

THE RELIEF OF VIENNA IN VAIN

Assessing the Implications of Turkish EU-membership
for Council of Ministers' Decision-making

Gerben Kristian Wedekind

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ABSTRACT

This research forecasts the implications of Turkish membership for decision-making effectiveness and dynamics within the Council of Ministers of the European Union (EU). Effectiveness is determined in this research by 'passage probability': the chance that a random proposal as put forth by the European Commission (EC) is accepted by the Council of Ministers. Dynamics are determined by means of the Shapley-Shubik Index (SSI), which plots power values of individual member states by forecasting a number of possible EU enlargement scenarios. This study falsifies earlier research by Baldwin and Widgrén.¹ It finds that the implications of Turkish EU-membership for EU decision-making efficiency are ambiguous and depend on the number of other candidate states entering the EU alongside Turkey, as well as the timeslot - 2014 or 2020 - at which the accession would take place. Moreover, this study asserts that Turkish EU-accession would result in unequal- but generally negative - power changes among other EU member states, although member states with similar demographic weight will experience comparable changes. Finally, it appears that the larger a EU member state is, the more power it loses if Turkey would join the EU.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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¹ Baldwin and Widgrén 2005.

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1 INTRODUCTION

In 1683, Polish, Austrian and German forces defeated the Ottomans who besieged Vienna for 61 days. The subsequent 'Relief of Vienna' meant a halt to the Ottoman advance into the heartland of Europe and was hailed a decisive victory from 'Christian Europe' over the 'blood-thirsty and barbaric' Islamic world. In 2004, European Commissioner Bolkestein stirred commotion by stating that if Turkey should join the European Union "the Relief of Vienna in 1683 will have been in vain."²

By depicting a future scenario in which Turkey is an actual EU member, this study asserts that the 'Relief' will be in vain indeed. However, it does not contain the value-ladenness similar to Bolkestein's statement. Whereas Bolkestein claimed that no place exists for Turkey in the EU, this research refrains from doing so. It abides the conclusions of the 1999 Helsinki European Council³, and will not engage in the normative debate of Turkish EU-membership. Instead, it aims to provide quantifiable insights into one of the practicalities of Turkish EU-accession - namely that in case of accession, Turkey's large and fast-growing population will significantly influence the dynamics and efficiency of the EU's decision-making procedures.

Since Turkey is a candidate "whose accession could have substantial financial consequences", its accession can only be concluded after 2014, which is the scheduled date for the EU's new financial framework.⁴ However, ignoring increasing scepticism on Turkey's accession prospects while taking into account the current pace of reforms, it is expected that Turkey "(...) will join the EU in a decade or so (...)",⁵ thus around 2020.

In approximately one decade, the situation within the EU will have changed significantly. Logically, it can be expected that in 2020 the EU will count more than its current 27 members. Turkey, Croatia and Iceland face imminent accession prospects, while Western-Balkan countries and Albania have already submitted a membership request, or might do so in the near future.

Besides an increase of the n to a figure beyond 27, the demography of the EU will change. Different dynamics will take hold of the EU. On the one hand, a large part of the 'old' EU members - the members which joined the EU up to 2010 - will experience the adverse effects of an ageing population, while for instance Turkey's populace will continue to grow significantly the coming years.

Regarding decision-making processes, the Lisbon Treaty ascribes great importance to the number of member states as well as their respective demographic size. Only when certain thresholds are met, decision-making can effectively take place in the Council of Ministers - the EU's primary decision-making body.

As from 2014, proposals falling within exclusive competence areas - where Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) applies - can be adopted by the Council of Ministers, when:

² The Guardian 2004.

³ The Helsinki Council concluded that "Turkey is a candidate state destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate states" (German Federal Foreign Office 2010).

⁴ EurActiv 2010.

⁵ British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) 2010.

- 1.) at least 55% of the member states votes in favor of the proposal, and;
- 2.) these member states compromise at least 65% of the EU's population.⁶

Logically, it follows that change in the number of member states and demographic size, of which possible Turkish EU-accession constitutes an important example, will influence decision-making dynamics and effectiveness significantly.

Following this introduction, the methodological and theoretical frameworks are outlined in section 2. Section 3 contains a statistical analysis of the implications of Turkey's EU-accession for Council of Ministers' decision-making effectiveness and dynamics. As will be outlined in the theoretical framework, the concepts 'passage probability' and 'power' will stand central in this analysis. Moreover, this section provides for an interpretation of the findings. In section 4 a conclusion is drawn summarizing the most important findings, while answering the central research question and contributing to the academic debate. Moreover, the strengths and weaknesses of this study are outlined while an agenda for further research is proposed.

⁶ Treaty on the European Union (TEU) 2010, 24.

2 THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

This research aims to determine the implications of Turkish EU-membership for the dynamics and effectiveness of Council of Ministers' decision-making procedures. 'Effectiveness' within the Council - or its capacity to act - is captured by 'passage probability', which is "(...) the likelihood that a random proposal would attract a winning coalition, assuming that all coalitions are equally likely."⁷⁸ Specifically, it is the number of all possible winning coalitions divided by the number of all possible coalitions".⁹ In the case of EU decision-making, it means that only those Council of Ministers' coalitions adhering to the Lisbon Treaty's provisions on QMV-voting would lead to a 'win'. Logically, it follows that changes in voting thresholds or in conditions relevant to the thresholds - such as Turkish EU-accession - influence the EU's capacity to act.

Furthermore, if the EU changes in member size, its internal dynamics will most probably change as well. Baldwin and Widgrén¹⁰ regard these changes in voting dynamics primarily in terms of 'power' which is defined as " (...) an actor's marginal contribution to the equilibrium outcome, i.e. how big the outcome shift would result from an actor's marginal preference shift."¹¹ Power is measured through the Shapley-Shubik-Index (SSI). The SSI gauges the likeliness that a nation "finds itself in a position to 'break' a winning coalition on a randomly selected issue."¹²¹³

⁷ Baldwin and Widgrén 2005, 332.

⁸ Passage probability leans heavily on the 'veil of ignorance' as outlined by Rawls (1971, 136): it focuses on randomly selected legislative proposals: "Random in the sense that no EU member would know in advance whether it would be for or against the proposition" (Baldwin, Widgrén 2003, 6). Passage probability is captured by the Coleman Collectivity Index (CCI). This index named after Coleman (1971) divides the number of winning coalitions by the total number of possible coalitions in voting games. In games where only 'yes' or 'no' decisions can be taken, the total amount of coalitions is 2^n , where n is the number of actors participating in the vote (Ade 2005, 6). Subsequently, index A is calculated by dividing the number of winning coalitions W by 2^n . Thus passage probability is captured by the formula $A = W/(2^n)$ (Holler and Owen 2001, 300). In the case of the present EU - which comprises 27 member states - the total number of coalitions is thus $2^{27} = 134. 217.728$. Due to the sheer size it is impossible to handpick the total number of winning coalitions. Instead, a computer programme such as Bräuninger and König's (2001) *Indices of Power 2.0* can be made to work with 'brute force' in order to do so.

⁹ Baldwin and Wyplosz 2009, 123.

¹⁰ Baldwin and Widgrén 2005.

¹¹ Widgrén 2008, 2.

¹² Baldwin and Widgrén 2005, 332.

¹³ The formula for the SSI is written as follows :

$$\phi_i = \sum_{S \subseteq N, i \in S} \frac{(s-1)!(n-s)!}{n!} [v(S) - v(S \setminus i)],$$

Herein, ϕ_i is the power index of a particular member state i while N is a given set of n member states. $S \subset N$ plots any coalition having s members. Council voting games can be characterized by $v(S)$, which takes on value 1 when a coalition S forms a qualified majority and zero when no qualified majority can be formed. Moreover, $i = 1, \dots, n$. This sum's first term gives "the probability of country i being in a pivotal position in coalition S and the latter term counts those pivotal positions where country i is able to swing a winning coalition into losing, i.e. S is winning and the removal of i makes it losing" (Widgrén 2008, 3). Moreover, besides the SSI other power indices exist, of which the most notable one is the Normalized Banzaf Index (NBI). Whereas the NBI assumes that each possible voting coalition has the same probability of occurrence, the SSI operates using a somewhat different dynamic. The SSI "assumes that voters have different intensities in terms of accepting or rejecting a proposal" (Baldwin and Widgrén 2005, 332). Although differences between the NBI and SSI are not clear-cut - since the SSI comes to resemble the workings of the NBI when the number of issues addressed is large

This study takes the Council of Ministers as its principal research unit. The reason for this is threefold. First, the Council is the only EU decision-making body where the size of a country directly translates into voting power. Second, it enables a proper falsification of Baldwin and Widgrén's study. Third, in the EU institutional framework, the Council of Ministers constitutes the principal meeting place of the national governments. Lewis states that "The Council is very much at the centre of EU decision-making and plays a pivotal role in the making of European policy".¹⁴ Moreover, although the Commission and the EP have alike functions, their respective powers "(...) are not comparable to those of the Council".¹⁵

The implications of Turkish EU-membership for the Council's acting capacity have been studied before by Baldwin and Widgrén.¹⁶ In their analysis, which stems from 2005, Baldwin and Widgrén forecast the passage probability - and thus the EU's ability to act - for the year 2009. In doing so, Baldwin and Widgrén assumed that in 2009 the EU would differ from the EU of 2005 in two respects. First, they assumed that by 2009 Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia and Turkey would have entered the Union. The membership-base of the EU would thus have been expanded to 29 states. Second, the scholars predicted that the Treaty establishing the Constitution for the European Union would have been effectively ratified by all member states. Subsequent entry into force of the Constitutional Treaty would have resulted in the replacement of the Nice Treaty's triple majority threshold scheme by a double majority voting scheme similar to the one of the current Lisbon Treaty.

Following a forecast of the EU-29 in 2009 which included the EU-27, Croatia and Turkey, the scholars subsequently concluded that passage probability of the EU-29 would lie only 0.7 percentage points lower than the passage probability of the EU-27, namely at 12.2%. Therefore, Baldwin and Widgrén concluded that "Turkey's membership would have only moderate implications for the passage probability"¹⁷ and that therefore "(...) Turkey's membership in the EU does not erode the EU's ability to act."¹⁸

In short, Baldwin and Widgrén's conclusions on Turkish EU-accession translate in the following hypotheses:

- *'If Turkey joins the EU, its implications for the passage probability within the EU are moderate'*

And:

- *'If Turkey joins the EU, the EU's capability to act will not be eroded'*¹⁹

In retrospective, reality has strayed well from the path predicted by Baldwin and Widgrén: the Constitutional Treaty was never ratified due to a French '*non*' and Dutch '*nee*' resulting from referenda held late 2005, while Turkey and Croatia have not entered the Union until now. Moreover, in the case of Turkey, the '*euromania*'²⁰ of 2004 has even made way for '*euro-scepticism*' or '*euro-fatigue*' and EU-membership seems not to be in close reach at

enough (Paterson 2005, 2) - Baldwin and Widgrén (2005, 333) state the following about using the NBI or SSI: "If one is interested in voting rules as such, the NBI is more advantageous. If one is more interested in decision-making and bargaining under certain rules, knowing that actors communicate, then the SSI is a far more suitable tool."

¹⁴ Lewis 2004, 149.

¹⁵ Nugent 2006, 191-192.

¹⁶ Baldwin and Widgrén 2005.

¹⁷ Baldwin and Widgrén 2005, 333.

¹⁸ Baldwin and Widgrén 2005, 334-335.

¹⁹ Baldwin and Widgrén 2005, 334-335.

²⁰ Dismorr 2008.

present. Therefore, one always needs to take into account that predicting future developments or 'crystal gazing' is difficult and is subjected to certain reservations.

However, if one actually does decide to forecast, one needs to ensure that it is done as correct as possible. In this respect, Baldwin and Widgrén's study, although thorough, falls short in two ways. First, it *appears* that Baldwin and Widgrén calculated the passage probability under the Constitutional Treaty - supposed to enter into force 2009 - by using demographic data of 2005. This constitutes a clear fallacy. In order to accurately forecast the passage probability under the 2009 Constitutional Treaty the scholars should have used demographic predictions of 2009 instead of the ones of 2005. In this way a more precise inference regarding the passage probability could possibly have been made. Second, and more serious, is the fact that Baldwin and Widgrén seem not to have realized that it has never been the intention of the European Commission or Council of Ministers to grant Turkey full EU-membership before 2014. Already in 2004, the Commission stated that Turkey would most probably enter by 2014.²¹ Therefore, Baldwin and Widgrén's study fails to depict a realistic scenario, because it asserts Turkish EU-membership in 2009.

If Turkey joins the EU, it will be from 2014 onwards, while 2020 is more likely taking into account recent developments. In 2014 or 2020, the European Union will differ significantly from the EU as sketched by Baldwin and Widgrén. It will have a broader membership-base while encompassing a different demographic makeup, not in the last place due to ageing of significant parts of its population. Whereas the EU will fall victim to adverse demographic trends, Turkey experiences booming population growth. Therefore, the Turkey of 2020 will differ from the Turkey *anno* 2009.

Abovementioned makes that the following counterhypotheses can be formulated:

- *'If Turkey joins the EU, its implications for the passage probability within the EU are not moderate'*

And:

- *'If Turkey joins the EU, the EU's capability to act will be eroded'*

Both hypotheses seem feasible at this point. Deterioration in the EU's acting capability is possible due to an increased *n* of member states: increasing the EU with numerous, small member states - such as the states of the Western Balkans - makes it more difficult to adhere to the Lisbon Treaty's voting threshold. Moreover, due to Turkey's significant demographic weight implications for passage probability in the EU could be significant.

Therefore, this research aims to rerun and extend Baldwin and Widgrén's passage probability analysis in order to more accurately forecast the actual influence of Turkish EU-accession on passage probability within the Council of Ministers.

Regarding the implications of Turkish EU-membership on power distributions - and thus the dynamics - within the EU, Baldwin and Widgrén state the following:

"As for power, Turkey's membership will have a big impact. Under either the Nice Treaty or Constitutional Treaty rules, Turkey would be the second most powerful member of the EU29. Under the Constitutional Treaty Turkey would be substantially more powerful than

²¹ European Commission 2007.

France, Italy and Britain, while under the Nice Treaty rules the power differences among the members with more than 50 million population would be small.”²²

Furthermore, Baldwin and Widgrén found that enlarging the EU from 25 to 29 member states would lower “(...) the power of all incumbents on a fairly even basis, with the marked exception of Germany; Germany loses more than twice as much power as any other member.”²³

Therefore, Baldwin and Widgrén’s abovementioned statements translate in the following hypotheses:

- *'If Turkey’s joins the EU it will have a big impact on the power distribution of the EU'*
- *'If Turkey joins the EU it will become the second most powerful member state'*

And:

- *'If Turkey joins the EU the power of all EU members would decrease more or less equally, except for Germany which is to experience a decline more than twice as much as any other EU member'*

Taking into account demographic forecasts - Turkey has a faster population growth than many of the EU members - the first above mentioned hypothesis appears to be valid. However, with regard to the second hypothesis, the following counterhypothesis can be formulated:

- *'If Turkey joins the EU it will become at least the second powerful EU member state'*

At first sight, this counterhypothesis appears to be feasible since it can be expected that Turkey - in case of Union-accession - will eventually surpass Germany as the largest EU member state.

As for the third hypothesis extracted from Baldwin and Widgrén’s study, it is not clear (yet) how Turkish EU-accession will affect the EU’s power distribution: this seems to be a matter of mathematical calculations and as such needs to be calculated with the appropriate statistical software. What seems certain however is that EU member states lose power if Turkey enters the Union. The 'pie' - which in this case constitutes the concept 'power' - needs to be divided between at least 28 members instead of 27, thus decreasing the share of 'breaking' power available to individual member states. Additionally, in case of Turkish accession, the 28th Union member will have significant demographic weight. Taking into account the need for reanalysis of Baldwin and Widgrén’s conclusions, this study therefore formulates the following counterhypotheses:

- *'If Turkey joins the EU the power of all EU members would decrease unequally'*

And:

- *'If Turkey joins the EU the power of all EU members would decrease equally'*

²² Baldwin and Widgrén 2005, 337.

²³ Baldwin and Widgrén 2005, 338.

Abovementioned hypotheses are addressed by calculating SSI values and changes herein. To this end, this study uses Bräuninger and König's Indices of Power 2.0 computer program²⁴, a statistical tool especially designed for calculating power indices.

The decision to only use the SSI - despite the fact that other indexes are available, most notably the Normalized Banzhaf Index (NBI) - is partly fuelled by time concerns and partly by the fact that - as Baldwin and Widgrén stated - "(...) compared to the NBI, the SSI is a far more suitable tool when one is interested in bargaining and decision-making changes."²⁵

As was argued above, it is most probable that Turkey will join the EU in either 2014 or 2020. By that time, the EU will probably look different in terms of member states and demographic composition. Since it is difficult to pinpoint the exact future of the European Union different forecasting scenarios need to be plotted. By forecasting different scenarios the probability that the EU's future is accurately predicted rises significantly. This study asserts eight different scenarios, differing from each other in terms of 'member state composition' and 'time period'.

Regarding the future composition of the EU, one needs to take into account that when Turkey joins the EU, the EU will most probably consist of more than 27 member states. Besides Turkey, other European states are currently knocking the doors of the EU and within one decade or so some - or most - of them will enter the Union. Besides Turkey, the countries that have been designated candidate status are currently Macedonia (FYROM), Croatia and Iceland. Countries that have been earmarked by the European Commission as potential candidates - which have not yet started negotiations, and thus appear to be a step behind *vis-à-vis* the candidates - are Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro,²⁶ Serbia and Kosovo.

Different candidates move at different speeds. For instance - and taking into account the high degree of integration it already enjoys with the EU, for example through its membership of the European Economic Area - it can be expected that Iceland's EU-accession will go rather smoothly.²⁷ On the contrary - due to the gridlock of the political system - it seems that Bosnia-Herzegovina's membership seems less immanent.²⁸

However, when determining scenarios, a balance needs to be stricken between thoroughness and effectiveness. Eight or nine (potential) candidate members - depending if Kosovo is considered as an up to mark one - make tens or hundreds of thousands potential enlargement combinations possible. Since plotting them all is a sheer impossible task, one needs to focus on a limited set of probable scenarios.

This study depicts four different EU compositions, each comprising a distinct set and number of member states. The first two scenarios are 'low-level' predictions, focusing on accession of either Turkey alone - thus plotting the intrinsic influence of Turkey's EU-membership on the passage probability of legislative proposals presented to the Council - or Turkey and Croatia. The passage probability in case of these scenarios has been calculated before by Baldwin and Widgrén.²⁹ They asserted that the passage probability of the EU-29

²⁴ Bräuninger and König 2001.

²⁵ Baldwin and Widgrén 2005, 333. See footnote 15 on a further elaboration on the SSI and the NBI.

²⁶ When this article was first published, Montenegro was not yet designated candidate status.

²⁷ European Commission 2010.

²⁸ Chandler 2000.

²⁹ Baldwin and Widgrén 2005.

under Constitutional Treaty provisions is 12.2%. Additionally, a EU-28 consisting of the EU-27 plus Turkey would constitute a passage probability of 11.2%. When Baldwin and Widgrén compared these figures to the passage probability under the EU-27 - which they found to be 12.9% - they concluded that “Turkey’s membership would have only moderate implications for the passage probability”³⁰ and that therefore “(...) Turkey’s membership in the EU does not erode the EU’s ability to act.”³¹ As argued before however, this seems to be a somewhat premature inference. By integrating EU-28 and EU-29 scenarios into this research, a comparison between this study and the research of Baldwin and Widgrén is made possible.

The third scenario constitutes a 'medium-level' prediction. Based on the current state of events, and as indicated by the Commission, one can expect that, besides Turkey, the countries facing most immanent prospects of EU-membership are Iceland, Croatia, Macedonia and Serbia.

The final scenario is the most extensive one. This scenario holds that all eight candidate states will gain accession to the European Union. In this study Kosovo is omitted because the United Nations³² - the principal source of this study’s demographic data - does not possess demographic predictions for this country. However, this will not pose a significant issue since Kosovo only has an estimated population of around 2 million³³ and can be considered a minor entity compared to other EU-countries and the EU as a whole. Turkey will thus be one among many, albeit possessing a very large population when compared to the other candidate countries.

This study aims to forecasts the European Union at two different periods in time, namely 2014 and 2020. Although seemingly being two arbitrary timeslots, and as indicated above, 2014 and 2020 are common estimations of Turkish EU-accession. Moreover, in 2014 and 2020 the voting thresholds will differ from the current ones under the Nice Treaty - although the TEU³⁴ indicates that the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty’s voting thresholds can be postponed until 2017.

All in all, this research forecasts eight new scenarios: four scenarios for the year 2014, four scenarios for 2020. These scenarios are then compared with the findings of Baldwin and Widgrén - where possible - and to newly calculated passage probability scenarios of a EU-27 in 2014 and 2020.

³⁰ Baldwin and Widgrén 2005.

³¹ Baldwin and Widgrén 2005.

³² United Nations 2009.

³³ Statistical Office of Kosovo 2010.

³⁴ TEU 2010, 322.

3 TURKEY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION



3.1 The influence of Turkish EU-membership on passage probability within the Council

In order to allow for proper assessment of the implications of Turkish EU-membership for EU-decision-making effectiveness, points of reference need to be determined. By determining the EU-27's past, present and future capacity to act - in 2014 and 2020 that is -, terms of reference are outlined and a comparison with Baldwin and Widgrén's study is enabled.

In 2005 Baldwin and Widgrén forecasted that due to the "(...) high threshold of the Nice Treaty

rules for Council votes (...)” passage probability in the EU-27 would only be 2.1%.³⁵ As appears from Figure 3.1 this finding is confirmed by this study, which estimates the acting capacity in the EU to be 2%. Subsequently, Baldwin and Widgrén³⁶ found that changing the voting thresholds - from the Nice Treaty's triple majority scheme to a dual one under the Constitutional Treaty - would significantly improve passage probability. Following changes in voting regime, passage probability would jump to 12.9%. Again, these results are largely confirmed by this analysis: if the Constitutional Treaty was enacted in 2009, the passage probability would have been 12.8%. Furthermore, passage probability for the EU-27 will only change slightly in the future: to 12.8% and 12.7% in 2014 and 2020 respectively.

If Turkey becomes an EU-member, passage probability figures would change somewhat (Figure 3.2). Baldwin and Widgrén³⁷ found that for a EU-28 passage probability would be 11.2%. Although doubt can be cast on the validity of this inference - since the scholars unjustly assumed Turkish EU-membership in 2009 - it is nevertheless wholly confirmed by this study in retrospective. However, the more realistic forecasts - previewing Turkish EU-membership in 2014 or 2020 - only partly confirm Baldwin and Widgrén's findings. Whereas




³⁵ Baldwin and Widgrén 2005, 332.

³⁶ Baldwin and Widgrén 2005, 332.

³⁷ Baldwin and Widgrén 2005, 340.


in 2020 passage probability for a EU-28 would be 11.2% as well, in 2014 it will be 17.3% - thus differing significantly. What explains this significant rise? Since the sole difference between the three outlined scenarios is demographic makeup - the number of member states and voting thresholds are similar for all scenarios. It logically follows that this must be the key variable in explaining the significant passage probability level. As will be shown in the subsequent section, the passage probability difference could be accounted to the significant growth in SSI power values by the smallest EU-27 member states. Why the small EU-27 members gain this amount however falls beyond the scope of this study.




The difference between the passage probability of a EU with Turkey and without it, is ambiguous. As shown in Figure 3.3, Baldwin and Widgrén found that under Constitutional Treaty voting provisions, Turkish membership would only have marginal implications for EU decision-making capacity.³⁸ *Vis-à-vis* the passage probability in the EU-27, they found that in a EU-28, passage probability would drop with 1.7 percentage points. Logically, this study's retrospective findings depict a similar image with a drop of 1.6 percentage points. In contrast, passage probability for the year 2014 shows a significant rise, with 4.4 percentage points to. In 2020, passage probability differences are once more negative, falling 1.5 percentage points.

In Figure 3.4 different passage probability scenarios are plotted for the EU-27 plus Turkey and Croatia. For a EU-29 Baldwin and Widgrén estimated a passage probability of 12.2%. This analysis largely mirrors these findings with 12.3% for both 2014 and 2020. Whereas Baldwin and Widgrén excluded passage probability calculations for a EU-27 plus Croatia, this study does so. In this case, passage probability is rounded-off to 11.3% in 2014 while in 2020 it would be 11.2%. In Baldwin and Widgrén's case it is impossible to plot the difference between a EU-29 and EU-28. For 2014 and 2020 it is however possible to calculate these differences and it appears that Turkish EU-membership would lead to a slight rise in passage probability, with 1.0 percentage point in 2014 and 1.1 point in 2020.


³⁸ Baldwin and Widgrén 2005, 333.



Subsequent scenarios have not been plotted by Baldwin and Widgrén. However, if one focuses on the implications of Turkish EU-membership for decision-making efficiency, these depict a more realistic picture. As appears from Figure 3.5, the passage probability of proposals tabled in a EU consisting of 32 member states - the EU-27 plus immanent candidates Croatia, Iceland, FYROM, Serbia and Turkey - is equal for 2014 and 2020: 10.7%. In a EU-31 - thus excluding Turkey - passage probabilities are similar for both time slots as well: 9.6%. Therefore, the passage probability difference between both scenarios is 1.1 percentage points to the advantage of a EU consisting of 32 member states, including Turkey.




The final scenario contains 35 member states: the EU-27 plus Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, FYROM, Iceland, Serbia and Turkey (Figure 3.6). In this scenario passage probability in 2014 will be 9.7%, whereas in 2020 the EU's capacity to act will be 0.3 percentage points lower, 9.4%. In a scenario excluding Turkey - but including other candidate states - passage probability will increase with respective 1.4 and 1.3 percentage points to 11.1% in 2014 and 10.7% in 2020.



From the abovementioned the following inferences can be extrapolated - see Figure 3.7 for a graphical overview:

- Baldwin and Widgrén's predictions on the EU's capacity to act do not seem to differ much from this study's retrospective findings;
- Predicted demographic developments seem to have limited influence on passage probability: differences between 2014 and 2020 scenarios are generally marginal or non-existent;
- Except for the 'deviant' case EU-28 2014, passage probability differences between the various scenarios are limited;
- This analysis rejects Baldwin and Widgrén's assertion that Turkish EU-membership has only marginal negative implications for EU passage probability³⁹ and highlights the existence of ambiguous effects instead. Turkey's membership has a wholly positive impact on passage probability when enlarging the EU-28 with Turkey. An increase in passage probability can also be seen when expanding a EU-31 with Turkey. Different impacts exist when the EU-27 expands with Turkey however. Expanding the EU-27 with Turkey in 2014 leads to a significant increase in passage probability, whereas doing the same in 2020 leads to a drop. Finally, in case of the EU-35 *vis-à-vis* a EU-34, passage probability is negatively affected by Turkish EU-membership.



³⁹ Baldwin and Widgrén 2005, 333.

3.2 The influence of Turkish EU-membership on the power distribution within the Council

It can be expected that possible Turkish EU-membership will influence the power distribution within the EU as well. For matters of clarity, EU member states that currently have less than fifteen votes in the Council of Ministers - under the Nice Treaty provisions - have been grouped in two distinct categories. The group 'EU-27 Small' consists of those EU-27 member states that presently have less than eight votes in the Council of Ministers,⁴⁰ whereas 'EU-27 Medium' comprises those that have between ten and fourteen votes.⁴¹ This study highlights the power values - and developments herein - of the six largest EU-states bearing the most votes: Poland and Spain,⁴² Italy, the United Kingdom, France and Germany.⁴³




Figure 3.8 shows that the transition from the Nice Treaty to the Constitutional Treaty or Lisbon Treaty would clearly disadvantage the smaller and medium-sized EU-27 member states. Moreover, Germany - and to a lesser extent the other large EU states: France, Italy and the United Kingdom - will clearly gain from eventual treaty changes. Spain and Poland slightly lose breaking-power when the Constitutional or Lisbon Treaty will replace the Nice Treaty. Furthermore, demographic changes appear to have limited influence: differences between the hypothetical Constitutional Treaty scenario and the forecasted Lisbon Treaty scenarios in 2014 and 2020 are limited. Nevertheless, if one takes a closer look, demographic influences on power values can be detected. Related inferences need to be made carefully since these are based only on forecasted data of two timeslots only. Poland and Germany, which are both expected to experience a decrease in population, will experience a slight downfall in SSI-values. Then again, Spain and the United Kingdom are both forecasted to have a growing population, and unsurprisingly, their power values will increase.

⁴⁰ The 'small members' group consists of: Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta and Slovakia and Slovenia.

⁴¹ The 'medium members' group comprises Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania and Sweden.

⁴² These states have 27 votes in the Council.

⁴³ These states have 29 votes in the Council.






Figure 3.9 plots the power distribution within the EU if Turkey would join in 2014. Irrespective of the plotted EU composition, it appears that the medium-sized member states would collectively remain the most powerful in case of Turkish accession. However, they would lose a significant amount of power if the EU increases from 28 to 29 member states onwards. Furthermore, in case of a EU-28 - thus including Turkey - the smaller member states would greatly increase their power *vis-à-vis* a EU-27 scenario. Presumably, this great increase of the collective power value of the smaller member states contributes to the presence of an extraordinary high passage probability of 17.3%, as graphed in Figure 3.2. This power-increase is however annulled in subsequent scenarios entailing EU compositions larger than 28 member states. The 'big six' largely show similar power value developments in case of Turkish EU-accession. If Turkey would join the EU solitarily, the big six clearly would lose power. Especially Germany would see its power decrease significantly. In a scenario comprising 29 member states, the big six would regain some of their power and would get close to pre-enlargement levels. Then again, from 32 states onwards the larger member states would see their power values decrease. Figure 3.9 also shows that Turkey would become a significant player if it joins the EU: in all scenarios it becomes the second most powerful EU-state, whereas its power value developments would mimic those experienced by the big six. Finally, the 'enlargement' member states - the states joining the EU alongside Turkey - would see their power increase significantly. This power-increase is logical since different scenarios are plotted which include an increasing number of accession member states: in a EU-29 the only EU-accessor next to Turkey is Croatia, in a EU-32 Iceland, Croatia, Macedonia and Serbia are included as well and in a EU-35 it are Albania, Iceland, Croatia, FYROM, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Serbia, thus automatically increasing power values of the collective.



In case of exclusion of Turkey, EU-enlargement appears to have limited effects on the intra-EU balance of power (Figure 3.10). The medium-sized EU-27 member states would remain the most powerful group and see their power diminish marginally. The largest EU-27 states will see their power values remain constant despite subsequent enlargements. Germany will remain the most powerful EU state. Only the smallest member states would see their power diminish in case of a EU larger than 28 states. Logically, the enlargement group gains in importance when their figure increases from one - in a EU-29 - to six in case of a EU-35.

By comparing power values of forecasts including Turkey in the EU to those excluding it, the intrinsic influence of Turkey on the EU's power distribution can be determined (Figure 3.11). In case of a EU-28, the smaller member states would gain significant power compared to a EU-27 (59.20%). Moreover, it appears that the medium-sized member states group would benefit slightly from a EU enlarged with Turkey (4.60%). However, other EU member states would be negatively affected by Turkish EU-membership. It appears that the larger a EU-27 member state is, the more power it loses following Turkish membership. Poland and Spain lose significantly (-25% and -25.30%), France, Italy and the United Kingdom even more (-29.20%, -28.60% and -29.10%), while Germany would lose the most (32.30%).



Changes in power-values look different in subsequent scenarios. When a EU-27 plus Turkey and Croatia (EU-29) and a EU-27 plus Croatia (EU-28) are compared with each other, it appears that the smaller and medium EU-27 members are adversely affected the most by Turkish membership (-27.90% and -24.70%). Moreover, the other member states would also endure power-losses following Turkish EU-membership, albeit less. Poland and Spain would lose slightly (-5.30% and -5.50%), France (-9%), Italy (-8.90%), the United Kingdom (-8.90%) somewhat more. In this scenario, Germany would lose significantly (-11.40%). Croatia (5.30%) would be the only state in this comparison gaining power from Turkish EU-membership.

When comparing the power distribution of EU-32 to a EU-31, it shows that Turkish EU-membership has negative effects on the power values of every EU member state or group. The small and medium-sized member states are affected the most (-19.20% and -14.80%) as well as the states that would access the EU alongside Turkey (-18%). The big six would lose approximately the same as in the previous comparison: Spain and Poland lose again slightly (-5.70% and -5.60%), while France (-8.90%) Italy (-8.50%) and the United Kingdom (-8.80%) lose more. Once more, Germany would lose the most if Turkey would become a EU member (-11.40%).

The final comparison for 2014 is between a EU-35 and EU-34. In this case only Poland would benefit from Turkish EU-accession (8.10%), while the grouping of smaller member states (-1.80%) and the accession states would lose marginally (-3.00%). The other states have to hand in power as well if Turkey would access the EU. Once more, it appears that a connection exists between the size of a EU-27 member state and the amount of power it loses. From the larger member states, Spain loses the least (-9.20%), followed by Italy (-14.30%), the United Kingdom and France (both -14.60%) and Germany (-16.90%).

Differences between forecasted EU compositions in- and excluding Turkey translate themselves in the following preliminary summarizing remarks:

- the smaller member states would clearly benefit from a EU with 28 members, including Turkey;

- Croatia - the only accession state besides Turkey in the EU-29 scenario - would see its power increase if the EU consists of 29 member states, once more including Turkey;
- Poland would significantly gain power in case of a EU consisting of 35 member states including Turkey;
- on average, it appears that Turkish membership has negative consequences for other EU member states' power values;
- the small and medium-sized member states would significantly lose power in a EU consisting of 29 or 32 member states compared to a EU-28 or EU-31;
- the large EU member states would be the most negatively affected by Turkish EU-membership, especially in the cases of a EU-28 compared to the EU-27 and a EU-35 to EU-34;
- Germany would suffer the most from Turkish EU-membership in terms of power - especially if the EU-27 enlarges with Turkey or if a EU-34 would come to include Turkey as well.






Figure 3.12 plots the power distributions of multiple EU compositions in 2020. In 2020, the medium-sized EU-27 member states would collectively remain the most powerful, although power falls down slightly between the EU-27 and EU-29 scenarios. The group of smallest EU-27 members would lose slightly if the EU-28 expands with Croatia. The larger EU-27 member states - excluding Germany - experience broadly similar power changes and see their power decline as the EU expands. As a result of enlargement, the power of accession states would increase significantly as well. Interestingly, Germany would lose a significant amount of power if the EU-27 expands with Turkey. Finally, Turkey would become the most powerful EU-state, consistently having higher SSI-values than Germany.

Similar EU compositions - although excluding Turkey - are plotted in Figure 3.13. Also in this case, the medium EU-27 member states would consistently remain the most powerful collective and Germany remains the most powerful EU member state. The smaller member states see their power decline somewhat as the EU expands. This decline is however offset by an increase of power values by the accession states. Spain and Poland on the one hand and France, Italy and the United Kingdom on the other, would experience more or less constant power values if the EU expands its member-base.



From Figure 3.14 it appears that in none of the scenarios member states and groups would benefit from Turkish EU membership. If Turkey joins the EU-27 in 2020, the smaller EU-27 member states would lose the least power (-5%), whereas Poland (-9.20%) and Spain (-11.70%) and the group of medium member states (-12.60%) would see their power decrease approximately twice as much. The real sufferings however would be endured by the large member states. France (-16.20%), Italy (-15.30%) and the United Kingdom (-16.10%) would lose approximately the same amount of power in case of Turkish accession. Germany (-18.80%) would lose the most in case of sole Turkish EU-membership.

Power changes in case of a EU-29 versus the EU-28 scenario - although being consistently negative - differ somewhat from the comparison above. If Croatia and Turkey join the EU - compared to a scenario in which only Croatia would join - the smaller (-21%), medium (-24.80%) member states and Croatia (-19.70%) would see their power decline the most. Poland (-5.80%) and Spain (6.60%) would lose the least power in this case. From the large

EU-27 member states, Germany (-12.80%) would lose most power, whereas France (-10.20%), Italy (-9.60%) and the United Kingdom (-10.20%) would endure some declines in power.


Turkish EU membership in case of a EU-32 results in power changes comparable to the EU-29/EU-28 plot, although being slightly less dramatic. The small (-19.00%) and medium (-15.40%) EU-27 member states as well as the accession states (-18.00%) would lose the most, while Poland and Spain (both -6.50%) would lose the least in case of Turkish EU-membership. France (-9.90%), Italy (-9.40%), the United Kingdom (-9.90%) and Germany (-12.80%) would see their power values decrease significantly.

The consequences for the other member states' power values are clearly negative as well if a EU-34 expands with Turkey. The smallest member states (-4%) would lose the least from Turkish EU-accession, followed by the seven accession states (-5.40%). The medium member states (-12.70%), Poland (-11.60%) and Spain (-9.20%) would incur a significant power-loss. France (-13.70%), Italy (-15.70%) and the United Kingdom (-12.90%) would experience similar decline, whereas Germany again would bear the largest losses (-19.20%).


From the abovementioned, the following main points can be inferred:

- in 2020, Turkish EU-membership would clearly negatively influence the other individual and groups of EU member states' power values;
- the group of small EU-27 member states would experience the least power losses if the EU expands from 27 to 28 member states or from 34 to 35 member states, whereas they incur the largest loss if the EU expands from 31 to 32 states;
- whereas the medium-sized EU-27 collective would lose a significant amount of power in all plotted scenarios, it would experience the largest loss if a EU-28 including Croatia expands with Turkey;
- Polish and Spanish power losses are relatively stable and irrespective of the composition of the EU;
- the larger member states would suffer the most from Turkish EU-accession, especially if the EU-27 and a EU-34 would expand with Turkey;
- Germany would experience the adverse effects of Turkish EU-membership most intensely, primarily in expansions to a EU-28 and a EU-35.


Subsequently, Figure 3.15 and Figure 3.16 show that differences in power values between the two plotted timeslots are limited and pivot around zero. Only in a EU-28 clear differences exist for the smaller and medium-sized member states. For the smaller member states this significant difference can be explained by the exceptionally large power-gain that the smaller member states would experience in a EU-28 scenario in 2014 - the 'deviant' case.



Baldwin and Widgrén⁴⁴ took into account less forecasts than this study: whereas this study plots and analyzes the power distribution of a EU consisting of either 27, 28, 29, 32 or 35 member states for both 2014 and 2020, the scholars only forecasted a EU-29 power distribution in 2009. In Figure 3.17 Baldwin and Widgrén’s findings are given and compared to the figures retrospectively found by this study. Since very little difference exists between this study and the one by Baldwin and Widgrén, one could conclude that their demographic projections seem - at least in this case - to be valid and accurate.



⁴⁴ Baldwin and Widgrén 2005.



The sections on passage probability and the EU's power distribution result in the following overarching conclusions:

- Turkish membership generally has limited influence on the passage probability within the EU - the 2014 EU-28 compared to a EU-27 scenario (the 'deviant' case) being the notable exception;
- the effects of Turkish EU-accession on passage probability are divergent: they are strongly positive (the deviant case), slightly positive (the EU-29 versus EU-28 and EU-32 versus EU-31 scenarios in 2014 and 2020) or slightly negative (the 2020 EU-28 versus EU-27 scenario and the EU-35 comparison with a EU-34 for 2014 and 2020);
- EU-enlargement generally results in decreased passage probability, the deviant case being the exception;
- on average, Turkish EU-accession would have negative implications for other EU members' power values; only in the deviant case power values would rise significantly for the smaller EU-27 member states;
- in case of Turkish EU-accession, Turkey will replace Germany as the most powerful EU state in the 2020 scenario;
- scenarios rendering a EU inclusive of Turkey more favorable to a (enlarged) EU excluding it, are also those that would result in the most dramatic power changes within the EU: in the deviant case, but also in a EU-29 *vis-à-vis* a EU-28 excluding Turkey and EU-32/EU-31 comparisons for 2014 and 2020, Turkish accession would lead to significant power losses and changes for the other EU members;
- overall, the largest EU states appear to be affected most significantly by Turkish EU membership;
- differences between 2014 and 2020 scenarios are limited - and based on a comparison of only two timeslots - demographic change appears to have limited influence on the medium term's power distribution within the EU. Turkey is the exception to this statement, since it experiences significant demographic growth and eventually would become the most powerful EU state;
- although Baldwin and Widgrén's⁴⁵ account included a limited number of scenarios and power distribution plots, the ones that they actually forecasted are validated by this study in retrospective.

⁴⁵ Baldwin and Widgrén 2005.

4 CONCLUSIONS

Implications of Turkish EU-membership for Council decision-making effectiveness are moderate. Only if the EU-27 expands with Turkey in 2014, passage probability in the EU would rise substantially. In all other forecasted the impact of Turkish EU-membership compared to scenarios excluding Turkey as a EU member is limited. Therefore, this analysis confirms Baldwin and Widgrén's claim⁴⁶ that:

- *“If Turkey joins the EU, its implications for the passage probability within the EU are moderate”*

Furthermore, Baldwin and Widgrén asserted that Turkish EU-accession will not erode the EU's capacity to act.⁴⁷ Analysis however showed that this claim is only partially valid. Only in a EU-28 (in 2014), a EU-29 and a EU-32 (both in 2014 and 2020) Turkish EU-membership would not lead to an erosion of passage probability within the EU. To the contrary: in these cases passage probability would rise somewhat.

In case of a EU-28 (in 2020) and a EU-35 (in 2014 and 2020) Turkish presence within the EU would lead to a moderate deterioration of the EU's capacity to act. Therefore, the counterhypotheses need to be modified slightly in order to fully fit this study's findings:

- *“Turkish EU-membership enhances the EU's capability to act in case of a EU-28 (2014), EU-29 (2014/2020) and EU- 32 (2014/2020). In these cases passage probability is higher than in similar forecasted EU compositions although excluding Turkey”*
- *“Turkish EU-membership decreases the EU's capability to act in case of a EU-28 (2020) and EU-35 (2014/2020). In these cases passage probability is lower than in similar forecasted EU compositions although excluding Turkey”*

Possible Turkish EU-membership will have significant implications for the power distribution in the EU. Regardless of the EU's composition, Turkish EU-membership forthright results in a decrease of other member states' power - the small and medium-sized member states in case of a EU-28 (in 2014), Croatia in case of a EU-29 (2014) and Poland in case of a EU-35 (2014) constituting exceptions to this rule.

Moreover, this study found that although power decreases in case of Turkish EU-membership are almost omnipresent, they are not distributed evenly amongst EU member states. This contrasts sharply with Baldwin and Widgrén's following hypothesis: *“If Turkey joins the EU the power of all EU members would decrease more or less equally.”*⁴⁸ However, possible Turkish membership does have broadly similar effects on the power values of member states having similar demographic weight. In different EU compositions Poland and Spain would experience largely similar adverse effects in case of Turkish EU

⁴⁶ Baldwin and Widgrén 2005, 333.

⁴⁷ Baldwin and Widgrén 2005, 334-335.

⁴⁸ Baldwin and Widgrén 2005, 338.

entry, while the same would apply for France, Italy and the United Kingdom. Therefore the counterhypothesis on power changes in case of Turkish accession needs to be amended slightly:

- *“Turkish EU-membership will result in unequal changes in EU member states’ power, although member states with similar demographic weight will experience comparable adverse power changes”*

Additionally, Baldwin and Widgrén claimed that: *“If Turkey joins the EU the power of all EU members would decrease more or less equally except for Germany which is to experience a decline more than twice as much as any other EU member.”*⁴⁹ Once more, this study’s findings point in a somewhat different direction. Although Germany would suffer the most from Turkish EU-membership, its power losses will not be twice as much. At most, Germany sees its power decline with 32.30% when a EU-27 in 2014 expands with Turkey. Moreover, evidence exists that the demographic weight of a member state is negatively correlated with the amount of power it would lose in case of Turkish EU-membership. It appears that the larger a member state is, the more power it will lose if Turkey joins the EU. Therefore, the following claim is made:

- *“The larger a EU member state is, the more it will see its power decline in case of Turkish EU-membership. Therefore, Germany would experience the most adverse power changes if Turkey would join the EU”*

Turkey’s significant demographic weight was not ignored by Baldwin and Widgrén. The scholars forecasted that Turkey would become the second largest EU member state in case of accession in 2009.⁵⁰ Taking into account Turkey’s significant demographic growth rate and the fact that this study focuses on Turkish EU-accession at a later point in time, the counterhypothesis on Turkey’s power within the EU is fully confirmed:

- *“Whereas Turkey would be the second most powerful EU member state in case of EU-accession in 2014, it would be the most powerful if it enters in 2020”*

This study rejects many of Baldwin and Widgrén’s findings, either fully or partially. Were Baldwin and Widgrén wrong when they arrived at their conclusions back in 2005? Perhaps surprisingly, the answer is ‘no’. This study confirms to a large extent the forecasts made by Baldwin and Widgrén. Although their calculations were valid - and no indications exist that the demographic data they used was incorrect - their forecasts never became reality. The scholars thus fell in the trap of ‘crystal-gazing’, meaning that focusing on a limited number of forecasted scenarios greatly enhances the risk of making wrong predictions. If Baldwin and Widgrén would have included more and different possible EU scenarios in their research, the latter’s ‘expiry date’ would have been extended significantly.

The data generated by this research is very suited for subsequent analysis since it is up-to-date and not widely available. Moreover, the principal instruments of this study - passage probability and the SSI power index - are of great value. They help to determine and forecast EU decision-making capability and dynamics in a relatively straightforward way. Moreover, this study depicts a reasonably accurate forecast of the EU’s decision making

⁴⁹ Baldwin and Widgrén 2005, 338.

⁵⁰ Baldwin and Widgrén 2005, 338.

effectiveness and dynamics - regardless its future composition. This is due to the fact that demographic developments appear to be of limited significance to Council of Ministers' decision-making effectiveness and dynamics; throughout this analysis differences between the 2014 and 2020 forecasts surprisingly turned out to be extremely limited. This assertion is backed further by the fact that Baldwin and Widgrén's 2005 predictions about the EU in 2009 coincided almost perfectly with the factual situation within the EU *anno* 2009.

Nevertheless, this study is subjected to limitations. First, power is measured only by means of the Shapley Shubik Index. Including other power indexes, such as the Normalized Banzhaf Index would have greatly enhanced this analysis. Paterson⁵¹ for instance states that differences between the two indexes are "*usually* only marginal. However, there are important cases in which the results do in fact differ dramatically". Herein, he points to 'oceanic' voting games - involving a few large and many small players - as well as games concerning the division of power between different executive and legislative authorities, in his example between the President, Senate and Congress of the United States. Second, voting games disregard voters' preferences.⁵² In different policy areas, states have different interests and are thus likely to vote differently. Third, passage probability does not portray a wholly realistic image of decision-making efficiency in the EU. Whereas passage probability tools indicate that enlargement has negative consequences for the EU's capacity to act, analyses of empirical decision-making records by Depoorter⁵³ and Verkaart⁵⁴ found that it had risen somewhat instead. Differences between reality and passage probability forecasts predominantly arise because the latter presupposes that the Commission brings forward random legislative proposals, whereas this is not the case in reality. Of course, when crafting legislative proposals, the Commission takes into account other institutions' views in order to ensure that the proposal gets accepted by the Council and/or Parliament. Additionally, the Commission is often requested by the Council to come up with certain legislative proposals.⁵⁵ Moreover, passage probability forecasts omit informal practices. Hayes-Renshaw *et. al*⁵⁶ found that explicit voting in the Council of Ministers is rare since Ministers " (...) generally endorse collective consensus, even in those cases (...) where they could activate qualified majority voting (...). To the extent that voting takes place in these latter cases, it occurs implicitly than explicitly, operates mostly at the level of officials rather than ministers and is not recorded systematically in publicly accessible form." Moreover, "(...) there has been heavy reliance on consensus-building on many topics for functional reasons."

Fourth, this study focused only on one EU institution: the Council. In order to thoroughly assess the implications of Turkish EU-accession also other institutions besides the Council need to be analyzed.

Therefore, subsequent research could expand this study's outcomes by including more scenarios - more and different future EU compositions, different timeslots - and by using multiple power indexes. This will allow for falsification of this study, and will be of particular importance to explain the exceptionally high passage probability in deviant case, when the EU-27 would expand with Turkey in 2014. Finally, in order to arrive at a more

⁵¹ Paterson 2005, 3.

⁵² Widgrén 2008, 1.

⁵³ Depoorter 2008.

⁵⁴ Verkaart 2006.

⁵⁵ Nugent 2006, 166-168.

⁵⁶ Hayes-Renshaw *et. al* 2006, 162-163.

complete forecast, future research should determine implications for the EU as a whole and not only for the Council of Ministers.

The most important conclusion of this research is that the Turkish EU-accession process is not a black and white case. Policy makers and politicians should note this when assessing the Turkish EU-bid. Although it is still unclear whether 'the Relief of Vienna' will ever be in vain, if Turkey actually enters the Union it will most probably not only enter by itself. As such, and depending on the number and size of the other entrants, as well as the time slot, Turkish EU-accession will have differing consequences for the EU as a whole and Council in specific.

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