Jean Monnet Centre EuroMed
Department of Political Studies - University of Catania

Jean Monnet Working Papers in Comparative and International Politics

Carla MONTELEONE
University of Palermo
monteleone@sciepol.unipa.it

Rosa ROSSI
University of Catania
rossiro@unict.it

TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT[1]

December 2004 - JMWP n° 57
Keywords: Transatlantic cooperation, Conflict management, Security, EU Foreign Policy

Abstract: Despite remarkable policy disagreements between the US and the EU, a quantitative analysis of transatlantic cooperation in the field of conflict management shows the existence of a growing cooperative *habit* between the two actors. Indeed, changes in security culture and, more specifically, in conflict management have led to the creation of a transatlantic cooperative nucleous capable of promoting a wide socialisation process and a favourable environment for multilateral intervention to occur. In particular, the contemporary transition of the organization of the international political system, seems to be the viable environment where US's and EU's apparently opposing visions of international security not only coexist but also produce cooperation.

---

[1] The paper was delivered at the Transatlantic Studies Association Conference, Dundee, 12-15 July 2004. The paper is a joint work, however, Carla Monteleone is responsible mainly for paragraphs 1 and 3, while Rosa Rossi for paragraph 2.

1. Transatlantic Cooperation and the New Challenges

The continuous warnings about a widening of the gap between Americans and Europeans and the increasing number of disputes in all sectors between them have increasingly led scholars and commentators to describe the transatlantic relationship in terms of a "drifting apart" of the two partners. It has been said that what is lacking is the "glue" that kept allies together during the Cold War, to use an expression which was fashionable especially in the 1990s. The absence of a common threat seems to have underlined such a radical estrangement that somebody has advanced the hypothesis that Americans come from Mars while Europeans are from Venus (Kagan, 2003). However, while it would be naïve to deny the presence of serious and meaningful disagreements between the US and the EU, it is worth noticing that their commitment towards the identification of long term common goals and means to deal with contemporary global security challenges, that took place in the 1990s and was exemplified by documents such as the Transatlantic Declaration and the New Transatlantic Agenda, has underlined the importance of looking at the redefinition of the transatlantic relationship after the Cold War.

Despite the recent number of "crises" between Americans and Europeans, even today very few observers would contest the definition of the Atlantic region as a pluralistic security community, and specifically a partly tightly coupled one (Adler, 1997: 256). In the Atlantic region (which is broader than just the area comprising the United States and the European Union and includes countries such as Canada and Australia), there are dependable expectations of peaceful change, and we can find the elements that Karl Deutsch considered essential for the construction of a security community, i.e. compatibility of major values and mutual responsiveness (Deutsch et al., 1957). Indeed, we can also find at least some of the elements of the indicators Adler and Barnett used to define a "tightly coupled pluralistic security community", i.e. a mutual aid society in which members have constructed collective security arrangements, and in which a sort of post-sovereign system, with common supranational, transnational and national institutions and some form of a collective security system has been realised (Adler and Barnett, 1998). The sharing of fundamental constitutive norms, together with the increase of the institutionalisation process, are at the basis of the maintenance of the Atlantic security community and its institutions.

An extremely important role in the construction of the identity of the community is played by international organisations and institutions, i.e. those social institutions and material practices that, establishing behavioural norms, monitoring mechanisms and sanctions in case of non application of the established norms, can push the members of the security community to develop mutual expectations and therefore to identify with each other. This does not mean that asymmetry of power has no consequences nor that power is not exercised within the security community: it just rules out the use of its most coercive form (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 428). At the same time, this does not mean that important divergences and even clashes between the community members are excluded: not only rules are subject to interpretation, but they are meant to solve conflicts peacefully, not to avoid them. That's why the disputes internal to the Atlantic community cannot be seen as a military threat by the members of the community nor will they lead to new internal alliances to balance the system.[2]

This framework makes even clearer the importance of the increase of the institutionalisation of the relationship between the United States and the European Union that took place in the 1990s with the adoption of the Transatlantic Declaration and the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA). The enormous amount of IR literature on relations between Europe and America, however, has long neglected a systematic study of the relations between the United States and the European Union, as a new political actor, preferring to analyse the more general framework of the Atlantic Alliance and NATO or the bilateral relationship between EU individual member states and the United States.

A previous empirical analysis of the reactions by the US and the EU to the international security crises (defined as events capable of threatening existentially a referent object in a multidimensional definition of security) that occurred in the period 1990-2000 showed how difficult it is for the US and the EU to face independently the new crises and global challenges, and that there has been a shift towards a greater burden-sharing and responsibility-sharing, particularly evident in the second half of the '90s (Monteleone, 2003). From those data it also came out that the US and the EU consulted and/or coordinated each other in 46% of security crises, with an increase from 41% in 1990-95 to 47% in 1996-2000, i.e. after the adoption of the New Transatlantic Agenda, and that cooperation was not limited to the European region (see figures 1 and 2).

---

[2] On this point see also Risse (2000).

Figure 1: Percentage of reactions by sector in 1990-2000



A = political, military, ethnical; B = economic; C = societal; D = environmental

Figure 2: Percentage of all reactions by region 1990-2000



R1 = joint/coordinated; R2 = non-coordinated; R3 = no recorded answer; R4 = USA (+ others); R5 = EU (+ others)

However, that analysis adopted a multidimensional definition of security, leaving us wondering whether similar results would be repeated analysing the two actors' actions in the more traditional field of security, i.e. armed conflict and, in particular, conflict-management. Indeed, in the area of armed conflicts it is now remarkable the decline of traditional interstate wars and the increase in the number of civil wars, often capable of involving neighbouring countries, if just by massive flows of refugees that impose economic, political and social costs that the receiving country is sometimes not able to deal with and that can provoke the expansion of the conflict, or by incursions of irregular armies, etc. Most of contemporary conflicts have new characteristics compared to traditional interstate wars: the "new wars", as Kaldor calls them, involve a wider range of political and social groups if compared to traditional interstate wars; states can have a role of support, but they are not the aggressors; violence is dispersed, fragmented and directed mostly against civilians; political goals are deliberately achieved through atrocities and massive violations of human rights; war is fought to defend a religious identity, to gain political or economic power more than to obtain territorial gains (Kaldor, 1999).

In some of these cases, military interventions by the international community have been ineffective and proved how difficult it is to intervene in the new wars using only traditional security instruments[3]. They also proved the need to contain the causes of regional conflicts using not only military capabilities, but also new instruments[4] and structural policies[5]. Military intervention is nowdays more often in the form of police actions than of traditional military intervention, and economic instruments are more and more used as rewards or punishment to contain conflicts or to prevent nuclear proliferation, for instance, but they are also useful in the phase of reconstruction after a war, to facilitate the maintenance of peace and the prevention of a return to conflict. International financial institutions can provide incentives to cooperation in areas of crisis thanks to investments that can act as a restraint on the causes of violence, and through conditional assistance, that can be used to induce cooperation with neighbouring states or with potential adversaries (Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1997). The IMF and World Bank often work together with individual donors that, as in the case of the European Union in former Yugoslavia or, more recently in Afghanistan, sometimes lead the reconstruction efforts.

It is especially in the area of preventive diplomacy, more specifically in the field of economic diplomacy and in the so called soft power, that new international subjects, like the EU, have already found an important intervention niche that could prefigure their larger involvement in the management and resolution of conflicts. So far the EU has managed to exercise its influence not only – or not so much - through the instruments of CFSP, but mostly using economic and diplomatic instruments[6]. It is through the careful use of instruments of development cooperation, economic cooperation, assistance, humanitarian aid, political dialogue, mediation, and economic and political sanctions that the EU has addressed the structural causes of conflicts. So far the EU has privileged the use of conditionality and the reconstruction of societies devastated by conflicts in order to prevent conflict recurrence. However, recent initiatives addressing occasional causes of conflicts, especially in the field of arms proliferation, together with the intervention of the EU in the Balkans and in the Democratic Republic of Congo under the aegis of the UN, and the provision for a Rapid Reaction Force, show the possibility of a partially new approach.

After having defined conflict management and analysed its evolution, we will move on to assess the international actorness of the EU, and specifically how it can act in a way which is distinct from its member states, especially in international organisations of which it is not formally a member and that are at the basis of multilateral interventions. We will then analyse transatlantic cooperation in the field of conflict management trying to point out the influence that this collaborative nucleous has on security governance. The analysis will point out the existence of a cooperative nucleous made of the US and the EU, capable of promoting a wider socialization process and of creating a favourable environment for multilateral interventions to occur, even in the field of conflict management.

---

[3] In some cases the external military intervention accelerated the state disintegration process.

[4] Such as preventive diplomacy, early warning and early response systems, confidence and security building measures, fight against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international mediation, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, sanctions and incentives, positive and negative conditionality

[5] Such as development aid, democratisation, etc.

[6] For an analysis of the political use of its economic instruments throughout most of its history, see Ginsberg (1989)

2. Approaches to Conflict Management

The evolution of different approaches to conflict management mirrors changes in the global order of the post Cold War international system (Richmond 2001a:140-145). The traditional state system seems to coexist with a post-Westphalian "interdependent environment" (Richmond 2001b: 32) characterised both by global and fragmented dynamics. If on the one hand «globalization breaks down territorial boundaries and replaces them with new, uniform configurations of power, money and culture», on the other hand there is still a persistence of "states interactions" which «reconfirms territorial boundaries and the structures and processes contained by them» (Armstrong, 1998: 96). This means that next to traditional inter-states dynamics and relations, we have assisted to a proliferation of weak states, to the erosion of state sovereignty and to the rise of fragmentation. These processes offered more space to non state actors, however their manoeuvre room potentiality remains constrained by state actors and relations.

Since the '80s the concept and the agenda of security started acquiring a multidimensional meaning and to be more and more detached from the military sector. In particular in the '90s the concept of *human security* arose and immediately became operational within the UN system and within other international organizations, also thanks to the support of states such as Canada, the Nordic Countries and Japan. The notion of human security, and more generally of *multidimensional security*, has been increasingly acknowledged by the rhetoric of the international society and of the new non state actors. Human beings and human needs are at the core of security approaches and non state actors seem to respond well to citizens expectations (Richmond, 2001b 35). Notwithstanding, the territorial integrity of states and the traditional meaning of security are not completely overcome. The contemporary presence of different discourses on security tends to construct security practices with a broad vision, which includes a great variety of actors in conflict management initiatives, which range from states to international organizations, regional organizations, NGOs, civil society, etc. and a great variety of resources: military, civilian, diplomatic, economic, etc.

The diffusion of the human security concept, with all the issues implied, such as massive violations of human rights, humanitarian crises, etc. brought deep changes in international norms and particularly those concerning intervention/sovereignty issues. The evolution of the international order is based on changes of the patterns of international violence, which - traditionally being based wihin the context of inter-states conflicts - is now resting more often on internal wars and on terrorism, producing inevitably implications in terms of appropriateness and legitimacy for international actors to intervene in domestic issues.

These shifts in the type of armed conflict and in the international order are also reflected in the evolution of the UN system and in particular in the peacekeeping practices which developed from traditional peacekeeping operations, based on impartial interposition of light equipped troops, to more active and multidimensional peace operations. The UN system, accordingly, should not be treated "as given", as its institutional arrangements go under an inevitable adaptation in order «to meet the emerging needs and demands of states and civil societies» (Coate *et al*. 2001:16). For instance, the UN Security Council has gradually expanded the scope of Chapter VII of the UN charter to link the security of peoples within a country to international peace and security (Schmitz and Sikkink, 2002: 530).

The literature tends to distinguish between different generations of peace-keeping which reflect the evolution in conflict management. The first generation is exemplified by traditional peace-keeping, the second generation is identified by a multifunctional peacekeeping (where humanitarian post-conflict peace building is included) and the third generation is formed by "quasi enforcement" operations (Richmond, 2001b:34).

According to Richmond (*ibid*: 41-70), the first generation of peacekeeping includes "mono-dimensional approaches" and peacekeeping, state-centric diplomacy, mediation and negotiation initiatives.

Traditional peacekeeping is characterized by the following principles: «a) Consent of the parties to the dispute for the establishment of the mission; b) Non-use of force except in self defence; c) Voluntary contributions of contingents from small, neutral countries to participate in the force; d) Impartiality; e) Control of peacekeeping operations by the Secretary General». Traditional Peacekeeping was launched by Dag Hammarskjold, Secretary General, and Lester Pearson, Canadian Foreign minister, in 1956 to resolve the Suez crisis when UNEF I was implemented (Hansen, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 2003; Diehl 1994: 30). The first period of traditional peacekeeping doctrine lasted until 1989. Operations were quite limited both in terms of numbers of missions deployed and in terms of blue helmets and resources involved.

Second generations approaches aim to resolve conflict examining the root causes of armed conflict and have multilateral, multidimensional, and multinational characteristics (Duffey, 2000:123). «*Multilateralism* implies the involvement of several levels of actors in an operation» (Hansen, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 2003). Actors involved may range from states, NGOs, UN or other international and regional organizations. *Multidimensional* peace operations imply the use of different means which range from military to civilian components and includes: preventive deployment, observation of cease-fire agreements, demobilization of warring parties, assisting interim civilian authorities, supporting elections, helping the return of refugees and displaced persons; mine clearing, protecting humanitarian relief operations, arresting international criminals (Knight, 1998: 23). «The terms *multinationalism* and *multiculturalism* suggest that both the military and the civilian components of the peacekeeping force are drawn from a diverse range of nations or agencies. Each of these will bring to the operation its own unique political and cultural background, its own varied understandings of the conflict situation, and its own diverse approaches and techniques for conflict resolution» (Hansen *et al.*: *ibid*). Functional to the above developments, the UN system has evolved its institutional arrangements to deal with peacekeeping. UN peacekeeping operations are under control of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). The DPKO was set up as a separate department of the UN Secretariat in 1992 and works with the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), which is in charge for conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacebuilding within the UN system. The DPKO also manages other peace and security operations that are mainly civilian. The organ with "primary responsibility for international peace and security" under the UN Charter, is the Security Council and all peacekeeping operations are established by it.

In this phase, and «specifically from 1989 to 1994, some eighteen operations were deployed, more than had been dispatched in the UN's first forty-five years» (Chopra 1998:4). Underlining the great increase of UN involvement in conflict management since the end of the Cold War, often attributed only to the end of crossed vetoes in the Security Council of the two super powers, but which has also to do with the acknowledgment of new operational needs in relation to what were perceived to be new security issues and priorities. UNTAG, created to facilitate Namibia's independence from South Africa, is regarded as the first UN operation that has introduced this new approach to peace-keeping. Second generation approaches therefore offered an important acknowledgement to individuals, humanitarianism, and democratisations (Richmond 2001).

Third Generation operations or enforcement operations involve military efforts implemented «to defend victims of aggression and restore peace and security by the defeat of aggressor forces» (Diehl, 2003:42). Diehl distinguishes two types of enforcement actions: A) "collective *security*" when a coalition of states (most of the time acting within an international organization) seeks to stop (by deterrence or defeat) another state(s) that uses military force in order to change the status quo, and B) "collective *defence*", which implies also military actions, but supported by a traditional military alliance and where the aggressor (enemy) is identified before and is generally an external state (Diehl 2003:43-48). According to Diehl some conditions are needed for the coalition of states or the organizations in order to carry out "collective security" initiatives and these includes:

- political will to fight for the *status quo* facing risky and costly actions;
- military capabilities,
- rules, procedures and structural apparatus (Diehl, 2003: 44-48).

Third generation operations are quite different from traditional peacekeeping, as they may lack of «consent, impartiality and the non-use of force» (Duffey, 2000: 121), and involve Article 39 in Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which empowers the Security Council to undertake enforcement actions to maintain peace and security. However the UN lacks military forces (no agreement has been signed to provide national forces to the UN) and consequently any operation should be implemented on ad hoc basis.

The shifts in UN peacekeeping are briefly addressed in a number of UN documents, such as Boutros-Ghali's *An Agenda for Peace*, the *Supplement to the Agenda for Peace* and the *Brahimi report*.

3. The European Union as an International Actor

The multidimensionality of new interventions gives new space to non state actors and has allowed the EU to play an increasingly relevant role in the field of conflict management. The capacity of the EU to act on the international stage as a unitary and autonomous actor is still under debate. However its international actorness is more and more recognised, at least to some extent, as it has managed to successfully use its economic instruments for political goals. Foreign policy cooperation among EU member states has been discussed nearly since its foundation, and the development of the European Political Cooperation (EPC), first, and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), since the Maastricht treaty, have led to a significant level of foreign policy coordination amongst EU member states since the '70s (Ginsberg, 1989; 2001). Until the first half of the '80s, the EPC was a pure intergovernmental instrument, distinct from the European Community structure, that nonetheless kept adapting itself in its rules, procedures and even the definition of its roles and competences to the situations that its members had to face.

The Maastricht treaty (TEU) introduced the CFSP, which covers all aspects of foreign and security policy (Article J.1,1) and introduced the possibility of common positions and joint actions. However, the practice of the CFSP is based on the perennial search for consensus amongst the member states. The new instruments are relevant in that member states must adapt their national policies to common positions, must coordinate their actions in international organisations and international conferences, and in international fora they must defend the common positions adopted. The only "freedom of manoeuvre" is left to the permanent representatives in the Security Council of the UN, who still are invited to defend the positions and interests of the Union. Still, the behaviour of member states at the UN, even at the Security Council, is much more homogenuous than one would expect.

The Amsterdam treaty, recognising the need to give coherence to foreign policy, external relations and development policies gave a bigger role to the Commission in the field of external actions. The Commission and the Council must cooperate in this sector, and the Council can request that the Commission advances initiatives/proposals relative to the CFSP to implement common actions. The Commission became then part of the new troika, which now comprises the Presidency and the High Representative, and if necessary the following presidency.

The Amsterdam treaty introduced the possibility to adopt common strategies and principles, defined by the European Council, which becomes a more relevant actor together with the Secretary General, called to act as High Representative in the field of CFSP and to work with the Council in particular in formulating, elaborating and implementing political decisions, but also to have a political dialogue with non member states, in the name of the Council and upon request by the Presidency. Moreover, the Secretary General is called to assist the Presidency in representing the

Union in CFSP, and to express the position of the Union in international conferences and organisations.

The Nice treaty, which took effect on 1 February 2003, strengthens security and defence issues, introduces new provisions in the area of enhanced cooperation and gives new competences to the Political and Security Committee, which has more relevance and autonomy in determining the political control and the strategic direction of crisis management operations.

Towards a Common Defence Policy

The competence of the European Union in the area of defence policy was introduced in the Maastricht treaty and strengthened in the Amsterdam treaty, which introduced the possibility of a stronger relationship between the EU and the WEU, and explicitly defined amongst its missions the so-called Petersberg tasks (humanitarian missions, peacekeeping, peacemaking…), gradually absorbing some of the WEU tasks. Moreover, the Amsterdam treaty better defined the relationship between the WEU and NATO.

The June 1999 Cologne European Council strengthened the military capacities of the EU integrating, in practice, the WEU into the EU and putting as a political priority the need to strengthen the operational capacities of the EU in the field of peacekeeping and peacemaking. The December 1999 Helsinki European Council established as a goal for 2003 the capability of deploying within 60 days and for at least one year up to 60,000 military units for the Petersberg tasks in operations under the direction of the EU. It also established new permanent institutions: the Political and Security Committee, the Military Committee and the Military Staff. Further developments, in particular in the relationship between the EU and NATO came at the June 2000 Feira European Council and at the December 2000 Nice European Council.

Since September 2000 the NATO North Atlantic Council and the Political and Security Committee of the European Union have met to structure new forms of cooperation (the meetings have become regular since 2001), which take on and move forward the arrangements that already existed between the WEU and NATO. The meetings ensure consultation and cooperation also with EU member states who are not members of NATO and are developed on questions that are considered of common interest and that are relating to security and defence, especially in crisis management. Joint NATO-EU Ad Hoc Working Groups have been meeting regularly since 2000 to discuss issues such as modalities for EU access to Alliance assets and capabilities and the defence planning system. In 2001 it was also decided to establish formal meetings of NATO and EU foreign ministers and the Secretary General of NATO established a direct contact with the EU General Affairs Council. Direct contacts have increased since 2001, especially after 9/11 and in relation to the campaign against terrorism. But direct consultation and cooperation has occurred on all issues relating to the Balkans and joint operations have been carried out by the NATO Secretary General, the EU High Representative, the Chairman in Office of the OSCE and the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe in Macedonia. Indeed, it is in Macedonia that the EU has substituted NATO in the international military operation Allied Harmony establishing the EUFOR and the operation Concordia[7]. In the Balkans Concordia has been followed by two police missions, in Bosnia and in Macedonia.

The scope of action is not limited to the European area though. The operation Artemis was launched in the Democratic Republic of Congo in accordance with UN SC resolution 1484 (30/5/2003) and a EU joint action adopted five days later, and it established the deployment of an interim emergency multinational force in the region of Ituri, in close coordination with MONUC, the United Nations Mission in DRC.

---

[7] NATO (2002: ch. 15); Longo (2004).

The EU and Multilateral Fora

Despite disagreements on the full capacity of the EU as an international actor, none of the participants to this debate denies that the EU has a full and growing impact on international politics, that started since EPC. As M.E. Smith (2004) notes, the creation and strengthening of a European foreign policy resulted in the expansion of collective foreign policy actions, in the expansion of the number of functional issues with which it deals, and in the repertoire of policy tools. A remarkable effect can be noticed at the level of the member states foreign policies. Indeed, «EU states gradually exhibited a greater willingness to use EC resources (rather than national contributions) for EPC/CFSP actions, a willingness that clearly had been absent during the 1970s… [t]hese activities reflect the tendency for all EU states to adapt their foreign policies on a wide range of issues in accordance with common EU norms… This trend toward the 'Europeanization' of foreign policy among EU states is a direct result of the institutionalized socialization process» (*ibid*: 111-113). National foreign policies have not disappeared, but, as Hill (1998) noted, next to the logic of divergence it is possible to find a logic of convergence because of the advantages of the politics of scale, external demands and perceptions, common values…: all of these factors push national governments to find a common political line. This means that the *practice* of cooperation in foreign policy has created a *habit* of cooperation, so that member states try to present themselves as a common front and make efforts to at least present a common declaration. But this also means that this is exactly what external actors expect from the EU.

Not only in 1993 member states decided that foreign policy actions had to be under the EU name only (not member states)[8], but they progressively changed their behaviour in multilateral fora, so as to allow the EU to gain a more or less direct participation even in international organisations in which the EU only has observer status and not full membership. Membership of the EU in international organisations can occur either because it accedes to an existing international organisation or because it participates in the conclusion of an international treaty establishing an organisational structure. It is the Presidency that expresses the position of the Union in multilateral fora. In practise, however, European representation is more complex. As noticed by Govaere *et al.* (2004: 162), «[a]s many international organizations cover areas which fall under both Community competence (sometimes including exclusive and non-exclusive EC competence) and Union competence, it is not always apparent who is entitled to speak: the Commission, the Presidency, the Member States, or a combination. International organizations might not always know whom to address, nor in what capacity the addressee answers. When the Presidency takes the floor on the international scene, it can do so in three different capacities: as the EU representative in CFSP matters; the representative of its own state, in particular in the event no common position (under the second-pillar provisions) was reached; or representing both the EC and the EU in cross-pillar (first and second pillar) matters whereby the thrust of the issue lies within EU competence».

This has not prevented the EU to become an actor at the UN, which can be considered the most important formal institution of government of the international system, founded upon rules and procedures which reflect the existing world structure of government, and whose change would reflect a change in the organisation of the international political system (Attinà, 2003a and 2003c). Moreover, as the UN is the source of most of multilateral actions in the field of conflict management and as, under current shared norms about when the use of force is legitimate and appropriate, even humanitarian military intervention now must be multilateral and organised under UN auspices or with explicit UN consent to be considered legitimate by the other members of the international society (Finnemore 1996), the behaviour of the EU and its member states at the UN becomes particularly relevant.

Indeed, EU member states coordination in UN organs is very high, and based on more than 1,000 coordination meetings conducted each year to prepare and finalise EU positions[9]. The high number of coordination meetings is necessary to reach consensus, but at the same time prompts it.

---

[8] Council decision 8 November 1993.

[9] Available at www.europa.eu-un.org

This does not mean reaching the lowest common denominator decision, as most often EU member states have acquired the habit of working together and coordinating their position, so much so that they redefine their national interest according to the importance of reaching a common EU position, and when one state defects, it is socially emarginated by the others, proving the existence of the "norm" of cooperation (Smith M.E., 2004). It is the delegation of the Presidency that convenes and chairs consultations, and this practice has become routine for EU member states both in intergovernmental organisations and in world conferences. The Presidency is also in charge of presenting the EU position. According to the EU, this coordination effort results in a common position on more than 90% of the General Assembly votes. But also at the UN Security Council it is possible to notice the regular formation of an EU 'caucus' whenever European countries members of the EU become temporary members of the Security Council. Moreover, even the UK and France have started consulting and informing the other EU member states on Security Council matters and have a much more accommodating attitude under pressure from the other EU member states (Dedring 2004).

If we have a closer look at voting cohesion, the analysis of roll call votes gives percentages not as high as the ones above 90% declared by the EU Commission on the basis of the aggregate of roll call votes and consensus votes. Still it is a percentage that has been growing constantly since the 1980s, and especially in the 1990s (see figure 3). Moreover, as pointed out by Laatikainen, the EU more and more often issues statements, declarations and documents not only in the General Assembly, but also in the Security Council (see figure 4). This means that member states normally align their positions within the Security Council representing the Union's position, and that normally the Presidency (when the EU Presidency coincides with membership of the Security Council) speaks on behalf of the Union in the Security Council in a way that allows the EU to be seen as a different actor than the UK or France (Laatikainen, 2004: 4) (figure 5).

Figure 3: EU Member States Voting Cohesion during UN General Assembly Roll-Call Votes 1991-2000 (Source: adapted from Laatikainen, 2004: 7)



Figure 4: Statements and Documents in UN General Assembly and Its Main Committees 1990-2000 (Source: adapted from Laatikainen, 2004: 9)



Figure 5: The EU at the UN Security Council 1990-2000 (Source: adapted from Laatikainen, 2004: 9)



The EU has also been progressively seen as a unitary power by other UN members also because of its great structural power within the UN. Not only the EU and its member states together constitute the largest financial contributor to UN operations and one of the main contributors from an operational point of view[10], but it also *dominates* the regional group of which it is part (the Western European Group and Other States), therefore controlling nominations for member states of UN bodies and for leadership positions (Jorgensen and Laatikainen, 2004). All of this allows the EU - which is not a formal member, but just a permanent observer at the UN - to be increasingly recognised as a unitary force (Laatikainen, *ibidem*: 5).

The European habit of coordination and consensus-creation can be seen in place also in the relationship with the US. Although the voting coincidence between EU member states and the US has been slowly but definitely decreasing in the past few years (figure 6), signalling policy differences, aggregating the EU countries it is still possible to notice that the vote coincidence between the US and the EU member states at the UN General Assembly is by far the highest amongst all political groups (figure 7), signalling the persistence of common values and of a similar agenda. Even by looking at the Department of State's data on voting coincidence with the US at the UN, it is possible to note an US-EU cohesion on what the US considers to be "important matters". Jorgensen and Laatikainen also notice that in the Security Council there is even greater coincidence between the US and the EU member states, but this is a reflection of the practice of consensus at the UN Security Council. On the basis of an empirical analysis, not only of the EU and US voting behaviour, but also of their speeches, Jorgensen e Laatikainen (ibidem: 15) argue that «there is not much difference in the values that are held by the US and the EU, though US national interests have led to some divergent positions, notably on the Middle East and Cuba. There is a difference in tone, with the US acting as a stern taskmaster with regard to UN operations and the EU being much more nurturing of UN activities and more expansive in articulating multilateral priorities. However, the 'difference machine' that Manners and Whitman [2000] argue distinguishes the EU from the United States and others is tenuous at best when it comes to values and principles».

Figure 6: EU Voting Coincidence with the US at the UN General Assembly, votes only (Source: adapted from U.S. Department of State, 2000; 2001; 2002; 2003)



---

[10] The EU cannot directly contribute to the UN general budget as formally it is just an observer, not a member, but it is one of the main donors to its agencies and programmes with over 50% of contribution to UN funds and programmes, 40% of the share of the UN peacekeeping operations budget in 2001-2003, and 37% of the share of the UN regular budget in the period 2001-03 (Govaere et al, ib: 178; EU-UN Statistics from www.europa.eu-un.org)

Figure 7: Overall Plenary Votes – Percentage of Voting Coincidence with the United States (Source: Department of State, 2003)



Similar dynamics can be found when we turn to another organisation that is today more and more associated with global governance and that has recently started dealing with conflict management: the G8. The EU is not a formal member, but it has an observer status since 1977. Moreover, as the G8 is not formally an international organisation, from a strictly legal point of view the rules in the TEU that should bind member states and the Commission do not necessarily apply fully: Article 300 does not apply. However, the CFSP rules are still binding. Therefore, it is possible to find what has been defined by Fisher (2001) as “a strong behavioural connection”. Indeed, not only most of the issues debated in the G7/8 have now moved from member states competence to the EU competence, but the European countries of the G8 have an important weight also in the EU and, as Fischer (2001: 131) points out, «at the summit level both bodies deal with a very similar agenda». Indeed, it has been noticed that, during the 1990s, «the European input to the summit became more coherent, more confident, and more innovative» (Bayne, 2002:24), allowing the European members and Canada to take the lead in certain issues. As Stephens (2002:242) notices, «the US appears to be increasingly affected by the policy initiatives of other G8 members […] [Although] these policy alternatives also act as Trojan horses, carrying with them their author country’s underlying norms and principles within their particular issue area» and allowing the norms and principles of the G8 to gradually transform. The G8 can therefore be considered a socialising institution for promoting the hegemon’s norms, values and interests, but one in which «no longer does the success of a particular summit issue depend on US support» as it is more open to the influence of the small states. Indeed, Fischer underlines how similar the G8 Communiqué of Cologne in 1999 was to the previous Cologne European Council and how similar their agendas were. So similar that he argues that, although indirectly, the limits of the G7/8 summit are basically set at the previous European Council for European states, as not only they are bound to that position for legal reasons, but they also *feel* bound (Fischer, ib: 138).

4. The Outcomes of Transatlantic Cooperation[11]

The increase in the number and level of institutional contacts between the US and the EU, i.e. the creation of a cooperation structure that has been progressively institutionalised and that helps both to solve internal disputes (or to avoid their degeneration) and to promote coordinated actions in sectors recognized as of common responsibility and interest, is consistent with the belonging of the US and the EU to the Atlantic pluralistic security community, but also with the framework of evolutionary theory (Modelski, 1999).

According to Modelski, it should be possible to place the new transatlantic agenda between the agenda-setting and the coalition-building phases, i.e. to interpret it as a reflex of a relative weakening (not necessarily in terms of material capabilities) of the global leader and the construction of new alliances around a new agenda and a new set of issues. This does not mean that the US and the EU must necessarily and always share exactly the same values and an identical vision of their goals or of the best instruments to achieve them, as they do not. What it implies is that they share a similar vision of the global order and an analogous commitment to solve what they have identified as global problems.

The new structure established by the NTA strengthened and stabilised the already existing consultation framework, shifting from *ad hoc* to regular meetings. Although the enormous number of formal and informal contacts makes it difficult to map it, the US-EU dialogue has already established some regular meetings at every level. The structure around which the transatlantic partnership is built has been capable of adapting itself to the new and evolving capabilities of the European Union. At the same time, the presence of the Commission in almost all institutionalised meetings inserts an element of continuity and is meaningful of the capacity of the Commission to exert its power not only in the economic sector but also in all grey areas of foreign policy.

To the framework of institutionalised contacts within the bilateral EU-US relationship, it is also possible to add not only the daily non institutionalised contacts which are virtually impossible to trace, but also meetings in other international fora in which the EU is present: United Nations, OSCE, G8, ASEAN Regional Forum, Quartet, Quadrilateral (US, EU, Canada and Japan), WTO, OAS[12], etc.

In order to verify the existence of a *habit of cooperation* between the US and the EU, it was conducted a quantitative analysis of the *answers* given by the two actors in managing armed conflicts. In particular the research carried out an empirical assessment of the *reactions* of the EU and the US to all armed conflicts that took place between 1990 and 2001. The period was chosen because of the structural change that took place both at the international system level and at the internal EU level in the post Cold War environment. Moreover, in November 1990 the Transatlantic Declaration was signed, indicating the beginning of the US interest towards the EU as an international actor. We chose as source for armed conflicts the PRIO/Uppsala Armed Conflict Dataset[13] as it covers the most recent period. An armed conflict is defined, by PRIO/Uppsala researchers, as «a contested incompatibility that concerns government or territory or both where the use of armed force between two parties results in at least 25 battle-related deaths. Of these two parties, at least one is the government of a state» (Gleditisch et al. 2002: 616-617).

---

[11] For a more extensive analysis, see Monteleone (2003).

[12] The EU has permanent observer status in this organisation.

[13] The PRIO/Uppsala Armed Conflict Dataset is available at http://www.prio.no/page/Project_detail//9244/45926.html

Moreover, this Dataset has the advantage of including a low threshold of battle deaths, including, accordingly, different intensity level of armed conflicts (minor, intermediate, war). In our research we take in consideration all the different type of conflicts[14].

In our final table we collected, however, 83 armed conflicts that is a number slightly inferior compared to the PRIO/Uppsala dataset, since we unified as *a single* record some internal armed conflicts considered different in Uppsala dataset (they regard different conflicts when the opposing parties are different). However we chose to unify in a single conflict, when it was possible to record a high consistency on the issues at stake, there was the same political framework and there was a coincidence in the period[15]. In our final table we also add two conflicts, which were not recorded in PRIO/Uppsala and expressly the Central African Republic (1995/1997) and Haiti (1995).

We draw data on international interventions to manage armed conflicts mainly by the Doyle and Sambanis Dataset[16]. However, since this Dataset addresses only *internal* conflicts and covers data till 1997, data were updated, till 2001 and the interventions by the international community in the considered period for the management of also *international* conflicts were added (Rossi, 2003). In order to assess the type of the international intervention into the conflicts we refer both to Doyle and Sambanis' and Fortna's datasets[17] and, following the latter, we distinguish international commitment in: *monitoring or observer mission*, *traditional peacekeeping*, *multidimensional peacekeeping* and *peace enforcement*.

Monitoring or observer missions is defined as «an interim arrangement used in violent conflicts, with the consent of the host government and where there is no formal determination of aggression, aimed at monitoring a truce and assisting the negotiation of a peace through the presence of military and civilian observers» (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000: 781).

«*Traditional Peacekeeping* involves the deployment of military units and civilian officials in order to facilitate the negotiated settlement of a conflict. It is based on the consent of the parties (normally authorised under Chapter VI of the UN Charter). Traditional peacekeeping operations (PKOs) typically establish and police a buffer zone and assist the demobilization and disarmament of military forces» (*ibidem*).

«*Multidimensional Peacekeeping* is also consent based and is designed to implement a comprehensive negotiated peace agreement. It includes a mix of strategies to build a self-sustaining peace, ranging from those of the traditional PKOs to more multidimensional strategies for capacities-expansion (e.g. economic reconstruction) and institutional transformation (e.g. reform of the police, army, and judicial system, elections, civil society re-building» (*ibidem*).

«*Peace enforcement* is a (usually multilateral) military intervention, authorised under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, designed to impose public order by force, if needed, with or without host government consent» (*ibidem*).

---

[14] The three subsets are defined as follows: «Minor Armed Conflict when there are at least 25 battle-related deaths per year and fewer than 1,000 battle-related deaths during the course of the conflict, Intermediate Armed Conflict when at least 25 battle-related deaths per year and an accumulated total of at least 1,000 deaths, but fewer than 1,000 per year. War when at least 1,000 battle-related deaths per year» (ibidem).

They include four types of armed conflicts: «1. Extra-state conflict is a conflict over a territory between a government; and one or more opposition groups, where the territory is a colony of the government. 2. Interstate conflict is a conflict between two or more countries and governments. 3. Internal conflict is a conflict within a country between a government and one or more opposition groups, with no interference from other countries; 4. Internationalized internal: Similar to internal conflict, but where the government, the opposition or both sides receive support from other governments» (ibidem).

[15] As example we considered as one the conflicts in Bosnia Herzegovina which in PRIO Uppsala dataset are considered three (Serb, Croat, Bihac), as for the PRIO Uppsala researchers considered the three opposing parties were different. However the three conflicts broke out in the same period, in the same political framework after the collapse of Former Yugoslavia and aimed all to gain part of the territory, which was mainly habited by an ethnic group. Other conflicts we unified are: Azerbaijan, Burma, India, Ethiopia, Niger.

[16] Available at http://econ.worldbank.org/programs/conflict/datasets/data?id=13219

[17] Available at http://www.columbia.edu/~vpf4/research.htm

However, in some cases we made different valuations on the type of international missions compared to Fortna and Doyle & Sambanis dataset[18].

Concerning the reactions of the US and the EU, to operationalise them we used a widely accepted definition of cooperation as variation in the preferences of the actors through a negotiating process (Keohane, 1984: 51). Therefore actions or declarations here classified as "joint and/or coordinated" are those on which a negotiating process occurred, that were discussed by the two actors, even if this does not automatically guarantee the adoption of identical actions. Actions defined as "non coordinated" are those on which no negotiation process occurred, that were not discussed by the US and the EU, neither during summits and high level meetings established within the framework of the TD or the NTA, nor during multilateral international meetings, but in which they both intervened, even though sometimes despite the lack of any recorded coordination the two actors ended up acting in exactly the same way. "No recorded reaction" indicates that no reaction could be found in any of the above-mentioned collections of documents and materials used. "US + others" or "EU + others" indicate that the US or the EU were involved either alone or together with other actors different from the EU in the first case, from the US in the second case.

These criteria have been applied to a screening of the *Keesing's Record of World Events* from November 1990, when the first transatlantic document, the Transatlantic Declaration, was adopted, to December 2001 (updating Monteleone, 2003), in order to verify the impact of transatlantic cooperation in the field of conflict management. More specifically, in order to find elements of the relationship between events and reactions of the US and the EU, the *Dispatch* of the Department of State, the *Foreign Policy Bulletin* and the online database of the *Public Diplomacy Query* for American actions, and the *EC Bulletin* and the online database on EPC/CFPS of the EUI for European actions have also been used.

Out of the 83 armed conflicts that took place in the considered period, most of which were internal, in 7 cases there was no recorded reaction by any of the two actors, while the number of conflicts in which it was recorded a non cooperative intervention was very limited (2 for the US (+ others) and 3 for the EU (+ others)). On the contrary, the American and European presence was highly predominant, sometimes separately (26 cases) but most often in coordination. Indeed, the US and the EU intervened in a joint or coordinated manner in 45 out of 83 armed conflicts. If we look at the percentages, we can see that the two actors intervened with a cooperative approach in 54% of the cases, indicating that, as soon as the EU acquires new competences in the field of conflict management, the habit of cooperation that already exists in other issues is transposed to the area of conflict management (figure 8).

---

[18] Burundi, Congo, Liberia, Sierra Lione, Somalia, Colombia, India-Kashimir, Indonesia, Sri Lanka,

Figure 8: US-EU Reaction to Conflicts



Disaggregating our data by region, in absolute numbers Africa is the region where cooperation occurs the most, followed by the Middle East (figure 9). However, looking at the percentages of cooperation, it is possible to notice that it is the Middle East the region in which there is the highest peak of cooperation (9 conflicts out of 11 or 82%) (figure 10). It is important to underline that in all the regions the cooperation attitude is equal (Africa) or higher than 50%, with the only exception of Asia (37%). This is consistent with Gilligan and Stedman's analysis that reveals a bias against Asia in UN interventions, explaining this difference with the fact that the goal of most of civil wars in Asia is not over the control of government (Gilligan and Stedman, 2001). However it might also be the case that the limited cooperation of Americans and Europeans in the area does not create the best environment in which a multilateral operation can be "constructed".

Figure 9: Reactions by Region (absolute numbers)



Reactions 1= joint/coordinated action; 2= non coordinated action; 3= no reaction recorded; 4= USA (+ others non-EU); 5= EU (+ others non-US)

Figure 10: Reactions by Region (percentage)



Reactions 1= joint/coordinated action; 2= non coordinated action; 3= no reaction recorded; 4= USA (+ others non-EU); 5= EU (+ others non-US)

Indeed, a multilateral intervention was recorded only in 35 cases out of the total of 83 armed conflicts, or 42% of the cases. This limited intervention should be considered however within the framework of a majority of internal conflicts and also of a high number of minor intensity conflicts, and is significantly higher when compared to multilateral intervention before the end of the Cold War. Disaggregating our data by type of intervention (figure 11), it is remarkable that out of 35 multilateral interventions, only one was realised without the active role of either the US or the EU (Papua New Guinea), while none was realised "unilaterally" by the US or the EU. On the contrary, in 34 cases out of 35 there was the active role of ***both*** the US and the EU, either acting separately (7 cases or 20%) or, more often, acting jointly or in a coordinated way (27 cases or 77%).

Figure 11: Multilateral Intervention



Intervention 1= monitoring or observer mission ; 2 = traditional peacekeeping;
3 = multidimensional peacekeeping; 4 = peace enforcement

Reactions 1= joint/coordinated action; 2= non coordinated action; 3= no reaction recorded; 4= USA (+ others non-EU); 5= EU (+ others non-US)

Going into the details of the type of international operations, we may see that in all types of intervention, apart from traditional peacekeeping, the intervention was decided on the basis of an environment in which the EU and the US had some sort of cooperative arrangement (figure 12), this does not necessarily mean that the agreement between the two actors is in a direct causal relationship with the decision to intervene, but it is a signal that cooperation between the EU and the US may create a favourable environment for launching multidimensional initiatives in the field of conflict management. This is particularly evident when we look at peace enforcement, which occurred in 11 cases out of 35, but we can also notice that, out of those 11 cases, in 10 cases (or 91%) a cooperative *answer* was recorded. The exception is traditional peacekeeping where still both actors have to be present, but there direct cooperation was limited to 50% of the cases. Further research has to be done, in order to understand whether the lack of EU capabilities until recently may have influenced this data. The only exception to the cooperative rule is given by the case of Papua New Guinea where cooperation between the US and the EU was not required to launch an UN initiative (the UNPOB United Nations Political Office in Bougainville, established in August 1998).

Figure 12: Intervention



5. Conclusions

Our analysis has shown the existence of a growing cooperative habit between the US and the EU, also when it comes to conflict management, and it has highlighted the relevance of the existence in multilateral fora of this cooperative nucleus. In particular it has been shown that transatlantic cooperation may be the basis of a wider socialization process capable of creating an environment in which multilateral intervention is more likely to occur. This is consistent not only with the evolutionary approach to IR and expressly Modelski's definition of the passage from the *agenda setting* or *legitimization to coalition building* or *deconcentration*, but also with a constructivist definition of security culture. In particular, as suggested by Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein (1996), it is possible to note how relevant in interests' formation the common values expressed by the two actors can be.

The US and the EU different visions may represent the combination of traditional and multidimensional approaches to conflict management within the framework of the contemporary international order which is constrained between opposing principles such as sovereignty inviolability and non-intervention rule coming from westphalian system (Newman and Richmond, 2001: 5-12) versus more active principles of intervention originated from the human security doctrine. Their apparently different views on what are considered key dimensions of world order, e.g. sovereignty leadership, institutions, etc. (Smith M., 2004), may enclose the contemporary and competing dimensions and values of the international system. US links to the westphalian concept of sovereignty based on territorial integrity and national autonomy and EU's vision of «post-modern version of sovereignty … in which responsibility is shared» (Smith M, 2004:104) may produce a complementary and broad-spectrum way to approach international security, which could be more efficient. A successful approach to conflict management should take in consideration both EU and US values, i.e. it should consider the still fundamental importance in the contemporary system of the interactions between states, and therefore may not neglect the influence of power and hierarchy, but at the same time it should give space to the legitimacy of institutions which may reduce uncertainty and lower transnational costs (*ibidem*: 105).

Transatlantic coordination may result in an efficient way to manage armed conflicts, as the US and the EU base their legitimization on different sources: the US on leadership and military capabilities and the EU on a communitarian approach to security processes. This does not imply just the division of labour between the two main actors (Wallace, 2001) in conflict management (e.g. intervention and coercive means carried out by US and re-construction and peace-building issues managed by EU), but on the contrary create complementary visions that best respond to the competing norms in the contemporary world order.

References

ADLER Immanuel (1997), "Imagined (Security) Communities: Cognitive Regions in International Relations", in *Millennium*, vol. 26, n. 2.

ADLER Immanuel and BARNETT, Michael (eds.) (1998), *Security Communities*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

ARMSTRONG David (1998), "Globalisation and the Social State", in *Review of International Studies*, vol. 24, pp. 461-478.

ATTINÀ Fulvio (2003a), *La sicurezza degli stati nell'era dell'egemonia americana*, Milano, Giuffrè.

ATTINÀ Fulvio (2003b), *Il sistema politico globale*, Bari, Laterza.

ATTINÀ Fulvio (2003c), *Transatlantic Relations in Post-Iraq Global Politics*, Jean Monnet Working Papers in Comparative and International Politics n. 50, http://www.fscpo.unict.it/EuroMed/jmwp50.htm

BAYNE Nicholas (2002), “The G8 Summit and Global Governance: The Message of Okinawa”, in KIRTON, John J. and TAKASE, Junichi (eds.) (2002), *New Directions in Global Political Governance*, Ashgate

BISCOP Sven (2004) “The European Security Strategy. Implementing a Distinctive Approach to Security”, in ‘*Sécurité & Stratégie’*, Paper No. 82, March 2004 by the Royal Defence College (IRSD-KHID), Brussels

CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON PREVENTING DEADLY CONFLICT (1997), *Preventing Deadly Conflict. Final Report*, New York, Carnegie Corporation

COATE Roger, A. KNIGHT Andy W. and MAXIMENKO Andrei I. (2001), “Requirements of Multilateral Governance for Promoting Human Security in a Postmodern Era” in KNIGHT Andy (ed.) *Adapting the United Nations to a Post Modern Era. Lesson Learned*, Hampshire, Palgrave.

DEDRING Juergen (2004), “Reflections on the coordination of the EU member states in organs of the United Nations”, in *CFSP Forum*, vol. 2, n. 1, pp. 1-3.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE (2000), *Voting Practices in the United Nations, 2000*, http://www.state.gov/p/io/rls/rpt/2000/vtg/

DEPARTMENT OF STATE (2001), *Voting Practices in the United Nations, 2001*, http://www.state.gov/p/io/rls/rpt/2001/vtg/

DEPARTMENT OF STATE (2002), *Voting Practices in the United Nations, 2002*, http://www.state.gov/p/io/rls/rpt/2002/vtg/

DEPARTMENT OF STATE (2003), *Voting Practices in the United Nations, 2003*, http://www.state.gov/p/io/rls/rpt/2003/c12061.htm

DEUTSCH Karl W. *et al.* (1957) *Political Community and the North Atlantic State*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

DIEHL Paul F. (1994), *International Peacekeeping*, Baltimore, Johns University Press.

DIEHL Paul F. (2003), “Strategies. Regional Conflict Management. Necessary Conditions, and Comparative Effectiveness”, in DIEHL Paul F. and LEPGOLD Joseph (eds), *Regional Conflict Management*, Maryland, Rowan & Littlefield Publishers.

DOYLE Michael and SAMBANIS Nicholas (2000), “International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis”, in *American Political Science Review*, vol. 94, n. 4, pp. 779-801.

DUFFEY Tamara (2000), “United Nations Peace-keeping in the Post-Cold War Era” in JONES Clive and KENNEDY-PIPE Caroline (eds), *International Security in A Global Age. Securing the Twenty-first Centur*y, London, Frank Cass Publishers.

FISCHER Klemens (2001), “The G7/8 and the European Union”, in KIRTON John, DANIELS Joseph and FREYTAG Andreas (eds.), *Guiding Global Order: G8 Governance in the Twenty-First* century, Ashgate, Aldershot, pp. 123-140.

FINNEMORE Martha (1996), “Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention”, in KATZENSTEIN Peter J (1996), *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, New York, Columbia University Press.

FORTNA Virginia P. (2003), “Scraps of Paper? Agreements and Durability of Peace”, in *International Organization*, vol. 57, n. 2, pp. 337-372.

FORTNA Virginia P. (2004), “Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War”, in *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 8, n. 2, pp. 269-292.

GILLIGAN Michael & JOHN STEDMAN, Stephen (2003) "Where Do The Peacekeepers Go?" in *International Studies Review* vol.5 , N.4, pp. 37-54.

GINSBERG Roy (1989), *Foreign Policy Actions of the European Community*, Boulder, Lynne Rienner.

GINSBERG Roy (2001), *The European Union in International Politics*, Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield.

GLEDITSCH Nils Petter, WALLENSTEEN Peter, ERIKSSON Mikael, SOLLENBERG Margareta & STRAND Håvard, (2002), 'Armed Conflict 1946–2001: A New Dataset', in *Journal of Peace Research* vol. 39N. 5, pp. 615–637

GOVAERE Inge, CAPIAU Jeroen., VERMEERSCH An (2004), "In-Between Seats: The Participation of the European Union in International Organizations", in *European Foreign Affairs Review*, vol. 9, n. 2, pp. 157-187.

HANSEN Wibke, RAMSBOTHAM Oliver and WOODHOUSE Tom (2003), "Hawks and Doves Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution", in *Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation by Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict* http://www.berghof-handbook.net (05/2004)

HILL Christopher (1998), "Convergence, Divergence and Dialectics: National Foreign Policies and the CFSP", in ZIELONKA Jan (ed.), *Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy*, Dordrecht, Kluwer Law International, pp. 35-53

JEPPERSON Ronald L., WENDT Alexander and KATZENSTEIN Peter J. (1996), "Norms, Identity and Culture in National Security", in KATZENSTEIN Peter J (1996), *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, New York, Columbia University Press.

JORGENSEN Knud Erik and LAATIKAINEN Katie Verlin (2004), "The EU @ the UN: Multilateralism in a New Key?", paper presented at the Second Pan-European Conference on EU Politics, Bologna 24-26 June 2004

KALDOR Mary (1999), *New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era*, Cambridge, Polity Press.

KALDOR Mary (2003), "Intervention in the Balkans. An Unfinished Learning Process" in SIANI-DAVIES Peter (ed.) *International Intervention in the Balkans since 1995*, London and New York, Routledge.

KEOHANE Robert O. (1984), *After Hegemony*, Princeton, Princeton University Press.

KEOHANE Robert 1990 "Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research" in *International Journal*, vol XIV (4) autumn 1990.

KNIGHT Andy W. (1998), "Establishing Political Authority in Peace-Maintance" in CHOPRA Jarat (ed), *The Politics of Peace-Maintenance*, London, Lyenne Rienner Publishers.

LAATIKAINEN Katie Verlin (2004), "Assessing the EU as an Actor at the UN: Authority, Cohesion, Recognition and Autonomy", in *CFSP Forum*, vol. 2, n. 1, pp. 4-9

LONGO Francesca (2004), "Il ruolo della politica europea di difesa e sicurezza comune", in COLOMBO Alessandro (ed.), *L'Occidente diviso*, Milano, Università Bocconi Editore, pp. 69-99

MANNERS Ian and WHITMAN Richard G. (eds) (2000), *The Foreign Policies of European Union Member States*, Manchester, Manchester University Press

MODELSKI George (1999), "From Leadership to Organization: The Evolution of Global Politics", in BORNSCHIER Volker and CHASE-DUNN, Christopher, *The Future of Global Conflict*, London, SAGE.

MODELSKI George and THOMPSON William. R. (1999), "The Long and the Short of Global Politics in the Twenty-first Century: An Evolutionary Approach", *Mershon International Studies Review*, 1, pp. 109-140.

MONTELEONE Carla (2003), *Le relazioni transatlantiche e la sicurezza internazionale*, Milano, Giuffrè.

NATO (2002), *Nato Handbook*, Brussels, NATO.

NEWMAN Edward and RICHMOND Oliver (2001), (eds), *The United Nations and Human Security: Beyond Peacekeeping*, Palgrave.

RICHMOND Oliver (2001a), *Maintaining Order, Making Peace*. Palgrave.

RICHMOND Oliver (2001b), "The limits of UN Multidimensional Peace Operations", in NEWMAN Edward RICHMOND Oliver (2001), eds, *The United Nations and Human Security: Beyond Peacekeeping*, Palgrave.

RISSE Thomas (2000), "A Liberal World Order: The Democratic Security Community and U.S. Power", paper presented at the conference *American Unipolarity and the Future of the Balance of Power*, Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, D.C., 19 May 2000.

RISSE-KAPPEN, Thomas (1995), *Cooperation Among Democracies*, Princeton, Princeton University Press.

ROSSI Rosa (2003), *Peace Interventions and Armed Conflicts Recurrence*, paper delivered to European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) General Conference, University of Marburg, 16-21 September 2003

SCHMITZ Hans Peter and SIKKINK Kathryn (2002), "Human Rights and International Relations Theory", in CARLSNAES Walter, RISSE Thomas and SIMMONS Beth (eds.), *Handbook of International Relations*, London, SAGE.

SMITH Michael (2004), "Between Two Worlds? The European Union, the United States and World Order" in *International Politics*, 2004, 41, (95–117).

SMITH Michael E. (2004), "Institutionalization, Policy Adaptation and European Foreign Political Cooperation", in *European Journal of International Relations*, vol. 10, n. 1, pp. 95-136.

STEPHENS Gina (2002), "The Roots of the New Consensus: The United States and the Transformation of the G8 System", in KIRTON John, DANIELS Joseph and FREYTAG Andreas, (eds.), *Guiding Global Order: G8 Governance in the Twenty-First* century, Ashgate, Aldershot.

WALLACE William (2001), "Europe The Necessary Partner", in *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 80, n. 3, pp. 16-34.

Region	Location	Issue	Years /Intensity	Answer USA-EU	Multilateral Intervention
AFRICA	Liberia	Govt	1989/Minor 1990 /War 1991/Intermediate 1992 /War 1993-95/Intermediate 1996/Minor 2000-01/Minor	1	4
AFRICA	Rwanda	govt	1990/ Minor 1991-92/ War 1993-94 /Intermediate 1998 /War 1999-2000/Intermediate 2001/War	1	4
AFRICA	Somalia	Govt	1989-92/ War 1993-96/ Intermediate	1	4
AFRICA	Angola	Govt(supported by Namibia 2000-2001)	1975-94/War 1995/Intermediate 1998-2001/War	1	3
AFRICA	Central African Republic	Govt	1995/97 (Minor) 2001/Minor	1	3
AFRICA	Congo/Zaire Renamed Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 1997.	govt	1996/Minor 1997/War 1998-2000/War 2001/Intermediate	1	3
AFRICA	Sierra Leone	Govt	1991-93/Minor 1994-97/Intermediate 1998-99 /War 2000/Intermediate	1	3
AFRICA	Eritrea-Ethiopia	Terr (Badne)	1998-2000/ War	1	2
AFRICA	South Africa	govt	1989-93 War	1	2
AFRICA	Burundi	Govt	1990-92/Minor 1995-96/Minor 1997/Intermediate 1998/War 1999/Intermediate 2000-01/War	1	1
AFRICA	Angola	Terr (Cabinda)	1992/Minor 1994/Minor 1996-97/Minor	1	0
AFRICA	Djibouti	Govt	1991-94/Minor	1	0
AFRICA	Ethiopia	Terr (Eritrea)	1974-1991/War	1	0
AFRICA	Sudan	Terr (southern Sudan)	1983-92/War 1993-94/Intermediate 1995-2001/ War	1	0
AFRICA	Togo	Govt	1991/ Minor	1	0
AFRICA	Chad	Govt	1990/War 1991-94/Minor 1997-2001/Minor	2	3
AFRICA	Mozambique	Govt	1981-1992/War	2	3
AFRICA	Guinea Bissau	Govt	1998/War 1999/Intermediate	2	2
AFRICA	Algeria	Govt	1992/Minor 1993-2001/ War	2	0
AFRICA	Congo Brazzaville	Govt	1997/War 1998-99 War	2	0

AFRICA	Guinea	Govt	2000-01 Minor	2	0
AFRICA	Uganda	govt	1989/War 1990/ Intermediate 1991/War 1994-95/ Minor 1996-2001/Intermediate	2	0
AFRICA	Ethiopia	govt	1976-91/War	3	0
AFRICA	Ethiopia	Terr (Ogaden) (Afar) (Somali) (Oromiya)	1996/Minor 1998-2001/Minor	3	0
AFRICA	Senegal	Terr (Casamance)	1990/Minor 1992-93/Minor 1995 Minor 1997-2001/intermediate	3	0
AFRICA	Cameroon -Nigeria	Terr(Bakassi)	1996/Minor	4	0
AFRICA	Comoros	Terr (Anjouan)	1997/Minor	5	0
AFRICA	Mali	Terr (Air and Azawad)	1990 /Minor 1994/Minor	5	0
AFRICA	Niger	Terr (Air and Azawad) (Toubou)	1990-92/ Minor 1994/ Minor 1996/Minor 1997 /Minor	5	0
AMERICA	Haiti	Govt	1991/ Minor 1995 (Intermediate)	1	4
AMERICA	El Salvador	Govt	1981-90/War 1991/Intermediate	1	3
AMERICA	Guatemala	Govt	1988-91/Intermediate 1992/War 1993-95 /Intermediate	1	3
AMERICA	Colombia	Govt	1989-90/War 1991/Intermediate 1992-93/War 1994-97/Intermediate 1998-2001/War	1	1
AMERICA	Perù	Govt	1988-92 /War 1993-99/Intermediate	1	0
AMERICA	USA	Govt (al-Qa'da- the base)	2001/War	1	0
AMERICA	Ecuador -Peru	Terr (Cordillera del Condor)	1995/Minor	2	0
AMERICA	Mexico	Govt	1994/Minor	2	0
AMERICA	Venezuela	Govt	1992/Minor	2	0
ASIA	Indonesia	Terr (East Timor)	1979-89/ Intermediate 1992/ Intermediate 1997-98/ Intermediate	1	4
ASIA	Cambodia	govt	1989 /War 1990-98 /Intermediate	1	3
ASIA	Afghanistan	Govt	1978-2001/ War	1	1
ASIA	Bangladesh	Terr (Chittagong Hill Tracts)	1987-1992//Intermediate	1	0
ASIA	Burma/Myanmar	Terr (Karen) (Arakan) (Mon) (Shan) (Kachin) (Kaya)	1991-92/ minor 1993-1994/War 1995-2001/ Intermediate	1	0
ASIA	India-Pakistan	Terr (Kashmir)	1989-90/ Intermediate 1992/ Intermediate 1996-98/ Intermediate 1999/ War 2000-01/ Intermediate	1	0
ASIA	Indonesia	Terr (Aceh)	1989/Minor 1990 /War 1991/Intermediate	1	0

			1999-2001/Intermediate		
ASIA	Tajikistan	govt	1992-93 /War 1994-96 /Intermediate 1998 /Minor	2	4
ASIA	India	govt	1989-1994/Minor 1996-2001/ Minor	2	0
ASIA	Laos	Gov	1989-90/ Intermediate	2	0
ASIA	Nepal	Govt	1997-2000/Minor 2001/Intermediate	2	0
ASIA	Philippines	Govt	1989-1992/ War 1993-94/Intermediate 1999-2001/Intermediate	2	0
ASIA	Philippines	Terr (Mindanao)	1994-99/ Intermediate 2000/ War 2001/ Intermediate	2	0
ASIA	Sri Lanka	Terr (Eelam)	1989-93 /War 1994/Intermediate 1995-2001/War	2	0
ASIA	Sri Lanka	Govt (JVP II)	1989 /War 1990/Intermediate	2	0
ASIA	Papua New Guinea	Terr (Bougainville)	1989-90/ Minor 1992-96/ Minor	3	3
ASIA	India-	Terr (Punjab/Khalistan) Nagaland Tripura Assam Manipur	1989 /War 1993 /Intermediate 1995-2001/Minor	3	0
ASIA	Pakistan	Govt	1995-96/Minor	3	0
ASIA	Uzbekistan	Govt	2000 /Minor	4	0
EUROPE	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Terr (Croat, Serb, Bihac)	1992-93 War 1994-1995/Intermediate	1	4
EUROPE	Yugoslavia	Terr (kosovo)	1998-1999 War	1	4
EUROPE	Croatia -Yugoslavia	Terr (serb)	1991/War	1	3
EUROPE	FYROM (Macedonia)	govt	2001/Minor	1	3
EUROPE	Russia	govt	1993/ Minor	1	0
EUROPE	Russia	Terr (Dagestan)	1999/ Minor	1	0
EUROPE	Russia-	terr (Chechnya)	1994 /Minor 1995-96/ War 1999-2001 /War	1	0
EUROPE	Yugoslavia	Terr (Slovenia)	1991/Minor	1	0
EUROPE	Georgia-Abkhazia	Terr (Abkazis seek independence)	1992/Minor 1993/ War	2	2
EUROPE	Georgia-Ossetia	Terr (Ossetians breaking from Georgia to join North ossetians)	1992/ Minor	2	2
EUROPE	Azerbaijan-	Terr (fighting over Nagorno-Karabakh)	1992-94/War	2	1
EUROPE	Spain	Terr (Basque)	1991-92/Minor	2	0
EUROPE	Georgia	Govt	1991-93/Minor	2	0
EUROPE	Moldova-Dniester	Terr (Dniester republic secession)	1992/Minor	2	0
EUROPE	UK (Northern Ireland)	Terr	1978-1998/ Intermediate	2	0
MIDDLE EAST	Iraq	Govt	1991/War 1992-96/Intermediate	1	4
MIDDLE EAST	Iraq-Kurds	Terr (Kurdistan)	1989-90 / Intermediate 1991/War 1993/ Intermediate	1	4

MIDDLE EAST	Iraq-Kwait	Terr (Kuwait)	1990-1991/War	1	4
MIDDLE EAST	Lebanon	Govt	1989-90/ War	1	2
MIDDLE EAST	Israel-Palest.	Terrr (Palestine)	1965-2001/Intermediate	1	1
MIDDLE EAST	Yemen	Terr (Sothyemen)	1994/ War	1	1
MIDDLE EAST	Iran	Govt	1991-93/ Intermediate 2000-01 Intermediate	1	0
MIDDLE EAST	Iran	Terr (Kurdistan)	1990/Intermediate 1993/Intermediate	1	0
MIDDLE EAST	Turkey	terr (Kurdistan)	1987-91 /Intermediate 1992-97 /War 1998-2001/ Intermediate	1	0
MIDDLE EAST	Egypt	Govt	1992-98/Minor	2	0
MIDDLE EAST	Turkey	Govt	1991-92/Minor	3	0

Multilateral Intervention
0 = none; 1 = observer; 2 = traditional peacekeeping; 3 = multidimensional peacekeeping ;4= peace enforcement

US-EU Reaction
1= joint/coordinated ; 2= non coordinated ; 3=no answer recorded ; 4= US+others (non-EU) ; 5= EU+others (non-US)

Success of the mission
0= failure; 1= success; na=not available