncan Sandys has just spoken.

This is not going to be served up to you on a plate, but you can work on it, and that is why this meeting is so extremely



useful and necessary, my esteemed colleagues from the joining countries and the six member States. You can work on it in your own parliaments so as to make sure that your Ministers and Heads of State do not agree in Paris next October to a further transfer of national powers to a European executive unless such a development is accompanied by democratic, parliamentary supervision to be exercised by the European Parliament. A much more important matter than direct elections is that such powers of supervision shall be established. If they are established and if the European Parliament gets this modest mandate, then decisions about general, direct European elections will follow as a matter of course.

In this respect our hopes centre mainly on the activities of the British, Irish, Norwegians and Danes in their own national parliaments. We hope that the transfer of powers from national to European level will be accompanied by an extension of the powers of the European Parliament. For if we wish to create nothing less than an economic and monetary union, powers must be transferred at European level. Otherwise it is out of the question.

As I have said, this dialogue between our two institutions is of great importance. In this connection I am thinking of the following words of Abraham Lincoln : "Democracy is government of the people, by the people and for the people." "Of the people" we know about, for we are all governed in one way or another, both nationally and at Community level. But what about "by the people" ? In other words, what say do the 260 million European citizens have at present in determining the European laws according to which we shall have to live ? At the present time the directives and regulations are fixed by the Council, so far as the Council decides at all. At the moment the Council has 240 proposals from the Commission lying in its drawer and no decisions have been made. When the Council does make a decision it is done in the dark, as it were. It is done in the same manner as deliberations were conducted and decisions made in town councils in the Netherlands before 1851.

What influence do these 260 000 000 people have when it comes to fixing the laws that govern their lives ? This point is much more important than the fixing of the Community budget because not more than about 5 % of the latter can be altered ; the remainder follows from orders laid down in European legislation and from the budgetary standpoint we have hardly any more influence left. It is therefore more important to create a European parliamentary assembly that shall have the final say in the fixing of the rules governing the everyday life of the citizen in the enlarged Europe.

Lastly comes the third point in Abraham Lincoln's trilogy — "for the people". What does the man-in-the-street see and notice at the present time of the Europe we are building ? All he can see are huge buildings in Brussels and he hears talk about all sorts of things that he does not understand—threshold prices, weights and sizes of jam-jars and loading trays, head-lights and rear-lights and all kinds of technical matters.

What must we wish for the ordinary man who is to benefit from Europe and on whom, in the long run, everything depends ? In the first place, this man must be enabled to gain an insight into what is happening in the Europe on which we are working. Secondly, this Europe must mean something to him in all his everyday doings. In other words we must create the largest possible Europe. I experienced just the opposite—it was an anti-climax—on 5 May this year, the famous Europe Day. That day I was going to Bonn and at the frontier the train was boarded by an army of customs officers and all sorts of other officials who asked us for passports, luggage, and so on. In the highest European circles we are at present arguing about whether people should be allowed to take 200 or 300 cigarettes from one country to another ; whole meetings are devoted to the subject, if not marathon sessions. We must get this thing settled as quickly as possible if this Europe is really going to mean anything to the ordinary man. When I asked a customs official on 5 May whether he knew it was Europe Day, he looked at me strangely. That customs officer probably thought :

I wonder whether this chap knows what he is talking about. Such was my experience on Europe Day.

So let the economic and monetary union according to the Werner Plan be put into effect around 1980. You will then have an instrument with which to supervise enlargement of the monetary union by institutional parliamentary bodies. So let the ideal embodied in the Werner Plan be realised as quickly as possible, namely, that the ordinary European can move freely and unhindered from north to south, from Trondheim to Taranto, without papers and without having to change his money six or seven times. We must therefore have one European currency with which he can move freely throughout the whole of the European area.

Mr. Chairman, that is the contribution which I wanted to make to this interesting meeting on behalf of my political friends and myself.

*(Applause)*

**The Chairman** (*F*). — Ladies and Gentlemen, I would ask you all to be as brief as possible.

I call Lord Gladwyn.

**Lord Gladwyn.** — Mr. Chairman, as I understand it, we are now discussing the whole likely future of the Council of Europe after the enlargement of EEC from Six to Ten and after a sufficient time has elapsed to demonstrate that the enlarged Community will develop into a political entity of some kind.

I entirely agree with Mr. Reverdin when he observes in his highly intelligent report that this cannot really take place until and unless the enlarged Community has faced and solved the vital question of a common defence policy within the general framework of the Western Alliance. I need hardly say that I agree also that progress should now shortly be made in the

general direction so eloquently indicated by our brilliant Rapporteur, Mr. Radoux. Finally, I should like to say that I associate myself wholly with the immediate steps proposed by my colleague Mr. Duncan Sandys, many of which I, like him, have been advocating for many years.

But today I suppose what we are really considering are hypothetical situations, and if we are to consider probabilities at all I feel that there are some that are perhaps not sufficiently dealt with or brought out in either of the reports which are now before us. For instance, the establishment within the next few years, say by 1980, to take a date of a political entity of the type envisaged just now, a sort of political entity, if indeed it occurs, will clearly invest the Community with an enormous power of attraction, and I find it very difficult to believe that at least two, and perhaps three, of the European democracies, which for the time being will find themselves outside the Community of Ten, will not by that time, by 1980, have taken the decision to join it also. I think they will be obliged to join for purely economic reasons. In that case, the enlarged Community will consist of twelve and possibly thirteen States.

I cannot help feeling, too, that by that time, or perhaps a little later, the States of the Iberian Peninsula, no doubt under new management, will also have joined. If so, that will make fifteen. The two remaining European neutral States, one of which is neutral by treaty, can hardly help also being in very close association with such an enlarged Community, at any rate from the economic, cultural, and social points of view. That makes effectively seventeen States.

Apart from the communist States, the only European countries outside this enormous organisation, in 1980, shall we say, although no doubt they will also be in some kind of association with it, will be likely to be Greece, Turkey, Cyprus and Malta, although we may well hope that one of the other Mediterranean States, shall we say, Tunisia, will be in some kind of association with this organisation also.

What, in such circumstances, if we envisage such circumstances, would then be left for the Council of Europe to do, at any rate in all political spheres, and might there not be some question of its continuing to function as a separate organisation? I think the question must at least be posed if we are realistic, even if no perfectly satisfactory answer may be forthcoming in this debate.

For, of course, things may not work out like this: nobody can at present be certain. If there is not sufficient will on the part of the governments of the Western European democracies to accept certain supranational obligations, notably of course, as regards foreign affairs and defence, and if one cannot even contemplate the formation of some kind of nucleus which will operate a common defence policy, in those circumstances the emerging confederation, or whatever it may be deemed to be, may never emerge. In this case there is every reason to suppose that, far from exercising a power of attraction for the countries of the East, it would be the countries of the East which would be exercising a power of attraction for us!

In such regrettable circumstances as these, it might perhaps seem desirable—no doubt it would—to base Western European union, whatever one may call it, less on an unrealisable political Community as on a non-political, in the sense of being a non-supranational, Council of Europe.

Whatever our speculations, I entirely agree with the Rapporteur, I think Mr. Reverdin, that for the time being at any rate, and perhaps indefinitely, it is important to maintain the Council of Europe as a centre for the organisation of European technical activities generally. I think they were specified by Mr. Reverdin as being human rights, science, education and culture, local authority co-operation, environment, legal and social affairs, public health, and so on. Even if by 1980 the Community attains the dimensions which I alluded to earlier, it may well be desirable for it to make use of a wider European body which, in these non-political spheres, might in its turn

find it easier to co-operate with the communist States of the East.

My own provisional conclusion, therefore, would be that, though we cannot possibly be sure now what kind of future the Council of Europe will have, it is entirely probable that it will continue in one form or another. I do not, in other words, imagine for a moment that the great building, the foundation stone of which was laid yesterday, will by 1980 have become a sort of concert hall or a convention centre. It may or may not be the place from which Europe is governed—personally I do not believe that it will be that—but at least it will be, so to speak, the shop window of Europe, the place where the best qualities of our peoples can best be displayed to the outside world.

*(Applause)*

**The Chairman** (*F*). — I call Mr. Bousquet.

**Mr. Bousquet** (*F*). — Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, last Monday in the presence of the President of the Consultative Assembly and our Vice-President, Mr. Furler, we attended the laying of the first stone of the new Europe House. The ceremony, which was presided over by Mr. Pierre Graber, Chairman of the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers and Head of the Political Department of the Swiss Confederation, was a very happy occasion. The work of building began in earnest the very next day, that is yesterday, with the preparation of the ground for the laying of the actual foundations. It is a good augury that the work should have begun two months ahead of schedule, 1 July having been the date originally fixed. Thanks, however, to the energy with which the preparatory work has been pursued, two months have been gained and I should like to express my admiration for all those concerned. Our congratulations are due first and foremost to the architect, Mr. Henry Bernard, and his assistants, who have worked unceasingly to complete the plans. I congratulate them on their skill and on the way in which, in the new building, elegance

is to be combined with the most scrupulous attention to functional requirements.

The building now begun will be larger than originally planned. Since 1967, when a committee of government experts was set up to assess requirements, I need not remind you that European co-operation has developed and there has been an increase in the Council of Europe staff in addition to the enlargement of the European Communities. As a result, the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers has decided that an extra floor of offices should be added to the building, to provide space for an enlarged European Parliament with its appropriate services, as well as for all the Council's own organs and members of staff. When attending the meetings of the European Parliament in Strasbourg, members of the EEC Council and Commission will naturally have at their disposal the additional space they will need.

Provision was also made for some extra offices to be held in reserve when the building was first occupied, so that it will be able to meet the full requirements of the Council of Europe and of the European Parliament.

While I am on the subject, I should like to pay a tribute to the Committee of Ministers whose decision to add the extra floor of offices testifies to both their realism and their foresight.

I hope I may be pardoned for entering into a little more detail. When the Committee of Ministers set up its working party to investigate requirements for the new Europe House, it instructed it to approach the European Parliament whose President, Mr. Poher, provided the necessary information. The Parliament's requirements as set out in 1967 were for 178 offices in all: 8 for its President, Vice-Presidents and Secretary General, 25 for its Assembly services, 32 for its committee services, 28 for political groups, 11 for national delegations and 55 for the Council of Ministers and the Commission. It also asked that an area equivalent to about one quarter of the total,

or 50 offices, be reserved in case of the enlargement of the European Communities. The Parliament's further requirements included an Assembly Chamber capable of seating some 400 delegates, at least 4 committee rooms, 2 press rooms, adequate bar and restaurant facilities, an information desk, travel office, bank, post office and newspaper stand, besides recording and photographic studios, reproduction workshops and distribution rooms, and waiting rooms for interpreters and drivers. It also asked that 20 of the offices be placed at its permanent disposal.

These requirements were accepted by the working party and the Council's Committee of Ministers, with the result that the new Europe House will provide all the offices and other facilities requested by the European Parliament. This being a joint meeting, let me add that all the demands of the Consultative Assembly were likewise accepted by the Committee of Ministers.

What will the new Europe House look like ? First, there will be a large entry hall, open to the public ; then there will be a library, a reading room and a work room for the parliamentarians, interview rooms, rooms for the use of distinguished visitors, a Representative's bar and restaurants which are to be built on the old fortifications overlooking the Marne-Rhine Canal, the River Ill and the neighbouring sports grounds. The offices of the President, Vice-Presidents and Secretary General of the European Parliament will be together in one part of the building and those of the President, Vice-Presidents and Clerk of the Consultative Assembly in another. There will also be adequate office space for the political groups, Chairmen of committees and the national delegations.

The Assembly Chamber will be circular and capable of seating 400 members, as requested by Mr. Poher. There will be 14 committee rooms, ten of which will be available for parliamentary committees. The 50 offices reserved in the original plans for the needs of an enlarged Community have now, in agreement with the Secretariat of the European Parliament, been allocated as required among the services concerned.



Thus, the new Europe House will meet all the needs both of the European Parliament and of the Council of Europe. It will be completed by the end of 1975 or the beginning of 1976 and we shall then be able to leave our present Chamber and move into our new quarters.

That still leaves us with the problem of what to do in the meantime, between the first meeting of the enlarged Parliament on 1 January 1973 and the opening of the new building. However, I can assure you that the necessary arrangements have been made. In the first place, this Chamber is quite large enough to accommodate the European Parliament of the ten member States, and the Committee of Ministers has voted the necessary appropriations for the alterations to the interpreters' booths which will permit the use of additional languages. So far as offices are concerned, more than a hundred pre-fabricated temporary offices, of a moveable type, are to be put up in the garden to accommodate the Parliament services. The European Parliament will therefore be able to meet quite satisfactorily as from 1 January 1973 and throughout the intervening period until the new Europe House is opened.

As I have just described them, Mr. President, our future prospects are more than just satisfactory ; they are highly promising. After twenty years of working under very difficult conditions, we shall soon be occupying a building worthy of the Europe we are creating and one, moreover, far better suited to our needs.

So far as communications and links with the outside world are concerned, a real improvement has recently been brought about, as you know, by the introduction of a Strasbourg-Milan and a Strasbourg-Brussels-London air service. There is still room for further improvement, however. We need faster aircraft and the introduction of Sunday services, Sunday being the day on which many parliamentarians, diplomats and civil servants are obliged to travel if they are to be at work on Monday morning. I know that an air service to Frankfurt is about to be opened. These are all matters calling for consideration

and I am very hopeful of further developments along the lines I have indicated now that a beginning has been made with the Strasbourg-Milan and Strasbourg-Brussels-London links.

We can look forward to the future, and especially to Strasbourg's future as the parliamentary capital of Europe, with real optimism, Mr. Chairman.

I think myself, and I feel sure that, in so saying, I am interpreting the feelings of all our colleagues in the Council of Europe and the European Parliament, French and non-French alike, that today's developments and those to which we can look forward tomorrow are more than encouraging for all those who are spending so much time and effort in this building to achieve their ideal of a united Europe.

*(Applause)*

**The Chairman (F).** — Perhaps I may be allowed to remind members that the object of this exchange of views is to discuss the political consequences of the enlargement of the European Economic Community.

I call Mr. Gratz.

**Mr. Gratz (G).** — Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, as a parliamentary representative of Austria, which is not one of the four new Members, I should like to say that the enlargement of the European Communities gives us satisfaction and pleasure. The Consultative Assembly, too, has often pressed for enlargement and for an agreement of this kind. We share the satisfaction of the four new Members that this has now come about. We have often said that it was long in coming and that it would have been easier to unite Europe shortly after the war, when production stood at zero, than it is today when the task is that of apportioning prosperity. But the goal has now, thank heaven, been reached.

I should also like to say that we, as parliamentary representatives of a non-member country, follow with sympathy and concern the efforts of our colleagues in the European Parliament to win genuine parliamentary rights, not just because we are parliamentarians ourselves, but because we share their conviction that the spiritual basis which a major economic power like this requires can only be created by setting up a living parliament with full parliamentary powers.

A previous speaker has already suggested that we are now after a few centuries witnessing, on a European scale, a repetition of the earlier struggle for parliamentary rights at national level. I only hope that the European Parliament will not be obliged to use against the Commission those drastic measures which the national parliaments used against their monarchs.

But I should like, Ladies and Gentlemen, to state our problems with frankness and, if you permit it, a measure of scepticism, from the Austrian point of view. I thank both the rapporteurs, and in particular the Rapporteur of the European Parliament, for making it clear that even Europe of the Ten is not the whole of Europe, since Europe as a whole is larger than the Ten ; we have always pointed out that it is also larger than the membership of the Council of Europe.

I should like to follow up Mr. Radoux's remark that Europe needs neutral States, because they serve as a bridge between Eastern and Western Europe. We accept this view because, as I said two days ago in another connection, *détente* is no abstract value for us Austrians, but the factor which determines whether our frontiers are peaceful or closed with barbed wire.

We accept our function as a bridge, but we wish to make it clear that this never has meant and never can mean that we belong on neither side. That would be a totally false view of the matter.

For Austria, neutrality does not mean withdrawal from the spiritual community of Europe—on the contrary, as the Rapporteur said, it was neutrality which made it possible for us to remain within that European community as a free and undivided country.

We therefore look on ourselves as a part of the European spiritual community, and this is why we take a vital interest in the future role of the Council of Europe and the Consultative Assembly. To put it bluntly, does enlargement of the Community from Six to Ten also mean that Europe shrinks from Seventeen to Ten ? That is the central question for us.

Starting from the passionate assertion that the Council of Europe has a justification for its existence, I should like to say plainly, Ladies and Gentlemen, that I am still not wholly convinced that we all want the same thing when we talk of the Council's continued existence.

When the future function of the Council of Europe is discussed, one often hears people say ; "Of course we still need it as a forum, as meeting place for the exchange of views." I tell you frankly, that sounds to us too much like cheap consolation. But we don't want consolation and we don't want reassurance—we want to see this institution, which still has, as we believe, a role to play, enabled to continue its work. I should like to make that quite clear.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I also feel—although it may not have been meant that way—that the expression "technical activities" shows a glaring failure to appreciate the value of our work for human rights, European cultural co-operation and the establishment of a common system of education. I don't regard this as technical work myself—I regard the Convention on Human Rights, the attempt to establish closer cultural co-operation and the attempt to set up a common educational system as going far beyond mere technical co-operation, since they, quite as much as an Economic Community, lay the basis for a united Europe.

I also believe that democratic Europe's appeal for the undemocratic countries and for Eastern Europe does not lie in economic production figures or in the history which its countries share. The two bids for freedom, for liberalisation, which have so far been made in communist countries, in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, were not intended to achieve higher productivity and were not based on the vision of a shared history : their aim was to win more freedom for humanity. I therefore believe that our ideals of human rights and democracy and of cultural co-operation have more appeal— if we talk in these terms—than production figures or other technical details.

I am not trying to denigrate the European Communities—I am simply trying to show what the future role of the Council of Europe and the Consultative Assembly should be.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I should like to refer briefly to the three tasks suggested for the Council of Europe by the Rapporteurs, and to underline their importance.

The first thing is to pursue, in all economic areas, the activity which the Council of Europe and the Consultative Assembly have undertaken since their foundation. I cannot go into details now—these are contained in Mr. Reverdin's report.

The second thing, is, I believe, to foster positive co-operation with the countries of Eastern Europe, and I have already remarked that, in my view, the Council of Europe's appeal lies in democracy, in its work for human rights and in the development of cultural relations.

Thirdly, one of Mr. Reverdin's proposals particularly appealed to me as a representative of Austria—namely the suggestion that, instead of seven bilateral committees to maintain contact between the associated countries and the European Communities, we should rely on the single, multi-lateral committee which already exists, in other words, the Council of Europe. I believe that we should take up this idea

in the delegations of all those States which are currently negotiating agreements with the European Communities.

In conclusion, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should like to thank the two Rapporteurs. I hope that my doubts are unfounded, since the continued existence of this Community is of great importance to us.

The previous speaker referred to the new building which is to be built here. I myself have one sincere hope. The erection of large, senseless and monumental buildings has sometimes been the final action of waning empires. I hope that this is no such building, but that it holds the promise of life and work for Europe.

*(Applause)*

**The Chairman (F).** — I call Mr. Deniau, member of the Commission of the European Communities.

**Mr. Deniau, member of the Commission of the European Communities (F).** — Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, I feel I must begin by thanking Mr. Radoux and Mr. Reverdin for their analysis of the situation with which the enlarged Community is now faced, of the tasks awaiting it and the best method of tackling them. Then, Mr. Chairman, I shall have one or two comments of my own to add, some of which will be favourable and others not because, when preparing to face the future, if it is a good thing to know what one wants, it is sometimes equally useful to know exactly what one does not want as well.

The foundation on which we have to build, consisting of the treaties of accession, I think is a sound one for the future of the enlarged Community. As I have said before, the treaty that has been negotiated with the four candidates for admission is a good treaty precisely in that it takes due account of the interests of the countries in question as a whole, with a view not to a dispersion of our efforts but to an increasing European solidarity.

But when all has been said, Ladies and Gentlemen, a treaty is, after all, only a treaty. It is not easy to confine either life or men and women within texts, and a great deal will obviously depend on how the situation evolves, on events themselves, and on those who will be carrying the responsibility in the crucial years to come. For it is my belief that the most important problems have been neither posed nor solved during the treaty negotiations or those still taking place. For all of us, the really serious problems will, I am sure, be those of what I may call the "post-accession" period. Let me give you a few examples. The enlarged Community, which will form a group of considerable size and importance, will have to decide what it wants to be. New possibilities, new opportunities and new resources will be open to it, although at the same time, of course, as Mr. Radoux has reminded us, it will no longer be able to plead certain excuses it could hitherto advance for any failure to make progress. It will have simultaneously to decide what it wants to be both inside and outside, so to speak, and we cannot but be very much aware of the indissoluble links between the two.

As Mr. Radoux said, the main axis of all our efforts must be economic and monetary union ; an effort, in other words, to create in Europe a climate of economic unity, social progress and stability which will not only advantage ourselves, but will also be a more or less indispensable element in international equilibrium.

However, this internal aim which relates to ourselves—our industries, populations and standards of life—and which is a necessity for a number of reasons that concern ourselves alone, obviously carries with it certain international implications. Since there can be no question of our search for greater economic unity not being accompanied by a search for greater monetary stability as well, this inevitably involves the whole question of international monetary relations, including that of the right attitude for Europe to adopt towards that and towards the dollar in particular.

Next, we shall shortly be confronted with a whole series of external tasks which will more or less oblige us to adopt a definite attitude vis-à-vis other countries and consequently also among ourselves, by adopting a co-ordinated policy at European level, as it were, in these two different spheres.

So far as other countries are concerned, the first question to arise is that of the negotiations with the EFTA countries which have not applied to join us. The position here is that certain EFTA Members are closely connected with the acceding States by legal ties of which the material result has been the achievement of a certain degree of free trade between them, at least in certain sectors. The same countries also have equally close links with the present Community Members with whom they have achieved a fairly high level of economic integration, even though it may not have issued in multilateral legal agreements. That being the case, there were two aims to be kept in view. Firstly, it was necessary to ensure that the result of some EFTA countries joining the Community would not be either to put the clock back or to create difficulties for the EFTA countries remaining outside it. I would regard that as a somewhat negative aim, but it has its importance none the less. The second aim was a more positive one which was to lay a good foundation for a growing measure of European co-operation in the future.

Given the starting positions, the current negotiations, which we all hope will be concluded before the summer, seem to me to be on the way to achieving this two fold aim. There will be no putting the clock back so far as trade is concerned ; on the contrary, trade will certainly improve. Moreover, given the positions of the various parties, we shall have a basis for collective action and it will be for us to ensure that there is no *a priori* rejection of the possibility of progressive development.

In view of the close relations that already exist between us and in the confident belief that they and our commercial exchanges are going to develop still further, we can look forward to ever-increasing co-operation in the years to come.



Naturally, in doing so we must look facts in the face. There was no question of accession. The present treaties, as negotiated, are restricted to certain sectors and subject to certain limitations so far as their permanence is concerned. In the absence of an institutional system such as that of the Community, for example, the only alternative is to fall back on the system of bilateral agreements, with each party acting independently, a situation which is reflected in the safeguard clauses. But even despite those limitations, what it is really important for the enlarged Community to do, I think, is first to realise that all the European countries want to have their share in this great enterprise, secondly to avoid immediate commercial difficulties, and thirdly, as a longer-term policy, to begin laying foundations for closer co-operation in the future.

Another question shortly requiring to be dealt with, which will probably turn out to be one of the most important, is that of our relations with the United States. The appearance on the scene of an enlarged Community certainly changes something in the world ; a circumstance which, I think, we can be glad of. It may give rise to some anxieties and it is natural enough that these should be deliberately exaggerated in an attempt to establish a stronger bargaining position. If that is all it is, I do not think we need worry too much about the course of our negotiations with the United States, since their object will be to reach a new equilibrium and negotiation in itself clearly implies reciprocity. The search for a new equilibrium in our relations with the United States must be based on mutual concessions in what is plainly the common interest, not just of Europe and the United States, but of Europe as a whole.

I am sometimes surprised at the attacks levelled against the Community, especially from the American side, and it occurs to me to wonder whether their object may not be to avoid negotiations altogether by presuming the Community's guilt *a priori*, so to speak, and using that presumption to obtain concessions from it for which it will receive no counterpart. I can see that that might be envisaged as a piece of short-term tactics,

but I should be afraid lest, in adopting it, I should in the long run be prejudicing something really important, namely, a fair negotiation based on reasonable concessions by both sides.

Another matter calling for a wise and realistic approach by the enlarged Community is the question of its relations with Eastern Europe, which will involve it in grave problems and responsibilities that may have a lasting effect on its future.

The Europe we are in process of building naturally is not, and will not become, the Europe of the cold war. I do not want to press the metaphor too far, but if Europe must, most certainly, not become the Europe of the cold war, the search for a fresh basis for a dialogue with the East European States must equally not cause a freeze-up inside the Community itself. The great danger that faces a Community like ours is lest it remain wedded to the status quo, lest it fail to advance. We must have complete freedom of movement—I mean, naturally, in the positive sense. It is in everyone's interests that there should be a *détente* in Europe and that we should develop our relations with the Eastern States, especially the Soviet Union, in every field. Already, there has been an improvement in our trading and other relations and the past ten or fifteen years have seen some real progress. Our activities in that direction should be co-ordinated to the extent required to ensure our own internal unity.

Apart from that, whether or not we are acknowledged for what we are by other countries does not strike me as particularly important. It is our business and responsibility to know whether or not we exist ; it is the business of the other countries to know whether or not they acknowledge the facts of the situation. That is a point on which their views as to where their own interests lie may be more or less highly coloured. What matters is that we ourselves should continue our progress and expand our dialogue with Eastern Europe.

I welcome the suggestion that the Council of Europe should serve as the forum for these contacts. We need some-

where where our exchanges of views with the Eastern States can take place. The need may perhaps always have been apparent, Mr. Chairman, but I think the size of the enlarged Community and all its many-sided relationships will render the provision of such a meeting-place even more important in the years ahead.

Without entering upon the legal aspects of the question, there is another place where it might be thought that contacts could be made and views exchanged with the Eastern States : that other economic organisation, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. It is probable, however, that it would offer too technical and too restrictive a framework. For myself, what I should like would be for us to find an opportunity, preferably with the Council of Europe's help, of arranging for a dialogue and an exchange of views with the East at a more political and general level.

Another very important question with which the enlarged Community will be faced is the action it ought to take in respect of developing countries. To my mind, it would be nothing short of a disaster if it were to appear as a kind of rich countries' club. Europe's image—and more particularly the image of an enlarged Europe—demands the deliberate adoption of a better co-ordinated and more active policy towards the countries in process of development. That is one of the points on which, during the accession negotiations, I think we went a little further than the mere settlement of immediate problems. One or two positive guidelines were suggested for the future policy of the enlarged Community which already, in a sense, dictate our future action, and I for one welcome that fact.

We have a foundation on which to build, we have some experience of Community activities. We have association arrangements with several States which possess the advantage of providing a unique opportunity for combining every type of assistance—commercial, financial, humanitarian, cultural—likely to be of value to the developing countries, as well as of dealing with the problem of under-development within a single

framework and a single system offering the possibility of political, technical or diplomatic dialogue ; a system, moreover, possessing institutions capable of arranging for an exchange of views at any level, on a strictly egalitarian and democratic basis.

There was general agreement during the negotiations that that was the right basis from which to start, although it would naturally be expanded as and when other countries expressed a desire to participate. It was also agreed that something more was needed, in the shape of Community action directed towards other developing regions because, while under-development took many forms, it was at the same time a world problem and the Community could obviously not restrict its activities to a single area. One point which must be made quite clear is that this is not a case of substituting one system for another, nor of doing less for each because of deciding to do the same for all. On the contrary, I would hope that we should regard what we are doing now as a starting point from which to expand our present activities and thereafter forge ahead without looking back.

Mr. Reverdin said also, and I agree, that we cannot avoid concern for the Mediterranean area. At the moment, our agreements with that part of the world are of a somewhat negative character. That is to say, they deal with the abolition of customs duties which, of course, offers a positive advantage to the countries concerned but goes no further towards providing aid or co-ordinating the various means of assistance, at Community or bilateral level, by which some significant help might be provided for those of our neighbour countries which are also in process of development. It will be one of the enlarged Community's most important tasks to formulate a somewhat more generous and coherent policy towards an area which is at once so close to us and of such vital importance to the world as a whole.

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, these will not be easy tasks because every problem will have two aspects : firstly,

its external aspect which presupposes negotiation contacts and discussions with other countries and regions ; secondly, what is sometimes the more difficult of the two, its internal aspect which involves asking ourselves exactly what form we want our enlarged Community to take, and what is the future we envisage for a Europe that will be worthy of the name, in other words, possess its own personality.

It seems likely that the future of the enlarged Community during the next few years will be largely dictated by our success or failure in solving the problem of our relations with the United States, Eastern Europe and the third world, respectively. But, let me repeat, no treaty, however perfect one may try to make it, can ever settle everything. Its results can be assessed only in the light of events and only by those whose responsibility it will be to deal with those events. Only then will it be possible to see whether the European treaties provide the framework we need, that is, whether they offer each of us a permanent opportunity of becoming more than just a national of his own country, an opportunity of living and behaving as a European.

The other quality we shall need is imagination. Given today's situation, the implications of which it is not easy to foresee in a world where the unpredictable always occurs, our countries and institutions, as well as our public opinion, must look ahead to possible future difficulties and be ready with at least some new answers to them.

The only hope, if we want to go on building Europe, is to attract the interest of the general public and that we shall never do unless and until they get the impression that something really revolutionary is going on. That brings us up against two difficulties. The first is the nature of the gamble upon which we entered fifteen years ago, when Europe was to be constructed stage by stage, the first stage to consist of the adoption of a certain number of rules and measures of harmonisation. That still seems to me a valid approach providing a good basis for our future work, but it has to be realised that it is not the kind of

approach to arouse immediate enthusiasm or even one that is particularly easy to understand.

The second difficulty may arise from the fact that the motives commanding our own actions and those of everyone else fifteen years ago no longer obtain. At that time, the world had survived two wars, each begun in Europe and each arising from what was strictly a European quarrel, and it had become necessary to invent some totally new system which could be more or less guaranteed to prevent any conflict between European nations for the future. Moreover, Europe, which had been ruined following the destructions caused by the war, was everywhere bristling with restrictions. A minimum of economic breathing space had to be created to provide a possibility of development for our peoples and their economies. Those motives exist no longer, and this is a direct result of the action taken at that time and the progress we have achieved. That is now accepted as a fact.

We have to look for a fresh incentive which, plainly, can be found only in a certain vision of Europe as compared with other continents, combined, however, with the pursuit of certain other aims of our own that are inseparable from our search for a new European civilisation.

A French writer, when asked once whether he was really a revolutionary, replied, if I remember correctly : “No, no, I am no friend to disorder. But what I do dislike is seeing people forbidden to move when they are none of them yet in their right place.” It cannot be said that in the world of today all of us are in exactly our right place, or Europe either. For us, as I have said, the two essentials are unity and imagination. We must move in order that things may come a little nearer to being in their right place tomorrow, but we must move all together.

*(Applause)*

**IN THE CHAIR : Mr. SCHUIJT****Vice-President of the European Parliament**

**The Chairman (N).** — I call Mr. van der Stoel.

**Mr. van der Stoel.** — The subject of this debate is “Political consequences of the enlargement of the European Economic Community”. That title implies to a certain extent that the enlargement of the Community will take place. That seems virtually certain in the case of Ireland and the United Kingdom. The Governments of Denmark and Norway have signed the treaty, but the parliaments and peoples of those countries still have to decide. It is up to them to make up their minds.

I wish to speak on the experience we in the Netherlands have had in the European Community. I do so because in many ways the Netherlands and countries like Norway and Denmark can be compared. All three are small countries.

Our first experience has been that the process of integration does not mean that small nations lose their national identity. Common policies must mean some loss of freedom of movement in determining national policies, but the same applies whatever treaty is being concluded. If there is no longer any national identity, the whole of national life is lost, but that certainly has not been the result of integration as we have experienced it. Secondly, it is important to realise that the Europe of the future will not be imposed on the new Members, especially on the smaller ones, in the enlarged Community. On the contrary, they have a vital role to play in determining the future shape of Europe. Thirdly, I believe our experience as a small nation shows that it is possible within the framework of the Community to safeguard vital national interests. It could be said that in such a Community large nations always dominate. Our experience has been that we have hardly ever found our-

selves completely alone. There are always other nations sharing our point of view and as a result we have always succeeded in safeguarding our vital national interests. To conclude my remarks on our experience as a small nation, we in the Netherlands hope that very soon we will find two other small nations joining us in the enlarged Community, and we look forward to co-operating very closely with them in the enlarged Community.

My second remark concerns the question of political co-operation in Europe. I am thinking of the Davignon Committee and plans which might be developed for a future Summit in Paris. The question I would like first to put is : where does economic integration end and political co-operation begin ? In other words, is it possible to draw a dividing line between economic and political integration ? In my view it is not. There is no clear distinction between the two. To quote some examples, what about the Mediterranean policies of the enlarged Community, economic relations with Eastern Europe, the relationship with under-developed countries or the relationship with the United States of America ? No one can say this one is a purely political subject and that a purely economic one. They are a mixture of the two.

If one bases oneself on this conclusion, one has to draw some further conclusions. First of all, it will be undesirable to regard economic and political co-operation and integration as separate sectors. Secondly, inevitably in the many separate spheres which are often called political co-operation, the European Commission has a vital role to play. It is not a question of conceding to the European Commission a vital role. Just by virtue of the existing treaties the European Commission has to play a vital role in very many subjects which are often called subjects of political co-operation. This in effect means it will be the European Commission which has to take an initiative to make concrete proposals concerning many subjects which must be discussed in the framework of political co-operation. Not only will the European Commission have to be present ; it will really have to play the role of initiator.



In this context we must see the future structure of a political secretariat. Because of the vital role the European Commission has to play in this context, this will inevitably have to be modest in character and, moreover, closely linked with Community institutions.

I turn next to the content of European political co-operation and particularly the question of whether this co-operation would also have to include defence. First, it would be essential for any defence co-operation within the wider framework of the Ten to be firmly embedded within the Atlantic framework or, to put it another way, it must never develop to the detriment of Atlantic relations. This would certainly endanger vital aspects of European security. Secondly, in my view—and I am glad that this view is widely shared in my country—this defence co-operation if it develops ought to be of a conventional character. A European nuclear force would not unite but divide Europe. It would create tensions and divisions with the United States and it would endanger the chances of a *détente* with Eastern Europe. In many ways it would be a drawback to the possibility of developing European unity because on the fundamental issue there would be deep divisions which would hamper progress towards European unity.

I turn next to the institutions. The French President spoke about a year ago about the possibility of having European Ministers in the hope that this would contribute to stimulating the process of European integration. I wonder whether this would be a practical solution. There are two possibilities here. One possibility is that the European Ministers would be “super-Ministers” or overlords in that the Foreign Minister and the Ministers of Economics, Finance and Agriculture would have to be subordinate to them. All experiences in my view show—as, for instance, in a country like Britain—that the system of overlords does not work. I know one country at least where the Ministers of Finance and Foreign Affairs would deeply object to such a formula and doubtless many more Ministers in other countries would react similarly. The other possibility is that the European Minister would be little more

than a permanent representative with a more grandiose title. Whatever option one chooses, it seems unlikely that in this way a real contribution can be made towards promoting European unity.

A far more realistic though modest proposal would be to have regular meetings, perhaps even once a week, of European State Secretaries who could try to lift some of the burden from the shoulders of the Ministers assembled in the Council of Ministers of the Community, in fact, a grouping of State Secretaries to deal with secondary matters. This would enable the Ministers to concentrate on vital questions and might have the effect of speeding up the procedure of decision-making in the European Community. This is a very important aspect because there is now a very heavy backlog of work in the European Community. Once there is an enlargement of the Community to Ten, it will be even more difficult to prevent a slowing down of the process of decision-making. We must think very seriously about the need for reverting to a system of majority decisions, at any rate to start off with, when dealing with secondary matters.

As to parliamentary institutions, I agree with Mr. Duncan Sandys who has already referred to the vital role the Council of Europe will have to play. I also agree with many of the remarks Mr. Gratz made on the subject. However, the situation is slightly different in the case of the Western European Union Assembly. I am not speaking here about the Treaty of Western European Union, which we must be careful to maintain, but of the Western European Assembly itself. It is my guess that as European political co-operation develops, the European Parliament will tend more and more to discuss similar subjects in similar debates to those now taking place in the Western European Union Assembly. If that is indeed the future development—and we will know in a few years' time whether or not it is—would it not be desirable to have a closer co-ordination of the work of the Western European Union Assembly and that of the European Parliament? Here there is one institutional obstacle: parliamentarians who are members

of the Council of Europe and from the seven member States of Western European Union are at the same time automatically members of the Western European Union Assembly.

Looking at the prospects of future political co-operation in Europe, might it not be more practical to change the article in the Western European Union Treaty so that national parliaments of the seven member States of Western European Union would no longer be obliged to send the same delegates to the Council of Europe as they do to the Western European Union Assembly? In future it might be more practical to combine in one person membership of the European Parliament and Western European Union. In this way a certain co-ordination would automatically be initiated to the benefit of both Assemblies because there is a valuable tradition in the Western European Union Assembly which I certainly would not like to see abandoned.

Finally, I have two remarks to make on the relationship of the enlarged Community with the outside world. The first concerns the relationship between the enlarged Community and the United States. Quite a number of difficulties and even tensions have been experienced in this relationship. I am not trying here to attribute any blame to anyone. I merely conclude that these developments have without doubt been detrimental to the Atlantic relationship and we would do well to attempt to prevent these tensions developing in future.

Against this background it would be important to take up an old idea of the Monnet Committee and propose some kind of institutionalised dialogue between the Community and the United States at either ministerial or top civil servant level.

My second remark concerns the responsibilities of the enlarged Community towards the outside world. This is one of the most vital problems with which the enlarged Community will be confronted. The Community at present—and I say this quite bluntly—has failed to live up to its responsibilities towards the under-developed world.

Its contribution to the solution of the problem of poverty in the world has been totally inadequate, and recent events in UNCTAD have demonstrated this very clearly. This cannot continue. We must not only double but at least treble our efforts if we really want to make a significant contribution to this problem which is so vital not only for the future of the developing countries but for the future and safety of the whole world.

*(Applause)*

**The Chairman** (*N*). — I call Mr. Digby.

**Mr. Digby.** — I am glad to follow Mr. van der Stoel who has the advantage of a detailed knowledge of Western European Union and the Consultative Assembly as well as of the European Parliament which places him in a particularly good position to judge these questions.

I am glad to be able to take part in this debate on the eve of the challenge and opportunity of enlargement, for it is a challenge and an opportunity for Europe as a whole. I should like to add my congratulations to Mr. Reverdin on his very lucid report, which I thought was quite excellent, and to Mr. Radoux on his report, which was so very precise. I thought that Mr. Reverdin did well to dwell at some length on the question of the neutrals—“comparable neighbours”, as he called them—because I believe that in some measure they are central to the problem of the future of Western Europe and the problem of the Council of Europe. If the Community were to remain strictly economic, they would appear to belong to it, but if political and defence co-operation is to make the rapid progress which I believe it should, then they must, I suppose, remain outside.

The aims of Mr. Radoux's report are very wide. An alternative, I suppose, might be to separate the development of the political and the defence institutions of an enlarged Community, say through WEU, from the economic one. To do this

would result in overlapping, and I believe we have reached the stage where we cannot afford any more overlapping of European institutions—overlapping which has indeed already gone too far. Yet the three neutrals, especially Switzerland, have a particularly big economic contribution to make to the future of Europe.

One of the problems of enlargement, as far as the Council of Europe is concerned, is that it leaves only seven outside it, and some of those are numerically small and small in other terms as well. This means that until democratic regimes allow the admittance of Spain and Portugal, the Ten are bound to dominate the Council of Europe of the future. Hence, I believe it must aim at undertaking tasks unfulfilled by an enlarged Community, perhaps in a more informal role.

Mr. Reverdin did well to stress the increasing dominance of EEC by the national executives through the Council of Ministers ; and yet it is hard for me to see how the Council of Europe can become the watchdog of democracy. Perhaps we have concentrated here too much on this and too little on laying the foundations of the unification of European peoples, regardless of regimes which they may have at the present time.

Many suggestions have been put forward for the future of the Consultative Assembly and I think many of them are admirable. In particular, I would subscribe to the following : first, as a kind of informal and uncommitted vehicle for technical co-operation with Iron Curtain countries, however difficult that may seem to be at the present time. Secondly, as an overall West European forum for matters outside the strict ambit of the Community. Thirdly, as contact between the Community and the rest who stay outside. Fourthly, as a forum in which to debate the reports of international agencies some of which are primarily European but not exclusively, such as OECD.

Meanwhile, I realise that the problem of democratic decision within the Community is posed. I know that there are

many who would welcome early direct elections, but, as someone who has been taking part in elections for over thirty years, I must confess that I have my doubts here, because the right to vote is not synonymous with the desire of the elector to use his vote, and we see in local government elections in my country only a small percentage of the electors going to the polls. If that were to happen in the European context, I believe that it would do great harm among the great bulk of European electors to the whole of the European ideal.

I believe we should proceed with great caution in this matter and rather seek to get more of a feeling among the electors for European problems. In this connection, it is disappointing to me that the media, which nowadays are so very powerful—television, the press, and so on—are still exclusively on a national level and there is no idea of anything like a European broadcasting company which could put over a European point of view to the electors in preparation for the direct election of their representatives.

To my mind, too, the geographical location of the European institutions is still not satisfactory. I would have thought there might have been a great advantage in having a site for the European Parliament which is near that of the other institutions—the Commission, and so on—either in Paris, if it could be moved, or indeed in Brussels. When I look at examples in other parts of the world on a national level where parliaments are away from the government, I do not see that they have derived very much advantage from this. I think immediately of the division in South Africa between the government in Pretoria and the parliament sitting in Cape Town for something like six months in the year. Equally, when I look at examples where a parliament sits away from the main centres of population, I do not think this has been very satisfactory. In this context I think of Canberra, Ottawa and Brasilia, a very interesting city which some representatives may have had the pleasure of visiting. I believe that these considerations are of enormous importance.

If the European Parliament is to grow in importance and influence, as we wish to see it do, I think there is an enormous advantage in its being very close to the Executive and to the Council of Ministers. Certainly this is a lesson which we have learnt over the centuries in my own country.

Finally, I believe that in modern Europe there will be room for the Council of Europe as well as for the Community, but what I believe is essential—and this will have to be cleared out of the way within the next year—is a clear definition of spheres between the two, because I believe that Europe can no longer afford a continuation of serious overlapping after 1973.

*(Applause)*

**The Chairman (F).** — I call Mr. Habib-Deloncle to speak on behalf of the European Democratic Union of the European Parliament.

**Mr. Habib-Deloncle (F).** — Mr. Chairman, the two excellent reports we have just listened to from Mr. Reverdin and Mr. Radoux have confirmed, if need there be, the usefulness of a meeting between our two European parliamentary bodies, which are all the closer to each other and all the more in a position to understand each other in that they stem from the same legal background, since both consist of delegations from their national parliaments by which they are mandated and membership of which keeps their feet on the ground.

As a member of the European Parliament, I also acknowledge the seniority of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, which has enabled many people to serve their apprenticeship to multinational assemblies. When the enlargement of the Community brings four new countries into the European Parliament, I do not think they will feel they are taking a parliamentary leap in the dark, because, like myself, they have become accustomed to this admittedly new type of confrontation in this hall, in the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe.

In this debate, where so many excellent things have been said, I want to deal with three features of the building of Europe. First, its flexibility, around which, as we all see quite clearly, all our debates revolve. There are a great many European institutions, and I do not think we need take exception to that, for each at the moment has its own specific object and is an integral part of the whole.

There is the European Economic Community properly so-called, yesterday of the Six and in the very near future of the Ten, together with its associated countries.

There is, among the member countries of the Community both present and future, the mooted political union requiring its own approach and its own institutions to correspond with a different aim from that laid down in the treaties for the Economic Community as such.

There is the Council of Europe, and I can quite see that it is now wondering about its future at a moment when its internal balance is being changed in favour of the enlarged Community as compared with the non-member countries, although both at ministerial and parliamentary level it can remain a forum for exchange of views between the member and non-member countries on very important aspects of life not covered by the Community treaties. Among other things— and I personally regard this as rather important—it can also become the centre for contacts and exchanges with all outside countries, and particularly with the countries which are geographically part of Europe but also belong to the communist world, which keeps them at arm's length from us.

Then there is Western European Union, and we all feel that its attributes in the field of defence, covered neither by the Community, nor political co-operation, nor the Council of Europe, must be studied very carefully indeed before anyone dreams of laying a finger on them.



The second, complementary, feature on which I now want to spend a little time is respect for diversity and individuality. Here, I think it may be quite useful that it is a Frenchman who is reassuring Mr. Reverdin that we have no intention whatsoever of transferring to the European sphere—and he knows this perfectly well—the process which led to the unification and centralisation of our country, although I do not entirely share his pessimistic appraisal of this form of government, particularly in home affairs.

Europe is being built by countries which have their own history, traditions, culture and interests—and I will not add the adjective “selfish”, which is always placed before this word, as if the national interest must inevitably be disinterested. All these considerations mean that in the building of Europe empiricism is essential.

Friendly bilateral relations, like those Mr. Berkhouwer referred to just now, closer or less close, but as close as possible, between one country and another, no longer threaten anybody, as they did in the past, and such special friendships help to weld the whole.

In the Community institutions as such, we must try to reconcile efficiency which is essential—and as parliamentarians we often become very impatient at the slowness of decision-making—with the impossibility, which we all recognise, of imposing on any State—under no matter what legal guise—by the vote of other member States a decision contrary to its essential interests.

This desire to build Europe on agreement rather than coercion will have repercussions both on the Council of Ministers and the way it functions and on the powers of decision of a Parliament which is by nature majority-minded. We must try, in that originality of spirit so rightly stressed by Mr. Radoux, to set our imaginations to work to find new solutions which will take the special nature of our European Community into account. In any case, there is no doubt at all

that in our different countries people will increasingly come to demand much greater parliamentary supervision in the enlarged Community and as the powers of the Community increase by delegation from the national States. In my view, the European Parliament as now constituted is perfectly fit to exercise that supervision. And as regards the famous dilemma that one cannot elect the Parliament by universal suffrage because it has no powers, whereas it cannot be given any powers because it is not elected by universal suffrage, my friends and I have long ago decided where we stand.

We believe that by giving the Parliament more power and particularly by allowing it to exercise fully the power of supervision, we would not only bring about the evolution in public opinion of which Mr. Digby was talking, but also evolution in the institutions which, at a later stage, would make the election of the European Parliament by universal suffrage possible. We are not opposed to that in principle ; we just feel that it is a reform which cannot be isolated from its entire context.

Respect for diversity and individuality makes us realise that there are valid reasons, though we sometimes regret them, why some Members of the Council of Europe must remain outside the Community, and that circumstances, which we regret even more, prevent other Europeans from joining either the Community or the Council. But we are convinced that this must not be allowed to lead to the creation of watertight compartments, of gulfs which cannot be spanned, of *cordons sanitaires*. Even while we recognise this state of affairs and the reasons for it, we must use every possible form of co-operation to build more and more bridges and pave the way for future developments. And amongst these forms of co-operation, why can we not retain within the Community bilateral associations concluded between it and certain countries—associations whose specific character we should make a point of preserving, however tempting, theoretically speaking, the suggestions made by some people in this hall may be to let the Council of Europe take over the problems they involve. Let us take care not to

be more restrictive when it comes to diversity of form than we are regarding diversity of institutions, and not to put everything into a straitjacket in case we cause paralysis.

The third feature that I have noticed particularly is our feeling here, one universal feeling, that an independent Europe has a part to play on the world stage. But let us never forget that, however exciting the European idea may be, Europe is not an end in itself. Europe means nothing unless it contributes to the well-being of mankind. And I see this contribution taking place in three directions : peace, co-operation and progress.

Peace means first and foremost détente. Détente means the end of the blocs which were erected against each other shortly after the end of the second world war. It means a new approach to the problem of security, wherein the stress is laid more on the individuality of countries than on their ideological affiliations. Naturally, we shall have to handle defence problems very cautiously indeed, because we immediately come up against differences in situation, even as between Members of the Community, which no European defence preparations can obliterate. We are only half joking when we say that any mention of defence is explosive, and that we should look very carefully at what we are doing before going any further.

Europe's aim should be to try still harder to obliterate that dividing line inside our continent, while still preserving the links which unite Western Europe with the great North American democracies, the United States and Canada.

There again, it may mean pursuing two apparently different courses of action, but in that case too, imagination and good will must help us find a way.

In the context of co-operation—I shall not dwell on this because a great deal has been said about it already and Mr. Deniau in particular was very eloquent on the subject—there are the developing countries.

The Community has taken a regional line in dealing with that problem, which seems to me perfectly legitimate.

I would also like to associate myself with what Mr. Reverdin said about the need for us to pay special attention to the problems of co-operation around the whole perimeter of the Mediterranean.

But there is an overall problem of the developing countries, and the UNCTAD debates have recently made it clear that the European countries were not yet approaching it in the same way.

One of the most urgent tasks of the Community and the European countries co-operating with it is to define and implement their policy towards the developing countries, defining it in full respect for the freedom by which many of them set so much store, but bearing in mind that more than that is needed if we are to help those countries and to guarantee an income to the poorest among them. This is essential if Europe is to play her part in this end-of-our-century task, which is to prevent that famous gulf from opening up again between the developing countries and the wealthy ones to which we are so fortunate as to belong.

And talking about wealthy countries brings me to the third feature of Europe's aims : progress for our own peoples.

Is it too ambitious to believe that we Europeans can found a new type of society, built of course on all our Christian and humanist foundations, but adapted to economic problems, the problems of the type of life at the end of the twentieth century, a society wherein man feels he is participating fully and freely in deciding his own fate, not only political but economic, and wherein wealth is fairly distributed and not confiscated by the State or for the benefit of a particular class of society ?

All these things, may I say in conclusion, can be dealt with at the Summit Conference in Paris when it meets in October,

and we hope it will in fact deal with them in a positive way, thus first and foremost providing Europe with the means to play its part, not only by strengthening its structures, but by establishing between the Members of the Community that economic and monetary union which would seem to be our first priority. We also hope that, on the basis of what was done at The Hague, the Summit will define Europe's relations with the outside world, so that our continent can at last play the part that we know very well it has not played for the last fifty years, doubtless to the detriment of the world.

We no longer live in an age when Utopia is just a hope. The impossible, or what seemed impossible, has been done. The age we now live in should be fruitful enough to make our hopes come true.

*(Applause)*

**The Chairman (N).** — I call Mr. Czernetz.

**Mr. Czernetz (G).** — Mr. Chairman, when one sees the progress currently being made with attempts to unite Europe, one is bound to think of the old doctrinaire conflict between the federalists and the functionalists. I agree completely with the Rapporteur, Mr. Radoux, that such conflict is senseless and that empirical methods must be used to achieve that progress which is now being made towards European unity.

The present process of integration has certainly come about on the basis of pragmatic solutions and not of some overall plan. As we are experiencing it, this process is going forward on various levels and with differing intensities. The greatest intensity currently shows itself in the enlargement, on the basis of the Rome Treaty, of the European Economic Community, from Six to Ten.

But this raises the entire problem of the enlarged Community's future relations with the remaining EFTA countries. My colleagues have already spoken of the relations of the three

neutrals—Austria, Sweden and Switzerland—with EEC. Of course, one must also ask: “how can the relations between Finland and Iceland and EEC be settled?” For purely economic reasons, one must also ask—what form will relations between Portugal and EEC take?

But the chief question is this: if the three neutrals establish a kind of free trade area with EEC through bilateral agreements, will similar solutions be found for the other remaining EFTA countries? This is a vital question and one that has yet to be answered.

Beyond this, however, there is also the problem of EEC's relations with the rest of Europe. The Rapporteur, Mr. Radoux, has said that the Eastern bloc—and in particular the Soviet Union—is prepared to recognise EEC, to acknowledge its existence, but we still don't know whether, when and to what extent the Eastern bloc and the Soviet Union will be prepared to recognise EEC collectively as a partner in agreements and in trade.

In discussions which we recently held with representatives of several Eastern bloc countries at symposia in Vienna, this very question emerged as a central point of disagreement.

We currently face the fact that individual Eastern bloc countries wish to establish bilateral relations with EEC. I should like to mention two examples in particular: unaligned, independent Yugoslavia would like to conclude a direct agreement with EEC. Can representatives of the European Parliament and EEC perhaps tell us what possibilities are being considered here? A second example: there is even a Warsaw Pact country, namely Romania, which is considering thinking in terms of an agreement with EEC. I don't know whether I understood Mr. Radoux correctly when he said that formal relations of this kind are not possible today and that this is why there are at present no bilateral agreements with countries of the Eastern bloc. I repeat, I don't know whether I understood him correctly. I would very much regret it, if this were the case,

and would ask whether this means that we should not think in terms of such agreements. In my view, it would have major significance if EEC also adopted an understanding and flexible attitude towards those East European countries who wish to conclude direct agreements, since a rigid and doctrinaire approach to this question by EEC would harm Western Europe too.

When one observes the process of European unification and takes part in it, one realises that the new united Europe is currently visualised as a series of concentric circles. Even the remarks of the previous speaker, Mr. Habib-Deloncle, who spoke of many such institutions and of a flexible structure, tend in this direction.

A major part of our discussion today has been set aside for consideration of the Council of Europe's continued existence following enlargement of the Community and of the European Parliament. There is no need for me to emphasise that I am pleased by the remarks of the Rapporteur, Mr. Reverdin—my friend, Mr. Gratz, has already supported them—who suggests that we can regard the Council of Europe and the Consultative Assembly as a multilateral liaison group between EEC and the remaining EFTA countries.

But various speakers have said things about the Council of Europe, on which I would like to comment briefly, without going into detail.

The Rapporteur, Mr. Radoux, spoke of technical and non-political questions within the Council of Europe ; Lord Gladwyn spoke of the Council of Europe as a non-political assembly in the future ; Duncan Sandys suggested that the Council of Europe could include representatives of non-democratic parliaments. All of this must be carefully considered, but my own instinct is to reject it.

I agree wholeheartedly with Mr. Radoux when he says that the Council of Europe can hold meetings with representatives

of the non-democratic countries of Eastern Europe. I think that his suggestion for periodic symposia or round-table conferences is a good and practical one. But I do not believe that we can discuss the admission of representatives of non-democratic States to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. I am also of the opinion that there is no sense in the suggestion that the Council of Europe could become a non-political assembly. As a non-political assembly it would, in my view, have no future whatsoever.

I fully support the view of my friend, Mr. Gratz, that upholding the Convention on Human Rights, holding the assembly, providing a parliamentary forum for OECD and the other activities of the Council of Europe are essentially political in character.

Our colleague, Mr. Habib-Deloncle, said that he thought it most important to establish a link between the EEC parliamentarians and the representatives of the remaining EFTA countries, and I fully agree with him in this.

I don't quite know what Mr. Radoux means when he says, in section 20 of his report, that this is the business of the Joint Meetings of the European Parliament and the Council of Europe. I believe that the Council of Europe's Consultative Assembly already provides a point of contact between EEC parliamentarians and the parliamentary representatives of the remaining EFTA countries. In my view, we have here the greatest parliamentary forum in Europe, which is not going to become a specialised technical parliament, but which must retain its political character. If this is to happen, however, one thing is essential: EEC, the European Parliament and the Council of Europe must not simply agree to co-exist; what we need is, on the contrary, genuine co-operation. And this necessitates mutual understanding, goodwill and a readiness to work together in harmony. Both sides must show this readiness. I think I can safely say that the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe possesses it in large measure already. I hope we shall also find it in the European Parliament.



Mr. Habib-Deloncle said that Europe will have to create a new type of society for the future and he spoke of futuristic thinking and of Utopias. Mr. President, in the past we have often said that the spirit—one might say, the philosophy—of the united Europe is a philosophy of intellectual pluralism, based on three historical and intellectual elements, Christian democracy, liberalism and democratic socialism. I don't know whether Mr. Habib-Deloncle will agree with me when I say that, in my view, the European society of the future must represent a synthesis of these three intellectual movements—in other words, a synthesis of liberalism, Christian democracy and democratic socialism.

*(Applause)*

**The Chairman** (N). — I call Mr. Gordon Walker.

**Mr. Gordon Walker.** — (N) We have listened to a very brief and pointed speech by Mr. Czernetz. I am in very close agreement with what he said, although I should like to deal with one or two different matters.

As Mr. Reverdin said in his very good report, the prospective enlargement of the Community will create a new situation for us in a world framework. The two things go together. A different situation for us in the Ten will be created and, because Europe is so important, this will affect the world framework.

An enlarged EEC must become a major factor in the world ; but that means that the enlarged Community can affect the outside world by assuming or neglecting its responsibilities. If it assumes them, it will serve the world. If it neglects them, it will damage the world.

A Community of ten nations without a means of self-expression is more dangerous to the world than a Community of Six without a means of self-expression, because it is a more powerful part of the world. A large unit such as the Community with great economic power without assuming political, defence

and corresponding responsibilities is a potential danger to the world.

As Mr. Reverdin said, we must progress towards political and other forms of self-expression, but the progress of the Community will not come about by the classical means of the past, by federation, by the ways in which the United States, Australia and other countries—which had very different kinds of problems—have progressed in the past.

“Community” is a unique word and is indeed a unique concept. The Community will develop—and will have to develop—by means apt to itself which will be new in the world.

The only way the Community can develop the various political, defence and other means of self-expression is not by thinking it all out beforehand and passing clever and legalistic resolutions. It will be by means of having to meet particular crises and challenges—the sort of crises and challenges that would come from prolonged economic depression or from a great reduction or a total reduction of American forces in Europe.

We will unite when we have to unite, and we will not unite before we have to unite. I am sure we will have to unite. But when that moment comes in one crisis or another, we will then find the ways to do it. I believe this is the right way of approaching this problem rather than trying to think out things too far ahead.

It is an equal truism that the European Parliament must get greater powers and develop them, and particularly that there should be direct elections. This is very desirable, but there has been much too much talk and not enough thought about this problem of direct elections. There are very grave problems involved. Direct elections must by definition cut the link between national parliaments and the European Parliament, a link which, up to now, has been of very great importance.

Furthermore, I believe that it will be very difficult to keep the interest and support of political parties in each national parliament for general elections to the European Parliament, because elections to the European Parliament will not help or benefit those political parties in their own national parliaments. If we hurry the process of election, there is a great danger that the voting will be on only a small scale. I agree very much with Mr. Habib-Deloncle and others that it is much more important to increase the power of the European Parliament and that we should not worry too much about direct elections and at any rate we should think much more about it than we have in real, hard-headed terms.

The power of the purse is very important for a parliament. Ultimately, the rights of all Parliaments derive from the power of the purse. We must have more control—here I agree with Mr. Duncan Sandys—over the Parliament, over the Council of Ministers and over the Commission. But there is something Parliament itself can do which will help. It must, if it wants to be a true parliament, cover the full range of debate that parliaments cover, particularly on defence and foreign policy. A parliament that does not deal with defence and foreign policy is not a proper parliament. It cannot claim to be a proper parliament unless it behaves like a proper parliament. Whatever the Treaty of Rome says, each parliament determines what ought to be debated and nothing can stop it. It would be a very great step forward for a parliament if it simply decided to debate the kind of matters which must be debated in a true parliament.

Finally, I want to say a word about the relationship of the enlarged Community and East-West relations. Here I disagree with Mr. Reverdin and it is the only matter on which I disagree with him in his very admirable report. I think the Community will play a much bigger part in developing relations with Eastern Europe than will this Council, simply because the Community will be larger and more important and will be a body to which the Eastern European nations will pay much more attention.

This will depend on relations with the Soviet Union because the Eastern European nations cannot act independently or freely without the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has tried over the years to prevent the enlargement of the Community and particularly to prevent Britain's joining the Community. It now realises it has failed. It is a very realistic power. It will come to terms with the Community. Mr. Brezhnev has already begun to do so. Once the Community is enlarged, the relations between the Western and the Eastern European nations and the Soviet Union will become gradually better because the Soviet Union cannot ignore so great a force in the world.

To achieve proper and natural relations with Eastern European countries will take a long time. We shall be preoccupied for a long time with the problems of adapting the Community to ten Members, but we should never forget that our duty must always be to work for a rebuilding of a full and complete Europe which includes the Eastern European nations as well as the Western nations. Until we have achieved that aim, we shall not be able to say with truth that we have made Europe.

*(Applause)*

**The Chairman (N).** — Ladies and Gentlemen, may I have your attention for a moment ? The Chair is faced with a problem. It has been agreed that the meeting is to end at 1.30 p.m. There are sixteen more people down to speak. If each of them speaks for the allotted ten minutes, that will take 160 minutes in all, making us very late. I would remind you that both the Council of Europe Consultative Assembly and the European Parliament have committee meetings scheduled for this afternoon. In addition, Mr. Radoux has made arrangements to leave at 2 o'clock. I understand from him that he feels bound to reply to a number of points. You could help me out of this difficulty by agreeing to limit speaking time to five minutes instead of ten minutes. We could then conclude the meeting at about 2 o'clock.

I call Mr. Radoux.

**Mr. Radoux (F).** — In order to help you, I asked Mr. Reverdin if he would be kind enough to reply for both of us, and he has agreed. So we can save time there too.

**The Chairman (F).** — Thank you, Mr. Radoux.

I call Mr. Goëss.

**Mr. Goëss (G).** — One question, please, Mr. Chairman. The number of speakers was known at least three hours ago ! Why, then, was this limitation of speaking time not announced earlier ?

**The Chairman (N).** — It is difficult for me to answer that question. We waited to see whether some speakers might perhaps stand down of their own accord, in which case the problem would not have arisen. However, nobody's zeal has waned. Does the meeting agree with this proposal ? If so, speaking time from now on is limited to five minutes per speaker. I am sorry about this, but I am sure you will understand.

I call Mr. Leonardi.

**Mr. Leonardi (I).** — Mr. Chairman, I take the floor subject to your suggestion that we should not speak for more than five minutes, although I think this really reveals a situation that is not fair as regards our sharing in the proceedings of the European Parliament. I shall, of course, curtail what I have to say.

All I wished to say is that we do not believe the enlargement is a necessary and sufficient preliminary to facilitating, as it should, the desired political developments, namely the development of the Community as a political entity. On the contrary, we believe that precisely because the Community is to be enlarged, it will encounter greater difficulties both internally and externally. It is not possible to foresee a development in a Community of Ten comparable to that which has taken place in the Community of Six.

On the other hand, so far as the economic and monetary union is concerned, the greatest difficulties arose precisely when the Community went on from being a customs union to become an economic and monetary union ; and I would like to remind you that all the declarations made at the Summit Conference in The Hague regarding the creation of the economic and monetary union have either not been fulfilled at all or only very partially so.

The situation today is very different from what it was when the Community of the Six was formed. If we wish to achieve political development in the enlarged Community and overcome the external difficulties operating against this, we must be able to rely on adequate internal strength and the real Community interests of the European nations. For this purpose we believe that enlargement must be accompanied by institutional reform to provide the European nations with means of expressing those interests. For this, it is first of all essential that the European Parliament should be enabled to function more efficiently without discrimination against opposition parties such as still exists with the absence from the European Parliament of representatives of the French Communist Party and with the exclusion of our delegation also from parliamentary activity. As an example, this was the position only recently in connection with the membership of the delegation which is to establish contact with the United States House of Representatives.

We believe that representative systems have meaning provided that they represent actual strength. Everyone knows that if the Communist Party were represented in proportion to its actual strength it would be the third largest group here, and in that case there would be no difficulty about its participation in all the activities of the European Parliament.

I agree with everything that Mr. Radius said about the necessity for breaking this vicious circle of the major powers and the method of election. However, what we can do today is endeavour to see that the European Parliament is made more

representative and help the opposition parties as much as possible, because no parliament can exist without an opposition.

We believe that an expression of the internal strength of the European nations will consist in calling for a number of active policies aimed at a new kind of development, to be expressed through joint solidarity. It is not enough to insist on common policies in the fields of transport, power supplies and industry ; it is essential to see who determines such policies and by whom they are drawn up. On the other hand, the topical nature of these problems is also demonstrated by the statements made, although in a distorted and contradictory manner, by Dr. Mansholt during the recent Conference on Industrial Policy at Venice.

An essential feature of this new kind of development will be new and different relations with the world outside, the United States, the socialist countries and those of the third world. The enlargement of the Community and its resulting increased economic and political strength must set in motion a process operating inversely to that which prevailed during the years when the European nations were very weak and EEC itself was being formed, when internal interests were subordinate to and conditioned by forces operating from outside. Now it is the interests of the European nations that must be adequately expressed and must determine external relations based on independence from and collaboration with all countries throughout the world.

The recent monetary crisis has shown that no economic and monetary union is possible unless we are independent of the United States. On the other hand, economic co-operation must be regarded as the most reliable foundation for détente and security, in other words, for tackling and permanently solving the problems with countries having a socialist system that will come up at the Security Conference.

In conclusion, nothing but new and more energetic forms of collaboration will ensure new relations with the countries of

the third world, on which the countries in our continent more than in any other depend for their very existence.

*(Applause)*

**The Chairman (N).** — I call Mr. Ryan.

**Mr. Ryan.** — With all appropriate modesty, I venture to claim that I speak with a more authoritative voice on the subject of European unity than the delegate of any other nation here ; because last Wednesday in my country in a referendum, the common people of Ireland voted by a five to one majority in favour of Ireland becoming a Member of the European Communities. I would suggest to Mr. Digby and others who doubt the interest of the common people of Europe in the principle of European integration that this is a fair proof the people of Europe are prepared to move more rapidly towards European unification than some of us politicians believe.

In darker days when Ireland was known throughout Europe as the island of saints and scholars, our missionary monks spread Christianity across Europe. The impious and Philistines among you may be content to know that we do not have sufficient of either sanctity or scholarship in exportable quantities these days ; but we have a strong commitment to neutrality. Military neutrality, pressure for special economic assistance for peripheral areas, a will to strengthen links with European non-member nations and a determination to help to democratise the European Parliament are four components of the individual contribution which Ireland will hope to make to the European Community.

Because Ireland is a neutral country she has an identity of interest with other neutrals—Sweden, Switzerland, Austria and Finland. Ireland is not and will not become a Member of NATO or WEU. Ireland's neutrality is founded not merely on self-interest but on our conviction that a warring world will always be the better for having some oasis of peaceful sanity. In voting for Europe, the people of Ireland voted in the con-



fident expectation that her European partners would be determined to keep Europe at peace within and without, and that therefore no demands would be made upon neutral Ireland which would compromise her determination to stay out of other peoples' wars.

We believe the European Community gains by having a neutral like Ireland in the "club", because it makes Europe's peaceful intentions more manifest to friendly and worried States alike. Ireland looks forward to the day when the other neutrals of Europe will follow Ireland's example by entering as full Members of the European Communities. This is the surest means of achieving peace in our own time and ensuring its preservation for our children's children.

As a country on the perimeter of Europe, Ireland understands the loneliness of remoteness and the anxieties and problems of people in under-developed peripheral areas, both inside and outside the European Community. It was in the expectation that the Community would honour the pledge of the Rome Treaty to help equal development and progress in all regions that my countrymen voted for EEC. Clearly, insufficient attention has so far been given to the improvement of depressed areas. Ireland intends to press for substantial reforms in this field to ensure that regional policies be given top priority to create that equal prosperity and opportunity which EEC was founded to accomplish. The Community, as it pursues these goals for its own Members, must also give aid to its associate Members in peripheral areas to avoid pockets of poverty in any part of free Europe.

As the European Community grows in size and strength, it becomes vitally urgent to democratise its institutions. Meaningful participation in decision-making by all the people has long been recognised as essential to the well-being of the nation State. It is no less important for the survival and welfare of the European Community. "No taxation without representation" has been the cry of men against systems of government which purported to bind them with laws imposed without par-

liamentary decision. But as the Community extends its influence into more and more facets of life, there will be a risk of non-acceptance unless the popular will can be determined through direct elections to an effective Parliament. Therefore, whatever may be the administrative difficulties, Europe must proceed to strengthen its Parliament and to provide our people in Europe with a direct system of election so that they become involved in decisions and policies which will shape their future.

*(Applause)*

**The Chairman (N).** — I call Mr. Peel.

**Mr. Peel.** — Mr. Chairman, may I first congratulate Mr. Reverdin warmly on what I consider to be a first-class report with which I agree almost wholly. The report was well presented and the suggestions made in it are admirable.

I entirely agree with Mr. Reverdin that the danger of the expanding Community becoming an economic giant without a political head incapable of defending itself is a very serious one. It would undoubtedly become a temptation to predatory powers which still exist in the world. Therefore, the establishment of adequate political institutions within a reasonable time is undoubtedly necessary. This will involve extending the functions and powers of the European Parliament and also consideration of its composition.

Mr. Duncan Sandys mentioned the recent Vedel Committee report and its suggestions on how, and to what extent, the powers of the European Parliament should be extended in the near future.

As to the composition of the European Parliament, the Vedel Committee seems to think that although direct elections as provided by the Treaty of Rome must ultimately come, there is no great hurry to change the present system of recruitment from national parliaments. Whatever system is eventually adopted, I am sure it will also be very important for relations

between the European Parliament and the national parliaments to be close, and machinery for that purpose must be worked out.

There is I believe a rather special problem for Britain not only because of the burden of work in the House of Commons—no doubt that applies to the other members of parliament of the Community—but also particularly because of the special relationship which exists between British members of parliament and their constituencies. There are members of the House of Commons who think it will be impossible for members to serve their constituencies, the House of Commons and the European Parliament.

For this reason in Britain a number of ingenious ideas for direct elections to the European Parliament are being put forward for consideration. I find them ingenious and worthy of careful study although undoubtedly they have their disadvantages as well as their advantages. My own view is that we shall have to, and we should, conform to the present European system for some time ahead. I hope that the burden on British members of parliament will not prove too onerous. A good publicity campaign will be necessary to inform the British electorate what is involved and the importance of the work of the European Parliament to them, to Britain and to Europe.

I realise that the Assembly of the Council of Europe does not normally concern itself with defence, but both Rapporteurs have in my view rightly mentioned it this morning. A united Europe will have to provide more completely for its own defence. One day we may well see a European Economic Community soldier. Here I agree very much with Mr. van der Stoep, for if there is to be an effective defence of the free world it will have to be in the context of the North Atlantic Alliance. This necessitates a close dialogue between European institutions and those of North America. I understand some dialogue has already taken place between American Congressmen and European parliamentarians. It is very important that this should be developed and extended.

This brings me to the need for some change in the composition and scope of two other international parliamentary institutions, one of which over the years has been closely connected with the Assembly of the Council of Europe. I refer to the Assembly of Western European Union and the North Atlantic Assembly. The revised Brussels Treaty provides that the parliamentary representatives of the treaty powers of Western European Union should be the same as those of the Council of Europe. In the changed circumstances of the enlarged Community and its evolution, it would be wise for member countries to have some of their parliamentary representatives in the European Parliament and some of those in Western European Union as members of the North Atlantic Assembly.

*(Applause)*

**The Chairman (N).** — I call Mr. Goëss.

**Mr. Goëss (G).** — Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, Professor Reverdin's report is so thorough and so expert that it really needs no further commentary. I speak now simply because I wish to emphasise three points.

First, the growing importance of the European Parliament will inevitably lead to a decline in the importance of the Council of Europe. This may well mean the end of the Council of Europe if we do not remain clearly conscious of the tasks which are left to us ; for not even a strengthened European Parliament would be capable, either from the standpoint of subject matter or that of its membership, of taking on our role. Professor Reverdin has clearly indicated this already.

I believe we must remember that the existence of the Council of Europe can be questioned from another angle and that we run a risk of being caught between two fires. This will happen if, as many people foresee, one or more Security Conferences are held, and if these are then set on a permanent institutional basis.

It is therefore my opinion that we should oppose the institutionalisation of a Security Conference. Our sessions—and Professor Reverdin has said as much—are fully adequate and can be made flexible enough to deal with any problems which remain outstanding after a Security Conference.

Secondly, many of us have attended a large number of these sessions and have left Strasbourg well-informed, but not necessarily satisfied. This dissatisfaction was not only due to the fact that one must plainly belong to a privileged circle of parliamentarians before one can speak at all, but also to the fact that the stimulus and sound initiatives originating here after the Assembly sessions frequently led to nothing. I therefore feel that the two parliamentary bodies should not only move into and share a new building, but that they should establish in it a permanent office responsible for those issues which have been recognised as being of common concern, and which are also mentioned in Mr. Reverdin's report ; this office should also attempt to divide responsibilities in a way that would guarantee results.

Thirdly, it should be particularly emphasised that the enlarged European Parliament must give a hearing to those who cannot belong to it or who, for various reasons, do not wish to do so. They must not simply come as observers, but must be able to participate in a full exchange of information. One should not think of this as being, for example, a special concession to the European neutrals. It simply reflects the right of members of the Parliament to information. Before they take any decisions which are likely to have effects outside their own territory, they should consult with those who will be affected.

Mr. Chairman, we have had many discussions here on whether EEC should be enlarged ; we have also discussed at length the particular problems connected with Great Britain's entry ; our debates in general were often overshadowed by these issues. I am glad to say that we have now progressed from discussing whether the Community should be enlarged to considering how this should be done. Enlargement will certainly

affect those States which cannot themselves belong to the enlarged EEC. We couldn't say much on the "whether" of enlargement, but we can contribute a lot on the "how". When we part company today, the result of this debate should show that the members of the Council of Europe have indeed a great deal to contribute to this second area.

*(Applause)*

**The Chairman (F).** — I call Mr. Delforge.

**Mr. Delforge (F).** — Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, at a moment when the enlarged Community is about to become a reality, Mr. Reverdin's report certainly provides us with a valuable reference document. Today, even those who have held back longest over the building of Europe admit that there must be political union between the States now signatories to the Rome Treaty and those on the point of acceding to it. Such a union has long been advocated by our Assembly.

As to how it is to be achieved, opinions differ, and this debate is not the right occasion for a discussion of the respective merits of federation or confederation, or even a federation of regions. But the political assemblies have re-discovered their unanimity in calling for the creation of democratic institutions.

In addition to the Council of Ministers, which is a body that represents States, our nations and peoples must be given an opportunity of making their voices heard in a parliamentary assembly elected by universal suffrage and possessed of real powers. Such an assembly might be of dual composition : first, the European Parliamentary Assembly containing the representatives of the ten nations belonging to the European Community, and secondly the Council of Europe's Consultative Assembly containing, in addition to the Community representatives, the representatives of the seven other European democracies as well. The latter body could also organise study sessions to consider such specific problems as, for example, cultural co-operation or the protection of the environment, to which all

the European States, regardless of their political regime, would be invited to send representatives.

Mr. Reverdin has drawn special attention in his report to two important aspects of the question of expanding our contacts. The first is the need to develop our open policy towards the countries of Eastern Europe ; the second, the danger entailed by our ignorance about most of those Mediterranean countries which are ruled by dictatorships differing considerably in kind from those to be found in the east of Europe.

As you will readily understand, it is hard for someone who himself was once a political prisoner to advocate an open policy of this kind because, in either case, it will involve talking to people who put others in prison for the crime of voicing their own opinions. All the same, we must recognise the fact that we cannot go on ignoring those States. It is just possible that our conversations with them might open a small window in a few limited sectors or a few strictly practical ones, since we have to remember that our electors have already begun to make their own contacts in places like Madrid, Belgrade and Warsaw. Our populations have already adopted a number of pragmatic solutions in the sectors in which they have some direct concern. Still, that particular task must not be allowed to distract us from our main duty of creating political union between the Ten and subsequently extending it so far as possible in the direction of the Seventeen.

We have been told more than once this morning that a political union postulates a defence union as well. As the citizen of a neutral country, Mr. Reverdin obviously could not comment on that, but the voice of Europe will certainly never be able to make itself heard if it remains the voice of an economic unit alone. The defence of democratic Europe admits of one set of alternatives only : either Europe guarantees its own defence within NATO, or its defence is founded on the presence of American troops, also within NATO. Whether we like it or not, the fact is that the majority of States have so far opted for the second alternative ; but with the expansion of Europe, the

time has come to ask ourselves whether that alternative is really the best. Since the collapse of the European Defence Community, the first one has never really been given proper consideration. The individual States have no longer the courage or the desire to consider it, but is not that a task which might now well be undertaken by the assemblies responsible for Europe's future ? I will leave that thought with you. It is not my intention to initiate a debate on the subject.

**The Chairman** (*F*). — Excuse me for interrupting you, Mr. Delforge, but your time is up and I must ask you to conclude your speech.

**Mr. Delforge** (*F*). — I have finished, Mr. Chairman.

I would like merely to draw your attention to one fact. We want a politically united Europe and I do not think that that is possible without a Europe united at the social level as well. In that connection, I wonder whether something ought not to be done one day by the Council of Europe or the European Parliamentary Assembly, in addition to our meetings of parliamentary representatives, in order to arrange a conference which both sides of industry in our various countries would also be invited to attend so that they too could join with us in building Europe.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologise for having exceeded my time.

(*Applause*)

**The Chairman** (*N*). — I call Mr. Andersen.

**Mr. Andersen**. — We are discussing developments in Europe after the enlargement of the Community. However, I should like to begin my remarks by saying a few words on one important question that relates to the situation before enlargement.

In three or four of the candidate countries referenda have been or will be held. I congratulate our Irish colleagues upon



the overwhelming majority obtained in their country for the constitutional changes that are necessary before Ireland could join the European Community. This result will be useful in my country. In Denmark the opinion polls so far have indicated a positive result and, according to the latest polls, the majority for entry has increased considerably during the last one or two months.

It may be difficult for those in other European countries to understand why we are going to have these referenda and why we are having such a lively debate on the whole question of joining Europe. This morning I listened with great interest to the remarks of our colleague from the Netherlands, Mr. van der Stoep, on the position of small countries within the European Community. It would be very useful if such statements could reach the public even in my country, because there are essential misunderstandings at home about the whole question of the real character of European co-operation seen from the viewpoint of a small country.

Anxieties expressed by many people in Denmark centre on the political consequences of enlargement. This is fundamentally different from the co-operation we enjoy today within EFTA as well within the Nordic Council. Since Nordic contacts in terms of culture and language are much wider and deeper than our contacts with the other eight countries that will constitute the enlarged EEC, it is only natural for many people to feel that our membership, especially with its political consequences, means a radical re-orientation of our external policies. This explains the intensity of the debate now going on in my country as well as in Norway. A public debate which arouses great interest and attracts a wide participation amongst all sections of the population is a very important democratic preparation for our future contribution to the building of a new Europe.

I have read with much interest and concern the Vedel Report on the present and future institutional set-up within the Community. The report finds it important that Community activities should have the support of public opinion and it

adds : "Public opinion is not committed. At least it is indifferent or only appears in protest. Europe has its 'silent majority' ; like the others it is pretty ineffective." I can assure you that in Denmark today neither the majority nor the minority is silent on the European question, which I hope augurs well for an active contribution by the Danish people to the future of democratic Europe.

As the Danish Minister for European Integration until October last year, I stressed to the Council of Ministers of the Community during our accession negotiations that in our opinion the role of the European Parliament should be strengthened parallel with the widening and deepening of European co-operation generally. We are studying the proposals in the Vedel Report and we are looking forward eagerly to taking part in the work of the European Parliament.

At the session of the Nordic Council in Helsinki last February, there was unanimous support for the political will of the Nordic governments to continue our co-operation in all fields where this is possible in spite of our different position in regard to the European Community. In this way the Nordic Council within its limited membership hopes to play a role similar to that foreseen by Mr. Reverdin in his report for the Council of Europe, as a link between Members and non-members of the Community.

*(Applause)*

**The Chairman (N).** — I call Mr. Joachim Weber.

**Mr. Joachim Weber (G).** — Mr. Chairman, I should like to thank both the Rapporteurs for their excellent work and to congratulate them on it. In particular, I agree unreservedly with Mr. Reverdin's remarks. I am also particularly pleased by what Mr. Radoux said in his report about the need for the neutrals in Europe. The days when the neutrals could, as it were, follow the course of world events from a sheltered corner, are past. As far as its neutral status and direct democracy permit, our coun-

try too will take its place in the new community of nations which are steadily growing together.

In a declaration of principle, the Swiss *Bundesrat* recently emphasised the need for Switzerland to open itself to the outside world, and in particular to Europe, and to strengthen its relations with the countries of Europe. Once our relations with EEC have been regularised, as is currently planned, the close involvement of the Swiss economy with the Six, which already exists in fact, will be officially recognised. This close involvement with the Communities appears particularly in Switzerland's external trade. When EEC is enlarged, imports from the Ten will amount to 75<sup>0</sup>/<sub>0</sub>-80<sup>0</sup>/<sub>0</sub> of our total imports, and exports to the Community will represent some 58<sup>0</sup>/<sub>0</sub> of our total exports. There are well-founded hopes that the negotiations will be concluded early enough for the imminent free trade agreement with the enlarged EEC to come into force at the same time. This is the only way of averting a situation which would make it necessary to re-introduce the trade barriers dismantled under EFTA.

To be brief, I should like to emphasise the importance of the Council of Europe for a neutral country like ours. The Council of Europe in Strasbourg not only retains its importance as the only place where the free democratic nations of Western Europe can meet and discuss the issues which concern them—it is also the only institution where parliamentarians from the EEC countries can regularly meet those from EFTA.

In short, I can only say that for us, and for the other countries, as our Austrian colleagues have already emphasised, any reduction in the rights and powers of the Council of Europe following enlargement of the European Community and the necessary strengthening of the European Parliament, would be highly regrettable and must be avoided.

*(Applause)*

**The Chairman (N).** — I call Mr. Barry Jones.

**Mr. Barry Jones.** — I am not afraid in this emotionally charged Assembly to admit to the heresy of doubting the wisdom of Britain joining EEC at this time, on these terms and under the Heath government. Already it appears that the great British steel industry, for example, is to be savagely restricted as part of the price of our ticket to Europe. Our current steel capacity is 27 million tons a year ; the signs are that we are now budgeting for a 28 million ton ceiling and large-scale redundancies in the industry. This ludicrous steel tonnage target is an act of craven folly or so it seems to the people who live in the British steel towns. There are millions of ordinary people in Britain who are expressing grave concern at our decision to join EEC.

In Europe some would say there is a current natural air of superiority and apparently little concern for our affairs, that our parliament might be trussed up like a helpless chicken. Yet I recognise the integrity of colleagues who take a view opposite to mine because they are distinguished colleagues with years of experience and conviction to draw upon, but it appears to many of us that the Commission is the voice of the big men, of the ruthless industrialists, of shadowy financiers, of influential bankers and insurance men, of unit trusts and multinational corporations.

I share the ideals of many democratic socialists who believe in controlling the power of capitalism and who also believe that the common people should possess the commanding heights of the economy. What of the little man in Britain and in Europe ? Precious little has been said of him today in this rarefied atmosphere. I predict a new European elite of legislators, broadcasters, journalists and civil servants jetting endlessly from capital to capital. Yet the people I care for, the common working people, seem to have been left out of the grand design. Indeed, the basic defences of ordinary working people in the United Kingdom are now under attack. Parliament, which represents the people, is under the baleful influence of Brussels and the trade unions are the subject of pernicious legislation in Britain. Therefore I say that in this sceptical climate in Bri-

tain there is a need for much missionary work and the Assembly here today would be deluding itself if it thought that the British people are digging frenziedly to fill in the Dover Straits.

*(Applause)*

**The Chairman (N).** — I call Mr. Karasek.

**Mr. Karasek (G).** — Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, as time is growing short and interest is waning—which I can understand after several hours of discussion—I shall follow the appeal and make my remarks as brief as possible.

As Austrians, we are grateful to both Rapporteurs for what they said in their reports ; both are admirable documents.

I should like to ask Mr. Reverdin to tell Mr. Radoux that there is one point in his report, namely section 6, about which we are not happy. It is certainly not a major fault, but it does invite misunderstanding when he says that there are some neutral countries that would like to join but cannot, and others that can join but do not want to—if I may put it in this way.

I must make it absolutely clear that Austria's neutrality was freely chosen. It was not, as some of the previous speakers have mistakenly asserted, imposed on us. Nor was it forced on us by the State treaty—our neutrality is a unilateral act of the Austrian legislature.

What I am trying to say is that we stand by our neutrality and we believe that it enables us to play a particular role in ensuring political stability in Europe.

I emphasise this because I also wish to make it clear that we explicitly support European integration, as hitherto realised in the Six and as it will now be realised in the Ten. As my fellow-countryman, Mr. Gratz, has already said, we do not feel that participation in this enlarged Europe is a hindrance, certainly not for us.

But one should not, I believe—and this is perhaps an important point—regard neutrality as something immoral and expect Austria to discard its neutrality in the next ten or fifteen years. That is why the Council of Europe is for us, and for the other European countries concerned, an essential instrument.

Very briefly, one further point—also mentioned and emphasised by one of my countrymen : in the reports too little attention has been paid to the coming European Security Conference. Apart from the renunciation of force and the recognition of frontiers, the major theme of the European Security Conference will certainly be economic, cultural, scientific and technical co-operation. From our contacts with East European parliamentarians and with representatives of the East European countries, we know that a call will be made for the abolition of power blocs in Europe and for the replacement of the existing organs of integration by co-operation throughout Europe, as envisaged by those who regard the Security Conference as a desirable goal. I believe we must make it plain that we are ready for co-operation in these areas—but not to sacrifice that progress towards integration which has already been made in the West.

I have no time to take this matter further. I simply wish to raise it today in the hope that we can discuss it thoroughly on some future occasion. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, for your attention.

*(Applause)*

**The Chairman (N).** — I call Mr. Walder.

**Mr. Walder.** — It is with a certain amount of diffidence on my first visit to Strasbourg that I attempt to mention some of the matters which have been talked about in the debate which has been going on in my country on the subject of entry. Persons like myself who have always been determined Europeans have attempted to explain the Six as it stands to our own people. We have talked about peace and I think everyone in

this Chamber accepts that as an object. But I should say that within the Six, within Western Europe, there is peace, and I do not think there are any dangers of anyone breaking it at the moment.

We have also talked about prosperity and undoubtedly the Six have been successful. That, of course, is one of our reasons for wishing to join, but our own people have also put a question to us. They have said, "What is the purpose of this Community?", over and above the issues which I have mentioned. Greater unification in Europe has been mentioned, but I suggest to this Assembly that that is something which may come in the future. One may take small steps with smaller nations, but anyone here today who thinks of a complete unity of Europe, East and West, in his lifetime or perhaps the lifetime of our children, I think must be an optimist.

So I think practically in terms of an enlarged Community going from Six to Ten we should think of shorter-term objectives and also more realistic ones. I think the dangers to peace in the world at the moment stem not from Europe but from outside Europe, in the third world, in the Middle East and in the Far East. I think that those are matters which an enlarged Community, if it is to have a moral and political purpose as well as an economic one, must consider. I think the danger is of having a Community which certainly possesses economic prosperity but no sense of political direction.

I think that some of our European friends are suspicious of us, the British, because we are the late possessors of a large empire, now a Commonwealth. Some Europeans say, "Ah, but their interests are still outside Europe." That, I think, is true to an extent, but I think it is no bad addition to a Community of Ten. However, I think the Six were coming to a point when they had to consider a political and moral purpose. As they are about to become Ten and more powerful and more prosperous, I think the consideration of their purpose is now a necessity.

*(Applause)*

**The Chairman (N).** — I call Mr. Gislason.

**Mr. Gislason.** — Because of the very short time at my disposal I have to omit from my speech a number of items I wanted to mention.

I have read with great interest the reports of Mr. Reverdin and Mr. Radoux. We have heard their clever speeches.

I agree with Mr. Reverdin and others that the proposed enlargement of the European Community is an event of outstanding political significance. This is one of the turning points in European history. What is most significant now is that the enlargement of the Economic Community has, so to speak, arrived at its destination. At least for many years ahead one cannot go any further. It is not realistic to suppose that there will be any further enlargement of the Community in the future.

I do not believe that the Seven outsider Members of the Council of Europe are likely to join the European Economic Community in the near future. Our future discussions and policies should therefore not circle so much around the idea of the further enlargement of the Communities. We must be realistic, not over-enthusiastic, about this one item.

Mr. Reverdin has given the reasons why the seven outsiders do not want to follow the course taken by the four applicant States. The main reason is that they do not fit into the prescribed pattern of the Economic Community. They are people on the fringes, to quote Mr. Reverdin. They are either politically or economically unwilling or unprepared for membership of EEC.

The so-called neutral States—Sweden, Switzerland and Austria, which industrially and commercially meet the requirements of the Community—do not want to join the Communities because of their neutrality. They want to make no change in their political status as neutrals.



I have the feeling that Turkey and the Mediterranean island States of Cyprus and Malta are neither politically nor economically prepared to join the Community.

It is not to be misunderstood that the fundamental philosophy of the European Community is so far based on the needs and aspirations of industrial Europe, that is the Community of the highly industrialised and rich nations of Europe.

Iceland is on the fringes.. We are not an industrial nation. Nevertheless we are not one of the under-developed nations. We have emerged from backwardness and poverty by utilising the only rich natural resource we possess, the fisheries. We have become a prosperous nation through the fisheries.

It was my intention to deal at some length with our basic problems as a fisheries nation and to explain the reasons for our fisheries limit policy, which in the eyes of some of our partners in the Council of Europe is controversial. But I must leave that out or at least be very brief.

Iceland is a Member of EFTA. We are not one of the applicant States to EEC. We are negotiating with EEC about our future links or our co-operation with the Communities. I have no doubt that the able leaders and the experts of the European Community understand the problems of Iceland. But there has been a tendency on the part of the Community to persuade Iceland to change its fisheries policy.

However much Iceland desires to sell its fish to the European Community, we are not likely to move far back from what we consider our most vital policy. But we are ready to discuss this policy in the right place and in the right manner.

The National Assembly of Iceland passed unanimously on 15 February 1972 a resolution on the fisheries jurisdiction of Iceland. The main clause in the resolution is an approval of the governmental decision to extend the fisheries limits to 50 miles

on 1 September, 1972. That decision has been a matter of serious disagreement between Iceland and two of our partners in the Council of Europe.

Those two problem States maintain that the Icelandic decision to extend its fisheries limits will affect the trawling industries of Great Britain and Germany. Iceland does not deny the existence of the problem. The Government of Iceland is more than willing to discuss the problem with the Governments of the United Kingdom and Germany. We have been discussing those problems for a long time.

My main conclusions would be that there is still a need for the Council of Europe. We need it as a meeting place of the democratic nations of Europe and as a co-ordinator of the European intergovernmental work. It is useful, and will be useful in the future, to have the joint meetings of these two parliamentary bodies which are now working together.

In spite of our enthusiasm for European integration, there are so many complexities of politics, economics and cultures within the European landscape that we cannot afford to follow the straight line of an orthodox policy. I hope that the European policy of the future will be flexible and liberal in the best sense of the word.

*(Applause)*

**The Chairman (N).** — I call Mr. Treu.

**Mr. Treu (I).** — Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, in view of the short time left and the value of any judgment on the two admirable reports, I would be tempted not to speak at all if it were not my duty to touch very briefly on two themes, one from Mr. Reverdin's report and one from the well-founded assessment of method and administration put forward by Mr. Radoux.

It is true, Mr. Reverdin, that the enlargement of the Community is, as you said, an important step forward in the

building of Europe ; but it could be a massive creation, bigger than the previous one but lacking a head.

And here we have the first point : I would not wish this step forward to make us dwell even more on the Community's technical and economic solidarity, while forgetting another much more important advance in the shape of the reorganisation of its political structure, which has been mentioned many times not only today but also in the past.

Recalling a famous Latin tag *dum Romae consulitur*, it seems to me in this case that if we are to wait for more studies and preparatory work in order to define (Item 44) the respective powers and duties of the Community, the Parliament and the Council, if, I repeat, we are to dwell on distinctions and powers, Saguntum will not be conquered, it will disappear ! In short, Europe will remain an economic concept and nothing more.

Here, I should like to say that even if we have to face a direct election of members of the Community's legislative body on universal suffrage (this is a reference to Mr. Radoux's report), it will be a risk worth taking.

Some of our colleagues have expressed criticisms and reservations about direct election of representatives to the future European Parliament because they foresee that not many would vote. I, on the contrary, believe that it is precisely the institution of direct election of members of the various parliaments to the European Parliament that would provoke greater interest than now exists in public opinion, the press, the parties, the trade unions and all the various organisations that operate in modern society.

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen (I repeat that this argument cannot be dealt with in a few seconds), if it is true, as it is, that time flies, that evolutionary movements in society operate inversely to Einstein's law, according to which periods of time increase in response to an increase in velocity (inversely in the sense that here the periods of time become shorter), if it

is true, as I was saying, we must make haste because if we cannot accede to the requests and entreaties of our own generation, then our own generation will soon be replaced by the next generation, one which has not witnessed the birth of the Europe that came into being as a result of the aims set at the time by Churchill, De Gasperi, Schuman and other friends of ours now present or no longer here. If the new generation succeeds in a few months or years in achieving a Europe that is united economically but not politically sound, it will be its duty and right to say that we have wasted too much time in considering, preparing and making distinctions, but it will have to acknowledge that we did face the risk I have spoken of.

May I quote you an example. We in Italy recently set up regions after a delay of twenty years ; we have found that even after twenty years this idea has not yet been accepted by our people. Despite this, however, the first difficult steps are proving that it was worth while taking the risk, because those steps were taken without hoping for too much. The European Community of the Ten will be able to have an effective legislative instrument of its own which will not only exercise control but also take political as well as economic initiatives.

With the prospects indicated, the Council of Europe will have other methods and other areas in which to operate and, above all, will be able to rely on convinced, popular participation in the European Parliament, of the Ten now, but we may hope it will not be long before others also take part in it.

*(Applause)*

**The Chairman (N).** — I call Mr. Stewart.

**Mr. Stewart.** — Mr. Chairman, I have long ago torn up the notes of the speech I was going to make. So I will now begin by a few words in reply to my honourable friend, Mr. Jones. He mentioned that among British public opinion there is a good deal of scepticism about going into the Common

Market. It is quite true that the British people are sceptical about it, but they are sceptical about everything else, particularly about large prospects of the future of any kind. But I doubt if there is anyone in Britain who feels that membership of the Community involves a disregard for the interests of the ordinary man and his wife and particularly for the trade unionists and the workers.

I think it would be fair for them to consider what is the opinion of those groups of people in the countries already in the Six, and the remarkable fact is that all the democratic trade unions, all the political parties of the countries of the Six which are comparable to the party to which Mr. Jones and I belong, are not only strongly in favour of their own countries belonging to the Community but are very anxious to be joined by Britain and the other applicants.

But there is, I think, one element in the British scepticism which it would be wise to consider. I do not believe it is now being disputed on the evidence that if Britain were to remain out, while her position would be very far from impossible, all her economic problems would be harder to solve than if she were in.

Enlargement of the Community holds out a considerable prospect of increasing material prosperity. But there are these questions, I think, that people will ask about that. They will ask, first of all, "Does this pursuit of material prosperity mean a purely materialistic society?" There is a whole range of questions, stretching from human rights to pollution and environment which together turn a prosperous continent into a civilised continent. It seems to me that exactly at that point the Council of Europe is useful. These are exactly the matters the Council of Europe should be giving special attention to in the future.

Then I think part of the scepticism is also concerned with the question: does this mean an exclusive ganging-up of the Western powers, possibly to the danger of the peace of the world? It has been pointed out earlier in this debate, and it

was mentioned in Mr. Reverdin's report, that on the whole the reverse seems to be true. Every fresh assertion by Western Europe of its greater unity has been followed by a comparatively conciliatory move from the East.

This means we have to convince the peoples of Europe that the Community is worthwhile. If we do not convince them of that, there is no point in bothering about the machinery of electing a Parliament. You must have the faith and imagination of the people behind you. You will get that if you show that, among other things, the Community, with the Council of Europe to help it, is concerned to reach a *détente* with the countries of Eastern Europe and intends to take the problem of development aid seriously.

All these are possibilities. In my judgment, if Britain stays out of the Community, her economic problems will be such that she will not be able to do what she would like to do in the case of development aid. But going in does not automatically mean we shall do what we could do or ought to do. It will need a further effort of will to see that the policies of the Community are such that will satisfy generously minded people. Our motto has to be : "For Europe, but with Europe for mankind."

*(Applause)*

**The Chairman.** — I call Mr. Molloy.

**Mr. Molloy.** — Mr. Chairman, it is perfectly true what my colleague, Mr. Stewart, has said, that there are many people of the working classes and trade union movement in Europe who want us in. The reason why they want Great Britain in is because they are not too happy if we are not going to come in and they will be in there on their own. They want us to be there to hold their hands in case of anything emerging. They are apprehensive. The plain truth is that the method and the manner in which the Rome Treaty is at present drafted does not give them the comfort they think they could get if we were in.

It is also perfectly true to say that the wealth of Europe and of EEC has increased, but it is equally true to say that it was even increasing at a faster rate before EEC was really formed.

I have to congratulate at this stage Mr. Reverdin and Mr. Radoux for their very valuable documents. Mr. Reverdin said during his speech that he hoped EEC would become something like the Holy Roman Empire. I am bound to remind him of what Voltaire said about it, that it was neither holy, Roman, nor an empire ; and EEC is neither wholly European nor is it wholly a Community.

I feel from the discussions we have had this morning that there is a great danger of this very valuable community, the Council of Europe, being slowly strangled. I think this would be a great shame. The Council of Europe has done valuable work towards the real idealistic unity of Europe. I hope that yesterday we did not witness a gravestone rather than the laying of a foundation stone that we saw.

I am bound to support my colleague, Mr. Barry Jones, when he said the people in Britain are anxious about the loss of their traditional democracy. Whether we like it or not, we were all of us fighting for that democracy. If it had not survived, we should not be having this debate now and there would be no discussion about EEC or other economic organisations.

One of the great bulwarks that inspired and sustained people all over the world was the traditions of our House of Commons.

There are many British people, and many of us who are members of that great House, who fear that if we enter the Common Market on the present terms, the vitality of that House of Commons will start to wither away and that this will be to the benefit of no one. The price and present terms of joining the Common Market are too high. Many of us are not prepared to relinquish our form of democracy for an inferior version.

We have many problems, too, in relation to the British Commonwealth. I can understand people telling us, "It is your problem", but let us not forget that that Commonwealth made its massive contribution to the establishment, or re-establishment, of democracy in this Europe of ours. I fear that inasmuch as we are already living in a divided Europe, going forward within the Common Market will mean we are going further to divide Europe.

I was rather alarmed and dismayed—though if I wanted to I could use it to my advantage—by the contribution from Mr. Duncan Sandys when he hoped there would be a form of foreign affairs commission similar to the present EEC Commission. There are many pro-Marketees in Britain who are now desperately anxious that the power of the Commission of the Common Market is much too great ; and they wonder what will happen if there is a foreign affairs commission with great power.

The growth of bureaucracy means the detriment of democracy. What is likely to happen is that people will be not at the centre but rather pushed to the periphery. The threat of a dominant bureaucracy challenges the integrity of the politician and could cause him to exchange his inspiration of the pioneer for the reward of the lackey. Political vitality could be sucked out. The politicians could end up without chart or compass and with the steering wheel no longer in their possession if we went the way that has been outlined in terms of Common Market control.

I am bound to say to this Assembly that in my view, and I hope in the view of all of us, political helotry is not a condition congenial to the psychology of an artisan population. A *wholly* united Europe but not a *bound* Europe. A Europe not bound by the Treaty of Rome can be the cornerstone for building world peace. But whatever we decide upon must command resources of idealism if we are to surmount the fears and limited ambitions in which international relations are now snarled.



The instrument for the task cannot be one nation nor a limited combination of nations. It must be an assembly of all Europe. We *must* arrive at a détente with Eastern Europe, for that is also part of Europe. Neither must détente be limited to the so-called Common Market which seems to many of us to threaten the real democracy with which we are concerned. Whatever organisation we attempt to establish we must have in the forefront of our minds and must go for the larger ideal with the accent not only on any particular Common Market but on the commonalty of European and, ultimately, world humanity.

(*Applause*)

**The Chairman (N).** — I call upon Mr. Reverdin to reply to the various speeches made.

**Mr. Reverdin, Rapporteur (F).** — Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Although I am speaking on behalf of two people, you need not worry. There are many things I could say but I will restrict myself to one or two.

I find something symbolic in the fact that these two parliamentary assemblies, which have been represented on occasion as being rivals, should in the end—for reasons not in fact of major importance—have chosen a single spokesman to wind up this debate.

The type of democratic control to be exercised in the Europe we are now building has been much discussed by parliamentarians. That is a matter on which we shall have to reach some conclusions and arrive at some judgments, something our two Assemblies have refrained from doing.

If I may quote Aristotle on the constitution of Athens, I would remind you that he says there were three archons. The first in order of date was the king who had no powers to speak of. Next came the polemarch who was supposed to lead the Athenian forces to war. As, however, those elected to the office

were usually incapable of waging war, the polemarch had no powers either. Lastly came just the archon. And how was it that he exercised such supreme power? Simply because of *ta epitheta*, what was added or acquired.

Our national parliaments and, I make no doubt, our parliamentary assemblies and European Parliaments of the future will also acquire powers thanks to what is added, as will also the central organs of the Community.

I need only look at the situation in my own country to realise that the central State created in 1848 has all this time been acquiring powers, not to the detriment of its member cantons, but simply because it has been necessary to entrust it with all sorts of new tasks which it alone is in a position to undertake.

I am quite sure that, as parliamentarians, there is a struggle ahead of us to rid Europe of those shadowy economic and political sectors over which no control is really being exercised in the name of our peoples. That, I think, is one of the basic elements of today's debate.

So far as concerns our relations with the rest of the world, a number of what struck me as important comments have been made. It must be a matter of congratulation for all of us that Europe looks like being better equipped in the future to assume her world responsibilities and so help to give humanity as a whole a more delicately poised balance and more genuine powers.

There is one point I want to make about co-operation between our two Assemblies. There have been several interesting suggestions, all of which deserve consideration, about the best way of working together and how to allocate all these various tasks between us. Equally, however, I think that not merely the Consultative Assembly but the Council of Europe as a whole would undoubtedly lose much of its significance if it were to be deprived of its political attributions. It must not

have its task restricted to dealing with a few matters commonly—although, as Mr. Gratz has pointed out, wrongly—regarded as being of secondary importance. In fact, the sectors with which the European Parliament is unable to deal at present—because its members have no time to spare from their other complex and difficult tasks—are of the highest importance and will play a part no less vital than that of the economic sector in laying new foundations for the united Europe, the goal of all our hopes, but a goal to which we have not yet succeeded in giving an institutional form.

We are now approaching the end of our 19th Joint Meeting and I expect that in future our two Assemblies will have to seek others forms of co-operation. In any case, we have a joint task and if we are to accomplish it we must join forces—*viribus unitis*. That task is to ensure that every European sector is put under efficient and democratic control.

It will be a happy day when members of the European Parliaments receive their mandate and powers directly from the people. Meanwhile, we must content ourselves with solutions which may be less than satisfactory intellectually speaking but are the only practicable ones at the moment.

One last point. In reply to Mr. Czernetz, Mr. Radoux has asked me to say, with regard to the dossier which he referred to without naming it but which your told us was the Romanian dossier in Brussels, that it is essential to distinguish carefully between joining the Communities—something which requires a democratic regime—and the relations between the Communities and outside States. We cannot require everyone in the world to adopt the type of regime that we ourselves regard, with good reason, as being the best.

I will add one simple remark. I think we are sometimes apt to show far too much eagerness in our approach to the Eastern countries whose regimes, from our point of view, are even worse, and far too much reluctance in our search for ways in which to collaborate with other countries, especially certain

Mediterranean countries, which may have authoritarian regimes but which have nevertheless not brought the art of repressing ideas and individuals to the same high degree of perfection.

I hope we shall learn to show more flexibility in that direction, for the greater good of the European peoples in whose interests, after all, we are working.

*(Applause)*

**The Chairman (F).** — I thank Mr. Reverdin for the skill he has shown in winding up this long but nevertheless most interesting debate.

#### **4. Closure of the Joint Meeting**

**The Chairman (N).** — We have now reached the end of our discussion.

I declare the 19th Joint Meeting of members of the Consultative Assembly and members of the European Parliament closed.

The Sitting is closed.

*(The Sitting was closed at 2.10 p.m.)*







