

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

PROCEEDINGS

THIRTY-FIFTH ORDINARY SESSION

SECOND PART

December 1989

III

Assembly Documents

WEU

PARIS

700.1.2

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

PROCEEDINGS

THIRTY-FIFTH ORDINARY SESSION

SECOND PART

December 1989

III

Assembly Documents

WEU

PARIS

The proceedings of the second part of the thirty-fifth ordinary session of the Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes:

Volume III: Assembly documents.

Volume IV: Orders of the day and minutes of proceedings, official report of debates, general index.

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LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

BELGIUM

Representatives

MM. ADRIAENSENS Hugo	SP
BIEFNOT Yvon	PS
DERYCKE Erik	SP
KEMPINAIRE André	PVV
PÉCRIAUX Nestor	PS
Mrs. STAELS-DOMPAS Nora	CVP
Mr. UYTENDAELE René	CVP

Substitutes

MM. CAUWENBERGHS Frans	CVP
COLLART Jacques	PS
DE BONDT Ferdinand	CVP
DE DECKER Armand	PRL
EICHER Bernard-J.	PS
MONFILS Philippe-J.F.	PRL
NOERENS René	PVV

FRANCE

Representatives

MM. BASSINET Philippe	Socialist
BAUMEL Jacques	RPR
BEIX Roland	Socialist
CARO Jean-Marie	UDF-CDS
COLLETTE Henri	RPR
DURAND Adrien	CDS
FILLON François	RPR
FORNI Raymond	Socialist
FOURRÉ Jean-Pierre	Socialist
GALLEY Robert	RPR
GOUTEYRON Adrien	RPR
JEAMBRUN Pierre	Dem. Left
JUNG Louis	UCDP
OEHLER Jean	Socialist
PONTILLON Robert	Socialist
SEITLINGER Jean	UDF-CDS
THYRAUD Jacques	Ind. Rep.
VIAL-MASSAT Théo	PC

Substitutes

MM. ALLONCLE Michel	RPR
ANDRÉ René	RPR
BALLIGAND Jean-Pierre	Socialist
BARRAU Alain	Socialist
BIRRAUX Claude	CDS
BOHL André	UCDP
CROZE Pierre	Ind. Rep.
DHAILLE Paul	Socialist
GRUSSENMEYER François	RPR
HUNAUULT Xavier	UDF (App.)
KOEHL Émile	UDF
LAGORCE Pierre	Socialist
LE GRAND Jean-François	RPR
MASSERET Jean-Pierre	Socialist
PISTRE Charles	Socialist
ROGER Jean	RDE
VALLEIX Jean	RPR
WORMS Jean-Pierre	Socialist

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Representatives

MM. AHRENS Karl	SPD
ANTRETTNER Robert	SPD
BÖHM Wilfried	CDU/CSU
BÜCHNER Peter	SPD
EICH Tay	Die Grünen
HITSCHLER Walter	FDP
HOLTZ Uwe	SPD
IRMER Ulrich	FDP
KITTELMANN Peter	CDU/CSU
Mrs. LUUK Dagmar	SPD
MM. MÜLLER Günther	CDU/CSU
NIEGEL Lorenz	CDU/CSU
REDDEMANN Gerhard	CDU/CSU
SCHEER Hermann	SPD
von SCHMUDE Michael	CDU/CSU
SOELL Hartmut	SPD
UNLAND Hermann Josef	CDU/CSU
WULFF Otto	CDU/CSU

Substitutes

Mr. ABELEIN Manfred	CDU/CSU
Mrs. BEER Angelika	Die Grünen
Mr. BINDIG Rudolf	SPD
Mrs. BLUNCK Lieselott	SPD
MM. BÜHLER Klaus	CDU/CSU
FELDMANN Olaf	FDP
Mrs. FISCHER Leni	CDU/CSU
Mr. HÖFFKES Peter	CDU/CSU
Mrs. HOFFMANN Ingeborg	CDU/CSU
MM. KLEJDZINSKI Karl-Heinz	SPD
LENZER Christian	CDU/CSU
PFUHL Albert	SPD
SCHMIDT Manfred	SPD
SCHMITZ Hans-Peter	CDU/CSU
STEINER Heinz-Alfred	SPD
Mrs. TIMM Helga	SPD
MM. ZIERER Benno	CDU/CSU
ZYWIETZ Werner	FDP

ITALY

Representatives

MM. CACCIA Paolo	Chr. Dem.
FILETTI Cristoforo	MSI-DN
FIORET Mario	Chr. Dem.
GABBUGGIANI Elio	Communist
INTINI Ugo	Socialist
KESSLER Bruno	Chr. Dem.
MALFATTI Franco Maria	Chr. Dem.
MARTINO Guido	Republican
MEZZAPESA Pietro	Chr. Dem.
NATALI Antonio	Socialist
PARISI Francesco	Chr. Dem.
PECCHIOLI Ugo	Communist
PIERALLI Piero	Communist
RODOTA Stefano	Ind. Left
RUBBI Antonio	Communist
SARTI Adolfo	Chr. Dem.
SINESIO Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
N...	

Substitutes

MM. ANDREIS Sergio	Verdi
CANNATA Giuseppe	Communist
CAPANNA Mario	Prol. Dem.
CARIGLIA Antonio	PSDI
FASSINO Giuseppe	Liberal
FIANDROTTI Filippo	Socialist
FOSCHI Franco	Chr. Dem.
Mrs. FRANCESE Angela	Communist
MM. GIAGU DEMARTINI Antonio	Chr. Dem.
GRECO Francesco	Communist
PASQUINO Gianfranco	Ind. Left
RAUTI Giuseppe	MSI-DN
RUBNER Hans	SVP
SCOVACRICCHI Martino	PSDI
SPITELLA Giorgio	Chr. Dem.
STEGAGNINI Bruno	Chr. Dem.
TEODORI Riccardo	Radical
TRIGLIA Riccardo	Chr. Dem.

LUXEMBOURG

Representatives

Mr. GOERENS Charles	Dem.
Mrs. LENTZ-CORNETTE Marcelle	Soc. Chr.
Mr. REGENWETTER Jean	Soc. Workers

Substitutes

MM. DIMMER Camille	Soc. Chr.
KOLLWELTER René	Soc. Workers
Mrs. POLFER Lydie	Dem.

NETHERLANDS

Representatives

MM. AARTS Harry	CDA
EVERSDIJK Huib	CDA
Mrs. HAAS-BERGER Ineke	PVDA
MM. de JONG Frans	CDA
NIJPELS Ed.	VVD
STOFFELEN Pieter	Labour
TUMMERS Nicolas	Labour

Substitutes

Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN	Elisabeth	Labour
MM. DE HOOP SCHEFFER Jakob	EISMA Doeke	CDA
Mrs. HERFKENS Eveline	Mrs. HERFKENS Eveline	D66
MM. VAN DER LINDEN Pierre	MARIS Pieter	Labour
	VERBEEK Jan Willem	CDA
		CDA
		Liberal

UNITED KINGDOM

Representatives

MM. COLEMAN Donald	Labour
COX Thomas	Labour
EWING Harry	Labour
Dame Peggy FENNER	Conservative
Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG	Conservative
MM. GARRETT Edward	Labour
HARDY Peter	Labour
HILL James	Conservative
JESSEL Toby	Conservative
Sir Russell JOHNSTON	Liberal
Earl of KINNOULL	Conservative
MM. MORRIS Michael	Conservative
PARRY Robert	Labour
Sir William SHELTON	Conservative
Sir Dudley SMITH	Conservative
Mr. SPEED Keith	Conservative
Sir John STOKES	Conservative
Mr. WILKINSON John	Conservative

Substitutes

MM. ATKINSON David	Conservative
BANKS Tony	Labour
BOWDEN Andrew	Conservative
FAULDS Andrew	Labour
HOWELL Ralph	Conservative
Sir John HUNT	Conservative
Lord KIRKHILL	Labour
MM. LAMBIE David	Labour
LITHERLAND Robert	Labour
LORD Michael	Conservative
Lord MACKIE	Liberal
Lord NEWALL	Conservative
MM. RATHBONE Tim	Conservative
REDMOND Martin	Labour
Lord RODNEY	Conservative
Mrs. ROE Marion	Conservative
MM. THOMPSON John	Labour
WARD John	Conservative

AGENDA

**of the second part of the thirty-fifth ordinary session
Paris, 4th-7th December 1989**

I. Report of the Council

Thirty-fifth annual report of the Council
(first part)

II. Political questions

- | | |
|---|---|
| 1. WEU in the single European market –
reply to the half-yearly report of the
Council | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Caro on behalf of the
General Affairs Committee</i> |
| 2. European security and events in the
Near and Middle East | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Pieralli on behalf of the
General Affairs Committee</i> |

III. Defence questions

- | | |
|---|---|
| 1. Force comparisons (NATO and
Warsaw Pact military potential) –
reply to the annual report of the
Council | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Steiner on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments</i> |
| 2. Western European security: defence
implications of the People's Republic
of China's evolving geopolitical situ-
ation | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Cox on behalf of the Com-
mittee on Defence Questions and Armaments</i> |

IV. Technical and scientific questions

- | | |
|---|--|
| Co-ordinating Committee for Multilateral
Export Controls (Cocom) | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Atkinson on behalf of the
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aer-
ospace Questions</i> |
|---|--|

V. Budgetary and administrative questions

- | | |
|---|--|
| 1. Draft budget of the administrative
expenditure of the Assembly for the
financial year 1990 | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Klejdzinski on behalf of the
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Adminis-
tration</i> |
| 2. Accounts of the administrative
expenditure of the Assembly for the
financial year 1988 – the auditor's
report and motion to approve the final
accounts | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Klejdzinski on behalf of the
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Adminis-
tration</i> |

VI. Rules of Procedure of the Assembly

- | | |
|---|---|
| Revision of the Charter and Rules of Pro-
cedure | <i>Report tabled by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg on behalf
of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and
Privileges</i> |
|---|---|

VII. Parliamentary and public relations

- | | |
|---|---|
| 1. WEU's information policy | <i>Report tabled by Sir William Shelton on behalf of
the Committee for Parliamentary and Public
Relations</i> |
| 2. Western European Union (draft of a
new booklet) | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Tummers on behalf of the
Committee for Parliamentary and Public Rela-
tions</i> |

ORDER OF BUSINESS

**of the second part of the thirty-fifth ordinary session
Paris, 4th-7th December 1989**

MONDAY, 4th DECEMBER

Morning

Meetings of political groups.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

1. Opening of the second part of the thirty-fifth ordinary session.
2. Examination of credentials.
3. Address by the President of the Assembly.
4. Statement by the President of the Assembly on a motion tabled with a request for urgent procedure and distribution of the text of the motion.
5. Adoption of the draft order of business of the second part of the thirty-fifth ordinary session.
6. *Vote on urgent procedure.*
7. Action by the Presidential Committee:
presentation of the report tabled by Mrs. Staels-Dompas, Vice-President of the Assembly.
Debate.
8. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU.
9. Revision of the Charter and Rules of Procedure:
presentation of the report tabled by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg on behalf of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.
Debate.
Votes on the draft decisions.
10. WEU in the single European market – reply to the half-yearly report of the Council:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Caro on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.
Debate.

TUESDAY, 5th DECEMBER

Morning 10 a.m.

1. WEU in the single European market – reply to the half-yearly report of the Council:
Resumed debate.

10.30 a.m.

2. Address by Mr. Eyskens, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

11.30 a.m.

3. Address by Mr. Schäfer, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

1. Address by Mr. Chevènement, Minister of Defence of France.
2. WEU in the single European market – reply to the half-yearly report of the Council:
Resumed debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.
3. European security and events in the Near and Middle East:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Pieralli on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.

WEDNESDAY, 6th DECEMBER

Morning 11 a.m.

1. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1990:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Klejdzinski on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.
Debate.
Vote on the draft budget.
2. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1988 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Klejdzinski on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.
Debate.
Vote on the motion to approve the final accounts.

If urgent procedure is adopted:

3. Establishment of a peaceful and secure order in Europe.
Debate.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

1. Address by Mr. Coëme, Minister of Defence of Belgium.
2. Establishment of a peaceful and secure order in Europe.
Vote on the motion for an order.
3. Force comparisons (NATO and Warsaw Pact military potential) – reply to the annual report of the Council:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Steiner on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.
4. Co-ordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (Cocom):
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Atkinson on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.
Debate.

THURSDAY, 7th DECEMBER

Morning 10 a.m.

1. Co-ordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (Cocom):
Resumed debate.

11 a.m.

2. Address by Mr. Vitalone, Secretary of State, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Italy.
3. Co-ordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (Cocom):
Vote on the draft recommendation.
4. Western European security: defence implications of the People's Republic of China's evolving geopolitical situation:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Cox on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.
Debate.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

1. Western European security: defence implications of the People's Republic of China's evolving geopolitical situation:
Resumed debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.
2. Western European Union's information policy:
presentation of the report tabled by Sir William Shelton on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations.
Debate.
Vote on the draft order.
3. Western European Union (draft of a new booklet):
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Tummers on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations.
Debate.
Vote on the draft order.

CLOSE OF THE SECOND PART OF THE THIRTY-FIFTH ORDINARY SESSION

*Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly
for the financial year 1988*

THE AUDITOR'S REPORT

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LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY TO THE AUDITOR SUBMITTING THE ACCOUNTS OF THE ASSEMBLY FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1988 – 10th April 1989.

LETTER FROM THE AUDITOR TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY – 12th June 1989.

REPORT OF THE EXTERNAL AUDITOR TO THE ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION ON THE ACCOUNTS FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1988 – 12th June 1989.

CERTIFICATE OF THE AUDITOR FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1988 – 12th June 1989.

APPENDICES

- I. Summary of income and expenditure for the financial year 1988 – Financial position as at 31st December 1988.
 - II. Statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits for the financial year 1988.
 - III. Statement of sums due and received from the Secretary-General of WEU, London, in respect of contributions to the WEU Assembly budget for 1988.
 - IV. Provident fund – Account for the financial year ended 31st December 1988.
 - V. 1988 balance sheet for the Communist Group.
 - VI. 1988 balance sheet for the Federated Group of Christian Democrats and European Democrats.
 - VII. 1988 balance sheet for the Liberal Group.
 - VIII. 1988 balance sheet for the Socialist Group.
-

*Letter from the President of the Assembly
to the Auditor submitting the accounts
for the financial year 1988*

10th April 1989

Dear Mr. Van de Velde,

In accordance with Article 14 of the Financial Regulations of the Assembly of WEU, I have the honour to submit to you the accounts for the financial year 1988 in accordance with the statements attached hereto, which refer to:

1. (a) Summary of income and expenditure – financial position as at 31st December 1988 (Appendix I);

(b) Statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits (Appendix II);

(c) Contributions (Appendix III);

(d) Provident fund (Appendix IV).

As is customary, after being audited these tables will be signed by the President of the Assembly, the Clerk of the Assembly and the Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration before being submitted to the Assembly.

2. The statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits shows a saving of F 82 179, whereas the final statement

of income and expenditure shows a credit balance of F 6 591. The difference between these two figures, i.e. F 75 588, represents a deficit of receipts over estimates:

	F	F
- Bank interest	148 669	
- Sundry receipts	14 886	
- Sale of publications	42 169	
- Contributions 7%	<u>442 688</u>	
		648 412
- Receipts for 1988 estimated in the budget		<u>724 000</u>
		<u>- 75 588</u>

3. Excess expenditure under Heads III and V of the operating budget, amounting to F 583 745, has been met by transfers from other heads of the budget.

4. All contributions for the financial year 1988 (revised 1988 budget) have been received from the Secretary-General of WEU London.

5. Amounts in the Assembly's provident fund are incorporated with those of the other organs of WEU and the joint fund is administered by the Secretary-General in consultation with the Clerk of the Assembly.

On 31st December 1988, these amounts totalled F 4 853 511 as shown in Appendix IV. On that date there remained two loans to two staff members amounting to F 199 740.

The Secretary-General has continued to receive advice from the advisory panel set up within WEU and from outside bankers on the investment of these funds. On 31st December 1988 the fund was held by Montagu Investment Management Limited in London.

6. Also appended to the accounts of the Assembly are the reports on the funds attributed to the political groups drawn up in accordance with the directives issued by the Presidential Committee (document A/WEU/CP (86) 39) as follows:

- Communist Group;
- Federated Group of Christian Democrats and European Democrats;
- Liberal Group;
- Socialist Group.

These reports will be considered as an integral part of the accounts of the Assembly; they give details of the use of credits included in

Sub-Head 30 of the operating budget of the Assembly.

Yours sincerely,

Charles GOERENS
President of the Assembly

Mr. J. VAN DE VELDE
Premier Président de la
Cour des Comptes
Rue de la Régence 2
B - 1000 BRUXELLES

***Letter from the Auditor to the President
of the Assembly***

12th June 1989

Dear Mr. Goerens,

I have the honour to enclose the accounts of the Assembly of Western European Union for the financial year 1988 together with my opinion and report on these accounts.

Yours sincerely,

Jeroom L.-E. VAN de VELDE
*(Premier Président de la
Cour des Comptes de Belgique)
Commissaire aux comptes*

Mr. Charles GOERENS
President of the Assembly
of Western European Union
43, avenue du Président Wilson
75016 PARIS

***Report of the External Auditor
to the Assembly of Western European Union
on the accounts for the financial year 1988***

12th June 1989

I have audited the accounts of Western European Union for the financial year 1988 in accordance with Article 14 of the Financial Regulations of the Assembly in order to appraise the correct management of the budget and the book-keeping.

The final statement of income and expenditure shows a credit balance of F 6 591 whereas the statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits shows a saving of F 82 179.

The difference, i.e. F 75 588, stems from a deficit in sundry receipts which are F 648 412 instead of the estimated F 724 000.

The total saving in the budget may be summarised as follows:

	Total credit after transfers F	Total expenditure F	Balance F
Head I			
Permanent staff	10 639 875	10 636 311	3 564
Head II			
Temporary staff	2 843 000	2 841 363	1 637
Head III			
Expenditure on premises and equipment	1 461 800	1 461 513	287
Head IV			
General administrative costs	1 738 450	1 662 147	76 303
Head V			
Other expenditure	1 879 575	1 879 233	342
Head I			
Pensions, allowances and social charges	2 719 800	2 719 754	46
Total :			<u>82 179</u>

The financial situation compared to that on 31st December 1987 has improved slightly thanks to the fact that bank interest, which was F 60 523 in 1987, amounted to F 143 669 in 1988.

Situation of transfers between heads in 1988

	+	-
Head I	151 400	213 525
Head II	66 700	217 700
Head III	279 900	105 100
Head IV	20 400	425 450 *
Head V	416 675 **	7 100
Head I	<u>55 350</u>	<u>21 550</u>
TOTAL	<u>990 425</u>	<u>990 425</u>

* Sub-head 20 "Printing and publication of documents" was reduced by F 319 450.

** Considerable increase in sub-heads:

	F
27 - "Official journeys"	+ 95 200
28 - "Expenses of experts" (architect)	+ 75 626
29 - "Expenditure on information"	+ 164 250

of which about F 149 000 is the cost of recruiting as an expert adviser a person who retired on 1st February 1989.

I thank the President, the Clerk and staff of the Assembly for the willingness with which all requests for information were met and for their co-operation and assistance in the exercise of my duties as Auditor.

Jeroom L.-E. VAN DE VELDE
(Premier Président de la
Cour des comptes de Belgique)
Commissaire aux comptes

*Certificate of the Auditor
for the financial year 1988*

12th June 1989

In application of Article 15 of the Financial Regulations of the Assembly of Western European Union, I have examined the appended financial statements of the Assembly comprising the summary of income and expenditure and the statement of assets and liabilities for the financial year 1988.

My examination included verification of the books and other relevant documents that I deemed necessary. As a result of this examination, my opinion is that these statements are a correct record of the financial operations conducted during the 1988 financial year, that these operations were in conformity with the budget estimates, the financial regulations, the financial instructions and other decisions of the legislative authority, and that they are a correct record of the financial situation for the year ended 31st December 1988.

Jeroom L.-E. VAN DE VELDE
(Premier Président de la
Cour des comptes de Belgique)
Commissaire aux comptes

APPENDIX I

Summary of income and expenditure for the financial year 1988

(in French francs)

Per attached statement

Assessments of member states (see Appendix III)	20 558 500
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Miscellaneous

(A) Sundry receipts

Bank interest	148 669
Sundry receipts	14 886
Sale of publications	42 169

(B) Pensions

Contributions (7%)	<u>442 688</u>
--------------------------	----------------

648 412

Expenditure under budget authorisation	21 206 912
--	------------

Expenditure in excess of budget authorisation on Heads II, IV and I-P	
--	--

Total expenditure (see Appendix II)	<u>21 200 321</u>
---	-------------------

Excess of income over expenditure	F <u><u>591</u></u>
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*Financial position as at 31st December 1988**Assets*

Cash at bank	834 215
Sundry advances	117 736
Accounts receivable	<u>257 265</u>

F 1 209 216*Liabilities*

Accounts payable	1 202 625
Excess of income over expenditure	<u>6 591</u>

F 1 209 216*Certified correct:*

Charles GOERENS
President of the Assembly

Georges MOULIAS
Clerk of the Assembly

Roger LINSTER
*Chairman of the Committee
on Budgetary Affairs
and Administration*

STATEMENT OF BUDGET AUTHORISATIONS, EXPENDITURE

(in Fr

PART I: OPERATING BUDGET		Total budget for 1988	
HEAD I – PERMANENT STAFF			
<i>Sub-Head 1</i>	Basic salaries	7 542 000	
<i>Sub-Head 2</i>	Allowances		
2.1.	Expatriation allowance	673 000	
2.2.	Household allowance	317 000	
2.3.	Allowance for children and other dependent persons	341 000	
2.4.	Rent allowance	40 000	
2.5.	Education allowance	65 000	
2.6.	Allowance for language courses	2 000	
2.7.	Overtime	50 000	
2.8.	Home leave	20 000	
<i>Sub-Head 3</i>	Social charges		
3.1.	Social security	1 018 000	
3.2.	Supplementary insurance	314 000	
3.3.	Provident fund	151 000	
<i>Sub-Head 4</i>	Expenses relating to the recruitment and departure of permanent officials		
4.1.	Travelling expenses of candidates for vacant posts	10 000	
4.2.	Travelling expenses on arrival and departure of permanent officials and their families	13 000	
4.3.	Removal expenses	40 000	
4.4.	Installation allowance	98 000	
<i>Sub-Head 5</i>	Medical examination	8 000	
Total of Head I		10 702 000	

IX II

ND UNEXPENDED CREDITS FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1988

ncs)

	Transfers		Total after transfers	Total expenditure	Unexpended credits
	+	-			
		104 525	7 437 475	7 436 867	608
	52 200		725 200	725 196	4
	2 200		319 200	319 172	28
	39 400		380 400	380 396	4
	27 900		67 900	67 863	37
		6 500	58 500	58 408	92
		1 500	500	487	13
	13 000		63 000	62 785	215
	16 000		36 000	35 934	66
		49 000	969 000	968 474	526
		13 000	301 000	300 525	475
		500	150 500	150 103	397
		5 000	5 000	4 873	127
		8 000	5 000	4 485	515
		5 500	34 500	34 076	424
		20 000	78 000	77 974	26
	700		8 700	8 693	7
	151 400	213 525	10 639 875	10 636 311	3 564

PART I: OPERATING BUDGET		Total budget for 1988	
HEAD II – TEMPORARY STAFF			
<i>Sub-Head 6</i>	Staff recruited for sessions of the Assembly		
6.1.	Sittings service	1 072 000	
6.2.	Interpretation service	401 000	
6.3.	Translation service	772 000	
6.4.	Other services	40 000	
<i>Sub-Head 7</i>	Interpretation staff required for Assembly work between sessions	500 000	
<i>Sub-Head 8</i>	Temporary staff for the Office of the Clerk	80 000	
<i>Sub-Head 9</i>	Social charges		
9.1.	Insurance for temporary staff other than interpreters	4 000	
9.2.	Provident fund for interpreters	120 000	
9.3.	Insurance for interpreters	5 000	
Total of Head II		2 994 000	
HEAD III – EXPENDITURE ON PREMISES AND EQUIPMENT			
<i>Sub-Head 10</i>	Share of joint expenditure on the Paris premises	418 000	
<i>Sub-Head 11</i>	Hire of committee rooms	15 000	
<i>Sub-Head 12</i>	Technical and other installations for Assembly sessions	365 000	
<i>Sub-Head 13</i>	Various services for the organisation of sessions	45 000	
<i>Sub-Head 14</i>	Maintenance of the premises of the Office of the Clerk	18 000	
<i>Sub-Head 15</i>	Purchase or repair of office furniture	43 000	
<i>Sub-Head 16</i>	Purchase of reproduction and other office equipment	11 000	
<i>Sub-Head 17</i>	Hire and maintenance of reproduction and other office equipment	372 000	
Total of Head III		1 287 000	

	Transfers		Total after transfers	Total expenditure	Unexpended credits
	+	-			
	11 000		1 083 000	1 082 848	152
		42 000	359 000	358 850	150
		115 900	656 100	656 051	49
		3 800	36 200	36 188	12
	49 500		549 500	549 471	29
		26 500	53 500	53 428	72
	6 200		10 200	9 119	1 081
		27 500	92 500	92 473	27
		2 000	3 000	2 935	65
	66 700	217 700	2 843 000	2 841 363	1 637
		87 900	330 100	330 035	65
		15 000	-	-	-
	12 000		377 000	376 930	70
	3 550		48 550	48 506	44
		2 200	15 800	15 795	5
	93 500		136 500	136 460	40
	139 700		150 700	150 640	60
	31 150		403 150	403 147	3
	279 900	105 100	1 461 800	1 461 513	287

PART I: OPERATING BUDGET		Total budget for 1988	
HEAD IV – GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS			
<i>Sub-Head 18</i>	Postage, telephone, telex and transport of documents	490 000	
<i>Sub-Head 19</i>	Duplication paper, headed writing paper and other office supplies	264 000	
<i>Sub-Head 20</i>	Printing and publication of documents	1 214 000	
<i>Sub-Head 21</i>	Purchase of documents	60 000	
<i>Sub-Head 22</i>	Official cars	115 000	
<i>Sub-Head 23</i>	Bank charges	500	
Total of Head IV		2 143 500	
HEAD VI – OTHER EXPENDITURE			
<i>Sub-Head 24</i>	Travelling and subsistence allowances and insurance for the President of the Assembly, chairmen of committees and rapporteurs	155 000	
<i>Sub-Head 25</i>	Expenses for representation	210 000	
<i>Sub-Head 26</i>	Committee study missions	5 000	
<i>Sub-Head 27</i>	Official journeys of members of the Office the Clerk	370 000	
<i>Sub-Head 28</i>	Expenses of experts and the auditor	60 000	
<i>Sub-Head 29</i>	Expenditure on information	320 000	
<i>Sub-Head 30</i>	Expenses for political groups	327 000	
<i>Sub-Head 31</i>	Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere provided for	3 000	
<i>Sub-Head 32</i>	Non-recoverable taxes	20 000	
Total of Head V		1 470 000	
Total		18 596 500	

	Transfers		Total after transfers	Total expenditure	Unexpended credits
	+	-			
		90 000	400 000	393 794	6 206
	7 000		271 000	270 998	2
		319 450	894 550	825 626	68 924
	13 400		73 400	73 396	4
		16 000	99 000	98 333	667
			500	-	500
	20 400	425 450	1 738 450	1 662 147	76 303
	10 800		165 800	165 709	91
	68 000		278 000	277 975	25
		5 000	-	-	-
	95 200		465 200	465 167	33
	75 625		135 625	135 608	17
	164 250		484 250	484 213	37
			327 000	327 000	-
		2 100	900	892	8
	2 800		22 800	22 669	131
	416 675	7 100	1 879 575	1 879 233	342
	935 075	968 875	18 562 700	18 480 567	82 133

PART II: PENSIONS BUDGET		Total budget for 1988
HEAD I – PENSIONS, ALLOWANCES AND SOCIAL CHARGES		
<i>Sub-Head 1</i>	Pensions and leaving allowances	
1.1.	Retirement pensions	2 161 000
1.2.	Invalidity pensions	218 000
1.3.	Survivors' pensions	50 000
1.4.	Orphans' or dependants' pensions	
1.5.	Leaving allowances	
<i>Sub-Head 2</i>	Family allowances	
2.1.	Household allowances	97 000
2.2.	Children's and dependants' allowances	53 000
2.3.	Education allowances	42 000
<i>Sub-Head 3</i>	Supplementary insurance	65 000
Total of Head I		2 686 000
Total		21 282 500

The expenditure figures include charges for goods delivered and services rendered by 31st December 1988, and paid for up

Charles GOERENS
President of the Assembly

Geor
Clerk

	Transfers		Total after transfers	Total expenditure	Unexpended credits
	+	-			
	47 220		2 208 220	2 208 219	1
	1 250		219 250	219 247	3
	-	450	49 550	49 549	1
	6 030		103 030	103 022	8
		14 350	38 650	38 646	4
		6 750	35 250	35 227	23
	850		65 850	65 844	6
	55 350	21 550	2 719 800	2 719 754	46
	990 425	990 425	21 282 500	21 200 321	82 179

at March 1989, in accordance with the Financial Regulations of the Assembly.

DULIAS
? Assembly

Roger LINSTER
*Chairman of the Committee on
Budgetary Affairs and Administration*

APPENDIX III

**STATEMENT OF SUMS DUE AND RECEIVED FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
OF WEU LONDON IN RESPECT OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE WEU ASSEMBLY
BUDGET FOR 1988**

Member states	600ths	Budget surplus from 1987		Budget for 1988	Supplementary budget for 1988	Contributions received
		F		F	F	F
Belgium	59	(-)	3	1 947 147	81 911	2 029 055
France	120	(-)	7	3 960 300	166 600	4 126 893
Federal Republic of Germany	120	(-)	7	3 960 300	166 600	4 126 893
Italy	120	(-)	7	3 960 300	166 600	4 126 893
Luxembourg	2	(-)	1	66 006	2 778	68 783
Netherlands	59	(-)	3	1 947 147	81 911	2 029 055
United Kingdom	120	(-)	7	3 960 300	166 600	4 126 893
	600	(-)	35	19 801 500	833 000	20 634 465

1987 Budget surplus	35
Transfer of credits to the financial year 1989 ..	76 000
1988 Budget	<u>20 558 500</u>

Charles GOERENS
President of the Assembly

Georges MOULIAS
Clerk of the Assembly

Roger LINSTER
*Chairman of the Committee on
Budgetary Affairs and Adminis-
tration*

APPENDIX IV
PROVIDENT FUND
ACCOUNT FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR ENDED 31st DECEMBER 1988

in French francs

	F		F
<i>Balance brought forward:</i>			
Accounts of staff members as at 1st January 1988	4 425 218	Withdrawals	320 973
Contributions of staff members and of the Assembly of Western European Union	224 708	Management fee	20 308
Repayments of loans by staff members	81 600		
Interest received during the year	343 997		
Gain on valuation at 31st December 1988	119 269	Accounts of existing staff members as at 31st December 1988	4 853 511
	5 194 792		5 194 792

Charles GOERENS
President of the Assembly

Georges MOULIAS
Clerk of the Assembly

Roger LINSTER
*Chairman of the Committee on
 Budgetary Affairs and Administration*

I have examined the foregoing account. In my opinion the account presents fairly the financial position of the provident fund at 31st December 1988.

Jeroom VAN DE VELDE
*Premier Président de
 la Cour des Comptes de Belgique,
 Commissaire aux Comptes*

4th July 1989

APPENDIX V

*1988 Balance sheet for the Communist Group**Assets*

	F
1. Surplus at 31st December 1987 (bank accounts, cash)	-
2. Interest	-
3. Appropriations granted by the Assembly of WEU for 1988	38 138

Liabilities

I. Expenditure

1. Secretarial staff (salaries, insurance)	14 725
2. Administrative expenses (postage, telephone, office supplies)	5 462
3. Seminars and meetings	5 856
4. Travel and subsistence (members and secretarial staff)	4 880
5. Interpretation costs	2 405
6. Representational expenses (receptions, dinners)	3 375
7. Sundry expenses	1 435

II. Surplus at 31st December 1987 (bank accounts, cash)	-
Total	38 138

Signatures of the Treasurer

and two auditors of the group

APPENDIX VI

*1988 Balance sheet for the Federated Group
of Christian Democrats and European Democrats**Assets*

	F
1. Surplus at 31st December 1987 (bank accounts, cash)	176 589.70
2. Interest	10 539.91
3. Appropriations granted by the Assembly of WEU for 1987	<u>140 146.00</u>
Total	327 275.61

Liabilities

I. Expenditure

1. Secretarial staff (salaries, insurance)	84 100.00
2. Administrative expenses (postage, telephone, office supplies)	187.68
3. Seminars and meetings	16 704.15
4. Travel and subsistence (members and secretarial staff)	25 568.00
5. Interpretation costs	-
6. Representational expenses (receptions, dinners)	-
7. Sundry expenses	<u>150.00</u>
Total	126 709.83

II. Surplus at 31st December 1987 (banks accounts, cash)	<u>200 565.78</u>
Total	327 275.61

Signatures of the Treasurer

and two auditors of the group

APPENDIX VII

*1988 Balance sheet for the Liberal Group**Assets*

	F
1. Surplus at 31st December 1987 (bank accounts, cash)	37 550.25
2. Interest	1 467.80
3. Appropriations granted by the Assembly of WEU for 1988	<u>49 965.00</u>
Total	88 983.05

Liabilities

I. Expenditure

1. Secretarial staff (salaries, insurance)	23 821.00
2. Administrative expenses (postage, telephone, office supplies)	4 000.00
3. Seminars and meetings	8 500.00
4. Travel and subsistence (members and secretarial staff)	2 460.00
5. Interpretation costs	-
6. Representational expenses (receptions, dinners)	6 460.00
7. Sundry expenses	<u>-</u>
Total	45 241.00

II. Surplus at 31st December 1988 (banks accounts, cash)	<u>43 742.05</u>
Total	88 983.05

Signatures of the Treasurer

and two auditors of the group

APPENDIX VIII

*1988 Balance sheet for the Socialist Group**Assets*

	F
1. Surplus at 31st December 1987 (bank accounts, cash)	175 270.87
2. Interest	10 541.44
3. Appropriations granted by the Assembly of WEU for 1988	<u>98 751.00</u>
Total	284 563.31

Liabilities

I. Expenditure

1. Secretarial staff (salaries, insurance)	75 396.00
2. Administrative expenses (postage, telephone, office supplies)	1 483.81
3. Missions and meetings	15 803.50
4. Travel and subsistence (members and secretarial staff)	1 664.00
5. Seminars	-
6. Interpretation costs	-
7. Representational expenses (receptions, dinners)	4 620.25
8. Sundry expenses	<u>127.00</u>
Total	99 094.56

II. Surplus at 31st December 1988 (banks accounts, cash)	<u>185 468.75</u>
Total	284 563.31

Signatures of the Treasurer

and two auditors of the group

*Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly
for the financial year 1988*

**MOTION TO APPROVE THE FINAL ACCOUNTS OF THE ASSEMBLY
FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1988 ¹**

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration ²
by Mr. Klejdzinski, Chairman and Rapporteur*

The Assembly,

Having examined the final accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1988, together with the auditor's report, in accordance with Article 16 of the financial regulations,

Approves the accounts as submitted and discharges the President of the Assembly of his financial responsibility.

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee: Mr. Klejdzinski (Chairman); MM. Rathbone, Lagorce (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Asselborn, Biefnot (Alternate: Eicher), Mrs. Blunck, MM. Dhaille, Durand, Dame Peggy Fenner, MM. Greco (Alternate: Rubner), Höffkes, de Kwaadsteniet, Morris (Alternate: Lord), Niegel, Noerens, Oehler, Rauti, Redmond (Alternate: Coleman), Sinesio (Alternate: Mezzapesa), Triglia (Alternate: Giagu Demartini), Worrell.*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Replies of the Council to Recommendations 467 to 473

RECOMMENDATION 467¹

on the establishment of a European institute for advanced security studies

The Assembly,

(i) Recalling the proposals to establish a European institute for advanced security studies and noting that these proposals correspond to the wishes expressed by the Assembly, particularly in Recommendations 442 and 463;

(ii) Believing that there could be fruitful co-operation between such an institute and the services of the Assembly,

RECOMMENDS TO THE COUNCIL

1. That a European institute for advanced security studies be established under the terms of Article VIII, paragraph 2, of the modified Brussels Treaty in order to promote a European spirit in matters of defence;
2. That this institute be housed in the same building as the Assembly;
3. That members of the staff of this institute be recruited on the basis of specific qualifications required by virtue of their employment;
4. That the Office of the Clerk be made responsible for common services (management of the building, meeting rooms, documentation, security);
5. That the mandate of the WEU security agencies be brought to an end;
6. That this recommendation be implemented without delay.

1. Adopted by the Presidential Committee on 16th March 1989, in accordance with Rule 14, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ¹
to Recommendation 467

On 3rd April 1989, WEU ministers instructed the Permanent Council to “ review the question of an institute for strategic studies (...) with a view to further discussion at (their) next meeting ” in November.

The Permanent Council requested its Institutional Working Group (IWG) to prepare a report on the subject, taking account of the proposals contained in Assembly Recommendation 467.

The Foreign and Defence Ministers of the WEU member states, at their Council meeting in Brussels on 13th November 1989, examined the report and decided to set up a WEU Institute for Security Studies ². The purpose of this institute is to strengthen the organisation's impact on the identification of European security interests by giving it a study capacity. The institute has been set up in accordance with Article VIII, paragraph 2, of the modified Brussels Treaty and with the conclusions on institutional questions reached by ministers in The Hague on 27th October 1987 and 19th April 1988.

It will comprise a director and five permanent experts. Funds will also be earmarked for enlisting the expertise available in the member countries to carry out specific and in-depth studies.

The director and the experts will carry out their tasks independently and objectively. The director will report to the Council on the execution of the scientific tasks assigned to him and on how the budget has been used. For 1990, the budget will be F 11 380 000, including F 1 730 000 for functional expenditure. The director is to be appointed by the Council by 1st February 1990 at the latest and will take up his duties as soon as possible to enable the institute to be operational from 1st July 1990 onwards. The Council also decided to wind up the Paris-based Agencies for Security Questions and Standing Armaments Committee ³. The Council will take the necessary measures to terminate the contracts of staff currently employed by those bodies, in accordance with the legal provisions in force.

Ministers have asked the Permanent Council to take appropriate decisions, after consulting the Assembly, on the organisational aspects of setting up the institute in the organisation's building.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 23rd November 1989 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 24th November 1989.

2. See Annex.

3. This does not apply to the Agency for the Control of Armaments.

ANNEX

*Ministerial decision concerning the setting-up of a
"WEU Institute for Security Studies"**Brussels, 13th November 1989*

THE MINISTERIAL COUNCIL:

Convinced that, as stated in the platform on European security interests adopted in The Hague on 27th October 1987, the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include security and defence and that WEU makes an important contribution to the broader process of European unification;

Determined to increase the effectiveness of the organisation and to contribute to an overall solution to its institutional problems;

Stressing the importance of having within WEU a capacity to study, and provide documentation on, questions concerning European security;

Recalling that the Assembly, in Recommendation 467, has expressed interest in the establishment of such a capacity;

HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS:

1. A "WEU Institute for Security Studies" shall be set up. Essentially, the rôle of this institute shall be to promote a European security identity and to assist the organisation in pursuing the objectives laid down in the platform. Accordingly, its main tasks shall be:
 - (a) to carry out research, principally for the Council, calling on national experts if necessary and in consultation with the Secretariat General; this research will be carried out independently and objectively;
 - (b) to encourage and help the existing institutes in the member states to promote a greater awareness of European security issues and specifically to organise courses and seminars to that end;
 - (c) in collaboration with existing institutes, to organise meetings with institutes in countries not belonging to Western Europe, particularly those in the Warsaw Pact countries;
 - (d) to establish and keep up to date a data bank for the purposes of research into the defence efforts of the WEU member countries and for studies relating to European security – the relevant practical arrangements will be the subject of an institute proposal to the Council;
 - (e) to contribute to academic work on the same topics.
2. It is decided that the Agencies for Security Questions¹ and the Standing Armaments Committee shall be abolished.
3. The institute shall be placed under the authority of the Council which shall appoint the director for a period of three years. The director shall be responsible to the Council for the management of the institute.
4. The institute shall be located in Paris in the premises of WEU. The question of its location shall be reviewed in the light of the conclusions of the Ministerial Councils of 27th October 1987 and 19th April 1988 regarding the collocation of WEU institutions, necessary in the context of the European construction process.
5. The Assembly may, with the Council's approval, assign to the institute studies relating to the Assembly's own activities. The Assembly shall have access to the results of the institute's unclassified work.
6. The director of the institute shall be appointed by 1st February 1990 at the latest. He shall take up his duties as soon as possible, at the latest by 1st June 1990.

1. This does not apply to the Agency for the Control of Armaments.

RECOMMENDATION 468¹

***on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union
for the financial years 1988 (revised) and 1989²***

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting that, in communicating the budgets of Western European Union for 1988 (revised) and 1989, the Council has complied with the provisions of Article VIII (c) of the Charter;
- (ii) Considering that:
 - (a) no decision has yet been taken by the Council on the restructuring of the ministerial organs;
 - (b) the budgets of these organs are still based on former organograms;
 - (c) consequently these budgets are not a valid estimate of requirements in relation to programmed work;
 - (d) consequently the Assembly is not in a position to give an opinion on the budgets in question on the basis of a cost/efficiency ratio;
 - (e) in the framework of budgetary management, a new practice seems to be introduced (which is to transfer from one financial year to the next unused credits within the limits of the total contributions of member states), which does not correspond to Article 10 (c) of the Financial Regulations of WEU which is referred to as justification;
- (iii) Regretting that:
 - (a) the staff of the Paris agencies is still uncertain about its future;
 - (b) furthermore, in the framework of "co-ordination" there is a tendency to limit the participation of staff representatives in the negotiations on determining conditions of employment,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Follow up without delay Recommendation 467 adopted by the Presidential Committee on 16th March 1989;
2. Make the necessary amendments to the Financial Regulations to regularise the procedure for transferring credits from one financial year to another outside the provisions of Article 10 (c) of the Regulations;
3. Afford its backing to the staff associations in their action to defend the right of their representatives to take part in negotiations in the framework of "co-ordination" on the conditions for the employment of staff;
4. Make a study to determine how to facilitate the transfer of staff between the co-ordinated organisations in order to improve career possibilities.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 6th June 1989 during the first part of the thirty-fifth ordinary session (2nd sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mrs. Pack on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration (Document 1184).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ¹***to Recommendation 468***

1. Recommendation 467, proposing substantial organisation and management changes, is still being considered. The Council will, in due course, inform the Assembly of progress.

2. The Council has considered the recommendation of the Assembly concerning the transfer of budgetary credits from one financial year to the next. It recognises that the system of budgetary control has to have some flexibility in practice to meet special circumstances, providing modifications to agreed budgets are made with the authority of the Council on the recommendation of the Budget Committee. The Council notes that, in the instances referred to, the secretariat sought and obtained the appropriate authority.

The Council is fully aware of the exceptional nature of the circumstances in which the secretariat has to operate at present. It does not consider that a new criterion has been set in adopting a practical response to meet the unusual situation.

Whilst it may be somewhat premature to modify permanently the Financial Regulations to meet what is in effect a transient phase, this matter will be examined by the Budget and Organisation Committee to consider whether a change would be advisable in the long term.

3. The rôle of the staff associations to take part in the negotiations in the framework of "co-ordination" is recognised. Considerable progress has been made in the past ten years to establish and develop this participation and the process continues to be refined and improved. The positive attitude of the staff, as well as their contributions during the discussions and negotiations, are much appreciated.

The framework of "co-ordination" is, however, complex and often time-bound, and sometimes one or other of the three parties involved may feel that it should have had more influence or that the outcome of the negotiating process should have resulted in a more favourable compromise.

The Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts, within its sphere of competence, endeavours to give each side its proper due and arrive at a common consensus as much as possible before submitting its recommendations to the councils.

4. The movement of staff between co-ordinated organisations ought not to be considered "transfers", but rather the leaving of one autonomous organisation (resignation, expiry of contract, etc.) and the entering of another autonomous organisation (recruitment).

Staff mobility between co-ordinated organisations is enhanced by the more or less automatic transfer of pension entitlements under the common pension scheme, and in that generally in recruitment, preference will be given to appropriate staff members from other co-ordinated organisations, maintaining, wherever possible, acquired grade and seniority, whilst recognising also opportunities for career advancement.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 12th September 1989 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 12th September 1989.

RECOMMENDATION 469¹*on the state of European security –
intervention forces and reinforcement for the centre and the north*²

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming the improved relations between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the arms reduction agreements that have been achieved or are being negotiated;
- (ii) Noting nevertheless that the USSR and its allies are still maintaining a high level of arms production and that the present disarmament agreements have been reached by NATO maintaining its own high level of security and unity of purpose;
- (iii) Recognising that it will be politically difficult to maintain western defence budgets in real terms, let alone increase them;
- (iv) Underlining therefore the increased urgency of making as cost effective as possible existing procurement, personnel, and command, control and communication systems;
- (v) Stressing the key strategic importance to NATO of reinforcement and resupply from North America to Europe, which itself can act as a deterrent in time of tension, and increases the importance of the northern flank,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member governments to recommend to NATO:

1. That the highest priority be given to improving command, control and communication systems:
 - (a) firstly, aircraft “ identification friend or foe ” (IFF) systems, to achieve a high-grade common standard in NATO air operations which is now long overdue;
 - (b) secondly, in interoperability of tactical radio equipment between multinational units;
 - (c) thirdly, in communication, tactics and doctrine, for better control of the land/air battle;
2. That France be encouraged to join the United Kingdom in taking part with its four Boeing E-3 AWACS *ab initio* in the training and development of the teams destined for the alliance air defence system aircraft;
3. That in view of the importance of the northern flank in securing maritime and air superiority for transatlantic reinforcement and resupply, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands should reach an early decision on new amphibious ships;
4. That in view of the withdrawal of Canadian forces from the northern flank, apart from their replacement by other allies, consideration should be given to the skilled elements of the force d'action rapide being assigned to Norway;
5. That still greater efforts be made on weapon and ammunition standardisation, interoperability of equipment and more cost-effective joint procurement ventures;
6. That through the member countries of WEU the following steps should be taken to give practical expression to the European pillar of defence:
 - (a) encourage more multinational units such as the United Kingdom-Netherlands landing force and the Franco-German brigade;
 - (b) take specific action to allow at an individual level the exchange of military personnel between countries to enhance their awareness of European co-operation, give them greater opportunity for travel and a more interesting work environment, and serve as a useful recruiting incentive at a time when the demographic levels are making recruiting most difficult;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 6th June 1989 during the first part of the thirty-fifth ordinary session (2nd sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Speed on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 1183).

7. That proper recognition and understanding be given to greater concepts of speed and flexibility in European forces to meet the changing situation in Europe. The doctrines and equipment which underly the force d'action rapide and 24 Airmobile Brigade are good examples that could be emulated and enhanced throughout the alliance (although dedicated helicopter lift capacity for 24 Brigade is an essential priority).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ¹

to Recommendation 469

1. The Council of WEU attaches great importance to maintaining the security and defence of the frontiers of all its member states, in particular in the northern and central areas. In view of the diversity of the member states, particularly in geographical terms, the fullest use must be made of the complementary features of their defence doctrines and postures. This requires above all a continuation of the efforts to which the member countries are committed in order to achieve better interoperability of forces and to improve their performance and availability (training, logistic support). The Council is also aware of the need to take account of technological progress in order to improve command, control and communications systems, and it pays close attention to these matters.

2. Moreover, the heads of state and government of the WEU member countries have, in their capacity as ministers of the Atlantic Alliance, adopted the comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament, formulated within that forum, the principles of which are consistent with the commitments entered into within the framework of WEU; thus, paragraph 30 of the comprehensive concept states that "the conventional forces must be able to respond appropriately and to confront the aggressor immediately and as far forward as possible with the necessary resistance to compel him to end the conflict and to withdraw or face possible recourse to the use of nuclear weapons by the allies. The forces of the allies must be deployed and equipped so as to enable them to fulfil this rôle at all times".

3. It is in this spirit that studies are being carried out as part of the current work on the implementation of the platform regarding exchanges of military personnel and the pooling of training facilities. Other forms of co-operation, including the pertinent suggestions in Recommendation 469, will also be examined.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 8th September 1989 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 12th September 1989.

RECOMMENDATION 470¹***on current aspects of arms control: the Western European position***²

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming the successful outcome of the third review conference in Vienna in January 1989, and more specifically the signing of the mandate for negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe and the promising start to these negotiations;
- (ii) Stressing that the mistakes which hampered the MBFR negotiations should not be repeated, especially the disagreements over actual numbers and the quality of weapons systems and military personnel and differences regarding an effective and strict verification régime;
- (iii) Certain that it is in the interests of all twenty-three participants in the CFE talks that the negotiations should be fruitful and harmonious, avoiding any unnecessary obstructive action;
- (iv) Considering that political reality calls for equal ceilings of armaments and troops, visibly lower than the present NATO levels;
- (v) Convinced that the absence of offensive equipment near the contact line would strengthen mutual confidence;
- (vi) Recognising that SNF weapons are part of a credible deterrent – even with a balance of conventional armaments – and that a mix of nuclear and conventional weapons remains a necessity in the foreseeable future;
- (vii) Noting, however, that time is required for further technical and tactical research on a replacement for the Lance missile and that a final decision about production does not require to be taken at present in consideration of the CFE talks;
- (viii) Underlining the useful contribution to mutual confidence-building which would result from the publication of detailed and clear defence budgets,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Strive for simple definitions of equal ceilings in which qualitative complications should be avoided insofar as possible, and take the view that disagreements about the actual numbers of forces is a matter of secondary importance;
2. Advocate that, for the sake of effective and strict verification, the exchanges of information mentioned in the mandate should refer not only to levels of armaments and military personnel but also exact locations;
3. Take the necessary steps to ensure that practical research is carried out by WEU on the vital subject of verification and report fully to the Assembly;
4. Consider the possibility of including in the CFE talks all conventional weapons systems which are not explicitly excluded in the mandate, if this is essential for both parties for the smooth progress of the negotiations;
5. Aim to achieve equal ceilings by asymmetrical reductions, lower than the present NATO levels, at least a 10% reduction in tanks, armoured infantry fighting vehicles and artillery being a provisional goal;
6. Participate on a national basis in all the preparations necessary for replacing the Lance missile, but decide on production/deployment at a later time;
7. Ask for the start of negotiations on SNF weapons;
8. Promote the publication of complete, detailed and clear defence budgets by all participants in the CSCE talks;
9. Urge the Chairman-in-Office to establish at the highest level in his country's delegation in Vienna, a WEU liaison officer for the CFE talks.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 6th June 1989 during the first part of the thirty-fifth ordinary session (3rd sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. de Beer on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 1182).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹***to Recommendation 470***

1. The aim of the proposals concerning conventional forces in Europe, as put forward by the sixteen member countries of the Atlantic Alliance at the CFE negotiations in Vienna on 6th March 1989 and supplemented on 13th July, is to increase security and stability in Europe with the lowest possible balanced levels of forces and weapons, having regard to vital security requirements.

2. The Council considers that these proposals take account of the specific security interests not only of Europe as a whole, but of the member states of the Western European Union, all of whom contributed to their drafting. During the CFE negotiations, which came within the general framework of the CSCE process, all the WEU member states took part and had the opportunity, in the preparatory discussions between the western countries, to highlight specific national and European interests.

3. On the basis of both the aforementioned proposals and those made by the Warsaw Treaty countries, the twenty-three participating states have agreed that the negotiations should cover five conventional weapon categories: main battle tanks, artillery, armoured personnel carriers, combat aircraft and attack helicopters. However, the scope of the negotiations can only be clearly defined and agreements on the proposed levels for either side only be determined on the basis of definitions yet to be agreed. Other essential aspects of the proposals made by the western states, which have still to be negotiated, concern regional variations involving a number of interdependent sub-limits aimed at preventing concentrations of residual forces, and stabilising measures to underpin the reductions.

4. Any agreement on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe will have to be accompanied by stringent and effective verification measures.

As has been demonstrated by the INF and the chemical weapons negotiations, the preparation of a verification régime calls for exacting and vigorous effort.

With regard to the CFE verification system, a possible WEU contribution is under consideration, the emphasis being on the exploitation of European capabilities and the pooling of member states' assets.

In this connection, attention is drawn to the deliberations of the Council's ad hoc working group which is studying the possible uses of space-based means for the verification of conventional arms control agreements.

5. The member states of the integrated military structure have agreed that the question of introducing and developing a successor to the Lance missile will be dealt with in 1992 and in the light of general security developments.

6. They have also stated that as soon as an agreement on conventional forces is implemented, the United States, in consultation with the allies concerned, will be ready to enter negotiations with a view to achieving a partial reduction, to equal and verifiable levels, of United States and Soviet ground-based short-range nuclear forces.

7. Exchanges of information on the annual military expenditure of the participating states are planned in the context of the negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures.

The Presidency of WEU will keep the Assembly and the Council informed of developments in the Vienna arms control negotiations. Furthermore, the Presidency will endeavour to ensure that the concerns expressed by both the Council and the Assembly are taken into account in the negotiations.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 8th September 1989 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 12th September 1989.

RECOMMENDATION 471 ¹

on the development of East-West relations and Western European security ²

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that the new policy of reforms started in the Soviet Union four years ago has now created conditions allowing decisive progress to be made towards a negotiated limitation of armaments, the opening and development of a sincere dialogue and a wide spectrum of co-operation between the countries of Eastern and Western Europe;
- (ii) Noting that, after the agreement on intermediate-range missiles, the opening of the conference on chemical disarmament and adoption of the mandate of the conference on conventional disarmament offer prospects of a general reduction in the level of armaments in Europe;
- (iii) Welcoming the Soviet Union's effort to base armaments reduction negotiations on greater openness by publishing accurate, detailed information on Soviet military strength and to prepare data that are effectively comparable with those provided by the western countries and also welcoming the first unilateral measures to reduce Soviet troop levels in Eastern Europe;
- (iv) Welcoming the fact that the heads of state of or government of the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance agreed in Brussels on 29th and 30th May to present a proposal for a substantial reduction in conventional armaments and to say in what conditions they would be prepared to negotiate a reduction in short-range nuclear weapons in Europe;
- (v) Noting with satisfaction that many conflicts in the world calmed down in 1988;
- (vi) Welcoming the exchanges started between the WEU Assembly and the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union;
- (vii) Taking into account the fact that the new Soviet concept of "reasonable sufficiency" has not yet been translated into specific measures and cannot therefore yet be considered irreversible, but hoping the Vienna negotiations on the reduction of conventional armaments will be successful;
- (viii) Noting further that the new deployment and reorganisation of Soviet forces are still far from complete and awaiting the implementation of the defensive strategy, the principle of which has been proposed by the Soviet Union;
- (ix) Welcoming the participation of the Soviet Union and its allies in all efforts by the international community designed to restore or strengthen peace in areas where it is threatened and to avoid nuclear proliferation,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Follow closely the evolution of the strategy, organisation and deployment of Soviet forces and report to the Assembly on the conclusions it draws from its analysis;
2. Compare the tables of the two alliances' forces and arms published by NATO and the Warsaw Pact to explain existing differences between the figures quoted by the two sides;
3. For each of the negotiations on limiting or banning armaments in which member countries are participating, hold consultations between their delegations so as to co-ordinate their position on the basis of the principles defined in the platform of The Hague;
4. Hold close consultations with its American allies in order to:
 - (a) apply the principles defined in Brussels on 29th and 30th May to ensure the progress of negotiations on the limitation of conventional armaments and to link all initiatives in regard to short-range nuclear weapons with their success;
 - (b) define ways and means of introducing a new security concept which ensures that no part of Europe has its security diminished or made inferior to that of others;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 7th June 1989 during the first part of the thirty-fifth ordinary session (4th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Pontillon on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 1187).

- (c) define a security system based on the maintenance of conventional and nuclear means at the necessary level to avoid deterrence being circumvented;
 - (d) conduct a redefinition of burdens and responsibilities within the Atlantic Alliance with a view to a multilateral approach to security;
 - (e) determine the requirements for effective verification of the application of agreements on conventional and chemical armaments;
 - (f) take no steps contrary to commitments entered into or liable to jeopardise further progress in the negotiations on the limitation of conventional armaments;
5. Urge the earliest possible resumption of the START negotiations;
6. In the framework of the Council of Europe, promote an active dialogue on all matters for which it is responsible with all appropriate Eastern European countries fulfilling the conditions and expressing the desire to take part;
7. In all appropriate forums, promote the development of exchanges of all kinds between Western Europe and the Eastern European countries and a rapprochement between those countries and all organisations seeking to foster the free circulation of ideas, persons, currencies, services and goods.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹***to Recommendation 471***

1. Meeting in Council on 3rd April 1989, ministers had a wide-ranging exchange of views on Soviet intentions with regard to Western Europe. On 4th April, the Presidency communicated the conclusions of that discussion to the Assembly.

2. The Council of WEU continues to follow very closely developments in Soviet defence concepts, and the effects of such developments on our security.

3. The differences between the figures published by the Atlantic Alliance and by the Warsaw Pact with regard to their forces and weapons are the subject of negotiations in Vienna. It is by being present at the negotiating table and by holding consultations with one another and with their western allies that the WEU member states can help to advance those discussions.

4. The principles and objectives with regard to European security defined in The Hague platform remain as valid as ever and will continue to guide the activities of the member states.

It is also interesting to note that other members of the alliance, particularly the United States, whose President, Mr. Bush, actually said so recently, are expressing support for the emergence of a European security identity and for WEU's rôle in that connection.

The development of East-West relations is the subject of regular consultations within the alliance.

As far as the Council is concerned, however, it is unnecessary to develop a new security concept: existing alliance proposals, notably the comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament, adopted by the heads of state and government in Brussels in May 1989, aim to guarantee an equivalent level of security for all the European members of the alliance.

5. The Council of WEU also follows all the initiatives taken by the United States with a view to progress in the area of strategic arms reduction.

6. The Council welcomes all measures likely to promote exchanges of any kind between East and West, especially the fruitful dialogue that is developing between Eastern European countries, on the one hand, and the European Community, member states of the EC, and the Council of Europe, on the other. Such a dialogue will inevitably help to create a climate of confidence and mutual respect.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 8th September 1989 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 12th September 1989.

RECOMMENDATION 472 ¹

***on the future of European security –
reply to the annual report of the Council ²***

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting the motion for a resolution in Document 1168;
- (ii) Having taken cognisance of the second part of the thirty-fourth annual report of the Council;
- (iii) Noting that member governments decided on the occasion of the accession of Portugal and Spain to WEU to prepare a revision of the modified Brussels Treaty and noting the statement by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council on 16th March 1989 that “ the Assembly will be regularly consulted on this matter as the work progresses ”;
- (iv) Noting that the Council has said it is “ willing to meet those needs of the Assembly which are the direct result of enlargement ”;
- (v) Noting that the Council of Ministers has “ instructed the Permanent Council to review the question of an institute for strategic studies and the related question of the WEU agency ”;
- (vi) Recalling that the Presidential Committee expressed an opinion on these points in Recommendation 467, urging that the Council establish “ a European institute for advanced security studies... in order to promote a European spirit in matters of defence ” and “ that the mandate of the WEU security agencies be brought to an end ”;
- (vii) Considering that the colloquy on the future of European security held in Florence from 21st to 23rd March 1989 allowed a useful review to be made of the new facts of this question which will guide the work of WEU in the coming years;
- (viii) Believing the attempts of the European Parliament to take over the European security file to be misplaced,

I

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Give an organogram of the intergovernmental organs of WEU;
2. In its annual report, give the Assembly detailed information on every aspect of the application of the modified Brussels Treaty;
3. Continue to keep the Assembly regularly informed about all its activities, in particular through regular letters from the Secretary-General;
4. Ensure that it gives more detailed and quicker answers to Assembly recommendations;
5. Make available without delay the premises needed to accommodate the Portuguese and Spanish Delegations in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly;
6. To this end, take early action on Recommendation 467;
7. Promote a more active public information policy on the requirements of European security;
8. Define without delay a draft statute for a European institute for advanced security studies and submit it to the Assembly for a joint examination of the implications of its implementation;
9. Ensure that an incorrect interpretation of the Rome Treaty and the single European act does not affect the application of the modified Brussels Treaty;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 8th June 1989 during the first part of the thirty-fifth ordinary session (6th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. van der Sanden on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 1185).

II

ALSO RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Specify as soon as possible which provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty it intends to revise;
2. Adopt no provision which might weaken the impact of Article V;
3. Retain in full the preamble and Articles I, II and III of the treaty which make WEU an essential factor in the establishment of a European union;
4. Maintain the provision in Article IX for the Assembly to be composed of delegations from the national parliaments of member countries.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ¹

to Recommendation 472

1. The protocol of 14th November 1988 for the accession of Portugal and Spain indicates that the enlargement of WEU, which must be considered “ a significant step in the development of European solidarity in the field of security and defence ”, should remind the member states of “ their commitment to build a European union in accordance with the Single European Act ”.

The Council is fully aware of the implications of this accession for the future of WEU. For that reason, the member states adopted not only the aforementioned protocol, but also, at the same time, a political declaration stating that “ the relevant provisions of the Brussels Treaty, as modified in 1954, and its corresponding protocols (would) be re-examined, as appropriate, having regard for the practice and achievements of, and the prospects for, their co-operation in security matters ”.

The Council will pursue its consideration of this matter, bearing in mind the information referred to in point II of Recommendation 472. The Assembly’s rôle in this process was acknowledged by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council in his letter of 16th March 1989.

2. Enlargement has also affected the work of the Assembly, particularly with regard to meeting rooms for committees and political groups, and offices for the delegations.

In order to evaluate the budgetary implications, the Council consulted two architects about the alterations to be made to the WEU building in Paris.

Subsequently, it requested the WEU administration in Paris to issue the necessary invitations to tender so that the work proposed in the revised version of the first study could go ahead.

3. Ministers also tasked the Permanent Council to re-examine the question of setting up an institute for strategic studies, together with the related issue of the WEU Agency.

The Institutional Working Group has been instructed to prepare proposals for submission at the forthcoming ministerial meeting.

Recommendation 467 of the Presidential Committee of the Assembly and contributions from individual member states are included in the working group’s dossier.

4. The Council and the Secretary-General will provide the Assembly with accurate, up-to-date information on all aspects of the implementation of the modified Brussels Treaty and on the activities of WEU bodies.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 8th September 1989 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 12th September 1989.

RECOMMENDATION 473 ¹

on new technologies and their implications for European defence ²

The Assembly,

- (i) Recognising that for the foreseeable future the defence of the Central European front will continue to play a vital rôle for the armed forces responsible for the defence of Western Europe;
- (ii) Warning that the specific attention and high priority given to that area should not lessen alertness regarding overseas lines of communication, freedom of movement on the high seas and pressure on the northern and southern flanks of Europe;
- (iii) Conscious that the governments of WEU nations at the same time have to deal with declining demographic trends and compelling constraints in defence budgets;
- (iv) Aware that high-technology weapon systems have a valuable potential for saving manpower, recognising that they require higher standards of training and maintenance;
- (v) Aware of the greatly-enhanced capabilities in firepower, accuracy, battle management and virtually any area of military activity offered by high technology;
- (vi) Anxious, however, about the vulnerability, reliability and availability of high-tech weapon systems, in particular in prolonged battle conditions;
- (vii) Emphasising that, including research and development, it takes ten to fifteen years to field high-technology weapon systems and other military hardware;
- (viii) Recalling its recommendations on the importance of increased Western European co-operation in research, development and production of defence equipment;
- (ix) Stressing the need for a determined and actively integrated European space policy, which should include an opinion on military aspects and a possibly imminent ASAT weapon race, the latter of which could have a destabilising effect on the security of Europe;
- (x) Aware that NATO is preparing a new comprehensive concept of the military potential of new technologies, the outcome of which could influence existing analyses,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Formulate revised concepts in the light of the new technologies for the security of Western Europe and the defence of the central front;
2. Assess the European effort required in manpower, military equipment, research, development and the production capacity of the defence industry and financial means;
3. Present a comprehensive report on the dependence on military satellites of all nations actually using them and the political/military consequences of this dependence, taking into account the existence of ASAT weapons and the different options for limiting or banning the deployment of these weapons;
4. Examine in which areas of defence high technology the European defence industry has real chances for co-production, including research and development, on an equal footing with the United States defence industry;
5. Urge member governments:
 - (a) to continue their efforts as mentioned in Recommendation 455 and the relevant reply of the Council more vigorously and explicitly;
 - (b) to prevent any unilateral cuts in defence budgets which might cause unilateral rôle changes in their armed forces;
 - (c) to start seriously considering rationalisation and division of labour among armed forces involved in the defence of Europe lest they be trapped by this problem when the next generation of even more expensive high-technology weapon systems is announced for procurement;
 - (d) to insist that military experts and the defence industry make it their first priority to develop more reliable, more available and less vulnerable high-technology weapon systems.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 8th June 1989 during the first part of the thirty-fifth ordinary session (6th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. van der Werff on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 1186).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ¹

to Recommendation 473

1. The Council is aware of the need to make an on-going assessment of Western Europe's security and defence requirements on the lines indicated in The Hague platform and taking particular account of the opportunities presented by new technologies and the prospects for arms control. The Special Working Group and the Defence Representatives Group are pursuing a process of long-term reflection on these issues. The Ministerial Council of 13th November confirmed the value of such activity and laid down the necessary guidelines for its continuation.

2. An ad-hoc group of WEU is preparing an interim report for the Council on the value of, and possibilities for, the joint use of space-based observation systems in the field of security, principally in connection with the verification of arms control agreements.

3. The Council is aware of the need to develop all useful forms of co-operation in those areas of defence high technology in which the European defence industry has real chances of becoming involved in co-production, including research and development, on an equal footing with the industries of other alliance countries.

The Council shares the Assembly's concerns in this respect.

In order to give fresh impetus to the efforts being made to increase the competitiveness of the European defence industry, the Council considers it important to make use of the framework provided by WEU and other forums, in particular the IEPG, a body comprising the European members of the alliance which is concerned with equipment co-operation.

4. (a) In accordance with its reply to Recommendation 455, the Council reaffirms that it attaches great importance to enhancing co-operation, especially within the IEPG and alliance framework, in the field of armaments research and development, the aim being to save costs, reduce duplication, promote increasing standardisation of equipment and hence genuine interoperability between forces.

(b) Pending the hoped-for conclusion in 1990 of a CFE agreement and its implementation, the Council calls on member governments to make every endeavour to maintain their budgetary contributions to the defence effort.

Moreover, to be effective, a CFE agreement will have to include strict verification measures.

WEU is studying to what extent the member countries can co-ordinate their efforts with regard to the implementation of provisions stemming from the agreement.

The efforts made by WEU to further co-operation in the field of simulator training should prompt member countries to look into ways of bringing some measure of standardisation to simulation equipment.

(c) The Council would point out that it is not within the direct competence of WEU to address questions concerning the rationalisation and sharing of rôles among allied armed forces involved in the defence of Europe, but that such matters are dealt with mainly in the context of discussions of problems arising from the implementation of a CFE agreement.

(d) The Council agrees that priority should be given to the development of those weapon systems offering the best possible trade off between high technologies and their cost.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 28th November 1989 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 28th November 1989.

INFORMATION LETTER

*from the Secretary-General of WEU,
on the activities of the intergovernmental organs*

(June – September 1989)

18th September 1989

Dear President,

As the Permanent Council and its working groups prepare to resume their activities, I am sending you the first information letter of my term of office. It concerns mainly the activities of the WEU ministerial organs between the end of the first part of the 35th ordinary session of the Assembly and 1st September.

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Developments in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe are continuing apace. A totalitarian state for seventy years, the Soviet Union has kept half of Europe in its iron grip for nearly forty years. Today, the democratisation of Poland and Hungary seems irreversible, Soviet society is in a state of unrest, the nationalists are asserting themselves openly in the West and South, and the nature of the régime itself is changing – a factor borne out by the partially free elections held on 26th March. The will to reform is indisputable, but there is still a long way to go beyond the present constitutional compromise – the future of which is uncertain – if “Soviet democracy” is one day to become authentic. The greatest pitfalls are to be found at the half-way stage, which is where we should be at our most vigilant.

As far as Europeans are concerned, the most important thing is to promote confidence within the context of the new East-West relations that are developing within the CSCE process, to reach a conventional arms control agreement as soon as possible, and to devise a dynamic policy that will give the peoples of Eastern Europe the renewed hope of a promising future. Rent already, the iron curtain must be swept away, not by the flight of the elite, but by the flow of cultural, economic and technological exchanges.

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In this context, political consultations within the framework of WEU and the activities of the Council's working groups have continued at a steady rate.

The *Permanent Council*, meeting on 28th June and 12th July, continued to assess the progress made by the working groups in accordance with the terms of reference laid down by the Ministerial Council.

With regard to the problems of the Assembly, it was at pains to expedite consultations with the architects with regard to the alterations to the Palais d'Iéna required in the wake of WEU enlargement to include Portugal and Spain. Substantial funds have been released, therefore, to enable invitations to tender to be issued so that work can begin as soon as the second part of the 35th ordinary session of the Assembly has ended. To deal with problems as they arise, the Council will be represented by a “troika” with members from Belgium, France and the United Kingdom, whose responsibility it will be to oversee the proceedings in close collaboration with the Office of the Clerk.

The *Special Working Group*, focal point of political consultation on European security interests within WEU, met on 13th June and 11th July. It discussed the implications of the alliance summit for

Mr. Charles GOERENS
President of the Assembly
of Western European Union

the European countries and as regards progress in the negotiations on conventional forces. There were three main topics of discussions: problems relating to personnel, the question of zones and procedures for verification of the eventual agreement. All these issues potentially jeopardise the military balance in Europe that is likely to ensue from the proposed reduction and stabilisation measures. They also have long-term implications for European defence planning and indicate the need to examine the distribution of reductions among WEU member states.

At an extraordinary meeting on 24th August 1989, the Special Working Group discussed European security interests in connection with the proposals being prepared by the High Level Task Force of the Atlantic Alliance for the next stage of the negotiations on conventional forces in Europe. Those proposals primarily concern the Europeans, who are anxious to have a treaty that can be implemented effectively. They also need to estimate as soon as possible the very considerable resources (human and technical) likely to be required for that purpose. They must, therefore, assess not only the rôle they will be expected to play in proper, satisfactory implementation, but also the degree of co-operation and co-ordination that will inevitably be required of them.

The Special Working Group also made an initial evaluation of European security requirements for the period 1992-1995, bearing in mind not only changes in the nature and perception of threats, but also the ways and means of ensuring defence at the borders. The defence implications of "dateline 1993" will be analysed in this context. The vital need for a joint European exploration of the subject is underlined by the fact that an interministerial group of experts has been set up, paradoxically, at the Pentagon to consider the matter.

Lastly, the Group concluded an exchange of information on member states' security-related programmes of assistance, which was intended to reveal not only their strong points, but also any gaps.

The Defence Representatives Group held two meetings, on 6th and 27th July. The incident involving a MiG 23 that crashed onto a Belgium hamlet on 4th July prompted an exchange of views on possible European initiatives to prevent military accidents, consistent with the agreement concluded on 12th June by the governments of the United States and the USSR. The increasingly frequent and constructive military contacts between WEU member states and the USSR were discussed and will become a regular item on the agenda.

The Group continued its work on training in the armed forces of the member states with a view to completing a report for submission to ministers next November. Lastly, there was preliminary discussion, within a broad European context, of the practical military implications of arms control verification and inspection. It could be appropriate for WEU to play a co-ordinating rôle in that field, given that it now appears desirable for there to be some pooling of national resources. Another aspect of the likely consequences of a future CFE reduction agreement included on the Group's agenda was the impact on defence planning in each member state.

In accordance with the instructions given by ministers, an *ad hoc Sub-Group on Space* of the Special Working Group was set up to make recommendations as to the advisability of future European co-operation, on the basis and in-depth study of the potential for space technology in three areas:

- verification of arms control agreements, particularly in the conventional field;
- crisis management;
- prevention and control of environmental crises.

On that basis, the Sub-Group was requested, more specifically, to summarise the member states' existing space activities and projects, and to examine the technical options that would be available if it became appropriate for Europe to use satellite equipment as an independent means of ensuring compliance with the verification obligations laid down in arms reduction agreements applicable from the Atlantic to the Urals.

The Sub-Group's work has progressed remarkably quickly because it was able to agree, at only its second meeting, upon the main lines of the interim report to ministers. Since the third meeting on 28th July, preparation and drafting of the report have reached their final stages.

The Recommendation of the Presidential Committee of the Assembly adopted on 16th March 1989 helped to convince the Ministerial Council of WEU that it should instruct the Permanent Council to study the question of setting up an institute for strategic studies within WEU. For that purpose, the *Institutional Working Group* was reconvened. It met on 1st June and 3rd July 1989, the two meetings proving highly constructive. There is undoubtedly a rôle for such an institute as part of the strengthening of a reactivated WEU in the area of both security research co-ordination in a specifically European context, and the promotion of public awareness of a European security identity in the member states.

At present, the experts are continuing their consideration of the terms of reference, tasks and structure of the institute. Indications are that the report for submission to the Ministerial Council in November will enable the latter to take the expected decision.

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Since taking up my appointment on 15th May, I have endeavoured to meet all the foreign and defence ministers of the member states. Naturally, I first made contact with those of the outgoing Presidency, Sir Geoffrey Howe and Mr. George Younger, whom I met on 24th May and 18th May, respectively. They shared with me the lessons that they had learnt from an exceptionally fruitful Presidency, with regard to the future of WEU. On 3rd July, I went to Brussels to discuss with Mr. Eyskens and Mr. Coëme prospects for, and aims of, the Belgian Presidency with a view to the forthcoming ministerial meeting.

At the invitation of Vice-Chancellor and Foreign Minister, Mr. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Ambassador Holthoff and I visited Bonn on 30th August to have talks with Dr. Stercken, President of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Bundestag, the Defence Minister, Dr. Stoltenberg, Minister of State, Mr. Schäfer (standing in for Mr. Genscher), and Admiral Wellershoff, Inspector-General of the Bundeswehr. Our detailed discussions were indicative of the high priority the German Government attaches to security-related co-operation within WEU.

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* *

With regard to institutional relations, WEU was invited to send representatives to the Atlantic Alliance's SHAPEX exercise, which took place from 8th-10th May. Ambassador Holthoff, Deputy Secretary-General, and Mr. Destefanis, Assistant Secretary-General, Head of the Political Affairs Division, participated as observers. The exercise provided the opportunity for valuable exchanges of views on developments in the Soviet Union, current thinking as regards military concepts, and the alliance's defence planning. The participation of WEU representatives also provided the opportunity to publicise the organisation's rôle and activities, and to strengthen links with SHAPE and NATO.

For the same purpose, I visited Evere on 13th July to meet the NATO Secretary-General, Dr. Manfred Wörner. In a warm spirit of openness, we had a wide-ranging discussion of the tasks facing the allies in the wake of the alliance summit. As I described the work programme of the WEU ministerial organs, I emphasised how keen our organisation was for its activities to complement those of the alliance, and for all its NATO partners to be kept informed of developments. We agreed to have similar exchanges of views on a regular basis.

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* *

The Secretariat maintained its public relations drive and efforts to inform public opinion of the rôle of WEU in building the defence dimension of Europe.

I represented WEU in Europe at the following events:

- Conference on stability in Europe, organised by the Foundation of International Security - Ammerdown, 16th May 1989;
- Round-table discussion on the future of WEU, with the FDP Bundestag Group - Bonn, 9th June 1989;
- SEALINK Symposium - Annapolis, 12th-15th June 1989;
- Symposium of the Foundation for International Security - Washington, 16th-17th June 1989;
- Annual Joint Conference of the Aspen Strategy Group and the European Strategy Group on the future American rôle in Europe - Aspen Institute, Berlin, 18th-20th June 1989;
- Seminar on security concepts, organised by the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik in collaboration with the Polish Institute of International Affairs - Ebenhausen, 22nd-24th June 1989;
- Conference of Young Europeans for Security (YES) - The Hague, 29th June 1989;
- Seminar of the Defence Systems Management College - Bad Godesberg, 19th July 1989;
- Conference of the Clausewitz Gesellschaft e.V. - Hamburg, 25th August 1989.

Ambassador Holthoff, Deputy Secretary-General, represented WEU at the spring session of the North Atlantic Assembly, held in Antalya from 26th to 30th May 1989. Furthermore, he spoke to the Academic Associates group, invited to Europe by the United States Atlantic Council and the NATO Information Service (Kerkrade-Limburg, 23rd June 1989).

Mr. Destefanis, Assistant Secretary-General, Head of the Political Affairs Division, represented WEU at a symposium organised by the Istituto A. de Gasperi on European security in the 1990s - Rome, 14th-15th May 1989.

Lastly, a group of American journalists visiting Europe at the invitation of the Netherlands Atlantic Commission was received at the Secretariat on 12th June 1989. Ambassador Holthoff described the structures and activities of WEU at both intergovernmental and parliamentary level.

Finally, I should like to take this opportunity to send you a copy of the booklet I prepared on the basis of discussions within the European Strategy Group. As you will see, it is dated 12th May and pre-dates, therefore, my present appointment.

Willem VAN EEKELLEN

**DRAFT SUPPLEMENTARY BUDGET OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE
OF THE ASSEMBLY FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1989¹**

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration²
by Mr. Klejdzinski, Chairman and Rapporteur*

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submitted by Mr. Klejdzinski, Chairman and Rapporteur

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Explanatory memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Klejdzinski, Chairman and Rapporteur)

1. In January 1989, a supplementary budget was submitted to the Council for adapting the means available to the Assembly to the requirements stemming from the accession of Portugal and Spain to WEU. This budget was not examined by the Council, however, since, in analysing the Assembly's requirements, it first wished to study the work necessary for reorganising the headquarters which accounted for the major part of the supplementary appropriations requested.
2. This work had been the subject of a feasibility study conducted by an architect on a list supplied by the Premises and General Affairs Service of the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The estimates set out in this study were those given in the supplementary budget for 1989.
3. At the request of the Council, a second study was requested from another architect (also on the abovementioned list) in order to verify the financial assessment of the work and to suggest means for reducing the cost. To this end, the Council asked for a reduction in the space attributed to national delegations and the Office of the Clerk in the first study and the cancellation of work planned in the basement.
4. Comparison of the two studies (in the meantime an alternative to the first study had been prepared with a view to reducing the cost of work) led the Council to opt for the first study as modified. At its meeting on 12th July 1989 therefore, it authorised the representatives of the Office of the Clerk and of the Secretariat-General to meet the architect concerned in order to launch the call for bids as soon as possible on the basis of the alternative of 25th May 1989, without the work connected with transferring the reproduction services from the first floor to the basement. At the same time it invited the Assembly to prepare a new draft supplementary budget detailing all the expenditure made necessary by the enlargement of the organisation.
5. This expenditure was the subject of the supplementary budget for 1989 presented to the Council in January 1989. It proved necessary to revise this budget in order to update the estimates connected with the reorganisation of the seat and also those relating to other budgetary heads since, in the meantime, certain factors which were taken as a basis for estimating these heads have changed.

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Klejdzinski (Chairman); MM. Rathbone, Lagorce (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Asselborn, Biefnot (Alternate: Eicher), Mrs. Blunck, MM. Dhaille, Durand, Dame Peggy Fenner, MM. Greco (Alternate: Rubner), Höffkes, de Kwaadsteniet, Morris (Alternate: Lord), Niegel, Noerens, Oehler, Rauti, Redmond (Alternate: Coleman), Sinesio (Alternate: Mezzapesa), Triglia (Alternate: Giagu Demartini), Worrell.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

6. The appended table sets out the variations envisaged. Each sub-head calls for detailed examination.

7. The estimates for Sub-Head 6 "Staff recruited for sessions" were based on the organisation of two sessions in 1989. The June session, however, was held in the usual conditions because the procedure for ratifying the protocol of accession of Portugal and Spain had not yet been completed. These estimates should therefore be reduced to take into account the December 1989 session only, the three parts of these estimates being amended as follows:

- Interpreters	from F 440 000 to 130 000
- Verbatim reporters	from F 180 000 to 90 000
- Translators	from F 130 000 to 65 000
TOTAL	F 750 000 to 285 000

8. The large reduction in the estimate for interpreters which comes to less than half of the previous estimate is due to the fact that the forthcoming entry into force of the new convention between the co-ordinated organisations and the International Association of Conference Interpreters (IACI) will allow the team of 22 interpreters (three per cabin plus the co-ordinator) to cover both interpretation in plenary sitting and also interpretation at the various meetings during sessions (political groups, committees, etc.), it no longer being necessary to recruit the five interpreters initially planned for these meetings.

9. The estimates under Sub-Head 7 "Interpretation staff required for Assembly work between sessions" were based on the programme of work for the second half-year. The procedure for ratifying the convention of accession will presumably not be completed before the autumn, the result being that it will not be necessary to strengthen the interpretation teams before then. It is therefore possible to reduce the additional amounts requested under this sub-head from F 185 000 to F 90 000.

10. The reductions made in Sub-Heads 6 and 7 bring a consequential reduction in the amount requested under Sub-Head 9 "Social charges" from F 60 000 to F 30 000.

11. The installation of a new simultaneous interpretation system in the chamber of the Economic and Social Council was included in the supplementary budget for 1989 for the sum of F 550 000. In view of the need to harmonise certain work (precabing) with the Economic and Social Council's timetable of meetings, the Council decided at its meeting of 28th June 1989 "to approve as an exceptional measure the release of credits up to a maximum of F 550 000 in order to set in motion the normal contracting procedure". The call for bids sent to about ten specialised firms allowed the Assembly to adopt the tender made by SATI which seemed to be the most suitable from the financial and technical angle and also gave the best guarantee for protecting the classified furniture in the Chamber in accordance with the wishes of the head architect of Civil Buildings and National Palaces in charge of the Palais d'Iéna. SATI's tender, which includes contracts of various types (purchase, hire purchase, hire, on a case-by-case basis) includes a global commitment of F 471 600 in 1989 (once-only work and hire of equipment for one session) and, on the basis of two sessions per year, subsequent commitments of F 440 000 from 1990 to 1993, F 400 000 in 1994 and F 275 000 as from 1995. Since the ordinary 1989 budget included a credit of F 150 000 for installing the old interpretation equipment for the December 1989 session, the initial supplementary amount of F 550 000 is therefore reduced to F 321 600.

12. Estimates under Sub-Head 33 "Reorganisation of the building" should be reduced from F 10 634 125 to F 6 474 175, in accordance with the evolution of the feasibility study mentioned in paragraphs 1 to 4 above. The new sum is therefore broken down as follows:

Sub-Head 33.1 - Feasibility study (This is the cost of the second feasibility study, the first having been settled in 1988)	F 68 300
Sub-Head 33.2 - Work on utilities	F 5 880 000
Sub-Head 33.3 - Prime contractorship	F 525 875

In regard to Sub-Head 33.3, it is specified that the amount for prime contractorship and supervision is F 588 000. The architect, Mr. Madon, has agreed to consider the F 62 125 paid in 1988 for the feasibility study as an advance on his overall fee. The amount requested under this sub-head, therefore, takes account of this reduction.

The summary estimate of work in question is set out in the feasibility study prepared by Mr. Madon (Document A/WEU/BA (89) 9).

13. No change is made in the summary estimates under Sub-Head 34 "Installation of committee rooms". It is emphasised that these estimates, based on average market prices, may vary considerably, particularly for furniture for the two new conference rooms since there is a very wide range of prices, depending on the type and quality of equipment. It would be possible to adjust them, therefore, only after examining the tenders submitted.

14. Conversely, since national delegations are being attributed offices which are smaller than initially planned, it is possible to reduce from F 362 000 to F 130 000 the amounts included in Sub-Head 35 "National delegation offices", including the purchase of two typewriters (one with a Spanish keyboard, the other with a Portuguese keyboard) for the two new delegations. In assessing these sub-heads, account has been taken of using the furniture already in the offices on the second floor which will be transferred to the Assembly by the ministerial organs of WEU.

15. The credits under Sub-Head 36 are also yet to be confirmed in view of the creation in the basement of a lounge and other essential facilities which cannot be built on the ground floor.

16. The installation in the entrance hall of a security system (check-post, screening doors, etc.) included in Sub-Head 37 is also to be confirmed. Security requirements will be of even greater importance after the accession of Portugal and Spain. Furthermore, the reorganisation of the building includes bringing into service staircase B and the lift at the end of the building (Economic and Social Council end) and the revision of the security measures in force and the way they are applied, placing the check-post in the entrance hall and not on the second floor as at present. WEU is the only international organisation in Paris which has not yet made provision for the protection of persons. Only during sessions is an approximate means of control installed with a mobile screening door and a barrier of tables. This rudimentary arrangement is not efficient and does not give a good impression of the organisation. Since the estimate for the security system was made in November 1987, the initial amount has been updated by 6%. This brings the credits already requested to F 428 000.

17. Overall, this revised supplementary budget includes:

- under sub-section A.1 - ordinary expenditure: a global amount of F 726 600 which is an increase of 3.65% in relation to the net total of the initial operating budget for 1989;
- under sub-section A.2 - extraordinary expenditure: a global amount of F 9 188 335.

18. It is to be noted that it will not be possible to use part of the funds included in this budget (sub-section A.2 - extraordinary expenditure) until the financial year 1990 since actual expenditure will have to follow the progress of work. In this case, Article 10 of the Financial Regulations of the Assembly will have to be followed:

"If payment of a commitment for the previous year has not been made before 1st April, the credits concerned shall be cancelled automatically and corresponding credits will be taken up in the budget of the current financial year."

19. Because of the supplementary credits requested, the net total of the budget of the Assembly for 1989 (Part I: operating budget, Part II: pensions) - as set out in Table II - amounts to F 32 219 935.

TABLE I
Changes in the supplementary credits for 1989 requested in Document 1174

Sub-Head	Initial credits	Variations	Revised credits
6 - Staff recruited for sessions	750 000	- 465 000	285 000
7 - Interpretation staff required for Assembly work between sessions	185 000	- 95 000	90 000
9 - Social charges	60 000	- 30 000	30 000
12 - Technical and other installations for Assembly sessions	550 000	- 228 400	321 600
33 - Reorganisation of the building	10 634 125	- 4 159 950	6 474 175
34 - Installation of committee rooms	2 101 160	-	2 101 160
35 - National delegation offices	362 000	- 232 000	130 000
36 - Lounge in the first basement	55 000	-	55 000
37 - Security system	404 000	+ 24 000	428 000
TOTAL	15 101 285	- 5 186 350	9 914 935

TABLE II
Summary of budget estimates for 1989

Heads and sub-heads	Budget for 1989	Additional credits requested	Budget for 1989 (revised)
PART I: OPERATING BUDGET			
<i>Section A - Expenditure</i>			
Sub-Section A.1 - Ordinary expenditure	19 934 000	726 600	20 660 600
Sub-Section A.2 - Extraordinary expenditure	-	9 188 335	9 188 335
Total expenditure	19 934 000	9 914 935	29 848 935
<i>Section B - Receipts</i>	135 000	-	135 000
Net total operating budget	19 799 000	9 914 935	29 713 935
PART II: PENSIONS BUDGET			
Section A - Expenditure	3 010 000	-	3 010 000
Section B - Receipts	504 000	-	504 000
Net total pensions budget	2 506 000	-	2 506 000
NET GRAND TOTAL	22 305 000	9 914 935	32 219 935

Part I - Operating budget

Heads and sub-heads	Budget for 1989	Additional credits requested	Budget for 1989 (revised)
SECTION A - EXPENDITURE			
<i>Sub-Section A.1 - Ordinary expenditure</i>			
HEAD I - PERMANENT STAFF			
Sub-Head:			
1 - Basic salaries	8 320 000	-	8 320 000
2 - Allowances	1 899 000	-	1 899 000
3 - Social charges	1 630 000	-	1 630 000
4 - Expenses relating to the recruitment and departure of permanent officials .	70 000 ¹	-	70 000
5 - Medical examination	9 000	-	9 000
TOTAL	11 928 000	-	11 928 000
HEAD II - TEMPORARY STAFF			
Sub-Head:			
6 - Staff recruited for sessions	2 300 000	285 000	2 585 000
7 - Interpretation staff required for Assembly work between sessions	550 000	90 000	640 000
8 - Temporary staff for the Office of the Clerk	15 000	-	15 000
9 - Social charges	135 000	30 000	165 000
TOTAL	3 000 000	405 000	3 405 000
HEAD III - EXPENDITURE ON PREMISES AND EQUIPMENT			
Sub-Head:			
10 - Share of joint expenditure on the Paris premises	406 000 ²	-	406 000
11 - Hire of committee rooms	5 000	-	5 000
12 - Technical and other installations for Assembly sessions	400 000	321 600	721 600
13 - Various services for the organisation of sessions	47 000	-	47 000
14 - Maintenance of the premises of the Office of the Clerk	13 000	-	13 000
15 - Purchase or repair of office furniture .	50 000	-	50 000
16 - Purchase of reproduction and other office equipment	-	-	-
17 - Hire and maintenance of reproduction and other office equipment	435 000	-	435 000
TOTAL	1 356 000	321 600	1 677 600

1. Brought over from the financial year 1988.

2. Including F 6 000 brought over from the financial year 1988.

Heads and sub-heads	Budget for 1989	Additional credits requested	Budget for 1989 (revised)
HEAD IV – GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS			
Sub-Head:			
18 – Postage, telephone, telex and transport of documents	500 000	–	500 000
19 – Duplication paper, headed writing paper and other office supplies	270 000	–	270 000
20 – Printing and publication of documents .	1 077 500	–	1 077 500
21 – Purchase of documents	63 000	–	63 000
22 – Official cars	115 000	–	115 000
23 – Bank charges	500	–	500
TOTAL	2 026 000	–	2 026 000
HEAD V – OTHER EXPENDITURE			
Sub-Head:			
24 – Travelling and subsistence allowances and insurance for the President of the Assembly, chairmen of committees and rapporteurs	160 000	–	160 000
25 – Expenses for representation	220 000	–	220 000
26 – Committee study missions	5 000	–	5 000
27 – Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk	400 000	–	400 000
28 – Expenses of experts and the auditor ..	70 000	–	70 000
29 – Expenditure on information	410 000	–	410 000
30 – Expenses for political groups	336 000	–	336 000
31 – Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere provided for	3 000	–	3 000
32 – Non-recoverable taxes	20 000	–	20 000
TOTAL	1 624 000	–	1 624 000
TOTAL Sub-Section A.1 – Ordinary expenditure .	19 934 000	726 600	20 660 600
<i>Sub-Section A.2 – Extraordinary expenditure</i>			
HEAD VI – PREMISES			
Sub-Head:			
33 – Reorganisation of the building			
33.1 – Feasibility study	68 300		
33.2 – Work on utilities	5 880 000		
33.3 – Prime contractorship	525 875		
	–	6 474 175	6 474 175
Sub-Head:			
34 – Installation of committee rooms			
34.1 – Interpretation equipment .	1 240 160		
34.2 – Furnishing committee rooms	825 000		
34.3 – Furnishing corridor	36 000		
	–	2 101 160	2 101 160

Heads and sub-heads	Budget for 1989	Additional credits requested	Budget for 1989 (revised)
Sub-Head:			
35 - National delegation offices			
35.1 - Furniture and other office equipment . 118 000			
35.2 - Typewriters 12 000			
	-	130 000	130 000
Sub-Head:			
36 - Lounge in the first basement	-	55 000	55 000
Sub-Head:			
37 - Security system	-	428 000	428 000
TOTAL Sub-Section A.2 - Extraordinary expenditure	-	9 188 335	9 188 335
TOTAL SECTION A - Expenditure	19 934 000	9 914 935	29 848 935
TOTAL SECTION B - Receipts	135 000	-	135 000
NET TOTAL OPERATING BUDGET	19 799 000	9 914 935	29 713 935

Part II - Pensions budget

	Budget for 1989	Additional credits requested	Budget for 1989 (revised)
Section A - Pensions	3 010 000	-	3 010 000
Section B - Receipts	504 000	-	504 000
NET TOTAL PENSIONS BUDGET	2 506 000	-	2 506 000
NET GRAND TOTAL (Operating budget and pensions budget)	22 305 000	9 914 935	32 219 935

*Draft supplementary budget of the administrative expenditure
of the Assembly for the financial year 1989¹*

Opinion of the Council

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- II. Opinion of the Council (letter XI.131 dated 29th November 1989)
- III. Tables showing the changes made to the initial draft budget in the light of the Council's opinion

Explanatory Memorandum

1. The draft supplementary budget of the Assembly for the financial year 1989, transmitted to the Council for its prior opinion in accordance with Rule 48(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly, was examined attentively by the WEU Budget and Organisation Committee at its meeting in Paris on 16th November 1989.

At the close of this examination, the following decisions were taken:

(a) *Ordinary expenditure*

The sum of F 285 000 requested under Sub-Head 6 was reduced, at the Assembly's request, by F 60 000 since neither Portugal nor Spain will be able to second teams of verbatim reporters and assistants for the December 1989 session, only Portugal being able to send two editing staff.

(b) *Extraordinary expenditure*

(i) At the request of the United Kingdom Delegation, the sum of F 825 000 under Sub-Head 34.2 "Furnishing committee rooms" was reduced to F 600 000. However, it was understood that in the event of this proving insufficient in the light of the relevant tender, a further sum would be requested by the Assembly.

(ii) The sum of F 428 000 under Sub-Head 37 "Security system" was withdrawn from the draft budget since for the time being the delegations do not consider such a system necessary, the measures adopted by the Assembly during sessions being considered adequate.

2. The draft supplementary operating budget of the Assembly for the financial year 1989 was thus reduced from F 29 713 935 to F 29 000 935. Thus reduced, the WEU Budget and Organisation Committee recommended that the Council approve it.

3. At its meeting on 29th November 1989, the Council expressed a favourable opinion on the draft budget as amended by the WEU Budget and Organisation Committee.

4. The budget estimates revised in accordance with the opinion expressed by the Budget and Organisation Committee are set out in the tables at Appendix III hereto.

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

Members of the committee: Mr. Klejdzinski (Chairman); MM. Rathbone (Alternate: *Bowden*), Lagorce (Alternate for Mr. Dhaille) (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Biefnot, Mrs. Blunck, MM. Durand (Alternate: *Jeambrun*), Eversdijk, Dame *Peggy Fenner*, Mr. Greco, Mrs. Haas-Berger, Mrs. Hoffmann, MM. *Masseret*, *Morris*, *Niegel*, *Noerens*, *Oehler*, *Rauti*, *Redmond*, *Sinesio* (Alternate: *Parisi*), *Triglia*, N... (Alternate: Mrs. *Lentz-Cornette*).

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

APPENDIX I

*Secretary-General's Note**WEU Assembly draft supplementary budget for 1989*

1. The WEU Assembly draft supplementary budget for 1989 (Assembly Document 1197) was circulated to the Budget and Organisation Committee on 13th October 1989 under reference B(89)19 and was examined during the committee's meeting on 16th and 17th November 1989 (BR(89)2 to be circulated).
2. The supplementary budget reflects the cost of adapting the facilities available to the Assembly to the requirements stemming from the accession of Portugal and Spain to WEU. The supplementary credits requested in the document (1197) presented to the committee amounted to F 9 914 935.
3. The committee acknowledged the efforts made by the Assembly to meet the wishes of the Council to adapt previous plans and to achieve substantial reductions. However, it emphasised the importance of allotting adequate and appropriate office space to the parliamentary delegations of Portugal and Spain.
4. The Budget and Organisation Committee recommended a total reduction of F 713 000 in the proposed credits, as follows:
 - (i) the Assembly after further analysis of the requirements for staff recruited for sessions proposed a reduction of F 60 000 in Chapter II, Sub-Head 6;
 - (ii) the estimated cost of the installation of committee rooms was considered to be too high; a reduction of F 225 000 was made in Chapter VI, Sub-Head 34;
 - (iii) the proposed amendments to the security system were considered not to stem from the adhesion of Portugal and Spain and should not therefore be included in this supplementary budget; consequently, the proposed provision in Chapter VI, Sub-Head 37 was reduced by F 428 000.
5. In accordance with Document C-B (88) 19 as approved by the Council (CR(89)1,VIII,2) this special supplementary budget should be funded on the new pro-rata basis by the present seven member states together with Portugal and Spain (CR(88)19,III,1).

Thus the supplementary contributions needed to cover the reduced total of F 9 201 935 are as follows:

	%	FF
Belgium	8.35	768 361.57
France	17.00	1 564 328.95
Germany	17.00	1 564 328.95
Italy	17.00	1 564 328.95
Luxembourg30	27 605.81
Netherlands	8.35	768 361.57
Portugal	2.00	184 038.70
Spain	13.00	1 196 251.55
United Kingdom	17.00	1 564 328.95
	100.00	9 201 935.00

6. The committee recommends the Council to give a favourable opinion on the Assembly special supplementary budget for 1989, as amended.
7. The Council's opinion will be sought at the next meeting on 22nd November 1989. It is recalled that this opinion should be conveyed to the Assembly before the next part-session opens on 4th December 1989.

APPENDIX II

*Letter from Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU,
to Mr. Moulias, Clerk of the Assembly*

29th November 1989

.....

I have the honour to inform you that, at its meeting today, the Council examined the draft supplementary budget of the Assembly for 1989 and, in accordance with procedure in force, expressed a favourable opinion on this amended budget as given in document C-B (89) 23.

I enclose copies of this document.

.....

Willem VAN EEKELLEN

Mr. G. MOULIAS,
Clerk of the Assembly of
Western European Union,
43, avenue du Président-Wilson,
75775 Paris Cedex 16.

APPENDIX III

TABLE I

Changes in the supplementary credits for 1989 requested in Document 1174

Sub-Head	Draft budget for 1989 (revised)	Changes requested by the B.O.C.	Recommended draft budget for 1989
6 - Staff recruited for sessions	285 000	- 60 000	225 000
7 - Interpretation staff required for Assembly work between sessions	90 000	-	90 000
9 - Social charges	30 000	-	30 000
12 - Technical and other installations for Assembly sessions	321 600	-	321 600
33 - Reorganisation of the building	6 474 175	-	6 474 175
34 - Installation of committee rooms	2 101 160	- 225 000	1 876 160
35 - National delegation offices	130 000	-	130 000
36 - Lounge in the first basement	55 000	-	55 000
37 - Security system	428 000	- 428 000	-
TOTAL	9 914 935	- 713 000	9 201 935

TABLE II

Summary of budget estimates for 1989

Heads and sub-heads	Draft budget for 1989 (revised)	Changes requested by the B.O.C.	Recommended draft budget for 1989
PART I: OPERATING BUDGET			
<i>Section A - Expenditure</i>			
Sub-Section A.1 - Ordinary expenditure	20 660 600	- 60 000	20 600 600
Sub-Section A.2 - Extraordinary expenditure	9 188 335	- 653 000	8 535 335
Total of expenditure	29 848 935	- 713 000	29 135 935
<i>Section B - Receipts</i>	135 000	-	135 000
Net total operating budget	29 713 935	- 713 000	29 000 935
PART II: PENSIONS BUDGET			
Section A - Expenditure	3 010 000	-	3 010 000
Section B - Receipts	504 000	-	504 000
Net total pensions budget	2 506 000	-	2 506 000
NET GRAND TOTAL	32 219 935	- 713 000	31 506 935

Part I – Operating budget

Heads and sub-heads	Draft budget for 1989 (revised)	Changes requested by the B.O.C	Recommended draft budget for 1989
SECTION A – EXPENDITURE			
<i>Sub-Section A.1 – Ordinary expenditure</i>			
HEAD I – PERMANENT STAFF			
Sub-Head:			
1 – Basic salaries	8 320 000	–	8 320 000
2 – Allowances	1 899 000	–	1 899 000
3 – Social charges	1 630 000	–	1 630 000
4 – Expenses relating to the recruitment and departure of permanent officials .	70 000 ¹	–	70 000
5 – Medical examination	9 000	–	9 000
TOTAL	11 928 000	–	11 928 000
HEAD II – TEMPORARY STAFF			
Sub-Head:			
6 – Staff recruited for sessions	2 585 000	– 60 000	2 525 000
7 – Interpretation staff required for Assembly work between sessions	640 000	–	640 000
8 – Temporary staff for the Office of the Clerk	15 000	–	15 000
9 – Social charges	165 000	–	165 000
TOTAL	3 405 000	– 60 000	3 345 000
HEAD III – EXPENDITURE ON PREMISES AND EQUIPMENT			
Sub-Head:			
10 – Share of joint expenditure on the Paris premises	406 000 ²	–	406 000
11 – Hire of committee rooms	5 000	–	5 000
12 – Technical and other installations for Assembly sessions	721 600	–	721 600
13 – Various services for the organisation of sessions	47 000	–	47 000
14 – Maintenance of the premises of the Clerk	13 000	–	13 000
15 – Purchase or repair of office furniture .	50 000	–	50 000
16 – Purchase of reproduction and other office equipment	–	–	–
17 – Hire and maintenance of reproduction and other office equipment	435 000	–	435 000
TOTAL	1 677 600	–	1 677 600

1. Brought over from the financial year 1988.

2. Including F 6 000 brought over from the financial year 1988.

Heads and sub-heads	Draft budget for 1989 (revised)	Changes requested by the B.O.C	Recommended draft budget for 1989
HEAD IV – GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS			
Sub-Head:			
18 – Postage, telephone, telex and transport of documents	500 000	–	500 000
19 – Duplication paper, headed writing paper and other office supplies	270 000	–	270 000
20 – Printing and publication of documents .	1 077 500	–	1 077 500
21 – Purchase of documents	63 000	–	63 000
22 – Official cars	115 000	–	115 000
23 – Bank charges	500	–	500
TOTAL	2 026 000	–	2 026 000
HEAD V – OTHER EXPENDITURE			
Sub-Head:			
24 – Travelling and subsistence allowances and insurance for the President of the Assembly, chairmen of committees and rapporteurs	160 000	–	160 000
25 – Expenses for representation	220 000	–	220 000
26 – Committee study missions	5 000	–	5 000
27 – Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk	400 000	–	400 000
28 – Expenses of experts and the auditor ..	70 000	–	70 000
29 – Expenditure on information	410 000	–	410 000
30 – Expenses for political groups	336 000	–	336 000
31 – Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere provided for	3 000	–	3 000
32 – Non-recoverable taxes	20 000	–	20 000
TOTAL	1 624 000	–	1 624 000
TOTAL Sub-Section A.1 – Ordinary expenditure .	20 660 600	– 60 000	20 600 600
<i>Sub-Section A.2 – Extraordinary expenditure</i>			
HEAD VI – PREMISES			
Sub-Head:			
33 – Reorganisation of the building			
33.1 – Feasibility study	68 300		
33.2 – Work on utilities	5 880 000		
33.3 – Prime contractorship	525 875		
	6 474 175	–	6 474 175
Sub-Head:			
34 – Installation of committee rooms			
34.1 – Interpretation equipment .	1 240 160		
34.2 – Furnishing committee rooms	825 000		
34.3 – Furnishing corridor	36 000		
	2 101 160	– 225 000 ¹	1 876 160

1. Reduction in Sub-Head 34.2.

Heads and sub-heads	Draft budget for 1989 (revised)	Changes requested by the B.O.C	Recommended draft budget for 1989
Sub-Head:			
35 - National delegation offices			
35.1 - Furniture and other office equipment . 118 000			
35.2 - Typewriters 12 000			
	130 000	-	130 000
Sub-Head:			
36 - Lounge in the first basement.....	55 000		55 000
Sub-Head:			
37 - Security system	428 000	- 428 000	-
TOTAL Sub-Section A.2 - Extraordinary expenditure	9 188 335	- 653 000	8 535 335
TOTAL SECTION A - Expenditure.....	29 848 935	- 713 000	29 135 935
TOTAL SECTION B - Receipts	135 000	-	135 000
NET TOTAL OPERATING BUDGET	29 713 935	- 713 000	29 000 935

Part II - Pensions budget

Heads and sub-heads	Draft Budget for 1989 (revised)	Changes requested by the B.O.C	Recommended draft budget for 1989
Section A - Pensions	3 010 000	-	3 010 000
Section B - Receipts	504 000	-	504 000
NET TOTAL PENSIONS BUDGET	2 506 000		2 506 000
NET GRAND TOTAL (Operating budget and pensions budget).....	32 219 935	- 713 000	31 506 935

**DRAFT BUDGET OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE
OF THE ASSEMBLY FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1990¹**

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration²
by Mr. Klejdzinski, Chairman and Rapporteur*

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1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee: Mr. Klejdzinski (Chairman); MM. Rathbone, Lagorce (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Asselborn, Biefnot (Alternate: Eicher), Mrs. Blunck, MM. Dhaille, Durand, Dame Peggy Fenner, MM. Greco (Alternate: Rubner), Höffkes, de Kwaadsteniet, Morris (Alternate: Lord), Niegel, Noerens, Oehler, Rauti, Redmond (Alternate: Coleman), Sinesio (Alternate: Mezzapesa), Triglia (Alternate: Giagu Demartini), Worrell.*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Klejdzinski, Chairman and Rapporteur)

1. General

1. When presenting the budget for the financial year 1989, the Rapporteur said the accession of Portugal and Spain to WEU would make it necessary to adapt the means at the Assembly's disposal and the financial implications would therefore be considerable. A first adaptation was proposed in the supplementary budget for 1989 and related mainly to work on reorganising the premises which is essential if the work of the Assembly and its committees is to be conducted in the manner laid down in the Rules of Procedure.
2. The implications of enlargement for the structure of the Office of the Clerk must now be studied as it must be able to meet new requirements efficiently.
3. In this context, the draft budget for 1990 is not a renewal of the previous one, as was the last budget, but reflects the Assembly's true needs at a specific time in its history when its enlargement involves an intensification of its work to allow it to be tuned into major world political events and to draw the consequences with a view to attaining the intrinsic aims of Western European Union. A detailed analysis of these needs is given hereafter.

2. Restructuring the Office of the Clerk

4. An increase of almost a quarter in the number of the members of the Assembly will lead to a proportional increase in the tasks assigned to its secretariat. Everyone knows that parliamentarians must be able to rely on the assistance of the Office of the Clerk for obtaining information on various basic or procedural matters, preparing speeches in plenary sitting, in committee or at colloquies, organising press conferences or gathering information necessary for preparing articles. The number of official languages of member states in which speeches may be made in plenary sitting and in committee and for which simultaneous interpretation and translation facilities have to be provided by the Office of the Clerk under its Rules of Procedure is to be increased from five to seven. Meetings and visits will be organised regularly in two new member countries. Finally, Portuguese and Spanish trainees will henceforth have to be recruited and guided in their work on the same basis as trainees from other member countries.
5. At present, however, there are gaps in the structure of the Office of the Clerk which, if they persist after enlargement, would jeopardise the smooth running of the Assembly services.
 - (a) The Clerk Assistant responsible for political questions assists and deputises for the Clerk in areas within his purview. His duties require, on the one hand, that he direct the committee services and ensure co-ordination of the work of the committee secretaries whom he advises on the preparation of reports and, on the other, that he help to prepare written and oral parliamentary interventions and organise the Assembly's participation in various seminars, colloquies, conferences and committees.

These are clearly the tasks of a full-time official. The enlargement of WEU will make it unfeasible for one and the same official, already overburdened, to fulfil the duties of Clerk Assistant and titular Secretary of the General Affairs Committee. These two separate duties should be covered by two posts in the budget, each held by a different official.
 - (b) The absence of a post of Secretary to the Committee on Rules of Procedure compels the Clerk to ensure the secretariat of that committee personally or to be replaced when he cannot be present.
 - (c) During sessions, the Clerk cannot spend all his time with the sittings service and remain permanently at the side of the President of the Assembly or the Vice-President taking the chair. Nor can he be replaced by one of his assistants since they are fully taken up by their own duties. Assisting the President in the conduct of debates or in solving procedural problems is therefore left to temporary staff more familiar with procedure in their own parliaments than with that of the WEU Assembly. As in the Council of Europe, the Clerk should be able to rely on a permanent official with a thorough knowledge of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly, procedural practice and the complex organisation of the sittings service.

- (d) The tasks of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, now known as the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations, have increased significantly. Its public relations work has developed considerably. It has therefore been decided to change its mandate and give it the status of a permanent Assembly committee. The tasks of the Secretary of the committee have therefore also increased and will increase still further with the enlargement of WEU. The official concerned should be relieved of his present responsibility for the research office.
- (e) The efficiency of the research office is at present limited because it is not computerised. Whoever takes over that office will have to ensure that Assembly documentation is computerised and that the Office of the Clerk has access to the computerised documentation of parliaments and various research centres.
- (f) The Assembly will have to develop its relations with the government authorities and parliaments of the two new member countries. For this purpose, it will require the services of the linguistic section. It should be added that the linguistic section is responsible for revising texts drafted in the two working languages, English and French, by officials of whom they are not the mother tongue. The arrival in the Office of the Clerk of officials from the two new countries will necessarily increase the burden of work on the linguistic section.
- (g) The absence of a chauffeur/messenger often means using taxis which are often difficult to find. Exceptionally, a member of the staff of the reproduction service might be good enough to help, although driving the Assembly's official car is not one of their duties, but this service is often very busy. The Office of the Clerk is therefore either unable to help the President or rapporteur or has to recruit a chauffeur on a temporary basis. It is strange that the parliamentary Assembly of WEU cannot have a permanent chauffeur at its disposal to drive the official car.
6. To alleviate the abovementioned shortcomings, two posts for senior officials should be created, i.e.:
- (a) one grade A5 post of Secretary of the General Affairs Committee;
- (b) one grade A4 post of head of the rules of procedure and research service whose duties would include the secretariat of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, organising and directing the sittings service and various related services and directing the new computerised research office. Because of his duties, this official will come directly under the Clerk whom he will also assist in some of his tasks, including the secretariat of the Presidential Committee.
7. Creation of these posts would also allow a wider breakdown of posts between the various nationalities. At present, the six most senior officials (from A6 to A4) under the authority of the Clerk are each of a different nationality. It is indeed essential for the Assembly, in its relations with each member country, to be able to draw upon the reliable knowledge of an official of the Office of the Clerk concerning the institutions of each of those countries. After the enlargement of WEU, it would therefore be unthinkable for the Assembly not to be able to recruit a senior official of Portuguese or Spanish nationality, just as there can be no question of removing from the Office of the Clerk any of the six senior officials (Belgian, British, Dutch, French, German and Italian) who fulfil their duties with praiseworthy efficiency and loyalty.
8. One grade L2/3 post of translator/interpreter should also be created. Nevertheless, it is not proposed to recruit an official solely as a translator but to carry out the twofold duties of translator and interpreter, as is the case in the ministerial organs. The official concerned would also be responsible for assisting the President, committee chairmen and rapporteurs as an interpreter (from French into English or vice versa) and acting as an interpreter at committee meetings. It would thus be possible to economise F 110 000 under Sub-Head 7. This post, which exists in the ministerial organs, might possibly be transferred to the Office of the Clerk, which would make an overall saving in the budget of the organisation.
9. Both the Secretary of the General Affairs Committee and the head of the rules of procedure and research service will have to have grade B3 assistants. However, for reasons of economy the head of the rules of procedure and research service and the translator/interpreter when acting as translator might be assisted by staff with other duties too, which would avoid creating one post of assistant. Only the Secretary of the General Affairs Committee would have a full-time assistant, which means creating one grade B3 post.
10. Conversely, a second grade B3 post should be created for the archives and mail office. One B4 official now ensures the filing and distribution of mail and documents, keeping files up to date and running the library and archives. She already has a heavy work-load because of the reactivation of WEU and this will increase with enlargement. Delay in carrying out these tasks would be a major

impediment to the work of the entire Office of the Clerk, and the official concerned is normally replaced when absent by one of the committee assistants, thus making it difficult to carry out the work of the committee concerned.

11. It should be underlined that the creation of these two grade B3 posts would mean resorting less often to temporary staff when assistants are on leave for long periods. A saving might thus be made under Sub-Head 8 of the budget.

12. Finally, a grade C3 post of chauffeur should be created. The Assembly has proposed creating this post in many previous budgets. However, the probable abolition of one of the two posts of chauffeur in the Paris ministerial organs might perhaps encourage the Council to transfer this post to the Office of the Clerk, which would constitute an overall saving in the cost of recruiting a chauffeur and often in hiring a chauffeur-driven car for the President.

13. With the creation or transfer of the abovementioned six new posts, the total number of staff in the Office of the Clerk would rise from 31 to 37, as shown at Appendix I. Appendix II shows the new organogram of the Office of the Clerk in which these six new posts have been included.

14. This change in the organogram would mean an increase of about F 2 637 000 in Head I and a decrease of about F 215 000 in other sub-heads of the budget, as follows:

– *Sub-Head 6.1*: F 30 000, made possible by abolishing the temporary post of Sergeant-at-Arms whose duties will be taken over by the head of the rules of procedure and research service. It should be underlined that, in view of the conclusions drawn in the study on reorganising the sittings service, it is difficult to express an opinion on a possible subsequent saving in temporary staff since only experience will show what economies are possible in this connection, particularly as the new official will certainly need a “running-in” period which will probably coincide with the inevitable difficulties pursuant to the enlargement of WEU to include two new delegations. This question will therefore be taken up again in the context of the budget for the financial year 1991.

– *Sub-Head 7*: F 110 000, since the creation of a post of linguist will allow the number of interpreters recruited for meetings of the various Assembly organs to be reduced from six to five.

– *Sub-Head 22*: F 75 000, since the creation of a post of chauffeur will mean that a chauffeur-driven car no longer has to be hired for the President of the Assembly.

3. Operating budget

15. Apart from Head I, which includes the sums necessary for creating the six new posts, the other heads of the budget are also affected by enlargement and the increased work of the Assembly and its organs, as set out below.

16. First, there is the decision taken by the Presidential Committee at its meeting on 13th July 1989 to hold an ordinary session of the Assembly away from the seat in 1990 and to make the necessary provision for this in the budget for the financial year 1990, which affects several sub-heads:

- (a) Sub-Head 6 “Staff recruited for sessions of the Assembly”, since most of the temporary staff in the various sittings services will have to travel to the appointed place, whereas, normally, many of them are recruited in Paris. A comparison between Tables 1.1 and 1.2 at Appendix III shows that a further F 337 000 will be needed under this sub-head. To this is added expenditure for interpreters, estimated at F 41 000 on a basis of work which may vary considerably depending on whether interpreters with the required linguistic combinations are available on the spot.
- (b) Sub-Head 12 “Technical and other installations for Assembly sessions”, for which there is an estimate of F 525 000. This corresponds to the amount normally spent when two sessions are held in Paris but may be higher or lower depending on whether the host country is able to make the necessary premises and equipment available to the Assembly free of charge, as was the case at the last two extraordinary sessions held in Rome and Luxembourg.
- (c) Sub-Head 13 “Various services for the organisation of sessions”, since the hire of a lorry to transport documents and equipment makes it necessary to include an additional sum of F 50 000 under this sub-head.
- (d) Sub-Head 27 “Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk” which will cover extraordinary expenditure relating to the movement of staff of the Office of the Clerk. This is estimated at F 280 000.

17. There is no increase in estimates under Sub-Head 7 " Interpretation staff required for Assembly work between sessions " compared with the supplementary budget for 1989 since the creation of a post of linguist proposed in the context of the restructuring of the Office of the Clerk will allow the number of interpreters normally recruited for the two teams to be reduced from six to five. The estimated saving of F 110 000 will offset the cost of increasing the interpretation teams to cover seven official languages instead of five. If the creation of this post is not authorised, this sum will obviously have to be added to the estimate under this sub-head.

18. Estimates under Sub-Heads 15, 16 and 17 are analysed in detail in Appendix IV. It should be noted that the equipment modernisation programme provides only for the replacement of the five oldest word processors, the cost of which will be fully amortised at the end of 1989. In any event, the total estimate for the hire and maintenance of the word-processing system is lower than that in the budget for the financial year 1989. The purchase of a calculating machine (F 2 000) and the purchase and repair of office furniture (F 35 000) are also included in the abovementioned programme.

19. Generally speaking, estimates under the various sub-heads of Head IV " General administrative costs ", apart from Sub-Head 22 " Official cars ", renew sums for the previous financial year subject to minor adjustments due to the expected rise in consumer prices. The estimate under Sub-Head 22 takes account, on the one hand, of the replacement of the official car which is already nine years' old and no longer running well, with the resulting higher cost of repairs (expected cost: F 100 000), and, on the other hand, of a saving of about F 75 000 due to the fact that the creation of a post of chauffeur would dispense with the need to hire a chauffeur-driven car for the President of the Assembly.

20. Estimates under Head V " Other expenditure ", apart from the exceptional increase under Sub-Head 27 to cover the cost of holding a session away from the seat (see paragraph 15 above), are little different from the previous financial year, except for Sub-Head 29 " Expenditure on information ", which includes the cost of implementing the second stage of the programme based on the proposal for a general communications strategy aimed at improving the circulation of information between WEU and public opinion. This stage provides for the purchase of a second Macintosh personal computer (estimated cost: F 45 000) and designing a logo for the Assembly (estimated cost: F 45 000) for the reasons set out below:

(a) *Personal computer*

For the last year, the Information Service of the Office of the Clerk has had an Apple Macintosh personal computer and a laser printer. Initially purchased for managing the mailing list for press communiqués, it quickly became useful for other purposes and is now used for:

- managing the mailing list of journalists to whom press communiqués are sent (almost 1 300 names broken down into different mailing groups according to their specialisation and geographical location);
- the automatic printing of self-adhesive labels for mailing these communiqués;
- managing the mailing list of official services, defence institutes, universities, politicians and military personnel receiving Assembly documents;
- the automatic printing of self-adhesive labels for mailing these documents;
- drafting and producing press communiqués and articles;
- all the correspondence of the Information Service;
- the drafting, layout and production of prints for Assembly information letters;
- regular searches for references to WEU in the central computers of the major press agencies.

It is therefore clear that this is too much for a single computer. The purchase of a second should allow:

- more information to be stored;
- the two computers and the printer to be connected to allow the two computers to communicate with each other;
- the hardware of one computer to be used to protect the other;
- a better division of work between the Press Counsellor and his assistant.

(b) Assembly logo

Unlike the Council of Europe, the North Atlantic Assembly and the European Parliament, the WEU Assembly does not have a logo. However, in any modern communications policy, a logo is one of the essential basic means of creating an image.

The Presidential Committee therefore instructed the Press Counsellor to study the creation of a logo to enhance the Assembly's graphic identity.

This logo would be used mainly on:

- all kinds of paper: letters, internal administrative forms, committee reports, proceedings of sessions, information booklets, press communiqués, press files, volumes of proceedings;
- identity badges for staff and parliamentarians;
- possible souvenir items for special occasions.

Designing and introducing a logo requires special ability in graphic creation. It is therefore essential to have this kind of work done by professionals in graphic communication.

Another solution, which would have the merit of making young people in member countries aware of European security questions (and which would thus be in line with recommendations made time and again by the Secretariat-General and the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations) would be to organise a competition open to students from graphic arts colleges in the nine member countries. Such students would be invited to submit designs for a logo, one of which would be chosen by the Assembly. However, for professional ethical reasons, the prize in such a competition could not be less than the fee normally payable to a communications agency.

21. The increase of 20% in Sub-Head 30 "Expenses for political groups" corresponds to the increase in the number of members of the Assembly following the accession of Portugal and Spain to WEU.

22. In the operating budget, it should be underlined that estimated expenditure under Sub-Head 10 "Share of joint expenditure on the Paris premises" and some of that under Sub-Head 18 relating to telephone charges are based on the old formula for sharing such expenditure, under which the Assembly paid 30% and the Paris ministerial organs 70%, the latter having hitherto been responsible for this service. However, this formula is no longer realistic and the study on restructuring the ministerial organs seems to indicate that they will be replaced by an institute for advanced security studies and that the Assembly will be made responsible for joint services. This transfer of responsibility will obviously involve transferring staff specifically assigned to these services to the Office of the Clerk. Consequently, the abovementioned estimates under Sub-Heads 10 and 18 are included in this draft budget on a provisional basis and will have to be revised as soon as the Council takes decisions on the matter.

23. Finally, receipts in the operating budget in this draft budget are lower than in 1989 because bank interest, which had improved significantly in 1988 (F 60 523 in 1987 and F 148 669 in 1988), has fallen again in 1989 to a far lower level (estimate: F 60 000) because of the reduction in the total sum paid into the bank for the WEU Paris organs as a whole and the negative effects of certain states' delay in paying their contributions.

24. As shown in the tables in Appendices V and VI, at F 25 168 500 the net operating budget of the Assembly is F 4 642 900 higher than the revised 1989 budget, i.e. a growth rate of 22.6%. This is a considerable increase but it must be borne in mind that the comparison is not really significant since estimates for the financial year 1990 are based on the active, full participation of parliamentarians from nine member countries while estimates for the financial year 1989 were only slightly affected by the enlargement of WEU (except for extraordinary expenditure). The governments of member countries will certainly grasp the exceptional nature of the factors taken into account in preparing this budget and the vital necessity of giving the Assembly the wherewithal to work efficiently.

4. Pensions budget

25. It is not expected that any new pensions will become payable in 1990. Estimates in this section of the budget therefore represent total pensions payable to thirteen former officials (eleven retirement pensions, one invalidity pension and one survivor's pension) adjusted, as for present staff, in accordance with a 6.28% increase in salary scales.

26. Receipts take into account the contributions of the six new officials, amounting to about F 108 000. These estimates would therefore have to be revised if the creation of the new posts is not authorised.

5. Summary of the Assembly's operating and pensions budgets

27. As shown in the table at Appendix V, the net grand total of estimates in the Assembly's draft budget for 1990 (operating budget plus pensions budget less receipts) is F 27 667 500, i.e., compared with the net grand total of the revised budget for 1989, a growth rate of 20.1%. It is certainly not without importance to note that this growth rate is the same as the percentage increase in the number of members of the Assembly following the accession of Portugal and Spain to WEU.

Summary of estimates of expenditure and receipts for the financial year 1990

Details		Expenditure	Receipts
PART I: Operating budget			
<i>Section A:</i>	Expenditure		
<i>Head I:</i>	Permanent staff	15 421 000	
<i>Head II:</i>	Temporary staff	4 045 000	
<i>Head III:</i>	Expenditure on premises and equipment	1 546 000	
<i>Head IV:</i>	General administrative costs	2 085 500	
<i>Head V:</i>	Other expenditure	2 181 000	
<i>Section B:</i>	Receipts		110 000
		25 278 500	110 000
	NET TOTAL		25 168 500
		25 278 500	25 278 500
PART II: Pensions budget			
<i>Section A:</i>	Expenditure		
<i>Head I:</i>	Pensions, allowances and social charges	3 151 000	
<i>Section B:</i>	Receipts		652 000
		3 151 000	652 000
	NET TOTAL		2 499 000
		3 151 000	3 151 000
	NET TOTAL BUDGET		27 667 500

Budget estimates

PART I: OPERATING BUDGET

*Section A – Expenditure**Head I – Permanent staff*

Sub-Heads	Estimates for 1990	Budget for 1989 (revised)	Expected expenditure in 1989	Actual expenditure in 1988
Sub-Head 1 – Basic salaries	10 531 000	8 320 000	8 272 000	7 436 867
Sub-Head 2 – Allowances:				
2.1. Expatriation allowance	1 080 000			
2.2. Household allowance	477 000			
2.3. Allowance for children and other dependent persons	611 000			
2.4. Rent allowance	85 000			
2.5. Education allowance	60 000			
2.6. Allowance for language courses	2 000			
2.7. Overtime	59 000			
2.8. Home leave	61 000			
	2 435 000	1 899 000	1 831 000	1 650 241
Sub-Head 3 – Social charges:				
3.1. Social security	1 410 000			
3.2. Supplementary insurance	471 000			
3.3. Provident fund	167 000			
	2 048 000	1 630 000	1 629 000	1 419 102
Sub-Head 4 – Expenses relating to the recruit- ment and departure of permanent officials				
4.1. Travelling expenses of candi- dates for vacant posts	17 000			
4.2. Travelling expenses on arrival and departure of permanent officials and their families	31 000			
4.3. Removal expenses	200 000			
4.4. Installation allowance	147 000			
	395 000	70 000	33 000	121 408
Sub-Head 5 – Medical examination	12 000	9 000	9 000	8 693
TOTAL OF HEAD I	15 421 000	11 928 000	11 774 000	10 636 311

Explanations

Sub-Heads 1 and 2

Estimates under these two sub-heads cover emoluments (basic salary and allowances) paid to permanent staff in accordance with Chapter III of the Staff Rules of the Office of the Clerk of the WEU Assembly. They are calculated on the basis of global salaries in application of the scales in force on 1st July 1988¹, adjusted in accordance with an expected increase of 4.2% as from 1st July 1989 and 4% as from 1st July 1990. Adjustments taken into account amount to F 873 000.

Estimates take account of the financial implications of the creation of six new posts, amounting to F 2 240 000.

The table of establishment of the Office of the Clerk, showing grades, is given at Appendix I and the organogram at Appendix II.

Sub-Head 3

Estimated expenditure for "Social charges" is based on commitments stemming from:

- application of the social security agreement signed between Western European Union and the Government of the French Republic on 2nd June 1979 (Sub-Head 3.1)²;
- application of the convention on complementary collective insurance (Sub-Head 3.2)³;
- application of Article 27 of the Staff Rules providing for the employer's contribution to the Provident Fund, amounting to 14% of basic salary, for staff not affiliated to the pension scheme (Sub-Head 3.3).

Sub-Head 4

No officials are expected to leave in 1990. Estimates under this sub-head relate to the new posts included in the organogram of the Office of the Clerk.

Sub-Head 5

The sum requested is to cover the cost of the medical check-up which all members of the staff must undergo under Article 9 of the Staff Rules. Medical check-ups for WEU staff in Paris are carried out at the OECD medical centre.

1. These scales are worked out by the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts and approved by the WEU Council and the councils of the other co-ordinated organisations (NATO, OECD, Council of Europe, ESA).

2. Under this agreement, WEU staff benefit from the French general scheme, with the exception of family allowances and old-age pensions.

3. Under this convention, WEU staff benefit from complementary insurance in the event of sickness or temporary or permanent disability. Furthermore, in the event of the death of an insured person, the insurance company pays a lump sum to the beneficiaries he has named.

Head II – Temporary staff

Sub-Heads	Estimates for 1990	Budget for 1989 (revised)	Expected expenditure in 1989	Actual expenditure in 1988
Sub-Head 6 – Staff recruited for sessions of the Assembly				
6.1. Sittings service	1 575 000			
6.2. Interpretation service	685 000			
6.3. Translation service	915 000			
6.4. Other services	42 000			
	3 217 000	2 285 000	2 437 000	2 133 937
Sub-Head 7 – Interpretation staff required for Assembly work between sessions	640 000	640 000	630 000	549 471
Sub-Head 8 – Temporary staff for the Office of the Clerk	15 000	15 000	36 000	53 428
Sub-Head 9 – Social charges				
9.1. Insurance for temporary staff other than interpreters	16 000			
9.2. Provident fund for interpreters	150 000			
9.3. Insurance for interpreters	7 000			
	173 000	165 000	135 000	104 527
TOTAL OF HEAD II	4 045 000	3 405 000	3 238 000	2 841 363

*Explanations**Sub-Head 6*

Estimates under this sub-head relate to:

(a) Salaries and, where appropriate, per diem allowances, allowances for travelling time and the reimbursement of travelling expenses of temporary staff recruited for sessions (sittings, interpretation and translation services). A list of such staff, showing their respective duties and salaries, is given at Appendix III.

Salaries are calculated in accordance with scales in force on 1st July 1988 in the co-ordinated organisations (on the basis of salaries paid to permanent staff of comparable grades), adjusted in the same way as for permanent staff, the adjustment amounting to F 143 064.

In application of the agreement signed between the co-ordinated organisations and the International Association of Conference Interpreters (IACI), the salaries of interpreters are calculated on the basis of the scale in force for grade L4.8 staff, increased by 6%.

(b) Lump-sum payments made to staff recruited for various services during sessions (doctor, post office technician, typewriter mechanic, etc.).

Sub-Head 7

This sub-head shows the sums paid to interpreters recruited for simultaneous interpretation at meetings of parliamentarians between sessions (salaries and where appropriate per diem allowances, travelling time and travelling expenses).

Estimates are based on the recruitment of five interpreters for each meeting (216 working days, of which 100 in Paris), the sixth interpreter being the permanent official it is proposed to recruit. Salaries and working conditions are the same as for interpreters recruited for sessions (cf. Sub-Head 6). Their salary adjustment for 1990 amounts to F 43 000.

Sub-Head 8

Estimates under this sub-head relate to the salaries of additional staff of all grades which the Office of the Clerk may have to recruit in 1990. This is an overall sum covering salaries, possible travelling expenses and insurance.

Sub-Head 9

Estimates under this sub-head correspond to the following social charges:

Insurance for temporary staff other than interpreters

Staff recruited for Assembly sessions are insured with the Van Breda insurance company against the risks of death, accident or sickness, 60% of the premium being paid by the Office of the Clerk and 40% by staff. The estimates take account of the updating of the capital and premium as from May 1988.

Provident fund for interpreters

In accordance with the agreement between the co-ordinated organisations and the IACI, WEU has to pay into the conference interpreters' fund or, where appropriate, another provident fund, a contribution of 14%, which is added to a contribution of 7% by interpreters.

Insurance for interpreters

A Lloyds insurance policy, taken out through the intermediary of Stewart Wrightson in London, covers interpreters for accidents, sickness and temporary or permanent disability preventing them from working. The premium of 1.1% of their fees (lower rate) is divided between the Office of the Clerk (0.7%) and the interpreters (0.4%).

Head III – Expenditure on premises and equipment

Sub-Heads	Estimates for 1990	Budget for 1989 (revised)	Expected expenditure in 1989	Actual expenditure in 1988
Sub-Head 10 – Share of joint expenditure on the Paris premises	400 000	406 000	360 000	330 035
Sub-Head 11 – Hire of committee rooms	10 000	5 000	23 400	–
Sub-Head 12 – Technical and other installations for Assembly sessions	525 000	721 600	720 000	376 930
Sub-Head 13 – Various services for the organisation of sessions	100 000	47 000	44 000	48 506
Sub-Head 14 – Maintenance of the premises of the Office of the Clerk	13 000	13 000	9 000	15 795
Sub-Head 15 – Purchase or repair of office furniture	35 000	50 000	40 000	136 460
Sub-Head 16 – Purchase of reproduction and other office equipment	2 000	–	–	150 640
Sub-Head 17 – Hire and maintenance of reproduction and other equipment	461 000	435 000	440 000	403 147
TOTAL OF HEAD III	1 546 000	1 677 600	1 636 400	1 461 513

*Explanations**Sub-Head 10*

Until the financial year 1989, sums requested under this sub-head covered the Assembly's 30% share of joint expenditure, which was managed by the WEU ministerial organs in Paris. The planned creation of an institute for advanced security studies in place of the agencies will, inter alia, mean reorganising this service, reassigning responsibilities and adopting another formula for sharing expenditure. The same estimate is therefore given as in the previous financial year subject to any adjustments which prove necessary in the context of the reorganisation of the joint services.

Sub-Head 11

For meetings outside Paris, Assembly bodies normally have committee rooms with simultaneous interpretation equipment made available to them by the national delegations concerned. However, in certain cases the Assembly may have to pay for hiring a room or installing portable interpretation equipment in rooms not so equipped. Sums requested under this sub-head are to allow the Assembly to cover such expenditure if necessary.

Sub-Head 12

As its title indicates, this sub-head relates to expenditure for the installation of simultaneous interpretation equipment, telephone booths, telex, screens and other installations in the premises of the Economic and Social Council during Assembly sessions.

Estimates no longer cover, as in the past, the installation of two metal-detecting doors necessary for improving security measures, since these will be replaced by the fixed security installations included in the supplementary budget for 1989.

Sub-Head 13

Expenditure under this sub-head relates to contracts for the provision of various services during Assembly sessions (removal of equipment, cleaning of premises, etc.).

Sub-Head 14

The same sum is requested as for the previous financial year to allow minor repairs to be carried out to the premises of the Office of the Clerk.

Sub-Heads 15, 16 and 17

Sums under these sub-heads are justified by the five-year modernisation and maintenance programme for equipment given at Appendix IV to this budget.

Head IV – General administrative costs

Sub-Heads	Estimates for 1990	Budget for 1989 (revised)	Expected expenditure in 1989	Actual expenditure in 1988
Sub-Head 18 – Postage, telephone, telex and transport of documents	480 000	500 000	430 000	393 794
Sub-Head 19 – Duplication paper, headed writing paper and other office supplies	280 000	270 000	250 000	270 998
Sub-Head 20 – Printing and publication of documents	1 120 000	1 077 500	1 000 000	825 626
Sub-Head 21 – Purchase of documents	65 000	63 000	60 000	73 396
Sub-Head 22 – Official cars	140 000	115 000	116 000	98 333
Sub-Head 23 – Bank charges	500	500	200	–
TOTAL OF HEAD IV	2 085 500	2 026 000	1 856 200	1 662 147

Explanations

Sub-Head 18

Estimates under this sub-head are lower than in the previous financial year since the Assembly's share of telephone expenditure for WEU in Paris as a whole (joint expenditure) has fallen, probably due to the reduction in the staff of the agencies. Conversely, for other categories of expenditure (postage, telex, etc.), expenditure is tending to rise due to intensification of the work of the Assembly, particularly its Press Service. Every step has been taken to contain the cost of mailing documents as far as possible.

Sub-Head 19

In spite of the considerable increase in reproduction work and the larger number of staff in the Office of the Clerk, the increase in the estimate as compared with 1989 is slight and is due solely to the foreseeable variation of prices in this sector (4%).

Sub-Head 20

Estimates under this sub-head take into account the expected increase in costs (4%).

Sub-Head 21

There is a slight increase in estimates under this sub-head as compared with 1989 due to the need to purchase a wider range of documentation essential for the preparation of studies and reports.

Sub-Head 22

Priority has to be given to replacing the official car of the Office of the Clerk, first registered in 1981, because of its poor condition. In recent years, it has often had to be repaired at considerable cost. Estimates under this sub-head therefore include the cost of a new car of the same category as the present one, i.e. F 100 000, plus running expenses (garage, petrol, servicing, etc.), amounting to about F 15 000, and the cost of hiring a chauffeur-driven car occasionally (about F 25 000).

Sub-Head 23

The estimate of F 500 remains unchanged.

Head V – Other expenditure

Sub-Heads	Estimates for 1990	Budget for 1989 (revised)	Expected expenditure	Actual expenditure
Sub-Head 24 – Travelling and subsistence allowances and insurance for the President of the Assembly, Chairmen of committees and rapporteurs	190 000	160 000	180 000	165 709
Sub-Head 25 – Expenses for representation	280 000	220 000	313 000	277 975
Sub-Head 26 – Committee study missions	5 000	5 000	–	–
Sub-Head 27 – Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk	730 000	400 000	578 000	465 167
Sub-Head 28 – Expenses of experts and the auditor	40 000	70 000	78 000	135 608
Sub-Head 29 – Expenditure on information	500 000	410 000	491 000	484 213
Sub-Head 30 – Expenses for political groups	403 000	336 000	336 000	327 000
Sub-Head 31 – Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere provided for	3 000	3 000	1 000	892
Sub-Head 32 – Non-recoverable taxes	30 000	20 000	25 000	22 669
TOTAL OF HEAD V	2 181 000	1 624 000	2 002 000	1 879 233

Explanations

Sub-Head 24

The cost of travelling and subsistence allowances for members of the Assembly for sessions and committee meetings is borne by the governments of member countries as are those of members of the Bureau and Presidential Committee.

The Assembly bears the cost of travelling and subsistence allowances for visits by the President of the Assembly, rapporteurs and, when appropriate, committee chairmen when these visits are connected with the preparation of a report or the work of the Assembly. Journeys by committee chairmen and rapporteurs are subject to approval by the Presidential Committee.

Estimates take account of the increase in the Assembly's work.

Sub-Head 25

The increase compared with the 1989 budget stems mainly from the increase in the Assembly's work due inter alia to the accession of Portugal and Spain to WEU. It should be pointed out that expenditure in 1989 is expected to be much higher than appropriations under this sub-head because of extraordinary expenditure incurred for the visit of a delegation from the Supreme Soviet to the WEU Assembly.

Sub-Head 26

Sums under this sub-head are to cover extraordinary expenditure for committee study visits. As these sums cannot be foreseen accurately, the same amount has been requested as last year.

Sub-Head 27

There are two aspects to the estimates under this sub-head, which take into account the increase in per diem allowances provided for in the 248th report of the Co-ordinating Committee:

- F 450 000 is earmarked for travel by members of the Office of the Clerk on Assembly business. The increase of F 50 000 compared with the previous financial year is based on experience, justified by the increase in such work;
- F 280 000 relates to travel by members of the Office of the Clerk necessarily involved in holding an ordinary Assembly session away from the seat.

Sub-Head 28

Estimates for 1990 are lower than in the previous financial year because the auditor who will verify the accounts as from the financial year 1989 lives in Paris.

Sub-Head 29

The increase of F 90 000 is requested mainly to allow the Press Service to improve its methods of work, as explained in the explanatory memorandum.

Sub-Head 30

The estimate under this sub-head is 20% higher than in the previous financial year because of the increase in the number of parliamentarians following the accession of Portugal and Spain to WEU. By decision of the Presidential Committee, each group has an equal fixed share and a further sum in proportion to the number of members listed. Also by decision of the Presidential Committee, as from the financial year 1987, the political groups have had to submit balance sheets at the close of the financial year. All these balance sheets are appended to the accounts of the Assembly and are consequently subject to verification by the auditor.

Sub-Head 31

The same amount is requested as for 1989.

Sub-Head 32

The increase in the estimate under this sub-head is necessary to cover non-reimbursable VAT payments.

PART I: OPERATING BUDGET

Section B – Receipts

	Estimates for 1990	Budget for 1989 (revised)	Expected receipts in 1989	Actual receipts in 1988
1. Sales of publications	30 000	25 000	30 000	42 169
2. Bank interest	60 000	100 000	60 000	148 669
3. Social security reimbursements	20 000	10 000	53 000	14 886
TOTAL RECEIPTS	110 000	135 000	143 000	205 724

Explanations

Estimates for the sale of publications, bank interest and social security reimbursements are based on experience.

PART II: PENSIONS BUDGET

*Section A – Expenditure**Head I – Pensions, allowances and social charges*

Sub-Heads	Estimates for 1990	Budget for 1989 (authorised)	Expected expenditure in 1989	Actual expenditure in 1988
Sub-Head 1 – Pensions and leaving allowances				
1.1. Retirement pensions	2 582 000			
1.2. Invalidity pensions	239 000			
1.3. Survivors' pensions	54 000			
1.4. Orphans' or dependants' pensions	–			
1.5. Leaving allowances	–			
	2 875 000	2 746 000	2 875 000	2 477 015
Sub-Head 2 – Family allowances				
2.1. Household allowances	116 000			
2.2. Children's and other dependants' allowances	42 000			
2.3. Education allowances	35 000			
	193 000	191 000	181 000	176 895
Sub-Head 3 – Supplementary insurance	83 000	73 000	79 000	65 844
TOTAL OF HEAD I	3 151 000	3 010 000	3 135 000	2 719 745

*Explanations**Sub-Heads 1 and 2*

In 1990, the Assembly will be paying thirteen pensions, as follows:

- eleven old-age pensions;
- one invalidity pension;
- one survivor's pension.

Estimates of expenditure under these two sub-heads are calculated in accordance with the provisions of the pension scheme rules.

Sub-Head 3

Pensioners are insured against the risk of sickness in accordance with Article 19bis of the collective convention in force.

Estimates of expenditure under this sub-head correspond to the proportion of the premium paid by the Assembly.

PART II: PENSIONS BUDGET

Section B – Receipts

	Estimates for 1990	Budget for 1989	Expected receipts in 1989	Actual receipts in 1988
Contributions by permanent officials	652 000	504 000	497 000	442 688

Explanations

Estimated receipts are calculated on the basis of contributions to the pension scheme paid by the thirty-five permanent staff members of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly (7% of basic salary) affiliated to the pension scheme.


APPENDIX I

*Table of establishment of the Office of the Clerk
of the Assembly for 1990*

Grade	Duties	1990 budget	1989 budget	+ or -
H.C.	Clerk	1	1	-
A6	Clerk Assistants	2	2	-
A5	Counsellors	5	4	+ 1
A4	First secretaries	3	2	+ 1
L2/3	Translator-interpreter	1	-	+ 1
A2	Controller; Head of private office	2	2	-
A2	Translators ; Documentalist	3	3	-
B6	Chief accountant	1	1	-
B4	Qualified assistants	7	7	-
B3	Accountant	1	1	-
B3	Bilingual shorthand-typists	6	4	+ 2
B3	Switchboard operator	1	1	-
C6	Head of documents reproduction service	1	1	-
C4	Assistants in documents reproduction service	2	2	-
C3	Chauffeur	1	-	+ 1
		37	31	+ 6

APPENDIX II

Organogram of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly



N.B Posts underlined are those it is proposed to create as from 1st January 1990
 * Service organised/staff recruited during Assembly sessions
 1 The duties of Head of the Administration and Finance Service, Security and Personnel and Secretary of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration are exercised by the Clerk Assistant for Administrative and Financial Affairs
 2 Duties exercised by the assistant to the Clerk
 3 Duties exercised by the assistant to the Head of the Administration and Finance Service
 4 The duties of Head of the Translation Service are exercised by the senior reviser, since 1st October 1986 the English reviser. His assistant helps him in the exercise of his duties
 5 The Head of the Rules of Procedure and Research Service also exercises the duties of Secretary of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and Head of the Research Service
 6 The duties of assistant to the Head of the Rules of Procedure and Research Service are exercised by the assistant in the Private Office of the President

APPENDIX III

*Salaries of staff recruited for Assembly sessions**1. Sitings service**1.1. Session outside Paris*

Duties	Number	No. of days	Daily remuneration F*	Total F	Total F
Counsellors to the President of Assembly	2 b	9	1 632	29 376	29 376
Heads of sections	3 b	5	1 498	22 470	
	1 b	5	1 913	9 565	32 035
Parliamentary secretaries	4 b	5	1 342	26 840	26 840
Precis writers	6 b	5	1 342	40 260	40 260
Verbatim reporters	3 a	4	665	7 980	
	6 b	5	1 778	53 340	
	16 b	5	1 342	107 360	168 680
Assistants	2 a	4	402	3 216	
	2 b	9	769	13 842	
	38 b	5	769	146 110	
	6 b	5	831	24 930	188 098
Head usher	1 a	5	723	3 615	
Ushers:					
Security control					
Sittings office	12 a	4	334	16 032	
Messengers	2 a	5	334	3 340	
Cloakroom attendant	1 a	4	334	1 336	
Offset-assemblers	14 a	5	334	23 380	47 703
	120				532 992
Adjustment for 1990					22 386
					555 378
Travelling expenses					400 000
					955 378
				Rounded up to	956 000

* In accordance with scales in force on 1st July 1988.

a. Recruited locally.

b. Recruited outside Paris.

1.2. Session in Paris

Duties	Number	No. of days	Daily remuneration F*	Total F	Total F
Counsellors to the President of Assembly	1 a	8	955	7 640	22 139
	1 b	9	1 611	14 499	
Heads of sections	1 a	4	821	3 284	22 998
	2 b	5	1 477	14 770	
	1 a	4	1 236	4 944	
Parliamentary secretaries	2 a	4	665	5 320	18 530
	2 b	5	1 321	13 210	
Precis writers	3 a	4	665	7 980	27 795
	3 b	5	1 321	19 815	
Verbatim reporters	6 a	4	1 101	26 424	151 919
	19 b	5	1 321	125 495	
Assistants	13 a	4	402	20 904	157 698
	1 a	8	402	3 216	
	1 b	9	757	6 813	
	27 b	5	757	102 195	
	6 b	5	819	24 570	
Head usher	1 b	5	723	3 615	
Installations usher	1 a	12	368	4 416	
Ushers:					
Security control	8 a	4	334	10 688	
Sittings office	4 b	5	689	13 780	
Messengers	4 a	5	334	6 680	
Cloakroom attendant	1 a	4	334	1 336	
Offset-assemblers	13 a	5	334	21 710	
Mechanic	1 a	4	334	1 336	63 561
	123				464 640
Adjustment for 1990					29 179
					493 819
Travelling expenses					125 000
					618 819
					Rounded up to 619 000

* In accordance with scales in force on 1st July 1988.

a. Recruited locally.

b. Recruited outside Paris.

2. Interpretation service**2.1. Session outside Paris**

Duties	Number	No. of days	Total F
Interpreters	10 a	4	107 920
	12 b	5	192 000
	22		299 920
Adjustment for 1990 (4.2%)			12 597
			312 517
Travelling expenses			50 000
			362 517
		Rounded up to	363 000

2.2. Session in Paris

Duties	Number	No. of days	Total F
Interpreters	13 a	4	140 296
	9 b	5	144 974
	22		285 270
Adjustment for 1990 (6.28%)			17 915
			303 185
Travelling expenses			19 000
			322 185
		Rounded up to	322 000

a. Recruited locally.

b. Recruited outside Paris.

N.B. On 1st July 1988, the daily remuneration of interpreters amounted to F 2 698. In addition, interpreters recruited outside Paris are entitled to payment for time spent in travelling (one or two half days as appropriate), a daily allowance (per diem) corresponding to that of a Grade L4 permanent official, plus reimbursement of their travelling expenses.

3. Translation service

Duties	Number	Daily remuneration F	Estimates ¹	Total F
Revisers	5 a	1 092	136 500	311 300
	4 b	1 748	174 800	
Translators	5 a	862	107 750	297 500
	5 b	1 518	189 750	
Assistants	5 a	402	60 300	228 120
	2 a	464	27 840	
	4 b	757	90 840	
	2 b	819	49 140	
	32			836 920
Adjustment for 1990				52 558
				889 478
Travelling expenses				25 000
				914 478
			Rounded up to	915 000

1. Based on 25 days for revisers and translators and 30 days for assistants.
a. Recruited locally.
b. Recruited outside Paris.

APPENDIX IV

*Five-year modernisation and maintenance programme for the equipment of the Office of the Clerk**(The estimates given may fluctuate with the trend of prices)*

Ref. No.	Equipment	Modernisation and equipment programme	Budgets				
			1990	1991	1992	1993	1994
	<i>A. Reproduction equipment</i>						
1	<i>Photocopiers</i>						
1.1	1 RX 1065	Hire (rate blocked). Maintenance contract (indexed).	57 600 28 000	74 000 28 000	74 000 28 000	74 000 28 000	74 000 28 000
1.2	1 RX 3107	Property of the Assembly. Maintenance contract (indexed).	2 800	2 800	2 800	2 800	2 800
1.3	1 Gestetner 2200	Property of the Assembly. Maintenance contract (indexed).	800	800	800	800	800
2	<i>Offset machines</i>						
2.1	1 Gestetner 311 (1984)	Property of the Assembly. Maintenance contract (indexed).	8 350	8 350	8 350	8 350	8 350
2.2	1 Gestetner 329 (1985)	Property of the Assembly. Maintenance contract (indexed).	5 700	5 700	5 700	5 700	5 700
2.3	1 Gestetner 339 (1986)	Property of the Assembly. Maintenance contract (indexed).	6 700	6 700	6 700	6 700	6 700
3	<i>Electrostatic stereotypers</i>						
3.1	1 Gestetner PM/9 (1980)	Property of the Assembly. Reserved for sessions.					
3.2	1 Gestetner DT 1 (1985)	Property of the Assembly. Maintenance contract (indexed).	1 450	1 450	1 450	1 450	1 450
3.3	1 Gestetner 100PM (1986)	Property of the Assembly. Maintenance contract (indexed).	2 950	2 950	2 950	2 950	2 950
4	<i>Binding machines</i>						
4.1.	1 Gestetner 100	Purchased in 1978, this machine is in good condition. Normal maintenance by the staff concerned is enough to keep it in good working order.					
4.2.	1 Orpo Planax	Property of the Assembly. Normal maintenance by the staff concerned is enough to keep it in good working order.					
4.3.	1 Orpo Thermatic	Property of the Assembly. Normal maintenance by the staff concerned is enough to keep it in good working order.					
5	<i>Miscellaneous equipment</i>						
5.1.	1 Logabax-Ordina 7630 assembling machine with stapler	Purchased in 1977, this machine is serviced when required, since the cost of a maintenance contract is exorbitant. The estimate is based on experience.	6 000	6 000	6 000	6 000	6 000
5.2.	1 AM International 5000 addressograph	Property of the Assembly. Maintenance contract (indexed).	3 800	3 800	3 800	3 800	3 800
5.3.	1 Fortematic 655 paper-cutting machine	This machine is serviced when required. A single annual service is enough to keep it in good working order.	750	750	750	750	750

Ref. No.	Equipment	Modernisation and equipment programme	Budgets					
			1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	
6	<i>B. Typewriters and calculators</i>							
6.1	Office of the Clerk 8 Olivetti 121 electronic typewriters	Purchased between 1981 and 1983, these typewriters are in good condition.						
6.2	1 Olivetti 221 typewriter	Purchased in 1983, this typewriter is in good condition.						
6.3	1 Olympia SGE 51 long-carriage electronic typewriter (French keyboard)	This machine is part of the old stock and will remain in service as long as possible.						
6.4	3 Olivetti calculators	These machines are in good working order.						
6.5	1 calculator	To be purchased for the accounts section.	2 000					
7	<i>For use during sessions</i>							
7.1	6 Olympia SGE 51 electric typewriters - 2 English keyboards - 4 French keyboards	These machines are part of the old stock and are assigned to national delegations and one political group.						
7.2	4 RX 6015 electronic typewriters (English keyboards)	These machines were purchased in 1986 and are assigned to session services.						
7.3	1 IBM electric typewriter (French keyboard)	Assigned to a political group.						
7.4	2 ET 109 typewriters (Italian keyboards)	Assigned to the Italian Delegation and the Italian summary reporters.						
7.5	1 Editor electric typewriter (Italian keyboard)	Assigned to the Italian summary reporters.						
7.6	21 Olympia mechanical typewriters - 19 English keyboards - 2 French keyboards	Purchased between 1966 and 1979, these typewriters are used only occasionally because they are old models and the staff are no longer used to working on such machines. It is planned to keep them in reserve in case of electricity cuts.						
7.7	Electronic typewriters	To meet the requirements of the various services during Assembly sessions, and subject to the possible purchase of other typewriters, the following hire programme is envisaged for each session: - 13 machines with English keyboards - 15 machines with French keyboards - 2 machines with Spanish keyboards - 1 machine with a Portuguese keyboard All typewriters and calculators are serviced twice a year, before each session, by a mechanic recruited for the purpose, but a lump sum should be earmarked for possible repairs at other times.	35 000	35 000	35 000	35 000	35 000	
			8 000	8 000	8 000	8 000	8 000	

Ref. No.	Equipment	Modernisation and equipment programme	Budgets					
			1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	
9	<i>C. Miscellaneous equipment</i>							
	<i>Dictaphones</i>							
9.1	2 Uher 5000	Purchased in 1971, they will have to be replaced in the coming years.		12 000	12 000			
9.2	1 Sony BM 80	Purchased in 1987, it is in very good working order.						
9.3	11 Grundig Stenorettes	Purchased between 1963 and 1987, they should be replaced gradually as from 1991.		12 000	12 000	12 000	12 000	
9.4	1 stenotyping machine Grandjean	Purchased in 1974, this machine is in good working order. Provision for an overall sum in the budget for possible repairs to equipment in this category.	4 000					
10	<i>D. Word processors and computers</i>							
10.1	9 Olivetti ETS 2010 word processors 1 Olivetti M 24	These have been hired on a five-year leasing basis. The three contracts expire in December 1989, September 1991 and March 1993 respectively. A study is being conducted on replacing 5 word processors by more modern machines, compatible with the ETS 2010 system, when the first contract expires. Estimates take account of this replacement programme. The maintenance contract will have to be renegotiated.						
		Cost of hire.	224 000	202 000	142 000	128 000	102 000	
		Maintenance contract (indexed).	59 000	89 000	89 000	89 000	89 000	
10.2	1 Olivetti ETS 2010	Purchased in 1988.						
		Maintenance contract (indexed).	5 500	5 500	5 500	5 500	5 500	
10.3	1 Macintosh	Purchased in 1988, it is considered sufficient to service it when required.	-	2 500	5 000	5 000	5 000	
11	<i>E. Office furniture</i>							
	<i>Office of the Clerk</i>	Purchase or replacement of various items of furniture.	35 000	35 000	35 000	35 000	35 000	

Breakdown by budget classification

Budget classification		Ref. No. in programme	Budgets				
Head	Sub-Head		1990	1991	1992	1993	1994
III	15. Purchase or repair of office furniture	11	35 000	35 000	35 000	35 000	—
III	16. Purchase of reproduction and other office equipment	6.5	2 000	—	—	—	—
		9.1	—	12 000	12 000	—	—
		9.3	—	12 000	12 000	12 000	12 000
			2 000	24 000	24 000	12 000	12 000
III	17. Hire and maintenance of reproduction and other office equipment	1.1	85 600	102 000	102 000	102 000	102 000
		1.2	2 800	2 800	2 800	2 800	2 800
		1.3	800	800	800	800	800
		2.1	8 350	8 350	8 350	8 350	8 350
		2.2	5 700	5 700	5 700	5 700	5 700
		2.3	6 700	6 700	6 700	6 700	6 700
		3.2	1 450	1 450	1 450	1 450	1 450
		3.3	2 950	2 950	2 950	2 950	2 950
		5.1	6 000	6 000	6 000	6 000	6 000
		5.2	3 800	3 800	3 800	3 800	3 800
		5.3	750	750	750	750	750
		7.7	35 000	35 000	35 000	35 000	35 000
		8	8 000	8 000	8 000	8 000	8 000
		9.5	4 000	4 000	4 000	4 000	4 000
	10.1	283 000	291 000	231 000	217 000	191 000	
	10.2	5 500	5 500	5 500	5 500	5 500	
	10.3	—	2 500	5 000	5 000	5 000	
			460 400	487 300	429 800	415 800	389 800

APPENDIX V

Trend of the Assembly budgets from 1989 to 1990

	1989 a	1989* revised b	% $\frac{b-a}{a}$	1990 c	% $\frac{c-b}{b}$
A. Operating budget					
Head I. Permanent staff	11 928 000	11 928 000	–	15 421 000	29.28
Head II. Temporary staff	3 000 000	3 405 000	13.5	4 045 000	18.79
Head III. Expenditure on premises and equipment	1 356 000	1 677 600	23.72	1 546 000	– 7.84
Head IV. General administrative costs	2 026 000	2 026 000	–	2 085 500	2.94
Head V. Other expenditure	1 624 000	1 624 000	–	2 181 000	34.30
Total expenditure	19 934 000	20 660 600	3.64	25 278 500	22.35
Receipts	135 000	135 000	–	110 000	– 18.52
Net Total	19 799 000	20 525 600	3.67	25 168 500	22.62
B. Pensions budget					
Pensions and leaving allowances	3 010 000	3 010 000	–	3 151 000	4.68
Receipts	504 000	504 000	–	652 000	29.37
Net Total	2 506 000	2 506 000	–	2 499 000	– 0.3
GENERAL NET TOTAL (A + B)	22 305 500	23 031 600	3.26	27 667 500	20.12

* Section A.2. "Extraordinary expenditure", totalling F 9 188 335, has not been taken into account.

APPENDIX VI

Percentage of credits under the various heads of the operating budget for 1989 (revised) and 1990

	Revised budget for 1989			1990		
	Amount	% of		Amount	% of	
		A	B		A	B
A. Operating budget						
Head I. - Permanent staff	11 928 000	57.73	58.11	15 421 000	61.00	61.27
Head II. - Temporary staff	3 405 000	16.48	16.59	4 045 000	16.00	16.07
Head III. - Premises and equipment	1 677 600	8.12	8.17	1 546 000	6.12	6.14
Head IV. - General administrative costs	2 026 000	9.80	9.87	2 085 500	8.25	8.29
Head V. - Other expenditure	1 624 000	7.86	7.91	2 181 000	8.63	8.66
TOTAL A (expenditure)	20 660 600	100.00	100.65	25 278 500	100.00	100.43
Receipts	135 000		0.65	110 000		0.43
TOTAL B (net)	20 525 600		100.00	25 168 500		100.00

*Draft budget of the administrative expenditure
of the Assembly for the financial year 1990*¹

Opinion of the Council

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-

Explanatory Memorandum

1. The draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for 1990, transmitted to the Council for its prior opinion in accordance with Rule 48.3 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly, was examined attentively by the WEU Budget and Organisation Committee at its meeting in Paris on 16th November 1989.

At the close of this examination, the following decisions were taken:

- (a) Only one new post was accepted, that of translator/interpreter, the committee reserving the right to reconsider the other five posts proposed by the Assembly on the basis of a management survey. This should show how the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly could be organised efficiently and a new organogram would be proposed. Estimates under Head I were therefore reduced by F 2 159 000.
- (b) On the proposal of the Assembly, sums required for holding the June session outside Paris (F 708 000) were frozen. It was agreed that in February 1990 the Assembly might ask for these sums to be released if the state of work made it unlikely that it would be completed by 15th May 1990.
- (c) A sum of F 30 000 was added to Head III for the hire of a screening door during sessions since the installation of a security system in the entrance hall included in the supplementary budget for 1989 had been refused.
- (d) An overall reduction of F 159 000 was made in Head V, the Assembly being free to decide which sub-heads of this head would be affected by reduction.
- (e) Income under the pensions budget was reduced by F 80 000 since the creation of five new posts in the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly had been refused.

2. The draft budget of the Assembly for 1990 was thus reduced from F 27 667 500 to F 25 459 500. At its meeting on 28th November 1989, the Council expressed a favourable opinion on the budget as amended.

3. The revised budget estimates are set out in the tables at appendix hereto. In regard to Head V, a breakdown of the overall reduction of F 159 000 is shown.

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

Members of the committee: Mr. Klejdzinski (Chairman); MM. Rathbone (Alternate: *Bowden*), Lagorce (Alternate for Mr. Dhaille) (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Biefnot, Mrs. Blunck, MM. Durand (Alternate: *Jeambrun*), Eversdijk, Dame *Peggy Fenner*, Mr. Greco, Mrs. Haas-Berger, Mrs. Hoffmann, MM. *Masseret*, *Morris*, *Niegel*, *Noerens*, Oehler, Rauti, *Redmond*, Sinesio (Alternate: *Parisi*), *Triglia*, N... (Alternate: Mrs. *Lentz-Cornette*).

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

APPENDIX I

*Secretary-General's Note**WEU Assembly budget for 1990*

1. The WEU Assembly draft budget for 1990 (Assembly Document 1198) was circulated to the Budget and Organisation Committee on 13th October 1989 under reference B(89)20, and was examined during the committee's meeting on 16th and 17th November 1989 (BR(89)2 to be circulated).

2. The net total of the proposed draft budget was:

(a) Operating budget	F 25 168 500
(b) Pensions budget	F 2 499 000
TOTAL	F 27 667 500

These figures represent an increase on 20.1% over the net total of the revised budget for 1989.

3. The Budget and Organisation Committee's conclusions and recommendations are summarised as follows:

Head I

After discussing the proposed restructuring of the Office of the Clerk, the committee agreed that the additional translator/interpreter, grade L2/L3 was needed as a direct result of the adhesion of Portugal and Spain.

The committee was of the opinion that before any of the other proposals to increase or upgrade the staff could be considered, a management review should first be carried out to assess, inter alia, the position on staffing. Indeed, a proposal was made that a similar management review should also be carried out for the Secretariat-General.

Thus, with the exception of the provision for the one translator/interpreter the committee proposed that the credits for the restructuring of the Office of the Clerk be withdrawn from the budget; a new appraisal should be made after the proposed management review. The committee recommended that Head I should be reduced by F 2 159 000. As a direct consequence, the estimated income of the pensions budget would be reduced by F 80 000 in respect of the contributions (7% of basic salary) foreseen for the additional staff.

Head II - V

The committee formed the view that the proposal to include additional credits to enable the Assembly to convene a session outside Paris was premature. They considered that the additional credits would not be needed if the building work in connection with the reorganisation of the seat of the Assembly were completed as intended, in good time for the June session.

The committee recommended that these additional credits should be frozen pending the presentation of a report on the progress of the work for decision by the Council in due course.

Head II

Credits proposed under Sub-Head 6, (staff recruited for sessions of the Assembly), included amounts in respect of the proposed session outside Paris. Consequently, an amount of F 378 000 was frozen.

Head III

In its special supplementary budget for 1989, the Assembly had proposed a number of additional security measures which would have led to a small economy in Head III, Sub-Head 12. However, the economy would not now be realised, because the Budget Committee did not approve the additional measures. To compensate for this, the committee approved an additional F 30 000, under Head III, Sub-Head 12.

The Committee considered that the expenditure foreseen under Head III, Sub-Head 13 (services for the organisation of the sessions) was too high and included an amount relating to the session outside Paris. An amount of F 50 000 was frozen.

Head IV

The committee did not agree the proposals concerning the restructuring of the Office of the Clerk, which included the cost of employing a chauffeur for the service car (see Head I). Consequently, the amount for the cost of hiring a chauffeur-driven car for the President of the Assembly needed to be greater than that provided under Sub-Head 22. However, because the committee did not reduce the total of Head IV, they considered that any additional cost for hiring a chauffeur-driven car could be found within the total provision for the head.

Head V

The increase in the provision for this head, compared with 1989, was considered to be far too high. The total was reduced by F 159 000 leaving it to the discretion of the Assembly where to effect the reduction within the head.

Moreover, in Sub-Head 27, (travel expenses for members of the Office of the Clerk), an amount of F 280 000 was frozen; this related to the proposed session of the Assembly outside Paris.

4. The committee recommended the following amended budget for 1990:

<i>(a) Operating budget</i>			
Head	Credits proposed F	Amendments F	Credits recommended F
I	15 421 000	2 159 000	13 262 000
II	4 045 000	-	4 045 000*
III	1 546 000	+ 30 000	1 576 000**
IV	2 085 500	-	2 085 500
V	2 181 000	159 000	2 022 000***
Income	25 278 500	- 2 288 000	22 990 500
	110 000	-	110 000
Net total operating budget	25 168 500	- 2 288 000	22 880 500
<i>(b) Pensions budget</i>			
Expenditure	3 151 000	-	3 151 000
Income	652 000	80 000	572 000
Net total pensions budget	2 499 000	80 000	2 579 000
<i>(c)</i>			
Net total budget	27 667 500	- 2 208 000	25 459 500

* of which F 378 000 frozen

** of which F 50 000 frozen

*** of which F 280 000 frozen

5. The following contributions would be required provisionally (CR(88)19,III,I and CR(89)1,VIII,2) from the seven member states to cover the total of F 25 459 500:

	600ths	F
Belgium	59.00	2 503 517.50
France	120.00	5 091 900.00
Germany	120.00	5 091 900.00
Italy	120.00	5 091 900.00
Luxembourg	2.00	84 865.00
Netherlands	59.00	2 503 517.50
United Kingdom	120.00	5 091 900.00
		25 459 500.00

6. The committee recommends the Council to give a favourable opinion on the Assembly's draft budget for 1990, as amended.

7. The Council's opinion will be sought at the next meeting on 22nd November 1989. It is recalled that this opinion should be conveyed to the Assembly before the next part-session opens on 4th December 1989.

APPENDIX II

*Letter from Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU,
to Mr. Moulias, Clerk of the Assembly*

25th November 1989

.....

I have the honour to inform you that, at its meeting today, the Council examined the draft budget of the Assembly for 1990 and, in accordance with procedure in force, expressed a favourable opinion on this amended budget as given in document C-B(89)24.

I enclose copies of this document.

.....

Willem VAN EEKELLEN

Mr. G. MOULIAS,
Clerk of the Assembly of
Western European Union,
43, avenue du Président-Wilson,
75775 Paris Cedex 16

APPENDIX III

*Table showing changes made to the initial draft budget
in the light of the Council's opinion*

Heads and sub-heads	Draft budget for 1990	Breakdown of changes made by the B.O.C	Amended draft budget
HEAD I – PERMANENT STAFF			
Sub-Head:			
1 – Basic salaries	10 531 000	– 1 142 000	9 389 000
2 – Allowances	2 435 000	– 408 000	2 027 000
3 – Social charges	2 048 000	– 212 000	1 836 000
4 – Expenses relating to the recruitment and departure of permanent officials	395 000	– 395 000	–
5 – Medical examination	12 000	– 2 000	10 000
TOTAL	15 421 000	– 2 159 000	13 262 000
HEAD II – TEMPORARY STAFF			
Sub-Head:			
6 – Staff recruited for sessions	3 217 000	–	3 217 000 ¹
7 – Interpretation staff required for Assem- bly work between sessions	640 000	–	640 000
8 – Temporary staff for the Office of the Clerk	15 000	–	15 000
9 – Social charges	173 000	–	173 000
TOTAL	4 045 000	–	4 045 000

1. Of which 378 000 F frozen.

Heads and sub-heads	Draft budget for 1990	Breakdown of changes made by the B.O.C	Amended draft budget
HEAD III – EXPENDITURE ON PREMISES AND EQUIPMENT			
Sub-Head:			
10 – Share of joint expenditure on the Paris premises	400 000	–	400 000
11 – Hire of committee rooms	10 000	–	10 000
12 – Technical and other installations for Assembly sessions	525 000	+ 30 000	555 000
13 – Various services for the organisation of sessions	100 000	–	100 000 ¹
14 – Maintenance of the premises of the Clerk	13 000	–	13 000
15 – Purchase or repair of office furniture ...	35 000	–	35 000
16 – Purchase of reproduction and other office equipment	2 000	–	2 000
17 – Hire and maintenance of reproduction and other office equipment	461 000	–	461 000
TOTAL	1 546 000	+ 30 000	1 576 000
HEAD IV – GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS			
Sub-Head:			
18 – Postage, telephone, telex and transport of documents	480 000	–	480 000
19 – Duplication paper, headed writing paper and other office supplies	280 000	–	280 000
20 – Printing and publication of documents .	1 120 000	–	1 120 000
21 – Purchase of documents	65 000	–	65 000
22 – Official cars	140 000	–	140 000
23 – Bank charges	500	–	500
TOTAL	2 085 500	–	2 085 500

1. Of which F 50 000 frozen.

Heads and sub-heads	Draft budget for 1990	Breakdown of changes made by the B.O.C	Amended draft budget
HEAD V – OTHER EXPENDITURE			
Sub-Head:			
24 – Travelling and subsistence allowances and insurance for the President of the Assembly, chairmen of committees and rapporteurs	190 000	–	190 000
25 – Expenses for representation	280 000	– 50 000	230 000
26 – Committee study missions	5 000	–	5 000
27 – Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk	730 000	– 50 000	680 000 ¹
28 – Expenses of experts and the auditor	40 000	– 10 000	30 000
29 – Expenditure on information	500 000	– 45 000	455 000
30 – Expenses for political groups	403 000	–	403 000
31 – Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere provided for	3 000	–	3 000
32 – Non-recoverable taxes	30 000	– 4 000	26 000
TOTAL	2 181 000	– 159 000	2 022 000
Operating Budget	25 278 500	–	22 990 500
Receipts	110 000	–	110 000
NET TOTAL OPERATING BUDGET	25 168 500	– 2 288 000	22 880 500
Pensions expenditure	3 151 000	–	3 151 000
Receipts	652 000	– 80 000	572 000
NET TOTAL PENSIONS BUDGET	2 499 000	+ 80 000	2 579 000
NET GRAND TOTAL	27 667 500	– 2 208 000	25 459 500

1. Of which F 280 000 frozen.

Revision of the Charter and Rules of Procedure

REPORT¹

*submitted on behalf of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges*²
by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Chairman and Rapporteur

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on the revision of Articles VII and XI of the Charter

DRAFT DECISION

on the revision of Rules 38, 42 and 47 of the Rules of Procedure

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submitted by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Rapporteur

APPENDICES

- I. Memorandum from Mr. Ahrens, Chairman of the General Affairs Committee, on changing the title of the General Affairs Committee
- II. Memorandum from Mr. Pontillon, Chairman of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations, on the reconsideration of the title and terms of reference of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations by the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee: Sir Geoffrey Finsberg (Chairman); MM. Thompson (Alternate: Hardy), Maris (Vice-Chairmen); MM. André, Antretter, Bohl, Caccia (Alternate: Mezzapesa), Collette, De Rycke, Dimmer, Eicher, Filetti (Alternate: Stegagnini), Jessel, Lord Kirkhill, Pasquino, Pistre, Scheer, von Schmude, Stoffelen (Alternate: de Kwaadsteniet), Taramelli, Unland.*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Decision

on the revision of Articles VII and XI of the Charter

The Assembly

DECIDES

To amend Articles VII and XI as follows:

1. *Article VII*

In paragraph (a), amend the titles of the committees to read as follows:

1. Defence Committee;
2. Political Committee;
3. Technological and Aerospace Committee;
4. Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration;
5. Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges;
6. Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations.

2. *Article XI*

In paragraph (b), after “committees”, add “or any other body created by the Assembly”.

In paragraph (c), replace “and the three agencies for security questions” by “and with the person responsible for any subsidiary body created by the Council”.

In the French text only, replace “Greffes de l’Assemblée” by “Secrétariat de l’Assemblée” and “Greffier” by “Secrétaire général de l’Assemblée”.

The English text remains unchanged.

Draft Decision

on the revision of Rules 38, 42 and 47 of the Rules of Procedure

The Assembly

DECIDES

To amend Rules 38, 42 and 47 as follows:

1. *Rule 38*

In paragraph 1, amend the titles of the committees to read as follows:

- (i) Defence Committee;
- (ii) Political Committee;
- (iii) Technological and Aerospace Committee;
- (iv) Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration;
- (v) Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges,

and add:

- (vi) Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations.

Leave out paragraph 2 and insert: " The first and second of the permanent committees shall be composed of 34 members divided as follows: Belgium 3, France 5, Federal Republic of Germany 5, Italy 5, Luxembourg 1, the Netherlands 3, Portugal 3, Spain 4, the United Kingdom 5. The third, fourth, fifth and sixth permanent committees shall be composed of 26 members divided as follows: Belgium 2, France 4, the Federal Republic of Germany 4, Italy 4, Luxembourg 1, the Netherlands 2, Portugal 2, Spain 3, the United Kingdom 4. The Presidential Committee may, during the periods between sessions or part-sessions, provisionally fill the seats which have fallen vacant in committees with representatives or substitutes. These appointments must be ratified at the first session of the Assembly. The secretaries of national delegations shall take part in meetings of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations without the right to vote. "

2. *Rule 42*

Delete Rule 42 and renumber subsequent rules accordingly.

3. *Rule 47*

In paragraph 5, replace " and the three agencies for security questions " by " and with the person responsible for any subsidiary body created by the Council ".

In the French text only, replace " Greffe de l'Assemblée " by " Secrétariat de l'Assemblée " and " Greffier " by " Secrétaire général de l'Assemblée ".

The English text remains unchanged.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Chairman and Rapporteur)

1. The Presidential Committee instructed the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges to submit a report to the Assembly on the titles of committees with a view to making them correspond more closely to the committees' activities.

2. The committee was also asked to consider a proposal by the Chairman of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations that that committee, which now has a special status, should be made a permanent committee of the Assembly.

I. Titles of committees

3. The committees were asked to give their views on their own titles.

4. In the memorandum at Appendix I, Mr. Ahrens, Chairman of the General Affairs Committee, set out the reasons why his committee wished to be known as the Political Committee. The purpose is to give the committee a simple, clear title more in line with its activities. This proposal was agreed to unanimously by the committee.

5. The Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments opted for the brief title of Defence Committee, since the word defence includes armaments concepts, as there can be no defence without armaments, and disarmament, since efficient defence is also sought in negotiating agreements on balanced, verified arms reductions.

6. The Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions also wished to be given the shorter title of Technological and Aerospace Committee to take account of the fact that the committee does not deal with purely scientific matters.

7. It is not proposed to amend the titles of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration or the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.

8. The proposal to change the French title of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations to "Commission pour les relations parlementaires et publiques" is in order.

II. Status of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations

9. Mr. Pontillon's memorandum at Appendix II sets out very clearly the reasons why the Committee for Parliamentary and

Public Relations should be made a permanent WEU committee.

10. Initially, the committee was merely a working group formed to draw the attention of the parliaments of member countries to the activities of the WEU Assembly. Each delegation was therefore represented equally by two members and two alternates.

11. This working group was made into a committee whose status is set out in Rule 42 of the Rules of Procedure. It was authorised to submit draft orders to the Assembly or resolutions addressed to the parliaments. However, it may not adopt draft recommendations since it has no mandate to handle relations with the Council.

12. The mandate of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations was extended to public relations shortly before the Council decided to be more active in public relations. Moreover, in spring 1989 the United Kingdom presidency of the Council organised a seminar on changes in public perceptions of European defence.

13. The committee was therefore instructed by the Presidential Committee to consider the sections of the Council's annual report relating to the public relations activities of the Council and its presidency. However, the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations cannot carry out its task if it is not empowered, like the other committees, to submit to the Assembly draft recommendations in reply to the Council.

14. For it to be able to do so, its composition has to be changed. The number of titular and alternate members of the Assembly's permanent committees, who have to vote on texts that form part of the Assembly's dialogue with the Council, is laid down in the Rules of Procedure and is in proportion to the number of members on each delegation.

15. It is therefore proposed to give the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations the same composition as the other 26-member committees, i.e.:

- four titular members and four alternates for the largest delegations;
- three titular members and three alternates for Spain;
- two titular members and two alternates for Belgium, the Netherlands and Portugal;
- one titular member and one alternate for Luxembourg.

16. Finally, the secretaries of national delegations would continue to have the right to take part in the work of the committee but not to vote.

17. The amendments thus proposed mean that Article VII of the Charter would have to be amended in order to change the titles of certain Assembly committees and add a sixth permanent committee, the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations.

18. In parallel with the amendment of Article VII, paragraphs 1 and 2 of Rule 38 of the Rules of Procedure on the appointment of committees would have to be amended to take account of the amended Article VII and to show the composition of the new permanent committee as indicated above.

III. Article XI of the Charter

19. On the occasion of this revision of the Charter and Rules of Procedure, the opportunity should be taken to update Article XI of the Charter, paragraph (c) of which states that "the Clerk shall establish close co-operation with the Secretary-General of Western European Union and the three agencies for security questions". It is believed that these agencies are to be wound down and replaced by an institute in accordance with the Assembly's wishes. However this may be, the words "and the three agencies for security questions" should be replaced by "and with the person responsible for any subsidiary body created by the Council". Paragraph (b) of this article referring to the Clerk's commitments

to the Assembly should also be completed by adding after "committees" the words "or any other body created by the Assembly".

20. Finally, it is proposed to amend the French text of Article XI because of the misunderstanding caused by use of the words "Greffe" and "Greffier". Paul Robert's dictionary of the French language defines them as follows: *Greffe*: office in which the minutes of proceedings are kept; *Greffier*: public official in charge of that office (of a civil court or justice of the peace). It is understandable that, in his relations with certain authorities, the Clerk (*Greffier*) has some difficulty in making it understood that he is not the official in charge of the Assembly's archives.

21. It should be pointed out that in Belgium the title of *Greffier* hitherto applied to the Secretaries-General of the Chamber of Representatives and Senate has been replaced by that of "Secrétaire général de la Chambre des Représentants (or Sénat)". It is therefore proposed to amend the French text only to replace "Greffe" by "Secrétariat de l'Assemblée" and "Greffier" by "Secrétaire général de l'Assemblée".

22. The English text of Article XI of the Charter and Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure would remain unchanged since the word "Clerk" does not give rise to the same confusion with a public official in charge of filing court orders.

APPENDIX I

*Memorandum from Mr. Ahrens,
Chairman of the General Affairs Committee, on
changing the title of the General Affairs Committee*

At the meeting of the Presidential Committee on 4th April 1989, a request was made to change the title of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. I took the opportunity of pointing out that the title of the General Affairs Committee, too, seemed inappropriate since its meaning was already obscure in French and became incomprehensible when translated into other languages. I proposed that henceforth the committee be known as the Political Committee, which seemed clear and unambiguous in all languages and corresponded exactly to the mandate of the General Affairs Committee. The change of title should allow the press to report on the work of the committee more easily.

As we know, when WEU was first set up, the Council, anxious not to imply that it was duplicating the work of the political bodies of other organisations, formed a General Affairs Division, so that it was natural for the Assembly to give the same title to its committee that handled the same questions. However, since the reform of the WEU ministerial organs in 1985, the General Affairs Division has disappeared from the Council's organogram and secretariat and has been replaced by a Political Affairs Division. It therefore seems logical for the Assembly to adopt the same title for the committee more particularly responsible for following the work of that division of the Council.

For these two reasons, the General Affairs Committee asks to be known henceforth as the Political Committee.

Since the Presidential Committee has asked the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges to report to it on the titles of the committees, I reserve the right to transmit this text to the Presidential Committee if the committee agrees to it.

APPENDIX II

***Memorandum from Mr. Pontillon, Chairman of the Committee
for Parliamentary and Public Relations, on the
reconsideration of the title and terms of reference of
the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations
by the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges***

At its meeting on 4th April 1989, the Presidential Committee was informed of proposals to change the titles of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, which henceforth wishes to be known simply as the Defence Committee, and of the General Affairs Committee, which now wishes to be called the Political Committee. After a discussion, it was agreed to ask the Committee on Rules of Procedure to consider the titles of *all the committees* on the basis of proposals by the committees concerned.

I took the opportunity of pointing out that the study proposed should not exclude examination of the terms of reference of certain committees, including the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations.

I received the following letter from the Clerk of the Assembly dated 3rd May:

“ The Presidential Committee has instructed the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges to examine committee titles after consulting the committees concerned.

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg would therefore be particularly grateful if you would notify him before 31st July of any suggestions the committee of which you are Chairman might wish to make concerning its title. He has asked me to point out that, if he receives no answer from you, he proposes to consider that your committee does not wish its title to be changed.”

If the committee agrees, I propose answering Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Chairman of the Committee on Rules of Procedure, in the following sense:

“ Clearly, the title of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations is fairly cumbersome, particularly in French. The title of the corresponding committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe – the Committee on Parliamentary and Public Relations – is shorter in French, and this title – Commission des relations parlementaires et publiques – might be adopted for our own committee.”

However, the committee considers that its main problem is not its title but the limit on its status and powers which restricts its activities in an area of growing importance.

For some time, the committee has been instructed by the Presidential Committee to examine sections of the annual report of the Council relating to its public relations activities, with particular regard to informing the public and the press. It was also invited to participate in the seminar organised by the United Kingdom Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council on changes in public perceptions of European defence.

The committee's work in this area can serve no useful purpose if it is not authorised to transmit its conclusions to the Council in the form of a text voted upon in committee.

In view of the growing importance of strengthening the dialogue with the parliaments and public in Europe and also in the New World, it would seem fully justified for the committee to be given the status of permanent committee within the meaning of the Charter and Rules of Procedure of the Assembly.

This new status would not prevent the secretaries of national delegations continuing to take part in the committee's work. Their participation is useful and should be continued.

It is therefore proposed that:

- the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations be added to the five present permanent committees;
- the breakdown of members of the committee among member countries be determined;
- it should be specified that the secretaries of national delegations are entitled to participate in meetings of the committee on a consultative basis;
- Rule 42 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly be deleted.

Revision of the Charter and Rules of Procedure

AMENDMENTS 1 and 2¹

tabled by Mr. Reddemann

1. In paragraph 2 of the draft decision on the revision of Articles VII and XI of the Charter, leave out the third and fourth sentences.
2. In paragraph 3 of the draft decision on the revision of Rules 38, 42 and 47 of the Rules of Procedure, leave out the second and third sentences.

Signed: Reddemann

1. See 7th sitting, 4th December 1989 (amendments withdrawn).

*First part of the thirty-fifth annual report of the Council
to the Assembly of Western European Union*

(1st January – 30th June 1989)

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Introduction

1. The first half of 1989 was a highly eventful period as far as East-West relations affecting security were concerned. The adoption on 15th January of the final document of the Vienna follow-up meeting to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, the opening on 6th March of the Vienna negotiations on conventional forces in Europe – part of the CSCE process – the parallel 35-nation negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures, and the Atlantic Alliance summit held in Brussels on 29th and 30th May were all noteworthy events directly connected with WEU activities. It is against this dynamic, and potentially promising, background that the organisation has continued its activities, pursuing its consideration of problems affecting European security.

2. Also of note are the positions adopted by the new United States administration, which openly declared itself in favour of the development of a European security identity, and the backing given by President Bush to greater co-operation within WEU. Such declarations will undoubtedly inspire the member states to continue in their endeavours. Other European states have also shown a sustained interest in WEU activities.

3. Discussions ranged over all the main current issues concerning European security. At their meeting on 3rd and 4th April, ministers had an in-depth exchange of views on all such matters, in anticipation of the alliance summit on 29th and 30th May. The question of modernising SNF was discussed on that

occasion, highlighting the need for a common position, such as was adopted at the Brussels summit. In that light also, the ministers examined the question of conventional arms control that they considered to be the keystone of European security. They welcomed the constructive atmosphere in which those negotiations had begun on the basis of the western proposals prepared jointly by the allies, with the active participation of WEU member states.

4. With regard to developments in Eastern Europe and in the USSR, ministers noted at their meeting of 3rd and 4th April that there should be a favourable response to the desire expressed by those countries, and in particular by President Gorbachev, to maintain close and co-operative relations with Western Europe as a whole and with the member states of the European Community. Ministers welcomed these developments which they considered fundamental for Europe and its future. They were, however, of the opinion that some caution should prevail regarding these developments. Accordingly, while on the one hand encouraging Eastern Europe to show more and more openness, one should on the other hand maintain an effective defence capability including an adequate level of deterrence to guarantee the security of Western Europe. Ministers took the view that such deterrence was the best means of directing developments towards greater stability in the longer term.

5. Ministers welcomed the successful outcome of the Paris Conference on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and stressed the need to overcome quickly the remaining

problem concerning the setting-up of a convention on the worldwide ban of these weapons at an early date.

6. In view of the fact that the co-ordination of member states' naval activities in the Gulf had come to a successful conclusion with "Operation Cleansweep", ministers noted that this experience and the lessons to be learnt regarding concertation on an out-of-Europe crisis were valuable both for the member states and the organisation itself.

7. Ministers took note of the fact that both Turkey and Greece wished to accede to WEU. Ministerial level consultation procedures had been initiated with the two countries.

8. With regard to institutional matters, the Ministerial Council indicated that it was prepared to meet Assembly requirements ensuing directly from enlargement. It requested the Permanent Council to continue to seek a solution that would satisfy the Assembly and that could be financed from the resources available for this purpose. Furthermore, the Ministerial Council requested the Permanent Council to continue examining the question of setting up an institute for strategic studies and the related matter of the WEU Paris ministerial organs with a view to discussions at its next meeting.

9. Lastly, the Ministerial Council took note of the departure of Mr. Alfred Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU. It paid tribute to him for his outstanding service on behalf of the organisation. Dr. Willem van Eekelen was appointed Secretary-General for five years with effect from 15th May.

10. Assembly representatives were informed of the outcome of the ministerial meeting held on 4th April by the ministers representing the United Kingdom presidency, namely Sir Geoffrey Howe and Mr. George Younger.

I. Activities of the Permanent Council

1. During the period under review, the Permanent Council, both at its regular meetings and at "enlarged" sessions, continued to follow all the activities of the WEU intergovernmental organs.

2. The Council studied the applications for accession by Turkey and Greece; it prepared ministerial decisions on the subject and kept a close watch on developments, particularly the initiation of the ministerial-level consultation procedure with the two countries.

3. The Council addressed all matters related to WEU enlargement to include Portugal and Spain following the signing of the protocol of accession on 14th November 1988. It followed progress in the national ratification procedures. By 30th June 1989, four member states had ratified the protocol of accession.

4. The Permanent Council had initial exchanges of views on the review of the provisions of the treaty and its protocols. It will consider this matter in greater depth at the appropriate time, taking due account in its deliberations of the views of the Assembly, such as those expressed in the van der Sanden report and Recommendation 472.

5. The Council has closely followed matters relating to Assembly requirements directly ensuing from enlargement. For that purpose, numerous contacts have been made with the Assembly.

In order to make a detailed analysis of the financial implications, the Council decided to obtain the opinion of a second architect on the work required.

The Council was insistent that the reorganisation should in no way hinder the normal functioning of the Paris ministerial organs.

6. The Council looked at the whole range of institutional matters. Following the Ministerial Council in April 1989, and taking account of Recommendation 467 of the Presidential Committee of the Assembly on the setting up of an institute for advanced defence studies, the Council decided to establish an institutional working group (see VI below) to prepare a solution to the organisation's institutional problems for submission at the ministerial meeting in November 1989.

7. The Council dealt with a large number of topical issues in the politico-military field. They included:

- the situation in the Mediterranean and in the Gulf;
- the Anglo-German summit held in Frankfurt on 20th and 21st February;
- Mr. Gorbachev's visit to London (6th and 7th April);
- the modernisation of short-range nuclear missiles in Europe;
- the Franco-German Security and Defence Council;
- the alliance summit and the meeting of the North Atlantic Assembly.

II. Activities of the Special Working Group

1. Following the ministerial meeting of 14th November 1988, the Special Working Group decided that it should concentrate in the first half of 1989 on topical politico-military questions and on specific studies requested by the Council.

2. The main topical questions studied by the SWG in the first six months of 1989 were:

- the conclusion of the Vienna Conference on CSCE follow-up;
- the Paris Conference, the problems of verification and European disarmament interests as regards chemical weapons;
- the negotiations on conventional forces in Europe and the attitude that member states should adopt;
- the consequences for WEU countries of the NATO summit.

3. As part of the implementation of the platform and on the basis of mandates approved by the Ministerial Council, the SWG has undertaken to study two significant items, one on Europe's possible rôle in the space field and the other on the defence implications of the single market after 1992.

4. As far as space is concerned, the SWG examined, on the basis of national contributions, the prospects offered by the application of space technology to verification requirements.

Subsequently, it defined the terms of reference for a study to be conducted by a sub-group on space with a view to submitting to ministers at their meeting in November 1989 an interim report, describing the value and potential of co-operation in space (see IV below).

5. With regard to 1992 and its possible implications in terms of security, it was considered useful to study to what extent the prospects of the opening-up of Community frontiers, the free movement and establishment of persons and the opening-up of public contracts, were likely to affect the organisation of our countries' defence.

This process of reflection, now in progress, should also take account of work on the same topics being carried out within other fora, such as the European Community or the IEPG.

6. Further progress in the process of European construction and the conclusion of the CFE negotiations will mean a profound change in the conditions of our security in Western Europe.

Accordingly, the SWG has undertaken to reflect on European security requirements in the medium term, i.e., 1992-1995.

7. The SWG has also been considering the question of the "out-of-Europe" activities of WEU member states.

There was an exchange of information on the member states' security-related programmes of assistance to third world countries, and on the

assessment of regional situations likely to affect vital European security interests.

8. Lastly, the SWG is also considering the possible implications of a CFE agreement, in particular its verification régime, for the security of WEU member states.

III. Activities of the Defence Representatives Group (DRG)

1. During this period, the DRG has met approximately once a month, twice at high level. Whereas the SWG studies the whole range of politico-military questions, the DRG has confirmed its rôle as a forum within which defence ministry representatives can address those aspects more specifically concerned with defence. The joint meetings now taking place between the SWG and the DRG provide a useful mechanism for maintaining cohesion in the work at all levels.

2. The DRG has begun its consideration of the potential for intensifying co-operation in future, inter alia, by improving the use of training facilities, the joint use and development - wherever possible - of simulators, and by exchange programmes for units and personnel. A detailed report containing practical recommendations for co-operation in the field of instruction and training will be submitted to the ministerial meeting in November 1989.

3. The group has also begun to consider the practical military consequences of verification and inspection measures which might ensue from a CFE agreement. It was agreed that, although verification was a national responsibility, the member states would consider studying, as far as was possible, those areas of verification in which WEU countries might usefully co-operate and co-ordinate their activities. There was also a preliminary discussion of the impact which any conventional force reductions agreed in CFE might have on defence planning by the ministries concerned in the member countries.

4. The DRG is keeping on its agenda a number of longer-term issues such as the study of operational concepts and requirements and the demographic problems in Western Europe.

Another topic addressed by the DRG was the public perception of defence, a topic which provided the subject for a seminar organised by the United Kingdom (see VIII below).

IV. Activities of the Mediterranean Sub-Group of the Special Working Group

In accordance with ministers' instructions, the sub-group continued its work, concentrating on an analysis of the situation in two specific areas.

1. Developments in Yugoslavia and their repercussions in the Balkans

The sub-group noted that the power of the executive continued to weaken to the advantage of the Republics. At federal level, there was a strong determination to maintain continuity in foreign and defence policies against an unfavourable economic background.

Yugoslavia, whilst attaching importance to its rôle as leader of the non-aligned movement, is becoming more interested in co-operation with Western Europe and in regional problems in the Balkans and the Mediterranean.

Albania continues to pursue its policy of cautious openness towards Western Europe, and appears particularly keen to avoid any worsening of the situation in Kosovo.

2. Developments in the Maghreb

In this region, threats to stability are not essentially of a military nature, but derive from the political, social, demographic and, above all, economic factors apt to produce change in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. The unpredictability of crises constitutes an additional element of uncertainty. On the other hand, the creation of the Arab Maghreb Union is an important stabilising factor in the region.

The group is currently studying the rôle of naval units in the region.

V. The ad hoc Sub-Group on Space

At their meeting of 3rd-4th April 1989, ministers discussed the implications for European security of current or planned national space programmes.

They asked the Permanent Council to draw up guidelines for an in-depth study of three specific aspects: the possible use of space technology in connection with arms control verification, the monitoring of political crises and civilian missions concerning the environment.

An ad hoc sub-group on space was set up to:

- review partners' activities in the field of space technology;
- consider areas where member states might see a need for co-ordinated activities;
- identify the technical means available and/or required for such activities;
- report to ministers.

The sub-group met for the first time on 14th June to discuss the initial national contributions on co-operation in the space field and to decide on its working methods and work programme.

VI. The Institutional Working Group

1. The question of the possible establishment under WEU auspices of a European institute for advanced defence studies has been discussed frequently by the Council since the reactivation of WEU. The Presidential Committee of the Assembly recalled as much when, on 16th March 1989, it adopted Recommendation 467.

2. On 3rd April 1989, the Ministerial Council of WEU "(...) instructed the Permanent Council to review the question of an institute for strategic studies and the related question of the WEU Agency with a view to further discussion at its next meeting (...)".

3. On the basis of this mandate, the Permanent Council agreed to convene its Institutional Working Group (IWG). Following an initial exchange of views on 1st June 1989, the IWG decided that the possible establishment of such an institute could be considered from three angles:

- the contribution of such an institute in the context of strengthening the European security identity;
- the tasks it should perform;
- its method of operation.

4. The Assembly will be informed of the outcome of ministers' discussions on the subject when the Belgian presidency of the Council meets the Presidential Committee of the Assembly in Brussels on 14th November, following the ministerial meeting.

VII. Relations with the Assembly

1. The dialogue between the Council and the Assembly of WEU has continued constructively.

The concern of both the presidency and the Council to keep the Assembly informed of the state of WEU dossiers has found expression in the "formal" meetings held before - and after - the Ministerial Council and in the informal contacts between representatives of the current presidency, either alone or accompanied by representatives of the previous and future presidencies (the "troika"), and representatives of the Assembly.

2. The United Kingdom Chairman-in-Office, Sir Geoffrey Howe, Foreign Secretary, and Mr. George Younger, Secretary of State for Defence, in the presence of the Secretary-General, met:

- on 16th March, in London, representatives of the Presidential Committee of the Assembly;
- on 4th April, at the end of the London Ministerial Council, representatives of the Presidential Committee, the General Affairs Committee and the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments of the Assembly.

The two representatives of the incoming presidency of the Council, the Belgian Foreign Minister, Mr. Leo Tindemans, and Defence Minister, Mr. Guy Coëme, were also present at the second meeting.

3. The Secretary-General continued to send to the Assembly, approximately every two months, an information letter on the activities of the intergovernmental organs.

The Assembly will continue to receive such information letters at suitable intervals,

depending on the pace and substance of the Council's activities.

VIII. Public Relations

The public relations activities of the organisation continued to increase. During the period under review, the Secretary-General made strenuous efforts to publicise the work of WEU and to promote greater European public awareness and understanding of European security issues. In addition, the United Kingdom presidency organised a seminar on "Changes in Public Perceptions of European Defence", from 6th-7th March at Lancaster House, London. Among the participants from the nine WEU member countries were civil servants from the foreign and defence ministries, academics, journalists and representatives from the WEU Assembly. At their meeting in April, ministers took note of this seminar and instructed the Permanent Council to suggest ways of improving the organisation's public relations effort. The Secretariat is currently working on proposals to submit to the Council in this respect.

*WEU in the single European market –
reply to the half-yearly report of the Council*

REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee ²
by Mr. Caro, Rapporteur*

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1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Ahrens (Chairman) (Alternate: *Soell*); Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Martino (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Aarts, Beix, *Böhm*, Caro, Coleman (Alternate: *Lord Kirkhill*), Collart, Eich, Forni (Alternate: *Pontillon*), Foschi (Alternate: *Mezzapesa*), Hill, Hirschler, Koehl, *Lord Mackie of Benshie*, MM. Müller, Natali, Pécriaux, *Pieralli*, Mrs. Polfer (Alternate: *Kollwelter*), MM. Ruet, van der Sanden (Alternate: *Eisma*), Sarti, Sir William Shelton (Alternate: *Speed*), Mrs. Staels-Dompas, Mr. Stoffelen.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

*on WEU in the single European market –
reply to the half-yearly report of the Council*

I

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that the Single European Act is in harmony with the principles and aims set out in the modified Brussels Treaty, particularly in its preamble and Articles I and II, and considering that the respective responsibilities of WEU and the European Community are complementary;
- (ii) Considering that the creation of a single European market raises problems of security for the WEU member countries to which they will have to find concerted solutions;
- (iii) Noting that the European Commission has set up a service to deal with security and defence questions but that the prospect of the development of relations between the European Community and several neutral countries or non-members of the Atlantic Alliance should deter the Community from handling such matters which, in any case, fall within the competence of WEU under the modified Brussels Treaty which has not been superseded and which are of greater importance because of recent political developments in Europe;
- (iv) Considering that the Atlantic Alliance remains the basis of European security but that the rôle played by Europe in the alliance should be re-examined,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Instruct a working group to conduct, in consultation with the European Commission, a detailed study of the problems that will arise for the security of member states when frontier controls are abolished and report to the Assembly on its conclusions;
2. Study carefully the disparities that will arise in the single European market due to the present difference between the burdens imposed on member states by their defence policies with a view to finding a remedy;
3. With the European Commission, set up a joint working group to prepare a list of products and technologies which, if released to third countries, might jeopardise world peace, the aim being to ban any such action by member countries, and endeavour to promote the same rules among other exporting countries;
4. Seek better methods so that, wherever possible, specifications and requirements may be harmonised and agreed in joint programmes, thus facilitating an effective co-ordinated European approach;
5. Examine procedures in the various member countries for placing orders for the armed forces with industrial firms with a view to achieving a unified approach;
6. In the same context, examine the obligations of staff employed by industries manufacturing partly or solely for defence purposes.

II

Furthermore, the Assembly,

- (i) Considering with regret that the Council does not make sufficient use of its statutory means of pursuing a dialogue with the Assembly;
- (ii) Considering in particular the delay in replying to Recommendation 467;
- (iii) Noting with satisfaction that, in its reply to Recommendation 472, the Council renewed its undertaking to report to the Assembly on all aspects of the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, even when this is done in other forums, but noting that it has given no information about the activities of the European Commission in defence matters;

(iv) Welcoming the fact that the Secretary-General's address in Brussels on 21st September 1989 provided interesting information on the state of the reactivation of WEU, but regretting that the Assembly has not yet received an official communication of the same standard;

(v) Considering that the Council's requirements in respect of the management of the Assembly's supplementary budget would, if carried into effect, be detrimental to the principle of the Assembly's budgetary autonomy and the responsibilities of the President of the Assembly as defined in the Financial Regulations;

(vi) Welcoming the steps taken by the Council in 1989 to allow more in-depth thinking by the administration of member countries on keeping the public informed and on artificial intelligence and the pursuit of European sessions of defence studies,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Use its statutory means to give the Assembly precise, full information on its structures, work and plans so as to allow a true dialogue;
2. Give priority to the Assembly when communicating such information;
3. Enable the Assembly to take part in its thinking on the tasks to be attributed to the future institute;
4. Take no measures that may involve relations between the new institute and the Assembly without securing the latter's prior agreement;
5. Respect the principle of the Assembly's budgetary autonomy in the conditions that the Council itself laid down in 1987;
6. Inform the Assembly of the measures taken in the European Community to allow the European Commission to study security and defence questions;
7. Continue to associate the Assembly with the seminars and colloquies that it organises;
8. Examine in what conditions and in which framework a European centre for preventing military risks might be set up and inform the Assembly of the conclusions of its study.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Caro, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. When the working paper that was to serve as a basis for the present report was first considered on 5th October 1989, some members of the General Affairs Committee said they believed it should be strongly reaffirmed that the Atlantic Alliance was the essential basis of Europe's defence. Your Rapporteur willingly accepts this fact. However, since the subject with which he has to deal relates to the 1993 deadline, he felt that the main reason for his report was the introduction, on that date, of the single European market. He reserves the right to ask for a report to be included in the agenda of the next part-session in June 1990 on relations between WEU and NATO in the new circumstances, a subject which he considers to be of very special importance. He has not been able to conduct that study and the one for which he is more particularly responsible at one and the same time.
2. Started in July 1987, implementation of the Single European Act, signed and ratified by the present twelve member countries of the European Community, is to be continued until 31st December 1992, on which date there should no longer be any economic frontiers between those countries. This may be seen as a major step towards the establishment of a united Europe even if it should prove that from certain points of view the abolition of these frontiers could not be complete on that date. It is indeed very probable that the drive of the single market will lead to an early solution being found to economic problems not settled beforehand.
3. It is clear the disappearance of remaining barriers to total freedom in exchanges of goods and persons will raise questions for the states concerned, the importance of which cannot yet be fully assessed in terms of internal legislation and external and defence policy. In the first area, for instance, there are considerable differences between member countries of the Community in allowing foreigners the right to vote and these differences have repercussions on the application of the right of establishment, now in principle guaranteed for all citizens of Community countries. The aim of the present report is to consider the implications of this emerging European economic entity for the external and defence policies of the WEU member countries and, perhaps too, what limits security-related considerations must impose on the opening of frontiers.
4. Since the single act was signed, it has been apparent that these matters have been tackled in two different ways. Some, considering the Community to be the first step towards the future United States of Europe, infer that it should quickly take on global responsibilities far exceeding its responsibilities under the various founding treaties. They therefore believe the European Community to be closed to all countries which do not accept at one and the same time all the founding treaties and also a certain view of their future. This was, for instance, the attitude adopted by Mr. Delors, President of the Commission of the Community, in his speech to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on 26th September 1989. It should, however, be said that, speaking in Bonn on 5th October 1989, Mr. Delors said "Europe and its unity cannot be dissociated from your own. The movement towards it may succeed with the Community... the movement can only succeed with it". He encouraged the Community to go out to meet the wishes of Eastern Europe, asserting that "it never intends to subordinate fundamental working rights to economic efficiency". If this really is his view, he should adjust his action in security and defence matters accordingly.
5. Others, on the contrary, believing the treaties should be strictly respected, consider that the Community has responsibilities only in areas assigned to it under the treaties and that, in those where it has none, it is for other international bodies to co-ordinate the policies of member states of the Community, including NATO and WEU in security matters. This concept, presented to the Assembly at its last session by Mr. Younger, United Kingdom Secretary of State for Defence, is to be found in the "Plan for Europe" referred to by Mr. Genscher, the Federal German Minister for Foreign Affairs, on 1st October 1989 in a interview on the Deutsche Rundfunk. In view of the very rapid pace of events in Eastern Europe, Mr. Genscher proposed making use of the European Economic Community to organise close co-operation between Eastern European countries choosing the path of radical reforms and Western Europe, and of the Council of Europe to set the framework for a "European juridical area". He believed this meant that those two organisations should avoid tackling security and defence questions which should remain a matter for the Atlantic Alliance and WEU, in accordance with the treaties in force. Without settling the question clearly, the text of the single act nevertheless refers security and defence matters to these two organisations. In other words, it does not question the application of Articles 223 and 234 of the Rome Treaty.

6. Moreover, the development of détente in the last four years has significantly changed the facts of the matter. The Soviet Union has shown clearly that it is tackling the problem of its relations with Western Europe from two very different standpoints. For the development of economic relations between Eastern and Western Europe, it has agreed that the European Community is a legitimate partner. It has fully recognised the existence of the Community and is simply afraid, like the United States and most third countries, that it may be protectionist. It has established diplomatic relations with it and made it plain that it had no objection to neutral countries, or even member countries of the Warsaw Pact, organising their relations with the Community as they saw fit, even considering accession. Conversely, Soviet diplomacy has made it plain that this attitude is closely linked with the fact that the Community is not and does not intend to be a military bloc. In other words, it is not troubled by the treaties governing the European Community and it feels they provide the framework for a European entity with which the Soviet Union is prepared to develop relations. They should also allow its allies to organise their own relations as they please. It considers, however, that neutral countries, or member countries of the Warsaw Pact, could not legitimately find a place in a European system of military alliance without jeopardising balance and peace, which is, after all, quite logical.

7. However, early in 1989, Austria, whose neutrality is defined in an act of the Austrian state, compatible with the 1955 state treaty of which the Soviet Union is a signatory, as are the 1945 western allies, made it plain that it intends to apply for membership of the Community. Hungary, a Warsaw Pact member country, has also indicated that it hoped to develop economic relations with the European Community and that it too was thinking of applying for membership.

8. The Community is therefore going to have to emerge from the mist in which it has so far shrouded its relations with defence Europe. In the probably quite near future, it will have to decide whether it alone is a precursor of the future United States of Europe, consisting solely of countries having chosen the western liberal and democratic way of life, or whether it must give up this view of its future and opt for the prospect of East-West détente, entente and co-operation, i.e., in the more or less long term, the reunification of Eastern and Western Europe in accordance with its own principles but at the cost of giving up any claim in the areas of security and defence. As long as the Soviet Union seemed to be a very direct threat and persisted in running its economy in a way that separated it radically from parts of the world that it did not control, the prospects of détente

appeared to be merely a device to thwart the West's unifying aims. It was then perfectly logical not to take account of the prospects of a then problematic evolution of East-West relations when organising the present and future of a highly integrated Western Europe. This changed once Europe was faced with a choice between two future prospects, neither of which it could discard: reunification of a Europe which had been fragmented by two world wars and the closest possible union of Europe. Before Austria's candidature has even been presented, it brings the Western European countries to grips with this unpleasant option that it has been trying to avoid for forty years.

9. Die Welt of 30th August 1989 reported a statement by Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU, as follows:

“WEU is the appropriate instrument for adding the security policy dimension to the economic and political dimensions of the European union. He said it would thus be a mistake to admit neutral states such as Austria to the European Community. If it were admitted, Europe would be powerless and unable to play any rôle in the world. He recommended concluding special co-operation agreements, mainly economically-oriented, with interested neutral countries such as Austria rather than to admit them to the Community.”

10. The Assembly, by calling for many years for a political Secretary-General to be appointed, persevered with the idea that a politician would be best placed to act with authority, and it can but welcome the fact that, after Mr. Alfred Cahen, Mr. van Eekelen is asserting himself as a Secretary-General who says what he thinks in public, without bothering to obtain the prior approval of the Council. The Assembly regrets that he was unable to do so when he was invited to address its Soviet guests on 11th July 1989. However, this does not mean that it endorses his views nor that it wishes to associate itself with his comment on the European Parliament, reproaching it for intervening in a matter which does not directly concern it. It is not for our Assembly to give its views on the enlargement of the Community.

11. The modified Brussels Treaty probably provides the only means of moving towards the twofold aim of union and détente without too much difficulty. On the one hand, it created a defensive alliance between its members and, on the other, its preamble stresses the will of its signatories to develop their economic, social and cultural links, “to promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe” and “to associate progressively in the pursuance of these aims other states inspired by the same ideals and animated by the like determination”. Article I lays down that

co-operation in WEU "shall not involve any duplication of, or prejudice to, the work of other economic organisations in which the high contracting parties are or may be represented but shall on the contrary assist the work of those organisations", while Article II makes "specialised agencies" responsible for ensuring economic and social co-operation between the WEU member countries. There is nothing to prevent such co-operation being extended to include countries that are not members of WEU, be this in the framework of the Council of Europe, the Community or co-operation with Eastern European countries.

12. If, therefore, the Community chooses a path that prevents it from assuming responsibility for Europe's defence policy, WEU is the instrument by which those of its members who so wish can develop co-operation in this area. The two organisations are complementary and, with the decisions it will have to take when Austria applies for membership, it is the Community that will have to fix the boundaries of what it is able to undertake. Conversely, it will then be for WEU to examine the implications for the joint organisation of the security of WEU member countries of decisions taken by members of the Community.

13. Everything indicates that this was the point of view of the governments of the seven WEU countries and of Portugal and Spain, who declared, in subscribing to the platform of The Hague: "We are convinced that the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include security and defence. An important means to this end is the modified Brussels Treaty." This text corresponds perfectly with the single act, in which it is stated that "closer co-operation on questions of European security would contribute in an essential way to the development of a European identity in external policy matters".

14. There is moreover every reason to be gratified that the President of the European Commission has instructed some of his counsellors to examine the problems that the security and defence of Europe raise for the Community since there inevitably are problems and there will be even more as from 1993. It is equally normal for the ministers of defence of the Community member countries not to meet in the twelve-power framework and that, in their political consultations, the ministers for foreign affairs avoid matters relating to joint defence.

15. However, there is a school of thought that assimilates a future European union, whose structures and shape are far from fixed, wholly and immediately within a European Community based on the accession of certain countries to very precise contractual texts. As defenders of that interpretation note that the twelve governments concerned consider unani-

mously that their commitments are limited strictly to application of the treaties they signed, they are tempted to use the European Parliament to force the governments' hands. For instance, they speak of "constituent" initiatives that that parliamentary assembly might take and ask that it deal directly with security and defence questions. This is, for instance, the sense of a resolution adopted by the Union of European Federalists on 9th April 1989. As they foresee that such an initiative might be refused by representatives of countries whose defence policy does not coincide with that pursued by others in NATO, some are asking for the delegations of the seven (soon nine) WEU member countries to the European Parliament to replace the delegations from those countries to the Council of Europe for forming the WEU Assembly. To some extent, the European Parliament echoed these views, first by having security matters dealt with in the reports of its Political Committee, then by giving that committee a security and disarmament sub-committee and, finally, by asking for Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty to be revised so as to have our Assembly formed at least partly from members of the European Parliament.

16. There is no need to re-examine this matter here since the Assembly gave its point of view on 5th June 1989 when it adopted Recommendation 472 on a report by Mr. van der Sanden on behalf of the General Affairs Committee. Inter alia, it recommended that the Council "maintain the provision in Article IX for the Assembly to be composed of delegations from the national parliaments of member countries" on the occasion of the forthcoming revision of the treaty and "ensure that an incorrect interpretation of the Rome Treaty and the Single European Act does not affect the application of the modified Brussels Treaty". These points in a recommendation that also related to other WEU activities were tantamount to recalling the principle of *pacta sunt servanda*.

17. It is therefore most surprising that some observers, including the director of the press agency whose task is to inform the world about what is going on in Europe, should have interpreted our Assembly's vote as "starting a war against the European Parliament". Contrary to what is stated in the editorial in the Europe Bulletin of 15th June 1989, the WEU Assembly did not "choose the time at which important political tensions are emerging within the Community on vital problems, in order to bring up an old argument which, over and above the classic inter-institutional conflicts, looks more like a war declared against the system based on European political integration". On the one hand, the Assembly did not choose to adopt this recommendation just when there was tension in the Community, of which it was moreover

unaware. It answered a European Parliament text that concerned the application of the modified Brussels Treaty and not at all the Rome Treaty. Hence it is the European Parliament which chose the moment to attack WEU and not the reverse. Furthermore, nothing in the recommendation adopted by our Assembly, in Mr. van der Sanden's explanatory memorandum or the debates on 4th and 5th June can be construed as a criticism of "the system based on European political integration". Respect for the treaties and responsibilities of each institution was the sole preoccupation of the members of our Assembly.

18. It might be added that neither the interest shown by the European Parliament when it was invited to take part in the colloquy organised by the General Affairs Committee in Florence in April 1989, nor the place given to defence questions during the electoral campaign of the various lists taking part in the European elections in June 1989, nor the rate of participation in those elections give it special authority to deal with the future of European security.

19. On the contrary, the WEU Assembly is remaining strictly within the framework of its responsibilities by attempting to consider in as much detail as possible the consequences of the implementation of the Single European Act for Europe's security and wondering how the WEU Council will be able to answer the questions thus raised.

20. In so doing, it is perfectly in harmony with the Council, which again voiced the following opinion on 6th June 1989 through the representative of the presidency, Mr. Younger, the United Kingdom Secretary of State for Defence, in answer to a question put by our colleague, Mr. Stegagnini:

"...But it is most important to preserve the clear definition that the European Community, with all its enormous responsibilities, does not have responsibility for defence. That is not in any way to devalue the importance of the EC to every aspect of our lives. It is to make the essential point that defence is different, for two reasons. First, the Treaty of Rome did not set out to involve the European Community in defence matters, and defence is of such great complexity that there is a strong argument for having a different forum to deal with it. The second reason is a practical one: the membership of the European Community is different from that of WEU, and not all its members are prepared to be involved in defence. One member of the EC is a neutral country. We must respect that.

All the suggestions that are flying about of amalgamating rôles, exchanging parlia-

mentarians or having parliamentarians perform both rôles are wide of the mark. Defence is different. It requires different people with different skills, but at the same time keeping in close contact with the community that it serves. That line is simple and easy to understand, and we should maintain it."

*II. Defence in the Single European Act*¹

21. Contrary to what many people think, defence Europe preceded economic Europe. The Schuman plan, which gave birth to the European Coal and Steel Community, dates back to 9th May 1950, whereas the Brussels Treaty, by which five European countries grouped their armed forces to ensure their common defence, was signed on 17th March 1948. This remark is not merely of historical interest. It points to the fact that the first concern of those who wanted to build Europe was to ensure the survival and security of Europeans. It was largely the outside threat that helped to federate Europe.

22. This is not without importance when the Single European Act is examined. Security and defence matters are not given much space, far less than economic decisions, and the act proposes no spectacular European progress in that area. However, it is plain that its authors were well aware that no decisive progress could be made towards European union without a firm foundation of joint security concepts.

23. However, in the last thirty years, defence Europe has made little progress. It took sixteen years after the failure of the EDC and of two successive versions of the Fouchet plan for the then six members of the European Community to reach agreement and, in Luxembourg in 1970, adopt a report by their ministers for foreign affairs laying the foundations of European political consultations. The Six then set themselves the aim of promoting, through the development of political co-operation, the progressive establishment of a European identity vis-à-vis the outside world.

24. Since then, these political consultations have been extended to include the new members of the European Community, but the aims are still principally those set in 1970. They are set out in the single act. The main bases are still harmonisation of viewpoints, the rapprochement of policies leading, if possible, to

1. This chapter owes much to the two colloquies organised by the European Institute of Public Administration under the direction of Mr. Panos Tsakaloyannis whose proceedings were published under the titles "The reactivation of the Western European Union: the effects on the EC and its institutions", Maastricht 1985, and "Western European security in a changing world: from the reactivation of the WEU to the Single European Act", Maastricht 1988, and in particular to the paper in the latter on "European political co-operation and the Single European Act".

joint action, and the use of non-constraining, purely intergovernmental procedures. The need to develop these consultations was strongly emphasised at the summit meetings in Copenhagen in 1973, Paris in 1974 and London in 1981, in the 1983 Stuttgart declaration and at the summit meeting in Milan in 1985; they made no great changes in these guidelines and have hardly improved upon the procedures, which are defined in Title III of the Single European Act. It describes what exists more than it innovates.

25. Thus, the single act classifies the bodies designed for political co-operation: European Council, meetings of ministers for foreign affairs, Political Committee, European Correspondents' Group and groups of experts on each topic. At each meeting, whatever decisions are reached are taken unanimously: the governments have never agreed to majority voting and this certainly limits Europe's ability to take decisions in this area.

26. The only novelty in the single act in regard to political co-operation is the creation of a permanent secretariat to assist the presidency in preparing and holding consultations but it has no powers of initiative or implementation. It is the presidency that was given very limited powers of initiative and to represent the Twelve as a whole when a joint decision has to be implemented.

27. It should be added straight away, however, that paragraph 6 of Article 30 of the single act reduces the scope of European political consultations still further where defence is concerned, although the member states indicate in that paragraph that they "consider that closer co-operation on questions of European security would contribute in an essential way to the development of a European identity in external policy matters" and that they "are ready to co-ordinate their positions more closely on the political and economic aspects of security". This therefore excludes military aspects which the single act does not include among the responsibilities, even potential, of the Twelve.

28. In the same paragraph, the signatory states say they "are determined to maintain the technological and industrial conditions necessary for their security. They shall work to that end both at national level and, where appropriate, within the framework of the competent institutions and bodies", which is plainly non-committal. Furthermore, the same paragraph concludes with the remark that the provisions of the single act must not "impede closer co-operation in the field of security between certain of the high contracting parties within the framework of the Western European Union or the Atlantic Alliance".

29. It may therefore be wondered why the single act is so restrictive in all defence-related questions when it admits – as Europeans have always proclaimed – that the aim of joint defence is an essential basis of the European union which, since 1972, the Nine promised to set up and the principle of which has, to varying degrees, been accepted by the Twelve.

30. Admittedly, the presence among the Twelve of Ireland, which does not wish to relinquish its policy of neutrality and be part of the Atlantic Alliance, is a major obstacle to the pursuit of a joint defence policy. Similarly, in recent years, uncertainty about the effective participation of Denmark and Greece in the defence effort orchestrated by NATO helped to prevent European political consultations venturing into this field.

31. However, there are other reasons for this paralysis: for instance, certain governments do not wish to weaken Atlantic solidarity by promoting a European nucleus in the alliance that might give the Americans an excuse to reduce their military presence in Europe. Nor do they want countries which are loyal members of NATO, such as Norway and Turkey, but which do not take part in political consultations or the European Community, to be left out of the preparation of a European security policy. Conversely, other governments do not wish political and military integration in NATO to be replaced by another form of integration as they fear this might mean a return to dependence from which they had partly freed themselves. It is not necessarily the idea of European defence that they reject, but the link between that defence and a Community with a supranational vocation.

32. However, in the Council's declaration on the programme of work of the Spanish presidency, presented to the European Parliament on 17th January 1989, the Spanish Government stated:

"Spanish membership of the WEU is the result of a dichotomy recognised in the single act itself and one which my country would like to see resolved. In the meantime, we must not avoid an extremely important debate to which, I am pleased to note, the Parliament is giving all the attention it deserves."

33. It should be noted, moreover, to what extent the political co-operation defined in the single act resembles what the seven governments have established in WEU. The reactivation which took place between 1984 and 1987 first consisted of an increase in intergovernmental activities at various levels that, apart from the level of heads of state or of government, which does not exist in WEU, or not yet, corresponds exactly to the scheme worked out for the Twelve, with the one noteworthy difference that

the ministers of defence or their representatives at an appropriate level take part in joint activities. Moreover, as in the case of European political co-operation, the Secretariat-General which, in the case of WEU, existed ever since the organisation was set up, has been deprived of most of its powers of political initiative and execution to the benefit of the presidency, at the same time as the Permanent Council, presided by the Secretary-General, had its work reduced to the administration of WEU. To overcome the drawbacks of too fast a rotation among the countries exercising the presidency of WEU, the term of office of the presidency has even been extended to a year and, in both institutions, the so-called troika system has been introduced, which, for certain matters, groups the Chairman-in-Office with his predecessor and his successor.

34. This fact was probably not very apparent to the Assembly because of the personality of the then Secretary-General, Alfred Cahen, who managed to use the margin of initiative left to him by the Council to give the Assembly, the press and the audiences at his many lectures information and comments for which the Council never wished to accept responsibility, even in its half-yearly reports to the Assembly or replies to recommendations. It is to be hoped that the new Secretary-General, Mr. van Eekelen, intends to use – and on occasion misuse – the possibility the Council leaves him to assert himself as the “political Secretary-General” that the Assembly has always wanted to see in that post.

35. In any event, it would appear that in the framework of the Seven, for defence, as in that of the Twelve, for the other aspects of foreign policy, the governments have, in the last five years, had quite a clear, coherent concept of what they wanted. Being prepared to accept significant limits on their sovereignty in the economic field, they have shown much good will in co-operating both politically and militarily, provided they retained full freedom of decision and action in those areas.

36. This parallelism between the two institutions, that of the Twelve and that of the Seven, was clearly indicated in the communiqué on which the Seven agreed in The Hague on 27th April 1988 announcing their decision to invite Portugal and Spain to join WEU. They based their decision on the two countries' acceptance of the modified Brussels Treaty and the platform on European security interests that they had adopted in The Hague on 27th October 1987, and on the determined commitment of Portugal and Spain to the building of Europe, i.e. among the Twelve. They thus confirmed that co-operation in security matters in WEU and economic integration in the framework of the Community were two aspects of a same approach.

37. In so doing, the seven governments clearly indicated the rôle they intended to assign to WEU and European political consultations: both help to promote the same cause, the building of a European union. This is done by endeavouring to harmonise the views of member countries with a view to subsequent action, whether joint or co-ordinated, but without encroaching on state sovereignty, which remains intact in both external policy and defence.

38. This fact gives a better picture of the kind of Europe whose shape was fixed in the single act: side by side with economic Europe, whose Community nature is stressed, political Europe and defence Europe are being built by other means, other procedures and other institutions. They are a matter for states.

39. The Single European Act therefore demonstrates the need for Europe to co-operate in security matters and the fact that the Twelve are at present incapable of meeting this need. The rôle it acknowledges for WEU is to allow Europe to overcome the deadlock that occurs in the Communities whenever defence questions arise and move towards better co-ordination of member countries' security policy.

40. Thus, although the Single European Act emanates from Community Europe and is intended for Community Europe, it defines WEU's place: the organisation is to complete the system it is setting up, just as the organisation of the single European market will considerably strengthen the security system based on the modified Brussels Treaty. The fact that the platform on European security interests was adopted by the Seven at a time when the Twelve had just agreed to adopt the single act is not without significance: it shows that the governments were able to agree on a concept of Europe which admittedly does not satisfy those advocating the early construction of a united Europe round the Community, but which is logical in the context of what Europeans are prepared to do today.

III. Subsequent developments

41. A number of events that have occurred since the adoption of the Single European Act show how the governments of the Community and WEU countries are approaching the deadline of 1993. They have clearly not reached agreement on any clear doctrine on a twelve-, seven- or nine-power basis but the decisions they have taken, or avoided taking, in several areas provide useful indications of the guidelines that may govern the implementation of the single act.

(a) In WEU

42. Your Rapporteur does not wish to go back over the measures taken in WEU since the Assembly has already examined them on several occasions, most recently in the report presented by Mr. van der Sanden on behalf of the General Affairs Committee in June 1989 (Document 1185). Suffice it to recall the definition of the joint views of the seven WEU member countries on security in Europe as set out in the platform adopted in The Hague on 27th October 1987, the acceptance of Portugal and Spain's applications for membership of WEU and the signing of the act of accession of those countries to the modified Brussels Treaty and the platform in December 1988, the co-ordination of member countries' efforts to safeguard freedom of navigation in the Gulf during the war between Iran and Iraq by a mine-sweeping operation (since July 1987), the absence of meetings of the WEU Standing Armaments Committee since October 1985 and the accompanying development of the activities of the Independent European Programme Group, which set up a permanent secretariat in March 1989, consideration of the French proposal to set up a European institute for security or defence studies on which a decision should be taken at the ministerial meeting in autumn 1989, the abolition of the agencies set up in 1985 and the growth in inter-governmental activities aimed at adapting Europe to its new security conditions, with particular regard to sharing responsibility for and the burden of joint security between the members of the Atlantic Alliance and the development of Europe's observation satellite capability.

43. The Council which, in many of these cases, followed Assembly recommendations (removal of limitations on conventional armaments, definition of European security principles, enlargement of WEU, creation of an institute for defence studies, observation satellites) thus demonstrated by its action how it was considering exercising the rôle of European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, an expression which it also usefully took from Assembly recommendations. The plan emerging from the Council's decisions may be summed up as follows:

- (i) to bring together all member countries of the European Community who so desire and who fulfil the conditions necessary for their accession to the modified Brussels Treaty not to lessen the impact of this treaty of alliance;
- (ii) to strengthen the Atlantic Alliance, in particular through improved burden- and responsibility-sharing between its European and American members;

- (iii) to maintain or promote a spirit of defence in Western Europe through action to keep public opinion properly informed of European security requirements, provided that the tasks the Council attributes to the institute it is preparing to establish correspond to Assembly recommendations;

- (iv) to allow Western Europe to play an active part in the negotiation of international agreements on the limitation of conventional weapons and the application of the necessary verification procedures;

- (v) to seek the agreement of member countries to concerted approaches to crises outside the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty and, wherever possible, to co-ordinate any action they take.

- (vi) Conversely, the Council has not given enough information about the rôle it would assign to WEU in regard to the production of armaments. The creation of an IEPG secretariat and the de facto disappearance of the international secretariat of the SAC indicate that it foresees that many industrial aspects of such production might be made subject to Community regulations, whereas the military aspects of co-operation would be a matter for the IEPG. This specific question is one to which the implementation of the single act will give new dimensions that will be examined later in the present report.

44. There seems to have been quite a favourable response outside the organisation to these guidelines followed by WEU since 1985. Speaking in Leiden on 17th July 1989, President Bush said: "The revival of the Western European Union, in which the Netherlands played a vital rôle; the growing co-operation on security issues between West Germany and France; British and French resolve to modernise their own nuclear forces: each of these developments is a sign that Europe sees the wisdom of sustaining the collective strength that has kept the peace." The accession of Portugal and Spain and the candidatures of Greece and Turkey, although the Council has decided to defer consideration of the latter, show that reactivated WEU is of new interest to countries which had hitherto preferred to remain apart. Finally, the exchanges between the WEU Assembly and the Supreme Soviet, started in 1987 with a visit by an Assembly delegation to Moscow and continued in July 1989 with the visit to Paris of a high-level delegation from the Supreme Soviet which had particularly interesting talks with the

Assembly, indicate that the Soviet Union for its part considers that WEU represents Western Europe well when it is a matter of discussing disarmament and the organisation of world peace. These testimonies show that the adoption of the Single European Act by all the WEU member countries, far from meaning, as some would like it to be thought, that the European Community is soon to extend its security and defence activities, enhances the authority of our organisation within the framework of its responsibilities.

(b) In the Community

45. The evolution of the European Community itself since the single act was ratified also helps to draw the boundaries between the two institutions' areas of activity. The development of European political co-operation was important but it has never led to decisions relating to the defence of Europe or its military activities outside the NATO area or to positions in regard to arms limitation or burden-sharing in the alliance. It is admittedly very difficult to define which matters are the responsibility of the Twelve and which are that of the Nine. In the end, it is the presence of ministers of defence or their representatives and of chiefs of staff or their deputies in the WEU Council or inter-governmental bodies deriving from it that gives WEU its own specific character. Thus, the Lebanese question has been the subject of political consultations between the Twelve in recent months and declarations were made, but no consideration was given to deploying European forces. The deployment of French warships off Lebanon in September 1989 does not seem to have been examined in that forum. Conversely, the deployment of warships from five member countries in the Gulf in 1988 was examined and followed in WEU.

46. The question nevertheless arises as to what extent the Commission of the Community considers defence questions are outside its purview. Following the divulgation of certain information, our colleague, Sir Dudley Smith, put the following question to the United Kingdom Secretary of State for Defence on 25th July 1989:

“To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what briefing and assistance he is giving the defence advisory team set up by Mr. Delors, the European Commissioner.”

Mr. Sainsbury, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, answered: “We are not aware of the existence of such a team.”

47. Your Rapporteur is nevertheless now sure that this group (with the title plans and fore-

casts) exists in the Secretariat-General of the Commission, but it is just as if the Commission was doing its utmost to conceal its real activities from the public or even from certain governments. It is surprising that the European Community which, in other areas, is careful to proceed with a degree of openness that is a fortunate departure from national diplomatic practice, should in this connection be so secretive. The absence of public information prevents your Rapporteur going further into this matter in the present report.

48. Your Rapporteur found an excellent summary of the conclusions that he himself reached in a report by the North Atlantic Assembly Sub-Committee on Defence Co-operation² indicating that “it is in the economic sphere, via trade and industrial policy, that the EC finds potentially broader, if more indirect, room for manoeuvre in the defence arena”. He can but stress the words “potentially” and “indirect” as they give a good idea of the situation in the Community which, although not having the essential legal basis or the governments' agreement, is really active in this area thanks to the large financial resources available to it which WEU does not have. But this activity is very liable to be fruitless as long as the twelve governments do not endorse it. In the circumstances, it therefore seems vain to compare it with what may emerge, albeit in a rather unsatisfactory form, from nine-power consultations in WEU. It would seem infinitely more reasonable to seek a basis for agreement and above all for communication between the two European organisations than to try, through more or less clandestine channels, to force the hands of the governments, several of which do not seem at all prepared to concur. Clandestinity does not seem to be the best means of attaining this aim.

IV. The single market and security problems

49. The existence of a single market in which frontier controls will have disappeared, persons and goods will be able to circulate freely, competition between firms will be free, direct and indirect state assistance to producers and exporters will be banned and individual citizens will be able to settle wherever they wish and be free to compete for any job will inevitably raise many problems for countries where the public authorities control vast sectors of the national economy in areas which are not always the same, moreover. However, in all countries, whatever their share of the collective security effort may be, the military administration is the

2. North Atlantic Assembly – Sub-Committee on Defence Co-operation – *Supplementary document to the draft report on burden-sharing* by MM. José Lello and Bill Richardson, Co-Rapporteurs, May 1989.

one on which states keep the tightest rein and which are the most inclined to view their problems in national terms. There is certainly a NATO strategy and efforts have been made to make weapons interoperable, unify nomenclatures and ensure equivalent duties, ranks and titles among the NATO countries. Although the very scope of military responsibility differs from one country to another, since in some countries the military carry out police work or part of the armaments industry is run by the ministry of defence, in all countries the army is considered to be an essential part of the life of the nation. This is due just as much to its traditions and national past as to its present tasks in a collective defence system. Moreover, some Western European armies still have important duties outside this system, whereas others, such as the Bundeswehr, are wholly committed to NATO. There is no provision in the single act for changes in these areas, but the maintenance of certain present practices may create disparities that might be detrimental to the smooth running of the single market.

(a) Problems of the defence economy

50. For many years, the United States has been raising the question of the unequal share of European and American members in the burdens of the Atlantic Alliance and asking for a fairer division. The same inequality is to be found among the European members of the alliance. The proportion of GNP earmarked for defence varies considerably, from about 1% in Luxembourg to 5.2% in the United Kingdom (4% in France, 3% in the Federal Republic and the Netherlands and 2.5% in Belgium and Italy). This disparity obviously affects the fiscal effort required of individuals and firms in each of these countries and hence the conditions for competition in a single market.

51. There is another disparity, which relates to employment: the proportion of the active population employed by the armed forces varies from 0.9% in Luxembourg to 3% in France (2% in the United Kingdom, 2.3% in the Netherlands, 2.4% in the Federal Republic, 2.5% in Italy and 2.9% in Belgium). The fact that there is no conscription in Luxembourg and the United Kingdom also means life in these countries is affected differently by the defence effort. At a time when there is not full employment in most European countries, the degree of pressure exercised by the army on employment is obviously not liable to be a vital factor of imbalance within a single market. It may, however, affect certain sectors where there is a shortage of qualified staff. Above all, it may become so if a change in the economic situation, likely if the single market achieves the anticipated results, brings about almost full employment in certain countries. Furthermore, this inequality may lead

nationals of countries with heavier military commitments to take advantage of freedom of establishment to settle in countries where commitments are lighter or non-existent.

52. Another question will inevitably be raised by the principle of equality between firms when contracts are awarded. The Rome Treaty admittedly excludes the armaments industries from Community responsibilities and leaves states free to procure military equipment. The single act does not change this provision. However, with the growing complexity of modern weapons, ever more firms are required to produce for defence purposes, and this allows states, the only procurers of weapons, to favour firms in their own countries by placing orders with them rather than with foreign competitors which, for one reason or another, do not have a "captive market". Industries thus favoured on the arms market would clearly be able to cut profit margins on their products for the civil market.

53. As long as defence is considered to be a national matter for a national army subject to national regulations, the public authorities can hardly be expected not to give preference systematically to national firms and, where appropriate, state firms over which the ministries of defence can exercise strict control, particularly in regard to secrecy. But they are thus likely to jeopardise the free play of market forces, even for products not directly defence-related, whatever Community provisions there may be.

54. Generally speaking, the arms industry and trade are outside the Community framework and the indications are that this sector is not subject to the conditions already covering the industrial sectors that are adapting themselves to the single market, nor will it be after 1993. The report on "The armaments industry in the WEU member countries", prepared by the WEU Standing Armaments Committee in October 1985, set out in detail the problems that your Rapporteur is referring to here and made a number of suggestions for solving them, particularly in regard to the juridical measures Europe might take to ensure the existence of a single arms market. The Council has never really considered this document and has failed in the task it set itself when it instructed the SAC to prepare the report.

55. The WEU countries as a whole have an arms production capability superior to their requirements. This surplus production capability will probably increase further in the period of disarmament and cuts in defence budgets towards which the world now seems to be moving. To various degrees, the WEU governments therefore have to consider restructuring the arms sector of their economies and well know that their present surplus capability is too great a burden on their defence budgets and con-

sequently on Europe's security. This restructuring is necessary, but the question is whether the WEU countries wish to carry it out in a purely national framework, as some have started to do with a series of mergers of firms, in a European framework or even in a transatlantic context. Several forms of co-operation have been used in the latter two cases although producer firms have rarely committed themselves permanently. At most, there have recently been changes in the status of arms-producing firms such as GIAT in France to make them less dependent on the public administration and to facilitate their participation in international projects.

56. Some committee members rightly underlined that the problem of standardisation and interoperability of armaments in Europe would be solved only if the European arms industries wished to reorganise of their own accord. This would be the logical consequence of the single market and there is no doubt that the United States fears this restructuring of firms which might become dangerous competitors for their own firms.

57. Furthermore, implementation of the Euclid programme, comparable, because of its flexibility, to the Eureka programme which concerns civil technology, should allow the joint development of research and "exploratory development" in new weapons technology to be conducted outside Community jurisdiction. However, since this programme was launched by the IEPG only at its ministerial meeting in Lisbon on 29th June 1989, it is still too early to assess its efficiency, which will depend largely on states' will to co-operate at European level. It is believed to cover such areas as radar, micro-electronics, composite materials, avionics, optronics, simulators, underwater acoustics, space observation and stealth technology, but not development at the industrial level. In other words, it will not be a direct answer to the questions raised by the single market.

58. Finally, there are certain sectors of the economy that are so important for the survival of the nation that the state has often tried to control them by setting up state firms, nationalisation, buying shares in private firms or through regulations. This is the case in particular of a number of transport-related activities and energy production, not to speak, of course, of armaments. While certain countries have long relied on market forces for trade in oil and its derivatives, almost all the larger European countries have at one time or another pursued an oil policy. Almost everywhere, the production of nuclear energy is closely controlled by the states. Community legislation can naturally impose respect for certain standards, including equality of treatment for all clients of transport firms or energy producers and distrib-

utors, since these matters are not directly defence-related. But when the state is the main supplier of such services and, a fortiori, when it has a monopoly, one may wonder whether it will really respect these principles, possibly arguing that its control over such sectors is essential for its security.

(b) Problems linked with international trade

59. The existence of a single market will clearly mean full freedom to exchange technology within the Community, including the acquisition and sale of patents. In this case, too, it will be extremely difficult, as it was for the application of Cocom rules, to distinguish between purely military technology that is not subject to Community regulations and civil technology, particularly in the case of computers, laser equipment, optronics, nuclear and space technology, etc. Furthermore, it will be difficult not to make technology imported from third countries, including the United States, subject to the general rule. However, the problem will also arise for exports of products or technology to third countries, whether to safeguard European technology or to take account of the political and military aspects of arms sales. This has already occurred with the delivery to Libya of chemical products and industrial equipment which, together, could be used to produce chemical weapons. In Council Regulation 428/89 of 20th February 1989, the Community listed chemical products whose sale outside the Common Market was henceforth subject to prior authorisation, it being agreed that authorisation would be given by the appropriate authorities of member states and not by the Community itself. Moreover, each member country has special relations with certain outside countries and is particularly sensitive to certain problems. The war between Iraq and Iran showed that not all members of the Community had the same political and military options. The attitude of the Federal Republic towards arms sales to Middle East countries is not the same as that of France, which grants several African countries military assistance. In this case, arms deliveries are part of a global policy from which it would be very difficult to separate them.

60. In fact, the arms trade raises specific economic and political problems, but it cannot be entirely separated from other commercial transactions. The explosion in August 1989 in the military industrial centre at Al Hilal in Iraq attracted the attention of the western press to the methods used by that country to acquire - by procuring in Western Europe equipment and technology much of which is in the civil sector and sending trainees to work in mainly European industries - material, industrial

equipment, high-technology products and know-how allowing it to develop, in some cases in co-operation with Egypt and Argentina, highly sophisticated weapons that might upset the balance of forces in the Middle East. Thus, Iraq is reported to have managed to develop the Condor missile, with a range of 1 200 km, from ageing missiles procured in the Soviet Union. These results are believed to have been obtained by good co-ordination of industries, research, development and external trade thanks to a specialised network without the latter necessarily having to infringe any of the supplier countries' legislation restricting exports of sensitive products. It is even believed to have had most of these operations financed by the American subsidiary of a major Italian bank. We are not concerned here with whether or not the seller or creditor firms consciously or otherwise were party to this diversion of trade; what is clear is that the absence of European regulations and European control of the arms trade can lead to an outside country endangering Europe's security, indirectly at least, with money, goods and technology supplied by Europe³.

61. From the purely economic point of view, the arms trade also raises special problems which are not covered by Community regulations but which might seriously upset the operation of a single market. The main problem is due to the significant spread of "offset" practices in recent years. Industrial countries procuring weapons have acquired the habit of insisting that their suppliers manufacture in the procuring country a sometimes very large part of the equipment sold, so that the procuring country thus benefits from what it has procured and from the seller's technological know-how. This obviously thwarts the principles of a free market and, although politically it is not so serious when the trade is within the European Community, it is liable to be more serious in the case of sales to countries in the process of setting up an armaments industry, particularly in Latin America and the Middle East, which become the rivals of the selling industries. But other countries have started to insist on compensation that sometimes equals or even exceeds the cost of what it is importing by forcing the seller to purchase goods of all kinds, including oil, agricultural produce or even, in the case of Greece's procurement of Mirage 2000s, the marketing of tourist travel in that country. Many arms-exporting firms have had to set up subsidiaries specialising in reselling and distributing on their national market goods thus acquired as "compensation" that they did not know what to do with. Competition is so ferocious on the arms market that it seems essential for anyone

wishing to export to comply with such practices. They are clearly liable to distort the overall market seriously, for instance when a manufacturer of aircraft engines has to organise promotional sales in supermarkets of cheese, fruit and vegetables he has had to take as compensation⁴.

62. It would be easy to say that these practices must be stopped. Yet they are so well anchored and used by countries outside the Community that to eliminate them purely and simply would exclude European production from the world arms market and ruin the industries concerned. The European states are hardly likely to follow this course since they are not obliged to do so under either the Rome Treaty or the single act. The most that can be hoped is that, among themselves, they will seek an identical solution to the problems thus raised and try to promote it among all the arms-exporting countries. WEU would be the natural framework for member governments to exchange views on this matter.

63. In short, it seems impossible for a single market Europe to ignore the problems raised by international trade in regard to technology or products which might be used for military purposes. It has managed to agree on regulations for exports of chemical products, probably more theoretical than effective, and probably will be able to do likewise for other products or technologies with essentially civil applications. However, while it is left to member states to decide whether there are reasons to believe that the products in question will be used to develop or manufacture weapons (chemical weapons in the regulation of 20th February 1989) and verify application of the decisions taken, in the long run it is these states that will remain in control, as in the past. Relevant Community regulations are not at all supranational and differ little from what the governments might resolve to do in another institution. The advantage of the Community is thus merely to extend to twelve countries a measure which would concern only nine if it had been determined by the WEU Council.

64. Hence, it is apparently desirable, where everything economic is concerned, for the European Community to extend its field of activity as far as possible and, consequently, for WEU, which is fully competent in this area under Articles I and II of the modified Brussels Treaty, to deal with them only in the event of the Community not having been able or not having wished to do so. However, since many essential measures are specifically military, particularly assessing the dangers involved in the sale of certain products or transferring certain

3. Information in this paragraph was taken mainly from the Financial Times of 9th, 13th and 20th September 1989.

4. The facts reported in this paragraph were taken from an article by Philippe Douroux in the Tribune de l'Expansion, 15th June 1989.

technologies, it would seem normal for the WEU Council to tackle these matters at the appropriate level of representatives of defence ministries or chiefs of staff so as to make appropriate recommendations to the Community.

(c) Removal of frontier controls

65. For the time being, state security is ensured by the national authorities within each country's frontiers. Although there is some co-operation between police forces, this is done solely by means of rather cumbersome procedure and in specific cases requires, inter alia, the legal definition of offences and crimes committed to be the same in the countries involved. The fact that national legislation and practice differ considerably had only limited disadvantages as long as people entering and leaving were controlled at each state's frontier. It was for national police to stop deserters or spies leaving the country and to prevent any foreigner who might be a danger to the state entering: agitators, spreaders of subversive propaganda, terrorists, intelligence agents. With the removal of internal frontier controls, such persons might take refuge on the territory of another member country, perhaps even continuing unhindered with their subversive activities, and then easily penetrate the territory of the state that its police force should protect. This probably does not apply to common law criminals or known terrorists, against whom action in one member country might be followed up on a reciprocal basis throughout the Community. There is no reason to think that the same would be true for more military or political delinquencies, unless specific agreements spelled out reciprocal commitments in those areas. The single act makes no reference to new European Community responsibilities in this connection, hence there is no possibility of Community law replacing national decisions.

66. Application of the Schengen agreement by which France, the Federal Republic and the Benelux countries undertook to apply the same measures in respect of visas and the entry of nationals of third countries already seems to be raising difficulties because a country which needs to protect itself against a specific risk finds it hard to make its partners endorse its point of view.

(d) Freedom of establishment

67. Each Community member country is working out measures to ensure the freedom of establishment of Community nationals. Naturally, this principle does not apply to certain sectors of the public administration or the armed forces. However, one may wonder how it

will be respected wherever security, defence and armaments are involved. It is for each state to determine the security clearance of staff recruited by firms working wholly or partly in such sectors. Each has its own investigative and decision-taking criteria, which allow it to exclude certain persons from so-called sensitive firms, even if the latter work only partly for the state. One may wonder whether the national authorities will use this right to safeguard employment in their countries and, in any event, how will they determine the security clearance of foreign citizens since their national services will not be empowered to conduct inquiries in neighbouring countries.

68. Your Rapporteur does not claim to have given an exhaustive list of the questions that the existence of a single market will raise for those responsible for security in member countries. He merely wishes to say that he considers it impossible to find solutions to such problems in a purely national framework. Naturally, they would be solved if the European union were on the point of coming into existence, but, as long as that is not the case, he thinks it is essential for these problems to be the subject of consultations and of specific agreements between the governments concerned, and WEU seems to be the framework in which representatives of national security authorities might meet each other and draw up such agreements. He does not feel that the absence of Ireland, Greece and Denmark is a serious obstacle, on the one hand because they are probably less inclined than the Nine to commit themselves in this area and, on the other hand, because there is nothing to prevent each one subscribing to the provisions it wishes to adopt.

V. The political activities of the WEU Council

69. The first part of the thirty-fifth annual report of the Council was received by the Assembly on 11th October 1989. Your Rapporteur also has as a basis for examining this question the replies to certain Assembly recommendations, in particular Recommendation 472, received on 7th September, statements by ministers or the Secretary-General in various forums and the letter addressed to the Assembly by the Secretary-General on 18th September 1989.

70. Your Rapporteur was especially interested in the text of the Secretary-General's address to the Institut royal supérieur de défense in Brussels on 21st September 1989 because it provided many important details on the working of WEU that the Council has not so far seen fit to communicate to the Assembly or that were only briefly or vaguely mentioned in the annual report. While welcoming the fact that the Secretary-General has thus made public much infor-

mation whose concealment was quite unjustified, he wishes to express his regret that the Assembly was not the first to receive this information.

71. For these reasons, your Rapporteur will therefore quote three important passages from this address.

72. (a) *On the structure of the Council*, the Secretary-General said:

- “WEU now works at four levels, i.e.:
- *groups of experts*;
 - the *Special Working Group* and/or the *Defence Representatives Group*;
 - the *Permanent Council*, which co-ordinates the work of the working groups and approves reports submitted to the Council enlarged to include political directors; and, finally;
 - the *Council of Ministers*.”

In spite of its requests, the Assembly has never been given such a clear description of the hierarchy of the institutions covered by the word “Council”. One may wonder why.

73. (b) *On the work of the Council*, the Secretary-General said:

“Under the authority of the Permanent Council, the WEU working groups carry out remarkable preparatory work in six main areas in which member states intend together to assume their full responsibilities:

1. *Defence at the frontiers*, which covers two kinds of problem: the stationing of forces in the Federal Republic and the availability of reserve forces; consideration of the repercussions of a future CFE agreement on the deployment of forces of member countries and of the United States and Canada in Europe.
2. *Improving consultations*, particularly on defence planning. The long-term aim is to harmonise strategic concepts.
3. *The growing involvement of chiefs-of-staff* in our deliberations and in the implementation of the WEU ministers' decisions on force structures and training.
4. *The definition of European criteria* for assessing each member state's contribution to the common defence and forces' equipment requirements.
5. *Assessing the human and material resources* needed for a credible defence

of Europe in the last decade of this century and with a view to the forthcoming conclusion of an agreement on conventional forces in Europe.

6. *Finally, continued consultations* on areas of instability outside the area covered by the Brussels Treaty that started at the time of the crisis caused by attacks on freedom of navigation in the Gulf in 1987.

The Council's working groups are also a forum for constant thinking on the extent, meaning and conditions of implementing western positions on the control of nuclear, chemical and conventional weapons. Exchanges of views on current negotiations are essential to guarantee that the European countries' specific security interests are effectively taken into consideration at each stage of progress towards an agreement.”

Here, too, the Secretary-General's description is far clearer and more precise than that of the Council. Is it because the Secretariat-General did not give the Council a suitable draft of the half-yearly report or because it did not adopt the text prepared by the Secretariat-General?

74. (c) *On the scope of matters handled by the Council*, the Secretary-General said:

“... I wish to refer briefly to three specific aspects of our present work which seem to me to illustrate clearly the reality of the reactivation of the organisation:

- the impact of 1992 and changes in the European countries' security environment on our defence in the years 1993-95;
- Europe's stake in verifying force reduction agreements now being negotiated;
- the expediency and areas of application of the security aspects of European space co-operation.

The probability that a CFE agreement will be concluded early in the next decade and the creation of a single European market in 1992 mean that we must take immediate steps to look ahead at the future requirements of our joint defence. This thinking must be based on the principles set out in the platform adopted in The Hague and, more particularly, the maintenance of defensive deterrence, and in the global concept of arms control and disarmament adopted by the North Atlantic Council in Brussels on 30th May 1989.

Many complex questions have arisen. I will quote only a few of them which seem to me worthy of continuing discussion in WEU political consultations.

- What will be the rhythm of progress in the arms control negotiations: will there be a START treaty and what will be the resulting prospects?
- What will be the content of the convention on chemical weapons?
- How will a possible CFE agreement be followed up?
- What future will there be for short-range nuclear weapons in the context of the proliferation of ballistic missiles, particularly in the Near and Middle East?
- How will the defence burden be shared in WEU?
- How should joint armaments programmes be developed?
- What course are armaments industries to follow in the prospect of the single European market?

The second major topic now central to WEU's work and that will be on the agenda for all Europeans for a long time to come: what is at stake in the verification of disarmament agreements.

The negotiations on conventional forces in Europe succeed the successful negotiations on confidence-building measures. In view of the political evolution of our continent, everything relating to openness, exchanges of information on the military environment in the widest meaning of the term, budgets as indicators of states' military approach and, finally, the verification of agreements concluded, is of great interest. The new confidence-building measures, negotiated on a thirty-five-power basis, must bolster stabilisation measures negotiated on a twenty-three-power basis.

Europeans' specific interests in regard to the control of the production of armaments subject to limits and the movement towards and round the area of application of the future agreement on equipment subject to limits require joint thinking on the non-circumvention of the agreement on ways and means of verifying it. Let there be no mistake: while verification is theoretically a national responsibility, close co-operation or even a division of tasks among Europeans will be essential if our countries are to play their full rôle in this area. For instance, consideration might be given to setting up joint teams of inspectors and joint training programmes, *inter alia* linguistic. Specialisation would allow optimum benefit to be obtained from various existing proficiencies; verification of a CFE agreement will require

considerable investment that should be assessed so that we have the means necessary for implementing it available in time. There are significant economic interests at stake. Finally, we must not lose sight of the political stake. Now that the readjustment of rôle-, risk- and responsibility-sharing is on the alliance's agenda, Europe must not, through carelessness and lack of foresight, become dependent on the United States which wishes, on the contrary, to be able to depend on sound, reliable partners.

After verification, I turn to the urgency of an in-depth discussion of the possible security applications of space technology. Here, there is a direct link with the verification of disarmament agreements by observation satellites.

Europe has built up a remarkable technological potential in space matters as testified by the success of the Ariane launchers. Apart from the limited case of co-operation between France, Italy and Spain in the Helios programme, this potential has not been made to serve our joint security. Because of its polyvalence, satellite observation is a particularly flexible tool which is acknowledged to meet the needs of verifying disarmament agreements. Together, therefore, Europeans must explore the possibilities of this instrument so as to take it into account when working out their proposals for verifying a future CFE agreement. Satellites, by adding to our overall observation potential, will help Europe to be independent for verification purposes. A joint technological and industrial effort will create new synergies while allowing large-scale economies. Moreover, satellite means of observation might also play a rôle in preventing and managing both political and ecological crises.

Because of the subjects it tackles and the synergy between the expert knowledge and concerns of the foreign affairs experts and their military counterparts, WEU fulfils to the utmost its rôle of political co-operation in security matters by being the forum for basic thinking on Europe's strategic stakes by means of a twofold concrete, forward-looking approach.

.....

For a long time to come, WEU will probably be the only instrument for rationalising the means and harmonising the fundamental concepts of our joint defence. To this end, we must not relax our efforts, in particular our efforts at clarification and explanation *vis-à-vis*

public opinion and those responsible for the economy because defence is not an attractive subject now that détente is again so attractive. WEU will strive to do this by promoting the adjustment that needs to be made at security level in a world that is in full transformation and may consequently become increasingly unstable...”

75. If we now attempt to review the state of progress in the Council's work, we can see that:

76. (i) On the *revision of the treaty*, the Council confirms that it is continuing to examine the matter and takes note of Recommendation 472, but does not specify how it will follow it up. Paragraph I.4 of the annual report gives useful details on this point:

“The Permanent Council had initial exchanges of views on the review of the provisions of the treaty and its protocols. It will consider this matter in greater depth at the appropriate time, taking due account in its deliberations of the views of the Assembly, such as those expressed in the van der Sanden report and Recommendation 472.”

This shows that the Council has not seriously examined the matter, and that the Agency for the Control of Armaments thus retains all its prerogatives under the modified Brussels Treaty and cannot be abolished in present circumstances.

77. (ii) On *enlargement*, the French Prime Minister, Mr. Rocard, said in his address at the forty-second session of the French Institut des hautes études de défense nationale that this had become a fact in 1988 for Portugal and Spain. This is particularly surprising since France is one of the five countries which had not, at the time of writing, ratified the 1988 act of accession. Conversely, the Council has, as the Assembly requested, deferred examination of the candidatures of Greece and Turkey. The Assembly should, however, be given more substantial information than has been given in the half-yearly report on the nature of the “consultation procedure” with those two countries that is to be initiated by the Permanent Council.

78. The Secretary-General's address on 21st September gave a new definition of the conditions for future accessions to WEU:

“... Three conditions must be fulfilled for a state to accede to WEU:

- candidate countries must be aware of all the political and military implications of their accession;
- they must confirm their determination to make a full contribution to the joint defence effort;

- finally, they must say how they intend to contribute to attaining all the aims set out in the platform and to the development of a European security identity.

For the time being, WEU must give priority to ensuring the successful integration of Portugal and Spain. Further enlargement seems neither expedient nor practical in the short term...”

79. It should be noted that these conditions differ considerably from those previously described by the former Secretary-General, particularly in that they no longer refer to membership of the EEC which, in present circumstances, seems logical. However, we need to know to what extent the Secretary-General's remarks effectively commit the Council.

80. (iii) On the *consequences of enlargement for the Assembly*, the reply to Recommendation 472 indicates how the Council intends to follow up enlargement where the Assembly is concerned, at least in regard to the alterations to the WEU building in Paris, since it makes no reference at all to staff matters. It should be noted that the Council has “requested the WEU administration in Paris to issue the necessary invitations to tender”. This statement is to say the least surprising since it was the Assembly that, at the request of the Council, included in its supplementary budget for 1989 sums necessary for carrying out the work planned and, within its purview, took all the administrative steps relating to calls for tenders for work on the building in consultation with the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs, for installing simultaneous interpretation equipment in the two new conference rooms in consultation inter alia with the Technical Committee of the International Association of Conference Interpreters, and for installing new simultaneous interpretation equipment in the chamber of the Economic and Social Council. The WEU administration in Paris was associated with the contacts with the architect only in regard to the reorganisation of the building so as to be able to uphold the Council's views on the matter. If the statement in the reply to Recommendation 472 expressed the Council's decision to attribute to its Paris administrative organs direct responsibility for the conduct of the work, which comes under the Assembly's budget management, this would be an attempt to take over from the Assembly and a serious infringement of the principle of the Assembly's budgetary autonomy recognised by the Council of Ministers on 28th April 1987.

81. However, the Secretary-General's letter makes an interesting point which indicates that the Council effectively does not intend to take account of the Assembly's budgetary autonomy:

“With regard to the problems of the Assembly, it (the Permanent Council) was

at pains to expedite consultations with the architects with regard to the alterations to the Palais d'Iéna required in the wake of WEU enlargement to include Portugal and Spain. Substantial funds have been released, therefore, to enable invitations to tender to be issued so that work can begin as soon as the second part of the 35th ordinary session of the Assembly has ended. To deal with problems as they arise, the Council will be represented by a 'troika' with members from Belgium, France and the United Kingdom, whose responsibility it will be to oversee the proceedings in close collaboration with the Office of the Clerk."

82. It is thus clear that:

(a) The Permanent Council has no accurate knowledge of the facts and the administrative work accomplished, as summarised above.

(b) It has instructed three of its members (and not the Secretariat-General) to oversee the work "in close collaboration with the Office of the Clerk", certainly, but has chosen the interlocutors that suited it alongside the Assembly with no thought that the Presidential Committee, the Assembly's steering body, might have something to say about it since it is the President of the Assembly alone who is responsible for implementing the Assembly's budget once the Council has agreed to it. This means quite plainly that the Council has decided to take the matter in hand, which is a flagrant violation of the principle of budgetary autonomy. Subsequent exchanges of correspondence clearly show that the Council, after asking the Assembly to include in a supplementary budget expenditure relating to the work on the WEU building in Paris and after asking for a reduction in the estimates, at the expense inter alia of an increase in the space reserved for national delegations, persists in refusing to apply the principle of budgetary autonomy and in terms which are in fact an insult to the Assembly and its President. It is just as if, a priori, the Council suspected the Assembly, or its President, or the Office of the Clerk, of concealing their true intentions and wishing to use sums earmarked for the work for other purposes.

We must be perfectly clear on this point. If the Council has any grievances whatsoever about the Assembly's budgetary management, it should say so in order that the Assembly may take the necessary steps to correct any mistakes it may have made. If not, in view of the Council's communications, it would seem that its sole aim is to go back on the budgetary autonomy it granted the Assembly, which would be intolerable. If the Council had wished to take account of the fact that WEU's Paris premises belong to WEU as a whole, and not to the Assembly alone, and impose joint management

of the budget for the work to be undertaken, it should have foreseen a budgetary procedure commensurate with these views. It can have no such claims to the Assembly's budget. Relations between the Council and the Assembly must have clear juridical bases. In words full of innuendos, the Council is continually calling in question what it asserts as a matter of principle. The Assembly cannot accept such an attitude, but this does not mean that it is not prepared to take the greatest account of the Council's views, particularly on the use the future institute might make of WEU's Paris premises, but the Council must first inform the Assembly of what the institute's tasks and statute will be⁵.

83. (iv) On the *creation of an institute*, it must be noted that the documents your Rapporteur has seen are extremely woolly and contradictory. The very title of the institute is said by Mr. Rocard to be "European institute for advanced security studies", but the reply to Recommendation 472 gives it as "Institute for Strategic Studies". These two titles clearly suggest very different orientations.

84. The Council says nothing of the rôle of the institute and the Secretary-General's letter is not very explicit:

"There is undoubtedly a rôle for such an institute as part of the strengthening of a reactivated WEU in the area of both security research co-ordination in a specifically European context, and the promotion of public awareness of a European security identity in the member states."

However, a few days earlier, the French Prime Minister described this rôle rather differently:

"It should fulfil three aims:

- establish links between national and WEU parliamentarians;
- encourage contacts between those responsible for security at European level and research workers in existing institutes: the purpose is not to compete with the latter but to make their work more accessible;
- finally, promote meetings between institutes of East and West so that the new East-West détente is better integrated into our European deliberations: this would be the outcome of my proposal for an openness centre.

One of the first matters that might be considered is the institutional landscape of our security between now and the

5. Remarks by Mr. Eyskens, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, offer hope that he will be prepared to consider means that do not endanger the Assembly's autonomy in managing its budget.

year 2000. This obviously means giving thought to the Atlantic dimension of security."

85. The second point made above meets a concern already expressed by Mr. Genscher in December 1984 and repeated several times since. Although the Assembly is not opposed to this plan, it was sceptical about the possibility of a body dependent on the Council co-operating with institutes, many of which have a university-type statute. Nevertheless, Mr. Rocard's suggestions are aimed at meeting most of the objections to such co-operation and might perhaps allow the institute to do useful work.

86. Conversely, none of the earlier proposals is to be found in the first point, in particular the one made by the French Prime Minister in 1988:

"The institute would have a training and teaching rôle in propagating a spirit of joint defence and making public opinion aware of the notion of collective European security."

This proposal obviously corresponded to an idea which had been ripening for several years, at least in France, i.e. that Western Europe would be allowed to benefit from, while adapting, the IHEDN's useful experience. To tell the truth, it is very hard to understand what rôle might be played by an institute dependent on the WEU Council in establishing links between national parliamentarians and an Assembly composed of delegations from the same parliaments. The Assembly is entitled to be kept informed of what the Council has started to do in this area before the ministerial meeting at which it is to approve the establishment of the institute, as Mr. Rocard announced.

87. The third point hardly corresponds to Mr. Rocard's proposal on 15th November 1988 to create an "openness centre... to gather, circulate and explain information". This had little in common with "meetings between institutes of East and West" and the Assembly is also entitled to know, before the Council of Ministers takes a decision, what it intends to do. It also has a special reason for wanting this information since the way in which the premises in which it has its seat can be used will depend largely on the status and needs of the new institute with which it will have to cohabit in conditions that have yet to be specified.

88. The reply to Recommendation 472 gives few details on these points and is also ambiguous about the way the Council is operating in this connection since it announces that: "Ministers also tasked the Permanent Council to re-examine the question of setting up an institute... together with the related issue of the WEU Agency", without saying whether it means the Agency for the Control of Arma-

ments, which can be transformed only by revising the treaty, or what is left of the agencies set up in 1985, that are apparently in the process of being completely liquidated, although the Assembly has not been informed of the Council's decisions on the matter. However, this reply also says that: "The Institutional Working Group has been instructed to prepare proposals for submission at the forthcoming ministerial meeting." In this case, it is hard to determine the rôle of the Permanent Council in this matter and at what point it intervenes.

89. The Assembly's position towards the institute was expressed in Recommendations 442, 463, 467 and 472, in which lessons were drawn from the experience of the agencies set up in 1985. This showed that an organ closely dependent on the Council, itself subject to the system of unanimous decisions, could not make a worthwhile contribution. Experience with the ACA and the SAC, on the contrary, showed that there could be "subsidiary organs" of the Council that were not subordinate to it and consequently had considerable freedom of action within the framework of a permanent task, defined by the Assembly in Recommendation 467 as being "to promote a European spirit in matters of defence". It proposed certain methods of achieving this and ensuring that it had the necessary autonomy and, in Recommendation 472, asked the Council to submit a draft statute to the Assembly for joint examination. The fact that the Council has not yet replied to Recommendation 467 and that the procedure referred to in the reply to Recommendation 472 with a view to the Council of Ministers adopting a decision to allow the planned institute to be set up indicates that the Council has no intention of consulting the Assembly before the Ministers take a decision. This probably means it is not really prepared to follow the Assembly's proposals on the rôle and structure of the institute or on the organisation of its relations with the Assembly. This conclusion is confirmed in paragraph VI.4 of the half-yearly report, which announces that the Assembly "will be informed... following the ministerial meeting" which is to take the decisions now being prepared.

90. This supposition seems particularly well founded since the letter from the Secretary-General to the Assembly is dated 18th September and reached the Assembly only on 22nd September although it was sent by rapid means. It mentions meetings of the Institutional Working Group on 1st June and 3rd July, but your Rapporteur has learned that the group also met on 18th September. He therefore thinks the letter, prepared before 18th September, was not sent at once because everyone was expecting the institutional group to agree on the question of the institute. The absence of agreement probably then induced the Secretary-General to send the

letter posthaste as drafted prior to that meeting so as not to have to report on a setback, thus concealing it from the Assembly. Your Rapporteur would be most surprised if this supposition were denied.

91. (v) It was solely in the press⁶ that your Rapporteur learned of an interesting initiative by the Belgian Government to set up, in WEU, a European crisis management centre. This probably means "for averting military risks". It is believed that, on 5th July 1989, following the crash of a MiG-23 aircraft on Belgian territory on 4th July, from which the pilot had ejected himself over Polish territory, Mr. Coëme, Belgian Minister of Defence, after the fashion of centres for nuclear accidents in the United States and the Soviet Union, made this proposal to the "meeting of WEU experts", i.e. probably the Special Working Group. The procedure is interesting in itself since the Special Working Group would thus for the first time have had a matter placed before it directly by the Chairmanship-in-Office and not by other Council instances, which confirms the view that the Special Working Group should be considered as an embodiment of the Council. According to the same sources, this proposal was well received provided naval matters were excluded from the centre's responsibilities, and, on 8th July, the Soviet Union is reported to have announced that it was in favour of the creation of such a centre on a twofold basis, in WEU and the Warsaw Pact. The final decision on this matter should be taken by the Council of Ministers at its meeting in November. While the Belgian initiative seems very welcome, it has to be noted that, once again, neither the Council nor the Secretary-General in his letter of 18th September saw fit to inform the Assembly, although this is an important question which might have a significant effect on WEU's future.

92. (vi) The Assembly will be gratified that the Council confirms its intention to "provide the Assembly with accurate, up-to-date information on all aspects of the implementation of the modified Brussels Treaty and on the activities of WEU bodies", but in practice this intention has not been followed up, at least in the areas referred to here. Consideration of the reply to Recommendation 472, like that to Recommendation 468, to be examined by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration for the June 1990 session, give the impression that the Council does not take the Assembly's recommendations at all seriously and seeks to accede to its wishes formally without thought for the content of its communications or even attempting to respect the principle of non-contradiction. Such perfunctory documents

cannot be part of a dialogue between the Council and the Assembly.

93. (vii) Furthermore, the Assembly can but welcome the creation of an ad hoc Sub-Group on Space, which corresponds to its requests. It emphasises the political importance for Europe of having technical means of taking part in the verification of future agreements on the limitation of conventional weapons. Without these means, it cannot hope to occupy its due place in the current negotiations and would thus have to put up with decisions taken without its participation. It will thus find the programme of the sub-group as described in Chapter V of the Council's report too modest since Europe has little time left it wishes to occupy that place.

94. (viii) The Assembly will notice that, for the first time, the half-yearly report of the Council uses the word "formal" to describe the meetings between the Presidential Committee or other Assembly committees and the Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council. It will welcome this insofar as the Council had hitherto underlined the "informal" nature of such meetings which made it difficult for a parliamentary assembly that cannot delegate its powers to pursue a satisfactory dialogue with the Council. It remains to be seen what this linguistic innovation conceals, but the Council must realise that the Assembly can consider itself properly informed only through written or oral communications to all its members, although this does not mean that it rejects other forms of communication.

VI. Conclusions

95. The transformations now under way in Europe will inevitably have significant consequences for the West and, in particular, for the European Community. However, these changes are still incomplete, ambiguous and uncertain, making it difficult today to determine their extent and possible effects. There could be nothing more dangerous than to anticipate events when it is not known when they will take place, thus jeopardising the running of the Atlantic Alliance and the organisation of Community Europe in order to work out assessments of the future of defence. It is in the light of its own needs that the West must tackle the problems that in any event arise: burden- and responsibility-sharing in the alliance and implementation of the Single European Act. However, it must do so in such a way that any measures it takes do not hold up the arms limitation process or the development of co-operation between the two halves of Europe and the removal of what is known as the iron curtain.

96. Your Rapporteur therefore considers that now is not the time to link the European Community too closely with a European security and

6. Eurostratégie, No. 27, September 1989; De Defensa, Volume 5, No. 2, 25th September 1989.

defence policy. He wonders whether the European Parliament or even the Commission are not at present going too far in this direction and whether their haste in moving towards the European union that is everyone's aim may not cause cracks in the European edifice the day it is necessary to make a choice which many find difficult between the reunification of Europe and advancing towards the United States of Europe. Your Rapporteur therefore suggests that, keeping to the provisions of the Rome Treaty and the programme set out in the single act, the Western European countries continue, for as long as necessary, to separate security Europe from economic Europe, i.e. that they keep to the treaties and institutions now in force in each area.

97. More than any other country, the Federal Republic of Germany is naturally aware of the danger for détente of the Community taking over defence matters. Thus, its Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Genscher, said in September 1989:

“We should be ready if Central and Eastern European states want closer co-operation with the European Community and we should even be prepared to welcome new members if they fulfil the necessary conditions. It is therefore important for the European Community to concentrate on joint external policy, joint economic policy, ecological and technological policy and cultural co-operation. But military questions which concern the Western European countries must be kept apart and dealt with in Western European Union. Otherwise, in spite of the formal opening of the European Community, the accession of neutral states and above all of other Central and Eastern European states would be precluded. The European Community must be open to all European countries wishing to become members and fulfilling the conditions. The European Community should, moreover, develop more open structures such as the Eureka programme, which is also open to states that are not members of the European Community.”⁷

Mr. Mitterrand's words in Caracas on 10th October can apparently be interpreted as endorsing this viewpoint. After confirming his attachment to the cause of German reunification, to be effected “peacefully and democratically”, he added:

“The building of the European Community can contribute to, and even answer in part the German problems that

will arise in the event of reunification. No time must therefore be lost in giving the European Community the structure it needs.”

Finally, on 16th October 1989, Mr. Andreotti granted an interview to *Die Welt* in which he endorsed the view expressed by Mr. Genscher as follows:

“I think that, independently of the methods of co-operation now being developed in the light of each country's means and needs, it is particularly important that military matters should not be touched upon. Military questions should continue to be handled in the framework of the increasingly close relations between the pacts and alliances and at the level of the Helsinki agreements.”

98. This does not mean WEU and the Community must ignore each other. Your Rapporteur has tried to pinpoint various questions towards which the prospect of 1992 should guide the work of the WEU Council and, at the same time, a number of aspects of European security, in particular in the industrial and commercial field, that the Community organs should examine. A line should be drawn between the areas of responsibility of the two organisations on the basis of a strict application of the treaties in force, while introducing all the necessary means of communication between them so that each one may at any time take account of what the other is doing. The corollary to the principle that everything that can be done in the wider framework, that of the Community, should be done there is that WEU has a complementary rôle to play, because of its specific responsibilities, in preparing the future European union in areas in which the Community is not at present able to do so. Far from giving the Community a grip on defence questions, the single act, in conformity with the modified Brussels Treaty, paves the way for closer co-operation between the two organisations.

99. On 5th December 1988, the former Secretary-General of WEU, Mr. Alfred Cahen, answered a question put by our colleague, Mr. Hill, on relations between the Community and WEU as follows:

“... We should logically therefore work together. This is why I endeavour to cultivate close co-operative relations with the Commission – i.e. with Mr. Delors and the other commissioners. Unfortunately, we cannot push that co-operation beyond certain limits because in the Communities there are three countries which cannot at present accept the security dimension, and two of them do not wish to have too close relations with WEU. The

7. Interview with Mr. Genscher in the *Spiegel*, 25th September 1989, page 26.

building of Europe is not a logical process...

Mr. van Eekelen spoke in similar terms in his Brussels address.

100. It remains for the governments to grant WEU the institutional wherewithal for it effectively to play the rôle they set for it when WEU was reactivated, concomitant, it should be recalled, with the drawing up of the single act. This reactivation seems to have become a reality at the level of intergovernmental practice as the Secretary-General's letter of 18th September usefully recalls. But it has been accompanied by the destruction of the organisation's structures. While the Secretary-General is now a politician who can express his own views without having to obtain the prior agreement of the Council, the Secretariat-General as an institution has lost all initiative, to the extent that, in affairs of minor political importance such as refurbishing the building in which the Assembly has its seat the Council has set up a troika to oversee the work. Similarly, everything indicates that the introduction of the WEU-Com network has resulted in all communications being transmitted from the Chairmanship-in-Office and member governments to the Assembly without the intervention of the Secretariat-General. Yet often in the past the Secretariat-General, considering that it was not only a Council secretariat but a body responsible for applying the modified

Brussels Treaty, including Article IX, managed to intervene to ensure that governments fulfilled their commitments. It no longer seems to have this possibility. The present winding down of the agencies is further helping to diminish the institution, and the Council's apparent will to consider the future institute as an organ wholly subordinate to it, which was not the case of the ACA or the SAC, confirms this tendency.

101. All this would be acceptable if the governments did not shroud European security activities in an ever thicker mist. This is so for the European Commission's action in security matters and intergovernmental exchanges in WEU. The Council's annual reports are increasingly devoid of content. Replies to Assembly recommendations are increasingly vague and remote from reality. Neither public opinion nor the Assembly is correctly informed of what is going on in reactivated WEU, so that there is, probably mistakenly, no longer much belief in the reality of reactivation.

102. Let the governments make no mistake, twenty-first century Europe will not come into being without the wholehearted backing of public opinion, strongly in favour of close European co-operation but increasingly sceptical about what is being done. If the governments fail to remedy this situation, in particular in the framework of WEU, they will quickly see their most auspicious initiatives fail.

European security and events in the Near and Middle East

REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee ²
by Mr. Pieralli, Rapporteur*

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DRAFT RECOMMENDATION

on European security and events in the Near and Middle East

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1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Ahrens (Chairman) (Alternate: *Soell*); *Sir Geoffrey Finsberg*, Mr. Martino (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Aarts, Beix, *Böhm*, *Caro*, Coleman (Alternate: *Lord Kirkhill*), Collart, Eich, Forni (Alternate: *Pontillon*), Foschi (Alternate: *Mezzapesa*), Hill, Hirschler, Koehl, *Lord Mackie of Benshie*, MM. Müller, Natali, Péciaux, *Pieralli*, Mrs. Polfer (Alternate: *Kollwelter*), MM. Ruet, van der Sanden (Alternate: *Eisma*), Sarti, Sir William Shelton (Alternate: *Speed*), Mrs. Staels-Dompas, Mr. Stoffelen.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation***on European security and events in the Near and Middle East***

The Assembly,

- (i) Recalling its Recommendations 349 and 403;
- (ii) Considering that Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels Treaty gives the WEU Council competence to examine threats to international peace in the Near and Middle East;
- (iii) Welcoming the Council's reply to Recommendation 472 which reaffirms its intention to report on the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, even when this is carried out in a framework other than WEU, in accordance with Article II of the treaty;
- (iv) Recalling the action taken by WEU in 1988 to restore freedom of navigation in the Gulf;
- (v) Expressing its satisfaction at:
 - (a) the continuation of the cease-fire between Iran and Iraq;
 - (b) the suspension of fighting in Beirut;
- (vi) Aware of the important consequences of the meeting of sixty-two members of the Lebanese Parliament on the initiative of the committee formed by Morocco, Algeria and Saudi Arabia to:
 - (a) work out a political and institutional solution allowing the various communities to cohabit peacefully;
 - (b) assert the integrity, sovereignty and independence of the Lebanese state, freed of interference and foreign military presence;
- (vii) Condemning the taking of hostages, their detention and terrorism in all its forms;
- (viii) Expressing the strongest concern that no general peace process has yet been started in the Middle East in spite of the action that the international community has been taking for a long time through:
 - (a) United Nations resolutions;
 - (b) recommendations of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe;
 - (c) European Community declarations;
 - (d) diplomatic action by the superpowers;
 - (e) the good will shown by the Arab countries at their recent summit meeting in Casablanca;
- (ix) Strongly disapproving the new impetus given to the arms race by states in the region, particularly in regard to long-range aircraft, medium-range missiles and chemical and nuclear weapons:
 - (a) by firms, banks and experts from European Community countries;
 - (b) by agreements with and arms deliveries and military assistance from certain Western European countries, the Soviet Union, the United States and China,

which are obviously contrary to the search for peaceful solutions to the conflicts causing bloodshed in the region;

- (x) Gratified that the European Council has taken a major step to prevent its members contributing to the production of chemical weapons by countries in the region but regretting that the Western European countries have taken no collective steps to avoid the proliferation of other types of armaments such as medium- and long-range surface-to-surface missiles and nuclear weapons;
- (xi) Endorsing unreservedly the United Nations' decision to convene an international conference on peace in the Middle East;
- (xii) Considering that, to ensure peace and stability in the region, it is essential to seek a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that guarantees the security of the state of Israel and the right of the Palestinian people to a homeland and to self-determination in the Gaza Strip and West Bank;
- (xiii) Recognising the will of the Palestinian people who for two years have been demonstrating, with the intifada movement, their refusal to accept the prolongation of the Israeli military occupation that started in 1967,

and condemning repression, attacks and any action that violates human rights and international conventions;

(xiv) Considering that the start of a general peace process, and hence the convocation of an international conference on peace in the Middle East under the aegis of the United Nations, calls for a dialogue between the parties involved as a first step,

and assessing positively:

(a) the decisions taken by the Palestinian National Council in Algiers;

(b) the rejection of terrorism by the PLO;

(c) the PLO's explicit recognition of the state of Israel;

(d) the decisions taken at the Arab summit meeting in Casablanca;

(xv) Considering further that the Israeli Government's plan for elections in the occupied territories, if accompanied by the necessary international guarantees and negotiated between all the parties involved, might provide an opportunity to start a dialogue which cannot be held without the PLO, which manifestly has the sympathy and support of the people of the West Bank and Gaza Strip,

and expressing its disappointment at the Israeli Government's rejection of the ten points completing the Shamir plan presented by Mr. Hosni Mubarak, President of Egypt;

(xvi) Wishing constructive negotiations to be started without delay between a representative and credible Palestinian delegation and the Israeli Government,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

I

1. Confirm that it is fully prepared:
 - (a) to respond to any request aimed at encouraging the consolidation of the military truce, the resumption of civilian life and normal air and sea traffic in Lebanon;
 - (b) to support the action taken by Morocco, Algeria and Saudi Arabia;
 - (c) to support current efforts in Lebanon to:
 - restore peaceful cohabitation among the communities;
 - reform the institutions;
 - re-establish state authority;
 - enable all foreign troops to be withdrawn;
 - guarantee the integrity and sovereignty of Lebanon;
2. Take immediate steps to halt the arms race in the Middle East, particularly in regard to chemical and nuclear weapons, missiles and long-range aircraft and to this end:
 - (a) stop the implementation of contracts for supplies of arms and take various measures, co-ordinated between governments, to prevent firms, banks and research centres from evading control, as has already been the case;
 - (b) propose that all states, in particular the Soviet Union, China, the United States, South Africa and Brazil, adopt a similar approach;
 - (c) exert pressure on the Arab states and Israel to accept a freeze on and verification of their military potential and the progressive elimination of chemical and nuclear weapons with a view to the international conference on peace in the Middle East which will have to consider special negotiations on the reduction of armaments following the political agreements reached and as an essential guarantee of the security of all states in the region;
3. Draw up a list of products and technologies which member countries would undertake not to deliver to any Near or Middle East country and seek the endorsement of the other arms exporting countries for such a decision;
4. Ensure in particular that member states do not authorise the export to any country in the region of:
 - (a) chemical products on the list given in the European Council regulation of 20th February 1989;
 - (b) technology necessary for the development of medium- and long-range surface-to-surface missiles;

5. Reaffirm its resolve to preserve freedom of navigation on all seas;
6. Announce here and now that member countries are prepared to co-ordinate the action of their armed forces:
 - (a) for humanitarian operations and international police duties at the request of the United Nations;
 - (b) with the agreement of the parties directly concerned, for guaranteeing the implementation of bi- or multilateral agreements concluded by the international conference on peace in the Middle East, or even earlier through direct negotiations between the parties to the conflict;

II

Urge member states to take action in the European Council to ensure acceptance of United Nations resolutions on Palestine and Lebanon and:

- (a) Intensify diplomatic action to promote peace negotiations between Iran and Iraq based on the full acceptance of United Nations Resolution 598;
- (b) Follow up the Assembly's earlier recommendation to give substantial assistance to Kurdish refugees and insist on respect for human rights and recognition of the cultural and administrative independence of the Kurdish people in the various states in which they live;
- (c) Recommend that member states increase, directly or in the framework of the European Community, their humanitarian assistance to the Palestinian people of the Gaza Strip and West Bank whose living conditions are deteriorating from day to day;
- (d) Persevere with approaches to each state capable of exercising influence to bring about the release of all the hostages taken on Lebanese territory and the international fight against all forms of terrorism;
- (e) In any event, promote the meeting of the international conference on peace in the Middle East which only Israel and Iran are now refusing and, to this end:
 - (i) ask the Soviet Union to renew normal diplomatic relations with Israel;
 - (ii) ask the United States to raise the level of their contacts with the Palestine Liberation Organisation;
 - (iii) ask the United Nations General Assembly to stop equating Zionism with racism as approved in one of its resolutions;
 - (iv) ask the United Nations Security Council to adopt a resolution in favour of the Palestinians' right to self-determination;
- (f) Ask the Israeli Government:
 - (i) to stop its repressive action in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, which has already caused several hundred deaths;
 - (ii) to abandon all practices that are prejudicial to human rights;
 - (iii) to respect the property of the population of the occupied territories;
 - (iv) to allow Palestinian universities to be reopened;
- (g) Ask the Israeli Government to agree to a dialogue with the PLO and negotiations with a credible and representative Palestinian delegation with a view to holding free elections in the occupied territories;
- (h) Ask Israel's neighbouring Arab states and the PLO to exercise their influence and vigilance in halting infiltrations of armed groups into Israeli territory;
- (i) Together with the Council of Europe and the European Community – which can place at the service of peace in the Middle East its great economic potential and vast wealth of supranational experience – take the necessary steps to define a truly Western European peace initiative with a view to:
 - (i) backing up the diplomatic effort by the United States and the Soviet Union;
 - (ii) helping to terminate the present dangerous status quo;
 - (iii) fostering an international conference on peace in the Middle East under the aegis of the United Nations.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Pieralli, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. When he starts to recount his campaign in Palestine and Syria in his famous book "The seven pillars of wisdom", T.E. Lawrence gives a very evocative picture of the human geography of the region at the beginning of the century. He describes a mosaic of communities, each with its own ethnic group, language and religion, some of which controlled only a small group of villages and whose difficult cohabitation was ensured only through the far-off domination of the Ottoman rulers. Some were the heirs to local civilisations with a history dating back several thousand years; others were the result of recent immigrations such as those of the Circassians, the Cherkesses and the Armenians who had fled Turkish persecution. Although prepared to take part, each on its own behalf, in a revolt against the Ottoman Empire, they were hardly prepared to form a state or states.

2. Since that time, there have been other migrations, the three main ones being the arrival of Armenians during the first world war, Jews as from the beginning of the century, but particularly in the aftermath of the second world war, then after the decolonisation of the Arab countries, and finally the Palestinians, chased out by the extension of the state of Israel since 1947. However, the unequal economic development in the countries in the region led to other, less massive migrations.

3. The formation of new national states after the second world war, the expiry of the European powers' mandates and completion of the decolonisation process did not solve the problems involved in the cohabitation of such different communities throughout the region. The dream of Arab unity, contested moreover by many communities, had already failed even before the death of Nasser, who was its apostle and builder. This situation must be borne in mind in attempting to understand the drama which has been tearing the Middle East apart for fifty years, including the most recent events.

II. Recent developments in the Middle East

4. While a political solution has been found, or is in the process of being found, to the various regional conflicts in Asia, Africa and Latin America, allowing a relaxation of tension and an improvement in international relations, the situation in the Near and Middle East is becoming increasingly explosive and dangerous.

5. The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan was definitely a positive, dynamic factor in improving the international situation. However, the civil war is continuing in that country and the military situation is deadlocked. There is still no sign of a political solution and the United States and Pakistan are continuing to provide military assistance to the guerrillas and the Soviet Union to the government in Kabul.

6. The cease-fire between Iran and Iraq, achieved through special efforts by the United Nations, has been respected and, a year later, it may be said that the truce has been consolidated. However, there has been no progress at all with negotiations for a peace treaty, only a few hundred prisoners have been exchanged and there are tens of thousands of Iraqi and Iranian soldiers in prison camps. Since the countries are no longer at war, talks are being conducted with the Soviet Union, France, Italy, Spain and other eastern and western countries for resuming supplies of military equipment. Iraq and Iran are still at grips with each other through direct or indirect intervention in the Lebanese civil war.

7. When your Rapporteur visited Israel from 17th to 20th September 1989, the many analysts that he met stressed their concern at Iraq's dynamism in the region since the end of the war with Iran. In particular, they underlined the possible risk of military co-operation between Iraq and Jordan.

8. The Kurdish problem has not been solved and even seems to have worsened since the end of hostilities between Iran and Iraq, with repression tantamount to genocide with the use of weapons of mass destruction, political assassinations, the provocation of new waves of political refugees and the migration of terrified, defenceless civilians from one country to the other. Yet a political solution to the conflict between Iran and Iraq implies an undertaking to grant cultural and administrative autonomy allowing the Kurdish people to live in peace and receive immediate and larger-scale humanitarian assistance through international organisations without changing the shape of existing frontiers.

9. Fundamentally, the two positive aims so keenly sought by international diplomacy (the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the end of the state of war in the Persian Gulf) have not initiated a general process of peace throughout the region.

10. The Lebanese civil war and the Palestinian question, which are interdependent, are still in the centre of the world stage and the present report will therefore be concerned mainly with these two specific aspects.

III. Lebanon

11. The Syrian-supported militia's shelling of the Christian sector of Beirut, which started in summer 1989, has already killed about 1 000 people and wounded 3 000 other civilians, crowded into cellars and makeshift shelters in intolerably dangerous conditions, with practically no possibility of obtaining supplies of food and water, their hygiene and hospital services being inaccessible or no longer operating. It has again aroused the horror of the entire world at the tragedy of the Lebanese civil war that has lasted for fourteen years and made it imperative for the international community to make a further attempt to end it.

12. Since 1975, there has been an intolerable number of victims for a country which at one time had three million inhabitants plus about 400 000 Palestinian refugees. According to recent estimates, between 800 000 and a million Lebanese have been forced to leave their country. The first stage of the war alone, which lasted from 1975 to 1978, was responsible for about 50 000 killed, 100 000 wounded and hundreds of thousands of refugees. The period from 1978 (first Israeli invasion) and 1982 (second Israeli invasion) was rife with attacks, clashes between various armed factions and abortive attempts to restore the unity of the state and lay the foundations of a new national pact. The Peace in Galilee operation, which brought Israeli troops right to Beirut, caused a further 18 000 dead and 50 000 wounded. Just as the arrival of Syrian troops in 1976 was symbolised by the massacre of the Palestinian refugee camp at Tal Al Zaatar, the arrival of the Israeli army in 1982 was symbolised by massacres at the Palestinian camps of Sabra and Chatila.

13. Since then, all state institutions have completely collapsed. All the ethnic and religious communities and their various factions have formed or strengthened their armed militia forces. The civil war has become a war between all parties (armed skirmishes between pro-Syrian Palestinians and those loyal to Mr. Arafat, between Lebanese Christian Falangist forces and Christian brigades from the army, battles between Amal Shiite militia forces and Hezbollah forces, also Shiite, etc.), each community wishing to show its followers its supremacy in the war waged against the others. Alliances between internal forces and with states in the region have constantly shifted according to the interests of the moment.

14. The Lebanese economy, which had withstood the first stage of the civil war, collapsed after 1982, suffering also from strong Israeli competition, in particular in the consumer goods and tourist sectors.

15. Lebanese constitutional practice was based on a subtle attribution of government posts between the various communities. The President of the Republic had to be a Maronite and the Prime Minister a Sunnite. It did not survive the civil war and, today, Lebanon has no President since parliament, which should elect him, has been unable to meet and there are two opposing governments: one presided by Mr. Selin Hoss, a Sunnite Moslem, and the other, in East Beirut, under General Michel Aoun, leader of the Maronite Christian brigades of the Lebanese army, who proclaimed a "war of liberation" against the Syrian invasion by receiving military supplies from Iraq and starting what is known as the "war of the Lebanese ports".

16. The Lebanese civil war had endogenous causes which have become increasingly mingled with the Israeli-Arab conflict, the struggle between Arab and Moslem states for supremacy in the region and the interests of the super-powers.

17. The 1943 national pact, drawn up jointly by leading Christians and Moslems under the patronage of France, a mandatory power, was based on a compromise by which Lebanon was to be part of the Arab world but with a pre-eminence of Christians in the state. On this basis, Lebanon took part in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, and the pact was confirmed after the first split in 1958, when President Chamoun, a Maronite Christian, considering the time ripe for changing the balance of internal forces, called the United States marines to Beirut, the United States, following the Iraqi revolution, having proclaimed, in the Eisenhower doctrine, its vital interest in the Near and Middle East.

18. Economic development in subsequent years, which accentuated social imbalances to the detriment of the poorer section of the population, demographic growth, in particular among the Shiites, the proportion of whom among the total population rose from 20% to 40%, and the arrival of hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees emphasised the frailty of the national pact. The 1943 compromise had kept the Shiites on the sidelines and excluded the many other ethnic and religious communities – first and foremost the Druze community, which was to play a major rôle throughout the civil war – from the principal institutional posts and, hence, from all forms of protection and social promotion. The Maronite Christian right wing initiated the civil war in 1975, but the Moslem social and political left wing felt strong enough to take up the challenge. For a whole year Mr. Arafat managed to keep most Palestinians

outside the confrontation. They became involved only when their refugee camps were attacked in 1976. Their intervention upset the facts of the conflict by provoking the arrival of 30 000 Syrian troops, called in by the President of the Lebanese Republic to put an end to the first stage of the civil war. The Syrian army then stayed on in Lebanon as an Arab deterrent force with a mandate from the Arab League. It withdrew from Beirut a number of times and then returned to the Lebanese capital at the request of one or other of the parties to the conflict following clashes between armed militia forces from the various Lebanese communities and between Palestinians.

19. Syria's interest in Lebanon is clear, both for strategic as well as for historical and geographical reasons. Following its loss of the Golan Heights during the war against Israel in 1967, Syria has considered the Lebanese Bekaa Valley to be an essential base for defending its national territory.

20. In view of the Palestinian presence, Lebanon has also been the setting for complex politico-military relations between Syria and the PLO under Arafat, who has had to safeguard the political unity and independence of his organisation.

21. In the often changing context of the various factions, Syria has allies among both Moslems and Christians in Lebanon and uses them in accordance with its political views by exercising something of a protectorate that it claims to be legitimate under its mandate from the Arab League.

22. Speaking of Syrian interests in Lebanon to a delegation from the Council of Europe, the President of the Syrian Parliament said:

“ Syria considers Lebanon should be independent, unified and part of the Arab world. Peace will be restored in Lebanon when foreign interference stops. The Lebanese are a single people and Syria will not allow a single religious faith to assume the right to govern. ”

One of the most likely reasons for the military intervention in Lebanon in 1976 is the fear that a victory by the Moslem left wing in the civil war might lead Israel to occupy Lebanon and involve Syria in the conflict. It is certain that Syria and Israel, both present in Lebanon, have carefully avoided any contact between their two armies during their main deployments: Syria in 1976 and Israel in 1978. Similarly, in 1982, when the two armies came into contact they managed to avoid the inevitable clashes degenerating into all-out war between the two countries.

23. The Israeli leaders have never concealed the fact that they considered it in their interest to have a separate Christian entity close to the

frontiers of the Jewish state as a possible ally to prevent encirclement by the Moslem world. The wish to have Israel as a protector was not foreign to the Maronite groups who started the civil war in 1975 when they felt threatened by the presence of Palestinians who, in 1969, received from the Arab League, with the consent of the Lebanese Government, the right to station and train their military units in Lebanon. Relations between Israel and the Maronite Christian right wing have always been, and still are, quite close. Since 1985, the “ Lebanese forces ” have had an office in Jerusalem. Since 1978, Israel has controlled Southern Lebanon either directly or through the Southern Lebanese Army (SLA) formed by Major Haddad, a deserter from the Lebanese army, and which, since the latter's death, has been commanded by Colonel Antoine Lahad, also a Maronite Christian. The SLA owes its existence, and this is still the case, to the financial and military support of Israel. With its invasion in 1982, Israel's intention was not only to hit the Palestinian camps and eliminate the bases from which attacks were launched on Israeli territory, it was also to establish a real protectorate over Lebanon. This was the meaning of the Israeli-Lebanese agreement drawn up under the aegis of Mr. Philip Habib, President Reagan's special envoy to the Middle East, which was first signed and then denounced by President Amin Gemayel of Lebanon. Disavowal of the agreement was the only decision taken jointly by the heads of the Lebanese factions at the two national reconciliation conferences held in Geneva and Lausanne in autumn 1983 and spring 1984 under the aegis of Syria and Saudi Arabia. At the same time, fighting continued in Beirut. On withdrawing from the Chuf mountain, the Israeli army undertook to rearm both the Maronite Christians and their Druze enemies. Only in 1985 did Israeli troops withdraw partially from Southern Lebanon, almost three years after United Nations Resolution 475 calling for an immediate, total withdrawal. Thus, the PLO had to leave Beirut and all territory south of the Lebanese capital, but the ensuing vacuum was filled by Shiite militias, first those of Amal and then the Hezbollah. A third foreign involvement thus emerged and developed: that of Iran.

24. A few months after it was proclaimed, it already became clear that the Islamic Republic of Iran, led by Imam Khomeini, was intent on exporting the Islamic revolution to the rest of the Moslem world and introducing unheard-of conduct in international diplomacy. An example of this concept of international relations was when the staff of the United States Embassy in Tehran was taken hostage. Those who planned and carried out this action were covered by Khomeini and subsequently put in charge of the principal sectors of the state and Islamic organisations responsible for propaganda and

action abroad. Overall, it cannot be said that Khomeini's international strategy was successful, but it gained a foothold and found a way to express itself to some extent in the complicated tangle of the Lebanese civil war and the international context of which that war is a part.

25. After the end of the war between Iran and Iraq and the death of Khomeini, what is happening in the Islamic Republic is not essentially a struggle for power. Hojatolislam Rafsanjani indeed took his place without too much difficulty as the senior political leader and then became President of the Republic. It is rather a clash between tendencies which differ mainly in their approach to international policy. While it was probably not too difficult to normalise relations with the Soviet Union, this was not at all true for relations with the western countries and more particularly the United States. Rafsanjani's pragmatic leanings are now being put to the test with the negotiations to free the western hostages (eight American, four British, two German, one Italian and one Irish) held by the Lebanese Hezbollah. Differing, discordant voices have been raised among the fundamentalists, both Iranian and Lebanese. The question of hostages is an important factor in the complicated, confused situation in Lebanon. For humanitarian reasons first, but also to avoid further dangerous outbursts, international diplomacy is therefore striving to solve this matter. Arab countries (including Syria), European Community countries and the Soviet Union have all made efforts in this sense.

26. The situation in Lebanon was examined at the Arab summit meeting in Casablanca in May 1989. According to the final communiqué:

“The conference requested all Lebanese parties to respect the cease-fire *immediately and permanently*... and urged (them) to co-operate in an effort to reach global national reconciliation and concord whereby a definitive end could be put to the Lebanese crisis in all its aspects... *The conference rejected all attempts at partition and renewed the assurance of its undertaking to support the rebuilding of Lebanon and its national economy*¹. The conference decided to set up a committee comprising H.M. King Hassan II of Morocco, the Custodian of the Haramain, King Fahd Ibn Abdul Aziz of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and H.E. President Chadli Benjedid, President of the Democratic People's Republic of Algeria. This committee was given full and illimited prerogatives to achieve the goals set by the conference... This committee

1. The words underlined in this quotation were in the official French text of the communiqué received from the Arab League, but not in the English text.

will have for a task to carry out what contacts and measures are deemed appropriate with a view to securing a favourable climate for the members of the Lebanese Parliament to meet and discuss the document of political reforms, hold presidential elections and form a government of national unity within a period not exceeding six months. The conference also expressed its readiness to meet again... in order to assess... what other developments will have occurred.”

After a first working session that closed in July with negative conclusions, the committee set up by Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Algeria again took the initiative in Lebanon in mid-September. It first managed to ensure a truce in the fighting in Beirut. Then it managed to bring together sixty-two Lebanese members of parliament (half Christian, half Moslem) in Taif in Saudi Arabia. Unofficial sources have reported that the Lebanese Parliament reached agreement on the principle of parity between Christians and Moslems in the future national parliament and a new balance of power among state leaders. The partial stage-by-stage withdrawal of Syrian troops was also agreed upon. General Aoun expressed his disagreement with the Taif decision and several Moslem factions (Amal and Hezbollah), for opposite reasons, shared this disagreement. It is to be hoped that the Christians and Moslems who drew up the Taif agreement will be capable of controlling the situation in Beirut with the backing of Arab mediators and international diplomacy.

27. The United States, following harsh criticism and hostile demonstrations by followers of General Aoun, who had called for its support against Syria, has shut its embassy in Beirut for security reasons, thus confirming its low profile on the Lebanese question. France, which has the presidency of the European Community, decided, after the deployment of a fleet in Lebanese waters had given rise to a good deal of discussion and opposition, to convene a meeting of European political co-operation in Paris and made a special effort to bring humanitarian assistance to the Lebanese civilian population, as agreed by the European Community. The Soviet Union, Pope John-Paul II and the conference of non-aligned countries have also taken steps to try to restore peace.

28. The main elements for restoring peace in Lebanon are a cease-fire, reconstituting constitutional organs, revising the national pact, disarming the militias, asserting the authority of the Lebanese state throughout national territory, the withdrawal of all foreign troops and an end to all interference by other countries.

29. All this obviously requires the participation and consensus of all the Lebanese parties but, even if they are capable of making such an

effort after fourteen years of civil war, they have no means of imposing a global, lasting solution. It is not just a question of the Syrian military presence. There is also mention of some 4 000 Iranians and, above all, one must not forget the Israeli military occupation of part of the south of the country. It is very difficult to imagine any of these countries withdrawing. Both the Syrians and the Israelis consider their presence in Lebanon to be essential for their security. This makes the departure of foreign soldiers from Lebanon possible only once the process of peace in the region has reached an advanced stage. A final solution to the Lebanese crisis must therefore now be sought in the framework of a global peace agreement on the "fertile crescent". Originally, the Lebanese war was basically a civil war between Lebanese factions, but it has become far more than that: it is now part of the Arab-Israeli conflict and must be considered as such if it is to be ended.

IV. The Palestinian question

30. What has hitherto prevented and rendered more difficult any solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not just the admittedly considerable problem of finding enough space to ensure the security of two opposing sovereignties in a fairly small territory to which both Jews and Palestinians have undeniable historical, religious, cultural, economic and community claims. The Arab countries were stunned by the plan for the partition of Palestine set out in United Nations Resolution 181 and in the last forty years they have refused to recognise the existence of the state of Israel. Equally undeniable is the fact that in that time Israel has sought to widen its frontiers by conducting a policy of expansion to the detriment of its Arab neighbours. It should also be added that the Palestinian problem has often been used as a pretext for policies of hegemony and strength by various countries in the region (Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Jordan) and, in general, in the Arab and Islamic world: Israel has been able to count on these divisions for refusing to implement United Nations decisions relating to the West Bank and Gaza, occupied since the 1967 war, and to shirk its commitments, albeit limited, under the Camp David agreements. During this period, moreover, the Near and Middle East have been a particularly sensitive, important point in the worldwide confrontation between the two superpowers and, because of their proximity to the European continent of which they are the principal supplier of energy, they have played a significant rôle in both the East-West and North-South balance.

31. This is not the place to describe the stages in the conflict that has been steeping the Near and Middle East in blood for more than forty

years through five wars, numerous invasions, many massacres and biblical migrations whose principal victim has been the Arab population of Palestine. Consideration will merely be given to events in the last two years which now allow international diplomacy to attempt, with some chance of success, to find a lasting political solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It should not be forgotten that, following the denunciation of the Jordanian-Palestinian agreement, the failure of the Hussein plan and the PLO's persistent crisis after its break with Syria, the situation seemed to be deadlocked in mid-1987. In examining subsequent events, which offered new possibilities and prospects, the major changes at international level (East-West détente) and regional level (the end of the war between Iran and Iraq helped to bring the Palestinian problem back into the limelight) must not be forgotten.

32. What has helped the most to change prospects in the Middle East is the wide-ranging, unarmed struggle by the Palestinian population of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, occupied by Israeli armed forces, which combines strikes, demonstrations and various forms of civil disobedience. The intifada has lasted for two years and is showing no signs of abating, in spite of brutal Israeli repression.

33. According to early 1989 figures, more than 700 Palestinians have been killed by Israeli troops and 43 000 wounded, including 5 800 who will be permanently handicapped, and there have been 2 500 miscarriages and cases of impotence due to the use of toxic gas in built-up areas. There have been 48 military and civilian dead on the Israeli side. Israeli sources also speak of 100 Palestinians killed since they were suspected of collaborating with Israel. Israel has taken expulsion measures against sixty Palestinians. 806 homes belonging to Palestinians suspected of taking part in the revolt have been destroyed, leaving 8 000 persons homeless, while thousands of political prisoners are kept in improvised quarters in disastrous hygienic conditions. Israel has just increased the period of administrative detention without trial from six months to a year. Palestinian schools of all kinds and every level, which were closed in December 1987, have been reopened on a temporary basis by decision of the Israeli military authorities. The universities, on the contrary, are still closed. Your Rapporteur met Palestinian university professors in Jerusalem who underlined the tremendous repercussions the closing of Palestinian universities would have on the future of their community. The third university year was about to start and those who had obtained their school-leaving certificates could not continue their studies. Even professors were not allowed access to offices and laboratories. A matter that has been widely commented upon throughout the world is the confiscation of the property of

citizens of the town of Beit-Sahour whose Christian Palestinian population is refusing to pay taxes to the Israeli Government which uses them to continue the military occupation. In Jerusalem, your Rapporteur was given a report entitled "Reporting harassment: Israeli restrictions of press freedom in the West Bank and Gaza Strip" published by the Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre. The list of zones and towns which the military authorities have closed to the press is impressive. Between 9th December 1987 and 15th August 1989, ninety-eight Palestinian journalists were arrested and imprisoned. Most recently, the number of Palestinian demonstrations and deaths each day has risen considerably. Deteriorating living conditions in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank call for an increase in our countries' humanitarian assistance to the Palestinian people.

34. Repression of the intifada has caused Israel to be criticised by world public opinion, governments and international organisations. Even the United States administration, a traditional ally of Israel, denounced the behaviour of forces of repression in the annual report on human rights violations in the world published by the State Department. On 6th October 1989, the United Nations General Assembly adopted yet another resolution condemning Israeli repression in the occupied territories.

35. The intifada has already had considerable political repercussions which it will be difficult to reverse (quite apart from the results it achieves) in international diplomacy and the situation in Israel. For the first time it has made the Palestinian inhabitants of the occupied territories the principal protagonist and not merely, as hitherto, the victim of the Middle East conflict. While it has shown Israel that there are no negotiating partners other than the PLO, it has also proved the vanity of attempts by the Arab camp, or part of it, to dominate the Palestinian movement and to speak in its name. It is certainly not by chance that, a few months after the intifada started, King Hussein gave up his administrative mandate and all responsibility for the West Bank and Egypt did likewise for the Gaza Strip.

36. The intifada, a unified movement by the Palestinian people, capable of using relatively non-violent instruments in a major, prolonged mass struggle, carried decisive weight in solving the crisis in the Palestine Liberation Organisation by shifting the balance in favour of the views long held by President Yasser Arafat for seeking a political solution to be negotiated with Israel in the framework and with the assistance of the Soviet Union, the United States, Europe and international diplomacy.

37. The Palestinian National Council, which met in Algiers on 15th November 1988, confirmed a historic turning point in PLO policy

when it decided, by 83% of the votes (but also with an undertaking by those against to respect the decisions of the majority unless there were absolutely no political results), to proclaim a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza territories, with Jerusalem as capital, while accepting United Nations Resolutions 181 of 1947 (which, as Mr. Arafat said, was the birth certificate of both Israel and Palestine), 242 of 1967 and 338 of 1973, confirming the condemnation of terrorism already proclaimed by Arafat in Cairo in October 1985 and accepting the Jordanian-Palestinian Confederation as a free, autonomous decision of the future Palestinian state.

38. In the meantime, the PLO has taken further steps towards détente with Mr. Arafat's speech at the United Nations special session in December 1988 and his press conference in Geneva on the same occasion. In Paris, on 3rd May 1989, he said the sections of the Palestinian National Charter approved in 1968 concerning the destruction of the state of Israel were null and void. Although critical, the PLO subsequently expressed no opposition of principle to the plan by the Israeli Prime Minister, Mr. Shamir, to hold elections in the occupied territories. By asking for explanations and changes, it showed that it was prepared to negotiate, even on the limited, vague proposal made by the Israeli Government.

39. The PLO's new policy was officially sanctioned and unconditionally endorsed at the recent extraordinary Arab summit meeting in Casablanca from 23rd to 26th May 1989. Even countries like Syria, which had expressed reservations and hostility in the past, admitted that the green light should be shown as soon as possible for the process leading to the convocation of an international conference on peace in the Near and Middle East, under the aegis of the United Nations Security Council. This summit meeting was a historic event of great importance with the return, as a full member, of Egypt, which had been expelled from the Arab League following the signing of the Camp David agreements in 1979. Contemporary Egypt is a factor of stability and moderation in the Middle East. Together with the Soviet Union, the United States and a few European countries, Egypt has, in recent years, exercised a strong influence in the process leading to the PLO's recognition of the existence of the state of Israel through its acceptance of United Nations resolutions. The Arab summit meeting in Casablanca completed the political circle that started with the intifada and continued with the Palestinian National Council meeting in Algiers for honest, serious negotiations on the entire Arab-Israeli conflict.

40. The intifada and its repression have had profound repercussions in Israel itself, and also on that country's image in the world, by

arousing more widespread reactions and protests that may carry greater weight than those raised at the time by the Peace in Galilee operation that led to the invasion of Lebanon in 1982. What is being questioned, not only in Israel but also in the communities of the diaspora and among American Jews, who have constantly been the main defenders of the state of Israel, is in fact its character as a democratic state based on respect for universally recognised and affirmed human rights thanks to the sacrifice of millions of Jews during the second world war. A dangerous process of radicalisation is under way in the country, both to the left and through the strengthening of the extreme right, determined to act on its own against the Palestinians and prepared to accuse of treason politicians and rulers showing signs of a minimum of willingness to negotiate.

41. For the time being, there is no sign of a real opening in official Israeli positions. The moderation of the PLO and its condemnation of terrorism are seen as a ruse, hence the refusal to deal with "terrorists". It is also said that Israel is not at war only with the Palestinians but with all the Arab countries which, except for Egypt, have never recognised it. Israel holds that the time is not yet ripe for the international peace conference and prefers direct talks. But with whom? The Jordanian option no longer exists since King Hussein closed that door.

42. The legislative elections held in Israel in November 1988 reflected this situation. Great uncertainty now seems to prevail about the future prospects, as well as paralysis in face of current Arab-Palestinian deployment and pressure from international diplomacy. Many agree that there is no military solution to the intifada but it is obviously hoped that it will die a natural death or degenerate in such a way as to arouse horror among world public opinion and justify more repressive, decisive interventions. The idea of Israel annexing the occupied territories is rejected since it would change the demographic balance between Arabs and Jews and hence the nature of the state, and it is realised that the international community would reject this idea, just as it would not accept the solution envisaged by the extreme Likud wing whereby Palestinians would be expelled from Gaza and the West Bank towards neighbouring Arab states. The main parties forming the fragile government coalition seem divided, not only among themselves (the Labour Party being more willing than the Likud to hold negotiations and make territorial concessions) but also within the parties, between the more moderate and more extreme wings. On the Palestinian question, the agreement in the Shamir-Peres government is based solely on the idea of elections in the occupied territories. Consequently, when the Israeli Prime Minister agreed to change his plan radically to meet the wishes of the right wing

of the Likud, the Labour Party threatened to bring about a government crisis. The fall of the ministry was avoided only because, bearing in mind pressure from the United States, too, Mr. Shamir confirmed the plan to hold elections in Gaza and the West Bank.

43. Your Rapporteur had many talks with parliamentarians from various Israeli parties in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. He also had talks at the International Centre for peace in the Middle East, headed by Mr. Abba Eban, and the Jaffee Centre for Strategic Studies of the University of Tel Aviv and with leaders of the Palestinian movement in the occupied territories. Your Rapporteur wishes to point out two problems he considers important and which are part of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. They will probably be of very great importance in the future negotiations and probably require mutual concessions, a strong spirit of understanding between the negotiators and, above all, many international guarantees.

44. The first question concerns the limit to the territorial concessions that those most in favour of negotiating with the Palestinians are prepared to make (and this does not include the Likud, which is now against the "land for peace" formula). Various Labour parliamentarians, for instance, stressed the need, for a long time at least, for the strategic parts of the Palestinian territories necessary for Israel's security to remain in Israeli hands. A better idea will be obtained of real intentions during the negotiations.

45. The second question concerns the right of Palestinians of the diaspora to return to Palestine. Israel wants the PLO to renounce this claim. Your Rapporteur noted that the Israelis he spoke to had forgotten that this right was recognised in the Camp David agreements for Palestinians who left the Gaza Strip or West Bank after the 1967 war. The Camp David agreements obviously do not imply a right to return for all those who fled after 1948 and took refuge in the territory attributed to Israel in United Nations Resolution 181. It therefore seems clear that, if the Palestinians are to be given a homeland and the existence and security of the state of Israel are to be safeguarded, equitable compromises will have to be sought in the context of the peace process.

46. Your Rapporteur also wishes to point out the interest of the report published by the study group of the Jaffee Centre for Strategic Studies of the University of Tel Aviv entitled "Israel, the West Bank and Gaza: towards a solution". This report, which was also discussed at a special hearing of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the United States House of Representatives, considers six options: 1. the status quo; 2. the independence of the Gaza Strip and West Bank; 3. annexation of the occupied territories;

4. the Palestinian state; 5. withdrawal from the Gaza Strip; 6. Jordano-Palestinian federation. The report concludes that none of these options is practicable or even desirable for Israel, but underlines that the worst imaginable situation is the continuation of the status quo and that Israel must accept a dialogue with the PLO to start serious negotiations.

47. Israel is also being pushed into negotiations by its ally and historic protector: the United States of America. With the Shultz plan, American attempts to solve the Middle East problem were resumed, although with great caution and circumspection. Now, as in the past, this initiative is decisive. After the failure of the Reagan plan in 1982 and Lebanon's refusal to ratify the separate treaty between Israel and Lebanon, drawn up jointly with the United States mediator, Philip Habib, there was a long period of stagnation in American policy in the Middle East, perhaps too because of the negative effects in the Arab world of the military operations against Libya and the Irangate revelations. The Middle East has not been discussed at the frequent summit meetings with the Soviet Union that were a feature of President Reagan's second term of office, although the foundations were laid for a solution to many other regional issues. The United States initiative was resumed in March 1988 with what is known as the Shultz plan (in reality, it was a letter from the Secretary of State to Mr. Shamir, Israeli Prime Minister, and the leaders of the Arab countries) that many consider to be a direct consequence of the intifada.

48. The Shultz plan, rejected by Mr. Shamir, while providing for the opening of negotiations between Israel and a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation with United States participation, on the basis of United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338, set the talks in the context of an international conference with the participation of all the parties concerned, the PLO being neither included nor excluded. The United States has thus started to lift its earlier, long-standing reservations about the convocation of an international conference, while voting against United Nations General Assembly Resolution 43/176. Following Mr. Shamir's refusal, the United States shelved the Shultz plan. Discussion is now concentrated on the Israeli May 1989 plan for holding elections in Gaza and the West Bank.

49. Other positions are to be adopted by President Bush and Secretary of State Baker in the course of the year, particularly regarding international guarantees for the elections in the occupied territories, reopening Palestinian schools, opposing the expulsion of Palestinians and bringing to a halt Israeli colonisation in Gaza and the West Bank. The most significant innovation in American Middle East policy is

the resumption of official relations with the PLO that had been suspended in 1973 and the undertaking to hold substantial talks with it. Although, for the time being, the Tunis talks between the two parties have produced no visible results, there is nevertheless a new balance in relations that is necessary for the success of the United States initiative in the Middle East.

50. It is significant that relations between the United States and the PLO were restored thanks to mediation involving the Swedish Government, President Mubarak of Egypt and a large American Jewish delegation linked with the International Centre for Peace in the Middle East founded by Mr. Abba Eban in Tel Aviv. As a result of the intifada and its repression, shown in televised news programmes in American homes, the Jewish community in the United States, the most powerful in the world, underwent a process of polarisation similar to that which occurred in Israel and Jewish organisations in the United States have brought pressure to bear on the Israeli Government to accept the Shultz plan.

51. When forming an opinion on the United States' attitude towards Israel, account must also be taken of the reasons for the friction that occurred, first of all when the Likud wished to bury the Shamir plan for elections in the occupied territories and then when the United States felt that the kidnapping of Sheik Obeid by the Israelis was endangering the lives of the American hostages held by Lebanese Islamic extremists. American criticism of the Israeli Government has not, for the time being at least, had any great impact on the United States' firmly-based privileged relationship with Israel.

52. In regard to the future of American policy in the Middle East, account also has to be taken of the growing influence on American public opinion of organisations grouping American nationals of Arab Palestinian origin and, in particular, the rôle played in American universities by professors and intellectuals belonging to those organisations. It is certainly not by chance that the PLO proposed including in its delegation to discuss the matter of elections in the occupied territories a few American citizens of Palestinian origin who are members of its National Council. Although this community, which might form a new lobby, has for the time being little influence on United States foreign policy, what may, conversely, have major repercussions is the cohesion with the PLO that was shown at the Arab summit meeting in Casablanca and the increasing activity of moderate Arab countries such as Egypt. United States policy in the Middle East will also have to take account of Soviet diplomatic action in the region.

53. Having freed itself of the handicap of its military invasion of Afghanistan, which had lost it the sympathy and support of the Islamic world and reduced it to a marginal rôle among the Arab countries in that area, the Soviet Union has started to make its presence felt in the Middle East. Already, by pursuing, under the leadership of President Gorbachev, a policy showing more respect for human rights for its citizens and hence for Soviet Jews, the Soviet Government has drawn closer to the state of Israel in recent years. This has not yet led to the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two countries, broken off by the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. The Israeli Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Arens, recently deplored the fact that the normalisation of relations between the two countries was not advancing at the necessary rate. For the time being, the Soviet Union apparently links any further progress in this direction with Israel's acceptance of the international peace conference and the start of a dialogue with the PLO. It is possible, however, that this condition will be lifted to correspond with the raising of the level of talks between the United States and the PLO or even independently of that.

54. Since the beginning of 1989, Soviet diplomacy has been actively proposing moderate compromise aims in the problem of the hostages and that of Lebanon, by exercising discreet pressure on both Syria, its traditional ally in the region, and Iran, with which relations returned to normal following President Rafsanjani's visit to Moscow. The Soviet Union seems particularly concerned at the militarisation of the Middle East. Deputy Soviet Ministers for Foreign Affairs travel frequently in the region and the visit by the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs to Damascus, Amman and Cairo in February 1989, when he also met the Israeli Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Arens, was of particular importance.

55. Mr. Shevardnadze's speech to the Egyptian Parliament on 23rd February is considered in many diplomatic circles to have been the fullest expression of the "pragmatic turning point" in Soviet Middle East policy. The Soviet Union is counting mainly on the rôle of the international peace conference and the mediation of the United Nations Security Council which it has asked to appoint a special envoy to the Middle East.

56. Particularly significant was Mr. Shevardnadze's statement that:

"We welcome the development of the Middle East's states' contacts with the European Community and with the United States of America. In these questions the Soviet Union stands for eliminating any competition among the great powers. It is necessary to renounce the

policy of ousting one another from the area, and to switch over to constructive co-operation in the name of peace and tranquillity in the Middle East."

57. In the 1980 Venice declaration, referring to common interests and traditional links with the Middle East, the European Community placed its peace-keeping action in the region on a basis of sound principles. The then nine member countries of the Community were the first in the western world to assert that the Palestinian problem was not just one of refugees and that, in accordance with an appropriate process defined in the framework of a global peace settlement, the Palestinian people must be placed in a position where they can exercise in full their right to self-determination and the PLO must be associated with the negotiations. The nine European Community countries considered that:

"The time has come to promote recognition and implementation of the two principles universally accepted by the international community: the right to existence and security of all the states in the region, including Israel, and justice for all the peoples, which implies the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people."

The importance and novelty of the Venice declaration were not denied by Mr. Arafat's statements in subsequent years that the Venice declaration was certainly an important approach but not yet an initiative. Like the United States, the European Community missed a favourable opportunity – the Arab summit meeting in Fez in 1982 which produced the Fahd plan in which, although indirectly, the Arab countries for the first time recognised, in an official text, the state of Israel's right to exist.

58. However, that very year the European Community seemed particularly involved in the Lebanese affair, with the presence of troops from three member countries in the multinational buffer force which was intended to stop the occupation of the country. Community summit meetings and political co-operation meetings (which have greater authority since the Single European Act started to be implemented) have since expressed the European Community's positions and proposals on specific developments in the Middle East, while remaining in contact with all the parties concerned. The recent Paris meeting took humanitarian initiatives in favour of the Lebanese population and gave full support to the tripartite committee which the Arab summit meeting in Casablanca instructed to promote an immediate cease-fire and draw up a new national pact for Lebanon. At the recent summit meeting of heads of state or of government of the twelve European Community countries in Madrid, a declaration was

approved on the Middle East which updated the principles laid down in Venice and added considerable detail to the European Community's position.

59. After noting the positive trend of the PLO's position and the importance of the Arab summit meeting in Casablanca and calling for the human rights of the population of the occupied territories to be respected, the necessary guarantees for holding free elections in Gaza and the West Bank were described.

***V. The international conference on peace
in the Near and Middle East
called for by the United Nations
General Assembly***

60. The European Community attaches very great importance to the creation of favourable conditions for holding an international peace conference under the aegis of the United Nations, the appropriate forum for direct negotiations between the parties concerned with a view to a global, fair and lasting settlement. In regard to the international conference on peace in the Middle East, it should be pointed out immediately that the need to convene it in the near future is now recognised by international diplomacy as a whole and by all the countries in the region except Israel and Iran.

61. The idea of convening an international conference on peace in the Middle East has existed for a long time. It was decided on first by the United Nations, which attributed the chairmanship to the United States and the Soviet Union. The United States Secretary of State and the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs were to meet in Geneva and had even decided on the date of their meeting. The Camp David agreements, signed a month earlier than expected, and then the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan and the period of the "new cold war" lasting until the mid-1980s brought all negotiations to a halt.

62. It was the President of the French Republic, François Mitterrand, who subsequently revived this proposal and soon obtained the support of the Soviet Union. For some time further, the idea was opposed by Israel, several Arab countries, including Libya and Syria, and cold-shouldered by the United States. In 1988, the situation altered due to the positive change in the atmosphere between the superpowers, the start of the intifada and pressure from many international diplomatic circles. On 4th March 1988, in a letter to the Israeli Prime Minister, Mr. Shultz, the United States Secretary of State, after proposing negotiations between Israel and a Jordano-Palestinian delegation, wrote: "Two weeks before the opening of negotiations, an international conference will be held. The Secretary-General of the United Nations will be asked

to issue invitations to the parties involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict and the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. All participants in the conference must accept United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and renounce violence and terrorism. The parties to each bilateral negotiation may refer reports on the status of their negotiations to the conference, in a manner to be agreed. The conference will not be able to impose solutions or veto agreements reached."

63. On 15th December 1988, with its Resolution 43/176, the United Nations General Assembly decided to convene the international conference on peace in the Middle East with the participation of all the parties concerned and the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. Since then, there have been a very large number of statements favourable to the conference from international and regional organisations: the European Council of the European Community, the European Parliament, the Council of Europe, the summit meeting of non-aligned countries and the International Co-ordinating Committee of Non-Governmental Organisations. The fact that the extraordinary Arab summit meeting held in Casablanca on 26th May 1989 subscribed to the international peace conference is of particular significance since it marked the end of all opposition to the conference among the Arab states.

64. In Bangkok in October 1987, the Inter-Parliamentary Union set up an ad hoc committee in support of the international conference and launched a campaign for its convocation which was subscribed to by the parliaments of almost all the countries of the world. Iran and Israel were exceptions. The national group of the parliament of the Islamic Republic of Iran wrote: "All recent attempts to convene an international conference on peace in the Middle East aimed at reconciling all the parties concerned and Israel have the same aim: the security and stability of Israel." For its part, the Israeli interparliamentary group held that: "Everyone knows these Arab states are deluding themselves that an international conference will, on the one hand, solve the problem they would have in sitting at the same table as Israel and treating it as an equal and, on the other hand, offer them an imposed settlement which will satisfy their every wish."

65. Nevertheless, the letter from the Israeli interparliamentary group went on to assert: "It is one thing to hold a conference to ratify agreements reached during negotiations, but it is another thing to use a conference as a stick for obtaining what one would never have obtained otherwise." Your Rapporteur was told many times during his visit to Israel that, since Israel must sign peace agreements with the Arab countries with which it is still at war, its government

does not wish the content of these agreements to be imposed on it by the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. However, between the simple ratification of agreements already concluded and the imposition of a solution, there are many other possibilities.

66. It is not an idea of imposition that emerges from Mr. Shultz's letter referred to above. Moreover, in his speech in Cairo – as can be clearly seen from the extracts given at appendix to this report – Mr. Shevardnadze proposed a very flexible structure for the international conference, with a clause allowing the bilateral stages and multilateral stages of the negotiations in the framework of the conference itself to alternate so as to ensure the success of the whole. Your Rapporteur has ascertained that Israel has taken note of these proposals but remains hostile.

67. It is therefore necessary to increase international pressure, but also for ideas on the way the international conference should proceed to be made clear so as to overcome fears. Ideological opposition in countries whose active, constructive participation in the conference is essential must also be overcome. The international conference on peace in the Middle East could not start without Israel, which must first start a dialogue with the Palestinians and their representative, the PLO.

VI. Present prospects of the Shamir plan and President Mubarak's ten points

68. An opportunity for a dialogue may result from the Israeli Government's plan for elections in the occupied territories if it agrees to negotiate with the Palestinians. This is the aim of the Egyptian President's ten points. During your Rapporteur's visit to Israel, there were very interesting developments in President Mubarak's initiative. The Egyptian President specified that his ten points were not a new plan but an integral part of the Israeli initiative to hold elections in Gaza and the West Bank. He invited the Israeli Minister of Defence, Mr. Rabin, to Cairo, and Mr. Rabin agreed to President Mubarak's proposals. They both agreed that the Palestinian delegation which should take part in the negotiations on the purpose and methods of the elections would also include politicians now outside the occupied territories.

69. These facts had an immediate impact in the Israeli Government and Parliament. The Ma'arach Labour Party was reunited in approving Mr. Rabin's position. The reaction of Mr. Shamir and his Likud Party was negative. They rejected three of President Mubarak's ten points, i.e. the participation in the negotiations of Palestinians from outside, the participation of Arabs from Jerusalem in the vote and the land for peace formula.

70. The Palestinian views your Rapporteur heard contained criticism of the Mubarak plan, not for what it contained but for what was missing, i.e. the Palestinians' right to self-determination. Above all, your Rapporteur had the impression that they were awaiting an official PLO position on the matter. But the two persons he spoke to with the most prestige inside or outside the Palestinian territories were in favour of the PLO going to Cairo for talks with the Israeli Government, as President Mubarak had asked. They believed that it was decisive for a dialogue to be started, even if the starting points were somewhat incompatible. The rest would follow.

71. Your Rapporteur endorses this opinion. There will never be an international conference on peace in the Middle East or an acceptable solution to the conflict if the Israelis and the Palestinians do not start to speak to each other. It would really be a pity if the opportunity that now exists were to be lost. Time is not on the side of peace since the situation is deteriorating both in Israel and in the West Bank and Gaza.

72. Unfortunately, after the talks between the United States and Egypt in Washington and New York on the occasion of the annual session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Israeli Government rejected President Mubarak's ten points. Disappointment was very great throughout the world and particularly in Western Europe. Our governments and parliaments had readily endorsed President Mubarak's ten points. The most moderate leaders among the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza Strip have rejected the Israeli Government's claim to decide the composition of the Palestinian delegation and to exclude the PLO from the talks on elections.

73. The United States Secretary of State has made new proposals: 1. Israel must give its agreement to negotiating with the Palestinians; 2. Egypt must consult the Palestinians before they form their delegation to the talks; 3. Israel will take part only if it is satisfied with the composition of the Palestinian delegation; 4. the talks will concern elections in the occupied territories; 5. Israel will submit its plan for the elections but the Palestinians may raise any matter at all linked with the peace process. The United States would be the guarantors of this process, which should start with the formation of three working groups, Egyptian, Palestinian and Israeli respectively. Mr. Sharon, Mr. Modai and Mr. Levy, who form the right wing of the Likud, have announced that they will ask the party's central committee to reject Mr. Baker's proposals. Furthermore, Mr. Baker's proposals were rejected by the Central Council of the PLO, meeting in Baghdad. After an exchange of declarations by Mr. Shamir that were highly critical

of the United States and American answers intended to reassure its ally, consultations are now under way between the Israeli Government and the United States administration.

74. The Labour Party intends to support Mr. Baker's proposals just as it had expressed its agreement with President Mubarak's ten points. It is not for us to interfere in Israel's internal policy or to anticipate developments pointing to a cabinet crisis and further elections of which there is, moreover, much talk in Israel. Our duty, which we must not shirk, is to say clearly that Western Europe urges Israel to abandon the policy of refusal and at last show itself open to negotiations with the Palestinians and dialogue with the PLO. Your Rapporteur considers it would be useful at the same time to ask the PLO and Israel's neighbouring Arab states to exercise their influence and vigilance in halting infiltrations of armed groups into Israeli territory.

VII. The Middle East and European security

75. Everyone acknowledges that the explosive situation in the Near and Middle East, in particular in the Mediterranean area, is a direct threat to European security. The final document of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe, issued in Vienna on 19th February 1989, sets out this concept very clearly:

“(The participating states) reiterate their conviction that security in Europe is to be considered in the broader context of world security and is closely linked with security in the Mediterranean area as a whole, and that accordingly the process of improving security should not be confined to Europe but should extend to other parts of the world, and in particular to the Mediterranean area.”

76. Over the years, fighting in the Near and Middle East have had serious, dramatic repercussions on the security of the Western European countries and their citizens. The danger was first perceived to relate to the security, regularity and continuity of oil supplies from the Middle East, vital for the economies of the Western European countries. But in this respect Europe's security has never been seriously threatened. Conversely, other threats have emerged. As from 1967, the European capitals became the theatre for action and intrigue by Near and Middle Eastern secret services, with political assassinations and the first terrorist operations. These became particularly serious fifteen years later with attacks on the security of shipping and aircraft, massacres in airports, the hijacking of aircraft and ships and the taking of hostages. Although it cannot now be said that such phenomena have completely disappeared, they are nevertheless clearly on the decline. However, faced with a worsening of the situ-

ation in Lebanon and in the absence of a solution to the Palestinian problem, they may re-emerge on a large scale. The warning by President Mubarak of Egypt should be taken very seriously. At a meeting with the group for contact with the Near and Middle East of the Political Committee of the Council of Europe, he described the future risk as follows: “Should the courageous plan of Arafat and the moderates fail, the PLO would break up into terrorist groups which would fight against American and Israeli interests, particularly in Europe.”

77. Lebanon, whose territory, because of clashes between opposing militias and terrorist groups, has also become a sort of world super-market for weapons of all kinds, is also one of the main routes for drugs on their way to Western Europe. The exchange of arms for drugs, the swarm of traffickers of all kinds and the increasingly close link, because of this traffic, between terrorist groups and organised crime in Western European countries is becoming more and more clear.

78. Particularly since the proclamation of the Islamic Republic in Iran, Western European public opinion has perceived the risk of the Islamic revolution being exported throughout the Near and Middle East, with repercussions for Europe itself, and the spread of fundamentalism. In Israel, too, this phenomenon is evident in terms of greater activism and electoral influence by extremist religious groups. The condemnation to death of the Anglo-Indian writer Salman Rushdie was particularly startling because it was pronounced by the heads of a state. This must not make us forget a series of other facts involving protagonists other than Iranian exponents of the export of the Islamic revolution and which have led to bloodshed in Arab and Moslem countries. Attacks on military establishments in Syria and Egypt, the assassination of Sadat, the overthrow of Numeiry, repeated episodes in the armed struggle against the Syrian régime, bloody skirmishes in Mecca and systematic attacks on symbols of western luxury and corruption are all facts that can fit into a vast strategic plan by Moslem fundamentalist groups to gain power, although it is not out of the question that, in turn, other mutually hostile factions or states may have used such methods, which is fairly easy in the complex religious and ethnic mosaic of the Near and Middle East.

79. Attention should be paid to the fact that the underlying reason for revolts and popular uprisings (recently in Algeria and Jordan) is to be found in the conditions and intolerably low standard of living of large sectors of the population.

80. This economic situation is growing worse throughout the region, with the apparent exception of Syria, which derived some advan-

tages from its relations with Iran during the Gulf war. The economic situation has deteriorated in the occupied territories and Israel because of the intifada and its repression. (According to a member of the Israeli Government, the cost of the intifada in 1988, including the cost of military mobilisation and the fall in tourism, is estimated at \$666 million.)

81. In Egypt, too, there seems to be a risk of popular uprisings similar to those which have occurred in Algeria and Jordan. According to SIPRI's 1987 report, the economy there failed to achieve positive results, the overall GDP dropping by 1.5%. Iraq's foreign debt is estimated at \$70 000 million.

82. Increasing demographic pressure has revealed that disastrous forecasts of the prospects of the developed countries should the trend of economic relations between the northern and southern halves of the world not be reversed concern first and foremost Western Europe. The Near and Middle East and Africa are the parts of the so-called South that are closest to Europe and steady flows of migrants, both legal and clandestine, are already streaming into our countries. Looking ahead, the deteriorating living conditions of millions of people in the Near and Middle East is the most serious danger for Western European security.

VIII. Overarmament in the Middle East, European security and the rôle of WEU

83. The question of European security must henceforth also be measured against the imposing military systems that exist in the Near and Middle East, which appear increasingly out of proportion and threatening as the arms control and reduction agreements between NATO and the Warsaw Pact progress in Europe. Furthermore, the situation in the Near and Middle East and the concentration of arms in the region might stand in the way of the process of disarmament and international détente. The first signs that difficulties relating to the Near and Middle East are arising and affecting the disarmament agreements, already so complicated and difficult, emerged at the international conference on banning the production of chemical weapons held in Paris early in 1989.

84. Iran accused Iraq of using chemical weapons against the Kurdish town of Halabja, causing 10 000 civilian casualties, but, according to United Nations sources, the Iranians, too, used toxic gas during the war. Israel asserts that there are chemical arms production plants in Damascus and Samarra (Iraq), and Kuwait has accused the Israeli army of using toxic gas against Palestinians in the occupied territories. Iraq seems hostile to the signing of a further

chemical arms treaty, while many Arab countries apparently connect a ban on such weapons with the simultaneous destruction of Israel's nuclear potential.

85. Everyone knows the United States' concern about the reported use of chemical weapons in the Middle East. In a speech to the Washington Institute for the Middle East at Wye Plantation, Maryland, on 16th September 1988, published by the State Department under the title "The administration's approach to Middle East peace making", the former Secretary of State, Mr. Shultz, recalled that ballistic missiles and chemical weapons were still proliferating. The use of chemical weapons by both parties to the Gulf war and by Iraq against the Kurds shows the danger of these arms for the conduct of international relations. The United States has also denounced the probable building of a chemical weapons factory in Libya.

86. In his speech in Cairo, Mr. Shevardnadze, Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs, also denounced the arrival in the Near and Middle East of weapons that NATO and the Warsaw Pact are in the process of banning, and he gave a few impressive figures relating to a military potential quite out of proportion with the economic and demographic importance of that region: military expenditure of \$59 000 million in 1987, \$600 000 million in the last ten years, 25 000 battle tanks, 4 000 fighter aircraft, 5 million men in the armed forces and 2 million reservists.

87. If these figures are compared with the proposals for arms reductions made by NATO and the Warsaw Pact at the current Vienna conference, it can be seen that the military potential in that part of the world will in many respects be superior (number of men in the armed forces), almost equal (fighter aircraft, excluding helicopters) or not greatly inferior (battle tanks) to that of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals if a similar process is not initiated in the Middle East.

88. The magnitude of the arms race in the region is also confirmed by very diverse sources. In the book "The Middle East Military Balance 1987-1988", published by the Jerusalem Post and the West View press, an analysis is made of the imposing military means deployed in the Middle East. During your Rapporteur's visit to Israel, experts on armaments questions mentioned recent progress in the range of Israeli missiles and those of the Arab states, be they of western, Soviet or Chinese origin. According to press estimates, the 1988 report of the Institute for Strategic Studies in London will show, on the one hand, strategic parity between the two military blocs and the diminishing material possibility of a surprise attack in Europe and, on the other, the fact that surface-to-surface missiles and chemical weapons are in the process of

filling the arsenals of "hot spots" such as the Middle East.

89. The arms race is continuing and even accelerating in the Middle East in spite of the cease-fire between Iran and Iraq and the fall in income from oil sales, certain countries' enormous international debts, galloping inflation in others, economic recession in still others and the fall in the standard of living of the people almost everywhere in the region. It is therefore very important to repeat here the exhortation to the third-world countries to use their meagre resources for essential civil investments and not overarmament, making the adoption of such conduct one of the factors to be considered when granting debt relief and development assistance and also to promote democracy in the third-world countries so as to ensure respect for human rights and sound social and environmental policies, thus helping to avoid militarisation².

90. Recent revelations about the activities of an American subsidiary of an Italian bank and about the important rôle western firms and technicians are playing in pursuing the plan by Argentina, Egypt and Iraq to develop the Condor II missile with a range of about 800 km increase our concern in spite of the fact that the State Department of the United States recently announced that Egypt had withdrawn from this project. Furthermore, SIPRI's 1988 report refers to Israeli progress in developing the Jericho II missile with a range of about 1 200 km. The missile was apparently tested successfully at the beginning of September 1989.

91. At the beginning of the present session of the United Nations General Assembly, the President of the United States, Mr. Bush, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Mr. Shevardnadze, announced their willingness to renounce chemical weapons unilaterally to facilitate the early conclusion of negotiations on banning this type of weapon throughout the world. It will be necessary to insist on the new international treaty containing very strict, verifiable standards to avoid a number of countries circumscribing the difficulty as was the case with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The fact that Israel has nuclear weapons worries the Arab countries, increases their participation in the arms race, particularly in chemical weapons, and affects the Palestinians in the occupied territories. At the Paris conference on chemical weapons, the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Farouk al Shara, proposed the creation of a zone in the Near and Middle East that would be free of weapons of mass destruction. In

2. Cf. Resolution 928 on the arms trade and human rights adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on 27th September 1983 on a report by our colleague, Mr. Speed.

this connection, one may endorse the opinion expressed in the 1988 SIPRI report published in Stockholm that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East had been proposed many times in recent years but could be achieved only in the framework of a general political settlement in the Middle East and the ensuing significant reduction in all categories of weapons. However, your Rapporteur considers that even the start of a process of reducing arms must be part of the proposal for a political settlement of Middle East problems and that WEU has a significant rôle to play, particularly for this task.

92. On several occasions, the Assembly has asked the Council to extend its consultations to cover arms exports. The scandal which broke out at the beginning of September 1989 when it was realised that Iraq had set up an organisation, largely financed by European banks, to purchase, through special agreements with Western European countries or firms, the components and technology it needed to manufacture sophisticated weapons – alone or in co-operation with other countries in the region such as Egypt, or Latin American countries such as Argentina – including medium-range missiles that could carry conventional, chemical or even nuclear warheads, should draw the governments' attention to the danger of the incoherent decisions taken by each of them in military co-operation matters. If it proves impossible to reach global understanding as the Community managed to do in February 1989 in regard to chemical substances that could be used to produce weapons, it is essential for there to be consultations to ensure that Europe does not become responsible for a further build-up of armaments by the Near and Middle Eastern countries.

93. According to information that your Rapporteur obtained from Israeli sources during his visit, the Soviet Union recently sold modern aircraft to Syria and Libya and the United States did likewise to Saudi Arabia. It should be added that the United States provides the Israeli army with military technology and financial assistance, Israel being in turn an arms producer and exporter. But, since the two great powers can now clearly see that transfers of arms and military technology in the region are constituting the most serious threat to world peace, it seems possible for WEU to discuss with the United States and the Soviet Union the possibility of an agreement designed first and foremost to freeze the militarisation of the region. WEU should also approach all the governments in the region asking them to agree to freeze their present military potential with a view to a political settlement of the conflicts causing bloodshed in the Middle East and to the international peace conference decided upon by the United Nations General Assembly.

94. Within WEU's specific field, European action to promote the restoration of peace in the Middle East might be envisaged if the nine governments consented, as they did when freedom of navigation in the Gulf had to be safeguarded, to concert their policies in the region, i.e. to sacrifice a few immediate benefits to a more reasonable view of Europe's true interests which, in the long run, are also theirs.

95. Secondly, Europe as an entity seems better placed than any individual European country to be present militarily to facilitate the application of United Nations decisions or cease-fire agreements or, again, to allow humanitarian operations for the benefit of the civilian population, because Europe cannot be suspected of having ulterior motives in regard to certain countries in the region. It is therefore important for the WEU Council to be duly informed of any initiatives its members may have to take in this respect.

IX. Western Europe's rôle in seeking a solution to the conflict in the Near and Middle East

96. The fact that the Council's reply to Recommendation 472 recognises the Assembly's right to call for reports on the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, even when this is done outside the framework of WEU, and that the modified Brussels Treaty makes the WEU Council responsible for examining threats to international peace in the Near and Middle East gives your Rapporteur an opportunity to express a few views on action that might be taken by the European institutions as a whole to promote peace in the Middle East.

97. At the present time, the Assembly is the last of the European parliamentary assemblies to express its opinion on the Middle East. On 12th October, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the Middle East, the spirit and concrete proposals of which your Rapporteur approves. On 22nd September, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted Resolution 923 on a report by our colleague, Mr. Fourné. This report was prepared with a visit by the Political Committee of the Council of Europe to all the Middle East capitals and an enlarged meeting of the same committee attended by representatives of Israel, the PLO, several Arab countries and the Soviet Union. This important work was followed directly and indirectly by your Rapporteur who thus gathered many useful ideas for his own work. On the whole, it can be said that a common view emerges from the three assemblies of the situation in the Middle East and the rôle that can be played there by Western Europe. Our governments, which belong to WEU, the Council of Europe and the European Community, can find some useful pointers there for their action.

98. Western Europe can now play an increasingly incisive, independent rôle because the conflict in the Near and Middle East is becoming less of an East-West confrontation and the position of the Palestinians and the Arab countries is evolving towards recognition of Israel and direct multilateral negotiations in the framework of an international conference under the aegis of the United Nations. It can assume greater responsibility in seeking a fair and lasting solution to the Near and Middle East conflict by helping, together with the United States and the Soviet Union, to offer the necessary military, economic, social and legal guarantees to all the parties concerned and to strengthen the rôle and prestige of the United Nations.

99. Thanks to the positions it has adopted over the years, and again recently in regard to the tragic events in Beirut, and also to the attention it has paid to any chance, however slight, of evolution between the parties to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Western Europe and its institutions can act as a mediator, listened to increasingly by the factions involved, the various ethnic and religious communities, the people and states in the Near and Middle East.

100. While it seems impossible to ask the Palestinians and Arabs to make further concessions in view of Israel's refusal to start a dialogue and hold negotiations, it seems clear that the European Community's main effort must be directed towards helping Israel to overcome its fears and contradictions now that its failure to repress the revolt by the Palestinian people is clearly proving that security sought by occupying other people's territories is a myth.

101. To smooth the path for the international conference on peace in the Middle East, the United Nations General Assembly should be asked no longer to equate Zionism with racism as in one of its resolutions a few years ago. At the same time, the United Nations Security Council might be asked to adopt a resolution on the Palestinians' right to self-determination which has been affirmed several times by the General Assembly but never by the Security Council.

102. The declaration issued after the recent Madrid summit meeting indicates that the Community countries are quite prepared, at every stage, to take any steps that prove necessary to initiate, implement and verify any agreements concluded, acting in the framework and under the responsibility of the United Nations. Western Europe can thus help all the member countries of the United Nations to guarantee that security is ensured in all states of the region, including Israel and the state that will emerge when the Palestinians exercise their right to self-determination.

103. The very existence of the European Community, the originality of its institutions, the current process of transforming it into a real European union, its prestige and its economic potential, mean that, once peace has been restored in the Near and Middle East, it can expect to make a specific contribution to security extending well beyond military security.

104. The Italian Chamber of Deputies recently adopted, almost unanimously, a resolution urging the government "to explore with its European partners the possibility of the EEC playing a more active rôle in solving the conflict, subject to the principle of it being possible subsequently to enlarge the EEC to include the states of Israel and Palestine in forms and in conditions acceptable to all the parties concerned and to offer its good offices for organising the region on a permanent basis, also by opening up the Community in the abovementioned direction". Nor must it be forgotten that there are already association and trade treaties between the EEC and Israel and between the EEC and several Arab countries in the region.

105. Political observers in other European Community countries have borne in mind the need for a sort of Marshall plan, initiated by Western Europe, to rebuild Lebanon and for Palestine and Israel. In Israel, too, consideration is being given to various forms of integration between countries so as to attenuate the possible effects of the emergence of new sovereignties along its frontiers.

106. In this effort, the European Community, which already has means of co-operation with Israel and the Arab countries in various areas, can take into consideration the bodies for co-operation already existing in the region, i.e. the Maghreb Union (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya), the Gulf Co-operation Council and the new association between Iraq, Jordan, North Yemen and Egypt. As can be seen, Israel and Syria (which is nevertheless a member of the Arab League) are not included in any regional co-operation framework. Efforts by Western European countries should try to help these two

countries to emerge from their isolation in the Middle East.

107. Of course, none of the abovementioned hypotheses represents a solution, but this is the ground on which we can and must work for Western Europe to make an economic, legal and Community contribution to its own security and to that of the Near and Middle East.

108. As has already been said several times, Western Europe has managed to adopt fair and courageous political positions from the time of the Venice Declaration to the present day. It has unswervingly followed developments in the Middle East and intervened in specific well-defined cases. Quite recently, for instance, the European Community's political co-operation again voiced member states' concern at the Palestinian universities remaining closed and launched a solemn appeal to the Israeli Government to refrain in future from any measures liable to jeopardise the teaching system in the occupied territories. The Western European countries also endorsed President Mubarak's attempts to mediate.

109. Nevertheless, Western Europe has never launched an initiative of its own to promote peace in the Middle East. Now is perhaps the time to do so. Faced with the obvious risk of a serious deterioration in the situation in the Gaza Strip and West Bank and the repeated negative answers of the Israeli Government to any request for moderation and peace, it is perhaps necessary to place on the Middle East scales the full weight of Western Europe's political prestige, economic potential and diplomatic ability.

110. To this end, the Council should be urged to promote, together with the European Community and the Council of Europe, the contacts and consultations necessary for working out a truly Western European initiative for peace in the Middle East that can boost the diplomatic effort of the United States and the Soviet Union, help to unblock the present dangerous status quo and encourage the convocation of the international conference on peace in the Middle East proposed by the United Nations.

European security and events in the Near and Middle East

ADDENDUM ¹

*to the report submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee ²
by Mr. Pieralli, Rapporteur*

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DRAFT RECOMMENDATION

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Draft Recommendation

1. After paragraph (vi) of the preamble, add a new paragraph (vii) as follows:
“ Condemning unreservedly the assassination of President René Moawad of Lebanon; ”
and renumber subsequent paragraphs accordingly.

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Ahrens (Chairman); Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Martino (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Aarts (Alternate: Verbeek), Beix, Böhm, Caro (Alternate: Pontillon), Coleman, Collart, Eich, Forni, Foschi (Alternate: Spitella), Hill (Alternate: Ward), Hirschler, Koehl, van der Linden, Lord Mackie of Benshie, MM. Müller, Natali, Pécriaux, Pieralli, Mrs. Polfer, MM. Sarti, Sir William Shelton, Mrs. Staels-Dompas, MM. Stoffelen, Thyraud.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

*Explanatory Memorandum**(submitted by Mr. Pieralli, Rapporteur)*

Since his report was adopted by the General Affairs Committee, your Rapporteur visited Tunis to meet leaders of the Palestine Liberation Organisation and Stockholm to exchange views with officials of the Swedish Ministry for External Affairs. Both talks were of great interest and are summarised at appendix to the present document which gives information on the most recent events. In November, the Middle East was the scene of tragic events and the subject of major efforts by international diplomacy, and in particular of several governments, to mediate and bring about peace.

1. The whole world was pained and horrified at the attack by dynamite that cost the life of the President of the Lebanese Republic and twenty other persons. René Moawad, a Maronite Christian, had been elected President of the Republic seventeen days before his death during the first stage of the application of the Taif agreements which deeply divided the Christian community, some of whom were in favour of the agreements. The most senior religious personage of Lebanese catholicism, the Patriarch of the Maronite Church, Monsignor Sfeir, supported the Taif agreements, calling them the least of two evils. As a result, he had to leave Beirut in the teeth of insults from supporters of General Aoun. The Lebanese Front, a coalition of Christian parties and fighting forces led by Dany Chamoun, called for Christian unity and exhorted all leaders to make good use of the positive aspects of the agreements and pass over those which were negative with a view to ending all foreign occupation of Lebanon and thwart the Syrian attempt to take control of Lebanon's future. Mr. Samir Gagea's powerful Lebanese Forces adopted a different position. According to a communiqué issued on 16th November, the Lebanese Forces were trying to reconcile Mr. Michel Aoun with Mr. René Moawad because unity was the main aim now that the Christian community had so many problems to cope with. Mr. Samir Gagea's aim is therefore to draw Christians closer together in order to find a way out of this difficult situation. Even on the other side, there are considerable differences between those who approve the Taif agreements (the Sunnite Moslems) and those who accept them without approving them (Mr. Jumblatt's Druzes). The greatest rift is among the Shiites. The Amal leader, Mr. Nabih Berri, is a member of the new government. The Hezbollah has threatened to retaliate against members of parliament helping to implement the Taif agreements, and General Michel Aoun has issued similar threats against Christian members of parliament.

On 24th November, the Lebanese Parliament, which has lost some of its representativity because it has not been renewed for more than fifteen years, and some of its independence, to the point that it has to meet under Syrian protection because of threats from General Aoun, elected Elias Hraoui, a Maronite Christian, President of the Republic. Selim Hoss, a Sunni Moslem, was again asked to form a government. The situation in Lebanon is still difficult and the outcome has become more uncertain. International diplomacy must therefore continue to support the Arab League's peace initiative. Your Rapporteur considers it particularly significant that, on 18th November, the United Nations Security Council, by a unanimous vote, welcomed Mr. Moawad's election, in the framework of the Arab League's peace plan, and urged the Lebanese people and armed forces to support the President. This exhortation gains added weight following the tragic death of President Moawad.

2. In the Israeli-occupied territories, the intifada is continuing and is still being repressed; Palestinians are being killed and arrested by the occupying troops and Arabs accused of collaborating with Israel are being assassinated by their compatriots. The armed ambush in which one Israeli soldier lost his life and another was wounded was described as an isolated incident contrary to the orders given by the intifada's clandestine command.

In Israel, elections in the single trade union, Histadrut, which were to give pointers to the countries' political tendencies, did not change the situation. The Likud progressed and the Labour Party regressed, but the latter retained an absolute majority.

There has been very intense activity in international diplomacy involving many protagonists: the United States, the Soviet Union, the troika of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the European Community, Sweden, Israel, the PLO, Egypt and others, too. It has been concentrated on the five points proposed by Mr. Baker, United States Secretary of State, intended to allow a preliminary meeting between Israelis and Palestinians, in the presence of the United States and Egypt, about the elections in the Gaza Strip and West Bank. A few comforting events have been reported: the Israeli Government's restricted cabinet accepted Mr. Baker's five points by 9 votes to 3, while confirming its refusal to hold talks with a Palestinian delegation that was not composed solely of people from the occupied territories and its refusal to extend the talks to include aspects of the peace

process other than its plan for elections. Similarly, the PLO which had rejected Mr. Baker's five points at the meeting of its Central Council in Baghdad confirming the overtures and conditions agreed upon at the meeting of its National Council in Algiers, subsequently accepted them. The PLO put a few questions to the United States on the composition of the Palestinian delegation and the possibility of discussing proposals on the overall peace process in Palestine and the Middle East in addition to the Shamir plan for elections in the occupied territories.

Israeli reservations and the questions put by the Palestinians must of course not be underestimated. However, a result has been achieved and United States mediation can now be continued, although many difficulties still remain.

These difficulties were not overcome by

the recent visit by the Israeli Prime Minister to the United States nor by his meetings with President George Bush and Mr. Baker. During his subsequent visits to Paris and Rome, Mr. Shamir discussed prospects of peace in the Middle East with President Mitterrand, the European Community troika, the Italian Government and all the Italian political parties. The Israeli Prime Minister stressed his disappointment at the European position. The Western European political leaders asked him to drop his reservations about Mr. Baker's five points and to accept a dialogue with the PLO. This dialogue is impatiently awaited by the international community, which considers it to be a first step on the path that Israel, the Palestinians and the Middle East in general have to follow in order to build peace and ensure mutual security.

APPENDIX I

*Summary record of the Rapporteur's meeting with
Mr. Farouk Kaddoumi, Head of the Political Department
of the PLO Executive Committee in Tunis on 30th October 1989*

(Extract)

We met Farouk KADDOUMI at the PLO Headquarters in Tunis on 30th October 1989. During our talks, we asked for general explanations of current PLO policy and comments on certain issues drawn to our attention during our visit to Israel. These are matters of some significance to the political debate which enjoy extensive coverage by the Western European press.

A. Right of the Palestinians of the diaspora to return to their homeland

We can in no way disclaim the right to return to one's own homeland, as it is not only a common right but also applicable to any individual.

It is significant that we have accepted the existence of two states in Palestine and, therefore, the right to existence of the state of Israel. The return of Palestinians is a problem to be discussed between the two states. There are 800 000 Palestinians in Israel and one cannot rule out the possibility for Jewish people to remain in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank once the Palestinian state is established.

We have recognised Israel, but has Israel recognised us? Why does Israel always demand concessions on our rights without ever conceding anything? Europe had been asking us for a long time to recognise Israel and we did: why does Israel not do likewise with us?

B. Interpretation of the recent Al Fatah Conference

The Likud Steering Committee has set four qualifications on the electoral plans of Israel's Government: no recognition of the PLO, no self-determination in the occupied territories, no withdrawal of Israeli troops, no Palestinian state. Though the Likud is the main government party, faced with Labour protest Shamir has stated that the aforementioned decisions are not binding for the government. If I were to give an easy answer I could say that the Al Fatah Conference is not binding for the PLO either, but actually no extremist decisions were taken at the conference.

The Americans have raised just one

objection with us for the contemptuous words used with reference to Israel. The British have expressed their gratitude for our decisions at the conference.

C. Killing of "collaborationists" in the occupied territories

It is true that this has happened in some cases, but we hope to put an end to it.

In any society under normal circumstances murders and revenge are possible. There are instances where pretexts are found to kill people, in particular in exceptional situations. In the occupied territories people fear for their own and everybody's lives and experience terrible times: 900 people killed, mainly youngsters and children, 35 000 injured or maimed, 40-45 000 imprisoned; while some are released, others are put in jail. According to Amnesty International, 30% of the Palestinians in the occupied territories have been in jail some time or another, not to mention the destruction of houses, seizure of assets and deportations.

However, we have decided to prevent all killing. In case of betrayal a decision must be taken unanimously at three different levels of responsibility, and even then authorisation must be granted from abroad. In no case have we or the national leadership of intifada released such an authorisation.

D. Episodes of extremism and Islamic fundamentalism in the occupied territories

The phenomenon of fundamentalism exists and is something new to us. There were raids in shops selling wines and spirits when the movement started, as well as fits of extremism. Now, however, the situation is under our control. The Israelis try to exploit the Hamas movement, but when Hamas started to show a greater sense of responsibility its leaders were arrested.

Should the situation remain at a stalemate with no prospects of positive political developments, more extremism will emerge. We believe there is greater danger in political radicalism than in fundamentalism.

APPENDIX II

*Summary record of the Rapporteur's meeting at
the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs
in Stockholm on 13th November 1989*

In Stockholm on 13th November, your Rapporteur met Mr. Pierre Shori, Secretary-General of the Swedish Ministry for External Affairs, and his colleagues, Mr. Anders B. Jurner, Deputy Assistant Secretary, and Mr. Mathias Massberg, Director of the Political Department. It was of great interest to have first-hand information on the position of a neutral European country which has always played a mediating rôle in the Middle East. Everyone knows that eminent Swedes have played an important part in events in Palestine: Mr. Enul Sandström, Vice-Chairman of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, proposed the partition plan adopted by the General Assembly in 1947 in Resolution 181; Mr. Folke Bernadotte, killed in 1948, was the United Nations mediator in the Arab-Israeli conflict; Mr. Gunnar Jarring represented the United Nations Secretary-General in the Middle East after the 1967 war. Throughout the various stages of the long Middle East conflict, thousands of Swedish soldiers have been, and still are, members of the United Nations peace-keeping observer force. For forty years, Sweden has supported the state of Israel's right to exist and now, as a friend of the Palestinian people, it is supporting their right to self-determination. Swedish diplomacy worked with the PLO for a long time to induce it to recognise the state of Israel's right to exist and to condemn all forms of terrorism. When the PLO took these decisions, Sweden was able to play a major rôle in its rapprochement with the United States. The meeting between President Arafat and the dele-

gation of American Jews was held in Stockholm with the active participation of the Swedish Government and this initiative made it possible for contacts and talks between the United States and the PLO to be resumed. The United States and the PLO subsequently asked Sweden to continue its mediating action, even after 14th December 1988.

Swedish diplomacy has been very active in obtaining the consensus of the parties concerned by President Mubarak's ten points and Mr. Baker's five points. Your Rapporteur was told that it was possible that an Israeli-Palestinian dialogue could be started on these bases and that the Middle East peace process had entered a decisive stage. Believing it to be important that half the Israeli Government (the Labour Party) had opted for negotiations with the Palestinians, Swedish officials considered it to be the duty of the other half (the Likud) to initiate a dialogue to guarantee the future of Israel and its survival as a democratic Jewish state. If efforts to restore peace fail, the situation might become dangerous in the very near future because of the growth of extremist forces on both sides and increased violence. On 21st October, the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Sten Andersson, said that, in these circumstances, the Swedish Government urged all the forces interested in a peace process producing results to make the maximum effort to overcome outstanding differences and that the responsibility for a possible failure would lie with those who were opposed to a dialogue.

***Western European security: defence implications of the
People's Republic of China's evolving geopolitical situation***

REPORT ¹

***submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments ²
by Mr. Cox, Rapporteur***

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1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee: Sir Dudley Smith (Chairman); MM. Fourré, de Beer (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Alloncle, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, MM. Bassinet, Cariglia, Cox, De Decker (Alternate: Cauwenberghs), Derycke, Ewing (Alternate: Lord Newall), Fiandrotti (Alternate: Mezzapesa), Fillon, Fioret (Alternate: Fassino), Irmer, Jung, Kittelmann, Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, MM. Maris, Pecchioli, Scheer, Sinesio, Speed, Steiner, Steverlynck (Alternate: Uyttendaele), Sir John Stokes, Mr. Zierer.*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

V. Chinese military policy
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Introductory Note

*Principal persons met by the Committee
on Defence Questions and Armaments or by the Rapporteur*

Your Rapporteur wishes to thank all the persons met before, during and after the visit by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to the People's Republic of China and Hong Kong from 12th to 22nd May 1989 and who received the committee or helped in the organisation of the visit and to obtain the information necessary for the preparation of this report.

Beijing

Mr. Han Nianlong, President of the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs;
Mr. He Guanhui, First Vice-Minister of the State Commission for Restructuring Economic Systems;
Mr. Zhou Nan, Vice Foreign Minister;
Mr. Xu Xin, Deputy Chief-of-Staff, General in the People's Liberation Army;
Mr. Ye Fei, Vice-President of the Chinese People's Assembly.

Tianjing

Colonel Yang Jun, Divisional Commander, Division 196 of the PLA;
Colonel Zhu Fujin, Deputy Divisional Commander.

Xi'an

Mr. Mao Shengxian, Vice-Chairman of the Standing Committee of Shaanxi Province.

Shanghai

Rear-Admiral Liu Ji Pan, Commandant of the Shanghai Naval Base;
Captain Zhou Ting Zhong, Chief-of-Staff;
Commanders Qiu Yan Peng, Guoyong Dong and Ho Qing Hua;
Lieutenant-Commander Xie Orizhou;
Mr. Liang Yu Fan, President of the Shanghai Institute of International Strategic Studies;
Mr. Shu Qi, President of the Shanghai Chapter of the People's Institute of Foreign Affairs.

Guangzhou (Canton)

Mr. Luo Keming, Vice-Chairman of the Standing Committee of the People's Congress of Guangdong Province.

Throughout the visit to the People's Republic of China

Members of the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs, including:
Mrs. Jin Shuzhang, Head of the European Division;
Mrs. Shen Yiyuan; Miss Ma Jia; Messrs Liu Yadong, Chai Haipo, Liu Huijie and Huang Chengye.

Hong Kong

Sir David Wilson, Governor of Hong Kong;
Miss Tracey Chan of the Governor's Office;
Brigadier Giles Arnold, Deputy Commander, British forces in Hong Kong, and Colonels Brian Daly and Douglas Fox;
Captain Peter Dalrymple-Smith, Royal Navy, Captain-in-Charge Hong Kong, HMS Tamar;
Commander Tim Burne, Royal Navy;
Lieutenant Commander Cy Beattie, Royal Navy;
Brigadier Miles Hunt-Davis, Brigadier, Brigade of Gurkhas;
Brigadier Vernon Beauchamp, Commander, 48 Gurkha Infantry Brigade;
Colonel Nick Worthington, Commanding Officer, Training Depot, Brigade of Gurkhas;
Lieutenant Colonel Chris Patey, Commanding Officer, Royal Hong Kong Regiment (The Volunteers).

London

H.E. Mr. Ji Chaozhu, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the People's Republic of China to the United Kingdom;

Messrs Tony Millington, Alan Paul, Andrew Seaton, Mrs. Claire Smith and Mr. Rod Wye of the Far Eastern Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office;

Messrs Mike Perrett and Steven Pollard and Lieutenant Commander John Topp, Royal Navy, of the Ministry of Defence;

Mr. David Chan of the Hong Kong Government Office.

Paris

H.E. Mr. Zhou Jue, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the People's Republic of China to the French Republic;

Mr. Xu Weiquin, Counsellor;

Mr. Mu Wen, First Secretary;

Colonel Teng Dinglie, Assistant Defence Attaché.

The committee also had the benefit of the assistance of Their Excellencies the Ambassadors of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and Portugal in Beijing, and especially H.E. Sir Alan Donald, CMG, Ambassador of the United Kingdom, the country assuring the Chairmanship-in-Office of the WEU Council, and of Miss Alyson Bailes, Counsellor and Consul-General, Colonel Colin Lees, Defence Attaché, and Commander Mike Farr, Royal Navy, Naval Attaché, of his staff, to whom the Rapporteur expresses particular gratitude.

Both the committee and the Rapporteur would like to thank the secretariat of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments for their help during the preparation of this report, and especially Mr. Colin Cameron, Defence Counsellor in the Assembly and Secretary of the committee, for his "quiet diplomacy" throughout the visit to China in May.

Draft Recommendation

***on Western European security: defence implications of the
People's Republic of China's evolving geopolitical situation***

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting the inalienable right of the Chinese Government and people to conduct their own internal affairs but nevertheless considerably shocked and saddened by the events in Beijing and other major cities in May and June 1989, as well as by subsequent violations of human rights;
- (ii) Noting the rôle played by China in maintaining a world balance and contributing to peaceful international relations;
- (iii) Considering that, insofar as the interests of China and of Western Europe converge in many areas, they should therefore continue to be developed independently of ideological and institutional differences, provided human rights are respected;
- (iv) Considering that the essential aim of the Chinese Government is still the country's economic and social development;
- (v) Welcoming the development of the Chinese economy and of exchanges of all kinds between China and Western Europe, while regretting the absence of a parallel improvement in the political situation;
- (vi) Welcoming the convergence between diplomatic action by Western European countries and by China to seek a solution to ensure Cambodian independence;
- (vii) Noting that events in China have caused concern among the residents of Hong Kong and Macau about their future, and noting also that the Chinese Government has undertaken to guarantee their rights and safety;
- (viii) Noting that for many years the Chinese have occupied Tibet and denied the Tibetan people their human rights,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Ensure that member countries continue firmly to express their disapproval of the measures of repression and restriction of freedom taken by China in 1989, possibly resuming regular consultations with the Government of the People's Republic of China on matters relating to the maintenance of world peace;
2. Invite member governments, in time, given the conditions laid down in paragraph 1, to proceed to develop political, technological, economic, commercial and cultural relations with the People's Republic of China;
3. Take the necessary initiatives to seek a convergence of views between member countries and the People's Republic of China on arms control and disarmament, particularly by ensuring that the negotiations on arms limitations in Europe do not lead to an increase in forces and arms deployed in Asia;
4. Pursue among member governments the possibility of concerting a policy designed to lay the foundations for lasting peace in Eastern Asia in order to maintain the independence of Cambodia.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Cox, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. In early 1988, the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments received an invitation from the Chinese People's Institute for Foreign Affairs to visit the People's Republic of China the following year. At that stage, of course, nobody could presage the momentous events which were to take place in May and June 1989. As the time for the visit (12th to 20th May) drew closer, it was announced that a historic Sino-Soviet summit was planned for the same date, with Mr. Gorbachev scheduled to be in both Beijing and Shanghai at the same time as the committee.

2. The Defence Committee's visit proved fascinating from every point of view: the people met, the sights seen, the discussions at all levels – the whole against a background of perpetual movement, most of all for “democratic” change. Whether it was at the official meetings with ministers, during talks in the Great Hall of the People or, in the evenings after dinner, conversations with crowds of students in Tiananmen Square, members of the committee were tremendously impressed with the optimism expressed by all – optimism for peaceful change. At no stage whatsoever was there any hint that force might be used, on one side or the other, nor any evidence of the violence which was to come. In addition to Beijing, the committee visited Xi'an, Shanghai and Canton and the above remarks apply throughout.

3. As we are now only too vividly aware, the situation took a frightful change for the worse shortly after the end of the committee's visit and with that change occurred a setback in China's progress which is likely to take years to remedy. The consequence of the events in Beijing and many other major cities is that your Rapporteur has felt constrained to attempt an analysis of the internal affairs which so influence present external attitudes – the original “raison d'être” for producing this report.

4. This is the fifth report presented to the Assembly over the past quarter of a century dealing with some aspect of the relationship between European security and China.

5. The first in 1966, “The Chinese Problem” (Document 394, Rapporteur: Colonel Bourgoïn), was produced for the Assembly by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments as a reaction after China had tested its first nuclear weapons and demonstrated an ability to deliver an intercontinental ballistic missile. The headlines at the time talked of

“continuing revolution”, the “need for nuclear education”, “the Chinese threat” and the “Moscow-Peking” conflict. One of the conclusions was:

“98. China is thus at the present time both frightened and frightening: frightened because its organisation is still precarious and fragile, frightening because it is a power of the future which causes world anxiety by its violent declarations and also because it is liable to attract many third countries.”¹

6. Times have changed since Colonel Bourgoïn produced his report and the progression of that change is obvious in the succeeding reports of the Assembly, all produced by the General Affairs Committee:

1978: “China and European security” (Document 770, Rapporteur: Sir Frederic Bennett)

1983: “China and European security” (Document 945, Rapporteur: Mr. Caro)

1985: “Developments in China and European security” (Document 1035, Rapporteurs: Mr. Michel and Mr. van der Werff).

The 1983 and 1985 reports resulted from visits by members of the Assembly to China at the invitation of the Chinese authorities: evidence that the Chinese considered it worthwhile to establish a link with Western European Union as part of a growing global awareness.

7. In the present report, your Rapporteur has tried to be as objective as possible, in spite of the natural emotion which has accompanied recent events. He trusts that the reader, both in the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and in the Assembly generally, but more particularly those readers whose country is the subject of the report, will accept what is intended as constructive criticism and will continue the Sino-WEU dialogue in the future.

(a) Immediate defence implications

8. The events in Tiananmen Square which resulted in the action by the People's Liberation Army (the PLA) to regain government control have obviously had a far-reaching consequence

¹ Document 394.

for the relationship of most countries with China. The majority of western nations immediately banned all trade in the defence sector and cancelled official visits (indeed the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments' visit was the last one by a western organisation to fulfil its programme as originally planned).

9. As will be examined later in this report, these developments will obviously affect the modernisation programme of the Chinese armed forces, but will probably not impact much on China's growing arms export trade. The events themselves showed the PLA to be generally unprepared and inappropriately trained and equipped for internal security operations. (Reportedly, there were at the time only a dozen vehicles in the whole of China capable of mounting water cannon, and Beijing's total stock of tear gas was supposedly exhausted in one evening.)

10. Mr. Gorbachev's visit to Beijing may not have proved quite the historic Sino-Soviet summit the authorities originally envisaged but it does demonstrate the extent of rapprochement between the two countries and, together with the announced withdrawals and reductions of Soviet forces in Mongolia and the continuing negotiations on issues affecting the common border, may perhaps allow further reductions and more rapid progress with the reorganisation of the PLA.

11. After having to endure years of manpower reductions, a shrinking defence budget and lessening political influence, the PLA achieved considerable prominence as the result of the events of May and early June. The defence establishment had made up its reduced means by large-scale arms exports, particularly to Iran and other Middle Eastern states, in recent years (see Chapter V), but, in the wake of the internal problems encountered, it would appear probable that the defence budget will increase once again.

II. Factors in the internal crisis

12. In reality, the Chinese leaders are faced with a twofold social and political crisis, as amply demonstrated by dismissals within the party.

(a) Main causes of the democratic sedition

13. It is widely thought that the purges – particularly the exclusion of the reformers Hu Yaobang in 1987 (who has since died) and Zhao Ziyang – which marked a step backwards, were the direct cause of the uprising in spring 1989. The movement in Tiananmen Square started with Hu Yaobang's funeral, the students having asked that he be posthumously rehabilitated as a symbolic gesture.

14. This is probably not untrue but the disturbances probably had deeper roots stemming from two factors. A first analysis would indicate that the reforms undertaken since 1978 created a different ideological context in accordance with a Marxist principle that methods of production have an influence on social, cultural and political phenomena. Unlike what is now happening in certain eastern countries, modernisation in China does not involve pluralism. An attempt was made to introduce capitalism progressively, to open the country to the world economy and abandon collective ownership without, however, renouncing communist dirigism, but privatisation apparently exacerbated the contradiction between the forms of production and superstructures of Mao's days and directly encouraged claims for political democracy. From this point of view, the system of domination could therefore not resist economic modernisation or cultural opening and seemed to be threatened inexorably. But the Chinese leaders turned a deaf ear; there was still no question of political reforms. Two arguments were invoked:

- First, Chinese culture had no democratic tradition and therefore could not adapt itself to a democratic system.
- Second, economic development did not necessarily need a democratic system. A dictatorial policy combined with a free economy would suit the country perfectly.

The leaders therefore chose to maintain order (in passing, shooting part of China's younger generation), even if this meant sacrificing reunification with Hong Kong and Macau albeit essential to the industrial and financial revival of the empire.

15. A second analysis brings out another factor. Although it seems that in the more or less long term the communist system is, if it undergoes no changes, condemned to disappear, it is not the system as such that was called in question by the demonstrators but its corollaries: corruption and autocracy. The students in Tiananmen Square and elsewhere took the "Internationale" as their theme song (indeed several colleagues on the committee joined in the singing in Tiananmen Square) and at no stage was there any hint that the student movement was "anti-communist" as such. The uprising apparently originated in growing hostility towards the party leaders who had grown rich at the expense of investment, particularly in infrastructure, and there was no longer any sympathy for the Chinese nomenclature, far more prosperous than their Soviet counterparts, with their luxurious villas, air-conditioned cars and children's education in Europe and the United States. Young people were finding it difficult to continue to live in university slums with no hot water, where in winter the ice had to be broken in order to wash...

*(b) The impact of the crisis**(i) At social and political level*

16. To start with, it may be said that the crisis had a very limited impact; it is an exaggeration to say, as was often the case, that the whole of China was in a state of crisis:

- First, more than 80 % of rural Chinese were not affected by events, although they must have witnessed them on television in their areas.
- Second, the political crisis was not as profound as it was depicted. Opposition at the top of the political hierarchy was insignificant and there were no plans for political reform.
- Third, the People's Liberation Army remained loyal to the régime. While there was some evidence indicating a difference in approach to the task between forces based around Beijing and those brought in from other military districts, media reports of a possible disintegration of the PLA into contending factions now appear to have been greatly exaggerated.

(ii) At economic level

17. China temporarily suspended its modernisation programme but it is to be expected that the economic sanctions swiftly applied by the international economic community in reaction to the repression will be felt when the régime tries to reactivate this programme. Trade sanctions were adopted soon after the western states unanimously announced a freeze on their high-level diplomatic relations. The European Economic Community, which managed to adopt a joint position, announced that it was suspending the economic and commercial co-operation agreement concluded with China in 1985.

18. The United States' sanctions were taken in two stages:

- In the first stage, the United States announced a freeze on military contacts and decided to ban the sale of American arms to China. It should be pointed out in passing that, between 1984 and 1987, China procured \$590 million worth of armaments from the United States in the specific framework of Foreign Military Sales. The Chinese armed forces, particularly the air force, had concluded several joint venture agreements with American industry, which are now being questioned, including the most important Sino-American defence contract, Shenyang F-8, an anti-aircraft defence pro-

gramme. This contract, concluded with the Grumman Corporation, amounted to about \$550 million. This sanction is therefore prejudicial to the modernisation of the Chinese army and might also jeopardise the interests of the firm should it not continue its programme of modernising F-7M6 fighter aircraft. This is not covered by the ban since it is a trade agreement to which the rules governing sales of arms abroad (Foreign Military Sales) do not apply.

- In the second stage, the United States announced the suspension of diplomatic relations. Simultaneously, its Secretary of State announced economic sanctions, including the United States' intention to defer consideration of Chinese requests for credit from major international organisations, especially the World Bank. The World Bank has already lent China \$8 000 million, a sum which helps to illustrate the country's economic difficulties.

19. Although the consequences of economic sanctions will soon be felt on the Chinese economy, their scale must not be exaggerated. Investors, businessmen and industrialists have no real interest in breaking off relations with China. Trade is beneficial to them as well as to the Chinese and hence to the United States, since trade is of course based on a balance of mutual advantages. Similarly, in the context of international competition, no one is really willing to lose the Chinese market. In an interview granted to a French journalist shortly after the events, Li Peng said he was unperturbed about the prospects of economic co-operation since economic circles were more reasonable than certain politicians. Not all co-operation has been suspended, particularly with French and British partners; for instance, their co-operation in nuclear matters at Dahia Bay did not stop for a single day. Similarly, negotiations with the French firm Citroën on proposed co-operation in car manufacturing proceeded without interruption. At first sight, therefore, economic exchanges have not been deeply affected by the crisis.

III. Geopolitical trends

20. These are worth analysing since Chinese defence policy will be based partly on the threat from outside. Identification of possible threats guides military leaders in the choice of strategic stances to be adopted (conventional war, possible use of nuclear weapons, etc.). Only partly, however, because the choice of means of defence is of course limited by other considerations which will be examined below (e.g. technological

and financial considerations, economic priorities, etc.) These factors, resulting largely from China's relations with its Soviet neighbour, have changed shape in the last few years.

(a) *Sino-Soviet relations since 1949*

(i) *Stages preceding the 1989 reconciliation*

21. Three stages may be distinguished:

- From 1949 to 1954, China took the Soviet Union as a model for reorganising its society. It received economic assistance and advice from Moscow.
- From 1956 to 1979, there was an ideological and strategic break with the Soviet Union, which became effective in 1960 with the withdrawal of Soviet advisers from China. Khrushchev's destalinisation clashed with Mao's personality cult. Furthermore, frontier incidents and differences over the Cuban crisis and the Sino-Indian conflict led to a break between the Chinese and Soviet Communist Parties. China was also opposed to the Moscow partial test ban treaty between the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union and tested its first nuclear bomb two months after the treaty was signed, on 16th October 1964.

In March 1969, incidents along the Sino-Soviet frontier caused scores of deaths on both sides.

In 1979, China abrogated the 1950 treaty of alliance with the Soviet Union but nevertheless proposed holding negotiations on normalising their relations. However, in January 1980, following the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, China announced that these negotiations were to be frozen.

- 1982 to 1989 was a period of reconciliation. A normalisation process began in 1982 and took concrete shape with visits by officials from both sides. However, China pointed out that there were three obstacles to normalisation: the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, Soviet support for Vietnam and the concentration of troops on the Chinese frontier.

In May 1989, the Sino-Soviet meeting officially terminated the thirty-year feud. Mr. Gorbachev took several initiatives at this summit meeting, including the withdrawal of troops from the Chinese frontier.

(ii) *Outstanding problems*

22. There is still disagreement over Cambodia although in the last few months the positions of the two communist powers have drawn significantly closer together, particularly on the search for a negotiated solution, the departure of foreign troops, procedure for control and supervision, holding an international conference and the non-return to power of the Khmer Rouge. However, there is still one major difference relating to the kind of administration to be set up before organising general elections to provide the future state of Cambodia with western-type democratic foundations. Whereas China wishes Prince Sihanouk, present leader of the anti-Vietnamese resistance movement, to head a four-party interim government, (including the Khmer Rouge), the Soviet Union would prefer to see the former monarch at the head of a sort of national reconciliation council in which all the Khmer factions involved would be represented. There are therefore differences about the rôle to be attributed to Prince Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge. Meeting in Paris in July, the four Khmer factions found no satisfactory solution to this problem.

(b) *Consequences for the West of a Sino-Soviet rapprochement*

(i) *Background of Sino-Western relations*

23. While 1949 marked the start of a period of co-operation between China and the Soviet Union, and the ideological war was continuing in Indochina, Malaysia and Korea, relations with the West were non-existent or even hostile. China was considered more of a threat, as can be seen from what Colonel Bourgoïn wrote in 1966 in his report on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments²: "... by converting itself to Marxist-Leninist communism, the country has assumed a new mission which goes beyond the narrow confines of its territory to stretch into the world as a whole. Consequently... China is... an element of disorder, trouble and subversion... war appears for China to be a means among others of achieving its ends."

24. The Vietnam war did not help to improve the relations between China and the United States. They started to improve in the early seventies when President Nixon embarked upon a policy of reconciliation with China. He tried to remove the obstacles that separated it from the United States and to take account of its legitimate national interests.

25. Relations between China and Western Europe also improved. In the report he submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Com-

2. The Chinese problem, Document 394, December 1966.

mittee in 1978³, Sir Frederic Bennett wrote: "... China now adopts a consistently favourable attitude towards the European Community, to which it has accredited an ambassador. It considers the Community has a rôle to play in the potential resistance of European states to the Soviet Union." At that time, indeed, the Soviet Union was still "their only serious, aggressive, potential enemy". Today, circumstances have changed considerably, since the two great communist countries have officially terminated their thirty-year estrangement.

(ii) Economic and strategic consequences for Western Europe

26. From an economic and strategic standpoint, there has been regular economic and commercial co-operation between China and several Western European countries for about ten years. While trade relations between China and the West may in the short term be perturbed, this is a western initiative. Especially strategically speaking, the West can clearly not be offended by the Sino-Soviet rapprochement. There is no reason why China should modify its external policy which, for elementary reasons of internal stability and because of its economy, is a peaceful one.

(iii) Consequences for the United States

27. The thirty-year estrangement was clearly favourable to American affairs in Asia. From the strategic standpoint, the United States was on the same side in defending the region against the Soviet threat. The Philippines, faced with a communist guerrilla movement or the South Koreans and still troubled by Kim Sung, had little inclination to call in question the string of American bases in the Pacific. When President Bush visited Beijing, he stressed that the United States intended to remain a Pacific power. However, from a strategic point of view, the "comrades'" rapprochement may mean the maps having to be redrawn in this part of the world. Soviet-Chinese détente and their economic reform policies to catch up their backlog make the two countries a far greater source of concern in the Pacific; the United States may become less and less indispensable there. Furthermore, the work of American diplomats in Asia has been complicated by Mr. Gorbachev who has appointed experienced ambassadors, *inter alia* to Beijing, Tokyo and Manilla, and is pushing for denuclearising the Pacific. For instance, in Vladivostok in July 1986, Mr. Gorbachev proposed a conference on the security of the Pacific nations and in September 1988 he launched the idea of evacuating Cam Ranh Bay (the Soviet Union's vast base in Vietnam) if the Americans abandoned their bases in the Philippines. This proposal seriously

complicated the United States' negotiations with Mrs. Aquino on renewing the United States forces' leases in the archipelago.

28. Conversely, from an economic point of view, there seems little reason why China should change its policy. Its economic relations with the United States – and to a large extent with Hong Kong and Japan – and the Pacific economic markets are far more useful to it than its economic links with the Soviet Union. Its trade with the Soviet Union amounts to less than 5 % of its total trade, whereas that with the United States, Japan and the Pacific countries amounts to more than two-thirds. Japan and the United States had hitherto been its major source of assistance, investment and technology. China therefore has no interest in depriving itself of these links which are so valuable for its economy. It remains to be seen whether the sanctions planned by the United States will change these facts.

**IV. Strategic doctrine
and geostrategic and technological facts**

29. Several aspects of military geography and Chinese strategic doctrine should be considered.

*(a) Impact of geostrategic facts
on the doctrine of Chinese strategists*

30. Because of its perpetual tension with Vietnam, its rivalry with India and, above all, its long frontier with the Soviet Union, almost the whole of its gigantic frontier is a matter of vital concern for China. Strategists realise their country must be able to meet limited attacks aimed at occupying frontier areas. Until now, the Soviet threat has been the main concern of Chinese strategists. The *nature* of the threat (deployment of highly-mechanised troops with nuclear weapons *along China's northern frontier*) was comparable to the situation in which the Maoist strategy of a people's war was to be used; this is why that traditional strategy still has supporters at PLA headquarters, but it has had to be adapted.

31. In February 1979, Deng Xiaoping wished to bring his Vietnamese "vassal" to heel after its intervention against China's allies, the Khmer Rouge, who were in power in Cambodia. However, the PLA, ill-prepared and probably not well led, soon had to withdraw. Mediocre performances underlined the need to modernise the army and revise strategic concepts.

(b) Present strategic doctrine

32. At operational level, the traditional doctrine described by Mao in 1965 in "The long war" retains its full force, i.e. to beat and anni-

3. China and European security, Document 770, May 1978.

hilate the aggressor while taking advantage of the country's numerical superiority and geo-strategic depth. Annihilation of the aggressor and China's victory would be obtained at the end of a prolonged war in which the enemy would be stifled in depth and drowned in a sea of guerrillas. A Sino-Soviet conflict would be prolonged and defensive and take place on Chinese territory. Strategy and support tactics would be implemented in the framework of active defence. These tactics would be applied over vast areas of Chinese territory and require the rapid movement of defence forces to block a Soviet invasion of frontier areas such as Xinjian and Manchuria. In order to succeed, defence of this type should also be capable of preventing a surprise attack or the use of better technology and disorganise the enemy army's control and command.

33. However, this doctrine has been partly abandoned by Chinese strategists, or in any event adapted. The last revision of the people's war doctrine concentrated mainly on the interest of static wars and the need to defend industrial bases.

(i) The PLA is not capable of waging the kind of mobile war with rapid movements as close as possible to the frontiers advocated in the people's war doctrine. To compensate for the PLA's limited mobility and inferiority in armaments, the Chinese have to organise a defensive strategic war, at least in the first stage, the aim at this point being to stabilise defence, thus forcing the enemy into a prolonged war. In a second stage, Chinese forces, with the assistance of mobile and guerrilla units, might effectively counter-attack with the support of a logistic base situated in safe rear positions. An air mobile force (a mini "Force d'Action Rapide" similar to the British air mobile brigade) is now being trained.

(ii) Defence of the industrial bases which the PLA expects to afford logistic support is also an integral part of the people's war. However, implementing this new doctrinal approach requires sophisticated modern military equipment, modern logistics and well-trained men, otherwise the PLA would be reduced to a strategy corresponding more to the traditional definition of a people's war and this might lead to the loss of vital industrial areas.

34. The people's war concept is now embedded in a new military doctrine: the people's war must be conducted in accordance with modern fighting concepts. This is a radical

change. It takes into account foreign experience in contemporary wars (Soviet Union/Afghanistan, Iran/Iraq) and means transforming the armed forces into a regular, modernised army and promoting the development of science and military technology. Thus, in place of the mass army in which people's militias would play an important rôle in the event of national territory being invaded, China is introducing a regular army in which crack parachute or marine units now have an increasing part to play.

35. The ways and means of effecting this modernisation will be considered in the next chapter and are also illustrated at appendix.

V. Chinese military policy

36. The new defence policy was drawn up by the party's Military Commission, the National Defence Scientific and Technical Committee and PLA headquarters staff.

(a) Modernisation of the military system

37. The modern fighting concepts referred to above imply a complete overhaul of the military system. Although modernisation of defence is at the bottom of the list of four modernisations, the first three – agriculture, industry and particularly science and technology – clearly play a large part in the modernisation of the Chinese military system. There are several aspects to modernisation:

(i) Renovation

38. Renovating the old system and incorporating sophisticated equipment: China has purchased a large quantity of machine tools⁴ in order to mass-produce spare parts and even new engines for MiG-19 and MiG-21 fighter aircraft. It is also renovating its old Soviet T-34 and T-39 tanks and giving them sights and turrets of a new type.

(ii) Rationalisation

39. Rationalising the operation of the armed forces to make up for an inadequate defence budget which in 1988 amounted to 21.8 billion yuan (\$5.86 billion), i.e. 8.17% of the state budget, although forecast to rise in 1989 to 24.55 billion yuan (\$6.60 billion). These figures represent only some 0.4% of total world military expenditure and, for a country with 20% of the world's population, this is very little. It

4. In this context reference should be made to the concurrent report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on "Co-ordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (Cocom)", Rapporteur: Mr. Atkinson.

may be wondered how such a large country as China can run its army with such a low level of military expenditure.

40. There have been several *changes* in the way the army is serviced in order to compensate for the shortage of military funds:

- Consumption turned towards production. The PLA's service units are trying to increase production and reduce the burden on the state, considering this to be a strategic task. As from 1985, various hospitals were opened to the public, as well as depots, aerodromes, ports, factories producing military supplies, repair, fuel and other services hitherto reserved for the military. For instance, 20 million civilian patients are treated each year and 1 million civilians taken into military hospitals. Similarly, factories producing for the military have manufactured several thousand items for civilian use. The Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was invited to visit a factory producing shoe polish and which employs the wives and daughters of officers of the 196th Division and a Coca Cola plant being run by the navy in Shanghai. The military supply services are helping to develop the country's infrastructure as well, with units of engineers, for example, helping to construct railways and roads for local communities (which also has a spin-off in reinforcing civil-military relationships).
- Development of co-operation. Until recently, the PLA service units had ideas based on a "natural economy". A system was set up according to which it was preferable to be self-sufficient and, for instance, be treated in one's own hospital or stock one's equipment in one's own warehouses. However, the principles of a market economy have made headway, even in the PLA. Today, directors of supply services are trying to use appropriations in a profitable manner. For instance, units from various branches of the armed forces procure equipment for joint use from supply services close to their units; arms for joint use are repaired in workshops close to the units and troops are treated in the nearest hospitals.
- Reorganising the old equipment procurement system. The old system was irrational since equipment was supplied with no real account being taken of the troops' requirements. Officers supervised supplies but neglected management. Service units have very

recently introduced market economy management methods. For instance, petrol suppliers practice a system of responsibility: they give vouchers to units which, if not fully used, may be exchanged for cash at a fixed rate.

- Finally, the number of troops has been reduced by about one and a half million. A million soldiers demobilised since 1985 have been rehabilitated, which was not easy because there is a catastrophic surplus of staff in the administration and state or collective firms. However, ex-soldiers are given priority for employment.

(iii) Reorganisation

41. *Re-establishment of ranks and appointment of younger officers*

The reintroduction of ranks in September 1988, twenty-three years after they were abolished prior to the outbreak of the cultural revolution (1966-76), was a spectacular step towards modernising the military system. Deng Xiaoping decided to reintroduce the rank system following the semi-failure of the lesson China had tried to inflict on Vietnam in retaliation for the invasion of Cambodia, the PLA's poor performance in the fighting – the first clash with a foreign power since the frontier fighting with India in 1962 – underlined the need to modernise the army. It is not merely a matter of flattering the PLA by restoring ranks and glittering uniforms for its officers. Apart from the fact that ranks facilitate the exercise of command, they allow a system of compulsory retirement depending on age and rank to be introduced. The operation has thus allowed many military staffs to be thinned down and many experienced old leaders who had proved their worth during the civil war have been overtaken by modern developments, removed from active service, and replaced by younger officers. The process was difficult to implement because of questions of personal prestige and above all the material interests at stake: veterans who are removed lose all the privileges associated with the exercise of power. Similarly, some officers have their promotion blocked – particularly because of the new emphasis on education and specialisation – and especially those who, since 1959 and above all 1966, owed their rise solely to political activism.

42. *Raising the general level of the army, from top to bottom*

- In the higher echelons, for a long time, the army has been without trained officers capable of conducting operations. The level of certain officers responsible for political training and logistics is so pitiful that, according to

an article in the PLA magazine of October 1988, the country might be without effective leadership in the event of war. Consideration is therefore being given to organising regular examinations for officers. Those whose results are not satisfactory after several tests will be reduced in rank.

- At the lower end of the scale, the physical and even mental abilities of applicants are far from satisfactory. There is currently a recruitment crisis in China, the indirect consequence of rural decollectivisation: young people stay at home where manpower is needed. The government's "one child per couple" policy may eventually also have a long-term effect on recruiting – although it does seem a paradox to talk of a potential "demographic problem" in a country with a population of over one thousand million people! The PLA, which used to recruit the great majority of its troops in the country, now recruits mainly in very poor areas. It must be said that both the troops and their officers are something of misfits of modernisation. Raised to a pinnacle under Mao, they are now almost at the bottom of the social scale. In relative terms, their material situation is steadily declining: their pay (about six yuan per month or ten with various allowances) has not been revalued. The PLA cannot share in the growing wealth that the new economic trends allow civilians. For all these reasons, there is no longer a rush to join the army.
- Similarly, there is apparently a crisis, or rather a serious problem, to be overcome in regard to PLA personnel. There is talk of improving selection by scrutinising young recruits more closely since the PLA is proving to be an immense hotbed of delinquents. According to a recent inquiry by a military tribunal, of some 300 soldiers tried in recent years almost 70 % had a criminal background before joining the army. The Council and the Central Military Committee have therefore proposed a system of recruitment which engages the responsibility of officers responsible for selection in their departments or units.

(b) China's external policy

(i) Arms control and disarmament

43. The new open foreign policy has theoretically led China to adopt a positive attitude towards arms control and its corollary, disarm-

ament. China has become an apostle of disarmament (cf. the nine-point disarmament proposal made by Zhao Ziyang on 21st March 1986), endorsing inter alia a general ban on and the complete destruction of existing nuclear weapons. Disarmament should mainly concern the two superpowers whose nuclear arsenals represent 97 % of the world total. China is therefore now praising arms control – a process it had consistently denounced as a waste of time or, worse, as an act of hegemony – considering it to be the start of disarmament.

44. This new approach is demonstrated by its participation in the Geneva disarmament conference under United Nations aegis, its ratification of the 1984 outer space treaty and its joining, the same year, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It should be recalled that its first major initiative was at the Geneva conference in March 1984 when it proposed banning and destroying all chemical weapons. These initiatives must be seen as a way of recognising that the large nations have responsibility for world peace. When it has wider experience of multilateral arms control negotiations, China will perhaps be encouraged to join the superpowers' negotiations.

45. For the time being, however, its arms control theories are purely verbal. In practice, China is still refusing to participate in arms control with the superpowers because it sees no need to do so. There is only a minimum deterrent force and no thought of building up large stocks of nuclear weapons. This strategic doctrine of deploying a minimum deterrent force implies a wide range of forces but a small number of arms in each category, thus allowing the PLA to transfer most of its nuclear arms production installations to the civil sector.

46. As it will continue to have comparatively few forces, China has no interest in associating itself with an arms control process with the superpowers, which have a capability for overkill. Its position therefore remains that the superpowers must first make large reductions in their arsenals before other nuclear powers take part in arms control. Only then will China consider reductions in proportion to those of the superpowers. (A very similar attitude to that of France and the United Kingdom.)

47. Nor does China take part in the European arms control process, since European and Chinese security are obviously two quite separate things. It has certainly often said there was a link between the two, particularly in its three-world theory and it has referred to so-called co-operation between the third world and Europe. Today, however, its opinion is basically that Europe is clearly dominated, in a relatively balanced manner, by the two superpowers and that the European states still attach importance to the policies of the superpowers with which

they are allied. This leaves little room for action by outside powers such as China. However, these theories are out of step, not to say in contradiction, with practice, as will be seen from a brief glance at Chinese capabilities, nuclear included.

(ii) Chinese nuclear capability

48. China, which tested its first atomic bomb only in 1964, developed nuclear weapons with impressive efficiency, producing the hydrogen bomb and more than adequate launchers and multiple warheads more quickly than nations that preceded it. China's nuclear forces have avoided the financial cuts imposed on the rest of the PLA. China does not seem prepared to reduce the growth rate of its nuclear power; on the contrary, expenditure on research and development have risen steadily since 1978.

49. There does, however, seem to be a slight slowing down in weapon production at present. For example, the 60 CSS-1 (medium-range ballistic missiles) belonging to the Strategic Rocket Forces are no longer operational. First introduced in 1970, with a range of 1 200 km, and probably a 20 kiloton warhead, the CSS-1 does not have an obvious successor at present. There is as yet no sign of the second Xia-class SSBN becoming operational, let alone any further vessels of a supposedly 4-strong class. (Mr. Frank Carlucci, when United States Secretary of Defence, was reportedly shown the outside of the first Xia.) Whether the problem at present is one of submarine development or of the missile delivery system concerned remains to be determined. Details of nuclear capability are given at appendix to this report.

(iii) China's arms trade

50. China, which has been regularly represented at international exhibitions for several years, has a special interest in the arms trade. In 1984, its exports of defence equipment amounted to \$1.66 billion, or almost 7% of its total exports. The figure has since fallen slightly, mainly because of the ending of the Iran-Iraq war. According to the cash value of world arms exports, China is in fifth place behind the Soviet Union, the United States, France and the United Kingdom. Because the cost of munitions exported by China is very low, it exports far more by quantity than countries at the top of the list.

51. China exports a great deal to the third world, thus allowing it to increase its influence in international affairs. In the early eighties, Deng Xiaoping set up an organisation called China North Industries Corporation (Norinco) to sell arms to the third world in order to bring in the currency necessary for importing advanced technology equipment. The results were soon spectacular. The principal importing countries include Albania, North Korea, Egypt,

Algeria, Zaire, Sudan, Tanzania, some Latin American countries, etc. China also exports to the Gulf countries, which sparks off reactions, particularly in the case of its arms sales to Saudi Arabia (to which medium-range CSS-2 missiles have been sold). China also exports missile launchers to various Middle Eastern countries which have the capability of manufacturing chemical weapons.

52. More particularly, from 1981 to 1988, China was one of the main supporters of both sides in the war between Iran and Iraq, behind the Soviet Union and Western Europe. By 1985, China had signed a \$1 500 million contract with Iraq before signing another with Iran, worth \$1 600 million. This contract covered the sale of arms and aircraft for the next two years and included twelve F-6 fighter aircraft and 200 T-59 tanks, as well as rocket-launching anti-tank guns and the famous Silkworm anti-shipping missiles. The outbreak of peace in the Gulf was certainly bad for Chinese business: almost 70% of its arms exports in the last six years were to Iran and Iraq.

VI. China's defence system

(a) Human resources

(i) Organisation and structure of the army

53. All the country's armed forces are integrated within the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Government and party control is exercised through two main military commissions, both chaired by Deng Xiaoping: the Central Military Commission of the National People's Congress and the Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee. The party committee is the traditional instrument for party control of military affairs. The Ministry of National Defence controls the PLA. A National Defence Science, Technology and Industry Commission supervises weapons research and development and co-ordination of the defence industry with the civilian industrial base.

54. The PLA has three main departments: General Staff, General Logistics and General Political. The General Staff in turn controls the service arms. The force commands are Air Force, Navy, Artillery, Armour, Engineering, Communications, Nuclear/Biological Chemical and Strategic Rockets (called the Second Artillery Corps). The navy consists of three fleets: East Sea, North Sea and South Sea.

55. There are three levels of forces in the Chinese army.

- **Main forces**, under the direct operational command of the General Staff, are capable of intervening in any part of the territory. After restructuring, they theoretically have some twenty armies known as Jituanjun and some fifteen

independent divisions. The Jituanjun appeared for the first time in 1986. Their chain of command varies but they have an average of 60 000 men each. The divisions (of which there are about a hundred in the ground forces) have an average of 10 000 men each.

- Local or regional forces are under regional command. They operate only within their own military region. They have a total of about eighty divisions plus about a hundred independent regiments.
- Ground forces are controlled through the country's armed forces which are all integrated in the PLA. The Ministry of Defence is an essential cog in the administration.
- Operational ground forces are controlled through seven military regions, each having responsibility for twenty-eight provincial-level military districts. Until June 1985, there were eleven military regions; following the important meeting of the Central Military Commission at that time, the former Wuhan military region was merged with Jinan, Lanzhou with Xinjiang and Chengdu with Kunming and Fuzhou. The reorganisation, along with the reduction in staff officers, was aimed at easing centralisation of command.
- Some armies are now being reorganised into group armies and transformed into integrated units. These are new integrated, combined-arms units which are intended to replace the traditional field armies.

(ii) Composition, inventory

56. The Chinese army is numerically the strongest in the world with 3 200 000 men, of which 1 300 000 conscripts.

57. The army is by far the strongest of the three components of the People's Liberation Army. It has 2 300 000 men of which about 1 100 000 conscripts.

58. There are 300 000 men in the navy (including the naval air forces and coast guard) and 470 000 in the air force.

59. China also has 1 200 000 reservists. There are 12 million men in the para-military forces, including the police.

60. Military service is by selective conscription for men and women between 18 and 22 years of age and lasts three years for the army, five for the navy and four for the air force.

(b) Material resources

61. According to the Military Balance (1989-90), the army has 9 000 heavy tanks, 2 000 light tanks, 14 500 pieces of artillery and 2 800 armoured troop carriers. (See Appendix.)

62. The navy reportedly has a new anti-ship, supersonic long-range sea-skimming missile of Chinese design to be commissioned in 1989. The navy still seems confined to a coastal defence rôle although there are rumours of the imminent start of work on an aircraft carrier. Until that is commissioned, the four Han nuclear submarines now in service will remain the spearhead of the navy.

63. New frigates launched recently are equipped with Exocet-type ship-to-ship missiles and some of the new vessels also boast United States-built LM-2500 turbine engines. A few destroyers have been issued with Hangqi surface-to-surface missiles while selected frigates now have the Haiying 4 surface-to-surface missile that is an improved version of the Soviet Styx. During the tremendous reception laid on for the committee by the Chinese Navy near Shanghai in May (all ships dressed overall, crews smartly turned out and "lining the side", red carpets everywhere), members were able to visit one of the latest Luda-class destroyers (the "WUHU"), a Romeo-type conventional submarine (the "CHANG CHENG"), an anti-submarine corvette (the "SUN JIANG"), and "Mine-sweeper 082". All vessels, even the mine-sweeper, are equipped for mine-laying - a rôle which has been largely neglected of late in western navies.

64. All the vessels we saw were very modern in construction and their crews appeared to be smart, well-trained and with good morale. Nevertheless, the very limited space available in the operations room and the quality of the command, control and communications equipment must cast doubt on the effectiveness of the surface ships either in modern war operations or in the possibility of being modernised to make them more capable warships.

65. The air force, with almost half a million men (470 000), has only 9 000 aircraft. The technology of many of these aircraft dates back to the fifties. There is not yet an inflight refuelling capability but China is planning to adapt the H-6D medium-range bomber (the Chinese version of the Badger TU-16) for the inflight refuelling of the A-5 Fantan-A attack aircraft. A protocol of agreement has been signed with the British firm Flight Refuelling. The air force now has the ability to make rapid short-term deployments using medium-range transport aircraft and helicopters but long-range deployment is still impossible. Furthermore, it can operate only in daylight and good weather as it has only

out-of-date interceptors and ground installations. Only the F-6 Fantan fighter carries an effective radar system.

66. Currently much attention is being devoted to the modernisation of the radar networks and communications systems together with improvements to the long-range tracking stations in Shanxi and Gansu. There is also a shortage of anti-tank airborne weapons but the 120 H-6 (Tupolev 16) bombers are well-maintained in readiness to carry nuclear bombs in their rôle of deterrent. The air forces are also in charge of the major deterrent – the 66 strategic land-based nuclear missiles. Although the Chinese have at long last produced effective solid fuel that now powers the Dong Feng (East Wind) and carries a megaton warhead over a range of 13 000 km, the other missiles still use liquid fuel which requires a long time – around 36 hours – to make them operational.

VII. Conclusions

67. This was your Rapporteur's third visit to China, but this particular visit, because of the magnitude of the events which coincided with the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments' presence, was by far the most fascinating. All members of the committee could not fail to be impressed by the tremendous progress which has taken place in China in recent years. Definite progress in economic and material terms, from the obvious prosperity of the "man on the Shanghai omnibus" to the very international standards of the newly-built hotels resulting from various successful joint ventures. It was, therefore, very difficult with this sort of background to understand the depth of Chinese reaction to their students' desire for dialogue and change. Except that, on one particular occasion during the committee's visit, it was very evident that such dialogue is certainly not the norm in Chinese society. A seminar on arms control held at the Shanghai Institute of International Studies was one of the highlights of the visit. The discussion was free-ranging and everybody present contributed to the exchange of views. The only point, however, which obviously perplexed our hosts was that on our side we certainly did not speak with the one voice they expected from one institution – far from it, in fact, when the vexed subject of short-range nuclear weapons was discussed!

68. Your Rapporteur's hope for the future might be that more such sessions and exchanges would be beneficial for mutual understanding. Economic change and progress is all very well, as we Europeans are especially aware, but a dearth of political discussion and awareness, at least amongst those in positions of responsibility, is disastrous.

69. The draft recommendations formulated at the beginning of this report reflect the continuing realities of the relationship between Western Europe and China – a relationship which has suffered because of the aftermath of the events the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments saw with its own eyes.

70. We must now take up the links between us again, although perhaps keeping more firmly in the forefront of our minds the internal events which have shaped modern China, such as the behaviour by the "Gang of Four" and the Red Guards, the "Cultural Revolution" and now the massacre all the world, except the Chinese Government, believes took place in Tiananmen Square last June.

71. Your Rapporteur is convinced nevertheless that there should be further convergence between Western Europe and China when it comes to consideration of arms control and disarmament on a wider scale than the present discussions in Vienna: there is much more room here for agreement and a common position for the longer term, as we have similar interests.

72. In sum our relationship with China must develop in spite of the problems. We still need to show our own interest in the area of the Chinese sphere of interest and in establishing contacts at all levels, economic, political, cultural, just as the Chinese themselves have made considerable efforts to allow some part of their population access to western language and culture. Let us hope that they will continue that trend now.

VIII. Postscript

Hong Kong and Macau

73. The preceding analysis of the Western European relationship with China would not be complete without mention of the special interests of the United Kingdom concerning Hong Kong and Portugal concerning Macau. Both territories are scheduled to be integrated into the People's Republic of China – Hong Kong in 1997, Macau in 1999. At the end of the committee's visit to China, members were kindly received by the Governor of Hong Kong on the day after one million Hong Kong residents had marched through the streets to voice their concern over events on the Chinese mainland. Portuguese parliamentarians, observers present with the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, would have travelled to Macau for discussions had not a typhoon disrupted communications.

74. There can be no doubt that the communities of both Hong Kong and Macau have legitimate cause for concern and worry as to what might befall them in the 21st century. While

members of the committee were impressed with the attempts of local officials and especially the military to ensure that life in Hong Kong is not totally disrupted in the intervening period (for example because of illegal immigration or problems with Vietnamese boat people), your Rapporteur must record the committee's serious doubts as to whether enough effort is being made to reassure the local populations by the national capitals concerned. The solution may well be to bring the problems before a wider audience and seek help from such bodies as the

European Community or the Commonwealth, particularly for those people who do not wish to remain in Hong Kong and Macau after 1997 or 1999.

75. The committee is aware of the problems also for the governments concerned in negotiating the necessary agreements with the Chinese authorities – a particular imperative which underlines the central theme of the present report: the renewal of links between Western Europe and China is essential.

APPENDIX

*Military data**Personnel*

Chairman, Military Commission: Deng Xiaoping
 Vice-Chairman, Military Commission: Ye Jianying
 Vice-Chairman, Military Commission: Xu Xiangqian
 Vice-Chairman, Military Commission: Nie Rongzhen
 Executive Vice-Chairman, Secretary-General, Military Commission: Yang Shangkun
 Vice-Secretary-General, Military Commission and Chief-of-Staff: Yang Dezhi
 Vice-Secretary-General (Minister of National Defence): Zhang Aiping
 Vice-Secretary-General, Chief, General Political Dept.: Yu Qiuli
 Vice-Secretary-General, Head, General Logistics Dept.: Hong Xuezhong
 Commander, PLA Navy: Ma Xinchun
 Commander, PLA Air Force: Wang Hai
 Commander, Second Artillery Corps (Strategic Rocket Force): He Jinheng
 Commander, Beijing Region: Qin Jiwei
 Commander, Chengdu Region: Fu Quanyou
 Commander, Guangzhou Region: You Taizhong
 Commander, Jinan Region: Li Jiulong
 Commander, Lanzhou Region: Zhao Xianshun
 Commander, Nanjing Region: Xiang Shouzhi
 Commander, Shenyang Region: Liu Jingsong
 Ministry of Defence, Beijing

Total armed forces

Active: some 3 200 000 (perhaps 1 350 000 conscripts), being reduced
 Reserves: 1 200 000+ including military and militia reserves

Paramilitary forces

These forces comprise three parts: the Militia (Ministry of Defence), Ordinary Militia and People's Armed Police Force (Ministry of Security).

Militia (Ministry of Defence)

This force is further broken down into three elements: the Basic Militia, composed of some 4 300 000 personnel; the Armed Militia, composed of men and women aged 18 to 28 years and who serve with Regular Forces for 30-40 day periods each year; and a Maritime Militia with its own armed trawlers and an air defence component.

Ordinary Militia

Some 6 000 000 personnel aged 18 to 35 years. Generally not armed.

People's Armed Police Force (Ministry of Security)

Composed of former soldiers and personnel transferred from Local Forces divisions. Comprise Internal Defence divisions and 30 independent regiments. Perform border security, patrol and internal security duties.

Available manpower

291 558 000; 162 738 000 fit for military service (est.).

Service period

Selective conscription:

Army, marines: 3 years; air force: 4 years; navy: 5 years (technical volunteers can serve 8 to 12 more years to maximum age 35)

Annual military expenditure

1987: \$5.64 billion
 1988: \$5.86 billion

N.B. The defence expenditure given above is, in all likelihood, grossly understated. This is because Chinese budgetary methods are not known in detail in the West and because China does not include personnel costs and research and development costs in its official figures.

Defence budget

1989: \$6.60 billion

Alliances and organisations

IACO, IAEA, Seabeds Committee, United Nations and various others. There is a 30-year treaty of alliance and friendship with the Soviet Union; a mutual defence agreement with North Korea dating from 1961, with an agreement to provide free military aid, and non-aggression pacts with Afghanistan, Burma and Cambodia.

*Strategic forces**Offensive:*

1. Land-based missiles

These are organised in 6 or 7 divisions, regiments and battalions, by type of missile.

Equipment: ICBM: Total: 8 – 2 DF-5 (CSS-4) with a 5 megaton warhead and a 12 900 km range; 6 DF-4 (CSS-3) with a 3 megaton warhead and a 7 000 km range;
 IRBM: 60 DF-3 (CSS-2), 2 megaton, 2 700 km range;
 MRBM: 50 DF-2 (CSS-1), 20 kiloton, 1 100 km range (may now be retiring).

2. Submarines and SLBM

1 Xia-class SSBN with 12 CSS-N-3 (J-1) with one 2 megaton warhead, estimated range 2 200 to 3 000 km.

N.B.: Production of Chinese SSBN is continuing, but extremely slowly. A further 3 Xia-class are under construction.

Defensive:

- (a) Tracking stations: Xinjiang (covers central Asia) and Shanxi (northern border with USSR and Mongolia); and some limited anti-ship capability (shipborne).
- (b) Phased-array radar complex. Ballistic missile early warning; and air force air defence system of some 4 000 air force and navy fighters, some 100 Hongqi-2 HQ-2J (SA-2 type) SAM units and more than 16 000 AA guns and a civil defence shelter and evacuation system in the capital and other major cities.

*(a) Army battle order**Manpower*

2 300 000 (perhaps 1 075 000 conscripts) – reductions continue

Service period

3 years, conscription

Organisation

Main forces: 7 military regions (divided into 28 military districts (MDs)), 3 garrison commands

22 Integrated Group Armies (GAs), comprising:

- 80 infantry divisions
- 10 mechanised armoured divisions
- 5-6 field and AA artillery divisions
- some independent artillery, AA regiments
- 50 independent engineer regiments
- aviation: helicopter group reported
- AB (manned by air force): 1 corps of 3 divisions, 1 independent division, support troops

Deployment

The army is *believed* to be deployed in-country as follows:

North: Beijing Military Region (MR): 5 GA, 3 armoured, 17 infantry, 1 missile division, 1 airborne division
 North-East: Shenyang MR: 4 GA, 4 armoured, 16 infantry, 2 missile divisions
 East: Nanjing MR: 3 GA, 1 armoured, 11 infantry divisions
 South: Guangzhou MR: 2 GA, 10 infantry divisions
 West: Lanzhou MR: 2 GA, 1 armoured, 9 infantry, 2 missile divisions
 South-West: Chengdu MR: 3 GA, 10 infantry, 1 missile division
 Central: Jinan MR: 2 GA, 1 armoured, 7 infantry, 3 airborne divisions

Equipment

MBT (9 000):

T-54, 6 000 Type-59, 80 T-69 (mod Type-59); (not including T-69 II, which is export only), Type-79/-80 reported

Light tanks (1 200):

Type-62, 800 Type-63 amphibious

APC (2 800):

Type-531 C/-D/-E, Type-85 (YW-531H), Type-55 (BTR-40), -56 (BTR-152), -63, Type-77-1/-2 (Soviet BTR-50PK amphibious); Type-523

Towed artillery (14 500):

100 mm: Type-59 (fd/ATK), Type-86
 122 mm: Type-54, Type-60, Type-83, D-30
 130 mm: Types-59/-59-1
 152 mm: Type-54, Type-66

SP Artillery:

122 mm: Type-54-1 (Type-531 chassis), YW-302
 152 mm: Type-83

MRL (1 250):

107 mm: Types-63 towed /-81 SP (being replaced by 122 mm)
 122 mm: Type-81, Type-81 mine-layer, Type-83, Type-85
 130 mm: Type-63, Type-70 SP, Type-82
 132 mm: BM-13-16
 140 mm: BM-14-16
 273 mm: Type-83
 284 mm: Type-74 mine-layer
 320 mm: WS1
 425 mm: Type-762 mine clearance

Mortars:

82 mm: Type-53, W2-304 SP
 120 mm: Type-55, W-86, WZ-381 SP
 160 mm: Type-56

SSM:

launchers: M-9 (range 600 km)
 M-11 (range 120-150 km) (under development – in service c. 1989)

ATGW:

HJ-73 (Sagger-type), HJ-8 (TOW/Milan-type)

RCL:

75 mm: Type-52, 56
 82 mm: Type-65

RL:

90 mm: Type-51

ATK guns:

57 mm: Type-55
 76 mm: Type-54
 100 mm: Type-73

AD guns (15 000):

12.7 mm: Types-54, -77
 14.5 mm: Types-75, -75-1 towed, Types-56, -58, -80 twin SP
 23 mm: (ZSU-23 type)
 37 mm: Types-55/-65/-74, -63 twin SP
 57 mm: Types-59, -80 SP
 85 mm: Type-56
 100 mm: Type-59

SAM:

HN-5, HN-5A/-C (SA-7 type)
 HQ-61 twin SP

*(b) Naval battle order**Manpower*

260 000 officers and men, including coast defence, marines and naval air (some 35 000 conscripts).

Reserves

About 177 000 reservists, including navy and marines.

Service period

5 years.

Fleet– *Submarines (93):*

Strategic submarines: 1 Xia SSBN with CSS-N-3 SLBM

Tactical submarines (92):

SSN: 4 Han with 533 mm TT
 SSG: 1 modified Romeo (Type ES5G), with 6 C-801 (YJ-6, Exocet derivative) SSM; plus 533 mm TT
 SS (87): 3 improved Ming (Type ES5E) with 533 mm TT
 84 Romeo (Type ES3B) with 533 mm TT
 20 Whiskey with 533 mm and 406 mm TT
 (N.B. probably only about half the older Romeo and Whiskey classes fully operational)

Other rôles: 1 Golf (SLBM trials)

– *Principal surface combatants (53):*

Destroyers (19):

- 1 new construction (possibly Wuhan-B) (ASUW) with 8 × C-801 SSM, 1 Z-9A (Fr Dauphin) hel (OTHT), 1 × 100 mm gun
- 16 Luda (Type-051) (ASUW) with 2 × 3 CSS-N-2 (HY-2 Styx derivative Silkworm) SSM, 2 × 2 130 mm guns; plus 2 × 12 ASW RL (1 modernised with 8 × C-801 vice C-SSN 2, hel deck vice after 2 × 130 mm gun)
- 2 Anshan (Soviet Gordy) with 2 × 2 CSS-N-2 SSM, 2 × 2 130 mm guns

Frigates (37):

26 Jianghu; 4 variants:

- About 13 Type I, with 4 × ASW RL, plus 2 × 2 CSS-N-2, 2 × 2 100 mm guns
- About 9 Type II, with 2 × 5 ASW RL, plus 2 × 2 CSS-N-2, 2 × 2 100 mm guns
- About 2 Type III, with 2 × 3 ASTT, plus 8 × C-801 SSM, 2 × 2 100 mm guns
- About 2 Type IV, with 1 Z-9A hel, 2 × 5 ASW RL, 2 × CSS-N-2 SSM, 2 × 100 mm guns

- 2 Jiangdong with 2 × ASW RL, 2 × 2 100 mm guns
- 5 Jiangnan with 2 × ASW RL, 3 × 100 mm guns
- 4 Chengdu with 1 × 2 CSS-N-2 SSM, 3 × 100 mm guns

– *Patrol and coastal combatants (about 915):*

Corvettes:

about 10 miscellaneous WW2 (and earlier) escorts

Missile craft (215):

- 125 Huangfent/Hola (Soviet Osa-type) with 4 × CSS-N-2 or 8 × C-801 SSM
- 90 Hegu/Hema (Komar-Type) with 2 × CSS-N-2 or 4 × C-801 SSM

Torpedo craft (about 160):

100 Huchuan, 60 P-6, 20 P-4 all under 100 tons with 2 × 533 mm TT (more in store)

Patrol (about 540):

- Coastal (110): 10 Haijui (improved Hainan)
- 90 Hainan with 4 × ASW RL
- 10 Kronshtadt with 2 × ASW RL
- Inshore (380): 290 Shanghai, about 90 under 100 tons
- Riverine (50): all under 100 tons

– *Mine warfare (56):*

Mine-layers: none dedicated, but Luda, Anshan, Jiangnan and Chengdu class DD/FF and Hainan Kronshtadt and Shanghai PC have mine-laying capability

MCM (56) : 35 Soviet T-43 MSO

- 1 new construction MSI Hull No 4422
- 20 Fushun MSI; plus about 60 unmanned drone MSI under 100 tons

– *Amphibious (58):*

- 3 Yukan LST, capacity about 200 tps, 10 tk
- 13 Shan LST, capacity about 150 tps, 16 tk
- 30 Yuliang, 4 Yuling, 4 Yudao LSM capacity about 100 tps, 3 tk
- 6 Qiong Sha LSI, capacity 400 tps
- 10 Hua (US LSM-1), capacity 25 tps, 4 tk
- Plus about 400 craft: 320 LCU, 40 LCP, 10 LCT and some hovercraft

– *Support and miscellaneous (104):*

3 Fuqing AOR, 25 support AO, 1 AFS, 8 submarine support, 2 repair, 11 transport, 35 survey/research/experimental, 2 ice-breakers, 17 ocean tugs

Coastal regional defence forces (27 000)

35 independent artillery and SSM regiments deployed in 25 coastal defence regions with forces disposed to protect naval bases, offshore islands and other vulnerable points.

Guns 85 mm, 100 mm, 130 mm

SSM CSS-N-2 (HY-2)

Marines (naval infantry) (some 6 000)

1 brigade
special reconnaissance units

Reserves

On mobilisation to total 8 divisions (24 infantry, 8 tanks, 8 artillery regiments).
(3 army divisions also have an amphibious rôle.)

Equipment

MBT:	T-59
Light tanks:	T-60/-63, PT-76
APC:	Type-531, LVT; some Type-77
Artillery:	how: 122 mm: Type-54 (including -54-1 SP)
MRL:	Type-63

Naval air force (25 000)

Some 894 shore-based combat aircraft, 55 armed helicopters; organised in 3 bomber, 6 fighter divisions including:

Bombers:	some 50 H-6, some H-6D reported with C-601 anti-ship ALCM about 130 H-5 torpedo-carrying light bombers
FGA:	some 100 Q-5
Fighters:	some 600 including J-5/-6/-7
Reconnaissance:	H-5
MR/ASW:	10 ex-Soviet Be-6 Madge, 4 PS-5 (Y-8 mod)
Helicopters:	50 Z-5, 12 SA-321 ASW, 1 Z-9A on trial
Miscellaneous:	some 60 light transport aircraft; JJ-5/-6 training aircraft
ALCM:	FL-1/C-601

Naval fighters are integrated into the national AD system.

Deployment and bases

North Sea Fleet: Coastal defence from Korean border (Yalu River) to south of Lianyungang; equates to Shenyang, Beijing and Jinan Military Regions and seaward. Bases: Quingdao (CinC), Dalian (Luda), Huludao, Weihai, Chengshan. 9 coastal defence districts. Forces: 2 submarine, 3 escort, 1 mine warfare, 1 amphibious squadron; plus Bohai Gulf training flotillas. About 300 patrol and coastal combatants.

East Sea Fleet: Coastal defence from south of Lianyungang to Dongshan; equates to Nanjing Military Region and seaward. Bases: Shanghai (CinC), Wusong, Dinghai, Hangzhou. 7 coastal defence districts. Forces: 2 submarine, 2 escort, 1 mine warfare, 1 amphibious squadron. About 250 patrol and coastal combatants. Marines: 1 cadre division. Coastal defence regional forces: Nanjing, Fuzhou coastal districts.

South Sea Fleet: Coastal defence from Dongshan to Vietnam border; equates to Guangzhou Military Region, and seaward (including Paracels and Spratly Islands). Bases: Zhanjiang (CinC), Shantou, Guangzhou, Haikou, Yulin, Beihai, Huangpu; plus outposts on Paracel and Spratly Islands. 9 coastal defence districts. Forces: 2 submarine, 2 escort, 1 mine warfare, 1 amphibious squadron. About 300 patrol and coastal combatants. Marines: 1 brigade.

*(c) Air force battle order**Manpower*

470 000 (including strategic forces and 220 000 air defence personnel) (160 000 conscripts).

Service period

4 years.

Organisation

7 Military Air Regions, HQ Beijing.

Some 5 000 combat aircraft, no armed helicopters.

Combat element organised in armies of varying numbers of air divisions (each with 3 regiments of 3 squadrons of 3 flights of 4-5 aircraft, 1 maintenance unit, some transport and training aircraft).

Medium

bombers: 120 H-6 (some may be nuclear-capable)
Some carry C-601 msl; some others to be converted to tankers

Light bombers: some 250-300 H-5 (some with C-801 msl)
 FGA: 500 Q-5
 Fighters: 4 000 including 400 J-5, some 60 regiments with about 3 000 J-6/B/D/E, 250 J-7/J-7M, 30 J-8
 Reconnaissance: 130 J-5, 90 JZ-6 (J-6 variant), 40 HZ-5 (H-5 variant) aircraft
 Transport: some 420 including 300 Y-5, 20 Y-7, 20 Y-8, Y-11, Y-12, ex-Soviet Li-2, II-14, II-18 (to be retired), 18 BAe, Trident (2-1E, 16-2E)
 Helicopters: 400 including Z-5/-6, Z-9, Alouette III, SA-321, 4 Bell 214-ST, 6 AS-332, 24 S-70 (serviceability uncertain)
 Trainers: (some OCU) including CJ-5/-6 (mod CJ-5), J-2, JJ-2, JJ-4/-5/-6, HJ-5
 Missiles: AAM: PL-2/-2A, PL-5B Atoll-type, PL-7
 ASM: (anti-ship): C-601, subsonic ALCM (perhaps HY-2 SSM derivative); C-801 surface skimmer
 AA artillery: 16 divisions: 16 000 57 mm, 85 mm and 100 mm guns
 28 independent AD regiments (100 SAM units with HQ-2, -2J (CSA-1), -61 SAM)

Major air bases

Canton, Changsha, Chengchiao, Chienchiao, Fuzhou, Hsincheng, Hungchiao, Kwangchan, Kunming, Liencheng, Lhasa, Luchiao, Nanhai, Nanking, Peking, Pingtang, Shenyang, Sian, Tenghai, Tzaochiao, Wuhan.

Paramilitary (some 12 000 000)

Ministry of Public Security: People's Armed Police (1 830 000).

29 divisions, 1 029 border/mountain/internal defence.


Abbreviations used

AA	anti-aircraft
AD	air defence
AF	stores ship(s) with RAS capability
ALCM	air-launched cruise missile(s)
AO	tanker(s) with RAS capability
AOT	tanker(s) without RAS capability
APC	armoured personnel carrier(s)
AS	submarine depot-ship(s)
ASM	air-to-surface missile(s)
ASTT	anti-submarine TT
ATGW	anti-tank guided weapon(s)
ATK	anti-tank
FGA	fighter(s), ground-attack
GA	Chinese Integrated Group Army
ICBM	intercontinental ballistic missile(s)
IRBM	intermediate-range ballistic missile(s)
LCP	landing craft, personnel
LCT	landing craft, tank
LCVP	landing craft, vehicles and personnel
LCU	landing craft, utility
LSM	landing ship(s), mechanised
LST	landing ship(s), tank
MBT	main battle tank(s)
MCMV	mine counter-measures vessel(s)
MD	Military District(s)
MR	maritime reconnaissance (or motor rifle)
MRBM	medium-range ballistic missile(s)
MRL	multiple rocket launcher(s)
MSC/I/O	mine-sweeper(s), coastal/inshore/offshore
OCU	operational conversion unit(s)
OTHT	over-the-horizon targeting
RAS	replenishment at sea
RCL	recoilless launcher(s)
RL	rocket launcher(s)
SAM	surface-to-air missile(s)
SLBM	submarine-launched ballistic missile(s)
SP	self-propelled
SS	submarine(s)
SSB	ballistic-missile submarine(s)
SSBN	nuclear-fuelled SSB
SSGN	SSN with dedicated non-ballistic missile launchers
SSM	surface-to-surface missile(s)
SSN	nuclear-fuelled submarine(s)
tk	tank(s)
tps	troop(s)
TT	torpedo tube(s)

Reproduced from:

IISS Military Balance 1989-90
Defence and Foreign Affairs Handbook 1987-88

Chinese military regions and districts



APPENDIX/ANNEXE

President and Vice-President of the People's Republic of China
and members of the State Council
(April 1989)

Président et Vice-Président de la République Populaire de Chine
et Membres du Conseil des Affaires d'État
(Avril 1989)

国家主席 Président de la République President	杨 尚昆 YANG SHANGKUN
国家副主席 Vice-Président de la République Vice-President	王 震 WANG ZHEN
* * * *	
国务院总理 Premier Ministre Premier of the State Council	李 鹏 LI PENG
副总理 Vice-Premier Ministre Vice-Premier of the State Council	姚 依林 YAO YILIN
副总理 Vice-Premier Ministre Vice-Premier of the State Council	田 纪云 TIAN JIYUN
副总理 Vice-Premier Ministre Vice-Premier of the State Council	吴 学谦 XU XUEQIAN
国务委员 Conseiller d'État State Councillor, State Council	李 铁映 LI TIEYING

秦 基 伟 王 丙 乾
QIN JIWEI, WANG BINGQIAN

宋 健 王 芳
SONG JIAN, WANG FANG

邹 家 华 李 贵 鲜
ZOU JIAHUA, LI GUIXIAN

陈 希 同 陈 俊 生
CHEN XITONG, CHEN JUNSHENG

国务院秘书长 Secrétaire Général du Conseil des Affaires d'État Secretary-General	陈 俊 生 CHEN JUNSHENG (cumul)
外交部部长 Ministre des Affaires Étrangères Minister for Foreign Affairs	钱 其 琛 QIAN QICHEN
国防部部长 Ministre de la Défense Nationale Minister of National Defence	秦 基 伟 QIN JIWEI (cumul)
国家科学技术委员会主任 Président de la Commission d'État pour les Sciences et les Techniques Minister in charge of State Scientific and Technical Commission	宋 健 SONG JIAN (cumul)
国家科学技术工业委员会主任 Président de la Commission Scientifique, Technique et Industrielle pour la Défense Nationale Minister in charge of National Defence Scientific, Technical and Industry Com- mission	丁 衡 高 DING HENGGAO
航空航天工业部部长 Ministre des Industries Aéronautique et Spatiale Minister of Aeronautics	林 宗 棠 LIN ZONGTANG
对外经济贸易部部长 Ministre des Relations Économiques et Commerciales avec l'Étranger Minister of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade	郑 拓 彬 ZHENG TUBIN
物资部部长 Ministre du Matériel Minister of Equipment	柳 随 年 LIU SUINIAN

*Western European security: defence implications
of the People's Republic of China's
evolving geopolitical situation*

AMENDMENT 1 ¹

tabled by Mr. Pontillon and others

1. At the end of paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, add “ in accordance with the objectives fixed at the time of the Paris conference in August 1989 ”.

Signed: Pontillon, Bassinet, Stoffelen

1. See 12th sitting, 7th December 1989 (amendment agreed to).

*Western European security: defence implications
of the People's Republic of China's
evolving geopolitical situation*

AMENDMENTS 2, 3 and 4¹

tabled by Mr. Bindig and others

2. At the end of paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert “ and pointing out that all member states of the United Nations, by their membership of that organisation, have solemnly committed themselves before the international community to respect in the conduct of their internal affairs the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ”.
 3. Leave out paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert the following new paragraph:
“ (iv) Considering that the essential aim of the Chinese Government to promote the country's economic and social development can be achieved only if civil and political rights are developed to the same extent; ”
 4. At the beginning of the draft recommendation proper, insert the following new paragraph:
“ 1. Request the Chinese Government to accede to the two Human Rights Covenants of the United Nations, i.e. the International Covenant on Civic and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; ”
- and renumber the following paragraphs accordingly.

Signed: Bindig, Stoffelen, Tummers, Antretter, Soell, Blunck, Pfuhl

1. See 12th sitting, 7th December 1989 (amendments 2 and 4 agreed to; amendment 3 negatived).

***Force comparisons (NATO and Warsaw Pact military potential)
– reply to the annual report of the Council***

REPORT ¹

***submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments ²
by Mr. Steiner, Rapporteur***

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1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Sir Dudley Smith (Chairman); MM. Fourré, de Beer (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Alloncle, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, MM. Bassinet, Cariglia, Cox (Alternate: Sir Russell Johnston), De Decker (Alternate: Cauwenberghs), Derycke, Ewing (Alternate: Lord Newall), Fiandrotti (Alternate: Mezzapesa), Fillon, Fioret (Alternate: Fassino), Irmer, Jung, Kittelmann, Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, MM. Maris, Pecchioli, Scheer, Sinesio, Speed, Steiner, Steverlyncck (Alternate: Uyttendaele), Sir John Stokes, Mr. Zierer.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

- (a) Strategic nuclear weapons – the will to negotiate since Reykjavik
 - (b) INF – state of the INF treaty
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APPENDICES

- I. Strengths of Warsaw Pact and NATO armed forces on 1st July 1988
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Rapporteur's Preface

In preparation for this report, *the Rapporteur* had interviews as follows:

Washington, 24th February 1989

General Brent Scowcroft, National Security Council;
Senator Sam Nunn, Chairman Senate Armed Forces Committee.

Brussels (NATO Headquarters), 14th March 1989

Ambassador Niels Hansen, Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany;
Ambassador Henning Wegener, Assistant Secretary-General, Political Affairs;
Mr. M. Mattingley, Assistant Secretary-General, Defence Support, Chairman, Conference of National Armaments Directors;
Mr. Holger Pfeiffer, Deputy Assistant Secretary-General and Director for Force Planning;
Colonel W. Meyer, Plans and Policy, International Military Staff;
Colonel K. Meletzki, Intelligence, International Military Staff.

London (International Institute for Strategic Studies), 3rd April 1989

Colonel John Cross, Deputy Director;
Colonel Andrew Duncan, Assistant Director for Information.

*Stockholm (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute – SIPRI),
12th and 13th September 1989*

Dr. Walther Stützle, Director (FRG);
Mr. Andreas Fürst (FRG);
Dr. Richard Kokoski (Canada);
Dr. Axel Krohn (FRG);
Dr. Adam Rotfeld (Poland);
Mrs. Jane Sharp (United Kingdom);
Dr. Thomas Stock (GDR);
Dr. Herbert Wulk (FRG).

The committee as a whole held meetings and was briefed as follows:

Paris, 6th February 1989

Mr. Jean-Pierre Chevènement, Minister of Defence.

London, 4th April 1989

Sir Geoffrey Howe, MP, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; The Rt. Hon. George Younger, MP, Secretary of State for Defence.

Bonn, 25th and 26th April 1989

Dr. Gerhard Stoltenberg, Federal Minister of Defence;
Mr. Helmut Schäfer, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs;
Mr. Willy Wimmer, Parliamentary State Secretary;
Mr. Alfred Biehle, Chairman of the Parliamentary Defence Committee;
Lt. Gen. Jörg Schönbohm, Head of the Planning Staff, Ministry of Defence;
Captain Wolfgang Engelmann, Armed Forces Staff.

Paris, 12th July 1989

A delegation from the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union:

Mr. Vladimir Kravets, Vice-President of the Committee for International Affairs of the Supreme Soviet; Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Ukraine;

Mr. Oleg Bogomolov, Member of the Committee for Economic Reform; Director of the Economics Institute of the World Socialist System, Soviet Academy of Sciences;

Mr. Fedor Bourlatski, Chairman of the Sub-Committee for Humanitarian and Cultural Relations of the Committee for International Affairs; Vice-President of the Soviet Association of Political Sciences;

General Vladimir Lobov, First Deputy Commander of the unified forces of the Warsaw Pact; Member of the Committee for International Affairs of the Supreme Soviet.

Vienna, 2nd and 3rd October 1989

Heads of Delegations to the CFE and CSBM talks:

Their Excellencies Ambassadors Gleissner (Austria); Grinievsky (USSR); Konarski (Poland); Coene (Belgium); Plaisant (France); Hartmann (FRG – CFE); Joetze (FRG – CSBM); Pucci di Benisichi (Italy – CFE); Traxler (Italy – CSBM); Reuter (Luxembourg); Meesman (Netherlands); Queiroz de Barros (Portugal); Sangil (Spain); Edes (United Kingdom); Ledogar (United States).

Brussels (Ministry of Defence), 17th October 1989

General Charlier, Chief of the General Staff;

Colonel Stainier, Head of Allied Relations;

Colonel Pioge, Head Plans and Programmes.

Mons (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe), 18th October 1989

General Sir John Akehurst (United Kingdom), Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Europe;

General John A. Shaud (United States), Chief-of-Staff;

Minister-Counsellor Don Gelber (United States), Special Assistant for International Affairs;

Vice-Admiral Fiorenzo Rosso (Italy), Deputy Chief-of-Staff, Support;

Air-Vice Marshal Anthony Woodford, RAF (United Kingdom), Assistant Chief-of-Staff, Policy;

Colonel Graham Messervy-Whiting (United Kingdom), SB/COFS;

Group Captain Johnston, RAF (United Kingdom), Policy Division.

Brussels (NATO Headquarters), 19th October 1989

Mr. Manfred Wörner (FRG), Secretary-General;

Mr. W. Robert Pearson (United States), Deputy Assistant Secretary-General and Director, Political Directorate;

Mr. W.A. Young, Director of Information;

Mr. Y. Buluc (Turkey), Head Plans and Policy Section;

Admiral Sir Patrick Symons (United Kingdom), Saclant Representative Europe/CinChan Representative;

Mr. Christopher Donnelly (United Kingdom), Sovietologist in Residence.

The committee and the Rapporteur extend their thanks to those ministers, ambassadors, officials and senior officers who met the Rapporteur or committee and replied to questions.

The opinions expressed in the report, unless otherwise attributed, are those of the committee.

Draft Recommendation

*on force comparisons (NATO and Warsaw Pact military potential) –
reply to the annual report of the Council*

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting that the signing of the INF treaty in 1987 brought about a change in East-West relations, particularly in regard to the arms limitation process, which encourages the adoption of further disarmament measures;
- (ii) Welcoming the fact that the INF agreement generally improved the East-West atmosphere, thus making a decisive contribution to establishing confidence between the great powers;
- (iii) Aware that this agreement provides, in the form of inspections, for the most searching and extensive verification measures that have ever existed and that experience thus gained might make a valuable contribution to the conclusion of future agreements on other types of armaments;
- (iv) Considering that it is essential for the arms limitation and disarmament process to be continued step by step in Europe and worldwide;
- (v) Considering that the dynamism generated by the INF treaty should be exploited with determination to achieve the control of armaments and further reductions;
- (vi) Stressing the special responsibility of the United States and the Soviet Union in the conclusion of a convention on a global ban on chemical weapons and of a START agreement providing for a 50% reduction in strategic nuclear weapons;
- (vii) Welcoming the announcement by Secretary-General Gorbachev in his speech to the United Nations General Assembly on 7th December 1988 that unilateral arms reductions would be made, subsequent to which the other Warsaw Pact countries (with the exception of Romania) also announced that they would unilaterally reduce forces and arms in the next two years;
- (viii) Endorsing unreservedly President Bush's disarmament initiative at the NATO summit meeting in Brussels on 29th May 1989 which is likely to lead to decisive progress in the conventional disarmament process;
- (ix) Supporting in particular the inclusion of combat aircraft and helicopters in the first series of negotiations on conventional disarmament and the West's offer to reduce troop levels significantly;
- (x) Considering that the series of proposals made by the NATO member countries in Vienna on 22nd September 1989, completing important aspects of the western proposals of 13th July 1989, is particularly likely to foster the establishment of a peaceful order in Europe based on mutual confidence and joint security;
- (xi) Concerned that the problem of short-range (less than 500 km) missiles, particularly important for Western Europe because of the deployment, range and numerical superiority of Soviet missiles, is not yet the subject of negotiations;
- (xii) Considering that the WEU member countries' security interests can be defended only in the framework of the North Atlantic Alliance but that in future they must be harmonised more consistently;
- (xiii) Welcoming the French Prime Minister's proposal of 7th September 1989 that WEU should start a specific programme of immediate co-operation with regard to verification and disarmament;
- (xiv) Pleased that the Council in its reply to Recommendation 470 is considering a WEU contribution to the CFE verification system, emphasising "the exploitation of European capabilities and the pooling of member states' assets",

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Strongly insist on a change in the alliance's priorities as defined by the NATO ministers for foreign affairs in Reykjavik in June 1987, i.e. in particular:
 - (a) a 50% reduction in strategic nuclear weapons;
 - (b) a worldwide ban on chemical weapons;

- (c) the establishment of a stable global conventional balance through the elimination of inequalities and reductions in troop levels and arms;
- (d) significant, verifiable reductions in United States and Soviet shorter-range land-based nuclear forces;

and to act in this manner whenever possible;

2. Take up the proposal made by the French Prime Minister on 7th September 1989 and prepare a WEU programme for purposeful verification and disarmament co-operation;
3. Take appropriate initiatives to exert pressure for results to be achieved quickly in the CFE negotiations so as to allow the immediate resumption of the SNF negotiations;
4. Work out here and now the prior conditions necessary in the conceptual field for SNF negotiations to be resumed without delay after the implementation of the first CFE agreement;
5. In the framework of the CFE negotiations, take steps to obtain a verified halt in the production of new generations of conventional weapons;
6. In view of the favourable progress in the CFE negotiations, endeavour to halt the development and stationing of new nuclear weapons in Europe;
7. Seek at least a verified ban on chemical weapons in Europe if the agreement proposed by President Bush at the United Nations General Assembly on 25th September 1989 on the conclusion of an international treaty banning chemical weapons is not concluded by 1990.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Steiner, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. When, ten years ago, the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, adopted its report on "The balance of force" (Rapporteur Mr. Pawelczyk)¹, the most perspicacious of commentators would have had enormous difficulty in predicting today's situation of staggering change. The INF treaty signed and well on its way to full implementation; the United States contemplating reducing its presence in Western Europe; the Soviet Union announcing its own unilateral and apparently massive reductions in tanks and troops in Eastern Europe; talk of the reunification of Germany unabated by well over forty years of division; a non-communist Prime Minister in Poland; ethnic turmoil in the Soviet Union and calls for the self-determination of the Baltic states (a reference to which, incidentally, led to the rejection of the committee's last report on threat assessment², only 18 months ago).

2. Each and every one of us is able to compile his or her own list of the major changes in the political circumstances which affect defence and security here in Europe. We place our nuances depending on our own stances and the points we wish to make and it is obvious that such selection is particularly subjective. Nobody would expect anything else from politicians.

3. In 1979, Mr. Pawelczyk's report on the balance of force led to the Assembly adopting Recommendation 336. The preamble began:

"Aware that different political assumptions used in interpreting information can lead to widely differing assessments of adversary capabilities and of the balance of force;"

and recommended that the Council:

"urge member governments:

To take account of both Soviet and western perceptions of objectives, military capabilities and resulting threats, and to reject worst-case analysis as the only basis of assessment;"

4. Since 1979, fortunately, there has indeed been a tendency to "reject worst-case analysis" and as a result there is now a much greater and closer consensus in western and eastern analyses than hitherto. Indeed, within the last year has

come the first "official" Warsaw Pact analysis of force comparisons with which to confront evolving western studies.

5. The aim of the present report, therefore, is to bring together the various strands in an attempt to arrive at a synthesis which will help the Assembly determine the various recommendations to the Council and member governments and, in turn, aid the process of arms control. Your Rapporteur has had little difficulty in fulfilling his terms of reference to "take account of new information available from both western and Soviet sources" and the committee as a whole, in its meeting in Vienna as recently as October, at the height of the discussions concerning conventional armaments, has had ample opportunity to follow progress in the CFE talks at first hand. In addition, recent contacts with Soviet parliamentarians and arms control negotiators have provided occasions both to hear their points of view and to express directly our own preoccupations as Western Europeans.

II. Force comparisons: quantity/quality

(i) Conventional forces

6. To obtain the most up-to-date picture possible, both older editions and, in particular, the latest editions of IISS's "The military balance (1989-1990)", the British defence white paper (1988 and 1989) and the Pentagon pamphlet entitled "Soviet military power" (1989) have been consulted for this comparative analysis. The NATO force comparison of 1984, the update published by the German Defence Ministry in 1987 (SKV 87) and the comparison of conventional forces undertaken by NATO in November 1988 have also been considered.

7. The range of figures obtained from the available sources itself indicates the difficulty of taking stock of data which is entirely quantitative and which originates almost solely from the western defence community. To gain an impression of how the two military blocs assess each other, the abovementioned western sources are compared with eastern figures on conventional forces never previously published on this scale. Particular mention must be made in this context of the Warsaw Pact's force comparison of January 1989 published by the Novosti Press Agency publishing house in Moscow and entitled "Warsaw Treaty Organisation and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation: correlation of forces in Europe". Reference is also made to an article by the Soviet Army General Yasov,

1. Document 809, 22nd May 1979.

2. Document 1115 revised, 11th April 1988 - Rapporteur: the then Mr. Stokes.

USSR Minister of Defence, which appeared in "Neues Deutschland" on 10th February 1988, as well as to more recent pronouncements.

8. It will be seen that the assessments by the two sides differ, substantially in some cases. This inevitably results in divergent perceptions of the threat. This must be emphasised because it shows how important the adoption of simple common units of calculation is for military and political decisions to be taken. These classification problems arise primarily from the differences of degree in assessing the various compo-

nents of the branches of the armed services, which are either overrated or underrated in the sources, depending on information available or political objectives. Consequently, like is not always compared with like in the analyses. This problem will therefore be considered separately at particularly obvious junctures in the following discussion of the figures. To shed light on the different analyses in East and West, statistical averages, which are not significant in themselves, are given for the western sources. All the abovementioned sources are listed in the following tables, beginning with ground forces.

TABLE 1

	Personnel		Battle tanks		MICVs	
	Millions NATO: WP	PC ¹	Thousands NATO: WP	PC	Thousands NATO: WP	PC
Yasov	3.0 :3.0	1:1	WP 20 more	-	-	-
WP 89	2.11:1.82	1.2:1	30.6:59.4	1:1.9	46.9: 70.3	1:1.5
NATO 84	2.60:4.00	1:1.5	13.5:26.9	1:2.2	39.5: 94.8	1:1.4
SKV 87	2.80:4.00	1:1.4	17.8:32.2	1:1.8	46.2:129.9	1:2.8
NATO 88	2.21:3.09	1.1.3	16.4:51.5	1:3.1	39.5: 93.4	1:2.4
IISS 86/87	1.86:2.70	1:1.4	20.3:46.6	1:2.3	-	-
IISS 87/88	2.38:2.29 ²	1:0.9	22.2:52.2	1:2.4	-	-
IISS 88/89	3.19:2.74	1:0.9	33.6:68.9	1:2.1	-	-
UK-WP 87	2.40:4.10	1:1.7	15.2:50.9	1:3.3	-	-
UK-WP 88	-	-	11.5:28.9	1:2.5	-	-
US-SMP 87	-	-	19.6:32.0	1:1.6	-	-
US-SMP 88	-	-	21.1:32.4	1:1.5	-	-
US-SMP 89	-	-	16.4:51.5	1:3.1	-	-
Average of western PCs		1:1.35		1:2.31		1:2.2

1. Power comparison.

2. Fully strengthened forces.

(a) Ground forces

9. In a force comparison published in "Neues Deutschland" on 10th February 1988, the Soviet Defence Minister Army General Dimitri Timofeyevich Yasov puts the Warsaw Pact's superiority in tanks at 20 000 - without, however, giving any comparative figures. Precise figures are included in the force comparison published by the Warsaw Pact in January 1989: NATO 30 690 battle tanks, Warsaw Pact 59 470 (equivalent to a ratio of 1:1.9).

10. This comparison of figures, the first to be published by the Warsaw Pact and undertaken in view of the Vienna negotiations on conven-

tional arms control, also includes the following figures on ground forces: NATO 2 115 360 soldiers (including airborne troops and air force personnel), Warsaw Pact 1 823 500 (1.2:1). The various figures do not allow for the unilateral disarmament measures in this area announced by the Warsaw Pact. Details of these measures are based on publicly accessible sources. It should also be pointed out that the assessment criteria differ from those normally used by NATO (see "Explanations" on the Warsaw Pact's 1989 force comparison in Appendix I), this being true for all figures obtained from these statistics.

11. In contrast, the previously mentioned western sources contain the following compar-

TABLE 2

	Artillery		Armed helicopters		Anti-tank missile systems	
	Millions NATO: WP	PC	Millions NATO: WP	PC	Millions NATO: WP	PC
Yasov	—	1:1	—	1.5:1	—	2:1
WP 89	57.0:71.5 ^a	1:1.2	5 270:2 785 ^b	1:1.9	18.0:11.4	1.6:1
NATO 84	11.0:19.9 ^c	1:1.8	560:1 135 ^d	1:2.0	12.3:18.4	1:1.5
SKV 87	14.3:26.9 ^c	1:1.9	680:2 265	1:3.3	13.3:23.6	1:1.8
NATO 88	14.4:43.4	1:3	2 419:3 700 ^e	1:1.5	18.2:44.2	1:2.4
IISS 86/87	9.0:24.4 ^f	1:2.6	714:2 085	1:2.9	1.8: 3.5 ^g	1:1.9
IISS 87/88	11.1:37.0 ^h	1:3.3	780:1 630 ⁱ	1:2.1	10.1:16.6 ^k	1:1.6
IISS 88/89	17.0:48.7	1:2.8	3 208:2 105 ⁱ	1:0.7	28.3:22.4	1:0.8
UK-WP 87	8.6:36.2	1:4.2	—	—	—	—
UK-WP 88	6.5:32.5	1:5	—	—	—	—
US-SMP 87	—	—	650: 960 ^m	1:1.5	13.4:18.0	1:1.3
US-SMP 88	15.3:23.8 ^c	1:1.5	600:1 000 ^m	1:1.7	13.2:20.1	1:1.5
US-SMP 89	14.6:43.4	1:3.0	2 419:3 700	1:1.5	—	—
Average of western PCs		1:2.60		1:1.82		1:1.48

a: missile launchers, cannon 75 mm and above, mortars 50 mm and above; *b:* including navy; *c:* artillery pieces and mortars over 100 mm, including multiple rocket launchers; *d:* attack helicopters, including transport helicopters which can be used for offensive purposes; *e:* total number; *f:* artillery and multiple rocket launchers; *g:* only those mounted on MICVs and helicopters; *h:* artillery, multiple rocket launchers and anti-tank cannon; *i:* all for close air support, including anti-tank; *k:* only land-based; *l:* all armed helicopters; *m:* excluding all transport helicopters.

ative figures (unless otherwise stated, only forces in being are considered): the most favourable estimate of battle tank numbers for NATO is to be found in "Soviet military power" (1989) (NATO 16 400, Warsaw Pact 51 500 = 1:3.1), the least favourable in the British 1987 white paper, which refers to a ratio of 1:3.3 (NATO 15 200, Warsaw Pact 50 900). All available western sources produce a statistical average of 1:2.31 (NATO: Warsaw Pact) for battle tanks, the latest Soviet comparison based on the above figures, on the other hand, referring to a ratio of 1:1.9 (NATO: Warsaw Pact).

12. In its 1987/88 comparison, the IISS believes ground forces in 1987/88 to have been fairly balanced at 2 380 000 and 2 290 000 (NATO: Warsaw Pact), equivalent to a ratio of 1:0.9. It should be remembered in this context that the Warsaw Pact figure would rise by about 500 000 to 700 000 if border troops and security and paramilitary forces were included. The least balanced assessment is again made in the 1987 British white paper, which refers to a ratio of 1:1.7 (NATO: Warsaw Pact), equivalent in absolute terms to 2 400 000 and 4 100 000 soldiers respectively. The statistical average of

assessments in western force comparisons is a ratio of 1:1.35 (NATO: Warsaw Pact).

13. If only NATO and only Warsaw Pact ground force figures are compared, the Warsaw Pact calculates that it has 500 000 more ground force troops itself and that NATO has 1.4 million more. The Warsaw Pact's force comparison thus again refers to equality of troop numbers, whereas NATO clearly believes the Warsaw Pact to be far superior in this respect. This first example already demonstrates how necessary a differentiated explanatory definition of the criteria is if any worthwhile comparison of the figures is to be possible.

14. The ratio of MICVs (including other armoured vehicles) — only the NATO and Warsaw Pact comparisons are used since they alone make similar classifications and contain corresponding figures — is put by NATO in its comparison of November 1988 at 1:2.4 (NATO: Warsaw Pact), equivalent in absolute terms to 39 504 and 93 400 respectively (fully strengthened forces). This figure also roughly reflects the average of NATO's 1984 comparisons and its extrapolation by the Federal German Defence Ministry in 1987.

15. In its force comparison of January 1989, on the other hand, the Warsaw Pact presents far lower figures for its own forces: 70 330 as against NATO's 46 900, equivalent to a ratio of 1:1.5 (NATO: Warsaw Pact). The MICV category again reveals the problem of differentiating criteria: NATO makes a distinction – quoting its own figures in each case – between “MICVs” and “Other armoured vehicles”, whereas the Warsaw Pact combines these two categories under one heading (“Armoured infantry vehicles and MICVs”) and gives only one figure.

16. Where artillery is concerned, Yasov quotes a ratio of 1:1, again without any absolute figures. According to the latest comparison published by the Soviet Union in January 1989, NATO has 57 060 artillery weapons and the Warsaw Pact 71 560, equivalent to a ratio of 1:1.2. It must be pointed out, however, that the Warsaw Pact includes anti-tank cannon in its own figures and lists only anti-tank missile systems (see below) separately.

17. Western force comparisons estimate the ratio in the case of artillery (over 100 mm and including multiple rocket launchers) as follows: the most favourable recent assessment is made by “Soviet military power 1989”, which puts the absolute figures at 14 600 and 43 400 (NATO: Warsaw Pact), equivalent to a ratio of 1:3, the least favourable, at 1:5 (NATO: Warsaw Pact) equivalent to 6 500 and 32 500 pieces respectively, by the 1988 British white paper. The statistical average of assessments in western sources is a ratio of 1:2.6 (NATO: Warsaw Pact).

18. However, the figures on NATO and Warsaw Pact artillery are again, strictly speaking, of no value. In the West, as implied above, artillery pieces are counted upwards of a calibre of 100 mm and shown as such, whereas the Warsaw Pact adopts a wider base by classifying cannon of 75 mm and above and mortars of 50 mm and above as artillery.

19. In the force comparison it published in January 1989, the Warsaw Pact maintains that it has 2 785 armed helicopters and NATO 5 270 (including the naval helicopters in both cases), equivalent to a ratio of 1:1.9 (Warsaw Pact: NATO), whereas Yasov had previously referred to a ratio of 1:1.5 (Warsaw Pact: NATO).

20. The most recent western source, the IISS's “The military balance 1988/89”, again gives NATO superiority in armed helicopters, at a ratio of 1:0.7 (equivalent to 3 208 and 2 105 in absolute terms). A far less favourable recent assessment is the 1:1.5 shown in “Soviet military power 1989”, this being equivalent to 2 419 and 3 700 armed helicopters (excluding transport helicopters) for NATO and the Warsaw Pact respectively. The statistical

average of the figures contained in western sources is 1:1.82 (NATO: Warsaw Pact).

21. The situation as regards the final element of ground forces, anti-tank missile systems, may be described as follows: while Yasov puts the ratio at 2:1 (NATO: Warsaw Pact) without quoting numbers, the Soviet comparison of January 1989 gives a ratio of 1.6:1 (NATO: Warsaw Pact), equivalent in absolute terms to 18 070 and 11 465 respectively.

22. Western force comparisons arrive at almost the opposite ratio. The IISS's “The military balance 1988/1989”, gives the most favourable ratio, 1:0.8 (NATO: Warsaw Pact), the NATO comparison of November 1988 the least favourable, 1:2.4 (NATO: Warsaw Pact). The statistical average of the ratios calculated by western force comparisons is 1:1.48 (NATO: Warsaw Pact). The data obtained from the various sources on the air and naval forces discussed below are shown in Table 3.

(b) Air forces

23. In his abovementioned article, Yasov contends that NATO has 1 400 more combat aircraft than the Warsaw Pact, without otherwise quoting any absolute figures. In their force comparison published in January 1989 the Warsaw Pact commits itself to more specific figures. According to this source, NATO has 7 130 tactical combat aircraft, the Warsaw Pact 7 876, of which 4 075 and 2 783 respectively are attack aircraft. This gives a combat aircraft ratio of 1:1.1 (NATO: Warsaw Pact).

24. Western sources, on the other hand, contain the following figures: at 2 245 and 2 380, the most balanced assessment of attack aircraft is that made in the Federal Defence Ministry's 1987 force comparison, this being equivalent to a ratio of 1:1.1 (NATO: Warsaw Pact). “The military balance 1987-1988” contains similar figures. The least favourable analysis for NATO in the latest sources is the NATO comparison of November 1988, which puts the ratio at 1:2.1 (NATO: Warsaw Pact), equivalent to 3 977 and 8 250 in absolute terms. The statistical average of the ratios calculated in western comparisons is 1:1.65. However, the wide variation of the figures because of the different criteria adopted must be borne in mind.

25. The Warsaw Pact again makes no mention of the criteria it applies for designating combat aircraft. It also includes naval attack aircraft in the total figure for such aircraft, although the mandate for the CFE negotiations, for example, requires that these systems be omitted.

TABLE 3

	Combat aircraft		Large surface vessels		Submarines	
	Number NATO: WP	PC	Number NATO: WP	PC	Number NATO: WP	PC
Yasov	NATO 1 400 more		—	3:1	—	—
WP 89	7 130:7 876	1:1.1	499:102 ^b	5:1	200:228 ^r	1:1.1
NATO 84	2 990:7 430 ^c	1:2.5	301:214	1:0.7	197:246	1:1.2
SKV 87	2 245:2 380	1:1.1	403:226	1:0.6	208:249	1:1.2
NATO 88	3 977:8 250	1:2.1	—	—	—	—
IISS 86/87	3 243:5 299 ^c	1:1.6	321:127	1:0.4	—	—
IISS 87/88	2 393:2 594 ^d	1:1.1	360:128	1:0.4	196:231	1:1.2
IISS 88/89	8 245:9 955	1:1.2	503:297	1:0.6	241:271	1:1.1
UK-WP 87	3 300:7 700 ^c	1:2.3	310:230	1:0.7	170:215	1:1.3
UK-WP 88	6 750:9 400	1:1.4	—	—	—	—
US-SMP 87	3 260:6 310 ^c	1:1.9	343:227	1:0.7	171:214 ^r	1:1.3
US-SMP 88	2 200:3 000	1:1.4	343:227	1:0.7	171:214 ^r	1:1.3
US-SMP 89	3 977:8 250	1:2.1	—	—	—	—
Average of western PCs		1:1.65		1:0.68		1:1.21

a: battleships, cruisers, destroyers, missile frigates, including aircraft carriers; b: including landing craft; c: including fighter aircraft in offensive (subsidiary) rôles; d: bombers and attack aircraft; e: tactical combat aircraft and fighters; f: excluding submarines carrying ballistic missiles.

(c) Naval forces

26. While Yasov arrived at a ratio of 3:1 in NATO's favour in the case of large surface vessels (including aircraft carriers) in his article, it is put at 5:1 (NATO: Warsaw Pact), including the landing craft listed separately in NATO's comparisons, by the Warsaw Pact in its force comparison of January 1989.

27. Although the West similarly refers to its own superiority in this area, the ratios are not so extreme. The lowest, 1:0.4 (NATO: Warsaw Pact), equivalent to 360 and 128 respectively, is given by IISS in "The military balance 1987-1988". A far more balanced assessment, a ratio of 1:0.7 equivalent to 343 and 227 (NATO: Warsaw Pact), is made by the latest source, "Soviet military power 1988". The statistical average of the ratios given in western force comparisons is 1:0.68 in favour of NATO, whose own figures are roughly the same.

28. In the case of submarines, the Warsaw Pact again puts the ratio at 1:1.1 (NATO: Warsaw Pact), equivalent to 200 and 228 respectively (excluding submarines carrying ballistic missiles), in its force comparison of January 1989. The western ratios give a statistical average of 1:1.21 (NATO: Warsaw Pact) and are almost all close to this ratio.

(d) Regional considerations

29. Given their specific military-geographical position in Europe's central region, the conventional forces of the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands (NATO) and the GDR, Czechoslovakia and Poland (Warsaw Pact) are considered separately on the basis of a study published by Senator Carl Levin in 1988 ("Beyond the bean count. Realistically assessing the conventional military balance in Europe").

30. According to Levin, who refers to some of the abovementioned sources in coming to his conclusions, NATO has 12 700 battle tanks, the Warsaw Pact 18 000, equivalent to a ratio of 0.7:1. The figures for MICVs are 3 400 and 8 000, giving a ratio of 0.4:1 (NATO: Warsaw Pact). NATO's 3 600 artillery pieces compare with the Warsaw Pact's 9 500 (0.4:1). The figures for mortars (120 mm and above) are closer: 1 200 for NATO and 2 200 for the Warsaw Pact (0.5:1). NATO has, at 6 500, more land-based anti-tank missiles than the Warsaw Pact (4 500), the ratio being 1.4:1 (NATO: Warsaw Pact). The absolute figures for the armed helicopter category are, at 550 and 430, again in favour of NATO (1.3:1), which has also superiority in air forces. In this region, NATO

has 901 attack aircraft, the Warsaw Pact only 799 (1.1:1).

31. In the militarily particularly sensitive central region along the line dividing the two blocs, the Warsaw Pact's superiority is less pronounced than in the case of total forces from the Atlantic to the Urals, and in three categories NATO is in fact superior.

(ii) *Chemical weapons*

32. As very little information is available, it is difficult to assess the ratio of NATO to the Warsaw Pact in the realm of chemical weapons. Freely accessible sources do at least enable estimates to be made of the United States' stocks of chemical weapons in NATO, but no reliable data is available on the USSR's stocks. The SIPRI Yearbook of 1989 quotes the following figures:

33. In NATO's case, France is estimated to have "several hundred tons" of chemical weapons³. The United States has over 30 000 tons, of which up to 7% are said to be stored in the Federal Republic (435 tons) and on the Johnston Atoll in the Pacific (1 610 tons).

3. Rapporteur's note: if true, this would be totally contrary to both the spirit and the letter of the modified Brussels Treaty and at variance with the solemn annual declarations to the Council of Western European Union.

34. Within the Warsaw Pact, the USSR is estimated to have over 50 000 tons of active ingredients. It is impossible to assess how these ingredients are distributed within the Warsaw Pact. The United States has declared definitely that it will start to withdraw the chemical weapons stored in the Federal Republic in 1990 without replacing them and that it will destroy these weapons on the Johnston Atoll, 1 000 km south-west of Hawaii.

35. Apart from data of which one is sure, the following points are no longer contested in the alliance.

36. There is no longer any possible justification for chemical weapons. They have no political effect, i.e. they cannot help to maintain peace and therefore have no strategic rôle to play. The superpowers keep them in their arsenals because other states have them and it has proved particularly complicated to eliminate them. When in the hands of smaller countries, they may even endanger peace because they are not very expensive and are relatively easy to manufacture. The war between Iran and Iraq proved this in no uncertain manner. The negotiations on banning chemical weapons have been under way for more than twenty years and, whereas the superpowers have agreed on certain parts of an agreement, not all the verification problems have been settled. President Bush's

TABLE 4
The United States' INF potential in the 500 to 5 500 km range

	FRG deployed	United Kingdom deployed	Netherlands deployed	Belgium deployed	Italy deployed	Europe total deployed	USA not deployed	Total	
								Launchers	Missiles
P II									
- launchers .	108 (7/-)					108 (7/-)	51	166	
- missiles ..	108 (12/12)					108 (12/12)	115		247
GLCM									
- launchers .	12 (9/-)	30 (5/-)	-	4 (8/-)	24 (7/-)	70 (29/-)	17	116	
- missiles ..	48 (14/-)	114 (5/-)	-	16 (4/16)	96 (12/-)	274 (35/16)	117		442
IRM									
- launchers .	120 (16/-)	30 (5/-)	-	4 (8/-)	24 (7/-)	178 (36/-)	68	282	
- missiles ..	156 (26/12)	114 (5/-)	-	16 (4/16)	96 (12/-)	382 (47/28)	232		689
SRM: PIA									
- launchers .						0	1	1	
- missiles ..						0	178		178

1. Figures in accordance with the memorandum of understanding relating to the INF treaty; the corrigendum of 15th January 1988 has been taken into account.

2. IRM (= Intermediate-Range Missile): the treaty defines these as missiles with a range of 1 000 to 5 500 km. The terms "IRM" and "LRINF missile" are identical in substance. LRINF (Longer-Range Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces), SRM (Shorter-Range Missile): missiles with a range of 500 to 1 000 km, i.e. partial potential of the SRINF (Shorter-Range Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces), which comprise weapon systems with a range of 150 to 1 000 km.

3. Figures in parentheses: additional maintenance equipment with a distinction made, in compliance with treaty terminology, between "deployed" and "not deployed".

4. Of the United Kingdom's GLCM potential, 6 launchers and 18 missiles have been notified as "non-operational".

speech at the United Nations on 25th September 1989 gave fresh hope. He proposed signing a treaty with the Soviet Union on banning chemical weapons and eliminating them within ten years.

37. President Bush's proposal was hinged on three points:

- (i) Within eight years after the agreement is signed, the United States proposes to destroy 98% of its stocks of chemical weapons if the Soviet Union agrees to do likewise.

(ii) All remaining chemical weapons will have to be eliminated within ten years of the signing of the agreement by all states having such weapons.

(iii) The United States is prepared to proceed immediately with the elimination of 80% of its stocks on condition the Soviet Union does likewise and verification is guaranteed.

It remains to be seen whether President Bush's proposals will help to overcome verification problems. An agreement banning chemical weapons is long overdue.

TABLE 5

The USSR's potential in the 500-5 500 km range

Type	GDR		Czechoslovakia		Soviet Union (Europe)		Europe (Total)		Soviet Union (Asia)		Total	
	deployed	not deployed	deployed	not deployed	deployed	not deployed	deployed	not deployed	deployed	not deployed	launchers	missiles
SS-20												
- launchers					243	113	243	113	162	5	523	
- missiles					243	240	243	240	162	5		650
SS-4												
- launchers					79	6	79	6			85	
- missiles					65	105	65	105				170
SS-5												
- launchers											0	
- missiles						6		6				6
IRM												
Total												
- launchers					322	119	322	119	162	5	608	
- missiles					308	351	308	351	162	5		826
SS-12												
- launchers	34		24		5	20	63	20	52		135	
- missiles	54		39		9	368	102	368	118	138		726
SS-23												
- launchers	16				42	20	58	20	24		102	
- missiles	53				92	33	145	33	22			200
SRM												
Total												
- launchers	50		24		47	40	121	40	76		237	
- missiles	107		39		101	401	247	401	140	138		926

1. Figures in accordance with the memorandum of understanding relating to the INF treaty.

2. IRM (= Intermediate-Range Missile): the treaty defines these as missiles with a range of 1 000 to 5 000 km. The terms "IRM" and "LRINF missile" are identical in substance. (LRINF = Longer-Range Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces), SRM (Shorter-Range Missile): missiles with a range of 500 to 1 000 km, i.e. partial potential of the SRINF (Shorter-Range Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces), which comprise weapon systems with a range of 150 to 1 000 km.

3. Not listed is the land-based cruise missile SSC-X-4, which is also the subject of the INF treaty. It is undergoing tests and is not therefore classified, in compliance with treaty terminology, as either "deployed" or "not deployed". At present, the Soviet Union has 84 missiles and 6 launchers of this type, held in a depot in the European part of the Soviet Union.

(iii) Nuclear weapons

(a) Short- and intermediate-range weapons

38. The INF treaty concluded by the United States and the USSR on 8th December 1987 was the first agreement on the destruction of existing weapons to be reached in the history of arms control policy. The missiles covered by this treaty are divided into intermediate-range (between 1 000 and 5 500 km) and shorter-range (500 to 1 000 km) missiles. The treaty requires that all the *land-based* intermediate-range missiles in these two categories listed in the following tables be destroyed after it has entered into force, and forbids testing and the manufacture of new missiles of these types.

39. Account being taken of the figures referred to in the INF treaty, the Federal Defence Ministry's 1987 force comparison indicates that, with this treaty now in force, the Warsaw Pact will be left with some 580 missile systems (in Europe) with a range of less than 500 km (Scud 580) which are not counted as short-range missiles. NATO, on the other hand, will have no systems with this range once the Pershing IA has been taken out of service.

40. In the case of longer-range INF aircraft, NATO has 144 F-111s operational in Europe,

compared with the Warsaw Pact's 360 Tu-16 Badgers, Tu-22 Blinders and Tu-22m Backfires (excluding some 230 naval aircraft in Europe).

41. The ratio in the case of shorter-range INF aircraft (technically dual-capable in Europe) is 4 000 (Su-7/Su-17 Fitters, MiG-21 Fishbeds, MiG-23 Floggers, Su-24 Fencers) to 1 800 (F-104s, F-4s, F-16s, Tornados).

42. The abovementioned sources contain the following figures on short-range nuclear forces not affected by the INF treaty (which could be used in a nuclear rôle in Europe): NATO's stock of missile systems with a range of up to 150 km consists of 88 Lance systems, compared with the Warsaw Pact's 775 systems (140 SS-21s, 635 Frogs); the Warsaw Pact has 3 800 dual-capable artillery systems (between 152 and 240 mm), NATO 1 200 (105 or 203 mm) – a ratio which has emerged only since the early 1980s, NATO having previously had superiority in such systems.

43. It should be remembered that none of the figures on remaining nuclear intermediate- and short-range systems quoted here from the Federal Defence Ministry's force comparison includes French and British systems of these types. A separate table showing these forces therefore follows.

TABLE 6

*British and French medium and short-range nuclear missiles
(based on launchers or warheads)*

	United Kingdom		France	
	Type	Number	Type	Number
Land-based				
IRBM	–	–	SSBS S-3/TN 61	18
SRBM	Lance	14	Pluton	32
Artillery	M-110	16		
	M-109	110		
Sea-based				
SLBM	Polaris		MSBS M-20/	
	A 3	64	TN 60	64
			MSBS M-4/	32
			TN 70	
Land-based				
air forces	Tornado	210	Mirage III E	15
	IDS		Mirage IVP	18
	Jaguar	108	Mirage 2000 N	13
	A		Jaguar A	45
Sea-based				
air forces	Sea Harrier	42	Super Étendard	64
ASW				
air forces	Nimrod	36		
	Buccaneer	52		

Source: The military balance 1988-1989.

44. Besides these missile systems and aircraft with nuclear capability, the two sides have sea-based nuclear potential below the strategic level. According to the figures contained in "The military balance 1988-1989", the situation in European/Atlantic waters is as follows:

TABLE 7

Sea-based nuclear potential

	NATO	Warsaw Pact
SLBM	160 ¹	18
SLCM	41	58
Air forces ²	458	286
ASW air forces ..	95	66
Torpedoes		337

1. Plus 400 Poseidons assigned to SACEUR.

2. These forces which are part of the navy are land-based in the Warsaw Pact's case, sea-based in NATO's case.

45. The British and French forces listed in Table 6 are included in Table 7.

TABLE 8

The United States' strategic nuclear weapons

System	Number	Warheads/ launchers	Total warheads
ICBM			
Minuteman II ..	450	1	450
Minuteman III ..	511	3	1 533
MX	39	10	390
Total	1 000		2 373
SLBM			
Poseidon C-3 ..	256	14	3 584
Trident C-4	384	8	3 072
Total	640		6 656
Bombers			
B-52 G/H (non ALCM)	105	12	1 260
B-52 G (ALCM)	98	20	1 960
B-52 H (ALCM)	60	20	1 200
B-1 B	99	12	1 188
Total	362		5 608
Total	2 002		14 637

Source: The military balance 1988-1989.

(b) Strategic weapons

46. NATO's and the Warsaw Pact's strategic nuclear weapons include weapons with a range of over 5 500 km. The statistical comparison shown in Tables 8 and 9 is possible.

TABLE 9

The USSR's strategic nuclear weapons

System	Number	Warheads/ launchers	Total warheads
ICBM			
SS-11	420	1	420
SS-13	60	1	60
SS-17	138	4	552
SS-18	308	10	3 080
SS-19	350	6	2 100
SS-24	10	10	100
SS-25	100	1	100
Total	1 386		6 412
SLBM			
SS-N-6	256	1	256
SS-N-8	286	1	286
SS-N-17	12	1	12
SS-N-18	224	7	1 568
SS-N-20	100	9	900
SS-N-23	64	10	640
Total	942		3 662
Bombers			
Bear H	70	20	1 400
Bear	100	2	200
Bison	5	4	20
Total	175		1 620
Total	2 503		11 694

Source: The military balance 1988-1989.

*(iv) Level and use of resources**(a) Population, industrial development, technology*

47. NATO's and the Warsaw Pact's military potential largely depends on their member countries' demographic and industrial options. Technology levels also impose limits on the development of military potential. The following table shows the demographic situation in NATO and the Warsaw Pact:

TABLE 10

*Population of NATO and the Warsaw Pact
(000)*

NATO	646 481	Warsaw Pact	398 752
Belgium	9 876	Bulgaria	9 078
Canada	25 922	Czechoslovakia	15 676
Denmark	5 125	GDR	16 593
France	55 506	Hungary	10 628
FRG	60 931	Poland	38 122
Greece	10 055	Romania	23 836
Italy	54 472	USSR	284 819
Luxembourg	370		
Netherlands	14 630		
Norway	4 177		
Portugal	10 373		
Spain	39 068		
Turkey	51 385		
United Kingdom	56 271		
United States	245 320		

Source: The military balance 1988-1989.

48. Related to the gross national product of the two sides, the above figures allow the following conclusion:

TABLE 11

*Gross national product of NATO and the Warsaw Pact
(in dollars)*

	NATO	Warsaw Pact
Total	8 524 billion	3 230 billion
Per capita	13 176	8 157

Source: Levin, Beyond the bean count, 1986 figures.

49. A comparison of United States and Soviet standing in the twenty basic technology areas produces the conclusions shown in Table 12.

50. Table 13 compares technology levels in deployed military systems.

(b) Expenditure on personnel and equipment

51. This development depends not only on the previously mentioned factors, which generally give NATO an edge as regards military development options, but also on expenditure on personnel and equipment in the various budgets. As Table 14 shows, NATO is able to spend more on defence, despite the smaller percentage of its member countries' total budget devoted to this area.

TABLE 12
*Comparison of United States
 and Soviet technical performance*

Technology	United States superior	Equal	USSR superior
1. Aerodynamics/fluid dynamics		X	
2. Computers and software	← X		
3. Conventional warheads (including all chemical explosives) ..		X	
4. Directed energy (laser)		X	
5. Electro-optical sensor (including infrared)	X		
6. Guidance and navigation	X		
7. Life sciences (human factors, biotechnology)	X		
8. Materials (lightweight, high strength, high temperature)	X →		
9. Micro-electronic materials and integrated circuit manufacturing	X		
10. Nuclear warheads		X	
11. Optics		X	
12. Power sources (mobile) (includes energy storage)		X	
13. Production/manufacturing (includes automated control)	X		
14. Propulsion (aerospace and ground vehicles)	X →		
15. Radar sensor	X →		
16. Robotics and machine intelligence	X		
17. Signal processing	X		
18. Signature reduction	X		
19. Submarine detection	X →		
20. Telecommunications (includes fiber optics)	X		

Source: Annual Report of the United States Secretary of Defence to the Congress for fiscal year 1987.

- The list is limited to 20 technologies, which were selected with the objective of providing a valid base for comparing overall United States and USSR basic technologies. The list is in alphabetical order. These technologies are "on the shelf" and available for application. (The technologies are not intended for comparing the technology level in currently *deployed* military systems.)
- The technologies selected have the potential to *change* military options fundamentally in the next ten to twenty years. They are not static and are either evolving constantly or are inherently capable of major improvements. Future lists may include new technologies.
- The arrows signify that the technology level concerned is undergoing fundamental *change* in the direction indicated.
- The findings are based on a corresponding assessment of each basic technology. The USSR may have a lead in some subsidiary branches of a basic technology. If individual component parts of a technology are taken into account, the average assessment may include major deviations.

TABLE 13

System	United States superior	United States/ USSR equal	USSR superior
Strategic			
CBMs		■	
SSBNs	■		
SLBMs	■→		
Bombers	■		
SAMs			■
Ballistic missile defence			■
Antisatellite			■
Cruise missiles		←■	
Tactical			
■			
Land forces			
SAMs (including naval)		■→	
Tanks		■→	
Artillery		■	
Infantry combat vehicles		■	
Antitank guided missiles		■→	
Attack helicopters	■→		
Chemical warfare			■
Biological warfare			■
■			
Air forces			
Fighter attack and interceptor aircraft	■→		
Air-to-air missiles	■→		
Air-to-surface munitions	■→		
Airlift aircraft	■→		
■			
Naval forces			
SSNs	■→		
Torpedoes		■	
Sea-based aircraft	■		
Surface combatants	■→		
Naval cruise missiles		■→	
Mines			■
■			
C³I			
Communications		■	
Electronic countermeasure ECCM	■→		
Early warning	■		
Surveillance and reconnaissance	■→		
■			
Training simulators	■		

Source: Soviet military power 1988.

TABLE 14

*Defence spending by NATO and the Warsaw Pact
(in dollars)*

	NATO	Warsaw Pact
Total	421 billion	345 billion
Share	4.9%	10.7%

Source: Levin: Beyond the bean count, 1986 figures.

III. Results and prospects of arms limitation policy

(i) Conventional forces

52. Since the beginning of the year, East-West arms limitation policy is again promising. While the MBFR talks that started in 1973 on the initiative of NATO came to an end at the beginning of the year with an agreement between the two parties, the CFE negotiations, which started in Vienna on 9th March 1989, should lead to the signing of the first conventional disarmament agreement in 1990.

53. Furthermore, the Warsaw Pact has already announced unilateral arms reductions that may have a considerable effect on the quantitative balance of forces in Europe.

(a) Unilateral disarmament measures announced by the Warsaw Pact countries and their implementation

54. In his speech to the United Nations in New York on 7th December 1988, Mr. Gorbachev announced a unilateral reduction of Soviet conventional forces. By 1991, six armoured divisions are to be withdrawn from the GDR, Czechoslovakia and Hungary and disbanded, representing a total of 5 000 battle tanks and 50 000 men. For the European sector of the Warsaw Pact as a whole, the reduction in Soviet forces covers a total of 10 000 battle tanks, 8 500 pieces of artillery and 800 fighter aircraft. Without indicating a specific reductions area, Mr. Gorbachev also announced a reduction of 500 000 men in the Soviet forces in the next two years. On the NATO side, reactions to the Soviet General Secretary's declarations were, on the whole, positive, although there were a few warnings against excessive euphoria and many others held the view that it was possible for the Soviet Union to eliminate obsolete weapons systems and that the conventional East-West imbalance would not be totally eliminated⁴.

4. Cf. Jan Reifensburg, NATO's credibility is at stake, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 15th December 1988.

55. Furthermore, according to highly reliable sources, the withdrawal of six armoured divisions from the Soviet Union's European flank would significantly reduce the Soviet forces' offensive capability. In this connection, Sam Nunn stressed that NATO would have an additional warning time if the announced reductions were not offset in other areas⁵.

56. With the exception of Romania, even the smaller Warsaw Pact countries are considering making unilateral reductions in their forces and armaments in the next two years. As far as your Rapporteur knows, the unilateral reductions which the Warsaw Pact countries are to effect may be summed up as follows: the number of troops based in Europe will be reduced by 321 000 by the end of 1990, battle tanks by 12 750, MICVs and other armoured vehicles by 975, artillery systems by 10 030 and fighter aircraft by 930 (see Table 15).

TABLE 15

	Soviet Union	Other Warsaw Pact countries	Total
Troops	240 000	81 300	321 300
Battle tanks ...	10 000	1 750	12 750
MICVs	-	975	975
Artillery	8 500	1 530	10 030
Fighter aircraft	800	130	930

57. In the event of the local reductions announced becoming effective, the result, according to the first force comparison published by the Warsaw Pact in January 1989, would be approximate parity in troops, fighter aircraft and artillery. For battle tanks, the superiority the Warsaw Pact admits it has in its force comparison would be reduced by almost half, whereas there would be only a slight fall in armoured vehicles.

58. Conversely, compared with western figures, the Warsaw Pact will still have superiority in conventional weapons, even after the unilateral reduction measures have been implemented.

59. Generally speaking, such declarations of intent will be of value only when it can be verified that they have been put into practice, i.e. when there is proof of their implementation,

5. Cf. Sam Nunn, If Moscow means business, NATO has work to do, International Herald Tribune, 21st December 1988.

which is not yet the case. However, unusually clear criticism by Soviet military authorities of the announced reductions should provide food for thought. It is certainly not overestimating the psychological effect to assume that Mr. Gorbachev's announcement helped to speed up the conclusion of the talks on the mandate of the CFE negotiations and the opening of those negotiations in Vienna.

(b) Negotiations on conventional forces in Europe (CFE)

60. Negotiations on conventional forces in Europe started in Vienna on 9th March 1989. They were preceded by talks on a mandate which lasted just two years. The mandate for the CFE negotiations includes the following important provisions:

- Priority will be given in the negotiations to the elimination of the capability for launching surprise attack and for initiating large-scale offensive action. The measures quoted includes reductions, limitations, redeployment provisions and equal ceilings.
- The conventional armed forces, which include conventional armaments and equipment, of the twenty-three participants based on land within the territory of the participants in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals are the subject of the negotiation.

Naval forces and chemical and nuclear weapons will not be a subject of the negotiation.

Dual-capability armaments will be included in the negotiation because of their conventional capability.

- The results of the negotiations will be determined only by the twenty-three participants. It is nevertheless agreed that they will hold regular meetings with the twelve neutral and non-aligned European countries to exchange views and information.
- The most important section, "Exchange of information and verification", provides for a verification régime to be made responsible for verifying compliance with the provisions and conducting on-site inspections as a matter of right and exchanging detailed information.

61. As soon as the CFE negotiations opened on 9th March 1989, NATO made a series of in-depth, detailed offers which were completed, on 13th July and 21st September, by other firm proposals in important areas. For instance, the proposals made on 13th July 1989, in particular,

which followed up President Bush's initiative at the NATO summit meeting in Brussels at the end of May 1989, gave strong impetus to the third series of CFE negotiations held at the Hofburg in Vienna. A summary of the most important elements of the negotiations is given at Appendix III, together with a recapitulation of the stage reached in the talks in September 1989.

62. When the committee visited Vienna on 2nd and 3rd October 1989, it was given an assurance during important and interesting talks with the ambassadors of the two parties to the negotiations that both parties wanted early results. It is believed that the CFE negotiations made decisive progress at the first two sittings. Both parties were motivated by the same political will to aim at a first agreement in 1990. This strong impression is confirmed by a statement by the United States Ambassador at the negotiations, Mr. Ledogar, that "three months after they started, the CFE negotiations have light years of advance over the MBFR, which lasted fifteen years".

63. A joint conceptual basis must now be established. It is beyond doubt the West which is playing the leading rôle in defining concepts and, with President Bush's initiative, for instance, it met the East's wishes by examining aircraft, helicopters and troops. Here too, by introducing definitions, the western alliance allowed concrete discussions to be started.

64. It is important to achieve a consensus, particularly on the following points:

- six categories (see the summary on CFE);
- asymmetrical reductions to 10 to 15% below the lowest ceiling of one or other party;
- implementation in stages;
- principle of regional sub-ceilings;
- limitation of stationed land forces, one country not being allowed more than a given percentage of the forces of all the other countries, i.e. the sufficiency rule;
- agreement on the structure of subsequent negotiations by the creation of two working groups (WG):
 - WG A: definitions, calculation criteria, exchanges of information and verification;
 - WG B: ceilings, regional sub-ceilings, stabilisation measures.

65. When, on 21st September 1989, the West submitted proposals on exchanges of information, stabilisation measures, verification and non-circumvention of the agreements, it again

showed that it was playing the driving rôle in the definition of concepts. The alliance has thus placed on the negotiating table all the basic elements that will be necessary for drawing up the first agreement, to be concluded next year.

66. The West's current proposals, together with those it has already made on the limitations applicable to six categories of conventional weapons, englobe the most complete, detailed and ambitious arms control system ever conceived for conventional armed forces.

67. The four outstanding political problems that the ambassadors referred to during our talks, i.e. aircraft, troops stationed, regional subceilings and stockpiles, do not seem insoluble.

68. A cautious political assessment of the first agreement, which is to be concluded in the near future, allows your Rapporteur to make the following remarks:

69. This first agreement will considerably limit the Soviet Union's present conventional military capabilities and, hence, continue to improve the state of European security. The Soviet Union will no longer be able to face Western Europe with a massive conventional threat or dominate the Warsaw Pact as strongly as hitherto. The CFE agreement will also amplify and strengthen the political impact of current developments in Eastern Europe, which will help to improve co-operation in the CSCE framework.

70. The subsequent stages of the CFE process seek to freeze the conventional potential permanently at a much lower level, which will eliminate the possibility of a threat from other countries since the armed forces will then have an optimum advanced defence structure. In this connection, it is gratifying that a seminar is to be organised at the beginning of 1990 at which high-ranking officers and scientists from both alliances will examine military doctrines and tactics with a view to making changes that have long been awaited.

71. The figures given in the force comparisons and threat assessments will no longer be so important if it proves possible to adapt military doctrines to the results of negotiations and consequently revise the military handbooks. All this requires patience because military inertia has to be contended with.

(ii) Nuclear weapons

72. Although the results of the NATO summit meeting on 30th and 31st May 1989 were widely approved in the West, the nuclear situation still causes some concern. At the summit meeting, it was admittedly agreed to defer taking a decision on modernising short-range Lance missiles and to endeavour to negotiate a reduction of short-range missiles – excluding a zero option,

however – but it is still not known when it will be possible to start these negotiations.

73. Conversely, in September 1989 new impetus was given to the will to hold negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on strategic nuclear weapons.

(a) Strategic nuclear weapons – the will to negotiate since Reykjavik

74. After President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev had reached agreement on the principle of a 50% reduction in the number of intercontinental missiles, the negotiations came to a standstill and the eleventh round, which was opened in Geneva on 19th June 1989, came to an end on 7th August 1989 without making a decisive breakthrough.

75. According to the Americans, the main obstacle during these negotiations was Soviet insistence on linking the question of strategic weapons with that of space-based systems. The Soviet Union had linked its agreement to a START treaty with a halt to the American strategic defence initiative (SDI) that included space systems. Among the other stumbling-blocks was the number of air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM), intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), problems relating to the verification of sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM), intermediary ceilings for ballistic missiles and the elimination of heavy ICBMs. The draft START treaty, under negotiation since 1985, is now reported to be 400 pages long. As well as a fundamental treaty, it contains various protocols on inspection, reconversion or elimination of arms subject to reduction and the payload of missiles.

76. There is also a memorandum on data to be exchanged and an appendix containing jointly-established definitions. The meeting between the United States and Soviet Foreign Ministers, Mr. Baker and Mr. Shevardnadze, in Wyoming on 22nd September 1989 gave a strong boost to the START negotiations since Mr. Shevardnadze then renounced linking a START treaty with an agreement on weapons in space (SDI) as the Soviet Union had previously insisted.

77. On 25th September 1989, the Chairmen of the Senate and House of Representatives Armed Forces Committees – Sam Nunn and Les Aspin – said they were in favour of an agreement on a 50% reduction in long-range nuclear missiles being linked with global agreements on strategic weapons. Mr. Nunn underlined the dispute over the interpretation of the ABM treaty in regard to anti-missile defence. He considered it might prove negative to conclude an agreement without knowing what the other party was doing in the defence field.

(b) INF – state of the INF treaty

78. The signing of the INF treaty on 8th December 1987 brought about a change in East-West relations which, with the current negotiations on CFE, will lead to new and promising disarmament agreements. Under this treaty, which came into force on 11th June 1988 when the United States President visited the Soviet Union and instruments of ratification were exchanged, the United States and the Soviet Union undertake to reduce and eliminate intermediate-range United States and Soviet

weapons based *anywhere in the world*. The provisions of Articles IV and V on elimination show that the following missiles have to be destroyed between now and 30th November 1989: 178 Pershing Is on the American side and 726 SS-12 and 200 SS-23 missiles on the Soviet side. Between now and 31st May (or September?) 1991, the United States will have to destroy a total of 689 other Pershings and GLCMs with a range of 1 000 to 5 500 km and the Soviet Union 910 equivalent systems (see Table 16).

TABLE 16

*Summary of data on INF systems in the memorandum of understanding*⁶

On 1st November 1987	Launchers			Missiles		
	deployed	non- deployed	total	deployed	non- deployed	total
<i>United States</i>						
LRINF						
Pershing II	115	51	166	120	127	247
GLCM	99	17	116	309	133	442
Sub-total	214	68	282	429	260	689
SRINF						
Pershing I	–	1	1	–	178	178
Total	214	69	283	429	438	867
<i>Soviet Union</i>						
LRINF						
SS-20	405	118	523	405	245	650
SS-4	79	6	85	65	105	170
SS-5	–	–	–	–	6	6
SSC-X-4	–	6	6	–	84	84
Sub-total	484	130	614	470	440	910
SRINF						
SS-12	115	20	135	220	506	726
SS-23	82	20	102	167	33	200
Sub-total	197	40	237	387	539	926
Total	681	170	851	857	979	1 836

6. IISS, Strategic survey 1987-1988, London, page 27.

79. Your Rapporteur has information that allows him to affirm that the contractual agreements are being respected.

80. It must now be ensured that, by eliminating its SS-20s, the Soviet Union renounces a major strategic military potential targeted on NATO in Europe.

81. Renunciation of SS-13s and SS-23s, sophisticated weapons that can be used in conventional rôles, is equally significant. The importance of the INF treaty in terms of arms control policy may be summed up as follows:

- The INF treaty contains co-operative verification measures of a scope and

precision that seemed inconceivable not very long ago.

- In particular, the exchange of detailed information is a novelty because, apart from information on technical performances, it includes a detailed description of the deployment of missiles at various sites.
- The aim of parity at zero level is attained thanks to asymmetrical reductions based on the principle – just as important in the case of the CFE negotiations – that it is incumbent upon the party with the most weapons to relinquish the greatest number.
- The agreement is confined solely to American and Soviet systems.

82. Independently of the INF agreement, NATO has withdrawn from Europe, since 1979, 1 000 nuclear warheads and, since the decision taken by the Nuclear Planning Group in Montebello in October 1983, 1 400 more nuclear warheads. Thus, after the implementation of the INF treaty, the number of American nuclear warheads remaining in Europe would fall from 7 000 in 1979 to 4 000 – according to SIPRI figures⁷ – by 1991, or 3 274 if sea-based systems are excluded.

83. There are also the United Kingdom and French nuclear systems which the Soviet Union considers to be part of the NATO potential. The INF treaty places no restriction on the increase and modernisation of these systems.

84. Your Rapporteur considers it interesting to mention in this context that, after the signing of the INF treaty in December 1987, the United States army and air force, with the support of conservative congressmen, called for compensatory arms measures, mainly in short-range nuclear weapons, to maintain the credibility of the American nuclear guarantee for Europe (enlarged deterrence).

85. According to information in the United States press and statements by senior officers and representatives of the Department of Defence in the United States Congress, a vast compensatory armaments programme for NATO was examined at the beginning of 1988, including:

- modernisation of nuclear artillery grenades;
- introduction of a longer-range replacement of Lance;
- enhancing the survival capability of aircraft for use in either a nuclear or a con-

ventional rôle, inter alia by equipping them with air-to-surface missiles.

86. The United States Secretary of Defence, Mr. Carlucci, repeated these requirements in his annual report to Congress early in 1989.

87. In Bonn on 1st August 1989, our colleague Mr. Scheer published an expert and very authentic report on stocks of nuclear weapons and nuclear planning in Europe. Your Rapporteur wishes to quote a few passages from Mr. Scheer's conclusions on the political debate on strategy and nuclear disarmament initiatives for the nineties since he considers these questions have not been studied sufficiently in WEU:

- What are the strategic and political rôles of American nuclear weapons and those of France and the United Kingdom in the defence of Western Europe?
- Which of these rôles are essential and which are not?
- Which nuclear weapons are essential for playing these rôles and which are not?
- Would it be possible, desirable and politically acceptable to remove all land-based systems from the territory of foreign states?
- How much of a threat are the nuclear weapons of other alliances?
- What should be thought of the introduction of the SS-21 and the modernisation of Scud?
- What should be thought of NATO's nuclear arms modernisation plan following the Montebello decision?
- In what conditions would it be possible, desirable and politically acceptable to take British and French nuclear systems into account in the arms limitation talks?

88. Your Rapporteur therefore suggests that the committee prepare a special report containing an up-to-date political analysis of these important questions.

(c) Short-range nuclear weapons (SNF) – pros and cons of negotiations

89. Preparations for the NATO summit meeting in May 1989 took place in an atmosphere overshadowed by the debate on modernisation. Furthermore, a number of NATO member countries wished the outlook for SNF negotiations to be made clear. By adopting the report on the "Comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament" at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council held in Brussels on 29th

7. SIPRI yearbook 1989, World armaments and disarmament, page 14.

and 30th May, the heads of state or of government made this wish subject to a compromise, as follows:

“ In keeping with its arms control objectives formulated in Reykjavik in 1987 and reaffirmed in Brussels in 1988, the alliance states that one of its highest priorities in negotiations with the East is reaching an agreement on conventional force reductions which would achieve the objectives above. In this spirit, the allies will make every effort, as evidenced by the outcome of the May 1989 summit, to bring these conventional negotiations to an early and satisfactory conclusion. The United States has expressed the hope that this could be achieved within six to twelve months. Once implementation of such an agreement is underway, the United States, in consultation with the allies concerned, is prepared to enter into negotiations to achieve a *partial* reduction of American and Soviet land-based nuclear missile forces of shorter range to equal and verifiable levels. With special reference to the western proposals on CFE tabled in Vienna, enhanced by the proposals by the United States at the May 1989 summit, the allies concerned proceed on the understanding that negotiated reductions leading to a level below the existing level of their SNF missiles will not be carried out until the results of these negotiations have been implemented. Reductions of Warsaw Pact SNF systems should be carried out before that date. ”

90. This position certainly takes account of German interests but does not allow an early start to negotiations on short-range weapons. Those in favour of SNF negotiations insist that a global concept that does not take account of the nuclear component is out of the question. If we wait for the results of the CFE negotiations to be implemented, they say much time will be lost, since this will take about five years. They also believe there is no justification for such a wait if it is still asserted that SNF are not intended to compensate for conventional inferiority. Moreover, the massive concentration of nuclear artillery or short-range nuclear missiles in Central Europe can no longer be explained by the need for a deterrent force. This is particularly so in the Soviet Union which, according to available figures, has superiority that nothing can justify. Furthermore, the compromise solution adopted is tantamount to eluding Mr. Gorbachev's offer to hold concrete negotiations on SNF. Advocates of SNF negotiations refer to the Soviet General Secretary's address to the Council of Europe on 7th July 1989, when he made the following declaration on SNF:

“ If it becomes clear that NATO countries are ready to join us in negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons, we could, naturally after consulting our allies, carry out without delay *further unilateral reductions* in our tactical nuclear missiles in Europe. ”

91. According to reliable supporters of negotiations, Mr. Gorbachev's offer should be used to terminate as soon as possible the Warsaw Pact's present vast superiority in short-range nuclear weapons.

92. However, for the time being reserves about SNF negotiations are swaying the balance. That is why the alliance believes that in the near future, to attain the still valid goal of preventing war by deterrence, an adequate mix of appropriate and effective nuclear and conventional weapons was required. SNF belong to this category. The short-range land-based weapons option must therefore be retained if NATO's strategy of flexible response is to be effective. References are also made to history which has shown that conventional weapons have never repelled an aggressor whereas, for almost forty-five years, nuclear weapons have succeeded in safeguarding peace in Europe. It is therefore similarly deduced that a mix of conventional and nuclear weapons remains necessary even if there is a balance of conventional forces at a fairly low level. Renouncing nuclear weapons seems contrary to the aim of making war impossible.

93. Your Rapporteur does not claim to believe it is possible to settle the dispute about a fair assessment by making new proposals. He is convinced, however, that a weak point of this perennial discussion is that it combines excessive fear with a lack of clarity in concepts. An objective analysis of questions that have already been raised might help to overcome the most obvious shortcomings.

Lance modernisation plans

94. In spring 1989, the system which is to replace Lance, called the FOTL missile (follow-on to Lance) by experts, was at the heart of political debate in the Federal Republic and of the transatlantic controversy. For the financial year 1989, Congress earmarked \$7.4 million for the initial development of this missile whose range is just under 500 km. The United States army had asked for \$162 million for the financial years 1990 and 1991. The Pentagon estimates that the total development and procurement budget will amount to \$1.2 billion. The political debate in the Federal Republic was therefore concentrated on the follow-on to Lance since that country would be one of the countries in which the FOTL might be deployed. The undisputed fact that the FOTL may, because of its long range, be considered a

nuclear weapon within the context of the FOFA doctrine played a major part in extremely heated public debates. The West Germans are overwhelmingly against this weapon and the new options it involves, as shown clearly in the results of opinion polls.

95. The following questions were thus put with increasing insistence:

- If a new nuclear weapon is developed, does this help to promote disarmament vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, which is prepared to disarm?
- Is it a proof of confidence in the success of conventional disarmament negotiations to develop, just when negotiations are being started, weapons against targets which are to be eliminated?

96. Moreover, the argument that only the presence of visible, i.e. land-based, nuclear weapons in Europe proves that the Americans' destiny is closely linked with that Western Europeans is no longer substantiated.

97. Your Rapporteur considers that it is time to put an end to the debate on the so-called coupling or decoupling between the United States and Western Europe which, basically, merely causes mistrust. When it is already so difficult to come to terms with nuclear deterrence, the potential of nuclear weapons should, in view of the fear it provokes among the public, be handled in such a way as to leave no doubt about the fact that these weapons are designed solely as political weapons.

IV. Reply to the annual report of the Council

(a) The committee's remit

98. As previously, the Presidential Committee has referred to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments the sections of the Council's annual report concerning:

- the Council's activities relating to security in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, the control of armaments and disarmament;
- the application of Protocol No. II on WEU forces;
- the activities of the Agency for the Control of Armaments and Agencies I and II.

(b) Information received

99. The second part of the thirty-fourth annual report of the Council (Document 1177) and the first part of the thirty-fifth annual report of the Council (Document 1200), plus the information letters of the Secretary-General, have

tended towards providing much more of the sort of information the Assembly has been requesting and are indicative of the changing nature of the Council's work and consultations.

(c) The work of the Council

100. At its different levels and in its various bodies, the Council is to be congratulated on the breadth of the discussions which have taken place over the past year:

(a) Work of the enlarged Council and the Special Working Group:

- chemical weapons;
- implementation of the Hague platform;
- the impact of the single European market on European security interests;
- defence planning;
- defence contributions;
- demographic problems;
- logistics and training;
- co-operation out-of-area;
- the possibility of regular consultations between the General Staffs of member countries;
- the implications of European projects and programmes in the field of space for the security of WEU member states;
- arms control and European defence requirements;
- conventional stability;
- the START negotiations;
- the modernisation of short-range nuclear missiles in Europe;
- the possible implications of a CFE agreement, in particular its verification régime, for the security of WEU member states.

(b) Work of the Defence Representatives Group:

- proposals for practical defence co-operation;
- improving the use of training facilities;
- the joint use and development of simulators;
- exchange programmes for units and personnel;

- possible European initiatives to prevent military accidents;
- the study of operational concepts;
- demographic problems in Western Europe;
- the public perception of defence;
- practical military implications of arms control verification and inspection (with, for the very first time, the note that "it could be appropriate for WEU to play a co-ordinating rôle in that field, given that it now appears desirable for there to be some pooling of national resources").

101. It is worth quoting the relevant paragraph from Document 1200 in full:

"3. The group has also begun to consider the practical military consequences of verification and inspection measures which might ensue from a CFE agreement. It was agreed that, although verification was a national responsibility, the member states would consider studying, as far as was possible, those areas of verification in which WEU countries might usefully co-operate and co-ordinate their activities. There was also a preliminary discussion of the impact which any conventional force reductions agreed in CFE might have on defence planning by the ministries concerned in the member countries."

Over the past two years, the Assembly has been advocating exactly this, so it is very gratifying to hear that practical steps are now being taken. For example, one way in which WEU might consider making a particular contribution could be by training the inspectors who will surely be required for on-site inspection in any post-CFE verification régime. WEU's experience over some thirty years of running its own "verification régime" should prove especially useful in this respect.

102. At the other end of the scale, in terms of verification, is the Special Working Group's "Ad Hoc Sub-Group on Space". Set up in response to the recommendations contained in the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments' report on "Verification: a future European satellite agency" (Document 1159, Rapporteur: Mr. Fourné), and in the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on "Scientific and technical aspects of arms control verification by satellite" (Document 1160, Rapporteur: Mr. Malfatti), the Sub-Group on Space is tasked to make recommendations as to the advisability of future European co-operation, on the basis of an

in-depth study of the potential for space technology in three areas:

- verification of arms control agreements, particularly in the conventional field;
- crisis management;
- prevention and control of environmental crises.

103. On that basis, the sub-group was requested, more specifically, to summarise the member states' existing space activities and projects, and to examine the technical options that would be available if it became appropriate for Europe to use satellite equipment as an independent means of ensuring compliance with the verification obligations laid down in arms reduction agreements applicable from the Atlantic to the Urals.

104. By the time the current report is presented to the Assembly in plenary session, it is hoped that further progress will have been achieved and the sub-group properly established to examine other aspects of the proposal to create a WEU observation satellite agency.

105. Another sub-group of the Special Working Group has continued work on an analysis of the situation in the Mediterranean in two specific areas:

- (a) developments in Yugoslavia and their repercussions in the Balkans;
- (b) developments in the Maghreb.

At present the group is concentrating also on the rôle of naval units in the region. (It is to be hoped that some measure of cross fertilisation may be possible with the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments of the Assembly in the new year when the committee is scheduled to examine co-operation in the Western Mediterranean.)

(d) The activities of the Paris ministerial organs

106. The most recent mention of the activities of the Paris ministerial organs appears in Document 1177:

- "The activities of the Paris ministerial organs have continued to centre on:
- the study of arms control and disarmament questions;
 - the study of security and defence questions;
 - the development of co-operation in the field of armaments, and the residual tasks of the Armaments Control Agency.

In the course of the year under review, the process of streamlining the principal activities outlined above has been pursued, with the expertise available to the Council and its subsidiary bodies being utilised in an appropriate manner.

The Council continued to give careful consideration to all proposals for useful work falling within the scope of the Paris ministerial organs, including those made by the Assembly.

1. Reports, studies and discussion papers on subjects in the main tasking areas have been submitted for consideration by the Special Working Group and Defence Representatives Group as required.

Most of these contributions have been requested in order to provide technical support for these groups and have principally concerned:

- verification aspects of conventional arms control;
- threat assessment;
- resource management;
- logistics and training;
- armaments co-operation;
- defence technologies.

At the close of the year, further supporting work was called for to enable the ideas of the Paris experts to be taken into account in discussions on ways of giving further expression to implementation of the platform on European security interests."

107. While much of this work has proved very useful, the uncertainty surrounding the "Paris ministerial organs" at the time of writing has not been conducive to any sense of optimism for the future, although it is obvious that certain aspects could and should be taken over by the proposed European Institute for Security Studies when it is formed.

(e) The Agency for the Control of Armaments

108. In addition to its residual tasks in respect of atomic, biological and chemical weapons control, the Agency for the Control of Armaments followed the work of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva in these areas, particularly the negotiations to bring about a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons and those aimed at strengthening the 1972 convention on the prohibition of biological weapons.

109. It has also contributed to the Council's work on chemical weapons, notably by

summarising the ACA's experience in controlling chemical weapons since 1955 and assisting the Secretary-General in preparations for the study among WEU specialists of a chemical weapons ban, requested by ministers.

110. Although a "residual task" within WEU, the verification of accords on chemical weapons in particular is of growing importance. When the time comes to revise the Brussels Treaty, the work of the ACA must be remembered and safeguarded as the embryo for a Western European contribution to a satisfactory and global chemical weapons treaty (when such a treaty is signed).

111. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has recently given a very full answer to a parliamentary question regarding the ACA's programme of chemical inspections and it would be appreciated if the same information could be included in the annual report of the Council to illustrate the value of continuing work in this field.

112. The committee is disappointed that the information on such inspections, missing from the Council's report in 1986, reinstated at the committee's insistence in 1987, should again be missing in 1988.

(f) Institutional defence tasks of the Council

113. Last year, in Document 1158, "Disarmament - reply to the thirty-third annual report of the Council" (Rapporteur: Mr. Tummars), the committee was at pains to "underline the importance of maintaining agreed numbers and not making unilateral reductions unless and until agreed and verifiable multilateral arms control measures are negotiated", and is particularly disappointed that the Council should immediately see fit to suppress all information concerning the levels of forces of member states (forces under NATO command and forces under national command) and limiting comment to United Kingdom forces "stationed on the mainland of Europe".

114. The maximum levels of ground, air and naval forces which member states of WEU place under NATO command are fixed in Articles I and II of Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty. So that it may satisfy itself that the limits laid down in Articles I and II of Protocol No. II are not exceeded, the Council receives information every year concerning the levels in question, in accordance with Article IV of that protocol. This information is obtained in the course of inspections carried out by the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and is transmitted to the Council by a high-ranking officer designated by him to that end. The committee would welcome the Council's assurance that this procedure is still being respected.

115. This is a vital time for alliance solidarity just when the reductions of such forces are being discussed in Vienna. The next difficult step will be to "harmonise" such reductions and your Rapporteur suspects that the real reason why the necessary information is missing from the Council's annual report is exactly because there is a lack of "harmony", a definite "discord" amongst the allies concerning the subject! The committee would like to stress the fact that WEU must play a definite part in negotiating the sharing of reductions between member nations once agreement at the CFE talks in Vienna has been obtained. This is an obligation under the modified Brussels Treaty.

116. In Article VI of Protocol No. II, the United Kingdom undertook to maintain on the mainland of Europe the effective strength of "four divisions and the second tactical air force, or such other forces as the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, regards as having equivalent fighting capacity". The United Kingdom undertook: "not to withdraw these forces against the wishes of the majority of the high contracting parties...this undertaking shall not, however, bind her in the event of an acute overseas emergency...". In accordance with the procedure provided for in that article, the Council subsequently acquiesced in the United Kingdom's request to reduce the levels of forces it maintains on the mainland of Europe, and the level now agreed by the Council is 55 000 men plus a tactical air force. At the insistence of the Assembly, acting on reports from the committee, the United Kingdom agreed to include a statement in the Council's annual report setting forth the precise levels of the forces affected by this undertaking.

117. The Council's annual report states that the "average" number of British land forces stationed on the mainland of Europe in 1988 in accordance with this commitment was 53 346 but "...in 1988 there were an average 891 men redeployed...to Northern Ireland". This means that the underlying average number of men on the mainland of Europe was 52 455 – a shortfall of 2 545 below the current level of the United Kingdom's obligation. As the figure quoted is an average level, it must be concluded that there were periods in 1988 when the actual level was lower still.

118. The committee regrets that the United Kingdom fell short of its WEU commitment by an average of over 4.5% in 1988, exacerbating the previous year's trend, and would welcome an explanation of the underlying reasons, especially as the committee had understood from the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence that the trend was to be reversed and a special attempt made to reach WEU targets. The committee accepts the Council's assurance that BAOR units redeployed to Northern Ireland would be

speedily returned to their duty station in an emergency affecting NATO.

119. With regard to the United Kingdom's contribution to the second allied tactical air force in 1988, the Council's report provides the following information:

United Kingdom contribution to the second allied tactical air force

Rôle	Aircraft equipment	Squadrons
Strike/Attack	Tornado	7
Offensive support	Harrier	2
Reconnaissance . .	Jaguar/ Tornado	1
Air defence	Phantom Rapier surface-to-air missiles	2 4
Air transport	Puma Chinook	1 1
Ground defence .	RAF regiment	1

(g) Postscript

120. As will be seen from the draft recommendation, the committee especially welcomes the Council's reply to Recommendation 470 and strongly supports the French Prime Minister's proposal of 7th September 1989 that WEU should start a specific programme of immediate co-operation with regard to verification and disarmament.

121. At long last and after much urging from the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, the WEU Council seems to be tackling all aspects of arms control positively.

V. Conclusions

122. We are faced with universal challenges which compel us to co-operate at world level. No measure taken at national level can alone make up for the damage caused to the ozone layer or tackle the greenhouse effect. No state, however large or wealthy, can fight hunger in the world or ward off the coming North-South conflict while there is still time.

123. Efforts by the two superpowers to seek joint solutions to regional conflicts in the world have manifestly been worth while and have been crowned with success, which is gratifying.

124. Further material constraints and new problems exist, caused by the destruction of the

environment, world economic growth, the worsening of the North-South conflict and new dangers to world peace due to mass fundamentalist movements and religious fanaticism and to the inadequacy of civilised procedure for settling conflicts in certain parts of the world. The dangers these conflicts represent for our civilised world will increase still further – going perhaps even so far as to threaten our countries' existence – if we fail to put an end to the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons and missiles and also guarantee the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the future.

125. The need for peoples to co-operate in peace and to have rules stem and solve antagonism between them is a further argument of weight for holding on to alliances and friendship between nations. Another argument, added to experience of these proven friendships, is the friendship which for more than forty years has linked the United States with the whole of Western Europe. The need for peaceful co-operation between nations also strengthens the aims that the United States and Western Europe defined jointly and pursued in the CSCE process. Fourteen years after the conclusion of the Helsinki final act, the plans and regulations then worked out are proving particularly judicious. The CSCE is a success which still offers many prospects for the future.

126. In this context, an attempt may be made to sketch out the future of Europe and the United States' rôle in Europe:

- (i) Europe is determined to seize the opportunity to demilitarise the East-West conflict. There has never been such a good opportunity since the rewards of the CSCE can be reaped in at least two areas: the Soviet Union is prepared to disarm and remove the threat the Warsaw Pact represents for the West, and Eastern Europe, led by the Soviet Union, is undergoing a process of change which can hardly be reversed and which promises to reduce the many differences of principle between East and West. The changes are accompanied by a differentiation between the Warsaw Pact states in the degree of internal liberalisation – now ranging from the emergence of pluralism to terrorist dictatorship – as well as matters relating to the economic system or the extent of open economic co-operation with the West.
- (ii) These are nevertheless merely assumptions about a new trend which gives only a vague picture of the

future structure. It is clear that there are two superpowers and two military alliances which will continue to exist. In other words, in the future there will still be no East-West balance in Europe without the United States' presence on the continent and without close links between the United States and Western Europe. Where NATO is concerned, there is one essential conclusion: we need NATO and *will still need it in the future.*

- (iii) Our common aim is an economically strong Europe in which internal conflicts will be settled in a peaceful and civil manner and resources will be devoted to settling the world's humanitarian problems. Demilitarisation of the East-West conflict is a major prior condition for attaining a new degree of world civilisation in which economic relations and interdependent relationships are creating, and must continue to create, increasingly close solidarity so as to circumscribe and avert danger.

127. This means our joint security policy should serve this aim. For this purpose, we must pursue what we have started in recent years:

- The INF treaty was a breakthrough on the road to true disarmament. Disarmament is to a certain extent synonymous with greater security. It must be continued and develop its own dynamism. Together, we have started to work to this end.
- The aim of the START negotiations between the great powers is to carry nuclear disarmament through to the area of strategic weapons. This aim is endorsed by all Europeans in both alliances.
- Since March 1989, negotiations have been under way for the reduction of conventional forces with the aim of removing the direct threat of surprise attack.
- The verification provided for in the INF treaty, the wide-ranging verification that must be included in the conventional disarmament agreements, openness and inspections, all measures stemming from the Stockholm agreements and which are still being improved, together make a significant contribution to extending warning times and preventing any form of attack.

- The two parties should now also be prepared to tackle the question of the remaining nuclear weapons in Europe.

128. All these efforts might lead to the "civilisation" or demilitarisation of the East-West conflict. If well understood and used knowledgeably, verification and confidence- and security-building measures can be strong foundations on which to build security structures transcending the blocs.

129. Through this prospect or view that has been called the common European house we are giving the Eastern Europeans the hope of better economic living conditions, more information and international exchanges and the external security they vitally need in order to obtain more freedom internally. For our fellow citizens, this prospect also means some degree of security vis-à-vis new military conflicts and the certainty of being able to continue to live as they wish. Materialisation of this view might have the additional advantage of solving our budgetary problems, the question of the means needed to protect the environment and help the devel-

opment of the third world, and also might offer interesting ideas for settling the question of burden- or rôle-sharing.

130. This view, a western one, has many supporters. What is often called German Gorbomania does not mean adopting Soviet ideas at the expense of western values. In reality, Mr. Gorbachev merely added the tangible shape of the European house to this western view, the broad lines of which had already existed since the start of the CSCE and he has made this view now seem easier to achieve than before.

131. The wish not to allow military security measures to hold up the process already defined arose in this context. Here too started the hope that in a foreseeable future nations will at least be freed of the nuclear weapons that they do not themselves possess and on which they cannot or do not wish to take a decision. It is therefore logical that pragmatism directed towards precise aims should seek arms reductions and the elimination of nuclear weapons rather than a balance between the powers based on increased armaments.

APPENDIX I

Strengths of Warsaw Pact and NATO armed forces on 1st July 1988

TABLE 1

*Numerical strength of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in Europe and adjoining maritime areas
(in '000 men)
(at 1st July 1988, in this and all the following tables)*

	Warsaw Pact	Ratio	NATO
General staff, principal and central staffs of the defence ministries	30.2	1:1.6	49.47
Land forces, airborne troops and army air corps	1 823.5	1:1.2	2 115.36
Air defence forces	550.5	4.0:1	137.7
Air forces	425.1	1:1.1	482.3
Naval fleets (naval forces)	338.0	1:2.0	685.0
Centrally assigned units (reconnaissance, electronic warfare, military training establishments, etc.)	225.4	2.3:1	96.9
Support units of the armed forces	146.3	1.7:1	87.5
Civil defence troops (territorial defence)	34.1	5.7:1	6.0
Total armed forces in Europe and adjoining maritime areas	3 573.1	1:1	3 660.23

N.B.: The numerical strength of the internal affairs ministries (para-military police) and the frontier troops has not been included in the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact and NATO.

TABLE 2

Main types of equipment deployed by the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in Europe and adjoining maritime areas

	Warsaw Pact	Ratio	NATO
Front-line (tactical) combat aircraft, air defence forces and naval aircraft	7 878	1.1:1	7 130
Thereof:			
– front-line combat aircraft, tactical air forces and air defence forces	5 355	1:1	5 450
– air defence fighter interceptors which are “incapable” of acting against ground targets	1 829	36:1	50
– naval combat aircraft	692	1:2.4	1 630
Total number of attack aircraft (bombers, fighter bombers, ground attack aircraft) of front-line (tactical) air forces and maritime (naval) air forces	2 783	1:1.5	4 075
Armed helicopters, including those embarked	2 785	1:1.9	5 270
Tactical missile launchers	1 608	11.8:1	136
Tanks	59 470	1.9:1	30 690
Anti-tank guided missile systems	11 465	1:1.6	18 070
MICVs and armoured combat vehicles	70 330	1.5:1	46 900
Multiple launchers, cannon (75 mm and above) and mortars (50 mm and above)	71 560	1.3:1	57 060
Submarines (excluding those carrying strategic ballistic missiles)	228	1.1:1	200
Thereof nuclear powered	80	1:1	76
Large surface vessels (aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers, destroyers, frigates, landing craft displacing 1 200 tonnes or more)	102	1:5	499
Thereof:			
– missile ships with flight decks, aircraft carriers	2	1:7.5	15
– missile ships	23	1:11.9	274
– amphibious ships (displacing 1 200 tons or more)	24	1:3.5	84

TABLE 3

Total strength of the Warsaw Pact's armed forces in Europe (in '000 men)

	Total Warsaw Pact	Bulgaria	Hungary	GDR	Poland	Romania	USSR	Czechoslovakia
General staff, principal and central administration of the defence ministries, etc.	30.2	1.1	1.2	2.5	2.8	2.2	17.1	3.3
Land forces, airborne troops and army air corps	1 823.5	70.4	54.7	103.3	169.8	110.0	1 187.2	128.1
Air defence forces	550.5	17.6	19.8	29.9	49.8	22.0	389.1	22.3
Air forces	425.1	4.5	1.6	4.7	40.9	5.4	345.0	23.0
Naval fleets (naval forces)	338.0	6.3	—	14.2	22.2	6.4	288.9	—
Centrally assigned units (reconnaissance, electronic warfare, military training establishments, etc.)	225.4	14.2	23.5	5.5	21.1	12.0	133.2	15.9
Support units of the armed forces	146.3	2.7	6.0	13.0	33.5	12.0	75.1	4.0
Civil defence troops (territorial defence)	34.1	0.7	—	—	6.9	1.0	22.4	3.1
Total armed forces in Europe and adjoining maritime areas ..	3 573.1	117.5	106.8	173.1	347.0	171.0	2 458.0	199.7

N.B.: The numerical strength of the internal affairs ministries (para-military police) and of frontier troops has not been included in the Warsaw Pact armed forces totals.

Explanations of Tables 1 and 2

In the calculation of the ratio of the armed forces of the two sides in Europe and adjoining maritime areas the following have been included in full in the total personnel and equipment figures:

- ground forces
- air forces
- air defence forces and
- naval forces

and

- operational and non-front line security troops and civil and territorial *defence troops of both politico-military alliances.*

The calculation of the armed forces of the member countries of the Warsaw Pact covers all forces of all fleets deployed in the European zone, including the Soviet Northern, Baltic and Black Sea Fleets.

Analogously, the naval and naval support forces of all Western European NATO countries have been included in the assessment of NATO naval forces. All personnel and equipment of US Naval forces operating in the North Atlantic and the Mediterranean have similarly been included.

None of the personnel and equipment deployed by the United States and Canada in their own territory and immediately adjoining areas of the Atlantic Ocean and throughout the Pacific and Indian Oceans has been included in the overall armed forces ratio.

The numerical strength of the armed forces deployed in the Asian part of the USSR have similarly been omitted.

The personnel and equipment of the Soviet Union's and United States' strategic nuclear forces and the units equipped with missiles which are to be scrapped under the INF treaty have not been taken into account.

As submarines equipped with missiles, the missiles on the Plateau d'Albion (S-3) and Mirage IV bombers are not included in the overall ratio in the case of the United Kingdom and France, the USSR's medium-sized Tu-22 bombers (apart from naval aircraft) have not been considered.

Civilian employees of the armed forces and the military engineers of both sides have not been included since they do not receive military training and do not bear arms in peacetime.

In the comparison of equipment: the main types of equipment held by troops, in store and in reserve at operational centres have not been taken into account.

They include:

Combat aircraft of the following types:

Warsaw Pact

- Front-line bombers
Su-24
- Fighter bombers
Su-22, Su-7b, Su-17, MiG-17, MiG-27
- Close air support aircraft
Su-25
- Fighters
MiG-29, MiG-23, MiG-21, Su-27
- Fighter interceptors of the air defence forces
MiG-31, MiG-25, Su-27, Su-15, Tu-128 and Yak-28
- Reconnaissance and air defence aircraft
MiG-25, MiG-21, Su-17, Su-24, Yak-28
- Naval aircraft
Tu-16, Tu-22, Tu-142, Il-38, BE-12, Yak-38, Su-17, MiG-21, MiG-23, MiG-29, Su-27

NATO

- Fighter bombers Buccaneer, Tornado, F-111, Mirage 5, F-4, F-15, F-16, F-18 Jaguar, Mirage III, F-104, Mirage 2000, F-100, F-35 Draken, F-5, F-84, G.91
- Close air support aircraft A-17n A-10, Harrier, Alpha-jet
- Fighters F-16, Tornado, Mirage 2000, F-4, F-104, Mirage F-1, F-5
- Air defence fighter interceptors Lightning
- Reconnaissance and ground attack aircraft EF-111, RF-4, Tornado, Jaguar, Mirage F1R, RF-5, Mirage IIIR, RF-16, Nimrod, P-3 Orion, G.91R, RF-104, RF-84, EC-130, DC-8, Canberra, Shackleton.
- Naval aircraft A-4, A-6, A-7, F/A-18, Sea Harrier, AV-8, Étendard, Super Étendard, F-4, Tornado, F-104, F-14, Crusader, anti-submarine, reconnaissance and ground attack aircraft, and air defence aircraft.

Armed helicopters of the following types:

Warsaw Pact

- Gunships Mi-24
- Airborne troop transport helicopters Mi-8
- Reconnaissance and fire control helicopters Mi-24 and Mi-8
- Air defence helicopters Mi-8
- Naval helicopters Ka-25, Ka-27, Ka-29 and Mi-14

NATO

- Gunships Apache, Huey Cobra, Cobra TOW, BO-105P, Lynx, Mangusta, Gazelle
- Multi-purpose helicopters Iroquois, Black Hawk, BO-105M, Alouette, Lynx, AB.204, AB.205, AB.206, AB.212
- Reconnaissance helicopters Kiowa, Gazelle, Alouette
- Airborne troop transport and special helicopters Puma, EH-1H, EH-60
- Naval helicopters Sea King, Wessex, Lynx, Super Frelon, Alouette, AB.212, Sea Cobra, Sea Stallion, Seahawk, Iroquois
- Tanks: All types of tanks used by the Warsaw Pact and NATO anti-tank guided missile systems

Warsaw Pact

Anti-tank guided missile launcher vehicles at front-line, army, divisional and regimental level and portable systems at battalion level.

NATO

Systems needed for similar purposes and having similar parameters.

MICVs, armoured combat vehicles, air-portable MICVs, armoured reconnaissance vehicles and reconnaissance MICVs

Multiple rocket launchers, field artillery cannon with a calibre of 75 mm and above, mortars with a calibre of 50 mm and above.

TABLE 4

Total strength of the NATO countries' armed forces in Europe (in '000 men)

	Total NATO	thereof																	
		UK	FRG	France	Norway	Denmark	Belgium	Netherlands	Luxembourg	Italy	Greece	Portugal	Spain	Turkey	United States		Canada		Iceland
															In Europe	In the Atlantic	In Europe	In the Atlantic	
General staff, principal and central administration of the defence ministries, etc.	49.47	1.0	1.8	5.0	0.08	0.06	1.0	1.0	0.03	17.0	0.3	1.9	2.3	18.0	-	-	-	-	-
Land forces, airborne troops and army air corps	2 115.36	143.9	342.0	238.2	21.2	17.3	59.2	60.4	0.71	234.75	135.4	43.6	185.0	420.0	208.8	-	4.9	-	-
Air defence forces	137.7	13.0	31.3	15.0	2.0	1.5	5.1	4.0	-	21.2	11.4	-	12.0	12.0	9.2	-	-	-	-
Air forces	482.3	74.9	71.3	70.7	6.9	4.5	15.7	13.4	-	51.4	15.2	9.0	23.1	44.2	80.1	-	1.9	-	-
Naval fleets (naval forces)	685.0	71.0	36.0	62.0	8.0	6.0	4.0	18.0	-	45.0	22.0	13.0	48.0	52.0	32.5	261.5	-	6.0	-
Centrally assigned units (reconnaissance, electronic warfare, military training establishments, etc.)	96.9	2.7	6.5	38.5	1.7	0.1	4.2	2.75	0.3	19.65	4.3	1.0	8.8	5.1	-	-	1.3	-	-
Support units of the armed forces	87.5	4.7	5.0	13.1	1.2	1.5	2.8	1.5	-	6.0	1.2	1.5	3.3	44.5	0.9	-	0.3	-	-
Civil defence troops (territorial defence)	6.0	-	1.1	-	-	-	-	0.8	-	1.0	0.2	-	0.5	2.4	-	-	-	-	-
Total armed forces in Europe and adjoining maritime areas	3 660.23	311.2	495.0	442.5	41.08	30.96	92.0	101.85	1.04	396.0	190.0	70.0	283.0	598.2	331.5	261.5	8.4	6.0	-
															593.0		14.4		

N.B.: The numerical strength of para-military forces and of frontier troops has not been included in NATO's armed forces.

TABLE 5

Main types of equipment of the Warsaw Pact in Europe

	Total Warsaw Pact	Bulgaria	Hungary	GDR	Poland	Romania	USSR	Czecho- slovakia
Front-line (tactical) combat aircraft, air defence forces and naval aircraft ..	7 876	234	113	307	480	380	5 955	407
Thereof:								
– front-line combat aircraft, tactical air forces and air defence forces ..	5 355	234	113	283	480	156	3 682	407
– air defence fighter interceptors which are “ incapable ” of acting against ground targets	1 829	–	–	–	–	224	1 605	–
– naval combat aircraft	692	–	–	24	–	–	668	–
Total number of attack aircraft (bombers, fighter bombers, ground attack aircraft) of front-line (tactical) air forces and maritime (naval) air forces ..	2 783	69	–	65	108	128	2 276	137
Armed helicopters, including those embarked	2 785	51	96	74	43	220	2 200	101
Tactical missile launchers	1 608	72	27	80	81	50	1 221	77
Tanks	59 470	2 200	1 435	3 140	3 330	3 200	41 580	4 585
Anti-tank guided missile systems	11 465	360	270	620	435	400	8 840	540
MICVs and armoured combat vehicles	70 330	2 365	2 310	5 900	4 855	5 000	45 000	4 900
Multiple launchers, cannon (75 mm and above) and mortars (50 mm and above)	71 560	3 990	1 750	2 435	3 065	6 600	50 275	3 445
Submarines (excluding those carrying strategic ballistic missiles)	228	4	–	–	3	1	220	–
Thereof nuclear powered	80	–	–	–	–	–	80	–
Large surface vessels (aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers, destroyers, frigates, landing craft displacing 1 200 tons or more) .	102	–	–	–	–	1	101	–
Thereof:								
– missile ships with flight decks, aircraft carriers	2	–	–	–	–	–	2	–
– missile ships	23	–	–	–	–	–	23	–
– amphibious ships (displacing 1 200 tons or more)	24	–	–	–	–	–	24	–

TABLE 6

Main types of equipment of the NATO countries in Europe

		thereof															
		UK	FRG	France	Norway	Denmark	Belgium	Nether-lands	Luxem-bourg	Italy	Greece	Portugal	Spain	Turkey	USA in Europe	Canada in Europe	Iceland
Front-line (tactical) combat aircraft, air defence forces and naval aircraft	7 130	835	850	880	100	100	170	200	-	450	450	150	296	640	1 960	50	-
Thereof:																	
- front-line combat aircraft, tactical air forces and air defence forces	5 450	740	680	680	100	100	170	180	-	430	450	150	280	630	810	50	-
- air defence fighter interceptors which are "incapable" of acting against ground targets	50	50	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
- naval combat aircraft	1 630	45	170	200	-	-	-	20	-	20	-	-	15	10	1 150	-	-
Total number of attack aircraft (bombers, fighter bombers, ground attack aircraft) of front-line (tactical) air forces and maritime (naval) air forces	4 075	410	615	460	50	50	110	110	-	160	230	130	140	410	1 150	50	-
Armed helicopters, including those embarked	5 270	700	450	700	-	-	70	20	-	540	130	-	160	310	2 180	10	-
Tactical missile launchers	136	12	26	36	-	-	6	8	-	12	-	-	-	-	36	-	-
Tanks	30 690	2 000	4 900	3 190	370	360	530	1 250	-	2 330	2 000	470	1 850	4 320	6 980	150	-
Anti-tank guided missile systems	18 070	1 480	2 760	2 000	150	310	560	764	6	2 130	320	40	190	2 350	4 940	70	-
MICVs and armoured combat vehicles ..	46 900	5 480	6 840	4 520	190	1 090	2 020	3 240	-	6 440	1 720	280	1 720	5 270	7 590	500	-
Multiple launchers, cannon (75 mm and above) and mortars (50 mm and above) .	57 060	3 320	3 190	8 510	2 320	1 750	1 620	1 410	10	5 510	3 960	1 870	5 010	14 900	3 520	170	-
Submarines (excluding those carrying strategic ballistic missiles)	200	28	24	17	11	7	-	5	-	10	10	3	8	17	57	3	-
Thereof nuclear powered	76	16	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	58	-	-
Large surface vessels (aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers, destroyers, frigates, landing craft displacing 1 200 tons or more)	499	68	16	54	11	10	4	17	-	27	29	17	29	31	173	15	-
Thereof:																	
- missile ships with flight decks, aircraft carriers	15	3	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	9	-	-
- missile ships	274	31	13	40	5	5	4	17	-	19	8	-	13	10	109	-	-
- amphibious ships (displacing 1 200 tons or more)	84	10	-	9	3	-	-	-	-	3	9	-	6	7	37	-	-

Source: "Neues Deutschland", 30th January 1989.

APPENDIX II

Unilateral reductions in troops and weapons to be effected by the Warsaw Pact by the end of 1990

	Bulgaria	Czecho-slovakia	GDR	Poland	Hungary	Total
Personnel in '000	10	12	10	42-100 ^a	9.3	bis 141.3
Tanks	200	850	600	?	251	1901?
MICVs	-	-	-	?	-	?
Armoured personnel carriers...	-	165	-	?	30	195?
Artillery systems ^b	200	-	-	?	430	630?
Tactical missile launchers		-	-	-	6	6
Combat aircraft	20	51	51	?	9	130?
Divisions to be disbanded	-	-	-	4 ^c	-	4
... to logistic divisions	-	3	-	2	-	5
Tank regiments to be dissolved	-	??	6	-	-	6?
Withdrawal of ... brigades	-	-	-	-	-	-
Air defence regiments to be disbanded	-	??	-	-	-	??
Air defence squadrons to be disbanded	-	-	1	-	-	1
Withdrawals of unassigned battalions		-	-	-	-	-
Decommissioning of naval vessels	5	-	-	-	-	5

(For sources see next table)

Notes (a) and (c) not mentioned in the table:

(a) Extrapolation based on the measures announced by the Polish Government. In addition, the ?? (not named) is said to have decided to reduce the Polish armed forces by 100 000 men. The decision has yet to be published.

(b) Artillery systems include cannon, mortars and multiple rocket launchers, although their calibres are yet to be announced.

(c) Including two divisions which were disbanded in 1988 but whose equipment is gradually being placed in supply depots.

Unilateral reductions in the armed forces of the Soviet allies by the end of 1990 will thus be as follows:

GDR

Reduction by 10 000 men; disbanding of six tank regiments; reduction by 600 tanks, which will be converted for civilian use or scrapped; disbanding of an air squadron and decommissioning of 50 combat aircraft; defensive restructuring; 10% reduction in the defence budget.

Czechoslovakia

Reduction in troops in combat units by 12 000 with a simultaneous *increase* in the army support organisation of 20 000 men; reduction in the tank and anti-aircraft regiments in ground and air forces; decommissioning of 850 tanks, 51 combat aircraft and 165 armoured vehicles, followed by gradual destruction; reorganisation of three motorised rifle divisions with conversion into logistic units; reduction in tactical troop exercises at regimental and divisional level by 50% and of exercises by 25%-30%; reduction in reservists summoned to exercises by 15 000 men; 15% reduction in the defence budget.

Bulgaria

Reduction by 10 000 men; decommissioning of 200 tanks, 200 artillery systems, 20 combat aircraft and 5 naval vessels; 15% reduction in the defence budget.

Poland

Reduction by 100 000 men; disbanding of two divisions and reduction in the personnel of two other divisions by 85% this year; storage in supply depots of the equipment of two divisions disbanded last year; 5% reduction in the defence budget.

Hungary

Reduction in the armed forces by 9 300 men; decommissioning of 251 tanks, 30 armoured personnel carriers, 430 artillery pieces, 6 tactical missile launchers and 9 fighter interceptors, which will be subsequently scrapped; 17% reduction in the defence budget.

	USSR in Eastern Central Europe	Total Warsaw Pact	European part of the USSR	Total Warsaw Pact
Personnel in '000	50	Up to 191.3	210 ^d	Up to 401.3
Tanks	5 000	6 901?	5 000	11 901?
MICVs	1 440?	1 440?	?	1 440?
Armoured personnel carriers ...	252	447?	?	447?
Artillery systems ^b	1 116 ^e	1 746 ^e	7 384 ^e	9 130?
Tactical missile-launchers	(24-36)	(30-42)	—	(30-42)
Combat aircraft	60? ^e	190? ^e	740 ^e	930?
Divisions to be disbanded	6	10	—	10
... to logistic divisions	—	5	—	5
Tank regiments to be dissolved	3 ^f	9	?	9?
Withdrawal of ... brigades	1?	1?	—	1?
Air defence regiments to be dis- banded	1?	??	?	1?
Air defence squadrons to be dis- banded		1?	?	1?
Withdrawals of unassigned bat- talions	11?	11?	?	11?
Decommissioning of naval vessels	—	5	—	5

(a) and (c) See above

(d) As Soviet troops in the Southern Military could also be deployed against the Asian part of Turkey, 20 000 of the 60 000 troops to be withdrawn from the Southern Military District have also been included here.

(e) The two figures probably do not reflect the likely breakdown. The proportion to be withdrawn from eastern central Europe will be far higher (because of defensive restructuring).

(f) Training regiments

?? = the reduction has been announced but the figure is not known

() = estimate.

Sources: Speech by Erich Honecker on 23rd January 1989 at a dinner in East Berlin in honour of the Swedish head of government, in: Dokument zur Politik der DDR, N° 1, Berlin (East) 1989, pp. 7-8

Novosti (APN) (ed.), Treffen Michael Gorbatschows mit Vertretern der Dreierkommission, in: Dokumente, N° 6, Cologne, 25th January 1989, p. 7

dpa report of 31st January 1989 on the unilateral reductions in the Hungarian armed forces

Moskau zieht 10 000 Soldaten und 450 Panzers aus Ungarn ab, in: Frankfurter Rundschau, 2nd January 1989, p. 2

Honecker folgt Gorbatschows Konzept, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 25th January 1989, p. 2

Polen: Zwei Divisionen auflösen, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 25th January 1989, p. 1

Verteidigungsrat der CSSR beschloss Abrüstungsmassnahmen, in: Neues Deutschland, 28/29th January 1989, p. 1

Equipment of the six Soviet land divisions of be withdrawn from Eastern Central Europe :

Personnel	48 000 ^a	60 000 troops
Tanks	1 968	
MICVs	1 440	
Troop carriers	252	
Artillery systems (including mortars and rocket-launchers of 100 mm and above)	1 116	
Tanks carrying anti-aircraft guns	96	
Tanks carrying anti-aircraft missiles	216	
Attack helicopters	36	
Bridging vehicles	60	

(a) 75% deployed.

Source : Philip A. Karber, " Military impact of the Gorbachev reductions ", BDM Corporation, McClean, 12th December 1988, page 11.

APPENDIX III

NATO and Warsaw Pact CFE proposals

The following tables show how various categories of equipment and troops in Europe between the Atlantic and the Urals would be limited in accordance with the NATO and Warsaw Pact proposals presented at the CFE talks in Vienna:

The overall total of NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional forces from the Atlantic to the Urals in each of the following categories not to exceed:

	Updated NATO proposal July 13th, 1989	Warsaw Pact proposal
Main battle tanks (active and stored)	40 000	40 000
Artillery (active and stored)	33 000	33 000
Armoured troop carriers (active and stored)	56 000	56 000

Aircraft

NATO has proposed a ceiling of 11 400 for total NATO and Warsaw Pact holdings in permanently land-based, combat-capable aircraft. This figure includes several aircraft types that the Warsaw Pact's proposed limit of 3 000 "strike" aircraft does not include – e.g. so-called "air defence only" aircraft – and therefore the proposed residual ceilings are different.

Helicopters

NATO has proposed a ceiling of 3 800 for total NATO and Warsaw Pact holdings of permanently land-based, combat-capable helicopters. This figure reflects a broader definition of combat helicopters than that used by the Warsaw Pact, which has proposed a ceiling of 3 400.

Manpower

2 700 000 (700 000 stationed in Europe outside national territory)

*NATO and Warsaw Pact limits
in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals (attu)*

	Updated NATO proposal	Warsaw Pact proposal
Main battle tanks	20 000 (active units and stored)	20 000 (in units and stored)
Artillery	16 500 (active units and stored)	24 000 (in units and stored)
Armoured troop carriers	28 000 (active units and stored)	28 000 (in units and stored)

Aircraft

NATO has proposed a ceiling of 5 700 for each alliance's holding of permanently land-based, combat-capable aircraft. This figure includes several aircraft types that the Warsaw Pact's proposed limit of 1 500 strike aircraft does not include – e.g. so-called air defence only aircraft – and therefore the proposed residual ceilings are different.

Limits on foreign stationed forces

Among countries belonging to a treaty of alliance, neither side to station armaments/troops outside national territory in active units exceeding the following numbers:

	Updated NATO proposal	Warsaw Pact proposal
Main battle tanks	3 200 (active units only)	4 500 (in units and stored)
Artillery	1 700 (active units only)	4 000 (in units and stored)
Armoured troop carriers	6 000 (active units only)	7 500 (in units and stored)
Aircraft	N/A ¹	350 strike aircraft
Helicopters	N/A ¹	600
Manpower	275 000 (United States and Soviet)	350 000

Sub-limits

In the areas below, each group of countries belonging to the same treaty of alliance shall not exceed the following levels:

	Updated NATO proposal	Warsaw Pact proposal ¹
	In the area consisting of Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the territory of the USSR (west of the Ural mountains, the Ural River and the Caspian Sea)	
Main battle tanks	20 000	
Artillery	16 500	
Armoured troop carriers	28 000 (of which no more than 12 000 armoured infantry fighting vehicles)	
Aircraft	5 700 land-based combat aircraft	
Helicopters	1 900 combat helicopters	
Manpower	(Warsaw Pact proposal) none	

1. Because of the extreme mobility and speed of aircraft and helicopters, regional sub-ceilings or ceilings on stationed equipment have not been proposed.

	Updated NATO proposal	Warsaw Pact proposal ¹
	In the area consisting of Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Poland, Hungary, and the territory of the USSR (West of the Urals comprising the Baltic, Byelorussian Carpathian, Moscow, Volga, and the Urals military districts in active units	Forward Zone in the area consisting of FRG, Benelux, Denmark, (Central Zone) plus Norway, Italy, Greece and Turkey and GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary (Central Zone) plus the Baltic, Leningrad, North Caucasus, Odessa and Trans-Caucasus military districts plus Romania and Bulgaria
Main battle tanks	11 300	16 000
Artillery	9 000	16 500
Armoured troop carriers	20 000	20 500
Aircraft	N/A ²	1 100 strike aircraft
Helicopters	N/A ²	1 300
Manpower	(NATO proposal) none	1 000 000

	Updated NATO proposal	Warsaw Pact proposal ¹
	In the area consisting of Belgium, France, Italy, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the German Democratic Republic, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, the territory of the Soviet Union west of the Urals comprising the Baltic, Byelorussian, Carpathian military districts in active units	Rear Zone In the area consisting of Iceland, the United Kingdom, France, Spain, Portugal, Byelorussian, Carpathian, Kiev, Moscow, Volga, Ural military districts
Main battle tanks	10 300	4 000
Artillery	7 600	7 500
Armoured troop carriers	18 000	7 500
Aircraft	N/A ¹	400 strike aircraft
Helicopters	N/A ¹	400
Manpower	(NATO proposal) none	350 000

1. The Warsaw Pact tabled an alternative regional proposal on 29th June 1989, defining four regions as follows: North Zone (the area consisting of north of the Leningrad Military District, and Norway); Center Zone (the area consisting of the GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, The Baltic, Byelorussian, Carpathian, Kiev Military Districts and Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, the FRG, France and the U.K.); South Zone (the area consisting of Romania, Bulgaria, the Odessa, North Caucasus and Trans-Caucasus Military Districts, and Italy, Greece and Turkey); Rear Zone (the area consisting of south of the Leningrad Military District, the Moscow, Volga, and Urals Military Districts, and Spain, Portugal and Iceland).

2. Because of the extreme mobility and speed of aircraft and helicopters, regional sub-ceilings or ceilings on stationed equipment have not been proposed.

	Updated NATO proposal	Warsaw Pact proposal ¹
	In the area consisting of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Poland in active units	Central Zone In the area consisting of Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic and Poland
Main battle tanks	8 000	8 700
Artillery	4 500	7 600
Armoured troop carriers	11 000	14 500
Aircraft	N/A ¹	420 strike aircraft
Helicopters	N/A ¹	800
Manpower	-	570 000

1. Because of the extreme mobility and speed of aircraft and helicopters, regional sub-ceilings or ceilings on stationed equipment have not been proposed.

Summary of the state of the CFE negotiations – September 1989

	Western proposal (taking account of the Bush initiative)	Eastern proposal
Progressive approach:	Phase 1 (conclusion in 6 to 12 months, implementation in 1992/93: elimination of existing disparities Phase 2: other reductions Phase 3: reorganisation of defensive structures	Phase 1 (conclusion before 1991, implementation in 5-6 years): elimination of existing disparities Phase 2 (up to 1997): additional 25 % reduction Phase 3 (up to 2 000): reorganisation of defensive structures
Categories concerned:	Battle tanks (BT) Artillery (Art) Armoured troop carriers (ATC) Troops (United States and Soviet Union only) Combat helicopters (CH) Fighter aircraft (FA) (no distinction according to rôle)	Battle tanks Artillery Armoured troop carriers Troops (T) Combat helicopters Fighter aircraft (except strike aircraft).
Aims of phase 1:	Equal collective ceilings throughout Europe – for each alliance 20 000 BT 16 500 Art 28 000 ATC 5 700 FA 1 900 CH 275 000 T each for American and Soviet land and air forces (except on national territory) Intermediate ceilings for equipment deployed in 3 overlapping sub-regions: Region 1 (FRG, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Poland): 8 000 BT, 4 500 Art, 11 000 ATC Region 2 (1 + Denmark, France, United Kingdom, Italy, Hungary; Baltic, Carpathian, Byelorussian military districts): 10 300 BT, 7 600 Art, 18 000 ATC Region 3 (2 + Spain, Portugal, Moscow, Urals and Volga military districts): 11 300 BT, 9 000 Art, 20 000 ATC	Equal collective ceilings throughout Europe 20 000 BT 24 000 Art 28 000 VIC 1 500 FA 1 700 CH Intermediate ceilings for 2 (possibly 3) sub-regions: 1. Central Europe (FRG, Denmark, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Poland, Hungary): Ceilings not yet specified 2. Contact zone (1 + Norway, Italy, Greece, Turkey; Lenin-grad, Baltic, Northern Caucasus and Trans-Caucasus military districts, Romania, Bulgaria): 16 000 BT, 16 500 Art, 20 500 ATC, 1 100 FA, 1 300 CH, 1 million T 3. Rear zone (Iceland, United Kingdom, France, Spain, Portugal; Byelorussian, Carpathian, Kiev, Moscow, Volga and Urals military districts): 4 000 BT, 7 500 Art, 7 500 ATC, 400 FA, 400 CH, 350 000 T. Other

	Western proposal (taking account of the Bush initiative)	Eastern proposal
		<p>proposals for intermediary ceilings for 4 regions:</p> <p>1. Central Europe (FRG, Denmark, United Kingdom, Belgium, Netherlands, GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary; Baltic, Byelorussian, Carpathian and Kiev military districts): 13 300 BT, 11 500 Art, 20 750 ATC, 1 120 FA, 1 250 CH, 910 000 T</p> <p>2. Northern Europe (Norway, northern part of Leningrad military district): 200 BT, 1 000 Art, 150 ATC, 30 FA, 30 CH, 20 000 T</p> <p>3. Southern Europe (Italy, Greece, Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria; Odessa, North Caucasus and Trans-Caucasus military districts): 5 200 BT, 8 000 Art, 5 750 ATC, 290 FA, 360 CH, 270 000 T</p> <p>4. Peripheral zone (Spain, Portugal, Iceland; Moscow, Volga and Urals military districts, southern part of the Leningrad military district): 1 300 BT, 3 000 Art, 1 350 ATC, 60 FA, 60 CH, 150 000 T.</p>
Treatment of equipment and troops to be reduced:	Equipment: destruction; troops (United States and Soviet Union): demobilisation	Equipment: destruction or conversion for civil use
Stationing outside national state territory:	Up to 3 200 BT 1 700 Art 6 000 ATC	Up to 4 500 BT 4 000 Art 7 500 ATC 350 strike aircraft 600 CH 350 000 T
Sufficiency rule:	(Units in service only) For each state, a maximum of: 12 000 BT 10 000 Art 16 800 ATC 3 420 FA 1 140 CH	(Units in service + stocks) For each state a maximum of: 14 000 BT 17 000 Art 18 000 ATC 1 200 strike aircraft 1 350 CH 920 000 T
Special measures:	Openness; compulsory notification; limits on dismantling, stockpiling, movements and combat-readiness	Reduction of military budgets; conversion of armaments factories; no-increase obligation; emphasis on reciprocal reductions
Verifications:	On-site inspections detailed exchanges of information	On-site inspections; national technical means, international verification commission

APPENDIX IV¹

*Communiqué of the meeting
of the Political Consultative Committee
of the Warsaw Treaty states*

A meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the states members of the Warsaw Treaty of friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance took place in Bucharest on 7th and 8th July.

The meeting participants exchanged opinions on the course of the international situation and surveyed the main directions of action of the allied states in the interest of consolidating peace and stability in Europe, of disarmament, of a broader international co-operation and dialogue.

It was stressed that owing to the active policy of the socialist countries, to the action taken by all peace-loving and realistic forces there were positive developments in international issues, in lessening tension and confrontation, in confidence-building, in developing political dialogue and intensifying inter-state contacts at various levels. The first steps in disarmament were taken, a control mechanism has been set in motion. The beginning of the Vienna negotiations is encouraging. Co-operation in the economic, technical, scientific and human rights areas has broadened. Progress has been made in the political settlement of regional conflicts. There is a growing readiness of the international community to co-operate in the field of security and in solving global issues.

Nevertheless, the world situation continues to be complex and contradictory, as favourable processes have not become irreversible yet. The stockpiling of weapons and their modernisation has not been stopped. Nuclear tests continue and so do the actions for the militarisation of space. The conception of confrontation born in the cold war years of recourse to force is overcome with difficulty. The nuclear deterrence strategy, reiterated at the recent NATO session, is a dangerous anachronism which runs counter to the interests of general security. The practice of interference in the domestic affairs of states and the attempts to destabilise them, and human right violations continue.

The meeting participants reasserted their states' attachment to the ideal of ridding mankind of the war threat by liquidating nuclear and chemical weapons, radically cutting conventional weapons. They see disarmament as the cardinal question of the present-day world, the decisive factor of consolidating peace, security and confidence, deepening detente, developing broad international co-operation, and solving global issues.

The Warsaw Treaty states attach primordial importance to the development of the all-European process in all areas, to the passage to a new level of security and co-operation on the continent, to the advancement on the path of building a united Europe of lasting peace and co-operation, of a European home in the diversity of its social and state systems, with respect for the current territorial and political realities, the inviolability of the existing frontiers, each people's sovereignty and right to freely decide its destiny. The determination was expressed actively to contribute to the implementation of the understandings reached at the Vienna meeting to the end of strengthening peace and security, of a better understanding and co-operation on the continent.

The participating states' position on the questions related to strengthening European and general security, to developing the disarmament process, is set forth in the document "For A Stable and Secure Europe, Free of Nuclear and Chemical Weapons, for Substantial Cuts in Troops, Arms and Military Spending" adopted by the meeting.

The meeting participants spoke for setting the relations between the Warsaw Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty on a non-confrontation line, for the development of a constructive dialogue between them in the political and military sphere, for this dialogue to become a factor of security and co-operation on the continent. Furthermore, the principled stand of the Warsaw Treaty states on ridding Europe of military blocs, the simultaneous dismantlement of both alliances and on the liquidation of their military organisations, as a first step, remains unchanged.

The states participating in the meeting firmly declared for a peaceful settlement of regional conflicts in the Middle East, Asia and

1. The following texts were formally communicated by the Warsaw Treaty Organisation to the Western European Union Assembly via the Romanian Ambassador in Paris on 7th August 1989.

Central America. Life has proved there is no alternative to the fruitful road of negotiations. They will contribute also in future to the political settlement of the crisis situations in the world and to a further growth of the United Nations' role in this respect.

In this context the treaty countries spoke up for an undelayed calling of a UN-sponsored international conference on the Middle East to be attended by all the sides concerned, including the PLO, and for a global solution of the problems in the region on the basis of the Palestinian people's right to self-determination and to the independent state of Palestine to exist, as well as of the right to independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the states in the area, Israel included.

The meeting participants expressed their support to the leadership of the Republic of Afghanistan, for a just settlement of the situation in that country on the basis of national reconciliation, for the building of a united, independent and non-aligned Afghanistan whose people may decide its own destiny, without any outside interference.

Expressing concern over the serious economic problems facing mankind, the deepening gap between developed and developing countries, the rising foreign debt and the growing national means earmarked for its liquidation, the states represented at the meeting declared for a concerted effort of all countries to solve those problems on an equitable and just basis, with the active participation of the United Nations, for the establishment of a new international economic order. The meeting underscored the need to eliminate discriminations and barriers to the growth of commercial, economic and technical-scientific exchanges, to promote access to modern technology, on the basis of equal rights. Economic relations must not be conditional upon political or other considerations.

Examining the questions of collaboration in the conservation and restoration of the environment, the meeting participants reiterated the position expressed by their countries in the document "The consequences of the arms race on the environment and other aspects of ecologic security" endorsed by the Political Consultative Committee Meeting in 1988. The readiness was stated for active co-operation with other countries on a multilateral and bilateral basis in the resolution of ecological problems, to contribute to a good unfolding of the Sofia meeting on environmental protection this autumn so that it may mark a significant step toward a growing international collaboration in this area as well as to the preparation of the UN Conference on the environment and development planned for 1992.

Underlining the important rôle of the non-aligned movement in the international life, the meeting participants expressed their hope that the forthcoming summit of these countries would lead to a growing contribution of the movement to the settlement of the major problems of our days, to its rising prestige and influence. The states represented at the meeting attach due importance to the further growth of their relations and co-operation with the non-aligned countries on international issues.

The Warsaw Treaty states will make their contribution to more fully use the potential and rôle of the United Nations Organisation, with the active participation of all countries, regardless of size and social system, to solving world problems. They stand for a growing efficiency of the UN and wider use of the organisation's peace-keeping operations. Emphasis was placed on the importance of actively involving the UN in the efforts of preventing conflictual situations on an international plan.

The meeting participants informed one another on their countries' development, on the course and problems of socialist construction, with emphasis on the growing interdependence between home and foreign policies. They underscored the influential force of the ideas of socialism, the importance of changes in the allied states to improve and renew socialist society, confer a permanent dynamism on the political and economic system, develop democracy, raise the people's welfare, improve the quality of life, better use the potential of all members of society, ensure the fundamental human rights and liberties. They start from the fact that there are no universal models of socialism, nobody is the holder of truth. The construction of the new society is a creative process and it is achieved in each country in harmony with its traditions, specific conditions and demands.

The meeting reiterated the common aspiration to work in the interest of socialism, of improving collaboration among the allied states, and of ensuring their lasting security. Confidence was shown in the capacity of the socialist states, of the leading forces of society to solve the problems that arose in their current development stage. It was also stressed that their relations should develop on the basis of equality, independence and each one's right to make its own political line, strategy and tactics, without any outside interference.

The meeting participants unanimously assessed the Warsaw Treaty as durably serving the ensurance of security of all participating states and being a major factor of peace and stability in Europe and the world over.

The constructive, individual and collective actions of the allied countries bear posi-

tively on world developments, stimulate the growth of international relations on democratic principles, in the spirit of new political thinking.

The general opinion favoured the consolidation of the solidarity and co-operation of the allied states, the further development of their many-sided collaboration on the basis of equality of rights and mutual respect for the benefit of their peoples and in the interest of general peace.

It was decided that efforts should continue toward strengthening the political character of the Warsaw Treaty and improving, on democratic bases, its mechanism of collaboration.

The activity of the Committee of Foreign Ministers and the Committee of Defence Ministers was assessed as positive and their future tasks were set.

The Political Consultative Committee adopted a decision in connection with the report of the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty states.

The Socialist Republic of Romania, as host of the meeting, shall ensure the dissemination of its documents to other states and international organisations.

The representative of the USSR, I.P. Aboinov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, was appointed Secretary General of the Political Consultative Committee for the next period.

The meeting was held in an atmosphere of friendship and collaboration.

The next meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty states will be held in Moscow.

***For a stable and secure Europe free from nuclear
and chemical weapons, for a substantial reduction of armed forces,
armaments and military spending***

The top level representatives of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Hungarian People's Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Socialist Republic of Romania and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, gathered in Bucharest on 7th and 8th July 1989 in a meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty member states, considering the realities of the contemporary world and guiding themselves by the states' aspirations to ensure security in Europe, to take new steps towards disarmament and actively to contribute to setting international relations on new bases, to mankind's passage to a new development stage, in a climate of peace and collaboration, declare the following:

I

The Warsaw Treaty member states consider the consolidation of peace, mankind's relief of the war threat and the development of broad, mutually advantageous international collaboration to be the supreme goal of their foreign policy. They are ready to contribute in future too, in every way, to ensuring equal security for all.

The states represented at the meeting reaffirm their resolve to do their utmost for reaching new understandings on disarmament, which must become a continuous and irreversible process. They also declare for the eradi-

tion of underdevelopment and the establishment of the new international economic order, for the undelayed solution of ecological and the other global problems.

The settlement of the issues on which mankind's survival and the progress of civilisation depend calls for joint efforts, for the active participation of all countries and peoples. In this context, the states represented at the meeting stress the need for a growing rôle of the UN and reassert their resolve to contribute to it by all means.

The Warsaw Treaty member states firmly stand for the ensurance of security by political, not military means; the assertion of international law in interstate relations; the maintenance of normal relations and the development of collaboration among states regardless of their socio-political system; the renunciation of the policy of confrontation and hatemongering and its replacement by a policy of collaboration, understanding, mutual confidence and good neighbourliness, in consideration of the interests of all states and peoples; collaboration in the human rights and humanitarian fields, account being taken of those obligations which the states have assumed.

The promotion of a policy of security, mutual understanding and collaboration among states calls for the strict observance of the national independence and sovereignty, and equality of rights of all states, of the equality of rights among peoples and of each people's right

to self-determination, freely to choose its socio-political development path; non-interference in internal affairs; the unconditional renunciation of the use and threat of force, whatever their form; the settlement of all disputes among states exclusively by peaceful means; the strict observance of territorial-political realities, of the inviolability of the existing frontiers and of the territorial integrity of states; the achievement in each country of all human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, irrespective of race, sex, language, religion or nationality; the development of co-operation among states in various domains on the basis of mutual advantage; the observance of the pledges made in accordance with international law; the observance of all the principles and purposes of the UN Charter, of the Helsinki Final Act principles, of the other generally acknowledged norms of international relations.

In the context of the growing interdependences in the contemporary world, the implementation of all these principles and provisions all contribute to the assertion of generally human values and norms of conduct in international relations.

The Warsaw Treaty member states are willing to develop and expand the dialogue with all states, to collaborate constructively on settling the issues which Europe and the world are faced with. Such a dialogue and collaboration are particularly necessary at the present important moment in the evolution of the international situation.

II

Taking into account the fact that the elimination of the danger of a nuclear and conventional war and the building of international security are an objective prerequisite for mankind's survival and progress, the Warsaw Treaty member states consider the halting of the arms race and the achievement of disarmament to be the main task of the contemporary world.

The ever broader understanding by governments and peoples of their common security interests has allowed of taking the first steps towards reducing military confrontation. A possibility has taken shape of replacing senseless and dangerous military rivalry by the states' peaceful collaboration. In this context, the meeting participants highlight the special significance of the treaty on medium- and shorter-range missiles, whose applications marked the beginning of scrapping nuclear armament, as well as the working atmosphere which has lately become manifest in certain disarmament talks.

However, no radical turning point in disarmament questions has been recorded yet. Despite acknowledgment by both alliances of the inadmissibility of a new war, the level of

military tension remains extremely high and dangerous.

NATO's efforts to perpetuate the policy of force, to go ahead with the nuclear deterrence strategy are a reason for concern.

The Warsaw Treaty member states consider that under these circumstances all countries, all realistic, peace-loving forces must take resolute action. Starting from the need for a global approach to security-related questions, they declare for the ensurance of security through the maintenance of the military balance at an ever lower level which should be sufficient for defence, but which should not enable a surprise attack or large-scale offensive actions to be launched. The objective pursued by the participating states is the reduction of armaments down to the complete elimination of the risk of a war to break out. This objective can be attained only through concerted efforts, by consolidating the political ways of ensuring security and stability, not the military ones.

They are ready further to contribute, alongside all countries concerned, to the conclusion of agreements leading to the gradual reduction down to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, to the banning and destruction of chemical weapons, to deep cuts in conventional armed forces, to the prevention of outer space militarisation, to the gradual reduction of military production and the substantial curtailment of military spending. They also set out from the fact that the disarmament measures must ensure equal security to all states, with the full observance of each state's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity within the existing frontiers, and rule out the possibility of the threat or use of force in interstate relations.

Hailing the resumption of the Soviet-American talks on major disarmament-related questions, the allied states voice their hope that these may yield tangible results as soon as possible.

They consider that one of the priority goals should be the finalisation of the treaty on the 50% reduction of the offensive strategic arms of the USSR and the United States with the observance of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, as it was signed in 1972.

The states represented at the meeting stand for the immediate cessation of nuclear weapon tests and the thorough examination of this problem, at a multilateral level included, viz. the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. They declare for the undelayed finalisation of the protocols on the verification of the 1974 and 1976 Soviet-American agreements, and their entry into force as a step towards attaining the final target – banning all nuclear weapon tests.

The Warsaw Treaty states support the idea that the 1963 Moscow treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water may be extended to underground tests as well, as a way of urgently solving the question of a comprehensive test ban. Retaining their topicality are the objectives to halt, and, in the long run ban the production of fissionable material for arms manufacturing, just as to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and of missile technology for military purposes. A major task is to ensure the protection of peaceful nuclear projects against any attack.

The meeting participants state their concern over the danger spelt for international peace and security by the use of chemical weapons as long as they exist and are spread, and propose that effective steps should be taken in order to eliminate this danger. The participants call for a speedy drafting of a universal convention on the general and complete ban of chemical weapons and the destruction of the existing stockpiles.

The key issue of security and stability in Europe is the reduction of armed forces and conventional weaponry, the limitation and eventual elimination of tactical nuclear arms, and confidence-building on the continent.

The meeting participants consider that the immediate goal of the negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe is to agree, in a first stage, on collective ceilings, equal for the NATO countries and the Warsaw Treaty member states, for troops and the principal classes of weapons, in Europe and various parts of the continent. The new ceilings should be sensibly lower than the lowest levels either side has at present. The proposals advanced in Vienna by the allied socialist countries stipulate the mutual substantial reduction of armed forces and armament. These will make it possible to eliminate the existing imbalances in conventional weaponry. Troops and armament reductions and limitations should be made under strict international control.

During the meeting it was noted that the additional proposals regarding the conventional armed forces in Europe made at the recent NATO Council summit session met halfway the allied socialist countries' stand. The meeting participants expect these proposals to be detailed out and tabled at the Vienna negotiations as soon as possible.

The Warsaw Treaty countries reiterated their determination to do their best for the Vienna talks to yield positive results without delay. The opinion was expressed that the situation of the negotiations is such that the first understandings may be achieved already in

1990, provided that a constructive approach is made by all. Experts will be entrusted with urgently drafting adequate proposals.

The concrete measures adopted by the Warsaw Treaty states, in keeping with their defensive doctrine of unilaterally reducing armed forces and armaments, of ensuring their non-offensive structure as well as of reducing their armament production and military expenditure aim to create the material and political conditions likely to ensure the steady continuation of the arms limitation process and the lowering of the level of military confrontation.

The Warsaw Treaty member states call on the NATO countries to take similar measures concerning their troops and armaments, their military spending and activities.

The meeting participants declared for the application of the Stockholm agreements, for the adoption – as part of the negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures in Europe by the 35 states participating in the CSCE – of new measures aimed at developing them, extending the notification, observation and limitation measures to all military activities of states, including the activity of their naval and air forces.

A great contribution to confidence- and security-building, to increasing stability on the continent could be made by a centre for lessening the military threat and preventing surprise attacks in Europe – a body with informatory and consulting functions.

The same confidence- and security-building aims are pursued by the other proposals advanced by the Warsaw Treaty member states during the negotiations.

An action of great importance, apt to raise the process of European disarmament and security building on a qualitatively new plan would be convening of a meeting of the heads of the 35 states participating in the CSCE to examine the results in these fields on the continent and to set the future objectives.

The allied socialist states consider that the examination of military doctrines, of their character, of their political and military and technical aspects, as well as their future evolution would also contribute to the development of military conceptions and doctrines on strictly defensive principles.

Stability and security in Europe cannot be fully ensured unless the question of tactical nuclear means is solved. Moreover, as conventional armaments are curtailed the destabilising effect of tactical nuclear weapons will grow inevitably. In this respect, the NATO plans to update its tactical nuclear arms cause great concern.

With respect to certain evolutions in the position taken by the NATO countries to the talks concerning tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, the Warsaw Treaty member states call on these countries to solve the tactical nuclear armaments issues not by modernising them but by negotiating their step-by-step reduction. The Warsaw Treaty countries reiterate the proposal they have already put forward in this sense.

The meeting participants expressed their support for the Soviet Union's initiative to pass to new unilateral cutbacks on tactical nuclear missiles stationed in Europe provided the NATO states are willing to start negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons.

The meeting participants also welcomed the Soviet Union's decision unilaterally to withdraw 500 warheads for tactical nuclear missiles from the allied socialist states' territory this year, as well as its declaration that it is ready to remove all the nuclear warheads stationed in the territory of its allies over 1989-1991, provided the United States takes a similar step.

The Warsaw Treaty member states are convinced that the stepwise curtailment and eventual liquidation of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe alongside deep cuts in conventional armed forces and armaments would be an efficient means of lessening the war threat and strengthening mutual confidence.

In ensuring security and stability at an ever lower level of the balance of military forces, account should be taken of the rôle played by the navy and its armaments, as well as of its military activity, apt to have a destabilising influence on the situation and jeopardise the security of Europe and of other regions. The meeting participants stand for the intensification of dialogue on those problems and take the view that separate negotiations should open between the states concerned and, first of all, between the great maritime states, to analyse them.

The meeting stressed that the reduction of military expenditures allows the means thus saved to be used for social and economic development. In this respect, of topical importance is the effective settlement of the question of channeling the means used so far for military production to economic and social purposes. This problem could become the object of consultations among states, the UN included.

Also the significance of joint and individual initiatives was underlined, which may help solve security issues in various regions of the continent, in particular: the creation of a nuclear and chemical free zone in the Balkans; the creation of a denuclearised corridor and a chemical weapon-free zone in Central Europe; armaments cuts and confidence-building in

Central Europe; the creation of a zone of confidence, collaboration and relations of good neighbourliness along the contact line between the states of the two alliances; the transformation of the Mediterranean into a zone of peace and collaboration; a sharp reduction of the level of military tension in Northern Europe. They support practical measures taken multi- and bilaterally for the achievement of these initiatives.

The Warsaw Treaty member countries consider that disarmament measures should be supported by appropriate measures to ensure a strict and effective control. They are ready to participate in the achievement of agreements pursuing the creation of a comprehensive disarmament control system. In this framework, the United Nations would have a positive rôle.

The Warsaw Treaty member states reiterate their appeal to the countries in the North Atlantic Alliance to use the opportunity taking shape at present for completely overcoming the consequences of the cold war in Europe and worldwide. They reassert their principled stance in favour of dismantling the two military and political alliances.

III

The goal of stability and security in Europe, of the affirmation of new relations on the continent founded on the overcoming of confrontation, on the strengthening of trust and good neighbourliness continues to be the focus of the Warsaw Treaty states' effort. They declare for the development of a broad, mutually advantageous collaboration in various fields, for the participation of all countries and all peoples in the settlement of the pressing problems of the continent. The all-European process remains a basic element in the building of a new Europe.

Stating their firm intention to contribute by all means to the deepening of the Helsinki process, the meeting's participants set out from the idea that, in building a Europe of peace and collaboration, everything that has been achieved on the continent over the centuries and in the past decades should be taken into account. Differences between states or groups of states should not prevent mutual understanding and co-operation. On the contrary, the European peoples' diversity of experience can be a source of mutual enrichment. In this connection, it is important that the processes taking place in various parts of the continent should help the development of relations among states on a bilateral, as well as multilateral, all-European plan.

The states participating in the meeting attach a great importance to the promotion of

mutually advantageous economic and technical-scientific collaboration among the CSCE countries. This may give each country the opportunity of efficiently using its material and human resources, the possibilities provided by the international division of labour for its socio-economic development. This requires that the obstacles and restrictions standing in the way of broader commercial, scientific, technical and production exchanges should be removed, and that mutual access should be ensured to present-day advances in technology.

To develop and deepen multilateral and bilateral collaboration in Europe for the resolution of urgent ecological problems is an increasingly topical question. Europe may set an example in this direction.

The expansion of European co-operation calls – as part of it – for broader collaboration on humanitarian matters, encouragement of human contacts, the development of collaboration in information exchanges and the flow of information as well as in culture and education.

At the same time, the ensurance of peace and collaboration in Europe demands that all human rights and fundamental freedoms contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in the International Covenants on economic, social, civil and political rights, in the Helsinki Final Act and in other UN and CSCE documents should be achieved in each country. The Warsaw Treaty states declare for the full achievement of the civil, political, economic, social, cultural and other rights in their interdependence.

The strengthening of peace and security in Europe would contribute to solving many serious social problems with which the peoples of the continent are confronted, would ensure the right to life and to work.

The meeting participants underline that a firm response should be given to any manifestations of revanchism and chauvinism, any form of sowing hatred among peoples. They share the concern of public opinion in the West European countries about neofascist manifestations there.

The allied socialist countries attach a primordial importance to the ensurance of military, political and territorial stability in Europe. They start from the fact that each people decides the fate of its country, and has the right to choose its socio-political and economic system, the state system it thinks fit. There can be no single models for the organisation of society.

Stability presupposes renunciation of confrontation, of the policy of force, non-admission of direct or indirect interference in the domestic affairs of states. No country has the right to dictate the events in another country, to assume the position of judge or arbiter.

IV

The People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Hungarian People's Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Socialist Republic of Romania and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are ready to develop their collaboration with the other states participating in the all-European process, with all the states interested, to work together with these states with a view to reaching understanding on deep arms cuts and on disarmament, the strengthening of security and stability in Europe, the transition from confrontation to collaboration in the relations among states, the building of a Europe of lasting peace, good neighbourliness and collaboration. They will be receptive and support any step or constructive proposal in this direction.

*Force comparisons
(NATO and Warsaw Pact military potential) -
reply to the annual report of the Council*

AMENDMENT 1 ¹

tabled by MM. De Decker and Noerens

1. At the end of paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, insert “by the two super-powers”.

Signed: De Decker, Noerens

1. See 11th sitting, 6th December 1989 (amendment not moved).

Western European Union's information policy

REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations ²
by Sir William Shelton, Rapporteur*

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on Western European Union's information policy

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submitted by Sir William Shelton, Rapporteur

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- I. The degree of information of the public on WEU and on defence questions
- II. WEU seminar organised by the United Kingdom presidency on changes in public perceptions of European defence, held on 6th-7th March 1989, Lancaster House, London

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Pontillon (Chairman); Mr. Ewing, Mrs. Fischer (Alternate: *Bühler*) (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Asselborn, *Büchner*, *De Bondt*, De Hoop Scheffer (Alternate: *Eisma*), Ewing (Alternate: *Hardy*), Fiandrotti (Alternate: *Pasquino*), Sir *John Hunt*, MM. Kempinaire, Kollwelter, Stegagnini, *Tummers*.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Order
on Western European Union's information policy

The Assembly,

- (i) Stressing the importance of public opinion in the pursuit of a sound European security and defence policy;
- (ii) Considering, however, that the degree of public opinion's awareness of Western Europe's defence and security requirements leaves much to be desired;
- (iii) Noting that WEU's rôle and activities are still hardly known to the wider public;
- (iv) Convinced that it cannot be left to the Assembly, the Secretary-General or the press to propagate knowledge of the organisation's work and posture but that the Council itself must make a much greater effort to inform public opinion,

INSTRUCTS ITS PRESIDENTIAL COMMITTEE

1. In its contacts with the Council:
 - (a) to ask how the Council intends to improve the organisation's public relations effort following the WEU seminar on changes in public perceptions of European defence;
 - (b) to request that the Council inform the Assembly of the proposals the Secretary-General has made in this respect;
2. To ask the Council to place the problem of WEU's information policy on its agenda as a matter of urgency in order to consider specific initiatives such as:
 - (a) issuing press guidelines after meetings of the Permanent Council;
 - (b) preparing and publicising understandable basic information documents to be distributed widely in all member countries;
 - (c) creating a WEU periodical in the official languages of all member countries to circulate articles, communiqués and topical information on WEU's activities;
 - (d) establishing WEU information offices in European member countries of the alliance and in particular in the United States and Canada;
 - (e) creating a logo for Western European Union, perhaps organised by a competition in member states;
 - (f) encouraging member governments to provide more information about WEU;
 - (g) defining the conditions for the organisation of opinion polls at European level;
 - (h) considering how to increase co-operation with existing relevant private groups, associations and institutes to promote interest in studies of Western European security questions;
 - (i) considering how to promote co-operation, debates and exchanges of views with social groups, industrial organisations, trade unions, cultural associations, schools and universities;
 - (j) increasing the use of the televised media for presenting WEU;
3. To ask the Council in view of the above considerations to grant the financial means needed for a WEU public information policy;
4. To remind the Council that the Assembly is prepared to discuss with the Council ways and means of co-operating in public relations activities, it being understood that the Assembly's independence will be strictly respected.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Sir William Shelton, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. Five years after the Rome declaration in which ministers decided to reactivate Western European Union, the objective of promoting a European security identity is still far from being reached. A continuing concern of the Assembly has been to ensure that the significance of public awareness of the requirements of European security is not neglected. The importance of this increases as developments in a changing world, and particularly in Eastern Europe, might call for a new definition of security for Europe.

2. Once again, therefore, in Recommendation 472¹ the Assembly urged the Council to promote a more active public information policy in this matter. Unfortunately the Council's reply² failed to cover this particular aspect.

II. Analysis of the problem

3. The results of two recent opinion polls carried out in a number of Western European countries might help to obtain an idea of what people know about the subject, although they should be considered only as specific examples and not as a final conclusion since this would require a far more fundamental study.

4. The first poll³ was conducted in April-May 1989 among citizens of four European countries: France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom, by SIRPA (Service for Information and Public Relations of the Armed Forces), an institution responsible to the French Defence Ministry for informing French public opinion about the country's defence policy. Only a tiny minority (1% in France, Germany and Italy, 3% in the United Kingdom) of the people consulted considered it was very well informed about problems of European defence.

5. In three countries, France, the United Kingdom and Italy, the press and the media were the source of the most reliable information on defence problems. Conversely the credit given to political authorities as sources of information was the lowest in all four countries.

6. *Inter alia*, SIRPA asked about WEU and its work. 72% in the United Kingdom, 65% in France, 64% in Italy and 32% in Germany

answered that they had never heard of WEU. Conversely, 5% in Germany, 4% in France, 2% in Italy and 1% in the United Kingdom were able to give a positive answer to the question.

7. On the other hand, according to the "Flash-Eurobarometer" opinion poll carried out in July 1989 under the responsibility of the Commission of the European Communities in the twelve Community member countries, a majority of 54% of the citizens consulted were in favour of giving the European Community competence in security and defence matters. In the nine WEU member countries, the specific results were as follows:

– Luxembourg	75%
– Netherlands	75%
– Italy	67%
– France	62%
– Germany	55%
– Belgium	52%
– United Kingdom	46%
– Portugal	42%
– Spain	40%

Both these polls show how far WEU's ambitions for improving public awareness of security matters and its rôle are still far from being achieved.

8. These ambitions were set out in the conclusion of the document entitled "WEU and public awareness" adopted by the Council on 23rd April 1985:

"Success in achieving the objectives of the Rome declaration will depend on many factors, a major one of which will be the stimulation of public interest in WEU and the generation of greater public awareness of policies which WEU members follow."

Has there ever been a true political will to implement these intentions?

(i) The Council and its public relations

9. Press briefings given twice a year by the Chairman-in-Office at the close of ministerial meetings or communiqués issued after meetings as in Bonn, Venice and Luxembourg are the Council's principal means of informing public opinion about its work. Only during the Gulf crisis was special information released when the

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 8th June 1989.

2. Communicated to the Assembly on 6th September 1989, Document 1195.

3. See Appendix I.

Council issued several press guidelines on its rôle in the area. So a member of the operations staff in the German Defence Ministry concluded in an article on WEU published in 1988 by a German periodical specialised on defence matters ⁴:

“WEU’s public relations effort has not yet attained the scale required to consolidate the consensus among public opinion on defence and security requirements. It is not enough to make the press responsible for reminding public opinion about WEU once every six months on the occasion of ministerial meetings.”

10. The adoption of the Hague platform was an important step which created the hope that the political rôle of WEU would definitely be increased. But with one exception during the Gulf crisis the Council has always avoided adopting joint positions in public when problems became more specific. One example is the problem of arms limitations in Europe. In its reply to Recommendation 464 ⁵, the Council did not take up the Assembly’s proposals to reply in the name of WEU to Mr. Gorbachev’s call for a pan-European summit on conventional arms. Nor did it take up the Assembly’s recommendation to give substance to the principles enunciated in the Hague platform by defining and *stating publicly* a Western European Union posture on specific arms control issues.

11. Thanks to relevant parliamentary questions put by members of the Assembly in their home countries, we know at least why some of the member governments are so reluctant. The *German* Government said that it used WEU as a framework for exchanging views on security matters (answer in the Bundestag on 9th May 1989). The *Luxembourg* Government stated that the rôle of WEU was limited because it played no direct part in the negotiations (answer on 9th April 1989 to a question put by Mr. Burger). Finally the *United Kingdom* Government said the responsibility for defining and publicising joint positions on specific aspects of arms limitations rested with NATO (reply on 1st February 1989 to a question put by Mr. Hill).

12. In an article published in NATO Review No. 3 (June 1989) entitled “WEU: the way ahead” Sir Geoffrey Howe, outgoing Chairman-in-Office of the Council, specified that WEU was not a framework for developing a consensus in particular negotiations, but had a valuable rôle as ginger group.

13. It is the formal position of the Council that all consultations within the special working

group and its subgroups created within the Permanent Council had to remain confidential ⁶. There has never been any public statement after meetings of the Permanent Council. Furthermore, the activities of the ministerial organs in Paris remain unknown to the public. Exceptionally, however, a communiqué was issued in September 1989 announcing that the Standing Armaments Committee Working Group No. 8 had organised a symposium on artificial intelligence as an aid in operational military decision-making, which took place on 20th and 21st June 1989 at the WEU seat in Paris. But the interest in such information was minimised by the fact that it was not issued until two months later! How does the Council hope to promote public interest in WEU’s work under these conditions?

14. The Council has always recognised the need to inform European public opinion as fully as possible (replies to Recommendations 411, 420, 429, 438, 459). It underlined several times that this was essentially the responsibility of *each member state* (replies to Recommendations 411, 429, 464), the *Chairman-in-Office* with regard to press briefings after ministerial sessions and the *Secretary-General* (reply to Recommendation 438). The responsibility of the latter for publicising WEU’s activities was also underlined by the United Kingdom Government in a reply in the House of Commons on 14th May 1987.

15. But in face of the reluctance of the Council in regard to making public WEU’s positions on specific matters concerning European security, it is difficult for the Secretary-General to develop an effective information policy. It could therefore have only limited effect when in September 1986 a unit within the Political Division of the Secretariat-General was set up to be responsible for relations with the press and for providing information. It is to be welcomed that in its reply to Recommendation 449 ⁷, the Council announced that “a separate press and information unit in the Secretariat-General is under consideration as part of the Council’s continuing review of the restructuring of the ministerial organs”.

16. The job description in a vacancy notice for the post of Assistant to the Public Relations Officer at the Secretariat-General of WEU in London issued recently includes the “preparation of press briefings/meetings”. It would be interesting to know what kind of information the Secretariat-General is able to provide to the press, bearing in mind that all the activities of the Permanent Council and the working groups are confidential and that the Chairman-in-Office gives a press conference only twice a year.

4. Der Mittler-Brief-Informationsdienst zur Sicherheitspolitik, No. 3, 1988.

5. Communicated to the Assembly on 10th February 1989.

6. Reply of the Council to Recommendation 449, communicated to the Assembly on 12th April 1988.

7. Communicated to the Assembly on 12th April 1988.

It is therefore not surprising that all the other activities of the new official concern internal administration matters, such as:

- preparing the daily press review,
- maintaining files on press contacts,
- carrying out general secretariat duties,
- maintaining up-to-date the required documentation in co-operation with the library service.

Nevertheless, the notice announces that "as the press service is still in the process of expansion, other related tasks may emerge". Is this an indication that the Council's information activities will be intensified?

17. At present, however, the process of restructuring the ministerial organs is still not completed. Despite these difficulties Mr. Alfred Cahen, former Secretary-General, had initiated considerable public relations activities under his own responsibility, writing articles and giving lectures in various circles. He has now published an information booklet entitled "Western European Union and NATO - building a European defence identity within the context of Atlantic solidarity", so far available in English only. It seems that Mr. van Eekelen, the new Secretary-General of WEU, is determined on pursuing this active information policy of his predecessor. The Assembly has paid tribute several times to these personal activities but it is obvious that they cannot relieve the Council of its own responsibilities.

18. It is to be welcomed that the new Secretary-General is continuing his predecessor's practice of sending newsletters to the President of the Assembly, describing the activities of the intergovernmental organs. This new practice is based on a decision taken by the Permanent Council on 15th June 1988, specifying that the frequency of this letter would be "determined in the light of the rhythm and significance of these activities". More significant, however, is the fact that the Council underlined that all these letters would be issued under the Secretary-General's own responsibility. Consequently the Council is in no way bound by the information given in these letters. There is a strong impression that, by using this kind of procedure, the Council is trying to entrust the Assembly with the task of circulating information on the Council's activities without being committed by the news transmitted. It is evident that the annual report the Council transmits statutorily to the Assembly, even in its new half-yearly form, is not an appropriate document for public relations use.

19. Problems start already with regard to basic information about Western European Union. The modified Brussels Treaty, with the texts of protocols and other basic documents

concerning WEU, was last published by the Secretariat-General in 1969. It would be highly desirable for Assembly members and anyone else who might be interested to have an updated edition of the treaty and its protocols.

20. In 1988, the Secretariat-General published an information booklet entitled "The reactivation of WEU - statements and communiqués 1984 to 1987" containing the Rome declaration, the platform on European security interests and the communiqués issued after the ministerial meetings in Bonn, Venice and Luxembourg. Furthermore, it offers a thematic presentation of the general lines of a European security policy set out in the different documents just mentioned. Despite its somewhat dry presentation, this booklet is a very useful document for people with a certain basic knowledge of WEU. But a drawback is that so far it has been published only in English and French. Furthermore, since only a limited number of copies have been sent to capitals of member countries, its public impact is practically nil.

21. So far, the Council's position has been that developing further means of information *shall not involve new expenditure*⁸. If the Council's position remains unchanged, the prospects for more effective public relations activities will be gloomy. At present, it is difficult to show how much the Secretariat-General and the other ministerial organs are spending for informing the public since the sub-head "Information, etc." covers the costs of documentation such as newspapers, periodicals, books and other publications for internal use. The figure of this sub-head in the revised WEU budget for 1988 was £ 6 735.

22. As far as the responsibilities of national governments are concerned, it is obvious that they act in a totally independent manner in this area except when a formal joint decision commits them to specific action. Obviously there is no particular pressure in this respect. It should be recalled that the Assembly regretted in Resolution 78⁹ on public information activities on security and defence matters in WEU member countries on the basis of Mr. Burger's report that member governments only exceptionally issue adequate information on the rôle of WEU. It might be useful to examine in a further report how the situation has developed in member countries since Mr. Burger's report.

23. The attitude of certain governments vis-à-vis a specific proposal is characteristic. In Recommendation 457¹⁰ the Assembly noted that

8. Reply of the Council to Recommendation 420, communicated to the Assembly on 18th September 1985.

9. Adopted by the Assembly on 3rd December 1987 (See Document 1112).

10. Adopted by the Assembly on 8th June 1988.

international public opinion was still hardly aware that WEU was being reactivated and asked the Council in Recommendation 459¹¹ to provide adequate information on a regular basis to the North American media and public regarding the nature, scope and aims of the reactivation of WEU, the specific constraints of the WEU countries in security matters and European co-operation in that area. As the Council assured in its reply¹² that it fully recognised the importance of the matter, a member of the Assembly proposed establishing a WEU information bureau in the United States.

24. On 25th August 1988, the *Luxembourg Government* announced its readiness to support such an initiative insofar "as it seems likely to attain these aims". It said that the usefulness of such a project would therefore have to be assessed from this point of view (reply to a question put in the Chamber of Deputies by Mr. Linster). When he was asked about the same subject by Mr. Antretter in a Bundestag debate on 13th October 1988, the *German Minister of State for Foreign Affairs* said that he was not yet able to give a definite answer. Stressing the financial implications, he said in a personal capacity that he considered it worth endorsing. Conversely, the *United Kingdom Government*, answering a similar question put by Mr. Hill in the House of Commons on 19th July 1988, referred to the embassies of WEU member countries which already worked to develop awareness in North America of WEU's contributions and objectives. So far there are no indications that the subject has been taken up seriously.

25. It follows from the second part of the thirty-fourth annual report of the Council to the Assembly¹³ that the Council considers the organisation of European sessions for advanced defence studies and the creation of an association of alumni of these sessions under the aegis of WEU to be an important contribution to public relations. In fact, these initiatives concur with the Assembly's view of the importance of developing the information conveyed to people in a position to influence public opinion. Further sessions should therefore be strongly encouraged as well as parliamentary participation in these events. Nevertheless it should be recalled that these meetings are first and foremost of an academic nature without immediate effect on the wider public.

(ii) *The London seminar -
a first step towards new thinking?*

26. Obviously as a reaction to Mr. Gorbachev's impact on western public opinion the United Kingdom presidency took a so far

unique and entirely new initiative, when it decided to organise a WEU seminar on "Changes in public perceptions of European defence" which was held in London¹⁴ on 6th and 7th March 1989. The importance of this seminar should not be underestimated. Three members of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and two Assembly officials were able to play a full part in the seminar's work - perhaps a first step for closer co-operation between the Council and the Assembly in public relations. It is now time to ask the Council what practical conclusions it intends to draw from the seminar and what follow-up action it intends to take.

27. During the seminar many courses of possible action emerged, some of which are listed below:

- (i) there is a lack of interest in defence in certain countries (Major General Hollants van Loocke);
- (ii) in some countries there is a taboo on discussing strategic issues (working group one);
- (iii) there is a possible lack of public support for necessary defence spending (Sir William Shelton);
- (iv) it is vital to ensure that the *substance of policy* is right (Edward Mortimer, assistant foreign editor of the Financial Times);
- (v) there is a need to define a basic *European consensus on defence*, as well as an *effective explanation of policies* (Major General Hollants van Loocke, Director of the Royal High Institute for Defence, Brussels, and working group three);
- (vi) there is a need for a *common European threat analysis* (working group three);
- (vii) effective security should be seen as a political imperative for Europe irrespective of the threat stemming from the Warsaw Pact (working group two);
- (viii) in the case of disarmament, there was no clear public statement of the WEU Council's views on important recent developments (Mr. Pontillon, Chairman of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations);
- (ix) the threats to Europe coming from other parts of the world should be explained (working group one);

11. Adopted by the Assembly on 9th June 1988.

12. Communicated to the Assembly on 3rd August 1988.

13. Document 1177, page 5.

14. Summary report prepared by the United Kingdom presidency at Appendix II.

- (x) the Hague platform is a good basis for appealing to a sophisticated public. *But a shorter visionary document could also be helpful* (working group two);
- (xi) WEU language should be accessible to the public (working group three) and WEU should have regular contacts with the media (working group one);
- (xii) there could be advantages in presenting policy at two levels, e.g. for quality and popular press (working group two);
- (xiii) a publicity think-tank could be valuable (working group three);
- (xiv) a WEU public relations committee should be created with representatives from both the Assembly and the Council (Mr. Pontillon);
- (xv) the rôle of parliamentarians is important (working group three).

28. The initiative of the United Kingdom presidency in organising this seminar was a very useful and necessary exercise. Both the Council and the Assembly should now examine seriously the practical consequences to be drawn. It appears from the first part of the thirty-fifth annual report of the Council to the Assembly that at their meeting in April WEU ministers took note of this seminar and instructed the Permanent Council to suggest ways of improving the organisation's public relations effort. Furthermore, according to the annual report, the Secretariat-General is currently working on the proposals to be submitted to the Council in this respect. Now is therefore the right time to submit the Assembly's views to the Council.

(iii) *The Assembly's particular problems*

29. The Assembly, composed of representatives of the people of member countries who are responsible to their electorate, is inevitably in permanent contact with public opinion. It has always tried to give maximum publicity to its sessions and to the reports it examines. But as Mr. Pontillon emphasised in his address at the London seminar, a parliamentary assembly such as the WEU Assembly cannot arouse the interest of public opinion on its own. It is first the standard of the public dialogue between the parliamentary and the governmental sides of WEU that can elicit a meaningful response from public opinion. Yet this dialogue is still far from satisfactory. The Assembly is mostly alone in publicising common positions regarding European security interests.

30. A recent example was the Assembly's Defence Committee's recommendation to defer decisions on the production and deployment of short-range nuclear missiles for replacing the Lance systems. The committee's position was made public in April 1989. The WEU Council remained mute on the matter. When it finally replied to Recommendation 470 in September 1989, it simply referred to the decision reached in the meantime within the alliance.

31. This is not the only instance of the "one way street" aspect of the public dialogue the Assembly endeavours to develop with the Council. How can the public assess the value of the Assembly's initiatives in these circumstances?

32. It is not surprising, therefore, that, for instance, in May 1989 a member of the Belgian Chamber of Representatives, with reference to the Defence Committee's recommendation mentioned above, asked the Belgian Government for information about the status, rôle, competence and membership of the Assembly's Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

33. Efforts to strengthen the impact of the Assembly's work through national parliaments have so far been partly successful. In this respect the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations has had special responsibility from the very outset.

34. Following the selection by the committee of four recommendations (467, 470, 471 and 472) for debate in national parliaments, the relevant recommendations and the corresponding reports were transmitted to the presidents of member parliaments. Furthermore, because of its particular topicality, the report by Mr. Pontillon on the development of East-West relations and Western European security (Recommendation 471) was transmitted to all foreign affairs and defence committees of member parliaments, including those of Portugal and Spain, as well as to the relevant committees of both houses of the American Congress and the Canadian Parliament.

35. It has been very rare in the past for a member of a national government to refer in public to an Assembly report. It is therefore particularly welcome that *Mr. Francis Maude*, United Kingdom Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, seized the opportunity of a House of Commons debate on 27th July 1989 on Eastern European problems to pay tribute to Mr. Pontillon's report which he called a "coherent and imaginative basis for the development of the alliance's rôle in both protecting security and improving East-West relations through arms control". If more ministers of national governments followed this United Kingdom example by referring to Assembly

reports in parliamentary and other political speeches it would be a considerable help to expanding public knowledge of the Assembly's activities.

36. It is also to be welcomed that the United Kingdom Minister of State referred in the same debate to the Assembly's efforts in activating the East-West parliamentary dialogue. He said:

“that the WEU Assembly can play a useful rôle in talking to parliamentarians and to other opinion formers in the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries. It is good news that the Assembly began exchanges with the Supreme Soviet. I hope that these can be developed in future, and perhaps expanded to take in equivalent bodies in other such countries, notably, perhaps, Poland and Hungary.”

37. It should be noted that this debate in the House of Commons was initiated by members of the United Kingdom Delegation to the Assembly. Several delegation members underlined the importance of the WEU Assembly. *Mr. Wilkinson*, in particular, pleaded for a stronger rôle for WEU in concerting a Western European position on key strategic issues, East-West relations, arms control and out-of-area security problems.

38. However, the committee's efforts to increase the number of Assembly representatives putting questions in parliaments on the basis of texts adopted by the Assembly were successful only in three member parliaments. *Mr. Pontillon*, Chairman of the committee, put in the French Senate, on 27th July 1989, five questions relating to Recommendations 467, 469, 470, 471 and 472. So far, three of them were answered by the French Government on 5th October 1989. On 18th September 1989, *Mr. Fourré* put similar questions in the French National Assembly.

39. On 27th June 1989, the House of Commons adopted an early day motion initiated by the United Kingdom Delegation to the WEU Assembly welcoming its Resolution 80 on the condemnation of the repression and massacre of students and others in the People's Republic of China. Furthermore, *Mr. Hill* put a question on Recommendation 467 answered by *Mr. Waldegrave*, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, and a question on progress in arms co-operation (Recommendation 469) answered on 28th July 1989 by *Mr. Alan Clark*, Minister of State for Defence Procurement. Attention should be paid to the last phrase of this answer which reads as follow:

“The Western European Union has taken interest in these and other areas (of arms co-operation) but progress on these issues within Europe as a whole is, and will remain, the responsibility of IEPG.”

40. “Taking interest” is far away from ambitions made public in the Rome declaration according to which ministers decided to “give political impetus” to arms co-operation or in the Hague platform in which ministers decided “to... intensify armaments co-operation”. The United Kingdom answers should be further reason for the Assembly to ask the Council again to explain how it intends to implement the political impetus it decided to give to co-operation in armaments matters as requested in Recommendation 457.

41. With regard to the *Bundestag*, it is to be noted that it took up the question of the revision of the modified Brussels Treaty which is an important subject of Recommendation 472. In the framework of the ratification procedure of the protocol of accession of Portugal and Spain to Western European Union, the *Bundestag* adopted, on 22nd June 1989, a resolution in which it welcomes the enlargement and stresses that WEU should remain open to candidates from other European members of the Atlantic Alliance. Turning to the revision of the modified Brussels Treaty, the resolution underlines that the growing importance of WEU makes it essential to *improve the working conditions of the Assembly of WEU*. Furthermore:

“Changing the provisions of the treaty should allow an end to be put to the obligation to appoint a single delegation of representatives of the *Bundestag* to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the Assembly of WEU.”

42. The presentation of the half-yearly delegation information report given by the German Delegation to the *Bundestag* on the ordinary Assembly session has been modified. The report covering the June 1989 session now contains a lively summary of the debates, rendering the document more interesting for the reader. This is a valid contribution to improving parliamentary and public information in Germany regarding the Assembly's work. This is worth being followed by other delegations.

43. On 14th September 1989, *Mr. Schäfer*, German Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, answered two questions put by *Mr. Steiner* relating to Recommendations 470 and 472. On 2nd October 1989, *Mr. Antretter* put a question on Recommendation 472, answered on 11th October 1989 by *Mr. Adam Schwaetzer*, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, and two questions on Recommendation 469, answered on 13th October 1989 by *Mr. Wimmer*, Parliamentary Secretary of State of the Federal Ministry of Defence. On 12th September 1989, *Mr. Schäfer*, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, answered two questions put by *Mrs. Teubner* (Die Grünen) on the activities of the WEU Agency for the Control of Armaments.

44. So far, no specific initiatives have been registered by other delegations and member parliaments. It should be taken into account that a new delegation had to be appointed in Luxembourg, general elections were held in the Netherlands and there were difficulties in forming new governments in Italy and Belgium. Such internal events show how difficult it sometimes is for the Assembly to ensure the continuity of its work in national parliaments.

45. In order to strengthen the impact of the committee's work, initiatives have been taken following Mr. Pontillon's memorandum dated 31st May 1989 to make the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations a permanent WEU committee with the same status as the other committees. It is to be hoped that the relevant revision of the Charter and Rules of Procedure will improve the impact of this committee's work among Assembly members, the Council and the public.

46. Furthermore, as reported in the draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1990, further efforts are being made to implement the Assembly's general communications strategy with a view to improving the way the public is informed. It is proposed to appropriate F 500 000 for informing the public which is an increase of F 90 000 over the revised budget for 1989. In order to show how modest these sums are, it should be noted that the estimate in one of the member parliaments – the Bundestag – in the draft budget for 1990 is for DM 7.5 millions expenditure for public relations work plus DM 3 millions for information arrangements (the Bundesrat will be authorised to allocate more than DM 1 million for the same purposes).

47. Provided the Council approves the budget, the increased means will be used mainly for the purchase of a second personal computer for the Assembly's press service and for the preparation of an Assembly logo. It should be recalled that the Presidential Committee instructed the press counsellor to study the creation of a logo which is considered as an essential means in modern communications policy for creating a public image. Unlike the Council of Europe, the North Atlantic Assembly and the European Parliament, the WEU Assembly so far does not have a logo.

48. The new "letter from the Assembly", issued for the first time in January 1989 under the responsibility of the Assembly's press department, will be published four times each year in order to propagate information about the Assembly's activities and order of business. Recipients are:

- members of the Assembly;
- the foreign affairs and defence committees of member parliaments;

- the foreign affairs and defence ministries of member countries;
- all press agencies;
- academic institutions, universities and political research institutes;
- the ambassadors of member countries in every capital of WEU;
- the political parties in member countries;
- all present recipients of Assembly documents;
- all who ask individually for the letter.

49. Arrangements are being made to expand the list by including the relevant committees of the United States Congress and Canadian Parliament, as well as the parliaments of other members of the Atlantic Alliance and other interested recipients.

50. Apart from updating the WEU information booklet prepared by Mr. Tummers on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations as a necessary basic information document, the publication of shorter information booklets or leaflets under the responsibility of the press department within the financial limits imposed on the Assembly are under way.

51. Thanks to the telefax now installed, the possibilities of rapid communication with press agencies have been considerably improved. Furthermore, the press list has been completed and the press counsellor establishes more systematic contacts with the media in member countries.

52. As explained above, the Assembly is making considerable efforts to improve the public impact of its work. But this is an area in which both the Council and the Assembly should be more aware that they can and must play a complementary rôle.

III. Conditions for improving the public impact of WEU's work

53. First, the political importance of public opinion for Western European security should be realised. The lack of sound public knowledge of security and defence matters as reported in opinion polls and the lack of interest in the subject in certain countries as diagnosed during the London seminar should lead the Council to put the problem of public information policy on the agenda of its consultations.

54. Secondly, the objectives of WEU and the Council's activities should be clearly defined and publicly explained. To achieve this, commitments under the WEU treaty should be recalled. The modified Brussels Treaty is clear

and distinct in its far-reaching commitments in regard to collective defence, strengthening peace and security and promoting the unity and integration of Europe. Such commitments call for an active policy and appropriate decisions.

55. Thirdly, a clear joint concept of WEU's rôle in the framework of the building of Europe, the Atlantic Alliance and vis-à-vis the dramatic progress of East-West relations must be defined and made public. Here the difficulties begin, since there is so far no joint Western European Union voice but a great diversity of voices, those of different WEU politicians.

56. So the public is told that WEU was created to sort out internal European defence problems and not to assume external responsibilities¹⁵; furthermore, that WEU is not an operational forum, and not a framework for developing a consensus in particular negotiations¹⁶; it has a limited rôle because it does not participate in disarmament negotiations¹⁷ but on the other hand: "WEU is used as a framework" for exchanging views¹⁸ and even a "ginger group"¹⁹. "Its aim is to try and ensure the closest possible identity of view on security issues between its members so that they can, individually, make a stronger input to the alliance"²⁰.

57. Does the public understand what is meant in practical terms when the future goals of WEU are described as to:

"confirm and carry forward the vital process of a joint reflection and concertation on security problems now in progress",

"give concrete expression to the principles concerning the security of its member states",

"provide the necessary political impetus in order that in the much wider fora... European co-operation in the field of armaments can progress", or to

"clarify the politically concerted and technically co-ordinated approach... to problems outside the Brussels Treaty area..."²¹

15. See Willem F. van Eekelen in "Future defence co-operation, the rôle of WEU", published in September 1989 by the European Strategy Group, page 22.

16. See Sir Geoffrey Howe in NATO Review, No. 3, June 1989, page 13.

17. See Luxembourg Government on 9th April 1989.

18. See the German Minister of State for Foreign Affairs in the Bundestag on 9th May 1989.

19. See Sir Geoffrey Howe in NATO Review, No. 3, June 1989, page 13.

20. See Sir Geoffrey Howe in NATO Review, No. 3, June 1989, page 13.

21. See the information letter from the Secretary-General of WEU, April-May 1989, Document 1188, pages 15-16.

58. As requested at the London seminar, WEU's language should be accessible to the public. Furthermore, it is crucial for the substance of WEU's activities to become more interesting for the public. This applies of course also to Assembly documents. Furthermore, it was rightly said that the language of the Hague platform was perhaps suitable for appealing to a sophisticated public, but a shorter visionary document would be helpful. If no efforts are made to provide clear public guidelines on WEU's rôle, how can it in future successfully "pursue efforts to create a European public awareness of security problems in the countries belonging to the organisation"²² or to help "to maintain public support for minimum defence and deterrence"²³ as demanded by Sir Geoffrey Howe for a WEU strategy to the year 2000?

59. The more the WEU Council is considered as an internal debating society, the more difficult it is to explain to public opinion the usefulness of its activities and – even more important – their conformity with the commitments arising from the modified Brussels Treaty.

60. The degree of an organisation's political profile also has a strong influence on its public impact, as rightly stated in the conclusions of the document "WEU and public awareness" adopted by the WEU Council four years ago. Although WEU's profile has improved since 1984, there is a strong impression that it has so far hardly been possible to make the appropriate heads of state or of government take a serious interest in its work. Since WEU's reactivation, only one head of government, the French Prime Minister, has addressed the Assembly. Furthermore, to be self-critical: are the majority of the parliamentary experts in defence and foreign affairs matters really represented in the delegations to the Assembly? In any case, thanks to a higher political profile, the Council should be less sparing and issue more public comments and positions on current political events and developments.

61. Finally it should be recognised that improving public awareness of security matters costs more money, otherwise it must be concluded that there is no real political will behind all the declarations of intention on the matter.

IV. Some practical proposals

62. As a consequence of the London seminar, the Council should put the question of information policy on its agenda as a matter of

22. Information letter from the Secretary-General of WEU on the activities of the intergovernmental organs, April-May 1989, page 16 (Document 1188).

23. Sir Geoffrey Howe in NATO Review No. 3, June 1989, page 15.

urgency. The purpose of deliberations should be to seek a consensus including the concrete initiatives proposed in the preliminary draft order.

63. The WEU Public Relations Committee proposed during the London seminar, composed of representatives of both the Assembly and the Council, should be set up soon in order to work out ways and means by which it should be possible to achieve a sort of division of labour between the Assembly and the Council in public relations.

64. Independently of that, the Assembly must not slacken its efforts to reconsider its own working methods in order to improve the impact of its activities on public opinion and the media. When Assembly committees meet, they should seek wide publicity by holding press conferences, even if they do not adopt formal texts. The example given by Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, who gave a press conference on 2nd October 1989 on the occasion of the committee's meeting in Vienna with several delegation members of the CFE and CSBM negotiations, should be followed.

65. The increased resources for the Assembly's external relations and press service

should also be used for establishing closer relations with the televised media in member countries. Such relations could be useful in opening these channels for senior Assembly members such as the President, vice-presidents, committee chairmen or rapporteurs to present the views and positions of the Assembly on appropriate occasions.

66. The Assembly should do its utmost to facilitate the use of its reports and recommendations in parliaments and by the public. It should carefully select the subjects of its reports and debates in order to choose those of interest to public opinion. This is not always easy since matters dealt with by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments or the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, for instance, are often very technical. It is therefore most important that all rapporteurs endeavour to use language that is accessible to the public.

67. In a further stage it might be worth studying how style and presentation of reports and recommendations can be modernised. In this respect initiatives now being discussed in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on improving the public impact of its activities should be carefully studied.

APPENDIX I

The degree of information of the public on WEU and on defence questions

Result of an enquiry conducted by a French service: the Service for Information and Public Relations of the Armed Forces (SIRPA), in France, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy (Extracts)

April-May 1989

SIRPA (Service for Information and Public Relations of the Armed Forces), created in 1969, is an institution responsible to the French Defence Ministry for informing French public opinion on the country's defence policy.

Its activities include regular opinion polls on such questions.

The following extracts are drawn from a wider enquiry on defence questions conducted in April-May 1989 with the assistance of OPTEM (Options for the Policies of Firms and Marketing), conducted among citizens of four European countries.

Knowledge of WEU

Question: Of the present European organisations, there is one, Western European Union (WEU) which handles defence problems. Of the sentences on this card, which is the most appropriate in your case?

	France (%)	UK (%)	Germany (%)	Italy (%)
I know this organisation and I have a fair idea of what it does	4	1	5	2
I have heard of it but I am not very sure what it does	12	11	20	10
I only know its name	16	13	23	9
I have never heard of it	65	72	32	64
(NP)	(3)	(3)	(19)	(15)

Result (SIRPA assessment):

Very little is known about WEU in all countries (the situation in Germany is slightly better than in other countries).

Degree of information on problems of European defence

Question: On problems of European defence, do you think you are:

	France (%)	UK (%)	Germany (%)	Italy (%)
Very well-informed	1	3	1	1
Fairly well-informed	14	20	25	16
Fairly badly-informed	48	46	43	35
Very badly-informed	34	26	23	41
(NP)	(3)	(4)	(8)	(7)

Result (SIRPA assessment):

In the four countries, a tiny minority considers it is very well informed of defence problems.

Those who consider they are very well or fairly well informed represent one citizen in six in France and Italy, one in four in the United Kingdom and Germany.

Sources of information on defence problems

Question: On defence questions, which of the following sources of information do you consider to be the most reliable?

	France (%)	UK (%)	Germany (%)	Italy (%)
The political authorities	10	12	20	10
The military authorities	27	19	21	15
The press and the media	44	51	39	58
(NP)	(19)	(18)	(20)	(18)

Result (SIRPA assessment):

In three countries, the press and radio are the source of information considered to be the most reliable on defence problems. It is of course the one with which citizens are in the most direct contact.

In Italy and in the United Kingdom, the press score is particularly high, that of the political and military authorities the lowest.

Opinion in France is more nuancé and gives greater credit than elsewhere to the military authorities.

Opinion in Germany tends to give greater credit than in all the other countries to the political authorities.

Methods applied in conducting the enquiry

Country	Poll institute	Dates of Poll	Number of persons questioned
France	BVA	15/4-20/4/89	1 059
United Kingdom	BMRB	13/4-19/4/89	866
Germany	EMNID	20/4-6/5/89	945
Italy	DEMOSKOPEA	16/4-5/5/89	902

Selections were made according to the quota method in France (sex, age, CSP, region, domicile), random selection in Italy, random route in the United Kingdom and Germany.

APPENDIX II

WEU seminar organised by the United Kingdom presidency on changes in public perceptions of European defence, held on 6th-7th March 1989, Lancaster House, London

(Summary of proceedings prepared by the United Kingdom presidency)¹

1. This paper describes proceedings at the seminar held by the presidency in London on 6th-7th March 1989.

2. The seminar was opened by the *Honourable Archie Hamilton*, United Kingdom Minister of State for the Armed Forces. He explained that the important changes now taking place in the Soviet Union resulted in large part from the resolute approach adopted by the western alliance for many decades. In welcoming the proposed reductions announced by the Warsaw Pact, Mr. Hamilton drew attention to the massive superiority in conventional forces that would remain even after the latest proposals. For example, the Warsaw Pact would retain a superiority of about 1.5 to 1 in the key area of tanks and artillery. Mr. Hamilton stressed the importance of ensuring that public perception took account of the continuing military realities in Europe, and reflected *capabilities* as well as intentions. He concluded that the West must hold onto its winning formula and press for increased international understanding while retaining the strength necessary to ensure lasting security.

3. The second talk ("The impact of President Gorbachev on western public opinion") by *Dr. Philip Sabin* of King's College, University of London, provided a detailed consideration of opinion poll evidence on shifts in European attitudes to defence. Dr. Sabin's data concentrated particularly on opinion in the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and France. He showed substantial evidence of a shift to more favourable views of the Soviet Union. Confidence in the United States was also shown to be rising. However, evidence in the United Kingdom showed that more Britons would feel threatened by the Soviet Union if Gorbachev was deposed.

4. Dr. Sabin highlighted two main issues: spending on defence, and nuclear weapons. Support for spending had declined in recent years. On nuclear weapons, a large majority indicated opposition of the Federal Republic of Germany while the United Kingdom (and France) showed divided opinion. In general, opinion in the Federal Republic of Germany

was more inclined to see the main threat from the superpower arms race. Others had different concerns, e.g. the United Kingdom public saw more danger from the Middle East. European publics retained support for the alliance, but more support was visible in countries that felt themselves to have an independent defence capability. All Western European nations had felt the impact of Gorbachev, but detailed differences of views on defence related to other justifying factors.

5. The subsequent discussion touched on the generally low level of public knowledge of defence and the difficulty of measuring the saliency of such issues from poll data. On the image of the Federal Republic of Germany among other allies, it was suggested that any concerns were held only at an elite level. There was some agreement that, while politicians could be influenced by poll data, they needed to view results cautiously, e.g. events had shown the wisdom of INF deployment despite evidence of strong public concern.

6. *Major General Hollants van Loocke*, Director of the Royal Higher Institute for Defence, Brussels, provided the third address to the seminar on the subject of "Defence and Europe: Public Perceptions". He started by noting a need for basic consensus on defence, as well as effective explanation of policies; the debate had not, perhaps, been sufficiently democratised. Despite agreement on fundamental values of freedom, justice and solidarity, questions could be asked about different American and European interests. The Kennedy thesis on "imperial overstretch" could provoke questions on Europe's relative value to the United States. Europe might anyway need to look at wider concerns for *all* of Europe. Moreover, there was European concern at non-defence threats such as environmental and health problems, and financial issues such as third world debt.

7. Major General Hollants van Loocke pointed out that the communist threat now came only from military power and not from ideology. In presenting the threat it was important to have credible and reliable figures. It was also important to guard against the assumption that Russia could never change, or that real initiatives could only come from the

1. The texts of the speeches quoted are available at the Office of the Clerk in the language in which they were given.

West. Suggestions that Soviet actions threatened to drive a wedge between the American and European allies implied that NATO was only united by the Soviet threat.

8. Further points included European concern at some United States actions, and a lack of interest in defence in certain countries. Defence spending was sometimes seen as a "tribute" payable to NATO to ensure peace, but with no wish for further involvement. Such feelings in smaller nations, such as Belgium, could be helped by fuller involvement in NATO decision-making. In looking at wider European defence, it could be argued that an Atlantic pillar was required to counter the threat from the East, with other arrangements to deal with other threats. Particular problems for NATO concerned the image of détente as a poor relation, nuclear concerns and doubts over the morality of flexible response and reduced willingness to pay for defence or accept burdens of military presence and exercising.

9. In the subsequent question and answer period there was further discussion of the transatlantic link. Europe's shared values with the United States were mentioned, as was the possibility that the United States might want Europe strong militarily but not economically. The rôle of WEU was touched on in terms of the firm defence commitments of the Brussels Treaty. However, the non-operational nature of WEU was also mentioned.

10. The first day of the seminar closed with a report back from the three working groups. The following main points were made, concentrating on an analysis of changes in public opinion.

Group One

- changes in Soviet foreign policy led to a need to redefine policy in NATO countries;
- the European pillar should be strengthened and the European interest redefined;
- more European sources of information on Soviet capabilities would be helpful;
- in some countries there was a taboo on discussing strategic issues;
- military service could provide an opportunity to make the case for European defence.

Group Two

- there are probably pragmatic as well as ideological reasons for Gorbachev's initiatives, with links between arms control and perestroïka;

- domestic problems more difficult for Gorbachev than dealings with the West;
- the silent majority in Europe support the transatlantic link. But issues like low flying could overshadow this;
- in future, public opinion may focus more on specific national contributions to defence and on national problems;
- presentation might benefit from more emphasis on bilateral co-operation and from a clearer European dynamic and should avoid implying some countries are "hard line" on defence, which others focus on arms control;
- there could be advantages in presenting policy at two levels, e.g. for quality and popular press;
- the firm presentation of policy on INF deployment succeeded. But it was for consideration whether a continued firm approach was right, or might endanger consensus in some countries.

Group Three

- is support for defence linked to the threat? What is the threat?
- threat goes beyond defence and can be perceived at many levels;
- polls may give a partial impression of Gorbachev's impact, given the evidence of a wide recognition of the continuing need for defence and membership of the alliance;
- Soviet internal problems have an impact on foreign relations; is the Soviet system really changing?
- Gorbachev is good at appealing to western media; he understands the appeal of the spectacular;
- UN offer could be a poisoned chalice if West obliged to make concessions in return;
- appropriate for WEU to consider *western* defence. Bound to be different views within alliance. Must look for equilibrium with United States;
- should our reply to Gorbachev be single or diverse (reflecting national differences)? Rôle of parliamentarians important;
- West should be optimistic.

The chairman then raised three further issues: European perceptions of United States defence in the early Reagan years; the potential involvement of the Soviet military in affecting

proposed changes in the Soviet Union; and Gorbachev's ability to deliver real change in the face of severe domestic difficulties.

11. The second day of the seminar started with a presentation from *Edward Mortimer*, assistant foreign editor of the *Financial Times*. He started by noting that it is a journalist's job to see through government "presentation" of issues. It was therefore vital to ensure that the substance of policy was right. Western governments need to agree on the threat and the need for modernisation. In presenting policy, it was wrong to be preoccupied by headlines, or to feel obliged to launch initiatives for their own sake. Gorbachev's ability to catch attention marked the Soviet's continuing room to do better.

12. Mr. Mortimer suggested the following advice:

- *do not* make proposals if you fear acceptance;
- *do not* grudge Gorbachev good publicity when he deserves it. Dangerous to imply that a more benign Soviet Union would be bad for the West;
- *do not* present perestroïka as a trap to delude the West. The public will not agree;
- *do not* sound as though West was trying to score debating points;
- *do not* fear media criticism;
- *do* publicise continuing Soviet war machine to help public appreciate need for "worst case" defence planning;
- *do* consider predicting what Gorbachev will do next. If he does, it will seem stale; if not, he will seem to have failed;
- *do* focus on risk that Gorbachev will fail in his attempts to change the Soviet Union. His task is daunting, with no precedent for dismantling state economy. Two generations have not known market forces, so there will be much resistance to change. Also nationality problems;
- *do* point out threats to security, e.g. in Middle East; with CW and ballistic missiles. Third world threats could affect Europe, e.g. Libya's attack on Italy; Islamic resurgence. The threat to Europe is especially appropriate for consideration in WEU;
- *do* build on the European element of the alliance. The United States link can be unpopular in Europe, with United States forces seen as more "foreign" than European forces. Must avoid provoking United States withdrawal, but

need also to appreciate the divergence of United States and European interests;

- *do* ensure clear aims for arms control.

13. In conclusion, Mr. Mortimer pointed to the continuing need for a nuclear element in deterrence. The superpowers' view of this requirement could diverge from the European view, with the United States and Soviet Union perhaps inclined to look ultimately for a nuclear-free world. A long-term aim would be needed to ensure public support for the continued need for nuclear weapons; one possibility would be a multinational nuclear force.

14. In discussion, Mr. Mortimer touched on the continuing difficulties of EC involvement in security issues. These would grow if, for example, Austria joined the Community. WEU would therefore have an interesting rôle in European defence. Europe should, however, be cautious about suggestions of shared interest with the Soviet Union; Western Europe would be a small part of a "common European home" covering the Eurasian landmass.

15. A talk on the rôle of the WEU Assembly was then delivered by *Mr. Robert Pontillon*, Chairman of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations of the WEU Assembly. He emphasised the long-standing involvement of the Assembly in the question of public awareness and welcomed the seminar as evidence of increased Council interest in the issue. Mr. Pontillon went on to emphasise the rôles of the different parts of WEU, and the importance of maintaining an independent voice for the Assembly. He described the value of the Assembly's debates, both for the media and to compare divergent views on questions of European security.

16. Continuing, Mr. Pontillon considered how the Assembly tries to do more. It seeks to maximise publicity for its sessions and reports, and organises colloquies to improve public awareness of European interests in security and defence matters. The Assembly also seeks to intensify debate in national parliaments. Moreover, the Presidential Committee has sought additional funding to enhance public information activities.

17. Mr. Pontillon also stressed the importance of effective public dialogue between parliamentarians and governments. He expressed concerns, in this context, at the bland responses sometimes produced by the Council to Assembly messages. In the case of disarmament, there was no clear public statement of Council views on important recent developments. Recent replies in the United Kingdom Parliament were a case in point. The Council should at least issue communiqués after its ministerial meetings. Mr. Pontillon commended two

French proposals: the first to establish a European institute for advanced defence studies; the second for an "openness centre" to make known the armaments at the disposal of countries in Eastern and Western Europe. Finally, Mr. Pontillon mentioned the possible creation of a WEU Public Relations Committee with representatives of both the Assembly and the Council.

18. After a further period of study by the working groups, the *Secretary-General* offered some brief remarks. Mr. Cahen started by stressing the good relations between the Assembly and the Council. Both shared a need to improve public interest in, and knowledge of, security matters. There was a need to act discreetly at a time when public opinion saw a reducing threat. It would be important to stress European concerns in trade and foreign policy to explain the importance of security issues. Mr. Cahen went on to express interest in the proposals for a PR Committee, a European defence institute and an "openness centre".

19. *Sir William Shelton* then outlined some areas of agreement that had emerged during the seminar:

- welcome for the profound changes starting in Russia;
- a clear change in public perceptions of the Soviet threat;
- the need for defence spending to plan for the worst case;
- the continuing military strength of the Soviet Union and the risk of Gorbachev failing;
- the continuing need for a western nuclear capability;
- possible lack of public support for necessary spending.

He went on to discuss the importance of getting agreement on policy within WEU and of ensuring good public awareness of WEU discussion.

20. *Mr. Tummers* then spoke of the need to consider change in new circumstances. There could be a risk in continuing as before. He asked if we could reconstruct our general defence culture and our style of dealing with the public. He also touched on the scope for co-operation in a Europe running from the Atlantic to the Urals, and the rôle of the WEU Assembly which was elected by a convoluted route. *Mr. Pontillon* then remarked on the consensus of aims that had been evident, and on the need for a novel, direct and appropriate message. We should not appear to be fighting a rear-guard battle; Soviet initiatives reflected our past efforts.

21. The seminar then received a final report from the working groups, focusing on prescriptions for improving public appreciation of defence issues:

Group One

- WEU might usefully be linked to ideas of building up Europe, a popular and easily understood idea;
- non-WP threats should be explained;
- WEU should have regular contacts with the media;
- there should be scope to build on institutes such as IHEDN;
- disputes between European leaders were counter-productive;
- the public is receptive to WEU's message, but it needs to be conveyed with skill.

Group Two

- the public perceives a change in climate primarily linked to Gorbachev;
- governments must, and do, welcome this change;
- polls show the long-term potential threat continues to be understood;
- we should highlight the western values that unite us. The West is more cohesive than the Warsaw Pact;
- effective security should be seen as a political imperative for Europe, irrespective of the Warsaw Pact threat. A clear view of European security is needed;
- The Hague platform is a good basis for appealing to a sophisticated public. But a shorter, visionary document could also be helpful.

Group Three

- Mr. Mortimer's suggestion to set targets for the Soviets would need careful handling;
- it would be wrong to disparage progress in the Soviet Union;
- we must be open to new ideas in our societies;
- WEU language should be accessible to the public;
- there is a need to define a European consensus;
- force levels must be distinguished from intentions to use force. The public sees no Warsaw Pact intention, but a growing threat in other parts of the world;

- we need a common threat analysis;
- public knowledge of WEU should be improved. A publicity think-tank could be valuable;
- we need to reflect on what we have in common with the United States and what are special European concerns.

22. In a final address, *Sir Michael Quinlan*, Permanent Under Secretary of State at the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, stressed the importance of the subject discussed at the seminar. He stressed that our problems were

those of success. Gorbachev has acknowledged the weakness of his system and adopted our agenda. We need unity and firmness. It would be particularly important to ensure continuing support for the transatlantic link and for retention of effective nuclear forces. He emphasised that the concepts of nuclear strategy are not easy. But it would be wrong to resort to over-simplified and misleading arguments. In general, Sir Michael argued, we are in the middle of a western success. If we feel on uncertain ground, it is because the territory is *unfamiliar* not *unwelcome*.

Western European Union's information policy

AMENDMENT 1 ¹

tabled by Mr. Eisma

1. At the end of the preamble to the draft order, add a new paragraph:
“ (v) Noting that the seats of the Assembly and the Council of WEU are not in the same location as the press agencies specialising in defence matters; ”

Signed: Eisma

1. See 13th sitting, 7th December 1989 (amendment not moved).

Western European Union

(Draft of a new booklet)

REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations ²
by Mr. Tummers, Rapporteur*

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on the draft of a new booklet on Western European Union

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submitted by Mr. Tummers, Rapporteur

Draft Order

*on the draft of a new booklet on
Western European Union*

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting the report on the draft of a new booklet on WEU submitted by its Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations;
- (ii) Considering that this text is an appropriate basis for the general information of parliamentarians and the public in member countries,

INSTRUCTS ITS COMMITTEE FOR PARLIAMENTARY AND PUBLIC RELATIONS

1. To ensure that a booklet based on the report submitted is published in the seven languages of the WEU member countries;
2. To ensure that the text of this booklet will be brought up to date in the event of major developments in WEU prior to its publication.

1. Adopted by the committee by 6 votes to 0 with 2 abstentions.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Pontillon (Chairman); Mr. Ewing (Alternate: *Hardy*), Mrs. Fischer (Alternate: *Bühler*) (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Asselborn, *Büchner*, *De Bondt*, De Hoop Scheffer (Alternate: *Eisma*), Fiandrotti (Alternate: *Pasquino*), Sir John Hunt (Alternate: Sir *William Shelton*), MM. Kempinaire, Kollwelter, Lacour, Stegagnini, *Tummers*.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Tummers, Rapporteur)

Manual for parliamentarians and the public

1. The purpose of this manual will be to provide members of the WEU Assembly, particularly those attending its meetings for the first time and all persons interested in the organisation, with documentation which is as brief, clear and specific as possible about Western European Union. It is intended to replace the booklet entitled "Western European Union" prepared in 1986 by Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations, since this booklet, published in the five languages of the member countries, could not take account of events occurring after its publication and no longer describes WEU as it has developed since Reykjavik.

2. It is therefore essential to produce accurate information about WEU in its renovated form. This aim is particularly important since the public still has little knowledge of the European dimension of security and defence problems. It is therefore desirable for this booklet to be circulated not only to parliamentarians but also to a wide public in all member countries.

3. However, the text of this booklet can but be a provisional text since WEU will remain in a transitional stage until the Council reaches a decision on the final structure and location of its ministerial organs and completes the revision of the modified Brussels Treaty announced in a November 1988 political declaration accompanying the protocol of accession of Portugal and Spain.

***Co-ordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls
(Cocom)***

REPORT ¹

***submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions ²
by Mr. Atkinson, Rapporteur***

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 - (f) The October 1989 Cocom meetings

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Stegagnini (Chairman); MM. Garrett (Alternate: *Lambie*), Hill (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Adriaensens (Alternate: *Noerens*), Böhm (Alternate: *Müller*), Caccia (Alternate: *Malfatti*), De Bondt, Dimmer (Alternate: Mrs. *Lentz-Cornette*), Eich, Mrs. Francese, MM. Intini, Lagorce, Lenzer, Parry, Schmidt, Valleix, Verbeek (Alternate: *Aarts*), Wilkinson, Worms, Worrell.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

- VII. The pros and cons of the Cocom export control debate
 - (a) Moderates and orthodox
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 - (a) Restructuring the Soviet economy and ensuing needs
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Statistics regarding joint ventures in the USSR – Situation on 1st October 1989

Rapporteur's Preface

In preparing this report, the Rapporteur had interviews with the following experts:

Washington DC. (Department of Defence), 6th March 1989

Mr. Francis M. Cevasco, Assistant Deputy Under-Secretary of Defence.

Mr. John Konfala, Director of Strategic Trade, Defence Technology Security Agency.

London, 6th September 1989

Mr. Ian S. McDonald, Head of Defence Export Services Secretariat, Ministry of Defence.

Mr. Eric Beston, Department of Trade and Industry.

Mr. Roy Reeve, Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Brussels, 14th September 1989

Mr. David Fischer, Chargé d'Affaires, Permanent Representation of the United Kingdom at NATO;

Mr. Chris Donnelly, Sovietologist-in-residence, NATO Headquarters.

Paris, 5th and 6th October 1989

Mr. Ranieri Tallarigo, Ambassador.

Mr. Michael Hentley, First Secretary, Technology Service, British Embassy.

Moscow, 23rd and 24th October 1989

Dr. I. Ivanov, Vice-Chairman of the State External Economic Commission of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

Mr. V. Karpov, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

Mr. A. Serdiuk, Deputy Chief of the Department of Scientific and Technological Co-operation with Developed and Developing Countries of the State Committee of Science and Technology of the USSR.

Mr. Yuri S. Derjabin, Head of the Department for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Mr. G. Rahimbayev, Deputy Minister for External Economic Relations of the USSR.

Mr. V. Lapigin, Chairman of the Committee of Defence and State Security Problems of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

The Rapporteur expresses his special thanks to all the officials and senior officers who met him and kindly replied to the many questions they were asked.

Draft Recommendation

***on the future of the Co-ordinating Committee
for Multilateral Export Controls (Cocom)***

The Assembly,

- (i) Aware that the technology gap between the western alliance and the Soviet bloc in sophisticated weaponry has narrowed in recent years;
- (ii) Confirming the continued need to protect advanced western defence technology through Cocom until arms control and reduction, confidence-building and enhanced security over a reasonable period of time justify that need being reviewed;
- (iii) Concerned at past violations of Cocom rules which have led to a serious transfer of strategic technology to proscribed countries, thus enhancing Soviet offensive capability in vital areas at the expense of western security;
- (iv) Concerned at variations in methods of enforcing export controls between Cocom member states;
- (v) Noting the concern of WEU member states at United States extra-territorial claims which effectively discourage exports of non-sensitive technology;
- (vi) Acknowledging the complaints of western high-technology companies that Cocom rules prevent them from taking advantage of valuable trading opportunities, including joint ventures in the Soviet bloc;
- (vii) Welcoming the improvements in Cocom review procedures in recent years, which have reduced the list of sensitive items, but fearing that they may still not be keeping up with the pace of progress in technology;
- (viii) Aware of President Gorbachev's appeal to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on 6th July 1989 to rescind the Cocom rules;
- (ix) Noting requests to grant exceptions to Cocom rules for Hungary and Poland and the Soviet request for closer co-operation with the West on the development of new technologies,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Call for

1. A fundamental reassessment of the current state of Soviet technology;
2. A complete review of the Cocom lists in the light of this reassessment, with a view to encouraging maximum opportunities for trade;
3. Common export and re-export controls and common enforcement policies in the Cocom member countries;
4. Negotiations with proscribed countries for the introduction of on-site verification procedures to accompany all future sales of western strategic technology where appropriate in return for the further liberalisation of the Cocom list;
5. The forthcoming conference on economic co-operation in Europe, to be held in Bonn from 19th March to 11th April 1990, to be used for a discussion of high-technology trade between East and West and the rôle of Cocom in that framework;
6. The establishment of a committee of experts within the CSCE framework which should make recommendations for the sharing of high technology between East and West.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Atkinson, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. The last time that the Assembly of WEU considered Cocom was in the context of a report on economic relations with the Soviet Union (Document 958) by its General Affairs Committee which was debated by the Assembly on 30th November 1983.

2. This report was in response to concerns that the alliance required greater unity of purpose and action by all its members following attempts by the United States Government to apply sanctions on western firms which were supplying technology for the Siberian gas pipeline, the use of western credit to defaulting Comecon countries, and the use of trade as a weapon of diplomacy.

3. It noted the Kremlin aim, set by Khrushchev following the Cuban crisis, to secure superiority in arms over the West, in which western technology would be transferred by fair means or foul. Furthermore it said that, in response to the very long list of technology obtained in the West which was threatening its lead, the United States Government was calling for a stricter limit on supplies of advanced technology to the eastern bloc.

4. In a recommendation adopted by the Assembly (401), the Council was recommended to promote consultation between all democratic countries with a view "to ban all exports of advanced technology which might be used for armament purposes," and to "adapt this and other principles accordingly in the light of results obtained in international negotiations on the limitation of armaments".

5. In its reply to this recommendation (Document 980), the Council referred to various communiqués adopted at the conclusion of ministerial meetings such as those of the North Atlantic Council on 9th-10th June and 8th-9th December 1983, which read as follows:

"Trade conducted on the basis of commercially sound terms and mutual advantage, that avoids preferential treatment of the Soviet Union, contributes to constructive East-West relations. At the same time, bilateral economic relations with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe must remain consistent with broad allied security concerns. These include avoiding dependence on the Soviet Union, or contributing to Soviet military capabilities."

The Council further stated:

"The WEU member states consider that their security interests are best served by stable economic and political relations with the Soviet Union. The benefits of East-West trade to the Soviet and Eastern European economies must be weighed against this consideration, and against the advantages which such trade brings to western businesses and economies."

6. Now, six years have gone by since November 1983 and the world is witness to unprecedented developments in Eastern Europe. The elimination of the iron curtain between Hungary and Austria has allowed tens of thousands of East Germans to leave their country for West Germany. Beginning in November 1989, the East German Government lifted a number of travel restrictions and East Germans can now legitimately travel to the West. Even the most wretched symbol of the cold war, the Berlin Wall, is being demolished in some places in order to allow more people to cross the line between East and West Berlin. Poland has its first non-communist led government since the communists seized power after World War II and the establishment of a western-style market economy has been declared its economic goal. In Hungary free elections are forthcoming and a stock exchange has been established in Budapest.

7. In the Soviet Union a tentative start with a more democratic representation of the people to discuss political questions has led to a national outburst of emotions in an urgent need to finish with the past and seek new ways for the economy to improve the quality of life.

8. In this light, the existence of the Co-ordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (Cocom), which controls western high-technology exports to the eastern bloc, is fast appearing to be a relic of the cold war policy.

9. However this may be, in the turmoil of sweeping changes in East-West relations, the principle of Cocom's rules has not yet been challenged, except by President Gorbachev himself. While on the one hand there is strong pressure to relax controls on western technology exports to the East, on the other hand there are voices in defence of Cocom arguing that it remains as necessary as ever.

10. It is extremely difficult to predict where the present developments in Eastern Europe will lead, but if Western European governments in

the face of history feel responsible for the future of their own continent, which may have important consequences for the rest of the world, they cannot sit idly and just look at what is happening in Eastern Europe. Fortunately they are moving, and the atmosphere in negotiations in both the framework of CFE (conventional forces in Europe) and CSCE (Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe) is fostering optimism. There are doubts, however, whether the same can be said for East-West technology transfer, where Cocom has an important influence.

11. This report seeks to make a contribution to the discussion on questions regarding Cocom which may have to be reconsidered, among which are the following: Has Cocom a continuing rôle to play in the light of this unprecedented and encouraging progress towards democracy, respect for human rights and even an economic system which keeps account of certain capitalist market mechanisms in Eastern Europe, which – it is being suggested – is ending the cold war? If it still has, how can the demands from western firms for a relaxation of these controls be met so that they can pursue the undoubted trading opportunities which exist? Do the Cocom rules in the light of new assessments of the state of Soviet technology require radical reappraisal to ensure that their original aim – to protect western superiority in arms – can better be met?

II. Cocom: history, procedures and policy

(a) History and procedures

12. As the history and workings of Cocom have been described in detail in several recent public documents, this report will mention them only briefly, referring to other documents for more details¹.

13. Cocom was established in 1949 and began operating in 1950 with the aim to avoid delivering to potential adversaries the high-technology items which could enhance their military capabilities and thus reduce the national security of members of the western alliance.

14. Cocom is not based upon a treaty. It is an informal co-ordinating arrangement, the members of which are all NATO countries minus Iceland plus Japan and Australia. Proscribed countries are Afghanistan, Albania, Bulgaria, the People's Republic of China, Czecho-

slovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, North Korea, Poland, Romania, the USSR and Vietnam.

15. Cocom is located in Paris and has a relatively small permanent secretariat. It is in constant and permanent session with a permanent committee meeting weekly and other meetings being held at various intervals, depending on the type of meeting.

16. At these meetings, each of the member states is represented by a delegation which varies from country to country. In general, member states are represented by officials from their Paris embassies, from their Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) delegation or from their national ministries most concerned. Once a year, a high-level meeting is held in order to consider major policy problems and other questions of exceptional interest.

17. In order to be able to understand the activities of Cocom better, it should be recalled that it has to perform three major functions, i.e. the establishment and revision of the three control lists, the co-ordination of export control enforcement activities and the review of special cases where member states are allowed to export embargoed goods to proscribed countries, all of which will be briefly reviewed here.

(i) Control lists

18. The establishment and revision of the control lists is the most important of the abovementioned functions. There are three lists under the following headings: (a) *atomic energy* – goods used for nuclear energy; (b) *munitions* – military goods; (c) *industrial* – goods with military and civil applications.

19. The atomic energy and munitions lists are relatively short, straightforward and unchallenged. The industrial list, however, including technology used in both military and civil or dual-use technology, is inevitably long and complicated and almost monopolises Cocom's attention.

20. Since 1984, the industrial list has been under a rotating review which reconsiders one-fourth of the list every year. For an item to be placed on or taken off the list, a unanimous vote by the members of Cocom is required. At the request of members, an item not included in the part of the list currently under review can be reconsidered with priority. In 1988, an executive committee was created to oversee the review process. At present a majority of the member countries wishes to streamline the list and a process is under way to review the entire control list for items which no longer need to be controlled. According to these member countries, such a thorough revision would allow Cocom to concentrate its attention more closely on items which are really significant militarily.

1. In particular, mention should be made here of two reports: Trade with Eastern Europe, second report from the Trade and Industry Committee, House of Commons, Session 1988-1989; second report drawn up on behalf of the Committee on External Economic Relations on restrictions on strategic exports and US-EC technology transfer, Rapporteur: Mr. M. Toussaint, European Parliament, Document A 2-31/89/part B.

(ii) Co-ordination of export control

21. The co-ordination of export control enforcement activities is carried out by the Cocom Sub-Committee on Export Controls. It should be repeated here that Cocom is not based on a treaty or international executive agreement. Consequently, it has no power to enforce its export rules, which leaves legal enforcement to the law of the individual member countries. Even if it is true that enforcement has gradually improved over the years, there are still countries where the prosecution of violations is not up to standard.

(iii) Review of special cases

22. If the export of specific technology to proscribed nations may involve only a small risk of diversion for military purposes, it can be considered a special case. About half the items on the industrial list belong to a category of special cases which are determined at national discretion. The export of other items, not under national discretion, must be approved unani- mously by the committee. In this category, about 4 000 requests are submitted annually for review by the committee, with about 1 600 being granted an export licence, altogether representing some 1.7 billion dollars.

(b) Policy

23. In order to achieve its main objective of preventing the eastern bloc from obtaining highly sensitive technology from the West, Cocom applies a mix of two different tactics – relative and absolute control.

24. Relative control is concerned with main- taining a relative technological lead over the eastern bloc. Here, only the control of “leading edge” and “state of the art” technologies is important. If applied consistently, such a control policy does not entail controlling second- and third-generation technology, even if more advanced than current Soviet technology.

25. Absolute control covers a far wider range of technology, given that its objective is the control of any technology which is more advanced than Soviet technology, no matter if it is out-dated according to western standards.

26. It is quite obvious that a number of the recurring complaints being made by trade and industry is a result of the control policy which is in two minds.

27. A clear choice should be made between two different objectives, of which one is to simply stay ahead of Soviet technology by one step, while the other is to make sure that the Soviet Union has to spend as much money on research and development as possible in order to keep pace with the most advanced technology available in the world.

28. It seems worth while to consider pursuing a more consistent export control policy. Obviously, as long as there is not a reliable, common assessment of the state of Soviet technology, an absolute-control policy is the safest way to ensure Cocom's objectives. At the same time, an all too prudent attitude is ruling out export markets for western firms which should not always be underestimated.

29. There can be little doubt that accurate knowledge and a common assessment of the state of Soviet technology, agreed to by all member countries, would facilitate the maintenance of a not necessarily shorter but certainly different and more credible Cocom export list.

30. If a choice were made exclusively for relative control, it would not necessarily make the export control régime less complicated. Such a control policy would require an even more accurate procedure for rapidly reviewing the list. A number of different questions would have to be solved, including the question of whether Cocom as it is now organised would be able to handle the consequences of this different approach. However, the choice for relative control would have the undeniably immense advantage of transparency in Cocom's policy, for both the member countries and for the proscribed countries.

III. Western technology

31. It has been said above that the only rationale for the existence of Cocom is for the West to maintain its lead in technology – especially for use in military equipment – over the eastern bloc.

32. This rationale is still valid forty years after Cocom's creation. In a report recently presented by Mr. van der Werff on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions² this was explained in detail. The report made it clear that many problems of the inadequate NATO defence system can be solved only by capitalising on the relative advantages and strengths of the western alliance while exploiting the disadvantages and weaknesses of the Warsaw Pact. Here, advanced weapon technology is considered one of the West's strong points.

33. Areas where the West is said to have technological superiority are inter alia: microelec- tronics, optics, superconductivity, passive sensors, phased array radars, lightweight composite materials and air-breathing propulsion.

34. In general, it is believed that the West has a ten-year technology lead over the East. It is

2. New technologies and their implications for European defence (Document 1186).

assumed, for instance, that the eastern bloc is eight years behind the West in semiconductors, five to seven years behind in computers and a decade behind in machine tools.

35. It should be stressed, however, that in the West the civilian technology has in practically all areas taken over the leading edge from military technology. Research and development in the civilian sector have long had priority and in many instances the military are taking advantage of civilian high technology.

IV. Soviet technology

36. In general, Cocom members can boast a technological edge over the eastern bloc, more specifically the Soviet Union. At the same time, there can be little question that the Soviet Union is lagging behind in the application of modern technologies to the advantage of the quality of everyday life. But these general statements are not accurate if subject to more detailed consideration. In this chapter, a number of phenomena regarding technology in Soviet society will be discussed which might lead to a more accurate and slightly different assessment of the true situation.

(a) Position of defence industry in the Soviet Union

37. For a number of reasons among which the traumatising experience of the second world war is only one, the Soviet Union has for a long time been preoccupied with the building up and maintaining of a formidable military power. This has led to an organisation of its society where, ever since the first five-year plan more than fifty years ago, the military have had priority. Unlike, and in recent years almost contrary to, the situation in the West, the Soviet military have always been given priority when improved industrial skills or results in high-technology research and development became available. They also without exception had priority in allotment of scarce production means and technical personnel and its employees are among the best paid in the country.

38. The particular Soviet defence procurement system has proved its efficiency. Contrary to what happens in the West, no money is wasted in designing and producing several different weapon systems for the same purpose. New technology is incorporated in defence equipment much faster than in the West, the production rate is high and in general the equipment is of good quality, robust and technically reliable. Moreover, any piece of equipment being fielded is integrated in a conceptual system where it is assigned a specific rôle.

39. More so than western defence equipment, Soviet weaponry has been designed with a view to training and use under wartime conditions. The consequent lack of attention for details which are considered inessential makes that weaponry often look crude. When assessing the skill and capabilities of the Soviet defence industry and its products therefore, western observers have often been misled by the consequences of the Soviet approach to weapon systems. In short, an unpolished rivet does not necessarily influence the performance of the MiG-29.

40. This approach also implied, for instance, that the Soviets did not have to put a major effort into the design and production of a jet engine for fighter aircraft which runs 1 500 hours without a major overhaul, simply because the life expectancy of a fighter aircraft in wartime is much less than 1 500 hours. The same is true for safety standards and many other issues which have been important for the West where the armed forces – considered to be a heavy financial burden – have always been subject to democratic scrutiny.

41. The Soviets consider design to be of foremost importance: while in the West weapon systems carry the name of the industrial company which produced them, in the Soviet Union they carry the name of the design bureau which conceived them. These design bureaux, where all technological knowledge is concentrated, can at any given time produce a complete synopsis of the technologies they need, i.e. a specific shopping list. The Soviet intelligence services – the KGB (Soviet Committee for State Security) and GRU (Chief Intelligence Directorate of the Soviet General Staff) and their surrogates among Eastern European services – and Soviet trade and scientific organisations are actively involved in acquiring items from this shopping list.

42. In 1975, the KGB established a special office for industrial espionage composed of qualified specialists in all fields of advanced technologies. These specialists suggest objectives to be pursued, upon which an executive committee together with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs considers the possibilities of acquiring the technology under review. In some cases this technology can be obtained legally in countries with a more lenient export control system. However, the Soviet Union does not consider third countries to be an important source of high technology (see Chapter VII (b)). Illegal means of active industrial espionage are used only if the secret technologies desired cannot be obtained in the open market.

(b) Specific capabilities of the Soviet defence industry

43. All in all, in recent years the Soviet Union has been able to field a whole series of defence equipment, well-integrated into its defence

concept which in terms of suitability for use in an armed conflict is very well able to stand comparison with the equipment of allied forces in Europe.

44. True, there is not enough reason to believe that a 1986 United States Department of Defence assessment which cited the Soviet Union as being behind in 14 out of 20 key technologies with military applications has since changed considerably to the advantage of the Soviet Union. On the other hand it would be mere arrogance to assume that the weapon systems which have been developed by allied countries are superior to Soviet weapon systems under war conditions.

45. Soviet aircraft such as the MiG-29, Fulcrum A fighter/interceptor and the Su-27 Flanker B fighter, both of which could be seen at recent air shows in the West, certainly compelled admiration. The manoeuvrability of the Su-27 is remarkable and it remains to be seen if any allied fighter-bomber would be its match in a real wartime situation.

46. One should also bear in mind that the Soviets have been very well able to develop key military technologies independently from the West. One example is the highly accurate guidance system in Soviet nuclear missiles. It is acknowledged that in general the United States has the lead in missile guidance technique, and this has caused many analysts to argue that the Soviets have stolen western technology for their nuclear missile guidance system. In fact, a recent study has demonstrated that the Soviets have not relied on the West for key technologies in their strategic missile guidance systems for more than forty years³.

47. Submarine technology is another area in which the Soviets are very inventive and extremely advanced. Their command of metallurgical techniques enabled them to build hulls from titanium alloys for submarines with a diving depth of around 3 000 feet in the 1970s. At the same time, they have been experimenting with many different propulsion techniques, among which the liquid metal-cooled nuclear reactor, which requires less space for the same power output as compared with a water-cooled reactor and which provides the Alfa-class submarines with a speed of no less than 42 knots when submerged.

48. Without going into any further detail, suffice it to quote the foreword to the 1985-86 edition of Jane's fighting ships where – four years ago – it is stated that “western research has been fully matched by that in the Soviet Union and that the new classes of the latter's submarines with anechoic tiles, well-formed

fins, polymer ejectors, small screws to break up the water flow and the probability of a capability to vary fin shape, are very advanced designs”. It also says that “innovation, forward thinking, the support of new ideas and the cash to implement them mark the Soviet approach as an unusual one”.

49. With these factors in mind, the Kongsberg-Toshiba case may be seen in a slightly different light. This case was denounced long after Jane's assessment of Soviet submarine technology at the time when the United States heavily contested Japan's dumping practices on the American electronics consumer market. Toshiba was promptly punished with a denial for it to enter the American market for several years. It is still difficult to believe that, without the illegal transfer of sophisticated milling machines for submarine propellers, Soviet submarines would not have been able to challenge the maintenance of the Atlantic Alliance's transatlantic maritime supply lines.

50. A report on crucial defence technologies published by the United States Department of Defence in May 1989 stated that the Soviet Union appeared to have superior technology in high-power microwaves, which can be used as weapons, and in pulsed power, i.e. mobile high-power lasers. The report further noted that the Soviet Union may have a technological lead in developing very high-power sources for electromagnetic or electrothermal guns⁴.

(c) The urgent need for better assessment of Soviet technology

51. On occasion, ominous stories are told in the West about operational high-technology military equipment which afterwards turn out to be red herrings. Such was the case with the Sary Shagan facility in Kazakhstan. For many years, the United States Department of Defence had been arguing that the Soviet Union had developed very powerful ground-based lasers which would be able to knock out satellites. The facility in Sary Shagan was said to be the site of a laser weapon which could be used in an anti-satellite rôle today and possibly in a ballistic-missile defence rôle in the future. The Pentagon used this false information as a rationale for major investments in anti-satellite and anti-ballistic missile programmes, which in turn made the Soviets feel uneasy and compelled them to react.

52. Indeed, the Soviets had planned this facility in the 1960s as a high-powered system capable of shooting down ballistic missiles, but it was downgraded after the signing of the 1972 ABM treaty.

3. Donald MacKenzie: The Soviet Union and strategic missile guidance: technology transfer, nuclear strategy and arms control, 1988.

4. International Herald Tribune, 17th May 1989.

53. In July 1989, a mixed delegation of United States congressmen, scientists and journalists was allowed to visit the facility only to discover some very ordinary lasers with beams a thousand times less powerful than those of the Mid-infrared Chemical Laser (MIRACL) at the Strategic Defence Initiative's White Sands proving ground.

54. In fact, what the United States delegation found matched the assessment of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Earlier, intelligence experts had, however, acknowledged their uncertainty about what kind of laser was actually at Sary Shagan. Pentagon officials allegedly decided to present only a worst-case assessment in unclassified publications in a deliberate attempt to mislead public opinion and boost its own high-technology SDI programme⁵.

55. This is certainly not the only example of misinformation being disseminated in order to help public opinion to accept political goals.

56. Of course, despite a network of intelligence sources, it has not always been easy to make a clear assessment of technology developments in the Soviet Union. With increasing openness in the Soviet Union, however, the West cannot afford to deceive public opinion in order to maintain some of the less attractive relics of the cold war.

57. Recently, a State Department official, Francis Fukuyama, referred to the era of the cold war as history, arguing that "The struggle for recognition, the willingness to risk one's life for a purely abstract goal, the worldwide ideological struggle that called forth daring, courage, imagination and idealism will be replaced by economic calculation, the endless solving of technical problems, environmental concerns." He then confessed a "powerful nostalgia for the time when history existed".

58. West Europeans are less attracted to this sort of nostalgia for an ideological dreamworld. For many years, they have been exposed to the icy breeze of the cold war, dividing countries, families and people with a common history and cultural background, and they no longer accept deception about what is really going on in the eastern bloc.

59. At the initiative of the United States, Cocom members have recently established Security and Technology Experts Meetings (STEM). The assessments of western and eastern technology resulting from the work of STEM, however, are not being reported to Cocom, but to the individual national administrations. In fact, it is left to national administrations to

interpret the expert advice according to their own interests and to decide if they wish to discuss certain technology issues in Cocom or not. Moreover, it seems that until now, STEM has only provided very limited information on technology developments in the Soviet Union.

60. Consequently, discussions in Cocom on placing items on or taking them off the control lists are not based on a common assessment. Combined with the principle of unanimous decisions, this leaves ample room for painstaking and endless discussions and does not help to speed up the review process of the lists. There is urgent need for a better co-ordinated and less ideologically-inspired state-of-the-art technology assessment of the Soviet Union on which to base a sound Cocom policy.

(d) Konversiya

61. With all the efforts of its rigidly centrally-planned economy concentrated on military production and no scope for private enterprise and initiative, there remains little for civil production and the related sorely-needed improvement in the quality of life. The consequence of so many years of this policy for the Soviet economy and society are known only too well to be repeated here. In recent years the leadership of the Soviet Union has started a vast programme to stop and reverse the process of a desperately declining economy.

62. One aspect of this new policy is Konversiya, a dedicated conversion effort within a framework of government directives to reduce military spending and channel the technological knowledge and production capability thus becoming available to the civilian and consumer sector.

63. According to the Chairman of the Committee of Defence and State Security Problems of the Supreme Soviet, drastic reductions in military expenditure are being planned. While the budget for military expenditure in 1989 is 77.3 billion roubles or 8.9% of GDP, it is planned to be reduced to 70.9 billion roubles, or less than 8% of GDP in 1990.

64. It need not be explained here that not all production equipment which has been used for military production can easily be adapted for the production of other goods. This is a reason why the Soviet Union is interested in co-operation with western companies and the acquisition of western technology, since the western economic system has always focused its attention on production for the consumer market.

65. In a recent example of this new approach, the Sukhoi design bureau, well known for its fighter aircraft, has tabled a research programme

5. New York Times, 19th August 1989.

for a supersonic business aircraft to be called Mk VI Su in partnership with the United States manufacturer Gulfstream.

66. Furthermore, apart from a reduction in the number of aircraft being procured for the Soviet armed forces, the Politburo has proposed a 14.2% cut in aerospace research and development over the next three years with the money most likely being diverted to general consumer products, although it seems that a final decision has not been taken yet ⁶.

V. The specific position of China

67. Following improved relations between member countries and China and in encouragement of the Chinese Government's policy of economic modernisation, Cocom agreed in 1985 to maintain a differential in the application of controls of strategic goods to the People's Republic of China. In 1988, export control barriers with this country were again relaxed.

68. It is a well-known objective of the Chinese leadership since 1978-79 to have an autonomous defence industry and at the same time, if there is a requirement for off-the-shelf military technology, to diversify its imports among a number of countries in order not to be dependent on one specific country.

69. At the moment, China is a rather successful exporter of weapons systems to third world countries. In many cases it has established different ways of co-operating with western suppliers in order to produce weaponry such as aircraft, tanks, missiles and guns which is relatively cheap yet still equipped with sufficiently modern technology to be efficient and attractive to third world countries. This co-operation has also been attractive for the western companies involved, especially since many of them in recent years had to deal with a shrinking market.

70. After the violent crackdown on the movement for more democracy on 4th June 1989, all Cocom member countries reacted with indignation. For the time being, negotiations within Cocom for further relaxation of the rules towards China have been deferred, but on the whole Cocom has not changed its earlier relaxed rules for exports to China. At national level, the United States suspended all government-to-government sales and commercial exports of weapons and the United Kingdom, following this example, announced that it would ban all arms sales to China.

71. So far, however, the United States' suspension of arms shipments to China has had little effect. United States military contractors

are still producing the weaponry and China is still paying the bills to keep the production lines open. Delivery is being held up, but most of these items, including a \$502.1 million deal for United States electronics to upgrade China's J-8 II fighter planes, will not be ready until 1991 or later ⁷.

72. In September 1989, the United Kingdom allowed the export of equipment for the F-7M fighter aircraft, a Chinese equivalent of the Soviet MiG 21, which has been developed for export, while denying that it was breaking its own embargo on arms sales to Beijing. In this £30 million deal, Marconi and GEC Avionics were allowed to export cockpit display screens, radar and other equipment. The aircraft concerned here are destined largely for export to Pakistan. According to a Foreign Office spokesman, the ban on arms sales to China covers weapons, such as firearms, missiles and ammunition, and any equipment that could be used for internal repression, which is not the case for avionics equipment ⁸.

73. It can rightly be argued that export of the abovementioned items will not constitute a strategic threat from China to the Cocom countries. Indeed, the British Government has recently stressed that amendments to the Cocom control lists, which can be agreed only by consensus, are made on strategic rather than political grounds, following an assessment of the strategic threat posed by a given country to western security ⁹.

74. All in all, the principal objective of western countries can only be to resume effective business with China and not to isolate it, a policy which is also being recommended in the report "Western European security: defence implications of the People's Republic of China's evolving geopolitical situation", presented by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments of the Assembly of WEU (Document 1203). Consequently there can be no doubt that eventually Cocom rules will again be relaxed as regards China in the not too distant future.

VI. Changes in Cocom's policy

(a) The January 1988 high-level meeting

75. From the establishment of Cocom until the early 1980s, the United States has had a near-monopoly of many advanced technologies and consequently it could easily dictate Cocom policy. This situation has changed in recent years with the spread of advanced technological

7. International Herald Tribune, 29th August 1989.

8. The Independent, 15th September 1989.

9. Reply from the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster to a question by Mr. David Atkinson, House of Commons, 13th June 1989.

6. Jane's Defence Weekly, 16th September 1989.

knowledge to the other Cocom member countries and also to emerging industrial nations in South-East Asia and in the Far East.

76. On the other hand, the United States still has a dominant position in a number of high-technology areas. Of all goods and technologies related to computers (60% of the special cases in Cocom), 80% of the value of contracts which were granted an export licence accrues to American companies, 11% to Japanese, 3% to West German, 2% to British and 1% to French companies¹⁰.

77. With its allies being more assertive in demanding more flexible regulations, increasing pressure from its own Department of Commerce and important changes in the Soviet Union, the United States had little choice but to reconsider its position regarding strategic export controls.

78. This led to a first round of major changes agreed at the high-level meeting of representatives from all Cocom countries in January 1988.

79. Having confirmed their determination to control the exports of items and technology which could endanger their security, the member countries agreed that they should:

- rationalise the lists by concentrating the controls on products and technologies with a strategic value;
- enhance co-operation with third countries regarding the transfer of technology and the control of the final destination of these products and technologies;
- harmonise and enhance the efficiency of national controls in order to prevent illegal transfers of these products and technologies more efficiently;
- facilitate exchanges of these products and technologies between member countries.

80. Furthermore, they decided to organise regular high-level meetings – normally once a year – in order to evaluate the progress made and define the direction to be taken.

(b) Allied criticism of the United States posture

81. Recognising the importance of the January 1988 decisions, the other member countries still strongly felt that more should be done, and with the advent of the Bush administration, western allies increased their pressure on the United States Government to respond innovatively to the political and economic changes under way in the Soviet Union. West Germany

and the United Kingdom in particular urged greater flexibility in export controls. Moreover, two specific issues in the United States export policy were in particular subject to criticism from other Cocom members, the “no exceptions” rule and the claim to extraterritorial jurisdiction.

(i) The “no exceptions” rule

82. A thorn in the allies’ side was the maintenance of the so-called “no exceptions” rule, introduced by President Carter after the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan and meaning that for products subject to the Cocom embargo no exception whatever would be made.

83. Under this rule, the United States consistently opposed any attempt to approve the sale of items included in the Cocom lists. This had the effect of a veto, since Cocom rules by consensus. The rule has been strictly applied, in particular for computers.

84. In its ten-year existence, the rule has effectively blocked sales of strategic goods manufactured in the United States, but it has not always curbed sales of controlled goods produced in allied countries. Allied countries have been able to approve certain contested sales without bringing the matter up for Cocom approval. This was the case for the largest industrial contract between the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union yet, a Simon-Carves £246 million contract to build a plant for factory automation equipment in Yerevan. This plant, scheduled for completion in 1991, will make “programmable logic controllers” – industrial microcomputers used to control robots in factories. It will use technology developed by GEC, which has itself exported similar technology to the Soviet Union and argues that it is not sufficiently sophisticated to be used for military purposes. In disagreement with the Americans, the British Government backed GEC’s argument and has refused to submit the contract to Cocom.

85. During the Reagan administration, proponents of the hard-line policy towards the eastern bloc were all too happy about the “no exceptions” rule because, as Richard Perle, former Assistant Secretary of Defence for international security policy put it recently: “(before 1979) it got to the point where they (Cocom members) were making deals, promising to support the other’s requests for exceptions and negating the safeguards for export control¹¹. In fact, with or without a no exceptions rule, in a body which rules by unanimity such as Cocom, the making of deals is the most effective way of making progress. Consequently, one might wonder whether deciding by simple or qualified major-

10. Le Monde, 28th October 1989.

11. Comments made on 28th February 1989 before the Technology Transfer Caucus of the House Republican Study Committee, Defense News, 10th April 1989.

city would not improve and speed up the decision-making process in Cocom.

(ii) The claim to extraterritorial jurisdiction

86. Another bone of contention within Cocom is the United States' claim to extraterritorial jurisdiction which in practice means that the United States authorities go to great lengths to punish companies in allied countries which re-export or transfer United States technology to any other user without United States Government permission. This requirement for any user of United States controlled technology to comply with American export controls applies to both technology produced in the United States or by United States companies abroad and to foreign users of United States technology. All technology items containing one or more United States controlled components are covered by this requirement. A system of distribution licences permits United States exporters to make multiple shipments of specified goods to approved overseas importers. However, to be an "approved" importer, these importers have to establish an internal control programme and also keep records for inspection or "audit" by United States Department of Commerce officials.

(c) The 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act

87. The United States Congress had already given signs of weariness with the federal export control legislation when, in an attempt to reduce the trade deficit and boost United States exports, it passed the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act in August 1988. This trade act, signed into law on 23rd August 1988, contains a number of measures designed to loosen United States controls over exports of sensitive technology. Most of these measures deal with exports to Cocom members and other western nations. Complaints have been made by industry and government experts that the coming into effect of some of the most important regulations of the trade act is being blocked in the administrative jungle of the Office of Management and Budget. One of these was a regulation which, with some exceptions, would remove the need to license the re-export of goods to Cocom countries (the so-called extraterritoriality claim) if these goods contain 25% or less United States components. Until now this re-export licence was not required for goods with 10% or less United States components. The other was a regulation which removes the requirement that exports of low-level technology to Cocom countries and to countries with Cocom-like export controls be licensed.

88. However, in an announcement in the United States House of Representatives' Foreign Affairs Committee on 5th October

1989, the Secretary of Commerce, Robert Mosbacher, declared that the first of these regulations had now come into force. He also declared that the export controls on a majority of low-level technology goods have been removed as required by the abovementioned 1988 trade act, while the remainder should be decontrolled by the end of 1989.

(d) Recent changes in United States and Cocom export control policy

89. In his 29th May 1989 press conference in Brussels, President Bush made the long-awaited announcement that the United States would lift the "no exceptions" rule. This was followed in July 1989 by the decision to remove export restrictions from certain types of desktop computers. A compromise, negotiated within the Cocom framework, later led to the expansion of the export restrictions list to laptop and more powerful types of desktop computers. The agreement, which came into effect on 15th August 1989, will permit the shipment of personal computer systems based on 16/32 bit microprocessors and with a maximum 4 M Byte of RAM.

(e) More reform projects?

90. Recently, the United States Under-Secretary of Commerce, Dennis Kloske, announced that the Departments of Commerce and of Defence had agreed upon a joint recommendation on reforming export controls for machine tools with an emphasis on enforcement and streamlining, which had been accepted by President Bush and submitted to Cocom. At the moment, no information is available on the contents of this recommendation.

91. The Secretary of Commerce recently stated that the Bush administration is actively discussing the removal of some export controls for the Soviet Union. In particular, the prohibition on exports of equipment and technical data which is useful for the Kama River and Zil truck manufacturing plants may be re-examined.

(f) The October 1989 Cocom meetings

92. In September last, President Bush is said to have written to all the leaders of the Cocom member countries to say that he was "extremely concerned about the rapid erosion of the Cocom régime". He then urged the allies to tighten their export controls and enforce the embargo.

93. He also said that at a Cocom meeting which took place on 4th and 5th October 1989 the Americans announced that all negotiations for streamlining the list of embargoed dual-use

goods would be cancelled until the Europeans and the Japanese come up with new proposals for the enforcement of existing agreements¹².

94. On 25th and 26th October 1989, a high-level meeting of representatives of Cocom member countries was held in Paris. At that meeting, no progress was made towards the further relaxation of the Cocom export régime desired by the European member countries. West Germany obtained no immediate reply to its request for special treatment for Poland and Hungary. However, requests to make exceptions for these two countries could be taken into consideration more quickly¹³. In general, the results of this high-level meeting have fallen short of the expectations of the European and Japanese member countries for a changing attitude towards Eastern Europe. The United States has again succeeded in avoiding making a fundamental choice in the ever-more urgent debate on the vital rôle of western high technology in the restructuring of Eastern European economies and – even more so – societies.

VII. The pros and cons of the Cocom export control debate

(a) Moderates and orthodox

95. The debate which accompanied the August 1989 decisions on a relaxation in computer export controls in the United States is typical of the diverging points of view of those who might be called the moderates and the orthodox.

96. The moderates, led by Commerce Secretary Mosbacher and supported by all other Cocom member states, argued that the former United States restrictions on computer sales harmed companies and aided their competitors. They pointed out that nearly 100 companies in 19 countries have the ability to produce these computers – “absolutely a middling level of technology” – of which some are likely to sell them to the eastern bloc. They argued that personal computers made in Taiwan, India, Brazil, China and other nations which do not cooperate with western export controls are already being sold to the Soviet bloc. The orthodox, on the other hand, led by Defence Secretary Cheney, asserted that the sale of these computers with a technology which, according to him, is not generally available, would give the Soviet Union and eastern bloc countries “significant capabilities they do not now possess” which could also be used for military purposes.

97. Apart from this, Mr. Cheney has advanced the view that the Soviet reform movement is largely motivated by a desire to

obtain ready access to western technology. If the West likes to help the Soviet Union in this acquisition process, he thinks it should be paid for with effective troop reductions and genuine democracy.

(b) Availability of technology in third countries

98. Advocates of a more relaxed Cocom régime always argue that much of the embargoed technology is freely available in non-Cocom countries. Indeed, an increasing number of non-Cocom member countries throughout the world have technology available which is embargoed under Cocom restrictions. Obviously the eastern bloc does not refrain from trying to obtain items of its technology shopping list from these third countries. The importance of this third countries availability should not be exaggerated. Soviet authorities admit that some technology can be obtained in third countries. Such was the case for electronics components obtained from Taiwan which were used for assembling computers in Hungary. In general, it is only bottom-line technology that is freely available. The Soviet authorities unanimously agreed that advanced high technology is very difficult to obtain even from non-Cocom countries since countries which have it normally try to respect rules that concord with Cocom rules.

99. The fact is that western countries, and especially the United States, have appealed to the countries most concerned to introduce export and re-export legislation in order to prevent the transfer of high technology to eastern bloc countries. A number of these countries, such as Austria, Finland, Singapore, South Korea and Sweden, have replied positively.

100. For a long time, the United States has considered Austria, to mention only one example, to be a sieve for technology transfer to the eastern bloc. As a neutral country, it had always been reluctant to offend the eastern bloc by imposing a too rigid export control régime. Moreover, national legislation did not grant Austrian customs the power to search and seize suspicious consignments. Nevertheless, in the summer of 1986, the seizure of a load of key computer parts, including computer work stations which could be used in the design of aircraft, missiles and components of space-based weapons, intensified existing negotiations between the United States and Austria on the technology transfer issue. Recently, the Austrian Government agreed to step up enforcement efforts and strengthened its customs laws, including a new provision allowing customs officials to search suspicious consignments passing through Austrian transit or free-trade zones.

12. Sunday Times, 8th October 1989.

13. Le Monde, 28th October 1989.

Since then, whatever flow of technology there might have been through Austria to the eastern bloc has been curtailed¹⁴.

101. A different approach has been chosen by Australia. For many years it had already co-operated with the western strategic community in controlling the export of dual-use technology. In April 1989 it decided to join Cocom as a full member. One of the reasons for this decision was that it had not previously participated in the work of Cocom other than as a spectator and consequently had minimal influence on the content of the guidelines applied. Exports of dual-use technology subject to the administration's export controls had been increasingly handicapped by the government's non-participation in Cocom. The ministers concerned stated that notwithstanding the major recent thaw in East-West relations the underlying rationale for Cocom still existed and was accepted by Australia.

102. The problem with third countries is that sovereign states can by no means be forced to adopt specific legislation as proposed by other states. The United States tried to find a solution to this problem by including a provision in its 1985 Export Administration Act whereby non-Cocom members are granted Cocom-like trading privileges if they co-operate fully on export control issues. This provision undoubtedly encouraged certain states to co-operate more closely in this field.

103. Another solution advocated by all other Cocom member countries is to rationalise the Cocom list further and remove obsolescent items in order to be able to concentrate on really important strategic items and technology. It may still take some time before this solution is reached.

104. Meanwhile it is rather unlikely that most of the other third countries concerned will follow the Australian example of joining Cocom. Third countries might be tempted more easily to co-operate on export control issues if Western European countries could develop a common encouragement policy towards these countries, a solution which would have the additional advantage of creating more uniformity in export régimes.

(c) Cocom and missed business opportunities

105. A well-known argument in discussions on Cocom is that companies in Cocom countries might be deprived of vast business opportunities and billions of dollars in contracts. Missed opportunities are here understood to be those cases where a proscribed country has made a call for bids from one or more companies established in Cocom countries and where the final

offer could not be made because of Cocom restrictions, presupposing that the proscribed country had the financial means to fulfil its potential obligations.

106. In fact, it is extremely difficult to give a reliable figure for these missed opportunities, in particular since any such estimate would also include a number of imponderables of which the following are only two examples: would a country have had the financial means to make a bid for another contract if a preceding bid had led to a contract with the ensuing financial obligations? Would an earlier bid, if it had been successful, have led to better economic performance and, as a consequence, to even more financial means for the country in question to buy western technology?

107. Notwithstanding these impediments which are being acknowledged by the Soviet Union, estimates have been made. The Soviet authorities estimate the missed opportunities for France over the years 1981-86 at 2.3 billion roubles, or 23 billion francs. A western source has given a figure of 9.3 billion dollars for the same period for the United States¹⁵.

108. These figures may be fundamentally unreliable, but there can be no question that western companies are missing contracts because of Cocom embargoes.

109. On the other hand, at a hearing in the European Parliament's Committee on External Economic Relations with representatives of the Union of Industries of the European Community in September 1985, the industrialists stated that Cocom does not paralyse East-West trade¹⁶. It should be noted, however, that this hearing was held four years ago, long before June 1987, when the Communist Party's Central Committee ordered extensive changes in Soviet economic management, including a specific emphasis on higher technology.

110. There is also a different kind of missed business opportunities. This occurs when a proscribed country such as the Soviet Union is denied technology from Cocom countries which cannot be obtained in third countries. On several such occasions, to name only pumping stations for pipelines, the Soviet Union after developing and producing these goods on its own, has been able to compete successfully with western companies on foreign markets.

VIII. Illegal exports and re-exports

111. Even if Cocom countries have a reasonably efficient system to control exports of dual-use technology to proscribed countries, it

14. Washington Post, 28th August 1989.

15. Messe Magazin International, 1987, No. 7.

16. Second report on restrictions on strategic exports and United States-EC technology transfer, Rapporteur: Mr. M. Toussaint, European Parliament Document A 2-31/89/-part B.

will never be leak-proof. Each year there are incidents of illegal exports, either through trickery by shrewd businessmen, or through laxity in administrative controls. Especially in the business world, the complaint is often made that some countries have a greater tolerance of Cocom violations than others, thus favouring their national identity. It seems fair to state that illegal export scandals occur in each of the Cocom member countries in turn. Understandably enough, these scandals get more attention as the technology involved is more sensitive, which causes countries with a highly-developed level of technology to be more exposed. A few cases are cited here as examples to show that such exports may occur in any Cocom country.

112. This year it became known that furnaces worth £7 million to make a secret substance which can help to give ballistic missiles pinpoint accuracy had been exported freely from the United Kingdom to the Soviet Union because of blunders by the CIA and the United Kingdom Department of Trade and Industry. The material, known as carbon carbon, placed on the missiles as a nose cone shield, burns evenly on re-entry into the atmosphere, eliminating the wobble which causes inaccuracy in metal-tipped warheads. The producer of the furnaces had received export clearance from the DTI and officials changed their minds only when it was too late. A United States committee recently investigated this incident as one of the worst five security lapses since the second world war¹⁷.

113. In February 1989, two Japanese executives were arrested on suspicion of having illegally sold to the Soviet Union a chemical solution that can be used in missile guidance systems¹⁸.

114. A French executive has been under criminal investigation since 1988 for his alleged rôle in the sale to the Soviet Union of sophisticated milling machines used in building war planes. The executive had a combination of jobs, which is not unusual in Cocom countries, but which at the same time entails potential conflicts of interest. He was employed by France's electronics-manufacturing association and advised Machines Françaises Lourdes, a leading French machine-tool manufacturer involved in the contested sale to the Soviet Union. The sale took place in 1986 for delivery in 1987 and 1988. At the same time, this executive worked as a consultant for the Ministry of Industry, preparing official lists of embargoed technology, and represented the Foreign Ministry in meetings of allied governments on strategic trade. Industrial observers have said that France's machine-tool sector is losing ground to European and Asian competition which might

make it vulnerable to Soviet agents seeking to sign contracts with companies prepared to get round western embargoes.

115. The West German Government decided to tighten its export control procedures after the all too well known illegal export of chemical technology to Libya.

116. Recently, an Italian computer firm was accused of having exported \$25 million of embargoed state-of-the art flexible manufacturing systems to the aviation industry of the Soviet Union. It is being said that this equipment, combined with the computer firm's technicians stationed at the plant to keep the manufacturing systems operating, produces components for the Yak-41, a supersonic vertical-take-off fighter aircraft¹⁹. It should be mentioned here that this case still has to be settled.

117. In these cases, it would be very difficult to prove that government agencies have been negligent on purpose. Yet there is no doubt that many Cocom countries do not have an adequate export control system. Moreover, the fact that half of the items on the industrial list are determined at national discretion opens the way for individual interpretation of the control lists. In this light, it can be no surprise that countries will interpret the list according to their own national interests, which may be different from one country to the other. The more items there are on the list, the more reasons there are for internal differences.

118. On top of this, there are great differences among Cocom countries when it comes to the system for enforcing national export legislation. Differences range from one country not having an export control system at all, others not publishing their national control lists and countries with rather elaborate systems and too much red tape. A better tuning-in of the export control and enforcement systems in Western European countries might solve many recurring questions and remove legitimate tension. It would also contribute to the much needed transparency and predictability of the Cocom control régime for everybody concerned.

***IX. No relaxation of eastern bloc attempts
to acquire western high technology
through espionage***

119. With on the one hand the existence of extensive Cocom lists of embargoed technology and increasing efforts in the West to develop new technologies which are so advanced that they are not yet included in the Cocom lists, and on the other hand a number of eastern bloc countries which are eager to acquire these tech-

17. Manchester Guardian International, 1987, No. 7.

18. Daily Telegraph, 21st February 1989.

19. Sunday Times, 8th October 1989.

nologies for various reasons, there can be little doubt that these countries will employ all possible means to attain this end.

120. Although it is difficult to provide hard evidence for this grey area of perpetual human activity, there are indications that the relaxation in the cold war attitude has increased rather than reduced eastern bloc spying efforts. Western intelligence officials have made it clear that the KGB, GRU and other eastern bloc intelligence services have intensified their efforts to obtain western technology, trying to take advantage of the improved climate in East-West relations.

121. The interest of the Soviet Union in illicitly obtaining information in the United Kingdom even went so far that there was no way decently to stop it. Recently the British Government, confronted with a continued expansion of Soviet espionage activities, opted for a discreet approach in the hope that a mixture of strong hints and quiet diplomacy would have an effect upon the Kremlin leadership. In the long run, neither this policy nor a personal appeal by Prime Minister Thatcher to President Gorbachev had any effect, which then resulted in the expulsion of 11 Soviet diplomats and journalists in May 1989²⁰.

122. According to counter-intelligence authorities in West Germany, there has been a rise in attempts by eastern bloc, especially East German, agents to recruit West German businessmen to supply them with blueprints and other data²¹. It was said that the East has focused in particular on data about electronics, data-processing, telecommunications and lasers. Most probably the principal goal of this activity is to modernise the Soviet economy, but it should not be forgotten that the military, used to decades of preferential treatment, will not easily give up the best part of the cake if it becomes available.

123. In a recent report on foreign espionage activities in Switzerland from 1980 to 1988, the Swiss Government made it clear that the share of espionage by the eastern bloc has increased considerably. Advanced technology, in particular computers, microelectronics and know-how, has been their main goal²².

124. In the quest for new technologies, no methods are left untried. This year, an interesting new way of spying was again brought to public attention when three West German computer hackers were arrested on suspicion that they conducted electronic espionage by stealing secrets from western computer banks world wide and selling the data to an eastern bloc intelligence service. This intelligence service was

believed to have used passwords and other information obtained from the hackers to penetrate top secret United States computer systems, including the United States Department of Defence staff data bank, and data banks of the United States nuclear arms laboratory at Los Alamos and NASA²³.

125. The fact that eastern bloc intelligence activities for obtaining western technology are continuing or have been intensified is no reason for special alarm. Such activities have existed as long as there have been friendly or less friendly relations between nations. In the capitalist industry, companies are at great pains to obtain secrets from their competitors. Even if the methods used are not always fair or legal, it is a fact of life with which nations have to deal, in the first place through their counter-intelligence services.

126. The case of eastern bloc technological espionage clearly shows the continuing great interest in western technology, which these countries need for their military and at least as much for their civilian industry. The existence of Cocom rules certainly compels the eastern bloc to be more active in the intelligence field, but it would be erroneous to think that these activities would stop if Cocom did not exist. Secrets there will always be, not only between states but also between industrial companies, if not for security reasons, for reasons of economic competition.

127. With all the indignation manifested by the party which has unmasked a spy ring, both sides know that espionage is a fair game, played with foul means.

X. Joint ventures

128. A fairly recent way for the Soviet Union to acquire western technology is the establishment of joint ventures with western countries, the first of which were established in 1987. In Appendix I to this report, some very recent statistics are given, released by the State External Economic Commission of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. These statistics clearly show that many of the existing joint ventures are in public catering and consultancy.

129. Officially, the government of the Soviet Union has not set any priorities for the nature of activities of joint ventures, lest this be wrongly interpreted, but apparently there is a strong desire for more foreign capital and know-how to be channelled to industrial production such as machine building, making use of components which are not available in the country itself.

130. The USSR has bilateral agreements on technology co-operation with a number of

20. The Independent, 22nd May 1989.

21. International Herald Tribune, 29th August 1989.

22. Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 11th August 1989.

23. International Herald Tribune, 3rd March 1989.

Cocom member countries, but in all these agreements the base-line is the Cocom list together with the United States extraterritoriality claim which means that in general no high technology is involved.

131. Cocom rules have prevented the establishment of joint ventures proposed by Soviet partners in such fields as laser technology, machine-tool equipment, computers, electronics, metallurgy, printing technology and chemical technology.

132. According to Soviet authorities, Cocom was also an insurmountable obstacle when, in negotiations with the European Community, they proposed co-operative projects in such fields as the control of transcontinental pollution and the restoration of bronze art objects.

133. The abovementioned practice can hardly be reconciled with a joint venture, Sterch, recently established between Honeywell Inc. and the Soviet Ministry of Mineral Fertiliser Production in a programme to modernise state-run fertiliser production plants. Sterch will provide the Soviet Union with production equipment involving microprocessors, computer software, a special data system and related training techniques.

134. Here, the United States Department of Commerce, which approved the deal, described the equipment as old, low-level technology which was no longer banned from export.

135. The conservative Centre for Security Policy, however, alleged that "the venture would entail the transfer of the necessary machinery and continuing technical support needed to permit the Soviets domestically to produce highly-advanced control devices", all "modern technology exceedingly well-suited to efficient chemical – and nuclear – weapons production".

136. It was also said that this deal would "encourage others both in the United States and in allied nations to seek to export similar dual-use equipment and know-how to the Soviet bloc". The United States Government was accused of inconsistency in its efforts to curb the export from western countries of systems applicable for manufacturing chemical weapons.

137. Without detailed knowledge of the technology involved in this deal, it is difficult to say who is right, but if technological co-operation can be the subject of such widely differing views between those who know more, it needs no explanation that the export control régime for dual-use technology in Cocom countries is far from transparent and predictable.

XI. Cocom and perestroïka

(a) Restructuring the Soviet economy and ensuing needs

138. No discussion of Cocom would be complete without mentioning perestroïka, or the restructuring of Soviet society, initiated by President Gorbachev, who now seems to have gained support for his ideas from the majority of policy-makers in his country. Several other Warsaw Pact countries, while having chosen a slightly different approach to their own specific situation, equally support his policy.

139. The main goal of this immense restructuring plan is to improve the quality of life of the Soviet citizen. A major obstacle is the desperate situation of the country's economy, which needs almost instant treatment with radical means.

140. To this end, the Central Committee of the Communist Party took drastic decisions at its June 1987 meeting. It ordered changes in Soviet economic management including an end to fixed subsidised prices and decentralisation of economic decision-making. Firms should be more independent with direct links between manufacturing companies and the suppliers of raw materials. Telecommunications and computer links should be built up or improved. There should be a dedicated commitment to high technology.

141. In the West, as in the East, the prevailing opinion is that if the Soviet economy is not going to improve, there will be little scope for real changes in other areas. At the moment, the circumstances are such that only advanced technologies and management techniques available in the West can help to modernise the industry by making it less labour-intensive and more efficient. This is where Cocom appears on the scene.

142. In his speech in the Council of Europe of 6th July 1989, President Gorbachev specifically referred to Cocom, venturing the following opinion:

"I think that the distinguished audience will agree that in our age segregating economic ties from scientific and technological ties is something less than normal. Yet, East-West relations have of late been bled white by Cocom.

If one could justify such practices at the peak of the cold war, today many restrictions seem utterly ridiculous.

Of course, we, too, are often excessively closed. However, we have begun to straighten this out. We have started to take down our 'domestic Cocom' – the wall separating military and civilian production – in particular, in connection with conversion.

So maybe experts and representatives of the respective governments could get together and break all those cold war log-jams.

To bring secrecy down to reasonable limits which are indeed required for security, and to give the green light to the normal two-way flow of scientific knowledge and technical art ”.

143. In the Soviet Union, there is indeed a vast and urgent need for high technology.

144. The western computer industry, for instance, estimates that the Soviet Union needs about twenty million personal computers and an unknown number of higher-performance computers to help it to streamline its bureaucracy and industry. Cocom lifted its restrictions on certain categories of personal computers only a few months ago, but many others are still on the list.

145. Another sector which, according to the Soviet leadership, urgently needs to be modernised and expanded is telecommunications. The Ministry of Communications is planning to triple the number of telephones in the country by the year 2000, which should give the Soviet Union a telephone penetration of 90 million sets at that time. There can be no doubt that a telecommunication system not only benefits the consumer, but also serves state and security purposes. The transfer of communications technology is therefore also watched by Cocom. A \$1 billion contract between Alcatel and the USSR comprising the delivery of 250 000 telephone lines and the creation of a joint venture for assembling digital telephone exchanges is still pending because of objections raised in Cocom. In particular, Cocom has objected to the joint venture for digital equipment which could threaten western security in case of hostilities.

146. In fact, Cocom's difficulty is that virtually all modern technology is dual-use, including computer equipment and related software which is being used for managing live-stock in modern dairy farms and automated manufacturing equipment for the most trivial consumer goods. A prominent example was given by the Soviet Deputy Minister for External Economic Relations, G. Rahimbayev, who in an earlier capacity had signed a contract with a company in California for delivery to the Soviet Union of an electronically controlled system, regulating weight and moisture of paper in a paper mill. The contract was later embargoed by the United States authorities for reasons of possible dual use of the technology concerned.

147. Soviet authorities have made it clear that practically all potential high-technology co-operation projects with the West fail because of Cocom restrictions. This is particularly so in

the areas of telecommunications, chemical technology, electronics, biotechnology, data-processing, computer science and machine tooling, all fields with a vast potential for trade and co-operation.

(b) Western conditions for Soviet economic integration in the world economy

148. The Soviet Union has made it ever more clear that in order to improve the quality of life of its citizens and to make its restructuring process a really durable success, it is aiming at integration into the economic system of Europe, thus opening its economic windows to the world and improve its overall trade relations.

149. Although there may be minor differences between western industrialised countries, they agree on the general conditions to be fulfilled for real integration. Some of these conditions have been met in the recent past, such as legalisation of foreign investment, and the possibility of joint ventures and private co-operatives.

150. What remains to be done has been most clearly stated by the United States Government which, notwithstanding the changing attitude in the Soviet Union, is apparently maintaining its hardline policy of letting the Soviets solve their own problems. On 4th October 1989, Secretary of State James Baker made it clear that the United States would block Soviet accession to the World Bank, the IMF and the GATT, as long as it did not fully introduce within its borders the free market economy, the legal right to private ownership, the end of state control and state monopolies and stabilisation and convertibility of the rouble.

(c) Soviet efforts to meet these conditions

151. The Soviet Government is well aware that, in order to reach its goal, more is needed than good intentions and solemn declarations. Rather radical changes are now taking place regarding the convertibility of the rouble. In December 1988, it ordered an end to the multiple exchange rate system for roubles against foreign currency. At the moment, there seems to be agreement among Soviet officials to replace the multiple exchange rate for business transactions and private citizens with just three: one each for the earnings from exports of raw materials and of manufactured goods, one for tourists and one for Soviet citizens. Even more exciting is a decree which calls for the eventual convertibility of the rouble. As an initial step, the government ordered auctions in which rouble-rich firms in need of hard currency would be able to buy surplus dollars from other firms.

152. On 5th November 1989, a first auction was held at a rate between 13 and 15 roubles to the dollar. Hard currency auctions will be held regularly and groups permitted to participate will be broadened.

153. On 25th October 1989, the Soviet Union announced that the tourist exchange rate of the rouble would be slashed by 90% as from 1st November 1989. This will also affect Soviet citizens travelling abroad who will have to pay 6.26 roubles to the dollar instead of the present official rate of around 63 kopecks to the dollar.

154. This new step certainly reflects the Soviet Government's willingness to take dramatic steps in pursuit of integration into the world economy. It is expected that this first step in devaluation of the rouble will soon be followed by other changes in exchange rates for all export transactions.

155. The Soviet authorities are also well aware that their price-fixing system, which has no relation to economic reality, is a main stumbling-block on the road towards restructuring. Legislation to bring about price reforms will be examined in November 1989. According to current planning, wholesale prices will first be subject to reform, with retail prices to follow after a few more years.

156. Decentralisation of the economic decision process is being introduced and, according to Deputy Minister G. Rahimbayev, a total of 8 000 Soviet companies are now allowed to make contacts with foreign counterparts autonomously.

157. A first explosion of liberty in doing business with foreign countries has led to purchases in equipment and materials up to a total of 5.5 billion roubles which later could not be justified and is now standing idly.

158. The planning now being implemented is to make these companies fully responsible for their own budget and cashflow. In fact, they will have to manage with the money they are earning. If they do not have enough, they will have to borrow.

159. Co-operative firms are still considered to be a hot issue in the Soviet Union. High profits and the corresponding high incomes of members of these firms have sometimes caused envy. For western observers it is no surprise that such small flexible firms have wide scope for profiting from inefficiencies in the present economic system. Soviet citizens understandably are still inclined to denounce these methods of doing business, but the authorities have not challenged the principle of co-operative firms and it is trusted that this new branch of activity will survive its growing pains. At the moment, co-operative firms are not allowed to be middlemen in East-West trade, but, according to Deputy Minister G. Rahimbayev, they could be granted a licence for such business in specific cases.

160. In connection with the abovementioned changes in economic policy, Soviet authorities keep asking western economists for advice to help their economy emerge from the slump.

161. Alan Greenspan, the United States Federal Reserve Board Chairman, recently visited Moscow at the invitation of Leonid Abalkin, President Gorbachev's leading economic adviser. The purpose of Greenspan's visit was to advise the Kremlin on ways to rebuild the Soviet financial system.

XII. Conclusions

162. The entire debate on Cocom which is being pursued at the moment can be reduced to two main questions: what is the current assessment of what is traditionally called the threat, as posed by the Soviet Union and its allies, mainly united in the Warsaw Pact? What can or should the West, and more specifically those countries which are members of Cocom, do to encourage and help the current process of change taking place in Eastern Europe?

163. As regards the first question, regarding the "threat", it may be interesting to note here that in government officials' statements made at the presentation of the latest edition of the United States Department of Defence's "Soviet Military Power", published in September 1989, the usual aggressive propaganda tone has been tempered considerably.

164. True, in this publication, it was said that Soviet strategic nuclear forces were modernised with "extraordinary momentum" and that despite Moscow's plans to cut defence spending by 14.2%, expenditure since 1985 has increased by an average of 3% a year in real terms. At the same time, however, the publication notes a "significant trend" in reduced Soviet naval activities around the globe and it evaluates the likelihood of a United States-Soviet military conflict as being "perhaps as low as it has been at any time in the postwar era".

165. Likewise, the Military Balance 1989-90, a publication of the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, is making it clear that the ability of the Warsaw Pact to mount a surprise attack on NATO will shortly be "barely plausible" because of the unilateral troop cuts started nine months ago by the Kremlin. Mr. Heisbourg, the Institute's Director, has said that growing tensions between different members of the Warsaw Pact are undermining its ability to act as an alliance.

166. Indeed, the rapidly-changing situation in different Eastern European countries, where divergent opinions and decisions on national political and economic developments inevitably must have consequences for their mutual relations and for the cohesion of the Warsaw Pact,

makes one wonder about the effectiveness of the Warsaw Pact as a political and military alliance. In this framework, it appears ever less appropriate to speak of an existing threat. One might rather speak of security risks, caused by internal social and political unrest.

167. All in all, the general conviction is clearly that the "threat" has diminished, even if some of the allies still prefer to give an ambiguous reply when the question is asked directly.

168. As for the second question – what should the West do to help restructuring in Eastern Europe to succeed – there is far less unanimity.

169. Regarding Poland and Hungary, both the United States and its European allies agree that they can and must act to help these countries in modernising their economies. But the United States is still more cautious when it comes to bold action. This was again demonstrated at the Cocom high-level meeting of 25th-26th October 1989 in Paris.

170. Until now, the United States administration has been adamant in its opinion that it can (and wishes to) do nothing to help the Soviet Union out of its economic swamp. It still seems to aim at winning an ideological battle which it won long ago.

171. There has been little basic disagreement on this issue between the Republican government and the Democratic opposition, as was perfectly demonstrated by Senator Nunn in a recent address before the United States Congress when he said: "We should give a red light to offering Moscow money or materials which serve mainly to defer the hard choices between guns and butter, between muddling through and systematic reform."

172. There are signs however that the United States administration is starting to move, particularly in response to the accelerating changes in Eastern Europe.

173. An instance of this is the announcement that President Bush and President Gorbachev are to meet informally on 2nd and 3rd December on board American and Soviet warships in the Mediterranean. Both sides agree that the main burden of arms talks would fall on the formal summit conference in 1990, and have suggested that co-operation and economy might be the main subject for their informal meeting in December, with other subjects not being excluded.

174. In Western Europe, the prevailing opinion appears rightly to be that the Soviet Union has already made the choice between guns and butter in favour of the latter. The trouble is that the systematic reform which has already been set in motion will most likely not be able to perform

quickly enough without substantial western aid, both financial and technological. A failure of the present Soviet leadership to provide citizens with enough food and consumer goods in the short term may well have disastrous consequences for internal security in Eastern Europe, with possible unpleasant consequences for Western Europe.

175. Whether or not history repeats itself, it is useful to recall historic parallels. After the first world war, the allies wished to punish Germany by imposing an extremely restrictive peace treaty with absolutely no regard for possible financial repercussions. The subsequent impact of this peace treaty turned out to be among the main origins of the second world war.

176. If the cold war has been an ideological struggle, the western world has won it gloriously. It should now act correctly to consolidate its victory by preventing a world power in dissolution becoming a serious security risk.

177. What should be done in the framework of Cocom in order to reflect a more positive and forthcoming attitude by its member countries towards Eastern Europe?

178. First and foremost, it should be noted that under present circumstances Cocom still has a right to exist. At the same time, it seems irrational to make exceptions in the Cocom export control régime for Poland and Hungary as long as these countries are full members of the Warsaw Pact, which automatically implies the exchange of any information of military relevance, including technological information.

179. As long as there are no perfect guarantees for peace and security, Cocom members have a right to protect their advanced military technology.

180. There is general unanimity among the Cocom countries that the industrial list of dual-use technology is too extensive and inaccurate. On the other hand, it is also true that the rules are interpreted differently in the various member countries and the situation is not clear. An important effort should therefore be made to make Cocom rules and their application transparent and predictable, which is in the interest of both Cocom member states and the proscribed countries.

181. For member countries to be able to agree on more accurate Cocom lists, a serious effort should be made to establish a commonly-agreed and regularly-revised assessment of the state of military technology in the Soviet Union.

182. Consideration should be given to opportunities for on-site verification as regards end-user destination and application of technologies and goods with a possible dual-use capability which are being exported from Cocom countries to proscribed countries.

183. The conference on economic co-operation in Europe, to be held in the CSCE framework in Bonn from 19th March to 11th April 1990, offers a starting point for discussions on industrial and technological co-operation as mentioned in the agenda. In this framework, western countries should be prepared to discuss Cocom with an open mind.

184. Many opponents of a more flexible attitude towards the Soviet Union maintain that the process of restructuring is doomed, that recent developments can easily be reversed if hard-line politicians take over from the present Soviet leadership. In this opinion, the West should not therefore be flexible or co-operative vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Of course, nobody can predict the future but it seems very difficult to imagine how a process can be reversed which has already introduced changes in the Soviet Union and some of its Eastern European allies which are forcing Western Europe to reconsider the bases of its position. Conducting imaginative politics involves taking risks and requires courage. At the moment, the Soviet Union is

seeking to co-operate with the West. This calls for restrictions on the export of sensitive technology to be eased, and other steps such as the removal of the veto on the Soviet Union joining organisations like the IMF and the GATT.

185. Admittedly, the Cocom countries would be taking a risk if they decided to lift certain restrictions on the export of sensitive technology. But the Soviet Union is certainly prepared to negotiate conditions under which restrictions could be eased.

186. Moreover, one should bear in mind that Cocom countries will also be taking a risk if they decide to keep present export restrictions intact as has been argued elsewhere in this report.

187. Given the fact that Cocom countries have to choose between two alternatives, both of which involve taking risks, they would be well advised to take the more imaginative decision to negotiate with the Soviet Union and other eligible countries regarding the conditions under which certain export restrictions might be lifted.

APPENDIX

*Statistics regarding joint ventures in the USSR **
Situation on 1st October 1989

1. *Number of joint ventures*

	Units	%	Statutory fund (millions of roubles)	%
Overall	940	100.0	2 505.6	100.0
With socialist countries	105	11.2	352.1	13.9
With capitalist countries	748	79.6	2 036.2	80.6
Mixed (with both socialist and capitalist countries)	12	1.3	26.2	1.0
With developing countries	60	6.4	63.2	2.5
Mixed (with both capitalist and developing countries)	8	0.9	27.9	1.1
Mixed (with both socialist and developing countries)	—	—	—	—

2. *Contributions in the statutory fund*

	Million roubles	Million US dollars	%
Overall	2 505.6		100.0
Soviet	1 439.1		57.4
Foreign	1 066.5		42.6
Socialist countries	172.8		6.9
Capitalist countries	862.1	1 436.8	34.4
Other countries	31.7	52.8	1.3

* *Source:* Soviet National Institute for Studies on External Economic Relations attached to the State Committee on External Economic Relations of the Soviet Council of Ministers.

3. *Distribution of joint ventures in the economy of the USSR*

Economic activity	Number	%
Overall	940	100.0
1. Fuel-energetics	5	0.5
2. Metallurgy	5	0.5
3. Wood chemics	47	5.0
4. Machine building		
5. Production of personal computers and software	122	13.0
6. Construction and production of building materials	60	6.4
7. Transport and communications	18	1.9
8. Agro-industrial activities	41	4.4
9. Social activities	308	32.8
9.1. Trade and catering	58	6.2
9.2. Tourism, hotel and transport services for the public	53	5.6
9.3. Medicine, public health service ..	46	4.9
9.4. National education	0	0.0
9.5. Light industry	31	3.3
9.6. Consumer goods	58	6.2
9.7. Film and video-production, concert activities	37	3.9
9.8. Printing industry	25	2.7
10. Preproduction models, engineering consultancy and mediation services and staff education	287	30.5

*Co-ordinating committee for Multilateral Export Controls
(Cocom)*

AMENDMENT 1¹

tabled by Mr. Rathbone and others

1. At the end of paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, insert “and for worldwide co-operation in controlling the supply of munitions and of industrial goods with military applications to terrorist groups”.

Signed: Rathbone, Finsberg, Pontillon, Sarti

1. See 12th sitting, 7th December 1989 (amendment amended and agreed to).

Action by the Presidential Committee

REPORT

*submitted on behalf of the Presidential Committee
by Mrs. Staels-Dompas, Vice-President of the Assembly*

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-

1. In the second half of 1989, the Presidential Committee's main activities were to ensure the continuity of the Assembly's political action, prepare the December session and ensure that the Assembly had the material and financial means to carry out its tasks.

*I. Dialogue with the Chairmanship-in-Office
of the Council*

2. In political matters, the Presidential Committee was able to establish an in-depth dialogue with the Belgian presidency. It endeavoured to encourage the Council to strengthen WEU as an instrument for European consultations on security questions.

3. Thus, at its meetings with the Chairmanship-in-Office, it underlined the value it attached to WEU studying the new conditions of European security following the progressive collapse of the régimes set up by Stalin and to the Council examining the consequences to be drawn from future disarmament agreements and the introduction of European measures to verify these agreements.

4. The decision to set up an institute to promote a European identity in security matters helped the reactivation of WEU. In this connection, the Presidential Committee congratulated the Belgian presidency for having obtained the Council's agreement to the creation of a WEU institute for security studies.

5. Last June, the Assembly asked the Council to conduct a joint study of the implications of the implementation of this plan.

6. In his exchange of correspondence with the Chairman-in-Office of the Council¹, the President of the Assembly, clarifying certain points, stressed how necessary he believed it to be to ensure co-operation between the Assembly and the future institute. He made firm proposals to this end and asked that a representative of the Assembly be able to explain the views he had just expressed. The Presidential Committee hopes that a dialogue with the Council will allow harmonious relations to be established between the Assembly and an institute whose aims seem to converge with its own and whose physical proximity implies close co-operation between the two users of the same building.

*II. Visit by a delegation
from the Supreme Soviet*

7. The Presidential Committee also implemented Order 70, addressed to it by the Assembly, asking it to invite members of the Supreme Soviet to continue the exchanges of views that were started in Moscow in April 1987. To this end, it arranged to receive a delegation from the Supreme Soviet consisting of five parliamentarians led by Mr. Kravets, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic

1. See Appendix I.

of Ukraine and Vice-Chairman of the Committee for International Affairs of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union. Admittedly, rather a long time had elapsed between the two invitations, but the Soviets themselves had drawn the Assembly's attention to the value of inviting members of the new Supreme Soviet elected in spring 1989 by more democratic means in the context of perestroika.

8. The members of the delegation which the Supreme Soviet sent to Paris² had a particularly open approach indeed and this enhanced the interest of the talks the Presidential Committee had with them after their meetings with the General Affairs Committee and the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. The Soviet delegates listened attentively to the briefing on the democratic working methods of our Assembly and, under the heading of the common house, discussed our views on the foundations of European security.

9. The leader of the Soviet delegation, for his part, underlined the importance of and need for perestroika in the Soviet Union, denied the existence of a Soviet threat and rejected the accusation that his country was seeking to encourage a rift between Europeans and North Americans. He protested at WEU statements on the need to maintain nuclear deterrence, stressing that a technical incident might trigger off a disaster. Referring to Mr. Gorbachev's words, he predicted the end of the division of Europe thanks to a system of technical, cultural and economic co-operation agreements for the greatest benefit of the inhabitants of the common house.

10. Winding up the meeting, the Soviet delegation expressed its satisfaction with the talks that had just been held. It considered a constructive approach had prevailed over conflicting views and the talks should therefore be continued. The Presidential Committee agreed and it was decided to organise a further meeting in Moscow in 1990. Further to this, however, it was planned to hold regular meetings of parliamentarians at least once a year alternately in Paris and Moscow, the chair being taken by the delegation of the host country. Discussions would be limited to the political and military aspects of European security to take account of the Assembly's concern to concentrate on these matters in accordance with Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty.

11. These talks on the conditions of peace, disarmament and co-operation in Europe have already been overtaken by recent events in the Central and Eastern European countries. The opening of the Berlin wall and political developments in the GDR and Czechoslovakia mean WEU must define new conditions for European

security and take immediate steps to sketch the outline of a new European order. Informed that a motion on these matters was being prepared with a request for urgent procedure, the Presidential Committee agreed on the interest of holding such a debate during the December session.

III. Preparation of the session

12. The agenda adopted by the Presidential Committee at an earlier meeting will thus be amended and completed by the Assembly.

13. Conversely, it is with regret that the committee took note of requests to withdraw from the agenda reports attributed to committees. This was the case for the report by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on the future of low flying and the report by the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on developments in command, control, communications and intelligence.

14. Since the agenda of a session forms a balanced whole, the President of the Assembly has informed your Rapporteur that he proposes to ask the committees to ensure that they submit realistic proposals to the Presidential Committee when the agenda of the subsequent session is drawn up. For the debates to be coherent, the committees must complete their work within the prescribed time-limits, i.e. at least three weeks before the session opens.

15. In preparing for the session, the Presidential Committee also examined the question of parliamentary observers since Greece and Turkey's interest in WEU had to be taken into consideration. It will be recalled that, while believing their wish to accede was premature, the Council decided to allow privileged treatment for these two countries, which are informed of the results of its discussions through their ambassadors to the country exercising the presidency. The Presidential Committee, for its part, has decided to increase the number of members of the Greek and Turkish delegations of parliamentary observers in proportion to the number of members of their parliamentary delegations to the Council of Europe: Greece, which has seven representatives to the Assembly of the Council of Europe, will have four to the WEU Assembly and Turkey, which has twelve in Strasbourg, will have seven in Paris.

16. The Presidential Committee was concerned at certain parliaments' delay in ratifying the protocols of accession of Portugal and Spain to the modified Brussels Treaty. It therefore instructed the President of the Assembly to approach the countries concerned to endeavour to ensure that the enlargement of WEU was

2. List at Appendix II.

completed before the December session. Unfortunately, the Assembly has to note that, more than a year after the Council's decision to enlarge WEU, the parliamentary ratification process has still not been completed. However, it is to be hoped that it will be before the end of the year.

17. In the light of the forecasts communicated to it by the Council and in view of time-limits which cannot be reduced, however, the Assembly secretariat had to make the necessary arrangements to allow the Portuguese and Spanish parliamentarians to speak in their own languages. A special effort has been made to recruit, for the first time, not only interpreters capable of working in the organisation's two new languages but also staff capable of recording speeches in those languages.

18. Since the Assembly's premises are not yet adapted to these new working conditions, transitional measures have had to be taken for the December session. Thus, it was decided to ask the Council of Europe to allow the Assembly, on an exceptional basis, to use a large room in its avenue Kléber premises. The Presidential Committee wishes to thank the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe, Mrs. Lalumière, for kindly acceding to our request.

19. The Presidential Committee is therefore happy to be able to allow the delegations of Portuguese and Spanish observers to benefit here and now from the facilities provided for in the Rules of Procedure for full members. At the next session, we expect to have the pleasure of extending an official welcome to the Portuguese and Spanish Delegations with full rights.

IV. Reorganisation of the WEU building

20. The Presidential Committee's main administrative concern was to reorganise the Assembly's premises as soon as possible to allow it to hold its sessions and committee meetings in accordance with the requirements of the Rules of Procedure. The draft supplementary budget transmitted to the Council in January therefore included detailed proposals, drawn up on the basis of an architect's study, for work to be undertaken to reorganise the building. These proposals were not agreed to by the Council, which considered that the work proposed went further than the strict requirements of the enlargement of WEU. New and less costly proposals were therefore submitted to the Council but the latter insisted on even larger reductions. It then had another architect conduct a further study for comparative purposes. Since it was not satisfied with the result of the study it had asked for, the Council finally agreed to the study submitted by the Assembly, subject to its reductions.

21. On completion of this preliminary work, the Council asked the Assembly to submit a new draft supplementary budget giving only the details of expenditure necessary for enlarging the organisation, excluding all other considerations. When revising its draft, the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration not only updated estimates for reorganising the premises but also those relating to other budget heads. Indeed, because of the delay in the procedure for ratifying the convention of accession, some of the elements taken as a basis for estimates under these heads had changed.

22. It should be stressed that the draft supplementary budget was approved by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration only subject to a reservation about the inadequacy of the sums foreseen for reorganising the Assembly's premises. The Presidential Committee in turn approved this document only in the light of the reservation expressed by that committee. The draft supplementary budget was therefore transmitted to the Council with a specific reference to this reservation.

23. By approving the draft supplementary budget submitted to it, with the amendments contained in document BA (89) 11 Revised, at its meeting on 28th November, the Council appears to have expressed at least its partial agreement with the Assembly. It endorsed the remark by the Council's financial experts on the Budget and Organisation Committee that it was important to attribute sufficiently well-equipped and spacious offices to the Portuguese and Spanish parliamentary delegations. The reduction in sums earmarked for reorganising the building had, indeed, led to a reduction in the space to be used by the Assembly since transferring the documents reproduction service to the basement had not been authorised. Furthermore, the Council asked that an office be reserved for the Secretary-General on the second floor of the building which had been attributed to the Assembly. Finally, by insisting that the work on the second floor be limited to the installation of a few communicating doors between offices, the Council achieved substantial savings, but did not allow the same amount of floor space to be given to delegations with equal numbers of members.

24. The Presidential Committee's action in regard to the preparation of the revised supplementary budget is now submitted to the Assembly for ratification in accordance with Rule 48(2) of the Rules of Procedure.

25. As soon as the preparatory stage of the plan was started, a problem of responsibilities arose because the Council considered, in view of its responsibility for the WEU building, that the President of the Assembly would have to submit to it for prior approval all administrative acts

relating to the execution of the work, whereas the Presidential Committee considered this to be essentially the responsibility of the President of the Assembly in accordance with the principle of the Assembly's autonomy in managing its budget, since the work was included in its supplementary budget at the request of the Council itself. Budgetary autonomy seemed indeed to be the basis of the Assembly's political independence and, as such, an essential condition for carrying out its tasks. A compromise solution now makes the Assembly the contracting authority for the reorganisation of the building, the agreement of the Council or the Chairmanship-in-Office being sought for certain specific acts.

26. Because of the delay in approving the plan for reorganising the Assembly's premises, it will not be possible for work to start until after the December session. It is therefore not at all certain that it will be completed by 15th May 1990 as planned. The Presidential Committee has therefore asked that the budget for the financial year 1990 include the appropriations necessary to allow the Assembly to hold its spring session away from the seat of the Assembly. However, since it is impossible for

the Presidential Committee to take a final decision at present in view of the uncertainty still prevailing about the date of the effective enlargement of WEU and the date on which work will be completed, the credits relating to a session away from the seat have been frozen, following an agreement between the Council and the Assembly, pending a decision by the Presidential Committee, probably at the beginning of next year.

27. On 29th November 1989, the Council approved, with amendments, the draft budget for the financial year 1990. This budget will be examined by the Assembly at the sitting indicated in the order of business.

28. On the whole, in the second half of this year the Presidential Committee has had to take many steps linked with the present period of enlargement and restructuring of WEU. It is to be hoped that the solution of the problems now pending will allow the Presidential Committee to concentrate in future on the deepening of its political dialogue with the Council. Such a dialogue will be particularly necessary at this new juncture in Europe, which imposes increased responsibilities on WEU.

APPENDIX I

*Letter from Mr. Eyskens, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium,
Chairman-in-Office of the Council of WEU,
to Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly*

16th October 1989

.....

I was delighted with our talk on 14th September, which gave us an opportunity to review problems facing WEU, be it in the activities of the ministerial organs or of the Assembly. I am gratified to note that we hold parallel views on the development of WEU as an organisation and its place in the building of Europe.

Like you, I attach the greatest importance to close, confident co-operation between the Council and the Assembly.

On the problems raised in your letter of 25th September relating to the enlargement of WEU and the consequent necessary transformations in the Assembly premises, I can but confirm that it is the presidency's wish that the organisation be able to work as soon as possible in the best conditions. The Assembly, as a service using the premises, must clearly have a say in the implementation of the work, the Council obviously being concerned that this should be done in accordance with the global budget adopted for this purpose. The matter was discussed by the Permanent Council on 2nd October. The Secretary-General will contact you to determine procedure allowing the work to be carried out flexibly and rapidly to the satisfaction of all concerned.

Like you, I hope it will be possible to decide at the ministerial meeting on 13th November to create in WEU a European institute for advanced security studies with its seat in Paris subject to decisions that will have to be taken at the appropriate time on the seat of the ministerial organs, in the prospect of the building of Europe.

I think we are very broadly in agreement on the aims and tasks that should be attributed to such an institute. Similarly, I bear in mind the Assembly's interest in such a project insofar as it will have to share premises with the institute which may be instructed to conduct studies or other work connected with that of the Assembly.

As you know, the presidency is endeavouring, not without difficulty, to draw up a draft decision likely to obtain the approval of all parties. I believe our efforts will bear fruit in the few weeks still separating us from the ministerial meeting.

The presidency will receive with interest any suggestions you wish to make to it on this delicate matter and will endeavour to ensure that they are taken into account whenever possible.

The idea of inviting a representative of the Assembly to inform the institutional group of the Assembly's views may raise certain problems insofar as this is a technical body dependent on the Council. However, I will inform the Permanent Council of the content of the communication you intend to make to me on this subject.

I am sure we shall have an opportunity to pursue this dialogue, to which I attach great value, at the meeting with the Presidential Committee on 17th October.

.....

Mark EYSKENS

Mr. Charles GOERENS,
President of the Assembly,
Western European Union

*Letter from Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly,
to Mr. Eyskens, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium,
Chairman-in-Office of the Council*

17th October 1989

.....

Further to my letter of 25th September 1989, I have the honour to enclose a note setting out the Presidential Committee's views on relations between the WEU Assembly and the European institution now being set up.

I should be very grateful if you would bring this note to the attention of the Council and allow a representative of the Assembly to be heard when it is examined.

.....

Charles GOERENS

H.E. Mr. Mark EYSKENS,
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium,
Chairman-in-Office of the WEU Council of Ministers,
2, rue des Quatre-Bras,
1000 Brussels.

*Note on relations between the WEU Assembly
and the European institute*

17th October 1989

In Recommendation 467, the Assembly indicated the value it attaches to the early creation of an institute for advanced security studies under senior officials and with the wide degree of independence necessary for accomplishing its tasks. This autonomy does not seem incompatible with the status of "subsidiary body of the Council" in view of the precedents created by Protocol No. IV relating to the Agency for the Control of Armaments and the Council decision of 7th May 1955 creating the Standing Armaments Committee.

However, information available to the Assembly makes it wonder how far the plan now being worked out by the Council corresponds to the views it expressed.

However this may be, the Presidential Committee wishes to hold a dialogue with the Council on this subject to which it attaches particular importance and take part in the definition of principles which should govern the close relations that the Assembly considers should be established with the institute.

The committee first notes that the Assembly will be concerned by the institute's work in gathering information. This task will necessarily imply the creation of a data bank that the Assembly should be able to use for the preparation of the reports it attributes to its committees. Above all, however, the institute's exercise of its task of promoting a European security identity among public opinion in member countries may raise problems of co-ordination with Assembly action. The Assembly therefore wishes to take part in guiding the institute's work in this area and consider with the Council the conditions for such participation.

Finally, since the Assembly and the institute will be accommodated in the same building, there will have to be administrative co-operation in managing services of joint interest.

Conditions for such co-operation will have to be worked out with due respect for the principle that the services of the Assembly come under its authority alone. The Assembly believes that its political independence, essential to the exercise of its twofold rôle of political impetus and supervision, implies that it have full responsibility for running all the services provided by its secretariat.

The conditions for harmonious co-operation can be defined within the framework of these principles.

The Assembly's views on its administrative co-operation with the institute are set out hereafter.

Administrative co-operation between the Assembly and the institute

Since the Assembly and the institute are to be accommodated in the same building, there will have to be administrative co-operation between them in running the following services:

- security;
- reproduction of documents;
- documentation;
- managing the building;
- liaison with the French authorities.

There should be a more rational sharing of responsibilities in this connection and a management committee should be set up composed of representatives of the Assembly and the institute, responsible for settling problems linked with the use of services of joint interest.

1. Security

There are two aspects to security:

- security of persons;
- security of classified documents.

At present, responsibility for security as a whole is incumbent upon a service of the Paris ministerial organs which give priority to the protection of secret documents. The Assembly for its part has to take the necessary steps to ensure the security of parliamentarians at Assembly sessions and committee meetings.

Responsibility for the security of persons should be incumbent upon the Assembly while the institute would ensure the security of its classified information.

Problems raised by the security of persons have increased in magnitude due to the threat of terrorism, while the enlargement of WEU has increased the number of parliamentarians exposed to this danger. The Assembly is intent on its officials being fully responsible for solutions to its own problems. The Assembly official responsible for security should therefore be empowered to take all necessary steps to ensure the security of persons, which implies having authority over the security guards.

It should be recalled that, in its supplementary budget for 1989, the Assembly already included the estimates necessary for installing diverse equipment in the entrance hall to ensure effective control over the movement of persons and the introduction of miscellaneous objects into the security area.

2. Reproduction of documents

The Assembly, which already has a large documents reproduction service, is studying the possibility of an installation with a higher performance to cope with the increase in its work linked with the reactivation and enlargement of WEU. While remaining under the responsibility of the Assembly, this service might be made available to the institute, bearing in mind that at certain times the reproduction of Assembly documents has to be effected very urgently and must be given priority.

3. Documentation

The Assembly had thought of establishing a more advanced, computerised documentation service.

However, because of the nature of its work, the institute will have to set up a large documentation service including a data bank and a well-stocked library. It might allow the Office of the Clerk to make use of its documentation and library which would mean the Assembly would not have to make what would necessarily be a costly effort in terms of both staff and finance.

The libraries of the institute and the Assembly might be merged, the Assembly allocating its library estimates to the institute in exchange for free access to the latter's library.

4. General services

To date, these services have been run by the administrative service of the WEU ministerial organs in Paris which had the largest number of staff and occupied two-thirds of the building.

However, without even counting the large number of temporary staff, there will certainly be more staff in the Assembly secretariat than in that of the institute and they will occupy most of the space.

It should also be emphasised that the conference rooms are used mainly by the Assembly, which included in its supplementary budget for 1989 estimates for building two large rooms, each with fifty seats and seven interpretation booths. It would be particularly rational for the Assembly to be made responsible for their upkeep and programming their use, since the disparity between parliamentary time-tables in member countries and the many considerations that will have to be borne in mind when it fixes the dates of its meetings make its own programming delicate.

The same is true of the restaurant which will have to meet the requirements of clients consisting mainly of parliamentarians and permanent or temporary members of the Office of the Clerk.

Finally, the Office of the Clerk seems to be the main user of the telephone.

For all these reasons, responsibility for managing the building and all the abovementioned services should be given to the Assembly secretariat, which would ensure that the institute's needs were met.

Transferring these services would obviously imply transferring posts with due respect for their holders' interests.

5. Liaison with the French authorities

Since the majority of members of the WEU staff depend on the Assembly, it would be normal for duties such as the issue of official residence cards, the distribution of petrol coupons, etc., to be attributed to an official of the Office of the Clerk. If there are legal obstacles to transferring these duties, the Assembly's Head of Administration should be able, through the management committee, to share in running this service.

APPENDIX II

*Composition of the Supreme Soviet delegation to the WEU Assembly**10th-13th July 1989***Mr. Vladimir KRAVETS**

Vice-President of the Committee of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR for International Affairs
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Ukraine

Mr. Oleg BOGOMOLOV

Member of the Committee of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR for Economic Reforms
Director of the Economics Institute of the World Socialist System of the USSR Academy of Sciences

Mr. Fedor BOURLATSKI

Member of the Committee of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR for International Affairs
Political observer of the Literary Gazette

Mr. Vladimir LOBOV

Member of the Committee of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR for International Affairs
First Deputy Commander of headquarters of the armed forces of the USSR

Accompanied by:

Mr. Ivan KOROSTIOLEV

Chargé de mission at the Department for International Relations of the secretariat of the
Supreme Soviet
Secretary of the delegation

Mr. Vladimir OROKHOVSKI

Section head at the Department for Co-operation and Security in Europe
Delegation counsellor

Written questions 282 to 284 and replies of the Council

QUESTION 282

*put to the Council by Mr. Caro
on 20th September 1989*

1. What services will the WEU ministerial organs provide to ensure the continuity of the various European sessions for advanced defence studies organised by specialised institutes in the member countries and to assist the association of alumni set up at the close of the first session in Paris in November 1988, in view of the fact that the Council specified in the second part of its thirty-fourth annual report that "this association would be under the aegis of, and receive material support from, WEU" ?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
on 7th November 1989*

1. The WEU ministerial organs support the association of alumni, set up in November 1988 at the first European session for advanced defence studies, by providing the association's secretariat with practical assistance on an ad hoc basis, for example, with the preparation of agendas, summary records and correspondence with members. On 21st April 1989, the association held a meeting of its delegates in the WEU building in Paris, at which the ministerial organs and the Office of the Clerk were represented.

2. If the association develops, as is hoped, following the second European session for advanced defence studies, it will no doubt direct its activities towards a consideration of defence programmes and problems in the WEU member states, and to providing the alumni with the relevant detailed information. Other forms of support could then be considered in conjunction with the leaders of the association.

3. The ministerial organs are, in any case, keen to ensure the continuity of the European sessions whilst respecting each host country's preferences with regard to the duration of activities, the topics covered, and the publicity required.

QUESTION 283

put to the Council by Mr. Péciaux

In accordance with Assembly Recommendation 467, the Council seems determined to put an end to the existence of the WEU

specialised agencies at the end of 1989 and to set up a European institute for strategic studies.

1. In view of that institute's specific staff requirements, it seems probable that there will be no place for at least some of the officials employed by the agencies. Can the Council say how many officials employed by the agencies will be offered posts in the institute?

2. Will the staff of the agencies having contracts of indefinite duration have these contracts maintained by the institute or will they have to accept fixed-term contracts? In the latter case, how will they be compensated for the deterioration in their status decided upon unilaterally by the Council?

3. In the case of staff with indefinite contracts or whose contracts are terminated prematurely, will the Council take as a basis the precedents created when the European Communities were enlarged or when ESA replaced ELDO and ESRO in fixing accompanying measures adapted to the implementation of a highly political collective measure which cannot be assimilated to the termination of individual contracts provided for in the rules of procedure of the co-ordinated European organisations?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
on 28th November 1989*

1. At its ministerial meeting on 13th November 1989 in Brussels, the Council decided to set up a "WEU institute for security studies". The institute will be housed in the organisation's building in Paris. The aim is that it should be operational with effect from 1st July 1990. Apart from the director, who should be appointed by 1st February at the latest, the institute will have a team of five permanent experts.

At the same time, the Council decided to wind up the Paris-based Agencies for Security Questions¹ and the Standing Armaments Committee. The Council will take the necessary measures to terminate the contracts of staff currently employed by those bodies, in accordance with the legal provisions in force.

The director of the institute will be appointed by the Council. Under the Council's supervision, he will recruit the other A-grade staff.

¹ Excluding the Agency for the Control of Armaments.

The candidatures of those staff currently serving in the agencies and wishing to be recruited by the institute will be considered by the director having regard to the requirements and particular nature of the duties to be carried out. Priority consideration will be given to the merits and aptitude of those persons.

The Council is fully aware of the human dimension of the problem created and will do everything it can to prevent personal hardship to the staff members concerned. With regard to those staff who are not re-engaged, the WEU Staff Rules will apply, in particular Annex VI concerning regulations on the indemnity for loss of job.

The Council has already offered B and C-grade staff members the option of voluntary resignation with loss-of-job indemnity. To date, seven staff members have taken up this offer.

QUESTION 284

put to the Council by Mr. De Decker

Can the Council indicate:

- how the arms controls provided for in the modified Brussels Treaty that were not abolished in 1985 will be applied, in particular control of the non-production of chemical weapons;
- how the secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committees and its groups and working sub-groups will be assured,

when an institute for defence studies replaces the present WEU Agency?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
on 7th November 1989*

1. Under the Rome declaration, the controls on conventional armaments which the modified Brussels Treaty assigned to the ACA were, in accordance with Article V of Protocol No. III, entirely lifted with effect from 1st January 1986. In the same declaration, ministers decided that the "commitments and controls concerning ABC weapons would be maintained at the existing levels and in accordance with the procedure agreed up to the present time".

Since the ACA was established by the treaty, its fate can be decided only in the context of a review of the modified Brussels Treaty.

2. The Standing Armaments Committee and its international secretariat were set up by a Council decision of 7th May 1955.

In accordance with a decision of the Ministerial Council in Bonn, the international secretariat was abolished on 23rd April 1985.

In the context of the possible abolition of the Agencies for Security Questions, the Council would necessarily be called upon to decide on the fate of the SAC.

Whatever happens, any decision concerning the SAC will in no way prevent WEU from addressing, in accordance with the appropriate procedures, questions of co-operation between the member countries in the field of armaments.

INFORMATION LETTER

*from Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU
on the activities of the ministerial organs*

(mid-September – mid-November 1989)

London, 23rd November 1989

Dear President,

I am sending you this eighth information letter in the aftermath of the Brussels Ministerial Council and with a view to your Assembly's forthcoming debates during the second part of its thirty-fifth ordinary session. It therefore concerns the activities of the ministerial organs from mid-September until 14th November.

*
* *

Europe has embarked upon a new phase in its history, a phase characterised not only by the end of armed conflict and the renunciation of the use of force but also by an extraordinary awakening of the people living between the Elbe and the Urals. The fundamental principles laid down in the Helsinki Final Act spelt the break-up of totalitarianism and the destruction of the barriers erected in the heart of Europe. Today, we are seeing them disintegrate under pressure from the people. Only recently, Poland and Hungary seemed a fragile avant-garde. Today, we are wondering how much longer Czechoslovakia and Romania can resist the tide of freedom.

The remarkable thing about this irresistible and no doubt irreversible movement – since it springs from the very depths of oppressed societies – is its peaceful nature. But we must not be blind to the dangers inherent in both the latent risks of confrontation between the countries of Eastern Europe and the extremely high social cost of the necessarily slow transition of a closed and interventionist economic system to an open market economy. Whereas, after the war, we witnessed several examples of the transition of capitalism to Marxist socialism, we have so far had no experience of the transition – no doubt full of pitfalls – in the reverse direction.

There is an urgent need to give political and economic endorsement to Western Europe's active solidarity and this means progressing towards European union. It would be a mistake to mark time and opt for a "wait-and-see" policy just when the attraction of the successes of the European construction process is having such a tangible liberating effect. We are gathering the fruits of forty years of perseverance in the defence of freedom and of firmness in dissuading all attempts at aggression.

WEU is at the hub of this Europe around which are organised the concentric circles of European political co-operation, the European economic institutions (EC and EFTA), the European security organisations (Eurogroup and IEPG) and, lastly, the Council of Europe. It is important to maintain their homogeneity and extend their activity.

The member states of WEU have just reaffirmed their willingness to widen the process of joint strategic thinking. Priority has been given to an assessment of the likely repercussions on European security of the future CFE treaty, particularly as regards the rôle and structure of the nuclear deterrent, the arrangements for defence at the borders and the stationing of forces on the territory of other WEU member states.

The happy prospect of a cut in force levels and armaments and the removal of asymmetries must not cause us to be carried away nor prompt us to take unilateral and premature measures. The Soviet military machine will no doubt make up for any loss of numerical strength by increased power and effectiveness. Whatever happens, the Soviet Union will remain a major military power. Its domestic difficulties may block the progress of perestroika. The reforms desired by the leadership may tomorrow

Mr. Charles GOERENS,
President of the Assembly
of Western European Union

be stopped by the leadership. Consequently, an assessment of the threat is not an outmoded and useless exercise for WEU. Defence co-operation has lost nothing of its topicality and urgency. At the same time, we are witnessing the emergence of a new mission for our security forces, namely the verification of arms control agreements and the implementation of confidence-building measures. That will require us to devise new forms of co-operation, whether in relation to on-site inspections or to space-based observation.

In all these areas, WEU – Assembly and Council – will in the coming months have to play a pivotal rôle in the service of European security.

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Over the last two months, the activities of the Permanent Council and its working groups have been geared principally to the completion of the prescribed reports with a view to the Enlarged Council on 30th October and the Ministerial Council in Brussels. The Permanent Council met three times, on 20th September, 25th October and 8th November respectively.

The Special Working Group met on 24th August, 12th September and 6th October. On 5th and 20th October, joint meetings were held with the Defence Representatives Group (DRG). Discussions focused on the preparation of the ministerial debate on topical questions. Both groups carried on their assessment of European security requirements in the period 1992-1995 and considered how this subject should be addressed in order to allow ministers to have an informed discussion and to decide on further work in that area. Possible co-operation between member countries on verification of a CFE agreement was also discussed with a view to identifying specific areas for such co-operation. The DRG finalised its report on training.

As regards the ad hoc Sub-Group on Space, its work has progressed remarkably quickly since, by its third meeting on 28th July, the interim report for ministers was already in its final states of compilation and drafting. The Belgian presidency, with the help of the Secretariat, had submitted a draft which was discussed on 4th September and consequently reworked. A new draft was circulated on 14th September together with a draft executive summary. These two documents were reviewed by the sub-group on 29th September and then finalised by WEUCOM, consensus having been reached on the report's concluding chapter. The Enlarged Council was therefore able to approve the report and summary without any difficulty.

At its meeting on 20th October, the Mediterranean Sub-Group continued its exchange of information on the evolution of the situation in the Balkans, the Maghreb and Cyprus. It also considered a joint report regarding naval deployments in the Mediterranean which underlines the need for European countries to carry on shouldering their responsibilities in the Mediterranean basin with adequate forces to play an active peace-time rôle in the prevention and, if the need arises, management of local crises.

At its meeting on 12th September 1989, the Special Working Group agreed to ask the Mediterranean Sub-Group to reflect on the future direction of its work so that it might focus more sharply on the assessment, from a politico-military point of view, of the current and potential threats to the security interests of WEU member countries in the region.

The group agreed that its terms of reference were geographically limited to the Mediterranean, but that this did not preclude other areas where the politico-military stakes affected the security of the riparian states. Thus, the group will continue its assessment of regional situations and, where appropriate, its exchanges of information on bilateral relations but it will also from now on report on wider politico-military problems affecting European security. A number of topics are being considered for 1990.

At its meetings on 18th September and 19th October, the Institutional Working Group continued its work on finalising the draft ministerial decision concerning the setting-up of a WEU institute. The Enlarged Council was able to resolve the question of the director's grade and to agree on what the institute should be called. It should be pointed out that all the discussions, which culminated in a draft ministerial decision satisfactory to all the delegations, took place in an excellent atmosphere which reflected member states' willingness to arrive at a positive solution to the benefit of the organisation as a whole and to that of its future development.

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Let me now turn to the direct relations between the Council and your Assembly during the same period.

For the record, I should mention the now traditional meeting between the Council presidency and your Presidential Committee prior to the Ministerial Council, which took place in Brussels at the Palais d'Egmont on Tuesday, 17th October.

At this meeting, Mr. Mark Eyskens, Belgian Minister for External Relations and Chairman-in-Office of the Council, stressed that we were at a turning point in East-West relations and as regards the problems of the relationships between WEU and the other elements of the European construction process.

The prospect of a CFE treaty being signed raises the problem of a new approach to sharing rôles and responsibilities in implementing the reductions and also the problem of possible verification procedures.

The new course of East-West relations throws into sharper relief the emergence of a common foreign policy for the Twelve, Community enlargement and the recognition of the security dimension in this context. In the medium term, WEU's future may depend on these developments, requiring in-depth reflection on the part of the Council and the Assembly.

The Belgian Defence Minister, Mr. Coëme, has made it clear that the Belgian General Defence Staff had organised itself in such a way as to be able to follow each specific problem raised within WEU.

Mr. Coëme drew a number of conclusions from his recent trip to the United States which are of special interest for WEU as a whole. In particular, he mentioned the fact that WEU was relatively unknown in the new administration; its reticence about certain military co-operation projects between Europeans within NATO (for example, an air-mobile division); the desire to promote specialisation among alliance members in the implementation of the future CFE treaty; lastly, the continuation of a very lively debate on burden-sharing involving Japan and Korea as well as Europe, in an economic climate increasingly conducive to substantial cuts in defence spending. These subjects will no doubt capture the attention of WEU parliamentarians.

The first part of the Council's thirty-fifth annual report to the Assembly was sent to you on 10th October so that it was available to the General Affairs Committee before its meeting on 26th October to prepare for the forthcoming Assembly session. The Council was also able to send all but two of its replies to the recommendations adopted in June. It was in fact considered preferable, as regards the institute and new technologies, to give you a reply which took account of the decisions of the Ministerial Council. The same applies to Written Question 283 on staff of the Paris ministerial organs.

On 1st November, I had the privilege of welcoming at the Secretariat 14 members of the United Kingdom Delegation to your Assembly, led by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg. We reviewed progress in the political work programme of the ministerial organs and discussed the new prospects for Europe's security in the light of the major transformation taking place in the European political landscape. The questions put to me allowed me to clarify the Council's positions specifically with regard to the problems of adapting the Paris building to meet the new requirements created by enlargement and to institutional problems. I shall not dwell on these matters since, on all these points, we have made substantial progress as a result of the decisions reached by the Ministerial Council.

May I merely emphasise that I and the Secretariat are at the disposal of national parliamentary delegations and your Assembly's committees should any of them wish to come to London to be briefed on our work and to discuss the problems of WEU. I am of course also prepared to visit national parliaments to meet with WEU parliamentarians.

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The WEU Ministerial Council took on special significance given the historic events which had taken place the previous week.

Consequently, the discussion of topical questions and East-West relations was much more extensive than usual.

Ministers heard a statement by Mr. Genscher given on behalf of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany on the latest developments in Eastern Europe, particularly those affecting Poland and the GDR.

They unanimously stressed the absolute necessity to support the development of the reforms under way. They also recalled that the Harmel doctrine, which provided for the establishment of a

peaceful and secure order in Europe, was still valid, the foundations having been subsequently laid by the Helsinki Final Act. They were pleased to see that the ideas originally put forward by the governments of Western Europe now had a real prospect of becoming a reality. Their aim was to achieve successive and controlled stages of disarmament in a balanced and stable atmosphere.

They stressed the need to pursue and implement the CSCE process and to insist that free elections be held as a prerequisite for the advent of pluralist democracies.

They stressed their commitment to the pursuit of European integration and in particular to the implementation of the Single European Act.

They also stressed the need to maintain a system of deterrence within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, having regard to the achievements of the arms control negotiations.

Ministers believed that there was an urgent need to help and encourage the countries of Eastern Europe which were embarking on the road to democracy by means of a varied package of economic aid geared to the specific situation of each country, preferably within the Community framework.

Ministers also exchanged views on the European security environment in the period 1991-95.

Whilst emphasising the undeniable benefits of a CFE agreement, they noted that the residual capability in the East following the reductions would continue to pose a potential military threat.

Ministers concluded that, against a background of rapid political change, the reforms in the East had to be supported in any event and the stability of the broad strategic balance maintained. They considered that an assessment of the likely security environment of Western Europe in the period 1991-95 would be an important topic for discussion at future meetings.

Ministers instructed the Special Working Group and the Defence Representatives Group to conduct a comprehensive and in-depth study on the basis of the issues raised during their meeting and of the preliminary work done by both groups.

They requested that a report be prepared for their next meeting in spring 1990.

This subject will therefore dominate consultations between WEU member states in the months to come. Since, first and foremost, it is Europe's security environment which is changing so rapidly, it is vital that a European organisation should take the true measure of these changes and make recommendations on how to respond. Given that WEU is not involved in the day-to-day decisions about defence and the conduct of the current negotiations aimed at arms reductions, taking a medium- and long-term view was precisely what it should be doing with the help of defence experts and diplomats.

Ministers mandated the Defence Representatives Group and the Special Working Group to draw up a report on the conditions needed to maintain an undiminished level of security during the transition period pending the full implementation of a CFE treaty.

The Special Working Group and the Defence Representatives Group are to present joint proposals, for the next ministerial meeting, on the practical arrangements for co-operation between the WEU member countries in order to ensure their optimum participation in the process of verifying the implementation of a CFE treaty. These proposals might, for example, include the co-ordination of verification activities such as those of inspection teams or even co-operation in the training of inspectors.

Ministers discussed an interim report prepared by the ad hoc Sub-Group on Space on the potential for security-related co-operation between WEU member states in the field of space technology, a field in which the potential at their disposal had not been exploited.

They agreed that satellite observation was of interest to Europe mainly in the field of verification of arms control agreements, and for monitoring crises with security implications and also environmental hazards. It could offer greater security for member states and the alliance as a whole, an increase in Europe's contribution to, and expertise in, the verification of arms control agreements and an enhancement of European industrial and technological capabilities.

Ministers agreed that joint exploration of the potential for European security-related co-operation in the space field was important, and they tasked the ad hoc Sub-Group on Space to study the concrete possibilities for co-operation as regards an analysis of the operational requirements, the development, setting up and operation of a space-based observation satellite system and the associated costs, and also the data accessible by means of existing or planned systems. This second phase of more technical studies would provide the basis for a possible decision to develop and launch a future satellite observation system.

Ministers discussed a report on how best to promote further co-operation with a view to maintaining effective and realistic training while keeping the associated nuisance resulting from exercises and manoeuvres to a minimum.

They recognised that proper training was essential for the credibility of the armed forces and that there was no perfect substitute for exercises in open terrain. They noted, however, that there was possible scope for changing the present mix of field training and other exercises, in the light of studies under way, and by increasing the use of simulators. Ministers also agreed that member states should continue to share information on national developments in these areas.

Ministers welcomed the exchange of information which had taken place between member states on their training facilities and exchange programmes, and they agreed that the widest possible take-up of opportunities for bi- and multilateral co-operation in these fields should be encouraged.

Ministers agreed that the report should be kept up to date.

Since 1987, the Mediterranean Sub-Group has focused its work on the assessment of regional situations which posed a potential threat to the security interests of WEU member states. I gave an oral report on the work of the sub-group and ministers confirmed the group's original mandate and endorsed the new orientation as defined in October.

Ministers decided to set up a WEU institute for security studies which would be located in Paris in the organisation's premises. The institute has been set up in accordance with Article VIII, paragraph 2, of the modified Brussels Treaty and with the conclusions on institutional questions reached by ministers in The Hague on 27th October 1987 and 19th April 1988 respectively. This decision meets the wish to strengthen the organisation's effectiveness and impact on the identification of European security interests by providing it with a capacity to study, and provide documentation on, all questions concerning European security.

Essentially, the rôle of the institute will be to promote a European security identity and to assist the organisation in implementing the provisions of the Hague platform.

The institute's five main tasks are as follows:

- (a) to carry out research, principally for the Council, calling on national experts if necessary and in consultation with the Secretariat-General; this research will be carried out independently and objectively;
- (b) to encourage and help the existing institutes in the member states to promote a greater awareness of European security issues and, specifically, to organise courses and seminars to that end;
- (c) in collaboration with existing institutes, to organise meetings with institutes in countries not belonging to Western Europe, particularly those in the Warsaw Pact countries;
- (d) to establish and keep up to date a data bank for the purposes of research into the defence efforts of the WEU member countries and for studies relating to European security;
- (e) to contribute to academic work on these topics.

The institute will comprise a director and five permanent experts. Funds will also be earmarked for enlisting the expertise available in the member countries to carry out specific and in-depth studies.

The director will report to the Council on the execution of the scientific tasks assigned to him and on how the budget has been used. For 1990, the budget will be F 11 380 000, including F 1 730 000 for functional expenditure. The director is to be appointed by the Council by 1st February 1990 at the latest and will take up his duties as soon as possible to enable the institute to be operational from 1st July 1990 onwards. The Council also decided to wind up the Paris-based Agencies for Security Questions and Standing Armaments Committee. The Council will take the necessary measures to terminate the contracts of staff currently employed by these bodies, in accordance with the legal provisions in force.

Ministers have asked the Permanent Council to take appropriate decisions, after consulting the Assembly, on the organisational aspects of setting up the institute in the organisation's building. In practice, this will involve consultations between you, Mr. President, the Council presidency and myself under appropriate arrangements to be worked out in the coming weeks. The Clerk and the institute director will of course be closely involved in the necessary decisions.

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The day after the ministerial meeting, your Presidential Committee was briefed by Mr. Eyskens and Mr. Coëme on the Council's decisions and discussions.

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I have continued my round of contacts with senior officials from the foreign affairs and defence ministries of the member states. On 25th September, I met Mr. William Waldegrave, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and, on 7th November, Mr. Tom King, Secretary of State for Defence, both meetings providing an opportunity for fruitful exchanges of view. On 6th November, I was received in Paris by Mr. Jean-Pierre Chevènement, Minister of Defence. We reviewed the priorities for European security in preparation for the Ministerial Council and discussed the future direction of WEU's work in the context of the forthcoming French presidency from July 1990 onwards.

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Turning to public relations and information on the rôle and activities of WEU, these last weeks have been particularly busy.

From 14th to 17th September 1989, I took part in the thirty-first annual conference of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). For the first time, participants included representatives of the Warsaw Pact alongside western experts. Mr. Bogomolov gave a surprisingly frank assessment of the weaknesses of the Soviet Union, stressing in his conclusion that the success of perestroika would require western aid. In his reply, Mr. Marshall Shulman reviewed the uncertainties weighing heavily on Mr. Gorbachev's enterprise, i.e., economic collapse, reactions of the Soviet communist party and the nationalities problem in its three manifestations, namely, Russian nationalism, claims for independence and confrontation between ethnic groups. For some years to come, uncertainty would no doubt be the dominant feature of any analysis of change in the Soviet Union. The uncertainty would be particularly great as regards the future pace and extent of reforms.

On 21st September, I gave the inaugural address to mark the start of the academic year of the Institut Royal Supérieur de Défense in Brussels (a copy of which is annexed hereto).

The following day, Ambassador Holthoff was a guest speaker at the Bow Group in London. He reviewed the problem of restructuring Europe's defence industries and the respective rôles of the Community, the IEPG and WEU in this connection.

On 29th September in Hamburg, I addressed a seminar of young political leaders on the future of the Atlantic Alliance.

From 6th to 9th October, Ambassador Holthoff represented the Secretariat-General at the annual meeting of the North Atlantic Assembly which was held at the Palais Montecitorio in Rome. As usual, the reports covered the whole gamut of problems facing the Atlantic Alliance. This meeting provided an opportunity for a great deal of public and private discussion on what rôle WEU should play at a time of rapid change in Central Europe and with regard to the progress needed in the building of Europe in order to maintain an adequate level of security. Apart from the speeches made by the Italian Prime Minister, Mr. Giulio Andreotti, and the NATO Secretary-General, Mr. Manfred Wörner, the NAA parliamentarians heard a debate between General Galvin and General Lubov, the latter displaying embarrassing reservations at questions from the floor. At the same time, Ambassador Holthoff had talks with senior Italian officials from the foreign affairs and defence ministries.

From 9th to 13th October, I was in Washington, the purpose of my visit being twofold.

First, to have talks with the most senior representatives of the United States diplomatic service and the defence establishment. I was received by Mr. James Baker and Mr. Dick Cheney and by Under-Secretary of State Bartholomew. Together with experts from the State Department, I took part in a round table chaired by Mrs. Avis Bohlen, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, on major issues of European security (European pillar, defence co-operation).

All my interlocutors impressed upon me that the speech given by President Bush on 21st May at the University of Boston on the construction of Europe was the cornerstone of American policy towards our continent. Our allies expect more and better of us whereas the concept of burden-sharing, based too much on "bean counting", is now giving way to a more qualitative and imaginative approach, namely the sharing of responsibilities, a development borne out by the appointment of Mr. Alan Holmes as Ambassador Extraordinary with responsibility for this dossier.

The second purpose of my visit was to reply to an invitation from the organisers of the COMBEF '89 symposium and the Eurogroup seminar.

The aim of the symposium was to discuss the military problems which would face the alliance in the next decade. I spoke on the subject of defence co-operation, focusing on the new prospects opening up for the development of multilateral armaments programmes in Europe.

The Eurogroup seminar, organised on 12th October under the auspices of the Washington Centre for Strategic and International Studies, was a useful contribution to the Euro-Atlantic dialogue.

Lastly, I met Dr. Alton Frye of the Council of Foreign Relations and Mrs. Rozanne Ridgway, former Assistant Secretary for European Affairs at the Atlantic Council of the United States.

The overriding impression I had from all these meetings was that WEU is undeniably seen in a very favourable light in the United States. But this will only last as long as our organisation demonstrates its ability to make a concrete and dynamic contribution to the building of the European pillar, by which our transatlantic allies set so much store.

Mr. Destefanis, Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, represented the WEU ministerial organs at the seminar on European security in the 1990s, organised in Madrid by the Institute for International Affairs (INCI). He spoke about the place of WEU in the transatlantic dialogue and its rôle in building the European pillar. You too, Mr. President, were also present on this occasion and made a remarkable speech on the implications of the single market for the process of European construction and for WEU; I should like to take this opportunity of congratulating you.

On 22nd October, I gave the closing address at Valkenburg to the fourth international conference of the Young Europeans for Security Movement, taking as my theme "What kind of Europe do we want?".

On 23rd October, I took part in a debate on European defence co-operation in a post-CFE context at the IISS in London.

On 26th October, I was invited to give the WEU viewpoint at a conference in Southampton organised by the British "Peace through NATO" association.

Finally, on 8th November, I addressed the "Dunamis Open Forum" in London.

Ambassador Holthoff, Deputy Secretary-General, represented WEU at a seminar on public opinion organised by the NATO Information Service in Brussels on 3rd November. The aim of these seminars is to review trends in public opinion in alliance countries and the effect of such trends on governments. They also aim to provide an opportunity to reflect on the content and methods of disseminating the NATO message. The invitation to the WEU Secretariat-General illustrates the mutual willingness of both institutions to be kept informed of their respective concerns and plans as regards keeping European public opinion properly informed about the specific conditions of their security. The Norwegian participants in particular were interested in the presentation of current activities within WEU.

Finally, I have had an opportunity to talk with many press and television journalists, both British and foreign (in particular, The Economist, Daily Telegraph, Financial Times, Le Monde, le Quotidien de Paris, Die Welt). Prior to the Ministerial Council, the "Foreign Press Association" in London invited me to take part in a debate, involving some twenty journalists, on the implications for WEU of the current events and on the topics on the Ministerial Council's agenda in Brussels.

Willem VAN EEKELLEN

Establishment of a peaceful and secure order in Europe

MOTION FOR AN ORDER ¹

*tabled by Mr. Ahrens and others
under Rule 28 of the Rules of Procedure
with a request for urgent procedure*

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting with satisfaction the measures taken by the Soviet Union and several Central and Eastern European countries to:
- ensure greater respect for individual freedoms and human rights;
 - promote free expression of opinions, a free choice for the electorate and the development of a certain degree of political pluralism;
 - facilitate the free movement of persons;
 - allow freedom of information;
- (ii) In particular, welcoming with joy the removal of obstacles to the free movement of persons in Berlin on 9th November 1989;
- (iii) Further welcoming the progress made towards agreements on the limitation of strategic nuclear weapons, chemical weapons and conventional weapons;
- (iv) Considering that this rapid turn of events is likely to attenuate significantly the division of Europe that has existed since the end of the second world war and to accelerate the establishment of a peaceful and secure order in Europe, in accordance with the aims the members of the Atlantic Alliance set themselves in December 1967;
- (v) Gratified that, on 13th November, the Council held “ a detailed exchange of views on the latest developments in Eastern Europe, particularly in the German Democratic Republic ”;
- (vi) Considering that it is for the Assembly to consider without delay the new prospects these developments offer for organising peace, security and co-operation in Europe and to clarify the rôle of WEU at this new juncture,

INSTRUCTS THE GENERAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

To present to it, at the first part of its thirty-sixth ordinary session, a report on the prospects offered by developments in Central and Eastern Europe with a view to establishing peace and security in Europe.

Signed: Ahrens, Goerens, Finsberg, Pieralli, Stegagnini, Soell, Staels-Dompas, Kittelmann, Reddemann, Unland, Niegel, Lenzer, Fischer

1. See 7th sitting, 4th December 1989 (urgent procedure agreed to).

Establishment of a peaceful and secure order in Europe

DRAFT ORDER ¹

*submitted on behalf of the Political Committee ²
by Mr. Ahrens, Rapporteur*

The Assembly,

(i) Noting with satisfaction the measures taken by the Soviet Union and several Central and Eastern European countries to:

- ensure greater respect for individual freedoms and human rights;
- promote free expression of opinions, a free choice for the electorate and the development of a certain degree of political pluralism;
- facilitate the free movement of persons;
- allow freedom of information;

(ii) In particular, welcoming with joy the removal of obstacles to the free movement of persons in Berlin on 9th November 1989;

(iii) Further welcoming the progress made towards agreements on the limitation of strategic nuclear weapons, chemical weapons and conventional weapons;

(iv) Gratified that, on 13th November, the Council held “ a detailed exchange of views on the latest developments in Eastern Europe, particularly in the German Democratic Republic ”;

(v) Considering that it is for the Assembly to consider without delay the new prospects these developments offer for organising peace, security and co-operation in Europe and to clarify the rôle of WEU at this new juncture,

CONSIDERS

1. That these rapid developments are likely to attenuate considerably the division of Europe that has existed since the end of the second world war and speed up “ the establishment of a peaceful and secure order in Europe ” in accordance with the aim the members of the Atlantic Alliance set themselves in December 1967;

DECIDES

2. To hold an extraordinary session during the first quarter of 1990 to examine the prospects stemming from developments in Central and Eastern Europe for the establishment of a just, peaceful and secure order in Europe;

INSTRUCTS THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE

3. To present a report to it on this subject.

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Ahrens (Chairman); Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Martino (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Aarts, Beix, Böhm, Caro, Coleman, Collart, Eich, Forni (Alternate: Pontillon), Foschi (Alternate: Spitella), Hill (Alternate: Ward), Hitschler, Koehl, van der Linden, Lord Mackie of Benshie, MM. Müller, Natali, Péciaux, Pieralli, Mrs. Polfer, Mr. Sarti, Sir William Shelton, Mrs. Staels-Dompas, MM. Stoffelen, Thyraud.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Establishment of a peaceful and secure order in Europe


AMENDMENT 1¹

tabled by Mr. Speed and Sir Geoffrey Finsberg

1. In paragraph 2 of the draft order proper, before “ peaceful ” insert “ just, ”.

Signed: Speed, Finsberg

1. See 11th sitting, 6th December 1989 (amendment agreed to).

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