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Commission



Evaluation of the European Union's Support to Private Sector Development in Third Countries

Final Report

Volume IV

Annexes 4 to 10

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Development
and Cooperation
EuropeAid

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of the European Commission*



Development
Researchers'
Network



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c/o ADE, leading company

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*The opinions expressed in this document represent the authors' points of view
which are not necessarily shared by the European Commission
or by the authorities of the concerned countries.*

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The author accepts sole responsibility for this report, drawn up on behalf of the Commission of the European Union. The report does not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission.

Cover page illustration “Industrial Textile Factory”, copyright Lucian Coman, Dreamstime.com.

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Annex 4 – Data Collection Grid for meta-analysis of Evaluations

The purpose of this data collection grid has been to collect PSD evidence from existing evaluations (country, regional and thematic) in geographical zones which have received PSD support. This data collection grid therefore does not aim to be exhaustive but rather provides additional evidence upon which the analysis of the present evaluation has been based.

The information provided in this data collection grid was gathered at the levels of the Judgment Criteria. It is displayed in a basic form and served as a basis, together with information arising from other sources, to conduct the analysis presented in the Final report.

To this purpose, the grid contains evaluation inputs taken from:

- Six country evaluations:
 - Evaluation des opérations d'aide budgétaire de la Commission Européenne à la Tunisie 1996 – 2008 (2011);
 - Evaluation of the European Commission's support to the Republic Of Moldova 200-2006 (2007);
 - Evaluation of European Commission's Cooperation with El Salvador – Country level Evaluation 1998-2008 (2010);
 - Evaluation de la coopération de l'Union européenne avec le Burkina Faso 1998-2008 (2010);
 - Evaluation Of The European Commission's Support To The Republic Of Guyana 1997-2007 (2008);
 - Evaluation of European Commission's Support with Egypt 1998-2008 (2010)).
- One regional evaluation:
 - Evaluation of the Council Regulation N° 2698/2000 (MEDA II) and its implementation (2009)
- Seven thematic evaluations :
 - Final Evaluation of the EU/ACP Microfinance Programme (2012);
 - Final Evaluation Private Sector Enabling Environment Facility (PSEEF) (2010);
 - Mid-term evaluation of EIB's external mandate (2010);
 - Evaluation Of Commission's Aid Delivery Through Development Banks And EIB (2008);
 - Evaluation of the Center for Development of Enterprise (2011);
 - Banking Measures in the Mediterranean Area in the context of the MEDA programme and the previous protocols, Special Report n°1 (2009);
 - Thematic global evaluation of EC support in the sectors of ESI (employment and social inclusion) in partner countries during the period 1999-2008 (2011).

0	Preliminary elements
0.1	The evaluation refers to the COM(2003)267 Communication and/or to 2003/2010 PSD Guidelines ¹ (Y/N). If yes specify whether in main text and/or bibliography
Tunisia Evaluation ²	N.
Moldova ³	N.
El Salvador ⁴	N.
Burkina Faso (1999-2008)	No
Guyana (1997-2007)	No
Microfinance	Y: Main text refers to COM(2003)267, with regard to the overall objectives of the EU/ACP Microfinance Programme. PSD guidelines are not referred to at all.
BizClim	Y: Main text refers to COM(2003)267, with regard to the role of the private sector in poverty reduction.. PSD guidelines are not referred to at all.
MEDA II	No
Egypt 98-08	No
Banking Measures in the Mediterranean area in the context of the MEDA programme and the previous protocols ⁵	No.
Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008 ⁶	No.

¹ European Commission, *Guidelines for European Commission Support to Private Sector Development*, 2003 and European Commission, *Trade and Private Sector Policy and Development Support programmes financed by EU external assistance – Tools and Methods Series – Reference Document No. 10*, 2010.

² DRN (for the European Commission), *Evaluation des opérations d'aide budgétaire de la Commission Européenne à la Tunisie entre 1996 et 2008*, 2011.

³ Particip (for the European Commission), *European Commission's Support to the Republic of Moldova – country-level evaluation*, 2007.

⁴ ADE (for the European Commission), *Evaluation of the European Commission's co-operation with El Salvador over the period 1998-2008*, 2010.

⁵ European Court of Auditors, *Banking Measures in the Mediterranean Area in the context of the MEDA programme and the previous protocols*, Special Report n°1, 2009.

⁶ DRN-PARTICIP (for the European Commission), *Thematic global evaluation of EC support in the sectors of ESI (employment and social inclusion) in partner countries during the period 1999-2008*, 2011.

EIB IF/OR (2010) (2010)	n.a.
Channeling DBs and EIB (2008)	No
CDE (2011)	Yes. The evaluation has a specific judgment criterion on this, hence with a section of the main report dedicated to this point: "JC 1.3 The CDE aligned its strategy and activities to Commission's policy and programmes in support of private sector development to promote mutual synergies".
0.2	The evaluation includes EQs which are specific to PSD (specify)
El Salvador	EQ 4 on MSE Development: "To what extent did the EC interventions contribute to the development of and employment in local micro and small enterprises, and ultimately increased economic growth?".
Burkina Faso (1999-2008)	One EQ on PSD: "Secteur privé et intégration régionale" : « <i>Dans quelle mesure l'aide de l'UE a permis le renforcement et la compétitivité de la petite et moyenne entreprise ?</i> » p.72 One EQ related to PSD : ▪ "Secteur transport": Two JCs seem related : 1) « Augmenter les échanges commerciaux » ; 2) « Augmenter les capacités des acteurs de l'entretien routier (dont PME de l'entretien routier). »
Guyana (1997-2007)	One EQ on PSD : « Production capacity » : "To what extent have Commission interventions contributed to private sector strengthening and ultimately to sustainably restoring and increasing Guyana's production capacity?" p.35
Microfinance	Insofar as microfinance is the provision of financial services to low income people and MSMEs, all 10 EQs can be said to address PSD to some extent (see full set of EQs in 0.3 below). Beyond this, 5 EQs can be said to be specifically related to the ability of the EC to provide access to finance: EQ 2, EQ 3, EQ 4, EQ 6, EQ 10.
BizClim	The evaluation employed 5 EQs, one referring to each OECD-DAC criterion plus cross-cutting issues. The only EQ that contained a specific reference to PSD was EQ 1 on relevance, which included a sub-question of "Has BizClim been coherent with the overall strategy of the Commission in the field of PSD in ACP? »
MEDA II	Yes. EQ3 is on effectiveness and impact of PSD and trade interventions ("To what extent have the Commission's interventions to support private sector development and trade contributed to improving growth and competitiveness? »)
Egypt 98-08	Not specifically but the Barcelona process, also know as Euromed partnership, particularly its pillar II (dedicated to the development of an economic and financial partnership to establish a free trade area - FTA) is undoubtedly a driving force in Egypt since national policies aim increasingly at opening-up of the economies and are concerned with the competitiveness of domestic enterprises. Commission's support to Egypt is for a great deal oriented towards trade, economic and financial reforms, as the evaluation is, with implicit links with PSD even though not explicitly mentioned as such. It should be noted that EQ4 (on economic transition) and EQ5 (on employment) have a particularly strong link with PSD, though not explicit.
EIB IF/OR (2010)	n.a. The evaluation concerns the EIB operation on Own Resources (OR) and under the Investment Facility (IF). Hence it does not concern as such Commission's support to PSD. This said, as the EIB is a sister institution of the Commission and can be called its "financial arm", the information contained in the evaluation is also relevant when it comes to examining Commission support to PSD (notably in terms of coordination but also comprehensiveness of the set of instruments provided etc.).

Channeling DBs and EIB (2008)	No. The evaluation concerns the channeling of Commission funds through respectively the Development Banks (mainly the World Bank) and the EIB. Hence the EQs concern the channeling as such and do not focus specifically on PSD																		
CDE (2011)	<p>Yes, there are several EQs on PSD, in the sense that the CDE has the mandate, under the Cotonou Agreement, to support private sector development in all ACP countries part of the Agreement through the provision of non-financial services to enterprises in all sectors of the economy:</p> <table border="1"> <tr> <td>EQ 1</td> <td>Strategy</td> </tr> <tr> <td>EQ 2</td> <td>Adequacy to needs</td> </tr> <tr> <td>EQ 3</td> <td>Inputs provided and link with outputs</td> </tr> <tr> <td>EQ 4</td> <td>Business environment reforms</td> </tr> <tr> <td>EQ 5</td> <td>Quality and certification</td> </tr> <tr> <td>EQ 6</td> <td>Access to finance</td> </tr> <tr> <td>EQ 7</td> <td>Access to markets</td> </tr> <tr> <td>EQ 8</td> <td>Business development services</td> </tr> <tr> <td>EQ 9</td> <td>Cost-effectiveness</td> </tr> </table> <p><i>Source: ADE (for the European Commission), Evaluation of the Centre for the Development of Enterprise, 2011 (p19)</i></p>	EQ 1	Strategy	EQ 2	Adequacy to needs	EQ 3	Inputs provided and link with outputs	EQ 4	Business environment reforms	EQ 5	Quality and certification	EQ 6	Access to finance	EQ 7	Access to markets	EQ 8	Business development services	EQ 9	Cost-effectiveness
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Banking Measures in the Mediterranean area	Not applicable. The Court of Auditors Report is a performance audit of the banking measures financed under the MEDA programme and the previous protocol. It looked specifically at: “(a) <i>Are the projects adequately monitored by the Commission and the EIB by means of proper control procedures, ensuring that there is feed-back in the event of obstacles affecting the execution of the projects?</i> (b) <i>Are the project s achieving their objectives?</i> ” (p.10).																		
Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008	Not on PSD specifically but, as per the subject of the evaluation, three questions on (1) Labour demand and employment creation (EQ 5), (2) Employability (EQ 6), (3) Decent work (EQ 7).																		
0.3	The evaluation addresses PSD in a transversal manner in the EQs (specify)																		
Tunisia Evaluation	No.																		
Moldova	No.																		
El Salvador	No.																		
Burkina Faso (1999-2008)	Yes in the sense that PSD is mentioned in different EQs: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ On relevance ▪ On transport ▪ On private sector and regional integration ▪ On coherence, complementarity and coordination 																		
Guyana (1997-2007)	To some extent in the sense that PSD addressed in the other transversal EQs such as EQs: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ On relevance ▪ On efficiency ▪ On cross-cutting issues ▪ On the “3 Cs” But not mentioned in the other thematic EQs such as those:																		

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ On sea defences ▪ On social benefits to local communities 																												
Microfinance	<p>All 10 EQs were to some extent related PSD in the sense that they addressed EC support to microfinance, aiming at increasing access to finance for low income persons and enterprises. EQs were as follows:</p> <table border="1" data-bbox="475 506 1331 1854"> <tr> <td data-bbox="475 506 576 696">EQ 1</td> <td data-bbox="576 506 772 696">Relevance</td> <td data-bbox="772 506 1098 696">To what extent did the Programme design and implementation address needs of the ACP microfinance sector?</td> <td data-bbox="1098 506 1331 696"> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Relevance ▪ EC value-added ▪ Coordination </td> </tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="475 696 576 913">EQ 2</td> <td data-bbox="576 696 772 913">MFI Capacity-building</td> <td data-bbox="772 696 1098 913">To what extent did the Programme contribute to strengthening MFIs' social and financial performance, efficiency and technical capacity?</td> <td data-bbox="1098 696 1331 913"> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Effectiveness ▪ Sustainability </td> </tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="475 913 576 1104">EQ 3</td> <td data-bbox="576 913 772 1104">Other actors' Capacity-Building</td> <td data-bbox="772 913 1098 1104">To what extent did the Programme contribute to strengthening the capacities of microfinance actors (other than MFIs)?</td> <td data-bbox="1098 913 1331 1104"> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Effectiveness ▪ Sustainability </td> </tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="475 1104 576 1294">EQ 4</td> <td data-bbox="576 1104 772 1294">Microfinance sector</td> <td data-bbox="772 1104 1098 1294">To what extent has the Programme contributed to a more effective and transparent microfinance sector in ACP countries?</td> <td data-bbox="1098 1104 1331 1294"> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Effectiveness </td> </tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="475 1294 576 1485">EQ 5</td> <td data-bbox="576 1294 772 1485">Leverage</td> <td data-bbox="772 1294 1098 1485">To what extent has the Programme leveraged and diversified financing sources for microfinance actors?</td> <td data-bbox="1098 1294 1331 1485"> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Effectiveness </td> </tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="475 1485 576 1675">EQ 6</td> <td data-bbox="576 1485 772 1675">Financial services</td> <td data-bbox="772 1485 1098 1675">To what extent has the Programme contributed to increasing the range and use of microfinance services?</td> <td data-bbox="1098 1485 1331 1675"> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Impact </td> </tr> <tr> <td data-bbox="475 1675 576 1854">EQ 7</td> <td data-bbox="576 1675 772 1854">Beneficiary⁷ Selection</td> <td data-bbox="772 1675 1098 1854">To what extent did the criteria and process for selecting grantees/partners suit the Programme objectives?</td> <td data-bbox="1098 1675 1331 1854"> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Efficiency ▪ Relevance </td> </tr> </table>	EQ 1	Relevance	To what extent did the Programme design and implementation address needs of the ACP microfinance sector?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Relevance ▪ EC value-added ▪ Coordination 	EQ 2	MFI Capacity-building	To what extent did the Programme contribute to strengthening MFIs' social and financial performance, efficiency and technical capacity?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Effectiveness ▪ Sustainability 	EQ 3	Other actors' Capacity-Building	To what extent did the Programme contribute to strengthening the capacities of microfinance actors (other than MFIs)?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Effectiveness ▪ Sustainability 	EQ 4	Microfinance sector	To what extent has the Programme contributed to a more effective and transparent microfinance sector in ACP countries?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Effectiveness 	EQ 5	Leverage	To what extent has the Programme leveraged and diversified financing sources for microfinance actors?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Effectiveness 	EQ 6	Financial services	To what extent has the Programme contributed to increasing the range and use of microfinance services?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Impact 	EQ 7	Beneficiary⁷ Selection	To what extent did the criteria and process for selecting grantees/partners suit the Programme objectives?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Efficiency ▪ Relevance
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⁷ The term 'beneficiaries' as used in this report refers to Programme grantees and partners. References to 'end-clients' are referred to as such.

		EQ 8	Cross-fertilisation	To what extent has there been a cross-fertilisation of ideas and lessons learned between beneficiaries?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Effectiveness ▪ Coherence 	
		EQ 9	Institutional set-up	To what extent did the Programme's institutional set-up and configuration facilitate achievement of the Programme goals?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Efficiency ▪ 3Cs, Coherence ▪ EC added-value 	
		EQ 10	EC/ACP capacity	To what extent did the establishment of a microfinance-dedicated programme enhance the EC and ACP Secretariat's capacity and visibility in this field?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Coherence ▪ Visibility 	
BizClim	<p>Despite the limited explicit reference to PSD in the EQs, the nature of the BizClim programme, which was focused exclusively on PSD, makes the combined set of 5 EQs of relevance to PSD to some degree. The full set of EQs, with sub questions is presented below:</p> <p>1.1. Policies and strategies</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Has BizClim been coherent with the overall strategy of the Commission in the field of PSD in ACP? - How do the BizClim activities address the national and regional policies of the beneficiaries? - Have BizClim activities as planned in the successive annual work plans been responsive to the evolving needs of the beneficiaries? - Has the programme remained responsive to changes in the economic and social environment in the ACP area? <p>1.2. Design</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - How adequate (relevant) are the aspects addressed in the intervention logic of BizClim (and individual interventions) as currently set out? Inputs / Activities, Results, PP, OO, Assumptions. - How well did the project management adjust the project design (including the intervention logic / hierarchy of objectives) to make it more relevant? - Is the PP achievable in the project framework? - Are the results appropriate to achieve the PP? - Are coordination, management and financing arrangements clear and do they support institutional strengthening and local ownership? - How much flexibility is built in the design on the input/activity and results level? - Are the assumptions given in the LFM as well as successive AWP still valid and how did the programme monitor the assumptions? - Have the recommendations of previous programmes (DIAGNOS, etc.) been taken into consideration in the design and during implementation of BizClim? <p>1.3. Complementarity and added value</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Are BizClim activities complementary to EC Country Strategic Plans (CSPs) and National Indicative Plans (NIPs) of the respective beneficiary countries and regions? - How has the facility complemented the activities of other cooperating partners (CPs)? - What has been the 'added value' of the funded project? <p>2. Efficiency</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - To what degree are inputs / resources provided or available on time to implement activities, from 					

all project partners (EC, PMU, ACP Secretariat, final beneficiaries)?

- To what degree are inputs provided / available at planned cost (or lower than planned), from all parties identified?

- Are project resources managed in a transparent and accountable manner which promotes equitable and sustainable development?

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- Is an activity schedule (or work plan) and resource schedule available and is it also used by the PMU?

- To what extent are activities implemented as scheduled?

- How well are activities monitored regularly by the project and corrective measures taken if required? (e.g. new activities due to rising additional needs, cancellation of activities)

3. Effectiveness

- Have the OVI's (i.e. targets according to the intervention logic) been achieved as planned to date?

- Have all planned results been delivered to date?

- What is the quality of results to date?

- How well is the achievement of results monitored regularly by the project and corrective measures taken if required?

- Are the inter-institutional structures adequate to allow efficient project implementation?

- Have all partners been able to provide their contributions to the project?

- How good / fluent is the communication between the PMU and the Commission (including EU Delegations in the countries where individual interventions have taken place)?

4. Impact

- What impact has the implementation of BizClim brought about in terms of strengthening of institutional and human resources capacity of Ministries/Agencies and private sector organizations concerned?

- What is the real contribution of BizClim to the overall objective?

- What is the programme's impact, both anticipated and unanticipated?

- Are there data available to measure this impact?

- Did indicators to measure impact exist, and if so, were they appropriate?

- What are the unplanned positive and negative effects of the programme?

5. Sustainability

5.1. Financial / economic viability

- If the services (results) have to be supported institutionally, are funds likely to be made available?

- Are the services affordable for the final beneficiaries at the completion of project?

- Are the responsible persons / institutions assuming their (financial / economic) responsibilities?

- Are the target groups (and relevant authorities / institutions) in the position to afford maintenance and replacement of the technologies introduced and / or used by the project?

- Is there a phase-out strategy defined and (to be) implemented?

5.2. Level of Ownership

- How far BizClim interventions are embedded in local (community) structures?

- To what extent have beneficiaries and possibly other relevant interest groups / stakeholders been involved in the planning process?

- To what extent are relevant target groups and beneficiaries actively involved in decision-making concerning project orientation and implementation?

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- What is the likelihood that target groups / beneficiaries will continue to make use of relevant services after external support has ended?

5.3. Level of Policy Support / Degree of Interaction between Project and Policy Level

- How much support did BizClim interventions receive from the public and private sector in the beneficiary countries?

- To what extent BizClim interventions have contributed to democratization e.g. promotion of

	<p>participation, accountability and human rights?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - To what extent do BizClim interventions enhance the role of non-state actors, as partners in public policy making and implementation? <p>5.4. Project Contribution to Institutional and Management Capacity</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - How far are BizClim interventions embedded in institutional structures that are likely to survive beyond the availability of EU funding? - What is the actual level of availability of qualified human resources to implement BizClim interventions compared to initial planning? - Are there good relations with new or existing institutions and are they capable of continuing the interventions' flow of benefits? <p>5.5. Appropriate Technology</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - How understandable and flexible it is? - To what extent do the technologies build on existing practices and knowledge? - How well does it encourage the development of local knowledge and capacity? - How well does it maximise the use of local resources? <p>5.6. Cross Cutting Issues – Gender and Environment, Good Governance</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Does BizClim contents and methodology reflect a gender-sensitive approach? - Has BizClim been planned on the basis of a gender-differentiated target group analysis? - Have practical and strategic gender interests been adequately considered in the initial strategy behind BizClim interventions? - Are BizClim interventions respecting environmental needs? - Has environmental damage been done or likely to be done by individual BizClim interventions? What kind of mitigation measures has been taken? <p><i>Source : EC, Final Evaluation Private Sector Enabling Environment Facility (PSEEF), 2010.</i></p>
MEDA II	<p>Yes. MEDA II Regulation is the main financial instrument of the Barcelona Process (also known as Euromed partnership) which focuses on three pillars, the second and most important one being dedicated to the development of an economic and financial partnership to establish a free trade area (FTA) by 2010, including its PSD dimension.</p> <p>Sectorwise the priority of the Euromed partnership and MEDA II support has been placed on economic reforms, including the private sector and trade (40%). The social sectors and infrastructure each benefited from 20% of the total commitments, the remaining 20% being shared between all other sectors.</p> <p>The distribution of commitments per sector of intervention is quasi similar at bilateral and regional level except that at regional level social sectors received minor support to the benefit of other intervention sectors such as energy, telecommunications, environment, and culture and information.</p>
Egypt 98-08	<p>Yes. See point 0.2 above.</p>
EIB IF/OR (2010)	n.a.
Channeling DBs and EIB (2008)	<p>Yes, as the EIB support concerns PSD and as the evaluation focuses on the channeling of Commission funds through the EIB, the evaluation addresses PSD related matters.</p>
CDE (2011)	<p>Yes in the sense that the evaluation object is entirely in the field of PSD (see also EQs under previous indicator).</p>
Banking Measures in the Mediterranean area	<p>No EQs as the Report is a performance audit of the banking measures financed under the MEDA programme and the previous protocol.</p>

Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008	Yes, the role of PSD on Employment and Social Inclusion is mentioned in transversal manner in this evaluation.
0.4	The evaluation has one or more specific conclusions on PSD
Tunisia Evaluation	<i>C 3.2 Réforme de l'environnement des affaires : les ABG (appuis budgétaires généraux) ont appuyé la forte dynamisation du secteur privé dans la période 1996-2008. Forces et faiblesses des résultats. (QE 3.3b, 4.1).</i>
Moldova	Yes, on SMEs and rural development: <i>“EC TA and policy advice has contributed to a substantial and tangible improvement in the legal and regulatory environment for SMEs. Over the evaluation period, new laws were enacted and administrative red tape was reduced. While steps have been taken to address the inadequacy of SME finance, there has been less progress in this field. Most experts were of the opinion that it is finance rather than the business environment that is the main constraint to development of the SME sector”</i> . p. 46. <i>“The EC devoted considerable effort to putting local Business Centres in place to stimulate SME development in pilot rural regions. Results have, in general been disappointing. Although a large range of activities was implemented during the project lifetime, activities largely ceased after the end of international support. »</i> p.47.
El Salvador	No.
Burkina Faso (1999-2008)	<p>Une conclusion générale qui mentionne notamment PSD: “Efficacité de l'aide dans les différents secteurs d'intervention » :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>« SECTEUR PRIVE ET INTEGRATION REGIONALE : L'appui au secteur privé de la Union européenne au Burkina Faso s'est concrétisé à travers la mise en oeuvre du Programme de renforcement des capacités des entreprises (PRCE) qui a fait preuve d'une bonne efficacité et, au niveau de l'UEMOA, à travers la mise en place d'un système d'accréditation, de normalisation et de promotion de la qualité (PARI 1 et 2), à l'efficacité nettement moins avérée. »</i> p.93 <p>Une conclusion spécifique sur PSD : « Le secteur privé » :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>« [S]uccès en termes de dynamisation du marché des SDE, d'amélioration de l'environnement des affaires et d'émergence d'un savoir-faire local en matière de gestion stratégique et opérationnelle de projets. [...] Les contraintes structurelles du secteur restent néanmoins lourdes et l'élaboration participative d'une stratégie pour lever ces contraintes devra être menée [...] [B]ilan plus mitigé dans le cadre régional des appuis à l'intégration et au renforcement de la compétitivité internationale du Burkina Faso. [...] Il n'existe pas encore de réelle politique sectorielle ayant trait au secteur privé et aucune réelle stratégie pour accroître significativement la productivité des facteurs de production. [...] Le rôle du secteur privé dans le processus de définition de scénarii « réalistes » de croissance durable et équitable mérite d'être conforté. »</i> p.99
Guyana (1997-2007)	<p>No specific conclusion on PSD. General conclusions that notably mentions PSD :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ On Relevance of Commission's strategy: <i>“The Commission co-operation strategy is largely in line with the development priorities of the GoG. However, some GoG priorities have either not been funded by the Commission to the extent expected (private sector development and vocational and technical training) or have not been addressed in their wider context (sea defences as part of water management).”</i> p.74 ▪ On Capacity Building and brain drain: <i>“The low human resources capacity, recognised as a major constraint in the implementation of the strategy, has been partially addressed by the capacity-building component of Commission interventions. But support in this field has been hampered by the brain drain issue.”</i> p.75 ▪ On Effectiveness & Impact of interventions: <i>“Most of Commission interventions have quite satisfactorily met their targets, but the global impact of the interventions on the overall objectives of the Commission strategy in Guyana is rather limited.”</i> p.76 ▪ On Sustainability of interventions <i>“The sustainability of Commission interventions is weak. The interventions have for most of the time not included an exit strategy at the design stage nor developed one during implementation and before closure. Moreover, appropriation of the interventions by the beneficiaries has not always been facilitated and has even often been constrained by the low capacities of the beneficiaries.”</i>

	<p>p. 77.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ On Coherence with other Commission policies and instruments: <i>“The choices of focal areas and interventions under the 8th and 9th EDF have resulted in a basket of activities that had little links between them so that potential synergies and complementarities with other Commission policies and instruments have not been recognised and optimised.” p. 80</i>
Microfinance	<p>As per 0.2 above, the nature of the evaluation subject means that each conclusion is relevant to PSD in a sense. However, of the 9 conclusions, one has specific relevance to PSD: “Conclusion 5: The Programme has had a certain level of impact on end-clients’ use of a broader range of products or services, but available information does not allow to have a full view on this, owing to lack of monitoring data or to the rather indirect link between certain actions and overall objectives.”</p>
BizClim	The evaluation does not have any specific conclusions on PSD.
MEDA II	PSD is transversally addressed in the conclusions for the same reason as above but no specific conclusion is exclusively and explicitly dedicated to PSD.
Egypt 98-08	<p>Not specifically. See point 0.2 above.</p> <p>It should be noted that conclusion 4 touches upon PSD though not exclusively nor explicitly.</p>
EIB IF/OR (2010)	n.a.
Channeling DBs and EIB (2008)	No. The evaluation concerns the channeling of Commission funds through respectively the Development Banks (mainly the Worldbank) and the EIB. Hence the EQs concern the channeling as such and do not focus specifically on PSD
CDE (2011)	Yes, in the sense that the evaluation object is entirely in the field of PSD.
Banking Measures in the Mediterranean area	<p>The Report is a performance audit of the banking measures financed under the MEDA programme and the previous protocol.</p> <p><i>“Regarding the monitoring by the Commission and the EIB, the Court found that:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>the Commission relied entirely on the work performed by the EIB and did not carry out any monitoring of its own;</i> ▪ <i>until 2005, the level of monitoring by the EIB was not adequate;</i> ▪ <i>there was a lack of coordination between the EIB’s activities and the Commission’s, especially at the local level;</i> ▪ <i>not enough emphasis was put on environmental monitoring.”</i> <p><i>“Regarding the achievement of project objectives, the Court found that technical assistance projects had broadly achieved their objectives. For interest rate subsidies and risk capital operations projects, the situation was more diverse as they only partially achieved their objectives.” (Summary, p.7).</i></p>
Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008	<p>The following conclusions make a reference to the role of PSD in the promotion of employment and social inclusion:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>« In the majority of the interventions the focus on employment creation is relatively weak or at best indirect. This is reflected in the quite common absence of detailed analyses of the dynamics of the labour market and the challenges and development perspectives it faces in relation to macro-economic interventions as well as in targeting job creation, mainly via the promotion of the private sector », p.136.</i> ▪ <i>« In LAC countries a constant theme of policy dialogue has been the concern for the social deficit and inequalities in the region. Since 2000 social cohesion has become the backbone of EC support to LAC social sectors¹²¹, while support to economic development is mainly via the private sector and, more recently, the Decent Work Agenda. Even so, an integrated approach combining economic development and social equity, with an explicit linkage to employment and job creation, remains to be more systematically adopted and implemented. », p.139.</i>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>“In low-income countries (mainly African) ESI-related issues, coherently with national development strategies, are not part of EC response strategies as such but are rather treated, via regional integration and private sector development, within a broader framework of economic reform and human resource development. The linkage between education and training and labour market needs remains quite weak. Poverty reduction, followed by private sector support, are the main areas of EC intervention: that is to say, reducing poverty in the most vulnerable areas while supporting job creation and trade development. In middle-income countries, support to employment and labour market policies is integrated into broad support to macro-economic stability and growth. The match between TVET and labour market needs is more evident and is connected with trade and private sector development. Economic growth and social development go hand-in-hand, albeit with differences between lower-middle and upper-middle income countries », p.141-2.</i> ▪ <i>“About two thirds of total EC ESI commitments at global level are concentrated on three sectors: poverty reduction, private sector development and structural reforms, all corresponding to the ESI Enlarged definition. », p.142</i> ▪ <i>“Trade and stronger regional integration as well as macro-economic reforms, private sector development and enhanced investments, are all means to generating, in the medium and long terms, growth and job creation, especially in the formal economy. However, employment related targets (e.g. increases in labour demand and job creation) are not adequately mainstreamed in such macro-policy interventions. They are addressed rather as a by-product of national or sectoral economic development in specific areas, such as the private sector, SMEs and agriculture. », p.145.</i>
0.5	The evaluation has one or more specific recommendations on PSD (specify)
Tunisia Evaluation	<p>R 3.1 Appuyer la compétitivité du marché intérieur, notamment dans les services et dans l'agriculture, et l'essor de nouveaux secteurs économiques pour renforcer la croissance et accroître l'emploi. (C3.1, C3.2, C3.3, C3.4, C3.5).</p> <p><i>« L'appui à la compétitivité, notamment dans les services et dans l'agriculture, en vue d'accroître les investissements et d'augmenter la création d'emploi pourrait bénéficier de différentes formules d'appui budgétaire : un AB couvrant un éventail complexe et multisectoriel de politiques économiques, qui reprenne l'expérience positive des FAS multilatéraux ; et un AB plus ciblé, dans le secteur du développement rural », p. xi.</i></p>
Moldova	<p>Recommendations related to JC S1: Income, poverty and Unemployment trends in areas where SMEs and regional development schemes were piloted.</p> <p><i>“The experience with Business Centres indicates that simply making available advisory services and training is not enough. Local entrepreneurs and would-be entrepreneurs need a large and varied basket of services available at all points in the life cycle of their business, from start-up through expansion to, if necessary, termination. The team would recommend:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>Lengthening project duration. Two years has proved insufficient to achieve a lasting impact.</i> ▪ <i>Address the entire range of problems faced by SMEs, from poor local infrastructure through lack of access to credit to lack of business skills, rather than concentrating only on a subset of needs.</i> ▪ <i>Adopt a strategic approach to SME development. Not all SMEs have an equal chance of success. Two basic conditions for an SME to flourish in rural Moldova are horizontal links to a major economic sector (such as to agriculture via food processing) and vertical links to larger firms, perhaps through an outsourcing arrangement. The presence of these links, as well as various agglomeration and networking economies, should be considered.</i> ▪ <i>Put more emphasis on partnerships with local government, local firms (perhaps via local Chambers of Commerce) and other projects, including EC-financed projects”. p.103.</i> <p>Recommendations related to JC S2: Barriers to SME development alleviated <i>“The new barriers to entry, however, take the form of restricted access to finance. Given the progress that has been made in regulatory and administrative reform, this area may be in line for a period of benign neglect, with resources instead being devoted to the problem of access to credit. It is known that there is no shortage of liquidity in the Moldovan banking system. Why then is so little of it translated into credit to SMEs? A review of the situation should be carried out to ascertain why lenders are reluctant to lend and, equally important, why potential borrowers are reluctant to borrow. By serving as an unbiased broker of information between</i></p>

	<p>banks and entrepreneurs, Business Centres can help unblock the credit pipeline. <i>An even more direct intervention would be joint participation with international financial institutions or bilateral donors to make subsidised lines of credit available to SMEs (perhaps targeted specifically on priority end-uses such as meeting international norms and standards in food processing)</i>". p.103.</p> <p>"EC co-financing can also be "piggy-backed" on to large loans, for example in the form of small grants to help small businesses take advantage of new energy or transport infrastructure financed by institutions such as the World Bank, EBRD, or EIB", p.111.</p> <p><i>"The team would go further and suggest a holistic approach to development at regional level which might include:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SME promotion, emphasizing links with a agri-business; • <i>promotion of food and agricultural exports, including the key area of standards and product quality;</i> • <i>concentrating on environmentally sustainable farm and production practices; containing a substantial community-level component, in which the basic infrastructure needed for local development – clean water, a reliable energy source, basic transport infrastructure, and reasonably dense social networks – are in place;</i> • <i>identifying regional "growth poles" in the form of secondary cities and towns and ensuring an adequate supply of urban services and amenities to support growth in the surrounding countryside".</i> p.116-117.
El Salvador	No.
Burkina Faso (1999-2008)	<p>Une recommandation générale qui concerne aussi PSD:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>« Accroître les capacités de mise en oeuvre des actions, de dialogue et de communication du personnel de la DUE en charge du dialogue politique et sectoriel et consolider les capacités à capitaliser les expériences et leçons apprises »</i> <p>Deux recommandations spécifiques sur PSD :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>« Améliorer la qualité du dialogue sectoriel et permettre au secteur privé de renforcer son rôle dans la définition des stratégies de croissance durable et dans le monitoring de la mise en oeuvre de celles-ci »</i> ▪ <i>« Participer à la levée des contraintes sectorielles et à l'amélioration du cadre général des affaires. »</i>
Guyana (1997-2007)	<p>One general recommendation that notably mentions PSD:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>"The Commission should prepare, in coordination with the GoG, an exit strategy for all its interventions at the design stage and update it throughout the implementation process" p. 85</i> <p>One specific recommendation related to PSD:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>"The Commission should support interventions that foster human resources development and help minimise the brain drain, notably through vocational and technical training and capacity-building interventions targeted on labour market needs and the job-creation opportunities emerging from the restructuring of the sugar and rice sectors and the non-traditional agricultural sub-sectors." p.86</i>
Microfinance	As per 0.4 above, the nature of the evaluation subject means that each recommendation is relevant to PSD in a sense. However, of the 14 recommendations, none have specific relevance to PSD beyond this.
BizClim	The evaluation does not have any specific recommendations on PSD
MEDA II	Yes. Recommendation 1.5 proposes to increase the resources available for risk capital investment in order to improve private enterprises (and particularly SME's) access to finance.
Egypt 98-08	Not specifically. See point 0.2 above.
EIB IF/OR (2010)	n.a.
Channeling DBs and EIB (2008)	No. The evaluation concerns the channeling of Commission funds through respectively the Development Banks (mainly the Worldbank) and the EIB. Hence the EQs concern the channeling as such and do not focus specifically on PSD
CDE (2011)	Yes, in the sense that the evaluation object is entirely in the field of PSD.
Banking Measures in	The Report is a performance audit of the banking measures financed under the MEDA

the Mediterranean area	<p>programme and the previous protocol.</p> <p>It recommends that “with the start of the new European neighbourhood and partnership instrument (ENPI) that was launched in 2007, the Commission should:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ launched in 2007, the Commission should: ▪ set up a tailor-made evaluation and monitoring programme for banking measures; ▪ ensure the effective coordination of the assistance work undertaken by the Community, the EIB and other international/ local partners in order to increase the consistency and complementarity of their actions; ▪ negotiate adequate management conventions that ensure appropriate monitoring, cover the environmental aspects and safeguard the Community’s financial interests; ▪ ensure that monitoring by the EIB provides that all projects are adequately executed and that the financial and reporting obligations of the intermediaries/ promoters are met; ▪ for risk capital operations, define an overall strategy at the Commission level and choose the best implementation process, involving either direct management or management by international/ local partners.” (summary, p.7).
Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008	<p>The following recommendations make a reference to the role of PSD in the promotion of employment and social inclusion:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ « Mainstream ESI focus in economic and social development support. In relation to labour demand, a new focus on growth strategies should include measures to enhance the capacity of SMEs and the informal economy. On labour supply, strategies should include upgrading of TVET and secondary technical school quality and access, according to the needs of the labour market, and in association with the private sector. See R. 8 & 9.” p.151. ▪ “Enhance the employment consequences of the economic reform and private sector support programmes, through the introduction of specific monitoring and operational tools. [...] adequate employment indicators should be included in the M&E frameworks of such programmes. Complementary programmes should be added, when appropriate, to the core policy support programmes, specifically to enhance the employment effects of economic reforms, for example introducing specific foci and related measures on some areas such as the informal economy, SMEs, youth inclusion and employment, territorial development in the less advantaged areas, and rural employment, among others. ▪ “Support to the establishment of TVET partnerships, with the involvement of employers’ and workers’ organizations in the design of TVET policies and programmes; a permanent and decentralised dialogue with the private sector, especially for TVET, should be developed so as to create a continuous capacity to respond to the needs of a dynamic and competitive labour market” p.155. ▪ “A specific focus on the informal economy to support targeted labour policies needs to be included. Stronger, explicit inclusion of the informal economy in ESI strategies supported by the EC, using existing practices, would allow a relatively quick learning process” (p.3).
0.6	<p>Share of ODA in the country’s budget, share of EU support in ODA, share of Commission support in ODA (if available in the evaluation), share of Commission PSD support in total Commission assistance in country (if available in the evaluation)</p>
Tunisia Evaluation	<p>The only information available on the significance of the Commission’s support in the report is the following: the evaluation reports that the relative weight of the GBSs within public spending was in fact small: « <i>Même si les quantités d’AB et leur pourcentage sur les flux concessionnels globaux ont augmenté au cours du temps, le poids relatif de l’AB sur la dépense publique est resté modeste : en 2006 le montant global de l’AB était équivalent à 1,55% des dépenses, en 2007 et 2008 il était respectivement de 1,90% et de 0,61%. Ceci explique pourquoi les responsables du ministère des finances et de la BCT, mais aussi les membres de la Commission des Finances de la Chambre des députés, ont estimé lors de cette évaluation que les AB étaient moins une source de financement qu’un « accompagnateur » utile ayant soutenu le mouvement tunisien de réformes économiques.</i> », p. 25.</p>
Moldova Evaluation	<p>Not available.</p>
El Salvador Evaluation	<p>The evaluation report indicates that the EU’s share of the \$1.6bn ODA grants to El Salvador over the period 2001-2007 was of 51%: “The EC and the European Union (EU) Member States accounted together for 51% of the \$1.6bn ODA grants over the period 2001-2007.” (Executive Summary / Page i). It</p>

	<p>also indicates that “The EC committed a total of €195m over the period 1998-2008 for country-specific interventions in El Salvador, mainly through RELEX-AIDCO (€171m) in addition to ECHO (€23m). » (Executive Summary/Page i). It doesn't give the share of Commission PSD support in total Commission assistance in country - it does however indicate that 9% of AIDCO commitments between 1998-2008 were made in the field of Economic Growth and employment, regional integration and trade, and that, over the evaluation period, the EC support to local Micro and Small Enterprises materialised mainly through one programme: FOMYPE (“Fortalecimiento de la Competitividad de las Micro y Pequeñas Empresas en El Salvador”, 2005-2009), which with its €10m commitment on ALA resources, filled entirely the €10m envelope envisaged in the 2002-2006 National Indicative Programme for “Equitable growth of economy and employment” (p. 36). The report doesn't give the share of ODA in the country's budget.</p>																						
<p>Burkina Faso (1999-2008)</p>	<p>L'aide de la Commission = 15,3% de l'APD (2ème donneur après la BM) L'aide de l'UE et Etats membres= 57,3% de l'APD L'appui au secteur privé et integration régionale était de €2,57m sous le 8ème FED et de €4,91m sous le 9ème FED soit un total de €7,48m qui équivaut à 1% de l'aide de la Commission sur la toute la période (€749,83m).</p>																						
<p>Guyana (1997-2007)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ External aid as measured by ODA represented 17,3% of GDP in 2003, 31,7% in 2005 and 11,7% in 2006. ▪ Over the period 1996-2005, Commission + EU MS = foremost donor with 43,2% of ODA commitments. Commission only = 9,46% <p>This does not include indirect assistance such as preferential access on EU market, mainly for sugar and rice (sales to the EU market account for half of sugar production volume and 70% of industry revenues)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Private Sector is the third biggest sector in terms of commitments over the evaluation period. But the amount is “too negligible (2 interventions for €15m) for attainment of the objectives presented in the Commission strategy –to improve Guyana's production capacity-.” p.37 <div data-bbox="373 1211 1219 1641" style="text-align: center;"> <p>Chart 3.3.3a Distribution of commitments per sector 1997-2007</p> <table border="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"> <caption>Data for Chart 3.3.3a</caption> <thead> <tr> <th>Sector</th> <th>Commitment (Million Euros)</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr><td>Macro-economic support</td><td>58</td></tr> <tr><td>Sea Defences</td><td>40</td></tr> <tr><td>Private Sector</td><td>18</td></tr> <tr><td>Rice</td><td>15</td></tr> <tr><td>Housing</td><td>12</td></tr> <tr><td>Sugar</td><td>8</td></tr> <tr><td>Civil society and good governance</td><td>7</td></tr> <tr><td>Programme Management</td><td>4</td></tr> <tr><td>Environment</td><td>3</td></tr> <tr><td>Transport</td><td>2</td></tr> </tbody> </table> <p>Sources: CRIS consultation and CRIS production databases.</p> </div>	Sector	Commitment (Million Euros)	Macro-economic support	58	Sea Defences	40	Private Sector	18	Rice	15	Housing	12	Sugar	8	Civil society and good governance	7	Programme Management	4	Environment	3	Transport	2
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<p>MEDA II</p>	<p>Share of EU support in ODA in 10 MEDA countries between 2000 and 2006: 46.8% Share of Commission support in ODA in 10 MEDA countries between 2000 and 2006: 17.3% To be completed</p>																						

<p>Egypt 98-08</p>	<p>Between 1998 and 2007 Official Development Aid (ODA) commitments to Egypt from OECD/DAC donors amounted to USD 14bn. This figure represents approximately 5.5% of the total aggregate revenues of the Egyptian General Government. Over this period. The United States are by far the largest provider of aid to Egypt.</p> <p>For the same period, the share of EU support in ODA to Egypt corresponds to a bit more than 7% (1bn) of which 166 million euro were dedicated to PSD strictly speaking.</p> <p>In terms of financial resources however, the support to the opening and liberalisation of the Egyptian economy to stimulate growth and employment represented 49% of the Commission's bilateral assistance: €489m have been devoted to economic infrastructure, private sector development, external trade and the financial sector. (p36)</p>																													
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<p>Banking Measures in the Mediterranean area</p>	<p>No information but the following table presents the financial importance of banking measures managed by the EIB on behalf of the Commission under the MEDA programme and the cooperation agreements for Mediterranean partners:</p> <table border="1" data-bbox="338 1081 1482 1709"> <thead> <tr> <th colspan="2"></th> <th colspan="2" style="text-align: right;"><i>(million euro)</i></th> </tr> <tr> <th colspan="2"></th> <th style="text-align: center;">31.12.2006</th> <th style="text-align: center;">31.12.2007</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td rowspan="2" style="background-color: #e6f2ff;">Risk capital operations</td> <td>Total amount committed for all ongoing-operations (MEDA only)</td> <td style="text-align: center;">380,1 (289,4)</td> <td style="text-align: center;">388,4 (309,1)</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Net value at end 2007 of all ongoing-operations (MEDA only)</td> <td style="text-align: center;">213,5 (144,9)</td> <td style="text-align: center;">218,0 (159,0)</td> </tr> <tr> <td rowspan="2" style="background-color: #e6f2ff;">Interest rate subsidies</td> <td>Total loan amounts</td> <td style="text-align: center;">2 867,77</td> <td style="text-align: center;">2 867,77</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Total amount of interest rebates</td> <td style="text-align: center;">479,5</td> <td style="text-align: center;">487,67</td> </tr> <tr> <td rowspan="2" style="background-color: #e6f2ff;">Technical assistance</td> <td>Budgetary appropriations</td> <td style="text-align: center;">105,0</td> <td style="text-align: center;">105,0</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Total amount paid by the budget</td> <td style="text-align: center;">50,0</td> <td style="text-align: center;">50,0</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>Source: Commission and European Investment Bank.</p>			<i>(million euro)</i>				31.12.2006	31.12.2007	Risk capital operations	Total amount committed for all ongoing-operations (MEDA only)	380,1 (289,4)	388,4 (309,1)	Net value at end 2007 of all ongoing-operations (MEDA only)	213,5 (144,9)	218,0 (159,0)	Interest rate subsidies	Total loan amounts	2 867,77	2 867,77	Total amount of interest rebates	479,5	487,67	Technical assistance	Budgetary appropriations	105,0	105,0	Total amount paid by the budget	50,0	50,0
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<p>Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008</p>	<p><i>"The global committed funds (Budget101 and EDF) during the period 1999-2008 for the regions covered by the evaluation amount to €61,953 m. Of these global commitments, the total committed to ESI sectors through regional and bilateral cooperation amounted to €2,480 m. [...] In terms of annual commitments, support to the ESI sector has constantly increased its size over the global allocations and it had more than doubled in size by the end of the evaluation period (Table 3), from 1.56% in 1999 to 7.84% in 2008. The total allocation to ESI sectors from 1999 to 2008 represents 4% of the total EC cooperation (16% if the ESI-enlarged definition is taken into account). (p.56).</i></p>																													

EQ 1	To what extent did the Commission's PSD strategy and programming take into account the recommendations of the 2005 evaluation and the evolution of the overall private sector environment?
Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) - Tunisia Evaluation	None.
Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) – Moldova Evaluation	None.
Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) – El Salvador Evaluation	None.
Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) Microfinance	None.
Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) BizClim	None.
Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) MEDA II	<p>The regional programmes faced severe difficulties linked to the political situation and regional tensions (Israel-Palestinian conflict, 11 September 2011, occupation of Irak, political Islamic movements, politiczal extremisms and lately the Arab Spring) and were therefore oriented to maintaining and stimulating a dialogue and establishing networks between the MPC and with the EU. (pii)</p> <p>Economic integration among the South Mediterranean countries is among the lowest in the world. The complementarities between the economies are limited reflecting an insufficient diversification of the productive base, particularly in the oil and gas exporting countries, differences in economic regimes and the very wide spread in the GDP per capita levels. (p17)</p> <p>Low levels of governance, weak institutions and corruption impacted negatively on business environment, competitiveness and foreign investment. (p17)</p> <p>As a consequence, the convergence of the living standards, the significant breakthrough of exports from the MPC to the EU and the intensification of intraregional trade that would be necessary to reach the objective of shared prosperity (2d Pillar of Barcelona) have not taken place at the expected pace. (piii)</p>

Egypt 98-08	The second pillar of Barcelona (development of an economic and financial partnership to establish a free trade area) is undoubtedly a driving force since Egyptian national policies aim increasingly at opening-up of the economies and are concerned with the competitiveness of domestic enterprises, notably <i>vis-à-vis</i> the EU that is a major trade partner. (p26)
Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere)	
Banking Measures in the Mediterranean area	None.
Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008	None.
JC 1.1	<i>The Commission undertook efforts to make sure that the recommendations of the 2005 Evaluation were taken into account</i>
I-1.1.1	Existence of a plan or specific approach for the dissemination of the Recommendations to those responsible for programming and design of interventions
I-1.1.2	Evidence of dissemination of the recommendations to those responsible for programming and design of interventions
I-1.1.3	Commission staff were conversant with the 2005 Evaluation or with the recommendations made in this evaluation
Findings at JC level - Tunisia Evaluation	Not applicable.
Findings at JC level – Moldova Evaluation	Not applicable.
Findings at JC level – El Salvador Evaluation	The 2005 Evaluation was not mentioned at all.
Findings at JC level Burkina Faso (1999-2008)	No evidence
Guyana (1997-2007)	Even though PSD Evaluation positively taken into account see JC 1.2, the Evaluation Report mentions in a footnote (footnote 55, p.39) that one recommendation has not been followed: <i>“Similarly, the Evaluation of European Community Support to Private Sector Development in Third Countries (2005) recommended that the Commission should avoid programmes aimed solely at the provision of credit</i>

	<i>lines.</i> ” Indeed the report emphasizes that the Commission subsidized credits instead of addressing the obstacles to access to finance.
Findings at JC level – Microfinance	The evaluation did not discuss the 2005 PSD evaluation
Findings at JC level – BizClim	The evaluation did not discuss the 2005 PSD evaluation
Findings at JC level MEDA II	No specific information found.
Egypt 98-08	No specific information found.
EIB IF/OR (2010)	n.a.
Channeling DBs and EIB (2008)	Not mentioned
CDE (2011)	Not mentioned
Banking Measures in the Mediterranean area	The 2005 Evaluation was not mentioned at all.
Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008	The 2005 PSD evaluation was not referenced.
JC 1.2	<i>Specific recommendations of the 2005 evaluation relating to the Commission’s overall PSD Strategy have been taken into account</i>
<p>I-1.2.1 Evidence of greater clarity at programming level regarding the role of the Commission in PSD (particularly including the link between PSD, economic growth, the development objectives and poverty reduction)</p> <p>I-1.2.2 Evidence of a process taking place to create a common vision of the Commission’s PSD between HQ and EUD levels</p> <p>I-1.2.3 Commission programming has prioritised the areas of highest Commission comparative advantage as described by the 2005 evaluation recommendation RS-2</p>	
Findings at JC level - Tunisia Evaluation	Not applicable.
Findings at JC level – Moldova Evaluation	Not applicable.

Findings at JC level – El Salvador Evaluation	The 2005 Evaluation was not mentioned at all.
Findings at JC level Burkina Faso (1999-2008)	<p>Even though evidence that the government establishes a link between PSD, development objectives and poverty reduction and that the Commission supports this strategy no evidence that this is coming from the specific recommendations of the 2005 evaluation.</p> <p><i>“Au niveau macro économique, actuellement le secteur privé est une des priorités du gouvernement, notamment dans le cadre de la définition des stratégies de lutte contre la pauvreté dites de « troisième génération » » (Les stratégies de lutte contre la pauvreté dites de « troisième génération » place de plus le secteur productif privé de l'économie au coeur de la stratégie de croissance économique durable et équitable.) pp. 76-77</i></p>
Guyana (1997-2007)	<p>The Evaluation Reports states that: <i>“Commission interventions in Guyana are most of the time aligned with the best practices identified in the Private Sector Development Evaluation”</i>:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>“[O]bjectives of Commission interventions in the private sector are in line with the broader aim of Commission support to private sector development, namely enhancing the competitiveness of the business sector of third countries in local and international markets”</i> ▪ <i>“A methodological procedure has been devised for selection of the areas of intervention for PSD support in Guyana”</i> ▪ <i>“[I]nterventions focus on specific Commission PSD strategy activities: business development services, training, and financial services”</i> ▪ <i>“Key constraints conditioning success in the areas of intervention have been identified through a participatory approach and have for the most part been addressed.”</i> ▪ <i>“Coherence & complementarities between areas of intervention have most of the time been maximised through linkages between different components within the same project (LEAP) and synergies with other donor-funded projects (GTA & LEAP).” pp.37-38</i>
Findings at JC level – Microfinance	No evidence is presented regarding the uptake of recommendations of the 2005 PSD evaluation.
Findings at JC level – BizClim	No evidence is presented regarding the uptake of recommendations of the 2005 PSD evaluation.
Findings at JC level MEDA II	No specific information found.
Egypt 98-08	No specific information found.
EIB IF/OR (2010)	n.a.
Channeling DBs and EIB (2008)	Not mentioned
CDE (2011)	<p>The CDE evaluation does not mention the 2005 evaluation of the Commission’s overall PSD Strategy. Nevertheless, it states that opportunities of synergies with the Commission remained underexploited (in the response to EQ 1) and concludes that the CDE lacked a strategic approach (Conclusion 10):</p> <p><i>“The CDE made policy commitments favouring synergies with Commission programmes with a view to achieving maximum coherent impact with its limited resources. Overall, its support was in line with the Commission</i></p>

	<p><i>private sector development policies but actual complementarities with Commission programmes have been rare. Contacts between the staff of the RFO [Regional Field Offices] and of the EUD varied according to the country and to timing, with a net improvement in 2010-2011.</i></p> <p><i>Source: ADE (for the European Commission), Evaluation of the Centre for the Development of Enterprise, 2011 (p22)</i></p> <p><i>“The CDE adopted a demand-led approach to deliver its services, attempting to focus on specific sectors. Its support however lacked strategic orientation.</i></p> <p><i>The mandate of the CDE as defined in the Cotonou Agreement broadly defines the domains where the CDE should intervene, in particular the enhancement of the competitiveness of ACP enterprises and promotion of a business environment conducive to PSD, but it does not indicate the key strategic orientations that the CDE should pursue. These orientations have to be defined by the CDE. The 2005 Statutes and rules of procedures of the CDE indeed stipulate that “the CDE shall define its objectives in greater detail in a policy document”. But over the evaluation period the CDE has not further delineated in detail its objectives and main pillars of support in a policy or strategy document.</i></p> <p><i>Instead, the CDE’s approach has mainly and deliberately been “demand-led”, attempting to concentrate CDE responses on requests in specific sectors of intervention.</i></p> <p><i>(...)</i></p> <p><i>The CDE’s approach has therefore been rather vague, based more on what was already in the pipeline, and on available expertise in the field, than on a strategic vision that could have been aligned on the strategies and priorities of the partner countries and of other donors. A strategy was however under preparation in 2011.”</i></p> <p><i>Source: ADE (for the European Commission), Evaluation of the Centre for the Development of Enterprise, 2011 (p86)</i></p>
<p>Banking Measures in the Mediterranean area</p>	<p>The 2005 Evaluation was not mentioned at all.</p>
<p>Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008</p>	<p>The 2005 Evaluation was not mentioned but contains information relevant to some of its recommendations:</p> <p>On coordination, the evaluation found that: <i>“Further promote internal (within the EC) and external coordination. Internal coordination could help identify strategies (in addition to exchanges promoted by the Inter-Service Quality Support Group), and support packages. External coordination could help improve interventions effectiveness, identify possible specialized institutional partners, and promote twinning arrangements”</i> (p.4).</p>
<p>JC 1.3</p>	<p><i>The Commission is aware, through studies and exchanges with other sources of aid for PSD, of the evolution of the private sector environment</i></p>
<p>I-1.3.1 Existence of Commission documents evidencing awareness of the evolution of the private sector environment</p> <p>I-1.3.2 Stakeholders report existence of dialogue with other sources of aid for PSD concerning the evolution of the private sector environment</p> <p>I-1.3.3 Evidence exists that the private sector environment has been taken into account in the Commission’s PSD strategies and programming at country/regional level</p>	
<p>Findings at JC level - Tunisia</p>	<p>In parallel to the GBSs partly funded by the Commission, the Commission funded some economic and sectoral, notably on the financial sector and on privatization, which supported</p>

Evaluation	<p>the drafting of the GBS conditionalities:</p> <p><i>« L'AT aide à formuler et à suivre les réformes et favorise le dialogue (CJ 142-CJ 221). L'AT ne fait pas directement partie des programmes d'aide budgétaire générale évalués. Toutefois, plusieurs activités d'AT et/ou d'études économiques et sectorielles menées en parallèle ou en amont des programmes d'ABG ont permis d'approfondir l'analyse économique, ont contribué au bon ciblage des réformes et ont fourni une base de référence pour la définition des mesures spécifiques des matrices de conditionnalités.[...] la CE a utilisé l'expertise mobilisée dans les projets d'appui à la compétitivité des banques et des assurances pour la mise au point des conditionnalités spécifiques de la FAS III. De même, une étude financée par la CE sur les privatisations dans le cadre du PATP a été utilisée pour la mise au point des stratégies et des conditionnalités des FAS », p. 27.</i></p>
Findings at JC level – Moldova Evaluation	<p>The report contends that the Commission's support to SMEs in Moldova suffered from the lack of consideration of other structural factors, which in effect, hindered the effect of its support. This conclusion suggests that the evolution of the private sector environment in Moldova has not been sufficiently considered: <i>“While there has been broad success in policy formulation, policy implementation and enforcement have lagged [...]. The most concrete example is the continued failure to make significant inroads into the structural problem of rural poverty through, for example, SME development and promotion of agriculture-based exports. The team do not say that impacts on direct beneficiary populations have been low -- the FSP, in particular, has achieved impressive results -- but these impacts have not had the multiplier effects and linkages that would make for sustainable impacts on poverty. One result of the field mission has been that of making the team more aware of the community level deficits -- lack of clean water, lack of reliable energy, poor transport infrastructure, and so forth - that keep communities mired in poverty. These grass-roots problems, although acknowledged, were never at the heart of the EC's strategic approach in Moldova.”</i> p.112-113.</p>
Findings at JC level – El Salvador Evaluation	<p>No information on the Commission's level of awareness of the evolution of the private sector environment. No information on the existence of dialogue with other sources of aid for PSD concerning the evolution of the private sector environment</p> <p>On evidence that the Commission took the private sector environment into account in its PSD strategies and programming at country/regional level: the evaluation only indicates that the FOMYPE programme was expected to benefit micro and small enterprises with a competitive potential, mainly export-oriented industrial and agro-industrial enterprises, in priority. The evaluation found however that this targeting did not take place: <i>“qualitatively, insofar as a majority (58%) of the enterprises it supported was operating in the commerce sector and only 39% in the priority targeted industrial and agro-industrial sectors, the programme stayed short of its expected results.”</i> (p. 39).</p>
Findings at JC level Burkina Faso (1999-2008)	No evidence
Guyana (1997-2007)	No evidence
Findings at JC level – Microfinance	<p>The evaluation describes the informal needs analysis that took place prior to the launch of the EU/ACP Microfinance Programme. No mention of the evolving PSD environment is made, however. Instead the report highlights “lack of institutional [microfinance] capacity, increased [microfinance] market transparency, and the necessity to expand [microfinance] outreach” as the key needs highlighted by the needs analysis.</p> <p><i>Source: EC, EU/ ACP Microfinance Programme Final Evaluation, p.23.</i></p>
Findings at JC level –	The evaluation does not refer to background studies of the evolution of the private sector environment used in the design phase of BizClim, although the conduct of such studies

BizClim	<p>constituted a large part of the activities of BizClim:</p> <p>« <i>Examples of the studies indicated in the FA included:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>The all-ACP level, in areas where the ACP group was interested in having studied their joint possibilities of action, such as general policies;</i> ▪ <i>The regional level, in areas where a group of ACP countries were interested in having studied their joint possibilities of action, for example in the legal and regulatory frameworks;</i> ▪ <i>The country level, especially in understanding needs and priorities; informing discussions between EC delegations, ACP governments and private sector representatives in defining NIPs and RIPs; and in assisting discussions between a broader group of development partners including multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and bilateral donors on new pertinent themes. »</i> <p><i>Source: EC, Final Evaluation Private Sector Enabling Environment Facility, p.10.</i></p>
Findings at JC level MEDA II	<p>Most interventions have been prepared through studies, joint seminars and workshops; budget support interventions, particularly those addressing structural reforms and reform of the public finance systems, benefited from deeper and continued analysis during the implementation process. (p32)</p> <p>There is evidence of analysis and consultation conducted at the stage of the identification of the needs and the preparation of the response, but the access to the related documentation is often difficult. (p34)</p>
Egypt 98-08	<p>Past EU-Egypt cooperation strategy has mainly been driven by the priorities of the Commission rather than those of the Government of Egypt; this is slowly changing through increased participation of the Egyptian Government in the programming process. At the same time, local stakeholders were increasingly consulted during the identification and formulation of the interventions to be supported by the cooperation programme. (p19)</p>
EIB IF/OR (2010)	n.a.
Channeling DBs and EIB (2008)	Not mentioned
CDE (2011)	<p>Not mentioned.</p> <p>As detailed under JC 1.2, the CDE adopted a demand-led approach to deliver its services. It took at least account in this way of expressed needs of the private sector.</p>
Banking Measures in the Mediterranean area	No relevant information.
Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008	<p>The 2005 PSD evaluation was not referenced.</p> <p>On the evolution of the context in which PSD operates, the evaluation mentions the role of AA in ENP countries and of EPAs in ACP in the creation of new economic opportunities with effects on employment. <i>“A necessary, although not sufficient, condition for generating significant levels of employment is achievement of high levels of growth and trade. Such accelerated growth may take place only in a framework of new economic opportunities. The challenges of sustainable and inclusive growth – including social cohesion – are important in this context. The Association Agreements with the ENP countries - when appropriated and internalized by the recipient governments - have been shown to be a sound instrument for promoting accelerated growth. EPAs have been shown to raise the interest of the partner countries in the ACP area. They should be re-launched to allow expansive support strategies in other geographical contexts”.</i> (p.152).</p>

	The evaluation also mentions two additional regional cooperation agreements - with Mercosur and the Andean Community – where there is reference to TVET [Technical and Vocational Education and Training]. <i>“In the first case cooperation in education and training, including TVET, is geared to regional integration. In the Agreement with the Andean Community, mentioned is implicitly made in the context of economic cooperation with the aim of improving human productivity in the work sector.”</i> (p.42).
JC 1.4	<i>Policy documents and surveys relating to PSD and the quality of aid have been taken into account by the Commission</i>
I-1.4.1	Documents show that new policy recommendations have been taken into account
I-1.4.2	Stakeholders report existence of internal dialogue or other process(es) that take into account new policy recommendations regarding quality of PSD aid
Findings at JC level - Tunisia Evaluation	No information.
Findings at JC level – Moldova Evaluation	No information.
Findings at JC level – El Salvador Evaluation	No information.
Findings at JC level Burkina Faso (1999-2008)	No evidence
Guyana (1997-2007)	No evidence
Findings at JC level – Microfinance	The EU/ACP Microfinance Programme was launched in response to a Peer Review of EC interventions in microfinance, conducted by other donors (led by the multi-donor microfinance initiative CGAP) in 2003. The Programme responded directly to the policy recommendations made in the Review, most notably including the (partial) withdrawal of credit lines and a new focus on technical assistance and capacity development of microfinance institutions. Source: EC, EU/ACP Microfinance Programme Final Evaluation
Findings at JC level – BizClim	« The Private Sector Enabling Environment Facility (PSEEF) was created on the basis of the Financing Agreement (FA) 9278/REG signed in February 2005 between the European Commission (EC) and the ACP Secretariat, against a background of increased recognition of the impact of Private Sector Development (PSD) as an engine of growth, consistent with the orientations expressed by the Cotonou Agreement. » Source: EC, Final Evaluation Private Sector Enabling Environment Facility, p.1
Findings at JC level MEDA II	See J.C. 1.3.

Egypt 98-08	See J.C. 1.3.
EIB IF/OR (2010)	n.a.
Channeling DBs and EIB (2008)	Not mentioned
CDE (2011)	Not mentioned. But as detailed in JC 1.2, the CDE lacked a strategic approach, with operations based more on what was already in the pipeline and on available expertise in the field.
Banking Measures in the Mediterranean area	No relevant information.
Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008	In its section on the overall policy framework, the evaluation mentions the 2005 Commission Communication <i>European Union's contribution to speeding up progress towards the Millennium Development Goals</i> , part of the European Union's contribution to the UN Summit of September 2005, which proposed amongst others to increase financial allocations and to enhance the quality of aid . This not specific to employment or to PSD however but is an overarching commitment.

EQ 2	To what extent was Commission support to PSD in partner countries part of a strategic approach geared to the overall objectives of EU External Policy, while aligning with the priorities of the country/region and maximizing its VA, including in terms of synergies with other actors and other types of Commission support?
Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) – Tunisia Evaluation	None.
Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) – Moldova Evaluation	None.
Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) – El Salvador Evaluation	None.
Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) Guyana (1997-2007)	Focal sector under the 8th EDF but not under the 9th EDF CSP <i>“in spite of the Government’s preparation of its strategy to promote the private sector in “Enhancing National Competitiveness - A National Competitiveness Strategy for Guyana” (2007).” P.22</i>
Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) Microfinance	
Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) BizClim	
Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere)	
Banking Measures in the	None.

Mediterranean area	
Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008	None.
JC 2.1	<i>Commission geared PSD support towards overall EU external policy objectives</i>
I-2.1.1	Relation between overall EU external policy objectives and Commission PSD support is explicitly identified in Commission policy documentation
I-2.1.2	Programming documentation explicitly relates PSD interventions to overall EU external policy objectives
I-2.1.3	Stakeholders consider that Commission PSD support has contributed to the achievement of overall EU external policy objectives
Findings at JC level - Tunisia Evaluation	Tunisia signed an Association Agreement (AA) in 1995. The AA has framed the entire Tunisia-EC cooperation since then. The GBS translate some of the AA's objectives and have supported the Tunisian government in meeting some of the PSD requirements which have stemmed from the AA. <i>“Premier pays qui, en 1995, signe un Accord d'Association euro-méditerranéen avec l'UE, portant sur un partenariat global politique, économique et socioculturel et prévoyant une zone de libre-échange, entrée en vigueur le 1er janvier 2008.”</i> p. 4. <i>« Depuis la signature de l'AA, l'ensemble de la coopération entre l'UE et la Tunisie a été restructuré autour des trois grands axes de Barcelone (politique, économique et social). Les programmes d'Appui Budgétaire traduisent notamment les objectifs des axes économique et social.[...] »</i> , p. 22. <i>« L'ABG est une preuve tangible que le gouvernement n'est pas laissé seul dans la conception et la mise en oeuvre des processus de modernisation, privatisation et mise à niveau de l'économie, rendus nécessaires par l'AA et l'intégration euro-méditerranéenne. »</i> , p. 79.
Findings at JC level – Moldova Evaluation	Annex 1 on the Overall context specifies that: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ TACIS priority areas (Council regulation 99/2000) include “Support to the private sector and assistance to economic development” ; ▪ The Partnership and cooperation Agreement (PCA) which is the legal basis for the EC's engagement with Moldova agreed in 1998 for a 10 years term. It includes SMEs under the Economic area of cooperation. ▪ The 2002-2006 CSP identified 3 major areas of cooperation, including private sector and economic development and MSMEs as a sub-area of cooperation. ▪ The 2004-2006 CSP/NIP included Support for private sector and economic development, and in particular expert/investment promotion and support to micro-enterprises, SMEs and small farmers in rural areas, as priority areas. p.139-140.
Findings at JC level – El Salvador Evaluation	Support to PSD provided through the “Fortalecimiento de la Competitividad de las Micro y Pequeñas Empresas en El Salvador” programme (FOMYPE, 2005-2009)”, which aimed to strengthen Micro- and Small enterprises' productivity and competitiveness, aimed ultimately to contribute to economic growth and employment. (p.36).
Findings at JC	Link established between PSD and fight against poverty:

<p>level Burkina Faso (1999-2008)</p>	<p>« <i>Le positionnement du secteur privé au coeur des stratégies de croissance et de lutte contre la pauvreté (stratégie de lutte contre la pauvreté dite de troisième génération) nécessite un réel pilotage et monitoring du secteur basé, notamment, sur un système fiable et récurrent d'évaluation des performances sectorielles.</i> » p.75</p>
<p>Guyana (1997-2007)</p>	<p>The intervention logic “<i>makes it possible to visualise the global coherence of all the activities of the Commission in Guyana and show them to be in line with the global objectives,[...]</i>”. With respect to PSD, link established between global impacts “<i>Integration into the world economy advanced</i>” and “<i>Poverty levels reduced</i>” and results “<i>private sector strengthened</i>” and outputs “<i>private sector (competitiveness enhanced Activity increased through SMEs)</i>”. p.18</p>
<p>Findings at JC level - Microfinance</p>	<p>The EU/ACP Microfinance Programme was aimed at providing “<i>a sustainable contribution to poverty reduction via the development of a range of financial services better responding to poor people’s needs</i>”.</p> <p>However, the Programme’s final evaluation questioned the idea that this Programme objective could be met:</p> <p>“<i>The Programme did not focus directly its action on poverty reduction or social performance, but considered this rather as an ultimate, resulting objective, with an immediate need lying rather in capacity-building...[However] the conditions for contribution of microfinance to poverty reduction are still currently being debated, with for instance a recent literature review (Duvendack et al., 2011) concluding that “it remains unclear under what circumstances, and for whom, microfinance has been and could be of real, rather than imagined, benefit to poor people.” This puts in perspective the assessment of the design of the programme design and of the impact of the programme.</i>”</p> <p><i>Source: EC, EU/ACP Microfinance Programme Final Evaluation, p.69</i></p>
<p>Findings at JC level - BizClim</p>	<p>BizClim was launched, according to the Final Evaluation “<i>against a background of increased recognition of the impact of Private Sector Development (PSD) as an engine of growth, consistent with the orientation expressed by the Cotonou Agreement</i>”.</p> <p><i>Source: EC, Final Evaluation Private Sector Enabling Environment Facility</i></p>
<p>Findings at JC level MEDA II</p>	<p>The political character of the Barcelona process confers special characteristics on the Commission’s cooperation with the MPC. The Association Agreements (AA) negotiated under Barcelona, were designed in coherence with EU policies and the MEDA II Regulation is intended to support their financial implementation. (p75)</p> <p>An essential and explicit part of the second pillar (economic and financial partnership) of the Barcelona process is the implementation of economic cooperation and concerted action in the following areas : investment and internal savings, regional cooperation, industrial cooperation and support to SME, cooperation in energy and water resources management, modernisation of agriculture, transport infrastructure, and others. (p12)</p> <p>Gradual establishment of a free trade area (FTA) between the EU and each Mediterranean country was targeted for 2010. The FTA is set up by means of the Association Agreements (AA) and free trade agreements to be concluded. Tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade in manufactured products will be gradually eliminated in accordance with timetables to be negotiated between the partners. Trade in agricultural products will be liberalised in stages, as will trade in services. (p12)</p> <p>Bilateral cooperation strategies clearly refer to and fit within the Barcelona process. In all the interventions examined the Barcelona process is clearly referenced as the umbrella under which the cooperation takes place. Reference to one or several</p>

	<p>Barcelona objectives is clearly made in the programming documents and the interventions are in line with the strategy documents (CSP/NIP). However this linkage remains largely nominal and the programming documents do not demonstrate how they will achieve the process objectives. (p30)</p> <p>Given that a majority of MPC are medium-income countries with relatively sophisticated social systems, there is a general perception in the region that poverty reduction should not be the main focus of cooperation. So there is an overall consensus between the Commission and its partners that efforts should be concentrated on strengthening the economy and the social delivery mechanisms and on generating income and employment opportunities in a general way rather than targeting specific populations. (p51)</p> <p>The good results achieved in the economic and social sectors have not been accompanied by commensurate consolidation of human rights and democratization and a strengthened involvement of Civil Society in the development process. (pv)</p>
Egypt 98-08	<p>The overall coherence of all EC policies likely to affect Egypt (such as trade, energy, transport, environment, research science and technology, good governance, etc.) lies at the heart of the Barcelona process. The latter is embodied in the AA which provides for political dialogue and cooperation in various fields of mutual interest. With the ENP, the ENP AP sets an agenda of political and economic reforms anchored in the Barcelona process. Overall, this framework ensures that EC policies likely to affect Egypt take into account the objectives of the Community policy in the sphere of development cooperation. (p74)</p>
EIB IF/OR (2010)	n.a.
Channeling DBs and EIB (2008)	<p>The channeling of the Commission's funds through the EIB concerns indeed the external mandate of the EIB which aims also at poverty reduction. The evaluation also stated in this respect that the Commission ensured that the use of funds was in line with its objectives (p. 87). "The Commission ensured that funds were used in line with its objectives, notably by being involved in the identification and set-up of interventions and also by participating in the governance mechanisms (...).the Commission and the EIB pursued common objectives in terms of policies and priorities. The nature of the use of Commission funding (instruments and conditions) was agreed formally in the strategic EU cooperation agreements. The Commission could, if need be, reject proposals for individual operations through committees in which it participated. But this rarely occurred as the Commission essentially relied on the EIB to manage those financial instruments. It should also be noted that conducting policy dialogue is not within the remit of the EIB and that the Commission generally did not use this collaboration directly to promote EU policies and priorities."</p>
CDE (2011)	<p>The CDE has the mandate, under the Cotonou Agreement, to support private sector development. The introduction of the Cotonou Agreement (2005) itself states that the priority is, and remains, poverty eradication and sustainable development.</p> <p>In the 2005 version of the Cotonou Agreement, the overall objectives of the CDE are broadly defined: <i>"The CDE shall support the implementation of private-sector development strategies in the ACP countries by providing non-financial services to ACP companies and businesses and support to joint initiatives set up by economic operators of the Community and of the ACP States. The CDE shall aim to assist private ACP enterprises to become more competitive in all sectors of the economy"</i>.</p>

	<p>Following the 2010 revision of the Agreement the mandate of the CDE was enlarged to encompass promotion of “a business environment conducive to private sector development.”</p> <p><i>Source: ADE (for the European Commission), Evaluation of the Centre for the Development of Enterprise, 2011 (p3)</i></p> <p>The introduction to the official brochure on the Cotonou Agreement of 2000 and its revision in 2005 states that “<i>The partnership is centred on the objective of reducing and, in the long term, eradicating poverty, in line with the objectives of sustainable development and progressive integration of the ACP countries into the global economy.</i>” These reflect largely the EU External Policy overall objectives.</p> <p>Source: EC, Partnership Agreement ACP-EC, Signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000, Revised in Luxembourg on 25 June 2005 (p15-16); http://www.forumsec.org.fj/resources/uploads/attachments/documents/Cotonou%20Agreement.pdf</p>
<p>Banking Measures in the Mediterranean area</p>	<p>The three banking measures, managed by the EIB under a mandate from the Commission, looked at in the Court of Auditors Report, were foreseen under MEDA. They include TA, Interest rate subsidies for environmental loans granted by the EIB from its own resources and Risk Capital Operations.</p> <p>The Report presents the objectives of the MEDA instrument, to which the banking measures contribute: “<i>Council Regulation (EC) 1488/962 provided a new framework for financial and technical measures (MEDA). Its aim was to accompany the reform of economic and social structures in the partner countries. The purpose of the MEDA regulations was to contribute to initiatives of joint interest in the three sectors of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>the reinforcement of political stability and democracy;</i> ▪ <i>the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean free- trade area;</i> and ▪ <i>the development of economic and social cooperation, taking due account of the human and cultural dimensions.” (p. 8).</i> <p>Precisely in the case of the Risk Capital Operations, the Regulation says that: “<i>Risk capital shall be used, first and foremost, to make available own funds to undertakings in the production sector, in particular those that can bring together natural or legal persons who are nationals of a Community Member State and of Mediterranean non-member countries or territories. Risk capital shall be used primarily to strengthen the private sector, and in particular to reinforce the financial sector in MEDA countries. It shall add value clearly, by offering financial products and terms that are not available locally”.</i> (p.19).</p>
<p>Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008</p>	<p>The evaluation reports that “<i>the European Consensus on Development (2005) marked a significant step forward for ESI, addressing ESI-relevant issues in two of its nine chapters, namely, Human Development’ and Social Cohesion and Employment”</i>, (p.2).</p>
<p>JC 2.2</p>	<p><i>The Commission applied explicit policies and guidelines to make sure that its support to PSD was part of a strategic approach</i></p>
<p>I-2.2.1 Existence of policy documents and guidelines that explicitly tackle the importance of a strategic (prioritised) approach towards PSD alongside the different dimensions mentioned</p> <p>I-2.2.2 These policies and guidelines were utilised for the design of PSD strategies at country/ regional level and for the programming</p> <p>I-2.2.3 Commission staff expressed the view that the guidance provided was appropriate</p>	

<p>Findings at JC level - Tunisia Evaluation</p>	<p>The Commission's support to PSD, within the GBSs it has co-funded, was framed by the 1995 AA with Tunisia, which constituted the overall strategic approach. Meeting reform, modernisation and privatization requirements, stemming from the AA, was supported by the GBSs: <i>« La position de l'appui budgétaire dans le contexte de l'Accord d'Association. Il ressort de l'analyse que l'AB a fait un excellent travail en appuyant les politiques du gouvernement et que celles-ci ont contribué de manière décisive à atteindre les résultats de développement que les programmes MEDA et PEV, via l'appui budgétaire, entendaient appuyer. Mais l'analyse nous indique aussi que ce cercle vertueux est assuré dans un contexte spécifique qui a permis au gouvernement tunisien de s'engager avec succès dans un processus relativement radical de transformation économique et social du pays. Ce contexte est l'Accord d'Association avec l'UE, qui crée une nouvelle opportunité de développement, c'est-à-dire : (a) l'accès à un marché très riche et diversifié ; (b) la possibilité d'acquérir les standards productifs, institutionnels, culturels pour une intégration compétitive dans ce marché ; et (c) les supports techniques, financiers et partenariaux, pour appuyer les processus de transition nécessaires »</i>. p. 80. <i>« L'ABG est une preuve tangible que le gouvernement n'est pas laissé seul dans la conception et la mise en oeuvre des processus de modernisation, privatisation et mise à niveau de l'économie, rendus nécessaires par l'AA et l'intégration euro-méditerranéenne. »</i>, p. 79. <i>« Au niveau indirect, le partenariat soutenu par les ABG a également contribué à la mise en oeuvre du processus de réforme dans les secteurs considérés. La perspective de l'intégration compétitive euro-méditerranéenne a été certainement un des moteurs principaux de la réforme du secteur financier, en plus des contributions directes des ABG »</i>. p. 45.</p> <p>The AA, is one trade agreement amongst others which Tunisia has signed in to. They constitute the frameworks for the reform processes the Tunisian government has been following and which also frame PSD. <i>« Les accords commerciaux (avec l'UE, l'OMC et la région MENA) se situent désormais dans une perspective plus vaste de partenariat global euro-méditerranéen, qui implique un travail approfondi de mise à niveau des différents secteurs de l'économie pour en assurer l'intégration compétitive dans le nouveau contexte, ainsi que du cadre institutionnel et de gestion des ressources humaines. Au cours de la dernière décennie, plusieurs réformes ont été lancées et en grande partie mises en oeuvre. Dans le domaine économique, il faut notamment remarquer :</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>Amélioration de la gestion macroéconomique et des équilibres budgétaires.</i> ▪ <i>Mise à niveau de l'industrie manufacturière.</i> ▪ <i>Démantèlement tarifaire total pour tous les produits manufacturés originaires de l'UE.</i> ▪ <i>Amélioration de l'environnement de l'entreprise et promotion de l'investissement privé.</i> ▪ <i>Assainissement et renforcement de la compétitivité du secteur bancaire.</i> ▪ <i>Amélioration des infrastructures de base et des télécommunications.</i> ▪ <i>Désengagement du rôle de l'état dans l'économie (privatisations).</i> » p. 4.
<p>Findings at JC level – Moldova Evaluation</p>	<p>The report gives evidence of the contrary: the report contends that the Commission's support to SMEs in Moldova suffered from the lack of consideration of other structural factors, which in effect, hindered the effect of its support. This conclusion suggests that the Commission did not truly have a strategic approach to PSD which took all elements into account and which would have induced synergies: <i>“While there has been broad success in policy formulation, policy implementation and enforcement have lagged [...]. The most concrete example is the continued</i></p>

	<p><i>failure to make significant inroads into the structural problem of rural poverty through, for example, SME development and promotion of agriculture-based exports. The team do not say that impacts on direct beneficiary populations have been low -- the FSP, in particular, has achieved impressive results -- but these impacts have not had the multiplier effects and linkages that would make for sustainable impacts on poverty. One result of the field mission has been that of making the team more aware of the community level deficits -- lack of clean water, lack of reliable energy, poor transport infrastructure, and so forth - that keep communities mired in poverty. These grass-roots problems, although acknowledged, were never at the heart of the EC's strategic approach in Moldova.”</i> p.112-113. This is also confirmed by the statement that access to finance was a pressing need for SMEs and needed to be taken into account in parallel to its support in order to create better effects: <i>“Within sectors, the team have noted cases where the team think relevance could have been improved. For example, SME development interventions tackled regulatory and administrative issues but not credit constraints”.</i> P.113.</p>
Findings at JC level – El Salvador Evaluation	<p>Support to PSD provided through the FOMYPE programme, which aimed to strengthen Micro- and Small enterprises' productivity and competitiveness was three-tiered: a) policy and legal framework development (macro level); b) capacity building of the main public and private providers of technical and financial Business Development Services (BDS) (meso level); and c) provision of better, diversified and geographically more accessible BDS to the Salvadorian Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSME) (micro level). (p.37).</p>
Findings at JC level Burkina Faso (1999-2008)	<p>No evidence</p>
Guyana (1997-2007)	<p>The Evaluation Reports states that: <i>“Commission interventions in Guyana are most of the time aligned with the best practices identified in the Private Sector Development Evaluation”:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>“[O]bjectives of Commission interventions in the private sector are in line with the broader aim of Commission support to private sector development, namely enhancing the competitiveness of the business sector of third countries in local and international markets”</i> ▪ <i>“A methodological procedure has been devised for selection of the areas of intervention for PSD support in Guyana”</i> ▪ <i>“[I]nterventions focus on specific Commission PSD strategy activities: business development services, training, and financial services”</i> ▪ <i>“Key constraints conditioning success in the areas of intervention have been identified through a participatory approach and have for the most part been addressed.”</i> ▪ <i>“Coherence & complementarities between areas of intervention have most of the time been maximised through linkages between different components within the same project (LEAP) and synergies with other donor-funded projects (GTA & LEAP).”</i> pp.37-38
Findings at JC level - Microfinance	<p>The EC's “Guidelines for EC Support to Microfinance” (2008) outlines a strategic approach to microfinance for all EC staff in DEVCO headquarters as well as delegations.</p> <p><i>Source: EC, EU/ ACP Microfinance Programme Final Evaluation</i></p>
Findings at JC level - BizClim	<p>The BizClim Financing Agreement took account of several EC communications on PSD, including COM(2003) 267, as noted in the final evaluation:</p> <p>«In the text of the FA it was acknowledged that, during the 9th EDF, the EC envisaged concentrating the respective National and Regional Indicative Programmes (NIPs and RIPs) primarily on social sectors and physical</p>

	<p>infrastructure. Consequently, PSD could not be expected to be a focal sector in many NIPs and RIPs but rather constitute a cross-cutting concern. It was therefore important that relevant private sector initiatives were put in place at an all-ACP level, to make sure that those options clearly expressed in the Cotonou Agreement for PSD were duly taken on board. Bearing in mind the potential role of the private sector as a vehicle for poverty reduction outlined in the EU Communications from 1998, 2000, and 2003, its role was expected to be more dominant as a consequence of annual country reviews. »</p> <p><i>Source: EC, Final Evaluation Private Sector Enabling Environment Facility, p.9</i></p>
<p>Findings at JC level MEDA II</p>	<p>The Commission's approach towards economic development, in line with Annex II of the MEDA II Regulation, focused on a set of reforms aiming at creating favourable conditions for the three objectives directed to the establishment of the FTA in 2010:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Competitiveness; ▪ Opening and insertion into the world economy; ▪ Regional integration at the level of the Mediterranean basin (among MPC and with the EU). ▪ In this context, several categories of interventions have been implemented: ▪ The Association Agreements and their implementation have stimulated the trade and private sector reforms. It is difficult to establish whether the AA generated the interest in reform programmes or whether it developed in parallel, but there are clear signs that the AAs have put a pressure on the beneficiaries to undertake reforms to open their economies and strengthen their competitiveness. ▪ A major proportion of the resources provided by MEDAII (€1.99bn) has been dedicated to systemic economic reforms (Tunisia, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco) with a view to improving <i>the legal and regulatory environment of business and trade activities</i>. ▪ Specific programmes directly targeted private sector development. These interventions amounted to €504.3m. ▪ Of the funds provided by the Commission to the EIB, the Risk Capital Facility (RCF) allowed the EIB to support the private sector through the acquisition of funds. <p>The Technical Assistance Support Fund of the FEMIP is another category of fund made available to the EIB by the Commission. It was used to improve projects funded with loans from EIB's own resources or to accompany interventions funded with the RCF. A proportion of these loans was in support of the private sector, making use of the TA facility.</p> <p>The third category of funds made available to the EIB by the Commission is the interest rate subsidy; it is exclusively applicable to environment-related loans, including projects with a private dimension. (p39-40)</p>
<p>Egypt 98-08</p>	<p>During the early programming period, synergies between several interventions supporting the same objectives have been foreseen in strategy documents. However, the interventions were generally not designed so as to create synergies, and, as a result, few complementarities happened during implementation. Most programmes of the CSP 2007-2013 and NIP 2007-10 have been designed in the continuity of past Commission's support to strengthen ongoing efforts and take them a step further, but without spelling out potential complementarities between interventions. (p25)</p> <p>The areas of GoE-Commission cooperation were not prioritised and the response strategy was not explicitly spelled out in the strategy documents. (p85)</p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The reform measures supported by the Commission have not necessarily been part of wider reform programmes; ▪ SBS funds were treated by the GoE as project funds in the budget, thus effectively separating them from the overall budget arbitrage decisions where policy priorities, including reforms, are expressed. (p94) <p>The cooperation programme should clarify the medium and long term cooperation strategy in each priority area and interventions should be accompanied by the commitment to continued support to ongoing efforts: the efforts to bring about change outlast by far the length of the programming cycle. (p100)</p>
EIB IF/OR (2010)	n.a.
Channeling DBs and EIB (2008)	The channeling through the EIB was based on strategic regional cooperation agreements, between on one side the European Community (including the Commission and the EIB) and on the other side the Mediterranean or ACP countries (p. 82). The report underlines also that the fact that through this channelling the Commission inscribed its support in a broader strategic European approach (p. 85).
CDE (2011)	<p>As mentioned under JC 1.2, the CDE evaluation states that opportunities of synergies with the Commission remained underexploited (in the response to EQ 1) and concludes that the CDE lacked a strategic approach overall (Conclusion 10):</p> <p><i>“The CDE made policy commitments favouring synergies with Commission programmes with a view to achieving maximum coherent impact with its limited resources. Overall, its support was in line with the Commission private sector development policies but actual complementarities with Commission programmes have been rare. Contacts between the staff of the RFO [Regional Field Offices] and of the EUD varied according to the country and to timing, with a net improvement in 2010-2011.”</i></p> <p><i>Source: ADE (for the European Commission), Evaluation of the Centre for the Development of Enterprise, 2011 (p22)</i></p> <p><i>“The CDE adopted a demand-led approach to deliver its services, attempting to focus on specific sectors. Its support however lacked strategic orientation.</i></p> <p><i>The mandate of the CDE as defined in the Cotonou Agreement broadly defines the domains where the CDE should intervene, in particular the enhancement of the competitiveness of ACP enterprises and promotion of a business environment conducive to PSD, but it does not indicate the key strategic orientations that the CDE should pursue. These orientations have to be defined by the CDE. The 2005 Statutes and rules of procedures of the CDE indeed stipulate that “the CDE shall define its objectives in greater detail in a policy document”. But over the evaluation period the CDE has not further delineated in detail its objectives and main pillars of support in a policy or strategy document.</i></p> <p><i>Instead, the CDE’s approach has mainly and deliberately been “demand-led”, attempting to concentrate CDE responses on requests in specific sectors of intervention. (...)</i></p> <p><i>The CDE’s approach has therefore been rather vague, based more on what was already in the pipeline, and on available expertise in the field, than on a strategic vision that could have been aligned on the strategies and priorities of the partner countries and of other donors. A strategy was however under preparation in 2011.”</i></p> <p><i>Source: ADE (for the European Commission), Evaluation of the Centre for the Development of Enterprise, 2011 (p86)</i></p>
Banking	The Report found evidence of a lack of strategic approach, in the case of the Risk

<p>Measures in the Mediterranean area</p>	<p>Capital Operations that “<i>There was no defined strategy as to the type of projects and sectors to be supported, at either the level of the Commission or the EIB or at the level of the financial intermediaries</i>”. (p. 19).</p> <p>The Commission’s official reply to the Court of Auditors Report highlights improvement measures: “<i>A strategy for risk capital operations has been defined within the ENPP</i>”. (p.28).</p> <p>However at the level of the Regulation (Article 6(4) of the MEDA regulation) which created FEMIP’s Risk capital facility, there is evidence of strategic thinking: “<i>Risk capital shall be used, first and foremost, to make available own funds to undertakings in the production sector, in particular those that can bring together natural or legal persons who are nationals of a Community Member State and of Mediterranean non-member countries or territories. Risk capital shall be used primarily to strengthen the private sector, and in particular to reinforce the financial sector in MEDA countries. It shall add value clearly, by offering financial products and terms that are not available locally</i>”. (p.19).</p>
<p>Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008</p>	<p>The evaluation found that: “<i>The EC adopted a responsive strategy towards regional and country-specific situations with the promotion of a consistent framework of intervention between the global and regional strategies’ overarching objectives and regional and country cooperation strategies.</i>” (p.2).</p>
<p>JC 2.3</p>	<p><i>The PSD strategies and programming of the Commission took into account the national/regional priorities</i></p>
<p>I-2.3.1 The Commission conducted a policy dialogue with national authorities on PSD strategies</p> <p>I-2.3.2 CSPs/RSPs clearly link the Commission PSD support to national/regional overall and PSD specific strategies and programming</p> <p>I-2.3.3 Stakeholders consider that Commission support to PSD is aligned to the overall and sector specific national priorities</p>	
<p>Findings at JC level - Tunisia Evaluation</p>	<p>The report gives strong evidence that the Commission’s cooperation strategy, which included PSD, was influenced by national priorities. In turn national priorities had been framed by larger strategic agreements, such as the 1995 AA.</p> <p>The 1996-1999 and 2000-2002 National Indicative Programmes have been built upon the 9th Tunisian Development Plan. Supporting the economic environment of the private sector was one of the NIPs’ two main priorities. « <i>Les PIN 1996-1999 et 2000-2002 (MEDA) se sont appuyés sur les objectifs fixés par le 9^{ème} Plan de Développement tunisien (1997-2001) en se focalisant sur les priorités suivantes :</i></p> <p><i>a) Soutenir les réformes économiques dans les domaines macroéconomique et fiscal, privatisation, déréglementation du transport maritime et des ports, commerce extérieur, secteur financier et domaine des politiques sociales ;</i></p> <p><i>b) Améliorer l’environnement économique pour le secteur privé à travers la privatisation des entreprises d’État, l’attraction d’investissements étrangers, le développement de services aux entreprises et une mise à niveau de la formation professionnelle », p. 5.</i></p> <p>The GBSs partly funded by the Commission and which included PSD components</p>

	<p>were largely influenced by the government's five-year plans, in turn framed by the 1995 AA. « <i>Les Plans quinquennaux de développement établis par le gouvernement ont incorporé les axes et les objectifs de l'AA, les traduisant en plans d'action politico-économiques. [...] Ceci ressort fortement de l'analyse des Conventions de Financement des programmes, tant pour l'ABG que pour l'ABS. En ce qui concerne l'ABG, à partir de la FAS III, le lien entre les programmes et les réformes établies par les Plans de développement du gouvernement ressort de manière particulièrement détaillée (CJ124).</i> », p. 22.</p> <p>The evaluation reports the strong alignment of the Budget support programmes with the National Development Plans' objectives. « <i>L'alignement par rapport aux objectifs du gouvernement (CJ222). Le niveau élevé de correspondance entre les programmes d'AB et les objectifs et les orientations des Plans de Développement a facilité l'établissement d'un cadre d'évaluation des performances aligné sur les systèmes gouvernementaux, qui à son tour a facilité l'appréciation conjointe des résultats généraux et spécifiques visés par les programmes d'AB</i> », p. 28.</p> <p>In terms of the GBS' achievements, the evaluation reports sound information exchanges between the donors and the government, and high flexibility, which in turn contributed to the implementation of complex measures. « <i>Pour les FAS, la bonne coordination et l'échange constant d'informations entre les cofinanciers et le gouvernement ont contribué à une certaine flexibilité dans l'appréciation de la réalisation de mesures complexes</i> », p. 28. <i>L'ampleur et l'articulation du cadre de dialogue politique et sur les politiques, dans lequel les programmes d'AB s'insèrent et auquel ils contribuent, représentent une des caractéristiques spécifiques de l'AB en Tunisie et, plus en général, dans la région (CJ113).</i> ». p.20.</p> <p>The evaluation also reports the government's strong ownership of the reform processes supported by the GBSs and high commitment « <i>Les renvois aux matrices de FAS dans les paragraphes ci-dessus montrent comment dans chaque sous-secteur celles-ci contenaient des liens très stricts et pertinents par rapport au contenu des réformes, non seulement en termes d'orientations générales et de grands objectifs, mais surtout pour leur référence aux „actions à ne pas négliger / oublier”, témoins et/ou garants de la qualité du processus, dont l'appropriation par le gouvernement était très élevée</i> ». p. 44. « <i>La détermination et l'expérience des institutions tunisiennes sont à la base du succès du processus de réforme appuyé par l'AB</i> ». p. 83.</p>
Findings at JC level – Moldova Evaluation	No information aside from the information provided in Annex 1 on the Overall context, which specifies that the Partnership and cooperation Agreement (PCA) which is the legal basis for the EC's engagement with Moldova agreed in 1998 for a 10 years term. It includes SMEs under the Economic area of cooperation.
Findings at JC level – El Salvador Evaluation	The evaluation reports that the FOMYPE programme helped design the national SME policy (“libro azul”) (p. 36). It reports also however that “ <i>the EC programme on micro and small enterprises had no clear sectoral strategy on which it could align itself</i> ” (p. 61).
Findings at JC level Burkina Faso (1999-2008)	Evidence of dialogue with PS stakeholders in the country: « <i>Le Gouvernement du Burkina Faso ainsi que le secteur privé et la société civile en sont les principaux bénéficiaires. Les projets qui ont été financés par l'UE ont connu une forte implication de ces bénéficiaires à toutes les étapes : conception, exécution, suivi et évaluation.</i> » p.36
Guyana (1997-2007)	Alignment but negligible in terms of budget plus policy dialogue could have been better:

	<p><i>“Commission interventions in private sector development are consistent with the GoG strategy, with the Commission’s strategy in Guyana and with the general aim of Commission support to private sector development. However, the amounts allocated to private sector development over the period 1995-2000 seem too negligible to attain the objectives presented in the Commission strategy.” P.36</i></p> <p><i>“However, some GoG priorities have not been funded through the Commission’s support to the extent expected. This is particularly the case of private sector development, vocational training, the sugar sector and the transport sector. In fact private sector development benefited from the SYSMIN instrument mobilised during the first period under observation but during the second period no other funding was agreed at the time when GoG finalised its National Competitiveness Strategy and Guyana Action Plan for the sugar sector.” p.74</i></p>
<p>Findings at JC level - Microfinance</p>	
<p>Findings at JC level - BizClim</p>	<p>BizClim was a centralised operation, often operating in countries and regions where PSD was not a priority in the NIPs/RIPs. This fact was explicitly acknowledged during programme design:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>« In the text of the FA it was acknowledged that, during the 9th EDF, the EC envisaged concentrating the respective National and Regional Indicative Programmes (NIPs and RIPs) primarily on social sectors and physical infrastructure. Consequently, PSD could not be expected to be a focal sector in many NIPs and RIPs but rather constitute a cross-cutting concern. It was therefore important that relevant private sector initiatives were put in place at an all-ACP level, to make sure that those options clearly expressed in the Cotonou Agreement for PSD were duly taken on board. »</i> <p><i>Source: EC, Final Evaluation Private Sector Enabling Environment Facility, p.9</i></p> <p>However, in terms of engaging with national priorities, it was noted in the Final Evaluation that dialogue with national governments and coordination with priorities, as defined by ongoing budget support operations, was less than optimal in some cases:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>“Policy support from national governments and RECs to those initiatives that were reviewed during the field missions has been generally strong but with a few exemptions being the most notorious case the ‘misunderstanding’ about the scope of BizClim work in Rwanda and, to a lesser extent, in Liberia (both cases already mentioned in 3.3.2). In terms of coordination with budgetary support initiatives, there is a window open to the future for interventions designed to follow up BizClim work. The EC Delegation in Barbados, for example, is moving towards the “thirdgeneration” of budget support schemes, which implies more hands-on involvement and monitoring of government programmes receiving EC funding. TA and advice from intra-ACP BizClim-like programmes may play an important role to coordinate budgetary support schemes under the 10th EDF and beyond. »</i> <p><i>Source: EC, Final Evaluation Private Sector Enabling Environment Facility, p.34</i></p>
<p>Findings at JC level MEDA II</p>	<p>There is evidence of analysis and consultation conducted at the stage of the identification of the needs and the preparation of the response, but the access to the related documentation is often difficult. (p34)</p>

	<p>There is an overall consensus between the Commission and its partners that efforts should be concentrated on strengthening the economy (including private sector) and the social delivery mechanisms and on generating income and employment opportunities in a general way rather than targeting specific populations. (p51)</p> <p>The second pillar of Barcelona (development of an economic and financial partnership to establish a free trade area) is undoubtedly a driving force since national policies aim increasingly at opening-up of the economies and are concerned with the competitiveness of domestic enterprises, notably <i>vis-à-vis</i> the EU that is a major trade partner. (p26)</p> <p>At bilateral level the Commission aimed at responding to the demands expressed by the partners. All the fields of intervention supported by MEDAII have supported complex structural reforms that were national priorities. These were largely driven by their domestic priorities and it was not always demonstrated that the proposed measures were sufficiently strategic to alleviate the internal and regional constraints to achieve the Barcelona objectives. (pii)</p> <p>In most cases, national priorities and, therefore, the demands from the partner for support are generally not determined by the Barcelona process. It is only, and then only to a certain extent, in the development of the private sector and the opening-up of the economies to international trade that there is convergence with and mutual support for the Barcelona and national objectives. (p30)</p> <p>A major proportion of the resources provided in MEDAII (€1.99bn) has been dedicated to systemic economic reforms (Tunisia, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco) with a view to improving <i>the legal and regulatory environment of business and trade activities</i>. These interventions have been carefully tuned to the specific country specifications, their priorities and their capacity to implement the reforms. The most ambitious programmes were implemented in Tunisia (with the successive structural adjustment facilities), Morocco (reform of the fiscal system and of public administration), and in Jordan (Sector Reform Facility) since in these countries the reforms supported by the Commission were also mainstreamed in the national plans. (p39)</p> <p>Regional interventions suffered from insufficient ownership in the countries in which they were implemented due to the fact that they were not directly addressing national issues. (p94)</p>
Egypt 98-08	<p>Working towards fulfillment of the second pillar (economic and financial partnership to create an area of shared prosperity) of the Barcelona objectives has undoubtedly been - and continues to be - a major priority of the Commission-Egypt cooperation strategy. (p2)</p> <p>Past EU-Egypt cooperation strategy has mainly been driven by the priorities of the Commission rather than those of the Government of Egypt; this is slowly changing through increased participation of the Egyptian Government in the programming process. At the same time, local stakeholders were increasingly consulted during the identification and formulation of the interventions to be supported by the cooperation programme. (p19)</p> <p>The consultation process with the Government of Egypt has not yet fully been extended to a discussion of the priority areas of support.</p>

	<p>Consultations with line ministries and other stakeholders has mainly been undertaken for the formulation of interventions. (p86)</p> <p>The Government's adoption of a policy reform programme after 2004 has enabled the Commission to increasingly shift its financial support from projects towards a more comprehensive support to reform using budget support thus facilitating its participation in (selected) sector policy dialogues. (p94)</p> <p>The relevance and thus effectiveness and sustainability of the Commission-Egypt cooperation programme could be greatly enhanced if cooperation interventions were responding more closely to jointly identified priority needs whilst taking account of the specific characteristics of the Commission's potential support modalities. (p98)</p>
EIB IF/OR (2010)	n.a.
Channeling DBs and EIB (2008)	The evaluation does not provide specific information on this issue.
CDE (2011)	<p>The CDE evaluation has relatively positive findings in this respect with regard to the CDE: <i>"Overall, the evaluation findings show that the CDE generally identified the needs of the private sector appropriately and responded to them adequately. The demand-led nature of its support did not guarantee that priority needs were addressed. CDE support has been aligned on partner government policies."</i></p> <p><i>Source: ADE (for the European Commission), Evaluation of the Centre for the Development of Enterprise, 2011 (p26)</i></p>
Banking Measures in the Mediterranean area	No information.
Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008	<p>The evaluation found that:</p> <p><i>"EC support over the period considered accounted for third country needs and priorities in relation to ESI-related issues and was accordingly aligned with nation-ally-owned development strategies. Furthermore, the development progress of each targeted country, and in particular their levels of income as well as their socio-economic development process and related policy changes, was reflected in EC-related support approaches and financial commitments. In some countries ESI-related support has become very important and is being implemented through specific programmes, while in others it remains no more than an implicit concern."</i> (p.2).</p> <p>The need to <i>"further enhance country ownership of the ESI agendas by promoting social dialogue and peer-to-peer institutional exchanges"</i> (p.3).</p>

JC 2.4	<i>The potential VA of the Commission geared its decisions on the nature of the support it would provide</i>
I-2.4.1	Types of potential VA the Commission considered it could offer when providing support to PSD (as attested for instance by overall documents on the Commission's PSD strategy)
I-2.4.2	Overall approach of the Commission to ensure that its PSD support would be geared, among other things, by its potential VA
I-2.4.3	References in strategy documents at country/ regional level to the potential VA of the Commission when providing support to PSD
I-2.4.4	Stakeholders consider that the Commission's country and regional strategies took into account the Commission's potential VA and are able to identify such VA
Findings at JC level - Tunisia Evaluation	No information.
Findings at JC level – Moldova Evaluation	No information.
Findings at JC level – El Salvador Evaluation	The evaluation gives evidence of the contrary: <i>“Much less evidence could indeed be found of any comparative advantage in having the EC intervening vs. EU MS, for instance in the areas of education, juvenile delinquency, basic services or SME. At the contrary, interviewees deplored the lack of capitalisation (mechanisms), institutional memory and continuity of staff at the EC, and hence the lack of thematic expertise and country experience, including in terms of relations with the government.”</i> (p. 57).
Findings at JC level Burkina Faso (1999-2008)	No reference to Commission's potential VA
Guyana (1997-2007)	The Evaluation Report mentions: <i>“Moreover, interventions in Guyana focus on three main areas of the Commission PSD strategy: business development services, financial services, and training.”</i> P.36 But does not mention whether this related to potential VA of Commission in these areas.
Findings at JC level - Microfinance	EC interventions in microfinance were, to some extent, guided by consideration of the EC's potential value-added in the sector. The multi-donor Peer Review of EC microfinance activities, conducted in 2003, argued that the EC's funds would be better channelled if it withdrew from credit lines (an area of lesser added-value) and focused on capacity building (one of greater EC added-value). In 2004, the EC followed this recommendation and ended credit lines (with some exceptions); established the capacity-building focused EU/ACP Microfinance Programme; and later publishing the EC Guidelines for support to microfinance in 2008. <i>Source: EC, EU/ ACP Microfinance Programme Final Evaluation</i>

Findings at JC level - BizClim	<p>In terms of focusing on areas of EC added value, BizClim specifically supported actions at the macro and meso level but not at the micro level, in accordance with the 1998 DGVIII Communication to the European Council:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ « <i>BizClim was a direct off-spring of DLAGNOS, intended to add value specific to the EC in the ACP area by supporting policy dialogue at the national and regional levels on all matters that 36 helped improve the business environment.</i> [...]Coherent with the 1998 DGVIII Communication to the European Council, BizClim supported actions at the macro and meso level but did not intervene at the micro level because it did not involve directly with private enterprises. » <p><i>Source: EC, Final Evaluation Private Sector Enabling Environmnet Facility, pp.35-36</i></p>
Findings at JC level MEDA II	<p>Few specific information found. The quotes below may be relevant though :</p> <p>Community value added was taken into account by Commission interventions in a number of aspects. (p75)</p> <p>The blending of Commission and EIB instruments is an element of Community value added. (p78)</p>
Egypt 98-08	<p>Whilst being consulted in the process, the GoE's influence on the outcome remained small, being limited to more minor aspects (such as the amounts, the implementation modalities, the scope, etc.) while its desire to receive support in some areas where it felt the Commission to have a comparative advantage remained unanswered. Examples include support to trade facilitation or to human resource development, including technical knowhow, training, transfer of knowledge and science and technology, for which the Commission has potential value added and could step up its current support. (p21)</p> <p>The scope of potential areas that could require the Commission's support in Egypt is immense and any intervention can thus be easily justified by a need identified either by the Commission or by the Government. However, with aid effectiveness in mind, it is important that the Commission's cooperation focuses on those areas where the Commission has previous experience and where the Government of Egypt has recognised that the Commission could bring in specific value added as compared to other donors (trade facilitation, human resource development including training, transfer of knowledge, science and technology, education, health). (p98)</p>
EIB IF/OR (2010)	n.a.
Channeling DBs and EIB (2008)	<p>See J.C. 2.5 below. Indeed, the VA the Commission could bring through grants geared the “channeling” of its support through the EIB. See also for instance p. 51 of the evaluation: “<i>The contributions of the Commission to the EIB served for filling a gap between grant assistance and capital borrowing at market conditions by offering the beneficiaries services (TA), incentives (interest subsidies) and the financial underpinning for risk capital operations. The mandate of the EIB allows it to use its own resources only for loans. As explained in the Inventory Note, the grant money provided by the Commission (from its Budget and the EU MS' EDF) was used to offer additional funding modalities, more attractive conditions, and resources in operations too risky for traditional financing. For the interest rate subsidies and TA related to EIB loans, and for the risk capital operations – all managed by the EIB –, the Commission and the EIB joined forces to provide the regional agreements for the MEDA and ACP countries with a comprehensive array of EC long-term financial solutions, at conditions more favourable than those of the market but not market distorting. It permitted a more flexible and comprehensive response to partner countries' needs than Commission grants or</i></p>

	<i>EIB loans alone could have provided.”</i>
CDE (2011)	<p>The CDE evaluation concludes on CDE value-added (Conclusion 3) in summary that <i>“The CDE had a strong value added for beneficiaries through its capacity to mobilise qualified professional expertise. However, to its funders (mainly EU MS through the EDF), IFIs and other partners, its value added was low.”</i></p> <p>It provides hereby the following details:</p> <p><i>“The value added of the CDE must be assessed under three categories of stakeholders: the beneficiary enterprises; the funders of the CDE, that is mainly the EU MS through the EDF; but also partners who co-finance its activities or finance it to manage their own programmes. Three sub-conclusions are drawn, corresponding to these different stakeholders.</i></p> <p><i><u>Value added for beneficiaries (SMEs, IOs and BDS providers)</u></i></p> <p><i>C7.1 For the beneficiary enterprises the valued added of the CDE has lain in the access to relatively low-cost valuable technical assistance and professional expertise that generally increased their performance. For the intermediary organisations and BDS providers, the value added of the CDE has lain in its capacity to mobilise qualified expertise and strengthen their capacity to provide services to enterprises.</i></p> <p><i>For the beneficiaries the potential value added of the CDE lies in (1°) the timely availability of relevant advice and technical assistance at a subsidised cost, and (2°) the transfer of useful professional expertise.</i></p> <p><i>Regarding the first point, beneficiary enterprises, IOs and BDS providers benefitted from TA and advice that were relevant insofar as they addressed their requests, and at a relatively limited cost since it never exceeded 33% of the total cost, regardless of their contribution capacity. However, in several cases complex and bureaucratic procedures have been a disincentive to drawing on the support of the CDE.</i></p> <p><i>On the second point the record of the CDE is positive, owing to the quality of the expertise provided and the dedication of the staff in the field; but the support provided was too fragmented and marginal to allow achievement of significant results at sector or meso levels, beyond the direct benefits to the enterprises or organisations assisted.</i></p> <p><i><u>Value added for the funders of the CDE: EU MS through the EDF</u></i></p> <p><i>C7.2 For the funders of the CDE, the value added of CDE support has been limited by the lack of CDE strategic approach (see conclusion 11) and its high cost of operations.</i></p> <p><i>For the EU MS, the potential value added of the CDE resides in its capacity to:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>identify the priority needs of the private sector; and</i> ▪ <i>use efficiently the EDF subsidy to respond to private sector needs in such a way as to complement and support the overall EDF programmes as prepared and managed by the Commission.</i> <p><i>The record of the CDE has been mixed: although it has demonstrated that its demand-driven approach has undoubtedly permitted it to address the needs expressed by beneficiaries, a number of issues are of concern:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>from the field visits, there was little evidence that CDE’s knowledge of the situation of the private sector served as an important input in the programming of the Commission’s assistance.</i>

- *The CDE being an institution created under Cotonou dealing with private sector development, there was a potential for complementarities with Commission programmes and EIB operations. However, synergies remained underexploited over the evaluation period, implying that the potential of the whole EU family had not been fully achieved.*
- *Finally, CDE activities have been professional and useful for the beneficiaries but have been provided at an extremely high management cost for the EDF, owing to the heavy permanent structure involved.*

Value added for partner institutions (e.g. IFIs, regional organisations, other donors, ACP partner governments)

For the partners, the value added of the CDE contribution has lain more in its complementarities with them and in its capacity to transfer professional know how than in its cost-effectiveness in managing programmes on behalf of third parties.

For the partner institutions the added value of the CDE has lain in:

- *the complementarities of the CDE with their own specific characteristics that allows them to better fulfil their mandate by using the CDE to provide services they cannot offer themselves;*
- *its accumulated knowledge of private sector problems at enterprise level and the experience it has built up in identifying and mobilising adequate professional expertise;*
- *its capacity to manage their programmes swiftly and efficiently.*

The cooperation with the EIB illustrates the first point. There are clear potential complementarities between the CDE and the EIB, the CDE providing non-financial assistance to financial intermediaries benefiting from EIB global loans and to SMEs to help them access this source of finance. While the two institutions have cooperated in the past, there was no concrete collaboration between them during the evaluation period at HQ or in the field, although there have been increased contacts since 2010. They signed two conventions in 2011 (one for the Pacific and the other for the Caribbean) which envisage management by the CDE of the EIB-financed TA to financial intermediaries.

The second and third points are deeply inter-related. Partners who use the CDE to implement their PSDP and other programmes expect the institution both to provide adequate professional expertise and to administer their programmes in a swift and cost-efficient manner. Specifically:

- *Despite the fact that the CDE had a good record when it came to transferring professional know-how, its high running costs and deficiencies in reporting its performance have made it difficult for the partners to perceive the value added of the CDE prior to its restructuring.*
- *Hence, although potential complementarities were recognized by the partners, their interaction with the CDE remained minimal during the evaluation period. The 2010 strategic redirection and re-focus by the CDE on the management of programmes for third parties has again raised the possibility of achieving synergies with partners. A number of agreements have been concluded between the CDE and partners (the PSDP DR Congo materialised in 2010 and the WAEMU PSDP was signed in 2011). However, so far it has not been clear how the CDE plans to adapt its processes and organisational modalities to the role of "programme management".*

At the same time the restructuring of the CDE has also led to the reduction of in-house expertise. If the CDE does not take sufficiently into consideration the necessity of maintaining and expanding its in-house (or closely associated) professional expertise there is a risk that its potential value added to the partner institution may become negligible."

Source: ADE (for the European Commission), Evaluation of the Centre for the Development of Enterprise, 2011 (pages 77-79)

Banking Measures in the Mediterranean area	In the case of risk capital operations, the Court of Auditors report quotes Article 6(4) of the MEDA regulation which specifies in which cases should be used and also which added value it was intended to bring: <i>“Risk capital shall be used, first and foremost, to make available own funds to undertakings in the production sector, in particular those that can bring together natural or legal persons who are nationals of a Community Member State and of Mediterranean non-member countries or territories. Risk capital shall be used primarily to strengthen the private sector, and in particular to reinforce the financial sector in MEDA countries. It shall add value clearly, by offering financial products and terms that are not available locally”</i> . (p.19).
Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008	The Evaluation finds that interventions conducive to employment at country level inspired by most of the core elements of the European Social Model combining economic growth with social justice, is an AV. (p. 24). <i>“the definition of a European Social Model which, in turn, has directly contributed to a more structured and comprehensive European development strategy for ESI-related issues.”</i> (p.71).
JC 2.5	<i>The potential synergies of the Commission with other actors and other types of Commission support geared its decisions on the nature of the support it would provide.</i>
<p>I-2.5.1 Commission documents that lay down the overall (not country specific) PSD strategy of the Commission require that the Commission PSD strategies and interventions are chosen on the basis of, among other things, synergies with support provided by other actors or other types of Commission support</p> <p>I-2.5.2 CSPs/RSPs and programming documents highlight synergies with support provided by other actors or other types of Commission support</p> <p>I-2.5.3 Stakeholders consider that synergies with support provided by other actors or other types of Commission support been a key criterion for deciding on the nature of the support to be provided</p>	
Findings at JC level - Tunisia Evaluation	No information.
Findings at JC level – Moldova Evaluation	No information.
Findings at JC level – El Salvador Evaluation	<p>The evaluation gives evidence of failed opportunities in terms of possible synergies with other Commission forms of assistance: <i>“Regarding laws for MSMEs, FOMYPE failed to take advantage of FEDECACES’ experience and knowledge about remittances to help analyse and adapt the financial and legal framework so as to improve the use of remittances at national and local level. And the “Ley de Calidad” -much expected as a result of the recent EC’s cooperation strategic change from programme support to budget support- was still pending approval in September 2009, impeding the EC from launching its budget support programme PROCALIDAD as planned in the 2007-2013 CSP.”</i> (p.37). No other forms of synergies were mentioned.</p> <p>The report also mentions <i>“On the contrary, there was a case of duplication of efforts in FOMYPE.”</i> (p. 55) without specifying however the nature or cause of the duplication of efforts.</p>
Findings at JC	Evidence of complementarities with other actors and other Commission’s

<p>level</p> <p>Burkina Faso (1999-2008)</p>	<p>interventions:</p> <p><i>“Dans la pratique, le PRCE (Programme de renforcement des capacités des entreprises) a visé finalement les très petites entreprises assurant ainsi une complémentarité avec d'autres interventions financées par d'autres PTF (Banque Mondiale,..) » p.72.</i></p> <p><i>« Les Centre de gestion agréé (CGA) ont plus d'opportunité, car la Chambre de Commerce et d'Industrie du Burkina Faso (CCI-BF) s'est engagé à prendre le relais du PRCE pour leur financement, permettant ainsi à cette composante de poursuivre ses activités malgré l'arrêt du Programme. Il faut noter par ailleurs un projet régional, financé par la facilité « ProInvest » devrait permettre de structurer les CGA sur un plan régional. » p.73</i></p> <p>EIB's support to the financial sector: <i>“Ces prêts ont permis le financement des investissements de petites et moyennes entreprises par des ressources à moyen et long termes qui leur sont difficilement accessibles, contribuant ainsi à soutenir le secteur privé qui est le moteur de la croissance économique. »</i></p>
<p>Guyana (1997-2007)</p>	<p>Evidence of synergies:</p> <p><i>“Coherence & complementarities between areas of intervention have most of the time been maximised through linkages between different components within the same project (LEAP) and synergies with other donor-funded projects (GTA & LEAP).” p.38</i></p> <p>Furthermore good donors' coordination in PSD:</p> <p><i>“[D]onors work alongside each other rather than together although again there are exceptions such as in private sector development where a Donor Coordination Unit (DCU) is in charge of the establishment of thematic groups involving donors and line ministries to review and develop project pipelines, to review the participation Action Plan and to strengthen the capacity of line ministries.”</i></p>
<p>Findings at JC level - Microfinance</p>	<p>The EU/ACP Microfinance Programme did not explicitly develop synergies with other types of Commission support, with the Final Evaluation noting that <i>“it would also be beneficial for both the EC and beneficiaries if there were increased coherence and synergies between an EC follow-up flagship programme in microfinance and other EC interventions in this area, for instance in terms of end-client focus.”</i></p> <p>With regards to other actors, however, the Programme did build in synergies with other donors by providing core funding to the 2008-2013 work programme of the multi-donor CGAP (Consultative Group for the Assistance of the Poor) initiative.</p> <p><i>Source: EC, EU/ACP Microfinance Programme Final Evaluation, p.iv</i></p>
<p>Findings at JC level - BizClim</p>	<p>BizClim was intended to play a facilitation role with respect to other intra-ACP centralised operations, although none were noted in the Final Evaluation. The final evaluation also notes that, with regard to other EC activities from geographical budget lines, BizClim's interventions were “generally very small” in comparison, suggesting that BizClim's role was more that of a trigger for other, larger, EC interventions. No significant synergies with other donors were noted, however:</p> <p><i>« Activities undertaken by BizClim were intended to play a facilitating role vis-à-vis other intra-ACP PSD-support programmes like the EIB Investment Facility, the EU-ACP Microfinance Programme, Trade.com and PRO€INVEST, developing synergies with them. The scale of BizClim interventions was generally very small in relation to budgets for similar actions allocated through NIPs and RIPs under the 10th EDF. BizClim actions should be assessed by their capacity to trigger or facilitate full-scale actions funded under other EC instruments. For instance, for regional integration in the ECOWAS region, the 10th EDF RIP foresees funding programmes amounting to more than €100 million; the same happens in most RIPs of the ACP</i></p>

	<p><i>sub-regions and in a good number of NIPs in Africa.</i></p> <p><i>Clearly, BizClim also allowed the EC to achieve its development policy objectives without internal contradiction or without contradiction with other Community policies. However, it was also observed that BizClim may have not worked enough on "branding" its specific services. The programme was perceived primarily as an "extra" and quick-disbursing resource to access EC funding. In terms of complementing partner country or REC policies and other donors' interventions, events funded by BizClim were generally seen as adequate instruments for informal public/private dialogue, particularly in the context of EPA negotiations. »</i></p> <p><i>Source: EC, Final Evaluation Private Sector Enabling Environment Facility, pp.35-36</i></p>
<p>Findings at JC level MEDA II</p>	<p>A considerable proportion of the support for the development of the productive sectors and for the integration of the MPC into the world market has been provided through instruments other than the MEDA Regulation. Two such instruments need to be mentioned because of their magnitude and their complementarity in supporting the objectives of Barcelona:</p> <p>(i) The Euromed II mandate was conferred on the EIB by the Member States for provision of loans from the bank's own resources to contribute to development of the private sector and infrastructure of the MPC. This financial facility amounted to €6.52bn over the period 2000-2006. EIB loans targeted on the private sector and trade were provided direct to private corporate bodies and financial intermediaries with a view to strengthening their capacity to finance SMEs.</p> <p>(ii) Non-financial cooperation was conducted principally in accordance with the first pillar of Barcelona and organised through implementation of the Association Agreements, and was the platform on which the political dialogue on trade policy (tariff dismantlement, bilateral and regional trade agreements) and economic liberalisation took place. It is an essential component of the cooperation programme and is the framework for the bilateral policy dialogue on specific reforms. (p40)</p> <p>The Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP), operational since 2002, regroups various financial facilities operated by the EIB with a view to supporting the "Economic and Financial Partnership" chapter of the Barcelona process. Four FEMIP facilities are included in MEDA II and they all have a PSD dimension: the TA Support Fund; interest subsidies; the Risk Capital Facility; and the FEMIP Trust Fund. In the last-mentioned the Commission contribution is minor. (p15)</p> <p>The funds made available by the Commission to be managed by the EIB have achieved their intended goal of creating a bridge between the EIB banking activities and the economic and development objectives of the cooperation of the Commission with the MPC.</p> <p>The risk capital facility managed by the EIB proved a useful contribution to the strengthening of selected financial market institutions and private sector enterprises. However, the disbursement of the funds suffered from delays (because it depends on a number of factors: the capacity of the partners to meet the requirements of the EIB in terms of financial governance, the timing of their needs of the successive tranches of the capital resources, etc.) and it was difficult for the Commission to coordinate their implementation with its own activities. (p103)</p> <p>It should also be noted that the use of the Risk Capital Facility funds by the EIB is based on the identification of promising individual deals. This banker's approach is not directly articulated to the programming of the Commission and is perceived by the latter as a default of coordination that limits the contribution of EIB RCF</p>

	<p>interventions to the objectives of the cooperation defined in the Commission strategy documents, despite the fact that strategic coordination between Commission services and the EIB (and the BWI) takes place in the Luxembourg process. (p44)</p> <p>The fact that the EIB does not have a programmatic approach precludes both entities from deciding on what should be supported with loans and what with grants. This has negatively impacted on the complementarity of their respective measures. (p77)</p> <p>Beyond the support provided by the Commission the MPC benefit from substantial assistance from the EU Member States and other bilateral (notably the US) and multilateral donors (WB and AfDB). (p22)</p> <p>Coordination between the Commission and EU MS has been the object of guidelines at the outset of MEDA II and took place within the various <i>fora</i> established by the MEDA regional cooperation (ministerial, senior official, and working group levels). There is strong coordination in the political dialogue accompanying the AA and the identification of the regional programmes. But the absence of clear and common criteria in the use of instruments by the Commission on the one hand, and by the EU MS development agencies and EIB on the other, did not permit a fully consistent approach to similar problems. Indeed, the Commission supports the development of the private sector with development financing modalities such as grants where the rules of some EU MS agencies and the EIB impose loans. (p86)</p> <p>More precisely MEDA bilateral cooperation varied across countries. Whereas effective donor coordination mechanisms have been elaborated and are used in Egypt, WB&GS and Morocco, in the other countries visited by this evaluation it generally proved limited to some exchanges of information both at design and implementation stages, but has recently improved and is increasingly in line with the principles of the Paris Declaration. In BS interventions coordination between the Commission and Bretton Woods Institutions has been strong (p75)</p>
Egypt 98-08	<p>Several donor coordination mechanisms have been established between the Commission and EU MS as well as with other donors:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ at strategic level: the Luxembourg process gathers the Commission, EIB, WB and IMF, while coordination between the Commission, EU MS and the EIB takes place in the MED/ENPI Committee at programming level; and ▪ at implementation level: the Development Partners Group gathers all donors in the field and ten thematic sub-groups have been put in place. (p74) <p>Consultation and involvement of EU MS in the CSP/NIP formulations has progressively improved over the evaluation period. Donor coordination within the DPG has been mostly limited to exchange of information. In 2009, coordination was variable across sectors. (p75)</p> <p>Coordination with other donor-funded interventions has not been the general rule. It materialised during implementation when foreseen at design stage. It was generally stronger for BS interventions with the matrix of disbursement conditions being the result of extensive discussions. (p75)</p> <p>Complementarities between donors' interventions have generally not materialized. The research of complementarities was increasingly pursued by donors at the end</p>

	of the evaluation period. (p75)
EIB IF/OR (2010)	<p>The mid-term evaluation of the EIB IF and OR operations concludes that there were few synergies between the EIB and the Commission, despite potential benefits of such synergies (cf. p. 84: <i>“The Commission and the EIB generally operated on parallel tracks with few synergies despite the potential benefits of such synergies for enhancing development impact.”</i>).</p> <p>It explains indeed that several mechanisms for EIB coordination with the Commission and the EU MSs exist and were operational both at Headquarters level and at the level of specific operations. However coordination activities remained generally a formality and therefore both the EIB and the Commission operated <i>de facto</i> on parallel tracks:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ mutual consultation on the CSP/RSP took place but was mainly formal; ▪ there were no reported cases where both institutions called upon each other to benefit from their respective expertise and experience ; ▪ consultation at project level was also a formality and was not always preceded by an informal discussion by the Commission and EIB ; ▪ there was no cooperation in terms of policy dialogue and little reference in the policy dialogue conducted by the Commission ; <i>and</i> ▪ resources of regional offices were insufficient for optimising the cooperation potential, despite demonstration of the utility of local presence. <p>As a result, <i>EIB and Commission operations were “compatible”, but did not show strong synergies at operational, strategic or sector level.</i> Several reasons were adduced to explain this lack of coordination and complementarity: the difficulty of combining a Commission programming cycle over several years with a demand-led EIB approach; the fact that the EIB and the Commission were not active in the same sectors, the lack of EIB representation at local level and of resources in general for ACP/OCT operations.</p> <p>However several elements show that there was room for potential synergies that could have enhanced the development impact:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ in a number of cases the Commission and the EIB were active in the same sectors in which strong coordination could have been expected ; ▪ the combination of EIB loan and equity financing with Commission TA has proved effective but remained limited ; ▪ both institutions provided considerable funding in many countries of interventions and therefore there was room for a mutual strengthening of visibility. <p>Similarly, coordination between the EIB and other EU initiatives was also scarce, such as with BizClim, PROINVEST, the TradeCom Facility, the ACP Multilateral Trading System Programme, the CDE or the EU/ACP Microfinance Framework Programme. Nevertheless, stronger cooperation could be observed, particularly for the later two initiatives. (see pp. 84-85 of the EIB IF /OR Evaluation).</p>
Channeling DBs and EIB (2008)	<p>Several elements indicate that potential synergies were at the heart of the Commission’s decision to channel funds through the EIB and that this precisely led to different types of value added of the Commission’s support. Indeed, the evaluation explains that the strategic agreements on which the</p>

	<p>Commission's support was based aimed precisely at complementing the EIB-managed financial instruments (interest rate subsidies, technical assistance, risk capital) with the provision of Commission grants (p. 82.). This allowed according the evaluation (p. 85-86) the generation of different types of value added:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ for the Commission: it had a broader range of instruments to offer to beneficiaries, it could rely on EIB expertis and experience and it could strengthen the EC-EIB co-operation in addition to strengthening its visibility; ▪ for Partner Countries: they can benefit from a larger array of instrument in economic cooperation with the EU and from better lending conditions in less productive sectors as well as from the EIB expertise and experience ▪ for the EIB itself: larger EIB operations, not possible with own resources, better implementation of EIB loans, higher attractiveness of EIB loans. Also: the critical mass provided by the Commission, strengthened EC-EIB cooperation and a leverage for developing projects with an environmental dimension
CDE (2011)	<p>The CDE evaluation states that opportunities of synergies with the Commission remained underexploited (in the response to EQ 1):</p> <p><i>“The CDE made policy commitments favouring synergies with Commission programmes with a view to achieving maximum coherent impact with its limited resources. Overall, its support was in line with the Commission private sector development policies but actual complementarities with Commission programmes have been rare. Contacts between the staff of the RFO [Regional Field Offices] and of the EUD varied according to the country and to timing, with a net improvement in 2010-2011.”</i></p> <p><i>Source: ADE (for the European Commission), Evaluation of the Centre for the Development of Enterprise, 2011 (p22)</i></p>
Banking Measures in the Mediterranean area	<p>No evidence of this. Evidence rather of lack of communication between the EIB and the Commission, especially at EUD level which likely prevented potential synergies:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>“The Commission, and especially two of the EC delegations in the partner countries visited by the Court, were not sufficiently informed of EIB projects and was therefore not able to monitor or follow them. Furthermore, even when information had been transmitted by the EIB to the Commission's central offices in Brussels, it had not always been shared with the delegations visited by the Court. The audits on the spot did, however, show that the establishment of EIB representative offices had facilitated communication between the Commission and the EIB at the local level. This was especially noted in Morocco, with the organisation of regular meetings.” (14).</i> ▪ <i>« In the case of Risk Capital Operations, the Report found that “The Commission did not set up controls in order to detect whether the same beneficiary was benefiting from different risk capital operations, either managed directly or through financial intermediaries. This was due to the absence of a central database at Commission level of all beneficiaries benefiting from risk capital operations.” (p.20).</i>
Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008	<p>The report mentions the link between TVET (education) intervention and the private sector, <i>“which has been strengthened throughout the period considered”</i>. The report gives examples: in Morocco <i>“with the project ‘Appui au développement de la formation professionnelle’ dans les secteurs du tourisme, du textile et des nouvelles technologies de l'information et de la communication’ and the ‘Tourism Training Programme’ in Tanzania, where the Government has always emphasized investment in human capital - also through private sector education - as a precondition for progress in development and for reduction of poverty. In Jordan, in line with the National Social and Economic Plan, EC programmes are contributing to empowering the private sector to become more actively engaged in the broader</i></p>

	<p><i>national objectives of reducing poverty and unemployment. In Armenia, the EC poverty re-education programme specifically targets empowerment of private sector players in all areas relating to skills development” (p.120).</i></p> <p>However it is largely critical of the lack of sectoral approach to addressing employment issues: <i>“The sectoral and thematic approach to ESI is still poor. With few exceptions, mainly in the ENP area, there are no attempts to address the ESI themes, in particular employment, as a comprehensive and complex issue requiring interconnected and complementary interventions (inclusive growth, education, governance) which would benefit from strong government coordination, the participation of the social partners, and joint harmonized action with other donors.” (p.72).</i></p>
JC 2.6	<i>The Commission’s PSD strategies and programming were clearly prioritised and part of a wider Commission strategy in the country/region</i>
I-2.6.1	Commission strategy/programming documents explain how the Commission’s PSD strategy fits into the wider Commission’s country/regional strategies and priorities
I-2.6.2	Commission strategy/programming documents explain how the Commission’s have been prioritised with regard to the PSD needs of the country
I-2.6.3	Stakeholders consider that the Commission’s PSD support was part of a wider prioritised approach of the Commission in the country/region as well as prioritised with respect to PSD need of the country
I-2.6.4	A methodological procedure has been adopted for selecting areas of intervention per country, as per the 2005 Evaluation Recommendation RI-1, including: an assessment of priority needs; selection of interventions with Commission comparative advantage; and an assessment of whether pre-conditions of intervention are met
Findings at JC level - Tunisia Evaluation	<p>The GBSs with PSD components largely supported national development plans which had in turn been framed by the AA requirements to modernise the financial sector, enterprises’ competitiveness etc.</p> <p>Some TAs were funded to support the drafting of the GBS conditionalities, in order to better identify needs and conditionalities needed.</p>
Findings at JC level – Moldova Evaluation	<p>No information aside from the information provided in Annex 1 on the Overall context, which specifies that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ TACIS priority areas (Council regulation 99/2000) include “Support to the private sector and assistance to economic development” ; ▪ The Partnership and cooperation Agreement (PCA) which is the legal basis for the EC’s engagement with Moldova agreed in 1998 for a 10 years term. It includes SMEs under the Economic area of cooperation. ▪ The 2002-2006 CSP identified 3 major areas of cooperation, including private sector and economic development and MSMEs as a sub-area of cooperation. ▪ The 2004-2006 CSP/NIP included Support for private sector and economic development, and in particular expert/investment promotion and support to micro-enterprises, SMEs and small farmers in rural areas, as priority areas. p.139-140.
Findings at JC level – El Salvador	<p>No specific information aside from the finding that: <i>“The EC strategy and interventions responded well to the main needs and priorities of the population of this country. [...]the EC was able to find, as far as possible, common ground with national</i></p>

Evaluation	<p><i>policies, which was a difficult exercise given the high polarisation of the successive right-wing Governments. There was indeed little Government concern in EC priority areas such as poverty, inequalities, decentralisation, or small and medium enterprises, during most of the period.”</i> (Executive Summary / Page ii).</p> <p>On the last indicator, the evaluation gives evidence of the lack of - or a poor needs assessment which resulted in inadequate targeting of beneficiaries, away from micro and small enterprises “<i>lack of an identification study impeded benefiting from adequate data on the universe and characteristics of the beneficiaries and hereby better targeting the intervention. The lack of a precise targeting led to a contradiction between the objectives and methods of the project rather directed towards the small and medium enterprises and the supposed beneficiaries which should have been the micro enterprises. The absence of a midterm evaluation did not permit to correct this problem – and others- on time;”</i> (p. 39).</p>
Findings at JC level Burkina Faso (1999-2008)	Fair to say that Commission’s PSD interventions were part of a wider strategy to stimulate growth and reduce poverty but no evidence of prioritisation.
Guyana (1997-2007)	<p>Yes. The Evaluation Report notes in this respect:</p> <p><i>“The interventions are in line with several instances of best practices as identified in the PSD Evaluation:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>A methodological procedure has been devised for selection of the areas of intervention for PSD support in Guyana. An identification study for the economic diversification of Linden, a pre-feasibility study and a “Training Programme Guyana – Inception Report have been carried out to define the focus of the projects.</i> ▪ <i>Key constraints conditioning success in the areas of intervention have been identified through a participatory approach and have for the most part been addressed. The LEAP addressed key constraints whereas the GTA project design did not tackle the migration of skilled technical and key management personnel. One could legitimately criticise the financing of projects concerned with vocational and technical training if there is no strategic plan to reverse the brain drain problem.” pp.37-38</i>
Findings at JC level - Microfinance	<p>The EU/ACP Microfinance Programme was a Centralised Operation and little evidence is available of a strategic attempt to align programming with the Commission’s wider country or regional strategies and priorities, or to match the Programme grants with beneficiary country PSD needs in particular.</p> <p><i>Source: EC, EU/ ACP Microfinance Programme Final Evaluation</i></p>
Findings at JC level - BizClim	<p>BizClim was a Centralised Operation and there is no evidence in the final evaluation to suggest that operations were decided as part of a strategic approach to PSD in each country or region of operation. As noted in the Final Evaluation, the selection procedure was notably fast in comparison to other intra-ACP operations and did not include any criteria directly related to EC priorities in the country/region:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ «The typical BizClim request for funding took the form of an email presenting the project idea to the PMU, which then decided to put the application forward or not based on predetermined selection criteria. If the answer was positive, the PMU, in consultation with the applicant, prepared the AIP, which was then submitted to the Validation Committee. The AIP constituted the basis for the TOR of any BizClim intervention or project. <p>Usually BizClim went through the application process much faster than other intra-ACP programmes, especially when comparison is made with Pro€invest although this is not always pertinent since a good number of BizClim</p>

	<p>interventions were intended to fund events rather than actually projects. In some particular cases, however, the organization of BizClim business forums and conferences was preceded by diagnostic studies.</p> <p>The selection criteria established by BizClim included:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Recommendations made by the funded interventions likely to be followed up by activities (e.g. mainstreaming in overall policies and strategies, funding from donors, adoption of laws); - Proposal passed the test of the 3Cs (consistency, coherence, complementarities); - Existence of strong support by key stakeholders. » <p><i>Source: EC, Final Evaluation Private Sector Enabling Environment Facility,</i></p>
<p>Findings at JC level MEDA II</p>	<p>The MEDA II Regulation strengthens the programming process so as to render it more strategic, notably with the introduction of the Country and Regional Strategy Papers (CSP and RSP) and the National and Regional Indicative Programmes (NIP and RIP) intended to render coherent the cooperation strategy of the Commission in MPC with national / regional priorities. (p14)</p> <p>CSPs/RSPs identify national/regional priority areas of interventions linked to the overall objectives of Barcelona and the AA. However they do not analyse how and to what extent the resources proposed are expected to contribute, over the period of their deployment, to the reduction of the internal constraints. (p31)</p> <p>Generally bilateral interventions advocate the potential benefits of regional cooperation but few practical activities are planned to develop regional networks, or functional cooperation at the level of the region or groups of countries. (p31)</p> <p>There are examples though of strategies developed at regional level focusing on trade and private sector development, governance, Civil Society, migration, and natural resources and the environment. (p20)</p> <p>Under MEDA II the Inter-service Quality Support Group (iQSG) gives its opinion on CSPs/RSP, NIPs/RIP and on the annual national and regional financing plans. (p18)</p>
<p>Egypt 98-08</p>	<p>Within the framework of the AA, the objectives of strategy documents (CSPs) have been geared towards the opening and liberalisation of the Egyptian economy to stimulate growth and employment. The Commission's assistance supported:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ GoE reforms of the regulatory, administrative and financial framework for business development (Trade Enhancement Programme, Support to the Association Agreement, Support to the Implementation of the Action Plan Programme, Financial and Investment Sector Cooperation Programme - Financial, Support to the Water Sector); ▪ existing GoE reform programmes in sectors critical for the Egyptian economy (Spinning and Weaving Sectors Programme, Support to the Association Agreement, Trade Enhancement Programmes, Financial and Investment Sector Cooperation Programme – Social and Rural); and ▪ GoE efforts to modernise the administrative capacities of the institutions responsible for the provision of economic infrastructure essential for business development (Trade Enhancement Programmes, Support to the Association Agreement, Support to the water Sector, Support to the Implementation of the Action Plan Programme).

	In terms of financial resources, this support represented 49% of the Commission's bilateral assistance: €489m have been devoted to economic infrastructure, private sector development, external trade and the financial sector. (p36)
EIB IF/OR (2010)	n.a.
Channeling DBs and EIB (2008)	The evaluation does not provide specific information on this topic.
CDE (2011)	<p>The CDE evaluation states that opportunities of synergies with the Commission remained underexploited (in the response to EQ 1) and concludes that the CDE lacked a strategic approach (Conclusion 10):</p> <p><i>"The CDE made policy commitments favouring synergies with Commission programmes with a view to achieving maximum coherent impact with its limited resources. Overall, its support was in line with the Commission private sector development policies but actual complementarities with Commission programmes have been rare. Contacts between the staff of the RFO [Regional Field Offices] and of the EUD varied according to the country and to timing, with a net improvement in 2010-2011."</i></p> <p><i>Source: ADE (for the European Commission), Evaluation of the Centre for the Development of Enterprise, 2011 (p22)</i></p> <p><i>"The CDE adopted a demand-led approach to deliver its services, attempting to focus on specific sectors. Its support however lacked strategic orientation.</i></p> <p><i>The mandate of the CDE as defined in the Cotonou Agreement broadly defines the domains where the CDE should intervene, in particular the enhancement of the competitiveness of ACP enterprises and promotion of a business environment conducive to PSD, but it does not indicate the key strategic orientations that the CDE should pursue. These orientations have to be defined by the CDE. The 2005 Statutes and rules of procedures of the CDE indeed stipulate that "the CDE shall define its objectives in greater detail in a policy document". But over the evaluation period the CDE has not further delineated in detail its objectives and main pillars of support in a policy or strategy document.</i></p> <p><i>Instead, the CDE's approach has mainly and deliberately been "demand-led", attempting to concentrate CDE responses on requests in specific sectors of intervention.</i></p> <p><i>(...)</i></p> <p><i>The CDE's approach has therefore been rather vague, based more on what was already in the pipeline, and on available expertise in the field, than on a strategic vision that could have been aligned on the strategies and priorities of the partner countries and of other donors. A strategy was however under preparation in 2011."</i></p> <p><i>Source: ADE (for the European Commission), Evaluation of the Centre for the Development of Enterprise, 2011 (p86)</i></p>
EIB IF/OR (2010)	n.a.
Channeling DBs and EIB (2008)	
Banking Measures in the Mediterranean	The report gives no evidence of prioritization of support through the three banking measures managed by the EIB and funded by MEDA. It rather gives evidence of lack of communication between the EIB and the Commission, especially at EUD level which likely prevented strategic programming and

area	<p>prioritization:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>“The Commission, and especially two of the EC delegations in the partner countries visited by the Court, were not sufficiently informed of EIB projects and was therefore not able to monitor or follow them. Furthermore, even when information had been transmitted by the EIB to the Commission’s central offices in Brussels, it had not always been shared with the delegations visited by the Court. The audits on the spot did, however, show that the establishment of EIB representative offices had facilitated communication between the Commission and the EIB at the local level. This was especially noted in Morocco, with the organisation of regular meetings.” (p.14).</i> ▪ <i>« In the case of Risk Capital Operations, the Report found that “The Commission did not set up controls in order to detect whether the same beneficiary was benefiting from different risk capital operations, either managed directly or through financial intermediaries. This was due to the absence of a central database at Commission level of all beneficiaries benefiting from risk capital operations.” (p.20).</i> <p>However the purpose of Risk Capital Operations was determined from the outset, in the MEDA Regulation: <i>“Risk capital shall be used, first and foremost, to make available own funds to undertakings in the production sector, in particular those that can bring together natural or legal persons who are nationals of a Community Member State and of Mediterranean non-member countries or territories. Risk capital shall be used primarily to strengthen the private sector, and in particular to reinforce the financial sector in MEDA countries. It shall add value clearly, by offering financial products and terms that are not available locally”.</i> (p.19).</p>
Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008	<p>The report is critical of the lack of integration of employment issues in other sectoral forms of support: <i>“The sectoral and thematic approach to ESI is still poor. With few exceptions, mainly in the ENP area, there are no attempts to address the ESI themes, in particular employment, as a comprehensive and complex issue requiring interconnected and complementary interventions (inclusive growth, education, governance) which would benefit from strong government coordination, the participation of the social partners, and joint harmonized action with other donors.”</i> (p.72).</p>
JC 2.7	<i>The Commission designed its PSD support so as to promote gender equality, good governance, and combat environmental degradation and HIV</i>
<p>I-2.7.1 Commission strategy/programming documents explain how the Commission’s PSD strategy and specific intervention will contribute to the above mentioned crosscutting issues</p> <p>I-2.7.2 Stakeholders consider that when designing its support, the Commission took into account the above mentioned cross-cutting issues</p>	
Findings at JC level - Tunisia Evaluation	<p>These crosscutting issues were not mentioned in the sections of the report on the GBSs with PSD components.</p>
Findings at JC level – Moldova Evaluation	<p>These crosscutting issues were not mentioned in the report and were not the focus of the Commission’s SME interventions which focused on:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ regional Business Centres and training for SMEs (the “SME Development Moldova” project). ▪ The creation of at least 100 new SMEs, improvements in the commercial situation and expanded employment in 140 SMEs ("Support for SMEs in rural regions" project)

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Creation of two Business Centres (other EU projects (under City Twinning and CBC)). P. 42. <p>However within its recommendations, the evaluation report mentions attention to the environment: <i>“The team would go further and suggest a holistic approach to development at regional level which might include</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>SME promotion, emphasizing links with a agri-business;</i> ▪ <i>promotion of food and agricultural exports, including the key area of standards and product quality;</i> ▪ <i>concentrating on environmentally sustainable farm and production practices; containing a substantial community-level component, in which the basic infrastructure needed for local development – clean water, a reliable energy source, basic transport infrastructure, and reasonably dense social networks – are in place;</i> ▪ <i>identifying regional “growth poles” in the form of secondary cities and towns and ensuring an adequate supply of urban services and amenities to support growth in the surrounding countryside”.</i> P.116-117.
Findings at JC level – El Salvador Evaluation	The evaluation only reports that a modest contribution was made to employment – and quite specifically to women labour conditions- with the Las Dignas’ project financed under thematic budget lines (p.37). It also reports on attention to gender, that <i>“Other interventions were more explicit on gender-specific measures or activities, but little was put into practice (APREMAT, FOMYPE, PROARES) or with suboptimal impact (FORGAES), or even with an inadequate approach (FORGAES)”</i> (p. 52).
Findings at JC level Burkina Faso (1999-2008)	No evidence that such cross-cutting issues were taken into consideration in the Commission’s strategy/programming
Guyana (1997-2007)	The Evaluation Report states in this respect: <i>“In the design of programmes which do not directly address these issues, CCI have been marginally taken into account”</i> p.59
Findings at JC level - Microfinance	No mention of cross-cutting issues is given in the programming documentation or Final Evaluation of the EU/ACP Microfinance Programme.
Findings at JC level - BizClim	No mention of the above cross-cutting issues is given in the final evaluation.
Findings at JC level MEDA II	<p>A majority of Commission interventions aimed at strengthening the economic context and institutional capacity rather than targeting specific populations or groups. (piii)</p> <p>The cross-cutting issues considered in the evaluation were gender and environment. They were recognised as critical <i>per se</i> and key to sustainable economic and social development in most strategy and programming documents, but have not been the object of in-depth analysis. Outside the interventions targeted on them, the cross-cutting issues were generally not addressed under MEDA II. (p68)</p> <p>The third category of funds made available to the EIB by the Commission is the interest rate subsidy; it is exclusively applicable to environment-related loans and has a private sector component. (p40)</p>

Egypt 98-08	<p>Lately, with the 2007-2013 CSP, the first and last pillars of the Barcelona process have come much more to the forefront of cooperation priorities: the strengthening of civil society has become a full fledged objective with aims to encourage reforms in the areas of democracy, human rights, good governance and justice and the scope of funding for social development was gradually widened to include economic infrastructure for sustainable development in addition to the more traditional social development support. (pii)</p> <p>In the area of human rights, democracy and the rule of law, the Commission and the GoE have made great strides forward in opening up the political dialogue but its effectiveness could not be evidenced. (piii)</p>
Banking Measures in the Mediterranean area	<p>The Court of Auditors' report starts by outlining the Commission's obligations regarding the environmental monitoring of its banking measures managed by the EIB "<i>When delegated management is applied and especially in the case of projects with potential environmental impact, environmental compliance has to be monitored to ensure that environmental rules and requirements are being respected. Environmental assessments should identify possible environmental effects and propose measures to mitigate them. Regular environmental monitoring should be conducted to ensure that mitigating measures are taken and that significant adverse environmental effects are avoided</i>". However the report found that the "<i>The EIB did not always receive sufficient evidence from financial intermediaries/promoters regarding environmental compliance.</i>" and "<i>The environmental monitoring performed by the EIB was limited to documentary checks, which did not constitute a comprehensive environmental monitoring exercise. For intermediated operations, the financing contracts and the practical provisions did not require environmental monitoring by the financial intermediaries after the investment screening and approval phases.</i>" (p.15).</p> <p>No information on good governance, and combat environmental degradation and HIV.</p>
Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008	<p>The evaluation reports that "<i>the opinion of EUD officers and NCs on the EC's influence in Decent Work matters is generally quite positive, recognizing the introduction of specific legislation, gender and child labour, migration and freedom of association as areas in which the EC has contributed the most</i>" (p. 126).</p>
JC 2.8	<i>The Commission PSD activities have contributed to the decent work agenda and/or the improvement of core labour standards and rights of the worker</i>
<p>I-2.8.1 EC macro-economic and policy interventions targeted the decent work agenda and/or improvement of core labour standards and social governance in beneficiary countries during the evaluation period</p> <p>I-2.8.2 Regulations passed on core labour standards and/or social governance in beneficiary countries during the evaluation period</p>	
Findings at JC level - Tunisia Evaluation	Labour standards and rights of the workers were not mentioned in the sections of the report on the GBSs with PSD components.
Findings at JC level – Moldova Evaluation	Labour standards and rights of the workers were not mentioned in the report and were not the focus of the Commission's SME interventions in Moldova between 2000 and 2006.

Findings at JC level – El Salvador Evaluation	No evidence of this. It seems decent work agenda and/or the improvement of core labour standards and rights of the worker were not addressed in the FOMYPE programme.
Findings at JC level Burkina Faso (1999-2008)	No specific mention of core labour standards and social governance but improvement in the legal framework in general: “Bien que le PRCE (Programme de renforcement des capacités des entreprises) n’avait pas pour vocation d’apporter un appui à l’ensemble du secteur privé, les améliorations constatées en matière législatives ont été notamment liées à la création des CGA (Centre de gestion agréé) et ont concernés essentiellement l’amélioration du cadre incitatif légal et une meilleure application de celui-ci. » p.73
Guyana (1997-2007)	No mention of such improvements
Findings at JC level - Microfinance	No mention of the decent work agenda is given in the programming documentation or Final Evaluation of the EU/ACP Microfinance Programme.
Findings at JC level - BizClim	No mention of the decent work agenda is given in the Final Evaluation.
Findings at JC level MEDA II	A majority of Commission interventions aimed at strengthening the economic context and institutional capacity rather than targeting specific populations or groups. (piii)
Egypt 98-08	No specific information found.
EIB IF/OR (2010)	n.a.
Channeling DBs and EIB (2008)	No specific information on this topic in the evaluation.
Banking Measures in the Mediterranean area	No information on this.
Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008	The evaluation found that Employment has been a concern in its development policy but that this is not sufficiently linked to its PSD support: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ “Following the adoption of the Decent Work Agenda, and in order for the EC to further develop the social dimension of globalization, promotion of employment and the decent work chapter of the ECD, the Commission elaborated in 2007 a working paper on Promoting Employment through EU Development Cooperation. The paper focuses on employment and labour market within the broader concept of decent work, which calls for the integration of economic and social objectives and for a combination of measures in the areas of productive employment, rights at work, social protection and social dialogue. Gender equality is integrated in all dimensions. » (p. 72). ▪ “EC bilateral support does not focus enough on coherence with international commitments to Decent Work as a key issue in the overall cooperation dialogue, and there is no systematic approach to setting out targets to promote implementation of this type of international

	<p><i>agreement</i>”. (p.2).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ <i>“In spite of the ECs’ specific value added on workers’ rights, issues relating to labour market governance (such as social dialogue, labour disputes, trade unions; and the labour markets’ normative framework) still have only limited weight in EC programmes”</i>. (p.3). <p>One of the evaluation’s recommendations is therefore to: <i>« Stress labour core rights in the framework of global partnership and trade agreements. Their inclusion and application in the framework of broad economic partnership agreements, which provide new development opportunities while negotiat-ing basic conditions, seems to be the most credible and effective way of addressing them”</i>. (p.5).</p>
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EQ 3	To what extent did the set of Commission funding vehicles and aid modalities for supporting PSD strategies and activities of partner countries and regions result in the provision of timely responses at a reasonable cost to the challenges faced by the private sector in third countries, while fostering synergies among each other and with vehicles offered by other actors?
Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) – Tunisia Evaluation	None.
Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) – Moldova Evaluation	The evaluation recommends continuing the support to PSD, despite the general movement towards GBS: <i>“Particularly in the context of a move to general budget support which, it has to be admitted, has the potential to crowd out private-sector approaches, it is also important to support private sector development much more than in the past. The EC can serve an important role by sending a consistent policy signal to the GoM that private sector development, not more and better public programmes, holds the key to sustainable growth in Moldova.”</i> , p.117.
Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) – El Salvador Evaluation	None.
Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) Guyana (1997-2007)	Significance of the non programmable instruments in the cooperation strategy of Guyana (1/3 of total Commission commitments). More specifically, they <i>“constitute 90% of private sector support”</i> p.23
Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) – Microfinance	
Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) - BizClim	None.
Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere)	
Banking Measures in the	None.

Mediterranean area	
Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008	None.
JC 3.1	<i>The set of funding vehicles or aid modalities developed by the Commission at general level to support partner country PSD strategies and activities aimed at covering the range of challenges faced by the private sector in third countries, while bearing in mind efficiency and synergies</i>
I-3.1.1	Documents outlining the rationale of each modality/ instrument with respect to PSD identify the specific challenges to which it should respond
I-3.1.2	Commission documents explain how the <i>set</i> of instruments/modalities covers the needs of the private sector in a comprehensive manner, while fostering efficiency and synergies
I-3.1.3	Stakeholders consider that the Commission's set of instruments was designed with a view to tackle challenges while fostering efficiency and synergies
Findings at JC level - Tunisia Evaluation	Not applicable (not-country specific).
Findings at JC level – Moldova Evaluation	Not applicable (not-country specific).
Findings at JC level – El Salvador Evaluation	Not applicable (not-country specific).
Findings at JC level - Microfinance	No discussion of the instruments/modalities used by the Commission to support microfinance is presented in the programming documentation of the EU/ACP Microfinance Programme.
Findings at JC level - BizClim	<p>The Final evaluation provides examples of BizClim activities at ACP, regional and country level, without explicitly passing judgement on the appropriateness of the choices made:</p> <p><i>“The FA foresaw a variety of activities aimed at achieving these expected results, including upstream analyses on the enabling environment of private sector development in ACP States or Regions. Such analyses, generally carried out on a demand-driven basis, were aimed at identifying the specific bottlenecks hampering private sector development, and the reforms needed and the way to implement them. The facility was also meant to fund specific studies at all-ACP, regional and local levels based on a request by host country governments and private sector representatives or by the EC Delegations. Examples of the studies indicated in the FA included:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>The all-ACP level, in areas where the ACP group was interested in having studied their joint possibilities of action, such as general policies;</i> <i>▪ The regional level, in areas where a group of ACP countries were interested in having studied their joint possibilities of action, for example in the legal and regulatory frameworks;</i>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>The country level, especially in understanding needs and priorities; informing discussions between EC delegations, ACP governments and private sector representatives in defining NIPs and RIPs; and in assisting discussions between a broader group of development partners including multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and bilateral donors on new pertinent themes”</i> <p><i>Source: EC, Final Evaluation Private Sector Enabling Environment Facility, pp.24-25</i></p>
Findings at JC level MEDA II	Not applicable.
Egypt 98-08	Not applicable.
EIB IF/OR (2010)	<p>Although they are not Commission instruments, the EIB offers different financial instruments, notably under the IF, that have been designed to answer to a range of challenges with which the private sector in third countries is confronted.</p> <p>Although the EIB IF/OR (2010) operations are not Commission instruments, it is important to take them into account when discussing to what extent the set of instruments/modalities are adequate to respond to the range of challenges faced by the private sector in third countries. Indeed, to a certain extent the EIB can be considered the “financial arm” of the Commission and the financial instruments it funds in ACP countries through the IF are financed through the EDF.</p> <p>Loans provided through the IF tackle challenges that are specific to the private sector in third countries notably in the sense that for loans provided under the IF are different from those provided under OR, as the EIB can accept a higher level of risk and can deploy risk capital instruments and set its pricing accordingly. They pursue a developmental objective. More specifically the EIB provides the following instruments under the IF:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Risk capital (equity participation, quasi capital, guarantees) ▪ Ordinal loans, including global loans (non concessional) ▪ Concessional loans (interest rates subsidies capitalized or used for TA projects), under specific circumstances: infrastructure in LDC, in post conflict situations, for restructuring (privatization), for investment projects with social/environmental benefits, for countries benefitting from internationally agree debt sustainability frameworks (e.g. HIPC). <p>Also EIB financing on OR can be adapted to specific challenges of third countries under specific circumstances.</p> <p>In the same line, the EIB IF/OR (2010) evaluation concludes that this was a clear value added of the IF, specifying (p. 80) that “<i>IF resources provided clear VA in terms of development financing that could not have been provided with OR.</i>” <i>The higher risk-bearing capacity allowed interventions in projects that could not have been financed under OR and for which private financing would not have been available. It also allowed intervention with other products (e.g subordinated loans, equity, and quasi-equity). On this basis the IF has been used to address categories of need to which the OR could not respond, even if in some cases the choice between IF and OR was not clear. IF resources have thus been used to strengthen development financing and have not been used, with some exceptions, to finance projects that could also have been financed by OR or private financing.</i>”</p> <p>Furthermore the evaluation also specifies that the combination of financial instruments through the IF/OR brought value-added in that it was</p>

	<p>determinant in allowing the financing of SMEs and specific projects notably through the combination of different instruments (see pp. 80-81). <i>“The IF has a definite comparative advantage in its high risk-bearing capacity (see conclusion above), which not all IFIs/DFIs possess. Besides senior loans under both IF and OR, the IF had the capacity to apply higher-risk instruments or combinations of such instruments. This had a positive effect on the balance sheet of the beneficiaries and hence on their viability. Not only equity instruments but also quasi-equity instruments were applied for achieving a sound financing plan for projects financed. The flexibility of the IF’s risk-bearing capacity has been used judiciously.</i></p> <p><i>With credit lines and investment funds, and even more when combined with TA directed to both the financial intermediaries and the investees, the EIB has addressed the otherwise insufficiently covered needs of SMEs and MSMEs and contributed to the strengthening of the local financial sectors. It was instrumental in the transformation of several microfinance institutions into banks by helping to structure their balance sheets and providing both loans and equity finance. It has also helped to capitalise investment funds, allowing the provision of equity finance to local enterprises, including SMEs, in economies characterised by a shortage of equity funding. Additionally, local currency financing by the EIB has been a potent instrument, particularly for intermediaries supporting SMEs/MSMEs which in the vast majority of cases have limited foreign exchange earnings.</i></p> <p><i>More specifically with respect to TA, several operations among those reviewed showed that the combination of TA with other EIB instruments such as loans and equity investments allowed enhancing the quality of the investment, smoothing its implementation and/or strengthening investee companies. This was also the case for those operations where TA or funding for TA was provided by other institutions, as well as for the blending of loans with concessional elements within the context of the EU-Africa infrastructure TF. The current envelope for TA funding available to the EIB for supporting operations ACP countries was however considered to be insufficient to use this type of blending to its full potential. “</i></p>
<p>Channeling DBs and EIB (2008)</p>	<p>See JC 2.5 and 2.6. that show that the “channeling” through the EIB aims precisely at mutual complementing Commission and EIB instruments through blending, widening thereby the range of instruments provided with a view to answer better to the needs of the private sector in the countries concerned. This widening of the range of instruments and the ability to rely on the EIB experience and expertise with respect to financial instruments is also underlined in this respect.</p> <p>In this respect the report also notes (pp. 51-52): The mandate of the EIB allows it to use its own resources only for loans. As explained in the Inventory Note, the grant money provided by the Commission (from its Budget and the EU MS’ EDF) was used to offer additional funding modalities, more attractive conditions, and resources in operations too risky for traditional financing. For the interest rate subsidies and TA related to EIB loans, and for the risk capital operations – all managed by the EIB –, the Commission and the EIB joined forces to provide the regional agreements for the MEDA and ACP countries with a comprehensive array of EC long-term financial solutions, at conditions more favourable than those of the market but not market distorting. It permitted a more flexible and comprehensive response to partner countries’ needs than Commission grants or EIB loans alone could have provided.</p> <p>The expertise and experience that was offered by the EIB for the provision of these instruments was widely recognised and related to the following, which are directly related to the institution’s banking activities:</p>

	<p style="text-align: center;">▪ Financial instruments</p> <p>Management of financial products and complex financing structures. This was particularly the case for instruments generating reflows such as loans and risk capital operations. Commission staff reported for instance that the Commission itself had managed risk capital operations in the past, but that it had proved more efficient for the EIB to do it. Regarding TA on EIB loans, despite the EIB's limited experience with managing TA prior to the creation of the FEMIP Support Fund, interviewees recognise that the EIB was in the best position to identify and manage the TA necessary for the loans it provided, albeit with support from the Commission in one reported case⁸. The same is true for the Commission's contribution to the HIPC Initiative <i>as a creditor</i> through the EIB HIPC Fund; the claims under consideration were special loans and risk credits which had been granted by the Community through the EIB.</p> <p>Specific benefits of EIB loans. These include very long maturities often not readily available in third countries; fund-raising and lending capacity in local currency for some countries, which appear to have contributed to the development of local capital and financial markets; and competitive standard interest rates owing to its triple-A rating on international capital markets⁹.</p> <p>Flexibility in the management of some instruments, in particular for risk capital.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">▪ Operational management</p> <p>Thorough technical-economic competence, for instance with regard to reviews of environmental studies.</p> <p>Involvement in projects at an early stage and assisting with project preparation and implementation (particularly public sector promoters).</p> <p>Rigorous appraisal of project conditionality, notably ensuring the application of EU environmental and procurement standards¹⁰.</p> <p>Project management and expertise, which has even increased according to a Commission interviewee, owing to more staff and the use of EU-funded TA.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Sectors: EIB expertise lay in particular in the – public as well as private – sectors of "viable infrastructure", environment and Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs), where it sought to pass on to project promoters its technical and economic know-how. - Risk assessment: the EIB has decades-long experience in the MEDA and ACP regions, including risk capital operations and interest subsidies, resulting in knowledge of local actors and national authorities. This proved an essential factor in assessing the national and sector environment in which particular investments are funded and in assessing
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⁸ A large TA for an EIB loan for the rehabilitation of hospitals in Morocco (*see 3.5.1*).

⁹ On the latter it should be noted that the attractiveness of the EIB's interest rates has declined over the last years in some countries such as Morocco, at least in the more profitable sectors, owing to the increased liquidity of their financing markets and the subsidised interest rates offered by a number of development banks.

¹⁰ EIB project conditions also cover other important issues such as pricing and tariff policies, improvements in management capacity, cessation of non-profitable activities, productivity targets and asset disposal, and so on. But the EIB is said to look primarily at project conditions and only to a limited extent at sector, development or other conditions.

	<p>the risks involved in these operations. A number of external representation offices were also created¹¹. But projects remain generally managed from EIB HQs.</p>
<p>CDE (2011)</p>	<p>As detailed under JC 2.4, the CDE evaluation concludes in summary on CDE value-added (in Conclusion 3) that “<i>to its funders (mainly EU MS through the EDF), IFIs and other partners, its value added was low</i>”, owing mainly to CDE’s lack of strategic approach and its high cost of operations in managing programmes on behalf of third parties.</p> <p>It provides hereby the following details:</p> <p><i>“Value added for the funders of the CDE: EU MS through the EDF</i></p> <p><i>C7.2 For the funders of the CDE, the value added of CDE support has been limited by the lack of CDE strategic approach (see conclusion 11) and its high cost of operations.</i></p> <p><i>For the EU MS, the potential value added of the CDE resides in its capacity to:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>identify the priority needs of the private sector; and</i> ▪ <i>use efficiently the EDF subsidy to respond to private sector needs in such a way as to complement and support the overall EDF programmes as prepared and managed by the Commission.</i> <p><i>The record of the CDE has been mixed: although it has demonstrated that its demand-driven approach has undoubtedly permitted it to address the needs expressed by beneficiaries, a number of issues are of concern:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>from the field visits, there was little evidence that CDE’s knowledge of the situation of the private sector served as an important input in the programming of the Commission’s assistance.</i> ▪ <i>The CDE being an institution created under Cotonou dealing with private sector development, there was a potential for complementarities with Commission programmes and EIB operations. However, synergies remained underexploited over the evaluation period, implying that the potential of the whole EU family had not been fully achieved.</i> ▪ <i>Finally, CDE activities have been professional and useful for the beneficiaries but have been provided at an extremely high management cost for the EDF, owing to the heavy permanent structure involved.</i> <p><i>Value added for partner institutions (e.g. IFIs, regional organisations, other donors, ACP partner governments)</i></p> <p><i>For the partners, the value added of the CDE contribution has lain more in its complementarities with them and in its capacity to transfer professional know how than in its cost-effectiveness in managing programmes on behalf of third parties.</i></p> <p><i>For the partner institutions the added value of the CDE has lain in:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>the complementarities of the CDE with their own specific characteristics that allows them to better fulfil their mandate by using the CDE to provide services they cannot offer themselves;</i> ▪ <i>its accumulated knowledge of private sector problems at enterprise level and the experience it has built up in identifying and mobilising adequate professional expertise;</i> ▪ <i>its capacity to manage their programmes swiftly and efficiently.</i>

¹¹ To facilitate enhanced coordination with local public authorities, borrowers, the banking sector and lenders, and to improve identification and monitoring of projects, the EIB has opened small external representation offices: Rabat, Cairo, and Tunis in the Mediterranean; and Nairobi, Dakar, Pretoria, Fort-de-France, and Sydney for ACP countries.

	<p><i>The cooperation with the EIB illustrates the first point. There are clear potential complementarities between the CDE and the EIB, the CDE providing non-financial assistance to financial intermediaries benefiting from EIB global loans and to SMEs to help them access this source of finance. While the two institutions have cooperated in the past, there was no concrete collaboration between them during the evaluation period at HQ or in the field, although there have been increased contacts since 2010. They signed two conventions in 2011 (one for the Pacific and the other for the Caribbean) which envisage management by the CDE of the EIB-financed TA to financial intermediaries.</i></p> <p><i>The second and third points are deeply inter-related. Partners who use the CDE to implement their PSDP and other programmes expect the institution both to provide adequate professional expertise and to administer their programmes in a swift and cost-efficient manner. Specifically:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>Despite the fact that the CDE had a good record when it came to transferring professional know-how, its high running costs and deficiencies in reporting its performance have made it difficult for the partners to perceive the value added of the CDE prior to its restructuring.</i> ▪ <i>Hence, although potential complementarities were recognized by the partners, their interaction with the CDE remained minimal during the evaluation period. The 2010 strategic redirection and re-focus by the CDE on the management of programmes for third parties has again raised the possibility of achieving synergies with partners. A number of agreements have been concluded between the CDE and partners (the PSDP DR Congo materialised in 2010 and the WAEMU PSDP was signed in 2011). However, so far it has not been clear how the CDE plans to adapt its processes and organisational modalities to the role of “programme management”.</i> <p><i>At the same time the restructuring of the CDE has also led to the reduction of in-house expertise. If the CDE does not take sufficiently into consideration the necessity of maintaining and expanding its in-house (or closely associated) professional expertise there is a risk that its potential value added to the partner institution may become negligible.”</i></p> <p><i>Source: ADE (for the European Commission), Evaluation of the Centre for the Development of Enterprise, 2011 (pages 77-79)</i></p> <p>Besides, the CDE evaluation concludes that the enlargement of the mandate of the CDE in 2010 to include promotion of business environment reforms is not adequately matched by CDE's resources and skills. Two reasons are provided: “This is due to two main reasons: (1) in the light of the limitations in the CDE's resources and considering that the mandate of the CDE prior to the 2010 revision of the Agreement was already vast, it does not seem realistic to expect that the CDE will make significant achievements in this domain; (2) additionally, the business environment area is not part of the core business of the CDE, which does not have specific internal capabilities in this field; moreover, historically government bodies, who are the main actors capable of enabling the business environment, have not been the key interlocutors of the CDE.”</p> <p><i>Source: ADE (for the European Commission), Evaluation of the Centre for the Development of Enterprise, 2011 (page v)</i></p>
<p>Findings at JC level - Banking Measures in the Mediterranean area</p>	<p>Not applicable. The three banking measures looked at exist at the regional level (Mediterranean region).</p>
<p>Employment and social inclusion, over</p>	<p>The evaluation reports that “EUDs officials and NCs consider, with the exception of Asia, project aid as the most effective aid modality for achieving results in ESI-related issues. This is probably due to the persisting difficulty of tailoring specific</p>

1999-2008	<i>budget support interventions to ESI objectives and identifying specific conditionalities and targets</i> ". (p.97).
JC 3.2	<i>When designing its support for partner country PSD strategies and activities in specific countries or regions, the Commission's choice of funding vehicles or aid modalities was geared towards the specificity of challenges, the expected efficiency and the potential synergies with other vehicles or modalities</i>
I-3.2.1 Justification of the choice of instruments in strategy and programming documents at country/regional level	
I-3.2.2 Justification of the choice provided by Commission representatives	
Findings at JC level - Tunisia Evaluation	No information on the design stage of the GBSs with PSD components. For information on their implementation, see JC 3.4 .
Findings at JC level – Moldova Evaluation	No information.
Findings at JC level – El Salvador Evaluation	<p>FOMYPE was a programme and as such followed the project-level approach. The evaluation doesn't give any information on the choice of the instrument/aid modality. It reiterates the aims of the programme which were: strengthening MSE's productivity and competitiveness in El Salvador through a three-tier intervention: a) policy and legal framework development (macro level); b) capacity building of the main public and private providers of technical and financial Business Development Services (BDS) (meso level); and c) provision of better, diversified and geographically more accessible BDS to the Salvadorian Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSME) (micro level). (p.37).</p> <p>The evaluation adds that budget support was not adequate to support MSEs considering the absence of a sectoral strategy: "<i>Budget support was not an option for the interventions funded before the PAPEES, given the absence of a GoES poverty reduction strategy before 2005 (see I-5.1.3 in Annexe 9) and additionally of an eligible sector strategy (not existing in the field of MSEs for instance).</i>" (p. 46).</p> <p>The evaluation reports that a sector budget support programme, in the field of PSD and more specifically in the field of quality and metrology was under preparation at the time of the report: PROCALIDAD: €12.1m in support of the "Programa de Fortalecimiento del Sistema Nacional de Calidad en El Salvador", as some conditions remained unfulfilled (p.37).</p>
Findings at JC level Burkina Faso (1999-2008)	<p>The Commission used a "project approach" for PSD in Burkina Faso, there is evidence that it chose this instrument because the government does not yet possess a sectoral policy. The Evaluation Report concludes and recommends in this respect:</p> <p><i>CCL : « Les difficultés de passage d'une approche « projet » classique à une approche sectorielle, financée ou non par de l'ABS, sont également observées dans les appuis de l'UE au secteur privé et au secteur « culture ». Ces difficultés ne sont néanmoins pas insurmontables et pourraient significativement s'estomper grâce à une amélioration du dialogue sectoriel et à une meilleure</i></p>

	<p><i>définition du rôle de l'Etat dans le cadre de ce type de transition. » p.4</i></p> <p><i>REC : « Utiliser les approches « projets » pour préparer les conditions de mise en place d'un ABS et lever les contraintes sectorielles spécifiques qui retardent l'utilisation de l'ABS (faiblesse de la gouvernance sectorielle (transport), blocage du dialogue sectoriel (culture), absence de stratégie sectorielle appropriée (secteur privé), etc..) » p.5</i></p>
Guyana (1997-2007)	<p>The Commission used non-programmable support (SYSMIN) to fund its PSD but the rationale behind this decision is not given.</p> <p><i>“The Commission has to some extent taken into account the resources potentially available under non-programmable support (namely SYSMIN, Budget Lines and the RIP) in the design of its NIP/CSP”p.64</i></p>
Findings at JC level – Microfinance	<p>No discussion of the instruments/modalities used by the Commission to support microfinance is presented in the programming documentation of the EU/ACP Microfinance Programme.</p>
Findings at JC level - BizClim	<p>The evaluation suggests that the BizClim programme design process took account of the potential for coherence with other EC activities, and took account of lessons learned from other donor experience:</p> <p><i>« The programme design has taken stock of the evaluation of the former programme DIAGNOS, of the new framework represented by the Cotonou Agreement and the evolving world economic order as well as of other donor experiences, as gathered in the White & Chacaltana paper of 2002 and White paper of 2004 prepared in the framework of the activities of the DC.</i></p> <p><i>Furthermore, the Facility has played a facilitating role vis-à-vis other private sector programmes like the Investment Facility, the EU/ACP Microfinance Programme, TradeCom and PROINVEST, developing synergies with them. »</i></p> <p><i>Source: EC, Final Evaluation Private Sector Enabling Environment Facility, p45</i></p>
Findings at JC level MEDA II	<p>Most interventions have been prepared through studies, joint seminars and workshops; budget support interventions, particularly those addressing structural reforms and reform of the public finance systems, benefited from deeper and continued analysis during the implementation process. (p32)</p> <p>In PSD, a distinction must be made between BS interventions, mainly designed to support systemic macro-economic or sector reforms, and other programmes and projects generally targeted more on specific capacity-building. (p42)</p> <p>However, there is often insufficient explanation of the rationale underlying the choice of instruments (BS, TA,...). (pv)</p> <p>A major proportion of the resources provided in MEDAII (€1.99bn) has been dedicated to systemic economic reforms (Tunisia, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco) with a view to improving <i>the legal and regulatory environment of business and trade activities</i>. These interventions have been carefully tuned to the specific country specifications, their priorities and their capacity to implement the reforms. Budget support has been the preferred mode of intervention but programmes to support implementation of the Association Agreements, including twinning activities, and some specific components of large TA programmes have also pursued this goal. In countries where such systemic reforms could not be considered, the effort was concentrated on specific sector reforms (social sectors, trade and private sector development, water, trade, transport) with BS and TA. (p39)</p> <p>Unfortunately, private sector operators were not sufficiently associated in the</p>

	design of some systemic interventions targeted at improving the business environment. (p102)
Egypt 98-08	<p>The increasing importance of the use of SBS (Sector Budget Support) as a financing modality over the period espoused the GoE's policy shift towards economic reforms accompanied by sector policy dialogue from 2004 onwards and responded to the finding that projects relying on parallel management structures were not successful agents of change.</p> <p>Existing or nascent reform programmes and the GoE's openness to discuss them eased the way for policy-linked SBS (triggers for disbursement have been mostly policy-based process indicators) and make ownership and sustainability of these reforms more likely. (p55)</p> <p>During the period 1998-2008, financing modalities and amounts were decided by the Commission's headquarters at a very early stage of the programming exercise and the process by which they were arrived at was not based on an explicit argumentation; the GoE had little influence over these decisions. Implementation mechanisms were decided upon during project formulation as a result of context analysis and discussions with the main stakeholders; the GoE had an increasing role to play in decision making at this level. (p67)</p> <p>More efforts should be spent at the identification and formulation phases to determine the most appropriate implementation and financing modalities for each intervention such as to adapt to the context whilst giving the intervention the best chance of reaching its objectives by using the most appropriate intervention modalities. In this regard the analysis of sector's institutional, operational, policy and budgeting frameworks are essential. (p102)</p> <p>New (and older) instruments such as sector budget support, twinning, technical assistance and NIF should be better explained to Egyptian counterparts so that they know what advantages these different financing modalities offer and what constraints or obligations they entail. (p104)</p>
EIB IF/OR (2010)	See J.C. 2.5: The EIB IF/OR (2010) evaluation considers that the EIB and the Commission often operated on parallel tracks for their support.
Channeling DBs and EIB (2008)	See above: the channeling through the EIB precisely aimed at valorizing potential synergies with other instruments/modalities.
CDE (2011)	<p>The CDE evaluation concludes (Conclusion 12) that there are issues related to the extent to which the priority needs of the private sector have been addressed at sector or country levels :</p> <p><i>"The CDE generally responded adequately to the needs expressed by the beneficiaries but this did not guarantee that the priority needs of the private sector at sector and country levels were addressed. CDE services were provided on a demand-led basis and the CDE then often helped beneficiaries to adapt their demand to their needs. However, there are issues related to the extent to which the priority needs of the private sector have been addressed. In particular (i) responding to a demand from the beneficiaries did not guarantee that the real priority needs at sector or country levels were addressed; (ii) ad hoc support, based on a "first come, first served" principle, similarly did not guarantee that priority needs at sector or country levels were addressed; (iii) where the CDE did not have a RFO [Regional Field Office], interviewees generally stressed that the CDE was not proactive enough in identifying the constraints faced by the enterprises."</i></p> <p><i>Source: ADE (for the European Commission), Evaluation of the Centre for the Development of Enterprise, 2011 (page v).</i></p>

	<p>The CDE evaluation also states that opportunities of synergies with the Commission remained underexploited and that EC-CDE contacts at country level varied (in the response to EQ 1):</p> <p><i>“The CDE made policy commitments favouring synergies with Commission programmes with a view to achieving maximum coherent impact with its limited resources. Overall, its support was in line with the Commission private sector development policies but actual complementarities with Commission programmes have been rare. Contacts between the staff of the RFO [Regional Field Offices] and of the EUD varied according to the country and to timing, with a net improvement in 2010-2011.”</i></p> <p><i>Source: ADE (for the European Commission), Evaluation of the Centre for the Development of Enterprise, 2011 (p22)</i></p>
<p>Banking Measures in the Mediterranean area</p>	<p>The three banking measures looked at in the report are:</p> <p><i>“financed under the MEDA regulations or the previous protocols from the EU budget and implemented by the European Investment Bank (EIB): technical assistance through the FEMIP Support Fund, interest rate subsidies for certain EIB loans and risk capital operations”</i> (summary, p.1).</p> <p>As such, they contribute to the objectives of the MEDA instrument: <i>“Council Regulation (EC) 1488/962 provided a new framework for financial and technical measures (MEDA). Its aim was to accompany the reform of economic and social structures in the partner countries. The purpose of the MEDA regulations was to contribute to initiatives of joint interest in the three sectors of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>the reinforcement of political stability and democracy;</i> ▪ <i>the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean free- trade area;</i> and ▪ <i>the development of economic and social cooperation, taking due account of the human and cultural dimensions.”</i> (p. 8). <p>They are part of the FEMIP instrument, which: <i>“Since October 2002, all EIB operations in the Mediterranean region have been brought together under the facility for Euro-Mediterranean investment and partnership (FEMIP), which was set up following a decision of the European Council in Barcelona. The objective was to provide a new impetus to the economic development of the Mediterranean region by improving financial and economic cooperation”. (p.10).</i></p>
<p>Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008</p>	<p>No information.</p>
<p>JC 3.3</p>	<p><i>The level at which the Commission intervened (national, regional, supra-regional) was appropriate to meet the specific challenges in terms of PSD</i></p>
<p>I-3.3.1</p> <p>Strategy and programming documents show evidence that the intervention level was selected on the basis of a consideration of the challenges being addressed.</p> <p>I-3.3.2</p> <p>Stakeholders consider that the selection of intervention levels made by the Commission across the board of its PSD interventions, has been appropriate to the challenges being addressed</p> <p>I-3.3.3</p> <p>Stakeholders consider that the selection of intervention levels made by the Commission has enabled synergies and cross-fertilisation to develop between countries and regions.</p>	

Findings at JC level - Tunisia Evaluation	The GBSs with PSD components all targeted the national level.
Findings at JC level – Moldova Evaluation	No information.
Findings at JC level – El Salvador Evaluation	The evaluation only reports that under FOMYPE, an aim was to provide better, diversified and geographically more accessible BDS to the Salvadorian Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSME) (p.37).
Findings at JC level Burkina Faso (1999-2008)	Only evidence of potential synergy between national level PSD intervention and a regional level one. Commission's intervention supported notably the creation of CGAs (Centre de gestion agréé) in Burkina Faso <i>« Il faut noter par ailleurs un projet régional, financé par la facilité « ProInvest » devrait permettre de structurer les CGA sur un plan régional. » p.73</i>
Guyana (1997-2007)	Intervention level not well chosen considering objectives of Commission's strategy. The Evaluation Report notes that the impact of Commission's support to strengthen Guyana's productive capacity is negligible because of its modest budget but also because of its limited geographical coverage: <i>“The limited geographical scope of the programme automatically reduces the impact of the programme at national level.” p.42.</i>
Findings at JC level - Microfinance	The EU/ACP Microfinance Programme was a centralised operation funded from the intra-ACP envelope. The use of a centralised operation as opposed to separate interventions at the national or regional level was not justified in terms of PSD needs in the programme documentation. The Final Evaluation noted, however, that the use of a “microfinance-dedicated centralised flagship programme made sense for contributing directly or indirectly to the wider microfinance community knowledge and practices beyond direct beneficiaries, and for strengthening both EC capacity and image in microfinance.” <i>Source: EC, EU/ACP Microfinance Programme Final Evaluation</i>
Findings at JC level - BizClim	BizClim was designed as an all ACP intervention. The final evaluation points out that this was inherent in its design, focusing on needs as identified by the ACP group of states. As such, the all ACP level of intervention can be said to have met the needs identified. The final evaluation, without passing judgement on the appropriateness of this level of intervention, makes the following remarks: <i>« The basic idea was to combine a core group of experts with a pool of consultants in undertaking studies and interventions based mainly on demand from the ACP governments and private sector institutions. Such interventions were to be primarily aimed at addressing, at global, regional and country level, the needs identified by the EU and by the ACP Group of States. In the text of the FA it was acknowledged that, during the 9th EDF, the EC envisaged concentrating the respective National and Regional Indicative Programmes (NIPs and RIPs) primarily on social sectors and physical infrastructure. Consequently, PSD could not be expected to be a focal sector in many NIPs and RIPs but rather constitute a cross-cutting concern. It was therefore important that relevant private sector initiatives were put in place at an all-ACP level, to make sure that those options clearly expressed in the Cotonou Agreement for PSD were duly taken on board. Bearing in mind the potential role of the private sector as a vehicle for poverty reduction outlined in the EU Communications from 19981, 20002, and 20033, its role was expected to be more</i>

	<p><i>dominant as a consequence of annual country reviews. »</i></p> <p><i>Source: EC, Final Evaluation Private Sector Enabling Environment Facility, p.9</i></p>
<p>Findings at JC level</p> <p>MEDA II</p>	<p>Regional interventions suffered from insufficient ownership in the countries in which they were implemented due to the fact that they were not directly addressing national issues. (piv)</p> <p>The regional programmes faced severe difficulties linked to the political situation and regional tensions (Israel-Palestinian conflict, 11 September 2011, occupation of Irak, political Islamic movements, political extremism and lately the Arab Spring) and were therefore oriented to maintaining and stimulating a dialogue and establishing networks between the MPC and with the EU. (piï)</p> <p>This approach could not resolve major regional constraints but contributed to building the prerequisites for the more strategic and focused regional cooperation set out in the 2007-2010 regional programme. (p91)</p> <p>Economic integration among the South Mediterranean countries is among the lowest in the world. The complementarities between the economies are limited reflecting an insufficient diversification of the productive base, particularly in the oil and gas exporting countries, differences in economic regimes and the very wide spread in the GDP per capita levels. (p17)</p>
<p>Egypt 98-08</p>	<p>Complementarities with regional interventions were increasingly mentioned in strategy documents at bilateral level (CSPs), but the NIPs generally did not envisage these complementarities. Regional strategy and programming documents (RSPs and RIPs) more systematically referred to bilateral programmes and to potential complementarities with them. However, they did not identify precisely which bilateral intervention should support the regional intervention and vice versa. At intervention-specific level, complementarities between bilateral and regional interventions were generally not envisaged and did not occur either during implementation.. (p25)</p>
<p>EIB IF/OR (2010)</p>	<p>n.a.</p>
<p>Channeling DBs and EIB (2008)</p>	<p>n.a.</p>
<p>CDE (2011)</p>	<p>The CDE evaluation concludes (Conclusion 8) that the partial decentralization of the CDE has not yet reached its full potential: <i>“Decentralisation has so far improved the CDE’s visibility and its proximity to the local stakeholders; however its full potential benefits have been hampered by the limited decision-making capacity of the RFOs [Regional Field Offices] and the difficulty of increasing their outreach in countries other than where they are located.”</i></p> <p>The following details are provided:</p> <p><i>“Decentralisation, with a view to increasing proximity with local enterprises and private stakeholders has taken place with the development and expansion of Regional Field Offices. Indeed, in line with option 2 of the 2007 study “Analysis of the mandate, positioning and structures for a new CDE”, the CDE enhanced its decentralisation process over the period with the expansion of Regional Field Offices from four in 2005 to six in 2010. Decentralisation has had favourable effects, mostly in the countries where the RFOs are located, in terms of visibility of the CDE to the enterprises and the authorities and of contacts with other donors in the field. But these benefits have also been reduced by a number of factors:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>The RFOs have had limited decision-making capacity and their resources have been based on an administrative allocation decided at HQ level and not on an analysis of their needs</i>

	<p>or of their past performance. Important decisions regarding procurement - even for contracts of a relatively small amount - and approvals of activities have to be made at HQ level. This often reduced the flexibility of the RFOs and created delays.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Among the beneficiaries and the partner authorities there has been confusion regarding the roles and specificities of the RFOs and the TIOs. ▪ The development of RFOs has been paralleled by a weakening of the network of TIOs that was essential to identification of needs and activities.” <p>Source: ADE (for the European Commission), Evaluation of the Centre for the Development of Enterprise, 2011 (p84)</p>
Banking Measures in the Mediterranean area	No information.
Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008	No information.
JC 3.4	<i>The implementation showed that funding vehicles or aid modalities were appropriate to tackle challenges and to do so efficiently and in synergy with other vehicles</i>
I-3.4.1	Evidence provided in reports on the support concerning the appropriateness of instruments/modalities, their efficiency and synergies with other instruments/modalities
I-3.4.2	Stakeholders consider that instruments (specific instruments and/or the set of instruments) were appropriate and enhanced efficiency and synergies
Findings at JC level - Tunisia Evaluation	<p>The evaluation reports that the GBSs implemented in Tunisia were part of, what the evaluation calls, a « cluster approach » whereby they were supported by other PSD programmes/instruments running in parallel, which together produced synergy effects. « <i>La cohérence interne et la complémentarité des AB et des autres programmes de la CE (CJ232). Une approche cluster</i> (*L'expression « approche cluster » est utilisée ici de manière générique pour désigner la combinaison de différents instruments d'aide relativement indépendants produisant un effet synergétique. Par rapport à l'approche sectorielle, cette expression désigne plutôt la complémentarité d'actions différentes gérées par un ou plusieurs bailleurs de fonds, même dans des secteurs différents) <i>entre les programmes d'AB et les autres programmes de la CE est évidente. [...]. Dans le macro-secteur „environnement des affaires et développement du secteur privé’ la CE a financé 7 interventions pour un total d'environ 140,5 millions d'Euro (ou 8 interventions pour 170,5 M€, BEI incluse), soit 14,5% du montant total alloué.</i> », p.30.</p> <p>On the effectiveness of the GBSs, the evaluation reports significant contributions: « <i>L'évaluation a montré un lien très fort entre les réformes réalisées par le gouvernement et les résultats de développement atteints par le pays (STEP 2). D'autre part, elle a montré le lien important entre l'appui budgétaire et la qualité des réformes en question (STEP 1). Il a été donc possible de démontrer un lien significatif entre l'appui budgétaire et les résultats de développement (STEP 3).</i> » p. x.</p> <p>The technical assistance projects which ran prior the GBSs or in parallel also</p>

contributed to the synergy effects reported by the evaluation : « **L'AT aide à formuler et à suivre les réformes et favorise le dialogue (CJ 142-CJ 221).**

L'AT ne fait pas directement partie des programmes d'aide budgétaire générale évalués. Toutefois, plusieurs activités d'AT et/ou d'études économiques et sectorielles menées en parallèle ou en amont des programmes d'ABG ont permis d'approfondir l'analyse économique, ont contribué au bon ciblage des réformes et ont fourni une base de référence pour la définition des mesures spécifiques des matrices de conditionnalités.[...] la CE a utilisé l'expertise mobilisée dans les projets d'appui à la compétitivité des banques et des assurances pour la mise au point des conditionnalités spécifiques de la FAS III. De même, une étude financée par la CE sur les privatisations dans le cadre du PATP a été utilisée pour la mise au point des stratégies et des conditionnalités des FAS », p. 27.

Finally participating in GBSs with other donors has increased leverage as coordinated action has further pressed the government to act on the pledged reforms : « *La coordination, l'harmonisation entre les partenaires internationaux et l'approche sectorielle (CJ231) ; Les programmes d'ABG pris en compte (les seuls qui sont cofinancés) sont marqués par un niveau élevé d'harmonisation et de coordination parmi les bailleurs de fonds, tant dans les phases de programmation que dans les phases de suivi et de négociation ».* p. 28. « *Avec la FAS IV, les rapports de suivi qui étaient liés aux décaissements des tranches star sont issus de missions de suivi conjointes entre la Commission Européenne, la Banque Mondiale et la Banque Africaine de Développement. **L'intervention coordonnée de ces trois bailleurs de fonds importants a constitué un support à la fois politique, technique et financier qui a raffermi la volonté de réforme des autorités et les a aidé à accélérer le rythme de ces réformes.*** », p. 29.

The report adds that Budget support was appropriate and effective, notably in terms of providing a framework for dialogue, technical and financial support in support of the implementation of government strategies, framed by the AA, and which have reaped positive results (growth and well-being). « *L'appui budgétaire a fourni un cadre de dialogue, des appuis techniques et des appuis financiers qui ont renforcé la mise en oeuvre des stratégies du gouvernement. Celles-ci, profitant du cadre d'opportunités offert par l'AA, ont permis la réalisation de réformes importantes, au niveau économique et social, qui ont été à la base des succès en matière de croissance économique et de bien-être social enregistrés par le pays ».* p.x.

The framework for political dialogue between Tunisia and the EU provided by the GBSs was highlighted in particular: « *En général, l'appui budgétaire s'est inséré dans le contexte de l'AA, **contribuant à l'établissement d'un cadre de dialogue complexe et intégré entre la Tunisie et l'UE (C1.5)*** », p.xi. and « *L'ampleur et l'articulation du cadre de dialogue politique et sur les politiques, dans lequel les programmes d'AB s'insèrent et auquel ils contribuent, représentent une des caractéristiques spécifiques de l'AB en Tunisie et, plus en général, dans la région (CJ113).* ». p.20.

In the end, the evaluation reports that the combination of instruments resulted in significant effects in PSD « *Le dialogue, les conditionnalités et des études ciblées ont fourni des contributions significatives : pour le démantèlement des monopoles d'importation ; l'allègement des autorisations administratives des entreprises ; l'amélioration du droit des sociétés. Et des contributions déterminantes : pour la restructuration et l'assainissement du secteur financier; les privatisations ; la libéralisation et la privatisation des TIC (y compris le GSM). CONTRIBUTION DIRECTE : très forte en coopération avec les cofinanciers, particulièrement dans le secteur financier, moyenne sur l'environnement des affaires ».* p. 79.

As regards synergies between the Commission's support and other donors, the GBSs with PSD components looked at in the evaluation were co-funded (FAS I;

	<p>1996: with WB; FAS II; 1999 with WB and ADB; FAS-III; 2002 with WB and ADB; FAS IV; 2005. with WB and ADB). The evaluation reports that the design, negotiation, monitoring and disbursements of the GBSs were characterized by a high level of coordination amongst the participating donors. It also reports that this coordinated approach amongst the participating donors gave a clear signal to the national authorities and prompted the push ahead with the reforms: « La coordination, l'harmonisation entre les partenaires internationaux et l'approche sectorielle (CJ231); <i>Les programmes d'ABG pris en compte (les seuls qui sont cofinancés) sont marqués par un niveau élevé d'harmonisation et de coordination parmi les bailleurs de fonds, tant dans les phases de programmation que dans les phases de suivi et de négociation</i> ». p. 28. « <i>Avec la FAS IV, les rapports de suivi qui étaient liés aux décaissements des tranches star sont issus de missions de suivi conjointes entre la Commission Européenne, la Banque Mondiale et la Banque Africaine de Développement. L'intervention coordonnée de ces trois bailleurs de fonds importants a constitué un support à la fois politique, technique et financier qui a raffermi la volonté de réforme des autorités et les a aidé à accélérer le rythme de ces réformes.</i> », p. 29.</p>
Findings at JC level – Moldova Evaluation	<p>The evaluation reports on the overall efficiency of the SME projects supported, rather than on the efficiency of the combination of instruments:</p> <p>They were not very efficient: “<i>In other areas, such as trade and SME development, the situation is the reverse – large sums were expended, but little tangible impact was evident.</i>” p. 112. Most of the impact was made possible due to changes in the ToRs: “<i>Much of the most valuable impact of the “Support to SMEs” project, TA at the Ministry level, was made possible only by an adjustment to the project’s Terms of Reference late in the project cycle</i>”.p.92.</p>
Findings at JC level – El Salvador Evaluation	<p>No further information on instruments and aid modalities, specific to PSD assistance, than that under JC 3.2.</p>
Findings at JC level Guyana (1997-2007)	<p>No mention of appropriateness and efficiency but of synergies:</p> <p>“<i>Non-programmable instruments complemented the Commission interventions implemented through the programmable envelope, mainly in the areas of private sector and budgetary support</i>” p.16</p>
Findings at JC level - Microfinance	<p>The EU/ACP Microfinance Programme was, as noted under JC3.3 above, a centralised ACP-wide operation. The use of this instrument was said to have hampered, to some extent, synergies and coherence with other EC interventions in microfinance, as noted by the Final Evaluation:</p> <p>“<i>this centralized programme was however repeatedly confronted with challenges relating to coherence with EC national/regional cooperation strategies, lack of synergies with other EC interventions, and EU Delegation capacity for follow-up.</i>”</p> <p><i>Source: EC, EU/ACP Microfinance Programme Final Evaluation, p.ii</i></p>
Findings at JC level - BizClim	<p>The Final evaluation of BizClim concluded that the instrument allowed for adequate coordination and synergies with other donors:</p> <p>« <i>17.Regarding mutual reinforcement (coherence), activities undertaken by BizClim were intended to play a facilitating role vis-à-vis other intra-ACP PSD-support programmes like the EIB Investment Facility, the EU-ACP Microfinance Programme, Trade.com and PROINVEST, developing synergies with them. The scale of BizClim interventions was generally very small in relation to budgets for similar actions allocated through NIPs and RIPs under the 10th EDF. BizClim actions should be assessed by their capacity to trigger or facilitate full-scale actions funded under other EC instruments. For instance, for regional integration in the ECOWAS region, the 10th EDF RIP foresees funding programmes amounting to more than €100 million; the same</i></p>

	<p><i>happens in most RIPs of the ACP sub-regions and in a good number of NIPs in Africa. Clearly, BizClim also allowed the EC to achieve its development policy objectives without internal contradiction or without contradiction with other Community policies. However, it was also observed that BizClim may not have worked enough on “branding” its specific services. The programme was perceived primarily as an “extra” and quick-disbursing resource to access EC funding.</i></p> <p><i>18.Co-ordination with other donors, especially with actions carried out by EU member states, was ensured through the OECD, the Donor Committee for Small Enterprise Development and CGAP. Regular consultation and exchange of information was carried out with donors active in the area of PSD. Specifically, the €2 million contribution provided by the PSEEF, the source of funding of BizClim, to the Knowledge for Change Programme (KCP) and to the Public Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPLAF) was aimed at ensuring complementarity, coordination and synergies with other efforts by EU Member States. »</i></p> <p><i>Source: EC, Final Evaluation Private Sector Enabling Environment Facility,p.6</i></p>
<p>Findings at JC level MEDA II</p>	<p>Commission interventions in the economic and social sectors generally supported reforms that produced tangible advances. The increased international credibility and access to financial markets, improved professional know-how, introduction of good practices in the management of public administrative bodies and better macro-economic governance are some illustrations. These positive results benefit both directly and indirectly economic operators and the population segments that make use of improved public services. (p95)</p> <p>In terms of trade however the region remains one of the least integrated in the world; its international trade is progressing but more with the rest of the world than with the EU, and a majority of MPC are losing international market shares. The main explanatory factors behind these trends are the lack of export diversification of many MPC economies and, therefore, the absence of complementarity between their economies, and a slow pace of economic and political reforms that limited their competitiveness. (p38)</p> <p>Many useful reforms have been stimulated and accelerated; most programmes have delivered their expected outputs with substantial advantages for the direct beneficiaries. Positive moves have been observed in all MPC in terms of economic stability, competitiveness and trade. (p38)</p> <p>But the rationale behind the use of instruments was neither always clear nor consistent across countries of intervention. The problem arises mostly with the use of BS versus TA and the use of loans and grants for infrastructure and support to private sector development. (p108)</p> <p>Due to the complexity of the reforms supported, to the time needed to achieve their outcomes, and to the difficulty of attributing these outcomes to Commission support, the monitoring of BS interventions was based on the verification of the adoption of the reforms rather than on their results. But there are examples of several interventions pointing in the good direction (e.g. : (i) the support provided to the macro-economic policy in Tunisia <i>via</i> the successive SAF and, particularly, the SAF IV ; (ii) the combined support of the TEP A, B and C interventions in Egypt has produced effective results in terms of trade facilitation and working of the Customs services ; (iii) activities to support export oriented SMEs (for example the SEBC programme in Syria, components of TEP A in Egypt, integrated SME support programme in Lebanon). (p42)</p>

	<p>BS interventions also favoured continuous involvement of both donors and partners and induced a policy dialogue on the reforms supported. They reinforced the capacity of the institutions supported, thereby allowing them to use and benefit from the management and evaluation tools introduced.</p> <p>However, the sustainability of the policies supported by BS interventions will depend on their acceptability by the population. The elements of fragility of specific MPC economies threaten the political acceptability of the government development model if welfare conditions cannot be maintained (e.g. Tunisia). (p71)</p> <p>No general conclusion can be drawn for TA and twinning projects and programmes but most interventions analysed point to satisfactory delivery of expected outputs, although with no clear evidence on the outcomes. (p43)</p> <p>In countries where TA and BS modalities are available, large sector interventions have been supported with one or the other without demonstration that they were the most suitable. For instance, in Egypt it is not clear why in two parallel interventions in support of trade capacity-building, one (TEP-A) is a TA programme whereas the other (TEP-B) is a BS - and why not <i>vice versa</i> or a single BS. (p99)</p> <p>Many large traditional TA programmes proved over-dimensioned and suffered from a lack of ownership. (p51)</p> <p>Although the resources to support the Barcelona process have considerably increased under MEDA II, they remain limited compared to the magnitude of the problems to resolve. (p50)</p>
Egypt 98-08	<p>In practice the SBS funded the activities required to implement reform measures rather than supporting overall sector strategy implementation. The pre-agreed reform measures were ambitious, some unattainable in the time span given; they triggered regulatory, institutional and managerial changes but their effects upon service delivery remain unknown.</p> <p>SBS implementation has had no effect upon budgetary processes and budget management, partly because Public Finance Management (PFM) issues have only very recently been integrated into Commission's SBS programmes in Egypt but mostly because the Egyptian Government used SBS funds like project funds. The compartmentalisation of budget programming in Egypt constrains the budget arbitration process, effectively weakening the links between policy priorities and resource allocation and, by isolating the funding of reform measures from the overall expenditure allocation processes, casting doubts on the Government's political and strategic commitment to these reforms. (p55)</p> <p>Implementation mechanisms have been found relevant to project objectives except in SAAP where the use of technical assistance might have been more appropriate to the beneficiary institutions' objectives than twinning. (p67)</p> <p>The choice of financing modalities has mostly been found appropriate except for the support used to strengthen CSO and NGOs (calls for proposals). (p67)</p> <p>Interventions generally implemented their activities but the extent to which the produced deliverables contributed to the expected outcomes and impact was not monitored by the Commission which did not identify quantified targets to be reached by its interventions and focused its attention on the monitoring of project</p>

	<p>and budget support activities and deliverables. (p87)</p> <p>The efficiency of the Commission's support has been hampered by several factors:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Lead time from project identification and formulation to implementation; ▪ Overambitious objectives of some programmes; ▪ Complexity of procedures; and ▪ Weakness of human capacities and institutions. (p91) <p>When designing its sector budget support operations, the Commission has actively implicated the beneficiary institutions (even when there were many such as in the water sector) as well as other donors active in the sector in the discussion of the disbursement matrix. This proactive approach could be replicated when designing project interventions so that interventions can better respond to stakeholders concerns and needs about the sector's context, and adapt accordingly the intervention's objectives, achievable outcomes, time-frame of operations, implementable project modalities and appropriate institutional and human capacities for project implementation. (p101)</p> <p>More efforts should be spent at the identification and formulation phases to determine the most appropriate implementation and financing modalities for each intervention such as to adapt to the context whilst giving the intervention the best chance of reaching its objectives by using the most appropriate intervention modalities. In this regard the analysis of sector's institutional, operational, policy and budgeting frameworks are essential. (p102)</p>
<p>EIB IF/OR (2010)</p>	<p>n.a.</p>
<p>Channeling DBs and EIB (2008)</p>	<p>See J.C 2.5 and 2.6 that explain the synergies between Commission and EIB and show the value added in this respect.</p>
<p>CDE (2011)</p>	<p>The CDE evaluation shows that efficiency was a major issue at the CDE, in terms of inadequate internal organization (Conclusion 6), inadequate management of human resources (C7), difficulties relating to the decentralization (C8), and limitations in budget and accounting (C9).</p> <p>Those conclusions are summarised as follows:</p> <p><i>“Though important improvements have taken place, the internal organisation of the CDE has remained insufficiently directed to the achievement of the goals of the mandate. Considerable efforts made by the CDE over the last years to overcome its deficiencies and improve its functioning namely, through increased focus on programme approach, the “four pillars” certification, and the improvement of operation and administrative rules. Notwithstanding these positive changes, the organisation of the CDE remained in many aspects rather bureaucratic and procedural in a way that it constituted an impediment to a swift and flexible cooperation with private sector organisations and SMEs. Even more important, it did not give enough room to the verification that the activities pursued achieve their intended results. The financial data, although compliant with the financial regulation and submitted to regular audits, did not provide the analytical information needed to monitor the strategy and to make quick decisions when revenues and expenditures deviated from the original plans.”</i></p> <p><i>“The management of the human resources of the CDE has been too much oriented to a reduction of the ratio of operating costs to total costs rather than to adaptation of the internal organisation to the best way of fulfilling the mandate. Over the period of the evaluation the average ratio of operating costs to total costs</i></p>

	<p>was 60.7%, leaving only 39.3% for operations (these figures are respectively 56% and 44% if one excludes the years 2007 and 2009). The reduction of this excessively high ratio has been a continuous concern to CDE management and the relative shares moved from 60.8% in 2005 to 48.4% in 2010 (see annex 2). The shift in the relative shares has been obtained by reallocation to operations of savings resulting from a drastic reduction in staff numbers. In purely arithmetical terms this has increased the productivity of the CDE. However, this policy raises two main concerns: (1) the willingness to save on labour costs resulted in under-execution of the budgetary resources allocated to operating costs and (2) the composition of the staff that resulted from the restructuring was unbalanced with a relatively large number of unfilled expert (coordinator) positions and an excess of assistant and technical staff in relation to the available positions.”</p> <p>“Decentralisation has so far improved the CDE’s visibility and its proximity to the local stakeholders; however its full potential benefits have been hampered by the limited decision-making capacity of the RFOs and the difficulty of increasing their outreach in countries other than where they are located.” (see details under JC 3.3)</p> <p>“The budget and the accounting did not provide a clear view of the resources and means of the CDE in such a way as to allow an understanding of the way in which resources have been used and thereby to provide guidance on reaching the objectives. The budgets of the CDE have complied with the financial regulation of the CDE but they have not been organised so as to provide clear information on how the resources have been allocated to achieve the objectives. Such limitations imply that it is difficult - including for the management of the CDE - to have a comprehensive view of the resources mobilised by the CDE and the different types of expenditure they allow. Such information would be necessary to guide an efficient allocation of resources and to understand the real leverage of its activities. As it is, the budget and accounts are satisfactory from a formal legal perspective but they do not constitute a useful instrument to follow up the overall activity of the CDE during the budget year.”</p> <p>Source: ADE (for the European Commission), Evaluation of the Centre for the Development of Enterprise, 2011 (pages iii to v)</p> <p>With regard to synergies, as mentioned under JC 1.2, the CDE evaluation states that opportunities of synergies with the Commission remained underexploited (in the response to EQ 1):</p> <p>“The CDE made policy commitments favouring synergies with Commission programmes with a view to achieving maximum coherent impact with its limited resources. Overall, its support was in line with the Commission private sector development policies but actual complementarities with Commission programmes have been rare. Contacts between the staff of the RFO [Regional Field Offices] and of the EUD varied according to the country and to timing, with a net improvement in 2010-2011.”</p> <p>Source: ADE (for the European Commission), Evaluation of the Centre for the Development of Enterprise, 2011 (p22)</p> <p>In terms of stakeholders’ perception of the (low) CDE value-added, see JC 3.1.</p>
<p>Banking Measures in the Mediterranean area</p>	<p>No evidence of synergies. On the contrary, the report gave evidence of lack of communication between the EIB and the Commission, especially at EUD level which likely prevented potential synergies:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ “The Commission, and especially two of the EC delegations in the partner countries visited by the Court, were not sufficiently informed of EIB projects and was therefore not able to monitor or follow them. Furthermore, even when information had been transmitted by the EIB to the Commission’s central offices in Brussels, it had not always been shared with the delegations visited by the Court. The audits on the spot did, however, show that the

	<p><i>establishment of EIB representative offices had facilitated communication between the Commission and the EIB at the local level. This was especially noted in Morocco, with the organisation of regular meetings.” (.14).</i></p> <p><i>« In the case of Risk Capital Operations, the Report found that “The Commission did not set up controls in order to detect whether the same beneficiary was benefiting from different risk capital operations, either managed directly or through financial intermediaries. This was due to the absence of a central database at Commission level of all beneficiaries benefiting from risk capital operations.” (p.20).</i></p>																																																							
Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008	No information.																																																							
JC 3.5	<i>Projects were implemented in line with planning, both in terms of timeliness and costs</i>																																																							
I-3.5.1	Stakeholders consider that timing and planning do fit requirements of private sector actors																																																							
I-3.5.2	Evidence provided in reports on the extent to which planned timing and costs were respected																																																							
I-3.5.3	Views of stakeholders on the extent to which planned timing and costs were respected																																																							
I-3.5.4	Factors having enhanced or hampered the respect of planning in terms of time and costs as displayed in reports and invoked by stakeholders																																																							
Findings at JC level - Tunisia Evaluation	<p>The reports indicates that close to all GBSs with PSD components were fully disbursed, despite some occasional delays :</p> <p><i>« L’analyse des différentes catégories d’inputs prévus et fournis fait ressortir que Les fonds engagés par la CE au titre de l’appui budgétaire ont été déboursés presque intégralement et transférés à la Banque Centrale comme prévu (CJ111) ; [...] p.20. « Les montants convenus ont été décaissés parfois avec un certain retard, mais le taux de décaissement a toujours été très élevé au cours de la période considérée. Les retards ont souvent été dus à l’attente de la réalisation de l’une ou l’autre des conditionnalités », p. 26.</i></p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th>Facilité d’Ajustement Structurel I, FAS I (1996-1998)</th> <th>Facilité d’Ajustement Structurel II - FAS II (1999-2001)</th> <th>Facilité d’ajustement structurel III, FAS III (2002-2004)</th> <th>Facilité d’Ajustement Structurel IV - FAS IV (2005-2009)</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>MONTANT TOTALE ALLOUE AU PROGRAMME, dont</td> <td>100,000,000</td> <td>80,000,000</td> <td>80,000,000</td> <td>78,000,000</td> </tr> <tr> <td>DIALOGUE SUR LES POLITIQUES</td> <td>✓</td> <td>✓</td> <td>✓</td> <td>✓</td> </tr> <tr> <td>AIDE BUDGETAIRE</td> <td>✓</td> <td>✓</td> <td>✓</td> <td>✓</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Montant Aide Budgétaire alloué</td> <td>100,000,000</td> <td>80,000,000</td> <td>79,500,000</td> <td>77,750,000</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Montant Aide Budgétaire déboursé</td> <td>100,000,000</td> <td>80,000,000</td> <td>66,906,000</td> <td>77,750,000</td> </tr> <tr> <td>% Aide Budgétaire alloué/déboursé</td> <td>100.00%</td> <td>100.00%</td> <td>84.16%</td> <td>100.00%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>SUIVI & EVALUATION</td> <td>x</td> <td>x</td> <td>✓</td> <td>✓</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Montant suivi & évaluation alloué</td> <td>-</td> <td>-</td> <td>500,000</td> <td>250,000</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Montant suivi & évaluation déboursé</td> <td>-</td> <td>-</td> <td>198,470</td> <td>121,107</td> </tr> <tr> <td>% S&E alloué/déboursé</td> <td>-</td> <td>-</td> <td>39.69%</td> <td>48.44%</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>Source: Tableau 5 : Schéma des inputs prévus - et effectivement fournis, p. 20.</p>		Facilité d’Ajustement Structurel I, FAS I (1996-1998)	Facilité d’Ajustement Structurel II - FAS II (1999-2001)	Facilité d’ajustement structurel III, FAS III (2002-2004)	Facilité d’Ajustement Structurel IV - FAS IV (2005-2009)	MONTANT TOTALE ALLOUE AU PROGRAMME, dont	100,000,000	80,000,000	80,000,000	78,000,000	DIALOGUE SUR LES POLITIQUES	✓	✓	✓	✓	AIDE BUDGETAIRE	✓	✓	✓	✓	Montant Aide Budgétaire alloué	100,000,000	80,000,000	79,500,000	77,750,000	Montant Aide Budgétaire déboursé	100,000,000	80,000,000	66,906,000	77,750,000	% Aide Budgétaire alloué/déboursé	100.00%	100.00%	84.16%	100.00%	SUIVI & EVALUATION	x	x	✓	✓	Montant suivi & évaluation alloué	-	-	500,000	250,000	Montant suivi & évaluation déboursé	-	-	198,470	121,107	% S&E alloué/déboursé	-	-	39.69%	48.44%
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Findings at JC level – Moldova	No information on the level of respect of timeliness and costs.																																																							

Evaluation	
Findings at JC level – El Salvador Evaluation	<p>The report gives evidence not so much of lack of timeliness and costs but of under-achievements in view of expected results, which is linked to the efficiency question: “</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. <i>First, the programme’s capacity building activities meant to strengthen institutions in charge of BDS provision to SMEs converged mainly on 4 institutions and left aside important business and financial service providers, such as universities, Technical Assistance Fund (FAT) operators, technical institutes, non-bank financial institutions.</i> 2. <i>Second, activities mostly focused on operational capacity building such as the creation and installation of CONAMYPE’s 3 Business Development Centres, leaving aside institutional management (effectiveness, efficiency, credibility), knowledge and financial strengthening (CONAMYPE’s yearly budget is not higher than an NGO’s).</i> 3. <i>Third, institutional strengthening has been misunderstood and a great part of the capacity building funds were used to pay salaries and administrative expenditures, to the detriment of technical and knowledge capital, which explains the low level of sustainability of the intervention in the end.” (p. 38).</i> <p>The report also indicates that the beneficiary enterprises were not the ones which were initially intended to receive support, which also impacts efficiency: “<i>The lack of a precise targeting led to a contradiction between the objectives and methods of the project rather directed towards the small and medium enterprises and the supposed beneficiaries which should have been the micro enterprises.</i>” (p. 39).</p>
Findings at JC level Burkina Faso (1999-2008)	<p>The Evaluation Report states that budget support and bigger interventions have been more efficient than those financed by small project (which was the case for PSD less than €10m over both programming period):</p> <p>« Cet état de fait est révélateur d’une trop grande ambition des programmes, ou d’une inadéquation des procédures et modes de faire aux spécificités du secteur et aux modes et capacités d’appropriation de ses acteurs. Par ailleurs, il faut noter que ces programmes ne sont pas conformes aux engagements de la déclaration de Paris (2005) et à la volonté actuelle de ne plus financer des activités en dessous de 10 M €. » p.78</p>
Guyana (1997-2007)	<p>The Evaluation Report stated that (and this is also true for the PSD interventions):</p> <p>“Based on the conclusions of ROM reports and programme evaluations, it appears that most Commission programmes in Guyana suffered significant slippages in their planned implementation time schedules due to starting delays, TA problems, shortages and turnover of local staff, and difficulties in the definition of roles and responsibilities of the key stakeholders.” p.53</p>
Findings at JC level - Microfinance	<p>The EU/ACP Microfinance Programme was implemented to time and budget, with the majority of performance targets and indicators met by the Programme grantees.</p> <p>Source: EC, EU/ACP Microfinance Programme Final Evaluation</p>
Findings at JC level - BizClim	<p>« Furthermore, the impact of BizClim was good. The reconstructed log frame made the project purpose (PP) much more specific. This was defined as improved rule-based policies, legal and regulatory frameworks; improved access to finance, notably from the EIB; enhanced SOE reforms, privatizations and corporate social responsibility; and better understanding of linkages and business enabling environment issues. Most of these objectives were achieved if measured against the inputs, outputs and outcome indicators proposed in the FA. »</p> <p>Source: EC, Final Evaluation Private Sector Enabling Environment Facility, p.6</p>

	<p>« In terms of developing monitoring tools and a quality assurance system, it is important to differentiate between programme monitoring (facility performance) as outlined in the FA (and to a certain extent the contractor's offer) and the monitoring of specific sub-activities (projects) implemented under the PE. There is no doubt that the contractual obligation vis-à-vis the requirements established in the FA has been met – it is clear that the PMU proposed a reporting format in its offer and implemented the same accordingly and all intervening parties seem to have agreed at the time that it was adequate. However, it has not been possible to receive any consistent recorded qualitative review of specific projects, either from the PMU or the beneficiaries. This fact implies that there is room for improvement, as the monitoring system implemented in BizClim has not been adequate in this respect. »</p> <p>Source: EC, Final Evaluation Private Sector Enabling Environment Facility, p.5</p>
<p>Findings at JC level MEDA II</p>	<p>Compared to MEDAI, there were increased financial resources and faster disbursement in MEDA II. (p38)</p> <p>Overall there has been clear progress in formulation and swifter implementation. Compared to MEDA I, disbursement rates are considerably higher. This is evidently a result of the extensive use of BS but not exclusively so since the disbursement rates for non-BS interventions have doubled in MEDA II as compared to MEDA I. (piv)</p> <p>As for the risk capital facility managed by the EIB, the disbursement of the funds suffered from delays (because it depends on a number of factors: the capacity of the partners to meet the requirements of the EIB in terms of financial governance, the timing of their needs of the successive tranches of the capital resources, etc.).</p> <p>Interest subsidies also managed by the EIB facilitated investments in natural resources but their disbursement rate was low. (p103)</p>
<p>Egypt 98-08</p>	<p>Project/programme design were found to have at times underestimated the human resource limitations, absorption capacities and/or institutional constraints that had to be overcome to implement complex projects, resulting in slower than planned execution rates. Effectiveness was relatively protected from these effects, notably by remaining responsive to change and in particular extending implementation times beyond the initial plans. (p67)</p>
<p>EIB IF/OR (2010)</p>	<p>n.a.</p>
<p>Channeling DBs and EIB (2008)</p>	<p>The evaluation notes in this respect (p. 90) that : “Channelling through the EIB generally proved efficient in terms of time and costs throughout the whole channelling process, except for delays connected with interest rate subsidies”.</p> <p>The evaluation underlined that this was due to (p. 91):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ “relatively low EIB management fees; ▪ significantly reduced Commission management time; ▪ no reported difficulties in terms of transaction costs; ▪ EIB banking expertise and expertise. <p>In terms of time, few issues were mentioned regarding TA, but where interest rate subsidies were concerned delays were frequent. Governments indeed had difficulty in meeting rapidly the EIB conditionalities on loans, which could be even more stringent when there was a possibility of benefits from an interest rate subsidy.“</p>

<p>CDE (2011)</p>	<p>See JC 3.4 on the major efficiency issues of the CDE.</p> <p>With regard to timeliness and cost-effectiveness of the operations, the evaluation shows mixed evidence for both:</p> <p><i>“From interviews and available ex post evaluations it appears that cost-effectiveness varied widely across activities.</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>For instance, the efficiency of the SMART programme has been assessed in the ex post evaluation as poor in Southern and Western Africa but as good in the Caribbean.</i> ▪ <i>In general, for the 20 selected activities an in-depth assessment of cost-effectiveness was hampered by the absence of (i) indicators or quantitative targets introduced at design stage to measure the cost-effectiveness of the activities, (ii) monitoring of cost-effectiveness during implementation and (iii) measurement of results achieved. Field visits conducted within the framework of this evaluation allowed the team to identify several examples of return on support that justified the expenditures made by the CDE (e.g. several beneficiaries of the EEMP and Kaizen programmes). The main factors influencing efficiency positively and negatively were respectively the pro-activeness of the CDE staff in charge of selecting consultants and coordinating activities, and the CDE procedures.”</i> <p>(...)</p> <p><i>“Regarding the timeliness of implementation, there was no systematic documented planning and mixed evidence on delays in those cases where information was available.</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>Of the 20 selected activities eight were not documented in terms of the extent to which activities were implemented in line with time schedule and budget, but information was obtained during the field visits on three of them, and in sum the following situation was observed:</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ <i>No information at all: 5 activities</i> ○ <i>Conducted with delays: 7 activities</i> ○ <i>Conducted according to plan: 8 activities</i> ▪ <i>Several interviews and evaluations on the selected activities provided evidence of delays in implementation, especially in the initial phases between request and decision, and between decision and start of implementation.”</i> <p><i>Source: ADE (for the European Commission), Evaluation of the Centre for the Development of Enterprise, 2011 (pages 68-69)</i></p>
<p>Banking Measures in the Mediterranean area</p>	<p>The Court of Auditors report found regular delays in the case of “interest rate subsidies” (one of three banking measures supported by the Commission through MEDA and managed by the EIB): <i>“Projects benefiting from loans with interest rate subsidies were often subject to delays. Significant delays, up to seven years, were found in 11 out of 30 projects analysed.”</i> (p.17).</p>
<p>Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008</p>	<p>The evaluation found that: <i>“Intervention implementation was in many cases delayed for a number of reasons: lengthy procedures, cumbersome setup of the PMU, difficulties in defining the implementing counterparts, negotiation of a common set of rules, and others. Nonetheless, neither NCs from Ministries and public institutions nor EUD officials indicate that EC procedures and funding instruments are a major negative factor in the efficiency of interventions.</i></p> <p><i>For budget support interventions, traditional assessment mechanisms appear quite inadequate in the absence of specific indicators and dialogue on ESI results.”</i> (p. 99).</p>

EQ 4	To what extent did the Commission contribute to make the institutional and regulatory framework more conducive to PSD?
Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) – Tunisia Evaluation	None.
Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) – Moldova Evaluation	None.
Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) – El Salvador Evaluation	None.
Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) Guyana (1997-2007)	Commission's support was not geared to tackling the main institutional and regulatory obstacles to PSD. The Evaluation Report notes with respect to institutional framework: <i>“National support for the programme is strong but eventual sustainability of the LEAP (Linden Economic Advancement Programme) depends on the existence of strengthened local institutions capable of taking over the programme. Until now, public and private organisations do not have sufficient capacity to undertake LEAP's activities”p.41</i>
Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) Microfinance	None.
Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) BizClim	None.
Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere)	
Banking Measures in the Mediterranean area	None.
Employment	None.

and social inclusion, over 1999-2008	
JC 4.1	<i>The Commission support was geared to tackling the main institutional and regulatory obstacles to PSD</i>
<p>I-4.1.1 Identification of the main obstacles to PSD in terms of macro-economic environment and institutional and regulatory framework in the country/region in official documents /studies (national strategies or other documents/studies), including both the domestic environment and obstacles to the integration in regional and world economies</p> <p>I-4.1.2 Commission strategy and programming documents refer to the obstacles mentioned in I-4.1.1 and gear the support to the removal of these obstacles (or justify alternative approaches)</p> <p>I-4.1.3 The private sector was consulted for determining the priorities for helping remove the main institutional and regulatory obstacles to PSD</p> <p>I-4.1.4 Stakeholders, and in particular the private sector, consider that Commission support was geared towards priorities for helping remove the main institutional and regulatory obstacles to PSD</p> <p>I-4.1.5 Number of technical and economic analyses/fora covering major strengths and weaknesses of the private sector in third countries conducted with Commission support or, in the case of pre-existing studies and fora, utilised by the Commission in developing PSD activities targeting regulatory and institutional frameworks.</p>	
Findings at JC level - Tunisia Evaluation	<p>As already mentioned above, the GBSs were largely framed by the commitments made under the AA to, amongst others, modernise the private and financial sectors. In parallel to the GBSs partly funded by the Commission, the Commission funded some economic and sectoral, notably on the financial sector and on privatization, which supported the drafting of the GBS conditionalities: <i>« plusieurs activités d'AT et/ou d'études économiques et sectorielles menées en parallèle ou en amont des programmes d'ABG ont permis d'approfondir l'analyse économique, ont contribué au bon ciblage des réformes et ont fourni une base de référence pour la définition des mesures spécifiques des matrices de conditionnalités.[...] la CE a utilisé l'expertise mobilisée dans les projets d'appui à la compétitivité des banques et des assurances pour la mise au point des conditionnalités spécifiques de la FAS III. De même, une étude financée par la CE sur les privatisations dans le cadre du PATP a été utilisée pour la mise au point des stratégies et des conditionnalités des FAS »</i>, p. 27.</p> <p>On the level of consultation of private sector actors in determining the priorities for helping remove the main institutional and regulatory obstacles to PSD, the report says that it increased, especially in the frame of the PAC programmes : <i>« Le rapport d'évaluation des PAC (Programmes d'Appui à la Compétitivité I et II) confirme l'engagement vers une participation accrue du secteur privé et de la société civile dans la définition et la mise en oeuvre des réformes »</i>, p. 39.</p>
Findings at JC level – Moldova	The report indicates that the Commission has focused its support on the legal and regulatory environment for SMEs but that whilst this has produced outputs, impact has not been felt, as it has been constrained by another factor, namely

Evaluation	shortcomings in access to finance: “ EC TA and policy advice has contributed to a substantial and tangible improvement in the legal and regulatory environment for SMEs. Over the evaluation period, new laws were enacted and administrative red tape was reduced. While steps have been taken to address the inadequacy of SME finance, there has been less progress in this field. Most experts were of the opinion that it is finance rather than the business environment that is the main constraint to development of the SME sector”. (see EQ5). p. 46. “Within sectors, the team has noted cases where the team thinks relevance could have been improved. For example, SME development interventions tackled regulatory and administrative issues but not credit constraints ”. P.113.
Findings at JC level – El Salvador Evaluation	Support to PSD provided through the FOMYPE programme was three-tiered, one of which was support to the policy and legal framework development at macro level (p.37). However the evaluation reports the lack of an identification study on potential beneficiaries which resulted in poor targeting and reorientation of the support towards SMEs rather than the MSEs initially targeted by the programme (p.39).
Findings at JC level Burkina Faso (1999-2008)	Even though Commission’s support was not geared to tackling the main institutional and regulatory obstacles to PSD its interventions did have positive effects in this domain. See JC 4.3
Findings at JC level - Microfinance	The EU/ACP Microfinance Programme did not tackle institutional and regulatory obstacles to PSD as such. Nevertheless, it did target regulatory obstacles to microfinance in particular. Regulatory challenges were selected and tackled on a country-by-country basis via the Programme’s support to the multi-donor CGAP (Consultative Group to Assist the Poor) initiative’s work on regulatory reform in the ACP. <i>Source: EC, EU/ ACP Microfinance Programme Final Evaluation</i>
Findings at JC level - BizClim	BziClim targeted, among other things, improvements to legal and regulatory frameworks with a view to enhancing the business environment : « <i>Expected results were: improved rule-based policy, legal and regulatory frameworks; improved access to finance, notably from the European Investment Bank (EIB); enhanced reforms in stateowned enterprises through privatizations and corporate social responsibility; and better understanding of linkages and business enabling environment issues » <i>Source: EC, Final Evaluation Private Sector Enabling Environment Facility, p.6</i></i>
Findings at JC level MEDA II	A priority of the Euromed partnership to progressively establish a FTA is the adjustment and modernisation of economic and social structures, giving priority to promotion and development of the private sector, upgrading of the productive sector and establishment of an appropriate institutional and regulatory framework for a market economy. (p12) A major proportion of the resources provided in MEDAII (€1.99bn) has been dedicated to systemic economic reforms (Tunisia, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco) with a view to improving <i>the legal and regulatory environment of business and trade activities</i> . The most ambitious programmes were implemented in Tunisia (with the successive structural adjustment facilities), Morocco (reform of the fiscal system and of public administration), and in Jordan (Sector Reform Facility) since in these countries the reforms supported by the Commission were also mainstreamed in the national plans. Budget support has been the preferred mode of intervention but programmes to support implementation of the Association Agreements, including twinning activities, and some specific components of large TA

	<p>programmes have also pursued this goal. In countries where such systemic reforms could not be considered, the effort was concentrated on specific sector reforms (social sectors, trade and private sector development, water, trade, transport) with BS and TA. (p39)</p> <p>Among the interventions mentioned above, a set of specific programmes, the so-called <i>Support to the Association Agreement Programme</i> (SAAP), has been designed and implemented in most MEDA countries. Under the MEDA II Regulation, eight programmes supporting the AA have been implemented to a total amount of €122m. The beneficiary countries are Algeria (€10m), Egypt (€25m), Jordan (€35m), Lebanon (€12m), Morocco (€20m), and Tunisia (€20m). These programmes are principally designed to assist the partner countries in adapting and modernising their legal and regulatory framework, enhancing the institutional capacity of the State administrations, and taking forward the trade liberalisation effort. Implementation is geared to adaptation of the economies and institutions with the aim of ensuring that the future FTA will permit development of a fruitful economic partnership between the EU and each MPC. (p28)</p> <p>The private sector operators notably expressed concerns about their limited involvement in the BS programmes linked to major economic reforms. (p60)</p>
<p>Egypt 98-08</p>	<p>The EU-Egypt Association Agreement has been the driving force of the Commission's support to reforms of the institutional and regulatory environment of business and trade activities. (p36)</p> <p>The EU-Egypt AA (EEAA), signed in 2001 and entered into force in 2004, followed by the Egypt-EU jointly-agreed Action Plan (AP), signed in March 2007 under the umbrella of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), are the catalyst for the Commission's support to wider economic and trade reforms targeting a Free Trade Area between the partner country and the EU. Indeed, it requires regulatory liberalization and legislative reforms and entails the creation and/or strengthening of institutions involved in the implementation of the AA. The institutional and regulatory reforms will guarantee the trade-related aspects of the AA, such as liberalisation of services and right of establishment, rules on competition and state aid, intellectual property protection, as well as public procurement. (p36)</p> <p>The Commission's assistance supported:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ GoE reforms of the regulatory, administrative and financial framework for business development (Trade Enhancement Programme, Support to the Association Agreement, Support to the Implementation of the Action Plan Programme, Financial and Investment Sector Cooperation Programme - Financial, Support to the Water Sector); ▪ existing GoE reform programmes in sectors critical for the Egyptian economy (Spinning and Weaving Sectors Programme, Support to the Association Agreement, Trade Enhancement Programmes, Financial and Investment Sector Cooperation Programme – Social and Rural); and ▪ GoE efforts to modernise the administrative capacities of the institutions responsible for the provision of economic infrastructure essential for business development (Trade Enhancement Programmes, Support to the Association Agreement, Support to the water Sector, Support to the Implementation of the Action Plan Programme).

	In terms of financial resources, this support represented 49% of the Commission's bilateral assistance: €489m have been devoted to economic infrastructure, private sector development, external trade and the financial sector. (p36)
EIB IF/OR (2010)	The evaluation notes in this respect (p. 82) that EIB IF/OR operations " <i>also influenced the business environment in terms of access to certain infrastructure and services but less in terms of institutional and regulatory aspects.</i> "
Channeling DBs and EIB (2008)	On the basis of the evaluation it appears that the channeling through the EIB did not target in particular the institutional and regulatory framework.
CDE (2011)	<p>Support to business environment reforms was not given priority in the CDE operations to avoid duplication with the Pro€Invest programme. Indeed, support for business environment reforms was considered as part of the mandate of Pro€Invest that focused on the capacity-building for intermediary organizations (IOs) and has been newly introduced in CDE's mandate in 2010. It has therefore not been a priority for CDE activities over the evaluation period.</p> <p>Nevertheless, the CDE progressively shifted its assistance from direct support for enterprises to support for enterprises channelled through intermediary organisations. This support through IOs was not primarily aimed at helping them prepare sector strategies and reinforcing their advocacy capacities but was rather considered as a means of leveraging the business development services to be retailed by the IOs to their member enterprises. Increased support through IOs, as well as workshops and meetings with public and private stakeholders held within the framework of sector programmes, have had positive results on the ability of IOs to identify the regulatory constraints faced by SMEs at sector level, and have to some extent facilitated public private dialogue on business environment reforms. Overall, however, CDE activities have not influenced the business environment reforms agenda of partner governments.</p> <p><i>Source: ADE (for the European Commission), Evaluation of the Centre for the Development of Enterprise, 2011 (p35)</i></p>
Banking Measures in the Mediterranean area	The banking measures looked are (1) TA, (2) Interest rate subsidies for environmental loans granted by the EIB from its own resources and (3) Risk Capital Operations. None are relevant to EQ4.
Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008	<p>The report describes several interventions in the field of institutional strengthening and the labour market legislative framework:</p> <p><i>JORDAN:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>Special labour market governance issues have been covered under the umbrella of broader EC interventions. An example is the support to the ratification of C.87 on Freedom of Association which was mobilized through implementation of the Action Plan when an Inter-Ministerial Committee urged the Prime Minister to consider its ratification.</i> ▪ <i>Jordanian Labour Empowerment through Labour Rights Education and Capacity Building: the project promoted the design of a labour rights development package, a labour rights training workshop, a review of labour legislation, and a seminar for the leadership of the General Federation of Trade Unions.</i> ▪ <i>The EC supported a social dialogue project in cooperation with the MoL and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) for reinforcing the capacities of the social partners to practise social dialogue.</i>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>EC Conditionality Matrix of Indicators for disbursement of EC SBS to E-TVET reforms (2009-2013) specifies enhancement of social dialogue through an operational ECOSOC and Tripartite Committee.</i> <p>MOROCCO:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>Programme d'appui aux associations professionnelles II: the programme aims to reinforce, among other things, dialogue between Government and professional associations.</i> ▪ <i>Appui Institutionnel à la Circulation de Personnes: the project aims to improve the legal movement of persons for work purposes between EU and Morocco. Specifically it aims to reinforce the capacity of the national agency and to train officials on the migration legislative framework.</i> <p>JAMAICA:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>The ILO-executed Regional Programme (all regions) for Child Labour - TACKLE.</i> <p>VIETNAM:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>Since 2006 the EC has been relentlessly supporting, through the PRSP policy dialogue, revisions to the Labour Code which will improve the current mechanisms for dispute resolution at enterprise level which are well adapted to addressing labour discontent (as exemplified by a decline in the number of wildcat strikes).</i> ▪ <i>Empowerment of Workers and Trade Unions in Vietnam' project: the 'Participatory Learning and Action' activities are expected to help workers have a clearer understanding of their conditions and rights and encourage them to play an active part in their own representation and organization. The PLA will allow testing of more participatory forms of workers' organization. In this sense strengthening the representative role of trade unions involves helping the unions to become a more effective conduit for bringing grassroots voices to the policy level.</i> ▪ <i>The EC Trade Integration Project MUTRAP should facilitate meeting WTO accession conditions of creating a level playing field by raising the level of minimum wages in the domestic sector to that of the foreign investment sector (with 50-60% of those earning minimum wages being women or youth).” (p. 128-9).</i>
JC 4.2	<i>The Commission has had strong policy dialogue on the institutional and regulatory frameworks</i>
<p>I-4.2.1 Number, level and depth of contacts with public authorities</p> <p>I-4.2.2 Number, level and depth of contacts with other policy actors (e.g. business associations, non-state actors, IMF/WB, other donors)</p> <p>I-4.2.3 Evidence exists of Commission leadership in or contribution to dialogue with policy actors</p> <p>I-4.2.4 Evidence exists of Commission contribution to private-public dialogue</p>	
Findings at JC level - Tunisia Evaluation	<p>The report mentions the existence of structured political dialogue in the frame of the GBSs (« <i>Pour les FAS, la bonne coordination et l'échange constant d'informations entre les cofinanciers et le gouvernement ont contribué à une certaine flexibilité dans l'appréciation de la réalisation de mesures complexes</i> », p. 28. <i>L'ampleur et l'articulation du cadre de dialogue politique et sur les politiques, dans lequel les programmes d'AB s'insèrent et auquel ils contribuent, représentent une des caractéristiques spécifiques de l'AB en Tunisie et, plus en général, dans la région (CJ113).</i> ». p.20). As the FAS included institutional and regulatory reform components, the dialogue may also have covered those,</p>

	<p>although the report doesn't mention this specifically.</p> <p>The report also mentions an improvement in the consultation of private sector actors in the definition and implementation of the reforms, specifically in the frame of the PAC programmes: « <i>Le rapport d'évaluation des PAC (Programmes d'Appui à la Compétitivité I et II) confirme l'engagement vers une participation accrue du secteur privé et de la société civile dans la définition et la mise en oeuvre des réformes</i> », p. 39.</p>
Findings at JC level – Moldova Evaluation	No information.
Findings at JC level – El Salvador Evaluation	No information specific to on the existence of a policy dialogue on the institutional and regulatory PSD frameworks. The evaluation only gives information on the quality and extent of the general consultation process for the elaboration of the CSP: “ <i>EC undertook consultations on both CSP but more as a formality than as a means to take stakeholders' views into account. The main stakeholders of international cooperation (GoES, Civil Society, MS, other donor) were consulted during the preparation process of the 2002-2006 and 2007-2013 CSPs, and more formally in the later than in the former. However most stakeholders interviewed on this matter recall that these consultations were a formality and that the opinions expressed were little taken into account.</i> ” (p. 23) and in the case of project identification and formulation “ <i>Little evidence was found of consultation of the population at the project identification and formulation levels in the projects where this information is available.</i> ” (p. 39)
Findings at JC level - Microfinance	<p>The Commission did not participate directly in policy dialogue on the microfinance sector as part of the EU/ACP Microfinance Programme. Instead, it supported regulatory reform via the CGAP initiative's regulatory work in the ACP region.</p> <p><i>Source: EC, EU/ACP Microfinance Programme Final Evaluation</i></p>
Findings at JC level - BizClim	<p>The evaluation notes that BizClim « supported development of improved rule-based policies and legal and regulatory frameworks, helped in improving access to finance, promoted enhancement of SOE reforms primarily through PPP schemes and contributed to a better understanding of linkages and business enabling environment issues within the ACP region. »</p> <p><i>Source: EC, Final Evaluation Private Sector Enabling Environment Facility, p5</i></p>
Findings at JC level MEDA II	<p>The Barcelona Declaration provides for periodic meetings of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Mediterranean partners and the EU. These meetings are prepared, accompanied and followed by diverse committees and expert groups. (p12)</p> <p>An essential feature of the implementation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has been the negotiation of Association Agreements between the European Union and its Mediterranean Partners to replace the Co-operation Agreements of the 1970s. The Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements, which govern bilateral relations, provide for specific arrangements with each partner country. They share a similar structure and are intended to promote the three pillars of the Barcelona Declaration.</p> <p>Association Agreements are intended to promote regular dialogue as well as trade, with gradual liberalisation of trade in goods, services and capital. (p13)</p> <p>Non-financial cooperation is the main purpose of the Association Agreements, the platform on which the political dialogue on trade policy (tariff dismantlement,</p>

	<p>bilateral and regional trade agreements) and economic liberalisation took place. It is an essential component of the cooperation programme and is the framework for the bilateral policy dialogue on specific reforms. (p40)</p> <p>The various technical subcommittees established under the AA create a valuable framework for sector dialogue and ensure consistency between sector-policy issues and cooperation. The committee addressing liberalisation has given the Commission a point of entry as an interactive partner into the liberalisation process. (p76)</p>
Egypt 98-08	<p>Major advances have been made in the political dialogue between the GoE and the Commission with the entry into force of the AA and the signature of the AP. In parallel, the Government's adoption of a policy reform programme after 2004 has enabled the Commission to increasingly shift its financial support from projects towards a more comprehensive support to reform using budget support thus facilitating its participation in (selected) sector policy dialogues. (p94)</p> <p>The current budgeting process used by the Government of Egypt which fragments public expenditure programming by type of expenditure undermines the use of the budget as a policy instrument and does not lend itself to realising the full potential benefits of SBS. For this, SBS should be accompanied by an intensive policy dialogue on public finance management reform aiming to improve policy based budgeting and to unify the budgeting process (or at least improve the coordination and coherent programming of public expenditure underpinning activities contributing to the same policy objective) in order to improve allocative efficiency of public expenditure. (p105)</p>
EIB IF/OR (2010)	n.a.
Channeling DBs and EIB (2008)	
CDE (2011)	No focus on policy dialogue in CDE operations, to avoid duplication with the ProfInvest programme. (see JC 4.1)
Banking Measures in the Mediterranean area	The banking measures looked are (1) TA, (2) Interest rate subsidies for environmental loans granted by the EIB from its own resources and (3) Risk Capital Operations. None are relevant to EQ4.
Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008	The report found that: " <i>more limited has been support to measures targeting consultation and exchange of information between representatives of governments, employers and workers, on issues relating to economic and social policy, labour disputes, trade unions</i> " (p. 148).
JC 4.3	<i>The institutional and regulatory frameworks have been strengthened</i>

<p>I-4.3.1 Reports / stakeholders show that new laws and regulations have been issued and are enforced</p> <p>I-4.3.2 Reports / stakeholders show that required institutions have been created or developed and are operational</p> <p>I-4.3.3 Evidence exists of Commission role in strengthening of institutional and regulatory frameworks</p> <p>I-4.3.4 Stakeholders consider that Commission interventions have maximised local government commitment by ensuring they are in line with the government's own agenda, consulting with relevant stakeholders and proposing reforms at the local or sub-national level.</p>	
<p>Findings at JC level - Tunisia Evaluation</p>	<p>The report presents a table which outlines the GBSs' contributions to socio-economic achievements in country over the period evaluated. It mentions, specifically for the institutional and regulatory frameworks that, the direct contribution was in fact limited. "<i>Contribution des programmes d'AB aux améliorations susmentionnées (CJ363) [réglementation en matière de droit des entreprises: renforcement de la liberté d'entreprise, droit des sociétés, gouvernance d'entreprises, propriété intellectuelle et industrielle, modes de résolution des conflits]: « À part leur contribution au système de partenariat en tant que tel, les programmes d'AB ont apporté une contribution directe limitée à ces thématiques, visant certaines des mesures concrètes de ce processus de modernisation. [...] Les FAS III et IV portaient un accent spécifique sur l'amélioration du droit de l'entreprise et plus en général de la transparence du marché et des mécanismes de contrôle relatifs ».</i> p. 55.</p> <p>The evaluation gives evidence of the effects of the GBSs, namely in terms of improvements of the business environment and its lawfulness as well as the liberalisation of the internal market: « <i>Les ABG ont contribué à la forte dynamisation du secteur privé sur la période 1996-2008, bien que des éléments de faiblesse persistent par rapport à la réforme de l'environnement des affaires et à la libéralisation du marché intérieur (C3.2) [...]. Les ABG ont contribué spécifiquement à l'amélioration de la gouvernance économique, et de la légalité dans le monde des affaires, qui ont enregistré des progrès, bien que les standards atteints restent insuffisants (C3.5).</i>», p. xi.</p>
<p>Findings at JC level – Moldova Evaluation</p>	<p>The evaluation reports evidence that the institutional and regulatory frameworks have been strengthened: "EC TA and policy advice has contributed to a substantial and tangible improvement in the legal and regulatory environment for SMEs. Over the evaluation period, new laws were enacted and administrative red tape was reduced" p. 46.</p> <p>The evaluation reports a number of significant institutional and regulatory changes supported by the Commission, notably institutional-building within the Ministry of Economy and Trade, to the elaboration of an SME strategy and the elaboration of a piece of legislation: "EC co-operation, largely in the form of TA to the Division of Small Business Development (DSBD) within the Ministry of Economy and Trade, has contributed to the GoM's increasing attention to the need to alleviate barriers to SME development. The Tacis SME Development Project prepared policy papers, built capacity via study tours and training, and raised local officials' awareness of the potential of the SME sector to provide growth and employment. The GoM's Strategy for Support to Development of SMEs for 2006-2008 was developed with EU Tacis support</p>

	<p><i>from the SME Development project (under an "Extended Scope" revision to the ToRs, a good sign of flexibility). This document is broadly recognised to be a strong guiding document for the GoM and has attracted the attention of donors and enabled the GoM to attract additional financial resources for development of the sector (mainly from World Bank and EBRD). The main points of the Strategy found their outlet in the Law on Support of SMEs approved by Parliament on 7th of July 2006. The law puts the small business classification criteria into compliance with EC recommendations, introducing at the same time the notion of the medium enterprise. The law establishes a new procedure for qualifying an entity as an SME on the basis of the declaration on its own liability. It defines the institutional framework supporting SMEs and eliminates the legislative gap by which local enterprises with foreign investments were not previously able to benefit from the facilities offered by the State to SMEs. », p. 43-44.</i></p>
<p>Findings at JC level – El Salvador Evaluation</p>	<p>The evaluation gives evidence of the following achievements, adding caveats however: “EC contribution through FOMYPE to the national policy and legal framework on MSEs has helped design the national policy but has been scarcely efficient as far as norms and legal framework are concerned (see I-4.1.1 in Annexe 9 for more details):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ FOMYPE supported the drafting of the national policy in favor of MSMEs, which the MINEC made public in 2007 (known as the “libro azul”); ▪ Regarding norms for MSMEs, FOMYPE contributed to the design of a National Innovation System; and it supported the creation of the National Quality and Productivity System, which will not bring any results while the 4 institutions (Metrology, Technical Regulation, Normalisation and Registration) on which the system is based are not working effectively. ▪ Regarding laws for MSMEs, FOMYPE failed to take advantage of FEDECACES’ experience and knowledge about remittances to help analyse and adapt the financial and legal framework so as to improve the use of remittances at national and local level. And the “Ley de Calidad”-much expected as a result of the recent EC’s cooperation strategic change from programme support to budget support- was still pending approval in September 2009, impeding the EC from launching its budget support programme PROCALIDAD as planned in the 2007-2013 CSP.” (p. 37).
<p>Findings at JC level Burkina Faso (1999-2008)</p>	<p>Evidence that this was the case and that it has had positive impacts on the functioning of enterprises:</p> <p>« Bien que le PRCE n’avait pas pour vocation d’apporter un appui à l’ensemble du secteur privé, les améliorations constatées en matière législatives ont été notamment liées à la création des CGA et ont concernés essentiellement l’amélioration du cadre incitatif légal et une meilleure application de celui-ci.</p> <p>En effet, la création des CGA a donné à de nombreuses entreprises une alternative formelle, légale à la continuation de leurs activités dans le cadre strictement informel. Les mécanismes incitatifs mis en place (incitants fiscaux, accès au financement, appui pour la conquête de nouveaux marchés, etc.) ont été suffisamment efficaces pour permettre aux entreprises de travailler dans un cadre légal et de formaliser leur statut et leur activités. L’impact fiscal à moyen et long terme pour le gouvernement est non négligeable. » p.73</p>
<p>Findings at JC level - Microfinance</p>	<p>Through its support of the CGAP Work Programme 2008-2013, the EU/ACP Microfinance Programme assisted the formation of new microfinance regulation in West Africa, in dialogue with BCEAO (the Banque Centrale des Etats African de l’Ouest), as well as further policy dialogue with Nigeria and DRG.</p> <p>Source: EC, EU/ACP Microfinance Programme Final Evaluation</p>
<p>Findings at JC level - BizClim</p>	<p>« BizClim diagnostic studies have been broadly endorsed by major stakeholders and that ACP States and RECs have widely utilized the recommendations resulting from such diagnostic studies.</p>

	<p><i>Although there is no evidence that they were mainstreamed, where applicable, in the PRSPs, stakeholders acknowledged that BizClim interventions, in most cases, led to the adoption of either policies or regulatory frameworks aimed at improving their national business environments. »</i></p> <p><i>Source: EC, Final Evaluation Private Sector Enabling Environment Facility, p.28</i></p>
<p>Findings at JC level MEDA II</p>	<p>Few specific information found.</p> <p>As BS has been used to promote, encourage and support systemic macro-economic and sector reforms, their monitoring by the Commission has been focused on accompanying the reform process undertaken by the partner and verifying the adoption of its successive steps. This was done by negotiating with the partner and in coordination with the other donors involved, in advance of the provision of the Budget support, a matrix of conditions. Among these conditions some are regarded as conditions for disbursement. For example, in the case of the macroeconomic support FAS IV in Tunisia a condition of disbursement of the first tranche was to create markets open to competition. (p61)</p> <p>BS interventions favoured continuous involvement of both donors and partners and induced a policy dialogue on the reforms supported. They reinforced the capacity of the institutions supported, thereby allowing them to use and benefit from the management and evaluation tools introduced.</p> <p>However, the sustainability of the policies supported by BS interventions will depend on their acceptability by the population. The elements of fragility of specific MPC economies threaten the political acceptability of the government development model if welfare conditions cannot be maintained (e.g. Tunisia). (p71)</p> <p>Commission interventions generally faced significant difficulties at all stages of the project cycle on the politically sensitive reforms to be addressed. Core reforms concern many aspects of liberalisation, utility tariffs, subsidies, reform of the judiciary systems, and banking regulations (p95)</p> <p>Some tariff reforms have been accompanied by non-tariff measures that reduced their effectiveness as shown by the slow progress in the reduction of total trade restrictions (tariff and non-tariff measures) compared to that achieved with tariff measures alone. (p45)</p>
<p>Egypt 98-08</p>	<p>Commission's interventions have contributed to trade facilitation but trade restrictions are still important and the sustainability of the support is questioned.</p> <p>There are several positive achievements in terms of trade facilitation, in particular:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Contribution to the reinforcement of the public administration's capacity to harmonise legislation and regulations with international and particularly EU frameworks through TEP-A and C. TEP-A provided technical assistance (i) to the Trade Agreement Sector department which is in charge of implementing and coordinating the implementation of trade-related aspects of the AA (ii) to the staff of the Ministry of Trade and Industry for trade policy formulation, and (iii) to the staff of the Egyptian export promotion entities. TEP-C contributed to the upgrading of the Egyptian Customs Authority senior and middle management skills through training and mentoring. ▪ Contribution to the decrease in trade barriers and in non tariff measures through TEPB, in particular improvement of customs services, exemption of all imports earmarked for free zones from all inspection at ports, improvements of standards and control services, and expansion of export promotion schemes.

	<p>While Egypt's trade agreements were limited to a preferential trade agreement with Syria (1991) and the WTO Agreement when Egypt joined as a member in 1995, Egypt became very active over the past ten years in signing a number of trade agreements at bilateral (among which the EU, several Southern Mediterranean partners, Irak, Turkey), regional (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Agadir) and multilateral levels (WTO). These legal settings contributed to the drastic reduction of Egypt's tariff barriers between 2000 and 2008. However, trade restrictions (tariff and non tariff) remain important in absolute value and compared to the Lower-Middle Income countries average. (p40)</p> <p>Sector budget support has been used to finance the implementation of reform measures in several sectors (customs, trade, water, health, education) thus paving the way for regulatory, institutional and managerial changes that characterise an improved overall framework for sector operations. (p90)</p> <p>Sector budget support has been implemented by the GoE as a project modality, using SBS funds to execute workplans of activities required to achieve the reform measures used as triggers for SBS disbursements. This approach and the absence of links between the SBS and general PFM issues have constrained the instrument's potential benefits, in particular its effects upon the improvement of sector policy and budgeting frameworks. (p90)</p>
EIB IF/OR (2010)	(see JC 4.2): this was not the target
Channeling DBs and EIB (2008)	(see JC 4.2): this was not the target
CDE (2011)	No evidence. As detailed under JC 4.1 above, support to business environment reforms was not given priority in the CDE operations to avoid duplication with the ProfInvest programme. Nevertheless, CDE operations have to some extent indirectly facilitated public private dialogue on business environment reforms. But overall they have not influenced the business environment reforms agenda of partner governments.
Banking Measures in the Mediterranean area	The banking measures looked are (1) TA, (2) Interest rate subsidies for environmental loans granted by the EIB from its own resources and (3) Risk Capital Operations. None are relevant to EQ4.
Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008	<p>The report found that gender and child labour were the areas in which the EC has been more successful in introducing legislation. Tripartite consultations, and issues related to workers' and employers' organizations, were also two of the areas in which, according to national officials, EC has had a role in supporting the introduction or application of new legislation. (p. 129).</p> <p>It also reports that more limited has been support to measures supporting the institutional capacities of key relevant institutions and the labour markets' normative framework. (p.148).</p>
JC 4.4	<i>The strengthening of the institutional and regulatory framework has contributed to the creation, better functioning and growth of enterprises</i>

I-4.4.1	
Evidence that enterprises have benefited from an improved framework and environment	
Findings at JC level - Tunisia Evaluation	No specific information available in the report.
Findings at JC level – Moldova Evaluation	<p>The evidence shows that support to the institutional and regulatory framework did not lead to the creation, better functioning and growth of enterprises: <i>“Policy formulation (especially drafting of new laws and completion of studies laying the foundation for legal reform) has progressed further than policy implementation. This is, for example, clearly evident in the team’s analysis of the SME sector, where thorough regulatory reform has not led to actual results at local level.”</i>, p. 89.</p> <p>Aside from the lack of implementation of regulatory change, the evaluation has also identified another another constraining factor, namely SME’s lack of access to finance, was not sufficiently taken into account in the Commission’s support: <i>“Over the evaluation period, new laws were enacted and administrative red tape was reduced. While steps have been taken to address the inadequacy of SME finance, there has been less progress in this field. Most experts were of the opinion that it is finance rather than the business environment that is the main constraint to development of the SME sector”</i>. (see EQ5). p. 46. <i>“Within sectors, the team has noted cases where the team thinks relevance could have been improved. For example, SME development interventions tackled regulatory and administrative issues but not credit constraints”</i>. P.113.</p>
Findings at JC level – El Salvador Evaluation	No information on whether enterprises have benefited from an improved framework and environment.
Findings at JC level Burkina Faso (1999-2008)	<p>See previous JC</p> <p>Institutional and regulatory framework still perceived by Evaluation Report as a constrain to PSD:</p> <p><i>« Cadre général des affaires²⁷ : l'augmentation des investissements privés nationaux et étrangers (IDE) dépend fortement de l'amélioration du cadre général actuel des affaires. Le cadre juridique commercial doit être assaini et permettre la pratique d'une justice équitable et prévisible pour l'ensemble des acteurs privés. La mise en place récente (octobre 2009) de tribunaux de commerce va dans ce sens. »</i> p.76</p>
Findings at JC level - Microfinance	No evidence of the impact of the progress on institutional and regulatory frameworks outlined under JC 4.3 is provided in the programme documentation or Final Evaluation.
Findings at JC level - BizClim	No evidence provided in the BizClim evaluation regarding the impact of legal/regulatory improvements on better functioning of enterprises.
Findings at JC level MEDA II	Few specific information found.
Egypt 98-08	Commission's interventions have contributed to facilitating the development of productive sector activities but Egypt’s performance in ease of doing business remained under the regional and income groups’ averages.

	<p>For more detail, see J.C. 6.3.</p> <p>Where sector statistical systems do not exist or cannot deliver the data required for result monitoring, the Commission should support the development or improvement of such systems as a matter of priority. (p106)</p>
EIB IF/OR (2010)	(see JC 4.2): this was not the target
Channeling DBs and EIB (2008)	(see JC 4.2): this was not the target
CDE (2011)	No evidence. As detailed under JC 4.1 above, support to business environment reforms was not given priority in the CDE operations to avoid duplication with the Pro€Invest programme. Nevertheless, CDE operations have to some extent indirectly facilitated public private dialogue on business environment reforms. But overall they have not influenced the business environment reforms agenda of partner governments.
Banking Measures in the Mediterranean area	The banking measures looked are (1) TA, (2) Interest rate subsidies for environmental loans granted by the EIB from its own resources and (3) Risk Capital Operations. None are relevant to EQ4.
Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008	This was not the purpose of the above-mentioned activities supported.

EQ 5	To what extent did the Commission contribute to improve access to finance by enterprises?
Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) – Tunisia Evaluation	The report indicates that the GBSs coupled with the perspective of the competitive Euro-Mediterranean integration were incentives for the reform of the financial sector: « <i>Au niveau indirect, le partenariat soutenu par les ABG a également contribué à la mise en oeuvre du processus de réforme dans les secteurs considérés. La perspective de l'intégration compétitive euro-méditerranéenne a été certainement un des moteurs principaux de la réforme du secteur financier, en plus des contributions directes des ABG</i> ». p. 45.
Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere)– Moldova Evaluation	None.
Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) – El Salvador Evaluation	None.
Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) Burkina Faso (1999-2008)	Evidence that SMEs were “diagnosed” but no specific reference is made to “improving access to finance”: « <i>Des PME ont été diagnostiquées et mises en relation avec des consultants labellisés. Elles ont ainsi été accompagnées pour comprendre leurs besoins et gérer convenablement leur relation avec un prestataire de services.</i> » p.72
Guyana (1997-2007)	The Evaluation Report notes: “ <i>The interventions focus on specific Commission PSD strategy activities: business development services, training, and financial services.</i> ” p. 38
Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) Microfinance	The EU/ACP Microfinance Programme was not explicitly aimed at improving access to finance by enterprises as opposed to other low income groups. Nevertheless, the nature of the Programme activities and beneficiary profile entailed some impact upon access to finance for enterprises, particularly regarding supply-side constraints: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The Programme aimed “to provide a sustainable contribution to poverty reduction via the development of a range of financial services better responding to poor people’s needs”. As such, it aimed at provision of access to finance for poor people rather than microenterprises in particular. Moreover, the Programme pursued its objective by building capacity and efficiency of the microfinance sector, rather than by providing microfinance products and services direct to users. For both of these reasons, the Programme should not be considered as a response to an assessment of the financing needs of microenterprises in the ACP region. ▪ Nevertheless, in terms of impact rather than design, the Programme activities can be considered as relevant to the ability of microenterprises to access financial products and services. Notably, the Programme beneficiaries were, for the large part, microfinance institutions providing access to finance for both microenterprises and low income households. Moreover, each of the Programme’s three activity areas (building capacity among microfinance

	<p>institutions, promoting the use of strengthened ratings and information systems by microfinance providers, and improving the transparency and efficiency of the microfinance market) can be considered as having impact on the supply-side constraints facing microenterprises in accessing financial services.</p> <p><i>Source: EC, EU/ACP Microfinance Programme Final Evaluation</i></p>
<p>Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) BizClim</p>	<p>None.</p>
<p>Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) MEDA II</p>	<p><i>Recommendation 1.5 : In order to improve private enterprises (and particularly SME's) access to finance, increase the resources available for risk capital investment.</i></p> <p>Access to finance for private enterprises, especially SME and micro-enterprises, remains a severe constraint in the MPCs. Although Mediterranean banks may have, on average, sufficient capital and liquidity, they are extremely risk adverse, largely due to a large proportion of non-performing loans.</p> <p>As economies are opening and the business environment is improving the development of the private sector requires increasingly operational capital that most MPC financial markets are not yet able to provide. There is therefore an important unsatisfied demand for risk capital by the MPC's enterprises and a lack of capacity of the local financial sectors to meet it. This requires in depth reforms of the financial sector. Such reforms are addressed by the donors including important interventions (BS and TA) of the Commission.</p> <p>The evaluation has shown that the provision of risk capital by the EIB could contribute positively to an improved management and governance of financial intermediaries as well as increasing the risk capital available to enterprises. The EIB is already the largest risk capital investor amongst international financial institutions in the region.</p> <p>Therefore, this recommendation, in line with those already formulated by a Commission Staff Working Document, suggests to increase the resources available for risk capital investment.</p> <p>It should be noted that this does not necessarily require an increase of the resources made available by the Commission to the EIB through the Risk Capital Facility, but can be funded out of the reserves of the EIB by increasing the Special FEMIP Envelope reserve. (p110)</p>
<p>Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere)</p>	
<p>Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) Banking Measures in the Mediterranean area</p>	<p><i>“Three types of banking measures are financed under the MEDA regulations or the previous protocols from the EU budget and implemented by the European Investment Bank (EIB): technical assistance through the FEMIP Support Fund, interest rate subsidies for certain EIB loans and risk capital operations” (summary, p.1).</i></p> <p>In the case of the risk capital operations, the report specifies the form they took:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>“direct investments : acquisition of equity or quasi-equity instruments (subordinated loans) in private companies;</i> ▪ <i>private equity funds: participation in investment funds taking participations in private companies or other investment funds;</i> ▪ <i>co-investments with pre-selected local intermediaries ;</i>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>loans on special conditions, notably to micro-finance institutions; and</i> ▪ <i>support to guarantee schemes. (p.18).</i> <p>It quoted Article 6(4) of the MEDA regulation to specify in which cases risk capital operations should be used: <i>“Risk capital shall be used, first and foremost, to make available own funds to undertakings in the production sector, in particular those that can bring together natural or legal persons who are nationals of a Community Member State and of Mediterranean non-member countries or territories. Risk capital shall be used primarily to strengthen the private sector, and in particular to reinforce the financial sector in MEDA countries. It shall add value clearly, by offering financial products and terms that are not available locally”.</i> (p.19).</p> <p>The Court of Auditors identifies important shortcomings in the Commission’s monitoring of its support to banking measures managed by the EIB which affected the Community’s financial interests, notably due to late recovery or non-recovery of funds and the waiving of some contract clauses, for example regarding penalties for late payment: <i>“During the early years of the programme, and until 2005, the EIB did not implement adequate monitoring and controls. In addition the reporting flow from the intermediaries/promoters was insufficient. This mainly affected the monitoring of projects and the implementation of corrective action for projects that were not meeting their objectives or intermediaries/promoters who were not meeting their contractual obligations. This lack of adequate monitoring affected the Community’s financial interests, notably due to late recovery or non-recovery of funds and the waiving of some contract clauses, for example regarding penalties for late payment.”</i> (p.13).</p>
<p>Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008</p>	<p>Improving access to finance by enterprises was not the focus of the support to Employment and social inclusion looked at within this evaluation.</p>
<p>JC 5.1</p>	<p><i>The Commission’s support was informed by an analysis of the country/region’s main constraints in terms of access to finance for enterprises (whether they were primarily on the demand or on the supply side or both)</i></p>
<p>I-5.1.1 Existence of documented analysis of the countries’/regions main constraints in terms of access to finance (demand and supply side)</p> <p>I-5.1.2 In its strategy/programming documents the Commission refers to these analyses</p> <p>I-5.1.3 Stakeholders, in particular form the private sector, consider that the constraints identified are the right ones</p> <p>I-5.1.4 The Commission support was geared towards tackling the constraints identified in these analyses</p> <p>I-5.1.5 Number of Commission interventions in the area of access to finance that have been conducted in cooperation with other financial institutions</p>	
<p>Findings at JC level - Tunisia Evaluation</p>	<p>The report indicates that the reform of the financial sector was a priority of the government and as such was central to some of the GBSs supported. The financial sector was in fact the target of the most conditionalities within the FASs as a</p>

	<p>whole: « <i>La réforme du secteur financier est une des grandes priorités du gouvernement dans les divers Plans nationaux de Développement (IXème, Xème et XIème). Ainsi, elle a été au centre des mesures appuyées par les ABG. Déjà dans la FAS I, le thème est présent. Dans la matrice de la FAS II sont inscrites les mesures clé d'un plan pour l'assainissement du secteur bancaire. Des mesures de consolidation sont inscrites dans la FAS III et encore dans la FAS IV. De même, pour les assurances, des conditionnalités détaillées sont incluses à partir de la FAS II, notamment dans les FAS III et IV. On peut dire que le secteur financier fait l'objet du plus grand nombre de conditionnalités dans l'ensemble des FAS</i> ». p. 43. « <i>La CE a utilisé l'expertise mobilisée dans les projets d'appui à la compétitivité des banques et des assurances pour la mise au point des conditionnalités spécifiques de la FAS III</i> », p. 27.</p>
<p>Findings at JC level – Moldova Evaluation</p>	<p>The report gives evidence of the contrary. Access to finance was not sufficiently taken into account in the Commission's support to SMEs and this was adverse. <i>"Within sectors, the team have noted cases where the team think relevance could have been improved. For example, SME development interventions tackled regulatory and administrative issues but not credit constraints"</i>. p.113.</p> <p>The report also recommends that the Commission conducts an analysis of the reasons for the lack of access to finance: <i>"The new barriers to entry, however, take the form of restricted access to finance. Given the progress that has been made in regulatory and administrative reform, this area may be in line for a period of benign neglect, with resources instead being devoted to the problem of access to credit. It is known that there is no shortage of liquidity in the Moldovan banking system. Why then is so little of it translated into credit to SMEs? A review of the situation should be carried out to ascertain why lenders are reluctant to lend and, equally important, why potential borrowers are reluctant to borrow."</i> p.103</p>
<p>Findings at JC level – El Salvador Evaluation</p>	<p>Access to finance was not the focus of the FOMYPE programme aimed at strengthening Micro- and Small enterprises' productivity and competitiveness through policy and legal framework development (macro level) and support to the supply of Business Development Services (BDS) (meso and micro levels).</p>
<p>Findings at JC level Burkina Faso (1999-2008)</p>	<p>No evidence of such analysis</p>
<p>Guyana (1997-2007)</p>	<p>Such analysis was conducted by the GoG and informed its National Competitiveness Strategy (NCS). The Evaluation Report writes in this respect: <i>"The NCS identified the challenges faced by enterprises in Guyana in accessing finance:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>Limited range of financial institutions restricting the supply of loans: the range of financial institutions in Guyana is fairly limited and Banks do not offer financial services.</i> ▪ <i>Relatively high interest rates which affect the competitiveness of Guyana's products. Interest rates for lending to enterprises range between 8% and 18% whereas annual micro-finance rates fluctuate around 15%.</i> ▪ <i>Limited capacity of the banks to appraise long-term projects"</i> <p>AND Commission support to PSD in financial services addressed these challenges <i>"through the setting-up of the Linden Economic Advancement Fund (LEAF) within the framework of LEAP in Region 10."</i> p.39</p>
<p>Findings at JC level - Microfinance</p>	<p>The EU/ACP Microfinance Programme's support was not informed by analyses of country or regional constraints in terms of access to finance for enterprises as such. Support was provided to microfinance institutions and umbrella</p>

	<p>organisations in any ACP country on a demand-driven basis, with the aim of improving access to financial services for all low income clients rather than specifically aiming at microenterprises.</p> <p><i>Source: EC, EU/ ACP Microfinance Programme Final Evaluation</i></p>
Findings at JC level - BizClim	<p>BizClim targeted improved access to finance, specifically from the EIB, as one of the project purposes described in the intervention logic. Whilst per-country needs analysis was not foreseen during the overall design phase, the core part of BizClim's activities in the area of access to finance was to produce needs in-country analyses of financial access for enterprises:</p> <p><i>"Sector specific studies and consultations at regional and local level , have clarified the basis of potential investment proposals or have examined ongoing investments from the point of view of poverty reduction and other social concerns;"</i></p> <p><i>Source: EC, Final Evaluation Private Sector Enabling Environment Facility, p.81</i></p>
Findings at JC level MEDA II	<p>No specific information found but most interventions have been prepared through studies, joint seminars and workshops; budget support interventions, particularly those addressing structural reforms and reform of the public finance systems, benefited from deeper and continued analysis during the implementation process. (p32)</p>
Egypt 98-08	<p>No specific information found but past EU-Egypt cooperation strategy has mainly been driven by the priorities of the Commission rather than those of the Government of Egypt; this is slowly changing through increased participation of the Egyptian Government in the programming process, with a clear turning point in 2004/05. At the same time, local stakeholders were increasingly consulted during the identification and formulation of the interventions to be supported by the cooperation programme. (p19)</p>
EIB IF/OR (2010)	n.a.
Channeling DBs and EIB (2008)	This issue is not really tackled in the evaluation.
CDE (2011)	No information provided in the CDE evaluation on this point (of a specific analysis of the country/region's main constraints in terms of access to finance for enterprises).
Banking Measures in the Mediterranean area	No information.
Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008	Improving access to finance by enterprises was not the focus of the support to Employment and social inclusion looked at within this evaluation.
JC 5.2	<i>At the macro-level, the Commission has addressed the constraints in the business environment for larger enterprises and MSMEs to develop</i>
I-5.2.1	Steps were taken to facilitate the creation of formal enterprises, through accessible procedures of registration

I-5.2.2	
The Commission has supported the regulatory environment of financial intermediaries to facilitate their lending to, and/or investment in, MSMEs	
Findings at JC level - Tunisia Evaluation	No specific information available in the report.
Findings at JC level – Moldova Evaluation	In Moldova, the Commission has supported the alleviation of certain constraints in the business environment for larger enterprises and MSMEs to develop; although none which are specifically linked to access to finance: “ <i>EC co-operation, largely in the form of TA to the Division of Small Business Development (DSBD) within the Ministry of Economy and Trade, has contributed to the GoM’s increasing attention to the need to alleviate barriers to SME development. The Tacis SME Development Project prepared policy papers, built capacity via study tours and training, and raised local officials’ awareness of the potential of the SME sector to provide growth and employment. The GoM’s Strategy for Support to Development of SMEs for 2006-2008 was developed with EU Tacis support from the SME Development project (under an “Extended Scope” revision to the ToRs, a good sign of flexibility). This document is broadly recognised to be a strong guiding document for the GoM and has attracted the attention of donors and enabled the GoM to attract additional financial resources for development of the sector (mainly from World Bank and EBRD). The main points of the Strategy found their outlet in the Law on Support of SMEs approved by Parliament on 7th of July 2006. The law puts the small business classification criteria into compliance with EC recommendations, introducing at the same time the notion of the medium enterprise. The law establishes a new procedure for qualifying an entity as an SME on the basis of the declaration on its own liability. It defines the institutional framework supporting SMEs and eliminates the legislative gap by which local enterprises with foreign investments were not previously able to benefit from the facilities offered by the State to SMEs.</i> ”, p. 43-44.
Findings at JC level – El Salvador Evaluation	Support to the facilitation of the creation of formal enterprises and to the regulatory environment of financial intermediaries to facilitate their lending to, and/or investment in, MSMEs was not the focus of the FOMYPE programme.
Findings at JC level Burkina Faso (1999-2008)	Commission’s interventions did facilitate the creation of formal enterprises: « <i>Bien que le PRCE (Programme de renforcement des capacités des entreprises) n’avait pas pour vocation d’apporter un appui à l’ensemble du secteur privé, les améliorations constatées en matière législatives ont été notamment liées à la création des CGA (Centre de Gestion Agréé) et ont concernés essentiellement l’amélioration du cadre incitatif légal et une meilleure application de celui-ci.</i> <i>En effet, la création des CGA a donné à de nombreuses entreprises une alternative formelle, légale à la continuation de leurs activités dans le cadre strictement informel.</i> » p.73
Guyana (1997-2007)	Important to note that LEAF was targeting only one region (Region 10). Furthermore, according to the Evaluation Report, the Commission’s support in financial services did not address the obstacles to access to finance. It states: “ <i>Similarly, the Evaluation of European Community Support to Private Sector Development in Third Countries (2005) recommended that the Commission should avoid programmes aimed solely at the provision of credit lines.</i> ” P.39
Findings at JC level - Microfinance	The EU/ACP Microfinance Programme did not explicitly address the business environment constraints that hinder the development of enterprises and MSMEs as such. However, as outlined under JC4.3 above, some support was provided to improve the regulatory environment for financial intermediaries providing

	<p>microfinancial services in West Africa, Nigeria and DRC. But no evidence of the impact of these improvements on the development of enterprises was presented in the programme documentation or final evaluation.</p> <p><i>Source: EC, EU/ACP Microfinance Programme Final Evaluation</i></p>
Findings at JC level - BizClim	<p>BizClim conducted studies and consultations to address macro-level constraints, with the following results recorded by the final evaluation:</p> <p><i>“Studies and consultations at the macro level will have clarified and documented the options available for the ACP Governments, Regional Organisations, and Private Sector Representatives in order to improve the enabling environment for the private sector; An improved knowledge of the actual bottlenecks hampering private sector development and of the possible way to better address them and how”</i></p> <p><i>Source: EC, Final Evaluation Private Sector Enabling Environment Facility, p.81</i></p>
Findings at JC level MEDA II	<p>As economies are opening and the business environment is improving the development of the private sector requires increasingly operational capital that most MPC financial markets are not yet able to provide. There is therefore an important unsatisfied demand for risk capital by the MPC's enterprises and a lack of capacity of the local financial sectors to meet it. This requires in depth reforms of the financial sector. Such reforms are addressed by the donors including important interventions (BS and TA) of the Commission. (p110)</p> <p>Private sector operators were not sufficiently associated in the design of some systemic interventions targeted at improving the business environment. (p102)</p>
Egypt 98-08	<p>No specific information found.</p> <p>See J.C. 5.1.</p>
EIB IF/OR (2010)	n.a.
Channeling DBs and EIB (2008)	This issue is not really tackled in the evaluation.
CDE (2011)	No evidence. As detailed under JC 4.1 above, support to business environment reforms was not given priority in the CDE operations to avoid duplication with the ProInvest programme. Nevertheless, CDE operations have to some extent indirectly facilitated public private dialogue on business environment reforms. But overall they have not influenced the business environment reforms agenda of partner governments.
Banking Measures in the Mediterranean area	No information.
Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008	Improving access to finance by enterprises was not the focus of the support to Employment and social inclusion looked at within this evaluation.
JC 5.3	<i>Support targeted enterprises that were facing difficulties in obtaining financial products and services</i>
I-5.3.1	

<p>The Commission had a specific approach to identify those enterprises that were facing difficulties in obtaining loan and investment funding</p> <p>I-5.3.2</p> <p>The Commission identified the specific constraints these enterprises were facing</p> <p>I-5.3.3</p> <p>The Commission support was geared to these enterprises and aimed at tackling their specific constraints, including specifically for MSMEs (core constraints of lack of capitalisation and lack of collateral)</p>	
Findings at JC level - Tunisia Evaluation	No specific information available in the report.
Findings at JC level – Moldova Evaluation	No evidence of this. On the contrary the report recommends that the Commission conducts an analysis of the reasons for the lack of access to finance: <i>“The new barriers to entry, however, take the form of restricted access to finance. Given the progress that has been made in regulatory and administrative reform, this area may be in line for a period of benign neglect, with resources instead being devoted to the problem of access to credit. It is known that there is no shortage of liquidity in the Moldovan banking system. Why then is so little of it translated into credit to SMEs? A review of the situation should be carried out to ascertain why lenders are reluctant to lend and, equally important, why potential borrowers are reluctant to borrow.”</i> P.103
Findings at JC level – El Salvador Evaluation	Support to enterprises that were facing difficulties in obtaining loan and investment funding was not the focus of the FOMYPE programme.
Findings at JC level Burkina Faso (1999-2008)	No evidence of this
Guyana (1997-2007)	Enterprises were targeted according to their sector of activity: <i>“LEAF mainly targeted the primary sector (forestry and agriculture). It also supported the development of the tertiary sector (vending and services). It has however not supported the growth of the manufacturing sector.”</i> This meant an alignment with the Regional Development Strategy for Region 10 but criticism for not supporting the manufacturing sector sufficiently. p.40.
Findings at JC level - Microfinance	The EU/ACP Microfinance Programme did not provide loans or investment funding directly to enterprises. <i>Source: EC, EU/ACP Microfinance Programme Final Evaluation</i>
Findings at JC level - BizClim	No specific information regarding the targeting of particular enterprise-types. BizClim primarily conducted studies and consultations, often at the macro-level, rather than direct support to enterprises: <i>« Coherent with the 1998 DGVIII Communication to the European Council, BizClim supported actions at the macro and meso level but did not intervene at the micro level because it did not involve directly with private enterprises »</i> <i>Source: EC, Final Evaluation Private Sector Enabling Environment Facility, p.36</i>
Findings at JC level	No specific information found but private sector operators were not sufficiently associated in the design of some systemic interventions targeted at improving the business environment. (p102)

MEDA II	
Egypt 98-08	No specific information found. See J.C. 5.1.
EIB IF/OR (2010)	n.a.
Channeling DBs and EIB (2008)	This issue is not tackled as such in the evaluation.
CDE (2011)	No information provided in the CDE evaluation on this point (of target on enterprises that were facing difficulties in obtaining loan and investment funding).
Banking Measures in the Mediterranean area	The risk capital operations could take the form of “ <i>direct investments: acquisition of equity or quasi-equity instruments (subordinated loans) in private companies</i> ”. No further information.
Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008	Improving access to finance by enterprises was not the focus of the support to Employment and social inclusion looked at within this evaluation.
JC 5.4	<i>At the meso-level, the Commission has supported the intermediary organisations supporting enterprises (large and MSMEs)</i>
I-5.4.1	Stakeholders consider that the Commission has selected those private sector representative organisations that have a real impact
I-5.4.2	Intermediary Organisations supported by the Commission have, during the period of support, implemented activities designed to increase capacity of private sector enterprises to obtain funding from bank or non-banking institutions
Findings at JC level - Tunisia Evaluation	No specific information available in the report.
Findings at JC level – Moldova Evaluation	On the selection of private sector representative organisations that have a real impact: The evaluation reports that the impact of the Business centres which have been supported was limited by the lack of the “ <i>Necessary partnerships and relationships of trust with local public administrations, local businesses, and other donor-financed SME project</i> ”. (p.45). “ <i>Since local authorities were not properly involved in the design of the Centres, they never entered into any commitment to be part of their future development, with adverse implications for financial sustainability</i> ”. “ <i>The poor sustainability of these Business Centres can be contrasted with the more long-term oriented Business Centres established in Ungheni (CBC finance) and Cabul (City Twinning finance). In these cases, a public-private partnership (local public authority and local Chamber of Commerce and Industry) was envisaged from the start. In general, “stand-alone” Business Centre projects have not proved successful</i> ”, p. 46. Additionally, “ <i>A structural weakness was that local public authorities and businesses preferred to contract the services of Business Centre directors personally, rather the services of the Business Centre as an institution</i> ”.

	<p>Targeting only one set of needs was criticized by the report, the team arguing that: <i>“The experience with Business Centres indicates that simply making available advisory services and training is not enough. Local entrepreneurs and would-be entrepreneurs need a large and varied basket of services available at all points in the life cycle of their business, from start-up through expansion to, if necessary, termination. The team would recommend [...] Address[ing] the entire range of problems faced by SMEs, from poor local infrastructure through lack of access to credit to lack of business skills, rather than concentrating only on a subset of needs”. P.103.</i></p> <p>On the implementation of Intermediary Organisations’ activities designed to increase capacity of private sector enterprises to obtain funding from bank or non-banking institutions, the evaluation contends that this was neglected in the Commission’s support and that this was detrimental. In turn the evaluation recommends that Business centres: <i>“By serving as an unbiased broker of information between banks and entrepreneurs, [Business Centres] can help unblock the credit pipeline. An even more direct intervention would be joint participation with international financial institutions or bilateral donors to make subsidised lines of credit available to SMEs (perhaps targeted specifically on priority end-uses such as meeting international norms and standards in food processing)”.</i> p.103.</p>
Findings at JC level – El Salvador Evaluation	Support to Intermediary Organisations in charge of increasing the capacity of private sector enterprises to obtain funding from bank or non-banking institutions was not the focus of the FOMYPE programme.
Findings at JC level Burkina Faso (1999-2008)	<p>As mentioned under JC 5.2, the Commission has supported the creation of CGAs (Centre de Gestion Agréé)</p> <p>Another intervention consisted in subsidizing the services of another intermediary organisation:</p> <p><i>« Un mécanisme de subvention (chèques services) a facilité l'accès au marché de cette demande émergente et solvable ; la Maison de l'Entreprise du Burkina Faso (MEBF) a confirmé son aptitude en tant qu'interface pour la promotion des Services de développement de l'entreprise (SDE) au Burkina Faso. »</i>p.72</p> <p>The Evaluation Report emphasises however:</p> <p><i>« L'Etat devra mobiliser suffisamment de ressources pour l'accompagnement du secteur privé comme moteur de la croissance durable et du développement et renforcer les capacités des institutions intermédiaires d'appui au secteur privé en leur allouant des moyens d'action. »</i> p.75</p>
Findings at JC level - Microfinance	<p>The EU/ACP Microfinance Programme did not provide support to intermediary organisations supporting enterprises to develop bankable dossiers or otherwise enhance their capacity to obtain financing.</p> <p><i>Source: EC, EU/ACP Microfinance Programme Final Evaluation</i></p>
Findings at JC level - BizClim	<p>No evidence is provided in the final evaluation of BizClim to suggest that it supported intermediary organisations during its activities.</p> <p><i>Source: EC, Final Evaluation Private Sector Enabling Environment Facility</i></p>
Findings at JC level MEDA II	EIB loans targeted on the private sector and trade were provided direct to private corporate bodies and financial intermediaries with a view to strengthening their capacity to finance SMEs (p40)

	In MEDA II a variety of instruments has been used, including technical assistance programmes and twinning to strengthen institutional capacity, and transfer of know-how to SMEs, professional associations, tradefacilitating institutions, and others. (p38)																					
Egypt 98-08	See J.C. 5.6																					
EIB IF/OR (2010)	n.a.																					
Channeling DBs and EIB (2008)	n.a.																					
CDE (2011)	<p>The table below shows that the bulk of the CDE support for access to finance has been addressed to enterprises, either SMEs (65.8%) or financial intermediaries (8.2%). Assistance to IOs (23.8%), with few exceptions, was ad hoc and targeted on professional associations or on specific structures set up to enhance and facilitate access to investment financing of SMEs, such as Tanyo in Niger.</p> <p>Table 1 – Distribution of assistance to the “Banking” sector</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th>€</th> <th>%</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Assistance to financial institutions</td> <td>202 675</td> <td>8.2%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Assistance to IOs</td> <td>588 479</td> <td>23.8%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Assistance to services providers</td> <td>6 200</td> <td>0.3%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Direct and integrated assistance to ACP enterprises</td> <td>1 630 282</td> <td>65.8%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Meetings and technical and thematic seminars</td> <td>50 000</td> <td>2.0%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Total Banking</td> <td>2 477 636</td> <td>100.0%</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p><i>Source: ADE (for the European Commission), Evaluation of the Centre for the Development of Enterprise, 2011 (p44)</i></p> <p>The evaluation further specifies that “As far as investment finance was concerned the financial intermediaries supported have mostly been investment and venture capital funds. Banks were the main beneficiaries for capital finance.</p> <p><i>The financial intermediaries supported through the non-financial assistance of the CDE generally benefited from credit lines or capital participation granted by international financial development institutions, such as the EIB. The objective of such loans and capital participation was to provide the financial intermediaries with the means - and in the case of the banks to stimulate their willingness - to finance SMEs. The non-financial assistance of the CDE to the financial intermediaries was targeted on improving their capacity to interact with SMEs. In such cases the CDE assistance, funded from the EDF subsidy and a modest contribution from the beneficiary, permitted improvements in the effectiveness of the loan or capital participation without increasing significantly its cost to the beneficiary financial institution.”</i></p> <p><i>Source: ADE (for the European Commission), Evaluation of the Centre for the Development of Enterprise, 2011 (p43)</i></p> <p>But as detailed under JC 5.5, there is little evidence, despite efforts, that beneficiary SMEs have managed to obtain financing from a bank.</p>		€	%	Assistance to financial institutions	202 675	8.2%	Assistance to IOs	588 479	23.8%	Assistance to services providers	6 200	0.3%	Direct and integrated assistance to ACP enterprises	1 630 282	65.8%	Meetings and technical and thematic seminars	50 000	2.0%	Total Banking	2 477 636	100.0%
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Banking Measures in the	<p>The risk capital operations could support IOs, for instance:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ “private equity funds: participation in investment funds taking participations in private companies or other investment funds; 																					

Mediterranean area	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>co-investments with pre-selected local intermediaries ;</i> ▪ <i>loans on special conditions, notably to micro-finance institutions;</i> <p><i>and</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>support to guarantee schemes. (p.18).</i> <p>However, the Report found that the choice of Intermediary Organisations was not always adequate: “<i>The Commission did not set up controls in order to detect whether the same beneficiary was benefiting from different risk capital operations, either managed directly or through financial intermediaries. This was due to the absence of a central database at Commission level of all beneficiaries benefiting from risk capital operations.” and “<i>Several financial intermediaries and agents did not meet their monitoring, reporting and financial requirements or were acting as promoters instead of as independent intermediaries” (p.20).</i></i></p>
Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008	Improving access to finance by enterprises was not the focus of the support to Employment and social inclusion looked at within this evaluation.
JC 5.5	<i>The ability of enterprises to obtain financial products and services has been strengthened</i>
<p>I-5.5.1 Improvements in enterprises’ capacities to submit bankable dossiers and evidence provided in this respect</p> <p>I-5.5.2 Improvements in enterprises’ accounting practices and evidence provided in this respect</p> <p>I-5.5.3 Improvements in dealing with enterprises’ lack of capitalisation (e.g. through seed money, venture capital) and lack of collateral (e.g. guarantee schemes) and evidence provided in this respect</p>	
Findings at JC level - Tunisia Evaluation	No specific information available in the report.
Findings at JC level – Moldova Evaluation	No evidence of this. See JC 5.3.
Findings at JC level – El Salvador Evaluation	On support to finance, the report only mentions a missed opportunity in terms of synergies with a programme on remittances: “ <i>Regarding laws for MSMEs, FOMYPE failed to take advantage of FEDECACES’ experience and knowledge about remittances to help analyse and adapt the financial and legal framework so as to improve the use of remittances at national and local level.</i> ” (p. 37).
Findings at JC level Burkina Faso (1999-2008)	One incentive to encourage SMEs to become formal is access to funding but no more information is provided in the Evaluation Report: <i>“Les mécanismes incitatifs mis en place (incitants fiscaux, accès au financement, appui pour la conquête de nouveaux marchés, etc.) ont été suffisamment efficaces pour permettre aux entreprises de travailler dans un cadre légal et de formaliser leur statut et leur activités. »p.73</i>
Guyana (1997-2007)	See JC. 5.2
Findings at JC	The EU/ACP Microfinance Programme did not provide support to intermediary

level - Microfinance	<p>organisations supporting enterprises to develop bankable dossiers or otherwise enhance their capacity to obtain financing.</p> <p><i>Source: EC, EU/ACP Microfinance Programme Final Evaluation</i></p>
Findings at JC level - BizClim	<p>No evidence regarding improvements of enterprises' ability to access finance is provided in the final evaluation. This was not included in the programme's logframe indicators.</p> <p><i>Source: EC, Final Evaluation Private Sector Enabling Environment Facility</i></p>
Findings at JC level MEDA II	<p>The evaluation has shown that the provision of risk capital by the EIB could contribute positively to increasing the risk capital available to enterprises. (p110)</p> <p>Of the funds provided by the Commission to the EIB, the Risk Capital Facility with an envelope of €200m for the period 2001-2006 allowed the EIB to support the private sector through the acquisition of equity or quasi-equity funds in private companies or in investment funds, and through local currency loans to micro-finance institutions. (p40)</p> <p>The <i>Risk Capital Facility</i> has been successfully exploited by the EIB for financing promising private sector initiatives while developing and strengthening financial sector institutions and their capacity to finance SME. The participation of the EIB as the main investor or coinvestor contributed to improving the standards of governance of the beneficiaries, increasing their attractiveness for other investors. It is worth noting that more than 50% of RCF operations are targeted on multi-country initiatives. (p43)</p> <p>The macroeconomic impact of this facility remains difficult to perceive due to the limited amount of the RCF and therefore to its marginal contribution to the development of the private and financial sector in the region. (p44)</p>
Egypt 98-08	<p>In terms of SMEs and micro-enterprises access to commercial bank credit supported by the Commission, the main achievements pointed out in the evaluation are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ FISC-Rural improved the access to credit facilities for small and medium producers of agricultural products, processors and entrepreneurs by (i) providing a revolving credit facility managed by Commercial International Bank, under the property of the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation, and (ii) facilitating the extension of loans to the disadvantaged groups through the establishment of focal points in four governorates. However, the results of the programme have been constrained by the banking financial regulation in risk management and in requiring collaterals for credits. ▪ With FISC-Social, the Social Fund for Development's Small Enterprise Development Organization (SEDO) operated lending programs focused on bank intermediaries that were mostly used in trade and in agro-business and the SFD's Micro-Finance Unit (MFU) operated loan contracts with NGOs intermediaries that reached the poorest strata of the Governorates (Menia and Aswan). (p38)
EIB IF/OR (2010)	n.a.
CDE (2011)	<p>Little evidence. The CDE evaluation finds that the relevance and quality of CDE support in access to finance has been generally recognised, but that there is little evidence that beneficiary SMEs have managed to obtain financing from a bank</p>

	<p>(but in a few individual cases the assistance was also successful in that regard):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>“The 2005 evaluation of the CDE and the ex post evaluations of various programmes indicate that the technical assistance and training provided by the CDE to the financial institutions and to the SME was highly relevant, given the constraining nature of access to finance. They showed that the fields of interventions (aid to preparation of credit requests, information on available support mechanisms, etc.) were well targeted and that the CDE had been instrumental in raising awareness, transferring professional know-how, and assisting with the search for finance and advice on appropriate financing packages. But the various evaluations have not found any evidence that these efforts have led to significant increases in loans made available to SMEs. The building materials evaluation concludes that the measures deployed to tackle this problem have not been sufficient. In particular, the financial capability of the beneficiaries has not been taken sufficiently into account, to the extent that there is no evidence that CDE support has effectively led to an SME obtaining financing from a bank</i> ▪ <i>The survey conducted in this evaluation conveyed a rather similar message: five out of eight survey respondents (62.5%) mentioned that the quality of the assistance to facilitate access to investment finance was good or excellent, while the three remaining respondents considered it fair or average. However, almost half of the survey respondents (12 out of 25) mentioned that CDE services did not help them at all to obtain credit for operations or investments; four mentioned that it helped them to a limited extent; five answered that it helped them considerably; and the remaining four did not know.</i> ▪ <i>Of the 20 activities selected for in-depth analysis in this evaluation, one, the SME Investment Support Programme in Western and Central Africa¹², had access to finance as its main objective. It was successful in improving, through its pre-investment support, access by several SMEs to funding from an investment fund. In three other cases, CDE support - although not specifically directed at access to finance - improved the productivity and cash flow of the companies (the Kaizen Mini Programme Kenya)¹³, gave the companies an opportunity to benefit from a BIO loan (Senegal International Business Meeting)¹⁴, or assisted them in obtaining access to financial credit (Botswana Manufacture Livestock Feed)¹⁵”</i> <p>It notes hereby that “the rate of success of the activities (...) is difficult to measure as the latter did not include targets for the number of beneficiary BDS or SME supported or for the results.”</p> <p>Source: ADE (for the European Commission), Evaluation of the Centre for the Development of Enterprise, 2011 (p45)</p>
<p>Banking Measures in the Mediterranean area</p>	<p>No information.</p>
<p>Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008</p>	<p>Improving access to finance by enterprises was not the focus of the support to Employment and social inclusion looked at within this evaluation.</p>

¹³ KEN-2008-Mgmt

¹⁴ SEN-2010-SIBM

¹⁵ BOT-2009-Livestock

JC 5.6	<i>Supported financial institutions have improved their ability to mobilise funding and/or act as intermediaries</i>
I-5.6.1	Commission strategy and programming documents foresee support for the mobilisation of private funding sources including private savings
I-5.6.2	Commission strategy and programming documents foresee support for more efficient financial markets
I-5.6.3	Central Bank monitoring data show an increase and diversification of private funding sources including private savings
I-5.6.4	Stakeholders consider there is a linkage between the observed evolutions in funding mobilisation and the Commission's support
I-5.6.5	Local financial institutions have improved their mobilisation and intermediation to effectively channel resources and adapt financial services/products to the needs of local enterprises and notably of MSMEs
Findings at JC level - Tunisia Evaluation	No specific information available in the report.
Findings at JC level – Moldova Evaluation	No evidence of this. See JC 5.3.
Findings at JC level – El Salvador Evaluation	The FOMYPE did not support financial institutions' ability to mobilise funding and/or act as intermediaries.
Findings at JC level Guyana (1997-2007)	See JC. 5.2
Findings at JC level - Microfinance	The EU/ACP Microfinance Programme did not aim at improving the ability of financial institutions to mobilise private funding sources. <i>Source: EC, EU/ACP Microfinance Programme Final Evaluation</i>
Findings at JC level - BizClim	BizClim did not provide direct support to financial institutions. The ability of such institutions to mobilise funding and/or act as intermediaries was not included in the programme's logframe indicators. <i>Source: EC, Final Evaluation Private Sector Enabling Environment Facility</i>
Findings at JC level MEDA II	The evaluation has shown that the provision of risk capital by the EIB could contribute positively to an improved management and governance of financial intermediaries. (p110) Of the funds provided by the Commission to the EIB, the Risk Capital Facility with an envelope of €200m for the period 2001-2006 allowed the EIB to support

	<p>the private sector through local currency loans to micro-finance institutions. (p40)</p> <p>Local banks tend to be risk adverse, notably because of their high percentage of non-performing loans. In this context the RCF was a valuable contribution to support the private sector and the financial intermediaries while encouraging them to take entrepreneurial risks. (p44)</p> <p>The macroeconomic impact of this facility remains difficult to perceive due to the limited amount of the RCF and therefore to its marginal contribution to the development of the private and financial sector in the region. (p44)</p> <p>EIB loans targeted on the private sector and trade were provided direct to private corporate bodies and financial intermediaries with a view to strengthening their capacity to finance SMEs. (p40)</p>
Egypt 98-08	<p>In terms of reinforcement of the financial markets and of the capacity of local financial institutions supported by the Commission, the main achievements pointed out in the evaluation are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ FISC-Financial assisted in the modernization process of the Egyptian financial sector (banks, financial institutions and regulators): it helped the Central Bank of Egypt to acquire new skills and have exposure to the latest supervisory techniques and to tackle the issue of the non-performing loans, state-owned banks in their restructuring process, and bank regulations to be increasingly in line with international standards, though more has to be done to comply with Basel II. As the Commission intervention fell under the GoE's Financial Sector Reform Programme umbrella, the improvements were closely embedded into this ongoing Egyptian reform. ▪ FISC-Social delivered outputs (trainings, study tours, seminars, financial guides, etc.) that increased the capacity of local financial institutions to finance small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and micro-enterprises; ▪ FISC-Rural organised awareness raising campaigns and training to encourage banks towards a more commercial cash-flow lending approach for rural agribusiness; ▪ EPAP II contributed to increase the commercial banks capacity to finance SMEs by showing commercial banks that environmental lending can be a profitable and low risk business and leading them to develop their own environmental risk manual which helps them assessing environmental investments. (p37)
EIB IF/OR (2010)	n.a.
CDE (2011)	No information provided in the CDE evaluation on this point (supported financial institutions having improved their ability to mobilise funding and/or act as intermediaries).
Banking Measures in the Mediterranean area	<p>The report found, in the case of Risk Capital Operations, that: <i>“The financial performance of the risk capital operations showed mixed results and often depended on the quality of the financial partners selected by the EIB. [...] . Furthermore, it was difficult for the Court to assess, whether the risk capital operations had achieved their objectives as, most of the time, no indicators other than financial ones, were available.”</i> (p.21). Additionally: <i>“There was no defined strategy as to the type of projects and sectors to be supported, at either the level of the Commission or the EIB or at the level of the financial intermediaries. For several projects, there was no evidence that EU participation was playing a significant role and that they would not have been realized</i></p>

	<i>without it” (p.19).</i>
Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008	Improving access to finance by enterprises was not the focus of the support to Employment and social inclusion looked at within this evaluation.
JC 5.7	<i>Among MSMEs, the Commission has addressed the constraints of micro-enterprises</i>
I-5.7.1	The Commission has analysed the specific problems of micro-enterprises in countries of intervention
I-5.7.2	The Commission has addressed the capacity problems of micro-enterprises in terms of submitting bankable financing requests to financial intermediaries
I-5.7.3	The Commission has addressed the capacity problems of micro-enterprises in terms of management capacity, accounting, and transparency
I-5.7.4	Evidence that MSMEs have improved their access to finance and role of the Commission support in this respect
Findings at JC level - Tunisia Evaluation	No specific information available in the report.
Findings at JC level – Moldova Evaluation	No information specific to micro-enterprises’ constraints.
Findings at JC level – El Salvador Evaluation	The FOMYPE did target micro and small enterprises but focused its support on an enabling business environment and on the supply of BDS, rather than on their difficulties in accessing finance.
Findings at JC level Burkina Faso (1999-2008)	Commission interventions ended-up focusing on micro-enterprises but no mention is made of their specific constraints in the Evaluation Report: Aucune activité adaptée au segment des Moyennes Entreprises n’a été programmée: la cible du PRCE repose sur une définition large de la PME au Burkina Faso ainsi que l’indisponibilité d’une étude approfondie de référence sur la typologie des entreprises et leurs besoins d’appui. Dans la pratique, le PRCE a visé finalement les très petites entreprises assurant ainsi une complémentarité avec d’autres interventions financées par d’autres PTF (Banque Mondiale,..) p.72
Guyana (1997-2007)	The Evaluation Report states in this respect: “Whereas the initial aim of LEAF was to provide credits to micro, small and medium enterprises, most of the funds allocated are micro-loans and only a few small and medium-size enterprises have been serviced (347 micro-credits were disbursed until end-2006 whereas 98 small and medium credits were disbursed).” p.39
Findings at JC level -	The EU/ACP Microfinance Programme did not aim at improving capacity levels of micro-enterprises.

Microfinance	Source: EC, EU/ACP Microfinance Programme Final Evaluation
Findings at JC level - BizClim	BizClim did not aim at improving capacity levels of micro-enterprises <i>Source: EC, Final Evaluation Private Sector Enabling Environment Facility</i>
Findings at JC level MEDA II	Of the funds provided by the Commission to the EIB, the Risk Capital Facility with an envelope of €200m for the period 2001-2006 allowed the EIB to support the private sector through the acquisition of equity or quasi-equity funds in private companies or in investment funds, and through local currency loans to micro-finance institutions (for micro-enterprises ?). (p40) However, access to finance for private enterprises, especially SME and micro-enterprises, remains a severe constraint in the MPCs. Although Mediterranean banks may have, on average, sufficient capital and liquidity, they are extremely risk adverse, largely due to a large proportion of non-performing loans. (p110)
Egypt 98-08	See J.C. 5.5
EIB IF/OR (2010)	n.a.
CDE (2011)	No information provided in the CDE evaluation on access to finance specifically for MSMEs.
Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere)	
Banking Measures in the Mediterranean area	No information.
Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008	Improving access to finance by enterprises was not the focus of the support to Employment and social inclusion looked at within this evaluation.

EQ 6	To what extent did the Commission contribute to a better ability of enterprises, in particular SMEs, to compete and to access technology and new markets?
Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) – Tunisia Evaluation	None.
Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) – Moldova Evaluation	None.
Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) – El Salvador Evaluation	None.
Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) Guyana (1997-2007)	<i>“The NCS (National Competitiveness Strategy) identifies investments in skills as a vital pre-condition for improved national competitiveness.”</i> AND: <i>“Commission support clearly emphasised training as a means of increasing SME competitiveness in Guyana.”p.40</i>
Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) Microfinance	
Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) BizClim	None.
Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) MEDA II	<p>The convergence of the living standards, the significant breakthrough of exports from the MPC to the EU and the intensification of intraregional trade that would be necessary to reach the objective of shared prosperity (2d Pillar of Barcelona) have not taken place at the expected pace. The main explanatory factors behind these trends are the lack of export diversification of many MPC economies and, therefore, the absence of complementarity between their production structures and a slow pace of economic and political reforms that limited their competitiveness, with the exception of a few MPC in the Mashreq region. (piii)</p> <p>The goal of establishing a FTA at the horizon of 2010 has been pursued through the political dialogue and trade negotiations, accompanied and supported by the</p>

	financial assistance provided in the field of economic and social reforms. Macroeconomic stability has significantly improved and encouraging progresses have been made in such fields as macro tariffs, rules of origin, trade liberalisation, competition, and others, and trade agreements have been concluded between MPC and with third countries, but the economic performance of the MPC still lags behind that of other developing countries. (p90)
Egypt 98-08	<p>Commission's interventions have contributed to facilitating the development of productive sector activities but Egypt's performance in ease of doing business remained under the regional and income groups' averages.</p> <p>The absence of a monitoring system enabling to ensure the followup of the achievements of the interventions constrained the assessment of the expected results. However, available monitoring and evaluation reports and interviews reported several positive achievements. (p37)</p> <p>For more detail see J.C. 6.3.</p> <p>Where sector statistical systems do not exist or cannot deliver the data required for result monitoring, the Commission should support the development or improvement of such systems as a matter of priority. (p106)</p>
Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere)	
Banking Measures in the Mediterranean area	No information
Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008	Contributing to enterprises, in particular SMEs, ability to compete and to access technology and new markets was not an objective/component of the Commission's support to Employment and social inclusion looked at under this evaluation.
JC 6.1	<i>The Commission's support to enterprise competitiveness was targeted on the basis of an analysis of the main shortcomings of enterprises in terms of competitiveness</i>
<p>I-6.1.1 Existence of documented analysis of the main shortcomings of enterprises in terms of competitiveness, including forward studies and surveys of key sectors or subsectors in regions/countries concerned</p> <p>I-6.1.2 In its strategy/programming documents the Commission refers to these analyses</p> <p>I-6.1.3 Stakeholders, in particular from the private sector, consider that the shortcomings identified are the right ones</p> <p>I-6.1.4 The Commission support was geared towards tackling the shortcomings identified in these analyses</p> <p>I-6.1.5 A critical mass of enterprises facing competitiveness problems (grouped by sector, or by potential exporting enterprises) has been targeted</p>	

<p>I-6.1.6</p> <p>PSD programming in the area of BDS and non-financial service provision has targeted sustainable reinforcement of the structures and functioning of local markets (as per Recommendation RI-2 of the 2005 Evaluation)</p> <p>I-6.1.7</p> <p>Number of BDS interventions aimed at reinforcing local BDS markets versus the number of interventions providing direct BDS services</p>	
<p>Findings at JC level - Tunisia Evaluation</p>	<p>No information.</p>
<p>Findings at JC level – Moldova Evaluation</p>	<p>The evaluation does not report any evidence of analyses of the main shortcomings of enterprises in terms of competitiveness conducted by or for the Commission in Moldova.</p> <p>However the support provided has intended to reinforce local enterprises, notably by supporting the provision of business development services by Business centres: <i>“With EU support the first Business Centre under the TACIS SME Development Project was created in Comrat (UTA Gagauzia) in November 2003, the Causeni Business Centre was opened in September 2004, and the Soroca Business Centre in October 2004. These Business Centres provided training to local SMEs and to existing or potential local service providers, organized round-tables, facilitated dialogue between local authorities and local SMEs, and provided free-of charge consultancy services to SMEs.”</i> p. 45. However the evaluation reports a number of project design and implementation flaws: <i>“Since local authorities were not properly involved in the design of the Centres, they never entered into any commitment to be part of their future development, with adverse implications for financial sustainability”</i>. P.45.</p>
<p>Findings at JC level – El Salvador Evaluation</p>	<p>FOMYPE was aimed at strengthening MSE's productivity and competitiveness in El Salvador. It was a three-tiered programme, the last two-tiers of which were focused on b) capacity building of the main public and private providers of technical and financial Business Development Services (BDS) (meso level); and c) provision of better, diversified and geographically more accessible BDS to the Salvadorian Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSME) (micro level). (p.37).</p> <p>No evidence of an analysis of enterprises' main competitiveness shortcomings of enterprises in terms of upon which the FOMYPE was based. On the contrary, the report gives evidence of the lack of - or a poor needs assessment which resulted in inadequate targeting of beneficiaries, away from micro and small enterprises <i>“lack of an identification study impeded benefiting from adequate data on the universe and characteristics of the beneficiaries and hereby better targeting the intervention. The lack of a precise targeting led to a contradiction between the objectives and methods of the project rather directed towards the small and medium enterprises and the supposed beneficiaries which should have been the micro enterprises.”</i> (p. 39).</p> <p>The report also indicates however the FOMYPE programme was expected to benefit micro and small enterprises with a competitive potential, mainly export-oriented industrial and agro-industrial enterprises, in priority. The evaluation found however that this targeting did not take place: <i>“qualitatively, insofar as a majority (58%) of the enterprises it supported was operating in the commerce sector and only 39% in the priority targeted industrial and agro-industrial sectors, the programme stayed short</i></p>

	<i>of its expected results.” (p. 39).</i>
Findings at JC level Burkina Faso (1999-2008)	Evidence that SMEs were “diagnosed” but no specific reference is made to “needs in terms of competitiveness”: <i>« Des PME ont été diagnostiquées et mises en relation avec des consultants labellisés. Elles ont ainsi été accompagnées pour comprendre leurs besoins et gérer convenablement leur relation avec un prestataire de services. » p.72</i>
Findings at JC level - Microfinance	The EU/ACP Microfinance Programme did not provide BDS or other assistance to enterprises in order to improve their competitiveness or their ability to access technology or new markets. <i>Source: EC, EU/ACP Microfinance Programme Final Evaluation</i>
Findings at JC level - BizClim	BizClim did not provide BDS or other assistance to enterprises in order to improve their competitiveness or their ability to access technology or new markets. <i>Source: EC, Final Evaluation Private Sector Enabling Environment Facility</i>
Findings at JC level MEDA II	The main demands for cooperation addressed to the Commission by the countries concerned were for activities that strengthened competitiveness and the growth potential of the economies. The Commission has responded with large structural adjustment type BS interventions (FAS IV in Tunisia, economic sector reform in Jordan, tax reform and public administration reform in Morocco) and TA or a combination of BS and TA to support private sector and trade development (TEP A, B and C in Egypt, industrialisation modernisation programmes and SME support programmes in various countries, etc.). (p52)
Egypt 98-08	No specific information found but through several interventions representing almost half of the Commission’s portfolio under the bilateral assistance, the Commission supported GoE reforms of the regulatory, administrative and financial framework for business development, existing GoE reform programmes in sectors critical for the Egyptian economy (textile, tourism, etc.), and GoE efforts to modernise the administrative capacities of the institutions responsible for the provision of economic infrastructure essential for business development. (p36)
EIB IF/OR (2010)	n.a.
CDE (2011)	No information provided in the CDE evaluation on this point (specific analysis of the main shortcomings of enterprises in terms of competitiveness).
Banking Measures in the Mediterranean area	No information
Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008	Contributing to enterprises, in particular SMEs, ability to compete and to access technology and new markets was not an objective/component of the Commission’s support to Employment and social inclusion looked at under this evaluation.
JC 6.2	<i>The delivery channels or IOs for this support were appropriate and able to deliver</i>

<p>I-6.2.1 Commission programming documents and stakeholders show that intermediary organisations were selected on the basis of their ability to deliver</p> <p>I-6.2.2 Monitoring/evaluation reports and/or stakeholders provide evidence that selected intermediary organisations delivered</p> <p>I-6.2.3 Monitoring/evaluation reports and/or stakeholders provide evidence that key follow-up at the level of intermediary organisations occurred</p> <p>I-6.2.4 Monitoring/evaluation reports and/or stakeholders provide evidence to show that institutions for business development services have been strengthened in a sustainable manner</p>	
Findings at JC level - Tunisia Evaluation	No information.
Findings at JC level – Moldova Evaluation	<p>The “SME Support in Rural Sector” project was hindered by a number of factors, according to the evaluation, indicating that the delivery channels or IOs for this support were not fully appropriate and able to deliver :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>“Demand for the services and products of the Business Centre was low, because SME entrepreneurs were often not aware of their need for training and information.</i> • <i>The density of SMEs in rural areas is low.</i> • <i>There is no local tradition of purchasing business services among entrepreneurs, a weakness accentuated by the often marginal profitability and precarious financial situation of many SMEs.</i> • <i>On the service supply side, the number of professionals able to provide high-quality consultancy services is limited.”</i> p. 45. <p>The report adds that “Despite the impressive volume of activities carried out during the lifetime of the project, post-donor support sustainability has proved to be low”. p. 45.</p>
Findings at JC level – El Salvador Evaluation	<p>The evaluation found evidence of the contrary, namely that FOMYPE’s contribution at meso level <i>“to capacity building in the institutions in charge of business development service provision to MSME was limited and showed low levels of sustainability partly due to a misconception of capacity building”</i> (p. 36).</p> <p>The reasons put forward by the evaluation are as follows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Limited focus of capacity-building on 4 institutions: <i>“First, the programme’s capacity building activities meant to strengthen institutions in charge of BDS provision to SMEs converged mainly on 4 institutions and left aside important business and financial service providers, such as universities, Technical Assistance Fund (FAT) operators, technical institutes, non-bank financial institutions.</i> ▪ Focus on operational capacity building rather than on knowledge and skills transfer, for sustainability purposes: <i>Second, activities mostly focused on operational capacity building such as the creation and installation of CONAMYPE’s 3 Business Development Centres, leaving aside institutional management (effectiveness, efficiency, credibility), knowledge and financial strengthening (CONAMYPE’s yearly budget is not higher than an NGO’s).</i> ▪ Focus on supporting running costs rather than longer-term capacity-building: <i>Third, institutional strengthening has been misunderstood and a great part of the capacity building funds were used to pay salaries and administrative expenditures, to the detriment of technical and knowledge capital, which explains the low level of sustainability of</i>

	<i>the intervention in the end.” (p. 38).</i>
Findings at JC level Burkina Faso (1999-2008)	<p>Evidence of positive role played by IOs but no information with respect to their selection:</p> <p><i>Un mécanisme de subvention (chèques services) a facilité l'accès au marché de cette demande émergente et solvable ; la Maison de l'Entreprise du Burkina Faso (MEBF) a confirmé son aptitude en tant qu'interface pour la promotion des Services de développement de l'entreprise (SDE) au Burkina Faso.</i></p> <p><i>La MEBF a confirmé son savoir-faire en matière d'exécution de programmes d'appui au secteur privé. En termes d'impact, elle se positionne actuellement comme une référence en ce qui concerne le marché des services aux entreprises. Il existe une véritable offre locale de services conseil de qualité et la demande solvable des entreprises s'est développée. P.72</i></p> <p>Creation also of successful intermediary organizations: CGAs (Centre de Gestion Agréé):</p> <p><i>En effet, la création des CGA a donné à de nombreuses entreprises une alternative formelle, légale à la continuation de leurs activités dans le cadre strictement informel. Les mécanismes incitatifs mis en place (incitants fiscaux, accès au financement, appui pour la conquête de nouveaux marchés, etc.) ont été suffisamment efficaces pour permettre aux entreprises de travailler dans un cadre légal et de formaliser leur statut et leur activités. p.73</i></p> <p>BUT monitoring and sustainability problems :</p> <p><i>« Les outils de suivi évaluation projetés n'ont pas été maîtrisés et le personnel dédié recruté tardivement. Une évaluation à mi-parcours réalisée en 2006 a permis d'améliorer cette situation mais en 2008, le système prévu n'est pas opérationnel. Fort heureusement des actions pertinentes (enquête de satisfaction par exemple) permettent de pallier partiellement cette déficience du programme. »p.73</i></p> <p><i>« En termes de viabilité, la faiblesse du programme de renforcement des entreprises réside dans l'absence de mécanismes financiers pour la poursuite des activités de formation et de Chèques Service. Les Centre de gestion agréé (CGA) ont plus d'opportunité, car la Chambre de Commerce et d'Industrie du Burkina Faso (CCI-BF) s'est engagé à prendre le relais du PRCE pour leur financement, permettant ainsi à cette composante de poursuivre ses activités malgré l'arrêt du Programme. » p.73</i></p>
Guyana (1997-2007)	<p>For the Guyana Training Agency (GTA) project:</p> <p><i>“They have been satisfied with the training and the results have had a positive impact on employee performance and production. The overall reaction to GTA training was clearly favourable with about 80% of responses indicating that the service came up to their expectations. The GTA project is indeed recognised as a recent success in the NCS. However, since the closure of the agency, a need for technical training in Guyana remains.” p.40.</i></p>
Findings at JC level - Microfinance	<p>The EU/ACP Microfinance Programme did not provide BDS, through IOs or otherwise, to enterprises in order to improve their competitiveness or their ability to access technology or new markets.</p> <p><i>Source: EC, EU/ACP Microfinance Programme Final Evaluation</i></p>
Findings at JC level - BizClim	<p>BizClim did not provide BDS or other assistance to enterprises in order to improve their competitiveness or their ability to access technology or new markets.</p> <p><i>Source: EC, Final Evaluation Private Sector Enabling Environment Facility</i></p>

Findings at JC level MEDA II	Few specific information found, except maybe the quote below. In MEDA II a variety of instruments has been used, including technical assistance programmes and twinning to strengthen institutional capacity, and transfer of know-how to SMEs, professional associations, tradefacilitating institutions, and others. (p38)
Egypt 98-08	No specific information. See J.C. 6.1.
EIB IF/OR (2010)	n.a.
CDE (2011)	No information provided in the CDE evaluation on this point.
Banking Measures in the Mediterranean area	See JC 5.4.
Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008	Contributing to enterprises, in particular SMEs, ability to compete and to access technology and new markets was not an objective/component of the Commission's support to Employment and social inclusion looked at under this evaluation.
JC 6.3	<i>Enterprises that benefited from Commission support have been upgraded and accessed new markets</i>
I-6.3.1	Evidence exists of follow-up after cooperation meetings and agreements in terms of upgrading of enterprises (development of skills, know-how, managerial, market knowledge, etc.), and adequate targeting of key sectors
I-6.3.2	Number of business to business cooperation and promotion meetings which gave rise to increased trade exchanges and enhanced export prospects
I-6.3.3	Number of business to business cooperation and promotion meetings which gave rise to durable partnerships enhancing business opportunities and sustainable enterprise prospects
I-6.3.4	Monitoring reports demonstrate a systematic flow of know-how resulting from such activities
Findings at JC level - Tunisia Evaluation	No information.
Findings at JC level – Moldova Evaluation	The evaluation report is relatively negative on the impact of the support to Business centres, largely as the Business centres and their place within the local institutional landscape as well as the range of services needed by SMEs, were not considered in a holistic way: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>Necessary partnerships and relationships of trust with local public administrations, local businesses, and other donor-financed SME projects were not formed. Since local authorities were not properly involved in the design of the Centres, they never entered into any commitment to be part of their future development, with adverse implications for financial sustainability, p.45</i> ▪ <i>A structural weakness was that local public authorities and businesses preferred to</i>

contract the services of Business Centre directors personally, rather the services of the Business Centre as an institution. p.45

- *“The experience with Business Centres indicates that simply making available advisory services and training is not enough. Local entrepreneurs and would-be entrepreneurs need a large and varied basket of services available at all points in the life cycle of their business, from start-up through expansion to, if necessary, termination. The team would recommend:*
 - *Lengthening project duration. Two years has proved insufficient to achieve a lasting impact.*
 - *Address the entire range of problems faced by SMEs, from poor local infrastructure through lack of access to credit to lack of business skills, rather than concentrating only on a subset of needs.*
 - *Adopt a strategic approach to SME development. Not all SMEs have an equal chance of success. Two basic conditions for an SME to flourish in rural Moldova are horizontal links to a major economic sector (such as to agriculture via food processing) and vertical links to larger firms, perhaps through an outsourcing arrangement. The presence of these links, as well as various agglomeration and networking economies, should be considered.*
 - *Put more emphasis on partnerships with local government, local firms (perhaps via local Chambers of Commerce) and other projects, including EC-financed projects”.* p.103.

In the case of the projects which supported the development of SME strategies, the evaluation reports that: **“SME strategies elaborated in the framework of SME Development projects – although said to be sound -- never found outlets in concrete steps implemented by local public authorities, local business service providers, local businesses, or other donors. There has been no roll-out to other raions. They remain at the survival stage (language courses, secretarial services to the US-financed project, etc.), without a secure and sustainable institutional base. The “case” for sustainable institutions has not been made. They are not “attractive” and trustworthy from the point of view of the LPAs, of only marginal importance to other donors, seldom used by local businesses, even not treated as partners for other EU projects, for example the SME Support in the Rural Sector Project. The poor sustainability of these Business Centres can be contrasted with the more long-term oriented Business Centres established in Ungheni (CBC finance) and Cabul (City Twinning finance). In these cases, a public-private partnership (local public authority and local Chamber of Commerce and Industry) was envisaged from the start. In general, “stand-alone” Business Centre projects have not proved successful.”**, p. 46.

Finally, the report also highlights a number of other contextual factors, such as shortcomings in productive factors, which were not taken into account and limited the effect of the Commission's support to SMEs:

- **“SME development has lagged in part because SMEs lack vertical links to agro-industry, which in turn have lagged in part because European export markets remain unexploited, largely because Europe-consistent standards have not been implemented. Farming practices are unsustainable because they represent survival strategies made necessary by unemployment and the lack of off-farm alternatives. In other words it is difficult, if not impossible, to pick out one piece of the rural poverty puzzle and identify it as the key factor”.** P. 116.
- **“While there has been broad success in policy formulation, policy implementation and enforcement have lagged [...]. The most concrete example is the continued failure to make significant inroads into the structural problem of rural poverty**

	<i>through, for example, SME development and promotion of agriculture-based exports. [...] One result of the field mission has been that of making the team more aware of the community level deficits -- lack of clean water, lack of reliable energy, poor transport infrastructure, and so forth - that keep communities mired in poverty. These grass-roots problems, although acknowledged, were never at the heart of the EC's strategic approach in Moldova.</i> ” p.112-113.
Findings at JC level – El Salvador Evaluation	The evaluation gives evidence of the FOMYPE's contribution at micro level: <i>“it helped deliver improved business services to 7.3% of the 174,400 MSME registered universe, reaching hereby 80% of its quantitative target, but only a small part of those enterprises was in the priority targeted industrial and agro industrial sectors.”</i> (p.36).
Findings at JC level Burkina Faso (1999-2008)	Reference to two programmes PARI I and PARI II which had the objective of facilitating access to regional and international trade through the establishment of accreditation system, normalisation and promotion of quality: <i>« La phase 1 du programme a donné de bons résultats et a permis de développer le socle d'une démarche qualité au niveau des entreprises et des structures de normalisation. Le programme a contribué à mettre en place des organisations de normalisation dans un pays qui n'en avait pas. Des formations ont été développées concernant l'utilisation optimale du nouveau matériel utilisé pour le contrôle de la qualité et permettant une bonne appropriation des normes internationales en la matière. Des rencontres régionales ont eu lieux ainsi que des appuis aux laboratoires et des accompagnements d'entreprises vers la certification. Malheureusement, force est de constater que 5 ans après ces actions ciblées, aucune entreprise n'est certifiée et aucun laboratoire n'est accrédité. »</i> p.74
Guyana (1997-2007)	Evidence that Commission's support to training has had a positive impact on SMEs' competitiveness but no mention is made with respect to access to new market: <i>“The impact of Commission support to private sector development in training on SME competitiveness has been positive”</i> p.40
Findings at JC level - Microfinance	The EU/ACP Microfinance Programme did not provide BDS or other assistance to enterprises in order to improve their competitiveness or their ability to access technology or new markets. <i>Source: EC, EU/ACP Microfinance Programme Final Evaluation</i>
Findings at JC level - BizClim	BizClim did not provide BDS or other assistance to enterprises in order to improve their competitiveness or their ability to access technology or new markets. <i>Source: EC, Final Evaluation Private Sector Enabling Environment Facility</i>
Findings at JC level MEDA II	Support for the macroeconomic and structural reforms has contributed to improving the macro-financial equilibria of the partners and the business environment. (p51) In terms of trade the region remains one of the least integrated in the world; its international trade is progressing but more with the rest of the world than with the EU, and a majority of MPC are losing international market shares. The main explanatory factors behind these trends are the lack of export diversification of many MPC economies and, therefore, the absence of complementarity between their economies, and a slow pace of economic and political reforms that limited their competitiveness. (p38) Macroeconomic stability has improved in most MPC. Factors such as real growth

	<p>of GDP per capital, inflation rates, fiscal balances, current account balances, public debts have evolved favourably. There is evidence that Commission interventions in support of major structural reforms have contributed to these developments that are essential to supporting and reaping the benefits of trade openness, but it is impossible to demonstrate. It must also be observed that the economic performance of the MPC still lags behind that of other developing countries. (p45)</p> <p>Progress towards the central objectives of shared prosperity and economic integration of the MPC with each other and with the EU remain moderate. (p45)</p>
Egypt 98-08	<p>According to the 2009 Doing Business, Egypt was among the top ten global performers (the third time in four years) and top regional performer. Overall, most ease of doing business indicators in Egypt showed progress over time, but among the 178 (respectively 181) countries benchmarked by the WB in 2008 (respectively 2009), Egypt was in the fourth quintile. Moreover, within the Southern Mediterranean region, Egypt remained at the fourth place in 2008 and 2009.</p> <p>Progress in Egypt has in particular been made as regards:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ starting a business (e.g Egypt reduced the paid-in minimum capital requirement by more than 80%, abolished bar association fees, and automatised tax registration while in 2006-2007 it cut the minimum capital required to start a business from LE 50,000 (equivalent to € 6700) to LE 1,000 (equivalent to €134), and halved start-up time and cost) ▪ and trading across borders (e.g new one-stop shops have been established for traders at Egyptian ports; as a result, time to import has been reduced by seven days and time to export by five). <p>But Egypt's performance remained under the regional and income group averages in the following areas: (i) Getting Credit, (ii) Employing Workers, and (iii) Paying Taxes. (p39)</p> <p>The direct causality between Commission's interventions and the evolution of Egypt exports was difficult to show.</p> <p>Several Commission interventions, in particular the TEP programmes, aimed at contributing to the growth of trading and export activities. The achievements in terms of trade facilitation, and more importantly the implementation of the AA as of 2004, contributed to some extent to the evolutions but attribution is not possible. One also has to keep in mind that the GoE has devoted significant resources to trade related-issues and that within the donor community USAID was an important player with a total support of \$14.8bn over the period 1975-2008.</p> <p>Trade between Egypt and the EU in absolute value has increased over the evaluation period, in particular as of 2002.</p> <p>However, the shares of Egypt imports and exports were stronger with the Rest of the World than with the EU and negligible with the Mediterranean area. Moreover, the shares of EU imports (respectively exports) in Egyptian imports (respectively exports) were not increasing over the period.</p> <p>Egypt's external trade situation has not improved over the period. Indeed, while the trade deficit diminished between 1999 and 2002, it widened as of 2003 with imports (respectively exports) increasing at an average pace of 26% (respectively 28%) over the years 2003-2007. (p41-42)</p>

EIB IF/OR (2010)	As background information it is interesting to note the conclusion of the EIB IF/OR (2010) evaluation in this respect (pp. 82-83). <i>“The EIB IF/OR (2010) operations reviewed generally reinforced the financial viability and competitiveness of the enterprises supported, particularly in the financial sector. They also influenced the business environment in terms of access to certain infrastructure and services but less in terms of institutional and regulatory aspects. Overall, the impact on growth and competitiveness at country level remained modest, mainly because of the relatively limited size of the portfolio at country level.”</i>
CDE (2011)	<p>The CDE evaluation shows that "the CDE contributed to developing the competitiveness of beneficiary enterprises which it supported directly or indirectly, but that “there is very limited evidence that this has led to improving access to regional or international markets”:</p> <p><i>“The improvement of enterprise productivity and competitiveness has been a major focus of CDE support. The CDE programmes and ad hoc support included activities that focused on productivity and competitiveness enhancement issues and on increasing the managerial capabilities and performance of beneficiary enterprises. Throughout the evaluation period, the focus shifted increasingly from support to technical and production upgrading so as to strengthen the managerial capabilities of beneficiary enterprises.</i></p> <p><i>The CDE technical assistance contributed to the development of productivity and managerial capability of enterprises, which has led to more efficient management practices. The sector evaluations and field visits revealed that the CDE’s support increased productivity, energy efficiency, and international marketing exposure. The support has led to the general enhancement of the competitive situation of the beneficiaries, including their competitive position in relation to foreign imported products on their own market, but not necessarily to improving market access to international markets, in particular the EU.</i></p> <p><i>There is very limited evidence that enterprises expanded their export market base and that the linkages created have led to sustainable business partnerships. This is mainly due to inadequate reporting by beneficiaries and the absence of follow-up on the activities implemented and their effect on beneficiaries. The evidence collected during the field visits, however, indicated that beneficiaries have improved their productivity and enhanced their competitive situation, and in some cases have improved their market access.”</i></p> <p><i>Source: ADE (for the European Commission), Evaluation of the Centre for the Development of Enterprise, 2011 (p47)</i></p>
Banking Measures in the Mediterranean area	No information.
Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008	Contributing to enterprises, in particular SMEs, ability to compete and to access technology and new markets was not an objective/component of the Commission’s support to Employment and social inclusion looked at under this evaluation.

JC 6.4	<i>Enterprises that benefited from Commission support have increased their access to technology</i>
I-6.4.1	Monitoring reports show that new technology, including European technology, has been mobilised by enterprises in Partner Countries
I-6.4.2	Stakeholders interviews indicate that such technology transfers has heightened their competitiveness
I-6.4.3	Monitoring reports indicate that the volume of technology transfers has been important for enterprises and relevant target sectors
Findings at JC level - Tunisia Evaluation	No information.
Findings at JC level – Moldova Evaluation	No evidence of transfer of technologies resulting from the Commission's support.
Findings at JC level – El Salvador Evaluation	The evaluation only reports the failure of FOMYPE to help one of the Business Development Centres' ISO 9000 certification. (p.38).
Findings at JC level Burkina Faso (1999-2008)	No evidence of increased access to technology
Guyana (1997-2007)	The Evaluation Report states in this respect: <i>“LEAP also designed and conducted training programmes to help entrepreneurs improve the management of their businesses in the areas of book keeping and accountancy, and in computer applications for small business.”</i> p.40 Over 1,000 people were trained up until 2006 and they valued the quality of the training received.
Findings at JC level - Microfinance	The EU/ACP Microfinance Programme did not provide BDS or other assistance to enterprises in order to improve their competitiveness or their ability to access technology or new markets. Source: EC, EU/ACP Microfinance Programme Final Evaluation
Findings at JC level - BizClim	BizClim did not provide BDS or other assistance to enterprises in order to improve their competitiveness or their ability to access technology or new markets. <i>Source: EC, Final Evaluation Private Sector Enabling Environment Facility</i>
Findings at JC level MEDA II	Few or no explicit references to technologies, except in the area of water management (irrigation, drinking water, water sanitation).
Egypt 98-08	No specific information found.
EIB IF/OR	n.a.

(2010)	
CDE (2011)	The findings of the CDE evaluation do not distinguish access to technology from other access-to-market measures. See hence non-technology-specific findings under JC 6.3
Banking Measures in the Mediterranean area	No information.
Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008	Contributing to enterprises, in particular SMEs, ability to compete and to access technology and new markets was not an objective/component of the Commission's support to Employment and social inclusion looked at under this evaluation.

EQ 7	To what extent did Commission support contribute to increased cross-border investment in partner countries' private sectors?
Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) – Tunisia Evaluation	None.
Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) – Moldova Evaluation	None.
Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) – El Salvador Evaluation	None.
Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) Burkina Faso (1999-2008)	Commission's interventions in PSD did not focus on cross-border investment promotion only indirectly with regional support to increase quality: <i>« Il n'a pas été retenu une question spécifique sur l'intégration régionale, qui a été incorporée dans la question Q7 sur le secteur privé. En effet, les appuis régionaux ont porté largement sur le renforcement de la démarche qualité au sein des entreprises privées. » p.18</i>
Guyana (1997-2007)	Investment promotion not the focus of Commission's PSD support in Guyana. Furthermore, the Evaluation Report notes that the amount dedicated was too modest to have any impact on macroeconomic indicators such as FDI. p.41
Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) Microfinance	The EU/ACP Microfinance Programme did not provide support to improving cross-border investment in partner countries' private sectors. <i>Source: EC, EU/ACP Microfinance Programme Final Evaluation</i>
Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) BizClim	BizClim did not provide support directly contributing to cross-border investment, and did not monitor the evolution of such investment. Nevertheless, its activities were designed in part to provide the necessary information and analyses required for improved cross-border investment. Some of its activities were specifically targeted at improving the conditions for FDI, e.g.: The study «Investing in COMESA» was launched in response to the «lack of information in the investment context had been identified as a key impediment to FDI in COMESA in the Regional Investor's Roadmap (2001). This project addressed this concern with the overall objective of contributing to the region's efforts to increase FDI to and cross-border investment within the COMESA region». Monitoring of the impact in terms of FDI flows was not foreseen, however. <i>Source: EC, Final Evaluation Private Sector Enabling Environment Facility</i>
Other relevant information	Stimulation of regional cooperation proved a major hurdle due to extremely difficult regional context. Therefore interventions focused on establishing dialogue

<p>(not captured elsewhere) MEDA II</p>	<p>and networks on issues of common interest. (pv)</p> <p>Low levels of governance, weak institutions and corruption impacted negatively on business environment, competitiveness and foreign investment. (p17)</p> <p>With the exception of Turkey all MPC have a business environment that does not make them attractive for investors and is an impediment to their competitiveness. (p46)</p> <p>More than 50% of RCF operations are targeting multi-country initiatives, thus encouraging cross border cooperation between financial and private sector operators. (p85)</p>
<p>Egypt 98-08</p>	<p>The Neighbourhood Investment Facility, which brings together the Commission, the EU MS, the partner country and the European Public Finance Institutions, presents a good potential for complementarities. In Egypt, it facilitates co-financing of large investments projects in the area of water and energy between the EIB, KfW, AfD and the Commission, such as the recently decided IWSP. (p79)</p>
<p>CDE (2011)</p>	<p>The CDE evaluation (2011) does not provide details on cross-border investment promotion. There have apparently not been many CDE operations in this area over the period 2004-2010.</p>
<p>Banking Measures in the Mediterranean area</p>	<p>None.</p>
<p>Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008</p>	<p>The Commission's contribution to increased cross-border investment in partner countries' private sectors was not an objective/component of the Commission's support to Employment and social inclusion looked at under this evaluation.</p>
<p>JC 7.1</p>	<p><i>The Commission's support was targeted on the basis of an analysis of the needs of enterprises</i></p>
<p>I-7.1.1 Enterprises needs analyses provided in regional/country surveys or through other means</p> <p>I-7.1.2 Evidence in programming documentation on the Commission's knowledge of potential European sources of investment when organising investment promotion activities</p> <p>I-7.1.3 Elements provided in programming documentation and/or by stakeholders showing that the Commission's support was based on these needs analyses and that the Commission had a prioritised approach in selecting groups of beneficiary enterprises</p>	
<p>Findings at JC level - Tunisia Evaluation</p>	<p>No information.</p>
<p>Findings at JC level – Moldova Evaluation</p>	<p>No evidence of this in the evaluation report. There seems to be more evidence of the contrary, ie. The lack of identification of needs and the lack of prioritization in the selection of beneficiary enterprises: <i>“The experience with Business Centres indicates that simply making available advisory services and training is not enough. Local entrepreneurs and would-be entrepreneurs need a large and varied basket of services available at all points in the life cycle of their business, from start-up through expansion to, if necessary, termination. The team</i></p>

	<p>would recommend:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ [...]Address the entire range of problems faced by SMEs, from poor local infrastructure through lack of access to credit to lack of business skills, rather than concentrating only on a subset of needs. ▪ Adopt a strategic approach to SME development. Not all SMEs have an equal chance of success. Two basic conditions for an SME to flourish in rural Moldova are horizontal links to a major economic sector (such as to agriculture via food processing) and vertical links to larger firms, perhaps through an outsourcing arrangement. The presence of these links, as well as various agglomeration and networking economies, should be considered.p.103. <p>However more generally, the evaluation reports that the Commission's support to SME development was geared towards employment generation, especially in rural areas with low employment prospects: "Recognising that the vast majority of firms in Moldova are small businesses and that the employment generation potential of these enterprises remains under-developed, the EC placed SME development at the heart of its efforts to fight unemployment in Moldova. In line with the focus on poverty and GoM priorities as expressed in the EGPRSP, these SME development efforts were focused on rural areas, where the lack of off-farm employment opportunities has worsened the already low level of productivity in Moldovan agriculture while providing no escape from poverty.", p.47.</p>
Findings at JC level – El Salvador Evaluation	The FOMYPE programme was not focused on contributing to increased cross-border investment.
Findings at JC level Burkina Faso (1999-2008)	<p>Evidence that some analyses were conducted but no information on the type of needs assessed:</p> <p>« Des PME ont été diagnostiquées et mises en relation avec des consultants labellisés. Elles ont ainsi été accompagnées pour comprendre leurs besoins et gérer convenablement leur relation avec un prestataire de services. » p.72.</p>
Findings at JC level - Microfinance	<p>The EU/ACP Microfinance Programme did not provide support to improving cross-border investment in partner countries' private sectors.</p> <p>Source: EC, EU/ACP Microfinance Programme Final Evaluation</p>
Findings at JC level - BizClim	<p>Some of BizClim's interventions were specifically targeted at providing background data in order to facilitate FDI flows. Those that were, were generally designed in response to needs analyses, e.g.:</p> <p>The « Investing in COMESA » study cited « A lack of information in the investment context had been identified as a key impediment to FDI in COMESA in the Regional Investor's Roadmap (2001). This project addressed this concern with the overall objective of contributing to the region's efforts to increase FDI to and cross-border investment within the COMESA region. »</p> <p>Source: EC, Final Evaluation Private Sector Enabling Environment Facility</p>
Findings at JC level MEDA II	No specific information found but private sector operators were not sufficiently associated in the design of some systemic interventions targeted at improving the business environment. (p102)
Egypt 98-08	No specific information found but through several interventions representing almost half of the Commission's portfolio under the bilateral assistance, the Commission supported GoE reforms of the regulatory, administrative and financial framework for business development, existing GoE reform programmes

	in sectors critical for the Egyptian economy (textile, tourism, etc.), and GoE efforts to modernise the administrative capacities of the institutions responsible for the provision of economic infrastructure essential for business development. (p36)
Findings at JC level	
Banking Measures in the Mediterranean area	Not relevant.
Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008	The Commission's contribution to increased cross-border investment in partner countries' private sectors was not an objective/component of the Commission's support to Employment and social inclusion looked at under this evaluation.
JC 7.2	<i>The Commission has supported the development of investment-related intermediary organisations, and these IOs have effectively engaged in investment promotion</i>
I-7.2.1 Number of Investment Promotion Agencies (IPAs) and other investment intermediaries supported	
I-7.2.2 Monitoring reports contain evidence of improvements in the performance of IOs in the supply of investment support	
I-7.2.3 Number of investment promotion events that gave rise to actual additional investment	
Findings at JC level - Tunisia Evaluation	No information.
Findings at JC level – Moldova Evaluation	This was not the focus of the Commission's support to PSD in Moldova over the period evaluated.
Findings at JC level – El Salvador Evaluation	The FOMYPE programme was not focused on contributing to increased cross-border investment.
Findings at JC level - Microfinance	The EU/ACP Microfinance Programme did not provide support, through IOs or otherwise, to improving cross-border investment in partner countries' private sectors. <i>Source: EC, EU/ACP Microfinance Programme Final Evaluation</i>
Findings at JC level - BizClim	BizClim did not provide support, through IOs or otherwise, to improving cross-border investment in partner countries' private sectors. <i>Source: EC, Final Evaluation Private Sector Enabling Environment Facility</i>
Findings at JC level	Few specific information found, except the quote below:

MEDA II	In MEDA II a variety of instruments has been used, including technical assistance programmes and twinning to strengthen institutional capacity, and transfer of know-how to SMEs, professional associations, tradefacilitating institutions, and others. (p38)
Egypt 98-08	No specific information found. See J.C. 7.1.
Findings at JC level	
Banking Measures in the Mediterranean area	Not relevant.
Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008	The Commission's contribution to increased cross-border investment in partner countries' private sectors was not an objective/component of the Commission's support to Employment and social inclusion looked at under this evaluation.
JC 7.3	<i>The Commission has supported investment related business to business meetings & investment promotion events, and these have had identifiable results</i>
I-7.3.1 Number of investment promotion meetings & events organised	
I-7.3.2 Monitoring reports contain evidence of investment mobilisation resulting from such events, and stakeholders confirm such results	
I-7.3.3 Commission follow-up steps have been taken to enhance the results of investment promotion activities	
I-7.3.3 Also see answers to indicators I-6.3.2 and I-6.3.2 above	
Findings at JC level - Tunisia Evaluation	No information.
Findings at JC level – Moldova Evaluation	No evidence of this.
Findings at JC level – El Salvador Evaluation	The FOMYPE programme was not focused on contributing to increased cross-border investment.
Findings at JC level - Microfinance	The EU/ACP Microfinance Programme did not provide support, through investment promotion events or B2B meetings, to improving cross-border investment in partner countries' private sectors. <i>Source: EC, EU/ACP Microfinance Programme Final Evaluation</i>
Findings at JC	BizClim provided only limited support to B2B meetings, with the logframe

level - BizClim	including just one sub-activity on “ <i>Exchange of information, coordination meetings and joint actions.</i> ” No evidence of the monitoring of the results of such meetings was provided in the final evaluation. <i>Source: EC, Final Evaluation Private Sector Enabling Environment Facility, p.81</i>
Findings at JC level MEDA II	No specific information found.
Egypt 98-08	No specific information found. See J.C. 7.1.
Findings at JC level	
Banking Measures in the Mediterranean area	Not relevant.
Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008	The Commission’s contribution to increased cross-border investment in partner countries’ private sectors was not an objective/component of the Commission’s support to Employment and social inclusion looked at under this evaluation.
JC 7.4	<i>Commission support has encouraged FDI</i>
I-7.4.1	Reports exist that document the mobilisation of investment flows as a result of Commission support
I-7.4.2	In the absence of actual financial investment, the Commissions reports demonstrate that potential has been created for later investment resulting from business partnerships
Findings at JC level - Tunisia Evaluation	No information.
Findings at JC level – Moldova Evaluation	No evidence of this.
Findings at JC level – El Salvador Evaluation	The FOMYPE programme was not focused on encouraging FDI.
Findings at JC level - Microfinance	The EU/ACP Microfinance Programme did not provide support to improving cross-border investment in partner countries’ private sectors. <i>Source: EC, EU/ACP Microfinance Programme Final Evaluation</i>
Findings at JC level - BizClim	
Findings at JC level MEDA II	Low levels of governance, weak institutions and corruption impacted negatively on business environment, competitiveness and foreign investment. (p17)

	<p>The growth of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the MPC has significantly strengthened over the period 2000-2006. The larger share is coming from the Gulf, mainly in the banking and real estates sector. In relative terms FDI from the EU have declined but European investors remained the most important ones in the manufacturing and SME sectors. (p50)</p> <p>Specific programmes directly targeted private sector development amounted to €504.3m over the evaluation period and took mostly the form of large technical assistance programmes and twinning activities targeted on capacity-building in public (customs, ministerial departments, etc) and private institutions. They consisted of projects in support of SMEs and industry; trade related assistance; support for the financial sector and the financing of enterprises; and projects to support privatisation and attract foreign direct investment. (p39)</p> <p>The <i>Risk Capital Facility</i> has been successfully exploited by the EIB for financing promising private sector initiatives while developing and strengthening financial sector institutions and their capacity to finance SME. The participation of the EIB as the main investor or coinvestor contributed to improving the standards of governance of the beneficiaries, increasing their attractiveness for other investors. It is worth noting that more than 50% of RCF operations are targeted on multi-country initiatives. (p43)</p>
Egypt 98-08	No specific information found. See J.C. 7.1.
Findings at JC level	
Banking Measures in the Mediterranean area	No information.
Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008	The Commission's contribution to increased cross-border investment in partner countries' private sectors was not an objective/component of the Commission's support to Employment and social inclusion looked at under this evaluation.
JC 7.5	<i>SMEs were adequately targeted by comprehensive provision of investment related services</i>
I-7.5.1	Regional and country surveys and studies indicate that SMEs were among the Commission's priorities
I-7.5.2	Intervention documentation evidences that SMEs have been duly targeted
I-7.5.3	Monitoring reports contain evidence of investment mobilisation benefiting SMEs
Findings at JC level - Tunisia Evaluation	No information.
Findings at JC level – Moldova	No evidence of investment mobilisation benefiting SMEs as a result of the Commission's support. However SMEs were the target of the Commission's PSD support in Moldova over 2000-2006 (see 0.2 in the box on Preliminary elements) a

Evaluation	and also <i>“Since Moldova is a small country, all but a few enterprises are, in effect, SMEs. SME development is therefore a highly appropriate response, and the EC should continue to work in this area.”</i> p.103.
Findings at JC level – El Salvador Evaluation	The focus of the FOMYPE was not on providing investment related services.
Findings at JC level - Microfinance	The EU/ACP Microfinance Programme did not provide support to improving cross-border investment in partner countries' private sectors. Source: EC, EU/ACP Microfinance Programme Final Evaluation
Findings at JC level - BizClim	BizClim did not provide support directly contributing to cross-border investment, and did not monitor the evolution of such investment. Nevertheless, its activities were designed in part to provide the necessary information and analyses required for improved cross-border investment. Some of its activities were specifically targeted at improving the conditions for FDI, e.g.: The study «Investing in COMESA» was launched in response to the «lack of information in the investment context had been identified as a key impediment to FDI in COMESA in the Regional Investor's Roadmap (2001). This project addressed this concern with the overall objective of contributing to the region's efforts to increase FDI to and cross-border investment within the COMESA region”. Monitoring of the impact in terms of FDI flows was not foreseen, however. <i>Source: EC, Final Evaluation Private Sector Enabling Environment Facility</i>
Findings at JC level MEDA II	No specific information found.
Egypt 98-08	No specific information found. See J.C. 7.1.
Findings at JC level	
Banking Measures in the Mediterranean area	Not relevant.
Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008	The Commission's contribution to increased cross-border investment in partner countries' private sectors was not an objective/component of the Commission's support to Employment and social inclusion looked at under this evaluation.

EQ 8	To what extent has the Commission PSD support contributed to facilitate the generation of employment?
Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) – Tunisia Evaluation	None.
Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) – Moldova Evaluation	None.
Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) – El Salvador Evaluation	None.
Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) Guyana (1997-2007)	With respect to employment, Guyana faces a real brain drain problem. A problem that Commission's interventions have not sufficiently taken into account according to Evaluation Report: <i>"Interventions in training are however called into question in view of the absence of a national policy on migration of the workforce which is needed to address the brain drain problem faced by Guyana."</i> p.36
Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) Microfinance	The EU/ACP Microfinance Programme did not target nor have visible impact upon the generation of employment in partner countries. <i>Source: EC, EU/ACP Microfinance Programme Final Evaluation</i>
Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) BizClim	BizClim did not target nor have visible impact upon the generation of employment in partner countries. <i>Source: EC, Final Evaluation Private Sector Enabling Environment Facility</i>
Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) MEDA II	Overall there has been a consensus between the Commission and its partners that efforts should be concentrated on strengthening the economy and the social delivery mechanisms and on generating income and employment opportunities in a general way rather than targeting specific populations. (p51) The improved economic performance to which activities targeting private sector and trade development contributed has probably been beneficial insofar as it created opportunities for employment and income but there is no evidence that they benefited or protected the poor. (p52)
Egypt 98-08	Although no specific labour reform policies were planned, the Government's economic reform programme launched in the early 2000s placed employment in the centre of its preoccupations. (p44) Employment issues that were so far tackled primarily through the demand channel

	(production) would, through the new reforms, now also be addressed through the supply side (quality and level of available manpower). (p44) The absence of a labour policy can be partly explained by the difficulties in capturing the essence of the Egyptian labour market. (p44) The informal job market is large (estimated anywhere between 30% to 70% of the total) (p45)
CDE (2011)	The CDE evaluation (2011) does not provide information on employment.
Banking Measures in the Mediterranean area	None.
Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008	None.
JC 8.1	<i>The Commission monitors employment effects</i>
I-8.1.1	Description of Commission practices in terms of monitoring of employment effects (e.g. specific indicators defined)
I-8.1.2	Evolution of employment figures included in beneficiary progress reports to Commission
Findings at JC level - Tunisia Evaluation	No information.
Findings at JC level – Moldova Evaluation	There is no evidence that within the projects the Commission monitored employment effects. However within the frame of the country evaluation, effects of the Commission's support on employment were reviewed (see following JCs). The evolution of employment figures in Moldova was also included in the country-level evaluation: "Data from the Ministry of Economy and Trade indicate that the number of SMEs rose from about 24,000 in 2002 to about 34,000 in 2006. SME development is largely confined to the Chisinau and Balti municipalities. There are between 10 and 15 times more SMEs in Chisinau than in the rural areas », p.46.
Findings at JC level – El Salvador Evaluation	The evaluation gives evidence of the contrary: "It is difficult to assess the EC contribution to employment and economic growth due to the absence of internal monitoring tools within FOMYPE and of a baseline survey. Indicators, defined at design stage so as to assess the contribution of FOMYPE to the socio-economic development of the country (e.g. the contribution of MSEs to GDP and to regional and extra-regional trade), have not been monitored during implementation . Consequently, there is a lack of statistical data which explains why the final evaluation could not assess to what extent MSMEs which benefited from FOMYPE have contributed to economic growth and employment in El Salvador. » (p.39).
Findings at JC level Burkina Faso (1999-2008)	No evidence of Commission monitoring employment even though one overarching objective of Commission's support to PSD in Burkina Faso is the creation of employment:

	« Le Programme de renforcement des capacités des entreprises (PRCE) visait à appuyer le développement des petites et moyennes entreprises susceptibles d'apporter une meilleure contribution aux objectifs sociaux et économiques de création d'emplois et de modernisation. » p.72
Guyana (1997-2007)	No evidence of Commission monitoring employment even though training was one of the three areas of focus (with BDS and financial services): <i>“Commission support clearly emphasised training as a means of increasing SME competitiveness in Guyana. Both Commission interventions addressing private sector development in Guyana focused on training. GTA and LEAP training activities, in terms of number of people trained, are satisfactorily meeting the goals” p.40</i>
Findings at JC level - Microfinance	The EU/ACP Microfinance Programme did not target nor have visible impact upon the generation of employment in partner countries. Employment effects were not monitored by the Programme management during implementation. <i>Source: EC, EU/ACP Microfinance Programme Final Evaluation</i>
Findings at JC level - BizClim	BizClim did not target nor have visible impact upon the generation of employment in partner countries. <i>Source: EC, Final Evaluation Private Sector Enabling Environment Facility</i>
Findings at JC level MEDA II	No specific information found.
Egypt 98-08	Overall poor knowledge of the labour market's characteristics and functioning. Labour dynamics in Egypt are strongly influenced by behavioural, social and cultural characteristics which make secondary and higher education very attractive to the detriment of vocational and technical education and employment. (p45)
Findings at JC level	
Banking Measures in the Mediterranean area	The Report says that: <i>“it was difficult for the Court to assess, whether the risk capital operations had achieved their objectives as, most of the time, no indicators other than financial ones, were available.”</i> (p. 21).
Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008	The evaluation found that: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>“At the programme design level, major weakness exist in the lack of ESI-related indicators - such as job creation and levels of social protection”</i> (p. 3). ▪ <i>“the frequent absence of detailed labour market analysis for support to economic growth and promotion of the private sector reveals that ESI-related support is often relatively weak or merely applies an indirect focus on employment creation in the majority of its interventions. Nonetheless, its overall effect is positive for employment generation for new labour market entrants.”</i> (p. 2). ▪ <i>“Enhance employment consequences of economic reform and private sector support programmes through the introduction of specific measures and monitoring and evaluation tools, mainly via the introduction of adequate employment indicators. Where appropriate, complementary programmes should be added to core policy support programmes, specifically to enhance the employment effects of economic reforms. For example, specific foci and related measures should be enhanced in some areas, such as the informal economy, SMEs, youth inclusion and employment, territorial development in the less advantaged areas, rural employment, and others.”</i> (p.4)

JC 8.2	<i>Generation of employment has been a concern of the Commission when providing PSD support</i>
<p>I-8.2.1 Commission strategy and programming documents explain how supported interventions will contribute to employment</p> <p>I-8.2.2 Available reports explain how Commission support aimed at and did contribute to employment</p> <p>I-8.2.3 Stakeholders consider that Commission interventions aimed at and did contribute to the generation of employment</p>	
Findings at JC level - Tunisia Evaluation	No information.
Findings at JC level – Moldova Evaluation	<p>The report indicates that the Commission's support to SME development was geared towards employment generation, especially in rural areas with low employment prospects. However results were low and not sustainable. Reasons for such poor results are the lack of integration of the business centres supported with local governments, firms, and other donor-financed projects: <i>“Recognising that the vast majority of firms in Moldova are small businesses and that the employment generation potential of these enterprises remains under-developed, the EC placed SME development at the heart of its efforts to fight unemployment in Moldova. In line with the focus on poverty and GoM priorities as expressed in the EGPRSP, these SME development efforts were focused on rural areas, where the lack of off-farm employment opportunities has worsened the already low level of productivity in Moldovan agriculture while providing no escape from poverty. Results have been mixed. At the policy formulation level, TA provided by the EC made a very substantial contribution to an improvement in the general environment for SME development. At the level of actual impacts at local level, however, little appears to have resulted. The statistical data examined show no evidence of an improvement in rural living conditions, let alone of an improvement that could be attributed to the EC's SME development initiatives. Pilot Business Centres financed by Tacis engaged in many activities, but failed to attain sustainability and have become largely dysfunctional since donor support ended. The adverse context – low demand for services, for example – bears part of the blame for this. However, project-related reports and interviews reveal some basic structural flaws with the approach, especially failure to form effective partnerships with local governments, firms, and other donor-financed projects. Business Centres financed through other Tacis interventions (CBS and Twinning) appear to have a higher likelihood of achieving lasting impacts”</i>. P. 47.</p>
Findings at JC level – El Salvador Evaluation	<p>The FOMYPE programme did aim to contribute to employment, as well as economic growth, by strengthening MSEs' productivity and competitiveness. However as the evaluation reports: <i>“there is a lack of statistical data which explains why the final evaluation could not assess to what extent MSMEs which benefited from FOMYPE have contributed to economic growth and employment in El Salvador. »</i> (p.39).</p>
Findings at JC level Burkina Faso (1999-2008)	Again mentioned as an overarching objective but the Evaluation Report does not state how different interventions contributed to foster employment.

Guyana (1997-2007)	Competitiveness was the primary concern of the Commission when providing support to training. p.40
Findings at JC level - Microfinance	The EU/ACP Microfinance Programme did not target nor have visible impact upon the generation of employment in partner countries. <i>Source: EC, EU/ACP Microfinance Programme Final Evaluation</i>
Findings at JC level - BizClim	BizClim did not target nor have visible impact upon the generation of employment in partner countries. <i>Source: EC, Final Evaluation Private Sector Enabling Environment Facility</i>
Findings at JC level MEDA II	No specific information found.
Egypt 98-08	<p>Employment was not directly targeted or addressed by the Commission (not one of the Commission-Egypt areas of cooperation during 1998-2008) but was indirectly supported via many aspects of the cooperation. Many of the Commission programmes supporting economic transition addressed in fact several of the areas identified by the GoE as important for employment. During the period these programmes have in particular aimed:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ to stimulate private sector growth, to restructure productive enterprises and to enhance external trade capacities thus potentially contributing to production and employment (Trade Enhancement Programmes TEPs, Spinning and Weaving restructuring, Support to the Association Agreement SAAP, Research and Innovation); ▪ to stimulate the creation of small enterprises (via the provision of funds for on-lending to small and micro-enterprises – Social Fund, FISC Rural and FISC Social) which were given a special role in the Sixth Five Year Plan in creating job opportunities for unemployed youth; ▪ to improve education access and to reform the education system (Education Enhancement Programme, Education Sector Policy Support Programme, higher education Tempus) which aimed to increase education levels of the population and thus improve the skills of new entrants into the labour market; and, ▪ to contribute to the improvement of the overall competitiveness of Egyptian enterprises through supporting them with highly qualified and skilled labour in different production and service sectors (manufacturing, tourism and construction) and developing human and institutional capacities for the formulation and implementation of a national technical and vocational education and training (TVET) reform policy. <p>Amongst these different programmes, the still ongoing TVET has been the closest to aiming directly for labour market reform even though, by focusing on the retraining of the existing workforce to facilitate industrial modernisation, it mainly targeted the qualifications and skills of the already employed workforce rather than tackling employment levels. (p45)</p>
Findings at JC level	
Banking Measures in the Mediterranean area	No evidence of this.

<p>Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008</p>	<p>The evaluation has found that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ « <i>Most EC interventions in support of trade development, macro-economic stability and growth contribute to creating new sustainable employment opportunities. However, few of these interventions focus explicitly on employment creation as their main target or support specific measures to this end.</i>” (p. 3). ▪ “<i>ESI support is not adequately mainstreamed in the various components of the country and regional strategies. There is a weak focus on ESI results and ESI indicators are considered almost exclusively in the ESI specific programmes; and (ii) there is still a poor sectoral approach in ESI, with few exceptions, mainly in the ENP area. There have been few attempts to address ESI themes as a comprehensive issue requiring inter-connected and complementary interventions, with strong government coordination, participation by the social partners, and joint harmonized action with other donors.</i>” (p. 3). ▪ “<i>Employment creation is tackled as a core sector in three countries (Algeria, Tunisia and Jordan) and has been considered as a secondary area in two other countries (Morocco and Egypt).</i>” (p. 41).
<p>JC 8.3</p>	<p>Commission support to formalisation of MSMEs has contributed to increased employment opportunities</p>
<p>I-8.3.1 Evolution of employment figures within MSME sector in beneficiary countries during evaluation period</p> <p>I-8.3.2 Number of MSMEs created in beneficiary countries during evaluation period</p>	
<p>Findings at JC level - Tunisia Evaluation</p>	<p>No information.</p>
<p>Findings at JC level – Moldova Evaluation</p>	<p>The reports mentions the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ “<i>The statistical overview provided by the indicators above gives no evidence that EC support for rural SMEs resulted in any significant or sustainable reduction in rural unemployment or improvements in living standards.</i>”, p. 43. ▪ “<i>Thorough regulatory and administrative reform and the provision of SME Business Centres has not had an impact on rural unemployment.</i>”, p. 114. ▪ “<i>The team concluded that nothing in the data consulted suggested that there has been a “take-off” in rural Moldova. Given the severe environmental degradation associated with Moldovan agriculture, vitalizing non-farm employment is essential. [...] However, when compared with other SME-related projects the team found the results of the EC’s work in this area to be meagre. In order to improve impact and achieve tangible results in the form of improved income, reduced poverty and reduced unemployment, the team recommends a broader approach than applied in the past</i>”. P.103
<p>Findings at JC level – El Salvador Evaluation</p>	<p>The FOMYPE programme did not aim at the formalisation of MSMEs. Additionally, the evaluation gives no information on MSME creation.</p>
<p>Findings at JC level Burkina Faso (1999-2008)</p>	<p>One effect of Commission’s support to PSD was the formalisation of MSMEs but the Evaluation Report does not link this phenomenon with evolution of employment figures:</p> <p>“<i>La création des CGA a donné à de nombreuses entreprises une alternative formelle, légale à la</i></p>

	<i>continuation de leurs activités dans le cadre strictement informel. Les mécanismes incitatifs mis en place (incitants fiscaux, accès au financement, appui pour la conquête de nouveaux marchés, etc.) ont été suffisamment efficaces pour permettre aux entreprises de travailler dans un cadre légal et de formaliser leur statut et leur activités. » p.73</i>
Findings at JC level - Microfinance	The EU/ACP Microfinance Programme did not target nor have visible impact upon the generation of employment in partner countries nor on the formalisation of informal employment opportunities. <i>Source: EC, EU/ACP Microfinance Programme Final Evaluation</i>
Findings at JC level - BizClim	BizClim did not target nor have visible impact upon the generation of employment in partner countries. <i>Source: EC, Final Evaluation Private Sector Enabling Environment Facility</i>
Findings at JC level MEDA II	No specific information found.
Egypt 98-08	No specific information found.
Findings at JC level	
Banking Measures in the Mediterranean area	No evidence of this.
Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008	The evaluation finds that “an important weakness in EC strategy is that the informal economy is often overlooked. Despite its responsiveness to local contexts, the EC development strategy does not reflect adequate attention to improving access to employment and working conditions for the poor in the informal economy”, (p. 3).
JC 8.4	<i>Commission SBS has increased private sector employment opportunities in the sectors supported</i>
I-8.4.1	Evolution of employment figures in the sectors supported by Commission SBS during evaluation period
Findings at JC level - Tunisia Evaluation	No information.
Findings at JC level – Moldova Evaluation	Not applicable, no SBSs in PSD in Moldova between 2000 and 2006.
Findings at JC level – El Salvador Evaluation	The evaluation reports: “there is a lack of statistical data which explains why the final evaluation could not assess to what extent MSMEs which benefited from FOMYPE have contributed to economic growth and employment in El Salvador. » (p.39).
Findings at JC level Burkina Faso (1999-2008)	The Commission used a “project approach” for PSD in Burkina Faso, there is evidence that it chose this instrument because the government does not yet possess a sectoral policy. The Evaluation Report concludes and recommends in this respect: <i>CCL : « Les difficultés de passage d'une approche « projet » classique à une approche sectorielle,</i>

	<p><i>financée ou non par de l'ABS, sont également observées dans les appuis de l'UE au secteur privé et au secteur « culture ». Ces difficultés ne sont néanmoins pas insurmontables et pourraient significativement s'estomper grâce à une amélioration du dialogue sectoriel et à une meilleure définition du rôle de l'Etat dans le cadre de ce type de transition. » p.4</i></p> <p><i>REC : « Utiliser les approches « projets » pour préparer les conditions de mise en place d'un ABS et lever les contraintes sectorielles spécifiques qui retardent l'utilisation de l'ABS (faiblesse de la gouvernance sectorielle (transports), blocage du dialogue sectoriel (culture), absence de stratégie sectorielle appropriée (secteur privé), etc..) » p.5</i></p>
Guyana (1997-2007)	SBS was not used for support to PSD
Findings at JC level - Microfinance	The EU/ACP Microfinance Programme was not implemented via SBS. <i>Source: EC, EU/ACP Microfinance Programme Final Evaluation</i>
Findings at JC level - BizClim	BizClim did not target nor have visible impact upon the generation of employment in partner countries. <i>Source: EC, Final Evaluation Private Sector Enabling Environment Facility</i>
Findings at JC level MEDA II	No specific information found.
Egypt 98-08	<p>SBS in trade and PSD contributed to stimulate private sector growth, to restructure productive enterprises and to enhance external trade capacities thus potentially contributing to production and employment (Trade Enhancement Programmes TEPs, Spinning and Weaving restructuring, Support to the Association Agreement SAAP, Research and Innovation). ; (p45)</p> <p>Several of the Commission's programmes directly supported employment creation such as the credit lines provided by the FISC programmes (rural and social) which, at their own scale, led to increased employment opportunities for rural based households and low income households. Their impact was limited to the scale of the programme (and the survival rate of created jobs unknown) and some 43,883 jobs were estimated to have been created thanks to the loans extended under the FISC programmes to small and microenterprises. (p47-48)</p> <p>SBS in education, particularly the national technical and vocational education and training (TVET) reform policy supported by the Commission contributed to the improvement of the overall competitiveness of Egyptian enterprises through supporting them with highly qualified and skilled labour in different production and service sectors. (p45) However, the sustainability of TVET is doubtful in practice due to several factors :</p> <p>(i) at the policy level, sustainability is conditional upon a national body taking over the responsibility of the overall TVET reform which is still currently under discussion;</p> <p>(ii) the time span for TVET (six years) is short in regard of the complexity of the project ;</p> <p>(iii) the project's design primarily fits the manufacturing sector and its application to the tourism and construction sectors which have different training dynamics was found by beneficiaries to be less successful ;</p> <p>(iv) the financial sustainability of the project is uncertain. (p46)</p>

Findings at JC level	
Banking Measures in the Mediterranean area	No evidence of this.
Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008	The evaluation finds that: <i>“There have been few attempts to address ESI themes as a comprehensive issue requiring inter-connected and complementary interventions, with strong government coordination, participation by the social partners, and joint harmonized action with other donors. Such weaknesses also limit the use of budget support and other flexible and policy-sensitive aid modalities.”</i> (p.2).
JC 8.5	<i>Commission support has contributed to the transition of entrepreneurs from the informal to the formal sector</i>
I-8.5.1 Commission strategy and programming documents foresee support for the transition from the informal to the formal sector I-8.5.2 Improvements in the transition from the informal to the formal sector	
Findings at JC level - Tunisia Evaluation	No information.
Findings at JC level – Moldova Evaluation	No evidence of this.
Findings at JC level – El Salvador Evaluation	The FOMYPE programme did not aim at the formalisation of MSMEs.
Findings at JC level Burkina Faso (1999-2008)	See JC 8.3
Findings at JC level - Microfinance	The EU/ACP Microfinance Programme did not target nor have visible impact upon the transition of entrepreneurs from the informal to the formal sector. Source: EC, EU/ACP Microfinance Programme Final Evaluation
Findings at JC level - BizClim	BizClim did not target nor have visible impact upon the generation of employment in partner countries. Source: EC, Final Evaluation Private Sector Enabling Environment Facility
Findings at JC level MEDA II	No specific information found.
Egypt 98-08	No specific information found.

Findings at JC level	
Banking Measures in the Mediterranean area	No evidence of this.
Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008	The evaluation finds that “ <i>an important weakness in EC strategy is that the informal economy is often overlooked. Despite its responsiveness to local contexts, the EC development strategy does not reflect adequate attention to improving access to employment and working conditions for the poor in the informal economy</i> ”, (p. 3).

EQ 9	What was the Commission's added-value when providing support to PSD in third countries?
Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) – Tunisia Evaluation	None.
Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) – Moldova Evaluation	None.
Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) – El Salvador Evaluation	None.
Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) Burkina Faso (1999-2008)	<p>The Evaluation Report does not emphasis the Commission's added-value in the PSD sector but it does refer to a "success story":</p> <p><i>« La mission a identifié deux secteurs de concentration pour lesquels l'aide européenne possède un réel avantage comparatif à savoir l'appui macro-économique et les infrastructures. Néanmoins, les tous les autres secteurs présentent des résultats intéressants et sont susceptibles de faire l'objet de financements futurs. En effet, dans les autres secteurs, l'aide européenne a néanmoins connu de réelles « success stories » (Culture, Eau, appui PME, Sécurité alimentaire et développement rural) qu'il faut souligner et qui peuvent servir de base à une réelle consolidation des interventions dans ces secteurs. » p.92</i></p>
Guyana (1997-2007)	<p>The Evaluation Report mentions that: "The interventions focus on specific Commission PSD strategy activities: business development services, training, and financial services." But does not mention whether this is the case because of an added-value of the Commission in these areas. p.38</p>
Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) Microfinance	
Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) BizClim	<p>Overall, the BizClim evaluation makes the following observations regarding EC added-value:</p> <p><i>« The communication of DGVIII to the European Council of November 1998 encouraged a combination of support at the macro-economic level (improvement of the business environment and investment climate; policy and institutional reforms), meso level (strengthening of the financial and non-financial intermediaries) and micro level (increasing enterprise competitiveness). To boost the private sector in ACP countries, the EC implemented a number of programmes, which included a second generation of reforms for governments, dialogue between the private sector and ACP governments on how to improve services intermediary structures</i></p>

	<p>and to catalyze a higher level of private capital and the development of EU-ACP business co-operation. Different programmes made a diagnosis of the situation in each country (DIAGNOS), offer credit facilities and technical advice to enterprises (EBAS and INFAC), and promote co-operation agreements among operators (PRO€INVEST).</p> <p>BizClim was a direct off-spring of DIAGNOS, intended to add value specific to the EC in the ACP area by supporting policy dialogue at the national and regional levels on all matters that helped improve the business environment. Coherent with the 1998 DGVIII Communication to the European Council, BizClim supported actions at the macro and meso level but did not intervene at the micro level because it did not involve directly with private enterprises.</p> <p>Co-ordination with other donors, especially with actions carried out by EU member states, was ensured through the OECD, the Donor Committee for Small Enterprise Development and CGAP. Regular consultation and exchange of information was carried out with donors active in the area of PSD. Specifically, the €2 million contribution provided by the PSEEF, the source of funding of BizClim, to the Knowledge for Change Programme (KCP) and to the Public Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF) was aimed at ensuring complementarity, coordination and synergies with other efforts by EU Member States. »</p> <p>Source: EC, Final Evaluation Private Sector Enabling Environment Facility</p>
CDE (2011)	<p>Overall, the CDE evaluation concludes on CDE value-added (Conclusion 3) in summary that “The CDE had a strong value added for beneficiaries through its capacity to mobilise qualified professional expertise. However, to its funders (mainly EU MS through the EDF), IFIs and other partners, its value added was low.”</p> <p>It provides hereby the following details:</p> <p>“The value added of the CDE must be assessed under three categories of stakeholders: the beneficiary enterprises; the funders of the CDE, that is mainly the EU MS through the EDF; but also partners who co-finance its activities or finance it to manage their own programmes. Three sub-conclusions are drawn, corresponding to these different stakeholders.</p> <p><u>Value added for beneficiaries (SMEs, IOs and BDS providers)</u></p> <p>C7.1 For the beneficiary enterprises the value added of the CDE has lain in the access to relatively low-cost valuable technical assistance and professional expertise that generally increased their performance. For the intermediary organisations and BDS providers, the value added of the CDE has lain in its capacity to mobilise qualified expertise and strengthen their capacity to provide services to enterprises.</p> <p>For the beneficiaries the potential value added of the CDE lies in (1°) the timely availability of relevant advice and technical assistance at a subsidised cost, and (2°) the transfer of useful professional expertise.</p> <p>Regarding the first point, beneficiary enterprises, IOs and BDS providers benefitted from TA and advice that were relevant insofar as they addressed their requests, and at a relatively limited cost since it never exceeded 33% of the total cost, regardless of their contribution capacity. However, in several cases complex and bureaucratic procedures have been a disincentive to drawing on the support of the CDE.</p> <p>On the second point the record of the CDE is positive, owing to the quality of the expertise provided and the dedication of the staff in the field; but the support provided was too fragmented and marginal to allow achievement of significant results at sector or meso levels, beyond the direct benefits to the enterprises or organisations assisted.</p>

Value added for the funders of the CDE: EU MS through the EDF

C7.2 For the funders of the CDE, the value added of CDE support has been limited by the lack of CDE strategic approach (see conclusion 11) and its high cost of operations.

For the EU MS, the potential value added of the CDE resides in its capacity to:

- *identify the priority needs of the private sector; and*
- *use efficiently the EDF subsidy to respond to private sector needs in such a way as to complement and support the overall EDF programmes as prepared and managed by the Commission.*

The record of the CDE has been mixed: although it has demonstrated that its demand-driven approach has undoubtedly permitted it to address the needs expressed by beneficiaries, a number of issues are of concern:

- *from the field visits, there was little evidence that CDE's knowledge of the situation of the private sector served as an important input in the programming of the Commission's assistance.*
- *The CDE being an institution created under Cotonou dealing with private sector development, there was a potential for complementarities with Commission programmes and EIB operations. However, synergies remained underexploited over the evaluation period, implying that the potential of the whole EU family had not been fully achieved.*
- *Finally, CDE activities have been professional and useful for the beneficiaries but have been provided at an extremely high management cost for the EDF, owing to the heavy permanent structure involved.*

Value added for partner institutions (e.g. IFIs, regional organisations, other donors, ACP partner governments)

For the partners, the value added of the CDE contribution has lain more in its complementarities with them and in its capacity to transfer professional know how than in its cost-effectiveness in managing programmes on behalf of third parties.

For the partner institutions the added value of the CDE has lain in:

- *the complementarities of the CDE with their own specific characteristics that allows them to better fulfil their mandate by using the CDE to provide services they cannot offer themselves;*
- *its accumulated knowledge of private sector problems at enterprise level and the experience it has built up in identifying and mobilising adequate professional expertise;*
- *its capacity to manage their programmes swiftly and efficiently.*

The cooperation with the EIB illustrates the first point. There are clear potential complementarities between the CDE and the EIB, the CDE providing non-financial assistance to financial intermediaries benefiting from EIB global loans and to SMEs to help them access this source of finance. While the two institutions have cooperated in the past, there was no concrete collaboration between them during the evaluation period at HQ or in the field, although there have been increased contacts since 2010. They signed two conventions in 2011 (one for the Pacific and the other for the Caribbean) which envisage management by the CDE of the EIB-financed TA to financial intermediaries.

The second and third points are deeply inter-related. Partners who use the CDE to implement their PSDP and other programmes expect the institution both to provide adequate professional expertise and to administer their programmes in a swift and cost-efficient manner. Specifically:

- *Despite the fact that the CDE had a good record when it came to transferring professional*

	<p><i>know-how, its high running costs and deficiencies in reporting its performance have made it difficult for the partners to perceive the value added of the CDE prior to its restructuring.</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>Hence, although potential complementarities were recognized by the partners, their interaction with the CDE remained minimal during the evaluation period. The 2010 strategic redirection and re-focus by the CDE on the management of programmes for third parties has again raised the possibility of achieving synergies with partners. A number of agreements have been concluded between the CDE and partners (the PSDP DR Congo materialised in 2010 and the WAEMU PSDP was signed in 2011). However, so far it has not been clear how the CDE plans to adapt its processes and organisational modalities to the role of "programme management".</i> <p><i>At the same time the restructuring of the CDE has also led to the reduction of in-house expertise. If the CDE does not take sufficiently into consideration the necessity of maintaining and expanding its in-house (or closely associated) professional expertise there is a risk that its potential value added to the partner institution may become negligible."</i></p> <p><i>Source: ADE (for the European Commission), Evaluation of the Centre for the Development of Enterprise, 2011 (pages 77-79)</i></p>
Banking Measures in the Mediterranean area	None.
Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008	The Evaluation mentions the EC's specific value added on workers' rights (p. 4). Whilst the nature of this added value is not clearly specified in the report, there are indication, that it is an area which has not usually been supported by other donors.
JC 9.1	<i>The Commission PSD strategies were geared towards the provision of Commission-specific benefits, as compared to private sector initiatives, other financing modalities and support provided by other actors</i>
<p>I-9.1.1 Commission documents that lay down the overall (not country specific) PSD strategy of the Commission require that the Commission PSD strategies and interventions are chosen on the basis of, among other things, the specific benefits the Commission can provide</p> <p>I-9.1.2 CSPs/RSPs and programming documents highlight the specific value added of the Commission support</p> <p>I-9.1.3 Stakeholders consider that the potential value added of the Commission support has been a key criterion for deciding on the nature of the support to be provided</p>	
Findings at JC level - Tunisia Evaluation	No information.
Findings at JC level – Moldova Evaluation	No evidence of attention to added-value in the formation of the Commission's PSD support.
Findings at JC level – El Salvador	No information on whether FOMYPE, its design or targets, was informed by a Commission added-value. Rather the evaluation reports that: " <i>Much less evidence could indeed be found of any comparative advantage in having the EC intervening vs. EU MS,</i>

Evaluation	<i>for instance in the areas of education, juvenile delinquency, basic services or SME” (p.39).</i>
Findings at JC level - Microfinance	<p>The EU/ACP Microfinance Programme was geared towards the provision of capacity building rather than credit lines, in part due to the perception that the Commission was well placed to provide technical assistance whilst other donors were better suited to provision of credit.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The Programme was designed in response to the multi-donor Peer Review of EC activities in microfinance, conducted in 2003. The Peer Review recommended focusing on capacity building of the microfinance sector rather than direct provision of credit lines for microfinance institutions. ▪ This recommendation was made on the basis that other actors, including the EIB, are better placed to provide credit lines. ▪ The recommendation was implemented by the EC in 2004, and the Programme was designed as part of this response. <p><i>Source: EC, EU/ACP Microfinance Programme Final Evaluation</i></p>
Findings at JC level - BizClim	<p>BizClim was designed in response to a consideration that the EC could add value by targeting diagnosis of the business environment at the macro and meso levels in third countries:</p> <p><i>« The communication of DGVIII to the European Council of November 1998 encouraged a combination of support at the macro-economic level (improvement of the business environment and investment climate; policy and institutional reforms), meso level (strengthening of the financial and non-financial intermediaries) and micro level (increasing enterprise competitiveness). To boost the private sector in ACP countries, the EC implemented a number of programmes, which included a second generation of reforms for governments, dialogue between the private sector and ACP governments on how to improve services intermediary structures and to catalyze a higher level of private capital and the development of EU-ACP business co-operation. Different programmes made a diagnosis of the situation in each country (DIAGNOS), offer credit facilities and technical advice to enterprises (EBAS and INFAC), and promote co-operation agreements among operators (PRO€INVEST). BizClim was a direct off-spring of DIAGNOS, intended to add value specific to the EC in the ACP area by supporting policy dialogue at the national and regional levels on all matters that helped improve the business environment. Coherent with the 1998 DGVIII Communication to the European Council, BizClim supported actions at the macro and meso level but did not intervene at the micro level because it did not involve directly with private enterprises. Co-ordination with other donors, especially with actions carried out by EU member states, was ensured through the OECD, the Donor Committee for Small Enterprise Development and CGAP. Regular consultation and exchange of information was carried out with donors active in the area of PSD. Specifically, the €2 million contribution provided by the PSEEF, the source of funding of BizClim, to the Knowledge for Change Programme (KCP) and to the Public Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPLAF) was aimed at ensuring complementarity, coordination and synergies with other efforts by EU Member States. »</i></p> <p><i>Source: EC, Final Evaluation Private Sector Enabling Environment Facility</i></p>
Findings at JC level MEDA II	<p>No specific information found but most interventions have been prepared through studies, joint seminars and workshops; budget support interventions, particularly those addressing structural reforms and reform of the public finance systems, benefited from deeper and continued analysis during the implementation process. (p32)</p> <p>See also J.C. 4.2 on policy dialogue.</p>

<p>Egypt 98-08</p>	<p>The relevance and thus effectiveness and sustainability of the Commission-Egypt cooperation programme could be greatly enhanced if cooperation interventions would take account of the specific characteristics of the Commission's potential support modalities (e.g. choose priority areas where the Commission has experience and value added). (p98)</p> <p>The GoE's desire to receive support in some areas where it felt the Commission to have a comparative advantage remained unanswered. Examples include support to trade facilitation or to human resource development, including technical knowhow, training, transfer of knowledge and science and technology, for which the Commission has potential value added and could step up its current support. (p21)</p>
<p>CDE (2011)</p>	<p>See the overall assessment of the CDE value-added in the 2011 CDE evaluation directly under EQ9 above.</p> <p>One of the findings is that the CDE had value-added for the beneficiary enterprises "in the access to relatively low-cost valuable technical assistance and professional expertise that generally increased their performance. For the intermediary organisations and BDS providers, the value added of the CDE has lain in its capacity to mobilise qualified expertise and strengthen their capacity to provide services to enterprises". The following details are provided:</p> <p><i>"For the beneficiaries the potential value added of the CDE lies in (1°) the timely availability of relevant advice and technical assistance at a subsidised cost, and (2°) the transfer of useful professional expertise.</i></p> <p><i>Regarding the first point, beneficiary enterprises, IOs and BDS providers benefitted from TA and advice that were relevant insofar as they addressed their requests, and at a relatively limited cost since it never exceeded 33% of the total cost, regardless of their contribution capacity. However, in several cases complex and bureaucratic procedures have been a disincentive to drawing on the support of the CDE.</i></p> <p><i>On the second point the record of the CDE is positive, owing to the quality of the expertise provided and the dedication of the staff in the field; but the support provided was too fragmented and marginal to allow achievement of significant results at sector or meso levels, beyond the direct benefits to the enterprises or organisations assisted."</i></p> <p><i>Source: ADE (for the European Commission), Evaluation of the Centre for the Development of Enterprise, 2011 (pages 77)</i></p>
<p>Banking Measures in the Mediterranean area</p>	<p>The Court of Auditors report quotes Article 6(4) of the MEDA regulation to specify in which cases risk capital operations should be used and also which added value it was intended to bring: "<i>Risk capital shall be used, first and foremost, to make available own funds to undertakings in the production sector, in particular those that can bring together natural or legal persons who are nationals of a Community Member State and of Mediterranean non-member countries or territories. Risk capital shall be used primarily to strengthen the private sector, and in particular to reinforce the financial sector in MEDA countries. It shall add value clearly, by offering financial products and terms that are not available locally</i>". (p.19).</p>
<p>Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008</p>	<p>The Evaluation finds that interventions conducive to employment at country level inspired by most of the core elements of the European Social Model combining economic growth with social justice, is an AV. (p. 24). "<i>the definition of a European Social Model which, in turn, has directly contributed to a more structured and comprehensive European development strategy for ESI-related issues.</i>" (p.71).</p>

JC 9.2	<i>The beneficiaries of Commission PSD support were not in a position to provide or to provide as swiftly and with the same results the support that was provided by the Commission</i>
I-9.2.1	Evidence provided in strategy, programming documents and reports that show that beneficiaries at macro, meso- and micro level were not in a position to provide the support
I-9.2.2	Stakeholders consider that beneficiaries at macro, meso- and micro level were not in a position to provide the support
Findings at JC level - Tunisia Evaluation	No information.
Findings at JC level – Moldova Evaluation	On the contrary, the report argues that two other SME support projects, similar to the Commission's, were more successful <i>“when compared with other SME-related projects (see also the Special Focus section in Annex 3) the team found the results of the EC's work in this area to be meager”</i> . P.103.
Findings at JC level – El Salvador Evaluation	No information.
Findings at JC level - Microfinance	The EU/ACP Microfinance Programme provided support to both large and small microfinance institutions (MFIs). No direct evidence is available from the programming documentation to demonstrate that the beneficiaries were not in a position to achieve the results by other means. However, the fact that few beneficiaries managed to leverage non-public funds for the projects implemented under the Programme suggests that their ability to implement without Programme support would have been somewhat limited. As the Final Evaluation notes: <i>“Leverage (i.e. access to additional funding, and/or more diversified funding) could be observed mainly for larger MFIs or MFIs linked to international networks. Leverage remained limited for second-tier [smaller] MFIs and savings-oriented institutions...[Globally] grantees managed to mobilise additional public funding, but little semi-public and private funding (apart from deposits).”</i> <i>Source: EC, EU/ACP Microfinance Programme Final Evaluation</i>
Findings at JC level - BizClim	No information.
Findings at JC level MEDA II	Most interventions have been prepared through studies, joint seminars and workshops; budget support interventions, particularly those addressing structural reforms and reform of the public finance systems, benefited from deeper and continued analysis during the implementation process. (p32) See also J.C. 4.2 on policy dialogue.
Egypt 98-08	No specific information found.
CDE (2011)	No information provided in the CDE evaluation on this point (beneficiaries were not in a position to provide the support), except that it was relatively low-cost valuable technical assistance and professional expertise.

Banking Measures in the Mediterranean area	There is evidence of the contrary, in the case of Risk Capital Operations. The report finds that: <i>“For several projects, there was no evidence that EU participation was playing a significant role and that they would not have been realised without it »</i> (p.19).
Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008	No information.
JC 9.3	<i>The Commission's grant support had specific benefits</i>
I-9.3.1 Areas of PSD support selected by the Commission are generally not considered as fit for loan funding or for other financing modalities	
I-9.2.2 Evidence provided in evaluation/ monitoring reports on the value added of the Commission through blending grant funding with other modes and sources of funding	
I-9.2.3 Stakeholders consider that the Commission had value added through blending grant funding with other modes and sources of funding	
I-9.2.4 Elements provided in strategy, programming documents, and reports that show other specific benefits of grant funding for the interventions	
I-9.3.5 Stakeholders are able to show other specific benefits of the grant funding for the PSD support provided	
Findings at JC level - Tunisia Evaluation	No information.
Findings at JC level – Moldova Evaluation	No evidence of this.
Findings at JC level – El Salvador Evaluation	The evaluation reports that: <i>“Much less evidence could indeed be found of any comparative advantage in having the EC intervening vs. EU MS, for instance in the areas of education, juvenile delinquency, basic services or SME”</i> (p.39).
Findings at JC level - Microfinance	<p>The EU/ACP Microfinance Programme provided grant funding and did not blend grants with other modes of funding. The use of grant funding in the microfinance sector was highlighted as a much needed and Commission-specific benefit by the Final Evaluation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>“There clearly was (and still is) a need for grant funding in the area of microfinance. In Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, microfinance was not yet much developed and financial service providers had proven weaknesses requiring more capacity-building than in other regions. ‘Smart subsidies’ were needed for capacity-building and sector-level strengthening and for stimulating innovation or demonstration.</i> <p><i>Providing grant funding was the EC's main comparative advantage for the Programme; there being relatively few donors providing grants in the area of microfinance, and indeed</i></p>

	<i>progressively fewer over time"</i> <i>Source: EC, EU/ACP Microfinance Programme Final Evaluation</i>
Findings at JC level - BizClim	No evidence of this
Findings at JC level MEDA II	<p>The blending of Commission and EIB instruments is an element of Community value added. By making resources available to the EIB within the framework of the risk capital facility, the Commission (i) bears a risk on risk capital that could not be borne by the EIB without breaching its governance rules and allows the EIB to address an essential constraint on the development of the private sector, and (ii) promotes organisation of networking among professional associations. (p78)</p> <p>The fact that the EIB does not have a programmatic approach precludes both entities from deciding on what should be supported with loans and what with grants. This has negatively impacted on the complementarity of their respective measures. (p77)</p> <p>The criteria for using development cooperation modalities, in particular grants and loans, and the definition of the conditions upon which the Commission accepts to provide an interest subsidy on EIB loans in the environment and natural resources sector have not been sufficiently clear to achieve an optimal blend of instruments to finance private sector and infrastructure. (p80)</p> <p>The absence of clear and common criteria in the use of instruments by the Commission on the one hand, and by the EU MS development agencies and EIB on the other, did not permit a fully consistent approach to similar problems. Indeed, the Commission supports the development of the private sector with development financing modalities such as grants where the rules of some EU MS agencies and the EIB impose loans. Similarly, several environment projects have been funded with Commission grants (e.g. an €80m water and sanitation programme in Egypt) whereas these projects have an economic return and could have benefited from an EIB subsidised loan. (p86)</p>
Egypt 98-08	No specific information found.
Channeling DBs and EIB (2008)	<p>According to the evaluation, the Commission's grant funding indeed allowed for the provision of different types of value added (see also the answer to JC. 2.5). Indeed, the evaluation explains that the strategic agreements on which the Commission's support was based aimed precisely at complementing the EIB-managed financial instruments (interest rate subsidies, technical assistance, risk capital) with the provision of Commission grants (p. 82.). This allowed according the evaluation (p. 85-86) the generation of different types of value added:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - for the Commission: it had a broader range of instruments to offer to beneficiaries, it could rely on EIB expertis and experience and it could strengthen the EC-EIB co-operation in addition to strengthening its visibility; - for Partner Countries: they can benefit from a larger array of instrument in economic cooperation with the EU and from better lending conditions in less productive sectors as well as from the EIB expertise and experience <p>for the EIB itself: larger EIB operations, not possible with own resources, better implementation of EIB loans, higher attractiveness of EIB loans. Also: the critical mass provided by the Commission, strengthened EC-EIB cooperation and a</p>

	leverage for developing projects with an environmental dimension
CDE (2011)	See the overall assessment of the CDE value-added in the 2011 CDE evaluation directly under EQ9 above. One of the findings is that the CDE had value-added for the beneficiary enterprises <i>“in the access to relatively low-cost valuable technical assistance and professional expertise that generally increased their performance. For the intermediary organisations and BDS providers, the value added of the CDE has lain in its capacity to mobilise qualified expertise and strengthen their capacity to provide services to enterprises”</i>
Banking Measures in the Mediterranean area	Not applicable.
Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008 Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008	No information.
JC 9.4	<i>The Commission had a specific value added compared to the support provided by other public actors, in particular but not only EU MS</i>
I-9.4.1	Documents show and stakeholders consider that the Commission's support at country and/or intervention level was of significant financial weight compared to the support provided by other actors
I-9.4.2	Documents show and stakeholders consider that the Commission provided a technical expertise that could not be provided by other actors (to the extent possible to be broken down by area of intervention)
I-9.4.3	Documents show and stakeholders consider that the Commission infused EU best practice and standards through its support
I-9.4.4	Documents show and stakeholders consider that the Commission's procedures) offered advantages compared to those of other actors
I-9.4.5	Documents show and stakeholders consider that the fact that the support was provided by the Commission as representing the EU offered specific advantages
I-9.4.6	Documents show and stakeholders consider provide examples of other types of VA
Findings at JC level - Tunisia Evaluation	On the significance of the Commission's support, the evaluation reports that the relative weight of the GBSs within public spending was in fact small. The AV lied therefore more in its accompanying function than in the financial means provided: <i>« Mêmes si les quantités d'AB et leur pourcentage sur les flux concessionnels globaux ont augmenté au cours du temps, le poids relatif de l'AB sur la dépense publique est resté modeste : en</i>

	<p>2006 le montant global de l'AB était équivalent à 1,55% des dépenses, en 2007 et 2008 il était respectivement de 1,90% et de 0,61%. Ceci explique pourquoi les responsables du ministère des finances et de la BCT, mais aussi les membres de la Commission des Finances de la Chambre des députés, ont estimé lors de cette évaluation que les AB étaient moins une source de financement qu'un « accompagnateur » utile ayant soutenu le mouvement tunisien de réformes économiques. », p. 25.</p>
Findings at JC level – Moldova Evaluation	<p>On the contrary, the report argues that two other SME support projects, similar to the Commission's, were more successful “when compared with other SME-related projects (see also the Special Focus section in Annex 3) the team found the results of the EC's work in this area to be meager”. P.103. “As the EC has discovered, SME development in Moldova is difficult. However, as demonstrated by the experience of two major SME development projects -- the “Rural Investments and Services” project (RISP), co-funded by the World Bank, DFID and other donors, and the EBRD BSA Project— it is not impossible.” (annex 3, p.156).</p>
Findings at JC level – El Salvador Evaluation	<p>The evaluation reports that: “Much less evidence could indeed be found of any comparative advantage in having the EC intervening vs. EU MS, for instance in the areas of education, juvenile delinquency, basic services or SME” (p.39).</p>
Findings at JC level - Microfinance	<p>No evidence is presented in the programme documentation concerning the specific value added of the Commission's support via the EU/ACP Microfinance Programme as opposed to the support provided to the microfinance sector by other donors or EU Member States.</p>
Findings at JC level - BizClim	<p>The evaluation of BizClim provides the following evidence regarding added-value with respect to other donors:</p> <p>« In terms of complementing partner country or REC policies and other donors' interventions, events funded by BizClim were generally seen as adequate instruments for informal public private dialogue, particularly in the context of EPA negotiations. »</p> <p>Source: EC, Final Evaluation Private Sector Enabling Environment Facility</p>
Findings at JC level MEDA II	<p>Coordination between the Commission and EU MS has been the object of guidelines at the outset of MEDA II. There is strong coordination in the political dialogue accompanying the AA and the identification of the regional programmes. Moreover, strategic coordination between Commission services and the BWI and the EIB takes place in the Luxembourg process. (piv)</p> <p>Coordination between the Commission and the EIB also proved rather formal at the programming stage whereas the EIB, EU MS development agencies and BWI developed closer cooperation at implementation stage. The government partners generally preferred to maintain bilateral relations with each donor and did not push further the recent development of donor coordination mechanisms in which they fulfilled their leading role unevenly. (p75)</p> <p>The three sources of funds made available by the Commission to be managed by the EIB have achieved their intended goal of creating a bridge between the EIB banking activities and the economic and development objectives of the cooperation of the Commission with the MPC. (p103)</p> <p>The blending of Commission and EIB instruments, especially risk capital facility operations and interest subsidies, and the use of the twinning modality, reinforced the Community dimension. (p75)</p>

Egypt 98-08	<p>Several donor coordination mechanisms have been established between the Commission and EU MS as well as with other donors:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ at strategic level: the Luxembourg process gathers the Commission, EIB, WB and IMF, while coordination between the Commission, EU MS and the EIB takes place in the MED/ENPI Committee at programming level; and ▪ at implementation level: the Development Partners Group gathers all donors in the field and ten thematic sub-groups have been put in place. (p74) <p>Consultation and involvement of EU MS in the CSP/NIP formulations has progressively improved over the evaluation period. Donor coordination within the DPG has been mostly limited to exchange of information. In 2009, coordination was variable across sectors. (p75)</p> <p>Coordination with other donor-funded interventions has not been the general rule. It materialised during implementation when foreseen at design stage. It was generally stronger for BS interventions with the matrix of disbursement conditions being the result of extensive discussions. (p75)</p> <p>Complementarities between donors' interventions have generally not materialized. The research of complementarities was increasingly pursued by donors at the end of the evaluation period, with the Commission active in the fields of education, water, energy and transport. (p75)</p>
CDE (2011)	<p>One of the findings of the 2011 CDE evaluation is that the CDE had low value-added to its funders (mainly EU MS through the EDF), IFIs and other partners. See details directly under EQ9 above.</p>
Banking Measures in the Mediterranean area	<p>No information.</p>
Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008	<p>No information.</p>

EQ 10	To what extent were the Commission's organisational set-up and management practices fit to a successful implementation of its PSD support?
Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) – Tunisia Evaluation	None.
Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) – Moldova Evaluation	None.
Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) – El Salvador Evaluation	None.
Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) Microfinance	
Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) BizClim	
Other relevant information (not captured elsewhere) MEDA II	The management structure of the MEDA programme evolved over the period. In 2000 the reform of the Commission's external assistance addressed four broad areas: the Commission's programming assistance; the project cycle; the creation of a EuropeAid Cooperation Office; and the devolution of project and programme management tasks and responsibilities to Delegations. From 2003 a new version of the Financial Regulation became effective. (pi)
CDE (2011)	<p>The CDE evaluation shows that efficiency was a major issue at the CDE, in terms of inadequate internal organization (Conclusion 6), inadequate management of human resources (C7), difficulties relating to the decentralization (C8), and limitations in budget and accounting (C9).</p> <p>Those conclusions are summarised as follows (and are further detailed in the report if needed):</p> <p><i>“Though important improvements have taken place, the internal organisation of the CDE has remained insufficiently directed to the achievement of the goals of the mandate. Considerable efforts made by the CDE over the last years to overcome its deficiencies and improve its functioning namely, through increased focus on programme approach, the “four pillars” certification, and the improvement of operation and administrative rules. Notwithstanding these positive changes, the organisation of the CDE</i></p>

	<p><i>remained in many aspects rather bureaucratic and procedural in a way that it constituted an impediment to a swift and flexible cooperation with private sector organisations and SMEs. Even more important, it did not give enough room to the verification that the activities pursued achieve their intended results. The financial data, although compliant with the financial regulation and submitted to regular audits, did not provide the analytical information needed to monitor the strategy and to make quick decisions when revenues and expenditures deviated from the original plans.”</i></p> <p>“The management of the human resources of the CDE has been too much oriented to a reduction of the ratio of operating costs to total costs rather than to adaptation of the internal organisation to the best way of fulfilling the mandate.” (see details under JC 10.3 below)</p> <p>“Decentralisation has so far improved the CDE’s visibility and its proximity to the local stakeholders; however its full potential benefits have been hampered by the limited decision-making capacity of the RFOs and the difficulty of increasing their outreach in countries other than where they are located.” (see details under JC 10.1 below)</p> <p>“The budget and the accounting did not provide a clear view of the resources and means of the CDE in such a way as to allow an understanding of the way in which resources have been used and thereby to provide guidance on reaching the objectives. The budgets of the CDE have complied with the financial regulation of the CDE but they have not been organised so as to provide clear information on how the resources have been allocated to achieve the objectives. Such limitations imply that it is difficult - including for the management of the CDE - to have a comprehensive view of the resources mobilised by the CDE and the different types of expenditure they allow. Such information would be necessary to guide an efficient allocation of resources and to understand the real leverage of its activities. As it is, the budget and accounts are satisfactory from a formal legal perspective but they do not constitute a useful instrument to follow up the overall activity of the CDE during the budget year.”</p> <p><i>Source: ADE (for the European Commission), Evaluation of the Centre for the Development of Enterprise, 2011 (pages iii to v)</i></p>
<p>Banking Measures in the Mediterranean area</p>	<p>The Court of Auditors’ report highlights the lack of coordination and information exchange between the Commission and the EIB, on the implementation and follow-up of the banking measures in the Mediterranean funded by MEDA and managed by the EIB. The lack of information was mainly between the EUD at the EIB and the report notes that information provided by the EIB to HQ did not always reach interested EUDs. It notes however that establishment of EIB representative offices has facilitated communication between the Commission and the EIB at the local level: “The Commission, and especially two of the EC delegations in the partner countries visited by the Court, were not sufficiently informed of EIB projects and was therefore not able to monitor or follow them. Furthermore, even when information had been transmitted by the EIB to the Commission’s central offices in Brussels, it had not always been shared with the delegations visited by the Court. The audits on the spot did, however, show that the establishment of EIB representative offices had facilitated communication between the Commission and the EIB at the local level. This was especially noted in Morocco, with the organisation of regular meetings.” (.14).</p> <p>The Commission’s official reply to the Court of Auditors Report highlights improvement measures: “since 2005 the Commission, including the delegations, received regular and comprehensive RCO (Risk capital Operations) reports issued by the EIB. » (p.27).</p>

Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008	None.
JC 10.1	<i>The devolution facilitated the implementation of the Commission PSD support</i>
I-10.1.1	Stakeholders provide evidence that the devolution to delegations contributed to facilitating to the implementation of PSD support (e.g. better knowledge of local needs/priorities, better interaction with local stakeholders, notably of the private sector, etc.)
I-10.1.2	Stakeholders do not consider that there were major drawbacks of the devolution to delegations in terms of PSD support (e.g. less direct linkages with the European private sector, less coherence in the approach, etc.)
I-10.1.3	Stakeholders, such as major private sector operators in countries, are of the view that the EU Delegations make efforts to understand the private sector fabric and its constraints
Findings at JC level - Tunisia Evaluation	No information.
Findings at JC level – Moldova Evaluation	Not necessarily in the case of Moldova, as over the period evaluated, an EU delegation only existed from 2006 which limit the level of effectiveness of the Commissions' support: <i>“An issue specific to Moldova is the fact that, until last year, no Delegation was in place and that, until recently, there was not a full staff complement (in particular, no Head of Operations at the time of the field mission). The team note that this situation has been addressed, with the final “transfer of files” scheduled to occur in November 2007. The team commends Delegation staff in both Kiev and Chisinau for having implemented reasonably high-quality co-operation programmes under such circumstances. It needs to be recognised, though, that this arrangement limited the effectiveness of the EC co-operation strategy over the evaluation period. One result is that the EC, despite being a very large donor in Moldova and one which should have special leverage given Moldova’s long-term ambition to accede to the EU, has achieved little visibility.”</i> , p.114.
Findings at JC level – El Salvador Evaluation	No PSD-specific information.
Findings at JC level Burkina Faso (1999-2008)	The Evaluation Reports emphasises that the government of Burkina Faso does not possess a private sector policy and in light of this it recommends to a strengthening of the EUD's capacity to conduct a policy dialogue: « <i>Il n'existe pas encore de réelle politique sectorielle ayant trait au secteur privé et aucune réelle stratégie pour accroître significativement la productivité des facteurs de production.</i> » p .99 « <i>Accroître les capacités de mise en oeuvre des actions, de dialogue et de communication du personnel de la DUE en charge du dialogue politique et sectoriel et consolider les capacités à capitaliser les expériences et leçons apprises</i> » p.103

<p>Findings at JC level - Microfinance</p>	<p>The EU/ACP Microfinance Programme was a centralised operation, with decentralised follow-up of grants by the EUDs. According to the final evaluation, decentralisation of follow-up led to some implementation difficulties due to the low priority given to microfinance in many of the EUDs:</p> <p><i>“The decentralisation to EU Delegations of the follow-up of country-level microfinance grants posed several difficulties and questions. The set-up laid down that the Programme Coordinator managed the Call for Proposals and related selection of and contracting with applicants. For country-level grants the EC decided to give Delegations the responsibility for the follow-up of the activities and contractual and financial reporting; they were also consulted during the Call for Proposals. Field missions and opinions received showed that in many cases effective follow-up was hampered by the limited expertise in microfinance at the Delegation or by the limited priority given to it because the Programme was not part of bilateral cooperation (for which the Delegations are mainly accountable). This was even more the case in those countries where microfinance was not one of the EC’s focal sectors of cooperation or was a field with few interventions in the country. It led notably to difficulties in terms of follow-up of performance target achievement and contractual aspects, but also in terms of coherence and synergies with other EC interventions or participation to Programme events and other activities in this sector (e.g. thematic donor coordination meetings). Commentators mentioned the exception of the Delegation in Madagascar, in that there was a microfinance programme funded with EDF resources and hence a staff member spending a clear portion of his time on microfinance, and the Delegation in Uganda where the Programme coordinator helped them find consultants for their specific programmes and where an exchange of expertise took place. More generally, country-level activities of this centralised multi-country thematic Programme were clearly not aligned with the EC bilateral cooperation, at any rate not in all countries visited¹⁶, despite an effort to consult Delegations on project proposals in the context of the call for proposals. Some commentators noted however, that lack of coherence at country-level was not necessarily a major issue for such a demand-based all-ACP programme and for such a flagship programme that aims at overall EC learning and contribution to the wider microfinance community.”</i></p> <p><i>Source: EC, EU/ ACP Microfinance Programme Final Evaluation, p.60</i></p>
<p>Findings at JC level - BizClim</p>	<p>No evidence provided</p>
<p>Findings at JC level MEDA II</p>	<p>Devolution of management to the Delegations has given them more responsibilities in the conduct of policy dialogue with the partners. All these factors proved beneficial in terms of efficiency. (piv)</p> <p>Disbursement rates have significantly increased under MEDA II compared to MEDA I. In that respect the devolution of programme management responsibilities to the Delegations played an important role for the benefit of cost-effectiveness. (p80)</p> <p>The devolution of programme management responsibilities to the Delegations facilitated an enhanced role in the policy dialogue underlying and accompanying preparation and implementation of interventions. (p89)</p>
<p>Egypt 98-08</p>	<p>The change in the way the programming process responded to identified needs can be linked at least partly to the implementation of the Commission’s Reform of the Management of External Assistance which gave the Delegation in Egypt close involvement in the programming process after 2001. The Commission’s deconcentration facilitated increasing participation of local stakeholders in the programming process. Choices of sectors of cooperation resulted from consultation between the Commission and the Ministry of International</p>

¹⁶ Cameroon, Rwanda, Kenya and Jamaica

	Cooperation (MoIC) even if cooperation priorities remained decided upon by the Commission. (p21)
CDE (2011)	<p>The CDE evaluation concludes (Conclusion 8) that the partial decentralization of the CDE has not yet reached its full potential: <i>“Decentralisation has so far improved the CDE’s visibility and its proximity to the local stakeholders; however its full potential benefits have been hampered by the limited decision-making capacity of the RFOs [Regional Field Offices] and the difficulty of increasing their outreach in countries other than where they are located.”</i></p> <p>The following details area provided:</p> <p><i>“Decentralisation, with a view to increasing proximity with local enterprises and private stakeholders has taken place with the development and expansion of Regional Field Offices. Indeed, in line with option 2 of the 2007 study “Analysis of the mandate, positioning and structures for a new CDE”, the CDE enhanced its decentralisation process over the period with the expansion of Regional Field Offices from four in 2005 to six in 2010. Decentralisation has had favourable effects, mostly in the countries where the RFOs are located, in terms of visibility of the CDE to the enterprises and the authorities and of contacts with other donors in the field. But these benefits have also been reduced by a number of factors:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>The RFOs have had limited decision-making capacity and their resources have been based on an administrative allocation decided at HQ level and not on an analysis of their needs or of their past performance. Important decisions regarding procurement - even for contracts of a relatively small amount - and approvals of activities have to be made at HQ level. This often reduced the flexibility of the RFOs and created delays.</i> ▪ <i>Among the beneficiaries and the partner authorities there has been confusion regarding the roles and specificities of the RFOs and the TIOs.</i> ▪ <i>The development of RFOs has been paralleled by a weakening of the network of TIOs that was essential to identification of needs and activities.”</i> <p><i>Source: ADE (for the European Commission), Evaluation of the Centre for the Development of Enterprise, 2011 (p84)</i></p>
Banking Measures in the Mediterranean area	<p>In relation to Devolution, the Report highlights that information provided by the EIB to the Commission at HQ level did not always reach the EUD. It notes however that establishment of EIB representative offices has facilitated communication between the Commission and the EIB at the local level: <i>“The Commission, and especially two of the EC delegations in the partner countries visited by the Court, were not sufficiently informed of EIB projects and was therefore not able to monitor or follow them. Furthermore, even when information had been transmitted by the EIB to the Commission’s central offices in Brussels, it had not always been shared with the delegations visited by the Court. The audits on the spot did, however, show that the establishment of EIB representative offices had facilitated communication between the Commission and the EIB at the local level. This was especially noted in Morocco, with the organisation of regular meetings.”</i> (.14).</p>
Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008	No information.

JC 10.2	<i>The division of responsibilities between different DGs did not hamper an optimal implementation of the Commission's PSD support in the different countries'/regions concerned</i>
I-10.2.1	The Commission had formal mechanisms to ensure collaboration between its different DGs involved with PSD related matters, including in terms of transfer of knowledge on PSD support within and outside the EU
I-10.2.2	Stakeholders consider that Commission support in third countries has benefited from general PSD knowledge and networks present within the Commission
Findings at JC level - Tunisia Evaluation	No information.
Findings at JC level – Moldova Evaluation	No information.
Findings at JC level – El Salvador Evaluation	No PSD-specific information.
Findings at JC level Burkina Faso (1999-2008)	No reference to the different DGs
Guyana (1997-2007)	The Evaluation Report emphasises a lack of communication (90% of support to PSD was financed by the non-programmable instrument SYSMIN): <i>“At this stage it appears that there is very little evidence of exchange of information between the different units of the Commission Services (HQ) dealing with the country, the commodity trade protocols (sugar, rice, rum) or the compensation schemes (STABEX, SYSMIN). This seems to be the case for programming as well as for the potential assessment of the impact of the various elements of the policy mix on implementation of activities and achievement of NIP/CSP objectives.”p.64</i>
Findings at JC level - Microfinance	There is no evidence in the programme documentation to suggest that the division of responsibilities between DGs hampered the implementation of Commission support via the EU/ACP Microfinance Programme. <i>Source: EC, EU/ACP Microfinance Programme Final Evaluation</i>
Findings at JC level - BizClim	No evidence provided to suggest that the division of labour between DGs hampered implementation. Moreover, the evaluation suggests that communication within DG DEV was enhanced by the institutional set up: <i>“The main form of communication between BizClim PMU and the Commission was the Steering Committee (SC), which regularly met every six months. AIDCO C4 and DG Dev were permanent SC members but also fluent communication was recorded with AIDCO E2, DG Trade C2 and C3. EC Delegations were not actively involved in the implementation of BizClim projects but in most cases provided opinions before approval of interventions in their respective countries. In one case, the Delegation of Ghana was the direct beneficiary of a BizClim project.”</i> <i>Source: EC, Final Evaluation Private Sector Enabling Environment Facility, p.29</i>

Findings at JC level MEDA II	No specific information found.
Egypt 98-08	See J.C. 10.3.
CDE (2011)	No information provided in the CDE evaluation on this point (division of responsibilities between different DGs).
Banking Measures in the Mediterranean area	Not applicable.
Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008	The evaluation found that: <i>“Despite differences between regions and EC cooperation frameworks, constant dialogue and coordination between EC and key national stakeholders, as well as between the different concerned EU HQ General Directorates - mainly during the last programming period - positively influenced the quality of project identification and design and, therefore, their potential sustainability.”</i> (p.95).
JC 10.3	<i>The Commissions’ HR policy was conducive to an optimal design and implementation of its PSD support</i>
I-10.3.1 Existence of a specific HR policy for the management of Commission support to PSD in third countries	
I-10.3.2 Existence of sufficient dedicated staff specialised in PSD matters both at HQ and Delegation level	
I-10.3.3 Existence of specialised PSD trainings for staff in charge of PSD matters	
I-10.3.4 Staff in charge of the Commission’s PSD support is conversant with PSD constraints, and are well aware of the strategy and guidance documents, as well as of specific tools developed by the Commission for implementation	
I-10.3.5 Stakeholders consider that Commission HR policy was a strength/weakness of PSD support	
Findings at JC level - Tunisia Evaluation	No information.
Findings at JC level – Moldova Evaluation	The evaluation reports that: <i>“apart from a political officer, no sector experts (e.g. in standards, agriculture, migration and asylum issues, etc.). Each project officer has also served de facto as a sector expert. This arrangement has had the advantage of not compartmentalising project officers into purely administrative and process-oriented functions. However, based on EC experience in other countries a lack of dedicated, stand-alone sector expertise may place the Delegation at a disadvantage in its discussions with its GoM counterparts, as well as with its international partners, and thus reduce the chances solid project possibilities being identified”</i> , p.91.
Findings at JC level – El Salvador Evaluation	The evaluation gives evidence of the contrary: <i>“Much less evidence could indeed be found of any comparative advantage in having the EC intervening vs. EU MS, for instance in the areas of education, juvenile delinquency, basic services or <u>SME</u>. At the contrary, interviewees deplored the lack of capitalisation (mechanisms), institutional memory and continuity</i>

	<i>of staff at the EC, and hence the lack of thematic expertise and country experience, including in terms of relations with the government.” (p. 57</i>
Findings at JC level Burkina Faso (1999-2008)	No reference to a Commission's HR policy
Guyana (1997-2007)	No reference to a Commission's HR policy
Findings at JC level - Microfinance	<p>The EU/ACP Microfinance Programme aimed, in part, to contribute to an increase in the microfinance capacity of the EC. The final evaluation notes, however, that the EC's HR policy hampered a sustainable increase in such capacity:</p> <p><i>“The Programme faced unresolved issues relating to the management of human resources at the EC in terms of both Programme implementation and its objective of increasing the EC's capacity in microfinance. Many people involved in microfinance, or more specifically in the management of the Programme, have indeed been working on microfinance for the EC for only a few years. Most (not all) EC staff members involved in this Programme did not have prior (strong) experience of microfinance, and several of those who have gained experience in microfinance are currently not working in this field, or indeed any longer at the EC. There was at the end of 2010 perhaps only one EC full-time equivalent (FTE) working specifically on microfinance at headquarters, but spread across different staff members. This all led to the structural difficulty of having EC staff members with extended personal expertise in microfinance working in this area.”</i></p> <p><i>Source: EC, EU/ ACP Microfinance Programme Final Evaluation, p.64</i></p>
Findings at JC level - BizClim	No specific information found.
Findings at JC level MEDA II	No specific information found.
Egypt 98-08	<p>Information related to the early years of the evaluation period, both at strategy/programming and intervention-specific levels, proved difficult to retrieve. This does not necessarily mean that information does not exist but it points to limits in the management and archive of the information within the different services of the Commission. This rendered more difficult the analysis of those interventions which had terminated or for which the persons involved in implementation were no longer available. (p15)</p> <p>Information and corresponding reports related to the identification/formulation phases of interventions and sometimes evaluation reports also proved difficult to retrieve. The problem was compounded by the limited institutional in-house knowledge about past operations due to staff turn-over. (p15)</p>
CDE (2011)	The CDE evaluation shows that inadequate management of human resources was a major issue at the CDE (Conclusion 7): <i>“The management of the human resources of the CDE has been too much oriented to a reduction of the ratio of operating costs to total costs rather than to adaptation of the internal organisation to the best way of fulfilling the mandate. Over the period of the evaluation the average ratio of operating costs to total costs was 60.7%, leaving only 39.3% for operations (these figures are respectively 56% and 44% if one excludes the years 2007 and 2009). The reduction of this excessively high ratio has been a continuous concern to CDE</i>

	<p><i>management and the relative shares moved from 60.8% in 2005 to 48.4% in 2010 (see annex 2). The shift in the relative shares has been obtained by reallocation to operations of savings resulting from a drastic reduction in staff numbers. In purely arithmetical terms this has increased the productivity of the CDE. However, this policy raises two main concerns: (1) the willingness to save on labour costs resulted in under-execution of the budgetary resources allocated to operating costs and (2) the composition of the staff that resulted from the restructuring was unbalanced with a relatively large number of unfilled expert (coordinator) positions and an excess of assistant and technical staff in relation to the available positions.”</i></p> <p><i>Source: ADE (for the European Commission), Evaluation of the Centre for the Development of Enterprise, 2011 (page iv)</i></p> <p>Further details are provided under section 4.9 (EQ 9) of that report.</p>
Banking Measures in the Mediterranean area	The design and implementation of its PSD support via the three banking measures looked at was carried out by the EIB.
Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008	<p>On the level of in-house expertise, the report found that: “<i>A considerable proportion of EUDs (82%) do not have a specialist in ESI-related issues among their technical staff.</i> When they do, the expertise is mainly on labour market demand (economic restructuring and private sector development) and labour market governance (mainly in relation to the institutional capacities of relevant key institutions and, to a lesser extent, core labour standards, including promotion of social inclusion in the labour market). Nevertheless <i>this lack of technical expertise is not seen by the majority of NCs and NSAs as a very major obstacle to the EC’s having a more important and suitable role in ESI-related areas.</i>” (p.97).</p> <p>On harnessing of “employment” related in-house expertise, the report found that: “<i>DGs internal coordination at HQ level varies according to the regional cooperation framework. For ENP, the institutional set-up, in particular the sub-committees, paves the way for internal inter-sectoral consultations facilitated, as shown under EQ 1, by holistic and integrated ESI cooperation strategies. In other regions such structured consultation mechanisms often do not exist and, when they are in place, they take other forms, mainly with DG Employment (which is chef de file for relations with ILO) and its role of sensitising of Labour Ministries in LAC or its association with programming cycles for the ACP</i>” (p. 97).</p>
JC 10.4	<i>The Commission developed and used specific tools and guidance to facilitate the design and implementation of its PSD support</i>
I-10.4.1	Description of available tools and guidance for the Commission support to PSD
I-10.4.2	Knowledge and use of these tools and guidance by Commission staff in charge of support to PSD
I-10.4.3	Commission staff expressed the view that these tools and guidance were useful
Findings at JC level - Tunisia Evaluation	No information aside from the technical assistance projects used to design and support the GBSs with PSD components implemented in Tunisia.
Findings at JC	No information.

level – Moldova Evaluation	
Findings at JC level – El Salvador Evaluation	No PSD-specific information.
Findings at JC level Burkina Faso (1999-2008)	No mention of specific tools and guidance
Guyana (1997-2007)	The Evaluation Report states that: <i>“The interventions are in line with several instances of best practices as identified in the PSD Evaluation:</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>A methodological procedure has been devised for selection of the areas of intervention for PSD support in Guyana. An identification study for the economic diversification of Linden, a pre-feasibility study and a “Training Programme Guyana – Inception Report” have been carried out to define the focus of the projects.” p.38</i>
Findings at JC level - Microfinance	The EU/ACP Microfinance Programme was not developed using specific tools or guidance on PSD. However, the Commission did publish, in 2008, Guidelines for EC support to microfinance, which were intended for Commission staff involved in microfinance operations outside the Programme. Notably, the Programme Coordinator of the EU/ACP Microfinance Programme provided review and input into the drafting of this guideline. <i>Source: EC, EU/ACP Microfinance Programme Final Evaluation</i>
Findings at JC level - BizClim	No information
Findings at JC level MEDA II	No specific information found.
Egypt 98-08	No specific information found.
CDE (2011)	No information provided in the CDE evaluation on this point (Commission tools and guidance).
Banking Measures in the Mediterranean area	The design and implementation of its PSD support via the three banking measures looked at was carried out by the EIB.
Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008	None mentioned but the report suggests that ILO specific know-how and tools, may represent a useful resource and reference. (p. 151). Lack or insufficiency of guidance from EC/HQs in ESI-related issues was however reported by EUDs in all regions, aside from ENP. <i>“This lack of structured consultations in regions other than ENP does not appear to be a serious obstacle preventing the EC from playing a better role. Similarly, the lack or insufficiency of guidance, is not recognized as a major problem, but it is interesting to observe that EUD officials who expressed this opinion in the survey come, with only one exception, from regions other than ENP”</i> (p. 97).

JC 10.5	<i>The Commission monitored/evaluated its support to PSD and used and disseminated the results</i>
I-10.5.1	The Commission developed specific systems and sets of indicators to monitor and evaluate its support to PSD both at HQ and country level
I-10.5.2	The above mentioned monitor/evaluation systems were operational
I-10.5.3	The results of the monitoring and evaluations were disseminated and used to redirect strategies and programming
I-10.5.4	Stakeholders consider that monitoring and evaluation systems were useful to improve design and implementation of the PSD support
Findings at JC level - Tunisia Evaluation	From FAS III (not for FAS I and II), between €0.3m and €0.5m were allocated for their monitoring and evaluation. No further information.
Findings at JC level – Moldova Evaluation	No information.
Findings at JC level – El Salvador Evaluation	The evaluation gives evidence of the contrary: <i>“Information on attainment of results and impact was further difficult to retrieve in a few interventions, due to repeated absence or delays of mid-term and final evaluations and even to the absence of an internal monitoring and evaluation system in one intervention (FOMYPE).”</i> (p. 65).
Findings at JC level Burkina Faso (1999-2008)	Monitoring of PSD support was precisely a problem: <i>« Les outils de suivi évaluation projetés n'ont pas été maîtrisés et le personnel dédié recruté tardivement. Une évaluation à mi-parcours réalisée en 2006 a permis d'améliorer cette situation mais en 2008, le système prévu n'est pas opérationnel. Fort heureusement des actions pertinentes (enquête de satisfaction par exemple) permettent de pallier partiellement cette déficience du programme. »</i> p.73 <i>« Le positionnement du secteur privé au coeur des stratégies de croissance et de lutte contre la pauvreté (stratégie de lutte contre la pauvreté dite de troisième génération, voir foot note ci-après) nécessite un réel pilotage et monitoring du secteur basé, notamment, sur un système fiable et récurrent d'évaluation des performances sectorielles. »</i> p.75 The Evaluation Report recommends in this respect : <i>« Le monitoring de la mise en oeuvre des stratégies de croissance demande une mise à niveau rapide et conséquente de systèmes pérennes permettant de produire des statistiques sectorielles pertinentes et fiables, insuffisamment disponibles actuellement. »</i> p.108
Guyana (1997-2007)	Only reference to ROM reports with signalling significant problems during inception and starting phases of PSD interventions (pp.57-58) but no mention on how these results were used or disseminated.
Findings at JC level -	The Microfinance Programme was evaluated both at mid-term and programme closure phases. The mid-term evaluation was published on the Programme website, whilst the Final Evaluation is due to be published on the website of the

Microfinance	<p>successor Programme (ACP/EU Microfinance Programme II). No further dissemination activities were recorded regarding these evaluations.</p> <p>The Programme also monitored individual grantees on a quarterly basis, using a system of performance-based contracts that identified minimum performance thresholds across approximately 3-4 indicators, achievement of which was a condition of continued grant support.</p> <p><i>Source: EC, EU/ACP Microfinance Programme Final Evaluation</i></p>
Findings at JC level - BizClim	<p>The evaluation finds that monitoring took place, in line with formalised procedures, but that the final results of monitoring were not sufficient:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ « In terms of developing monitoring tools and a quality assurance system, the FA indicated that the SC, with the assistance of the PMU, was the body responsible to monitor implementation and ensure that the quality of each individual action meets the minimum quality standards to guarantee a relevant outcome. Six-monthly activity reports and annual action plans were being prepared by the PMU to be submitted to the SC for consideration. The activity reports were indicated to include financial statements and budgets and an assessment of programme implementation to cover the evolution of objectively verifiable indicators. The TL of the PMU, supported by the relevant expert, was mandated to carry out periodical monitoring missions to verify that the individual experts (or groups of experts) contracted through framework contracts, worked in the field consistently within the guidelines and that follow-up activity was undertaken. Whenever appropriate, the monitoring missions were supposed to be carried out in coordination, and possibly at the same time as EIB, PROINVEST or CDE monitoring missions. To ensure co-ordination of activities implemented in a decentralized way or through grant agreements, the PMU had also to ensure full information of the national and regional authorities and of the EC Delegations in the countries and regions where the projects were being implemented. » ▪ « However, the evaluators want to underline the fact that it has not been possible to receive any consistent recorded qualitative review of specific projects, either from the PMU or the beneficiaries.¹⁰ This fact implies that there is room for improvement on these aspects. Consequently, the observations made by the evaluators lead to conclude that the monitoring system implemented in BizClim has not been adequate enough. Again, as in the previous section referred to the think tank role, the evaluators' interpretation is that BizClim did not have enough time to formalize the establishment of an adequate monitoring system, which should have resulted from the work of dedicated full-time staff, specifically in charge of the monitoring function. » <p><i>Source: EC, Final Evaluation Private Sector Enabling Environment Facility, pp.24-25</i></p>
Findings at JC level MEDA II	<p>No specific information found.</p>
Egypt 98-08	<p>Interventions generally implemented their activities but the extent to which the produced deliverables contributed to the expected outcomes and impact was not monitored by the Commission which did not identify quantified targets to be reached by its interventions and focused its attention on the monitoring of project and budget support activities and deliverables. (p87)</p> <p>For budget support, where sector statistical systems do not exist or cannot deliver the data required for result monitoring, the Commission should support the development or improvement of such systems as a matter of priority. (p106)</p> <p>The results obtained by the implementation of reforms supported by the Commission should be monitored on a continuous basis by the Government and the Commission to verify that reforms reach their intended outcomes and that</p>

	<p>support has been effective. In addition to the collection on a regular basis of a minimum set of performance result indicators in the sectors supported by SBS, annual sector reviews should be organised between the GoE and the Commission (and other donors) to monitor progress of service delivery performance and, if possible, of use of services by the population. The verification of the contribution to impacts could be undertaken on a less frequent basis. (p107)</p>
<p>CDE 2011</p>	<p>The CDE evaluation concludes (Conclusion 2) that monitoring and evaluation of activities and achievements had been major weaknesses of the CDE, with an approach oriented to the delivery of activities and not to measurement of performance: <i>“The CDE generally did not define clearly the results to be achieved by its activities and did not follow-up closely their performance owing to the absence of monitoring mechanisms: it followed an activity-based approach rather than a results-oriented one.”</i></p> <p>The following description is provided:</p> <p><i>“Throughout the analysis the evaluation findings pointed to the fact that the CDE did not design its activities with a view to being able to measure their performance and that it clearly failed to follow up and document outputs and results achieved (see Conclusion 1). This issue had already been repeatedly raised in the 2005 Evaluation of the CDE and in the ex post evaluations of CDE sector programmes.</i></p> <p><i>Two major points should be highlighted:</i></p> <p><i>The CDE generally did not define in a sufficiently clear way the expected outputs and results of its activities. In particular:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>in CDE formulation documents, activities, outputs and results have often been mixed up together;</i> ▪ <i>for its projects or programmes, the CDE mostly set targets in terms of activities to be implemented, less so in terms of outputs, and generally not at all in terms of results;</i> ▪ <i>when defined, outputs and results to be achieved generally did not embody quantitative targets to be achieved.</i> <p><i>Moreover, the CDE did not develop a monitoring system that would have allowed it to follow-up closely the implementation of its activities - in particular to verify whether the activities delivered the expected outputs and results - and to take corrective action during implementation if necessary. In particular:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>Reporting has been weak:</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>At the level of the overall portfolio, the CDE has not produced an overall document providing a clear view on all the activities it financed in ACP countries and on the results achieved by them.</i> - <i>At the level of individual projects, reporting was not systematically carried out. When it was carried out, project progress and final reports were generally produced by the BDS provider or IO or by the beneficiary. The quality and quantity of the information provided varied greatly across activities.</i> - <i>The CDE created an evaluation form in the form of a checklist to be filled out by the beneficiaries at the conclusion of each project. This checklist, useful in terms of direct feedback from the beneficiary on its satisfaction or not with the services provided, contained very little information on achieved outputs and results.</i> - <i>There has been no follow-up by the CDE of the development of the performance of its beneficiaries once the activities supported were terminated. This generally gave the beneficiaries the impression that there was a lack of continuity in the support from the CDE. It also deprived the CDE of an important source of capitalisation of know-how since it missed the opportunity of analysing the effects of its activities on the beneficiaries once the support had been provided and of drawing out lessons for future undertakings.</i> ▪ <i>Formal external monitoring and evaluation of activities has been almost</i>

	<p>absent:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>An external monitoring system has not been set up.</i> - <i>As regards programmes, seven sector programmes were discontinued in 2006 and were evaluated at their closure. Programmes that ran throughout the evaluation period were not subject to mid-term evaluations.</i> - <i>Ad hoc activities have not been evaluated.</i> <p><i>This renders complex any assessment of the effectiveness of CDE activities by the CDE itself and by external evaluators. It also precludes a continuous lesson-learning process from taking place within the CDE, a feedback which is essential to enable the CDE to have a clearer picture on the direction to take, to continuously improve its services in line with the needs of its beneficiaries, and to demonstrate its capacity to perform effectively and efficiently.</i></p> <p><i>Source: ADE (for the European Commission), Evaluation of the Centre for the Development of Enterprise, 2011 (pages 75-76)</i></p>
<p>Findings at JC level - Banking Measures in the Mediterranean area</p>	<p>The report presents the Commission's monitoring obligations in the case of delegated management assistance: <i>"For delegated management, the Commission is supposed to implement a form of monitoring that is complementary to the monitoring performed by the EIB. The Commission should notably ensure:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <i>that the banking measures financed under the MEDA programme are adequately managed by the EIB; and</i> ▪ <i>that information is received by the Commission from the EIB, both at the central and local level, so that it can fulfil its duties."</i> <p>However the report identifies important shortcomings in the Commission's monitoring of its support to banking measures managed by the EIB: <i>"During the early years of the programme, and until 2005, the EIB did not implement adequate monitoring and controls. In addition the reporting flow from the intermediaries/promoters was insufficient. This mainly affected the monitoring of projects and the implementation of corrective action for projects that were not meeting their objectives or intermediaries/promoters who were not meeting their contractual obligations. This lack of adequate monitoring affected the Community's financial interests, notably due to late recovery or non-recovery of funds and the waiving of some contract clauses, for example regarding penalties for late payment."</i> (p.13).</p> <p>The report adds that corrective measures have been taken by the EIB since 2005: <i>"Since 2005, when the department responsible was reorganised, the EIB has implemented a more structured monitoring approach, including enhanced controls and reporting, notably with the establishment of individual follow-up sheets »</i> (p.14) and also by the Commission, from 2007, under the ENPI: <i>"Beforehand, it was the EIB's responsibility under the management agreement signed between the Commission and the EIB to monitor and follow-up the projects funded under budgetary resources. As from 2007, under the European neighbourhood policy (ENPI) budgetary resources, projects managed by the EIB are included in the Commission's results-oriented monitoring system."</i> (p.27).</p>
<p>Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008</p>	<p>The evaluation finds that: <i>"At the programme design level, major weakness exist in the lack of ESI-related indicators - such as job creation and levels of social protection - and specific institution-building: this hampers EC monitoring of intervention results, and impedes an accurately informed process to facilitate orientation of follow-up, review, evaluation, recommendations, and assistance with policy fine-tuning."</i> (p.3).</p>

JC 10.6	<i>The Commission developed and used specific mechanisms to ensure capitalisation and sharing of its knowledge with respect to PSD</i>
<p>I-10.6.1 Description of existing mechanisms (networks, working groups, etc.) to ensure capitalisation of Commission knowledge on PSD both among Commission staff concerned with implementation of PSD support inside and outside the EU</p> <p>I-10.6.2 Knowledge and involvement of staff concerned with PSD support in third countries with these mechanisms</p> <p>I-10.6.3 Stakeholders expressed the view that these mechanisms are useful, with specific results generated and possible drawbacks</p>	
Findings at JC level - Tunisia Evaluation	No information.
Findings at JC level – Moldova Evaluation	No information.
Findings at JC level – El Salvador Evaluation	The evaluation gives evidence of the contrary: <i>“Much less evidence could indeed be found of any comparative advantage in having the EC intervening vs. EU MS, for instance in the areas of education, juvenile delinquency, basic services or SME. At the contrary, interviewees deplored the lack of capitalisation (mechanisms), institutional memory and continuity of staff at the EC, and hence the lack of thematic expertise and country experience, including in terms of relations with the government.”</i> (p. 57)
Findings at JC level Burkina Faso (1999-2008)	The Report recommends with respect to capitalisation and sharing of knowledge : <i>« Accroître les capacités de mise en oeuvre des actions, de dialogue et de communication du personnel de la DUE en charge du dialogue politique et sectoriel et consolider les capacités à capitaliser les expériences et leçons apprises »</i> p.103
Guyana (1997-2007)	No evidence of such mechanism
Findings at JC level - Microfinance	<p>The EU/ACP Microfinance Programme was launched as part of an effort to improve the microfinance capacity and knowledge-base within the Commission and the ACP Secretariat. Contribution of the Programme in this regard included:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ “frequent exchange of information and views between the Programme Coordinator, the EC Programme task manager and the EC Microfinance Focal Point; ▪ review and contributions by the Programme Coordinator and several CGAP staff members of the “Guidelines for EC Support to Microfinance” (2008); ▪ the Programme coordinator’s participation in the elaboration and conduct of the EC internal 2-3-day training courses on microfinance (58 staff members trained during the period 2007-2010); ▪ training material based on the CGAP curriculum and incorporating examples from the Programme; and ▪ the Programme coordinator’s participation to annual Microfinance Weeks of the European Microfinance Platform (e-MFP), with for instance a presentation of the Programme in 2010 jointly with presentations by the EC

	<p>Programme task manager and EC Microfinance Focal Point.”</p> <p>Source: EC, EU/ACP Microfinance Programme Final Evaluation, p.63</p> <p>However, the Programme’s contributions to this effort were called into question by the Final Evaluation, which stated that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ “the Programme made active contributions to the improvement in knowledge management mechanisms in microfinance at the EC, while EC staff members were overall satisfied with the support received from the Programme. Nevertheless, some unresolved issues remained in terms of building sustainable human capacity in microfinance in both the EC and the ACP Secretariat.” <p>Source: EC, EU/ACP Microfinance Programme Final Evaluation, p.62</p>
Findings at JC level - BizClim	<p>The final evaluation praises the knowledge management of BizClim, citing the online dissemination of its analyses and studies:</p> <p><i>“The facts developed through BizClim interventions and the compilation of data and publications in a living e-platform survived online even after the conclusion of the programme. This should be considered as a very important achievement in terms of knowledge management and dissemination”</i></p> <p>Source: EC, Final Evaluation Private Sector Enabling Environment Facility, p.39</p>
Findings at JC level MEDA II	No specific information found.
Egypt 98-08	Individual interventions should be systematically evaluated (as foreseen in the cooperation programme) and their results shared publicly before the formulation of new interventions in the same area or pursuing the same objectives. This will also help disseminate best practices developed at project level and thus add value to the Commission’s cooperation programme. (p107)
CDE (2011)	<p>The CDE evaluation provides the following finding with regard to capitalisation and sharing of knowledge, showing a deteriorating situation :</p> <p><i>“The capitalisation of expertise was a major asset for the CDE.</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Prior to 2005, this was largely done by a «pool of tried and trusted» experts specialised in specific sectors or thematic areas. Contracts with associated experts were used to that end.</i> - <i>Both the severe restructuring and the abandonment of these contracts have resulted in a loss of professional expertise. The near-disappearance of this sector expertise constitutes a severe constraint on the institution with the risk of limiting its capacity to that of administrator of subsidies.</i> <p>Source: ADE (for the European Commission), Evaluation of the Centre for the Development of Enterprise, 2011 (pages 65)</p>
Banking Measures in the Mediterranean area	No information.
Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008	No information.

	Other relevant PSD information available in the report and not captured by the EQs
Tunisia Evaluation	None.
elsewhere) – Moldova Evaluation	None.
El Salvador Evaluation	None.
Burkina Faso (1999-2008)	<p>Visibility of the Commission :</p> <p><i>« Toutefois certains acteurs du secteur privé ont du mal à identifier la source principale de financement des actions de renforcement de capacités : en effet ces sessions de formation sont souvent organisées par le PST-2 qui coordonne différentes sources de financement des PTF, les financements CE sont alors noyés. »</i></p>
Guyana (1997-2007)	<p>Sustainability of Commission's intervention is a challenge in the sector :</p> <p><i>“The real challenge as far as Commission interventions in the private sector are concerned is sustainability. In spite of a strong national political commitment to PSD enhancement in Guyana, Commission interventions either fail to become sustainable owing to a lack of private sector investment and participation, or seriously risk being unsustainable owing to a lack of institutional development.”</i></p>
Banking Measures in the Mediterranean area	None.
Employment and social inclusion, over 1999-2008	None.

Annex 5 – Results of CSP/RSP review

The purpose of the CSP/RSP review was to gather information on the EU's PSD strategy and programming at the country/regional level. In total, 40 Commission Country or Regional Strategy Papers¹ were reviewed, covering the nine countries visited and an additional eleven countries or regions.

This review was done by the evaluation team, using a specific review grid, so as to facilitate aggregated processing and use of responses.

The annex is made of two separate documents:

- one document covering each country and region paper over the first programming period (in most cases, 2001-2007);
- the second document covering the same countries and regions for the second programming period (in most cases, 2007-2013).

Aggregated results for both period and the total are displayed in both documents, to facilitate comparison between periods.

¹ Namely Country Strategy Papers (CSPs), National Indicative Programmes (NIPs), Regional Strategy Papers (RSPs) and Regional Indicative Programmes (RIPs)

Results of the CSP-RSP review - First programming period

This document applies to :	Country	Country	Country	Country	Region	Region	Country	Country	Country	Country	Region	Country
Which Country/Region ?	Morocco	Jamaica	Vietnam	Lebanon	Euro-Med Partnership	Caribbean region	Nicaragua	Egypt	Jordan	Tunisia	Central America	Algeria
Which Period ?	2002-2007	Other	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007
Which Period ? [Other]		2001-2007										
Efforts undertaken to make sure recommendations of 2005 evaluation were taken into account (IC 1.1)												
The CSP/RSP mentions the 2005 PSD Evaluation (I-1.1.2)?	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Please explain (max. 5 lines)												
The CSP/RSP refers to a plan or specific approach for the dissemination of recommendations to those responsible for programming and design of intervention (I-1.1.1)?	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
The CSP/RSP provides other evidence of dissemination of the 2005 recommendations to those responsible for programming and design of interventions (I-1.1.2)?	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
The CSP/RSP identifies support to PSD by the Commission : [as a focal sector]				1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1
The CSP/RSP identifies support to PSD by the Commission : [as a non-focal sector]				0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
In the country/region, what is the estimation in %, by survey respondents and on basis of information in CSP/RSP/NIP/RIP, of share of PSD support on total support by the Commission ?				No estimation given	No estimation given	0 - 10	No estimation given	51 - 60	No estimation given	41 - 50	No estimation given	No estimation given
Specific recommendations taken into account (IC 1.2)												
The CSP/RSP explicitly clarifies the role the Commission intends to play with respect to PSD (I-1.2.1)?	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0
Please explain (max. 5 lines)		One of the areas of focus of the Commission's cooperation strategy was PSD. It was foreseen to support a business support programme to assist companies in designing and implementing restructuring programmes and to improve competitiveness. Special attention was to be supporting the meeting of standards and phytosanitary and certification requirements. It is specified that Private sector is considered the most effective engine for growth and the development of business activities should be supported and facilitated.	The transition to a market economy in Vietnam needs to be completed, with reforms in foreign trade, state owned enterprises, the financial sector, and private sector development. (CSPNIP2002-2006 – NIP2005-2006 p19)	"Helping the private sector to improve its competitiveness in a liberal trade regime is a critical requirement for the success of the Association Agreement.", (p.8).					The interventions relating to PSD are named explicitly in a table joint to the CSP ('Business Service Team', EJADA programme, risk capital to support private sector investments via EIB)	Le soutien à DSP est intégré dans un des objectifs de la coopération pour 2000-2006 "réformes économiques et renforcement des institutions de l'économie du marché". D'après le DSP, "Cette priorité contiendra un ensemble de mesures visant la création d'un environnement économique propice à la modernisation de l'économie et à la facilitation de la mise à niveau des entreprises dans le contexte d'une intégration progressive dans l'économie mondiale. L'augmentation de l'investissement privé, en particulier dans les PME, qui constitue la majorité des entreprises tunisiennes, est essentielle pour accélérer la croissance de la production et de l'emploi." (p.20-1).		
The CSP/RSP prioritizes the Commission's interventions with respect to PSD (I-1.2.3)?	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

This document applies to :	Country	Country	Country	Region	Country	Country	Region	Country	# Yes	% Yes	# Yes	% Yes	# Yes	% Yes
Which Country/Region ?	Zambia	Syria	South Africa	SADC	Moldova	Russia	Asia	Ukraine						
Which Period ?	2002-2007	2002-2007	Other	2002-2007	Other	2002-2007	Other	2002-2007	Total		First Period		Second Period	
Which Period ? [Other]			2003-2005		2002-2006		2005-2006							
Efforts undertaken to make sure recommendations of 2005 evaluation were taken into account (JC 1.1)														
The CSP/RSP mentions the 2005 PSD Evaluation (I-1.1.2)?	N/A	N/A	0	N/A	0	N/A	0	N/A	2	5,0%	0	0%	2	10%
Please explain (max. 5 lines)														
The CSP/RSP refers to a plan or specific approach for the dissemination of recommendations to those responsible for programming and design of intervention (I-1.1.1)?	N/A	N/A	0	N/A	0	N/A	0	N/A	0	0,0%	0	0%	0	0%
The CSP/RSP provides other evidence of dissemination of the 2005 recommendations to those responsible for programming and design of interventions (I-1.1.2)?	N/A	N/A	0	N/A	0	N/A	0	N/A	0	0,0%	0	0%	0	0%
The CSP/RSP identifies support to PSD by the Commission : [as a focal sector]	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	23	57,5%	12	60%	11	55%
The CSP/RSP identifies support to PSD by the Commission : [as a non-focal sector]	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	9	22,5%	3	15%	6	30%
In the country/region, what is the estimation in %, by survey respondents and on basis of information in CSP/RSP/NIP/RIP, of share of PSD support on total support by the Commission ?	0 - 10	61 - 70	21 - 30	0 - 10	31 - 40	No estimation given	11 - 20	11 - 20						
Specific recommendations taken into account (JC 1.2)														
The CSP/RSP explicitly clarifies the role the Commission intends to play with respect to PSD (I-1.2.1)?	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	19	47,5%	9	45%	10	50%
Please explain (max. 5 lines)		Sous le PIN 2005 2006, le CE a choisit 5 priorités dont 3 sont liées au PSD: "renforcement des institutions", notamment le soutien à la création d'une nouvelle structure nationale destinée à soutenir les entreprises syriennes, notamment les PME, "modernisation industrielle" notamment le renforcement des organes responsable pour les normes et la métrologie, et "développement des échanges commerciaux" pour la mise en place des aspects commerciaux de l'AA. (p. 7-8).	- support to local economic development and urban regeneration in eastern cape - Sector wide enterprise, employment and equity programme - Risk Capital provision for black-owned SMEs		support to MSMEs, including regulatory reform (registration procedures and pro-business tax arrangements) and export promotion		In the NIP 2002-2003, one of the overarching priorities is to "support the private sector and to assist for economic development", with background justification, main and specific objectives, expected results, description of programmes as well as indicators.							
The CSP/RSP prioritizes the Commission's interventions with respect to PSD (I-1.2.3)?	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	11	27,5%	4	20%	7	35%

This document applies to :	Country	Country	Country	Country	Region	Region	Country	Country	Country	Country	Region	Country
Which Country/Region ?	Morocco	Jamaica	Vietnam	Lebanon	Euro-Med Partnership	Caribbean region	Nicaragua	Egypt	Jordan	Tunisia	Central America	Algeria
Which Period ?	2002-2007	Other	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007
Which Period ? [Other]		2001-2007										
Please explain (max. 5 lines)		The section of the Commission's cooperation strategy on PSD identifies the following components: "a broad-ranged programme of business advisory services, to strengthen the supply response once macro conditions improve and to deal with a more open economic environment resulting from the extension and deepening of regional and global co-operation agreements". This programme of business advisory services will be supplemented by an EIB programme of financing for investments to be made by SMEs in core sectors of the economy, and accessible through banks.		It is explained that EU support will be focused on (1) Extending the network of decentralised business service centres to assist entrepreneurs in developing business plans, marketing, product identification. (2) Assisting agricultural co-operatives in production and marketing, in particular, in targeting export markets. (3) Assisting in the establishment of an export promotions agency, with appropriate cofunding from chambers of commerce and other business and industrialists organisations. (p. 8).								
Commission's awareness of the evolution of the private sector environment (JC 1.3)												
The CSP/RSP refers to changes in the general (i.e. not country or region specific) PSD environment (e.g. EPA, BRICS, Financial Crisis, other) (I-1.3.1)?	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0
Please explain (max. 5 lines)		The CPS mentions the EPA, which is region-specific however: "In this context Jamaica's active involvement in the preparation and negotiation of the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) under the CARICOM framework is foreseen." (p. 31);	Three major external trade events have marked Vietnam's recent path to integration into world's economic flows: •The Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) mechanism of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) • WTO. Vietnam became member of the World Trade Organisation in 2007. •US-Vietnam bilateral Trade Agreement ratified in 2001. (CSPNIP2002-2006 p11-12)	The NIP for 2005-2006 mentions the Doha round, "The launch of the new WTO Round - the Doha Development Agenda - comprises both further market openings and additional rule making, underpinned by commitments to strengthen substantial assistance to build capacity in developing countries. The main objective of the new round is to assist developing countries' integration into the world trade system in a way that will help them combat poverty." p. 4.				The CSP refers several times to the economic impact of the 9.11 terrorist attacks on Egypt. It also mentions bilateral trade liberalisation through the negotiation of Free Trade Areas (with the EU through the AA and with African States through COMESA).	Sporadic and limited references to external factors such as Jordan's accession to WTO in 2001, EU-Med free trade area, risk relating to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.	The DSP mentionne la mise en oeuvre des accords du GATT, l'élimination des accords multifiabres (2005) et aussi la conjoncture fragilisée par les attentats du 11.09. The PIN mentionne également l'agenda de Doha (p.7).		
The CSP/RSP shows how changes in the general (i.e. not country or region specific) PSD environment (e.g. EPA, BRICS, Financial Crisis, other) have been taken into account in the strategy and/or programming (I-1.3.1.3)?	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0
Please explain (max. 5 lines)				It limits itself to saying that the strategy has taken account of policy orientations under the Doha round (integration in the world trade system).				The objectives of the cooperation are (1) support to the implementation of the EU-Egypt AA, (2) support to stability and sustainable and balanced socio-economic development, which will contribute to alleviate the effects of 9.11 on the Egyptian economy.		Un objectif majeur de la stratégie de coopération est d'appuyer la Tunisie dans son adaptation à l'intégration orogressive dans l'économie mondiale et d'assurer la mise à niveau de son secteur privé.		
Policy document and surveys taken into account (JC 1.4)												
The CSP/RSP refers to policy documents or surveys or analyses relating to PSD?	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

This document applies to :	Country	Country	Country	Region	Country	Country	Region	Country	# Yes	% Yes	# Yes	% Yes	# Yes	% Yes
Which Country/Region ?	Zambia	Syria	South Africa	SADC	Moldova	Russia	Asia	Ukraine						
Which Period ?	2002-2007	2002-2007	Other	2002-2007	Other	2002-2007	Other	2002-2007	Total		First Period		Second Period	
Which Period ? [Other]			2003-2005		2002-2006		2005-2006							
Please explain (max. 5 lines)		Les interventions dans le domaine du PSD sont priorisées selon les priorités du PIN (voir comment box plus haut).			as above, no further prioritisation within these elements though									
Commission's awareness of the evolution of the private sector environment (JC 1.3)														
The CSP/RSP refers to changes in the general (i.e. not country or region specific) PSD environment (e.g. EPA, BRICS, Financial Crisis, other) (I-1.3.1)?	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	22	55,0%	10	50%	12	60%
Please explain (max. 5 lines)		Le Pin ne fait pas références à des évolutions générales mais à des évolutions qui impactent l'économie syrienne, notamment le nouveau cycle de l'OMC (l'agenda de Doha) et la mise en place de l'Accord d'association avec l'UE.				Reference to financial crisis of 1998 Reference to increase in oil price	Elements relating to overall trade and economic performances in Asia, globalisation, WTO accessions. consideration of political stability as condition for good business, etc.	Few mentions of the supra-national context, limited to (i) EU-Ukraine trade issues and (ii) remaining obstacles to FDI.						
The CSP/RSP shows how changes in the general (i.e. not country or region specific) PSD environment (e.g. EPA, BRICS, Financial Crisis, other) have been taken into account in the strategy and/or programming (I-1.3.1.3)?	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	12	30,0%	5	25%	7	35%
Please explain (max. 5 lines)		Le PIN indique simplement que ces évolutions ont influencé les orientations économiques et politiques mondiales (Doha) ou ont créé des obligations régionale, auxquelles les priorités du PIN contribuent.					"On trade and investment, all countries are linked with common challenges and opportunities in the context of globalisation and progressive trade liberalisation. Almost all countries in the region are member of the WTO (p7)							
Policy document and surveys taken into account (JC 1.4)														
The CSP/RSP refers to policy documents or surveys or analyses relating to PSD?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	12,8%	1	5%	4	20%

This document applies to :	Country	Country	Country	Country	Region	Region	Country	Country	Country	Country	Region	Country
Which Country/Region ?	Morocco	Jamaica	Vietnam	Lebanon	Euro-Med Partnership	Caribbean region	Nicaragua	Egypt	Jordan	Tunisia	Central America	Algeria
Which Period ?	2002-2007	Other	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007
Which Period ? [Other]		2001-2007										
Please explain (max. 12 lines)				The NIP 2005-2006 refers to the UNDP report "Globalisation: towards a Lebanese Agenda". It states that private sector employment in Lebanon amounts to 1.3 EM. More than one third of the labour force already suffers from unemployment. The report also says that this situation results from increased competition caused by tariff dismantlement undertaken in Lebanon. (p. 16).								
Support geared toward overall EU external policy objectives(Examined in two stages: first what is the general theory the CSP/RSP describes in terms of relation between PSD and overall EU Policy objectives; second is the CSP/RSP support explicitly linked to these objectives)												
The CSP/RSP explicitly links PSD support in general to the following EU external policy objectives (I-2.1.1) [Contribute to poverty reduction]	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
The CSP/RSP explicitly links PSD support in general to the following EU external policy objectives (I-2.1.1) [Contribute to a (sustainable) economic development]	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1
The CSP/RSP explicitly links PSD support in general to the following EU external policy objectives (I-2.1.1) [Contribute to a (sustainable) social development]	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
The CSP/RSP explicitly links PSD support in general to the following EU external policy objectives (I-2.1.1) [Contribute to a (sustainable) environmental development]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
The CSP/RSP explicitly links PSD support in general to the following EU external policy objectives (I-2.1.1) [Contribute to gradual integration in the world economy, notably through Trade]	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
The CSP/RSP explicitly links PSD support in general to the following EU external policy objectives (I-2.1.1) [Links trade to poverty reduction]	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP explicitly links PSD support in general to the following EU external policy objectives (I-2.1.1) [Contribute to preserving peace / ensuring political stability / security]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP (choose all those that apply) (I-2.1.1) : [Describes support to PSD as an indirect means to contribute to poverty reduction (i.e. PSD will enhance economic growth and this growth in the end will trickle down to the poor)]	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP (choose all those that apply) (I-2.1.1) : [Describes support to PSD as a direct manner to contribute to poverty reduction. If selected: please specify how (e.g. by targeting directly the poorer segments of the population).]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
The CSP/RSP (choose all those that apply) (I-2.1.1) : [Not specified]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP (choose all those that apply) (I-2.1.1) : [Other]												
The CSP/RSP shows how the Commission's planned PSD support in the country/region will (tick all those that apply) : [Contribute to poverty reduction]	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
The CSP/RSP shows how the Commission's planned PSD support in the country/region will (tick all those that apply) : [Contribute to a (sustainable) economic development]	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1
The CSP/RSP shows how the Commission's planned PSD support in the country/region will (tick all those that apply) : [Contribute to a (sustainable) social development]	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1

This document applies to :	Country	Country	Country	Region	Country	Country	Region	Country	# Yes	% Yes	# Yes	% Yes	# Yes	% Yes
Which Country/Region ?	Zambia	Syria	South Africa	SADC	Moldova	Russia	Asia	Ukraine						
Which Period ?	2002-2007	2002-2007	Other	2002-2007	Other	2002-2007	Other	2002-2007	Total		First Period		Second Period	
Which Period ? [Other]			2003-2005		2002-2006		2005-2006							
Please explain (max. 12 lines)														
Support geared toward overall EU external policy objectives(Examined in two stages: first what is the general theory the CSP/RSP describes in terms of relation between PSD and overall EU Policy objectives; second is the CSP/RSP support explicitly linked to these objectives)														
The CSP/RSP explicitly links PSD support in general to the following EU external policy objectives (I-2.1.1) [Contribute to poverty reduction]	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	12	30,0%	5	25%	7	35%
The CSP/RSP explicitly links PSD support in general to the following EU external policy objectives (I-2.1.1) [Contribute to a (sustainable) economic development]	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	25	62,5%	15	75%	10	50%
The CSP/RSP explicitly links PSD support in general to the following EU external policy objectives (I-2.1.1) [Contribute to a (sustainable) social development]	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	7	17,5%	4	20%	3	15%
The CSP/RSP explicitly links PSD support in general to the following EU external policy objectives (I-2.1.1) [Contribute to a (sustainable) environmental development]	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	6	15,0%	2	10%	4	20%
The CSP/RSP explicitly links PSD support in general to the following EU external policy objectives (I-2.1.1) [Contribute to gradual integration in the world economy, notably through Trade]	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	32	80,0%	17	85%	15	75%
The CSP/RSP explicitly links PSD support in general to the following EU external policy objectives (I-2.1.1) [Links trade to poverty reduction]	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	7	17,5%	5	25%	2	10%
The CSP/RSP explicitly links PSD support in general to the following EU external policy objectives (I-2.1.1) [Contribute to preserving peace / ensuring political stability / security]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,0%	0	0%	0	0%
The CSP/RSP (choose all those that apply) (I-2.1.1) : [Describes support to PSD as an indirect means to contribute to poverty reduction (i.e. PSD will enhance economic growth and this growth in the end will trickle down to the poor)]	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	6	15,0%	4	20%	2	10%
The CSP/RSP (choose all those that apply) (I-2.1.1) : [Describes support to PSD as a direct manner to contribute to poverty reduction. If selected: please specify how (e.g. by targeting directly the poorer segments of the population).]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	12,5%	1	5%	4	20%
The CSP/RSP (choose all those that apply) (I-2.1.1) : [Not specified]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	5,0%	0	0%	2	10%
The CSP/RSP (choose all those that apply) (I-2.1.1) : [Other]														
The CSP/RSP shows how the Commission's planned PSD support in the country/region will (tick all those that apply) : [Contribute to poverty reduction]	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	6	15,0%	4	20%	2	10%
The CSP/RSP shows how the Commission's planned PSD support in the country/region will (tick all those that apply) : [Contribute to a (sustainable) economic development]	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	20	50,0%	13	65%	7	35%
The CSP/RSP shows how the Commission's planned PSD support in the country/region will (tick all those that apply) : [Contribute to a (sustainable) social development]	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	7	17,5%	4	20%	3	15%

This document applies to :	Country	Country	Country	Country	Region	Region	Country	Country	Country	Country	Region	Country
Which Country/Region ?	Morocco	Jamaica	Vietnam	Lebanon	Euro-Med Partnership	Caribbean region	Nicaragua	Egypt	Jordan	Tunisia	Central America	Algeria
Which Period ?	2002-2007	Other	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007
Which Period ? [Other]		2001-2007										
The CSP/RSP shows how the Commission's planned PSD support in the country/region will (tick all those that apply) : [Contribute to a (sustainable) environmental development]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
The CSP/RSP shows how the Commission's planned PSD support in the country/region will (tick all those that apply) : [Contribute to gradual integration in the world economy, notably through Trade]	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
The CSP/RSP shows how the Commission's planned PSD support in the country/region will (tick all those that apply) : [Links trade to poverty reduction]	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP shows how the Commission's planned PSD support in the country/region will (tick all those that apply) : [Contribute to preserving peace / ensuring political stability / security]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP explains that the Commission's planned PSD support in the country/region (tick all those that apply) will contribute to poverty reduction (I-2.1.2) : [Indirectly (through economic growth)]	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP explains that the Commission's planned PSD support in the country/region (tick all those that apply) will contribute to poverty reduction (I-2.1.2) : [Directly (e.g. through specific target groups or actions)]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Please provide some clarification for both		"Private sector growth can be expected to result in the creation of employment and therefore in addressing poverty. For this reason the strategy proposed for support by the EC has a strong private sector development component." (p.28).						Its purpose is to promote growth and reduce poverty through the economic, political and social integration of Central America, with an emphasis on three areas (one being PSD related)				Emphasis on education and training and development of micro enterprises to fight unemployment and reduce poverty
Use of guidelines for a strategic approach (JC 2.2)												
The CSP/RSP refers explicitly to the Commission's PSD guidelines (I-2.2.2)?	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Elements in the CSP/RSP indicate that these guidelines have been used for the design of the support in the country (I-2.1.2)?	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Please specify	P.4 specifies that the Commission plans to support a Support to enterprises programme within its commitment to support the implementation of the Association Agreement (alongside a transport programme and a vocational training programme). p.39 indicates that this programme ("programme d'appui aux entreprises marocaines") is linked to the 10 years transition phase, under the Association Agreement, given to Moroccan enterprises to adapt themselves to the future free trade area.	"Private sector is considered the most effective engine for growth and the development of business activities should be supported and facilitated.", p. 25. "PSD through developing a broad-ranged programme of business advisory services, to strengthen the supply response once macro conditions improve and to deal with a more open economic environment resulting from the extension and deepening of regional and global co-operation agreements." (p.26).	Investment is one of the areas where Vietnam could fall short of its target. As the whole south-east Asia region is suffering a decrease in FDI, domestic investment should become an important source of growth. An increase in domestic investment requires that private sector development, particularly through SMEs, and the liberalisation of services become top priorities for the government. (CSPNIP2002-2006 p12).	"The development of the private sector and its successful integration in the Euro Mediterranean and international trade system is a predominant theme in the Association Agreement." (p.16). "To contribute to the economic reforms in Lebanon with a view to balanced growth and the creation of employment." (p.17).		"Strategy support will be also directed at the strengthening of trade-related capacity in order to help the region play its full part in and take full advantage of international trade." (p.17).						Under the priorities of the EU-Egypt cooperation, priority 1 is on promoting the implementation of the EU-Egypt AA which is composed, amongst others, of support to (1) Trade enhancement, including a 'Industrial Modernisation Programme' targeting SMEs, and (2) Support to the comprehensive restructuring of the spinning and weaving sector, a sector particularly vulnerable to market and trade liberalisation.
Taking into account national priorities (JC 2.3)												
The CSP/RSP refers to : [The existence of a national country strategy]	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
The CSP/RSP refers to : [The existence of a national PSD strategy]	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
The CSP/RSP refers to a policy dialogue with national authorities on the country strategy in general : [Conducted]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0
The CSP/RSP refers to a policy dialogue with national authorities on the country strategy in general : [To be conducted as part of the Commission's strategy]	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0

This document applies to :	Country	Country	Country	Region	Country	Country	Region	Country	# Yes	% Yes	# Yes	% Yes	# Yes	% Yes
Which Country/Region ?	Zambia	Syria	South Africa	SADC	Moldova	Russia	Asia	Ukraine						
Which Period ?	2002-2007	2002-2007	Other	2002-2007	Other	2002-2007	Other	2002-2007	Total		First Period		Second Period	
Which Period ? [Other]			2003-2005		2002-2006		2005-2006							
The CSP/RSP shows how the Commission's planned PSD support in the country/region will (tick all those that apply) : [Contribute to a (sustainable) environmental development]	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	5	12,5%	2	10%	3	15%
The CSP/RSP shows how the Commission's planned PSD support in the country/region will (tick all those that apply) : [Contribute to gradual integration in the world economy, notably through Trade]	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	29	72,5%	16	80%	13	65%
The CSP/RSP shows how the Commission's planned PSD support in the country/region will (tick all those that apply) : [Links trade to poverty reduction]	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	3	7,5%	2	10%	1	5%
The CSP/RSP shows how the Commission's planned PSD support in the country/region will (tick all those that apply) : [Contribute to preserving peace / ensuring political stability / security]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,0%	0	0%	0	0%
The CSP/RSP explains that the Commission's planned PSD support in the country/region (tick all those that apply) will contribute to poverty reduction (I-2.1.2) : [Indirectly (through economic growth)]	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	4	10,0%	3	15%	1	5%
The CSP/RSP explains that the Commission's planned PSD support in the country/region (tick all those that apply) will contribute to poverty reduction (I-2.1.2) : [Directly (e.g. through specific target groups or actions)]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	7,5%	1	5%	2	10%
Please provide some clarification for both			PSD support is a sub-theme of the 2nd focal area, the goal of which is to accelerate growth, equity and employment. PSD contributions to this include: enhancing policy and reg. environment, promoting local economic development, improving access to economic opportunities for historically disadvantaged people.											
Use of guidelines for a strategic approach (JC 2.2)														
The CSP/RSP refers explicitly to the Commission's PSD guidelines (I-2.2.2)?	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	0,0%	0	0%	0	0%
Elements in the CSP/RSP indicate that these guidelines have been used for the design of the support in the country (I-2.1.2)?	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	0,0%	0	0%	0	0%
Please specify														
Taking into account national priorities (JC 2.3)														
The CSP/RSP refers to : [The existence of a national country strategy]	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	33	82,5%	18	90%	15	75%
The CSP/RSP refers to : [The existence of a national PSD strategy]	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	7	17,5%	4	20%	3	15%
The CSP/RSP refers to a policy dialogue with national authorities on the country strategy in general : [Conducted]	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	0		0,0%	7	35%	9	45%
The CSP/RSP refers to a policy dialogue with national authorities on the country strategy in general : [To be conducted as part of the Commission's strategy]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	25,6%	5	25%	5	25%

This document applies to :	Country	Country	Country	Country	Region	Region	Country	Country	Country	Country	Region	Country
Which Country/Region ?	Morocco	Jamaica	Vietnam	Lebanon	Euro-Med Partnership	Caribbean region	Nicaragua	Egypt	Jordan	Tunisia	Central America	Algeria
Which Period ?	2002-2007	Other	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007
Which Period ? [Other]		2001-2007										
The CSP/RSP refers to a policy dialogue with national authorities on the countries PSD strategy : [Conducted]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP refers to a policy dialogue with national authorities on the countries PSD strategy : [To be conducted as part of the Commission's strategy]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP shows explicitly how the Commission's PSD strategy : [Fits into to the countries' national strategy]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP shows explicitly how the Commission's PSD strategy : [Fits into the countries' PSD strategy]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The potential VA of the Commission geared its decision (JC 2.4)												
The CSP/RSP explicitly mentions the types of VA the Commission has for/when providing PSD support (I-2.4.3)?	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Please specify		The CPS mentions previous, extensive experience in support to PSD as well as complementarity with other programmes: "The EC has gained considerable expertise in implementing private sector development programmes. The programme will build on the experiences which have been gained in EC supported projects in Jamaica (Target Europe 2000, the Trade Development Project, the Eastern Jamaica Agricultural Support Project, EJASP, and the ACP banana support programme aiming at raising the competitiveness of the banana industry and diversification) and supplement activities supported by other co-operation partners. The programme is also complementary to support from other Community	The EC has already been active in providing support in trade policy, promotion of the private sector and banking. In SME development, the EC could offer further know-how and technical assistance as appropriate. (CSPNIP2002-2006 p14)					"EU co-operation is considered especially relevant to Egypt because of Europe's recent experience of radically reforming key sectors (technical education and vocational training/TEVT, industrial restructuring, financial sector reform, etc)," (p.20).				
The CSP/RSP shows that this VA has been a criterion to decide on the Commission's PSD support in the country/region. (I-2.4.1)?	N/A	0	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Synergies with other actors and other types of Commission support (JC 2.5)												
In terms of PSD support provided by EU MS, the CSP/RSP : [Describes what kind of PSD support they provide]	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1
In terms of PSD support provided by EU MS, the CSP/RSP : [Describes how this support and the Commission's PSD support complement each other]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
In terms of PSD support provided by EU MS, the CSP/RSP : [Shows that the choices made by the Commission in terms of PSD are geared by the objective of enhancing synergies with other actors.]	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
In terms of PSD support provided by EIB, the CSP/RSP : [Describes what kind of PSD support the EIB provides]	1	1	N/A	1	1	1	N/A	1	1	1	N/A	1
In terms of PSD support provided by EIB, the CSP/RSP : [Describes how this support and the Commission's PSD support complement each other]	0	1	N/A	0	1	0	N/A	N/A	0	1	N/A	0
In terms of PSD support provided by EIB, the CSP/RSP : [Shows that the choices made by the Commission in terms of PSD are geared by the objective of enhancing synergies with the EIB.]	0	0	N/A	0	0	0	N/A	N/A	0	0	N/A	1
In terms of PSD support provided by EBRD, the CSP/RSP : [Describes what kind of PSD support the EBRD provides]	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

This document applies to :	Country	Country	Country	Region	Country	Country	Region	Country	# Yes	% Yes	# Yes	% Yes	# Yes	% Yes
Which Country/Region ?	Zambia	Syria	South Africa	SADC	Moldova	Russia	Asia	Ukraine						
Which Period ?	2002-2007	2002-2007	Other	2002-2007	Other	2002-2007	Other	2002-2007	Total		First Period		Second Period	
Which Period ? [Other]			2003-2005		2002-2006		2005-2006							
The CSP/RSP refers to a policy dialogue with national authorities on the countries PSD strategy : [Conducted]	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	3	7,7%	1	5%	2	10%
The CSP/RSP refers to a policy dialogue with national authorities on the countries PSD strategy : [To be conducted as part of the Commission's strategy]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,0%	0	0%	0	0%
The CSP/RSP shows explicitly how the Commission's PSD strategy : [Fits into to the countries' national strategy]	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	4	10,3%	2	10%	2	10%
The CSP/RSP shows explicitly how the Commission's PSD strategy : [Fits into the countries' PSD strategy]	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	7,7%	1	5%	2	10%
The potential VA of the Commission geared its decision (JC 2.4)														
The CSP/RSP explicitly mentions the types of VA the Commission has for/when providing PSD support (I-2.4.3)?	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	11	28,2%	5	25%	6	30%
Please specify							"Asian exporters face yet another common challenge - to adapt their products to meet changing EU regulatory requirements, notably in the areas of health and environmental protection." (p7) "The Commission is not aware of any Asia wide programme with the same focus run by other donors." (p31)	The experience and best practices of the Tacis Enterprise Restructuring Facility will be used. (Ukraine CSP2002-2006 – p24)						
The CSP/RSP shows that this VA has been a criterion to decide on the Commission's PSD support in the country/region. (I-2.4.1)?	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	0	5	12,5%	1	5%	4	20%
Synergies with other actors and other types of Commission support (JC 2.5)														
In terms of PSD support provided by EU MS, the CSP/RSP : [Describes what kind of PSD support they provide]	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	22	55,0%	12	60%	10	50%
In terms of PSD support provided by EU MS, the CSP/RSP : [Describes how this support and the Commission's PSD support complement each other]	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	7	17,5%	4	20%	3	15%
In terms of PSD support provided by EU MS, the CSP/RSP : [Shows that the choices made by the Commission in terms of PSD are geared by the objective of enhancing synergies with other actors.]	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	5	12,5%	4	20%	1	5%
In terms of PSD support provided by EIB, the CSP/RSP : [Describes what kind of PSD support the EIB provides]	1	1	1	0	0	N/A	0	N/A	23	57,5%	12	60%	11	55%
In terms of PSD support provided by EIB, the CSP/RSP : [Describes how this support and the Commission's PSD support complement each other]	1	0	1	0	0	N/A	0	N/A	10	25,0%	5	25%	5	25%
In terms of PSD support provided by EIB, the CSP/RSP : [Shows that the choices made by the Commission in terms of PSD are geared by the objective of enhancing synergies with the EIB.]	0	0	0	0	0	N/A	0	N/A	3	7,5%	1	5%	2	10%
In terms of PSD support provided by EBRD, the CSP/RSP : [Describes what kind of PSD support the EBRD provides]	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1	1	N/A	1	6	15,0%	3	15%	3	15%

This document applies to :	Country	Country	Country	Country	Region	Region	Country	Country	Country	Country	Region	Country
Which Country/Region ?	Morocco	Jamaica	Vietnam	Lebanon	Euro-Med Partnership	Caribbean region	Nicaragua	Egypt	Jordan	Tunisia	Central America	Algeria
Which Period ?	2002-2007	Other	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007
Which Period ? [Other]		2001-2007										
In terms of PSD support provided by EBRD, the CSP/RSP : [Describes how this support and the Commission's PSD support complement each other]	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
In terms of PSD support provided by EBRD, the CSP/RSP : [Shows that the choices made by the Commission in terms of PSD are geared by the objective of enhancing synergies with the EBRD.]	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
In terms of PSD support provided by other donors, the CSP/RSP : [Describes what kind of PSD support they provide]	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1
In terms of PSD support provided by other donors, the CSP/RSP : [Describes how this support and the Commission's PSD support complement each other]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
In terms of PSD support provided by other donors, the CSP/RSP : [Shows that the choices made by the Commission in terms of PSD are geared by the objective of enhancing synergies with other actors.]	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Please provide examples.			Co-ordination and harmonisation among EU donors (twelve active Member States and the European Commission) in Vietnam have already reached good levels (meetings, guidelines, etc.). EU donors must seek harmonisation with the Government of Vietnam in the first place, and not only among themselves, but also with other donors. (CSPNIP2002-2006 – NIP2005-2006 p27-28).									No description of past complementarities but mention that synergies will be sought with the investment activities of the EIB and that strategy will also take into account a regional intervention jointly financed by the WB and the Commission "Participation privée dans les infrastructures méditerranéennes".
Prioritization of the PSD strategy (JC 2.6)												
The CSP/RSP shows how the Commission's PSD strategy in the country/region fits into the wider Commission's country/regional strategy (I-2.6.1)?	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
The CSP/RSP provides a description of the needs of the country in terms of PSD (I-2.6.2)?	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	1
This description refers to : [A documented analysis done by the Commission]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
This description refers to : [A documented analysis done by the national/regional authorities]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
This description refers to : [A documented analysis done by other instances]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
This description refers to : [A documented analysis undertaken by another body]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
This description refers to : [No other analysis than the one provided in the CSP/RSP]	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	1
Which other instances have done a documented analysis ? [WB]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Which other instances have done a documented analysis ? [IMF]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Which other instances have done a documented analysis ? [An EU MS]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Which other instances have done a documented analysis ? [Other]												
The CSP/RSP explains how the different components of the Commission's PSD support have been (I-2.6.1) : [Prioritised]	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1
The CSP/RSP explains how the different components of the Commission's PSD support have been (I-2.6.1) : [Sequenced]	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0

This document applies to :	Country	Country	Country	Region	Country	Country	Region	Country	# Yes	% Yes	# Yes	% Yes	# Yes	% Yes
Which Country/Region ?	Zambia	Syria	South Africa	SADC	Moldova	Russia	Asia	Ukraine						
Which Period ?	2002-2007	2002-2007	Other	2002-2007	Other	2002-2007	Other	2002-2007	Total		First Period		Second Period	
Which Period ? [Other]			2003-2005		2002-2006		2005-2006							
In terms of PSD support provided by EBRD, the CSP/RSP : [Describes how this support and the Commission's PSD support complement each other]	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	0	N/A	1	1	2,5%	1	5%	0	0%
In terms of PSD support provided by EBRD, the CSP/RSP : [Shows that the choices made by the Commission in terms of PSD are geared by the objective of enhancing synergies with the EBRD.]	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	0	N/A	1	1	2,6%	1	5%	0	0%
In terms of PSD support provided by other donors, the CSP/RSP : [Describes what kind of PSD support they provide]	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	21	53,8%	11	55%	10	50%
In terms of PSD support provided by other donors, the CSP/RSP : [Describes how this support and the Commission's PSD support complement each other]	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	7,5%	2	10%	1	5%
In terms of PSD support provided by other donors, the CSP/RSP : [Shows that the choices made by the Commission in terms of PSD are geared by the objective of enhancing synergies with other actors.]	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	5	12,5%	4	20%	1	5%
Please provide examples.	"The selected focal sectors complements Member States' co-operation programmes. Thus, the proposed interventions in the transport sector will be consistent with, and supportive to, the German and Danish programmes. They are also well in line with the road construction programmes financed by World Bank, African Development Bank, Norway and Japan. The latter four institutions/countries are the leading non-EU donors in the transport area." (p.23)							EU Member States present in Ukraine will continue to support economic restructuring and investment promotion, with increasing emphasis on the development of civil society and social and health issues, while EC assistance will focus on border management, legal, judicial and administrative reform, as well as trade and investment promotion in the context of the PCA. (Ukraine CSP2002-2006 – p13)						
Prioritization of the PSD strategy (JC 2.6)														
The CSP/RSP shows how the Commission's PSD strategy in the country/region fits into the wider Commission's country/regional strategy (I-2.6.1)?	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	32	80,0%	18	90%	14	70%
The CSP/RSP provides a description of the needs of the country in terms of PSD (I-2.6.2)?	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	25	62,5%	14	70%	11	55%
This description refers to : [A documented analysis done by the Commission]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	5,0%	0	0%	2	10%
This description refers to : [A documented analysis done by the national/regional authorities]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	7,5%	0	0%	3	15%
This description refers to : [A documented analysis done by other instances]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	5,0%	0	0%	2	10%
This description refers to : [A documented analysis undertaken by another body]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,0%	0	0%	0	0%
This description refers to : [No other analysis than the one provided in the CSP/RSP]	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	21	52,5%	14	70%	7	35%
Which other instances have done a documented analysis ? [WB]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2,5%	0	0%	1	5%
Which other instances have done a documented analysis ? [IMF]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,0%	0	0%	0	0%
Which other instances have done a documented analysis ? [An EU MS]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,0%	0	0%	0	0%
Which other instances have done a documented analysis ? [Other]														
The CSP/RSP explains how the different components of the Commission's PSD support have been (I-2.6.1) : [Prioritised]	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	13	32,5%	7	35%	6	30%
The CSP/RSP explains how the different components of the Commission's PSD support have been (I-2.6.1) : [Sequenced]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	5,0%	2	10%	0	0%

This document applies to :	Country	Country	Country	Country	Region	Region	Country	Country	Country	Country	Region	Country
Which Country/Region ?	Morocco	Jamaica	Vietnam	Lebanon	Euro-Med Partnership	Caribbean region	Nicaragua	Egypt	Jordan	Tunisia	Central America	Algeria
Which Period ?	2002-2007	Other	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007
Which Period ? [Other]		2001-2007										
Please provide one or two examples		The expected results presented in the CSP, p. 28 are as follows: "Results: The EC support will result in more competitive business practices in terms of management, product design and quality, organisation of production, working procedures, standards and technologies, as well as better access to financial institutions, especially for SME. In addition, business services for SME will have been improved. The project will also result in an improved capacity of the banking sector in lending to small and medium-sized enterprises and in facilitating the implementation of an EIB lending/loan guarantee programme for SMEs".		"EU support continues from that provided under the existing NIP, and will be focused on: • Extending the network of decentralised business service centres to assist entrepreneurs in developing business plans, marketing, product identification. • Assisting agricultural co-operatives in production and marketing, in particular, in targeting export markets. • Assisting in the establishment of an export promotions agency, with appropriate cofunding from chambers of commerce and other business and industrialists organisations." (p.8).		The RSP indicates, p. 18, that "In this framework, the RS will support the improvement of the regional business environment and competitive climate, the reinforcement of the capacity of private sector organisations and service providers, new forms of business collaboration, clustering and trade facilitation.".		The Support to Trade enhancement strand of the cooperation strategy was intended to be complemented/reinforced by the Industrial Modernisation Programme actions which will assist the SME sector in competing more effectively on international markets and help upgrade Egyptian standards and accreditation systems. The Support to the Comprehensive Restructuring was chosen to cover the needs of critical sectors especially vulnerable to the impact of global competition and technological change.		The choice of support has been significantly determined by the scope of the Association Agreement: "Les caractéristiques essentielles de la stratégie de la Commission pour la coopération financière avec la Tunisie sont déterminées par la nécessité de soutenir la réalisation des objectifs de l'Accord d'Association, entre autres, la mise en oeuvre du libre échange et de la mise en place des mécanismes du marché intérieur." (p.16).		Prioritisation done according to the strategic objectives of the Barcelona Process.
The CSP/RSP refer to a methodological procedure to select areas of intervention per country with (I-2.6.4): [Selection of priority needs]	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0
The CSP/RSP refer to a methodological procedure to select areas of intervention per country with (I-2.6.4): [Selection of interventions with Commission comparative advantage]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP refer to a methodological procedure to select areas of intervention per country with (I-2.6.4): [Assessment of whether pre-conditions of intervention are met]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cross-cutting issues (IC 2.7)												
The CSP/RSP explains how the Commission's PSD support will contribute to the following cross-cutting issues (I-2.7.1) (please select all that apply) : [Gender equality]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
The CSP/RSP explains how the Commission's PSD support will contribute to the following cross-cutting issues (I-2.7.1) (please select all that apply) : [Good governance]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
The CSP/RSP explains how the Commission's PSD support will contribute to the following cross-cutting issues (I-2.7.1) (please select all that apply) : [Combat environmental degradation]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
The CSP/RSP explains how the Commission's PSD support will contribute to the following cross-cutting issues (I-2.7.1) (please select all that apply) : [HIV]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP explains how the Commission's PSD support will contribute to the following cross-cutting issues (I-2.7.1) (please select all that apply) : [Other]	cross-cutting issues are mentioned but in general and not specifically in relation to PSD support.						regional integration and ICTs considered as CCIs			In the case of teh SAF V (NIP 2005-2006), "The Tunisian authorities have shown great interest in this operation, which covers the key issues of good governance (performance-based budget management) and service liberalisation (principal source of additional growth)." (p.10)		

This document applies to :	Country	Country	Country	Region	Country	Country	Region	Country	# Yes	% Yes	# Yes	% Yes	# Yes	% Yes
Which Country/Region ?	Zambia	Syria	South Africa	SADC	Moldova	Russia	Asia	Ukraine						
Which Period ?	2002-2007	2002-2007	Other	2002-2007	Other	2002-2007	Other	2002-2007	Total		First Period		Second Period	
Which Period ? [Other]			2003-2005		2002-2006		2005-2006							
Please provide one or two examples		Sous le PIN 2005-2006, la CE a décidé de soutenir le Centre d'affaires euro-syrien qui a bénéficié du soutien de la CE depuis 2000. La priorité "modernisation industrielle" et le renforcement de la gestion, des capacités et des infrastructures dans le domaine de la qualité s'inscrit dans l'appui à la mise en oeuvre de l'AA, et notamment des procédures d'évaluation de conformité.												
The CSP/RSP refer to a methodological procedure to select areas of intervention per country with (I-2.6.4): [Selection of priority needs]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	20,0%	4	20%	4	20%
The CSP/RSP refer to a methodological procedure to select areas of intervention per country with (I-2.6.4): [Selection of interventions with Commission comparative advantage]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	7,5%	1	5%	4	20%
The CSP/RSP refer to a methodological procedure to select areas of intervention per country with (I-2.6.4): [Assessment of whether pre-conditions of intervention are met]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,0%	0	0%	2	10%
Cross-cutting issues (IC 2.7)														
The CSP/RSP explains how the Commission's PSD support will contribute to the following cross-cutting issues (I-2.7.1) (please select all that apply) : [Gender equality]	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	7	17,5%	4	20%	3	15%
The CSP/RSP explains how the Commission's PSD support will contribute to the following cross-cutting issues (I-2.7.1) (please select all that apply) : [Good governance]	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	5,0%	2	10%	0	0%
The CSP/RSP explains how the Commission's PSD support will contribute to the following cross-cutting issues (I-2.7.1) (please select all that apply) : [Combat environmental degradation]	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	8	20,0%	4	20%	4	20%
The CSP/RSP explains how the Commission's PSD support will contribute to the following cross-cutting issues (I-2.7.1) (please select all that apply) : [HIV]	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	5,0%	1	5%	1	5%
The CSP/RSP explains how the Commission's PSD support will contribute to the following cross-cutting issues (I-2.7.1) (please select all that apply) : [Other]			(i) civil society and NSA involvement and (ii) capacity-building											

This document applies to :	Country	Country	Country	Country	Region	Region	Country	Country	Country	Country	Region	Country
Which Country/Region ?	Morocco	Jamaica	Vietnam	Lebanon	Euro-Med Partnership	Caribbean region	Nicaragua	Egypt	Jordan	Tunisia	Central America	Algeria
Which Period ?	2002-2007	Other	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007
Which Period ? [Other]		2001-2007										
For each of the above, does the CSP/RSP define specific objectives, specific indicators ?	A description of the Programme d'appui aux entreprises marocaines is given in the NIP 2002-2004 (out of scope but the programme was delayed and implemented in the scope of the evaluation, and is one of the 27 selected interventions). It includes the following performance indicators: · Nombre d'entreprises qui auront bénéficié de ce programme pour l'amélioration de la qualité de sa production et leur rapprochement aux normes européennes ; · Augmentation du niveau d'exportation de ces entreprises	No as they are not mentioned in the descriptions of the PSD intervention.		No.			0				Mentions that specific indicators will be prepared	Indicators to measure disparity between men and women
Decent work agenda [JC 2.8]												
The CSP/RSP refers to EC macro-economic and policy intervention targeting the decent work agenda and/or improvement of core labour standard and social governance?	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
The choice of modalities and instruments at country / regional level [JC 3.2]												
The CSP/RSP justifies the choice of instruments (e.g. CDE, PROINVEST, etc..) and aid modalities for the Commission's PSD support in the country (I-3.2.1): [choice of instruments]	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
The CSP/RSP justifies the choice of instruments (e.g. CDE, PROINVEST, etc..) and aid modalities for the Commission's PSD support in the country (I-3.2.1): [choice of aid modalities]	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	0
The CSP/RSP justifies the choice of the instrument by referring to (I-3.2.1) (tick all that are applicable): [The expertise to tackle specific technical challenges]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP justifies the choice of the instrument by referring to (I-3.2.1) (tick all that are applicable): [Political objectives]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
The CSP/RSP justifies the choice of the instrument by referring to (I-3.2.1) (tick all that are applicable): [The enhanced efficiency (eg. timeliness)]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP justifies the choice of the instrument by referring to (I-3.2.1) (tick all that are applicable): [The potential synergies with other instruments/modalities]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
The CSP/RSP justifies the choice of the instrument by referring to (I-3.2.1) (tick all that are applicable): [Other]		PSD funding under 9th EDF A-allocation is preceded by the following mention: "This allocation is destined to cover the long-term development", p. 33. See also p.31.			PSD support via FEMIP (see justification p.28).					in the case of the FEMIP (MEDA-funded and EIB-managed)		The European Neighbourhood Policy concept envisages the possibility of integrating
The CSP/RSP justifies the choice of aid modalities by referring to (I-3.2.1) (tick all that are applicable): [The expertise to tackle specific technical challenges]	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP justifies the choice of aid modalities by referring to (I-3.2.1) (tick all that are applicable): [Political objectives]	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0
The CSP/RSP justifies the choice of aid modalities by referring to (I-3.2.1) (tick all that are applicable): [The enhanced efficiency (eg. timeliness)]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP justifies the choice of aid modalities by referring to (I-3.2.1) (tick all that are applicable): [The potential synergies with other instruments/modalities]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

This document applies to :	Country	Country	Country	Region	Country	Country	Region	Country	# Yes	% Yes	# Yes	% Yes	# Yes	% Yes
Which Country/Region ?	Zambia	Syria	South Africa	SADC	Moldova	Russia	Asia	Ukraine						
Which Period ?	2002-2007	2002-2007	Other	2002-2007	Other	2002-2007	Other	2002-2007	Total		First Period		Second Period	
Which Period ? [Other]			2003-2005		2002-2006		2005-2006							
For each of the above, does the CSP/RSP define specific objectives, specific indicators ?			none											
Decent work agenda (JC 2.8)														
The CSP/RSP refers to EC macro-economic and policy intervention targeting the decent work agenda and/or improvement of core labour standard and social governance?	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	3	7,5%	0	0%	3	15%
The choice of modalities and instruments at country / regional level (JC 3.2)														
The CSP/RSP justifies the choice of instruments (e.g. CDE, PROINVEST, etc..) and aid modalities for the Commission's PSD support in the country (I-3.2.1): [choice of instruments]	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	25,0%	5	25%	5	25%
The CSP/RSP justifies the choice of instruments (e.g. CDE, PROINVEST, etc..) and aid modalities for the Commission's PSD support in the country (I-3.2.1): [choice of aid modalities]	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	13	32,5%	6	30%	7	35%
The CSP/RSP justifies the choice of the instrument by referring to (I-3.2.1) (tick all that are applicable): [The expertise to tackle specific technical challenges]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2,5%	0	0%	1	5%
The CSP/RSP justifies the choice of the instrument by referring to (I-3.2.1) (tick all that are applicable): [Political objectives]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2,5%	1	5%	0	0%
The CSP/RSP justifies the choice of the instrument by referring to (I-3.2.1) (tick all that are applicable): [The enhanced efficiency (eg. timeliness)]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,0%	0	0%	0	0%
The CSP/RSP justifies the choice of the instrument by referring to (I-3.2.1) (tick all that are applicable): [The potential synergies with other instruments/modalities]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	7,5%	1	5%	2	10%
The CSP/RSP justifies the choice of the instrument by referring to (I-3.2.1) (tick all that are applicable): [Other]		"The nature of aid will be project aid in the form of technical assistance and policy advice lack of a comprehensive reform policy and a clear commitment to reforms, Syria should not be considered for sectoral support." DSP, p. 15.												
The CSP/RSP justifies the choice of aid modalities by referring to (I-3.2.1) (tick all that are applicable): [The expertise to tackle specific technical challenges]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2,5%	1	5%	0	0%
The CSP/RSP justifies the choice of aid modalities by referring to (I-3.2.1) (tick all that are applicable): [Political objectives]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	10,0%	3	15%	1	5%
The CSP/RSP justifies the choice of aid modalities by referring to (I-3.2.1) (tick all that are applicable): [The enhanced efficiency (eg. timeliness)]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2,5%	0	0%	1	5%
The CSP/RSP justifies the choice of aid modalities by referring to (I-3.2.1) (tick all that are applicable): [The potential synergies with other instruments/modalities]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2,5%	0	0%	1	5%

This document applies to :	Country	Country	Country	Country	Region	Region	Country	Country	Country	Country	Region	Country
Which Country/Region ?	Morocco	Jamaica	Vietnam	Lebanon	Euro-Med Partnership	Caribbean region	Nicaragua	Egypt	Jordan	Tunisia	Central America	Algeria
Which Period ?	2002-2007	Other	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007
Which Period ? [Other]		2001-2007										
The CSP/RSP justifies the choice of aid modalities by referring to (I-3.2.1) (tick all that are applicable): [Other]					technical assistance and risk capital support to FEMIP, funded by MEDA but managed and implemented by the EIB			"Although there may be a need for technical assistance, the key issues to be addressed are essentially policy related and the successful restructuring of spinning and weaving will require a strong political will to act rapidly and decisively. The nature and objectives of such a programme make it a natural candidate for sector facility funding" (p.39).		Budget support (in the case of the SAF V). Choice justified by "In accordance with the recent guidelines, priority was inevitably given to budget support for reforms in the sectors affected by implementation of the Association Agreement." (p. 7 of NIP).		
Intervening at the appropriate level (national, regional, supra-regional) (JC 3.3)												
The CSP/RSP specifies that the Commissions support to PSD intervenes at the following levels (I-3.3.1) (please select all that apply): [Sub-national (i.e. focus on specific regions or parts of a country)]	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP specifies that the Commissions support to PSD intervenes at the following levels (I-3.3.1) (please select all that apply): [National]	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	1
The CSP/RSP specifies that the Commissions support to PSD intervenes at the following levels (I-3.3.1) (please select all that apply): [Regional (more than one country of a region)]	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1
The CSP/RSP specifies that the Commissions support to PSD intervenes at the following levels (I-3.3.1) (please select all that apply): [Supra-regional beyond a specific region]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP justified the level at which the Commission intervened in its PSD support (I-3.3.1):	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0
Please explain briefly (max 8 lines)			The key element that will guide the EU's harmonisation work in Vietnam is a country-based approach that emphasises country ownership and government leadership, includes capacity building, and recognises diverse aid modalities (projects, sector-wide approaches, etc). (CSPNIP2002 2006 – NIP2005-2006 p27-28)			Its support is linked to the aim to support the Caribbean's integration in the world economy which requires structural transformation and repositioning of its economy (p.17).	Complementarity is given as a justification (for the national and regional level, no justification given for the sub-regional level): "Regional cooperation with Central America is a fundamental complement to the three sectors identified."		EC will assist Jordan to prepare for particular challenges resulting from the so-called "Agadir process" and other regional trade cooperation initiatives with Mediterranean partners (CSPNIP2002-2006, p 22)		Complementarity and even possibility of using national budget for regional strategy and vice-versa.	
Timeliness and cost-effectiveness												
The CSP/RSP identifies specific factors that might enhance/hamper timeliness and cost-effectiveness of the Commission's PSD support (I-3.5.4): [Enhance]	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	1
The CSP/RSP identifies specific factors that might enhance/hamper timeliness and cost-effectiveness of the Commission's PSD support (I-3.5.4): [Hamper]	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1

This document applies to :	Country	Country	Country	Region	Country	Country	Region	Country	# Yes	% Yes	# Yes	% Yes	# Yes	% Yes
Which Country/Region ?	Zambia	Syria	South Africa	SADC	Moldova	Russia	Asia	Ukraine						
Which Period ?	2002-2007	2002-2007	Other	2002-2007	Other	2002-2007	Other	2002-2007	Total		First Period		Second Period	
Which Period ? [Other]			2003-2005		2002-2006		2005-2006							
The CSP/RSP justifies the choice of aid modalities by referring to (I-3.2.1) (tick all that are applicable): [Other]		Voir plus haut.	SBS justified by strengthening donor coordination											
Intervening at the appropriate level (national, regional, supra-regional) (JC 3.3)														
The CSP/RSP specifies that the Commissions support to PSD intervenes at the following levels (I-3.3.1) (please select all that apply): [Sub-national (i.e. focus on specific regions or parts of a country)]	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	5	12,5%	2	10%	3	15%
The CSP/RSP specifies that the Commissions support to PSD intervenes at the following levels (I-3.3.1) (please select all that apply): [National]	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	20	50,0%	12	60%	8	40%
The CSP/RSP specifies that the Commissions support to PSD intervenes at the following levels (I-3.3.1) (please select all that apply): [Regional (more than one country of a region)]	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	16	40,0%	8	40%	8	40%
The CSP/RSP specifies that the Commissions support to PSD intervenes at the following levels (I-3.3.1) (please select all that apply): [Supra-regional beyond a specific region]	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	2,5%	1	5%	0	0%
The CSP/RSP justified the level at which the Commission intervened in its PSD support (I-3.3.1):	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	16	40,0%	8	40%	8	40%
Please explain briefly (max 8 lines)				Brief reference made to the RIP focusing on interventions "with clear regional value added" made on p.29, which tallies with the regional nature of the focal areas (regional integration and trade; transport and communications).		Only justification to intervene in the Kaliningrad region located at the EU's borders.	"In trade and investment the response strategy requires an Asia-wide programme to encourage the development of common approaches and greater integration." (p28)							
Timeliness and cost-effectiveness														
The CSP/RSP identifies specific factors that might enhance/hamper timeliness and cost-effectiveness of the Commission's PSD support (I-3.5.4): [Enhance]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	25,0%	5	25%	5	25%
The CSP/RSP identifies specific factors that might enhance/hamper timeliness and cost-effectiveness of the Commission's PSD support (I-3.5.4): [Hamper]	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	15	37,5%	8	40%	7	35%

This document applies to :	Country	Country	Country	Country	Region	Region	Country	Country	Country	Country	Region	Country
Which Country/Region ?	Morocco	Jamaica	Vietnam	Lebanon	Euro-Med Partnership	Caribbean region	Nicaragua	Egypt	Jordan	Tunisia	Central America	Algeria
Which Period ?	2002-2007	Other	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007
Which Period ? [Other]		2001-2007										
Please specify briefly (2 lines)			The European Union (EU) in Vietnam recognises that the totality and wide variety of donor requirements and processes for preparing, delivering, and monitoring development assistance are generating unproductive transaction costs for, and drawing down the limited capacity of, partner countries. (CSPNIP2002-2006 – NIP2005-2006 p27-28)	"Conditions for engagement are measures to be taken by government to address the internal factors which give rise to high production costs, such as port charges, electricity usage, certain taxes, without which EU support would not be effective." (p. 18).	The CSP indicates, p. 28, that improvements in the domestic institutional environment would facilitate endogenous PSD and financing.		Heavy burden of EC procedure, "control culture" of the EC.	The CSP identifies political, operational and circumstantial risks for the implementation of EU programmes in general (not PSD specific ones): erosion of government commitment to reform, problems of absorptive and institutional capacity, economic risks, social unrest/violence, especially from youths and external risks (conflict).	The development of a more dynamic private sector is hampered by the dysfunctioning of the financial sector. (CSPNIP2002-2006, p 22)	The PIN mentions avoiding "over-sizing programmes (examples: privatisation, competitiveness) in relation to the level of the recipient's political commitment to the reform and the take-up capacity of beneficiary institutions, as well as ensuring that implementation takes place at the right time in relation to the actions supported (e.g. privatisation)" (p.6).		Enhance: Experience shows that TA an effective support for SMEs assistance Hamper:Disbursement pb related to security reason
The CSP/RSP provides for all or parts of the Commission's PSD support (I-3.5.4): [A clear planning]	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP provides for all or parts of the Commission's PSD support (I-3.5.4): [A clear estimation of costs]	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP provides for all or parts of its PSD support indicators to monitor timeliness and cost effectiveness (I-3.5.4): [Timeliness]	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	None
The CSP/RSP provides for all or parts of its PSD support indicators to monitor timeliness and cost effectiveness (I-3.5.4): [Cost effectiveness]	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	Parts	None	None	None
PSD support geared to tackling the main institutional and regulatory obstacles to PSD (JC 4.1)												
The CSP/RSP identifies or refers to a document identifying the main obstacles to PSD in terms of (I-4.1.1) (tick all relevant boxes) : [Macro-economic environment]	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
The CSP/RSP identifies or refers to a document identifying the main obstacles to PSD in terms of (I-4.1.1) (tick all relevant boxes) : [Institutional and regulatory framework]	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1
The CSP/RSP identifies or refers to a document identifying the main obstacles to PSD in terms of (I-4.1.1) (tick all relevant boxes) : [Integration in the regional economy]	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1
The CSP/RSP identifies or refers to a document identifying the main obstacles to PSD in terms of (I-4.1.1) (tick all relevant boxes) : [Integration in the world economy]	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1
The Commission's strategy with respect to PSD in the country/region as displayed in the CSP/RSP is geared to removing obstacles in terms of (I-4.1.2) (tick all relevant boxes) : [Macro-economic environment]	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
The Commission's strategy with respect to PSD in the country/region as displayed in the CSP/RSP is geared to removing obstacles in terms of (I-4.1.2) (tick all relevant boxes) : [Institutional and regulatory framework]	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1
The Commission's strategy with respect to PSD in the country/region as displayed in the CSP/RSP is geared to removing obstacles in terms of (I-4.1.2) (tick all relevant boxes) : [Integration in the regional economy]	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1
The Commission's strategy with respect to PSD in the country/region as displayed in the CSP/RSP is geared to removing obstacles in terms of (I-4.1.2) (tick all relevant boxes) : [Integration in the world economy]	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	1

This document applies to :	Country	Country	Country	Region	Country	Country	Region	Country	# Yes	% Yes	# Yes	% Yes	# Yes	% Yes	
Which Country/Region ?	Zambia	Syria	South Africa	SADC	Moldova	Russia	Asia	Ukraine							
Which Period ?	2002-2007	2002-2007	Other	2002-2007	Other	2002-2007	Other	2002-2007	Total		First Period		Second Period		
Which Period ? [Other]			2003-2005		2002-2006		2005-2006								
Please specify briefly (2 lines)		Le PIN précise que certaines conditions doivent être mises en oeuvre avant le lancement de certaines activités, notamment l'adoption de cadres réglementaire et institutionnelles. Le DSP précise lui que plus généralement des freins politiques et institutionnels au processus de réforme sont possibles: "some risk that the reform process simply does not take off. This could be caused by a change in power in Damascus, or more likely, through bureaucratic blockages resulting from different actors acting against each other or vested interests acting against the reform policy.", DSP, p. 20					"The key risk for (trade and investment) programme implementation is the lack of a sufficient number of applications under the call for proposals from the target group." (p30)								
The CSP/RSP provides for all or parts of the Commission's PSD support (I-3.5.4): [A clear planning]	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	10	25,0%	4	20%	6	30%	
The CSP/RSP provides for all or parts of the Commission's PSD support (I-3.5.4): [A clear estimation of costs]	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	14	35,0%	8	40%	6	30%	
The CSP/RSP provides for all or parts of its PSD support indicators to monitor timeliness and cost effectiveness (I-3.5.4): [Timeliness]	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	Parts							
The CSP/RSP provides for all or parts of its PSD support indicators to monitor timeliness and cost effectiveness (I-3.5.4): [Cost effectiveness]	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	None							
PSD support geared to tackling the main institutional and regulatory obstacles to PSD (JC 4.1)															
The CSP/RSP identifies or refers to a document identifying the main obstacles to PSD in terms of (I-4.1.1) (tick all relevant boxes) : [Macro-economic environment]	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	16	40,0%	8	40%	8	40%	
The CSP/RSP identifies or refers to a document identifying the main obstacles to PSD in terms of (I-4.1.1) (tick all relevant boxes) : [Institutional and regulatory framework]	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	25	62,5%	12	60%	13	65%	
The CSP/RSP identifies or refers to a document identifying the main obstacles to PSD in terms of (I-4.1.1) (tick all relevant boxes) : [Integration in the regional economy]	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	20	50,0%	10	50%	10	50%	
The CSP/RSP identifies or refers to a document identifying the main obstacles to PSD in terms of (I-4.1.1) (tick all relevant boxes) : [Integration in the world economy]	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	19	47,5%	11	55%	8	40%	
The Commission's strategy with respect to PSD in the country/region as displayed in the CSP/RSP is geared to removing obstacles in terms of (I-4.1.2) (tick all relevant boxes) : [Macro-economic environment]	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	14	35,0%	8	40%	6	30%	
The Commission's strategy with respect to PSD in the country/region as displayed in the CSP/RSP is geared to removing obstacles in terms of (I-4.1.2) (tick all relevant boxes) : [Institutional and regulatory framework]	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	28	70,0%	15	75%	13	65%	
The Commission's strategy with respect to PSD in the country/region as displayed in the CSP/RSP is geared to removing obstacles in terms of (I-4.1.2) (tick all relevant boxes) : [Integration in the regional economy]	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	25	62,5%	13	65%	12	60%	
The Commission's strategy with respect to PSD in the country/region as displayed in the CSP/RSP is geared to removing obstacles in terms of (I-4.1.2) (tick all relevant boxes) : [Integration in the world economy]	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	24	60,0%	14	70%	10	50%	

This document applies to :	Country	Country	Country	Country	Region	Region	Country	Country	Country	Country	Region	Country
Which Country/Region ?	Morocco	Jamaica	Vietnam	Lebanon	Euro-Med Partnership	Caribbean region	Nicaragua	Egypt	Jordan	Tunisia	Central America	Algeria
Which Period ?	2002-2007	Other	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007
Which Period ? [Other]		2001-2007										
The CSP/RSP explains that the private sector was consulted for determining the priorities for helping remove the main institutional and regulatory obstacles to its development (I-4.1.3) :	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Policy dialogue on the institutional and regulatory frameworks (JC 4.2)												
The CSP/RSP describes policy dialogue to be conducted on the institutional and regulatory frameworks with the following actors I-4.2.1 and I-4.2.2) (Please tick all relevant boxes) : [Public authorities of the country]	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP describes policy dialogue to be conducted on the institutional and regulatory frameworks with the following actors I-4.2.1 and I-4.2.2) (Please tick all relevant boxes) : [Business associations]	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP describes policy dialogue to be conducted on the institutional and regulatory frameworks with the following actors I-4.2.1 and I-4.2.2) (Please tick all relevant boxes) : [Non-state actors]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP describes policy dialogue to be conducted on the institutional and regulatory frameworks with the following actors I-4.2.1 and I-4.2.2) (Please tick all relevant boxes) : [IMF/WB]	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP describes policy dialogue to be conducted on the institutional and regulatory frameworks with the following actors I-4.2.1 and I-4.2.2) (Please tick all relevant boxes) : [Other donors]	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP describes policy dialogue to be conducted on the institutional and regulatory frameworks with the following actors I-4.2.1 and I-4.2.2) (Please tick all relevant boxes) : [Others]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP states that the Commission will take the lead in terms of (some of the) dialogue(s) with policy actors (I-4.2.3) :	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP foresees Commission activities in terms of contribution to private-public dialogue (I-4.2.4)	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Analysis of the country/region's main constraints in terms of access to finance (JC 5.1)												
The CSP/RSP identifies or refers to a document identifying the country's/region's main constraints in terms of access to finance for enterprises (I-5.1.2): [On the demand side]	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP identifies or refers to a document identifying the country's/region's main constraints in terms of access to finance for enterprises (I-5.1.2): [On the supply side]	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1
The Commission's PSD strategy as described in the CSP/RSP was (partially) geared towards the removal of these constraints (I-5.1.4)	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1
The Commission has addressed the constraints in the business environment for larger enterprises and MSMEs to develop (JC 5.2)												
The Commission's PSD strategy as described in the CSP/RSP was (partially) geared towards: [the facilitation of the creation of enterprises through accessible procedures of registration (I-5.2.1)]	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
The Commission's PSD strategy as described in the CSP/RSP was (partially) geared towards: [The regulatory environment of financial intermediaries to facilitate their lending to, and/or investment in MSMEs (I-5.2.2)]	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0
The support targeted enterprises that were facing difficulties in obtaining loan and investment funding (JC 5.3)												
The CSP/RSP describes a specific approach that the Commission intends to apply or applied (distinguish between both): [to identify enterprises that are facing difficulties in obtaining loan and investment funding (I-5.3.1)] [Scale 1]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP describes a specific approach that the Commission intends to apply or applied (distinguish between both): [to identify enterprises that are facing difficulties in obtaining loan and investment funding (I-5.3.1)] [Scale 2]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

This document applies to :	Country	Country	Country	Region	Country	Country	Region	Country	# Yes	% Yes	# Yes	% Yes	# Yes	% Yes
Which Country/Region ?	Zambia	Syria	South Africa	SADC	Moldova	Russia	Asia	Ukraine						
Which Period ?	2002-2007	2002-2007	Other	2002-2007	Other	2002-2007	Other	2002-2007	Total		First Period		Second Period	
Which Period ? [Other]			2003-2005		2002-2006		2005-2006							
The CSP/RSP explains that the private sector was consulted for determining the priorities for helping remove the main institutional and regulatory obstacles to its development (I-4.1.3) :	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	10,0%	1	5%	3	15%
Policy dialogue on the institutional and regulatory frameworks (JC 4.2)														
The CSP/RSP describes policy dialogue to be conducted on the institutional and regulatory frameworks with the following actors I-4.2.1 and I-4.2.2) (Please tick all relevant boxes) : [Public authorities of the country]	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	14	35,0%	5	25%	9	45%
The CSP/RSP describes policy dialogue to be conducted on the institutional and regulatory frameworks with the following actors I-4.2.1 and I-4.2.2) (Please tick all relevant boxes) : [Business associations]	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	6	15,0%	3	15%	3	15%
The CSP/RSP describes policy dialogue to be conducted on the institutional and regulatory frameworks with the following actors I-4.2.1 and I-4.2.2) (Please tick all relevant boxes) : [Non-state actors]	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	4	10,0%	2	10%	2	10%
The CSP/RSP describes policy dialogue to be conducted on the institutional and regulatory frameworks with the following actors I-4.2.1 and I-4.2.2) (Please tick all relevant boxes) : [IMF/WB]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	10,0%	2	10%	2	10%
The CSP/RSP describes policy dialogue to be conducted on the institutional and regulatory frameworks with the following actors I-4.2.1 and I-4.2.2) (Please tick all relevant boxes) : [Other donors]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	12,5%	2	10%	3	15%
The CSP/RSP describes policy dialogue to be conducted on the institutional and regulatory frameworks with the following actors I-4.2.1 and I-4.2.2) (Please tick all relevant boxes) : [Others]	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	4	10,0%	1	5%	3	15%
The CSP/RSP states that the Commission will take the lead in terms of (some of the) dialogue(s) with policy actors (I-4.2.3) :	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	5,0%	1	5%	1	5%
The CSP/RSP foresees Commission activities in terms of contribution to private-public dialogue (I-4.2.4)	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	6	15,0%	3	15%	3	15%
Analysis of the country/region's main constraints in terms of access to finance (JC 5.1)														
The CSP/RSP identifies or refers to a document identifying the country's/region's main constraints in terms of access to finance for enterprises (I-5.1.2): [On the demand side]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	5	12,5%	4	20%	1	5%
The CSP/RSP identifies or refers to a document identifying the country's/region's main constraints in terms of access to finance for enterprises (I-5.1.2): [On the supply side]	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	12	30,0%	7	35%	5	25%
The Commission's PSD strategy as described in the CSP/RSP was (partially) geared towards the removal of these constraints (I-5.1.4)	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	16	40,0%	10	50%	6	30%
The Commission has addressed the constraints in the business environment for larger enterprises and MSMEs to develop (JC 5.2)														
The Commission's PSD strategy as described in the CSP/RSP was (partially) geared towards: [the facilitation of the creation of enterprises through accessible procedures of registration (I-5.2.1)]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	17,5%	2	10%	5	25%
The Commission's PSD strategy as described in the CSP/RSP was (partially) geared towards: [The regulatory environment of financial intermediaries to facilitate their lending to, and/or investment in MSMEs (I-5.2.2)]	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	12	30,0%	6	30%	6	30%
The support targeted enterprises that were facing difficulties in obtaining loan and investment funding (JC 5.3)														
The CSP/RSP describes a specific approach that the Commission intends to apply or applied (distinguish between both): [to identify enterprises that are facing difficulties in obtaining loan and investment funding (I-5.3.1)] [Scale 1]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,0%	0	0%	0	0%
The CSP/RSP describes a specific approach that the Commission intends to apply or applied (distinguish between both): [to identify enterprises that are facing difficulties in obtaining loan and investment funding (I-5.3.1)] [Scale 2]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,0%	0	0%	0	0%

This document applies to :	Country	Country	Country	Country	Region	Region	Country	Country	Country	Country	Region	Country
Which Country/Region ?	Morocco	Jamaica	Vietnam	Lebanon	Euro-Med Partnership	Caribbean region	Nicaragua	Egypt	Jordan	Tunisia	Central America	Algeria
Which Period ?	2002-2007	Other	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007
Which Period ? [Other]		2001-2007										
The CSP/RSP describes a specific approach that the Commission intends to apply or applied (distinguish between both): [to identify the specific constraints these enterprises are facing][Scale 1]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP describes a specific approach that the Commission intends to apply or applied (distinguish between both): [to identify the specific constraints these enterprises are facing][Scale 2]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP shows that the support will be geared to these enterprises	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Meso-level: supporting intermediary organizations supporting enterprises (JC 5.4)												
The CSP/RSP describes how private sector representative organizations that have a real impact will be selected (I-5.4.1)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Support to financial institutions (JC 5.6)												
The CSP/RSP foresees support [for the mobilization of private funding sources (I-5.6.1)]	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP foresees support [for more efficient financial markets (I-5.6.2)]	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0
This includes private savings ?	N/A	N/A	0	N/A	0	N/A	N/A	1	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Addressing the constraints of micro-enterprises (JC 5.7)												
The CSP/RSP explains that the Commission has analysed or will analyse the specific problems of micro-enterprises in countries of intervention (I-5.7.1)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP explains that part of the Commission's PSD support will be geared towards addressing the capacity problems of micro-enterprises in terms of: [Submitting bankable financing requests to financial intermediaries (I-5.7.2)]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP explains that part of the Commission's PSD support will be geared towards addressing the capacity problems of micro-enterprises in terms of: [Management capacity (I-5.7.3)]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP explains that part of the Commission's PSD support will be geared towards addressing the capacity problems of micro-enterprises in terms of: [Accounting (I-5.7.3)]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP explains that part of the Commission's PSD support will be geared towards addressing the capacity problems of micro-enterprises in terms of: [Transparency (I-5.7.3)]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Analysis of enterprises' shortcomings in terms of BDS (JC 6.1)												
The CSP/RSP identifies or refers to a document identifying the main shortcoming of enterprises in terms of competitiveness (I-6.1.2)	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0
This includes forward studies and surveys of key sector or subsectors in regions/countries concerned ?	N/A	0	0	0	N/A	0	N/A	0	N/A	0	N/A	N/A
The Commission's strategy with respect to PSD in the country/region as displayed in the CSP/RSP is geared towards tackling the shortcomings identified in these analyses (I-6.1.4):	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0
The CSP/RSP explicitly underlines the importance of targeting a critical mass of enterprises facing competitiveness problems (I-6.1.5):	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Commission PSD programming in the area of BDS and non-financial service provision has targeted sustainable reinforcement of the structures and functioning of local markets (I-6.1.6):	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Appropriate delivery channels/IO (JC 6.2)												
The CSP/RSP explains how intermediary organizations have been or will be selected on the basis of their ability to deliver (I-6.2.1):	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enterprises have been upgraded and accessed new markets (JC 6.3)												

This document applies to :	Country	Country	Country	Region	Country	Country	Region	Country	# Yes	% Yes	# Yes	% Yes	# Yes	% Yes
Which Country/Region ?	Zambia	Syria	South Africa	SADC	Moldova	Russia	Asia	Ukraine						
Which Period ?	2002-2007	2002-2007	Other	2002-2007	Other	2002-2007	Other	2002-2007	Total		First Period		Second Period	
Which Period ? [Other]			2003-2005		2002-2006		2005-2006							
The CSP/RSP describes a specific approach that the Commission intends to apply or applied (distinguish between both): [to identify the specific constraints these enterprises are facing][Scale 1]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,0%	0	0%	0	0%
The CSP/RSP describes a specific approach that the Commission intends to apply or applied (distinguish between both): [to identify the specific constraints these enterprises are facing][Scale 2]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,0%	0	0%	0	0%
The CSP/RSP shows that the support will be geared to these enterprises	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	5,0%	2	10%	0	0%
Meso-level: supporting intermediary organizations supporting enterprises (JC 5.4)														
The CSP/RSP describes how private sector representative organizations that have a real impact will be selected (I-5.4.1)	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	3	7,5%	2	10%	1	5%
Support to financial institutions (JC 5.6)														
The CSP/RSP foresees support [for the mobilization of private funding sources (I-5.6.1)]	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	6	15,0%	4	20%	2	10%
The CSP/RSP foresees support [for more efficient financial markets (I-5.6.2)]	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	12	30,0%	8	40%	4	20%
This includes private savings ?	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1	N/A	N/A	3	7,7%	2	10%	1	5%
Addressing the constraints of micro-enterprises (JC 5.7)														
The CSP/RSP explains that the Commission has analysed or will analyse the specific problems of micro-enterprises in countries of intervention (I-5.7.1)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,0%	0	0%	0	0%
The CSP/RSP explains that part of the Commission's PSD support will be geared towards addressing the capacity problems of micro-enterprises in terms of: [Submitting bankable financing requests to financial intermediaries (I-5.7.2)]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	5,0%	1	5%	1	5%
The CSP/RSP explains that part of the Commission's PSD support will be geared towards addressing the capacity problems of micro-enterprises in terms of: [Management capacity (I-5.7.3)]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,0%	0	0%	0	0%
The CSP/RSP explains that part of the Commission's PSD support will be geared towards addressing the capacity problems of micro-enterprises in terms of: [Accounting (I-5.7.3)]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,0%	0	0%	0	0%
The CSP/RSP explains that part of the Commission's PSD support will be geared towards addressing the capacity problems of micro-enterprises in terms of: [Transparency (I-5.7.3)]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,0%	0	0%	0	0%
Analysis of enterprises' shortcomings in terms of BDS (JC 6.1)														
The CSP/RSP identifies or refers to a document identifying the main shortcoming of enterprises in terms of competitiveness (I-6.1.2)	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	16	40,0%	9	45%	7	35%
This includes forward studies and surveys of key sector or subsectors in regions/countries concerned ?	N/A	0	N/A	N/A	0	N/A	N/A	0	1	2,5%	0	0%	1	5%
The Commission's strategy with respect to PSD in the country/region as displayed in the CSP/RSP is geared towards tackling the shortcomings identified in these analyses (I-6.1.4):	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	18	45,0%	10	50%	8	40%
The CSP/RSP explicitly underlines the importance of targeting a critical mass of enterprises facing competitiveness problems (I-6.1.5):	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2,5%	0	0%	1	5%
Commission PSD programming in the area of BDS and non-financial service provision has targeted sustainable reinforcement of the structures and functioning of local markets (I-6.1.6):	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	13	32,5%	6	30%	7	35%
Appropriate delivery channels/IO (JC 6.2)														
The CSP/RSP explains how intermediary organizations have been or will be selected on the basis of their ability to deliver (I-6.2.1):	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	4	10,0%	3	15%	1	5%
Enterprises have been upgraded and accessed new markets (JC 6.3)														

This document applies to :	Country	Country	Country	Country	Region	Region	Country	Country	Country	Country	Region	Country
Which Country/Region ?	Morocco	Jamaica	Vietnam	Lebanon	Euro-Med Partnership	Caribbean region	Nicaragua	Egypt	Jordan	Tunisia	Central America	Algeria
Which Period ?	2002-2007	Other	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007
Which Period ? [Other]		2001-2007										
The CSP/RSP foresees a follow-up after cooperation meetings and agreements in terms of upgrading of enterprises (development of skills, know-how, managerial, market knowledge, etc.) and adequate targeting of sector (I-6.3.1):	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Support targeted on the basis of an analysis of the needs of enterprises (JC 7.1)												
The CSP/RSP identifies or refers to a document identifying potential European sources of investment to organize investment promotion activities, or it underlines the importance of making sure that such an identification takes place (I-7.1.2)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The Commission's strategy with respect to PSD in the country/region as displayed in the CSP/RSP (I-7.1.3) : [Was based on a needs analysis in terms of investment]	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
The Commission's strategy with respect to PSD in the country/region as displayed in the CSP/RSP (I-7.1.3) : [Planned a prioritized approach in selecting groups of beneficiary enterprises]	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Support to the development of investment-related intermediary organizations and events (JC 7.2 and 7.3)												
The CSP/RSP planned Commission support to: [Investment Promotion Agencies or other investment intermediaries (I-7.2.1)]	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP planned Commission support to: [Investment promotion meetings and events (I-7.3.1) Y/N. If yes, the CSP/RSP planned follow-up steps to enhance the results of investment promotion activities (I-7.3.3)]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Targeting SMEs (JC 7.5)												
The CSP/RSP underlines that SMEs will be among the priorities of the Commission's PSD support (I-7.5.1)	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0
Generation of employment as an objective of Commission support and Commission's monitoring of employment effects (JC 8.1 and 8.2)												
The CSP/RSP mentions the generation of employment as one of the objectives of the Commission support in the country/region (I-8.2.1): [In relation to its support in general]	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1
The CSP/RSP mentions the generation of employment as one of the objectives of the Commission support in the country/region (I-8.2.1): [Employment as a result of its support to PSD]	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	1
Please specify (max. 3 lines)	p. 22: "Plus concrètement la stratégie de l'UE doit répondre pour la période envisagée 2002- 2006 aux priorités qui découlent de: a) la mise en oeuvre de l'Accord d'Association entré en vigueur le premier mars 2000. L'accord dicte comme domaines prioritaires de la coopération financière: - réformes visant la modernisation de l'économie; mise à niveau des infrastructures économiques; - promotion de l'investissement privé et de la création d'emploi; - mise à niveau et reconversion de l'industrie et conséquences de la ZLE; - accompagnement des politiques dans les secteurs sociaux."			The CSP indicates, p. 16, that "the EU strategy for 2000-2006 will focus on support to - institutional, legal and regulatory reforms; - structural adjustment, including human resources development, market opening, stimulation of employment-creation, poverty alleviation through carefully targeted social programmes, environment; - consolidation of the rule of law, good governance and human rights".			Focal sector = Investment in human capital especially in education		EC will focus on the needs of displaced work-force in the context of industrial restructuring and privatisation. These entail to (1) adapt capabilities of redundant workers to allow their reinsertion into the economic process, (2) create alternative employment opportunities. (CSPNIP2002-2006, p34)			Unemployment described as a medium-term challenge that the Commission tackles by investing in human resources in general

This document applies to :	Country	Country	Country	Region	Country	Country	Region	Country	# Yes	% Yes	# Yes	% Yes	# Yes	% Yes
Which Country/Region ?	Zambia	Syria	South Africa	SADC	Moldova	Russia	Asia	Ukraine						
Which Period ?	2002-2007	2002-2007	Other	2002-2007	Other	2002-2007	Other	2002-2007	Total		First Period		Second Period	
Which Period ? [Other]			2003-2005		2002-2006		2005-2006							
The CSP/RSP foresees a follow-up after cooperation meetings and agreements in terms of upgrading of enterprises (development of skills, know-how, managerial, market knowledge, etc.) and adequate targeting of sector (I-6.3.1):	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	15,0%	2	10%	4	20%
Support targeted on the basis of an analysis of the needs of enterprises (JC 7.1)														
The CSP/RSP identifies or refers to a document identifying potential European sources of investment to organize investment promotion activities, or it underlines the importance of making sure that such an identification takes place (I-7.1.2)	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	3	7,5%	1	5%	2	10%
The Commission's strategy with respect to PSD in the country/region as displayed in the CSP/RSP (I-7.1.3) : [Was based on a needs analysis in terms of investment]	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	7	17,5%	3	15%	4	20%
The Commission's strategy with respect to PSD in the country/region as displayed in the CSP/RSP (I-7.1.3) : [Planned a prioritized approach in selecting groups of beneficiary enterprises]	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	5	12,5%	2	10%	3	15%
Support to the development of investment-related intermediary organizations and events (JC 7.2 and 7.3)														
The CSP/RSP planned Commission support to: [Investment Promotion Agencies or other investment intermediaries (I-7.2.1)]	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	6	15,0%	2	10%	4	20%
The CSP/RSP planned Commission support to: [Investment promotion meetings and events (I-7.3.1) Y/N. If yes, the CSP/RSP planned follow-up steps to enhance the results of investment promotion activities (I-7.3.3)]	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	4	10,0%	1	5%	3	15%
Targeting SMEs (JC 7.5)														
The CSP/RSP underlines that SMEs will be among the priorities of the Commission's PSD support (I-7.5.1)	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	21	52,5%	10	50%	11	55%
Generation of employment as an objective of Commission support and Commission's monitoring of employment effects (JC 8.1 and 8.2)														
The CSP/RSP mentions the generation of employment as one of the objectives of the Commission support in the country/region (I-8.2.1): [In relation to its support in general]	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	13	32,5%	6	30%	7	35%
The CSP/RSP mentions the generation of employment as one of the objectives of the Commission support in the country/region (I-8.2.1): [Employment as a result of it support to PSD]	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	20	50,0%	11	55%	9	45%
Please specify (max. 3 lines)			The stated goal of the 2nd focal area (Equitable and sustainable economic growth) is to contribute to the acceleration of growth, equity and employment.											

This document applies to :	Country	Country	Country	Country	Region	Region	Country	Country	Country	Country	Region	Country
Which Country/Region ?	Morocco	Jamaica	Vietnam	Lebanon	Euro-Med Partnership	Caribbean region	Nicaragua	Egypt	Jordan	Tunisia	Central America	Algeria
Which Period ?	2002-2007	Other	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007	2002-2007
Which Period ? [Other]		2001-2007										
Please describe in 5 lines the link made		It is explained, p. 25, that "A more robust private sector will contribute directly to employment creation and poverty reduction."	The reform of State-Owned Enterprises and the anticipated migration of people will result in a pressing need for employment creation. Increased numbers of SMEs will be required to drive the modernisation of Vietnam's economy and to maximise export and industrial co-operation opportunities. (CSPNIP2002-2006 p25)	The specific objective of priority area 3 of the NIP 2005-2006 (strengthening competitiveness of the PS) is "To contribute to the economic reforms in Lebanon with a view to balanced growth and the creation of employment." (p.17).			Private sector's needs are a concern of the Commission when providing support to vocational training	The Spinning and Weaving Industry Restructuring is heavily geared towards alleviating the social costs of the privatisation of the sector and its exposure to a much more competitive market.	See above.	One of the SAF V's performance indicators is "number of jobs created and employment rates for first-time jobseekers" (NIP, p. 10). The CSP also indicates that "L'augmentation de l'investissement privé, en particulier dans les PME, qui constituent la majorité des entreprises tunisiennes, est essentielle pour accélérer la croissance de la production et de l'emploi." (p.20)		But also by investing in matters related to PSD (training and micro-enterprises)
Does the CSP/RSP refer to potential negative impacts of PSD support on employment generation, e.g. through the streamlining of enterprises (I-8.2.1):	0	0	0	0	N/A	N/A	0	0	1	0	N/A	0
The CSP/RSP foresee an approach to monitor employment effects (I-8.1.1):	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0
Does this include the definition of specific indicators?	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1	1	1	N/A	N/A
Please specify (in 2 lines)							Education indicators bu no employment indicators					
Transition from the informal to the formal sector (JC 8.5)												
The CSP/RSP foresees Commission support for the transition from the informal to the formal sector (I-8.5.1):	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Beneficiaries were not in a position to provide the support themselves or to provide it as swiftly and with the same results as the Commission itself (JC 9.2)												
The CSP/RSP explains that the support could not be provided by the beneficiaries themselves (or as swiftly or with the same results) (I-9.2.1)	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Benefits of devolution (JC 10.1)												
The CSP/RSP underlines the (expected) benefits of the devolution (I-10.1.1): [For the Commission support in general]	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP underlines the (expected) benefits of the devolution (I-10.1.1): [Specifically for its PSD support]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Division of responsibilities between different DGs (JC 10.2)												
The CSP/RSP refers to other DGs in its description of the Commission's PSD support in the country/region (I-10.2.1)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HR Policy, tools and guidance, monitoring, capitalisation (JC 10.3, 10.4, 10.5, 10.6)												
The CSP/RSP refers to a specific HR policy the EUD has in terms of providing support to PSD (I-10.3.1)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP refers to specific tools and guidance it used for its support to PSD (I-10.4.1): [Developed by the Commission]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP refers to specific tools and guidance it used for its support to PSD (I-10.4.1): [Developed by others]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP refers to the use by the Commission of a specific system / set of indicators to monitor / evaluate its support to PSD in the country/region (I-10.5.1):	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP refers to the set-up/use by the Commission of a specific capitalisation mechanisms for sharing and disseminating knowledge (I-10.6.1): [Related to is support in general]	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP refers to the set-up/use by the Commission of a specific capitalisation mechanisms for sharing and disseminating knowledge (I-10.6.1): [Related specifically to its PSD support]	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0

This document applies to :	Country	Country	Country	Region	Country	Country	Region	Country	# Yes	% Yes	# Yes	% Yes	# Yes	% Yes
Which Country/Region ?	Zambia	Syria	South Africa	SADC	Moldova	Russia	Asia	Ukraine						
Which Period ?	2002-2007	2002-2007	Other	2002-2007	Other	2002-2007	Other	2002-2007	Total		First Period		Second Period	
Which Period ? [Other]			2003-2005		2002-2006		2005-2006							
Please describe in 5 lines the link made		L'objectif spécifique de la priorité 1 du PIN 2005-2006, soit le soutien au centre euro-syrien des entreprises: "Développement des PME afin de les rendre plus efficaces et plus compétitives sur la scène nationale et internationale, ce qui générerait davantage de revenus et des possibilités d'emploi accrues dans ce secteur" (p. 9).	as above, with specific indicators for the 2nd focal area relating to employment: "Growth and employment indicators, particularly in the poorest provinces and identified urban and rural development nodes, industrial zones and Spatial Development Initiatives, City Development Index in areas of intervention					One of the expected results of the NIP 2002-2003 is: Expansion of a viable and more profitable SME sector and subsequent job generation. (Ukraine CSP2002-2006 – p24)						
Does the CSP/RSP refer to potential negative impacts of PSD support on employment generation, e.g. through the streamlining of enterprises (I-8.2.1):	N/A	0	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	1	2,5%	1	5%	0	0%
The CSP/RSP foresee an approach to monitor employment effects (I-8.1.1):	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	6	15,0%	5	25%	1	5%
Does this include the definition of specific indicators?	N/A	N/A	1	N/A	1	N/A	N/A	N/A	6	15,0%	5	25%	1	5%
Please specify (in 2 lines)														
Transition from the informal to the formal sector (JC 8.5)														
The CSP/RSP foresees Commission support for the transition from the informal to the formal sector (I-8.5.1):	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	5,0%	2	10%	0	0%
Beneficiaries were not in a position to provide the support themselves or to provide it as swiftly and with the same results as the Commission itself (JC 9.2)														
The CSP/RSP explains that the support could not be provided by the beneficiaries themselves (or as swiftly or with the same results) (I-9.2.1)	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	7,5%	3	15%	0	0%
Benefits of devolution (JC 10.1)														
The CSP/RSP underlines the (expected) benefits of the devolution (I-10.1.1): [For the Commission support in general]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	15,0%	3	15%	3	15%
The CSP/RSP underlines the (expected) benefits of the devolution (I-10.1.1): [Specifically for its PSD support]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,0%	0	0%	0	0%
Division of responsibilities between different DGs (JC 10.2)														
The CSP/RSP refers to other DGs in its description of the Commission's PSD support in the country/region (I-10.2.1)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,0%	0	0%	0	0%
HR Policy, tools and guidance, monitoring, capitalisation (JC 10.3, 10.4, 10.5, 10.6)														
The CSP/RSP refers to a specific HR policy the EUD has in terms of providing support to PSD (I-10.3.1)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,0%	0	0%	0	0%
The CSP/RSP refers to specific tools and guidance it used for its support to PSD (I-10.4.1): [Developed by the Commission]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,0%	0	0%	0	0%
The CSP/RSP refers to specific tools and guidance it used for its support to PSD (I-10.4.1): [Developed by others]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,0%	0	0%	0	0%
The CSP/RSP refers to the use by the Commission of a specific system / set of indicators to monitor / evaluate its support to PSD in the country/region (I-10.5.1):	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	5,0%	2	10%	0	0%
The CSP/RSP refers to the set-up/use by the Commission of a specific capitalisation mechanisms for sharing and disseminating knowledge (I-10.6.1): [Related to is support in general]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	5,0%	1	5%	1	5%
The CSP/RSP refers to the set-up/use by the Commission of a specific capitalisation mechanisms for sharing and disseminating knowledge (I-10.6.1): [Related specifically to its PSD support]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	5,0%	1	5%	1	5%

Results of the CSP-RSP review - Second Programming Period

This document applies to :	Country	Country	Country	Country	Region	Region	Country	Country	Country	Country	Region
Which Country/Region ?	Morocco	Jamaica	Vietnam	Lebanon	Euro-Med Partnership	Caribbean region	Nicaragua	Egypt	Jordan	Tunisia	Central America
Which Period ?	Other	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013
Which Period ? [Other]	2007-2013 and Mid-term review of the CSP										
Efforts undertaken to make sure recommendations of 2005 evaluation were taken into account (JC 1.1)											
The CSP/RSP mentions the 2005 PSD Evaluation (I-1.1.2)?	N/A	0	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Please explain (max. 5 lines)											
The CSP/RSP refers to a plan or specific approach for the dissemination of recommendations to those responsible for programming and design of intervention (I-1.1.1)?	N/A	0	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP provides other evidence of dissemination of the 2005 recommendations to those responsible for programming and design of interventions (I-1.1.2)?	N/A	0	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP identifies support to PSD by the Commission : [as a focal sector]		0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
The CSP/RSP identifies support to PSD by the Commission : [as a non-focal sector]		1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
In the country/region, what is the estimation in %, by survey respondents and on the basis of information in CSP/RSP/NIP/RIP, of the share of PSD support within the total support by the Commission ?		No estimation given	No estimation given	11 - 20	41 - 50	No estimation given	11 - 20	31 - 40	No estimation given	41 - 50	No estimation given
Specific recommendations taken into account (JC 1.2)											
The CSP/RSP explicitly clarifies the role the Commission intends to play with respect to PSD (I-1.2.1)?	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0
Please explain (max. 5 lines)	Morocco, having signed up to free-trade agreements with the EU, US and the countries of the Agadir Agreement, the objective of Commission's PSD support is to support the authorities' efforts to diversify the sources of growth (Emergence plan), improve the competitiveness of existing businesses and continue reform of the legislative and regulatory frameworks for investment (see p.22-3)	The only assistance somewhat related to PSD is the assistance provided to sensitive industries such as banana and sugar cane, respectively through the budget line "Special Framework of Assistance" (which will run through 2013) which aims to increase the competitiveness of the banana industry and to facilitate diversification in the rural areas, and via the support for the Adaptation of the Sugar Industry 2006-2015 (JCS) provided to address the key problems of the sugar sector.		The CSP indicates, p. 18, that "EU action could be dedicated to improve the business environment and the competitiveness of companies, in particular for SMEs, notably in the priority areas which have been identified by Lebanon in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Enterprise: access to finance, enhancing the innovative capacity for SMEs, simplifying procedures for enterprises, and improving business support services. On the other hand, emphasis should be put on removing obstacles to investment and private sector such as the lack of active export and investment strategies, lack of competitiveness, inadequate financial products and services for an expanding private sector economy".	The Commission's regional support to PSD will take the following forms: (1) investment promotion and reform dynamisation to attract investments, (2) support to South-South regional economic integration and (3) Technical assistance and risk capital support for FEMIP. Those three areas are grouped under priority area 2 of the regional cooperation strategy ("sustainable economic development").	The Commission's support to PSD is embedded in its support to "deeper and wider regional economic integration and cooperation", which includes enhancing the region's trade and competitiveness and facilitating regional business development.		"The overall objective is to develop the competitiveness and productivity of the private sector in a business-friendly institutional and regulatory environment." (p.31).	Three mutually-enhancing programmes are planned, which will ensure better consistency between the different operations to develop the private sector: 1.Support for the modernisation of the services sector (30 Meuro) 2.Support to enterprise and exports development (15 Meuro) 3.Trade and transport facilitation programme (33Meuro) (CSPNIP2007-2010 p26-28)		
The CSP/RSP prioritizes the Commission's interventions with respect to PSD (I-1.2.3)?	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	0
Please explain (max. 5 lines)				The CSP gives a description of the sub-priority area "support to the reinvigoration of SMEs affected by the conflict" which will prioritize: - Increase direct assistance in the reconstruction of the private sector affected by the military conflict, including through interest rate subsidies, - Provide SMEs with targeted support for reconstruction, - Facilitate access to funding, - Support to improve the business environment and the competitiveness of companies, in particular SMEs, notably in the priority areas which have been identified by Lebanon in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Enterprise: access to finance, enhancing the innovative capacity for SMEs, simplifying procedures for enterprises, and improving business support services.	The Commission's regional support to PSD is broadly divided in 3 components: (1) investment promotion and reform dynamisation to attract investments, (2) support to South-South regional economic integration and (3) Technical assistance and risk capital support for FEMIP.	The focal area of cooperation "deeper and wider regional economic integration and cooperation" is composed of a number of activities of which those PSD-related are: ""enhance OECS trade&competitiveness", "facilitate regional business development" and "complete the CARIFORUM Single Market and Economy".		The components of the Commission's PSD support are (1) upgrading economic legislation and the business environment, which includes modernisation of legislation, capacity-building of institutions etc, (2) Enhancing the agricultural sector, focusing on modernising the production and organisational capacity of the agricultural sector, as was as its regulatory environment.	Both PSD programme were planned to be composed as follows: "The programme's components are as follows: (i) consolidating progress in macroeconomic and budgetary stabilisation and the reforms concerning governance, the public finances and administration, (ii) improving the business climate and enhancing private sector competitiveness to boost private investment and the number of business start-ups, particularly SMEs, which create the greatest number of jobs and (iii) restructuring and developing a competitive financial sector which is business-friendly (goods and services) and extends to microfinance so as to maximise the impact in terms of poverty reduction." (p.23).		

This document applies to :	Country	Country	Country	Region	Country	Country	Region	Region	Country	# Yes	% Yes	# Yes	% Yes	# Yes	% Yes
Which Country/Region ?	Algeria	Zambia	Syria	SADC	Moldova	Russia	Asia	ENPI Eastern Region	Ukraine						
Which Period ?	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	Total		First Period		Second Period	
Which Period ? [Other]															
Efforts undertaken to make sure recommendations of 2005 evaluation were taken into account (JC 1.1)															
The CSP/RSP mentions the 2005 PSD Evaluation (I-1.1.2)?	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	5,0%	0	0%	2	10%
Please explain (max. 5 lines)		CSP focuses on "meso level i.e. on the policies and regulatory framework" after consideration							In the case of economic development the Commission has been most successful						
The CSP/RSP refers to a plan or specific approach for the dissemination of recommendations to those responsible for programming and design of intervention (I-1.1.1)?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,0%	0	0%	0	0%
The CSP/RSP provides other evidence of dissemination of the 2005 recommendations to those responsible for programming and design of interventions (I-1.1.2)?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,0%	0	0%	0	0%
The CSP/RSP identifies support to PSD by the Commission : [as a focal sector]	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	23	57,5%	12	60%	11	55%
The CSP/RSP identifies support to PSD by the Commission : [as a non-focal sector]	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	9	22,5%	3	15%	6	30%
In the country/region, what is the estimation in %, by survey respondents and on the basis of information in CSP/RSP/NIP/RIP, of the share of PSD support within the total support by the Commission ?	11 - 20	0 - 10	31 - 40	0 - 10	No estimation given	No estimation given	No estimation given	No estimation given	No estimation given						
Specific recommendations taken into account (JC 1.2)															
The CSP/RSP explicitly clarifies the role the Commission intends to play with respect to PSD (I-1.2.1)?	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	19	47,5%	9	45%	10	50%
Please explain (max. 5 lines)			To support the improvement of the business climate and the transition to a social market economy via (i) the Trade Enhancement Programme, which has a strong component on customs facilitation and streamlining of trade-related legislation, and via (ii) the Business Environment Simplification Programme, which aims to achieve a drastic simplification of the regulatory and administrative procedures for doing business, (iii) public finance reform and (iv) industrial restructuring and upgrading, including state-owned enterprises.		RSP identifies improvements to the investment climate as sub priority 1 (of 2) of the 2nd priority area.										
The CSP/RSP prioritizes the Commission's interventions with respect to PSD (I-1.2.3)?	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	11	27,5%	4	20%	7	35%
Please explain (max. 5 lines)			Yes, it has identified the 4 fields of intervention, listed in the comment box above.		as above, but no further prioritisation										

This document applies to :	Country	Country	Country	Country	Region	Region	Country	Country	Country	Country	Region
Which Country/Region ?	Morocco	Jamaica	Vietnam	Lebanon	Euro-Med Partnership	Caribbean region	Nicaragua	Egypt	Jordan	Tunisia	Central America
Which Period ?	Other	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013
Which Period ? [Other]	2007-2013 and Mid-term review of the CSP										
Commission's awareness of the evolution of the private sector environment (JC 1.3)											
The CSP/RSP refers to changes in the general (i.e. not country or region specific) PSD environment (e.g. EPA, BRICS, Financial Crisis, other) (I-1.3.1)?	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	0
Please explain (max. 5 lines)	Yes, it mentions the 2001 Doha development agenda (which aimed to achieve major reform of the international trading system through the introduction of lower trade barriers and revised trade rules). The mid-term review also indicates that, amongst others, "aid for trade", increases in global food prices, and the financial and economic crisis are new priorities of the Commission's external policy, although it specifies that this will be reflected only in the 2011-2013 programming (p.4).	The RSP mentions developments in WTO (including DDA negotiations) and world prices of sugar and energy (p. 78), as well as the the EU market reform for sugar (p.75) which impacts Jamaican exports.			The RSP only mentions that nearly all Mediterranean countries have become members of the WTO.	On the EPA (which is region-specific though): "The comprehensive EPA (where the EC signed up to duty-free-quota-free market access, with the exception of rice and sugar where transition periods have been foreseen) will complement regional efforts to strengthen governance of regional integration and cooperation and the consolidation of regional markets." The RSP also mentions the effects of the reform of the CAP on the access of certain Caribbean agricultural products to the EU: "The limited transition period foreseen for imports of rice and that for sugar (until 2015) have been designed to take into account the Common Agricultural Policy reform process." (p.32).	Reference to "economic global downturn", "vulnerability to external shocks"(energy prices), "increased trade liberalization"		Loose references to external factors such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.		
The CSP/RSP shows how changes in the general (i.e. not country or region specific) PSD environment (e.g. EPA, BRICS, Financial Crisis, other) have been taken into account in the strategy and/or programming (I-1.3.1.3)?	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
Please explain (max. 5 lines)	The mid-term review indicates how the economic crisis will have a social impact, notably in employment figures, and that the Commission's strategy to support the government's efforts to diversify its sources of growth and improve enterprises' competitiveness is key in this respect.	The budget line "Special Framework of Assistance" (which will run through 2013) for the banana industry and the support for the Adaptation of the Sugar Industry 2006-2015 (JCS) were set up to address the effects of market and trade liberalisation and the end of preferential trade agreements with the EC.				See comment box above.	PSD strategies of the Commission take into account the factors mentioned under I-1.3.1 in the sense that in "helping to improve the business and investment climate" it seeks to support "one of the bases for economic growth , in particular those linked to the challenges of regional integration" and mitigate in this way Nicaragua's vulnerability.				
Policy document and surveys taken into account (JC 1.4)											
The CSP/RSP refers to policy documents or surveys or analyses relating to PSD?	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Please explain (max. 12 lines)				The CSP refers to a needs assessment analysis conducted by several EC services and international financial institutions has shown the need for a medium-term reconstruction facility targeting businesses (mainly in the Southern part of Lebanon) affected by the military conflict. (p.28).	The RSP indicates that the foreseen programme "promotion des investissements et dynamisation des réformes pour attirer les investissements" will take into account the results of an impact study "sous l'angle de durabilité de la mise en place la zone de libre-échange (SIA-EMFTA)" (p.28).						
Support geared toward overall EU external policy objectives (Examined in two stages: first what is the general theory the CSP/RSP describes in terms of relation between PSD and overall EU Policy objectives; second is the CSP/RSP support explicitly linked to these objectives)											
The CSP/RSP explicitly links PSD support in general to the following EU external policy objectives (I-2.1.1) [Contribute to poverty reduction]	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0
The CSP/RSP explicitly links PSD support in general to the following EU external policy objectives (I-2.1.1) [Contribute to a sustainable economic development]	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0

This document applies to :	Country	Country	Country	Region	Country	Country	Region	Region	Country	# Yes	% Yes	# Yes	% Yes	# Yes	% Yes
Which Country/Region ?	Algeria	Zambia	Syria	SADC	Moldova	Russia	Asia	ENPI Eastern Region	Ukraine						
Which Period ?	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	Total		First Period		Second Period	
Which Period ? [Other]															
Commission's awareness of the evolution of the private sector environment (JC 1.3)															
The CSP/RSP refers to changes in the general (i.e. not country or region specific) PSD environment (e.g. EPA, BRICS, Financial Crisis, other) (I-1.3.1)?	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	22	55,0%	10	50%	12	60%
Please explain (max. 5 lines)	The Oil boom which has allowed Algeria to accumulate exchange of reserves on an unprecedented scale.		It references changes in the PSD environment but in relation to how they affect Syria: the negotiation of an AA with the EU, its application to the WTO, and the changes in economic partners, including Turkey, Russia, China, Iran, India and Ukraine.	Evolution of SADC country investment levels, EPA development and changing macroeconomic conditions are detailed, with reference to the impact on the business environment.			General considerations such as economic growth in Asia, accession of most Asian Countries to WTO, increased openness, world crisis, stability, etc.	General considerations such as globalization, WTO accession, energy and transport, political instability and tensions, etc.	Loose mention of issues impacting the business climate such as political stability, energy prices.						
The CSP/RSP shows how changes in the general (i.e. not country or region specific) PSD environment (e.g. EPA, BRICS, Financial Crisis, other) have been taken into account in the strategy and/or programming (I-1.3.1.3)?	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	12	30,0%	5	25%	7	35%
Please explain (max. 5 lines)			The Commission's support is geared towards supporting the improvement of the business climate and the transition to a social market economy, which will contribute to the adaptation of the Syrian economy to the changes outlined in the comment box above.				For instance special cooperation foreseen in the field of animal and human health following avian influenza.	Key issues to be addressed such as support to the transport and energy sectors.							
Policy document and surveys taken into account (JC 1.4)															
The CSP/RSP refers to policy documents or surveys or analyses relating to PSD?	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	12,8%	1	5%	4	20%
Please explain (max. 12 lines)		References made to previous Zambia government PSD policies and plans, including: 2004 Private Sector Development Reform Programme and the associated PSD Action Plan. All references concern alignment of previous EC support though, not the 2008-2013 programming.	It refers to the World Bank Doing Business study which ranked Syria poorly (121 out of 155). It also refers to a 2004 UNCTAD World Investment Report which ranked Syria 121 out of 140 countries according to its FDI Performance Index (p.10).												
Support geared toward overall EU external policy objectives (Examined in two stages: first what is the general theory the CSP/RSP describes in terms of relation between PSD and overall EU Policy objectives; second is the CSP/RSP support explicitly linked to these objectives)															
The CSP/RSP explicitly links PSD support in general to the following EU external policy objectives (I-2.1.1) [Contribute to poverty reduction]	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	12	30,0%	5	25%	7	35%
The CSP/RSP explicitly links PSD support in general to the following EU external policy objectives (I-2.1.1) [Contribute to a (sustainable) economic development]	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	25	62,5%	15	75%	10	50%

This document applies to :	Country	Country	Country	Country	Region	Region	Country	Country	Country	Country	Region
Which Country/Region ?	Morocco	Jamaica	Vietnam	Lebanon	Euro-Med Partnership	Caribbean region	Nicaragua	Egypt	Jordan	Tunisia	Central America
Which Period ?	Other	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013
Which Period ? [Other]	2007-2013 and Mid-term review of the CSP										
The CSP/RSP explicitly links PSD support in general to the following EU external policy objectives (I-2.1.1) [Contribute to a (sustainable) social development]	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP explicitly links PSD support in general to the following EU external policy objectives (I-2.1.1) [Contribute to a (sustainable) environmental development]	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0
The CSP/RSP explicitly links PSD support in general to the following EU external policy objectives (I-2.1.1) [Contribute to gradual integration in the world economy, notably through Trade]	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
The CSP/RSP explicitly links PSD support in general to the following EU external policy objectives (I-2.1.1) [Links trade to poverty reduction]	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0
The CSP/RSP explicitly links PSD support in general to the following EU external policy objectives (I-2.1.1) [Contribute to preserving peace / ensuring political stability / security]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP (choose all those that apply) (I-2.1.1) : [Describes support to PSD as an indirect means to contribute to poverty reduction (i.e. PSD will enhance economic growth and this growth in the end will trickle down to the poor)]	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP (choose all those that apply) (I-2.1.1) : [Describes support to PSD as a direct manner to contribute to poverty reduction. If selected: please specify how (e.g. by targeting directly the poorer segments of the population).]	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0
The CSP/RSP (choose all those that apply) (I-2.1.1) : [Not specified]	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
The CSP/RSP (choose all those that apply) (I-2.1.1) : [Other]							Willing to support "national pro-poor policies" in its work on the focal sector "Economic and trade issues".				
The CSP/RSP shows how the Commission's planned PSD support in the country/region will (tick all those that apply) : [Contribute to poverty reduction]	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP shows how the Commission's planned PSD support in the country/region will (tick all those that apply) : [Contribute to a (sustainable) economic development]	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	0
The CSP/RSP shows how the Commission's planned PSD support in the country/region will (tick all those that apply) : [Contribute to a (sustainable) social development]	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP shows how the Commission's planned PSD support in the country/region will (tick all those that apply) : [Contribute to a (sustainable) environmental development]	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP shows how the Commission's planned PSD support in the country/region will (tick all those that apply) : [Contribute to gradual integration in the world economy, notably through Trade]	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
The CSP/RSP shows how the Commission's planned PSD support in the country/region will (tick all those that apply) : [Links trade to poverty reduction]	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP shows how the Commission's planned PSD support in the country/region will (tick all those that apply) : [Contribute to preserving peace / ensuring political stability / security]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP explains that the Commission's planned PSD support in the country/region (tick all those that apply) will contribute to poverty reduction (I-2.1.2) : [Indirectly (through economic growth)]	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP explains that the Commission's planned PSD support in the country/region (tick all those that apply) will contribute to poverty reduction (I-2.1.2) : [Directly (e.g. through specific target groups or actions)]	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0

This document applies to :	Country	Country	Country	Region	Country	Country	Region	Region	Country	# Yes	% Yes	# Yes	% Yes	# Yes	% Yes
Which Country/Region ?	Algeria	Zambia	Syria	SADC	Moldova	Russia	Asia	ENPI Eastern Region	Ukraine						
Which Period ?	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	Total		First Period		Second Period	
Which Period ? [Other]															
The CSP/RSP explicitly links PSD support in general to the following EU external policy objectives (I-2.1.1) [Contribute to a (sustainable) social development]	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	7	17,5%	4	20%	3	15%
The CSP/RSP explicitly links PSD support in general to the following EU external policy objectives (I-2.1.1) [Contribute to a (sustainable) environmental development]	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	6	15,0%	2	10%	4	20%
The CSP/RSP explicitly links PSD support in general to the following EU external policy objectives (I-2.1.1) [Contribute to gradual integration in the world economy, notably through Trade]	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	32	80,0%	17	85%	15	75%
The CSP/RSP explicitly links PSD support in general to the following EU external policy objectives (I-2.1.1) [Links trade to poverty reduction]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	17,5%	5	25%	2	10%
The CSP/RSP explicitly links PSD support in general to the following EU external policy objectives (I-2.1.1) [Contribute to preserving peace / ensuring political stability / security]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,0%	0	0%	0	0%
The CSP/RSP (choose all those that apply) (I-2.1.1) : [Describes support to PSD as an indirect means to contribute to poverty reduction (i.e. PSD will enhance economic growth and this growth in the end will trickle down to the poor)]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	15,0%	4	20%	2	10%
The CSP/RSP (choose all those that apply) (I-2.1.1) : [Describes support to PSD as a direct manner to contribute to poverty reduction. If selected: please specify how (e.g. by targeting directly the poorer segments of the population).]	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	5	12,5%	1	5%	4	20%
The CSP/RSP (choose all those that apply) (I-2.1.1) : [Not specified]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	5,0%	0	0%	2	10%
The CSP/RSP (choose all those that apply) (I-2.1.1) : [Other]															
The CSP/RSP shows how the Commission's planned PSD support in the country/region will (tick all those that apply) : [Contribute to poverty reduction]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	15,0%	4	20%	2	10%
The CSP/RSP shows how the Commission's planned PSD support in the country/region will (tick all those that apply) : [Contribute to a (sustainable) economic development]	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	20	50,0%	13	65%	7	35%
The CSP/RSP shows how the Commission's planned PSD support in the country/region will (tick all those that apply) : [Contribute to a (sustainable) social development]	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	7	17,5%	4	20%	3	15%
The CSP/RSP shows how the Commission's planned PSD support in the country/region will (tick all those that apply) : [Contribute to a (sustainable) environmental development]	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	5	12,5%	2	10%	3	15%
The CSP/RSP shows how the Commission's planned PSD support in the country/region will (tick all those that apply) : [Contribute to gradual integration in the world economy, notably through Trade]	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	29	72,5%	16	80%	13	65%
The CSP/RSP shows how the Commission's planned PSD support in the country/region will (tick all those that apply) : [Links trade to poverty reduction]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	7,5%	2	10%	1	5%
The CSP/RSP shows how the Commission's planned PSD support in the country/region will (tick all those that apply) : [Contribute to preserving peace / ensuring political stability / security]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,0%	0	0%	0	0%
The CSP/RSP explains that the Commission's planned PSD support in the country/region (tick all those that apply) will contribute to poverty reduction (I-2.1.2) : [Indirectly (through economic growth)]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	10,0%	3	15%	1	5%
The CSP/RSP explains that the Commission's planned PSD support in the country/region (tick all those that apply) will contribute to poverty reduction (I-2.1.2) : [Directly (e.g. through specific target groups or actions)]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	7,5%	1	5%	2	10%

This document applies to :	Country	Country	Country	Country	Region	Region	Country	Country	Country	Country	Region
Which Country/Region ?	Morocco	Jamaica	Vietnam	Lebanon	Euro-Med Partnership	Caribbean region	Nicaragua	Egypt	Jordan	Tunisia	Central America
Which Period ?	Other	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013
Which Period ? [Other]	2007-2013 and Mid-term review of the CSP										
Please provide some clarification for both		The most vulnerable sugar and banana producers are targeted by the Sugar Accompanying measures programme and the EU Banana support programme. They are intended to support the reconversion and adaptation of sugar and banana producing areas. Only the banana programme has an export-oriented component.						By supporting trade and regional integration the Commission wants to stimulate economic growth and, when doing so, it will also make sure to support "national pro-poor policies".			
Use of guidelines for a strategic approach (JC 2.2)											
The CSP/RSP refers explicitly to the Commission's PSD guidelines (I-2.2.2)?	N/A	0	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Elements in the CSP/RSP indicate that these guidelines have been used for the design of the support in the country (I-2.1.2)?	N/A	0	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Please specify			Driven by WTO accession and the need to reform state owned enterprises, numerous commercial and legal reforms are being prepared and implemented, including: the new enterprise development and common investment laws; a new Land Law; a new Customs law. (CSPNIP2007-2013 p11)								
Taking into account national priorities (JC 2.3)											
The CSP/RSP refers to : [The existence of a national country strategy]	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
The CSP/RSP refers to : [The existence of a national PSD strategy]	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP refers to a policy dialogue with national authorities on the country strategy in general : [Conducted]	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	1
The CSP/RSP refers to a policy dialogue with national authorities on the country strategy in general : [To be conducted as part of the Commission's strategy]	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0
The CSP/RSP refers to a policy dialogue with national authorities on the countries PSD strategy : [Conducted]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP refers to a policy dialogue with national authorities on the countries PSD strategy : [To be conducted as part of the Commission's strategy]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP shows explicitly how the Commission's PSD strategy : [Fits into to the countries' national strategy]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP shows explicitly how the Commission's PSD strategy : [Fits into the countries' PSD strategy]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The potential VA of the Commission geared its decision (JC 2.4)											
The CSP/RSP explicitly mentions the types of VA the Commission has for/when providing PSD support (I-2.4.3)?	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1

This document applies to :	Country	Country	Country	Region	Country	Country	Region	Region	Country	# Yes	% Yes	# Yes	% Yes	# Yes	% Yes
Which Country/Region ?	Algeria	Zambia	Syria	SADC	Moldova	Russia	Asia	ENPI Eastern Region	Ukraine						
Which Period ?	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	Total		First Period		Second Period	
Which Period ? [Other]															
Please provide some clarification for both															
Use of guidelines for a strategic approach (JC 2.2)															
The CSP/RSP refers explicitly to the Commission's PSD guidelines (I-2.2.2)?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,0%	0	0%	0	0%
Elements in the CSP/RSP indicate that these guidelines have been used for the design of the support in the country (I-2.1.2)?	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,0%	0	0%	0	0%
Please specify															
Taking into account national priorities (JC 2.3)															
The CSP/RSP refers to : [The existence of a national country strategy]	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	33	82,5%	18	90%	15	75%
The CSP/RSP refers to : [The existence of a national PSD strategy]	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	17,5%	4	20%	3	15%
The CSP/RSP refers to a policy dialogue with national authorities on the country strategy in general : [Conducted]	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0		0,0%	7	35%	9	45%
The CSP/RSP refers to a policy dialogue with national authorities on the country strategy in general : [To be conducted as part of the Commission's strategy]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	25,6%	5	25%	5	25%
The CSP/RSP refers to a policy dialogue with national authorities on the countries PSD strategy : [Conducted]	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	7,7%	1	5%	2	10%
The CSP/RSP refers to a policy dialogue with national authorities on the countries PSD strategy : [To be conducted as part of the Commission's strategy]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,0%	0	0%	0	0%
The CSP/RSP shows explicitly how the Commission's PSD strategy : [Fits into to the countries' national strategy]	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	10,3%	2	10%	2	10%
The CSP/RSP shows explicitly how the Commission's PSD strategy : [Fits into the countries' PSD strategy]	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	7,7%	1	5%	2	10%
The potential VA of the Commission geared its decision (JC 2.4)															
The CSP/RSP explicitly mentions the types of VA the Commission has for/when providing PSD support (I-2.4.3)?	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	11	28,2%	5	25%	6	30%

This document applies to :	Country	Country	Country	Country	Region	Region	Country	Country	Country	Country	Region
Which Country/Region ?	Morocco	Jamaica	Vietnam	Lebanon	Euro-Med Partnership	Caribbean region	Nicaragua	Egypt	Jordan	Tunisia	Central America
Which Period ?	Other	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013
Which Period ? [Other]	2007-2013 and Mid-term review of the CSP										
Please specify			As far as Medium-sized Enterprise Development Fund (SMEDF) and MUTRAP are concerned, the EC has been able to provide relatively effective support in Vietnam thanks to its strengths and competence in these fields. (CSPNIP2007-2013 p14)				Knowledge and experience leadership role vis-à-vis other donors (for the latter in the domain of vocational training only)				VA mentioned when providing support to regional integration (including PSD): Critical amount of funding and intervention in sectors related to integration such as trade, environment...
The CSP/RSP shows that this VA has been a criterion to decide on the Commission's PSD support in the country/region. (I-2.4.1)?	N/A	N/A	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	1	N/A	N/A	N/A	1
Synergies with other actors and other types of Commission support (JC 2.5)											
In terms of PSD support provided by EU MS, the CSP/RSP : [Describes what kind of PSD support they provide]	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1
In terms of PSD support provided by EU MS, the CSP/RSP : [Describes how this support and the Commission's PSD support complement each other]	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
In terms of PSD support provided by EU MS, the CSP/RSP : [Shows that the choices made by the Commission in terms of PSD are geared by the objective of enhancing synergies with other actors.]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
In terms of PSD support provided by EIB, the CSP/RSP : [Describes what kind of PSD support the EIB provides]	1	1	N/A	1	1	1	N/A	1	1	1	1
In terms of PSD support provided by EIB, the CSP/RSP : [Describes how this support and the Commission's PSD support complement each other]	0	0	N/A	1	1	0	N/A	1	0	0	0
In terms of PSD support provided by EIB, the CSP/RSP : [Shows that the choices made by the Commission in terms of PSD are geared by the objective of enhancing synergies with the EIB.]	0	0	N/A	0	0	0	N/A	1	0	0	0
In terms of PSD support provided by EBRD, the CSP/RSP : [Describes what kind of PSD support the EBRD provides]	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
In terms of PSD support provided by EBRD, the CSP/RSP : [Describes how this support and the Commission's PSD support complement each other]	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
In terms of PSD support provided by EBRD, the CSP/RSP : [Shows that the choices made by the Commission in terms of PSD are geared by the objective of enhancing synergies with the EBRD.]	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
In terms of PSD support provided by other donors, the CSP/RSP : [Describes what kind of PSD support they provide]	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1
In terms of PSD support provided by other donors, the CSP/RSP : [Describes how this support and the Commission's PSD support complement each other]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
In terms of PSD support provided by other donors, the CSP/RSP : [Shows that the choices made by the Commission in terms of PSD are geared by the objective of enhancing synergies with other actors.]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0

This document applies to :	Country	Country	Country	Region	Country	Country	Region	Region	Country	# Yes	% Yes	# Yes	% Yes	# Yes	% Yes
Which Country/Region ?	Algeria	Zambia	Syria	SADC	Moldova	Russia	Asia	ENPI Eastern Region	Ukraine						
Which Period ?	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	Total		First Period		Second Period	
Which Period ? [Other]															
Please specify			In the NIP 2008-2010: "The EC can bring real value added and assist Syria in its transition process thanks to the extensive experience gained in this area during the enlargement of the EU to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe." (p. 11).	Two points of added-value are noted with respect to regional integration (which is only implicitly linked to PSD in the RSP): The key advantage of the European Commission relative to other international cooperating partners in supporting the process of regional economic integration lies in the EU's importance as the region's major trading partner and its own experience of economic integration. (p38)					One short paragraph (p17) on specific EC support to regional SME networks.						
The CSP/RSP shows that this VA has been a criterion to decide on the Commission's PSD support in the country/region. (I-2.4.1)?	N/A	N/A	1	1	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	N/A	5	12,5%	1	5%	4	20%
Synergies with other actors and other types of Commission support (JC 2.5)															
In terms of PSD support provided by EU MS, the CSP/RSP : [Describes what kind of PSD support they provide]	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	22	55,0%	12	60%	10	50%
In terms of PSD support provided by EU MS, the CSP/RSP : [Describes how this support and the Commission's PSD support complement each other]	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	17,5%	4	20%	3	15%
In terms of PSD support provided by EU MS, the CSP/RSP : [Shows that the choices made by the Commission in terms of PSD are geared by the objective of enhancing synergies with other actors.]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	12,5%	4	20%	1	5%
In terms of PSD support provided by EIB, the CSP/RSP : [Describes what kind of PSD support the EIB provides]	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	23	57,5%	12	60%	11	55%
In terms of PSD support provided by EIB, the CSP/RSP : [Describes how this support and the Commission's PSD support complement each other]	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	25,0%	5	25%	5	25%
In terms of PSD support provided by EIB, the CSP/RSP : [Shows that the choices made by the Commission in terms of PSD are geared by the objective of enhancing synergies with the EIB.]	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	7,5%	1	5%	2	10%
In terms of PSD support provided by EBRD, the CSP/RSP : [Describes what kind of PSD support the EBRD provides]	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1	1	0	0	1	6	15,0%	3	15%	3	15%
In terms of PSD support provided by EBRD, the CSP/RSP : [Describes how this support and the Commission's PSD support complement each other]	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	1	2,5%	1	5%	0	0%
In terms of PSD support provided by EBRD, the CSP/RSP : [Shows that the choices made by the Commission in terms of PSD are geared by the objective of enhancing synergies with the EBRD.]	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	0	0	0	0	1	2,6%	1	5%	0	0%
In terms of PSD support provided by other donors, the CSP/RSP : [Describes what kind of PSD support they provide]	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	21	53,8%	11	55%	10	50%
In terms of PSD support provided by other donors, the CSP/RSP : [Describes how this support and the Commission's PSD support complement each other]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	7,5%	2	10%	1	5%
In terms of PSD support provided by other donors, the CSP/RSP : [Shows that the choices made by the Commission in terms of PSD are geared by the objective of enhancing synergies with other actors.]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	12,5%	4	20%	1	5%

This document applies to :	Country	Country	Country	Country	Region	Region	Country	Country	Country	Country	Region
Which Country/Region ?	Morocco	Jamaica	Vietnam	Lebanon	Euro-Med Partnership	Caribbean region	Nicaragua	Egypt	Jordan	Tunisia	Central America
Which Period ?	Other	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013
Which Period ? [Other]	2007-2013 and Mid-term review of the CSP										
Please provide examples.								The CSP specifies that the ECD in Cairo is "instrumental in donor coordination" and that coordination of assistance between the EC and EU MS is ensured through regular meetings of development counsellors in Cairo.			
Prioritization of the PSD strategy (JC 2.6)											
The CSP/RSP shows how the Commission's PSD strategy in the country/region fits into the wider Commission's country/regional strategy (I-2.6.1)?	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
The CSP/RSP provides a description of the needs of the country in terms of PSD (I-2.6.2)?	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0
This description refers to : [A documented analysis done by the Commission]	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
This description refers to : [A documented analysis done by the national/regional authorities]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
This description refers to : [A documented analysis done by other instances]	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
This description refers to : [A documented analysis undertaken by another body]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
This description refers to : [No other analysis than the one provided in the CSP/RSP]	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Which other instances have done a documented analysis ? [WB]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Which other instances have done a documented analysis ? [IMF]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Which other instances have done a documented analysis ? [An EU MS]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Which other instances have done a documented analysis ? [Other]				"The needs assessment analysis conducted by several EC services and international financial institutions".							
The CSP/RSP explains how the different components of the Commission's PSD support have been (I-2.6.1) : [Prioritised]	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0
The CSP/RSP explains how the different components of the Commission's PSD support have been (I-2.6.1) : [Sequenced]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Please provide one or two examples		The banana and sugar sectors have been selected as priority areas, in view of the end of the the Sugar Protocol under the Lome Convention and Cotonou Agreement - which guaranteed a market for Jamaican and other ACP sugar exports to Europe at a set price, and a WTO ruling against some elements of the ACP banana regime and against a background of falling banana prices on the world market.		The programme is described as such: "- Increase direct assistance in the reconstruction of the private sector affected by the military conflict, including through interest rate subsidies, - Provide SMEs with targeted support for reconstruction, - Facilitate access to funding, - Support to improve the business environment and the competitiveness of companies, in particular SMEs, notably in the priority areas which have been identified by Lebanon in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Enterprise: access to finance, enhancing the innovative capacity for SMEs, simplifying procedures for enterprises, and improving business support services".					The financial assistance can be maximised by supporting a limited number of objectives, by prioritising strategic sectors in which the EU has developed good co-operation with Jordan. (CSPNIP2007-2010 p5)		The CSP indicates that "The Commission intends to support (i) extension of the State's reform programme to include governance, public finances and administrative reform and (ii) deepening of structural reforms (private-sector and financial-sector environment)." (p.25).
The CSP/RSP refers to a methodological procedure to select areas of intervention per country with (I-2.6.4): [Selection of priority needs]	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP refers to a methodological procedure to select areas of intervention per country with (I-2.6.4): [Selection of interventions with Commission comparative advantage]	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0
The CSP/RSP refers to a methodological procedure to select areas of intervention per country with (I-2.6.4): [Assessment of whether pre-conditions of intervention are met]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cross-cutting issues (JC 2.7)											
The CSP/RSP explains how the Commission's PSD support will contribute to the following cross-cutting issues (I-2.7.1) (please select all that apply) : [Gender equality]	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0

This document applies to :	Country	Country	Country	Region	Country	Country	Region	Region	Country	# Yes	% Yes	# Yes	% Yes	# Yes	% Yes
Which Country/Region ?	Algeria	Zambia	Syria	SADC	Moldova	Russia	Asia	ENPI Eastern Region	Ukraine						
Which Period ?	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	Total		First Period		Second Period	
Which Period ? [Other]															
Please provide examples.															
Prioritization of the PSD strategy (IC 2.6)															
The CSP/RSP shows how the Commission's PSD strategy in the country/region fits into the wider Commission's country/regional strategy (I-2.6.1)?	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	32	80,0%	18	90%	14	70%
The CSP/RSP provides a description of the needs of the country in terms of PSD (I-2.6.2)?	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	25	62,5%	14	70%	11	55%
This description refers to : [A documented analysis done by the Commission]	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	5,0%	0	0%	2	10%
This description refers to : [A documented analysis done by the national/regional authorities]	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	7,5%	0	0%	3	15%
This description refers to : [A documented analysis done by other instances]	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	5,0%	0	0%	2	10%
This description refers to : [A documented analysis undertaken by another body]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,0%	0	0%	0	0%
This description refers to : [No other analysis than the one provided in the CSP/RSP]	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	21	52,5%	14	70%	7	35%
Which other instances have done a documented analysis ? [WB]	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	2,5%	0	0%	1	5%
Which other instances have done a documented analysis ? [IMF]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,0%	0	0%	0	0%
Which other instances have done a documented analysis ? [An EU MS]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,0%	0	0%	0	0%
Which other instances have done a documented analysis ? [Other]															
The CSP/RSP explains how the different components of the Commission's PSD support have been (I-2.6.1) : [Prioritised]	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	13	32,5%	7	35%	6	30%
The CSP/RSP explains how the different components of the Commission's PSD support have been (I-2.6.1) : [Sequenced]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	5,0%	2	10%	0	0%
Please provide one or two examples			Priorities in terms of PSD dictated by the signing of the Association Agreement which foresees the creation of a FTA by 2017.			The CSP and the Nips simply indicate which priority areas in the field of PSD will be supported: "improvement in the business environment", "trade enhancement", "corporatisation of SOEs and promotion of entrepreneurship" and "industrial upgrading and restructuring".									
The CSP/RSP refers to a methodological procedure to select areas of intervention per country with (I-2.6.4): [Selection of priority needs]	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	8	20,0%	4	20%	4	20%
The CSP/RSP refers to a methodological procedure to select areas of intervention per country with (I-2.6.4): [Selection of interventions with Commission comparative advantage]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	7,5%	1	5%	4	20%
The CSP/RSP refers to a methodological procedure to select areas of intervention per country with (I-2.6.4): [Assessment of whether pre-conditions of intervention are met]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,0%	0	0%	2	10%
Cross-cutting issues (IC 2.7)															
The CSP/RSP explains how the Commission's PSD support will contribute to the following cross-cutting issues (I-2.7.1) (please select all that apply) : [Gender equality]	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	17,5%	4	20%	3	15%

This document applies to :	Country	Country	Country	Country	Region	Region	Country	Country	Country	Country	Region
Which Country/Region ?	Morocco	Jamaica	Vietnam	Lebanon	Euro-Med Partnership	Caribbean region	Nicaragua	Egypt	Jordan	Tunisia	Central America
Which Period ?	Other	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013
Which Period ? [Other]	2007-2013 and Mid-term review of the CSP										
The CSP/RSP explains how the Commission's PSD support will contribute to the following cross-cutting issues (I-2.7.1) (please select all that apply) : [Good governance]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP explains how the Commission's PSD support will contribute to the following cross-cutting issues (I-2.7.1) (please select all that apply) : [Combat environmental degradation]	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
The CSP/RSP explains how the Commission's PSD support will contribute to the following cross-cutting issues (I-2.7.1) (please select all that apply) : [HIV]	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP explains how the Commission's PSD support will contribute to the following cross-cutting issues (I-2.7.1) (please select all that apply) : [Other]							regional integration as a CCI				
For each of the above, does the CSP/RSP define specific objectives, specific indicators ?	No, as cross-cutting are not mentioned in the sections on PSD support.	Under the support to the sugar cane sector, the following were foreseen: (1) Elaboration of a Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA), (2) the gender dimension was included in the ToRs for the TA and capacity building component, (3)		No.			Specific indicators defined for gender and environment, "specific analysis" are to be carried-out for each CCI.				
Decent work agenda (JC 2.8)											
The CSP/RSP refers to EC macro-economic and policy intervention targeting the decent work agenda and/or improvement of core labour standard and social governance?	N/A	0	N/A	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
The choice of modalities and instruments at country / regional level (JC 3.2)											
The CSP/RSP justifies the choice of instruments (e.g. CDE, PROINVEST, etc..) and aid modalities for the Commission's PSD support in the country (I-3.2.1): [choice of instruments]	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0
The CSP/RSP justifies the choice of instruments (e.g. CDE, PROINVEST, etc..) and aid modalities for the Commission's PSD support in the country (I-3.2.1): [choice of aid modalities]	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	1
The CSP/RSP justifies the choice of the instrument by referring to (I-3.2.1) (tick all that are applicable): [The expertise to tackle specific technical challenges]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP justifies the choice of the instrument by referring to (I-3.2.1) (tick all that are applicable): [Political objectives]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP justifies the choice of the instrument by referring to (I-3.2.1) (tick all that are applicable): [The enhanced efficiency (eg. timeliness)]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP justifies the choice of the instrument by referring to (I-3.2.1) (tick all that are applicable): [The potential synergies with other instruments/modalities]	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0

This document applies to :	Country	Country	Country	Region	Country	Country	Region	Region	Country	# Yes	% Yes	# Yes	% Yes	# Yes	% Yes
Which Country/Region ?	Algeria	Zambia	Syria	SADC	Moldova	Russia	Asia	ENPI Eastern Region	Ukraine						
Which Period ?	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	Total		First Period		Second Period	
Which Period ? [Other]															
The CSP/RSP explains how the Commission's PSD support will contribute to the following cross-cutting issues (I-2.7.1) (please select all that apply) : [Good governance]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	5,0%	2	10%	0	0%
The CSP/RSP explains how the Commission's PSD support will contribute to the following cross-cutting issues (I-2.7.1) (please select all that apply) : [Combat environmental degradation]	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	8	20,0%	4	20%	4	20%
The CSP/RSP explains how the Commission's PSD support will contribute to the following cross-cutting issues (I-2.7.1) (please select all that apply) : [HIV]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	5,0%	1	5%	1	5%
The CSP/RSP explains how the Commission's PSD support will contribute to the following cross-cutting issues (I-2.7.1) (please select all that apply) : [Other]															
For each of the above, does the CSP/RSP define specific objectives, specific indicators ?	The CSP mentions that "activity indicators" will be determined notably with respect to gender equality						No but existence of institutionalised dialogues on these issues								
Decent work agenda (JC 2.8)															
The CSP/RSP refers to EC macro-economic and policy intervention targeting the decent work agenda and/or improvement of core labour standard and social governance?	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	3	7,5%	0	0%	3	15%
The choice of modalities and instruments at country / regional level (JC 3.2)															
The CSP/RSP justifies the choice of instruments (e.g. CDE, PROINVEST, etc..) and aid modalities for the Commission's PSD support in the country (I-3.2.1): [choice of instruments]	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	25,0%	5	25%	5	25%
The CSP/RSP justifies the choice of instruments (e.g. CDE, PROINVEST, etc..) and aid modalities for the Commission's PSD support in the country (I-3.2.1): [choice of aid modalities]	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	13	32,5%	6	30%	7	35%
The CSP/RSP justifies the choice of the instrument by referring to (I-3.2.1) (tick all that are applicable): [The expertise to tackle specific technical challenges]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2,5%	0	0%	1	5%
The CSP/RSP justifies the choice of the instrument by referring to (I-3.2.1) (tick all that are applicable): [Political objectives]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2,5%	1	5%	0	0%
The CSP/RSP justifies the choice of the instrument by referring to (I-3.2.1) (tick all that are applicable): [The enhanced efficiency (eg. timeliness)]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,0%	0	0%	0	0%
The CSP/RSP justifies the choice of the instrument by referring to (I-3.2.1) (tick all that are applicable): [The potential synergies with other instruments/modalities]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	7,5%	1	5%	2	10%

This document applies to :	Country	Country	Country	Country	Region	Region	Country	Country	Country	Country	Region
Which Country/Region ?	Morocco	Jamaica	Vietnam	Lebanon	Euro-Med Partnership	Caribbean region	Nicaragua	Egypt	Jordan	Tunisia	Central America
Which Period ?	Other	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013
Which Period ? [Other]	2007-2013 and Mid-term review of the CSP										
The CSP/RSP justifies the choice of the instrument by referring to (I-3.2.1) (tick all that are applicable): [Other]					Justification of choice of FEMIP managed by the EIB, p. 38.				Adequate tools will be selected at the identification phase (CSPNIP2007-2010 p24)		
The CSP/RSP justifies the choice of aid modalities by referring to (I-3.2.1) (tick all that are applicable): [The expertise to tackle specific technical challenges]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP justifies the choice of aid modalities by referring to (I-3.2.1) (tick all that are applicable): [Political objectives]	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP justifies the choice of aid modalities by referring to (I-3.2.1) (tick all that are applicable): [The enhanced efficiency (eg. timeliness)]	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP justifies the choice of aid modalities by referring to (I-3.2.1) (tick all that are applicable): [The potential synergies with other instruments/modalities]	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP justifies the choice of aid modalities by referring to (I-3.2.1) (tick all that are applicable): [Other]					In the case of FEMIP, justification for the accompanying TA, p. 38.		to have greater impact, to tackle the root of problem including low institutionalisation, improve ownership		Adequate tools will be selected at the identification phase (CSPNIP2007-2010 p24)	Budget aid "reinforces ownership on the part of the authorities and as such gives rise to greater accountability on the part of recipients, the possibility for all donors to use national procedures (partly as a result of untangling of aid, harmonisation of procedures, etc.), more dialogue at macroeconomic and sectoral level and good coordination between donors and the government." (p.12).	Choice of project approach based on past experience plus BS conditions not met at regional level yet
Intervening at the appropriate level (national, regional, supra-regional) (JC 3.3)											
The CSP/RSP specifies that the Commissions support to PSD intervenes at the following levels (I-3.3.1) (please select all that apply): [Sub-national (i.e. focus on specific regions or parts of a country)]	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP specifies that the Commissions support to PSD intervenes at the following levels (I-3.3.1) (please select all that apply): [National]	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1
The CSP/RSP specifies that the Commissions support to PSD intervenes at the following levels (I-3.3.1) (please select all that apply): [Regional (more than one country of a region)]	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	1

This document applies to :	Country	Country	Country	Region	Country	Country	Region	Region	Country	# Yes	% Yes	# Yes	% Yes	# Yes	% Yes
Which Country/Region ?	Algeria	Zambia	Syria	SADC	Moldova	Russia	Asia	ENPI Eastern Region	Ukraine						
Which Period ?	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	Total		First Period		Second Period	
Which Period ? [Other]															
The CSP/RSP justifies the choice of the instrument by referring to (I-3.2.1) (tick all that are applicable): [Other]			On the former and ongoing assistance, the CSP indicates that "Aid has taken the form of technical assistance and policy advice. Sectoral support was not envisaged for lack of a clear commitment to reform. Budget support is not yet possible in view of the inadequate public expenditure management." (p. 19).												
The CSP/RSP justifies the choice of aid modalities by referring to (I-3.2.1) (tick all that are applicable): [The expertise to tackle specific technical challenges]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2,5%	1	5%	0	0%
The CSP/RSP justifies the choice of aid modalities by referring to (I-3.2.1) (tick all that are applicable): [Political objectives]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	10,0%	3	15%	1	5%
The CSP/RSP justifies the choice of aid modalities by referring to (I-3.2.1) (tick all that are applicable): [The enhanced efficiency (eg. timeliness)]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2,5%	0	0%	1	5%
The CSP/RSP justifies the choice of aid modalities by referring to (I-3.2.1) (tick all that are applicable): [The potential synergies with other instruments/modalities]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2,5%	0	0%	1	5%
The CSP/RSP justifies the choice of aid modalities by referring to (I-3.2.1) (tick all that are applicable): [Other]			See above.		increased flexibility (re. ENPI over TACIS)										
Intervening at the appropriate level (national, regional, supra-regional) (JC 3.3)															
The CSP/RSP specifies that the Commissions support to PSD intervenes at the following levels (I-3.3.1) (please select all that apply): [Sub-national (i.e. focus on specific regions or parts of a country)]	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	5	12,5%	2	10%	3	15%
The CSP/RSP specifies that the Commissions support to PSD intervenes at the following levels (I-3.3.1) (please select all that apply): [National]	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	20	50,0%	12	60%	8	40%
The CSP/RSP specifies that the Commissions support to PSD intervenes at the following levels (I-3.3.1) (please select all that apply): [Regional (more than one country of a region)]	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	16	40,0%	8	40%	8	40%

This document applies to :	Country	Country	Country	Country	Region	Region	Country	Country	Country	Country	Region
Which Country/Region ?	Morocco	Jamaica	Vietnam	Lebanon	Euro-Med Partnership	Caribbean region	Nicaragua	Egypt	Jordan	Tunisia	Central America
Which Period ?	Other	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013
Which Period ? [Other]	2007-2013 and Mid-term review of the CSP										
The CSP/RSP specifies that the Commissions support to PSD intervenes at the following levels (I-3.3.1) (please select all that apply): [Supra-regional beyond a specific region]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP justified the level at which the Commission intervened in its PSD support (I-3.3.1):	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1
Please explain briefly (max 8 lines)		"The privatisation of the industry involves changes in the structure and location of cane cultivation and sugar production that will lead to contraction of output and employment in areas which are highly dependent on the sugar industry, with the most vulnerable areas including communities around the Long Pond estate in the parish of Trelawney and the Bernard Lodge estate in the parish of St. Catherine where the production of raw sugar is scheduled for closure by 2008. It will be necessary to ensure that steps are taken during the transition to a modernized industry to protect the welfare of those dependent on the industry, including planning community and regional interventions to mitigate any potential dislocation to the rural labour force and to avoid any increase in rural poverty." (p.76).		"The needs assessment analysis conducted by several EC services and international financial institutions has shown the need for a medium-term reconstruction facility targeting businesses (mainly in the Southern part of Lebanon) affected by the military conflict." (p. 28).	The RSP indicates p. 13 that "The present regional programme for the Mediterranean focuses on reform activities in sectors where there is scope for regional approaches, either because of regional economies of scale in infrastructure networks (transport, energy, ICT, environment) and/or because of economies of scope in regional convergence and harmonisation of regulatory frameworks for these sectors, in particular harmonisation with EU regulatory standards within the context of the free trade agreements and the ENP internal market policy."	The RSP aims to support regional economic integration and cooperation and EPA priority areas including capacity-building, in which its PSD support is embedded.	Complementarity between the two levels when considering the challenges of regional integration	In the case of the "enhancing the agricultural sector" component of priority area 2 "developing the competitiveness and productivity of the Egyptian economy", rural areas will be targeted. No other specification for the other PSD components.			Complementarity between national and regional levels
Timeliness and cost-effectiveness											
The CSP/RSP identifies specific factors that might enhance/hamper timeliness and cost-effectiveness of the Commission's PSD support (I-3.5.4): [Enhance]	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	0
The CSP/RSP identifies specific factors that might enhance/hamper timeliness and cost-effectiveness of the Commission's PSD support (I-3.5.4): [Hamper]	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0
Please specify briefly (2 lines)			Since SOEs (State-Owned Enterprises) absorb a good third of the bank credit available and enjoy other types of preferential treatment from the authorities, e.g. as regards land allocation, they deprive the non-state sector of growth opportunities. (CSPNIP2007 2013 p6-7)	"Only if the reform process is backed by a national pact, encompassing all political forces as well as religious and ethnic groups, and thereby overcoming political rivalry, vested interests and clientelism, will it have a chance of actually being implemented." (p. 11).	For support provided by FEMIP, the RSP indicates that improvements in the domestic institutional environment will facilitate endogenous PSD and financing, which the FEMIP will also contribute to.	mention of "heavy burden of EC procedures" and "control culture" linked to projects creating delays the shift to SBS should lower transaction costs	"Bottom-up" initiatives, such as support to the private sector, have proved valuable, even though their cost effectiveness remains questionable. "Top-down" initiatives critically depending on the Government's reform agenda – mainly those targeting privatisation and banking reform - have produced weak outcomes, especially in cases where the Government's action and commitments have remained limited." (p.17).	The implementation of the proposed strategies and interventions are subject to certain risks (...) (CSPNIP2007-2010 p23)	Absorption capacity, realistic deadlines for implementation (p.12).		
The CSP/RSP provides for all or parts of the Commission's PSD support (I-3.5.4): [A clear planning]	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0
The CSP/RSP provides for all or parts of the Commission's PSD support (I-3.5.4): [A clear estimation of costs]	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0
The CSP/RSP provides for all or parts of its PSD support indicators to monitor timeliness and cost effectiveness (I-3.5.4): [Timeliness]	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	None
The CSP/RSP provides for all or parts of its PSD support indicators to monitor timeliness and cost effectiveness (I-3.5.4): [Cost effectiveness]	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	None
PSD support geared to tackling the main institutional and regulatory obstacles to PSD (JC 4.1)											

This document applies to :	Country	Country	Country	Region	Country	Country	Region	Region	Country	# Yes	% Yes	# Yes	% Yes	# Yes	% Yes
Which Country/Region ?	Algeria	Zambia	Syria	SADC	Moldova	Russia	Asia	ENPI Eastern Region	Ukraine						
Which Period ?	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	Total		First Period		Second Period	
Which Period ? [Other]															
The CSP/RSP specifies that the Commissions support to PSD intervenes at the following levels (I-3.3.1) (please select all that apply): [Supra-regional beyond a specific region]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2,5%	1	5%	0	0%
The CSP/RSP justified the level at which the Commission intervened in its PSD support (I-3.3.1):	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	16	40,0%	8	40%	8	40%
Please explain briefly (max 8 lines)									Mentions that support to regional networks of SMEs complements activities under national programmes.						
Timeliness and cost-effectiveness															
The CSP/RSP identifies specific factors that might enhance/hamper timeliness and cost-effectiveness of the Commission's PSD support (I-3.5.4): [Enhance]	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	25,0%	5	25%	5	25%
The CSP/RSP identifies specific factors that might enhance/hamper timeliness and cost-effectiveness of the Commission's PSD support (I-3.5.4): [Hamper]	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	15	37,5%	8	40%	7	35%
Please specify briefly (2 lines)	Because of Experience acquired with programme PME I : TA is an "effective way of contributing to the modernisation of Algeria's economic fabric".		The CSP and NIPs identify risks which would hamper efficiency of EC assistance. None are PSD-assistance specific but could potentially impact PSD assistance: political developments (regional stability, future development of EC's political relations with Syria, lack of support for reform, structural weakness of Syrian administration.												
The CSP/RSP provides for all or parts of the Commission's PSD support (I-3.5.4): [A clear planning]	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	25,0%	4	20%	6	30%
The CSP/RSP provides for all or parts of the Commission's PSD support (I-3.5.4): [A clear estimation of costs]	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	14	35,0%	8	40%	6	30%
The CSP/RSP provides for all or parts of its PSD support indicators to monitor timeliness and cost effectiveness (I-3.5.4): [Timeliness]	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	None						
The CSP/RSP provides for all or parts of its PSD support indicators to monitor timeliness and cost effectiveness (I-3.5.4): [Cost effectiveness]	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	None	None						
PSD support geared to tackling the main institutional and regulatory obstacles to PSD (JC 4.1)															

This document applies to :	Country	Country	Country	Country	Region	Region	Country	Country	Country	Country	Region
Which Country/Region ?	Morocco	Jamaica	Vietnam	Lebanon	Euro-Med Partnership	Caribbean region	Nicaragua	Egypt	Jordan	Tunisia	Central America
Which Period ?	Other	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013
Which Period ? [Other]	2007-2013 and Mid-term review of the CSP										
The CSP/RSP identifies or refers to a document identifying the main obstacles to PSD in terms of (I-4.1.1) (tick all relevant boxes) : [Macro-economic environment]	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0
The CSP/RSP identifies or refers to a document identifying the main obstacles to PSD in terms of (I-4.1.1) (tick all relevant boxes) : [Institutional and regulatory framework]	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0
The CSP/RSP identifies or refers to a document identifying the main obstacles to PSD in terms of (I-4.1.1) (tick all relevant boxes) : [Integration in the regional economy]	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1
The CSP/RSP identifies or refers to a document identifying the main obstacles to PSD in terms of (I-4.1.1) (tick all relevant boxes) : [Integration in the world economy]	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0
The Commission's strategy with respect to PSD in the country/region as displayed in the CSP/RSP is geared to removing obstacles in terms of (I-4.1.2) (tick all relevant boxes) : [Macro-economic environment]	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0
The Commission's strategy with respect to PSD in the country/region as displayed in the CSP/RSP is geared to removing obstacles in terms of (I-4.1.2) (tick all relevant boxes) : [Institutional and regulatory framework]	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0
The Commission's strategy with respect to PSD in the country/region as displayed in the CSP/RSP is geared to removing obstacles in terms of (I-4.1.2) (tick all relevant boxes) : [Integration in the regional economy]	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1
The Commission's strategy with respect to PSD in the country/region as displayed in the CSP/RSP is geared to removing obstacles in terms of (I-4.1.2) (tick all relevant boxes) : [Integration in the world economy]	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0
The CSP/RSP explains that the private sector was consulted for determining the priorities for helping remove the main institutional and regulatory obstacles to its development (I-4.1.3) :	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Policy dialogue on the institutional and regulatory frameworks (JC 4.2)											
The CSP/RSP describes policy dialogue to be conducted on the institutional and regulatory frameworks with the following actors I-4.2.1 and I-4.2.2) (Please tick all relevant boxes) : [Public authorities of the country]	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0
The CSP/RSP describes policy dialogue to be conducted on the institutional and regulatory frameworks with the following actors I-4.2.1 and I-4.2.2) (Please tick all relevant boxes) : [Business associations]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP describes policy dialogue to be conducted on the institutional and regulatory frameworks with the following actors I-4.2.1 and I-4.2.2) (Please tick all relevant boxes) : [Non-state actors]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP describes policy dialogue to be conducted on the institutional and regulatory frameworks with the following actors I-4.2.1 and I-4.2.2) (Please tick all relevant boxes) : [IMF/WB]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
The CSP/RSP describes policy dialogue to be conducted on the institutional and regulatory frameworks with the following actors I-4.2.1 and I-4.2.2) (Please tick all relevant boxes) : [Other donors]	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
The CSP/RSP describes policy dialogue to be conducted on the institutional and regulatory frameworks with the following actors I-4.2.1 and I-4.2.2) (Please tick all relevant boxes) : [Others]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP states that the Commission will take the lead in terms of (some of the) dialogue(s) with policy actors (I-4.2.3) :	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0

This document applies to :	Country	Country	Country	Region	Country	Country	Region	Region	Country	# Yes	% Yes	# Yes	% Yes	# Yes	% Yes
Which Country/Region ?	Algeria	Zambia	Syria	SADC	Moldova	Russia	Asia	ENPI Eastern Region	Ukraine						
Which Period ?	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	Total		First Period		Second Period	
Which Period ? [Other]															
The CSP/RSP identifies or refers to a document identifying the main obstacles to PSD in terms of (I-4.1.1) (tick all relevant boxes) : [Macro-economic environment]	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	16	40,0%	8	40%	8	40%
The CSP/RSP identifies or refers to a document identifying the main obstacles to PSD in terms of (I-4.1.1) (tick all relevant boxes) : [Institutional and regulatory framework]	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	25	62,5%	12	60%	13	65%
The CSP/RSP identifies or refers to a document identifying the main obstacles to PSD in terms of (I-4.1.1) (tick all relevant boxes) : [Integration in the regional economy]	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	20	50,0%	10	50%	10	50%
The CSP/RSP identifies or refers to a document identifying the main obstacles to PSD in terms of (I-4.1.1) (tick all relevant boxes) : [Integration in the world economy]	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	19	47,5%	11	55%	8	40%
The Commission's strategy with respect to PSD in the country/region as displayed in the CSP/RSP is geared to removing obstacles in terms of (I-4.1.2) (tick all relevant boxes) : [Macro-economic environment]	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	14	35,0%	8	40%	6	30%
The Commission's strategy with respect to PSD in the country/region as displayed in the CSP/RSP is geared to removing obstacles in terms of (I-4.1.2) (tick all relevant boxes) : [Institutional and regulatory framework]	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	28	70,0%	15	75%	13	65%
The Commission's strategy with respect to PSD in the country/region as displayed in the CSP/RSP is geared to removing obstacles in terms of (I-4.1.2) (tick all relevant boxes) : [Integration in the regional economy]	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	25	62,5%	13	65%	12	60%
The Commission's strategy with respect to PSD in the country/region as displayed in the CSP/RSP is geared to removing obstacles in terms of (I-4.1.2) (tick all relevant boxes) : [Integration in the world economy]	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	24	60,0%	14	70%	10	50%
The CSP/RSP explains that the private sector was consulted for determining the priorities for helping remove the main institutional and regulatory obstacles to its development (I-4.1.3) :	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	4	10,0%	1	5%	3	15%
Policy dialogue on the institutional and regulatory frameworks (JC 4.2)															
The CSP/RSP describes policy dialogue to be conducted on the institutional and regulatory frameworks with the following actors I-4.2.1 and I-4.2.2) (Please tick all relevant boxes) : [Public authorities of the country]	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	14	35,0%	5	25%	9	45%
The CSP/RSP describes policy dialogue to be conducted on the institutional and regulatory frameworks with the following actors I-4.2.1 and I-4.2.2) (Please tick all relevant boxes) : [Business associations]	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	6	15,0%	3	15%	3	15%
The CSP/RSP describes policy dialogue to be conducted on the institutional and regulatory frameworks with the following actors I-4.2.1 and I-4.2.2) (Please tick all relevant boxes) : [Non-state actors]	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	4	10,0%	2	10%	2	10%
The CSP/RSP describes policy dialogue to be conducted on the institutional and regulatory frameworks with the following actors I-4.2.1 and I-4.2.2) (Please tick all relevant boxes) : [IMF/WB]	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	4	10,0%	2	10%	2	10%
The CSP/RSP describes policy dialogue to be conducted on the institutional and regulatory frameworks with the following actors I-4.2.1 and I-4.2.2) (Please tick all relevant boxes) : [Other donors]	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	5	12,5%	2	10%	3	15%
The CSP/RSP describes policy dialogue to be conducted on the institutional and regulatory frameworks with the following actors I-4.2.1 and I-4.2.2) (Please tick all relevant boxes) : [Others]	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	4	10,0%	1	5%	3	15%
The CSP/RSP states that the Commission will take the lead in terms of (some of the) dialogue(s) with policy actors (I-4.2.3) :	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	5,0%	1	5%	1	5%

This document applies to :	Country	Country	Country	Country	Region	Region	Country	Country	Country	Country	Region
Which Country/Region ?	Morocco	Jamaica	Vietnam	Lebanon	Euro-Med Partnership	Caribbean region	Nicaragua	Egypt	Jordan	Tunisia	Central America
Which Period ?	Other	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013
Which Period ? [Other]	2007-2013 and Mid-term review of the CSP										
The CSP/RSP foresees Commission activities in terms of contribution to private-public dialogue (I-4.2.4)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Analysis of the country/region's main constraints in terms of access to finance (JC 5.1)											
The CSP/RSP identifies or refers to a document identifying the country's/region's main constraints in terms of access to finance for enterprises (I-5.1.2): [On the demand side]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
The CSP/RSP identifies or refers to a document identifying the country's/region's main constraints in terms of access to finance for enterprises (I-5.1.2): [On the supply side]	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0
The Commission's PSD strategy as described in the CSP/RSP was (partially) geared towards the removal of these constraints (I-5.1.4)	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0
The Commission has addressed the constraints in the business environment for larger enterprises and MSMEs to develop (JC 5.2)											
The Commission's PSD strategy as described in the CSP/RSP was (partially) geared towards: [the facilitation of the creation of enterprises through accessible procedures of registration (I-5.2.1)]	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0
The Commission's PSD strategy as described in the CSP/RSP was (partially) geared towards: [The regulatory environment of financial intermediaries to facilitate their lending to, and/or investment in MSMEs (I-5.2.2)]	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0
The support targeted enterprises that were facing difficulties in obtaining loan and investment funding (JC 5.3)											
The CSP/RSP describes a specific approach that the Commission intends to apply or applied (distinguish between both): [to identify enterprises that are facing difficulties in obtaining loan and investment funding (I-5.3.1)] [Scale 1]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP describes a specific approach that the Commission intends to apply or applied (distinguish between both): [to identify enterprises that are facing difficulties in obtaining loan and investment funding (I-5.3.1)] [Scale 2]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP describes a specific approach that the Commission intends to apply or applied (distinguish between both): [to identify the specific constraints these enterprises are facing] [Scale 1]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP describes a specific approach that the Commission intends to apply or applied (distinguish between both): [to identify the specific constraints these enterprises are facing] [Scale 2]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP shows that the support will be geared to these enterprises	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Meso-level: supporting intermediary organizations supporting enterprises (JC 5.4)											
The CSP/RSP describes how private sector representative organizations that have a real impact will be selected (I-5.4.1)	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Support to financial institutions (JC 5.6)											
The CSP/RSP foresees support [for the mobilization of private funding sources (I-5.6.1)]	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0
The CSP/RSP foresees support [for more efficient financial markets (I-5.6.2)]	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0
This includes private savings ?	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	N/A
Addressing the constraints of micro-enterprises (JC 5.7)											
The CSP/RSP explains that the Commission has analysed or will analyse the specific problems of micro-enterprises in countries of intervention (I-5.7.1)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP explains that part of the Commission's PSD support will be geared towards addressing the capacity problems of micro-enterprises in terms of: [Submitting bankable financing requests to financial intermediaries (I-5.7.2)]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0

This document applies to :	Country	Country	Country	Region	Country	Country	Region	Region	Country	# Yes	% Yes	# Yes	% Yes	# Yes	% Yes
Which Country/Region ?	Algeria	Zambia	Syria	SADC	Moldova	Russia	Asia	ENPI Eastern Region	Ukraine						
Which Period ?	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	Total		First Period		Second Period	
Which Period ? [Other]															
The CSP/RSP foresees Commission activities in terms of contribution to private-public dialogue (I-4.2.4)	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	6	15,0%	3	15%	3	15%
Analysis of the country/region's main constraints in terms of access to finance (JC 5.1)															
The CSP/RSP identifies or refers to a document identifying the country's/region's main constraints in terms of access to finance for enterprises (I-5.1.2): [On the demand side]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	12,5%	4	20%	1	5%
The CSP/RSP identifies or refers to a document identifying the country's/region's main constraints in terms of access to finance for enterprises (I-5.1.2): [On the supply side]	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	12	30,0%	7	35%	5	25%
The Commission's PSD strategy as described in the CSP/RSP was (partially) geared towards the removal of these constraints (I-5.1.4)	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	16	40,0%	10	50%	6	30%
The Commission has addressed the constraints in the business environment for larger enterprises and MSMEs to develop (JC 5.2)															
The Commission's PSD strategy as described in the CSP/RSP was (partially) geared towards: [the facilitation of the creation of enterprises through accessible procedures of registration (I-5.2.1)]	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	17,5%	2	10%	5	25%
The Commission's PSD strategy as described in the CSP/RSP was (partially) geared towards: [The regulatory environment of financial intermediaries to facilitate their lending to, and/or investment in MSMEs (I-5.2.2)]	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	12	30,0%	6	30%	6	30%
The support targeted enterprises that were facing difficulties in obtaining loan and investment funding (JC 5.3)															
The CSP/RSP describes a specific approach that the Commission intends to apply or applied (distinguish between both): [to identify enterprises that are facing difficulties in obtaining loan and investment funding (I-5.3.1)] [Scale 1]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,0%	0	0%	0	0%
The CSP/RSP describes a specific approach that the Commission intends to apply or applied (distinguish between both): [to identify enterprises that are facing difficulties in obtaining loan and investment funding (I-5.3.1)] [Scale 2]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,0%	0	0%	0	0%
The CSP/RSP describes a specific approach that the Commission intends to apply or applied (distinguish between both): [to identify the specific constraints these enterprises are facing] [Scale 1]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,0%	0	0%	0	0%
The CSP/RSP describes a specific approach that the Commission intends to apply or applied (distinguish between both): [to identify the specific constraints these enterprises are facing] [Scale 2]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,0%	0	0%	0	0%
The CSP/RSP shows that the support will be geared to these enterprises	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	5,0%	2	10%	0	0%
Meso-level: supporting intermediary organizations supporting enterprises (JC 5.4)															
The CSP/RSP describes how private sector representative organizations that have a real impact will be selected (I-5.4.1)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	7,5%	2	10%	1	5%
Support to financial institutions (JC 5.6)															
The CSP/RSP foresees support [for the mobilization of private funding sources (I-5.6.1)]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	15,0%	4	20%	2	10%
The CSP/RSP foresees support [for more efficient financial markets (I-5.6.2)]	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	12	30,0%	8	40%	4	20%
This includes private savings ?	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	3	7,7%	2	10%	1	5%
Addressing the constraints of micro-enterprises (JC 5.7)															
The CSP/RSP explains that the Commission has analysed or will analyse the specific problems of micro-enterprises in countries of intervention (I-5.7.1)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,0%	0	0%	0	0%
The CSP/RSP explains that part of the Commission's PSD support will be geared towards addressing the capacity problems of micro-enterprises in terms of: [Submitting bankable financing requests to financial intermediaries (I-5.7.2)]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	5,0%	1	5%	1	5%

This document applies to :	Country	Country	Country	Country	Region	Region	Country	Country	Country	Country	Region
Which Country/Region ?	Morocco	Jamaica	Vietnam	Lebanon	Euro-Med Partnership	Caribbean region	Nicaragua	Egypt	Jordan	Tunisia	Central America
Which Period ?	Other	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013
Which Period ? [Other]	2007-2013 and Mid-term review of the CSP										
The CSP/RSP explains that part of the Commission's PSD support will be geared towards addressing the capacity problems of micro-enterprises in terms of: [Management capacity (I-5.7.3)]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP explains that part of the Commission's PSD support will be geared towards addressing the capacity problems of micro-enterprises in terms of: [Accounting (I-5.7.3)]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP explains that part of the Commission's PSD support will be geared towards addressing the capacity problems of micro-enterprises in terms of: [Transparency (I-5.7.3)]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Analysis of enterprises' shortcomings in terms of BDS (JC 6.1)											
The CSP/RSP identifies or refers to a document identifying the main shortcoming of enterprises in terms of competitiveness (I-6.1.2)	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1
This includes forward studies and surveys of key sector or subsectors in regions/countries concerned ?	0	N/A	N/A	0	N/A	N/A	0	0	0	N/A	0
The Commission's strategy with respect to PSD in the country/region as displayed in the CSP/RSP is geared towards tackling the shortcomings identified in these analyses (I-6.1.4):	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	0
The CSP/RSP explicitly underlines the importance of targeting a critical mass of enterprises facing competitiveness problems (I-6.1.5):	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Commission PSD programming in the area of BDS and non-financial service provision has targeted sustainable reinforcement of the structures and functioning of local markets (I-6.1.6):	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Appropriate delivery channels/IO (JC 6.2)											
The CSP/RSP explains how intermediary organizations have been or will be selected on the basis of their ability to deliver (I-6.2.1):	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enterprises have been upgraded and accessed new markets (JC 6.3)											
The CSP/RSP foresees a follow-up after cooperation meetings and agreements in terms of upgrading of enterprises (development of skills, know-how, managerial, market knowledge, etc.) and adequate targeting of sector (I-6.3.1):	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Support targeted on the basis of an analysis of the needs of enterprises (JC 7.1)											
The CSP/RSP identifies or refers to a document identifying potential European sources of investment to organize investment promotion activities, or it underlines the importance of making sure that such an identification takes place (I-7.1.2)	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0
The Commission's strategy with respect to PSD in the country/region as displayed in the CSP/RSP (I-7.1.3) : [Was based on a needs analysis in terms of investment]	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
The Commission's strategy with respect to PSD in the country/region as displayed in the CSP/RSP (I-7.1.3) : [Planned a prioritized approach in selecting groups of beneficiary enterprises]	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0
Support to the development of investment-related intermediary organizations and events (JC 7.2 and 7.3)											
The CSP/RSP planned Commission support to: [Investment Promotion Agencies or other investment intermediaries (I-7.2.1)]	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP planned Commission support to: [Investment promotion meetings and events (I-7.3.1) Y/N. If yes, the CSP/RSP planned follow-up steps to enhance the results of investment promotion activities (I-7.3.3)]	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Targeting SMEs (JC 7.5)											

This document applies to :	Country	Country	Country	Region	Country	Country	Region	Region	Country	# Yes	% Yes	# Yes	% Yes	# Yes	% Yes
Which Country/Region ?	Algeria	Zambia	Syria	SADC	Moldova	Russia	Asia	ENPI Eastern Region	Ukraine						
Which Period ?	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	Total		First Period		Second Period	
Which Period ? [Other]															
The CSP/RSP explains that part of the Commission's PSD support will be geared towards addressing the capacity problems of micro-enterprises in terms of: [Management capacity (I-5.7.3)]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,0%	0	0%	0	0%
The CSP/RSP explains that part of the Commission's PSD support will be geared towards addressing the capacity problems of micro-enterprises in terms of: [Accounting (I-5.7.3)]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,0%	0	0%	0	0%
The CSP/RSP explains that part of the Commission's PSD support will be geared towards addressing the capacity problems of micro-enterprises in terms of: [Transparency (I-5.7.3)]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,0%	0	0%	0	0%
Analysis of enterprises' shortcomings in terms of BDS (JC 6.1)															
The CSP/RSP identifies or refers to a document identifying the main shortcoming of enterprises in terms of competitiveness (I-6.1.2)	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	16	40,0%	9	45%	7	35%
This includes forward studies and surveys of key sector or subsectors in regions/countries concerned ?	N/A	N/A	1	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1	2,5%	0	0%	1	5%
The Commission's strategy with respect to PSD in the country/region as displayed in the CSP/RSP is geared towards tackling the shortcomings identified in these analyses (I-6.1.4):	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	18	45,0%	10	50%	8	40%
The CSP/RSP explicitly underlines the importance of targeting a critical mass of enterprises facing competitiveness problems (I-6.1.5):	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2,5%	0	0%	1	5%
Commission PSD programming in the area of BDS and non-financial service provision has targeted sustainable reinforcement of the structures and functioning of local markets (I-6.1.6):	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	13	32,5%	6	30%	7	35%
Appropriate delivery channels/IO (JC 6.2)															
The CSP/RSP explains how intermediary organizations have been or will be selected on the basis of their ability to deliver (I-6.2.1):	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	10,0%	3	15%	1	5%
Enterprises have been upgraded and accessed new markets (JC 6.3)															
The CSP/RSP foresees a follow-up after cooperation meetings and agreements in terms of upgrading of enterprises (development of skills, know-how, managerial, market knowledge, etc.) and adequate targeting of sector (I-6.3.1):	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	15,0%	2	10%	4	20%
Support targeted on the basis of an analysis of the needs of enterprises (JC 7.1)															
The CSP/RSP identifies or refers to a document identifying potential European sources of investment to organize investment promotion activities, or it underlines the importance of making sure that such an identification takes place (I-7.1.2)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	7,5%	1	5%	2	10%
The Commission's strategy with respect to PSD in the country/region as displayed in the CSP/RSP (I-7.1.3) : [Was based on a needs analysis in terms of investment]	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	7	17,5%	3	15%	4	20%
The Commission's strategy with respect to PSD in the country/region as displayed in the CSP/RSP (I-7.1.3) : [Planned a prioritized approach in selecting groups of beneficiary enterprises]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	12,5%	2	10%	3	15%
Support to the development of investment-related intermediary organizations and events (JC 7.2 and 7.3)															
The CSP/RSP planned Commission support to: [Investment Promotion Agencies or other investment intermediaries (I-7.2.1)]	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	6	15,0%	2	10%	4	20%
The CSP/RSP planned Commission support to: [Investment promotion meetings and events (I-7.3.1) Y/N. If yes, the CSP/RSP planned follow-up steps to enhance the results of investment promotion activities (I-7.3.3)]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	10,0%	1	5%	3	15%
Targeting SMEs (JC 7.5)															

This document applies to :	Country	Country	Country	Country	Region	Region	Country	Country	Country	Country	Region
Which Country/Region ?	Morocco	Jamaica	Vietnam	Lebanon	Euro-Med Partnership	Caribbean region	Nicaragua	Egypt	Jordan	Tunisia	Central America
Which Period ?	Other	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013
Which Period ? [Other]	2007-2013 and Mid-term review of the CSP										
The CSP/RSP underlines that SMEs will be among the priorities of the Commission's PSD support (I-7.5.1)	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0
Generation of employment as an objective of Commission support and Commission's monitoring of employment effects (JC 8.1 and 8.2)											
The CSP/RSP mentions the generation of employment as one of the objectives of the Commission support in the country/region (I-8.2.1): [In relation to its support in general]	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0
The CSP/RSP mentions the generation of employment as one of the objectives of the Commission support in the country/region (I-8.2.1): [Employment as a result of its support to PSD]	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	0
Please specify (max. 3 lines)	The CSP 2007-2013 indicates, p. 3: "The EU's strategy in Morocco has been to tackle Morocco's two major concerns, which dominate the country's political, economic and social agenda: to emerge from the spiral of weak growth, unemployment, poverty and migration and, externally, make a success of implementing the Association agreement and the Neighbourhood Action Plan". The NIP 2007-2010 indicates, p. 24 "A programme to "promote investment and the exports of Moroccan industry" is proposed to support the implementation of the new guidelines on industrial policy and to tackle growth-investment-employment problems."			During the past five years, 7.5 million jobs have been created. Non-State economic sectors remain the most dynamic source of job creation. The capacity for further economic development and poverty reduction is hampered by persisting problems of low productivity, under-qualification and lack of professional and technical staff. (CSPNIP2007-2013 p9)			Focal sector = investment in human capital especially in education		Support to education and employment policy is among the priorities of the NIP2007-2010.	Amongst the EU's strategic priority objectives for 2007-2013, the CSP includes "creation of the right conditions for private investment, the development of competitive SMEs, growth, a reduction in unemployment and sustainable rural development" (p. 15).	
Please describe in 5 lines the link made		"help produce positive outcomes from the privatization process and help mitigate any negative social consequences of rationalization and modernization" (p. 77).		Job creation is amongst the expected results of sub-priority 2 – support to the reinvigoration of small and medium-sized enterprises affected by the conflict.	"Un programme régional de promotion des investissements pourrait contribuer à l'obtention des résultats suivants : • augmenter le nombre de projets d'investissement ; • multiplier les flux d'IDE ; • contribuer d'ici 2010 à la création de nouveaux emplois de façon directe et indirecte" (p.28).		Private sector's needs are a concern of the Commission when providing support to vocational training	"The overall objective is to develop the competitiveness and productivity of the private sector in a business-friendly institutional and regulatory environment. This will increase investment, production and trade and help stimulate growth and job creation in Egypt." (p.31).		The "Economic governance/competitiveness" I and II programmes foreseen included the following objectives: "improving the business climate and enhancing private sector competitiveness to boost private investment and the number of business start-ups, particularly SMEs, which create the greatest number of jobs" (p.23).	
Does the CSP/RSP refer to potential negative impacts of PSD support on employment generation, e.g. through the streamlining of enterprises (I-8.2.1):	0	0	0	0	0	N/A	0	0	0	0	N/A
The CSP/RSP foresees an approach to monitor employment effects (I-8.1.1):	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Does this include the definition of specific indicators?	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Please specify (in 2 lines)							Education indicators but no employment indicators				
Transition from the informal to the formal sector (JC 8.5)											
The CSP/RSP foresees Commission support for the transition from the informal to the formal sector (I-8.5.1):	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Beneficiaries were not in a position to provide the support themselves or to provide it as swiftly and with the same results as the Commission itself (JC 9.2)											
The CSP/RSP explains that the support could not be provided by the beneficiaries themselves (or as swiftly or with the same results) (I-9.2.1)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Benefits of devolution (JC 10.1)											
The CSP/RSP underlines the (expected) benefits of the devolution (I-10.1.1): [For the Commission support in general]	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0

This document applies to :	Country	Country	Country	Region	Country	Country	Region	Region	Country	# Yes	% Yes	# Yes	% Yes	# Yes	% Yes
Which Country/Region ?	Algeria	Zambia	Syria	SADC	Moldova	Russia	Asia	ENPI Eastern Region	Ukraine						
Which Period ?	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	Total		First Period		Second Period	
Which Period ? [Other]															
The CSP/RSP underlines that SMEs will be among the priorities of the Commission's PSD support (I-7.5.1)	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	21	52,5%	10	50%	11	55%
Generation of employment as an objective of Commission support and Commission's monitoring of employment effects (JC 8.1 and 8.2)															
The CSP/RSP mentions the generation of employment as one of the objectives of the Commission support in the country/region (I-8.2.1): [In relation to its support in general]	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	13	32,5%	6	30%	7	35%
The CSP/RSP mentions the generation of employment as one of the objectives of the Commission support in the country/region (I-8.2.1): [Employment as a result of its support to PSD]	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	20	50,0%	11	55%	9	45%
Please specify (max. 3 lines)		One priority of cooperation is the development of training and education to bring down unemployment				"Alongside work on the Common Economic Space, the Commission strives for cooperation over employment and social issues in general."									
Please describe in 5 lines the link made		Another priority of cooperation is PSD and aims to create growth and lower unemployment.	Employment generation is mentioned in the Commission's support to the restructuring of SOEs. The CSP also states that "Syria's real potential for growth and job creation lies in the development of a buoyant private-sector and dynamic SMEs." (p. 26).												
Does the CSP/RSP refer to potential negative impacts of PSD support on employment generation, e.g. through the streamlining of enterprises (I-8.2.1):	0	N/A	0	N/A	N/A	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	1	2,5%	1	5%	0	0%
The CSP/RSP foresees an approach to monitor employment effects (I-8.1.1):	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	15,0%	5	25%	1	5%
Does this include the definition of specific indicators?	1	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	6	15,0%	5	25%	1	5%
Please specify (in 2 lines)						Employment not mentioned under the trade and economic cooperation (and so no indicators foreseen)									
Transition from the informal to the formal sector (JC 8.5)															
The CSP/RSP foresees Commission support for the transition from the informal to the formal sector (I-8.5.1):	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	5,0%	2	10%	0	0%
Beneficiaries were not in a position to provide the support themselves or to provide it as swiftly and with the same results as the Commission itself (JC 9.2)															
The CSP/RSP explains that the support could not be provided by the beneficiaries themselves (or as swiftly or with the same results) (I-9.2.1)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	7,5%	3	15%	0	0%
Benefits of devolution (JC 10.1)															
The CSP/RSP underlines the (expected) benefits of the devolution (I-10.1.1): [For the Commission support in general]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	15,0%	3	15%	3	15%

This document applies to :	Country	Country	Country	Country	Region	Region	Country	Country	Country	Country	Region
Which Country/Region ?	Morocco	Jamaica	Vietnam	Lebanon	Euro-Med Partnership	Caribbean region	Nicaragua	Egypt	Jordan	Tunisia	Central America
Which Period ?	Other	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013
Which Period ? [Other]	2007-2013 and Mid-term review of the CSP										
The CSP/RSP underlines the (expected) benefits of the devolution (I-10.1.1): [Specifically for its PSD support]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Division of responsibilities between different DGs (JC 10.2)											
The CSP/RSP refers to other DGs in its description of the Commission's PSD support in the country/region (I-10.2.1)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HR Policy, tools and guidance, monitoring, capitalisation (JC 10.3, 10.4, 10.5, 10.6)											
The CSP/RSP refers to a specific HR policy the EUD has in terms of providing support to PSD (I-10.3.1)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP refers to specific tools and guidance it used for its support to PSD (I-10.4.1): [Developed by the Commission]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP refers to specific tools and guidance it used for its support to PSD (I-10.4.1): [Developed by others]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP refers to the use by the Commission of a specific system / set of indicators to monitor / evaluate its support to PSD in the country/region (I-10.5.1):	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP refers to the set-up/use by the Commission of a specific capitalisation mechanisms for sharing and disseminating knowledge (I-10.6.1): [Related to is support in general]	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
The CSP/RSP refers to the set-up/use by the Commission of a specific capitalisation mechanisms for sharing and disseminating knowledge (I-10.6.1): [Related specifically to its PSD support]	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0

This document applies to :	Country	Country	Country	Region	Country	Country	Region	Region	Country	# Yes	% Yes	# Yes	% Yes	# Yes	% Yes
Which Country/Region ?	Algeria	Zambia	Syria	SADC	Moldova	Russia	Asia	ENPI Eastern Region	Ukraine						
Which Period ?	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	2008-2013	Total		First Period		Second Period	
Which Period ? [Other]															
The CSP/RSP underlines the (expected) benefits of the devolution (I-10.1.1): [Specifically for its PSD support]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,0%	0	0%	0	0%
<i>Division of responsibilities between different DGs (JC 10.2)</i>															
The CSP/RSP refers to other DGs in its description of the Commission's PSD support in the country/region (I-10.2.1)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,0%	0	0%	0	0%
<i>HR Policy, tools and guidance, monitoring, capitalisation (JC 10.3, 10.4, 10.5, 10.6)</i>															
The CSP/RSP refers to a specific HR policy the EUD has in terms of providing support to PSD (I-10.3.1)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,0%	0	0%	0	0%
The CSP/RSP refers to specific tools and guidance it used for its support to PSD (I-10.4.1): [Developed by the Commission]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,0%	0	0%	0	0%
The CSP/RSP refers to specific tools and guidance it used for its support to PSD (I-10.4.1): [Developed by others]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0,0%	0	0%	0	0%
The CSP/RSP refers to the use by the Commission of a specific system / set of indicators to monitor / evaluate its support to PSD in the country/region (I-10.5.1):	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	5,0%	2	10%	0	0%
The CSP/RSP refers to the set-up/use by the Commission of a specific capitalisation mechanisms for sharing and disseminating knowledge (I-10.6.1): [Related to its support in general]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	5,0%	1	5%	1	5%
The CSP/RSP refers to the set-up/use by the Commission of a specific capitalisation mechanisms for sharing and disseminating knowledge (I-10.6.1): [Related specifically to its PSD support]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	5,0%	1	5%	1	5%

Annex 6 – Results of EU Delegation survey

An internet-based survey to EU Delegations was organised in this evaluation to collect views of Commission staff in the field. The survey tackled most of the issues raised in the EQs. It allowed covering transversal issues but also a number of straightforward matters such as the numbers of PSD-dedicated staff in Delegations, coverage of particular types of intervention in different regions, conduct of needs analyses and types of beneficiary selection criteria used. Invitations to participate in the survey were sent on 7 May 2012 to 82 EU Delegation in countries that benefitted the most from PSD funds (including the nine countries chosen for field visits). The survey went offline on 31 June 2012 with 54 EUD responses, yielding a response rate of 66%. The analysis of these results were directly included in the answers to the EQs in Section 4 of the Final report.

The annex includes:

- The survey itself
- The aggregated survey results

Results of online survey (completed May-June 2012) to staff of European Union Delegations responsible for managing Commission-supported private sector development interventions over the period 2004-2010

		Total	Average							No entry	# respondent	TOTAL
1.1	How many staff does your EUD employ on private sector development?	96,5	2									
1.2	How many staff, or full-time equivalents, does your EUD employ overall?	2334,5	43									
	Percentage of EUD staff members employed on private sector development		10%									
		Yes		No		Other						
2.1	What type of PSD support has your EUD provided over the period 2004-2010? [General Budget Support with PSD-related indicators included for variable tranches]	19%	10	78%	42	4%	2			0%	54	100%
2.1	What type of PSD support has your EUD provided over the period 2004-2010? [Sector Budget Support targeting development of the private sector]	9%	5	89%	48	2%	1			0%	54	100%
2.1	What type of PSD support has your EUD provided over the period 2004-2010? [Projects or programmes including technical assistance / twinning etc.]	93%	50	7%	4	0%	0			0%	54	100%
2.1	What type of PSD support has your EUD provided over the period 2004-2010? [Basket funding or other sectoral approaches]	20%	11	70%	38	9%	5			0%	54	100%
		Active and I am well informed of its activities		Active but I am not well informed of its activities		Not active		I do not know				
2.2	Which PSD-related Centralised Operations and investment facilities (see list below) have been active in the country you cover over the period 2004-2010? [BizClim (the Private Sector Enabling Facility)]	9%	5	28%	15	46%	25	17%	9	0%	54	100%
2.2	Which PSD-related Centralised Operations and investment facilities (see list below) have been active in the country you cover over the period 2004-2010? [Centre for Development of Enterprise (CDE)]	17%	9	17%	9	50%	27	17%	9	0%	54	100%
2.2	Which PSD-related Centralised Operations and investment facilities (see list below) have been active in the country you cover over the period 2004-2010? [EU/ACP Microfinance Programme]	0%	0	13%	7	70%	38	17%	9	0%	54	100%
2.2	Which PSD-related Centralised Operations and investment facilities (see list below) have been active in the country you cover over the period 2004-2010? [ProInvest]	11%	6	22%	12	50%	27	17%	9	0%	54	100%
2.2	Which PSD-related Centralised Operations and investment facilities (see list below) have been active in the country you cover over the period 2004-2010? [AI-Invest]	11%	6	9%	5	54%	29	26%	14	0%	54	100%
2.2	Which PSD-related Centralised Operations and investment facilities (see list below) have been active in the country you cover over the period 2004-2010? [FEMISE research network]	4%	2	6%	3	57%	31	33%	18	0%	54	100%
2.2	Which PSD-related Centralised Operations and investment facilities (see list below) have been active in the country you cover over the period 2004-2010? [ACP Investment Facility]	0%	0	11%	6	67%	36	22%	12	0%	54	100%
2.2	Which PSD-related Centralised Operations and investment facilities (see list below) have been active in the country you cover over the period 2004-2010? [Latin American Investment Facility]	4%	2	4%	2	87%	47	6%	3	0%	54	100%
2.2	Which PSD-related Centralised Operations and investment facilities (see list below) have been active in the country you cover over the period 2004-2010? [Neighbourhood Investment Facility]	11%	6	2%	1	81%	44	6%	3	0%	54	100%

		Systematically		On a regular basis		Exceptionally		Never		I do not know		No entry	# respondent	TOTAL
3.1	What channels did the Commission (including both the EUD and HQ in Brussels) use over the period 2004-2010 to remain informed of the evolution of the private sector environment in the country. Please indicate for each of them how often they have been used. [Documented analyses (by Commission)]	13%	7	41%	22	24%	13	9%	5	13%	7	0%	54	100%
3.1	What channels did the Commission (including both the EUD and HQ in Brussels) use over the period 2004-2010 to remain informed of the evolution of the private sector environment in the country. Please indicate for each of them how often they have been used. [Documented analyses (by other actors)]	13%	7	57%	31	24%	13	0%	0	6%	3	0%	54	100%
3.1	What channels did the Commission (including both the EUD and HQ in Brussels) use over the period 2004-2010 to remain informed of the evolution of the private sector environment in the country. Please indicate for each of them how often they have been used. [Surveys conducted by the Commission or other actors]	6%	3	33%	18	39%	21	4%	2	19%	10	0%	54	100%
3.1	What channels did the Commission (including both the EUD and HQ in Brussels) use over the period 2004-2010 to remain informed of the evolution of the private sector environment in the country. Please indicate for each of them how often they have been used. [Dialogue with public authorities]	17%	9	70%	38	13%	7	0%	0	0%	0	0%	54	100%
3.1	What channels did the Commission (including both the EUD and HQ in Brussels) use over the period 2004-2010 to remain informed of the evolution of the private sector environment in the country. Please indicate for each of them how often they have been used. [Dialogue with representatives of the private sector]	15%	8	65%	35	15%	8	0%	0	6%	3	0%	54	100%
3.1	What channels did the Commission (including both the EUD and HQ in Brussels) use over the period 2004-2010 to remain informed of the evolution of the private sector environment in the country. Please indicate for each of them how often they have been used. [Dialogue with the European Investment Bank]	7%	4	37%	20	31%	17	15%	8	9%	5	0%	54	100%
3.1	What channels did the Commission (including both the EUD and HQ in Brussels) use over the period 2004-2010 to remain informed of the evolution of the private sector environment in the country. Please indicate for each of them how often they have been used. [Dialogue with other actors (e.g. World Bank/IFC)]	9%	5	63%	34	22%	12	0%	0	6%	3	0%	54	100%
3.1	What channels did the Commission (including both the EUD and HQ in Brussels) use over the period 2004-2010 to remain informed of the evolution of the private sector environment in the country. Please indicate for each of them how often they have been used. [Other channels (please specify)]	6%	3	6%	3	7%	4	7%	4	74%	40	0%	54	100%
		Significant changes on the international scene		Significant changes within the country you cover		Little or no changes						No entry	# respondent	TOTAL
3,2	In your view, over the period 2004-2010, were there important changes in the private sector environment that impacted the development of the private sector, or that could potentially impact that development in the future	15%	8	65%	35	20%	11					0%	54	100%
3.2.2	Did these evolutions lead to changes in terms of the PSD support provided by the Commission in the country:	Yes		Not really, but this was not necessary		Not really, but it would have been better to adapt the PSD support		I do not Know				No entry	# respondent	TOTAL
		57%	20	29%	10	11%	4	3%	1			35%	35	100%
3,3	As an EUD staff member, do you consider you have sufficient knowledge on the evolution of the private sector environment	Yes		No		I do not know						No entry	# respondent	TOTAL
		80%	43	17%	9	4%	2					0%	54	100%
3,4	As an EUD staff member, do you consider that the role the Commission wanted to play in terms of PSD support over the period 2004-2010 was clear to you?	Yes		No		I do not know						No entry	# respondent	TOTAL
		61%	33	39%	21	0%	0					0%	54	100%

		A clear and direct link		An indirect link		A very distant link		No link at all		I do not know		No entry	# respondent	TOTAL
3.5	How would you qualify the link between the Commission's support (including centralised and decentralised operations) to PSD in the country over the period 2004-2010 and its potential contribution to the following overall EU external policy objectives in the country you cover [Gradual integration into the world economy]	65%	35	22%	12	9%	5	0%	0	4%	2	0%	54	100%
3.5	How would you qualify the link between the Commission's support (including centralised and decentralised operations) to PSD in the country over the period 2004-2010 and its potential contribution to the following overall EU external policy objectives in the country you cover [Poverty reduction]	44%	24	35%	19	15%	8	2%	1	4%	2	0%	54	100%
3.5	How would you qualify the link between the Commission's support (including centralised and decentralised operations) to PSD in the country over the period 2004-2010 and its potential contribution to the following overall EU external policy objectives in the country you cover [Sustainable social and economic development]	48%	26	41%	22	7%	4	2%	1	2%	1	0%	54	100%
3.5	How would you qualify the link between the Commission's support (including centralised and decentralised operations) to PSD in the country over the period 2004-2010 and its potential contribution to the following overall EU external policy objectives in the country you cover [Peace and security]	9%	5	30%	16	39%	21	13%	7	9%	5	0%	54	100%
		Yes		No		I do not know						No entry	# respondent	TOTAL
3.6	Did the country you cover have an explicitly defined and documented strategy in terms of support to PSD (for the two periods 2004-2007 and 2008-2013) [For the 1st Programming period within the evaluation period (2004-2007)]	37%	20	43%	23	20%	11					0%	54	100%
3.6	Did the country you cover have an explicitly defined and documented strategy in terms of support to PSD (for the two periods 2004-2007 and 2008-2013) [For the 2nd Programming period within the evaluation period (2008-2010)]	57%	31	41%	22	2%	1					0%	54	100%
		Aligned		Aligned, but with differences		Developed mainly by the Commission and/or donor community		I do not know				No entry	# respondent	TOTAL
3.7	In terms of alignment with the national PSD strategy/actions of the partner country, would you say that, broadly speaking, the Commission's strategy in the country was rather: [1st period (2004-2007):]	39%	21	20%	11	11%	6	30%	16			0%	54	100%
3.7	In terms of alignment with the national PSD strategy/actions of the partner country, would you say that, broadly speaking, the Commission's strategy in the country was rather: [2nd period (2007-2010):]	52%	28	26%	14	13%	7	9%	5			0%	54	100%
3.7a	Please feel free to comment on your answer to 3.7:													
		Policy dialogue has been a key tool to enhance PSD		Policy dialogue has not been a key tool, but PSD was part of the policy dialogue		Policy dialogue has not really been used with that purpose		I do not know				No entry	# respondent	TOTAL
3.8	In your view, to what extent has the Commission used policy dialogue as a means to enhance private sector development in the country: [1st period (2004-2007):]	15%	8	30%	16	24%	13	31%	17			0%	54	100%
3.8	In your view, to what extent has the Commission used policy dialogue as a means to enhance private sector development in the country: [2nd period (2007-2010):]	37%	20	33%	18	19%	10	11%	6			0%	54	100%

		Yes, including for PSD support		Yes, but not for PSD support		No		I do not know		Not applicable		No entry	# respondent	TOTAL
3.9	To your knowledge, did the Commission have a specific and systematic approach to: [Promoting human rights]	9%	5	78%	42	2%	1	7%	4	4%	2	0%	54	100%
3.9	To your knowledge, did the Commission have a specific and systematic approach to: [Promoting gender equality]	37%	20	44%	24	6%	3	13%	7	0%	0	0%	54	100%
3.9	To your knowledge, did the Commission have a specific and systematic approach to: [Promoting democracy]	4%	2	81%	44	2%	1	9%	5	4%	2	0%	54	100%
3.9	To your knowledge, did the Commission have a specific and systematic approach to: [Promoting good governance]	50%	27	39%	21	4%	2	7%	4	0%	0	0%	54	100%
3.9	To your knowledge, did the Commission have a specific and systematic approach to: [Promoting children's rights]	13%	7	43%	23	11%	6	22%	12	11%	6	0%	54	100%
3.9	To your knowledge, did the Commission have a specific and systematic approach to: [Promoting indigenous people's rights]	11%	6	37%	20	4%	2	24%	13	24%	13	0%	54	100%
3.9	To your knowledge, did the Commission have a specific and systematic approach to: [Promoting environmental sustainability]	50%	27	31%	17	6%	3	11%	6	2%	1	0%	54	100%
3.9	To your knowledge, did the Commission have a specific and systematic approach to: [Combating HIV/AIDS]	4%	2	48%	26	7%	4	20%	11	20%	11	0%	54	100%
3.9	To your knowledge, did the Commission have a specific and systematic approach to: [Promoting the decent work agenda]	26%	14	19%	10	19%	10	31%	17	6%	3	0%	54	100%
		Critical		Very important		Marginal importance		Not so important		I do not know		No entry	# respondent	TOTAL
3.10	Could you please rate the importance, in your view, of each of the following cross-cutting issues in relation to support to PSD in the country you cover (regardless of whether they were effectively taken into account or not): [Promoting human rights]	7%	4	43%	23	20%	11	26%	14	4%	2	0%	54	100%
3.10	Could you please rate the importance, in your view, of each of the following cross-cutting issues in relation to support to PSD in the country you cover (regardless of whether they were effectively taken into account or not): [Promoting gender equality]	13%	7	56%	30	9%	5	20%	11	2%	1	0%	54	100%
3.10	Could you please rate the importance, in your view, of each of the following cross-cutting issues in relation to support to PSD in the country you cover (regardless of whether they were effectively taken into account or not): [Promoting democracy]	6%	3	43%	23	19%	10	31%	17	2%	1	0%	54	100%
3.10	Could you please rate the importance, in your view, of each of the following cross-cutting issues in relation to support to PSD in the country you cover (regardless of whether they were effectively taken into account or not): [Promoting good governance]	44%	24	46%	25	4%	2	4%	2	2%	1	0%	54	100%
3.10	Could you please rate the importance, in your view, of each of the following cross-cutting issues in relation to support to PSD in the country you cover (regardless of whether they were effectively taken into account or not): [Promoting children's rights]	7%	4	30%	16	24%	13	31%	17	7%	4	0%	54	100%
3.10	Could you please rate the importance, in your view, of each of the following cross-cutting issues in relation to support to PSD in the country you cover (regardless of whether they were effectively taken into account or not): [Promoting indigenous people's rights]	4%	2	22%	12	31%	17	30%	16	13%	7	0%	54	100%
3.10	Could you please rate the importance, in your view, of each of the following cross-cutting issues in relation to support to PSD in the country you cover (regardless of whether they were effectively taken into account or not): [Promoting environmental sustainability]	28%	15	57%	31	2%	1	11%	6	2%	1	0%	54	100%
3.10	Could you please rate the importance, in your view, of each of the following cross-cutting issues in relation to support to PSD in the country you cover (regardless of whether they were effectively taken into account or not): [Combating HIV/AIDS]	4%	2	15%	8	44%	24	31%	17	6%	3	0%	54	100%
3.10	Could you please rate the importance, in your view, of each of the following cross-cutting issues in relation to support to PSD in the country you cover (regardless of whether they were effectively taken into account or not): [Promoting the decent work agenda]	17%	9	41%	22	13%	7	22%	12	7%	4	0%	54	100%

		Yes		No		I do not know				No entry	# respondent	TOTAL
4.1	With respect to the set of vehicles and modalities that the Commission had at its disposal to tackle challenges faced by the private sector in third countries, would you say that: [It was comprehensive enough to answer to the PSD needs in the country]	41%	22	46%	25	13%	7			0%	54	100%
4.1	With respect to the set of vehicles and modalities that the Commission had at its disposal to tackle challenges faced by the private sector in third countries, would you say that: [It was easy for you to determine which vehicle/modality to use to tackle a specific challenge]	41%	22	46%	25	13%	7			0%	54	100%
4.1	With respect to the set of vehicles and modalities that the Commission had at its disposal to tackle challenges faced by the private sector in third countries, would you say that: [There were overlaps between different types of vehicles/modalities]	35%	19	44%	24	20%	11			0%	54	100%
4.1	With respect to the set of vehicles and modalities that the Commission had at its disposal to tackle challenges faced by the private sector in third countries, would you say that: [There was a clear and specific rationale for why the use of one aid modality was chosen over another]	63%	34	22%	12	15%	8			0%	54	100%
4.1	With respect to the set of vehicles and modalities that the Commission had at its disposal to tackle challenges faced by the private sector in third countries, would you say that: [The Commission combined different types of instruments/modalities in view of potential synergies between them]	50%	27	24%	13	26%	14			0%	54	100%
		Yes		No		I do not know				No entry	# respondent	TOTAL
4.2	Are there elements in the set of vehicles/modalities or specific vehicles/modalities that could be improved in your view to better tackle challenges faced by the private sector in third countries (if yes, please provide a brief summary of the improvements you have in mind):	69%	37	13%	7	19%	10			0%	54	100%
		Yes, systematically		Yes, but there were exceptions		No, a substantial share of interventions were tackled at the wrong level		I do not know		No entry	# respondent	TOTAL
4.3	In your view, did the Commission intervene at the appropriate level (national, regional, supra-regional)? Please feel free to elaborate on your answer in the comment box provided.	30%	16	41%	22	7%	4	22%	12	0%	54	100%
		Above expectations		In line with expectations		Below expectations		I do not know		No entry	# respondent	TOTAL
4.4	Overall, for the period 2004-2010, do you consider that, in most cases, timeliness and/or cost-effectiveness of the implementation of the Commission's PSD support were: [Regarding timeliness]	2%	1	31%	17	50%	27	17%	9	0%	54	100%
4.4	Overall, for the period 2004-2010, do you consider that, in most cases, timeliness and/or cost-effectiveness of the implementation of the Commission's PSD support were: [Regarding budget]	4%	2	48%	26	31%	17	17%	9	0%	54	100%
		Critical		Important but not critical		Little impact		No impact at all		No entry	# respondent	TOTAL
4.5	For those cases where there was a delay or concern regarding timeliness or cost-effectiveness, could you please specify which of the following factors were critical (please limit your answer to a maximum 4 or 5 "critical" factors): [Incorrect planning]	22%	12	44%	24	22%	12	11%	6	0%	54	100%
4.5	For those cases where there was a delay or concern regarding timeliness or cost-effectiveness, could you please specify which of the following factors were critical (please limit your answer to a maximum 4 or 5 "critical" factors): [The specific instrument used]	13%	7	37%	20	31%	17	19%	10	0%	54	100%
4.5	For those cases where there was a delay or concern regarding timeliness or cost-effectiveness, could you please specify which of the following factors were critical (please limit your answer to a maximum 4 or 5 "critical" factors): [The specific modality used]	17%	9	41%	22	31%	17	11%	6	0%	54	100%
4.5	For those cases where there was a delay or concern regarding timeliness or cost-effectiveness, could you please specify which of the following factors were critical (please limit your answer to a maximum 4 or 5 "critical" factors): [The Commission procedures]	41%	22	35%	19	19%	10	6%	3	0%	54	100%
4.5	For those cases where there was a delay or concern regarding timeliness or cost-effectiveness, could you please specify which of the following factors were critical (please limit your answer to a maximum 4 or 5 "critical" factors): [Lack of specific expertise within the EUD]	11%	6	28%	15	37%	20	24%	13	0%	54	100%

		Critical		Important but not critical		Little impact		No impact at all				No entry	# respondent	TOTAL
4.5	For those cases where there was a delay or concern regarding timeliness or cost-effectiveness, could you please specify which of the following factors were critical (please limit your answer to a maximum 4 or 5 "critical" factors): [Lack of local staff in the EUD]	11%	6	20%	11	35%	19	33%	18			0%	54	100%
4.5	For those cases where there was a delay or concern regarding timeliness or cost-effectiveness, could you please specify which of the following factors were critical (please limit your answer to a maximum 4 or 5 "critical" factors): [Lack of capacities of national and/or regional counterparts]	59%	32	30%	16	2%	1	9%	5			0%	54	100%
4.5	For those cases where there was a delay or concern regarding timeliness or cost-effectiveness, could you please specify which of the following factors were critical (please limit your answer to a maximum 4 or 5 "critical" factors): [Institutional or regulatory constraints of the beneficiary country]	52%	28	31%	17	7%	4	9%	5			0%	54	100%
4.5	For those cases where there was a delay or concern regarding timeliness or cost-effectiveness, could you please specify which of the following factors were critical (please limit your answer to a maximum 4 or 5 "critical" factors): [Lack of capacities of beneficiaries]	50%	27	39%	21	4%	2	7%	4			0%	54	100%
4.5	For those cases where there was a delay or concern regarding timeliness or cost-effectiveness, could you please specify which of the following factors were critical (please limit your answer to a maximum 4 or 5 "critical" factors): [Cumbersome coordination with other donors]	9%	5	31%	17	41%	22	19%	10			0%	54	100%
4.5	For those cases where there was a delay or concern regarding timeliness or cost-effectiveness, could you please specify which of the following factors were critical (please limit your answer to a maximum 4 or 5 "critical" factors): [International developments with an impact on the countries' private sector environment (e.g. financial crisis, emergence of BRICS)]	19%	10	26%	14	44%	24	11%	6			0%	54	100%
4.5	For those cases where there was a delay or concern regarding timeliness or cost-effectiveness, could you please specify which of the following factors were critical (please limit your answer to a maximum 4 or 5 "critical" factors): [Other]	7%	4	7%	4	15%	8	70%	38			0%	54	100%
		Yes		No		I do not know						No entry	# Respondant	TOTAL
5,1	In the country you cover and over the period considered, was there Commission support to target the improvement of the institutional and regulatory frameworks with a view to making it more conducive to PSD?	70%	38	22%	12	7%	4					0%	54	100%
		In line with		Below Commission		I do not know						No entry	# respondent	TOTAL
5,2	To what extent would you say that globally, over the period considered, the Commission contributed to the strengthening of institutional and regulatory frameworks? (Please feel free to elaborate further in the comment box below)	55%	21	42%	16	3%	1					30%	38	100%
		Critical importance		Useful, but not critical		Marginal importance		Policy dialogue did not concern the institutional and regulatory framework		I do not know		No entry	# respondent	TOTAL
5,3	How would you rate the role of policy dialogue with respect to improving the institutional and regulatory framework?	55%	21	29%	11	8%	3	3%	1	5%	2	30%	38	100%
		Yes		No		I do not know						No entry	# respondent	TOTAL
5.4	In your view, did the Commission's intervention to strengthen the institutional and regulatory framework contribute to the creation, better functioning and growth of enterprises [Creation of new enterprises]	42%	16	29%	11	29%	11					30%	38	100%
5.4	In your view, did the Commission's intervention to strengthen the institutional and regulatory framework contribute to the creation, better functioning and growth of enterprises [Better functioning of enterprises]	61%	23	13%	5	26%	10					30%	38	100%
5.4	In your view, did the Commission's intervention to strengthen the institutional and regulatory framework contribute to the creation, better functioning and growth of enterprises [Growth of enterprises]	55%	21	18%	7	26%	10					30%	38	100%

		Yes		No		I do not know					No entry	# respondent	TOTAL				
6,1	Did the Commission provide support to target access to finance in the country you covered over the period 2004-2010?	37%	20	52%	28	11%	6				0%	54	100%				
6.2	Did the Commission provide support in the following fields over the period considered: [Regulatory environment of financial intermediaries to facilitate their provision of financial products and services for MSMEs]	65%	13	30%	6	5%	1				63%	20	100%				
6.2	Did the Commission provide support in the following fields over the period considered: [Support to intermediary organisations supporting enterprises in accessing finance (large and MSMEs)]	80%	16	10%	2	10%	2				63%	20	100%				
6.2	Did the Commission provide support in the following fields over the period considered: [Support to enterprises facing difficulties]	25%	5	55%	11	20%	4				63%	20	100%				
6.2	Did the Commission provide support in the following fields over the period considered: [Support for the mobilisation of private funding sources including private savings]	25%	5	55%	11	20%	4				63%	20	100%				
6.2	Did the Commission provide support in the following fields over the period considered: [Support for more efficient financial markets]	50%	10	40%	8	10%	2				63%	20	100%				
6.2	Did the Commission provide support in the following fields over the period considered: [Support to micro-enterprises]	50%	10	25%	5	25%	5				63%	20	100%				
6.2	If the Commission supported intermediary organisations, did those organisations implement activities to increase the capacity of private sector enterprises to obtain funding from bank or non-banking institutions?	81%	13	6%	1	13%	2				70%	16	100%				
6.2	If you answered yes to "support to enterprises facing difficulties", did the Commission apply a specific approach to identify those enterprises	60%	3	40%	2	0%	0				91%	5	100%				
		Critical		Useful, but not critical		No real consultation took place		I do not know					No entry	# respondent	TOTAL		
6,3	How important was consultation with the private sector to determine which were the main constraints in terms of access to finance?	35%	7	30%	6	10%	2	25%	5				63%	20	100%		
		The vast majority of them		Only some of them		No		I do not know					No entry	# respondent	TOTAL		
6,4	Would you say that globally over the period considered the priorities supported by the Commission responded to the most important needs in terms of access to finance?	40%	8	45%	9	5%	1	10%	2				63%	20	100%		
		Yes, always		Yes, regularly		Only exceptionally		No		I do not know					No entry	# respondent	TOTAL
6,5	Have Commission interventions in the area of access to finance been conducted in cooperation with other financial institutions?	15%	3	50%	10	15%	3	10%	2	10%	2	63%	20	100%			

		1		2		3		4		I do not know		No entry	# respondent	TOTAL
6.6	For each of the following objectives, could you please provide your appreciation of the extent to which expected results were reached. For each objective, please select between 1 to 4, where:1 = It yielded results above expectations2 = It yielded results in line with expectations3 = It yielded results below expectations4 = It did not yield the expected results [Improvements in enterprises' capacities to submit bankable dossiers]	0%	0	25%	5	45%	9	0%	0	30%	6	63%	20	100%
6.6	For each of the following objectives, could you please provide your appreciation of the extent to which expected results were reached. For each objective, please select between 1 to 4, where:1 = It yielded results above expectations2 = It yielded results in line with expectations3 = It yielded results below expectations4 = It did not yield the expected results [Improvements in enterprises' accounting practices]	0%	0	25%	5	25%	5	5%	1	45%	9	63%	20	100%
6.6	For each of the following objectives, could you please provide your appreciation of the extent to which expected results were reached. For each objective, please select between 1 to 4, where:1 = It yielded results above expectations2 = It yielded results in line with expectations3 = It yielded results below expectations4 = It did not yield the expected results [Improvements in dealing with enterprises' lack of capitalisation (e.g. through seed money, venture capital)]	5%	1	15%	3	10%	2	30%	6	40%	8	63%	20	100%
6.6	For each of the following objectives, could you please provide your appreciation of the extent to which expected results were reached. For each objective, please select between 1 to 4, where:1 = It yielded results above expectations2 = It yielded results in line with expectations3 = It yielded results below expectations4 = It did not yield the expected results [Improvements in dealing with enterprises' lack of collateral (e.g. through guarantee schemes)]	10%	2	25%	5	10%	2	30%	6	25%	5	63%	20	100%
6.6	For each of the following objectives, could you please provide your appreciation of the extent to which expected results were reached. For each objective, please select between 1 to 4, where:1 = It yielded results above expectations2 = It yielded results in line with expectations3 = It yielded results below expectations4 = It did not yield the expected results [Increased diversification of private funding sources]	5%	1	15%	3	20%	4	15%	3	45%	9	63%	20	100%
6.6	For each of the following objectives, could you please provide your appreciation of the extent to which expected results were reached. For each objective, please select between 1 to 4, where:1 = It yielded results above expectations2 = It yielded results in line with expectations3 = It yielded results below expectations4 = It did not yield the expected results [Increased mobilisation of private savings]	0%	0	5%	1	10%	2	25%	5	60%	12	63%	20	100%
6.6	For each of the following objectives, could you please provide your appreciation of the extent to which expected results were reached. For each objective, please select between 1 to 4, where:1 = It yielded results above expectations2 = It yielded results in line with expectations3 = It yielded results below expectations4 = It did not yield the expected results [Local financial institutions have improved their ability to effectively channel resources and adapt financial services/products to the needs of local enterprises]	5%	1	35%	7	30%	6	5%	1	25%	5	63%	20	100%
6.6	For each of the following objectives, could you please provide your appreciation of the extent to which expected results were reached. For each objective, please select between 1 to 4, where:1 = It yielded results above expectations2 = It yielded results in line with expectations3 = It yielded results below expectations4 = It did not yield the expected results [Improvements of MSME's access to finance]	5%	1	45%	9	30%	6	10%	2	10%	2	63%	20	100%

		Yes		No		I do not know						No entry	# respondent	TOTAL
7,1	Was there Commission support to target the improvement of enterprise competitiveness in the country you covered over the period 2004-2010? Relevant examples would include, among other types, industry-specific initiatives targeting competitiveness, value chain analysis and development, geographical cluster development or industrial upgrading.	65%	35	24%	13	11%	6					0%	54	100%
7.2	Please indicate the type of support provided (select all relevant boxes): [Support to business development service providers]	43%	23	57%	31	0%	0					0%	54	100%
7.2	Please indicate the type of support provided (select all relevant boxes): [Support to locality-specific economic clusters]	33%	18	67%	36	0%	0					0%	54	100%
7.2	Please indicate the type of support provided (select all relevant boxes): [Support to chambers of commerce and industry]	54%	29	46%	25	0%	0					0%	54	100%
7.2	Please indicate the type of support provided (select all relevant boxes): [Other (please specify):]	9%	5	91%	49	0%	0					0%	54	100%
7.2	Please indicate the type of support provided (select all relevant boxes): [I do not know]	0%	0	100%	54	0%	0					0%	54	100%
		Yes, systematically		Yes, on a regular basis		Rather exceptionally		No		I do not know		No entry	# respondent	TOTAL
7,3	Regarding support for business development services in particular, did the Commission conduct documented needs analyses or identification studies prior to implementation? Feel free to comment in the box provided.	23%	8	17%	6	31%	11	11%	4	17%	6	35%	35	100%
7,3	Regarding support for business development services in particular, did the Commission conduct documented needs analyses or identification studies prior to implementation? Feel free to comment in the box provided. - Comment													
		Systematically		In most cases		In some cases		In very few or no cases		I do not know		No entry	# respondent	TOTAL
7.4	In the case of support that was provided to intermediary organisations, would you say that: [The support was used to build the capacity of intermediary organisations]	14%	5	54%	19	20%	7	6%	2	6%	2	35%	35	100%
7.4	In the case of support that was provided to intermediary organisations, would you say that: [The delivery capacity of intermediary organisations was used as a key selection criteria]	14%	5	34%	12	20%	7	11%	4	20%	7	35%	35	100%
7.4	In the case of support that was provided to intermediary organisations, would you say that: [The support helped to foster a sustainable market for business development services]	3%	1	20%	7	37%	13	20%	7	20%	7	35%	35	100%
7.4	In the case of support that was provided to intermediary organisations, would you say that: [Overall, are you satisfied with the selected intermediary organisations?]	0%	0	46%	16	37%	13	6%	2	11%	4	35%	35	100%

		Yes		No		I do not know				No entry	# respondent	TOTAL		
8,1	In the country you cover and over the period 2004-2010, did the Commission support investment promotion activities and events?	43%	23	39%	21	19%	10			0%	54	100%		
8.2	As far as you know, did the Commission monitor: [New investment flows experienced by beneficiary/participating enterprises]	35%	8	26%	6	39%	9			57%	23	100%		
8.2	As far as you know, did the Commission monitor: [The quality and impact of relationships created during investment promotion events]	43%	10	22%	5	35%	8			57%	23	100%		
8.2	As far as you know, did the Commission monitor: [Changes in foreign direct investment specifically resulting from Commission interventions]	39%	9	30%	7	30%	7			57%	23	100%		
		In line with expectations		Below expectations		I do not know				No entry	# respondent	TOTAL		
8.2a	What were the results obtained from these elements as compared with expectations? [New investment flows experienced by beneficiary/participating enterprises]	15%	8	9%	5	76%	41			0%	54	100%		
8.2a	What were the results obtained from these elements as compared with expectations? [Quality and impact of relationships created during investment promotion]	17%	9	7%	4	76%	41			0%	54	100%		
8.2a	What were the results obtained from these elements as compared with expectations? [Foreign direct investment specifically resulting from Commission interventions]	9%	5	11%	6	80%	43			0%	54	100%		
		Yes		No		I do not know				No entry	# respondent	TOTAL		
8.3	Regarding the targeting of SMEs for Commission support to investment promotion: [Has the Commission applied a specific approach to targeting SMEs with investment promotion activities?]	57%	13	26%	6	17%	4			57%	23	100%		
8.3	Regarding the targeting of SMEs for Commission support to investment promotion: [Would you say that SMEs have been adequately targeted by Commission investment promotion activities in the country you cover over the period 2004-2010?]	39%	9	43%	10	17%	4			57%	23	100%		
		Employment generation has been a systematic objective of all PSD interventions		Employment generation has been an objective of some PSD interventions but not all		Employment generation has not been an objective in most PSD interventions		Employment generation has not been an objective in any PSD interventions		I do not know		No entry	# respondent	TOTAL
9,1	To what extent has the generation of employment, as a result of private sector development, been an objective (though not necessarily the main objective) of Commission PSD support in the country you cover over the period 2004-2010?	15%	8	43%	23	24%	13	7%	4	11%	6	0%	54	100%
		Employment generation has been systematically monitored		Employment generation has been monitored, but not systematically		Employment generation has been rarely monitored		Employment generation has not been monitored		Other		No entry	# respondent	TOTAL
9,2	To what extent has your Delegation monitored the employment effects of PSD support?	4%	2	19%	10	20%	11	46%	25	11%	6	0%	54	100%

		Observed Commission value added		Potential but underutilised value added		Not a real value added in the country		I do not know			No entry	# respondent	TOTAL
10.1	How would you rate the following elements regarding the value added of the Commission in terms of its support to PSD in the country as compared to that of EU MS and/or other donors (please tick the appropriate box): [Ensuring coordination among EU players to increase the impact of their PSD support]	33%	18	46%	25	15%	8	6%	3		0%	54	100%
10.1	How would you rate the following elements regarding the value added of the Commission in terms of its support to PSD in the country as compared to that of EU MS and/or other donors (please tick the appropriate box): [Conducting policy dialogue with the national authorities on PSD in the country]	44%	24	41%	22	9%	5	6%	3		0%	54	100%
10.1	How would you rate the following elements regarding the value added of the Commission in terms of its support to PSD in the country as compared to that of EU MS and/or other donors (please tick the appropriate box): [Links between PSD support and other areas, e.g., regional integration, trade capacity development, democratic governance]	50%	27	39%	21	7%	4	4%	2		0%	54	100%
10.1	How would you rate the following elements regarding the value added of the Commission in terms of its support to PSD in the country as compared to that of EU MS and/or other donors (please tick the appropriate box): [The capacity to establish long-term partnerships]	24%	13	35%	19	26%	14	15%	8		0%	54	100%
10.1	How would you rate the following elements regarding the value added of the Commission in terms of its support to PSD in the country as compared to that of EU MS and/or other donors (please tick the appropriate box): [The critical mass of financial support provided by the Commission]	28%	15	35%	19	28%	15	9%	5		0%	54	100%
10.1	How would you rate the following elements regarding the value added of the Commission in terms of its support to PSD in the country as compared to that of EU MS and/or other donors (please tick the appropriate box): [The technical expertise with respect to PSD]	37%	20	37%	20	17%	9	9%	5		0%	54	100%
10.1	How would you rate the following elements regarding the value added of the Commission in terms of its support to PSD in the country as compared to that of EU MS and/or other donors (please tick the appropriate box): [Funding vehicles and programmes to cover diverse PSD needs]	20%	11	46%	25	24%	13	9%	5		0%	54	100%
10.1	How would you rate the following elements regarding the value added of the Commission in terms of its support to PSD in the country as compared to that of EU MS and/or other donors (please tick the appropriate box): [The diversity of aid modalities]	22%	12	31%	17	37%	20	9%	5		0%	54	100%
10.1	How would you rate the following elements regarding the value added of the Commission in terms of its support to PSD in the country as compared to that of EU MS and/or other donors (please tick the appropriate box): [The capacity to federate efforts and to build synergies with other institutions (EDFI, EIB, World Bank, etc.)]	28%	15	54%	29	13%	7	6%	3		0%	54	100%
10.1	How would you rate the following elements regarding the value added of the Commission in terms of its support to PSD in the country as compared to that of EU MS and/or other donors (please tick the appropriate box): [The country specific knowledge (overall, not just PSD-specific knowledge)]	46%	25	28%	15	11%	6	15%	8		0%	54	100%

		Observed Commission value added		Potential but underutilised value added		Not a real value added in the country		I do not know				No entry	# respondent	TOTAL
10.1	How would you rate the following elements regarding the value added of the Commission in terms of its support to PSD in the country as compared to that of EU MS and/or other donors (please tick the appropriate box): [The provision and demonstration of best practice]	39%	21	24%	13	26%	14	11%	6			0%	54	100%
10.1	How would you rate the following elements regarding the value added of the Commission in terms of its support to PSD in the country as compared to that of EU MS and/or other donors (please tick the appropriate box): [The capacity of blending grants with loans]	19%	10	31%	17	35%	19	15%	8			0%	54	100%
10.1	How would you rate the following elements regarding the value added of the Commission in terms of its support to PSD in the country as compared to that of EU MS and/or other donors (please tick the appropriate box): [Other (please specify in Q10.1a below)]	2%	1	2%	1	6%	3	91%	49			0%	54	100%
		Yes		Rather yes		Rather no		No		I do not know		No entry	# respondent	TOTAL
11.1	Do you consider that generally (i.e. not specific to the country covered), PSD was sufficiently high on the Commission's (Headquarters) agenda?	15%	8	44%	24	24%	13	7%	4	9%	5	0%	54	100%
11.2	Overall, would you say that devolution facilitated the design and/or implementation of the Commission's PSD support? [Devolution facilitated design]	28%	15	44%	24	6%	3	2%	1	20%	11	0%	54	100%
11.2	Overall, would you say that devolution facilitated the design and/or implementation of the Commission's PSD support? [Devolution facilitated implementation]	35%	19	39%	21	4%	2	0%	0	22%	12	0%	54	100%
11.2	Feel free to comment (maximum 5 lines):													
		Yes, clearly		Yes, but more could be done		No, but much of this knowledge is not really useful in the specific context of this country		No, and this is a shortcoming		I do not know		No entry	# respondent	TOTAL
11.3	Overall would you say that the Commission support to PSD provided in the country has benefited from general PSD knowledge and networks present within the Commission's Headquarters (in different DGs):	9%	5	44%	24	11%	6	20%	11	15%	8	0%	54	100%
11.3a	Please feel free to comment on your answer to question 11.3													
		Strongly agree		Agree		Disagree		Strongly disagree		Do not know		No entry	# respondent	TOTAL
11.4	In terms of the Commission's resources available to support PSD, please indicate for each of the statements below whether or not you agree with them for the period considered. [Sufficient expertise in PSD matters were available at EUD level]	9%	5	48%	26	26%	14	7%	4	9%	5	0%	54	100%
11.4	In terms of the Commission's resources available to support PSD, please indicate for each of the statements below whether or not you agree with them for the period considered. [It was easy for EUD staff to access expertise of specialised staff at HQ level]	2%	1	50%	27	35%	19	4%	2	9%	5	0%	54	100%
11.4	In terms of the Commission's resources available to support PSD, please indicate for each of the statements below whether or not you agree with them for the period considered. [Training for EUD staff in charge of PSD matters was available]	7%	4	48%	26	30%	16	9%	5	6%	3	0%	54	100%

		Strongly agree		Agree		Disagree		Strongly disagree		Do not know		No entry	# respondent	TOTAL
11.4	In terms of the Commission's resources available to support PSD, please indicate for each of the statements below whether or not you agree with them for the period considered. [Mechanisms were in place to ensure the capitalisation of Commission knowledge on PSD]	0%	0	30%	16	46%	25	9%	5	15%	8	0%	54	100%
11.4	In terms of the Commission's resources available to support PSD, please indicate for each of the statements below whether or not you agree with them for the period considered. [More should be done in terms of capitalisation between EUDs on support to PSD]	39%	21	44%	24	6%	3	0%	0	11%	6	0%	54	100%
		High		Not its key expertise but		Some shortcomings		Not sufficient				No entry	# respondent	TOTAL
11.5	How would you rate the technical expertise within the EUD on PSD related matters	19%	10	50%	27	22%	12	9%	5			0%	54	100%
11.6	On guidance provided by the Commission headquarters	I am aware of and regularly use		I am aware of but rarely use		I am not aware of						No entry	# respondent	TOTAL
11.6.1	Please indicate for the following documents whether you knew and used them [COM(2003) 267: The Commission's approach to future support for the development of the Business sector]	6%	3	39%	21	56%	30					0%	54	100%
11.6.1	Please indicate for the following documents whether you knew and used them [The 2003 Guidelines for European Commission Support to Private Sector Development (revised in 2005)]	11%	6	52%	28	37%	20					0%	54	100%
11.6.1	Please indicate for the following documents whether you knew and used them [Reference Doc. No. 10: Trade and Private Sector Policy and Development]	19%	10	39%	21	43%	23					0%	54	100%
		The Commission systematically monitored impact on enterprises		The Commission monitored impact on enterprises sometimes, but not always		The Commission rarely monitored the impact of interventions on enterprises		I do not know				No entry	# respondent	TOTAL
11.7	Did the EUD monitor (or have monitoring data at its disposal) on the impact of Commission interventions (excluding centralised operations) on the functioning and growth of third country enterprises?	2%	1	26%	14	48%	26	24%	13			0%	54	100%

Annex 7 – Compilation of Field Mission Debriefings

Evaluation du soutien de la Commission au développement du secteur privé (DSP) dans les pays tiers (2004-2010)

Mission pays Algérie

Debriefing auprès de la Delegation

Alger, 26 juin 2012



This document is designed as support to the oral presentation and is not intended to be used separately

Objectifs

Objectifs du debriefing

- **Presenter les activités et les constats de la mission**
- **Débattre des constats de la mission**
- **Informer des étapes suivantes de l'évaluation**


Agenda

- Objectifs de la mission (*Rappel*)
- Les constats de la mission par question d'évaluation et discussion
- Description des étapes suivantes de l'évaluation

Sujet, objectif et champs de l'évaluation

Sujet	Evaluation du soutien de la Commission au DSP dans les pays tiers (niveau stratégique, plusieurs pays)
Objectif	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Fournir une évaluation globale indépendante du soutien actuel et historique de la Commission au DSP• Identifier les points essentiels pour améliorer les stratégies et programmes de la Commission
Portée	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Tous les types de soutien au SP, sauf l'appui au commerce• Soutien global de la Commission, pas une évaluation d'instruments particuliers de soutien au SP• Tous les pays tiers, sauf les membres de l'OCDE & les pays DG ELARG• Financement provenant de tous les instruments de la Commission + FED 2004-2010

C'est une évaluation du soutien global de la CE au secteur privé
Ce n'est pas une évaluation du soutien au niveau pays



Pourquoi l'Algérie a-t-elle été sélectionnée?

(Rappel)

Algérie

- 5ème plus important bénéficiaire** du soutien *direct* de la Commission au développement du secteur privé (DSP) sur base de notre inventaire
- Pays méditerranéen. La région **MEDA** est celle qui a reçu **le plus large soutien direct au DSP** avec près d'un tiers du montant total sur la période étudiée (€691m)
- Le soutien inclue une Intervention financée par la FEMIP
- Les domaines de soutien au DSP était variés: compétitivité des PME, accès au financement, modernisation du secteur financier, appui aux organisations intermédiaires, renforcement du cadre institutionnel et réglementaire, ...

Focus sur 4 interventions du portefeuille:

- « Programme d'Appui au développement des PME en Algérie » (MED/1998/003-367);
- « Maghreb Leasing Algeria » (MED/2004/0247);
- « Programme d'Appui au développement des PME en Algérie II » (ENPI/2007/019-422);
- « Modernisation du Secteur Financier en Algérie » (MEDA/1999/003-283)

Objectif: collecter l'information pour nourrir l'évaluation thématique globale (et non d'évaluer l'aide pour un pays ou projet spécifique)

6

Soutien au DSP de la Commission en Algérie

(Rappel)

Modalités de gestion	Interventions	Durée	Montant engagé
Decentralisée (auprès de la Del. UE)	Programme d'Appui au développement des PME en Algérie (MED/1998/003-367)	2000-2007	€55m
	Modernisation du Secteur Financier en Algérie (MEDA/1999/003-283)	2001-2007	€23.25m
	Programme d'Appui au développement des PME II en Algérie	2009-2012	40 €m
	Programme de d'appui à la diversification de l'économie (DIVECO)	2009-2012	17.5 €m
Centralisée	FEMIP - Maghreb Leasing Algeria» (MED/2004/0247)	2009-2015	€10m
MONTANT TOTAL ENGAGE 2004-2010:			€146

5ème plus important bénéficiaire du soutien *direct* de la Commission

7

Activités entreprises pendant la mission: 18 au 26 juin

- **Briefing et Debriefing auprès de la Délégation de l'UE:** 18 juin & 26 juin
- **Delegation:**
 - Chef des Opérations de Coopération
 - Attaché de Coopération/ Transition économique
 - Point Focal DG Commerce
 - Chargés de programmes
- **Autorités nationales et bénéficiaires:**
 - Ministère des Finances et Ministère de l'Industrie et de la PME
 - Agences publiques de soutien aux entreprises: CNCPME, ANDPME, ALGEX, ANDI, CCI (Caci), CCI (Alger)
- **Des partenaires de développement :** BM, SFI, GIZ
- **Des institutions financières:** CGCI, "Maghreb Leasing Algeria"
- **Des Organisations Intermédiaires:** APAB
- **Des PME bénéficiaires**

8

Agenda

- Objectifs de la mission (*Rappel*)
- Les constats de la mission par question d'évaluation et discussion
- Description des étapes suivantes de l'évaluation

Questions d'évaluation

Q 1	Evolution des politiques et de la programmation
Q 2	Approche stratégique
Q 3	Instruments et modalités
Q 4	Cadre institutionnel et réglementaire
Q 5	Accès au financement
Q 6	Développer la compétitivité des entreprises
Q 7	Promotion de l'investissement
Q 8	Création d'emplois
Q 9	Valeur ajoutée de la Commission
Q 10	Moyens mis en oeuvre

Q1 – Evolution des politiques et de la programmation

Dans quelle mesure la stratégie et programmation de la Commission tiennent-elles compte (1) des recommandations de l'évaluation 2005 et (2) de l'évolution du contexte plus global du secteur privé?

- **L'évaluation du soutien au secteur privé 2005 est connue au niveau de la Del. UE. Elle n'est toutefois pas mentionnée dans les documents stratégies et projets**

- **La Commission est au fait de l'évolution du contexte du secteur privé en Algérie et en a tenu compte dans sa programmation:**
 - Boom pétrolier impliquant une capacité d'auto financement d'interventions de l'Algérie
 - Le besoin de mise à niveau lié aux AA et libre échange et L'échéance 2017 de la ZLE (surtout expertise et AT)
 - Importance que doit prendre le secteur privé dans la diversification de l'économie nationale (DSP avec objectif de retombée au niveau commercial)
 - Le changement de cap du GdA avec l'introduction de la "loi de finances complémentaire 2009" (en tient compte dans son dialogue économique avec le pays)

Q2 – Approche stratégique

Dans quelle mesure le soutien de la Commission au DSP faisait-il partie d'une approche stratégique orientée vers les objectifs globaux de la politique extérieure de l'UE, tout en s'alignant sur les priorités du pays et en maximisant sa VA, y compris en termes de synergies avec d'autres acteurs et autres types de soutien de la Commission?

- **Lien établi entre la coopération dans le secteur privé et les objectifs globaux de l'UE:**
 - Intégration dans l'économie mondiale
 - Favoriser le développement économique et social dans le pays

- **Les lignes directrices que la Commission s'est fixées en Algérie sont d'intervenir sur deux fronts, notamment pour permettre à l'Algérie de tirer partie de l'AA et de la future zone de libre échange (ZLE):**
 - Appui Institutionnel et réglementaire (Climat des affaires): toutefois absence de priorités par rapport à l'impact sur la performance du secteur privé;
 - L'approche filière est difficile à adopter car au niveau stratégique elle n'existe pas et elle est difficile étant donné que le GdA adopte plutôt une approche sectorielle
 - Mise à niveau des PME afin d'améliorer leur compétitivité

Q2 – Approche stratégique

- **Identification des besoins se fait en étroite concertation avec les autorités algériennes**
 - Soutenir dans le cadre de PME I et II les entreprises pilotes et reproduire ce travail au niveau national avec le Programme National de mise à niveau exécuté par l'ANDPME
- **La Commission est confrontée à une évolution de la stratégie économique et commerciale du gouvernement depuis 2008 qui a pour effet l'introduction de certaines mesures protectionnistes**
 - Certains acteurs du secteur privé comprennent le fond de ces mesures mais en condamne la forme (changement brutal et de façon unilatérale de la réglementation)
- **Pertinence du programme de Modernisation du Secteur Financier mais difficultés rencontrées dans sa mise en œuvre (abordé dans la Q5)**
- **La VA de la Commission n'a pas été une donnée déterminante dans l'élaboration des programmes mais des VA ont été notées (voir la Q9)**
- **Des synergies existent entre les différentes interventions de la Commission sans que celles-ci puissent toujours se concrétiser au niveau opérationnel (partage inégal de l'information entre les programmes PME et DIVECO)**

Q2 – Approche stratégique

- **L'interaction entre les programmes de la Commission et les programmes des autres bailleurs n'a pas permis de créer des synergies concrètes**
 - La Del. UE coordonne le sous-groupe secteur privé/emploi mais le pays partenaire ne s'est pour l'instant pas impliqué. Ce manque de coordination de la part du GdA ne facilite pas la création de synergies entre les programmes
 - Pourtant peu de bailleurs sont actifs
- **Néanmoins, prise d'initiative des bénéficiaires finaux pour réaliser des synergies**
 - Exemple de la CGCI qui a utilisé le diagnostic réalisé par l'AfD et son souhait de s'inspirer de l'exemple de l'organisme de garanties OSEO pour déposer un dossier auprès du programme de la Commission PME II
 - Dans la conception des programmes PME, il est tenu compte de l'amélioration des conditions de travail et des droits des travailleurs à travers notamment la promotion du dialogue tripartite (ANDPME, patronat et syndicats)
- **L'importance des thèmes transversaux est soulignée dans les documents de stratégie et dans les documents programmes**
 - Par exemple comme critères de sélection des projets financés par les programmes PME et ces critères ont été respectés

Q3 – Instruments de financement

Dans quelle mesure l'ensemble des instruments et modalités de financement de la Commission pour appuyer les stratégies et activités DSP dans les pays partenaires et régions ont donné lieu à des réponses en temps opportun, à un coût raisonnable, aux défis rencontrés par le secteur privé dans les pays tiers tout en favorisant des synergies entre eux et avec des instruments fournis pas d'autres acteurs?

■ **Mis à part la facilité d'investissement qui a permis de faire face au défis de financement des PME, les autres instruments et modalité d'aide développés au niveau général n'étaient pas particulièrement efficaces pour relever les défis du secteur privé dans le pays.**

- Ces modalités suivent les souhaits du gouvernement qui n'est pas assez focalisé (région, secteur, activité) au détriment de l'efficacité de son aide
- La coopération bilatérale n'a pas permis de prendre suffisamment en compte le point de vue des acteurs du secteur privé
- La Del. UE recherche des modalités qui lui permettraient d'adresser plus directement les acteurs du secteur privé

■ **Le choix de la Commission d'une approche projet (par opposition à un appui budgétaire) était réfléchi et prenait en considération la tendance du secteur public à vouloir diriger le secteur privé**

Q3 – Instruments de financement

■ **Même si la Commission a une approche régionale pour les pays MEDA, celle-ci n'est pas soutenue par le GdA qui privilégie une coopération bilatérale.**

- La Charte européenne pour les entreprises est un succès au Maroc et en Tunisie, mais ne fonctionne pas en Algérie
- Pour les programmes nationaux similaires à d'autres de la région MEDA pas de transfert de "leçons apprises" de ces autres expériences dans d'autres pays

■ **Au niveau de la mise en œuvre, les instruments et les modalités ne répondent pas à certains défis des PME (accès au financement, contraintes dans le climat des affaires, promotion de l'exportation)**

- Exception de la FEMIP et de la mise en place du leasing

■ **Dans l'ensemble des retards ont été notés au niveau du démarrage des programmes**

- PME/PMI pour lequel trois avenants à la convention de financement ont dû être signés (objectifs trop ambitieux on doit être adaptés)
- PME II pour lequel un avenant pour prolonger a dû être signé (mise en place de l'ATI)
- Modernisation du secteur financier, retard également dû à une révision des objectifs initiaux mais ce retard a cependant pu être comblé

■ **Dans le suivi d'un programme, les problèmes contrats-finances mobilisaient parfois toutes les forces plus que de véritablement réfléchir sur la progression du projet**

Q4 – Cadre institutionnel et réglementaire

Dans quelle mesure est-ce que la Commission a contribué à rendre le cadre institutionnel et réglementaire (I & R) plus propice au DSP?

- **La Commission a visé le cadre institutionnel et réglementaire notamment par rapport à l'harmonisation des réglementations requises par l'AA**
 - Effort de simplification
 - Certains règlements existent mais c'est leur application qui fait défaut
- **L'appui institutionnel auprès des différents ministères (finances, travaux publics) a permis certaines améliorations dans la collecte d'informations même si les données statistiques du secteur privé demeurent un défi**
- **Le manque de communication entre les différents ministères rend la tâche de l'amélioration du cadre institutionnel et réglementaire plus hardue**

Q4 – Cadre institutionnel et réglementaire

- **Néanmoins la Commission a obtenu des avancés dans ce domaines:**
 - L'appui de PME II a abouti à la nette amélioration du cadre réglementaire du secteur de la boisson (traçabilité)
- **Même s'il y a un souhait du GdA de diversifier ses exportations, il n'y a pas d'appui ou de stratégie nationale dans ce sens**
- **Par rapport à un appui I&R de la Commission pour favoriser l'investissement, celui-ci est compliqué suite au changement de stratégie du GdA en 2008 (restrictions liées au souhait de ne plus avoir de dette extérieure) et à l'adoption de la "loi de finances complémentaire 2009" qui stipule que dans tous les investissements réalisés en Algérie, l'actionariat étranger est limité à 49%, le reste étant détenu par des résidents algériens**

Q5 – Accès au financement

Dans quelle mesure la Commission a-t-elle contribué à améliorer l'accès des entreprises au financement?

- **La Commission a fait des difficultés rencontrées par les PME algériennes en termes d'accès au financement et sur la nécessité de moderniser le secteur financier (banques publiques peu performantes)**
 - Elaboration d'un programme dont le but était précisément de moderniser le secteur financier
- **La Commission a renforcé la capacité des institutions financières à mobiliser des financements (garanties bancaires) mais ceci n'a pas amélioré la capacité des entreprises à obtenir des financements**
 - Exemple de la CGCI pas suffisamment suscitée par les PME
 - Programme de Modernisation du Secteur Financier qui n'a pas réussi à changer l'approche crédit des banques publiques
- **Difficulté du contexte financier algérien: 84% de banques publiques avec des conditions de crédit pas attractives. En outre du manque d'intérêt des banques à octroyer des crédits, le manque de confiance entre elles et le secteur privé persiste. 70% de la création des TPME se fait par l'autofinancement.**

Q5 – Accès au financement

- **L'intervention au travers de la FEMIP a permis d'introduire un nouveau produit financier en Algérie: le leasing avec des résultats très positifs**
 - création d'un marché du leasing
 - renforcement de la capacité de l'institution financière
 - MLA et professionnalisation des services de leasing
- **Ceci a permis de donner accès aux PME:**
 - à un mode de financement adapté à leur besoins
 - facilitant leur croissance (équipements performants)
 - pas uniquement au niveau d'Alger (6 agences)
 - ouvertes depuis la création de MLA en 2006)
 - Taux de recouvrement supérieur à 90%

Q6 – Développer la compétitivité des entreprises

Dans quelle mesure est-ce que la Commission a contribué à l'amélioration de la compétitivité des entreprises - en particulier les PME – et de contribuer à leurs accès à la technologie et aux nouveaux marchés?

■ **Problème de disponibilité d'analyse fiable dans ce domaine pour orienter le soutien de la Commission**

- La définition des PME n'est pas appropriée au tissu entrepreneurial algérien
- Les TPE et PE (- de 10 pers.) représentent plus de 90% du tissu
- Divergence dans l'interprétation des parties prenantes dans la définition de la PME

■ **Le secteur privé fait face à de nombreuses contraintes tant internes ...**

- Structure familiale avec manque de formation en gestion
- Bas niveau de compétence technique et commerciale
- Faible notion de qualité, ...

..qu'externes aux PME

- Secteur informel considérable
- Manque de main d'œuvre qualifiée pour certains secteurs d'activité
- Difficulté d'accès au financement
- Faiblesse des institutions ministérielles d'appui et organisations intermédiaires dans la mise en œuvre des programmes

Q6 – Développer la compétitivité des entreprises

■ **La Commission est consciente de ces différentes contraintes décrites dans ses documents de stratégie et projets**

- Les programmes PME I et PME II visaient essentiellement à l'amélioration de la compétitivité des entreprises

■ **Les résultats sont mitigés (certains satisfaits d'autres non) au niveau des entreprises:**

- Manque de ciblage
- AT limitée au diagnostique avec manque de suivi
- Objectif quantitatif dépassé (445) mais effet levier au niveau sectoriel?
- Augmentation du chiffre d'affaires des PME bénéficiaires (enquête Évaluation finale) mais difficile d'accès à de nouveaux marchés
- Qualité des experts mise à disposition et appréciation des binômes experts nationaux/ internationaux

■ **La sélection de certaines OI s'est faite au vu des objectifs à atteindre**

- par ex. ALGERAC, IANOR chargée de l'accréditation et la normalisation pour le volet qualité du programme PME II

Q6 – Développer la compétitivité des entreprises (3/3)

- **La canalisation de l'aide via des OI n'a pas toujours permis de maximiser l'impact**
 - "Success story" du soutien apporté à l'Association des Producteurs Algériens de Boissons (APAB) qui représente 85% de la production nationale de boisson: Atteinte de résultats concrets tant sur les pratiques dans le secteur (importance de la qualité, hygiène) que sur le cadre réglementaire (loi sur la traçabilité attribuée au projet)
 - Appréciation plus mitigée quant au renforcement de la CCI Djurdjura
- **Certaines parties prenantes questionnent la pertinence de certaines OI dans le soutien efficace du secteur privé (questions du statut et de la représentativité)**
- **Dans certains cas, l'AT a permis l'accès au savoir faire et une amélioration de la compétitivité qui ont notamment induit des progrès technologiques (logiciels de gestion)**
- **Le soutien de la FEMIP a également permis l'accès à la technologie grâce à des financements accessibles aux PME**

Q7 – Promotion de l'investissement

Dans quelle mesure le soutien de la Commission contribuera à accroître les investissements transfrontaliers dans les secteurs privés des pays partenaires?

- **Le soutien de la Commission n'était pas orienté par une analyse du climat de l'investissement**
- **La Commission est au fait de l'évolution du climat de l'investissement depuis 2008 tant au niveau de Bruxelles (DG Trade) que de la DUE**
- **Une série d'instructions émises par le GdA à partir de 2008 a introduit de strictes procédures pour les investisseurs étrangers et commerçants**
- **Ce contexte affecte le soutien à la promotion de l'investissement**
 - Dans le cadre de la FEMIP, l'assistance de la BEI n'est pas renouvelable malgré les résultats positifs pour les PME algériennes

Q8 – Création d'emplois

Dans quelle mesure est-ce que le soutien de la Commission au DSP a contribué à faciliter la création d'emplois?

- **La création d'emploi est un objectif clair des programmes de soutien au secteur privé**
 - Phase documentaire et confirmée par les entretiens
 - Cependant, pas de mécanismes de suivi pour effectivement mesurer l'impact sur la création d'emploi
- **Pour les entreprises qui ont amélioré leur compétitivité grâce au soutien de la Commission, il y a eu création d'emplois**
 - Par exemple, le soutien de la Commission à l'APAB (qualité) a permis l'augmentation des effectifs des entreprises de la filière de façon indirecte
- **Le sous-groupe de bailleurs dédié au secteur privé englobe également l'emploi et est coordonné par la Del. UE**
 - Importance de l'emploi et notamment l'employabilité des jeunes réaffirmée après le Printemps arabe dans les pays voisins

Q9 – Valeur ajoutée de la Commission

Quelle était la valeur ajoutée (VA) de la Commission lors de la fourniture de soutien à la DSP dans les pays tiers?

- **Le soutien de la Commission au secteur privé pendant toute la décennie 2000 lui a permis d'acquérir une expertise et également d'ajuster son aide aux besoins du secteur**
 - introduction du volet qualité dans PME II
- **La Commission est en mesure d'avoir un dialogue politique; concrètement réaffirmer, par exemple, l'importance du rôle du secteur privé dans les efforts entrepris par le GdA de diversification de son économie**
- **L'envergure du soutien de la Commission lui permet d'intervenir sur deux fronts simultanément : institutionnel et au niveau des acteurs du secteur privé, toutefois une VA de cette approche n'a pas encore été totalement exploitée**
 - APAB est une illustration de réussite de cette VA potentielle

Q9 – Valeur ajoutée de la Commission

■ La VA au niveau des interventions

- Volet institutionnel: Ouverture de la Commission qui vise les besoins des bénéficiaires
- Volet entreprises: apport d'expertise et de savoir-faire

■ Malgré l'évolution de la stratégie nationale avec l'objectif de l'Algérie de ne plus avoir de dette extérieure, la Commission a pu poursuivre son soutien sous formes de dons alors que les banques de développement comme la BAD, la BM, la SFI ont dû limiter leur soutien (AT) ou l'interrompre

- Ces acteurs perçoivent cette VA et soulignent à ce propos l'intérêt de travailler avec la Commission

Q 10 – Moyens mis en oeuvre

Dans quelle mesure est-ce que la structure organisationnelle de la Commission et sa pratique de gestion ont été aptes à une mise en œuvre réussie de son soutien DSP?

- Le processus de dévolution a facilité la mise en œuvre du soutien du secteur privé en favorisant la proximité avec le GdA
- Selon la Del. UE, en règle générale, la coordination avec les DG ECFIN et Trade est étroite (malgré l'absence d'un représentant de DG Trade au sein de la Del.) et n'entrave donc pas le soutien au secteur privé
- Les différentes DG ne réagissent pas toujours aux demandes d'appui et d'information ponctuelles exprimées par la Del. UE
- Délais des échanges entre Bruxelles et la Del. qui peuvent être gérés lors d'exercices planifiés (élaboration du document stratégie pays) mais plus problématique lorsqu'il s'agit de réagir à des besoins du secteur privé sur le terrain

Q 10 – Moyens mis en oeuvre (2/2)

- **Au stade de l'identification et de la formulation, la Del UE confirme un lien étroit avec le QSG dans ce processus notamment pour être informé de l'existence de nouveaux documents importants comme des lignes directrices à suivre**
 - Ne pas sous-estimer le facteur humain dans l'utilité du QSG
 - Une bonne collaboration avec l'unité thématique en amont est établie et considérée comme primordiale pour éviter les problèmes en aval
- **Par rapport à la coordination avec les opérations centralisées (FEMIP), la Del UE considère qu'elle peut avoir accès à l'information si elle le souhaite mais cette information ne lui a pas fournie de façon systématique afin qu'elle l'intègre dans son travail de coopération.**
- **En termes de politiques de RH, la Del. UE sait qu'il existe des formations dans le domaine mais un manque de budget ne permet pas leur bonne mise en œuvre.**
- **La Commission a évalué son soutien au secteur privé ce qui lui a permis de faire des ajustements entre PME I et PME II.**

Agenda

- **Objectifs de la mission (*Rappel*)**
- **Les constats de la mission par question d'évaluation et discussion**
- **Description des étapes suivantes de l'évaluation**

Etapes suivantes

- **Fin juin** Finalisation des missions & compilation des constats
- **Juillet** Présentation des travaux de la phase de terrain au Groupe de Référence
- **Juillet – Août** Phase de synthèse
- **Septembre** Soumission du rapport final provisoire

**Nous remercions la Délégation pour son soutien
dans la réalisation de cette mission de terrain**

Evaluation of the European Commission's support to private sector development in third countries (2004-2010)

Country mission to Jamaica

Debriefing to the EU Delegation

Kingston, 13 June 2012



*This document is designed as support to the oral presentation
and is not intended to be used separately*

Objectives

Objectives of today's debriefing

- Provide an overview of the mission activities & findings
- Have a discussion on mission findings
- Provide information on next steps

Agenda


- **Reminder of the objectives of the mission and activities undertaken**
- **Mission findings per evaluation question and discussion**
- **Next steps**

Evaluation subject, purpose and scope

(Reminder)

Subject	Evaluation of the European Commission's (EC) support to private sector development (PSD) in third countries (strategy-level, multi-country)
Purpose	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide an overall independent assessment of EC's past and current support to PSD • Identify key lessons for improving the EC's strategies and programmes
Scope	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • All types of PSD support, excl. trade-related assistance • Overall EC support, not country- or instrument-specific • All third countries, except OECD & DG ENLARG countries • All EC funding vehicles & modalities • 2004-2010

**This is an evaluation of the Commission's overall support to PSD
It is not an evaluation of the support at country level as such**



Why we selected Jamaica

(Reminder)

Jamaica

Jamaica (JAM)...

- ...32nd largest recipient of *direct* EC support to PSD (SBS incl., out102 and 6th largest recipient of *indirect* Commission support to PSD, ie. through GBS with PSD-related indicators
- ... an ACP country, the 2nd largest recipient region of EC *direct* support to PSD...
- ... PSD a focal area of the 2001-2007 CSP but not under 2007-2013 CSP but consistent EC support to the transition to open and competitive markets in the banana, sugar and rice sectors
- ... Varied support to the Caribbean region through the *Centre pour le Développement de l'Entreprise* (CDE), PROINVEST, the EU-ACP Micro-Finance Programme and the ACP Business Climate Facility Program (BizClim).

We focused on 3 interventions:

- Private Sector Development Programme (PSDP): €14.5m contribution
- Debt Reduction and growth Enhancement Programme (DRGEP): €56.6m contribution (GBS)
- Strengthening of the Caribbean Association of Investment Promotion Agencies (CAIPA, Regional PROINVEST), €0.6m

Objective: collect information to feed into the overall thematic evaluation (and not to evaluate aid to a specific project or country)

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EC private sector development support in Jamaica

Modalities	Interventions	Duration	Contracted
Decentralised (to the EUD)	Private Sector Development Programme (PSDP)	2004-2009	€14.5m
	EU/ACP Microfinance Programme: CARIB-CAP "Strengthening Caribbean Microfinance Institutions"; CGAP Work Programme (indirectly)	• 2007 • 2005	• €420000 • €3.74m
	Support to transition to open and competitive markets in banana and sugar sectors: • EU Banana Support Programme in Jamaica (EUBSP); • Accompanying Measures for Sugar Protocol Countries	• 1999-2009 • 2006-2010	• All cs: €42.6m; • All cs: €84m
Centralised (at EC HQ)	GBS - « Debt Reduction and growth Enhancement Prog. (DRGEP)», Condition on "Business administrative and tax reforms aimed at private initiative, productive investment, growth and social cohesion"	2008-ong.	€65m (not all to PSD)
	Activities of the Centre for Development of Enterprise	2005-2010	€2.3m
<p>Regional assistance, committed under RIP for 2008-2013 CAIPA (PROINVEST), Caribbean Export Development Agency (€10,5 m), CTPSDP (€2,6 m); Support for the Caribbean Rum Industry (€70 m)</p>			



Activities undertaken during mission: 5 to 13 June

- **EU Briefing & Debriefing:** 5 June & 13 June
- **Interviews:**
 - **EU Delegation:**
 - Head of Section Economic and Social Development
 - Attaché, Project Manager, Economics, Trade, Politics & Information
 - Project Manager Infrastructure & Rural Development Section
 - **National Authorities :** Planning Institute of Jamaica (NAO)
 - **Implementing partners and beneficiaries:**
 - JAMPRO – Trade & Invest Jamaica, Jamaica Business Development Corporation (JBDC), Jamaica Exporters' Association (JEA)
 - TA in frame of DRGEP (Particip GmbH), former members of the PSDP PMU, former members of the Outsourced Service Providers (for PSDP)
 - Small Business Association of Jamaica (SBAJ), Caribbean Association of SMEs (CASME), The Jamaica Manufacturers' Association Ltd
 - **Other private sector actors/representatives:** Jamaica Chamber of Commerce , EX-IM bank, The Competitiveness Company
 - **Other donors:** USAID, Embassy of the USA, Inter-American Development Bank, International Finance Corporation and WB



Agenda

- Reminder of the objectives of the mission and activities undertaken
- Mission findings per evaluation question and discussion
- Next steps

Evaluation Questions

EQ 1	Evolution of EC policies & programming
EQ 2	Strategic approach
EQ 3	Funding Vehicles and Modalities
EQ 4	Institutional and regulatory frameworks
EQ 5	Access to finance
EQ 6	Fostering enterprises competitiveness
EQ 7	Investment promotion
EQ 8	Employment
EQ 9	Commission added-value
EQ 10	Means provided

EQ1 – Evolution of Commission policies & programming

To what extent did the Commission's PSD strategy and programming take into account (1) the recommendations of the 2005 evaluation and (2) the evolution of the wider private sector context?

- The 2005 PSD evaluation was not known by EUD stakeholders interviewed, indication of lack of dissemination from HQ; Little evidence of a specific approach to sharing knowledge between Commission HQ and EUDs: indication of insufficiencies in institutional memory
- Overall assistance prompted by changes in PSD context; yet flexible approach to adapting assistance constrained by rigidity of EC procedures:
 - AMS Sugar prompted by combined effects of 2008 economic, change in EU pricing regime and end of preferential access under the EU Sugar Protocol and the privatisation process. In 2009, introduction of some changes in the approach and extending timetable for implementation;
 - EBSP, banana prompted by increased market competition and erosion of the preferential access. Shift in assistance away from "competitiveness improvement" to supporting economic diversification and social resilience
 - DRGEP in response to debt overhang (crowding out PS of bank lending), yet impossibility to include new conditions with the GBS (establishment of credit bureaux, on ease of doing business/paying taxes) due to current impasse with IMF agreement
 - PSDP: no adaptation to economic crisis: timing (ended in 2009) and difficulties in changing programmes. Discussions on whether to assist hard-hit tourism sector.
 - EPA Programme planned after signature in 2008 of EU-CARIFORUM EPA, to support compliance of agriculture and agribusiness exports with international quality standards.

EQ2 – Strategic approach

To what extent was Commission support to PSD part of a strategic approach geared towards the overall objectives of EU external policy, whilst aligning with the priorities of the country and maximizing its value added, including in terms of synergies with other actors and other types of Commission support?

- PSD was part of prioritized approach within broader country/regional strategy:
 - EC support to PSD clearly linked to growth creation and poverty reduction, in reaching the EU's cooperation objectives; Appreciated by stakeholders.
 - PSD support in relation to macro-economic stabilisation and debt reduction, as well as market liberalisation in frame of end of preferential access to EU market, EPA, and regional integration;
 - LT support to PSD, yet whilst a thread has existed since 5th EDF (Target Europe Programme>TDP> PSDP > EPA Prog; banana and sugar assistance programmes):
 - No seamless sequencing & insufficient cross-fertilisation/linkages between progs. which could have maximised impact (ie. SERP III included legislative reforms in PSD but no reference in PSDP; cluster under different progs).
 - No central PSD knowledge depositary capitalizing on past experiences in JAM and other countries.
 - Varying focus on export-oriented PSD over 8th to 10th EDF, with recognition that PSD positive for internal trade as well;

EQ2 – Strategic approach

- Evidence that diagnosis phase and identification of PSD needs & evolution not sufficient in some cases: under PSDP (despite consultation); in identifying conditions for GBS: vast consultation with other international actors and State bodies (as based on government policy), but little with private sector operators (banks, PSOs)
- Evidence of alignment to national priorities: pre-2004 National Industrial Policy considers PS as major source of growth & that employment lies in SMEs. Shared EC view.
- Policy dialogue in frame of GBS but limited under PSDP: missed opportunity?
- Consideration to potential VA and synergies in EC decision on nature of its support depends on area:
 - Other donors active in PSD proper, yet little coordination with similar mesoµ activities and some redundancies: USAID (clusters), IDB (micro-finance, access to finance); No specific donor thematic group nor PSD-specific donor strategy. Evidence of lack of capacity at NAO (PIOJ), some donors operating outside PIOJ;
 - Proper donor coordination on macro-economic support: under GBS, with IMF and IDB, use of IMF & IDB assessment.
- Little evidence of thorough consideration to cross-cutting issues (CCI) e.g gender, governance, environment, labour standards. On gender, need to contextualise to country gender specificities;
- Extent to which PSD has been mainstreamed in other sector support: in AMS, yet some evidence of lack of EC take-up of past results to build on; less under EUBSP as focus shifted to economic redeployment and social activities

3

EQ3 – Funding Vehicles and Modalities

To what extent did the set of Commission Funding Vehicles and Modalities for supporting PSD strategies and activities of partner countries and regions result in the provision of timely responses, at a reasonable cost, to the challenges faced by the private sector in third countries, whilst fostering synergies with each other and with instruments provided by other actors?

- Evidence of some rationale for choice of partic. funding vehicle/aid modality:
 - Shift to BS reflected general trend and instructions from HQ, as well as beneficiary's demands;
 - Some synergies bw. different funding vehicles/aid modalities but insufficient sequencing bw different PSD interventions, rather, a juxtaposition of opportunities; insufficient knowledge from EUD and beneficiaries on centralised operations;
 - Stakeholder confusion on modes to access different sources of EU funding (regional, national, centralised, decentralised) and selection criteria (eligibility)
- Evidence of delays in implementation due in part to aid modality/funding vehicle/procedures:
 - Elements of 9th EDF procedures ill-fitted to dynamic/risk-prone PSD – even counter-productive? Major disconnect between selection and procurement procedures (guarantee, 3 bids, cost-sharing, retroactivity, documentary requirements) and market realities, ie. basic PS/large informal sector (small business with limited capacities to apply for assistance)
 - Novelty of 9th EDF rules and insufficient capacity at JAMPRO/"hand-holding" underestimated; TA introduced late in process
 - Importance of PSPD (amounts, 12 components) – evidence that too large to manage

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EQ3 – Funding Vehicles and Modalities

- Under BS:
 - Powerful tool for macro-level I&R changes; more impact when underpinned by accompanying TA (IDB)
 - Improvements in monitoring of the meeting of the conditionalities and in the reporting for disbursement of tranches, TA introduced at MinFin in view of novelty of aid modality ;
 - Set targets for 4 years (as per initially designed) unlike IDB and WB policy-based loans where targets renegotiated annually; balance between managing changes in needs/context and maintaining strong, long-term objectives.

EQ4 – Institutional and regulatory frameworks

To what extent did the Commission contribute to making the institutional and regulatory (I&R) framework more conducive to PSD?

- I&R support under:
 - the DRGEP/GBS in order to support the business environment, specifically the cost of borrowing and standardizing the way to create a business, tax reform; ultimately to improve WB 'doing business ranking'. Preceded by previous BS "Support to the Economic Reform Programme (SERP)"
 - some PSDP components (Competitiv. Committee, Support to BSOs and their lobbying activities; Brand Jamaica; the "one-stop shop" policy)
- In terms of needs analysis and design:
 - Under DRGEP:
 - Little evidence of prior diagnostic studies: under GBS, conditions based on MTF and discussions with international actors, and little evidence of structured dialogue with private sector (banks, PSOs);
 - Policy dialogue considered as key under GBS to discuss strategy-level issues
 - Under PSDP: little information on design of I&R activities. Less access to government under project-approach, despite high-level steering committee.

EQ4 – Institutional and regulatory frameworks

To what extent did the Commission contribute to making the institutional and regulatory (I&R) framework more conducive to PSD?

- On results of I&R reforms:
 - Two variables tranches of DRGEP released: BS effective instrument yet full ownership of reform process if some conditions achieved through other donor assistance support, as reported?;
 - Comments that I&R (ie. Business enabling environment) needed addressing before meso and micro-level interventions such as PSDP or TDP;
 - Some policies documents developed by JAMPRO under PSDP but lack of information on status (enactment, implementation?)
 - Little evidence so far of impact on private sector base (end beneficiary),

EQ5 – Access to finance

To what extent did the Commission contribute to improving enterprises' access to finance?

- "Access to finance" support under:
 - Two components under PSDP: "Corporate Finance Broker" and "Mutual Guarantee Company"; some support to both supply and demand sides;
 - EU-ACP MicroFinance Programme: some focus on constraints of microenterprises
 - No EIB involvement (despite being foreseen under 9th EDF) partly due to over-liquidity of financial system
- Other actors more involved in "access to finance" (IDB, USAID)?
- No evidence of overall strategic approach to addressing constraints to access to finance (targeting, supply/demand-side). EU-ACP MicroFinance Evaluation found:
 - Lack of study on the demand for loans in Caribbean region. A key issue, as the capacity-building component aimed at developing microcredit products with select MFIs,
 - Lack of evaluation of legal and regulatory framework for microfinance, needed to estimate whether this environment would be enabling for the sector, and to decide on potential actions at this level.

EQ5 – Access to finance

To what extent did the Commission contribute to improving enterprises' access to finance?

- On results of “access to finance” support:
 - Under PSDP:
 - Mixed evidence on “Corporate Finance Broker” (also question on ratio n° of dossiers supported/n° of loans enabled); little targeting of enterprises with most difficult access to finance;
 - Feasibility Study on “Mutual Guarantee Company” not used;
 - The EU-ACP MicroFinance programme:
 - Positive: built capacity of MFIs in their financial activities (risk assessment, cleaning their portfolio (delinquency)) yet less evidence of trickle-down effect to MSMEs;
 - Caveat: Priority was given to micro-credit, whereas real needs might have been on other microfinance products (e.g. savings) notably for cooperatives.
 - Stumbling block of banks unused to doing retail banking, especially with SMEs

EQ6 – Fostering enterprises' competitiveness

To what extent did the Commission contribute to enterprises' - in particular SMEs' – improved ability to compete and to access technology and new markets?

- Support to “companies' competitiveness” under:
 - Banana and sugar assistance: diversification and improved productivity end objectives
 - DRGEP: rationalisation measures for public bodies/SOEs & privatisation/divestment from debt-creating public bodies (Air Jamaica and Sugar Company)
 - PSDP/TDP/EPA programme: end objectives
- On the approach:
 - Evidence of choice to build capacity of local BDS market over direct provision of BDS: clear shift between TDR and PSDP (shift to grants under calls for proposals)
 - Evidence of lack of systematic/formalised needs/context analyses with impact on selection of implementing partner/end beneficiary selection: JAMPRO instead of PSOs specialised in MSMEs?, check capacity to deliver/agenda; more fundamentally, challenge of choice to support PS through the (weaker?) public sector; conflict of interest implementing partner/beneficiary of some activities (bias in selection); lack of incentives/requirements to improve coordination with PSOs in Jamaica;
 - EC guidelines & procedures constraints in selection of a PSO as implementing partner (EPA prog.)?

EQ6 – Fostering enterprises' competitiveness

To what extent did Commission support contribute to increased cross-border investment in partner countries' private sectors?

- On the results:
 - PSDP: Mixed evidence, opportunity insufficiently harnessed: evidence that direct implementing partners strengthened, insufficient trickle-down to private sector base
 - Some IOs' capacity-building yet sustainability questions: strong at JAMPRO& less ar JBDC, missed opportunity for smaller BSOs and PSOs although improvements reported; also issue of sustainability of outputs in context of public sector cuts (BIPs/EC, clusters)
 - enterprises' capacity & ability to access markets, finance, new technology, know-how: unsystematically monitored. Unclear results in terms of increased exports. Loss of focus of the end objective in view of programme's potential?
 - Banana: improvements since 1999 in productivity, quality and diversification but 5 consecutive hurricanes prompted shift in focus away from global market to local one.

EQ7 – Investment promotion

To what extent did Commission support contribute to increased cross-border investment in partner countries' private sectors?

- Less focus in PSD assistance to investment promotion: Support at regional level, mostly capacity-building of regional IOs, through:
 - CAIPA (€2.2m, through PROINVEST), support to investment promotion agencies, their networking activities, and creation of a regional identity,
 - Support to CASME, and creation of its website
- Little information on the use of investment needs analysis at enterprise and country level
- No information on results in terms of:
 - IO capacity-building: study tours reported, little information on status of other activities under CAIPA
 - SMEs access to FDI, investment flows, technological transfer

EQ8 – Employment

To what extent has the Commission PSD support contributed to facilitating the generation of employment?

- Generation of employment not a explicit objective of EC PSD support over 2004-2010: few employment-specific indicators, indication that employment issues (labour standards, CSR) were not mainstreamed into PSD support.
- DRGEP impact on employment and formalisation, in view of 2 following conditionalities (1) business application reform process and (2) debt divestment from debt-creating entities.
- Evidence of lack of reporting on number of job creation (more on sales).
- No focus on formalisation of the economy and of its impact on employment. Informal sector mainly made up of one-to-few people businesses.

EQ9 – Commission added-value

What was the Commission's added value (AV) when providing support to PSD in third countries?

- Types of added-value of Commission PSD support not specifically highlighted in documentation
- Evidence that insufficient assessment of market to determine EC additionality to what is available
- Types of AV reported:
 - Financial weight: largest grant donor,
 - Only grant donor for BS
 - Historical relationship and deriving 'expectations': banana and sugar assistance related to end of preferential access gave EU/EC a role in assisting the sectors – considered than no other assistance would have been available
- AV insufficiently leveraged:
 - In view of largest grant donor position, evidence of insufficient coordination with other international actors in PSD: IDB, USAID, which are few
 - Variety of PSD support (centralised/bilateral support, regional/national levels) yet evidence of lack of clarity of how to access, and cumbersome application processes reported

EQ10 – Means provided

To what extent were the Commission's organisational set-up and management practices fit to a successful implementation of its PSD support?

- Evidence of devolution's positive effects (improved contacts in field, policy dialogue) yet evidence of problems resulting from manner in which devolution was implemented, notably the disconnect with centralised operations: unsystematic or late prior consultation of EUD; lack of information on CDE/PROINVEST activities, insufficient linkages/synergies with bilateral assistance
- Limited evidence of use of PSD tools and guidance in design & implementation of support: minors exchange with thematic unit at DEVCO, iQSG process considered as formal with limited AV. Some evidence of reliance on personal experience rather than capitalisation body of experience collected worldwide (vs. USAID) or on past experiences in country?
- On M&E of assistance:
 - Evidence of H&R stretched for proper, regular monitoring assistance going beyond checking quarterly, mostly quantitative, reports (project visits- IDB) – ratio project officer/number of projects managed/financial volumes?
 - PSDP steering committee: power balance against EC? Yet extensive dialogue and EC insistence on not losing focus of end beneficiaries reported
- On technical skills (vs. USAID/IDB): extensive use of external consultants in design of assistance, in checking GBS conditionalities. Also lengthy HQ consultation for decision-taking.

Agenda

- **Reminder of the objectives of the mission and activities undertaken**
- **Mission findings per evaluation question and discussion**
- **Next steps**

Next Steps

- **End of June** Finalisation of field missions & compilation of findings
- **July** Presentation of Field Phase to the Reference Group
- **July – August** Synthesis phase
- **End August** Submission of Draft Final Report
- **End September** Submission of Final Report

Evaluation of the European Commission's support to private sector development in third countries (2004-2010)

Country mission to Jordan

Debriefing to the EU Delegation

Amman, 21 June 2012



*This document is designed as support to the oral presentation
and is not intended to be used separately*

Objectives

Objectives of today's debriefing

- Provide an overview of the mission activities & findings
- Have a discussion on mission findings
- Provide information on next steps

Agenda

- **Reminder of the objectives of the mission and activities undertaken**
- **Mission findings per evaluation question and discussion**
- **Next steps**



3

Evaluation subject, purpose and scope


Subject	Evaluation of the European Commission's (EC) support to private sector development (PSD) in third countries (strategy-level, multi-country)
Purpose	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide an overall independent assessment of EC's past and current support to PSD • Identify key lessons for improving the EC's strategies and programmes
Scope	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • All types of PSD support, excl. trade-related assistance • Overall EC support, not country- or instrument-specific • All third countries, except OECD & DG ENLARG countries • All EC funding vehicles & modalities • 2004-2010

**This is an evaluation of the Commission's overall support to PSD
 It is not an evaluation of the support at country level as such**

Source: Terms of Reference



4



Why did we select Jordan?

Jordan

Jordan...

... is the **4th largest recipient** of direct Commission support to PSD (cf. inventory)

... **1st largest recipient in Mediterranean region**, which itself represents the largest share of Commission support to PSD by region

... beneficiary of **PSD support across various fields:**

- support to access to finance; to investment promotion to increase competitiveness; to micro-enterprises; to improving enterprises' management and organisation;
- Sector Budget Support** relating to PSD


We focused on 2 interventions:

- EJADA (2000-2005)
- Sector Reform Facility (2005-2010) – *sector budget support*

but also consideration of the PSD portfolio in Jordan as a whole

Objective: collect information to feed into the overall thematic evaluation (and not to evaluate aid to a specific project or country)

ADE 6



Commission interventions in PSD in Jordan

Commission PSD interventions in Jordan, 2004-2010

Decision year	Decision number	Decision amount	BS?
1999	EJADA / Industrial Modernisation Programme (IMP)	45 m€	
2001	SRRP (Support for Regulatory Reform and Privatisation)	20 m€	
2002	AZESA (Institutional Support to Aqaba Special Economic Zone Authority)	10 m€	
2005	SRF (Sector Reform Facility)	40 m€	SBS
2006	SRTD (Support to Research & Technological Development & Innovation)	5 m€	
2007	SMP (Services Modernisation Programme)	15 m€	SBS
2008	SEED / JUMP II (Support to Enterprise & Export Dev.)	15 m€	
Grand Total		150 m€	

+ **Regional programme activities** (not much)
 + **DG ENTR activities**, e.g. Euro-Med Charter for Enterprises
 + **FEMIP operations** (loans, risk capital, TA)

ADE 8

Interlocutors met during mission

- **EU Delegation**
- **Ministries:**
 - MoPIC (Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation)
 - MoIT (Ministry of Industry and Trade)
- **Business Support Organisations:**
 - JEDCO (Jordan Enterprise Development Corporation)
 - Jordan Chamber of Industry (+ Amman Chamber of Industry)
 - EJADI (Euro-Jordanian Advanced Business Institute)
 - JLGC (Jordan Loan Guarantee Corporation)
 - JIB (Jordan Investment Board)
- **Financial institutions:**
 - Bank of Jordan
- **SME:**
 - National Stationary Industries
- **PSD experts:**
 - Nasser Shraideh
 - Yusuf Mansur

Agenda

- **Reminder of the objectives of the mission and activities undertaken**
- **Mission findings per evaluation question and discussion**
- **Next steps**

Evaluation Questions

EQ 1	Evolution of EC policies & programming
EQ 2	Strategic approach
EQ 3	Funding Vehicles and Modalities
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EQ1 – Evolution of Commission policies & programming (1/2)

To what extent did the Commission's PSD strategy and programming take into account (1) the recommendations of the 2005 evaluation and (2) the evolution of the wider private sector context?

- The background / justification section of the EJADA (1999) and SRF FAs indicate general **EC awareness of the evolution of the PS in Jordan**
- **Few changes in EC interventions owing to changing context**
 - Changes in EJADA, but mainly to improve its sustainability
 - SBS conditions not changed (SRF), despite indications of refinement needs
 - No specific changes in programmes following global financial & economic crisis since 2008
- **Little evidence of thorough consultation and involvement of private sector** (financial sector and enterprises/BSOs) in defining EC strategy and interventions
 - *Note. Not easy to recall design period of some programmes (up to 1999)*
 - MoPIC / MoIT consultative council with BSOs.

EQ1 – Evolution of Commission policies & programming (2/2)

- **Limited awareness of the 2005 PSD evaluation** and its recommendations
 - Little memory on whether recomm. have been considered in programmes' design
- **Limited use of the COM(2003) 267 and subsequent PSD Guidelines**
 - Little evidence of use of PSD-specific studies / diagnostics in early EC strategies and programmes.
 - Nevertheless, BST project contributed to design EJADA, and EJADA contributed to design SRF

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EQ2 – Strategic approach (1/2)

To what extent was Commission support to PSD part of a strategic approach geared towards the overall objectives of EU external policy, whilst aligning with the priorities of the country and maximizing its value added, including in terms of synergies with other actors and other types of Commission support?

- **The underlying strategic element for the EC's actions in PSD in Jordan is the market liberalisation** relating to the progressive entry into force of the EU-Jordan free trade market (cf. 2002 Association Agreement)
 - Strong links between PSD and Trade in EC approach to Jordan
 - In line with EU external policy objectives for Med. countries, mainly in terms of economic development and progressive creation of Euro-Med. free trade area;
- **The main strategy document consists of the AA (1997) and the five-year EU-Jordan Action Plans** in 2005 and 2010 (cf. ENP)
 - **Jointly defined priorities in Action Plans**; aligned with Jordan's policies & strategies (Vision 2020, National Agenda)
 - These action plans are translated into specific strategic actions and corresponding budgets through the **CSP/NIP**.

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EQ2 – Strategic approach (2/2)

- **EC strategic plan in terms of trade liberalisation, but not specifically for PSD**
 - A progressive approach in PSD could indeed make sense
 - But shortcoming in logic of sequencing of activities owe probably to the lack of a well-thought strategic plan (*e.g. guarantees before credit bureaux, cf. EQ4*)
 - A comprehensive SME strategy is only being designed now with the GoJ, based on acquired experience
- **EC PSD support (focusing on enterprise competitiveness) leveraged on its mandate for trade matters (AA), more than on EC expertise in this field**
 - Alignment on Jordan priorities
- **Structured coordination with other donors decreasing over time** owing to weak Gov steering, but compensated by bilateral contacts.
 - Few examples raised of successful or unsuccessful coordination (incl. with EU MS and USAID AMIR/SABEQ) – *caveat: no other donors met*
 - Strong coherence with EIB on venture capital (see EQ3)
- **Visibility of the programme towards local SMEs was a key ingredient** for the success of the EJADA programme (and rightly so) - *€1m envelope*
- **CCIs and Decent Work Agenda have not been actively considered** in programme design and implementation

EQ3 – Funding Vehicles and Modalities (1/3)

To what extent did the set of Commission Funding Vehicles and Modalities for supporting PSD strategies and activities of partner countries and regions result in the provision of timely responses, at a reasonable cost, to the challenges faced by the private sector in third countries, whilst fostering synergies with each other and with instruments provided by other actors?

- **PSD funding vehicles** in Jordan: bilateral cooperation, FEMIP (RC & TA), DG ENTR
 - No global approach at country level encompassing all funding vehicles
 - Set of EC funding vehicles address important PSD support needs
 - Strong EC-EIB coherence in terms of venture capital – cf. EIB SME VC Funds
 - But issue of logical sequencing
 - Few other examples of coordination among EC funding vehicles
- **PSD aid modalities** in Jordan: programme approach + SBS (see next slide)
- **PSD financial and non-financial instruments in Jordan:** Grants, loans, TA, Risk capital
 - **TA, knowledge transfer** and other types of **non-financial support** much appreciated
 - **Direct grants to SMEs** also much appreciated by EC and (top-end) SME met
 - (*EIB on operations in Jordan: Meetings in Luxembourg on 25-26 June*)

EQ3 – Funding Vehicles and Modalities (2/3)

- **Effective and sustainable results in PSD seemingly stronger under EC's programme-approach vs. SBS in Jordan:**
 - *Programme-approach (e.g. EJADA):*
 - Demonstration effect → highly visible successes of EJADA acted as impetus for PSD in the country (for SMEs, BSOs, Gov, etc.)
 - Demand-driven TA and non-financial support → state-of-the-art expertise and benchmarks
 - Evidence of sustainability & ownership of (several) results
 - Several stakeholders regretted non-continuation of successful EJADA
 - *SBS (e.g. SRF):*
 - Decision for SBS approach originated at EC HQ in compliance with general EU policy / trends / regulations, rather than local effectiveness considerations
 - Completion of all but one conditions for disbursement
 - But little evidence of long-standing results and impact
 - Relatively vague conditions, focusing on activities vs. results/impact and with lack of follow-up in respect of BS conditions
 - E.g. Credit Information System condition met, but no credit bureau yet
 - Evidence of some outputs created just for meeting SBS conditions

EQ3 – Funding Vehicles and Modalities (3/3)

- **EC approach for PSD channelled through public sector.**
 - B2B approach to PSD insufficiently exploited, although important for trade objective
- **PSD support mainly at national level (which makes sense in Jordan/Med.)**
 - Regional PSD support: mainly through (EIB) FEMIP
- **EC rules & procedures became counter-productive for support to local SMEs**
 - No issue reported in early programme (1999 EJADA at the contrary introduced simplified procedures vs. earlier programmes), but SMEs faced many difficulties for later programme-approach interventions (2008 SEED/JUMP II), due to the 2003 Financial Regulation (post-Santer Commission + working through national institutions, no PMUs anymore)
 - Accountability on process & procedures took overwhelming priority on accountability on results
 - Lengthy, costly, complex + not in Arabic → **counter-productive:**
 - refrained SMEs to apply; rejected SME applications for administrative issues; provided support too late; made support received to complex to use; etc.
 - hampered in particular less sophisticated SMEs (smaller, outside of Amman)
 - Current standard template on procedures designed for NGOs etc., no derogations/adaptation to peculiarities of (third country) SMEs

EQ4 – Institutional and regulatory frameworks (1/2)

To what extent did the Commission contribute to making the institutional and regulatory (I&R) framework more conducive to PSD?

- **EC tackled important institutional and regulatory obstacles to PSD in Jordan**
 - In principle institutional and regulatory reforms stand out for their sustainability effects
- **Institutional build-up**
 - EC strengthened several national BSOs (public sector JEDCO and JIB, and several PS BSOs)
 - But Chambers of Commerce and Industry with general coverage were missed
 - EC contributed to the establishment of Competition Directorate (with TA)
 - EC contributed to capacity-building of Ministry of Industry & Trade

EQ4 – Institutional and regulatory frameworks (2/2)

- **Policy and regulatory reforms/improvements:**
 - EC addressed financial infrastructure: introduction of credit bureau (although no one exist as of today)
 - EC contributed to drafting laws and strategies: e.g.:
 - Competition Law (under EJADA),
 - Investment Promotion Law (expected in 2012)
 - National SME Strategy (currently being prepared)
 - But unclear whether EC addressed company registration process (as envisaged)
 - Progress was obtained through both technical support (TA) and policy dialogue (EU Delegation)
- **No comprehensive survey exists yet on impact of institutional and regulatory reforms on the creation, better functioning and growth of enterprises attributable to EC support.** However, WB 2012 Doing Business is relatively positive overall:
“Jordan is another Arab economy that has made substantial progress toward the frontier. Since 2005 it has implemented 14 regulatory reforms in areas covered by Doing Business”

EQ5 – Access to finance (1/2)

To what extent did the Commission contribute to improving enterprises' access to finance?

- **Banks' reluctance to take SME risks is unusually pronounced in Jordan**
 - Difficulties in addressing this issue in EJADA's design, reportedly → no strong A2F approach
- **Short review of A2F needs in EC preparation documents, but no evidence of comprehensive needs diagnostic**
 - EC dialogue with financial institutions appears very limited
 - Little evidence of thorough consultation and involvement of private sector (financial and sector and industry) in defining EC strategy and interventions
- **Several EC actions relating to A2F in EC cooperation, although no global strategic approach**, in terms of fields covered and sequence
 - Some A2F constraints addressed in two large successive programmes (EJADA and SRF), but with shortcomings in logical sequencing
 - E.g. Supporting infrastructure such as credit bureaux should have preceded (and not come after) risk-mitigating mechanisms such as guarantee funds
 - EC services to SMEs in formulating business plans helped SMEs submitting bankable proposals, although no clear analysis of this was found.

EQ5 – Access to finance (2/2)

- **Little result of EC support in A2F in terms of:**
 - **credit bureaux** (no one established yet)
 - **banks (departments) for SMEs** (reportedly no single bank targeting SMEs)
 - **export credit services** (not established yet)
 - **loan guarantees:** some evidence, though limited, that (top-end) SMEs have obtained loans due to the guarantee scheme, that would otherwise have not materialised
 - **But positive results expected from EC/EIB venture capital activities**
- **Little impact: A2F remains a key concern for SMEs in the country**
 - Reported by studies and several types of interlocutors
 - E.g. Jordan in WB Doing Business 2012 report: "Getting credit" : 150th/183 countries (vs. Jordan average for "Ease of doing business": 96th/183)

EQ6 – Fostering enterprises' competitiveness

To what extent did the Commission contribute to enterprises' - in particular SMEs' – improved ability to compete and to access technology and new markets?

- **Enterprises' competitiveness was the heart of the Commission's support to PSD to Jordan**, in the context of trade liberalisation (cf. AA)
- **Little evidence of a comprehensive analysis of SME preparedness to trade liberalisation**, except for a few ad hoc studies
- **Direct financial + non-financial support to SMEs considered very useful for upgrading SMEs**
 - E.g. TA, vocational training, etc. for capacity-building
 - E.g. Direct grants to SMES (SEEP) considered particularly useful for upgrading
 - E.g. Jordan's accession to EU-Mediterranean Charter for Enterprise
- **But B2B approach not sufficiently exploited**, which would focus on final PSD-Trade objectives (e.g. exports and FDI) – incl. twinning, sectoral clusters, etc.
- **Key BSOs supported/used are now considered effective in the country** (e.g. JEDCO, EJABI, smaller BSOs – but Chambers of industry/commerce missed)
- **Several indications that SME exports increased (to US, Arab c.), but not to EU**
 - Major obstacles reported: EU rules of origin + technical standards & specifications

EQ7 – Investment promotion

To what extent did Commission support contribute to increased cross-border investment in partner countries' private sectors?

- **The EC has supported investment promotion in Jordan in several ways:**
 - Investment Promotion was an important part of SRF SBS
 - Support to Jordan's IPO (2010): €0.8m for development of JIB's strategic plan
 - JIB's CRM reports significant impact on overall FDI (not EU specific)
 - Some workshops, etc. as part of larger EC PSD programmes
 - Venture capital funds (growth and early-stage equity) have investment mobilisation in part
 - JIB benefited from regional B2B programme (but not very successfully)
 - Note. Regional MEDA-INVEST programme frozen following management issues
- **Direct results from this support include the drafting of the Investment Promotion Law (expected in 2012) and JIB's strategic plan**, but there is little evidence yet whether activities undertaken have resulted in an increase in domestic and foreign investment.
- **Lack of strong B2B approach in Jordan = key shortcoming in EC "PSD for Trade" approach** according to several interlocutors
 - contributed to lack of impact on exports to EU and EU FDI

EQ8 – Employment

To what extent has the Commission PSD support contributed to facilitating the generation of employment?

- **Strategic focus for PSD in Jordan (EC + Gov) on enterprise competitiveness rather than on employment** during evaluation period 2004-2010
 - Employment was rather a result of enterprise upgrading than a clear target (e.g. in selection of beneficiary enterprises)
 - Employment became a clear priority for Jordan Gov. since Arab Spring (2010)
 - E.g. generation of employment now a major objective for JIB (important selection criteria for exemptions and incentives)
- **No monitoring of EC effect on employment → unclear impact on employment** of key EC programmes (e.g. EJADA, SRF, etc.)
- **No evidence of specific support for transition of entrepreneurs from the informal to the formal sector**, which would benefit to employees (social security, etc)

EQ9 – Commission added-value (1/2)

What was the Commission's added value (AV) when providing support to PSD in third countries?

- **EC PSD support leveraged on its mandate for trade matters (AA)**, more than on EC expertise in this field (*cf. EQ2*)
- **EC widely acclaimed for having created a national impetus for PSD:**
 - Tangible results from a successful programme (EJADA)
 - Incentives for fast-tracked progress on PSD (SRF)
- **EC approach for PSD was based on VA of grant funding**
 - E.g. TA for capacity-building of MoIT, BSOs and SMEs
 - E.g. Both financial and non-financial support
 - Non-financial support example: know-how on jump-starting incubators
 - E.g. Venture Capital Funds with EIB for growth and ICT
 - E.g. Subsidising guarantee schemes (*a kind of blending mechanism*)
 - But issues with EC management of such schemes: €6m handed over to corporation after 5-year programme closure, without any conditionality or follow-up

EQ9 – Commission added-value (2/2)

- **EC approach for PSD was delivered through the public sector** (except EJADA's PMU), **with clear effect in terms of sustainability**
 - Institutional building / sustainability was widely recognised as a key dimension and differentiating factor of EC VA (vs. USAID for instance): e.g. JEDCO, EJABI, JIB, smaller BSOs
 - But lack of strong B2B approach (*cf. EQ6*)
- **Some specific EC aid modalities (BS) and rules & procedures were however detrimental** to the effectiveness of its support to PSD (*cf. EQ 3*)

EQ10 – Means provided

To what extent were the Commission's organisational set-up and management practices fit to a successful implementation of its PSD support?

- **Devolution facilitated implementation of Commission PSD support**
- **Little coordination with DG ENTR**
- **Lack of institutional knowledge depository on PSD within the EC:**
 - No clear resources centre/person on PSD at the EC
 - Lack of comprehensive and state-of-the-art PSD diagnostics and practices
 - PSD guidelines not used by PSD-experienced staff
 - PSD programme designs do not systematically capitalise on acquired EC experience
 - Variable quality of feedback from QSG
 - HR practices hampering building strong in-house PSD experts; uneven quality of external consultants due to FWC BENE (and predecessors') process & procedures
- **EU Delegation PSD staff dedicating most time to implementation vs. strategy, design, evaluation, etc.**
 - e.g. EJADA evaluation conducted 5 years after programme closure

Agenda

- Reminder of the objectives of the mission and activities undertaken
- Mission findings per evaluation question and discussion
- Next steps



Next Steps

- **End of June** Finalisation of field missions & compilation of findings
- **July** Presentation of Field Phase to the Reference Group
- **July – August** Synthesis phase
- **End August** Submission of Draft Final Report
- **End September** Submission of Final Report



Evaluation of the European Commission's support to private sector development in third countries (2004-2010)

Country mission to Kenya

Debriefing to the EU Delegation

Nairobi, 8 June 2012



*This document is designed as support to the oral presentation
and is not intended to be used separately*

Objectives



Objectives of today's debriefing

- Provide an overview of the mission activities & findings
- Have a discussion on mission findings
- Provide information on next steps

ADE

Agenda

- **Reminder of the objectives of the mission and activities undertaken**
- **Mission findings per evaluation question and discussion**
- **Next steps**

3

ADE

Evaluation subject, purpose and scope



(Reminder)

Subject	Evaluation of the European Commission's (EC) support to private sector development (PSD) in third countries (strategy-level, multi-country)
Purpose	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide an overall independent assessment of EC's past and current support to PSD • Identify key lessons for improving the EC's strategies and programmes
Scope	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • All types of PSD support, excl. trade-related assistance • Overall EC support, not country- or instrument-specific • All third countries, except OECD & DG ENLARG countries • All EC funding vehicles & modalities • 2004-2010

This is an evaluation of the Commission's overall support to PSD
It is not an evaluation of the support at country level as such

Source: Terms of Reference

4



ADE

Why we selected Kenya

Kenya
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Hosts 3 interventions in our inventory of direct support to PSD, and is within the top half of EDF-eligible countries by contracted amounts for direct support. Each of these interventions fall under a different category: support for SMEs in the form of non-financial services; support to governments to improve the institutional and regulatory framework; support to improve enterprise management and organisation Hosts the regional headquarters of the European Investment Bank and the headquarters of the Centre for Development of Enterprise Private sector development is included as a non-focal sector in the Kenyan CSP under 10th EDF. <p>Focus on 3 interventions, within the portfolio:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> EU/ACP Microfinance Programme grant to K-Rep Development Agency (FED/2003/016-400) Assistance to Micro and Small Enterprises (FED/2007/018-893) Support to Kenya Private Sector Development (FED/2009/021-656)
Objective is to collect information to feed into the overall thematic evaluation (and not to evaluate aid to a specific project or country)

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EC private sector development support in Kenya

(Reminder)

Management modality	PSD-related interventions	Duration	Contracted Amount
Managed by DEVCO	EU/ACP Microfinance Programme grant funding for K-Rep Development Agency (CRIS FED/2003/016-400)	2006-2009	€0.3m
Managed by the EUD	Assistance to Micro and Small Enterprises (FED/2007/018-893)	2007-2012	€6.2m
	Support to Kenya Private Sector Development Policy (FED/2009/021-656)	2010-2013	€4.3m
Other EU interventions	The Centre for Development of Enterprise	2005-2010	€0.85m
	ProInvest	2002-2011	€0.14m (exc. Reg.)
TOTAL AMOUNT CONTRACTED:			ca.€11.79m

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Activities undertaken during the mission

(Reminder)

From Monday 4 June to Friday 8 June

- June 4: **Briefing** at EUD and first interviews
- Day 5 to 7: **Interviews with Stakeholders**
 - **EUD officials:** Trade section, Rural Development section
 - **GoK:** Ministry of Trade
 - **EU/international donors active in PSD:** EIB, IFC, DFID, CDE, Donor Group
 - **Implementing partners:** ASMEP, MESPT, K-REP Development Agency
 - **Private sector actors/representatives:** KAM, KIM, Institute of Quantity Surveyors
- **Day 5: Debriefing** at EUD
- **Still pending:** interview with the PSDS

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Agenda

- **Reminder of the objectives of the mission and activities undertaken**
- **Mission findings per evaluation question and discussion**
- **Next steps**

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Evaluation Questions		
<i>(Reminder)</i>		
#	EQ Title	Evaluation Criteria & Key issues
EQ 1	Evolution of EC policies & programming	Relevance, coherence, 3Cs
EQ 2	Strategic approach	Relevance, coherence, added-value
EQ 3	Instruments and modalities	Efficiency, 3Cs, coherence
EQ 4	Institutional and regulatory frameworks	Effectiveness, impact, sustainability
EQ 5	Access to finance	Effectiveness, relevance, sustainability
EQ 6	Fostering enterprises competitiveness	Effectiveness, impact, sustainability, CCI
EQ 7	Investment promotion	Effectiveness, sustainability, CCI
EQ 8	Employment	Effectiveness, sustainability, CCI
EQ 9	Commission added-value	Added-value, 3Cs, CCI
EQ 10	Means provided	Effectiveness, efficiency, 3Cs

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EQ1 – Evolution of Commission policies & programming

To what extent did the Commission's PSD strategy and programming take into account (1) the recommendations of the 2005 evaluation and (2) the evolution of the wider private sector context?

- Starting point: **the 2005 PSD evaluation was not systematically and pro-actively disseminated to the EUDs**
- **EUD pushed for an increasing focus on the role of PSD**, (diagnostic analyses in the I&R reform process)
- Nevertheless, in terms of specific interventions, stakeholders argued that **EDF procedures imposed constraints on responding to evolving needs**
- **Delays and time constraints made it harder to include strategic thinking in terms of the evolving private sector context**

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EQ2 – Strategic approach

To what extent was Commission support to PSD part of a strategic approach geared towards the overall objectives of EU external policy, whilst aligning with the priorities of the country and maximizing its VA, incl. in terms of synergies with other actors and other types of Commission support?

- Good evidence of country-level strategic focus on I&R reforms
- Majority of stakeholders viewed PSD support as very well aligned to national priorities and the Vision 2030 strategy
- Good evidence of coordination with other donors over implementation period, but little evidence of coordination gearing the design of PSD support
- Little evidence that the Commission designed its support with a view to exploit its potential added value
- Decent work agenda and cross cutting issues not emphasised in PSD programming
- Several EC policies & guidelines aimed to embed PSD support in a broader strategic approach, but evidence found that operational guidance was not known at the EUD level (e.g. the PSD Guidelines 2003)

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EQ3 – Funding Vehicles and Modalities

To what extent did the set of Commission Funding Vehicles and Modalities for supporting PSD strategies and activities of partner countries and regions result in the provision of timely responses, at a reasonable cost, to the challenges faced by the private sector in third countries, whilst fostering synergies with each other and with instruments provided by other actors?

- Channeling support through GoK appeared to be neither efficient nor effective, specific concerns were raised about the project management capacity of MoT
- Channeling support with other donors (as financing partner) yielded good results, where the EUD played an active steering and guiding role
- Fragmented support PSD in Kenya, lacking a single strategic framework for PSD support. Incoherence between strategy and implementation due to delays between the Country Strategy Paper signature and programme implementation
- The nature of the funding implied an absence of direct interactions with PS

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EQ4 – Institutional and regulatory frameworks



To what extent did the Commission contribute to making the institutional and regulatory (I&R) framework more conducive to PSD?

- Overall, **the contribution of the Commission has been viewed as encouraging and conducive to PSD**
- Reform programme was well aligned to national priorities and Vision 2030 and the sharing of responsibility between public and private sectors
- **Focus on I&R reform by the EUD aimed at building institutional ownership and improve governance and accountability**
- EUD played a guiding and active role and emphasised areas of focus
- I&R programme with IFC was viewed as adequate by stakeholders
- In terms of results, **the IFC calculated cost savings of more than USD100m to private sector as a result of I&R reform programme** (much of this is the result of joint support, not just the EU)

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EQ5 – Access to finance



To what extent did the Commission contribute to improving enterprises' access to finance?

- **EUD views access to finance as well covered by DFID**
- Stakeholders felt that results were constrained by limited funding allocations
- **Where access to finance was targeted, results were visible, e.g., the grant to K-Rep Development Agency** (EU ACP Microfinance Programme)
- **Focus on access to finance in rural areas was viewed by stakeholders as a unique feature of EU support**, as compared to other donors (ASMEP and K-Rep Development Agency)
- However, **limited evidence found of trickle-down to the micro-level**

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EQ6 – Fostering enterprises' competitiveness



To what extent did the Commission contribute to enterprises' - in particular SMEs' – improved ability to compete and to access technology and new markets?

- **No indication of focus or systematic needs analyses to provide support to fostering private sector competitiveness**
- No direct interaction between Commission and private sector actors, unlike other members of the donor community
- **Private sector does not have a clear perception of the role played by the Commission in the support to PSD & improving enterprise competitiveness**
- **Channelling support to private sector through ministries rather than individual enterprises reduced visibility of Commission support in private sector eyes**
- Close informal coordination between PSD and DG TRADE sections at EUD level, in terms of PS access to markets, but no formal mechanism present

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EQ7 – Investment promotion



To what extent did Commission support contribute to increased cross-border investment in partner countries' private sectors?

- Overall, **very limited financial contribution for investment promotion**
- **Focus on investment promotion was primarily at institutional level** (the special economic zones component of Investment Kenya Investment Climate Programme with the liability to attract domestic and foreign investments)
- No focus on investment promotion at enterprise level

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EQ8 – Employment

To what extent has the Commission PSD support contributed to facilitating the generation of employment?

- Stakeholders emphasised the importance of the private sector in generating employment as a source for stability, given the high rate of youth unemployment
- Internally to the EUD, this point is not recognised or supported
- In general, employment creation was a concern in the support provided by the EU
- Employment effects of PSD support were not monitored
- Evidence found that other employment issues (decent work agenda, labour standards, CSR) were dealt with by social section at EUD level, rather than integrated in PSD support
- Re. formalisation of informal economy, evidence suggests that the intention was there (ASMEP) at level of individual projects, but the results were lacking and no strategic approach was taken

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EQ9 – Commission added-value

What was the Commission's added value (AV) when providing support to PSD in third countries?

- Perceptions of VA varies according to the stakeholders
- VA at strategic level was recognised by stakeholders in:
 - Providing guidance and insights at institutional level
 - Bringing experience on governance and accountability
 - Focusing on cross cutting issues
- For the donor partners, the EU has been an influential instrument, over the last years, in focusing on the importance of the private sector development
- PS does not have a strong perception, if any, of Commission added value, due to absence of interaction at the micro level
- No indication of specific added value concerning blending of grants and loans, or the leverage potential of EC funding

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EQ10 – Means provided



To what extent were the Commission's organisational set-up and management practices fit to a successful implementation of its PSD support?

- **Devolution** was perceived as a positive step by stakeholders, in respect of improving:
 - Proximity to stakeholders;
 - Flexibility and responsiveness in decision-making; *and*
 - Interaction with the development partners.
- However, limited awareness of devolution among EUD staff
- Some stakeholders argued that quality of projects and speed of approvals has increased since devolution
- **Human Resources issues:**
 - High staff turnover, leading to delays in decision-making at programme levels mentioned by stakeholders
 - Lack of communication strategy for Commission activities at EUD level, leading to low visibility among private sector stakeholders (see EQ9)
- **HQ back up** and support with respect to PSD issues viewed as available by EUD, but orientation and strategic PSD advice not available to EUD staff

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Agenda



- **Reminder of the objectives of the mission and activities undertaken**
- **Mission findings per evaluation question and discussion**
- **Next steps**

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Next Steps 

■ End of June	Finalisation of field missions & compilation of findings
■ July	Presentation of Field Phase to the Reference Group
■ July – August	Synthesis phase
■ End August	Submission of Draft Final Report
■ End September	Submission of Final Report

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Evaluation of the European Commission's support to private sector development in third countries (2004-2010)

Country mission to Morocco

Debriefing to the EU Delegation

Rabat, 19 April 2012



*This document is designed as support to the oral presentation
and is not intended to be used separately*

Objectives



Objectives of today's debriefing

- Provide an overview of the mission activities & findings
- Have a discussion on mission findings
- Provide information on next steps

ADE

Agenda

- **Reminder of the objectives of the mission and activities undertaken**
- **Mission findings per evaluation question and discussion**
- **Next steps**

3

ADE

Evaluation subject, purpose and scope



(Reminder)

Subject	Evaluation of the European Commission's (EC) support to private sector development (PSD) in third countries (strategy-level, multi-country)
Purpose	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provide an overall independent assessment of EC's past and current support to PSD Identify key lessons for improving the EC's strategies and programmes
Scope	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> All types of PSD support, excl. trade-related assistance Overall EC support, not country- or instrument-specific All third countries, except OECD & DG ENLARG countries All EC funding vehicles & modalities 2004-2010

This is an evaluation of the Commission's overall support to PSD
It is not an evaluation of the support at country level as such

Source: Terms of Reference

4



Why we selected Morocco

(Reminder)

Morocco

Morocco is...

- A MEDA /ENPI South country, largest recipient region
- Recipient of 14% of total direct Commission support to PSD worldwide (SBS incl.);
- 8th largest recipient of General Budget Support which included PSD-related indicators;
- Recipient of varied PSD support: support to supply-side of finance (guarantees and local financial products), to quality and accreditation systems, to professional organisations and key Intermediary Organisations (ANPME), to competition policy, to promotion of exports policy, as well as FEMIP funding (EIB managed).

Focus on 4 interventions, within the portfolio:

- Programme d'Appui aux entreprises, €58m
- Capmezzanine », funded under FEMIP, €6m
- Programme d'Appui aux Associations Professionnelles II, €4.9m
- Appui aux institutions financières de garantie aux PME, € 28.2m

Objective: collect information to feed into the overall thematic evaluation (and not to evaluate aid to a specific project or country)

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EC private sector development support in Morocco

(Reminder)

Decision Year	Interventions	Contracted Amount	Support Vehicle
1998	Appui au Programme pour la Promotion de la Qualité - NORMES	€13m	Direct
▶ 1999	Appui aux institutions financières de garantie aux PME	€28m	Direct
▶ 2005	Programme d'Appui aux Associations Professionnelles II	€5m	Direct
▶ 2002	Programme d'Appui aux entreprises	€58m	Direct
▶ 2008	Programme d'appui aux Investissements et aux Exportations	€60m	GBS

* Direct support includes both individual projects and sector budget support

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Activities undertaken: 18 meetings held between 12th – 18th April



- **EU Briefing: 12th April and EU Debriefing: 19th April**
- **Meetings 12th – 18th April:**
 - **EU Delegation:**
 - Chef des Opérations
 - Chef de section Appui aux Réformes Economiques
 - Chargée de programmes Climat des Affaires – Investissements
Section Appui aux Réformes économiques
 - **Government of Morocco:**
 - Ministère Economie et Finances: service UE et Direction du trésor et des finances extérieures
 - Ministère de l'Industrie, Direction de la Qualité et de la Surveillance du Marché
 - **Other donors:** IFC, BM, BEI bureau local au Maroc
 - **Implementing partners/Beneficiaries:** Caisse Centrale de Garanties (CCG), CDG Capital, Dar Ad Damane (institution de garantie), Confédération Générale des Entreprises du Maroc (CGEM)
 - **Other PSD stakeholders:** Agence Nationale pour la Promotion de la petite et Moyenne Entreprise (ANPME)
 - **Project visit:** Complexe des centres techniques

Agenda




- **Reminder of the mission scope, objectives, findings & activities undertaken**
- **Mission findings per evaluation question and discussion**
- **Next steps**

Evaluation Questions	
EQ 1	Evolution of EC policies & programming
EQ 2	Strategic approach
EQ 3	Funding Vehicles and Modalities
EQ 4	Institutional and regulatory frameworks
EQ 5	Access to finance
EQ 6	Fostering enterprises competitiveness
EQ 7	Investment promotion
EQ 8	Employment
EQ 9	Commission added-value
EQ 10	Means provided

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EQ1 – Evolution of Commission policies & programming
<p>To what extent did the Commission's PSD strategy and programming take into account the recommendations of the 2005 evaluation and the evolution of the overall private sector environment?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">■ The 2005 PSD evaluation was not systematically and pro-actively disseminated worldwide – some evidence for MOR■ Thematic unit E2/C4 of DEVCO reported to have a role in disseminating knowledge on PSD support and strategies worldwide between Commission HQ and EUDs.■ Main evolution in change in PSD context in MOR was momentum created by AA and creation of free trade zone - an accelerator for change. In response, cornerstone of EC support to PSD has been support to mise à niveau of Moroccan enterprises.

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EQ2 – Strategic approach

To what extent was Commission support to PSD in partner countries part of a strategic approach geared to the overall objectives of EU External Policy, while aligning with the priorities of the country or region and maximizing its VA, inc. in terms of synergies with other actors and other types of Commission support?

On the strategy:

- In MOR, no PSD strategy document as such, rather, broad PSD orientations part of CSPs & NIPs, yet clear thread /logic:
 - Closer economic integration in frame of AA and free trade zone, integration with European market, so that PSD support linked to mise à niveau
 - Evolution of objectives of PSD support: from mise à niveau to reap benefits of AA, to more focus role in growth and employment
 - Evolution from programme approach targeting specific needs at macro, meso and micro levels to BS targeting macro, I&R reform.
- Overall, alignment on government strategies/priorities/requests, which are also strongly influenced by AA. In mature emerging country, such as MOR, government commitment to reform, a pre-condition to success of assistance, e.g. support to competition policy vs. state aid. (in less mature environments with weaker administration, EC own priorities more important). Yet international pressure can be applied to remove obstacles, e.g OECD report on money laundering.
- FEMIP/EIB strategy for MOR reportedly defined by agreement (FEMIP committee and ministerial meeting) , however insufficient linking with EC bilateral assistance.

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EQ2 – Strategic approach


To what extent was Commission support to PSD in partner countries part of a strategic approach geared to the overall objectives of EU External Policy, while aligning with the priorities of the country or region and maximizing its VA, inc. in terms of synergies with other actors and other types of Commission support?

- In design of strategy&programming, some evidence of consideration to potential VA and synergies: providing MOR with EU best practices. Yet insufficient linking of centralised and bilateral operations. (see EQ3).
- Evidence of strong consultation/information exchange with other donors (WB, IFC) at strategy and at operational stages, yet not coordination or 'division of labour' according to AV. Good ex. of synergies: combining conditionalities (WB), sequencing (WB, IFC), twinning (GIZ, KfW), but room for improvement for maximised leverage. Insufficient visibility of EC operations in PSD for other donors, progress since. More consultation on relevance of EC PSD actions with 'technical' partners? More clarity on who (HQ, EUD) is responsible for what ?
- Some evidence of consideration to cross-cutting issues e.g gender, governance, environment, labour standards. Balancing bw. ensuring developmental impact & adaptation to realities of SMEs in country context. Consumer rights & anti-corruption included in BS – strongly enough?

On the tools:

- 2003 and 2010 (T)PSD guidelines known, of use, but contextualisation required
- COM 267 also known and evidence of consultation at formulation stage.

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EQ3 – Instruments & modalities

To what extent did the set of Commission instruments and financing modalities for supporting PSD strategies and activities of partner countries and regions result in the provision of timely responses, at a reasonable cost, to the challenges faced by the private sector in third countries, while fostering synergies with each other and with instruments offered by other actors?

- Wide set of EC funding vehicles to support PSD in 3rd countries, but little evidence of integrated approach/guidance on rationale for choice of partic. funding vehicle/aid modality. A juxtaposition of opportunities ?
- In MOR, EC support through bilateral assistance (progs/projects, twinning, BS, NIF) and through centralised / regional operations (FEMIP via EIB):
 - Programme approach (at meso & micro levels): (1) addressed key needs (financial guarantees, CTIs, creation ANPME) with (2) positive, yet ad-hoc effects/impact (e.g. enterprise upgrading & access to finance but proportionately small number of enterprises) (3) yet enables EC contact with PS reality on the ground.
 - BS and twinning (macro & meso): (1) support to implementation of government strategy, macro-level intervention; I&R reforms should benefit all enterprises, (2) strong leverage of EC grant in accelerating reforms, (3) accompanying TA important for institutional capacity building & knowledge transfer.
- In MOR, EC project approach created enabling conditions / institutions for later follow-up through BS. Yet move to BS also influenced by HQ instructions and beneficiary's demands.

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EQ3 – Instruments & modalities

To what extent did the set of Commission instruments and financing modalities for supporting PSD strategies and activities of partner countries and regions result in the provision of timely responses, at a reasonable cost, to the challenges faced by the private sector in third countries, while fostering synergies with each other and with instruments offered by other actors?

- Avenues for BS improvements:
 - Maintaining project approach in parallel to BS: PSD assistance through BS exclusively = losing contact with economic actors ground.
 - Larger EC role in putting pressure on MinFin in budgetary allocations between ministries to meet conditionalities as estimated at design stage?
 - Increased flexibility in conditionality matrix to (1) match rapid evolutions, characteristic of PSD context? e.g. WB, (2) results-based approach vs. an action based one
 - Better communication to beneficiary institutions on the instrument: rationale otherwise misunderstandings: e.g. accompanying TA eligibility for achievement of conditionality
 - Considering MOR institutional context (multiplicity, lack of leadership), a strong national coordination structure would have been necessary.
- At general level, evidence of a disconnect between centralised and bilateral operations. Could FEMIP funding better support (1) SME access to finance/upgrading as supported by EC assistance and (2) adoption of a specific reform supported by EC/other donors? E.g. through joint programming & identification of projects.

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EQ3 – Instruments & modalities

To what extent did the set of Commission instruments and financing modalities for supporting PSD strategies and activities of partner countries and regions result in the provision of timely responses, at a reasonable cost, to the challenges faced by the private sector in third countries, while fostering synergies with each other and with instruments offered by other actors?

- Evidence of delays at the start of and during implementation of PSD support and/or readjustment of target/activities. Partially linked to aid modality/funding vehicle (but also insufficient stakeholder consult. /needs analysis/understanding of pol. eco.): PAIGAM, PAE.
- However appreciation of EC responsiveness, though EC procedures considered as too heavy and somewhat ill-adapted to dynamics of private sector.

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EQ4 – Institutional and regulatory frameworks

To what extent did the Commission contribute to making the institutional and regulatory (I&R) framework more conducive to PSD?

- In MOR, AA regulatory convergence commitments imply large I&R reform; have been supported by EC through twinning, BS and project approach (and also through Support to FEMIP):
 - Competition: creation of Competition Council, support to drafting of law (through twinning and BS);
 - Enterprise governance and PPP Training Manual (through twinning);
- Quality standards and implementing institutions (CTIs): PAE and PIE (through BS).
- In MOR, I&R support was demand-driven, based on the government's strategies ("Plan Emergence" and "Livre Blanc") which were based on consultation of private sector.
- Some evidence of policy dialogue on I&R reforms with government – maturity and strength of gov. gave EC less room for manoeuvre.
- Progress in I&R reforms: (1) in MOR, evidence in above-mentioned areas; in frame of BS, some issues regarding unbalanced bargaining between ministries for resources (2) less evidence (yet?) of trickle-down effect on private sector base; (3) sufficient consideration by EC of who will benefit from opening up of economy?

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EQ5 – Access to finance

To what extent did the Commission contribute to improving access to finance by enterprises?

- On EC approach to addressing constraints to access to finance: (1) access to finance identified as main constraint to SME upgrading, (2) focus on support to financial intermediaries (supply side), (3) targeting of key needs, identified as priorities – guarantees (PAIGAM), (4) support to public IOs, chosen as most appropriate to overcome market failures (risk aversion of banks)
- Division of labour with EIB which supports PS actors directly in access to finance exists, through support to specific financial instruments: RCO+TA – yet room for more consultation/coordination
- Evidence of positive effects on IOs, less info on end effects on SMEs:
 - On IOs: (1) CCG new way to assess risks, yet some evidence of insufficient preliminary analysis of context, esp. cautiousness of banks; (2) Usefulness of FEMIP support on supply-side: mobilising effect, transfer of best international practices/requirements/training (through TA), effect on development of local financial markets;
 - Limited impact on entire SME population;
 - Little targeting of those enterprises with most difficult access to finance – rather, different approach: support to champions (in government strategy), to export-oriented, development-potential SMEs.

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EQ6 – Fostering enterprises competitiveness

To what extent did the Commission contribute to a better ability of enterprises, in particular SMEs, to compete and to access technology and new markets?

- EC PSD support approach – mise à niveau – fully geared towards improving competitiveness, in frame of implementation of AA.
- Choice of support to intermediaries, rather than to SMEs directly.
- EC approach has been support to sectoral structuration through dual support to (1) professional organisations, as intermediaries and as representatives of sectors in dialogue, and to (2) CTIs as sectoral technical arm
- Results have been:
 - capacity-building of intermediary organizations : (1) in MOR, key strengthening of CCG, Dar al Damane (transfer of knowledge/skills, effects on turnover), ANPME (growth of institution, regional network), CTIs. Stronger positions in institutional landscape, better established,
 - less impact on private sector base: initial underestimation of SME's and banks' cautiousness & importance of communication activities (guarantee product, FOMAN funding, CTIs' services); restrictive/ill-adapted eligibility criteria (PAIGAM), but trickle-down effect expected.
- Little evidence found of monitoring enterprises' access to new markets and technologies following Commission support.

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EQ7 – Investment promotion

To what extent did Commission support contribute to increased cross-border investment in partner countries' private sectors?

- Support to cross-border investment promotion and inter-enterprise cooperation less of a focus on EC PSD 2004-2010 portfolio in MOR: in BS and under PAE, support to Euro-Maroc Info Centre, though never implemented.
- Regional context (e.g. animosity with Algeria) makes cross-border investment/trade more difficult than in other regions.
- No additional documents on cross-border investment needs however business development environment reform, eg. Competition, will impact cross-border investment

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EQ8 – Employment

To what extent has the Commission PSD support contributed to facilitating the generation of employment?

- In MOR, first and foremost consideration to mise à niveau; employment issues not prime objective, although shift in focus since Arab Spring (out of temporal scope).
- Little evidence that employment issues (labour standards, CSR) have been systematically mainstreamed into PSD support.
- Employment often treated separately or in relation to education, vocational curricula and training.
- Under FEMIP, (1) employment strongly mentioned in strategy and (2) evidence of consideration of labour standards in 'Support FEMIP' funding.
- Lack of evidence of employment-related monitoring indicators for PSD interventions, due to M&E focus on ST effects of assistance?
- No support to formalisation of MOR economy and its impact on employment.

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EQ9 – Commission added-value

What was the Commission's added value when providing support to PSD in third countries?

- AV includes:
 - Political importance of relation between EU and MAR (AA since 2000, 'Statut avancé' since 2008) and LT nature of partnership
 - Pressure on reform acceleration
 - EU expertise, transfer of best practices
 - Variety of instruments: BS, Taiex, twinning, project approach, blending of grants and loans
 - Intervention at all PSD levels - macro, meso and micro
 - In access to finance: FEMIP support has had mobilising effect, transfer of best international practices/requirements/training (through TA),
 - Financial weight not particularly mentioned
- Insufficient leverage of full EU AV?: development assistance (1% of MOR budget) is but one lever, further combining with other levers, such as access to EU market, access to R&D and DG ENTR funding programmes to which MOR has been eligible to. Difficulty in mobilising other sides of EC institution.

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EQ10 – Means provided

To what extent were the Commission's organisational set-up and management practices fit to a successful implementation of its PSD support?

- Evidence of devolution to EUDs having positive effects, e.g., improved contacts in the field and policy dialogue
- Heaviness of EC procedures – not fitted to responsiveness requirements of private sector?
- Disconnect of bilateral assistance with centralised operations, leverage could be maximized: linking EIB/FEMIP support to EC supported reforms/assistance?
- On division of labour between HQ and EUDs:
 - Confusion amongst beneficiaries and other donors over the division of labour
 - lengthy decision-making process.
- Level of PSD expertise in relevant EUDs : not technicians like WB and IFC.
- Insufficient capitalisation on in-house PSD expertise across EC DGs.
- Strong and formal exchanges of PSD experience across EUDs missing.


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Agenda

- **Reminder of the mission scope, objectives, findings & activities undertaken**
- **Mission findings per evaluation question and discussion**
- **Next steps**

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Next Steps

■ July	Finalisation of field missions & compilation of findings
	Presentation of Field Phase to the Reference Group
■ July – August	Synthesis phase
■ End August	Submission of Draft Final Report
■ End September	Submission of Final Report

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Evaluation of the European Commission's support to private sector development in third countries (2004-2010)

Country mission to Nicaragua

Debriefing to the EU Delegation

Managua, 15 May 2012



*This document is designed as support to the oral presentation
and is not intended to be used separately*

Objectives

Objectives of today's debriefing

- Provide an overview of the mission activities & findings
- Have a discussion on mission findings
- Provide information on next steps

Agenda


- **Reminder of the objectives of the mission and activities undertaken**
- **Mission findings per evaluation question and discussion**
- **Next steps**

Evaluation subject, purpose and scope

(Reminder)

Subject	Evaluation of the European Commission's (EC) support to private sector development (PSD) in third countries (strategy-level, multi-country)
Purpose	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide an overall independent assessment of EC's past and current support to PSD • Identify key lessons for improving the EC's strategies and programmes
Scope	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • All types of PSD support, excl. trade-related assistance • Overall EC support, not country- or instrument-specific • All third countries, except OECD & DG ENLARG countries • All EC funding vehicles & modalities • 2004-2010

**This is an evaluation of the Commission's overall support to PSD
It is not an evaluation of the support at country level as such**



Why we selected Nicaragua

(Reminder)

Nicaragua

Nicaragua...

- ...has been the 9th largest recipient of direct Commission support to PSD based on our inventory of the Commission's direct support to PSD ;
- ...has been the largest recipient of direct Commission support to PSD in the Latin American region (Latin America accounted for 9% of the total support with €221m);
- ... has received LAIF funding;
- ... PSD support has been varied: support to access to finance, to investment promotion to increase competitiveness, to Intermediary Organisations.

We focused on 2 national interventions and one regional:

- PRODECOOP, (B76000 - ONG-PVD/2003/004-562) ;
- PRAMECLIM, (DCI-ALA/2007/019-011)
- « Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy programme for SME in Central America » (LAIF-DCI-ALA/2009/021-734 KfW-01)


Objective: collect information to feed into the overall thematic evaluation (and not to evaluate aid to a specific project or country)


ADE 6

EC private sector development support in Nicaragua

(Reminder)


Interventions	Duration	Committed Amount
Fortalecimiento productivo y organizativo de 1856 familias de pequeños productores cafetaleros y agropecuarios (PRODECOOP)	2004-2008	€1,4 m
Programa de Apoyo a la Mejora del Clima de Negocios e Inversiones en Nicaragua (PRAMECLIM)	2007-2010	€ 5,4m
Programa de Fortalecimiento de la competitividad de las MIPYME nicaragüenses (COMPETITIVIDAD)	2009-2013	€16.8m
Programa de apoyo al Plan Nacional de Desarrollo de Nicaragua (PAPND) (SBS suspended in 2009)	2006-	€68m
TOTAL AMOUNT COMMITTED		€91.6m

 **Largest recipient of direct Commission support to PSD in the Latin American region**

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Activities undertaken during mission: 13 to 19 June

- **EU Briefing & Debriefing:** 7 May & 15 May
- **Interviews:**
 - **EU Delegation:**
 - Head of Operations
 - Head of Sector
 - LAIF focal point
 - Project Officers
 - **National Authorities & Beneficiaries:** Ministry of Trade & Industry (MIFIC); Institute for SMEs (INPYME)
 - **Other donors including EU MS:** Finland, Denmark, The Netherlands, OMT, ONUDI, WB, USAID
- **Project visits** and interviews with project actors and beneficiaries: HIVOS (PRODECOOP), NGO Alternativa (PRAMECLIM); APEN; CADIN; PRONICARAGUA; Cooperatives; small entrepreneurs

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Agenda

- Reminder of the objectives of the mission and activities undertaken
- Mission findings per evaluation question and discussion
- Next steps

Evaluation Questions

EQ 1	Evolution of EC policies & programming
EQ 2	Strategic approach
EQ 3	Funding Vehicles and Modalities
EQ 4	Institutional and regulatory frameworks
EQ 5	Access to finance
EQ 6	Fostering enterprises competitiveness
EQ 7	Investment promotion
EQ 8	Employment
EQ 9	Commission added-value
EQ 10	Means provided

EQ1 – Evolution of Commission policies & programming

To what extent did the Commission's PSD strategy and programming take into account (1) the recommendations of the 2005 evaluation and (2) the evolution of the wider private sector context?

- **DEL in Nicaragua not aware of the content of the 2005 PSD evaluation**
- **Commission had to adapt to new political context in Nicaragua:**
 - trust strongly affected (suspension of BS)
 - huge financial flow from Venezuela not considered as donor because it is private to private
- **Commission takes into consideration the context in its support to PSD:**
 - small and low-income national market; difficult for SMEs to develop
 - focus on poverty reduction on one side and regional and broader integration on the other side
 - financial crisis not factored in Commission support to PSD but Nicaragua not that affected because its economy was not exposed to the toxic assets that have triggered the crisis, even though main export destinations such as the US imported less from Nicaragua

EQ2 – Strategic approach

To what extent was Commission support to PSD part of a strategic approach geared towards the overall objectives of EU external policy, whilst aligning with the priorities of the country and maximizing its VA, incl. in terms of synergies with other actors and other types of Commission support?

- **In its programming Commission geared PSD support towards overall EU external policy objectives, essentially three (economic development, international and regional integration, poverty reduction)**
- **Difficult dialogue with GoN on PSD due to unclear / ambivalent conceptions of PSD**
- **No consensus on a shared strategy. Three public documents are addressing PSD in Nicaragua: 1) the National Development Plan, 2) the National Operative Development Plan, 3) PROMIPYME:**
 - For the private sector: the documents do not address its critical challenges; COSEP drafting its own plan for 2012-2016.
 - For the GoN itself: despite these strategic documents it keeps on leading its PSD policy on a project basis (reaction to "red lights")
 - For Donors and esp. the Commission: Use of documents 2 and 3; PROMIPYME a good tool to avoid overlaps (especially in absence of dialogue with GoN, preventing proper coordination) but aware that PROMIPYME is becoming increasingly outdated

EQ2 – Strategic approach

- Difficult for Commission to use a plan drafted by COSEP because not representing SMEs

- Despite this lack of consensus and the lack of commonly agreed alternative approach to alignment, as well as the fact that the Commission is committed to disburse, it has strived to remain coherent in its approach:

PRAMECLIM laying the ground for PSD support

COMPETITIVIDAD as a follow-up project

↓
Approach in different sectors

- In Nicaragua, Commission's specific added value was generally not considered as an entry point to think-out PSD support but it could be argued that added-value has not yet kicked-in in designing because PSD is a new sector of intervention for the Commission in Nicaragua
- Nevertheless different types of Commission's added value were identified and will be discussed under EQ9

EQ2 – Strategic approach

- According to Paris Declaration, coordination is to be led by national government. This works in some sectors (health and education), but complicated in others including PSD.

- Not entirely clear why this is the case. Tentative answer: MIFIC does not have the capacity to coordinate and does not want to "expose" this lack of capacity to donors
- Because of this donors have taken the decision to meet without GoN. Commission leads.
- Scarce information flow with ALBA despite attempt from traditional donors' community. ALBA funds influences the GoN's balance of payment so they had to publish a minimum of data

- With respect to CCIs, findings from desk study confirmed:

- Very little attention given to HIV (not as relevant than in the African context?)
- Considerable efforts to favour environment
- Gender: the CSP 2007-2013 has a gender profile (the only CSP in Lat. Am. to have such annex) that gives an overview of aspects such as women unemployed relevant for PSD support

- In the case of PRAMECLIM, CCIs not prominent in programming but given importance at implementation level (e.g. women cooperatives, SMEs must be registered at INSEE and respect labour standards)

- Decent work and labour standards more of a concern under the 2nd programming period

EQ3 – Funding Vehicles and Modalities

- Despite the wide variety of instruments that the Commission possesses in general to finance its interventions, the fact that the Commission must sign an agreement with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the partner country may be a problem in the case of PSD
- In Nicaragua where the dialogue on PSD with the GoN is not optimum, the Commission does not have at its disposal an appropriate and significant (in terms of budget) vehicle that allows it to directly tackle the private sector (like The Netherlands or the US) (reference here to interventions with provisions to avoid market distortions)
- BS used to be the preferred aid modality (Nicaragua rated well in the 2006 OECD DAC evaluation) but for political reasons already mentioned, and because of lack of transparency in public finance it was suspended. So the comments below do not relate to the Commission's first choice of instruments

EQ3 – Funding Vehicles and Modalities

- The project approach and more specifically the Programme Estimates (PE) that it had to adopt because of lack of alternatives, had positive and negative aspects:
 - Positive: it allows to plan and control (timing and amounts of disbursements known beforehand). Beneficiaries reported a valuable learning process in that respect.
 - Negative: if we consider PRAMECLIM as an example it is evident that the lack of flexibility of this instrument creates problems at the stage of implementation (e.g. For every single service a contract is required with the pressure of the D+3 rule; furthermore for each contract above 50.000€ a prior approval by the Commission is required). Finally PE significantly increases workload at level of EU Del (efficiency?)
- On synergies between different Commission instruments: not planned at the programming level because:
 - Difficulty to build synergies between projects that do not have the same cycle / timing
 - Some are centralized (i.e. AI-Invest and LAIF) and there is a lack of information sharing between the different staff and stakeholders in charge
- Recent improvements with respect to AI-Invest with joint events (DG Trade at delegation level and stakeholders of AI-Invest in the country)

EQ3 – Funding Vehicles and Modalities

- **But synergies happen at implementation level. Example: end-beneficiaries of PRAMECLIM establishing synergies with programme implemented by OXFAM to manage to optimize the value chain from access to raw material (wood) on the Caribbean coast to selling of furniture in Managua**
- **On synergies between same Commission instruments: as mentioned above, a structured coherent approach was adopted and there are synergies between PRAMECLIM and COMPETITIVIDAD.**
- **On synergies with other donors:**
 - The problem of different project cycles and timing applies here too
 - The difficulty of coordination mentioned above (GoN not playing its leading role)
 - Last but not least, all donors do not have the same (policy) agenda

EQ4 – Institutional and regulatory frameworks

To what extent did the Commission contribute to making the institutional and regulatory (I&R) framework more conducive to PSD?

- **The institutional and regulatory reform process in favour of PSD in Nicaragua is needed but incomplete, not fully adapted and slow**
 - Incomplete: a large part of the regulatory reforms proposed by the study commissioned by PRAMECLIM to address the main I&R obstacles to PSD are not yet implemented, maybe due to lack of ownership or capacity in GoN (?). In addition these reforms required institutional adaptations which represents an important challenge in the context of Nicaragua.
 - Not fully adapted: insufficient consultation of SMEs by GoN, so laws passed are potentially not well adapted to the context (e.g. the formalization process that puts too much regulatory pressure on SMEs as soon as they become formal). Parallel channels for public/private dialog on I&R reforms have been created spontaneously such as the "Comisión de Seguimiento" – no legal identity – to bridge these institutional gaps.
 - Slow: for example the one-stop shops (Ventanilla Unica de Inversiones) co-supported by PRAMECLIM are an important step forward to accelerate creation process of new enterprises, but they remain slow to be established.

EQ4 – Institutional and regulatory frameworks

- **Commission is aware of this difficult context and, as part of its structured and coherent approach to PSD, first tackled the regulatory and institutional frameworks with PRAMECLIM.**
 - A good start (e.g. “Ley 645”, even though not enough disseminated and implemented, has had the benefit to provide for common definitions of what MSMEs are in Nicaragua).
- **However there are needs for reinforced support to ensure consolidation and sustainability, as reported by EU donors. Provisions in that direction exist but might be insufficient:**
 - A follow-up is foreseen by COMPETITIVIDAD but only on the institutional segment in support to quality and inspections.
 - A Directorate on “Clima de negocio” is to be created in MIFIC following assessed needs by PRAMECLIM but no provision to accompany this new department.
 - NL will phase out its support to MIFIC that allowed for the recruitment of extra staff.
- **As mentioned earlier, this support to I&R reforms takes place in the context of a less smooth policy dialogue with GoN (difficulties in obtaining a clear mapping of the institutional division of tasks and responsibilities in the sector), but Commission strove to address the genuine needs expressed by the competent national authorities. Reminder: Commission cannot lead these types of reforms it can only contribute**

EQ5 – Access to finance

To what extent did the Commission contribute to improving enterprises' access to finance?

- **The Commission's support to PSD as a focal sector started with PRAMECLIM on the basis of an informal collection of data and no thorough analysis.**
- **However consensus on the existence of need: according to EU MS, gap for medium amounts (between 3.000US\$ and 10.000US\$). ALBA may finance microfinance but limited knowledge**
- **Only few instruments allow the Commission to finance credits: e.g. thematic budget lines and investment facilities (NSA in the case of PRODECOOP; LAIF)**
- **Limited measures taken at macro-level that have facilitated access to finance. Formalisation supported by PRAMECLIM have put fiscal pressure on SMEs before they could benefit from a better access to finance**
- **No evidence on the supply-side of actions supported by the Commission even though critical (the liquidity is not the problem, it is there but not lent to SMEs)**

EQ5 – Access to finance

- There are cases where Commission did target enterprises that were facing difficulties: (credits schemes in the cases of SMEs with LAIF and small coffee producers with PRODECOOP, the latter excellent feedback, sustainable)
- Commission's support has not aimed to strengthen IOs in their capacity to facilitate SMEs' access to finance
- Access to finance on the demand-side not specifically targeted by Commission support; nevertheless Commission's support has sought to build capacities of SMEs and this capacity-building may have had an effect on accessing credits
- Overall the capacity of enterprises to access finance remains weak (lack of collateral; inability to prepare bankable dossier, too uncertain overtime)
- Commission well aware that in the Nicaraguan context, micro enterprise and SMEs form a single group.

EQ6 – Fostering enterprises' competitiveness

To what extent did the Commission contribute to enterprises' - in particular SMEs' - improved ability to compete and to access technology and new markets?

- As for access to finance no evidence of a thorough analysis but rather informal gathering of data
- More informed knowledge of enterprises shortcomings with respect to competitiveness is expected from the characterisation study of PRAMECLIM which is to constitute the baseline for the programme COMPETITIVIDAD
- In addition, shortcomings in terms of competitiveness of specific beneficiaries have been tackled with accuracy thanks to a bottom-up approach (call for proposals) under:
1) the NSA thematic budget line; 2) component "contribution to strengthening" of PRAMECLIM
 - Standardised production
 - Design and marketing
 - Joint action on the market (redes)
- However certain shortcomings key for competitiveness remain problematic for SMEs: production capacity, access to raw material (wood, paint, glue etc..), access to finance

EQ6 – Fostering enterprises' competitiveness

- IOs involved in competitiveness such as APEN (for exports) or INATEC (for certification) have also been selected on the basis of call for proposals (mentioned above) and not as a result of other means such as benchmarking. Such selection process has been appropriate.
- In terms of achievements (up-grading of enterprises, access to new markets) results have been reached (five-fold increase of coffee yields in PRODECOOP; access to new market for potters) by the Commission's projects but strengthening of competitiveness is an on-going process that needs further attention especially with the entering into force of the AA.
- Despite the absence of exit strategy for beneficiaries, the latter have taken action in order to ensure sustainability (for example creation of revolving funds)
- Technological innovation not considered as key at this stage for MSMEs and their intermediaries in Nicaragua nevertheless technological support foreseen under component "contribution to strengthening" of PRAMECLIM but not information gathered
- Awareness on the part of the Commission of external factors hampering competitiveness of MSMEs (Infrastructure, Energy, Regulations)

EQ7 – Cross-border Investment promotion

To what extent did Commission support contribute to increased cross-border investment in partner countries' private sectors?

- As mentioned in the two previous EQs no thorough analysis. However PRAMECLIM in its study on the regulatory framework included aspects on foreign investment facilitation (e.g. protection of private property, fiscal incentives) identified with the support of PRONICARAGUA)
- Furthermore mention in CSP 2007-2013 of a trade assessment, no information gathered on this assessment
- PRONICARAGUA rightly identified by the Commission as the key investment promotion agency in the country

EQ7 – Cross-border Investment promotion

- Unlike EU MS, Commission's bilateral cooperation has not focused on cross-border investment, more considered under the responsibility of trade . Thanks to the AA, FDI in Nicaragua will have access to the whole Central American Market

- No support to business to business or investment promotion events

- Depending on its nature (more or less opportunistic) FDI can or not have a sustainable impact on a country's economic development. FDI not very labour intensive in Nicaragua (with the exception of the *zonas francas*), this is why the Commission has not encouraged FDI in its bilateral cooperation for PSD

- LAIF by its emphasis on infrastructure, access to finance for SMEs and environment, is the main financial instrument identified promoting sustainable FDI

EQ8 – Employment

To what extent has the Commission PSD support contributed to facilitating the generation of employment?

- Over both periods the Commission has provided support to human capital. Focus not on PSD with a concern to generate employment but rather focus on education with a concern for the private sector's needs in terms of vocational training

- Exception may be PRODECOOP where Commission was aware of coffee production being the greater source of employment (seasonal and permanent) in the rural areas and where activities of the programme had a direct impact on employment (securing the job of the targeted group, creating jobs also to manage the transformation unit)

- Up to now Commission has not monitored employment effect but characterisation study of PRAMECLIM has employment indicators

- Problem of lack of statistics including to monitor Employment, even though the situation is improving (FUNIDES)

EQ8 – Employment

- In the Nicaraguan context the challenge is not so much the generation of employment but rather the improvement of employment standards and conditions
- Commission aware (reference to diagnosis made by macro-economists) that the informal economy is too big in Nicaragua and needs to be reduced to favour development. Also problem related to the low labour productivity.
- The Commission wishes to address this challenge notably by encouraging formalisation (e.g. law 645 supported by PRAMECLIM and formalisation of beneficiaries of PRAMECLIM projects)
- However, formalisation if not accompanied by proper capacity-building of the SMEs and well adapted regulatory framework may lead to adverse effects (excessive fiscal pressures, environmental requirements, etc.)

EQ9 – Commission added-value

What was the Commission's added value (AV) when providing support to PSD in third countries?

- As mentioned under EQ2, AV was not central in gearing Commission's support to PSD yet different types of AV were identified:
 - Financial critical mass enabling Commission to intervene at macro, meso and micro levels such as supporting integrated approach, i.e. I&R reforms led in parallel to competitiveness capacity building (e.g. PRAMECLIM)
 - Commission's openness to dialogue on PSD proposals put forwards notably by the GoN; may be explained by the absence of a strong political agenda in the sector unlike other bilateral donors . This being said, the Commission considers that –despite the Paris Declaration- the Government is not always the best counter-part especially in PSD
 - Commission maintains its presence and support when other donors are leaving the country: "We stay in the country to cooperate with the people of Nicaragua" (Commission has never put its withdrawal on the agenda to be discussed by EU MS)

EQ9 – Commission added-value

- Its BS instrument initially adapted to Nicaragua (Nicaragua good scoring according to OECD-DAC evaluation of BS 2006)
- Commission active in related sector to PSD such as trade and regional integration (on the edge of evaluation scope but deserves attention)

■ **AA is an added-value because it will give market opportunities to SMEs that cannot grow on the basis of the small low income national market; even though generally considered an opportunity AA may have adverse effects on PSD. Awareness of the Commission of this risk with the exclusion of the “maquila” scheme from its focal sectors due notably to labour standards concerns**

■ **Since the first programming period there is an emphasis on regional integration supported by specific actions such as harmonization in the field of technical standards, rules of origins and quality**

EQ10 – Means provided

To what extent were the Commission's organisational set-up and management practices fit to a successful implementation of its PSD support?

- **On the one hand devolution favoured ownership by EU Del and improved policy dialogue with national authorities**
- **On the other hand, at the implementation level, it drastically increased the workload and lowered the availability of staff to communicate with beneficiaries. Nuance between the workload created by the devolution of responsibilities and the workload caused by certain instruments such as PE (according to EU Del the latter is the problem)**
- **Perception by PSD beneficiaries of divergent interpretations between EU Del and HQs: “Bruselas no quiere” (“Brussels does not want”).**
 - According to EU Del: the devolution is not full and they do need approval from HQs (there is still a control on their part) (e.g. Addendum to a contract). This being said this sentence also used in some cases as “an umbrella” for the good cause of maintaining good relationship with partners in the country

EQ10 – Means provided

- **With respect to division of responsibilities at HQs:**
 - there is perception from the EU Del of insufficient coordination between different departments (e.g. insufficient knowledge sharing between thematic staff and geographical staff). Lack of information-sharing also sometimes vertically within the geographical staffs (illustrations given infrastructure and tourism)
 - between different DGs notably DG Trade, significant improvement towards the very end of the evaluation period (2010)
- **There are efforts from HQs to build a shared vision of PSD with EU Del such as trainings. PSD training scheme described at HQs during desk phase considered relevant at EU Del level (some have undertaken such training others such as LAIF focal point willing to be trained). The posting of DG trade staff in EU Del. (early 2010 in the case of the EU Del in Managua) is a strong contribution to build such shared vision**
- **According to EU Del training not well planned and more budget should be allocated: staff have to register when not all training sessions are known. The last PSD training to take place in Lat. Ame. was cancelled due to insufficient attendance.**
- **Awareness of the existence of PS guidelines at EU Del but not time to read them or other policy documents in general essentially due to excessive workload. Furthermore, they are considered too general when it comes to the design of a specific project or its daily implementation**

EQ10 – Means provided (3/3)

- **As mentioned in EQ1, it seems that no specific efforts were undertaken in order to take advantage of the results of the 2005 global PSD evaluation**
- **At the country and regional levels, evaluation and monitoring are a genuine concern of the Commission; weakness with respect to impact evaluation**
- **EU Del in Nicaragua is willing to follow the new trend in terms of operational M&E (e.g. constitution of a baseline for COMPETITIVIDAD thanks to PRAMECLIM)**

EQ10 – Means provided (3/3)

- **With respect to capitalisation and sharing of knowledge on PSD within the Commission:**
 - the issues of staff rotation is as always problematic even though one could argue that if the EU Del loses someone the Commission rarely does but still that person in charge needs to be tracked-down
 - the expertise and stability of local staff sufficiently valued? (Potential conflict of interest)
- **Take-over procedures exist** (take-over notes written by predecessor, archives, hierarchical superior) **but their usefulness sometimes questioned**
- **For the quality of communication between both :1) stakeholders/beneficiaries and EU Del; and 2) EU Del and HQs the human factor was essential and kept coming back in discussions**

Agenda

- **Reminder of the objectives of the mission and activities undertaken**
- **Mission findings per evaluation question and discussion**
- **Next steps**

Next Steps

- **End of June** Finalisation of field missions & compilation of findings
- **July** Presentation of Field Phase to the Reference Group
- **July – August** Synthesis phase
- **End August** Submission of Draft Final Report
- **End September** Submission of Final Report

We would like to thank the EU Delegation for its support in the course of this mission

Evaluation of the European Commission's support to private sector development in third countries (2004-2010)

Country mission to South Africa

Debriefing to the EU Delegation

Pretoria, 19 June 2012



*This document is designed as support to the oral presentation
and is not intended to be used separately*

Objectives

Objectives of today's debriefing

- Provide an overview of the mission activities & findings
- Have a discussion on mission findings
- Provide information on next steps

Agenda


- **Reminder of the objectives of the mission and activities undertaken**
- **Mission findings per evaluation question and discussion**
- **Next steps**

Evaluation subject, purpose and scope

(Reminder)

Subject	Evaluation of the European Commission's (EC) support to private sector development (PSD) in third countries (strategy-level, multi-country)
Purpose	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide an overall independent assessment of EC's past and current support to PSD • Identify key lessons for improving the EC's strategies and programmes
Scope	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • All types of PSD support, excl. trade-related assistance • Overall EC support, not country- or instrument-specific • All third countries, except OECD & DG ENLARG countries • All EC funding vehicles & modalities • 2004-2010

**This is an evaluation of the Commission's overall support to PSD
It is not an evaluation of the support at country level as such**



Why we selected South Africa

(Reminder)

South Africa

South Africa (SA)...

- ...represents 9% of total Commission support to PSD worldwide (2004-2010)
- ...fills a key role in Southern African region (in both trade and diplomatic terms)
- ...is the location of two Sector Budget Support (SBS) interventions specifically targeting PSD


We focused on 3 interventions:


- Economic Cluster Programme of Action: €20m contribution (SBS)
- Risk Capital Facility II: €49.7m contribution (SBS)
- Local economic development support programme in Kwazulu Natal: €33.8m

Objective: collect information to feed into the overall thematic evaluation (and not to evaluate aid to a specific project or country)

6

EC private sector development support in South Africa		
<i>(Reminder)</i>		
Interventions	Duration	Contracted Amount
Innovation for Poverty Alleviation	2007-2011	€59.6m
Economic Cluster Programme of Action: €20m contribution	2006-2013	€20m
Risk Capital Facility II	2006-2013	€49.7m
Support For The SADC Finance & Investment Protocol (FISCU)	2006-2013	€1.5m
Sustainable Rural Development in Eastern Cape (SURUDEC)	2006-2013	€10.1m
Local economic development support programme in Kwazulu Natal	2003-2012	€33.8m
1999/21 - EU-SADC Investment Promotion (ESIP)	1999-2009	€2.6m
TOTAL AMOUNT CONTRACTED:		€177.3m

 **Largest contracted amount among Sub-Saharan African countries**

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Activities undertaken during mission: 13 to 19 June
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ EU Briefing & Debriefing: 13 June & 19 June ■ Interviews: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - EU Delegation: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Head of Delegation: Roeland van de Geer • Head of Operations: Richard Young • Project Officers: Pilar Rodriguez Blanco; Milly Cheshire; Natalie D'Olio; Matabo Le Roux; Gerhard Pienaar - National Authorities & Beneficiaries: Industrial Development Corporation, National Treasury, Department for Trade & Investment, Municipal government (KwaZuluNatal) - Other donors: L'Agence Français de Développement (AFD), Dutch Embassy, U.K. Dep. for International Development (DFID), European Investment Bank (EIB) ■ Project visits to each of the 3 PSD case study activities: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Local Economic Development KZN (Pietermaritzburg): Corridor Shoes, Project Gateway - Risk Capital Facility II (Gauteng & KwaZuluNatal): Oteo Constructoin, Utho Capital - Employment Creation Fund (Pretoria) SPX South Africa

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Agenda

- Reminder of the objectives of the mission and activities undertaken
- Mission findings per evaluation question and discussion
- Next steps

Evaluation Questions

EQ 1	Evolution of EC policies & programming
EQ 2	Strategic approach
EQ 3	Funding Vehicles and Modalities
EQ 4	Institutional and regulatory frameworks
EQ 5	Access to finance
EQ 6	Fostering enterprises competitiveness
EQ 7	Investment promotion
EQ 8	Employment
EQ 9	Commission added-value
EQ 10	Means provided

EQ1 – Evolution of Commission policies & programming

To what extent did the Commission's PSD strategy and programming take into account (1) the recommendations of the 2005 evaluation and (2) the evolution of the wider private sector context?

- **Commission** documents & stakeholders provided, as a basis for the support, an analysis of the **specificities of the South African (SA) context**, including:

SA is a middle income country, with low aid-dependence & an important regional & international role

- *Middle income BRICS country:*
 - 50% of total Sub-Saharan Africa GDP, 75% SADC GDP
 - Dual economy: significant gap between "first" and "second" economies
- SA plays an important role both in the region and worldwide
- EU role in SA: (70% ODA to SA), but overall ODA represents only 1% of Government of South Africa (GoSA) budget and 0.3% of GNP
- EU is the biggest trading partner (40% imports and exports; 70% of FDI (valued at 34% of SA GDP in 2010)
- GoSA partnership strengths:
 - Several national poverty reduction strategies already exist,
 - GoSA is more accountable to population than in heavily aided countries

EQ1 – Evolution of Commission policies & programming

- Taking into account these specificities, the Commission's development cooperation in SA was **geared towards the promotion of pro poor sustainable growth** (employment generation, reducing inequality, developing skills, tackling social exclusion)
- In this context, **even if a substantial share of interventions were directly or indirectly PSD related, they were not part of a strategy targeting PSD support in its own right**, but rather they fell under the broader umbrella of alignment with national strategies including the black economic empowerment (BEE) strategy and local economic development plans
- Other elements:
 - No reference found to the (recommendations of the) 2005 evaluation at EU Delegation level

EQ2 – Strategic approach

To what extent was Commission support to PSD part of a strategic approach geared towards the overall objectives of EU external policy, whilst aligning with the priorities of the country and maximizing its value added, including in terms of synergies with other actors and other types of Commission support?

- *South Africa is a Middle income BRICS country:*
 - 50% SSA GDP, 75% SADC GDP
- Through the BEE and other relevant national strategies, the **PSD-related activities were geared towards poverty alleviation**
- Given the SA context, **alignment and value-added (VA) lay at the heart of the Commission's approach**, which ensured that Commission support was geared by its potential VA in a middle income country with a low and sustainable budget deficit:
 - “Not the finance itself, but what comes with it” is key, i.e. importing international best practices, innovation, risk taking, pilot programmes, skills & knowledge at local level
 - Privileging demonstration effects with a view to ensure future (wider) take-up by the SA government
- In this sense, **interventions responded to needs, but to what extent were these the priority needs?**
 - Some EUD analysis of government priorities took place (e.g., Vision 2030 strategy and EDF11 programming) but beyond this alignment was prioritised

EQ2 – Strategic approach

- **Commission-EIB synergies have been valorised, but have also been challenged by priorities in terms of alignment:**
 - Commission and the EIB are two key players in the country: together representing 45% of ODA in South Africa (25% and 20%, respectively, EU MS 25%)
 - There were good examples of the use of Commission-EIB complementarities (RCF II, where EIB provided TA)
 - But the EIB has not always been envisaged as a privileged partner: potential tension between the necessity to align and the combined assets of EU bodies in SA
- **Donors exchanged information but remained wedded to their own priorities in close collaboration with the government: “level of coordination among donors is quite small, except in the health sector”**
 - Evidence of information exchange but not always of mutual awareness of activities
 - Not many examples of common donor programmes (exceptions include the Risk Capital Facility II)
 - More substantially: quite different point of entry between some donors (White Book) and the Commission (BEE and other relevant national strategies)
- **Little evidence of dialogue with the private sector**

EQ2 – Strategic approach

- Cross cutting issues:
 - **In the project and programming documents, there was a clear commitment to the incorporation of CCIs** (HIV/AIDS, gender, environment protection, capacity building, including PPPs, good governance and innovation)
 - Available evaluations/review confirmed the incorporation of some of these CCIs
 - But for some of these, GoSA already had quite stringent requirements (notably gender & historically disadvantaged persons)
- Relation to TDCA:
 - **Trade negotiations implications for PSD were not systematically foreseen during PSD programming design**
 - Some PSD programming had positive impacts on exports (e.g., Risk Capital Facility II, but this was ad hoc)

Other issues:

- **No general practice of mainstreaming PSD support in support to other sectors**
- No evidence found of consideration of the decent work agenda within employment generation programming (references found in the government's New Growth Plan (2010))

EQ3 – Funding Vehicles and Modalities

To what extent did the set of Commission Funding Vehicles and Modalities for supporting PSD strategies and activities of partner countries and regions result in the provision of timely responses, at a reasonable cost, to the challenges faced by the private sector in third countries, whilst fostering synergies with each other and with instruments provided by other actors?

- One limitation of the funding vehicles in South Africa was the **absence of an investment facility type vehicle** (compensated to a certain extent by the creation of the RCF)
- **A substantial share of support was provided through SBS, considered as the privileged approach.** The **rationale** behind this choice pointed to specific advantages of BS; but also to elements that are to a certain extent "external" to SBS in the SA context
 - **Specific advantages invoked:**
 - Broad consensus that the country fitted the SBS criteria
 - Interviewees provided examples of advantages: e.g. RCF I to II: transition from project approach to SBS allowed beneficiaries to adapt to pipeline uncertainty by escaping the D+3 rule, so as to privilege quality over fast disbursement
 - **"External" elements:**
 - The choice was to a large extent motivated by compliance with EU policy (injunction from HQ)
 - Some evidence that SBS was used in order to overcome the constraints of project-approaches, rather than as a means to supporting beneficiary ownership

EQ3 – Funding Vehicles and Modalities

- **Questions were also raised regarding the implementation of SBS:**
 - A number of reporting requirements were felt not to be in line with the spirit of BS
 - Some interlocutors regretted that it was not possible to maintain a project approach combined with SA procedures for reporting
 - Several stakeholders stated that SBS was understood at some levels (e.g. National Treasury) but not others (particularly in rural municipalities)
- **Commission procedures were considered heavy, but some interlocutors argued that other donor procedures were even more so. Some mentioned also a “learning effect”**
- The level of intervention (supra-national, national, sub-national) was coherent with the overall approach of aligning to the government's growth agenda:
 - Some interventions were made at the municipal level:
 - With some difficulties seen due to municipal capacity
 - Some interlocutors raised questions about usefulness of “*developing municipal capacity to comply with Commission procedures*”
 - Very few interventions at the supra-national level

EQ4 – Institutional and regulatory frameworks

To what extent did the Commission contribute to making the institutional and regulatory (I&R) framework more conducive to PSD?

- Even if it was not mentioned as the most urgent need, **several sources underlined the importance of tackling I&R obstacles** (corruption, red tape, even the BEE framework was mentioned as a constraint)
- **But this was not part of the Commission's PSD strategy**
- The EC has leverage potential on the basis of trade partnership, rather than development cooperation: EU accounts for
 - One third of SA total trade with the world
 - 88% of FDI in SA – valued at 34% GDP in 2010.
- EUD has raised the issues of red tape and regulatory burdens with the Government of South Africa, but with limited impact to date. This could be further pursued with coordinated effort between trade and development sections of the EUD, notably in the context of Busan and the Decent Work Agenda.

EQ5 – Access to finance

To what extent did the Commission contribute to improving enterprises' access to finance?

- **There is broad consensus that access to finance is an important constraint for SMEs**
- **The Commission has devoted substantial efforts to this issue:**
 - There was one key programme that targeted access to finance: RCF responded in particular to the finance gap apparent for SMEs of a particular size, which was not previously provided by IDC or any other major investor
 - The mid term review of RCF II indicates that the programme was successful (see results on next slide)
 - Indications of good sustainability and demonstration effect:
 - RCF still operational, with significant funds left
 - Reflections ongoing for government buy-in
- **Some limitations were also mentioned:**
 - Questions about the development targets, given the R3m min. loan threshold
 - However, newly created IDC subsidiary, Small Enterprise Finance Agency, will do similar things, as well as concentrating on investments below R3m

Risk Capital Facility II – Results achieved at mid-term: over 50% achievement for most targets

	Target defined in FA	Achieved as of 11.2009*
# SMEs funded	70	41
# jobs created	6000	3,829
Max. cost per job	R60,000	38,197
Sustainability	100% reflow of funds**	No estimates yet, but RCF I expected to reach 100%
HDP ownership	All investees to have 25% HDP ownership 1 yr after investment	Exceeded: Min. HDP holding is 28%; average 83%
BSS provision	€5m BSS allocation to be used during RCF II lifecycle	€66,000 used, by 6 investees
Environment & HIV	Investees to establish env. & HIV plans	All investees have env. % HIV plans
# Investments outside S.A.	15	0
# HDP jobs outside S.A.	500	0

* Adapted from the Mid-Term Review of the Risk Capital Facility II (2009)

** After deduction of IDC management fee

EQ6 – Fostering enterprises' competitiveness

To what extent did the Commission contribute to enterprises' - in particular SMEs' – improved ability to compete and to access technology and new markets?

- **Not a focus of Commission activities, although some activities were undertaken**
- **RCF II aimed to include BSS in finance provision**, specifically addressing the absence of such support in RCF I:
 - But take-up was very low: 1% of total BSS allocation by end of 2009.
 - MTR suggests this resulted from a “hands-off” approach: i.e., the prevalence of subordinated unsecured loans (85% in terms of loan numbers), rather than “real” equity provision: so little possibility to promote BSS among investees
- **KZN Local Economic Development Programme included activities to support enterprise competitiveness** (e.g. support in accessing new technology, assistance with business plan development and implementation): delivery proved challenging in some respects:
 - R80m (plus R50m leveraged private sector investments) provided through demand-driven grants for 84 projects
 - Demand driven element led to creation, in some cases, of partnerships for the sake of the grant only, rather than sustainable entities.
 - Final Report cited strict interpretation of EU procedures as a contribution to delays

EQ7 – Investment promotion

To what extent did Commission support contribute to increased cross-border investment in partner countries' private sectors?

- **Not a focus of Commission activities**
- One activity was undertaken during the evaluation period - EU-SADC Investment Promotion (ESIP):
 - ESIP was a multi-sector (mining, tourism, lighting,...) investment promotion activity aimed at fostering investment relations between EU and SADC countries
 - It was mentioned that investment promotion meetings were good in their own right, but lacking follow up:
 - Participants to the events signed letters of intent for future collaboration
 - But no evidence was found of follow up activities to monitor investment relationships resulting from the meetings

EQ8 – Employment

To what extent has the Commission PSD support contributed to facilitating the generation of employment?

- **Employment generation was at the heart of the Commission's strategy in SA**
- Under this umbrella, the approach of the Commission was **not to see employment as one of the objectives of PSD support, but rather to see PSD support as one of the means to generate employment**
- Despite the recognition of the role of SMMEs and the 2nd economy in tackling unemployment, **Commission support did not specifically target the 2nd economy**:
 - *"It is hoped that the growth of the SMMEs will boost the 2nd economy and reduce unemployment"* (CSP 2007-2013)
 - But no activities directly targeted the informal economy
- Regarding monitoring of employment effects:
 - **Employment effects were monitored** (but some reservations found in RCF II MTR regarding monitoring of employment over time)
 - But **uncertainty was seen on the appropriate calibration of employment targets**, in terms of jobs created or cost per job or duration of a sustainable job (>6 months? > 12 months?)

EQ9 – Commission added-value

What was the Commission's added value (AV) when providing support to PSD in third countries?

- **Providing added value was at the heart of the Commission's strategy** (c.f. EQ2), specifically focusing on provision of innovative support with demonstration effect with a view to future scalability by the GoSA
- There is **evidence to support the demonstration effect** (e.g. RCF II, LED)
- **But there were no mechanisms to ensure that EU expertise at headquarters was valorised in this respect** (e.g. DG ENTR, DG RESEARCH)
- Several actors underlined the added value of Commission blending mechanisms elsewhere (NIF, LAIF, EIB IF), whilst noting the potential for a similar facility with a mandate in South Africa
- The Commission is **maintaining a development cooperation perspective in South Africa**, including in its PSD support; this is not the case for several other EU MS donors

EQ10 – Means provided

To what extent were the Commission's organisational set-up and management practices fit to a successful implementation of its PSD support?

- As noted under EQ9, **there were no specific mechanisms to ensure that EU Delegations can benefit from the private sector expertise present at HQ level across other DGs.**
- **Limited awareness of PSD Guidelines at EUD level.**
- Would be a good idea to emulate knowledge-sharing practices in other areas, e.g:
 - Microfinance: EC HQ's microfinance focal point provides useful information to EUDs
 - Local Economic Development: South Africa's LED network or ILO's LED online portal provides useful information for EUDs working on LED.
 - But in EC HQ, LED as a term is not recognised (its labelled "regional development" instead); this makes it harder to access HQ expertise
- **A PSD focal point could provide, *inter alia*: guidelines, workshops, details of PSD activities and best practices in other countries**
- No specific constraints were mentioned for human resources in PSD. But some evidence suggests that EUD staff were unaware of whom to contact at HQ for PSD support.
- Several stakeholders underlined that EUD staff are well informed on PSD needs

Agenda

- **Reminder of the objectives of the mission and activities undertaken**
- **Mission findings per evaluation question and discussion**
- **Next steps**

Next Steps

- **End of June** Finalisation of field missions & compilation of findings
- **July** Presentation of Field Phase to the Reference Group
- **July – August** Synthesis phase
- **End August** Submission of Draft Final Report
- **End September** Submission of Final Report

Evaluation of the European Commission's support to private sector development in third countries (2004-2010)

Country mission to the Ukraine

Debriefing to the EU Delegation

Kiev, 24 May 2012



*This document is designed as support to the oral presentation
and is not intended to be used separately*

Objectives

Objectives of today's debriefing

- Provide an overview of the mission activities & findings
- Have a discussion on mission findings
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Agenda


- **Reminder of the objectives of the mission and activities undertaken**
- **Mission findings per evaluation question and discussion**
- **Next steps**

Evaluation subject, purpose and scope

(Reminder)

Subject	Evaluation of the European Commission's (EC) support to private sector development (PSD) in third countries (strategy-level, multi-country)
Purpose	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide an overall independent assessment of EC's past and current support to PSD • Identify key lessons for improving the EC's strategies and programmes
Scope	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • All types of PSD support, excl. trade-related assistance • Overall EC support, not country- or instrument-specific • All third countries, except OECD & DG ENLARG countries • All EC funding vehicles & modalities • 2004-2010

**This is an evaluation of the Commission's overall support to PSD
It is not an evaluation of the support at country level as such**



Why we selected the Ukraine

(Reminder)

Ukraine

Ukraine (UKR)...

- ... 21st largest recipient of EC *direct* support to PSD worldwide (SBS incl.) out of 102 in total;
- ... A TACIS/ENPI-East country, the 3rd largest recipient region (11% of total);
- ... “Support to the Private Sector and Assistance for Economic Development” one of the 3 focal areas under 2002-2006 CSP, and PSD supported under 2007-2013 CSP “Support for Regulatory Reform and Administrative Capacity Building” focal area
- ... varied PSD support: support to banking /financial sector, to SME access to finance, to micro-lending, technological transfer, to entrepreneurship; received NIF funding (EBRD managed).

We focused on 2 interventions:

- SME Support in Priority Regions - Ukraine: €2.7m contracted
- EU Contribution to EBRD Ukraine Micro Lending Programme Regional Expansion : €1.4m contracted

Objective: collect information to feed into the overall thematic evaluation (and not to evaluate aid to a specific project or country)

6

EC private sector development support in Ukraine

(Reminder)

Interventions	Duration	Contracted
Strengthening of Ukrainian Financial Services Sector	2008	€3.7m
Support to the Ukrainian Insurance Sector	2006	€2.9m
SME Support in Priority Regions - Ukraine	2006	€2.7m
Bank sector reform	2004	€2.7m
Support to the Development of Business Capacity of Ukrainian SMEs – International Dimension	2007	€2m
Improvement of Risk Management Capacity of SMEs in Agriculture	2005	€33.8m
Ukraine Micro-Lending Programme Regional Expansion; EU Contribution to EBRD Ukraine Micro Lending Programme Regional Expansion 2008-2009	2006;2007	€2.9m
EU Contribution to the EBRD SME Finance Support to Regional Banks and Banks with Large Regional Branch Network	2007	€1m
IFC SME Policy Project 2005-2006	2006	€0.5m
TOTAL AMOUNT CONTRACTED (not all PSD projects are included above):		€30m

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Activities undertaken during mission: 21 to 25 May

- **EU Briefing and Debriefing: Monday 21 and Thursday 24 May**
- **Interviews (21 to 25 May):**
 - **EU Delegation:** Head of Economic Cooperation Section, Sector Manager Private sector development/Innovative economy; Sector Manager, Technical Barriers to Trade, Financial Services; Economic and Trade Section officials
 - **Ukrainian officials:** representative of former State Committee of Ukraine for Regulatory Policy and Entrepreneurship (SCURPE)
 - **EU/international donors:** EBRD, GIZ, CIDA, IFC, Sweden
 - **Project actors and private sector actors/representatives:**
 - Implementing partners: EBRD, consultants for “SME Support in Priority Regions”
 - Private sector actors/representatives: Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), Fortecia (SME interest group), All-Ukrainian Center of Business Assistance, Kreditprom bank

Agenda

- Reminder of the objectives of the mission and activities undertaken
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Evaluation Questions

EQ 1	Evolution of EC policies & programming
EQ 2	Strategic approach
EQ 3	Funding Vehicles and Modalities
EQ 4	Institutional and regulatory frameworks
EQ 5	Access to finance
EQ 6	Fostering enterprises competitiveness
EQ 7	Investment promotion
EQ 8	Employment
EQ 9	Commission added-value
EQ 10	Means provided

EQ1 – Evolution of Commission policies & programming

To what extent did the Commission's PSD strategy and programming take into account (1) the recommendations of the 2005 evaluation and (2) the evolution of the wider private sector context?

With respect to the recommendations of the 2005 evaluation

- Evolution over the period covered: Shift towards a focus at the "macro" level (Legal approximation and institutional capacity building) in the 2nd part of period covered
- No indications of lack of common vision on PSD between HQ and EUD

In terms of taking into account the wider PS context:

- The expiry of the PCA launched the start of the AA.
- In terms of adaptation to the financial crisis of 2008:
 - Initiatives were taken (e.g. Programme of EBRD)
 - Interlocutors met stated that this was done swiftly
- Distinction between 2 periods over 2004-2010:
 - 2004-2005: Orange Revolution changed EC's assistance strategy and intensified the dialogue & assistance. Change in political context also contributed to start of AA negotiations from 2007. AA negotiation areas were reflected in NIP's goals and as such treated as priorities
 - 2009-2010, difficult to provide support to PSD in an institutional and political context that did not aim at favouring PSD (see EQ 2)

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EQ2 – Strategic approach

To what extent was Commission support to PSD part of a strategic approach geared towards the overall objectives of EU external policy, whilst aligning with the priorities of the country and maximizing its value added, including in terms of synergies with other actors and other types of Commission support?

- Clear strategic framework: as of 2007 the AA – Overall objective is stability – less on PSD
- Evolution over the period in terms of prioritization:
 - The needs of the PS in Ukraine have been extremely wide and substantial (WB ranking)
 - Support provided over the period covered was "relevant" but not always addressing the most urgent needs till 2007
 - Shift more recently to institutional and regulatory reform. Stakeholders met underlined:
 - That this has been a key priority need: stakeholders considered regulations and practices as obsolete and detrimental to PSD; other support might not be sustainable
 - That the Commission has assets to play an important role in this respect (see EQ on VA)

ADE 12

EQ2 – Strategic approach

- Alignment posed important challenges:
 - Government has strategy documents that include provisions on PSD support
 - Stakeholders met generally consider that statements are not rooted in a genuine will to devote efforts to PSD (e.g. SCURPE – EC counterpart in PSD/SME support – was liquidated in 2010)
 - In absence of committed counterparts, EC response has been to support CSOs in their lobbying functions, work at the regional-level (infra and supra) & conduct policy dialogue
- Efforts have been made to enhance synergies with other actors:
 - Over 1st part of evaluation period: little donor coordination except on support to financial sector & SMEs. Consisted in exchange of information, some distribution of labour. But no genuine common strategies, each actor having also its particular interests/priorities
 - Difficult context has been an incentive to increase donor coordination (e.g. High-level donor group) and agree on approach which consisted of working at regional and CSO levels, vs. through governmental bodies/at central level.
- On CCI and Decent Work Agenda: Efforts have been made (e.g. green energy calls, green tourism, support to female entrepreneurship, to equal opportunities in BDS, local ecological projects) but no clear overview on extent to which CCIs have been systematically streamlined.

EQ3 – Funding Vehicles and Modalities

To what extent did the set of Commission Funding Vehicles and Modalities for supporting PSD strategies and activities of partner countries and regions result in the provision of timely responses, at a reasonable cost, to the challenges faced by the private sector in third countries, whilst fostering synergies with each other and with instruments provided by other actors?

- Funding instruments:
 - Use of LT instruments has been an indication of EC commitment to launching structural changes
 - Rigidity of programming is the drawback of LT instrument which is not always adapted to an unstable administrative and political context such as UKR
 - On centralised and decentralised operations:
 - some problems of lack of communication between what is done directly by other DGs and by EUD, *and*
 - late consultation of EUD when development at HQ of regional programmes, under the NIF, political initiatives, Eastern Partnership Programme, Black Sea programmes.

EQ3 – Funding Vehicles and Modalities

To what extent did the set of Commission Funding Vehicles and Modalities for supporting PSD strategies and activities of partner countries and regions result in the provision of timely responses, at a reasonable cost, to the challenges faced by the private sector in third countries, whilst fostering synergies with each other and with instruments provided by other actors?

- Funding modalities: not well adapted to a context like the one in Ukraine:
 - The key priority are institutional and regulatory reforms:
 - BS would be the privileged instrument in this respect, but not appropriate given the political situation and lack of sector strategy
 - Project support posed several problems:
 - Sustainability challenged by lack of reforms at “macro” level
 - High level of corruption: always high risk of vested interests
- Policy dialogue remains key: stakeholders underline importance of linking project assistance with policy dialogue.

EQ4 – Institutional and regulatory frameworks

To what extent did the Commission contribute to making the institutional and regulatory (I&R) framework more conducive to PSD?

- Evolution over the period: with the PCA, and AA negotiations, legal approximation and institutional capacity building have increasingly become main cooperation priority
- Stakeholders met underlined that institutional and regulatory reform :
 - has been a key priority need: stakeholders consider regulations and practices as obsolete and detrimental to PSD; other support might not be sustainable without it
 - are areas where the Commission had a mandate (AA) to act in: structural/I&R level changes
- But particularly difficult to implement in the country due to:
 - lack of political will and instability of the context
 - Difficulty to conduct dialogue with private sector as it is not well structured and not well voiced.
- As a consequence results remain limited.

EQ5 – Access to finance

To what extent did the Commission contribute to improving enterprises' access to finance?

- Stakeholders considered access to finance as a major problem (very high interest rates)
- Focus on I&R but other activities (to financial intermediaries) also supported, mainly to the supply side:
 - strengthening financial regulation and supervision, less on access to finance. Part of the PCA as well as the DCFTA & AA negotiations that include items on financial regulations, anti-money laundering, joint-stock issues, transparency. Important component of the cooperation with UKR over 2004-2010, e.g. Strengthening of Ukrainian financial services sector (2008)
 - Support to financial intermediaries, e.g. Bank sector reform (2004), EBRD UMLP (2006)
- Some positive results mentioned, but not enough information to provide an assessment of results in general. Example: EBRD UMLP: quick reaction of the Commission to revise approach further to 2008 crisis: consultancy switched from growth and outreach to how to stabilize banks
- Further policy of the Commission with respect to access to finance?

EQ6 – Fostering enterprises' competitiveness

To what extent did the Commission contribute to enterprises' - in particular SMEs' – improved ability to compete and to access technology and new markets?

- Activities
 - Two instruments of EBRD with Commission contributions (Enterprise growth programme et Business Advisory Services)
 - Three projects with SMEs: SME support in priority regions in Ukraine, Business Capacity of Ukrainian SMEs – International Dimension, SME Charter Political dialogue
- Difficult to obtain impact as no Government commitment; even stronger risk in terms of sustainability
- Stakeholders generally underlined the importance in the Ukrainian context of strengthening and voicing intermediaries such as business associations, networks
- BSO have been weak, strong reliance on donor money, very instable, illprotected; some have independence questioned.
- However wider impact limited by liquidation of SCURPE in 2010.

EQ7 – Investment promotion

To what extent did Commission support contribute to increased cross-border investment in partner countries' private sectors?

This was not part of the activities over the period considered

EQ8 – Employment

To what extent has the Commission PSD support contributed to facilitating the generation of employment?

- Employment not main objective of EC PSD support in UKR but indirect link
- PSD support did not explicitly refer to employment creation, but the ultimate objective has been support to stability and to the rise of a middle-class in the country, with implications in terms of quality employment.

EQ9 – Commission added-value

What was the Commission's added value (AV) when providing support to PSD in third countries?

- Political leverage potential :
 - Major donor capable of providing critical mass of funding
 - Positive image of the EU among substantial part of population
 - Importance of the AA and linked political dialogue
 - Continued presence whereas some other donors stop cooperation considering Ukraine a middle income country
- But very difficult to materialise this potential due to the political situation
- Other types of value added at project level:
 - Catalytic effect for projects:
 - Commission presence provides confidence to and attracts other (potential) partners
 - Prestigious donor (also leverage effect towards authorities)

EQ10 – Means provided

To what extent were the Commission's organisational set-up and management practices fit to a successful implementation of its PSD support?

- Devolution:
 - Advantage of being closer to the country
 - No specific difficulties mentioned in terms of linkages EUD – HQ, including with other DGs
- HR:
 - PSD expertise available within EUD; Sector managers selected based on their expertise; participation to a training in Jordan.
 - Some stakeholders questioned to what extent sufficient HR available to ensure sufficient follow-up
- No specific information on capitalisation on PSD support.

Agenda

- **Reminder of the objectives of the mission and activities undertaken**
- **Mission findings per evaluation question and discussion**
- **Next steps**

Next Steps

- **End of June** Finalisation of field missions & compilation of findings
- **July** Presentation of Field Phase to the Reference Group
- **July – August** Synthesis phase
- **End August** Submission of Draft Final Report
- **End September** Submission of Final Report

Evaluation of the European Commission's support to private sector development in third countries (2004-2010)

Country mission to Vietnam

Debriefing to the EU Delegation

Hanoi, 3 July 2012



*This document is designed as support to the oral presentation
and is not intended to be used separately*

Objectives



Objectives of today's debriefing

- Provide an overview of the mission activities & findings
- Have a discussion on mission findings
- Provide information on next steps

ADE

Agenda

- **Reminder of the objectives of the mission and activities undertaken**
- **Mission findings per evaluation question and discussion**
- **Next steps**

3

ADE

Evaluation subject, purpose and scope



(Reminder)

Subject	Evaluation of the European Commission's (EC) support to private sector development (PSD) in third countries (strategy-level, multi-country)
Purpose	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide an overall independent assessment of EC's past and current support to PSD • Identify key lessons for improving the EC's strategies and programmes
Scope	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • All types of PSD support, excl. trade-related assistance • Overall EC support, not country- or instrument-specific • All third countries, except OECD & DG ENLARG countries • All EC funding vehicles & modalities • 2004-2010

This is an evaluation of the Commission's overall support to PSD
It is not an evaluation of the support at country level as such

Source: Terms of Reference

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ADE

Why we selected Vietnam

(Reminder)

Vietnam
<p>Vietnam is...</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> An Asian country A lower middle income economy, with strong growth and notable integration into the world economy during evaluation period (c.f. WTO accession) A pilot country in terms of donor coordination Host to significant and consistent Budget Support activities (PRSC 3-9) Host to 8 PSD interventions in our global inventory: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Total €285.2m commitment Broad range of intervention types: SME support, access to finance, I&R reforms, among others
<p>Objective: collect information to feed into the overall thematic evaluation (and not to evaluate aid to a specific project or country)</p>

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ADE

EC private sector development support in Vietnam

(Reminder)

Decision Year	Interventions	Contracted Amount	Support Vehicle
2007	SWITCH-Asia , Promoting Sustainable Consumption and Production	€24.5m	Direct
▶ 2002	ETV2 : European Technical Assistance Programme Vietnam	€10.6m	Direct
2000	SMEDF II : Small and Medium Enterprises Development Fund	€9.5m	Direct
2010	Environmentally and Socially Responsible Tourism Capacity Development Programme	€4.6m	Direct
2002	Asia Invest Programme 2006-2007	€31.4m	Direct
2003	SPF : Small Projects Facility	€1.5m	Direct
▶ 2003	VPSSP : Vietnam Private Sector Support Programme	€7.9m	Direct
▶ 2004 - 2008	PRSC : Support to Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy PRSC 3-9	€99.8m	GBS
TOTAL AMOUNT CONTRACTED:		€285.2m	


* Direct support includes both individual projects and sector budget support

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**Activities undertaken:
24 meetings held between 25 June to 3 July** 

- **EU Briefing: 25th June**
- **Meetings 25th June – 3rd July:**
 - **EU Delegation:**
 - Head of Cooperation: Berenice Muraille
 - Programme Officers: Nguyen Thi Thu Hang, Hoang Thanh, Natividad Lorenzo, Tuan Anh
 - Trade & Economic Section: Madeleine Kihlberg; Le Ky Anh
 - **Government of Vietnam:** Ministry of Planning & Investment; Hanoi Authority for Planning & Investment; Ministry of Industry & Trade
 - **Other donors:** DANIDA, DFID, SNV, JICA, Swiss, UNIDO, IFC, ADB
 - **Project visits:**
 - Hanoi Province Incubator
 - **Other stakeholders:** Vietnam Chamber of Commerce & Industry; Hanoi Young Business Association; Women's Business Association; Dr Ngyuen Van Hang, National Economics University
 - **Conference: Closure of Italian/UNIDO project: "SME Cluster Development"**
- **EU Debriefing 3rd July**

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Agenda 

- **Reminder of the mission scope, objectives, findings & activities undertaken**
- **Mission findings per evaluation question and discussion**
- **Next steps**

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Evaluation Questions	
EQ 1	Evolution of EC policies & programming
EQ 2	Strategic approach
EQ 3	Funding Vehicles and Modalities
EQ 4	Institutional and regulatory frameworks
EQ 5	Access to finance
EQ 6	Fostering enterprises competitiveness
EQ 7	Investment promotion
EQ 8	Employment
EQ 9	Commission added-value
EQ 10	Means provided

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EQ1 – Evolution of Commission policies & programming

To what extent did the Commission's PSD strategy and programming take into account the recommendations of the 2005 evaluation and the evolution of the overall private sector environment?

- **Between 2004 and 2010, the Commission's involvement with PSD support has evolved:**
 - Until 2007, the EC was providing support to private sector (PS) as a formal element of its country strategy (situated within support to enhance integration into the world economy)
 - From 2007 onwards, the EC withdrew from specific support to PSD but included some related activities, for instance under trade related assistance (e.g. MUTRAP III)
- **These approaches were based on specific considerations:**
 - 1st period: recognition of PSD importance to the evolving economy
 - 2nd period: shift away from PSD based on analysis of significant donor presence in this field and the need to focus on limited number of sectors

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EQ1 – Evolution of Commission policies & programming

To what extent did the Commission's PSD strategy and programming take into account the recommendations of the 2005 evaluation and the evolution of the overall private sector environment?

- **No specific reference to international developments for the design of EC interventions** (e.g. financial crisis, emergence of the BRICS)
- **Some knowledge but little use of the 2005 evaluation:**
 - The evaluation was disseminated to the EUD by HQ.
 - EUD then circulated to PSD beneficiaries.
 - But little use was made of it since the EUD was pulling out of PSD at the time.
- **Linkages between PSD support and poverty reduction are not so clear**

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EQ2 – Strategic approach

To what extent was Commission support to PSD in partner countries part of a strategic approach geared to the overall objectives of EU External Policy, while aligning with the priorities of the country or region and maximizing its VA, inc. in terms of synergies with other actors and other types of Commission support?

- **Commission support to PSD was implemented under the umbrella of integration into the world economy rather than poverty reduction**
- **EC support was aligned to government growth and reform strategies**
 - However, many stakeholders raised questions about the extent of government commitment to, and capacity for, PSD
- **Prioritisation and VA (see EQ1)**
- **Indications that donor coordination on PSD issues took place early in the period but that later on coordination was weak:**
 - Vietnam was a pilot country for donor coordination; with coordination groups operational in the years 2005 and 2006
 - Stakeholders report that coordination is weak or nonexistent and that many donors are more tied to national/commercial relations than poverty reduction
 - Interaction with EIB was at best exchange of information

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EQ2 – Strategic approach

To what extent was Commission support to PSD in partner countries part of a strategic approach geared to the overall objectives of EU External Policy, while aligning with the priorities of the country or region and maximizing its VA, inc. in terms of synergies with other actors and other types of Commission support?

- **Few bridges and limited synergies evident between PSD and TRA support:**
 - Synergies are limited by different perspectives: it's hard to build synergies without threatening coherence of trade and development policies
- Cross cutting issues have, at best, been integrated in only a formal manner

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EQ3 – Instruments & modalities

To what extent did the set of Commission instruments and financing modalities for supporting PSD strategies and activities of partner countries and regions result in the provision of timely responses, at a reasonable cost, to the challenges faced by the private sector in third countries, while fostering synergies with each other and with instruments offered by other actors?

- **Little questioning of the appropriateness of the set of instruments for PSD,** except at the micro level
- **In general, Budget Support was used as a means to promote harmonisation and alignment in Vietnam.** But w.r.t. PSD elements of SBS programmes, questions emerged about the Gov. capacity and commitment to PSD
- **Coordination with centralised operations consisted mainly in exchange of information; it did not aim at enhancing synergies with the Country strategy.** Questionable regional added value, particularly re. plugging lessons learned from Vietnam into regional level

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EQ3 – Instruments & modalities

To what extent did the set of Commission instruments and financing modalities for supporting PSD strategies and activities of partner countries and regions result in the provision of timely responses, at a reasonable cost, to the challenges faced by the private sector in third countries, while fostering synergies with each other and with instruments offered by other actors?

■ **In terms of delays:**

- Delays were observed in several interventions for classical reasons such as incorrect planning (e.g. ETV2)
- In case of VPSSP, time required for local authorities to understand EU procedures was also cited, whilst final evaluation argues the capacity built will be lost at programme end, when contract personnel will cease involvement
 - NB. It was noted that use of EU procedures is the only option where local procedures don't meet international standards

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EQ4 – Institutional and regulatory frameworks

To what extent did the Commission contribute to making the institutional and regulatory (I&R) framework more conducive to PSD?

■ **I&R reform was at the heart of the Commission's PSD activities**

- Significant I&R developments over the evaluation period (e.g. Enterprise Law, reforms to Land Law and Customs Law)
- But it is not clear what the specific role of the Commission was in bringing new policies about

■ **Rather, EC activities appeared to target policy implementation and institutional reforms, e.g.:**

- PSSH final report shows mixed results on I&R reforms:
 - Business registration «one stop shops» viewed as successful, leading to substantial reduction in business registration time (30 days – 8 days) with high sustainability potential
 - Some activities have not resulted in specific achievement, e.g., work on investment licenses and land transfers, but results not achieved by the end of the programme
- ETV2 evaluation states that the programme followed the policy agenda set by GoV, rather than seeking to shape it, with notable successes on drafting legal standards accounting, audit, measurements, and quality control

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EQ5 – Access to finance



To what extent did the Commission contribute to improving access to finance by enterprises?

- **Credit market dominated by SOEs and a small no. of state controlled banks**
 - NB SOEs account for large share of non performing loans (weaken the position of the banks).
- **Stakeholders suggest that the playing field is still not level between private sector and SOEs in terms of access to finance despite banking reform at policy level**
- Little Commission interventions on this issue (except via contribution to PRSC)
- No evidence that Commission-supported BDS activities were used to facilitate access to finance

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EQ6 – Fostering enterprises competitiveness



To what extent did the Commission contribute to a better ability of enterprises, in particular SMEs, to compete and to access technology and new markets?

- **Several stakeholders state that there are clear needs regarding enterprise competitiveness and market access**, particularly given the PS developments between 2000 and 2009:
 - Tenfold increase in number of new enterprises between 2000 and 2009, but **quality of business strategies, standards and practices remain patchy**
 - WTO accession opened up Vietnamese economy to international competition, requiring enterprises to adopt new standards and practices
 - **Vietnamese BDS market remains limited**
- Some interlocutors argued that donors could support **community-based BDS demonstration projects** to enhance quality of enterprise management and link up value chains whilst targeting poverty reduction
 - But enterprise demand (& ability to pay) for such activities remains questionable
- Commission has supported BDS through PSSP, a number of results have been seen, but the final evaluation strongly questions the sustainability of these results
- **Questions raised regarding the appropriateness of MPI as an implementing channel** for private sector competitiveness activities

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EQ7 – Investment promotion

To what extent did Commission support contribute to increased cross-border investment in partner countries' private sectors?

- **The Commission conducted some investment promotion activities, e.g. under MUTRAP**
- These activities were hence more trade than PSD related
- Some interlocutors noted that the Government of Vietnam also conducts several investment promotion activities...
- ...but also that **SMEs have been consistently underrepresented in Government-led investment promotion programmes**
- Some interviewees suggested that **there is a need for investment promotion centres specifically designed to provide SMEs with information points for foreign investment opportunities**

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EQ8 – Employment

To what extent has the Commission PSD support contributed to facilitating the generation of employment?

- **Commission strategy documents and interviewees underline the importance of the PS in terms of generation of employment** (estimated at 90% for Vietnam)
- **Support to PSD was rather geared towards integration in the world economy and not so much towards generating employment**
- Several stakeholders mention the informal economy as an issue but not many donors tackle this issue (it was mentioned that 60% of the new enterprises come from the informal economy).
- **Employment effects of interventions are not systematically monitored**

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EQ9 – Commission added-value

What was the Commission's added value when providing support to PSD in third countries?

- **Several types of value added have been invoked by stakeholders met, but most of them are rather related to trade support**
- The following types of value added were mentioned:
 - Knowledge on **economic integration**
 - Knowledge with respect to **compliance with EU standards**
 - **Not being tied to the particular interests of a specific country**

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EQ10 – Means provided

To what extent were the Commission's organisational set-up and management practices fit to a successful implementation of its PSD support?

- HR issues are not specific to PSD
- **EUD staff is aware of the PSD guidelines, but rarely uses them**
 - EUD Staff also noted that, in general, **HQ Guidelines are often more suited to LDCs than MICs**. Specific MIC-focused guidelines would be of particular help.
- **There are no specific capitalisation exercises among different EUDs on PSD related issues**, but such initiatives would be welcomed

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Agenda

- **Reminder of the mission scope, objectives, findings & activities undertaken**
- **Mission findings per evaluation question and discussion**
- **Next steps**

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Next Steps

■ July	Finalisation of field missions & compilation of findings
	Presentation of Field Phase to the Reference Group
■ July – August	Synthesis phase
■ End August	Submission of Draft Final Report
■ End September	Submission of Final Report

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Annex 8 – List of persons met

During the desk phase of the evaluation, the evaluation team met the following Commission staff members at DGs DEVCO, TRADE and ENTR headquarters as well as EIB staff met at EIB headquarters.

European Commission staff at headquarters

Surname, name	Department Unit	Function
AUDAZ Gérald	DEVCO unit F2, Geographical Coordination Neighbourhood South	International Aid / Cooperation Officer
BELTRAME Lara	DEVCO.DGA1. C3	Programme Assistant – EU Policies
BONDO TSHIANI Augustin	DEVCO.DGA1. E2	Cooperation officer East and Southern Africa
CORMAN Marie	ENTR A.2, Affaires internationales	Policy Officer - Euro-Mediterranean coordination - Maghreb - Mashrek
COUGE Ilse	DEVCO.DGA1.C.4	Assistant Policy Officer - Regional Integration - Trade Policy coordinator quality support for Central Africa and the Caribbean
di BENEDETTO Marco	DEVCO.DGA1.C.4	Policy Officer - Coordinator quality Support for ENPI East
DOCHERTY Michael	Commission Headquarters, DEVCO unit F2, Geographical Coordination Neighbourhood South	Team Leader - Head of sector for Israel, Jordan and Occupied Palestinian Territory (West Bank and Gaza Strip)
GONZE Nicolas	DEVCO.DGA1.C.5	Cooperation officer South Africa
GROENVALD Lars	DEVCO.DGA1.C.4	Policy Officer - Regional Integration, Trade Facilitation, coordinator quality support for ASEAN countries, Pacific, PSD, Trade and Regional integration
HACK Olivier	DEVCO unit F2, Geographical Coordination Neighbourhood South	current desk for Lebanon, unit's <i>focal point</i> for private sector development matters
LERAY Thais	DEVCO.DGA1.C.4	Policy Officer - Corporate Social Responsibility, Inclusive Business, Green Economy coordinator quality support for ENPI South
LIBERATI Monica	DEVCO.DGA2.F.2	Head of sector for Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Geographical Coordination Neighbourhood South, former Head of sector for the Maghreb and desk officer for Tunisia

LOUIS Olivier	Commission européenne (siège), DEVCO	Ancien coordinateur géographique pour le Maroc, actuellement Chef d'équipe, Ressources humaines au siège, unité R4, DEVCO
MARANGONI Luca	DEVCO.DGA1.C.4	Policy Officer - Private Sector Development, Business Enabling Environment, Competitiveness, Public Private Partnership, coordinator quality support for Southern Africa
MARX Véronique	DEVCO.DGA1.C.4	Geographical Coordination Latin America and Caribbean
NIKOLOVA Snežina	DEVCO.DGA2.H.1	International Aid / Cooperation Officer, Geographical Coordination Asia and Pacific
NILSSON, Bjorn	DGTRADE.DGA1.D1	Policy Coordinator – Policy Officer – policy & negotiations – trade and development
PAUWELS Stefaan	DEVCO C4 (Private Sector Development, Trade, Regional Integration)	Policy Officer - Access to Finance, Microfinance, Quality Infrastructure, SPS and TBT, PSD Training, coordination, quality support for Latin America
PEDERSEN Jesper	DEVCO.DGA1.E5	Programme Manager – External Relations – Head of Section
RINALDI Sarah	DGTRADE.DGA1.D1	Manager de Programmes - Chef de secteur
SALVIA Paolo	Trade and Development	Trade and Development policies inter-service co-ordinator
SOPINSKI Wojciech	SME policy development and crafts DG ENTR	Policy Officer Internationalisation of EU SME policy
ten BLOEMENDAL Jan	Quality of delivery systems, Quality and Impact, Directorate general Development and Cooperation - EuropeAid	Head of Unit DEVCO

EIB Staff at Headquarters

Surname, name	Department	Function
ANTZ Susan	Lending Operations Outside Europe, Operations in Latin America	Senior Loan officer
AREVALO CALSINA Monica	Lending Operations Outside Europe, West Africa, Sahel and Caribbean Division	Loan Officer
BARTON Tamsyn	Lending Operations Outside Europe	Director-General
BERKHOFF Andreas	Lending Operations Outside Europe	Senior Policy Advisor
BRUUN, Adam	Lending Operations Outside Europe, ACP Division	Deputy Head of Division, Loan Officer
BRUNNHUBER, CFA Ulrich H.	Operations Evaluation	Evaluation Expert
COLLIN Catherine	Lending Operations Outside Europe	Head of Division
DE LIMA Pedro	Development Economics Unit	Head of Unit
GUTIERREZ DEGENEVE Javier	Lending Operations Outside Europe, Maghreb Division - Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment & Partnership	Head of Near East Division
HOENICKE Marion	Lending Operations Outside Europe, Eastern Neighbourhood and Central Asia Division	Head of Division
JENNI Angela	Lending Operations Outside Europe, ACP Division	Loan Officer
KONING Monique	Lending Operations Outside Europe, ACP Division	Head of Division
MACRAE Angus	Lending Operations Outside Europe, Maghreb Division - Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment & Partnership	Head of Division
NADEAU Alain	Lending Operations Outside Europe, Maghreb Division - Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment & Partnership	Head of Division
PALANZA Flavia	Lending Operations Outside Europe, ACP Division	Head of Division
SOTO RIBA Inmaculada	Lending Operations Outside Europe, West Africa, Sahel and Caribbean Division	Loan Officer
STAFF VASARELA Alexandre	Lending Operations Outside Europe, Asia & Latin America Division	Loan Officer
TAPIO Ari	Lending Operations Outside Europe, Asia & Latin America Division	Deputy Head of Division
ZAJC Peter	Lending Operations Outside Europe, ACP Division	Loan Officer
ZILLER Bernard	Institutional Affairs Department	Strategy
YONG-PRÖTZEL Ivory	Operations Evaluation	Head of Division

The following lists of people met represent all stakeholders met in the course of the nine field visits.

Algeria

European Commission / EU Delegations / EEAS¹

Surname, name	Organisation	Unit/Function
AOUIDEF Amar	Délégation de l'UE auprès de l'Algérie	Chargé à la Section Coopération pour les projets de coopération économique
BERTRAND Philippe	Délégation de l'UE auprès de l'Algérie	Appui budgétaire et finance publique Point Focal DG ECFIN
MARTINS Paulo	Délégation de l'UE auprès de l'Algérie	Chef de la Coopération
RIVAGORDA Laetitia	Délégation de l'UE auprès de l'Algérie	Chargée de Programme de Coopération Point Focal DG AGRI et DG SANCO
VANDER ELST Antoine	Délégation de l'UE auprès de l'Algérie	Attaché de Coopération (Programme d'appui par rapport à l'Accord d'Association) Point Focal DG Trade

EU Member States / International organisations / Other donors

Surname, name	EU MS / Donor	Unit/Function
BENBITOUR Ismahane	Banque Mondiale	Chargée des opérations
RIEDEL Marita	GIZ	Directrice
BOUDEHANE Mouauouya	IFC/Banque Mondiale	Responsable Investissements Afrique du Nord Moyen Orient, Europe du Sud

National authorities and agencies

Surname, name	Organisation	Unit/Function
KOUIRET Safia	Agence Nationale de Développement de l'Investissement (ANDI)	Directrice d'Etude
MANSOURI Abdelkrim	Agence Nationale de Développement de l'Investissement (ANDI)	Directeur Général
BRAHITI Amor	Ministère de l'industrie et des PME	Directeur Général
ADAOURE Zouheir	Ministère des Finances	Directeur de la fiscalité
FERHANE Sidi Mohamed	Ministère des Finances	Directeur Général de la Prévision et des Politiques

¹ European External Action Service

LOUAHADJ Sid-Ahmed	Ministère des Finances	Directeur de la prévision macro-économique
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Other implementing partners

Surname, name	Organisation	Unit/Function
BARBOTTIN Jean-Michel	Programme PME II	Responsable Administratif et Financier
BUCQUOYE Marc	Programme PME II	Expert appui aux PME
DAHACHE Chahrazed	Programme PME II	Expert Assistant Appui aux PME
KASSOUSSI Aldjallil,	Programme PME II	Directeur du Programme

Other beneficiaries

Surname, name	Organisation	Unit/Function
BENNINI Mohamed	Agence Nationale de Promotion du Commerce Extérieur (ALGEX)	Directeur Général
ZERTAL Naima	Agence Nationale de Promotion du Commerce Extérieur (ALGEX)	Directrice des Stratégies et Programme
BELLIL-MEDJOUBI Meriem	Association des Producteurs Algériens de Boissons (APAB)	Secrétaire Générale
HAMANI Ali	Association des Producteurs Algériens de Boissons (APAB)	Président
DAOUDI Ammar	Caisse de Garantie des Crédits d'Investissements-PME (CGCI)	Directeur Général
RABIA Mahmoud	Caisse de Garantie des Crédits d'Investissements-PME (CGCI)	Conseiller Technique
MEDJKOUH Améziane	Chambre de Commerce et d'Industrie du Djurdjura	Président
BENCHIK LEHOCINE Mohamed	Chambre de Commerce et Industrie Mezghena/Alger	Directeur
BENSASSI M.	Conseil National Consultatif PME	Expert mis à disposition par le projet PME II
MADJD Oumoussa	Conseil National Consultatif PME	Expert et président par interim du Conseil National Consultatif PME, Président de la Commission Etude, Stratégie et Développement
OUBERNINE Abdelhalim	Maghreb Leasing Algeria	Responsable Administration et Finances
ZAOUN Chedly	Maghreb Leasing Algeria	Directeur Général
BENDIMERAD Mehdi T.	PME	Directeur Général
FERHAT Nadia	Roubia (PME)	Audit et contrôle

Jamaica

European Commission / EU Delegations / EEAS²

Surname, name	Organisation	Unit/Function
JENKINSON Helen	EUD to Jamaica	Head of Economic & Social Section
MENGHINI Alberto	EUD to Jamaica	Attaché, Project Manager, Economics, Trade, Politics & Information
VANHAEVERBEKE Pierre-Luc	EUD to Jamaica	Project Manager, Infrastructure & Rural Development Section

EU Member States / International organisations / Other donors

Surname, name	EU MS / Donor	Unit/Function
HALAT Nathan S.	Embassy of the Unites States of America	Economic/Commercial Officer
BEECHER Wayne	Inter-American Development Bank	Multilateral Investment Fund
STEVENSON Claudia	Inter-American Development Bank	Competitiveness & Innovation Department
GOPAL Rajeev	International Finance Corporation, World Bank Group	Resident Representative Jamaica and Belize
GREEN Judith A.E.	International Finance Corporation, World Bank Group	Senior Investment Officer, Latin America and the Caribbean
BURROWES James	USAID	Director, Office of Program, Policy & Management

National authorities

Surname, name	Organisation	Unit/Function
DAVIES Diane	Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ)	Manager, European Union Unit
HARPER-GRIFFITHS Monique	Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ)	Senior Project Economist

² European External Action Service

Other implementing partners

Surname, name	Organisation	Unit/Function
BELL Lisa	Formerly at JAMPRO, currently at EX-IM Bank	Former Director at JAMPRO with responsibility for PSDP, currently Managing Director EX-IM Bank
DAVIS Harold	Jamaica Business Development Corporation (JBDC)	Executive Director
VEIRA Valerie J.P	Jamaica Business Development Corporation (JBDC)	Chief Executive Officer
SMITH Jean	Jamaica Exporters' Association (JEA)	General Manager
MORGAN Delaine	JAMPRO – Trade & Invest Jamaica	Vice-President Trade & Business Development
HARRIS Hugh	Particip GmbH, NAO TA in frame of DRGEP, the EC's ongoing GBS	Senior Project Economist
MATHIEU Paul A.	Particip GmbH, NAO TA in frame of DRGEP, the EC's ongoing GBS	Team Leader
GORDON André	PSDP TA	Former Deputy Team Leader for the Outsourced Service Providers

Other beneficiaries

Surname, name	Organisation	Unit/Function
CHIN-MOOK Edward	Small Business Association of Jamaica (SBAJ) Caribbean Association of SMEs (CASME)	Former President SBAJ & Current President CASME
DERBY Meredith	Small Business Association of Jamaica (SBAJ)	President SBAJ
BREESE McNAB Imega	The Jamaica Manufacturers' Association Ltd	Executive Director
TURNER Kamesha	The Jamaica Manufacturers' Association Ltd	Research and Project Officer

Civil Society

Surname, name	Organisation, Unit	Function
MORGAN Beverley	The Competitiveness Company	Head
FEARON Trevor	The Jamaica Chamber of Commerce	Chief Executive Officer
SAMUDA Milton J.	The Jamaica Chamber of Commerce	President

Jordan

European Commission / EU Delegations / EEAS³

Surname, name	Organisation	Unit/Function
WRONECKA Joanna	EU Delegation to Jordan	Head of Delegation
DEWERPE Jean-Marc	EU Delegation to Jordan	Head of Finance and Contracts Section
JOLAS Bertrand	EU Delegation to Jordan	Trade and Transport Affairs
ROCA Imma	EU Delegation to Jordan	Head of Political Sector
TOPOLOVEC Germana	EU Delegation to Jordan	Trade, Economic Affairs & PSD Section, Economic affairs & PFM
VERGAMOTA Kaluwa	EU Delegation to Jordan	Trade, Economic Affairs & PSD Section, Economic affairs & PFM

National authorities

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URAIIDI Hana	JEDCO	Director of Cross Cutting Directorate
GHUNEIM Adi	JEDCO (Jordan Enterprise Development Corporation)	Head of Financial Services Scheme
AL-RUCHOUD Awni H.	JIB	<i>Acting CEO</i>
FARRAJ Elias S.	JIB	<i>Deputy CEO</i>
KABAR Tamara	JIB	<i>International Relations Analyst, Research and Studies Department</i>
AL-DABBAS Nidal Adel	JIB (Jordan Investment Board)	<i>A. CEO</i>
MANSUR Yusuf	Jordan Agency for Investment Environment Development (JAED)	<i>Former CEO (now independent consultant)</i>
HAMMAD Ahmed K.	Ministry of Industry and Trade (MoIT)	Head of Trade Policy Division
SHANA'A Emad	Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MoPIC)	Head of EU Partnership Division
SHRAIDEH Nasser	Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MoPIC)	<i>Former Director General and Secretary General of International Cooperation (now Chairman of the Board of the Jordan Free Zones Development Company)</i>

³ European External Action Service

Other implementing partners

Surname, name	Organisation	Unit/Function
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AL-JAFARI Jamal	JLGC	Loan Guarantee Development, Manager
AL-JAFARI Mohammad	JLGC	Director General
MOHANNA Hekmat Adel	JLGC	Industrial Finance Development, Manager
AL HAMMAMI Mohammed Saeed	JLGC (Jordan Loan Guarantee Corporation)	<i>Former</i> Managing Director

Private sector actors

Surname, name	Organisation	Unit/Function
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ABU-DAHOUH Rae'f Y.	Bank of Jordan	CEO/Manager of SME Banking and Executive Manager, Commercial Business Development
AL-QUAWASMI Ahmad	Bank of Jordan	Market Research & Product Development Officer, Commercial Business Development- Head Office
ZRAIQAT Nasser M.	Bank of Jordan	Manager, Credit Control & Admin. Dept
AL-MAHROUQ Maher	Jordan Chamber of Industry	Director General
AL-WAKED Nada	Jordan Chamber of Industry	Director of International Relations

Kenya

European Commission / EU Delegations / EEAS⁴

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STURESSON, Peter	EU Delegation to Kenya	First Counsellor, Rural Development

EU Member States / International organisations / Other donors

Surname, name	EU MS / Donor	Unit/Function
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GREEN, Adrian	DFID	Senior Private Sector Development Advisor
MILIANITIS, Nikolaos	EIB, Regional Representation of East and Central Africa	Senior Loan Officer
NZIOKA, Nicholas	EIB, Regional Representation of East and Central Africa	Business Analyst
OCHIENG, Sarah Ruth	IFC	Private Sector Development Specialist
TWAGIRA, Frank	IFC	Regulatory Specialist

National authorities

Surname, name	Organisation	Unit/Function
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Other implementing partners

Surname, name	Organisation	Unit/Function
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⁴ European External Action Service

Other beneficiaries

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MAINA, Betty	Kenya Association of Manufacturers	Chief Executive Officer
MAINA, Zipporah	Kenya Association of Manufacturers	Finance, Administration & Projects Officer
MUNGAI, Bernadette	Kenya Institute of Management	Chief Manager, Centre for Enterprise Development
MUTURI, David	Kenya Institute of Management	Executive Director
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Morocco

European Commission / EU Delegations / EEAS⁵

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EU Member States / International organisations / Other donors

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AL AISSAMI Nouaiman	Ministère Economie et Finances, Direction Trésor et finances extérieures	Chef de division crédit, Direction du trésor et des finances extérieures
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⁵ European External Action Service

Other implementing partners

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EL HATIMI Mustapha	Caisse Centrale de Garanties (CCG)	Directeur des engagements entreprises
LAHRACH Taoufiq	Caisse Centrale de Garanties (CCG)	Directeur financier et juridique
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LAAZIRI Hassan	CDG Capital	Administrateur Directeur General
OUKRID Omar	CGEM, Confédération Générale des Entreprises du Maroc	Directeur de pôle
BOUJENDAR Mohamed	Dar Ad Damane, Institution de garantie	Adjoint au Directeur général
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Other beneficiaries

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Nicaragua

European Commission / EU Delegations / EEAS⁶

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BASTINO Jorge	EU Delegation to Nicaragua	Task Manager of Competitiveness project and follows other general aspects of PSD
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EU Member States / International organisations / Other donors

Surname, name	EU MS / Donor	Unit/Function
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TAPIA Salvador	Finish Embassy	Adviser Rural Development and Trade
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National authorities

Surname, name	Organisation	Unit/Function
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⁶ European External Action Service

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Other implementing partners

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Other beneficiaries

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South Africa

European Commission / EU Delegations / EEAS⁷

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EU Member States / International organisations / Other donors

Surname, name	EU MS / Donor	Unit/Function
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⁷ European External Action Service

Other implementing partners

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Other beneficiaries

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Jabu MNCULWANE Reverend	Project Gateway	Director
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Ukraine

European Commission / EU Delegations / EEAS⁸

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EU Member States / International organisations / Other donors

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CHIRKOV Alexander	EBRD	Technical Co-operation, Financial Institutions
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YAVORSKAYA Oxana	EBRD	Principal Banker
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⁸ European External Action Service

National authorities

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Other implementing partners

Surname, name	Organisation	Unit/Function
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Other beneficiaries

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Civil Society

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European Commission / EU Delegations / EEAS⁹

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EU Member States / International organisations / Other donors

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BRUHIN, Brigitte	Swiss Embassy	Deputy Country Director
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LE THI, Hien	Hanoi Authority for Planning and Investment	Vice Manager, R&D Management Incubator, SME Promotion Center

⁹ European External Action Service

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TRAN THI, Chau	Hanoi Authority for Planning and Investment	CEO
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Other beneficiaries

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DAU ANH, Tuan	VCCI	Deputy Director of Legal Department

Civil Society

Surname, name	Organisation, Unit	Function
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HA THI Giang	Hanoi Association for Entrepreneur Women	Standing Member
HOANG Kim Dung	Hanoi Association for Entrepreneur Women	Head of Group 3
LE THI Thu Huong	Hanoi Association for Entrepreneur Women	Standing Member
LUONG THI Kim Oanh	Hanoi Association for Entrepreneur Women	Standing Member
PHAM THI, Loan	Hanoi Association for Entrepreneur Women	Chairman
PHAM THUY Duong	Hanoi Association for Entrepreneur Women	Standing Member
TO PHUONG Thao	Hanoi Association for Entrepreneur Women	Standing Member
TU THI Bich Loc	Hanoi Association for Entrepreneur Women	Standing Member
VU THI Man	Hanoi Association for Entrepreneur Women	Standing Member
NGUYEN, Van Thang	National Economics University	Director of Asia Pacific Institute for Management

Annex 9 – Methodology

This Annex presents the main features of the methodological approach to the evaluation, in particular (i) **the evaluation approach**; (ii) **the tools and sources of information used**; and (iii) **the challenges and limitations of this exercise**.

The Annex is composed of **three sections**:

1. Structured evaluation approach;
 - 1.1. The intervention logic;
 - 1.2. The evaluation questions;
2. Tools and information sources;
3. Challenges and limitations.

1 Structured evaluation approach

The structured sequence of the evaluation process was primarily based on the Joint Evaluation Unit's methodological bases for evaluation¹ and its specific guidelines for thematic evaluations². The specific methodological approaches and tools used for this complex evaluation are furthermore in line with the Joint Evaluation Unit's evaluation tools³.


A schematic overview of the different steps is provided in the figure below. The results of the inventory and typology are summarised in the main report, whilst the Intervention Logic and the evaluation questions are explained below. The data collection and analysis phase is further detailed in section 2 below.

¹ European Commission, Joint Evaluation Unit, *Methodological Bases for Evaluation – External Assistance (volume 1)*, 2006, and updates on the Joint Evaluation Unit's website.

² European Commission, Joint Evaluation Unit, *Guidelines for Geographic and Thematic Evaluation – External Assistance (volume 2)*, 2006.

³ European Commission, Joint Evaluation Unit, *Evaluation Tools – External Assistance (volume 3)*, 2006.

Figure 1 – General overview of the structure of the evaluation approach



1.1 The Intervention Logic

The intervention logic is a schematic representation of EU support to private sector development in third countries. It links the activities of the Commission to their intended results; to their intermediate impacts on the private sector; and finally to the intended overall impacts on beneficiary countries, as described by the Treaty of Nice and the European Consensus on Development.

The intervention logic, presented in Figure 2 overleaf, was constructed on the basis of several Commission communications and strategies on PSD support published prior to and during the evaluation period.⁴ Key documents in this regard include Commission COM(2003) 267 (European Community Co-operation with Third Countries: the Commission's approach to future support for the development of the Business sector) and the Guidelines (2003) for Commission support to Private Sector Development (2003) (hereinafter, the Guidelines (2003)), which together describe the intended activities and rationale of EU support to private sector development over the evaluation period.


⁴ In this respect, the intervention logic should be considered as a faithful, rather than a reconstructed, intervention logic; with only limited regrouping from the original documentation in order to better reflect the logical structure of interventions.

The intervention logic is presented in the form of an expected impact diagram. It differentiates four levels of expected impact which correspond to three levels of objectives, and the intended activities for attaining the results:

- Overall impact (corresponding to global objectives, over the long term);
- Intermediate impacts (corresponding to intermediate objectives, over the medium term);
- Results (corresponding to specific objectives);
- Activities (corresponding to inputs provided).

The hierarchical links for attaining the expected impacts are made explicit in the diagram. The latter also highlights the level at which the Evaluation Questions (which are detailed further down in this section) are pitched within the intervention logic.

Figure 2– Intervention Logic



1.2 The evaluation questions

The Evaluation Questions (EQ), the related Judgement Criteria (JC) and their respective indicators (I), aim at addressing the key issues with respect to the Commission's support to PSD and its implementation and results. They were derived from the intervention logic (and related to it by Figure 2 above) and from the inventory. Table 1 lists the set of questions, which are further detailed hereafter.

Table 1 – Overview of the Evaluation Questions

EQ 1	Evolution of Commission policies & programming	To what extent did the Commission's PSD strategy and programming take into account the recommendations of the 2005 evaluation and the evolution of the overall private sector environment?
EQ 2	Strategic approach	To what extent was EU support to PSD in partner countries part of a strategic approach geared to the overall objectives of EU External Policy, while aligning with the priorities of the country/region and maximizing its VA, including in terms of synergies with other actors and other types of EU support?
EQ 3	Instruments & modalities	To what extent did the set of Commission mechanisms and aid modalities for supporting PSD strategies and the associated activities of partner countries and regions result in the provision of timely responses, at a reasonable cost, to the challenges faced by the private sector in third countries, while fostering synergies between one other and with comparable mechanisms offered by other actors?
EQ 4	Institutional & regulatory framework	To what extent did the Commission contribute to make the institutional and regulatory framework more conducive to PSD?
EQ 5	Access to finance	To what extent did the Commission contribute to improving access to finance by enterprises?
EQ 6	Fostering enterprises competitiveness	To what extent did the Commission contribute to a better ability of enterprises, in particular SMEs, to compete and to access technology and new markets?
EQ 7	Investment promotion	To what extent did EU support contribute to increased cross-border investment in partner countries' private sectors?
EQ 8	Employment	To what extent has the EU PSD support contributed to facilitate the generation of employment?
EQ 9	Commission added-value	What was the Commission's added-value when providing support to PSD in third countries?
EQ 10	Means provided	To what extent were the Commission's organisational set-up and management practices fit to a successful implementation of its PSD support?

The proposed set of Evaluation Questions allows to cover the main dimensions of the Commission's intended strategy in terms of supporting PSD in third countries, and the different evaluation criteria defined by the evaluation terms of reference, while making sure that the evaluation has a clear focus, through a precise and well defined questioning. Figure 3 shows the linkages between the evaluation questions and the evaluation criteria tackled by this evaluation.

Figure 3 – Coverage of the Evaluation Criteria by the Evaluation Questions

	EQ1 Evolution	EQ2 Strategic approach	EQ3 Instrument s & Modalities	EQ4 Inst. Reg. Framework	EQ5 Access to Finance	EQ6 Competiti- veness	EQ7 Investment Promotion	EQ8 Employ- ment	EQ9 EC AV	EQ10 Means Provided
<i>DAC Evaluation criteria</i>										
Relevance	■	■	□	□	□	□	□			
Effectiveness				■	■	■	■	■		■
Impact				■		■				
Sustainability		□		□	□	□	□	□		
Efficiency			■							■
<i>Coherence, Commission added value, coordination and complementarity</i>										
Coherence	□	■								□
EC added value	□	□							■	
3Cs	□	□	□						□	■
<p>■ Focus □ Covered</p>										


2 Tools and information sources

Once the structuring stage was completed, information or facts were collected by the evaluation team through specific **evaluation tools**.

- Given the complexity of the subject to be evaluated, tools were chosen in order to make sure that the **combination** of all of them would yield to the collection of facts for all indicators identified.
- **Several levels of information** had indeed to be collected to tackle the more general level indicators, as well as country level and specific-intervention level indicators.
- Moreover, the tools used had to allow the **verification and cross-checking** of the information collected. For example, the intervention-level documentary analysis (which had a particular role in this evaluation, as explained hereunder) were completed and cross-checked with answers to the EUD survey as well as through EU Delegation interviews.

The toolbox used for this evaluation is schematically represented in the figure below. Further details for each tool are then provided.

Figure 4 – Main information sources & tools



- **General-level Desk Study:** the evaluators screened general-level strategy documents relating to EU support of private sector development in third countries;
- **Country & Intervention-level Desk Study:** the evaluators included an in-depth documentary study of project documentation relating to a selection of 27 interventions in the nine countries to be visited during the field phase; plus country-level

documentation relating to the nine countries visited and Zambia (the latter of which was reviewed during desk phase only).⁵

- **Interviews in Brussels, Luxembourg and the field:** semi-structured interviews were undertaken with key stakeholders including staff from DEVCO, DG TRADE, DG ENTR, the EIB and EU Delegation staff in the nine countries visited. Approximately 200 interviews were conducted, including 20 in Brussels and Luxembourg, and 180 in the field.
- **Overall analysis of the inventory:** after constructing the inventory of PSD interventions over the evaluation period, the evaluation team conducted a global analysis of funds contracted and disbursed by intervention type, geographical region and their evolution over time.
- **CSP/RSP Review:** review of 40 Commission country or regional strategy papers⁶, covering the nine countries visited and an additional eleven countries or regions (two papers per country or region, corresponding to the two programming periods within the evaluation period 2004-2010). This review was done by the evaluation team, using a specific review grid, so as to facilitate aggregated processing and use of responses.
- **Field visits:** the evaluation team conducted field visits to nine countries, namely: Algeria; Jamaica; Jordan; Kenya; Morocco; Nicaragua; South Africa; Ukraine; Vietnam.⁷ The key tool deployed during the field visits were semi-structured interview guides, developed on the basis of the evaluation EQs, JCs and Indicators, and tailored towards the beneficiaries being interviewed. Field visits lasted between five and twelve days, including briefing and debriefing sessions at the EU Delegations, in-depth interviews with Delegation staff, beneficiaries, government ministries, private sector representative bodies and project visits to beneficiary sites.
- **EU Delegation survey:** an internet-based survey to EU Delegations was organised in this evaluation to collect views of Commission staff in the field. The survey tackled most of the issues raised in the EQs. It allowed covering transversal issues but also a number of straightforward matters such as the numbers of PSD-dedicated staff in Delegations, coverage of particular types of intervention in different regions, conduct of needs analyses and types of beneficiary selection criteria used. Invitations to participate in the survey were sent on 7 May 2012 to 82 EU Delegation in countries that benefitted the most from PSD funds (including the nine countries chosen for field visits). The survey went offline on 31 June 2012 with 54 EUD responses, yielding a response rate of 66%. The aggregated results can be found in Annex 6, whilst the analysis of these results were directly included in the answers to the EQs in Section 4 below.

⁵ See Annex 3 for the intervention selection criteria, full intervention fiche and associated data collection grid inputs.

⁶ Namely Country Strategy Papers (CSPs), National Indicative Programmes (NIPs), Regional Strategy Papers (RSPs) and Regional Indicative Programmes (RIPs)

⁷ See Annex 3 for details of the country selection criteria and associated data collection grids.

- **Meta-Analysis** (15 reports):
 - **Geographical evaluations:** the evaluators reviewed existing Commission country and regional evaluations with a view to identifying PSD-related findings, based on the matrix published on the Evaluation Unit website⁸;
 - **Meta-Analyses of funding vehicle evaluations:** the evaluators reviewed other key evaluations relating to Commission and EU support in the field of PSD, including for instance the BizClim evaluation, the EIB IF evaluation, the evaluations of the CDE and of the EU/ACP Microfinance Programme, and the previous evaluation of EU support to PSD in third countries.

3 Challenges & limitations

The limitations of the analysis were closely related to the **quantity and quality of the information**. This related in particular to the process of obtaining (i) key documents on the selected interventions; and (ii) important strategic documents. Problems encountered in information collection were mainly due to an absence of information on results and impact. This was mostly due to the absence of systematic and detailed monitoring and evaluation of the operations. The team tackled this challenge by diversifying the sources of information (e.g. general documentation, EUD survey, interviews, field visits). It then triangulated and cross-checked all information collected in the analysis.

Moreover, a **strategy-level evaluation** of this kind is a challenge *per se*. It goes beyond the mere summation of evaluations of multiple operations and tackles many high-level issues. It covers a wide range of countries, sectors, periods, and individual interventions. This challenge has been tackled mainly through the specific structured methodological approach, based primarily on the construction of the intervention logic; the definition and delineation of the Evaluation Questions, Judgement Criteria and Indicators; and the choice of countries and interventions for the desk and field studies.

⁸ http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation_reports/documents/tbl_sect_cov_en.pdf

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General Documentation

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ADE (for the European Commission)	Evaluation of Commission's Aid Delivery through Development Banks and the EIB	2008
ADE (for the European Commission)	Evaluation of the Council Regulation N° 2698/2000 (MEDA II) and its implementation	2009
ADE (for the European Commission)	Mid-Term Evaluation of the Investment Facility and EIB Own Resources Operations in ACP Countries and the OCTs	2010
ADE (for the European Commission)	Evaluation of the Centre for the Development of Enterprise	2011
ADE (for the European Commission)	Final Evaluation of the EU/ACP Microfinance Programme	2012
B&S Europe Consortium and LINPICO (for the EU)	On-Going Evaluation of the Project "Invest in Med"	2011
Camdessus Michel	European Investment Bank's external mandate 2007-2013, Mid-Term Review. Report and recommendations of the Steering Committee of "wise persons".	2010
CEPS	Innovative Approaches to EU Blending Mechanisms for Development Finance	2011
Coes Consultants, The Netherlands. Coes Ben and Vickers David (for the European Commission)	EuroMed innovation and technology programme - Improving innovation in textile and clothing Study throughout MEDA countries	2008
Council of the European Union	Framework on loans and grants blending mechanisms in the context of external assistance. ECOFI 612 - DEVGE 271.	2008
COWI (for the European Commission)	Mid-term evaluation of EIB's external mandate	2010
DAVIES Penny	The Role of the Private Sector in the Context of Aid Effectiveness; Consultative Findings Document, Final report	2011
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DFID	Private Sector Development Strategy – Prosperity for all: making markets work	2008

Source	Title	Year
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DRN- PARTICIP	Thematic global evaluation of EC support in the sectors of ESI (employment and social inclusion) in partner countries	2011
EIB	FEMIP Trust Fund Evaluation of activities at 30.09.2006	2006
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European Commission	Guidelines for European Commission Support to Private Sector Development	2003
European Commission	The European Consensus on Development	2005
European Commission	Trade and Private Sector Policy and Development Support programmes financed by EU external assistance, Tools and Methods Series - Reference Document No 10	2010
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European Commission - EuropeAid	Neighbourhood Investment Facility - Operational Annual Report	2008
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TRANSTEC (for the European Commission)	Mid-Term Evaluation of PRO€INVEST (2002 – 2006)	2007
UNCTAD	UNCTAD World Investment Prospects Survey 2009-2011	2009
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World Bank	Private Sector Development Strategy - Directions for the World Bank Group	2002

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ADE (on behalf of the European Commission)	Evaluation of the European Commission's Support to the Republic Of Guyana 1997-2007	2008
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European Commission	Partenariat Euro-Med Tunisie, Document de stratégie 2002-2006, Programme indicatif national, 2002-2004	No date
European Commission	Partenariat Euro-Med, Algérie, Document de stratégie 2002-2006 et Programme indicatif national 2002-2004	No date
European Commission	Regional Programming For Asia(*) Strategy Document 2007-2013	No date
European Commission	Republic of Moldova: Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013	2007
European Commission	Summary Mid-Term Review Document Nicaragua Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013	2010

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European Commission	Ukraine: Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013	2007
European Commission	Vietnam – European Community Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006	No date
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Appui aux Entre./MAR	European Commission	Annexe 1.2: Dispositions Techniques et Administratives	2003
Appui aux Entre./MAR	European Commission	Monitoring Report-MR-10248.01	2004
Appui aux Entre./MAR	European Commission	Project Synopsis	2004
Appui aux Entre./MAR	European Commission	Avenant 1 à la Convention de Financement	2005
Appui aux Entre./MAR	European Commission	Monitoring Report-MR-10248.02	2005
Appui aux Entre./MAR	European Commission	Monitoring Report-MR-10248.03	2006
Appui aux Entre./MAR	European Commission	Monitoring Report-MR-10248.04	2007
Appui aux Entre./MAR	European Commission	Fiche des données pour les conclusions	2008
Appui aux Entre./MAR	European Commission	Monitoring Report-MR-10248.05	2008
Appui aux Entre./MAR	ADE (for the European Commission)	Evaluation Finale du Programme d'Appui aux Entreprise	2010
Appui aux Ins. Fin./MAR.	European Commission	Fiche Projet	2000
Appui aux Ins. Fin./MAR.	European Commission	Convention avec la BEI	2000
Appui aux Ins. Fin./MAR.	European Commission	Contrat de subvention avec la Caisse Central de Garantie	2000
Appui aux Ins. Fin./MAR.	European Commission	Monitoring Report -MR-10130.01	2003
Appui aux Ins. Fin./MAR.	European Commission	Project Synopsis	2003
Appui aux Ins. Fin./MAR.	European Commission	Monitoring Report -MR-10130.02	2004
Appui aux Ins. Fin./MAR.	European Commission	Monitoring Report -MR-10130.03	2006
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Appui aux Ins. Fin./MAR.	European Commission	Monitoring Report -MR-10130.05	2008
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ASMEP/KENYA	European Commission	Delegation Agreement	2010
ASMEP/KENYA	European Commission	UNDP Contract and Action Description	2010
ASMEP/KENYA	European Commission	Mid Term Report	2011
CAIPA/Caribbean Region	European Commission	Grant Contract with the Caribbean Export Development Agency	2010
CAIPA/Caribbean Region	European Commission	Grant Contract with the Caribbean Export Development Agency: Annex A	2010
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CAIPA/Caribbean Region	European Commission	Grant Contract with the Caribbean Export Development Agency: Annex C	2010
CAIPA/Caribbean Region	European Commission	PRO€INVEST Project Closure Workshop, Draft Agenda	2011
Capacity Buid./ZA	European Commission	Financing Agreement	2005
Capacity Buid./ZA	European Commission	Annex II -Technical and Administrative Provisions	2005
Capacity Buid./ZA	European Commission	Monitoring Report. MR-02168.01	2007
Capacity Buid./ZA	European Commission	Monitoring Report. MR-02168.02	2007
Capacity Buid./ZA	European Commission	Background Conclusion Sheet	2009
Capacity Buid./ZA	European Commission	Project Synopsis	2009
Capacity Buid./ZA	European Commission	Annex II -Technical and Administrative Provisions	2009
Capmezzanine/MAR	EIB	Note Financière sur le Fonds Capmezzanine	2007
Capmezzanine/MAR	EIB	Proposition du Comité de Direction au Conseil d'Administration sur le fonds Capmezzanine	2007
Capmezzanine/MAR	European Commission	Accord donné à la BEI pour financement de l'Assistance Technique	2007
Capmezzanine/MAR	EIB	Summary Sheet Capmezzanine	2010

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Competitive Jamaica – PSDP / JAM	European Commission	Financing Agreement with the Government of Jamaica	2009
Competitive Jamaica – PSDP / JAM	European Commission	Private Sector Development Programme 3 Year Strategic Plan 2007-2009	2007
Competitive Jamaica – PSDP / JAM	Government of Jamaica, Ministry of Information and Development	Private Sector Development Programme Quarterly Reports 2005-2009	2005
Competitive Jamaica – PSDP / JAM	European Commission	Private Sector Development Programme: Monitoring Report	2006
Competitive Jamaica – PSDP / JAM	European Commission	Private Sector Development Programme: Monitoring Report	2007
Competitive Jamaica – PSDP / JAM	European Commission	Private Sector Development Programme: Monitoring Report	2009
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DRGEP (GBS) / JAM	European Commission	Disbursement Note Letter to NAO	2009
DRGEP (GBS) / JAM	European Commission	Explanatory Note	2011
DRGEP (GBS) / JAM	EU Delegation to Jamaica	European Union – Jamaica project sheet - Debt Reduction and Growth Enhancement Programme (DRGEP)	2012
EBRD Micro Lending/UKR	European Commission	Contribution Agreement with the EBRD	2007
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EJADA/JORD	European Commission	Financing Agreement	2000

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EJADA/JORD	European Commission	Overall Logical Framework	2000
EJADA/JORD	European Commission	Monitoring Report -MR-00513.01	2001
EJADA/JORD	European Commission	Project Synopsis	2001
EJADA/JORD	European Commission	Monitoring Report -MR-10206.01	2004
EJADA/JORD	European Commission	Project Synopsis	2004
EJADA/JORD	European Commission	Monitoring Report -MR-10206.02	2005
EJADA/JORD	European Commission	Project Synopsis	2005
EJADA/JORD	European Commission	Monitoring Report -MR-10206.03	2006
EJADA/JORD	European Commission	Project Synopsis	2006
EJADA/JORD	European Commission	Monitoring Report -MR-10206.04	2007
EJADA/JORD	European Commission	Project Synopsis	2007
EJADA/JORD	DFC (for the European Commission)	Final Evaluation of EJADA	2012
ETV2/VIET	European Commission	Financing Proposal	2002
ETV2/VIET	European Commission	Commission Decision	2002
ETV2/VIET	European Commission	Addendum Financing Agreement	2008
ETV2/VIET	European Commission	Addendum Revised Annex II: Technical and Administrative Provisions	2008
ETV2/VIET	European Commission	Monitoring Report-MR-20500.01	2006
ETV2/VIET	European Commission	Project Synopsis	2006
ETV2/VIET	European Commission	Monitoring Report-MR-20500.02	2007
ETV2/VIET	European Commission	Background Conclusion Sheet Ex-post	2010
ETV2/VIET	Pohl Consulting and Associates (for the European Commission)	Final Evaluation of the European Technical Assistance Programme for Vietnam (ETV II) Final Report	2009

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JAM	EU Delegation to Jamaica	European Union – Jamaica project sheet - European Banana Support Programme	2012
JAM	Kisserup International Trade Roots Europe Aps on behalf of PROINVEST Management Unit	Final Report - Preparation of scoping proposal for Regional Private Sector Development Programme	2011
JAM	EU Delegation to Jamaica	European Union – Jamaica project sheet - EPA Capacity Building (10th EDF)	2012
JAM	HTSPE Limited on behalf of the European Union	Impact Evaluation of the Special Framework of Assistance for Traditional ACP Suppliers of Bananas	2008
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JAM	Jamaican Ministry of Agriculture	European Union Banana Support Programme - Creation of sustainable employment opportunities through economic diversification in the banana producing parishes of Jamaica Guidelines for grant applicants	2011
JAM	EU Delegation to Jamaica	European Union – Jamaica project sheet - Jamaica Accompanying Measures for Sugar (AMS)	2012
KDA/Kenya	European Commission	EU Final Report	2009
KDA/Kenya	European Commission	Contract and Performance Thresholds	2008
KDA/Kenya	European Commission	Annual Report	2007
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LAIF/NIC	European Commission	Delegation Agreement between the European Commission and KfW	2010
LAIF/NIC	European Commission	Contribution Request A1	2010
Local econ. Dev./SA	European Commission	Financing Agreement	2003
Local econ. Dev./SA	European Commission	Annex B-Technical and Administrative Provisions	2003
Local econ. Dev./SA	Republic of South Africa-	Interim Work Plan	2003

Intervention – Country	Source	Title	Year
	Dept. Of Economic Development and Tourism - KwaZulu Natal Province		
Local econ. Dev./SA	European Commission	Monitoring Report- MR-01085.01	2003
Local econ. Dev./SA	European Commission	Project Synopsis	2003
Local econ. Dev./SA	European Commission	Monitoring Report- MR-01085.02	2005
Local econ. Dev./SA	European Commission	Project Synopsis	2005
Local econ. Dev./SA	European Commission	Monitoring Report- MR-01085.03	2006
Local econ. Dev./SA	European Commission	Project Synopsis	2006
Local econ. Dev./SA	European Commission	Mid-Term Review of the Gijima Kzn Led Support Programme	2007
Local econ. Dev./SA	European Commission	Background Conclusion Sheet	2008
Local econ. Dev./SA	European Commission	Project Synopsis	2008
MAR	Delegation de la Commission européenne au Maroc	Note de réflexion sur Appui aux PME	2012
MAR	Commission européenne	Dispositions Techniques et Administratives - Annexe à la convention du Programme d'Appui aux Investissements et aux Exportations	2008
MLA/ALG	EIB	Operations Evaluation: Evaluation of operations financed by the EIB in Neighbourhood and Partnership Countries between 2000 and 2008 Maghreb Leasing Algeria	2009
MLA/ALG	EIB	Summary Sheet for MEDA RC Operations	2010
Moder. Secteur Financier/ALG	European Commission	Convention de Financement	2000
Moder. Secteur Financier/ALG	European Commission	Annexe 2: Dispositions Techniques et Administratives	2000
Moder. Secteur Financier/ALG	European Commission	Monitoring Report. MR-10166.01	2003
Moder. Secteur Financier/ALG	European Commission	Rapport définitif d'Evaluation à mi-parcours	2003
Moder. Secteur Financier/ALG	European Commission	Monitoring Report. MR-10166.02	2005
Moder. Secteur Financier/ALG	European Commission	Synopsis du Projet	2005

Intervention – Country	Source	Title	Year
Moder. Secteur Financier/ALG	European Commission	Monitoring Report. MR-10166.03	2007
Moder. Secteur Financier/ALG	European Commission	Monitoring Report Ex-post. MR-10166.04	2008
Moder. Secteur Financier/ALG	European Commission	Note de la Délégation pour la Clôture du Programme	2010
NIF EBRD/ENPI East Region	European Commission	Commission Decision	2007
NIF EBRD/ENPI East Region	European Commission	Action Fiche for NIF	2007
NIF EBRD/ENPI East Region	European Commission	Cooperation within the Framework of the NIC-Framework arrangement between the European Commission and eligible finance institutions	2009
NIF EBRD/ENPI East Region	European Commission	Contribution Agreement with the EBRD	2009
NIF EBRD/ENPI East Region	European Commission - EBRD	Annual Report	2010
NIF EBRD/ENPI East Region	European Commission - EBRD	Annual Report	2011
PAAPII/MAR	European Commission	Fiche Projet	2005
PAAPII/MAR	European Commission	Convention de Financement	2005
PAAPII/MAR	European Commission	Annexe II- Dispositions Techniques et Administratives	2005
PAAPII/MAR	European Commission	Monitoring Report -MR-10445.01	2007
PAAPII/MAR	European Commission	Synopsis du Projet	2007
PAAPII/MAR	European Commission	Monitoring Report -MR-10445.02	2008
PAAPII/MAR	ACE (for the European Commission)	Mission d'Evaluation Finale du Programme d'Appui aux Associations Professionnelles au Maroc (PAAP II)	2011
PME/ALG	European Commission	Convention de Financement	1999
PME/ALG	European Commission	Annexe 1.2: Dispositions Techniques et Administratives	1999
PME/ALG	IBM Belgium (for the European Commission)	Evaluation finale du programme d'appui aux PME	2008
PMEII/ALG	European Commission	Convention de Financement	2008
PMEII/ALG	European Commission	Annexe 2: Dispositions Techniques et Administratives	2008
PMEII/ALG	European	Fichhe Récapitulative pour les Conclusions	2009

Intervention – Country	Source	Title	Year
	Commission		
PMEII/ALG	European Commission	Synopsis du Projet	2009
PMEII/ALG	European Commission	Fichhe Récapitulative pour les Conclusions	2010
PMEII/ALG	European Commission	Synopsis du Projet	2010
PMEII/ALG	SOFRECO/E CORYS (for the European Commission)	Evaluation à mi-parcours du programme d'appui aux PME/PMI et à la maîtrise des technologies d'information et de communication (PMEII)	2011
PRAMECLIM/NIC	European Commission	Identification Fiche/ Business and Investment Climate Programme (BIC)	2006
PRAMECLIM/NIC	European Commission	Fiche Action pour le Nicaragua/ Appui au développement des entreprises su secteur privé	2007
PRAMECLIM/NIC	European Commission	Fiche d'impact budgétaire	2007
PRAMECLIM/NIC	European Commission	Anexo II del Convenio de Financiación - Disposiciones Técnicas Administrativas	2008
PRAMECLIM/NIC	European Commission	Ficha de recopilación de información (BSC)	2010
PRBS 3/ZA	European Commission	Financing Agreement	2009
PRODECOOP/ NIC	European Commission	Contrato de subvención -ONG/PVD/2003/063-907	2004
PRODECOOP/ NIC	European Commission	Anexo I al Contrato de subvención -Descripción de la acción	2004
PRODECOOP/ NIC	European Commission	Monitoring Report MR-30366.01	2005
PRODECOOP/ NIC	European Commission	Ficha de recopilación de información (BSC)	2010
PRODECOOP/ NIC	European Commission	Sinopsis del Proyecto	2010
PRODECOOP/ NIC	European Commission	Sinopsis del Proyecto	2010
PRODECOOP/ NIC	ACE (for the European Commission)	Evaluación de medio término - Informe final	2011
PRSC 3/VIET	European Commission	Financing Agreement	2004
PRSC 3/VIET	European Commission	Annex II -Technical and Administrative Provisions	2004
PRSC 3/VIET	European Commission	Monitoring Report - MR-20349.01	2005
PRSC 3/VIET	European Commission	Project Synopsis	2005
PRSC 3/VIET	European Commission	Monitoring Report - MR-20502.01	2006

Intervention – Country	Source	Title	Year
PRSC 3/VIET	European Commission	Project Synopsis	2006
PRSC 3/VIET	European Commission	Background Conclusion Sheet Ex-post	2008
PRSC 4/VIET	European Commission	Financing Proposal	2005
PRSC 4/VIET	European Commission	Financing Agreement	2006
PRSC 4/VIET	European Commission	Annex II -Technical and Administrative Provisions	2006
PRSC 5/VIET	European Commission	Financing Proposal	2005
PRSC 5/VIET	European Commission	Commission Decision	2006
PRSC 5/VIET	European Commission	Financing Agreement	2007
PRSC 5/VIET	European Commission	Annex II -Technical and Administrative Provisions	2007
PRSC 6/VIET	European Commission	Annual Action Plan Vietnam	2007
PRSC 6/VIET	European Commission	Commission Decision	2007
PRSC 6/VIET	European Commission	Action Fiche	2007
PRSC 6/VIET	European Commission	Financing Agreement	2008
PRSC 6/VIET	European Commission	Annex II -Technical and Administrative Provisions	2008
PRSC 7/VIET	World Bank	International Development Association Program Document	2008
PRSC 7-9/VIET	European Commission	Annual Action Plan Vietnam	2008
PRSC 7-9/VIET	European Commission	Public Financial Management (PFM) Report	2008
PRSC 7-9/VIET	European Commission	Description and assessment of the national strategy of Vietnam: The Socio-Economic Development Plan 2006-2010 (SEDP 2006-2010)	2008
PRSC 7-9/VIET	European Commission	Description and assessment of the macroeconomic policy	2008
PRSC 7-9/VIET	European Commission	Timeline for PRSC 7-9	2008
PRSC 7-9/VIET	European Commission	Financing Agreement	2009
PRSC 7-9/VIET	European Commission	Annex II -Technical and Administrative Provisions	2009
PRSC8/VIET	World Bank	International Development Association Program Document	2009
PRSC9/VIET	World Bank	International Development Association Program Document	2010

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PSDS/Kenya	European Commission	Financing Agreement	2010
PSDS/Kenya	European Commission	IFC Contract	2010
PSDS/Kenya	European Commission	Action Description	2010
Risk Capital 2 SBS/SA	European Commission	Commission Decision	2005
Risk Capital 2 SBS/SA	European Commission	Financing Proposal	2005
Risk Capital 2 SBS/SA	European Commission	Memorandum of Understanding between the European Commission and the EIB	2006
Risk Capital 2 SBS/SA	European Commission	Background Conclusion Sheet	2010
Risk Capital 2 SBS/SA	European Commission	Project Synopsis	2010
Risk Capital 2 SBS/SA	EIB	Result Oriented Mission - EIB Comments	2010
Sector Ref. Facility/JORD	European Commission	Commission decision	2005
Sector Ref. Facility/JORD	European Commission	Financing Agreement	2005
Sector Ref. Facility/JORD	European Commission	Annex II-Technical and Administrative Provisions	2005
Sector Ref. Facility/JORD	European Commission	Exchange of letters between Delegation and HQ on the disbursement of tranches	2005-2009
SME Support/UKR	European Commission	Ukraine Annual Action Programme	2003
SME Support/UKR	European Commission	Commission Decision	2003
SME Support/UKR	European Commission	Project Fiche	2003
SME Support/UKR	European Commission	Financing Agreement	2004
SME Support/UKR	European Commission	Monitoring Report -MR-40528.01	2006
SME Support/UKR	European Commission	Project Synopsis	2006
SME Support/UKR	European Commission	Monitoring Report -MR-40528.02	2007
SME Support/UKR	GFA Consulting Group	SME Support Services in Priority Regions - Inception Report	2006
SME Support/UKR	GFA Consulting Group	SME Support Services in Priority Regions - 2nd Project Progress Report	2007
SME Support/UKR	GFA Consulting Group	SME Support Services in Priority Regions - 3rd Project Progress Report	2007

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SME Support/UKR	GFA Consulting Group	SME Support Services in Priority Regions - Final Project Report	2007
SPSP Econ. Cluster/SA	European Commission	Action Fiche and Annexes	2008
SPSP Econ. Cluster/SA	European Commission	Financing Agreement	2009
SPSP Econ. Cluster/SA	European Commission	Annex II- Technical and Administrative Provisions	2009
SPSP Econ. Cluster/SA	European Commission	Background Conclusion Sheet for Paris Declaration	2010
SPSP Econ. Cluster/SA	European Commission	SPSP Synopsis	2010
SPSP Econ. Cluster/SA	European Commission	Comments from EU Delegation to the 2010 ROM report	2010
UKR	ING on behalf of the EU	The European Union's Bank Sector Reform programme for Ukraine - Completion Report	2006
UKR	Planet S.A	Final report - Strengthening of Ukrainian Financial Services Sector	2010
VPSSP/VIET	European Commission	Financing Proposal	2003
VPSSP/VIET	European Commission	Financing Agreement	2004
VPSSP/VIET	European Commission	Annex II -Technical and Administrative Provisions	2004
VPSSP/VIET	European Commission	Monitoring Report -MR-20441.01	2006
VPSSP/VIET	European Commission	Project Synopsis	2006
VPSSP/VIET	European Commission	Monitoring Report -MR-20441.02	2007
VPSSP/VIET	European Commission	Background Conclusion Sheet Ex-post	2009