

## EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

### INFORMATION SERVICE

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Rapport du Bureau de Washington

Objet : Réactions américaines à la conférence de La Haye.

Si les milieux du State Department n'ont pas manifesté une grande surprise en apprenant les résultats de la conférence au sommet (ils affirment que tous les renseignements qu'ils avaient obtenus avant la conférence dans les différentes capitales européennes indiquaient que le sommet aurait une issue positive), les milieux de la presse, par contre, laissent transparaître une heureuse surprise. Avant le 1er décembre, la presse avait écrit qu'il s'agissait de la "conférence de la dernière chance" pour le Marché Commun. Il n'est pas nécessaire de revenir ici sur ce que nous avons écrit dans le passé à plusieurs reprises à propos des attitudes très critiques des autorités et du public américains envers la Communauté (et l'Europe en général), que l'on décrivait facilement comme en proie encore une fois à la fièvre des nationalismes, comme protectionniste, paralysée par une politique agricole desservant les intérêts et de la Communauté et de ses partenaires commerciaux. Les récentes crises monétaires étaient apparues, aux yeux de beaucoup, comme une preuve que la construction européenne était arrivée au bout de son souffle. Il serait inexact d'affirmer que les résultats de La Haye ont renversé cette tendance, mais ils ont sûrement obligé les critiques à se donner un temps de réflexion.

Les Américains ont retenu de la conférence de La Haye notamment quatre conclusions :

- Le Marché Commun n'est pas mort.
- Bonn a remplacé Paris en tant que centre principal d'influence pour les affaires européennes.
- La France a donné le feu vert pour l'ouverture des négociations avec la Grande-Bretagne.
- La coopération monétaire des Six est sur le point de devenir une réalité.

Quelques exemples de titres d'articles et d'éditoriaux : "Europe is on its way again" (Christian Science Monitor); "Europe's new momentum" (New York Times); "Trust and good feelings at The Hague" (Time); "The necessity of Europe" (New York Times).

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Notons toutefois que ces voix ne sont pas unanimes et que si l'éditorial du New York Times du 4 décembre a pu écrire avec un enthousiasme quelque peu inattendu que le communiqué de La Haye "reads astonishingly like a manifesto of Jean Monnet's Action Committee", l'éditorial du Washington Post (le 5 décembre) a été beaucoup plus prudent, voire négatif : "On ne peut pas dire," a écrit l'éditorialiste du Washington Post, "que la conférence au sommet ait apporté de nouvelles énergies à l'idée européenne.... " Certes, des progrès ont été accomplis, mais "for the moment, political momentum is lacking."

En ce qui concerne l'adhésion britannique, tout en prenant note de ce que la conférence de La Haye a ouvert la porte après six ans à de nouvelles négociations, on observe qu'il y a en cela un aspect ironique, car le veto français a été levé au moment même où l'opinion publique britannique semble avoir retiré son appui à l'idée d'une participation anglaise à l'entreprise européenne.

La conférence de La Haye ayant été suivie par la rencontre de l'OTAN à Bruxelles et les débats sur la politique envers l'Est, les commentaires que la presse américaine a consacrés au rôle de M. Brandt ont tenu compte non seulement de ce qu'il a dit et de ce qu'il a fait à La Haye, mais également de ces autres événements. Voir à ce propos l'éditorial "Brandt's successful start" du New York Times du 8 décembre; ainsi, pour le Christian Science Monitor: "Bonn holds keys to new Europe"; et pour le Baltimore Sun : "La décision d'ouvrir les négociations avec la Grande-Bretagne représente une victoire majeure pour M. Brandt." En général, tous les commentaires observent que M. Brandt a pris vis-à-vis de Paris une attitude plus ferme que celle de ses prédécesseurs. Le New York Times a publié un article d'un de ses correspondants européens qui commence avec la phrase suivante : "La conférence de La Haye fera date plus à cause des preuves très visibles qu'elle a offertes sur le passage du pouvoir de Paris à Bonn que par ses résultats immédiats," et se termine avec cette conclusion : "Dans un sens plus large, la prédominance que M. Brandt a affirmé grâce à sa diplomatie ferme mais géniale à la conférence de La Haye n'a fait que régulariser une situation que les milieux diplomatiques n'avaient pas manqué d'observer au cours de ces sept derniers mois : c'est-à-dire qu'une fois disparu le "powerful charisma" de Charles de Gaulle, les réalités de l'Europe sont apparues en pleine lumière."

La conférence de La Haye a été interprétée comme un dialogue, voire comme une confrontation, entre la France et l'Allemagne. Les articles soulignent le fait que la France a obtenu ce qu'elle voulait, c'est-à-dire le règlement financier pour la politique agricole commune, et que c'est seulement sous les pressions très fortes des Cinq que M. Pompidou a accepté un compromis verbal concernant l'ouverture des négociations avec la Grande-Bretagne ; dans un article du Washington Post, on peut lire, à ce propos : "In the best Common Market tradition of grudgingly accepting compromises after unbudging initial positions, Pompidou kept repeating yesterday's firm refusal to agree on a negotiating date - in any form - until an arduous working lunch. Pressed hard by his partners, Pompidou finally accepted the oral compromise. But such is

the heritage of mutual distrust among Common Market countries that the other five heads of state obliged Pompidou to insert in the official communiqué his own words of vague optimism delivered at the morning summit session." Peut-être le commentaire le plus complet sur la position française est-il celui qu'on trouve dans un éditorial du Christian Science Monitor sous le titre : "The suit (contd.)" du 5 décembre (voir annexe) qui, entre autres, attribue l'esprit conciliatoire de la délégation française à La Haye à certains développements de politique intérieure qui ont eu lieu en France dans les dernières deux semaines du mois de novembre.

Le dialogue-duel franco-allemand a, entre autres, inspiré la veine sociologique du correspondant du Wall Street Journal (voir article de Félix Kessler : "EEC Footnote : Power of the Press" ) qui a analysé l'influence des mass media sur le dénouement de la conférence de La Haye (c'est un fait que depuis le discours de M. Agnew il y a trois semaines, les Américains passent leur temps à faire des distinctions entre l'événement réel et l'événement télévisé, et entre bonnes et mauvaises influences des mass media) et qui a fait un compte-rendu détaillé et amusé des efforts des délégations françaises et allemandes pour conquérir l'attention de la presse à La Haye.

En résumant, on peut affirmer que la presse américaine a donné un compte-rendu assez détaillé et plutôt équilibré de la conférence au sommet. On se réjouit des résultats, mais avec toutes les précautions d'usage.

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Cela dit, le public américain n'a pas tardé, dès que les résultats de La Haye ont été connus, à se poser la question suivante : quelles sont les conséquences pour les Etats-Unis de cette nouvelle solidarité des Six ?

"Si les Européens parviennent au degré d'intégration économique et politique esquissé à La Haye", a écrit Business Week, " cela signifierait une réduction considérable de l'influence américaine en Europe occidentale, particulièrement en Grande-Bretagne et en Allemagne." Dans le même article, les rédacteurs de Business Week , après avoir noté que, si les efforts d'intégration devaient échouer, il serait plus facile à la Grande-Bretagne et aux autres pays candidats d'entrer dans la Communauté, ajoutent que "une union douanière dans laquelle l'union économique et politique ne serait pas poussée trop loin serait moins nuisible aux intérêts économiques des Etats-Unis qu'un groupe plus compact qui deviendrait en effet un autre bloc monétaire."

Le Washington Post, dans l'éditorial cité ci-dessus, écrit ; "Dans le courant de l'année prochaine, il devrait être possible de se faire une idée plus claire de la direction dans laquelle l'Europe s'oriente. Pour les Américains, aussi bien que pour les Européens, les conséquences seraient

bien diverses selon que l'Europe deviendrait une union politique plus large ou plus simplement un concurrent économique plus fort ("For Americans as for Europeans, it makes a great deal of difference whether Europe is becoming a largest political factor or merely a stronger economic competitor.") A La Haye, cette question est restée sans réponse, en fait elle n'a même pas été posée."

Tout le monde se souvient de l'article que le correspondant économique du New York Times, Edwin Dale, a publié le 24 septembre sur le London Times. Dans un article publié le 4 décembre, sous le titre "Washington silence reflects new doubts on what will serve American interests", M. Dale souligne l'absence de réactions à la conférence de La Haye dans les milieux de l'administration américaine, (il y a eu, il est vrai, notons-le en passant, une déclaration du State Department, mais M. Dale nous ferait sans doute observer qu'une hirondelle ne fait pas le printemps....) M. Dale pense que ce silence ne reflète pas un changement de politique. L'administration américaine, écrit-il, est toujours en faveur de l'adhésion britannique, mais ce silence est malgré tout significatif, car il exprime une préoccupation qui ne fait que s'accroître et qui est basée essentiellement sur deux considérations : 1) un scepticisme quant au développement à long terme de la Communauté (notamment en ce qui concerne l'unité politique); 2) la réalisation que l'entrée de la Grande-Bretagne dans le Marché Commun déterminerait une réduction ultérieure des exportations américaines vers l'Europe ; (on trouvera le texte complet de l'article en annexe.)

Peut-être le commentaire le plus équilibré sur cet aspect du problème est-il celui paru dans le New York Times du 6 décembre, sous la signature de son correspondant à Londres, M. Anthony Lewis. M. Lewis écrit que "il ne fait pas de doute que dans certains milieux américains les attitudes vis-à-vis de la Communauté sont très critiques," il cite ensuite l'article de M. Dale sur le London Times, pour dire que certains des faits critiqués par M. Dale confirment sans aucun doute que la Communauté est "inward-looking", mais il conclut : "La rencontre de La Haye montre que cette étrange institution (la Communauté) peut aussi jouer un rôle, politiquement vital, de catalyseur pour les problèmes communs de l'Europe. Si les Britanniques maintiennent leur calme et négocient leur adhésion avec succès, la Communauté deviendra plus forte. Il vaudrait mieux que nous (Américains) reconnaissons le fait qu'elle est là pour de bon."

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C'est un fait que l'intérêt suscité par la conférence de La Haye a été très grand. Il y a longtemps qu'on n'avait vu la presse de ce pays publier autant d'articles sur les Communautés. Vous trouverez en annexe une sélection des articles les plus intéressants et les plus représentatifs. Le 10 décembre, nous avons invité à déjeuner un groupe de journalistes économiques américains. Cette rencontre rentre dans le cadre de nos contacts normaux avec la presse, mais il n'en reste pas moins que le soussigné a été heureux, pour une fois,

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de ne pas se trouver obligé de répondre à une série de questions critiques concernant la politique agricole commune, mais de présenter un rapport positif sur la rencontre au sommet et sur les implications de cette rencontre pour l'avenir de la Communauté. Nous avons été très frappés du fait que des journalistes comme Hobart Rowen du Washington Post, Jim Bishop de Newsweek, Crosby Noyes de l'Evening Star, (qui en général brillent par leur absence dans des occasions semblables : par exemple, aucun d'entre eux n'était présent aux conférences de presse données à l'occasion des dernières visites de M. Rey et de M. Mansholt) soient là, aient écouté avec attention, et aient posé un grand nombre de questions. M. Dale était également parmi les participants. Il ne fait pas de doute que la conférence de La Haye a réveillé un intérêt certain pour les développements économiques et politiques de l'Europe. Jusqu'à présent, cet intérêt s'était concentré quasi exclusivement sur les aspects de la politique communautaire que les Américains jugent "dangereux."

Une occasion nous est ainsi offerte qu'il importe d'exploiter au maximum. Ce bureau a eu parfois dans le passé des difficultés dans ses efforts visant à "sensibiliser" les services du siège sur la nécessité de nous fournir toute la documentation et les informations susceptibles de nous mettre en mesure d'expliquer, et le cas échéant de défendre les actions et les points de vue de la Communauté auprès de l'opinion publique américaine. Il est certain que maintenant les Américains attendront avec une curiosité critique les actions concrètes devant faire suite aux décisions de La Haye. Il importe dès lors que le Porte-Parole de la Commission et les services responsables du siège apportent un soin particulier à donner toute l'information possible sur les travaux de la Commission et les décisions du Conseil prises à la suite de la réunion au sommet. Il faut en d'autres mots nous mettre en mesure de bien souligner que la conférence ne représente pas un fait isolé, mais qu'elle aura été suivie par toute une série de développements positifs. Pour que les bureaux extérieurs puissent faire cela d'une façon efficace, les informations qui nous sont envoyées du siège devraient être plus étoffées que par le passé. Un soin particulier devrait être apporté dans la présentation de chaque action (background information, indications plus détaillées que d'habitude sur l'orientation de la Commission sur tel ou tel autre problème, etc...) Il serait également souhaitable que, au lieu de se borner à nous fournir l'information après l'événement, on fournisse aux bureaux extérieurs toutes les indications disponibles sur le programme des travaux des mois à venir, en nous donnant également une idée de l'importance et des implications éventuelles de chaque action, et des alternatives possibles, pour que nous puissions anticiper les événements et mieux exploiter, auprès de l'opinion publique des pays dans lesquels nous opérons, les événements qui auront lieu en 1970 -- année que tout le monde ici s'accord à définir comme une année-clé pour l'avenir de la Communauté et de l'Europe.

Alessandro SILJ

December 4, 1969

# West Europe unity?

## French shift in EEC lifts hopes at 'summit'

By Carlyle Morgan

Staff correspondent of *The Christian Science Monitor*

The Hague

Europe is on its way again.

The hope for broad and close Western European unity which was launched 20 years ago mainly with French inspiration has been revived.

Ironically its revival has come from what many of the most experienced observers of Common Market affairs regard as a body check for recent French policy.

This view of the outcome of The Hague summit meeting persists despite a final communiqué which describes the French attitude here as "positive."

It persists despite the fact that French President Pompidou has succeeded in obtaining assurances that French farm interests will be taken care of more or less as he has demanded. It persists despite the fact that he has succeeded in his aim to prevent the Common Market from setting a definite date for the beginning of negotiations on British entry.

And it persists even despite a six-point program put forward by Mr. Pompidou for the development of Western Europe.

By this he sought to prove that his attitude toward European unity was indeed, as he said over and over again, "positive."

Some Common Market experts with longest experi-

ence in the effort to build a united Europe welcomed Mr. Pompidou's achievements here more heartily. They say that eventually the outcome of The Hague will be recognized as a victory not only for the Common Market but for France.

What obscures the fact now, they say, is that this victory differs sharply from the sort that Gen. Charles de Gaulle used to seek. They say too that even General de Gaulle was beginning to change his ideas about the Common Market toward the end of his presidency of France. He had begun to think that Western European unity should be strengthened and broadened.

He had become less concerned about Britain's possibly acting as an "American agent" in Europe through British membership in the Common Market.

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tion.

Against this background the Pompidou strategy in The Hague meeting becomes more understandable. He is seen moving forward with ideas which are still opposed by many so-called "hard-line" Gaullists in France. These Gaullists are apparently ignorant that even their idolized General de

His Common Market partners know about Mr. Pompidou's domestic political situation. Their knowledge is reflected in The Hague communiqué. It names no date for the beginning of negotiations with Britain. This is mostly because France all along has insisted that no specific date can be named.

The Italians here were keen to name March 31, but Mr. Pompidou managed to postpone Italian hopes. He has won a much longer schedule. This runs to June 30. It was mentioned merely by an announcement to a press conference.

But the central fact of all this is that France now is on record as favoring enlargement of the Common Market. This has been enough to revive hopes all along the line.

The next biggest question, in the view of France's five Common Market partners—West Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg—concerned farm matters. For France, however, it was the biggest question. And it has been given priority over talks toward Britain's membership.

A farm-finance policy must be agreed by January, a date set in the Treaty of Rome which founded the Common Market. But dates of that kind are "movable." In the past the experts have "stopped the clock" at midnight on Dec. 31 and talked on for many days afterward in order to reach difficult agreement.

The farm question is just such a matter. Finding a formula to cover it in The Hague communiqué caused the conference to drag on hours after its scheduled end.

Mr. Pompidou's six-point program for Europe attracted attention here belatedly. It was at first eclipsed by the impressive program West German Chancellor Willy Brandt presented Dec. 1. Also Mr. Pompidou's seemed less important because Mr. Brandt had based his entire conception of revitalized European unity on the idea of enlargement of the Common Market.

This appealed to all the delegations here except the French as of first importance. Mr. Pompidou called for many of the same things that Mr. Brandt suggested. But the French leader failed to stress the question of membership.

In a second speech on Dec. 2 he repaired his omission. He stated that preparatory talks on British, Norwegian, Danish, and Irish membership should be conducted "in the most speedy, most active, most positive way."

December 4, 1969

## At Hague Summit

# European Integration Step Seen

By H. PETER DREYER  
Brussels Bureau

BRUSSELS, Dec. 3 — The results of the Hague summit meeting of the Common Market six are on the whole considered here as an important step forward towards European integration. On the other hand, they have not entirely eliminated the doubts felt by some observers.

Nor is this in itself surprising. The understanding reached by

French President Georges Pompidou and the prime and foreign ministers are contingent on creating an atmosphere of confidence and trust within the community. After years when these were hardly the prevailing mood in Brussels, it was not to be expected that they would come back overnight.

There are other reasons why, the first euphoric reactions aside, it is difficult to properly

evaluate the outcome. For one thing, though concrete arrangements may have been agreed on by conference participants on material subjects, their width and range is not yet known.

For another, it is not the first time that the six have managed to concur on broad principles, only to drift apart later when practical details have to be settled. Not only is the final communique full of subject matters where the six are in principle intent on pushing forward with integration without specifying how this is to be done. There is also the fact that on the key problems confronting the Common Market right now in the agricultural field, the extent of concrete understandings remains to be revealed. More particularly, this applies to the finance regulations, the restructurization of European agriculture and the elimination of huge farm surpluses.

While the regulations in line with the French wishes will have to be adopted within the next few weeks, might their ratification later in 1970 perhaps have to be held up until the other two questions have been settled in detail likewise?

Doubts naturally also revolve around the topic of membership negotiations with the four candidate countries, considered by many as the central theme of the conference.

On paper the compromise devised by ministers seems acceptable enough, and some feel that it is more than might have been expected.

It is understood that the timing arrangements for the beginning of such negotiations had to be left outside the formal communique so as to spare the French president embarrassment in his domestic policy, yet cynics maintain that this is pure hair splitting. Mr. Pompidou's posture surely would not be different whether such an accord, once reached, is either made part or not made part of the official text.

But that being so, why not

include it in the communique? That such a laborious process should have been resorted to, whatever the reasons, is seen as proof that the hurdles in the path of integration are still looming very large.

On the positive side, if the euphoria now generated is perhaps essentially a mood, it might yet pay handsome dividends in the weeks ahead. On the vast array of major as well as minor questions awaiting community decisions now, ministers might be readier for more give and take than they generally have been in recent months.

December 8, 1969

# EEC Footnote: Power of the Press

By FELIX KESSLER

THE HAGUE—When reporters, TV cameramen and photographers mill around men who make monumental decisions, are they not in fact influencing the decisions themselves?

Such eminent philosophers as Marshall McLuhan and Spiro T. Agnew have indeed argued that the communications media shape an event simply in the way they record it.

This is, of course, disputable. But a good case could be made that the sheer presence of 450 reporters, analysts, commentators, photographers, TV people and assorted deep thinkers was as potent a force in the agreement reached at the Common Market's summit meeting last week as any so-called political will or unanimity of agreement among the six assembled heads of state.

## An Important Feedback

This international assembly of professional observers — the newsmen came from West European countries, the U.S., Russia, Bulgaria, Poland, Czechoslovakia and even included numerous Japanese — provided an important feedback to the leaders of the European Economic Community, much the same way that an actor is nourished by an appreciative audience.

Undoubtedly to their surprise, the EEC's statesmen learned that there was keen world-wide interest in their long-heralded meeting on the Common Market's future; despite ample evidence that the Common Market had long been drifting and aimless, a lot of people from far away thought that "European community" still mattered for something.

Had the ministers failed to reach agreement, it was clear, the folding of the Common Market would have been proclaimed throughout the world, and with it the idea of European unity. And if the instant world publicity the individual participants received did not shape the final outcome of the talks, it did prove a complicating factor.

The opening session quickly revealed the basic split that divided France and Germany. The issue was ostensibly the setting of a specific deadline to open negotiations with Britain over entering the EEC. Beneath the sur-

face, however, was the unstated power struggle between President Georges Pompidou and Chancellor Willy Brandt, the new leaders of France and Germany, over who will succeed Charles de Gaulle as Europe's most influential political voice.

Customarily at an EEC meeting, there is no general press briefing at which the various participants explain what transpired within the private discussions. Italian officials talk to "their" journalists, the Germans brief German reporters—and the talks are interpreted in a strictly nationalistic light. The French allow non-Frenchmen into their briefings but hold private huddles for a select few. The Dutch permit such outsiders as the British and Americans into their briefings but some journalists discount Dutch interpretations as traditionally too optimistic.

At this summit, however, differences in how the participants handled the huge press corps turned the debate over British negotiations into a standoff between President Pompidou and Chancellor Brandt. Their statements to the press amounted to commitments which complicated the compromise agreement finally hammered out in the secret sessions.

The first round went to Chancellor Brandt. Not only did his 13-page preliminary statement spell out the German viewpoint on the Common Market's future course, but the text was made available to newsmen in German—and in English. In contrast, Mr. Pompidou's much briefer opening remarks were distributed only in French.

## Praise for Mr. Brandt

The result: Mr. Pompidou's speech was described as largely negative and sketchy. Mr. Brandt was praised for stealing the spotlight with a thoughtful position paper that was widely quoted by American, British and other foreign journalists (including Japanese and East Europeans) whose English was stronger than their French. Nor was the French position helped when their first briefing was conducted solely in French, the official language of the EEC.

The French, obviously dismayed at the favorable press the Germans received, made a significant concession on the second day: The

French briefing was simultaneously translated into English. By clamping on headsets, newsmen who previously gathered only a sketchy understanding of the French view were now able to quote confidently that the French government spokesman was "still optimistic."

The French also gained from ways they helped newsmen interpret the final summit communique, itself complicated by previous statements of Mr. Brandt and Mr. Pompidou. The crucial issue that would decide whether the French or German view prevailed involved the date of British negotiations: Mr. Brandt had publicly stated he couldn't go home without a concrete date; Mr. Pompidou had said he couldn't accept a date until the market's agricultural financing was completed.

## A Hagggle Over Wording

This obvious conflict produced a delay of more than two hours as the prime ministers haggled over the wording of the communique. Finally, a compromise developed: There'd be no date in writing but the ministers were allowed to interpret the phrase "as soon as practically and conveniently possible" to mean next June 30.

It was then that the French scored their own press coup. Because the talks were late in ending, Dutch Premier Piet De Jong nervously rattled through a reading of the communique so quickly that the translators barely kept pace. In the same hall, French Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann immediately followed with a French press briefing. Not only did he have a ready audience of journalists seated to hear him describe the talks as "a complete success for France," but the translators made certain that all of the newsmen quoted and understood when he said the outcome was attributable to the initiative and vision of Mr. Pompidou.

German Foreign Minister Walter Scheel's press briefing was held elsewhere at the same time—and sparsely attended. Nor could all those in attendance understand what the Germans thought they gained; the briefing was in German and there were no interpreters. A British journalist who attended concluded that "Scheel looked happy but I didn't know what he was talking about."



December 15, 1969

## COMMON MARKET: Enough Blah-Blah

*This application is not just a matter of economics and politics. The history and culture of our Continent is the birthright of us all. We have all contributed to it and we all share in it.*

The words were those of a desperately sincere Briton, former Foreign Secretary George Brown, as he tried two years ago to convince an elderly Frenchman, Charles de Gaulle, that Britons were just as much Europeans as any other Europeans. De Gaulle was unconvinced, as he had always been, and for the second time in five years, he vetoed Britain's application to join the Common Market. But *le grand Charles* no longer controls the destiny of either France or Europe. Indeed, it was his successor, President Georges Pompidou, who proposed last week's summit meeting of the six Common Market members at The Hague in the Netherlands to discuss Britain's membership application and the basic economic and political future of Europe for the coming decade.

Dutch Premier Petrus de Jong and an honor guard and band shuttled between airport and railroad station to welcome Pompidou, West Germany's Willy Brandt and the other three leaders of the Six. The European movement flag—a green E on a white field—fluttered in the chill winter air. But otherwise, the unemotional Dutch showed little sign of interest as the official black limousines with their white-clad motorcycle escorts glided through city streets towards the Ridderzaal, the thirteenth-century Hall of Knights, where three rows of scarlet-uniformed grenadiers and the first few bars

of their national anthems awaited them.

There was little cause for celebration by the Dutch or anyone else in Europe. The Common Market ends its first twelve-year transitional phase at the end of this month with the dream of Continental unity which gave it birth as far from reality as ever. The Europe of the Market's founding fathers is now little more than an amorphous customs union of six quarrelsome, nationalistic states with a common agricultural policy that has proved an unmitigated disaster. Payment of subsidies to farmers (most of whom are French, though the Germans foot the largest share of the bill) is costing the community \$2.7 billion, and price continues to soar as food surpluses pile up all over Europe. And to many Europeans, the gathering of their political leaders in the Hall of Knights symbolized a last-chance effort to re-create the original dream.

**No Change:** At first, the meeting seemed doomed to failure. For Pompidou quickly made it clear that, despite all his earlier hints to the contrary, the French position remained unchanged: the Common Market would have to put its own house in order—and in particular come through with a new and permanent system of farm finance acceptable to French farmers—before tackling the question of British entry. "Are we prepared," he asked his colleagues, "to open our community to Britain and other candidates at the price of weakening it and perhaps seeing it crumble?"

As the French President finished speaking, a gloomy silence permeated the vast, timbered hall. Outside, some 1,000 European federalists set up a chant of "enough blah-blah," clashing with Dutch mounted police as they staged a sit-in before the medieval courtyard surrounding the hall. Inside, the cool statesmanlike voice of Chancellor Willy Brandt echoed around the old gothic walls, lined with centuries-old banners and coats of arms. He demanded a French response to West Germany's "clear will" for British

admission into Europe. "The German Parliament and public expect me not to return from the conference without concrete arrangements" for Britain's entry. "The choice," he said, was "between a courageous step forward and a dangerous crisis."

**Backdown:** For all Brandt's tough talk and Pompidou's intransigence, a few glasses of champagne over dinner in Queen Juliana's palace that evening brought about a mellowing of attitudes. In the past it had always been the Germans who had backed down over British entry rather than disturb relations with France. This time it was the French who changed their stand, reflecting the shift of the center of West European power from Paris to Bonn. And so the next morning, Pompidou announced that, in return for a favorable agriculture agreement by the end of the year, France was willing to begin negotiations with Britain by July 1970—and with Norway, Ireland and Denmark as well. (As a face-saving gesture to the French, the official communiqué did not mention the deadline.)

It was hardly the stuff that history is made of, and the irony was that public enthusiasm in Britain for the venture has been waning sharply ever since General de Gaulle's departure made the prospect valid. Of course, it was always possible that Pompidou had agreed to open negotiations on the gamble that the British, in the last resort, would not be prepared to pay the price of admission. And there was no doubt that the price would come high. Anti-Marketees gloomily predict that Britain's cash contributions to the community agriculture will cost her several hundred million dollars a year. And they have warned housewives to expect food prices to soar—political dynamite at a time when British politicians are preparing for a general election, which must be held before May of 1971.

**No Enthusiasm:** A recent public-opinion poll in Britain showed that 59 per cent of the country disapproved of entering the Common Market. But fortunately for the Labor government, the leadership of the Tory opposition is also committed to taking Britain into Europe. And the fact is that the arguments for British entry are as compelling as ever. British manufacturers would gain access to a free market of 250 million people—compared to only 50 million at home. And on the political front, Britain would once again be able to talk to the superpowers on more equal terms, even if only as part of a united European voice. "We are ready for negotiation," Prime Minister Harold Wilson told a crowded House of Commons last week. He suggested that Britain could become a member of the Common Market before 1973, although Tory leader Edward Heath, who might well be Prime Minister by then, has predicted that negotiations might take as long as five years. But first both men have to convince their countrymen that they are Europeans. And that may prove the hardest task of all.

## Europe

## Britain gets a foot in

Government chiefs of the six Common Market nations met in The Hague this week and signaled their readiness to accept Britain as a member.

After seven years of deadlock between France and its partners over the question of British entry, the breakthrough came during a 25-minute chat between French President Georges Pompidou and West German Chancellor Willy Brandt. The upshot: France got promises of continued subsidies for French farmers, and the five partners got Paris's agreement that talks on British entry could begin within six months or so.

on its consumers and on its balance of payments. Reason: a requirement that Britain buy high-cost food from the Continent instead of the cheap food it now buys from Australia, New Zealand, and other suppliers.


The Six must still reach a common negotiating position before talking with the British, so there is room for foot-dragging by Paris. But French Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann said he saw "no reason to doubt" that a common position will be hammered out by next June 30, and other delegates agreed.

Ironically, the new opening for Britain

must make concrete proposals for "realizing progress" toward political unification. Also, detailed plans are to be spelled out during 1970 for the creation of "an economic and monetary union."

After years of discussions on such goals, the EEC has never moved much beyond a customs union, and prospects for further progress are as cloudy now as ever. And if EEC fails to get its efforts at integration back on the rails next year, it is a safe bet that it will never progress beyond its present status.

Failure of the Common Market to achieve further integration would not necessarily be bad. It might be easier for Britain and other candidates (Ireland, Denmark, and Norway) to join in a customs union that does not push economic and political union too far. And it might



Common Market's top men meet in The Hague, where Pompidou (with briefcase) agreed to discuss Britain's entry.

Observers accustomed to years of tough French talk were surprised when Pompidou said that preparatory talks on British membership should proceed "as practically and as quickly as possible, and in the most positive spirit." A Dutch delegate to the talks, which took place around a giant oval table in the 675-year-old Knights Hall, said: "I haven't heard a French minister talk that way since the Common Market got started in 1958."

Indeed, the six prime ministers reached a compromise on the thorny issue of farm policy that would reduce the cost Britain would have to pay to become a member. For a long time, a major obstacle to Britain's acceptance of the Rome Treaty that set up the EEC has been the burden that the community's farm policy would throw

comes at a time when British public sentiment is swinging against membership in the Common Market. A Gallup poll published in London this week showed that only 36% of Britons favor entry, against 45% who disapprove and 19% undecided. Though all major parties have endorsed the membership bid, opponents have been making the most noise, harping especially hard on the prospect of swiftly rising food prices.

**Uncertainties.** The next question may well be what the Common Market will be like if the Six start negotiations with Britain. The final communique from the Dutch capital was rife with high-sounding but vague calls for closer economic, monetary, and political integration. By next July, for instance, the foreign ministers

be less damaging to U. S. economic interests than a tightly-knit group that could become, in effect, a separate monetary bloc.

**Effect on U. S.** Washington will keep a sharp eye on the negotiations. British entry into the Common Market under the present farm policy would raise loud squawks from the U. S., because American growers of feed grains and other products would lose sales to Britain. Extending the EEC's high price supports to Britain would also pile up still bigger farm surpluses in Europe and depress world market prices.

The U. S. is not too worried, though, because Britain is as eager as this country to modify the Common Market's farm policies. And in other products, the U. S. would benefit from a lowering of average

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British tariffs from 11% to about 7%.

If Britain gets in, though, along with other countries, the U. S. will have to start thinking about what comes next. Washington officials do not rule out some new bid for a wider free trade area including the enlarged Common Market, the U. S., Canada, Japan, and other industrial nations.

If the Europeans reached the degree of economic and political integration outlined at The Hague, it would mean a far-reaching reduction in American influence in West Europe—particularly in Britain and West Germany. Both Brandt and Pompidou made strong pleas for a Europe that would be "master of its own destiny" in the world of tomorrow.

**Compromise.** Whether or not political and economic unity becomes a reality, one thing is clear: The leaders of the six governments left no doubt that they considered their summit meeting a success on the specific issue of British membership. "For us this was the essential objective," said one key diplomat, "and on this point we are satisfied."

Pompidou's performance differed sharply from the haughty attitude of his predecessor, Charles deGaulle. After taking a tough position on the opening day, Pompidou quickly showed his willingness to negotiate. DeGaulle, by contrast, was never really ready to negotiate fundamental issues.

On farm policy, France demanded an agreement on financing EEC agricultural programs to assure the continued preferences and subsidies for French farmers. The Germans, who pay for the bulk of EEC farm subsidies, wanted a change in farm policy to reduce the cost of the program as well as the growing mountain of farm surpluses generated by high price supports.

And on the issue of British membership, Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries wanted to pin down France to a target date for opening of membership talks with London.

The Hague compromise calls for the Six, through the Council of Ministers, to work out financial arrangements by the end of 1969. Practically, this means they will "stop the clock" on bargaining and wrap it up in January. (The new policy would go into effect on Jan. 1, 1971.) The French conceded that there could be a "reorientation" of policy to handle the surplus problem. Equally important, they acknowledged that farm policy could be "adapted" during negotiations with Britain to accommodate British interests.

**Goals.** In further hopes of reviving the fading dream of European federation, all six governments proposed far-reaching new steps toward economic integration. Brandt, for instance, urged that the Council of Ministers work out a timetable during the coming year for full monetary and economic union.

Pompidou ticked off a long list of steps

toward unity. He wants EEC members to take a common position in the International Monetary Fund, an idea that the Six have been chewing on for years. He called for more frequent meetings of the economic and finance ministers, to be supported by a small "secretariat" to coordinate their work.

**Joint efforts.** The delegates made an effort to blow new life into other old ideas. For example, they are going to study the possibility of creating a European reserve fund, a scheme that dates back a decade. They also proposed to extend the "Barre plan," named after EEC Commissioner Raymond Barre. The plan provides for closer consultation on economic policies coupled with aid to members in balance-of-payments difficulties. But it will take a lot more willingness to cooperate to get plans like these off the ground.

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## *Moving the Common Market Off the Dime*

Finally the European Common Market is to consider Britain's application for membership. That was the achievement of the Six's summit at The Hague. True, France would not permit the setting of a specific date and, more importantly, the French won agreement that the Six would compose a joint position on market enlargement—without formal consultations with London. Nonetheless, the Common Market is off the dime. Negotiations with the British could begin as early as next summer. They cannot fail to force hard decisions on questions which have been debated, inconclusively, for years. As the British application is converted from suspense game to political reality, it will become possible to see whether President de Gaulle's veto was more cause or scapegoat in Britain's exclusion.

At The Hague, France also gained market agreement to make permanent farm-financing rules by Jan. 1, the deadline laid out in the Treaty of Rome. The difficulties are acute: high price supports have stimulated giant and growing surpluses and thus have severely strained the principle that all market members must share financial responsibility for them. The system favors France, penalizes Germany and, of course, has given Britain pause as it contemplates the higher food prices market

membership would bring. (Membership would also bring Britain access to Common Market markets and the stimulus of market competition.) A terrific battle, on farm rules, is shaping up; unless Europe is to drown in costly surpluses, it must be fought.

It cannot be said that the summit talk proved or found or added any new vigor to the European idea, although an exception should perhaps be made for Willy Brandt, who is alive to the evident interest of European youth in it. Issues of economic integration, albeit at a step deeper than a customs union, still command market priority. Perhaps it will be different as work on farm financing and on enlargement proceeds. For the moment, however, political momentum is lacking; it should be remembered that, when the Common Market was set up, economic union was intended to be a vehicle for, and a way station toward, political integration. Over the next year it should be possible to get a much clearer idea of how Europe is moving. For Americans, as for Europeans, it makes a great deal of difference whether Europe is becoming a larger political factor, or merely a stronger economic competitor. The question was left unanswered, unasked even, at The Hague.

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## Europe's New Momentum

The wide-ranging decisions on economic and political union just taken at the Common Market summit meeting will do as much to spur British entry as the agreement to open negotiations with London by July.

The Hague communiqué, which contains some hard-fought compromises over vested interests, reads astonishingly like a manifesto of Jean Monnet's Action Committee for a United States of Europe—with which

most of the ministers who were at the meeting long have been associated. After years of dissension introduced by General de Gaulle, the European Economic Community is again pronounced a going concern. And, with President Pompidou's consent, it is going toward most of the old objectives de Gaulle opposed.

There is agreement progressively to permit the E.E.C. to have its own revenue, presumably from customs duties, to the tune of billions of dollars—in place of contributions given and controlled by the six governments. The money would be used both for farm subsidies and for the Community's general budget. Oversight by a strengthened European Parliament is declared the democratic concomitant. Only four years ago a proposal by the E.E.C. Commission to move in this direction triggered a six-month boycott by de Gaulle of the Community's activity.

There is not only agreement by the French to prepare for negotiations with the British "in a most positive spirit," but also French acquiescence that British entry "undoubtedly" is in the interest of the Common Market.

In return, President Pompidou won his partners' agreement to shape a common position for the negotiations with Britain and to pass from the transitional to the final stage of the Common Market beforehand.

Included in this arrangement would be the establishment by Dec. 31 of a "permanent" system for financing the farm subsidies that chiefly benefit France. Subsequent changes will require unanimity, i.e., French consent, but Mr. Pompidou has agreed that changes can be made to limit surpluses and facilitate British entry.

Perhaps the most significant aspect of the Hague compact was the decision of the Six to move toward a pooling of part of their gold and foreign currency holdings in a European Reserve Fund. This long step toward a common currency for external transactions was made possible by West Germany, the Continent's strongest monetary power.

The new momentum and cohesion in the Common Market, plus the renewed invitation to London, should restore public enthusiasm in Britain for joining the E.E.C. Britain's leaders of both major parties never turned off, but public interest did decline when the dissension-ridden Community slammed the door in Britain's face for the second time.

Revival of interest is predicted now that the door to a cohesive Europe is being opened again. For both the British and the Six, the difficult adjustments involved in Britain's entry into the E.E.C. will be much more easily made with the present clear signs that the Common Market is on the upgrade again.

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## The suit (contd.)

All participants in this week's Common Market summit at The Hague knew that if their meeting were not to be a failure, they had to be on their best behavior as good Europeans. They all were.

The key figure of French President Pompidou made enough concessions to open the door to talks on Britain's admission to the Common Market without insisting on conditions at this stage that would be unacceptable to Britain. West German Chancellor Willy Brandt was conciliatory and reassuring, managing simultaneously to keep his country's special lines out to France, to argue the British case and to give no opening to the Germanophobes who fear German hegemony under every bed. For the Benelux group, Netherlands Foreign Minister Luns was ever at hand to enjoin (when necessary) — as Hamlet's mother did: "More matter, with less art!"

And the Italians? Well, the difficulties of the Rumor Cabinet at home kept them perhaps in what the Japanese would call a low posture. But it was an Italian initiative, resulting from Foreign Minister Moro's indisposition, that had made necessary the postponement of The Hague meeting from mid-November to the beginning of December.

In those intervening two weeks, there were two significant developments within

France which combined to dissipate some of the distrust which French representatives have had to face at Common Market meetings in recent years and to add credibility to President Pompidou's professions of good European intentions. These developments were: (1) the publication of a French National Assembly Committee's report saying that in British entry into the Common Market "there is both a political and economic interest" for France; and (2) a public opinion poll by one of France's most respected organizations showing that a considerable majority of Frenchmen of all shades of political opinion put their hope in a European community including Britain.

There is thus general acceptance of President Pompidou's sincerity in agreeing to talks on Britain's entry into the Common Market. There are hurdles along the road before the market can take up the talks. They center on the community's agricultural policies which Mr. Pompidou apparently wants resolved in France's favor before Britain is inside to add her weight in an opposite direction. On this some compromise is likely. But ironically the question could then be whether, while France has been getting more willing, Britain has been getting more unwilling and might even be the one this time to say "No" at the altar.

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## Brandt's Successful Start

Russia's last-minute agreement to open talks with West Germany today on a pact for mutual renunciation of the use of force brings to fruition a three-year effort by Willy Brandt, first as Foreign Minister and now as Chancellor, to initiate a broad dialogue with the East.

The talks in Moscow—which Bonn has agreed to accompany by seeking nonaggression agreements with the other Warsaw Pact countries, including East Germany—are expected to reach far beyond commitments not to use force, which in themselves will have little more than psychological value.

Both the talks and the agreements they envisage are recognized by both sides as a vehicle for increased acceptance by Bonn of Germany's postwar borders and of East Germany as a second state in the German nation. Bonn expects, in return, a move toward diplomatic relations with Poland and the other Warsaw Pact countries, starting with trade and consular missions.

Bonn's aim is to gain Eastern support for its main objective, a *modus vivendi* with East Germany and ultimate erosion of the country's partition.

Reports that Washington protested inadequate consultation by the Brandt Government in its moves toward the East have now been counteracted by the cordial letter President Nixon delivered to the Chancellor through Secretary of State Rogers. The letter emphasizes that Bonn's moves and Washington's are on parallel courses in seeking "to reduce longstanding causes of tension in Europe."

The Moscow talks and the liquidation of a budding controversy with the United States add to the impression of an unusually constructive beginning by West Germany's new "mini-coalition" Government, particularly in foreign affairs. Chancellor Brandt and Foreign Minister Scheel have acted decisively on major policies in a manner reassuring to Bonn's partners in the West as well as to the Soviet Union and most of East Europe.

The prompt upward revaluation of the mark by an even greater margin than financial circles had anticipated was an act of economic statesmanship, of political courage and of faith in the German economy. A Government with a hairline Bundestag majority might have stalled on an action certain to slash Bonn's trade surplus and balance of payments.

Another act of courage was Bonn's signing of the treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. This brought loud protests from Mr. Brandt's Christian Union opponents, including the charge that he was a "sell-out Chancellor," but it reassured the countries once victims of German aggression and provided a good example for other nations, particularly Japan.

Mr. Brandt also deserves much credit for the agreement of the six European Common Market members to open negotiations next summer looking to the admission of Britain and other applicants. He took a much stronger line with France on this matter than any previous West German Chancellor,

But most important of all perhaps is Mr. Brandt's effort—undertaken with imagination but without illusions—to build better relations with Moscow and the Soviet bloc. With the opening of the Moscow talks, which reflect a mutual conviction after extensive exploration that an agreement is within the realm of possibility, Mr. Brandt can already claim a modest success.

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## Britain and EEC

This time around France hasn't said anything like a positive Yes to Great Britain's application to join the European Common Market but neither has it again said the big No. President Pompidou has agreed to the opening of negotiations with "candidate countries" (Ireland, Denmark and Norway as well as Britain) and sees no reason why the preparations by the present six members of the market for entering into the discussions "will take more than six months." So, in effect, a date, July 1, for the start of negotiations is fixed. That much is now settled.

But what was done at The Hague conference is only the beginning of a beginning. In return for its acquiescence to the shaping of a rough sort of timetable, France received the promise of its market partners that they will endeavor "without delay" to formulate a farm program which, once agreed on, could be modified, before or after the admission of new members, only by unanimous vote. In light of all the difficulties inherent in the working out of such a program, the special interests involved, and France's retention of its veto power, that will take a good deal of doing.

Again, looming beyond that is the fact that the negotiations with Britain cannot be expected to move easily or quickly to a conclusion. The British government knows this quite well. Michael Stewart, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has described the British position: "We are resolute applicants; we are not suppliants." And he emphasized that Britain, "in good faith and good hope," will seek "reasonable" terms, adding, "I know the difficulties which lie ahead in negotiation. They are difficulties to be surmounted."

The full measure of the difficulties is still to be taken. At least real movement toward learning how many and how hard they are seems to be under way at last.



December 6, 1969

## The Necessity of Europe

By ANTHONY LEWIS

LONDON, Dec. 5—After the alarms and the hopes, the communiqué and the glosses, the Hague summit meeting has told us at least this much about the European Economic Community: whatever its disappointments, it is now an inescapable premise of politics in Western Europe. For the men who make policy it is a psychological fact of life, a given condition whose absence is too remote or difficult to bother imagining.

That is the significance to be seen in the performance of President Pompidou. That is what must explain the elaborate verbal devotion paid by this shrewd and careful Frenchman to the ideals of a united Europe.

### Political Entity Emerges

For not only did Pompidou sign a communiqué larded with references to a "European university" and a "monetary union" and the "integration process." But even his opening address, which was generally considered over-cautious, spoke

of "Europe" in the sense of a mystical political entity—and saw the Community as the "means of her [Europe's] development and of her influence."

That is a long way from the language or the assumptions of Pompidou's predecessor. When he said "Europe," General de Gaulle meant a group of states led by France, not an entity developing from the quarrelsome ministers and bureaucrats of the E.E.C.

### In France's Interest

French interests and ambitions have not changed in the months since the general's fall. Georges Pompidou still wants money from the Community's agricultural system to help cushion the needed shift of French peasants out of marginal farming. He still wants French economic stability and diplomatic influence.

Why should Pompidou, while covering his flanks with Gaullist noises, advance so far toward a Community-oriented position? The answer is hardly elusive. He is a politician, not an ide-

ologue, and that course was practical politics.

One reason is fear of West Germany's growing economic power—a fear that is an important political fact in France today. *Le Monde* spoke last week of the Germans' "insolent economic health." The recent French devaluation, followed by upward valuation of the mark, can have left no one in doubt about the relative strength of those economies.

The flourishing of the Germans is not a new phenomenon, but here again General de Gaulle was able for a while to ignore reality. Now Frenchmen see the political as well as the economic consequences. The disconcerting strength of the Bonn Government doubtless helps to explain recent French polls that show a large majority in favor of a united Europe, including Britain.

And there is what outsiders, especially Americans, must understand about the Common Market. Exaggerated as its pretensions to be the voice of a united Europe may at times

have been, it is a working political institution. When a French politician thinks about how to deal with the Germans, he automatically thinks about the Community.

### The American Reaction

There is obviously a critical reaction against the E.E.C. in some American quarters. It was reflected in a superbly iconoclastic article in *The Times* of London by Edwin L. Dale Jr. of *The New York Times*. What has really come of the dream of Europe united, he said, "is a lovely system by which six European countries foul up world trade in farm products, including ours."

There are selfish, inward-looking aspects to the Community as it operates. But the Hague meeting shows that this strange institution can also play the vital political role of a catalyst for common European problems. If the British hold their nerve and negotiate their way in, the Community will become stronger. We had better recognize that it is not going to go away.

December 4, 1969

# Common Market of the 70's: European and U.S. Views

## Negotiations Will Be Difficult but Hague Accord May Be Crucial Turning Point

By CLYDE H. FARNSWORTH

Special to The New York Times

PARIS, Dec. 3—The meeting in the Hague yesterday may mark a turning point in European history.

The leaders of the six members of the Common Market, gathered in the Hague's Hall of Knights, agreed that their Community should be enlarged and that, provided the British are willing, negotiations could begin next July. That decision, which may reshape Europe in the nineteen-seventies by creating a vast single market of more than 250 million people, represents a victory for persistence.

It also shows the changes that are taking place in the leadership of the Market—2 shift in the center of gravity from Paris to Bonn. Twice under President Charles de Gaulle, France vetoed British membership, but with the passing of the de Gaulle regime and the reversal of the franc, France lacks the authority to make the veto stick.

The five other members of the bloc, led by Chancellor Willy Brandt, pressed the British case in the two-day meeting. "The German Parliament and public expect me not to return from this conference without concrete arrangements regarding the Community's enlargement," the West German Social-Democratic leader said.

### Shift in French Policy

He got what he needed. President Pompidou extracted concessions in agriculture, but this does not diminish the importance of the Brandt victory. Succumbing to pressure, French policy has shifted 180 degrees.

The pact is made, and now Europe awaits the answer to the new questions: Do the British really want to join and what price are they willing to pay?

There is little doubt the conditions will be stiff. Britain will have to accept the common tariff on all imports into the bloc, which means she cannot

trade the way she is accustomed to. She will make a heavy financial contribution to agriculture, which will mean a drain of several hundred million dollars a year in her balance of payments. Furthermore, the British housewife will pay more for food, a politically explosive issue.

A cartoon in The London Sunday Express showed a fat Frenchman in a plush restaurant, and asked the question: "Do you want to pay for the Frenchman's lunch?"

It will be up to the skill of British negotiators to try to ease the conditions as much as possible. They will want long transition periods so that Britain can take her medicine gradually. They will argue strongly that Britain should not be called upon to pay an unfair amount into the Community's agricultural till.

There is a strong cynical feeling in Paris that Britain will never pay the price.

### Negotiations to Be Tough

A new phase has opened, a phase of tough negotiations, in which both the bloc and the British will play their cards with utmost care.

An American diplomat said that if the negotiations were well prepared they could end in success. He assumes that the political will exists on both sides of the Channel.

If the negotiations drag out for much longer than a year, it could be a sign of failure, British and Continental diplomats say. Assuming a year for negotiations and a year for parliamentary ratification, Britain could be in the Market by 1972.

But surprises may be in store. The leaders of the Six agreed that they would have to adopt a common negotiating position. This was at the demand of Mr. Pompidou.

In an earlier round of negotiations, which ended with General de Gaulle's veto in January, 1963, there was no common position, and the British were able to play off one member state against the other.

In seeking a common posi-



Associated Press

Chancellor Willy Brandt addressing Bundestag in Bonn. He praised President Pompidou's acceptance of a plan to expand Common Market.

tion, it will be easy for one country to stiffen the membership terms, perhaps beyond Britain's capacity.

Britain's objectives in seeking to join the Community have always in the main been political. Although British industrialists believe they can benefit once the tariff barriers are lifted, the overriding anxiety of the British Government has been political isolation from important developments on the Continent.

### Needed Forum in Europe

When Britain lost her empire and her huge influence in world affairs, she needed a forum in Europe. She did not see the importance of the Economic Community in its formative years, a misjudgment on which General de Gaulle capitalized. But that era has ended.

Should Britain join the Community, the three other applicants will probably follow.

December 4, 1969

## **Washington Silence Reflects New Doubts On What Will Serve American Interests**

By EDWIN L. DALE Jr.

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 3—Six or seven years ago, if there had been a report that France might, after all, admit Britain to the Common Market, there would have been loud cheers in Washington and much official comment.

Today there was silence. This does not mean that official United States policy has formally changed. It has not. The policy is that British entry would advance the cause of political union in Europe, which the United States continues to favor. But the silence has meaning all the same. It reflects a growing disillusion with the whole process of European union, combined with an awareness that, economically, the United States is suffering more than anyone had though likely through an actual and potential loss of agricultural exports.

### **Nixon Almost Silent**

President Nixon has preserved an almost complete silence on the issue of Europe and British entry. On his trip to Europe shortly after he took office, he did reassert the basic United States policy in these terms:

"The world will be a much safer place and from our standpoint a much healthier place — economically, socially and politically — if there were a strong European Community."

But apart from that brief statement, there has been no policy statement from the White House, and none from the usually voluble State Department.

"You will search in vain," one official said today, "for a comprehensive statement of position on the European question from this Administration."

Others emphasized that, in contrast to the past, there was no United States pressure on Britain, France or the other Common Market countries to bring about British entry. United States Ambassadors were in the thick of the fray in 1962 and 1963.

Partly this reflects a view

that United States pressure does little good and may do harm. But part of it also reflects a growing doubt on what the United States interests are.

This rise of doubt, differing among different men, is caused by two things.

One is the clear failure so far of European economic union to lead to political union.

The other is the Common Market farm program. It has brought mounting surpluses and a reduction in some key United States exports, particularly grains. Under some circumstances, British entry could make the whole problem far worse, with a loss of agricultural exports to Britain, too.

Those who back British entry argue that Britain, in her own interest, is likely to press for a farm program that would be less damaging to the outside world. But there is no guarantee that she would succeed.

### **Farm Issue Crucial**

Much will depend on the nature of the farm arrangements worked out by the Six before the end of the year and the subsequent terms for negotiating with Britain. But the United States officials made clear today, is reserving the right to object strongly if the ultimate deal appears to work against United States interests — a position that was hardly prominent in the earlier clashes over British entry.

Eric Windham White, the former secretary general of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, told a Congressional committee today that United States negotiators in the past had probably given away more than they had gained, in strictly economic terms, to achieve certain political purposes.

This has long been the charge of many members of Congress, and it is part of the explanation for the more cautious attitude now.

December 7, 1969

# The World

## Without De Gaulle It's a Different Market

**BRUSSELS** — The summit meeting of the European Common Market at The Hague probably will be remembered more for the visible evidence it offered of the shift of power from Paris to Bonn in Western Europe than for its immediate results.

These were not negligible. The European Economic Community agreed to open negotiations with Britain and other countries seeking admission, and, by agreement, stipulated in news conferences that the preparations for these negotiations should not take longer than June 30, 1970. The general assumption is that the talks between the British and representatives of the European Economic Commission, reflecting the bargaining position of the six members, will open soon thereafter and the more optimistic British hope to be "in" by 1973.

These results were the out-

come of an undeclared but nonetheless fierce trial of strength between France and her partners in the Common Market. To understand the extent of the change that has taken place, it is necessary to view President Georges Pompidou as he arrived in The Hague Monday to lunch with Queen Juliana.

Mr. Pompidou represented the country that since 1963, when the first British bid for entry had been rejected by Gen. de Gaulle, had dominated the Common Market. He radiated confidence, he was the personification of élan. When, 36 hours later, the President, still beaming and bouncy, emerged from the Hall of Knights, where the market conference was held, he still wore all the trappings of leadership. But, in the interval, European leadership had passed to Chancellor Willy Brandt of West Germany.

### Spate of Hints

The erosion of the French position had begun with Mr. Pompidou's speech Monday afternoon. A spate of hints from Mr. Pompidou's entourage had prepared the conference for an electrifying statement of a new, expansive French policy that would at once revive the European idea and open the gates to Britain. What they got, in the words of one Frenchman, was "an editorial from *Le Monde* on a bad day, all questions, subtlety and no substance."

The French President, of

course, was looking over his shoulder at the right wing Gaullists in his party who cling to their lost leader's opposition to British admission as the only true French policy.

The speech created a vacuum in European leadership which Mr. Brandt soon filled. The German Chancellor's speech was precise, definite and compelling. Where the Frenchman asked questions, Mr. Brandt asked action.

### French Intransigence

After the two speeches, there was little doubt that Mr. Brandt had assumed the leadership of the conference and of Europe. His path was smoothed, to some extent, by the intransigence of the Foreign Ministry officials who had accompanied Mr. Pompidou to Brussels and who were now entrusted with the task of representing France in drawing up the communiqué on the results of the conference.

What the French wanted was an agreement on regulations financing Common Market agriculture — which in practice means subsidies for French farmers—by the end of the year. They got it. They also wanted an immutable agreement. This they failed to achieve. The agreement may be reviewed, the communiqué said, after the Community is enlarged by the admission of Britain — or of Norway, Denmark and Ireland.

Having achieved most of what

they wanted, Mr. Pompidou and Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann were somewhat laggard in their endorsement of talks with the British.

At this point, the French were told that the West German and the Netherlands Parliaments would find it difficult to ratify the agricultural agreement, which will not go into effect until Jan. 1, 1971, unless it was clear that the French were not delaying the negotiations.

Mr. Schumann asked the other Foreign Ministers why it was necessary to include in the news conferences a reference to June 30, 1970, as the end of the preparatory period for negotiations. Wasn't the word of Mr. Pompidou on French support for negotiations enough?

### Dutch Reply

Dr. Joseph Luns, the tall, mordant wit who is the Netherlands Foreign Minister, asked why it was necessary to doubt the word of the Dutch Government. It, like its allies, had accepted the expansion of the Community by signing the Treaty of Rome; if Mr. Schumann persisted in delaying agreement on the conference communiqué, there would be no communiqué. Mr. Schumann did not comment. The communiqué, when issued, said the Common Market nations were prepared to open negotiations with Britain on entry—and, at the carefully-staged press conferences, spokesmen for the delegations said the negotiations should be finished by next June 30.

In a larger sense, the ascendancy that Mr. Brandt established by his hardheaded but genial diplomacy at the conference only regularized a situation that has been apparent to Foreign Ministries in Europe for the past seven months. This is that once the powerful charisma of Charles de Gaulle was removed from the scene, the realities of Europe became apparent.

—DREW MIDDLETON

December 5, 1969

**Stronger Common Market goal****Bonn holds key to new Europe**

By Harry B. Ellis

Staff correspondent of *The Christian Science Monitor***Bonn**

Top government leaders of East and West met separately this week in Moscow and The Hague to map their respective plans for Europe.

Close to the center of discussion at both meetings stood the policies of the new West German Government led by Chancellor Willy Brandt.

Mr. Brandt set as one of his first priorities the strengthening of the existing Common Market and its enlargement to include Britain, Norway, Denmark, and Ireland.

He wants equally to broaden and diversify West

German relations with Communist powers east of the Iron Curtain, beginning with the Soviet Union and Poland.

First item on Bonn's agenda with Moscow — already agreed to in principle by the Soviets — are talks to conclude a Soviet-West German treaty renouncing the use of force.

Separately, broad agreement has been reached on the supply of Soviet natural gas from Siberia to West Germany over a period of 20 years.

The deal will mean money in the pockets of German industrialists, who will furnish the estimated 1.2 million tons of large-diameter pipe needed to transport the gas.

The Polish Government is actively seeking expanded

economic relations with West Germany, centering on technical cooperation to modernize Polish industry.

Warsaw and Bonn also are expected to negotiate a bilateral treaty renouncing the use of force, similar to that proposed by Mr. Brandt's government to Moscow.

These programs, should they come to fruition, will give a green light to Hungary and the Balkan states to expand their relatively flourishing trade with West Germany.

A trend now emerging in Balkan-West German trade is "third world" cooperation, whereby German and Communist enterprises share the construction of projects in underdeveloped countries.

Upset by these developments is the East German Government led by Communist Party chief Walter Ulbricht, who has sought to harness other Communist regimes to his own policy toward Bonn.

Mr. Ulbricht's policy, in effect, rules out closer relations with West Germany unless Bonn first accords diplomatic recognition to East Germany.

Reportedly Mr. Ulbricht arrived in Moscow well before conference time, to confer privately with Soviet leaders.

Since Mr. Brandt was elected Chancellor in October, almost all Communist regimes except East Germany have reacted relatively positively to his accession to power.

A double task appears to confront the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies in Moscow:

1. To concert Communist policies toward Mr. Brandt's government within a general framework sanctioned by the Soviets.

2. To outmaneuver East Germany so that smaller Communist powers may utilize West German help to modernize their economies.

**Negotiations stressed**

East Germany itself already derives substantial aid from West Germany,

through interzonal trade which outweighs trade conducted by any other Communist country with Bonn.

Whatever communiqué the Warsaw Pact powers issue may not disclose — indeed, may obfuscate — conclusions reached by the Communist leaders toward West Germany.

The proof of the pudding will be the progress or otherwise of bilateral West German negotiations with the Soviet Union and Poland, centering on renunciation of force and trade.

Mr. Brandt returned to Bonn from the Western summit conference, declaring himself satisfied with results chalked up by Common Market leaders at The Hague.

West Germany and its allies wrung a commitment from France that negotiations with Britain should begin by the end of June, 1970.

A thorny problem to be decided first is final agreement on financial regulations for Common Market agriculture. France stands to benefit from community farm payments and West German taxpayers stand to pay.

The month ahead will be one of tough bargaining on farm problems. But the feeling here is that the faltering Common Market received a new impulse at The Hague.

## COMMON MARKET Trust and Good Feelings At The Hague

As she raised her champagne glass, Queen Juliana of The Netherlands surveyed the guests seated around her palace dinner table: the President of France, the Chancellor of West Germany and the Premiers of Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and her own country. Said the Queen in a simple toast: "I wish you success at this meeting." Rising in his turn, Juliana's consort Prince Bernhard added sternly: "That, gentlemen, is a royal order."

Judging from the communiqués and comments that emerged from last week's Common Market summit meeting at The Hague, the royal order was scrupulously obeyed. During the two-day session, a new order for Europe began to take shape. In return for the continuation of sizable agricultural subsidies, French President Georges Pompidou at last agreed to negotiations leading to the admission of new members, most notably Britain.

**Uncommon Confrontation.** To be sure, Pompidou's concession was surrounded by a tangle of verbal barbed wire. His opening statement was studied with the sort of oblique warnings about British entry that other members had heard repeatedly from France during the days of Charles de Gaulle. West Germany's Willy Brandt, who emerged from last week's summit as spokesman for the Six, supplanting his French counterpart, firmly rebuffed the old position. "The German Parliament and public expect me to return from this conference with concrete arrangements regarding the Community's enlargement," Brandt said determinedly. The French, he continued, should "respond to our clear will."

During Queen Juliana's dinner at *Huis ten Bosch* ("House in the Woods") palace outside The Hague, Pompidou drew Brandt aside. As the two strolled for half an hour up and down the elegant *chinoiserie* rooms, cognac glasses in hand, Pompidou gave his word that France would agree to negotiations with Britain. Fearful that France's ardent Gaullists would attack him for that concession, however, Pompidou adamantly refused to specify a date for negotiations to begin. In the 13th-century Hall of Knights where the sessions were held, this refusal led to an uncommon confrontation. Pressed by Dutch Foreign Minister Joseph Luns to stipulate a date, Pompidou finally growled: "Am I to understand that the Dutch Foreign Minister does not trust the word of the President of France?"

"The Dutch Foreign Minister trusts the President of France," Luns hastily assured him. "Everyone in this room trusts the President of France. But we have our public opinion to consider."

The final communiqué made no mention of a date. Privately, however, the



POMPIDOU, JULIANA & BRANDT  
Obeying royal orders.

French representatives set the end of June as the deadline for talks to begin with Britain (as well as Ireland, Denmark and Norway, the other three nations that have applied for Common Market membership). Almost overlooked in the lively sparring over a timetable for British entry was a remarkable change in the French attitude toward the Market. The French President urged a six-point program calling for "harmonized" foreign policies, mutual technological development and a monetary policy that would include a Common Market central bank for the gold and currency reserves of all its members. Pompidou's ambitious proposals are by no means likely to be realized in the near future, but they nevertheless represent a dramatic reversal of previous French policy. The change was enthusiastically welcomed by France's five partners. "We all have the good feeling," said West German Foreign Minister Walter Scheel, "that the Common Market can now overcome its stagnation and resume a more dynamic development."

**Bigger Grocery Bills.** Though many Britons, after eight long years of waiting, have changed their minds about joining the Common Market, Harold Wilson's government welcomed the outcome of last week's summit. The Hague meeting, however, did nothing to ease the concern of Britons that membership in the Market would sharply raise grocery bills as a result of farm supports and import levies. Aware that Britain might be called upon to pay as much as 50% of the Market's total farm subsidies for a few years, Wilson sought in the House of Commons last week to stifle what he described as "excessive optimism in

this matter." Said the Prime Minister: "If the terms involve too high a price, I think all of us agree that it would be wrong to accept them." London's *Sunday Express* put the thought somewhat more bluntly with a cartoon showing a French diner sitting down to a meal in a restaurant. "Do you want to pay for the Frenchman's lunch?" asked the story that followed.

For a while, Britain may have to do just that. Before negotiations begin, the country must decide whether it is willing to foot the bill in exchange for long-term gains as a partner in a united Europe. That the decision lies with London this time rather than Paris, however, is a measure of how far the Common Market has progressed.

TIME

December 12, 1969

Dec. 9, 1969

# Bonn spurs European unification

By Carlyle Morgan

Staff correspondent of *The Christian Science Monitor*

Brussels

The West Germans are setting the pace not only for Western European unity but for East-West detente. This impression dominates the aftermath of last week's big Atlantic alliance conference here, which followed the Common Market's summit meeting at The Hague.

It is a story of the deutsche mark and détente.

Behind this new influence in Western affairs is seen looming the financial and economic power of West Germany. But the conversion of that power into strong German diplomacy has appeared with the rise of the forward-looking Willy Brandt to the chancellorship at Bonn.

This performance at The Hague caused a big Paris newspaper to change its headlines between editions because it had prematurely called President Pompidou the "star of the show."

## NATO response

Then, here at Brussels, the impact of German moves for closer West German understanding with East Germany and with the Soviet Union gave the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's winter ministerial meeting its most dynamic feature.

These moves were reflected in the long declaration which the conference added to an almost equally long communiqué issued at its close, in the writing of which West German Foreign Minister Walter Scheel took part.

The declaration was a NATO response to the proposals of the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact for a general European security conference. NATO listed means by which the Soviet Union could prove the seriousness of its desire for the success of such a conference.

Its declaration said that "a just and lasting peace for Germany must be based on the free decision of the German people and on the interests of European security.

"The ministers are convinced that, pending such settlement, the proposals of the federal republic for a modus vivendi between the two parts of Germany and for a bilateral exchange of declarations on the nonuse of force or the threat of force would, if they receive a positive response, substantially facilitate cooperation between East and West on other problems."

## 'Constructive steps'

The declaration added that the allied ministers "consider that these efforts by the federal republic represent constructive steps toward relaxation of tension in Europe and express the hope that the governments will therefore take them into account in forming their own attitude toward the German question."

The declaration also called for "elimination of difficulties created in the past with respect to Berlin and free access to the city."

It said that NATO ministers would "regard concrete projects in both these fields as an important contribution to peace in Europe."

The statements were seen here as the alliance's endorsement for Mr. Brandt's policy of seeking understanding with the East German and Soviet regimes on the future of Germany.

In Moscow Dec. 8, West Germany and the Soviet Union began talks on a formal agreement to renounce the use of force against each other. The talks were being conducted by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko and West German Ambassador Helmut Allardt.

In Paris the same day, United States Secretary of

Defense Melvin R. Laird denied at a press conference that the United States had disagreed with its allies in Brussels over what response should be made to the Soviet Union on the question of a general security conference.

Reports over the weekend had stated that the U.S. delegation to the NATO conference was rebuffed when it sought to name the "Brezhnev doctrine" as a possible obstacle to a general European conference.

The "Brezhnev doctrine" is the name given to the Soviet theory that it has the right to intervene in any Communist state if it thinks the development of "socialism" is threatened in that state. The theory was enunciated by Soviet Communist party chief Leonid I. Brezhnev in the wake of the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia.

## Czech reference withheld

The allies also were reported to have opposed American desires to include a direct reference to the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia last year in the official statement that closed the NATO meeting.

American officials, including Secretary of State William P. Rogers, already have declared that the United States Government is not opposed to a federal European conference. But it does want to make sure that the conference will be well prepared and will deal with specific matters which must be cleared up if European tensions are to be reduced.

French Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann talked with Mr. Rogers and Mr. Laird about the forthcoming allied response to Soviet proposals for such a conference at a state dinner that Mr. Schumann gave Dec. 7.

He told his American guests that the French Government agrees with the United States that a European conference should take place only if it has been thoroughly prepared in advance and has reasonable chance of success.