Hall, Peter A. (1994) Central Bank Independence & Coordinated Wage Bargaining: Their Interaction in Germany & Europe. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 04.4, 1994. [Working Paper]
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Abstract
This paper explores the fashionable proposition that with a more independent central bank, a country can secure lower levels of inflation without higher unemployment. Hall shows that the operation of the central bank depends on the character of wage bargaining. He illustrates this point with some cross-national data and an analysis of how coordinated wage bargaining is secured in Germany. He concludes by exploring the implications of this analysis for European Monetary Union.
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| Social Networking: |
| Item Type: | Working Paper |
|---|---|
| Subjects for non-EU documents: | EU policies and themes > EU institutions & developments > European Central Bank Countries > Germany EU policies and themes > Policies & related activities > economic and financial affairs > EMU/EMS/euro |
| Subjects for EU documents: | UNSPECIFIED |
| EU Series and Periodicals: | UNSPECIFIED |
| EU Annual Reports: | UNSPECIFIED |
| Series: | Series > Harvard University, Center for European Studies > Program for the Study of Germany and European Working Papers Series |
| Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email kms214@pitt.edu |
| Official EU Document: | No |
| Language: | English |
| Date Deposited: | 22 Apr 2015 10:21 |
| Number of Pages: | 31 |
| Last Modified: | 22 Apr 2015 10:21 |
| URI: | http://aei-dev.library.pitt.edu/id/eprint/63694 |
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