

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

PROCEEDINGS

THIRTY-FOURTH ORDINARY SESSION

SECOND PART

December 1988

IV

Minutes

Official Report of Debates

WEU

PARIS

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

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IV

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The proceedings of the second part of the thirty-fourth ordinary session of the Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes:

Volume III: Assembly documents.

Volume IV: Orders of the day and minutes of proceedings, official report of debates, general index.

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LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

BELGIUM

Representatives

MM. ADRIAENSENS Hugo	SP
BIEFNOT Yvon	PS
DERYCKE Erik	SP
KEMPINAIRE André	PVV
PÉCRIAUX Nestor	PS
Mrs. STAELS-DOMPAS Nora	CVP
Mr. STEVERLYNCK Antoon	CVP

Substitutes

MM. COLLART Jacques	PS
DE BONDT Ferdinand	CVP
DE DECKER Armand	PRL
EICHER Bernard-J.	PS
MONFILS Philippe-J.F.	PRL
NOERENS René	PVV
UYTENDAELE René	CVP

FRANCE

Representatives

MM. BASSINET Philippe	Socialist
BAUMEL Jacques	RPR
BEIX Roland	Socialist
CARO Jean-Marie	UDF-CDS
COLLETTE Henri	RPR
CROZE Pierre	Ind. Rep.
DURAND Adrien	CDS
FILLON François	RPR
FORNI Raymond	Socialist
FOURRÉ Jean-Pierre	Socialist
GALLEY Robert	RPR
JEAMBRUN Pierre	Dem. Left
JUNG Louis	UCDP
Mrs. LALUMIÈRE Catherine	Socialist
MM. MATRAJA Pierre	Socialist
OEHLER Jean	Socialist
PORTIER Henri	RPR
SEITLINGER Jean	UDF-CDS

Substitutes

MM. ALLONCLE Michel	RPR
ANDRÉ René	RPR
BALLIGAND Jean-Pierre	Socialist
BARRAU Alain	Socialist
BIRRAUX Claude	CDS
BOHL André	UCDP
DHAILLE Paul	Socialist
GRUSSENMEYER François	RPR
HUNAUT Xavier	UDF (App.)
KOEHL Émile	UDF
LACOUR Pierre	UCDP
LAGORCE Pierre	Socialist
PISTRE Charles	Socialist
PONTILLON Robert	Socialist
RUET Roland	Ind. Rep.
SOUVET Louis	RPR
VALLEIX Jean	RPR
WORMS Jean-Pierre	Socialist

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Representatives

MM. AHRENS Karl	SPD
ANTRETTNER Robert	SPD
BÖHM Wilfried	CDU/CSU
BÜCHNER Peter	SPD
HITSCHLER Walter	FDP
HOLTZ Uwe	SPD
IRMER Ulrich	FDP
KITTELMANN Peter	CDU/CSU
Mrs. LUUK Dagmar	SPD
MM. MECHTERSHEIMER Alfred	Die Grünen
MÜLLER Günther	CDU/CSU
NIEGEL Lorenz	CDU/CSU
REDDEMANN Gerhard	CDU/CSU
SCHEER Hermann	SPD
SCHMITZ Hans Peter	CDU/CSU
von SCHMUDE Michael	CDU/CSU
SOELL Hartmut	SPD
UNLAND Hermann Josef	CDU/CSU

Substitutes

Mr. ABELEIN Manfred	CDU/CSU
Mrs. BEER Angelika	Die Grünen
Mr. BINDIG Rudolf	SPD
Mrs. BLUNCK Lieselott	SPD
MM. BÜHLER Klaus	CDU/CSU
FELDMANN Olaf	FDP
Mrs. FISCHER Leni	CDU/CSU
MM. HÖFFKES Peter	CDU/CSU
KLEJDZINSKI Karl-Heinz	SPD
LENZER Christian	CDU/CSU
Mrs. PACK Doris	CDU/CSU
MM. PFUHL Albert	SPD
SCHMIDT Manfred	SPD
STEINER Heinz-Alfred	SPD
Mrs. TIMM Helga	SPD
MM. WULFF Otto	CDU/CSU
ZIERER Benno	CDU/CSU
ZYWIETZ Werner	FDP

ITALY

Representatives

MM. CACCIA Pietro	Chr. Dem.
FILETTI Cristoforo	MSI-DN
FIORET Mario	Chr. Dem.
GABBUGGIANI Elio	Communist
INTINI Ugo	Socialist
KESSLER Bruno	Chr. Dem.
MALFATTI Franco Maria	Chr. Dem.
MARTINO Guido	Republican
NATALI Antonio	Socialist
PARISI Francesco	Chr. Dem.
PECCHIOLI Ugo	Communist
PIERALLI Piero	Communist
RODOTA Stefano	Ind. Left
RUBBI Antonio	Communist
SALVI Franco	Chr. Dem.
SARTI Adolfo	Chr. Dem.
SINESIO Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
TARAMELLI Antonio	Communist

Substitutes

MM. ANDREIS Sergio	Verdi
CANNATA Giuseppe	Communist
CAPANNA Mario	Prol. Dem.
CARIGLIA Antonio	PSDI
FASSINO Giuseppe	Liberal
FIANDROTTI Filippo	Socialist
FOSCHI Franco	Chr. Dem.
Mrs. FRANCESE Angela	Communist
MM. GIAGU DEMARTINI Antonio	Chr. Dem.
GRECO Francesco	Communist
PANNELLA Marco	Radical
PASQUINO Gianfranco	Ind. Left
RAUTI Giuseppe	MSI-DN
RUBNER Hans	SVP
SCOVACRICCHI Martino	PSDI
SPITELLA Giorgio	Chr. Dem.
STEGAGNINI Bruno	Chr. Dem.
TRIGLIA Riccardo	Chr. Dem.

LUXEMBOURG**Representatives**

MM. BURGER René	Soc. Chr.
GOERENS Charles	Dem.
LINSTER Roger	Soc. Workers

Substitutes

Mr. HENGEL René	Soc. Workers
Mrs. HENNICOT-SCHOEPGES Erna	Soc. Chr.
Mr. KONEN René	Dem.

NETHERLANDS**Representatives**

MM. AARTS Harry	CDA
de JONG Frans	CDA
de KWAADSTENIET Willem	CDA
STOFFELEN Pieter	Labour
TUMMERS Nicolas	Labour
van der WERFF Ymenus	Liberal
WORRELL Joop	Labour

Substitutes

Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN Elisabeth	Labour
MM. de BEER Leopold	Liberal
DE HOOP SCHEFFER Jakob	CDA
EISMA Doeke	D66
Mrs. HERFKENS Eveline	Labour
MM. MARIS Pieter	CDA
van der SANDEN Piet	CDA

UNITED KINGDOM**Representatives**

MM. COLEMAN Donald	Labour
COX Thomas	Labour
EWING Harry	Labour
Dame Peggy FENNER	Conservative
Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG	Conservative
MM. GARRETT Edward	Labour
HARDY Peter	Labour
HILL James	Conservative
JESSEL Toby	Conservative
Sir Russell JOHNSTON	Liberal
Earl of KINNOULL	Conservative
MM. MORRIS Michael	Conservative
PARRY Robert	Labour
SHELTON William	Conservative
Sir Dudley SMITH	Conservative
Mr. SPEED Keith	Conservative
Sir John STOKES	Conservative
Mr. WILKINSON John	Conservative

Substitutes

MM. ATKINSON David	Conservative
BOWDEN Andrew	Conservative
FAULDS Andrew	Labour
GALE Roger	Conservative
HOWELL Ralph	Conservative
HUNT John	Conservative
Lord KIRKHILL	Labour
MM. LAMBIE David	Labour
LITHERLAND Robert	Labour
LORD Michael	Conservative
Lord MACKIE	Liberal
Lord NEWALL	Conservative
MM. RATHBONE Tim	Conservative
REDMOND Martin	Labour
Lord RODNEY	Conservative
Ms. RUDDOCK Joan	Labour
MM. STEWART Allan	Conservative
THOMPSON John	Labour

I

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

SEVENTH SITTING

Monday, 5th December 1988

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Resumption of the session.
2. Examination of credentials.
3. Address by the President of the Assembly.
4. Adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the session (Doc. 1149).
5. Address by Mr. Dumas, Minister of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs of France.
6. Action by the Presidential Committee (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Presidential Committee, Doc. 1165*).
7. Address by Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU.
8. Europe and the aftermath of the war between Iran and Iraq (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1162 and amendments*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Resumption of the session

The President declared the thirty-fourth ordinary session of the Assembly resumed.

2. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

3. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

4. Examination of credentials

In accordance with Rule 6 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly took note of the letter from the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe informing the Assembly that the credentials of the representatives and substitutes listed in Notice No. 7 had been ratified by that Assembly.

In the case of Mr. Uyttendaele, a substitute for Mr. van Hecke of Belgium, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe was unable to ratify his credentials but the Assembly itself, under Rule 6 (2), ratified them on the basis of an official document received from the Belgian Chamber of Deputies.

5. Address by the President of the Assembly

The President addressed the Assembly.

6. Observers

The President welcomed parliamentary observers from Denmark, Greece, Norway, Portugal, Spain and Turkey.

7. Adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the session

(Doc. 1149)

The President proposed the adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the session.

The draft order of business for the second part of the session was adopted.

8. Banning of low-altitude military training flights

(Motion for a resolution, Doc. 1169)

Banning of demonstration flights at air shows

(Motion for a resolution with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 1170)

***Integration of Europe with a view
to European union
(or the United States of Europe): WEU's rôle***

*(Motion for a resolution with a request
for urgent procedure, Doc. 1168)*

***Participation of Mr. Arafat
at the United Nations General Assembly
in New York***

*(Motion for a resolution with a request
for urgent procedure, Doc. 1167)*

The President announced that a motion for a resolution on banning low-altitude military training flights had been tabled by Mr. Büchner and others.

In accordance with Rule 28 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly would examine this request at the beginning of the next sitting.

The President announced that a motion for a resolution on banning demonstration flights at air shows had been tabled by Mr. Büchner and others with a request for urgent procedure.

In accordance with Rule 43 (2) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly would examine this request at the beginning of the next sitting.

The President announced that a motion for a resolution on the integration of Europe with a view to European union (or the United States of Europe): WEU's rôle had been tabled by Mr. Pannella and others with a request for urgent procedure.

In accordance with Rule 43 (2) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly would examine this request at the beginning of the next sitting.

The President announced that a motion for a resolution on the participation of Mr. Arafat at the United Nations General Assembly in New York had been tabled by Mr. Malfatti and others with a request for urgent procedure.

Speaker: Mr. Malfatti.

The motion for a resolution was withdrawn.

***9. Address by Mr. Dumas, Minister of State,
Minister for Foreign Affairs of France***

Mr. Dumas, Minister of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Dumas answered questions put by MM. Caro, De Decker, Soell, Kittelmann, Wilkinson, Sir Russell Johnston, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg and Mr. Klejdzinski.

10. Action by the Presidential Committee

*(Presentation of and debate on the report
of the Presidential Committee, Doc. 1165)*

The report of the Presidential Committee was presented by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Vice-President of the Assembly.

Mr. Soell, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

The debate was opened.

Speaker: Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

Speakers: MM. Reddemann, Hardy and Hill.

The debate was closed.

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Vice-President of the Assembly, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly ratified the action of the Presidential Committee.

***11. Address by Mr. Cahen,
Secretary-General of WEU***

Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Cahen answered questions put by Mr. Hill, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, MM. Caro, van der Werff and Lambie.

***12. Europe and the aftermath of the war
between Iran and Iraq***

*(Presentation of and debate on the report
of the General Affairs Committee
and vote on the draft recommendation,
Doc. 1162 and amendments)*

The report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mr. Martino, Rapporteur.

Mr. van der Werff, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Scovacricchi, Speed, Müller, Mrs. Luuk, MM. Atkinson, Eisma, Tascioglu (*Observer from Turkey*), Cetin (*Observer from Turkey*) and Malfatti.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Martino, Rapporteur, and Mr. Ahrens, Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Pieralli and others:

1. Leave out paragraph (xiii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation.

Speakers: MM. Pieralli, Martino and Ahrens.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Speed:

2. After paragraph (xiii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert a new paragraph:

“(xiv) Noting that over the last eight years the United Kingdom and France have maintained naval units in the Gulf whose prime task has been to assist and protect merchant shipping and these forces were supplemented last year by the WEU mine counter-measures force whose task was to detect and clear mines laid by Iran or others on either side of the Strait of Hormuz,”

Speakers: MM. Speed and Martino.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Ahrens and others:

3. At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph:

“ 9. Request the member countries of Western European Union to support Turkey in providing humanitarian assistance to the Kurdish refugees and urge the Iraqi Government to take measures in order to ensure, in future, a voluntary return of these refugees without repression.”

Speakers: Mrs. Luuk and Mr. Martino.

The amendment was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 461)¹.

13. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for Tuesday, 6th December 1988, at 10 a.m.

The sitting was closed at 7.20 p.m.

1. See page 16.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	Federal Republic of Germany	Netherlands
MM. Biefnot <i>Eicher</i> (Derycke) Kempinaire Péciaux Mrs. Staels-Dompas Mr. <i>Uyttendaele</i> (Steverynck)	MM. Ahrens <i>Bühler</i> (Böhm) Büchner Hitschler <i>Klejdzinski</i> (Holtz) Kittelmann Mrs. Luuk MM. Müller Reddemann Mrs. <i>Pack</i> (Schmitz) MM. Soell Unland	MM. <i>van der Sanden</i> (Aarts) <i>Maris</i> (de Jong) <i>Eisma</i> (de Kwaadsteniet) Stoffelen Tummers van der Werff Mrs. <i>Baarveld-Schlaman</i> (Worrell)
France	Italy	United Kingdom
MM. Bassinet Baumel Beix Caro Collette Croze Durand Fillon Forni Fourré Galley <i>Valleix</i> (Jeambrun) Jung Mrs. Lalumière MM. <i>Pontillon</i> (Matraja) Oehler <i>Pistre</i> (Portier) Seitlinger	MM. <i>Rauti</i> (Filetti) Fioret <i>Fassino</i> (Intini) Malfatti Martino <i>Scovacicchi</i> (Natali) Pecchioli Pieralli Mrs. <i>Francesca</i> (Rubbi) MM. <i>Giagu Demartini</i> (Salvi) Sarti <i>Triglia</i> (Sinesio)	MM. Coleman <i>Lambie</i> (Cox) Ewing <i>Gale</i> (Dame Peggy Fenner) Sir Geoffrey Finsberg MM. <i>Redmond</i> (Garrett) Hardy Hill Jessel Sir Russell Johnston MM. <i>Stewart</i> (Morris) Parry Sir Dudley Smith Mr. Speed Sir John Stokes Mr. Wilkinson
	Luxembourg	
	MM. Burger <i>Hengel</i> (Linster)	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	MM. Niegel Scheer von Schmude	MM. Parisi Rodotà Taramelli
Federal Republic of Germany	Italy	United Kingdom
MM. Antretter Irmer Mechtersheimer	MM. Caccia Gabbuggiani Kessler	Earl of Kinnoull Mr. Shelton

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 461***on Europe and the aftermath of the war between Iran and Iraq***

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that the region of the Gulf is a particularly important area for the security of Western Europe and for international peace;
- (ii) Welcoming the cease-fire between Iraq and Iran on 20th August 1988;
- (iii) Regretting that the negotiations to implement this cease-fire have still not been effectively started;
- (iv) Considering that the situation thus created is still highly unstable;
- (v) Noting that the eight years of warfare illustrate the horrors that can stem from the conduct of conventional warfare;
- (vi) Believing that supplies of armaments to the belligerents have helped to prolong fighting and still contribute to instability in the area;
- (vii) Condemning the use of chemical weapons by Iraq during the war;
- (viii) Welcoming the forthcoming convening of a conference to strengthen the ban on chemical weapons;
- (ix) Considering that the Kurdish problem is also a factor of instability in the region;
- (x) Noting the many indications that Iraq also used chemical weapons against the Kurds after the cease-fire;
- (xi) Considering further that the brutal repression of the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq, the destruction of villages and the deportation of populations are serious infringements of human rights;
- (xii) Noting that the execution by Iran of many political prisoners and the use of procedures, contrary to the laws of war, directed against Iraqi prisoners-of-war are also infringements of human rights;
- (xiii) Welcoming the measures taken by the Council to contribute, with the United States, to ensuring freedom of navigation in the Gulf,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Endorse the efforts of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to achieve true negotiations on the implementation of the cease-fire and the re-establishment of peace, in particular by banning any supplies of arms to the belligerents;
2. Continue to follow with vigilance the evolution of the situation in the Gulf, even after the possible withdrawal of the naval forces that member countries maintain there;
3. Endorse the proposal to convene a conference to ban the production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons;
4. Ask the Agency for the Control of Armaments for a report on the means of verifying that chemical weapons are not produced or stockpiled and communicate this report to the Assembly;
5. Examine carefully any sanctions that the United States might adopt against countries which have used chemical weapons in order to associate the WEU countries with them and call upon the Soviet Union and its allies to take part in these sanctions;
6. Ask the EEC and member countries of the Council of Europe to provide meaningful assistance to Kurdish refugees through the appropriate international organisations;
7. Also ask them to receive on their territory significant numbers of those who are now refugees because of persecution in Iraq;
8. Pursue the efforts undertaken to ensure the mine-sweeping of the Gulf until this operation has been completed.
9. Request the member countries of Western European Union to support Turkey in providing humanitarian assistance to the Kurdish refugees and urge the Iraqi Government to take measures in order to ensure, in future, a voluntary return of these refugees without repression.

EIGHTH SITTING

Tuesday, 6th December 1988

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Integration of Europe with a view to European union (or the United States of Europe): WEU's rôle (*Motion for a resolution with a request for urgent procedure*, Doc. 1168).
2. Banning of demonstration flights at air shows (*Motion for a resolution with a request for urgent procedure*, Doc. 1170).
3. Banning of low-altitude military training flights (*Motion for a resolution*, Doc. 1169)
4. Young people and defence – the rôle of parliaments (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and votes on the draft resolution and draft order*, Doc. 1157 and amendments).
5. Defence industry in Spain and Portugal (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions*, Doc. 1161).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 10.05 a.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. Integration of Europe with a view to European union (or the United States of Europe): WEU's rôle

(*Motion for a resolution with a request for urgent procedure*, Doc. 1168)

In accordance with Rule 43 (3) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly proceeded to consider the request for urgent procedure on the motion for a resolution on the integration of Europe with a view to European union (or the United States of Europe): WEU's rôle.

Speakers: Mr. Pannella, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, MM. Ahrens, Soell and Pannella.

The request for urgent procedure was withdrawn.

The motion for a resolution was included in the register of the Assembly for reference to the General Affairs Committee.

4. Banning of demonstration flights at air shows

(*Motion for a resolution with a request for urgent procedure*, Doc. 1170)

In accordance with Rule 43 (3) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly proceeded to consider the request for urgent procedure on the motion for a resolution on the banning of demonstration flights at air shows.

Speakers: MM. Büchner, Wilkinson, Kittelmann, Reddemann and Büchner.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the request for urgent procedure.

The request for urgent procedure was not agreed to.

5. Banning of low-altitude military training flights

(*Motion for a resolution*, Doc. 1169)

In accordance with Rule 28 (4) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly proceeded to consider for inclusion in the register a motion for a resolution on the banning of low-altitude military training flights.

Speakers: MM. Büchner, Jessel, Wilkinson and Kittelmann.

In accordance with Rule 16 of the Rules of Procedure, the motion for a resolution was included in the register of the Assembly.

6. *Young people and defence – the rôle of parliaments*

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and votes on the draft resolution and draft order, Doc. 1157 and amendments)

The report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations was presented by Mr. Shelton, Rapporteur.

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Gale, Hunt and Hardy.

Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

Speaker: Mr. Stewart.

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Speaker: Mr. Pannella (point of order).

In accordance with Rule 30 (4) of the Rules of Procedure, the President called Mr. Pannella to order.

Speakers: MM. Tummers, Jessel and Burger.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Shelton, Rapporteur, and Mr. Pontillon, Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft resolution.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Hardy:

1. In paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft resolution, leave out "and support".

Speakers: MM. Hardy, de Beer, Shelton and Hardy.

The amendment was withdrawn.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft resolution.

The draft resolution was agreed to. (This resolution will be published as No. 79)¹.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft order.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Hardy:

2. In paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft order, leave out "and support".

Speaker: Mr. Hardy.

The amendment was withdrawn.

1. See page 21.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft order.

The draft order was agreed to. (This order will be published as No. 72)².

Speakers: Mr. Pannella (explanation of vote) and Mr. Reddemann (point of order).

7. *Defence industry in Spain and Portugal*

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Doc. 1161)

The report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions was presented by Mr. Wilkinson, Chairman and Rapporteur.

Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

The debate was opened.

Speaker: Mr. Klejdzinski.

Mr. Wilkinson, Chairman and Rapporteur, replied to the speaker.

The debate was adjourned.

8. *Changes in the membership of committees*

In accordance with Rule 38 (6) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following changes in the membership of committees:

Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments

Belgium:

– Mr. Kempinaire as an alternate member in place of Mr. Vreven;

Federal Republic of Germany:

– Mr. Zierer as a titular member in place of Mr. Lemmrich.

General Affairs Committee

Belgium:

– Mr. Collart as a titular member in place of Mr. van der Biest;

Federal Republic of Germany:

– Mr. Soell as an alternate member in place of Mr. Holtz;

2. See page 22.

Italy:

- Mr. Scovacricchi as an alternate member in place of Mr. Manzolini.

*Committee on Budgetary Affairs
and Administration*

Federal Republic of Germany:

- Mr. Niegel as a titular member in place of Mr. Zierer;
- Mr. Höffkes as an alternate member in place of Mr. Lemmrich.

*Committee on Rules of Procedure
and Privileges*

Federal Republic of Germany:

- Mr. Pfuhl as an alternate member in place of Mr. Schmidt.

*Committee for Parliamentary
and Public Relations*

Belgium:

- Mr. Collart as an alternate member in place of Mr. van der Biest;
- Mr. Kempinaire as an alternate member in place of Mr. Vreven.

United Kingdom:

- Mr. Hunt as a titular member in place of Mr. Shelton;
- Mr. Hardy as an alternate member in place of Mr. Faulds;
- Mr. Shelton as an alternate member in place of Mr. Hunt.

**9. Date, time and orders of the day
of the next sitting**

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

The sitting was closed at 12.35 p.m.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	MM. Müller Niegel Reddemann Scheer Bühler (Schmitz) Höffkes (von Schmude) Soell Unland	Netherlands
MM. <i>Eicher</i> (Derycke) Pécriaux Mrs. Staels-Dompas Mr. <i>Uyttendaele</i> (Stevelyneck)		MM. <i>van der Sanden</i> (Aarts) <i>Maris</i> (de Jong) de Kwaadsteniet Stoffelen Tummers <i>de Beer</i> (van der Werff) Mrs. <i>Baarveld-Schlaman</i> (Worrell)
France		
MM. <i>Pistre</i> (Beix) Caro <i>Birraux</i> (Durand) Galley Jeambrun Mrs. Lalumière MM. <i>Pontillon</i> (Matraja) Oehler <i>Valleix</i> (Portier) Seitlinger	Italy	United Kingdom
	MM. <i>Rauti</i> (Filetti) Fioret <i>Fassino</i> (Intini) <i>Rubner</i> (Kessler) Malfatti Martino Pecchioli Pieralli Rodotà <i>Pannella</i> (Rubbi) <i>Giagu Demartini</i> (Salvi) Sarti <i>Triglia</i> (Sinesio)	MM. Coleman Cox <i>Lambie</i> (Ewing) <i>Gale</i> (Dame Peggy Fenner) Sir Geoffrey Finsberg MM. <i>Redmond</i> (Garrett) Hardy <i>Hunt</i> (Hill) Jessel Lord <i>Mackie</i> (Sir Russell Johnston) MM. <i>Stewart</i> (Earl of Kinnoull) Morris Shelton Sir Dudley Smith Mr. Speed Sir John Stokes Mr. Wilkinson
Federal Republic of Germany		
MM. Ahrens Antretter Mrs. <i>Pack</i> (Böhm) MM. Büchner Hitschler <i>Klejdzinski</i> (Holtz) Kittelmann Mrs. Luuk	Luxembourg	
	MM. Burger Linster	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	MM. Croze Fillon Forni Fourré Jung	Italy
MM. Adriaensens Biefnot Kempinaire		MM. Caccia Gabbuggiani Natali Parisi Taramelli
France	Federal Republic of Germany	United Kingdom
MM. Bassinet Baumel Collette	MM. Irmer Mechtersheimer	Mr. Parry

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RESOLUTION 79***on young people and defence – the rôle of parliaments***

The Assembly,

- (i) Stressing the importance of obtaining young people's understanding and support for Western European defence and security policy;
- (ii) Stating however that so far young people are not given enough opportunity to be told about WEU's rôle in the area;
- (iii) Convinced that a closer involvement of young people in the work of the WEU Assembly could enhance considerably their understanding of the specific European problems of defence and security;
- (iv) Welcoming the exemplary initiative taken by the Bundestag in organising a youth and parliament session once a year;
- (v) Regretting however that the Assembly's present means do not allow it to take meaningful initiatives for a more intensive dialogue with young people;

CALLS ON MEMBER PARLIAMENTS

To make the necessary organisational and financial arrangements to allow members of the Assembly to invite at least once a year a group of young visitors, including journalists, to visit Paris for briefings at the seat of the Assembly during or between sessions and to meet WEU parliamentarians and officials.

ORDER 72***on young people and defence – the rôle of parliaments***

The Assembly,

- (i) Stressing the importance of obtaining young people's understanding and support for Western European defence and security policy;
- (ii) Stating however that so far young people are not given enough opportunity to be told about WEU's rôle in the area;
- (iii) Convinced that a closer involvement of young people in the work of the WEU Assembly could enhance considerably their understanding of the specific European problems of defence and security;
- (iv) Welcoming the exemplary initiative taken by the Bundestag in organising a youth and parliament session once a year;
- (v) Regretting however that the Assembly's present means do not allow it to take meaningful initiatives for a more intensive dialogue with young people;

INVITES ITS PRESIDENTIAL COMMITTEE

To include the organisational and financial implications of enhancing the Assembly's dialogue with young people in its further deliberations on a new information policy for the Assembly.

NINTH SITTING

Tuesday, 6th December 1988

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Defence industry in Spain and Portugal (*Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1161*).
2. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1989 (*Presentation of and*
3. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1987 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the motion to approve the final accounts, Doc. 1152 and addendum*).

debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, Doc. 1154 and addendum).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 3.10 p.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. Defence industry in Spain and Portugal

(Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1161)

The debate was resumed.

Speaker: Mr. Pannella (renunciation of right to speak).

The debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 462) ¹.

4. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1989

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft budget, Doc. 1154 and addendum)

The report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration was presented by Mr. Linster, Chairman and Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Morris and Pannella.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Linster, Chairman and Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1989.

The draft budget was agreed to.

5. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1987 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts

(Presentation of the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the motion to approve the final accounts, Doc. 1152 and addendum)

The report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration was presented by Mr. Linster, Chairman and Rapporteur.

1. See page 26.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the motion to approve the final accounts for the financial year 1987.

The motion was agreed to.

***6. Date, time and orders of the day
of the next sitting***

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for Wednesday, 7th December, at 10 a.m.

The sitting was closed at 3.45 p.m.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	MM. Niegel Reddemann <i>Höffkes</i> (von Schmude) Soell	Netherlands
Mrs. <i>Staels-Dompas</i> Mr. <i>Uyttendaele</i> (Steverynck)		MM. Aarts <i>Maris</i> (de Jong) de Kwaadsteniet Stoffelen Mrs. <i>Baarveld-Schlaman</i> (Worrell)
France	Italy	
MM. <i>Pistre</i> (Beix) Collette <i>Lagorce</i> (Fourré)	MM. Fioret <i>Scovacricchi</i> (Natali) <i>Pannella</i> (Rubbi)	United Kingdom
Federal Republic of Germany	Luxembourg	Dame Peggy Fenner Sir Russell Johnston Mr. Morris Sir Dudley Smith Lord <i>Rodney</i> (Speed) Sir John Stokes Mr. Wilkinson
Mr. Antretter Mrs. <i>Pack</i> (Böhm) MM. Hitschler Kittelmann	MM. Burger Linster	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	Federal Republic of Germany	MM. Rodotà Salvi Sarti Sinesio Taramelli
MM. Adriaensens Biefnot Derycke Kempinaire Péciaux	MM. Ahrens Büchner Holtz Irmer Mrs. Luuk MM. Mechttersheimer Müller Scheer Schmitz Unland	Netherlands
France	Italy	MM. Tummers van der Werff
MM. Bassinet Baumel Caro Croze Durand Fillon Forni Galley Jeambrun Jung Mrs. Lalumière MM. Matraja Oehler Portier Seitlinger	MM. Caccia Filetti Gabbuggiani Intini Kessler Malfatti Martino Parisi Pecchioli Pieralli	United Kingdom
		MM. Coleman Cox Ewing Sir Geoffrey Finsberg MM. Garrett Hardy Hill Jessel Earl of Kinnoull MM. Parry Shelton

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 462
on defence industry in Spain and Portugal

The Assembly,

- (i) Recognising the benefits of a more cohesive and politically more vigorous European defence effort within the alliance which the accession of Spain and Portugal to WEU should bring;
- (ii) Aware that Western Europe's defence industrial base would be strengthened if the productive and technical potential of Spain and Portugal were stimulated by an active programme of joint research, collaborative development and production of defence equipment as well as by common maintenance and training programmes with the existing WEU member countries;
- (iii) Conscious that important recommendations in the report "Towards a stronger Europe" presented by the European Defence Industry Study Group to the ministers of the Independent European Programme Group which are of particular relevance to countries with a less-developed defence industry have not as yet been fully implemented;
- (iv) Convinced that budgetary constraints will impel all the European member countries within the alliance to promote enhanced co-operation by governments over the setting of common operational requirements through the Independent European Programme Group as well as through intensified industrial collaboration in the design, development and production of defence equipment;
- (v) Hopeful that better value for money in armament procurement for Western Europe as a whole can be obtained through the imaginative involvement of Portugal and Spain in the development, manufacture and support of a wide range of European defence equipments,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member governments:

1. To mark the accession of Portugal and Spain to WEU with a political initiative to address the industrial needs of the countries with a less-developed defence industry within the alliance;
2. To bear in mind the particular respective considerations of Portugal and Spain in implementing more fully the recommendations of the report "Towards a stronger Europe" presented by the European Defence Industry Study Group to the Independent European Programme Group;
3. To investigate the benefits to be derived to the alliance from common dependence by other WEU member countries on more specialist and economic sources of supply for defence equipments, and thereby enhance the opportunities for defence equipment procurement from Portugal and Spain;
4. To match Spanish and Portuguese commitment to a wide range of European collaborative aircraft, naval and missile programmes with the establishment of joint European training facilities and courses as well as the secondment of Portuguese and Spanish personnel to military research establishments elsewhere in Western Europe;
5. To facilitate by granting preferential terms of access the participation of LDDI nations such as Portugal in common technology projects;
6. To study the opportunities for military establishments for third line servicing within the WEU countries to bid commercially on the OGMA model for maintenance contracts from the armed forces of other western countries and from approved civilian sources.

TENTH SITTING

Wednesday, 7th December 1988

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. First part of the thirty-fourth annual report of the Council (*Presentation by Sir Geoffrey Howe, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Doc. 1155*).
2. The reactivation and enlargement of WEU – reply to the annual report of the Council (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 1163, addendum and amendments*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 10.05 a.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. Resignation of a Vice-President of the Assembly

The President informed the Assembly that Mr. Valleix had resigned as a Vice-President of the Assembly.

4. First part of the thirty-fourth annual report of the Council

(Presentation by Sir Geoffrey Howe, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Doc. 1155)

The first part of the thirty-fourth annual report of the Council to the Assembly was presented by Sir Geoffrey Howe, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Sir Geoffrey Howe answered questions put by MM. Rathbone, Hardy, Stewart, Encarnacao (*Observer from Portugal*), Ms. Ruddock, MM. Soell, Redmond, Sir Russell Johnston, MM. van der Werff, Ewing, Jessel and Cetin (*Observer from Turkey*).

5. The reactivation and enlargement of WEU – reply to the annual report of the Council

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 1163, addendum and amendments)

The report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mr. van der Sanden, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speaker: Mr. Reddemann.

Mr. van der Werff, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Speakers: MM. Rathbone, Antretter, Rauti, Burger, Katsaros (*Observer from Greece*), Tascioglu (*Observer from Turkey*), Cetin (*Observer from Turkey*) and Caro.

The debate was closed.

6. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly

One candidate had been proposed for the vacant post of Vice-President, namely Mr. Fourré.

The Assembly decided unanimously not to have a secret ballot but to elect the Vice-President by acclamation.

Mr. Fourré was elected Vice-President by acclamation.

The President informed the Assembly that the order of precedence of the Vice-Presidents according to age was as follows: Mr. van der Werff, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Sarti, Mr. Soell, Mr. Pécriaux and Mr. Fourré.

***7. Date, time and orders of the day
of the next sitting***

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

The sitting was closed at 1 p.m.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	Mrs. Luuk MM. Niegel Reddemann Mrs. <i>Pack</i> (Schmitz) MM. <i>Höffkes</i> (von Schmude) Soell	Netherlands MM. <i>van der Sanden</i> (Aarts) <i>Maris</i> (de Jong) de Kwaadsteniet Tummers van der Werff Mrs. <i>Baarveld-Schlaman</i> (Worrell)
France	Italy MM. <i>Stegagnini</i> (Caccia) <i>Rauti</i> (Filetti) Fioret <i>Fassino</i> (Intini) <i>Rubner</i> (Kessler) Malfatti Martino <i>Scovacricchi</i> (Natali) Pieralli Mrs. <i>Francesca</i> (Rubbi) MM. <i>Giagu Demartini</i> (Salvi) Sarti	United Kingdom MM. <i>Lambie</i> (Coleman) <i>Redmond</i> (Cox) Ewing Dame Peggy Fenner Sir Geoffrey Finsberg Ms. <i>Ruddock</i> (Garrett) MM. Hardy <i>Rathbone</i> (Hill) Jessel Lord <i>Mackie</i> (Sir Russell Johnston) MM. <i>Stewart</i> (Earl of Kinnoull) Morris <i>Thompson</i> (Parry) Shelton Sir Dudley Smith Mr. Speed Sir John Stokes
Federal Republic of Germany	Luxembourg Mr. Burger	
MM. Bassinet Caro <i>Birraux</i> (Durand) Forni <i>Pontillon</i> (Matraja) <i>Valleix</i> (Portier) Seitlinger	MM. Ahrens Antretter <i>Bühler</i> (Böhm) Büchner Hitschler <i>Klejdzinski</i> (Holtz) Kittelmann	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	Mrs. Lalumière Mr. Oehler	MM. Pecchioli Rodotà Sinesio Taramelli
France	Federal Republic of Germany MM. Irmer Mechtersheimer Müller Scheer Unland	Luxembourg Mr. Linster
MM. Baumel Beix Collette Croze Fillon Fourré Galley Jeambrun Jung	Italy MM. Gabbuggiani Parisi	Netherlands Mr. Stoffelen
		United Kingdom Mr. Wilkinson

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

ELEVENTH SITTING

Wednesday, 7th December 1988

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. The reactivation and enlargement of WEU – reply to the annual report of the Council (*Replies to speakers and vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 1163, addendum and amendments).
2. Disarmament – reply to the thirty-third annual report of the Council (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 1158 and amendments).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 3.15 p.m. with Mr. Pécriaux, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in Appendix I.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. The reactivation and enlargement of WEU – reply to the annual report of the Council

(Replies to speakers and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc 1163, addendum and amendments)

Mr. van der Sanden, Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Mr. Ahrens, Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Pieralli and others:

1. Redraft paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft recommendation as follows:

“Considering that the positive trend in the international situation and the forthcoming stages of East-West relations imply that Western Europe will have to assume special responsibilities in the negotiations on the reduction of conventional weapons to ensure its security, promote disarmament and contribute to international peace;”

Speakers: MM. Pieralli, Reddemann, van der Sanden and Ahrens.

The amendment was agreed to.

Four amendments (Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5) were tabled by Mr. van der Sanden:

2. Redraft paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation as follows:

“ (vi) Welcoming the accession of Portugal and Spain to WEU; ”

3. After paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert a new paragraph as follows:

“ Noting that the nine signatory countries of the modified Brussels Treaty agree that a revision of the treaty is necessary; ”

4. After paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert a new paragraph as follows:

“ Considering that satisfactory application of Articles V, VIII and IX of the treaty means effectively deleting or updating the protocols to the Paris Agreements that no longer meet European security requirements; ”

5. At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:

“ 10. Undertake without delay an examination of those provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty whose deletion or revision it considers necessary and inform the Assembly of the results of that examination. ”

Speakers: MM. van der Sanden and Ahrens.

The amendments were agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 463)¹.

4. Exchange of armed forces personnel between the national units of the individual member nations

(Motion for a recommendation, Doc. 1171)

In accordance with Rule 28 (4) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly proceeded to consider for inclusion in the register a motion for a recommendation on the exchange of armed forces personnel between the national units of the individual member nations.

Speakers: Mr. Hitschler, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg and Mr. Ahrens.

In accordance with Rule 16 of the Rules of Procedure, the motion for a recommendation was included in the register of the Assembly.

5. Disarmament – reply to the thirty-third annual report of the Council

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1158 and amendments)

The report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. Tummers, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: Mr. Scovacricchi, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Ms. Ruddock, Sir Dudley Smith and Mr. de Beer.

Mr. van der Werff, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Speakers: Mr. Hardy, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, MM. Hill and Scheer.

Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

Speakers: MM. Klejdzinski, Balligand and Jessel.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Tummers, Rapporteur, and Mr. Kittelmann, Chairman, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

The President announced that Mr. Reddemann had withdrawn his amendment (No. 9).

Mr. Pieralli withdrew his amendments (Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4).

An amendment (No. 5) was tabled by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman:

5. Leave out paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation.

Speakers: Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, MM. Tummers and Kittelmann.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 7) was tabled by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman and others:

7. In paragraph (vii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "to help further such agreement" and insert "to reconfirm the Geneva Convention of 1925 and to take international political measures against any violation".

Speakers: MM. Klejdzinski and Tummers.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 6) was tabled by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman and others:

6. Redraft paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper as follows:

"1. Give substance to the principles enunciated in The Hague platform by defining and stating publicly a *Western European Union* posture on specific arms control issues, including the following criteria:

- (a) arms control priorities should now advance conventional and chemical disarmament measures;
- (b) in consonance with a comprehensive concept which encompasses the inter relation between the conventional and nuclear components in our force planning and negotiating strategy, negotiations should take place on tactical nuclear weapons with a range below 500 kilometres as well as conventional forces in a way which at any time contributes to stability in Europe;
- (c) in order to enhance stability and to complement and reinforce a conventional stability agreement primary attention should be devoted to reduction and withdrawal of battlefield nuclear weapons: their short range, the limited number of ammunition depots, and war-fighting rationale contribute to dangerous instability in the event of a crisis;
- (d) the idea of corridors with no nuclear weapons and particularly offensive conventional armaments should be supported as a confidence-building measure and an integral element in a régime for stability in Europe;

1. See page 36.

- (e) sub-regional nuclear weapon-free zones as part of an overall arrangement for reducing nuclear weapons in Europe could similarly contribute to stability and security in Europe at large;
- (f) arms control agreements should include verification measures which fully satisfy all parties;
- (g) arms control should proceed by stages, allowing the security of all to remain assured throughout;

Speakers: MM. Klejdzinski, Reddemann, Kittelmann, Tummers, Reddemann and Tummers (point of order).

The amendment was negated.

An amendment (No. 8) was tabled by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman and others:

8. Redraft paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper as follows:

“ 2. To speed up the negotiation process, take the initiative to mount a conference of the Foreign and Defence Ministers of the twenty-three states within CSCE, who carry responsibility for the European disarmament process as members of WEU, NATO and the Warsaw Pact. ”

Speakers: Mr. Hardy, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, MM. Tummers and Kittelmann.

The amendment was negated.

Speaker (point of order): Mr. Hardy.

In accordance with Rule 31 (1) (d) of the Rules of Procedure, Mr. Hardy proposed that the report be referred back to committee.

At the request of Mr. Hardy, the Assembly decided to vote by roll-call on the reference back to committee.

The reference back of the report to the committee was not agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix II) by 32 votes to 17 with 0 abstentions; 10 representatives who had signed the register of attendance did not take part in the vote.

Speakers: MM. Tummers (explanation of vote) and Hardy (point of order).

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 464)¹.

6. Changes in the membership of committees

In accordance with Rule 38 (6) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following

changes in the membership of committees proposed by the French Delegation:

Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments

- Mr. Fillon as a titular member in place of Mr. Matraja;
- Mr. Matraja as an alternate member in place of Mr. Koehl;
- Mr. Balligand as an alternate member in place of Mr. Bichet.

General Affairs Committee

- Mr. Forni as a titular member in place of Mr. Bassinet;
- Mr. Beix as a titular member in place of Mr. Baumel;
- Mr. Caro as a titular member in place of Mr. Chénard;
- Mr. Baumel as an alternate member in place of Mr. André.

Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions

- Mr. Worms as a titular member in place of Mr. Fourré;
- Mr. Lacour as an alternate member in place of Mr. de Chambrun;
- Mr. Birraux as an alternate member in place of Mr. Prat.

Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration

- Mr. Lagorce as a titular member in place of Mr. Bohl;
- Mr. Durand as a titular member in place of Mr. Chartron;
- Mr. Matraja as an alternate member in place of Mr. Sirgue.

Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges

- Mr. Bohl as a titular member in place of Mr. Lacour;
- Mr. Pistre as a titular member in place of Mr. Bordu;
- Mr. Collette as a titular member in place of Mr. Sirgue;
- Mr. Forni as an alternate member in place of Mr. Gremetz;
- Mr. Barrau as an alternate member in place of Mr. Montastruc;
- Mr. Lagorce as an alternate member in place of Mrs. Trautmann;
- Mr. Hunault as an alternate member in place of Mr. Bohl.

1. See page 38.

*Committee for Parliamentary
and Public Relations*

- Mr. Lacour as a titular member in place of Mr. de Chambrun.

***7. Date, time and orders of the day
of the next sitting***

The Assembly agreed to add at the end of the orders of the day for the morning sitting on

Thursday, 8th December, the orders of the day previously set down for the afternoon sitting on that day.

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for Thursday, 8th December 1988, at 10 a.m.

The sitting was closed at 6.55 p.m.

APPENDIX I

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹.

Belgium	MM. Niegel Reddemann Scheer <i>Höffkes</i> (von Schmude) <i>Klejdzinski</i> (Soell)	MM. de Kwaadsteniet Tummers <i>de Beer</i> (van der Werff) Mrs. <i>Baarveld-Schlaman</i> (Worrell)
MM. Adriaensens <i>Eicher</i> (Derycke) Pécriaux Mrs. Staels-Dompas Mr. <i>Uyttendaele</i> (Stevelyneck)		
	Italy	
France	MM. <i>Stegagnini</i> (Caccia) <i>Rauti</i> (Filetti) Fioret Martino <i>Scovacicchi</i> (Natali) Pieralli Mrs. <i>Francesca</i> (Rubbi) MM. <i>Giagu Demartini</i> (Salvi) Sarti	United Kingdom
MM. Bassinet Caro <i>Balligand</i> (Forni) Fourré Mrs. Lalumière Mr. <i>Valleix</i> (Portier)		Mr. <i>Redmond</i> (Cox) Ms. <i>Ruddock</i> (Coleman) Mr. Ewing Dame Peggy Fenner Sir Geoffrey Finsberg MM. <i>Thompson</i> (Garrett) Hardy Hill Jessel Sir Russell Johnston Earl of Kinnoull MM. Morris <i>Lambie</i> (Parry) Shelton Sir Dudley Smith Mr. <i>Stewart</i> (Speed) Sir John Stokes Mr. <i>Gale</i> (Wilkinson)
Federal Republic of Germany	Luxembourg	
MM. Ahrens Antretter <i>Zierer</i> (Böhm) Büchner Hitschler Holtz Kittelmann Mrs. Luuk Mr. Müller	Mr. Burger	
	Netherlands	
	MM. Aarts de Jong	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	MM. Matraja Oehler Seitlinger	MM. Kessler Malfatti Parisi Pecchioli Rodotà Sinesio Taramelli
MM. Biefnot Kempinaire		
France	Federal Republic of Germany	
MM. Baumel Beix Collette Croze Durand Fillon Galley Jeambrun Jung	MM. Irmer Mechtersheimer Schmitz Unland	Luxembourg
		Mr. Linster
	Italy	Netherlands
	MM. Gabbuggiani Intini	Mr. Stoffelen

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

APPENDIX II

Vote No. 3 by roll-call on the reference back to committee of the report on disarmament – reply to the thirty-third annual report of the Council (Doc. 1158) ¹:

Ayes	17
Noes	32
Abstentions	0

Ayes

MM. Adriaensens	MM. <i>Thompson</i> (Garrett)	Mr. Pieralli
Ahrens	Hardy	Mrs. <i>Francesca</i> (Rubbi)
Antretter	Holtz	MM. Scheer
<i>Redmond</i> (Cox)	Mrs. Luuk	<i>Klejdzinski</i> (Soell)
<i>Eicher</i> (Derycke)	MM. <i>Lambie</i> (Parry)	Mrs. <i>Baarveld-Schlaman</i>
Ewing	Péciaux	(Worrell)

Noes

MM. Aarts	Sir Russell Johnston	MM. <i>Höffkes</i> (von Schmude)
<i>Zierer</i> (Böhm)	Mr. de Jong	Shelton
Burger	Earl of Kinnoull	Sir Dudley Smith
<i>Stegagnini</i> (Caccia)	MM. Kittelmann	Mr. <i>Stewart</i> (Speed)
Caro	de Kwaadsteniet	Mrs. <i>Staels-Dompas</i>
Ms. <i>Ruddock</i> (Coleman)	Martino	Mr. <i>Uyttendaele</i> (Stevelyneck)
Dame Peggy Fenner	Morris	Sir John Stokes
Sir Geoffrey Finsberg	Müller	MM. Tummers
MM. Hill	Niegel	<i>de Beer</i> (van der Werff)
Hitschler	<i>Valleix</i> (Portier)	<i>Gale</i> (Wilkinson)
Jessel	Reddemann	

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 463***on the reactivation and enlargement of WEU –
reply to the annual report of the Council***

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that the positive trend in the international situation and the forthcoming stages of East-West relations imply that Western Europe will have to assume special responsibilities in the negotiations on the reduction of conventional weapons to ensure its security, promote disarmament and contribute to international peace;
- (ii) Noting that the Council considers the reactivation of WEU to have been completed but that the highest authorities of certain member countries do not appear to endorse this view;
- (iii) Noting that the rôle of the WEU Agency has still not been satisfactorily defined;
- (iv) Welcoming the very definite improvement in the information the Council has communicated to the Assembly in 1988;
- (v) Noting, however, that:
 - (a) the Council has not answered all the points raised in Recommendation 457;
 - (b) the Council's communications to the Assembly contain much ambiguity about the way the Council intends to interpret and implement the modified Brussels Treaty;
 - (c) the Council's promise to communicate the agencies' reports to the Assembly has been kept only in part;
- (vi) Welcoming the accession of Portugal and Spain to WEU;
- (vii) Noting that the nine signatory countries of the modified Brussels Treaty agree that a revision of the treaty is necessary;
- (viii) Considering that satisfactory application of Articles V, VIII and IX of the treaty means effectively deleting or updating the protocols to the Paris Agreements that no longer meet European security requirements;
- (ix) Recalling that it is incumbent upon the Council to give the Assembly detailed and accurate information about everything relating to the application of the modified Brussels Treaty;
- (x) Trusting that the colloquy on the future of European security to be held in Florence in March 1989 will allow a successful definition to be made of the tasks to be accomplished so that WEU may make a meaningful contribution to building a European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Answer the paragraphs of Recommendation 457 asking the Council:
 - (a) How it intends to implement the political impetus that it said it wished to give to co-operation in armaments matters;
 - (b) When it intends to transmit to the Assembly the text of the agencies' studies that have not yet been communicated to it;
 - (c) What progress has been made with its studies of burden- and responsibility-sharing in the Atlantic Alliance;
2. Inform the Assembly of the decisions taken by the IEPG at its meeting in Luxembourg on 9th November 1988;
3. Ensure that its annual report covers all its activities and the implementation of commitments incumbent upon the WEU organs under the Paris Agreements and the Council's decision of 7th May 1955, as long as these texts remain in force;
4. Inform the Assembly of the conclusions of the seminar on defence resources that it organised in The Hague on 14th and 15th March 1988;

5. In view of the nature of the subject to be tackled and the Assembly's responsibility for informing public opinion, invite the Assembly to play a full part in the seminar on informing public opinion it is planning to convene in 1989;
6. Specify whether the WEU "intergovernmental organs" referred to in the Secretary-General's letters to the President of the Assembly were effectively set up in application of Articles VIII and IX of the modified Brussels Treaty;
7. Not wait for agreement on a single seat for the WEU ministerial organs before defining the tasks of the new agency and specifying what henceforth it expects of the ACA and the SAC, as the Assembly asked it to do in Recommendations 428, 429, 432, 438, 442, 451 and 454;
8. Explain how the WEU ministerial organs will follow up the organisation of a European seminar by the French Ministry of Defence in November 1988 to make European security requirements better known to public opinion;
9. Invite member governments to be represented and play a full part in discussions at the colloquy on the future of European security that the General Affairs Committee is organising in Florence from 21st to 23rd March 1989;
10. Undertake without delay an examination of those provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty whose deletion or revision it considers necessary and inform the Assembly of the results of that examination.

RECOMMENDATION 464***on disarmament – reply to the thirty-third annual report
of the Council***

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming the renewed efforts of the Council to ensure a speedy transmission of the annual report;
- (ii) Pleased that information called for in previous replies has been reinstated in the Council's report;
- (iii) Commending the Council's initiatives in promoting the present comprehensive five-nation mine-sweeping operation in the Gulf, codenamed "Cleansweep", before disengagement;
- (iv) Calling for the collective defence effort to be maintained at the level necessary to ensure the security of all countries of the alliance, while negotiations are actively pursued on the mutual reduction of forces and armaments to the lowest levels compatible with that essential security, in full accordance with the long-standing policy of the alliance;
- (v) Endorsing the approach to a bilateral agreement to reduce strategic nuclear weapons;
- (vi) Stressing the importance of respect for the existing ABM treaty and the limitations of the SALT accords, which can be modified only by agreement between the parties to them;
- (vii) Supporting the efforts of the nations at the Conference on Disarmament to conclude a multi-lateral treaty to ban all chemical weapons and applauding US and French initiatives to convene an international conference to reconfirm the Geneva Convention of 1925 and to take international political measures against any violation;
- (viii) Noting with interest the Council's report on "The experience gained in verification of controls on forces and conventional armaments" (which reinforces the Assembly's belief that the Agency still has a major contribution to make in the important matter of verification), asking that such studies will be further developed and applied, and encouraged in this hope by the reply of the Council to Recommendation 460,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Give substance to the principles enunciated in The Hague platform by defining and stating publicly a *Western European Union* posture on specific arms control issues, including the following criteria:
 - (a) arms control priorities should now advance conventional and chemical disarmament measures in preference to the abolition of short-range nuclear weapons which for the present remain an essential factor for deterrence contributing significantly to the maintenance of peace;
 - (b) arms control measures should be global and must not prevent some countries from doing what others are allowed to do; (the creation of denuclearised zones, for example, would be a factor of destabilisation for Europe);
 - (c) arms control agreements should include verification measures which fully satisfy all parties and which do not infringe national sovereignty;
 - (d) arms control should proceed by stages, allowing the security of all to remain assured throughout;
2. In the name of Western European Union, reply to Mr. Gorbachev's call for a pan-European summit on conventional arms by stressing that such a forum already exists in the context of the CSCE;
3. Urge more and wider adequate publicity by member governments for disarmament issues aimed at both the press and the public, including the fact that in the initial stages arms reduction and control do not necessarily imply greatly-reduced defence spending, and invite the WEU Agency to prepare studies with a view to facilitating the task of the governments of member countries in informing public opinion of security and disarmament problems;
4. Call on member governments to involve the specialist scientific and technical departments of the universities and defence institutions closely in work on arms control, and authorise the WEU Agency, in

the framework of its own research for the Council, to consult certain specialised university departments and appropriate government bodies;

5. Ensure that the “appropriate utilisation of the WEU Agency in studying in detail questions relating to conventional disarmament and, in particular, problems relating to the technology of verification” (Reply of the Council to Recommendation 460) is implemented without delay.

TWELFTH SITTING

Thursday, 8th December 1988

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Verification: a future European satellite agency; Scientific and technical aspects of arms control verification by satellite – reply to the thirty-third annual report of the Council (*Presentation of and joint debate on the reports of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions*, Docs. 1159 and 1160).
2. Address by Mr. Manzolini, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 10.10 a.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. Verification: a future European satellite agency

Scientific and technical aspects of arms control verification by satellite – reply to the thirty-third annual report of the Council

(Presentation of and joint debate on the reports of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Docs. 1159 and 1160)

The report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. Fourré, Rapporteur.

The report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions was presented by Mr. Malfatti, Rapporteur.

The joint debate was opened.

Speaker: Mr. Klejdzinski.

The joint debate was closed.

Mr. Fourré, Rapporteur, and Mr. de Beer, Vice-Chairman of the Committee on Defence

Questions and Armaments, replied to the speaker.

The sitting was suspended at 11.05 a.m. and resumed at 11.10 a.m.

4. Address by Mr. Manzolini, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy

Mr. Manzolini, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy, addressed the Assembly.

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Mr. Manzolini answered questions put by MM. Rathbone, Speed, Martino, Fourré and Sarti.

5. Verification: a future European satellite agency

Scientific and technical aspects of arms control verification by satellite – reply to the thirty-third annual report of the Council

(Votes on the draft recommendations, Docs. 1159 and 1160)

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation on verification: a future European satellite agency, Document 1159.

The draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 465)¹.

1. See page 43.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation on scientific and technical aspects of arms control verification by satellite – reply to the thirty-third annual report of the Council, Document 1160.

The draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 466)¹.

6. Close of the session

The President declared the thirty-fourth ordinary session of the Assembly closed.

The sitting was closed at 11.45 a.m.

1. See page 44.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	MM. <i>Klejdzinski</i> (Holtz) <i>Zierer</i> (Niegel)	Mr. <i>de Beer</i> (van der Werff) Mrs. <i>Baarveld-Schlaman</i> (Worrell)
Mr. Adriaensens Mrs. Staels-Dompas Mr. <i>Uyttendaele</i> (Steверlynck)	Italy	United Kingdom
France	MM. <i>Rubner</i> (Kessler) Malfatti Martino Mrs. <i>Francesca</i> (Rubbi) MM. <i>Giagu Demartini</i> (Salvi) Sarti	Mr. <i>Lambie</i> (Ewing) Dame Peggy Fenner Sir Geoffrey Finsberg MM. <i>Thompson</i> (Garrett) Hardy <i>Hunt</i> (Hill) Lord <i>Mackie</i> (Sir Russell Johnston) Mr. Parry Sir Dudley Smith MM. <i>Speed</i> <i>Stewart</i> (Sir John Stokes)
MM. Bassinet Fourré <i>Pontillon</i> (Matraja)	Netherlands	
Federal Republic of Germany	MM. de Jong de Kwaadsteniet Tummers	
MM. Ahrens Antretter Hitschler		

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	Federal Republic of Germany	MM. Natali Parisi Pecchioli Pieralli Rodotà Sinesio Taramelli
MM. Biefnot Derycke Kempinaire Péciaux	MM. Böhm Büchner Irmer Kittelmann Mrs. Luuk MM. Mechttersheimer Müller Reddemann Scheer Schmitz von Schmude Soell Unland	Luxembourg
France		MM. Burger Linster
MM. Baumel Beix Caro Collette Croze Durand Fillon Forni Galley Jeambrun Jung Mrs. Lalumière MM. Oehler Portier Seitlinger	Italy	Netherlands
	MM. Caccia Filetti Fioret Gabbuggiani Intini	MM. Aarts Stoffelen
		United Kingdom
		MM. Coleman Cox Jessel Earl of Kinnoull MM. Morris Shelton Wilkinson

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 465***on verification: a future European satellite agency***

The Assembly,

- (i) Recalling that in The Hague platform the governments of the member states of Western European Union stressed “arms control and disarmament are an integral part of western security” as well as “arms control agreements have to be effectively verifiable”;
- (ii) Convinced that high levels of arms expenditure are caused by uncertainty in the international environment and the magnitude of the perceived threat affecting in particular relations between neighbouring countries;
- (iii) Believing that this uncertainty could be reduced by the operations of a European agency for observation satellites, the data and information from which might possibly be made freely available;
- (iv) Sharing the Council’s support for negotiations towards arms control and disarmament;
- (v) Considering that new negotiations on conventional stability in Europe are to be welcomed and are likely to begin in the near future;
- (vi) Noting that effective verification will be an essential feature of any negotiated agreement and that the signatory countries must be able to commit themselves fully and also actively participate in such verification;
- (vii) Emphasising the generally-accepted principle of sharing risks, rôles and responsibilities in ensuring European security which should also apply to the verification aspects of future agreements on the control of conventional armaments;
- (viii) Aware that the Council has commissioned the Agency for the study of arms control and disarmament questions to prepare an assessment of verification measures and has already expressed the opinion that “satellites...may offer possible means of verification which merit careful examination”;
- (ix) Certain that the verification régime of any future conventional arms control agreement in Europe should include national technical means of verification, such as monitoring by satellite, as well as other co-operative systems;
- (x) In the knowledge that various member states of Western European Union have developed sufficient technological expertise to begin working on the deployment of a satellite system capable of carrying out essential verification tasks;
- (xi) Believing that the time is now ripe for the member states of WEU to take a credible political initiative towards the setting up of a European satellite agency for the verification of conventional arms control and disarmament agreements and, in a second stage, crisis situations,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Define the conditions for setting up a European satellite agency in WEU on the basis of the guidelines in the present report with the initial task of verifying a future conventional arms control agreement,

and in particular, in accordance with suggestions made in paragraph 8.3 of the explanatory memorandum,

Identify and assess systems existing or under study in Western Europe, methods of foreseeable European co-operation – political, operational, industrial, technological and financial – and the advantages of co-operation or a merger with existing machinery in the alliance, together with the resulting institutional and legal aspects,

and present its conclusions to the Assembly.

RECOMMENDATION 466***on scientific and technical aspects of arms control verification by satellite –
reply to the thirty-third annual report of the Council***

The Assembly,

- (i) Recalling that in the platform adopted in The Hague the member countries of WEU affirmed that “arms control and disarmament are an integral part of western security policy and not an alternative to it” and that “arms control agreements have to be effectively verifiable and stand the test of time”;
- (ii) Recalling WEU Recommendations 369, 410, 430 and 448 and noting with interest the resolution on European space policy adopted by the European Parliament in 1987 and the communication of 26th July 1988 from the Commission of the European Communities to the Council on “The Community and space – a coherent approach”;
- (iii) Sharing the Council’s commitment to negotiations on the control of armaments and disarmament;
- (iv) Considering that it is both probable and desirable for new negotiations on conventional stability in Europe to be opened in a very near future;
- (v) Noting that the existence of a verification system on which all the signatory countries of an agreement could rely and in which they would participate actively has to be an essential part of any agreement;
- (vi) Considering that the generally-accepted principle of sharing risks, rôles and responsibilities in regard to the security of Europe should also be applied to systems for verifying future agreements on the control of conventional armaments;
- (vii) Recalling that the Council has instructed the Agency for the study of the control of armaments and disarmament to prepare a study of verification measures;
- (viii) Considering that the system for verifying a future agreement on conventional stability in Europe should include national technical means of verification such as monitoring by satellite and other co-operative systems including on-site inspection;
- (ix) Taking account of the fact that the member states of WEU have developed adequate technical knowledge to begin working on the deployment of a satellite system capable of carrying out essential verification tasks;
- (x) Stressing the importance of European co-operation in space matters in the framework of ESA and noting with satisfaction the development of the latter’s programmes,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Define all the conditions necessary for creating, in the framework of WEU, a European satellite monitoring agency whose main task would be to help to verify future agreements on the control of conventional armaments,
and, in particular,
Identify and assess present or planned systems, foreseeable measures of co-operation in Western Europe in industrial and technological, political and operational areas, the problems of co-operation or integration with existing machinery in the Atlantic Alliance and the ensuing juridical and institutional aspects and present its conclusions to the Assembly;
2. Urge member governments to co-ordinate all technological research work in the member countries of WEU, the importance of which is essential for verification by satellite.

II
OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES

SEVENTH SITTING

Monday, 5th December 1988

SUMMARY

1. Resumption of the session.
 2. Attendance register.
 3. Adoption of the minutes.
 4. Examination of credentials.
 5. Address by the President of the Assembly.
 6. Observers.
 7. Adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the session (Doc. 1149).
 8. Banning of low-altitude military training flights (*Motion for a resolution*, Doc. 1169).
Banning of demonstration flights at air shows (*Motion for a resolution with a request for urgent procedure*, Doc. 1170).
Integration of Europe with a view to European union (or the United States of Europe): WEU's rôle (*Motion for a resolution with a request for urgent procedure*, Doc. 1168).
Participation of Mr. Arafat at the United Nations General Assembly in New York (*Motion for a resolution with a request for urgent procedure*, Doc. 1167).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Malfatti.
 9. Address by Mr. Dumas, Minister of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs of France.
- Replies by Mr. Dumas to questions put by:* Mr. Caro, Mr. De Decker, Mr. Soell, Mr. Kittelmann, Mr. Wilkinson, Sir Russell Johnston, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg and Mr. Klejdzinski.
10. Action by the Presidential Committee (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Presidential Committee*, Doc. 1165).
Speakers: The President, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg (*Vice-President of the Assembly*), Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Reddemann, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Hill, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.
 11. Address by Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU.
Replies by Mr. Cahen to questions put by: Mr. Hill, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Caro, Mr. van der Werff, Mr. Lambie.
 12. Europe and the aftermath of the war between Iran and Iraq (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 1162 and amendments).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Martino (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Scovacricchi, Mr. Speed, Mr. Müller, Mrs. Luuk, Mr. Atkinson, Mr. Eisma, Mr. Tascioglu (*Observer from Turkey*), Mr. Cetin (*Observer from Turkey*), Mr. Malfatti, Mr. Martino (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Ahrens (*Chairman*), Mr. Pieralli, Mr. Martino, Mr. Ahrens, Mr. Speed, Mr. Martino, Mrs. Luuk, Mr. Martino.
 13. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Resumption of the session

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

I declare resumed the thirty-fourth ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union which was adjourned on 9th June 1988 at the end of the sixth sitting.

2. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

1. See page 15.

3. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the sixth sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

4. Examination of credentials

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the examination of the credentials of the new representatives and substitutes nominated since our Assembly's last part-session whose names have been published in Notice No. 7.

The President (continued)

In accordance with Rule 6(1) of the Rules of Procedure, these credentials have been attested by a statement of ratification from the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

In addition, as the credentials of Mr. Uyttendaele, who is replacing Mr. Van Hecke as a substitute, have not been ratified by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, our Assembly must ratify them according to Rule 6(2) of the Rules of Procedure.

This ratification is based on an official document provided by the Belgian Chamber of Deputies and is subject to subsequent ratification by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

Is there any objection to ratifying these credentials?...

The credentials are ratified by the Assembly.

I welcome our new parliamentary colleagues.

5. Address by the President of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ministers, your Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, the second part of the thirty-fourth session of our Assembly is, I hope, the last to bring together delegations from the parliaments of seven countries and the first to be attended by those of the nine future member countries of WEU. In London on 14th November, Portugal and Spain signed a protocol of accession to the modified Brussels Treaty. Accession will be effective once all the countries concerned have ratified it which, I trust, will not take long. The Assembly, for its part, wished to show its will to move swiftly by inviting delegations from the Portuguese and Spanish Parliaments to take part forthwith in all our activities, although, during the transitional period, they may not take part in votes.

This double accession is an undeniable success for the Assembly which, as soon as Portugal applied for membership in October 1984, expressed its firm, unanimous desire that the two countries take their place among the members of WEU as soon as possible. Allow me to convey our congratulations to the United Kingdom presidency, and in particular Sir Geoffrey Howe, who followed up so quickly and successfully the decision taken by the Council last spring to start negotiations on the accession of Portugal and Spain.

This successful outcome allows me to welcome the Portuguese and Spanish Delegations with special pleasure and express my unreserved satisfaction at seeing them take their place among us.

However, our satisfaction does not mean that the enlargement of WEU raises no problems for us. First of all, it presents us with material problems that will have to be solved in the near future: with more members and two new working languages the staff of the Office of the Clerk cannot meet the Assembly's increased requirements and our premises are becoming inadequate in spite of the improvements that have been possible in recent months. I have informed the Council of the extent of our requirements and I hope it will ensure that they are quickly met so that we may give the two new delegations the facilities to which they are entitled. The granting to the Assembly of funds allowing preliminary studies to be made means that we can look ahead with optimism. I extend my warmest thanks to the Council.

The arrival of Portugal and Spain in our midst also shows us that the nine countries have taken into account the need to bring up to date the texts governing us. Already the 1954 protocols no longer corresponded to the previous situation. In spite of the Assembly, the Seven had preferred to turn a blind eye to this. But certain provisions of the treaty cannot be applied in their present form to the new members of WEU. The Assembly, responsible under Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty for ensuring that the governments apply the treaty, has constantly, throughout its existence, insisted on the principle that any provisions of the treaty proving to be inapplicable should be revised accordingly. It would be undermining its own foundations and ruining the authority it derives from the treaty if it accepted the perpetuation of a situation in which the treaty was no longer applied in full. It can but welcome the fact that the Council has at last, on the occasion of its enlargement, decided to proceed to the essential adaptation of the fundamental texts.

This remark should not be attributed to an unduly legalistic approach. If we accept that Europe's cohesion is a major factor in the deterrence on which its security is based, it is clear that failure to respect certain parts of the 1954 protocols weakens the credibility of the treaty as a whole. Its main articles, i.e. Article V setting up the alliance between our nine countries, Article VIII assigning responsibilities to the Council and Article IX which forms the basis of the Assembly's Charter, are more than ever the reason for WEU's existence and the basis of European cohesion in security matters. But the governments' will to respect them might be doubted if they showed that they no longer felt bound by protocols which were no longer applied. It is therefore important for the Council to proceed without delay to examine what should be modified in the 1954 protocols.

The Assembly for its part will study what needs to be amended in these texts in order to be able, in due course, to give its opinion on the

The President (continued)

revision of the treaty. The colloquy on the future of European security that the General Affairs Committee is organising in Florence next March will allow it to hear the opinions of a number of eminent persons outside the Assembly and thus help it to work out its proposals.

But, first of all, the accession of the two countries must become effective without delay since there can no longer be any question of updating the treaty without them. Since the protocol of accession is subject to parliamentary procedure in several countries, the Assembly's Presidential Committee has proposed that a joint explanatory memorandum be prepared under the guidance of the Secretary-General of WEU to present the text of the protocol of accession to the parliaments which have to take a decision on it. It considered, on the one hand, that this would speed up ratification procedure and, on the other, that it would demonstrate the nine countries' unanimity by emphasising the European dimension of the reasons for the adoption of the protocol. The Assembly trusts that the governments will facilitate the implementation of this proposal.

Finally, the Assembly expects the Portuguese and Spanish Governments and their parliaments' delegations to inject new life into WEU. It was gratified that they endorsed the view of the Seven that the platform adopted in The Hague is now WEU's charter of action. It deplores that the Council for its part has made no progress in the last six months with the preparation of measures to implement the principles set out in that text. It firmly hopes that the new members will spur the Council on in this direction. It also expects the Portuguese and Spanish parliamentarians to approach their respective governments in this sense and also to convey to the Assembly the concerns of the peoples of the Iberian Peninsula by giving new impetus to its work, in particular by directing it more towards Western Mediterranean problems.

For WEU, the accession of Portugal and Spain must not just be the culmination of a process that was started only too late. It must also be a new starting point for both the Assembly and the Council.

WEU is indeed now faced with new problems and it will find a solution only if it is fully aware of the reality of Europe that is already emerging and which should be accomplished, with the single European market, in 1993.

For a long time now, Community Europe has been flattering itself that it was the world's leading trading power. But this was only a rather empty statistical fact as long as Europe was not united enough economically and politically to form a true entity. This situation is now changing and, as from 1993, Europe's unity will be an economic reality. It must also become a

reality at both political and defence levels since an economic power of that size cannot remain insensitive to threats that would no longer affect the European continent alone but all its relations with the rest of the world.

Based on the application of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty, the co-ordinated action by WEU member countries in the Gulf since July 1987 was the first demonstration of Europe's will to defend world interests, in this case freedom of navigation in the Gulf. This operation is now drawing to a close, but the instruments are still there for Europe to be able to meet any new challenge in an area that is essential for it.

Far from causing a clash with our American allies, this demonstration of European will to act outside the NATO area seems to have made them take a new view of the reactivation of WEU. I saw this last week when, thanks to the kindness of our Secretary-General, to whom I convey my warmest thanks, I was able to take advantage of my presence at a colloquy in Washington to establish useful contacts with several United States leaders, some of whom will be playing an important part in the new administration. Once suspicious of European consultations on arms limitation, the United States authorities are now happy that WEU did not leave them alone to tackle the delicate questions raised by the security of navigation in the Gulf.

However, they have another reason to be interested in the reactivation of WEU. For budgetary reasons, which Europeans must not underestimate, they are concerned about a better sharing of the burden of joint security and they have every reason to be satisfied that the Assembly, in adopting the report by our colleague, Senator Pontillon, last June, showed that it was paying attention to this problem, particularly since the Council has started to study the matter.

It is certainly regrettable that this study did not lead to the adoption of a joint position at the ministerial meeting on 14th November, but as we know it is not easy to measure the rôles played, the risks run and the responsibilities assumed by each of us and to arrange a new division between the Atlantic allies, starting with the members of WEU themselves. This question will quite obviously be at the hub of the discussions and work of the Council and its dependent organs for a long time to come. The Assembly for its part will continue to study the matter.

Furthermore, none of us has forgotten that the Europe we represent is but part of a continent which, since the second world war, has been divided into two blocs whose ideological dimension is perhaps fading but whose military dimension remains due to the requirements of world balance. The image of a "common

The President (continued)

house" so often referred to by Mr. Gorbachev evokes at least two aspects of this reality. On the one hand, it is perfectly true that another world war would inevitably lead to the destruction of the whole building. On the other hand, there is little doubt that in both East and West there is now a common desire to remove the obstacles which, for almost half a century, have stood in the way of the establishment of normal neighbourly relations.

This fact guides Western Europe in two, only apparently contradictory, directions. First, it must take account of the fact that no reasonable European policy can consider resorting to force as a means of pursuing ideological or political aims. Deterrence – and I give this word its full meaning, i.e. undertaking to convince a potential enemy that any warlike initiative would have results contrary to its interests – therefore remains the basis of *détente* in East-West relations because it guarantees the security of all concerned. We can but welcome the fact that WEU has made the platform adopted in The Hague, which proclaims this fact, the new charter of the organisation, after the modified Brussels Treaty.

Secondly, the maintenance of deterrence in no way excludes – on the contrary – the search for duly negotiated means of achieving the limitation of armaments and disarmament, subject to the necessary verification, placing deterrence at the lowest possible level of force deployment. We must not squander our security capital for the sake of *détente*, but we wish security to stop being too heavy a burden on the shoulders of the European peoples. Security must be achieved at a lower level of armaments.

For these various reasons, we are developing a dialogue on *détente*, disarmament and co-operation with representatives of Eastern European countries. Thus, the Presidential Committee has decided to respond to the invitation it received from the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union in 1987 by, in turn, inviting members of that assembly to meet some of our committees in Paris next May. We believe the pursuit of these exchanges will allow us to understand better the concerns of the Soviet leaders and throw light on our further debates on the future of European security based on transparency, the development of exchanges and the limitation of armaments.

Finally, I must pay tribute to the French Government and, in particular, to its Minister of Defence, Mr. Chevènement, who took the necessary steps to ensure that action was at last taken on the proposal made by Mr. Genscher, then Chairman-in-Office of the Council, in the Assembly in December 1984 to which we had unreservedly subscribed. This was the holding, in Paris, of a first European session organised under the aegis of WEU by the French Institut

des hautes études de défense nationale. This session was a remarkable success. Our colleague, Mr. Malfatti, and I were able to convey the view of members of the Assembly, while our Secretary-General drew conclusions from the session.

The session was marked by important addresses by authorities from most member countries and I am pleased that our colleague, Mr. van der Sanden, has been able to take note, in an addendum to his report which will be distributed to us on Wednesday, of the proposals made on that occasion by the Prime Minister of France, Mr. Rocard.

Among these proposals, particular attention should be paid to the one relating to the creation, in the framework of WEU, of a European institute for advanced defence studies, in accordance with a request the Assembly has made on several occasions. The organisation of a second session in Belgium next year and the creation of an association of former participants allow it to be hoped that this proposal will soon be followed up.

Such sessions and the possible creation of an institute to co-ordinate them may be of considerable importance because they correspond to the vocation that those who initiated the reactivation of our organisation wished WEU to have, i.e. to promote the spirit of defence in Europe without which the deterrent effect of our armaments would lose much of its impact. If our peoples failed to show their clear will to unite to defend their freedom, the door would be open to all kinds of speculation about their determination, if necessary, to use the weapons our countries have.

It is therefore with optimism that we can, at this session, tackle matters relating to the future of WEU. Better informed than in the past about the Council's activities thanks to the detailed information letters that our Secretary-General sends us at satisfying frequency, our Assembly is better able to carry out its mandate to monitor and stimulate the activities of our governments in areas that are WEU's responsibility.

We now have to put some order into these activities, which means finding a solution to the problems of the organisation of the intergovernmental bodies and collocation of the WEU ministerial organs. The importance of the latter problem should not be exaggerated, however. It is extremely disagreeable for officials who are being kept on without knowing what the coming months have in store for them and it must be solved as soon as possible, but it has not paralysed the Council's activities.

The Assembly did not wish to enter into the quarrel between governments about the seat of these bodies because it has always considered that the tasks of the agencies should first be decided upon and that the other aspects of the

The President (continued)

problem should then be considered in that light. The revision of the 1954 protocols should at last allow us to rid ourselves of the legacy of the past. There is no need to wait for this revision to be completed before saying what the Council intends a WEU agency to do. As long as this has not been done, it is to be feared that the present uneasiness will persist.

It is the Assembly's wish that the enlarged WEU should give vigorous impetus to the achievement of a united, strong Europe that is needed both by the Atlantic Alliance and the world.

The agenda of the present session covers most of these concerns. The standard of the reports before us augurs well for detailed debates on many of these points. It is therefore with the greatest confidence that I propose that we now start on our business.

6. Observers

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now welcome to our debates the parliamentary observers from Denmark, Greece, Norway, Portugal and Spain.

I also welcome those members of the Permanent Council present at this part-session.

7. Adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the session*(Doc. 1149)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the session, Document 1149.

Are there any objections to the draft order of business?...

The draft order of business is adopted.

8. Banning of low-altitude military training flights*(Motion for a resolution, Doc. 1169)***Banning of demonstration flights at air shows***(Motion for a resolution with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 1170)*

**Integration of Europe
with a view to European union
(or the United States of Europe): WEU's rôle**
(Motion for a resolution with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 1168)

Participation of Mr. Arafat at the United Nations General Assembly in New York*(Motion for a resolution with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 1167)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I have received four motions for resolutions: a motion for a resolution on banning low-altitude military training flights tabled by Mr. Büchner and others; a second motion for a resolution on banning demonstration flights at air shows tabled by Mr. Büchner and others with a request for urgent procedure; a motion for a resolution on the integration of Europe with a view to European union (or the United States of Europe): WEU's rôle tabled by Mr. Pannella and others with a request for urgent procedure; and a motion for a resolution on the participation of Mr. Arafat at the United Nations General Assembly in New York tabled by Mr. Malfatti and others with a request for urgent procedure.

These requests have been posted and their texts distributed.

The Assembly will be asked to vote on the requests for urgent procedure at the start of tomorrow morning's sitting.

I call Mr. Malfatti.

Mr. MALFATTI *(Italy)* (Translation). – Mr. President, in view of the turn that events have taken I and my colleagues wish to withdraw the motion for a resolution that we had tabled.

I would however like to explain in a few words the reasons why we tabled the motion. These reasons have to do with our regret at the fact that the United Nations Assembly has not been able to give a hearing to Yasser Arafat.

It seems to us unhelpful that the prerogatives of the United Nations should have been interfered with in this way nor do we think it is a good thing for the United States to find itself in a position of almost complete isolation given that, in our view, this great country has a vital rôle in the peace-making process in the Middle East.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I am sorry to interrupt you, Mr. Malfatti. Withdrawing your draft resolution does not mean you can start a debate. I would ask you to conclude quickly.

Mr. MALFATTI *(Italy)* (Translation). – Mr. President out of respect for you and the Assembly I simply wish to give the political reasons – for we are a political assembly – why I and my colleagues have withdrawn our motion for a resolution.

To conclude, I wanted with your permission to say that we think it a bad thing to take an un-receptive stance towards the positive and progressive steps taken in the National Council of

Mr. Malfatti (continued)

the PLO in Algiers and recognised as such by every one of the European countries represented in this chamber.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you. That, therefore, leaves only two draft resolutions with request for urgent debate to be submitted for your consideration tomorrow morning.

The motion for a resolution is withdrawn.

9. Address by Mr. Dumas, Minister of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs of France

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the address by Mr. Dumas, Minister of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs of France.

It is with great pleasure that I extend a welcome to Mr. Dumas, Minister for Foreign Affairs of France. This Assembly was previously addressed by Mr. Dumas in December 1985. The French Government, through its Prime Minister and its Defence Minister, has recently put forward proposals whereby Western European Union would be given the instruments to enable our countries to develop the spirit of defence and Europe to consolidate its security interests.

We shall – and I am sure, Minister, that I speak for the Assembly – listen to your address and to your replies to our questions with the utmost interest and attention.

I call Mr. Dumas, Minister of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs of France.

Mr. DUMAS (*Minister of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs of France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, it gives me great pleasure to have this second opportunity of speaking to you in this Assembly. Three years ago, it was my privilege to set out before you the reasons why France took steps to bring about the strengthening of WEU, and I paid tribute to your Assembly for its outstanding rôle in the debate on the security of our continent, an issue whose importance increases day by day. Today, I am pleased to note that you are going to be able to perform your mission even more fully than in 1985 for Europe is now better represented in this forum than it was three years ago. My reference here, of course, is to the presence of the representatives of Spain and Portugal.

In 1985 I said that the reactivation of WEU needed to be part of the wider process of European construction. The accession of Spain and Portugal, first to the Community and then to WEU, is, in this respect, an event of major political significance.

The achievements that we can already present to our new partners are considerable. We have realised the importance of having this unusual

forum for foreign and defence ministers to meet in and where schemes for co-operation can be hatched out and our joint thinking on general defence and security matters, or subjects like the Mediterranean, developed.

Both old and new partners must today reply to two essential questions, namely, what will WEU's place be in the Europe of tomorrow? What rôle will Europe play in joint defence?

The will to intensify our co-operation has to come to terms with WEU's lack of powers of decision. How are we to judge the proper direction to be given to European defence in the shifting international environment?

In our thinking we must first take account of the changes in East-West relations. Let us not oversimplify; change does not mean the end of the threat or of defence requirements, but change there is, undeniably.

As regards disarmament, the improvement in East-West relations calls for a global approach. In our view, the reduction of political tension and disarmament go together. It is this link which confers their importance on the CSCE and the Vienna talks.

The Helsinki final act pointed the way to an effective approach. For Europe, prospects for dialogue and progress are opening up in the various areas that give this approach its originality: disarmament, confidence and security-building measures, economic co-operation and respect for human rights.

The opening of negotiations on conventional armaments in Europe is now within hand's reach. These negotiations would primarily concern the old continent because it is only on its territory that the weapons in question are deployed and can be used. Could there be any subject more suitable for consultation at European level and, in particular, among Europeans sharing the same understanding of the conditions essential for their security, in other words, the members of our union?

The same is true of chemical weapons. We had an exchange of views on this question at the last ministerial meeting in London. There I found that all our partners were looking forward to the forthcoming Paris conference whose purpose is to reaffirm the importance of the 1925 protocol and to give new impetus to the Geneva negotiations. We agreed that the Nine should step up consultation on this issue, which now seems well and truly launched. Should we, in order to make it easier for a new détente to gain ground, abandon the objective of closer European co-operation in defence? I think not.

The fact is that the security of nations is a matter, not of alliances, but of imbalances. The primary objectives must be to achieve a balance of forces, and that at the lowest possible level.

Mr. Dumas (continued)

Once Western Europe is sure about its security situation, it will be better able to make progress in the dialogue with Eastern Europe.

Striving for closer co-operation within WEU is not incompatible with these objectives. But first, we have to deepen and reaffirm our joint perception of security questions. The Rome declaration and The Hague platform are timely reminders of the principles that unite us.

We must go forward in that spirit. The experts of the Seven have studied ways of giving The Hague platform greater depth. They have highlighted the specifically European aspect of our approach and shown how, in the geographical, political or military diversity of our member countries, there are complementarities of benefit to all.

We have to go further forward still, but we shall only be able to do so if public opinion is also convinced that it is necessary. You, ladies and gentlemen, can make an essential contribution both to forming and informing opinion.

It would also be desirable to have independent experts study the most difficult of these problems and freely exchange their ideas about them. The French Prime Minister has proposed that a European institute for advanced security studies be set up within the WEU framework. The research and forecasting work that such a "think tank" would be able to perform should be a valuable input to the efforts of both government agencies and the bodies of our Assembly.

This institute would also serve a particular purpose in winning public support for the idea of a European security community. The success of the first European meeting on advanced defence studies in Paris, which has just ended, shows that the idea is creating considerable interest in every sector: students, industry, trade unionists, the services and, of course, members of parliament. I am pleased to note the decision to hold a second session next year in Belgium.

Ladies and gentlemen, the consensus that unites the members of WEU is not limited to speeches and declarations. It is also enshrined in specific commitments under the modified Brussels Treaty. I am thinking of the commitment to aid and assist any ally that is the subject of an armed aggression in Europe and other commitments born of the needs and circumstances of the moment. Here are a few examples to prove my point.

The first is the successful, pragmatic co-operation in the Gulf between the navies of the WEU countries which ensured the free movement of merchant shipping in that area. France, whose fleet was already present before the beginning of concerted action, is very satisfied at the realistic and effective manner in which our commanders on the spot behaved.

My second relates to the space sector where European achievements are considerable, as I have no need to stress. In the civilian sector, the European Space Agency is one of the shining examples of European scientific co-operation. Then there is the military operation satellite Helios that France, Spain and Italy will be launching in 1993. This is excellent, but we can do even more. Other fields of research are open to us. It would be preferable to explore them jointly.

My colleague, National Defence Minister Jean-Pierre Chevènement, has pointed out that jointly-developed observation facilities would give us our own capability to monitor the development of a crisis and help in the verification of disarmament treaties.

You share, I am sure, my conviction of the importance of these questions since your Committees on Defence Questions and Armaments and on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions have produced studies and made suggestions that are interesting in every respect and extremely valuable to each and every one of us.

My third example is that of European arms co-operation, a serious problem, but one that relates to a real need. The need is that of industry. If production is to be improved and costs brought down, research has to be centralised and requirements harmonised.

The difficulty is the problem of national independence and sovereignty and may be phrased as follows: can we leave the production of certain weapon systems in other hands than our own? Suppose our national industry gains a technological lead in a given sector, should the country let others, which are both competitors and partners, also benefit? There is no simple reply to these questions. But we can try to rough out some avenues for research, which is what I would like to do before I close my address.

First, let us think what our needs are going to be, say, thirty years from now and try to identify the types of weapon for which joint and co-ordinated research would be possible. Next, let us draw on the studies being made to unify our thinking on security matters. WEU's rôle in this field could be complementary to that of the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG).

Ladies and gentlemen, this outline of prospects for co-operation, though brief, amply illustrates the scale of the task. We shall need all our imagination and determination.

In this connection, the rôle of parliamentarians will be essential. To make any progress, governments need, and will continue to need, your constant support. I am therefore very much concerned that, both in terms of premises and equipment, the Assembly should be given the means of carrying out its task.

Mr. Dumas (continued)

The unfortunate deadlock in the institutional reform of WEU distracts us from more important things. There are those of us who think, paradoxically, that the way to develop WEU is to reduce its resources. We have no objection to rationalisation measures but they must not, we feel, be to the detriment of the purposes or image of the organisation.

The institute that France has proposed should be set up would meet a real need and provide a rough model for a solution to the institutional problems. Could this institute not be the forum for discussing the ideas that I have just referred to? It would be located in Paris beside the Assembly. The Permanent Council could stay in London; the time is not yet ripe for discussing collocation and where that might be, and it would be better for the moment to close the debate.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, that brings me to the end of my address. I should once more like to welcome the Spanish and Portuguese Delegations. The organisation will be the richer for their accession; that is what I said in London, and I am happy to say so again here in Paris.

I should also like to wish you a fruitful session with rewarding debates. At the outset I stressed our need for imagination, realism and political determination if we are to progress in the direction of a European defence.

I hope that the process of revitalisation, which started in 1984 and in which France played its part, will continue. It will complement rather than detract from the advantages of bilateral co-operation, and in saying this I am probably, in practice, answering questions that some of you may have wished to ask.

We must all work together, take advantage of our complementarity, and advance with a clear vision of our goal. This is what I think is the right way forward, the path leading to the goal that I have just mentioned.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Minister, for your address and also, on behalf of the Assembly, for agreeing to answer questions.

I call Mr. Caro.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – Thank you, Minister, for your statement. As this is my first opportunity to speak during this part-session and since we are concerned with European defence, for which we need Europe at its largest, I should like to express my pleasure at the accession of Spain and Portugal to our organisation. We have asked so many times for this and at last our wish has been granted.

On the same score Minister, and having regard to what you have been saying, I should like to

refer to an important international event involving the Federal Republic of Germany and France at parliamentary level. Last Thursday, 1st December, the Bundestag and the Assemblée Nationale simultaneously ratified two protocols to the Elysée Treaty of co-operation between the Federal Republic and France.

In so doing, we approved the setting up of the Franco-German Defence Council. As stated in the preamble, this is strictly in conformity with the construction of European union, in other words, the political union that cannot be complete without the defence and currency dimensions.

This is not a Franco-German preserve, nor is it an exclusive club; it is a further and essential driving force.

Please, Minister, could you tell the Assembly whether the French Government, with its partners from the Federal Republic of Germany, has in mind finding the best possible method of keeping Western European Union informed – at both the intergovernmental and parliamentary levels – of what this “hard core” of European defence could do to help us forward – whilst abiding strictly by the terms not only of WEU reactivation, to which you referred in the early part of your speech, but also of The Hague platform?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. DUMAS (*Minister of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs of France*) (Translation). – I thank Mr. Caro for putting a question of such relevance.

I did refer to this matter briefly in my address. It is indeed a fact that the French National Assembly recently approved the draft bill authorising the government to ratify the agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany relating to the Franco-German Security and Defence Council, to give it its precise title, by a very large majority. It will shortly be debated by the Senate, and I venture to hope that the senators, like the deputies, will vote it through.

In your question, Mr. Caro, you emphasised the fact that the Bundestag ratified the document the same day. We are all aware of the highly symbolic nature of these debates and yours that followed: for one thing, the text itself – as though this were necessary more than forty years after the war – once again confirms the reconciliation between two great nations who have fought each other throughout their history; and for another, the two parliaments followed up their governments by demonstrating the two countries' clear resolve to co-ordinate their action in the field of security, their analysis of the problems of the threat and the launching of certain measures, the

Mr. Dumas (continued)

number of which, so far, has been very small. I am thinking in particular of the Franco-German brigade.

I think it may throw light on the discussion to point out that this text is in total conformity with the 1963 Elysée Treaty.

Today we are engaged in a debate which concerns not two, but nine, states. Hence it is perfectly natural that members should ask questions about the relationship that an agreement between two of these countries may have with the seven others. At the end of my address – and I am grateful for this opportunity to amplify what I said – I referred to the idea that bilateral agreements, far from being contradictory, would on the contrary be complementary to WEU, and I actually used the word “complementarity”.

Complementarity – and this is the precise answer to your question – necessarily means providing information both to governments and to this Assembly. It is perfectly normal that this complementarity should have full effect and I, for my part, shall endeavour to meet this obligation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Minister, would you prefer to answer questions separately or all together at the end?

Mr. DUMAS (*Minister of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs of France*) (Translation). – If you wish, Mr. President, I can take them in two rounds.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. De Decker.

Mr. DE DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – I should like to ask two questions, Minister, one concerning armaments co-operation and the other the modernisation of short-range nuclear weapons.

As regards co-operation in the arms industry, our countries are well aware that one of the fundamental problems within the alliance is burden-sharing, and that if we wish to do more with the same, or perhaps reduced, resources, we have to have very close collaboration.

On this subject you made two remarks which seem to me important. You stressed the difficulty for the big countries in Europe to accept some measure of arms dependence on their neighbours who, as you said, are also partners. But you also spoke about reconciling this policy of industrial co-operation in armaments with the fact that WEU had no power of decision. Recently, the President of the French Republic also referred to WEU as having no power of decision.

How does France view the future in this matter? How does it think the difficulties can be resolved? We know that each of the major

European countries, and a large majority of us here regret this, continues to produce its own fighter aircraft, tanks, helicopters and missiles. What we need, therefore, is the political will to harmonise our co-operation. I should like to know what your viewpoint on this matter is in more concrete terms.

My second question relates to the modernisation of short-range nuclear weapons. This question is currently a priority issue in the Atlantic Alliance. The WEU platform states that there can be no possible defence of Europe without both conventional and nuclear weapons. It also says that the United States' nuclear shield is necessary for the defence of Europe. I know that France itself has short-range nuclear weapons such as Pluton and Hadès. What is France's attitude towards the modernisation of NATO's nuclear weapons?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Soell.

Mr. SOELL (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – My first question to the Minister follows on from Mr. De Decker's. What is the French Government's current position on the modernisation of short-range nuclear weapons?

Does the Minister agree with me that the modernisation of short-range nuclear weapons must not be used as a means of circumventing the INF treaty?

Secondly, Prime Minister Rocard has proposed the establishment of a European security institute. How is this institute supposed to co-operate with Western European Union? Is it meant to replace WEU organs or to supplement the work of Western European Union?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Kittelmann.

Mr. KITTELMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I was pleased to hear what the Minister had to say about the need for joint efforts where armaments are concerned. Mr. De Decker has already hinted that political will frequently gives way to national egotism. Can I, as an optimist, assume from what the Minister has said that the French Government is reconsidering the possibility of participating in the joint development of the fighter of the future – I mean the 1990 combat aircraft? Or does it exclude this from the philosophy of joint European action?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. DUMAS (*Minister of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs of France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the subjects of the three questions – industrial co-operation in armaments, short-range nuclear weapons, modernisation and, lastly, the European security institute that I

Mr. Dumas (continued)

referred to earlier – are all to some extent related. In answering them I shall try to amplify what I said in my address.

It is quite clear that the kind of industrial co-operation that I referred to could be a major achievement in the direction of harmonisation not only in our understanding of security, but above all in the action that the countries of Europe embark upon. It is not a simple matter; we had an illustration of this not very long ago with the fighter aircraft issue about which certain parliamentarians present today, such as Mr. Kittelmann and Mr. De Decker, questioned me.

I should like to go back to this example. There were two projects on the table: one so-called European project involving the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and then Spain. The other, though planned to be European, was French. This approach showed how difficult the matter was and how necessary it was to give considerable thought to the problem.

This is why in 1985, with specific reference to fighter aircraft, France proposed that there be some very long-range thinking thirty to thirty-five years ahead, on whether it would be possible to set in place a European military aircraft programme to include fighter, transport and other aircraft designed to meet Western Europe's requirements at the end of the century. The project never got off the ground but I observe that there are already forums where these precise questions are being studied, IEPG being one.

This does not rule out consideration on a broader basis. In my view the idea that was put forward in 1985 will one day be taken up.

As regards the European security institute, one of the aims of this body could be to stimulate long-term thinking on security problems, not only as regards weapons – an issue already covered – but also as regards the problems of the threat and the response to the threat.

Turning to the French Government's proposal – mooted first by the Prime Minister and repeated by me – to establish a security institute, I have been asked how it would work. It seems clear that it would be an additional tool for use by governments and the WEU Assembly. In my view it would meet a real need because everything is interrelated – studies on security and the co-ordination of defence policies – subject to what has been said about WEU having no power of decision. So the subjects the institute would consider would be security, co-ordination with regard to security and response to the threat and, finally, arms industry co-operation.

I have outlined the difficulties, with reference both to the industrial need for co-operation and the financial problems, but the real problem is national sovereignty. You will realise, ladies and

gentlemen, that I was not claiming to provide an immediate and satisfactory reply to this problem today. I just wished to raise the problem to get us all thinking about it.

That, I think, answers the first question about industrial co-operation and, coincidentally, the question of the European security institute.

Mr. Soell and Mr. De Decker referred to the modernisation of short-range nuclear weapons. I recall that, on the conclusion of the INF talks between the two superpowers, France was one of the first countries to announce its approval of the Washington agreement on the zero option. The French Government has also stressed the importance of the talks to begin on the 50% reduction of strategic weapons and which should be resumed once the United States' administration has been formed following the election of George Bush. We similarly welcomed the double zero option and there is now the question of the future of very short-range weapons. On that subject there is a difference of opinion; arguments have been advanced on either side and I feel that the points at issue are not always very clear to the public. I should like to take this opportunity to attempt to clarify the matter as best I can, perhaps not for the majority of you, but at least for some and, in any event, for myself, because each time I do it gives me the opportunity to get my own ideas straight.

First, there are very short-range nuclear weapons which concern the Atlantic Alliance and the integrated command. On these France can only give the opinion of an outsider. It does not see itself as having any part in the debate because, from the outset, France has always said that it stood outside these negotiations and that the French nuclear force was outside the superpowers' field of negotiation. The fact remains that it can have an opinion on the matter, and that opinion has been expressed on many occasions by the head of state, the defence minister and myself. The difficulty stems from the fact that the main ally concerned, namely the United States of America, considers that its very short-range weapons will be obsolete by 1995 and that it will then be necessary to replace them. In order to have these weapons ready for 1995, a decision on deployment will be required in 1992 and, working back, the financial decision by Congress will have to be taken in 1989. The countries concerned, in particular the United States, are therefore anxious for a very early solution which would, of course, mean that these questions will have to be tackled at a very early date and, presumably, a decision taken.

For France, the problem relating to weapons of the same category is entirely different. Why? Because, in accordance with the technique and doctrine of deterrence, very short-range weapons are not combat weapons. They are not a complement to conventional battlefield weapons.

Mr. Dumas (continued)

They are an integral part of the deterrent whose purpose, as recalled by the President of the Republic, is not to start but to prevent a war. It is the ultimatum, the very last resort serving notice that strategic weapons are about to be used. It thus forms part of the strategic nuclear arsenal. Consequently, France has never taken any stance on the modernisation or otherwise of very short-range nuclear weapons since, by their very nature, they are not comparable with the NATO weapons that I referred to a moment ago whose situation must in any event be settled by 1995 or in reality by 1989, in the view of some of our partners, which is what makes the problem so complex.

The PRESIDENT. – We can now take our second round of questions.

I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I take this opportunity to express my appreciation to the Minister of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs for his remarks about naval, space and armaments co-operation, as well as his ideas on the European security institute. However, I wish to press him further on his reply on the modernisation of NATO's short-range nuclear weapons. *Prima facie*, there appears to be an inconsistency, which is uncharacteristic of French policy. When it came to the INF accord, France was very willing to make clear statements of policy – indeed, did – about the merits of such an accord, and all members of the western alliance appreciated the clarity of the French position. Now the Minister of State tells us that, because it is not an integral member of the NATO military organisation and because it has no such American nuclear weapons stationed on its soil, France can take an objective, scientific, external view of the whole matter.

Is it not the case at the very least that Franco-German military co-operation must impel France to take a strategic view on this matter that is central to the whole of deterrence on the European central front? Is it not a fact that the Soviets are modernising their own short-range nuclear weapons, and did not our willingness to modernise our own intermediate-range nuclear weapons bring the Soviets to the negotiating table and lead them to conclude an accord with NATO on intermediate-range nuclear forces? Would not it be dangerous for us now to take a different view of short-range nuclear weapons?

If in the longer term we are desirous of such an accord vis-à-vis short-range nuclear weapons, such as we secured in relation to intermediate-range nuclear weapons, would not it be in our best interests to modernise our short-range nuclear weapons as the threat evolves, at least until we get concrete evidence that an improvement in East-West relations is definite enough to bring about a commensurate

reduction in intermediate-range nuclear forces by the Soviets?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Russell Johnston.

Sir Russell JOHNSTON (*United Kingdom*). – I, too, thank the French Foreign Minister for his willingness to answer our questions. He said that at the last ministerial meeting there had been a discussion about chemical weapons. Was any thought given at that meeting to how best to bring pressure to bear on Iraq, which has been responsible for the greatest use of chemical weapons by any country since the first world war – both against Iran during the Gulf war and more recently against its own Kurdish minority? Was any judgment made of the relative effectiveness of the responses of the United States, which, for that reason, has denied Iraq all trade credits, of the Federal Republic of Germany, which has increased Iraq's trade credits, and of the United Kingdom, which has doubled its trade credits? Leaving morality politically on one side, may I ask which approach is likely to be more influential?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I have a brief question on a completely different subject. I was delighted to hear Mr. Dumas praise Western European Union. He said that in its new rôle it would require means, material and otherwise. Does that mean that we can look forward to the wholehearted support of the French Government when we ask for a larger budget?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Klejdzinski.

Mr. KLEJZINSKI (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I should like to put my question to the Minister once again, because his remarks about the various projects just now were very guarded. My question, which now concerns Rafale, is quite specifically this: could there still be co-operation in this project, or could parts of it be incorporated in the 1990 combat aircraft project? I am not referring here to previous individual combat aircraft projects, only to Rafale and the 1990 combat aircraft. His answer just now was evasive.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. DUMAS (*Minister of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs of France*) (Translation). – I shall do my best to reply to all four questions. First, I should like to go back to short-range nuclear weapons, because this is an important issue and I do not propose just to refer you to my earlier reply, Mr. Wilkinson, since you clearly want to reopen the discussion.

Mr. Dumas (continued)

To get things clear, let me recall some of the essential principles. You know them, but it is useful to have them in mind in order to follow the argument and see its logic.

The first point is that France has not been part of the NATO integrated command for many years so that its strategic position is unique – a fact that no one contests, or perhaps one could, but at least it should be understood. The unique feature of that strategic position is that France, though a partner in the alliance, insists that its weapons are used solely as it sees fit, which will also depend, of course, on the international situation. All this is a frequent subject of discussion within the Atlantic Alliance.

The second is that as things stand the two superpowers have an infinitely larger nuclear arsenal than the weapons that the United Kingdom and France, whose situation is in many respects roughly comparable, can command. For those who may have forgotten, I would point out that the French nuclear capability represents about 3% of the nuclear arms potential of countries like the Soviet Union and the United States. This is a second important point.

The third, which follows on from the first two and this time takes us into the future, is that one day or other if disarmament between the superpowers reaches a stage that I cannot guess at today, the question of general disarmament of all the nuclear powers in the world will perhaps arise. This possibility was not ruled out by the President of the Republic in his speech to the Assembly of the United Nations. He said that the day when disarmament between the superpowers reached the low point when France felt that it, too, came into the picture he would host a major international conference on nuclear disarmament in Paris. But do not ask me now to enter into a discussion on how low the needle would have to fall or when and at what figure the talks should begin.

I recall all this in order to be perfectly objective and I would add that probably this is also the opinion the two superpowers have in their talks, because I remember Mr. Gorbachev saying at his press conference in Paris in October 1985 that clearly the British and French nuclear forces were not being taken into account in the present negotiations but the day might come when it would be necessary to discuss them.

My apologies to those of you who were already well aware of all this.

That brings me to the specific question of the modernisation of very short-range weapons. I did not wish to offend anyone when I said that ours was an outsider's view on this issue. On the contrary it was a matter of intellectual honesty towards those concerned. As I have explained, we are not part of the integrated command and

on the simple grounds that we are not concerned directly in operations or manoeuvres, it is not our place to try to give advice to those who are. That is why I said that if pushed we could give an objective external opinion and I ask that it be understood as such.

That being said, I should like to look at some figures: in very short-range weapons, the disproportion between the Warsaw Pact forces and the Atlantic Alliance in Europe is vast so it is worth putting the question in the terms in which I have just referred to the problem. It is all the more important to put the question in that, if we take the date of 1995 again and imagine, for present purposes, that our partners do not reach their decision in time, i.e., by 1989, and put it off, say, for two or three years, the result may well be a void, a de facto denuclearisation on the part of the Atlantic Alliance from 1995 on, whereas, if no agreement is reached in the meantime, the superiority of the Warsaw Pact forces will remain. This issue should therefore be looked at and formulated in very objective terms. I wanted to refresh your memory on these facts in order to make it clear that this is not a simple problem and that France, although not directly concerned, obviously feels it is affected.

Now chemical weapons and the problem of Iraq and Iran that has been mentioned. I want to be very clear on this subject. There is no doubt that the recent events mentioned by Sir Russell Johnston have aroused strong feelings in public opinion internationally. We are and have been governed in this matter by the 1925 protocol which bans chemical weapons. The fact is that public opinion was appalled by the horrors of such weapons during the 1914-18 war and that by 1925 international society had succeeded in imposing a ban on their use. I stress the word use. For the sixty years between 1925 and 1985 or 1986 we lived under the protection of this protocol and in comparative peace in terms of the use of these weapons and, we might add, in undoubted satisfaction with the treaty banning them. But then dangers of the use of chemical weapons again arose in regional conflicts and, in particular, the Iraq-Iran war. I do not need to tell you the facts. You know them too well.

The time therefore seemed to have come to reopen the debate on this matter and to revise and amplify the 1925 protocol. The fact is that it is not sufficient merely to ban the use of such weapons. Hence the speech made by the President of the United States to the General Assembly of the United Nations and the request by the President of the French Republic in his speech following that of the American President, that a major international conference should be held, preferably in Paris, since France was making the offer, in order to give the protocol more teeth since it no longer fully matched present needs. The conference will take place in early January and bring together the one

Mr. Dumas (continued)

hundred and twenty or so signatories of the protocol in 1925 and all those who signed it later and anyone else who feels concerned. It will only last for three or four days and the conference is not intended to replace the Geneva negotiators who are, I have to say, working hard on the drafting of a new convention.

But what will this international conference be and what will it not be? It has to be defined. First it will be an opportunity for the leading countries in the world to draw the attention of the international community to this terrible danger. Next it will act as a spur to the Geneva talks and define the key principles, namely that it is not sufficient to ban the use of these weapons; at the same time there must be a ban on their manufacture and arrangements will be needed to verify that they are not being made – this probably being the most difficult problem to solve. In this way, with all the solemnity and weight that such international events carry, the conference should sound a real warning to the international community and impart the new drive needed in the Geneva talks.

What will it not be? By the very nature of things it will not be a tribunal. Otherwise it would fail in its aim. If the international conference in Paris were used as a pretext to put a country on trial – and we know which – and to condemn that country, it would not achieve its purpose. There are other places for that. This will not be the object of the conference because it would then get bogged down in an endless battle between accusers and defendants. So much for the conference. I should like to add that in the future provision should be made for specific sanctions against countries infringing established international rules.

I shall now answer two other questions but I shall be very brief so as not to take too much of your time.

WEU resources. We all know what that means. When I say that France will ensure that better premises and equipment are provided this is obviously in direct connection with what you said about the budget. The Foreign Minister is not the Finance Minister but still his voice does carry some weight in the government.

The last question was whether there was any possibility of a European project for fighter aircraft. I could reply that unfortunately the facts would appear to rule this out. At the moment a project for just one aircraft would seem to me very difficult. At all events what has happened is a setback, or rather a failed attempt, which should make us think about the future and our future requirements. Particularly our future requirements because today we need to think about weapons that will be available in fifteen or twenty years' time. We may not have been able to make the one all-European fighter aircraft but

let us at least try, in the fifteen to twenty years timeframe, to build up a system with which we can have really standard European armaments made by the various European specialist manufacturers. For the moment, however, though there are a few arrangements whereby part of a given unit is given out for manufacture in another country, I do not think it is possible to reconcile the two projects you know about – a fact that I regret, believe me.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I am especially grateful to you Mr. Dumas for kindly replying to so many questions. Between you, the speakers who put the questions and you in your answers have helped to raise this exchange of views to the level of a high-quality debate.

10. Action by the Presidential Committee

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Presidential Committee, Doc. 1165)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Presidential Committee on action by the Presidential Committee, Document 1165.

I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Vice-President of the Assembly and Rapporteur.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – Most of my colleagues will have read Document 1165, which runs to twenty-four pages. I do not therefore propose to deal with it at any great length; rather I shall highlight one or two matters.

The Assembly will have noticed that in the budget, for which there is collective responsibility, we have proposed 90 000 francs for information. We propose a security conference in Florence, which should provide a useful report which can be presented to a later session of the Assembly.

As you said, Mr. President, there is to be a visit by representatives of the Supreme Soviet, who are to meet some of our committees here next year. Our Defence Committee is going to China to assess the relationship between China and security in the world. All of these will make for useful reports.

The second section of the document deals with the efforts to secure Portuguese and Spanish entry into Western European Union. On behalf of the Presidential Committee, I welcome representatives from those countries who are here today, including His Excellency the Portuguese Ambassador in London, whom I am delighted to see here. The negotiations were highly successful, and we shall hear more about them on Wednesday morning when the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, addresses the Assembly.

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg (continued)

There is a problem about accommodating the new delegations and giving acceptable space to the existing ones and the interpreters. I am glad that the Council of Ministers has authorised and paid for the preparation of an architectural report to establish what is needed for the enlargement of WEU. I hope that when it sees what is needed the Council of Ministers will provide the means so that we can do our task effectively. That is in the future, but it is clear that once work commences, we shall be unable to meet in this building for approximately one year. We look to other governments to offer hospitality for at least two of the half-yearly Assembly meetings and, of course, our committee meetings. I hope that we shall not look for such hospitality in vain.

The third section deals briefly with the longer-term financial implications of enlargement. As one will appreciate, there are major budgetary implications which will involve discussion between the Assembly and the Council.

The third section was also to take account of what I remember many of our colleagues were saying – that they would like the Assembly meetings to move more smoothly and to have rather fewer ministerial speeches. The Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges has dealt with this in Appendix I.

Let me make two things clear. First, under the Charter, every minister from each of the nine member countries is entitled to address this Assembly by inviting himself or herself. The Charter lays it down; we cannot refuse them. What we have decided to do, therefore, in conjunction with the Chairman-in-Office, is to ensure that, other than those holding the presidency, we shall invite only two other government representatives to each half-yearly session.

However, if other ministers from other countries insist upon their rights under the Charter, they will be able to come – but they may find themselves put on on Thursday afternoon, with no audience. That is their choice, but I am sure that it will not come to that. I am sure that they will recognise that, for the smooth running of the Assembly, it is much better that we invite them and organise the programme accordingly.

Section IV deals briefly with the need to change our rules to take account of what the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration has proposed, which again is set out in Appendix III. I think that is both wise and self-explanatory.

Section V deals with the media. For a long time now, the Assembly has been drawing up guidelines for the media – nine years, to be precise. The Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges decided that it did not want any

loose ends, so we have tidied that up. With the great help of Paul Borcier, our former Press Director, who conferred closely with the media, we have produced in Appendix IV a document which will be helpful both to the media and to the Assembly. Those will now be the guidelines in operation.

Section VI deals with the supplementary budget, which takes account of the extra staff granted us on the last occasion by the Council of Ministers. Document 1153 contains those details.

The final item deals with honorary associate members. Here, we have basically followed the example of the Council of Europe. The details are set out and will be notified to all those who qualify as honorary associate members.

I have tried to be succinct and to convey to the Assembly the meat of our work. The acceptance of the report by the Assembly will ratify the decisions contained in Section IV, paragraph 33, and Section VI, paragraph 39.

(Mr. Soell, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is open.

I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I should like first to express my appreciation of the excellent work done in this report by my colleague Geoffrey Finsberg on behalf of the Presidential Committee. I draw attention particularly to paragraphs 10 to 16. It is extremely important, at this time of enlargement of our organisation, that worthy premises be found and made for the additional number of members who will take part in our debates.

I wholly accept the decision of the Council of Ministers to place greater emphasis at this time on the political work of the Assembly rather than on institutional reform, but enlargement must concentrate the minds of the Presidential Committee on collocation and rationalisation of the organs of WEU.

As we have learned, an additional budget is required not just to adapt these premises but also for the expanded work of the Assembly. In spite of the professions of support and encouragement which we have heard, not least from Mr. Dumas, the Minister of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, we all know that our governments operate in a climate of budgetary stringency. Therefore, it will be necessary to rationalise our own operations.

Mr. Dumas said that he welcomed the fact that the Council continues its work in London – and so do I. He urged, as did Mr. Rocard, the establishment of a European security institute adjoining this Assembly and the Agency here in

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

Paris. In other words, he was implicitly accepting the division of powers between the Assembly and the Agency in Paris and the Council in London.

I cannot believe that in the longer term that is the way in which we should wish to continue to operate. We have as a warning the example of the European Parliament, with the division of its functions between its plenary sessions in Strasbourg and its committee meetings in Brussels, with its staff located in Luxembourg. I hope that we shall use the ten or twelve months that we shall be forced to operate away from this Assembly because of the renovations and adaptations to this Conseil Economique et Social to concentrate our minds on collocation, rationalisation and institutional reform.

Geoffrey Finsberg knows that it was my personal desire that we should establish in County Hall in London, where there is already an admirable hemicycle and there are large committee rooms, a single headquarters for WEU in all its three manifestations. That was not possible – the opportunity was missed – but I hope that we shall now jointly put aside our differences and work towards the establishment of a joint headquarters. It is important that the Agency and the Assembly should be able to talk on an easy, routine daily basis with the Council. If we were all located in one building, thus sharing overheads and rationalising administrative expenditures, we would do our organisation a service.

I commend the admirable work done by Geoffrey Finsberg and hope that the Assembly will concentrate on paragraphs 10 to 16, which draw attention to an important aspect of the Presidential Committee's work now and in the immediate future.

(Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Reddemann.

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, today we not only have the pleasure of congratulating our Rapporteur on his report, but we can also congratulate ourselves, because this is our first meeting since the Council of Ministers admitted the Republic of Portugal and the Kingdom of Spain into Western European Union. They have been admitted thanks not only to the Ministers' deliberations but, above all, to this Assembly's constant pressure over many years.

I feel we should seize the few opportunities we have to congratulate ourselves for a change. I believe we can extend a warm welcome to our colleagues from the parliaments of the two new member states, even if they are here only as

observers for the time being. We all hope that they will be here as members of this Assembly next June.

I have a request for all of us here in this connection. We know how tedious and how slow and obstructive the work of councils of ministers and governments of all political complexions and from all the member states can be. On the other hand, as we know that Spain and Portugal will not become full members until the seven parliaments of the present member states have ratified their accession, I feel that in our national parliaments we should all begin pressing our governments to act as quickly and co-operatively as possible in ratifying and breathing life into the protocol of accession which has been signed.

Mr. President, there is another point I should like to raise in connection with Sir Geoffrey Finsberg's report. The arrival of the new member states and especially the new delegations will create a number of structural problems in our WEU building. I call on you, Mr. President, to ensure that the preliminaries to the work of construction are overseen by the Assembly's Presidential Committee, because we are all familiar with the problem, having seen it often enough in our national parliaments: if we leave everything to the architects, we shall get a few structural changes which look very prestigious, while our working facilities continue to be as inadequate as they are here and elsewhere.

If I might comment on working facilities, we really should be asking the French Economic and Social Council to put an end to our current lighting conditions, which make this building more like a mausoleum than a working parliament, and often oblige us – as I am sure we have all experienced – to contend with sleep rather than with the subject matter of the debate.

Thirdly and finally, Mr. President, we were looking through the Rules of Procedure this morning when we discovered, quite by chance, I admit, that they still contain a number of inconsistencies. We find, for example, that a substitute member of our Assembly can become the chairman of a committee but not, if you look at the Rules of Procedure closely, its vice-chairman.

I therefore call on you, Mr. President, to ask the Assembly's Bureau to request the appropriate committee to review the Rules of Procedure in the foreseeable future so that we do not find ourselves in the strange situation of the right hand not knowing what the left is doing, because of changes that have been made at some time or other. I am referring here to the Rules of Procedure, not the political situation.

That is what I suggest, Mr. President. I hope the Assembly is able to absorb all this.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I shall be extremely brief. I do not think that Sir Geoffrey Finsberg will be surprised to hear my point. I wish to refer to paragraph 19 of Section III and to paragraph 7 of Appendix II.

As you will know, Mr. President, on a number of occasions over several years I have raised the question of the proliferation of ministers interrupting debates. It is therefore right, I feel, for me to express my substantial appreciation of the consideration given to these matters by the Presidential Committee. You will recall, however, that my anxiety on previous occasions concerned the interpretation of the word “may”. Previously, we said that the Assembly “may” invite ministers, and an unsatisfactory position then developed. I acknowledge that the Presidential Committee is seeking to secure the improvement that had obviously become necessary by the last two or three Assemblies. The only anxiety that I feel after expressing my appreciation concerns the wording of paragraph 19 of Section III, “it might ask them”. I feel that the interpretation of the word “may” in the past assumed that it meant “must”. I hope that that same excessive interpretation will not be placed on the advice presented in Sir Geoffrey’s report on behalf of the Presidential Committee.

I wanted to draw attention to the presence of the word “might”, and I hope that those responsible will recognise that it is “might” rather than “should”. If that happens, the recommendation of the Presidential Committee will be both sensible and consistent. I hope that it will be demonstrated as such as a consequence of the interpretation that may be put on that advice in the years ahead.

I do not wish to burden the Assembly further, but it is right for me to express my appreciation and ask for a word or two of emphasis so that no excessive or inaccurate interpretation will be placed on the word “might” in future.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Hill.

Mr. HILL (*United Kingdom*). – For the purposes of the factual and grammatical way in which British delegations approach the matter, “might” and “may” are entirely different. My leader, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, has a point; on the other hand, there is the question of whether Mr. Hardy, the leader of the British Labour Delegation, has not himself made a point. I am inclined to agree with Sir Geoffrey, in as much as we cannot deny that the wording of the document belongs to the Rapporteur. As a consequence, the document will have to go through as it is: the Rapporteur will have to have his way.

There is, however, no doubt in my mind that sometimes the interpreters or translators, or those who speak several languages, do not appreciate the precise connotation of a word that they may use. I must point out that there is a difference of opinion in this case. Much as I would not have liked to agree with my colleague, Mr. Hardy, I think that his point should be taken into consideration.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I will not take up with my friend, John Wilkinson, the point about the defunct County Hall. He and I can discuss that over a cup of coffee.

We really have a problem about collocation which is not the responsibility of the parliamentary Assembly. Collocation is the responsibility of the Council of Ministers, and as individual members of the Assembly we must put whatever pressure we can upon those ministers who are standing in the way of collocation. As I have said, this is a matter not for this Assembly but for members of this Assembly as individuals in their own parliaments.

I am grateful to Mr. Reddemann for his kind words. He can be certain that when we get approval for the reconstruction of the facilities here, the President and the Clerk will make sure that we are not left in the unfortunate position in which members of the German Parliament found themselves. Their building was demolished and they were left waiting for several years for a new one to emerge. It has not yet emerged. I am sure that we shall learn from that difficult experience.

I am sorry that Mr. Hardy raises that point. I specifically looked for him when I was making my speech. I hope that he was not organising some amendments outside. However, I was very clear in trying to convey that if ministers did not accept the hint, action would then follow. In that circumstance, “might” means exactly the same as “would”. There is a need to get the point across in a fairly gentle and humorous way at this stage, but the steel is well inside the velvet glove.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I thank the Rapporteur and, on behalf of the Presidential Committee, congratulate him on the excellence of his work.

I think that the Assembly is content to ratify the Presidential Committee’s action.

Are there any objections?...

It is so decided.

**11. Address by Mr. Cahen,
Secretary-General of WEU**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the address by Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of Western European Union. Mr. Cahen is prepared to answer any questions at the end of his speech.

Mr. Cahen, would you please come to the rostrum?

Mr. CAHEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ministers, members of the Assembly of Western European Union, since the first part of the thirty-fourth ordinary session of your parliamentary Assembly, which was held here last June, the pace of developments on the international scene has not slackened. On the contrary, it would seem to have increased.

Major events have taken place in the USSR and in the United States, where, Mr. President, I was honoured to accompany you and where we had extremely interesting contacts with members of the present administration and with those appointed to the future administration of Mr. Bush. There have also been major events in our part of Europe and, inevitably, they have significant impact on East-West relations, transatlantic relations and the process of European construction.

These events are well known to you and have undoubtedly given you food for thought. I shall not therefore dwell on them. What I would say, however, is that the present session of your Assembly takes on a very special meaning and importance in this context.

May I say how greatly honoured I am to be able to speak at your rostrum and how grateful I am for what is now your seventh invitation to do so.

All the excellent reports and recommendations presented to you today reflect the various aspects of this international situation confronting us and suggest possible responses from a European angle.

This is most certainly true of the draft recommendation made by Mr. van der Sanden on behalf of the General Affairs Committee in which he clearly states that: “developments in the international situation require Western Europe to assume without delay greater responsibilities to ensure security, promote disarmament and contribute to international peace”. His recommendations – together with those contained in the other reports – will be carefully studied by the Council and a reply given without fail.

Not wishing to encroach too much on the Assembly's time, I shall merely refer to two problems raised by the honourable Rapporteur.

The first problem raised by Mr. van der Sanden is his suggestion that the “Council considers the reactivation of WEU to have been completed but that the highest authorities of certain member countries do not appear to endorse this view”.

In fact, what the Council has said and repeated is that reactivation of WEU has become a reality and not that the work of the organisation has been completed. The members of this Council are only too aware of the fact that the process of building Europe is a gradual and ongoing one and often under threat and are under no illusion that the work of WEU – an element in this process – has now been completed. But the important thing is that this work has progressed, a fact which was recognised last year by that leading European, Jacques Delors, in a speech on 24th September 1987, to the “Institut royal supérieur de défense” in Belgium: “As regards institutions, my hope lies in the reactivation of WEU and its ability to play in the future the necessary rôle as an interface between the European Community, political co-operation and the Atlantic Alliance. This hope is based on the fact that, since its reactivation, it has been possible, through WEU and the frequent and regular meetings of the Defence and Foreign Affairs Ministers of its seven member states, to begin in-depth reflection on Europe's defence”.

The second problem raised by Mr. van der Sanden is the question of whether “the WEU intergovernmental organs referred to in the Secretary-General's letters to the President of the Assembly were effectively set up in application of Articles VIII and IX of the modified Brussels Treaty”. I can assure the Rapporteur that this is indeed the case.

In the area of arms control the same European viewpoint is brought out by Mr. Tummens in the report he has prepared and is submitting on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. I can confirm to him here and now that, at their meeting on 14th November last, the Foreign and Defence Ministers of our member countries addressed most of the problems raised in his report, namely, the conventional stability talks, the START negotiations and the negotiations on chemical weapons. The spirit in which they approached these problems was similar to that of Mr. Tummens, the identical concern being to see to it that the collective defence effort was “sustained at a level which guaranteed the security of all the countries of the alliance whilst negotiations were actively pursued on the mutual reduction of forces and armaments to the lowest level compatible with this security... the entire process being fully consistent with the policy long pursued by the alliance”.

The Iran-Iraq conflict gave a revealing insight, if that were necessary, of the horror of chemical

Mr. Cahen (continued)

warfare and of the devastating power of this type of weapon, whose proliferation poses a particular threat. Mr. Martino is right to refer to this issue in the document which he is placing before you on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.

He will no doubt be happy to learn – as will Mr. Tummers – that our Ministers, at the last meeting of their Council, were unanimous in welcoming the forthcoming conference in Paris on chemical weapons, which would bring together the signatory states of the 1925 protocol and the other interested states. They stressed two aspects, namely the need to reaffirm and re-establish compliance with the 1925 protocol and also to make progress in the Geneva negotiations aimed at a worldwide ban on chemical weapons. In the same context, a study on ways of verifying the effective implementation of such a ban was also put forward. In a moment, I shall have something to say about the mine-clearing operations in the Gulf carried out by five of our member states with the full support of the two others; this is a problem which quite naturally falls within the ambit of the report on “Europe and the aftermath of the war between Iran and Iraq”.

Turning to another question, I can assure Mr. Fourré, author of the report submitted on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments entitled “Verification: a future European satellite agency” and also Mr. Malfatti, whose report entitled “Scientific and technical aspects of arms control verification by satellite” was submitted on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, that this important question was not overlooked either some three weeks ago by our Ministers. In the context of their exchange of views on the implementation of the platform on European security interests, they discussed the importance of space problems and the urgency of considering them in concrete terms within WEU. This is a subject about which Mr. Dumas spoke a few moments ago from this same rostrum.

Finally, as regards security problems, there is a gulf in Europe between the general public's perception of security and our approach as specialists. This is a matter for concern because it is harmful to the building of a national – and beyond that, a European – consensus without which, in our democracies, no defence policy can be conceived. The way in which the younger generation perceives defence-related questions is therefore crucial in this connection. As a lecturer at the Free University of Brussels, I am particularly aware of this problem. I am very pleased therefore, that Mr. Shelton has addressed himself to this subject and has examined the possible rôle of parliaments in this context. You have perhaps noticed that I – with all due modesty –

try not to refuse any invitation from groups of young people to speak on these questions from the particular viewpoint of WEU.

In this connection, I should like to mention the setting up and growth of a particularly interesting group of young people named “Young Europeans for Security”. This group originated in the Netherlands, but subsequently it has spread and now has branches in ten member countries of the alliance. It is an extremely important group and merits our support.

The six months which have elapsed since your last plenary session have not been leisurely ones for our Western European Union. They have been marked by a number of factors and events. I should like to select four which I believe are extremely significant in themselves and, furthermore, meet both the long-standing and more recent aspirations voiced by your Assembly.

First and foremost, of course, is the fact that two new states have joined WEU. Both you, Mr. President, and Mr. Dumas have welcomed the accession of Spain and Portugal to our organisation. There can be no doubt that the most important happening in the life of WEU over the last year is the signing by the seven member states, Spain and Portugal of the Protocol of Accession to WEU of Portugal and Spain.

You yourself were present at this solemn event which took place on 14th November last in London during the Ministerial Council.

Thus, the separate negotiations which began on 26th May last – under the auspicious stewardship of the Netherlands presidency – with each of these countries have now been brought to a close. The process consisted of a series of detailed discussions on both substantive issues and legal questions. Though detailed and complex, the discussions proceeded rapidly and for this we are indebted to the United Kingdom presidency. All the parties involved thought that the conclusions of these discussions were highly satisfactory.

It is truly a privilege for me to be able to welcome the presence among you of Portuguese and Spanish members of the WEU Parliamentary Assembly, and also the Portuguese and Spanish Ambassadors, who henceforth are their countries' permanent representatives to our organisation.

The process of European construction cannot be complete without Portugal and Spain which, together, have contributed so much to our Europe in both cultural, historical and human terms. It was vital that these two states should participate in that part of the growing “European edifice” represented by WEU.

It is no exaggeration to say that, under these circumstances – and the Preamble to the Pro-

Mr. Cahen (continued)

protocol of Accession stresses this point – the enlargement of WEU to include Portugal and Spain “represents a significant step in the development of European solidarity in the field of security and defence”.

May I add that the Council is aware of the material problems which enlargement created for the Assembly and to which reference is made in Mr. Linster's report. Accordingly, the Council has released F 100 000 to meet the expenses of an architectural study into the alterations required to the Paris offices of the organisation.

It has also appreciated the fact that Mr. Wilkinson has – in the same perspective – made a very full study of the armaments industry in Portugal and Spain. This report comes at a most opportune time when the organisation has just been enlarged to include these two states which, henceforward, will be our partners.

Secondly, the national (France, Italy) and integrated operations (United Kingdom, Netherlands, Belgium), co-ordinated in the Gulf on the basis of political consultation within WEU and with the support of the Federal Republic of Germany and Luxembourg, have continued.

In view of the developments in the region and the reduction of the threat to navigation since the cease-fire, it is quite normal, however, that the operations in their present form should come to an end. Some of the states are withdrawing their units from the region, others are adjusting their presence to a situation that is different from that which led the five member states of the organisation, in August 1987, to take action in the Gulf under the Netherlands presidency.

The conclusion of this action is in fact a final cleaning-up operation by each of the national and integrated fleets in their zones of action, in co-ordination with each other.

This operation is known as “Cleansweep”. Its aim is to complete the clearance of a shipping lane 300 miles into the Gulf from the Strait of Hormuz. It will be of benefit to all merchant shipping in those waters and will assist a return to normality in the region. This operation meets one of the recommendations contained in the conclusions to the report by Mr. Martino.

It is no exaggeration to say that these operations have highlighted the reality of WEU's reactivation and its ability to put this into concrete form in all the spheres of its competence, including areas outside the direct security zone of its member countries whenever this security – taken in its widest sense – is threatened.

Thus, as the members of this Assembly have long desired, substance has been given to Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels Treaty as well as Article 8 of the Rome decla-

ration and Part III (a) 4 of the platform on European security interests.

At the ministerial meeting on 14th November last, the participants welcomed the success of these operations. They drew a number of conclusions from the experience and concluded their discussions by agreeing that “the experience of operations in the Gulf would strengthen Europe's capacity for concerted action in the future”.

Another important item was the organisation by the Institute for Advanced Defence Studies in France of a European advanced defence studies session within the WEU context since it was directed at nationals of the WEU member states.

This event marks the beginning of a regular programme to provide information and an opportunity for reflection – among the most interested sections of the public – on problems of European security, seen of course in the vital context of Atlantic solidarity. It will have considerable impact on opinion in Europe just as the seminars organised for some years now by the IHEDN at national level have had an impact on opinion in France.

The session began on 15th November with an address by Mr. Rocard, the French Prime Minister, which was widely reported in the press. As you have said, Mr. President, the session was highly successful. The French Prime Minister, Mr. Rocard, opened it personally and in his address proposed the setting up of a European institute for advanced defence studies. Notable speakers of great quality took part in the discussions and you yourself, Mr. President, agreed to talk about the rôle of WEU in European security.

Our thanks are due to France for having agreed to launch this session with the benefit of its vast experience – and particularly that of the IHEDN – in the matter. This initiative will be continued next year because Belgium has already agreed to organise a similar session at its Royal Advanced Defence Institute. It may also be continued by the setting-up of a European institute for advanced defence studies and it will certainly be continued by the action of former participants who have already formed an association and intend, both at national level and, in the framework of our states, at regional level, to carry on with what they started two weeks ago in Paris.

Relations with the Assembly have always been a major concern of the Council, particularly since the reactivation of the organisation. The Council has, on several occasions, recognised that the information provided on its activities and those of its subsidiary bodies left something to be desired either in terms of its substance or the delay in providing it.

Mr. Cahen (continued)

A considerable effort has been made to remedy this state of affairs. The Council, and I too, were pleased to note that both Mr. van der Sanden and Mr. Martino drew attention to this effort in their reports.

In keeping with the promise made to you six months ago from this rostrum by Mr. David Mellor, then United Kingdom Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, the first part of the thirty-fourth annual report – which is to be debated at this session – has been submitted in good time. Care will be taken to ensure that the same happens in future. Furthermore, the Council has encouraged me to send you regular newsletters, Mr. President: they will be drafted under my own responsibility in order to save time over drafting negotiations – and designed to keep both you and the members of the Assembly up to date with the work of the Council and the other intergovernmental organs.

As Mr. van der Sanden points out, things are still not yet perfect, but progress has been made and this will be built upon.

Is it then that everything is for the best within WEU in the best of all possible worlds? To be very frank, I have to answer: of course not!

We are all aware of the difficulties which have, from the outset, faced the work of European construction, an enterprise of which Western European Union is but one part. Even today, some forty years on, are we not still asking ourselves about the ultimate aims of the enterprise?

Mr. Rocard neatly summed up the problems facing us when, in his address to the first European advanced defence studies session, he said that: "Though much has been achieved, there is still a long way to go. Difficulties remain which may be traced to the difference in statute between our countries, to the different courses their histories have taken and which have often brought them into conflict and to the more recent decisions they have made in both the political and military fields: they may also be traced to the harshness of our economic and technological environment in particular, which fuels fears and sharpens competition. But, as President Mitterrand said a short time ago at this same rostrum, these difficulties must prompt us to act. After all, did anyone think just over thirty years ago that the building of the Common Market would be easy? Was this a reason for abandoning the whole idea?"

This is clearly the case for the other parts of the European edifice, namely the communities and political co-operation. It is even more true of our Western European Union which is, in a way, a "crossroads organisation". Does it not lie at the point where the roads to building Europe and

Atlantic solidarity intersect? As far as I am concerned, there is absolutely no contradiction between these two vocations of our organisation; on the contrary, they strike me as being complementary.

That great European and Atlanticist, the late Paul-Henri Spaak, a former Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Belgium, was right when he wrote in his *mémoires*: "I did indeed feel somewhat sad that day – the day he left Parliament – but I consoled myself by recalling the struggles I had taken part in and the results which had been obtained. I had contributed, through the Atlantic Alliance, to ensuring peace in Europe, and I had contributed to the building of a united Europe. I had thus made two of my dreams come true."

Two dreams that belong together. That said, the fact that our reactivated organisation has a dual rôle – which is both its characteristic feature and its privilege – may mean that periodically it has to reaffirm that its European and Atlantic rôles are linked. As I have already said, the important thing, in any event, is to progress, and I feel that we have progressed.

Let me call as a witness one of Britain's leading journalists, whom you probably all know, a former diplomatic correspondent of the *Financial Times* and now that paper's Paris correspondent, Ian Davidson. His testimony is all the more interesting because three or four years ago he was very sceptical about the likelihood of reactivating WEU. What he wrote in the *Financial Times* on 10th November last has, for that reason, even greater validity:

"It is not surprising, therefore, that Western European Union, which was much derided when it was raised from the dead four years ago, now appears to have breathed in a fair amount of life. When the seven member states first dared to hold a private discussion of western arms control objectives two years ago, they were roundly rebuked for insubordination by a State Department official. On Monday – i.e. 14th November, date of the meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers – the Seven will sign the admission of Spain and Portugal as full members, and at the same time they will also approve two arms control reports, on strategic nuclear weapons and on conventional arms. These reports do not, apparently, break any startling new ground or reveal truths unsuspected by the US. The fact of engaging in the process is, however, a symbolic act of collective European autonomy. There is a growing consensus that Europe needs to be able to express a distinct defence identity, and for the moment it is being expressed in WEU."

Yes, I say it again: "That identity is being expressed in WEU."

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Secretary-General, for your address.

Thank you also for agreeing to reply to any questions.

I call Mr. Hill.

Mr. HILL (*United Kingdom*). – Does not the executive of WEU feel that it is light years away from the plenary session? The Commission of the European Community attends the committees of the European Parliament. Does that not point the way forward? Would not Mr. Cahen, who is a very able man, want to be more involved with the committees, which are deciding our future path?

After all, we are increasing our numbers from seven to nine Community countries, and the methodology is beginning to change. I should have thought that we were beginning to take over the European pillar of the NATO alliance and acquire a stronger voice in the payment of European defence. Rather than being divided between London and Paris, could not this organisation become more collegiate?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Secretary-General.

Mr. CAHEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*) (Translation). – I thank the honourable member for having raised this very interesting subject.

With the accession of Spain and Portugal, our membership now embraces more than half the members of the Atlantic Alliance. The additional importance this gives us is now recognised in the United States. Last week, when I accompanied Mr. Goerens to Washington, I noted that there was real recognition of our organisation as the beginnings of a European pillar. This is true of many members of the present administration like Mr. Carlucci and Mr. Taft, whom we met, and it also applies to others who will form part of the future administration such as General Scowcroft, Mr. Dennis Ross, who as one of the transition team is responsible for security problems, and finally, Mr. Donald Gregg, who is the future President Bush's special assistant for foreign affairs. We are thus recognised for what we are and that means we have a duty to work for unity.

As regards the communities, we should certainly seek the closest possible relations because they, together with political co-operation and WEU, are the three dimensions of European construction. The communities, which also have a political goal and a potential all-embracing vocation, at the moment represent the economic dimension of European construction. The political dimension is expressed in co-operation in foreign policy. We are the security dimension. We should logically therefore work together.

This is why I endeavour to cultivate close co-operative relations with the Commission – i.e. with Mr. Delors and the other commissioners. Unfortunately, we cannot push that co-operation beyond certain limits because in the communities there are three countries which cannot at present accept the security dimension, and two of these do not wish to have too close relations with WEU.

The building of Europe is not a logical process. I often compare it to a plant choked at the start by rocks heaped on it by some bad fairy. In order to grow, the plant has to put out shoots in all directions: there is a supranational branch in the form of the communities, an intergovernmental branch, which is political co-operation, and a branch that belongs to it all though no one knows quite where it comes from, and that is WEU. If one day the rocks were lifted, the plant would start to grow again the way nature intended, namely in accordance with the logic of the building of Europe. But, for the time being, we must live with what we have.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – What does the Secretary-General think of the proposal by the German Chancellor that WEU should be composed of members of the European Parliament?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Secretary-General.

Mr. CAHEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*). – Sir Geoffrey, you put me in a most awkward position.

(The speaker continued in French)

(Translation). Chancellor Kohl is not the only one to have made such a suggestion. It was made before by Mr. van den Broek in The Hague last year on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the Brussels Treaty.

As usual, there are a number of pros and cons. If the building of Europe met the ideal that I have just described, namely, the plant without the rocks and if it began to grow harmoniously, then perhaps there could be just the one entity for the construction of Europe. The communities, political co-operation and WEU could be brought together and only one parliamentary assembly would be necessary.

At the moment that is not the case and I must say that to my mind it is essential that we have an assembly whose members are in direct touch with the national parliaments.

With Sir Geoffrey Finsberg's permission I shall leave it at that, because I could be in trouble with the Assembly or the governments and that is not the rôle of the Secretary-General and certainly not in his interest.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Caro.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – I cannot resist the temptation of exchanging views with Mr. Alfred Cahen even in public session. Secretary-General he may be, of course, but now I know we also have a horticultural specialist we can call on.

I should like to ask him two questions. The first concerns this rather thorny issue of the co-production of armaments and the key rôle that the Council of Ministers should be playing in it as required by one of the most fundamental undertakings entered into by the Council in Rome in 1984, when the guidelines for the political reactivation of Western European Union were laid down.

We can all recall cases that made the headlines not only among us Europeans but also in the alliance. One such was the combat helicopter affair, a kind of test-case in which Westland lost out to Sikorsky. Mr. Secretary-General, is the Council, in order to meet the requirements of reactivation, kept regularly informed of the intentions of the governments and armaments industries of the seven – now nine – member countries so that it can take stock of the situation and also so that these governments, when they meet outside the framework of the Permanent Council, always have on their agenda those subjects enabling them, assuming that they have the political will to implement the Rome decisions, to provide the political stimulus that it is their duty to provide? This is something that we criticise, and we are right to do so.

The second question relates to the suggestion of the United Kingdom Government – at present holding the presidency – that it organise a colloquy in London to publicise Western European Union and the problems of European defence. Can the Secretary-General inform the Assembly to what extent our Assembly would be involved in this operation as I feel that would be most desirable?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Secretary-General.

Mr. CAHEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*) (Translation). – First I should like to thank the members of the Assembly for asking me these questions because, to me, this dialogue between us is extremely valuable. It is absolutely essential and must continue. As Mr. Caro knows, of course, it does continue outside the sessions of the Assembly.

As regards armaments co-operation, the Council does indeed address questions of this kind on occasion, when there is a problem. You quoted the example of combat helicopters. The Council did consider this question. That said, the problems referred to by Mr. Dumas remain and

I have nothing to add to what he said. However that may be, this is certainly one of our missions to which we try to add political stimuli. Why political stimuli but no more? Because, since the Standing Armaments Committee was set up in 1955 when we were the only forum possible for European armaments co-operation, things have changed. We have the Independent European Programme Group and the communities. In the communities co-operation is possible in the framework of industrial policies, although there is also the question of what will happen with the advent of the single market in 1992. I would add that the WEU Council also has that on its agenda. This is a key problem and our rôle is not to duplicate what is done in wider forums with greater potential in terms of available markets. We have to be the spur that goads these wider forums to come up with answers and take us forward because we seven countries, now nine, are industrially relatively homogeneous and strategically more or less “like-minded”.

With regard to the colloquy on public relations and informing the public about security problems as they appear to WEU in particular, I took due note at the meeting of the Presidential Committee in London on 15th November of the Assembly's wish to be closely involved in this colloquy. It is also my intention to inform the Council of this wish at its next meeting on 13th December. It is most important that the Assembly should be involved because the Assembly is the principal link between WEU and public opinion and in that sphere has a leading rôle to play.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. van der Werff.

Mr. van der WERFF (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Once again, the Secretary-General has given an excellent description of the international political situation. He is, as it were, the link between us and the whole of the executive. However, I have been instructed by my political group to act as a kind of critical Cassandra, so I do have a few questions.

First, the Secretary-General referred to the quality of our reports. I am glad that the Assembly provides work of high quality. The Secretary-General then said that the Ministers take note of these reports and react to them, but to what extent do our reports, or improvements to our reports – these would have to be made by the Secretary-General – add to what the Ministers in the Council already know from their own departments? After all, they have a fund of knowledge available. What are we members of parliament going on about?

Second, the Secretary-General pointed out that public opinion and government analyses of the situation in the eastern bloc sometimes differed significantly as regards the real conditions.

Mr. van der Werff (continued)

I think this happens to all of us. He has just said himself that we are the link with public opinion. I feel there is a difference between Mr. Gorbachev's words and the actions of the military industrial complex in the Soviet Union. How can we expose and unravel the difference and the reality? Words cost nothing, but actions leave their mark.

The Secretary-General used the word "complementarity". This word always makes me hesitate. How can we co-ordinate and integrate the activities and responsibilities of NATO, the EEC and WEU? In short, how can we match all this up in practice? Matchmaking is the world's second-oldest profession. I still cannot see how we are to have a blueprint for the future in this area. I personally believe that WEU cannot uphold European unity – and I tell you this quite frankly – if Europe breaks the link with Washington.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Secretary-General.

Mr. CAHEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*) (Translation). – Thank you for these three questions. In reply to the first, I would say that it is true that the reports of your Assembly are of an exceptional quality. It is also true that during the quiescent ten years of the organisation it was they that kept WEU in the public eye. This was of great importance.

The reports are certainly read in the national administrations. It is certain that ministerial staff – I was a minister's private secretary once and know that ministers do not read every single one – make summaries for them and keep them fully informed of their content, especially the recommendations made in this Assembly. Generally, as you have seen with Mr. Dumas and on previous occasions, they take your reports into account and try to respond to them.

The second question relates to our position regarding the public impression about what is happening in the USSR. It is a difficult problem: one has only to listen to the argument in each of our countries on what is, and what is not, significant in Mr. Gorbachev's reforms, and on their true meaning internally and internationally and how lasting they are likely to be. This was one of the major problems discussed at the round table organised in the United States by the Institute for the Analysis of International Political Problems and by the Netherlands Atlantic Council, and I do not think any agreed conclusions have been reached on the subject.

You are also right to say that though there may be significant reforms at the internal level, there is no evidence that, from the security angle, what is said and what is done in the USSR are the same. We are told that their intention is to

switch from an offensive to a defensive stance. That is not confirmed at the moment, either by the kind of weapons they are making or the rate at which they are being produced. Nor is it confirmed by the orders to their troops. It is not confirmed by their manoeuvres nor by the deployment of their forces. But it all takes time. We have to be ready for what may possibly happen because if the USSR were really, concretely and visibly to change from an offensive to a defensive position, we would then have two alliances: ours and theirs. This would no doubt be the supreme confidence-building measure; it would completely transform East-West relations. Unfortunately, that point has not yet been reached.

Mr. van der WERFF (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – My question was about the link.

Mr. CAHEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*) (Translation). – You ask me what the Assembly can say, since it is our channel of communication with the public. I believe that it has a very important rôle to play in a particular field. Mr. Gorbachev has a phrase he likes to use: the "common European house". Like all of you here I have read the "Perestroika" chapter devoted to his "European house" very carefully. I must say I found no working drawings. I think we should tell the public that we already have a European house, our own and one that we have been building for over forty years on the framework of the Council of Europe, the Twelve and, now, WEU. It is not finished, but it is going up and it would be a mistake for us to leave a house that exists for one that does not, and for which the drawings are, in any case, unclear.

Our European house, moreover, is open to all those who share the democratic and human values on which it is founded. It is even open for dialogue to those who do not yet share these values. Rather than build the other house that Mr. Gorbachev proposes, I suggest we stay in our own and make a garden where we can go walking with Mr. Gorbachev and plan a better future and where our children can play together till that future dawns.

As for the third question, there is, of course, some complementarity. We have no thought of doing without the alliance. In our view, there is no credible defence of the West without it. I personally have extremely close relations with the Secretary-General of NATO. I also try to promote such relations at the level of my colleagues and staff.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Lambie.

Mr. LAMBIE (*United Kingdom*). – I was interested in the Secretary-General's statement that he was a lecturer at the free university and that a new organisation of 1 000 students had been set

Mr. Lambie (continued)

up to support European security. Since Mr. Gorbachev's peace offensive, my own impression as a politician in the United Kingdom who has met young people is that young people are now anti-American and anti-American military philosophy. They also believe that WEU is a remnant of the cold war and an American front organisation in Western Europe. Is not the Secretary-General living in cloud cuckoo land?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Secretary-General.

Mr. CAHEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*) (Translation). – I shall answer you not in my capacity as Secretary-General but from my experience as a university teacher. For the last nine years it has been my privilege to teach at the University of Brussels, which no one would call a conservative institution. On the contrary it is "progressist" i.e. pretty radical. The students are full of questions for me but they are also very eager to hear the answers. Provided I am honest with them I have no difficulty in getting them to understand – even the very left-wing students – what WEU and the alliance really are.

If the President will allow me a few more minutes I should like to tell you a story. In 1979, on the death of the professor in the chair of international relations at the University of Brussels some of the other professors, remembering that I had once been a lecturer there, suggested I should apply. One of my rivals was Madame Macciochi, a well-known and very distinguished lady who, at the time, was a communist member of the European Parliament. The students clearly preferred her because she was "progressist". Finally, the teaching staff elected both of us, me to give the course one year and she the next. Since I was to start first, the students went to see the head of my faculty and asked could they not have Madame Macciochi to start with rather than this political adviser and ambassador, who had to be a frightful conservative. The president, also a communist but nevertheless an objective member of parliament, replied: "Try the political adviser and come back and see me in a month's time." So I was then on trial for a month teaching students who regarded me as an awful rightist because I was an ambassador and a political adviser. The exchange of ideas was tough. After a month they went back to the president of the faculty and said: "We'll keep him, he's all right, he tells us the truth." That is what is needed.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Secretary-General, for answering all these questions.

12. Europe and the aftermath of the war between Iran and Iraq

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1162 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on Europe and the aftermath of the war between Iran and Iraq and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1162 and amendments.

I call Mr. Martino, Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee.

Mr. MARTINO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. President. First, if you will, I would like to express my thanks for all the work that has been done by the committee's secretariat and for the research that went into the drafting of the report as it at present stands. The fact-finding task was extremely difficult because we were not allowed to collect any direct information on what happened in this extremely long, eight-year war.

I would also like to thank the Chairman and members of the General Affairs Committee who, through their work in committee, enabled us to make the necessary changes to the report as a result of which it is now readable and possibly suitable, I hope, for approval by this Assembly.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I have referred to the difficulties caused by the uneasy course of events which finally, on 18th July this year, brought eight years of cruel warfare to an end with the acceptance of the cease-fire that actually came into effect on 20th August. You are all familiar with what happened during the war, and the report before you will have brought back and heightened your recollections of the horrific news and pictures that the world press published at the time. The reports were contradictory – as I said at the start – and sometimes confused; often, even though Europe has already this century seen two world wars whose mistakes are carved in the stone of countless monuments reminding our own countries and the rest of the world of the vital need, everywhere and at all times, to make peace our goal, we had the impression of things happening much farther away – in another world or another period of history.

After a brief introduction, the report goes through events following the cease-fire, i.e. the end of military operations, on an extremely sensitive world chessboard on which seething and explosive political, religious, economic and social interests are extremely difficult to keep under control. The difficult and delicate negotiations through the mediation of the United

Mr. Martino (continued)

Nations Secretariat and its appointed representatives then began. The procedure, as you know, was often veiled in prudent silence broken only by news of exchanges of wounded prisoners and communiqués from the international organisations. The UNESCO action and its efforts to rebuild a fabric of civil society in the areas ravaged up to last summer by the destructive and deadly weapons of war also date from that time.

The problems, as you well know, are difficult to resolve and complicated: responsibility for the war, the various territorial questions that will only be solved in the medium and longer term, and then the Kurdish problem, which involves several peoples and nations and – even when not explicitly referred to – appears between the lines throughout the report. This is a problem that has to be defined as urgent for all countries, including our own, which must make it their duty to contribute to at least its partial, or what I would call piece-by-piece, solution.

It also appears, underlined so to speak, in two of the items of the recommendation to the Council of Ministers submitted, as always, for your kind examination. It is an extremely difficult problem outmatched only by the “lessons from the war”, as the report has it: the conduct of operations with the horrifying use of chemical weapons, acts of terrorism, mines laid in international waters, suicide operations and the killing of people at holy sites and on religious occasions. We all felt we were witnessing the collapse of every human right and all respect for international conventions under the law that applies even in wartime.

The local and regional consequences are clear to all, and the patient work of the negotiators at this time will be long and never easy. Our countries cannot shrug off their essential duty to contribute by practical collaboration in the difficult work of constructing a peace whose outline, in the history of the suffering human race, is hardly sketched in the bare wording of an unstable cease-fire.

Then there are the other problems and the threat they pose; the vast quantity of arms, an area with an accumulating supply of instruments of death and a widening dearth of the means of work and civil life, the problem of the Kurdish people and Kurdish refugees, the problem of the reconstruction of Iran and Iraq as yet only coming up on the horizon, and the horrifying problem of chemical weapons and their manufacture, storage, prohibition and final destruction.

Ladies and gentlemen, Mr. President, in the turmoil of this conflict WEU seized the occasion and the moment to assume a new rôle: this time

co-operation in safeguarding the freedom of the seas in an area where there was no longer any safety for shipping or even civil life as a whole.

That rôle is now on the wane but, to my mind, another is beginning to arise. We have included it in the draft recommendation that we now submit for your consideration and which we address to the Council of Ministers. This is not just another document for debate and adoption; in our eyes it is a new departure, something totally different, an oath of peace sworn by us as free men of a free state of Europe.

(Mr. van der Werff, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT. – The debate is open.

There are more than half a dozen people on my list of speakers, so I ask delegates to restrict themselves to five minutes each.

I call Mr. Scovacricchi.

Mr. SCOVACRICCHI *(Italy)* (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, up to the outbreak of the armed conflict between Iran and Iraq it was held more or less generally, that the causes of the crisis were intertwined in a tangle of historic grudges, religious divisions and ideological arguments, more or less covert ambitions of dominance and nationalism and the interference of foreign countries ever poised to take advantage of the weakness of the contestants. Other factors pointed to were Iraq's obvious aspirations to assume the rôle of police force or at least protector of the Gulf and the conviction of the Iraqi President Hussein that he would quickly realise this dream by taking advantage of the precarious state that Iran had been thrown into by the Shiite revolution led by Khomeini.

We have seen that instead of – and far from – a blitzkrieg the war has lasted nearly a decade with a heavy toll in human lives. Moreover not even the positive action taken by the United Nations, which had at once seemed to bear hopeful promise when Resolution 598 of the Security Council was unanimously approved by the representatives of the fifteen countries, had any comforting effects.

Finally, the passing of the years exhausted the belligerents to the point where, particularly as a result of the United Nations' continued diplomatic activity, both were successfully persuaded last summer to accept the Security Council resolution.

Mr. Martino, whom I congratulate on his accurate report, has said that we cannot remain inactive as though peace had been finally achieved. It is true that the cease-fire is a new factor of considerable importance and of which due note has to be taken but that does not mean that it offers any grounds for peace of mind.

Mr. Scovacricchi (continued)

There are still the after-effects and the difficulty and complications of the problems to which the Rapporteur has referred. Here I am thinking, in particular, of the Kurdish question, the problem of arms supplies to the two countries at war, the control of chemical weapons and the problem of providing significant help to the Kurdish refugees. All these questions constitute undeniable objectives, all clearly set out in the draft recommendation which also, taken as a whole, represents a clear, effective and valid model for a global European policy for the next few years in this area of strategic importance.

Mr. President, I necessarily had to cut short what I have to say because I have just been told that I have only five minutes to speak and not ten as the officials at first told me.

At all events I would like to say, in concluding my statement, that when I read the title of the report for the first time it seemed to me to hark back to past history, possibly inappropriate for debate as an event of great significance in this chamber. After a careful reading of the report and after listening to Mr. Martino's address, I realise that the problem is not as simple as it appears in the press where this historic happening is lost among the scandal and gossip; on the contrary it has implications and repercussions that we have to consider and keep under review if we are to save ourselves from further complications.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Scovacricchi, especially for keeping to the five-minute time-limit.

I call Mr. Speed.

Mr. SPEED (*United Kingdom*). – I have circulated my Amendment 2. I congratulate Mr. Martino on his excellent report. I have no quarrel with the main thrust of it, but I am worried that it could provide ammunition for critics in the United States who accuse the Europeans of not playing their full part.

The General Affairs Committee, of which I am an alternate member, went to Washington earlier this year, where we heard criticisms from congressmen and senators about Europe not playing its full part. Most of those criticisms were based on a lack of knowledge. What worries me is that the report, especially the explanatory memorandum, could add just a little to that unawareness of the full facts.

Paragraphs 119 and 120 of the explanatory memorandum could give the impression that the United States has done a great deal, maintained a naval force in the Gulf since 1980 and had a presence in the area since 1949, and that the European navies, particularly the WEU navies, have been involved only recently and that most

of that involvement has been with mine counter measures. Those impressions would be a distortion of the facts and give ammunition to American critics such as Congresswoman Schroeder.

The United Kingdom and France have had important naval units in the Gulf since the Iran-Iraq war started in 1980. We had confirmation of that earlier this afternoon from the French Minister of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs. The United Kingdom has had a major naval presence in the Gulf. Until recently, we had a naval base at Bahrain called HMS Jufair. Earlier this week I was aboard the Royal Navy aircraft carrier HMS Illustrious, which was part of a detachment in the Gulf involving other major Royal Navy units.

We know that French and British carriers have been in the Gulf. During the past eight years, there have been major surface units from Britain and France in the area. Their prime objective has been to protect merchant shipping and oil supplies to Western Europe, North America and Japan. Important though last year's initiative by WEU in mine counter-measures is – it has worked extremely well – we must make it clear to the world, and not least to the United States, that two WEU navies have been involved for a long time and spent a great deal of money. My only criticism of Mr. Martino's report is that that is not clear. That is why I have tabled my amendment, which would add a paragraph and set the record straight.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, anyone who has observed the United Nations and its activities since 1945 must surely have been convinced that nothing like this dreadful war between Iran and Iraq could possibly occur again. It lasted longer than the second world war. It cost more money than the second world war, though few people have taken this in. This war has made it clear that despite all the human suffering in the first and second world wars, wars of this kind can still happen.

I would point out that it was a classical war, not one sparked off by a clash between different religious movements, as people would now have us believe. It was a classical war triggered by frontier disputes. The original cause was a decision taken by Iran when the Shah was in power to change a certain frontier that had been fixed since about 1850. After the revolution in Iran, Iraq believed that Iran had been weakened, and tried to reverse this frontier change. So this is a war on the classical pattern.

This war entailed all the horrors which were thought to have been eliminated after the first world war. I recall the terrible trench warfare that

Mr. Müller (continued)

occurred during this war, reminding us of what happened not too far from Paris between German and French troops in the first world war. Poison gas and chemical weapons were used too, which did not even happen in the second world war, after the dreadful experiences of the first. But they were used again in this conflict between Iran and Iraq.

We also know that all the major requirements and internationally binding agreements, concerning, for example, the treatment of prisoners of war and political opponents, were simply ignored, and that human rights were completely disregarded.

What does this mean for us? What conclusions should we draw from it? After all, only a cease-fire has been agreed, and we do not know if peace has come to stay. We must be clear that this region is still a powder keg, which continues to be refilled with arms supplies, and which comprises more than Iran and Iraq alone. Remember adjacent Afghanistan. You are aware that religious and nationalist movements even in the southern part of the Soviet Union, with the Azerbaijanis and Armenians in conflict, show what a critical region this corner of the world is.

What conclusions should we in WEU be drawing? I believe the first is that as European nations we must continue to exert ourselves on behalf of human rights in this region, even after the cease-fire. The second conclusion is that we must reach agreements on chemical weapons at international level as soon as possible in order to have this area quite clearly defined. The third – and the previous speaker touched on this – is that WEU must be more willing to take joint action in critical situations. We have heard a description of the performance of the navies of WEU member states. I believe there is a lesson to be learned for the future here.

Finally, we have all been confronted with the internal conflict with the Kurdish minority, who live not only in Iraq but also in Iran, the Soviet Union and Turkey. I feel that in this special situation we should be grateful to the Turks for taking in tens of thousands of Kurdish refugees from Iraq.

In our national parliaments and in the countries we come from we must use our influence to ensure that in this difficult situation Turkey, a loyal member of the NATO alliance, receives material assistance in providing human and humanitarian support for the refugees from Iraq. I believe this is an obligation, if we are serious in our declarations of belief in human rights.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mrs. Luuk.

Mrs. LUUK (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I should like to refer specifically to the last idea that Mr. Müller put forward. I am talking about the suffering people who fled to Turkey as Kurdish refugees from Iraq. They are particularly at risk during these winter months.

I feel a number of facts should be listed to make their situation clearer. Turkey has not signed the Geneva Convention on refugees as a whole. It makes a reservation with regard to refugees from outside Europe and does not therefore recognise them as refugees. This means that the High Commissioner for Refugees has no mandate to do anything for these refugees. He cannot give them refugee status, and he cannot place them under his protection, with the concomitant guarantees.

Nonetheless – and this must be emphasised – Turkey has taken in these people on humanitarian grounds, and has given repeated assurances that it will be for them alone to decide if they want to return. Fifty thousand people are living in camps in Turkey. An unknown number of other refugees, who are not properly registered, are not living in camps. I should point out that the area in which the Kurdish refugees are living is very underdeveloped and poor. Living conditions are very tough, both for the people who have always lived there and most especially for the newcomers, the refugees.

I should add that this is a mountainous region and the temperature at night falls well below freezing point. These people are living in tents, which means they are not adequately housed, according to information from the ICRC and the UNHCR. If they are to survive, it is imperative that plans be made to resettle them or provide them with permanent housing.

I feel we must call on the relief organisations in our own countries to organise aid, because the Kurdish refugees need help to survive the winter. We must assist the Turks so that they can organise aid in co-operation with the recognised international relief organisations, such as the Red Crescent.

We must also consider the possibility of admitting certain quotas of the people who have become refugees in this conflict to the member countries of WEU, particularly in view of the fact, already mentioned here, that many of them are still suffering from the consequences of the poison gas attacks.

In the long term – and I consider this important – we in this Assembly must convey to Iraq our insistence that if the Kurds return to Iraq voluntarily they must not suffer any repression, must not be put in camps against their will and will not be forcibly resettled in the south of the country. This consideration is, of course, connected with the fact that, if they

Mrs. Luuk (continued)

return, these refugees will not enjoy the protection of the High Commissioner for Refugees. The Council of Europe is also going to champion this cause. A report is being drawn up and will be debated there shortly.

To conclude, a brief word about Amendment 3: this amendment, which I have also signed, is intended to complement paragraph 6, with the added idea of protecting the refugees if they return to Iraq voluntarily.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Atkinson.

Mr. ATKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. Martino has made an excellent report, on which I congratulate him. Like other speakers, I want to concentrate on his detailed descriptions of the Kurdish problem, on which he has drawn attention to two points. The first is that, so long as this problem remains, it will always be a source of tension in the region, which involves not just Iraq but Iran, Syria, Turkey and the Soviet Union, where Kurdish people live. The second is the appalling use of chemical weapons by Iraq against its Kurdish population.

Chapter III of the report provides us with a useful reminder of the background to the current Kurdish unrest. Until I read the report, I had not appreciated that the allies who won the first world war had promised an independent Kurdistan. In the light of that promise, it is not surprising that the Kurds have been fighting for it ever since and that they will go on doing so until they obtain their self-determination.

The Rapporteur is right to say in paragraph 52 that the international community cannot ignore the fate of the Kurds, and that that community has so far done nothing to ensure that they have the right to exist. Unfortunately, however, nowhere in his recommendations does the Rapporteur suggest what the international community should do to resolve this problem.

What we cannot do is continue to allow each of the five occupying powers periodically to repress their Kurdish populations and at the same time to pit their Kurds against each other, as they have been doing on and off for generations. We should instead be suggesting that some authority, presumably the United Nations, look into the Kurdish case for self-determination and make recommendations that might result in a peaceful solution. I am sorry that we seem to be missing an opportunity to do that today. I am, however, glad that the report has faced up to evidence of Iraq's use of chemical weapons against its Kurdish population.

Mr. Martino hesitated to use the word "genocide" in paragraph 54, but since he drafted the

report much more evidence has been forthcoming that that is precisely what Iraq has carried out against its Kurds, not just in March this year but more recently on 29th August. So far the rest of the world has done nothing about it. It is true that some countries, including mine, have delivered a sharp diplomatic slap on the wrist to Iraq. If that is all, however, Iraq – and anyone else for that matter – will know that it can get away with violating the Geneva protocol with complete immunity.

I hope that the WEU Council of Ministers will agree some meaningful retaliation against Iraq in response to the report. It must at the minimum insist on compensation for the families of victims, and ensure a safe return for refugees who have survived the genocide.

This century has already been scarred by far too many such tragedies, to which the world had turned a blind eye. If we do not react effectively against Iraq now, she together with Iran, Syria, Turkey and the Soviet Union, all of which have Kurdish populations, will know that she can do whatever she wants to put down the Kurds, and other minorities for that matter, and get away with it. Recommendations such as these will count for nothing.

I hope that the message will not be lost among our Council of Ministers, and I look forward to reading their response to the recommendations.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Eisma.

Mr. EISMA (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I must begin by complimenting Mr. Martino on his excellent report on the Iran-Iraq situation and European involvement in it.

We are particularly concerned about the situation of the Kurds in Iraq and the barbarous repression they are suffering in that country. The destruction of Kurdish villages and the deportation of this ethnic group are serious violations of human rights, as are the executions of large numbers of political prisoners, and the treatment of Iraqi prisoners of war by Iran. WEU, the Council of Europe, the European Parliament, the United Nations and the individual member states would do well to protest strongly and constantly to Iran and Iraq about their inhuman conduct.

Mr. President, the Iraqi Kurds in Turkey are a special issue. Refugee status in Turkey constitutes a major problem. We must therefore share the burden, as paragraph 7 of the draft recommendation in Mr. Martino's report proposes. This is burden-sharing in the particular context of refugees. We too, as member states of WEU, must be aware of our responsibility to receive refugees into our own countries. We must not leave Turkey to carry this heavy burden alone.

Mr. Eisma (continued)

On the other hand, we must also have the courage to criticise Turkey for not wanting to involve the non-governmental organisations in the distribution of aid. Our criticism and our aid must go hand in hand.

Mr. President, the United States has recently expressed some scepticism about the prospects for adequate verification at the Geneva negotiations on chemical weapons. President Reagan's address to the General Assembly of the United Nations was on a different note, and included an appeal for an international conference to speed up the implementation of the agreement reached in Geneva. That would be useful, but not enough. It is the Iran-Iraq conflict that has confronted the world with the greatest threat of the near future, chemical weapons. There is very great danger in the spread of the technology and raw materials needed to make chemical weapons. Maximum effort is called for to counteract this. Much sterner measures must therefore be taken to prevent the use of chemical weapons. The price must be set too high. If one country does not consider the price too high in military terms, it must be increased by the other countries in economic, diplomatic and financial terms. In other words, the country concerned must be regarded diplomatically as a pariah and financial aid to it must be suspended. Here again, the United Nations would appear to have a rôle to play.

Mr. President, in paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation the General Affairs Committee asks the Agency for the Control of Armaments for a report on the means of verifying that chemical weapons are not produced or stockpiled. We feel the Agency should draw on the work already done in Geneva and should, specifically, familiarise itself with the Dutch research in this field.

Finally, Mr. President, the follow-up is at least as important as the cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq conflict. Iraq in particular must be kept from further action, and here I have Syria and Kuwait in mind. In other words, our activities, the activities of Western European Union, in the Iran-Iraq conflict must extend beyond this report. Western European Union too must be constantly alert to fresh developments in this region.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Tascioglu.

Mr. TASCIOGLU (*Observer from Turkey*) (Translation). – Mr. President, first of all, thank you for giving me the floor and this opportunity to draw the Assembly's attention to the chapter entitled "The Kurdish problem" in the report prepared by our distinguished colleague Mr. Martino. I feel that certain fundamental details

need to be added on some of the points in this part of the report.

In the first place, I should like to point out that the Treaty of Sèvres to which our eminent colleague refers never came into force. You will recall that this stillborn treaty was replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne, signed in 1923 by Turkey and the European powers including Italy. This treaty, one of the pillars of the Turkish Republic, specifically listed the minorities living on Turkish territory and under the provisions of that treaty, the only minorities in Turkey are non-Moslem. The treaty, which defines the present frontiers of Turkey, makes no mention of any ethnic minority which explains all the more easily why there are no ethnic problems in Turkey.

Moreover, as Anatolia was the cradle of several cultures and civilisations and since the Turkish presence there for the last ten centuries has permanently and wholly consolidated cultural and religious unity it is wrong to speak of any distinct ethnic and cultural identity in contemporary Turkey.

Furthermore, neither the constitution nor legislation in Turkey allow discriminatory measures and all Turkish citizens are equal before the law and enjoy the same rights without distinction of religion, language, race, sect, sex and political opinion.

Finally, the Turkish Parliament represents the Turkish people as a whole: everyone is entitled to vote, without exception, in all elections, whether national or municipal.

In my view these facts are of vital importance in assessing the true nature of the international campaign that is being conducted for the purpose of fabricating a non-existent ethnic minority problem in Turkey. This campaign, claiming it is grounded on the universally recognised principles of human rights, is in reality aimed at the political destabilisation of Turkey and its territorial integrity.

There is no question but that the groups attempting to infiltrate Turkey in order to carry out terrorist activities in eastern Anatolia are in fact attempting to carry over into Turkey the political troubles of the Middle East in general and, of the countries on the Turkish border in particular. The Turkish people has never supported these terrorist groups whose bases, moreover, are outside Turkish frontiers.

In the same context, I should like to make one vital point which seems to have escaped our colleague: the language used throughout our country is Turkish. Contrary to what is claimed in certain quarters, no other common language is used by the inhabitants of any area of Turkey.

There may, of course, be certain dialects in use in some areas, but there are great differences

Mr. Tascioglu (continued)

between them, so that our nationals using them always have recourse to Turkish, their common language, in order to understand each other. An interesting point here is the fact that the separatist groups established in Europe also use Turkish for their harmful propaganda.

Without hesitation, without any complexes, Turkey has opened its frontiers to tens of thousands of people looking for somewhere to live as a result of the Iran-Iraq war. Turkey has thus done its humanitarian duty at the cost of considerable sacrifice. We would have hoped that this sacrifice be shared by those who claim that their reason for acting in this way is their concern for human rights.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Cetin, Observer from Turkey.

Mr. CETIN (*Observer from Turkey*). – I wish to add a few words to what my friend, Mr. Tascioglu, said. As is well known, after the cease-fire between Iran and Iraq, Turkey was taken by surprise when Iraq deported more than 50 000 people to Turkey. Turkey has agreed to give those people temporary shelter. The government's decision was also supported by all the opposition parties in Turkey. The consensus surrounding that decision was based solely on humanitarian grounds.

The Rapporteur referred to the problems faced by the Turkish authorities. I have tried to ascertain the most recent figures and have been told that at the beginning of October the total was about 51 000. Since then 1 471 have returned to Iraq following the announcement of the amnesty. About 10 000 have gone to Iran, and 6 000 others would like to go to that country. At present, nearly 40 000 Iraqis are in temporary resettlement centres in Turkey. They have been accommodated in reasonably good conditions, and health controls have been properly observed. Many of them have been moved from the mountains to other areas.

In this respect I welcome the recommendations in paragraphs 6 and 7, which suggest that the EEC and member countries of the Council of Europe should provide meaningful assistance and which call upon those countries to accept significant numbers of these people. However, I have learned that Turkey has not yet received sufficient financial contributions to meet the needs of these people.

Not all of our western friends have responded positively. The modest contributions already received by the Turkish Red Crescent are appreciated as a humanitarian gesture, but they far from meet the basic requirements of these people. It has been said that Turkey has not taken care of these people, but 40 000 is a large number to cope with, not only for Turkey but for

any other country. Criticism is all very well, but Turkey needs help and support to accommodate these people properly.

In paragraph 48 of his report, the Rapporteur claims that the Iraqi Kurds are "having rights that are refused to Turkish Kurds". I draw attention to the fact that these people have passed over our border with Iraq and have escaped probable danger to their lives. They have been given generous status as a result of the humanitarian stand of the Turkish authorities, but they do not have rights under legal instruments. Therefore, I do not understand how they can have rights that are refused to Turkish citizens. Turkey needs the support of western countries to deal with these refugees, but, more importantly, our western friends should support Turkey in its determined endeavours to establish peace in the region.

Allow me to say a few words about the Iran-Iraq peace talks. The eight years of war there have been the longest this century. It was one of the most destructive wars, both in human terms as well as material losses, since the second world war.

The PRESIDENT. – Your time is now up, Mr. Cetin.

Mr. CETIN (*Observer from Turkey*). – We owe a debt of gratitude to you, Mr. President, and to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for keeping the two sides at the negotiating table, but we have a very long way to go and it will take time to achieve real peace in the region.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Malfatti.

Mr. MALFATTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, being the last speaker my statement will be very short. I would like to thank Mr. Martino for his excellent report and to stress, with regard to the draft recommendation for which I shall be voting, the joy we feel at this cease-fire in one of the most cruel conflicts that have taken place since the last world war as the preceding speaker has just pointed out.

The question of the supply of arms to the belligerents, that has rightfully been brought up as one of the causes of the prolongation of the conflict, opens the door, or would if we had the time, to a major debate. Other questions are the Kurdish problem, Iran's violation of human rights, the use of chemical weapons and the condemnation of Iraq for that use. In this connection there is also the major debate on the total prohibition of chemical weapons, in other words the question raised with great authority in this chamber by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs at the request of the French Government.

When I said that I would be voting in favour of this recommendation, I should have added

Mr. Malfatti (continued)

that I shall not be able to vote in favour of Mr. Speed's amendment and therefore I shall abstain. It seems to me that the definition it contains is incomplete. The Italian navy units used in the Gulf did not restrict themselves to mine-sweeping but also performed an escort rôle for merchant shipping. This is not mentioned and that is why I shall abstain on this point.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Malfatti.

The debate is closed.

I ask the Rapporteur, Mr. Martino, to reply. He has a maximum of seven minutes.

Mr. MARTINO (*Italy*) (Translation). – I shall try to give my reply in less than the seven minutes you have graciously allowed me.

I must first thank members for their very kind words which are addressed not only to me as Rapporteur but also to the secretariat of the committee that provided the necessary information to produce so factual a report, as the Assembly has acknowledged.

I thank Mr. Speed who pointed out in vigorous terms – but we both remember our trip to the United States – the need that that country emphasised for a greater contribution to the cost of defence. However, the United States failed to consider or to consider sufficiently – or else they were ignoring – the presence of the WEU naval force in the Gulf. I say the WEU force and underline WEU once and for all because that is what enabled the Italian Government to call its operation a WEU operation. This was the plain sign that it was only under the banner of this Assembly that these naval units could provide a co-operative police force to safeguard navigation in the international waters of the Gulf.

I also thank Mr. Müller who pointed out how many causes the conflict had and how many iniquities had been committed while hostilities raged. I had said this in my brief address. He referred to the events in the first and the second world wars. I would remind him of the use of gas on the Italian front which cost so much human life. The death of many of the 600 000 Italians who fell in the first world war was largely due to gas. So there is nothing new under the sun. I have to tell Mr. Müller that meetings with the press and the press attachés of the various embassies and consulates of the Arab world in Paris have made it possible to check, at least to some extent, the figures supplied by our Turkish colleagues and by others who have spoken on the problem. Some reports have put the number of Kurds that have gone back to Iraq at 10 000. These are reports that have to be verified, of course, because they reach us in a way that makes it very difficult to assess the degree of truth on which they are based.

I share the concerns of Mrs. Luuk. Without a doubt there are forms of repression. Perhaps we are not aware of certain facts of the legislative measures in Iraq or of the constitution itself. According to that constitution the Iraqi vice-president has to be a Kurd. Kurds have equal rights in the army too.

As for the possibility of an amnesty for those going back to their country, the law has already been passed and promulgated and is in force. It would be useful to check and get more detail on many other reports on the subject. This would help us to make a fuller assessment of the facts in the service of the truth that must be our primary objective.

Mr. Atkinson referred to the many different nations involved in the Kurdish problem. It is true that up to now Iraq has not raised the subject of self-determination, nor do I think it intends to. It is very difficult for ethnic minorities to achieve immediate self-determination at this time. Various forms of independence have sometimes, however, been possible. Perhaps we should make a first start in that direction in order to move towards the other. We have examples of difficult situations like that of the Kurdish people in the Mediterranean: Cyprus and the conflict between the north and south of the island is a case in point.

I thank Mr. Eisma and agree with what he said about chemical weapons. On this problem, we shall see how far the American Senate will follow, in terms of legislation, its conviction that evils like that of the use of chemical weapons should be eradicated, and how suitable that legislation will be for extension to the other countries in the world. I would remind the chamber that chemical weapons are extremely simple to produce because they are based on chemical substances that are easy to make; the means of production are not therefore very costly. To the member who referred to the deterrent effect of the high cost that certain resources might have, I would answer that it does not exist and that very careful attention would need to be paid as regards those resources referred to in our report. Thank you for your advice.

To all members I have to say that maximum attention has been paid in the report to the efforts Turkey has made. I imagine that all of us in Europe are aware of economic conditions in Anatolia, which have always been difficult and extremely severe; we can understand that the situation of the refugees must certainly be very distressing. I myself, at the end of the last war, lived in transit camps until I was able to reach Italy. I was a refugee and I know that there was a big difference between the de facto and de jure situations: you are not a citizen of a country unless you have citizenship, so you do not have the same rights. This should not upset anyone, but

Mr. Martino (continued)

we ought to make a sincere, co-operative effort to work out possible solutions even at the legal level to implement paragraphs 6 and 7 of the recommendation to the Council which deal specifically with the subject and how the situation should be tackled.

There may perhaps be some inaccuracies, but I apologised for these at the start, pointing out that it is not easy to reach all the sources necessary for a completely reliable study. However, you will agree that what is contained in this report is not very far from the truth.

Thank you for your collaboration. That is all I have to say.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Ahrens.

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I should like to join in the congratulations and thanks which the Rapporteur and the secretariat have received from previous speakers. The fact that the guns have fallen silent in the Gulf war has naturally – and one can only welcome it – meant a quite fundamental change in the drafting of this report. It has in fact been drafted twice.

Ladies and gentlemen, the Gulf war was fought with dreadful ferocity and undreamt-of cruelty. It exacted a huge human toll. It was a war that gave us a clear picture of what a “merely” conventional war is like today. The distinction between nuclear and conventional war is in any case out of date, in my opinion. Europe would not survive any kind of war.

It has been pointed out that this war did not take place here. But it affected us more than any other conflicts since the second world war, first, because it broke out in a region which is still a major source of energy supplies to Europe, and, secondly, because five of the member states of our organisation became involved in the conflict when they decided to despatch armed forces to the region to guarantee freedom of navigation.

The guns are silent in a war that no one could win. Our goal now must be to win the peace. This means we must do all we can, and make our good offices available to facilitate negotiations between the two adversaries. But it also means that we must help with the reconstruction. Just as we face a challenge in Afghanistan, so, too, we face a challenge in the Gulf region. We must also ensure, of course – and the report refers to this – that our navies help to deal with the contamination of the Gulf and its approaches by mines.

Mr. President, several references have been made to the Kurdish problem. I should like to express specific thanks to Turkey for taking in so

many Kurds who were either expelled from Iraq or fled in fear. This was a great humanitarian deed. I believe it should be our duty to support Turkey, not one of the wealthiest member states of the Council of Europe, in its acceptance of these people. It is not enough to say: Turkey has taken these people in and now it will have to cope. We must support Turkey in this effort.

We should also urge our governments – as the report says – to admit some of those who wish to be resettled in our countries.

There is something else that should be added, and I think we could do this later by means of an amendment: we should insist on guarantees from Iraq that any Kurds who return will not suffer reprisals. An amnesty, which is little more than a piece of paper, is not enough. We need guarantees. I think, in fact, that the best solution for these people would be to be able to return to their original homes, without being in danger of suffering reprisals.

I am also firmly convinced, Mr. President, that the problem of the Kurds, who constitute a minority in several countries, can be solved only by means of a very far-reaching cultural autonomy. Many countries – some of them are represented here – have to live with cultural minorities. Coexistence succeeds best in those countries where the greatest possible degree of autonomy is maintained.

Autonomy is neither a sign of weakness nor a means of achieving destabilisation. It is a sign of a country's internal strength and helps to stabilise the situation.

Problems are not solved by being ignored: they must be tackled. So my particular request to our Turkish friends and colleagues here is this: tackle the problem assertively and take advantage of the experience we too have gained with minorities in our own countries. That is my heartfelt plea. I call on the Assembly to approve this report, which was adopted unanimously in committee, with one abstention.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Pieralli to support Amendment 1, which reads:

1. Leave out paragraph (*xiii*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation.

Mr. PIERALLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, this amendment proposes that the words “Welcoming the measures taken by the Council to contribute, with the United States, to ensuring freedom of navigation in the Gulf” be deleted.

In tabling this amendment, we felt, at the time when it was decided to send the fleet, and we still feel, that safeguarding the freedom of shipping was not a unilateral job for one country or one group of countries, but one for the United Nations Organisation. That is what we thought then and – I repeat – what we still think today.

Mr. Pieralli (continued)

I would like to add that it was United Nations Resolution 598, adopted unanimously, that enabled the cease-fire objective to be achieved, thus bringing the dangers to shipping to an end.

Lastly, I would make the point that the United Nations action would have been far more effective without any doubt if so many countries in the world, including some members of WEU, had not been sending a stream of arms and supplies to Iran and Iraq for so many years.

All this being so, we do not think there are any grounds for welcoming anything.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Martino.

Mr. MARTINO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I understand the attitude of the representative of the Italian communist party because it is the same that it took in the Italian Chamber of Deputies when the decision was taken to send the Italian fleet to assist in the mine-sweeping operations in the Gulf. In that sense, therefore, the amendment tabled by Mr. Pieralli and others is consistent and logical.

But I certainly cannot support what the member said in defence of an attitude to which I am diametrically opposed. We still feel that, apart from having preserved the situation in the Gulf in such a way as to prevent harm to shipping, which would have worsened a situation already made difficult and serious by the war in that area, the presence of naval units enabled the task of securing the safety of shipping to be carried out – a fact recognised as such internationally and by every nation.

For these reasons, Mr. President, I can only express my complete opposition to the amendment we are now considering, tabled by Mr. Pieralli.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Ahrens.

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the committee has not been able to discuss the amendments before you, but I feel that Amendment 1 runs counter to the discussions we have had in committee. I would therefore assume that, had it considered this amendment, the committee would have rejected it.

The PRESIDENT. – I now put Amendment 1 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 1 is negatived.

Mr. Speed has already spoken to Amendment 2, which reads:

2. After paragraph (*xiii*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert a new paragraph:

“ (*xiv*) Noting that over the last eight years the United Kingdom and France have maintained naval units in the Gulf whose prime task has been to assist and protect merchant shipping and these forces were supplemented last year by the WEU mine counter-measures force whose task was to detect and clear mines laid by Iran or others on either side of the Strait of Hormuz, ”

Does he wish to add to what he said?

Mr. SPEED (*United Kingdom*). – No, Sir. I have introduced my amendment, which I think is clear. It is intended to beef up those paragraphs in the explanatory memorandum. The amendment is the only way that I could see of doing that.

The PRESIDENT. – Than you. Does anyone wish to oppose the amendment?...

Does the Rapporteur wish to speak on the amendment?

Mr. MARTINO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, on this amendment I can only describe my attitude as agnostic. I therefore leave it to the Assembly to decide.

The PRESIDENT. – I see the Chairman of the committee takes the same view.

I now put Amendment 2 to the vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 2 is negatived.

I now call Mrs. Luuk to speak to Amendment 3, which reads:

3. At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph:

“ 9. Request the member countries of Western European Union to support Turkey in providing humanitarian assistance to the Kurdish refugees and urge the Iraqi Government to take measures in order to ensure, in future, a voluntary return of these refugees without repression. ”

Mrs. LUUK (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I move Amendment 3, tabled by Mr. Ahrens.

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Rapporteur, Mr. Martino.

Mr. MARTINO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, my attitude to this amendment, too, is one of agnosticism because I have to point out that a law granting amnesty for Iraqi Kurds

Mr. Martino (continued)

returning to Iraq already exists – that is, to the best of my knowledge and on the basis of the most recent reports which I think are reliable. It is probably because these reports are very recent that many members are unaware of them.

The PRESIDENT. – I now put Amendment 3 to the vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 3 is agreed to.

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1162, as amended.

Under Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, if five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber so desire, the Assembly shall vote by roll-call on a draft recommendation.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The amended draft recommendation is adopted¹.

13. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting

tomorrow morning, Tuesday, 6th December, at 10 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Integration of Europe with a view to European union (or the United States of Europe): WEU's rôle (Motion for a resolution with a request for urgent procedure, Document 1168).
2. Banning of demonstration flights at air shows (Motion for a resolution with a request for urgent procedure, Document 1170).
3. Banning of low-altitude military training flights (Motion for a resolution, Document 1169).
4. Young people and defence – the rôle of parliaments (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and votes on the draft resolution and draft order, Document 1157 and amendments).
5. Defence industry in Spain and Portugal (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Document 1161).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 7.20 p.m.)

1. See page 16.

EIGHTH SITTING

Tuesday, 6th December 1988

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. Integration of Europe with a view to European union (or the United States of Europe): WEU's rôle (*Motion for a resolution with a request for urgent procedure*, Doc. 1168).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Pannella, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Ahrens, Mr. Soell, Mr. Pannella.
4. Banning of demonstration flights at air shows (*Motion for a resolution with a request for urgent procedure*, Doc. 1170).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Büchner, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Kittelmann, Mr. Reddemann, Mr. Büchner.
5. Banning of low-altitude military training flights (*Motion for a resolution*, Doc. 1169).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Büchner, Mr. Jessel, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Kittelmann.
6. Young people and defence – the rôle of parliaments (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and votes on the draft resolution and draft order*, Doc. 1157 and amendments).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Shelton (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Gale, Mr. Hunt, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Stewart, Mr. Pannella (*point of order*), Mr. Tummers, Mr. Jessel, Mr. Burger, Mr. Shelton (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Pontillon (*Chairman*), Mr. Hardy, Mr. de Beer, Mr. Shelton, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Pannella (*explanation of vote*), Mr. Reddemann (*point of order*).
7. Defence industry in Spain and Portugal (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions*, Doc. 1161).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Wilkinson (*Chairman and Rapporteur*), Mr. Klejdzinski, Mr. Wilkinson.
8. Changes in the membership of committees.
9. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 10.05 a.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

3. Integration of Europe with a view to European union (or the United States of Europe): WEU's rôle

(Motion for a resolution with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 1168)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the request for a debate under the urgent procedure on the motion for a resolution on the integration of Europe with a view to European union (or the United States of Europe): WEU's rôle, Document 1168, tabled by Mr. Pannella and others.

I would remind you, in this connection, of the provisions of Rule 43. The debate on a request for urgent procedure can never relate to the substance, other than to argue for or against the request for urgent procedure.

In connection with a request for urgent procedure only one speaker for and one speaker against can be heard, the Chairman of the committee concerned and a representative of the Bureau of the Assembly speaking in its name.

I call Mr. Pannella to speak to this request.

1. See page 20.

Mr. PANNELLA (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I am aware that a perhaps rather hasty reading of this document prompted a degree of fright and a good deal of hubbub in our institution when it came out yesterday evening. I heard it described as a proposal to give our institution a state funeral. I even heard someone say we would be committing a kind of hara kiri in deference to the European Commission and the fear spread that what we were proposing meant in practice that WEU would hand over its powers and functions to the European Community.

In reality, Mr. President, the opposite is true. The policy of the ostrich is very bad. Under Rule 43 I request that we quickly lift our heads out of the sand and look reality in the face.

Our community is changing; the European Parliament is about to acquire constitutional powers. You, Mr. President, like your predecessors, have tried constantly to build a bridge between our Assembly and the European Parliament but often nothing has come of your efforts. The reason is that the European Parliament has never paid any heed to your initiatives or those of your predecessors to ensure that the two parliamentary institutions collaborate and work for the same ideals and on the same problems.

In short, we feel we have to take the initiative, arouse public opinion and use the media, too, in order to tell the world what our function and prerogatives are. That is the basic reason for the request for my proposal to be debated under the urgent procedure.

We ask to be associated, in accordance with the appropriate procedures, with the continuous preparatory work for the construction of the European Community or European union or the United States of Europe whatever name it is given. We consider it intolerable for our Assembly to be excluded, for example, from the preparation of the draft treaty of the European Parliament – the Spinelli treaty as it is called – or that of the institutional structures which President Delors daily tells us are now the most important aspect and should be developed as of 1989.

There is nothing, not one single document from our Assembly, that gives our President the right to secure a place for the parliamentary Assembly of WEU in this process. We are relegated, or rather we are relegating ourselves, to the sidelines. Defence sometimes means attacking and if a European defence community is to assert itself it must occasionally go on to the attack when it is shut out, as we are, from the European Community institutions.

Naturally, after the ten, twelve or fourteen years it will take for there to be a European union or a United States of Europe, the reasons for

WEU will be past history. We know how we came to life and we know that then we had certain responsibilities. Why not resurrect the treaties as they were written? We were a defence community and our mandate included economic, cultural and scientific aspects. We have been stripped of all that. But do we complain? Are we concerned to defend the terms of the treaties setting up WEU? Are we claiming our economic, scientific and other responsibilities back from the EEC? No. This is why we are extremely concerned.

In reality, the research and strategy agencies set up within WEU became impossibly obsolete and it was not just the Assembly but WEU as a whole that was pushed further and further to the sidelines because we failed to raise the problem.

Are we, yes or no, ladies and gentlemen, going to demand our rightful place in the process of developing European institutions and the European Community or are we prepared to be completely absent and wholly excluded from what is of direct concern to the European public and to our states?

Either we just say there is no problem – we are the parliamentary Assembly of WEU, we have certain prerogatives – mind you, I wonder what they are and how they stay alive; how is it that they are being increasingly recognised by states, governments, the public, political parties and the national parliaments of which we are the spokesmen? – or else should we not give our President and the Council instructions to see that WEU has from now on its place in the preparatory work for a European Community, especially in the area of defence, but also in all the other aspects which, following the Luxembourg single act, are developing at increasingly rapid rates? To deny this urgency is to be content with things as they are and voluntarily retreat to the sidelines...

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Pannella, I remind you that you have only five minutes to speak to your motion for a resolution.

Mr. PANNELLA (*Italy*) (Translation). – I was not aware that you applied that rule to explanatory statements for requests for urgent procedure as well. If you are, it must be by analogy.

There are always members who interrupt a speaker and afterwards complain about the explanations that he is giving. Had I not been interrupted I would not have gone over my time.

In conclusion, in company with all my friends from all parties in the Italian Parliament signing this motion for a resolution, we consider that there is real urgency. As the years have gone by,

Mr. Pannella (continued)

every president of our Assembly has tried in vain to establish real co-operative relations with the European Parliament and the European Community. That shows that our backing and this statement of policy serve a useful purpose. It is the reason why we have tabled this motion for a resolution with a request for urgent procedure.

I would now like to hear any reasons there are against the request for urgent procedure. If they are convincing and well-founded we are prepared to withdraw our request for urgent procedure without any ill-feeling and to pursue the matter at a different pace. For the moment, we consider it best to maintain the request for urgent procedure.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg to speak against the request for urgent procedure.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I do not think that I need waste much time suggesting to my colleagues that they do not grant urgency to this rather weird resolution. It answers itself, because urgency relates to something that is desperate and must be done straight away. One only has to look at this long string of paragraphs to see what I mean. For example, it uses phrases such as “once the procedure for ratifying”, and “Wishing a new plan for European union to be drawn up in 1989”. It kills its own argument for urgency.

If we were to accept what Mr. Pannella has said – that we are being pushed out – we at once admit that bodies other than Western European Union are competent to deal with defence. They are not. Very few governments want defence transferred to the European Parliament. We are the recognised body for defence matters. If that was not the view of all the governments, no one would have wasted time on the accession of Spain and Portugal.

Therefore, the argument kills itself, and I hope that we shall not waste any more time on this strange request for urgency. I hope that we shall vote it down or, if necessary, refer it to a committee, but no more than that.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Ahrens.

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the mere fact that Mr. Pannella did not find his speaking time long enough is in itself an indication of the difficulty of the problem referred to in this request. I do not consider it at all suitable for debate under the urgent procedure rule, and I would urge Mr. Pannella to withdraw his request and to agree that the matter concerned should be referred to the General Affairs Committee.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Soell, a member of the Bureau.

Mr. SOELL (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I agree with Mr. Ahrens's proposal. I suggest that the word “urgent” be deleted and that this subject be included in the already overdue report from the General Affairs Committee on the restructuring of the treaty governing Western European Union.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Can Mr. Pannella accept the compromise solution proposed by the Chairman of the General Affairs Committee, namely to refer the motion for a resolution to committee?

Mr. PANNELLA (*Italy*) (Translation). – First, let me reply to those colleagues arguing that the motion for a resolution is too complicated, which explains why I went over my speaking time, that they should read Rule 43 which the President is applying by analogy...

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Allow me to interrupt. Rule 43 deals with procedure and the speeches allowed under paragraph 3 are limited to five minutes by Rule 30 (7)...

Mr. PANNELLA (*Italy*) (Translation). – It is by analogy...

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Pannella, do you accept the compromise solution put forward by Mr. Ahrens, i.e. to refer your motion for a resolution to committee?

Mr. PANNELLA (*Italy*) (Translation). – Yes, and if you will allow me, Mr. President, I should like to say why. After consulting my colleagues with whom I tabled this motion, it seems clear to us that the representatives who have spoken saw no point in reading it. In our view the urgency is for us to get involved immediately in this process before 1989 and its deadlines come along. Our colleagues do not feel that urgency. We tabled this proposal in full awareness...

Mr. President, since yesterday the Office of the Clerk and its officials have been incredibly active and will be giving advice to those who are to speak. One would believe their very lives or jobs depended on it.

I accept the compromise by the Chairman of the General Affairs Committee that the motion for a resolution be referred to committee because we believe that we have, at all events, done our duty.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now consult the Assembly on the reference to Committee as proposed by Mr. Ahrens.

Are there any objections?...

The motion for a resolution is referred to the General Affairs Committee.

4. *Banning of demonstration flights at air shows*

(Motion for a resolution with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 1170)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the request for a debate under the urgent procedure on the motion for a resolution on the banning of demonstration flights at air shows, Document 1170, tabled by Mr. Büchner and others.

I call Mr. Büchner to support this request.

Mr. BÜCHNER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, on 28th August there was a terrible disaster at Ramstein. An aircraft crashed into the crowd during an aerobatic display. Seventy people were killed and over three hundred were badly or very badly injured. A considerable amount of material damage was done. This disaster has at least made it clear to many people that aerobatics and aerobatic displays are extremely dangerous, especially when they take place before hundreds of thousands of people.

This is the first time the WEU Assembly has sat since the disaster and it would be a very good thing for us to take this opportunity to deliver a clear opinion. Other parliaments have long since reacted. The European Parliament, for example, adopted a clearly worded resolution in September.

Preparations are currently being made for further air shows, and one of the questions being discussed in various countries is whether aerobatics, demonstrations of particularly difficult and risky manoeuvres, should be permitted in addition to exhibitions of flying equipment at these shows. I therefore feel there is an urgent need for us to say now that we do not want such displays, that we condemn them, that we are calling for a ban on all aerobatics in both the military and civil sectors, that we of WEU wish to make it clear that aerobatics has nothing to do with the military assignment, the training of soldiers in the air. It merely serves to satisfy the play instinct, the need to perform; it is a show, but it does not serve any military purpose, and it is extremely dangerous.

Mr. President, if we do not act now, further disasters are bound to happen. Let us therefore say as a matter of urgency: stop aerobatics; it is too dangerous; too much has happened already.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Wilkinson to speak against the request for urgent procedure.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – The Assembly may want the expert opinion of the Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-

ments, and I thought that it would also be convenient to give the view of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions. Of course, everyone has the greatest sympathy with the motivation behind Mr. Büchner's motion for a resolution on air shows. However, each manoeuvre at an air display ought to be properly cleared to ensure that if one of the participants makes an error, it involves no possible risk to the crowd – to the spectators – or to the neighbouring community.

What happened at Ramstein was deeply regrettable. It was the most horrendous tragedy that one could envisage but, in essence, it was avoidable. If the routines of the participants are properly rehearsed and all the manoeuvres in an air show cleared by the competent authorities, there is no reason why demonstration flights at air shows, either civil or military, should be banned.

Let us consider low flying in the course of military training. Such sorties are essential training to prepare the armed forces of our alliance for war but there should be no question of overflying heavy concentrations of population or sensitive places, such as schools or nuclear plants.

I sympathise with the motivation behind the resolution and believe that Mr. Büchner has done the Assembly a service by bringing these important matters to our attention but I do not think that it would be right for the Assembly to pass a resolution.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does the Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, or a representative of the committee, wish to speak?...

Mr. KITTELMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I fully appreciate that after the events in the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. Büchner is worried and has decided to raise this subject. But I believe we have settled the issue in the Federal Republic once and for all and that it is extremely difficult to discuss this subject here in an urgent debate. I would be prepared to have an expert discussion on it in the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments because, after what Mr. Wilkinson has said and given the situation in the various countries, I feel it will be difficult to consider the question straight away under the urgent procedure. Against the background of the German situation, I fully sympathise with Mr. Büchner's remarks.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does a representative of the Bureau of our Assembly wish to speak?...

I call Mr. Reddemann.

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I move that Mr. Büchner's request for urgent procedure

Mr. Reddemann (continued)

be referred to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, for the very simple reason that while no government will authorise or refuse to authorise an air display because of a decision taken by the Assembly of Western European Union, this motion gives us a great opportunity to draw up directives for all the member states of Western European Union. This is a matter for the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, and I therefore call on Mr. Büchner not to insist for propaganda reasons on a vote being taken immediately but rather to prepare the ground sensibly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does the author of the motion for a resolution accept the compromise proposed by Mr. Kittelmann in the name of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, or does he insist on retaining the urgent procedure for his resolution?

Mr. BÜCHNER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I cannot accept that, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall therefore proceed to the vote on the request for urgent procedure.

Under Rule 33 the Assembly votes by show of hands unless ten representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there ten members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The request for urgent procedure is not agreed to.

I call Mr. Klejdzinski.

Mr. KLEJDZINSKI (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, as we have now rejected the request for urgent procedure, I feel the question now to be decided is whether the motion tabled by Mr. Reddemann of the CDU should be referred to the proper committee for discussion and decision.

5. Banning of low-altitude military training flights

(Motion for a resolution, Doc. 1169)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is a motion for a resolution tabled by Mr. Büchner and others on the banning of low-altitude military training flights, Document 1169.

According to Rule 28 (4) of the Rules of Procedure, I call Mr. Büchner to present his motion for a resolution.

Mr. BÜCHNER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the future need for low-altitude flying has long been under discussion in many countries, and especially in the Federal Republic of Germany. It is a growing and intolerable nuisance to the public and it is also very dangerous, because many low-flying military aircraft have crashed in the past.

Quite a few experts now dispute the need for low flying as a defence measure. Radar detection methods have been developed which no longer sustain the theory that there is an urgent need for aircraft to fly low or very low indeed, to get below radar systems. So there are serious doubts about the military benefits of low flying.

Low flying over built-up areas is a great nuisance. On some days, especially when the weather is reasonable, low-altitude flights are such a frequent occurrence in some areas that people living there become distressed. Children, the elderly and the sick are particularly badly affected. Studies are also being made on a resultant increase in the incidence of illness.

I feel this subject should be discussed dispassionately by the appropriate committees of this Assembly. The fact that military aircraft fly low-altitude missions, which is extremely dangerous, particularly over populated areas, and the fact that public buildings, schools, hospitals, churches and even nuclear power stations have frequently been used as targets in aerial combat exercises, are in themselves extremely questionable.

I believe anyone who is in favour of meaningful defence must be in favour of ensuring that all measures taken to achieve it are actually justified, constantly reappraised, and constantly reconsidered in terms of the changing technical options.

Ladies and gentlemen, this question is often the subject of heated debate outside this Assembly. I believe we should also be debating it here in this Assembly, where we discuss defence questions. That is why I want to table this motion for a resolution. Its object is to ban low-altitude flying and air-combat exercises over populated areas and to permit low-altitude flying only when it is absolutely essential on grounds of defence, subject to sensible discussion on the nature of the flights and the areas over which they take place.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Jessel to speak against the motion.

Mr. JESSEL (*United Kingdom*). – If low-level flying by military aircraft over populated areas is to be referred to the appropriate committee, may

Mr. Jessel (continued)

I put it to the Assembly that the matter ought not to be considered in isolation and that we should also consider the wider problem of aircraft noise as it affects people living near major airports. Such people suffer as a result of flights, which at some airports number many hundreds a day, which overfly heavily populated areas. Aircraft noise, whether generated by civilian or military aircraft, is a serious problem and there is no reason for singling out low-level military flying at an even altitude and not considering civil aircraft taking off or landing at busy airports. That wider issue ought also to be considered.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Are you sure that you were the speaker opposing the motion, Mr. Jessel?

Mr. JESSEL (*United Kingdom*). – I am opposed to the motion unless Mr. Büchner is willing to widen it to include the problem of civil aircraft.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Perhaps I have not understood your position very well.

I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – There is no doubt that targets such as nuclear plants, hospitals, schools and places of worship are avoided by low-level military training exercises. Such exercises have to be cleared in advance. They are carefully planned. I agree that perhaps even stricter procedures ought to be worked out. That is happening in my country and, I am sure, in other alliance countries. The Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments went recently to Goose Bay in Labrador to see the training done by Canada. Such training is done over unpopulated parts of the alliance. It is done in Turkey, for example, and in northern Scotland and Wales. The deterrent effect of our air forces would be gravely inhibited if they were unable to do such training. The training is always extremely carefully controlled and done as far as possible over unpopulated areas.

I am glad that Mr. Büchner has raised this subject, but I do not believe that the motion deserves to be passed as a resolution.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Kittelmann, Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Mr. KITTELMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, what Mr. Büchner has said reflects the very heated debate that is going on in the Federal Republic of Germany, where both the Bundestag as a whole and the appropriate committees have looked at this subject very closely and arrived at decisions.

Presumably Mr. Büchner is also trying to conduct the debate that is going on in the Federal Republic with other member states, in order to establish whether they have similar problems and worries to ours. I regard this as a fundamental problem which should be discussed, in the wider sense suggested by other speakers, by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments under one of the next items on the agenda.

As this is not a request for urgent procedure, but a motion that any member of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments could have tabled at any time during the last few months – or when the committee met this morning for that matter – this subject should be discussed in the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. I am therefore in favour of the adoption of the motion taken in the wider context.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The Assembly will without doubt agree to include this resolution in the register.

Is there any opposition?...

It is so decided.

In accordance with Rule 16 of the Rules of Procedure, the motion for a resolution will be included in the register of the Assembly and will be referred by the Presidential Committee to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

6. Young people and defence – the rôle of parliaments

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and votes on the draft resolution and draft order, Doc. 1157 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations on young people and defence – the rôle of parliaments, and votes on the draft resolution and draft order, Document 1157 and amendments.

I call Mr. Shelton, Rapporteur of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations.

Mr. SHELTON (*United Kingdom*). – For some time now, members of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations have discussed among themselves the great importance of informing the younger generation on problems of security and defence in Europe with a view to securing their understanding and support of policies. For instance, I wonder how many youngsters know that our defence policies in Europe come under the democratic control of, among others, WEU?

This is underlined by the excellent report presented by Mr. Burger on public relations activities towards securing defence in the countries of Western Europe – a report adopted by this

Mr. Shelton (continued)

Assembly in December 1987. The purpose of the report that I have the honour to present today is to examine the rôle that parliaments, and especially our Assembly, can play in strengthening constructive dialogue with the young people of our countries.

One might say that WEU entirely abandoned that rôle in 1960, when it was decided that it should no longer have a social and cultural responsibility. Those responsibilities were transferred to the Council of Europe, to avoid duplication. That may have been right, but surely we will agree that it cannot be right that this Assembly should no longer have played a part in maintaining contact with the younger generation over the past decades.

Chapters II to V of the report highlight some of the problems. Naturally, our committee has continued its traditional activity, mainly in bringing the work of this Assembly to the attention of national parliaments and trying to persuade our colleagues there to follow up this work and bring it to the attention of their colleagues. Those activities are summarised in Chapter IV.

In my report, I write that, apart from efforts in the United Kingdom, Italy and Luxembourg in putting to their parliaments texts adopted last June by the Assembly, the impact of our work on member parliaments still leaves much to be desired. Since then, I have been informed that written questions have been tabled and debates have taken place in the Bundestag that mention WEU. That is very encouraging, and I am sure that we are grateful to our colleagues there. If more of our colleagues in the various national parliaments brought our work to their attention, we should have more impact.

Of course, we must accept that it is always difficult to approach youngsters about security and defence matters, but there are good reasons for trying. Alliances such as WEU must have public support in these security and defence matters. I believe that understanding leads to support and that it is right and proper to seek both. Surely we must have a strong interest in keeping in close touch with the younger generation, but, as I have said, neither the Council nor this Assembly has made any special effort to establish such a dialogue. For instance, I am told that in 1988 only two groups of youngsters will visit the Assembly to be briefed by officials and that the initiative came from the visitors themselves.

Surely we can also learn from other international bodies such as NATO, the Council of Europe and the European Community which have given far greater importance than we have to the involvement of young people. We must accept that national parliaments have before

them a wide range of issues, of which defence is only one; that is another good reason for WEU to take some responsibility in this matter.

However, we must be realistic and remember that WEU has other activities of great importance and that there are organisational and budgetary restraints. When I mention the budget, I call attention to the peace movements sponsored by some eastern bloc countries, especially among the young, and the vast sums that they must spend on organisation and promotion.

Consequently, the report describes initiatives such as hosting young visitors here at the seat of the Assembly, with audio-visual presentations, perhaps, of our work. NATO has scholarships for youngsters, and there is no reason why WEU should not have them. We should also consider the production of simple information leaflets in all official languages and organising colloquies, round tables and conferences with young people, as is done by NATO and the Bundestag.

Contact with the appropriate committees of the North Atlantic Assembly, the European Parliament and the Council of Europe should all be made now. In the draft resolution we make only a modest recommendation concerning visits by young people, but I very much hope and expect that the other matters mentioned in the report will be considered within the context of WEU's overall information policy. They fall more within that sector, and targeting the younger generation should be part and parcel of an information policy.

In this context we should all welcome the recent initiative taken by the President of the Assembly to re-examine the Assembly's policy on information in the Presidential Committee. I also welcome a useful document which I hope colleagues have seen, "General communications strategy", produced by our Press Counsellor. Some of the proposals are already under way.

Finally, I urge the Assembly to have a youth policy. Surely we should have such a policy, but we do not seem to have had one for twenty years or more. I also urge that the policy should have an important place in the deliberations of the Presidential Committee.

(Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Gale.

Mr. GALE (*United Kingdom*). – Let me start by congratulating Bill Shelton and the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations on drawing attention to a very important topic.

Paragraph 70 of the report, the final paragraph, says: "Apart from efforts made by several WEU Assembly members in the United Kingdom,

Mr. Gale (continued)

Luxembourg and Italy in putting questions to their governments on the basis of texts adopted by the Assembly, the impact of its work in member parliaments is still inadequate."

That is the understatement of the year. One informed source has said that the conclusion to be drawn from the report is that WEU and its rôle tend to be at the margin of information activities in national parliaments, and goes on to ask: "Is this really true?" The answer is no. It is not at the margin; it is in deep space.

It is probably more courteous for me to be self-critical than to criticise other countries whose representatives are present. Paragraph 34 of the report states: "In the United Kingdom, no general public relations work is carried out by the British Parliament. It does not have a budget or staff of civil servants for such activities."

As the select committees on foreign affairs and on defence regularly hold public hearings and publish up to a dozen reports, there is no lack of information on defence and security issues. Nevertheless, there is no special emphasis in schools programmes on those issues. I notice that the British Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence jointly produce excellent information packs entitled "Twenty questions on disarmament" and "Twenty questions on defence". I have searched through both documents, and there is not a single mention of WEU. That appears to be how seriously we take this organisation.

Why should that be so? Is it that young people are not at all interested? The terms of the Brussels Treaty, highlighted by Bill Shelton in paragraph 7, refer to "fundamental human rights" and to "the dignity and worth of the human person... principles of democracy, personal freedom and political liberty... the rule of law... maintaining international peace".

Those are all things that this organisation seeks to propagate, and that are of interest to young people. So why are we not promoting them harder? Why are we not taking them seriously?

Paragraph 27 states that WEU "is the only European parliamentary body empowered by treaty to discuss security and defence issues".

Yet, according to paragraph 29, "relations between young people and the Assembly are almost non-existent".

There is, of course, the responsibility delegated or transferred from WEU to the Council of Europe for dealing with these matters. In paragraphs 21 and 22 the report referred to the European Youth Centre. We learn of "a seminar held in Norway by the International Union of

socialist youth on 'Peace, disarmament and security in Europe'. The second was a meeting organised in Malta by the same organisation on 'nuclear-weapon-free areas in the Mediterranean basin'".

I suggest that the European Youth Centre, at least insofar as WEU is concerned, is not only doing its job but is doing someone else's for him.

Prior to the last meeting of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, I attended a seminar held at the European Youth Centre to discuss a variety of matters of specific interest to the young people of Europe. The eastern bloc fielded as their team the deputy leader of the Soviet delegation, four members of the Supreme Soviet, the second and third secretaries from the Soviet Embassy in Paris, the second secretary from the East German Embassy in Paris - I could go on. They had a team of advisers and youth representatives from most of the eastern bloc countries.

The eastern bloc is engaged in a "hearts and minds" operation to win the hearts and minds of the young people of Europe. As Bill Shelton said, they are putting a great deal of time and effort, money and commitment into peace movements. It is vital that defence issues are placed in context, particularly for young people. At present, the youth of Europe are probably led to believe that those of us who cannot even organise our own competent extradition of terrorists from countries some of which are represented here today are scarcely likely to be able to present them with a concise and understandable view of defence issues.

I suggest that to pursue the aims expressed in the report we need also to pursue - not only through WEU but through the Council of Europe and NATO - a joint effort to explain defence in context to young people. I do not think that that can or should be done by simply inviting very selective or select groups of young people to witness some of the perhaps more tedious debates in this chamber. I do believe, however, that by harnessing the energy of this organisation and of the Council of Europe and NATO, through proper presentation in the Youth Centre for the youth of Western Europe, it should be possible to put across properly the message and the context within which we work and which we seek to purvey. The Soviet Union and East Germany, and other countries behind the iron curtain, are spending time and money and taking trouble to put the message across. It is time that we woke up to reality.

Paragraph 48 asks: "How long can WEU, as the only European defence organisation, and its Assembly, the only European parliamentary body responsible for defence and security matters, manage without the necessary dialogue with young people on these matters?" We

Mr. Gale (continued)

cannot manage any longer. It is time that this organisation woke up. Resources are scarce: it is a question of priorities. I believe that we should be concentrating on young people. I believe that we have got the priorities wrong.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Hunt.

Mr. HUNT (*United Kingdom*). – Let me begin by adding to the congratulations already paid to my colleague, William Shelton, on this interesting and informative report. Those of us who are middle-aged or a little older – or, as the French would say, “d’un certain âge” – sometimes find it difficult to maintain any kind of meaningful dialogue with the younger generation; yet in the context of defence and security I believe that that dialogue is of the utmost importance if the continued freedom and democracy of our respective countries are to be assured.

Those of us who lived through the last war and experienced personally the traumatic events of those years sometimes find it difficult to appreciate that a whole new generation is growing up to whom the war is not a vivid personal experience but just another page in the history books. They have not seen, as we have, the terrible perils of being unprepared and undefended, of adopting a benign and complacent approach to any would-be aggressor. That is why I believe that the thrust of the report is so important, and why we have to inform our young people of the work of WEU and the democratic supervision of European defence and security which takes place in the Assembly and through our committees.

I am sure that young people, like the rest of us, welcome the recent move towards détente, but the perspective of the young is usually and understandably idealistic, tinged with the starry-eyed enthusiasm of youth.

We who are older must be more realistic and cautious. We must impress upon them that the new climate of glasnost and perestroika has been achieved only because of the determination of those of us in WEU and our wider allies to remain strong and united and not to yield to pressures for such things as unilateral disarmament. We welcome the thaw in East-West relations and fervently hope that it will be maintained and accelerated, but we must remain vigilant. I believe that the work of WEU is an important part of that process of vigilance and preparation.

As Mr. Shelton’s report demonstrates, relations between young people and our Assembly are at present almost non-existent. In paragraph 48 the report poses the highly relevant question – how long can WEU as the only European defence organisation and its Assembly, the only European parliamentary body responsible for

defence and security matters, manage without the necessary dialogue with young people on these matters? That is a very relevant question. As my colleague, Mr. Gale, has already reminded us, the eastern bloc never loses an opportunity to propagate its policies and philosophies among young people. No expense is spared in its relentless campaign of propaganda and persuasion. I fear that we in the West can never hope to match that level of expenditure, but let us at least make some attempt to counter their efforts.

If we are to begin to be effective, we shall have to convince our member governments of the need to devote more financial resources to this campaign of information and education for young people about WEU. In the meantime, it seems to me that WEU should be more actively associated with the meetings and seminars organised for young people within the framework of other bodies, such as the Council of Europe and the European Community.

Mr. Shelton’s report says that it would be unrealistic to wish WEU to have a say in establishing these annual programmes. But would it? Surely it is not unreasonable for the Council of Europe and the European Parliament to look to WEU for a specific input on any discussions that touch upon such matters as peace and disarmament. Frankly, it is ridiculous for us to go on operating in our watertight compartments. Our work in Europe is interrelated, and we should recognise that much closer co-operation in these seminars and meetings organised for young people is important.

In the longer term, this Assembly should budget for a greater involvement with young people. We should appoint a youth officer to give direction and purpose to our efforts, just as NATO has done. I believe, as the report recommends, that we should host groups of young visitors at the seat of the Assembly at least on a trial basis. I readily concede that our debates are not always of the most scintillating quality, but if the visits were combined with an audio-visual presentation, they could fulfil a useful purpose.

Those of us on the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations recently had the opportunity to visit SIRPA, the army information and public relations service, at the École Militaire here in Paris. We were shown a number of immensely impressive and professionally produced films that were an example of the sort of thing that WEU could and should be doing.

Mr. Shelton’s report refers to the collective determination of all our countries to fortify and preserve the common values in which we all believe. I fervently hope that, as a result of this report and debate, there will now be an equally strong collective determination to involve young people more closely with our work here and to persuade them that a policy of peace through strength through WEU is the best guarantee of a

Mr. Hunt (continued)

safe and secure future for themselves and their children.

The PRESIDENT. – It might help colleagues if they are aware of the order in which the remaining speakers will be called. After Mr. Hardy I shall call Mr. Stewart, Mr. Tummers, Mr. Jessel, and Mr. Burger.

I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – Both Mr. Gale and Mr. Hunt have offered their congratulations to the Rapporteur. Certainly, there is much within the report that commands interest and, perhaps, approval. However, there are also aspects that arouse hesitation and anxiety.

I am strongly in favour of both learning and enlightenment. I firmly believe that young people be encouraged to be aware of both historic and contemporary reality. I consider that a substantial share of our national resources should be devoted to education, which I regard as an essential investment. Therefore, I applaud any intelligent effort to enhance understanding among young people and, indeed, among the whole population, although I accept that the case for assistance to the young is of enormously higher priority.

However, I dislike the words that follow “understanding” in both the preamble and the recommendations, and I have tabled amendments to delete the words “and support”. I propose to refer in detail to the amendments in this speech to avoid having to make a significant and substantial contribution when the amendments are considered.

I take the view that if understanding is pursued and our case is good, support will follow. Only if the argument is flawed is conditioning essential. We are not selling soap powder or employing people skilled in commercial psychology to support the product. We are seeking to engender a mature consideration. Therefore, in my view, the case should rest with the enhancement of understanding. It would not be helpful to approach young people in the way that seems to be suggested by the inclusion and insistence of support within the recommendations. For that reason, I should like to see those two words taken out.

I can think of a case in my own constituency in relation to a current debate in the United Kingdom. One young man in my constituency from the far right of British politics has recently written to me to demand that, as his member of parliament, I should seek the absolute abolition of student grants so that there is a complete reliance upon parental support or 100% loans. He believes that students should be encouraged to stand entirely on their own feet and to act with independence.

Mr. JESSEL (*United Kingdom*). – Will my colleague give way?

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I do not know what the procedure is for giving way, but I do not think that we are allowed to do so.

That young man would probably be the first applicant to be included in a party to visit this Assembly. If he came, the students in my constituency who regret and deplore the current changes in the financing of students in the United Kingdom would be repelled. Such an arrangement would be very counter-productive. I do not think that it would be in the interests of Western Europe to engage in a counter-productive exercise. Therefore, we must be very careful indeed, especially in the United Kingdom, given the background of change in student finance, before we embark on such an approach.

You, Mr. President, will be aware that some of us within the Council of Europe have long supported co-operation. For years I have urged that a greater share of resources should be given to our young people so that they can co-operate within a wider Europe. For example, our young people should be in much closer cultural contact with their continental neighbours. I see no reason why the young musicians of Rotherham school orchestra should not play their instruments with young people in the European towns and cities where I have heard orchestras play when we have presented flags of honour for the Council of Europe. Such co-operation and the enhancement of understanding would be valuable but it would not necessarily be wise to say that we should bring young people to learn about WEU while we deny them the opportunity to play music and to engage in artistic and other wholesome activities together. Wisdom is essential.

Mr. Shelton rightly referred to the brainwashing exercises in which the Eastern European powers have been engaged from time to time. However, the fact that those powers have made themselves vulnerable to the charge of conditioning – of brainwashing – does not mean that we have to follow suit. I am aware that political extremists on the far left and far right are attached to the conditioning approach but the very basis of our democracies means that we should certainly abjure that line. Let us seek to ensure that our young people are given the opportunity to engage in mature consideration. By all means let us seek to promote understanding but let us be careful not to go too far. We should let our young people reach their own conclusions. By all means let us give them the arguments but let us show them that we are not in the business of applying the principle of selling soap to the defence of Western European freedom.

Mr. Hardy (continued)

I hope that this matter will be handled with great care. If it is not, the approach will prove counter-productive. I have placed on record my hesitation and tabled two identical amendments to the preamble to the draft texts. I have done so with considerable thought. I was reluctant to table the amendments as I recognise that Mr. Shelton has done a good deal of commendable work in preparing and presenting the report. I have not presented the amendments lightly. They are offered as serious advice and I trust that Mr. Shelton and the committee will consider them.

It would be foolish to devote resources to a purpose that subsequently proved to be counter-productive. We are not so rich in resources that we can afford to be generous in the treatment of our young people in one narrow way while appearing to act with deplorable meanness in others.

(Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Stewart.

Mr. STEWART (*United Kingdom*). – I join my colleagues in congratulating the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations – particularly its Rapporteur, Mr. Shelton – on an excellent and timely report. At this time of reactivation and enlargement of WEU it is right that we should seek to encourage among our young people a wider understanding of the work of WEU, particularly of the work of this Assembly, its democratic arm.

It is, of course, for the Rapporteur to give his committee's reaction to Mr. Hardy's amendments, but I entirely agree with Mr. Hardy about the need to be seen to be avoiding brainwashing, as that is not our business. On the other hand, we are not only in the business of seeking understanding. It is possible to understand something but wholly to oppose it. We are in the business of seeking support. Perhaps the most important point of the report is contained in paragraph 6: "Security matters should never be explained in an isolated way." If they are to be persuaded of the value of our work, young people will have to know what we are defending and what it is all about. We are talking not about the status quo or institutions but about a system of values. Those values have been set out in many places, particularly in the modified Brussels Treaty. We are talking about human rights, personal and political liberties and peace. The greatest danger is that our young people and successor generations will assume that those values are not under threat and that they may be taken for granted. That is not true. They are under threat, although the nature of that threat constantly changes.

What interests our young people? Like all of us, they are very worried about the environment in which they will live and in which they bring up their families. It is interesting to note that on 27th September, in a largely unreported speech to the United Nations, Mr. Shevardnadze referred to this matter. He asked that the United Nations environment programme should be turned into an environmental council with the job of taking "effective decisions to ensure ecological security".

What is ecological security? That was spelt out by Mr. Shevardnadze's deputy, Mr. V.F. Petrovsky, on 11th October:

"In the face of the global ecological threat, the paradigms of national security based on egotism and military, above all nuclear, deterrence require urgent revision... The arms race, above all nuclear, constitutes a most dangerous cause of the worsening of the natural balance."

Then came what some have called the punchline:

"We believe that the renunciation of certain military programmes, whether planned or undergoing, could be made use of to channel the released resources to establish an international régime of environmental security."

That means that we should stop spending money on weapons and spend it instead on protecting our environment. As a former United Kingdom Secretary of State for Defence, Mr. Michael Heseltine, said:

"We are seeing a well-thought-out, carefully-crafted attempt to hijack the environmental agenda. You do not have to be a cold war warrior to recognise that a new arena has been opened in which to fight some of the old battles."

We must constantly face such intellectual challenges. Many of our young people may respond to that challenge adversely unless we can get our argument across. That is a powerful and potent message. The report describes what our national parliaments are doing to inform our young people. With the exception of the Bundestag, the short answer is: "Not a lot". As Mr. Shelton said, WEU has paid no particular attention in the past to the need for dialogue with the young people of our member nations.

(Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The report says – Mr. Shelton reminded us of this earlier – that NATO, the European Community and the Council of Europe devote a substantial part of their activity to informing young people. There are organisational and financial problems associated with that, but we should

Mr. Stewart (continued)

accept the recommendation of a dialogue with young people. That issue should be given an important place in the Presidential Committee's further deliberations on the Assembly's information policy.

The suggestion that groups of young people should visit WEU for discussions here is dangerous. Peter Hardy was right when he said that it all depended on how young people were chosen and their motivation for coming. Where possible, we should use existing mechanisms. In his excellent speech yesterday, the Secretary-General drew attention to the work of Young Europeans for Security. Young people are not an undifferentiated group.

We all remember when we were young, although perhaps through rose-tinted spectacles. I do not recall being interested in Western European defence and the rôle of NATO and WEU when I was young – I had other priorities. No doubt that is not true for my colleagues, who spent most of their waking hours thinking about these matters when they were young. Most young people do not necessarily concern themselves with these issues. We must therefore seek broad understanding of our work and try to interest and involve young people who are personally interested in the issues in which we are involved.

Any programme must ensure that we include young people from all over our countries, not just those who happen to live in capital cities or cities in which the offices of major organisations are to be found. If we are to have a programme to enable young people to make a series of visits, why do we not start with an essay contest? That would ensure a better and wider perception of WEU.

The report identifies a challenge. There is no doubt that the Presidential Committee will consider its recommendations in detail and that we shall have another opportunity to discuss this subject. The challenge concerns opening a dialogue with our young people and maintaining it. It is a challenge for us all, not just in this Assembly but in our national parliaments and in our constituencies.

Mr. PANNELLA (*Italy*) (Translation). – On a point of order, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Pannella.

Mr. PANNELLA (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, a moment ago you read out a list of speakers in this debate and I note that my name was not among them. So I went to the Office of the Clerk, where I was told, most gracefully, that under Rule 30 representatives wishing to speak in a debate must enter their names “at the latest before the close of the sitting preceding the debate”. Noted.

Nevertheless, many colleagues, and in any case the regular attenders, will confirm that Presidents have always been and still are very flexible in their interpretation of paragraph 2 of Rule 30.

Mr. President, it is not, of course, part of a parliamentarian's job to discuss what officials do. However, everyone could see this morning that there was some Olympic Games sprinting to get to certain representatives and suggest what they should say...

The PRESIDENT. – Will you please make your point of order, Mr. Pannella.

Mr. PANNELLA (*Italy*) (Translation). – President Goerens told me that he would give me the floor under paragraph 2 of Rule 30, which stipulates that no other representative than those entered shall be called upon to speak “unless the President decides otherwise”. Read paragraph 2 of Rule 30.

I also note that a moment ago you moved up to President Goerens to convince him not to call me – which is perhaps why he again gave you the chair in his place.

I hope that in the future the Office of the Clerk will explain the Rules of Procedure to all Presidents, particularly the rule under which no other representative shall be called “unless the President decides otherwise”. This is fairly clear.

Conditions for parliamentarians from abroad are already very difficult. For the smooth-running of our work Presidents should not be too strict in interpreting the Rules of Procedure.

It would be wrong to ostracise certain members.

The PRESIDENT. – I am calling you to order for irrelevance, Mr. Pannella. I draw your attention to paragraph 4 of Rule 30. The rules are clear. In all the years during which I have been here, members have not challenged the chair. Paragraph 2 makes it clear that names have to be inscribed at the appropriate time. Your name, Mr. Pannella, was not inscribed yesterday – you said so yourself. The only way in which you may say something today is by way of explanation of vote.

I now call Mr. Tummens.

Mr. TUMMERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should like to say a few words about Mr. Shelton's report. I am grateful that this subject has been placed on the agenda of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations. I am also happy that the debate is taking place in the middle of this part-session and not at the end. Whenever the debate takes place at the end of a part-session, very little interest is shown, but I must say that interest in this debate at the

Mr. Tummers (continued)

moment is about the same as if it had come at the end of a part-session after all. The time set for the debate is therefore not the reason for the lack of interest. Clearly there is little interest in relations with the public and parliaments. I regret this and I believe the Chairman of the committee does too.

Mr. Shelton's report – paragraph 10 – broaches a very interesting subject for WEU. It mentions the time when the social and cultural responsibilities initially governed by the WEU treaty were transferred to the Council of Europe. The question remains as to whether we were completely relieved of responsibility for the substance of these matters after their transfer to the Council of Europe. The original treaties, which were clearly geared to the internal strengthening of the seven WEU countries against any threat to peace and security, very much needed these social and cultural aspects. How else can you gain a consensus among public opinion on the consolidation of non-military peace and security? We might suggest that WEU should ask the Council of Europe if it is tackling the activities transferred to it in a manner conducive to peace and security. The answer to this question is of great interest at the moment, especially in the light of Mr. Gale's and Mr. Hunt's comments on the East-West round table conference of young people organised by the Council of Europe a few months ago. I wonder if it is not unfair to put that kind of complexion on these talks.

The secretariats of the Council of Europe put some very careful thought into the composition of the groups who conducted the East-West debate. In my opinion, they actually had more facilities in this respect than WEU, so the conference was a success. The Council of Europe is very happy about it and has in fact been complimented on its success. But the compliments are not important: the point is that there is another verdict on these talks which differs from Mr. Hunt's and Mr. Gale's.

Mr. President, Mr. Hardy has said that we must be careful not to allow relations with young people and information on the importance of WEU to result in a kind of advertising campaign for the institution. I agree with that. This was no casual warning. Clearly, at the moment everything to do with young people and culture is being used for the benefit of public relations. The European Community in particular is very strong on this. To promote WEU, for example, people will want to involve young people, to indoctrinate them in these matters, where in reality there should be an open dialogue. The Council of Europe has handled this admirably. To indulge in a form of advertising for one institution in competition with other institutions is not right. It seems to me that young people are sensitive enough not to fall into that kind of trap.

There is much to be said for contacts with the Council of Europe and its Youth Centre. We must take advantage of the good relationship between the Council of Europe and WEU created by the work of the parliamentarians and our past history. If we do not have the know-how in this Assembly to deal with young people, we must use the know-how of the Council of Europe's Committee on Culture and Education and its Youth Centre.

Mr. President, I should like to add a practical point. The last time a booklet containing information on WEU was published was in 1986. In 1984, a motion for an order was adopted calling for a chronicle of WEU's third decade – 1974-84. There has been correspondence on this. I have here a letter dated 30th May 1985 from the then President, stating that to publicise WEU's third decade would cost too much. I have now discovered that two of the books in the popular French series *Que sais-je?* are devoted to European organisations, so how is it that the Bureau of this organisation has not taken any steps to chronicle and disseminate its own history? Should we not be approaching young people through education and explaining to them what WEU means?

The difference between WEU's treaties and NATO's must be made clear. NATO, an organisation that does not have a constitutionalised parliament, has committees working in the areas of culture and activities geared to young people. WEU, which does have a constitutionalised parliament, is not taking any real steps to use the opportunities available to it. We have transferred our tasks to the Council of Europe and yet we do not ask if it is performing them in a manner conducive to peace and security. Instead, we produce a report in which we complain how little is being done. I feel we must also search our own hearts. In recent years we have not pursued the initiatives that the Assembly has taken. They have been abandoned, on the pretext that there is no money, without any action being taken to follow up the decisions.

To conclude, I just want to say a few words about a topical matter that was discussed earlier this morning. I was surprised that the resolutions tabled by Mr. Büchner were referred to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. They concerned contacts with the public – disastrous contacts, unfortunately. Why were these resolutions not referred to the committee presenting this report? That would have been the right thing to do. I feel this is a symptom of the lack of insight into relations with the public. If Mr. Shelton's report helps in this respect we ought to welcome it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Jessel.

Mr. JESSEL (*United Kingdom*). – I join the general congratulations to Mr. Shelton on his excellent report and on the way in which he introduced it. The key passage is contained in the first sentence both of the draft resolution and of the draft order:

“Stressing the importance of obtaining young people’s understanding and support” –

I stress those words, “and support” –

“for Western European defence and security policy.”

That is vital. Young people should be asked positively to support the defence policies needed to keep our countries safe and free, above all in the interests of young people and of future generations.

I deplore the attempts by Mr. Hardy and others to undermine that concept by attempting to delete the word “support”, the concept of which is crucial. Defence is necessary and it needs to be effective. There is a political problem in that some – I repeat, some – young people dislike the very idea of defence. As Mr. Hunt said, a whole new generation is growing up starry-eyed and unrealistic about this matter – but that applies only to some young people and not to all. In a free democracy there is sometimes a need to lead public opinion, including that of young people, and not merely to follow it.

Positive support is needed. As Mr. Stewart said, we are not just in the business of seeking understanding. That does not go far enough. Support is needed so that we can continue resolutely to carry out what needs to be done. The question is how to obtain the positive support of young people. The answer is that, whether through this Assembly or through our national parliaments or the media, we must consistently put across certain simple truths.

There are seven basic propositions here. First, throughout human history, peoples have attacked one another. Not a year goes by without some warfare of international significance. It is a sad fact of human nature, and it would be arrogant to imagine that in our generation human nature has so much improved that we are immune to that risk.

Secondly, although individuals, when faced with a threat, can opt out of the protection of themselves and their families, governments and countries cannot do so. Defence has always been the prime duty of any country.

Thirdly, any defence must be effective. It cannot be cosmetic: we cannot just go through the motions. It has to work, and the best way is through a deterrent.

Fourthly, the concept of nuclear war is absolutely appalling, but we must get it across to young people that so, too, is the concept of con-

ventional war. Their revulsion at the idea of nuclear war is such that they almost seem at times to imagine that there is something relatively cosy or comfortable about a conventional war. We must dismiss that idea. In the second world war, between forty-one million and forty-two million people died violent deaths, apart from the six million murdered in concentration camps. It must be our strategy to deter a conventional as well as a nuclear war.

Fifthly, the policy of deterrence has been successful so far. In 1948, forty years ago, no one would have imagined that we would reach 1988 without a third world war. The policy of deterrence has worked.

Sixthly, the Russians, who have been the main perceived threat over the last forty years, still are. They have a vast superiority in conventional weapons, including between 400 and 500 submarines, which they continue to build. A one-sided nuclear disarmament would be desperately dangerous, because it would make it possible for the Russians simply to walk across free Europe under the shelter of their nuclear umbrella.

Seventhly, the recent conduct of Mr. Gorbachev and his rule of the Soviet Union could give rise to a dangerous complacency. No one knows how long Mr. Gorbachev will survive. For all we know, he could be out in two or three years, so in two or three years we could once again have a great need to persuade public opinion, including that of young people, of the need to uphold our defences. That need must be seen as continuing, and for that we need to prepare the ground now.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Burger.

Mr. BURGER (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Mr. President, colleagues, Mr. Shelton’s excellent report on the inadequate manner in which young people are informed about security and defence in Western Europe puts its finger on a weak spot.

The structural and financial resources for public relations and distribution of information are still lacking at all levels of our organisation. The result is that in the psychological war between East and West the East has the edge. The Soviets are excellent users of psychological techniques and they know that decisions, especially those of young people, are based on feelings and passions, rather than logic. They have learned the lessons of the Chinese general Sun Tse who, already in the year 600 BC, said: “The supreme art of war consists of beating the enemy without a fight”. Ridiculing traditions, sowing seeds of discord in people’s minds, setting the young against the not so young, spreading immorality and depravity by drugs and finally terrorism are a few examples.

Last Sunday, on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the declaration of human rights, I was surprised, in the television interviews in the

Mr. Burger (continued)

streets of Luxembourg, to see that in spite of events in Armenia barely 2% of people, including young people, questioned about violations of human rights named an East European country.

An opinion poll that I read, carried out by a West German newspaper, found that 60% of informants thought that, in armaments, NATO and the Warsaw Pact were on equal terms. Only 25% of young people still think – rightly or wrongly – that there could be a communist danger! The West has, it is true, enjoyed a period of considerable economic prosperity with phenomenal advances in science and technology, but we have at the same time gone a little too fast in scrapping all our moral, philosophical and spiritual safeguards and restraints, which is regrettable. This has allowed Soviet intimidation, propaganda and disinformation to poison the minds of our younger generation with “magic” but deceiving words like peace, détente, peaceful coexistence, disarmament, and so on. In the East, peace does not mean freedom, détente is designed to make us drop our guard, disarmament does not mean reducing the superiority of the East and peaceful coexistence has nothing to do with ending the ideological struggle that the East is waging.

If I have deliberately painted a black picture, it is to point out how difficult it will be for the West, and particularly for WEU, to contact and engage in dialogue with our young people and convince them that for our security and defence we cannot lower our guard still further with the balance of power as it now stands. Political and economic relations with the East may have appreciably improved, but reciprocal ministerial and presidential visits cannot yet replace the nuclear deterrent. Even if the present General Secretary, Mr. Gorbachev, gives the impression of a more peace-minded communist, there is no doubt that the peace movement has always had a communist hue, except for certain well-meaning idealists suffering from a kind of colour blindness.

I completely agree with the Rapporteur, Mr. Shelton, that we urgently need to inform our young people about the need for common defence of the WEU member countries and to ensure that when venturing into unknown territory they understand before becoming involved and collaborating. After the series of pacifist campaigns against nuclear weapons, against the deployment of Euromissiles and especially against military service, the truth must be re-established. We have to assess the threat and the counter-measures it calls for and we have to work out what resources these require.

Information is the foundation for the spirit of defence in a democracy, which is more vul-

nerable than a dictatorship. By what media? Just as the defence budget reflects a country's will to defend itself, funding plays the same rôle in information! Whilst television is the most effective, press and radio, and brochures, exhibitions, colloquies, courses and parliamentary speeches should all be used, as stated in Mr. Shelton's report.

It could also be useful to try to reach agreement between national education systems and national defence. If young people could be taught – before their military service – why such service is necessary, the atmosphere in the training units would be improved and the efficiency of the training itself would increase. The European community of defence will succeed if the standardisation of weapons – aircraft, tanks, guns – helps to overcome international rivalry by reasonable and responsible European industrial co-operation. History is full of examples of the military surprise.

Together then, colleagues, let us look for the structural and financial measures WEU needs to ensure that our young people are better prepared to hit back and win in the psychological and ideological war being waged by Eastern Europe.

It is my hope that the efforts made by the “special adviser” for communication with the media, and the projects of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations, not forgetting the initiatives by certain governments, will bear fruit, so that our young generations are not befooled by disinformation with, unfortunately, the co-operation of the western media.

I ask you to vote for the draft resolution and draft order proposed by Mr. Shelton.

The PRESIDENT. – The debate is closed.

I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. SHELTON (*United Kingdom*). – I am grateful for and pleased about the general level of understanding and support, apart from one instance, among my colleagues. I mention Mr. Gale's proposal for a joint effort between WEU, NATO and the Council of Europe. That is something that we should keep in mind.

Mr. Hunt said that we should have more resources. We should always have more resources. May we have them? He suggested the appointment of a youth officer. That again can be borne in mind.

Mr. Hardy gave his backing to the general thrust of the report. I believe that we shall discuss his amendments later, so perhaps I can reserve my comments on them until then.

My colleague, Mr. Stewart, made many interesting suggestions. Mr. Tummers put his finger on it when he said that there seemed to be a certain lack of interest in the subject in this Assembly. Perhaps the fault lies initially with

Mr. Shelton (continued)

ourselves. It is for us to understand, as those who have spoken have understood, that this is an important subject. We must move forward, but perhaps we can do so only if we all feel as those who have spoken feel.

I welcome Mr. Jessel's view that it is vital that we should have understanding and support. He gave us some interesting and simple truths that would attract votes if they were widely disseminated and understood.

Mr. Burger said that there was definitely a need for more information at all levels and that there was a woeful lack of understanding among the public. That is not the fault of the public, but rather the fault of those who perhaps have the duty to disseminate that information. Like several other speakers, he also referred to what has been done in the eastern bloc countries and to the amount of money and dedication involved. Mr. Gale also mentioned that forcefully. He referred to the conference that he had attended. We must bear that in mind when we decide how to take forward some of the recommendations in the report.

It is noted that those who have spoken feel deeply about this subject. I am grateful for their support.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Pontillon.

Mr. PONTILLON (*France*) (Translation). – I shall be brief because the essential has been said, and very well said, by the Rapporteur and other speakers.

We now have to assess and act upon the proposals that have been made. They are clearly part of a new, active information and public relations approach. It is now up to the Presidential Committee to see that this approach is given real effect, especially as it is also part of this Assembly's reactivation process, and the suggestions made a moment ago by our colleague Mr. Tummers regarding our relations with the Council of Europe should in my opinion be endorsed.

The problems raised in Mr. Shelton's report follow the line of thinking of the Council and the United Kingdom presidency which the Secretary General referred to yesterday when speaking about the colloquy on relations with the public which we shall be attending in London. In other words, the timing of this report is most opportune; it corresponds to a new awareness that we all feel.

As regards the political dimension of the problem, I would simply recall the words of the Minister of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, speaking yesterday in this chamber, i.e. that the change in East-West relations did not mean that the threats and therefore the need for defence no longer existed.

If there is one section of the population which needs to be convinced of this truth it is young people. We need, Mr. President and colleagues, to develop and maintain a form of security education for the new generation. This is the philosophy underlying the report presented on behalf of our committee by Mr. Shelton. I therefore hope it receives the approval and support of the Assembly and is finally adopted as a new criterion for our action in the future.

The PRESIDENT. – We shall now proceed to consider the draft resolution contained in Document 1157. Two amendments have been tabled by Mr. Hardy.

I call Mr. Hardy to support Amendment 1 which reads:

1. In paragraph (*i*) of the preamble to the draft resolution, leave out "and support".

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – You will recall, Mr. President, that I referred substantially to my amendments in my speech. I therefore do not propose to make a lengthy speech now. I offered the reasons for my amendments. I certainly accept that we should promote education and be in support of enlightenment. But in order to show that we are not in the process of conditioning or brainwashing, we should accept the proposal that understanding should be encouraged but conditioning abjured. I therefore move my amendments. The arguments have already been advanced. I trust that they will commend themselves to Mr. Shelton.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Mr. de Beer.

Mr. de BEER (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, although I understand why Mr. Hardy tabled the amendments, I nevertheless wish to oppose them. I do not believe this is a question of brainwashing. In the final analysis, we have defence in the West because we must defend our western values and democracies with weapons. I believe the public and young people can be asked to support this.

Furthermore, the resolution refers not only to understanding for European defence, but also to security policy. I do not think there can be any opposition to a request for support for European security policy, especially as it is now developing. I repeat, support certainly does not need to mean brainwashing. There is nothing evil in believing that we must defend our western values – even if it has to be done in this way.

The PRESIDENT. – Does the Chairman or Rapporteur wish to speak?

Mr. SHELTON (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. Hardy agrees with understanding but does not agree with support. As Mr. de Beer has just said,

Mr. Shelton (continued)

in no way is brainwashing or conditioning involved. That was not our intention. Even if it were, there is no way in which we would ever have enough money to do it.

I have never had the pleasure of attending one of Mr. Hardy's election meetings when he is standing for re-election in his constituency. However, I do not believe that on polling day he appeals to his electors to understand him but not to support him. Of course we look for understanding and support, just as he looks for those things, and in no way does he brainwash his constituents. Indeed, I would put the converse argument: it is right and proper to seek support for important policies in which this Assembly believes.

Had the word "support" not been included, that would have been understood, but now that it is included, should it be removed we would not wish the press to report the fact as it would be deeply misunderstood. I very much hope that my friend and colleague Mr. Hardy will withdraw his amendments.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I am deeply saddened by Mr. Shelton's response. He has requested me to withdraw the amendments. What astonished me about his comments...

The PRESIDENT. – Does Mr. Hardy propose to withdraw the amendment rather than make another speech?

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I am trying to make my mind up, if you will bear with me for a couple of minutes, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. – For ten seconds.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I was about to say that I would approach this matter in the same way as I approach an election meeting in my constituency. I present a powerful argument and leave the electorate to decide what to do. A substantial and increasing number vote for me without my having to operate like a soap powder salesman.

I simply express my deep regret that Mr. Shelton has not gone along with me, but has allied himself to the conditioning approach of Mr. de Beer. In sadness, and to avoid wasting the Assembly's time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – We understand and support Mr. Hardy's point of view.

Amendment 1 is withdrawn.

We now vote on the draft resolution contained in Document 1157.

Do ten members or more wish for a roll-call?...

They do not. The vote will therefore be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft resolution is adopted¹.

We now proceed to consider the draft order contained in Document 1157, to which Amendment 2 has been tabled by Mr. Hardy. It reads:

2. In paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft order, leave out "and support".

Mr. Hardy, do you wish to withdraw the amendment?

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – The withdrawal, after detailed and deep consideration, was intended to apply to both.

The PRESIDENT. – *Amendment 2 is withdrawn.*

We must all come and listen to you at election meetings.

We will now vote on the draft order contained in Document 1157.

Do ten members want a roll-call?...

They do not. The vote will therefore be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft order is agreed to².

I congratulate the committee on its document.

Mr. Pannella, I have promised you the right of explanation of vote.

Mr. PANNELLA (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, if we deserved the attention of the KGB it would probably be up to that body to supply the Assembly with what we are asking for with this decision. The KGB would certainly be interested in the participation of "a group of young visitors" – up to what age? – including journalists, to come to Paris for briefings, etc.

So this is how a parliamentary assembly, with its many members and its highly qualified staff interprets the needs of the perception of young people – how many tens of millions of them – of the problems of defence, security, life and survival. If someone working in a small private firm with a communication problem were asked to make a study and produced a document like this, I am sure his boss would sack him on the spot.

So today we have the temerity to approve a text stating that we must "make the necessary organisational and financial arrangements to allow members of the Assembly to invite at least once a year a group of young visitors, including

1. See page 21.

2. See page 22.

Mr. Pannella (continued)

journalists, to visit Paris for briefings at the seat of the Assembly...”! But obviously the KGB is also involved!

Mr. President, you asked who was for and who was against the draft a little too quickly. As I was following the French interpretation, I raised my hand and, probably as a result of a mistranslation you took it that I had abstained, whereas I wanted to vote against.

Thus, we are inviting the Presidential Committee “to include the organisational and financial implications of enhancing the Assembly’s dialogue with young people in its further deliberations on a new information policy for the Assembly” – what does that mean? It is not even political jargon; in a small business anyone proposing such a text would be dismissed. And young people are young up to what age? Forty? Sixty?

Is this a document worthy of an Assembly like ours? Have we been working for a whole year, holding committee meetings and travelling about, only to come up with this sort of thing in public session?

I shall speak as loud as I like. If all you want to do is sleep, find a bedroom! Here we can speak as loudly as we like. Raise your voices a little, ladies and gentlemen, aim a little higher! Otherwise European defence will soon not even need to go outside this chamber to find its enemies.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – One more minute, Mr. Pannella.

Mr. PANNELLA (*Italy*) (Translation). – Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, I did not know you as President, but I find this very interesting, because while the President calls me to order, you have been trying to interrupt me the whole time. Then, rather than applying Rule 30 with the customary tolerance, he decided to apply it very strictly.

Mind you, Mr. President, I am glad you did not record my vote against. Now, you can take pride in the unanimous adoption of a resolution whose intellectual, strategic and technical level is on a par with that of this Assembly. Congratulations. I suggest that you present it to your electors as an example of what you are proposing for Europe to win over young people; if the debates are like this, they will all flock to Paris at their own expense and queue up to listen and clap.

I wish you much enjoyment, Mr. President, if you go on like this. From now on you can rest assured that when you are in the chair I shall no longer disturb you.

The PRESIDENT. – I am most grateful to you for your comments, Mr. Pannella.

I now call Mr. Reddemann.

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I feel we have just seen how true it is that those who shout loudest are not necessarily right.

Mr. PANNELLA (*Italy*) (Translation). – I agree.

7. Defence industry in Spain and Portugal

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Doc. 1161)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on the defence industry in Spain and Portugal, Document 1161.

I call Mr. Wilkinson, Chairman and Rapporteur.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – After the melodrama and histrionics at the end of the previous debate, I shall try to inject a small, still note of reason into our proceedings.

It is genuinely a privilege to be able to present this report on the defence industries of Spain and Portugal, which was passed unanimously by the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions. The report follows a visit that our committee made to Spain and Portugal in early September this year, when we met leading industrial representatives from the SENER aeroengines and systems company in Bilbao, the CASA aerospace company in Seville, the INISEL avionic and radar company of Madrid and the OGMA Portuguese air force maintenance facility. We also met the national armaments directors of both countries, members of parliament from both parliaments, the Foreign Minister of Spain and the State Secretary of Defence of Portugal. We were accorded every facility and great hospitality wherever we went and I am glad to express my committee’s warmest appreciation and thanks to our Spanish and Portuguese colleagues and hosts.

The report is timely as it comes soon after the acceptance by the Ministerial Council of WEU of the requests made by Spain and Portugal for accession to our organisation. It also comes soon after the Ministerial Council meeting of the IEPG. In the course of his important remarks to our Assembly yesterday, the French Minister of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Dumas, said that he envisaged an important rôle for WEU in naval affairs, space policy and armaments collaboration. Spain and Portugal are, to a greater or lesser extent, involved in all three and, as the report makes clear, they can make a major contribution to the strengthening of the defence industrial base of our alliance.

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

It is clear that the incoming United States administration will face considerable congressional and public pressure to curb American defence spending to reduce the United States budget deficit and, to some extent, its balance of payments deficit. Our American friends will need to be convinced that we Europeans are assuming a fair share of the risks, rôles and responsibilities of our common defence.

The accession of Spain and Portugal to WEU and the strengthened political commitment to joint Western European security, which adherence to the modified Brussels Treaty and acceptance of The Hague platform entail, can only reassure our American allies. On the other hand, all of us in Western Europe will need to secure better value, in terms of enhanced defence capability, from our defence budgets.

In an ideal world, until such time as East-West relations lead to a balance of power between the Warsaw Pact and NATO at a lower level of forces, we should like defence budgets in the western alliance at least to keep pace with inflation. As that is unlikely and as historically the cost of new weapons has always run ahead of inflation, measures to get better value for money in equipment procurement are especially crucial. That is why our committee takes such a keen interest in the work of the IEPG. We believe that if the IEPG is to realise its full potential, it should not – as now – operate in a political vacuum. It should benefit from the informed backing of members of this Assembly, who can undoubtedly influence their national parliaments and governments to make the policies which will support the work of the IEPG. I do not understand why, as yet, there has not been instituted a formal mechanism to brief at least the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions or the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on the working of the IEPG.

At our committee's symposium in London in March this year on collaboration on military research in Europe, we recommended measures which were in line with the proposals of the report entitled "Towards a stronger Europe" presented by the Netherlands State Secretary, Mr. Vredeling, to the IEPG ministerial meeting in Seville in July last year. It was heartening to see some of those ideas taken up by the IEPG at its ministerial meeting in Luxembourg on 9th November.

At Luxembourg, ministers approved an action plan for a step-by-step approach to the creation of an open European armament market. They also gave instructions for the implementation of procedures which will stimulate border-crossing competition for both procurement and main-

tenance contracts. I believe that that will undoubtedly help Spain and Portugal. Ministers also suggested that there would be promulgation of national requirements in an agreed format to establish a recording system for cross-border contracts.

Ministers stressed that defence activities in Europe should be better co-ordinated and managed to provide for the fullest exploitation of funds and available talents. France was invited to chair a new IEPG panel charged with the development of a new European technology programme. That is very important for Spain and Portugal.

A technology transfer information system will be established to avoid duplication of effort and to ensure that the latest developments in technology are available to countries such as Spain and Portugal, which are in the process of modernising their defence industries.

Ministers reaffirmed their view that the establishment of a European defence equipment market would benefit countries with less-developed industries in the long term. They recognised that it might be necessary to concede to such countries special transition periods for the opening of their borders. I am especially pleased about that. Ministers also recalled the need to continue direct defence and equipment aid to LDDI – less-developed defence industries – countries. The ministers of non-LDDI countries will instruct their procurement agencies to give full scope to companies from LDDI countries to participate in procurement competition. LDDI countries will develop firm proposals for the most suitable means by which they can participate in research and technology programmes and obtain access to the latest defence technology. Our Spanish and Portuguese hosts stressed how important that was to them.

You will recall, Mr. President, that our symposium in London called for the establishment of a small permanent secretariat to provide continuous administrative support and a corpus of specialist expertise. The secretariat will assist with the implementation of measures relating to the creation of a European defence equipment market. I am glad to see that rationalisation is to occur in the IEPG and that the panels responsible for harmonisation of requirements and for equipment co-operation are to be merged. Moreover, one of the countries which, like Spain and Portugal, may ultimately apply for membership of WEU – Norway – is to chair the panel.

Our work in our symposium in March is bearing fruit. I am glad that that work is appreciated by the IEPG. I am pleased that my own country, which is currently chairing the Ministerial Council of WEU, is to assume the IEPG

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

chair from 1st January 1989, following the excellent work done by Spain, and that two years beyond that, an LDDI country, Turkey, which could ultimately also apply for membership of WEU and which has taken an interest in our proceedings, will be offered the opportunity to succeed the United Kingdom in the chair of the IEPG.

The report describes the organisation of Spanish defence industries and notes that 70% are controlled by the Spanish state holding company, INI. About 100 000 people are employed in those industries, which in recent years have exported about 50% of their production.

The report reviews each industrial sector and concludes that Spain produces relatively cheap, reliable equipment, but that at this stage the production is perhaps somewhat less sophisticated than that of Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom, and that, for understandable reasons, Spain has concentrated on developing its market overseas in a number of third world countries. However, the growth of competition from indigenous sources of supply in the third world must lead Spain, I think, to reassess the long-term future of this policy.

Very much to its credit, Spain is keen to improve the level of its technology in defence. It is investing heavily in military research and development and is participating in a thoroughly positive way in a number of collaborative programmes. The European fighter aircraft is a case in point. The three other partner nations were particularly glad when the Spanish Government ratified its participation in that very important European venture.

As for Portugal, until recently, the Portuguese armaments industry has been legally limited to state ownership, and it has had a relatively limited output. The report goes into the challenges which will be encountered in raising the level of Portuguese defence technology, and appreciates the budgetary constraints and the needs for technological enhancement that face Portugal. Portugal is one of the LDDI countries whose particular problems were outlined in Mr. Vredeling's report. As I said, I am especially pleased that the Luxembourg ministerial council is addressing itself to the problems and requirements of LDDI nations such as Portugal.

The report refers to OGMA, the maintenance facility of the Portuguese air force, which we visited. I was greatly impressed by it. The concept of an air force maintenance facility that is operated commercially and takes in work from the civil sector and other air forces has a great deal to commend it. I am very glad that a team from the Ministry of Defence in the United

Kingdom will be visiting OGMA later this month to assess the organisation's capabilities.

I believe that this report's recommendations, which were unanimously passed by the committee, should find favour not only with our Portuguese and Spanish friends, but with the Assembly as a whole. Undoubtedly, to quote the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe: "The decision to invite Portugal and Spain to join WEU is further evidence of the organisation's successful revitalisation." As he said, it is heartening that you are now joining us in the pursuit of our twin goals – the development of a more coherent European defence identity and to make a more effective European contribution to our common security within the alliance. I am sure that the defence industries of Spain and Portugal will play an important part in this process.

(Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is open.

I call Mr. Klejdzinski.

Mr. KLEJDZINSKI (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, we are used to the reports Mr. Wilkinson submits being highly professional. The report he has now submitted has the added advantage of having been unanimously adopted by all the members of the committee.

All the various points he has referred to – collaborative development and production, joint maintenance, the reference to the obligation to work together, and to enhanced industrial co-operation – are important steps, especially when it is realised how much money and how much intelligence are now tied up in the defence industry and – it should be remembered – are not available for other important areas of development.

I am also well aware that the reference to the participation of others, the reference to the fact that development has still to take place in Spain and Portugal, means an opening for many people working in this sector, and that many people are already thinking of this as the business of the future.

All I can say about Mr. Wilkinson's view that standardisation must be the magic word in Western European Union is this: I hear the message, but I lack the faith.

I am also aware – I want to emphasise this; it does not come out clearly in your report, so I shall be making a few critical remarks about the report – and, like you, I know that the research and development work of the "military-technological complex" is increasingly deter-

Mr. Klejdzinski (continued)

mining the course of the industrialised nations of Western Europe, and that it is by no means easy to make a distinction between a military and a comparable civil advance, because many of the areas we are working in today are open to both military and civil use.

I do not want to discuss the spin-off effect in this context, because that is a highly contentious issue. But one thing is certain: we need third generation computers for both the military and civil sectors.

We cannot yet grasp in detail the opportunities arising in the fields of telecommunication and means of communication – glassfibre technology, for instance. But my major anxiety – and I want to say this, despite my positive attitude towards this report – is that the military-technological complex is increasingly dominating our industrial world in Western Europe. Critics and advocates feel we should counter-balance the United States. This may well be right, but I think it would mean our taking on too much. In the economic triangle of Asia, America and Europe, the European market is undoubtedly significant. It is certainly worthwhile encouraging any efforts in the sense of joint activity.

However, we must not produce additional armaments and weapons simply because this military-technological complex exists. It must still be possible for us to disarm and control armaments. Disarmament and arms control must continue to be our top priority.

So when we talk about the development of a defence industry and defence technology, I feel we should place equal or greater emphasis on the fact that disarmament and arms control have priority in our eyes, and that we want to be able to use the capital and intelligence potential that is concentrated in this industry for worthwhile civil production lines as well.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does the Rapporteur wish to speak again?

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – The debate has been distinguished by the typically well-informed contribution of my colleague Mr. Klejdzinski from Germany. I do not dissent from the motivation of his remarks, but in practical terms I think that the report's proposals make good sense.

In my speech at the beginning of the debate I stressed that until an improved East-West relationship led to arms reductions at a lower level we should have to obtain better value from other joint defence projects. Pressure in that direction

would be heightened by the fact that our American allies would be likely to impose reductions in their own defence budgets to reduce the size of their budget and balance of payments deficits.

Clearly, to obtain better value for money for our common security in Europe it is necessary to obtain the benefits of economies of scale and more rational production, which standardisation and collaboration can entail. As our Spanish and Portuguese friends have so much to offer in terms of industrial and technical capacity and the desire to enhance the sophistication and technological capacity of their industrial base, it must make sense to encourage the positive steps that they are taking in that direction.

It should also not be forgotten that those countries are already active in important civilian matters. Neither is neglecting its computer industries, to take one example, and Spain is an active participant in the civilian Airbus programme and the civil space programmes under the aegis of the European Space Agency. I therefore do not see the incompatibility to which Mr. Klejdzinski referred. As he observed, there is clearly also a spin-off between military expenditures in industry and technological advance throughout the industry as a whole.

No one would wish the military-industrial complex to dominate European industry, or in any sense to dominate the research programmes of European nations. There must be a balance, and I feel that the report is balanced. As I said at the outset, I think that, having been passed unanimously by the relevant committee and addressing itself as it does to the important interests of our newly joined friends from Spain and Portugal, the report deserves to be passed.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is adjourned.

8. Changes in the membership of committees

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The Assembly must decide on the changes in the membership of committees requested by several delegations.

These changes have been published in Notice No. 7 which has been distributed.

All these changes are subject to ratification by the Assembly in accordance with Rule 38, paragraph 6, of the Rules of Procedure.

Are there any objections to these changes?...

These changes are agreed to.

**9. Date, time and orders of the day
of the next sitting**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Defence industry in Spain and Portugal (Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1161).
2. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1989 (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, Document 1154 and addendum).

3. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1987 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the motion to approve the final accounts, Document 1152 and addendum).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 12.35 p.m.)

NINTH SITTING

Tuesday, 6th December 1988

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. Defence industry in Spain and Portugal (*Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1161*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Pannella.
4. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1989 (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft budget, Doc. 1154 and addendum*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Linster (Chairman and Rapporteur), Mr. Morris, Mr. Pannella, Mr. Linster.
5. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1987 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts (*Presentation of the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the motion to approve the final accounts, Doc. 1152 and addendum*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Linster (Chairman and Rapporteur).
6. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

3. Defence industry in Spain and Portugal

(Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1161)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on the defence

industry in Spain and Portugal and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1161.

In the debate I now call Mr. Pannella, the last speaker on the list.

Mr. PANNELLA (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I will not take the floor now as I am also down to speak in the debate on the draft budget.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – That being the case, the debate is closed.

Does the Rapporteur wish to speak again?

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*) (Translation). – No, Mr. President, I have nothing to add.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now proceed to vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1161.

Under Rule 33, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless five representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft recommendation is adopted¹.

1. See page 25.

1. See page 26.

4. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1989

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft budget, Doc. 1154 and addendum)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration on the draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1989 and vote on the draft budget, Document 1154 and addendum.

I call Mr. Linster, Chairman and Rapporteur of the committee.

Mr. LINSTER (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – I have pleasure in presenting on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration the report on the draft budget for the financial year 1989. For the moment the budget presents no problem. These two expressions require a word of explanation.

In the first place, the budget presents no problem as the Council of Ministers has approved the Assembly's budget proposals with only a very slight reduction which, it was agreed, would have little or no effect on the operation of our Assembly.

It also presents no problem in that, thanks to the new financial autonomy which we secured in Luxembourg and which was embodied yesterday morning in the new financial regulations we adopted at Sir Geoffrey Finsberg's suggestion, we are entitled to make transfers between Heads II to V.

Lastly, there is no problem because the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration adopted the draft budget unanimously.

I use the phrase "for the moment", however, for the simple reason that the draft budget before you takes no account of the financial effects of the accession of Spain and Portugal. We shall therefore have to have a supplementary budget.

You can well imagine that the scale of this supplementary budget will be considerable, especially in its extraordinary part, since major investment and many changes to this building will be needed. It will also be considerable in the ordinary operating budget because there will be repercussions year after year. I will not dwell on this subject, which we will have other opportunities of discussing.

The draft budget for 1989, as presented to you, encompasses the new posts and new expenditures such as those relating to pensions, which

were adopted with the 1988 supplementary budget approved yesterday following Sir Geoffrey Finsberg's report.

With regard to the figures, I would remind you that any comparison between 1988 and 1989 must allow for the fact that the initial budget for 1988 has been increased by the supplementary budget adopted yesterday.

Mr. President, I shall not subject the Assembly to a mass of figures, as I am convinced that all members have very carefully studied the budget document and know practically by heart all the figures it contains. The budget we originally proposed totalled 8 306 000 French francs. The Council of Ministers decided to reduce it by 336 000 French francs, so the budget under discussion today comes to about 8 000 000 French francs.

The Presidential Committee and the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration have suggested a distribution of the reduction laid down by the Council of Ministers that is slightly more favourable to the operation of this Assembly than the breakdown proposed by the Council of Ministers. The total budget is not, of course, 8 000 000 but almost 20 000 000 French francs. The figures I have just quoted relate only to the operating budget.

The reduction has been split up as follows by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration. First, a sum of 83 000 French francs has been taken from budget Head II, temporary staff, leaving 3 000 000 French francs. We agreed with the Presidential Committee that the 500 000 French francs earmarked for interpreting should be retained. This service is essential to the work of the various committees, and it is therefore important that the estimate should not be reduced.

We have made a reduction of about 92 000 French francs under budget Head III, expenditure on premises and equipment, so that the total here is now 1 350 000 French francs. Major changes will have to be made under this head in the supplementary budget that we shall be submitting to you.

We have also made a reduction of 160 000 French francs in Head IV covering general administrative costs. The total now is just under 2 000 000 French francs, the reduction relating to printing and publishing costs. The Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration took the view that the new equipment – word processors, etc. – should enable us to meet our publication requirements without difficulty.

Turning now to Head V, other expenditure, which the Council wanted to cut, the Presidential Committee and the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration decided not to do so.

Mr. Linster (continued)

Thanks to our new autonomy, which enables us to make transfers between budget heads, we have retained the original total.

I now have to tell the Assembly of four decisions taken by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and the Presidential Committee in order to guarantee the smooth operation of the Assembly and increase the impact of our work outside this forum. In the first place, we have increased the estimates for interpreting services directly concerned with the running of committee meetings by 50% over the 1988 budget plus supplementary budget total.

In the same spirit we have kept the realistic figure of 400 000 French francs for the travelling expenses of members of the Office of the Clerk attending committee meetings away from Paris. The committee has already suggested to the President and the Presidential Committee that, should the amount of 400 000 French francs be exceeded because of unforeseen journeys from the capital, any savings made on other items should be allocated to travel and interpreting costs for committee meetings away from Paris. In this connection I wish to draw attention to a point which has often been raised in our committee. We consider it essential that such meetings be planned carefully and well in advance, if possible before the preparation of the budget for the following financial year, and announced and prepared by the Presidential Committee. A detailed budget should also be drawn up for meetings held away from Paris so that in future expenditures overshooting the estimates under Sub-Head 27 of Head V cease to require continual debate.

Lastly, we have provided an additional 90 000 French francs under Sub-Head 29, expenditure on information, to enable the Press and External Relations Service to improve the provision of information for the general public. This need has always been emphasised in this forum, and we are glad that the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, having been able to make some savings, should be able to offer this increase to the Assembly.

I know that the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations has before it two important documents aimed at an improved public relations strategy. The 1990 budget will give us another opportunity to discuss this Sub-Head 29 of Head V.

We have slightly increased the estimates under Sub-Head 30, which covers the expenses for political groups. I mention this increase not so much in my position as Rapporteur of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration but rather as Treasurer of one of the political groups, on whose behalf I am sure I can speak, as it is perfectly reasonable that the good order of

their accounts should be properly verified. That said, however, it also seems quite reasonable that, once these amounts have been allocated to the political groups, they should be able to decide freely how the sums in question should be used, and if in the course of a financial year or years covering, say, a decade, reserves are built up – the treasurers and chairmen of the political groups share this view – these sums should remain at their disposal and not be open to question by anyone, including governments.

To conclude, the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration invites the Assembly to approve the budget submitted to it incorporating the slight changes made by the Council, the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and the Presidential Committee.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Linster, the neutrality of my office prevents me from offering you my sincere congratulations.

In the debate I call Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS (*United Kingdom*). – I congratulate the Chairman of our committee and would like also to congratulate his predecessor, Sir Dudley Smith.

Not long ago, we had hanging around our necks the awful problem of pensions. Whatever we did, we found that the pension budget increased each year. It took an ever larger amount of the money available to us. Appendix VII of the budget Document 1154 shows what has happened to the pensions budget. Only in 1985 the pensions budget was 300 000 French francs, whereas it is estimated to be 2.5 million French francs in the forthcoming year. That gives some idea of the increase and it shows why the committee and the Assembly were justified in making strong representations to the Council of Ministers suggesting that pensions should be extracted from the Assembly's budget. We have now achieved that, but the Secretary-General's budget does not exclude pensions, so presumably it still suffers as ours used to.

It is nice to know that, at last, and again after years of lobbying, we have managed to get additional posts which match the expansion of WEU, which was relaunched so actively a few years ago.

Our Chairman mentioned the Council of Ministers' proposed reduction of merely 336 000 French francs. It is remarkable that, in this day and age, seemingly busy, and presumably extremely senior, people want to interfere in the details of our budget and to suggest amendments under various headings. I would have thought that, if the Council of Ministers wants to reduce our budget, it should set a figure by which it should be reduced and it should be left to the

Mr. Morris (continued)

Presidential and Budget Committees to argue about which headings should bear those reductions.

It will not be long before we have to consider the revenue budget. The proposed budget of 135 000 French francs is modest for an organisation which is attempting to communicate with a significant chunk of Western Europe. We should consider the revenue side in the forthcoming year and see how we can improve it. We are moving into an era of expansion, which is welcome, with the accession of Portugal and Spain. I am sure that the Chairman of our committee agrees that we should be failing in our duty if we did not make it clear to the Assembly and, through it, to the Council of Ministers that it is not possible to accept the membership of two important countries and expect there to be no effect on the budget.

Three areas of expenditure will have to be increased significantly. One has only to look around the hemicycle to realise that we need capital expenditure to accommodate the new delegates. It is no good anyone believing that it can be done within the existing building as it now is; it cannot. If the expansion of WEU is to mean something significant, it is important that we prepare plans at an early stage for these capital changes.

There will also be extra costs – Mr. Linster was right to emphasise this – in that transition period when delegates from Spain and Portugal join us. They will be one-off transition costs and should be recognised as such, with a special budget set aside.

Finally, there will of course be the continuing costs of such a significant increase in our membership. Again, I hope that the Council of Ministers recognises that.

The Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration works well and I thank Mr. Linster for his chairmanship. We have made progress in the past year. I certainly very much support the draft recommendations.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Pannella.

Mr. PANNELLA (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, we have this year at last achieved a degree of independence and inter-institutional dialogue which emphasises more clearly than ever the excellence of the work done by the Chairman and members of the committee. I join you and my other colleagues in welcoming this development.

I wish to add only a few brief remarks. I wonder for instance whether the pace at which we and our officials are able to work might not

be increased by installing a telefax, which would enable documents to be transmitted more quickly.

We should not, I think, deceive ourselves about the possibility of greater impact on the mass media. We could, I suppose, try to get Ilona Staller to come occasionally; given the cultural level of the media that might get us some publicity.

I am sure the problem should be tackled differently. Could we not build up our staffs and increase our operating expenses and get more out of our trips and meetings? We could, for instance, bring back more verbatim reports of our meetings than in the past. The suspicion is sometimes aroused that our trips are prompted merely by the desire for a change of scene or a little tourism, but this is wrong. If we made an effort to bring back more documents from these journeys and involved some additional members of staff, the result would probably be very beneficial.

It would also enable us to provide the media with more information, not “scoops” but relatively important facts about the activities of our committees and delegations.

These, as you can see, are very broad suggestions, thinking aloud, minor proposals of a technical nature. They are also, however, some ideas on ways in which we could get more value out of the discussions we hold and the knowledge we acquire on our trips by producing more reports. These would not only benefit our own institutions, through the excellent assessment work done thereafter by committees and rapporteurs, they would also enrich our store of data thanks to the capabilities of information technology. The documentation built up during our outside activities would provide an original source for the mass media and all those wishing to study our activities – modest perhaps, but not to be found anywhere else.

I am therefore very much in favour of the adoption of this report. I am encouraged by the fact that an amendment I suggested last year, again somewhat off-the-cuff, did not arouse the reaction I unfortunately met with this morning. It has even been incorporated practically word for word in the preamble to the new regulations.

I again express my regret at the lack of confidence shown this morning in myself and the other ten parliamentarians who wished to avert the danger of seeing the life of our Assembly mortgaged by decisions arrived at elsewhere. As in the case of the financial regulations, we wanted to create the possibility of dialogue between our Assembly, WEU and the other European institutions. It would be the only guar-

Mr. Pannella (continued)

antee of permanence, continuity and coherence we could set in place in these admittedly rather difficult historical circumstances.

At your suggestion, Mr. President, this has been referred to committee. I hope that a re-reading of the proposal will enable us to work together and make for the better use of our structures in progressing towards our objectives.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

I call the Chairman and Rapporteur.

Mr. LINSTER (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – I thank the two speakers for their kind words which I would like to share with the members of the Office of the Clerk who advised me in my task.

I join Mr. Morris in his view that it would be a great pity were the financial impact of the accession of Portugal and Spain – which we have all repeatedly advocated and now welcome – to imply a reduction of the Assembly's budget and hence of our operating resources. It would therefore appear essential for the Council of Ministers to recognise that the new costs be seen as additional to those already allowed for.

Mr. Pannella's suggestion that our Assembly be provided with what might be termed "a better memory" and improved documentation deserves study and consideration. I believe that links already exist between the libraries of the various national parliaments and the very extensive library of the European Parliament. How could we connect into this network, which would undoubtedly greatly benefit our member's research and documentary work?

Beyond that, I have nothing to add, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now proceed to vote on the draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1989.

Under Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless a roll-call vote is asked for by ten representatives or substitutes present in the chamber.

Are there ten members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. We shall therefore vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1989 is agreed to.

5. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1987 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts

(Presentation of the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the motion to approve the final accounts, Doc. 1152 and addendum)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration on the accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1987 – the auditor's report and vote on the motion to approve the final accounts, Document 1152 and addendum.

I call Mr. Linster, Chairman and Rapporteur.

Mr. LINSTER (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – In accordance with Article 13 of the Assembly's financial regulations, the accounts for the financial year 1987 have been submitted to the auditors. All the details are contained in Document 1152, to which the President has referred, and I do not think I need repeat all the figures. The auditor, first President of the Belgian Court of Auditors, considers that these accounts provide a correct record of the year's financial transactions in conformity with the budget estimates, the financial regulations, the financial instructions and the other decisions of the legislative authority and are a correct record of the financial situation for the year ended 31st December 1987.

I have nothing to add to this excellent presentation of the accounts and therefore invite the Assembly to express its satisfaction at the efforts of those responsible for compiling the budget by adopting the motion to approve the Assembly's accounts as set out in Document 1152 and addendum.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Approval appears to present no problems, as no one wishes to speak.

Under Rule 33, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless at least ten representatives or substitutes present in the chamber ask for a vote by roll-call.

Are there ten members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. We shall therefore vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The motion is agreed to.

**6. Date, time and orders of the day
of the next sitting**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Wednesday, 7th December, at 10 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. First part of the thirty-fourth annual report of the Council (Presentation by Sir Geoffrey Howe, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Document 1155).
2. The reactivation and enlargement of WEU – reply to the annual report of the Council (Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Document 1163, addendum and amendments).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 3.45 p.m.)

TENTH SITTING

Wednesday, 7th December 1988

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. Resignation of a Vice-President.
4. First part of the thirty-fourth annual report of the Council (*Presentation by Sir Geoffrey Howe, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Doc. 1155*).
Replies by Sir Geoffrey Howe to questions put by: Mr. Rathbone, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Stewart, Mr. Encarnacao (*Observer from Portugal*), Ms. Ruddock, Mr. Soell, Mr. Redmond, Sir Russell Johnston, Mr. van der Werff, Mr. Ewing, Mr. Jessel, Mr. Cetin (*Observer from Turkey*).
5. The reactivation and enlargement of WEU – reply to the annual report of the Council (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 1163, addendum and amendments*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. van der Sanden (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Reddemann, Mr. Rathbone, Mr. Antretter, Mr. Rauti, Mr. Burger, Mr. Katsaros (*Observer from Greece*), Mr. Tascioglu (*Observer from Turkey*), Mr. Cetin (*Observer from Turkey*), Mr. Caro.
6. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly.
7. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

3. Resignation of a Vice-President of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I must inform the Assembly that Mr. Valleix has resigned as a Vice-President of the Assembly.

His resignation is duly noted.

1. See page 29.

4. First part of the thirty-fourth annual report of the Council

(Presentation by Sir Geoffrey Howe, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Doc. 1155)

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the presentation by Sir Geoffrey Howe, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, of the first part of the thirty-fourth annual report of the Council, Document 1155.

I am delighted to welcome Sir Geoffrey to the Assembly and to have the opportunity to thank him personally not only for his kind welcome to the United Kingdom during my official visit last September but also for making himself available, along with Mr. George Younger, the United Kingdom Secretary of State for Defence, for two meetings with the Presidential Committee in October and November.

We have greatly appreciated the positive approach taken during the first six months of the British presidency – notably in achieving the enlargement of WEU to include Portugal and Spain. We look forward to further British initiatives in the next six months.

Sir Geoffrey HOWE (*Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – Mr. President, I begin by thanking you most

Sir Geoffrey Howe (continued)

warmly for your kind introduction. It gave me great pleasure to receive you and your colleagues in London at our most recent meeting there. My colleague, Mr. George Younger, the United Kingdom Secretary of State for Defence, regrets that he cannot be here with me today. As I suggested, we had intended that I should be accompanied by one of his ministerial colleagues. Unfortunately, however, one of them is stricken with illness – not serious, but sufficiently disabling to put him out of action – and another has received a competing invitation from our national parliament. I am afraid that I therefore appear unaccompanied.

As Chairman of the Ministerial Council, it gives me great pleasure to be able to report to you on the activities of WEU during the first six months of our presidency. When I have done that, I should like to share with you some thinking on a subject that lies at the heart of the defensive doctrine of the alliance – namely, nuclear deterrence. In particular, at a time when East-West relations are improving, and there are real prospects for further reductions in nuclear weapons, we must ask how we can sustain public support for the strategic doctrine on which WEU governments agree our security depends. I have no doubt that we, in the Council, and you, in the Assembly, have a key rôle to play in that debate.

At our meeting in April, WEU ministers agreed three priorities for our work over the months ahead: first, enlargement discussions with Portugal and Spain; secondly, the development of the commitments in the WEU platform, and, thirdly, the analysis of certain arms control questions.

At the ministerial meeting in London on 14th November we signed the protocol by which Portugal and Spain acceded to WEU. I was delighted that we were able to conclude the enlargement discussions successfully within only a few months. It should be made clear that those discussions were no mere formality. As I said in my speech at the signature ceremony – at which you, Mr. President, were present – we received information from both countries about how they intend to give effect to the serious obligations of WEU membership. We discussed their commitment to defend other countries at their frontiers, both countries' overall contribution to the common defence, and the question of consultation and co-operation in responding to out-of-area issues. At the end of the discussions, we concluded that Portugal and Spain would make valuable contributions to the twin goals of our organisation – to develop a more cohesive European defence identity and to make a more effective European contribution within the alliance. As a club of nine, we shall be well placed to face the challenges of the 1990s.

We also agreed to keep Turkey's interest in WEU under active review while the organisation's objectives and legal structure were reviewed, following the accession of Portugal and Spain. All of us acknowledged the valuable contribution that Turkey makes to the defence of Europe as a member of the alliance.

We examined, at our ministerial meeting, how we might best follow up the commitments in the WEU platform. We have identified a number of specific respects in which we might develop our co-operation: we agreed to look for scope for greater harmonisation in defence planning. We shall continue to analyse our defence contributions with the aim of establishing European norms for what those should be. We commissioned studies on logistics and training, to optimise the scope for improving our capabilities, as well as for rationalisation and savings.

We shall examine the implications of 1992 for the transatlantic trade in defence equipment and the demographic problems that will come our way in the 1990s. Work will also continue on developing the commitment to defend each other at our frontiers. Those of us who station forces forward in Germany stressed our commitment to keeping them there at adequate levels. That is a full programme. It provides evidence of our determination to develop our responsibilities in practical ways.

One of WEU's greatest successes over the past year has been the activities of the naval forces of five of our countries in the Gulf. Their contribution to freedom of navigation has been appreciated worldwide. The current minesweeping operation – Operation Cleansweep – will eventually produce a clear lane three hundred miles long. The WEU co-ordination framework for these activities has provided useful experience for us to take similar concerted action in future where our collective security interests are involved.

WEU membership is not only characterised by our common determination to make practical contributions to our collective defence. We also share an interest in co-ordinating more closely our positions on arms control. We had a good discussion in London of European interests in the current START and chemical weapons negotiations, as well as examining the prospect for talks on conventional stability in Europe.

This is a solid record of achievement in which we can all take pride. We shall strive in the remaining six months of our presidency to build on these achievements and to advance further wherever possible.

A priority must be to pursue the practical implementation of the ideas we have worked out. We all know that a sure defence does not come cheaply, and that resources available for

Sir Geoffrey Howe (continued)

defence are limited. We must therefore make the best possible use of the resources we have – for example, through optimal deployment of forces and close attention to training and the compatibility of the rules under which they operate.

This sort of work requires sustained effort and we should not expect results to be quick or easy in coming. I hope that you in this Assembly will assist us in government in this important task.

There is another task, as well, in which I should like to enlist your help today – that of bringing home to the public whom you represent the importance of the carefully considered western strategy of deterrence and defence based on an adequate mix of nuclear and conventional weapons.

This is a point on which the WEU platform is crystal clear. It declares that we can for the time being see no alternative to this well-established strategy. In particular, it declares that only the nuclear element can confront a potential aggressor with an unacceptable risk. As the platform notes, this strategy has ensured peace in freedom for an unprecedented period of European history, but how far are all our people convinced? How far even are some of you who represent them as members of this Assembly convinced that it must be the right strategy?

The reasons for hesitation have varied over the years. In times of East-West tension, some have seen the possession of nuclear weapons as tantamount to an invitation to use them.

For example, in the early 1980s NATO countries were implementing the alliance's 1979 twin-track decision in face of a sustained and well-orchestrated Soviet propaganda campaign. There was talk then of a breakdown in the western consensus on nuclear deterrence, arising from fears that the associated risks at that time seemed too great. Now, however, opinion polls suggest that the Soviet image in Western Europe is widely seen as far less threatening than in the past. Progress is being achieved on arms control, and public expectations for improved East-West relations are high.

In these very different circumstances, some doubts seem to persist – but for quite the opposite reason. Nuclear deterrence is now seen in some quarters as redundant on the ground, so it is argued, that the risks of conflict with a reformed Soviet Union have dwindled into insignificance. Currently, the argument in favour of deterrence has diminished because everything looks so safe whereas in the early 1980s that argument was diminished because everything looked so dangerous. That is the paradox and the dilemma. If the chances of conflict seem to be reduced, one important reason for the

improvement – I would not claim that it is the only one – is that deterrence is working.

In the very special circumstances of East-West relations, nuclear deterrence is an essential element, in good times as well as bad. We – all of us here – have a duty to explain to the public why this remains the right system of security and the best that is currently available to us, so let me restate the reasons.

Until the middle of this century, war in Europe was seen as a natural way of settling international differences. War was familiar, inevitable, and, for some, even desirable. It was possible, rightly or wrongly, for a country to calculate that it stood to gain more from going to war than it might lose. The second world war demonstrated appallingly the new vulnerability of civilian populations hundreds of miles behind the front lines. Hiroshima and Nagasaki added a horrific new element to the equation. The advent of the nuclear age brought the realisation that a decision to go to war with conventional weapons could easily lead to an exchange of nuclear weapons from which one's own territory could not be immune.

The essence of nuclear deterrence in the 1980s lies in making the option of war unacceptable. Deterrence nowadays reflects the fact that one cannot speak of "winners" or "losers" in a nuclear war: there is only the prospect of catastrophe for both sides. The risks involved in any conflict where nuclear weapons could be used are sufficient to inhibit any potential aggressor. Can we, however, be sure that nuclear deterrence is the best option available to us? Might it not be possible to safeguard our security as effectively by relying more heavily on defensive systems, or on conventional forces? Research on strategic defence is under way in both the United States and the Soviet Union. The United States programme – the strategic defence initiative (SDI) – is being carried forward on the basis of criteria established after discussion between the British Prime Minister and President Reagan at Camp David in 1984. The overall aim is to enhance deterrence, not to undermine it.

These are early days. There remain many unanswered questions about the technologies involved, and their cost-effectiveness. We cannot yet formulate sensible conclusions on the part that strategic defences might conceivably play in enhancing western security. Some see SDI as a way in which to create an invulnerable defensive shield, proof against any incoming ballistic missiles. Others have a more limited concept of a strategic defence system that will preserve a retaliatory strike capability after an attack.

Whatever the long-term possibilities for SDI might turn out to be, most people would accept that nuclear weapons will not become obsolete in the foreseeable future. That is why war will continue to be an unrealistic policy option.

Sir Geoffrey Howe (continued)

The other option that is sometimes argued is that we should rely more on conventional forces, but conventional weapons, horrifying though they can be, do not have the same deterrent effect. They cannot offer the same prospect of potential catastrophe as nuclear weapons. For advances in technology to make conventional weapons credible as a substitute for nuclear weapons, they would have to have similar destructive power. In those circumstances, we would be no better off than we are now. Nor would an improved conventional balance – of the kind we hope to secure in the new Vienna talks – wholly relieve us of the need for reliance on nuclear deterrence. We need nuclear weapons not just to redress imbalances in conventional forces, or to balance the nuclear forces of the Soviet Union. Ultimately, we need them to deter.

Of course, it is only human nature to wish that our security could be guaranteed by some other means, but I can see no prospect of this in the foreseeable future. Certainly it would be premature, indeed irresponsible, to allow the present improvement in East-West relations to propel us precipitately to such a fundamental reassessment of our defence requirements. There should be no misunderstandings – we all welcome the process of evolution away from Stalinist centralism and repression that is now taking place in the Soviet Union. We all want a better, less confrontational relationship with the East. We are all ready to take the opportunities now opening up for increased contact and co-operation, but we cannot ignore military realities – huge Soviet forces still deployed for offence, not defence. Nor can we ignore the fact that the Soviet Union remains a one-party state with values very different from our own. We cannot yet predict with any confidence how the process of change in the Soviet Union will develop, or what its full implications will be for Europe.

We must therefore maintain a sure defence, while continuing to pursue arms control. This tried and tested policy offers the only stable framework for western action at a time of change – and of hope – in East-West relations.

A security system based on deterrence carries heavy obligations. First, we must do our utmost to guard against misunderstandings or miscalculation. Hot lines, agreements on the prevention of accidents and co-operative arrangements are vital for this purpose. Secondly, we must ensure that deterrence forces are limited to the minimum necessary. Since 1979, NATO has reduced the number of its warheads in Europe by 35% from 7 000 to 4 600. I would expect to see that number reduced still further in the future, as our stockpile is modernised, but, for the reasons

I have given, while levels of weapons can be reduced, they cannot be eliminated altogether.

We have also to ensure that our nuclear forces remain sufficiently effective, flexible and up-to-date to meet the challenges of changing patterns of defence. Obsolete weapons do not deter. New systems will from time to time be necessary. The decisions which have to be taken are not always easy, but we must be prepared to pay that price if we accept, as all WEU governments do, that deterrence is the cornerstone of our defence.

Does this mean that there is no room for further nuclear arms control? Of course not. Arms control, in the context of the East-West relationship, can bring substantial political, military and, perhaps above all, economic gains. We are interested in arms control agreements – not at any price, but so long as they enhance our security. The INF agreement is a good example. A START agreement is potentially another. We are also giving priority to a global ban on chemical weapons and to tackling conventional imbalances.

These are some of the issues that will be on the agenda of the WEU Council over the coming months. I hope that you in the Assembly will reflect on them as well. Nuclear deterrence is not always a comfortable subject to contemplate. No system based on such awesome weapons can be, but in the Council we have a clear view of our responsibilities. We have a strategy for security in Europe which has stood the test of time. We have set it out in our platform. We need to explain and implement it. It is a strategy based on conviction, not prejudice; on reason, not illusion; on a recognition of the reality of nuclear weapons, not a love of them for their own sake. The political decisions that flow from this strategy are not always the easiest ones to take, but take them we must. I hope we can count on this Assembly's firm support in doing just that.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, the Chairman-in-Office of the Council has said he is prepared to answer questions.

I call Mr. Rathbone.

Mr. RATHBONE (*United Kingdom*). – I begin by endorsing what the British Foreign Secretary has said this morning, most particularly his admonition to us, as members of this Assembly, to carry the message of security, peace and strength in disarmament talks back to our own parliaments. How can WEU better forward arms control and disarmament through the United Nations, where there seems to be a new spirit of co-operation?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Sir Geoffrey HOWE (*Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – I thank Mr. Rathbone for his opening remarks. It is my belief that the new spirit of co-operation in the United Nations is most visibly reflected by the resumption of practical contact between the five permanent members of the Security Council, meeting through their permanent representatives, and frequently, and now annually, between their foreign ministers on two occasions. The development of co-operation at that level is helping to symbolise and carry forward the way in which the United Nations can play an effective part in arms control.

The fact that it was possible for us, at the special session during the summer, to focus, for example, on the scope for progress on chemical weapons, shows that that is a forum in which it is possible to advance particular proposals. The fact that it was then possible for the President of the United States, the President of France and the representative of the Soviet Union at the General Assembly to focus again on chemical weapons, and as a result to be able to look forward to the special conference on chemical weapons to be held in Paris in January as an urgent means of reaffirming the 1925 convention, again shows the sort of way in which the United Nations can be an effective forum for the distillation and advance of the right kind of idea.

Then, of course, the Geneva negotiations are themselves taking place within the same United Nations framework. There, too, chemical weapons are at the top of our agenda. Thus, a great deal is happening under United Nations auspices, quite apart from what is happening bilaterally in the START negotiations and from that which we hope will happen under CSCE European-Atlantic auspices in Vienna.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I am tempted to ask our Foreign Secretary whether he has seen the correspondence columns in the Guardian this morning, which suggest a fractured consistency in the approach to terrorism. He may care to comment on that; if not, I think we would understand.

Our Foreign Secretary referred to the adequate mix of nuclear and conventional capacity having helped to maintain peace and freedom in Western Europe. That comment is justifiable, but does that capacity have to stretch into infinity even if asymmetrical progress can be achieved?

Sir Geoffrey mentioned defence at the frontier, and this is obviously an essential approach. However, does he not accept that there may be beginning to be some difference within the

alliance about the commitment to the short-range nuclear weapon? Would he care to comment on the development of that difference? Does he see any likelihood of change within the next year or two in the policy of short-range nuclear weaponry?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Sir Geoffrey HOWE (*Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – I think that the opening question of my parliamentary colleague relates to a matter of special interest appealing only to the limited number of British people present and only to the very small minority of British people who read the Guardian. But that had better not be reported to the Guardian.

As for the substantial part of Mr. Hardy's question, I think that one of the themes that is shared by all members of the alliance is the recognition, as I tried to put it in my speech, of the rôle that will have to be played by nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future. We may all cherish a dream of a world free of all weapons, and therefore free of nuclear weapons, but for the foreseeable future in the world in which we live the nuclear mix is part of our defence equipment.

If one accepts that, the doctrine of flexible response, however one defines or describes it – the need to have a diversity of nuclear systems available to the alliance – is a second inescapable proposition. Having disposed, or being in the course of disposing, of intermediate nuclear weapons, we have to look the more carefully at that which is left to us if we are not to find ourselves unduly confined.

That is why I think we are right, after the START negotiations, to put as our first priority the need to tackle the conventional imbalance and the need to tackle chemical weapons. Negotiations which led to further reductions in theatre nuclear weapons before we had tackled those earlier matters – conventional and chemical – would greatly accentuate the significance of the Soviet conventional and chemical preponderance. That is why the NATO summit rejected the idea of a third zero-zero on short-range nuclear forces, and recognised the need to keep all NATO's forces – conventional and nuclear – up to date when necessary. My answer to Mr. Hardy's point, then, is that that on which he focuses is not likely to arise for some time.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Stewart.

Mr. STEWART (*United Kingdom*). – The Foreign Secretary has given a clear and positive address. In the first ministerial address to the

Mr. Stewart (continued)

Assembly on Monday, Mr. Dumas referred to the idea of a strategic institute – an institute for security studies. Would Sir Geoffrey care to comment on that?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Sir Geoffrey HOWE (*Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – I have received a report of the observations of my esteemed colleague and friend, Mr. Roland Dumas, and there has recently been a successful high-level course for WEU participants here in Paris. That course has generated a number of ideas for follow-up. It has been our concern as the current presidency to put the institutional question on one side and not to let it put a brake on other more pressing work in WEU, and that has been generally welcomed.

We have of course noted the proposal for the establishment of a new institute for strategic studies. It seems to us – this is inevitably an initial reaction – that a small agency working inside the Secretariat-General could provide valuable support for the revitalised WEU. It remains the British view that all the ministerial organs of WEU should be collocated in Brussels, but we recognise that there is no consensus on that at present, so we are not pressing the issue at this stage.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Encarnacao, Observer from Portugal.

Mr. ENCARNACAO (*Observer from Portugal*). – This occasion is significant to us, as it was during Sir Geoffrey's excellent period in office that the Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs signed the treaty of accession to WEU. It should also not be considered insignificant that Portugal and Great Britain are linked by a 600-year alliance. The Portuguese Delegation evokes that alliance as an historical example of a remarkable way of honouring the duties that the Portuguese state assumes in all circumstances. The Portuguese accession to WEU implies on our part a profound interest in continuing the task of collaborating, and contributing by all possible means to the general effort of constructing an enlarged Europe that can mobilise all Europeans to a common rôle to be played throughout the world.

That process could not be completed, as has been recognised by WEU, without Portugal and Spain. Both countries have given too much to Europe to be set aside by her. But the construction of Europe must take deeply into account the enrichment of the structural countenance. It cannot be limited to the economic, cul-

tural and political councils. We must reinstate the concept of European security and consider all the zones where European interests are at stake. We must keep WEU as the European pillar of the common efforts of NATO, while giving the most important consideration to European self-responsibility, and putting pressure on East European régimes to adopt significant measures to obtain a change to democracy, political freedom and scientific and technological co-operation to bring them to the concept of more open societies.

Will the Assembly note the Portuguese will for co-operation?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Sir Geoffrey HOWE (*Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – In a sense the question so eloquently put by our Portuguese colleague evoked its own answer in the applause recorded by colleagues in the chamber. Certainly it is a great pleasure and privilege for me, and for the United Kingdom presidency, to hear his observations.

We must take care not to pull rank on the more recent adherents to our ancient alliance. The treaty of Windsor celebrated its 600th anniversary three years ago, at a special service held in St. George's Chapel, Windsor. One of the pleasures of that occasion was to find there representatives of all the countries with us today. That, I think, was the point that our Portuguese colleague was making. The Anglo-Portuguese partnership is only one of the overlapping pieces of history shared by us Europeans that now lay the foundations of the wider WEU, and I know that all the existing members share my pleasure at being able to welcome Spain and Portugal into this organisation as quickly as we were able to do.

I forget which of our colleagues it was – I think that it was our Spanish colleague in London – who said that with the accession of Spain and Portugal a new meaning was added to the epithet "western". Without the Iberian countries, we could not really say that we were Western European; with them, we really are.

Our Portuguese colleague was right to emphasise that our co-operation extends beyond the political and economic, and must as a matter of our collective responsibilities extend to the security of the continent that we share. That is the importance of WEU as the expression of our determination collectively, as members of the European pillar, to sustain the strength of that pillar as one component in the Atlantic Alliance. He was also right to remind us of the culture that we share with our friends in Central and Eastern Europe. It is the common politics of that culture

Sir Geoffrey Howe (continued)

that finds expression in the Helsinki final act, which is being carried forward in the discussions taking place in the CSCE in Vienna.

I am delighted on behalf of all my colleagues in the Council of Ministers to endorse everything that our Portuguese colleague has said. Nine of us together will be even stronger and more effective in our championship of the common European cause that we all share.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Ms. Ruddock.

Ms. RUDDOCK (*United Kingdom*). – Does not the Foreign Secretary agree that the large number of Soviet short-range nuclear weapons which will remain deployed post-INF are more threatening to the West in general, and the Federal Republic of Germany in particular, than the Soviet chemical weapons stocks?

How, then, does he explain the West's prioritising of chemical weapons arms control over the short-range nuclear weapons treaty when the Soviets have made it clear that they are prepared to deal with the conventional asymmetries that have always been used to justify the deployment of the West's short-range nuclear weapons?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Sir Geoffrey HOWE (*Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – I tried to address myself to that question, but with due modesty I commend to the honourable lady that she re-examine the text of my speech. However, I shall try to supplement it briefly now.

It is our judgment that the maintenance of a due diversity of potential nuclear response is important and that, if we were to seek to embark early on SNF negotiations, we should have to address ourselves to a series of questions which it has not yet been possible to solve. For example, how would it be right to proceed down the road to a third triple zero? How would we be able to solve the verification problems implicit in an SNF deal? To what extent should it be restricted to SNF missiles?

It is our belief that the imbalance in conventional weapons and, perhaps above all, the Soviet domination in chemical weapons make it right to apply ourselves to that part of the agenda first. The honourable lady is right to draw attention to the importance of the Soviet statement that they recognise the need to tackle conventional imbalances by securing a reduction on the surplus side. That is an important statement. Now that NATO has published the data, which we did a fortnight ago, we are very

anxious to press ahead with actual practical negotiations on conventional weapons to see whether the Soviet Union will give substance to that statement. It is important to see whether that will be done. We are even more anxious to see headway being made in the chemical weapons negotiations where, as I have said, the Soviet domination in that area is one of the most frightening features of the scene today.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Soell.

Mr. SOELL (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Sir Geoffrey, I have attempted to follow very attentively your remarks on the problem of nuclear weapons and their rôle as an instrument for the prevention of war, but I have found no answer to the question why thousands of tactical nuclear weapons are allegedly needed to ensure that there is no recourse to war in Europe. These thousands of tactical nuclear weapons give rise to the dangerous illusion that tactical nuclear warfare does, after all, present an option. If the sole aim is to establish a general deterrent, then the presence of a few dozen tactical nuclear weapons here in Europe is sufficient. I expressly refer to tactical nuclear weapons below the level of strategic weapons. That is my first question.

My second question relates to The Hague platform, which is essentially concerned with the principles of deterrence and détente, and I wish to ask when this is to be complemented by a practical programme detailing the relationship between armament measures and arms control and reduction measures. This is the relationship of which we have no details.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Sir Geoffrey HOWE (*Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – I explained that if we were to confine our nuclear capabilities to a diminishing range of options, we should be diminishing the credible potential of the nuclear component of our total defensive posture. We do not believe that it is right or necessary to argue the case for short-range nuclear weapons because one is contemplating fighting a battlefield war with nuclear weapons. We do think that it is necessary and justifiable to retain them, certainly at this stage, as part of the overall range of nuclear options available to NATO commanders.

Mr. Soell is quite right to say that the development of the platform needs to be carried forward. The follow-up to the platform has, in the euphemistic jargon of the trade, proved itself to be a step-by-step process. The steps so far taken either on the platform or from the

Sir Geoffrey Howe (continued)

platform, whether in defence planning or in building a link to arms control, fall short of what we would like to achieve, and Mr. Soell is right to remind us that that has been one of them.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Redmond.

Mr. REDMOND (*United Kingdom*). – Given the Israeli track record in the Middle East, the delicate situation that exists there and the impact of any escalation on East-West relationships, does Sir Geoffrey condemn or condone America's sale of the fragmentation bomb to Israel?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Sir Geoffrey HOWE (*Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – That is not a matter to which the Ministerial Council has given any thought or attention at all.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Russell Johnston.

Sir Russell JOHNSTON (*United Kingdom*). – On Monday, as Sir Geoffrey has said, the French Minister of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Dumas, told us that at the last ministerial meeting of WEU there was some discussion on chemical weapons. I asked him whether any consideration had been given to the most effective means of putting pressure on Iraq, who, both in the Gulf war and more recently against its Kurdish minority, has earned the unenviable distinction of being the country that has used more chemical weapons than anywhere else in the world for more than half a century.

Let me put the same question to Sir Geoffrey, who also referred to chemical weapons this morning. In particular, at that ministerial meeting or in any other context, has there been any discussion about the potential or otherwise of economic pressure?

Does not Sir Geoffrey agree that it is highly unsatisfactory that the West is divided on this issue? The United States has denied Iraq all credit because of its activities, whereas the Federal Republic of Germany has increased its credits and the United Kingdom has actually doubled its credits – all while the Kurdish slaughter continues. Is there a chance of a common view emerging soon, and what would Sir Geoffrey like it to be?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-on-Office of the Council.

Sir Geoffrey HOWE (*Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). –

The question illustrates the difficulty – as in almost every case – of achieving a common position not just among western countries but much more widely. Perhaps Sir Russell has in mind general economic sanctions. Even the United States, which moved in that direction, has not yet put any such measures in place and the rest of the world has moved even less far.

The question foreshadows its answer. Sir Russell spoke of the limited extent of agreement on general sanctions against Iraq. I suggested that that was in the nature of the beast. It has proved extremely difficult to achieve effective economic sanctions and even the United States has not fulfilled the original objective of Congress in trying to impose such sanctions.

I am not complacent about chemical weapons – least of all about their use by Iraq. Sir Russell is right to say that Iraq has distinguished itself in a very unattractive way. That is one reason why the United Kingdom has given high priority to the search for remedies for the use of chemical weapons.

At the United Nations special session on disarmament in the summer I put forward proposals that sought to remedy the gap of action. We all react with shock and horror when we hear the reports, but the question is how we are to achieve effective action.

First, we wanted to achieve a wider endorsement of the 1925 Geneva protocol. Secondly, I said that we needed a system of automatic reporting procedures to facilitate United Nations investigations of allegations of the use of chemical weapons. The present procedure requires member states to sign up in support of allegations. We judge that there should be an automatic procedure so that, once an allegation of any substance has been made, the United Nations investigation procedure comes into play. The third important factor is a willingness – this was the narrow focus of Sir Russell's question – to ban the export of chemical weapons precursors to countries that violate the Geneva protocol. That method is more precisely focused than any other.

Since I put forward proposals in June this year, there have been further reports of the use of chemical weapons. The United Nations returned to that item on the agenda in September. We secured an undertaking by the Iraqi Foreign Minister that his country was not using, and would not use, such weapons. We attach some importance to that undertaking but it is important to ensure that it is observed.

Next in the story comes the meeting in Paris in January. The very fact that such a meeting is to take place at such high level – convened swiftly after it was proposed in New York – will serve to underline the sense of revulsion that the world feels about the use of chemical weapons.

Sir Geoffrey Howe (continued)

My great fear is that such weapons, which have largely been regarded as off limits as a result of the 1925 convention, have attained a status of near acceptability. That is the most shocking thing. That is why I attach such importance – and this picks up the point made by Ms. Ruddock – to trying to make real headway. I do not think that thrashing around for economic sanctions is likely to be the best way of tackling this extremely difficult problem.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. van der Werff.

Mr. van der WERFF (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I have a practical, household question. As soon as the agreement on the accession of Spain and Portugal has entered into force the parliamentary delegations of these two countries will have every right to sit in WEU. In order to fulfil its function, the Assembly will then need larger premises, equipped in accordance with the plans on which you, Mr. President, have reported to the Council of Ministers. The start of the necessary work depends on the Council's approval of that proposal, assigning to the Assembly the majority of the premises now owned by the ministerial organs in Paris. When will the Council be deciding about the Agency's future? What other building is the Council considering making available for the Assembly, if the decision I referred to is not taken very soon?

To cover the cost of the planned alterations shown in the study submitted to the Council regarding the modification of WEU's building in Paris, a supplementary budget will be submitted next month. Will the Council give an early answer so that an early start can be made? I would point out that, as soon as the enlargement of WEU is a reality, this Assembly's plenary sittings and many of the committee meetings will have to be held elsewhere if the alterations have not been completed by that time, which will undoubtedly cost a great deal more.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Sir Geoffrey HOWE (*Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – It is important that Mr. van der Werff should express his anxiety about the implications of enlargement for the institutions and their accommodation. In considering those consequences we should balance the need to provide appropriate accommodation against the need to make the most prudent use of the available resources. For the reasons that Mr. van der Werff gave, the Council of Ministers has already agreed to a sup-

plementary budget for an architect's study of the necessary accommodation. We must await the outcome of that study.

As we contemplate the resources that are available and the resources that may be made available we must examine the suitability of other institutions. If we conclude – as I suggest we should – that the existing agency structure still does not meet the needs of the revitalised WEU and that collocation is the key to an effective agency giving effective support to the Council and working groups, our search for the more efficient use of the resources now devoted to the agency must involve willingness to consider at the right time the question of collocation. There is a link. We have a constrained envelope of resources and if we want to enlarge resources in the form of premises available to the Assembly, it is prudent to consider the use that we are making of other resources. Meanwhile, the study is going ahead.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Ewing.

Mr. EWING (*United Kingdom*). – My colleagues here are trying to provoke me into asking Sir Geoffrey whether he will consult the Prince of Wales about which architects should be appointed, but I shall resist that temptation.

I found Sir Geoffrey Howe's speech fascinating, particularly the passage in which he issued a plea to parliamentarians of all the nations represented here to persuade their electorates and others of the need to preserve the nuclear deterrent as a component of the western alliance's strategic defence policy. I want to be as gentle as I can, but did I detect the same uncertainty there as I did when the General Affairs Committee of WEU visited the Pentagon in the United States earlier this year? I refer to my feeling that ministers are now worried about the Soviet Union putting proposals on the table and the West seeming to resist them.

Until the emergence of Mr. Gorbachev, it was the West that dictated the pace of disarmament discussions. I could be wrong, but it seems to me that in the not-too-distant future it will be the Soviet Union that dictates the pace. When Sir Geoffrey asked parliamentarians to persuade people of the need to retain the nuclear deterrent, did he mean that he and his ministerial colleagues were afraid that people in the West would want to go much further than politicians were prepared to go?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Sir Geoffrey HOWE (*Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – Just as Mr. Ewing was tempted to ask me about the rôle of the Prince of Wales – I notice that he

Sir Geoffrey Howe (continued)

found it difficult to resist that temptation – I find it difficult to resist the temptation of replying. As a Welshman myself, I hold the Prince of Wales in even higher esteem than Mr. Ewing, but nothing should be inferred from that.

I should like to follow the gentle style of Mr. Ewing's question. I spoke of the arguments in favour of deterrence not because I am worried about some irreversible slippage in the West's commitment to that doctrine. Rather I was ambitious as always – and hopeful – to enlist Mr. Ewing as a committed and powerful advocate of that cause. I may not have succeeded, but it is well worth trying.

I do not think that anybody should regard the West as being worried about some dramatic and recent Soviet successes in seizing the initiative. The agenda that the West has had on the table for a long time has recently begun to evoke a practical, worthwhile and meaningful Soviet response. Perhaps I may take the example of the START negotiations and the strategic, or even intermediate, nuclear forces negotiations. When, in 1984, I went to Moscow for the first time in my present job, all effective discussions between the Soviet Union and the United States had come to a halt. I tried very hard to persuade Mr. Chernenko with, inevitably, Mr. Gromyko, to produce a positive response to the proposals that the United States and the West had put on the table. Nothing happened. It was only later, when the Soviet Union returned to the INF bargaining table and took up our agenda, that we were able to make progress. The same is true for conventional weapons, a point raised by Ms. Ruddock.

For nine or ten years in the MBFR negotiations in Vienna we strove to reach first base – a willingness to agree the data that underlie the argument. Even on that, until recently, the Soviet Union has been unwilling to take the matter seriously. Mr. Gorbachev has now said that the Soviet Union is ready to consider the inequalities and to recognise the need to reduce on the side with the greater surplus. That is good, but it should not be thought that Mr. Gorbachev is coming on to the field, seizing the initiative and playing in the Scottish goal mouth. He has just come out of his own goal area. He is coming close to the half way line. I am not worried about the Soviet Union taking the initiative. I am glad that it is responding to our long-standing initiative, but I want to ensure that western opinion sees it that way.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Jessel.

Mr. JESSEL (*United Kingdom*). – I should like to ask about defence and the institutions of the

European Community. In view of the case that the Foreign Secretary put for the retention of the nuclear deterrent and as three members of the European Community – Ireland, Greece and Denmark – may be thought to be wobbly on this and perhaps not very strong on defence generally, and as some countries outside the European Community, such as Norway and Turkey, are very strong on defence, does the Foreign Secretary see any danger or disadvantage in our basing our defences on the European Community rather than WEU and NATO? Does he see any need for that? Surely our security is infinitely more important than the aspirations of the European Parliament.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Sir Geoffrey HOWE (*Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – Far be it from me to stir up strife between the many European institutions that serve the peoples of Europe or to embark at this late stage of the morning on the task of rationalising all of those institutions. They all started at different times in different ways and have different purposes.

Defence is not one of the European Community's objectives, but certain aspects of security are part of its objectives as a result of the single European act and the development of political co-operation. The European Community can, within the framework of its terms of reference, play a significant part in maintaining and enhancing European awareness of our common security needs. Mr. Jessel is right that if we seek the fulfilment of those aspirations in defence, we must look to the North Atlantic Alliance and WEU in that framework. NATO is the decision-making and executive organisation for the defence of Europe and the Atlantic partners. Within that structure WEU plays an important rôle by drawing together those who take our defence obligations seriously and enabling us to act as a ginger group to stimulate the strength of the European pillar within NATO.

Having asserted the conclusions in that positive way, I do not feel it necessary to cast any aspersions whatsoever on any other European institutions.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Cetin, Observer from Turkey.

Mr. CETIN (*Observer from Turkey*). – We have been informed – Sir Geoffrey referred to this in his speech – that Turkey's membership of WEU is under serious consideration. I should like to know what else is needed for Turkey to be a member of WEU. Secondly, how long does the Minister think it may take for Turkey to become a member of WEU?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Sir Geoffrey HOWE (*Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – I do not think that I could hazard a precise answer to those questions beyond what I said in my opening speech. Certainly, in the consideration that we gave this matter, the Ministerial Council readily acknowledged the valuable contribution that Turkey makes to the defence of Europe. That is a very serious acknowledgement of the commitment of our Turkish friends.

We are now reviewing the structure of WEU following enlargement. During that time we shall, as I said in my speech, keep Turkish interests under active review. I do not think that I could risk, on behalf of the Ministerial Council, being more precise at this stage.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone else wish to speak?...

Thank you, Secretary of State, for replying to all the questions.

5. The reactivation and enlargement of WEU – reply to the annual report of the Council

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 1163, addendum and amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on the reactivation and enlargement of WEU – reply to the annual report of the Council, Document 1163, addendum and amendments.

I call Mr. van der Sanden, Rapporteur.

Mr. van der SANDEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, since I presented my last report to the Assembly on behalf of the General Affairs Committee, there have been many very important developments on the world political stage. Our organisation, WEU, is of course about to be enlarged to include two new member states, Portugal and Spain. You, Mr. President, and Sir Geoffrey Howe have already paid ample attention to this happy event, but it would not be appropriate for me to ignore it today, for two reasons. Firstly, it is specifically the General Affairs Committee that has devoted a great deal of attention in its reports in recent years to WEU's possible enlargement and, with the approval of the whole Assembly, has also exerted considerable pressure on the Council of Ministers. Secondly, the report I have the honour of presenting today considers this historic event at length. Now that I, as Rapporteur, have also warmly welcomed the representatives of the two new member countries, who will undoubtedly be sitting in the Assembly and committees as

genuine members next year, I should just like to say a few words about the consequences of this enlargement.

In the addendum to my report, which has just become available, I say that the Council must consider carefully what amendments to the modified Brussels Treaty and Paris Agreements have become necessary as a result of the accession of Spain and Portugal. The Council of Ministers has not yet given our Assembly any clear insight into this. The draft recommendation therefore includes a paragraph requesting the Council to provide more information, as the report itself refers to a number of articles and protocols which will have to be looked at more closely.

I urge the Council to take this work in hand quickly, because amending treaties is often a very time-consuming business when nine countries and nine parliaments are involved. The Assembly would also be very grateful – and I am now looking in the direction of the Secretary-General – if it could be consulted on amendments to the treaty before the Council of Ministers takes its final decisions.

Mr. President, the Netherlands Foreign Minister, Mr. van den Broek, and subsequently – on 9th November 1988 – the Federal German Chancellor, Mr. Kohl, have suggested that the WEU Assembly should in future be composed of members of the European Parliament. I also refer to this in my report. This, too, would require an amendment to the modified Brussels Treaty. The composition of the Assembly has already been discussed in the past by, among others, the Chairman of my committee, Mr. Ahrens, during the part-session held in Rome in November 1984 to consider reactivation. All I will say today is this: there may well be changes in the composition of the national delegations, but the members of this Assembly should nevertheless come from the national parliaments. To emphasise this, I would remind the Assembly that one of the factors which prompted the reactivation of WEU was the failure of European political co-operation when it came to international security. Until this very important area of policy is covered by the EEC treaty, it seems obvious to me that the members of the European Parliament, who were elected – and elected directly – for other areas of policy, should not form WEU's parliamentary Assembly.

Mr. President, I have already used the word "reactivation" a few times. In my report I have referred to some tension between the Council's decisions on the accession of Portugal and Spain and the completion of reactivation. After all, the Ministers felt that Spain and Portugal could not accede until reactivation had been completed. And what are a few government leaders saying? That we are still in the process of finalising reactivation. I feel the Council of Ministers should

Mr. van der Sanden (continued)

shed more light on this as well. But I also listened carefully to what the Secretary-General said on Monday. I can accept a great deal of what he had to say. Let me quote from his statement:

“In fact, what the Council has said and repeated is that reactivation of WEU has become a reality and not that the work of the organisation has been completed. The members of the Council are only too aware of the fact that the process of building Europe is a gradual and ongoing one and often under threat and are under no illusion that the work of WEU – an element in this process – has now been completed.”

I am grateful to the Secretary-General for this reply to something I still had to say. Being a good politician, he anticipated what might happen in the Assembly.

Mr. President, a number of other decisions have to be implemented, of course, but they are decisions that the Council of Ministers has in principle already taken. It hardly needs to be said that the indecision regarding the single agency and collocation has made a very strange impression on our Assembly. The Ministers know what they want, and they know how they want it done. But it is clear that one country can prevent the implementation of these decisions, and the result is stalemate.

Mr. President, I want to refer briefly in this context to the statements recently made by President Mitterrand and quoted in this Assembly by the French Foreign Minister, Mr. Dumas. I refer to the institute to be established for security studies. The Secretary-General also talked about this on Monday, when he said that this institute would be linked to WEU. I gather from what the French authorities have said that the institute will be set up in Paris. I am not happy about this initiative at the moment. Why not wait, I ask myself, for the definitive establishment of a single agency, which might be able to play an outstanding rôle in carrying out studies of this kind for both the Council and the Assembly? The condition would of course have to be that the agency or institute would be staffed by independent experts. That Paris has already been named as the site for this institute will simply make the question of collocation more difficult than it already is. We really do not need any more difficulties or problems. The time the Council still has to spend on solving problems on which decisions have already been taken would be better spent on the further amplification of The Hague platform.

Mr. President, I will not go into these problems in any greater depth today, but I will give the Assembly a brief overview of the inter-

national context in which WEU operates. At the June part-session I referred to the major results achieved in the discussions between the superpowers, the United States and the USSR. These results are also reflected in the policy which NATO as a whole and its European pillar, WEU, must pursue. It is therefore pleasing to see that the discussions between the two powers are continuing, now that the outcome of the American elections is known. If these two superpowers continue to have the political will, further results can be expected in terms of mutual and simultaneous disarmament.

A great deal of interest is now being taken in conventional weaponry, since the Warsaw Pact's numerical superiority is a fact to which the NATO deterrent has acted as an effective counterbalance. But given the very great importance of what is at stake, we must ensure that the influence of the European pillar within the alliance is guaranteed at any further negotiations.

NATO's and WEU's goal is a political, not a military one. The reduction of armed forces is not a goal in itself: what matters is to guarantee peace and security now and in the future. Détente and disarmament are of secondary importance to this. In politics we must always ask ourselves if the West's military power is still capable of actually achieving the goal of guaranteeing peace. But it also means that the reduction of military efforts will be best achieved in the Council as long as it is placed in the context of the goal to be achieved. The consequences of the political changes taking place in the Soviet Union must therefore be considered in the light of an overall concept of security.

Mr. President, the problem of burden-sharing was discussed in NATO last week. As our Assembly's General Affairs Committee will be devoting a special colloquy in Florence to this and other problems next year, I will not discuss it further now. It was satisfying to hear at least that – according to the reports I have received – general agreement was reached in NATO. In view of the other subjects that will be discussed in Florence, I also expect we shall be able to draw some conclusions as to the more distant future of European security in March 1989.

Mr. President, in the past we have repeatedly complained that the information reaching the Assembly was too little and too late. I am pleased to say today that the thirty-fourth annual report has appeared quickly and that the flow of information to the Assembly has been greatly improved. We are grateful to the Council for this and I have, of course, a special word of thanks for the Secretary-General for opening up a new channel of information to the Assembly with his two-monthly letters. I can assure Mr. Cahen that

Mr. van der Sanden (continued)

we very much appreciate this new form of communication between the Permanent Council and the Assembly.

I have pointed out in various parts of my report that the Assembly does not receive all the information to which it feels entitled. Specifically, we know nothing about the latest meeting of the Council of Ministers, the one held in London in November, except that Portugal and Spain have acceded. There was not even a press release, and yet I believe that the amplification of the highly important platform adopted in The Hague is a mandate which the Council has set itself and which is of the greatest significance to the reactivation of WEU.

Nor has the Assembly received any reports on co-operation in the field of arms production, something that really must be tackled at European level now. What we have heard is that a small bureau set up within the IEPG is to contribute towards the co-ordination of arms production. This was decided in Luxembourg in November, but it is not known if or how WEU is to be involved.

Mr. President, I have almost finished. Many subjects are touched on in the report that I am presenting to this Assembly on behalf of the General Affairs Committee. There have been some satisfactory developments, but many matters still await further decisions by the Council of Ministers and/or the Permanent Council. Two major conferences will be held next year, one organised by our General Affairs Committee, the other by the Council of Ministers. In view of the task which has also been assigned to the Assembly – and which the Council of Ministers said should be performed primarily by the Assembly – we have asked the Council in paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation to invite the Assembly to play a full part in the seminar the Council itself is planning to convene on informing public opinion. There can be no doubt that it is in the problems connected with peace and security, in particular, that the public in our future nine member states must take an interest.

I will end by saying that I hope the Assembly, in close co-operation with the Council of Ministers, the Permanent Council and the Secretary-General, can make 1989 a fruitful year. Then the governments and parliaments will also be able to contribute to the achievement of the common objective of peace and security in the New Year.

This Assembly is ready, as always.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is open.

I call Mr. Reddemann.

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. President. You give me the opportunity of being the first to express the Assembly's thanks to our Rapporteur. It is not the first time that Mr. van der Sanden has addressed this topic, and I consider that he has proved to us once again how capable he is of formulating a report so correctly judged in relation to the variety of views held by the Assembly that we all value not only his information but also his opinion. Many thanks, Mr. van der Sanden.

The Rapporteur has indicated that the Assembly faces the problem of making its weight more fully felt than before within the structure of Western European Union. I feel this has become our problem since the rather foolish observation of the Council of Ministers in Rome that our sole responsibility was for the public relations of Western European Union, that we did not exercise any parliamentary control, nor were we, above all, the body which had instigated further development within Western European Union.

Ladies and gentlemen, I believe that we should, as the Assembly, make it absolutely clear that we are not a public relations agency but regard ourselves as the key institution of Western European Union and that we have no wish to wait and see what the Council of Ministers decides regarding the revision of the treaties, but that it is our task, as the Assembly, to make proposals to the Council of Ministers for the revision of the modified Brussels Treaty.

I therefore urge, ladies and gentlemen, that at the start of the coming year we carefully consider in our political groups and more especially in our committees and in the Assembly what proposals we should submit to the ministers to prevent them from again adopting a course which reflects a greater distrust of parliamentarians than of a potential enemy of the WEU states.

That said, Mr. President, there is a second point which needs to be made. We should submit serious proposals to improve the work not only of the Assembly but also of the Permanent Council of Western European Union. When the Council was set up and the ambassadors at the Court of St. James were requested to nominate their youngest officials so that theoretically there were departments relating to Western European Union, it was still assumed that WEU would only play an ancillary rôle and might not even exist in the long term.

At a time when modern technology enables representatives of all the member states to assemble within a few hours in any of the alliance capitals, I consider that the work in the Permanent Council should not be entrusted only to an ambassador who is already overloaded with a mass of other matters. This Permanent Council must be set up by the political heads of

Mr. Reddemann (continued)

the ministries of foreign affairs, so that the ambassadors in the Permanent Council do not have to receive their information by way of tedious instructions and via many channels. This Council should, in my view, be a body capable of more rapid and concise consultation and decision-making.

It will be equally necessary, ladies and gentlemen, to place our co-operation with the Council of Ministers on a completely new footing. It no longer makes any sense for us to meet with the General Affairs Committee and the Presidential Committee following sessions of the Council of Ministers, in order to obtain a few items of more or less interesting information, ask questions and express opinions.

If we take the revision of the treaty seriously, I believe that we ourselves should suggest that Assembly members, selected by the Assembly, should take part in the meetings of the Council of Ministers, as a sort of tenth state as it were. We must make it clear to the ministers that this is not merely a forum for the executives, but that the combined parliamentary institution of Western European Union is recording its vote within the Council of Ministers.

We must also consider, ladies and gentlemen, how long we can continue to tolerate a state of impasse within WEU because of the current impossibility of agreeing on its location. It is not enough simply to register the fact: as a parliamentary assembly, we ourselves must arrive at a very early decision, even if it results in some controversy so that we can bring home to the ministers the impossibility of reactivating a union when we do not even have the opportunity to decide on its location.

Mr. President, my final point is that we should cast aside the excessive modesty which we have often shown in the past. If we are to have a new treaty to succeed the Brussels Treaty, we should recall that when this treaty was established in 1948 and modified in 1954, the states of Europe were still in opposition to one another, as they were in the nineteenth century, and parliamentary activity extending across national frontiers was barely conceivable.

That time has passed. In the most varied forums, including the European Parliament and the Council of Europe, we have demonstrated that it is possible to work rationally towards the fusion of Europe in a manner transcending diplomatic niceties.

As the parliamentary Assembly of Western European Union we are therefore, I believe, under an obligation to make clear to the Council of Ministers, the allied governments and, if necessary, our own national parliaments, that this Assembly must become the hub of Western European Union.

In making these suggestions as an initial approach to the revision of the treaty I believe I am in line with your own thinking, Mr. van der Sanden.

(Mr. van der Werff, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Rathbone.

Mr. RATHBONE (*United Kingdom*). – I begin by taking this opportunity to add my own personal welcome to the countries of Portugal and Spain, the newest members of WEU. Spain has always been a historic challenger to British interests, both within the European context and what used to be called the "New World". But it has now joined Britain in re-establishing parliamentary democracy and a constitutional monarchy. That must bode well for the future of the close ties that now exist between Spain and other members of this organisation, particularly between Spain and Great Britain. Those ties have been encouraged through the relationship between our royal families and the unstinting work of the Spanish Ambassador to the United Kingdom and the United Kingdom Ambassador to Spain. Diplomats' work often goes unnoticed and unpraised, and I pay special tribute to two quite outstanding men for their contribution – for Spain and for Britain and for the friendship between the two countries. Perhaps it is worth noting that of the nine members of WEU four are constitutional monarchies, and one is a constitutional grand duchy. The continuity implicit in more than half the member nations having a hereditary head of state should provide additional stability for the countries and their allies.

Portugal is a historic friend of Great Britain. In the past we have been linked by shared interests, by blood and by trade. We are now linked by tourism as well as by shared membership of the European Community and the North Atlantic Alliance. Portugal and Spain are part of the European whole and European cohesion and security will be advanced as they play their important part in this defensive union of Western Europe.

Mr. van der Sanden's report on behalf of the General Affairs Committee is remarkably incisive. I pay tribute to him and it. It is a welcome reminder that WEU is developing as the vital body that it should be and of some of the things that remain to be done to ensure the proper working and influence of WEU. In the Assembly we continually question whether our function is properly understood in our own countries, and the report by Mr. Shelton which we debated yesterday highlighted our interest in young people in that regard. The British Foreign Secretary emphasised that one of our tasks is to improve that understanding. It is just as well that the report reminded us of WEU's responsibilities

Mr. Rathbone (continued)

to debate and decide how best to share the burden of defence and its cost and our commitment to contribute jointly to the control of the international arms trade and nuclear proliferation and to international and inter-regional efforts to reduce the numbers of nuclear and conventional arms and chemical and biological means of aggression from the Atlantic to the Urals and beyond. In this, Spain and Portugal have a special contribution to make, drawing on their linguistic, cultural and trade ties with many parts of the world outside Europe, including the western hemisphere. Together we must struggle with the uncertainties about what is the European part of a European defence policy which is also Atlantic, just as North American members of NATO must struggle with uncertainties about what is the American part of an Atlantic defence policy which is also European.

As Mr. van der Sanden's report clearly shows, the main questions for WEU relate to the deployment of forces and the sharing of their costs, to the rôle of nuclear weapons and to disarmament and arms limitation. It does not explicitly deal with the question underlying all those matters, which is the joint and several assessment of the threat – what it is, how strong it is and where it comes from. Without such an assessment of threat it is impossible to plan sensibly the capability that is needed to counter it. The Assembly will remember that that question was faced fairly and squarely by Sir John Stokes's excellent report earlier this year. The assessment of threat should become an increasingly important part of our endeavours because it requires both political and military analysis – precisely the things that our Assembly should be competent to provide.

The future of the WEU analysis must embrace a new reality and a new definition of military security that moves away from the idea that the diminution of another's security automatically leads to an increase in one's own. That new approach can come about only through an improved East-West dialogue, based on realism to overcome East-West antagonism and the paralysing arms competition that has prevented both sides from considering even more important long-term questions.

The ABM and INF treaties, SALT and progress with START all show how we can reach arms control agreements with the Soviet Union but progress can be made only through practical negotiations and it will not be made successfully if the West is weak or divided and if there is no mutual interest in striking military balances at specifically agreed levels.

Later today, we shall be considering a report on disarmament. Perhaps the time has now come for the WEU Assembly to establish a com-

mittee specifically charged with arms control and disarmament matters. I ask the President and respective bodies seriously to consider that suggestion. Just as there is a growing appreciation of the economic interdependence of the developed and developing world – and international forums are being established and better used to ensure international action – so existing forums in which the issue of regional and world security can be considered must be ever better utilised. WEU is just such a forum.

As I said in a question addressed to the British Foreign Secretary, the peacekeeping function of the United Nations has largely failed to work because the United States and the Soviet Union have not allowed it to. With the changes taking place in the Soviet Union, there are signs that the Security Council is beginning to work in a way that has not been possible since the United Nations was founded forty years ago. Should not our reactivated WEU investigate ways in which we can relate more closely as a group of nations to the reinvigorated United Nations – each drawing upon and contributing to the strength of the other in a mutual effort to ensure continued peace?

Paragraph 71 of Mr. van der Sanden's report deals with a crucial point. It correctly stresses the importance of national representation at WEU being drawn from national parliaments. The Secretary-General underlined that point in his speech on Monday. The Assembly has repeatedly found that its real influence is through its members and their national assemblies, national ministers and national governments.

That is not remarkable because those ministers and governments retain prime responsibility for defence matters, for explaining defence activities to their own public, with the help of their parliaments, and for furthering the increase of open European armament markets and better co-ordinated and managed defence research in Europe. They are responsible for furthering disarmament and for confidence-building activities between defence partners and with Warsaw Pact countries. Only members of national parliaments have an established channel and direct contact with the ministers of those governments; if our WEU delegations were not composed of such members the influence of the Assembly would be weakened and government answerability to parliament and parliamentarians would be reduced. We in Europe should be more aware than others of where such erosion of accountability can lead.

The year 2000 is only 133 months away. The start of the 21st century will not automatically mark the start of a better and more peaceful world but it tends to concentrate our minds on what we can do in the interim to move towards such a world. The problems that matter are those that affect many people as opposed to relatively few, and are severe in their effect. The problems

Mr. Rathbone (continued)

that matter are the problems that are potentially solvable.

Western European Union is working on – and must go on working on – one of the most pressing of such problems, which is peace through security in Europe. Our continued reactivation must encourage their work to continue.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Antretter.

Mr. ANTRETTER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, if we take advantage of the occasion offered by today's presentation of a further fine report by Mr. van der Sanden, and of the thirty-fourth annual report of the Council, to review once again the state of WEU and of efforts towards a European security and defence policy, a very uneven picture is revealed.

For the first time since the formation of WEU, the co-operation of the WEU states in maintaining freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf and the subsequent joint mine-sweeping exercise in these waters have shown that the member states are fully capable of making important contributions to security in an area outside the NATO sphere. I consider this too was highly significant especially in relation to our American allies. So it may well be said that this action was WEU's first practical success in implementing the modified Brussels Treaty.

Since the Assembly last met in June this year, however, the most striking development has been the rapid and successful conclusion of the talks on the accession of Spain and Portugal, leading after only a few months to the signature of a protocol of accession between these two states and the seven previous member governments. We can only hope, Mr. President, that the procedure agreed for the entry into force of the accession does not take longer than the relevant discussions.

The question arises here why governments considered it proper to decide that acts of agreement should be required from all the countries concerned. Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty covering the accession procedure certainly does not demand this. Under this provision it would have been sufficient for the invited states to deposit instruments of accession with the Belgian Government. However, as an agreement procedure in nine Western European countries has been decided on, all those concerned should make every effort to avoid unnecessary delays in giving Spain and Portugal full rights to participate in the work of WEU at both parliamentary and government levels.

When addressing the German Delegation in Bonn on 25th November this year, Mr. Schäfer,

Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, described the signature of the protocol of accession of Spain and Portugal as the most important result of the latest meeting of the Council of Ministers in London.

However gratifying the outcome may be, this statement strikes me as being indicative of the uneven picture now presented by WEU. In many important areas complete stagnation continues to prevail. This is particularly true of the institutional and organisational problems associated with collocation, an impasse from which nobody apparently knows how to escape.

Turning to the political activities of the Council, Mr. van der Sanden properly draws attention to the vagueness of the information supplied by the Council. We are obviously still far from achieving the various goals of the platform of European security interests, the establishment of which seemed so promising. We constantly learn of the commissioning of new studies by the Council's various organs and working groups, and it is gratifying that the flow of information to the Assembly has become more rapid and abundant. I am thinking here especially of the highly instructive information letters which we have for some time been receiving from the Secretary-General.

More and more meetings are held by every conceivable private and public institution, at which politicians and members of governments introduce a succession of new proposals into the debate on European security policy. I might mention specifically the recent European meeting of the French Institute for National Defence.

These, gratifying in themselves, initiatives and public utterances, have, however, so far failed to instil any greater clarity into the public mind concerning a European concept of security and defence policy. The 30th November issue of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* carried an article on attempted European collaboration in defence matters, tellingly entitled "But they don't know what they want", and it is indeed difficult to refute this impression.

It cannot, I think, be sufficient to regard WEU as merely a talking-shop in which nothing is decided. The French President recently used the term "groupe d'impulsion" (ginger group). I once again agree with our Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Schäfer, that the member states will have to agree on a concept for the European pillar which goes beyond using WEU as a debating chamber.

This will certainly not be simple, but we have a fresh chance now, especially as governments have decided to revise the modified Brussels Treaty in the light of the accession of Spain and Portugal. Given the sensitivity of this enterprise,

Mr. Antretter (continued)

about which a great deal could be said, I will confine myself to a single issue: the future of our Assembly. For almost thirty-five years Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty has provided the basis for our Assembly. A great diversity of proposals for its amendment have come from various quarters. To return once more to the heading I mentioned in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*: we as an assembly should at least know what we want. We should reach a clear decision quickly and make our viewpoint known to the Council and governments so that we are not steam-rolled by developments controlled from elsewhere.

As I see it, there are two main questions. The first concerns the composition of the Assembly, and here I share Mr. van der Sanden's view that all proposals should be assessed according to whether they enhance or weaken the rôle of this parliament in terms of its contribution to the establishment of a European security policy. We must assume that the elements of such a policy will long continue to be decided in the member states, that is to say, by the parliaments and governments concerned, at national level. In the present situation, proposals which aim at transferring parliamentary control powers in security matters to the European Parliament can only weaken this parliamentary control capability, since a parliament elected and acting on an exclusively European basis can have no direct influence on national decisions.

I would be rather more prepared to associate myself with an idea such as that put forward by Mr. van der Sanden, where he says:

"Another possibility would be to accept that the word 'representatives' in Article IX could apply both to representatives and substitutes within the meaning given to these two words in the Assembly's Rules of Procedure. In this case it should be easy to reach agreement among the delegations that representatives to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe would be substitutes in the WEU Assembly and vice versa, thus allowing members of the double delegation from each country's parliament to be specialised."

In my opinion, this is a correct statement.

The second salient question concerns our rights and powers. Hitherto we have been a consultative body pure and simple, without any genuine decision-making or control functions. Do we want things to stay this way permanently, or should we not rather seize the present opportunity to demand improvements? Of course we must adopt a realistic attitude here, and only submit proposals which stand a chance of being implemented. It would be conceivable for the Assembly to be granted complete autonomy over

its internal affairs, including financial, administrative and staffing matters. But are there not other areas affecting the WEU organisation as a whole, in which the Assembly could and should have a say? For instance, why should the Assembly not play a part in deciding institutional issues and the question of collocation?

No doubt we still have a long way to go before we achieve genuine parliamentary control over a European defence and security policy, but I think that the moment has come for us to clarify our goals. Mr. van der Sanden has indicated that the issues concerning our Assembly are to be examined at the colloquy that the General Affairs Committee is organising in Florence at the end of March next year. Let us hope that we have enough time left!

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Rauti.

Mr. RAUTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I think it would be right for me also to begin with the major political event of this stage in the life of WEU, namely the accession of Spain and Portugal. As Italians, we welcome this accession with particular warmth. As I said, I will make this highly positive development my starting point and echo the words that President Goerens used when opening the session, i.e. that for WEU the accession of these two countries should not be considered as an end but a new beginning. It could be added, or rather I think it should be added, that now that we have expanded, now that a large part of Europe is in WEU, now that the issue of the security and defence of Europe as a continent involves the majority of its peoples and territory, this is more than ever the moment to reactivate and relaunch European union – and to do so in a real sense throwing off the attitude or outlook that accepts as established practice the marginalisation of WEU by comparison with the key rôle it and Europe itself should be performing.

To be clear and factual, I shall begin with the actual conditions in which the work of WEU and its structures and offices has been and is still being done. This hoary problem has been raised once again and it is referred to several times in the early part of Mr. van der Sanden's report, which has to be commended for its clarity on this point as well as the rest.

Before embarking on that issue, however, there is one thing that has to be stated: we are working to an incredibly low budget, in premises that are virtually impossible and in conditions where no WEU structure, office, or initiative can hope to thrive, be organised or really operate as is strikingly illustrated by the example of our agencies which have, pathetically, never had more than a paper existence.

None of this is the doing of some higher and inscrutable inimical fate, ladies and gentlemen, the truth has names, its origin is very clear: it fits

Mr. Rauti (continued)

into a scenario corresponding exactly with what was intended. What is happening, in my opinion, is clear proof of the "low profile" that it has always been the intention for WEU to have, carefully avoiding, by every possible means – including niggardly resources and premises found in a corner of an antiquated building – making it what it could have been and ought to be: Europe's structure for the defence and security of European territory and people.

Now, however, and this is the central point of my brief argument, we find ourselves as WEU and as Europeans facing an entirely new situation. Certain aspects of this new phase are to be found in the first lines of this report i.e. in the explanatory memorandum on the basis of which the Rapporteur outlines the prospects he sees for the enlargement and reactivation of WEU.

In particular he says that our study of European security must break new ground and that one of the major rôles of WEU will be to preserve the necessary cohesion in security, given the present prospects of détente and disarmament, without jeopardising the unity now being forged in other fields, the economic sector, for example. He adds that the so-called "globalism" of United States defence policy – in this connection you may recall Mr. Pontillon's report on the way this issue was discussed in the United States in the run-up to the presidential elections – if it were to become a reality, which appears probable, would mean a reduction in the United States military presence in Europe. It is already very clear – you only have to look at the records of the Atlantic Alliance – that the United States wants Europe to bear a greater share of the cost of joint security and also, as the Rapporteur points out, possibly to take on more responsibilities both in the defence of Europe and in the efforts necessary elsewhere in the world.

But this is not all. In addition to all the factors prompting Europeans to take on a new rôle, compared with the past and the way things have gone up to now, there is another major development which offers us a really unprecedented opportunity, namely the crisis in the Soviet Union.

It is true, ladies and gentlemen, as we have been reminded during this part-session, that the Soviet war machine still has vast superiority in conventional weapons. But history teaches us that war machines depend on the political will behind them – they are the instrument and operational arm of that will – and it is at the level of political will that the Soviet Union seems to be forced back in on itself by its internal crisis, faced as it is with strife and tensions of dramatic gravity and urgency over practically the whole area occupied by the peoples of Eastern Europe

and internally as well, from the Baltic to the Caucasus.

Now, unless this process of implosion is reversed, which appears highly improbable because politically a return to – shall we say – Stalinism or even pre-Stalinism is absurd, it may be expected that for the next few years there will be no Soviet threat to Europe in the form in which it has existed since the last war – to borrow the words of a prudent conservative like Mrs. Thatcher. This means that we are at the end of the cold war.

In this new scenario, European union has a great, exceptional and I would even say, historically important mission: to shoulder the complete rôle of Europe's defence and security structure so that, for the first time since the war, Europeans may be free to develop their own independent and specific policy as Europeans and among Europeans now able to decide their own future and destiny. It would no longer be simply a debating chamber but also, as the rules provide, a place where decisions or at least choices are made, and structural and political links forged.

If I were asked how this could be done in practice – not everything at once but how we could all start work on this together – I would, leaving sentiment aside which could sound rhetorical, point to the most concrete aspect i.e. armaments.

Through WEU, we could and should aim at setting up a common area for armaments, in the same way as we are presently preparing to set up a single European market after 1992. A political push in this direction was given in early November by the thirteen defence ministers in the Independent European Programme Group meeting in Luxembourg. A plan of action has already been drawn up with a package of practical measures to be taken in the next few years to promote the integration of the defence industry in the thirteen European countries.

Contrary to what was said on the first day in the Assembly, WEU should not be a complement, a sort of appendage to the Independent European Programme Group; on the contrary, it should become the central driving force and most active structure in the group doing more and better work in the two directions laid down in Luxembourg: making it possible for national firms to enter into competition for the award of external defence contracts over the whole continent and all-in co-operation in research and technological development. This is the high road we need to set out on without delay.

Two days ago, listening to the address by the Secretary-General, I was struck by his quotation from the Financial Times of 10th November last in which Ian Davidson, one of the top British journalists, wrote that his serious scepticism

Mr. Rauti (continued)

about WEU had changed to a much more positive view. The article went on: "When the seven member states dared to hold a private discussion of western arms control objectives two years ago they were roundly rebuked for insubordination by a State Department official."

We Europeans, as Europeans, must lift ourselves out of this, to my mind, degrading condition, and WEU offers the concrete means of doing so. We should make full use of it, remembering – in the light of such rebukes – that the first prerequisite is to end our dependence on arms supplies from the United States because Europe can, and must, make its own independent choices in this field as in the others. European union cannot seriously be on the agenda as long as this dependence exists, as was clearly brought out in Luxembourg and in figures looks like this: only 1% for France and 7% for Great Britain, but 33% for Germany, 44% for the Netherlands and Spain, 53% for Italy and 89%, the highest figure, for Turkey. These percentages do not represent just tens or hundreds, but thousands of millions of dollars, and apply to the whole of the post-war period – which may, thanks to WEU, have a happy ending for all of us Europeans.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Burger.

Mr. BURGER (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, Mr. van der Sanden's excellent report is so detailed and extensive that it is impossible to address all the problems raised. A choice of priorities has to be made and I will therefore restrict myself to the questions of restructuring and defence.

The problem of the WEU Agency clearly does not seem to be solved. The Council has still not replied to Recommendation 457, and the Secretary-General, Mr. Cahen, did not mention it in his otherwise much appreciated address on Monday afternoon.

Although in the accession of Spain and Portugal to WEU Mr. Cahen sees a significant and perhaps historic step in the growth of European solidarity in security and defence, he at the same time admits that, in the negotiations, there had to be in-depth discussions on substantive problems and legal issues.

While supporting this enlargement which Mr. van der Sanden thinks could become a new stimulus insofar as it will oblige the Council to answer questions still not settled after thirty-four years, I also take the view that the updating of certain fundamental texts of the modified Brussels treaty is an absolute necessity.

Another problem is that of collocation, which some ministers and parliamentarians as late as last year were presenting as a condition essential to any enlargement.

The former minister, Mr. Raimond, advocated that Paris should be the single seat of the ministerial organs. The present minister, Mr. Dumas, takes the view that here in Paris, alongside the parliamentary Assembly, there should also be a European institute of advanced security studies within the framework of WEU, but that the Permanent Council could remain in London.

In reminding you of the current disagreement at the highest level of the Community regarding the location of the European Parliament and its subordinate bodies, in which France and Luxembourg are strongly insisting on the legal position as enshrined in the undertakings of the Community governments, confirmed as they were at the Maastricht summit of 1965 and in the single act, I think we must also ask ourselves whether the battle over the collocation of WEU will not in the short or medium term divide member countries instead of uniting them in the solidarity we have to have.

The problem will obviously become more thorny still in the relatively near future when the enlargement now under way actually materialises so generating problems like that of the space available in this chamber.

Ladies and gentlemen, I believe that the Council of Ministers, which is alone competent to act, ought to be studying this question. Two years ago, during a visit to NATO headquarters in Brussels, the former minister, Mr. de Donnée, received us in the rue de Valois with the words: "You are now in the future capital of Europe." This brought a sharp reaction from some of the members of our committee, but Mr. de Donnée was probably saying out aloud what others were inwardly thinking.

Our Belgian friends seemed to have forgotten the old saying about biting off more than you can chew.

At Rhodes, Mr. Mitterrand insisted that the question of location should be included in the agenda for the next Council of the Twelve. The future will eventually throw more light on the collocation of WEU and it would be a mistake to neglect this problem at the highest level, that is to say in the WEU Council of Ministers.

Turning to the problems of security and the European pillar of the alliance, Mr. van der Sanden rightly drew attention to the unflattering remarks about WEU by President Mitterrand for one – "WEU needs reorganising" – and Chancellor Kohl for another, who considers there is plenty of talk about a European pillar of the alliance but no concrete progress. I am sorry to observe that political disinformation is to be found in the West too, even at the highest government level.

Even so, ladies and gentlemen, it is my view that co-operation between these two historical

Mr. Burger (continued)

enemies, France and Germany, based on an economic and financial council on the one hand, and a defence and security council on the other, will not be an obstacle to our defence platform provided that arms co-operation operates at the European rather than the exclusively Franco-German level.

In this context Mr. Caro has referred to the "hard core" of European defence. The setting up of a flexible organisation for arms co-operation and the creation of an institute for security studies suggested by France could help reinforce the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. It would provide a forum for joint deliberations by the representatives of the WEU member countries on the overall problems of European defence. Students, diplomats, representatives of the private sector and military figures could all be invited.

It is my opinion that, militarily speaking, we have to keep on our guard towards the East; the reason is that perestroika has not yet been translated into cuts on military spending in the USSR. Only if the European pillar is very strong will it be able to advance the dialogue between the two – East and West Europe – with an eye to their possible rapprochement in the medium term.

As far as burden-sharing in the Atlantic Alliance is concerned, the Council has failed to respond despite the United States Assistant Secretary of State's visit to the European capitals of the alliance.

When our General Affairs Committee visited Washington, we found that the United States Congress looked on burden-sharing as a serious problem.

The American public, impressed by the tranquillising image of the USSR projected by Mr. Gorbachev, could well cause the politicians to reduce the United States contributions to the Atlantic Alliance. These already decreased at an annual rate of 2% from 1971 to 1985, whereas the European members of the alliance increased their contributions by an average of 2% over the same period.

It must be remembered that the United States budget covers not only NATO but also strategic and nuclear weapons and the defence of the Pacific. In our discussions with Ms. Pat Schroeder of the United States Defence Department, we were unable to find out just how much went to NATO.

So the transatlantic dialogue will go on with each of the two camps endeavouring to persuade the other of the force of its arguments.

As for the Council of Ministers, whilst it has not given the Assembly full satisfaction, we nevertheless have to admit there has been an improvement in the supply of information to say nothing of the beneficial effect of the information letters from the Secretary-General, Mr. Cahen, on the activities of the intergovernmental organs.

I will conclude by expressing the wish that, at every level, our organisation may finally speak and act in unison so that WEU may emerge from the shadows and take a responsible and active part in the security and defence of the old continent – without disturbing the peace of mind of Mr. Pannella, of course!

Ladies and gentlemen, I renew my thanks to our Rapporteur, Mr. van der Sanden, for the work he has done and I support the draft recommendation on the reactivation and restructuring of WEU.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Katsaros, Observer from Greece.

Mr. KATSAROS (*Observer from Greece*). – I, too, congratulate the Rapporteur on his excellent report. However, I should like to make some comments and observations on Chapter V, which is entitled "WEU and the European Community".

First, I draw attention to an inaccuracy in paragraph 65, which states: "Several of the Twelve, such as Greece, Ireland and Denmark, are not members of WEU, nor are they candidates for accession. This precludes any early merger between WEU and the Twelve." In fact, Greece, in February 1987, formally expressed her interest in becoming a member of WEU. The Greek Government made that formal application at the Assembly's meeting on 28th April 1987, when Mr. Poos mentioned it in his address. In addition, the substitute, Mr. Kapsis, formally made an official request for Greece to join. On several occasions in this Assembly I have also referred to that request.

The Rapporteur has expressed the view that all countries of the European Community should be members of WEU. If all the countries of the European Community are not invited to join WEU, if they so wish, there would be a potentially damaging distinction between those countries that participate and those that do not. Far from strengthening the cohesion of the European countries, such a distinction could result in a situation that would not be conducive to European construction. I again repeat that the desire of Greece to join WEU is firm, and we hope that all

Mr. Katsaros (continued)

the other European Economic Community countries will help us realise that objective.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Tascioglu, Observer from Turkey.

Mr. TASCIOGLU (*Observer from Turkey*) (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. President.

With reference to Mr. van der Sanden's very detailed report, I am taking this opportunity to explain briefly Turkey's position on the process of revitalising and enlarging WEU. Truly, I should have been much happier and more reassured had the report contained some slight reference to my country's request for membership. However, the decision of the Council of Ministers to keep this request on the agenda and to continue to give it close consideration inspires the hope that there will be other opportunities for discussing the matter in this forum.

Since the process started, in keeping with its traditional policy of involvement in movements aimed at European political, economic and social integration, Turkey has followed the efforts devoted to strengthening the European pillar of western defence and, within this framework, reactivating WEU, with the closest possible interest.

At it is common knowledge, I shall not go into details on Turkey's rôle in European defence and the importance of the flanks in maintaining the security of the area at the centre. I will simply point out that, as soon as the move towards extending membership of the organisation to other members of the alliance became apparent, we immediately made known our readiness and desire to join WEU. Again, following the adoption of the platform on European security matters, we were quick to notify the presidency that the undertakings contained in the approved document were at one with the fundamental principles of Turkey's foreign and defence policies.

In so doing, and with the principle of the indivisibility of European security in mind, we were convinced that the security and defence of Europe could not be envisaged without Turkish participation and that Turkey could not be absent from a forum where the various aspects of European security would be shaped. We are fully aware of the importance of strengthening the European pillar for the future of western defence and we are convinced that Turkey will make a substantial contribution towards that common objective.

As all members here will know, the WEU Council considered our application at its recent meeting in London. Turkey, as a full and unconditional member of NATO responsible for

defending 37% of the common frontier with the Warsaw Pact countries and fully supporting The Hague platform, is more than qualified to take part in the defence of Western Europe.

Though we do not yet have the Council's official response, the presidency's press statement reflecting the consensus of the ministers that Turkey's application for membership deserved serious consideration was deemed to be a first small but positive step towards our accession. I am sure that this final objective will be attained in the light of the values which we share with Western Europe and that it will be one of the components of our collective defence.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Cetin, Observer from Turkey.

Mr. CETIN (*Observer from Turkey*). – I begin by thanking Mr. van der Sanden for his comprehensive report. No one could doubt the importance of East-West relations and the recent initiatives on European security and defence. WEU has played an important rôle in these matters and it will play an even more important rôle in the future.

Several factors lead to the search for new patterns of European security co-operation. They include recent developments in the international scene, opportunities provided by the remarkable economic recovery and development of Western Europe and the challenges of post-INF security. Within that framework, the importance of the reactivation and enlargement of WEU is obvious. It is my sincere wish to live in a world in which we need neither the Warsaw Pact nor NATO, but a real and stable peace seems far away.

We sometimes observe a tendency for defence planners to focus on the threat to the central region and to try to evaluate NATO's security policy and strategic calculations according to that mistaken priority. Those who adopt such an approach fail to realise that the defence of the central region cannot be considered in isolation; it must be considered with that of the southern and northern regions.

Let me say a few words about my own country. Turkey has the second largest army in NATO, located in a critical region. It plays an important rôle – between East and West as well as between north and south. In spite of the heavy burden of joint defence, Turkey has contributed – and will continue to contribute – to the defence of Europe. Because of Turkey's important rôle in NATO, we firmly believe that our accession to WEU will make an important contribution to the European integration effort in security matters and that the enlargement process should not bring the principle of indivisibility of defence into question.

Mr. Cetin (continued)

As all members of the Assembly know, Turkey has shown the wish to be a member of WEU. It has accepted both the treaty and the platform. Turkey was clearly another candidate for membership after April 1987. We hope that the Assembly will call for the accelerated accession of Turkey to WEU, and that it will bring the issue once more to the attention of member governments.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Caro.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – I first wish to thank our colleague, Mr. van der Sanden, and the General Affairs Committee for the excellent report they have tabled and the draft recommendation, which I unreservedly support. I hope it will be adopted with a very large majority as it is another document conducive to frank speaking, and it is by telling the truth that we shall make ourselves understood inside and outside WEU.

The accession of Spain and Portugal demonstrates that reactivation is working. Had there been no reactivation, no country would have taken an interest in us, and it was in this chamber that we argued for enlargement to include the Iberian peninsula as one of the conditions essential to the reactivation of Western European Union.

At the same time it establishes a kind of north-south equilibrium with a wider opening towards the south of Europe and the Mediterranean. I fully understand the remarks made by our colleagues from the Mediterranean and, even, eastern Mediterranean area. I refer especially to our Turkish and Greek friends.

It is indeed vital that the European union of tomorrow, to which The Hague platform and the single European act expressly refer, should emerge from an initial consensus within WEU.

I have never counted myself among those who considered membership of the European Community to be a prerequisite for accession to WEU. I have always taken the line that, bearing in mind the commitments we entered into under the Brussels Treaty within the Atlantic Alliance, to be a member of the European Community it was first necessary to support the aims of WEU and therefore the defence plans defined in the framework of the alliance. Today neutrality is no longer possible – at least not in our fields of responsibility.

I go along with what is said concerning our relations with the Council; there is just one point I would like to stress. There are many ways, some off the record and others official, of communicating with the Council. The fact remains that, at least once a year, it needs to be possible for there to be contact with a broadened repre-

sentation of the Assembly, say the Presidential Committee, the General Affairs Committee or the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. We also need to have on the Council benches other members in addition to the Chairman-in-Office, his country's Foreign Secretary, and just diplomatic representatives from the others.

It would be good to have the heads of the foreign affairs departments of the various member countries present and to hold a balanced discussion with them. We have done this in the past and had some most inspiring meetings, their interest greatly enhanced by the presence of several ministers. I would like the Council to consider this possibility, which could, I think, be fruitful for both sides.

With regard to the coproduction of armaments, our Rapporteur rightly refers to the need to be kept informed of the work of the Independent European Programme Group. May I stress, Mr. President, the great value of this group in which the Assembly has always taken the closest interest, not merely as a source of information on harmonisation, coproduction and joint arms production and marketing policy, but also as a means of ending a number of structural inconsistencies within WEU.

We cannot defend the cause of European union in the field of security if we do not also meet all the conditions necessary to achieve economic and financial solidarity as well. There is constant talk about burden-sharing. I am sure that it would be extremely enlightening to follow the example of Mr. Delors at the Commission in Brussels and prepare a set of accounts here in WEU, with of course the vital help of the Council of Ministers, showing what we might call "the cost of not achieving European co-operation in the coproduction of arms", in which we would add together all the financial and commercial losses over the years as the result of our inability to harmonise policy, achieve maximum savings and produce only what we can produce and sell to meet our common defence and arms requirements.

When reactivation was launched in Rome in 1984, the Council included among its essential points – and I referred to this on the first day of this part-session – the need for the WEU Council of Ministers to give political stimulus for the coproduction of arms. It is essential that we achieve this goal, and the day we are able to say how much we have overspent in financial terms, i.e. how much we have wasted, the day we are able to work out how much Europe's failure to co-operate in the coproduction of arms has cost and hence the amount we would otherwise have been able to put in the balance to relieve our main NATO ally, the United States of America, I am sure even Senator Nunn will change his mind

Mr. Caro (continued)

and admit that the financial input in Europe could be infinitely more cost-effective.

The French Minister for Foreign Affairs has reminded us of the proposal for a research institute in security matters. It needs to be said that for years the Assembly has been clamouring for a research body, a powerful instrument enabling us to participate in the process of European construction, especially in the defence field.

However, Mr. President, if you will allow me to address these words to our Rapporteur who, I know, shares my opinion, it is my earnest wish that we should take every step to avoid a kind of university research institute springing up alongside our own organisation. What we need in the European context and under the umbrella of WEU is a true European institute of advanced defence studies, something like what we already have in France, which is the model the proposal is based on. What we need is a European IHEDN under the responsibility of WEU.

The revision of the treaty is on the table. The draft recommendation refers to this, for one thing as an aspect of enlargement. I sincerely hope that we shall be wise enough to confine the revision to the areas outlined by the committee and go no further. One of the great advantages that everyone refers to in the Brussels Treaty lies in its operative clauses in the opening articles. I would direct your attention to Articles V, VIII and IX. We must at all costs ensure there is no interference with nor questioning of this fundamental basis on which the Brussels Treaty and the alliance within WEU are founded. To open the door for re-examination of those articles would destroy the Brussels Treaty, and I do not think anybody wants that.

It is on this note that I wish to conclude, Mr. President. We are inching forward bit by bit, strengthening the belief in our capacity to create an operational European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. The day will come when we shall have to be prepared to see the alliance and NATO renewed, modernised and updated to meet the changing needs. Our objective as Europeans in that scenario is a partnership, in other words two partners face to face in the same room, round the same table, and in a single alliance, the Atlantic Alliance.

I refer again to the Franco-German agreement embodied in the treaty that has just been ratified by the national parliaments of those two countries. This adds a further stimulus to a concept which covers not only collective security and joint institutions but also an indissoluble alliance

with our American friends with whose help we have thus far avoided war and kept the peace.

The PRESIDENT. – The debate is closed.

6. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT. – I have received the nomination of Mr. Jean-Pierre Fourré for the vacancy currently existing for a vice-president of the Assembly.

The nomination is in order under Rule 10 (2) of the Rules of Procedure.

Under Rule 10 (7) of the Rules of Procedure, provided there are no objections, Mr. Fourré may be elected by acclamation.

Are there any objections?..

There are not.

I therefore declare Mr. Fourré elected Vice-President.

Under Rule 10 (7) of the Rules of Procedure, the Vice-Presidents take precedence in accordance with their age, namely: Mr. van der Werff, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Sarti, Mr. Soell, Mr. Pécriaux, Mr. Fourré.

7. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT. – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. The reactivation and enlargement of WEU – reply to the annual report of the Council (Replies to speakers and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1163, addendum and amendments).
2. Disarmament – reply to the thirty-third annual report of the Council (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1158 and amendments).

Are there any objections?..

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?..

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 1 p.m.)

ELEVENTH SITTING

Wednesday, 7th December 1988

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. The reactivation and enlargement of WEU – reply to the annual report of the Council (*Replies to speakers and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1163, addendum and amendments*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. van der Sanden (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Ahrens (*Chairman*), Mr. Pieralli, Mr. Reddemann, Mr. van der Sanden, Mr. Ahrens, Mr. van der Sanden, Mr. Ahrens.
4. Exchange of armed forces personnel between the national units of the individual member nations (*Motion for a recommendation, Doc. 1171*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Hitschler, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Ahrens.
5. Disarmament – reply to the thirty-third annual report of the Council (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the*

Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1158 and amendments).

Speakers: The President, Mr. Tummers (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Scovacricchi, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Ms. Ruddock, Sir Dudley Smith, Mr. de Beer, Mr. Hardy, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Hill, Mr. Scheer, Mr. Klejdzinski, Mr. Balligand, Mr. Jessel, Mr. Tummers (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Kittelmann (*Chairman*), Mr. Pieralli, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Mr. Tummers, Mr. Kittelmann, Mr. Klejdzinski, Mr. Tummers, Mr. Klejdzinski, Mr. Reddemann, Mr. Kittelmann, Mr. Tummers, Mr. Reddemann, Mr. Tummers (*point of order*), Mr. Hardy, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Tummers, Mr. Kittelmann, Mr. Hardy (*point of order*), Mr. Tummers (*explanation of vote*), Mr. Hardy (*point of order*).

6. Changes in the membership of committees.
7. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 3.15 p.m. with Mr. Pécriaux, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

3. The reactivation and enlargement of WEU – reply to the annual report of the Council

(Replies to speakers and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1163, addendum and amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the reactivation and enlargement of WEU – reply to the annual report of the Council, replies to speakers and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1163, addendum and amendments.

I call Mr. van der Sanden, Rapporteur.

Mr. van der SANDEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I will begin by thanking all those who have spoken this morning most sincerely for their approval of my report. It has undoubtedly done me good to see the Assembly so united in its view of the problem uppermost in our minds at the moment.

My plan is to follow up the remarks of the various speakers and, where necessary, to make

1. See page 34.

Mr. van der Sanden (continued)

just one comment, for the simple reason that, I am pleased to say, I have heard so much approval that just the odd comment here and there will suffice.

I come first to Mr. Reddemann's statement this morning. He focused on the problem of informing the public. In so doing, he made a rather strange remark: he said the Council of Ministers regarded the Assembly as a kind of public relations organisation for our electors, our citizens in the nine future countries of WEU. We know that in the past the Council of Ministers has allotted a special task to the Assembly where the provision of information to the public in our nine members states is concerned. On the other hand, I feel the word "distrust" used by Mr. Reddemann, though well-intentioned, may not be entirely appropriate, because the Council of Ministers must, of course, realise that they have their own specific task when it comes to disseminating information. It was precisely on this point that I criticised the Council of Ministers this morning, because after the Council's meeting on 14th and 15th November in London, not so much as a press release was issued to give us some information on the substantive problems – because that is what the meeting was for, not the accession of Spain and Portugal – on which the Council of Ministers had or had not made decisions. That too is worthwhile information. I am just as disappointed about this as Mr. Reddemann.

Mr. President, Mr. Reddemann also commented on the position of the Permanent Council in London. He said it might be a good idea if the directors of political affairs in the various foreign ministries were together to form the new Permanent Council.

All I can say to Mr. Reddemann at the moment is that I have no firm opinion on this as yet. He may well be right, but on the other hand, I would warn against the risk of losing a great body of knowledge accumulated by the members of the Permanent Council – the ambassadors in London – since reactivation in 1984. Of course, the knowledge can be transferred, and I believe that the directors of political affairs in the ministries are also very well informed, but we would then be operating at a somewhat different level, the level of civil servants, while the ambassadors have a rather different status from the directors-general for political affairs. I am not saying "No" to his suggestion, but to say "Yes" at this stage would be going a little too far for me. I can assure the Assembly that Mr. Reddemann's suggestion, which is not completely new to me because I have heard something similar in this Assembly in the past, will be taken up in the next

report submitted to the Assembly by the General Affairs Committee.

Mr. President, the question of collocation has been touched on by almost all the delegates this morning. As I said in my introductory statement, Sir Geoffrey Howe also referred to this matter in his capacity as Chairman-in-Office of the Council of Ministers. It seems rather difficult for me, as Rapporteur, to say anything concrete about this at the moment. We heard this morning that a large majority of the Council had tabled a particular proposal, which one member state had turned down as unacceptable. So this is our current political situation. I pointed out this morning that I see this as being linked to the question of the new institute to be established. This point is causing me particular concern, because it is simply making the collocation problem more, not less, difficult to solve. Both President Mitterrand and the French Foreign Minister have emphasised that the new institute must be located in Paris. Mr. President, the question of collocation should also be seen in the light of the review of the modified Brussels Treaty and the Paris Agreements. Let me be very frank and very clear about this. In the present circumstances I do not expect the Council of Ministers to be able to take a decision simply on the basis of what was set out in the platform. The Council of Ministers will want to see this in the context of the revision of the treaty. This means it will be some time before we see the Council deciding on this. This does not alter the fact that our Assembly's task is clearly to continue exerting the necessary pressure. As the Assembly knows, I find it very difficult to accept that the Council takes decisions and is then unable to implement them.

Mr. President, Mr. Rathbone said he felt there should have been a section in the report on threat assessment, but he added that Sir John Stokes had recently drawn up a report on this subject. That was precisely why we of the General Affairs Committee did not think it was our business to include a passage on this subject, which is more a matter for the committee dealing with defence and disarmament.

Mr. Rathbone also proposed the establishment of a committee specifically charged with arms control and disarmament matters. Since he put the question to you, Mr. President, I feel it would be inappropriate for me to answer: I shall leave that to you and the Presidential Committee. I do not think such matters should be referred to the General Affairs Committee.

Mr. President, Mr. Antretter made a very compelling statement which appealed to me greatly. I am very grateful to him. His argument coincided with my report and my explanatory comments on it. He and I agree on the subjects that have been broached, which means that the General

Mr. van der Sanden (continued)

Affairs Committee and the Assembly are in agreement. I do not think we shall have many problems with this. We also agree on the concept of security that WEU must take as a basis.

Mr. Antretter then commented on the question of the delegations, linking this with the revision of the Brussels Treaty under consideration by the Council of Ministers and the Permanent Council. He made an urgent appeal to the Council of Ministers to give the Assembly a say in the amendment of the treaty. I put a rather more cautious version of the same request to the Council of Ministers this morning, so there is no difference of opinion here either. I am, of course, very curious to see how the Council of Ministers reacts, perhaps through the Secretary-General's two-monthly letter. Before the treaty and the associated protocols are amended, the various aspects will have to be put to the governments. The Assembly must have a say in this. The argument developed by Mr. Antretter coincides with the one I explained this morning.

Mr. President, a particularly difficult point was raised by two parliamentarians from Turkey, who are here as observers. They made quite a clear plea for Turkey's accession to WEU. I do not want to say much about this today. I note that relations between Turkey and Greece are improving considerably at the moment, which I believe to be an essential precondition for further talks with Greece and Turkey about their accession to WEU. For the moment I will say no more than that relations are improving. The future outcome may be crucial to our further discussions on accession.

I was pleased to hear Jean-Marie Caro's contribution to this debate. He made it clear that reactivation must make progress and that contacts between the Assembly and the Council of Ministers must be stepped up. I myself have certain ideas about this. I will be very careful over what I say now, because this is a sensitive issue, but I will say what is in my mind. I am not too happy about the developments for which this Assembly is itself responsible, namely the fact that contact between the Council of Ministers and the Assembly in the last eighteen months to two years has been primarily through the Presidential Committee. The Rapporteurs, who are directly involved in the decisions taken by the Permanent Council and by the Council of Ministers, are not being included in these contacts. I tell you quite frankly, I am not very happy about this. The result is that information no longer flows from the Council of Ministers to the Assembly through the Rapporteurs but through the Presidential Committee. I feel this has gone too far and it is time for the Assembly to discuss it, as this situation cannot and must not continue. Things must change. I well remember how

it was in the past, when as Rapporteur I was most emphatically involved on a few occasions at a meeting of the Council of Ministers, where we were able to discuss the interests that we must jointly safeguard.

Mr. President, my final comment concerns the institute. I have not hesitated to raise this matter today. It is possible – I say this to Mr. Caro – that WEU needs an institute of this kind. All I wondered this morning was whether this should be done on the lines proposed in recent weeks by President Mitterrand and the French Foreign Minister. I feel there are other ways. We would do better to link it with the work of the single agency, whose terms of reference have not yet been definitively settled. If we took this course, the single agency could be a study centre serving both the Assembly and the Council of Ministers, which would provide a solution to the problems now before the Council of Ministers.

Mr. President, various members spoke about the finances which directly affect our Assembly in connection with the enlargement. I need say no more about this. The problems are clear to us all.

I will conclude by underlining Mr. Caro's comment that we are constantly taking a step in the right direction, in the direction of closer co-operation within Europe, as well as between the Council of Ministers and the Assembly. Like him, I expect it will not be long, once the Council of Ministers has taken the decisions it has to take – which undoubtedly include the political amplification of The Hague platform – before we sit down at the same table as equal partners, to the benefit of the peace and security which we, as the European pillar within the Atlantic Alliance, wish to uphold.

(Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Ahrens.

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I would first of all like to associate myself with all the previous speakers in thanking Mr. van der Sanden for the thoroughness of this report. If I remember rightly, this is the third report that you have presented, Mr. van der Sanden. Your reports therefore provide us not simply with an instant snapshot of the state of our organisation, but with a survey over quite a long period. I am especially grateful for this and for the fact that you will also be presenting the next report.

This session is the first following the ministerial decision on the accession of Spain and Portugal, and I am very pleased that this accession, which the Assembly has warmly advocated for years, has now actually come about. We should

Mr. Ahrens (continued)

remember that this accession has been made possible by the preliminary work of the very successful Netherlands presidency, for which I would again like to express my special thanks. I hope that within a reasonable time it will also be possible to reach a positive decision regarding the candidatures of other European states, as soon as the formal and practical conditions for accession have been met.

Mr. President, it has already been pointed out several times that we should be considering the future development of Western European Union. This was why yesterday morning – I think rightly – we rejected a request for urgent procedure which would have pre-empted aspects of these deliberations. Nothing is less compatible with urgent procedure than these complex deliberations concerning the future development of our organisation.

It is important that the Assembly should take part in these deliberations at the earliest possible stage – I mean from the word go – since they concern the position of the Assembly and its members, the parliamentarians of WEU.

Compared with the European Parliament and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the WEU Assembly is in the weakest institutional situation. I believe that we should demand to be put on the same footing as the European Parliament. We need greater autonomy and a more assured and stronger institutional position. We also need improved external conditions.

In this connection I will say a word about the idea of an institute introduced by the French. Without wanting to say anything conclusive about this proposal for the moment, I do favour one aspect of the suggestion, namely that this institute should also be at the disposal of the Assembly. It is a fact that we urgently need an institution available to the Assembly which is free from government instruments. We should also keep this requirement in mind in the forthcoming deliberations on a revision of the WEU treaty.

Mr. President, the committee debated this report thoroughly. There were several suggested changes which were discussed in the course of the proceedings and incorporated into the report, which I now ask the Assembly to accept.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now examine the draft recommendation on the reactivation and enlargement of WEU in Document 1163.

I have six amendments which will be considered in the following order: Amendment 1 tabled by Mr. Pieralli and Amendments 2, 3, 4 and 5 tabled by Mr. van der Sanden.

Mr. Pieralli, Mr. Greco and Mrs. Francese have tabled Amendment 1 which reads as follows:

1. Redraft paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft recommendation as follows:

“ Considering that the positive trend in the international situation and the forthcoming stages of East-West relations imply that Western Europe will have to assume special responsibilities in the negotiations on the reduction of conventional weapons to ensure its security, promote disarmament and contribute to international peace; ”

I call Mr. Pieralli.

Mr. PIERALLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the wording of the amendment which we proposed, as revised by the committee with our agreement, has been approved by the majority of the committee and includes two additions to the draft recommendation. First, the amendment describes developments in the international situation as positive, which seems to me undeniable. Second, the revised amendment refers specifically to negotiations on conventional armaments in Europe, which are to open at the end of next January, and emphasises the special responsibilities of Western Europe in these negotiations, which I also feel to be undeniable because it is the strategic stability of our continent that is at issue.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Mr. Reddemann.

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – It is our impression, Mr. President, that the purpose of this amendment is to separate Europe from its allies, that is from the United States and Canada. Had the amendment proposed that we should assume these major responsibilities jointly with our transatlantic allies, I would readily have endorsed it. As it stands, however, approval might give a completely false picture of the Assembly's previous decisions, and I therefore oppose acceptance of the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the opinion of the committee?

Mr. van der SANDEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, given the view expressed in paragraph (i) of the preamble, I do not, as Rapporteur, see the need for this amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman of the committee.

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the committee discussed this amendment this morning and a

Mr. Ahrens (continued)

majority decided in favour of its acceptance. The votes were 10 in favour of the amendment, 6 against and 1 abstention.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put Amendment 1 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 1 is agreed to.

Mr. van der Sanden, the Rapporteur, has tabled four amendments, Amendments 2, 3, 4 and 5, which read as follows:

2. Redraft paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation as follows:

“(vi) Welcoming the accession of Portugal and Spain to WEU;”

3. After paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert a new paragraph as follows:

“Noting that the nine signatory countries of the modified Brussels Treaty agree that a revision of the treaty is necessary;”

4. After paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert a new paragraph as follows:

“Considering that satisfactory application of Articles V, VIII and IX of the treaty means effectively deleting or updating the protocols to the Paris Agreements that no longer meet European security requirements;”

5. At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:

“Undertake without delay an examination of those provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty whose deletion or revision it considers necessary and inform the Assembly of the results of that examination.”

Mr. van der Sanden, do you agree to present Amendments 2, 3, 4 and 5 together?

Mr. van der SANDEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, there is no problem. These amendments stem from the fact that the original report and recommendation drawn up by the General Affairs Committee came into being before the meeting of the Council of Ministers on 14th and 15th November. This meant that we had to amend the report and recommendation to reflect the decision taken by the Council of Ministers on the accession of Spain and Portugal. These amendments stem solely from that decision. Apart from this, the committee did not have time to adjust the recommendation accordingly. The amendments have all been approved unanimously by the General Affairs Committee.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendments?...

I call Mr. Ahrens, Chairman of the committee.

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – The committee discussed all these amendments this morning and is unanimous in advocating their acceptance.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I put Amendment 2 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 2 is agreed to.

I put Amendment 3 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 3 is agreed to.

I put Amendment 4 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 4 is agreed to.

I put Amendment 5 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 5 is agreed to.

We shall now proceed to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

Under Rule 33, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless five representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The amended draft recommendation is adopted¹.

4. Exchange of armed forces personnel between the national units of the individual member nations

(Motion for a recommendation, Doc. 1171)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is a motion for a recommendation on the exchange of armed forces personnel between the national units of the individual member nations tabled by Mr. Hitschler and others, Document 1171.

In accordance with Rule 28(4) of the Rules of Procedure, I call Mr. Hitschler to present his motion.

1. See page 36.

Mr. HITSCHLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I would ask your agreement to refer this motion to the General Affairs Committee. The recommendation concerns Part III of The Hague platform calling for improved training, but is also particularly aimed at promoting the idea of the reciprocal integration of WEU armed forces.

The creation of the Franco-German brigade gave rise to some short-lived irritation on the part of the other WEU member states. However, it has since been recognised that from the WEU standpoint such far-reaching collaboration can only be welcome, as this form of military partnership serves the security interests of the WEU member states. But collective action of this kind should encompass all the WEU member states, as the principle of integration is equally applicable to all. In the long term, therefore, a special relationship between the Federal Republic of Germany and France should not be the end of it: collaboration embracing the other member states as well is essential to implementation of the total WEU concept.

If part of the period of military service were to be spent in the forces of an alliance partner, this would provide a better insight into the command structures, the weapons systems and the internal management of the allied force. In the event of war, when units of different nationality working side by side have to perform combat functions in unison, this improved knowledge could confer significant advantages.

It therefore seems sensible to get the conditions established in peacetime for improved intermeshing, and not only at staff level. The motto "Learn your neighbour's language" should also be regarded as not merely culturally desirable but as a military necessity.

Questions arising from the practical implementation of the idea should be considered in a report. This could, for example, cover such issues as the exchanges to be arranged in peacetime, which must be on a voluntary basis. The exchange opportunities should apply to both conscripts and professional soldiers, including those with fixed terms of engagement. The period involved might be limited to, say, three months. The country of origin would continue to be responsible for pay and military jurisdiction.

All these questions of detail need closer examination and study. The appropriate clarification could be undertaken by the General Affairs Committee. I ask you to refer this recommendation to the General Affairs Committee.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against?...

I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I want to speak against the proposal only to the extent that, in my judgment, the matter should go to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, and not to the General Affairs Committee.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – This is for the Presidential Committee to decide, should the Assembly decide to have the motion for a recommendation included in the register of the Assembly.

Does anyone wish to speak on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments?...

I call Mr. Ahrens.

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, it is my belief that more than one committee has an interest in the proposal. First of all there is the question of political principle, which concerns the General Affairs Committee. The other issues addressed by Mr. Hirschler, including military jurisdiction and forces pay, are certainly not matters for the General Affairs Committee. The General Affairs Committee should debate the principles and prepare a report as a basis for further deliberation by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

On the question of principle we should therefore agree initially to referral to the General Affairs Committee, and we should then ask the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to take the matter further on the basis of this recommendation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The Assembly is no doubt agreed that this motion for a recommendation be included in the register of the Assembly.

Is there any objection?...

It is so decided.

In accordance with Rule 16 of the Rules of Procedure, this motion for a recommendation will be included in the register and referred by the Presidential Committee to the appropriate committee.

5. Disarmament – reply to the thirty-third annual report of the Council

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1158 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on disarmament – reply to the thirty-third annual report of the

The President (continued)

Council and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1158 and amendments.

I call Mr. Tummers, Rapporteur of the committee.

Mr. TUMMERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the report I now have to present on my committee's behalf gives a clear indication of the paradoxical circumstances in which this subject is now being discussed. I had the impression this morning that the Chairman-in-Office of the Council also felt the need to refer to these paradoxical circumstances. From moment to moment you can feel optimistic, experience certain reservations, feel obliged to withdraw your own desiderata, or move on, while ensuring that negotiations continue. Let me put it in more practical terms. None of the changes that have occurred since the meeting in Reykjavik has directly resulted in a consistent line being followed as regards armament and disarmament.

The report was presented at the beginning of the year in a completely different form. The Council's thirty-third report was, after all, long overdue, and a kind of vacuum had developed. We had two options: not to submit a report on the appointed date, or to present an interim report.

At its meeting in The Hague my committee decided to present an interim report to consider what changes in thinking on armaments and disarmament had been discussed since Reykjavik. The description given was not acceptable to the committee, which is also revealing as regards the circumstances in which we have been operating since Reykjavik. The Rapporteur's statements were not denied, but it was feared that, given the quantity of facts – the reports and information received and all the data that came to light – there was a greater need to stick to those facts which had emerged from the negotiations on armament and disarmament all over Europe.

Initially, then, the report was left as it was. Then it was felt that it should be presented as a more detailed picture of the committee's views. The Rapporteur acted accordingly. He tried to express the various opinions of the committee members. Did this make it any easier to avoid the paradox and lay down firm lines to define the subject? No. It is even difficult to recognise the main line adopted by the committee as a whole. What is the main direction being followed as regards disarmament efforts, arms control and concern with the visionary aspect that is to lead, as the ultimate objective, to a world without weapons where no further threat exists? To put it in more realistic and less visionary terms, what needs to be done about arms control to eliminate risks? Talking about arms control does, after all, mean that there is still a chance of an arms race,

because control does not ultimately exclude an arms race. The line that ensures stability in the arms situation must be sought between disarmament and arms control, or in a synthesis of the two. This stability must be achieved through the conclusion of satisfactory agreements on the basis of satisfactory negotiating conditions, which must include all aspects of control.

The paradox persists in the present, unstable situation: there will still be some arms reduction and some arms production. What should now be given top priority in order to achieve this negotiating situation, and why? How can we eliminate the paradox from history at this time? How can we achieve this stability with the minimum risk to peace and security? What goal are we pursuing?

The negotiating base must not only seek to establish but actually to realise this stability. We can achieve it by showing that we are willing to negotiate, by putting forward confidence-building proposals and by devising control measures for an accurate verification method, which may eventually make the dream of stability in the arms situation come true.

Many proposals can, of course, be made in this area. Between finding the key to the activities leading to the mutual no-first-use declaration on the one hand, and optimal reduction as the objective on the other hand, there are an enormous number of intermediate stages. There is, for example, a ban on nuclear weapons, keeping space weapons out of space, openly declaring military capabilities in all areas, reducing missile sites, opposing the arms race and reaffirming opposition to chemical weapons, a subject which will be on the agenda for the conference to be held in Paris in January. This conference will be attended by Iraq and Libya in addition to the countries taking part in the Geneva conference. The information we were given this morning at least reveals that the Iraqis have said that "no use" and "no intention to use" will be discussed on that occasion. We naturally hope that all this will be formulated more clearly and in greater detail in Paris in January and that Iraq and Libya can attend – arrangements for this are in hand.

This morning the Chairman-in-Office of the Council made an appeal to us concerning relations with the public. A paragraph of our draft recommendation is devoted to this subject and I would stress how much importance we attach to it. The superficial perceptions – and who can blame the man in the street if he cannot follow this complex subject matter other than superficially – are derived from a headline over a brief report on the results achieved in the field of arms reduction. The initial reaction to this is to say that defence will cost less. After all, we shall be making do with fewer weapons, so there will be

Mr. Tummers (continued)

something left over for other necessities: a nursery for a tank, one might say.

Public information is extremely important. The research carried out on behalf of this report revealed that the system of reduction and verification will not lead to substantial reductions in defence budgets. We must convince people that peace and security do not come cheap and we must add that they are worth whatever price we have to pay. We discussed these matters yesterday. The people we represent still know too little about the opinions expressed here and the recommendations which go to governments and must be implemented. It is terribly difficult to disseminate satisfactory information about this and to get it generally accepted. It is therefore very important for an institution like WEU to take appropriate action itself. It would be a good thing if the parliamentarians received proper backing from WEU. What matters is not composing reports or bringing the part-session to a satisfactory conclusion: what matters is to achieve results where peace and security are under threat.

I realise that the report raises many controversial issues. I therefore intend to regard the debate on it as a public debate, in which the pros and cons are set out and explained. The public must be given the chance to reach their own conclusions. That is why I prefer a report that contains extensive compromises to one that founders at the committee's doors.

THE PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is open.

I call Mr. Scovacricchi.

Mr. SCOVACRICCHI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the point I want to make in this brief statement is that if we are to tackle the problem of disarmament with realism and not reach hasty conclusions like “unilateral disarmament” we have to consider it in association with the major issues of co-operation and integration, East-West relations and internal European economic and political relations.

The aim of stability at the lowest possible level, as international relations intensify and develop, now seems more feasible and may well make it possible to harmonise peaceful values with security measures provided we identify and make good use of every possible resource. Italy, for its part, has contributed by redeploying the United States F-16s on its territory. European policy in these concrete moves towards arms reduction and at the same time towards security must in our opinion be fitted into a broader process also involving the Atlantic Alliance in the development of its relations with the USSR and the Warsaw Pact countries. The dual-track

strategy should not be changed therefore because so far it has given excellent results both in the negotiations on the reduction of conventional weapons now taking place in Vienna and in the signing of the Washington INF agreement on 8th December last year. These results, which show the value of the permanent forums and of negotiating from a position of strength, in no way imply passive submission to the Soviet initiative.

In our view this is the only way to achieve the 50% reduction in strategic nuclear weapons, a global ban on chemical weapons and the elimination of the enormous imbalance in conventional forces in Europe. This would be a real peace policy on which we could all agree and which we should all desire.

In this historic task, WEU, knowing that it has a fundamental rôle in the integration process and as a factor of stability on our own continent and in our vital relations with the Atlantic Alliance, a structure clearly complementary to ours, especially in the context of East-West relations, should act as a point of reference. WEU today, recently strengthened to a significant degree by the European platform on security interests currently being put into effect by the accession of Spain and Portugal and by the technical co-ordination of naval operations in the Gulf, is in the optimum position to meet the requirements of the time. It should also be recalled that the last phase of the Italian mine-sweeping mission to clear international shipping routes in the Gulf is a “WEU mission” and that – an even more significant fact – the navies of Europe have, to use the official term, operated “out-of-area”. So regardless of what the future of WEU is to be, we believe that our commitment and determination must not waver nor our pace be slowed. Thank you, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman.

Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I feel that a report entitled “Disarmament” should discuss disarmament. You have to read the draft recommendation through very carefully to find anything about disarmament. You will realise that I have serious objections, particularly to the recommendation and I shall therefore confine myself to discussing this. I shall not be making a general statement on disarmament. Considering the amendments I have tabled, it seems better to me if I concentrate on the draft recommendation.

The Rapporteur took as his starting point a sentence about The Hague platform. My party and I do not fully endorse The Hague platform, which is based on the necessity for nuclear weapons, in the interests of Western European security and defence. I cannot subscribe to this view, and accordingly I do not agree with the premise underlying the first paragraph.

Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman (continued)

During the debate with the French Foreign Minister, Mr. Dumas, and this morning's debate with the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, it was constantly reiterated that the possession and maintenance of nuclear weapons guarantee security. We are also repeatedly told that the INF treaty would never have been concluded had we not had nuclear weapons. This is stated as a truth, which is not questioned. I find it equally wrong to claim that the main reason for the Soviet Union's decision to come to the negotiating table for discussions on disarmament was its internal economic situation. I would not regard that as the truth, either. We all know that a combination of factors resulted in the opening of negotiations.

In paragraph 1 (a) of the draft recommendation, the Rapporteur proposes that priority should be given to conventional and chemical weapons in the negotiations. I would express no preference to that effect: I see far better prospects in parallel negotiations. There should be simultaneous negotiations on chemical and conventional weapons and nuclear weapons. What point is there in setting priorities before any thought has been given to parallel negotiations? I feel this is partly due to the lack of a cohesive view. In the West there is more of an ad hoc response and ad hoc attitude to things than a cohesive security policy. This is also why more and more new conditions, requirements and priorities are introduced. I feel it would be better to complete the negotiations on nuclear, chemical and conventional weapons than to set priorities where disarmament is concerned.

Time and again we hear talk of the eastern bloc's enormous conventional superiority. I think – and I am not alone in this – that this is an enormous over-estimation of the eastern bloc's conventional capacity, not to speak of the quality of conventional arms in the eastern bloc and the geographical position of conventional arms in the Soviet Union and the eastern bloc countries.

In paragraph 1 (b), the Rapporteur says that denuclearised zones would be a factor of destabilisation for European security. I entirely disagree with him on that. What is more, it seems to me that this may be an opportunity to take the confidence-building measure of agreeing on denuclearised zones on both sides. It is often made to look as if we were sacrificing something. So the point is that there should be a zone on both sides. I see a denuclearised zone as one way of taking a confidence-building measure. It forms an integral component of balance in Europe.

I find that paragraph 2 is couched in a kind of old-fashioned cold war language. It says that we should reply to Mr. Gorbachev by stressing that

we have long had a forum in which conventional arms and above all conventional disarmament are discussed. This is surely not the way to talk in a recommendation on disarmament. I feel it should be discussed in a positive way.

Paragraph 3 says that defence spending will not necessarily be reduced. This is an old argument. During the debate on Mr. van der Sanden's report this morning it was said that we shall be discussing defence costs for three days in Florence in March. But we have already been talking about them here for a terribly long time. I think something else should be said on the subject today. Judging by the terminology used in paragraph 3, it is more of the same old song: we can assume that there will be disarmament, but we must not tell the people that this will release money for other things. I at least wonder whether the way in which this is expressed also means that we have no plans at all to reduce defence spending. Last month the NATO ministers met in my country, the Netherlands, and discussed the new nuclear round. They let it be known that they would be considering the "modernisation or replacement of weapons", a misleading title in my opinion. I feel this amounts to an increase in nuclear weapons. The Lance is being replaced by an improved missile, a precision weapon which can be fired with a much heavier load. The F-16 aircraft are being equipped with target-seeking nuclear missiles instead of bombs to be dropped on the battlefield. They too have a much greater range, reaching as far as the limits of the medium-range missiles that have been abolished, and thus constituting a threat to the INF treaty. Furthermore, these missiles can be launched with much greater accuracy.

Mr. President, where the modernisation and replacement of weapons are concerned, we should not choose the weapons whose nuts and bolts have rusted through, as the Belgian Foreign Minister has just put it. He said: come back when we are talking about rusty nuts and bolts. No, I see this as the same old song from those who still want armament, new weapons under the cloak of modernisation and replacement.

Mr. President, it will be clear that I am not very satisfied with the recommendation that has been submitted. I hope the amendments I have tabled will produce a recommendation that really concerns disarmament and not an increase in the threat.

THE PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Ms. Joan Ruddock.

Ms. RUDDOCK (*United Kingdom*). – I congratulate the Rapporteur on his hard work and commiserate with him about the result; as a member of the committee, I know that that result does not represent his personal views.

Ms. Ruddock (continued)

The difficulties that the committee experienced in drafting the report reflect the lack of real consensus on security matters in Western Europe. It is somewhat ironic that while glasnost is revealing diversity of opinion in the eastern bloc, western governments are seeking to impose stultifying unity on their alliance partners. That has been evident in the final communiqué of every NATO meeting; it will be evident in Brussels later this week and it is evident in the report.

As Mrs. Baarveld said, the problem is at the heart of WEU and The Hague platform. Specifically it concerns the appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional weapons, the notion of nuclear deterrence and the assertion that only nuclear weapons provide an unacceptable risk. Historically, those who have argued the case and sought to justify a nuclear armed alliance have cited the conventional threat from the Soviet Union and that country's relentless pursuit of the nuclear arms race. The difficulty for nuclear weapons enthusiasts and, indeed, for WEU, is that Mr. Gorbachev has declared himself in favour of a nuclear-free world and willing to deal with conventional asymmetries.

Such proposals should have been systematically and objectively examined to determine whether they were in the West's interests. Many of us feel that if they had been so examined the next priority, alongside adjustments in conventional imbalances, would have been the removal of all short-range nuclear weapons.

NATO has consistently justified the deployment of short-range nuclear forces on grounds of Soviet superiority in conventional land forces. Clearly, that link exists, yet the report dismisses that same link for disarmament purposes and favours the prioritising of chemical weapons instead. What is the explanation? Can it be that supporters of paragraph 1 (a) no longer consider Soviet short-range nuclear weapons a threat or that they underestimate the effects on the Federal Republic of the use of such weapons by either side? Of course not. The only argument that they have been able to mount is that concerning the remaining conventional imbalance – an argument that would have been convincing had not the Soviets offered to redress that very imbalance.

There are no logical answers to the report's negative stance on this issue if it is genuine disarmament – in East and West – that we seek. Perhaps there is another agenda – the agenda of those who seek to maintain the cold war by more subtle means. They know that if the Soviet disarmament proposals in Europe are spurned or significantly delayed, the momentum behind the INF agreement will be lost. Sadly, I believe that WEU is being used to promote that agenda.

Nowhere is that more apparent than in the section of the report headed "NATO forces post-INF" where we are told of the great military utility of cruise and Pershing II and of the gap that will be left by their removal. How extraordinary that is when we have been told for nearly a decade that the reason for deploying cruise and Pershing was to persuade the Soviets to give up their SS-20s. If the SS-20s were a specific threat in 1979, that specific threat is now being removed and no mental agility can change that fact and provide NATO with a justification for circumventing the INF with so-called adjustments.

If WEU is committed, as it should be, to advancing western security interests, its committees ought to be able to look objectively at the dangers of a new upward spiral in the nuclear arms race. It is frankly juvenile simply to give modernisation in the Soviet Union as justification for that and it is disappointing that WEU cannot explore alternatives such as an East-West freeze on new deployments in the European theatre.

Instead of reiterating the Montebello decisions made in the cold war years, we ought to be examining the scope for postponing modernisation while further East-West disarmament discussions are pursued. In short, I believe that WEU ought to listen to the doves in Europe rather than the hawks.

That brings me to my final criticism of the report. Part III of the explanatory memorandum deals with attitudes to arms control and disarmament. The manner of its repudiation of unilateral action is well known to British socialists and it is as lacking in substance here as it is in our own country. No one to my knowledge advocates total unilateral disarmament by the West yet many, including the United Nations Secretary-General and defence specialists, both East and West, advocate unilateral initiatives. Indeed, it was President Kennedy's unilateral abandonment of atmospheric nuclear tests that led to the partial test ban treaty.

Some months ago, this Assembly failed to find a consensus on threat assessment. Today, I believe that it does not find a real consensus on disarmament. We should not be surprised nor even perhaps disheartened because of that, for we are witnessing the end of the cold war and with it that old order of cast-iron certainties. The report fails to reflect the new thinking that is taking place in Western Europe as in Eastern Europe. As such, it does a disservice to WEU. I believe that it must either be substantially amended by Amendments 5 to 8 inclusive or rejected by the Assembly.

THE PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Dudley Smith.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – Listening to Ms. Ruddock, a socialist parliamentary colleague of mine from Britain, one would think that there was no rearming going on in Russia. One would think that there was no modernisation. She has been consistent. She was previously chairman of the well-known – even notorious – Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in Britain. I am glad that it had little electoral response. It has been rejected at several general elections and I predict that it will be rejected again.

Questions of disarmament and defence come down to credibility. We have to ask whether the defence system of any country is credible, whether proposals for disarmament are credible, whether verification procedures are credible and whether offers made by various sides are credible. I believe that there are perilous paths ahead of us. Some of them were mentioned by Sir Geoffrey Howe in his excellent and realistic speech this morning but, nevertheless, I believe that those paths can be negotiated successfully.

Like everyone else in the Assembly, I welcome the better understanding between East and West and the more enlightened approach of the Soviets during the past year or two. Long may it last. There is, however, no way in which we can sit back and rely on the East's approach. If it crumbled, we would be in a serious situation. We all hope that that will not happen.

As I have said before, and as I shall no doubt say again, if we are unlucky enough to suffer a third world war, I believe that it will begin as a conventional war. It might escalate into a chemical exchange. We have heard again today that the Soviets outnumber us in chemical weapons. That is a matter of the gravest import for the world.

We also need intense disarmament activity in conventional forces to bring us somewhere near parity with the Soviet Union in such forces in the centre of Europe. I am pleased that the report talks of the need to maintain the strategy of flexible response with nuclear weapons. We must maintain a modern, effective and flexible nuclear deterrent but we must also bear in mind the fact that the Soviets are still modernising and reorganising their nuclear forces. I stand to be corrected, but as far as I am aware they are also modernising and reorganising their conventional weapons. Alas, there is no doubt that they greatly outnumber us in men, machinery and weapons.

Talking about the problems of NATO last weekend The Daily Telegraph reported: "So far no cuts in the Soviet defence budget and armament programmes have been detected." A sensible and realistic approach is being taken by most sensible politicians of the centre and the right. The same is true to some extent of the left, but not the extreme left. I believe that most poli-

tics recognise the chances that now offer themselves and the concomitant dangers.

Sir Geoffrey Howe, the press and others have mentioned the perception of the public, whom we represent. With the ambitious and useful approach of the Soviet leader, with the additional talks that have taken place and the undertakings that are now in step with the ideas advanced over the last year or so, many members of the public, superficially, no longer perceive a nuclear threat or danger. They believe that there may be no need for countries such as ours to spend as much money – let alone more money – on defence, because of the new enlightenment and the alleged new understanding by the Soviets.

Given that situation, it will be that much harder for all countries to sell to their electorates via their governments the need to be vigilant and prepared and to have the right defence mechanism. In those circumstances we as an Assembly have a distinctly educational job to do, continually reminding people that peace is always fragile and that it will be maintained only by credible deterrent forces in all our countries at Western European, and particularly at NATO, level.

If we do this, we shall be able to preserve the peace as we did in the cold war era, in what has now become a warmer and better climate but has many of the same dangers. We shall then maintain the peace well beyond our own time and into the time of our grandchildren.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. de Beer.

Mr. de BEER (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I will begin by saying how much I appreciate Mr. Tummers's report. It is a balanced report. I appreciate it particularly because it makes definite choices. What is our current situation? The INF treaty is being implemented so we now have to concentrate solely on disarmament, strategic armaments, the 50% reduction on both sides, chemical weapons, conventional weapons and short-range nuclear missiles. We obviously cannot tackle all these areas at the same time or, at least, not successfully. I feel one of the reasons for the success of the INF treaty is that we concentrated on the one aspect, disarmament. We did not try to do everything all at once. It seems to me that we should stick to this line and concentrate on certain priorities in the areas we still have to deal with.

During the debate on the INF treaty in WEU I pointed out that Western Europe is taking a great risk by accepting this treaty. The Warsaw Pact is clearly superior in the field of conventional strategic weapons. It is also clear that the elimination of medium-range missiles has simply made the imbalance even greater.

Mr. de Beer (continued)

I also said that we had to meet this risk with our eyes open. It now remains to be seen how seriously the Warsaw Pact is taking disarmament. If the Warsaw Pact shows a real willingness to accept an asymmetrical reduction in conventional weapons, belief in the sincerity of its intentions will be considerably enhanced. We must obviously therefore give priority to disarmament, conventional disarmament and disarmament as regards chemical weapons. Unless we do, the imbalance will simply become worse rather than better.

But there are other reasons for not giving priority to short-range nuclear forces. Firstly, we would be removing the incentive to the Warsaw Pact countries to make concessions in the conventional sphere. Secondly, the flexible response is still in great demand: it has not disappeared. By removing short-range missiles from Europe, we would be removing the first stage in the escalation of the flexible response. This first step is essential. If there were no more medium-range and short-range missiles in Europe, the flexible response would no longer be credible. The fact that the Warsaw Pact has twice as many short-range missiles as the alliance is irrelevant in this context. What is relevant is that these weapons are there and that the flexible response has substance. Eventually – let there be no misunderstanding about this – we shall also have to abandon short-range missiles. That goes without saying. But this should only happen when the Warsaw Pact is no longer superior in the conventional sphere. Once that is the case, the flexible response will no longer be needed.

One of the merits of the report is that it makes this choice clear. Amendment 6, on the other hand, seeks the opposite. If this amendment is adopted, it will clash with the whole tenor of the report. I do not think this Assembly will want to accept something so ridiculous.

Mr. President, the WEU Bureau had talks at the Soviet Embassy yesterday evening. The WEU delegation was headed by the President. The Russians were represented by an official from the Soviet Union's Department of Foreign Affairs. The talks were held in a satisfactory atmosphere. The surprise was that the subject of Mr. Tummers's report came up during the discussions. The Russian comment was, if possible, even more interesting. They described the report as constructive and felt able to endorse it in general terms. The only doubts they had concerned paragraph 1 (b), which they found incomprehensible, I will say something about this in a moment.

So we now find ourselves in an ironic situation. By tabling an amendment which seeks to push the report in a certain direction, some

members of the Socialist Group of WEU have moved further to the left than the Soviet Union. It seems to me that we do not need to be "plus royaliste que le roi", although I am afraid this saying no longer really fits the Russians, now that they have no Tsar.

I should just like to add a few words about Germany's position. We fully appreciate that, in the event of armed conflict, Germany would be a front-line state. That follows from its geographical situation. But I do not believe this should be used as an argument for giving priority to the abolition of short-range missiles. If there should actually be a nuclear conflict – God forbid – there is, of course, no question of the threat being to Germany alone. In such a situation enemy tanks would have penetrated hundreds of kilometres into Western Europe and its very existence would be at stake. If the nuclear step is ever taken, the nuclear battlefield will not be confined to Germany or the two Germanies. The whole of Europe would be the target. This cannot therefore be adduced as an argument for giving priority to the abolition of short-range missiles.

Mr. President, on closer examination I find the draft recommendation proper less satisfactory. This recommendation was considered in the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, the assumption being that Mr. Gorbachev would be proposing a new framework for the discussion of disarmament at the summit meeting in Moscow. This view was denied by Mr. Mandelevitich yesterday evening. When he was asked about it, he said that there was no intention of creating a completely new framework for disarmament talks: the intention was that a conference of this kind should provide some impetus in the right direction. The matter would then have to be worked out by the twenty-three countries involved in the CSCE talks. If that really is the intention – if all the amendment is seeking to do is to provide a stimulus, and if the intention is that the conference should be properly prepared – then I am rather in favour of Amendment 8.

The meaning of paragraph 1 (b) of the draft recommendation was clear when we discussed it in committee. The phrase "arms control measures should be global" is largely a reference to chemical weapons. Unfortunately, two subjects have been compressed into one sentence. The part of the sentence between brackets fortunately refers to nuclear weapons, though on closer examination I find it rather unfortunate. It causes misunderstanding. It caused a misunderstanding among the Russians yesterday evening. No amendment has been tabled with a view to improving the wording here, nor can one be tabled now. Perhaps the Rapporteur can make it clear in his reply that the intention is not, of

Mr. de Beer (continued)

course, to spread nuclear weapons throughout the world and that everyone is to be given the opportunity of operating at the same level.

In paragraph 6.8 of the report, the Rapporteur says: "A particular phenomenon of late has been the creation of special arms control departments in ministries for foreign affairs or the various ministries of defence of the member states. The creation of such departments is to be highly recommended." I welcome this comment and am surprised that it is not reflected in the recommendation, where I would certainly have expected it to be incorporated. Perhaps the Rapporteur can tell us why he has not done this.

(Mr. van der Werff, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. de Beer's last point was fascinating. The Rapporteur may have felt that the Assembly would be quite happy if we educated the unenlightened, but was perhaps less eager to ally himself with those with professional expertise.

I am, however, extremely pleased and grateful to Mr. de Beer for welcoming the INF. Like several other Assembly members, we give a much warmer welcome to the reality than we did to the initial proposition. I recognise, as does Mr. de Beer – it is recognised across the political spectrum – that this is arguably the most important debate of the week. Certainly the Socialist Group, on whose behalf I speak, recognises that.

I stress that Mr. Tummers has the approbation and respect of our group. We appreciate the considerable energy that he has devoted to the subject, which reflects his dedication to the cause of peace through negotiation.

Mr. Tummers would, I think, agree that he made enormous gestures to accommodate a wide base of opinion, but he will probably also accept that a number of us prefer the initial version that he presented to our committee to the one that has since emerged. Committee members will recall that during the last meeting but one, when we considered the report in detail, I said that I wished for a substantial amendment.

This morning Sir Geoffrey Howe suggested in a sporting metaphor that the Warsaw Pact countries were only just walking on to the pitch. He gave the impression that the West had long occupied that arena and were waiting impatiently to be joined. He did not say that the emergence of the Warsaw Pact does not seem to have commanded any pleased and eager enthusiasm among those already present. It seems to me,

indeed, that there is an excessive suspicion of sustained negotiations, which is scarcely encouraging, even if – as Mr. de Beer said – it is to be negotiation by stages. We are now due for the negotiation stage. We have had START and INF; what is next, and when? We should be trying to ensure that the progress for which Mr. Gorbachev has called is made possible.

I do not dissent from the view that since the 1940s the concept of mutually assured destruction may have had relevance. What I question, and what increasing numbers of people in Europe question, is whether such a commitment should stretch to infinity, with all that that means in terms of the allocation of resources, the likelihood of hatred or the inevitability of tension or peril.

When we talk about short-range nuclear weapons, we must recognise that we lower the threshold of tension and pre-emption. That is a stage that all thinking people should demand as an appropriate subject for negotiation.

There is a time for vision and a time for courage. It surprises me that too little of both qualities is being demonstrated in the West. It is Mr. Gorbachev who seems to have taken the initiative and begun to command public esteem and popularity in the countries of democracy. It is no good denying that he has had a substantial impact on our community. Perhaps that is why we are going to start bringing large – or even small – numbers of students to watch WEU at work.

I do not believe that we have enough resources to counter the image that Mr. Gorbachev is building. If we wish to counter that image and take an initiative, it will have to be in terms of the game to which Sir Geoffrey Howe referred. We shall have to show that we are prepared to kick the ball as well, and to kick it a little faster and further than those on the right have suggested.

We need to show that our attachment to nuclear weaponry is not pervasive, that we are prepared to negotiate the reduction. I accept that that reduction must be accompanied by the asymmetrical reduction in conventional weaponry. It is obvious that the internal strains, problems and challenges within the Warsaw Pact now give us an opportunity of achievement, and I believe that we should seek that achievement without delay.

Sir Geoffrey suggested this morning that the Soviet Union had taken up the agenda of the West. I hope that that assessment is correct. It seems that it is, but if the Soviet Union has taken up that agenda, why should we seek to divert or delay it?

I believe that we have the prospect of peace, but it must be as a result of detailed and energetic negotiations. Let me draw the Assembly's

Mr. Hardy (continued)

attention to the statement from the European social democratic and socialist parties of countries belonging to the Atlantic Alliance – the Rome statement. Unfortunately, it has not received anything like the attention it deserves, certainly within the United Kingdom. It ought to receive attention, because it touches on the survival of humanity. I recommend that all political groups consider seriously the proposals that it embodies. They are entirely realistic and opportune. I do not believe – and I would like all respectable academics to study it – that any sane organisation or individual could dismiss its contents lightly. I hope that it will become the basis of Western European foreign policy, a policy based on realism but one that does not eschew either courage or vision.

I believe that our amendments are in tune with that declaration, and I hope that they are made. If they are, the report will be acceptable and the work of Mr. Tummers will not have been in vain. If not, we shall have perpetrated an act of folly and been guilty of a lack of vision that will inevitably be regretted, not merely in this Assembly but more widely.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – Among my many activities is that of a supporter of wild-life and preserving the species. Today we have seen a sad sight – the display by the, alas, almost isolated British Labour Party of being a beached whale, spluttering on the beaches, having been rejected at several elections and having put forward absolutely nothing fresh. Some of the speeches that have come from those quarters have been very sad indeed.

I found one of the remarks by Ms. Ruddock surprising and difficult to comprehend. She said that WEU had a stultifying effect. She was referring to The Hague platform. But The Hague platform was subscribed to by governments of all parties, particularly the French Government, which to my knowledge is not a conservative or a right-wing government. It is therefore clear that those with the responsibility of looking after the security and welfare of the peoples of Europe understand the situation and have given their unanimous support to The Hague platform. Those left outside go on talking but get little or no support from those they claim to represent.

Of course it is clear that Mr. Gorbachev wishes to make progress. I do not deny it. Indeed, I welcome it. I do not even seek to question why there has been this sudden change from almost forty years of “niet” to an era of “da”. It may be that the peoples of the Soviet Union want to share in what they see to be the growing prosperity of the West, but I, and I think this

Assembly, would welcome some concrete sign of determination to begin the asymmetrical reduction in conventional weapons.

I find it difficult to accept that this Assembly is a kind of Johnny-come-lately in welcoming the INF. I paraphrase Mr. Hardy's comments, but I think he will agree that that is the gist of what he said. Had we been, we would not have gone on a trek to Washington to make it clear that we wanted the American Congress, and the Senate in particular, to ratify the INF treaty. We all welcome it, but that is but the first stage in a long progress to what everyone here wants – world peace. However, one does not achieve world peace by unilateral gestures that have little or no meaning.

Those who find it odd that WEU wishes to give priority to conventional and chemical disarmament measures either were not present when Sir Geoffrey Howe spoke or did not listen to his speech. More likely, they did not understand it. We must therefore make progress on these two major issues, because there appears to be a willingness on the part of the Soviet authorities to make progress on those issues.

I confirm what Mr. de Beer said – that the view expressed in a certain large building in another part of the sixteenth arrondissement was not unfavourable to Mr. Tummers's report. We should take that clearly into account.

Some people have spoken this afternoon of doves and hawks. Those old, out-dated words are no longer used by those who understand what is going on in the world today. We are all realists in trying to make step-by-step progress, as the other Sir Geoffrey said earlier today.

The situation at present has a parallel with Hans Christian Andersen. It is like the emperor with no clothes. The Soviet Union is saying: “Yes, we will make progress. We are now picking up the offers made by the West a decade ago.” The fact that they have come on to the field does not necessarily mean that that is as far as they ought to go. We would welcome actual progress, for example, in achieving a reduction in the number of tanks produced each week or the number of nuclear submarines and war planes produced each month. When we see that and can verify it, and when they can verify the West's production, we shall then begin to agree that they are playing under the same rules as ourselves. Like the governments of the West, I am prepared to believe that that is what the Soviets want. But unfortunately belief is not enough for me to want my government – I think this view is shared by everyone else present – to jeopardise our safety until we can see something concrete resulting from the talks.

It may be that on his visit to America this week to the United Nations, Mr. Gorbachev may

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg (continued)

make some concrete proposals that take us along that road. If he does, all of us would welcome it. I doubt whether there is anyone left in this room on the so-called right who would not welcome that. But I occasionally wonder whether those on the so-called left understand the positive responses that have been made during the past decade by those on the right, and they have been major responses and advances.

The report in its entirety, including its recommendations, is balanced and good, but I wish to comment on three points in the recommendations. I leave aside the interesting explanatory memorandum because, as the Rapporteur rightly said, that is his work. We cannot alter or amend it. However, we can look at what has come out of it by way of recommendations.

My first point has already been touched on and relates to recommendation 1 (a). It concerns the concentration at this stage on conventional and chemical disarmament. I hope that the Paris conference, which will look at the Geneva protocol and chemical warfare as a whole, will provide the key that will enable progress towards finding a form of chemical disarmament that is susceptible to verification.

As a realist rather than a politician, I am not certain whether it is possible to verify chemical production because, alas, any collection of ingredients can be distorted into some evil mixture. I therefore do not know whether that will be wholly possible. But if we can at least get the governments of nations to agree that they ban the whole concept of chemical warfare, that might carry with it the determination on their part to make it difficult or impossible within their territories to manufacture products that might be used in chemical warfare.

Secondly, as recommendation 1 (d) states, it is right that "arms control should proceed by stages", followed by the key words "allowing the security of all to remain assured throughout". Again, I recognise, as we all must, the immense and enormous sacrifices made by the Soviet Union during the invasion that she suffered, including millions of casualties.

One can understand that the Soviets want their security, but, equally, they must understand that we want ours. It is a question of establishing mutual trust. The opportunity now exists for responsible statesmen to build upon that trust but it has to be earned, and it will not come easily.

Sir Geoffrey Howe referred to recommendation 3. We need to put the facts to our public and our electorates. It is perfectly true that there is a vast amount of information and, I have to say, disinformation, about what has been pro-

posed from the Soviets. We have not matched it, first, because we do not have the resources and, secondly, because it is not our way, but we must explain the facts. If we explain the facts, the public will accept them. The public in my country accepted them overwhelmingly at the last two general elections, in spite of all the misinformation used by those who advocate unilateral disarmament and all that goes with it. If we can put the facts to the public, I believe that WEU has the right approach and that the report ought to go through virtually unamended.

The PRESIDENT. – I now call Mr. Hill.

Mr. HILL (*United Kingdom*). – The question that we must ask ourselves is: "When is a deterrent not a deterrent?" Sir Geoffrey Howe made it perfectly plain. He said that if we ran ahead of the situation and phased out short-range nuclear weapons, we would leave the USSR in a very powerful strategic position, with almost all the known chemical weapons in Europe and with overwhelming conventional forces.

Like many of those who have spoken, I wish Mr. Gorbachev well. He is to speak in New York State today. I have always said that he is a first-class public relations man, but, in the words of the old American expression, can he deliver the goods? Peter Hardy, the leader of the British Socialist Delegation, said that we needed courage. I think that we need a certain amount of caution. We certainly do not want to brush aside the hand that is being held out or ignore the doves that are flying all round our heads or the reports coming out of the USSR that some of Mr. Gorbachev's plans are beginning to fall on deaf ears.

How far have the Soviets gone to date? According to my notes, the size of the stockpile has decreased from 7 000 warheads to about 4 600 since 1979. No one here – obviously not Mr. Tummers – can produce figures to show a similar decrease in weapons in the Soviet Union. I am sure that Mr. Tummers is well aware of the Soviets' plans to modernise their theatre nuclear weapons. Frog missiles are being replaced by longer-range, more accurate SS-21s. Dual-capable Fencer aircraft and medium-range Backfire bombers are being deployed in larger numbers, and the Blackjack strategic bombers are being equipped with the new AS-15 air-launched cruise missile with a range of 2 000 miles.

Ms. Ruddock did not have a single fact to support her case. It certainly takes courage – blind courage – to support a case with no facts whatever. The Assembly is not going to act on a promise. We are well aware that Mr. Gorbachev is as genuine as he can be, but there is no doubt that there are some very hardliners in the Soviet defence forces. A vital change – from one Pres-

Mr. Hill (continued)

ident to another – has been made in the United States and we are to be called upon for more burden-sharing. The WEU community has increased in size, with two more nations joining, and eventually we shall be called upon not only to pay for more of our own defence but to enter the verification process.

I agree with Sir Geoffrey that it will be a difficult time. Verification, whether by satellite or by individual members of the respective armed forces, will be extremely difficult. I also agree that there is no way in which we could possibly control the verification of chemical weapons. I do not know whether my newspaper was correct, but it said that it had been found that a German chemical company was supplying to an Arab nation materials that were eventually finding their way into weapons used in vile attacks on people in the region.

The Conservative Party is anxious to make progress. We shall do so by moving as fast as we can in our various tasks. However, we cannot possibly have further reductions in nuclear weapons until we start talks on chemical and conventional weapons.

Mr. Tummers's document was apparently very much altered in committee, and I am sure that he will be ready to defend it and support some of the amendments. The verification process will be the proof of the pudding. You, Mr. President, need to know that what you have agreed in Geneva and elsewhere is being carried out – either by observers or by satellite. I cannot stress too strongly the fact that simple politicians will believe what is written in the newspapers and what comes out in press statements. But that is not the same as the verification of stockpiles.

The whole report is worthy of consideration. We have already heard that one country has assessed it very favourably. I am sure that the United Kingdom Government would not make such an assessment. The report has been forced upon Mr. Tummers, and I sympathise with him. A couple of years ago a report was brought forward in such a way that the Assembly could not agree. This evening, however, we have to vote and my colleagues, whatever their political party, need not only courage but caution and the patience to see whether Mr. Gorbachev will deliver the goods.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Scheer.

Mr. SCHEER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I wish to speak to the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, and I emphasise this point, as it is a compromise document from the committee and certainly does not reflect the earlier version on disarm-

ament given in the debate by the Rapporteur, Mr. Tummers. There was in fact an earlier report by Mr. Tummers, which was rejected by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and with which I largely sympathise. Mr. Tummers's efforts to arrive at a compromise document have brought us to the present situation, where people are voicing criticisms which do not relate to him personally. I wanted to emphasise this, because on most disarmament policy issues I feel that my own personal position is invariably very close to that of Mr. Tummers.

I wish to make two observations on the debate. One concerns the concept of modernisation. I believe that this term has been wrongly employed from the outset and amounts to a self-deception. What we have here is not the normal form of modernisation which will always apply to military forces unless they become an element in a disarmament treaty. On the contrary, it concerns new nuclear weaponry in the case of short-range nuclear weapons, initiating a new quality of reciprocal threat. It additionally covers genuine compensation for the elimination of the West's intermediate missiles, but here we must ask why compensation should be necessary, if the loss of the West's intermediate missiles has been balanced by the elimination of similar weapons in the East? In other words, there is no need for compensation – that is the point to be emphasised. We are not talking here about modernisation, but about the acquisition of new nuclear weaponry – that is the reality.

I come now to the second point. Mr. de Beer has stated that the Soviet Embassy says the Soviet Union has no objection to the content of the recommendation. How long, I wonder, has the parliamentary Assembly of Western European Union been basing its attitude to disarmament on what the Soviet Union has to say about it? That is quite a new argument. What matters here is our own position, based on our own assessment of the problems and the circumstances.

Proceeding from this point, I should like to emphasise that the attitude of the Soviet Embassy spokesman causes me no great surprise. Why? For the same reason that I am not surprised that the United States Government, for instance, strongly resists disarmament processes involving short-range missiles. The reason is perfectly simple – it is there in the text, in fact. We have all become accustomed to a vocabulary in which strategic weapons are the arms of the superpowers, while the rest, the short-range nuclear missiles, are tactical weapons.

How is this to be interpreted? Clearly, strategic arms imply totality, whereas tactical weapons only affect the front line. But we are the front line, and if the front line is jeopardised we are affected strategically. In other words, short-range

Mr. Scheer (continued)

nuclear weapons are of strategic significance to the countries of Europe. As soon as we accept the concept of tactical weapons for us and strategic arms for them, we accept in principle our rôle as a front line for the superpowers. That is why I reject a definition in these terms. We should talk about long-range and short-range missiles. For the superpowers, the Soviet Union just as much as the United States, the focus is obviously on the abolition of long-range and intercontinental missiles. It is certainly not on short-range nuclear weapons, as the availability of short-range nuclear weapons implies the possibility of regionalising nuclear conflicts and hence the possibility of leaving the territories of the superpowers themselves unscathed in the event of nuclear conflicts.

This means that if it is justifiable for the superpowers to regard the abolition of intercontinental missiles as their priority, it is equally justifiable for the European states to give priority to the abolition of short-range nuclear weapons. If we in WEU reject this, and actually feel we must be right to do so because the Soviet Union and the United States display no inclination for the abolition of short-range nuclear missiles, then we are representing neither our own nor Europe's interests. That is my interpretation of the situation.

So there are two reasons why in the immediate future we must also give priority to disarmament processes covering short-range nuclear weapons, alongside our efforts on behalf of conventional arms reduction. One reason is that this is our contribution to the process of nuclear disarmament from the European side.

The second reason is that the Soviet Union has a superiority of twelve to one in short-range missiles. Twelve to thirteen times as many Soviet short-range missiles are deployed in Eastern Europe as American short-range weapons in central Western Europe. If we call for a disarmament effort covering short-range missiles, this will therefore help to dismantle Soviet superiority in this sector. I simply do not understand why this should be rejected by the West. I can see only one explanation, that of dogmatism in our policy of deterrence, which makes the West refuse to extend the disarmament process to short-range nuclear missiles. But we are concerned here with very important political goals, not the implementation of some dogma which has been developed over the last thirty years and has now become a brake on future developments.

A further reason for giving this matter priority is precisely that it is in our interests to do so.

I now turn specifically to paragraphs 1 (a), 1 (b) and 2 of the draft recommendation. That the emphasis in paragraph 1 (a) is placed exclusively on conventional and chemical disarm-

ament must be rejected, for the reasons given above. We should not tie our own hands: we must see to it that the conventional disarmament is accompanied by a round of negotiations aimed at reducing and dismantling short-range nuclear weapons. We cannot and should not countenance a ten-year intermission in nuclear disarmament in Europe, awaiting the possible outcome of a treaty on conventional disarmament. However, if paragraph 1 (a) were to become a political reality, this intermission is just what would occur.

Paragraph 1 (b) is completely untenable, and I can only warn against approving any such arrangement. It says, in the first place, that arms control measures should be global. What does that mean? Efforts to convene a European conventional disarmament conference are not global, they are continental. If this were approved, it would actually mean renouncing the principle of the European disarmament conference. In other words, this phrase is untenable.

The text also says that arms control measures must not prevent some countries from doing what others are allowed to do. Again, what does this mean? It means that this passage expressly contravenes the WEU treaty, which says that the Federal Republic of Germany, for instance, shall not manufacture any nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. So in the Federal Republic of Germany we are prevented from doing something which others are allowed to do. To be quite plain, I support the continuation of this prohibition, but this phrase would basically negate the terms of the WEU treaty.

And another thing: it would essentially signify our philosophical rejection of the whole non-proliferation treaty, since this treaty prohibits many, many signatory countries from doing something which others, that is the countries with nuclear weapons, are at present still allowed to do. It follows that this phrase has not been properly thought out, and cannot remain as it stands. I am not now speaking from a socialist or a personal viewpoint. On the contrary, this must be rejected by the Assembly as a whole as being fundamentally incompatible with the spirit of WEU.

Paragraph 2 rejects Mr. Gorbachev's call for a pan-European summit on disarmament and refers to the context of the CSCE.

I think the rejection implicit in paragraph 2 is wrong. We need a joint treaty on conventional disarmament. Such joint agreement will not be reached if this process is left solely to disarmament diplomacy, which lacks the political authority to speed up the operation. I therefore expressly plead for an amendment to paragraph 2, stating that we as WEU call for a conference of all the foreign affairs and defence ministers of the member states of the Warsaw Pact, WEU and

Mr. Scheer (continued)

NATO which are taking part in the European disarmament conference, in order to hasten this disarmament process. This would have the political mandate to achieve some real acceleration. We must not let this matter become submerged in disarmament diplomacy and in its often sluggish workings. These remarks are not directed against disarmament diplomacy but in favour of political impetus. We must not run the risk of the European disarmament negotiations becoming a repetition of the MBFR negotiations, which have produced no results in fifteen years. That is a tragedy.

We have another reason for the need to gain time. Faced with wide-sweeping Soviet offers of a kind completely unthinkable prior to Mr. Gorbachev, many say that we should be careful, as we do not know how long Mr. Gorbachev is likely to last. However, if we fear that Mr. Gorbachev's policy can perhaps not be maintained for internal reasons, that is all the more reason for us to conclude, as quickly as possible, sound and far-reaching disarmament treaties with provision for reciprocal verification. A disarmament treaty is an accomplished fact, which would no longer allow any government in East or West to revert to the previous situation. It follows that all those who have no faith in the peace – and who question the stability and durability of the new Soviet attitude – have special reason to conclude disarmament agreements as quickly as possible, so as to seize the chance which is now on offer.

(Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, resumed the chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Klejdzinski.

Mr. KLEJDZINSKI (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I wish to present the argument for Amendment 6. We tabled this amendment because we took the view that the broadest possible support should be mobilised among the WEU member states for a more precise formulation of paragraph 1(a) which would express more clearly the wishes of our Assembly.

In so doing – and we regard this as very important – we also seek conformity with Resolution 200 (1988) of the thirty-fourth annual meeting of the North Atlantic Assembly, which took place in November 1988.

The wording of this resolution is – and I quote verbatim:

“ The Assembly,

1. *Determined* to work for the adoption of further mutually complementary, militarily significant, and effectively verifiable stabilising

measures that would create greater openness and more predictability in military activities in order to reduce the risks of surprise and reinforced attacks, diminish the threat of armed conflict resulting from misunderstanding or miscalculation, and inhibit the use of force for the purpose of political intimidation;

2. *Recalling* the provisions of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, according to which the participating states recognise the interest of all of them in efforts aimed at lessening military confrontation and promoting disarmament;

3. *Recognising* the complementary nature of arms control measures affecting the structure of armed forces and those regulating military activities;

5. *Concerned* that every opportunity for progress in the forthcoming conventional arms talks be thoroughly explored;

12. *URGES* the 35 participating states of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe to adopt, at the next session of the conference, new measures in conformity with the 1983 Madrid Mandate. ”

Paragraph 1(b) describes our objective in the following very precise terms:

“ in consonance with a comprehensive concept which encompasses the interrelation between the conventional and nuclear components in our force planning and negotiating strategy, negotiations should take place on tactical nuclear weapons with a range below 500 kilometres as well as conventional forces in a way which at any time contributes to stability in Europe; ”

Another reason why we cannot agree with paragraph 1(b) is that the wording “ arms control measures should be global and must not prevent some countries from doing what others are allowed to do ” is open to misinterpretation. It cannot stand in this form.

My colleague, Mr. Scheer, has already gone into this point in detail. As I am speaking to an amendment, I should like at this juncture to make an important comment on this passage. I share Mr. Scheer's opinion that the present wording violates the spirit of the WEU treaty and the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. As applied to the Federal Republic of Germany, it has a security policy dimension which is certainly not wanted by any of the other WEU partners.

As social democrats, we will not enter into speculation concerning the possession, storage and operational control of nuclear weapons, and we reject any discernible lack of clarity on this issue as a matter of principle.

Mr. Klejdzinski (continued)

Our paragraph 1(c) also takes up the issue of battlefield nuclear weapons – an item which does not figure in the report. Our paragraph 1(c) is worded as follows:

“ In order to enhance stability and to complement and reinforce a conventional stability agreement primary attention should be devoted to reduction and withdrawal of battlefield nuclear weapons; ”

Battlefield nuclear weapons are not short-range missile systems but are to be placed in the category with ranges of up to 40 km.

Our paragraph 1(c) goes on to say:

“ their short range, the limited number of ammunition depots, and war-fighting rationale contribute to dangerous instability in the event of a crisis; ”

Mr. Scheer made a number of references to short-range weapons systems. To make the point clear: because of the geographical extent of the Federal Republic of Germany, battlefield nuclear weapons definitely count as strategic rather than tactical weapons for the Federal Republic, although they are not so classified in the numerical weapons inventories.

Our paragraphs 1(d) and (e) are practical proposals for agreement on confidence-building measures.

Paragraphs 1(f) and (g) deal with verification, and I wish to emphasise paragraph 1(g), worded as follows:

“ Arms control should proceed by stages, allowing the security of all to remain assured throughout; ”

We chose the words “ proceed by stages ” to facilitate the agreement of those who make the point – an important one in their view – that “ we cannot withdraw if nothing is happening on the other side while practical disarmament measures are being agreed and verified ”.

I again ask you to approve Amendment 6. I ask for your approval partly because I am convinced that further steps must be taken to reinforce and emphasise the obligation to prevent the use or the threat of force to violate the territorial integrity or the political independence of any state. This is a standpoint which has not only been formulated by the social democrats here: anybody who reads through Resolution 200 (1988) of the North Atlantic Assembly will find that it makes a similar point.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Balligand, the last member down to speak.

Mr. BALLIGAND (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, this WEU Assembly report appears at a time when disarmament negotia-

tions are at a pitch of activity and intensity which would have been unimaginable only five years ago. At that time the Geneva negotiations on intermediate nuclear forces had broken down and the first Euromissiles were being deployed. All the other disarmament forums were in deadlock, and only the European disarmament conference was still at work.

This ended in Stockholm in 1986 with the adoption of confidence-building measures, so hope remained. Since then it has become stronger. On 8th December 1987 the INF treaty on the withdrawal and destruction of intermediate missiles was signed in Washington. For the very first time a genuine disarmament agreement had been concluded, and for the first time the Soviets had accepted the principle of asymmetrical arms reduction and on-site verification.

There are now new hurdles to be cleared. But in this process Western European Union has to make its voice heard. If European security is to be assured by a defence effort at the required level, this security can only be reinforced by the disarmament process.

Firstly, we should approve the START negotiations aimed at reducing the strategic nuclear arsenals of the two superpowers by 50%. Such an agreement would put an end to the nuclear arms race that the two superpowers have been engaged in since the end of the second world war. Coupled with strict compliance with the ABM treaty, it would preserve intact the doctrine of nuclear deterrence as a means of preventing war since, with six thousand nuclear warheads, the United States and the Soviet Union would still be able to destroy each other several times over.

As regards chemical weapons, a strict ban needs to be placed on their use because, with the spread of missile manufacturing technology, it could be possible for some countries to acquire facilities for launching such weapons over medium and long distances.

We hope that the conference to be held in Paris in January will provide the stimulus necessary for signing a treaty prohibiting the manufacture of these weapons. Most countries have responded favourably to our invitation and we hope that Iran and Iraq will be represented.

Apart from providing this important stimulus, the objectives of the conference will be to condemn the use of chemical weapons in the past, reaffirm the protocol undertakings and urge the signatory countries to abide by them, appeal to countries to exercise self-discipline and restraint with regard to such weapons and support the rôle of the United Nations and its Secretary-General in this area.

Lastly – and I have left this to the end because it is of crucial importance to us as Europeans and

Mr. Balligand (continued)

French socialists – an early start should now be made on the negotiations on conventional forces. France has spelled out the objectives that the negotiators should set themselves. These are the objectives which our representatives in the Atlantic Alliance and in Vienna are backing up with concrete proposals.

First we need to establish a situation of stability in the conventional forces deployed in Europe. For this we need to reduce and set ceilings for heavy equipment, tanks and artillery and to introduce related measures designed to restrict the mobility and availability of forces. At the moment the asymmetry in terms of operational units favours the Warsaw Pact. The possibility of any surprise attack which could be exploited and grow into a large-scale offensive has to be prevented. This concerns not only military equipment but also the organisation of forces in peacetime. Parallel to operational confidence-building measures, structural measures need to be taken to the same end. For instance, constraints are needed on matériel necessary for offensive purposes such as bridging equipment.

Then there is the question of logistic support. The conduct of a lengthy war requires supply depots, transport for men and equipment, ammunition, spares and facilities for repairing damaged equipment in the shortest possible time. Action to make a prolonged war impossible must be taken in all these areas.

Military doctrines need to be discussed and compared. For this we need transparency with regard to military systems, which means there has to be an exchange of information on armed services budgets, planning, organisation and manoeuvres.

Ceilings also need to be set for the forces of any one country in the area as a whole, and a strict ratio of national to foreign military equipment imposed.

Lastly, and this will certainly not be the least of the difficulties, adequate verification measures will have to be set in place on a reciprocal basis and acceptable to all parties concerned. In this, observation satellites will have a part to play.

European co-operation of the kind which will be proposed tomorrow by our two Rapporteurs would be a useful initiative and help to defend our interests.

On all these issues France has acted with an energy that needs to be communicated not only to the other members of WEU but also to the countries in the Atlantic Alliance and, more generally, all those taking part in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.

In our view the countries in the CSCE talks ought to be involved in these negotiations in accordance with the principles laid down by the Madrid conference. The neutral and non-aligned countries in Europe are just as much concerned by the outcome as the others so the negotiations have to be multilateral and every country must be allowed to speak for itself.

It is imperative that Europe should have a collective strategy for its security and especially for disarmament. In this context, WEU, now including nine of the twelve member states of the European Economic Community, has a fundamental part to play, since what is at stake is our future as Europeans.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Jessel.

Mr. JESSEL (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. Balligand spoke a moment ago of transparency. I shall tell him of one transparent truth. Next to Russia there used to be a little country called Lithuania – a small Baltic state. That has been eaten up by the Russians. Its capital is a city called Riga. In my country children used to be brought up on a jingle, which said:

“ There was a young lady from Riga
Who went for a ride on a tiger.
They returned from the ride with the lady inside
And a smile on the face of the tiger. ”

We must not be like the young lady from Riga. We must not be taken for a ride. We must not be so stupid.

Mr. Scheer said that for internal reasons Mr. Gorbachev may not be able to have his way. We do not even know whether Mr. Gorbachev will be there two or three years from now. The man may not even exist. Should we gamble the future of our security on the survival of one man?

The Russians are building up massive military forces – nuclear, conventional and chemical. They are structured not for defence but for attack. I give as an example their five hundred submarines. How can anyone possibly argue that a vast country such as Russia, which is self-sufficient in food and oil, should want five hundred submarines for its own defence? Of course it does not. They are intended for attack, and the numbers are increasing year by year and month by month. Until those numbers are diminished, it is hopeless to demand, and useless to expect, that we should rely for our safety and security on the words of the Russians. Let us never forget that.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. TUMMERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the last speaker has made it easy

Mr. Tummers (continued)

for me by not addressing me but simply replying to Mr. Balligand. I shall therefore not take up what he said but go straight on to express my appreciation of the full and measured review he has given on behalf of the socialist party. The socialists can regard this review as encouragement for their views.

I will go back to the beginning of the list of speakers. I feel I should say that I myself explained the history of the report in my introductory statement, in order to give those members who were critical the tools for a proper examination. There was a preliminary report and my explanation was needed to make my position in this debate understandable. I wanted a public debate, in which all the positions would be revealed.

I would have preferred it if Mr. Scheer had made his statement in committee. That might have made something of an impact. Mr. Scheer's statement has heavily underscored and reinforced the essence of this debate.

I have enjoyed the debate because it has again illustrated the paradoxical atmosphere surrounding the matter in hand. I am not standing here to defend a party political programme or my personal philosophy. I have presented the opinions expressed in the committee, and was not pleased to hear comments to the effect that the Rapporteur was personally responsible. The Rapporteur was said to be using the language of the cold war. It would have been better if these cold war clouds had been recognised on the committee scene rather than being reflected in the Rapporteur's spectacles.

Ms. Ruddock has illustrated this conflict. She has shown her understanding of the situation in which the Assembly has to deal with this subject. Thorny points arise, the committee's policy cannot be accurately defined, no one in the committee can say that it has a remit to discuss armament and disarmament. Once again, this is the paradox. Some members have been lured into anecdotal contradictions. Sir Dudley Smith spoke of Ms. Ruddock's rôle in a British committee. Obviously, it was not the result or the political content of his remarks that interested him: he was intent on creating a caricature. Sir Geoffrey Finsberg followed suit. He talked about the conference in Paris and partly – could this have been a coincidence? – endorsed the wording used in the recommendation. Like him, I hope this conference will be attended by all concerned.

Mr. de Beer talked about monitoring by stages. Should we be aiming at global agreement straight away, or should we proceed step by step? That is an all-or-nothing trap which we must not fall into. He also talked about me in the same way that Sir Dudley Smith talked about

Ms. Ruddock. The Dutch elections are not relevant to the problem we are now discussing. History has progressed since Reykjavik, not since the elections in the Netherlands. We must concentrate on that, otherwise we shall be trying to impose our point of view by resorting to diversionary tactics. I would find that regrettable.

Mr. Hill commented on the persistence of historical distrust of the Soviet Union and included Mr. Gorbachev in this, despite what is actually happening in the Soviet Union. He missed the chance to bring things up to date, as Mr. Scheer did. But, of course, he did not have a model, since Mr. Scheer spoke after him.

Mr. Scheer did not resort to an updated analysis of outmoded concepts for party-political reasons, or for the sake of socialist realism. I appreciate that. I shall reveal what I have learned during this discussion when we come to consider the amendments.

Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman talked about the defence budget. Here I was sorry to see that we are verging on not wanting to understand. We must make it clear that the price of peace and security in this new phase simply has to be paid. Those who believe that arms reductions will release funds in the defence sector at national level to finance something else must be told at once not to cherish vain hopes. All in all, the reductions we want do not affect what is necessary to peace and security, but concern the procurement of arsenals in general, which, if all goes well, will produce results. That is what we are aiming at.

I am grateful to Mr. Hardy for underlining the points we have already discussed in the committee.

Mr. de Beer surprised me by saying that there was a conference yesterday evening at which my report was on the programme. If that was expected, it would have been better to invite me along. Even if it was a coincidence, that is still no reason to say that the report must not now be adopted and that the socialist wing of this Assembly wants to prove further left than the Soviet Union. If we create favourable conditions for the negotiations between East and West, that does not mean we can be identified with one of the groups who want to favour the talks. That is certainly not the case. There must be a meeting of minds on completely different ideas before any such identification is possible. I find it politically naïve, and in fact beneath Mr. de Beer, for him to use this example to gain our support. In other political statements he demonstrates a broader and more spiritual vision than he has done in this minor Parisian political episode.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman of the committee.

Mr. KITTELMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies

Mr. Kittelmann (continued)

and gentlemen, I can be brief. The debate which has taken place here concerns the wide spectrum that exists in national parliaments in matters of defence policy. Although it does not share its government's ability to act in its own country, the opposition is able to make an input into the parliament of Western European Union. That is quite legitimate, but whether it is always fair, as far as the nature of the debate is concerned, is an open question.

On behalf of the committee, I should like to express my warm personal thanks to the Rapporteur for his report. This morning we listened to Sir Geoffrey Howe's address, which was received with great applause. Whoever heard the address and the contributions to the debate when questions were asked, must conclude that memories are sometimes at fault, since in some cases quite contradictory inferences have been drawn.

I consider it important for the Assembly to know that this report underwent very long and intensive discussion and was approved by twelve votes to two with two abstentions. It is a realistic report. In future, obtaining a consensus in Western European Union will be an increasing problem. We must endeavour to achieve consensus wherever possible between the various political approaches, otherwise we shall increasingly incur the danger of making our whole policy dependent on the majorities and minorities obtaining at any time.

The place for us to debate with each other is in committee. Mr. Scheer, I repeat what the Rapporteur said: if you, as a committee member, had used the opportunity for discussion in committee, things would have been simpler today. For that reason there are many observations which I will not take up.

There is much more that could be said, but I will restrict myself to the positive comment that the great majority of committee members were trying to achieve something here that is important to our future work of advising the Council from our position as a parliamentary Assembly. I therefore ask you, after critical appraisal, to take a positive view of the report and to approve it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We now come to the draft recommendation on disarmament contained in Document 1158.

I have been informed of eight amendments to this text, Amendment 9 tabled by Mr. Reddemann having been withdrawn.

We will consider these amendments in the following order: first Amendments 5, 7 and 6 tabled by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman; then Amendments 1 and 2 tabled by Mrs. Francese.

I must inform you in advance that, if Amendment 6 tabled by Mrs Baarveld-Schlaman is agreed to, Amendments 1 and 2 tabled by Mrs. Francese will fall.

Then we will come to Amendment 8 tabled by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman and Amendments 3 and 4 tabled by Mrs. Francese.

If Amendment 8 tabled by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman is agreed to, Amendments 3 and 4 tabled by Mrs. Francese will fall.

I call Mr. Pieralli.

Mr. PIERALLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, we withdraw our Amendments 1, 2, 3 and 4 and will vote for Amendments 6 and 8.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Amendments 1, 2, 3 and 4 are therefore withdrawn.

Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman has tabled Amendment 5, which reads as follows:

5. Leave out paragraph (*iii*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation.

I call Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman.

Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I did not table Amendment 5 because the paragraph to which it relates is untrue or incorrect. I tabled this amendment because I do not think it right in the context of the report or of the recommendation, where it introduces a completely unreal element. The fact that joint action was taken in the Gulf is, of course, to be welcomed. I have absolutely no objection to the letter of the paragraph, but I do object to it in the general context.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I oppose the amendment. If a group of nations act together, they can have a positive effect which leads to a reduction in tension and therefore helps the cause of disarmament.

I do not think that anybody would argue with me if I said that if the mine-sweeping efforts and the Armilla patrol had not been in the Gulf, the Iran-Iraq war would probably not have ended. Because WEU countries were able to keep forces there to mine-sweep and to allow peaceful traffic to go through, those responsible for mine-laying realised that what they were doing could not succeed. I hope that on reflection, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, who has moved one of the non-political amendments, will recognise cause and effect and agree that the amendment is not suitable because it goes against what we have already achieved.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman.

Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mrs. Baarveld is accused to giving careful thought to everything she says and puts down on paper.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the opinion of the committee?

Mr. TUMMERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – The committee did not discuss the amendments. The Rapporteur will leave the result to be decided by the vote.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman of the committee.

Mr. KITTELMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Like all the other amendments, this amendment has not been discussed in the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments either. In my opinion, this part belongs in the report to the Council and I request that it be allowed to stand.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put Amendment 5 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 5 is negatived.

Amendment 7, tabled by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman and others, reads as follows:

7. In paragraph (vii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “to help further such agreement” and insert “to reconfirm the Geneva Convention of 1925 and to take international political measures against any violation”.

I call Mr. Klejdzinski to move the amendment.

Mr. KLEJDZINSKI (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, what we want is to make the wording a little more precise. We therefore suggested that the phrase “to help further such agreement” be deleted and replaced by a phrase which would both clarify our intention and establish an historical link, as follows:

“to reconfirm the provisions of the Geneva Convention of 1925 and to take international political measures against any violation;”

As I said, this merely establishes the historical link and helps to make the issue clearer.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

That is not the case.

What is the opinion of the committee?

Mr. TUMMERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – There was no discussion on this. The amendment is considered to be a worthwhile addition.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put Amendment 7 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 7 is agreed to.

Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman and others have tabled Amendment 6, which reads as follows:

6. Redraft paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper as follows:

“1. Give substance to the principles enunciated in The Hague platform by defining and stating publicly a *Western European Union* posture on specific arms control issues, including the following criteria:

- (a) arms control priorities should now advance conventional and chemical disarmament measures;
- (b) in consonance with a comprehensive concept which encompasses the interrelation between the conventional and nuclear components in our force planning and negotiating strategy, negotiations should take place on tactical nuclear weapons with a range below 500 kilometres as well as conventional forces in a way which at any time contributes to stability in Europe;
- (c) in order to enhance stability and to complement and reinforce a conventional stability agreement primary attention should be devoted to reduction and withdrawal of battlefield nuclear weapons: their short range, the limited number of ammunition depots, and war-fighting rationale contribute to dangerous instability in the event of a crisis;
- (d) the idea of corridors with no nuclear weapons and particularly offensive conventional armaments should be supported as a confidence-building measure and an integral element in a régime for stability in Europe;
- (e) sub-regional nuclear weapon-free zones as parts of an overall arrangement for reducing nuclear weapons in Europe could similarly contribute to stability and security in Europe at large;
- (f) arms control agreements should include verification measures which fully satisfy all parties;
- (g) arms control should proceed by stages, allowing the security of all to remain assured throughout;”

I call Mr. Klejdzinski to move the amendment.

Mr. KLEJDZINSKI (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, in my earlier contribution I think

Mr. Klejdzinski (continued)

I provided sufficient arguments in support of Amendment 6. The arguments have been exchanged, and I feel there is nothing to add.

However, there is perhaps one thing to be determined, with regard to the other parties represented here: is there any possibility of our jointly finding a way in which this matter could be discussed again in committee, in other words, is there any possibility of a fresh report? If not, rejection of our Amendment 6 would result in our having to reject the report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Mr. Reddemann.

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I wish to speak against the amendment. However, Mr. Klejdzinski has made a proposal and it would be best if the Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments could first say whether the committee does or does not propose to withdraw the entire report. I therefore prefer to wait until I have heard a statement from the committee Chairman. If he thinks we should vote, would you please call me again.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman of the committee.

Mr. KITTELMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, we have no mandate to withdraw this report by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, and I personally would also oppose the idea. In the near future we shall have a new rapporteur for a new report replying to the annual report of the Council, and this will provide those delegates who feel themselves unrepresented here with the opportunity to state their arguments. I therefore insist that the report be dealt with and that it be voted on here.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. TUMMERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, this is clearly the main dish on our menu. In replying to the various speakers, I have already said that a number of points have emerged which have considerably enhanced the body of ideas on this subject. We must further disseminate the ideas in this report, which strengthen our negotiating position, and offer prospects of stability. They give us the confidence to do this work. These were the guidelines which the committee and Rapporteur had in mind. I am therefore in favour of Amendment 6.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Reddemann.

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I

believe Amendment 6 contains some elements which are certainly acceptable to the whole Assembly. I refer to paragraph 1(b), (f) and (g). However, the force of the other suggestions is to reverse completely the statements in the report, and statements are made which differ completely from other parts of the recommendation. I refer here to the subject of so-called nuclear weapon-free zones and weapon-free corridors – and all the rest of it. This has neither been alliance policy in the past, nor has it been the policy of this Assembly.

If a global amendment of this kind is tabled, which aims not at modifying a few minor points but at injecting a completely different policy in the recommendation, we would do better to leave this to the experts in the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, leave it with the original competent body, and reject the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Positions are clear. We will proceed to the vote.

I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. TUMMERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – This is a rather strange procedure. As a rule, one hears the opposition to the amendment first, and the committee then has its turn. This has now been turned around: we spoke first, and then suddenly the counter-argument was advanced, making it impossible to point out that paragraph 1(d) of Amendment 6 makes it very clear that the idea of “corridors” is meant as a confidence-building measure. No one can object to that. I therefore feel I should have the opportunity to say so. I am glad to be able to take up this point of order.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put Amendment 6 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 6 is negatived.

Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman and others have tabled Amendment 8, which reads as follows:

8. Redraft paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper as follows:

“ 2. To speed up the negotiation process, take the initiative to mount a conference of the Foreign and Defence Ministers of the twenty-three states within CSCE, who carry responsibility for the European disarmament process as members of WEU, NATO and the Warsaw Pact; ”

I call Mr. Hardy to move the amendment.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I want to be brief, but if British conservatives insist on making pejorative comments of the kind that I have just heard from Mr. Hill, I will take a great deal longer.

Mr. Hardy (continued)

This amendment is not as important as one defeated earlier by the Assembly, in the discussion of which some unconstitutional remarks about the amendment seemed to be allowed. I want to make some serious points as briefly as possible.

We tabled this amendment out of respect for the Assembly and because we are interested in the standing of Western Europe. I am delighted that we did so, because it gives me an opportunity to correct a profoundly inaccurate observation made earlier this afternoon by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, who said that I had described WEU as a "Johnny-come-lately". In fact, what I said – I recall it particularly – was that some members of the Assembly seemed to show a much greater eagerness for INF and START and a much greater willingness to appreciate the achievement that they represented than they ever did when those advances were first proposed.

This is an important proposition. We do not seek to change the structure of world negotiations, nor do we say that Europe is yet as powerful as either the Soviet Union or the United States of America; what we do say is that Europe should not be a free-rider.

Yesterday I spoke about the irresponsibility of a young man who wished to evade his personal obligations. How much more regrettable is it if a nation state or group of nation states decides to be a passenger – unconcerned, uninterested, uncomplaining, perhaps even unaware of its destination?

We have tabled the amendment because we believe that Europe should have an input in international affairs and that we should not sit idly by having no influence and taking no interest. It is an important amendment. I do not need to make a long speech and I shall not do so, but I hope that those who did not vote for the more important Amendment 6 will at least accept on this occasion that history suggests Europe must have a sense of its continuing obligations. Perhaps we should recognise that the history of this planet, and certainly that of the catastrophic conflicts of recent generations, have come from Europe, and that Europe cannot escape the historic responsibilities that we have inherited.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – First, let me say that I accept Mr. Hardy's correction. The important thing is that he and I agree that the Assembly welcomed INF. He cannot be responsible for the odd person and nor

can I, so I am happy to accept what he said. I do not, however, accept his attack on the President, because nothing unconstitutional has occurred. The opposer of Amendment 6 asked whether the Chairman was going to withdraw it, and reserved his right to speak. The President permitted that, which is allowed by the rules.

I was somewhat doubtful when I saw the amendment and, like Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, I was prepared to think about it. Having thought about it, as she did, I advise rejection. I do not think that anyone who has followed the history of INF would feel that Europe was left out. The influence brought to bear on the Americans and Russians by the discussions in which President Reagan, Mrs. Thatcher and others have engaged has been profound, and I do not think that we would be acting helpfully if we took the initiative to mount a conference of twenty-three states within CSCE.

We would be well advised not to accept the amendment and to let our national parliaments know of our interest.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the opinion of the committee?

Mr. TUMMERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – As with Amendment 7, the Rapporteur feels that adoption of the amendment would enhance the ideas expressed.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman of the committee.

Mr. KITTELMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, there is always a risk when a committee has had no opportunity to discuss proposed amendments. I believe that the wishes of the mover of the amendment are basically positive. However, with amendments of this kind we always have to ask ourselves how realistic and expedient they are. Or, conversely, how illusory and unrealistic they are.

I too have wondered whether, if it were a proposal made to the committee, one might say: yes, we approve. But the Assembly is involved. As the proposal stands, the Assembly is asked to recommend that fifty ministers should gather together, not at the end of the negotiations, but in order to speed them up. Although this would give people hope, in reality insufficient preparation would only lead to disappointment. I therefore regard the amendment as premature at the present time. I think this matter should be pursued in the future, Mr. Hardy. If the proposal should fail to gain a majority today, it could be discussed again at the right moment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put Amendment 8 to the vote.

(*A vote was then taken by show of hands*)

The President (continued)

Amendment 8 is negatived.

I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – At this point I should give notice that I wish to move that the report be referred back and for the motion to be dealt with by means of a roll-call vote.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – This being a question of procedure, ten representatives at least are required to support Mr. Hardy's proposal for reference back to committee on a vote by roll-call.

Are there ten representatives who support Mr. Hardy's request?...

There are. We shall therefore vote by roll-call on Mr. Hardy's request to refer the report back to committee.

The roll-call will begin with the name of Mr. Burger.

The voting is open.

(A vote by roll-call was then taken)

Does any other representative wish to vote?...

The voting is closed.

The result of the vote is as follows¹:

Number of votes cast	49
Ayes	17
Noes	32
Abstentions	0

The reference back of the report to the committee is not agreed to.

I call Mr. Tummers for an explanation of vote.

Mr. TUMMERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, you will appreciate that I had my doubts. But now that I know that the thirty-fourth annual report is in preparation, I do not want to give the impression that I shall be working on the thirty-third annual report all over again.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Hardy on a point of order.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I referred to the fact that Mr. Reddemann had spoken rather later than I would have liked. I merely wish to make it clear that I did not intend that to be a criticism of the chair. I am obliged to Sir Geoffrey Finsberg for drawing the Assembly's attention to that interpretation of my comments.

1. See page 35.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1158, as amended.

Under Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure if five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber so desire, the Assembly shall vote by roll-call on a draft recommendation.

Does any member wish to propose a vote by roll-call?...

That is not the case. We shall therefore vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The amended draft recommendation is adopted¹.

6. Changes in the membership of committees

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I have been notified by the French Delegation of the following changes in the membership of committees: in the membership of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments: Mr. Fillon as a titular member in place of Mr. Matraja; Mr. Matraja as an alternate member in place of Mr. Koehl; Mr. Balligand as an alternate member in place of Mr. Bichet; in the membership of the General Affairs Committee: Mr. Forni as a titular member in place of Mr. Bassinet; Mr. Beix as a titular member in place of Mr. Baumel; Mr. Caro as a titular member in place of Mr. Chénard and Mr. Baumel as an alternate member in place of Mr. André; in the membership of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions: Mr. Worms as a titular member in place of Mr. Fourné; Mr. Lacour as an alternate member in place of Mr. de Chambrun and Mr. Birraux as an alternate member in place of Mr. Prat; in the membership of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration: Mr. Lagorce as a titular member in place of Mr. Bohl; Mr. Durand as a titular member in place of Mr. Chartron and Mr. Matraja as an alternate member in place of Mr. Sirgue; in the membership of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges: Mr. Bohl as a titular member in place of Mr. Lacour; Mr. Pistre as a titular member in place of Mr. Bordu; Mr. Collette as a titular member in place of Mr. Sirgue; Mr. Forni as an alternate member in place of Mr. Gremetz; Mr. Barrau as an alternate member in place of Mr. Montastruc; Mr. Lagorce as an alternate member in place of Mrs. Trautmann and Mr. Hunault as an alternate member in place of Mr. Bohl; in the membership of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations: Mr. Lacour as a titular member in place of Mr. de Chambrun.

1. See page 38.

The President (continued)

All these changes are subject to ratification by the Assembly in accordance with Rule 38, paragraph 6, of the Rules of Procedure.

Are there any objections to these changes?...

These changes are agreed to.

**7. Date, time and orders of the day
of the next sitting**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In view of the progress we have made, I propose that we change the order of business adopted during the afternoon sitting on Monday, 5th December, and bring forward to tomorrow morning instead of tomorrow afternoon the votes on the draft recommendations on verification, a future European satellite agency and the scientific and technical aspects of arms control verification by satellite – reply to the thirty-third annual report of the Council.

Are there any objections?...

It is so decided.

I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Thursday, 8th December, at 10 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Verification: a future European satellite agency; Scientific and technical aspects of arms control verification by satellite – reply to the thirty-third annual report of the Council (Presentation of and joint debate on the reports of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Documents 1159 and 1160).
2. Address by Mr. Manzolini, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy.

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 6.55 p.m.)

TWELFTH SITTING

Thursday, 8th December 1988

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. Verification: a future European satellite agency; Scientific and technical aspects of arms control verification by satellite – reply to the thirty-third annual report of the Council (*Presentation of and joint debate on the reports of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions*, Docs. 1159 and 1160).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Fourré (*Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*), Mr. Malfatti (*Rapporteur of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions*), Mr. Klejdzinski, Mr. Fourré (*Rapporteur*), Mr. de Beer (*Vice-Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*).
4. Address by Mr. Manzolini, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy.
Replies by Mr. Manzolini to questions put by: Mr. Rathbone, Mr. Speed, Mr. Martino, Mr. Fourré, Mr. Sarti.
5. Verification: a future European satellite agency; Scientific and technical aspects of arms control verification by satellite – reply to the thirty-third annual report of the Council (*Votes on the draft recommendations*, Docs. 1159 and 1160).
6. Close of the session.

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

1. See page 42.

3. Verification: a future European satellite agency

Scientific and technical aspects of arms control verification by satellite – reply to the thirty-third annual report of the Council

(Presentation of and joint debate on the reports of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Docs. 1159 and 1160)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The orders of the day call for the presentation of and joint debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on verification: a future European satellite agency, Document 1159, and on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on the scientific and technical aspects of arms control verification by satellite – reply to the thirty-third annual report of the Council, Document 1160.

In accordance with the change in the order of business agreed yesterday afternoon, we shall then take the vote on the draft recommendations.

I call Mr. Fourré, Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Mr. FOURRÉ (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, today in public sitting we have to debate two reports prompted by various initiatives both in this Assembly and in other agencies whose purpose is to launch and promote a number of proposals in the field of arms control.

The Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments decided to study the subject and, in close collaboration with the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, has endeavoured to define the technical content of the proposal to set up a European satellite agency for arms control.

What is involved? For some members this is no doubt a complex technical problem which is perhaps difficult to come to grips with unless a simple, not to say simplistic, approach is taken to understanding how arms verification increasingly requires sophisticated technical resources including observation satellites.

Before coming to the heart of the matter, it may, I think, be useful to remember that our planet is already under observation by scores of artificial eyes. One of the applications these are used for and that will grow in importance relates to arms control and disarmament and the use of satellite detection techniques for remote verification.

As we all know, the dictionary defines “verify” as “establish the truth or correctness of, by examination or demonstration”. The methods used to verify an arms control agreement vary widely with type of agreement but everything is possible from on-site inspection to the use of remote sensors located well away from the area to be examined.

Of all available techniques, satellites are preferred by various experts for the simple reason that they are relatively unobtrusive, although it has to be said that so far, it is the United States and the Soviet Union which have adapted their space-based surveillance capabilities to verification under arms control agreements. Now, however, it is becoming increasingly apparent that other countries, some already with more than an interest in space, recognise a responsibility to become more closely involved in certain aspects of space surveillance.

It would therefore be possible for Western Europe to participate in an effective control system using these techniques on the prior understanding that any such verification must have the specific purpose of ensuring the observance of a treaty.

Remote sensing, as I was saying, means being able to monitor objects or events from a distance. There is a range of devices for this purpose, but some of the most useful include sensors for a wide variety of military and civil

applications. The fundamental difference between these two types of sensor is that the military devices possess higher resolution than those used for civil purposes which are, of course, sometimes employed for very different purposes. For the record, the difference in resolution between the two types of sensor is currently of the order of one to one hundred.

At the moment, military sensors in space are currently used, perhaps too exclusively, for military purposes: but even so, such systems do make a direct contribution to peace and international security by maintaining effective deterrence.

Civil sensors used more for purposes related to our day-to-day lives and the functions of the Landsat, SPOT and Meteosat systems is familiar. However, we also know that civil sensors – I have just referred to Landsat and SPOT – can also be used with the existing networks, for surveillance purposes more or less closely associated with military problems. I will not repeat all the examples listed in the report but will simply remind you of the SPOT images of the Chernobyl nuclear reactor and the Landsat pictures of the Iran-Iraq war.

I think this makes quite clear how military sensors, given their much higher resolution, could be used to monitor compliance with multilateral conventional arms control agreements. That is the particular rôle which could be assigned to the capability which we are proposing, and it could cover treaties on outer space and chemical weapons, but more specifically, the control of conventional weapons in clearly defined areas.

But why should we not also contemplate using the facility to monitor crisis situations in other parts of the world?

A number of proposals had already been made prior to our own initiative. At the first special United Nations Special Session on Disarmament in 1978 France proposed that the United Nations set up an international satellite monitoring agency. Unfortunately, as we all remember, this project did not get anywhere because the Soviet Union and the United States were against it, although, reverting to the proposal in 1982, a United Nations group of experts said that the French proposal was highly interesting in every respect. In the view of the group the value and utility of satellite monitoring itself, the setting up of an agency and the feasibility of such an agency in terms of costs and technology all seemed compatible with the objectives of the United Nations.

Perhaps we should then have thought up other systems. As far as we were concerned, we considered that Europe had sufficient potential in space technology to meet the requirement. A

Mr. Fourné (continued)

European satellite agency and satellite monitoring system might have had considerable political impact. Europe would then have been able to monitor compliance with treaties and the behaviour of states in crisis situations, and have its say in the relevant forums where the legal issues are discussed. Certainly European countries can hardly expect to be a party in East-West negotiations or to sign multilateral treaties unless they have their own independent capability to monitor compliance. What is more, with a system of this kind crises could be monitored without having to rely on second-hand evidence.

In either case, each member government could keep its independence of decision while benefiting from a shared source of information, even to the extent, if required, of totally independent interpretation of imagery. Independent European analysis could well help, rather than hinder, transatlantic co-operation.

A satellite verification capability would seem essential for the future international and diplomatic rôle of Western Europe. If the CSCE talks in Vienna prove fruitful, greatly increased attention will be paid to the balance of conventional forces, and our capability would then also gain importance.

By taking the initiative of setting up such a European satellite monitoring agency, WEU would be offering all its partners a coherent system of monitoring from space. It would thus help to ensure recognition of its own specific rôle at the side of Europe's strategic ally, the United States. But to do this we must be pugnacious and determined and take the decision to set up such an agency, though recognising that it can only be done on a step-by-step basis.

With this in mind, I suggest in my report that from 1990, which is tomorrow, we set up an agency to monitor confidence-building measures using civil facilities provided by, inter alia, the SPOT network. This could be followed by the purchase and possible launch of a satellite in 1995. Some of us think that if the basis of co-operation in the Helios II project were extended this could provide a particularly desirable European satellite monitoring capability. Finally, by 2005 the optical capabilities and interpreting facilities should be amplified to provide a complete and coherent system for the use of all the partners.

However, accompanying this step-by-step approach, we must also give closer thought to evaluating the various parameters involved. You will see in my report that I ask, should the project be adopted, for a fuller study of certain essential aspects such as the technologies available and envisaged, improved definition of

the possible sources, the way in which information received is handled – should interpretation be by the member states or by the agency itself – closer scrutiny of launch costs and capital and running costs, the decision on participation should non-WEU European countries be allowed to join the agency and decisions as to who should have access to the information obtained, who should be allowed to exploit it and in what form the data should be transmitted. These are questions which only a group of experts can put to our Assembly to enable it to follow all these issues with the interest they deserve. If Western European Union wishes to play a full part in the great concert of nations on disarmament, this is an opportunity, simply by deciding firmly to use its influence and its universally recognised technological skills, to provide a service worthy of the goal and objective that we hope every time to see reasserted in this Assembly, namely that our defence system must be synonymous with peace.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Malfatti to present his report.

Mr. MALFATTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, in the wake of the Washington agreement on intermediate nuclear forces, we find there are now more negotiations under way on arms reductions than we have ever known before: negotiations are in progress on the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons and others on the elimination of chemical weapons. I should also, I think, mention conventional stability because I believe we are on the eve of the final talks between the twenty-three countries of the Warsaw Pact and the Atlantic Alliance. A brief reference to the spectacular unilateral reduction of conventional Soviet forces announced yesterday by Mr. Gorbachev at the General Assembly of the United Nations is also, I feel, in order.

We all know what the aim of negotiations on conventional weapons must be: they must relate not only to reducing conventional weapons themselves, but also, and the two aims are linked, eliminating the possibility of a surprise attack followed by a large-scale offensive.

We know how directly we Europeans are concerned by the negotiations on conventional weapons and – as I shall shortly explain – by the verification problems that they imply. These problems are mentioned, incidentally, in The Hague platform, which states that “arms control agreements have to be effectively verifiable and stand the test of time”.

The agreement on intermediate nuclear forces, the first agreement in history to remove completely a whole nuclear weapons system, enshrines two principles which will be essential in the subsequent negotiations on arms

Mr. Malfatti (continued)

reduction: asymmetry and on-site verification. The principle of on-site verification was introduced at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures following a change of attitude on the Soviet side which was to become truly spectacular in the provisions in the Washington agreements on intermediate nuclear forces that concern co-operative verification measures.

I should point out in passing that, in his opening speech to the Stockholm conference in 1984, Andrei Gromyko described on-site verification – i.e., the verification which, as I say, under pressure from the West and following a change in the Soviet attitude was introduced in 1986 into the Stockholm agreement signed by the thirty-five states taking part in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe – as “*espionage*”.

Paragraph 64 of the Stockholm agreement contains the following statement which I consider vital to my argument: “The participating states recognise that national technical means can play a rôle in monitoring compliance with agreed confidence- and security-building measures.” This same principle, i.e., that of the full legitimacy of national, or if you prefer, unilateral, controls, in addition to on-site verification under a treaty or of a co-operative nature, is repeated and amplified in the Washington treaty on intermediate nuclear forces by the specific terms in which Article XII of the treaty is phrased. Even so, it is clear to all, I repeat, that the fundamental provisions in this treaty are those of Article XI on co-operative verification, to which a whole protocol is devoted.

Hence, if the problem of verification and control continues to be of paramount importance in the future arms reduction agreements – particularly those on conventional weapons – that directly affect the forces and territories of Europe, and if co-operative on-site verification is also with us for good, then it is vital that Western Europe should, in the Atlantic framework, have its own facilities for remote sensing and control by satellite as a useful additional source of information. It would be politically desirable as a sign of the European security identity, meaningful as regards the sharing of tasks and responsibilities between Europe and the United States, and finally propitious for our industrial and technological development.

Hence the desirability of developing a European satellite system which could turn out to be very valuable not only for the surveillance of troop movements and the analysis of crisis situations, but also because of the assistance it would afford to our own on-site verification operations.

To set up a European satellite monitoring agency in the framework of Western European Union as proposed by our parliamentary Assembly, we shall need to look into all the technical, scientific, industrial, economic, financial, legal, institutional, political and operational aspects. A review of what already exists in this sector or, on the basis of programmes we know about, of what is planned for the future in Europe, will also be needed. We shall also have to study the problem of our relations with our American allies and that of co-operation with and integration in the Atlantic Alliance.

In my report, in addition to the specific initiatives by the European countries I have referred to – I am thinking, in particular, of the French Helios programme for the production of a military satellite in association with Italy and Spain and the civil programmes such as the French SPOT satellites – I refer to the Swedish programme. I mention Sweden because it is a European country but I do not mention the Canadian Paksat project, not just because Canada is not part of Europe, but also because this project would, in any event, be part of a satellite verification system common to all the parties signatory to an agreement on arms reduction. Similarly, I do not refer to the French proposal just mentioned by Mr. Fourré, which was put forward at the first Extraordinary United Nations Session on Disarmament in 1978 and sought to set up an international satellite monitoring agency to verify compliance with disarmament agreements and take preventive action in an emergency; in effect, this agency would in my opinion be very different in its aims from the one proposed in our recommendation because it would be organised and run by the United Nations.

I shall now go further into the technical aspects dealt with in the report, my working assumption being that the European satellite monitoring agency would have three tasks: the monitoring of military manoeuvres, the surveillance of crises and preparations for surprise attack and the verification of compliance with agreements on conventional arms control.

First, I must say that satellite surveillance does not completely meet the needs of verification and control because clearly the effectiveness of this type of monitoring is, in spite of everything, limited: it will not detect submersibles at depth nor various types of camouflage and simulation, not to mention the other basic considerations we have already referred to, namely that, for political and technical reasons, it could in no way replace on-site or “operational” verification. In any event, to carry out the three tasks I have listed, a multi-satellite system would be necessary so as to ensure complete coverage, day in day out, of the continent of Europe and the seas around it.

Mr. Malfatti (continued)

In addition, the resolution of remote-sensing equipment, as stated a few moments ago by the Rapporteur, Mr. Fourré, would have to be very fine, i.e. of the order of one to five metres for the first two tasks, i.e. surveillance of military movements and preparations for a surprise attack, and even 15 to 30 centimetres for the third, i.e. the identification of conventional weapons – assault tanks, armoured vehicles etc. – that is necessary to monitor compliance with agreements on the reduction of conventional forces. In addition to photographic optical spectrum and infrared cameras, there would – partly, but not wholly for meteorological reasons – equipment lifetime, for example – have to be synthetic aperture radar systems and hyper-frequency receivers for the data transmitted. These are, of course, projects that would need to be introduced in stages but it may already be affirmed that our countries are technologically, scientifically and industrially capable of launching these experiments and carrying them through to a successful conclusion.

I shall close by reminding you of a European success not unrelated to my subject, namely the European Space Agency's Ariane programme. Ariane 4, which has been operational since June of this year, will enable Europe to launch monitoring satellites of all reasonably foreseeable dimensions. It can place payloads of up to eight tonnes in low orbit and a little above four tonnes in geostationary orbit. Ariane 5, due to be operational in 1995, will be capable of launching – and this is its primary advantage from our viewpoint – up to twenty-one tonnes in low orbit and between six and eight tonnes in geostationary orbit.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, as I was saying, the progress already made by our countries as presented in my report, including advances in data processing and analysis, gives us the confidence to assert that, in terms of WEU's capability, there is no technical obstacle to the Council defining all the conditions necessary – as we state in the draft recommendation you are to vote on – for creating, in the framework of WEU, a European satellite monitoring agency.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The joint debate is open.

I call Mr. Klejdzinski.

Mr. KLEJZDZINSKI (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, my comments today on the need for Europe to have an observation satellite of its own in space are, of course, prompted by the draft recommendations presented by Mr. Fourré and Mr. Malfatti concerning the verification activities of a future European satellite monitoring agency, including the scientific and technical aspects.

I should like to take this opportunity to thank both Rapporteurs for their excellent work. They have done an excellent job of putting the case for a European observation satellite clearly and comprehensively, and of explaining the relevant technical and scientific requirements.

Their detailed catalogue of arguments makes it difficult for anyone to whom Europe's security is important to add anything more. I shall nevertheless make the attempt, because I believe that the importance of a European observation satellite cannot be stressed often enough, and also needs to be taken back to the member states for discussion, to increase their awareness of the need for a technical facility of this kind.

Both draft recommendations have my approval. For one thing, they confirm a personal view I have long held. With your permission, I should like to quote something I myself said in this place. I said that the emergence of a specifically national strategy for space developments was less important than the incorporation of this strategy in European integration, and that in a world perspective European co-operation was crucial to our civil space research.

I made the same statement in 1986 in the report on "German space policy at the turn of the century", drawn up by a group of experts for the Research Institute of the German Society for Foreign Policy. I still stand by this statement where the installation of a European satellite is concerned.

I also find it very easy in this context to give my approval because the social democrat group in the Bundestag, of which I am a member, tabled a motion on space policy in the Bundestag on 11th March of last year which fully endorses the demand expressed here. I feel we should be aware that we have a community of interests.

At the time, the Bundestag impressed on the Federal Government the need for the development and operation of a specifically Western European reconnaissance satellite for crisis management and arms and disarmament control purposes.

As I see it, it must be regarded as a success for Europe in security policy terms if we in Western Europe succeed in providing the initial impulse for the installation of a specifically European observation satellite in space.

Firstly, I believe the development of a European observation satellite will further strengthen Europe's autonomy in space. It is essential that we in Europe should have powers and, if necessary, be able to act autonomously in all areas, especially the critical ones.

I should like to illustrate this with an example which makes the need for a satellite of this kind abundantly clear. Immediately after the

Mr. Klejdzinski (continued)

explosion in the fourth reactor at Chernobyl, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany was confronted with the rumour that another reactor was about to explode, which would have made further precautionary measures necessary in Germany. But it was some weeks before the Federal Government had access to satellite photographs which could immediately have scotched this rumour. This actual event shows how very much the European countries need autonomous access to space, not only on economic, industrial and foreign policy grounds, but very specifically for reasons of security.

But this example also shows that an observation satellite can be important to civil defence and disaster prevention and that the emphasis does not need to be only on military observations.

In the case of WEU a satellite of this kind is needed because it can be used to gather data for European security which will be immediately available in unadulterated form to all the European countries and will not have to be obtained from other countries, with the attendant risk of incompleteness simply as a result of delayed access.

The Japanese recognised the importance of space to their national security, and also to their research projects, some time ago. They have been investing heavily in space for some years. Their per capita expenditure has long exceeded expenditure in Europe, and the Japanese space agency, the National Space Development Agency, has one of the largest space budgets in the world, as can be seen from an article on pages 36 et seq. of the December 1988 edition of the scientific journal "High Tech". The Japanese space agency is also currently engaged in research into satellite systems for data transmission. I see the Japanese efforts in space as a challenge to European co-operation. I must emphasise this. We Europeans should sometimes look beyond the clashes of competence among ourselves and realise that we can only stand up to the other economic agglomerations in the world if we are united.

The ESA has shown that such European co-operation can work efficiently, not only in science but also in the area of highly advanced technological developments. For its part, WEU can make a vital contribution to European security by calling for a European observation satellite.

I hope the two Rapporteurs are able to take in what I am saying despite their conversation down there. I see they are deep in conversation with the appropriate secretary.

I now come to the second reason for a European observation satellite. A Europe which is autonomous in space research and the use of space will naturally stabilise and strengthen Europe's rôle as a partner and its weight in international co-operation, particularly with the United States.

In this context I find a comment by Henry Kissinger revealing. He undoubtedly had good reason to mention WEU when he was awarded the Charlemagne prize of the City of Aachen in 1987. He said that in the years ahead the contribution made by a united Europe would be essential and that Europe must create a structure for the discussion of strategic problems, either by building on Western European Union or by developing another mechanism. And he added: "America must support this."

I expect a joint European observation satellite to enhance the political credibility of the European space policy at international level, because the joint advocacy, joint development and, ultimately, joint use of the satellite by the European nations will strengthen our feeling of togetherness and help to promote the unity of Europe and its continuing integration, in keeping with the central idea of the WEU treaty signed in 1954.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The joint debate is closed.

I call Mr. Fourré.

Mr. FOURRÉ (*France*) (Translation). – I wish to extend my special thanks to Mr. Klejdzinski, who has made himself the sole vehicle of the Assembly's contribution to this proposal for a European verification satellite agency. If what he has to say summarises a feeling widely shared by his fellow delegates, I am highly gratified at the Assembly's reaction. Mr. Klejdzinski has shown he appreciates not only the value of the initiative and the difficulties of setting it in place, but also the ambition in wishing to set up a European monitoring satellite agency.

As to the difficulties, we know them. As you said, the first is not in this Assembly. We have to convince our national institutions and thereby our governments to take the essentially political steps, not at first implying any big financial commitment, to respond to our request. A second difficulty is that of creating real awareness of Europe's position in the disarmament process to come.

These are key points for European collaboration but, as I pointed out in my report and my statement just now, we are also perhaps seeing here the culmination of a number of developments towards greater recognition of the position already occupied by Europe in the space field, i.e. its growing autonomy in the technological sphere and its greater credibility, to use Mr. Klejdzinski's exact words.

Mr. Fourré (continued)

I therefore thank him and would beg him and all the other representatives of our various countries, assuming of course that they vote in favour of these reports, to try to be our advocates in their national parliaments and governments so that, on the model of what some countries – the Netherlands and France, for instance – have already done, we can bring the process we are embarked on to a rapid conclusion.

I also wish to point out, Mr. President, that my report fits into the context of confidence-building measures between East and West.

And how, this morning, mindful of this report and the thinking behind it, can we fail to pay careful heed to the excellent suggestions in yesterday's speech by Mr. Gorbachev to the United Nations Organisation?

After the recent disaster in the Soviet Union, let us also take this opportunity to express our sympathy to him on the thousands of deaths in Armenia and to assure him of our support at this difficult time.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. de Beer.

Mr. de BEER (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I am speaking in place of Mr. Kittelmann in his capacity as Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

I will begin by complimenting Mr. Fourré on his report. Various kinds of reports are drawn up at WEU. This one has a typically initiatory function. It sets a new development in motion. We know there is no dispute about it, though the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments is not the easiest of committees in this respect. Differences of opinion are fairly widespread on certain problems, as we saw during yesterday afternoon's debate. It is to Mr. Fourré's credit that he has depoliticised this subject. The fact that this report was not disputed in the committee is therefore an implicit compliment to him.

It seems to me that we must forge a link with the Council of Europe. We are, after all, all members of delegations to the Council of Europe. The Council of Europe is currently discussing co-operation in the field of civil satellite technology. The Rapporteur, Mr. Fourré, is also active in this field.

There is reluctance in the Council of Europe to link the military and civil aspects. This report concerns a very specific aspect of satellite technology: its use in the service of projects designed to improve the security and safety of us all. I feel I can therefore say that co-operation between

civil satellite technology and what we are discussing here need not pose any problems.

The Rapporteur has proposed that research should be carried out over a wide area. He has raised many questions. I refer, for example, to paragraph 8.3 of his report, which in fact lists all the aspects which need to be studied. The Rapporteur also discussed this during his presentation.

The field is very wide, ranging from technical to monitoring aspects and from financial matters to public problems. Before we can make a start on all this, we shall have to do a great deal of research. I feel the report has made this very clear. That is another of its merits.

As a Dutchman – although I am speaking as the Vice-Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments – it gives me particular pleasure to be able to refer to the letter which the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Defence of the Netherlands have written to the Netherlands parliament. This letter is in fact included in Mr. Fourré's report as Appendix V. I should just like to quote two short passages from this letter:

“ For the above reasons, the government has therefore taken note with interest of the plea for possible future association with existing (or future) co-operation groups in the area of satellite technology. The undersigned believe that closer consideration should also be given to this problem since an observation satellite capability for Europe itself might be stimulating from the technological and industrial point of view. Furthermore, it might lead to more and better co-operation between federated information services. Closer co-operation in observation satellites with, consequently, progressively tighter economic, technological and also political links is of great importance for the countries of Western Europe. ”

The second quotation is particularly interesting to the members of WEU:

“ It is important to include the programme in an efficient European framework. To this end we believe it will be necessary to try to develop further an exchange of views in Western European Union too on the various aspects of a joint observation capability. ”

In the Netherlands government's view, Mr. Fourré's report has started life under a very lucky star.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is suspended.

(The sitting was suspended at 11.05 a.m. and resumed at 11.10 a.m.)

**4. Address by Mr. Manzolini,
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the address by Mr. Manzolini, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy.

It is a pleasure, Minister, to welcome you to this Assembly. On 9th June this year, speaking on behalf of the Italian Government, you said that in the framework of WEU reactivation “the parliamentary Assembly’s stimulating and monitoring rôle needs to be further enhanced”.

Your presence here again today is further evidence of the rôle which Italy intends to play in the process of WEU reactivation initiated in Rome in 1984.

Would you please take the rostrum.

Mr. MANZOLINI (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the current phase in international relations is probably the most interesting and stimulating that we have known since the emergence after the second world war of the present East-West configuration. The gradual creation over the last few years of an atmosphere of more constructive dialogue in East-West relations in general, the significant developments in the disarmament process and the dawning of new prospects in several fields ranging from international relations to technological development appear to justify the close attention that the problems of disarmament and security in Europe are now receiving from governments and public alike.

The beginning of this period of major disarmament negotiations has certainly had a profound effect on the fabric of relations between European countries by creating the basis for less conflict and more co-operation between the two Europes and the prospect of a gradual bridging of the divisions in our continent.

In this context, the agreement in intermediate nuclear forces has certainly been a starting point for a broader process which, in the case of the bilateral negotiations between the superpowers, should lead to the conclusion of the START agreement in a reasonably short time and, in that of the multinational negotiations, to an updating of the ban on chemical weapons and significant progress towards a better balance of conventional forces in Europe.

In this already positive context, the Soviet President’s statements at the United Nations yesterday add, in my view, a further reason for optimism, hope and confidence. Obviously and naturally the initiative demands fresh and careful thinking on our part. However, I think it is already possible to qualify it as a stimulus and encouragement both to continue down the road we are already on – I believe that a first

assessment is currently being made in the Atlantic Alliance – and to prepare ourselves with increased confidence for the forthcoming Vienna negotiations.

In Italy we feel that no doubt remains about the advantages for European security of a 50% reduction in the strategic arsenals of the two superpowers and the total elimination of chemical weapons. Italy will continue, as far as it can, to work towards the early attainment of these objectives in the expectation that after the change in the Washington administration and the planned United States-USSR summit in which the president-elect will be participating, the relevant negotiations will gain fresh momentum.

But above all I think that it is essential for us in the present changing situation to make a major effort in tackling the problems of stabilising conventional weapons from the Atlantic to the Urals at the lowest possible level. The asymmetry in this sector has influenced our continent’s political situation and security for decades and has been the cause of tensions and suspicion helping to maintain the division between the two Europes.

Whilst ending ideological and political rivalry and giving people more control over their own destiny may be essential for overcoming these divisions, success also depends on achieving safer and more stable balances of forces and armaments at ever lower levels. The problems of conventional disarmament in Europe, therefore, have great political importance and must necessarily be faced and resolved if we really wish to move towards a better Europe where, in every area, increasingly confident relations and peaceful co-operation prevail.

The negotiating framework for dealing with these problems seems now to be virtually defined since the intense negotiations in Vienna between the twenty-three member countries of the two alliances have made it largely possible to resolve the major difficulties of formulating a “mandate” for future negotiations. In the framework of a political and balanced conclusion on all the aspects of the current CSCE meetings in Vienna, it seems probable that in the coming hours, or days or, in any event, before the end of the year, the mandate for talks on conventional weapons will be agreed, thus leading immediately to talks on the basic problems. These are obviously matters of great complexity; they will require of all of us unprecedented effort and much determination, tenacity and solidarity in these vitally important negotiations for all the member countries of WEU and the Atlantic Alliance.

The data recently published by the alliance countries on conventional forces and armaments in Europe have confirmed the Warsaw Pact’s considerable superiority.

Mr. Manzolini (continued)

There is no doubt then that in order to achieve the elimination of the most destabilising asymmetries in the categories of the most patently offensive weapons, I think it is right to say that the biggest reductions will need to be made by the countries of Eastern Europe and the USSR in particular and I think that the fundamental starting point should be the will of all concerned and chiefly our counterparts in Eastern Europe to abandon once and for all the idea of security based on military domination.

Basically, the purpose must be to define fair and stable balances of forces at drastically reduced levels in order to guarantee the same degree of security for all and then to put them into effect regardless of who has or has not to make the biggest reduction.

Another point I want to make is that we have to think of the disarmament process and its impact on security requirements as an interconnected and dynamic system.

This means that a reduction in the threat and the establishment of genuine conventional stability would lead to less dependence on nuclear weapons, the benefit of a higher nuclear threshold and a further reduction in the number of atomic weapons in secure conditions.

Such measures could offer nothing but advantages. A further general advantage would be gained, in my view, from the savings in resources and their reallocation to economic and civil development.

But above all I am convinced that, in the present extremely important phase of international relations, a successful conclusion to negotiations on conventional stability in Europe, in removing the existing disparities in this area, would dispose of one of the main obstacles to closing the divisions between the countries of our continent and establishing a new kind and quality of relations.

Even if it does not seem realistic to assume that one could eliminate competition between the different socio-political systems and different ideologies there are in the states of Europe, there is no reason to think that this competition should not take on a totally new form paving the way to relations based increasingly on co-operation.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the view in Italy is that the disarmament process will decisively influence the prospects of greater security in the years to come by considerably reducing the need to have vast arsenals of sophisticated and offensive weapons to meet the threat. There is no doubt, moreover, that in the short term, the security policy of the western countries cannot be solely concerned with disarmament, although that will be a fundamental part of it.

In this context, there seems to be an increasing call on Europe to do more. In particular, our American allies consider that, given their budget problems and the economic growth of the countries of Europe, and Japan, these countries – I mean those of Europe – ought to take on a greater share of the responsibility for common security. In my view, in Europe's present political, social and economic situation it will be difficult to expect, at least as things are now, any marked increase in the resources applied to defence. Europeans are, however, clearly resolved to shoulder their own responsibilities and their share of the burden – which, I would remind you, are political as well as financial – in the fairest and fullest manner. Italy has demonstrated that it is so resolved in its decision to provide bases for the F-16 aircraft from Torrejon, when Spain closes this American base.

Mr. President, having outlined some of the features of the global framework of European security I should now like to turn more particularly to WEU.

In my address to this Assembly last June, I was able to present the Italian Government's position on the rôle of WEU in the definition of a European security policy. In our view, that policy has to serve two aims: European integration and the strengthening of the Atlantic Alliance by the consolidation of its "European pillar".

Italy, therefore, was highly satisfied when, on 14th November, the Council of Ministers brought the process of enlarging WEU to include Spain and Portugal to a successful conclusion. It was an opportunity to confirm the complete readiness of the two Iberian countries to comply with the provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty of 1954 and those of the 1984 Rome declaration and the 1987 Hague platform on European security interests.

We are convinced that the accession of Spain and Portugal, both of which are fully committed to the building of Europe and members of the Atlantic Alliance, will give new momentum to the development of European solidarity and to its defence and security identity and will at the same time help to reinforce the alliance's European pillar.

Furthermore, the participation of Spain and Portugal in the machinery for European consultation and co-ordination in security matters will undoubtedly integrate the two Iberian countries more fully in the process of building a stronger and more united Europe and will contribute to the strengthening of WEU itself.

Today therefore WEU appears as a growth organisation and this impression is confirmed by the, in general, positive outcome – to my mind, anyway – of the ministerial meeting of 14th

Mr. Manzolini (continued)

November, though we have to deplore, for the record, one negative feature: the continuing deadlock on the institutional reform of our organisation.

So, one year after the approval of the platform on European security interests and now that WEU is enlarged to include two new member states, we think the time is ripe for a few suggestions and some thinking about what can be done to develop the reactivation process and what direction we would collectively like WEU to follow.

First of all I should like to say that though the Italian Delegation had reasons for pointing out certain inadequacies in the past, we are now totally satisfied with the results obtained in terms of WEU's reactivation. I would add that we have nothing but praise for the work done so far especially in view of the intrinsic difficulties in the tasks we set ourselves.

In effect, developing a strong European security and defence identity is inevitably a long-term task and it would be pointless to expect sensational results and spectacular progress overnight. In our common will to work effectively towards the definition of common positions we cannot be blind to objective reality, i.e. the difference in status between the member countries: some are nuclear powers, some are not; some are fully integrated in the military structure of the Atlantic Alliance, some are not.

It is precisely because we are mindful of these disparities that we consider that what has been done so far is positive and, above all, that it has tended in the right direction as signposted by the Rome declaration of 1984 and the goals it lists, i.e. to promote the unity and encourage the progressive integration of Europe and to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. These two fundamental components of WEU's action are both confirmed in the platform and will continue to guide the organisation's future action.

WEU will thus continue to provide a privileged forum where the countries of Europe can consult together and co-ordinate their positions on security and defence with the probable long-term objective of operating the necessary conditions for a politically integrated Europe, i.e. a Europe able to put its stamp on international relations, including the vital sectors of security and defence.

At the same time, WEU must provide its help in defining the responsibilities of the European members of the Atlantic Alliance more clearly and thus contribute towards an overall strengthening of the European pillar of NATO. The presence of two countries that are not members

of the NATO integrated military system will, in this sense, be a stimulating factor. I therefore think that valuable work could be done by a deeper analysis of each member's contribution to common defence and of the synergies of our different views on strategy.

In the step-by-step performance of this difficult task, member states will need to take account of the general political context in which the conditions of European security must be assessed. There is still important work to be done in terms of continuing consultation on developments in East/West relations and this could take place in the WEU framework without any duplication of the political co-operation machinery, by concentrating on the military and political aspects of security.

The report on the implementation of the platform has defined a series of areas where possible forms of collaboration between the member states of the organisation could be developed. I feel that this too is an important task because a prerequisite for operational co-operation is that member states' readiness to commit themselves has to be verified. Nor should we forget the importance that the approval of forms of operational co-operation among the member countries of WEU could have for the public, which needs to be made increasingly aware of the problems of European security, a purpose that will also be served by giving greater powers to and heightening the importance of the parliamentary Assembly of WEU.

Mr. President, I would like to conclude my remarks with a brief reference to the out-of-area subject and confirm that in this sector too WEU could have its own part to play. Whenever necessary, therefore, the agreed consultative machinery should be set up after identifying the most important areas where the protection of common security interests seems most essential. Thank you, Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you for your address, Minister.

Would you be kind enough to answer questions from Assembly members?

(The Minister of State agreed)

(Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Rathbone.

Mr. RATHBONE (*United Kingdom*). – Will the Minister elaborate a little further on the step in the right direction reported in our newspapers today regarding the 15% reduction in Warsaw Pact forces in Europe? How does he see NATO and WEU reacting to those cuts, which, although not sufficient in themselves, seem to be a good sign?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. MANZOLINI (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy*) (Translation). – I should like to confirm, if only briefly, what I said in my address, briefly because the Soviet President only made his proposal yesterday and I do not therefore think we are in a position to evaluate all its political and military implications. But, apart from the strategic aspects which are the responsibility of another forum – this question is on today's agenda at the headquarters of the Atlantic Council – our assessment definitely leans towards optimism and confidence.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Speed.

Mr. SPEED (*United Kingdom*). – Following on from the previous question, the Minister of State referred in his interesting speech to the integration of Europe and to the Gorbachev-United Nations proposals, as did my colleague, Mr. Rathbone. Is there not a danger in considering disarmament almost as an end in itself and forgetting the fact that we still have the Berlin wall, the minefields and the machine-gun towers on the inner German border, and Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia which were subsumed into the Soviet Union by a Stalin-Hitler pact forty-eight years ago? All those matters detract from the integrated, free Europe that we all wish to see. That must be the ultimate political aim, but sometimes very welcome steps towards disarmament may lull us into forgetting what the ultimate aim should be.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. MANZOLINI (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy*) (Translation). – Thank you. Naturally, I agree with your general assessment which I feel was covered to some extent in my address, especially where I stated that disarmament is certainly an important factor in the process of détente but not the process of détente itself – which is something different and embraces many other fields and many other sectors and realities as you said.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Martino.

Mr. MARTINO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Minister, yesterday's surprise announcement by Mr. Gorbachev cannot drown out the sound of the calamity that has hit the Kurdish population and that we raised this week in the Assembly. You know how serious for Turkey is its generous action on behalf of the Kurdish population fleeing from Iraq and all over that region to take refuge in Anatolia.

What does the Italian Government think can be done in support of such action and to continue providing the Kurdish population with the help it needs?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. MANZOLINI (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy*) (Translation). – I should like to assure Mr. Martino that in talks between President Da Mita and the Turkish President, in Italy on 5th October, guarantees were given that emergency action would be taken to assist the Kurdish population.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Fourré.

Mr. FOURRÉ (*France*) (Translation). – Your arrival, Minister, coincided with a debate on disarmament at the point when we were discussing the Soviet initiative and the address you have given underlines the importance of Europe's rôle in this process.

When you arrived, an initiative which proposed the setting up of a European surveillance satellite agency was being presented to the Assembly by Mr. Malfatti and myself. I know how actively your country is already involved in co-operation in space matters and in the Helios programme in particular where you have decided to take a 15% share, but I would like to know whether, apart from your efforts to create this space facility, you will also be able to take part in the more political, though financially less onerous, undertaking of setting up, as Europeans in WEU, an agency which would enable us to go even further in arms verification and which would, of course, enable us to take our place in the concert of nations on disarmament issues?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. MANZOLINI (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy*) (Translation). – Thank you for giving me this opportunity to reaffirm the interest that my government has already shown – as the French Government has, too, I believe – in a sector not simply of great interest to Europe but also of specific importance to each of our countries.

Our view of the proposal that you and Mr. Malfatti have tabled cannot, therefore fail to be favourable.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Sarti.

Mr. SARTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Minister, this has been a good day for the WEU Assembly, coming as it does at the end of a session that has seen some excellent reports. There have, however, also been some fairly long periods of concern about attendance and overcrowding in the Assembly.

In your excellent statement, I – as a member of this Assembly – thought I detected a slight but highly important clue to your perception – as representative of the Government of the Republic of Italy – of the rôle of the Assembly of Western European Union.

With regard to this assessment, I should like to ask whether the Italian Government along with the other WEU governments is prepared to take

Mr. Sarti (continued)

action on the initiatives of our President, our excellent staff and the policy-makers present in this chamber in order to ensure that the rôle of this Assembly is enhanced, if possible, at the present critical and important juncture?

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Minister.

Mr. MANZOLINI (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should like to thank Mr. Sarti for his words of welcome for my statement to the Assembly on the position of the Italian Government and to do so with special warmth in recognition of Mr. Sarti's commitment, long experience and personal standing.

In answer to the question, I can affirm, on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Italy, that we shall follow up any concrete initiatives that further the political goal of enhancing the rôle and functions of this parliamentary Assembly, which we consider to be irreplaceable, and I stress irreplaceable, for carrying out the organisation's institutional tasks.

The PRESIDENT. – That is a very happy note on which to end the question and answer session, and it will be recorded in the official report. I trust that Mr. Manzolini's expression will mean that the financing of the reconstruction of the building and our budgets will be considered looked at with a sympathetic eye.

I think, Minister, that you will see how much you have pleased the Assembly by coming here and if your remarks in future are in the same vein, we shall welcome you back on many occasions.

Mr. MANZOLINI (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy*) (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. President.

5. Verification: a future European satellite agency

Scientific and technical aspects of arms control verification by satellite – reply to the thirty-third annual report of the Council

(*Votes on the draft recommendations, Docs. 1159 and 1160*)

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the votes on the draft recommendations on verification: a future European satellite agency and on scientific and technical aspects of arms control verification by satellite – reply to the thirty-third annual report of the Council, Documents 1159 and 1160.

We shall first proceed to vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1159.

Under Rule 33, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless five representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. We shall therefore vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft recommendation is adopted unanimously¹.

We now come to the vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1160.

Is there a request for a roll-call vote?...

There is not. We shall therefore vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft recommendation is adopted unanimously².

I congratulate the Rapporteurs and committees on their efforts.

6. Close of the session

The PRESIDENT. – Before I close the session, I think that you would all wish me to ask Mr. Goerens to send a message to the President of the Soviet Union commiserating with him on the tragic earthquake in Armenia.

That is agreed.

We have reached the end of the second part of the thirty-fourth ordinary session. I am sure that you would all wish me to thank all those responsible for ensuring the smooth running of the Assembly and its work.

I wish you all a safe journey home and declare closed the thirty-fourth ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union.

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 11.45 a.m.)

1. See page 43.

2. See page 44.

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