

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

PROCEEDINGS

TWENTIETH ORDINARY SESSION

SECOND PART

December 1974

IV

Minutes

Official Report of Debates

W E U

PARIS

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

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The Proceedings of the Second Part of the Twentieth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes :

Volume III : Assembly Documents.

Volume IV : Orders of the Day and Minutes of Proceedings, Official Report of Debates, General Index.

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LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

BELGIUM

Representatives

MM. ADRIAENSENS Hugo	Socialist
DEQUAE André	Chr. Soc.
KEMPINAIRE André	PLP
LEYNEN Hubert	Chr. Soc.
SCHUGENS Willy	Socialist
de STEXHE Paul	Chr. Soc.
TANGHE Francis	Chr. Soc.

Substitutes

MM. BREYNE Gustave	Socialist
de BRUYNE Hektor	Volksunie
DUVIEUSART Etienne	FDF-RW
Mrs. GODINACHE-LAMBERT Marie-Thérèse	PLP
MM. HULPIAU Raphaël	Chr. Soc.
PLASMAN Marcel	Chr. Soc.
VAN HOEYLANDT D. Bernard	Socialist

FRANCE

Representatives

MM. BOULLOCHE André	Socialist
BRUGNON Maurice	Socialist
CERNEAU Marcel	Centre Union
DELORME Claude	Socialist
de FÉLICE Pierre	Dem. Left
JUNG Louis	UCDR
KRIEG Pierre-Charles	UDR
LEGARET Jean	Ind. Rep.
de MONTESQUIOU Pierre	Soc. Dem. Ref.
NESSLER Edmond	UDR
President of the Assembly	
PÉRIDIER Jean	Socialist
RADIUS René	UDR
RIVIÈRE Paul	UDR
ROGER Émile	Communist
SCHLEITER François	Ind. Rep.
SCHMITT Robert	UDR (App.)
VALLEIX Jean	UDR
VITTER Pierre	Ind. Rep.

Substitutes

MM. BEAUGUITTE André	Ind. Rep.
BIZET Émile	UDR (App.)
BOURGEOIS Georges	UDR
CERMOLACCE Paul	Communist
de CHEVIGNY Pierre	Ind. Rep.
DAILLET Jean-Marie	Soc. Dem. Ref.
DARDEL Georges	Socialist
DEPIETRI César	Communist
FORNI Raymond	Socialist
GAUTIER Lucien	UDR
GRUSSENMEYER François	UDR

MM. LA COMBE René	UDR
LAURENT-THOUVEREY C.	Dem. Left
LEMAIRE Marcel	RIAS
PIGNION Lucien	Socialist
SOUSTELLE Jacques	Non-party
WEBER Pierre	Ind. Rep. (App.)
YVON Joseph	UCDR

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Representatives

MM. AHRENS Karl	SPD
ALBER Siegbert	CDU
AMREHN Franz	CDU
DREGGER Alfred	CDU
ENDERS Wendelin	SPD
GESSNER Manfred	SPD
KEMPFLER Friedrich	CDU
LEMMRICH Karl Heinz	CDU
MATTICK Kurt	SPD
MENDE Erich	CDU
MÜLLER Günther	CDU
RICHTER Klaus	SPD
SCHLAGA Georg	SPD
SCHMIDT Hansheinrich	FDP
Mrs. SCHUCHARDT Helga	FDP
MM. SCHWENCKE Olaf	SPD
SIEGLERSCHMIDT Hellmut	SPD
Mrs. WOLF Erika	CDU

Substitutes

Mr. BARZEL Rainer	CDU
Mrs. von BOTHMER Lenelotte	SPD
MM. BÜCHNER Peter	SPD
CARSTENS Karl	CDU
GÖLTER Georg	CDU
HOLTZ Uwe	SPD
KLEPSCH Egon	CDU
KLIESING Georg	CDU
LAGERSHAUSEN Karl-Hans	CDU
LENZER Christian	CDU
MARQUARDT Werner	SPD
OFFERGELD Rainer	SPD
PAWELCZYK Alfons	SPD
SCHULTE Manfred	SPD
VOHRER Manfred	FDP
WALTHER Rudi	SPD
WÖRNER Manfred	CDU
WURBS Richard	FDP

ITALY

Representatives

MM. ARNAUD Gian Aldo	Chr. Dem.
AVERARDI Giuseppe	Socialist
BETTIOL Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
COPPOLA Mattia	Chr. Dem.
LA LOGGIA Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
LEGGIERI Vincenzo	Chr. Dem.
MAMMI Oscar	Republican
MINNOCCI Giacinto	Socialist
Mrs. MIOTTI CARLI Amalia	Chr. Dem.
MM. PECORARO Antonio	Chr. Dem.
PICA Domenico	Chr. Dem.
PRETI Luigi	Socialist
QUILLERI Fausto Samuele	Liberal
SALVATORE Elvio Alfonso	Socialist
TALAMONA Augusto	Socialist
TREU Renato	Chr. Dem.
VEDOVATO Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
ZAMBERLETTI Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.

Substitutes

MM. ARFÉ Gaetano	Socialist
BONALDI Umberto	Liberal
BOTTARI Carlo	Chr. Dem.
BRANDI Lucio Mariano	Socialist
CASTELLUCCI Albertino	Chr. Dem.
Mrs. CATTANEO-PETRINI Giannina	Chr. Dem.
MM. CAVEZZALI Paolo	Socialist
DRAGO Antonino	Chr. Dem.
FARABEGOLI Furio	Chr. Dem.
LA ROSA Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
MAGLIANO Terenzio	Socialist
MONETI Alfredo	Chr. Dem.
NEGRARI Andrea	Chr. Dem.
PACINI Arturo	Chr. Dem.
PREARO Roberto	Chr. Dem.
REALE Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
SANTALCO Carmelo	Chr. Dem.
SPORA Ettore	Chr. Dem.

LUXEMBOURG

Representatives

MM. ABENS Victor	Soc. Workers
MARGUE Georges	Chr. Soc.
MART René	Dem.

Substitutes

MM. HENGEL René	Soc. Workers
KONEN René	Dem.
SPAUTZ Jean	Chr. Soc.

NETHERLANDS

Representatives

MM. BOERTIEN Cornelis	Antirevolution.
CORNELISSEN Pam	Pop. Cath.
DANKERT Pieter	Labour
LETSCHERT Hendrik	Pop. Cath.
de NIET Maarten	Labour
PORTHEINE Frederik	Liberal
VOOGD Joop	Labour

Substitutes

MM. de KOSTER Hans	Liberal
van OOIJEN David	Labour
PEIJNENBURG Marinus	Pop. Cath.
PIKET Frederik	Chr. Hist.
SCHLINGEMANN Johan	Liberal
STOFFELEN Pieter	Labour
WALTMANS Henk	Radical

UNITED KINGDOM

Representatives

MM. Stanley COHEN	Labour
Julian CRITCHLEY	Conservative
Lord DUNCAN-SANDYS	Conservative
MM. Raymond FLETCHER	Labour
W. Percy GRIEVE	Conservative
John HUNT	Conservative
Dr. J. Dickson MABON	Labour
MM. John MENDELSON	Labour
John OSBORN	Conservative
John PAGE	Conservative
Tom PENDRY	Labour
John PRESCOTT	Labour
Sir John RODGERS	Conservative
MM. John ROPER	Labour
William SMALL	Labour
David STEEL	Liberal
Frank TOMNEY	Labour
Thomas URWIN	Labour

Substitutes

Lord BEAUMONT of WHITLEY	Liberal
Sir Frederic BENNETT	Conservative
MM. Ronald BROWN	Labour
Raymond CARTER	Labour
John CORDLE	Conservative
Lord DARLING of HILLSBOROUGH	Labour
MM. John FARR	Conservative
Andrew FAULDS	Labour
Sir Harwood HARRISON	Conservative
MM. James LESTER	Conservative
Arthur LEWIS	Labour
Hilary MILLER	Conservative
Lord PEDDIE	Labour
Baroness PHILLIPS	Labour
Lord SELSDON	Conservative
Mr. Patrick WALL	Conservative
Lord WALSTON	Labour
Mr. Kenneth WARREN	Conservative

I

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

SIXTH SITTING

Tuesday, 3rd December 1974

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Opening of the Second Part of the Twentieth Ordinary Session of the Assembly.
2. Examination of Credentials.
3. Address by the President of the Assembly.
4. Adoption of the draft Order of Business for the Second Part of the Session (Doc. 644).
5. European union and WEU (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee*, Doc. 646).
6. Nomination of members to Committees.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The Sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Resumption of the Session and adoption of the Minutes

The President announced the resumption of the Twentieth Ordinary Session of the Assembly.

The Minutes of Proceedings of the Fifth Sitting on Thursday, 20th June 1974, were agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in the Appendix.

3. Examination of Credentials

In accordance with Rule 6(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly took note of the letters from the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe stating that the Assembly had ratified the credentials of :

- Mr. Beauguitte as a Substitute of France in place of Mr. Destremau ;
- Mr. Daillet as a substitute of France to fill a vacant seat ;
- MM. Müller and Mattick as Representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany in place of MM. Blumenfeld and Kahn-Ackermann ;

- MM. Carstens and Offergeld as Substitutes of the Federal Republic of Germany in place of MM. Müller and Wischnewski ;
- MM. Hengel and Konen as Substitutes of Luxembourg in place of MM. Cravatte and Elvinger ;
- MM. de Koster, Schlingemann and Waltmans as Substitutes of the Netherlands in place of Mrs. Gardeniers, MM. van der Werff and Rang.

In accordance with Rule 6(2) of the Rules of Procedure, and subject to ratification by the Council of Europe, the Assembly unanimously ratified the credentials of :

- Mr. Duvieusart as a Substitute of Belgium in place of Mr. Gendebien ;
- Mr. Hunt and Dr. Mabon as Representatives of the United Kingdom in place of Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Fox ;
- Lord Beaumont of Whitley, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Carter, Lord Darling of Hillsborough, Mr. Lester and Lord Walston as Substitutes of the United Kingdom in place of Lord Lloyd of Kilgerran, MM. Hunt, Hughes, Jones, Dr. Mabon and Mr. Roberts.

4. Observers

The President welcomed to the Second Part of the Session the following :

Parliamentary Observers

- Senator Grosart from Canada ;
- Mr. Elmholt and Mr. Larsen from Denmark ;
- Mr. Sjöthun and Mr. Jakobsen from Norway ;
- Mr. Inan and Mr. Ölçmen from Turkey.

Observer from Greece

- His Excellency Ambassador Touloupas.

Observers from Portugal

- Mr. Caldas ;
- Mr. Vasco da Gama Fernandes.

5. Address by the President of the Assembly

The President addressed the Assembly.

6. Adoption of the draft Order of Business for the Second Part of the Session

(Doc. 644)

The draft Order of Business was agreed to with the following amendments to the titles of the two reports to be discussed at the afternoon Sitting on Wednesday, 4th December :

- “State of European aerospace activities” to read “State of European aviation activities” ;
- at the end of “State of European nuclear energy programmes”, add “— security aspects”.

7. Channel Tunnel

(Motion for a Recommendation with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 657)

The President announced that a Motion for a Recommendation on the Channel Tunnel had been tabled by Mr. de Montesquiou with a request for urgent procedure under Rule 43 of the Rules of Procedure.

Speaker : Mr. Prescott.

Urgent procedure was not agreed to.

8. European union and WEU

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 646)

The Report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mr. Krieg, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

Speakers : MM. Farr, Richter, Cermolacce, Dankert, Lemmrich, Grieve, de Niet, Leynen, Roper.

Mr. Krieg, Rapporteur, and Mr. Siegler-schmidt, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

Speakers (on a request for reference back to Committee) : MM. Roper, Krieg (Rapporteur), Leynen.

The reference back to Committee was agreed to.

9. Date and time of the next Sitting

The next Sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

The Sitting was closed at 12.30 p.m.

APPENDIX

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance ¹ :

MM. Abens	MM. Hunt	MM. Prescott
Adriaensens	Kempfler	Radius
Ahrens	Mrs. <i>Godinache-Lambert</i>	Richter
Alber	(Kempinaire)	Rivière
Amrehn	MM. Krieg	Sir John Rodgers
Arnaud	Lemmrich	MM. <i>Cermolacce (Roger)</i>
Averardi	Letschert	Roper
<i>Pignion (Boulloche)</i>	Leynen	<i>Marquardt (Schlaga)</i>
Brugnon	Dr. Mabon	Schugens
Cerneau	MM. Margue	Schwencke
Cohen	Mart	Sieglerschmidt
<i>Schlingemann (Cornelissen)</i>	<i>Büchner (Mattick)</i>	Small
Critchley	Mende	de Stexhe
Dankert	Mrs. Miotti Carli	<i>de Bruyne (Tanghe)</i>
Dequae	MM. Müller	<i>Lewis (Tomney)</i>
<i>Lenzer (Dregger)</i>	de Niet	Treu
<i>Wall (Lord Duncan-Sandys)</i>	<i>Farr (Osborn)</i>	Urwin
Enders	Sir <i>Frederic Bennett (Page)</i>	Valleix
<i>Dardel (de Félice)</i>	MM. Pendry	<i>Beauguitte (Vitter)</i>
Fletcher	Péridier	<i>Stoffelen (Voogd)</i>
Grieve	<i>de Koster (Portheine)</i>	

The following Representatives apologised for their absence :

MM. Bettiol	MM. Mammi	MM. Schleiter
Boertien	Mendelson	Schmidt
Coppola	Minnocci	Schmitt
Delorme	de Montesquiou	Mrs. Schuchardt
Gessner	Pecoraro	MM. Steel
Jung	Pica	Talamona
La Loggia	Preti	Vedovato
Legaret	Quillieri	Mrs. Wolf
Leggieri	Salvatore	Mr. Zamberletti

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

SEVENTH SITTING

Tuesday, 3rd December 1974

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Changes in the membership of Committees.

2. Second draft supplementary budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1974 (Doc. 647); Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1975 (Doc. 648); Accounts of the admin-

istrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1973 — The Auditor's Report and Motion to approve the final accounts (Doc. 645 and Addendum) (*Presentation of and Debate on the Reports of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Votes on the draft texts, Docs. 647, 648 and 645 and Addendum*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in the Appendix.

2. Point of order

Mr. Brugnon raised a point of order on the decision taken at the previous Sitting on the request for urgent procedure for the Motion for a Recommendation on the Channel Tunnel, Document 657.

Speakers : MM. de Montesquiou, Grieve, Krieg, Brugnon, Farr, Sir John Rodgers, MM. Krieg, Cohen.

On a vote by sitting and standing the Assembly decided against urgent procedure.

Speakers : MM. de Montesquiou, Prescott.

3. Changes in the membership of Committees

In accordance with Rule 8(3) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly ratified the following changes in the membership of Committees made provisionally by the Presidential Committee on the proposal of the Luxembourg Delegation :

Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments

Mr. Konen as a member with Mr. Spautz as an alternate.

General Affairs Committee

Mr. Abens as a member with Mr. Hengel as an alternate.

Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions

Mr. Mart as a member with Mr. Hengel as an alternate.

Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration

Mr. Hengel as a member with Mr. Margue as an alternate.

Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges

Mr. Konen as a member with Mr. Abens as an alternate.

Committee for Relations with Parliaments

MM. Hengel and Spautz as members and MM. Mart and Konen as alternates.

In accordance with Rule 39(6) of the Rules of Procedure the Assembly ratified the changes

in membership of the six Committees proposed by the Delegations of France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands as follows :

*Committee on Defence Questions
and Armaments*

France :

Mr. Beauguitte as a member to fill a vacant seat.

Federal Republic of Germany :

Mr. Offergeld as a member in place of Mr. Schlaga.

Netherlands :

Mr. de Koster as a member in place of Mr. van der Werff.

General Affairs Committee

Federal Republic of Germany :

Mrs. von Bothmer as a member in place of Mr. Kahn-Ackermann.

Mr. Gessner as an alternate in place of Mr. Schulte.

Mr. Schwencke as an alternate to fill a vacant seat.

Netherlands :

Mr. de Koster as an alternate in place of Mrs. Gardeniers.

*Committee on Scientific, Technological
and Aerospace Questions*

France :

Mr. Cerneau as an alternate to fill a vacant seat.

Federal Republic of Germany :

Mr. Ahrens as an alternate in place of Mr. Kahn-Ackermann.

Netherlands :

Mr. Waltmans as an alternate in place of Mr. Rang.

*Committee on Budgetary Affairs
and Administration*

Federal Republic of Germany :

Mr. Vohrer as a member in place of Mr. Wurbs.

Mr. Wurbs as an alternate in place of Mr. Vohrer.

Netherlands :

Mr. Waltmans as a member in place of Mr. Peijnenburg.

Mr. de Koster as a member in place of Mr. Porthoine.

Mr. Peijnenburg as an alternate in place of Mr. Rang.

Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges

France :

MM. Cerneau and Pignion as members to fill vacant seats.

Mr. Périquier as an alternate in place of Mr. Cerneau.

Federal Republic of Germany :

Mr. Büchner as an alternate in place of Mr. Richter.

Netherlands :

Mr. Cornelissen as an alternate in place of Mrs. Gardeniers.

Committee for Relations with Parliaments

Netherlands :

Mr. Peijnenburg as a member in place of Mrs. Gardeniers.

Mr. Schlingemann as an alternate in place of Mr. Porthoine.

4. Second draft supplementary budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1974

(Doc. 647)

Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1975

(Doc. 648)

Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1973 — The Auditor's Report and Motion to approve the final accounts

(Doc. 645 and Addendum)

(Presentation of and Debate on the Reports of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Votes on the draft texts, Docs. 647, 648 and 645 and Addendum)

The Reports of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration were presented by Mr. Dequae, Chairman and Rapporteur.

Speakers : MM. de Bruyne, Ahrens.

Mr. Dequae replied to the speakers.

The second draft supplementary budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly

for the financial year 1974 contained in Document 647 was agreed to unanimously.

The draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1975 contained in Document 648 was agreed to unanimously.

The Motion to approve the final accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1973 contained in the Addendum to Document 645 was agreed to unanimously.

5. Date and time of the next Sitting

The next Sitting was fixed for Wednesday, 4th December, at 10 a.m.

The Sitting was closed at 4.10 p.m.

APPENDIX

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance¹:

MM. Adriaensens	Mrs. <i>Godinache-Lambert</i>	Mr. Radius
Ahrens	(Kempinaire)	Sir John Rodgers
Alber	MM. Krieg	MM. <i>Cermolacce</i> (Roger)
<i>Piket</i> (Boertien)	Lemmrich	<i>Marquardt</i> (Schlaga)
Brugnon	Letschert	<i>Vohrer</i> (Mme Schuchardt)
Cohen	Leynen	Schugens
Dankert	Margue	Lord <i>Beaumont of Whitley</i> (Steel)
Dequae	Mrs. Miotti Carli	MM. <i>Hulpiau</i> (de Stexhe)
Enders	MM. de Montesquiou	<i>de Bruyne</i> (Tanghe)
<i>Dardel</i> (de Félice)	<i>Waltmans</i> (de Niet)	Treu
Grieve	<i>Farr</i> (Osborn)	Voogd
Hunt	Prescott	

The following Representatives apologised for their absence:

MM. Abens	MM. Legaret	MM. Richter
Amrehn	Leggieri	Rivière
Arnaud	Dr. Mabon	Roper
Averardi	MM. Mammi	Salvatore
Bettiol	Mart	Schleier
Boulloche	Mattick	Schmidt
Cerneau	Mende	Schmitt
Coppola	Mendelson	Schwencke
Cornelissen	Minnocci	Sieglerschmidt
Critchley	Müller	Small
Delorme	Page	Talamona
Dregger	Pecoraro	Tomney
Lord Duncan-Sandys	Pendry	Urwin
MM. Fletcher	Péridier	Valleix
Gessner	Pica	Vedovato
Jung	Portheine	Vitter
Kempfer	Preti	Mrs. Wolf
La Loggia	Quilleri	Mr. Zamberletti

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

EIGHTH SITTING

Wednesday, 4th December 1974

ORDERS OF THE DAY

European security and the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments; Address by Mr. Destremau, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of France, Doc. 651 and Amendments*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The Sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the two previous Sittings were agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in the Appendix.

3. European security and the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments; Address by Mr. Destremau, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of France, Doc. 651 and Amendments)

The Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. Critchley, Chairman and Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

Speakers : Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Wall, Krieg, Roper, Mattick, Dr. Mabon, MM. Müller, Waltmans, Cermolacce.

Mr. Destremau, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of France, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Destremau replied to questions put by MM. Leynen, Sieglerschmidt and de Niet.

Speakers : Mr. Inan (Parliamentary Observer from Turkey) and His Excellency Ambassador Touloupas (Observer from Greece).

The Debate was adjourned.

4. Date and time of the next Sitting

The next Sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

The Sitting was closed at 12.45 p.m.

APPENDIX

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance ¹:

MM. Abens	MM. Hunt	MM. <i>Negrari</i> (Pecoraro)
Adriaensens	Kempfer	Pendry
<i>Büchner</i> (Ahrens)	Mrs. <i>Godinache-Lambert</i>	<i>Reale</i> (Pica)
Alber	(Kempinaire)	Richter
Amrehn	MM. Krieg	Sir John Rodgers
Arnaud	<i>Lemaire</i> (Legaret)	MM. <i>Cermolacce</i> (Roger)
<i>Piket</i> (Boertien)	Lemrich	Roper
Brugnon	Letschert	<i>Marquardt</i> (Schlaga)
Cerneau	Leynen	Schugens
Cohen	Dr. Mabon	Sieglerschmidt
<i>Waltmans</i> (Cornelissen)	MM. Margue	Small
Critchley	Mart	Lord <i>Beaumont of Whitley</i> (Steel)
Dankert	Mattick	MM. <i>Hulpiau</i> (de Stexhe)
Delorme	Mende	<i>Breyne</i> (Tanghe)
Dequae	Mrs. Miotti Carli	<i>Lewis</i> (Tomney)
<i>Lenzer</i> (Dregger)	MM. de Montesquiou	Treu
Enders	Müller	Urwin
<i>Pignion</i> (de Félice)	de Niet	Valleix
Fletcher	<i>Wall</i> (Osborn)	Voogd
Gessner	Sir <i>Frederic Bennett</i> (Page)	Zamberletti
Grieve		

The following Representatives apologised for their absence :

MM. Averardi	MM. Minnocci	MM. Schleiter
Bettiol	Péridier	Schmidt
Boulloche	Portheine	Schmitt
Coppola	Prescott	Mrs. Schuchardt
Lord Duncan-Sandys	Preti	MM. Schwencke
MM. Jung	Quilléri	Talamona
La Loggia	Radius	Vedovato
Leggieri	Rivière	Vitter
Mammi	Salvatore	Mrs. Wolf
Mendelson		

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

NINTH SITTING

Wednesday, 4th December 1974

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. European security and the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean (*Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 651 and Amendments*).
2. Address by Mr. Matthöfer, Minister of Research and Technology of the Federal Republic of Germany.
3. State of European aviation activities (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 658*).
4. State of European nuclear energy programmes — security aspects (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 655 and Amendments*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The Sitting was opened at 3.10 p.m. with Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in Appendix I.

3. European security and the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean

(Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 651 and Amendments)

Speaker : Mr. Ölçmen (Parliamentary Observer from Turkey).

Mr. Critchley, Chairman and Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation contained in Document 651.

An Amendment (No. 3) was tabled by MM. Roper, Dankert and van Ooijen :

In the second paragraph of the preamble to the draft Recommendation, after "Turkey" insert "and between the communities in Cyprus".

Speaker : Mr. Cermolacce.

The Amendment was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Krieg :

1. In the fifth paragraph of the preamble to the draft Recommendation, leave out "contributes" and insert "contributed".

2. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft Recommendation proper.

Speakers : MM. Roper, Critchley.

Mr. Krieg withdrew part 1 of the Amendment.

Consideration of part 2 of the Amendment was postponed.

An Amendment (No. 7) was tabled by Mr. Roper :

Leave out the fifth paragraph of the preamble to the draft Recommendation and insert :

"Believing that the continued presence of British defence installations in Cyprus, in accordance with international agreements to which representatives of the Cyprus communities are parties, contributes to the defence of Europe as a whole ;"

Speakers : MM. Krieg, Roper.

The Amendment was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 8) was tabled by Mr. Roper :

In the preamble to the draft Recommendation, after the fifth paragraph insert the following new paragraph :

“Convinced that the United Nations force in Cyprus, to which three members of the European Community have contributed, is playing an essential rôle in the return to normal conditions in the island ;”

The Amendment was agreed to.

Speaker : Mr. Roper.

An Amendment (No. 4) was tabled by MM. Roper, Dankert and van Ooijen :

Leave out the sixth paragraph of the preamble to the draft Recommendation.

Speakers : MM. Roper, Critchley, Roper, the President, Critchley.

The Amendment was withdrawn.

A manuscript amendment was tabled by Mr. Critchley :

Leave out the sixth paragraph of the preamble to the draft Recommendation and insert the following new paragraphs :

“Calling for satellite observation capability to be made available to the Secretary-General of the United Nations ;

Reiterating its earlier recommendation for the correct application of the Montreux Convention to prevent the passage of aircraft-carriers through the Dardanelles,”

Speaker : Mr. Cermolacce.

The Amendment was agreed to.

Speaker : Mr. Krieg.

An Amendment (No. 5) was tabled by MM. Roper, Dankert and van Ooijen.

In paragraph 1 of the draft Recommendation proper, leave out “NATO and” and insert “their partners and allies in Europe and in particular”.

Mr. Roper proposed to leave out the words “in Europe”.

Speaker : Mr. Critchley.

The Amendment, as amended, was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Krieg :

Leave out paragraph 4 of the draft Recommendation proper and insert :

“4. Foster the accession of Greece to the EEC ;”

An Amendment (No. 6) was tabled by MM. Roper, Dankert and van Ooijen :

In paragraph 4 of the draft Recommendation proper, leave out “Foster the association” and insert “Develop the association agreements”.

Speakers : MM. Krieg, Roper, Krieg, Dr. Mabon, MM. Leynen, Krieg, Waltmans, Siegler-schmidt, Leynen, Critchley, Roper.

Mr. Krieg proposed consolidating Amendments Nos. 1 and 6 to form a new paragraph as follows :

“4. Develop the association agreements of Greece and Turkey towards the objective of their full membership of the European Community.”

Speakers : MM. Leynen, Critchley, Roper.

The consolidated Amendment was agreed to.

The Assembly then considered part 2 of Amendment No. 2 by Mr. Krieg.

Speakers : MM. Krieg, Waltmans, Krieg, Cermolacce, Krieg, Roper, Critchley, de Niet.

Part 2 of the Amendment was negatived.

An Amendment (No. 9) was tabled by Mr. Roper :

Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft Recommendation proper and insert :

“3. Recognise the importance of the continued presence of British defence installations in Cyprus ;”

The Amendment was agreed to.

Speaker : Mr. de Montesquiou.

An Amendment (No. 10) was tabled by MM. Mattick and Richter :

1. At the beginning of the draft Recommendation proper, insert the following paragraph :

“1. Request member governments of WEU to examine to what extent humanitarian aid for the 200,000 refugees on Cyprus could be enhanced, particularly, whether through rapid deliveries from reserve defence stocks the

survival of those concerned through the winter could be ensured ; furthermore to appeal to the responsible States to dissolve the refugee camps and to house the refugees in civilised quarters ;”

2. Leave out paragraph 5 of the draft Recommendation proper.

Speakers : Mr. Richter, Dr. Mabon, Sir Frederic Bennett.

Mr. Leynen proposed that the figure “200,000” be left out.

Speakers : MM. Schwencke, Critchley, Dr. Mabon (on a point of order), Mr. Richter.

The Amendment was thus amended and adopted.

Speakers : Dr. Mabon (on a point of order), Mr. Roper (explanation of vote).

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Recommendation.

Speaker : Mr. Cermolacce.

Sir John Rodgers, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair in place of Mr. Nessler.

The amended draft Recommendation was agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix II) by 48 votes to 3 with 3 abstentions¹. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 256)².

Speakers (on points of order) : MM. de Montesquiou, Waltmans, Page, Dr. Mabon, Mr. Roper.

4. Address by Mr. Matthöfer, Minister of Research and Technology of the Federal Republic of Germany

Mr. Matthöfer addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Matthöfer replied to questions put by MM. Schwencke, Richter, Enders, Valleix, Abens, van Ooijen, de Montesquiou.

5. State of European aviation activities

(Presentation of the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Doc. 658)

Speaker (on a point of order) : Mr. Waltmans.

The Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions was presented by Mr. Warren, Rapporteur.

Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

6. Date and time of the next Sitting

Speakers : MM. Waltmans, de Montesquiou, Lenzer.

The next Sitting was fixed for Thursday, 5th December, at 9 a.m.

The Sitting was closed at 6.05 p.m.

1. Voting figures initially announced in the Chamber were : Ayes 48 ; Noes 3 ; Abstentions 2. After verification of the vote the result is : Ayes 48 ; Noes 3 ; Abstentions 3.

2. See page 28.

APPENDIX I

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance¹:

MM. Abens	Mr. <i>Lagershausen</i> (Kempfler)	MM. Pendry
Adriaensens	Mrs. <i>Godinache-Lambert</i>	<i>Reale</i> (Pica)
<i>Büchner</i> (Ahrens)	(Kempinaire)	Prescott
Alber	MM. Krieg	Richter
Amrehn	Lemmrigh	Sir John Rodgers
<i>Piket</i> (Boertien)	Letschert	MM. <i>Cermolacce</i> (Roger)
<i>Depietri</i> (Brugnon)	Leynen	Roper
Cohen	Dr. Mabon	<i>Vohrer</i> (Schmidt)
<i>Waltmans</i> (Cornelissen)	MM. Mammì	Schugens
Critchley	Margue	Schwencke
<i>van Ooijen</i> (Dankert)	<i>Konen</i> (Mart)	Sieglerschmidt
Delorme	Mattick	Small
<i>de Bruyne</i> (Dequae)	Mende	Lord <i>Beaumont of Whitley</i> (Steel)
<i>Lenzer</i> (Dregger)	Mendelson	MM. <i>Hulpiau</i> (de Stexhe)
Lord Duncan-Sandys	Mrs. Miotti Carli	Tanghe
MM. Enders	MM. de Montesquiou	<i>Lewis</i> (Tomney)
Fletcher	Müller	Urwin
Mrs. <i>von Bothmer</i> (Gessner)	de Niet	Valleix
MM. Grieve	Sir <i>Frederic Bennett</i> (Osborn)	Voogd
Hunt	MM. Page	Zamberletti
Jung	<i>Negrari</i> (Pecoraro)	

The following Representatives apologised for their absence :

MM. Arnaud	MM. Leggieri	MM. Schlaga
Averardi	Minnocci	Schleiter
Bettiol	Péridier	Schmitt
Bouloche	Portheine	Mrs. Schuchardt
Cerneau	Preti	MM. Talamona
Coppola	Quilleri	Treu
de Félice	Radius	Vedovato
La Loggia	Rivière	Vitter
Legaret	Salvatore	Mrs. Wolf

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

APPENDIX II

Vote No. 6 by roll-call on the amended draft Recommendation on European security and the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean (Doc. 651) ¹:

Ayes	48
Noes	3
Abstentions	3

Ayes

MM. Abens	Mrs. <i>Godinache-Lambert</i> (Kempinaire)	MM. <i>Negrari</i> (Pecoraro)
Adriaensens		Pendry
<i>Büchner</i> (Ahrens)	MM. Lemmrich	<i>Reale</i> (Pica)
Amrehn	Letschert	Richter
<i>Piket</i> (Boertien)	Leynen	Sir John Rodgers
Cohen	Dr. Mabon	MM. Roper
Critchley	MM. Mammi	<i>Vohrer</i> (Schmidt)
<i>van Ooijen</i> (Dankert)	Margue	Schugens
<i>de Bruyne</i> (Dequae)	<i>Konen</i> (Mart)	Schwencke
<i>Lenzer</i> (Dregger)	Mende	Sieglerschmidt
Enders	Mendelson	Lord <i>Beaumont of Whitley</i> (Steel)
Fletcher	Mrs. Miotti Carli	MM. <i>Hulpiau</i> (de Stexhe)
Mrs. <i>von Bothmer</i> (Gessner)	MM. Müller	Tanghe
MM. Grieve	de Niet	Urwin
Hunt	Sir <i>Frederic Bennett</i> (Osborn)	Voogd
Jung	Mr. Page	Zamberletti
<i>Lagershausen</i> (Kempfer)		


Noes

MM. <i>Depietri</i> (Brugnon)
<i>Waltmans</i> (Cornelissen)
<i>Cermolacce</i> (Roger)

Abstentions

MM. Krieg
de Montesquiou
Valleix

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.



TEXT ADOPTED AT THE NINTH SITTING

RECOMMENDATION 256
on European security and the situation
in the Eastern Mediterranean

The Assembly,

Deploring the loss of life and human suffering in Cyprus ;

Believing that any solution to the crisis in the island depends on improved relations between Greece and Turkey and between the communities in Cyprus involving mutual concessions on several issues ;

Recalling the continued increase in Soviet military power, especially at sea ;

Aware that European security is endangered by any weakening of the links between NATO and its member countries and by any deterioration in relations between NATO countries ;

Believing that the continued presence of British defence installations in Cyprus, in accordance with international agreements to which representatives of the Cyprus communities are parties, contributes to the defence of Europe as a whole ;

Convinced that the United Nations force in Cyprus, to which three members of the European Community have contributed, is playing an essential rôle in the return to normal conditions in the island ;

Calling for satellite observation capability to be made available to the Secretary-General of the United Nations ;

Reiterating its earlier recommendation for the correct application of the Montreux Convention to prevent the passage of aircraft-carriers through the Dardanelles,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Request member governments of WEU to examine to what extent humanitarian aid for the refugees on Cyprus could be enhanced, particularly, whether through rapid deliveries from reserve defence stocks the survival of those concerned through the winter could be ensured ; furthermore to appeal to the responsible States to dissolve the refugee camps and to house the refugees in civilised quarters ;
2. Endeavour to ensure that the good offices of their partners and allies and in particular of the members of the European Community continue to be available to all parties in order to secure a general settlement of the Cyprus problem through negotiations between the two communities ;
3. Impress upon all parties to the conflict the manifold advantages which active membership of NATO bestows on each and every member ;
4. Recognise the importance of the continued presence of British defence installations in Cyprus ;
5. Develop the association agreements of Greece and Turkey towards the objective of their full membership of the European Community.

TENTH SITTING

Thursday, 5th December 1974

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. State of European aviation activities (*Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 658*).
2. State of European nuclear energy programmes — security aspects (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 655 and Amendments*).
3. Rational deployment of forces on the central front (*Presentation of and Debate on the Interim Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 654*).
4. Conditions of service in the armed forces (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 650 and Amendment*).
5. Address by Lord Goronwy-Roberts, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom.
6. Address by Mr. Van Elslande, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Development Co-operation of Belgium.
7. Address by Mr. Vredeling, Minister of Defence of the Netherlands.
8. Rational deployment of forces on the central front : Conditions of service in the armed forces (*Votes on the draft Recommendations and draft Orders, Docs. 654 and 650 and Amendment*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The Sitting was opened at 9 a.m. with Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in the Appendix.

3. State of European aviation activities

(Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 658)

The Debate was opened.

Speakers : MM. Richter, de Bruyne.

Mr. Warren, Rapporteur, and Mr. de Montesquiou, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Recommendation contained in Document 658.

The draft Recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 257) ¹.

4. State of European nuclear energy programmes — security aspects

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 655 and Amendments)

The Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions was presented by Mr. Small, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

Speakers : MM. Waltmans, van Ooijen, Osborn.

Mr. Small, Rapporteur, and Mr. de Montesquiou, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

¹. See page 34.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation contained in Document 655.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by MM. Waltmans and de Bruyne :

Add the following paragraph at the end of the draft Recommendation :

"4. To study the consequences of a possible break-off of nuclear development within ten years."

Speaker : Mr. Small.

The Amendment was negatived.

An Amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Alber.

Add the following paragraph at the end of the draft Recommendation :

"To build nuclear power plants near a frontier only after agreement with the neighbouring country concerned."

Speaker : Mr. Small.

The Amendment was agreed to.

Speakers : MM. de Montesquiou, Waltmans, Cermolacce.

The vote on the draft Recommendation was postponed until the next Sitting.

**5. Address by Lord Goronwy-Roberts,
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
of the United Kingdom**

Lord Goronwy-Roberts, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Common-

wealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, addressed the Assembly.

Lord Goronwy-Roberts replied to questions put by MM. Critchley, Leynen, Lewis, Wall, Dr. Mabon.

**6. Address by Mr. Van Elslande,
Minister for Foreign Affairs and Development
Co-operation of Belgium**

Mr. Van Elslande, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Development Co-operation of Belgium, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Amrehn, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair in place of Mr. Nessler.

Mr. Van Elslande replied to questions put by MM. Sieglerschmidt, de Niet, Klepsch, Roper, Osborn.

Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

**7. Address by Mr. Vredeling, Minister
of Defence of the Netherlands**

Mr. Vredeling, Minister of Defence of the Netherlands, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Vredeling replied to questions put by MM. Roper, Leynen, Tanghe, Critchley.

8. Date and time of the next Sitting

The next Sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

The Sitting was closed at 12.40 p.m.

APPENDIX

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance¹:

MM. Abens	MM. Hunt	MM. Pendry
Adriaensens	<i>Lagershausen</i> (Kempfler)	Péridier
<i>Büchner</i> ((Ahrens)	Mrs. <i>Godinache-Lambert</i>	<i>Reale</i> (Pica)
Alber	(Kempinaire)	Richter
<i>Piket</i> (Boertien)	MM. Lemmrich	Sir John Rodgers
<i>Depietri</i> (Brugnon)	Letschert	MM. <i>Cermolacce</i> (Roger)
Cohen	Leynen	Roper
<i>Walmans</i> (Cornelissen)	Dr. Mabon	Schugens
Critchley	MM. Margue	Schwenoche
<i>van Ooijen</i> (Dankert)	<i>Spautz</i> (Mart)	Sieglerschmidt
<i>de Bruyne</i> (Dequae)	Mende	Small
<i>Klepach</i> (Dregger)	Mrs. Miotti Carli	Lord <i>Beaumont of Whitley</i> (Steel)
<i>Warren</i> (Lord Duncan-Sandys)	MM. de Montesquiou	MM. <i>Hulpiar</i> (de Stexhe)
Enders	Müller	Tanghe
Mrs. <i>von Bothmer</i> (Gessner)	de Niet	<i>Lewis</i> (Tomney)
Mr. Grieve	Osborn	Urwin
	<i>Wall</i> (Page)	Voogd

The following Representatives apologised for their absence:

MM. Amrehn	MM. Legaret	MM. Salvatore
Arnaud	Leggieri	Schlaga
Averardi	Mammi	Schleiter
Bettiol	Mattick	Schmidt
Bouloche	Mendelson	Schmitt
Cerneau	Minnocci	Mrs. Schuchardt
Coppola	Pecoraro	MM. Talamona
Delorme	Portheine	Treu
de Félice	Prescott	Valleix
Fletcher	Preti	Vedovato
Jung	Quilleri	Vitter
Krieg	Radius	Mrs. Wolf
La Loggia	Rivière	Mr. Zamberletti

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

TEXT ADOPTED AT THE TENTH SITTING

RECOMMENDATION 257
on the state of European aviation activities

The Assembly,

Concerned about the consequences of the oil crisis for the European civil air transport market and hence for the aviation industry ;

Aware of the part played by air transport in Europe's prosperity and the development of its advanced technology ;

Considering the interdependence of military and civil markets,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Invite the member countries to :

1. Agree on joint specifications for all military aviation procurement ;
2. Take particular account in the formulation of these specifications of the aircraft, engine and equipment capability of European aviation companies ;
3. Ensure that export market requirements are incorporated in the specifications ;
4. Give preference, wherever reasonable and possible, to the products of European aviation factories so that a self-sustaining design and manufacturing capability able to compete in world markets can be retained in Europe ;
5. Agree with the United States Government on equality of opportunity for the export and import of civil and military aerospace products between member countries and the United States and, until such agreement is reached, establish such commercial protection of the European market as is necessary to protect the jobs of European aerospace workers and the balance of payments of member countries ;
6. Recognise and establish Western Europe as a unified, single market for air transport operations and aircraft sales ;
7. Establish a strong and co-ordinated government- and EEC-backed programme of commercial, financial and diplomatic support for all aviation export sales.

ELEVENTH SITTING

Thursday, 5th December 1974

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Rational deployment of forces on the central front (*Presentation of and Debate on the Interim Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*, Doc. 654).
2. Conditions of service in the armed forces (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*, Doc. 650 and Amendment).
3. Rational deployment of forces on the central front; Conditions of service in the armed forces (*Votes on the draft Recommendations and draft Orders*, Docs. 654 and 650 and Amendment).
4. State of European nuclear energy programmes — security aspects (*Vote on the amended draft Recommendation*, Doc. 655).
5. The energy crisis and European security (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation*, Doc. 656).
6. National parliaments and the WEU Assembly (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments and Votes on the draft Recommendation and draft Order*, Doc. 653).
7. Advanced technology in Canada — the consequences for Europe (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Votes on the draft Recommendation and draft Resolution*, Doc. 649).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Amrehn, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in the Appendix.

3. Changes in the membership of Committees

In accordance with Rule 39(6) of the Rules of Procedure, on the proposal of the United Kingdom Delegation, the Assembly agreed to the following changes in the membership of Committees :

General Affairs Committee

Sir Frederic Bennett as a member in place of Mr. Page.

Mr. Page as an alternate in place of Sir Frederic Bennett.

Lord Beaumont of Whitley to fill a vacant seat.

Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions

Mr. Carter as a member in place of Mr. Osborn.

Mr. Osborn as an alternate in place of Mr. Farr.

Mr. Lester as an alternate to fill a vacant seat.

Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration

Lord Walston as an alternate to fill a vacant seat.

Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges

Lord Darling of Hillsborough as a member to fill a vacant seat.

Mr. Lester as an alternate to fill a vacant seat.

Committee for Relations with Parliaments

Mr. Farr as a member to fill a vacant seat.

Mr. Mendelson as an alternate in place of Sir Frederic Bennett.

4. Rational deployment of forces on the central front

(Presentation of and Debate on the Interim Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 654 and Amendment)

The Sitting was suspended at 3.05 p.m. and resumed at 3.15 p.m. with Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The Interim Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. Critchley, Chairman of the Committee, on behalf of Mr. Dankert, Rapporteur.

Mr. Amrehn, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair in place of Mr. Nessler.

The Debate was opened.

Speakers : MM. Reale, Critchley.

The Debate was closed.

5. Conditions of service in the armed forces

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 650 and Amendment)

The Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. Klepsch, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

Speakers : MM. Roper (on a point of order), Lemmrich, Wall, Cermolacce.

Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

Speakers : MM. Tanghe, Roper, Lemmrich.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation contained in Document 650.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Wall :

Insert the following paragraph after paragraph 2 of the draft Recommendation :

"That it urge member governments who participate in the NATO Defence Planning Committee to call on that body to conclude its examination of the United Kingdom's proposed defence review with a public statement of its findings as it did on concluding its

examination of the Netherlands defence review on 9th July 1974 ;"

Speaker : Mr. Wall.

The Amendment was withdrawn.

Mr. Klepsch, Rapporteur, and Mr. Critchley, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The vote on the draft Recommendation was postponed.

6. Address by Mr. Vasco da Gama Fernandes, Observer from Portugal

Mr. Vasco da Gama Fernandes addressed the Assembly.

7. The energy crisis and European security

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 656)

The Report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Sir John Rodgers, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

Speakers : MM. Depietri, Osborn, Lester, Alber.

Sir John Rodgers, Rapporteur, and Mr. Sieglerschmidt, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

The vote on the draft Recommendation was postponed.

8. Rational deployment of forces on the central front

(Votes on the draft Recommendation and draft Order, Doc. 654 and Amendment)

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation contained in Document 654.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Reale :

In the first line of the draft Recommendation proper, leave out "Urge" and insert "Encourage".

The Amendment was negatived.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Recommendation.

In accordance with paragraphs 3 and 4 of Rule 36 of the Rules of Procedure, the President declared that a majority of the Representatives was not present and that the vote would be postponed until the next session.

There not being a quorum, the vote on the draft Order was postponed until the next session.

9. Conditions of service in the armed forces

(Votes on the draft Recommendation and draft Order, Doc. 650)

There not being a quorum, the votes on the draft Recommendation and draft Order were postponed until the next session.

10. State of European nuclear energy programmes — security aspects

(Vote on the amended draft Recommendation, Doc. 655)

There not being a quorum, the vote on the amended draft Recommendation was postponed until the next session.

11. The energy crisis and European security

(Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 656)

There not being a quorum, the vote on the draft Recommendation was postponed until the next session.

12. National parliaments and the WEU Assembly

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments and Votes on the draft Recommendation and draft Order, Doc. 653)

The Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments was presented by Mr. Delorme, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

Speaker : Mrs. Miotti Carli.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Recommendation and draft Order contained in Document 653.

The draft Recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 258) ¹.

The draft Order was agreed to unanimously. (This Order will be published as No. 44) ².

13. Date and time of the next Sitting

The next Sitting was fixed for Friday, 6th December, at 10 a.m.

The Sitting was closed at 6.30 p.m.

1. See page 40.

2. See page 41.

APPENDIX

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance ¹ :

MM. Abens	Mr. <i>Lester</i> (Grieve)	MM. <i>Wall</i> (Page)
Adriaensens	Mrs. <i>Godinache-Lambert</i>	Pendry
<i>Büchner</i> (Ahrens)	(Kempinaire)	<i>Reale</i> (Pica)
Alber	MM. Krieg	Richter
Amrehn	Lemmrich	Sir John Rodgers
<i>Piket</i> (Boertien)	Leynen	MM. <i>Cermolacce</i> (Roger)
Brugnon	Dr. Mabon	Roper
Cerneau	MM. <i>Spautz</i> (Margue)	<i>Offergeld</i> (Schlaga)
Critchley	<i>Konen</i> (Mart)	Schugens
Delorme	<i>Pawelczyk</i> (Mattick)	Sieglerschmidt
<i>de Bruyne</i> (Dequae)	MM. Mende	Small
<i>Klepsch</i> (Dregger)	Mendelson	Lord <i>Beaumont of Whitley</i> (Steel)
<i>Warren</i> (Lord Duncan- Sandys)	Mrs. Miotti Carli	MM. <i>Breyne</i> (de Stexhe)
Enders	MM. de Montesquiou	Tanghe
<i>Depietri</i> (de Félice)	Müller	<i>Lewis</i> (Tomney)
Fletcher	<i>van Ooijen</i> (de Niet)	<i>Carter</i> (Urwin)
	Osborn	<i>Stoffelen</i> (Voogd)

The following Representatives apologised for their absence :

MM. Arnaud	MM. Legaret	MM. Salvatore
Averardi	Leggieri	Schleiter
Bettiol	Letschert	Schmidt
Bouulloche	Mammi	Schmitt
Cohen	Minnocci	Mrs. Schuchardt
Coppola	Pecoraro	MM. Schwencke
Cornelissen	Péridier	Talamona
Dankert	Portheine	Treu
Gessner	Prescott	Valleix
Hunt	Preti	Vedovato
Jung	Quillieri	Vitter
Kempfer	Radius	Mrs. Wolf
La Loggia	Rivière	Mr. Zamberletti

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

TEXTS ADOPTED AT THE ELEVENTH SITTING

RECOMMENDATION 258
on national parliaments and the WEU Assembly

The Assembly,

Regretting that the work of WEU is little known in the parliaments of member countries ;
Anxious to develop a sense of European solidarity in the parliaments of member countries,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge the governments of member countries to present a report, during debates on foreign policy, on their position on matters considered by the Council or Assembly of WEU and the action they intend to take on Assembly recommendations.

ORDER 44***on national parliaments and the WEU Assembly***

The Assembly,

Regretting that the work of WEU is little known in the parliaments of member countries ;

Anxious to develop a sense of European solidarity in the parliaments of member countries,

INVITES THE MEMBERS OF EACH NATIONAL DELEGATION

1. To take steps for parliaments to ask governments to present a report, during debates on foreign policy, on their position on matters considered by the Council or Assembly of WEU and the action they intend to take on Assembly recommendations ;
2. To promote relations between the Assembly of WEU and national parliamentary committees, *inter alia* by Rapporteurs of the Assembly of WEU being heard by these committees when matters are being discussed which have been dealt with in reports submitted to the Assembly of WEU.

TWELFTH SITTING

Friday, 6th December 1974

ORDERS OF THE DAY

Advanced technology in Canada — the consequences for Europe (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Votes on the draft Recommendation and draft Resolution, Doc. 649*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The Sitting was opened at 10.05 a.m. with Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in the Appendix.

3. Advanced technology in Canada — the consequences for Europe

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Votes on the draft Recommendation and draft Resolution, Doc. 649)

The Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions was presented by Mr. van Ooijen, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Grosart (Parliamentary Observer from Canada), Osborn, Richter, de

Bruyne, Mendelson (on a point of order), Carter, Small.

Mr. van Ooijen, Rapporteur, and Mr. de Montesquiou, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Recommendation and draft Resolution contained in Document 649.

The draft Recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 259) ¹.

The draft Resolution was agreed to unanimously. (This Resolution will be published as No. 54) ².

4. Close of the Session

The President declared the Twentieth Ordinary Session of the Assembly closed.

The Sitting was closed at 11.20 a.m.

1. See page 46.

2. See page 47.

APPENDIX

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance ¹ :

MM. Abens	Mrs. <i>Godinache-Lambert</i>	MM. Osborn
Adriaensens	(Kempinaire)	<i>Wall</i> (Page)
<i>Piket</i> (Boertien)	MM. Leynen	Richter
<i>van Ooijen</i> (Dankert)	<i>Spautz</i> (Margue)	Sir John Rodgers
Delorme	<i>Konen</i> (Mart)	MM. Schugens
<i>de Bruyne</i> (Dequae)	Mende	Small
Enders	Mendelson	<i>Breyne</i> (de Stexhe)
<i>Lagershausen</i> (Kempfler)	de Montesquiou	<i>Carter</i> (Urwin)
	Müller	

The following Representatives apologised for their absence :

MM. Ahrens	MM. La Loggia	MM. Roger
Alber	Legaret	Roper
Amrehn	Leggieri	Salvatore
Arnaud	Lemmrich	Schlags
Averardi	Letschert	Schleier
Bettiol	Dr. Mabon	Schmidt
Bouloche	MM. Mammi	Schmitt
Brugnon	Mattick	Mrs. Schuchardt
Cerneau	Minnocci	MM. Schwencke
Cohen	Mrs. Miotti Carli	Sieglerschmidt
Coppola	MM. de Niet	Steel
Cornelissen	Pecoraro	Talamona
Critchley	Pendry	Tanghe
Dregger	Péridier	Tomney
Lord Duncan-Sandys	Pica	Treu
MM. de Félice	Portheine	Valleix
Fletcher	Prescott	Vedovato
Gessner	Preti	Vitter
Grieve	Quilleri	Voogd
Hunt	Radius	Mrs. Wolf
Jung	Rivière	Mr. Zamberletti
Krieg		

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

TEXTS ADOPTED AT THE TWELFTH SITTING

RECOMMENDATION 259
***on advanced technology in Canada —
the consequences for Europe***

The Assembly,

Sharing the regrets expressed by the Canadian Senate Special Committee on Science Policy in its report on science policy for Canada regarding the absence of international co-operation ;

Considering the Canadian Senate's proposal to create an interparliamentary association for scientific and technological affairs open to all OECD member countries and its wish to hear opinions on this proposal ;

Considering also Canada's wish to develop its foreign policy and overseas trade in new directions ;

Aware of the need to collaborate with Canada on:

- (a) the development of V-STOL aircraft ;
- (b) nuclear research and development ;
- (c) other energy resources within the framework of the overall energy policy ;
- (d) computer communications,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Invite member governments :

1. To afford the interparliamentary association — as proposed by the Canadian Senate — their assistance in the study of the abovementioned subjects ;
2. To instruct the European Space Agency to seek co-operation with Canada on :
 - (a) remote sensing systems in satellites to further environmental monitoring, oceanography, new reforestation methods and worldwide crop assessment ;
 - (b) domestic satellite communications systems.

RESOLUTION 54
on parliamentary collaboration in
subjects of advanced technology

The Assembly,

Sharing the regrets expressed by the Canadian Senate Special Committee on Science Policy in its report on science policy for Canada regarding the absence of international co-operation ;

Considering the Canadian Senate's proposal to create an interparliamentary association for scientific and technological affairs open to all OECD member countries and its wish to hear opinions on this proposal,

INVITES THE PARLIAMENTS OF MEMBER COUNTRIES

To endorse the proposal to create an interparliamentary association for scientific and technological affairs and agree to hold colloquies from time to time between the science and technology committees of the national and international parliaments.

II

OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES

SIXTH SITTING

Tuesday, 3rd December 1974

SUMMARY

1. Resumption of the Session and adoption of the Minutes.
2. Attendance Register.
3. Examination of Credentials.
4. Observers.
5. Address by the President of the Assembly.
6. Adoption of the draft Order of Business for the Second Part of the Session (Doc. 644).
7. Channel Tunnel (*Motion for a Recommendation with a request for urgent procedure*, Doc. 657).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Prescott.
8. European union and WEU (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee*, Doc. 646).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Krieg (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Farr, Mr. Richter, Mr. Cermolacce, Mr. Dankert, Mr. Lemmrich, Mr. Grieve, Mr. de Niet, Mr. Leynen, Mr. Roper, Mr. Krieg (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Sieglerschmidt (*Chairman of the Committee*), Mr. Roper, Mr. Krieg (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Leynen.
9. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

The Sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Resumption of the Session and adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The Sitting is open.

I declare resumed the Twentieth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Western European Union, which was adjourned on Thursday, 20th June 1974, at the conclusion of the Fifth Sitting.

In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the Fifth Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments ?...

The Minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings¹.

1. See page 14.

3. Examination of Credentials

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the examination of credentials of new Representatives and Substitutes.

The list of new Representatives and Substitutes of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands was ratified by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe or its Standing Committee on 3rd July, 24th September and 27th November 1974. These ratifications are attested, in accordance with Rule 6 (1) of the Rules of Procedure of our Assembly, by the statements of the ratification of credentials communicated by the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

The credentials have not, however, yet been ratified in the cases of a Substitute of Belgium, Mr. Duvieusart, two Representatives of the United Kingdom, Mr. Hunt and Dr. Mabon, and six Substitutes of that country, Lord Beaumont of Whitley, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Carter, Lord Darling of Hillsborough, Mr. Lester and Lord Walston, who have just been appointed.

In conformity with the provisions of Rule 6 (2) of our Rules of Procedure, it falls to our Assembly to examine their credentials.

The President (continued)

These credentials have not been opposed, and they are certified by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium and by the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom respectively.

If the Assembly is unanimous, it may ratify these credentials without prior reference to a Credentials Committee.

Are there any objections to ratification of the credentials of the new Representatives and Substitutes of Belgium and the United Kingdom? ...

The credentials are therefore ratified, subject to subsequent examination by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

Consequently, the following members are admitted to take their seats in the Assembly of Western European Union: as Substitute of Belgium: Mr. Duviolsart; as Representatives of the United Kingdom: Mr. Hunt and Dr. Mabon; as Substitutes of the United Kingdom: Lord Beaumont of Whitley, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Carter, Lord Darling of Hillsborough, Mr. Lester and Lord Walston.

4. Observers

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I would like to extend a warm welcome to the parliamentary observers who are doing us the honour of participating in our deliberations: Mr. Grosart, Senator from Canada; MM. Elmholt and Larsen, members of the Danish Folketing; MM. Sjöthun and Jakobsen, members of the Norwegian Storting; Mr. Inan, Senator, and Mr. Ölçmen, Representative, from Turkey.

I would also like to welcome Ambassador Touloupas, who is attending our session as the Observer from Greece, and Mr. Caldas and Mr. Vasco da Gama Fernandes, Observers from Portugal.

5. Address by the President of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Ladies and Gentlemen, today we must take a new look at a new world. The ideas of yesteryear no longer enable us to grasp the magnitude of the problems which assail us.

The present crisis resembles neither the 1929 crisis, which was mainly economic, nor the political crises which preceded the two world wars; it has many facets because it is a crisis of civilisa-

tion. It calls in question both the structure of international relationships and man's relationship with nature in the production process and the goals of society. Social unrest, the gloomy prophecies of the Club of Rome, the conjunction of inflation and recession, the erratic movements of capital, the over-population of certain countries and the armaments race are but various sides of the same reality, difficult to grasp but which must be understood in order to bring our trials to an end.

In this new crisis is there not a danger of witnessing a continuation of the decline of Europe which began in August 1914? Is the very idea of Europe still alive at a time when each of our countries seems to be seeking its salvation by a different road?

On the eve of the summit conference of Heads of State or Government of the nine countries composing the European Community, our Assembly has no lack of topics for reflection.

Before proposing a cure we must attempt a diagnosis.

I believe that population pressure, the intensity of trade and the aggressiveness of technology have created one world where no malady can be confined and where any attack on the integrity of one part is felt by all. The world economy and political society can no longer serve as the stage for the blind confrontations whose results have determined economic and political developments hitherto. Yet the machinery for regulation, co-ordination and concertation which would avoid the exacerbation of conflicts has still to be perfected. As in the eighteenth century when feudal society, made rigid by a hereditary hierarchy and corporate charters, was giving way to a freer and more flexible society, our world needs enlightenment. Like an animal reaching a higher level in the scale of evolution of the species, our society has a deeper unity and therefore requires a greater capacity for analysis and decision. Formerly, the main decision-making centres were in Europe. But now the loss of political control over vast regions as the result of decolonisation has been followed by the loss of economic control. The decisions affecting our supplies are now taken elsewhere, and the rise in the cost of certain imported commodities is leading to a new sharing out of the world's wealth to our detriment. This economic dependence is accompanied by monetary dependence. Under the sway of the dollar, Europe is weakened by inflation for which its economic policy is not generally responsible. Speculative movements of capital are constantly threatening

The President (continued)

our currencies, while foreign investments question our ability to retain control of our own economy.

Weakened as they are, Europeans no longer seem to believe that salvation can come from joining their own forces. Will they in future have to comply with all the demands of oil exporters or follow every shift of American policy which, although friendly, is naturally concerned primarily with serving the interests of the United States? Shall we have the courage and strength to make our own voice heard? The answer to these questions depends on our determination at both national and European level.

At national level the need to change our economic structure and redeploy our investments calls for a clear view of long-term aims. Thus the present energy crisis was foreseeable insofar as our governments were counting on securing the continuous growth of energy production by a continuous increase in oil imports, mostly from the Middle East. The dangers of this dependence were pointed out long ago, but the diversification of energy sources implied temporarily higher production costs. This shows the danger of leaving the management of the economy to market mechanisms for too long a time and of sacrificing the solution of long-term problems to short-term benefits.

The pseudo-laws of the market should be abandoned in favour of an organised market or what I shall call a "voluntary market economy". It is for governments to define the frame of reference for assessing the rationality of economic decisions by the private sector. Prosperity and the quality of life today depend on applying the kind of political determination which in the past enabled us to cope with war and devastation. Only by a vigorous investment policy — i.e. a speeding up rather than a slowing down of the economy — can the drain caused by the rising cost of raw materials and in particular of oil be stopped. For the source of all finance is to be found in labour and not in unemployment.

Essential for national survival, only firmness will enable us to continue the construction of Europe. Far from being a pretext for national renunciation, the European idea implies national ambition which finds a natural extension in a European resolve because Europe, by ensuring cohesion and effectiveness, is the condition for the success of each of our countries' policies.

This view does not seem to be widely held today. Being affected in different ways by rising oil costs, our countries are tempted to adopt different approaches depending on their balance-of-payments positions and their rates of inflation or unemployment, but also and perhaps above all on the view they take of a desirable relationship with the United States. It is our Assembly's task to affirm that Europe should not confine itself to responding to the consequences of decisions taken elsewhere, that it must be strong enough to act instead of remaining passive and that it must unite in order to be strong.

Signs of the existence of a European will are sometimes evident in economic matters through the compromise solutions achieved by the member countries of the European Community at the price of stiff negotiations. They are also evident in certain limited successes in political co-operation, particularly the adoption of common positions in the United Nations or elsewhere.

But in fact Europe is marking time and may even disintegrate if the crisis worsens and the necessary action is still not forthcoming.

The reason is that any wider agreement between our countries runs up against differences in the underlying thinking of our leaders. There is no deep agreement on political aims because there is no agreement on the need to express a European identity in all fields, including foreign policy and defence.

I therefore express the hope that the summit conference to be held next week will not only enable a number of emergency measures required by the international situation to be adopted but will achieve the thorough convergence of political wills that is a necessary condition of any technical agreement.

Never has a vigorous affirmation of European identity appeared more necessary. Our currencies, our jobs, our society and our survival are at stake.

Do we wish our countries to stay in the technological race? Do we wish to keep highly skilled manpower in employment? Then we must give priority to the procurement of European aviation hardware, both civilian and military. Do we wish to have a satellite launching capability so as to establish our own telecommunications systems or participate in surveying the resources of our planet? Then as many of us as possible should take part in the construction of a European launcher. Do we wish to exploit the oceans as the source of tomorrow's wealth? Here again we must

The President (continued)

unite our efforts. In short, we must launch a European plan to ensure the survival and promotion of advanced technology in Europe.

The institutions which would enable us to take joint decisions exist. They must be infused with a European will. There has been talk of Euro-group. For what major items of European hardware has this body enabled a procurement or manufacturing agreement to be reached? What concrete tasks has it proved possible to give to the Standing Armaments Committee? Why has WEU not brought about a European consensus on an issue as important as the choice of a joint fighter aircraft, the touchstone of European determination in the next few weeks? Why have the plans for European union been allowed to fall by the wayside? The hesitations of one government should not discourage others from pressing ahead, for time is short.

Harassed by the day-to-day problems of a particularly difficult situation, our governments are only too inclined to wait until a problem becomes urgent before tackling it and then, when it is too late, showing little aptitude for solving it. Only too often the West lacks breadth of vision, determination and imagination. That is why I believe an Assembly such as ours has a leading rôle to play.

The three tasks of the European assemblies are to reflect, to encourage and to propose. They should therefore be clear-sighted, display the determination they hope to communicate to governments and the imagination needed for solving new problems. Our Assembly has a particularly difficult task, because it is the European Assembly responsible for defence. Its paramount rôle is to consider all political, economic and technical problems from the point of view of European security and to take a specifically European view of military problems.

But there are very few fields where routine, the *status quo* and the acceptance of facile solutions triumph so easily.

It is all too convenient to say that Europe is powerless, that it suffices to pay the economic and political price of American protection and that a joint European approach to armament problems is difficult because industry does as it pleases.

Our Assembly's task is not to comment on the action with periodic lamentations like a Greek

chorus. Its task is to create among us a strong European spirit thanks to the debates which give us a better understanding of each other's views and establish a durable basis of friendship. This is the spirit we must then communicate to our governments. Whether the present crisis marks the decline of Europe or her recovery depends on their determination. I would hope that the recommendations made to them by the Assembly on the eve of the summit conference contain a solemn warning and reflect the lofty view we take of the abilities of our peoples united in a common destiny. (*Applause*)

6. Adoption of the draft Order of Business for the Second Part of the Session

(Doc. 644)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the adoption of the draft Order of Business for the Second Part of the Twentieth Ordinary Session of the Assembly.

The draft in question is contained in Document 644 dated 2nd December 1974.

Two textual modifications should be made in the titles of the reports which are to be debated at the sitting on Wednesday afternoon :

1. The title of Mr. Warren's report should read : "State of European aviation activities".
2. The title of Mr. Small's report should read : "State of European nuclear energy programmes — security aspects".

Are there any objections to the draft Order of Business contained in Document 644 ?...

The Order of Business for the Second Part of the Twentieth Ordinary Session is agreed to.

7. Channel Tunnel

(*Motion for a Recommendation with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 657*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I have received from Mr. de Montesquiou and others a motion for a recommendation on the Channel Tunnel, with a request for urgent procedure.

The motion for a recommendation is contained in Document 657.

In accordance with Rule 43 of the Rules of Procedure, the request has been posted up and the text circulated.

The President (continued)

In accordance with Rule 43 (3) of the Rules of Procedure, the debate on the request for urgent procedure cannot enter into the substance of the question.

The Presidential Committee is in favour of adopting urgent procedure.

Only one speaker for the request, one speaker against and the Chairman of the Committee concerned are entitled to be heard.

I call Mr. de Montesquiou to speak on the request for urgent procedure.

I observe that Mr. de Montesquiou is not present.

I call Mr. Prescott.

Mr. PRESCOTT (*United Kingdom*). — But, Mr. President, has this motion yet been proposed? Does not our procedure at least require the motion to be moved?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — It has been suggested to me that the question should be deferred until a later sitting. I have been informed that Mr. de Montesquiou will speak at 3 p.m.

I call Mr. Prescott.

Mr. PRESCOTT (*United Kingdom*). — As I understand the situation, this is an emergency motion which we are expected to consider. Surely it would be highly irregular to defer the matter until this afternoon. If it is an emergency matter, surely the mover should be here to deal with it. If not, the matter must by definition fall.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — It is obvious that you are right about the actual definition of urgency. I would, however, remind you that Mr. de Montesquiou should be present at 3 o'clock this afternoon. If you are not in agreement, the problem of urgent procedure is automatically eliminated and the question will not appear on the agenda of this session.

Mr. PRESCOTT (*United Kingdom*). — We are all full-time politicians. If Mr. de Montesquiou cannot be here, I cannot accept that the matter be deferred until 3 o'clock this afternoon. I suggest that the Assembly should take the view that the motion should not even be heard and should be finished with.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I take formal note of your statement.

Mr. PRESCOTT (*United Kingdom*). — Thank you, Mr. President.

8. European union and WEU

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 646)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of the report of the General Affairs Committee on European union and WEU, Document 646.

I call Mr. Krieg, Rapporteur of the Committee.

Mr. KRIEG (*France*) (Translation). — The report which I have the honour to present to you today on behalf of the General Affairs Committee was adopted unanimously on 14th October last. It can only be considered as a provisional document, not only because, in the political sphere, there is nothing other than the provisional, but also because our Assembly will inevitably be led to revert to this subject during the next session. We are all aware that a summit conference is to be held within the next few days, and it will of course be necessary for WEU to consider the implications of that conference at its next session. It is, moreover, obvious that our Assembly will wish to recall once again, in more formal fashion, the place that WEU should be called upon to occupy in the Europe of tomorrow, when meeting in session for the first time in the capital of the Federal Republic of Germany, on the occasion of the celebrations marking its twentieth anniversary.

The report which we are now considering is therefore only a preparatory document designed to enable the reader looking at this subject afresh to learn the opinion of the members of this Assembly, and next, the joint views of our seven governments on the relevant problems.

A close examination of the attitudes adopted during the past years and months, both by the European parliamentary assemblies and by the governments of our different countries, has led the General Affairs Committee to note the divergences that exist between the policies advocated or adopted by the various parties involved. Nevertheless these policies rest on broad agreement among the member countries of WEU as to what is the essential issue, namely that Europe cannot contemplate a defence policy lying outside alliance with the United States, as defined by the Atlantic Alliance and as reaffirmed in the declaration

Mr. Krieg (continued)

adopted by the NATO Council at Ottawa in June 1974.

All those concerned likewise agree in considering that Europe must make its voice heard alongside that of the United States. The concept earlier advanced by President Kennedy, of an Atlantic Alliance resting on two pillars, one American and the other European, still seems today to muster unanimous support, at least among the European members of the Alliance.

It seems to me that this is the basis upon which our thinking about the place of WEU in tomorrow's Europe must rest.

Admittedly, the geographical outline of this Europe is still ill-defined. Its institutional structure is even more so, and it would serve no useful purpose to conceal the fact that disagreements exist. Nevertheless there should be agreement among our seven governments and among all the members of this Assembly in considering that the modified Brussels Treaty — which, as we know, includes commitments for the furnishing of mutual aid among the seven signatory countries that are more far-reaching and more precise than those contained in the North Atlantic Treaty — constitutes the foundation for a European defence policy.

What form will the political union of tomorrow assume?

The Heads of State or of Government of the Nine have decided that a report on European union will be examined, but not before 1975. Until then, the maintenance of WEU as the body responsible, with all its existing terms of reference, for implementing the modified Brussels Treaty, hardly comes into question.

What place will WEU subsequently occupy in the European union? That is a point about which it is more difficult to give a precise answer. Nevertheless, there is nothing to indicate that the Nine are at present inclined to enter into negotiations, which could only be prolonged and difficult, in order to reach a fresh agreement in the realm of defence. It is far more likely that the modified Brussels Treaty will take its rightful place in the whole series of agreements on which European union will be based.

We are all aware that two countries among the Nine have not acceded to the modified Brussels Treaty and are accordingly not members of WEU.

I refer to Denmark and Ireland. It would obviously be far from satisfactory, from a logical point of view, to see the European union of tomorrow based on a series of texts which would not involve to the same extent all the countries subscribing to the act of union. Naturally, if it were only the wording of the Brussels Treaty, or even the manner in which WEU operates, that kept Denmark and Ireland from participating in a European defence policy, it might be reasonable to envisage a revision of this treaty or a change in the institution itself.

Everything points to the fact, however, that the problem does not lie there. It is the actual principle of joint defence which is unacceptable, both to Denmark and to Ireland, for reasons connected with their place in Europe and their relations with neighbouring countries. It is unlikely that Ireland, which does not belong to the Atlantic Alliance, would agree, unless its situation were to change profoundly, to take part in a European defence organisation which itself would form an integral part of the Atlantic Alliance. Denmark, for its part, seems anxious not to separate its destiny too widely from that of the other Scandinavian countries, which cannot or will not join a European defence organisation. Consequently, it is not through deliberate choice, but because it seems to us difficult to envisage any other outcome, at least in the foreseeable future, that we are obliged to acknowledge that tomorrow's European union will be a limping institution, that it will rest on different treaties governing the economic sphere and the defence sphere, and that it will not comprise exactly the same countries in the one sphere as in the other.

We may feel that this is regrettable.

We could, as suggested in the recommendation which the General Affairs Committee proposes for adoption by us, call upon Ireland and Denmark to associate themselves with a joint defence policy and to accede to the Brussels Treaty. We cannot compel them to do so; but nor can we defer all progress towards political union in Europe until the day, probably distant, when they may feel inclined to join.

Conversely, there are countries which, without belonging to EEC, at least for the present, participate fully in a European defence policy within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance. This is specifically the position of Greece and Turkey. As we know, Greece decided to leave the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, as a consequence of the events that occurred last summer. Even if

Mr. Krieg (continued)

the motives which induced that country to take such a step are not the same as those which had earlier led General de Gaulle to leave the organisation, and even if the form of its relations with NATO are not the same as those which govern relations between France and NATO, nevertheless, the position of Greece in relation to the Atlantic Alliance is, in many respects, similar to that of France. But France is a member of WEU, while Greece is not. Would Greece now wish to become one? That is not impossible; and it would be expedient, now that the country has witnessed the re-establishment of a fully democratic régime, to put the question. Greece has applied to accede to the European Economic Community. It would obviously be in the interests of Europe, which is so sharply aware of the threats that may hang over its southern flank, to associate Greece more closely with its defence policy and, in consequence, to secure the adherence of that country to Western European Union.

Here are a series of points on which the General Affairs Committee was able to reach broad agreement among its members. They are the points set out in the six paragraphs of the preamble to the draft recommendation which it is proposed you should adopt. The seven operative paragraphs are addressed very directly to the WEU Council, and through it to the governments of the seven member countries of the organisation. They propose a number of measures, all of which appear capable of implementation without delay; without being calculated to prejudge the nature of tomorrow's European union, they are designed for use during the transitional period which Europe is currently traversing.

The first of these operative paragraphs is in many respects the most important, since it recommends that the Council propose that a conference of Heads of State or of Government of EEC member countries be held to study the requirements of a European defence policy in the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty.

Some voices were raised within the General Affairs Committee to point out that, in their view, summit conferences did not represent the best means of promoting the advancement of Europe. Perhaps they are not wrong.

It is clear, however, that conferences of that type will be held during the next few years, and it is hard to see why, if that is the case, problems connected with European defence should not be

tackled on such occasions. It is possible that those members of the EEC who do not wish to participate in a defence policy may raise objections, but is it not the rôle of WEU member countries constantly to remind their partners that the future of Europe depends on a determination to ensure the joint defence of a civilisation to which all Europeans are attached?

Is it conceivable that summit conferences should take decisions designed to lead to European union without tackling the problems connected with a European defence policy? If they were to do so, what union and what Europe would result? Would it not involve the *a priori* condemnation of Europe to political non-existence? Is not the realm of defence one of the very first on which countries desiring to build up a close association must agree?

In asking for a conference of this kind to be held, we are obviously calling upon the WEU Council to participate in its preparation, since no other European body is in a position to do so. It will naturally be incumbent on the government of each of the member countries to undertake the necessary preparatory studies and to put forward some conclusions. These conclusions would, however, have to be harmonised in anticipation of the summit conference, and it would clearly be the responsibility of the WEU Council to undertake this harmonisation.

It is in this perspective that the functions of the WEU Council should, in our opinion, be viewed today. The modified Brussels Treaty dates back more than twenty years; the international situation has undergone profound changes during those twenty years, particularly as regards the balance of forces and the threats which may hang over Western Europe. It is perfectly clear today that the fear of seeing Soviet tanks pour through Western Germany has markedly receded but at the same time the development of Western Europe's economic activity has rendered the area infinitely more responsive to everything that goes on in the rest of the world. Henceforth, the security of Europe depends upon a mass of factors, and the modified Brussels Treaty has assigned to the Council the task of undertaking a regular examination of these different factors.

The draft recommendation presented to you mentions several of these factors: the emergence of new nuclear powers; the development of agreements among nuclear powers; the evolving relations between Europe and the United States; the whole range of foreign policy issues that affect

Mr. Krieg (continued)

European defence ; the connection between the military efforts undertaken by the countries of Western Europe and the development of their industrial capacity ; and also the need that many countries experience to place strict limits on their defence expenditure.

It is true that, since the United Kingdom's accession to the European Community and the development of political consultations among the Nine, the WEU countries have come to consider these different issues in the context of the EEC rather than in that of WEU in the case of political problems, and in that of the North Atlantic Treaty in the case of defence problems.

In a written question put to the Council in October 1974, our colleague Mr. Leynen referred to a number of foreign policy problems that had formerly been dealt with within the framework of WEU ; and he asked the Council whether it considered that these problems formed the subject of adequate deliberation in the political consultations held among the Nine.

In its reply, the Council stated that these questions had given rise to frequent and detailed exchanges of views in the context of political co-operation among the Nine, in conditions which gave entire satisfaction to the governments of the seven WEU member countries.

We are entitled to wonder whether this feeling of "satisfaction" was not acquired too cheaply and whether, in reality, the whole range of problems to which we have just referred is dealt with satisfactorily in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance or in that of co-operation among the Nine.

However that may be, the WEU Council remains responsible for the implementation of the modified Brussels Treaty in its entirety, and it has recognised this fact by stating on several occasions that it would continue to inform the Assembly regarding consultations held in other bodies on the implementation of this treaty.

Nevertheless, we may ask ourselves whether the complete lack of activity by the Council at ministerial level during the year 1974 enables it to fulfil this rôle. It is quite obvious that we cannot ask the ministers to meet as often as they did in the past, or to deal once again in the framework of the Seven with problems that they already deal with in other places. Are we not entitled however to ask the Council to continue with periodic min-

isterial meetings in order to consider whether there are really no shortcomings whatever in the implementation of the Brussels Treaty by institutions other than WEU ?

It must be confessed that the attitude adopted by the Council during the past few months with regard to a number of important matters prompts one to inquire to what extent our governments are still ready to respect the Brussels Treaty and the commitments into which they have entered during the past few years with respect to the Assembly.

The manner in which the Council refused to hold a joint meeting with the General Affairs Committee regarding a questionnaire which covered a number of economic and political questions justifies a serious examination of this question.

The reply to Recommendation 241 affords grounds for fearing that the Council may begin to consider as lying outside its competence questions which, although relevant to the modified Brussels Treaty, are dealt with in institutions other than WEU. But what is a still more serious matter, we read in the reply given by the Council to Recommendation 254 that the Indian Ocean is not within the areas covered either by Western European Union or by the Atlantic Alliance.

It is not for me to ask whether the Atlantic Alliance defines an area in regard to which its members are allowed or not allowed to discuss their foreign policies ; but I can see nothing in the modified Brussels Treaty which might permit the Council to speak of the existence of an area about which it was precluded from deliberating.

In the past, the Council did not deny itself the right to consider the situation in South-East Asia or in what it called "the Horn of Africa". What is the new factor which enables it now to claim that the Indian Ocean lies outside its field of competence ?

We may ask ourselves whether the attitude adopted by the Council is not calculated to give rise in the next few months to a real conflict between it and the Assembly ; for I do not believe that the latter can agree to the Council giving a fresh interpretation to the Brussels Treaty, one that conflicts with what had always been its own interpretation and at the same time that of the Assembly.

Finally, the draft recommendation adopted by the General Affairs Committee alludes to the close

Mr. Krieg (continued)

connection which exists between the European resolve to constitute an economic entity and the need for Europe to co-ordinate the armaments policies of member countries.

The WEU Assembly has very frequently stressed the fact, especially through its Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, that the requirements of the most modern industrial developments implied a pooling of efforts in the armaments field. This prospect was already in the minds of those who drafted the modified Brussels Treaty, and it is a problem which constantly arises. I refer here to the flurry caused by the decision of the Belgian, Dutch, Danish and Norwegian Governments to acquire a new combat aircraft.

Obviously, the General Affairs Committee did not become involved in the technological discussion to which this problem gave rise. That was not its rôle. It does, however, express, in the draft recommendation presented to you here, its anxiety to see the industrial potential of Europe preserved and developed through a common armaments policy ; and in that connection it recalls elsewhere the proposals made before our Assembly last year by Mr. Michel Jobert, then French Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Taken as a whole, this draft recommendation should not surprise our Assembly. Indeed it reflects in its essentials a viewpoint which has been consistently defended not only by the General Affairs Committee but by the Assembly itself. It also reflects viewpoints which our governments have very frequently assured us were theirs. It is quite obvious, however, that this has not always been, and is not always today, the policy pursued by those governments.

We are not among those who think that institutional machinery, whatever form it may take, is capable of making up for political determination when that is lacking. Nevertheless, you will find mention in the explanatory memorandum of a number of reasons which give us reason to believe that this political determination should emerge afresh during the period we are traversing, because Europe more than ever finds itself facing a challenge. The challenge is that of seeing itself deprived of all influence in the world, and also of seeing itself deprived of any guarantee as regards its own security, at a juncture when it has completed its economic reconstruction and

when it has the means available to pursue a European defence policy.

Is it not the lack of any such policy which, in a difficult economic situation, results in making the realm of defence that in which governments most readily agree to introduce Draconian cuts, not as a matter of deliberate choice but simply through drifting into a habit of facile solutions ? Defence policies are indeed becoming more and more costly and less and less credible, and the temptation is growing ever stronger for each party to be content to make only such sacrifices as are essential for maintaining the American nuclear umbrella over Europe.

To abandon hope of a European defence policy would be tantamount to denying the existence of Europe, relying solely upon the United States not only for Europe's defence but also for its existence as an economic power and as a power in any sense.

That is what the present report has tried to do : to consider what might be achieved today, in our own framework, to escape from the temptation to give up, which the looming economic crisis threatens to render still more acute. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Krieg.

I call Mr. Farr to speak in the debate.

Mr. FARR (*United Kingdom*). — I wish first to congratulate the Rapporteur upon his excellent report which is so topical today. In particular, I wish to refer to your opening remarks today, Mr. President, which are very much associated with the report under consideration. There is no doubt that European union and WEU will occupy most of our time in one form or another during the week.

I consider that Mr. Krieg in his interesting document has very much hit the nail on the head regarding a number of subjects. The report can be divided into two themes on which he has elected to make his remarks. The first of these themes is his consideration that the desirability of full political and economic union by the nine EEC nations should be recognised by WEU. The second of the themes he has pinpointed in the report refers to the desirability at least of Western European nations pooling their defence procurement requirements.

Having divided the subject into those two themes, I wish to refer briefly to the second one,

Mr. Farr (continued)

namely, the desirability at least of WEU nations pooling their defence requirements. This must make sense to all members of WEU regardless of individual views on political union. If we do not have a common united defence procurement programme in WEU and, indeed, a common civil aircraft procurement programme, because civil aircraft production is so closely linked to military aircraft production, I believe that our individual defence production industries will slowly wither, decline and disappear. They will disappear in the face of strong and concerted United States action.

At the same time I offer the thought to the Assembly that those who urge European union in many cases will precipitate European joint independence from the United States not because they wish to strengthen Europe but because in the foreseeable future any divorce of Europe from the protection of the United States umbrella could be accompanied by disastrous consequences. In this area we must bear in mind when nations place orders for new armaments and new aircraft that the United States has a real and justifiable interest in what we in Europe buy.

Certainly let us foster a European aerospace industry but let us order the best, and if the best is American let us order American. I do not think that as adult politicians we can expect the United States and its Congress to continue to provide a nuclear umbrella at vast cost to the United States taxpayers unless occasionally Congress sees some tangible return, such as a firm aircraft export order.

I want now to turn to my second point which is the desirability, as Mr. Krieg suggests, of full political and economic union of the Nine. Mr. Krieg, who is an expert on this subject, seemed very disappointed that quicker progress towards full political and economic union had not been made, and he emphasises this fact in his report, especially in paragraphs 7 and 8. I would tell him that he is not to worry and that he should, I think, be thankful that we can get some form of worthwhile co-operation in Europe on our defence procurement programme alone. In my view, full political union is certainly years away and could be decades away, and if we politicians try to quicken the pace unnaturally we shall lose the sympathy of the electorates who send us to this Assembly.

Because some members of the Assembly are rightly spurred by the ideal of full political and

economic union of Europe we must not outstrip political union at home. Our views could be rejected by an electorate, with possibly very serious effects on any future European co-operation in any form. To use a racing term, it is no use the jockey arriving at the winning post if his horse has refused and turned tail two fences back.

One of the reasons for many of us hesitating to advance too quickly along the road to full political union is that it would result in a form of pooled government or co-operative government of the nine EEC nations and consequently, so far as Britain is concerned, I believe a far more unstable form of government. I believe that political union of the Nine could be unstable, and if the Nine were extended to Ten or Eleven, as Mr. Krieg suggests in his report might be possible, including the possibility of Greece, and perhaps later Portugal, joining, the likelihood of that instability would be even greater.

I therefore feel that the nations represented here today, rather than seeking to outstrip public opinion and rather than our wringing our hands because our peoples do not desire full political union, should instead concentrate attention on strengthening those forms of co-operation which at present exist and, in particular, WEU, and especially arms procurement. Let us remember that political union and union on defence matters are quite separate and should be considered as such. Progress politically may be barred at the moment, so let us advance together in the field of arms procurement which must and can be done if our national armaments industries are to survive at all. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you.

I call Mr. Richter.

Mr. RICHTER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I had a rather uneasy feeling, when studying the report and listening to Mr. Krieg's statement today, that we were re-living the confrontation that we had in this chamber some time ago. I am thinking of the statements made at the time by the French Foreign Minister, Mr. Jobert, and of what the German Defence Minister, Mr. Georg Leber, said. If I do see a continuation here, my feeling is that the statement will not enable us to resolve the critical issues existing in this area.

In his explanatory memorandum Mr Krieg deals very fully with the situation of NATO. Basically, he repeats the formulas which Mr. Jobert also

Mr. Richter (continued)

used in his day. Mr. Krieg also tries — as has been done very often — once again to defend France's leaving the integrated defence structure at the time. But it must however continue to be borne in mind that the other partners in the Alliance have still by no means got over that event.

The basic attitude with which Mr. Krieg appraises the plan of Secretary of State Kissinger of 23rd April 1973, which is intended to lead to a new Atlantic Charter, is also one which I do not share. He sees in that plan primarily an attempt to extend the American military rôle in Europe to the economic and political spheres as well. I cannot imagine that a majority of our colleagues will be prepared to share that view. I, at any rate, do not come to such a conclusion.

Nor am I in the least prepared to accept what Mr. Krieg says about the potential of Eurogroup. I was present at the twentieth annual session of the North Atlantic Assembly from 11th to 16th October in London. The occasion included a joint meeting of the Military Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly and our own Assembly's Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments; and at that meeting an assessment of Eurogroup led to an entirely different conclusion from that just given us by our Rapporteur.

In London, the results which Eurogroup was able to achieve were judged very favourably. The very point which worries our Rapporteur so much — Mr. Farr, a moment ago, also referred to it — namely, co-operation in arms procurement was given in London a cautiously positive assessment. The organisation of European Armaments Directors has produced results. In some areas we have got away from the practice of everyone going it alone. We have a large number of bilateral and trilateral programmes. Nearly all the major procurement programmes in Europe are now, fortunately, being managed at that level.

It was also on the basis of the EURONAD that the recommendation referred to by Mr. Farr emerged in the North Atlantic Assembly. I mean the resolution by that Assembly that the NATO partners be recommended to reach a common decision when a new weapon system is to be chosen as a successor to the F-104, as is the case in four member States in Europe. I regard that as a really useful basis.

Our Assembly — as was in fact pointed out in London — has strengths which we must make use of in the future. It has, for example, the possibility, in the specific area of European defence, of becoming a spokesman for European public opinion. The strength of our Assembly in that respect lies in the fact that we can, quite definitely, exercise a political control over the activities of the executive of WEU.

The two Committees I have mentioned came to another, and for me, not surprising conclusion at their London meeting: they considered that an expansion of WEU on the basis at present being recommended by Mr. Krieg could only be achieved with difficulty. I refer here to paragraph 5 of Mr. Krieg's recommendation, in which he is recommending the enlargement of WEU. In London the difficulty was seen to lie in the fact that the Brussels Treaty contained certain discriminatory provisions directed primarily against the Federal Republic of Germany.

Until we have an intergovernmental or supranational European union able to encompass the entire European defence effort in all the aspects so well described by Mr. Krieg, we shall have to learn — as far as I can see — to make simultaneous use of both bodies, namely WEU and Eurogroup. From these two platforms we shall have to move step by step towards the results we need. What I have primarily in mind is co-ordination in arms procurement, which receives very special mention in the report.

I fully recognise that Mr. Krieg's report contains a great many excellent suggestions, and I would single out in particular the ideas in paragraphs 66 and 67. I mean the need for keeping sufficient troops in Central Europe and the call for greater standardisation of armaments. These are points to which we must give our full support.

I would like to take this opportunity — and this is nothing to do with the report — of voicing my pleasure at the fact that, in line with the plea by Mr. Krieg, the United Kingdom was able yesterday to propose in its new defence review a programme which while it reduces commitments outside Europe, does ensure the full presence of the Rhine army in the Federal Republic of Germany.

In conclusion I would like to say that, in my view, the present proposals do not provide a balanced picture. If the recommendation were passed by a majority vote, it would engender confusion, and we should inevitably be losing

Mr. Richter (continued)

time. I hope you will therefore understand that I cannot support Mr. Krieg's recommendations in their present form. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Cermolacce.

Mr. CERMOLACCE (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the recommendation which is before the Assembly for discussion is part of a whole campaign to revive a project worked out during the worst moments of the cold war, a new-style EDC running entirely counter to international détente and efforts to lay the foundations of world peace and consolidate peaceful coexistence on a basis of mutual confidence. This proposal is twenty years out-of-date and at odds with the spirit of the times. Nowhere does it reflect the slightest effort to end the ruinous and suicidal armaments race. Nowhere is there any effort at disarmament, at transcending blocs and dissolving them.

The recent conversations in Vladivostok between the USSR and the United States show that significant moves can be made towards political and military détente and fruitful international economic co-operation. Our peoples would not understand if their countries turned their backs on this peaceful evolution.

The aim of your draft recommendation is, in reality, to set up a West European military bloc exclusively directed against the socialist countries.

This war machine — and at least you have the courage to say what we have always denounced — is an appendage of NATO, a sub-bloc which would be led by the United States of America. We consider your recommendation to be dangerous, inopportune and misplaced on the eve of the opening here in France of talks between the French and Russian leaders. These talks are a sequel to those held three years ago, following which our two countries adopted an important declaration of principle on co-operation, which was intended by them to serve as an example of co-operation on an equal footing between countries with different social systems.

This declaration provided in particular for co-operation in the improvement of European security, for overcoming the division of the world into blocs, for efforts to bring about disarmament and the respect of non-interference in internal affairs. Of course we realise that this co-operation is far from exemplary; we consider that our

political leaders here in France are still a long way from making their actions conform to their pledges. But we also know that the movement in favour of détente, co-operation and peace is so strong, not just in France but in the world at large, that in the end it will prevail.

For all these reasons we consider the recommendation which has been submitted contrary to the spirit of the times.

Ladies and Gentlemen, some time ago a resolution by the Assembly called attention to the fact that little heed was paid to WEU. How could it be otherwise at a time when everything points to moving towards the broadest possible form of co-operation in Europe, when the high-level conference on security and co-operation in Europe is coming to a conclusion, when we are actively participating in the Vienna talks aimed at easing tension in Central Europe, and when the nuclear and strategic armaments race is being slowed down — how could it be otherwise when you talk only of blocs and war? This project is condemned by history, which is the reason why I, for one, shall not vote for it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Cermolacce.

I call Mr. Dankert.

Mr. DANKERT (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — Mr. President, as a member of the Defence Committee I am usually concerned with the affairs of generals rather than with general affairs, but I must say that Mr. Krieg, or rather his report, has somewhat provoked me and forces me to reply.

For the good of the cause I shall reply in French — perhaps a more forthright French than that of the French but one which will, I hope, allow me not only to be more frank but to say more during the ten minutes I am allowed.

The Krieg report is a fairly long one, but I honestly believe that it can be described very briefly. It is anti-American, an anti-Americanism used as a means of solving all our European difficulties — and as we know, these difficulties do exist. To avoid any misunderstanding, Mr. President, let me say immediately that I have nothing against anti-Americanism as long as it serves some useful purpose — let us say, a purpose more useful than pro-Americanism.

I read the Krieg report, then, with great interest and was prepared to support it, as I think

Mr. Dankert (continued)

would many Americans, if its anti-Americanism could have solved the problems of Europe. This, unfortunately, is not the case. Mr. Krieg admits that the Europe of the Nine — an entity which, for the purpose of simplification, is often called Europe — is in a pitiful state. He goes even further. In paragraph 20 he states that “the union of Western European countries now seems threatened” — the question of who is to blame is not raised — “and in the circumstances it is essential not to tamper with the remaining firm foundations on which European co-operation can be based, one of the firmest being the modified Brussels Treaty.”

A moment ago I heard Mr. Krieg say, in his introduction, that there was a tendency for our governments no longer to respect the agreements made under the Brussels Treaty. But let that pass!

I truly regret that Mr. Jobert was quoted in this Hall, and that neither Mr. Leber nor Mr. Strauss — victims of discrimination in the modified Brussels Treaty — were present. Moreover, they are the only ones to respect the treaty.

I do not think that this is a very good omen for the safeguarding of the population of Europe, particularly in the present economic circumstances.

In this connection I remember having read a few weeks ago the document which accompanied the budget of my country's Minister for Foreign Affairs; you know him well, for as a member of parliament he submitted a number of reports to this Assembly. In this document Mr. van der Stoel wrote that WEU should of course be kept in being so that our dear parliamentarians might practise foreign languages; but that beyond this, there were no ministerial consultations either at Foreign Minister or at Defence Minister level. The first had the Nine and the others had NATO or Euro-group, and so on. There remained the treaty. Mr. van der Stoel believes, as no doubt do the majority of his colleagues in the Europe of the Nine, that this modified Brussels Treaty is no basis for an Nth European effort — far from it!

That being so, we can forget paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of the draft recommendation. I hope that other speakers will dismiss paragraph 3 — and not only on behalf of a Germany subjected to discrimination; I shall merely say a few words about the anti-Americanism of the Rapporteur, which dominates paragraphs 24 and 56.

As regards paragraph 24 concerning the American ascendancy and Europe's lack of freedom to act because of the integrated military organisation of NATO, I would remind the Rapporteur that the French and Dutch fought in their respective colonies with soldiers who, in the event of European war, would form part of the integrated structure of NATO; and I believe that, generally speaking, those colonial wars did not have the approval of our American partners.

So far as liberty is concerned, I do not think that the situation is different today, with a large part of the British Rhine army in Belfast or Londonderry, a long way from Bonn.

I will mention another point at random. The Rapporteur accuses the United States of having rubber-stamped the 1945 frontiers of Europe on the ground of its need for détente and collaboration with the USSR. I doubt if the German Christian Democrats would agree; but would a more united Europe which was less dependent on the United States have achieved different results? Would a Europe in confrontation with the United States have had the *de facto* frontiers which it has today? It is difficult for me to give an exact reply to this question, but the Rapporteur persists in suggesting that the European situation would be brighter if Europeans could decide to introduce a good measure of confrontation into their co-operation with the United States.

It might perhaps have been better to have carefully analysed the degree of confrontation that prevails in the present situation, which does not result in the breakdown of a co-operation which will remain essential to our security for a long time to come. I agree that this puts the Americans in the situation of protectors, but at least it gives us a degree of protection which we would be incapable of providing for ourselves, the Brussels Treaty notwithstanding.

I conclude with a few remarks concerning paragraphs 51 and 55, which deal with the successor to the F-104 Starfighter, a subject which, as you know, is dear to me. It is a complicated matter and I want to deal only with a few aspects which are mentioned in the report.

First, a remark of a general nature. I think that in this paragraph the Rapporteur makes the mistake — and he is not the only Frenchman to make it — of considering that France is the Common Market and the Common Market is France. In other words, I think that when we speak of Europe we should also speak of Germany,

Mr. Dankert (continued)

Italy and the United Kingdom, all of whom build a fair number of aircraft, including the MRCA, and perhaps even of Holland, Luxembourg, Belgium, Denmark and Ireland.

Next, when we speak of European aeronautics, we should realise that there are products of this industry which fly in France and others which have a rôle in the NATO system, which the report insists on describing as integrated. In relation to the standardisation which is suggested at every meeting of the Assembly, this is not lacking in importance.

We should also remember that from the point of view of employment, and contrary to what is suggested in paragraph 51, the Belgians, Danish and Dutch probably make very little distinction between American, French and Swedish aircraft — I give them in alphabetical order. For the Americans, French and Swedes the issue is not quite the same.

That being said, there remains the problem of European aeronautics and the quality of the competing aircraft. I do not deny that it is extremely important to achieve a very much closer degree of co-operation between our armaments industries, but here I pass from general affairs to the generals. Does this co-operation have to be pushed so far as long as it is impossible to build a single variable-geometry aircraft in a run of five or six hundred at 40 or 50 million francs each, instead of two types of aircraft — the MRCA and the ACF — which, from a technological point of view, differ very little and cost from 70 to 90 millions each, at a cautious estimate ?

General Stehlin pointed out — and he was not the first to do so — that this costs the taxpayer a great deal, particularly when it is remembered that in the United States a more advanced aircraft — though to be sure with a less variable geometry — can be procured for about 20 to 25 million francs. According to the Rapporteur, everyone agrees that the performance and cost of European aircraft are at least as satisfactory as those of their transatlantic competitors. I am not sure that everyone does agree.

And even if I am right and if the F-1 M-53 is not as good, always cost for cost, why not buy European or French so as to encourage our industrial growth, maintain employment in France and tighten the bonds of solidarity within the Common Market ? Should this not flow from

the degree of solidarity already existing in this Europe of the Nine ?

Unfortunately, from the defence point of view, this solidarity leaves much to be desired.

So far as the aircraft are concerned, why should not France purchase the MRCA which, after all, is just as European as the F-1 M-53 ? Fortunately, our relations with the Americans are not devoid of problems either. That is why I deeply regret that, as a result of the collective hysteria which arose in France when General Stehlin wrote a sufficiently honest report on the delays which our nationalisms have caused in our competition with the United States, it has become almost impossible to weigh the pros and cons of the Starfighter objectively. That is why I shall also vote against paragraph 7 of the recommendation. Eurogroup may perhaps be too much an instrument of American pressure where the procurement of armaments is concerned. I am convinced that this is the part France is trying to play on the WEU Standing Armaments Committee. And I do not believe that Europe needs it to do this so long as there is the risk of another Stehlin affair. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Lemmrich.

Mr. LEMMRICH (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Mr. Krieg's draft recommendation has points with which one can agree, but also has points that are controversial, as has already emerged from the discussion. When he argues that Europe must become a true partner of the United States within the Atlantic Alliance, I can only agree. A substantial step towards that goal would be — and on this we also agree — the political union of Europe, but the obstacles on that road are still great. But when Mr. Krieg says that the obstacle of stagnation in the process of European unification can be overcome — or, perhaps one could say, got round — if priority is given to defence co-operation, so that it ranks before a common foreign policy — for he has said that we should start with defence — I do not consider that is a road which will bring us to our goal in the immediate future. A common defence policy can only be the result of a common foreign policy, not its precursor.

This must surely have been one of the arguments put forward in France in the 1950s when the European Defence Community was rejected. I must repeat that we agree with the aim that Europe must become a genuine partner of the

Mr. Lemmrich (continued)

United States ; but there are, obviously, differing views as to how to go about this. If WEU is to provide a basis it would require revision, and it would not just be a matter of us having to ask other countries to join, but also of having to ensure that there will be equal status for all the partners.

In the political field there is now however one effective form of defence policy co-operation between European States within the Atlantic Alliance, and that is the NATO Eurogroup, which has not been viewed very sympathetically by you, Mr. President, and some of our colleagues. Eurogroup has basically only one defect, the fact that one of the most important partners, namely France, is missing.

With the major arms drive by the Soviet Union, which we must note and which presents a threat to the free nations of Europe, effective and immediate co-operation in the military sphere is essential. Eurogroup is quite obviously a practical and suitable instrument for that purpose at the present time.

Mr. Krieg reminds us in his draft recommendation that it would be desirable to invite the countries of the Mediterranean with a democratic system, and Denmark and Ireland, to join WEU. He reminds us that they can join WEU at any time. I would also remind our French colleagues that they can join Eurogroup at any time. That door, too, is open.

If we look at the defence of Europe as a whole — and that is how we must look at it — the great significance of the flanks is obvious to us. One European country, Norway, unfortunately turned down membership of the European Community. That country is not mentioned at all in Mr. Krieg's report, and yet the northern flank, with Norway, is of crucial importance for European defence. Norway does however belong to Eurogroup.

I would like to welcome what Mr. Krieg said about co-operation in arms procurement — that it must be pressed forward, so that we do not unnecessarily fritter away our economic resources which, for each of us, are limited. We have seen successful European endeavours, but there have been others which have failed. They have not always included all the European States, but they have been between leading partners. I would remind you of the common development of the

Transall transport aircraft by France and the Federal Republic of Germany. That was a successful venture. A less successful one was the joint development of a Franco-German tank, since it unfortunately proved impossible to work together and each country built its own version. But we do want to get over such difficulties and to work together in the future. Here again, Eurogroup offers a way. The closer we work together there, the greater weight we shall carry ; and we need to carry weight if we are to get our relations with the United States onto the right footing.

Let me say a further word, Mr. President, about the proposal that a conference of Heads of State or of Government on European defence policy should be held forthwith. I would like to lay special emphasis on the word "forthwith". I believe that we Europeans are, forthwith, going to have our hands full if we are to resolve the major difficulties in the European Community, and if we are to see that our British friends remain in the Community, do not leave it, and do not pose conditions that are unacceptable for the other European States. The European Community is in a difficult predicament, and I find it hard to imagine in view of the burdens on it that a conference on European defence policy could take place in the immediate future. If such a conference were to produce only declarations of intent, I could not hope for any progress from it, and if it merely revealed disagreement, it would be a step backward rather than forward.

It is absolutely right that something of the sort should be prepared at the appropriate levels but in the immediate future a major conference can contribute nothing in Europe's present political situation. That should not prevent us from being clear about our aim. It seems to me that our aim must be to work with all our strength for a European union with a common foreign policy, which will then automatically lead to a common defence policy. Until that aim has been achieved, we should make use of what we have tried and tested and stay within the realm of practical politics ; and from that point of view Eurogroup provides a suitable approach.

In view of these various points, I would be glad if Mr. Krieg's report could be looked at again in the General Affairs Committee, and therefore be referred back to it. Should reference back not be possible, I would not feel that I was able to vote in favour of the report and recommendation. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The request for reference back takes precedence over continuation of the debate. But as two speakers had put their names down before Mr. Lemmrich spoke, I think it desirable, in the interests of clarity, that they should be given a hearing before the Rapporteur and the Chairman of the Committee reply.

Having made this point, I call Mr. Grieve.

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). — It is perhaps always more dangerous to make an intervention in a debate in an international assembly without notes and without presentation than it is to do so in one's own national assembly. I have to confess to the Assembly this morning that I have neither notes nor preparation because I had no intention whatever of speaking. I was moved to speak when I listened to Mr. Krieg presenting his report and when I heard some of the other interventions which have been made, particularly that of my friend, colleague and political ally, Mr. Farr, with whom on one position I found myself in profound disagreement.

When one debates, as we are this morning, a subject relative to European union and the functions of Western European union, of our Assembly and of the Brussels Treaty once again, one has, I think, a profound sense of *déjà vu*.

I have had the honour of being a member of this Assembly now for some six years. We have gone over again and again the subjects which we are discussing this morning. That is not a criticism. It is inevitable that we should. It is only by thrashing out the subject we are discussing this morning and relative and allied subjects by discussion in an international forum that we shall make progress towards the united Europe and the peaceful world which must be the aim of every person here and of all those who send us here.

Looking back over the last six years, although relative to the talking the progress has perhaps been slight, nevertheless there has been considerable progress.

The last great step forward in European union was undoubtedly the adhesion of the United Kingdom, of Denmark and of Ireland to the European Community. I regret only that the adhesion of the United Kingdom should subsequently have been placed in any doubt at all. I

regret that profoundly, but I hope that before twelve months are out it will be in no doubt.

I want to refer to two matters only. Despite what Mr. Lemmrich has just said, I do not expect there is anything in the draft recommendation of Mr. Krieg which is really exceptionable. I would have hoped that all the points in the recommendation as such would appeal to the members of this Assembly. If there is to be criticism, I would be the first of the critics when it comes to the explanatory memorandum. The conclusions of the draft recommendation, I suggest, are unexceptionable. Indeed, it is with pleasure that we learned — and I speak I imagine for a great many of my friends here — that the first point of the recommendation, the proposal that there should be a conference of Heads of State or of Government of the European Community to be held forthwith, has been overtaken by events and that on the initiative of the President of the French Republic such a conference is shortly to be held. Whether it will deal with all the matters which Mr. Krieg suggests should have come before the conference of Heads of State which he envisaged, I do not know; but it is bound in the nature of things to deal with a great many of them. Therefore, we can, I think, accept with pleasure that head of the recommendation.

Turning to the substance of the explanatory memorandum, it is, I think, informed by this nibbling away at the solidarity which ought to exist between Europe and the United States. I rise on this occasion to emphasise once again to this Assembly something which I believe profoundly and which I think all objective analysis must support, namely, that the solidarity of the United States and of Europe, whatever their differences of interest, is indispensable to the peace and the security of the free world. Also, in the defence of Europe, the Treaty of Brussels and Western European Union have a vital part to play, but so, too, do NATO and the Eurogroup. These are not, and can never be, mutually exclusive. They should be interdependent and each should serve the other. These are generalisations, but they are generalisations which cannot be made sufficiently often in international assemblies in Europe.

I turn now to the final point I desire to make which was prompted by the words uttered by my friend, Mr. Farr, when he spoke of the danger of outstripping public opinion in our efforts to achieve a greater measure of European unity. Of course, we as politicians must always have before

Mr. Grieve (continued)

our eyes the classic dictum that politics is the art of the possible. Nevertheless, it is our duty as elected politicians to lead, to guide and to help forward public opinion. As a convinced European and one who believes that some measure of national sovereignty, and an ever-increasing measure, will have to be sacrificed to the European cohesion and greater unity which I believe should be the object of all of us, I would not put the function of those of us who are here in the negative way in which it was put by my friend Mr. Farr. I would not say that we must beware of outstripping public opinion but I would say that it is I hope a clarion call to those who like myself are ardent Europeans, and by that I mean an Englishman who sees the future of Great Britain in a new Europe and as part of the new Europe. We must guide and help forward public opinion, and give a lead to it. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. de Niet.

Mr. de NIET (*Netherlands*). — I am a member of the Committee that has produced this report but I was not present when the decision on the report was taken. I have looked at the composition of the Committee that accepted the report unanimously and I note that the attendance was not complete. I am sure that had it been the full Committee some people would have voted against the motion and it might not have been adopted.

I know that there is in this Assembly a large group who will vote against the resolution and the report and I entirely agree with the arguments advanced by Mr. Richter and Mr. Dankert. I have gained the impression here that members are inclined to exaggerate the possibilities and the importance of European union as though when everything has come to a deadlock in the Common Market or in NATO or in other international organisations, where there are the same members from WEU, the WEU group can save the situation. They are of course representative of the same countries and very often they are even the same people. Therefore, this is not a magical organisation. It is worth what the members are worth and what the political wills of the members are worth.

Other speakers, and particularly Mr. Richter and Mr. Dankert, have spoken already about the contents of the report so far as it concerns the United States, NATO, Starfighters, and so on. We cannot agree that the whole tendency of the

report is very good. It is not an international report, particularly in regard to France. Why should a big country of the Common Market or of Western European Union, which claims practically the leadership even when it is alone in its opinion, go on for ever without creating the same ambition in other big countries in these international organisations? There is danger there.

Western European Union cannot save the situation while our views are blocked again and again by one of its members in the Common Market. We in this organisation cannot take in hand the good defence of Europe if precisely those people, and others, who claim this seek in this report to justify France leaving NATO. That is an anomaly that I cannot understand and that many other people, and indeed the world as a whole, cannot understand. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Leynen.

Mr. LEYNEN (*Belgium*) (Translation). — I did not intend to take part in this debate, but having listened to some rather critical speeches and another which had all the appearance of a Philip-*pic*, I consider it my duty to restore a little balance and to come to the help of the Rapporteur. I shall do so in a language other than that he used.

(The speaker continued in Dutch)

I do not think, Mr. President, that this is an anti-American report, as Mr. Dankert has just said. I see it far more as a pro-European one. It has been written in a pro-European spirit, and more specifically in the spirit of Western European Union. Obviously, however, one is not, when giving one's approval to a draft recommendation from Western European Union, bound to agree with what is said in the Rapporteur's explanatory memorandum down to the smallest detail. There are several points in the explanatory memorandum where I can justifiably voice reservations from one viewpoint or another — for example, paragraph 52, where the Rapporteur says that everyone recognises the European lead in aircraft engineering. This is certainly a point that is open to argument. And I am very ready to admit this.

What I was not happy about in Mr. Dankert's speech was his dragging in Mr. van der Stoel, who has always been a very good friend of mine, to say that Western European Union can be done away with, that everything political has to go in the Nine, and that everything to do with defence is a matter for NATO — in a word, that WEU no longer has any point. If this is the attitude of

Mr. Leynen (continued)

the whole of the Netherlands Delegation, I wonder why they are all here.

I believe this is all exaggeration, things that may sometimes be said — as they have sometimes been said by certain Netherlands Ministers — but subsequently are put right.

I continue to believe that Western European Union has a crucial task to carry out in Europe, and if it did not exist it would have to be invented. I am absolutely against paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 being deleted from the recommendation. It is precisely these paragraphs that set out the rôle of WEU. And I would point out that these paragraphs have also figured in earlier recommendations, at the time when I was Rapporteur.

I did not wish to start off a polemical argument, Mr. President; but I did feel that after a number of critical and negative comments there was a need to set matters straight. It is not because the Rapporteur is a member of a particular political party in a particular country that we cannot have confidence in him on this issue. *(Applause)*

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*) (Translation). — I request the floor.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Mr. Roper, your name does not at present appear on the list of speakers.

I will give you the floor later on.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*) (Translation). — I do not agree with this procedure.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I give you the floor, Mr. Roper.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I apologise for having disrupted the procedure, Mr. President, but as you were taking the debate following Mr. Lemmrich's motion to refer back I assumed that you were taking both debates together.

The PRESIDENT. — No.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — Otherwise the motion to refer back would have taken precedence and would have been debated immediately. As you were prepared to overrule that normal procedure, I assumed that both debates would take place at the same time. I am in your hands, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Since there are no more speakers on the list, I will call on the Rapporteur to reply to the speeches.

Mr. KRIEG (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I have noted with pleasure that the subject with which we have been dealing today, in an Assembly twenty years old is itself twenty years old and yet still topical, since it arouses passionate feelings.

I remember preparing a report last year on a problem which was infinitely more technical, and feeling somewhat aggrieved when, following this report, I heard only soothing and favourable comments. Today, at least things are turning out otherwise and we are having an interesting and fruitful general discussion.

I shall try to deal comprehensively with most of the problems raised, which generally speaking dovetail with each other, but I should like first to make one observation of principle.

Mr. de Niet said just now, and probably with full justification, that in other circumstances the report which I presented on 24th October to the General Affairs Committee would not have been adopted unanimously by the members present.

I am perfectly happy to believe this, but why were the absent members not there? The Committee had been convened, and everybody was aware that we were to discuss a report which was already familiar since there had been a preliminary report giving rise to a good deal of discussion. Consequently, every member of the Committee knew that a decision would be taken.

The unanimity achieved surprised me, and I welcomed it in a fitting spirit, in other words, with satisfaction and a touch of scepticism. In my oral presentation I could do no other than express myself in terms which reflected the unanimous decision taken by the Committee.

I do not have the impression that the same thing will happen today.

If you will allow me, I should like to begin with some observations in reply to Mr. Dankert. But I must first congratulate him, for he handles my mother tongue with a virtuosity which delights me and leads me to believe that he must understand it as well as he speaks it. In consequence, there should be no misunderstanding between us over the answer that I should like to give him.

It is not a good thing, at whatever moment in a man's existence, particularly in international

Mr. Krieg (continued)

assemblies, for him to be so "pro something" that he ends up with the impression that all those who do not share his views in their entirety are "anti".

The pro-Americanism of Mr. Dankert is perfectly well-known to everyone, as is, moreover, his competence in the field of combat aircraft. In all matters, he reaches a point where, whenever others do not share his views, he has the impression that they are anti-American.

If he had taken the pains to read attentively the report which I prepared, he would have seen that there is no anti-Americanism there — and I would thank Mr. Leynen for stressing this point — and that, in particular, one of the paragraphs of the report is entitled: "Conditions for European defence in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance".

I am personally aware, as are many Europeans, of all that we owed to the United States in years past, both during the war and afterwards, and I consider that both as Europeans and as nationals of our countries, we have with this nation, the foremost nation in the world, links that are highly privileged bonds of alliance and friendship. But that does not mean that at all times and on all subjects I, like Mr. Dankert, must feel myself constrained to say that nothing is well done unless it is done in America, that nothing is good except in America, that there is no intelligent thinking except in America! I have always reserved the right to criticise anyone, even my political friends; why then should I not reserve the right to criticise my friends on the international scene as well when I consider, rightly or wrongly, that they invite criticism? That is what I meant to say, in a very general way.

If we turn to technical problems with which Mr. Dankert is more familiar than I since I am absolutely unqualified to speak about combat aircraft, I fully agree with him when he says that, for an outlay of thirty, forty or fifty millions, we must buy the best aircraft available and that, after all, it is perhaps possible to set in train the building of two different aircraft. It is possible, but I continue to claim — and I believe that it is in the interests of Europe to persist in that claim — that we must not automatically assert that one of two pieces of equipment, merely because it is not European, is the better one and that, in consequence, we must leave aside what might, in the final analysis, prove to be to the

future advantage of Europe. That is what I wanted to say on this point.

I would add that there has been much talk during this general discussion of the difficulties that might be encountered in pursuing a common defence policy. Mr. Lemmrich, in particular, said very rightly that a common defence policy could only come as a consequence of political union and could not precede it.

That is true; but is it not our duty, when our Assembly is discussing these defence problems, to urge our governments to advance further along this road.

Naturally this will not be enough to bring about, through the agency of our seven or nine governments, that political union which very many of us here, as Mr. Grieve said just now, desire to see. Yet it might perhaps be a factor which would induce all those concerned, at a given moment, to realise that efforts must be exerted in order to achieve political union, about which there has been so much discussion for the past twenty years, although unfortunately we discern very few signs of its emergence in the near future.

In that connection, I should like to tell Mr. Farr that I do not agree with him when he says that we must be careful to attach due weight to what people, our electorates in particular, may be thinking. Like Mr. Grieve, I consider it our duty, sometimes even against the views of those who have elected us to the positions we occupy as representatives, to demonstrate to them where the real future lies — their future, that of their children, that of the countries to which they belong and that of Europe, of which they form a part, ineluctably, even if they do not always appreciate the fact.

I would like to give a brief answer to my French colleague, Mr. Cermolacce, who was kind enough to speak along lines which I could easily have predicted. I would tell him that on the contrary — but that will not surprise him — the Assembly of Western European Union is not exclusively designed to rehash problems that are twenty or thirty years old, since these problems are always topical owing to the fact that progress is not sufficiently fast.

I personally have a profound belief in the policy of détente. It is essential if our purpose is to encourage in this world of ours, which has become so dangerous, prospects more agreeable

Mr. Krieg (continued)

than that of ending up as molecules following an atomic explosion.

Unfortunately, I do not draw the same conclusions as he does from the various discussions that have taken place recently and whose first stage was concluded a few days ago between the two greatest powers on earth.

Mr. Cermolacce, when atomic armaments are limited to some 2,500 nuclear warheads, in conditions such that their equivalent in terms of kilogrammes or megatons remains unknown, we are in reality giving fresh impetus to the nuclear arms race. There is so much truth in this that the United States, the country we were discussing just now, which has not reached the same level as the USSR in the matter of nuclear warheads, will probably feel bound to exert fresh efforts in that direction.

Naturally a policy of détente is proving indispensable. But when you advocate a policy that runs counter to the ideas of the Europeans on common defence, I wonder, placing myself at the level of the European countries represented here, what is the thinking of your socialist colleagues, who are after all closely linked with you under the banner of the common programme. That is a problem worth raising, and I wonder what answer they can give to it.

In conclusion, I would ask those of my colleagues to whom I have not replied explicitly to forgive me. In reality, two essential problems arise, which the Assembly of Western European Union must endeavour to settle. First of all, we must know whether we have a common political resolve and whether we wish to pursue it. Secondly we must know whether we are resolved upon common defence and whether we wish to put this concept into practice.

In order to allay the misgivings of those who might still believe in my anti-Americanism, I would repeat that it has never been my intention — as I have said both orally and in writing — to pursue such a policy, internal to Europe as it is, either in parallel to or against the United States. What is at issue is to pursue this policy together with them and, to quote the words of President Kennedy, not on the principle of leadership — which is, alas, the case today — but on that of partnership, in which the United States and Europe would represent the two pillars of a reliable and solidly-based entity specifically

animated by the determination to maintain peace and prosperity in Europe. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Chairman of the General Affairs Committee.

Mr. SIEGLERSCHMIDT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the result of this morning's discussion first raises questions about the way in which our Committee reports are prepared and how they are produced. I will not mention again the special circumstances in this case, such as the postal strike in France or the fact that the Chairman was unable to attend the last meeting of the Committee. That would be a simple way of getting out of the difficulty in a discussion like this. But that is not the main point.

In view of other experiences we have had, I would also like to address a clear call to all my colleagues that an attempt should be made — I want to express myself very carefully here — to see that what is expressed in a Committee's vote can in fact be jointly supported. This depends, I will readily admit, partly on the time-limits for the submission of papers. But then we shall have to schedule matters here, and in certain circumstances avoid — and it did not happen in this case — imposing a compulsory time-limit on a Committee, so that it will be completely clear that the Committee is putting forward a Committee opinion, which nobody who attended its meeting will have any grounds for disavowing in the plenary Assembly.

May I make a second point about the relationship between the actual draft recommendation and the explanatory memorandum. I can only emphasise what Mr. Leynen has said. I do know what our rules of procedure are on this point, Mr. President; nevertheless, I cannot deny that speaking both personally and in my capacity as Chairman of the General Affairs Committee, I would be inclined to allow the Rapporteur a certain latitude in the explanatory memorandum to put also his personal view, particularly if he is careful to set out clearly any dissenting views expressed in Committee.

I would give as an example Mr. Krieg's remarks — which have been criticised here — about France leaving NATO. In his explanatory memorandum Mr. Krieg did, in fact, state the French point of view, which — I almost said "naturally" — I do not share. But he also stated the views of the other members of the Committee on that point, and the most one can argue about is whether

Mr. Sieglerschmidt (continued)

he gave these sufficient weight. But, as I said, I am inclined to give the Rapporteur a certain freedom of manoeuvre in his explanatory memorandum.

As far as the recommendation is concerned, two points in particular have come in for criticism. The first one concerns paragraph 1 of the recommendation to the Council, that is to say the proposal that a conference of Heads of State or Government should be held forthwith to study questions of defence policy. One can certainly, with Mr. Lemmrich, argue whether the word "forthwith" is the right one here. I would have been quite prepared to support an amendment on this, had there been one; just as I must say that if one agrees with what I said about the explanatory memorandum — some may of course disagree — I personally consider that as far as the recommendation is concerned there would have been no need — and I shall come back to this in a moment — to refer the report back to the Committee. On the contrary the wishes of those who feel they have grounds for criticism could have been fully met by means of amendments.

But to get back to the main point: leaving aside the time factor, the first question is whether the European Community should in the light of its political aims, also concern itself with defence policy. Here I agree with a whole series of speakers. But then comes the second question, of what part Western European Union has to play in this respect? Can it, disregarding the fact that two members of the European Community do not, at any rate as yet, belong to it, already do some preparatory thinking on various matters and set certain processes in motion which are plainly not simply questions for the future? That it can is in fact borne out by the discussion which has taken place on the report of the General Affairs Committee. There is the problem of the aircraft industry, with invariably the implications for industry, foreign policy and defence that we have so often discussed. So it can hardly be regarded as indecent — if I may be a trifle ironical — to speak in this context of defence policy as well.

I want to make it quite clear that I would have resolutely opposed the draft of the report if I had sensed in any way that anti-American feeling was involved.

But let me say something about the second point of the recommendation which has been

criticised. This was the question of accession in paragraph 5, which I have already mentioned. I was really somewhat surprised at the criticism here. Ever since I have been in this Assembly, I have always heard only the same view voiced on all sides, namely that while it may be unrealistic — as the report too, says — to think of Ireland or Denmark acceding at this stage, such an event is nonetheless desirable in itself. I have always understood that to be the consensus.

I will now, if I may, make a few general remarks. Take this question of Eurogroup. I think the report has been a little misunderstood in this respect. In any case I did not interpret the report — and I have certainly read it very thoroughly — as an attempt, if I may use the expression, to cry stinking fish, in other words to denigrate Eurogroup. In my view it was more a matter of pointing out that Eurogroup, whatever its achievements in the technical field of armaments, has in the nature of things no part to play in defence policy and the determining of Europe's defence policy position. It was created for other purposes, and is set up along other lines.

Here of course there is another question which naturally arises — and it must be seriously and thoroughly discussed in the Assembly, even if we may not arrive at identical views — and that is whether it is correct to argue — and at least some of the speakers seemed to reflect this view, though I am open to correction on this as our discussion proceeds — that basically the defence of Western Europe is in good hands with NATO, and that, disregarding for the moment the European Community, there is no place for any kind of special rôle by WEU within the NATO framework.

But if that really is the case then Kennedy's saying about the two pillars which has already been quoted here no longer holds good, and we must officially abandon the principle. I hold firmly to it, and have so far seen no reason to abandon it. If it were abandoned then my former colleague who has also been quoted here, Max van der Stoel, whom I hold in the highest esteem, would also be right. If it were true that no special rôle or task existed within the framework of NATO for Western European Union, then WEU would be no more than an honourable piece of history to be put in cold storage until it is wanted again. But then I would see no sense in criticising the Council for inactivity, as we have often done from time to time. Such criticism would then be unfounded, and, as our former colleague the Netherlands Foreign Minister Max van der Stoel

Mr. Sieglerschmidt (continued)

has said, we would have to confine ourselves to meeting here now and again to hold what are certainly most interesting political discussions.

I believe you will appreciate, Mr. President, that I felt it necessary to make the alternatives facing us quite clear. Since I believe that profound uncertainty prevails in this Assembly about the position and task of Western European Union, I agree that this report should be thoroughly discussed again in the General Affairs Committee. After this debate I have no objection to the motion that it be referred back. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

A request for reference back to the Committee has been made by Mr. Lemmrich. On this request, I call Mr. Roper, whose name is down to speak.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — May I begin by apologising to you if, owing to a linguistic and procedural confusion, I intervened at the wrong time a few minutes ago. I had hoped to intervene in the general debate in support of the proposal of Mr. Lemmrich, and I hope that in giving my reasons for advocating the reference back at this stage in the debate I will not be out of order. If I stray out of order and say anything which goes beyond the technical limits of the reference back motion, I am sure you will very rapidly correct me.

I wish to see the reference back of this recommendation for a number of reasons, and the remarks which have just been made by Mr. Krieg and Mr. Sieglerschmidt do not completely reassure me. First of all, I find that the first preambular paragraph is somewhat sweeping in its assumptions. I do not consider that the modified Brussels Treaty is the only basis of European political union in defence matters. It seems to me that already we are having, in the discussions on political co-operation within the Nine, considerable discussions on defence co-operation and the preparation for the ECSC conference in Geneva, which obviously has security implications. Within that framework there is much greater possibility for co-operation in the future.

As the British Foreign Minister, Mr. Callaghan, has indicated in his speeches, he sees the framework of European political co-operation to be a helpful one and one which he hopes at a later stage may be able to be taken forward towards political union.

Secondly, when we come to the operative paragraphs, there are other matters which need further study and therefore require the reference back.

Mr. Krieg in his intervention suggested that the forthcoming conference of Heads of State or of Government might be discussing these matters. I consider that highly unlikely at this stage. It would be foolish to confuse these two things or to pass a resolution which might even imply such a conclusion.

I also feel that paragraph 3, which has this rather ambiguous reference to nuclear powers and re-examination of the implications of this for European security, requires further study and therefore a reference back to the Committee has been suggested by Mr. Lemmrich.

Paragraph 6, which suggests that there should be consideration regularly at ministerial and at permanent representative level of the Council of WEU of the various matters outlined in (a) and (b), I feel might lead to overlapping between discussions in the Davignon organisation — the political co-operation machinery — and in the WEU Council. I believe this is a matter about which we should clarify our minds before passing a recommendation of this sort.

Finally, in spite of what has been said by Mr. Sieglerschmidt regarding the relative importance of the Standing Armaments Committee as referred to in paragraph 7 and the continuing rôle of the Eurogroup, I feel that paragraph 7 of the recommendation as drafted with no reference at all to the Eurogroup — and this is after having read the references in the text of the Rapporteur to which I cannot now refer about the Eurogroup — is most unfortunate.

If I may quote the words of the British Prime Minister to the North Atlantic Assembly, he said :

“For the past six years the great majority of European allies have co-ordinated their defence efforts in an informal grouping within the Alliance: the Eurogroup... European defence co-operation can, and should, be taken further. But the achievements of the Eurogroup, which the last Labour Government was instrumental in creating, should not be undervalued. They go a long way to demonstrate that the Europeans are pulling their weight in the Alliance. I hope there are no doubts on this score.”

The absence of reference to the Eurogroup within the report, if there were no other reason

Mr. Roper (continued)

for referring the report back, is enough. I hope the Assembly will agree to refer the report back to the General Affairs Committee so that there can be fuller study.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Does anyone oppose the reference back ?...

What does the Committee think ?

Mr. KRIEG (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. Rapporteur, one must obviously not ask the Rapporteur to associate himself with the reference back of his report, or there would be no point in having a Rapporteur.

I would simply remind my colleagues that, so far as his written report is concerned, the Rapporteur speaks for the Committee ; and I think that in that written text I have informed the Assembly faithfully of the discussions in Committee and of what emerged from them. So far as my oral report is concerned, there is an old principle of French law : "The pen is in bondage, but speech is free". I do not think I took exaggerated liberties in my spoken report.

That being said, it is quite obvious that the Rapporteur is also answerable to the Assembly, and if the Assembly considers that the work done and approved by the General Affairs Committee should be reviewed, polished and completed, I will do the work a hundred times if necessary, polishing and re-polishing unceasingly. I shall do exactly what the Assembly now decides.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I thank the Rapporteur.

I shall now put the motion for reference back to the vote.

Mr. LEYNEN (*Belgium*) (Translation). — Is this reference back for two or three days or to a later session ? I am not clear on this point.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I think that as the debate stands at present, reference back, if decided, will be to the next session, which will be next spring. It is not for me to express an opinion, but I have my own thoughts on the matter.

I put the motion for reference back to the vote.

The motion for reference back is agreed to.

9. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following Orders of the Day :

1. Changes in the membership of Committees.
2. Second draft supplementary budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1974 (Document 647) ; Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1975 (Document 648) ; Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1973 — The Auditor's Report and Motion to approve the final accounts (Document 645 and Addendum) (Presentation of and Debate on the Reports of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Votes on the draft texts, Documents 647, 648 and 645 and Addendum).

Are there any objections ?...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak ?...

The Sitting is closed.

(The Sitting was closed at 12.30 p.m.)

SEVENTH SITTING

Tuesday, 3rd December 1974

SUMMARY

1. Attendance Register.

2. Point of order.

Speakers : Mr. Brugnon, The President, Mr. Brugnon, Mr. de Montesquiou, Mr. Grieve, The President, Mr. Krieg, Mr. Brugnon, Mr. Farr, Sir John Rodgers, Mr. Krieg, Mr. Cohen, The President, Mr. de Montesquiou, Mr. Prescott.

3. Changes in the membership of Committees.

4. Second draft supplementary budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial

year 1974 (Doc. 647) ; Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1975 (Doc. 648) ; Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1973 — The Auditor's Report and Motion to approve the final accounts (Doc. 645 and Addendum) (*Presentation of and Debate on the Reports of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Votes on the draft texts*, Docs. 647, 648 and 645 and Addendum).

Speakers : The President, Mr. Dequae (*Chairman and Rapporteur*), Mr. de Bruyne, Mr. Ahrens, Mr. Dequae (*Chairman and Rapporteur*).

5. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The Sitting is open.

1. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings¹.

2. Point of order

Mr. BRUGNON (*France*) (Translation). — I wish to speak on a point of order.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Brugnon on a point of order.

Mr. BRUGNON (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, under Rule 32 (a), I venture to raise a point of order in connection with the application of Rule 43 made this morning in regard to the question of the Channel Tunnel.

Rule 43, paragraph 2, lays down : "As soon as a request for urgent procedure is received, the

President shall communicate it orally to the Assembly." This was done. "The request shall then be posted up and the relevant text circulated." This too was done. "The Assembly shall decide on the request for urgent procedure at the earliest" — that is to say that it may be later — "after the first vote included in the Orders of the Day of the sitting at which the request for urgent procedure was communicated to the Assembly."

A debate was duly called for. Did the Assembly decide ? If we read the official report of the sitting, we see that the President decided that the matter should not be entered on the agenda for the session.

Did the Assembly decide ? That is the question I venture to put to the President.

It did not decide, because you called a speaker in accordance with Rule 43 but you called only Mr. de Montesquiou by name, and no other speaker, as might have been done, although other signatories to the motion for a recommendation submitted were present at the sitting. You then called for a speaker against the motion. To my knowledge, when a request for urgent procedure is being debated, the substance of the question must not be entered into. Only one speaker for — the speaker you called for the request was absent but others were there — and one against the request can be called. The Chairman of the

1. See page 18.

Mr. Brugnon (continued)

Committee concerned may also speak ; he is, I am well aware, Mr. de Montesquiou, but "the Chairman of the Committee" was not called. A representative of the Bureau of the Assembly may also be called upon to speak in its name. Owing to the fact that none of these were called, I ask that the question should be reconsidered, that the proposal you made to withdraw it from the Orders of the Day should be declared null and void and that the request for urgent procedure which was duly lodged should be discussed now. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Brugnon. I would like the Assembly to know that this exchange was not arranged between us. The fact is that when we introduced this question of urgency this morning I called Mr. de Montesquiou, who was not present at the sitting. Nobody asked to speak at once in favour of the request. A member rose to speak against it and pointed out that, since this was a request for urgent procedure, the consequence of the fact that the sponsor or sponsors of the request were not there was that the question became null and void. In the circumstances prevailing at that sitting, I was obliged to take note of his point.

That being said, the Assembly's decision is final where its own proceedings are concerned, and here I would express my own opinion without, I hope, showing any bias. There is not very much business this afternoon, and if the Assembly agrees, I am prepared to include the discussion of Mr. de Montesquiou's motion immediately after the debates which are included in the Orders of the Day, providing Mr. Prescott, who opposed its inclusion, is also present.

Does the Assembly agree to proceed in this way ?

Mr. BRUGNON (*France*) (Translation). — No, Mr. President. It seems to me that it is now, after the first vote has been taken, that you should allow the debate with which we are concerned. I also ask in this connection that the Chairman of the Committee should be asked to express his views, in accordance with Rule 32.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Rule 43, paragraph 4, lays down : "If the Assembly decides against urgent procedure..." — as was the case this morning...

Mr. BRUGNON (*France*) (Translation). — But it did not !

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — It noted that, since urgent procedure had been requested and those supporting the request were not present, urgent procedure could not be adopted. As I was saying, Rule 43 lays down that : "If the Assembly decides against urgent procedure, another request concerning the same question may not be placed before it during the same part-session." However, as a measure of conciliation, and since the question is indeed topical and does not lack interest, and since moreover we have comparatively little business this afternoon owing to the way in which the debate was concluded this morning, I am entirely ready to allow Mr. de Montesquiou's motion to be discussed after the end of the debate on the budget, which is an extremely important matter.

I call Mr. de Montesquiou.

Mr. de MONTESQUIOU (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, let me remind you of what was decided yesterday at the Presidential Committee. It was decided by a majority that this question would come up today at 3 p.m. There are witnesses, and the Secretary of the Committee of which I am Chairman was aware of the decision, since he put me down to speak this afternoon.

As Chairman, I therefore protest against the procedure which was followed this morning, on the ground that the Rules of Procedure were infringed and that since the sponsor of the motion had stated that he would not be present this morning, he should not have been put down to speak then. I consider it is most urgent, after the point of order raised by Mr. Brugnon and owing to the urgency of which we are all aware, since there are ten co-signatories from my Committee, that we should debate this question as a matter of urgency, even if, as was decided yesterday at the meeting of the Presidential Committee, it has to be referred back to the General Affairs Committee for a report to be prepared for Thursday.

In addition, this is a matter of very great importance, for in my opinion it conditions the future of Europe and even of our institution. The Channel Tunnel, now that it has been decided upon by the two States concerned, proves to the world that the bonds between the two countries will be strengthened by the construction of a tunnel which has been talked about for over a century.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Now is not the time to enter into the substance of the matter.

Mr. de MONTESQUIOU (*France*) (Translation). — It is my right as Chairman of the Committee.

Moreover, WEU needs to assert itself at the present time, and this morning you connived in a situation which resulted in eliminating an important problem from the Orders of the Day. In the interests of the future of Europe and of WEU, I demand that the urgency of this debate should be decided upon.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Mr. de Montesquiou, I think that your words are carrying you beyond your thoughts. I would merely remind you of this: yesterday the Presidential Committee decided by three votes against two, including mine, to include the motion you have proposed in the Orders of the Day, giving it the urgent character which you wanted. There never was any question of 3 p.m. We therefore included it in the first sitting. This morning you were not here and none of your co-signatories spoke except that, after the close of the incident, Mr. Brugnon sent me a note telling me, belatedly, that he might ask to speak.

Once again, as a measure of conciliation, since the matter is only put off for an hour — and we have already lost a quarter of an hour — I suggest that, after Mr. Dequae's report, we should return to this problem, if the Assembly agrees.

I shall put this proposal of taking the matter up later to the vote.

I have not connived in anything. I am even a protagonist of this business, as I showed yesterday in the Presidential Committee. Please, therefore, Mr. de Montesquiou, let us calm down on both sides and view the matter with serenity.

I call Mr. Grieve.

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). — I rise entirely on a question of procedure. However, as a preface on the question of procedure, I should say as a protagonist of the Channel Tunnel and a member of the Channel Tunnel group in the Parliament of the United Kingdom that I cannot stand by and see our procedure violated. Under Rule 43(4) the rules of the Assembly are formal:

"If the Assembly decides against urgent procedure, another request concerning the same question may not be placed before it during the same part-session."

I submit that we are bound by that rule.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Mr. Grieve, a misunderstanding has arisen here, because Mr. de Montesquiou, who had not informed the Presidential Committee of the facts, instructed the Secretary of the Committee to say that he would like this question to come up for discussion at 3 o'clock this afternoon.

Once again, since I do not wish to give the impression of burying a problem whose topicality and importance are obvious, if the Assembly, which is sovereign unless objections are raised, decides to include the question put forward by Mr. de Montesquiou and his co-signatories in the Orders of the Day for this afternoon, I think it would be, if not good procedure — for the Rules of Procedure are formal on this point — at least a good method of giving Mr. de Montesquiou satisfaction, which does not prevent any of you from speaking. Let us not waste time.

Mr. KRIEG (*France*) (Translation). — We are not wasting time when we turn our attention to the Rules of Procedure of a parliamentary assembly, even a European assembly. In this affair we have violated the Rules of Procedure from A to Z.

In the first place, this request for urgent procedure was signed by ten parliamentarians belonging to this Assembly and there was no call to submit it to the Presidential Committee. Furthermore, it was not for that Committee to decide on the inclusion of this question either in this morning's Orders of the Day or in those for this afternoon. Lastly, it is not for you, Mr. President, to decide that the question will not be included; it is the Assembly which must decide. This morning the Assembly did not do so; I attended the sitting and I can bear witness to that.

Let us therefore waste no more time, but decide immediately on what we have to discuss.

Since the Rules of Procedure have been violated from start to finish, we must know whether it is the intention to seek refuge behind the Rules of Procedure or, on the contrary, to make use of them.

Mr. Krieg (continued)

You took a decision this morning, Mr. President, that you had no right to take. The urgent debate will not last more than a quarter of an hour...

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I beg your pardon, Mr. Krieg. The Assembly decided; the question was put to it. (*Cries of "No"*)

Mr. Brugnon was not there. You should have made your protest at that moment, and not have waited for time to pass, so that we now find ourselves faced with a misunderstanding.

Once again, if you agree, I propose that we should deal quickly with Mr. Dequae's report on the budget, the debate on which will probably only last for half an hour or less. Afterwards we will return to Mr. de Montesquiou's question. There is no reason for you to be up in arms about this.

Mr. BRUGNON (*France*) (Translation). — It is because we wish to see the Rules of Procedure applied.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Farr.

Mr. FARR (*United Kingdom*). — I was here at 10 o'clock this morning and, Mr. President, I thought that your conduct of affairs was proper and correct. I am a member of Mr. de Montesquiou's Committee but not a signatory of the motion in question. Mr. de Montesquiou was not here. No member of the Committee who signed that motion was present. I believe that we took the right decision this morning in allowing this recommendation to lapse.

Some of us in the United Kingdom do not regard this as an urgent matter. As Mr. de Montesquiou said, this has been on the go for a hundred years and we shall probably be talking about the proposed tunnel for another hundred years. I am not prepared to have Mr. Dequae's important statement on our budget at this time rushed through. What Mr. Dequae has to say this afternoon is of extreme importance and I do not believe that we in this Assembly can be a party to an arrangement which would rush through an important statement by Mr. Dequae just to permit an irregularity to occur.

Sir John RODGERS (*United Kingdom*). — I rise not to debate the rights or wrongs of the Channel Tunnel, but to defend you, Mr. Presi-

dent, from the accusation that you have been an accomplice in breaking the rules of the Assembly in not allowing my friend and colleague, Mr. de Montesquiou, to raise this matter again this afternoon. Rules are made to be observed. This matter was presented to the Assembly as a matter of urgency. The urgency of the matter was such that none of the ten signatories to the request was present when the motion was dealt with this morning. If they like to stay in bed or to be wherever they were this morning rather than to be present in the Assembly, then they must take the view that this is not a matter of urgency. The urgency of the matter has been defeated by their own conduct. It would be a travesty of the rules if we were to take any other course.

I support my colleague Mr. Grieve on Rule 43, which clearly says:

"At the request of the Council, of the Committee concerned, or of ten or more Representatives, a debate may be held on an item which has not been placed on the Agenda."

I want to protest against the attempt to reverse this morning's decision since I believe that decision should be allowed to stand.

Mr. KRIEG (*France*) (Translation). — May I remind my colleagues, Mr. President, that when urgent procedure is requested, provision is made in Rule 43 (2) that the Assembly shall be called upon to decide on the motion for urgent procedure "at the earliest after the first vote included in the Orders of the Day". That means that we could not have discussed it this morning, since the first vote was taken at 12.20 p.m. and since it is only now possible to speak on this question.

Mr. COHEN (*United Kingdom*). — I support the view expressed by Sir John Rodgers and Mr. Farr. The normal procedure from a parliamentary point of view is that members take different political points of view according to their parties, but on this occasion all the United Kingdom Delegates who have been called to express a view have adopted the opinion that the constitution of the Assembly must be obeyed and indeed honoured.

With regard to your decision, Mr. President, this morning and the criticisms that you have been inflexible, I must point out that nobody who was present this morning in the Assembly sought to oppose that decision. I must emphasise

Mr. Cohen (continued)

that when the emergency resolution was called for debate this morning we felt that the movers and supporters should have been here to move the motion. The fact that they were not present leads one to believe that they were not treating the Assembly with courtesy but with a degree of contempt. That, rather than any conduct by the President, amounted to inflexibility. Considering the number of signatories to the motion, what happened this morning was not the proper way in which to treat an important subject which they regarded as an emergency resolution. Therefore, it would be unfair if the matter were to be reintroduced at this late stage — and certainly unfair to you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I wish to make a clarification. I was very surprised that a question of such long standing and consequently of such venerable antecedents should generate so much passion.

A number of expressions have been used on all sides which are not consonant with the importance of the subject. It is true that the subject in itself, viewed in the abstract, raises enormous problems.

As far as I am concerned, I should have liked the debate to begin very speedily. It is a fact that when I called the question this morning, none of the co-signatories presented himself. Observing this vacuum, Mr. de Montesquiou, I can tell you that I deleted the question from the Orders of the Day.

When Mr. Brugnon raised this problem on a point of order — and once again my views are not in doubt — I proposed this procedure, which involves a slight infringement of the Rules of Procedure, as one of conciliation, so as to enable the question nevertheless to come up for discussion.

I admit that, the decision having once been taken, only unanimity could now make possible the renewed inclusion of the matter in the Orders of the Day; unless — and this is a new approach I am making in order to reconcile all the viewpoints expressed — the Assembly should decide by majority to include this question as one of urgency. That shows you to what extent I am ready to violate the Rules of Procedure in order to satisfy the largest number of representatives here present. It is a fact that Sir John Rodgers and Mr. Farr, from the standpoint they adopt towards this problem, are perfectly right :

the issue should be deferred until a forthcoming session. But from the standpoint of WEU's interests, or in other words of grappling with questions that are truly topical — and this is one, since a decision was taken a few days ago — I should like us to be able to revert without delay to this matter at a given moment this afternoon, after the votes on the reports by Mr. Dequae.

Not everybody has appreciated my desire for conciliation. I am therefore obliged to put the motion for urgent procedure to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Urgent procedure is not agreed to.

Ladies and Gentlemen, the Assembly is sovereign; the request for urgent procedure having been rejected, I shall now turn to the next Order of the Day.

I call Mr. de Montesquiou.

Mr. de MONTESQUIOU (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I do not wish to say anything about the decision taken by our colleagues. I do wish to say, however, that I deplore the words used by my colleague, Mr. Cohen, about the Committee over which I have just presided, and I should like this to be recorded in the Minutes of Proceedings. It is unacceptable that such words should be directed against our colleagues, and especially against members of a Committee which deserves respect, if we desire to work for the cause of Europe and WEU.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I do not think that anyone here had ill intentions; I regard all that as over and done with; I pass it over and pass on to the Orders of the Day.

Mr. PRESCOTT (*United Kingdom*). — Will you accept a point of order, Mr. President?

The PRESIDENT. — Yes.

Mr. PRESCOTT (*United Kingdom*). — I should like to seek your advice on your ruling, which must be clearly understood. Is the result of your ruling that the issue can no longer be raised during this part-session, or have you just delayed the matter?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — It would be necessary to table a new motion with a request for urgent procedure.

The question is withdrawn from the Orders of the Day. That is the procedure. I am obliged to

The President (continued)

apply it, since the Assembly has taken its decision.

3. Changes in the membership of Committees

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the nomination of members to Committees.

During the period between sessions the Presidential Committee provisionally appointed members to vacancies caused by changes in the Luxembourg Delegation.

These provisional appointments were published as an appendix to Notice No. 6. They are submitted to the Assembly for ratification in accordance with Rule 8, paragraph 3 of the Rules of Procedure.

The Assembly must also pronounce on new proposals for changes in the membership of Committees submitted by the Delegations of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

These proposals were also published in the same appendix to Notice No. 6.

Are there any objections to the ratification of these appointments ?...

There are none.

The nominations are ratified.

4. Second draft supplementary budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1974

(Doc. 647)

Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1975

(Doc. 648)

Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1973 — The Auditor's Report and Motion to approve the final accounts

(Doc. 645 and Addendum)

(Presentation of and Debate on the Reports of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Votes on the draft texts, Docs. 647, 648 and 645 and Addendum)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and

debate on the reports of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, Documents 647, 648 and 645 and Addendum.

I call Mr. Dequae, Chairman and Rapporteur of the Committee.

Mr. DEQUAE (*Belgium*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, concerning first Document 645 dealing with the accounts for 1973, I shall be brief.

These accounts show a slight surplus of 5,883 francs, which indicates that our budget management is extremely careful. We always try to remain within budgetary limits, but these have become marginal for they account for about 1 % of the budget.

So far as the budget for 1974 is concerned, I should first of all say that, contrary to the usual procedure of drawing up a budget at the end of the year in accordance with the information available at that time, and subsequently drawing up a supplementary budget taking account of changes in salarial and other costs, this time, as a result of the inflation of which we are all aware and which began to get out of hand in 1974, we had to draw up a second supplementary budget, so greatly had the rate of increase taken us by surprise late in the year.

This was not an enormous amount and came to only 130,000 francs. The total budget is therefore increased to 5,030,000 francs if we take into account the corrigendum to Document 647 which provides for a reduction of 10 % in the allocation of credits for experts.

I might have finished at this point if an event affecting the 1975 budget had not occurred at the very last minute, thus obliging me to make a more extensive comment than usual. For since the Committee adopted this report a new factor has emerged which I must report and explain to you.

I have received a letter from Mr. von Plehwe, Acting Secretary-General of WEU, informing me of the Council's decision that certain allocations approved by the Presidential Committee had to be reduced ; in particular, that the allocation of 1,051,000 francs mentioned under Head II of the budget and relating to the expenditure of the Assembly had to be reduced to 950,000 francs and that an allocation of 1,066,000 francs for general administrative costs under Head IV had to be reduced to one million. Finally, an economy of 35,000 francs was imposed by the Council under Head V.

Mr. Dequae (continued)

This letter arrived yesterday morning and therefore no mention of it will be found in the document we have before us.

What can be the explanation of the Council's attitude on the substance of the matter? I think it is an understandable psychological reaction. In all countries efforts are being made to combat inflation and increased expenditure. But where the budget of the Assembly is concerned a special factor is involved. At the request of the Council, the 1975 budget was not drawn up on the same basis as in previous years. The Council instructed us to draw up the budget not in accordance with the information available at the end of the previous year as usual, but taking into account the probable increase in costs during 1975, so that it would not be necessary to ask for supplementary allocations during the year. Highly disciplined as we always are, we complied with this instruction; but I would like those who sit on the Council to glance at the inevitable consequences of this change.

What does it mean in plain language? First, that for the 1975 budget we must take into account not only all the items in the 1974 budget which have shown increases, as was always done, but that we must forecast the likely increase of all the items for 1975. This means that we have to include the rise in salarial and other costs for the two consecutive years during which the inflation of costs and rise in wages and salaries have been highest throughout Europe.

I can understand that anyone who has not followed this problem closely will be shocked to note an increase of 24 %, but this covers two years. I support those who want to attempt to reduce this increase, which is highly spectacular at first sight.

But I think we must try to appreciate the basic explanation. In addition to what I have already mentioned, there is a quite exceptional feature: our meeting next year, the twentieth anniversary session, will be held in Bonn. This is certain to give rise to some additional expenditure. It will probably not be enormous, but any additional expenditure must inevitably have a proportionally greater repercussion on our budget of only five million francs than on those of certain other institutions we know, even European ones.

This, then, may be the explanation of this reaction. But as I have already said, the Committee of which I am Chairman, and the administration, are willing and even determined to achieve the reductions asked of us; I shall refer to this further.

As for form and procedure, I must also say a few words. The Council of Ministers has not conveyed to us any detailed criticism of the expenditure in general or of any particular items. It leaves us in the dark concerning any objections it may have to our programme of work, but it does recommend that we should reduce allocations under three heads, in a global way. In this connection, I would like to convey two thoughts to the Assembly.

Since these reductions do not relate to specific items, it is impossible for me as Chairman of the Committee to convert them into amendments of any kind. You will surely not expect me to reduce the allocation for temporary personnel by over one-third, for you all know that this is the personnel of the Assembly; we have no permanent personnel for our sessions.

So do you want the Assembly to cease functioning?

We must therefore, for this item as a whole which is related to the very functioning of the Assembly, try to release a certain amount. This is the most sensitive point, because it truly affects the functioning of the Assembly as such.

In addition, I would remind the Council that ever since the 1960s there has been a procedure jointly agreed between the Council and the responsible authorities of the Assembly, under which joint meetings are held between the Council and the Assembly at which any amendments by the Council can be reviewed jointly, while the Council assumes the final responsibility for approving the budget of the Assembly. However, this procedure could not come into operation, in this case, since the information of which I have spoken was received only yesterday.

It is reasonable that we should ask for this procedure to be used, so that reductions can be made without actually preventing the Assembly from functioning.

Another point is that it is incompatible with the dignity of a parliamentary assembly to have its budgetary forecasts, duly approved by its committees and governing authorities, called into question by last-minute modifications laid down

Mr. Dequae (continued)

by the executive of the institution. The Assembly alone is competent to define the nature and extent of its activities, although I agree that the Council should insist that everything possible is done to ensure that once a programme has been approved, it is implemented with maximum economy.

It goes without saying that the Assembly is aware of governments' concern for economy. We are all sufficiently aware of our difficulties not to be insensible to those which are common to us all. The Assembly, therefore, shares this concern and is ready to look for ways of reducing the cost of its activities, though without modifying or restricting them. This means that the Assembly must retain absolute liberty to choose the directions in which the restrictions on allocations it has imposed on itself shall be applied.

In conclusion, I can do no more than ask the Assembly to adopt the budget for 1975 as submitted by the Budgetary Committee and the Presidential Committee, it being understood that every effort will be made to achieve the economy of about 200,000 francs desired by governments.

In any case I can assure you that the Chairman, the Committee and the WEU administration will endeavour to find items under which this undoubtedly painful economy can be achieved without interfering with the functioning of the Assembly. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. de Bruyne.

Mr. de BRUYNE (*Belgium*) (Translation). — I know no one will disagree if I say that if a budget were put forward in one of our national parliaments in this way, with changes still being made at the very last moment and with it impossible to have detail on any of the budget sub-heads, it would stand no chance at all. It would be thrown out without a second glance. I think we would do well to follow Mr. Dequae's advice, which is nevertheless to approve the Assembly's budget in the hope that the Committee and the President of the Assembly will do what is necessary, vis-à-vis the Council of Ministers, to make sure that what is happening today can be avoided in the future.

Where the budget is concerned, Mr. President, this parliamentary assembly is in a position of inferiority. We have only an indirect influence

on our own budget. Mr. Dequae pointed out that there was at any rate a procedure that somewhat softens the blow in this respect, since we are able through our contacts with the Council of Ministers to influence our budget to a certain extent. At all events, this is something that must be guaranteed. Since this procedure has been departed from within the last twenty-four hours, I feel that I must begin my speech by making a very strong protest.

Other than that, Mr. President, there is not all that much to say about the budget. For a number of years now the budget of the Assembly of Western European Union has been, quite simply, static and fossilised. There is no better way of judging how things are with an organisation, what it is trying to achieve and how much life there is in it, than to look at that organisation's budget. And here WEU's budgets are a true reflection of Western European Union itself. There is not a single new feature to be found in this budget, because for years no new initiative has been taken within this institution itself and, I am afraid, there are some who do not want to see any further initiative taken. There is no centre of interest, no new target to be seen in the budget. As closely as possible, it repeats what was shown in last year's budget. We have, with a great deal of difficulty, been successful in seeing that this time at least there is an increase to match the cost of living. This could not be otherwise, for if this minimum measure, which has social consequences, were not taken, the continued existence of this Assembly would at once be at risk. For the rest, I think we can only examine and approve the budget with resignation and without any great hope for the future. If we do not approve the budget, we shall be creating a situation that will make it plainer than ever that we have lost out.

When I went through this budget I thought of a poet from Mr. Dequae's part of the world, Guido Gezelle, who wrote a poem called *Het kindeke van de dood*, the Child of Death. In this poem there is a line that is particularly applicable to our Assembly; it runs "those there are that go through life with scarce a crumb of bread".

There are assemblies, Ladies and Gentlemen, which have to manage with a tiny budget that brings them, one might say, close to death's door. There are budgets that are set up in such a way that an assembly like ours, which has an international rôle to play, while it admittedly

Mr. de Bruyne (continued)

does not cease to exist in the legal sense, nevertheless — because its budget is so meagre — no longer remains alive. I ask you to wonder whether such an impossible state of affairs can continue in the longer term.

I would like if I may, Mr. President, to ask Mr. Dequae one or two questions about budgetary method. I have noted that it is normal practice in this Assembly to be able to shift credits within a budget head, and that it is even possible to transfer credits from one head to another. I am not going to discuss this technique here. It might be said — and if this sounds at all disdainful I really do not mean it to be — that this really is not worth the bother. The amounts involved are, indeed, very modest ones. But what I do ask is whether it is sound budgetary technique that the executive should be given the choice of altering certain items within the budget.

In the history of our national parliaments and of national budgets this is something that has been fought about very hard. The traditional liberal parliaments of the nineteenth century made it an article of faith that this kind of shifting of funds and making changes in the distribution of funds between the various budget heads to suit the views of the executive power should not be allowed. Are we not taking a risk when we go about things this way and when, in this respect, we no longer defend the stand taken by the classic parliaments of the past?

There is another question I want to ask, though Mr. Dequae may not have the information he needs to be able to answer it. If so, perhaps he can let me have a written answer later on. This institution of ours has a provident fund which is invested in a variety of currencies. In our budget documents it is shown in French francs, which act as a kind of accounting currency. At one particular place mention is made of the various currencies in which the provident fund investment monies are held. We are not told however — and this brings me to my question — what part of the provident fund is invested in which currency. If I may quote from the text referring to this, in Document 645, paragraph 6 :

“The Secretary-General has received advice from the advisory panel set up within WEU and from outside bankers on the investment

of the funds. These are at present held in United States dollars, French francs, pounds sterling, Dutch guilders, Deutschmarks and Swiss francs...”

What I would like to ask is how much of the fund is in these various currencies. It is further stated that these investments have been made through the International Westminster Bank Limited in London. To quote again from the same paragraph :

“The dollar holdings contract runs until 22nd September 1974, while the other contracts expire on 25th July 1974.”

Has this contract with this London bank been renewed? The dates mentioned are now past, and I assume that the necessary steps have already been taken.

My final question is about the reason for entrusting these provident fund investments to the Westminster Bank. Had we previously called on the co-operation of other banks? And are we prepared in the future to ask other banking houses for their advice?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Ahrens.

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, as a member of the Budget Committee I would not have asked for the floor here if it were only a matter of accepting the reports submitted by Mr. Dequae and of accepting the budget. I can assure you that the Budget Committee, which I have been a member of for some years, always take great pains in considering the budget. I would like to emphasise that particularly in view of the fact that this budget is really a matter of ridiculously small amounts compared with the budgets which we have to justify and vote in our own parliaments. Mr. Dequae has already explained the reasons why the considerable increases were almost obligatory, and I would only add that in our budget a disproportionately large share consists of staffing costs, costs which — as we know from our own parliaments — have the unpleasant characteristic of rising constantly and by the greatest amount.

In spite of all this careful and thorough scrutiny, we now have the objection from the Council of Ministers. I share Mr. de Bruyne's view that such a procedure would be inconceivable in our countries, or would at least mean a major constitutional conflict. I believe, Mr.

Mr. Ahrens (continued)

President, that the Council of Ministers should be told that this is not a procedure to follow when dealing with a parliamentary assembly which has also, after all, thought hard before submitting its proposals and texts.

The question now is what is to be done. It would probably be wrong to do what I would at first be inclined to do in this situation, and reject the budget, because then we would not know how we are going to meet our expenses after 1st January. In my view therefore, Mr. President, we must vote this budget. But I think it should be added — and it should be recorded in the text we vote — that the reductions will be decided on item by item by the Budget Committee at the beginning of the year at a special meeting which we would have to convene for the purpose; for it is only then, if we retain control and keep the power of decision over what and how much is to be reduced, that we can, as I see it, justify acceptance today in these circumstances. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Chairman of the Committee, Mr. Dequae.

Mr. DEQUAE (*Belgium*) (Translation). — I should like to reply briefly to the questions asked by Mr. de Bruyne.

(The speaker continued in Dutch)

In reply to Mr. de Bruyne's first question, I would comment that the Committee is empowered to make transfers from one budget head to another, in order to prevent too many changes having to be made in the budget during the course of the financial year. What is involved, therefore, is an extra measure of flexibility. It is not the executive arm, that is to say the Council of Ministers, that makes the decisions on this: it is done at the proposal of the Committee, so the decisions as such are taken by the parliamentary Committee of WEU. I believe that this flexibility we are permitted is a sound procedure, and we have in the past been grateful to the Council for it. The procedure allows these adjustments to be made a good deal more conveniently, without a lot of administrative and parliamentary difficulties, and without a lot of expensive documents. When it comes down to it, it is always a matter of very marginal and very small amounts. In these circumstances, this procedure can surely be described as a satisfactory way of dealing with the problem.

Mr. de Bruyne's second question was about the provident fund, which strictly speaking lies outside the scope of this budget. I will make the point that the fund covers not only the staff of the Assembly but of WEU as a whole. This is something that needs to be looked at in the light of the more fundamental issue of the future of the WEU staff. We know that this matter is at the present time being given very thorough study, which has not so far brought any solution. This is an area that is being watched over particularly by our friend Lord Selsdon and on which we have already had a report in London, dealing with both the development and the investment of the provident fund and the solution we hope to arrive at for the future. Details about this will in due time be found in Lord Selsdon's reports. I can see no objection to the secretariat giving the answers to Mr. de Bruyne's factual questions, and the same applies to the third matter he raised, that is to say why the money is invested with the Westminster Bank and whether advice was sought from other banks. Mr. de Bruyne will be sent a written answer. I can say now that these arrangements were made by the administration several years ago, and that a change of bank was made at one point. The only reason for this seems to have been that from the investment viewpoint a higher yield could be got from this other bank. We shall give Mr. de Bruyne the fullest possible information about the history of the investments, including details of where they have been placed. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The debate is closed.

The Assembly will vote successively on the second draft supplementary budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1974 contained in Document 647, the draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1975 contained in Document 648, the motion to approve the final accounts of the Asssembly for the financial year 1973 contained in the addendum to Document 645.

No amendment has been tabled to the second draft supplementary budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1974.

The vote on the whole draft supplementary budget would be by roll-call if the Assembly were not unanimous.

The President (continued)

Are there any objections to the second draft supplementary budget for 1974 contained in Document 647 ?...

Are there any abstentions ?...

The Assembly is unanimous.

The second draft supplementary budget is adopted unanimously.

No amendment has been tabled to the draft budget of the Assembly for 1975.

The vote on the draft budget as a whole would be by roll-call if the Assembly were not unanimous.

Are there any objections to the draft budget ?...

Are there any abstentions ?...

The Assembly is unanimous.

The draft budget is adopted unanimously.

No amendment has been tabled to the motion to approve the final accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1973 contained in the addendum to Document 645.

Are there any objections to the adoption of the motion ?...

Are there any abstentions ?...

The Assembly is unanimous.

The motion is adopted unanimously.

Following the unanimous votes that you have just cast, I must first of all pay tribute to the very conscientious and efficient work performed by Mr. Dequae as Chairman.

I would place on record the fact that although our staff, Assembly and Bureau, being highly conscious of the period of austerity into which we are, alas, about to enter, accept overall savings of approximately 4 % on the increases provided for in this draft budget, which — like all budgets — is only an estimate, and although it is true, once again, that every necessary effort will be exerted and every essential constraint agreed

to, it will, in contrast, be practically impossible to accept the imperative demands of the Council, presented head by head — which is incidentally not a good method of budgetary management.

At the moment when the Assembly has unanimously adopted the document presented by Mr. Dequae, I wanted to make a point of expressing this, as it were, preliminary reservation, in order to ensure that there are no objections *a posteriori* when the final accounts of the Assembly are presented.

There can be no doubt that we are going to experience a difficult year. Naturally we shall comply with the guidance given us by the Committee. We shall try to act for the best ; and I am, moreover, convinced that the best will be perfectly appropriate ; but, once again, in the application of the budget some departures from the set path will inevitably occur, and in the final analysis the results will depend upon the good administrative management to which we shall subject ourselves.

5. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting tomorrow morning, Wednesday 4th December, at 10 a.m. with the following Orders of the Day :

European security and the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments ; Address by Mr. Destremau, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of France, Document 651 and Amendments).

Are there any objections ?...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak ?...

The Sitting is closed.

(The Sitting was closed at 4.10 p.m.)

EIGHTH SITTING

Wednesday, 4th December 1974

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.

2. Attendance Register.

3. European security and the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments; Address by Mr. Destremau, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of France, Doc. 651 and Amendments*).

Speakers: The President, Mr. Critchley (*Chairman and Rapporteur*), Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Wall, Mr. Krieg,

Mr. Roper, Mr. Mattick, Dr. Mabon, Mr. Müller, Mr. Waltmans, Mr. Cernolacce, Mr. Destremau (*Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of France*).

Replies by Mr. Destremau to questions put by: Mr. Leynen, Mr. Sieglerschmidt, Mr. de Niet.

Speakers: Mr. Inan (*Observer from Turkey*), His Excellency Ambassador Touloupas (*Observer from Greece*).

4. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

The Sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The Sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the two previous Sittings have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The Minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings¹.

3. European security and the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments; Address by Mr. Destremau, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of France, Doc. 651 and Amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of the

report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on European security and the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean, Document 651 and amendments.

I call Mr. Critchley, Chairman and Rapporteur of the Committee.

Mr. CRITCHLEY (*United Kingdom*). — It is good for the character to have to make the first speech in a debate. It is also good for the level of one's blood sugar to have to concentrate on important matters so early in the morning.

I begin what I promise will be short introductory remarks by administering the most civilised of rebukes to the members of the Council, who so loyally get here on time for every debate — namely, that it is such a long time before we ever get any replies out of them to our recommendations. For example, the reply to Recommendation 254, which was adopted by the Assembly in June, did not arrive here before 14th November. Thus, the reply was far too late to be included in the document which we are now debating.

The point I should like to make is that, eagerly awaiting an answer, as we shall be, to any recommendation which the Assembly may adopt this morning, we need a reply by the second week of April 1975 by the very latest if it is to be incorporated in what I hope will be another report.

My theme will be "least said, soonest mended". I very much hope that this theme will be adopted

1. See page 20.

Mr. Critchley (continued)

by all speakers who feel that they have to participate in debate on the problems of Cyprus and their eventual solution and on the problems of security in the Eastern Mediterranean. This may be a forlorn hope, but it will be the theme of my introductory remarks.

The allies have watched with dismay the course of events since July. In the clash of legitimate interests and the clash of rival nationalisms in the Eastern Mediterranean, our desire all along has been to rescue the coherence of the Alliance, to avoid at almost any cost the outbreak of war between Greece and Turkey and to find an acceptable settlement to the human problems of Cyprus within the context of the friends of Greece and the friends of Turkey. It has been these three things which have determined the response of the allies to the events in the Eastern Mediterranean since July.

It is perhaps a little ironic for an Englishman to offer any sort of advice or solution in respect of a problem of acute nationalism and conflict of interest when, for seven hundred years, the English have failed to solve the problem of Irish nationalism. But politicians are, if nothing else, optimistic and always eager to intervene with good advice in the affairs of others.

What the report is, and what it is not, is something which I hope will be understood by the Assembly as a whole. The report is not an apology for one side or the other. It makes no attempt whatever to allocate blame between one side or the other or indeed on to one, or a second or even a third, of the NATO Alliance partners. It does not even spell out in detail ways in which a settlement on the island of Cyprus might eventually be achieved except in the most wide terms. It does not go in for solutions for Cyprus itself.

What the report is about and what it hopes to achieve is to highlight for the Assembly the effect upon European security of the events in Cyprus since 15th July. It is a report about the security of Europe and therefore the security of Greece and of other countries in the Eastern Mediterranean. But the focus of the report is European security. It does not allocate blame; it does not even seek out or suggest solutions to this very important problem.

We have not grown so accustomed to bad news that we are unable to welcome some good news when we see it. The good news to which I refer

is the return of Greece to freedom and to democracy. That is very good news indeed. We welcome to this Assembly the first visit of an observer from Greece just as we welcome the observer from Turkey.

I should like to look quickly at the security arguments and to highlight some of the issues which will be at stake were negotiations eventually to begin between NATO and Greece following the Greek decision to withdraw from the military organisation of the NATO Alliance. Were negotiations to begin between the new Greek Government and NATO, the heads of negotiation would include, in particular, early warning systems — NADGE — which are in operation and some of which are still being constructed in Greece, which is a very important matter for discussion; the operation of maritime aircraft on patrol; and the problem of communication links between SHAPE and Istanbul which at the moment run directly through Greek territory.

These would be some of the heads of negotiations between NATO and Greece, but any negotiations that were then to begin would be very much complicated by the fact that multilateral negotiations between Greece and NATO would be only one part of the problem, for the relationship between the United States and Greece would presumably also come under negotiation, and there is another series of important commitments between the United States and Greece which would have to come up for resolution. The stockpiling of small nuclear weapons under American ownership in Greece would be one of the most important matters to be discussed, and the facilities for the United States Sixth Fleet in Greek ports; Suva Bay and all the facilities in Crete; and over-flying rights. At the moment NATO has to request the permission of Greece in order to over-fly Greek territory. This permission has not been refused but none the less this is a matter which will have to be negotiated eventually between Greece and ourselves.

My final point on relationships between Greece and NATO is that it is unrealistic to compare what the Greeks might like to achieve with what France has already succeeded in doing, for there is not a fair parallel between the Greek position and the French position. It is true at the moment that the Greeks are still sending officers to the military staff of all the NATO headquarters save the one in Izmir, and that they still belong to many if not all of the important NATO committees. But France has not a frontier with any Warsaw Pact country, whereas the Greeks have

Mr. Critchley (continued)

a frontier with Bulgaria, and less than thirty kilometres separate that frontier from the Aegean Sea. The military organisation itself would speed the response of any allied power in coming to the aid of Greece were Greece attacked by a country of the Warsaw Pact, which would make it more difficult were Greece to be out of the military organisation and relying solely upon Article 5 of the NATO Treaty. France is a great power, self-sufficient in conventional and nuclear weapons, able to pose a threat of her own and able to mount her own defence against a Soviet attack. None of these things is true of Greece, and there is no doubt, especially when one looks at the amount of money that is spent on behalf of NATO for infrastructure within Greece itself, that 8 % of the money is met by Greece for infrastructure and the rest is met by NATO, but the chief victim of any Greek withdrawal from the military side of the Alliance would, I suspect, be Greece herself, because her defence, from whatever quarters, depends very largely indeed upon the contributions of her friends elsewhere.

May I finally draw the Assembly's attention to our recommendations. These recommendations, if passed, will be the focus of our work in this report. Firstly, we wish to "ensure that the good offices of NATO and of the members of the European Community continue to be available to all parties in order to secure a general settlement of the Cyprus problem through negotiations between the two communities".

The second recommendation is to "impress upon all parties to the conflict the manifold advantages which active membership of NATO bestows on each and every member".

The third recommendation is to "recognise the importance of a continued British military presence in the sovereign base areas". I do not believe that that has been changed in essence by the publication of the Labour Government's White Paper. I suspect that a number of amendments will be put forward on that particular point but I think they are amendments which I would be happy to accept.

The fourth recommendation is to "foster the association of Greece and Turkey with the European Community".

The fifth is to "request member governments to arrange for their Ministries of Defence to

assist in the provision of humanitarian aid for the 200,000 refugees on Cyprus through rapid deliveries from reserve defence stocks to ensure the survival of the refugees through the winter".

These are, I submit, moderate, sensible and constructive recommendations which, if adopted by this Assembly, will go a long way to defuse a very difficult situation and may even do something to achieve a settlement of the Cyprus problem, which is the sincere desire of the friends of Greece — and there are very many — and the friends of the Turks — and there are very many of those too — and the friends of both communities on the island of Cyprus who have a greater interest than anyone else in a settlement that will enable them to live in peace. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — In the debate, I call Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). — I have been very impressed by the report given by my colleague, and I hope that today we shall be able to get a virtually unanimous recommendation for its adoption, and that it will be adopted without amendment. I have not myself found any cause for seeking to improve or vary it.

This morning, speaking for my country, I speak in the immediate shadow of having read only a few minutes ago of the changes in our defence capacity announced yesterday by Her Majesty's Government. It would have been my wish to say something about this, but I do not believe that it is possible to give a considered comment in view of the short time since the announcements were made. All one can say from a very quick scrutiny is that it looks as though the highest priority — within the cuts, which I deplore — is for our remaining defence forces in NATO, which we are discussing today. That is at least one source of relief.

Although it is not directly mentioned in the report, I feel that we cannot in our thinking avoid the dangerous situation not only in Cyprus but more generally in the Middle East and Eastern Europe, that is, the Israeli-Arab conflict. As I have said, I am quite happy with the report as it stands, but I think for a debate of this sort it would be folly not to take into account that a much more menacing situation exists in the Eastern Mediterranean than exists even in the difficult situation of Cyprus.

Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)

One plea one would make is that Europe generally should have a greater awareness and try to play a greater part in attempting to resolve the situation in that part of the world. I am not one who detracts for a moment from the efforts of the United States or those of Dr. Kissinger, but probably through no fault of his own or anyone else in the United States the negotiations for a settlement are proceeding dangerously slowly. It is all very well to talk about "cautiously step by step". The two parties to the dispute there are not necessarily prepared to go along cautiously step by step if the months grow into years.

Where I think the most dangerous situation lies is that for the first time the Arabs really believe that they could get a decisive victory over the Israelis. It is not for me to decide whether this is a correct assessment or not, but there is certainly a different mood in the Arab world today from what there has been up to the present time.

There is another factor in this context, namely, that I do not myself believe that the Soviet Union which is a country of immense pride as well as power would be prepared again to see the Arab world decisively defeated by Israel. There comes a point at which the United States would find it intolerable that those she is supporting are going once more to be routed.

Therefore, there are two sets of danger, first, that the Arabs would win and a fate would engulf Israel which would cause another conflict, because it is unthinkable that in the last resort the United States would not go to the defence of a beleaguered Israel. On the other hand, one has the fact that if the Arab world is starting to lose, I do not believe that the Soviet Union would stand idly by and see its allies and its associates defeated decisively yet again. Apart from anything else, it would then be almost impossible for the Soviet Union ever to be once again a credible backer of any cause that she might find throughout the world.

The few months ahead are about the most dangerous unless by then all of us have managed to make some arrangements which enable Israel to make the territorial concessions she will have to make if she is to have an enduring peace. The only way we will ever be able to persuade her to do that is to give her a more built-in sense of security than any of us have been able to

conjure up in the past. Those two things must go together.

Finally, I want to say a word about Cyprus. Here, too, without entering into the controversy, one must not be too pussy-footed either. When we talk about negotiations succeeding, it is a fact that at the moment there are elements on the Greek side that really believe it is possible by one method or another to go back to the situation that existed up to the recent war there. That is totally impossible and unthinkable. It is very dangerous for such beliefs to continue when they are unrealisable. They are unrealisable for one very good reason. First, the whole balance of power there has changed. Secondly, in any event it is not a matter of going back to the old constitution because the old constitution in fact was never put into practice, as no one denies. Thus there will have to be an understanding on the Greek Cypriot side that there can be no going back to a situation that existed before, firstly because the power basis altered and secondly because in any event that constitution never provided in fact as opposed to theory the minority rights it was supposed to endorse. Secondly, Turkey for her part also has to appreciate that although she may presently be in a situation where she has a very powerful rôle to play in the island which cannot easily be thwarted, or indeed thwarted at all, she ought to look to the future and realise that she has also large enemies or potential enemies on her borders and that this is a world in which one wants to have all the friends that one can.

I sum up, therefore, by saying it is not enough just to make pious aspirations about "do let the sides talk rather than fight together". Both sides I am afraid, however much we negotiate and however much we help them to negotiate, will have to adopt different stances from those which they are adopting today if there is to be any chance of success. Of the two partners, it is in the last — and indeed in the first — resort primarily the Greek Cypriots, hopefully under the continued leadership of Mr. Clerides, who will have to go along to some extent to try to accept the realities of some kind of federation within the island. That, as far as I can see, is the basic minimum of what we can hope will be achieved. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Wall.

Mr. WALL (*United Kingdom*). — I wish to speak briefly on two issues, first, the problem

Mr. Wall (continued)

of Cyprus which was so ably covered by Mr. Critchley in his very comprehensive and balanced report ; and secondly, to try to put Cyprus in the context of the problems that face the whole world today.

In my view there are three basic problems regarding the island, first, the humanitarian problem of the refugees, secondly, the strategic importance of the island and thirdly, the unfortunate enmity between our two European and NATO partners, Greece and Turkey.

The humanitarian aspects are referred to in paragraph 46 of the report. The fact that there are still 200,000 refugees in the island is a matter we must do something about. It emphasises I think the importance of the sovereign base areas in the island where many of these refugees are still finding shelter. It emphasises the mix-up between the humanitarian aspect of the problem and the political aspects because I know my own government have had difficulties in knowing what to do with these refugees. One country wants the Turkish refugees repatriated to Turkey. For political reasons this is not easy to do, so the poor people still remain there. This is a matter that must be solved as soon as possible as the winter is upon us here in Paris and also upon Cyprus.

The second problem concerns the strategic position of the island which allows the USSR to use this problem as a lever against the West. First, as the report shows, the USSR took an anti-Greek line. Then it rather switched to an anti-Turkish line which was basically an anti-NATO line, trying to make out that NATO was directly involved with Cyprus which of course it was not. Why? Because, of course, Cyprus is the flank of NATO. It is very close to the Dardanelles and the important air base of Akrotiri, the British base from which forces committed to NATO and CENTO operate and it is, of course, on the flank of the Middle East.

The third problem concerns the tension between our two friends and allies in Greece and Turkey. I follow Mr. Critchley in congratulating the Greeks on their return to democracy.

I hoped the new government would have condemned the colonels and written off the problem of Cyprus as due to the action of the colonels which undoubtedly it was, but unfortunately Greek pride has become involved, which will make the problem even more difficult to solve.

As to Turkey, I think we in this Assembly must note that on two occasions Turkey has refrained from actively intervening in Cyprus, which many people believe should have been entitled to happen under the treaty of guarantee. On the third occasion she took positive action and it would be difficult to condemn her for so doing.

So much about the background. What is the present need? I am sure that I will carry all those present with me when I suggest that the first need is to settle local issues and that can be done only by a continuation of the talks between the two communities on the island ; in other words, those talks that have started or will continue between Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktash which will eventually perhaps allow for some form of political solution, perhaps some federal solution for the future of the island. But I feel that the return of Archbishop Makarios, who undoubtedly still is President of Cyprus, could endanger those talks. One must recognise that in Turkish eyes Archbishop Makarios has been mainly responsible for the repression — that may sound too strong a word but I think that I can use it because there has been repression over the past ten years. Mr. Denktash and Mr. Clerides have managed to make progress, but I very much fear that the return of the Archbishop may impede that progress and may prevent a rapid solution of this most important problem.

I want now to turn to the question of the importance of the island as it affects us in Europe, and beyond the actual humanitarian and political problems on the island itself. We are now in a position, as we must all recognise, that we have a stalemate in Central Europe, so that there is an increased exploitation of the flanks, and the flanks of Europe or of NATO are Iceland, Portugal, Greece and Turkey. That is why this island is more important than the problems of the island itself.

Greece and Turkey control the Dardanelles and this is referred to in the report in relation to the Montreux Convention and the construction of the aircraft carrier "Kiev" and her sister ship in the Black Sea. The immediate problem we will have to solve is whether she has the right to pass through the Dardanelles as she will undoubtedly want to do in the near future. This is spoken of in paragraph 36 of the report, though perhaps somewhat skirted over by the reply of the Council to Recommendation 254.

Mr. Wall (continued)

This is a vitally important area because it is a flank of NATO, of Europe and of the Middle East, and everyone in Europe today knows the importance and the dependence of Europe on the Middle East for oil which will last at least for perhaps the next fifteen years. I therefore hope that the nations represented in this Assembly, nations with centuries of maritime history, will appreciate that the importance of the Middle East and of the problem of oil is a problem of sea communications. The problem of oil can be dealt with in relation to two matters — the problem first of the source; any attempt to affect the source by either East or West would, I fear, lead to dangers of World War III. There is the second problem about which I have spoken in this Assembly before — the problem of supplies of oil — the problem of sea communications from the Middle East to Western Europe. This is where sea communications become an important problem which we are to discuss in a day or two when we deal with Sir John Rodgers' most important paper on energy. The problem of the source could, as I have suggested, result in World War III. The problem of sea communications could be equally dangerous to the West as its dangers are not so obvious. The problem of the flanks is today the problem of Iceland, Portugal and Turkey which, I suggest, we neglect at our peril. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Krieg.

Mr. KRIEG (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, before turning to Mr. Critchley's report, I should like to say that when I presented my own report yesterday and spoke of the risk that the defence budgets of the different member countries of WEU might be the first victims of the present situation, I did not think that I should have such a speedy rejoinder from the British Government as what I read in my newspaper this morning!

With regard to Mr. Critchley's report, I found it excellent, and I want to say at once that the remarks I am going to make are in no sense critical. I shall confine myself to presenting and defending in advance two amendments which, as I want to make clear at the outset, do not detract in any way from the actual substance of the report.

The first amendment concerns paragraph 4 of the recommendation, which calls upon the Coun-

cil to "foster the association of Greece and Turkey with the European Community".

Frankly, I find it difficult to understand this paragraph, and I say this for the good reason that, as far as I am aware, Greece and Turkey have already been associate members of the European Community for a long time past.

What is the issue?

What are we to give these countries?

It is true that as far as Greece is concerned, the European Community decided to freeze the functioning of associate membership during the period when that country was unfortunately enduring a dictatorial régime, the so-called régime of the colonels. But here we are talking of a past which is over and done with; and it seems to me that Greece's resumption of associate member status involves no problem.

Turkey, for its part, has never ceased to be an associate member of EEC.

Nevertheless, I recall that during the summer of 1974 — and I mentioned this in an earlier report — the then Minister for Foreign Affairs of Greece, Mr. Mavros, visited a number of European capitals with the request that Greece might be allowed to join the European Community. It was at that point no longer a question of association, but of actual accession. As matters stand, everything seems to point to the fact that full and complete accession to the machinery of the Common Market as a whole might confront Greece with a number of problems of an economic character, and it is difficult to envisage how those problems could find an immediate solution in the present state of affairs.

It is obvious that this country does not yet enjoy a degree of industrial development comparable with that existing in the majority of the other member countries of the European Economic Community, and everything points to the fact that its full and complete accession can only be achieved in progressive stages. Nevertheless, the case of Greece does not seem to me to differ very greatly from that of Ireland, which has in fact become a full member of the Common Market. The essential problem, however, is that of the participation of Greece in political consultations among the members of the European Community and, when the time comes, its participation in European union. It seems to me that there is nothing to prevent the opening in the near future of negotiations on the accession

Mr. Krieg (continued)

of Greece to the European Community, but leaving to that country a sufficiently long interval to enable its economy to adapt itself progressively to the new trends which its membership of the Common Market would imply.

In the case of Turkey, the government of that country has not hitherto, so far as I am aware, made any approaches similar to those undertaken by the Greek Government. It is for that reason that my amendment does not mention Turkey. It goes without saying, however, that if a request for accession should be made by Turkey, it would be necessary to consider the case with the greatest care.

My second amendment concerns both the fifth paragraph of the preamble and paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation itself.

Here, the issue is the continued British presence in the sovereign bases on the island of Cyprus. This is a problem of which I was conscious from the moment when the crisis broke and on 25th July last I addressed a written question to the Council about the guarantees which the members of WEU intended to give to the British Government as regards its policy in Cyprus.

The reply of the Council was communicated to the Assembly very recently, on 28th October last, and it throws an interesting light on the positions on which our seven countries — with the United Kingdom thus among them — were able to reach agreement. This reply points out *inter alia* that the London and Zurich agreements will not necessarily constitute the basis for the ultimate settlement which will have to be reached in the island. Now, these agreements at present constitute the legal basis for the maintenance of British bases in Cyprus. The question that arises for the future is, therefore, whether Europe should press for the agreements that will certainly have to be concluded on Cyprus to provide for continued British sovereignty over the bases.

Secondly, although Mr. Critchley's recommendation states that the continued presence of British forces in the sovereign bases contributes to the defence of Europe — and the following are not my own words, for I am quoting the reply of the Council of Ministers to my question — that reply stresses that the six other members of WEU are in no way legally committed by the

guarantee given by the United Kingdom to the Cyprus Constitution. It goes on to say that in the hypothetical case in which the United Kingdom might find itself engaged in an armed conflict as a result of the application of the 1960 treaty of guarantee, the possible application of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty should be examined — and here I quote the text verbatim — “in the light of the precise circumstances in which such a situation arose”. In other words, the Council, of which the British Government is a member, considers that the question of the military presence of the United Kingdom in Cyprus constitutes a matter of purely British concern and that the United Kingdom's partners in WEU are not directly concerned with that presence.

The recommendation proposed by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments therefore asks the Council to reconsider the position it had adopted last October.

Is this reasonable? Is it desirable?

We may well wonder. The events of last summer showed that the existence of British bases in no way prevented a clash between Greece and Turkey, even though, once the crisis had exploded, these bases were able to help in evacuating foreign tourists from the island and in protecting the inevitable refugees.

To the extent that Greece and Turkey are members of the Atlantic Alliance, it is really difficult to see why the application of a defence system based on that Alliance should make it necessary for a third country to maintain, as a permanent commitment, bases on this island, especially in the event, which today seems fairly probable if not indeed virtually certain, that the new agreements to be concluded should give Greece and Turkey sovereignty over Cyprus.

We are entitled to ask ourselves whether there are first-class and second-class members within the Atlantic Alliance? I dare not think that this is so. Is it really important for the defence of Europe that one member country of the Atlantic Alliance rather than another, likewise a member of that Alliance, should maintain under its sovereignty portions of territories its rights over which are based on agreements which our seven governments now regard as having been overtaken by events?

Is it not rather by giving Greece — and Turkey, too, if it asks for it — an opportunity to concert its activities as closely as possible

Mr. Krieg (continued)

with other countries of Western Europe in the framework of the European Community or, if appropriate, of WEU, that we shall be able to ensure that Western Europe maintains its positions in the Eastern Mediterranean ?

On the contrary the maintenance of foreign military bases in Cyprus can be viewed as the survival of a system inherited from colonialism. Far from rendering a settlement of the conflict between Greece and Turkey easier, it contributes in the last resort to the imposition of an additional lien on the fate of Cyprus and it renders the opening and pursuit of negotiations, which our seven governments deem to be essential more complicated. The reply of the Council to Written Question 148 seems to indicate that the British Government, like the six other governments in WEU, is not disposed to link the problem of British sovereignty over these bases with the whole complex of questions relating to European defence. For that reason, I consider it pointless to urge the Council to go back on an attitude which seems to me an extremely wise one. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Roper.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I begin, as others began, by congratulating the Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, who is indeed our Rapporteur on this occasion — Mr. Critchley — on having prepared a report so quickly and so topically on this important subject and thereby enabling the Assembly to have this discussion this morning. It would have been a tragedy if we had left without having a debate on the mixture of problems occurring in the Eastern Mediterranean which have such implications for the peace of Europe as a whole.

I apologise, Mr. President, for having complicated your task and that of the Clerk this morning by having had to table a number of amendments. Although I will not be formally moving them at this time, it might be helpful if at this stage I indicate, as Mr. Krieg indicated in his intervention, the general reasons for these amendments.

As a member of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments I apologise for having had to table amendments in the Assembly. We should, of course, have been able to resolve those

matters in our own Committee, and the reason that I must plead on this occasion is the pressure of time in the preparation of this report and, indeed, also some of the complications that the interruption in postal traffic which has occurred in recent weeks has brought about. Indeed, sometimes second thoughts are wiser thoughts.

In particular, when we come to the question of the United Nations satellite and the Montreux Convention, our Committee was, as Mr. Critchley indicated, considerably handicapped because we had not had the opportunity when we were considering the draft recommendation to consider the reply from the Council of Ministers. My amendment to paragraph 6 of the preamble is one which is intended at least as a probing amendment to take account of the points which are made in the reply from the Council of Ministers.

However, in view of the references which have been made already by two of my colleagues, and indeed by Mr. Krieg, to the cuts in British defence expenditure, and because this will have some relevance to the debate on the Eastern Mediterranean, and indeed also to much of our discussion, I think it is important that I should just say a few words about one of the clear statements which were made by Mr. Mason in the defence review which he completed yesterday. Mr. Mason said :

“NATO is the linchpin of British security and will remain the first charge on the resources available for defence. We therefore propose to concentrate as a first priority upon those areas in which we believe that we can most effectively contribute to the security of the Alliance and of the United Kingdom itself. These consist of our contributions of land and air forces in the central region of Europe ; of sea and air forces to the Eastern Atlantic and Channel areas ; and in the defence of the United Kingdom and its immediate approaches.”

It was interesting that in that context Mr. Mason later made it quite clear that he did not propose, in advance of any success in the negotiations for mutual and balanced force reductions,

“to reduce the forces which we maintain in Germany in accordance with our Brussels Treaty obligations.”

Mr. Roper (continued)

This Assembly, with its close links with the Brussels Treaty, will no doubt be pleased that Mr. Mason made that very clear in the defence review which he announced yesterday.

Because Mr. Mason and the government have decided to maintain a clear commitment to the central region, we have had to re-examine our commitments outside the Alliance. One of those to which reference has been made already by Mr. Wall was our declaration in respect of certain aircraft using Cyprus in relation to CENTO.

Although the section of the defence review dealing with Cyprus is perhaps more opaque than the rest of the review — not altogether surprisingly in view of the troubled situation in that island — my reading of the statement indicates that the forces which have been declared to CENTO in the past and based in Cyprus will cease to be so declared and will, I suspect, be withdrawn from Cyprus.

There is within the defence review a clear reference to the situation in Cyprus. Perhaps it is not appropriate at this stage to deal with the other commitments which we have at this time in Cyprus. We may know more as the situation develops.

Many of the amendments are minor and are intended to be helpful. Therefore, I hope that they can be accepted by the Rapporteur.

The first amendment, No. 3, suggests that any solution does not only depend on the improved relations between Greece and Turkey, but also on improved relations between the two communities in the island. But perhaps the most important amendment is No. 4 which seeks to delete the sixth paragraph of the preamble. That is the paragraph in which we reiterate two of our earlier recommendations, one referring to the creation of a United Nations observation satellite capacity and the other asking for the "correct application" of the Montreux Convention. I suggest that in view of the reply which we received only recently from the Council to Recommendation 254, the Assembly might wish to consider whether it is appropriate for us today to reiterate those recommendations until we have had a chance to discuss and consider the matter at rather greater length in terms of the Council's reply.

On the question of the United Nations observer satellite capability, I welcome the idea that the

Secretary-General and the Security Council should have access to accurate information from observation satellites to enable them to come to decisions. Very often when the Security Council meets in the middle of the night it has only limited, perhaps partial, perhaps biased, information from the two sides on the ground. The Secretary-General could appear and say: "Here is a photograph showing aircraft in the most recent past flying over the area". If such photographs were taken from an observation satellite it could help the Security Council to reach a satisfactory resolution of its problems. But it does not seem practical to envisage satellites wearing blue berets circling the globe. I am afraid that the present United Nations machine is unlikely to have its own satellites.

I suggest that if we were to remove this paragraph and to study both the reply of the Council and other possibilities, it might be more appropriate for us to come forward at a later stage with the suggestion that the United Nations should have access to the information which comes from the observation satellites of the two super powers — not the United Nations' own satellites, but a terminal in New York to which the Secretary-General could be authorised to have access to obtain photographs from observation satellites which are circling the world on behalf of the two super powers. That would be a more practical way of providing the Secretary-General with information which is clearly of value to him and to the Security Council in coming to its decisions.

The second part of paragraph 6 reiterates the view which we stated earlier on the interpretation and application of the Montreux Convention. We would be here for the rest of the day if we were to become involved in the legal intricacies of the Montreux Convention. Each time I study it I discover more problems if not ambiguities. It is interesting that the Council in its reply to us on the correct application states that it shares the view that complicated legal issues are involved in the interpretation of the convention to which nine States in all are party, though many of them are not members of this organisation. The Council has been assured by the two WEU member governments concerned with this matter that it will be given careful consideration.

It seems to me that before we as a parliamentary assembly reiterate our interpretation of the Montreux Convention, it would be useful for

Mr. Roper (continued)

us to await further advice from the Council of Ministers on the interpretation of this very confused subject.

Amendment No. 5 refers to paragraph 1 of the recommendation. We feel that while the other countries in Western Europe, the other members of NATO, will be able to contribute and use their good offices to bring a general settlement to the Cyprus problem, it is unlikely at this stage that the institutional framework in which that would be achieved is NATO as such. Therefore our proposal is to maintain the substance while changing the form and to substitute for "NATO", "their partners and allies in Europe" and in particular members of the European Community.

Amendment No. 6 seeks to take up the same point made by Mr. Krieg about the situation of Greece and Turkey vis-à-vis the European Community. Unfortunately, while in English the phrase "foster the association of Greece and Turkey with the European Community" implies a continuing development, the translation into French created a certain ambiguity.

The purpose of Amendment No. 6 was to try to make clear that what one wants to see occurring is the development of association agreements which were originally intended to lead to full membership, and therefore it is not far from the proposals Mr. Krieg seeks to make in his amendments.

The same can be said of Amendments Nos. 7 to 9. I take Mr. Krieg's point about the implications of international law in respect of sovereign base areas. I have in this series of amendments tried to distinguish between the responsibility of the United Nations forces, including a substantial British contingent also to include Danish and Irish forces, in trying to bring a return to normal conditions in the island; and, secondly, the continued importance of British defence installations in the island.

I have used that phrase for two reasons. The first reason relates to questions of international law and the commitment of the six other members of WEU in regard to sovereign base areas, but the second, and perhaps more important reason, is that some of the most important defence installations in the defence of Western Europe are outside the sovereign base areas,

namely, the radar installations on Mount Troodos. Therefore, the formulation which I have put forward and the reference to "British defence installations" would go a long way to meet Mr. Krieg's amendment by removing the reference to sovereign bases, which reference he finds unacceptable. Nevertheless, these installations have played and will in future play an important rôle in the defence of our continent.

I apologise for having taken so long, but I hope that it will save time when we come to discuss the amendments in detail. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Roper.

I call Mr. Mattick.

Mr. MATTICK (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, as far as the strategic position of Cyprus is concerned everything has already been said here. I can only endorse it, and do not wish to refer to the subject further. But I would like to begin by saying something about the human problems. The example of Cyprus makes us realise once again — and the debate has shown this — how quickly a civil war can lead to a world conflagration. Those who always suffer in such a case are people who are not directly involved and are often completely innocent. Some thousands of them are still living in the forests in Cyprus. There is one thing I cannot excuse, and that is that the powers involved — and whom we are discussing here — have not found an interim solution for the winter which would allow the refugees to be brought in from the woods. For after all, the powers involved are democratic countries. They know very well that the winter will have passed before the political problems are solved. There are many reasons for that, and I do not need to list them here. But it must surely be possible for democratic countries to find some way of bringing the refugees in from the forests for the winter; for even in Cyprus it is cold in the woods in winter.

There are two reasons for saying this, Mr. President. In the first place, I consider that the primary object of our political efforts is to help people. Secondly, I have found from experience in the course of my travels that refugee camps under canvas out in the woods, whether in bad weather or in a burning sun, are positive breeding-grounds for terrorists. Anyone who has followed the history of the Palestinian movement, and thinks of what went on in the refugee

Mr. Mattick (continued)

camps until eventually the partisan movement emerged, will understand what I mean.

So I say again to the powers concerned : find an interim solution for the people who are still living out in the woods !

There is something more I want to say about the report. Following my comments on the human problem, which has already played a large rôle in the debate, may I first of all suggest that paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation be made paragraph 1. I believe this change of order is justified because our recommendation should first and foremost express the fact that we are concerned about the welfare of the people involved.

I would further ask that where the paragraph reads : "Request member governments to arrange for their Ministries of Defence to assist..." the words "for their Ministries of Defence" be deleted. For I believe that the appeal to examine to what extent humanitarian aid for the 200,000 refugees on Cyprus can be increased cannot be addressed to the Defence Ministers but must be made to the governments. Only the last part of the paragraph concerns the Defence Ministers.

So I propose that paragraph 5 be made the first paragraph, and that the words "for their Ministries of Defence" be deleted ; and I would also request that if this amendment is adopted the following sentence be added to the new paragraph 1 :

"to appeal to the powers concerned, by finding interim solutions, to close down the camps and evacuate those now living in them".

I would like this added to paragraph 5, now to become paragraph 1.

There is also a comment I would like to make, on paragraph 3. This is in fact a question to my colleagues. Paragraph 3 recommends that the Council "recognise the importance of a continued British military presence in the sovereign base areas". The preamble expressly states that the Assembly believes :

"that the continued presence of British forces in British sovereign areas in Cyprus, in accordance with international agreements to which representatives of the Cyprus communities are parties, contributes both to the defence of Europe and to the return to normal conditions in the island as a whole".

I am not against this paragraph. But my question is what part did the 8,000 British soldiers in Cyprus play on the day when the junta with their Mr. Sampson started the civil war and thereby brought about all the trouble in Cyprus ? Perhaps that question can be answered ; if it can, it would be easier for me to support paragraph 3.

In conclusion, I have just one more comment to make. At the North Atlantic Assembly in London a fortnight ago we decided to set up a solidarity fund for the southern Mediterranean NATO countries which are in special need. Perhaps WEU could join in that.

My final point is that I believe it is our task within our own sphere to see that the policy of peace extends beyond that sphere. My impression is in this respect that we shall no longer be able for the foreseeable future to place our hopes in the United Nations, now that the United Nations General Assembly has become a talk-in where majority decisions override minority rights. When we look at the United Nations General Assembly, therefore, we no longer think in terms of justice. During the short time when the Cyprus crisis was at its height, the Security Council adopted no less than nine resolutions. My impression is that these resolutions made little difference. I think, therefore, we must concentrate more on those areas which are significant for European security and for the maintenance of peace. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Dr. Mabon.

Dr. MABON (*United Kingdom*). — I should like to revert to the contribution of Mr. Roper, dealing with the amendments which we shall be discussing in more detail later. I take no exception to Amendments Nos. 7, 8 and 9. With regard to the other amendments on the paper signed by Mr. Roper, Mr. Dankert and Mr. van Ooijen, I take no exception to Amendments Nos. 3, 5 and 6, but having listened to the argument about Amendment No. 4, I remain quite unconvinced that we should make this amendment and withdraw this very important section of the draft recommendation.

Nobody can deny that the second part of preambular paragraph 5 is a very important matter. Those of us who are interested in peace, not only in the Mediterranean but also in the Indian Ocean, do not want to see aircraft-carriers, Soviet or American, building up naval strength which will cause the other side to build

Dr. Mabon (continued)

up its strength. We are already seeing this in the Indian Ocean in quite an alarming way. It will not be long before the Suez Canal is opened, and if the Montreux Convention is disregarded, if the Soviet lawyers and the others concerned are able to argue that the Montreux Convention allows aircraft-carriers to sail through, there is a strong possibility of the Soviets reinforcing their fleet not only in the Mediterranean but in the Indian Ocean. I am not a lawyer, only a simple doctor — of medicine, I hasten to add — but my reading of the Montreux Convention makes it absolutely clear in my mind, simple though it may be, that aircraft-carriers are aircraft-carriers. They are not capital ships within the definition of the convention and ought not to be allowed through the Straits in either direction. Therefore, the Soviets would make a great mistake if they were to insist that the aircraft-carriers that they are building, and those that are there, should sail through the Straits of the Dardanelles.

I would hope, therefore, that we shall not resile from past resolutions and recommendations on this matter; that we will stick to what we have said in the past, and stick to our understanding of what was said.

With regard to the advice given to us by the Council of Ministers, referred to by my colleague Major Wall, I agree with him that the advice is very opaque, to put it in as flattering a way as I can, and I am not as a parliamentarian willing to accept that there is any ambiguity of the convention sufficiently strong to say that these aircraft-carriers can sail into the Eastern Mediterranean, so therefore I am not persuaded that we should agree with Amendment No. 4. I agree with my colleague Mr. Roper that it is meant to be a probing amendment. He is not in any way suggesting otherwise. I agree that he would probably want us to delete it today, and then at a later stage, when we have discussed it more fully, restore it to one of our future recommendations in June. I am perfectly willing for these matters to be examined, but on the evidence we have at the moment I feel that we should not make this amendment. We should stick to our past declarations. We can examine it again but we must not let anybody feel in any way that we are retreating from the proposition that the more there are naval vessels on the high seas of this considerable strength, the more danger there is to world peace. That is the

only difficulty I have with my colleague Mr. Roper. I hope he will seriously consider not moving Amendment No. 4 and I hope he can persuade his co-sponsors not to persist.

The report in my view is a very good one such as we would expect from Mr. Critchley. He is not only Chairman of the Committee but also the Rapporteur. Indeed, after his speech this morning he appeared to be not only the Prime Minister but the Leader of the Opposition all wrapped up in one. He was rather like the wonderful character in the English operetta "The Mikado". There, Gilbert and Sullivan described one of the characters, Pooh Bah, as a man with many offices rolled into one. Mr. Critchley often reminds me a little of Pooh Bah. The only trouble about that is that he is rather good at everything he does, which is rather irritating!

Passing to the substance of the report, here I am very glad that we have the presence of distinguished representatives of Greece, Turkey and Cyprus here today. I have always regarded myself as a friend of that very beautiful island and I have visited it many times. I have fortunately been able to meet the leaders of both communities on many occasions.

A solution of the problem of Cyprus in my view does not lie in any of these reports. It does not lie with any of the great powers. It does not lie in Athens or in Ankara. It lies entirely and exclusively on the island of Cyprus itself.

In paragraph 45 of the report, with regard to concessions to be made apparently by Turkey on the island of Cyprus and concessions elsewhere by Greece in other ways, for example, in the Aegean seabed, the implication that concessions on Cyprus are to be made by Turkey and only Turkey is a mistake. I like to think that I am equally friendly to both communities. However, the failure of the existing constitution on the island of Cyprus to work I believe was not the failure of the Turkish Cypriots; it was exclusively that of the Greek Cypriots. There was no effective Vice-President of Cyprus who by definition had to be a Turkish Cypriot. He was not allowed to carry out this office in a proper way. It is true there was a great deal of umbrage on the Turkish side, but a Turkish Vice-President was not allowed to work effectively with the Greek Cypriots of the island. In addition, the cabinet was drawn exclusively from the Greek Cypriot community. Whether by

Dr. Mabon (continued)

accident or some design does not matter. The fact remains that the Turkish Cypriots were not allowed in this bi-communal State, this federal State which was supposed to weld together two communities. It is not true that the Turkish Cypriots were allowed to sit in the commons chamber with their Greek Cypriot colleagues elected to serve in that parliament of both communities.

The constitution which was supposed to be one of friendship between both communities turned out to be a rather bitter one for the Turkish community. Some of us visited Cyprus in the so-called peaceful years on the island when the United Nations force was there and when there were very few incidents — for some time, in fact, no incidents at all — when the Turkish communities were beleaguered and isolated. In the centres of the towns of Famagusta, Kyrenia and so on they were beleaguered, impoverished, in many cases unfairly treated, second-class citizens.

It behoves not the Greek Government in Athens but the Greek Cypriots themselves to realise that they have sown the seeds of a great deal of hatred and they are now reaping the whirlwind of that at the present time. I do not rejoice in that at all. Indeed, I think it is a great tragedy. But it lies with the Greek Cypriots to make up their mind, if they do not want partition of the island, that they must have a constitution which works and one under which the Turkish Cypriots are given an equal chance of citizenship alongside the Greek Cypriots. If they do not want that and if it is not possible, then regrettably partition is inevitable. I hope that will not be the case because the problems of partition are enormous.

I wish to say to my friend, Mr. Critchley, that I regret that not more has been said in the report about aid given by the European powers — including, if I may say so modestly, the United Kingdom — or what we have done in the present situation to help those who are now in distress.

Something like a quarter of a million Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots are under canvas if they are lucky, or in caves or in other parts of the island, sheltered from further violence, some of them ill, some injured and recovering from their wounds and many of them of course holding their dead. These people are there today.

Some 100,000 of them or so are being sheltered outside the British base at Dhekelia. As to the Turkish Cypriots, there are 20,000 outside the British base at Akrotiri. These bases seemingly have their humanitarian usefulness apart from their defence capabilities. President Makarios would not be alive today if we had not had the base at Akrotiri. He would not have been able to escape with British assistance, as it is so politely put in the report, if that base had not been there. He would have been assassinated by Greek Cypriots, Eoka B, if that had not been the case. We often forget these things. In the report not enough credit has been given to those European powers who have made this humanitarian effort to help these people over this winter nor to those Europeans, including the British Government, who have assisted in the relief of these unfortunate people. I would like that to have been acknowledged.

Because I believe we should be a little more aggressive in this Assembly from time to time, we ought to put to shame and make reference to those European powers who, although they are willing to comment — and to comment adversely — on the activities of the others in Cyprus, are not willing to give any money for the aid of the refugees. We should name a few of our well-known critics who are not willing to give any money for this important humanitarian effort but are willing merely to talk about this.

This is a very good report. I hope the amendment will not be pressed. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Müller.

Mr. MULLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, before I say anything about the Cyprus question, I want to mention one circumstance which will in the years ahead affect the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean. Admittedly the region directly concerned is not actually in the Eastern Mediterranean, but the latter is going to be affected. I am talking about the way things are moving in the Adriatic; the region in question is to the north of Greece. Yugoslavia's policy of opening its harbours to Soviet vessels has started off a development that in the long run will affect the Eastern Mediterranean as well. We all know that in many quarters there is some concern about future developments in that area. When we look at the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean we can only endorse that concern.

Mr. Müller (continued)

Now, one or two points about Cyprus. I take the view, Mr. President, that the Cypriot problem can be solved only by restoring the independence of that island republic. We must however recognise that progress in this direction is unlikely with the normal, democratic rule of majority decisions.

Cyprus has been a trouble spot since 1960 because, as became clear, the two communities on the island were unable to arrive at a consensus. During the past year an attempt was made to cut the Gordian knot. The sword-stroke was initially the coup by Nikos Sampson and the National Guard, which was then followed by a further sword-stroke in the form of the Turkish invasion. As I see it, this attempt led only to further complication. The Cyprus problem can only be solved if the negotiations by those concerned — and I am thinking primarily of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots — lead to a federal solution for the island. Anything else would seem to me only to conjure up fresh trouble for the future.

Above all I believe that partitioning the island would not produce the solution. We have, God knows, already too many countries in the world which have been partitioned. We know that these divisions have led only to further conflicts. So there can only be one solution, one which leads to a federal constitution. We should strongly support such a solution. All of us — allies, friends or whatever — should back this up. I would support Mr. Roper on this when he said that Mr. Dankert's Amendment No. 5 should not use the word "NATO", but such words as "friends" or "allies". I think that would be a reasonable approach.

Just one comment on what Mr. Mattick said, and which has already been touched on by the previous speaker. I believe that the part played by the British troops in the Cyprus bases during the crisis period last year should not be underestimated. Not only does Makarios owe his life to the presence of British troops but tens of thousands of tourists in Cyprus owe it to the British bases that they emerged unharmed from that terrible civil war. Nor should we forget that the action of the British troops in Cyprus and their being able to open up their bases prevented a number of massacres which might otherwise have occurred. This rôle of the British troops should be recognised and the potential future

importance of the British bases in Cyprus understood.

I would like to end by stressing forcefully once again that there is only one solution for Cyprus — to establish a federal constitution safeguarding the rights of both communities — even if this does not always follow the rule of the democratic majority — and guaranteeing their right to live. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Waltmans.

Mr. WALTMANS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I am greatly honoured to be able to speak in this company of experienced and influential politicians from a number of Western European countries. I gather, from the outstanding and extensive groundwork that has been done for this report, that overall it reflects the thinking of the political and military top people in NATO. But this need not in itself be a reason why one should not be critical of it.

First of all, one must wonder whether the issue before us here really is a prime concern of the Assembly of Western European Union. Naturally there is solidarity between all of us in this world, and we ought to be able to deal with any problem in every political discussion; but whether it is right and intelligent to do so is another matter.

Another aspect one can criticise is that too many different issues are all mixed up together, so that what is lost sight of is in fact what is most important in it.

There are two more points I want to raise. In the first place the central issue, for me too, is the human problem of the refugees. I therefore wholeheartedly support what has been said by Mr. Mattick. In the second place, the ultimate objective of all our efforts, if we are trying to serve the cause of peace and European security, can only be the restoration of an independent, wholly sovereign, inviolably neutral and unfettered Cyprus, under international guarantees.

At least where my political friends are concerned, I would not dare insist that the presence of British troops in Cyprus is essential for any positive purpose. This is clearly also the view of the British Government, since they yesterday hinted that they are going to make a substantial reduction in the number of British troops in Cyprus.

Mr. Waltmans (continued)

To sum up, I would say again that the central issue for all of us should be a solution to the problems affecting the refugees and the interests of Cyprus itself. I believe this is the best contribution we could make to European peace and security. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Cermolacce.

Mr. CERMOLACCE (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, in the course of my speech yesterday on European union and WEU, I reminded you of the adoption of a recommendation by our Assembly which noted the small impact on public opinion achieved by the institution known as WEU. The current discussions bear witness to this. The debate on European union in this forum remained unfinished and is deferred until the next session.

Yesterday again, a debate on a request for urgent procedure for a recommendation concerning the Channel Tunnel got off to a poor start. The debate was cut short.

Today we are reverting to a text, the discussion of which ended up in confusion at the session of November 1973, although it is true that this text has been adapted to the new situation in that part of the world, with Cyprus becoming the focal point of our discussions. On each occasion questions of procedure have been advanced to explain these adjournments. But are these the real reasons? Are not these delays rather a sign of the difficulties, both internal and external, which you have to face? Is it not a fact that, despite your facade of unity, you are overwhelmed with contradictions, that this body, WEU, no longer matches up in any way to the spirit of our times, that it is done for, that it is going against the tide of history? And here, fundamentally, lies a large majority itself united in negation.

The draft recommendation we are again discussing which concerns European security and the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean, is a caricature of the spirit of the majority in this Assembly. Its aim is to ensure at all costs that a spirit of cold war, of isolation, anti-Soviet feeling and contempt for the right of peoples to decide their own destinies shall prevail. This draft is scandalous by virtue of what it omits

to say and what it pretends to ignore, namely the right of Cyprus to independence and sovereignty affirmed in various United Nations resolutions, and in particular in that of 1st November 1974, this last adding that all foreign troops — including British troops — should be withdrawn. It is along these lines that we should, above all, be thinking. For while it is true that Cyprus is a problem which concerns the international community, the island could become a veritable volcano, as Mr. Mavros, then Minister for Foreign Affairs of Greece, affirmed in his own statements.

What is then the solution? During the session of the Council of Europe last September, I had occasion to ask Mr. Averoff, Minister for Defence and acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, the following question: "I want to ask the Minister what his attitude is to the proposal just put forward by the United Nations for an international conference between the Mediterranean countries concerned, the Security Council and the non-aligned countries."

Mr. Averoff's answer is most important:

"So far as the methods of solving the Cyprus problem are concerned we are open to any kind of suggestion. What matters is the substance; the form is immaterial. Even bilateral discussions between Ankara and Athens would suit us, although they are not a good method because we are not the interested parties, provided the substance is guaranteed and the two parties can discuss the matter on an equal and dignified footing.

So what Mr. Cermolacce suggests" — it is Mr. Averoff speaking — "is acceptable too provided it can really be useful."

We believe this to be useful; and it is this quest for a peaceful solution which should be in the foreground of this recommendation. Yet you maintain the most complete silence, which also enables you to say nothing about the rôle of NATO and of the United States of America in this conspiracy, in supporting the Greece of the colonels, its vassal since 21st April 1967, and then in supporting the Turkish militarists, whose turn came after the fall of the Greek fascist junta. In all this no account is taken of the danger to which this conspiracy exposed peace in this Mediterranean region and in Europe, and no concern is expressed about the sufferings inflicted on the Cypriot peoples, Greek and Turkish.

Mr. Cermolacce (continued)

But the recommendation is also scandalous by virtue of what it says, namely in calling for the reintegration of Greece in NATO, in defiance of the popular demands which have emerged in Greece. We must take into account the fact that the Greek people has expressed itself in favour of withdrawal from NATO, while in the explanatory memorandum of your recommendation you describe this people as "at best volatile".

This recommendation is likewise scandalous in that it affirms its determination to settle the affair within the framework of NATO, to interfere in the affairs of the Cypriot people and in the second place to turn Cyprus into a base for the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

Who can dispute the assertion made recently in the Greek Cypriot weekly *Democratia*, that the United States wants to establish a military base in Cyprus, and that to this end it is exerting pressure on the Governments of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey?

To be more precise, let us point out that the base in question is that of Dhekelia, which it is said that the British Government will give up next spring. Through your recommendation, you are approving this course of action. The draft is also scandalous in that it repeats the never-ending refrain of the Soviet menace; for it is perfectly obvious that the United States would like to make the Mediterranean its own private preserve in which to play its sinister tricks, and it is likewise obvious that the Soviet presence restrains it.

We have a different conception of European security, which is centred on dialogue and directed towards political and military détente and fruitful international co-operation. It is the reverse of what the recommendation presented to us contains, and we reject it unhesitatingly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I have the honour and pleasure of welcoming Mr. Bernard Destremau, Secretary of State to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of France. I greet him with particular pleasure, because only a few months ago Mr. Bernard Destremau was seated amongst us, and indeed he presided with distinction over our important Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

We shall obviously listen to his words with great interest, and we shall also observe with

curiosity and some enjoyment to what extent a member of the government can continue to uphold the views he expressed as a parliamentarian.

The debate which is about to open is of particular interest to all of us.

Mr. Destremau, I invite you to take the floor. *(Applause)*

Mr. DESTREMAU (*Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, allow me to tell you how much I appreciate the words of welcome you have just uttered and how touched I am by your invitation to address from this rostrum my former colleagues in Western European Union, with whose work I had the honour to be associated not very long ago.

In a world in which the fear of over-production has given place to the threat of scarcity, it will be the purpose of my speech, with your permission, to bring us up to date as regards the problem of security in Europe and its guiding principle of détente, and to tell you what stage we have reached in building up Europe and what progress has been achieved in the political sphere.

Your reports highlight the fact that you are particularly concerned with perfecting a defence organisation common to the nations of Western Europe. Now it is apparent that the political and military aspects are closely connected: this can scarcely be disputed. Détente implies long and exacting effort. It depends upon the frame of mind of those concerned and upon the resolve of responsible leaders to improve relations among the peoples. The agreements concluded and the arrangements made stem, in fact, from a particular frame of mind or line of thought. If we come to look at what are traditionally called East-West relations, it seems to me that we can indulge in a certain measure of optimism, and we can assert here and now that détente has produced results which are reflected in exchanges of visits, contacts of all kinds and every form of co-operation, and which have become more firmly-rooted over the last ten years or so.

Although the risks of a major crisis have not disappeared, at least the tragic lack of understanding which plunged Europe into the cold war has been replaced by a dialogue expressing the patient endeavours of statesmen to understand each other better in order to ensure the security of their peoples more effectively.

Mr. Destremau (continued)

We have no alternative but to succeed in this venture, although we shall only succeed if our partners concert and harmonise their efforts with our own, and also provided we accept the idea that our partners in dialogue may themselves have a deep desire for peace.

In that connection, the conference on security and co-operation in Europe, at present being held at Geneva, represents a contribution to the process of détente. What stage have we now reached ?

We have observed that progress in a certain number of fields has been achieved since work was resumed last September. That is attributable to the fact that the countries of Eastern Europe have modified their initial intransigent attitude on a number of issues.

Does that mean to say that the essentials have been successfully secured and that only secondary questions remain to be settled ? Assuredly not, since we attach particular importance to an agreement on the free movement of men and women and, on this point, have not yet achieved satisfactory results.

Whatever the result of this conference may be, the discussions which are taking place there bear witness to praiseworthy perseverance on the part of those responsible for defence. That being said, we must recognise clearly that this policy still seems vulnerable and subject to the shocks in which the international situation continues to abound. Thus, for example, the development of a new type of crisis centred on the problem of raw materials and energy resources has had the indirect effect of adding a certain degree of relativity to the phenomenon of détente. In the same way, there are throughout the world many armed forces on the alert, and it must not be forgotten that you can do anything with bayonets except sit on them.

We Frenchmen are, however, convinced that Europe can constitute a solid and lasting pillar of détente, as one day it can become a pillar of defence. For that reason we shall unrelentingly pursue our work of building up Europe.

That work has experienced, is experiencing and will continue to experience vicissitudes. It is considered good form to utter laments about Europe, as though the considerable results which the Europeans have achieved might be held to

be completely natural. I would cite, in the first instance, the virtual impossibility of a conflict occurring between France, Germany and Britain. What we take for granted today would have amazed our grandfathers. I would also instance the extraordinary expansion of our industries and agriculture over the past fifteen years. Even if, in this latter case, some backward steps and some disappointments have to be recorded, should we not, distinguished deputies and senators, place on record the admirable progress achieved through our efforts to refrain from further disputes and to improve mutual aid ?

I do not therefore approve of the frame of mind that is now fashionable. I believe that to clear-sightedness in face of today's realities must be added faith in the undertakings of the men of Europe. For the time being, it must be their foremost endeavour to preserve at all costs what the Community has achieved, but they must also progress forthwith beyond preoccupations of a materialistic nature in order to foster the harmonisation of their political views as the weeks and months go by. There is no other way to advance along this road except by multiplying contacts, for although frequent meetings do not always lead to identical concepts, at least they make those concerned hesitate before a breakdown. Links of varying closeness endure among those who meet frequently and come to know each other better.

In this way political union may emerge here and now in hardly visible form, in particular as a result of the proposals to be considered at the forthcoming meeting of Heads of State on 9th and 10th December next. It is clear, however, that the building of Europe is dependent upon political will. We had a foretaste this summer of European political resolve on the occasion of the Cyprus crisis, during which the French presidency conducted its actions through a virtually uninterrupted dialogue with its European partners in the political field and also in the humanitarian sphere referred to in the report by my former colleague, Mr. Critchley.

This resolve to take common action again found expression at the United Nations, where voting on the majority of the resolutions presented revealed a community of views on the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus. It is essential that this rough cast of a common political determination should take clear shape whenever we have to tackle such explosive

Mr. Destremau (continued)

questions as the energy crisis or defence. We consider that Europe of the Seven or of the Nine has the means to establish an energy policy of such a nature that the apportionment of resources in cases of crisis would not, in our eyes, have overriding priority — for would it in that case be applied? — but would, on the other hand, be concentrated on immediate tasks, namely reduction in consumption as well as the search for and development of new energy sources. A Community policy is likewise essential for issues related to our defence, and we may hope that, among the preoccupations of every kind resulting from the energy crisis, the independence of our countries, as far as energy supplies affecting their security are concerned, will not be forgotten.

These last two points, namely concerted action and the strategic aspect of the problem, were aptly evoked in the recommendation contained in Sir John Rodgers' report.

A European political will can also be applied in supporting some of our industries. In this Assembly, where a number of parliamentarians specifically follow problems of science, technology and aerospace, I would express the fervent hope that they may remember, on every appropriate occasion, that where there are no differences in quality, it would be detrimental to our future not to choose the European product.

I think it was our colleague, Mr. Warren, who emphasised the gravity of the choices we shall soon have to make.

Lastly, political resolve is needed if we wish to bring about, when the time comes, an organised defence system among the Europeans who might come to be exposed to comparable dangers.

During the past few years, eminent members of the French Government have invited the Assembly to widen the scope of its thinking in that respect, and have specifically suggested that the Standing Armaments Committee should be given new life. The least one can say is that these suggestions do not seem to have met with unanimous good will.

While cold water was thrown on that suggestion, we heard much, in this Assembly, of the merits of another organisation — an organisation which, we must clearly admit, has also failed to cause many European products to be sold.

These are partisan arguments of no practical interest. Today, I would simply confirm the fact that we remain attached to the idea of rationalising armaments production; but the means for achieving this goal, as well as the framework for concerted action, still remain to be found.

In my view, however, the solution to these armament problems will not become visible so long as a closer identity of views on strategic concepts does not begin to emerge and so long as a genuinely European political resolve is not unequivocally affirmed.

The question which exercises many of you still remains, although I do not wish to give umbrage to any of the allies with whom we are linked in other ways or to pick quarrels with any of those powers with whom it is our specific desire to establish détente.

With each form of approach lending support to the other, defence and détente can move forward on the lines of the "leap-frog" advance taught in military academies, and can become at once the components and the resultants of a united Europe. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Secretary of State. You have kindly agreed to answer any questions you might be asked, and I shall now give the floor to those of our colleagues who request it.

I call Mr. Leynen.

Mr. LEYNEN (*Belgium*) (Translation). — Mr. President, in the sixth paragraph of the Council's reply to Recommendation 254, the governments speak of the "area... of Western European Union", which allegedly does not include the Indian Ocean. I should like to ask whether this is not a slip. At all events, it seems to me unfortunate to speak of an "area" in relation to WEU. I would ask the honourable Minister, who has a long experience of WEU debates, whether he can tell us on what text this is based and, if such an area exists, what are its limits.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Secretary of State.

Mr. DESTREMAU (Translation). — I would simply say to Mr. Leynen that his comment is very pertinent, but that I am not in a position to answer him on this point, since at the moment France is not in the Chair of the WEU Council of Ministers.

Mr. LEYNEN (*Belgium*) (Translation). — But France is a member of the Council.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Sieglerschmidt.

Mr. SIEGLERSCHMIDT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, may I first tell the Secretary of State how pleased I am — after working with him so long in this Assembly — to greet him as a speaker from the government seats. My question concerns his remark that we should one day achieve organised European defence. What immediate or preparatory tasks would the French Government think should be given in this respect to Western European Union?

Mr. DESTREMAU (Translation). — Mr. Sieglerschmidt knows as well as I do that WEU has experienced periods of difficulty, but it must also be observed that we have survived these periods and that WEU remains a very valuable organisation. This will become apparent when the moment comes to advance further in the direction which he has indicated; but this obviously necessitates a political will to do so, perhaps as a preliminary to the military organisation to which he has alluded.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. de Niet.

Mr. de NIET (*Netherlands*). — I should like to ask the Minister how this Government of France is looking at the recommendation of the spring meeting of this Assembly in which was included practically a call upon France to join again in the operative functions of NATO in the Mediterranean as a contribution to security and to a better foundation for coming to close co-operation in all those matters within the context of NATO.

Mr. DESTREMAU (Translation). — I would reply to Mr. de Niet, who is very well informed on many issues, that France has absolutely no intention of resuming its place in NATO, but it is obvious that it has a great number of links within the framework of the Alliance, which make it possible to say that security in the Mediterranean is assured in large measure thanks to the rôle which it plays there and which it will continue to play.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Does anybody else wish to speak ?...

On behalf of the whole Assembly, Mr. Secretary of State, I would reiterate to you our

thanks both for your statement and for the clarity of your answers.

We shall resume the debate on Mr. Critchley's report, and I call one of the observers from the Turkish Republic, Mr. Inan.

Mr. INAN (*Observer from Turkey*) (Translation). — Mr. President, distinguished members of the Assembly, it is a great honour and a privilege for me and for my colleague to be invited to attend this Assembly today and, above all, to be given the right to address you. This is a privilege which not only we ourselves, but also the Turkish Parliament and people, appreciate.

We have followed with great interest the debate which took place this morning. It showed that action by WEU, unlike that of other international organisations with which I am personally familiar, is not confined solely to problems which affect the interests and the defence of the western world as well. I believe that this constitutes an instructive example, from which other international organisations responsible for our defence might draw a lesson.

The third point that I should like to stress is the objectivity of the report presented to you, for which I would thank the Chairman, the Rapporteur and all the members of the Committee. This report shows a concern for equity, justice and balance which we should like to see prevailing everywhere when such conflicts arise.

I shall revert later to some points in this report for the purpose of correcting or clarifying certain matters.

There is one event about which Turkey is the first to feel gratification: the return of democracy in Greece. We are extremely glad to see this happen after an interval of over seven years. In the part of the world in which we are located, Turkey was the only democratic country and felt itself isolated. I have often had cause to compare our position in that part of the world with that of West Berlin. Now isolation, whether in a democracy or elsewhere, is not a desirable thing. In other words Western Europe will not be alone in rejoicing at the return of democracy in Greece, and we shall support the presence and continued existence of this democracy in the land of our neighbour.

After expressing these congratulations, I would add a note of regret. This is caused by the decision of the outgoing government to withdraw from the integrated system of the Atlantic

Mr. Inan (continued)

Alliance. Here I address an appeal to the government in Athens: it must reconsider its decision and join us once again in order to consolidate the defence of the western world in that part of the globe.

In this part of the report there is reference to the Montreux Convention and to the defence of that part of the world; but if an allied country opens the doors to facilitate the access and presence of the Soviet Union in this region, that is certainly not in order to contribute to the defence of the western world. Furthermore, can the Atlantic Alliance be held responsible for the way in which the situation developed and be blamed for its inability to avoid what occurred in Cyprus? This accusation is unjustified: in the first place, the Atlantic Alliance is not intended to intervene in conflicts of that kind.

Secondly — and this is still more important — Cyprus is not located in the area covered by the Atlantic Alliance. The events which took place in Cyprus were not the direct concern of the Atlantic Alliance.

We have followed with interest the debate on the question of Cyprus and of security in the Eastern Mediterranean. I felt gratification in listening to the words of the speakers; they will please the Turkish people and Government. I would stress the extent to which these speakers displayed objectivity, since nobody sought to lay the blame on any party.

It is not our intention to pass judgment on recent events. It would serve no useful purpose to focus on these events and to dissect them. The main issue is to know where we are going from here, and to find a solution which can give satisfaction to all parties.

It was clearly stated this morning that a return to the *status quo* prevailing before 15th July last was impossible. The intention was probably to lay the blame, unjustly, on the 1960 constitution.

It was not the constitution in itself that was responsible for these events, for the very same constitution was applied with a certain measure of success from 1960 until 21st December 1963. It was at that point that tragic events caused its application to be suspended. I do not wish to recapitulate the successive events occurring in subsequent years, until 15th July last, for the

main point is to turn our thoughts to the future. But with every constitution, however perfect it may be, it is necessary that the rules of the game should be observed.

It has been recognised by Turkey that the only solution to the present situation is a bicameral and federal system — a system which would respect the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus. This would avoid the division of the citizens of that island into first-class and second-class citizens.

That being said, I should like to examine some paragraphs of the report and present a few arguments.

First of all, there is mention in paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation of "active membership of NATO". I think that it would be better to align this recommendation with paragraph 43, in which the advantages of "active participation in the integrated military structure of NATO" are stressed. If we draw a distinction between active participation and passive participation, we are running counter to the interests of the Alliance. In my view, the terms used in paragraph 43 should be employed to make the meaning of this recommendation clearly understood.

I would like to make a few comments on the amendments. It goes without saying that we are in favour of the amendment proposed by Mr. Roper, Mr. Dankert and others which deals with developing the association agreements of Greece and Turkey with the European Community. The word "foster" which figures in the amendment proposed by Mr. Krieg is inopportune. It is, indeed, my belief that to "foster" action by a country to pursue that course upsets the balance existing between the two countries.

In another speech, the need was emphasised of associating Greece with the discussions of the Davignon committee. I would venture to point out that Turkey has wanted this for years past. We have not ceased to repeat that if there is discrimination in the realm of political consultations, the system of consultation under the North Atlantic Treaty is in danger of being compromised.

We have even stressed the fact that, although the economic level attained by Greece and Turkey does not enable them to contemplate full accession immediately, it would enable them to cooperate in the political sphere, and also that the Davignon committee must not be turned into an exclusive club of the Nine, which would not be

Mr. Inan (continued)

in the interests of Europe. I am glad to observe that you are in favour of this idea.

With regard to paragraph 5 of the recommendation, which refers to refugees who number 200,000, a distinction must be drawn between three kinds of refugees: those who have abandoned their houses and their belongings, those who are treated as hostages — I mean the Turks — in the Greek Cypriot part of the island, and those who have had the status of refugees for upwards of eleven years. In a fourth category, we have the case of the prisoners. When we speak of refugees, we must not think only of those who have suffered as a consequence of recent events, but also of those who have been suffering for the past eleven years. There are more than 30,000 Turks, in the areas controlled by the Greek Cypriots, who should be considered as refugees.

I now come to the actual text of the report. At the end of paragraph 5 of the explanatory memorandum, the words "large Turkish Cypriot minority" occur. We all agree in recognising that a Cypriot nation cannot be deemed to exist as such, in which a minority might be present. There are two communities in Cyprus. When a country is composed of two distinct communities, you cannot speak of a minority. In consequence, this term "minority" can lead to undesirable misunderstandings.

Paragraph 6 says that "the new [1960] constitution... was proving unworkable". The constitution as such should not be held responsible, and it would be unfair to lay the blame upon it.

I shall not trace the historical background of the events. You will recall that an independent judge was appointed — he was a German judge — to see that this constitution was applied. Now this same judge was compelled to leave the island in order that the constitution might not be respected. Blame should not therefore be laid on the text itself, although that does not mean that the constitution which we are going to work out for the future will necessarily be the same.

There is a small discrepancy between paragraphs 12 and 13.

In paragraph 12, we read: "the... talks convened on 8th August broke down...". The reference is thus to the Geneva talks. In paragraph 13, we find the words: "in the midst of negotiations".

Hence, although the talks broke down, this did not occur in the midst of negotiations. Here, I must provide you with a clarification and even a piece of specific information about the second round of the Geneva conference. The Turkish Government explicitly proposed a basis for negotiating a settlement in Cyprus, namely the basis of which you were vividly reminded this morning: the suggestion of a federal system. That proposal was not adopted. The same Turkish Government shelved the proposal, and invited its partners in the talks to make fresh proposals so as to make it possible for these negotiations to continue. No further proposals were put forward. The Turkish Delegation waited six days in Geneva in the hope of pursuing the talks. Furthermore, the first Geneva agreement provided for the freeing of Turkish prisoners and hostages, but that agreement was not respected. In other words, the course and consequences of the second round in the Geneva talks have probably not been completely and clearly explained. Nevertheless, it is right that we should bear these facts in mind.

Specifically, there is mention in paragraph 24 of a Turkish refusal. As I have stated, there was absolutely no refusal on the part of Turkey. In paragraph 32, I observe a minor mistake about dates: there is mention of President Johnson bringing pressure to bear in 1967. The actual date was 1964, when we received the famous letter from President Johnson; whereas in 1967 the Turkish Government, with the help of its allies, succeeded in persuading the Athens Government to withdraw about 15,000 soldiers whom it had sent to Cyprus illegally. At the end of paragraph 35, it is stated that "the Turkish attitude in Cyprus has so far done little to help a settlement of the Cyprus problem". Here, too, I believe that the text does not entirely tally with the facts.

What is the attitude of Turkey in Cyprus which would not favour the promotion of a solution? We have sought for a solution. I myself have visited the countries of the European Economic Community, as well as all the allied countries. I informed them that we were disposed to resume the negotiations immediately, for humanitarian reasons and on the basis of a system of separation into two cantons. At that time, we said that the existing demarcation line was not final, that it was subject to negotiation and discussion. Alas, we received no reply.

You are, moreover, perfectly well aware that contacts are taking place between the leaders

Mr. Inan (continued)

of the two communities, with the express purpose of facilitating negotiations; and you are also aware of the very constructive contribution made by Turkey. These same contacts have made it possible to alleviate suffering in the island. Prisoners have been freed. Another fact which I should like to emphasise is that Mr. Clerides was able to visit the areas controlled by the Turks to see for himself what was the situation of the Greeks in that part of the island. This is a matter for rejoicing and gratification, for it represents important progress.

I now come to paragraph 40, in which the statement made on 6th November by President Clerides, who is himself also a realist, is very rightly stressed. Some speakers to whom we listened this morning recognised that fact. I trust that the same realism will prevail at Athens and Nicosia in order to facilitate progress.

I would venture to make one single appeal, namely that the association which has maintained contacts in Cyprus between the two communities, with the support of Ankara, may also support the arrangements made by the Turkish Government to resume the talks as speedily as possible, unimpeded by a return which is, alas, in preparation. I must say this clearly: Archbishop Makarios has entirely lost the confidence of the Turkish people, the Turkish Government and every government — and that was true already long before his return. He had already refused a basis for negotiations, and I am, alas, constrained to say that his return to the island would put the whole issue, from start to finish, back into the melting-pot.

I would stress another fact. Since we are all gathered here to discuss the defence of Western Europe and its evolution, I would bring a recent development to your notice. The Soviet Union is now trying, together with Archbishop Makarios, to lend its support to the building of a possible base in Cyprus, on which an aerodrome would be established. In this connection, a Greek-Cypriot Delegation has gone to Moscow to negotiate for such support and assistance as the Soviet Union might be able to provide for it.

In your report, you express your anxieties about the possible passage of two aircraft-carriers, now under construction, from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. I fully share anxieties of this kind. Imagine the presence of the Soviets

in Cyprus: it would be the equivalent of a hundred aircraft-carriers, and would drastically alter the balance in the Mediterranean in general and the Eastern Mediterranean in particular.

That would provide the solution and the answer to the dream of the Soviet Union, which was lacking a cover for its presence in the Mediterranean, since it desired one day to have a base in one of the most sensitive and most important points, an island in the Mediterranean.

Imagine the rôle that this base would play in a possible conflict in the Middle East, and its influence on the Suez Canal, on the United Kingdom's presence in Cyprus, and on the protection and defence of this part of the world by the Atlantic Alliance.

Imagine, too, what this return would mean in the unfolding of events. It is not a desirable development. I hope that at the end of the session, through the medium of this draft recommendation, your Assembly will appeal to all concerned to avoid a return which would unsettle the good atmosphere prevailing at present and would create difficulties for the defence of the western world.

I would, in conclusion, address an appeal to you. In Turkey, we are aware that the Greeks and Turks have practically no alternative other than mutual understanding and co-operation, in the interests of both countries and also in the interests of the western world, since these two countries are members of the Atlantic Alliance and of the economic union. They share the way of life of the western world and they belong to the same family. These two countries must, therefore, overcome their differences and try to reduce the extent of their disagreements. They must endeavour to foster not only understanding but also affection. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Touloupas, observer from the Greek Republic.

Mr. TOULOUPAS (*Observer from Greece*) (Translation). — Mr. President, first let me express my warm thanks for being invited to attend this session of Western European Union as an observer from Greece. I would also thank you for giving me the floor and will take advantage of this opportunity to share some thoughts with you about the problems dealt with in the report by Mr. Critchley, Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Mr. Touloupas (continued)

The chief problem dealt with in this report is that of Cyprus, in the light of the situation created as the result of the Turkish invasion of 20th July last. This is proof of the importance which this Assembly rightly attaches to this problem, the outbreak of which has had unacceptable results in creating a real danger in this part of the Mediterranean. The crisis began with the Nicosia coup d'état of 15th July. This was immediately condemned by all the political parties of Greece and aroused indignation among the entire Greek people. While it is true that the dictatorial régime in Athens was alone guilty of this act, which it instigated, it is no less true that the coup d'état was in no way directed against the Turkish Cypriot community. The proof of this is that no Turkish Cypriot was touched and that not one member of this community suffered in any way at all — a fact which was immediately recognised not only by the representative of the Turkish Cypriot community but also by the leadership in Ankara. From this it may be concluded that the Turkish invasion of Cyprus was not a direct consequence of the coup d'état but the unbridled exploitation of a pretext offered, with frightening irresponsibility, by an authoritarian régime hated by both the Greek people and their friends. Today, it is proven that this operation, carried out on the basis of specific plans and bearing the evocative code-name "Attila", had been prepared down to the last detail well in advance and that all that was lacking was the opportunity for putting it into effect. The operation was hurriedly launched, for it was by no means certain that the dictatorship would resist the pressures called into being after 15th July. A change in Greece, such as the formation of the government of Mr. Karamanlis, could earlier have prevented the operation. Thus the Turkish army, under the tragically ironical name of a "peace-keeping force", and equipped with weapons provided for quite different purposes, invaded Cyprus, caused incalculable destruction and ruined the economic structure of the island, to say nothing of creating appalling numbers of Greek refugees. The Geneva conference — which took place in a stifling atmosphere — raised some slight hopes at the beginning. In the second stage, however, in spite of the efforts of Mr. Callaghan, the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, the Turks imposed conditions such that Mr. Mavros, the Greek Minister, described them as an ultimatum ; and they proceeded to the premeditated

implementation of the second part of their plans by violating the cease-fire and considerably extending their zone of occupation of the island. So it has come about that 18 % of the population of the Cypriot State — or others in their name — occupy almost 40 % of the territory, more than 70 % of the economy, 80 % of the tourist industry and 100 % of the mining industry. Three-quarters of the Greek population in the area occupied by the Turkish army have had to leave their homes. According to impartial sources, the outcome of the aggression was 5,000 victims, dead or missing, 50,000 houses destroyed or pillaged and 200,000 Greek refugees living in appalling conditions.

Moreover, it should be noted that Article IV of the treaty of guarantee signed in 1960 provides that in case of violation of the provisions of the treaty, the guarantor States shall reach agreement on the approaches to be made or steps to be taken to ensure that those provisions are respected. Under the terms of the same Article IV, in a case where joint action cannot be taken, each of the guarantor parties reserves the right to take independent action to restore the *status quo ante*. I shall not dwell on the legal aspect of the question whether a member of the United Nations can invade another member and thus act contrary to the provisions of the United Nations, even by invoking a treaty, a course which is generally not admitted. As regards the restoration of the *status quo ante* in Cyprus as envisaged in the 1960 treaty, comment would be superfluous.

Yet at the present time the problem of Cyprus cannot remain in suspense. For political and humanitarian reasons it must be solved as quickly as possible. In our opinion, the only just and reasonable course is that of negotiations between the two island communities, since Cyprus is, as has generally been recognised, an independent sovereign State which must maintain its territorial integrity. Any solution, therefore, which would result in partition of the island would be incompatible with the United Nations resolution of 1st November 1974 which lays down the principles mentioned above. Partition of the island, involving the enforced transfer of a large number of Greek or Turkish Cypriots, would result in economic and social upheaval and the creation of a situation which could not last. Moreover, this enforced mass transfer of the population would in fact be totally incompatible with the principles of the universal declaration of human rights. The possibility of such a

Mr. Touloupas (continued)

transfer was studied some time ago by Mr. Galo Plaza, the United Nations mediator, who reached the conclusion that such a solution would give rise to even greater difficulties than had already arisen.

Another argument which is often advanced is that the Greeks and Turks of Cyprus cannot and do not want to live together. The only people who advance this view are those who want to start with a geographical separation and finish with the partition of the island. I cannot support this argument. It is not clear that even Turkish Cypriots are ready to accept unreservedly their enforced transfer far from their homes. In an article published on 17th October last in the London *Times*, Mr. Michael Harbottle, former chief of staff of the United Nations forces in Cyprus, asserted that Greek and Turkish Cypriots wanted to and could live together in a single independent State. "A divided island", he added, "was not what was wanted except by the very few; and those who did, sought it for the protection it would provide — a protection presumably which was dependent in their eyes on the continuing presence of the Turkish army." If, then, the direct or indirect partition of the island is ruled out, the two communities will surely find by way of negotiations a constitutional solution providing guarantees for their respective rights.

When the crisis began last July, the rest of the world followed the march of events very closely, but reactions were varied. The factors which had made it possible to avoid a crisis in 1964 and 1967 were, however, lacking on this occasion. The Greek people, their hopes frustrated, had a feeling of disillusionment and willingly accepted their new government's decision to withdraw the Greek armed forces from NATO. The reasons were obvious. Before indulging in a study of the perils of the future, we should at least be able to face up to present dangers. NATO had been unable to prevent a member of the Alliance from attacking an independent country, from subsequently enlarging the area occupied as the result of the invasion and from thus creating a dangerous situation between two allies. The argument, mentioned in the report, that Cyprus is not Greek territory — which is certainly true since it is an independent State — and that consequently the Alliance could not intervene, is a very feeble one, meaning nothing more than shutting one's

eyes to something which is happening in the very region the security of which is under discussion. The fact is, therefore, that NATO has given proof of an apathy and indifference which may even be said to have aggravated the crisis. The disappointment felt by the Greek people is justified and understandable.

As far as the USSR is concerned, allow me to point out that this power, having strongly, and rightly moreover, attacked the dictatorial régime which instigated the coup d'état of 15th July, subsequently maintained a moderate attitude concerning the Turkish action, which was not calculated to curb the ambitions of Turkey. This should surprise nobody. We can hardly expect the USSR to be enthusiastic about helping to smooth out difficulties arising among members of the Alliance.

Before finishing I would like to say a word or two on the draft recommendation. The second paragraph of the preamble reads: "Believing that any solution to the crisis in the island depends on improved relations between Greece and Turkey involving mutual concessions on several issues." In this connection allow me to remark, as I have already mentioned, that Cyprus is a sovereign and independent State and that consequently it is incumbent on the two Cypriot communities to negotiate and arrive at a solution acceptable to both. This is confirmed by the last resolution of the United Nations General Assembly, which was accepted unanimously. This resolution calls on all members to respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus and expresses the view that the constitutional system of the Republic of Cyprus concerns the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot communities. The abovementioned paragraph, as drafted, by making the Cyprus problem subordinate to all the problems existing between Greece and Turkey, therefore runs counter to the United Nations resolution just quoted. In addition, I think that relating one difficult problem to other entirely different ones merely complicates matters. The paragraph should therefore, in my opinion, be drafted as follows:

"Believing that any solution to the crisis in the island will result in an immediate improvement in the relations between Greece and Turkey."

Finally, Mr. President, I would once again like to express my thanks for the welcome extended to my country in this Assembly. I shall

Mr. Touloupas (continued)

be very happy if my short speech has contributed to enlightening members of the Assembly on the problems of Cyprus and the objective sought by Greece in the matter. (*Applause*)

4. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I propose that the Assembly now suspend the debate and resume it this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following Orders of the Day :

1. European security and the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean (Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 651 and Amendments).
2. Address by Mr. Matthöfer, Minister of Research and Technology of the Federal Republic of Germany.

3. State of European aviation activities (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 658).

4. State of European nuclear energy programmes — security aspects (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 655 and Amendments).

This appears to me to be an ambitious programme and I do not suppose we shall complete the Orders of the Day this afternoon.

Are there any objections ?...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak ?...

The Sitting is closed.

(The Sitting was closed at 12.45 p.m.)

NINTH SITTING

Wednesday, 4th December 1974

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.

2. Attendance Register.

3. European security and the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean (*Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 651 and Amendments*).

Speakers: The President, Mr. Ölçmen (*Observer from Turkey*), Mr. Critchley (*Chairman and Rapporteur*), Mr. Cermolacce, Mr. Roper, Mr. Critchley, Mr. Krieg, Mr. Roper, Mr. Critchley, Mr. Cermolacce, Mr. Krieg, Mr. Roper, Mr. Critchley, Dr. Mabon, Mr. Leynen, Mr. Krieg, Mr. Waltmans, Mr. Siegler Schmidt, Mr. Krieg, Mr. Leynen, Mr. Critchley, Mr. Roper, Mr. Krieg, Mr. Waltmans, Mr. Cermolacce, Mr. Krieg, Mr. Roper, Mr. Critchley, Mr. de Niet, Mr. de Montesquiou, Mr. Richter, Dr. Mabon, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Leynen, Mr. Schwencke, Mr. Critchley, Mr. Richter, Dr. Mabon (*on a point of order*), Mr. Roper, Mr. Cermolacce.

On points of order: Mr. de Montesquiou, Mr. Waltmans, Mr. Page, Dr. Mabon, Mr. Roper.

4. Address by Mr. Matthöfer, Minister of Research and Technology of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Speakers: The President, Mr. Matthöfer (*Minister of Research and Technology of the Federal Republic of Germany*).

Replies by Mr. Matthöfer to questions put by: Mr. Schwencke, Mr. Richter, Mr. Enders, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Abens, Mr. van Ooijen, Mr. de Montesquiou.

5. State of European aviation activities (*Presentation of the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Doc. 658*).

Speakers: The President, Mr. Waltmans (*on a point of order*), Mr. Warren (*Rapporteur*).

6. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

Speakers: The President, Mr. Waltmans, Mr. de Montesquiou, Mr. Lenzer.

The Sitting was opened at 3.10 p.m. with Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The Sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments ?...

The Minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings¹.

1. See page 24.

3. European security and the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean

(Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 651 and Amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on European security and the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 651 and amendments.

In the resumed debate, Mr Ölçmen, Observer from Turkey, has asked for the floor.

I should like to point out that one Turkish speaker has already expressed himself very eloquently in this chamber. Since Mr. Ölçmen's name was on the list of speakers, I shall of course not refuse him an opportunity of speaking in his turn in this forum. Nevertheless, I would ask him, because of what has already been said, to confine himself to a short speech. I reserve the

The President (continued)

right, should the need arise and, I believe, with the unanimous agreement of the members of this Assembly, to give the floor once again to the Greek observer, if he should feel the need to provide additional clarification.

I call Mr. Ölçmen.

Mr. OLCMEN (*Observer from Turkey*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I will try to be brief. I would probably not have asked to speak if His Excellency the Greek Ambassador had not presented certain matters in a way which is not in accordance with the facts. I will try to prove to you, by citing the facts, that these assertions do not quite match reality.

In the first place, we as Turks cannot accept the term "invasion". The Turkish intervention in the island of Cyprus was not an invasion. It was based on international agreements, recognised even by the United Nations. As the guaranteeing powers, Britain, Greece and Turkey must ensure the sovereignty and independence of Cyprus. Turkey too, therefore, was bound by that duty.

The required consultation with Britain unfortunately did not lead to the desired result; our Prime Minister went to Britain and tried for three days to make contact with Britain on this issue. Turkey could not negotiate with the Greek junta, dominated at the time by the colonels who were themselves to be seen as the aggressors on the island. I must make that point quite clear.

His Excellency the Greek Ambassador also maintained that the putsch by Nikos Sampson did not affect the Turks on the island. That, from the Turkish point of view, cannot be right, because a conflagration on the island was bound to affect both the Greek islanders and the Turkish islanders.

We want to forget the past and not to talk about it any more. But unfortunately His Excellency brought the subject up. We, too, could talk about the massacre of 1963. We could talk about eleven years of oppression of the Turks. We could talk about Turkish children killed in their bathtubs. But we want to forget all this.

We want to work, together with our Greek friends, for European and western security. My colleague Mr. Inan has already said that we are condemned by geographical and geopolitical

factors to live and work together with our Greek friends in this area. Our economies are similar, and our strategic situation is similar. This is why we want, with the new democratic Greek government, to settle not only the problem of Cyprus, but also problems in the Aegean and in Thrace.

I must however also express regret at the baleful influence that Archbishop Makarios has had over eleven years. It would not help towards a peaceful solution if he returns to the island; he is felt to be responsible for the many mistakes made in the past, and this view cannot be changed that quickly.

Thank you, Mr. President, for giving me this opportunity to speak. Like my colleagues, I hope that in future we shall be able to speak to you from this rostrum as the partners of Greece. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Ölçmen. You have fulfilled your obligations in the spirit in which I myself gave you the floor. The Greek Ambassador is not present. We shall therefore proceed with the debate on Mr. Critchley's report.

Mr. Rapporteur, there are no further speakers on the list in the debate on your report. It is for you to wind up.

Mr. CRITCHLEY (*United Kingdom*). — Perhaps I may reply to some of the points made before the various amendments are either accepted, rejected or debated. I believe that this has been a valuable debate because it has been pitched in a low key. We have had an absence of recrimination, which I believe to be essential when one debates a situation as difficult and fraught as is the problem of Cyprus itself.

Mr. Krieg professed a degree of surprise that the British Government should yesterday of all days have announced their proposals to reduce the proportion of British defence expenditure. Why he should have been surprised I have no idea at all. Most politicians in England and a lot of politicians beyond Great Britain have been waiting for this defence review not for weeks but for months, and we feel a certain sense of relief, if not of anti-climax, that finally the review has been made public.

I disagreed with Mr. Krieg when he asserted that Cyprus had nothing to do with European security. It has a great deal to do with European security. The Vulcan aircraft which fly into and out of Cyprus are there available not only to

Mr. Critchley (continued)

CENTO but also to NATO, and the radar installations on the island, the listening post function of the island, is of vital importance to the whole of the Western Alliance itself. Further, for Mr. Krieg to claim that the sovereign bases owe legitimacy to the agreement of 1972 is quite wrong. They owe their legitimacy to the agreement, not of 1972 but of 1962.

I am very sorry to see that Mr. Roper is not here, although he is no doubt hurrying to the building from one of the finer restaurants of Paris and will be here before very long. I believe that his amendments are very valuable indeed and I am very happy to say that on behalf of the Committee I shall accept most of them. But I am really impressed by John Roper — who has just arrived — because he seems to have developed the habit of reading out at length from the speeches of either Mr. Harold Wilson or Mr. Roy Mason. I hope he will find it as easy in the future as he has today to go on making extravagant quotations from the leader of the British Labour Party.

Mr. Mattick put the stress on the fifth of our recommendations, that dealing with the humanitarian aspect, and suggested that it would be sensible were we to move that recommendation from the fifth to the first position. Provided that it is not sought to alter the recommendation itself on the lines he suggests I would be very happy to move the original recommendation from the fifth to the first position.

Mr. Mattick at one stage said that the 8,000 British troops in Cyprus did not help in the conflict. This is to repeat the fallacy that others have mentioned, that the rôle of the British troops in the sovereign base areas was to prevent conflict between Greeks and Turks or between the two communities. That was not their rôle at all. If reference is made to paragraph 16 of my report there will be seen written out in full the contribution that the British forces have made since 15th July. We were able to evacuate 8,000 foreign nationals from 49 different countries, including the Soviet Union, and the number of Cypriots who have been prepared to take refuge in the sovereign base areas is very large.

Dr. Mabon made a very esoteric reference to "The Mikado". I suggest that he circulates the script of the Gilbert and Sullivan opera as a document to members. I can only suggest that if Mr. Roper is the Dr. Finlay of the Assembly,

Dr. Mabon is the Dr. Cameron of the Western European Alliance. Nevertheless, his speech was a valuable contribution to our debate.

Mr. Inan was very flattering in that he went through our recommendations line by line. This is the sort of flattery to which humble members of parliament are unaccustomed, and we are very grateful to him. I apologise for certain errors of fact that have crept into that document.

The most interesting elements in the debate itself perhaps were the contributions by Mr. Inan and by the Greek Ambassador observer to the debate, for I think that we had the impression for a moment at least of being at the centre of events and seeing the situation itself move, a little perhaps, but at least important and interesting, and I hope that our observers have felt that they, too, have not wasted their time.

This has been a good debate, and one without rancour or recrimination. It has viewed a very difficult situation constructively, and I impress upon the Assembly that, amended or not — and I think that the amendments are marginal and that most of them will make the document more impressive than before — the Western European Union Assembly has made a real contribution to trying to find some sort of solution to an agonisingly difficult problem, the solution of which is in the interests not only of Cypriots and the Greeks and Turks but of the whole of the Western Alliance itself. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur.

We shall now proceed to consider the amendments, some of which have already been accepted by the Committee and by the Rapporteur.

Amendment No. 3, tabled by MM. Roper, Dankert and van Ooijen, reads as follows :

In the second paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after "Turkey" insert "and between the communities in Cyprus".

Does anyone wish to speak to this amendment ?...

Mr. CERMOLACCE (*France*) (Translation). — I shall abstain.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — If nobody wishes to speak, I shall put the amendment to the vote.

The amendment is agreed to.

Amendment No. 2, tabled by Mr. Krieg and accepted by the Committee, reads as follows :

The President (continued)

1. In the fifth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "contributes" and insert "contributed".

2. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I request the floor on a point of order. Can you confirm that this amendment is accepted by the Committee?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — That is what the Rapporteur told me.

Mr. CRITCHLEY (*United Kingdom*). — I do not think that we do accept this recommendation. We prefer Amendment No. 7, because I fear that if Mr. Krieg's amendment were to be carried we would lose the balance that we have striven — I think successfully — to maintain between the interests of Greece and Turkey and this might be open to misinterpretation. We should look, perhaps, at Amendment No. 7, which perhaps makes the point that Mr. Krieg is trying to make, but at the same time keeps the balance of aspiration with regard to the EEC between the Greeks and the Turks.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Krieg.

Mr. KRIEG (*France*) (Translation). — In order to avoid any argument on this point, I withdraw the first part of my Amendment No. 2, but maintain the second part.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The first part of Amendment No. 2 is therefore withdrawn.

I have before me Amendment No. 7 tabled by Mr. Roper — which is on the lines desired by Mr. Krieg — to replace the fifth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation with the following text :

"Believing that the continued presence of British defence installations in Cyprus, in accordance with international agreements to which representatives of the Cyprus communities are parties, contributes to the defence of Europe as a whole ;"

Mr. KRIEG (*France*) (Translation). — I request the floor.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Krieg.

Mr. KRIEG (*France*) (Translation). — It is my intention to defend the amendment tabled by Mr. Roper, but I have the impression that you are making a mistake, Mr. President, since Amendment No. 7 is designed to replace the fifth paragraph of the preamble with a text that is completely different from that desired by me.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*) (Translation). — Mr. President, can you explain to us what procedure you intend to adopt for the votes on these amendments? It seems, in fact, as though there were some confusion...

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The position is quite clear. (*Laughter*) Certain amendments have been accepted by Mr. Critchley, the author of the report, whereas he has expressed no views on a number of others, which will in consequence have to be discussed.

In the interests of clarity in this debate, I would point out that I am first bringing up for discussion the amendments accepted by the Rapporteur and which bear on the preamble to the recommendation.

I shall then call for discussion of the amendments bearing on the operative text itself.

Accordingly, I have before me Amendment No. 7, tabled by Mr. Roper, which I have just read out.

Does anybody wish to speak to this amendment?...

Are there any objections?...

Amendment No. 7 is agreed to.

I have before me Amendment No. 8, tabled by Mr. Roper and accepted by the Rapporteur, which proposes to insert the following new paragraph after the fifth paragraph of the preamble :

"Convinced that the United Nations force in Cyprus, to which three members of the European Community have contributed, is playing an essential rôle in the return to normal conditions in the island ;"

Does anybody wish to speak to this amendment?...

Are there any objections?...

Amendment No. 8 is agreed to.

I now have before me a number of amendments which have not been accepted by the Rapporteur or on which the Committee has not given its views.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*) (Translation). — Mr. President, can you tell me whether Amendment No. 9 has or has not been accepted by the Rapporteur? It seems to me to be on the lines of Amendment No. 7.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — We have not yet got that far.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*) (Translation). — It was my understanding that we were going to consider first of all the amendments accepted by the Rapporteur...

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — That is correct, but only those which are applicable to the preamble, whereas Amendment No. 9 applies to the text of the recommendation proper.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*) (Translation). — Can you give me firm confirmation, Mr. President, that Amendment No. 9 has not been accepted by the Committee?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — It has not yet come up for discussion.

I have before me Amendment No. 4, which proposes the deletion of the sixth paragraph of the preamble.

I call Mr. Roper.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I gave some of the reasons for the amendment when I spoke this morning. As I pointed out, the amendment, which proposes to leave out the sixth paragraph of the preamble, deals with two distinct matters. The first is the question of the United Nations having their own observation satellite capacity. I understand that it may be possible for the Committee to find a formula that would go some way to meet me on this matter.

There remains, however, the matter to which my colleague Dr. Mabon referred and to which others referred this morning, namely, the question of the interpretation of the Montreux Convention which we need to consider in the light of the reply which we have had from the Council of Ministers. I should be glad to hear what the Rapporteur of the Committee has to say on this matter, because I believe that, whatever is done this afternoon, it is very important that our Committee should, in the light of the report which we have had from the Council of Ministers, give considerable further thought to the question of the interpretation of the Montreux Convention and come forward with some proposal such as, for example, that the North Atlantic Council

should consider the appropriate interpretation of this somewhat complicated text. I should be glad to hear the reply of the Committee to this probing amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I give you the floor, Mr. Rapporteur.

Mr. CRITCHLEY (*United Kingdom*). — I accept that the amendment is a probing amendment. Therefore, I would be prepared to alter the first part of it to soften the recommendation that the United Nations should have its own observation satellite capability. I suggest that any such capability should be available to the Secretary-General. By that I mean that other powers should provide the machinery and therefore meet the expense of such a satellite surveillance capacity and that it should be made available to the Secretary-General. I do not wish the United Nations to get into the satellite business as such and to construct satellite capacity. That was not the intention of the first part of the amendment. I hope that that concession will make Mr. Roper a little happier.

The new paragraph would read :

“Calling for satellite observation capability to be made available to the Secretary-General of the United Nations;”

I think that would get round the problem of the United Nations being obliged to pay for such capability.

As for the second half of the amendment, I think that we should stand firm on what we consider at this stage of the debate to be our reading of the Montreux Convention. I wish to remind the Assembly of an interesting passage in Mr. Inan's speech when he mentioned the possibility — I do not think he put it any higher — of a Soviet base in Cyprus and compared that by implication with the possibility of a Soviet aircraft carrier being allowed through the Straits.

I do not accept that there is a relationship between these two ideas, but I believe at this stage it would be helpful for the Assembly to stress the standard conventional western interpretation of the Montreux Convention because we know from the answers given by the Council of Ministers that it is doing precisely this exercise at the moment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Mr. Rapporteur, do you accept the amendment which has been tabled and which is under discussion, designed to leave out the sixth paragraph of the

The President (continued)

preamble? The aim is to allay Mr. Roper's anxieties.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — May I ask whether Mr Critchley will give an undertaking that the Defence Committee, in the light of the reply from the Council, will make further studies on this difficult problem? Unless he is able to do so, I must press my amendment.

Mr. CRITCHLEY (*United Kingdom*). — Mr. Roper knows very well that the Defence Committee has a heavier load of work at the moment than it has had for some time. I would gladly give such an assurance, but I am a little doubtful as to the time scale. It would be particularly difficult if Mr. Roper wanted a study to be undertaken between the present time and May, but if he were to insist on a study being carried out between the present time and next November-December, the Committee would gladly meet his wishes.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The Committee has given an answer which I might describe as of a temporising nature.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — No.

The PRESIDENT. — Yes, that is so. (Translation). — Nevertheless, I put Mr. Roper's amendment to the vote.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*) (Translation). — Mr. President...

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — You have had your say, Mr. Roper. The Rapporteur has given you an answer. We cannot proceed with a debate in these conditions.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*) (Translation). — On a point of order...

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The Rapporteur has answered your question. You cannot speak again except by asking for the floor. You intervene constantly in the discussion in which we are engaged. Everybody must have his turn to speak, otherwise we must change our procedure.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I have been assured that I have the right to reply to a debate on an amendment. I trust, Mr. President, that you will follow the rules of procedure.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — You do not have the floor. You only have the right to

reply by asking for the floor; this is not a public place; we are in an assembly which has rules of procedure.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — May I request the suspension of the sitting while you, Mr. President, consult the Clerk on the question of procedure. I understand that I have the right to reply to a debate on an amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — You had the floor, and the Rapporteur replied to you. Everything was voted on normally. If you ask for the floor again, we shall never finish with this debate. The Assembly is sovereign, and a vote will put an end to this debate. I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. CRITCHLEY (*United Kingdom*). — I understand that Mr. Roper is prepared to withdraw the amendment on the assurances which I have given him.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I want to assist the work of the Assembly, but unfortunately, Mr. President, in your high office you seem to be denying me the possibility of assisting the Assembly's work. What I am attempting to do, in the light of what I have been told by the Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, is to withdraw the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — No one had any such intention, Mr. Roper. You have had the floor as often as you asked, I might even say, if I may, a little more than your share. Unfortunately, at a certain moment your microphone was not working because you had put your hand on it. There was therefore no interpretation and the majority of members could not understand what was going on. Do you withdraw your amendment?

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I am sorry, Mr. President, if we have managed to misunderstand each other twice because of translation difficulties or the fact that I have had the folly of speaking your language. I have done my best to assist the Assembly. I have a right to reply before a vote is taken. Having given my reply it was my intention, since an amendment has been accepted by the Rapporteur and in view of the assurances that he has given, to withdraw the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The amendment is withdrawn. The Rapporteur would like to clarify the position.

Mr. CRITCHLEY (*United Kingdom*). — May I inform the Assembly that a new paragraph is therefore substituted as follows :

“Calling for satellite observation capability to be made available to the Secretary-General of the United Nations ;”

Then the final paragraph would reiterate the earlier recommendation calling for the correct application of the Montreux Convention to prevent the passage of aircraft-carriers through the Dardanelles. In other words, we have divided the two recommendations on those lines.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I shall put the Rapporteur's motion to the vote.

SEVERAL REPRESENTATIVES. — What are we voting on ?

Mr. CERMOLACCE (*France*) (Translation). — We have not had the French translation ; we would like to hear it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Here it is : We are calling for satellite observation capability to be made available to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

I think that the text is a general one and does not call for any particular reservations.

Are there any more observations ? I put the text to the vote.

The text is adopted.

We shall now examine the recommendation.

Mr. KRIEG (*France*) (Translation). — I ask for the floor.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Krieg.

Mr. KRIEG (*France*) (Translation). — I am sorry, Mr. President. We are trying to do a serious job. Mr. Critchley has gone to considerable trouble to submit a report which, whether we agree with it or not, is well presented. Now we are in the middle of voting on an amendment for which we do not have the text. I did not understand the interpretation. If we must work under such conditions, it is not worth while, but a waste of time for everybody.

The text is worthy of discussion and analysis. We are discussing something which we do not have ; this is not a good method. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Mr. Krieg, I take note of your remarks which are perfectly

judicious, but a number of amendments has been tabled, and the Committee has expressed itself through its Rapporteur, saying that it was prepared to accept some of these amendments without discussion. I therefore had to put them to the vote. As the Committee has changed its opinion during the course of the debates, the method is certainly not very sound and gives rise to much misunderstanding. It would therefore have been better if the Committee had studied these amendments beforehand and provided us with specific texts for insertion into the recommendation or its preamble.

I am now obliged to proceed to the recommendation proper.

The text of Amendment No. 5 is as follows :

In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “NATO and” and insert “their partners and allies in Europe and in particular”.

I call Mr. Roper.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I beg to move the amendment standing in my name, along with those of Mr. Dankert and Mr. van Ooijen. As you have not given us any information on this subject, although we have now passed from the preamble to the recommendations, and you assured us that we would first consider the amendments to the recommendations which were accepted by the Committee, I have to assume that neither this nor any other of the amendments to the recommendations are acceptable to the Committee, in spite of assurances which I had previously received, but that is what I have now come to expect. I would, however, ask, Mr. President, whether you would accept, and whether the Assembly would accept, that this amendment be moved with one verbal change. I will read it slowly so that it can be translated. I understand that in this form it may be acceptable to the Rapporteur. I wish to leave out “NATO”, for the reasons I expressed this morning, that I believe it should not be the institution as such, and to replace it with the words “their partners and allies and in particular”. That is to move it exactly as on the order paper but leaving out the words “in Europe” in the English text and the word “européens” in the French text.

I beg to move the amendment, and I trust that on this occasion I will, at the end of the debate, have the right of reply.

Mr. CRITCHLEY (*United Kingdom*). — I will accept the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Does anyone else wish to speak ?...

I put the amendment to the vote.

The amendment is adopted.

We shall now examine Amendment No. 1 tabled by Mr. Krieg to leave out paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper and insert :

"4. Foster the accession of Greece to the EEC ;"

I call Mr. Krieg.

Mr. KRIEG (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I explained about this amendment in my speech this morning. Having since heard the explanations of the Turkish Representative who submitted to us his country's point of view, I propose slightly to modify my text so as to foster the accession of Greece and Turkey to the EEC.

I think my amendment is preferable to that of Mr. Roper because the agreements associating Greece and Turkey with the EEC already exist. They had been suspended so far as Greece was concerned and maintained for Turkey. It is unnecessary to express the hope that these association agreements should be developed. They exist and are developing normally.

It is to be hoped that Greece and Turkey will become full members of the EEC as quickly as possible. This is the purpose of my Amendment No. 1, and I ask the Assembly to adopt it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Roper.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I do not think there is a great deal of difference between Mr. Krieg and myself on this matter, particularly as I understand that he has amended his own amendment to add Turkey to Greece, and therefore we should read his amendment as "Foster the accession of Greece and Turkey to the EEC". I think I am right in understanding it in that light. I used the formulation in my amendment — this is why I prefer my text to his — because the association agreements themselves envisaged the eventual membership of both Greece and Turkey in the Community, and it is merely a question of seeing a faster development of those association agreements which already exist rather than taking other initiatives within the Community. I do not, therefore, think there is a great deal of difference between us on this matter, except that one would follow along the lines of an international agreement which is already

agreed by all nine members of the existing Community, and the other would require a new negotiation, which might create difficulties.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Krieg.

Mr. KRIEG (*France*) (Translation). — I reply to Mr. Roper to say simply that there is in fact very little difference between his amendment and mine, except that mine provides for an additional step — the accession of these two countries to the EEC. If, as I hope, my amendment is adopted, his would automatically fall since it does not go so far as mine.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Dr. Mabon.

Dr. MABON (*United Kingdom*). — Mr. Roper's amendment is much more practical than that proposed by Mr. Krieg. Mr. Roper's amendment accepts the fact that there are difficulties for both Greece and Turkey to accede to full membership of the EEC at once. I wonder if anyone has ever consulted the Governments of Turkey and Greece about the problems associated with immediate accession.

The Governments of Greece and Turkey are not knocking on the door of the European Council of Ministers and demanding immediate accession to the treaty as full members, nor are the Council of Ministers saying to Greece and Turkey : "I am sorry, you cannot become full members." It is a simple economic fact that Greece and Turkey are in a difficult situation with regard to coming into the Common Market as complete members.

With respect to my colleague, Mr. Krieg, it is therefore much more practical to accept Mr. Roper's amendment rather than academically to argue for what is not possible politically at the present time.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Leynen.

Mr. LEYNEN (*Belgium*) (Translation). — I support Dr. Mabon's point of view. Greece and Turkey have association status. Greece's status as an associate was suspended for a certain time. It is not realistic to consider full membership either now or in the next few years. That is why, in my opinion, it would be better to take up Mr. Roper's text calling for the development of the association agreements between Greece and Turkey and the Community. In my opinion that is the best text.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Krieg.

Mr. KRIEG (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I had some feelings of anxiety a few moments ago, and I feel still more anxious now, since I wonder whether we are being correctly interpreted and whether what we are saying is understandable in a language other than our own. What Mr. Leynen says leads me to believe that it is I who am expressing myself in a language that I do not understand or that others do not understand.

I had another example of this with Mr. Critchley, who in his reply just now put a whole series of remarks into my mouth which I had not made. If he will be good enough to refer, when the text appears, to my statement of this morning he will observe that I never made the remarks he has attributed to me. Similarly, I never made those that are being attributed to me now; I never said it was necessary for Greece and Turkey to accede to the EEC immediately, or tomorrow. I merely said that as these two States already had the status of countries associated with the EEC, there were two solutions: either we consider that all is well as it stands, and that no further progress should be made; or else we consider that we must take another step forward later on.

Now — and I think that I understood the excellent French spoken by the Representative of the Turkish Government who is present here — I heard him voice the reproach that I had only mentioned Greece and not his own country. But in doing so I had taken the rhetorical precaution of saying that I could not prejudge what Turkey desired, not having heard an appeal from the Turkish side.

What I understand today is that Greece and Turkey wish to join the EEC some day or other. It is a desire that we must encourage, and we hope that one day it will be realised. We do not have to think that this will happen on 1st January 1975, or even on 1st January 1976, but if we stand still where we are now, that means that we are displaying no real interest in or attention to the wishes of two countries which I find eminently congenial.

For that reason I maintain my amendment, which has some meaning, against that of Mr. Roper which — I hope he will forgive me — implies satisfaction with the existing state of affairs.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Waltmans.

Mr. WALTMANS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — Mr. President, in view of the consequences that the United Kingdom's membership alone is already going to have on the European Community's regional fund, I do not believe it is realistic at the present time to press for full membership of the EEC for Turkey and Greece. I believe that it is more realistic, more practical and thus more proper to support the amendment from Mr. Roper, Mr. Dankert and Mr. van Ooijen.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Sieglerschmidt.

Mr. SIEGLERSCHMIDT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, just two comments on what Mr. Krieg has said. It is true that he merely spoke of "fostering", and that no condition was laid down with regard to time. But in the first place it is a commonplace that in politics it is a matter of when and how something is said. And secondly I would point out that we are still suffering from certain digestive difficulties with regard to the three new accessions. That should also be borne in mind here.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Krieg.

Mr. KRIEG (*France*) (Translation). — I am in agreement with Mr. Roper in putting forward a proposal which will, I believe, satisfy everybody, since I attach great value to my text. This proposal is to consolidate Amendments Nos. 1 and 6 to give the following wording: "Develop the association agreements of Greece and Turkey with the European Community with a view to fostering the accession of these countries to the EEC." (*Applause*)

Mr. LEYNEN (*Belgium*) (Translation). — If you prefer that, I think it is already inherent in the status of an associate member and that it is rather a pleonasm; nevertheless, I associate myself with this wording.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Mr. Leynen, as far as I am concerned, I think that this is an evolving situation. Association constitutes a beginning and will culminate in accession.

I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. CRITCHLEY (*United Kingdom*). — As the discussion has proceeded, I must confess that I have come more and more to favour the original form of words in the amendment. None the less, circumstances being as they are, I would be

Mr. Critchley (continued)

equally happy to accept the compromise that has recently been reached, namely, to foster the association agreements with Greece and Turkey in order to further the accession of these countries to the European Community. This blend of all three ideas should commend itself to the Assembly.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I believed for a moment that the *entente cordiale* was reigning supreme but, alas, the Rapporteur has snatched that happy moment of agreement.

I had hoped that the formulation Mr. Krieg put forward in French might have read in English along the following lines: "Develop the association agreements between Greece and Turkey towards the objective of their full membership of the European Community." I hope that would be acceptable to both Mr. Krieg and the Rapporteur as it is to me.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — At the conclusion of this exhaustive and impassioned debate, Mr. Krieg and Mr. Roper have reached agreement and are presenting to us a text that is not a compromise but a great improvement. I put it to the vote.

The text is agreed to.

Mr. Krieg has tabled Amendment No. 2, which proposes that paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper be left out.

I call Mr. Krieg.

Mr. KRIEG (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, the amendment in question is one on which I gave a lengthy explanation this morning, and I was sorry to see that Mr. Critchley understood the opposite of what I said. I do not want at this hour of the day to re-open a discussion which has already been marked by a certain confusion, but in the end I ask myself to what extent this report should not suffer the same fate as mine did yesterday, of being referred back to Committee for clarification. The fact nevertheless remains that I was basing myself on the reply given by the Council to Written Question 148 which I had addressed to it. That reply indicated that the seven governments of WEU, of which the government of Mr. Critchley was one, were in no way inclined to link the problems of British sovereignty over the bases in Cyprus with the whole complex of questions involved in the defence of Europe. I said in conclusion this

morning, guessing what the fate of my amendment would be, that I thought it unprofitable to urge the Council of Ministers to reconsider a position which I, for my part, deem to be a wise one. For this once that I approve the position of the Council of Ministers, I am sure that the Assembly will not approve mine.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Waltmans.

Mr. WALTMANS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — Mr. President, have I understood aright that Mr. Krieg is proposing sending the Critchley report back to the Committee?

Mr. KRIEG (*France*) (Translation). — Certainly not! I shall end up by thinking that I am speaking double Dutch. I believe that for a number of sessions past the interpretation has not always been good; and I say this here as I have already said it at the Council of Europe. I never asked for reference back to Committee. I simply said that there had been so much confusion that we would end up by wondering whether it would not be appropriate to refer the text back to the Committee; but I never requested reference back in a formal way.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — There has been some confusion then.

I call Mr. Waltmans.

Mr. WALTMANS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — This is not the fault of the interpreting, Mr. President. Mr. Krieg was a little unclear in the way he expressed himself.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — My dear colleagues, we must put an end to this debate on linguistics and syntax. In reality, we understand very clearly what Mr. Krieg wants, and it must, moreover, be recognised that interpretation must be proving a delicate matter.

Having cleared up that point, I am going to put the amendment submitted by Mr. Krieg to the vote.

Mr. CERMOLACCE (*France*) (Translation). — I do not want to add to the confusion of this debate, but the text of the amendment has not been distributed, so that we do not know exactly on what we are being called upon to vote. Perhaps our colleague, Mr. Krieg, could clarify briefly the bearing of his text.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Krieg.

Mr. KRIEG (*France*) (Translation). — I do not wish to encroach unduly on the time of this Assembly, but I owe it to myself to recall that, in the written question that I addressed to the Council of Ministers on 25th July last, I asked what guarantees the member States of WEU might expect from the British Government with regard to the maintenance of its bases in Cyprus. On 28th October 1974, the Council of Ministers communicated to me their reply, in which they stated that the seven countries, with the United Kingdom among them, had agreed that the London and Zürich agreements did not necessarily constitute the basis for any possible settlement that might come about in the island of Cyprus. Now, these agreements today constitute the legal foundation for the continued presence of British bases in Cyprus. The question which arises for the future is, therefore, whether Europe should insist that the agreement which must be concluded should cover the maintenance of British sovereignty in this island. As I have mentioned all too briefly, this affair has a certain odour of colonialism because of British sovereignty over these bases.

I would repeat what I said this morning: in view of the position adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Seven, with the British Government among them, it did not seem to me profitable to be more Catholic than the Pope, and for that reason I suggest that this paragraph should be purely and simply deleted.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Roper.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — Could I ask whether the President should have his ear-phones on? I want first to ask the technical question whether if this amendment is adopted — that is the second part of Mr. Krieg's Amendment No. 2 — under the procedure which you, Mr. President, are following, Amendment No. 9 which is in my name falls. I should like your ruling on that technical point first.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — That appears to be a correct interpretation.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I am most grateful to you for your interpretation, Mr. President, and it is because of that, and not for any other reason, that I feel I have to oppose Mr. Krieg's amendment. I appreciate the point on international law that he has raised, and in paragraph 44 of the explanatory memorandum the Rapporteur, and Mr. Critchley in particular, has already drawn attention to the reply by the

Council of Ministers to Written Question 148. I pointed out that the six other WEU members are not legally bound. That is why I felt that the formulation in my Amendment No. 9 which did not raise the difficult question of the sovereign bases but also covered various defence installations which are outside the sovereign bases was a much more satisfactory formulation. I therefore have to oppose the Krieg amendment in the hope that the Assembly will subsequently amend the original recommendation in the way proposed in my Amendment No. 9.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — What does the Committee think?

Mr. CRITCHLEY (*United Kingdom*). — Mr. Krieg seems to be advocating the fate for my report which befell his own yesterday. I would not like that to happen to anyone. But I have to confess that I am opposed very strongly to his amendment and would be very happy to recognise and accept on behalf of the Committee Mr. Roper's amendment in its place.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Since the Committee has accepted Mr. Roper's amendment, I shall put it to the vote. (*Protests*)

Mr. KRIEG (*France*) (Translation). — Since my amendment is furthest from the text under discussion, it should be taken by the Assembly first.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The Assembly must obviously decide, but I thought it better to consider Mr. Roper's amendment immediately since it had been accepted by the Rapporteur. (*Murmurs of dissent*)

I call Mr. Roper.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I defend Mr. Krieg's position here. I asked you earlier, Mr. President, whether there were any other amendments accepted by the Committee and you assured me that there were not. If there were, however, you should have announced it at that time. It is quite unfair at this stage, after Mr. Krieg has moved his amendment, for this other amendment suddenly to be introduced. As I understand it, the interpretation you have just given me is that this recommendation should be voted on first, and that if it is defeated, as I hope that it will be, we proceed to the other, but it would not be fair play if we were to follow any other practice at this time.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The Assembly is sovereign. If it so wishes, I shall put Mr. Krieg's amendment to the vote first.

The President (continued)

Two amendments were tabled simultaneously. The Committee agreed to one, and I therefore considered it my duty to put it to the vote first. Its sponsor now withdraws to some extent and suggests that the other amendment should be put to the vote first, since it moves the total elimination of the paragraph.

Mr. de NIET (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — On a point of order, Mr. President. It is not a question whether Mr. Roper wishes that. It is a question of what is the right ruling, which is very different.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — To put an end to this debate, which has become, if I may say so in the presence of the Ambassador, somewhat Byzantine, I put Mr. Krieg's amendment, which goes further than that of Mr. Roper, to the vote.

The amendment is rejected.

I put Mr. Roper's amendment, which has been accepted by the Committee, to the vote.

The amendment is adopted.

You will notice all the same that this prolonged debate is a demonstration of the vitality of the Assembly. (*Smiles*)

Mr. de MONTESQUIOU (*France*). — Mr. President, I would point out that Byzantium is in Turkey. (*Laughter*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Excuse me, but Byzantium was never in Turkey; Constantinople, later Istanbul, is in Turkey. Byzantium was in Greece. I refer to history.

We now come to the last amendment which has been tabled, No. 10, submitted by Mr. Mattick and Mr. Richter and worded as follows:

1. At the beginning of the draft recommendation proper, insert the following paragraph:

"1. Request member governments of WEU to examine to what extent humanitarian aid for the 200,000 refugees on Cyprus could be enhanced, particularly, whether through rapid deliveries from reserve defence stocks the survival of those concerned through the winter could be ensured; furthermore to appeal to the responsible States to dissolve the refugee camps and to house the refugees in civilised quarters;"

2. Leave out paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper.

I call Mr. Richter to move the amendment.

Mr. RICHTER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, in our preliminary discussions it was agreed with the Rapporteur that provision should be made for an amendment of this sort. The Rapporteur pointed out that he welcomed Mr. Mattick's suggestion to place the humanitarian aspects firmly in the foreground. I believe that also reflects the feeling in the Committee.

I would also make room for the very minor amendment to the recommendation that the request be made to governments and not to defence ministers direct. I believe this is the right approach.

I would ask the Assembly to support this recommendation. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Dr. Mabon.

Dr. MABON (*United Kingdom*). — This is an admirable amendment. I support it completely except for the final paragraph of the first part where, in the English text, it says:

"furthermore to appeal to the responsible States to dissolve the refugee camps and to house the refugees in civilised quarters;"

I suggest that such a recommendation is quite unreal and impracticable at present. There is not the accommodation in the various towns in Cyprus. Some of them have been devastated. Some of them are occupied by the Turkish forces. Some of them have suffered in battle. It is unreal for anyone who knows anything of the situation in the southern area of Cyprus to believe that it is within the competence of the British Government or anybody else to dismantle the camps that are there and put the refugees into proper housing accommodation.

I have no doubt that my colleagues Mattick and Richter want this to be so. I certainly wish this to be so. However, it would make us a very academic, unreal and unpolitical assembly if we were to make this request seriously when it is impracticable so to do. I strongly support the amendment but believe that we should delete the portion beginning "furthermore to appeal", because what is requested is not possible in December 1974 with a winter coming up.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). — I want to say a few words in support of what my colleague Dr. Dickson Mabon has said. We should not include in the amendment at the last minute utterly unreal and unrealistic sentiments. Any of us who know the situation in the Cyprus refugee camps know that there is no possibility in the foreseeable future of better quarters being found for the refugees inside the areas where they are now. The best we can hope for, which opens a more controversial debate which we certainly could not undertake at this hour, is that we should hasten the return of the people in the camps to their own homes, either where they lived before or in another part of Cyprus. To put in a request such as that beginning "furthermore" in this context would be misunderstood and misrepresented, because what the overwhelming majority of the people in these camps want at the moment is, not better quarters, but to get home.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Leynen.

Mr. LEYNEN (*Belgium*) (Translation). — The statistics mention 200,000 refugees of Greek origin and 30,000 refugees of Turkish origin. The figure of 200,000 given in the amendment might lend itself to ambiguity; I merely ask if it would not be better to give no figure and say: "the refugees of the two communities", thus avoiding any ambiguity.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Schwenske.

Mr. SCHWENCKE (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, we all know that the refugees are in dire need. We should do ourselves the credit in this Assembly of planning and thinking beyond the current situation we have had described. Even if our decision goes beyond what is possible at the moment, I think it is sufficiently important to be adopted by this Assembly. I feel we would do well to leave this amendment by our colleagues Mr. Mattick and Mr. Richter just as it stands. We should not quarrel about the number of countries, but adopt this amendment in its present form, thus making its intention and its aim quite clear.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Critchley.

Mr. CRITCHLEY (*United Kingdom*). — My instinct, even at this late hour, is to oppose this amendment. It hardly moves the burden very far — or at least that sentiment applies to the first part of the amendment. I agree with my colleague, Dr. Mabon, that it is impracticable to go beyond the original recommendation. The question of any settlement in Cyprus conceivably is made more difficult rather than easier by the construction of dwellings which might be of a permanent character.

I believe that the movers of the amendment have found themselves in a situation where their hearts have overruled their heads. If they were to look again at recommendation 5, they would see that it is a sensible recommendation, carefully worded, which goes as far as it is reasonable to go. I suggest that we reject the amendment and hold to the original text.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Dr. Mabon.

Dr. MABON (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, Mr. President, you have been very lenient with the Assembly and indeed have been very sensible in dealing with earlier amendments. You have even allowed verbal amendments to amendments and you have done very well. However, I venture to suggest that it is very unfair to those of us who support part of the amendment to have to agree to the rest. Is it not possible to divide the amendment into two — the first dealing with the first section of the paragraph and the second with the second section of the first paragraph. I think we are all agreed that we could re-arrange paragraph 2; there is no difficulty about that. However, I would find it a little difficult to vote for an amendment with which I sympathise, despite the Rapporteur, if I am also obliged to vote for the second part of the first section.

I understand that the missing words in the English text are the words "at present". Unfortunately, the words "in future" should have been included. It would be irresponsible for any British parliamentarian to vote for an amendment including the phrase "at present". It is not possible to do so. I appeal to you, Mr. President, to allow a vote on both parts of the amendment rather than to take them as a whole.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I cannot accept your suggestion, no matter how much I sympathise with your feelings.

Mr. Leynen made a useful suggestion, for it is not known whether there are 200,000 or

The President (continued)

230,000 refugees. Since the Committee rejects the amendment, and although I share the opinion of a number of those present, it is not possible to start drafting again in plenary session.

I shall therefore put the amendment as tabled to the vote.

Mr. RICHTER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I want to oppose the splitting up of this amendment. I believe that our colleague's objections in this respect are covered by what is said in our amendment. Our amendment does not rule out the possibility of negotiations between the two communities in Cyprus still taking place, and of the refugees returning to their own homes. The ideal — the best solution — would be if good sense prevailed among people in Europe, and if two NATO partners which are engaged in very friendly talks were to decide — in view of the distress in Cyprus — to come to such a settlement. There is no question of rebuilding, or anything of that sort. Plenty of scope is left for interpretation. We are calling for common sense in dealing with humanitarian problems, and are of course also thinking here of the Governments of Turkey and Greece. That is a good base to start from. If the time factor is to be allowed for, I might be prepared to insert the phrase "as soon as possible" somewhere, in order to state expressly that it should be brought about as soon as possible. But please do not divide up the amendment; that would detract from its effectiveness.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Mr. Richter, you have tabled an amendment which has been slightly modified as a result of a judicious remark made by Mr. Leynen. It is not possible to draft a new amendment.

Does anyone else wish to speak ?...

I put the amendment as tabled, together with Mr. Leynen's suggestion, and as rejected by the Committee, to the vote.

The amendment is adopted. (Applause)

Dr. MABON (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order. If you, Mr. President, can accept an amendment in the sensible way in which you did to delete the figure of 200,000 in respect of the refugees — and I agree with that matter — and if the proposer of the motion can suggest that the words "as soon as possible" be added, why is it not possible for the words "as soon as pos-

sible" to be adopted in the resolution? Surely it is not outside the bounds of competence of the President to try to reach an agreed solution. I have not voted for or against the motion because I object to the fact that we cannot insert the words "as soon as possible". In future, Sir, I appeal to you if you are to allow one verbal amendment to allow two, three or four amendments.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I am sorry, Dr. Mabon, you asked to speak on a point of order and have spoken about something quite different.

The fact is that the amendment was tabled and then modified as a result of reasonable comments made within the Assembly. That amendment has been voted and adopted, although rejected by the Committee; consequently, the debate is closed. It is too easy to ask to speak on a point of order and then deal with something quite different.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I should like to explain why, with great reluctance, I had to vote against the amendment tabled by Mr. Richter and his colleague. I did not do so because I was in any way unsympathetic towards the humanitarian objectives which I know he and his colleagues have at heart but because, unfortunately, owing to the procedures of the Assembly and the fact that it was not possible to have as much detailed discussion and consultation as was desirable on such a delicate matter, we had a text which in some ways could be misinterpreted. That is why I reluctantly had to vote against the amendment. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Mr. Roper, I take note of what you say but I would remind you that Rule 26, paragraph 6, states: "When the examination of the text has been concluded, only explanations of vote may be made before the vote is taken on the text as a whole."

The incident is closed.

I shall put the whole draft recommendation proposed by the Rapporteur to the vote.

Mr. CERMOLACCE (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, we ask for a roll-call vote.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — We shall take a vote by roll-call.

The roll-call will begin with the name of Sir Frederic Bennett.

The President (continued)

The voting is open.

(A vote by roll-call was then taken)

(*Sir John Rodgers, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair in place of Mr. Nessler*)

The PRESIDENT. — Does anybody else wish to vote ?...

The voting is closed.

The result of the vote is as follows¹:

Number of votes cast	53
Ayes	48
Noes	3
Abstentions	2

*The amended draft recommendation is adopted*².

Mr. de MONTESQUIOU (*France*) (Translation). — What is the number of abstentions ?

The PRESIDENT. — I understand you are saying there is an extra abstention to be recorded.

Mr. de MONTESQUIOU (Translation). — Yes, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. — I will correct the situation immediately. This is the first time I have had the honour to preside over your gathering and I crave your indulgence and goodwill for the rest of the session. I apologise, Mr. de Montesquiou. The record has now been corrected.

Mr. WALTSMANS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — Now I am getting a little confused, Mr. President. The result of the vote has not been given correctly. I heard "contre" three or four times, while you now mention only two votes against. Are you counting votes against as only worth one-half ?

The PRESIDENT. — I can only rely on the figures as given me by the Clerk. We have three names down here shown as having abstained. If there are more members than that, I can tell you — perhaps I should not — the names of the three people who abstained. That is the position.

The final vote is as I announced it, three against and three abstentions. Therefore, the motion is carried.

1. See page 25.

2. See page 28.

Mr. PAGE (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order.

The PRESIDENT. — This is a little out of order, but I will allow you to speak.

Mr. PAGE (*United Kingdom*). — I was hoping to say on this item of business before it is closed on behalf of the Conservative members' delegation to the Assembly that we wish to dissociate ourselves completely from Mr. Roper's unjustified and discourteous criticism of your predecessor in the Chair during the debate.

The PRESIDENT. — I am new in the Chair, but I think if you wish to express such a point of view, it must be by way of a motion. However, you have made your point.

Dr. MABON (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order. I request you, Mr. President, as the distinguished Chairman of our gathering, to ask the President and his colleagues, the Vice-Presidents, to look into the question of procedure on so-called verbal amendments which we in the House of Commons sometimes call manuscript amendments. I am in favour of manuscript or verbal amendments.

We have seen at least four examples of verbal amendments by the Rapporteur and by individual representatives here today, but the President would not allow a suggested verbal amendment by Mr. Richter supported by me in the last debate.

I wish to know how the Chair distinguishes between one verbal amendment and another. Either all verbal amendments are in order or no verbal amendments are in order. There surely cannot be any distinction. However, I may speak in ignorance. Therefore, I wish to know from the Chair at the earliest possible time what procedure the Chair adopts to distinguish between one verbal amendment and another. I feel particularly aggrieved by this afternoon's business.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Dr. Mabon. I think you have raised a very important point, but it is not possible to criticise the selection of the Chair as to the choice and order of amendments. Nevertheless, the point you have raised is one which will be urgently submitted to the Procedure Committee for report and then I am sure that whoever is in the Chair will report the findings of that Committee. Thank you for raising the point.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order.

The PRESIDENT. — We must get on with the business. We have distinguished Ministers from other countries present who wish to speak. I do not think we should continue with points of order. There will be other occasions in Committee when these points can be raised.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I understand by implication that reference may have been made to something I addressed earlier to the Chair in a moment of heat in the Assembly.

If in any way I cast aspersions on the Chair, I would of course wish to withdraw them. I was out of the Chamber only in order to check the text of my remarks for I did not wish to cast any aspersion on the behaviour of the President.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Roper. The Assembly accepts your statement.

4. Address by Mr. Matthöfer, Minister of Research and Technology of the Federal Republic of Germany

The PRESIDENT. — We have had the distinguished Minister with us for some considerable time. I will therefore ask Mr. Hans Matthöfer, Minister of Research and Technology of the Federal Republic of Germany, to address us.

Mr. Matthöfer, I apologise for keeping you so long from speaking to us.

Mr. MATTHOFER (*Minister of Research and Technology of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I would like to convey my thanks for the kind invitation from President Nessler to address the Assembly today. It was a call I willingly responded to.

European policy on research and technology is faced by a number of fundamental decisions, decisions in which the WEU Assembly, which has rendered great services to the cause of Europe, should certainly have its say.

I want to show by way of two examples what developments in European co-operation must be given thought at the present time, and which solutions we should in my view work for. First there is the matter of space co-operation — this point will, since it is on the Assembly's order paper, loom largest, although without anticipating your Rapporteur, Mr. Warren — while the second concerns problems of energy policy, which I think are particularly urgent, and where again,

Mr. President, I do not wish to anticipate you in your capacity as Rapporteur. And finally I shall make a few general remarks about a European approach to research and technology.

The peaceful exploration and use of space provides a good example of an opportunity for successful co-ordination and integration of national interests in Europe. Success here depends on a willingness to forego national plans in favour of European projects, and to Europeanise national projects, which means merging them into joint projects. It also depends on a major effort by Europe to establish an adequate and balanced European space programme.

There are further grounds which justify this major effort and expenditure. We have to pave the way for new scientific and technological knowledge, and create conditions for utilising space technology applications, e.g. in telecommunications and earth resource surveys. The projects decided on do not of course cover the entire spectrum of the possible future uses of telecommunications and earth surveys. Nor is that possible in view of the wealth of potential applications of technology on the one hand, and the limited funds available on the other. We must therefore set ourselves sensible priorities, and aim at meeting social needs, while including projects which cater for the special requirements of developing countries.

The industrialised countries of Europe, whose natural resources are limited, are always compelled to seek a competitive advantage with the aid of technical innovation in order that they may exchange industrial products for vitally important raw materials and energy sources. It is therefore a welcome result of our space activities that for telecommunications a market for the products we are developing is already emerging outside Europe.

Europe finds itself competing with the other space powers and with those who are today on the threshold of space. Government funded programmes are helping to ensure the competitiveness of European industry. This encouragement is not a crutch for chronic invalids. It is intended to make industry gradually independent and self-supporting in the assisted areas.

European co-operation in this area is an economic necessity. The cost of a single project lies somewhere between DM 100 million and DM 2,000 million. These high costs virtually prohibit a single country from carrying out a worthwhile space programme on its own. Over the

Mr. Matthöfer (continued)

last ten years Europe has, all the same, had to find some DM 5,000 million for its joint projects. Yet costly application projects — if one disregards the Europa launchers — began to be tackled only in the course of the last four years. The huge scale of funding required makes it imperative to avoid unnecessary and costly duplication. It compels us to share out the work, and to co-ordinate and concentrate projects within the European framework.

We do not find this necessity of European co-operation unwelcome. On the contrary, we all agree that European co-operation in the peaceful exploration and use of space represents a valuable contribution to European integration. The emphasis on joint activities in space should not mean any downgrading of other forms of European co-operation. The arguments which are valid for space do not apply to all sectors. But I do regard the concentration of activities in a single European space organisation, ESA, as indispensable.

From the historical point of view there are three main reasons for pressing ahead with the establishment of ESA :

First, revision of the ESRO Convention has become necessary to take account of the changed tasks of the organisation. Originally set up solely for the scientific exploration of space, ESRO has since 1969 turned increasingly towards the applications of technology. The recommendations by the European space conference of 1971 expressed this trend for the first time in specific application projects.

The failure of the ELDO Europa-II programme is seen against the background of other, non-European failures in the launcher sector, not particularly surprising. But it was particularly keenly felt because of the large amount of resources expended and the fact that Europe has not so far developed a successful heavy launcher, whereas the United States for example, while having had its failures, can point to brilliant successes.

At the 1972 space conference the view prevailed that only by concentrating all efforts would it be possible to proceed with a European space programme. That programme was to be carried out by the European Space Agency. But ESA has still to start its work. It is true that its activities have, in the main, now been defined, but they are still being carried out within the

ESRO framework, which was not set up for that purpose and is suitable only to a limited extent. This has led to an unfortunate overloading of the ESRO management, a loss of motivation among its staff and the danger of programme slippage and cost overruns. A prompt solution of this problem is in my view a matter of urgency. The filling of the vacancies at the management level has so far not failed because of a lack of suitable candidates. I hope therefore that it will still be possible to find solutions before the year is out.

Consensus is also needed on a greater involvement of national space establishments. I have in mind the *Deutsche Forschungs- und Versuchsanstalt für Luft- und Raumfahrt* and the French *Centre National d'Etudes Spatiales*. Because of the reduction in the national space programmes the personnel and facilities of these centres are far from being fully utilised.

The problems can be overcome. They must be solved now, so that the new agency can take up its tasks early next year.

The tasks and programmes of the new space agency are manifold and wide-ranging :

As well as the scientific programme there are the major experimental and application projects like the three telecommunication satellites OTS, Marots and Aerosat. While OTS is intended to serve for the experimental transmission of telephony and radio and television broadcasts, Marots and Aerosat are communication satellites to meet shipping and air navigation requirements. The United States and Canada are taking part in the Aerosat project in addition to Europe. All three telecommunication satellites are to be orbited in 1977 and 1978.

In the spring of 1977, the European weather satellite, Meteosat, will be launched into a geostationary orbit. The satellite is Europe's contribution to the world-wide global atmospheric research programme, which will be carried out under the auspices of a special agency of the United Nations, the World Meteorological Organisation.

The agency is also involved in the Spacelab and Ariane projects. Testing of the Ariane launch vehicle is to begin in 1980. It is hoped to achieve a measure of European independence with regard to launcher capability.

Spacelab, a manned space laboratory which can be used for a whole series of scientific, technological and industrial tasks, is Europe's contribution to the shuttle system. This co-operation with

Mr. Matthöfer (continued)

America offers the chance of jointly developing and applying the necessary new technologies.

In future the new agency will probably concentrate on the following three fields :

1. Spacelab payloads : we must select a few from among the numerous payload possibilities. Process technology, materials science, and the biosciences might take pride of place.
2. Direct television : direct transmission of educational material and information will probably play a special rôle in large developing countries with a weak infrastructure. It is true that new technical developments also lead to as yet unsolved legal problems such as the conflict between the principle of the freedom of information and the claims of national sovereignty.
3. Surveying of earth resources : large amounts of important data can be obtained in this way which otherwise would either be obtainable only at great expense or not be obtainable at all. This new technology, too, gives rise to many difficult legal question in connection with data gathering and utilisation and the claims to sovereignty of the countries concerned.

Two further aspects of the agency's work will be industrial policy and a greater attention paid to future users. The aim of industrial policy must be to increase, on a competitive basis, the capabilities of the enterprises involved in space engineering.

The new space technologies are already being put to use in the interests of the developing countries ; and they will be making growing use of them in future. Examples are the use of earth survey data on humidity conditions and water resources in the Sahel area and the satellite project for educational television in India.

Let me now make a few remarks about energy supplies. The oil crisis has brought home to all of us the need for international co-operation in the energy sector. For us Europeans there is the question of what part Europe can and should play. One of the most important initiatives as regards energy co-operation, the invitation to the Washington energy conference in the spring of this year, came not from Europe, but from the United States. Since then the work of the so-called Group of Twelve, by working out the International Energy Agency, has provided Atlantic co-operation in the field of energy. At the same time, however, a European problem has

also become apparent, as France is unfortunately not for the time being to take part in the IEA. From the European standpoint there are two particularly important points. First there is the relationship between the European Community and the IEA. This is primarily a matter of keeping open through the European Community's accession to the IEA the option of working out a common European energy policy, and at the same time of making it possible for France to participate indirectly in the work done within the framework of the Agency. The other important point in my view is the world energy conference proposed by France for the spring of 1975, at which the Community should speak with a single voice.

The Federal Government sees no contradiction between these two initiatives. It takes, rather, the view that these are different approaches to the solution of the energy problem which are mutually complementary : co-operation between the industrial countries is thus expressed within the framework of the IEA. The energy conference proposed by France will provide a forum for a world-wide dialogue between oil-producing countries, industrial consumer countries and non-oil-producing developing countries. In both cases Europe can make its own, important contribution on the basis of a common European energy policy. The Federal Republic, for its part, is willing to do so.

Research and development can make a substantial contribution to the solution of energy problems, even if only in the medium or longer term. When we are talking about working out a common European energy policy it is too easily forgotten that many-sided scientific co-operation in the energy sector already exists in Europe and is working well.

In all this, nuclear research continues to be a key area. In Europe nuclear energy's share in the generating of electric power may amount to about a quarter by 1985. This is primarily a matter of the development of advanced reactor types, in which the breeder plays a specially important rôle since it seems likely to make a substantially more economical use of nuclear fuel.

The Federal Republic is co-operating with the Benelux countries in the development of the experimental reactor SNR 300 at Kalkar. The next step will be to commission German, French and Italian electricity supply undertakings to construct pilot plants. I would appeal to all those concerned to give their joint support and backing to this important but also costly project.

Mr. Matthöfer (continued)

While giving all due weight to industrial competition and allowing for national industrial policy, it must nevertheless be possible, for a project of this magnitude, to arrive at a joint solution which is fair to all.

Parallel with this is the development of the high temperature reactor. This type of reactor is important because, for example, it is extremely suitable for the gasification of coal and can thus contribute to a better utilisation of domestic sources of energy. A power station of this kind is under construction in the Federal Republic. There is good co-operation between the German firms working on this development with, among others, French industrial firms; it is of course open to other European firms to join in too.

As regards the supply of enriched uranium for the reactors, the necessary production capacity must be created to meet the growing requirements of the European countries at the beginning of the 1980s. The United States, which is still so far continuing to supply the European market, will to a growing extent be engaged in supplying its own market. Britain, the Netherlands and the Federal Republic have for some time therefore been working successfully on the industrial development of the gas centrifuge, which promises to be more economical and flexible than the conventional diffusion technique process. There will however be room for both processes in view of the expected requirements in the European market for the 1980s.

As Mr. Small points out in the report before you the safety and security of nuclear power plants and the disposal of radioactive waste is also a very serious European problem. The population density of Europe calls for a maximum safety effort. Considerable funds have therefore been provided for in Euratom's multi-year research programme in order to arrive at joint solutions.

In Euratom, the fusion programme is a good example of fruitful scientific co-operation in Europe which gets world-wide recognition and could therefore be a particularly suitable independent contribution by the Community to the IEA. The Community's work is not however limited to nuclear research. New sources of energy are also the subject of Community initiatives. The Community's institutions are at present actively engaged in developing specific projects, in particular in connection with solar

energy, geothermics and hydrogen. I hope that work will be successfully concluded as soon as possible. The Federal Government will do everything possible to contribute to this end.

From the wealth of industrial research problems I have chosen space and energy, not only because they are so topical, but also because both areas can serve as examples for clarifying the development of Europe's research policy objectives.

The efforts being made in the energy sector are a reaction to a world-wide crisis which has made durably clear the urgency of joint action. From the threat to oil supplies there arose the necessity of acting together promptly. But it would be useful if research policy objectives could be defined in advance, instead of being reduced to reacting only when one has to.

Bearing this in mind, co-operation in Europe should be pressed vigorously forward, and the most effective form of co-operation for each case developed. For space and energy, this has been done in a way which meets the particular requirements of these two fields. Both ESA and the Energy Agency provide, in their own sphere, the right framework for fruitful co-operation. Both also offer the utmost degree of flexibility. This is particularly important, because flexibility of organisation is an important prerequisite for success.

We must not lose sight of the overriding aim of a comprehensive, self-contained European research and technology policy. Without such a policy there is the growing danger, in spite of all the progress made in individual sectors, that isolated actions will be going on alongside each other in an unco-ordinated manner. As a result quite different industrial structures would develop in different sectors, which would run counter to a common European industrial policy and inevitably lead to a chronic weakening of Europe; and that is something we simply cannot afford.

What must be done, therefore, is increasingly to strengthen the European Community as the focal point for the development of a common European research and technology policy. This is the only way to ensure that we speak with a united European voice to the industrial countries of the West, to the East, and to the developing countries. This is the only way to set priorities for the individual sectors, and to use capacity where it is most urgently needed for the social and economic development of Europe. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — One or two members of the Assembly have said that they would like to address a question or two to you, Mr. Matthöfer, if you are willing to take the questions and to answer them.

Mr. MATTHOFER. — It will be a great pleasure, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. — In that case I should like to ask Mr. Schweneke if he would care to ask Mr. Matthöfer the first question.

Mr. SCHWENKE (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — If I may, Mr. President, I would like to put two questions to Mr. Matthöfer.

The Minister has told the Assembly about the activities of the Federal German Government in the field for which he is responsible, and explained the priorities. In so doing he emphasised the clear precedence of the peaceful utilisation of our resources. He also pointed out the European and world political context of these activities.

My first question concerns the field which is very familiar to him personally from his work as Secretary of State for economic co-operation. To what extent does such European co-operation assist the developing countries? He touched, though briefly, on this point.

The second question is perhaps a trifle speculative but is none the less certainly not without interest for this Assembly. How at the present time, when France has not yet indicated her willingness to co-operate, would he assess the chances of the energy conference planned for 1975?

Mr. MATTHOFER (Translation). — I believe that European efforts in the field of research and technology policy have a two-fold significance for the developing countries. First we should examine our technologies to see whether they can be relevant to the special problems of the developing countries. I am thinking here for example of research into solar energy, the desalination of sea-water, corrosion, the development of small nuclear power plants, which can be brought to outlying areas to generate power without the need for a big supply network; and of the contribution of satellites — which I referred to in my speech — to the educational systems in the developing countries, to the search for raw materials, to meteorological forecasting and so on. We must see which of the fields where we are doing research matches the special problems of developing countries. Then we must offer the results of

our research to these developing countries as a contribution towards solving their problems.

And secondly, we must make our technological and scientific potential available to the developing countries for the solution of problems which are theirs alone. We are not having to solve these problems, simply because we are not suffering from them. The developing countries cannot solve them, because they do not have the technological and scientific potential to tackle them successfully. There is a whole series of processing techniques — for raw materials, for example — which would be of real interest to the developing countries, but which for the reasons just mentioned they cannot develop themselves. This is where the industrial countries should, jointly with the developing countries, develop intermediate technologies suited to the special requirements and situation of those countries.

To answer the second question, I can only voice the hope that, in the interests of us all, the 1975 energy conference will be successful, and that we will manage to convince France that it would be useful for it to develop such a programme together with us. I believe we are on the right road, and so far as I can judge, we shall succeed.

The PRESIDENT. — Mr. Richter would like to address a question to the Minister.

Mr. RICHTER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, with your permission I would like to put three questions to the Minister.

First, we are here in a European institution. The reproach is made, time and again, that there is too much national selfishness about. Some of our colleagues are particularly interested in the state of the European aerospace industry and the Minister gave a very detailed account of the space sector. It would interest me to have an approximate estimate of the total effort of the Federal Republic of Germany in this field. What percentage of the projects we are engaged in in Germany would the Minister estimate are being carried out bilaterally or multilaterally in Europe? What percentage of our total budget appropriation for space is devoted to purely national programmes?

Secondly, on one point the Minister had to tell this Assembly an unpalatable truth. I refer to the inability of the governments to come to a decision about who should head ESA. The way he put it was: "I hope... before the year is out."

Mr. Richter (continued)

This is of course far worse than we had feared. There will be critics who may even wish to see in his phrasing evidence that a clear motivation for the European Space Agency is lacking. I should be glad if the Minister could perhaps say one or two words about the initiatives that might be forthcoming from the German side.

The third question is put to the Ministers not only as a representative of the governments but also as a mature and experienced parliamentarian. When we look at the developments we would like to see in the European Space Agency — a common concern we all share — then the problem of parliamentary control arises. As matters stand at present we have the possibility of commenting on reports submitted to us. ESA will probably submit annual reports to the WEU Assembly. This is scarcely what one can call genuine control in such an important area. Would the Minister be prepared, as things develop in the future, to include the problem of parliamentary control among the matters to be discussed?

Mr. MATTHOFER (Translation). — The first question was what percentage of our space resources is still being devoted to national programmes. The Federal Republic of Germany no longer has a national programme in the space sector. In future it will carry out either bilateral projects with the United States — though I do not foresee any great prospects of this for the moment — or European programmes, and finally it will also take in joint American and European projects, as has happened — to give a shining example — with the Spacelab project.

The problem over the head of ESA is a sorry business. I hope to be able this month to have a meeting with my French counterpart. We want to discuss jointly with the other ESA members how we are going to solve this problem. I believe it is urgently necessary that the organisational problem of the head of ESA should be solved jointly, that is to say with the British, French and the others. We need a solution not only for the motivation of the staff of the Agency, but also in order that it may now be formally established.

As for parliamentary control over the ESA, I can only say that we are all aware of this task. We also know how difficult it will be to get the machinery set up for effective parliamentary control of European activities. I can only assure

you that, as a parliamentarian of many years standing, I am very much concerned that some kind of solution be reached. Whatever I can contribute in my special field, which is very little, I will willingly do.

The PRESIDENT. — May I ask questioners to the Minister, since we are a little pressed for time and have much business to conduct before the evening is over, to keep their questions short.

Mr. ENDERS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — I would like the Minister to tell us a little more about energy questions. My question is about reactor safety. There was recently a hearing in Bonn on the subject of the protection of the population from radiation hazards. This is not just a national problem, but extends beyond national frontiers.

My question is how does co-operation stand at European level with regard to the protection of the population from radiation hazards?

May I add to that question about nuclear energy a further question on the use of solar energy? In my view we are at the very beginnings of using this immense source of energy. One reads from time to time that efforts are being made in individual countries to make use of it. But it seems that this is only happening in isolated cases. Does the Minister think that a better common European utilisation of solar energy could be brought about by funding research projects?

Mr. MATTHOFER (Translation). — I agree that the problem of the security and safety of the nuclear combustion cycle is a shared European problem. I can assure you that all national governments and the European Community are aware of the importance of this and that we are on the right way to finding European solutions.

Similarly, I agree with the questioner that, particularly as regards the Federal Republic of Germany, the importance of solar energy for our latitudes has been underestimated. If we can manage to solve the storage problem — usually there is heat at a time when it is not needed, so we must find a way to store it and use it in the winter — then solar energy can in fact, particularly for isolated buildings, contribute greatly to making Europe independent of non-European sources of energy.

The PRESIDENT. — Will members please ask short questions. Mr Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — I will ask you a simple question, Mr. Minister. It was only with difficulty that Europe re-embarked upon a space programme but this programme is now assuming a relatively specific and well-defined character. France has a particularly effective base available at Kourou. The question I want to ask is this: do you think you could envisage the possible Europeanisation of a base like Kourou?

Mr. MATTHOFER (Translation). — In my speech I pointed out that German establishments too, such as the establishment of the *Deutsche Versuchsanstalt für Luft- und Raumfahrt*, cannot be fully employed on national programmes. This is a problem which we have to solve together in connection with the whole package of questions relating to ESRO.

Mr. ABENS (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). — If I understood the Minister aright, he said in his speech that the Federal Government is co-operating with the Benelux countries in the establishment of an enriched uranium plant. I want to ask whether this is a reference to the plant which is to be set up in the German-Luxembourg Moselle, and if that is so, what progress has been made so far in that direction?

Mr. MATTHOFER (Translation). — We are co-operating in two different ways. First we have the trilateral project comprising Britain, the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany for the development of the gas ultra-centrifuge, in which — the site is on the frontier — we are jointly attempting to develop an enrichment process which requires only a tenth of the energy used by the diffusion process, and which also is particularly suited to European conditions and should make us independent of the American enrichment plants.

The other example I mentioned is co-operation between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Benelux countries in the development of the fast sodium-cooled reactor SNR 300 in Kalkar. The contracts have been signed, the reactor is being built, and if it becomes critical in 1979 I believe the Benelux countries and the Federal Republic of Germany will be able to claim a joint success.

Mr. van OOIJEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I would like to ask the Minister a question about the Kalkar project. He will not be unaware that there are still some objections to this in the Netherlands, and doubtless also in Germany. A moment ago the Minister said that

he hoped that the Benelux countries and the Federal Republic would adopt this as a joint project. A contract has now been signed between these countries for the first phase, but in the Netherlands there is still some objection to starting on the second phase. So, I would like to ask the Minister what the thinking is in the Federal German Government with respect to the second phase of the Kalkar project. Are there objections in the Federal Republic, as there are in the Netherlands?

Mr. MATTHOFER (Translation). — I think that in the Federal Republic of Germany we are now catching up with a protest movement which in other countries has already run its course. We are having a wide public debate on the uses and dangers of nuclear energy. I hope that this debate will be a thorough one and reach a large audience so that the public understands why we need nuclear energy and what residual risks remain despite all the efforts made to ensure safety, and so that we can then decide rationally how we want to proceed, particularly in the very difficult field of the special fast breeder type reactor, for which the SNR 300 in Kalkar represents the first step. A further development, the so-called SNR 2, has not been decided upon in the Federal Republic either. We shall wait until at least 1980, that is to say until we have had a year's operational experience of the SNR 300, before we decide, on the basis of studies and preparatory work, to build a new and bigger fast breeder. We hope to profit by French and British experience in that field, and are also trying to bring about close co-operation with France and Great Britain in the development of the fast breeder.

The PRESIDENT. — I call the Chairman of the Committee.

Mr. de MONTESQUIOU (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. Minister, your Ministry is spending very large sums of money on advanced technology, and on everything connected with engines and space. Now we are rather surprised to observe that your colleague at the Ministry of Transport, who is the Minister having oversight on Lufthansa — his Ministry is a joint owner holding 80 % of the equity — is showing no interest at all in products manufactured by the European aeronautical industry. I think it would be desirable for this company to show some interest in the production of the European aviation industry, not only in the matter of airframes but also in that of engines. Fundamentally, these efforts are being paid for by your

Mr. de Montesquiou (continued)

citizens, and I think that here Lufthansa has an opportunity of demonstrating its solidarity with respect to the efforts exerted by all of us to promote the European aviation industry.

Mr. MATTHOFER (Translation). — I do not believe that Lufthansa's procurement policy takes practically no account of European aircraft. It certainly examines all the available products carefully and then comes to a decision.

Personally — I do not know whether I can speak for the whole Federal Government — I am a little sorry that German undertakings, even when the degree of public participation in their ownership is very large, can follow a very independent procurement policy according to their own lights. With us it is not the same as in France, and it is very difficult to explain to a Frenchman that with us other considerations prevail. This applies not only to aircraft procurement, but also to electronic data processing and other fields with which I am concerned.

Like you I am somewhat uneasy at the fact that on the one hand as a public authority we are handing out large sums for development in these areas, and on the other hand our undertakings do not perhaps take these factors fully into account when deciding on their purchases.

The PRESIDENT. — Mr. Minister, thank you very much indeed for your patience and for answering all the questions that have been addressed to you. This demonstrates what interest your speech has aroused among members of the Assembly.

Knowing the pressures there are on all Ministers, Mr. Matthöfer, we are all greatly indebted to you for finding the time to address the Assembly.

On behalf of the Assembly, I express our gratitude to you for the wise, clear and knowledgeable contribution you have made to our debate. (*Applause*)

5. State of European aviation activities

(Presentation of the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Doc. 658)

The PRESIDENT. — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Techno-

logical and Aerospace Questions on the state of European aviation activities and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 658.

I call now Mr. Warren, Rapporteur of the Committee, to present his report.

Mr. WALTSMANS (*Netherlands*). — I regret to say that the Dutch Delegation has to go home tomorrow afternoon. I therefore wish to ask what procedure is envisaged to handle discussion of the report by Mr. Small. I have nothing against the present item of business, but I wish merely to know whether we will have the opportunity to discuss Mr. Small's report tomorrow at 10 o'clock.

The PRESIDENT. — It is the intention to take Mr. Warren's report now, followed by a short debate on it. So far only three speakers have put down their names to speak on the report. It is then proposed to go ahead with Mr. Small's report and discuss that subsequently this evening. It is not possible to find time tomorrow. If you wish to take part, I can only suggest you stay a little longer.

Mr. WARREN (*United Kingdom*). — Mr. President, I thank you for calling me for the first time to this rostrum. It is also an honour to follow Mr. Hans Matthöfer, the Minister of Research and Technology of the Federal Republic of Germany, whom I have had the pleasure of meeting today. I was interested, as I am sure was the whole of my Committee of which I am privileged to be a member, to hear his dissertation, particularly on space and energy.

It is my pleasure to present the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on European aviation activities. I am sure you will be happy to know that shortly before I entered the Chamber someone walked away with my speech. This has ensured that the speech you will now hear will be substantially shorter than that which I might have dared to give you.

Science and technology is one of the gateways to the future prosperity of Europe. The price of the key to this is always a popular subject for dispute by future politicians and by all taxpayers.

Today one feature of science and technology — the state of European aviation activities — I believe identifies through the analysis before you the nature of the entire problem we face in our duties as parliamentarians. The report would have been circulated earlier, but unfortunately a

Mr. Warren (continued)

postal strike in France delayed transmission. Perhaps technology has become our own master already.

Science and technology have worried and baffled politicians because of the cost and the need they command of us to predict the future, a quest which has always been the burden of politicians everywhere in the world. But without doubt, the industrial and political management techniques required to get the best from technology have not advanced at the rate equal to that required to give us an understanding of what is going on as the frontiers of technology expand round us.

In fact, the expansion of scientific knowledge has been greater than the management of technology and, therefore, the comprehension by politicians and the public.

It is easy to condemn the wastes and failure in science and technology, and this is fair and easy game, but to control and use the resources of science and technology for Europe and for the world is much more difficult. However, it is the essence of the proper use of today's education for tomorrow's world. Aviation brings together all of the sciences and technologies known to man. Aviation is a challenge to man to use his knowledge for his benefit.

In the report seven recommendations are listed which I should like to discuss briefly. The first is that we want to agree on joint specifications for all military aviation procurement. We start from this base in aviation because it is in the military centre that most progress is demanded.

It may be strange to think that we have here to state an objective which ought to be a common acceptance after twenty-five years of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, an objection which in no way confronts the Warsaw Pact nations which quite readily can draw up specifications and select aircraft to meet them, providing of course they are Russian.

Secondly, we need to take account, in the formulation of the specifications, of the aircraft, engines and equipment capabilities of European aviation companies. Here I draw attention to the fact that we so often talk about aircraft when the value of the airframe which represents the visible aircraft to most people is in fact one-third of the total cost of the purchase, another third is the cost of the engine and another third is the

cost of the equipment such as the electrics and the electronics which are found aboard every modern aircraft.

It is essential when we draw up our military specifications — as, indeed, I think the question of the Chairman of our Committee to Mr. Matthöfer this afternoon indicated — that we must seek to take account of the industrial base from which we are seeking to operate and in a military sense are seeking to defend.

So often one sees military specifications drawn up in a fashion which does not take any account of that which could be supplied by European sources. I want to touch on this matter a little later in terms of the procurement of aircraft at present.

Thirdly, we need to ensure that export market requirements are incorporated in these specifications. Again, this may seem to be a statement of the obvious but repeatedly it is not followed by national governments in sponsoring their individual industry. The Americans certainly do this. It is a common feature of American aircraft that the export potential of the aircraft is considered, but, strangely enough, amongst the great successes of the Americans in selling into Europe, such aircraft as Starfighter had no domestic requirement but a fantastic export potential.

Fourthly, we suggest that preference should be given wherever reasonable and possible to the products of European aviation factories so that self-sustaining design and manufacturing capability able to compete in world markets can be obtained in Europe. This morning, Mr. Destremau drew attention to this particular passage in my report and I repeat that "wherever reasonable and possible" is the prerequisite of such a choice.

Nevertheless, I am very worried that in response to a question this morning Mr. Destremau said that France had no intention whatever of rejoining NATO as a full member. This is a particularly difficult problem facing the French at a time when they seek to sell to our Danish, Belgian, Dutch and Norwegian allies one of their own aircraft, because at a critical time they will be faced with the political question of whether spares would be provided and, although this is entirely a matter for the French Government to make up their minds about, there is a precedent in terms of the last Israeli war which faced the Israelis with the same problem when supplies of spares were cut off at a very critical moment in seeking to carry out the defence of their nation.

Mr. Warren (continued)

Here I do not challenge the French Government but I say that if they wish to remain in the competition there must be immediate identification of their intention in time of crisis.

Fifthly, we suggest that there should be an agreement with the United States Government on equality of opportunity for the export and import of civil and military aerospace products between member countries and the United States. The reason for this is that at the moment such equality does not exist. I hope that one of the members of the Committee will contribute his own views on the matter of free trade but it seems to me to be a form of industrial lunacy to allow the Americans completely unfettered access to our own Community market in Western Europe when that access to the United States is not allowed under either the "Buy American" or other tariff regulations. I think that we should challenge the Americans on this, so in the second part of the recommendation it is suggested that until such agreement is reached we could establish such commercial protection of the European market as is necessary to protect the jobs of European aerospace workers and the balance of payments of member countries.

The sixth recommendation is that Europe should recognise and establish itself as a unified single market for air transport tariffs and aircraft sales. Here as in the last recommendation we are moving very rapidly into the area of civil aviation activity. Europe has a magnificent aerospace industry, divided by national frontiers, and it has a magnificent air transportation system, separated by all sorts of bilateral agreements of a kind which make air transportation very expensive for the European worker who is less well paid than his American friends. The protection which exists in Europe means that frequently one pays three times as much to fly the same distance in the same aircraft type supplied from the United States factory as one would have to pay to fly the equivalent distance in the United States. Frequently one is flying with 20% more passengers on board than the same aircraft carries in the United States but still at three times the price. We have the unique situation that the first-class passenger is subsidised by those less fortunate who have to fly economy.

The seventh recommendation is that we should establish a strong and co-ordinated government- and EEC-backed programme of commercial,

financial and diplomatic support for all aviation sales. The United States Government supports its own industry not only in terms of seeing that its products are properly financed and properly managed but it also exercises every reasonable diplomatic initiative possible to make sure that those products are projected properly into Europe. The United States by so doing has repeatedly wiped out competition from Europe in its own homeland. If that competition is wiped out in Europe it is hardly likely that the rest of the world will want to buy the European product. Above all it is almost impossible to sell that product back into the United States of America. There are some small exceptions to disprove this apparent rule but the general thesis is not one that one could challenge.

The governments of Western Europe should unite, and regard themselves as charged with the task of protecting their own industries and should use their purchasing power to ensure that they have a stable European industry working on aircraft programmes which represent the needs of their separate political interests.

When we look at the choice which now faces the four nations of North West Europe we have the classical case where everyone wants to try to obtain a simple solution to an extremely complex question. I do not think that anyone should be surprised if a simple solution proves to be impossible if the NATO task is to be met. What I do fear in terms of the history of procurement of aircraft for countries within the NATO network is that the single solution is the easy solution and we end up with the NATO task not being met and a very considerable amount of money committed for a long period ahead. At a very rough estimate the purchase proposed by the four countries of North West Europe of 350 aircraft implies that over, say, ten years, they will be committed to spending \$3,500 million — I speak of dollars not because I believe that those nations will necessarily choose American aircraft but perhaps use a currency which will immediately react on us all.

The choices before them at the moment are worth considering in some detail. There are two American aircraft — the YF-16 and the YF-17, neither of them designed for the European requirement which is now being met, neither of them yet flown by European pilots and neither of them yet selected by the United States of America. I hope that not only the four nations will make sure that their pilots will fly them but will get the United States Government to commit itself

Mr. Warren (continued)

to the selection of one of those aircraft before they are themselves asked to select either of them.

The third option is the Mirage F-1 M-53, the one European solution available, only just over the threshold of performance required and an aircraft which has not yet flown but is backed by the organisation of Marcel Dassault which must be one of the finest in the western world for the production of military aircraft.

The fourth option being considered is that of the Swedish Saab Viggen, an excellent aircraft, well built, and operated from a neutral country with again many of the constraints that the supply of spares may have on such an aircraft.

Beyond this there is the suggestion that the Anglo-French Jaguar perhaps could be used. It has operational experience already in two NATO countries and it offers a mixed European capability which could be used in association with the F-1 or any of the other aircraft suggested.

There is yet another option — the Lockheed Lancer, which was specifically designed for the European requirement — being considered, which is much less than the YF-16 and the YF-17 in price, which has not yet been flown, which is about a year away from production, even if it is launched at all, and which is not being considered by the four nations.

It will be seen, Mr. President, that nobody would want the four nations to select something that nobody else wants, because the aircraft must fit itself within the spares maintenance structure of NATO. Whereas we can be confident that the four nations will make the best selection possible and will defer that selection as long as is necessary to make the best selection, we will hope that in return they will recognise that Western Europe needs them to take full account of the effect of their selection on the social, economic and industrial future of Western Europe and its aerospace industry.

All that I have said today has merely been the words of a parliamentarian repeating many recommendations which have appeared before the Assembly before and which over the last ten years have been more easily presented than I am able to present them today. It is a debate which we have had over and over again. I was not being cynical when I said in one paragraph of the report which is before the Assembly :

“Think how much more could have been done if European governments had been on their side” — that is, on the side of the aircraft industry — “all the time.”

In conclusion to my statement, I quote one paragraph of my report :

“Europe was the cradle of aviation. Europe has a remarkable aerospace capability. It has repeatedly proved it can produce and sell its products in the world's markets. The industry's customers have returned satisfied. We must have their confidence in our industry.”

Thank you, Mr. President. (*Applause*)

(*Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I should like to thank Mr. Warren most particularly for the very full and explicit report he has just presented to us. I, for my part, believe that the debate which is about to open is one of the most important, if not the most important, of our session.

6. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Owing to the lateness of the hour and to the fact that the Chamber is almost empty, and also because the Presidential Committee has to meet at 6.15 p.m., I have a suggestion to make that would allow our debate to open with fuller participation. There are three speakers on the list, but others may put their names down, and the Chairman and Rapporteur of the Committee will be called upon to provide us with additional details ; so I suggest that we might resume the debate with wider participation and greater impact at 10 a.m. tomorrow.

Are there any objections ? ...

Mr. WALTmans (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — At 9.30 a.m. Mr. President ?

Mr. de MONTESQUIOU (*France*) (Translation). — I agree with Mr. Waltmans, Mr. President ; if we wish to save time, we can even begin at 8.30 a.m.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — It was agreed, Mr. Chairman, that the sitting would open on Thursday morning at 9 a.m. What I said was a slip on my part. Nine o'clock is the time fixed in the Order of Business.

Mr. LENZER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, may I ask whether the speakers who have so far put themselves on the list are still going to speak?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — If speakers on the list are obliged to be absent tomorrow they could speak now, but it would be before a sparsely-attended Assembly. It is in their own interests that I suggest we should resume the debate tomorrow, in the presence of a more substantial audience.

Nevertheless, if you are obliged to be absent, you can take the floor this very evening, but you can only speak for ten minutes, as we shall close the sitting at 6.15 p.m. This is made necessary by the meeting of the Presidential Committee.

I call Mr. de Montesquiou.

Mr. de MONTESQUIOU (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, as Chairman of the Committee, I am in full agreement with your decision. I consider that it would be far more responsible to proceed with this debate in the presence of an audience composed of competent persons, in view of the fact that the Committee has performed a remarkably good piece of work, for which I must thank the Rapporteurs.

I think therefore that in view of the advanced hour, we have every ground for continuing this debate at 9 a.m. tomorrow morning before an audience that is both interested and competent.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Are there any objections?...

It is so decided.

I therefore propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting tomorrow morning, Thursday 5th December, at 9 a.m. with the following Orders of the Day:

1. State of European aviation activities (Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions

and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 658).

2. State of European nuclear energy programmes — security aspects (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 655 and Amendments).
3. Rational deployment of forces on the central front (Presentation of and Debate on the Interim Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Document 654).
4. Conditions of service in the armed forces (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Document 650 and Amendment).
5. Address by Lord Goronwy-Roberts, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom.
6. Address by Mr. Van Elslande, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Development Co-operation of Belgium.
7. Address by Mr. Vredeling, Minister of Defence of the Netherlands.
8. Rational deployment of forces on the central front; Conditions of service in the armed forces (Votes on the draft Recommendations and draft Orders, Documents 654 and 650 and Amendment).

Are there any objections?...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The Sitting is closed.

(The Sitting was closed at 6.05 p.m.)

TENTH SITTING

Thursday, 5th December 1974

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.
2. Attendance Register.
3. State of European aviation activities (*Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 658*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Richter, Mr. de Bruyne, Mr. Warren (*Rapporteur*), Mr. de Montesquiou (*Chairman of the Committee*).
4. State of European nuclear energy programmes — security aspects (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 655 and Amendments*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Small (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Waltmans, Mr. van Ooijen, Mr. Osborn, Mr. Small (*Rapporteur*), Mr. de Montesquiou (*Chairman of the Committee*), Mr. Small, Mr. de Montesquiou, Mr. Waltmans, Mr. Cermolacce, Mr. Waltmans.
5. Address by Lord Goronwy-Roberts, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom.
Speakers: The President, Lord Goronwy-Roberts.
Replies by Lord Goronwy-Roberts to questions put by: Mr. Critchley, Mr. Leynen, Mr. Lewis, Mr. Wall, Dr. Mabon.
6. Address by Mr. Van Elslande, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Development Co-operation of Belgium.
Speakers: The President, Mr. Van Elslande.
Replies by Mr. Van Elslande to questions put by: Mr. Sieglerschmidt, Mr. de Niet, Mr. Klepsch, Mr. Roper, Mr. Osborn.
7. Address by Mr. Vredeling, Minister of Defence of the Netherlands.
Speakers: The President, Mr. Vredeling.
Replies by Mr. Vredeling to questions put by: Mr. Roper, Mr. Leynen, Mr. Tanghe, Mr. Critchley.
8. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

The Sitting was opened at 9 a.m. with Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The Sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments ?...

The Minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings¹.

1. See page 31.

3. State of European aviation activities

(Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 658)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The first Order of the Day is the debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on the state of European aviation activities and vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 658.

Yesterday we heard Mr. Warren, the Rapporteur of the Committee.

In the debate, I call Mr. Richter.

Mr. RICHTER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, my task this morning is a thankless one. It is not a simple matter to comment on the remarkable speech of a Federal German Minister on subjects of concern to all of us, to comment at the same time on the excellent presentation of the report by Mr. Kenneth

Mr. Richter (continued)

Warren, and to succeed in producing the atmosphere which we had here yesterday evening. As you, Mr. President, rightly pointed out, the discussion on the present theme might well be the central point of this WEU session.

I must convey my thanks to Kenneth Warren for this report. He follows in the footsteps of eminent predecessors; I am thinking of those who presented reports on this subject years ago and now bear governmental responsibility — to mention only one, Karl Wilhelm Berkhan, now Parliamentary Secretary of State in the Federal Ministry of Defence, was one of Kenneth Warren's predecessors as Rapporteur. Today he is dealing with the problem of which weapons systems should be introduced in the German armed forces.

The market survey which our Rapporteur has made has — as both he and I see it — revealed many negative pointers. It is important that we should take a look at market requirements. I am basing myself on a very familiar situation, because for years I was the Rapporteur for the aviation industry in the Defence Committee of the Bundestag, and I want to take a look at these market requirements, using an example from the Federal Republic of Germany.

The Luftwaffe's basic equipment consists, as is well known, of American weapons systems. When we had to bridge the gap which came about from the new task definition for the F-104 squadrons — to give better ground support to the army — this too was done with American equipment. The replacements we are now planning will be based entirely on European systems. The corresponding heads in the budget of the Federal Republic of Germany for 1975 can be taken to mean that procurement of the MRCA and Alpha Jet can be regarded as definite.

Here I see something which applies equally to nearly all other armed services — and possibly, in a similar form, to the civil sector as well: I mean "looking for the gaps". One must realise the extent to which MRCA and Alpha Jet, as new weapons systems, weigh on the budget of the Federal Republic of Germany; and on top of this, there are the operating costs of the existing weapons systems. At the same time, there is a relatively sound situation with regard to helicopters. The result is that industries concentrate totally on such gaps as may emerge, and which may be only very small. An example we have in

Germany at present is the question of the successor to the Alouette. All over Europe, in view of the budgetary circumstances, competition bears on a very narrow gap.

In connection with these problems one should also enquire in a market survey into the question of how far there is saturation. We must ask ourselves how we are to provide the European aircraft firms with programmes on a long-term basis. We have attempted to do this in Germany, in that for a number of years past the Federal Government has been obliged to submit a yearly report to the Bundestag on the state of the German aircraft industry; in this report special attention has to be given to a long-term aspect of keeping industry employed.

Coupled with the question of market saturation, there is also the problem of the size of the aircraft industries. In our country we have had a very rigorous policy. We warned our industry against making too optimistic a forecast of the market, and we did nothing which would have contributed to an enlargement of capacity. I am fairly well acquainted with the order of magnitude of the industries in Europe, and at times I am worried whether Europe will manage to provide work for companies of this size over a period of years or decades.

When I think of the problem of over-capacity, I could be tempted cautiously to offer a criticism to which politicians may well at some time be exposed, the criticism that we may be supporting a development that will prove a burden on the European taxpayer, a development in which the taxpayer will in the end be a big loser.

The Rapporteur has also gone into the relationships between the European and American aircraft industries. I am very grateful to Kenneth Warren that in doing so he avoided giving the impression that we were trying, here in this Assembly, to canvass a form of protectionism. All that the Rapporteur is asking for in his report is equal opportunity. I believe that he is quite justified in doing so and that our American partners will understand this. For they too are looking for markets, and fighting to gain them. This equal opportunity for European products on the American market is indeed a necessity.

If I were to paraphrase the European attitude from the standpoint of a German parliamentarian, I would do so in the words of the Federal Defence Minister Georg Leber, who recently said that he would be prepared to decide in favour of a European solution even if the efficiency of

Mr. Richter (continued)

the system remained less than that of a non-European system. He even mentioned a figure, saying that something is 10% less efficient from the shopkeeper on the corner was, in his view, better than having to go shopping outside Europe.

Comparing the German situation with that of the United Kingdom or even France, I would say this. The present generation of systems in the aircraft industry is European. At the same time we have a handicap — the presence in the Federal Republic of Germany of the United States forces which is greatly desired by all NATO parliamentarians and by all our colleagues in this Assembly. Here I would also mention the foreign exchange balance which we have to achieve. The Federal Government has for years naturally been concerned about the state of the two accounts which we have to settle with the United States Treasury.

One must of course recognise and allow for the fact that in the MRCA we have, together with the United Kingdom and Italy, sought a European solution. I would also like to express my gratification that it was possible for France and Dornier together to establish a European programme with the Alpha Jet. Taking all this together, I feel we can be very happy about the result.

My final comments concern the work of this Committee. Our Rapporteur stressed the interest taken by the European aircraft industry in the work of WEU. For that he deserves special praise. I do not know of any political institution to which so much attention is paid by the European aircraft industry as WEU. I am very happy to report that I am constantly being told what a lasting impression our colloquy last year here in Paris made on the industry. I hope that the European industry will continue to regard us as the institution and the level where it is possible to further their concerns. I hope that we shall soon be able to continue the dialogue we have started with European industry in order to avoid duplication of effort. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). —I call Mr. de Bruyne.

Mr. de BRUYNE (*Belgium*) (Translation). — It is of course understood, Mr. President, that the vote we shall be taking relates to the draft

recommendation contained in the Warren report. If we vote for this recommendation — which is what I shall be doing — this need not mean that we agree with all the opinions the Rapporteur puts forward in his report. Mr. Warren has made ample allowance for certain objections raised in Committee. More specifically, I would call the meeting's attention to the footnote on the fifth page to which the Rapporteur, at our request, added a sentence making it clear that the Defence Ministers of Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands and Belgium had taken no decision, either for or against, on the matter of the Mirage. When meeting with their French opposite number, they made no choice of any kind. Although I am perhaps the least fitted of all the Belgian Delegation to provide a gloss on the intentions of the Belgian Defence Minister, I am sure that I am giving an accurate reflection of his thinking on this matter.

I will take this opportunity to point out that nothing could do more harm to the chances of the Mirage — which I shall not discuss here — than giving the impression that people are trying to present the parliaments of these four countries with a *fait accompli*, and that the choice is, so to say, being forced upon them.

I have reservations about the language used in the report and recommendation, which sometimes make it seem that we favour a protectionist trade policy. More specifically, I would emphasise that I really do not find what is said in paragraph 22 of the report at all convincing. This is typical of the reasoning used by people who are prejudiced against imports, as if these were an evil best avoided whenever possible. Singularly enough, these same people are out-and-out advocates of their own exports. If everybody wants to export and nobody wants to import, world trade will of course grind to a halt. We saw in the 1930s how dangerous this is. I would point out to the Rapporteur that this kind of thinking is naturally just as true for the United States as it is for us in Europe.

At the end of paragraph 34, Mr. Warren quotes from a report of 1973 by our colleague, Mr. Valleix. The comment made by Mr. Valleix certainly has its interest; but it must not be interpreted in such a way that our governments are given the illusion that granting excessive export credits is doing something for the national economy. International trade will come to grief if exporters fight each other for their customers by the inflationary granting of credit, inflationary mainly for the exporting country. This fascinating aspect of international trade policy

Mr. de Bruyne (continued)

is not for us to discuss here, and Mr. Warren's report does not aim to bring it into our debate.

Approving this recommendation cannot mean that we are moving towards the formation of an economic bloc in Europe opposing the United States. I do think it is desirable to promote a European aviation industry, but this must not lead to a revival of nationalism in international politics, to a throttling of the flow of intercontinental trade, and to a brake on world trade. The co-operation of the United States is of course needed here just as much as that of its European trading partners, and I entirely share the Rapporteur's concern.

I would have liked to have found in the draft recommendation some echo of what the Rapporteur has to say in the first paragraph of his explanatory memorandum. What is said there should have prompted a passage in the recommendation that would make the European aircraft manufacturers face up to their responsibilities, not just the European governments. If the European aviation industry wants public patronage, it must first of all make fundamental changes in its own overall structure, by mergers that will probably need to go beyond national frontiers. Speaking for myself, I am not prepared to help in setting up official subsidies for an aviation industry that has not done everything in its power, by means of suitable mergers, to give itself the size and operating resources it needs for its own survival.

These are the reservations that I want to voice before voting for the recommendation, Mr. President. I would add that the verbal introduction by Mr. Warren himself was of a kind to remove all misunderstanding. There was, for instance, his comment on the speech by the Secretary of State, Mr. Destremau, the scope of which will surely not have been lost on anyone. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. WARREN (*United Kingdom*). — I should like to make a brief reply to the two colleagues who have spoken this morning. Mr. Richter rightly once again drew our attention to the fact that I am a Rapporteur who is merely treading the path of other Rapporteurs who have gone before. What worries me is that the path is so well trodden. There have not been the kinds of responses that one would have expected from so

many expeditions. I had been hoping that this report could bring from those concerned in Europe the response which we have spent so much time in preparing for over so many years.

Mr. Richter is perfectly correct to talk of the market demand and how small it is, and I would also say how infrequently that demand appears. But when the demand does appear, it can be a very expensive one. Yesterday, for instance, I was drawing attention to the fact that the purchase by the four nations of some 350 aircraft to replace their Starfighters and other aircraft in their inventory at the moment will mean an expenditure of some \$3,000 million. The decision is an extremely important one not only for their own national budgets but in terms of the industrial effect and the social effect of where the order is placed. It is interesting to contemplate whether it is more important to employ the workers of Europe, the workers of Los Angeles or of Fort Worth.

In terms of market demand, I hope the feeling has not been conveyed to the Assembly that the demand in civil aviation has curtailed to such an extent that no demand exists at all. The Arab oil price increases had very substantial effects and, according to statistics prepared from the United States of America, the effect of the Arab oil price increases appears to have been a reduction in the growth of civil passenger demand from about 14 % per annum at which it had been running for the last five to ten years down to a level of about 6 % compound increase per annum. This is still a very substantial increase. One should not forget that the aerospace industry has to meet this expanding demand.

The extent of the aircraft industry on which Mr. Richter commented is one which has given me very great cause for concern. I have to steer a rather careful path between apparent jealousy as a Britisher and any envy I might have of the way in which the German aircraft industry has expanded. This is not so, but I draw attention to the fact that in terms of the multi-rôle combat aircraft decisions on the division of tasks within the programme inevitably meant that capacity had to be created, particularly in the Federal Republic of Germany, to meet the demands of that programme where capacity already existed for that programme elsewhere in Europe. We must be very careful when we construct political programmes that we do not waste the scarce resources of Europe which already exist.

I am very grateful to Mr. Richter for mentioning again the equality of opportunity for two-

Mr. Warren (continued)

way sales across the Atlantic. This point was mentioned by Mr. de Bruyne to which I will come in a moment. Mr. Richter is perfectly correct to reiterate this point so ably made by one of his Ministers that it is so much better to buy something 10 % more expensive just round the corner. This is particularly true when one is looking for an assurance of supplies and spares at a time of crisis. However, any ability to buy something more expensive — and I suggested that could be as high as 40 % above an import price because of the recycling of money through taxation — and any opportunity to accept such an increase must be carefully monitored by politicians as not an excuse by the aircraft industry to spend more taxpayers' money.

My concluding comment on Mr. Richter's contribution is that I support his statement of the interest of the European aircraft industry in WEU. I hope this is a support and a dialogue which will continue, because the industry needs to be heard more loudly. I hope that the industry will speak out more clearly.

I turn now to Mr. de Bruyne's contribution this morning. He is I think perfectly correct to make it clear that no decision came out of the meeting which we noted as a footnote in the report concerning the discussions held between the four Defence Ministers and the French Minister of Defence in September in Paris, but I see nothing wrong in saying as he said that the Mirage happens to meet the requirements. I accept entirely what he says, that this should not be interpreted as being a selection in any way and I would not wish to convey that impression.

On his point about protectionism, I know how strongly he feels about this and I am as keen as anybody to see free trade of a kind of which he spoke. What I am not happy about, as I mentioned yesterday, is that the opportunity should exist for the Americans to export to Europe which is not reciprocated by them when we seek to export back to America. All we are looking for is equality of opportunity for two-way sales.

Lastly, Mr. de Bruyne talked about how much political support should be given to the aircraft industry before it has carried out what politicians regard as essential industrial mergers. In the United Kingdom there has been much talk recently of the support given to the aircraft

industry. We need to be very careful here to recognise that what politicians often interpret as support is in fact goods and services bought from the industry by the government. This is a very different thing from the support itself. In terms of the mergers which have gone on in Europe, I must admit I am not very happy that they necessarily reflect industrial progress. I have always felt that any industry, and particularly the aerospace industry, should in the structure of its organisation reflect the market it is supposed to be serving. My comment in the report on the subject of the fragmentation of the market in Europe is one I think is reinforced by Mr. de Bruyne's point. The industry reflects the fragmented market.

My appeal to politicians in terms of the manufacturing industry and the air transport industry is that it really is time that we organised ourselves as to the demand of the industry which is supposed to supply us.

I am grateful for the opportunity to reply to the debate. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur.

I call the Chairman of the Committee.

Mr. de MONTESQUIOU (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, Mr. Warren has just commented on his report and answered the two speakers. He expressed regret that there had been no differences of opinion, but his report is of very high quality and it stakes out so firmly the path outlined by WEU for many years past that he has today the confirmation of having proceeded along the right lines.

As Chairman of the Committee, I should like to echo the expressions of fellow-feeling and admiration of which he has been given further proof today.

In order to align the French translation with the English text of paragraph 6 in the draft recommendation, the words *un seul et même marché* should replace the words *un marché unifié, un marché unique*. The term "unifié" does not, in fact, reflect either the ideas of the Rapporteur or the English text.

This is a mere modification of form, and I think that everybody will agree, beginning with the Rapporteur, that the two texts should reflect the same line of thinking, or in other words, his. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I acknowledge your proposed modification, which is merely one of drafting.

The debate is closed.

No amendment has been tabled to the draft recommendation presented by the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

The vote on the whole draft recommendation would be by roll-call if the Assembly were not unanimous.

Are there any objections to the draft recommendation, as modified ?...

Are there any abstentions ?...

I note that the Assembly is unanimous.

*The draft recommendation is agreed to unanimously*¹.

4. State of European nuclear energy programmes — security aspects

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 655 and Amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on the state of European nuclear energy programmes — security aspects, and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 655 and amendments.

I call Mr. Small, the Rapporteur of the Committee.

Mr. SMALL (*United Kingdom*). — The report to which I am about to address myself is the result of much consideration in the Committee. Of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions I would say that it is probably the most information-rich Committee on which I have served, and I have sat on many committees dealing with science and technology. Therefore my explanatory memorandum will be seen to be couched in very exotic language, the

reason being that it would otherwise make all this a matter of debate because there is no progress anywhere without friction.

What I am finding today in the society in which we live is what I describe as technological omnipotence — the experts against democratic representation. During the past eighteen months since the oil crisis the experts themselves have been writing papers and bringing forward solutions but in the generality experts do not have a broader world vision ; their portfolio is within their own expertise.

As a Scot, I am watching Scottish oil, British oil, European oil — just name it. I see the future, as I say in the explanatory memorandum, in terms that we may end up with something like Ezekiel's valley of dry bones. So much is going on internationally for exploiting oil that in a small island and small offshore bases in Scotland we may find the place in twenty-five years festooned with nuclear installations which will despoil the Scottish landscape. The same is true of installations elsewhere, because what weakens defence in a nation is that there is always a social contingency and the requirement to find confidence for the people. One thinks of social breakdown in Europe such as at present exists in Ulster, a social breakdown which has spread over to Britain. This is an insoluble situation but nevertheless it weakens the resolve of the nation to take care of its own defences.

I shall not go into some of the things that are dealt with by romantic people writing in the newspapers. It is not so easy to play about with a rocket of plutonium. I do not suppose that anyone here present has ever seen plutonium, nor have millions of people throughout the world, but with a unit so fallible that the user can blow himself up by the explosion of an ordinary pint milk bottle people are not likely to carry plutonium about with them. We have this problem of nuclear installations and it is a weakening thing in terms of defence elements and of the people.

The Committee was quite right in the view that my presentation was not quite cognate with the study of nuclear energy programmes, but after a very nice and affable discussion we all agreed on the remarks being inserted in the report. The remarks in paragraph 4 deal with non-ratification, and for the sake of greater accuracy I have here a copy of the whole convention. Some nations have not yet signed the convention and we wanted to bring attention

1. See page 34.

Mr. Small (continued)

to those nations which have not signed and ratified it. Non-ratification may result from many causes. There are many reasons for not signing. Italy is an example. That nation seems to change government every six months or every year. The people there do not have the legislative basis which makes it easy to sign. There must be domestic legislation before there can be ratification. I advance that as one interpretation. I do not think that it is an unwillingness on the part of any nation to sign and ratify but the fact that domestic legislation is required before a nation can enter into such an affair.

In my explanatory memorandum I use the phrase "like playing Russian roulette". This refers to reactor choice and to the sphere of influence of those who make these things. I speak in terms of the British contribution in reactor research and the hard sell internationally. In our case the CEEGB was backing the American reactor but the House of Commons Committee on Science and Technology had a representative from the South of Scotland Electricity Board whose evidence on checks and balances seemed to make it possible for the government, and for Mr. Varley, Secretary of State for Energy, to engage in a heavy water reactor with British technology. Therefore, when I speak in terms of choice of systems it is not yet just a question of one system against another. There are many systems and all have their advocates. It is just the same as when one is buying a car. One man will praise it while another will tell you that it is not so hot, and that is what I had in mind when I referred to Russian roulette. When we consider the civil use of nuclear installations one has to remember that these are really just beginning, and the next twenty-five or fifty years will show which has a standard of maintenance which one can reasonably expect to sustain in both safety checks and other things.

I come to what might be described as the political problem. I have read much of the Rasmussen report in America and of the events following the publication of that report. The press said variously that there were 24, 28 or 50 closures. I have had an opportunity even since preparing this draft recommendation to check the official press releases. I believe that there has been far too much exaggeration.

I should therefore like to recommend that a slight change be made in Chapter I, paragraph

9, ninth line of the paragraph. I suggest that the wording be altered so that it reads: "The Atomic Energy Commission has since had" and then delete the words "to close down" and add the word "inspect" twenty-one boiling-water reactors. I think that "inspect" is the better word. There was no catastrophe to a degree such as the paragraph as it stands might suggest, although it was said in almost every international paper that there was.

I should not like to do the Americans or anyone else any injustice. This report may or may not find its way into publication as a newspaper syndicated article. Therefore, it would be unfair to put it so that it could be read as a condemnation, which is how it might be taken to read at the moment.

On the broadest base, the objectives of the Committee have been satisfied in our debate and, in finality, I wish to present the recommendation to the Assembly. It reads:

"RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge the governments of member countries:

1. To organise a public European conference within the framework" — I emphasise 'within the framework' — "of the OECD, to define the safety and security requirements of nuclear reactors... ;
2. To promote the accession of all member countries to or the entry into force of the Paris, Brussels and Vienna conventions... ; "

The Brussels supplement raised the amount of liability from £5 million to £25 million. There is no private insurance cover in this game. It is the State that provides the cover. So the Brussels amendment brings it up to £25 million. The recommendation continues:

- "3. To keep the public in all member countries regularly informed of all plans throughout Europe to establish nuclear power plants."

I could say much more, but it is not my job to make a powerful or profound speech. I say at the end of my report: "*Vestigia nulla retrorsum* — there are no footprints back from the lion's den."

We are all embarked upon the nuclear age. We must live with it. None of us has ever seen plutonium. There is Pu 239 which is lethal. There is Pu 238 which has a benign effect; that is the

Mr. Small (continued)

thing which makes the heart pacer. So there is a duality about the use of this form of energy.

I hope that on behalf of my Committee I have satisfied the Assembly that the recommendations can be fully endorsed. I thank the Assembly for its attention. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — In the debate, I call Mr. Waltmans.

Mr. WALTMANS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I really do not know where I should begin, by congratulating Mr. Small on the fact that the British, using American engineering, are succeeding in bringing up Scottish oil, or to congratulate him on a really excellent report. I think that the latter would really be more in order. The problem we are discussing now is not only important for the future of the present population of Europe, but also of crucial importance for the generations to come. There is a great deal of doubt, especially in my own country, about the safety, the usefulness and the financial prospects of nuclear energy programmes. We know that the majority of the parties represented in the present Netherlands Government wrote to the German Bundestag on 27th November 1974 telling them that they would really rather bring the whole Kalkar project to an end. That is how things stand in the Netherlands.

The major decisions in the field of the civil application of nuclear energy are, as we can see, now being taken. But when we look at the way these decisions have been taken, we find that the Community has had no hand at all in the decision-making; and in the last resort it is after all the future of society at large that is involved. We are afraid that the big multinational companies have too much influence and too strong a grip on the government decision-making process. We feel that governments give way too easily to calls for unhampered economic growth. This growth satisfies economic objectives such as the maximisation of profits and income, creating an enormous demand for energy and full and expanding employment. One may wonder, in these circumstances, whether governments ought not to explain rather more clearly how energy problems can be solved by economy measures and by limiting industrial production.

There are enormous differences of opinion between scientific experts. The Union of Concerned Scientists and the Suria Club, one of the

biggest environmental pressure groups in the United States, estimates the risk of a nuclear accident as sixteen times higher than is given in any official American report.

Mr. Small is quite wrong in comparing the risks involved in using nuclear energy with those of industrial accidents. The latter affect individuals, and are not solely and not primarily caused by external human factors and technological developments, as is the case with nuclear energy.

Then I would like to look for a moment at comments in the report about financial contributions and subsidies given by certain oil companies to environmental pressure groups. I was absolutely amazed at this. These oil companies, such as Shell and Gulf, have their own nuclear energy programmes. To me this suggests that they have great faith in the success of nuclear energy and the belief that their objectives will receive government support. In these circumstances it is easy for them to hand out a little charity for the activities of certain environmental pressure groups, to keep the latter quiet or their own consciences happy. We must make sure, however, that official information to the people who live close to nuclear power stations does not end up as official misleading of the population. In our view, faith in nuclear energy must give way to an awareness of the very real dangers of nuclear energy. It is this awareness that must grow, not a misguided and foolhardy belief and hope that everything will turn out all right.

And then there is the question of whether nuclear energy really is cheaper than conventional energy. The percentage differences mentioned are too small to let the future of humanity hang upon the development of nuclear energy. I wonder, too, about the possibility of the use of nuclear energy breaking up the present monopoly situation. The enormous investments needed will have to be put up by very powerful financial groups, and these same groups are at the present time working together with the oil and gas investment monopolies. What I can see, therefore, is a mutual dependence and a further concentration, and the formation of new monopolies by these groups rather than a breaking up of monopolies. I would point to the dangers to democracy of a new nuclear industrial and political complex; this worries me greatly.

The question that is asked right at the end of Chapter I is a very good one. I doubt very much whether the safety considerations involved

Mr. Waltmans (continued)

with light-water reactors are in fact within our financial capabilities. There is a need for government control over the social consequences of world technocracy, and this involves the setting up of a massive, world-wide security system to guard against sabotage and blackmail; but then there is also a need for guarantees to be given that no misuse will be made of a technological control machinery of this kind once it is set up.

In Chapter II, paragraph 37, the Rapporteur mentions the need for a continuing co-ordination of national security measures. But how large would budgets need to be if we are to achieve an effective security system?

Why is the question of proliferation and its consequences not touched on in this report?

I am not very happy with the comments made in Chapter I entitled "Nuclear energy — a political problem".

Turning to Chapter III, the question arises of what the consequences would be if we were obliged to call a halt to all nuclear programmes, and to shut down the nuclear power stations, because we had not found any sensible solution to the very basic problem of dangerous radioactive waste. In other words, have we looked at the consequences of what will happen if in ten years or so we come to the conclusion that nuclear energy is taking us down a blind alley? It is to get an answer to this question that I have put forward my amendment, hoping that the Assembly will appreciate my concern, and that it will look on my contribution to this debate as a constructive one. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. van Ooijen.

Mr. van OOIJEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I am very glad to see that our Scottish colleague William Small has taken the initiative of compiling a report on the safety problems of the use of nuclear energy. His report is a first step towards greater awareness of this problem of safety, so that it can make no claim to be a full and exhaustive treatment. But perhaps just because of that it invites discussion, a discussion in which I will very gladly join.

Up to a few years ago the problem of safety bore mainly on the non-peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Today, there is apprehension among large sectors of the population about the use of nuclear

energy in general. This unease is far from being stilled now that the governments, prompted by the economic and political situation, are tempted to make hurried decisions on the expansion of the nuclear energy systems. Public opinion is demanding, and not without good reason, that economic desirability shall not be the sole deciding factor. I think a lot of thought will have to be given, particularly by politicians, to the extent to which popular opposition to the use of nuclear energy is or is not to be taken notice of.

The rejection of nuclear energy is undoubtedly the result of the deep secrecy which, at an earlier stage, surrounded anything to do with nuclear energy. This secrecy created a climate in which emotional arguments thrived. Some of the emotional utterances one heard remind one of the appearance of the first train, or of the days when penalties were imposed for trading in tobacco, or when the people inveighed against the drinking of coffee.

This sort of emotional discussion is not what I have in mind, however. What I mean is real discussion by people who know what they are talking about, and which is based on a modicum of information. I say a modicum of information, because the great secrecy surrounding the whole business of nuclear energy has meant that the information cannot be other than fragmentary.

Rational decisions cannot be arrived at in an atmosphere where facts are lacking. Nor is it true, besides, that the criticisms of nuclear energy are based on emotional factors alone. Scientific quarters too have in recent times voiced well-founded criticism of an unchecked expansion of nuclear energy applications. The public uneasiness that results is not going to be got rid of by people making reassuring noises and making favourable comparisons.

Only solid information, based on hard facts, will allow responsible decisions to be reached through public discussion. Otherwise decisions for or against the peaceful uses of atomic energy will be influenced by emotion-laden rejection or by an excessively sanguine view of the advantages of nuclear energy. The partisans of nuclear energy run the risk of painting too rosy a picture, while its opponents tend to see the whole thing in unrelieved black. Hence the importance of a serious study and public discussion on the safety aspects of nuclear energy.

I think a study of this kind will have to cover the safety of the entire nuclear energy system.

Mr. van Ooijen (continued)

Attention will also have to be given to the safety of those who work in nuclear power stations, and of their progeny, to contingency plans for dealing with a disaster which, while it has not yet happened, is still always a possibility, and to the search for an effective solution to the problem of making radioactive waste safe during transport and storage.

I hope, Mr. President, that without dismissing the whole idea of nuclear energy out of hand I have made it plain that I doubt whether it is possible to give adequate guarantees of safety at the present time, so that we cannot blindly go ahead with a decision to make a very much wider use of nuclear energy.

In his report and draft recommendation William Small has drawn attention to the non-proliferation treaties. He says, in his recommendation, that the member States should promote the entering into force of the Paris, Brussels and Vienna Conventions. I would make the point however that it is not just a matter of ratifying these conventions, but also of applying them in the spirit.

Today there are about thirty countries producing plutonium from nuclear power stations being used for peaceful purposes. A number of these countries have not yet signed the non-proliferation treaty, and some of them have even come into possession of nuclear power stations through the agency of countries that have signed the treaty.

A treaty that makes it possible, without any difficulty, to supply nuclear power stations to third countries is a treaty that is not working properly and will have to be looked at again. I am leaving aside here the question of whether an infringement of the treaty is involved. I do think, however, that this problem ought to be put on the agenda of the European conference on the safety of nuclear reactors which Mr. Small is suggesting.

The report before us today seeks to provide a starting point for a fresh look at the problems of safety in the use of nuclear energy. I hope that there will be widespread discussion based on hard information. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Osborn.

Mr. OSBORN (*United Kingdom*). — I am pleased to have the opportunity to take part in

this debate and to congratulate Mr. Small on tackling an almost impossible assignment. We must bear in mind that last summer we discussed my report on the European atomic energy industry and the development of atomic energy as the only reliable and certain source of energy. We were aware of this factor, and the predictions show that half the electricity supply in the late 1980s and early 1990s will arise from electricity generated from nuclear power stations.

I recall that my report was at that time criticised on the ground that it did not give enough attention to safety aspects of nuclear power generation, nuclear energy and diffusion. Mr. Small in his report, however inadequate some may regard it, at least has endeavoured on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions to tackle the problem.

Atomic energy is a new technology. Only about twenty years have elapsed since I attended the first Atoms for Peace conference in Geneva. At that time, the United States decided to make available the knowledge gained for wartime purposes and to set aside some of the secrecy to which Mr. van Ooijen referred in the interests of peaceful uses of atomic energy.

As the Assembly's previous Rapporteur, on the atomic energy industry, I visited Washington and the AEC, and the then Committee had the opportunity to visit Canada. I must stress that the AEC is now dead and that the nuclear activities have been divided into two.

The Atomic Energy Commission has perhaps fallen to the environmental lobby in the United States of America. There was a very interesting article on this in "The New Scientist", published only last month, in which it said: "The AEC is dead. Long live the AEC." There was also a comment on this divergence.

On the one hand, in the United States of America, it is necessary to look at energy as a whole — new sources of energy — and I welcome the initiative taken by President Nixon and others. On the other hand, there is a greater need to regulate and ensure that atomic energy is safe. Mr. Small has pointed out that even in the United States of America they have had their troubles, and although there are some fifty reactors in operation, there are some nine hundred envisaged and in the pipeline at the present time.

On my visit to the AEC we met a Dr. Friedmann — in fact, we met those who would be leading ERDA at the present time — and I

Mr. Osborn (continued)

remember a discussion to decide whether a component for a reactor was safe or not.

Some twenty years ago I was making components for nuclear reactors and I visited a steel foundry in America making stainless steel bowls for their marine programme. There were more inspectors than those producing, and the problem facing those inspectors was to decide what was safe and what was not. An even bigger problem was that, if they made a mistake, lives were at stake in the early days of the nuclear submarine programme.

Today there is the challenge facing our scientists and engineers and those responsible for safety. Your Committee had the opportunity of interviewing Mr. Williams, who gave us a very fine report on the safety aspects of a nuclear programme. The inspector has to decide what is and what is not safe. The Science and Technology Committee went to see the CANDU reactor at Pickering. Since then even one of those reactors has presented problems. There is the problem in any water reactor, as against a gas reactor, of dealing with tritium which can be harmful in the short term to a certain extent for all those who have an overdose.

But even in Britain we learn that after some of the incidents in Lancashire and Cumberland there have been press reports to the effect that perhaps the leukaemia rate in Lancashire and near that area, although insignificant, is still higher than elsewhere in the country. There is so much that we do not know.

New technologies present their problems. When they are so complicated and difficult to understand they cause genuine fears. I welcome the fact that this Committee, at the request of the Assembly, has tackled this problem of safety. I welcome the first recommendation that there should be a public European conference. At that conference there should be papers from those operating various types of nuclear reactors, indicating their problems. There should be papers from all those responsible for safety in the European countries. There should be papers from those interested in our health and our environment. Above all, the various agencies, whether it is the European Nuclear Energy Agency, helped by OECD, or the International Atomic Energy Agency, should let us know what is going on in regard to nuclear safety to ensure that accidents do not happen.

I believe that the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions has an important rôle to play as a means of finding out within Europe what is going on in regard to safety, so that the people of Europe can better understand and know what are the problems, and also what are the alternatives if we do not continue apace with this nuclear programme, particularly with regard to recycling and disposal of waste. The experts have techniques in keeping waste. Some of the waste to which Mr. Small has referred has a very long half life in liquid containers or water containers, and indefinitely in stainless steel tanks. There is also the question whether that waste is to be in solid form. There are techniques that are becoming accepted. The people of Europe should have those techniques explained to them.

I would therefore commend to this Assembly a safety conference to explain what is going on, and I commend the work of Mr. Small and his Committee. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Small.

Mr. SMALL (*United Kingdom*). — I welcome Mr. Waltmans' contribution. The whole purpose of the report was to promote a debate, for none of us feels very secure.

What we are asking for in our recommendation is public interest in the matter — a public conference.

I believe that in Holland they are sitting on a "bubble of gas". I was always a good listener, in Dutch terms, and we should take a long-term look at nuclear energy. Taking the French figure for the price per kilowatt/hour, it is cheaper today than previously, so that from the point of view of long-term economics the utilisation of nuclear energy as a source of power has a definite future.

In the case of underdeveloped countries it is possible to by-pass to some extent the forces of nature by building a "power pack" and transferring it into darkest Africa, into India or elsewhere, and there can be a built-in survival kit for those who want to advance more quickly towards civilisation as we understand it in the West.

It is too early in these days just to make a direct condemnation of the new materials that science has brought to us on this planet, and with such speed. It is this very speed which is the disturbing element in our minds when we consider what is to be done with radioactive waste in the future.

Mr. Small (continued)

Mr. van Ooijen also expressed his doubt. I am very grateful for his contribution. None of us is easy in the mind, but we must make an analysis, and I thank him for his compliments.

I have paid a tribute to Mr. Osborn, and I pay one to him yet again as a most diligent Rapporteur on behalf of the Committee who, by having put all the technical data at its disposal, has made it one very rich in information. I welcome his support for the recommendations.

I hope the Assembly will pass this unanimously. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Does anybody else wish to speak ?...

I call the Chairman of the Committee.

Mr. de MONTESQUIOU (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the report you have just heard submitted by Mr. Small is very well thought out and, in my opinion, constitutes the first of a series of reports on a very important subject.

At a time when the civilised world is in danger owing to the energy crisis, it is essential that our Committee should carry out studies under the auspices of WEU to show clearly how we can continue to foster by all available means the installation of nuclear power stations, while taking all the necessary precautions. It is for this reason that we have decided to make contact with Euratom, the various European atomic energy agencies and OECD, to enable us to prepare another report on the problem of atomic energy and its possible dangers.

At a time when the problem arises of the survival of mankind within a civilisation which is that of progress, it is essential that, while taking all precautions for the defence of mankind, we should develop atomic energy.

I consider that Mr. Small's report is a remarkable one since it calls attention to atomic energy and asks that provision should be made for the protection of man, while maintaining and developing the energy which is essential to him. I would therefore ask the Assembly to adopt Mr. Small's remarkable report unanimously. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — We shall now consider the draft recommendation submit-

ted by the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

Two amendments have been tabled. The first was tabled by Mr. Waltmans and countersigned by Mr. de Bruyne. I will read it :

Add the following paragraph at the end of the draft recommendation :

"4. To study the consequences of a possible break-off of nuclear development within ten years."

I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. SMALL (*United Kingdom*). — I have studied the amendment and I recommend its rejection. The qualification of development is one that we could not support.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Does nobody else wish to speak ?...

I put the amendment, which is rejected by the Committee, to the vote.

The amendment is rejected.

Mr. Alber has tabled an amendment to add the following paragraph at the end of the draft recommendation :

"To build nuclear power plants near a frontier only after agreement with the neighbouring country concerned."

What does the Committee think ?...

Mr. SMALL (*United Kingdom*). — I welcome and can accept this amendment. I believe it is necessary to have this collaboration between frontiers and public debate before a nuclear installation is erected.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Does anyone wish to speak ?...

I put the amendment, which is accepted by the Committee, to the vote.

The amendment is adopted.

I have now been handed a purely drafting amendment relating to the French text, proposing to modify paragraph 2 of the recommendation proper as follows :

"2. *De favoriser l'adhésion de tous les pays membres... ou l'entrée en vigueur des...*"

— the remainder without change.

At the beginning of paragraph 3, replace "A informer" by "D'informer".

The President (continued)

I call the Chairman of the Committee.

Mr. de MONTESQUIOU (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, this is indeed a purely formal amendment. I imagine that you are surrounded by purists who defend the French language. I pay homage to them.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — This is an amendment of pure form and refers only to the French text.

Are there any objections ?...

It is adopted.

I shall put the whole recommendation, as amended, to the vote.

I call Mr. Waltmans.

Mr. WALTMANS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I had tried, by my amendment, to remove a certain lack of balance. Now that this has not succeeded, I shall be unable to give the draft recommendation my support.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Since there is an objection, I think it would be better to take the vote on the recommendation at the beginning of this afternoon, so as to avoid making the Minister wait.

Mr. de MONTESQUIOU (*France*) (Translation). — Since there is only one very slight objection which takes the form of an abstention, I think that the Minister will not mind...

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — There have been allegations that I have infringed the Rules of Procedure and recommendations that I should be stricter. This was why Mr. Waltmans' proposal caused me to put forward the suggestion I made just now. But if he only wants to indicate his abstention, I agree that we can put Mr. Small's recommendation to the vote.

Mr. WALTMANS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — I said, Mr. President, that I would not be able to support the draft recommendation ; this means in fact that I shall be abstaining.

Mr. CERMOLACCE (*France*) (Translation). — I ask for the floor.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — In that case the vote will be taken at the beginning of the afternoon. I do not want to delay the Minister's speech any further.

Mr. WALTMANS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — I shall be glad to follow your suggestion, Mr. President.

**5. Address by Lord Goronwy-Roberts,
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the
United Kingdom**

The PRESIDENT. — The Assembly extends a particularly warm welcome to you, Lord Goronwy-Roberts. We look forward to hearing a speech from a Minister with great experience at the Foreign Office and from a member of parliament with long and distinguished service at Westminster.

(The President continued in French)

(Translation). — I invite Lord Goronwy-Roberts to take the floor.

Lord GORONWY-ROBERTS (*Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). — Mr. President, thank you very much for your kind words of welcome. I would like to say how pleased I am to have this opportunity of addressing the Assembly of Western European Union. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Mr. Callaghan, much regrets that he is not able to attend himself.

The Defence Secretary, Mr. Mason, would also like to have been with you today. He is particularly conscious of the responsibilities of this Assembly in matters of defence. As many of you will be aware, it is only two days since he made a statement to the House of Commons on our defence review — the most extensive and thorough review of our system of defence ever undertaken by a British Government in peacetime. In these circumstances it seems right that I should address you on this subject here today.

Let us first put things into perspective. The idea that the British Government should reduce its expenditure on defence from its present level of 5.5% to 4.5% of GNP over the next ten years should shock no one. At present we are contributing a higher proportion of our GNP to defence than any country here represented. In view of the needs of our time some others might care to level up their expenditure — and there is room for it — as we are levelling ours down. The proposals outlined by Mr. Mason on Tuesday took fully into account strategic, political, eco-

Lord Goronwy-Roberts (continued)

conomic and military considerations. While the review was prompted by the difficult economic situation in the United Kingdom, the needs of our national security, the overriding importance of our commitments to NATO and WEU, and our responsibilities in Europe and overseas, were firmly and consistently kept in mind. Over the past twenty-five years we have sought to maintain a major contribution to all the main elements of NATO's capabilities despite the fact that our economic performance has lagged behind that of our major European neighbours. We are working to improve and strengthen our economic position and we are confident that we shall succeed. In the meantime the defence review reflects our determination to provide for a modern and effective defence structure which will make a significant contribution to the strength of the Alliance.

In addition to deciding the general scale of the programme needed to meet future defence requirements and the level of resources that can be devoted to defence, the British Government has reached provisional conclusions about our future commitments and the force levels needed to meet them. On the day that Mr. Mason made his statement, consultations were begun with our allies in NATO. These consultations, which are likely to last into the new year, will be thorough and genuine. Consultations will also be held with governments in other parts of the world who might be affected.

In conducting the review it was decided that since NATO is the linchpin of British security, it would remain the first charge on the resources available for defence. The first priority would therefore be to concentrate on those areas in which my government felt it could most effectively contribute to the security of the Alliance. These consist of our contributions in land and air forces in the central region of Europe, in sea and air forces to the Eastern Atlantic and Channel areas, and in the defence of the United Kingdom and its immediate approaches. The effectiveness of the Polaris force will also be maintained.

The British Government intends to discuss all aspects of its NATO contributions with its allies. The contribution to the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force will remain unchanged, but our declarations of specialised reinforcement forces could be reduced to an air-portable brigade group and a Royal Marine commando group specially

trained and equipped for Arctic warfare and would be available for the central region or the northern flank of NATO. The priority given to the NATO contribution will necessarily require a contraction in commitments outside the Alliance. The proposals will, however, be discussed in detail with our allies and partners before any final decisions are taken.

In your Recommendation 254 made during the June session and your debates in the current session, you have expressed understandable concern about security in the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean areas. We share this concern. In view of the Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean area we have decided to agree to proposals from the United States Government for an expansion of the facilities on the Island of Diego Garcia which it enjoys jointly with Her Majesty's Government under an existing agreement. Use of these facilities other than for routine purposes would be a matter for joint decision of the two governments. They have also agreed to pursue consultations, with the aim of developing realistic progress towards arms limitation in the Indian Ocean.

We shall maintain our membership of CENTO and SEATO. In accordance with the military facilities agreement concluded in 1972 with the Government of Malta British forces will remain there until 1979. We have in present circumstances no plans to withdraw from Cyprus although some further reduction in force level is not excluded.

The proposals outlined by Mr. Mason will naturally also have an effect on force levels within the three services. Priority has been given to maintaining as far as possible the level and quality of British front-line forces. They will be equipped in a manner commensurate with their rôles and responsibilities, and the support area will be restructured to match the new size and shape of the front line. The government attaches great importance to the negotiations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries on the mutual reduction of forces and armaments in Central Europe. We are committed to seeking an outcome which, while preserving undiminished security for all the countries concerned, would help to create a more stable relationship in the area at a lower level of forces. We hope that the negotiations will be successful in achieving this objective. But I can assure the Assembly that there will be no proposal, in advance of mutual and balanced force reductions, to reduce the forces which we maintain on the mainland of

Lord Goronwy-Roberts (continued)

Europe in accordance with our obligations under the revised Brussels Treaty.

Planned expenditure on research and development will be reduced by some 10 %. It is hoped that this can be achieved within the framework of the Alliance and in the spirit of the revised Brussels Treaty by increasing standardisation in equipment and eliminating duplication in research and development.

In the light of your consideration of the conditions of service within the armed forces you will be pleased to hear that the British Government has not ignored the effect that these proposals might have on the morale and well-being of the forces. Proposed changes will be carefully planned and introduced progressively over the next few years. Reductions will be achieved by normal wastage as far as ever possible, but some redundancies, both service and civilian, will be unavoidable if the services and the headquarters and outstations of the Ministry of Defence are to be adapted to the new range of commitments, and if the balance of ranks and ages necessary for a satisfactory career structure is to be preserved. Those who have to be made redundant will be offered fair terms, and time in which to plan their future employment. The government will be examining ways in which they can help with resettlement into civilian life.

Before concluding, I should emphasise that none of the proposals outlined by Mr. Mason in parliament on Tuesday and which I have briefly relayed to you today represents a final decision. All will be thoroughly discussed with our allies in NATO and outside, and the final decisions will be taken in the light of those consultations. Mr. Mason concluded his statement in the House of Commons by saying that these consultations should include not only our allies and partners, but also the members of the House. Perhaps in a few moments that invitation might be extended to members of this Assembly, who may wish to ask questions or to make comments, and I should be very glad indeed to listen to all that may be said, to attempt to give answers, and certainly to report to London what has been said in the Assembly about this matter.

After we have completed the process of consultations on the review and taken our final decisions, we have no doubt that the Royal Navy, the Army and the Royal Air Force will remain highly-effective forces equipped to the highest

standards as required by their front-line NATO tasks. Britain will continue to play its full part in preserving the strategy and cohesion of the NATO Alliance, and in meeting effectively its remaining commitments outside NATO.

Mr. President, I thank you most warmly for this opportunity to speak to the WEU Assembly, and I congratulate the Assembly on their serious and useful contribution to the debate about defence matters. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I thank Lord Goronwy-Roberts, who has kindly agreed to answer any questions members of the Assembly might care to put to him.

I call Mr. Critchley, Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Mr. CRITCHLEY (*United Kingdom*). — Though Lord Goronwy-Roberts' speech was mild and modest in delivery this should not disguise the fact that this document is highly controversial, not simply within the United Kingdom but throughout the members of the Western Alliance itself.

I do not want to inject a debate upon this particular paper into an international assembly, but there are one or two points I would briefly make and ask a question of Lord Goronwy-Roberts. He said at the beginning of his statement that the review owes its origins to the very difficult economic situation which faces Great Britain. This assertion hides more than it reveals. Although no one could argue that our economic situation is anything but desperate or question that there must be a relationship between that and the amount we spend on defence, to understand the object of this political exercise one must of course understand the nature of the Parliamentary Labour Party and the need of Labour governments to devote a very high proportion of their time to the management of a coalition which includes both Marxists and Social Democrats. It is that fact which has in fact stimulated and made necessary this kind of government.

The question I would like to put to Lord Goronwy-Roberts is this. In his speech he said this :

"The effectiveness of the Polaris force will also be maintained."

What does that mean? Does it mean that the government are prepared to look into the purchase of advanced warheads from the United States to keep this particular force up to date?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Do you wish to reply, Lord Goronwy-Roberts?

Lord GORONWY-ROBERTS. — Mr. President, I would prefer to reply to the questions and comments as a whole towards the end of what may well be a mini-debate, if that is convenient to you and to the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I therefore call Mr. Leynen.

Mr. LEYNEN (*Belgium*) (Translation). — Yesterday I received scant satisfaction when I asked Mr. Destremau, the French Secretary of State, what the Council meant, in its reply to Recommendation 254, by the expression: "area of Western European Union", which allegedly did not include the Indian Ocean. Mr. Destremau seemed to be referring me to a better source, namely the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and since the Minister has also alluded to the defence of the Indian Ocean in his speech, I would reiterate my question: What does the Council mean by the area of Western European Union? On what text does it base its reply? And if there is such an area, what are its limits?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Lewis.

Mr. LEWIS (*United Kingdom*). — I am rather annoyed having listened to Mr. Critchley, because, being a member of parliament supporting the Labour Government, I deeply resent that Mr. Critchley should at an Assembly such as this refer to what he believes to be the constitution and arrangements of the Labour Party. He may or may not be right, but I do not think that this is either the time or the place to make such remarks. I may well believe that there are neo-fascists and nazis in the Tory Party, but I do not think that it would be right for me to say that, because the Tory Party cannot arrange its own leadership, the trouble with the Tory Party is that it has no leader. I do not think that this is the time and place for comment like that.

We are discussing a matter concerning the British Government. I say to my Conservative friends that a British Government includes them as well. I have been a member of parliament for thirty years. I have always adopted the attitude that the government, whether they are Tory or Labour, are the British Government. As such I may disagree with them, and at home in my own parliament I will say anything I want, subject of course to the permission of the Chair, and I will attack my government in my own

country, but I do not think that this is the time or place.

Having said that, may I say that I warmly welcome the British Government's announcement of a reduction in armaments.

I make this plea for a particular reason. There are children in my constituency who cannot go to school every day of the week because they are on a rota system by which they take one day off per week from school. We have not enough schools. There is a shortage of schools and teachers, a shortage of hospitals and a shortage of houses. I could go on with the list of shortages. One reason for these shortages is the fact that there is not enough money to build the schools, the hospitals and the houses or to pay the teachers. One of the reasons for this situation is the fact that the British Government are spending too much of gross national product on armaments.

I warmly welcome, therefore, any cut which the government can make commensurate with the advice which they receive from their military advisers to maintain the security of our country. If I have any criticism at all, it is that the cut is not large enough. I would urge the government to consider whether they can make any more cuts because if that money is saved, I shall ask for some of it to be channelled into providing the homes, the schools and the hospitals for the people of Great Britain generally and for my own constituents in particular.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Wall.

Mr. WALL (*United Kingdom*). — I am certain that the Assembly does not want to become involved in a party political wrangle between British political parties. I should like to congratulate Lord Goronwy-Roberts on the delivery of his speech and on two parts in particular.

First, I was happy to hear that British forces are to remain in Cyprus and this matter is most relevant considering the debate on this topic which the Assembly conducted yesterday. Secondly, I wish to refer to the decision on Diego Garcia, which is of vital importance since it protects the oil route from the Middle East.

I should like to ask the Minister two factual questions. First he said that the defence review aimed at cutting defence expenditure from 5.5 % to 4.5 % of gross national product. Does he recognise that gross national product is not the only yardstick for defence expenditure? If one

Mr. Wall (continued)

uses GNP as the yardstick, then the result depends on the nation's total GNP and, unfortunately, the GNP in the United Kingdom at present is rather low. Therefore, perhaps it is not the best yardstick. Certainly in terms of per capita expenditure on defence, both France and Western Germany spend considerably more than the United Kingdom.

Secondly, the Minister referred to the importance of NATO and Central Europe and said that we do not intend to cut our forces in Central Europe. I am glad to hear that. Will Lord Goronwy-Roberts recognise that because there is a nuclear stalemate in Central Europe, pressure is exerted on the flanks? Indeed, I know that he recognises this factor since he mentioned the Indian Ocean. Is it not dangerous, therefore, to cut naval forces, maritime air forces and commando forces which are designed to protect the flanks of NATO and Europe?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Dr. Mabon.

Dr. MABON (*United Kingdom*). — I should like to associate myself with Mr. Wall in congratulating our friend Lord Goronwy-Roberts on his address. However, I do not agree with Mr. Wall that gross national product is an unreasonable measure of judgment. Perhaps the Minister could give some examples of the proportions of GNP in relation to defence expenditure on the part of our friends and allies which do not match ours in the United Kingdom.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Lord Goronwy-Roberts.

Lord GORONWY-ROBERTS. — I am grateful for this opportunity to reply to the mini-debate which has developed as a result of my statement. I particularly welcome the contributions made by members of the British Delegation, and I was most interested to hear constructive and searching comments made by others in the Assembly whom I have not yet met but very much hope to meet before I leave today.

I should like to refer Mr. Critchley to what was said by my colleague Mr. Arthur Lewis, who referred to the internal affairs of the British Parliamentary Labour Party. I would ask Mr. Critchley to refer to his own experience of how affairs are conducted within the British Conservative Party. If the British Labour Government are to be criticised for attempting, after

very careful consideration extending over many months, to make a progressive reassessment of our defence contribution, is there not an equal criticism to be levelled by Mr. Critchley at the Conservative Government in 1972-73 who carried out the same exercise which had the result of cutting defence expenditure by £300 million? If that policy is regarded as a virtue in a Conservative Government, is it not at least half a virtue in the case of a Labour Government?

My colleague Dr. Mabon asks for examples of proportions of GNP in relation to defence expenditure among our friends and allies. I disagree with my good friend Mr. Patrick Wall on this point; it is a matter of judgment and of choice. I agree with Dr. Mabon that GNP is the best assessment of the contribution of a State. Per capita contribution is more properly related to the contributions to a central fund by member States. It is as States that we are members of NATO and comrades in WEU. Therefore, it is the performance and contribution by States in terms of their economies which properly should be looked at.

I respond to Dr. Mabon's invitation and I will give the figures for which he asks. Of the fourteen countries about which I have information to hand in respect of a percentage of GNP contributed to defence, we are the third on the list — second only to the United States, which, for every conceivable reason, is bound to be the first. The second in the table is Portugal. I have 1973 figures and at that time Portugal was immersed in a very expensive colonial war. Therefore, in terms of percentage of GNP contribution, the United Kingdom is ahead of every other country here represented.

Let me give the actual figures. Let me take the NATO contribution which is somewhat different from ours at home. That put the United Kingdom contribution at 5.7% in 1973, the last full year for which we have an assessment. The figure for Turkey was 4.8%, Norway 3.8%, the Netherlands 3.7%, Italy 3.3%, Greece 4.6%, Germany 3.9%, France 4.2%, Denmark 2.5%, Canada 2.4%, and Belgium 3%. Therefore, at 5.7% the United Kingdom is very much at the top of the league, if one excepts the United States and Portugal because of their special reasons. Therefore, I resist — I hope in a comradely fashion — the suggestion that my country and successive British Governments, of whatever political colour, have not made a major contribution from the beginning of NATO to the defence of Western Europe.

Lord Goronwy-Roberts (continued)

I now pass to one or two other points of substance which have been raised by members of the Assembly. Mr. Wall rightly raised the question of northern and southern flanks. I thank him for his constructive remarks with which he prefaced his question and his reference to our decision to continue to make a major contribution where we think we can best make it in the general central region.

I would ask you, however, to study what I have said in relation to the defence of the United Kingdom and the Channel area, and also our commitment to the northern area. I think that on reflection you will find, in what I have said, reassurance certainly in regard to the northern flank.

As to the southern flank, I know that this causes anxiety not only to Mr. Wall but, I think, to Mr. Critchley, who was Rapporteur of a Committee that produced a very useful report on this matter. We think, first, that the countries in southern Europe and in the Mediterranean should be those primarily concerned with the defence of that area, but — and I now refer my honourable friend to what I said about Cyprus — while we expect and hope to make certain reductions there, we shall remain in Cyprus. I leave it at that, because the position in Cyprus, as members know, is very difficult and probably changing rapidly.

We are very hopeful that the talks with the Cypriot leaders themselves will lead to an early solution. We would not wish to do or say anything here or in our own country that might jeopardise the early possibility of such a solution. When Mr. Wall has studied the entire statement again I think he will find that we are concentrating on the area where we can make the best contribution. We are providing for the northern region, and with others we shall continue at least to make the small, minimal contribution — and it is, after all, small, Mr. Wall — that we have been making in the Mediterranean so far.

I shall answer the Polaris point very briefly. We shall take whatever steps are necessary to maintain their effectiveness, and I do not propose to go into any further detail here, neither would I in the House. I repeat that statement: we shall take whatever steps are necessary to maintain the effectiveness of Polaris.

A point was raised about the area covered by WEU. I am perfectly prepared to agree that this is a difficult question. Your own Council has not been able to return a definitive answer to at least one question put to it by the Assembly. Article V of the revised treaty relates only to "armed attack in Europe". However, I agree with the questioner that Article VIII, on the other hand, refers to consultation with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace in whatever area this threat might arise. It is a real point. I cannot myself resolve it today, nor do I think any member of the Assembly can, and your Council has not so far been able to resolve it. But we ought to remember that WEU is not the only forum for discussing contingencies of this sort related to the area of operation of policy. There is certainly NATO. So I would prefer to leave this point with the observation that it is a matter which your Council, my government and other governments, are constantly studying, but we must not regard it as being one of undue urgency, because it is also being studied and considered in a continuing way in other forums and certainly in NATO. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I wish to thank you for answering the various speakers.

6. Address by Mr. Van Elsandé, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Development Co-operation of Belgium

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I am happy to welcome Mr. Renaat Van Elsandé, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Development Co-operation of Belgium.

I would personally like to thank him for the very warm welcome he extended to me during my visit to Brussels.

The Assembly is aware of the efforts being made at present by the Foreign Ministers of the nine member countries of the European Economic Community, and particularly of the active part played by the Belgian Minister in ensuring the success of the active part played by the Belgian Minister in ensuring the success of the important summit meeting convened at the initiative of the President of the French Republic.

I will now ask the Minister to address the Assembly.

Mr. Van ELSLANDE (*Minister for Foreign Affairs and Development Co-operation of Belgium*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I would first like to thank you for the kind words you have just spoken. I shall immediately begin the address I have prepared for this meeting.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, in a few days the third meeting of the Heads of Government of the European Community will take place in Paris. We do not yet know what the results of it will be, but any convinced European will hope that a few steps can be taken in the right direction — the one leading to political integration. Integration already appears in the preamble to the modified Brussels Treaty and in the Treaty of Rome. The idea was confirmed in the conclusions of the 1972 Paris summit meeting. A date was put forward for its achievement — 1980.

The Foreign Ministers of the Nine are attempting, more or less successfully, within the framework of European political consultation, to establish common points of view. But a common point of view does not yet mean a common foreign policy, which can only really come into being when the various States have surrendered this aspect of their sovereignty to a European government which, under the control of a democratic European parliament, will exercise its attributes in the field of foreign policy. It will still take time to implement this project, but decisions to be taken at the summit meeting next Monday and Tuesday should indicate the road to be followed.

A common foreign policy necessarily implies a common defence policy. The fact that we are all members of the Atlantic Alliance cannot be used as an alibi to justify the lack of a European defence policy.

A few days ago I read in the last issue of the *Monde Atlantique* an article by the former Belgian Minister Fernand Dehousse — professor at the University of Liège and an out-and-out protagonist of united Europe. The article was entitled *Résurrection de la CED ?*

I am very well aware that history is not written with "ifs". But I cannot resist the temptation to quote an extract from this article.

The fact is that the European Defence Community contained the seeds of fruitful elements for progress both in the building of Europe and in European relations with the United States :

"(1) By providing for a common military budget, the EDC made necessary and urgent the institution of a control exerted by political organs, since an army is never more than an instrument at the service of objectives defined in the political sphere. If the 1952 treaty had been ratified, therefore, a far more rapid and more concrete advance would have been made than has been the case towards a European political community worthy of the name. That, incidentally, is what the treaty expressly contemplated with admirable lucidity. The economic developments would have followed, as was laid down in turn in a project which unfortunately became a dead letter after the breakdown of the EDC, namely the political community project worked out in 1952-53 by a special assembly of the Six known as the *ad hoc* Assembly.

(2) Since the EDC countries all belonged to the Atlantic Alliance, their grouping under the Treaty of Paris would have guaranteed to them a cohesion which they do not have at present. Their influence would have increased accordingly, and the Alliance, for its part, would have emerged in a more balanced state, in the sense that a certain excessively powerful country, but one which Europe cannot reasonably do without, would no longer have been confronted only by individual, if not to say dispersed, partners.

Was not this the road leading to a real 'independence' of Europe from the United States ?"

But that was the Europe of the Six. We now have the Europe of the Nine. EDC was the solution we had thought of in 1952. I do not know what we shall have to do in the future, but I do know very well that we have lost a quarter of a century. I also know that history will not grant us another quarter of a century to organise a common defence policy. It is therefore high time to concern ourselves with the problem and to take forthwith the measures necessary for achieving our aim.

WEU is ideally competent in matters of defence. This organisation can therefore help us along the right road. By means of its resolutions and recommendations, the Assembly can exercise a considerable influence on national governments and parliaments. This is the point of view from which I shall now deal with two points — the standardisation of armaments and their production.

Mr. Van Elslande (continued)

Standardisation is made necessary by compelling economic considerations. Thorough standardisation implies the unification of tactical and strategic concepts, together with increasing integration of production. But such integration is inconceivable in the absence of political decisions.

It seems to me therefore that through this approach we have a pragmatic means of promoting military integration in Europe, thus progressively imparting an initial content to this notion. It is a limited and technical approach but, as I shall point out, it also has the merit of emerging, though in a more modest manner, on to the political field and thus preparing the ground for European defence.

I shall begin by stating that we must maintain an armament production capacity in Europe. Disarmament conferences, whether in Geneva or Vienna or elsewhere, will one day, I am prepared to believe, be brought to a successful conclusion. Meanwhile I do not see how Europe can afford to neglect its capacity for defence. We must therefore have a defence force, but a "force" of whatever form cannot exist without "armaments" and, if we want the power to decide, we must have a defence capacity based on adequate means of production.

We must not, of course, pursue a policy of independence, autonomy and self-sufficiency at all costs, since there cannot reasonably be any credible defence system outside the Atlantic structure. But Atlantic solidarity by no means implies that we have to depend on others for everything while being content to play the part of a mere subcontractor.

It is therefore a necessity for Europe to maintain an armaments industry. Its productive capacity serves each member of the Alliance. Above and beyond the rivalries of competition, there should be a thorough awareness of this fact on both sides of the Atlantic. We should not see in standardisation a means of dominating the market, as is thought and feared in some quarters. Standardisation cannot be a one-way operation. On the contrary, by extending the market to the dimensions of the Alliance, it is a matter of giving each and every party a real opportunity based on competitiveness and quality rather than on a narrowly nationalist reflex. Even so, it is essential for European industry to prove itself reasonably competitive in price and quality so as to be able to seize every chance.

The choice should not be between exclusive dependence and a policy of "buying European" at no matter what price. This would be a disservice to the Alliance and Europe itself, since it is the security of us all which would suffer.

I believe therefore that, while making a far-reaching attempt to standardise, Europe should achieve an awareness in this field also. This is urgent and necessary. The cost of modern armaments is such that any duplication amounts to economic absurdity, the consequences of which may well be the disappearance or subordination of European industries; for it all too frequently happens, for reasons which I shall try to analyse, that these industries permit themselves the costly and ridiculous luxury of pursuing competitive projects.

Our countries must therefore standardise and produce jointly. I shall not speak here of the strictly military advantages of standardisation, but will merely note that, for simple technical reasons, it constitutes a by no means negligible factor in military integration. On the other hand, I will argue that the obstacles are above all of a political nature and that their removal serves the cause of military integration.

Standardisation has become a magic formula of which we often pretend to expect everything, whereas, in the absence of action in depth and real industrial rationalisation, it can achieve nothing and, indeed, cannot succeed. The obstacles are of various sorts, but all are characteristic of the same pretext — an out-of-date conception of independence which is nothing more than a reflex inherited from the past. That is the first cause. The remainder is only a more or less serious but always pernicious consequence, with cumulative effects interwoven in an inextricable situation.

At the risk of over-elaboration, I consider that there are three main types of difficulty. First of all there is the lack of a common tactical concept. In this connection no progress is being made in spite of the efforts undertaken in various circles.

Next, and above all, there are conflicts between national industrial interests. These are aggravated by a certain conception of independence.

Lastly, there is the export policy pursued by each of our countries. This, in fact, is no more than an indirect consequence of industrial policy, but exports give rise to specific problems which deserve to be treated separately.

Mr. Van Elsandé (continued)

Standardising implies a common tactical concept. One must go further than mere compatibility, for unless we reach prior agreement on the standards to which the various types of equipment should conform according to the nature of the missions and the ways of fulfilling them, the only result of standardisation will be a trend towards exaggerated versatility and excessive sophistication resulting in prohibitive costs. Without denying that obstacles exist — differences in schools, traditions, conditions peculiar to each theatre of operations, etc. — it should be possible to arrive at a common definition of missions or at least of categories of missions, allowing of a sufficient standardisation of equipment. For the Central European zone, in any case, this should be possible. The proof is that countries which, like Belgium, are concerned with replacing the F-104 have succeeded in adopting common standards. Even more significant, the United States and France both consider that, so far as they are concerned, the standards adopted by these countries are compatible with their own. We should not despair, therefore, but on the contrary should avoid exaggerating the difficulties; this sometimes depends on a systematic policy.

I believe that thinking along these lines should be undertaken in all NATO countries. It would be unthinkable to develop and define tactical concepts independently of the Alliance, since such tactics will inevitably be put into practice in NATO. It is therefore desirable that within Eurogroup — which incidentally is searching its conscience at present — Ministers should be in a position to give a political pledge that they will attempt to achieve, no matter what the technical difficulties, results which should not and cannot await the end of the century before taking concrete form.

The difficulties of defining common tactical concepts to some extent conceal economic and industrial conflicts of interest which are, in reality, the obstacles to free competition, that is, barriers related more to protectionism than to military security. One thing is certain: standardisation calls for the rationalisation and reorganisation of the armaments industries of Europe.

Our countries all adopt the most nationalist of positions even when they can see very clearly the necessity for a high degree of co-operation. This state of mind is bound up with a systematic policy of independence or with reasons connected

with the protection of national economic interests or, most often, with both at the same time.

There are armaments industries in nearly all our countries, varying in importance. It is, by the way, habitual to hear criticisms directed at what some people call "the politico-military establishment". Without wishing to compare the relative importance of the military sectors of our economies, it is a fact that hundreds of thousands of workers are employed, directly or indirectly, in related sectors. Millions are spent each year. Each country, therefore, considers that it should resort to its own national production in the first instance to cover its requirements. But this does not mean that any one of them provides a sufficiently large market to ensure a minimum of profitability. To be sure, so far as defence is concerned, profitability and economic rationalism are not predominant factors. This is a matter for regret, particularly as, since costs increase unceasingly, the ultimate victim is the efficiency of our own defence efforts. In reply to these arguments, the majority of our countries — or at least the largest of them — put forward reasons connected with independence. But should we not have the courage to recognise that this independence turns out to be much more of a dependence and a constraint? Employment and stability must be maintained at all costs in a sector depending entirely on government orders, which are themselves irregular since, generally speaking, they are bound up with limited equipment programmes. For the rest, and in many cases for the greater part, countries have to rely on a systematic export policy, which has political disadvantages to which I shall make further reference.

Standardisation, therefore, provides an opportunity of modifying this state of affairs. It offers the production sector wider access to a market which, theoretically at least, can extend to the whole of the Alliance or, in any case, to its European component. But standardisation of this sort calls for prior or simultaneous rationalisation by means of a certain degree of specialisation and concentration of research effort. It is in fact a matter of setting up a transnational structure allowing for a better distribution of resources and a better organisation of markets on a more competitive basis.

Yet the difficulties of an undertaking of this sort should not be underestimated. Integration within the Community will not escape the consequences of the law of fair return. Each party

Mr. Van Elsdale (continued)

will claim from the results of the joint effort the equitable share which he considers to be his due, whether in terms of production proper or of participation in the benefits of technological advance. This is due in the first place to an understandable attitude, but the Community experience of the Nine has also taught us that fair returns, considered within the strict limits of the industrial sector concerned, generally represent an almost automatic factor for bringing the matter to a halt. We must therefore aim at achieving a correct balance on a wider basis and in a more embracing economic context. This will probably not be possible without certain established economic interests considering they have been wronged and without certain reconversions.

It is clear therefore that reform on this scale implies an awakening of political conscience and the existence, at this political level, of a decision-taking and co-ordinating body. There must be real planning, an organisation of the market, and structures to control industry. Such a reform implies a severe check on private interests and, if necessary, their nationalisation, since a system of private enterprise may be ill-adapted to the restraints of a high degree of specialisation and a rigid organisation of activities.

The advantages of such an operation are, however, obvious. The creation of an enlarged and stable market will provide a healthy and solid basis for the European armaments industry. Private interests, I should add, have understood this, for the trend appears unavoidable. Wide-ranging projects are already being drawn up on a multinational basis. It would appear that the production of advanced technological equipment already exceeds the capabilities which can reasonably be expected of any single country. The task of governments is therefore not hopeless. In the long run, a sufficient degree of integration is possible provided that a political structure capable of channelling and organising activities is set up.

Finally, there are the problems related to exports. All European countries are exporters. That being so, they compete mercilessly with each other on foreign markets. Some of our countries, indeed, pursue a systematic export policy which shows itself to be more profitable and constitutes — particularly in present circumstances — a by no means negligible contribution to a healthy balance of payments.

Undoubtedly, exports are a consequence of the situation prevailing on national markets. They are also an additional complicating factor in the organisation of a policy of large-scale standardisation, since producers are all the more keen on dominating even a restricted national market when beyond it they are aiming at export sales which will assure them of considerable profits. Exporting enables private firms to make profits and the State to recover part or all of the investments devoted to research and development by passing them on in the sales price.

From a strictly economic point of view, the operation is certainly a paying one and even highly profitable. In a wider political context, however, the balance may prove negative. Competition on foreign markets and the hope of a large production run, no matter how limited national requirements may be, involves systematic duplication within the Alliance and — even more serious — among Europeans. In the last resort it will be more advantageous in every sense of the word, and probably more effective from our defence point of view, to produce a single type of equipment which, through standardisation, is assured of sufficiently long runs to ensure minimum profitability.

Still from a political point of view, exports are meeting with increasing opposition among the public. Rather than an instrument of foreign policy, they finally come to be seen as a constraint which limits our opportunities for diplomatic activity by subjecting them to excessive economic compulsions. To speak of Belgium alone, it is clear that a country which exports between 85 % and 90 % of its production, according to type, is obliged to consider exports more as an unavoidable factor than as an instrument in the service of its diplomacy.

Attempts at European integration imply a parallel common policy on exports. There is no question of their exclusion *a priori*; but standardisation should make it possible to reduce exports — outside the NATO area — to much more marginal proportions. A joint approach, a common philosophy and common regulations ought to prevail, so as to eliminate or organise competition on foreign markets. The present anarchical competition only results in encouraging the arms race. To be sure, Europe alone will not be able to find an effective solution to the problem of the armaments race and of the proliferation of armaments throughout the world. This is not to deny that, here again, Europe ought to be able to speak with a single voice

Mr. Van Elslande (continued)

which, being less dependent on vital economic interests, could afford to be more selective and more prudent than are each of our countries taken individually today.

For all the above reasons, a satisfactory solution can only result from a political decision. Such a decision, moreover, is well outside the competence of the Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs alone.

Efforts are being made to achieve greater standardisation in various institutions. But these efforts are nearly always confined to a limited sector where the object is to replace a specific type of equipment. To be sure, we should not decri the importance of this, since any progress, even partial, is a step in the right direction. Nevertheless, we are obliged to note that in the absence of a universal approach, it will not be possible to make any real progress.

A sectoral approach may prove worth while, but it does not go to the root of the evil. On the contrary, from certain points of view, it increases the contradictions by launching programmes to reconcile the irreconcilable. The only true remedy lies in a common armaments policy. Experience in the construction of Europe has taught us the limits of progress by sectors. In order to achieve results, efforts must be pursued on all fronts and progress must be parallel in all sectors, military, industrial and political, if the endeavour is not rapidly to come to a grinding halt.

But how can this common policy be devised and implemented? There have been many exchanges of views at various levels. Within the Atlantic Alliance our American allies have constituted themselves the champions of standardisation through the voice of the Secretary of State for Defence. Europe cannot afford to ignore this voice, if only in order to safeguard its opportunities and take advantage of them.

Eurogroup and WEU are also concerned with these questions, which, as all of us are aware, are vital. But hitherto we have been content chiefly to note the difficulties or to discuss the respective merits of one forum or the other. I think it is now urgent to try to do something and to begin to shape a common policy. A number of major equipment and re-equipment programmes have to be implemented in the comparatively near future. It is urgent for Europe to seize upon this opportunity, which may be

the last. It is not a matter of vetoing this or that organisation. In any case, there is no ideal forum. For one reason or another — composition, geographical coverage or competence — any given forum is always too restricted or inappropriate.

In any case the task is so vast that above and beyond sectoral approaches, which are limited by the very nature of things, it is necessary to deal with the problem wherever it is met, seeking to determine what each organisation or each forum is in fact most qualified to contribute.

It is clear that NATO, and even more particularly Eurogroup as far as Europeans are concerned, are the ideal venues for the definition of tactical and strategic concepts. I have already dealt with this point.

The industrial problem, and that of exports which is closely bound up with it, are by far the most vast and most delicate. I believe that WEU could devote itself to the study of these questions, to which insufficient attention has hitherto been paid. WEU includes the chief European producers. The first step must be a thorough study of the structures of the military sectors in the economy of each country. We must also ascertain what is their relative importance, what forms of specialisation are possible and what can be done about the pooling and financing of research activities. Finally, we must determine the best ways towards progressive integration, taking account of existing financial structures and of alliances which may constitute an advantage or a disadvantage, depending on circumstances.

But transcending these studies, projects and cogitations, a common armaments policy soon comes to imply that decisions must be taken at the political level. That is what I have tried to explain. To give real substance to these ideas, therefore, we must have an appropriate forum where this determination can become manifest. Here I come back to European union and its concomitant, European defence. Undoubtedly the proposed European union bears within it a political design. It must be woven around the existing institutions of the Common Market and of political co-operation. It is therefore undoubtedly at this level that the centre of gravity of a European armaments policy should be situated. Of course, European union is only in a rough-hewn state and European defence is in the clouds, but among the Nine there is a political orientation aimed at incorporating all Community and inter-State relations. A European

Mr. Van Elslande (continued)

armaments policy, therefore, forms an integral part of this design. In addition, such a project is by its nature closely associated with substantive issues that fall within the competence of the Common Market. But the Treaty of Rome excludes armaments from common policies.

It remains true that any attempt at integration, because of its consequences in the economic and industrial fields, and in that of exports, can only be conceived as closely related to the European Economic Community.

To sum up, at the moment when we shall proceed to implement a genuine plan of standardisation, and independently of the sectoral activities which are mainly pursued within Eurogroup and which should continue to receive our full support, we must act in as close association as possible with the political activities of the Nine. It is there that the focus of political decisions regarding unification, including military integration, will normally be situated.

Ladies and Gentlemen, these few ideas which I wanted to expound to you go far beyond the mere question of standardisation and production of armaments. It may well be that they cannot be realised, if political determination fails to overcome the obstacles. I am, however, convinced that European defence, no matter what the exact extent of this concept may finally be, could usefully begin with an effort in the field of armaments. If we want to succeed, it is time to start. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Van Elslande.

The Minister has been kind enough to agree to answer questions members may like to put to him.

I call Mr. Sieglerschmidt, Chairman of the General Affairs Committee.

Mr. SIEGLERSCHMIDT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I have listened with very special interest to what the Minister has been telling us, particularly about the problems of a common European defence policy and about WEU and Eurogroup in this connection. Last Tuesday morning we discussed all these questions very extensively. I do not know whether the Minister was kept informed of that debate. What he said could almost have been an epilogue to it.

If the Minister had followed that debate, he would have noticed that there were many in this chamber who were greatly concerned that a joint European defence policy, which was conceived as a pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, could nonetheless set up a measure of centrifugal force leading us out of the Alliance. I am not among those — as I said on Tuesday morning — who hold that view. My opinion is rather that it should be possible to create in the Alliance the two pillars that Kennedy spoke of.

My question, in view of what the Minister said, is this : what possibilities does he see, if Western European Union is brought in, of dispelling the misgivings and anxieties I have mentioned, and of better organising the European pillar of a common defence of the West ? I would particularly like to ask what prospects he sees of achieving and giving concrete form to what I might call, using a well-known phrase from German politics, an ordered coexistence of WEU and Eurogroup. The Minister himself mentioned this. Does he think that the solution could be found along the lines of a continuous exchange of information or a delineation of competences between the two bodies in the field of standardisation of armaments and similar matters ?

(Mr. Amrehn, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair in place of Mr. Nessler)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Van Elslande.

Mr. Van ELSLANDE (Translation). — Mr. President, I hope the Assembly will excuse me not only for not attending last Tuesday's debate myself, but also for not even being in a position to know of it.

I am very glad to see that this debate has followed the same lines, and that my speech this morning can serve as a kind of epilogue to the discussion.

Where this particular question is concerned I would point out that I deliberately tried in what I said to avoid giving an answer, because for one thing I do not believe that it is up to one government to lay down what ought to go on in the WEU Council of Ministers, and for another I feel that what was really important was to promote the idea of arms standardisation. I said that I, personally, hoped for a great deal from any resolutions the Assembly might adopt in order to win acceptance for this idea. I avoided mentioning any specific implementation, stressing that every approach has both advantages and disadvantages.

Mr. Van Elslande (continued)

I think it is wrong constantly to be weighing up the various priorities. What matters is first of all to reach a definite and unanimous attitude to the basic problem. Once people want the same thing, it will be easy to find ways and means for bringing it about.

To sum up, I would say what I hope for from today's debate is that the Assembly of Western European Union will look at this question very seriously. I have been so bold as to put forward one or two topics that might be studied. I believe that in this area the Assembly is in a position to do useful work.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. de Niet.

Mr. de NIET (*Netherlands*). — But when we are discussing important subjects such as those which have been dealt with by the Minister, Mr. Van Elslande, we must wrestle with the problem of what we as parliamentarians decide and what is decided by our governments in Benelux, WEU, the Common Market and NATO. Decisions are most important in terms of the production of armaments and in agreeing upon the various marks of arms. Nations, sometimes individually and sometimes in concert as belonging to international organisations, seek either through ambition or economic necessity to produce sophisticated armaments. These activities have great relevance in terms of aeroplane and armaments factories and in turn have a great bearing on employment problems. In seeking to keep up to date in sophisticated technologies, each country in terms of its balance-of-payments situation must decide whether in a particular case it can act on its own or with other countries in the various international organisations. Some of us remember between the two world wars the discussion of the problem created by the merchants of death.

That typical illustration does not ring a bell at this moment with the public, but between two wars — and some other members of this Assembly will remember it — that was a problem. We now fortunately see the rise of very many new countries, and at the same time the market for all these things is increasing and increasing. I know that we have to export and to take care of our balance of payments and full employment. I know, too, that we have to do all these things to avoid a major war, and I am not a pacifist. There has to be a balance of power in order to avoid war. I accept that, and I accept NATO.

On the other hand, it has the consequence that we try to find new markets everywhere in the globe. We westerners are already the "merchants of death". The dialectic of this problem arises in every discussion in any ministerial council that our institutions have. That is my question.

(*Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Minister.

Mr. Van ELSLANDE (Translation). — Mr. President, if there is one thing that deeply upsets me in the whole discussion, here and elsewhere, on this question of armaments it is that we could indeed merit the title of merchants of death. Probably — even certainly — I have not made this feeling plain enough in my speech. On this point, the basic idea underlying what I said is this. So long as we have national armaments factories, we shall have for purely economic and technical reasons to combine production with export. I would be very glad if we could give up exporting weapons. This is something that I believe would be possible if we tackled the problem on a European scale. What we need to do, inside this Alliance of ours, is to create enough economic opportunities to be able to limit weapons production to meeting our own defence requirements. Bearing in mind the areas of territory we have to defend, our economic potential and the equipment we need, I think it must be possible to set up an integrated European armaments industry which would serve only our own defence needs. When I say "our own defence" I mean, of course, the two pillars of the Atlantic Alliance, standing on either side of the Atlantic Ocean.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Klepsch.

Mr. KLEPSCH (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, the Minister made a very remarkable speech for which I would cordially like to thank him. There has recently been a plethora of statements — the best known is perhaps that of General Steinhoff — about the immense squandering of resources due to the many parallel cases of arms production, and there has been widespread discussion about how to bring this under control.

Today the Minister made the proposal — the pertinence of which must, I think, have been particularly obvious to this Assembly — that WEU, all of whose members are also members

Mr. Klepsch (continued)

of the European Community, be used in order to contribute to the co-operation, harmonisation, rationalisation and also perhaps therefore to the standardisation of armaments production. This should be taken seriously since all the discussions which we have so far had on the subject have always come to grief on the individual interests of the national economies. It is idle to talk of standardisation and rationalisation as long as there is no harmonisation of the interests of the armaments industries of the countries concerned. So long as proper progress is not possible within the European Community there is I think a great deal to be said for the Minister's proposal to use WEU for this purpose.

Now, I would like to have asked how far he has already developed the idea in detail. Theoretically, of course we already have a basis in certain WEU institutions. Is he of the opinion that the existing institutions should be — if I may use the expression — reanimated, or does he think additional measures are needed? In any case I do realise that if that idea takes shape, there will naturally still have to be thorough discussions on co-operation with the United States and Canada. But I believe that he really has put forward a sound practical idea, which offers us the chance of a new approach. This is what has been lacking in our international discussions.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Minister.

Mr. Van ELSLANDE (Translation). — Mr. President, when the honourable member asks whether I have in mind the setting up of new institutions, I think back to my young days when I read the Bible in Latin and where I found the following phrase: "*Multiplicavisti gentes sed non augxisti laetitiam.*" This could be translated as meaning "Thou hast increased the institutions, but thou hast not increased the happiness of mankind." So far as possible, I do not think about creating new institutions. If it is not possible to do anything else, then it will have to be done; but I believe that in the meantime we must look for a solution in the numerous institutions we already have. The political decision must, as I have said, belong with the Nine. There is no other way out of the various very serious problems involved.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Roper.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I will endeavour to respond to what you have said. I found the Minister's remarks about the development of a common defence policy for the Nine of very considerable interest, in that they would provide an executive mechanism by which bodies like the Eurogroup could function. I hope the Minister will accept that such a hypothetical development must await, as far as the British Labour Party is concerned, a successful outcome of the renegotiations and the approval of continued British membership by the British people. I personally hope that that will take place and that we can go forward in the direction that he mentioned. However, following up Mr. de Niet's question, it would appear that there could be some export of arms outside the NATO area. In those cases, if an agreement had been made within the Nine for a joint production programme, would it be necessary for the organ of political co-operation of the Nine to agree before there was any export of that particular arms product outside the NATO community?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Minister.

Mr. Van ELSLANDE (Translation). — Mr. President, I did mention this problem of arms exports during my speech. I believe I said that if we achieved an integrated weapons production I would not rule out any exporting of weapons, but that first of all this would certainly become marginal compared to the present-day total of exports from the various countries, and that secondly this would no longer be to meet economic needs but could become an instrument of diplomacy for us, and an instrument of our joint policy. Without totally ruling arms exports out, therefore, I believe that these are the two conditions under which any future integrated European weapons industry could be involved in export.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Osborn.

Mr. OSBORN (*United Kingdom*). — Mr. Van Elslande has given us a very wide-ranging philosophical presentation as one of the Foreign Ministers of Europe and the Community. I thank him for giving us food for thought which obviously has concerned us all within WEU and Europe.

I wish to deal with two issues. One with which he has dealt obviously falling inside the rôle of WEU is his discussion on the thinking of a European industrial structure.

Mr. Osborn (continued)

As an aside, may I say that he started by speaking of political unification as well as economic unification within the Community, assessing that this presents problems. Mr Van Elslande referred to nationalisation. Each nation has its own ordnance factories which are the property of the appropriate ministry of defence. I hope that he is not advocating eliminating a powerful private sector within Europe which can supply and must have freedom to export.

To put this on any political body is difficult, but what steps would he regard as the first steps necessary to bring about such an achievement? This challenge, I think, might go to the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions of WEU.

We have had a chance of looking at military aircraft production as well as civil aircraft production, but the problem is that each country wants an assembly factory on its own territory. The MRCA solution has been to have three assembly lines with a number of component factories. Is this an achievement for rationalisation or not? To have one assembly line in my view would have achieved much greater economies. Therefore, for Foreign Ministers to get into this is, indeed, difficult.

The second subject I wish to raise briefly is that one of the causes of war is difficulties in the supply of materials, at the present time energy, and possibly food.

Although this is not a Western European Union problem, to what extent does the Minister see Europe coming together more effectively to deal with the food supply, because it is difficulties over shortages of food that cause unrest and discord in our populations?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Minister.

Mr. Van ELSLANDE (Translation). — Mr. President, where the first question is concerned I think it is obvious that it will be difficult to find a separate solution for the armaments industry if the Nine do not pursue a genuinely integrated industrial policy. I am very sorry to have to say that the attempts that have so far been made within the Nine have not led to much in the way of practical results. It is quite clear that this industrial sector cannot be looked at in isolation from other areas of industry. I was asked what practical steps could be taken to progress along

this road. I am sorry, but I am not a technical expert on industrial matters, or on economic or military matters.

I think it must be underlined that we can, as we have been trying to do for a number of years, make some progress sector by sector. But this is not enough; this road would be so unbelievably long that we would quite obviously never get to our goal. The first step we will have to take is a purely political one. So long as we do not manage to come to the political decision to take this path, we shall I believe not make either a first or a second step in what I regard as being the right direction.

As for the second question, I would comment that a conference like the FAO conference that was held in Rome a few weeks ago shows us that the industrialised countries, and even the oil-producing non-industrialised countries, are becoming more and more aware of their responsibility in providing food for the whole world. Evidently we must do everything that we can to implement such a policy so that some, if not perhaps all, causes of friction and armed conflict can be avoided.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Minister. I should like to express once again the gratification with which the Assembly has listened with extreme interest to the very factual and comprehensive speech that you have been good enough to give us here.

7. Address by Mr. Vredeling, Minister of Defence of the Netherlands

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Vredeling, the Minister of Defence of the Netherlands.

It gives me special pleasure to greet Mr. Vredeling. As far as I am aware, this is the first time that he has appeared in this forum. But his reputation in European affairs is solidly established.

He has played an important part in the European organisations. A year and a half ago he transferred to the executive, but think I can safely say that in this new function he is defending the European cause with the same ardour.

I call Mr. Vredeling.

Mr. VREDELING (*Minister of Defence of the Netherlands*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I want to speak first of all in my own mother tongue to ask you and the Assembly to excuse

Mr. Vredeling (continued)

me for giving my speech in the language of the country where I now am ; I am doing this not only out of deference to that country, but also — and I hope that this will become plain in what I have to say — to underline the fact that, symbolically speaking, a Netherlands Minister of Defence has for the first time spoken through the mouth of the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs. I think I can, in the Benelux context, allow myself this symbolic statement.

(The speaker continued in French)

Mr. President, I thank you for the words you have just spoken.

A little while ago I received your invitation to address this Assembly on some aspects of European co-operation. I accepted your invitation with all the more pleasure in that I feel at ease among European parliamentarians. As a European parliamentarian myself, I have concerned myself with the problem of building up Europe over a period of many years. I must confess to you that this period has so far been the most rewarding of my life. As a result, I have remained acutely conscious of the need for European co-operation.

Progress towards European unity is arduous, but in my view it is also necessary and hence practicable.

In that context I consider the report of Mr. Klepsch, which is included in the Orders of the Day for this afternoon, as one of the manifold symptoms of your desire — which is also mine — to catalogue and study specific problems and issues of detail in a European framework as well.

I should like to tell you how much I appreciate the way in which the Klepsch report, which presents a comparative study of the conditions of service of professional personnel in the armed forces, has been compiled. For that reason, I was very happy to provide the necessary information and figures regarding the Netherlands position.

I can give only one solid excuse for the delay that occurred, namely that my colleagues and I myself were so busy preparing a memorandum on the organisation of European defence that we were unable to meet immediately all the other needs and requests for information.

The memorandum which I have just mentioned concerning the armed forces is to be the subject of a wide-ranging debate in the Netherlands Parliament.

In this memorandum, which explicitly sets out my intentions with regard to European security, I have pointed out that it will, in the long run, become impossible for the European countries — especially the small countries — to maintain effective defence machinery in existence without far closer co-operation, and that these countries will have to tread new paths to achieve this.

I have in mind international co-operation among States in the form both of standardisation, co-ordination and unification, and of allocating tasks and specialising in different sectors.

That is a development which, in my view, should likewise take its rightful place in the perspective of building Europe.

One sphere for possible co-operation that springs immediately to mind is that of logistics.

It has long been well known that no country — with the exception of a super power — is able to bear alone the burden of keeping in existence a modern defence apparatus, with all that this involves.

The increased costs relating to personnel — and this is another observation made in the Klepsch report — the problems of national service and the astronomical sums required for modern armaments and for the logistic support of the armed forces constitute so many factors that oblige us to rethink the actual principles involved in defending the countries of Western Europe.

Within the framework of the existing Alliance, the concept of this defence remains too dependent upon national considerations and influences.

It was for that reason that, in NATO first of all, I strongly stressed the need for seeking and studying possibilities whereby we might arrive at a new apportionment of tasks, in particular among the countries participating in the defence of the Central Europe sector ; for it seems to me that where a group of countries is to devote its energies to a collective task, it is logical that each one should concern itself with the sectors in which it is best qualified to act.

The question as to whether the long-term Netherlands defence plans to which I have referred can be implemented will depend upon the promptitude with which my ideas are translated into action.

I am, moreover, convinced that what is valid for the Netherlands in this field is equally valid

Mr. Vredeling (continued)

for the other European countries. For each nation must at present face the same problems: on the one hand, considerable increases in the costs of personnel and equipment, and, on the other, public resources which are heavily mortgaged by the demands of the affluent society.

I am aware that any reallocation of tasks will involve a painful adjustment for countries which have, for centuries past, organised their defence on a national basis, and which have only participated in a form of intergovernmental co-operation over the past twenty-five years.

I am, however, convinced that it is possible for us to organise the defence of Europe more intelligently than we do today. All my colleagues have already expressed the same idea, each in his own way.

In particular, I am following with interest a study which was started in NATO on the initiative of my American colleague concerning the possibilities of arriving at a more flexible organisation of our joint armed forces.

This would make it possible to increase the effectiveness with which the deployment of our forces is organised. The nations of Europe must see to it that this study is brought to a successful conclusion.

If I have dwelt on these problems, it is because I hold the firm conviction that it will depend upon the results achieved in this field whether a small country like mine can continue to make a full and wholehearted contribution to common defence on the seas, on land and in the air.

Furthermore, no genuine co-operation — and still less genuine unity — will be achieved unless the European nations allow themselves to be converted, in the interests of their collective security, to principles which have, in other aspects of European enterprise, led to tangible and remarkable achievements.

I am thinking of the European Communities with their supranational structures. Indeed, how is it that common policies exist in the realms of agriculture and energy, and not in that of defence?

A defence policy conducted in common clearly presupposes a common foreign policy. With the progressive building up of a common foreign policy, the nations of Europe should seek simul-

taneously to strengthen without delay their practical co-operation in the field of defence.

Moreover, in view of the strongly international character of our industries, it appears practically inevitable that we should direct our course towards a common industrial policy, which might have repercussions on the armaments industries. Here I am reiterating exactly what my Belgian colleague said.

You are aware that, at the beginning of the fifties, we tried to bring about the full integration of our defences — at least as far as land armies were concerned — among the six nations, France, Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. We wanted to find a *modus operandi* to associate West Germany with the collective defence of Europe.

This project failed for political reasons, and we were led to provide for German military participation in the framework of Western European Union, of which your Assembly is an important organ.

I think that the failure of the European Defence Community represented one of the most damaging developments in the process of building Europe. Although we must recognise that great progress has been achieved towards unification at the functional level, we must also acknowledge that a number of opportunities have been missed in the political sphere.

I well understand that co-operation, in the sense of a pooling of resources inspired by the best intentions in the world, has no real chance of success unless the nations concerned have the resolve to place themselves under the aegis of a common political authority.

During the fifties, minds were evidently insufficiently ripe to envisage European union. It is permissible to wonder whether they are so now. Today, in the seventies, instead of one single motivation, we find a whole range of economic and financial structures straining for integration, in the realm of defence as well.

To this must be added the fact that the past twenty years have given us considerable experience of institutional co-operation. The European Economic Community is a reality that can no longer be discounted.

The interdependence of the European States belongs to the realm of realities. Even those countries which are traditionally sensitive

Mr. Vredeling (continued)

towards their national entity, like France and the United Kingdom, neither can nor desire to escape from this state of affairs. It was France itself which was the cradle of concepts calling for European solutions.

Aware of the need to promote such solutions, the Nine of the EEC likewise have decided to consider, at their periodic consultations, that area in which it is evidently most difficult to arrive at a form of co-operation — namely, foreign policy.

They expressly demonstrated their desire to evolve a European policy, with its own distinctive personality vis-à-vis the outside world, by transforming the system that governs their relations into a European union by the year 1980 or thereabouts.

It is against this background that I discern possibilities for intensifying European co-operation in the field of defence, and ultimately for working out a policy of collective security designed to proceed hand in hand with political unification.

I am convinced that, in the future as well, Europe will be unable to assure its own security without co-operating closely with the United States; but it is also my conviction that, as the European political entity gradually takes shape, the defences of the European countries will increasingly bear the imprint of this development. For that reason, I consider that we should single out, here and now, the sectors in which more intensified co-operation among the maximum number of European countries could suitably be applied.

This European co-operation, which will assume a character different from that of Atlantic co-operation, will reinforce the security of the Alliance, because it will be more coherent.

In the long term, I have in mind a framework of co-operation that would enable the European countries to concert their defence efforts in the realm of finance and, in the final analysis, to achieve more balanced burden-sharing.

Furthermore, I envisage the possibility of defining operational criteria within the European framework which would go further than those established at NATO. This development could not fail to encourage co-operation in arms production.

Naturally, all this constitutes a long-term undertaking. There are all kinds of political factors of an incalculable nature which are beyond my influence, although I may be able to lend impetus to this or that development. For the time being, therefore, I prefer simply to submit to you the following question:

In what sectors of defence would it be desirable to extend co-operation in scope and depth straight away?

The appropriate fields seem to me to be those in which international links already exist.

I have already mentioned industrial production, which has a markedly multinational character and for which a common industrial policy might be worked out within the European Communities.

It would be of paramount importance to integrate the armaments industry into these arrangements, not only with an eye to military co-operation, but also with the aim of arriving at collective control of armaments production.

It would then be possible also to see that the armaments industry in Europe came under the supervision of a European Parliament elected by universal suffrage in order to ensure that the actions and reactions of this complex industry should be placed under more democratic supervision.

It would be necessary to reconsider Article 223 of the Treaty of Rome. As you are aware, this article respects the principle of national self-sufficiency in the armaments industries by expressly excepting military products from the provisions of the treaty. This same article stipulates that the Council may modify the list of such products.

Thus it comes about that all sorts of practices which, if they were applied in the agricultural sector, for instance, would immediately give rise to complaints addressed to the Community, are tolerated in the armaments sector.

I am sure that military logistics hold out wide prospects for co-operation; and in the same way, we might envisage the merging of a number of military units and organs, such as specialist training centres, intelligence services and various logistic bodies.

In the context of progressive unification in the equipment sector, I believe that it might also be feasible to arrive at more fully integrated

Mr. Vredeling (continued)

management and utilisation of the major terrains used for manoeuvres, with possible joint use of the equipment on the spot.

In the initial stages, we should adopt an essentially pragmatic approach in these efforts to foster European unification, with the sole aim of rendering them more effective.

That means that we should also stimulate the interest of the NATO Eurogroup in this respect. I expect positive results from this approach in the field of organisation and principles as well as in that of policy: first, the elimination of duplication will make it possible to increase the yield of the defence efforts accepted by the countries concerned, and to achieve economies; second, I believe that any attempt to further co-operation, if crowned with success, encourages the building of Europe.

Allow me, Mr. President, to make clear that I have in no way in mind the emergence of a third power alongside the two super powers.

I reject the idea of a European nuclear force because we do not feel the need for it in the framework of the integrated Alliance.

The fact is that European security is closely bound up with the existence of a system of nuclear balance, which will — as I fervently hope — be governed on a lasting basis by the outcome of the SALT negotiations, as we saw on the last day of the Vladivostok conference.

Although these negotiations have lessened the risk of war for Europe, the continent should nevertheless encourage this trend by making a European contribution to defence, which would derive the maximum results, in terms of both quality and quantity, from the sacrifices that the European peoples are disposed to make in the spheres of finance and manpower in the interests of their security.

Even if — which cannot be ruled out — our progress towards European unity in defence entails additional expense in the initial stages, I am convinced that the benefits which will finally accrue to us in terms of the safety of our existence will be considerable.

Finally, I should like to thank you for having allowed me to address the only institution of European parliamentarians which deals basically with military issues.

I would express the hope that you will continue, both in this international forum and in your respective parliaments, to strive for European unity — which will also serve the interests of our security. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Minister.

Mr. Vredeling has kindly agreed to answer any questions that the members of the Assembly might care to put to him.

I call Mr. Roper.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — It is a very pleasant situation and an honour for a member of a European assembly to be able to pose a question to a Minister who had a reputation when he himself was a member of European assemblies of being the champion of question askers. Today Mr. Vredeling has shown that he was not only a good member of European assemblies but now is a most constructive Minister of Defence.

Mr. Vredeling may not have seen the passage in the report by Mr. Krieg on behalf of the General Affairs Committee which we discussed on Tuesday and in which his views on Eurogroup are quoted:

“since Eurogroup seems to many observers, as Mr. Vredeling, Netherlands Minister of Defence, recently stated, to be an instrument of American pressure to undermine the economic solidarity of the members of the EEC.”

Will the Minister confirm that these are in fact his views and, if they are, what we can do about it?

Secondly, will the Minister go on to give us his views as to what could be developed as an executive mechanism for Eurogroup, particularly in view of the case that membership of Eurogroup goes beyond the nine members of the European Community?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Minister.

Mr. VREDELING (Translation). — Mr. President, I must tell the honourable member that I too noticed in Mr. Krieg's report the passage in which a quotation is ascribed to me; the passage concerned runs;

“France may rightly wonder what significance its accession would have, since Eurogroup seems to many observers, as Mr. Vredeling,

Mr. Vredeling (continued)

Netherlands Minister of Defence, recently stated, to be an instrument of American pressure to undermine the economic solidarity of the members of the EEC."

I do not recognise myself in this quotation. I have not had the opportunity to ask the Rapporteur where he took it from. On this point I am very curious about my own words. I get the impression that the Rapporteur has been the victim, as happens to all of us, of a quotation that is not entirely accurate.

The questioner has given me the opportunity to say a little more about Eurogroup as an organ. He has asked me how I see Eurogroup as an executive organ. I already said, in my introduction, that the intergovernmental co-operation such as takes place in Eurogroup and in NATO is marked by the very fact of the absence of an executive organ. I do not believe that in the Eurogroup context it is a practical possibility to create executive organs particularly since — as my Belgian colleague has said — we in Europe already have executive organs, in particular in the European Communities. Unhappily the European countries which co-operate in the European Communities are not always represented to a matching extent in the membership of various international bodies. But if the political will existed among these European countries, they could make a start tomorrow on putting into practice the principles they all say they subscribe to.

I have pointed out that Article 223 of the treaty setting up the EEC, and relating to arms production, has never been put into effect either in the Netherlands or in other countries. The Council could, at the proposal of the Commission, decide on this by a unanimous vote. Then we would have the executive, then parliamentary supervision would be possible, and then there would be a Court of Justice to make rulings. I think this is the road that we should follow.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Leynen.

Mr. LEYNEN (*Belgium*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I listened with great attention to the Minister's speech and I gathered that his aim is soon to arrive at a European union that will be responsible for the defence of Europe. But this European union is obviously not going to come about overnight, so I would like to ask Mr. Vredeling how he sees things developing

while we are waiting for this European union to come about. In view of the lack of agreement that there is about Eurogroup, I am wondering why he does not take this opportunity of making use of the treaty on the European Defence Community which will allow European defence to be organised until such time as European union comes about. In his introduction the Minister said that he was willing to follow new paths, and I would like to ask him what his views are on this.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Minister.

Mr. VREDELING (Translation). — Mr. President, I can tell the honourable member that European union is nothing new. There is the solemn declaration, made by the Heads of State and of Government at a previous summit meeting, that we would achieve European union by 1980. So it is no new objective, but a goal that has already been set. The road to European union is a difficult one, but it must be found. I said a moment ago that there is one issue where a beginning could be made on this, and that is the communalisation — if I may call it that — of arms production. A solution to the problems of joint defence will have to be found in an extension of the coming about of a shared foreign policy. It will be obvious that a separate shared defence — supposing that it could exist — would be inexpedient politically. Defence is not an end in itself, but a means of reaching a particular end which includes, among other things, the security of the inhabitants of a particular area. I believe that foreign policy must show the way to greater integration in the field of defence. This is a matter not for the technical experts but for the politicians, who have a vision that goes beyond national frontiers and who are embodied in the Ministers for Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Van Elslande already said, a moment ago, that this is not only something for Defence Ministers but also for Foreign Affairs Ministers; it brings in the entire foreign policy of the various member States. I believe that there is no need to stand still while we are waiting for European union to come about. It is quite possible to undertake something within the framework of the European Community. And there are things we can discuss in the Eurogroup context. Eurogroup will continue to be necessary, since not all its member countries are in the EEC; we should not for instance forget Norway, which in my opinion we certainly need as a member of Eurogroup.

Mr. Vredeling (continued)

To get down to practicalities, we no longer need separate treaties. What we need at the moment is political decision-making. There is no treaty on co-operation in foreign policy matters, yet despite this the Ministers and officials of the Foreign Affairs Ministries regularly get together in Brussels. The quite remarkable fact is, in Europe, that the only Ministers who have never met within the EEC framework are the Defence Ministers. Even Home Affairs Ministers have met on occasion, and the only ones who have not are the Ministers of Defence. Personally, I look forward with impatience to the day when they do.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Tanghe.

Mr. TANGHE (*Belgium*) (Translation). — Mr. President, a number of times already members from Mr. Vredeling's own country have asked whether the time has not come for the various member countries of WEU, or even of NATO, to arrive at a certain sharing out of tasks, so that each country would no longer be obliged to make an identical effort in the three branches of the armed services, and would be able to some extent to specialise in the sector to which it felt best suited. I would like to ask the Minister whether he takes the same view.

If his answer is in the affirmative, I would ask Mr. Vredeling how he proposes to cope with the problem that arises when each country is willing to put up with a great deal of expenditure in those sectors of the armed forces from which its industry can make a profit, while few countries are prepared to do so in sectors of the armed forces that are personnel-intensive, personnel being something that at the present time is becoming more and more expensive. Where are we to look for the body that will find and impose a fair balance in this distribution of tasks?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Minister.

Mr. VREDELING (Translation). — Task-sharing is indeed one of the objectives that we ought to be able to manage at this stage. One of the best known examples, which is attracting a certain amount of attention, is the successor to the Starfighter, where four small countries have decided, in principle, to join in seeking a solution; here, the aircraft's task is a specialised one. This is not an aircraft with a multi-purpose

rôle, but a rôle of a rather more limited nature. This is one example of task-sharing.

Other approaches to task-sharing are possible. Although there is no formal agreement, I would remind you that the Netherlands has a navy of some considerable size, while that of Belgium is rather more modest. One could call this a form of task-sharing. Luxembourg, so far as I know, has no navy at all, but this example can show that some countries do take over tasks from each other. This is something that I think should be pursued rather more deliberately than has been the case in the past.

Here I want to make the point straight away that the solution to the whole problem of European defence is not to be found in this issue of task-sharing. This will only take us part of the way, because very quickly we shall come up against the need for making political decisions.

Following the principle that we must do what falls to our hand to do, my answer to Mr. Tanghe would be that the task-sharing he is talking about does, in certain cases, make it possible to find a solution to practical problems; but this is not the remedy for all the ills that European defence is heir to. In other words, task-sharing cannot be a replacement for setting up a genuinely European defence policy.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Critchley.

Mr. CRITCHLEY (*United Kingdom*). — The Minister said in his speech that he rejected the idea of a European nuclear force. In that case, how does he see the future development of the French nuclear force and the British nuclear force between now and, shall we say, 1980, or whenever some form of European union becomes a reality?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Minister.

Mr. VREDELING (Translation). — The honourable member is touching on a very difficult problem indeed. He must be aware of this. There are a couple of countries in Europe, Britain and France, that have nuclear weapons, while the others do not. There are even those that would not be allowed to. This is a particularly difficult problem to which I can see only one solution. This solution, which is still being worked on, is that the great powers should agree together that nuclear weapons are to play a less important rôle. It does seem that these efforts are beginning to have a certain success. I think

Mr. Vredeling (continued)

therefore that it would be a mistake for Europe, as it moves towards integration, to equip itself with its own nuclear weaponry. If this were necessary, I would see it as a very adverse trend in internal relations. I believe therefore that the French *force de frappe* and British nuclear weapons represent problems for us all. I hope that it will not be necessary to Europeanise this means of national defence.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Mr. Minister, I should like to express to you once again the thanks of the members of the Assembly for your participation in our deliberations.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I draw your attention to the votes which will be taken this afternoon, and I would urge the largest possible number of members of this Assembly to participate in the voting.

8. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following Orders of the Day :

1. Rational deployment of forces on the central front (Presentation of and Debate on the Interim Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Document 654).
2. Conditions of service in the armed forces (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and

Armaments, Document 650 and Amendment).

3. Rational deployment of forces on the central front ; Conditions of service in the armed forces (Votes on the draft Recommendations and draft Orders, Documents 654 and 650 and Amendment).
4. State of European nuclear energy programmes — security aspects (Vote on the amended draft Recommendation, Document 655).
5. The energy crisis and European security (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 656).
6. National parliaments and the WEU Assembly (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments and Votes on the draft Recommendation and draft Order, Document 653).
7. Advanced technology in Canada — the consequences for Europe (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Votes on the draft Recommendation and draft Resolution, Document 649).

Are there any objections ?...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak ?...

The Sitting is closed.

(The Sitting was closed at 12.40 p.m.)

ELEVENTH SITTING

Thursday, 5th December 1974

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.
2. Attendance Register.
3. Changes in the membership of Committees.
4. Rational deployment of forces on the central front (*Presentation of and Debate on the Interim Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*, Doc. 654 and Amendment).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Critchley (*Chairman of the Committee*), Mr. Reale, Mr. Critchley.
5. Conditions of service in the armed forces (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*, Doc. 650 and Amendment).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Klepsch (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Roper (*on a point of order*), Mr. Lemmrich, Mr. Wall, Mr. Cermolacce, Mr. Tanghe, Mr. Roper, Mr. Lemmrich, Mr. Wall, Mr. Klepsch (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Critchley (*Chairman of the Committee*).
6. Address by Mr. Vasco da Gama Fernandes, Observer from Portugal.
Speakers: The President, Mr. Vasco da Gama Fernandes (*Observer from Portugal*).
7. The energy crisis and European security (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee*, Doc. 656).
8. Rational deployment of forces on the central front (*Votes on the draft Recommendation and draft Order*, Doc. 654 and Amendment).
9. Conditions of service in the armed forces (*Votes on the draft Recommendation and draft Order*, Doc. 650).
10. State of European nuclear energy programmes — security aspects (*Vote on the amended draft Recommendation*, Doc. 655).
11. The energy crisis and European security (*Vote on the draft Recommendation*, Doc. 656).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Depietri.
12. National parliaments and the WEU Assembly (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments and Votes on the draft Recommendation and draft Order*, Doc. 653).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Delorme (*Rapporteur*), Mrs. Miotti Carli (*Chairman of the Committee*).
13. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Amrehn, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The Sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments ?...

The Minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting

which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings¹.

3. Changes in the membership of Committees

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The United Kingdom Delegation has proposed certain changes in the membership of Committees; these have been published in Notice No. 11.

Are there any objections ?...

The changes are agreed to.

¹ See page 38.

4. Rational deployment of forces on the central front

(Presentation of and Debate on the Interim Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 654 and Amendment)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the interim report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on the rational deployment of forces on the central front, Document 654 and amendment.

This report is to be presented by Mr. Critchley in the place of Mr. Dankert. As Mr. Critchley has not yet arrived, we shall suspend the Sitting for a few moments.

(The Sitting was suspended at 3.05 p.m. and resumed at 3.15 p.m. with Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, in the Chair)

The Sitting is resumed.

I call Mr. Critchley, Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, to present the report on the rational deployment of forces on the central front.

Mr. CRITCHLEY (*United Kingdom*). — I apologise through you, Mr. President, to the Assembly as a whole for being so disgracefully late to begin this session. My excuses are legion but none, in fact, will measure up, so I will not attempt to make them.

My task is to introduce on behalf of Mr. Dankert his interim report and this I undertake to do very briefly indeed. It is an interim report in that it is an *hors d'oeuvre* for what I think will be a feast next May in Bonn, because this is perhaps one of the most important reports that the Defence Committee of this Assembly will have ever produced. The report is an *hors d'oeuvre*, because of shortness of time. As you will remember, as part of our operation we commissioned a study by General de Maizière on the rational deployment of forces on the central front. That report, which is quite admirable and heavily classified, did not arrive until 31st October — which was, of course, the right date. Since then we have been short of time to extract from it the full report, because not only had we to await its arrival but most of the document is classified and has to go through the process of declassification. For those two reasons it is an interim report.

It is clearly a report on the situation on the central front in Europe. It is based on the de Maizière report, but in May it will also cover the following four topics: the problems of the allied air forces in Central Europe; the problems of the ACE mobile force; American plans concerning the reinforcement of American forces in Europe and their disposition within Europe itself, and the whole problem of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe as a whole.

Perhaps I may just indicate the recommendations of the interim report. They are to press for the establishment of the European defence research institute called for previously in Recommendation 236 and, secondly, to study the possibility of common funding for the procurement of major weapons systems. A draft order is included in the report along with the draft recommendations.

I apologise for my lateness and for the shortness of my introduction of this interim report but, as I say, it is essentially in the nature of an *hors d'oeuvre*. The main meal of six courses will be served in May, and I can assure you, Mr. President, that when you sit down to that meal you will enjoy it very much indeed. (*Applause*)

(Mr. Amrehn, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair in place of Mr. Nessler)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Reale.

Mr. REALE (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, the Dankert report goes well beyond what was explicitly required, and its implied objective, written with a fine political sense, must be sought between its very lines. And it is precisely in the light of what is not written that I would justify my own remarks in order that they may be taken into account in the final drafting.

This morning's speech by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium may be regarded as the litmus paper which modifies the whole experiment — a speech open to the necessities born of the deep stirrings of Europe's destiny, and open also to the intervention which succeeded it at the same sitting.

I begin with the recommendations, the first paragraph of which lays stress, in the light of the explanatory memorandum, on the creation of a European defence research institute. Precisely because this point appears before the reader as the most important, it would seem at

Mr. Reale (continued)

first sight that it is desired to create a new organ, which some will perhaps regard as superfluous and most as certainly unnecessary. I understand the value of research, I appreciate the urgent need at stake when, in the unhappy event of a possible intervention, there might occur moments of confusion, of misdirection and hence of delay and frustration, by reason of dissimilarity of weapons and of unilateralism in the military stances not only of single arms but of single countries. The unity of strategic defensive plans, the uniform availability of weapons, are the conditions of success in all circumstances. Therefore — and this is the first point — the institute must be created to assure the effective identification and overcoming of the difficulties which arise from the diversity of schools, of trends, of instruments, in an attempt to achieve a synthesis capable of effective application to any operational deployment in an area which, as was said this morning, is indefinable, stretching as it does from the frozen waters of the North Sea, through the tepid Mediterranean, to the warm waters of the Red Sea and Indian Ocean.

The second point is that there may be something else behind the European research institute. There is an evident economic issue in circumstances which will see the involvement, in terms of contributions affecting national balances of payment, of all the countries, particularly at a time of grave economic difficulty when the quest for economic advantage is an imperative and immediate fact. Standardisation of equipment, apart from the operational unification aspect, which is the subject of the debate, is also a positive asset in economic terms and must therefore be taken into careful account.

In this context I would ask the Rapporteur, and through him yourself, Mr. President, to expand paragraphs 11 and 12 in the final version of this nevertheless admirable report in order to stress the enormous economic advantage which would accrue to all parties from a lesser dispersion of the resources allotted to research and development in armaments. Today for example — and I refer to paragraph 12, which is particularly illuminating — we know the distribution of one half of \$20 billion, that is, the sum wasted each year in this field, and we know which countries are most ready to yield to the temptation of dispersion. One half of \$20 billion is a very large sum which could be put to very dif-

ferent uses, even indeed to the institute it is proposed to create, and which in such circumstances would in no way swell the present contributions of member States. Here it is impossible not to take account of the industrial structures which are now operating in each region. The process could certainly take place by degrees, by means of a slow but steady reform of existing structures, by means of conversions and adaptations of those same structures. It would naturally be reasonable to begin with the more sophisticated sectors: technology, aviation, nuclear physics, space exploration; but it would be equally opportune to give some attention to the heavy armaments sector.

Third, the question which seemed to me this morning clearly to distress the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs was that relating to the possibility that many of us, and politicians in the first place, will be regarded as merchants of death. The temptation to sell arms to third parties would, under any system tending to standardisation in Europe, undoubtedly lessen; and in such circumstances the function of the merchant of death would become merged in dubious efforts to promote the countless mistaken ambitions which will erupt, in this or that part of the world, among those who still lack an appreciation of the value of life. It is certain that if, in the course of this process of standardisation, it remained possible to hold faith with the basic tenets of democratic collaboration, we here have the duty, by reason of our very parliamentary mandate, to strive towards standardisation of arms even through the diversities of integration. Democracy is a dialogue, respect for opinions, not a process of obliteration or suffocation.

Fourth, the final objective which binds us together is the unity of Europe. In a collective effort we are asking what means may be marshalled to realise this hope, transposing ourselves away from our own countries to participate in this international assize.

The Netherlands Minister of Defence this morning deplored the fact that there has not yet taken place a summit meeting of Ministers of Defence at the level of the Common Market. He was right. We can discuss the price of butter or the systematisation of citrus fruits endlessly: those are important matters, but essentially economic, and therefore arduous or perhaps even incapable of solution. There will certainly be less debate in the quest for armed defence when the issue is to ensure the survival of populations,

Mr. Reale (continued)

simply because life is more important than the purse. In this manner, like the prodigal sons who twenty-five years ago finally learnt the lesson taught by their fathers, exhausted by the delay — I refer to the collapse of the European Defence Community — we shall come back to the necessity for unified conduct in the field of defence, and WEU will then have contributed within its capability to the realisation of these many hopes. It is for that reason that I venture to suggest an amendment to the draft recommendation. I would ask the Assembly to substitute the word "encourage" for the word "urge" in the request addressed to the Council for action. We are not concerned here with urging, but rather with performing a duty, for which we therefore encourage; not a wish, but a deeply-rooted requirement. Hence it is not a petition that will move the Council, but an insistent demand that governments shall proceed to the creation of an instrument that may not appear the most effective, as I well realise, but which remains for us one of the most concrete and positive means of attaining the objective upon which we are agreed.

The institute is a small thing, but it appears to me that we have here, beyond the economic fact and the defence of democracy, a reaffirmation and confirmation of a great step forward in the march towards European unification.

Thank you, Mr. President. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Reale. I would ask you to submit your amendment to the Chair in writing.

I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. CRITCHLEY (*United Kingdom*). — We can accept the amendment. It adds a degree of urgency to our deliberations.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Critchley, for having taken over from Mr. Dankert.

The votes will be taken later.

5. Conditions of service in the armed forces

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 650 and Amendment)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and

debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on conditions of service in the armed forces, Document 650 and amendment.

I call Mr. Klepsch, Rapporteur of the Committee.

Mr. KLEPSCH (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I am very pleased to be able to submit this report to you today. The title of the report is: "Conditions of service in the armed forces": in addition, however, the further task was assigned of enquiring into the status and functions of women in the armed forces. We have tried to do justice to this requirement in the second part of the report.

I would like to start by thanking warmly all those who supported the experiment of this report. This morning we listened to a speech by Mr. Vredeling. Thanks are due to him for the fact that he, as the representatives of twelve other governments did, responded to our wishes — everyone we turned to did so — and replied to the two hundred questions in our questionnaire. The point should be stressed in particular that we received answers not only from the governments which belong to Western European Union, but also from governments of countries with a democratic structure which belong to NATO but not the European Economic Community or Western European Union, and from those which, like Ireland, belong to the EEC but to neither NATO nor WEU. All these countries replied to our questionnaire in a manner that enabled us to carry out an analysis without which this report could not have been submitted to you today.

I must not omit to convey my special thanks to Mr. Kitching. It was he who undertook the analysis of this report, and my thanks are also due to his wife, who assisted him. I would also like — I know this is rather unusual — to express my sincere thanks to Mr. Whyte, the Secretary of the Defence Committee, for his share of the work. I would like to add that I was able to have a whole series of interviews with authorities and persons other than those mentioned in the report. My particularly warm thanks are due to the Canadian Defence Minister, Mr. Richardson, his Assistant and Deputy Minister, Mr. Kirkwood, who is responsible for political questions, and General Milroy, who deals with personnel questions, together with General Romanow, the head of department responsible

Mr. Klepsch (continued)

for organisation and planning, and the heads of department and staff officers of the Canadian Ministry of Defence for the additional information they supplied.

I am also glad that it was possible to have special conversations on certain aspects of this report with the Italian Defence Minister, Mr. Andreotti, the German Minister of Defence, Mr. Leber, and the Inspector-General of the Bundeswehr, Admiral Zimmermann. That has put me in a position to submit this report to you. I would like to say expressly that I am aware that the report may contain various errors of transcription or calculation, but that nonetheless we have for the first time a comparative survey of the conditions of service in the armed forces of thirteen countries which not only offers us a kind of overall picture, but also provides a look in depth into the social structures and potential further development of the defence efforts of those countries.

I do not wish to repeat in my introductory remarks what I have already said in the report, and will limit myself to two main comments. First of all, I believe that there is no doubt in this Assembly that the credibility of defence efforts includes the need to make sure that, having had thirty years of peace in Western Europe since the second world war, we will also make peace secure in the future. Secondly, I believe it is fitting with such a report to thank the men and women who are often making many and sometimes personal sacrifices by serving in the armed forces.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I will not add to the text of the report, but I would like to put forward certain further ideas which in my opinion are worth taking into account in future thinking. First there is the relationship between the defence budget of a country and compulsory military service or a volunteer army. You all know that a considerable number of the countries questioned have, instead of a conscript army plus regular soldiers, an army of volunteers. It was for me particularly interesting to look at the question from this budgetary aspect.

In this connection the argument can be confirmed that from the overall economic point of view a regular army may be cheaper than a conscript army. The Institute of Strategic Studies in London, in particular, has carried out very

careful enquiries into this subject. We, however, are a political body and see things as political realists. We know that voting a budget is one thing and a general economic viewpoint is another. As a result of the enquiry which we carried out I must say with all frankness that I cannot examine this argument down to the last detail, but even assuming it is true that a regular army costs the national economy of a country less than an army of regulars and conscripts, it has nonetheless been shown that this principle cannot be applied budgetwise. In all countries concerned with building up a regular army wholly of volunteers, the question of funding manpower costs arises quite differently from that in countries which have a composite army of conscripts and volunteers. Take for example Canada, which I was able to get to know particularly well. There the current share of personnel costs represents 67 %, although in 1964 the army was reduced from 120,000 to 80,000 men in order to reduce manpower expenditure. The manpower budget already amounts to 67 % of the total budget, and is showing a tendency to rise by the early 1980s to 72 % and over. This means to all intents and purposes that scarcely any resources remain available for renewal of the army's equipment. The question of a further reduction of manpower in the armed forces is currently being debated in Canadian political circles. It would certainly be interesting — although your Rapporteur was unable to do this — to enquire into United States experience with the introduction of the volunteer army. It would be useful to do that in one or two years' time when there will be relevant experience to go on.

What can be said already however is that the budget costs resulting from the introduction of the regular army are considerable and that as well as the budget problem there is the question of meeting the manpower requirements of the armed forces. We can thus see in Canada a problem, which the Canadians are coping with, that every year no less than 10 % of the total armed forces have to be recruited anew as 10 % leave. This is of course a question of considerable significance in view of the fact that the period of recession may one day be past. In particular, one has to realise that, if minimum manning requirements are at a certain level, the question is then whether in many countries this can be solved except by the introduction of compulsory military service.

I believe that as far as manning costs are concerned one can summarise the result of our

Mr. Klepsch (continued)

enquiries in one sentence : numerically smaller armies are by no means cheaper, and the renewal of their equipment is becoming an increasingly heavy financial burden. I say that with all seriousness, because I know what pressure all the countries that have introduced compulsory military service are under, particularly with regard to fixing an adequate period for military service. In our report we have said that as a rule fifteen months is probably the lowest limit that can be set if the conscripts' contribution to the defence effort is to be a fully effective one. I said "as a rule", because in my explanatory memorandum I have drawn attention to a table which seems to me particularly interesting. It is essential to examine the relationship between the proportion of conscripts in the armed forces, and the total numbers of the armed forces and their period of service. If you have an army which has a corps in which 80 % of the establishment consists of conscripts, fifteen months appears to me to be the minimum for the period of service. For how can people be trained to act efficiently otherwise? Of course if the proportion of conscripts is only 20 or 25 % it seems to me that it might be possible to manage with fewer months' training, because conscripts would then only be given postings in which they carry out commensurate duties.

So I would ask that the table in question be looked at particularly closely ; for it expresses the relationship between the period of training, the operational capability of those concerned and the proportion of conscripts which an army as a whole can carry.

There are of course many aspects of compulsory military service which we did not enquire into specifically in this report. I am thinking for instance of the question of maintaining a feeling of defence willingness in the Community countries. Here compulsory military service may have a big part to play.

On the other hand we must consider what incentives are needed to ensure that a regular army will obtain the necessary quota of additional recruits. For a country like Canada the problem is solved by the fact that volunteers join the army in order to learn a trade and then, having learnt it, leave. For some of the European countries this is of no interest because they already have a fully operative system of vocational training. Canada is also moving in this

direction, and in future there will be an additional difficulty for the Canadian forces in recruiting volunteers when this major motivation recedes.

As a result of our findings I would like to make the specific point that there is a close relationship between a conscript army and budget problems. I think that in future it will be impossible in many countries to leave this out of account.

A second main set of considerations arose for us from a decision by the Assembly: we were asked to look at the rôle played by women in the armed forces. After thirty years of peace the move towards emancipation by women in our society is naturally having its effect on the armed forces as well. This is true at a time when the security of a well-paid job is of special importance in view of the economic recession. The employment of women in the armed forces is in fact being discussed in nearly all our countries, regardless of whether they have so far had women in their armed forces or not.

Again it is in Canada that the emancipation movement has made the greatest headway. Women there have succeeded in getting the political authorities to envisage filling 10 to 14 % of the positions in the armed forces with women. That represents a considerable step forward compared with the situation in the past. Your Rapporteur is inclined to think that the view of the British army is correct, that 5 to 7 % of women could be "taken on strength" in the army and could definitely improve efficiency.

We must take into account the fact that the emphasis differs according to whether a regular army or a conscript army is involved. In the case of a regular army the emphasis as a result of the emancipation movement is on better jobs and better promotion prospects, and in the case of a conscript army the men raise the question of equal treatment of men and women.

On one point all armies agree : women cannot have combatant duties, that is to say they cannot serve in combat units. It follows that in most armies women would not be posted to outlying or isolated stations, or made to serve at sea. The employment of women in the armed forces is therefore limited in this way.

We all know the problem of rotation in the postings of officers and non-commissioned officers in the army. If a given part of the army cannot be used in certain posts, it becomes more

Mr. Klepsch (continued)

difficult for another part of the army to move up the promotion ladder as quickly as before. This is a special problem to which I would like to draw your attention. It plays a part in armies which have a high proportion of women personnel.

However — as I have also stated in the report — the present trend is to increase the proportion of women in the armed forces, and the use of women has proved very satisfactory in a great many different posts.

We did not deal with the proportion of civilian personnel such as officials, clerks, and manual workers in the armed forces nor with the increase in the proportion of their numbers, although — as emerged in the course of our enquiries — this is an issue of considerable importance. For in quite a number of the countries we covered there is a tendency to reduce the number of those in the armed forces in uniform and to increase the number of civilian employees. Generally speaking this trend can also be seen wherever the personnel of the armed forces is being reduced. Where that is happening — and I have various examples in mind — the reduction is usually made in the combat units, that is to say the most active and most noticeable units of the armed forces. This is often hidden under a cloak of verbiage about the need for a streamlining of command staffs and lines of communication. But in the case of all reductions the result is usually that the combat units, on which the maintenance of defence and deterrent capability really depends, are cut back, whereas the numerous personnel in the lines of communication, the support units, and the headquarters staffs are admittedly regraded and redeployed, but remain relatively static in numbers.

I have drawn attention to this because it is linked with the tendency in quite a number of armies to take on civilian employees on the one hand and to economise on uniformed personnel on the other. This tendency also needs to be looked at very seriously.

Another point is that we did not enquire more closely into education and training in the armed forces — we did not realise the importance of this area so clearly at the beginning of our enquiries, and it will be the subject of a future report which the Defence Committee of this Assembly is already undertaking. There is no

doubt that this is a very important field. We must examine it in the light of the fact that — as I mentioned earlier — the army in many countries today still represents a first class training centre for civilian life which is of great importance to members of the armed forces on completion of their period of service.

Another reason why a survey of this subject is needed is that pay and service structures can really only be compared if one is clear about the necessary qualifications and the way they can be acquired — that is to say if one knows what educational and training courses are involved.

Ladies and Gentlemen, we propose to you — I refer again to the text of the recommendation — that this report should not only be brought to the notice of the governments with which this Assembly is directly linked, but be communicated to the Council of Europe and in particular to the European Parliament, as well, and also naturally to the related institutions such as the Council of Ministers and the Commission.

We believe that by publishing this survey we are also making a contribution towards the formation of a European political union and towards progressive co-operation and integration of the European countries. In the European Community there is already, as we know, freedom of establishment for workers. This gives considerable significance to a comparison between conditions of service in the armed forces and there should also be a study, as we have proposed in one of the points of our draft recommendation, of whether and under what conditions the nationals of one country can do voluntary service in the army of another country which is a member of the Alliance. In quite a number of countries such service by nationals of another State is possible, but on the other hand in quite a number of countries it is not. In view of the disparities the question seems worth looking into.

Of course the conditions under which service has to be done are of particular interest. We looked thoroughly into this. As I have mentioned, within the European Community — which includes the whole of Western European Union — each individual has the possibility of freely choosing his place of work. The more conditions of work and social conditions can be harmonised in this sphere, the more an enquiry into this question seems necessary, with an eye to future developments.

Mr. Klepsch (continued)

In our report we have produced a comprehensive compendium covering very many different aspects. So far it is the only work of reference for the subject we investigated. I must repeat that there may well be some minor errors here and there. But we have, I believe, produced in this report a survey which will make future co-ordination measures easier.

In conclusion let me say that this report represents the first attempt at seeing the armed forces, which have so far been a more or less anonymous mass as a real social structure. If we wish to arrive at real solutions, we must examine conditions of service, efficiency and budget problems in relationship to each other. I am thinking of solutions like those which many of the prominent personalities represented here put forward this morning. I would not wish to close without thanking Mr. Vredeling, as the representative of all the other Ministers who answered our questions here, most cordially for his co-operation.

Thank you for your kind attention. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Mr. Klepsch, you have presented an outstanding report which has been heard with great interest. I thank you and your co-workers for the effort you have put into the preparation of this encyclopaedia of military service.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I wish to speak on a point of order.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Roper on a point of order.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I have no desire to make your work more difficult, Mr. President, but it would be helpful if before we begin the debate on Mr. Klepsch's most interesting report you could, under Rule 29(2) of the Charter and Rules of Procedure of the Assembly, give us your ruling as to whether, according to the Order of Business for this afternoon, the amendment is to be considered together with Mr. Klepsch's report or not. Paragraph 2 of Rule 29 states :

"Amendments shall relate directly to the text which it is sought to alter. The President shall decide whether they are in order. Amendments should relate only to the substantive text..."

It is my submission that Amendment No. 1 to Document 650 submitted under the name of Mr. Wall alone is out of order under Rule 29 of our Assembly, and I ask you now, Sir, to rule whether I am correct in my interpretation.

The PRESIDENT. — I should like to discuss this problem, Mr. Roper, immediately before we begin our votes when I shall feel ready to decide whether or not the amendment is related to the text of the report. For the moment I am not able to decide the question, and I propose that we should first continue the general discussion on the items tabled.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I understand your ruling, Mr. President. I am only anxious that in order to save us complications you should give a ruling as early as possible because otherwise members may wish to raise in the debate, either on this amendment or on other items, matters which are totally out of the scope of the report, and therefore we will have difficulties. For example, I understand that Mr. Wall has asked to speak in the debate. If he speaks on something which is out of order what are we to do, as members of the Assembly, if you have not ruled ?

The PRESIDENT. — I understand that your interest is to avoid difficulties, Mr. Roper, and that is my interest also but there is no difficulty in discussing all points relating to the report and it is not necessary now to decide whether the amendment relates to the text of the report, but we can discuss all that has been proposed and what may be in relation to it. You agree ?

I now therefore ask Mr. Lemmrich to begin his contribution to the debate.

Mr. LEMMRICH (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I would like to express my sincere thanks to Mr. Klepsch for his excellent report. The report shows his great expert knowledge, and also the great deal of work he has done on it. I agree with the thoughts which he has expressed. I should like to clarify in somewhat greater detail certain aspects of the draft recommendation.

Today one often hears it argued that defending our countries by well-paid technicians with the most modern weaponry — perhaps one might also say, with the most modern machinery — is the best method of defence ; that the typical fighting soldier is old-fashioned and no longer necessary. I find it hard to believe this, when

Mr. Lemmrich (continued)

our potential adversaries attach the greatest importance not only to the most modern weapons but also to the fighting spirit of their soldiers.

(Interruption by Mr. Cermolacce)

The honourable member knows this perfectly well.

My view is that it is still true today that he who is not prepared to fight for his country will in the long run no longer have his country. One can put this in the words of a man with experience: a Finnish general who once said: "there is always *one* army in a country, either its own or a foreign one". So I would endorse most firmly what is said in the draft recommendation, that even in the age of technology, the effectiveness of defence capability and the credibility of deterrence depends in the first place on the men and women in the armed forces.

If my French colleague reacts to what I am saying as he has just done, then I would comment that we are used to men who represent this political persuasion always being somewhat put out when they are seen for what they are.

In a period of relative prosperity in the free world, men and women serving their country in the armed forces need to know that they are not being materially exploited and are not lagging behind those working in the general economy. This is why the material conditions in which they do their service are so important. The significant value of this report lies in showing this so clearly.

But as well as material conditions, the basic attitude of mind towards the defence of our countries and of our free and democratic way of life is of equal importance. Today this is unfortunately no longer so unanimously recognised. The governments, and all politicians, should therefore address themselves particularly to this problem, especially since we are finding that our attitude to defence is being eroded and undermined in a quite deliberate and clearly methodical way.

Manpower costs are an increasingly large part of defence expenditure. The Rapporteur has shown us that very strikingly. In the United States, too, manpower costs already account for more than 60 % of the total. Compulsory military service for all is not only a system which

forges a close bond between the citizen and the country he feels is worth defending, but also a system in which manpower expenditure is less than in countries with a purely professional army. The introduction of the regular army in the United States has cost about \$3,000 million more a year than an equivalent army of conscripts. In the Federal Republic of Germany it is estimated that a regular army would cost about DM 5,000 million more each year. In comparing the funds which our countries devote to defence, it seems important to take this state of affairs into account in order to put the efforts of our countries on a comparable basis. There is always discussion about whether one country is making a greater effort and another less. From this point of view, too, the report brings a welcome lucidity.

The draft recommendation also deals with the length of military service. For reasons of domestic politics some countries are inclined to reduce military service still further. One must, of course, realise that this tends to give the impression that defence is no longer so important. One cannot really in all conscience believe that at a time when the Warsaw Pact countries are again very rapidly stepping up their armaments, not so much by increasing the number of men, but rather by a significant strengthening of their striking power.

It is not only when faced with certain economic difficulties that the free world tends always to live somewhat from hand to mouth. Our potential political adversaries have repeatedly shown that their policy is constructed on a long-term basis. For people who are accustomed to considering problems only from one election to another, this could well be dangerous. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you very much.

I call Mr. Wall.

Mr. WALL (*United Kingdom*). — I do not wish to waste the time of the Assembly by making a prolonged speech. Therefore, Mr. President, I wish to make it clear exactly what your provisional ruling is. As I understand it, we are entitled to discuss Mr. Klepsch's report and also the broader aspects of the amendment tabled in my name and at the end of the general debate you will rule whether this amendment is in order. Am I right in that assumption, Mr. President?

The PRESIDENT. — I reserve my ruling. Is that all that you want to say at this moment, Mr. Wall?

Mr. WALL (*United Kingdom*). — I do not want to make a speech unless that is clear.

The PRESIDENT. — You may explain your attitude, of course.

Mr. WALL (*United Kingdom*). — I understand that I may speak about the amendment but not move it and you, Mr. President, will rule later whether it can be moved.

On that understanding, I start by congratulating Mr. Klepsch on his magnificent report. The research that must have gone into this bulky document is enormous and I believe that it will prove to be of great importance in all our countries and to the Alliance as a whole. We in the West spend about 60 % of our defence expenditure on manpower in its broader sense — that is, in addition to paying salaries, on pensions, barracks and living accommodation, etc. Therefore, there is only 40 % left for hardware. The relevant figures in the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries are about 20 % to 30 % on manpower and the balance on hardware. This shows the difficulties and the expense that manpower presents to the planners of western defence.

We in the Assembly are all politicians and, as politicians, we are subject to pressure from our electorates. It is clear that in none of our countries the electorate likes paying for defence. Defence is a national insurance, but the electorate is apt to forget that until it is too late. An overriding consideration here is the time it takes for any piece of hardware to get from the planning stage into service. It takes about seven years for any piece of hardware — be it a tank, a ship or an aircraft — to move from the planning stage into service. Therefore, we have a very important duty in these matters.

Many of the member countries of this Alliance have decided in recent years to streamline their forces. Canada, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and more recently Western Germany, and my country, have submitted proposals. These are proposals for streamlining. All these countries say that it improves the efficiency of their forces because it makes them more mobile or something like that. We must face the fact that all these suggestions involve a cut in manpower. The reason is that manpower is particularly expensive. Manpower is, after all, what Mr. Klepsch's paper is all about.

I believe that any suggestion of streamlining manpower must and should be discussed amongst

the member countries of the Alliance. I am certain that my own government believe this to be so. Paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation uses the expression : "before changing fundamental aspects of the conditions of service in their armed forces" there should be consultation.

I therefore ask that the same procedure be followed on the proposed British cuts as was followed when the Netherlands earlier this year decided to streamline its forces. The Assembly will remember that the communiqué was issued in July by the NATO Defence Planning Committee stating its views on the Netherlands' proposals and it was accompanied by a confidential document which went direct to the Dutch Government.

We heard this morning from Lord Goronwy-Roberts about the proposals of the British Government. I want to make two points on that. These are points which affect every member of the Assembly and every member country. First, the basic justification is that my country is spending more of its gross national product on defence than are many of our allies. It is therefore proposed to cut our expenditure on defence from 5.5 % to 4.5 % of the gross national product. That is perfectly true. The United Kingdom is spending, according to NATO estimates, 5.7 % — not 5.5 % as was stated — on defence; France is spending 4.2 % and Germany is spending 3.9 %, or, if we include Berlin, 4.7 %.

To take another yardstick, which I think is an equally important yardstick, namely, the per capita expenditure, my own country is spending £63, France is spending £73, and Germany is spending £81 or £98 if Berlin is included. Many of the Warsaw Pact countries, for example, Czechoslovakia, East Germany and the USSR, are spending much higher per capita on defence than does my own country.

The other particular issue that I want to mention is that we have virtually a stalemate in Central Europe which we all hope will not be broken. It emphasises the danger to the flanks. This issue, which must be of importance to every member of the Alliance, is the maritime aspect of our defence to the flanks. The proposals which were explained this morning are of considerable importance to the whole Alliance. I do not want to spend much time on this. These proposals of the British Government are highly controversial and will be argued, but not here in this Assembly. This is not the proper place

Mr. Wall (continued)

for that. They will be argued out over the coming months in the House of Commons.

Where the British proposals affect the Assembly is on the question of consultation. I remind members of the Assembly that Lord Goronwy-Roberts said this morning that none of these proposals represents a final decision. He also said that they would be thoroughly discussed with our allies in NATO and outside and the final decisions will be taken in the light of those consultations.

I believe that that was a genuine promise. I believe that this is a very important matter. I believe, not only that the promise was genuine, but that it must be seen to be genuine. I therefore submit that it is of great importance that the same procedure be followed as was followed in the case of the Netherlands.

I say again that I hope that my suggestions will not be regarded by my colleagues on the other side of the House of Commons or by any member of the Assembly as controversial. I believe that it is in the interests of all of us, when one member of the Alliance has to do something, for good, bad or indifferent reasons, that it should be discussed amongst all members. My government have said that such discussions will take place. What I am asking is that the North Atlantic Council shall pronounce on these discussions when they are completed, both publicly, as it undoubtedly will do, and privately. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Cermolacce.

Mr. CERMOLACCE (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I did not intend to speak, but Mr. Lemmrich talked about the reactions of the representative of the French Delegation. My friend and I do not represent the French Delegation but the French Communist Party.

In reply to his speech and to ensure that matters are perfectly accurate and clear, that there is no misunderstanding, I would point out that we do not entertain any hatred for the German people. But we do not forget what happened in our country and other countries of Europe as the result of a certain policy which was pursued in Germany at that time.

Above all, I would say with force and conviction, in the name of my friend Mr. Depietri and myself, that we do not accept lessons in patriotism from certain members of this Assembly. We are told that the purpose of the project under discussion is to harmonise and not to exploit the army from a material point of view. What humanitarian concern! Quite so, but what you are seeking by means of this harmonisation of systems is in fact the creation of a professional army, the resurrection of that EDC which was condemned by the people of France and other countries.

You require this resurrection for well-defined purposes. You interfere in the internal affairs of each country, for the problems thus raised are not your business; they are national problems which each country is entitled to solve in accordance with its national characteristics.

This is the reason for my indignation about the remarks which were made; they constitute a demonstration against our independence.

It is also the reason why, if there is a vote on this project, we shall oppose it, for we consider that these are matters which are the business of our own countries and of each of the other countries; they are matters of national concern, and it cannot be decided beforehand what we shall do with our armies in the future.

(Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Tanghe.

Mr. TANGHE (*Belgium*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I too want to congratulate Mr. Klepsch on this report, which the Chairman has just referred to as encyclopaedic. I would say that the report reminds one of the imposing figure of the Rapporteur himself, both in its bulk and in its solid reliability. The author of this report has also given us evidence, particularly when he spoke a moment ago, of his prudent approach. Indeed, he must, when he was analysing all this documentation about the conditions of service in the armed forces, inevitably have come up against the question of an army of regulars versus an army of conscripts. He has made no attempt to urge a particular doctrine on any country or anyone, and indeed the problem will present itself in different terms in different countries. Most of the countries that belong to our treaty organisation have become quite wealthy; the tendency then is to entrust defence

Mr. Tanghe (continued)

to hired hands, with all the consequences this brings, consequences of which we have a number of examples from history.

There are indeed arguments in favour of an increasing use of professional servicemen in our modern armies. The weaponry becomes daily more difficult to handle, and as the previous speaker has said the machinery becomes ever more complicated.

Where the period of military service is too short for national servicemen to be able to cope with these complicated techniques, there can be an argument for meanwhile passing the complicated jobs over to regulars who will of course serve rather longer engagements. Then there is a further argument that can be put forward for using more professionals in the army, one that will certainly be true for so long as economic expansion in all our countries continues to take its present form. In these circumstances one can certainly argue that all our young men — particularly the trained ones — can be employed far more usefully in the economy than in losing a year or fifteen months of their time in doing useless or pedestrian tasks in the army. This has certainly been the case, though in the months ahead there may be less justification for this argument for a greater use of regulars in the forces.

There is a further reason, which we often prefer to keep quiet about. This is that in all those countries that are increasingly turning to professional soldiers, there is an unspoken giving-in to the tendency among the population to make less of a personal commitment to our common defence. We have nowadays a younger generation who reached military age after the second world war and who have never known a régime of oppression and slavery in our countries.

But there are also arguments against using too many professionals in our armies. You all know as well as I do that in certain countries it has been queried, in certain quarters, whether a regular army is the right answer. On the walls in certain countries you can read the slogan "Down with the regular army". These people have certain reasons, which may be respectable ones. I personally am not among those who believe that in a modern democracy an army of professional soldiers will inevitably

bring with it the danger of becoming a State within a State.

And then there is another argument against professional armies. Mr. Klepsch has already mentioned that there is controversy about the rising cost of regulars in the forces. That institute in London may make certain calculations for certain countries, but I know that the plan for manning combat units of my own country's small army solely with regulars is going to cost B. Frs. 5,000 million a year if it is applied overall. This sum represents about 20 % of our present-day defence budget ; and this is something that could lead us to ever-increasing expenditure on personnel. On top of this, technical weaponry is going to cost more and more ; for example, there are the aircraft that will have to be replaced. What is there going to be left over to deal with recruitment? Shall we have to make further savings on the training of our tank drivers, all our various artillerymen and our pilots, so that in the end we have to go into the field with weekend pilots and Sunday drivers to handle all this technically complicated and expensive weaponry? This is a question which is certainly worth looking at here.

There is a third argument, Mr. President, against an excessive use of regular soldiers and the radical phasing-out of conscription. I am afraid that now we have become rich enough to leave our defence entirely to men who know their job and are paid for doing it, we are giving way all too easily to the growing unwillingness among young people and among the population at large not only to pay for their defence through their taxes, but also to play any personal part in defending the greatest blessing and heritage that we all possess, that is to say our peace and our security. It seems to me that a continuing enrolment into the armed forces of young men from the public will keep alive among them, among their parents and their fiancées, and among the whole population the idea that merely paying money is not enough — that there must be a personal commitment to peace and security. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Roper.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — May I begin by saying how much I, like other members of the Assembly, have appreciated the hard work of Mr. Klepsch in preparing such a report. The word "encyclopaedic" has been used. Like all encyclopaedias, I fear that this document has not been sufficiently read. I hope that, like other

Mr. Roper (continued)

encyclopaedias, it will not merely remain on our shelves but will be consulted, for I believe that within the detailed analysis in this document there is a great deal of information, and I very much hope that the Chairman of the Committee, when he comes to reply, will agree that this is the sort of report which WEU should keep up to date and revise every two or three years so that we have a permanent and up-to-date document on the conditions of service in our armed forces.

Although I have paid tribute to Mr. Klepsch, I am sure he would not mind if I also made reference to Mr. Kitching, the expert appointed to assist him in this work, who, together with his wife, was of considerable value in documenting the remarkable information contained in the report. I will return later to one of the most important parts of the report, at least to those of us in the United Kingdom, where we have not yet permitted the development of trade unions within the armed forces, and that is the rôle of trade unions within the armed forces as discussed on page 143. But there are a number of other very important questions. We have some extremely interesting information on the relative salaries of the armed forces in different countries. We have been having discussions — and I shall no doubt refer to the remarks of Mr. Wall in this respect in due course — as to the percentage of our gross national product allocated to defence in our different countries. That is very closely related to the salaries which are paid to the members of the armed forces, and it is very interesting to see, at page 75, the considerable range in salaries between the different countries among those questioned by Mr. Klepsch in the preparation of his report.

I draw attention only to the range of salaries which exists among NATO countries in regard, for example, to colonels. A colonel in Denmark gets \$26,000 a year, and a colonel in Turkey is paid only \$6,500 a year. Yet we then try to make comparisons of percentages of national incomes as though we were comparing like with like. Similarly, one can make comparisons between the pay of private soldiers in Canada, where a private soldier is paid \$8,000 a year and the Republic of France where a private may be paid as little as \$940 a year — a differential of virtually 9 to 1.

Again, if we look on page 137, we find one of the most significant statistics when we are

making comparisons of relative expenditure in our armed forces. We see the figure of the share of defence expenditure which goes to pay and allowances. I refer to the table on page 137, where we can see that in Canada 63.6 % of defence expenditure is on pay and allowances, whereas in France it is only 34 %. In part this is because there is a conscript army in France and a whole-time professional army in Canada, but that proportion — virtually two-thirds in Canada and one-third in France — shows the way in which, by changing from a conscript to a professional army, there can be a very significant and substantial effect upon the expenditure on the armed forces, and why, indeed, comparisons purely of percentages of gross national product overlook some of the most essential problems in this sort of assessment.

Again, if we look at the ratio of the pay between that of a colonel and that of a private, we see enormous differences. In France the colonel is paid 6.8 times as much as a private. No doubt he smokes more expensive cigarettes and drinks better wine. In Ireland the colonel is only paid 2.9 times as much as an Irish private. They have to drink the same Guinness in Ireland. Similarly, if we consider the problems of trade unions, which are discussed on page 143, we are able to see that in Denmark and Norway and, indeed, in the Netherlands and Luxembourg, virtually all the members of the armed forces are in the appropriate military trade union. On the other hand, in the United Kingdom, although certain servicemen who are trained in a craft are allowed to qualify for membership of a trade union once they have left the armed forces, there is not a military trade union. For these reasons and for many others this document, this "encyclopaedia", will be of very great value to all of us in our national defence committees when we come to analyse our own defence expenditure, because we shall be able to set the defence expenditure in our own countries, the pay for the colonel and the pay for the private, and the relativity one against the other, and compare them against the yardstick of other countries. I believe that this Klepsch report will lead not only in the Federal Republic and here but throughout all our countries to very useful and very fruitful debates about the relativities and about expenditures on pay and conditions in the armed forces. Indeed, one of the matters which I have not discussed at length, in view of the time, is the rôle of women in the armed forces. Perhaps we have not until now accepted sufficiently the rôle of women in the armed

Mr. Roper (continued)

forces, and Mr. Klepsch, in his encyclopaedic report, gives us a good deal of information as to the different ways in which they are used in the various services. I was interested to see in the United Kingdom that on the very day on which the defence review was announced, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary for the Navy was busily recruiting women for the Women's Royal Naval Service, thus showing the importance which we give to continued recruitment of women into armed forces in the future.

The report is of considerable value. However, it is quite clearly a report which deals with the fundamental aspects of the conditions of service of the armed forces of the countries which are mentioned. I therefore hope that other matters which go beyond the question of conditions of service and discuss the size of the armed forces or the expenditure on the armed forces in general terms will be precluded when we come to the votes on this report, because the report as it stands is of great value.

It would be a pity if, by mixing the issues of the conditions of service by which Mr. von Klepsch has done the Assembly a great service, by introducing other and irrelevant issues about the level of the expenditure in various member countries of WEU, we were to get involved in a debate which might lead to votes and, because of the lack of a quorum or for other reasons, we were not able to proceed to the adoption of something which I believe is a report of very great value.

I therefore hope that when it comes to the conclusion of the debate we will not mix ourselves up on matters which are outside the limited but important scope of the report. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Lemmrich to make a short statement.

Mr. LEMMRICH (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, our communist colleague, Mr. Cermolacce, considered it appropriate to say something here about my country's past. When Germany's misfortune began I was still a child but perhaps it would be interesting for our communist colleague to know that while the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Molotov, was being received in Berlin with great honour at the beginning of 1940, my father met his death in one of the Third Reich's concentration camps. It is perhaps important to

know that there were men and women in Germany, even in those days, who fought against dictatorship and oppression and injustice.

Far be it for me to give my colleague Mr. Cermolacce lessons in patriotism. I know the debates which took place in the French Parliament between his political friends and the government. As far as my own country is concerned, I know that the German communists have given communist ideology precedence over the national interest. Because of this, Germany is divided. That is all I wanted to say. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I take note of your statement; we shall now proceed to examine the texts.

Mr. Wall has tabled an amendment to the draft recommendation in Document 650, which I will read since it is somewhat controversial:

Insert the following paragraph after paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation:

"That it urge member governments who participate in the NATO Defence Planning Committee to call on that body to conclude its examination of the United Kingdom's proposed defence review with a public statement of its findings as it did on concluding its examination of the Netherlands defence review on 9th July 1974;"

It has been brought to my notice that whereas the recommendation deals exclusively with conditions of service in the armed forces, the amendment deals with British defence policy as a whole. According to the rules, therefore, this amendment is unacceptable in its present form.

Since the President's decision is final in this matter, I suggest the following to Mr. Wall so as to avoid lengthy debate: the amendment does in fact call into question the policy of one of the governments belonging to Western European Union, but owing to the fact that I have read it out here, it will be included in the minutes and in the documents giving an account of our debates. While it is true that it cannot be included in the recommendation, it will nevertheless appear in our documents as the expression of Mr. Wall's opinion. In the interests of sound procedure and of speeding up our debates, I therefore ask Mr. Wall to withdraw this amendment.

I call Mr. Wall.

Mr. WALL (*United Kingdom*). — The Assembly is obviously now almost half a day late. I do not want to detain it any more than anybody here wants to be detained.

However, I must say that it would have been fair to have given me the chance to reply to the points of order put by Mr. Roper on his points of procedure. To do so would, of course, have enlarged the debate and possibly have wasted the time of the Assembly.

I therefore bow to your ruling, Mr. President, but I hope that you will give thought to the fact there are two sides to every question and that before you give a ruling you will hear both sides of the question.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I thank Mr. Wall for his goodwill and courtesy.

Since it appears that the vote on the draft recommendation will not be unanimous, I propose to defer it till 5.30 p.m.

I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. KLEPSCH (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, as Rapporteur I just wanted to take up one point which was raised in the discussion; apart from this, most of those who spoke were, on the whole, in agreement. One of the members raised a question which in my view has nothing whatsoever to do with the report. The communist representative introduced an issue into the discussion of the report which was totally irrelevant, namely the issue of the European Defence Community, and the question of creating some form of European defence organisation. It was not the object of this report to make a pronouncement on that. Nor did we try to do so. That is a task for other reports. I had the impression that the speaker in question read that question into the report, and I wished therefore as Rapporteur to make it quite clear that the report has nothing to do with this.

Furthermore, I would like to say that nobody would have been happier than your Rapporteur if there had been no need to concern ourselves with the necessity of maintaining armed forces. To give you one small example, in a few months' time — when the required five years have elapsed — we shall have what is called a review conference on the non-proliferation treaty. This will have to look into the non-compliance with Article 3 of that treaty, namely the fact that the two world powers, the Soviet Union and the

United States of America, have not fulfilled their obligations to reduce their nuclear forces. It seems to me that this is also a point which could be mentioned in passing: we are unfortunately still compelled to maintain our defence efforts as before.

The sole object of this report, however, was to give a survey of conditions of service in the armed forces, and nothing else; and that is all we tried to do, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Chairman of the Committee.

Mr. CRITCHLEY (*United Kingdom*). — In winding up on behalf of the Committee I should like to echo the views of everyone, or nearly everyone, who has spoken, and especially the view of Mr. Roper in the very kind things he said about Mr. Klepsch's report. So moved, in fact, was Mr. Roper to praise Mr. Klepsch that he ennobled him by calling him Mr. von Klepsch. This may begin a process from which we will all benefit from time to time.

Mr. Klepsch's report is long on facts and comparatively short on opinions, something which I do not think anyone can say about the majority of reports which come before this Assembly. He is responsible for an extremely valuable piece of research. There are times when the Western European Union Assembly must be famed for its research as much as it is occasionally mentioned in the newspapers for the range of its opinions. We give you, Mr. Klepsch, our hearty congratulations.

I think, too, that the interim report of Mr. Dankert will prove immensely valuable when it finally comes to fruition in May, because throughout the Alliance there are all the pressures upon each and every allied country to reduce the monies spent on defence and to reduce the numbers of ready forces in the Alliance. We had a very good example of this given this morning in the speech of Lord Goronwy-Roberts.

If it is true that there is this very general tendency, we have some lines of defence. The first line of defence is put forward in part by Mr. Klepsch and also by Mr. Dankert: how do we rationalise, make more efficient, the defence expenditure we shall be able to afford in order to purchase a reasonable defence? That is our first line of defence — rationalise.

The second line of defence is the MBFR talks in Vienna, and long may they go on talking in Vienna because if our line of defence of the

Mr. Critchley (continued)

MBFR negotiations in Vienna were to fail us the strategy of flexible response would be rendered out of date. The substitute for a strategy of flexible response is a return to a nuclear strategy for Europe, and if anyone imagines that anyone will initiate the use of nuclear weapons it is about time they brought their thinking up to date. Nuclear weapons are only of value as a deterrent against the use of nuclear weapons by other people, and to go back to a strategy which relied overtly on the use of nuclear weapons, small or big, is to surrender once the crisis begins.

But if we do not accept a strategy which is based upon nuclear response the only other alternative to it is a strategy which is based upon warning time. Unfortunately, history is full of examples in which the warning time has been available, but no one ever acted upon it. On 7th December 1941, the Americans knew what the Japanese were up to but the information that came through to them was filtered through their own preconceptions because they did not expect such an attack. The German invasion of Russia in 1941 was signalled in advance to Stalin by British Intelligence; he took no notice, but said that it was a western plot. The invasion of Czechoslovakia took NATO by surprise, and also the decision-makers of every NATO country. Finally, who would have ever suspected that the Israelis of all people would have been caught with their prayer books in their hands last October when they were in receipt of satellised information from the United States that an attack was immediate? If we rely upon a strategy which is based on warning time, we should know that no politicians will ever act and it would be as good as disarmament.

So I come back to my two final points: excellent reports from Mr. Klepsch and Mr. Dankert — reports which focus upon the first line of allied defence which is how to get value for money in a climate of economic reduction. If they fail us, there is not much that will save us. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — It has been decided to defer the vote for half an hour.

6. Address by Mr. Vasco da Gama Fernandes, Observer from Portugal

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — At his request I now give the floor to the observer

from Portugal, who has a brief statement to make to you.

I am happy to welcome you to this Assembly; I know your country well. I even had the doubtful privilege, at the time when I was on my way to join the ranks of the free, of falling foul of the sinister PIDE, the *Policia internacional e de defesa do estrado*, which sent me to Caldas-da-Rainha fortunately for a short time.

I am therefore well acquainted with your problems and I salute the effort of emancipation which the entire Portuguese people has displayed over the past few months.

We welcome you here with considerable emotion and, so far as I personally am concerned, with a great deal of friendship. (*Applause*)

I invite the observer to come to the rostrum.

Mr. VASCO DA GAMA FERNANDES (*Observer from Portugal*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, after fifty years of fascism, Portugal can carry its head high. A Portuguese can now be proud both at home and abroad.

My first duty is to convey to this illustrious Assembly the greetings of my country, which is most desirous to forge good relations with all countries, particularly the countries of Europe.

The time of isolation is over. We were manacled by a régime which is now condemned. Isolation finished on the day when that régime was finally overthrown.

Portugal has an inclination — which it has always manifested except under the yoke of fascism — for dialogue and fraternal comradeship. It is our natural bent to be present everywhere, to participate in all manifestations of the spirit and therefore in all political events, for no citizen is devoid of a political dimension.

Touched as I am by your invitation and the warmth of your welcome, it is an honour for me to salute, in my own name and on behalf of the Portuguese Delegation, the illustrious President of this Assembly; in his person I also salute all the free countries which, united by European ideals, desire to work for peace and human progress.

The fact is that Portugal's presence here is due to your generosity and we are proud to be among you. We must return your generosity

Mr. Vasco da Gama Fernandes (continued)

by becoming more European. That is our aim. Ever since 25th April 1973 we have been moving ever closer to you. On that day Portugal suddenly freed itself from fascism, thanks to the perfect communion of purpose between the Portuguese people and the armed forces. An interminable colonial war was destroying our youth ; it landed us in a crisis from which we are beginning to emerge. Six months after 25th April public liberties have been restored in Portugal, political parties with their enormous impact have been authorised and all forms of repression stopped. But above all, we have undertaken the necessary and urgent task of decolonisation. Those are the great successes of which François Mitterrand recently spoke.

It seems to me, therefore, that we can hold our heads high. However, the extent of the tasks awaiting us compels respect and even fear. That is also why we need our friends. And our friends are you ; our friends are all those people who do not dispense with freedom, all those peoples whose way of living is characterised by their love of liberty.

This, very simply, is the message of friendship which I bring you. This message sent to you by Portugal asks for your friendship. It is our natural destiny to be among you. We shall not fail to be with you in the future. We shall do everything that is necessary to work side by side with you and become your partners. We shall do so with conviction and enthusiasm. *(Applause)*

7. The energy crisis and European security

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 656)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on the energy crisis and European security and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 656.

I call Sir John Rodgers, Rapporteur of the Committee.

Sir John RODGERS (*United Kingdom*). — Among all the industrial nations of the world, all of us must agree that the economic outlook is indeed sombre. Even the most powerful of

the industrial nations — the United States of America — appears to be entering a period of recession, and governments in nearly every industrial nation are trying to ward off inflation and rising unemployment. One of the prime causes, but not the only cause, of this is the fivefold increase in the price of oil, now recognised as one of the most vital of the raw materials in the whole world. This huge increase in prices has imposed a tremendous strain on the world's financial systems, for the oil profits accumulated by the producer countries have caused a transfer of wealth on a colossal scale which promises to bedevil the world for years to come unless some solution can be found.

No one doubts now that the issues are serious and that they can be solved by a substantial international co-operative effort. Luckily, work on an international scale has already begun. The new International Energy Agency has begun its work as planned on 18th November within the framework of OECD. The membership consists of the United States of America, Canada, Japan, Austria, Switzerland, Spain, Turkey and all the EEC countries with the exception of France. Later I shall refer briefly to the French decision to go it alone.

At first it was the hope of some countries that the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries might let the real price of oil erode through inflation. It could be argued that this would be a prudent course for the producing countries to adopt but OPEC have made it clear that they have no intention at all of lowering prices.

The United States have abandoned any attempts they might have wished to make to get prices lowered. They have also abandoned their earlier opposition to recycling petrodollars through special agencies.

Today one of the immediate aims of the IEA is to set up machinery for an emergency oil sharing scheme. But this is only the short term, and certainly not the most important objective.

In the long term, work will be undertaken in co-operation on energy conservation and in energy research and development : in the setting up of an oil information service and, most importantly, in trying to develop closer relations with the oil producing countries.

I think it is right to realise that we are only likely to solve our present problems in co-

Sir John Rodgers (continued)

operation with the oil producers and not in antagonism to them.

We need to persuade the oil-producing countries that stable and orderly conditions for the international energy market are as much in their long-term interests as they are in the oil consuming countries' interests.

So far efforts have been concentrated on the serious economic and monetary problems, and on helping the hardest-hit nations over their balance-of-payments problems, rising unemployment and inflation, and to prevent financial or industrial breakdowns.

One of the most interesting recent suggestions made by Mr. Thomas Enders, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs in a report to Congress was — and I quote — “It may be useful for the consuming countries to agree on the minimum level at which they will support new investment”. All major consumers should be encouraged to adopt policies to create “stable investment expectations at a level of return roughly equivalent to current oil prices”.

This is vitally important lest in a few years' time nations such as Britain and Norway might face what is termed as a “reverse embargo” leaving the United Kingdom and Norway with expensive investment in oil producing fields capable of producing oil only at prices much higher than those at which OPEC might then choose to sell. This could be a serious threat and special pricing arrangements and policies may be needed to avert such disasters.

I have deliberately spoken on the overall oil situation as it is only against this background that the subject of the energy crisis and its possible effect on European security and defence can properly be discussed.

The paper before you today, Document 656, is on the narrow point of the possible threat there could be to Europe in particular and to the western free world including countries such as Japan, in the present oil situation and particularly if oil supplies were to be withheld.

Only recently the Head of one of the Middle East countries said that should hostilities break out again in the Middle East, then immediately there would be an embargo on oil supplies to European countries. I think this is likely to include France, too.

Today, oil is undoubtedly one of the most important sinews of war and certainly a most basic ingredient in any defence arrangements.

Consumer countries to date have had two problems to face with regard to oil supplies. First, they have been threatened by production costs and boycotts, and, secondly, there is the very price of crude oil itself. As I say in my report, today this latter problem is of far greater importance than the former threat.

And even the problems of the Western European countries differ. For example, the United Kingdom, Norway and the Netherlands have firm hopes of producing enough oil to meet and even exceed their domestic requirements while countries such as France and Italy seem to have little or no hope of finding the energy resources they need in their own territories.

That is our reason for giving urgent priority to the definition of a common energy policy, certainly among the EEC countries. Naturally this work must take into account the work of the International Energy Agency and should seek to complement but not duplicate work in securing wider international co-operation.

As I stated in my report, while I appreciate the reasons for France negotiating directly for supplies covering some twenty years, it must surely be a matter of the greatest regret that the French Government did not feel able to take part in the work of the International Energy Agency. If there is to be European solidarity then surely it must be in all fields, and not merely in those fields which any country regards as bringing in immediate rewards. As your Rapporteur I have stressed that the difference between France and other western countries will in the long run, I hope, turn out to be more one of presentation than substance and I also hope that the French will find it possible to co-operate with IEA. Indeed, President Giscard d'Estaing recently made an interesting proposal for a meeting of certain countries representing oil producers, industrialised consumers and the non-oil developing countries. This last group is likely to suffer more than any group from the colossal increase in oil prices and they are the countries whose economies are least likely to be able to withstand this shock.

The IEA has already produced an emergency oil-sharing scheme which requires countries which are self-sufficient in oil to hold minimum stocks of sixty days' requirements. This obliga-

Sir John Rodgers (continued)

tion is to be increased to ninety days, at a rate still to be determined. An EEC directive fixes the target stock levels of Community members at ninety days from the beginning of 1975. At present there are precious little stocks in Europe.

But so far so good. But, as I said in the conclusions of my report, it was amply demonstrated in October 1973 that the use of the oil weapon could either paralyse the West's economy or render its armed forces powerless.

Special action should be taken, I believe, to ensure a special defence reserve in oil products. This reserve should be built up in each country as speedily as possible. If a decision were taken to withhold all Middle East supplies of oil if hostilities broke out, then European security would be entirely in jeopardy. In addition to the overall reserves of oil that are now under consideration, I have advocated in my report that stocks for at least three months supply of oil, necessary solely for security purposes, should be quickly built up for use only by the army, air force or navy. This should be built up with all possible haste. This security stock should be for defence purposes and available for defence purposes only. No government should be allowed to raid these reserves for purely domestic purposes — for example, in order to avoid the possible introduction of petrol rationing.

I realise that the strain on the economies of some countries in building up such a strategic reserve could be considerable and should be organised internationally and undertaken possibly by some organisation set up under the auspices of NATO.

Time is precious. There should, to my mind, be no delay in building up and allocating these reserve strategic stocks. The dangers in not doing this are evident. The need for speedy action is, I believe, of paramount importance. If it should be argued that we cannot afford to build up both strategic stocks for industrial and other purposes as well as a defence strategic stockpile, I would suggest that a percentage of the stock itself must be earmarked for NATO defence purposes. That is the least we could press for.

I hope that the Assembly will give a fair wind to my report and endorse its recommendations. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Sir John Rodgers.

I call Mr. Depietri to open the debate.

Mr. DEPIETRI (*France*) (Translation). — Ladies and Gentlemen, the written report presented by Sir John Rodgers on the energy crisis and European security is directed exclusively to the means the capitalist countries should employ in order to deal with the military aspects of the energy crisis and the requirements of industry. It takes no account of the fact that some of the oil-producing countries have rid themselves of the neo-colonial yoke and want to be masters of their own national resources, nor that this situation is the consequence of a deliberate policy on the part of the capitalist countries which not only have done nothing to increase their national energy resources, but, on the contrary, have sacrificed their own resources in favour of a cheap oil and energy policy, without taking into account the fact that the oil-producing countries had to face up to enormous development requirements, or that these countries were victims of the inflationary policy of the capitalist countries.

It is therefore the capitalist countries, by reason of their policy, and not the producer countries which are responsible for the difficulties that peoples are now facing in respect of energy. Obviously, it is easier for the capitalist countries to blame their own difficulties on the oil-producing countries by pursuing a dangerous and disgraceful anti-Arab campaign.

The report even goes so far as to insinuate in veiled terms that owing to lack of oil for their conventional equipment, in case of war they would not refrain from using atomic weapons. In their view, therefore, the Arab countries would be responsible for this. This anti-Arab campaign enables them to camouflage the scandalous profits of the multinational oil companies and the domination of the capitalist countries by these companies. Indeed, this is the situation revealed by the French parliamentary commission of enquiry into the oil trade, a commission set up at the request of the French communist deputies.

These oil companies not only make scandalous profits out of users and at the expense of the economy of each country, they also seek to use the crisis for their own profit.

Secondly, the report takes no account of an extremely important problem, thereby show-

Mr. Depietri (continued)

ing that the WEU Assembly completely disregards the decisions of the United Nations regarding the imperative necessity of settling the Middle East conflict, including the right of the Arab people of Palestine to reconstitute a State. There is no doubt that failure to settle the Middle East conflict in accordance with United Nations recommendations can only create difficulties.

This is what ought to guide our conduct.

A further problem arises: the European solidarity which you advocate is merely an alignment with the position of the United States of America, the setting up of a veritable front against the producer countries, and a flagrant challenge to the Arab countries.

Apart from this, what does the report suggest? A policy of austerity and sacrifice which will be borne by the working classes alone. No, oil is not at the origin of this crisis. The crisis which is developing in capitalist countries is, in truth, the crisis of the system; but — and you know this — workers in capitalist countries will accept neither the austerity nor the sacrifices designed to increase still further, at their expense, the profits of the multi-financed industrial firms and multinational companies.

To overcome the crisis, a different policy must be pursued: develop all national resources — coal, uranium, hydraulic energy and tidal power; all States must conclude stable, long-term agreements with the oil-producing countries, based on mutual interest, so as to prevent the market from being dominated by the international oil cartel — a cartel controlled by eight companies, six of them American; restrict the power of the major oil companies as a matter of urgent necessity; co-operate in the field of energy with the socialist countries and the developing countries.

This, then, is a brief statement of the political responsibilities of capitalist countries for the present crisis, and the ways of overcoming it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Osborn.

Mr. OSBORN (*United Kingdom*). — I should like to intervene briefly in the debate because we have had a very valuable and informative speech by Sir John Rodgers. I wish to thank

Sir John and his Committee for making their report available to us.

What Sir John has done, in contrast to some of the other committees on which I have been working, is to concentrate his remarks on immediate tactical information — not so much on the strategic situation — affecting the supply of oil. Although he has referred to much wider issues, his speech and the report have concentrated on the supply of oil to Europe and western countries generally. I should like to make a few comments on that subject.

A report issued by one of the oil companies visualised that in fifteen or twenty years' time offshore oil production will account for 50 % of oil production from normal sources. This means that the world will develop as a result of a huge new technology and much of this offshore oil will be away from the Middle East rather than from within it.

This raises another issue which is important to the United Kingdom, namely, the vulnerability of offshore oil production in the case of war or conflict. Drilling in waters of up to 600 feet could, with the aid of modern technology, well be stepped up to a much higher figure. I have read of anything up to 1,000 feet having been envisaged.

The British Parliamentary Scientific Committee only a few weeks ago had a very interesting presentation by two of the leading oil companies on the progress that had been made in the North Sea. I believe that WEU should give some thought to the vulnerability of the new oil supplies, because they have to be taken from the oil beds beneath the sea. The vulnerability is such that where there are long pipelines it is not difficult to devise a submarine block-and-tackle device to cut out that pipeline and cause a delay of anything up to six months or a year. It is not beyond the bounds of possibility, and this applies very much now in Britain. There must be close security on any rig to ensure that guerrilla action is not possible there as well.

If I may comment on the oilfield question a stage further, I would say that perhaps not enough has been said about the possibilities of tar sands and oil shale, although I notice — and I will refer to this later in regard to project independence — that oil from this source is not expected to make any major impact until after 1985 or 1990.

Mr. Osborn (continued)

I should like to make a few comments not only from the point of view of the work I have done on the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions of WEU but also the appropriate committees in the Council of Europe, but before doing so I want to take issue with the last speaker, who was blaming capitalism for our troubles. One of the greatest misfortunes now is that the supply of petroleum has become a political pawn, thanks to the philosophy of the left wing, which is to encourage those producing oil to nationalise their assets. Once nationalisation takes place, and once oil becomes a commercial commodity, it inevitably becomes a highly political commodity. This is one of the tragedies which is all past history. But if I take issue with him on that, I would agree that the western world has to look further for other sources of energy supply. To what extent can we in the west combine to develop a strategy for this?

There is likely to be published early in the new year — I have had some indication of the material that may be in this — an OECD report on sources of energy. I believe that this will be a useful technical report for all politicians on the lines of development that should be encouraged. I am very glad that Sir John Rodgers made reference to the Nixon initiative and the creation of the International Energy Agency, because this is vital. His recommendations, which I fully support — particularly recommendation 2, to try to persuade all of us in Europe to work together with the United States of America — are very warm to my heart.

I should like now to turn to the scene in the United States of America. As far as I can gather, not only are they concerned in project independence — there was a useful press release in November on the question of oil supplies — but with alternative sources of energy. I referred this morning to the fact that the Atomic Energy Commission has been broken up. This dynamic commission in the United States has been broken into two parts. Perhaps it was a victim of the environmental movement which opposed the building of nuclear power stations.

But last month President Ford signed a bill to abolish the AEC within 120 days and to divide its functions between two new agencies, the Energy Research and Development Administration and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ERDA, with Dr. Robert Seamans, for-

merly of the Federal Space Agency, at its head, will bring together virtually all the government's research programmes involving energy. It will take in the fossil fuel programmes, including coal gasification of the Interior Department; the investigations into solar and geothermal energy of the National Science Foundation, and even the Environmental Protection Agency's work on new forms of motor car propulsion. On the other hand, the new regulatory agency will, for its part, inspect, test, set safety standards and give licences for the American nuclear reactors.

On project independence, I have the official text released on 13th November. I will not go into detail on this but it asks: "What is the definition of project independence? How sufficient is self-sufficient?" The United States of America is asking itself these questions. What body can ask the same questions in Europe? To what extent is it our concern that we should be doing this? I raise this question at this particular time. Sir John referred to energy conservation, and any energy agency must be concerned with this. In Western European Union we should be concerned not only with standards of insulation and better use, but in industry I am finding that the great brains are trying to cut down their energy bills. If that information could be co-ordinated — and in Britain to a certain extent this is being achieved by the CBI — on a European and world-wide basis, I genuinely believe that there are great savings to be made. The impact on transport is fascinating. The Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions brought the aircraft manufacturers, the civil airlines and the airport authorities together. I believe that in the future land transport will gain from air transport because of the high cost of aviation fuel. I believe that public transport will take over from the private car and the lorry. I believe that electricity will be a much more important source of energy than others.

These are issues to be thought of in the tactical and defence sense, which is the concern of WEU, but they are issues which apply on the civil side as well.

I only wanted to intervene and to put these points to Sir John so that his General Affairs Committee can consider what we in Western European Union ought to be looking at, what the European Community should look at, how they should do it, and what should be left to

Mr. Osborn (continued)

the Council of Europe. But this is a vast problem and I welcome Sir John's contribution today. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Lester.

Mr. LESTER (*United Kingdom*). — It is a great honour for me so soon after making my maiden speech in a national parliament to be standing here in this Assembly making my maiden remarks in a European context. There must, I think, be some sense of divine guidance, because I can say simply and sincerely that it was the influence of my first visit to this beautiful city in 1948 at the age of sixteen which started me on the path to realising that one was a European. Since those days, one has tried to become even more so and, indeed, to bring one's family up in the same tradition.

I wish now to address myself briefly to the report. I would request that it be printed because I think its contents will be extremely valuable in a much wider circle than this Assembly. It is impossible to underestimate the change in the total situation in every walk of life that the present energy crisis has caused. Any document which helps us in our essential re-thinking is well worthwhile and well worth wide distribution.

The urgency of the first recommendation has been understood. One is hopeful that the summit meeting in this city next week, where I understand the energy question is the first item on the agenda, reflects that. I hope that anything we say today will act as a spur to those European leaders in their deliberations.

When this challenge came, many of us expected and wanted a European reaction rather than a national one. It is a matter of regret that in the first shock of all that happened this was not possible. I think now we can re-think our situation, and we should like to see a European reaction and a European consideration because it is very fundamental to the way we believe our nations are interdependent. Nor does it need any words from me to underline the decisive part that oil supply must play in any strategy because having common equipment and all the things about which we have been talking in terms of a defence budget without oil renders one defenceless.

I therefore support the sense of urgency in the fourth recommendation that we should move quickly in this matter. The suggestion that countries should decide their own stocks I think is not helpful because a variation from one to another could render the whole action useless, but I think now is a suitable time to look at this before there are any further developments in the Middle East.

I do not see that the report is either pro- or anti-Arab or pro or anti any country. This is a purely objective report: a stated situation and an objective answer to that situation. I do not see it as anti-West, anti-East or anti-Arab, or pro anybody else.

One difficulty in the report is that we have no knowledge of the quantities or value that this reserve would need. Obviously it is dependent on the relative scale of any action which may be taken over a three-month period. However, one is prepared to look with an open mind if we can get the actual analysis and the correct figures to see where the reserve should be and what should be its content.

I recommend that this exercise be carried out quickly and effectively. I ask the Rapporteur and the General Affairs Committee to keep a watching brief on the future developments following this document. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Alber.

Mr. ALBER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I would like to start by thanking Sir John Rodgers for his excellent report and for the wealth of material and information he has given us. It always sounds impressive when one can say that the situation is grave and that time is running out. Where the energy situation is concerned, this is actually true. It is greatly to be welcomed therefore that Europe seems slowly to be giving thought to a common energy policy.

It is a good thing, too, that there is talk of an international energy agency. But personally I do not expect a solution of the problems to result merely from that. Setting up an agency is no miraculous device. It is often like that in politics: when one cannot think of anything else to do, one sets up a committee, which in turn sets up a sub-committee. It is the same thing here. The agency which is to be set up will not unfortunately be able to produce a single drop of oil

Mr. Alber (continued)

itself. Still, as it does no harm, it is better than nothing. So it can be welcomed.

There has been talk here of solidarity. Out of politeness I would like to pass quickly over this subject. For if that solidarity is called on and put to the test — we have already experienced this once — it could easily turn out to exist virtually only on paper.

The right answer lies only in research and technology, and in finding new sources of energy. So, if we want energy, we must devote all our energy to research and technology. The new forms of energy concerned have been mentioned — nuclear power stations and solar energy. And I might add something which will probably not count for so much: in the university of my home town of Stuttgart, there is a Chair devoted to the generation of wind energy — and it seems that good results have already been achieved.

A second point is that we are using up too much energy, though not by using too much. For example, far too much energy is needed for the radiation of light by an electric bulb, because half of it is transformed into heat. Then there is the energy which is wasted going straight up and out of our chimneys every year and going unused. So this would be another large area for technology and research.

We on the political side are being urged to do something about focusing this research work. One often gets the feeling that in the field of research the right hand knows not what the left hand doth. I am sure that my colleague Mr. Richter would agree on that. We have already attended colloquies and conferences with research scientists, and found that they did not know each other, and that people did not know what research was going on in the various establishments. This could be a job for those in politics — to do what is needed to ensure the concentration of research.

A further point; let us look for a moment at electric motors or batteries. Here one has the feeling that each firm is doing research only on its own account, and regards results as strictly confidential and not to be passed on to anyone else. Such behaviour may be all very well in ordinary areas of the economy. But in the energy sector we must seriously ask ourselves

whether we can make any progress with our traditional patent and licensing laws. Rules as strict as these really do hamper the progress which we badly need in this field.

I would like to mention a second point made in Sir John Rodgers' report: recycling of the millions of petrodollars. This process caused quite a stir last week in my home town of Stuttgart, where 14 % of Daimler-Benz (i.e. Mercedes) was bought out by a country which at first remained anonymous, and later turned out to be Kuwait. This will naturally raise several questions.

In principle there is nothing against it; on the contrary — if the Arab countries take a share in our industry, then they will see the economic development of Europe quite differently. Nevertheless, the star of Stuttgart-Untertürkheim appears to be a star of the Wise Men — or, rather, of the Rich Men — from the East, and that does not please everyone. The Romans were indeed far-sighted when they spoke of *Arabia Felix* — happy Arabia. It certainly is a happy position to be in, when you do not know how to spend the money you have coming in. The time has surely come to say that these countries should do something more towards development aid.

But to come back to the recycling of the petrodollars: we must recognise that this is a redistribution of wealth, but in a different way from what we had in mind. Secondly, it is in part a transfer of wealth to State ownership, but again in a different way from that envisaged by us, and in particular by those who for ideological reasons always wanted State ownership. So much for the political side.

But let us look again at the economic side of the picture. We must realise that such a development can have considerable effects, depending on which sector of industry is being bought up. It can have strategic effects and it can have effects — through possible majorities on the board of directors — on the way in which an individual business is managed. However it can also have overall economic effects, since it is possible, by planned selective purchases, to influence the whole economic development of a country. For these reasons too we must review our company and commercial law, our rules on publicity and similar matters. For we are faced with new developments which we have not had to deal with before.

Mr. Alber (continued)

Let me say once again, in conclusion: it is not a question of thinking that we can solve the problem merely by setting up agencies or authorities. We must make real efforts to solve the problem ourselves. If we want to have energy, what we must do is devote the whole of our energy to new thinking and to new political developments whose thrust ensures that what is needed in the field of science and technology to produce energy will in fact be done. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Rapporteur.

Sir John RODGERS (*United Kingdom*). — I should like to thank members of the Assembly for the contributions they have made to the debate on my report. I was a little surprised by the remarks of Mr. Depietri because I hardly think that his strictures on capitalist countries of the West as against the capitalist countries of the Middle East really made any sense. If he tried to tell me that Saudi Arabia is more democratic than the Western European countries I find that very difficult to accept. It is not an argument that I could sustain. To me it only shows a great deal of prejudice and very little reason. I hope that he will forgive me for putting it so crudely.

I thank Mr. Osborn for his remarks, which we will ponder in Committee. It is a subject which I, as Rapporteur, or someone else who follows me, believe will be of continuing interest to the Assembly. We will most certainly study his remarks with the greatest interest, and I thank him for favouring us with them.

I congratulate Mr. Lester on a very excellent maiden speech. We hope to hear from him often in future. I can assure him that it is intended that the report should be printed, so that it will be available for future reference. I am glad that Mr. Lester pointed out that there was no anti-Arab sentiment in my mind when I prepared the paper. Indeed, I went out of my way to say that the countries of the West had not fully appreciated that in their economies they were using oil as a tax-producing commodity and I pointed out the effect that that was likely to have on the oil-producing countries when we were getting not only cheap oil from them but tax on that oil for our own governmental purposes. That being so, I have some sympathy with the Arab countries in that respect.

I agree with Mr. Alber — and this is a point raised also by Mr. Osborn — that we must have long-term concentration on new forms of energy. That is our intention and it is one of the main objectives of the international agency that is being set up. Apart from energy conservation, energy research and development and alternative sources of energy are of paramount importance but here I draw attention to the chart in paragraph 11 of the report, where we show the tremendous differences in the cheapness of Middle East oil compared with open-cast coal, deep-mine coal North Sea oil, tar sand, oil shale, coal-produced gas, etc., including nuclear. It will be some time before these alternative sources are anything like as economic as Middle East oil supply. This is one of the great problems.

Altogether, Mr. President, this has been a short but valuable debate. I am grateful for the contributions that have been made to it. I again commend the report, and hope that members of the Assembly will approve it. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Chairman of the Committee.

Mr. SIEGLERSCHMIDT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, may I add just a few words to the Rapporteur's remarks. I believe that the contributions by various speakers to the discussion clearly reflect what we in the General Affairs Committee already knew and took as our basis — that this problem of energy and defence will not be resolved at today's meeting, and that we shall have to continue giving it our close attention in the future.

I would also like to clarify another point. It is not, Ladies and Gentlemen, just a matter of the energy and defence problem in the narrow sense of fuel for our tanks and fuel for our military aircraft, but rather of the defence capability of our countries depending in a wider sense on the economies of our countries having an adequate supply of energy available. We all know how much our defence capability can be reduced if the economy is hamstrung by the energy problem.

It seems to me that the essential problem here is to reconcile the two approaches which for the moment are not wholly convergent. At first sight it looked as though the United States — I am saying this somewhat tartly — wanted to form a trade union of oil-consuming countries in order to bring pressure to bear on the oil capitalists in the producing countries. This was surely not

Mr. Sieglerschmidt (continued)

what was intended; nor can it really be the object of the exercise.

In the same way, it is quite wrong for individual countries to start from the standpoint that the best thing is a policy of *sauve qui peut*, or at least — to say it again in French — a policy of *chacun pour soi, Dieu pour tous*. The two approaches mentioned must be combined. On the one hand there must be a reasonable dialogue with the oil-producing countries. But of course, to the extent that these countries concert their pricing arrangements and so on, the consumer countries too must concert their attitudes.

A final comment on two points raised by my colleague Mr. Alber. To a large extent I agree with the views he expressed; but on the following two points I have a small criticism to offer. First, about the oil agency: I would not be so pessimistic as simply to say with him that the agency will do no harm, but will do no good either. I believe we can assume, if we all join in making the right efforts, that the oil agency will be very effective. It will be effective if all the western industrial countries take part, and if we recognise that within that framework there should be no — if I may so express myself — special deals made by the European Community. This is a field in which the countries of the EEC must act jointly with other industrial countries.

My second point concerns the recycling of petrodollars with Mercedes in Stuttgart. I do realise the problems presented by such Arab participation; but if Kuwait holds 14 % of the shares in a car assembly plant — I stress a car assembly plant — I really find this a very good thing, because the owner of these shares will be interested in keeping petrol flowing so that he can sell his cars. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — We shall now take the votes which have been held in suspense.

I am grateful for your presence in such numbers at this late hour.

8. Rational deployment of forces on the central front

(Votes on the draft Recommendation and draft Order, Doc. 654 and Amendment)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The Assembly will first vote on Mr. Dankert's report

on the rational deployment of forces on the central front.

Mr. Reale has tabled and moved the following amendment:

In the first line of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "Urge" and insert "Encourage".

I put the amendment to the vote by sitting and standing.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The amendment is not adopted.

The Assembly must now vote on the draft recommendation.

The vote on a draft recommendation taken as a whole has to be by roll-call if the Assembly is not unanimous.

There are two objections.

The vote will therefore be by roll-call.

The roll-call will begin with the name of Mr. Gessner.

The voting is open.

(A vote by roll-call was then taken)

Does anyone else wish to vote ?...

The voting is closed.

Ladies and Gentlemen, in the absence of a quorum, the votes on this draft recommendation and the draft order are postponed until the next session.

9. Conditions of service in the armed forces

(Votes on the draft Recommendation and draft Order, Doc. 650)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — We now turn to the draft recommendation on conditions of service in the armed forces, for which Mr. Klepsch was Rapporteur on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Document 650.

I find that there is one objection. A roll-call vote is therefore necessary, but as there is no quorum, the vote on this draft recommendation is also postponed until the next session.

10. *State of European nuclear energy programmes — security aspects*

(Vote on the amended draft Recommendation, Doc. 655)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The same situation arises regarding the vote on the amended draft recommendation on the state of European nuclear energy programmes — security aspects, for which Mr. Small was Rapporteur for the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

The vote on this recommendation is therefore also postponed until the next session.

11. *The energy crisis and European security*

(Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 656)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — As regards the vote on the draft recommendation on the energy crisis and European security for which Sir John Rodgers was Rapporteur on behalf of the General Affairs Committee, Document 656, is there any opposition?...

Mr. DEPIETRI (*France*) (Translation). — I oppose it, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I take due note of your position.

The vote on this recommendation is therefore also postponed until the next session.

12. *National parliaments and the WEU Assembly*

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments and Votes on the draft Recommendation and draft Order, Doc. 653)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report presented by Mr. Delorme on behalf of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments and votes on the draft recommendation and draft order, Document 653.

I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. DELORME (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, as Rapporteur of this Committee I have the honour to submit a report which will not, I think, give rise

to any polemics. It is already an advantage to be able to note this.

Before stating the guiding principles of the report, I would like to point out that I am replacing one of our former colleagues, Mr. Gabriel Péronnet. He was the original Rapporteur for this report but has become a Minister during the period between sessions. I congratulate him and I believe members will associate themselves with this. Thus I am assuming his succession.

The report first deals with improvements in relations with national parliaments. I think that, while our Committee may not have an important political part to play, it nevertheless has a mission — that of drawing the attention of the parliamentarians of member countries to the work of our Assembly. Permit me to point out that at the close of this session we shall very much need to draw the attention of our parliamentary colleagues to our work, for if we want to succeed in building Europe, we must first look at the proceedings of existing assemblies.

As compared with others, the Assembly of WEU had the privilege of being set up by treaty and therefore of having legal existence; but that implies that its members and committees have a duty — that of making themselves known.

I do not want to make any forecasts, but frequently in Committee I have turned over the following thought: when we ask our colleagues: what WEU represents and how many countries belong to it, when we ask what is the difference between the European Parliament and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, we are astounded and sometimes horrified to note the ignorance of those very people who ought to be the best informed — i.e. our colleagues.

When it is a matter of WEU, an organisation which includes seven countries, it is essential that our proceedings should be followed. That is why your Rapporteur, the Committee and the Chairman of the Committee make a point of asking you to make the proceedings and debates of our Assembly known.

We noted last year — and remember, it is a Frenchman who is speaking — that a Minister for Foreign Affairs made statements in this Assembly which he had never made in our own National Assembly. This was a privilege, but above all it showed that our union has a part

Mr. Delorme (continued)

to play, and even a leading part, since Mr. Jobert gave hitherto undisclosed information from the rostrum of this Assembly.

As I do not want to make a long speech, I shall confine myself to a brief comment on the report.

It is the desire of the Committee and of your Rapporteur that all texts relating to our work should be disseminated and that we should be very vigilant about this. In order to make the union better known, we ought each in our own parliaments to make use of the means available to us in the form of written questions, oral questions and oral questions with debate, so that WEU recommendations shall be given effect.

For the millstone which often hangs round the necks of European assemblies is that they only vote on recommendations. The very definition of this word indicates what that means. When we vote on a law, we are legislators and can lay down that law; a recommendation is always a decision which remains subject to the sovereign judgment of Ministers.

We therefore have a mission to fulfil, which is why in this report we emphasise the importance of your following the example of some delegations — and here I would pay tribute to the Italian Delegation. It is not because the Chairman of our Committee is Italian and because she represents the Italian National Assembly, nor is it a simple matter of courtesy, if I say that Italy has provided an example; but it is a fact that the parliamentarians who did harrass their government were the Italians. In particular, one of our colleagues, Mr. Bonaldi, has never ceased, by means of written questions and letters to the Prime Minister, to ask what had become of the consultation and decisions taken within the Atlantic Alliance on the European policy for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. He also raised the question of security in the Mediterranean.

Well, this is the kind of action which your Rapporteur and your Committee ask you to undertake.

In this short report we have tried to give you some idea of the work you may have to do and have asked you to take various steps, including the implementation of your own rules. But we have also suggested a few innovations.

We would like it if, within each delegation, you had a sort of co-ordinator, a person who ensured liaison with his own parliament. Let me explain. We often have committees which, through indifference or habit, meet and deal with problems without reference to European questions. I think it would be the task of this co-ordinator to suggest that Rapporteurs from WEU are given a hearing by national committees. I emphasise this point, for if we could have in the Belgian Parliament, the Bundestag, the French or the Italian Parliament, a speech from, say, a British Rapporteur, for example if one day we could place on the agenda of the Committee of National Defence of the French Parliament a statement by Mr. Critchley, Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments of our Assembly, that indeed would raise a certain amount of interest and we would have achieved what we were attempting by means of this report, which is to make our Assembly known.

In our national committees we have already had the opportunity of hearing representatives of the European Community as consultants. Why not representatives of WEU?

To sum up, what we want is that the texts which are adopted in this Assembly should be followed up and above all that they should arouse the interest of our own parliaments. Truly, it is because there was a need for it that this union was created nearly twenty years ago. It should be demonstrated that this need, which was evident at the time, still exists twenty years later.

That is why we have also dealt with this question of the twenty years of the union's existence, and we propose to do everything possible, with the help of the Presidential Committee and the Office of the Clerk — to whose work I would here like to pay tribute — to bring out in a booklet information which, we hope, will help to dispel the ignorance from which Western European Union too often suffers, and to make it better known.

This then, very briefly, is what we say in this report. It is an appeal which we are launching at a time when — and I am sorry that some of our colleagues are no longer here — factual evidence shows that so long as Europe has not been fully built, so long as we have no institutions, so long as we have no assembly elected by universal suffrage, that is, an assembly which can speak in the name of all our populations,

Mr. Delorme (continued)

we shall remain at the stage of making recommendations.

I am convinced that those who attend our meetings regularly do not think that we ought to remain at that stage. In any case I myself am convinced that we must go further if we wish to demonstrate our usefulness and efficacy.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I want to remain optimistic, for I am so by nature. The facts have not shown that we have been either very effectual or very homogeneous. In connection with recent problems raised in previous reports, we have had the opportunity to show that if we were united we would be strong. It is to this strength that I ask you to contribute by asking you to do everything possible to show that we have to exist and that our task is an important one. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Chairman of the Committee, Mrs. Miotti Carli.

Mrs. MIOTTI CARLI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the explanatory memorandum submitted by Mr. Delorme provides a starting-point for giving new meaning to WEU's existence within the national parliaments of the seven member States. I will not take up time with the salient points of Mr. Delorme's report, rich as it is with ideas, rich also with many suggestions for achieving this revitalising process: the appointment of a co-ordinator within each delegation; the meeting together of members of a national delegation after each part-session to determine the action to be taken in each parliament and to study and plan the steps required in approaching governments; and the hearing of Rapporteurs on WEU topics by Foreign Affairs Committees whenever the latter deal with questions which have been debated in the WEU Assembly.

The means of publicising the work of our Assembly and of the Council of Ministers proposed in Mr. Delorme's admirable report will remain inoperative without the concrete participation of each single member of the Assembly, who should accept the responsibility of making his country aware of events taking place in the various WEU gatherings. And it is with some sadness that I note, Mr. President, that at the very moment when we are discussing the matter of publicising our work — the work of the

Assembly of Western European Union — we do so in a practically empty hall.

However thoughtful and effective may be the steps designed to entrust certain members with this task of dissemination, which can no longer be evaded, the steps themselves are in danger of becoming for many mere alibis of a sort, devices for setting our conscience at rest and, in brief, ways of leaving things in the unchanged condition in which they unfortunately stand.

This necessity has also been noted by our Rapporteur in the closing part of his report. Italy for its part, as he states, has fulfilled this task of publicising our work: in paragraphs 17 and 18 of his report, Mr. Delorme draws particular attention to the questions addressed in September 1973 to the Italian Ministers for Defence and Foreign Affairs relating to Recommendations 235, 236, 237 and 238: Recommendation 235 on the promotion of a policy on the peaceful use of nuclear energy; Recommendation 236 on greater co-operation in defence, the rationalisation of joint efforts and the co-ordination of research; Recommendation 237 on the need for following closely the current major negotiations aimed at assuring European security, with particular reference to balanced force reductions in Europe, the security problem in the Mediterranean and in the regions of the north-eastern flank of Europe and the necessity of maintaining the Brussels Treaty in full; and Recommendation 238, which urges governments to improve Europe's contribution to defence.

In conclusion, Mr. President, I would like to thank Mr. Delorme for his accurate, detailed and balanced work, carried out with the perception, intellectual vigour and legal awareness that are his; and I am grateful to my colleagues and the representatives who have listened to me. Thank you, Mr. President. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Madam Chairman.

No amendment has been tabled to the draft recommendation submitted by the Committee for Relations with Parliaments in Document 653.

The vote on the draft recommendation will be by roll-call if the Assembly is not unanimous.

Is there any opposition to the draft recommendation ?...

Are there any abstentions ?...

The President (continued)

*The draft recommendation is adopted unanimously*¹.

Is there any opposition to the draft order contained in Document 653 ?...

Are there any abstentions ?...

*The draft order is adopted unanimously*².

The next Order of the Day would be a last report on advanced technology in Canada and an address by Mr. Grosart, Parliamentary Observer from Canada.

The question is whether we ought to carry on this evening before a practically empty hall, as the Chairman of the Committee has just pointed out, or whether you prefer to adjourn this debate until tomorrow morning.

What does the Assembly think ?...

(It was agreed to defer the debate until the next Sitting)

13. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting tomorrow morning, Friday 6th December, at 10 a.m. with the following Orders of the Day :

Advanced technology in Canada — the consequences for Europe (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Votes on the draft Recommendation and draft Resolution, Document 649).

Are there any objections ?...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak ?...

The Sitting is closed.

(The Sitting was closed at 6.30 p.m.)

1. See page 40.

2. See page 41.

TWELFTH SITTING

Friday, 6th December 1974

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.
2. Attendance Register.
3. Advanced technology in Canada — the consequences for Europe (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Votes on the draft Recommendation and draft Resolution, Doc. 649*).

Speakers : The President, Mr. van Ooijen (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Grosart (*Observer from Canada*), Mr. Osborn, Mr. Richter, Mr. de Bruyne, Mr. Mendelson (*on a point of order*), Mr. Carter, Mr. Small, Mr. van Ooijen (*Rapporteur*), Mr. de Montesquiou (*Chairman of the Committee*).

4. Close of the Session.

The Sitting was opened at 10.05 a.m. with Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The Sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments ?...

The Minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings¹.

3. Advanced technology in Canada — the consequences for Europe

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Votes on the draft Recommendation and draft Resolution, Doc. 649)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The first Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on advanced technology in Canada — the consequences for Europe and votes on the draft recommendation and draft resolution, Document 649.

I call Mr. van Ooijen, the Rapporteur of the Committee.

Mr. van OOIJEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation).

— Mr. President, it gives me great pleasure to be able to present to the Assembly the report from the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions. The Committee has had the opportunity of seeing and admiring a number of examples of advanced technology in Canada. The great readiness of our hosts to answer all our questions, and the very clear explanatory talks we were given about difficult technical problems, made it possible for us to compile this report. I am delighted at the presence here among us of Senator Allister Grosart, Chairman of the Steering Committee of the Canadian Senate's Special Committee on National Science Policy ; it is one more sign of the importance that Canada attaches to its contacts with Western Europe. During a week there, we had very useful discussions about the control exercised by the Canadian parliament in the fields of science policy, Canadian foreign policy, policy on space, policy on nuclear and other forms of power, the aerospace industry and the problems of paper and pulp production. The Committee had only a limited time at its disposal, but thanks to a very well organised programme it was possible to see a great deal within one week.

1. See page 43.

Mr. van Ooijen (continued)

The first thing that is bound to strike anyone going to Canada for the first time is the enormous expanse of the country. By European standards, Canada is unimaginably large. The great majority of Canada's twenty-three million inhabitants live in a strip of land some two hundred miles wide along the northern side of the border with the United States and along the Atlantic and Pacific seaboard. To the north of this zone there is a vast tract of land where no more than 500,000 people live in small communities. Moreover, the country is a bilingual one — speaking English and French — leaving aside the Eskimos and a number of other minorities most of whom have cultural links with Western Europe.

It is therefore extremely important for the Canadian Government, of whatever political colour it happens to be, to have a sound communications system; hence the substantial efforts that Canada makes in aerospace. Satellites are the only way that communications (telephone, radio and television) can be set up effectively and economically. This is something Europe would do well to take note of and learn lessons from. The same can surely also be said for the developing countries. How does one weld a continent into a single nation? Canada's answer to this question could one day be useful to Europe as well.

Apart from satellites, the Canadian Government has also shown great interest in vertical take-off aircraft and in aircraft that need only a short runway. This is a development that could also be of great importance in Europe, particularly in terms of inter-city air links. While in Canada it is small townships that do not have the wherewithal to build large airfields, in Europe there is very often insufficient space around large towns to build an airport close to the centre. On top of this, there is in Europe the problem of noise pollution, which can be very substantially reduced by the use of VTOL aircraft.

A particular problem facing Canada, which has the big American electronic companies on its doorstep, is the question of how the State is to exercise a reasonable amount of control on communications when these take place through the internal computer links of private companies. Could it not be said that these offer unfair competition to the postal and telecommunications authorities and the private telephone and telegraph companies that exist in Canada? I heard someone in Canada use the phrase "Every man his own computer terminal." It seems like tomor-

row's world that has already begun in Canada today, and one from which we Europeans can learn a number of lessons, cautionary or otherwise.

We already know in Europe that the Canadians have developed their own nuclear reactor, which has now gone into service with the electricity companies. This nuclear power station — known as CANDU — has been hailed as a success. As parliamentarians, we were of course curious to know why Canada, which is so richly endowed with oil and minerals, had nevertheless invested relatively large sums in nuclear energy; all the more so since in a country like Canada private industry is left a very large measure of freedom, and the authorities are not easily moved to invest money in, for example, electrical power stations. The answer to this question covers a number of points. During the last world war Canada was involved in the Manhattan project, because its soil hid large reserves of uranium. Once started along the nuclear path, the Canadian authorities thought that the knowledge that had been acquired ought to be put to use for civil purposes. A reactor type having once been decided upon, the authorities wanted their scientists and engineers to follow the chosen policy through. While Britain and France abandoned reactors using natural uranium, the Canadians pressed on with this system and succeeded in developing it further.

A country that has sizeable uranium deposits will naturally have a far greater interest in using unenriched uranium than a country that has to import it. Besides, the heavy water that was needed does not offer any insuperable problem, and producing heavy water is felt by the Canadians to offer more advantages than setting up a uranium enrichment plant. It should be noted here that the natural conditions for producing heavy water are very favourable in Canada.

The third aspect is that of cost. A generating station working with nuclear energy provides, we were told, much cheaper electricity than a traditional power station even in Canada, where minerals and fuels are easily extracted.

The fourth point is the certainty that fossil fuels will not always be available in unlimited quantities, and are thus better saved for purposes other than generating electricity. These, then, are the reasons why Canada has decided to press ahead with the development of nuclear energy.

Mr. van Ooijen (continued)

At the Pulp and Paper Research Institute the Committee learnt of new ways of protecting forests, timber stocks and other natural resources. We Europeans are bound to be struck by the fact that such a heavily-forested country as Canada is already feeling serious concern about timber production in the years to come. Research is going on into making better use of waste timber and recycling used paper, as well as into the possibility of changing over to fast-growing species which could be used — by burning or in other ways — to generate energy, and thus provide annually-renewable sources of power.

The report now before you also looks at the way science matters are organised in Canada. We look at how co-operation is arranged between the central government and the provinces, how the Minister for Scientific Policy and Technology does his job, and how parliamentary control is exercised. Experience gained in this field will undoubtedly be of interest to the countries of Europe. Governments and parliaments in a number of European countries are looking for ways in which they can have a greater influence over the large sums of money that are earmarked in the budget each year for scientific research. In the Netherlands, for instance, there has for two years past been a Minister for Scientific Policy, whose duties were to a large extent drawn up on the basis of experience gained in this field in Canada. I am quite certain that the lessons that have been learnt about scientific policy and parliamentary control could be just as useful to other European countries.

I shall not spend more time now telling you about what the Committee saw and heard, Mr. President, but I did think that it was well to give the Assembly an idea of what was gained from this trip.

This brings me to the points to be found in the draft recommendation and resolution. It was stressed by the Canadian parliamentarians that Canada needs more and better contact than in the past with parliamentarians from Europe. Up to now their external contacts have been concentrated on Washington and the American Congress. Without wishing to break off these existing contacts, Canadian members of parliament are seeking to forge new and close relations in the field of science and technology. They would like to see meetings organised once or twice a year to discuss areas of high technology such as I mentioned a moment ago — aerospace, satellite

communications, nuclear energy, aircraft production and the various applications of these.

In the recommendation to the Council of Ministers, the Committee is suggesting that the Council help parliamentarians to prepare for these meetings by arranging for briefings, etc. It is felt that the European Space Agency should be able to co-operate with the Canadians on aerospace matters in a greater number of fields and more intensively.

To our national parliaments we are suggesting that, to meet the wishes expressed by the Canadians, an interparliamentary association for scientific and technological affairs should be set up. We think, too, that they should organise colloquies between WEU parliamentarians, Canadian members of parliament and the members of the science and technology committees of the national parliaments.

I hope, Mr. President, that the draft recommendation and resolution can be accepted by the Assembly, so that we can achieve co-operation that is fruitful for us all. I would like to end by offering my thanks to the Presidential Committee which agreed to our trip, and to the Canadian authorities and all their officials who made it such a success. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr van Ooijen, for your excellent report.

I now call Mr. Grosart, the parliamentary observer from Canada, to whom I extend a warm welcome.

Mr. GROSART (*Observer from Canada*). — Mr. President and distinguished parliamentarians of Western European Union, my first pleasant duty as a member of the parliament of Canada is to convey our thanks to you for the invitation and opportunity to observe your proceedings here and to learn from them. It is a special honour to be permitted to address you when you are considering what to us appears to be an important report by Mr. van Ooijen the Rapporteur of your well-known and renowned Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

I assure you that we in Canada regard it as a high compliment to our modest scientific activities in global terms that your Committee has visited us and presented a detailed, interesting and excellent assessment of certain aspects of our research and development and related scientific activities.

Mr. Grosart (continued)

As Chairman of the Steering Committee of the Special Committee on National Science Policy of the Canadian Senate I am particularly grateful, as I know are all members of the Committee, for the many references in the report to the three-volume reports of our Committee. It may be of interest to you to know that we are now proceeding on a mandate from the Senate to make a detailed study of futures, as we call them, in relation to on-going Canadian policy.

Having said that, I may perhaps be permitted a personal apology for what might appear to some to be a presumption on my part in monopolising this great honour by inflicting myself on you for the second time in half a year. A wise man once said to me: "It is a great mistake to start a speech by making an apology." He said: "If your remarks are any good you won't need an apology and if they are no good an apology won't help". However, the apology is perhaps appropriate when I say that when we first received your invitation we had hoped that the Honourable Charles Drury, our Minister of Science and Technology, and/or Senator Lamontagne, Chairman of the Special Committee, would be able to come. Unfortunately events made that impossible. As you may know, the government were defeated late in the spring on their budget. We had an election and we are so far behind in our legislation that at present there are fifty government bills before the House of Commons and the Senate.

I am glad that I have the opportunity to be here today. I had not intended to do so because I have just returned from a session with the European Parliament in Strasbourg with some of the officials of the Community in Brussels as a member of the Canadian Delegation which was hoping — and I think has succeeded in a small way — to improve the terms of our access to that very important market, one and a half times that of the United States, the greatest import market in the world.

Perhaps I should make it clear that I am no expert on science. I am not a scientist. The closest I ever got to the title of "scientist" was when I graduated in political science. But since I have been a science watcher, so to speak, I have come to realise that there is no relationship whatever between political science and real science.

Let me illustrate the problem that faces parliamentarians in the general field of science and

technology by telling you that I recently spoke at a Canadian university and a professor, an economist from one of our large universities, rose and said: "I shall read off the names of the members of the Senate Science Committee and their occupations." He did so and then said: "You will notice that not one of them is a scientist or has any scientific background." When I was asked to respond I said: "I have great sympathy with the professor. He has enunciated a problem in micro and I should perhaps tell him what is the problem in macro." The problem was outlined by Mr. Wedgwood Benn, the former Minister of Science and Technology in the United Kingdom:

"Perhaps the most frightening fact facing the world today is that the more dangerous, difficult and all-embracing decisions which are to be made in the future in respect of science and technology are all going to be made by politicians. There is no other way. They will not be made by scientists because of the very nature of our parliamentary systems."

I hope you will bear with me if I make a few further remarks particularly about the recommendation and draft resolution in the report. I find myself somewhat in the position of a speaker who found himself addressing one of our service clubs. Before he began he asked the chairman: "How long can I speak?" I think that remark is appropriate to the present situation. The chairman said: "You can speak for as long as you like but the rest of us are getting out of here at 2 o'clock." I am aware that there are those constraints upon us. I shall be as brief as I can and if I am thought to be going on too long I hope that the Chairman will not hesitate to ring the bell and stop me.

I must congratulate Mr. van Ooijen and his Committee on their report. We found it a very comprehensive assessment of some highlights of what the Committee has been good enough to call the Canadian achievements in science and technology. The recommendation that there should be established at this time an interparliamentary association of science and technological interests was very much welcomed. We made a similar recommendation in our third report and suggested that Canada might be the host country for the first meeting of such an association if and when it can be organised. I am not in a position to respond positively. I am not a member of the government but I can assure Mr. van Ooijen and the Committee that I shall carry back the message to our Minister of Science and Techno-

Mr. Grosart (continued)

logy, and I have every hope that there will be some immediate response from Canada to that interesting suggestion.

The suggestion is not an entirely new one. I made the same suggestion at a meeting of the Science Committee of the Council of Europe at Lausanne two years ago. That Committee accepted the resolution and carried it rather further than I had suggested and made it a recommendation to the constituent nations of the Council.

I discussed the same question when I was a member of the International Panel on Science and Technology at about the same time when the Daddario Committee was sitting. We then had a very interesting response largely from the Latin American countries. The origin of our interest was the visit by members of our Senate to European countries and to the Congress of the United States in the early days of our deliberations. We heard a great many witnesses and we began with the wise men of science policy of the world. Then we examined our departmental officials, the universities, and finally the industrial sector. We then came to Europe, visited a number of countries, spun off the conclusions we had reached with parliamentarians in six or seven European countries, and found that we have learned much. We changed our minds on a good many things because of what to us was the extreme importance of international comparisons in national science policy.

If anyone were to ask why perhaps this is the time and occasion for the establishment of an interparliamentary committee, as suggested in the resolution, limited for the moment at least to OECD countries, and what its *raison d'être* might be, I would say that for us it comes out of our experience that there is really no substitute for discussions of comparative approaches, comparative achievements, in science and technology.

One of the most difficult things for parliamentarians is to find some yardsticks. How do we judge our own science policy? How do we decide whether our total budget, government funding and total funding, is adequate to keep us wherever we want to be in the science and technology race? How do we know whether our distribution of the funds is adequate between the disciplines and properly distributed between basic and applied science and development and innovation? How do we know whether our mix is a good one between the performers — government, in-house, universities and industries?

In our own case we have found that our mixes were very bad. I am thankful to say that the government has been proceeding quite rapidly to implement many of our recommendations, and that in itself should give some hope to parliamentarians who are interested in influencing their own national science policy, because we have found that our government will listen to parliamentarians.

There are two aspects of this. One is on the domestic scene and the other is on the international scene. On the domestic scene we have all found that one of the problems is that science and technology is so all-pervasive that the individual policies become solitudes and become hidden, so that the totality of the science and technology effort of any country is very difficult to find. It is usually distributed through a number of departments. This has meant that generally, certainly in our parliament — in our House of Commons we have no Committee on Science and Technology, only in the Senate — we have found that parliamentarians are constrained because of the difficulty of actually analysing science policy. This is also because science policy is comparatively new. The rate of change has been exponential for a number of years and has had tremendous effects on the political, social and economic norms and values of all nations. We have found that there is expertise in agriculture, because there are farmers in most legislatures, there is expertise on foreign policy, expertise on taxation and finance, regional policy, defence and so on, but very little expertise in depth among parliamentarians. It is our firm belief that the types of exchanges that will take place if the recommendation of your Committee were implemented would make a major contribution to this problem.

When we turn to the international aspect we become aware that technology itself is generating important new demands on the whole international system. It creates constraints on national independence, and to a degree that is at present not fully appreciated. There is a paradox here. As Eugene Sokolnikov said, technology is creating imperatives to internationalism, particularly since World War II. On the other side we have the fact of proliferating nations and nationalism, and it is this paradox that we feel could be resolved to some extent if these exchanges of parliamentarians took place.

One of our major recommendations has been what we call the visible science budget, that is, a total science budget, extracted from the esti-

Mr. Grosart (continued)

mates of the various departments and presented to the Ministry of Science and Technology before it goes to our Treasury Board. We are fully aware of the many problems that arise where there is in any parliamentary system ministerial responsibility, but we feel that our suggestions have to some extent overcome them. We now have an *ex post facto* total visible science overview of the estimates, and, hopefully, within the next year this will be presented before the various departmental estimates go to the Treasury Board, so that the totality can be examined by the Ministry of Science and Technology, who will then advise on such questions as I have already mentioned — the adequacy of the distribution of the funds overall, the adequacy of the distribution between performers, and perhaps above all an answer to the question: Is our science and technology budget enough or is it too much? Unless we see it in totality there is no way in which we can come up with answers to these very important questions.

Perhaps I could now give a very quick breakdown of government science funding in Canada. Our total budget this year will be one billion three hundred million dollars, which is an increase of 11.6 % over last year — just keeping up with inflation — but it represents 7.4 % of total government expenditure and amounts to 1.2 % of our gross national product. This puts us much farther up the list of countries than we were when the Senate Committee began its work, and I think we can take some credit for that. Of this total government funding, 55 % goes to applied science, 28 % to development, and 18 % to basic science.

In our energy research, 75 % is nuclear, 3 % coal, 17 % oil and gas, and 2 % hydro. This is something we should be looking at. This information has just come to the surface. Are we wise, in the new circumstances of the oil crisis, in devoting 75 % of our total energy research to nuclear and only 17 % to the oil and gas problem, particularly in view of the fact, as indicated by Mr. van Ooijen, that, whereas at the moment we are self-sufficient in oil, we do not know how long that self-sufficiency will last — perhaps not beyond 1985 unless we have new discoveries, which we are hopeful that we will have.

64 % of our total government spending on science and technology is intramural, that is, done in government laboratories of one kind or another. In our Committee we have been very cri-

tical of that. The government is moving to place considerably more of its funding in the industrial sector which at present is 18 %, with 16 % going to education and non-profit organisations.

In answer to the question, why are these kinds of breakdown important, I would reply that it is only when there is this kind of analysis of the total budget that it is possible for parliamentarians to get to grips with the expenditure, with the reasons for the expenditure and perhaps the reasons for the gaps, deficiencies and duplications which we certainly find.

I wish now to make a few remarks on specific matters. The first page of the report deals in general with some of the major problems. The second page is quite specific in its comments on development of the VTOL aircraft. We found this to be considerably more successful commercially than we had expected. There is a regular service now between Ottawa and Montreal which is working out extremely well.

Reference is made to nuclear research and development. Some may have heard that we have had a problem in our largest nuclear station at Pickering which the Committee visited. This is serious in the sense that it has temporarily knocked out one of the four reactors in that station. However, my information is that it is a purely mechanical error. In placing certain drums in tubes — and I will not go into the technicalities — there was a tolerance of about half an inch, in some cases the drum was inserted about three-eighths of an inch and in others a little more. This in turn caused pressure in the tubes, but the atomic energy scientists tell me that they are very hopeful they may have inert material which will solve this problem. It affects only one of the reactors and we have every confidence that we will be able to solve this problem very quickly.

The report of the Committee mentions other energy sources. I have given an indication of perhaps a somewhat impractical approach at the moment because of the oil crisis, but no doubt that will be changed.

The report of the Committee speaks for itself on computer communications. We always have the problem in Canada, of course, in big science of our proximity to the United States. We have had considerable difficulties in developing economically viable indigenous computer systems, but we are getting there.

Reference is also made to the remote sensing systems in satellites. I believe we may have

Mr. Grosart (continued)

pioneered to some extent in this area largely because of the land size of Canada to which reference was made, the second largest land mass in the world. There is also reference to our domestic satellite communications where we have established the first geophysic geostationary satellite system.

I thank you, Mr. President, and the distinguished parliamentarians for their patience and kindness in listening to me and above all for giving me the opportunity to occupy this distinguished rostrum for these twenty minutes.

In conclusion, I wish to say that we endorse heartily the recommendation and resolution in the report. We will do what we can in Canada to facilitate the start-up of such an association. As I said, I will carry this back to the Minister and to my colleagues. It will be a happy event for both of us if this important new breakthrough in parliamentary co-operation in science and technology has as its mother or father the Canadian Parliament and as its mother or father the Assembly of the Western European Union. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation).— In the debate, I call Mr. Osborn.

I invite speakers to keep to the time they have asked to speak so that we may conclude our debates this morning.

Mr. OSBORN (*United Kingdom*). — I congratulate Mr. van Ooijen on successfully putting together in one report all our varied experiences during our visit to Canada. Such a visit is of value as it gives us in Europe the chance to see how other countries tackle their problems. It is right that politicians who are concerned with science and technology should see how others do it — by "others", I include China and the Soviet Union, as I would the United States of America and Canada.

I welcome the contribution by Senator Grosart as Chairman of the Steering Committee of the Special Committee on National Science Policy. I welcome the fact that he has been present here. The most important and valuable outcome is our recommendation, which I heartily support, to create an interparliamentary association for scientific and technological affairs. I feel that this is a matter of urgency and one with which we should deal to some extent. What we have to establish is exactly who comes to this association. I will conclude by referring to that.

Mr. van Ooijen in paragraph 38 of the report points out that senior officials of Canada have contacts with senior officials of the Communities every six months, and he says that more contacts are certainly useful and it is of the greatest interest that they should take place at parliamentary level also. If Ministers and officials are meeting, then contacts at parliamentary level must take place as well. What I hope is that any getting together would put its emphasis on the technology industry rather than science because it is practical solutions that we want at the present time.

Mr. van Ooijen mentioned nuclear and other energy. We have some useful reports from Alberta on tar sands and oil shale. We even saw experiments on windmills to provide home electric generation as well as the report on the VTOL aircraft which have been put as priorities. I am interested to learn that what we saw as a prototype venture is now proving commercially successful. Intricacies of navigation provide lessons which are of value to the whole world.

Mr. van Ooijen referred also to computer communications. Here Canada has one advantage. 70 % of its electricity at present is hydro. It varies from state to state. I know that the hydro programme is nearly completed. However, what is missing from Mr. van Ooijen's report is two spheres which will be of more interest to the western world. Firstly, Canada as well as the United States of America is the granary of the western world. We have had the world food conference. Better yields and adequate output from Canada and the United States of America are essential for the survival of the world as well as the western world. I do not think Mr. van Ooijen put enough emphasis on the visit to the Pulp Institute. Forestry is important not only to the north of Europe and the Soviet Union but obviously to Canada. The practical problem is extracting the timber from the forests. The cost of forestry is in felling the trees and in getting the trees to the mills where they can be pulped. The idea of fast-growing trees which can be completely disintegrated and pulped on site portably is a new concept which is of immense significance to the whole of the western world. Therefore, the use of timber as a source of protein at the present time and the better yield from our land are all the more important.

Mr. Grosart referred to the enquiry on scientific policy — I have the three volumes in London, Canada — and Mr. Grosart is a Conservative Senator — has a slightly different

Mr. Osborn (continued)

philosophy from that developed by Conservatives ten years ago, and one which I shared, which was that science should not be isolated but that scientific and technological research and endeavour should take part in day-to-day activity whether at governmental or industrial levels. For instance, I think it right that building research in Great Britain should be attached to the Department of the Environment rather than to some scientific agency. Scientific endeavour in administration as well as in industry is a major problem which parliamentarians should consider.

I come back to the recommendation on the interparliamentary association for scientific and technological affairs. What is essential is that parliamentarians, those who normally do not understand science or are not interested in it, should meet scientists, industrialists and engineers at industrial level. In Great Britain we have had a Scientific Committee and we now have a Select Committee. Other countries have other systems.

How does the interparliamentary association operate? Mr. Grosart said that the Council of Europe had accepted such a meeting, and I hope that we will endorse it. I suggest that if the Canadians are the people to issue the invitation they will need to have a body organise this conference. They may wish to do it themselves, but the intention is that all OECD member countries should be invited. I therefore envisage that the proposed organisation should meet OECD, which is responsible to Ministers but which, apart from debates in the Council of Europe and advice to us, has very little contact with parliamentarians.

My hope therefore is that the Canadians and the sponsors of this first meeting will send invitations to the parliamentarians involved in science and technology in all their countries; secondly, that an invitation be made to this Western European Union Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions. You indicate, Mr. President, that you wish me to conclude, so I will just say that invitations in my view should also be issued to the Council of Europe and to the European Parliament. The agenda is important. There is urgency in ensuring the survival of civilisation as we know it, both industrially and commercially. This agenda must be thought out and specific items given to us to deal with.

I congratulate Mr. van Ooijen on his report, and I thank Mr. Grosart for being with us. I urge the Assembly to accept the recommendation. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Richter.

Mr. RICHTER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I too would like simply to say that some of the things learned from the WEU Committee's trip to Canada were for me unforgettable. I would like to single out a few points.

The first and most important thing for me was realising to what extent Canada is able to organise its national life with modern means of communication, particularly satellites. We were told about six satellites which have been built in Canada and which keep Canada supplied with necessary data.

The second point was that the Canadian centre for remote sensing provides the country with detailed data about its land masses, inland lakes, and the surrounding sea. In this respect Canada's working methods are probably, with those of the United States, in the forefront of world development.

Third, I was also impressed by Canada's sensitive attitude to environmental questions. I recall a series of talks we attended as European parliamentarians, and which dealt among other things with an IBM study of the pollution of Lake Erie. I found in Canada a quite different attitude to environmental matters and in the course of our journey we saw the extent to which people are now prepared to pay special attention to environmental problems when building new pipelines for gas and oil.

Fourth, I consider that the experiences which Canada is accumulating in exploiting oil shale and tar sands are of great significance for Europe.

Fifth, substantial sums are earmarked in the Canadian research budget for technological co-operation between Canada and the United States. The links with American firms in this co-operation must naturally be very close.

Sixth, I conclude from this that better co-operation between Canada and Europe would ensure that monopolistic positions which American firms might achieve on the world market would be avoided.

Mr. Richter (continued)

The contacts with parliamentarians from our continent which could result from the proposals by the Rapporteur, Mr. van Ooijen, are therefore of great importance. For that reason I would urge that his draft recommendation be adopted.

Perhaps I may, as Chairman of the Council of Europe's Committee on Science and Technology, say a few words to the Chairman of the corresponding Committee here. I am very grateful to my colleague, Mr. de Montesquiou, for the fact that in past years it has always been possible to harmonise the work of the two committees so that there has been no duplication. The subject we are discussing now provides a prime example of the harmonisation it has been possible to achieve with Mr. de Montesquiou.

I would like to refer, therefore, to the results of the third conference on Science and Parliament, which was organised in Lausanne by the Council of Europe. There we were dealing with problems of quite a different kind. At this Council of Europe conference it was primarily a matter of clarifying questions of principle: how can we improve the opportunities for members of parliament and scientists to work together? The future endeavours of the planned fourth conference will, I think, also be along those lines, and will also mean bringing into the discussion issues such as those raised by the Club of Rome. There will, however, also be a fundamental discussion of other themes. Our colleague Mr. Osborn is at present working on a report which deals with the limits to growth. I feel therefore that fields for and the scope of discussion have thus been laid down for both parliamentary assemblies, and that all this can be turned to good account in contacts with Canada at both levels.

Let me in conclusion thank Mr. Grosart, the Senator from Toronto, for the rewarding experience of visiting his country. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. de Bruyne.

Mr. de BRUYNE (*Belgium*) (Translation). — My contribution will be a very short one, Mr. President, and I shall certainly not be going into the content of the report itself, nor into the recommendation and resolution.

I do however want to draw attention to a rather typical aspect of this resolution and recommendation. We are calling, for their imple-

mentation, on bodies other than Western European Union itself. We are hoping that effect will be given to our resolution and to our recommendation on the one hand by an interparliamentary association for scientific and technological affairs, and on the other by the European Space Agency. In other words we are in some ways quite powerless to see that our wishes are carried out. It might perhaps be useful to investigate to what extent resolutions and recommendations like this are in fact followed up. While doing so one might also make a systematic examination of what the relations between Western European Union and other institutions ought to be.

You no doubt know, Mr. President, that in the EEC what are called external Community relations form a very important area of EEC policy. I do realise that because of a variety of circumstances WEU cannot follow the same path, using the same opportunities and the same instruments. It might however be a good idea — and I am putting this forward for you to think about, because it is not a matter for the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions — to go thoroughly into the matter of what form relationships between WEU and other organisations ought to and could take, so that we can operate more effectively in an area which, I believe, offers great possibilities for the future. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Small.

Mr. SMALL (*United Kingdom*). — I shall be very brief.

Mr. MENDELSON (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, Mr. President. I am not quite certain whether the debate is now closed or whether Mr. Carter is yet on the list to be called in the general debate.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Carter.

Mr. CARTER (*United Kingdom*). — I put my name on the list last night, Mr. President, and I was hoping to have the floor for five or ten minutes, but I will keep my comments to the briefest possible time.

I am a new member of the Assembly and any comments I have to make must be made in that context, as I have not much knowledge of the way the Committees and the Assembly work. However, I urge the Assembly to adopt in total

Mr. Carter (continued)

the recommendations of the Committee, because anyone who has had anything to do with science and technology, either outside political circles or within them, must be aware that international co-operation is of great urgency at this time.

The point I wish to make is that in accepting all the recommendations that are made in the report we should recognise as European politicians, representatives of European national parliaments, that it carries with it a very heavy indictment of the European rôle in this field over the past thirty years. Looking at the four principal recommendations which are made and the four areas of high technology with which we are concerned — aircraft, nuclear research, energy, and computer affairs and communications — Europe has a very bad record indeed.

When we are discussing a resolution of this kind we are entitled to ask how likely it is that European nations, which cannot agree amongst themselves and co-operate with one another, will find it any easier to co-operate with an external country such as Canada. It may well be that prompted by the need to co-operate in a much wider way — that is, with Canada — we will be compelled to look at our own record in the field of high technology and, in doing so, find greater co-operation amongst ourselves.

In conclusion, I want to refer briefly to a recent British experience in one of the fields concerned — that of nuclear energy. We are somewhat in advance of the rest of Europe, because we have already gone to Canada and have concluded an agreement on a limited area of co-operation with Canada on the CANDU project. Having gone on for twenty-five years or more with a nuclear programme which we increasingly could not afford but which we desperately needed as a nation — that is, to find alternative energy sources — we found that we had to look elsewhere for help and inspiration. Consequently, we are now co-operating with Canada.

I hope sincerely that the Assembly, quite apart from passing what may turn out to be a pious resolution, urges individual governments in Europe to co-operate with Canada and, indeed, with one another. I hope sincerely that individual members of the Assembly will not leave this resolution on the table but will return to their individual parliaments and their individual political parties and urge each and every govern-

ment in Europe to co-operate in the field of high technology. If this resolution does no more than compel us to do that, I think that it will prove to have been extremely worth while. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation) — Thank you, Mr. Carter. You are a young representative, but you know how to conform with the needs of a discussion which has to some extent to be cut short, although it is one of the very first importance.

I call Mr. Small.

Mr. SMALL (*United Kingdom*). — I shall speak for only a few moments, Mr. President. I congratulate the Rapporteur on a very diligent and comprehensive report. I know Canada reasonably well. It would be a discourtesy of me, as Senator Grosart and I are on first name terms and house-to-house visiting terms, not to congratulate him on his modesty.

For anyone who is interested in examining the international technical pulse a visit to Canada is well worth while. Taking the relationship in the nuclear field and the choice of nuclear reactors, the British Government saw fit to use British technology and Canadian experience.

The other thing I will say about Canada is that anybody who visits it should make an analysis of a country whose communications system is best illustrated by saying that Lake Superior is a three-day journey from some places within that country.

The remote sensing systems are such that I am provoked to say that the quality of the material in satellite terms has reached the stage where it is interesting to wonder whether one could in fact now look at Pravda over Brezhnev's shoulder, so good is the quality of the system. The system graphically describes continents on the screen, and they are in advance of most people.

Canada is the country of the big sky. It has much to offer the rest of us in international technology. Again, I congratulate the Rapporteur on his very comprehensive report and hope that the Assembly will adopt it. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation) — I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. van OOIJEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I want to start by expressing appreciation of what was said by Mr. Grosart.

Mr. van Ooijen (continued)

His interesting survey of the increasing internationalisation of science and technology confirms, I believe, once again the desirability of parliamentarians taking an interest — an interest going beyond national borders — in science policy. I am grateful to him for coming here, and for his kind words of praise for the report.

The other speakers here have not made my task a difficult one. Mr. Osborn, whom I would similarly thank for his congratulatory comments, has said that it is important that politicians should talk primarily about technology and not so much about pure science. I agree with him on this point, although I feel that politicians do have a certain responsibility for research and for pure science where science policy is concerned, and need to remain informed about what is going on in this field.

Mr. Osborn has also said that neither the draft resolution nor the report pays sufficient attention to two particular problems, that of food production — Mr. Osborn mentioned Canada as the granary of the world — and wood and pulp production. I think that Mr. Osborn is quite right here. It would have been quite possible, and I would undoubtedly have taken up his suggestions if he had made them at the time when the report was being drafted. One always goes about drafting a report in a somewhat arbitrary fashion. I thank him for making this correction, which will now in any case be included in the proceedings of this Assembly.

Mr. Richter, too, had praise for the report and pointed to the desirability of trying, through this resolution, to arrange collaboration between this Assembly's Committee on scientific affairs and the corresponding Committee of the Council of Europe. This is perfectly sound reasoning; as the sciences become increasingly internationalised, and increasingly transcend national frontiers, the politicians will be forced, if they want to keep up with things, similarly to look beyond their own frontiers. Consequently it is reasonable that we in WEU should seek to make contact with the Council of Europe and the European Parliament, both of whom are, in their own fields, having to deal with the same problem.

On this point, Mr. de Bruyne put forward the view that WEU tends rather too readily to turn to other bodies rather than to the WEU Council of Ministers. I believe that he is perfectly right here, but that there is a valid excuse

for this. This is that we in Europe must try to make contact with each other at a variety of levels, in order to arrive at some form of European co-operation. So long as there is still no government with international powers capable of putting this idea into concrete form to an adequate extent, there will continue to be a tendency for us to bypass the WEU Council of Ministers to some extent and turn direct to other bodies. I, like Mr. de Bruyne, regret this but I think it is almost inevitable. Nevertheless, for the sake of clarity in our discussions, it is not a bad thing that attention should regularly be drawn to this point.

I am grateful to Mr. Carter for what he had to say about European co-operation. He asked how the Europeans were going to be able to work together with Canada while they already found it so difficult to work together with each other. It seems to me that this comment is not entirely unfounded, but I would turn once again to what was said by Mr. Grosart, that where science and technology are passing beyond the national frontiers politicians will have to do the same if they want to keep a proper measure of knowledge and influence. It may well be that science and technology will get ahead of us if we, as politicians, are not able to bring about the unity of Europe. And then it is we who will have to follow.

Finally, I would like to offer my sincere thanks to Mr. Small for the kind words he said about my report. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Chairman of the Committee.

Mr. de MONTESQUIOU (*France*) (Translation). — Allow me to address myself directly to Mr. Grosart and to express my thanks to him, both because of his personal qualities to which we are greatly drawn and because he is the representative of a country with which Europe, and more particularly France, has very close links.

We thank you for all that you have said not only about the present, but also about your future projects for co-operation in the technological and technical fields, as well as the relations which are essential if we are to ensure that men should at the same time enjoy greater happiness and greater freedom.

Turning to a more specific field, you have a concept of nature and, with the help of your aircraft, the Canadair 215, you have saved lives and you have preserved nature. I wanted to add

Mr. de Montesquiou (continued)

this somewhat sentimental note, whereas my colleagues have stressed our relations in the technical sphere.

Co-operation between Europe and Canada on a global level can only prove enriching for both parties, and I would thank you for all that you have done personally, as well as for all that your government has accomplished, in combating all those dangers that threaten the world. You, as a representative of the great north, have today brought us a breath of fresh air. I thank you for this. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I thank the Chairman of the Committee.

The debate is closed.

The Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions submits in Document 649 a draft recommendation and a draft resolution.

No amendment has been tabled to the draft recommendation.

Rules 34 and 35 of the Rules of Procedure require the vote on a draft recommendation taken as a whole to be by roll-call, the majority required being an absolute majority of the votes cast. However, if the Assembly is unanimous and there are no objections to the draft recommenda-

tion and no abstentions, we can save the time needed for a vote by roll-call.

Is there any opposition to the draft recommendation ?...

Are there any abstentions ?...

I note that the Assembly is unanimous.

*The draft recommendation is adopted unanimously*¹.

No amendment has been tabled to the draft resolution.

I put it to the vote by sitting and standing.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

*The draft resolution is agreed to unanimously*².

4. Close of the Session

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The business of the Twentieth Ordinary Session is now completed.

Does anyone else wish to speak ?...

I declare closed the Twentieth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Western European Union.

The Sitting is closed.

(*The Sitting was closed at 11.20 a.m.*)

1. See page 46.

2. See page 47.

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