
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

Working Documents

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MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

tabled by Mr WALTER, Mrs WIECZOREK-ZEUL, Mr HÄNSCH,
Mrs WEBER, Mrs SEIDEL-EMMERLING, Mr SIEGLERSCHMIDT,
Mr WAGNER, Mr ARNDT, Mr NICOLAOU, Mr ENRIGHT, Ms QUIN,
Mr GABERT, Mr MUNTINGH, Mr VAN HINNEN, Mr ROGALLA,
Mrs HOFF, Mr HULLIGAN, Mr VON DER VRING, Mrs VIEHOFF,
Mr LINKOHR, Mr GAUTHIER, Mr SEEFELD and Mr WETTIG

with a request for topical and urgent debate
pursuant to Rule 48 of the Rules of Procedure

on the Nuclear Freeze Resolution of the US House of
Representatives

PE 87.013
Or. De.

The European Parliament,

- whereas important arms control negotiations are nearing conclusion,
 - alarmed at the growing arms build-up throughout the world,
 - whereas this poses a particularly serious threat to Europe,
 - convinced that there is no alternative to political détente, disarmament and a peaceful balance,
 - convinced that it is incumbent upon the European Parliament as on all parliaments to support every effort in the interests of peace,
1. Welcomes the Nuclear Freeze Resolution passed by the US House of Representatives on 4 May 1983 and endorses its proposals;
 2. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Foreign Ministers meeting in political cooperation and the Congress of the United States.

Annex

Text of the Nuclear Freeze Resolution

**NUCLEAR FREEZE RESOLUTION OF THE US CONGRESS (HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES)
4th May, 1983)**

Calling for a mutual and verifiable freeze on and reductions in nuclear weapons. Whereas the greatest challenge facing the earth is to prevent the occurrence of nuclear war by accident or design;

Whereas the United States and the Soviet Union have signed the joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations, known as the McCloy-Zorin agreement, enumerating general principles for future negotiations for international peace and security;

Whereas the increasing stockpiles of nuclear weapons and nuclear delivery systems by both the United States and the Soviet Union have not strengthened international peace and security but in fact enhance the prospect for mutual destruction;

Whereas adequate verification of compliance has always been an indispensable part of any international arms control agreement; and

Whereas a mutual and verifiable freeze and reductions in nuclear weapons and nuclear delivery systems would greatly reduce the risk of nuclear war: now, therefore, be it resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, that, consistent with the maintenance of essential equivalence in overall nuclear capabilities at present and in the future, the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) between the United States and the Soviet Union should have the following objectives :

1. Pursuing the objective of negotiating an immediate, mutual and verifiable freeze. Then pursuing the objective of negotiating immediate, mutual and verifiable reductions in nuclear weapons.
2. Deciding when and how to achieve a mutual verifiable freeze on testing, production and further deployment of nuclear warheads, missiles and other delivery systems which would threaten the viability of sea-based nuclear deterrent forces and to include all air defense systems designed to stop nuclear bombers. Submarines are not delivery systems as used herein.
3. Consistent with pursuing the objective of negotiating an immediate, mutual and verifiable freeze, giving special attention to destabilising weapons, especially those which give either nation capabilities which confer upon it even the hypothetical advantages of a first strike.
4. Providing for cooperative measures of verification, including provisions for on-site inspection, as appropriate, to complement national technical means of verification and to ensure compliance.

5. Proceeding from this mutual and verifiable freeze, pursuing substantial, equitable and verifiable reductions through numerical ceilings, annual percentages or any other equally effective and verifiable means of strengthening strategic stability, with such reductions to be achieved within a reasonable, specified period of time as determined by the negotiations.

6. Preserving present limitations and controls on nuclear weapons and nuclear delivery systems.

7. Incorporating ongoing negotiations in Geneva on intermediate-range nuclear systems into the START negotiations. Discussing the impact of developing comprehensive defensive systems consistent with all provisions of the treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems.

8. Nothing in this resolution shall be construed by United States negotiations to mandate any agreement that would jeopardise our ability to preserve freedom.

In those negotiations, the United States shall make every effort to reach a common position with our North Atlantic Treaty Organisation allies on any element of an agreement which would be inconsistent with existing United States commitments to those allies.

Sec. 2 In the absence of a bilateral agreement embodying the objectives set forth in this joint resolution, nothing in this resolution is intended to prevent the United States from carrying out its responsibilities under the December 1979 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation decision regarding intermediate range nuclear forces.

Sec. 3 (a) Consistent with pursuing the overriding objective of negotiating an immediate, mutual and verifiable freeze, nothing in this resolution shall be construed to prevent the United States from taking advantage of concurrent and complementary arms control proposals.

(b) Nothing in this resolution shall be construed to supercede the treaty making powers of the President under the Constitution.

Sec. 4 This resolution does not endorse any type of unilateral disarmament on the part of the United States.

Sec. 5 Consistent with pursuing the overriding objective of negotiating an immediate, mutual and verifiable freeze, nothing in this resolution should be construed to prevent measures necessary for the maintenance of and credibility of the United States nuclear deterrent.

Sec. 6 Until such time as the final instrument embodying the objectives set forth in section 1 has been fully ratified by both the Soviet Union and the United States, nothing in this joint resolution shall be construed to prevent whatever modernisation and deployment of United States weapons may be required to maintain the credibility of the United States nuclear deterrent.

Sec. 7 The Congress proposes that the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations study measures relating to reductions pursuant to the first section. And relating to concurrent and complementary arms control proposals pursuant to section 2, especially those aimed at progressive reductions in the number of destabilising weapons through a mutual "build-down" or other verifiable processes.

Sec. 8 Any freeze agreement negotiated pursuant to this resolution should not prevent the United States from taking such measures with respect to our strategic systems as are necessary to protect the lives of the United States personnel operating those systems.

Sec. 9 For purposes of this resolution, a nuclear delivery vehicle is a device whose primary or exclusive mission requires it to carry a nuclear weapon into territory of or occupied by hostile forces.

Sec. 10 A freeze agreement in accordance with this resolution will not preclude the one-for-one replacement of nuclear weapons and nuclear delivery vehicles in order to preserve the credibility of the United States nuclear deterrence, provided the new weapon or delivery vehicle is the same type as the old.

Sec. 11 Nothing in this joint resolution shall be construed

- i. to prevent, during any negotiations pursuant to this resolution, or
- ii. to require that, in any negotiations pursuant to this resolution, the United States agree to a provision which would prevent, such modernisation and deployment of United States new or improved dual capable delivery systems as the United States may determine is required to maintain the capability of the United States defense posture.

Sec. 12 Consistent with public law 88-186. As amended, no action shall be taken under this act that will obligate the United States to disarm or to reduce or to limit the armed forces or armaments of the United States, except pursuant to the treaty making power of the President under the Constitution or unless authorised by further affirmative legislation by the Congress of the United States.

Sec. 13 Consistent with the provisions of public law 92-448, as amended, negotiations undertaken pursuant to this act shall provide for the maintenance of a vigorous research, development and safety-related improvements program to assure that the United States would not be limited to levels of nuclear deterrent forces inferior to the force levels of the Soviet Union. Further, such negotiations should recognise the difficulty of maintaining essential equivalence and a stable balance in nuclear deterrent capabilities in a period of rapidly developing technology, and that any future arms control agreements should promote and stable international balance and enhance the survivability of United States nuclear deterrent forces.

Sec. 14 In all negotiations pursuant to this resolution, the United States shall make every effort to ensure that any agreement reached shall provide for full compliance by all parties with pre-existing international treaties, obligations and commitments.

Sec. 15 Any item both sides do not agree to freeze would not be frozen.

Sec. 16 The President shall take all necessary steps to ensure that any agreement embodying the objectives set forth in this joint resolution can be adequately verified, including pursuing the objective of providing the cooperative measures of verification (including provisions for onsite inspection as appropriate) to complement national technical means of verification and to ensure compliance.

Sec. 17 Nothing in this joint resolution shall be construed to prevent safety-related improvements in strategic bombers.

Passed the House of Representatives, May 4, 1983.

