

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

# PROCEEDINGS

TWENTY-SEVENTH ORDINARY SESSION

FIRST PART

**June 1981**

**I**

**Assembly Documents**

**WEU**

**PARIS**

**ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION**  
**43, avenue du Président Wilson, 75775 Paris Cedex 16 - Tel. 723.54.32**

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**I**

**Assembly Documents**

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The proceedings of the First Part of the Twenty-Seventh Ordinary Session of the Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes:

Volume I: Assembly Documents.

Volume II: Orders of the Day and Minutes of Proceedings, Official Report of Debates, General Index.

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## LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

### BELGIUM

#### Representatives

MM. ADRIAENSSENS Hugo	Socialist
BONNEL Raoul	PVV
HANIN Charles	Soc. Chr.
MANGELSCHOTS Jan	Socialist
PEETERS Renaat	Soc. Chr.
TANGHE Francis	Soc. Chr.
van WATERSCHOOT John	Soc. Chr.

#### Substitutes

MM. BRASSEUR Guy	FDJ
DEJARDIN Claude	Socialist
LAGNEAU André	PRL
LAMBIOTTE Fortuné	Socialist
MICHEL Joseph	Soc. Chr.
Mrs. STAELS-DOMPAS Nora	Soc. Chr.
Mr. VAN DER ELST Frans	Volksunie

### FRANCE

#### Representatives

MM. BERRIER Noël	Socialist
BIZET Émile	RPR (App.)
BRUGNON Maurice	Socialist
CARO Jean-Marie	UDF
DEPIETRI César	Communist
DESCHAMPS Bernard	Communist
FERRETTI Henri	UDF
GRUSSENMEYER François	RPR
JEAMBRUN Pierre	Dem. Left
JUNG Louis	UCDP
PÉRONNET Gabriel	UDF (App.)
PETIT Camille	RPR
PIGNION Lucien	Socialist
PONCELET Christian	RPR
SCHLEITER François	Ind. Rep.
SÉNÈS Gilbert	Socialist
SPÉNALE Georges	Socialist
VALLEIX Jean	RPR

#### Substitutes

MM. BAUMEL Jacques	RPR
BECHTER Jean-Pierre	RPR
BELIN Gilbert	Socialist
BOZZI Jean	RPR
COUDERC Pierre	UDF
DRUON Maurice	RPR
FORNI Raymond	Socialist
FORTIER Marcel	RPR

MM. JAGER René	UCDP
KOEHL Émile	UDF
LAGOURGUE Pierre	UDF
LEMOINE Georges	Socialist
LE MONTAGNER Louis	UCDP
MALVY Martin	Socialist
MÉNARD Jacques	Ind. Rep.
MERCIER Jean	Dem. Left
VISSE René	Communist
WARGNIES Claude	Communist

### FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

#### Representatives

MM. AHRENS Karl	SPD
ALTHAMMER Walter	CDU/CSU
BARDENS Hans	SPD
BÖHM Wilfried	CDU/CSU
BÜCHNER Peter	SPD
ENDERS Wendelin	SPD
GESSNER Manfred-Achim	SPD
JUNG Kurt	FDP
KITTELMANN Peter	CDU/CSU
MÄNNING Peter	SPD
MÜLLER Günther	CDU/CSU
REDDEMANN Gerhard	CDU/CSU
SCHMIDT Hermann	SPD
SCHULTE Manfred	SPD
SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM Adolf	CDU/CSU
SPRUNG Rudolf	CDU/CSU
UNLAND Hermann Joseph	CDU/CSU
VOHRER Manfred	FDP

#### Substitutes

MM. AMREHN Franz	CDU/CSU
BAHR Egon	SPD
CORTERIER Peter	SPD
EICKMEYER Karl-Arnold	SPD
HOLTZ Uwe	SPD
HORN Erwin	SPD
JAGER Claus	CDU/CSU
LEMMRICH Karl Heinz	CDU/CSU
LENZER Christian	CDU/CSU
MÜLLER Hans-Werner	CDU/CSU
Mrs. PACK Doris	CDU/CSU
MM. PENSKY Heinz	SPD
RÖSCH Klaus	FDP
SCHÄUBLE Wolfgang	CDU/CSU
SCHMIDT Hansheinrich	FDP
SCHMIDT Manfred	SPD
TOPMANN Günter	SPD
WITTMANN Fritz	CDU/CSU



## ITALY

## Representatives

MM. AGRIMI Alessandro	Chr. Dem.
ANTONI Varese	Communist
BERNINI Bruno	Communist
BONALUMI Gilberto	Chr. Dem.
CALAMANDREI Franco	Communist
CAVALIERE Stefano	Chr. Dem.
DE POI Alfredo	Chr. Dem.
FORMA Renzo	Chr. Dem.
FOSSON Pietro	Val d'Aosta Union
MARAVALLE Fabio	Socialist
MONDINO Giorgio	Socialist
PECCHIOLI Ugo	Communist
PETRILLI Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
PUCCI Ernesto	Chr. Dem.
RUBBI Antonio	Communist
TRIPODI Antonio	MSI-DN
VALIANTE Mario	Chr. Dem.
VECCHIETTI Tullio	Communist

## Substitutes

MM. AJELLO Aldo	Republican
AMADEI Giuseppe	Socialist
BATTAGLIA Adolfo	Republican
BENEDIKTER Johann Hans	SVP
Mrs. BONIVER Margherita	Socialist
MM. CAFIERO Luca	PDUP
CALICE Giovanni	Communist
CONTI PERSINI Gianfranco	PSDI
FIANDROTTI Filippo	Socialist
GIUST Bruno	Chr. Dem.
MARTINO Leopoldo	Communist
Atilio	
ORIONE Franco Luigi	Chr. Dem.
PATRIARCA Francesco	Chr. Dem.
POZZO Cesare	MSI-DN
ROMANO Angelo	Ind. Left
Mrs. ROSOLEN Angela Maria	Communist
MM. SPITELLA Giorgio	Chr. Dem.
STERPA Egidio	Liberal

## LUXEMBOURG

## Representatives

MM. BERCHEM Albert	Dem.
MARGUE Georges	Soc. Chr.
THOSS Maurice	Soc. Workers

## Substitutes

MM. GLESENER Jean-Pierre	Soc. Chr.
KRIEPS Robert	Soc. Workers
PRUSSEN Robert	Dem.

## NETHERLANDS

## Representatives

MM. CORNELISSEN Pam	CDA
van HULST Johan	CDA
PORTHEINE Frederik	Liberal
SCHOLTEN Jan Nico	CDA
STOFFELEN Pieter	Labour
TUMMERS Nicolas	Labour
VOOGD Johan	Labour

## Substitutes

MM. van den BERGH Harry	Labour
BLAAUW Jan Dirk	Liberal
KONINGS Martin	Labour
LAMBERTS J.H.	Labour
MOMMERSTEEG Joseph	CDA
SCHLINGEMANN Johan	Liberal
Mrs. van der WERF-TERPSTRA Anne-Maria	CDA

## UNITED KINGDOM

## Representatives

Mr. Alan BEITH	Liberal
Sir Frederic BENNETT	Conservative
MM. Thomas COX	Labour
Anthony GRANT	Conservative
W. Percy GRIEVE	Conservative
Peter HARDY	Labour
Paul HAWKINS	Conservative
Lord HUGHES	Labour
Mr. Toby JESSEL	Conservative
Sir Anthony KERSHAW	Conservative
Mrs. Jill KNIGHT	Conservative
Mr. Michael McGUIRE	Labour
Dr. Maurice MILLER	Labour
MM. Fred MULLEY	Labour
President of the Assembly	
John PAGE	Conservative
Lord REAY	Conservative
MM. Thomas URWIN	Labour
John WILKINSON	Conservative

## Substitutes

MM. David ATKINSON	Conservative
Ronald BROWN	Labour
Donald COLEMAN	Labour
Lord DUNCAN-SANDYS	Conservative
MM. Tony DURANT	Conservative
Robert EDWARDS	Labour
Raymond FLETCHER	Labour
Edward GARRETT	Labour
Harry GOURLAY	Labour
James HILL	Conservative
Ralph HOWELL	Conservative
Lord McNAIR	Liberal
Lord NORTHFIELD	Labour
MM. John OSBORN	Conservative
Laurence PAVITT	Labour
Dudley SMITH	Conservative
Keith STAINTON	Conservative
Sir Thomas WILLIAMS	Labour

## AGENDA

**of the First Part of the Twenty-Seventh Ordinary Session  
Paris, 15th-18th June 1981**

**I. Report of the Council**

Twenty-sixth annual report of the Council to the Assembly

**II. Political Questions**

- |   |  |
|---|--|
| 1. Political activities of the Council – reply to the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Page on behalf of the General Affairs Committee</i>  |
| 2. Developments in Poland   | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Hanin on behalf of the General Affairs Committee</i> |
| 3. European security and events in the Gulf area  | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Forni on behalf of the General Affairs Committee</i> |

**III. Defence Questions**

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| 1. Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Tanghe on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments</i>      |
| 2. European security and the Mediterranean   | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Bozzi on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments</i>       |
| 3. Talks on the reduction of long-range theatre nuclear forces in Europe                       | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Mommersteeg on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments</i> |

**IV. Technical and Scientific Questions**

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| 1. Future of European space activities – reply to the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions</i> |
| 2. The European combat aircraft and other aeronautical developments                             | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Brasseur on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions</i>  |

**V. Budgetary and Administrative Questions**

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| Revised budget of the Assembly for the financial year 1981 | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Adriaensens on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration</i> |
|--|--|

**VI. Rules of Procedure**

- |                                    |   |
|------------------------------------|---|
| Revision of the Rules of Procedure | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Grieve on behalf of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.</i> |
|------------------------------------|---|

**VII. Relations with Parliaments**

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| Half-yearly information report – Relations between parliaments and the press | <i>Report tabled by Mrs. Knight on behalf of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments</i> |
|--|---|

**ORDER OF BUSINESS**

**of the First Part of the Twenty-Seventh Ordinary Session  
Paris, 15th-18th June 1981**

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**MONDAY, 15th JUNE**

**Morning**

Meetings of Political Groups.

**Afternoon 3 p.m.**

1. Opening of the twenty-seventh ordinary session by the Provisional President.
2. Examination of credentials.
3. Election of the President of the Assembly.
4. Address by the President of the Assembly.
5. Election of the Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.
6. Adoption of the draft Order of Business of the first part of the twenty-seventh ordinary session.
7. Twenty-sixth annual report of the Council:  
presentation by the Hon. Douglas Hurd, United Kingdom Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, representing the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.
8. Political activities of the Council – reply to the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council:  
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Page on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.  
Debate.  
*Vote on the draft recommendation.*
9. Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council:  
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Tanghe on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.  
Debate.  
*Vote on the draft recommendation.*

**TUESDAY, 16th JUNE**

**Morning 9.30 a.m.**

Meetings of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.

10 a.m.

1. European security and the Mediterranean:  
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Bozzi on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.  
Debate.
2. Address by General Bernard Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

Afternoon 2.30 p.m.

Meetings of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

3 p.m.

1. European security and the Mediterranean:  
Resumed debate.  
*Vote on the draft recommendation.*
2. Talks on the reduction of long-range theatre nuclear forces in Europe:  
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Mommersteeg on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.  
Debate.  
*Vote on the draft recommendation.*
3. Revised budget of the Assembly for the financial year 1981:  
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Adriaensens on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.  
Debate.  
*Vote on the revised budget.*

WEDNESDAY, 17th JUNE

Morning 9.30 a.m.

Meetings of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.

10 a.m.

1. Future of European space activities – reply to the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council:  
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.  
Debate.  
*Vote on the draft recommendation.*
2. The European combat aircraft and other aeronautical developments:  
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Brasseur on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.  
Debate.

**Afternoon 3 p.m.**

**1. The European combat aircraft and other aeronautical developments:**

Resumed debate.

*Vote on the draft recommendation.*

**2. Relations between parliaments and the press:**

presentation of the report tabled by Mrs. Knight on behalf of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

**THURSDAY, 18th JUNE**

**Morning 10 a.m.**

**1. Developments in Poland:**

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Hanin on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.

Debate.

*Vote on the draft recommendation.*

**2. European security and events in the Gulf area:**

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Forni on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.

Debate.

*Vote on the draft recommendation.*

**Afternoon 2.30 p.m.**

Meeting of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

**3 p.m.**

Revision of the Charter and of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly:

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Grieve on behalf of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.

Debate.

*Vote on the draft resolution.*

**CLOSE OF THE FIRST PART OF THE TWENTY-SEVENTH ORDINARY SESSION**

*Twenty-Sixth Annual Report of the Council to the Assembly  
of Western European Union on the Council's activities for the period  
1st January to 31st December 1980*

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## INTRODUCTION

1. The Council of Western European Union transmit to the Assembly the Twenty-Sixth Annual Report on their activities, covering the period 1st January to 31st December 1980.
2. The main questions considered by the Council are dealt with in the following chapters:

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V. Public Administration Committee .....	36
VI. Budgetary and administrative questions .....	38

## CHAPTER I

## RELATIONS BETWEEN THE COUNCIL AND THE ASSEMBLY

Presenting the last annual report of the Council to the Assembly, Mr. van der Klaauw, the Chairman-in-Office, stressed the importance the governments of the WEU member states attach to the part played by this Assembly. Indeed, as the Council stated in their reply to Recommendation 347, the WEU Assembly, with the responsibility vested in it by the modified Brussels Treaty, constitutes the only European parliamentary institution empowered to deal with defence questions. In this capacity, it provides the forum where parliamentarians and Ministers from Western European countries discuss politico-military questions.

The Council noted with satisfaction that the Assembly welcomed the fact that the relationship between them "rested on a sound basis". Desirous of maintaining with the Assembly good relations which will enable the parliamentarians of the member countries to be informed of their governments' activities in the fields of security and defence, the Council have continued their dialogue with it on questions relating to the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, including those dealt with by the member governments in other international fora, and on questions of special interest for the parliamentarians.

**A. *Twenty-fifth annual report of the Council to the Assembly***

The Council transmitted their twenty-fifth annual report to the Assembly as early as possible. This document gave a detailed account of the activities of the Council and its subsidiary bodies during 1979. Some additional information on armaments control was provided to the Assembly in accordance with the procedure applied since 1971<sup>1</sup>.

**B. *Assembly recommendations to the Council and written questions put to the Council by members of the Assembly***

The Council took careful note of the reports presented by Assembly committees during the two parts of the twenty-sixth ordinary session on a number of questions concerning security and European union. They followed with interest the debates on those reports.

The Council gave careful consideration to the nineteen recommendations<sup>1</sup> adopted by the Assembly during the second part of the twenty-fifth ordinary session and the first part of the twenty-sixth ordinary session and to the nineteen written questions<sup>2</sup> put by members of the Assembly in 1980.

They replied in a detailed manner to all these recommendations and questions, which were more numerous than in previous years. In so doing, they also took account of activities in which the member states of WEU participate elsewhere; thus, they gave the Assembly as much information as they could of the results of consultations in which the representatives of those states had taken part, in particular in the framework of political co-operation of the Nine and in the North Atlantic Council.

With regard to the activities of the Independent European Programme Group, the Council, in their reply to Recommendation 347, stated that each of the governments represented in that Group remained responsible for informing the parliamentarians who are members of the WEU Assembly, on a national basis.

**C. *Meetings between the Council and Assembly bodies***

1. Two informal meetings took place in Luxembourg on 14th May 1980 after the ministerial session of the Council.

In the afternoon, the Council and the General Affairs Committee met under the chairmanship of Mr. Thorn, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. They discussed the subjects which had been proposed by the Committee: the activities of WEU; East-West relations; the situation in the Near and Middle East.

During that meeting, the Chairman-in-Office informed the Assembly representatives that the Standing Armaments Committee had recently completed the second, economic, part of its study of the armaments sector of industry in the member countries of WEU and that the Council had begun consideration of it. He indicated that the Council would send the Assembly a communication concerning this part of the SAC's study as soon as possible. It was recalled, in this connection, that when the

1. Cf. Council reply to Written Question 123.

1. Nos. 336 to 354.  
2. Nos. 205 to 223.

whole study had been completed, the Council would consider the content and the manner in which the Assembly could be adequately informed.

In accordance with established practice, the Chairman-in-Office of the Council also received the Chairman of the General Affairs Committee.

In the evening of 14th May, the members of the Council and the Presidential Committee of the Assembly met at a working dinner, also presided over by Mr. Thorn.

2. The President of the Assembly, in a letter to Mr. van der Klaauw, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, in mid-December, transmitted two requests for joint meetings in 1981, one from the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, the other from the General Affairs Committee. He also stressed the value which the Presidential Committee attached to the meetings which, in accordance with the agreement made in 1968, take place each year at the time of the Council's ministerial meetings.

The Council, appreciating the wish of the Assembly, thus confirmed by its representative, to meet them periodically, immediately undertook consideration of the practical possibility of meeting their requests.

***D. Speeches to the Assembly by  
the Chairman-in-Office of  
the Council and other Ministers of  
member governments***

It is customary for the Chairman-in-Office, each year, to introduce the Council's report on their activities before the Assembly.

Moreover, the members of the Council are aware of the Assembly's interest in the participation of Ministers in its discussions, to enable them better to understand the respective posi-

tions of the governments of the member countries of WEU with respect to items on its agenda.

In 1980, Mr. van der Klaauw, the Chairman-in-Office, and other Ministers of member governments spoke during both parts of the twenty-sixth ordinary session of the Assembly.

In June, Mr. van der Klaauw reviewed the main aspects of the activities of the Council and its subsidiary bodies during 1979 and the first months of 1980; then addressing the Assembly as Netherlands Foreign Minister, he gave his government's views about the repercussions of events in South-East Asia on prospects for the policy of détente with the East. Mr. Hurd, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, spoke of the major problems affecting the international situation, first among them the Afghan question, and told the Assembly what conclusions the British Government drew from them as to the policy the countries of Europe should follow, particularly in their relations with the Soviet Union.

In December, Mr. van der Klaauw, in the speech he made as Netherlands Foreign Minister, dealt with European security, stressing the importance, in that context, of solidarity between the European and American partners in the Atlantic Alliance. Mrs. Hamm-Brücher, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, gave the Assembly her government's position on both bilateral and multilateral aspects of the development of East-West relations since the end of 1979. Mr. Bernard-Reymond, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic, made a speech in which he reviewed the various elements which made up his country's security policy.

Following their speeches, Ministers answered numerous questions put to them by members of the Assembly.



## CHAPTER II

## ACTIVITIES OF THE COUNCIL

The Council met at ministerial level in Luxembourg on 14th May 1980 under the chairmanship of Mr. Thorn, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

The permanent representatives met fourteen times and there were twenty-two meetings of the working group.

\*  
\* \*

Introducing the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council to the Assembly, Mr. van der Klaauw, the Chairman-in-Office, reaffirmed the great importance the governments of the member countries of WEU attached to the modified Brussels Treaty and its Protocols and their determination to fulfil the obligations they have entered into. He specially mentioned Article V of the treaty, in which the member countries of the organisation promised each other mutual assistance in case of outside aggression; he stressed that this article remained one of the central elements of the security system of the signatory countries and its significance should not be belittled.

The Council continue to ensure that the provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty and its Protocols are applied and observed. In so doing, they are concerned both to ensure proper implementation of the obligations and responsibilities defined by the treaty and to avoid – as indeed is required by the treaty – duplication of activities in which the governments of the WEU member states participate in other international fora. Whilst, in present circumstances, the Council's field of action is limited, in particular because of work being done in the framework of European political co-operation, the North Atlantic Council and the Independent European Programme Group, their responsibilities remain unchanged as does the essential value of WEU as an organisation. In this context, the Council recall that, in replying to Assembly Recommendation 347, they stated that the governments of the member countries were keeping in mind the possibility of using WEU as a forum for exchanging views on defence problems not dealt with elsewhere; they noted the Assembly's wish that organisational measures be considered for possible future tasks of the organisation.

\*  
\* \*

During 1980, various aspects and phases of the implementation of the Paris Agreements have appeared twenty-two times on the Council's agenda.

In Luxembourg on 14th May, the Ministers discussed the development of East-West relations since their previous meeting. They also considered the latest progress of the Standing Armaments Committee's study on the situation of the armaments sector of industry in the member countries of WEU.

Finally, it is recalled that the dialogue with the Assembly, which constitutes an important part of the Council's activity, was continued on questions relating to the implementation of the modified Brussels Treaty and of its Protocols.

### A. *Political questions*

#### 1. *East-West relations*

Following the military intervention of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan at the end of 1979<sup>1</sup>, the governments of the member states of WEU, both individually and within various international bodies, made known their deep concern at this action and its effect on the prospects for détente.

In the declaration they made, together with their partners in the European Community, on 15th January 1980, they urged the Soviet Union to act in conformity with the United Nations General Assembly Resolution approved on 14th January. They also repeated that détente, which continued to be their aim, should be indivisible and have a global dimension.

In Luxembourg, on 14th May, the WEU Council discussed in depth the various aspects of developments in East-West relations, in the climate of uncertainty arising from the fact that Soviet armed forces continued to occupy Afghanistan.

They noted that bilateral relations between the WEU member countries and the Soviet Union had suffered through the international crisis brought about by the latter. The Ministers observed that the re-establishment of constructive relations with the Soviet Union, which was desired by their governments, could only be

1. See also point 2 of this part of the chapter.

founded on dialogue and mutual trust, and, above all, on the adoption of concrete measures by the USSR resulting in the removal of the obstacles standing along the path to détente.

In statements made to the Council on the development of bilateral relations with other eastern countries, various high-level contacts were mentioned, including: in the second half of 1979, visits by the President of the Italian Republic to Yugoslavia, by the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the Netherlands to Poland, by the Vice-President of the Government and Foreign Minister of Luxembourg to Hungary, by the Foreign Minister of France to Poland and the German Democratic Republic, by the Netherlands Foreign Minister to the German Democratic Republic and to Hungary, by the Italian Foreign Minister to Romania, by the Belgian Foreign Minister to Hungary and to the German Democratic Republic, by the Minister of State at the United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office to Poland; visits by the President of Poland to Belgium, by the Party First Secretary of Poland, the Prime Minister of Hungary, the Foreign Ministers of Romania and Bulgaria to France, by the Deputy Foreign Ministers of Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria to the United Kingdom; during the early months of 1980, the visit to Romania by the United Kingdom Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany's talks with the President of the Council of State of the German Democratic Republic and with the Party First Secretary of Poland in Belgrade, the visit by the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia to Luxembourg.

The Council took careful note of the detailed report made, as at every WEU ministerial meeting, by the German Delegation. They welcomed the progress it had been possible to achieve in various fields of bilateral relations between the member countries of WEU and several eastern countries.

On the occasion of this WEU meeting in Luxembourg, the Ministers reaffirmed their respective governments' support for détente and their determination to work towards this end in consultation and jointly with their partners of the European Community and the Atlantic Alliance.

In this spirit, the member states of WEU played an active part in the work within the framework of European political co-operation and in the Atlantic Council, in preparation for the CSCE follow-up meeting which was to open in Madrid in November. In their reply to Assembly Recommendation 351, the Council stated that the member states were firmly determined to enter, at that meeting, into a thorough and frank discussion on the implementation of

the principles and provisions as laid down in the final act of Helsinki. They added that the member states of WEU would ensure that the balance between all sections of this act was maintained and would work towards the adoption, as part of this balanced outcome, of a mandate for further negotiations under the aegis of the CSCE – in accordance with the proposal made by the French Government – on militarily significant and verifiable confidence-building measures, which would apply to the entire continent of Europe.

The Council draw attention to the fact that, at the end of the exchange of views on developments in East-West relations, at the European Council meeting in Luxembourg on 1st and 2nd December 1980, the Heads of State or of Government of the member countries of the European Community affirmed the determination of the Nine not to be content with apparent results in Madrid but to achieve genuine and balanced progress in the various chapters of the final act of Helsinki. In particular, they confirmed with this in mind the support which the Nine had already expressed for a proposed European disarmament conference, the first stage of which would be the drafting of binding and verifiable confidence measures to apply to the entire European continent.

The Council add that, at that same meeting, the Nine expressed their sympathy for Poland. They stated that, in their relations with that country, they conformed and would continue to conform strictly to the United Nations Charter and to the principles of the Helsinki final act. They called upon all the signatory states to abide by these principles with regard to Poland and the Polish people, emphasising that any other attitude would have very serious consequences for the future of international relations in Europe and throughout the world. Finally, they stated their willingness to meet, insofar as their resources allowed, the requests for economic aid which had been made to them by Poland.

The positions adopted by the governments of the member states of WEU within the framework of European political co-operation were confirmed by their Foreign Ministers at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council held in Brussels on 11th and 12th December. In the context of this part of their annual report, the Council wish to draw the Assembly's attention to points 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the communiqué published by the Ministers of the allied governments at the conclusion of their session and also to point 8 of that document. As the first phase of the Madrid meeting was coming to an end and with the second phase in mind, it was noted that the allies had presented and would present "new and important proposals in all areas covered by the final act of Helsinki,

including human rights, human contacts and information". On the subject of the French proposal for a conference on disarmament in Europe under the aegis of the CSCE, to which the Council have referred above, the allies took note that it had been tabled in Madrid and "welcomed by many delegations".

### 2. *Afghanistan*

As recalled by the Council in their previous annual report, all the member countries of WEU voted for the resolution adopted on 14th January 1980 by the General Assembly of the United Nations, which appealed to all states to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and non-aligned character of Afghanistan and to refrain from any interference in the internal affairs of that country. Together with their partners in the European Community, in the declaration of the Nine of 15th January, they urged the Soviet Union to conform with the United Nations resolution by carrying out an immediate and complete withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan.

In the replies to Assembly Recommendation 349 and Written Question 206, the Council referred to the efforts of their members, in the context of European political co-operation, to bring about a political settlement of the Afghan question. On 19th February 1980, the Nine, through the Presidency, gave support to an arrangement that would allow a neutral Afghanistan to be outside competition among the powers. They noted with satisfaction the positive reactions of several third world countries, particularly the ASEAN member countries, towards such an arrangement. At its meeting in Luxembourg on 27th and 28th April, the European Council proposed that the great powers and neighbouring states should undertake the necessary commitments to allow Afghanistan to remain outside the competition among the powers and to return to its traditional position as a neutral and non-aligned state. The Nine stated their readiness to support any initiative designed to promote such a solution of the Afghan crisis. The European Council confirmed its proposals in the declaration on Afghanistan which it adopted at its meeting on 12th and 13th June in Venice.

The governments of the WEU member states also played an active part in the consultations within the Atlantic Alliance in 1980. In their reply to Assembly Recommendation 351 the Council referred to the views expressed by the Foreign Ministers of the allied countries at their meeting in Ankara on 26th and 27th June. In paragraph 4 of the communiqué issued after the ministerial session of the North Atlantic Council on 11th and 12th December, the Ministers again asserted that the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan was unacceptable.

They declared that a political settlement of the question, in conformity with the new resolution adopted on 20th November by an overwhelming majority of the General Assembly of the United Nations, must provide for a total withdrawal of Soviet troops and enable the Afghan people to exercise fully their rights of independence and self-determination.

The Council also wish to point out that the governments of the member countries of WEU are contributing to the humanitarian aid provided by the allied governments and a large number of others to alleviate the plight of more than one million Afghans forced by the Soviet occupation to flee their homeland and take refuge in neighbouring countries.

### 3. *Iran*

As regards the occupation of the United States Embassy in Tehran and the holding of its staff as hostages, the Council recalled in its previous annual report the position adopted by the member countries of WEU in the various appropriate bodies following these grave events. They referred to the declaration adopted by the European Council on 30th November 1979 in Dublin, the declaration published by the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance in Brussels on 13th December 1979, and the resolution adopted by the United Nations Security Council on 31st December 1979.

In their reply in March 1980 to Assembly Recommendation 341, the Council reaffirmed that they condemned this action as being contrary to international practice and law. They recalled that the governments of WEU member states had supported all moves, both in the United Nations Security Council and in the European Communities, to secure the release of the American hostages from the Iranian authorities.

Replying to Recommendation 349, the Council recalled the consultations by the Nine at Foreign Minister level on 10th April 1980 in Lisbon, on 22nd April in Luxembourg, on 17th and 18th May in Naples, and at Head of State or Head of Government level on 27th and 28th April in Luxembourg. They also informed the Assembly of the steps that the member countries of WEU had taken, in unison with their partners in the European Community, in a consolidated effort, with the sole aim of freeing the hostages.

A further appeal was made to the Iranian Government by the Foreign Ministers of the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance on 27th June in Ankara.

### 4. *Situation in the Middle East*

The Council, in reply to Assembly Recommendation 341, agreed with the Assembly that a just and lasting peace could be established

only on the basis of a comprehensive settlement of the Middle East conflict in accordance with the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and on the following four principles: the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force; the need for Israel to end the territorial occupation which it has maintained since the conflict of 1967; respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries; recognition that in the establishment of a just and lasting peace account must be taken of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians, including their right to a homeland. This position, which was adopted by each of the WEU member states, was formulated in agreed terms by the member countries of the European Community in their declaration of 18th June 1979. The Council considered that all the parties involved should be called on to participate in working out and implementing such a settlement, and in particular the Palestinian people who are entitled, within the framework set by a peace settlement, to exercise their right to determine their future as a people and, through their representatives, to play their full part in the negotiations.

The member states of WEU, in unison with their Community partners, have subsequently continued their efforts to further the search for an overall settlement of the Middle East conflict. In their reply to Assembly Recommendation 349, the Council referred to the conclusions of the examination of the Middle East situation by the European Council at its meeting in Venice on 12th and 13th June 1980. They observed that the Nine agreed that the traditional ties and common interests which link Europe to the Middle East oblige them to play a special rôle and require them to work in a more concrete way towards peace. They then decided to entrust to the presidency the task of ascertaining the position of all the parties concerned in order to determine the form which an initiative on their part could take. In the Venice declaration the European Council recalled the basic principles which, in the opinion of its members, governed the search for a comprehensive peace settlement, namely, the right to existence and to security of all the states in the region, including Israel; justice for all peoples, which implies the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, who must be placed in a position, by an appropriate process defined within the framework of the comprehensive peace settlement, to exercise fully their right to self-determination.

The Council informed the Assembly of their position on the various points raised in Written Questions 218, 219, 220 and 221 which had been put by the Chairman of the General Affairs Committee.

The Council wished to draw the Assembly's attention to the conclusions which the European Council, at its meeting on 1st and 2nd December 1980 in Luxembourg, had reached as a result of the action taken by the Nine since the adoption of the Venice declaration. The results of President Thorn's mission, which had made clear the great interest aroused by the position taken up by Europe, reinforced the determination of the member countries of the European Community to contribute to the search for a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement to be negotiated by the parties concerned. In this spirit, the European Council approved the decision of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs to undertake consideration of the matter; this action has resulted in the drafting of a report on the principal problems relating to a comprehensive settlement. The European Council entrusted the presidency with a programme of action which would provide for, on the one hand, internal reflection based on the report approved by the European Council and aimed at clarifying and giving substance to the principles stated in the Venice declaration, and, on the other hand, further contacts with the parties concerned to be initiated by the presidency in consultation with the Ministers for Foreign Affairs.

## **B. Defence questions**

As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, defence and security questions figured prominently in the Council's activities during the year under review. The Council, while carrying out the obligations devolving upon them in accordance with the terms of the modified Brussels Treaty, continued to be attentive to developments in the field of the western security situation in general and remain conscious, in present circumstances, of the rôle devolving upon those organisations having particular competence and specialist knowledge acquired over many years in this field.

In the course of their various contacts with the Assembly in 1980, Ministers of member governments emphasised the value of each of the WEU bodies in the continuing search for greater co-operation between member governments in the vital area of European defence and security.

### **1. Level of forces of member states**

#### **(a) Forces under NATO command**

The maximum levels of ground, air and naval forces which member states of WEU place under NATO command are fixed in Articles I and II of Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty. Article III of the Protocol provides for a special procedure, if necessary, to enable these levels to be increased above the limits specified in Articles I and II.

So that they may satisfy themselves that the limits laid down in Articles I and II of Protocol No. II are not exceeded, the Council receive information every year concerning the levels in question, in accordance with Article IV of that Protocol. This information is obtained in the course of inspections carried out by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, and is transmitted to the Council by a high-ranking officer designated by him to that end.

The information, as at the end of 1979, which was conveyed by this officer at the appropriate time, was considered by the Council on 12th March. Information indicating the status as at the end of 1980 is expected to reach the Council at the usual time.

Furthermore, the Council take the necessary steps to implement the procedure laid down in their Resolution of 15th September 1956, whereby the levels of forces under NATO command are examined in the light of the annual review.

For the year 1979, at a meeting held on 25th February 1980, in Brussels, the permanent representatives (or their substitutes) to the North Atlantic Council of the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom examined the levels of forces of WEU member states and reported to the Council.

At their meeting on 12th March 1980, the latter noted that the abovementioned permanent representatives (or their substitutes) had recorded that the level of forces of the member states of WEU, as set out in the NATO force plan, fell within the limits specified in Articles I and II of Protocol No. II, as in force at that time, with the exception of a recommended increase in the force level of one member state. At their meeting on 12th March 1980, the Council authorised the state concerned to make this increase. At the same meeting, the Council took note of a declaration on French forces by the permanent representative of France.

The same procedure is under way for the year 1980.

*(b) Forces under national command*

The strength and armaments of forces of member states maintained on the mainland of Europe and remaining under national command – internal defence and police forces, forces for the defence of overseas territories, and common defence forces – are fixed each year in accordance with the procedure specified in the Agreement signed in Paris on 14th December 1957, in implementation of Article V of Protocol No. II.

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By means of the methods set out in paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the Council have been able, in 1980, to carry out their obligations under Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty concerning levels of forces.

*2. United Kingdom forces stationed on the continent of Europe*

In accordance with the Council's reply to Assembly Recommendation 331, the Government of the United Kingdom have informed the Council that the average number of British land forces stationed on the mainland of Europe in 1980 in accordance with the commitment in Article VI of Protocol No. II of the modified Brussels Treaty was 56,985. The continued need for the presence of troops in Northern Ireland made it necessary for units of the British Army of the Rhine to be redeployed for short tours of duty there. In 1980 there were on average 2,480 men in Northern Ireland. As has been previously stated, these units would be speedily returned to their duty station in an emergency affecting NATO.

Furthermore, in accordance with the Council's reply to Assembly Recommendation 348, the Government of the United Kingdom have informed the Council that the strength of the United Kingdom's Second Tactical Air Force in 1980 was:

<i>Rôle</i>	<i>Aircraft/Equipment</i>	<i>Squadrons</i>
Strike/Attack	Buccaneers	2
	Jaguars	4
Ground support	Harrier	2
Reconnaissance	Jaguars	1
Air defence	Phantom	2
	Bloodhound surface-to-air missiles	1
	Rapier surface-to-air missiles	4
Air transport	Wessex	1
Ground defence	RAF Regiment	1

These strengths will remain unchanged in 1981.

### 3. *Amendment to Annex III to Protocol No. III*

At their meeting on 21st July 1980, the Council, following the procedure laid down in Article II of Protocol No. III of the modified Brussels Treaty, cancelled paragraph V of Annex III to this Protocol. This amendment was made at the request of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, and having regard to a recommendation to that effect by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

As a result of this amendment, which was introduced in order to improve the defence capability of the Alliance, limitations on naval construction in the Federal Republic of Germany, as set out previously under this paragraph, no longer apply.

The President of the Assembly was duly informed of the Council's decision.

### 4. *Study of the situation of the armaments sector of industry in member countries<sup>1</sup>*

During 1980, the Council followed with interest the progress made by the Standing Armaments Committee with this important study.

The SAC had earlier carried out the first two tasks laid down in its mandate: the definition of armaments and the legal status of firms.

In April, the Council received the first section of the economic part of the study, as prepared by the SAC. Also in April, the Head of the International Secretariat of the SAC presented this part to the Council, at their invitation, and the permanent representatives reported to the Council of Ministers at their meeting on 14th May in Luxembourg.

The Ministers, on that occasion, expressed their appreciation to the Standing Armaments Committee for the complex and original work it had carried out, which would be carefully studied in all its aspects by member governments.

### 5. *Assembly recommendations and written questions*

(a) The Council gave a full reply to Recommendation 348 on matters connected with the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, including the level of forces of the Federal Republic of Germany and that of the United Kingdom forces stationed on the mainland of Europe.

Their views on force balance were set out in their answer to Recommendation 336 which

stressed that a realistic security policy must be based on an objective assessment of the situation, taking into account all factors possibly bearing on security. At the same time, governments of member countries of WEU remain convinced of the importance of maintaining credible deterrence which continues to be the fundamental strategic concept of allied defence.

(b) Problems of European armaments co-operation were dealt with in replies to Recommendations 337 and 338, where mention was made of the work carried out in the framework of the CNAD and the IEPG and also by the Standing Armaments Committee. The Council drew the Assembly's attention to the difficulties in devising methods suitable to the needs of different governments for analysing choices of international armaments programmes. This being so, to the extent that member countries are able to reach agreement on common requirements, the Council believe that the formation of international consortia makes a useful contribution to a better organisation of armaments co-operation in Europe, and that these bodies should be encouraged in their co-operative projects.

Progress made towards an Alliance-wide market for defence equipment, greater co-operation between the allies and a better division of equipment production was tabled.

Furthermore, following the symposium held by the Assembly in October 1979, the Council stated, in answering Recommendation 339, what they considered to be the most effective ways of concerting measures in the European armaments industries.

In addition, the Council took the opportunity provided by their reply to Recommendation 352 to clarify the situation regarding information technology related to the defence field.

(c) Defence strategy, and the impact upon it of new weapons, and in particular theatre nuclear systems, was referred to in the Council's replies to Recommendation 345 and 346. The directives adopted by CNAD at its meeting in the autumn of 1980, on the application of new technologies to defence purposes with a view to improving defence-effective weapons systems, were welcomed. Furthermore, it was noted that the package of arms control measures put forward by the participants at the meeting of 12th December 1979 represent a serious effort to stimulate the arms control process in Europe.

The Council recalled that, in each of the member states, the adoption of defence programmes has been subject not only to military but also to arms control considerations, both aspects being extensively discussed in parliament as well as in public.

1. See also Chapters I, C and IV.

(d) The prospects for standardising ammunition between the new generation of main battle tanks in Europe were referred to in the Council's reply to Written Question 215.

### C. Scientific, technological and aerospace questions

The Council noted with interest the reports produced by the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions. They gave full replies to the recommendations adopted by the Assembly and the Council provided the latter, as in previous years, with a number of details mainly regarding the policies of WEU member countries on scientific, technological and aerospace questions.

#### 1. Energy problems

The governments of the member countries of WEU played an active part in the efforts made during 1980, both within the European Communities and in the OECD, to increase co-operation in the field of energy policy.

In their twenty-fifth annual report, the Council referred to the conclusions reached at the meeting of the European Council held in Dublin on 29th and 30th November 1979. In their reply to Assembly Recommendation 354, the Council recalled the measures taken as a result of that meeting in December 1979, and in the early months of 1980, in order to promote the development of a common energy policy:

The EEC Council of Energy Ministers on 4th December 1979 agreed on a breakdown of overall oil import targets 1980 and 1985 into individual targets of member countries. A regular monitoring of oil import targets was also decided upon.

At the meeting on 27th and 28th April 1980, in Luxembourg, the European Council pointed out that a policy of structural changes should be developed in order to achieve a gradual reduction in the dependence of the Community member states on oil and a replacement of oil by alternative sources of energy.

The EEC Council of Energy Ministers subsequently on 13th May 1980 adopted two resolutions on energy objectives for 1990 and the reduction of energy consumption. In the first resolution the following guidelines for 1990 were agreed upon: firstly, the ratio between the rate of growth of energy consumption and the rate of growth of the gross domestic product should be reduced to 0.7 or less; and secondly, the oil consumption in the Community should be reduced to about 40 % of the gross consump-

tion of primary energy. Other points of this resolution refer to the increased use of solid fuels and nuclear energy for generating electricity, to the promotion of renewable sources of energy and to the pursuit of an appropriate energy pricing policy.

The Council noted, in the reply referred to above, that in the light of these decisions the Community would keep under review the energy programmes of member states directed to achieve the medium- and long-term targets agreed upon.

The EEC Council of Energy Ministers at their meeting on 27th November concentrated on the situation in the light of the reduction in oil supplies resulting from the conflict between Iran and Iraq, and identified a number of measures to minimise tension on the oil market, to draw on stocks, to prevent abnormal price rises, and to alleviate any particular problems that might arise. These conclusions formed the basis for the Community's approach to the IEA Energy Ministers' meeting on 8th and 9th December, when there were *inter alia* discussions on improving the IEA emergency system to meet specific difficulties in the event of a crisis in oil supplies. The 27th November meeting also discussed studies of spot market transactions, agreed a draft recommendation on electricity tariff structures, and had a useful exchange of views on Community energy policies and objectives.

At its meeting in Luxembourg on 1st and 2nd December 1980, the European Council drew attention once more to the pledges of all the Community member states to reduce their dependence on oil by energy saving and by having recourse to other energy sources, including coal and nuclear power and to do their utmost to prevent artificial stresses from occurring on the oil market.

#### 2. European aircraft industry

Like the Assembly, the Council are of the opinion that a viable civil aircraft industry is of utmost importance for a strong and expanding industrial capability in Europe.

Replying to Assembly Recommendation 354, the Council therefore welcomed the idea of well-balanced European aircraft development programmes in which all the available capabilities in the various European companies were taken into account and exploited to the maximum extent possible in economically viable programmes. These programmes should therefore be pursued, both for commercial purposes and for the maintenance of an advanced European technological capacity. The current co-operation programmes in the aero-engine sector with the United States and Japan were also

endorsed in this context. The Council welcomed all efforts by member governments concerning joint programming among major aircraft manufacturers. They noted that questions regarding specific co-operative programmes would be considered by the governments concerned in the light of the general approach as outlined above.

Regarding European co-operation in the field of military aircraft, the Council stated, in their twenty-fifth annual report to the Assembly, that the appropriate government departments in France, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany were firmly resolved to develop a joint European tactical fighter aircraft for the nineties. In their reply to Recommendation 354, mentioned above, they informed the Assembly of developments in this matter during 1980.

The industries of France, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany were requested on 12th February 1980, through the respective national armaments directors, to continue the studies started in the autumn of 1979. On 3rd April 1980, the firms of Avions Marcel Dassault/Breguet Aviation (AMD), British Aerospace (BAe), and Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm (MBB) submitted to the respective national authorities a European combat aircraft report containing the results of the studies. The results of the assessment, including a recommendation, and a joint report by the national armaments directors of France, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany were submitted to the governments concerned for their approval.

### 3. *Space questions*

In their reply to Recommendation 354 on the state of European aerospace activities, the Council reminded the Assembly that the member states of ESA were aware of the Agency's outstanding rôle in space co-operation in Europe. They pointed out that the ESA Council, which is the competent body to deal with this matter, was considering the Agency's future terms of reference and new programmes, and would take the necessary decisions in due course. They noted that future activities in the field of space travel and outer space research would, however, be determined not only by scientifically and technologically feasible and desirable objectives but also by the financial resources available.

Having taken careful note of the considerations and suggestions contained in Recommendation 353 on a European earth resources detection satellite programme, the Council gave the Assembly a detailed reply to the following points of which they would like to draw attention.

The political will exists for the development of a European remote-sensing programme to be implemented through the European Space Agency. The first stage of this programme provides for the improvement of data-processing techniques at ground stations where the Agency will operate through Earthnet and the ESRIN data bank at Frascati and through the launching of one or two satellites developed within ESA. The governments of the member countries will do their best to provide adequate funds for the European Space Agency's programme.

Furthermore, the governments of the majority of ESA member countries favour the continuation of the Meteosat programme and plan to improve arrangements for the distribution of meteorological data, including the use of a special relay satellite (Sirio II).

Clearly, the European remote-sensing programme will have to be suitably co-ordinated with NASA's existing Landsat satellite system and with the French Spot system now being developed on a national basis. The Council said it was to be hoped that an agreement could be reached by the member states of ESA on a European remote-sensing satellite programme as well as on the possible use of experiments on Spacelab.

Like the Assembly, the Council consider that the European remote-sensing programme is an important vehicle for European scientific and economic co-operation and they noted in their reply that it seemed likely to become one of ESA's major applications programmes in the years to come.

The Council indicated that the European governments believed that ESA's remote-sensing programme and the Meteosat programme could contribute substantially to resolving some of the third world's problems.

They added that they fully shared the view that "co-operation is the key to Europe's success", expressed by the Committee on Science and Technology of the Council of Europe on 6th June 1980. They commented that, in order to be effective, this co-operation need not be limited to the European Community.

### D. *Secretariat-General*

During the year 1980, the Secretary-General and his principal officers, representing Western European Union, attended a number of meetings of other international organisations, as observers, when questions of concern to WEU were under consideration. As in previous years the most frequent of these contacts were with authorities of the Atlantic Alliance and the Council of Europe.



## CHAPTER III

## ARMAMENTS CONTROL AGENCY

**A. Introduction**

Under the terms of Article VII of Protocol No. IV, the Agency is required:

- firstly, to control the level of stocks of armaments held by member countries on the mainland of Europe, this control extending to production and imports to the extent required to make the control of stocks effective;
- secondly, to satisfy itself that the undertakings given by the Federal Republic of Germany not to manufacture certain types of armaments on its territory are being observed.

In 1980, the Agency's activities continued very much along the same lines and at the same rate as in previous years.

Subject to the comments made under point B.2 below, the programme drawn up by the Agency for 1980, the twenty-fifth year of control, was carried out satisfactorily.

**B. General remarks on control activities****1. General operating methods**

The methods used by the Agency are determined by the provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty and by Council decisions on the subject. During the year under review they remained basically unchanged.

Within the Agency's terms of reference, controls from documentary sources serve mainly for checking levels of armaments as a whole. They also contribute to the preparation of field measures for the control of levels and of the non-production of certain categories of armaments. This aspect covers all activities concerned with processing, for the purposes defined above, any useful documentary material including, in particular, countries' replies to the Agency questionnaire, and the results of field control measures carried out earlier.

The execution of test checks, visits and inspections, and all that is linked with these functions, constitutes that part of control carried out physically wherever there are activities and stocks subject to control and, more generally, wherever this is necessary to ensure that the information supplied is correct and that undertakings are observed.

The control system is based primarily on controls from documentary sources, the purposes of field control measures being to verify, physically, the accuracy of all the information collected in implementation of Part III of Protocol No. IV.

Documentary and field control measures are complementary, and equally essential for the accomplishment of the Agency's task.

Traditionally, the annual report has always presented documentary and field control measures separately, in the interests of both convenience and clarity. However, it must not be forgotten that these measures together make up a single control function.

The Agency draws great benefit from the continuity of the methods; by its steadily-growing knowledge of the organisation of the forces of each member state, of the progress of armaments production or procurement programmes, the Agency develops its control activity efficiently and logically, both in the fixing of levels and quantities of armaments and in the choice and assessment of its control measures.

However, in implementing the methods outlined above, the Agency, as it is permitted, continued in 1980, to look for possible improvements. With this in view, the Agency has sought to adapt its work to meet the evolution of force structures and logistic organisations whilst attempting to make the best use of its budget by a careful ordering of its programmes and time-tables.

**2. Atomic, chemical and biological weapons**

The position described in earlier annual reports remained basically unchanged.

The activities of the Agency do not extend to nuclear weapons. The non-nuclear components of such weapons (namely the missiles themselves and other specially designed equipment) are subject to control except as regards the weapons of one member state.

Nor does the Agency apply any controls to biological weapons.

The control activities dealt with in this chapter do not, therefore, concern these two categories of armaments.

In the case of chemical weapons, only non-production controls take place; no quantitative controls are made since the member states have

always declared they possessed no such armaments (in this connection, for 1980, see point E.5 of this report).

### *C. Controls from documentary sources*

In this field of control, the Agency studies the relevant documents with the main purpose of comparing the quantities of armaments held by the member states with the levels fixed by the Council and thus establishing whether these constitute appropriate levels within the terms of the modified Brussels Treaty.

#### *1. Information processed by the Agency*

During 1980 documentary controls were carried out in the normal way by studying, processing and collating documents and information obtained from various sources.

The main source consists of member states' replies to the annual questionnaire sent to them by the Agency; levels are determined by processing the information supplied, taking into account the material supplied by NATO regarding in particular the forces placed under NATO authority.

The second source of information is provided by national defence budgets which, examined in conjunction with the data already supplied by each member state in its reply to the annual questionnaire, enables defence expenditure to be evaluated and the financing of programmes to be followed.

Finally, information from the media, assembled and circulated by the Agency's Central Documentation Office, is a third useful source from which official data can be cross-checked, developments in the situation can be followed and the knowledge of Agency experts can be kept up to date.

#### *(a) Annual Agency questionnaire and replies by member states*

Follow-up action on the replies to the questionnaire sent to member states as in all previous years was twofold. It is recalled that some of the facts reported are checked physically by means of field control measures. In addition, all the replies are studied by the Agency experts, and compared with the other sources of information available, including member countries' earlier replies to Agency or NATO questionnaires and budgetary documents.

#### *(b) Request for annual information*

Control of undertakings by one of the member states regarding the non-production of certain types of armaments takes the form of field control measures.

These measures are partly prepared from a study of documents based on the replies of the country concerned to the annual questionnaire and to the Agency's requests for annual information.

As in previous years, the replies received from the country concerned in 1980 were taken into consideration for selecting and preparing visits, inspections and agreed control measures for inclusion in the Agency's programme of control measures.

#### *(c) Information provided by NATO*

See point 2 (a) below.

#### *(d) Information provided by the United States of America and Canada (Article XXIII of Protocol No. IV)*

The Agency received, through the Council, information supplied by the Governments of the United States and Canada concerning their programmes of external aid in military equipment to the forces of member states stationed on the mainland of Europe. Since 1966, these countries have provided no aid to the forces concerned.

#### *(e) Scrutiny of budgetary information (Article VII, 2 (a) of Protocol No. IV)*

The study of budgetary and financial documents is one aspect of the continuing control of armaments. It is an important additional feature of the procedure applied for the determination of armament stock levels.

In 1980, as in all previous years, the Agency studied the defence budgets of member states as well as the budget section of their replies to its questionnaire; the emphasis, in these studies, is on credits for armaments production and more particularly, for the production of controllable armaments; in addition, its experts had consultations with the appropriate departments in the defence ministries of member countries.

The study of credit forecasts and real expenditure confirmed the findings of the Agency's studies on armaments levels forming part of controls from documentary sources.

*(f) Use of published material*

By systematic study of the daily press, of specialised magazines and periodicals and of books and catalogues published in the WEU member countries and in the United States, the Agency's Central Documentation Office made every effort to provide the Directorate and its experts with information of value for their activities.

In addition, special attention was again paid to sources of information and bulletins from other international organisations.

The close co-operation which exists between the Agency and the international staff of the SAC has resulted in the best use of available credits by avoiding duplication, to the greater benefit of both bodies.

*2. Verification of appropriate levels of armaments*

*(a) Appropriate levels of armaments for forces placed under NATO command*

After receiving and processing the member states' replies to the annual questionnaire and studying the statistical reports furnished by the authorities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Article VII, 2(a) of Protocol No. IV) and, in particular, by the NATO international staff, the Agency arranged, as each year, for the annual consultations with the NATO military authorities called for by Article XIV of Protocol No. IV.

As in previous years, these consultations included a joint study session at Casteau, on 18th November 1980, attended by Agency experts and the appropriate officers of SHAPE, and concluded with a meeting in Paris on 12th December 1980; at this meeting, which was attended by the representatives of the Agency, of SHAPE and of the International Military Staff of NATO, it was concluded that the levels of armaments for the forces of member states placed under NATO authority and stationed on the mainland of Europe represented appropriate levels for the control year 1980 within the terms of Article XIX of Protocol No. IV, for those armaments over which the Agency has so far been placed in a position to exercise its mandate of controlling levels.

*(b) Appropriate levels of armaments for forces maintained under national command on the mainland of Europe*

The quantities of armaments declared to the Agency by the member states as being required on 31st December 1980 for their forces maintained under national command on the mainland of Europe have been accepted or

approved by the Council, who have taken note of these figures of maximum levels of armaments for these forces in 1980.

*D. Field control measures*

*1. Principles governing the application of field control measures and general methods of execution*

As recalled in the introduction to this chapter, the treaty requires the Agency:

- to satisfy itself that the undertakings not to manufacture certain types of armaments are being observed;
- to control the level of stocks of certain armaments.

Field control measures continued during 1980 on the same basis as during previous years, as an essential part of the Agency's work, in accordance with Article VII of Protocol No. IV.

*(a) Initial studies*

When drawing up its programme of control measures, the Agency again worked on the basic assumption, which is supported by the observations of previous years, that the undertakings and declarations of member countries are being honoured.

For non-production field control measures, the Agency, as usual, began by reviewing all the information available to it, including that obtained from the 1979 and earlier inspection programmes, its progressive analysis of budgetary and other data and particularly the replies of the country concerned to the Agency's requests for information. At the conclusion of this review, the Agency decided that a limited programme of control measures similar in size and composition to those of recent years would allow acceptable verification of the undertaking not to manufacture specified armaments.

With regard to the control of levels of stocks and manufacture of armaments declared by member states, sampling techniques were again deemed to be adequate for verifying member countries' declarations with the requisite level of confidence. A limited programme on a similar scale to those of recent years was considered adequate to ensure an acceptable level of confidence in the correctness of the declarations made by member states.

There were no indications calling for significant variations in the distribution of field control measures except for a need, as predicted, to adjust slightly the 1980 programme to take account of those production schedules

whose planned increased outputs had reached a significant level.

*(b) Programme definition*

Insofar as depot and unit stocks were concerned, proposals for all quantitative field control measures were first reviewed in the light of known organisational changes, of declared re-equipment programmes and, where applicable, of the development of computerised stock accounting centres. Where it was thought necessary to extend such controls to factories, their production programmes were reviewed to ensure that each such inspection was planned to take place at the most appropriate time. For those factories where non-production and stock inspections were also indicated, all types of control measures were co-ordinated, so keeping to a minimum consistent with its responsibilities the frequency of the Agency's measures in private concerns.

As the Convention for the due process of law<sup>1</sup> has not yet entered into force, the control measures carried out by the Agency at private concerns had, in 1980, as in previous years, to take the form of "agreed control measures".

One consequence of this situation is that, in order to obtain the agreement of the firms concerned, the Agency has to give a few weeks' notice. This agreement has never been withheld. The 1980 programme of control measures at privately-owned plants was therefore drawn up with full confidence that it could be implemented as in previous years.

To avoid duplication of activities, Article VIII of Protocol No. IV provides that control measures relating to the forces under NATO authority shall be carried out by the appropriate NATO authorities. The forces subject to the Agency's control measures therefore vary in percentage and type from country to country, and this is an important factor in the Agency's programme considerations. Article VIII also affects depot inspections, but in a different manner. Since the logistic support of forces under NATO authority remains a wholly national responsibility, difficulties could occur in defining which matériel and munitions in depots are, or will be, assigned to forces under national command. Such problems were again avoided in 1980 by the renewed approval of the system of joint Agency/SHAPE inspections

1. Convention concerning measures to be taken by member states of Western European Union in order to enable the Agency for the Control of Armaments to carry out its control effectively and making provision for due process of law, in accordance with Protocol No. IV of the Brussels Treaty, as modified by the Protocols signed in Paris on 23rd October 1954 (signed in Paris on 14th December 1957).

introduced in 1957. A number of the depots in question were therefore included in the programme for inspection by the Agency/SHAPE group.

On the basis of the foregoing considerations and the information already available, the Agency was able to define its 1980 programme with sufficient certainty for the Director to outline it to the Council in March. After subsequent discussions and analysis of member countries' replies to the questionnaire only a few changes were made to the programme.

*2. Methods, type and extent of field control measures*

In 1980, no major changes were made in the Agency's established procedure for the conduct of its field control measures.

The teams selected for the Agency's field control measures all included one member of the nationality of the establishment visited, the Head of Mission and other experts all being of different nationalities.

The total number of control measures was seventy. It should be noted, in this connection, that this pattern of control activities carried out by the Agency is satisfactory: it enables some 80 % of existing armaments to be checked in four years for the air force, five years for the navy and six to seven years for army munitions.

These measures fall broadly into the following categories:

- (a) quantitative control measures at depots;
- (b) quantitative control measures at units for forces under national command;
- (c) control measures at production plants:
  - (i) quantitative control measures:

In 1980, these control measures were carried out at plants manufacturing aircraft, ammunition, rockets and armoured matériel, and at shipyards;

- (ii) non-production control measures:

These control measures related to chemicals and warships.

It should be stressed that the reports on field control measures are protected by the most stringent security measures at all stages of their preparation, custody and analysis.

*3. Conclusions*

- (a) In the fields where it is authorised to exercise its mandate, the Agency was able effectively to carry out its tasks of applying control

measures. Such problems as arose in this very complex field of inspections were dealt with satisfactorily through the excellent relations maintained with the national authorities.

(b) On the basis of all the field control measures carried out in 1980, the Agency was able to report to the Council:

- the measures taken for the control of the stocks of armaments at depots, units under national command and production plants amply confirmed the data obtained from documentary control measures;
- the measures taken for the control of non-production revealed no production contrary to undertakings.

### ***E. State and problems of control in certain particular fields***

#### ***1. Armaments for land forces***

##### ***(a) Current production and purchases***

In 1980, all the member countries have continued to modernise their land armaments in accordance with previously established long-term programmes.

##### ***- Armoured matériel***

The production of tanks and their derivatives has continued, in particular AMX in France, Leopard I in Italy, Leopard II in the Federal Republic of Germany; the Federal Republic of Germany has continued to modernise its M-48-US tanks.

As regards armoured vehicles, Belgium has started production of M-113 APCs under licence at the end of the year. Italy is putting the M-548 cargo vehicle into series production and France is doing likewise with armoured vehicles of the AMX-10 family and VABs. Germany is building armoured transport vehicles (Transportpanzer I). The Netherlands are equipping their mechanised troops with YPR-765 armoured vehicles and their derivatives imported from the United States.

##### ***- Artillery matériel***

The final phase of the trilateral co-production of a considerable number of FH-70 155 mm howitzers by the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom has begun.

All member countries holding American-type self-propelled artillery material of 155 mm, 175 mm and 203 mm calibre have adopted a modernisation programme of these weapons. France is modernising its artillery with the production of 155 mm GCT self-propelled

howitzers and the development of a new 155 mm towed howitzer.

In the countries concerned, the Lance system has now replaced the Honest John and Sergeant weapons systems.

##### ***- Anti-tank matériel***

In their production and equipment programmes, all member countries have given high priority to the production or purchase of anti-tank weapons. Weapons of the so-called second generation of anti-tank missiles such as Tow, Hot, Swingfire and Milan are now operational everywhere.

The ground forces of most of the member countries are, or soon will be, equipped with anti-tank helicopters fitted with either SS-11, Hot or Tow missiles.

##### ***- Anti-aircraft matériel***

Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands are now in possession of the Guépard gun tank, production of which is now coming to an end.

The construction programme for an anti-aircraft tank equipped with Roland missiles in two versions, fine-weather for France and all-weather for Germany, is progressing in those two countries.

##### ***- Ammunition***

The member countries have made major efforts to improve stocks of both current and new types.

##### ***(b) Control activity in 1980***

Quantitative control measures have been carried out at a number of depots, at several units under national command and at plants manufacturing armaments for land forces.

#### ***2. Guided missiles and other self-propelled missiles***

##### ***(a) Current production and purchases***

During 1980, the majority of the member states of WEU continued to modernise and increase their guided missile stocks. All countries participating in the Helip programme with the exception of Belgium, received their final deliveries of improved surface-to-air Hawk missiles. Belgium, however, should have its requirements met from French production in spring 1981. In the anti-tank guided weapon field, both France and the Federal Republic of Germany have increased their stock levels of Milan and Hot missiles whereas the Netherlands has added to its supply of Tow missiles. With regard to air-to-air weapons, France has added

to its inventory of Matra Magic R-550 (short-range) weapons and has started to take delivery of the Matra Super R-530 (medium-range) missiles. The Federal Republic of Germany has received its initial stock of Sidewinder AIM-9L weapons (short-range) and the United Kingdom has introduced its Skyflash (medium-range) weapon into service. Finally, France has begun introduction of its Roland surface-to-air missiles while also adding to its Crotales weapon systems and the United Kingdom has increased the number of its man-portable Blowpipe short-range surface-to-air weapon.

The following guided missiles were manufactured in the member countries during 1980: Milan and Hot anti-tank missiles (produced jointly by the Federal Republic of Germany and France), SS-11 (France) and Sistel Indigo (Italy); the surface-to-air missiles Roland (produced jointly by the Federal Republic of Germany and France), Hawk (Helip) (produced jointly by France and Italy), Matra R-440, Crotales and Masurca (France); the sea-to-sea missiles Exocet MM-38 (France), Otomat and Sistel Seakiller MK-2 (Italy); the air-to-sea missile Sistel Marte (Italy); the air-to-surface missiles Exocet AM-39 and AS-12 (France) and Kormoran (Federal Republic of Germany); the air-to-air missiles Matra Magic R-550, Matra R-530 and Matra Super R-530 (France); the air-to-air/surface-to-air missiles Aspide (Italy); Malafon anti-submarine rocket motors (France).

In addition to the guided weapons listed above, other self-propelled weapons were produced: Zuni air-to-ground rockets (Belgium), 110 mm Lars rockets (Federal Republic of Germany) and ASM-375 rockets (France).

#### *(b) Control activity in 1980*

Quantitative control measures were carried out at a number of depots, at units under national command and at one plant.

### *3. Air force armaments*

#### *(a) Current production and purchases*

Deliveries of new combat aircraft to the forces of the member countries of WEU have continued during 1980.

With regard to the Tornado programme, a number of series production aircraft have been manufactured. Deliveries have been made to the Manching Trials Centre in the Federal Republic of Germany and to the Practica di Mare Trials Centre in Italy. A prototype of the air defence version (ADV) has almost completed its trials. The training of instructors has begun at Manching. In the United Kingdom,

the Trinational Tornado Training Establishment (TTTE) is being set up at Cottismore where a number of series production aircraft have already been deployed.

The manufacture in France and the deliveries of Jaguar and Mirage F-1 aircraft have continued as planned; the Mirage 2000 programme has similarly advanced.

The Federal Republic of Germany has taken delivery of Alpha Jet aircraft and Belgium has received the last of those which it had ordered.

Deliveries of F-16 aircraft have continued in Belgium and the Netherlands.

#### *(b) Control activity in 1980*

Control measures were carried out at several depots, at a number of units under national command and in several factories.

### *4. Naval armaments*

#### *(a) Current production*

In France the first unit of the Provence submarine has begun its trials. The next two ships of this class have been laid down. Dupleix, the second ship of the Georges Leygues class of corvettes, should be operational in early 1981; the third and fourth ships are under construction. The aircraft carrier Foch had a major refit to allow it to operate Super Etendard aircraft; the replenishment ship, the Meuse, the second one of the Durance class, became operational in 1980. Deliveries of Super Etendard attack aircraft have continued.

In the Federal Republic of Germany the mid-life modernisation programme for the Lutjens class US-built destroyers began in 1980 with the Rommel; construction continued of the F-122 class frigates as well as the fast attack craft of the 143-A class, which are intended to replace the Zobel craft. The modernisation programme for the maritime patrol aircraft Atlantique has also continued.

In Italy, the third Sauro class submarine was launched at the end of 1979, and construction of the fourth of this class began in 1980. Construction of the helicopter carrier Garibaldi continued. Orsa, the last of the frigates of the Lupo class, was delivered in 1980. The ships of the Maestrale class are under construction. Half of the hydrofoil missile craft of the Sparviero class have become operational.

In the Netherlands, construction of submarines of the Walrus class to replace Dolphyn

and Zeehond has continued. Several frigates of the Korternaer class have become operational. Half of the frigates of the Van Speyk class have completed their MLM.

*(b) Control activity in 1980*

Quantitative control measures were carried out at naval shipyards. One was combined with a non-production control measure conducted in April, before the Council had taken their decision cancelling paragraph V of Annex III to Protocol No. III on 21st July 1980.

**5. Chemical weapons**

*(a) List of chemical weapons subject to control*

As in previous years, the Agency asked member countries whether they wished to renew in 1980 the list of chemical weapons subject to control.

The member countries agreed to this renewal. This was reported to the Council who noted the fact.

The Agency therefore continued to use this list for its control activities during 1980.

*(b) Control activity in 1980*

In application of Article III of Protocol No. III, which lays down conditions to enable the Council to fix the levels of chemical weapons that may be held on the mainland of Europe by those countries which have not given up the right to produce them, and in accordance with the Council decision of 1959, the Agency asked the countries concerned in its questionnaire whether production of chemical weapons on their mainland territory had passed the experimental stage and entered the effective production stage.

All the member countries concerned once again gave an explicit negative reply in 1980.

In addition, in the covering letter to its questionnaire, the Agency reminded the member states that chemical weapons, if held, should be declared in the same way as other armaments, whatever their origin. In reply to this questionnaire no country reported holding any chemical weapons and because of this the quantitative control of weapons of this nature raised no problems in 1980.

As in each year, in accordance with the resolution approved by the Council in 1959 and in application of the Council directive extending to chemical weapons the provisions laid down for the control of non-production of the armaments listed in Annex III of Protocol No. III, the Agency sent to the country concerned a "request for annual information to facilitate the Agency in its task of controlling the non-production of chemical weapons". A precise and detailed reply was received promptly in answer to this request. In addition, the temporary procedure applied with these authorities since 1973 was again used with success in 1980. All the information supplied in this way was a major factor in selecting chemical plants at which to carry out agreed control measures in 1980.

For each control measure carried out, a delegation from the national authorities was present.

None of these measures revealed any indication of production of chemical weapons within the terms of Annex II to Protocol No. III.

**6. Biological weapons**

All member countries reported their agreement to renew in 1979 the list of biological weapons subject to control. The Council noted the fact.

However, it will be recalled (see point B. 2 of the present chapter) that the Agency exercises no control in the field of biological weapons.

**7. Atomic weapons**

Since the situation remained the same as in previous years, the Agency is unable, as stated in point B. 2 of this chapter, to exercise any control in the atomic field.<sup>1</sup>

**F. Technical information visits and other means of improving the efficiency of the experts<sup>1</sup>**

At the invitation of the national authorities, technical information visits were arranged in 1980 as in previous years to enable the Agency's experts to bring their knowledge up to date in the fields of armaments research, development and production.

Land force experts visited the British Army Weapons Exhibition at Aldershot (United King-

1. See also point C. 1 (f).

dom). Next there was a visit to the Military Vehicles and Engineering Establishment (MVEE) where, after a detailed briefing on the development of armoured combat vehicles, they were taken around the laboratories and trials facilities. They also visited the Proof and Experimental Establishment at Shoeburyness, where they were shown round a modern experimental firing range and witnessed a series of on-going trials.

The naval experts visited the naval exhibitions at Genoa (Italy), Rotterdam (Netherlands) and Le Bourget (France). They were also invited by the United Kingdom authorities to the Surface and Underwater Weapons Establishments, where they were briefed on current trends of studies and research in the United Kingdom relating to naval weapons systems and the development of counter-measures.

The aeronautics and guided missile experts visited the air shows at Hannover (Federal Republic) and at Farnborough (United Kingdom). They were also invited by the United Kingdom authorities to the Preston plant, where they were given a full briefing on the Tornado programme, and to the two British Aerospace factories at Stevenage and Hatfield, where they learned of the latest developments in the field of missiles; they were also received at the RAF Logistics Centre at Hendon where they were shown a data-processing system. They were invited by the French authorities to visit the Brétigny Flight Trials Centre.

The experts in chemistry and biology visited government and private establishments of a scientific or industrial nature. In Italy they visited a modern chemical plant and in Belgium they visited the Army Technical Applications Establishment where they were briefed on the latest developments in the field of NBC. In addition, whilst visiting the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and Belgium, they obtained information on procedures for manufacturing vaccines for veterinary use and the production of viro-vaccines on a massive scale. Finally, one of the experts attended a course at the Pasteur Institute in Paris.

### G. Contacts

1. On 26th March 1980, the Director of the Agency presented the Agency's report on its activities in 1979 to the Council.
2. For the satisfactory conduct of its mission, the Agency must carry out its duties in an atmosphere of trust and close co-operation with the national authorities. To this end, the Director and the principal members of his staff

in 1980, as in previous years, maintained frequent contacts with these authorities.

3. As laid down in the modified Brussels Treaty, the Agency has maintained close contacts with the appropriate NATO authorities.

In this connection, mention should be made in particular of the two meetings held to fix the level of armaments of the forces under NATO command, already referred to in point C. 2 (a) of this chapter and of the implementation of the system of combined Agency/SHAPE inspections mentioned in point D. 1 (b).

In addition, the Director of the Agency and the principal members of his staff have made the usual contacts with the Office of the Secretary-General, the International Military Staff of NATO, with SHAPE, on the occasion of SHAPEX 80, during the North Atlantic Treaty Assembly and in the course of liaison visits.

4. The Director of the Agency met personally from military civilian and scientific circles at the Genoa and Le Bourget naval exhibitions and at the Farnborough air show.

### H. General conclusions

In accordance with Articles VII and XIX of Protocol No. IV, the Agency was able to report to the Council that, as a result of the control exercised in 1980, the figures obtained in accordance with Article XIII of Protocol No. IV:

- for armaments of forces under NATO command under the terms of Article XIV of Protocol No. IV; and
- for armaments of forces maintained under national command under the terms of Articles XV, XVI and XVII of Protocol No. IV and the Agreement of 14th December 1957, concluded in execution of Article V of Protocol No. II,

represented for the control year 1980 and for each of the member states, the appropriate levels of armaments subject to control for these categories of armaments over which the Agency has so far been enabled to exercise its mandate.

As required by Article XX of Protocol No. IV, the Agency confirmed that, in the course of field control measures at production plants, it did not detect for the categories of armaments which it controls:

- either the manufacture of a category of armaments that the government of the



member state concerned had undertaken not to manufacture;  
- or the existence, on the mainland of Europe, of stocks of armaments in excess of the appropriate levels (Article XIX of Protocol No. IV) or not justified by export requirements (Article XXII of Protocol No. IV).

In 1980, the Agency again applied controls effectively in those fields which are open to it. In this connection, as in the past, the help and co-operation of national and NATO authorities, and of heads and staff of both the private firms and military establishments visited played an important part.

## CHAPTER IV

## STANDING ARMAMENTS COMMITTEE

**A. Activities of the Standing Armaments Committee**

The Standing Armaments Committee met six times in plenary session, on 18th January, 22nd February, 19th March, 13th June, 19th September and 28th November 1980. The first four meetings were accompanied by a session of the ad hoc group devoted to the second part of the study of the armaments sector of industry in the member countries; another meeting was held by this group for the preparation of a declassified version of the economic part of the study.

In addition to this study, the main items on the SAC's agenda were the WEU Agreement 4.FT.6 and the activities of the Committee's two working groups concerned respectively with operational research and the evaluation of military equipment.

**1. Study of the situation of the armaments sector of industry in the member countries of WEU**

The first section of the economic part of the study of the situation of the armaments sector of industry in the member countries of WEU was approved by the Standing Armaments Committee at the end of the first quarter of 1980.

The International Secretariat, using its own resources, carried out in the shortest possible time the very considerable work involved in printing and circulating all the copies of this document in the organisation's two official languages.

The study was forwarded to the Council at the beginning of April 1980<sup>1</sup>.

Following the Council's decision to ask the SAC to prepare a declassified version of the economic study<sup>1</sup>, the Committee, with the assistance of the International Secretariat, prepared a draft which it forwarded to the Council for examination.

**2. WEU Agreement 4.FT.6**

The annual report on the updating of WEU Agreement 4.FT.6 was drawn up by the co-ordinator of the pilot country (United Kingdom).

1. See Chapter I, C.1 and Chapter II, B.4.

The SAC considered the proposals put forward in the report of the pilot country co-ordinator and offers of co-operation with the United States aimed at the co-ordination of the trials methods for military wheeled and tracked vehicles in the United States and in WEU.

The SAC decided to convene the Group of National Experts on Agreement 4.FT.6 who would study the American offer, bearing in mind the work carried out in NATO, and submit a report to the Committee containing proposals for updating Agreement 4.FT.6 and for the future activities of the group.

**B. Activities of the working groups****1. Working Group No. 8 on operational research**

At the invitation of the Federal German authorities, Working Group No. 8 on operational research held its spring meeting, which was coupled with a visit to the Dornier firm, at Friedrichshafen on 24th and 25th April.

In the course of the visit, seven illustrated talks on operational research studies relating to the army and navy were given by officers and experts from the Ministry of Defence, Dornier, and the IABG (from MBB at Ottobrunn) and were afterwards discussed by those taking part in the symposium.

During the visit to Dornier, the experts were shown some of the firm's developments (which are all carried out in co-operation with other companies) including the CL 289 reconnaissance drone, the simulator for training Roland crews, and the HSL guidance and control system for helicopters. The visitors' attention was also drawn to the satellite and Spacelab programmes in which Dornier was participating.

At the April meeting of the Working Group the exchanges of information continued with the presentation of several new forms of operational research.

Working Group No. 8 held its autumn meeting, coupled with a symposium on methodology, in Paris on 23rd and 24th October. New forms on operational research studies were presented by the Federal Republic of Germany and France.

At the end of 1980, the total number of studies proposed by the various countries came to: 155 for the Federal Republic of Germany,

73 for France, 31 for the United Kingdom, 30 for Belgium, 25 for the Netherlands and 14 for Italy. A new revised and completed edition of the existing recapitulatory document is being prepared by the Secretariat.

The five-language glossary of operational research terms was edited and distributed with help from France in the preparation and printing. Delegations asked for a period of reflection to consider a possible programme for correcting, updating and supplementing the glossary for submission to the SAC in 1981. The latter agreed, on the basis of reciprocity, to forward a copy of the glossary to NATO for internal use in the Secretariat.

The sixth symposium organised by the group was held on 24th October, after the autumn meeting, on the following subject: "The use of forecasting models for determining logistic requirements". France, the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany gave six talks (two per delegation) which were followed by very interesting comments and discussions.

The group plans to hold a seventh symposium in early May 1981 on the subject of "War Games". At its end-of-year meeting the SAC also approved Working Group No. 8's plans to go to The Hague to visit the RVO/TNO Physics Laboratory at the invitation of the Netherlands authorities.

#### *2. Group of experts on the evaluation of military equipment*

The group of experts is still awaiting a decision by the SAC regarding the second stage of its work, i.e. the evaluation, using different methods, of new equipment which has not yet been evaluated.

At its meeting on 28th November 1980, the SAC decided that although the question of the evaluation of military equipment would no longer be on its agenda, it could be retabled at the request of any government wishing to submit a work proposal.

### *C. International Secretariat*

#### *1. Contacts with the Council*

The Assistant Secretary-General presented to the Permanent Council at their meeting on 18th April 1980 the economic part of the SAC study on the armaments sector of industry in the member countries.

#### *2. WEU Assembly*

Extracts from speeches, reports, debates and recommendations from the two parts of the

twenty-sixth ordinary session of the Assembly were brought together by the International Secretariat in documents which were circulated to the members of the SAC.

#### *3. Relations with NATO*

The Assistant Secretary-General was present, as observer, at the North Atlantic Assembly, which was held in Brussels in November.

A member of the International Secretariat went, as observer, to the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) in April and October and another member went to the meetings of the NATO Naval Armaments Group in June and December. In accordance with the usual practice, the International Secretariat informed the SAC of these contacts.

#### *4. Relations with FINABEL*

In accordance with the liaison established in 1973 between the SAC and FINABEL Secretariats, a representative of the International Secretariat of the SAC was present at the meeting of the FINABEL Co-ordinating Committee, which was held in Brussels on 25th and 26th November 1980. In the course of this meeting, the updating of a series of agreements drawn up by WEU and transferred to FINABEL in 1973 was reported.

On 28th November 1980, the Head of the FINABEL Secretariat was present at the SAC's last meeting of the year in the course of which he confirmed that a study on a future family of logistic vehicles would be undertaken by the FINABEL Working Group E (fighting and transport vehicles). He pointed out that this study would probably lead the SAC to revise Agreement 4.FT.6, for which WEU was still responsible.

In addition to working contacts, the present liaison enables the International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee to make a regular study of the documents drawn up by FINABEL in order to present subjects to the SAC which might offer possibilities of concerted action in WEU without the risk of duplication.

#### *5. Visits*

The Assistant Secretary-General, accompanied by one of his colleagues, visited the military electronics exhibition held in Wiesbaden in October.

In October and November he had talks with the Belgian authorities in Brussels and with the Italian authorities in Rome.

## CHAPTER V

## PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE

*A. Meetings of the Committee*

In 1980, the Public Administration Committee held its two annual meetings at Norwich, from 23rd to 25th April and at Lecce, from 1st to 3rd October.

As is customary, these two meetings were devoted mainly to discussion of important administrative developments in the member countries during the preceding six months and the preparation of the multilateral course for government officials to be held towards the end of the year.

The following paragraphs summarise the main subjects raised during the Committee's meetings.

Inflation and unemployment, which for some years have been matters of major concern to the governments of the member countries, affect the administrative machinery of the states to an increasingly noticeable extent, although these effects are different, and contradictory, depending on which of these phenomena the emphasis is placed. In a number of countries, efforts to reduce unemployment have led to the recruitment of young trainees, on a temporary basis, into certain ministries. Opportunities for early retirement have been made available. Elsewhere, there has been a drive to fill all vacant posts on the establishment. At the other end of the scale, their concern to beat inflation has led most of the governments to adopt a policy of reducing public expenditure, the effects of which have been felt on the personnel front: limitation of appointments, even a standstill on recruitment or reduction of staffs to a greater or lesser extent.

In the administrative field, the need to economise public funds is also apparent in other areas, depending on the country: measures designed to increase the efficiency of the administrative machine, efforts to limit the field and extent of state intervention, decentralisation policies bringing possible reductions in the apparatus of central government.

One subject in the forefront in several member countries is connected with the recording and storage of computerised data. In this field, the aim of governments is to take advantage of modern methods of automatic data processing, whilst introducing a set of strict provisions to protect the data banks against misuse. On a more general level, governments are turning their attention to the problem of rela-

tions between the citizen and the administration, although there have been no startling developments. On the positive side, there has been an effort to simplify administrative procedures and work has been done to harmonise legislation and render it easier to understand. On the other hand, the movement towards more open governments has not been developed in all countries. The Parliamentary Commissioner (Ombudsman), where one exists, considers his powers inadequate.

The Committee also continued its traditional exchanges of views and information on training and refresher courses for senior civil servants both at national and international level as well as on conditions of service within the administration (transfer from one employment category to a higher one, etc.). Finally, the Committee discussed some of the administrative reforms which had taken place in the member countries during the preceding months.

*B. 1980 course for government officials*

The twenty-ninth multilateral course for government officials, sponsored by the Public Administration Committee, was held in the United Kingdom (Wilton Park European Discussion Centre), from 24th November to 4th December.

The course was designed to provide participants with a general introduction to the administrations of the member countries, and a better personal understanding of each other's tasks and methods by looking at specific problems faced by these countries in a fast-changing world; and to compare, through case-studies and international negotiations, the way their administrations respond to these problems of change.

Each participant was required to submit before the course, a brief case-study concerning a specific administrative or policy problem chosen within the following general areas of change:

- Social: the effect of demographic trends and migration on the provision of services, and methods of organising and reforming national health services.

- Economic: energy sources, production, and conservation; and pay and prices.

- Technological: effect on industry, employ-

in data transmission; and the implications for efficiency and individual rights of developments in data storage and processing.

The organisers therefore, after a brief introductory plenary session, divided the course participants into four multinational groups. These groups were left to organise their own work and appoint their own rapporteur, but were given the remit of using the case-studies which each participant had prepared to build up to a comparative view of the ways the various administrations worked.

The second element in the course was a negotiation exercise based on the United Nations Law of the Sea Conference. After an introductory talk participants entered into their rôles with enthusiasm. The exercise was however curtailed in response to requests from a majority of course-members for more time to exchange views on their national situations.

There were three lectures of general interest during the course. They were concerned with the institutions of the WEU member countries, the adaptation of administration to the computer, and data-protection.

One and a half days, at the end of the course, were given to further informal exchanges in plenary sessions. These exchanges were organised under four headings: the disengagement of the state; the civil service; the environment of administration; and involvement with international organisations (principally the European Communities).

The course brought together twenty participants, fairly high-level officials, from the administrations of the member countries. National delegations' comments have not yet been received, since the course was held fairly late in the year, but from impressions obtained at the end of the course, it may be concluded that it was a complete success.

### *C. Study visits*

Each year, the Public Administration Committee arranges, under the responsibility of its own members, study visits which are prepared with great care and the results of which, in the form of a report on each one, are sent to the Committee and, of course, to the administration visited. These visits enable an official to spend one or two weeks in the administration of one of the other member countries, studying his own speciality.

Consequently these visits cover a wide variety of subjects as is shown by the following few examples of visits carried out during 1980: tax liabilities of large companies; inter-library lending (subjects studied in the Federal Republic of Germany); implementation of state aid to industry (subject studied in Belgium); energy conservation in transport (subject studied in Belgium and France); defence procurement (subject studied in Italy); rôle of government in trade development; policing ethnic minority communities (subjects studied in the Netherlands).

## CHAPTER VI

## BUDGETARY AND ADMINISTRATIVE QUESTIONS

**A. Budget**

A summary of the revised budgets for 1980 is shown in the Appendix to this report. The proposed budgets for 1981 have not yet been approved and are still a matter of discussion in the Council; the delay is due to the need which has arisen to revise the various budgets in order to achieve, wherever possible, maximum economy.

The outstanding problem of social security for WEU staff working in the United Kingdom was still unresolved. A special meeting of national experts was held in October 1980 to discuss, in relation to general social security principles, the situation of staff members who may be exempted from contributing to the United Kingdom social security scheme. In this event, the problem will arise of the break in availability of benefits for staff leaving the organisation and who wish to join a national scheme. The transfer from one national system to another is satisfactorily regulated by the relevant EEC rules and special bilateral agreements, but the transfer procedure from an international organisation to a national system reveals gaps and delays in providing benefits and cover. This necessitates the introduction of temporary measures.

In addition, after the conclusion of any agreement, the option for staff members having provisionally retained their provident fund affiliation will have to be reopened.

This means that figures showing the results of the pensions option can still not be finalised and the preliminary figures given in the Appendix to Chapter VI of the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council to the Assembly are still valid.

The contributions to the United Kingdom social security scheme, by both staff members and the organisation, are still being held in a suspense account pending the final outcome of the negotiations.

An agreement, having due regard to the vested rights of staff members concerned, has been reached to adapt the existing supplementary insurance for the cases of death and permanent total invalidity to take account of the pension scheme. In this way the two systems are complementary and double benefits are avoided. A saving in the share of the contribution to be paid by governments has therefore been effected.

**B. WEU administrative meetings**

Officials of the Secretariat-General, the Agency for the Control of Armaments, the Standing Armaments Committee and the Office of the Clerk, responsible for administrative matters, met periodically during the year thus ensuring co-ordination between all WEU agencies as well as the Assembly while at the same time reviewing administrative matters of common concern. The experience gained in operating the pension scheme, the coming into operation of the Joint Pensions Administrative Section from 1st January 1980 and the examination by experts of the implementing instructions to the pension scheme rules, have obviated the need for frequent meetings.

The Joint Pensions Administrative Section is not only assisting considerably in the proper administration of the organisation's pensions but by the comparison and verification of pensions calculations and allocations, contributes greatly to the uniform application of the pension scheme rules in the co-ordinated organisations.

The close co-operation with the WEU Staff Association has continued.

**C. WEU provident fund**

The monies that have become due to governments as a result of the validation process have now been completely reimbursed to governments. However, as explained above under A, extra validations may again be expected in 1981 as the result of signing an agreement on United Kingdom social security and the subsequent reopening of the option for the staff members serving in the Secretariat-General who have provisionally remained in the provident fund.

The short-term policy of investment in French francs has been continued, and will be at least until the outstanding issues described above have been decided. This has however not reduced profitable gain as the interest on French currency investment is advantageous.

**D. Activities in the framework of the co-ordinated organisations**

The Co-ordinating Committee held nine meetings in 1980, each lasting two days. In addition, seven meetings were held by the

working groups, eleven by the Committee of Heads of Administration, nine joint meetings of the Standing Committee of Secretaries-General and the Standing Committee of the Staff Associations and two by the Committee of Secretaries-General.

The main problems discussed during these meetings and of which the majority have resulted in reports by the Co-ordinating Committee, are:

- the periodical revision and adjustment of salaries and allowances;
  - the establishment of a new system for the rules and amounts of the education allowance;
  - the examination of the principles and modalities of the expatriation allowance;
  - the admissibility of leaving balances in the provident fund after validating for the pension scheme;
- the comparison of grade equivalencies with one member country;
  - the problems associated with any form of extension of co-ordination to other international organisations;
  - the examination of the implementing instructions to the pension scheme rules with the assistance of two independent experts;
  - an amendment to Article 6 of the pension scheme rules;
  - the raising of the age limit for a dependent child and education allowances from 25 to 26 years;
  - the introduction of a language allowance for certain C grade staff members;
  - the progress in the functioning and operation of the Joint Pensions Administrative Section.

## APPENDIX

*Summary of revised WEU budget for 1980*

	A*	B*	C*	Total B+C
	£	Frs	Frs	Frs
Salaries and allowances .....	1,080,760	7,901,284	16,691,800	24,593,084
Pensions .....	89,830	703,000	2,250,334	2,953,334
Travel .....	36,885	102,700	412,900	515,600
Other operating costs .....	155,575	427,620	613,520	1,041,140
Purchase of furniture, etc. ....	11,565	15,075	28,935	44,010
Buildings .....	—	68,000	123,000	191,000
<b>TOTAL EXPENDITURE .....</b>	<b>1,374,615</b>	<b>9,217,679</b>	<b>20,120,489</b>	<b>29,338,168</b>
WEU tax .....	383,210	2,763,292	5,684,808	8,448,100
Other receipts .....	49,590	83,150	180,800	263,950
Pension receipts .....	25,365	277,248	613,157	890,405
<b>TOTAL INCOME .....</b>	<b>458,165</b>	<b>3,123,690</b>	<b>6,478,765</b>	<b>9,602,455</b>
<b>NET TOTAL .....</b>	<b>916,450</b>	<b>6,093,989</b>	<b>13,641,724</b>	<b>19,735,713</b>

*National contributions called for under the revised WEU budget for 1980*

	600ths	£	F. frs.
Belgium .....	59	90,117.58	1,940,678.45
France .....	120	183,290.00	3,947,142.60
Germany .....	120	183,290.00	3,947,142.60
Italy .....	120	183,290.00	3,947,142.60
Luxembourg .....	2	3,054.84	65,785.70
Netherlands .....	59	90,117.58	1,940,678.45
United Kingdom .....	120	183,290.00	3,947,142.60
<b>TOTAL .....</b>	<b>600</b>	<b>916,450.00</b>	<b>19,735,713.00</b>

\*A Secretariat-General.

B International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee.

C Agency for the Control of Armaments.



*Developments in Poland*

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REPORT <sup>1</sup>

*submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee* <sup>2</sup>  
*by Mr. Hanin, Rapporteur*

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1. Adopted in Committee by 17 votes to 0 with 1 abstention.

2. *Members of the Committee: Sir Frederic Bennett (Chairman); MM. De Poi, Portheine (Alternate: Schlingemann) (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Ahrens, Berrier (Alternate: Baumel), Mrs. Boniver, MM. Brugnon, Conti Persini,*

*Deschamps, Druon, Gessner (Alternate: Vohrer), Hanin, Hardy, Jung, Lagneau, Lord McNair (Alternate: Atkinson), MM. Mangelschots, Mommersteeg, Müller, Lord Reay, MM. Reddemann, Thoss, Urwin, Valiante, Vecchietti, Voogd.*

*N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

***Draft Recommendation***  
***on developments in Poland***

The Assembly of WEU,

(i) Considering that the final act of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe, adopted in Helsinki on 1st August 1975, constitutes the charter of détente in Europe;

(ii) Recalling that this text stipulates that:

“ The participating states will refrain in their mutual relations, as well as in their international relations in general, from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations and with the present declaration. No consideration may be invoked to serve to warrant resort to the threat or use of force in contravention of this principle.

.....

No such threat or use of force will be employed as a means of settling disputes, or questions likely to give rise to disputes, between them. ”;

and that

“ The participating states will refrain from any intervention, direct or indirect, individual or collective, in the internal or external affairs falling within the domestic jurisdiction of another participating state, regardless of their mutual relations.

They will accordingly refrain from any form of armed intervention or threat of such intervention against another participating state.

They will likewise in all circumstances refrain from any other act of military, or of political, economic or other coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest the exercise by another participating state of the rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus to secure advantages of any kind. ”;

(iii) Considering that the events in Poland in 1980 concern only the internal affairs of that country;

(iv) Considering consequently that any external intervention designed to impose on Poland measures which it has not freely decided upon would be a flagrant violation of the Helsinki final act and would therefore terminate any process of détente;

(v) Recalling that in Order 53 the Assembly requested its President:

“ To convene an extraordinary session forthwith should the independence and sovereignty of Poland be jeopardised by an armed foreign intervention ”,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Announce without delay the principles which will guide its reactions in the event of Soviet intervention in Poland, and in particular declare that it would consider that such intervention would make every aspect of the Helsinki final act null and void;

2. Proceed forthwith to hold consultations with a view to planning what measures all member countries should take in application of these principles;

3. Draw up proposals for member states to submit to the North Atlantic Council in order to extend application of these measures to all member countries of the Atlantic Alliance;

4. Examine what proposals member states might submit and jointly support in the Council of Europe so as to associate all free European states with whatever measures it may take;

5. Ask member states to foresee, in the framework of the European Communities, the diplomatic, economic, financial and commercial measures which the Communities would then have to decide upon and which should necessarily include an embargo on the transfer of advanced technology to the Soviet Union;
6. Request member states to respond as favourably as possible, under present circumstances, to any requests for credit facilities which the Polish Government has made or may make insofar as they are destined to improve living conditions for the Poles.

## *Explanatory Memorandum*

*(submitted by Mr. Hanin, Rapporteur)*

### I. Introduction

#### 1. The question

1. The question raised by events in Poland is whether it is possible for the people of an eastern country to gain a sufficient degree of independence in decision-making to adopt an internal form of political and social organisation which differs significantly from the type which the Soviet Union has adopted for itself and has imposed on the countries behind the iron curtain.

2. More particularly, the question facing western nations is how far and in what way – excluding armed intervention – can they help Poland to gain and retain this independence without provoking armed intervention from the Soviet Union and its satellites.

#### 2. The framework

3. There is no question of making a theoretical study of the situation.

4. This is WEU and it has to be seen what contribution, however small, the WEU Assembly can make to assist the Polish nation in its struggle.

5. It can help by:

- the impact of the position it adopts on the international scene;
- its influence on the policies of WEU member countries;
- the positions adopted, if need be, under its aegis in other organisations grouping western nations, such as the European Communities and the Council of Europe.

#### 3. The de facto situation

6. Since the second world war, there has been a fundamental misunderstanding about the nature of the relationship between the Soviet Union and European countries with communist régimes. Since this misunderstanding is the basis of peace, no one has any interest in dispelling it, but events which occur from time to time in the eastern countries show that, because of the very ambiguity of the East-West relationship, peace is still fragile.

7. Indeed, on the one hand, the Soviet side acts as if Europe, if not the world, had been divided up at the end of the second world war (some even specify that this was done at the Yalta conference in February 1945) assuming that the United States and the United Kingdom had given the Soviet Union the right to control all the countries which were then recognised as being occupied by the Red Army in the immediate post-war period, in exchange for which the Soviet Union agreed not to reach for more in Western Europe. The West has never formally recognised such a division. The Yalta Conference merely divided German territory into military occupation zones, inherently transitory, and made an approximate definition of Poland's frontiers; it did not divide Europe into areas of influence. The text of the Yalta Agreements, published in full by the United States Government in 1955, even affirms, in its "Declaration on liberated Europe", "the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live".

8. But the establishment of an area of influence by the Soviet Union has been constantly tolerated. After the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Soviet forces in 1968, the division was defined in the so-called Brezhnev doctrine, according to which the Soviet Union was entitled to intervene in the internal affairs of countries with communist régimes if the communist nature of their governments was threatened.

9. On the other hand, by subscribing to the United Nations Charter and then, in 1975, to the Helsinki final act, the Soviet Union recognised the principle of sovereignty of states and renounced interfering in their internal affairs.

10. There is a clear contradiction between these texts and the principle of limited sovereignty implied by the Brezhnev doctrine. When the West subscribed to the Helsinki final act, it was well aware of this contradiction and of the fact that a few years after the invasion of Czechoslovakia the Soviet Union had not effectively given up the Brezhnev doctrine. But the West also knew it was not in the interests of what it intended to be a resolutely peaceful policy to encourage the destabilisation or even the dismemberment of Eastern Europe since any disturbance could not be acceptable to the Soviet Union since it might endanger the maintenance of the régime in the Soviet Union itself. Thus the West – which has always refused to recognise the Yalta division and the Brezhnev doctrine – has deliberately closed its

eyes to Soviet policy except when it has caused a serious crisis. Everything under the heading of détente or, in the case of the Federal Republic, *Ostpolitik*, is based on the *de jure* denial and the *de facto* recognition of the doctrine of limited sovereignty.

## II. *The case of Poland*

11. Poland for its part, more than any other European country, has always started from the position that the international status quo was not and should not be called in question. On several occasions in the last twenty-five years it has shown a desire to achieve true internal autonomy without jeopardising the status quo or the international balance. For instance, one aim of the Rapacki plan for denuclearising Central Europe submitted by Poland in the United Nations in 1957 was to consolidate the status quo. The same concern was to be found in the Polish plan for disarmament in Europe submitted at the Madrid conference in 1980. Poland is pushed in this direction by the very nature of its underlying interests which are determined by its geography, history and relations with its neighbours.

12. Poland, which has no natural frontiers in either East or West, lies at the heart of Eastern Europe. Its membership of the Warsaw Pact seems essential for maintaining the cohesion of the eastern bloc, particularly because most lines of communication between the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia cross Polish territory. Hence, control over Poland appears essential for the Soviet Union's own security and Poland is compelled to maintain close contacts with the Soviet Union and with the other people's democracies. Consequently, the latter cannot turn a blind eye to the situation in Poland, just as the Soviet armed forces need Polish territory to operate the whole Warsaw Pact defence system. In early summer 1980, there were two Soviet armoured divisions in Poland, plus one air force, but there were twenty Soviet divisions in the German Democratic Republic, six in Czechoslovakia, four in Hungary and at least thirteen on Soviet territory near the Polish frontier.

13. In the absence of natural frontiers, the Polish people has throughout its history been inextricably mingled with the Russian, Lithuanian and Ukrainian peoples to the East, Slovaks to the South and Germans to the West, which resulted, when Prussia, Austria and Russia became great powers, in a series of partitions of Poland at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries. These partitions in no way detracted from the exis-

tence of a Polish national identity which, more than any other European nationality, has been forged in resistance to foreign oppression. Even today, its history is deeply imprinted on the Polish people who know better than anyone how to resist oppression and maintain their national identity in the direst circumstances.

14. This national element is accompanied by a religious element since Poland has remained a bulwark of catholicism between a mostly protestant German people and orthodox Russia. The history of Poland has strengthened the influence of a religion which emerges almost as a national religion. The election of a Pope of Polish nationality in 1978 for the first time in history further strengthened the feeling that catholicism is part of the Polish heritage, and John Paul II's triumphal visit to Poland in June 1979 was seen as a major event in national history. Throughout the period following the second world war and until today, catholicism seems to have formed a protection for the Polish people against communist oppression. The state has had to deal on a power-to-power basis with the catholic authorities which were anxious to avoid leading Poland and Europe into dangerous adventures, yet sought to maintain the maximum of freedom and the best possible economic and social living standards for the Polish people.

15. In general, the whole Polish nation has understood the church's attitude. It has not tried to terminate Soviet hegemony but when it has been the victim of over-flagrant excesses by the communist régime it has shown unequivocally that it was not prepared to put up with them. This was the case in June 1956 when there was an outbreak of rioting in Poznan over economic claims. The following October, Mr. Gomulka, a former communist leader who had been dropped from power and imprisoned, had to be called back to the party leadership. He promised liberal measures and then squashed the uprising. In December 1970, serious economic difficulties again led to unrest, particularly in the Gdansk and Gdynia areas. This led to the fall of Mr. Gomulka and his replacement by Mr. Gierek who, abandoning the policy of repression pursued by his predecessor, chose to embark upon a policy of concessions to dissident movements. In 1976, Mr. Gierek's government had to face further serious unrest due to economic difficulties and a sharp rise in food prices and he had to make major concessions and close his eyes to the formation of a social self-defence committee. It may be noted that on every occasion demonstrations and unrest have revealed remarkable national unity and the same feeling of national unity allowed Mr. Gomulka or Mr. Gierek to prevent unrest degenerating to the point where the régime

might be threatened. Thus, in 1956 Poland was able to avoid a fate comparable to that of Hungary and in 1970 a fate comparable to that just experienced by Czechoslovakia. Polish Governments have never called on Soviet forces to restore order and disturbances have never been such as to leave the government no alternative but to call on the Soviet Union. This appears to be due to a remarkable awareness of the possibilities enjoyed by Poland because of its special situation and also of the limits of this situation. Events in the early months of 1981 testify to the same wisdom among the leaders of the Unified Workers' Party and the state and the Catholic Church and the leaders of Solidarity.

### III. *The 1980 crisis*

16. In September 1979, agitation started in Poland with the publication of a "workers' charter" in the Workers' Defence Committee's journal calling for the right to strike, wage increases and better working conditions. Intellectuals warned the government of the dangers inherent in the situation and there were demonstrations in Warsaw in November, followed by numerous arrests in December. These repressive measures were the cause of the first strike at the Lenin shipyards in Gdansk in February 1980.

17. But the serious economic difficulties from which Poland was then suffering were the immediate cause of the widespread strike movement which broke out in Warsaw and Gdansk in July 1980. In spite of remarkable agricultural possibilities and ample coal resources, because of bad harvests and the rising cost of oil imports from the Soviet Union the country experienced a very sharp rise in prices and a serious food shortage which it could not remedy for lack of foreign currency.

18. Mr. Gierek's policy since 1970 had been to borrow large sums abroad to finance industrial development. However, agricultural yields were very inadequate and coal-mines and industrialisation were falling far short of the progress expected by the Polish planners. Inflation had reached very high levels, which did not prevent the shortage making itself felt with increasing severity.

19. Finally, external debts had gone beyond reasonable limits. At the beginning of 1980, they amounted to \$ 19,000 million and the cost of repaying the debt (interest and repayment of capital) would have amounted to \$ 7,600 million, i.e. 70 % of the country's external revenue, if Poland had been in a position to pay. To do so, it would have had to borrow more money abroad which was impossible in view of the size of the Polish foreign debt. At the end of

December, this debt is said to have amounted to \$ 23,000 million.

20. Thus the workers' claims were first economic and social. Increased wages and improved working conditions were in no way political claims. But soon were added claims relating to individual and trade union freedom, since the system of single trade unions controlled by the communist party did not allow normal expression to be given to these claims. Workers' organisations therefore sprang up spontaneously in firms where there had been strikes in summer 1980 and one of the main claims of the strikers was the right to form trade unions separate from the official ones. Here the strikers were calling in question a fundamental element of the Soviet doctrine that the communist party had to be the voice of the working class. Insofar as the latter felt the need to express itself outside the communist trade unions and challenged their right to represent them, it was the régime itself that was, in a way, being called in question. Finally, the workers' claims led to a twenty-one-point claims programme, the main points being:

- guaranteed right to strike and security for all strikers ;
- respect for the freedom to speak and write guaranteed in the constitution ; abolition of censorship and hence termination of the repression of independent publications ;
- liberation of all political prisoners ;
- respect for Convention 87 of the International Labour Organisation on trade union freedom, ratified by the People's Republic of Poland ;
- mass media access to representatives of churches of all creeds ;
- abolition of interference by government bodies in trade union activities ;
- adoption of concrete measures to overcome the crisis by:
  - (a) the publication of full information about the social and economic situation ;
  - (b) the possibility for all to take part in the discussion on the programme of reform ;
- wage increase of 2,000 zlotys for each worker to compensate for the rise in the cost of living in recent years ;
- payment of wages while on strike, as for holidays ;
- guaranteed automatic rise in basic wages in the light of price increases and the falling currency value ;

- publication in the press and on radio and television of authorised information on the strikes and on the establishment of the joint strike committee.

21. At the beginning of August, the strike movement, which had started in Gdansk, spread to all the Baltic ports, Warsaw and the Silesian mines, finally affecting the whole country and a large number of branches, particularly naval shipbuilding, mines and public transport. The policy of limited concessions launched by Mr. Babiuch's government, formed in February 1980, produced no results and growing unrest among the workers led to the fall of the government on 24th August, when Mr. Josef Pinkowski was called upon to replace Mr. Babiuch. At the same time, changes were made in the party leadership, where members who had been dropped at the beginning of the year reappeared.

22. The new government set itself the task of stopping the strike movement. It was helped by the Catholic Church which had hitherto shown its solidarity with the strikers but which, as soon as it saw that the situation was deteriorating too seriously and that the government was prepared to make major concessions, encouraged a return to work. It was clearly concerned, as may be understood from the words of Cardinal Wyszynski, for instance, on 26th August, not to provoke a brutal reaction from the Soviet Union.

23. After several days of very high tension, negotiations began between the government and the striking workers, first in Gdansk and then in the other regions. Finally, most of the strikers' claims were met in the Gdansk agreements of 31st August, subject to an undertaking not to undermine the "party's leading rôle". Similar agreements were concluded with strikers in other regions, particularly Silesia, where the miners obtained special advantages.

24. However, on 6th September, a few days after the Gdansk agreements, the Central Committee of the Polish Unified Workers' Party announced the departure for health reasons of its First Secretary, Mr. Gierek, who was replaced by Mr. Stanislaw Kania, known moreover for his liberal tendencies. This change at the head of the party was accompanied or followed by the replacement of a number of other Polish leaders, indicating a wish to start a new policy and no doubt also in response to the accusations about party leaders often made by the strikers, in particular that they took undue advantage of their duties to improve their material position.

25. But since the person responsible for the Gdansk agreements was replaced just when the Soviet press was increasing its warnings to the Polish leaders, it was to be wondered whether

the new party leaders would apply the agreements loyally. There were disconcerting signs, particularly the reluctance with which the tribunals registered the statutes of the new trade unions, deleting certain provisions outright. Another trial of force was in fact required, backed by the threat to resume the strike, before the trade unions, whose confederation adopted the name of "Solidarity", could obtain full application of the Gdansk agreements.

26. The fact was that, in view of Poland's economic situation, the application of certain economic parts of the agreements did not depend on the authorities of that country alone. Large-scale financial and food assistance from the eastern countries, and particularly the Soviet Union and the GDR, was far from being able to redress the financial situation and Poland therefore had again to turn to the western countries in spite of criticism from the Soviet Union. Mr. Gierek had already obtained a loan of DM 1,200 million from a consortium of German banks, two-thirds of which were to pay off the debt and one-third to be invested in the Polish coal industry. Mr. Kania obtained further loans from the United States and various other western countries, plus food assistance from the European Community. But this western assistance added further to the Polish national debt and displeased the Soviet Union, just as the need to assist Poland appears to have roused suspicion in the German Democratic Republic. In short, in such conditions it was difficult to consider wage increases, shorter working hours or higher consumption, and the Polish Government had to negotiate with the Solidarity trade union in order to obtain a delay in introducing the economic advantages granted in principle to Polish workers in the Gdansk agreements.

27. In this matter too the Solidarity trade union showed remarkable wisdom and realism and had the backing of the catholic church. A working class which had just realised what power could be wielded by using strikes as an instrument had to be made to understand that it could not continue to make use of this means of improving its standard of living without endangering the country. Until December, the most stubborn elements were kept in a minority and the domestic situation remained calm while the Polish Government started distributing ration cards.

28. The government and party for their part showed that they truly sought appeasement. On 16th December, the state and party authorities, side by side with the workers, took part in the unveiling of a monument erected in Gdansk in memory of the victims of the 1970 repression, which was a remarkable demonstration of national unity, discipline and moderation. However, there were still many causes for

anxiety, first of all because of the seriousness of the economic situation which has obviously not been improved by two months of an almost general strike, and second, and above all, because one can but wonder about the true wish, perhaps not of the Polish leaders, but at least of leaders in the Soviet Union and other people's democracies, to tolerate a truly free trade union system, i.e. the coexistence with the communist party and the government it controls of a "counter power" to which the possibility of recourse to strikes gives undeniable strength.

29. During the first fortnight of January 1981, in fact, two matters of concern came to the fore. One was the delay called for by the Polish Supreme Court in authorising farmers and students to set up a free trade union organisation whose legality the government contested; the other was the government's refusal to apply immediately the provision of the Gdansk agreements limiting the working week to five days. While in the first case it is difficult to imagine how a legal discrimination between workers and peasants can be maintained, in the second case Poland's economic situation provides sufficient explanation for the government's determination to tolerate nothing which might reduce national production.

30. It is equally understandable that Solidarity for its part is hesitant to condone anything that might appear to fall short of the Gdansk agreements, particularly as, in other areas such as freedom of information, the government seems to have adopted a very restrictive approach to the agreements. The result was a further clash between trade unionists and the state since, on Saturday, 10th January, many Polish workers refused to go to work. This matter is not without consequences since within Solidarity itself there seems to be opposition between a more realistic tendency, prepared to make concessions on matters where government requirements appear justified by the situation and represented by the man who has become Solidarity's principal leader, Lech Walesa, and a more intransigent element, ready to face up to another conflict with the country's authorities rather than back down even slightly on what was gained at Gdansk and perhaps even prepared to use the force it obtains from its very wide audience in the new trade union to obtain still further advantages, without flinching at the prospect of another trial of force.

31. This means that the unchanging wish of the government, the church, the strikers or their union to keep the crisis within Poland's frontiers has encountered very serious difficulties which Mr. Pinkowski's Government seemed incapable of overcoming, and at the beginning of February the situation seemed to be very seriously jeopardised. Strikes again

increased, claims, particularly in the economic field, surpassed the capabilities of the Polish economy and Poland again faced a major crisis.

32. Meeting on 9th February, the Central Committee plenum decided to place at the head of the government General Jaruzelski, hitherto Minister of Defence, who had managed to avoid the army being involved. A communist and patriot, untouched by the corruption of which certain party leaders were accused, the new Prime Minister seems to have lost no time in finding terms for a compromise acceptable to the moderate elements of Solidarity at least. The provisions of the Gdansk agreement relating to public and trade union freedom, including farmers and students, were to be applied unreservedly but at the same time there was to be an energetic economic policy designed to stem the country's debt and ensure the best conditions for economic recovery. This policy of austerity, which included rationing sugar, butter and meat, appears to have been understood by Solidarity's leaders who shared with the government, party and church the concern to maintain national independence at all cost, since they fell in with the government's request for a three-month truce in their claims.

33. The recovery manœuvred by General Jaruzelski has been facilitated by Mr. Walesa's improved position within his trade union following the welcome he was given abroad and in particular at the Vatican, where he was received at the beginning of February. For the immediate future, at least, his success may ward off the threat of Soviet intervention and offer Poland a last chance to escape economic and political collapse, which would be in no one's interests, be it in the East or the West.

34. But it is hardly likely that three months will be enough to straighten out such a difficult situation and it may be wondered whether beyond then further dangers will not be lying in wait. Cracks are already showing in the three-month truce: within Solidarity, an opposition is emerging which has little patience for relinquishing, even temporarily, economic claims which they consider to be the lever which allowed Polish workers to be mobilised in order to obtain reforms. Sanctions by certain firms on some of the autumn 1980 strikers maintain local tension leading to threats of further strikes. Finally, it is still hard to see how the Polish people will react to food restrictions, however essential a policy of greater austerity may be. One of the major drawbacks of the single-party system is of course that it associates the régime itself with any errors which its leaders may make in running the country's affairs.

35. Although a viable compromise between the country's leaders and Solidarity need not be



ruled out entirely, it obviously depends on the government being allowed sufficient freedom of movement by pressure exerted from outside – by the Soviet Union in particular.

36. In fact, in the second half of March, two new events brought the state and party authorities to grips with Solidarity.

37. First, in Radom on 17th March, the Polish authorities had to yield to the demands of local Solidarity leaders backed by a strike threat calling for the replacement of certain administrators accused of being responsible for the repressive measures taken during the events in June 1976. The action taken against party leaders, who had presumably merely carried out instructions, was probably very disturbing for all the party and state leaders.

38. Second, this reaction no doubt largely explains the events which occurred two days later in Bydgoszcz where, on 19th March, several local members of Solidarity were manhandled by the police who evacuated the hall in which a meeting of Solidarity was being held.

39. These two events gave a new slant to the dispute between Solidarity and the party, since:

- (i) the Solidarity leaders were accused by some members of the movement of being too weak in face of the state's demands and too inclined to respond to the catholic clergy's untiring calls for moderation;
- (ii) it transpired that local party authorities were particularly responsive to Solidarity's demands because they were based on deep-rooted uneasiness of a political and economic nature which affected a large number of party members;
- (iii) however real may have been the concerns of the Polish leaders about the country's economic situation and the threat of a Soviet invasion, they were therefore often interpreted as arguments designed to convince the Solidarity leaders to abandon their claims and threats of strike.

40. At the end of March and the beginning of April, there was thus a threefold crisis: inside the party, inside Solidarity and in relations between Solidarity and the state. In all three cases, the stake was the continuation of the three-month social truce.

41. The plenum of the Party Central Committee met on 29th March, when hard-liners and moderate elements came face to face. The former thought that the "right-wing" tendency in Solidarity had now trium-

phed and that the union had embarked on a fight for power against the party and against communism. However, since at the same time Solidarity demonstrated an undeniable spirit of concession, the moderate party elements were able to show that it was in the national interest to reach agreement. Finally, the plenum, without altering the balance between the trends at the head of the party and state, decided on an inquiry into responsibility for the Bydgoszcz affair, followed by sanctions and democratic changes within the party, whose congress is to be held in July, including free elections and a limit on the length of terms of office. Thus there are still conservative elements at the head of the party, but the desire to pursue the dialogue continues to prevail.

42. This is also so in Solidarity which, at the party plenum, made a major concession by reversing its decision to call a general strike for 31st March. This decision was challenged by the more intransigent elements but was finally confirmed, just as the leaders remained in office.

43. The fact that on both sides those who were most aware of economic and international realities and their political consequences were able to maintain the dialogue between Solidarity and the party allowed the crisis in March and April 1981 to be overcome, but certainly not without leaving deep marks. The return to the compromise policy pursued since the Gdansk agreements had already proved particularly difficult, especially because of the strong pressure exerted by the Soviet Union to tip the scales in favour of the party's hard-liners. There is no guarantee that wisdom and moderation will continue to win the day in the coming months.

#### IV. *Soviet policy*

44. It is clear that the caution and moderation shown by every sector of Polish public life is essentially due to the fear felt by all Poles of having the forces of the Soviet Union and its allies occupy Poland and impose a government and repressive measures by force. So far, the Soviet army, which has had forces on Polish territory since the second world war, has not intervened directly. It has probably been deterred from doing so on the one hand by the unanimity shown by the Polish people and on the other hand by the fact that the Soviet army was already involved in a deadlock in Afghanistan and that the conference on security and co-operation in Europe was being held in Madrid. The Soviet Union has always set great store by the pursuit of certain aspects of détente, particularly in the economic field, and

the West has made it quite clear that military intervention in Poland would put an immediate end to the Madrid negotiations.

45. It is equally clear that the Soviet Union considered events in Poland to be a threat to itself and its influence in Eastern Europe. The allies of Poland and the Soviet Union, including Czechoslovakia and above all the German Democratic Republic, appear to have brought strong pressure to bear on the Polish Government to ensure that it did not go too far in its concessions to the strikers and perhaps on the Soviet Government not to allow the Polish Government to yield too much. In fact, the Czechoslovak and East German leaders had every reason to fear that their own societies might be contaminated by Poland.

46. Until August 1980, the member countries of the Warsaw Pact were very discreet about the Polish affair, which was referred to in their press only after the conclusion of the Gdansk agreements. Even on 28th August, Mr. Brezhnev delivered a long general policy speech in Alma Ata, but made no mention of Poland. But from then on the Soviet press began to refer to the Polish strikes, attributing to western agents responsibility for "subversive action by anti-socialist elements" trying "to combine their efforts to move the country away from the socialist system". It took the opportunity of issuing warnings or hardly-veiled threats to Polish leaders, putting them on their guard against the dangers for the régime of the strikes and unrest, debts to foreign countries and excessive concessions to so-called anti-socialist elements. Among these concessions, recognition of trade unions outside party control was the most strongly and constantly condemned, even if it was explained by the shortcomings of the policy of Mr. Gierek who, having cut himself off from the working class, was responsible for this result. Similar warnings were issued in October by Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and the German Democratic Republic. Finally, for the first time, on 19th September Mr. Muskie, United States Secretary of State, announced that the United States had noted Soviet troop movements close to the Polish frontier and, at the end of October, the GDR and Czechoslovakia "closed" their frontiers with Poland.

47. The tension which had been growing throughout the month slackened with the impromptu visit by Mr. Kania and Mr. Pinkowski to Moscow on 30th October. All was as if the Soviet and Polish leaders had managed to reach an agreement, at least provisional: on the Soviet side, it was recognised that relations between the government and trade unions in Poland were "a purely Polish matter", which allowed Mr. Pinkowski later to make major

concessions to the leaders of Solidarity: liberation of political prisoners and acceptance by the Supreme Court of the statutes of the new trade union.

48. Conversely, while the Soviet Union granted financial assistance to Poland, the Polish leaders appear to have had to undertake to put their economy in order without delay and Mr. Walesa and the leaders of Solidarity were made to understand that it would not be possible to meet the economic undertakings entered into at Gdansk. There is no doubt that Mr. Walesa's friends understood that they would have to give in on this point since they then cancelled a strike order and since the beginning of November have sought to tone down differences between Polish workers and the state.

49. The indications are that the governments of the other people's democracies did not take a favourable view of this respite Moscow allowed Warsaw, on the one hand because they were afraid contestation might spread to their own countries, particularly with denunciations of excesses committed by communist leaders such as provided material for criticism of Mr. Gierek, and on the other hand because they had to provide Poland with material assistance to ensure that it did not receive all the economic aid it needed from the West.

50. Thus, in December 1980, the German Democratic Republic adopted a series of measures designed to aid Poland economically, including a financial contribution in western currencies intended to allow it to overcome the crisis. But at the same time the Government of the German Democratic Republic showed its displeasure at having to make such a contribution to refloating the Polish economy when it was not receiving the supplies of Polish coal it so greatly needed.

51. But alongside these economic assistance measures everything indicates that serious military steps have been taken by the Soviet Union and its allies to ensure that they could intervene quickly and massively in Poland if developments made this necessary. A large number of divisions have been concentrated all round the Polish frontiers and at the end of November they were placed in a state of alert, which made western observers wonder whether Poland was not about to be invaded.

52. At present, the pointers are that the Soviet Union and its allies still hope by threats to deter the Polish Government from making too many concessions to the protest movements and the movements themselves from going too far in their claims. At the same time, the utmost is being done to avoid the worst, i.e. armed intervention. It is quite clear that such

deterrence can be effective only if based on very credible threats of intervention and that escalating threats might lead to action even though this may not be the wish of the Soviet Union.

53. The question is therefore not only whether the Soviet Union intends merely to deter or whether finally it intends to intervene. The situation alone implies a true danger of intervention. But intervention could not be a large-scale, brutal invasion as in Czechoslovakia in 1968. It may be a series of political pressures, accompanied by the deployment of forces along the frontiers, the strengthening of Soviet garrisons in Poland and economic measures designed to make the Polish Government go back on the Gdansk agreements. This means that the West must not merely foresee what it would do in the event of Poland being invaded. It must hold continuing consultations on how to analyse the situation in Poland and, if necessary, how to react to developments that cannot be anticipated.

54. The change of government in Poland in February 1981 had no immediate effect on the situation. The Soviet authorities, particularly Mr. Brezhnev at the Twenty-Sixth Soviet Communist Party Congress, solemnly asserted their confidence in the new Polish leaders to maintain a socialist régime in the country and restore calm.

55. However, on 4th March 1981, at the close of the Twenty-Sixth Party Congress, there was a meeting between Soviet and Polish leaders. The final communiqué is important enough for your Rapporteur to quote the main part of it:

“... The Polish comrades spoke about the situation in their country and the measures taken to overcome the serious threat to the Polish people's socialist gains. The Polish United Workers' Party and the Government of the Polish People's Republic, in accordance with the decisions of the eighth plenary meeting of the PUWP central committee, relying on the working class, the working people and on all the conscious forces of society, will steadfastly press for the complete overcoming of anarchy and disarray and for the strengthening of the socialist system.

Those taking part in the talk pointed out that imperialism and internal reaction hoped that the economic and political crisis in Poland would result in a change in the alignment of forces in the world and in a weakening of the socialist community and of the international communist movement and the entire liberation movement. This made a firm

and resolute rebuff to such dangerous attempts a particularly urgent matter. The socialist community is inseparable and the defence of that community is the cause, not only of each state, but also of the entire socialist coalition.

The Soviet leaders stated that the USSR, together with the other fraternal countries, had given and would continue to give, all the necessary support to socialist Poland and to the Polish communists in their tense work to bring about a major improvement in the situation in the country. That approach had received the full approval of the 26th Congress of the CPSU and was shared by all Soviet communists and the Soviet people. Confidence was expressed that the Polish communists had the possibilities and strength to turn the course of events and to eliminate the dangers hanging over the socialist gains of the Polish people.

Soviet people have faith that Poland has been, and will continue to be, a reliable link of the socialist community, as has again been confirmed by the Polish leaders at the meeting.

Those taking part in the meeting were unanimous in pointing out that the complex international situation and the big tasks that must be solved in the interests of continuing and deepening the process of détente, call with still greater force for the strengthening of the unity and cohesion of the fraternal countries of socialism. The meeting took place in a cordial atmosphere and confirmed the common approach of the two sides to the questions under discussion...”.

56. Two points call for attention in this text. The first is the statement that the course of events in Poland should be turned. What does that mean? Is it merely a matter of rectifying an economic situation which was considerably worsened by events during the summer and autumn or even a political situation marked by the weakness of both state and party? Conversely, does it mean going back on the Gdansk and subsequent agreements?

57. The second point is the statement that the protection of the socialist community is the cause of the entire socialist coalition, i.e. where Poland is concerned, it is a reminder of the Brezhnev doctrine.

58. This twofold statement may portray two different intentions: to strengthen the authority of the government and the moderate Solidarity leaders to ensure respect for the truce and a continuation of the compromise, or to indicate that the Soviet Union considered this com-

promise as a temporary means and its intention is to have the Polish Government revert to a stricter application of communist orthodoxy. Should the second interpretation prove to be correct, it would very probably mean that the crisis which began in the summer of 1980 is far from at an end and that the invasion of Poland, whether or not at the request of the Polish Government, would be the likely outcome of the crisis. The tone of the communiqué issued on 4th March, adopted at a time when joint manoeuvres by Soviet and Polish forces on Polish territory could but recall the military threat, points strongly to the fear that this interpretation may be the right one, particularly as Pravda of 6th March referred to the collective responsibility of the socialist countries for maintaining party authority in Poland and strongly criticised the errors of the Polish leaders. This means that at the time of writing the threat of Soviet intervention again seems to be on the cards.

59. In these circumstances, the measures taken by the Polish Government in March 1981 against a few contestants and splinter groups almost breached the front formed with such difficulty between party and government on the one hand and Solidarity and the Catholic Church on the other to keep trade union claims within reasonable limits without, however, giving the Soviets satisfaction or, as a consequence, averting the threat of armed intervention hanging over Poland. This shows therefore what risks the West would be taking by intervening in Poland's internal affairs and what responsibility it would bear if it failed to warn the Soviet Union of all the inevitable consequences of intervention in Poland.

60. Developments during the crisis in March and April 1981 showed clearly on the one hand that the Soviet Union is anxious to do its utmost to avoid intervening directly in a dispute which it knows, if it acts overtly, would inevitably bring it into opposition with almost the entire Polish people, and at the same time most free countries, and, on the other hand, that it is determined to make every effort to prevent the communist régime being called in question by the Polish people.

61. The Soviet Union has acted on two levels: threatened military intervention and propaganda. As soon as the Bydgoszcz affair occurred, official Soviet bodies indicated clearly that they approved all measures which might be taken by the Polish authorities to restore order in the country. They laid responsibility for the incidents at the door of Solidarity, whose more intransigent elements they accused of being manipulated by foreign countries, particularly the American CIA, which they claimed was financing Solidarity through the intermediary of

the ICFTU, the international confederation of free trade unions, and they quite openly and clearly encouraged the Polish Party and Government to be uncompromising and repressive. This propaganda has been relayed by the press in most of the peoples' democracies which sometimes claimed that Solidarity was determined to use violence to overthrow the communist régime in Poland.

62. Agreed, it cannot be asserted that police brutality in Bydgoszcz was demanded by the Soviet Union, but it is more than probable that the Soviet Party leaders were disturbed at the administrative purge measures taken by the Polish authorities to quell public discontent. It would not be the first time that there were signs of solidarity of interests between leading circles who, in the Soviet Union as in the peoples' democracies and until 1980 Poland, are kept in power in the name of a revolutionary ideology. However, the firmness demonstrated by the Polish communist leaders in their desire to avoid calling on a foreign power, and the wisdom shown by Solidarity, have ensured that no Polish authority has appealed to the Soviet Union.

63. The latter has therefore confined itself to sabre-rattling in the form of manoeuvres by the armed forces of several Warsaw Pact countries in Poland and the concentration of troops along Poland's frontiers. This is not a chance interpretation of facts whose political nature is not evident. Indeed, concomitantly with the Soyuz 81 manoeuvres, which were prolonged beyond the date planned for their completion at the beginning of April and whose theme was the assistance to be afforded to a friendly country whose communist régime was in danger, the Soviet press repeatedly announced that the Soviet Union was prepared to answer any call from the Polish authorities, and at the same time the Soviet threat was invoked by the Polish Party to convince Solidarity to moderate its demands.

64. There was thus both threat and pressure from the Soviet Union. So far, neither had led to direct intervention, although obvious results have not been achieved thanks to the fundamental agreement which seems to exist between the Polish Party and Solidarity that nothing should be done which might justify Soviet intervention. There is no guarantee that either side will adhere to this position in the event of another crisis.

#### V. *The West's attitude*

65. The West has followed the whole Polish question with the closest attention but has been careful to do nothing which might be taken for

intervention in Poland's internal affairs. So far, the only fact the Soviet Union has been able to invoke to support the idea of such intervention is the financial assistance afforded by western trade unions to Solidarity. However, the deterioration of détente which began with the Afghanistan affair, information about the deployment of Soviet and East German forces on Poland's frontiers and the quite special relationship between certain western countries, particularly Belgium, and Poland mean that the West could not remain indifferent to that country's fate. There are many Polish immigrants throughout the western world and two of them, Mr. Muskie and Mr. Brzezinski, held key posts in the United States Democratic Administration. Finally, memories of the second world war, which was actually started because of the invasion of Poland, meant that no one could remain indifferent to the fate of a country for whose independence the world had fought for five years.

66. The West therefore took seriously the Polish claims and the threats to Poland's independence. But all the western countries have shown themselves keenly alive to the implications of the prevailing military situation. Soviet preponderance in conventional weapons in Europe precludes the use of conventional forces by the West. Moreover, the West cannot entertain – and the treaties of alliance would not allow it – recourse to force for matters not directly affecting the independence of the western countries, *a fortiori* in conditions where the only chance of attaining its aims would be to use or at least threaten to use nuclear weapons.

67. It was from the United States that word first came of concentrations of Soviet troops on Poland's frontiers at the beginning of September, and further troop movements were reported in the same areas at the end of November and beginning of December. On 9th December, the United States Government announced that four aircraft equipped with the AWAC system had been sent to the Federal Republic to monitor Soviet military activities. In an interview on 9th December, Mr. Muskie, then Secretary of State, described the American position:

(i) With regard to Soviet intentions towards Poland, he said: "We do not know that they have made a decision. On the other hand, the preparations for intervention have been extensive and expensive. And one must conclude... that these preparations have been made in order to influence events..."

(ii) This remark was accompanied by a warning: "The Soviets of course

must balance the objectives which would suggest intervention of one kind or another against the costs of such an intervention. And there are costs that could flow: diplomatic, economic, political, ... violence in Poland ... the continuation of détente and its benefits ... world reaction ... " but he made no mention of direct military intervention by the United States.

(iii) He appealed to the United States' European allies as follows: "It is important ... for all concerned countries ... to seek by every means possible to deter the action which we seek to prevent: ... in direct communications with the Soviet Union, in public statements, and in every diplomatic channel available to them."

68. From then on diplomatic deterrence was used by the West as never before, be it before the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 or of Afghanistan in 1979.

69. The United States' European allies for their part demonstrated their solidarity and desire to terminate any sign of détente should Poland be invaded by postponing a number of planned official visits to Eastern European countries last autumn. The most spectacular measure was Chancellor Schmidt's decision not to meet leaders of the German Democratic Republic at the end of August. Similarly, President Giscard d'Estaing's visit to Poland was postponed. Western diplomatic contacts continued with the eastern countries, however, including Poland, at the level of ambassadors or Ministers for Foreign Affairs. For instance, Mr. Nothomb, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, visited Warsaw at the beginning of December.

70. At its meeting on 2nd December, the European Council was able to adopt a text defining the position of the Nine towards events in Poland, as follows:

"1. In their relations with Poland, the Nine conform and will conform strictly to the United Nations Charter and to the principles of the Helsinki final act.

2. In this context, they would point out that in subscribing to these principles, the states signatory to the final act have undertaken in particular to:

– respect the right of every country to choose and freely develop its own political, social, economic and cultural system as well as to determine its own laws and regulations ;

- refrain from any direct or indirect, individual or collective intervention in internal or external affairs which fall within the national competence of another signatory state regardless of their mutual relations;
- recognise the right of all people to pursue their own political, economic, social and cultural development as they see fit and without external interference.

3. The Nine accordingly call upon all the signatory states to abide by these principles with regard to Poland and the Polish people. They emphasise that any other attitude would have very serious consequences for the future of international relations in Europe and throughout the world."

71. The convergence between European and American positions was shown at the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 11th and 12th December by the adoption of a communiqué specifying that:

".....  
Détente has brought appreciable benefits in the field of East-West co-operation and exchange. But it has been seriously damaged by Soviet actions. It could not survive if the Soviet Union were again to violate the basic rights of any state to territorial integrity and independence. Poland should be free to decide its own future. The allies will respect the principle of non-intervention and strongly urge others to do likewise. Any intervention would fundamentally alter the entire international situation. The allies would be compelled to react in the manner which the gravity of this development would require. Therefore, the Council will keep the situation under close and continuous review. At the same time, genuine Soviet efforts to restore the confidence necessary for détente will meet with a ready response from the allies.  
....."

72. Thus, while warning the Soviet Union and its allies of the serious repercussions an intervention in Poland might have, the West did not wish to spell out the measures it considered taking in that event since knowing what its reaction might be would weaken the deterrent effect of the threat. Perhaps too the western countries wished to reserve the possibility of graduating their response according to the nature of the Soviet intervention. One way or another, it is to be expected that the western response would in any event include a radical economic boycott of the Soviet Union and its

allies, the breaking off of the Madrid conference and of all disarmament negotiations and military equipment programmes would be strengthened throughout the West.

73. The western countries did not confine themselves to measures of deterrence; they also wished to afford the Polish Government economic assistance as quickly and effectively as possible. Thus, meeting in Brussels on 5th December 1980 in implementation of the decision taken at the summit meeting on 2nd December, the nine Ministers for Foreign Affairs decided to send Poland large consignments of sugar, butter, meat, powdered milk, oil and various grains at prices well below those of the world market and *a fortiori* far less than prices on the European market. According to provisional calculations, the EEC's gift to Poland is believed to be equivalent to about 300 million European currency units.

74. It should be added that the Polish Government was allowed generous credit facilities for obtaining these consumer goods, such facilities being a matter for bilateral negotiations between Poland and each of the Nine. Thus, following Mr. Nothomb's visit to Warsaw, Belgium granted a moratorium on payments which Poland should have made in respect of earlier loans, and a western consortium is being set up to arrange a very large loan to Poland in addition to the one made by the Federal Republic.

75. Therefore, like the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union, the western countries have shown that they were determined to do everything in their power to help the Polish Government to overcome the crisis. This convergence between the positions adopted by the social partners in Poland, the member countries of the Warsaw Pact and the Western European countries shows that, in spite of present difficulties in the world economic situation there is general determination to do as much as possible to avoid recourse to force, and there is no reason to think that the Soviet position is different, even if it is not at all sure that the Soviet Union and its allies are prepared to let the Gdansk agreements operate.

76. Hence, measures taken by the West to help Poland solve its problems make sense only insofar as they are accompanied by an extremely firm policy towards the Soviet Union: a passing convergence of interests on the need to avoid a serious international crisis must not be allowed to restrict progressively the freedom gained last summer by the Polish people, who are already relinquishing economic concessions granted at the height of the crisis but which are probably beyond Poland's reach.

77. It is naturally impossible to assess the impact of western warnings on Soviet decisions during the crisis in March and April 1981. They probably had some effect and possibly they helped to deter the Soviet Union from using force to impose its own solution in the Polish affair.

78. It is also difficult to foresee the possible effects of the measures taken to help the Polish economy. Recent statements by Mr. Kania indicated that Poland's foreign debt amounted to \$27,000 million. Servicing this debt is believed to cost about \$10,000 million in 1981 and new loans contracted by Poland in recent months are therefore mainly to allow it to meet the payments which are due, leaving little for major productive investments. Moreover, the Polish Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Jagielski, has visited several western capitals to ask for significant postponements of payments. Poland's twelve main western creditors met in Paris in February and decided to give a favourable response to his requests, provided, however, as Mr. Giscard d'Estaing explained on 30th March, Poland manages to reorganise its economy without external intervention or internal violence, which would infringe upon the gains of the Polish people. Also in February, the Soviet Union for its part granted a moratorium until 1985 on major loans contracted by Poland in 1976 and 1980.

79. It should nevertheless be noted that the West cannot be expected to grant loans without security to Poland indefinitely. Helping Poland to emerge from a serious economic crisis is an aim worth sacrifices, but Poland must initiate an economic policy to adapt its structures accordingly. So far, the measures taken by the Polish Government, particularly the plan adopted in January by the committee responsible for economic reforms, hold promise of an early recovery of the Polish economy, although some liberalisation, particularly in the agricultural sector, should be beneficial, in the medium term at least. But the Polish economy is so compromised that a protracted effort is called for to achieve the necessary recovery. This aspect of the problem cannot be overlooked by those who set great store by Poland's independence.

## VI. Conclusions

80. Among the concerns expressed by the General Affairs Committee in its discussion on events in Poland on 2nd December 1980 was first the need to show the solidarity of European public opinion for the declaration made at the Luxembourg summit meeting and its determination to oppose a possible Soviet intervention in Poland. At the same time nothing

should be done to give the impression that the West might intervene militarily in Poland, the aim being not to encourage excessive resistance on the part of the Polish workers and to preserve détente as much as possible and insofar as it serves the Eastern European nations, as was the case of the Helsinki final act. Finally, the WEU Assembly emphasised that it had no intention of interfering in any way in Poland's internal affairs.

81. This course seems as justified now as it was at the time. It is most important for western solidarity to remain firm in face of the Soviet threat to Poland.

82. For these reasons your Rapporteur put the following two questions to the General Affairs Committee:

(i) Is it enough, as the General Affairs Committee thought on 2nd December, to consider that any retaliatory measures by the West should be planned and spelled out, or should proposals be made on the subject?

(ii) Is it necessary to remain in the strict framework of WEU or should action be taken in other western organisations (European Communities, Council of Europe)?

83. The Committee discussed these questions on 16th February 1981 and your Rapporteur considers there was a consensus in favour of the following two answers:

### 1. Measures to be taken in the event of foreign aggression against Poland

84. If WEU's debates are to have sufficient impact, it seems essential for concrete measures to be proposed.

85. So far, there has been no indication that the western governments have agreed on the joint retaliatory measures they would take in the event of aggression against Poland.

86. There is no doubt about what is not wanted: armed intervention is not wanted, nor must the Poles be encouraged to adopt inflexible positions, ideologically or in alliances, which might provoke Soviet intervention.

87. This must be said in order to support the moderate faction among the Polish leaders and remove any justification for a Soviet intervention.

88. But at the same time it must be said that any coercive action by the Soviet Union and its allies would induce the western powers to take a series of measures on which they have already agreed.

89. A moot point is whether the measures to be taken in such an event should be made

known, particularly since the Soviet Union could intervene in many different ways. But there is no disputing the usefulness of agreeing on the measures that should be taken. When the "accident" occurs, it is too late to seek agreement on measures that have to be taken urgently.

90. If the Assembly of WEU is to have any influence, it should examine what measures might be taken so as to be able to discuss them with the Council.

91. It emerged from the discussion in Committee that the latter did not intend to list measures to be taken in specific cases but thought a solemn warning should be addressed to the Soviet Union, which was not done in the case of Czechoslovakia, nor of Afghanistan. The substance of any such warning could but be to record that the Soviet Union, by invading Poland, would bring to an end all that came under the heading of "détente", one key element of which being the Helsinki final act, the other being all the measures taken for the limitation of armaments.

92. Thus, it would not be the West which decided to terminate détente but the Soviet Union which, by such action, would be tearing up the Helsinki final act, making the whole text null and void, including:

- (i) the recognition of states and frontiers;
- (ii) non-interference in the internal affairs of states;
- (iii) the free circulation of persons and ideas;
- (iv) economic co-operation.

93. The West could not lightly relinquish the advantages it too draws from détente, but if this were to be nothing but a manoeuvre to cover a Soviet policy to make use of the Helsinki text only insofar as it was of direct advantage and to violate its undertakings once this was no longer so, the West might no longer feel bound by this text.

94. The enumeration of these four essential points clearly shows the areas in which the West might take action to convince the Soviet Union that it is embarking on a course which is incompatible with détente. It is not necessary to go into the details of how the measures should be applied if the West agreed on these principles which obviously are such as to challenge the very foundations of the system of Soviet domination in Europe. Indeed, European opinion would not understand that, in face of a challenge to the essential principles on which the Helsinki final act is based, nationals – diplomatic or other – of the eastern countries

in the West should continue to benefit from the freedom denied to western diplomats or nationals in the East. Nor would it understand why the Soviet Union and its allies should enjoy particularly advantageous price and credit conditions in their contracts with western countries or why internal subversion in countries with which they claim to maintain normal relations should be their exclusive prerogative.

95. Moreover, an invasion of Poland would be a demonstration of imperialism in face of which a policy of arms limitation, as defined *inter alia* in the SALT II agreement, which ensures overwhelming military preponderance for the Soviet Union, in the European theatre at least, would be a dangerous sign of weakness. Such an invasion could but preclude ratification of SALT II, the start of SALT III and the pursuit of all other negotiations on disarmament so as to allow the West as a whole, following the example just given by the new United States Administration, to make the armaments effort which circumstances would force upon them. Such an effort would admittedly call for heavy sacrifices at the present world economic juncture, but the threats to balance and hence to peace would then be such that absolute priority would have to be given without fail to a return to the balance of forces in Europe.

## 2. Framework for action

96(a) The Assembly's interlocutor is the WEU Council of Ministers.

97. It is to the Council that Assembly recommendations must be addressed.

98. It should be added that in order to be effective a true dialogue should be instigated between the Assembly and the Council on the latter's proposals.

99. Such a dialogue should be started as soon as possible if it is to have any significance.

100(b) However, it might be very worthwhile to foster concerted action between the various assemblies, at least in matters of general interest like the case in point.

### – European Parliament:

The European Parliament has already adopted a position on the general attitude to be taken by the Community countries. If the WEU Assembly goes further and, as has just been suggested, makes specific proposals on possible retaliatory measures, these proposals might be communicated to the European Parliament.



– Council of Europe:

Your Rapporteur considers it would carry considerable weight if an Assembly representing twenty-two countries were to endorse proposals made by WEU.

101(c) Where governmental action is concerned once it is established that the Soviet Union has put an end to détente, all frameworks in which European policy is worked out should be used to define, as soon as possible, the measures to be taken jointly with the United States, Canada and other countries wishing to be associated with them.

102. Naturally, the first organisation concerned would be NATO, an emergency meeting of whose Council at the highest level would be essential. But neither the EEC, for the commercial implications, nor the OECD or the Council of Europe, for associating non-member countries of the Alliance with these measures, could be left out. The WEU Council's specific rôle might be to promote these consultations and, provided it met often enough, to encourage Western Europe to play its due rôle in such circumstances and to ensure co-ordination of the measures its members would have to take in order to be effective and set an example. If in these circumstances the WEU Council did not react, those who showed no faith in Europe by seeking a bilateral relationship with the United States or by raising the question of a directorate of the leading members of the Atlantic Alliance would be proved right.

### VII. *Final remarks*

103. One may question:

(i) *The WEU Assembly's aptitude* to take effective action on matters of this kind with its present procedure.

104. A crisis such as the one in Poland is generally acute for a relatively short period, a few months at the most.

105. Is it imaginable that uncertainty about a Soviet intervention – in one form or another – will last several months longer? Perhaps, but something might happen at any time to force the West to take steps immediately.

106. This means that if the Committee approves this report on 27th April, as planned, the Assembly would adopt a position at its June session, by which time the problem may no longer be topical.

107. This drawback can be avoided in various ways:

- convocation of the Assembly in extraordinary session, as foreseen in Order 53;
- delegation granted by the Assembly to the General Affairs Committee for urgent matters;
- transmission of the General Affairs Committee's proposals to the Council of Ministers and dialogue with the latter on this basis, for instance at the joint meeting to be held in the spring.

108. These procedures are moreover not exclusive, but it should be underlined that there is a great danger of ineffectiveness if urgent matters are handled in accordance with procedure which is ill-suited.

(ii) *The procedure for a dialogue with the Council of Ministers.*

109. A dialogue with the Council of Ministers is impossible at Assembly level since the dialogue has to be in the form of questions and answers which is conceivable only between a small number of persons, which would not prevent the Assembly from taking it up again, on the contrary, since debates would in that event have been prepared by prior talks and the results obtained. However this may be, the General Affairs Committee is entitled to hope that the joint meeting planned for 3rd June 1981 will help it to start a dialogue which is clearly necessary and thus, at the session of the Assembly, present a realistic picture of the situation and of the means at Europe's disposal for making an effective contribution to overcoming the difficulties created by the Polish crisis.

*Developments in Poland*

**AMENDMENTS 1 and 2<sup>1</sup>**  
*tabled by Mr. Portheine and others*

1. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from “ Poland ” to the end and insert:  
“ which would constitute a flagrant violation of the principles laid down in the Helsinki final act and would have consequences for the future CSCE process ; ”.
2. In paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “ in 1980 ”.

*Signed: Portheine, Vohrer, Blaauw*

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1. See 6th Sitting, 18th June 1981 (Amendment 1 withdrawn ; Amendment 2 agreed to).

*Developments in Poland*

AMENDMENTS 3, 4, 5 and 6<sup>1</sup>  
*tabled by MM. Blaauw, Vohrer and the Liberal Group*

3. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “ planning what measures all member countries should take in application ” and insert “ implementation ”.
4. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “ application of these measures ” and insert “ implementation ”.
5. In the draft recommendation proper, leave out paragraph 4.
6. In the draft recommendation proper, leave out paragraph 5.

*Signed: Blaauw, Vohrer and the Liberal Group*

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1. See 6th Sitting, 18th June 1981 (Amendment 3 negatived ; Amendment 4 not moved ; Amendments 5 and 6 agreed to).

*Developments in Poland*

AMENDMENT 7<sup>1</sup>

*tabled by Mr. Hanin, Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Müller*

7. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from “ Poland ” to the end and insert:

“ which would be a flagrant violation of the Helsinki agreements and call in question their content ; ”.

*Signed: Hanin, Bennett, Müller*

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1. See 6th Sitting, 18th June 1981 (Amendment agreed to).

*European security and events in the Gulf area*

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**REPORT<sup>1</sup>**

*submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee<sup>2</sup>  
by Mr. Forni, Rapporteur*

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1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee: Sir Frederic Bennett (Chairman); MM. De Poi, Portheine (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Ahrens, Berrier, Mrs. Boniver, MM. Brugnon (Alternate: Forni), Conti Persini, Deschamps, Druon, Gessner (Alternate: Vohrer), Hanin, Hardy, Jung, Lagneau (Alternate:*

*Michel), Lord McNair (Alternate: Atkinson), MM. Mangel-schots, Mommersteeg, Müller, Lord Reay, MM. Redde-mann, Thoss (Alternate: Berchem), Urwin, Valiante, Vecchietti, Voogd.*

*N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

***Draft Recommendation***

***on European security and events in the Gulf area***

The Assembly,

Recalling its Recommendation 361;

Noting that the situation brought about by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has not changed since then but that the consequences for the Afghan people have become considerably worse;

Considering that this invasion also constitutes a direct threat to the security of all southern Asian countries as well as to peace in the world;

Recognising that the lack of progress towards peace between Israel and its neighbouring countries makes it impossible to restore stability throughout the Middle East;

Deploring the prolongation of the armed conflict between Iraq and Iran;

Considering that it is of vital interest to Europe to maintain good relations with all the Arab countries but not to intervene in any way in the internal affairs of any of these countries,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Demonstrate the will of its members to oppose any intervention by the Soviet Union in the Middle Eastern countries;
2. Concert its efforts with the United States to afford assistance to the Afghan resistance movement;
3. At the same time express Europe's determination to oppose Soviet military intervention and its will not to intervene in disputes which remain confined to the area;
4. Actively and jointly seek agreement between all countries likely to supply weapons to Iraq and Iran with a view to halting arms supplies to the two belligerents;
5. With a view to making Europe less dependent on Middle Eastern oil producers, propose consultations with the governments of other oil-consuming countries designed to promote an energy policy aimed at a progressive reduction in world oil consumption.

## *Explanatory Memorandum*

*(submitted by Mr. Forni, Rapporteur)*

### **I. Introduction**

1. The Gulf area has little unity and is rather isolated. It is surrounded on both sides by desert regions which are difficult to cross, particularly as they are mountainous in the north, in Iran, and in the South-West, in Oman. Only at its western end does the Mesopotamian plain, where conditions are suitable for human settlement, bring the Gulf into contact with the wealthy inhabited areas of the "fertile crescent". In all, about 80 million persons live between Afghanistan and Yemen, but not surprisingly they are rather scattered. Apart from a few areas suitable for agriculture or stockbreeding in the mountainous regions of Afghanistan, North-West Iran and the south-east of the Arabian peninsula and the Mesopotamian plain, Arabia and inland Iran had had, until recently, only a scattered nomadic population.

2. A few ports of minor importance led to the establishment of very small towns. However, the discovery and exploitation of oil in the twentieth century gave considerable impetus to the growth of some of these towns. Today, the southern shore of the Gulf has a number of relatively highly-populated centres, separated from each other by vast expanses of desert. Because of this very rapid urbanisation, the population of the area is far from homogeneous. Migration has been such that the population of most of these states, particularly the smaller ones, includes far more foreigners than original inhabitants. For instance, there are only some 562,000 nationals in Kuwait for a population of a million and a half. These foreigners are of course Bedouins who have settled but there are also Arab-speaking peoples from Egypt, Lebanon and Palestine as well as Iranians, Pakistanis and Indians who mix little with the indigenous population but who in many cases settle in the area without it ever being possible for them to take root permanently.

3. The principal unifying factor throughout the region is Islam, which, starting in the seventh century, spread to all the shores of the Gulf, but it is not the same Islam everywhere. Shiism dominates on the northern shore of the Gulf, but also has a strong foothold on the southern shore, whereas all the states except Iran are ruled by Sunnites. Shiites are not considered full-ranking citizens in most states south of the Gulf where, as in Iraq where they are in the majority, they constitute an

unreliable faction for the governments in power.

4. Moreover, there has been tension in Islam since the beginning of this century and it has been particularly serious in the regions surrounding the Gulf. In fact the tradition whereby the head of the tribe was a religious leader who ensured that the people respected Bedouin traditions has been maintained in a number of states. This has inevitably been called in question by the very rapid development of an industrial-type economy and a society in which the circulation of money occupies a large place and where the middle- and working-class elements have developed considerably whereas the nomads have become marginal. The consequence has been, on the one hand, the emergence of a new élite, westernised or sensitive to communist propaganda, which questions both the political régime and the influence of traditional Islam, and, on the other hand, an Islamic reactionary movement which has been making itself felt for a number of years. It rejects outright any change in society and attacks local dynasties and also the western influence with which it accuses them of being in complicity. Events in the great mosque at Mecca in November 1979 may be compared with the Iranian revolution and a number of demonstrations emanating from fundamentalist movements to be found in nearly all the Arab countries.

5. In face of this fundamentalism, the Baathist policy in Iraq and in Syria represents an attempt to associate a strict Islam with the development of a modern civilisation, but at the cost of a dictatorship which is sometimes called "Arab socialism". So far, it has managed to take hold only in countries with a long-standing urban tradition and naturally meets the strongest hostility in traditionalist circles and among the Emirs.

6. Hence, while Islam is a diversifying as much as a unifying factor, the feeling of belonging to a great Arab nation concerns only some of those living round the Gulf. It is not the case for the majority of Iranians, the Iraqi Kurds or the Indians and Pakistanis who have settled in Oman or the Emirates. Even for most of those who consider themselves Arabs, Arabism today does not represent a true factor of political unity but only a rather vague yearning. In particular, it runs counter to the interests of local rulers who are not very anxious to see subversive forces establishing themselves in

their states in the guise of Arabism and questioning their authority or the stability of the traditional social system.

7. The whole region extending, on both sides of the Gulf, from the Red Sea to the frontiers of the Soviets Union may therefore be considered unstable, over-rapid accession to vast wealth due almost solely to the exploitation of oil making it an area of frequent change and unrest now and probably for a long time to come.

8. The fact that the region is somewhat removed from the great international lines of communication and the major areas of confrontation might allow the West to let natural developments settle since over the years they should lead to progressive adaptation to the political and social requirements of a modern economy. But the Gulf area contains about one-third of world oil reserves and since the countries of the area are not heavy consumers, it supplies more than three-quarters of the oil on the world market.

9. Consequently, the West cannot ignore what happens there since, as in October 1973, a decision by a few major oil producers to stop exports or to raise their prices sharply is enough to trigger off a major crisis in Europe and throughout the world. Western Europe imports about 80 % of its oil requirements from the Middle East and stocks in consumer countries cannot in present circumstances represent more than three or four months' consumption. Western industry is so dependent on oil that it would soon grind to a halt if Europe no longer had access to the Middle East production. It may be hoped that by the end of the century oil will play only a secondary rôle in Europe's economy but, in the meantime, access to the Gulf is vital for Europe. The same is true for Japan and, to a lesser extent, the United States.

10. The Soviet Union for its part is constantly tempted to take advantage of tension prevailing in the Gulf area to improve its own positions. It is probably not trying to extend its direct influence as far as the Red Sea but far more probably, on the one hand, to prevent the effects of the Islamic revival spreading to Soviet Moslems and, on the other hand, to use the control of oil production as a means of pressure on the western world. The situation in the Gulf area must be viewed from this twofold standpoint.

11. The year 1980 was rich in events in that area: it opened with the invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet forces and the repression of the rebellion in the great mosque at Mecca in Saudi Arabia, while Iran, following the revolution which brought the Shiite clergy to power, took

the members of the United States Embassy in Tehran hostage. The year came to an end without the slightest sign of a solution to the Afghan affair, and new and serious fighting started between Iraq and Iran in November 1980 leading to further anxiety about stability in the area and oil supplies passing through the Strait of Hormuz.

12. Obviously Europe cannot ignore such events, which may have direct or indirect repercussions on its activity and security. The aim of the present report is to examine the situation with a view to defining a number of principles which your Rapporteur believes should govern the preparation of a policy for the Western European countries which, to be effective, must be concerted.

## II. *The situation in Afghanistan*

13. Since last November, when the General Affairs Committee adopted Mr. Hardy's report on the political implications for Europe of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, there have been few developments on the spot. Your Rapporteur can therefore be brief about this nevertheless essential matter. Information received indicates that the Soviet Union has an armed force of about 110,000 men in the country who are finding it difficult to control the large towns (although according to recent information Kandahar, the country's second town, is almost in the hands of the insurgents). These forces find it extremely difficult to move convoys about in daytime on the country's few main roads and they have absolutely no control over the territory. Frequent punitive raids carried out with large numbers of troops and modern weapons have led to the destruction of a few villages and the massacre of the inhabitants of a few valleys but the Soviets – and still less what remains of the Afghan army – are unable to hold ground.

14. The number of Afghan refugees in neighbouring countries has apparently increased considerably. It is particularly tragic that the figure has now reached about one and a half million, i.e. more than 10 % of the Afghan population, more than two-thirds of whom are settled along Pakistan's frontier with Afghanistan. Since the Soviets have no means of controlling the frontiers, there is a steady exchange between refugees and rebels.

15. It is certain that the Afghan people are almost unanimous in their resistance to the Soviet Union and the government it maintains by force in Kabul. However, there is unanimity only in face of a foreign invader and what is known of Afghan resistance movements allows it to be feared that it might be very diffi-



cult to set up a government in exile capable of bringing together all the tendencies and also all the tribal forces participating in the resistance movement. The present conflict may therefore be long drawn-out. Military victory by the resistance movement seems out of the question, but occupation of the whole country by a regular army seems equally impossible.

16. However, the conflict may well not remain localised. At present, the main risk of extension seems to come from the vast area of Baluchistan, situated on Iranian, Afghan and Pakistani territory between Kabul and the Indian Ocean. Pakistan's defeat by India in 1974, followed by the 1975 coup d'état, the Iranian revolution in 1979 and the outbreak of war in Afghanistan seem to have helped to revive national feelings in Baluchistan. From 1973 to 1977, there was in effect civil war in the Pakistani section of the area. In 1979, the fall of the Shah led to serious unrest in the Iranian section, and the problem of the future of the Baluchi people now seems to have arisen.

17. Precise details of the number and geographical distribution of the Baluchi people vary widely according to the source of information: there are in fact Baluchi minorities throughout the Middle East, particularly in the Gulf Emirates, and Baluchi nationalists often take ethnic concepts as a basis for claiming that there are up to thirty million Baluchis. In fact, using linguistic criteria, about five million persons speak Baluchi, a language which resembles Kurdish, and consequently the languages spoken in Medes in ancient times. They form most of the population in a vast territory of mountains and steppes covering 600,000 sq.km., i.e. larger than France, divided between three sovereignties and with outlets on the Indian Ocean, the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf with a 1,500 km. coast along which there are several small ports, at present very badly equipped. Little is known of the area's natural resources but they include natural gas and ores, including copper.

18. All this shows the interest Baluchistan represents for the Soviet Union: situated between Afghanistan and the coast, to a depth of some 600 km., control of it would allow air and naval bases to be established along the Strait of Hormuz for action throughout the Middle East and the Gulf area. Certain observers wonder whether the Soviet Union's true aim in intervening in Afghanistan was not to gain a hold on Baluchistan.

19. There is no proof of this, but the growth of Baluchi nationalist movements in recent years and the fact that they are prepared to lean on any ally to further their national cause may incite the Soviet Union to help them in order to destabilise Iran and Pakistan and extend its

influence as far as the Indian Ocean. Such a policy would obviously mean keeping the Soviet army in Afghanistan.

20. Pakistan for its part seems to be torn between two contradictory requirements since its government, contested in the country (as further shown by the hijacking of a Pakistani airliner by supporters of the former President, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, in March 1981), cannot turn down appeals for help from refugees who are the religious brethren of the Pakistani people living in the frontier areas and often of the same ethnic and cultural group. In particular, this is so for the Pathans and the Baluchis. But nor can General Zia ul-Haq's government grant the Afghans the military assistance they request lest it give the Soviet Union a pretext for intervening against Pakistan. Thus, in March 1981, the government announced that it was not prepared to serve as an intermediary for the arms supplies which President Reagan was considering for the Afghan resistance movement. Hence it is now clear that there is a twofold – internal and external – threat to Pakistan, in face of which it cannot rely on the American alliance alone, particularly because of the strength of the Islamic revival in Pakistan itself. It prefers to turn to Western Europe, as being less compromising in the eyes of the fundamentalists, and above all to China to provide it with the assistance needed for its faltering economy and arms for resisting any possible attack from abroad. Clearly, and in accordance with its interests, its first aim is to restore peace in Afghanistan, but this does not mean that it will be able to escape increasingly dangerous threats both at home and abroad. In some respects, Pakistan has already replaced Afghanistan as the buffer state between the great Asian powers – the Soviet Union, China and India – but there is no guarantee that it can fulfil all the internal and external conditions demanded by this difficult rôle.

21. This aspect of the situation is an additional reason for wanting peace to be restored in Afghanistan, which would obviously imply the withdrawal of Soviet forces, the subsequent formation by the Afghans themselves of an appropriate régime with, in particular, the participation of all ethnic, linguistic and religious factions of the population.

22. The Soviet Union has no choice but to seek a relatively honourable way out of the horns' nest it has fallen into by invading Afghanistan. Military and political failures on the spot are evident. Diplomatic damage has also been considerable, for the Soviet Union has been condemned not only by the West but also by the third world countries it has always tried to court. In September 1980, the great international Islamic conference organised in Tash-

kent to commemorate the fifteenth centenary of the Hegira was a fiasco for the Soviet Union. Two-thirds of the countries invited refused to attend and the others showed their hostility to the policy of the Soviet Union which failed to obtain the adoption of a final communiqué. Similarly, the conference of non-aligned countries held in New Delhi in February 1981 came to an end on 13th February with a "consensus" condemning foreign intervention in Afghanistan and Cambodia and implying a refusal to recognise the régime imposed on these countries by the Soviet Union.

23. In these circumstances, the West's prospects of action are relatively clear. It must help to restore peace on the basis of the right of nations to self-determination. This means that it cannot remain neutral or refuse assistance to the resistance movement, but nor should it humiliate the Soviet Union; it should help it rather, if it accepts, to find a way out. This is said to have been the sense of the proposals made by Lord Carrington in November 1980 mentioned in Mr. Hardy's report.

24. In January 1981, in a message to Mr. Brezhnev, the contents of which were revealed on 28th January, the President of the French Republic proposed the convocation of a conference on non-interference in Afghanistan between all Afghanistan's neighbouring countries, the five permanent members of the Security Council and certain Islamic countries in order to try to find solutions to the problem. Although sometimes reticent, most of these states agreed to the proposal, which was endorsed by the United States and most Western European countries. But the Afghan Government refused any interference in what it considered an internal matter, thus indicating that the Soviet Union is not likely to agree to such a conference being held either.

25. In adopting the recommendation in the report by Mr. Hardy, the WEU Assembly asked the Western European governments to provide the Afghanistan rebellion:

"... full financial assistance and, if necessary, supplies of military equipment ... until the USSR proves it is ready to negotiate the withdrawal of its forces from Afghanistan."

There was obviously no question of the Assembly encouraging the continuation of a conflict with no way out; its aim was to ask governments to show clearly that they cannot remain neutral in an affair of such gravity and still less bow down to the Soviet show of strength. Any act of solidarity towards the Afghan rebellion is a serious warning to the Soviet Union, which cannot ignore its self-inflicted isolation, and it

is already more than probable that Poland has benefited from a degree of Soviet patience in recent months which could not have been expected without the backlash of the Afghan resistance movement, because the Soviet Union had no wish to find itself committed on two fronts at the same time and to arouse too strong an international reaction.

### III. *The Iranian-Iraqi conflict*

26. Relations between Iran and Iraq have always been difficult. There has been territorial or ethnic rivalry between Mesopotamia and the nomadic peoples of the Iranian plateau throughout history, but it assumed a new dimension in the twentieth century with the emergence of national states whose territories correspond neither to ethnic groups nor to the different Islamic persuasions. One aspect is the fact that the Kurdish people is divided between Iraqi, Iranian and Turkish territories and all three countries have been tempted to unify this people to their own advantage. In rebellion against Iraq until 1975, the Kurds then had the support of Iran which supplied them with money and weapons. Since 1979, they have been in rebellion against Iran and it is more than likely that Iraq has supplied them with the assistance they require.

27. Moreover, in the Shatt al-Arab region the frontiers between Iraq, Iran and Kuwait are constantly being contested. Indeed, this is the area containing the world's largest oil resources. The distance between Abadan, Basra and Kuwait is no more than 200 km. There is a large population, almost entirely Arab even in Iranian Khuzistan. Consequently, Iraq has never been satisfied with a division which it considers too favourable to Iran and Kuwait. Its sole outlet to the sea is extremely narrow and easily threatened. It believes it represents Arabism in the region, whereas the Khuzistan Arabs form only a minority in the Iranian state, and it questions the legitimacy of the Emirate of Kuwait.

28. The Iranian revolution in 1979 seriously worsened the situation. Most Iraqis are Shiites and could not disregard the establishment of a régime in Iran dominated by Shiite clergy. Moreover, under the 1975 Algiers Agreements, the Shah was powerful enough to impose on Iraq a particularly unfavourable settlement to outstanding issues. In exchange for Iran stopping its assistance to the Kurdish rebellion, Iraq had to relinquish control of the Shatt al-Arab and certain territories on the left bank of the estuary. Even the few portions of territory which Iran should have given it in compensation were never handed over either by the Shah or by Ayatollah Khomeini.

29. In 1980, however, conditions seemed particularly propitious for Iraq to take its revenge. The Iranian Government still refused to apply the provisions of the Algiers Agreements which were not to its own advantage, but the position of the Iranian state had become much weaker: there were rebellions in many regions, particularly Kurdistan, the invasion of Afghanistan made it improbable that Iran would appeal to the Soviet Union and the affair of the American hostages made American assistance to Iran even more unlikely. It was therefore possible to gamble on Iran's isolation, a weakening of its army, whose principal leaders had been exterminated during the revolution, and a weakening of national feeling. This probably explains the Iraqi offensive in November 1980.

30. The aims of the war declared by Iraq were limited. It wanted to move the frontier back to the left bank of the Shatt al-Arab and obtain the return of the territories promised by Iran under the Algiers Agreements and the restitution by Iran to the Sultanates of Ra's al Khaymah and Sharjah of three islands seized on 30th November 1971, in peacetime, by the Shah's Government (Abu Musa, Tomb al-Koubra and Tomb al-Soughra) which are of no economic importance but of potentially considerable strategic importance because they are close to the Strait of Hormuz and could be used to control it. Finally, Iraq demanded that Iran renounce intervention in the internal affairs of Iraq and any other Arab state.

31. In fact, Iraq's underlying motives probably far exceed these aims. Saddam Hussein's Government probably hoped for a total collapse of the Iranian state, thus allowing Iraq to exercise effective control over all the shores of the Gulf. *Inter alia*, Iraq could have hoped that the Arab population, the great majority in the province of Khuzistan (which Iraq calls Arabistan), would revolt against the Iranian régime, either to attach themselves to Iraq or at least to obtain a large degree of autonomy which, by depriving Iran of its oil resources, would have led to that state's complete collapse. Among other advantages, such a success would have to some extent discouraged agitation in Iraqi Shiite circles and strengthened the power of the Baathists.

32. After some initial success, the Iraqi offensive achieved no decisive result. Iraq seems to have had three unpleasant surprises. First, the Iranians proved far more united than might have been expected in defending their national territory. Instead of encouraging dissidence, the war strengthened unified reaction. Second, the army proved far more determined to fight and far more capable of using its modern weapons than had been generally thought. In particular, it was seen that Iran was capable of using the Phantom aircraft which the United

States had delivered to the Shah. Third, without calling on either the United States or the Soviet Union, Iran received the support of a number of Arab countries, including Libya, Algeria, South Yemen and Syria, while the sympathy with Iraq expressed by other Arab states – particularly the Gulf states – was not without reservation since they were not very anxious to have Iraq replace Iran as the protecting power in the region. Only Kuwait and Jordan granted it apparently unreserved support.

33. The result was that the conflict stagnated and became position warfare which was not noticeably changed by the opening of a third front to the north in January 1981 in addition to those of Dezful and Khorramshahr. Such a situation could lead to economic disaster for the two belligerents. Iraqi oil terminals on the Gulf have been at least partly destroyed, as have the Abadan refinery and port. The amount of oil which can be brought out of Northern Iraq through Syria or Turkey is far from sufficient and Iranian oil can no longer reach the international market. This was one of the causes of the considerable rise in oil prices in 1980 and Western Europe would have been short of oil if Saudi Arabia had not made a very valid effort to offset the absence of Iranian and Iraqi oil on the international market. In 1980, of the 957 million tons produced by the Middle East as compared with 1,100 million in 1974, Saudi Arabia supplied 495 million tons, Iraq 138 million, Kuwait 86 million and Iran 74 million, which, in relation to 1974, represented a considerable reduction in output for Iran (300 million tons in 1973) and Kuwait (128 million tons), whereas Iraqi and Saudi Arabian output rose (96 million and 422 million tons respectively). Yet the effects of the Iranian-Iraqi war were not felt until the last two months of the year.

34. It is difficult to assess the damage already caused by the conflict: there was certainly considerable destruction in the area close to the battlefield, but so far neither Iran nor Iraq seems to have wanted to take the risk of all-out war. According to information published at the beginning of March, 22,000 sq.km. of Iranian territory had been occupied by Iraqi forces and Iranian losses were said to be 60,000 dead and 100,000 wounded. One and a half million refugees are reported to have left the battlefield and Iran's foreign currency reserves are said to have fallen from \$11,000 million to \$4,000 million. Iraq appears to be better placed. It is believed to have lost far fewer men and its foreign currency reserves of some \$30,000 million at the outbreak of the conflict have allowed it to procure new weapons and order others for the coming months, particularly from Italy (for its navy) and France (for its air force

and anti-aircraft missiles). Oil installations in the Abadan area seem to have been spared by Iraq, nor has it initiated naval operations in the direction of the islands of the Strait of Hormuz. Iran for its part has not carried out its threats to bomb Kuwait and close the Strait of Hormuz. In other words, although the consequences of the war have so far been limited, the situation may deteriorate seriously if one or other of the belligerents sees no way out other than resorting to extreme methods.

35. However, it is clear that even if Iraq's military successes are decisive it would not be able to control the whole territory of Iran which has a population of 35 million spread over an area of 1,600,000 sq.km., as compared with 12 million over 400,000 sq.km. in the case of Iraq. The Iraqi Government must therefore do its utmost to take even limited advantage of a particularly favourable war situation rather than allow itself to be bogged down in a war which it cannot win. This is no doubt the explanation for the repeated overtures by Mr. Sadam Hussein for starting negotiations. Conversely, although the Iranian Government must fear a prolongation of the conflict because of its economic consequences and the threat to national unity, its ground is not firm enough for it to be able to make major concessions to the enemy. A rapprochement of the points of view of the two sides does not therefore seem impossible but it cannot be achieved immediately. It would consequently make sense to try to call a truce during which negotiations might be held.

36. From Western Europe's point of view, the pursuit of this war involves very serious dangers and may become catastrophic. In fact, there is little likelihood of the war being continued without the two great powers being involved. The release of the American hostages by Iran in January 1981 made it possible for the United States and Iran to draw closer together, and this would inevitably lead, despite the Afghanistan affair, to Iraq drawing closer to the Soviet Union from which it had kept its distance in recent years, in spite of the 1972 treaty of friendship and co-operation between the two states. Such a process does not yet seem to have started, since the Iraqi Communist Party Congress, held in Moscow towards the end of February 1981, clearly condemned the "war of aggression" being waged by Mr. Sadam Hussein. Feeling threatened whether Iraq or Iran wins, the Emirates, which already rely on the West to supply them with modern weapons, may well demand more effective protection. Oman has already authorised the United States to set up a military base on Masirah, an island in the Indian Ocean, to balance the Soviet base on the island of Socotra, which belongs to the People's Republic of Yemen.

Six airports are being made ready in Oman for United States air force C-130 heavy transport aircraft for use in case of need, while the Soviet Union has built submarine shelters in Aden. Finally, destabilisation of the Moslem world would have extremely serious consequences for the entire relationship between Europe and the third world.

37. Western Europe's interests are therefore clear. The conflict must be contained as far as possible and then negotiations held between the two belligerents. Iraq's officially-announced demands might provide a basis for negotiations because they are not exaggerated, but the state of mind prevailing in both Iran and Iraq makes any concession by either government extremely difficult. Only when fighting ability declines will it be possible to negotiate, which means that deliveries of weapons to one or other side run counter to Europe's true interests. The interests of peace call for an international agreement banning all arms deliveries and it is to be regretted that the French Government has started delivering some sixty Mirage F-1 aircraft, admittedly ordered by the Iraqi Government before fighting started, particularly since France has placed an embargo on the delivery of patrol boats ordered during the Shah's régime now being demanded by the new régime. But the Soviet Union is also delivering weapons to Iraq through Saudi and Jordanian ports. If, as some maintain, France had also supplied Iraq with means of acquiring nuclear weapons, it would have assumed extremely grave responsibilities, the consequences of which make one's mind boggle.

38. Of course, a unilateral decision by one country or another not to deliver arms to a Middle Eastern country would be pointless if others took its place. But in the present international situation the fact that neither of the two great powers has yet become involved in the conflict makes it urgent to conclude an agreement between the principal arms producers to ensure respect for a firm embargo on deliveries to Iran and Iraq.

39. Your Rapporteur considers Western Europe can do little more to help to restore peace between these two countries. Memories of the colonial era are so close, national feelings so sensitive and Islamic convictions so strong in both Shi'ite Iran and Sunnite Iraq that any untimely action might well result in more being lost than may be gained. Mediation in whatsoever form would inevitably be seen as interference and any peace in which the West had played a part would be seen as a demonstration of imperialism and hence be suspicious from the outset. Probably all Europe can allow itself to do to help to restore peace is to circumscribe the conflict, oppose interference and prevent deliveries of arms.

#### IV. *The southern shore of the Gulf*

40. There is only one large state on the southern shore of the Gulf: Saudi Arabia, whose coast is almost entirely desert apart from oil installations round Jiddah. But there are a number of small states – Kuwait, the island of Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and the Sultanate of Oman – which all have Arab-type dynastic régimes, i.e. power is in the hands of a family from among whose members the dynasty is appointed and who exercise power collectively, at the same time providing the only opposition with any chance at all of acceding to power. This means that, although crises are frequent, they take place within the reigning family.

41. These dynastic states conform to the old social structure of the Bedouins and no longer correspond at all to the reality of the extremely cosmopolitan societies which sprang up thanks to the oil economy. “Foreigners” make up 90 % of the population of Abu Dhabi and Dubai, 70 % in Qatar, almost as much in Kuwait and 40 % in Saudi Arabia, Oman and Bahrain, and they represent an even higher percentage of the working population and the army.

42. Most Emirs have tried to allow the whole indigenous population to share the benefits derived from oil, but the move from a nomadic civilisation to wealth has encountered many social, economic, political and psychological difficulties to which no solution seems to have yet been found. In the best of cases, they have established a more or less enlightened despotism, although attempts at a constitution, with the establishment of an elected parliament, were made in Kuwait in 1962 and Bahrain in 1973. In fact, in both cases the constitution had to be suspended in 1976 and 1975 respectively, and in any event it did not meet the aspirations of a population, the foreign or Shiite majority of which had no political rights. There was no political campaign for the new elections in Kuwait in February 1981. Only 42,000 persons were asked to vote. In fact, Emirs everywhere have had to set up what amount to dictatorships to protect themselves against Islamic revolutionary movements, whether of a traditional or “socialist” nature. Strikes are banned everywhere: the fact that the great majority of workers are foreign allows mass expulsions if necessary. This is what happened in 1979 to 5,000 Indians employed in Kuwait.

43. The Emirates have formed armies with the most up-to-date equipment procured in western countries, composed mainly of mercenaries who are hence insensitive to the various currents flowing through the Arab world. For

instance, 80 % of the armed forces of the Arab Emirates are of Baluchi origin with Jordanian officers. Furthermore, there are groups of South Korean or Taiwanese “workers” quartered and organised on military lines so that they may serve if necessary as auxiliaries with the “national” armed forces in the event of trouble.

44. In March 1981 representatives of six Arab countries in the Gulf area, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman and the United Arab Emirates, meeting in Muscat, decided to take measures for their common security. These measures are directed against Soviet expansion towards the Gulf and any steps the West might take to safeguard its oil supplies. They decided to set up a joint co-operation council in the political, economic, cultural and social fields. However, the forces they are capable of mustering to defend a total area of 2,200,000 sq.km., including the world’s largest oil reserves, number only 110,000 men, admittedly equipped with the most sophisticated weapons, but they have no personnel trained to use them. These weapons are moreover of various origins. The 47,000 Saudi Arabian troops – to whom should be added 35,000 national guards – are equipped with 130 aircraft and 360 tanks, all of American or French origin, and 76 warships. Kuwait’s 14,000 men have 280 tanks, 50 combat aircraft and 43 warships, all of American or French origin, like the tanks, aircraft and 38 warships with which the 5,000 men from Qatar are equipped and those of the 3,000 men from Bahrain, whereas the Omani army, which has 15,000 troops, has mainly British equipment. Finally, the United Arab Emirates’ 27,000 men have 24 combat aircraft, 45 armoured vehicles and 15 warships of various origins.

45. There should however be no illusions about the relative importance of these forces: the fact that they are scattered and the inadequate maintenance and diverse origins of their weapons give them only limited effectiveness. They would not be in a position to offer any effective resistance to a Soviet advance towards the Strait of Hormuz and it is to be feared that they are meant to meet internal threats rather than external dangers.

46. However, in the last decade there has been an increase in the number of incidents and rebellions in this area. After a long civil war, the southern part of Yemen broke off from the Sultanate to become the Democratic Republic of Yemen, supported and armed by the Soviet Union for which it provides a military base. It has become a centre of subversion whose effects are felt throughout the Arabian peninsula and in East Africa. A permanent military installation on the island of Socotra

allows the Soviet Union to be present at the entrance to the Red Sea. In Oman, two rebellions broke out, one supported by South Yemen in the west of the country and the other in Dhufar. The Shah's army had to intervene before Sultan Qaboos managed to stifle this twofold insurrection. Demonstrations claiming to be in the name of Arab unity have taken place in several Emirates and have been severely repressed. But since the Iranian revolution the Shiites have also been taking part in disturbances in Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrein and Saudi Arabia. Everywhere they have been cruelly repressed. Finally, the affair of the great mosque at Mecca showed that the Saudi régime was also contested by certain fundamentalist circles. Although the Koran is the constitution of the Saudi state, here too there is a break between political power and religious authorities, apparently coupled with rivalry between the inhabitants of the Hedjaz and the ruling family who are Wahabites. The feeling of unity prevailing in the Arab world is better defended today by "Arab socialist" factions or even by fundamentalists than by the Emirs' supporters. The main obstacle to Arab unity in this area is the evolution of the Emirates towards a European-type dynastic system, i.e. towards monarchical states and the creation of nations, and the Emirs would probably have to be removed before any deep-rooted change could be introduced.

47. So far, the West has found its best contacts and its best allies in the Arabian peninsula among the Emirs. In particular, they are the most understanding when there are differences over oil prices, and it is quite natural for the western countries to try to come to terms with the established authorities and not to favour rebel forces. However, it is probably not in Europe's true interest to join its cause with that of a political system which may soon become obsolete. If the Emirs are threatened, they may try to outbid the opposition in nationalism at the expense of western interests. There are many pointers to this already, particularly in the wording of the Muscat Agreement in February.

48. Europe's policy in the region must therefore be most cautious. It must not seem too closely linked with that of the United States which, rightly or wrongly, has been denounced by the pan-Arab movements as being the principal opponent of Arabism. It must certainly not anticipate events but observe them and draw the consequences. Only a more equitable sharing of wealth and a balanced development of economies and societies can make the Arabian peninsula a reliable partner. Since the countries in the region need Europe for their equipment and transformation, they may prove to be prepared to negotiate long-term agree-

ments for the exploitation and sale of their oil and for lasting economic co-operation. Endorsing political structures which are condemned by an already well-advanced development of society can but lead to disturbances such as the West encountered in Iran and they might be even more serious if the Soviet Union, already present, proves more skilful at taking advantage of the situation.

## V. Conclusions

49. At the close of this too brief analysis of an extremely complex situation involving forces about which we still know little and which our systems of reference and assessment cannot manage to grasp, it seems very difficult to draw real conclusions, i.e. to define a possible European policy. Nevertheless, a few principles may be defined which might govern such a policy.

50(i) Any intervention in the affairs of the region, whether direct or indirect, may have repercussions of a magnitude impossible to foresee. It is not for Europe to endorse or oppose any political forces within the Arab or Islamic world. Any permanent military presence also involves dangers. For the immediate security of the area it may be necessary for the states to set up bases there, but it is probably not in the interests of the West as a whole for Europe's cause to be too obviously linked with that of the United States, both where Pakistan is concerned and with regard to Iran, Iraq or the Gulf countries, although, in view of the Soviet threat and the invasion of Afghanistan, a concerted European-United States policy seems essential.

51(ii) Conversely, any intervention by outside countries in the countries round the Gulf would affect Europe's security and call for an extremely firm reaction from the Western European countries.

52(iii) This is at present the case for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It is in line with Europe's vocation to assist resistance by the Afghan people by every available means, whether diplomatic or economic, or even by supplying appropriate weapons, until the Soviet Union consents to start negotiations leading to the total withdrawal of its forces from Afghanistan. The fact that in February 1981 President Reagan announced his intention to supply arms to the Afghan resistance movement is no reason for Europe not to do the same. Quite the reverse, it would be even more necessary to demonstrate common action in face of Soviet aggression if Europe maintains a cautious and reserved stand in regard to the area's internal affairs. This would clearly indicate that Soviet

intervention, and not the struggle for power in Afghanistan, is the sole reason for Europe's reaction.

53(iv) Hostilities between states in the region threaten Europe's security, indirectly at least, and if it cannot avoid them it must do its utmost to contain them, prevent them leading to intervention by third powers and encourage anything which may help to restore peace.

54(v) This applies in particular to the conflict between Iran and Iraq. While diplomatic action for an early cease-fire must remain discreet so as not to offend the national feelings of the belligerents, it is essential for Europe to initiate negotiations between arms exporting countries with a view to banning all supplies of arms and military equipment to the belligerents.

55(vi) While Europe should seek to develop its trade with the oil-producing countries in order to help them to obtain the agricultural, industrial or commercial equipment they need, it must avoid encouraging the accumulation of armaments in countries close to the Gulf.

56(vii) While it is in the interests of each European country to concert its policy in the Gulf area with that of its partners, it is probably not desirable for the West to present itself to the countries in the region as a political or military bloc, and this therefore precludes the establishment of any kind of integrated intervention

force by the western countries. In this respect there seems to be more to be lost than gained from President Reagan's proposals in this sense to certain European countries in February 1981. Indeed, they might lead to the European countries being involved in a policy with which they disagreed without thereby improving consultations.

57(viii) Conversely, close consultations between Western Europe and the new United States Administration seem essential on two matters directly relating to peace in the Gulf area:

- (a) a rational energy policy should be worked out by the whole western world with a view to limiting fluctuations in oil prices and achieving a reduction in the use of oil by the western economies at an early date so that Europe does not remain over-dependent on the Middle East;
- (b) the process for establishing the conditions for a true peace in Palestine should be revived, account being taken of the rights of all concerned. Until peace is achieved, the West will have the utmost difficulty in avoiding involvement in the conflict in spite of itself and maintaining a relationship of conflict-free co-operation with the Arab world.

*European security and events in the Gulf area*

**AMENDMENTS 1, 2, 3 and 4<sup>1</sup>**  
*tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett*

1. After the fifth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert:  
“ Deploring, in condemning Israel’s air attack on Baghdad, the resultant increase in tension throughout the whole Middle East which reduces the credibility of the West, especially of the United States, in seeking to provide compromise solutions to intractable problems in the area ;”.
2. After paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, insert :  
“ Furnish substantial economic aid to Pakistan in order to help it to receive refugees on its territory without unacceptable social and economic damage to its own economy and also provide that country with the armaments it urgently needs for its own security ;”.
3. After paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, insert :  
“ Offer active support to all efforts made by the countries of the area to assume collectively their own security and envisage giving them a unilateral European or western guarantee for their independence, if so requested ;”.
4. After paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, insert :  
“ Express its condemnation of any aggression against countries in the area, and propose that the United Nations use appropriate sanctions against any aggressor whatsoever. ”.

*Signed: Bennett*

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1. See 6th Sitting, 18th June 1981 (Amendments 1 and 4 agreed to ; Amendments 2 and 3 amended and agreed to).



*European security and events in the Gulf area*

AMENDMENT 5<sup>1</sup>  
*tabled by MM. Blaauw and Vohrer*

5. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, after “ assistance ” insert “ in particular in the political and humanitarian field ”.

*Signed: Blaauw, Vohrer*

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1. See 6th Sitting, 18th June 1981 (Amendment withdrawn).

*European security and events in the Gulf area*

## ADDENDUM

*submitted by Sir Frederic Bennett,  
Chairman of the General Affairs Committee*

## I. Foreword

1. Mr. Forni was authorised by the Presidential Committee of the Assembly to make a journey in the Gulf area in order to obtain the information necessary for up-dating the report for which he had already been made responsible. The Chairman of the Committee was also planning to accompany Mr. Forni on his own behalf. However, the French elections of April, May and June made it impossible for Mr. Forni to fulfil his proposed mission. Consequently, the Presidential Committee agreed that the Chairman of the General Affairs Committee should be responsible for collecting information about the situation in the area and report to the Assembly. He is thus now required to present his own views on the question since the report by Mr. Forni has already been adopted by the General Affairs Committee. For these reasons the present report dealing with the most recent aspects of the situation is being presented by the Chairman of the Committee in addition to Mr. Forni's report.

2. The short time available allowed the Chairman of the Committee to visit only three countries, chosen for their involvement in recent events in the Middle East and South-West Asia: Pakistan, Kuwait and Jordan. He was able, with the kind assistance of the national authorities of those countries, to meet a broad spectrum of persons who provided him with much relevant and direct information. In addition to officials of the three countries visited, he also met a number of Afghan refugees.

3. In the context of Mr. Forni's report, members of WEU are invited to recall previous reports on the situation in the Middle East and South-West Asia, namely Documents 820, 844 and 855, since some parts of these in substance and in regard to the adopted recommendations have much relevance to the present state of affairs in these areas and some are highly topical as revealed in the following extracts from Document 820 presented by Sir Frederic Bennett *before* the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan:

"5. Western Europe cannot remain indifferent to developments in the Middle East. Any growth in the Soviet military

presence in that area would be liable to endanger the southern flank of the Atlantic Alliance system and help to isolate Turkey. The security and economy of Western Europe, the world's leading oil importer, depend on supplies of oil which can come only from the Middle East, which produces 35 % of the world's oil and is by far the leading exporting region. The 1973 crisis showed the close relationship which exists between peace and stability in that area and world prices for oil, on which the West's economy and security largely depend. Finally, the situation in the Middle East and its rôle in the world economy make it a particularly sensitive area in which there is a risk of any tension having unforeseeable repercussions on peace and balance throughout the world."

and from Mr. Hardy's report, Document 855, after the invasion of Afghanistan:

"68. The invasion of Afghanistan may be viewed from two standpoints: increasing Soviet power and the Soviet threat in Asia. The deployment of Soviet forces closer to the Strait of Hormuz and the Indian Ocean makes it materially possible for the Soviet Union to intervene in the Near and Middle East, at least by air. However, the invasion of Afghanistan has many worrying repercussions for the Soviet Union, both in the East and in Europe. In fact, all the Moslem countries, including those which are not at present on friendly terms with the West, have become extremely sensitive to the Soviet threat and are anxious not to come under the Soviet area of influence, having seen clearly from the Afghanistan affair that their independence would be endangered if they came under Soviet protection or even had communists participate in their governments since such participation seems liable to make these countries subject to the Brezhnev doctrine, as was the case in Afghanistan."

4. Except insofar as socially and domestically, in political and economic terms, there are some improvements to record, e.g. Pakistan's

internal economic situation, and limited but significant steps towards a more democratic régime than a couple of years ago (elections at municipal level have taken place and the civilian element in the Cabinet has been much strengthened – now fifteen out of twenty, plus three retired army officers and only two on the active list) and also national elections albeit with a restricted voting electorate have been held in Kuwait, it is a sad fact that overall in international terms the situation throughout the whole area concerned has markedly, indeed dangerously, deteriorated.

## II. *Consequences of the invasion of Afghanistan*

5. It is now possible to assess more accurately than last year the true nature of Soviet policy in Afghanistan. Your Rapporteur refers you to previous General Affairs Committee documents on that question, especially his own reports (Documents 820 and 844) and the report submitted by Mr. Hardy at the last session of the Assembly (Document 855) since the views expressed there are more than confirmed, and indeed highlighted, by what he has seen now. He especially reminds you of the following paragraphs, presented to the Assembly in Document 820, adopted in November 1979, one month before the massive Soviet invasion in December:

“ 149. Afghanistan long preserved a precarious independence as a buffer state between Russia and Imperial British India. When Britain left the scene Pakistan was too weak to take over the United Kingdom's rôle. Indeed, because of large numbers of Pathans living on both sides of a frontier only in name, Pakistan has had all its work cut out to hold on to its own territorial integrity along the famous North-West Frontier. The United States attempted to take Britain's place both by supporting Pakistan and affording direct aid, mostly economic, to the Kabul Government. However, as to the latter, it was never a full commitment and never approached the extent of Russian assistance. As to the former, because of successive Indo-Pakistan conflicts, the United States decided that it was not worth offending India, even to maintain, let alone increase, its protective rôle in regard to Pakistan. That position obtains today and Rawalpindi now looks to Peking as its chief ally. But China is neither strong enough nor near enough to act as a counterweight against Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. So this small country, despite strong resistance by a major-

ity of its fiercely proud and independent Muslim tribesmen, is facing (unless the Soviet Union as some commentators predict, finds it has bitten off more than it can chew, except at disproportionate cost) ultimate subjection by, and absorption into, the Soviet Empire, as yet another so-called “ autonomous people's republic ”.

150. If this should happen, the next step would be dangerous indeed to western and most especially European vital interests. It is known that within a decade the Soviet Union will need to become a net importer of oil on a considerable scale.

151. Only a weak and divided Pakistan now stands between Russia and direct access to the Gulf area. With a huge and growing naval fleet in being, especially if by then the “ festering sore ” in Arab-western relations – the fate of the Palestinians – has not been satisfactorily dealt with, it would not be too long before a predominant Soviet presence in the area would exercise a decisive influence on the supply of oil that Europe so desperately needs to maintain let alone increase the standard of living of its own peoples.

.....

153. However, the Americans and the Europeans could do much to delay if not altogether to halt them by increasing not only economic aid but also defensive arms to Pakistan, and – no less important – showing greater understanding for that unhappy country's many difficulties. The excuse used in the past to curtail support for Pakistan – namely that this posed a threat to India with the risk of the latter turning to the Soviet Union for help – is certainly not valid today. The thought that a nation of four distinct ethnic groups, Punjabis, Sindis, Baluchis and Pathans, rift with internal divisions and living with the loss of half its original nation-state, now Bangladesh, taking on India, a country many times its size, about twenty times its population, with greatly superior armed forces in numbers and equipment and infinitely greater industrial resources is laughable.”

6. It is now clear that the Soviet invasion was not the result of an immediate reaction to the troubles under the Taraki régime, but one move in a long-term plan to bring a large part, if not all, of South-West Asia under Russian control. A special single military command has been created in the southern part of Soviet

Asia, including an air force and 44 divisions, nine of which are involved in Afghanistan. The resistance of the Afghan population forced them to afford increasing support to the Afghan army which lost two-thirds of its numbers, especially through mass desertion, for the control of the mainland. They are deployed towards the frontiers of Afghanistan, two of them westwards, at the Iranian border, seven eastwards, along the 1,800 km border of Pakistan, with a large number of forces in the north-east in the strip of Afghan territory between China and Pakistan. The 35,000 men remaining in the Afghan army are used for internal operations with the assistance of Soviet aircraft, helicopters and tanks.

7. The two divisions deployed along the south-west border of Afghanistan in the direction of Baluchistan and the Indian Ocean formed a very important base in the territory they occupied. It is crystal-clear that their aim was not to bolster up the Communist régime in Afghanistan, but to threaten the Hormuz Strait and ultimately to invade Baluchistan.

8. It seems that the Soviets have now given up the hopeless task of controlling the population of mountain villages and they use all possible means, including gas and napalm, for destroying the villages and compelling people to abandon their homes and land in order to concentrate them, if they are not able to cross a frontier as refugees, around the cities where it is less difficult to control them. Large parts of the Afghan mainland are thus fast being turned into desert.

9. Your Rapporteur was unable to obtain reliable information about the situation on the Iranian border. Estimates of the number of Afghan refugees in that country have given figures between 500,000 and 1,500,000 which makes it difficult to form an accurate view of the situation there. In Pakistan, 2,100,000 refugees are living along the border. This number increases on average by 80,000 to 100,000 each month. This is a very heavy economic and financial burden for the Pakistani government and nation since Pakistan is still a poor country although its economy has developed at a remarkable rate in recent years.

10. There appear to be two kinds of refugees, many of them homeless peoples whose villages have been destroyed by Soviet missiles and napalm. Others are the families of the Mujaheddin fighting on Afghan territory. They crossed the border to escape terrible retaliation by the Afghan army. This means that, even if the Soviet troops evacuate Afghan territory which for the time being seems highly unlikely, the first category of refugees would not be able simply to return to their former villages and would continue to be a heavy burden for both

Pakistan and Afghanistan. Whereas much welcome humanitarian aid in foodstuffs, tents, etc. has come on a continuing basis from external sources, UNHCR, Red Cross, the EEC and bilateral grants from friendly countries, Pakistan needs more help now since necessary aid was calculated on an assumption of 600,000 to a maximum of 1,000,000. The figure is now more than double the latter total. Moreover Pakistan itself has taken on the burden of cash aid for incidental living expenses of \$ 5 a month per refugee equalling now some \$ 12,600,000 per annum, a huge sum for a new and poor country.

11. The presence of refugees, generally speaking well-accepted by the tribes on both sides of the frontier, also presents a political and military danger for the stability of Pakistan since the Soviets are constantly exerting pressure on the Pakistani authorities for them to seal their frontier with Afghanistan in order to isolate the refugees from the Mujaheddin fighting inside Afghanistan. On seven occasions, Pakistani territory has been violated, shelled and bombed in order to increase that pressure. The Pakistani army is not strong enough to exercise effective control along a 1,800 km frontier and at the same time ensure the security of the country. Men are available but the Pakistani government can only equip and arm about 500,000. Much of their armament is becoming obsolete since Pakistan does not receive military aid from other countries and does not have the financial means necessary to modernise its army.

12. Account should also be taken of the fact that most of the refugees belong to tribes living partly on Pakistani territory. This makes it impossible for any Pakistani government to use its armed forces against the refugees it unwillingly received since they merge with its own citizens in the border regions. All it can do to ease Soviet pressure is to deny the use of its territory for the transport of armaments sent by other countries to the Afghan Mujaheddin.

13. In the short term the Pakistanis do not consider a Soviet invasion very probable. Their fear is far more that Soviet pressure may leave them in a very weak position in face of Indian claims. The Indian army is being steadily increased and modernised and has recently signed contracts for United States guns and anti-tank missiles, French Mirage 2000 aircraft and German submarines, but for the time being it is mainly equipped with weapons purchased from the Soviet Union. The Indian army has 38 divisions, 33 of them deployed westwards against Pakistan and 5 northwards against China. Military intervention by India against Pakistan may be possible in the near future but this would have to be before the

Pakistan army improves its armaments and before the United States rapid deployment force re-establishes a balance in the Indian Ocean or the Gulf area. This will probably be achieved in 1983. Until then, and especially between September 1981 and May 1982, when the Himalaya passes will be closed by snow and India will be protected from any Chinese retaliation, Pakistan's security and independence will be passing through a period of potential crisis on its western and/or eastern frontiers.

14. Pakistan well knows that it cannot hope for any military intervention by western forces and that its security is in its own hands. It also knows that the neutralisation of Pakistan would constitute a new and decisive step in the Soviet advance towards the Indian Ocean and the Gulf which would also place the Soviets in a position where they might be able to cut Europe and the western world off from their sources of oil and to intervene directly in the Arab world. Pakistan also very much needs assistance from the European countries as follows:

- (i) humanitarian aid for the Afghan refugees;
- (ii) economic aid to improve its economy so as to sustain the cost of the refugees in consumer items, especially extra grazing, if further hardship is not to be inflicted on the local people;
- (iii) very urgent military aid, especially modern anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles, in order to hold out during their two years of potential crisis without suffering the consequences of rising interest rates in all the western world.

15. As the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, recently underlined "Pakistan, together with the other Islamic countries, has worked tirelessly to promote a solution in accordance with the principles endorsed by the international community. The rôle has often been a rather lonely one. I admire the way in which Pakistan has played it, under difficult circumstances."

16. On the other hand, insofar as western countries consider that the Afghan Mujaheddin "will not abandon their determination to be free" they have the moral obligation to give them the means to pursue their heroic resistance. Recent accounts of events in Afghanistan are a list of victories by the Mujaheddin, now able to destroy Soviet helicopters and tanks on the battlefield, burn Russian aircraft on the Kabul airport and win battles against armed forces of one or two thousand men in the Afghan valleys. Those victories have been

won without yet receiving any substantial help from foreign countries, but, in the main, with Soviet arms confiscated on the battlefield or brought by deserting Afghan units. Even if Pakistan refuses, understandably, to be used as a base for the Afghan resistance, there are other ways of providing the Mujaheddin the means they have requested. Your Rapporteur recalls that in both 1981 and 1979, when he asked refugees who received from the Pakistani government a subsidy of about \$ 5 per month what more they needed, they unanimously answered that they only needed arms for fighting again.

### III. *The Gulf area*

17. If we now consider recent events in the Gulf area and the neighbouring Arab countries, it appears that uncertainty about their near future has never been so great. Indeed the Russian invasion of Afghanistan and the deployment of Soviet forces and especially air forces at a relatively short distance from the Indian Ocean creates a new situation in which it is more likely that the USSR will now be able to intervene directly in the region.

18. But, at the same time Israel's evolution seems to give it more opportunities than ever to do so.

19. Another political uncertainty is how the Tudeh communist party is playing an increasingly significant, even a decisive, rôle in the internal struggles in Iran and to take under its control, albeit indirectly, the administration, if not yet the army, is one clear aim.

20. Paradoxically, Tudeh has used as its machinery the most fanatical Islamic elements to infiltrate all organs of government and destroy any coherence in President Bani-Sadr's effective rule that threatens the ultimate development of yet another Soviet satellite.

21. These Islamic elements, theoretically anti-communist, do not seem yet to realise how, through organisational and financial covert support, they are being manipulated by strongly anti-religious communists who at any time will discard their strange bed-fellows and stage a classic Soviet-pattern takeover.

22. The stalemate in the war between Iraq and Iran also creates a situation where external intervention is increasingly likely to become the follow-up of a long drawn-out war.

23. For the time being, the initiatives taken by the Secretary General of the United Nations as well as by the Islamic nations for building foundations for negotiations between the two countries are progressing very slowly, if at all,

and neither of the two régimes seems to be strong enough to survive the political setback involved in what could be popularly exploited as a defeat.

24. Western countries are in neither a military nor a political position to allow them to become possible mediators. Only the USSR has enough political and military strength in the area to allow it to impose its views.

25. Moreover, the Israeli attack against the nuclear reactor Osirak near Baghdad has created a new situation in the area, because no country can now feel secure against becoming the next victim of such aggression. It is especially so in the case of Pakistan where the development of nuclear plants is still under way. It is also true for every Arab country in the area. Even in the most moderate Arab countries like Kuwait or Jordan your Rapporteur has been told by representative and reliable personalities that the Israeli threat was considered as more immediate and dangerous than the Soviet one. It means that all the countries in the area are now inclined to deal with the USSR if this holds out some hope of thus obtaining the guarantees they need against the Israeli aggression they fear.

26. Western nations are not yet in a position to offer those countries any alternative. They have not and are not likely soon to have enough forces in the area to deter Soviet action directly. Their only means would be to announce the globalisation of their reaction in the event of Soviet intervention. This means retaliating by taking advantage of their stronger position in other regions, e.g. in regard to Cuba. For obvious reasons, the future American rapid deployment force for some considerable time ahead cannot become a real counterweight to the Soviet divisions and air forces deployed in the south of the Soviet Union, even if it ultimately finds countries which welcome it.

27. The Israelis used against Iraq aircraft recently purchased in the United States without suffering more than an expression of disapproval from the United States, even after having promised not to use those aircraft, except for purely defensive actions. This arouses among all Islamic countries suspicions that there is full complicity between the American administration and Israel. The postponement of the delivery of four more aircraft of the type used against Iraq has not affected the critical Arab point of view and appears to be a minuscule response to the act of war committed by Israel. It means that for the time being no country in the area, not even Pakistan, is able to negotiate any defensive agreement with the United States, and even more explicitly to admit the presence of American forces on their soil.

This fact obviously restricts considerably the possibility of maintaining an American force in the area.

28. For the time being, European nations can take advantage of much greater confidence on the part of the Islamic countries of the region. The fact that the Nine acted unanimously in the past year for the restoration of a general and balanced peace agreement between Israel and the Arab nations, including the Palestinians, even if it did not produce many concrete results, has given the countries in the area the feeling that Europeans understand their problems better than Americans and that we at least genuinely try to re-establish peace and justice in the region. It may be of some interest to remember that our Assembly played a substantial rôle in persuading the European governments to initiate such an action, especially when it adopted in December 1979 a recommendation urging the Council to "Use its best endeavours... to promote a broader-based conference than Camp David including representation from *all* countries directly involved in the Palestinian dispute."

29. This does not mean that the Arab countries, and Pakistan, hope that the European countries may use their military forces for fighting either the Israelis or Soviet-inclined forces. What they hope to obtain from Europe far more is a moral, political and even also some material support. On the moral level, they feel themselves terribly frustrated by their helpless situation in face of Israel's military capabilities and deeply insulted by the recent aggression against Iraq. They hope that European countries will contribute not only to condemnation of the aggressor but also to more practical measures to deter future action of the same sort. On the political level, they want the Europeans discreetly to help *their* efforts for opening peace negotiations between Iran and Iraq. On the material level, they need European technology to improve their economic capabilities as well as modern defensive armaments to enable them to resist any aggression.

30. Thus is not in Europe's interest to appear in that region as being too closely identified with American policy-making. This does not of course mean that European countries should dissociate themselves from the United States. Consultation and co-operation between the NATO countries is more necessary than ever, even on the Middle East issues, in order to promote not just effective but objective action.

31. However, insofar as the United States is involved in policies which do not contribute to a just, peaceful solution of the actual conflicts in the area and to the deterrence of Soviet intervention, it is up to the Europeans to promote such policies, if possible in consultation

with their American allies but not constrained. For they can neither alienate their own interests and their goals because of an American policy of which they would not approve, nor can they afford to support a military enterprise able definitively to alienate the Arab countries as it is presently likely to be the case in regard to an American rapid deployment force entailing the use of land forces on their soil.

32. In Pakistan as well as in the Gulf area, it appears that the countries of the region are more and more inclined to take full responsibility for their own destiny, with western help welcomed but not uninvited intervention. The creation of a Council of the Gulf countries, even if it deals mainly with economic affairs, consolidates one demonstration of that will. Pakistan's determination to resist aggression and wishes expressed by them and by different countries to purchase in Europe a larger part than hitherto of the armaments they need for their security, because European countries are not likely to intervene in the area, are other signs of these tendencies. The best way to encourage such an evolution would of course be for the West to give separate and/or collective guarantees for the stability of the area but not on a pact basis. For mutual pact arrangements of the past completely collapsed and countries of the Middle East would not and could not afford to revive such treaties, at least not as long as they do not share the same views about priorities as the West. Unilateral guarantees from the West would give significance to their efforts to unite their forces and resist external intervention. No outside country can force them not to deal with the USSR in order to safeguard their security, but pledges of western support if called upon can help to convince them that flirtations with the USSR may be a very dangerous way to achieve their security goals. Such policies as outlined that do not constitute an intervention in their own affairs would strengthen their resolution to deal with the problems in the area and to resist outside pressure.

33. Your Rapporteur's recent journey in that region has convinced him that there is now an urgent need to restore the confidence in the West that the Middle East and Gulf countries have lost. At present only Europeans are in a position to play the rôle and thereby contribute to deterring the obvious expansionist moves the Soviets have initiated with their invasion of Afghanistan and apparently are prepared to follow up in other directions, e.g. in the south-east by the disintegration and eventually the disappearance of Pakistan as an independent state, and in the south-west by penetrating politically the Gulf countries and profiting from the present disqualification of the Americans because of their current apparent unconditional

support for Israel's expansionist policies, thus taking advantage of Arab frustrations, which are now socially explosive.

#### IV. *Conclusions*

34. There has long existed, on a continuing trend, a misunderstanding in Washington, and to a lesser extent, too, in certain circles in Europe, about the basic attitudes of not only the governments but also the peoples of most if not all the countries of the Middle East and the Gulf area, including Pakistan, in their assessment of the multifold dangers that exist today threatening both their political and territorial integrity.

35. It is said over and over again by those on both sides of the Atlantic to whom the wish is father to the thought firstly that whatever "moderate" Arab leaders may say in public their chief anxieties arise in the context of Soviet communist expansionism and that fears of Israeli imperialism are much less present in their minds.

36. This has never been so since the first Arab-Israeli military conflict in 1949, irrespective of the responsibility for the beginning of the still-continuing hostility between Israel and its Arab neighbours and the latter's associates throughout the Middle East and indeed further afield.

37. Israel's recent attack on Iraq has not created, only accentuated, a widespread belief throughout Arab countries that in fact, while apprehensions about Soviet intentions in the area are real, the chief preoccupations of Arab leaders, moderate and immoderate, and their peoples concern Israeli and not Soviet ambitions. Similarly, although to a much lesser extent, Pakistani determination to resist Soviet encroachments on their independence does not alter the reality of their fears and doubts about Indian intentions.

38. Former Indian Foreign Minister Mr. Desai has honestly admitted that when in office he was invited to "manufacture" a pretext for an Indian attack on Pakistan to force the adoption of policies, in Islamabad, less strongly committed to resistance of Soviet expansionism in South-West Asia.

39. To his credit Mr. Desai said "no" but no one is certain whether the same question has more recently been put to Mrs. Gandhi and if so what her answer has been.

40. In any case the fact today is that Pakistan feels constrained to keep 14 of its total 18 divisions on its eastern border facing 33 Indian divisions (5 only of the latter army being

deployed on their border with China) leaving only 4 Pakistani divisions to guard its long frontier – 1,800 kms – with Russian-occupied Afghanistan.

41. Reverting to the situation in Arabia, Mr. Forni indicates in his report and Lord Carrington freely admitted in the speech already quoted that Europe's Middle East policies should be complementary to but not identical with that of the United States. Your Rapporteur found the countries he visited attributed such a special rôle to Europe. Israeli aggression against Iraq with aircraft furnished by the United States, which occurred during your Rapporteur's visit to those countries, and the United States' reaction to this event, generally regarded as inadequate, after this act of war against an Arab country, contribute to making it even more difficult if not impossible for any Arab country for the foreseeable future to co-operate with the United States and hence to receive on its national territory any American military force.

42. To summarise, it appears to your Rapporteur that all those he met considered that the security of the area could be assured only by the area's own forces. It does not mean that they do not need or desire help but it does mean that no external country or group of countries is able to take global responsibility for the defence of the region. The grouping of the Gulf states in an economic community is probably a first significant step towards the people of the region taking over responsibility for their own destiny. The rôle of European countries could be to persuade the United States, by taking initiatives themselves, not to intervene in the area but to give useful assistance to the countries concerned, especially if they try to join forces to assume the most effective responsibility for their collective security. In that case, the western countries could be able to give a guarantee to the stability of the region that they could not give to separate states, each of them possibly pursuing differing national aims.

43. To consider a situation such as was created by the conflict between Iraq and Iran, it is obvious that no direct intervention by any western country can help to find a reasonable solution. Useful action can be taken only by other Islamic countries. If western countries fail to recognise that reality, perhaps the Soviets will find an opportunity to exploit the Arab countries' feeling of frustration, especially after their most recent humiliation at the hands of the Israelis, in order to put themselves forward as the peace-restoring country in the Middle East, with all the political and economic advantages they could obtain in that event.

44. Insofar as American policy in the Middle East seems to be essentially influenced by concern for the security of Israel, as has been made clearer than ever by the United States' mild reaction to the use of American aircraft for the air attack on Baghdad, the rôle of the European countries should be to remind them that such a policy may be self-defeating. This applies even to Israel, because the West is in no position to resist direct Soviet intervention, sustained by people of the area, even with an American rapid deployment force based in reluctant host countries. The security of Israel can be secured only by the establishment of real, i.e. negotiated and mutually-accepted, peace between the Arab nations, including the Palestinians, and this must mean giving them a homeland in Palestine.

45. In regard to Pakistan and Afghanistan, the need to reinforce the former's economic stability intrinsically and because of the appalling burden of sustaining well over 2,000,000 refugees – a number which is growing daily – and to reinforce Pakistan's ability to defend itself militarily against aggression from any source has been stressed already in the substance of this report and only needs now to be re-emphasised as a matter of urgency.



**DRAFT REVISED BUDGET OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE  
OF THE ASSEMBLY FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1981<sup>1</sup>**

*submitted on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration<sup>2</sup>  
by Mr. Adriaensens, Chairman and Rapporteur*

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*Summary of revised estimates for the financial year 1981*

Details	Initial estimates	Difference	Revised estimates
<i>Head I</i> : Expenditure for staff .....	6,883,000	(-) 84,000	6,799,000
<i>Head II</i> : Expenditure relating to temporary personnel .....	1,920,000	-	1,920,000
<i>Head III</i> : Expenditure on premises and equipment	383,000	-	383,000
<i>Head IV</i> : General administrative costs .....	1,526,000	(+) 17,000	1,543,000
<i>Head V</i> : Other expenditure .....	1,000,000	-	1,000,000
<i>Head VI</i> : Pensions .....	106,000	-	106,000
TOTAL EXPENDITURE .....	11,818,000	(-) 67,000	11,751,000
TOTAL RECEIPTS .....	460,000	-	460,000
NET TOTAL .....	11,358,000	(-) 67,000	11,291,000

1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee and approved by the Presidential Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee:* Mr. Adriaensens (Chairman); Mr. Jager (Vice-Chairman); MM. Ahrens, Althammer, Depietri, Fletcher (Alternate: *Urwin*), Lord Hughes, MM. Jeambrun, Krieps (Alternate: *Berchem*), Martino, Orione

(Alternate: *Vahante*), Peeters, Petrilli (Alternate: *Conti Persini*), Schleiter, Schulte, Smith, Sprung, Stainton (Alternate: *Lord Reay*), Tripodi, Tummers, Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

**Head I – Expenditure for Staff***Sub-Head 1*

## SALARIES OF PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT

*Revised estimate: F 5,051,000**(a) Basic salaries**Revised estimate: F 5,029,000**Initial estimate: F 5,172,000**Net decrease: F 143,000*

Rank	WEU Grade	No.	Total <sup>1</sup> F
The Clerk .....	Hors cadre	1	354,000 <sup>2</sup>
Senior Counsellors .....	A6 <sup>3</sup>	2	629,000
Counsellors .....	A5	3	903,000
First Secretaries .....	A4	2	516,000
Secretary .....	A3	2 <sup>4</sup>	407,000
Secretaries-Translators/Publications Administrative Assistant/Assistant Translator	A2	3	517,000
Chief Accountant .....	B6	1	171,000
Personal Assistants .....	B4	4	518,000
Bilingual Shorthand Typists .....	B3	6	638,000
Switchboard Operator .....	B3	1	111,000
Head Roneo-Storekeeper .....	C6	1	103,000
Messengers .....	C4 <sup>5</sup>	2	162,000
		28	5,029,000

*(b) Recruitment of additional temporary staff (grades B and C),  
including travelling expenses and insurance**Estimate: F 22,000*

1. Scale 1st July 1980 + 9.80 % estimated rise in the cost of living in 1981.
2. Basic salary Grade A7.6 + 1 % (approved by the Council on 27th November 1980) plus an entertainment allowance of F 7,700.
3. Regrading of two Grade A5 posts to Grade A6.
4. Creation of a new Grade A3 post.
5. Regradings already requested in the initial 1981 budget.

*Sub-Head 2*

## ALLOWANCES, SOCIAL CHARGES, ETC.

## (A) ALLOWANCES

*Revised estimate: F 941,000*

## (a) Household allowance

*Revised estimate: F 185,000**Initial estimate: F 194,000**Net decrease: F 9,000*

Rank	WEU Grade	No.	Total F
Clerk .....	Hors cadre	1	21,000
Senior Counsellor .....	A6	1	19,000
Counsellors .....	A5	3	54,000
First Secretary .....	A4	1	15,000
Secretary .....	A3	2	24,000
Personal Assistants .....	B4	2	16,000
Bilingual Shorthand Typists .....	B3	3	20,000
Head Roneo-Storekeeper .....	C6	1	6,000
Messengers .....	C4	2	10,000
		16	185,000

## (b) Children's allowance

*Revised estimate: F 181,000**Initial estimate: F 193,000**Net decrease: F 12,000*

F 7,850 per year per child ..... F 181,000

## (c) Expatriation allowance

*Revised estimate: F 448,000**Initial estimate: F 410,000**Net increase : F 38,000*

Rank	WEU Grade	No.	Total F
Senior Counsellors .....	A6	2	113,000
Counsellors .....	A5	1	61,000
First Secretary .....	A4	1	51,000
Secretary .....	A3	2	85,000
Secretary-Translator/Publications Administrative Assistant/Assistant Translator .....	A2	2	57,000
Personal Assistants .....	B4	2	47,000
Bilingual Shorthand Typists .....	B3	2	34,000
		12	448,000

(d) Compensatory rent allowance	<i>Estimate:</i> F 15,000
(e) Overtime	<i>Estimate:</i> F 30,000
(f)	
(g) Education allowance	<i>Revised estimate:</i> F 80,000
	<i>Initial estimate:</i> F 60,000
	<i>Net increase:</i> F 20,000
(h) Allowance for language courses	<i>Estimate:</i> F 2,000

## (B) SOCIAL CHARGES

	<i>Revised estimate:</i> F 716,000
(a) Social Security	<i>Estimate:</i> F 441,000
28 officials	F 441,000
(b) Supplementary insurance	<i>Revised estimate:</i> F 170,000
	<i>Initial estimate:</i> F 175,000
	<i>Net decrease:</i> F 5,000
(c) Provident fund	<i>Revised estimate:</i> F 105,000
	<i>Initial estimate:</i> F 137,000
14 % of basic salaries × 747,000	<i>Net decrease:</i> F 32,000

## (C) EXPENSES RELATING TO THE RECRUITMENT, ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE OF PERMANENT OFFICIALS

	<i>Revised estimate:</i> F 91,000
(a) Travelling expenses and per diem for candidates not residing in Paris who are convened for examinations and interviews and cost of marking examination papers	<i>Revised estimate:</i> F 10,000
	<i>Initial estimate:</i> F 1,600
	<i>Net increase:</i> F 8,400
(b) Reimbursement of travelling expenses on arrival and departure of staff and dependent persons	<i>Revised estimate:</i> F 6,500
	<i>Initial estimate:</i> F 1,500
	<i>Net increase:</i> F 5,000

**(c) Removal expenses***Revised estimate: F 20,000**Initial estimate: F 3,400**Net increase: F 16,600***(d) Installation allowance***Revised estimate: F 36,000**Initial estimate: F 7,000**Net increase: F 29,000***(e) Biennial home leave for non-French officials***Estimate: F 10,000***(f) Medical examination***Estimate: F 8,500****Head IV – General administrative costs****Revised estimate: F 1,543,000****Sub-Head 10*****OFFICIAL CARS**

– Purchase of an official car and cost of servicing

– Hire of an official car for the President

*Revised estimate: F 67,500**Initial estimate: F 50,500**Net increase: F 17,000*

*Explanatory Memorandum**(submitted by Mr. Adriaensens, Chairman and Rapporteur)*

1. At its December 1980 session, the Assembly adopted the draft budget for the financial year 1981 with a reservation regarding any decisions which might be taken concerning the status of the Clerk and possible changes in the table of establishment of the Office of the Clerk.

2. After considering the table of establishment of the Office of the Clerk, the Bureau voted in favour of the following changes:

- Regrading of two Grade A5 posts to Grade A6 ..... Cost: F 13,000
- Creation of a new Grade A3 post (including installation allowance, removal expenses, etc.) ..... Cost: F 320,000

3. The two Grade A6 posts are for two officials who, because of their seniority and duties (co-ordination of committees in one case; administration and finance in the other), have, in their respective fields, to replace the Clerk if he is absent.

4. The Grade A3 post is to allow a young official to be recruited to assist committee officials in their work. The fact that only one Grade A official is assigned to each committee makes it difficult for the Office of the Clerk to fulfil its tasks.

5. The entertainment allowance of F 7,700 for the Clerk of the Assembly, included in Head I, Sub-Head 1 (a) - Basic salaries - is the same amount as has been available to the Clerk heretofore.

6. The Assembly has never had an official car. Chauffeur-driven cars have been hired for the Clerk.

7. The Bureau felt that an official car should be made available to the Clerk, who now lives permanently in Paris. The estimate under Head IV, Sub-Head 10, which has been increased by F 17,000, includes the following items:

- Purchase of a car .....	F 37,000	
- Petrol, insurance, garage, servicing .....	<u>F 14,000</u>	F 51,000
- Hire of a car for the President for the two part-sessions of the Assembly .....	F 12,500	
- Hire of a car for the President when visiting other countries on Assembly business .....	<u>F 4,000</u>	F 67,500
Estimate in the initial 1981 budget .....		<u>F 50,500</u> F 17,000

8. It should be pointed out that the additional expenditure would arise only in the financial year 1981 since Sub-Head 10 of the budget for subsequent financial years would not include the item for the purchase of a car. Estimates under this sub-head would then amount to a total of only about 30,000 French francs in constant terms, i.e. a saving of 16,000 French francs in constant terms compared with the amount initially foreseen for the hire of official cars in 1981.

The Assembly's initial budget for 1981 as adopted by the Assembly was	F 11,358,000
The revised budget is .....	F 11,291,000
The draft budget for 1980 was .....	F 9,701,477
The difference therefore is .....	F 1,589,523
i.e. 16.38 %	

9. In accordance with the decision taken by the Assembly at its December 1980 session, the revised budget maintains the two regradings from C3 to C4 and the sum of F 250,000 under Sub-Head 17 - Expenditure on information - and Sub-Head 18 - Expenses for groups of the Assembly.

**SECOND REVISION OF THE BUDGET OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE  
OF THE ASSEMBLY FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1981 <sup>1</sup>**

*submitted on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration  
by Mr. Adriaensens, Chairman and Rapporteur*

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*Summary of second revised estimates for the financial year 1981*

	I		II		III
Details	Initial estimates <sup>1</sup>	Difference between I and II	Revised estimates <sup>2</sup>	Difference between II and III	Second revised estimates
<i>Head I</i> : Expenditure for staff . . . . .	6,883,000	(-) 84,000	6,799,000	- 285,000	6,514,000
<i>Head II</i> : Expenditure relating to temporary personnel . . . . .	1,920,000	-	1,920,000	-	1,920,000
<i>Head III</i> : Expenditure on premises and equipment . . . . .	383,000	-	383,000	-	383,000
<i>Head IV</i> : General administrative costs	1,526,000	(+) 17,000	1,543,000	-	1,543,000
<i>Head V</i> : Other expenditure . . . . .	1,000,000	-	1,000,000	- 140,000	860,000
<i>Head VI</i> : Pensions . . . . .	106,000	-	106,000	-	106,000
TOTAL EXPENDITURE . . . . .	11,818,000	(-) 67,000	11,751,000	- 425,000	11,326,000
TOTAL RECEIPTS . . . . .	460,000	-	460,000	-	460,000
NET TOTAL . . . . .	11,358,000	(-) 67,000	11,291,000	- 425,000	10,866,000

1. Document 851.

2. Document 872.

1. Adopted by the Presidential Committee.

*Allocation of Expenditure under Heads and Sub-Heads*

Details	Estimate for 1981 F
<i>Head I – EXPENDITURE FOR STAFF</i>	
Sub-Head 1: Salaries of permanent establishment .....	4,921,000
Sub-Head 2: (A) Allowances .....	867,000
(B) Social charges .....	694,000
(C) Expenses relating to the recruitment, arrival and departure of permanent officials .....	32,000
TOTAL OF HEAD I .....	6,514,000
<i>Head II – EXPENDITURE RELATING TO THE SESSIONS OF THE ASSEMBLY</i>	
Sub-Head 3: 1. Temporary staff .....	609,000
2. Linguistic staff .....	979,000
3. Insurance for temporary staff .....	5,000
4. Installation of equipment during sessions .....	270,000
5. Miscellaneous expenditure during sessions .....	57,000
TOTAL OF HEAD II .....	1,920,000
<i>Head III – EXPENDITURE ON PREMISES AND EQUIPMENT</i>	
Sub-Head 4: 1. Premises .....	283,000
2. Work on the building (joint areas) .....	83,000
Sub-Head 5: Capital equipment .....	17,000
TOTAL OF HEAD III .....	383,000
<i>Head IV – GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS</i>	
Sub-Head 6: Postage, telephone, telegraph charges, transport of documents .....	325,000
Sub-Head 7: Office supplies and hire of machines .....	210,000
Sub-Head 8: Printing and publishing of Assembly documents ..	910,000
Sub-Head 9: Purchase of documents, reference works, etc. ....	30,000
Sub-Head 10: Official cars .....	67,500
Sub-Head 11: Bank charges .....	500
TOTAL OF HEAD IV .....	1,543,000
<i>Head V – OTHER EXPENDITURE</i>	
Sub-Head 12: Travel and subsistence allowances and insurance for the President of the Assembly, Chairmen of Committees and Rapporteurs .....	85,000
Sub-Head 13: Expenses for representation and receptions .....	132,000
Sub-Head 14: Committee study missions .....	3,000
Sub-Head 15: Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk .....	215,000
Sub-Head 16: Expenses of experts and the auditors .....	50,000
Sub-Head 17: Expenditure on information .....	180,000
Sub-Head 18: Expenses for groups of the Assembly .....	180,000
Sub-Head 19: Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere provided for .....	3,000
Sub-Head 20: Non-recoverable taxes .....	12,000
TOTAL OF HEAD V .....	860,000
<i>Head VI – PENSIONS</i>	
Sub-Head 21: (A) Pensions .....	104,000
(B) Allowances .....	–
(C) Severance grant .....	–
(D) Supplementary insurance .....	2,000
TOTAL OF HEAD VI .....	106,000



**Head I – Expenditure for Staff***Sub-Head 1*

## SALARIES OF PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT

*Revised estimate:* F 4,921,000*Second revision:* F 4,856,000

(a) Basic salaries

*Revised estimate:* F 5,029,000*Net decrease:* F 173,000

Rank	WEU Grade	No.	Total <sup>1</sup> F
The Clerk .....	Hors cadre	1	354,000 <sup>2</sup>
Senior Counsellors .....	A6 <sup>3</sup>	2	629,000
Counsellors .....	A5	3	903,000
First Secretaries .....	A4	2	516,000
Secretary .....	A3	1	234,000
Secretaries-Translators/Publications Administrative Assistant/Assistant Translator	A2	3	517,000
Chief Accountant .....	B6	1	171,000
Personal Assistants .....	B4	4	518,000
Bilingual Shorthand Typists .....	B3	6	638,000
Switchboard Operator .....	B3	1	111,000
Head of Reproduction Department .....	C6	1	103,000
Assistants in Reproduction Department .....	C4 <sup>4</sup>	2	162,000
		27	4,856,000

(b) Recruitment of additional temporary staff (grades A, B and C),  
including travelling expenses and insurance*Revised estimate:* F 65,000*Initial estimate:* F 22,000*Net increase:* F 43,000

1. Scale 1st July 1980 + 9.80 % estimated rise in the cost of living in 1981.
2. Basic salary Grade A7.6 + 1 % (approved by the Council on 27th November 1980) plus an entertainment allowance of F 7,700.
3. Regrading of two Grade A5 posts to Grade A6.
4. Regradings already requested in the initial 1981 budget.

*Sub-Head 2*

## ALLOWANCES, SOCIAL CHARGES, ETC.

## (A) ALLOWANCES

*Revised estimate:* F 867,000*Second Revision:* F 175,000

## (a) Household allowance

*Revised estimate:* F 185,000*Net decrease:* F 10,000

Rank	WEU Grade	No.	Total F
Clerk .....	Hors cadre	1	21,000
Senior Counsellor .....	A6	1	19,000
Counsellors .....	A5	3	54,000
First Secretary .....	A4	1	15,000
Secretary .....	A3	1	14,000
Personal Assistants .....	B4	2	16,000
Bilingual Shorthand Typists .....	B3	3	20,000
Head of Reproduction Department .....	C6	1	6,000
Assistants in Reproduction Department .....	C4	2	10,000
		15	175,000

## (b) Children's allowance

*Second revision:* F 165,000*Revised estimate:* F 181,000*Net decrease:* F 16,000

F 7,850 per year per child ..... F 165,000

## (c) Expatriation allowance

*Second revision:* F 410,000*Revised estimate:* F 448,000*Net decrease :* F 38,000

Rank	WEU Grade	No.	Total F
Senior Counsellors .....	A6	2	113,000
Counsellors .....	A5	1	61,000
First Secretary .....	A4	1	51,000
Secretary .....	A3	1	47,000
Secretary-Translator/Publications Administrative Assistant/Assistant Translator .....	A2	2	57,000
Personal Assistants .....	B4	2	47,000
Bilingual Shorthand Typists .....	B3	2	34,000
		11	410,000

(d) Compensatory rent allowance	<i>Initial estimate:</i> F 15,000
(e) Overtime	<i>Initial estimate:</i> F 30,000
(f)	
(g) Education allowance	<i>Second revision:</i> F 70,000
	<i>Revised estimate:</i> F 80,000
	<i>Net decrease:</i> F 10,000
(h) Allowance for language courses	<i>Initial estimate:</i> F 2,000

**(B) SOCIAL CHARGES**

	<i>Revised estimate:</i> F 694,000
(a) Social Security	<i>Second revision:</i> F 426,000
	<i>Revised estimate:</i> F 441,000
	<i>Net decrease:</i> F 15,000
27 officials	
(b) Supplementary insurance	<i>Second revision:</i> F 163,000
	<i>Revised estimate:</i> F 170,000
	<i>Net decrease:</i> F 7,000
(c) Provident fund	<i>Revised estimate:</i> F 105,000
14 % of basic salaries × 747,000	

**(C) EXPENSES RELATING TO THE RECRUITMENT, ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE OF PERMANENT OFFICIALS**

	<i>Revised estimate:</i> F 32,000
(a) Travelling expenses and per diem for candidates not residing in Paris who are convened for examinations and interviews and cost of marking examination papers	<i>Second revision:</i> F 1,600
	<i>Revised estimate:</i> F 10,000
	<i>Net decrease:</i> F 8,400
(b) Reimbursement of travelling expenses on arrival and departure of staff and dependent persons	<i>Second revision:</i> F 1,500
	<i>Revised estimate:</i> F 6,500
	<i>Net decrease:</i> F 5,000

(c) Removal expenses

*Second revision:* F 3,400  
*Revised estimate:* F 20,000  
*Net decrease:* F 16,600

(d) Installation allowance

*Second revision:* F 7,000  
*Revised estimate:* F 36,000  
*Net decrease:* F 29,000

(e) Biennial home leave for non-French officials

*Initial estimate:* F 10,000

(f) Medical examination

*Initial estimate:* F 8,500

***Head V – Other expenditure***

*Revised estimate:* F 860,000

*Sub-Head 17*

EXPENDITURE ON INFORMATION

*Revised estimate:* F 180,000  
*Initial estimate:* F 250,000  
*Net decrease:* F 70,000

*Sub-Head 18*

EXPENSES FOR GROUPS OF THE ASSEMBLY

*Revised estimate:* F 180,000  
*Initial estimate:* F 250,000  
*Net decrease:* F 70,000

*Explanatory Memorandum**(submitted by Mr. Adriaensens, Chairman and Rapporteur)*

1. Document 872, which has been transmitted to the Council for an opinion, sets out the changes to the Assembly's initial budget which have been adopted by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and the Presidential Committee following decisions taken by the Bureau.

2. In his letter of 29th May 1981 (see Appendix), the Secretary-General informed the President of the Council's conclusions on this matter.

3. In response to that letter, the President of the Assembly submits the following proposed amendments:

*Head I (A):* Withdrawal of the request for the creation of a new Grade A 3 post.

*Head I (B):* Increase in the estimates under Sub-Head 1 (b) "Recruitment of additional temporary staff" F 43,000

*Head V:* Limiting to 12 % compared with 1980, the increase in estimates for information purposes and political groups, i.e. for each of these two sub-heads:

Initial estimate: F 250,000

Revised estimate: F 180,000

Decrease: F 70,000

4. Estimates for the following sub-heads have been maintained:

*Sub-Head 1:* Regrading of two A5 posts to A6 ;  
Regrading of two C3 posts to C4.

*Sub-Head 10:* Purchase of a car.

5. The 1981 budget would consequently be increased by 12 % compared with the 1980 budget.

6. It should be pointed out that the inflation rate recorded in France in the first months of 1981 was in fact more than 12 %. A ceiling of 12 % in the rise in estimates therefore represents a reduction in real terms compared with the 1980 budget.

7. The initial budget of the Assembly for 1981, as adopted by the Assembly, amounted to .....	F 11,358,000
The first revised budget amounted to .....	F 11,291,000
The second revised budget amounted to .....	F 10,866,000
The draft budget for 1980 amounted to .....	F <u>9,701,477</u>
The difference is therefore .....	F 1,164,523

i.e. 12 %.

APPENDIX

*Exchange of letters on the revised  
WEU Assembly budget for 1981*

*(a) Letter from Mr. E. Longestaey, Secretary-General of  
WEU to Mr. Fred Mulley, President of the Assembly*

29th May 1981

Mr. President,

*Revised WEU Assembly budget for 1981  
Document A/WEU/BA (81) 2*

The Council today considered the Assembly's revised budget for 1981 and have asked me to inform you as follows:

It is with the deepest regret that they find themselves unable to accept the Assembly's revised budget which has been considerably increased in spite of both previously expressed appeals for economies such as have already been applied to all other sections of the WEU budget for 1981, and of present well-known economic circumstances. The Council remain of the opinion that, as stated by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council of Ministers in a letter sent to you on 27th November 1980 by the Netherlands Ambassador, and also repeated in the Council's preliminary opinion on the Assembly's budget, the WEU budgets must not exceed in real terms the 1980 budget and should result in savings.

This means that they could accept as a maximum an increase over the 1980 Assembly's budget of 12 %, the figure which has been accepted by the Council as the foreseeable inflation rate for France.

The Council are fully aware that the suggestions contained in the Ambassador's letter of 27th November have been followed as regards the appointment of a full-time Clerk at the recommended grade. They note, however, that the proposed reorganisation of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly (promotion of two A5 posts to A6 and creation of an A3 post) brings about a marked increase in expenditure, whereas it would seem possible to restructure the Office in a different way and at considerably less cost. Other expenditure, such as the purchase of a car, also appears somewhat incompatible with the Council's concern to achieve savings. Finally, the Council also note that their initial suggestions, discussed in the first instance by the Budget and Organisation Committee, concerning expenditure on information and expenses for political groups have not been adopted.

The Council hope that the Assembly will be able to take the above remarks into consideration. They are put forward in a spirit of co-operation and are simply intended to facilitate the proper running of the Assembly in the context of increasing financial constraints.

Yours sincerely,

*(signed)* E. LONGERSTAEY

*(b) Letter from Mr. Fred Mulley, President of the Assembly,  
to Mr. C. van der Klaauw, Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs*

9th June 1981

Mr. C. van der Klaauw  
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands

.....

May I express my warmest thanks for the hospitality you extended to the Presidential Committee and to two other Committees of the Assembly during their stay in The Hague. Our talks with members of the Council will provide useful material for the work of the Assembly. I should also like you to know how much I have appreciated the keen interest you have taken in our work during your year as Chairman-in-Office.

During the excellent luncheon which you gave for the Presidential Committee in the magnificent setting of the Trevezaal, I had the impression that the Assembly might be allowed some degree of latitude in the allocation of its financial resources provided its total budget does not exceed that of the previous financial year, plus 12 % to be allowed for inflation.

The "envelope" approach, for this year at least, may help avoid friction between the Council and the Assembly, and assist us both to make economies, if the Council does not seek to follow its previous practice of minute supervision of minor administrative decisions by the Assembly and its Committees. I propose to ask the Presidential Committee at a meeting I hope to convene before the Assembly begins to consider a revised budget on this basis. I cannot, of course, predict the outcome as I know there will be disappointment in having a proposed staff reduction, which seems unavoidable, and smaller allocations for information and political groups, if we are to meet the smaller figure.

If, as I would wish, we can agree a budget on this basis at the Presidential Committee, I would hope it will also be approved by the Assembly. Questions concerning next year's budget can then be considered but I hope we may not, with costs, etc. being so uncertain, have to produce a budget for the Council's consideration quite as early as in previous years – particularly as we seem only to get a response from the Council on the eve of our Assembly meetings.

I am sending copies of this letter to your successor, as Chairman-in-Office, to the Secretary-General and to your Ambassador in London.

My colleagues join me in expressing their warm appreciation of your welcome in The Hague and to your parliamentary colleagues for all the trouble taken to provide us with facilities and assistance.

Your sincerely,  
(signed) FRED MULLEY, President

*(c) Letter from Mr. Hurd, United Kingdom Minister of State  
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, to Mr. Fred Mulley*

11th June 1981

Mr. President,

In thanking you for kindly sending me a copy of your letter of 9th June addressed to my predecessor as Chairman-in-Office of the Council, I can inform you that the Permanent Council at their meeting yesterday considered your proposal.

They will be pleased to study at the earliest opportunity an Assembly budget for 1981 revised in accordance with the terms of and following the suggestions contained in the letter sent to you by the Secretary-General on 29th May: within this framework the Assembly might be allowed some degree of latitude in the allocation of resources, provided that a maximum increase of 12 % over the 1980 budget is respected.

With regard to next year's budget, the Council can agree that, as has happened on certain previous occasions, the draft could if necessary be discussed at a later stage in the year than was the case for the 1981 budget. I may remind you that under the procedure adopted in 1960 for the approval of the Assembly's budget, the Council are required to express an opinion on the draft before the second part of the Assembly's annual session. This should however not create insuperable problems provided of course that the Assembly, in their draft budget for 1982, continues to bear in mind the need for strict economy.

(signed) DOUGLAS HURD

*Relations between parliaments and the press*  
*The WEU Assembly and the press*

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**INFORMATION REPORT**

*submitted on behalf of the*  
*Committee for Relations with Parliaments*  
*by Mrs. Knight, Rapporteur*

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submitted by Mrs. Knight, Rapporteur

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## *Information Report*

*(submitted by Mrs. Knight, Rapporteur)*

### I. Introduction

1. Your Rapporteur will consider as established the facts already given in the report which she presented to the Assembly on 4th December 1980, both where information received from national parliaments and the reference to press matters are concerned. She has appended to the present report the additional information received from the French Senate in January 1981. Consequently, she will delve further into the problems raised in her December report and, above all, in her speech presenting the report to the Assembly, the broad lines of which she had already mentioned in Committee. Among other things, she said:

“Without publicity, I submit that we are a sterile body. We get little publicity because we are so ineffective. We are ineffective because nothing that we do is of importance. Like Mr. Truman’s ‘buck’, it just stops here. My report seeks to bring this to the notice of all members and to invite them to consider ways of improving the situation.”

2. Since then, a number of factors have come to her attention which largely confirm what she said.

### II. Factors for making a diagnosis

#### A. Press coverage of the Assembly’s work

3. Your Rapporteur asked the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly to obtain as much information as possible about the number of press articles on recent Assembly sessions. The incompleteness of press reviews received by the Office of the Clerk, the assortment of subjects dealt with in many articles and the diversity of the opportunities which the press have of referring to the Assembly unfortunately do not allow a strict comparison to be made between press coverage of each session. Moreover, WEU press archives are kept for only one year and it was at the specific request of your Rapporteur that those relating to 1979 were kept. It was too late to refer to earlier years.

4. Moreover, certain events other than sessions have sometimes attracted the attention of journalists. For instance, the Brussels symposium in October 1979 was the subject of 82 references in October and 41 in November, whereas the December 1979 session was refer-

red to only 79 times, but the press conference by Mr. von Hassel, then President of the Assembly, in Bonn at which he set out the ideas he was to include in his 1980 report enabled the WEU Assembly to be mentioned 93 times in the press in September 1979, which means that the Press Department of the Office of the Clerk noted 434 articles relating to WEU in 1979, a figure which very probably is not complete. There were fewer outside events in 1980, so that the Office of the Clerk noted only 295 articles, although those written in months when sessions were held were not less than in 1979 (87 in June, 55 in December compared with 61 and 79 respectively). Further details are given at appendix to the present report.

5. Although your Rapporteur was not able to compare the number of articles on WEU published in 1979 and 1980 with those published in earlier years, available information confirms that the effort made by the Assembly and the Council of WEU as from 1979 to encourage the press to pay more attention to their work has not been ineffectual. Mr. von Hassel deserves particular praise for his efforts which were largely responsible for the Council agreeing to a substantial increase in appropriations for information. The amount available is still very little if compared with the sums available to comparable assemblies such as the Council of Europe or, *a fortiori*, the European Parliament.

6. For 1980, sums available for information amounted to 161,500 francs, representing the WEU information budget (not including the salaries of two members of the Office of the Clerk: one Grade A and one Grade B official).

7. As a comparison :

(a) the information budget of the assembly of the European Communities for 1981 amounts to 2,800,000 European currency units (i.e. 14 million French francs), not including the salaries of 149 officials, 50 of whom are in Grade A, 40 in Grade B and 59 in Grade C;

(b) the information budget of the Council of Europe for 1981 amounts to about 3,300,000 French francs, not including the salaries of 41 officials, 12 of whom are in Grade A and 29 in Grade B.

8. For the reasons mentioned above, it has not been possible to make a comparative study of the funds available to these assemblies and the number of press reports on their work, but it is certain that any such comparison would be extremely favourable to the WEU Assembly.

9. It will thus be seen that the results of the enquiry by your Rapporteur have made her moderate slightly the opinions she expressed in her previous report without however thereby changing her views on the problem as a whole. Miracles cannot be expected of an information policy pursued at the level of the Assembly alone. Public opinion's interest in our work depends largely on our own interest in it and, above all, on the effect our work has on the policy of our governments.

10. Individual members and national delegations have means of making known the work of the Council which your Rapporteur considers are not always used. In the difficult times which our countries are now experiencing, there is no question of suggesting that additional funds be allocated to the Assembly. On the contrary, a greater response to the work of the Assembly might be obtained by more sustained individual efforts.

**B. The part played by parliamentarians in the work of WEU**

11. In its November 1980 issue, a German review, the *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen*, published a most interesting article about the WEU parliamentary Assembly<sup>1</sup>. It was an extremely rigorous study by an author of unquestionable standing and impartiality. Some of the facts were known to us because they in fact originated in our Committee but others, coming from the German Delegation, are more revealing.

12. Our German colleagues will appreciate that your Rapporteur has absolutely no intention of accusing the delegation. She greatly regrets that, to her knowledge, comparable studies have not been made in other countries, but she has every reason to think that similar studies in other parliaments would produce equivalent results.

13. For anyone wishing to take the work and influence of the WEU Assembly seriously, the signs that emerge from this study are rather depressing.

1. Lutz Leinert: *Die Parlamentarische Versammlung der Westeuropäischen Union - Parlamentarische Legitimationsprobleme transnationaler Militärpolitik - Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen*, Jahrgang 11 (1980), Heft 3, pages 386-396.

14. It should be noted that the enquiry was conducted on the basis of a questionnaire answered by 19 out of 36 members of the German Delegation (i.e. 52 %) during the Seventh Legislature of the Bundestag. To a question about the effect WEU Assembly recommendations had on the Bundestag's decision-taking process, 8 parliamentarians answered that they considered they had none, 9 that they had little effect and 2 did not answer. When asked whether the work of the WEU Assembly occupied an important place in their political work, 2 said yes and 17 no. On the place occupied by their work for the WEU Assembly compared with that for the Bundestag, 12 answered that it represented less than 10 %, 3 that it represented between 10 % and 20 %, 1 that it represented more than 20 % and 3 did not answer. It should be noted however that this proportion is not disastrous since on average the WEU Assembly sits for no more than seven days a year.

15. Asked what importance being a member of the Assembly had for their political career, 3 parliamentarians said it had considerable importance, 2 that it was a useful beginning and 1 that it was a meaningful way to end a career but 7 felt it was of no importance and 6 did not answer. Furthermore, 10 parliamentarians said they preferred the Assembly of the Council of Europe compared with 2 who preferred the WEU Assembly and 5 who placed the two assemblies on an equal footing; 2 did not answer. Eleven believed the Assembly of the Council of Europe carried out more effective work than the WEU Assembly, 1 thought the opposite, 2 that they were equally effective and 5 did not answer. Finally, only 4 parliamentarians out of 19 quoted their knowledge of defence questions as a decisive reason for their appointment to the German Delegation to the WEU Assembly.

16. The results of this enquiry clearly illustrate what your Rapporteur indicated when presenting her previous report, i.e. that the WEU Assembly is not of sufficiently significant interest for the members themselves, in her view because there is no common measure between the effort it demands and the results one is entitled to expect. She said on that occasion:

"... At present, the Assembly of WEU is an extraordinarily useless body. So much of its work is completed only to be ignored. Reports are compiled with infinite care and with the profuse burning of midnight oil. They are argued about, amended, talked over and discussed and finally they appear in cherished print, like a much wanted child after a long and difficult labour. Alas, their fate is only

to live in the proud memory of the Rapporteur...

Yet many, perhaps even most, reports are very good and their recommendations are well worth implementing."

17. On this point, it can be seen that, to say the least, the information obtained since drafting the preliminary report is not likely to make her change her mind.

### III. *The prospects of an improvement*

#### A. *What the Assembly can do*

18. As noted, there is little with which to reproach members of the press assigned to the Assembly. We know they all work very conscientiously and that it is often their agencies or papers which prefer all kinds of other information to that concerning the WEU Assembly, which is quite understandable when it is borne in mind that members of the Assembly themselves make the work of WEU take second place to many other concerns. At most, it might be pointed out that they attach sometimes exclusive importance to action by or speakers from their own country at the expense of the representatives of the other six countries. This is quite a natural phenomenon, but may conceal from public opinion one of the essential virtues of our institution, that of being international.

19. For its part, the Assembly itself does what it can as regards the standard of the reports it prepares and of its debates. Nevertheless, as your Rapporteur pointed out in December, the organisation of these debates might be improved if an effort was made not to split debates up, for reasons which cannot always be grasped, so that journalists present may follow a debate with interest but not hear its conclusion, thus further lessening any importance which their editors may attach to the work of the Assembly. Thus, your Rapporteur said in December:

"I may be sticking my neck out, but I believe that we could run our procedures much more effectively. Occasionally, we start a debate on one topic, something else intervenes and we may or may not return to the original subject. There is considerable mystique about when a report is to be concluded. I appreciate the difficulties. We never know how many members may wish to speak, but can we say that we cannot improve our procedures? I believe that we could. If we did so, that would reflect much greater credit on our activities."

These remarks are addressed not so much to the Committee on Rules of Procedure as to the Presidential Committee which draws up the order of business of sessions and, finally, to the President who applies this order of business.

20. Moreover, it is for members of the Assembly to make a greater effort when they return to their countries and their work in their parliaments to make more of the reports, debates and recommendations of the WEU Assembly by every means available to them, among which written questions are probably not the most important. Last December, your Rapporteur said:

"All members of the Assembly have a duty to influence their own member governments to take note of, and consider action on, reports passed by the Assembly. We have all been to blame. We have ways of alerting member governments to reports and recommendations and we could do much more as individuals. We all have a duty in that regard. All members must consider and weigh their actions with immense care, particularly when recommendations urging that WEU's activities should be transferred to other organisations are before us."

#### B. *What the Council should do*

21. The modified Brussels Treaty set up the WEU Assembly to provide a parliamentary interlocutor for the Council. By ensuring that the implementation of the treaty was supervised by representatives of public opinion, the WEU Assembly helps to strengthen the Alliance. But in recent years the Council has not been an effective interlocutor for the Assembly. A parliamentary assembly can in fact carry out useful work only if its votes are implemented, and, in the framework of WEU, the Council is responsible for doing so.

22. But the way the Council now functions prevents it from fulfilling this rôle. It now only meets once a year and for a very short time at ministerial level, with junior Ministers often taking the place of cabinet Ministers, thus removing some of the impact of its discussions. If its own reports are to be believed, its agendas at these meetings are very sparse.

23. When, on the other hand, the Council meets at ambassadorial level, it never takes the initiative of tackling any political question whatsoever but merely tries to reply to Assembly recommendations.

24. This almost total lack of initiative on the part of the Council is skilfully concealed by the

absence of contact between it and public opinion. At the close of ministerial meetings, it is customary for the Chairman-in-Office of the Council to hold a press conference. But this is the only occasion on which the Council communicates any information whatsoever on its activities to public opinion, except for the annual report it addresses to the Assembly. Hence, where the press is concerned, there is a contradiction between the policy pursued by the Council when it is a question of its own affairs and the policy it allows the Assembly to pursue.

25. By granting the Assembly a substantial increase in its press budget in 1979, it showed that it attached some importance to our debates. But by taking no action in areas within its responsibility, by constantly and systematically relying on other organisations to exercise its responsibilities and by not keeping the press informed of its own activities, the Council is pursuing a policy diametrically opposed to that which it apparently wishes the Assembly to pursue. While it is not the responsibility of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments to examine the Council's policy, it should underline that the Assembly cannot hope to acquire authority of its own fundamentally different from that of the Council, and the absence of dialogue between the two principal WEU bodies is one of the essential causes of the lack of public interest in our work and the lack of credibility of any texts which the Assembly may adopt.

26. No true recovery is possible if the Council does not decide to pursue a real policy of informing both the Assembly and public opinion in general. It is clear that the officials of which the Council is composed at most of its meetings are not encouraged by the nature of their responsibilities to take initiatives or *a fortiori* to inform public opinion of any action which it may by chance take. Nevertheless, the fact that under the treaty these officials have to answer to a parliamentary assembly should encourage them to take more initiatives in this field. The Council's secretariat might instruct one of its members to be permanently in contact with representatives of the press as in the Assembly. At the close of each Council meeting, a communiqué could be issued by the Secretary-General, taking the chair when the Council meets at ambassadorial level. Surely its agenda is not so devoid of interest that it is not worth while! We are especially entitled to ask this question and to make these suggestions since issuing such communiqués and maintaining contacts with the press are constant practice in all the other European institutions.

27. Not only are all meetings (whether ministerial or not) held in the framework of the

European Community the subject of press communiqués and frequently even of press conferences, but Community officials are also often called on by the European Parliament to come and inform it of the progress of their work. This practice is totally unknown in the WEU Council, which seems to consider itself not as one element of a democratic Europe but as a left-over from that secret diplomacy which the Versailles Treaty already claimed to have eliminated from international practice but which in any event should no longer have a place in relations between European states.

28. In order to show the nature of this policy of secrecy practised systematically by the Council towards the Assembly, reference might be made to the example of the Standing Armaments Committee. In 1976, that body was instructed by the Council to carry out an inquiry into the European armaments industries. It was learned that it had handed the first chapter of its report, on the juridical aspects, to the Council in June 1978 and that it had completed a study on the economic aspects which it handed to the Council in June 1980. The Assembly has never been informed that other chapters were to be prepared. Further, the Council has always refused to give either the public or the Assembly the actual text of this report, although it has stated that it is prepared to keep the Assembly informed by what it considered to be the most appropriate means.

29. But to date nothing has been done in this respect. Admittedly, at the request of the Assembly Mr. Plantey, Head of the SAC Secretariat, made an important and interesting statement on the juridical problems raised by international armaments co-operation at the symposium held in Brussels in October 1979. But he did this on a personal basis and the Council has never indicated whether or not it considered this statement to be information supplied by the Council to the Assembly.

30. Moreover, it implied that it would not communicate the report transmitted to it by the SAC to the Assembly before it was complete. But since June 1980 it has had in its hands a version of the report which there are many reasons for considering final and complete and it has communicated nothing to the Assembly. Admittedly, such a report may contain military information which the Council does not wish to divulge although it is hard to see how the juridical aspects of the problem could involve such information. But where the economic chapter is concerned it is hard to imagine that this can amount to more than details which could easily be removed from the published text and it seems incredible that in democratic countries where information is

widely circulated, as is the case of the seven WEU member countries, a large amount of the information obtained by the SAC should not be published.

31. It is particularly unbelievable since the Commission of the European Communities for its part asked Professor Greenwood of Aberdeen University to carry out an inquiry on the same subject. The inquiry was carried out carefully and competently by this well-known expert and his colleagues and was paid for by the Community. Your Rapporteur notes that Mr. Davignon, member of the European Commission responsible for industrial questions, handed the text of Professor Greenwood's report to the European Parliament in January 1981 accompanied by a commentary which was published by a press agency. It may be noted in passing that this commentary proposed the creation of "a defence procurement analysis unit" which, according to Mr. Davignon, "might be established in the framework of Western European Union", and in no event in that of the European Community. Thus, our seven governments, which are all members of the European Community, agree to a major report on the European armaments industries being transmitted to the European Parliament which has no responsibilities in this field by the Commission of the European Communities but refuse to make the inquiry carried out in the framework of WEU, which does have responsibilities in this field, known to the members of the WEU Assembly. What then is the meaning of the words used each year by the Council in its annual report according to which we are "the only European assembly with defence responsibilities"?

32. One should therefore not be surprised if the press seeks the information which it is its duty to pass on to European public opinion outside WEU. The only logical way for our Assembly to react would be for it in turn to commission an expert to prepare a report on armaments problems. It can be seen how much waste of money, energy and time this would involve. But the example shows to what extent the attitude constantly adopted by the Council helps to discredit the Assembly and prevent it playing the rôle assigned to it in the treaty.

#### IV. Conclusions

33. In examining relations between the WEU Assembly and the press, your Rapporteur cannot confine herself to purely technical considerations. The fact that she has to note the press's lack of interest in the Assembly's work compels her to underline an obvious fact, i.e. that WEU is a single institution within which

one cannot deal with only one of its component bodies.

34. The Assembly cannot be hoped to hold the attention of public opinion unless the Council co-operates in its work. It must grant the Assembly the information it needs. It must also follow up the recommendations the Assembly transmits to it.

35. The Assembly may improve the organisation of its debates and invite journalists, but it will be credible only if the Council behaves like a true interlocutor, first through its own activities, second by raising the curtain of secrecy with which it surrounds itself and third by the active participation of Ministers from the seven WEU countries in the work of the Assembly. It is remarkable and scandalous that, with the one notable exception of Mr. Scholten, Netherlands Minister of Defence, in June 1979, in the last three years no defence minister from any member country has been able to address "the only European assembly with defence responsibilities".

36. Study of Appendix I shows that each time a decision, even a minor one, has been taken by the Council the press has duly noted the fact. Addresses by Ministers always draw the attention of public opinion to our work. Their answers to our oral questions rarely go unnoticed. But if the executive deliberately ignores the parliamentary element of the institution, why should the press pay it more attention?

37. Hence, it is at the level of the WEU Council that the two major problems arise and it will have to solve them if it effectively wishes the Assembly to fulfil its obligations under the modified Brussels Treaty. One relates to the nature of the Council's activities and it is for the other Assembly Committees, particularly the General Affairs Committee and the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, to study the matter. The other relates to the importance and seriousness of the information with which the Council provides the Assembly, the press and public opinion. This matter concerns us all and justifies your Rapporteur's remarks. She may seem bitter. She is in fact being too moderate.

38. Being without powers and having consultative status, the three European assemblies (Assembly of the Communities, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, WEU Assembly) find it hard to make themselves heard. The WEU Assembly has the further fundamental handicap that it is the only one of three whose *speeches* give rise to no corresponding *action* by its Council, member governments having until now not considered it expedient to use WEU or to make it *do* some-

thing. This inaction enormously reduces the Assembly's credibility in face of the events which daily jostle for the attention of the press and too often justifies accusations sometimes made by the press that our work is academic.

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\* \*

39. The Committee for Relations with Parliaments examined this report at its meeting on 28th April and instructed your Rapporteur to present it at the Assembly's next session. Noting that the problem in question concerned not only the Assembly but also the Council of WEU, the Committee regretted that it was not in a position to adopt a draft recommendation for transmission to the Council. It therefore decided to overcome this difficulty by communicating its conclusions to the General Affairs Committee, which is responsible for dealing with the question of relations between the Council and the Assembly in its reply to the annual report of the Council, to be presented at the June session.

40. The discussion in the Committee for Relations with Parliaments was especially positive and produced a series of proposals which develop and complete those suggested by your Rapporteur. She believes she can draw attention to the following points :

- (i) The Assembly should make an effort to attract more visitors to its sessions, particularly schoolchildren and students. Appropriate information material should be prepared for these groups.
- (ii) The Presidential Committee should ensure that the reports of the Committee for Relations with Parlia-

ments are debated at a time when it is certain that a large number of members of the Assembly will be present since this Committee's activities form an essential link between the work of the WEU Assembly and that of the parliaments of WEU member countries.

- (iii) The Committee for Relations with Parliaments should be brought into the dialogue between the Council and the Assembly for matters within its purview under the procedure for joint meetings.
- (iv) The Presidential Committee should ask the Council to ensure the presence of a cabinet Minister each day of the session and to propose that each Minister address the Assembly in the framework of the debate on a report, as far as possible expressing the views of the Council and not only those of his government on matters relating to the report in question.
- (v) More representatives of governments of countries which are not members of WEU but which are concerned by Assembly reports and non-governmental speakers should be invited if their views may be of interest for the Assembly's work.
- (vi) The dates of sessions should be fixed at times which suit all delegations.

41. Your Rapporteur is gratified that the Committee was able to make such specific proposals, thus demonstrating its wish to make the work of the Assembly more effective in the interests of Europe.

## APPENDIX I

*Articles in the international press partly or wholly relating to WEU received by the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly in 1979 and 1980*

Month	1979	1980
January	6	5
February	12	7
March	6	11
April	3	16
May		17
June	75 <sup>1</sup>	87 <sup>1</sup>
July	29 <sup>2</sup>	53 <sup>5</sup>
August	8	5
September	93 <sup>3</sup>	14
October	82 <sup>4</sup>	14
November	41 <sup>4</sup>	11
December	79 <sup>1</sup>	55 <sup>1</sup>
TOTAL	434	295

1. Assembly session.
2. Belgian decision on the procurement of armoured vehicles.
3. Debate in the parliamentary assembly of the European Communities on the oral question put by Mr. Fergusson and Mr. von Hassel on Community programmes for arms supplies in the framework of industry policy.
4. Brussels symposium on a European armaments policy.
5. Removal of restrictions on naval shipbuilding in the Federal Republic.

## APPENDIX II

*Addendum to Document 865**France**Relations between the Senate and the press*

Journalists wishing to follow the work of the Senate either in public sitting or in committee may be accredited by the Office of the Sergeant-at-Arms on the authorisation of the Parliamentary press association. About one hundred journalists are accredited in this way and enjoy the following facilities:

- access to the press gallery in the chamber during public debates;
- access to the press room near the chamber where they may work, telephone and listen to the retransmission of debates;
- certain other rights to use the Senate premises, the car park and restaurant.

In the press room, certain documents are communicated automatically to journalists :

- summary reports of sittings half an hour after speeches have been made;
- parliamentary reports and documents;
- press communiqués issued by committees, whose meetings are not open to the public but about which the press is thus kept informed by decision of their respective Chairmen, or by political groups or Senators acting in a personal capacity.

In 1971, the Bureau of the Senate set up the Information Division. It is under the responsibility of the Secretariat-General of the Presidency and its task is to assist journalists in their work :

- first, by issuing a weekly information bulletin while parliament is in session describing the work of the Senate during

the previous week and announcing the programme for the following week;

- by organising press conferences on the principal texts debated and the principal reports published;
- by providing, with the assistance of specialised staff from the committees and other departments concerned, notes summarising matters of particular interest;
- by answering as quickly and fully as possible their requests for specific information or documentation.

*Relations with radio and television*

Radio and television journalists accredited to the Senate enjoy the same facilities as other journalists plus a few others specifically connected with the techniques they use and their methods of work :

- the retransmission of all or part of a televised debate by one of the three television companies is subject to the authorisation of the President of the Senate;
- for such coverage, the television company is installed in a special gallery but must of course bring its own equipment. This also applies to radio services for which there are separate recording studios.

Information on the work of the Senate is included in various news casts or magazines, as are interviews with individual Senators. But the four companies, TF1, Antenne 2, FR3 and Radio France, are also obliged to reserve a number of broadcasts each year for the National Assembly and the Senate, which decide on the content.



*The European combat aircraft and  
other aeronautical developments*

REPORT<sup>1</sup>

*submitted on behalf of the  
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions<sup>2</sup>  
by Mr. Brasseur, Rapporteur*

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1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee:* Mr. Vallex (Chairman); MM. Lenzer, Wilkinson (Alternate: Jessel) (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Adriaensens (Alternate: Brasseur), Amadei, Antoni, Cornelissen (Alternate: Porthoine),

*Fiandrotti, Forma, Garrett, Hawkins, Konings, McGuire, Malvy (Alternate: Bizet), Manning, Péronnet, Prussen (Alternate: Thoss), Spies von Büllenheim, Topmann, van Waterschoot.*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

***Draft Recommendation***

***on the European combat aircraft and  
other aeronautical developments***

The Assembly,

Considering that several European countries will need to procure a new combat aircraft in the early nineties to replace, *inter alia*, fighter aircraft which will then be obsolete;

Considering that this aircraft must be designed in the light of the then prevailing threat to European states;

Considering therefore that this aircraft will involve the use of very advanced technology and will have to meet a wide range of requirements (air-to-air, air-to-surface, ease of handling, short take-off, etc.);

Considering further that the time available for the study and design of this aircraft will thus allow detailed technical studies to be made (new designs) and the necessary financial means to be provided;

Considering that the standard of industrial activity, employment and technological know-how in the European states is directly linked with the future of the civil and military aeronautical sector and hence to the maintenance of its order books,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Ask the British, French and German Governments to tackle their present study in greater detail and harmonise the specifications required by the staffs of the three air forces so that the development of a European combat aircraft may be undertaken;
2. Ask the governments of the other WEU member states, in the framework of the Standing Armaments Committee and of the Independent European Programme Group, to show their interest in the development of this aircraft which should be available for procurement in about fifteen years' time;
3. Recall the need to design a multi-purpose aircraft adaptable to the specific requirements of the various WEU member countries;
4. Insist on such co-operation being organised flexibly and efficiently, drawing on the lessons of twenty years of European experience of co-operation;
5. Consider extending European co-operation to other types of aircraft (helicopters, transport aircraft, etc.).

## *Explanatory Memorandum*

*(submitted by Mr. Brasseur, Rapporteur)*

### *Introduction*

1. The need for a future combat aircraft was already mentioned at the symposium on a European armaments policy, held in Brussels on 15th-17th October 1979. The Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions asked Air Marshal Sir Denis Smallwood, Military Adviser to British Aerospace Aircraft Group, to submit a paper on this subject. In his paper he did not discuss the full range of future combat aircraft requirements in Western Europe but the combat aircraft requirement for operations in the battlefield area. He considered this issue vital and a priority requirement for Western Europe. He believed that allied ground forces in Central Europe would be grossly outnumbered and that the only possibility of redressing the local imbalance of ground forces was to make use of air power and its flexibility and quick reaction capabilities in space and time. As General Haig said when he was Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), the only "masse de manœuvre" available on the central front is the air arm and it seems that this is likely to remain so in the foreseeable future.

2. The Air Marshal also believed the aircraft should become an international collaborative project in view of the importance of the requirements as this would reduce costs both directly, as a result of shared costs, and indirectly since it would result in increased sales.

3. This opinion was shared both by Admiral Sir Raymond Lygo, the Rapporteur who drew the conclusions on this question, and by a representative of the German aeronautical industry, Mr. Forster-Steinberg. Admiral Lygo stated that the threat to low-flying aircraft would increase considerably, which meant developing aircraft equipped with systems offering the maximum ability to withstand the threat.

4. Mr. Forster-Steinberg said that as an industrialist he was convinced of the need for government support. Europe could not increase its competitiveness in the civil and military aerospace field if it failed to pool its technological knowledge. A minimum of collaboration was essential, otherwise Western Europe would become economically dependent on the United States and vulnerable in addition.

5. In its reply to Recommendation 329 on the industrial bases of European security, the

Council recognised the usefulness of identifying weapons systems which could be produced in collaboration, of achieving improved operability where appropriate, and of seeking areas where European effort needed to be particularly concentrated. In its reply to a further recommendation (339) on the industrial bases of European security – guidelines drawn from the symposium on 15th, 16th, 17th October 1979, the Council named one of these areas when it said that the Independent European Programme Group was currently examining problems connected with the future combat aircraft, which was also the subject of intense tripartite discussions between the French, German and United Kingdom Governments. The Council shared the Assembly's concern that these efforts to co-operate should produce European successors for the Jaguar, Harrier and Phantom F-4F. In this reply, dated 30th April 1980, it also considered that the framework and form of such co-operation should be the existing machinery for concerting measures in the armaments field, in particular the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) and the conference of national armaments directors in the NATO framework.

6. The air staffs of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom have therefore been discussing the possibilities of a successor to the F-4F Phantom for the German air force, the Franco-British Jaguar for the French and Royal air forces and the Harrier for the Royal Air Force. Three types of national specifications have been drawn up: the AST-403 (air staff target for the Royal Air Force), the ACT-92 (*avion de combat tactique* for 1992 for the French air force), and the TKF-90 (*Taktisches Kampfflugzeug* for the 1990s for the German air force). The national industries involved are British Aerospace, Dassault-Bréguet and MBB.

7. Some of the requirements of the three air forces are more or less parallel as they all want great manoeuvrability and the ability to fly at supersonic speed at an altitude of less than 150 metres. It should have air-to-air and air-to-ground capabilities to be able to destroy airfields and tank units.

8. On other requirements, however, the three air forces are still far from agreement. For instance, the Royal Air Force sees no justification for the additional costs of developing a new engine when there is already the RB-199

which is a Turbo Union engine developed in co-operation between MTU, Fiat and Rolls-Royce. A new aircraft will require both the use of composite materials and new avionics. The German air force wants a new aircraft with modern technology but allowing the adaptation of existing engines and avionics. The French air force, to be equipped with the Mirage F-2000 in the early 1980s, will not order the F-4000.

9. The question will arise as to whether European industry alone will be able to produce an aircraft which fulfils all the requirements of the three air staffs, not only in engines, airframes or avionics, but also with fittings for the necessary weapons systems that will give the aircraft its offensive and defensive capabilities. In this connection acceptance of the cruise missile as a weapons system may be of great importance. But as long as requirements are not harmonised, industry will have to stand on the side-lines until the air staffs reach their decisions.

10. Several billion dollars will be needed to develop a new manned combat aircraft for which every major European country wishes to acquire the technological know-how. It is agreed that it should be a twin-engine aircraft, highly manoeuvrable, and with a very short landing and take-off capability. Research and development would certainly be extremely costly, but could be considered an insurance for future employment and the industrial products of advanced technology. Such huge sums will be involved that European collaboration will be essential. Furthermore, co-operation still does not allow large enough savings to be made in programme costs.

### **I. Requirements of the three European air forces**

11. Air power will remain the key factor in any defence effort because of its flexibility and ubiquity. In order to have local air superiority and a wide range of action into the second and third echelons behind the enemy lines it is necessary to have manned aircraft. They can not only reach but also search for targets. Missiles, whether cruise missiles or any other kind, can be used against fixed targets such as airfields. Helicopters have great manoeuvrability in the immediate front line but are extremely vulnerable. There is no doubt that manned aircraft will remain necessary in the future.

#### *Royal Air Force*

12. At the end of 1970s the Royal Air Force originally set an air staff target for one aircraft

to replace both the Jaguar and Harrier aircraft, which would considerably facilitate front-line supply. At the time the RAF was open-minded about the configuration of the aircraft. The requirement was based on the one hand on the state of Soviet defences and on the other on required technological improvement. When it became clear that neither France nor the Federal Republic of Germany wanted to include vertical take-off and landing characteristics in any potential collaborative European combat aircraft, the RAF altered its target requirements to include one aircraft as a Jaguar replacement and another as a Harrier replacement.

#### *French air force*

13. French requirements for a combat aircraft in the 1990s will be for a multirôle aircraft whose main rôle will be air-to-ground as it will have to replace the Jaguar. For the air-to-air rôle the French air force has ordered the Mirage 2000, a successor to the Mirage III, and this will be brought into service from 1983 onwards.

14. Some 300 European combat aircraft might be ordered. The aircraft should have all the new technical characteristics which staffs now know it should be possible to incorporate in aircraft for the early 1990s. The French name for the aircraft is ACT-92 (*avion de combat tactique*, for 1992 onwards). As it takes some ten years to develop such an aircraft, the time is therefore right to take a decision.

15. The Mirage 4000, developed as a private venture by Dassault without financial assistance from the state, is in the same class as the F-15 or F-18. Since an enormous amount of money, perhaps some F 60 billion, will be required to start actual production, the French air force has no programme for the Mirage 4000.

16. The existence of the Mirage 4000 prototype has not changed French opinion on the need to go ahead with common research and development of the European combat aircraft.

#### *German air force*

17. The staff of the German air force wants and needs to replace its Phantom F-4s at the end of the 1980s. According to the German air staff targets, the primary rôle of their new combat aircraft should be air-to-air, whereas that of the French and British version should be air-to-ground. There is therefore a difference in the air staffs' requirements but, on the other hand, the three countries concerned now require their new aircraft at about the same

time, i.e. the early 1990s, and the harmonisation of the time-tables could therefore be assured.

18. The European combat aircraft will have to be based on new concepts; it does not seem realistic to build a derivative of an existing aircraft if the new aircraft is to be used for some twenty years as from the early 1990s. However, a compromise has to be found as no military budget can be stretched far enough to satisfy all the requirements of the three air staffs.

19. The basic German requirements for the TKF (*Taktisches Kampfflugzeug*) with its main rôle being in air-to-air capabilities is as follows:

- thrust/weight ratio: 1.3-1.4,
- battle weight: 11,000-12,000 kg,
- maximum speed: < 1.6 Mach,
- take-off and landing distance: approx. 500 m,
- specific excess power: 380-450 m/s,
- modern guided missiles: 6-10,
- radius of action according to mission: 300-1,000 km,
- high carbon fibre content in the structure,
- use of direct force modes,
- high performance manoeuvrability.

## II. Harmonisation of requirements

20. The three countries concerned should be able to harmonise their requirements not only on the same type of aircraft but also on engines and armaments. It would, of course, be possible for certain parts of the avionics to differ from one another insofar as the air staffs require different types of armaments. This could alter the performances of these aircraft without greatly increasing the development cost.

21. In 1978, the three ministers of defence concluded an agreement to start work on the aircraft's common characteristics. They instructed their armaments directors to set up working groups in the three national defence ministries and asked British Aerospace, Dassault-Breguet and MBB to prepare a joint report on the industrial possibilities of them combining to build a European combat aircraft. In the summer of 1980 this report was sent to the national defence ministries. The ministries considered it very useful, but the solution suggested by industry meant in fact that the three air forces were united only on the airframe requirement; otherwise they wanted three different weapons systems as well as two,

or possibly three, different engines. France favours a new engine to be developed by SNECMA, whilst both the United Kingdom and Germany have an interest in the further use of the European Turbo Union RB-199 engine, which they have developed in association with Italy. Germany wishes to consider existing United States engines as well.

22. The governments were unable to accept such an expensive solution and invited the air staffs to try to align their requirements in order to make the aircraft cheaper. A further report has been requested for March or April 1981.

23. With regard to the airframe, there is agreement on short take-off and landing and multi-rôle characteristics and it is also agreed that powerful engines will be needed.

24. The choice of the type of aircraft to be manufactured is extremely important as the new aircraft will have to last for at least twenty years. With only one type of aircraft, the logistics and supply of the aircraft over the twenty-year period will automatically be much cheaper.

25. The armaments systems need to be more closely co-ordinated and simplified. However, this is not all that easy as all three air forces now use markedly different systems, whether they be air-to-air or air-to-ground. The most up-to-date technology will have to be used to withstand the Soviet threat. The Harrier and Jaguar, for instance, have very attractive low-level ground attack possibilities but not enough manoeuvrability in aiming and firing their weapons to be used for dog-fighting.

26. There is no doubt that Soviet industry is progressing rapidly and will be able to build high-performance new aircraft. Developments there are similar to those in Europe and the United States: all air forces want great agility for air-to-air combat, and Soviet developments are certainly keeping pace with those in Europe or America.

27. Where weapon developments are concerned, all weapons will eventually have a multi-target capability.

28. The three defence ministers have therefore ordered the air staffs to align their weapons systems to a greater extent. The German requirements in particular are very ambitious and therefore very expensive. It would certainly be possible to harmonise the requirements of France and the United Kingdom with regard to the air-to-ground rôle with those of Germany for the air-to-air rôle. This would mean changes in firing methods, avionics and armaments systems and there would probably be other technical changes, but the experts believe it could be done.

### III. *Industrial aspects*

29. There is a general feeling in all three countries that the European aircraft industry now has a chance of joining together to build a European combat aircraft and that it would be a disaster not to take advantage of this opportunity, the more so since the European industry now needs this type of order. The defence ministers are keenly conscious of this situation and have already met three times since 1978 to discuss possibilities for this new aircraft. Apart from the ministers' meetings, there have also been many meetings on particular issues between armaments directors and working groups. Other countries could participate in this venture if they so wished and have a share in production.

30. The question as to whether other European countries, members of NATO, should participate has not yet been decided upon at this stage. Interested countries are of course aware of the situation through the Independent European Programme Group.

31. Whether a new engine is required specifically adapted to the new type of aircraft is still a point of discussion. Although Rolls-Royce and the French firm SNECMA have both collaborated with MTU in Germany, and Rolls-Royce has also collaborated with the French firm Turbomeca, there was only collaboration between Rolls-Royce and SNECMA on the development of the engine for Concorde, the Olympus 593. For a new engine further collaboration would be necessary. In view of the fact that the first planes will not have to be delivered until after 1992, there might be ample time to build a completely new engine for this new aircraft.

### IV. *Budgetary aspects*

32. The German Ministry of Defence is not seeking a national replacement for the Phantom F-4 and would in fact much prefer a European replacement. However, for budgetary reasons it is unlikely that a new aircraft will be ordered in 1981 or 1982. All plans will therefore have to take account of the fact that no definite financial commitment can be given by the government before 1983. However, a solution might be found if industry could finance the preparatory studies and designs in order to maintain the possibility of the joint manufacture of such an aircraft. In recent years the Federal Government has given considerable financial aid to the German aeronautical industry and it should therefore be able to bridge the gap in the Federal budget.

33. In all three countries the situation is extremely complicated as major problems face each defence minister, particularly regarding cost. For instance, in 1981, the United Kingdom will have £200 million less to spend on defence; the German defence budget is also very restricted as the minister has to find extra money to assure normal development in the Tornado production. Five prototypes of the Mirage 2000 are now being flown by the French air force, but developments have still to be made regarding the SNECMA M-53 engine which should have a thrust of some 9.7 tonnes, and it has taken longer than was foreseen to develop the radar.

### V. *Organisational problems*

34. In the field of helicopters a certain division of work on different types is possible, thus giving each country a leadership rôle. Europe, however, cannot manufacture series of different types of combat aircraft and a common solution satisfying the countries and the industrial partners is therefore a necessity. The European part of NATO is just as capable of producing first class combat aircraft of a certain type as the United States, but only by collaborative effort and this requires ingenuity and forbearance.

35. Problems of design and industrial leadership have been satisfactorily solved in the past. The basic requirement is for every country to set aside considerations of prestige and fulfil its rôle as a co-producer to the best of its ability in accordance with the financial contribution it has to make. The workload is of course shared in proportion to the financial contributions. Many countries have now participated in several collaborative projects and know that the type and size of the programme as well as its complexity require a certain kind of management. There is no particular model according to which one should set up an organisation to assure the best possible execution of the programme with harmony and co-operation. There should be the political will to develop decision-making machinery and this should be set up before the actual programme starts.

36. Participants in the Tornado project consider the programme a good exercise in European collaboration and a series of more than 800 aircraft could be produced. Nowadays this number is necessary in order to amortise the research and development costs. The Americans have such a tremendous military domestic market that they are able to produce whole series of different types of aircraft, whereas no one European country is able to achieve acceptable costs, even for one

type of combat aircraft. Only an association of countries can provide enough possibilities. This is the reason why the trilateral European combat aircraft has to succeed, not only to provide the aeronautical industry with work, but also to keep it up-to-date technologically.

37. In an organisation like Panavia, the industrial consortium for producing the Tornado, extra cost of course stems from the need to collaborate internationally and the need for responsible military budget supervision by parliament. There is therefore some duplication of work in the Panavia framework and at the defence ministries. However, a price has to be paid in any collaborative effort.

38. On the type of organisation required to handle production of the combat aircraft, some would prefer a very light structure which would be cheap and efficient with clearly-defined responsibilities. Such an organisation, similar to that for the Alpha-Jet, would be possible if the political will to establish it existed. However, once the governmental organisation and the industrial base have been set up, there should be little interference on the political side, apart from overall control of the programme's execution.

#### *VI. Export possibilities*

39. The combat aircraft may, of course, be exported to other countries outside NATO once it is built in series, but this question has not yet arisen. However, if three major countries agree on the same type of combat aircraft this will do much to promote its export possibilities. For this reason too, ways and means should be sought to make a cheaper version of the aircraft than that on the project which has now been submitted by industry.

40. In the Independent European Programme Group discussions have already taken place on the possibility of other NATO countries acquiring this aircraft in the 1990s. However, it is hardly probable that Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway and Denmark, the four countries which bought the F-16, will agree to buy the European combat aircraft. In military terms they might need it but, in view of the cost of the F-16 programme, they will probably not have enough money to start a new programme so soon after purchasing the F-16. There is no doubt that the F-16 deal has considerably weakened the European aeronautical industry and has been prejudicial to the building of an aeronautical Europe for many years, which is to be regretted.

41. The Italian air force has the same requirements as the German air force and it is understood that for the Italians too the main

rôle of the European aircraft would be air-to-air. This would facilitate Italian participation, but the Italian Government has taken no decisive steps to associate itself with this European venture.

42. Other European NATO countries may wish to buy this aircraft but this will depend mainly on the type of missions to be fulfilled by their air forces, on the cost of the aircraft and the budgetary possibilities of the countries concerned. In this connection account should be taken of the fact that publications giving the prices of aircraft hardly ever quote the price of the whole system; for the most part they omit the price of armaments. Costs for the latter are of course increasing, but the aircraft itself is also becoming more sophisticated and therefore requires enormous sums for research and development to attain the sophistication required by the air forces.

43. Exporting aircraft to non-NATO countries would be very difficult for the Federal Republic of Germany as it has agreed not to export weapons to areas where there might be confrontation. However, as in the case of the Alpha-Jet, a solution could probably be found if the export problem arose. This is now the subject of much official discussion in the Federal Republic.

#### *VII. Other aeronautical developments*

44. Further collaboration should be promoted not only on the European combat aircraft but also regarding helicopters and transport aircraft.

45. In the helicopter field, co-operation between France, Germany and the United Kingdom is good. This might continue under the declaration made by these three countries, together with Italy, to build series of helicopters of different tonnage, i.e. a naval helicopter of some 10 tons, a transport helicopter of 6 to 8 tons, and anti-submarine and anti-tank helicopters of 4 tons. The field here is vast and many programmes are being considered or are already at the development stage. European industry is able to produce very good helicopters at a reasonable price.

46. As far as transport planes are concerned, France has relaunched the Transall production, which for the moment is sufficient. The French are not thinking of building a military Airbus<sup>1</sup>, although this could be a future possibility.

1. This plane was considered briefly as a substitute for the Boeing for the AWACS (airborne warning and control system) function but because of its cost the idea was not pursued further, at least provisionally.

47. The Federal Republic may have a surplus of military transport aircraft. It is taking part in the production of the new series of Transall aircraft but has not ordered any.

48. With transport aircraft one has to consider the movement of both men and heavy equipment. For men, the Boeing 747 could perhaps be used. For transporting heavy equipment the United Kingdom has the Hercules, a good transport aircraft. It is interesting to note that the origin of the Boeing 747 was the American requirement for a large military freighter. Lockheed was given the order and Boeing made the civil 747 from the prototype. It might well be possible for the European countries to build a military Airbus, but for the moment there is no need for such an aircraft. The Americans might develop a new C-XX long-range transport aircraft.

49. The American military airlift command is planning to develop a long-range, heavy-lift, inter-theatre aircraft that could be operational by the mid-1990s. The aircraft should provide enough space for the transport of large, unwieldy equipment, armoured personnel vehicles and tanks.

### VIII. *Alternatives*

50. When the British air staff decided to make preliminary enquiries regarding a combat aircraft it first held talks with the Tornado partners – Germany and Italy – in order not to waste the experience of the NATO MRCA (Tornado) Management Agency (NAMMA) and Panavia as the aircraft would have to replace the Tornado and Jaguar. Italy withdrew from the talks as it was planning to develop a much less sophisticated aircraft, but France joined in and thus the trilateral discussions began.

51. If agreement cannot be reached on a European combat aircraft, other solutions will have to be found. For example, the United Kingdom might then consider collaboration with the United States on a follow-up to the Harrier. This might be a joint programme with McDonnell Douglas using the modified British Aerospace AV-8A Harrier. The American marine corps is now spending some \$700 million to develop and buy the AV-8B Harrier jump-fighter. This could mean the Royal Air Force again having two aircraft instead of one as then an advanced version of the Tornado might also have to be ordered.

52. The United States air force will also develop a new fighter aircraft to come into service in the early 1990s. A design decision will be taken by 1985. \$10 million has been included in the 1982 budget request to Congress for the advanced tactical fighter programme leading towards a new aircraft. The selection of a new advanced tactical fighter will be open to both air-to-air and air-to-ground aircraft. A new version of the F-16 is also being developed, called the F-16XL. This will be a two-seater aircraft but might later be transformed into a single-seat fighter configuration.

53. For the French air force an alternative might be found in the prolonged use of the Mirage 2000 and possibly the ordering and buying of the Mirage 4000, which may be developed in a joint Franco-American programme.

54. The development of the Mirage 2000 has taken seven years, i.e. since 1974, and the development of its weapons systems, especially the radar, is still not complete. After 1985 its present radar system will be replaced by a new system called RDI (Radar Doppler with Impulsions). The Mirage 2000 will be equipped with tactical nuclear missiles for its penetration rôle. It should be noted that the operational life of an aircraft is some twenty-five years, which would normally mean that the Mirage 2000 – the first of which will come off the production line in 1983, continuing in production for at least ten years – should be expected to be still in operation well after the year 2000.

55. It is equally normal, however, to plan the development of a new generation of combat aircraft for about ten years later (1992-95) to replace aircraft older than the Mirage 2000.

56. Alternatives for the German air force might be a modified version of the Tornado multirôle combat aircraft, but even with modifications the Tornado could not fulfil the dual rôle required by the German air staff, i.e. it could not fulfil the highly manoeuvrable air-to-air rôle. Another option, the McDonnell-Douglas-Northrop F-18L, might be bought "off-the-shelf", and other possibilities would be the F-15 or perhaps the F-16. However, the "off-the-shelf" purchase of an American aircraft might disrupt the assembly lines of the German aircraft industry. Should this happen, it might have serious political consequences since the German Government has invested a great deal of money in its aircraft industry to bring it up to a level where it could usefully collaborate with the French and British aircraft industries.



*The European combat aircraft and other aeronautical developments*

AMENDMENTS 1, 2 and 3<sup>1</sup>  
*tabled by MM. Antoni, Bernini and Martino*

1. In paragraph 1, line 1, of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “ British, French and German Governments ” and insert “ governments of the WEU countries ”; consequently, in line 2 leave out “ three ”.
2. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “ other ”.
3. In the draft recommendation proper, alter the order of the paragraphs so that 3 becomes 1 ; 4 becomes 2 ; 1 becomes 3 ; 2 becomes 4.

*Signed: Antoni, Bernini, Martino*

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1. See 4th Sitting, 17th June 1981 (Amendment 1 withdrawn ; Amendments 2 and 3 agreed to).

*The European combat aircraft and other aeronautical developments*

AMENDMENTS 4 and 5<sup>1</sup>  
*tabled by MM. Forma and Maravalle*

4. In paragraph 1, line 1, of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “ British, French and German Governments ” and insert “ interested governments ”; consequently, in line 2 leave out “ three ”.
5. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “ other ”.

*Signed: Forma, Maravalle*

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1. See 4th Sitting, 17th June 1981 (Amendments agreed to).

*Application of the Brussels Treaty*  
*Reply to the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council*

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**REPORT <sup>1</sup>**

*submitted on behalf of the*  
*Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments <sup>2</sup>*  
*by Mr. Tanghe, Rapporteur*

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Articles IV, V and VIII.3 of the modified Brussels Treaty

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1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee:* Mr. Cavaliere (Chairman); MM. Bozzi, van den Bergh (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Bahr, Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Bernini, Bizet, Bonnel, Cox, Dejardin, Edwards, Fosson, Grant, Kittelmann, de Koster

(Alternate: *Mommersteeg*), *Lemrich*, Maravalle, Ménard, Pecchioli, Péronnet, *Prussen*, Schmidt (Alternate: *Ahrens*), Scholten, *Smith*, *Tanghe*, Vohrer.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

***Draft Recommendation***  
***on the application of the Brussels Treaty***

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that the fundamental provisions of the Brussels Treaty, particularly those in Articles IV, V and VIII.3<sup>1</sup>, have retained their full value and are one of the key factors in the security system of the signatory countries ;
- (ii) Noting however that for greater effectiveness the material organisation of collective defence is undertaken in the wider framework of the North Atlantic Council and the Independent European Programme Group ;
- (iii) Considering that a continuing and tangible activity in the framework of the treaty is essential to its credibility and that at the present time this activity is chiefly ensured by the Assembly and by its dialogue with the Council ;
- (iv) Considering further, for the abovementioned reasons, that at a time of economic difficulty for member countries the resources they make available to the WEU organs should be redeployed to adapt the latter to present conditions ;
- (v) Congratulating the Council for its response to paragraphs 1 to 6 of Recommendation 348 of the Assembly,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Conduct an investigation into:
  - (a) the extent of the controls provided for in Protocols Nos. III and IV that should be maintained and the decisions the Council should take under Articles II and V of Protocol No. III ;
  - (b) the appropriate allocation of financial resources and staff among all the WEU organs in the light of the present scope and importance of their respective activities ;
  - (c) the possibility of extending to the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly the current practice of close co-operation between the international secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments ;
2. Entrust the international secretariat of the SAC with the research necessary for the report on the rôle and contribution of armed forces in the event of natural or other disasters in peacetime which is referred to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments ;
3. Communicate to the Assembly the completed chapters of the Standing Armaments Committee's study on the European armaments industry.

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1. Text at Appendix.

## *Explanatory Memorandum*

*(submitted by Mr. Tanghe, Rapporteur)*

### **I. Introduction**

1.1. In application of Rule 27 (2) of the Rules of Procedure, the Presidential Committee referred to the Committee Chapters II. B. Activities of the Council – defence questions; III. Agency for the Control of Armaments and IV. Standing Armaments Committee of the annual report of the Council. The present report replies to these three chapters.

1.2. As the last chapters of the annual report did not reach the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly until the last week of March, the text was not communicated to members of the Assembly until the beginning of April. The Committee therefore postponed consideration of the present report until its meeting on 4th May.

### **II. B. Activities of the Council – defence questions**

2.1 In its report, the Council reaffirms, as it does each year, “the great importance the governments of the member countries of WEU attached to the modified Brussels Treaty and its protocols”, recalling Article V of the treaty “in which the member countries of the organisation promised each other mutual assistance in case of outside aggression; ... this article remained one of the central elements of the security system of the signatory countries and its significance should not be belittled”. The report adds: “Whilst, in present circumstances, the Council’s field of action is limited, in particular because of work being done in the framework of European political co-operation, the North Atlantic Council and the Independent European Programme Group, their responsibilities remain unchanged as does the essential value of WEU as an organisation”.

#### **1. Level of forces of member states – forces under NATO command**

2.2. Under Protocol No. II, the Council ensures each year that the level of forces of member states respects the limits laid down in that protocol. Where forces under NATO command are concerned, the annual report of the Council states that the traditional meeting of the seven permanent representatives of the WEU governments to the North Atlantic Council held on 25th February 1980 noted that for 1979 the level of forces of member states “as set out in

the NATO force plan, fell within the limits specified in Articles I and II of Protocol No. II, as in force at that time, *with the exception of a recommended increase in the force level of one member state*. At their meeting of 12th March 1980, the Council authorised the state concerned to make this increase”.

2.3. The Committee asks the Council to supply details of the state concerned and the increase in the forces in question. The Assembly has already had occasion to call for an increase in forces assigned to NATO; the increase in question would probably be welcome if details were known.

#### **2. United Kingdom forces stationed on the continent of Europe**

2.4. Under Article VI of Protocol No. II, the United Kingdom initially undertook “to maintain on the mainland of Europe... the effective strength of the United Kingdom forces which are now assigned to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, that is to say four divisions and the Second Tactical Air Force, or such other forces as the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, regards as having equivalent fighting capacity... not to withdraw these forces against the wishes of the majority of the high contracting parties...”. Following successive decisions of the Council, the level of this commitment is now down to 55,000 men plus the Second Tactical Air Force.

2.5. The Committee notes with great satisfaction that the information concerning this commitment given in the Council’s annual report for 1980 fully meets, for the first time, its wishes as expressed *inter alia* in the Assembly’s Recommendations 331 and 348. The report states in fact that the average number of British land forces stationed on the mainland of Europe in 1980 in accordance with the commitment in Article VI of Protocol No. II was 56,985. However, it continues: “The continued need for the presence of troops in Northern Ireland made it necessary for units of the British Army of the Rhine to be redeployed for short tours of duty there. In 1980 there were on average 2,480 men in Northern Ireland. As has been previously stated, these units would be speedily returned to their duty station in an emergency affecting NATO.” For the first time, it may be deduced from the report to the Assembly that the average number of British forces stationed in Germany was 54,505 men, whereas the commitment is for 55,000 men.

2.6. Also for the first time, the annual report gives the following details on the strength of the

United Kingdom's Second Tactical Air Force:

"Furthermore, in accordance with the Council's reply to Assembly Recommendation 348, the Government of the United Kingdom have informed the Council that the strength of the United Kingdom's Second Tactical Air Force in 1980 was:

<i>Rôle</i>	<i>Aircraft/Equipment</i>	<i>Squadrons</i>
Strike/Attack	Buccaneer	2
	Jaguar	4
Ground support	Harrier	2
Reconnaissance	Jaguar	1
Air defence	Phantom	2
	Bloodhound surface-to-air missiles	1
	Rapier surface-to-air missiles	4
Air transport	Wessex	1
Ground defence	RAF regiment	1

These strengths will remain unchanged in 1981."

2.7. As far as aircraft are concerned, it may be deduced that British forces stationed on the mainland of Europe include eleven squadrons of tactical aircraft of all kinds plus a squadron of Wessex helicopters.

2.8. The Committee welcomes the strength of British forces stationed on the mainland of Europe and in particular the standard of the aircraft, which include the Harrier, the first vertical take-off aircraft to become operational in the world. The deficit of 505 men shown in the average strength of land forces is not over-important in itself, although it is to be feared that with leave and other force movements the "average" of 54,505 men may conceal a true figure which is at times slightly lower. Much more important are the various pieces of information according to which the level of British troops stationed on the mainland of Europe might soon be reduced. For instance, speaking in Bonn on 6th April 1981, Mr. Nott, United Kingdom Secretary of State for Defence, said: "Some of us are trying to spread our efforts too thinly over too many tasks and we are going to have to concentrate our efforts to achieve a more effective output." The Secretary of State recalled that the United Kingdom not only had troops in Germany but contributed 70% of NATO naval forces in the eastern Atlantic, in addition to maintaining an independent nuclear force. "Our commitment to the forward defence of Germany is not in doubt... but the outputs may need to be varied within a NATO context." The newspapers also reported on 13th April that the number of British divisions in Germany would shortly be cut from four to three, although the divisions would be larger. However, the withdrawal of a divisional headquarters would abolish more than 1,000 posts.

2.9. The Committee recalls that under Article VI of Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels

Treaty, the United Kingdom undertook "not to withdraw these forces against the wishes of the majority of the high contracting parties". The Committee proposes that the Assembly ask the Council to consult it fully before authorising any reduction the United Kingdom may request in the level of its forces stationed on the mainland of Europe.

### 3. Amendment to Annex III to Protocol No. III

2.10. In Recommendation 348 adopted last year on the Committee's report, the Assembly recommended that the Council "delete paragraph V of Annex III to Protocol No. III of the modified Brussels Treaty". The paragraph V in question defined the warships which Germany was not allowed to produce; the Assembly strongly recommended that the provisions relating to these restrictions be cancelled entirely.

2.11. The Committee is, therefore gratified to note that, as the Assembly was informed at the time, the Council cancelled the provisions of paragraph V at its meeting on 21st July 1980.

### 5. Assembly recommendations

2.12. The Committee can but express satisfaction at the Council's detailed reply to most points in Recommendation 348 adopted by the Assembly last year on the Committee's report replying to the annual report of the Council. For instance, the Council reports on decisions taken by the NATO Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs on 14th May 1980 to strengthen the Alliance's defence capability and to mitigate "any military weaknesses arising from the possible deployment in South-West Asia of

United States reinforcement forces originally intended for Europe". At the same time, the reply endorses the decision taken by the NATO Defence Planning Committee in December 1980 on individual measures in certain sectors.

2.13. In paragraph 3 of the recommendation, the Assembly asked that German naval forces be assigned to SACLANT as well as to SACEUR with the aim of making the best use of them. In its reply, the Council reports to the Assembly on the decision by the Federal Security Council of 19th June 1980 expressing Germany's "willingness to let German naval and naval air forces henceforth be deployed also outside the area limits at present existing for the German navy in the northern flank command ... the German government will make this offer to the competent NATO bodies".

2.14. The Council's reply to paragraphs 4 and 6 of Recommendation 348 is wholly satisfactory. (See paragraphs 2.10 and 2.4 et seq.).

2.15. In paragraph 7 of the recommendation, the Assembly asked that the situation as regards stocks of chemical weapons held by member countries be clarified. In its reply, the Council recalls that the Agency for the Control of Armaments asks all member states to indicate whether they hold stocks of chemical weapons and that they all replied in the negative. The Council's present report is moreover clearer on this question. However, the Assembly's recommendation asked that the Council publish in its report "the list approved by the Council, currently in force, of chemical products to be controlled by the Agency". The Council did not reply to this paragraph of the recommendation and the annual report publishes no list. The Committee considers this omission regrettable since the list in question, marked "Unclassified", has been communicated by the Agency for the Control of Armaments to anybody wishing to receive it, and the details are given *inter alia* in the publications of the *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute* (SIPRI).

2.16. Otherwise, the Council reports fully on the activities of NATO and the Independent European Programme Group, the bodies where commitments stemming from the Brussels Treaty are effectively carried out. In this connection, the Committee notes the Council's remarks, which deserve special attention:

"... the formation of international consortia makes a useful contribution to a better organisation of armaments co-operation ... and ... these bodies should be encouraged in their co-operative projects."

With regard to the standardisation of munitions for the new generation of main battle tanks, it

can be seen from the Council's answer to Written Question 215 that a smooth-bore gun is envisaged for the tank and is the object of Franco-German studies, while the United Kingdom continues to favour a rifled gun. In these circumstances, the standardisation of armaments would unfortunately not be possible and the Council can see no advantage in asking the Standing Armaments Committee to investigate the matter.

### III. Agency for the Control of Armaments

3.1. When the Brussels Treaty was modified in 1954, certain provisions concerning the control of member states' armaments were incorporated; they are contained in Protocols Nos. III and IV. These provisions may be summarised as follows:

- (i) Germany undertook not to manufacture atomic, biological or chemical weapons on its territory;
- (ii) Germany also undertook not to manufacture certain conventional weapons, the list of which may be amended or cancelled in accordance with a special procedure, the Council deciding by a two-thirds majority;
- (iii) the Council determines the level of stocks of atomic, biological and chemical weapons which countries manufacturing them may hold on the mainland of Europe<sup>1</sup>;
- (iv) atomic, biological and chemical weapons and certain conventional weapons held by member countries on the mainland of Europe<sup>1</sup> are subject to verification by the WEU Agency for the Control of Armaments. The list of such atomic, biological and chemical weapons and of conventional weapons may be modified by a unanimous decision of the Council;
- (v) The Agency for the Control of Armaments verifies that the above provisions are respected, except for the weapons of forces assigned to NATO, which are verified by the latter.

#### (a) Non-application of controls

3.2. As the Committee has pointed out in its reports since 1978, the usefulness of these controls is now disputed. The Committee has always underlined the major shortcomings in

1. The expression "on the mainland of Europe" excludes British weapons on British metropolitan territory.

their application by the Council and the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council indicates no change.

3.3. Like earlier reports, the Council's present report refers to fields where the Agency does not exercise its activities:

*"Atomic, chemical and biological weapons"*

The position described in earlier annual reports remained basically unchanged.

The activities of the Agency do not extend to nuclear weapons. The non-nuclear components of such weapons (namely the missiles themselves and other specially designed equipment) are subject to control except as regards the weapons of one member state<sup>1</sup>.

Nor does the Agency apply any controls to biological weapons.

The control activities dealt with in this chapter do not, therefore, concern these two categories of armaments.

In the case of chemical weapons, only non-production controls take place; no quantitative controls are made since the member states have always declared they possessed no such armaments."

3.4. The Council's report goes on to say:

"As the convention for the due process of law<sup>2</sup> has not yet entered into force, the control measures carried out by the Agency at private concerns had, in 1980, as in previous years, to take the form of 'agreed control measures'.

One consequence of this situation is that, in order to obtain the agreement of the firms concerned, the Agency has to give a few weeks' notice. [This agreement has never been withheld.] ..."

3.5. The annual report also specifies that:

"In application of Article III of Protocol No. III, which lays down conditions to

1. In its report last year, the Committee noted that the state in question was France and that Pluton tactical nuclear missiles had been withdrawn from Agency control as from 1979. The accuracy of this interpretation was confirmed by the French Minister of Defence in answer to questions put by the press (AGEFI, 28th May 1980).

2. Convention concerning measures to be taken by member states of Western European Union in order to enable the Agency for the Control of Armaments to carry out its control effectively and making provision for due process of law, in accordance with Protocol No. IV of the Brussels Treaty, as modified by the Protocols signed in Paris on 23rd October 1954 (signed in Paris on 14th December 1957 but ratified by only six states: Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom).

enable the Council to fix the levels of chemical weapons that may be held on the mainland of Europe by those countries which have not given up the right to produce them, and in accordance with the Council decision of 1959, the Agency asked the countries concerned in its questionnaire whether production of chemical weapons on their mainland territory had passed the experimental stage and entered the effective production stage.

All the member countries concerned once again gave an explicit negative reply in 1980.

In addition, in the covering letter to its questionnaire, the Agency reminded the member states that chemical weapons, if held, should be declared in the same way as other armaments, whatever their origin. In reply to this questionnaire no country reported holding any chemical weapons and because of this the quantitative control of weapons of this nature raised no problems in 1980."

3.6. Having paid particular attention to chemical weapons in last year's report, the Committee is pleased to note that the Council considers that the control of chemical weapons raises no problems. Although the former British Secretary of State for Defence, Mr. Pym, showed some interest in chemical weapons, the Under-Secretary of State, Mr. Goodhart, declared on 2nd March 1981 in answer to a question in parliament: "We have no plans for research and development directed towards an offensive chemical warfare capability."

3.7. However, the Committee regrets that the Council's report to the Assembly did not contain the list of chemical weapons subject to control, although it has been communicated to the Swedish institute (see paragraph 2.15).

*(b) Activities of the Agency for the Control of Armaments*

3.8. Although the usefulness of WEU control is no longer evident and the Agency's true areas of activity remain limited solely to conventional weapons, the number of inspections carried out by the Agency each year shows that generally speaking there has been no reduction in its activities, as may be seen from the following table.

3.9. Once again, the Committee finds particularly useful the lists of armaments currently being produced, set out in parts 1 to 4 of Section E "State and problems of control in certain particular fields" which is a summary of all current armaments production programmes in member countries.



*Numbers and types of inspections  
carried out by the Agency for the Control of Armaments*

	Control measures at depots	Control measures at units under national command	Control measures at production plants (quantitative control measures)	Total quantitative control measures	Control measures at production plants (non-production control measures)	(of which non-production of chemical weapons)	Total control measures (all categories)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
1961	29	15	12	66	7	(2)	63
2	26	20	11	57	7	(2)	65
3	35	13	13	61	10	(4)	74
4	39	19	13	71	9	(4)	80
5	26	16	11	53	7	n.a.	60
6	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	78
7	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	70
8	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	79
9	*	*	*	*	*	(3)	77
1970	a b	a b	a b	a b	a b	n.a.	a b
1	* *	* *	* *	* *	* *	n.a.	82 72
2	* *	* *	* *	* *	* *	n.a.	82 72
3	* *	* *	* *	* *	* *	n.a.	66
4	* *	* *	* *	* *	* *	n.a.	66
5	* *	* *	* *	* *	* *	n.a.	71
6	* *	* *	* *	* *	* *	n.a.	72
7	* *	* *	* *	* *	* *	n.a.	71
8	* *	* *	* *	* *	* *	n.a.	70
9	* *	* *	* *	* *	* *	n.a.	68
1980	* *	* *	* *	* *	* *	n.a.	70

Note a, b: From 1971 onwards the Agency adopted a new system of presenting its summary table of inspections, thenceforth counting inspections of several small grouped ammunition depots as a single inspection. An apparent reduction in numbers of inspections in fact reflects no reduction in the activities of the Agency. For comparison, the Council reported both sets of figures (old and new style - a and b) for the years 1970 and 1971.

n.a.: Information not available.

Sources: Figures for total control measures (all categories) given in column 7 are derived from published annual reports of the Council. With regard to the various categories of controls (columns 1 to 6), figures for 1961-65 are also derived from the published annual reports of the Council. Those for 1966 to 1969 have never been made available to the Committee. Those for 1970 to 1980 have been communicated to the Assembly by the Council in response to Recommendation 213, but permission to publish them has been withheld. Minor discrepancies in some totals result from differences of definition of visit and are without significance.

\* Confidential information available to the Committee deleted from the published report.

### *Conclusion on the control of armaments*

3.10. The annual report of the Council stresses the limited nature of the field control programme, particularly visits to private firms. In connection with controls from documentary sources, it states: "The close co-operation which exists between the Agency and the international staff of the SAC has resulted in the best use of available credits by avoiding duplication, to the greater benefit of both bodies." In spite of this wish to be economical, the number of technical information visits

seems to have continued at the same rate in 1980.

### *IV. Standing Armaments Committee*

4.1. The study of the armaments industries in member countries which the Council instructed the WEU Standing Armaments Committee to prepare in 1977 has been completed as far as the economic part is concerned, a declassified version of which is being prepared. This part

is before the Council together with the parts completed earlier. In spite of the undertaking which the Council repeats each year that "when the whole study had been completed, the Council would consider the content and the manner in which the Assembly could be adequately informed", the latter has still received nothing.

4.2. In 1980, as in the recent years, the SAC's other activities were practically limited to a few information meetings of the Working Group on operational research.

### V. Conclusions

5.1. Having examined the chapters of the annual report of the Council on the defence activities of the organisation, the Committee concludes, in agreement with the Council, that the basic provisions of the Brussels Treaty, particularly those in Article V<sup>1</sup> which concern mutual defence, are still just as valid and important as they were in 1948 when the treaty was signed. Like the Council, the Committee notes that at present implementation of the commitments and responsibilities of the organisation as defined in the treaty is ensured in the wider frameworks to which the seven member countries belong, i.e. European political consultations, the North Atlantic Council and the Independent European Programme Group, quoted by the Council. These activities are conducted outside WEU with the twofold aim of efficiency and avoiding duplication of work in accordance with the provisions of the Brussels Treaty itself. By meeting their commitments in this way, the seven member countries still reserve the right, in case of need, to consult each other on a seven-power basis in the WEU Council under Article VIII of the treaty on threats to peace. It should be noted that, by their very existence, the Brussels and North Atlantic Treaties have been so effective that this article does not appear ever to have been invoked since the treaty was signed.

5.2. However, if a treaty, particularly a mutual defence treaty, is to be credible, it is essential for there to be visible continuing activity within its framework. For many years now, the work of the Assembly, its studies of defence matters and the dialogue between the Assembly and the Council have been the principal activities in the framework of the treaty. This highly political activity is the best way of ensuring the credibility of the Brussels Treaty. At the same time, the continuation for

narrowly legalistic reasons of activities that no longer serve any political or practical purpose is not only a waste of public money – it may bring the organisation as a whole into disrepute and undermine the credibility of the fundamental provisions of the treaty.

5.3. It has sometimes been considered that the automatic nature of Article V of the Brussels Treaty, which provides that "if any of the high contracting parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other high contracting parties will... afford the party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power", has an advantage over Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty which merely makes it binding upon the partners to consult each other. In this connection, it is interesting to quote the answer Mr. François-Poncet, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, gave on 26th February 1981 to a written question put in the Senate on France's nuclear force and the Brussels Treaty. Mr. François-Poncet said:

"The WEU treaty is not automatic in the way the honourable member would wish in that it is for each high contracting party to decide whether the conditions of *casus foederis* exist."

However this may be, Article IV of the Brussels Treaty makes it incumbent on the parties and any organs established by them to work in close co-operation with NATO and provides that the Council and its Agency will rely on the appropriate military authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters. At present, the Brussels Treaty may be considered as something of a safety net stretched under the North Atlantic Treaty.

5.4. For some time, the Committee, in the chapters of its reports on the application of arms controls provided for in Protocols Nos. III and IV of the Brussels Treaty, has pointed out that the usefulness of these controls is now disputed. The Council has never authorised the application of what might have been considered the most essential controls, i.e. of nuclear and biological weapons. Controls on the non-production of chemical weapons apply – very symbolically, moreover – only to Germany. There remain the controls on the non-production of certain conventional weapons in Germany, the list of which has been progressively reduced, and the quantitative controls of certain conventional weapons in all member countries on the mainland of Europe. Under Article V of Protocol No. III, however, the Council may vary the list of armaments subject to quantitative control "by unanimous decision". So far no use has been made of this provision. As for the list of conventional weapons the production of which is forbidden in Germany, it may be modified by the Council

1. The text of Articles IV, V and VIII.3 of the treaty referred to in the first paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation are at Appendix.

by a two-thirds majority if Germany so requests and if recommended by the NATO Supreme Commander.

5.5. Regarding the work of the Standing Armaments Committee – a body set up not by the Brussels Treaty or its protocols but by simple Council decision on 7th May 1955 – the Council has informed the Assembly that arrangements for co-operation in the field of arms production are the subject of work in the Independent European Programme Group, and that any duplication of work with that body must be avoided. The Standing Armaments Committee has completed the two chapters of a study of the European armaments industry that do not duplicate the work of the IEPG, and as in the past the Committee recommends that these chapters be communicated to the Assembly.

5.6. In view of the difficult economic position of all the member countries, they are at present trying to make economies in the budgets of international organisations including WEU. Answering a question put in the House of Lords, the United Kingdom Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Carrington, said on 2nd March 1981:

“ All member governments of the Western European Union are aiming at limiting the 1981 budget to zero growth in real terms at most. Her Majesty's Government believe that it will be possible to accommodate this without loss of efficiency, and that it will not affect the continued implementation of the tasks required of the WEU under the modified Brussels Treaty. ”

The Committee therefore considers that a new allocation of the resources which member governments make available to WEU is necessary in view of the present scale and importance of the activities of the various WEU bodies. The Committee notes with satisfaction that according to the annual report of the Council there is already close co-operation between the Agency for the Control of Armaments and the international secretariat of the Standing

Armaments Committee. This flexible staff policy should be extended to the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly, which is always short of staff in view of the work the Assembly calls for. Moreover, since most of the staff of the ministerial organs of WEU are retired officers who on average spend only the last five years of their careers in WEU, should the Council consider it necessary to make some reduction in the staff of these organs, this aim could be attained in a few years merely by suspending recruitment without jeopardising staff interests.

5.7. In the draft recommendation submitted for the consideration of the Assembly, it is recommended that the Council examine the functioning of WEU in the 1980's in the light of circumstances today. *Inter alia*, this study should cover:

- (a) the extent to which the controls provided for in Protocols Nos. III and IV should be maintained and the corresponding decisions called for in accordance with Articles II and V of Protocol No. III;
- (b) the appropriate allocation of financial resources and staff between all the WEU organs in the light of the present scope and importance of their respective activities;
- (c) the possibility of extending to the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly the current practice whereby staff of the international secretariat of the SAC may assist the Agency for the Control of Armaments.

5.8. The Council has already asked the Assembly to propose studies which might be entrusted to the Standing Armaments Committee. The Committee proposes that the assistance of the international secretariat of the SAC be made available to the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly to conduct the research necessary for the report on “ the rôle and contribution of armed forces in the event of natural or other disasters in peacetime ” which has been referred to the Committee.

APPENDIX

*Articles IV, V and VIII.3 of the modified Brussels Treaty*

ARTICLE IV

In the execution of the Treaty, the High Contracting Parties and any Organs established by Them under the Treaty shall work in close co-operation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

Recognising the undesirability of duplicating the military staffs of NATO, the Council and its Agency will rely on the appropriate military authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters.

ARTICLE V

If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in

Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power.

ARTICLE VIII

3. At the request of any of the High Contracting Parties the Council shall be immediately convened in order to permit Them to consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise, or a danger to economic stability.

*European security and the Mediterranean*

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**REPORT<sup>1</sup>**

*submitted on behalf of the  
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments<sup>2</sup>  
by Mr. Bozzi, Rapporteur*

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1. Adopted in Committee by 14 votes to 1 with 1 abstention.

2. *Members of the Committee:* Mr. Cavaliere (Chairman); MM. Bozzi, van den Bergh (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Bahr, Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Bernini, Bizet, Cox (Alternate: Müller), Edwards, Fosson, Grant, Kittelmann, de

Koster (Alternate: Mommersteeg), Lemmrich, Maravalle, Ménard, Pecchioli, Péronnet, Prussen, Schmidt (Alternate: Ahrens), Scholten, Smith, Tanghe, Vohrer.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

(e) The eastern Mediterranean

- (i) Iraq
- (ii) Syria
- (iii) Lebanon
- (iv) Israel
- (v) Egypt

(f) North Africa

- (i) Libya
- (ii) Tunisia
- (iii) Algeria
- (iv) Morocco

V. Conclusions

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### *Introductory Note*

In preparing this report the Rapporteur had interviews as follows:

*22nd February 1981 – Istanbul, Turkey*

General Muhsim Batur, former Chief of Staff, Turkish Air Force, former Senator.

*16th March 1981 – Toulon, France*

Vice Admiral Jean Accary, Commander-in-Chief, French Mediterranean Fleet.

*29th April 1981 – Paris*

H.E. Mr. Miguel Solano Aza, Spanish Ambassador;

H.E. Mr. Hédi Mabrouk, Tunisian Ambassador.

The Committee as a whole was addressed by, and discussed the theme of the report with, the following persons:

*16th February 1981 – Headquarters Allied Forces Southern Europe, Bagnoli, Naples, Italy*

Lieutenant General James M. Thompson, US Army, Chief of Staff, HQ AFSOUTH;

Colonel Pringle, US Air Force, AFSOUTH;

Admiral Buchanan, Chief of Staff, Headquarters Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe;

General Viagio Cacciola, Italian Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, HQ AFSOUTH;

Brigadier General Lombardi, Assistant Chief of Staff, Training, HQ AFSOUTH;

Brigadier General Tsougannis, Greek Army, Assistant Chief of Staff, Personnel and Administration, HQ AFSOUTH;

Brigadier General Imer, Turkish Army, Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, HQ AFSOUTH;

Rear Admiral Duvigier, Chief of French Liaison Mission;

Commander Conder, Royal Navy, Staff Officer, Operations, HQ NAVSOUTH;

Admiral Monassi, Commander, NAVSOUTH;

Brigadier General Tezel, HQ AIRSOUTH, and staff.

*18th February 1981 – Athens, Greece*

*Ministry of Defence:*

Brigadier General Nicholas Baltas, Hellenic General Staff;

Mr. Evangelos Averoff Tossizza, Minister of Defence;

Mr. George Roviou, Secretary of State for Defence;

Ambassador Tsamados, Head of NATO Department, Greek Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

*Chamber of Deputies:*

The following members of the Greek Parliamentary Defence Committee:

Admiral John Mineos, Chairman

MM. Denis Karvelos

Alexander Mantzoulinos

Constantine Kallios

Alexander Papadogonas

Mrs. Julia Tsirimokou

MM. Alexander Zaimis

P. Gerakis

A. Koutsogeorgas

John Stakiopoulos

Dimitrios Kaloudis

John Artonopoulos

P. Klis

*20th February 1981 – NATO missile firing installation, Crete, Greece*

Major General Constantinos Polyzos, Commander, NAMFI.

*21st February 1981 – Athens, Greece*

Mr. Costas Mitsotakis, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

*23rd February 1981 – Ankara, Turkey*

*Ministry for Foreign Affairs:*

Ambassador Şahinbaş, Under-Secretary General for Mutual Security Affairs, Ministry for Foreign Affairs;

Mr. Gunaltaş, Political Planning Department, Ministry for Foreign Affairs;

Dr. Türmen, Ministry for Foreign Affairs;

Colonel Özalp, Turkish General Staff;

Admiral Isik, Turkish General Staff.

*24th February 1981 – Ankara, Turkey*

*Turkish General Staff:*

General Kenan Evren, Head of State;

General Necdet Özturun, Deputy Chief of the Turkish General Staff;

General Necip Torumtay.

*Ministry of Defence:*

Mr. Ümit Halûk Bayülken, Minister of Defence.

*Ministry for Foreign Affairs:*

Mr. Ilter Türkmen, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

*Anadolu Club:*

Mr. Süleyman Demirel, President of the Justice Party.

(The following former parliamentarians, members of the Justice Party, were also present:

MM. Nahit Menteşe (Secretary-General)

Ihsan Sabri Çağlayangil

Necmeddin Cevherî (Vice-President)

Yiğit Köker (Vice-President)

Ali Nailî Erdem (Vice-President)

Dr. Şaban Karataş

MM. Halit Evliya

Sitki Yircali

- Ekrem Ceyhun

Dr. Nuri Bayar

MM. Bahri Dağdaş

Ahmet Topaloğlu

Cahit Dalokay

Ilhan Ersoy

Dr. Münif İscamoğlu

MM. Aydın Menderes

Ibrahim Kirazoğlu

General Faik Türün

General Süleyman Tuncel)

The following former parliamentarians, members of the Republican People's Party:

MM. Mustafa Üstündağ (Acting President, Secretary-General)

Turan Güneş

Altan Öymen

Hikmet Çetin



Irfan Özaydinli  
Gündüz Ökçün  
Metin Tüzün  
Besim Üstünel  
Hasan Esat Işık

*25th February 1981 – Headquarters Allied Land Forces South-East Europe and 6th Allied Tactical Air Force*

General Sedat Guncel, Turkish Army, Commander, LANDSOUTHEAST;

Lieutenant General Serafettin Uğur, Commander, 6 ATAF, and other members of the staff;

Major General Philip Kaplan, United States Army, Deputy Commander LANDSOUTHEAST;

Captain Gunay, COMNAVSOUTH Representative;

Captain Pippin, COMSTRIKFORSOUTH Representative;

Lieutenant Colonel Gregson, United Kingdom Army;

Lieutenant Colonel Richards, United States Air Force.

The Committee met at the seat of the Assembly, Paris, on 6th April for a first reading of the draft report, and met there finally on 4th May 1981 when it adopted the report as a whole.

The Committee and the Rapporteur express their thanks to the Ministers, officials and senior officers and experts who received the Rapporteur or addressed the Committee and replied to questions.

The views expressed in the report, unless expressly otherwise attributed, are those of the Committee.

**Draft Recommendation****on European security and the Mediterranean**

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting the continuous growth of Soviet military power and the strategic advantages enjoyed by the Soviet Union, and considering however that these factors have not led to any significant increase in the last three years in the direct *conventional* military threat from the Warsaw Pact countries in the Mediterranean region;
- (ii) Condemning the invasion of Afghanistan and the continued occupation of that country by Soviet forces;
- (iii) Concerned at the growing risk in parts of the eastern and southern Mediterranean region of conflicts or crises arising which can directly or indirectly involve the interests of allied countries;
- (iv) Drawing particular attention to the unprecedented levels of modern armaments in those areas, supplied both by the Soviet Union and certain countries of the Alliance, and which exceed in quantity and quality those of local NATO countries;
- (v) Welcoming the return of Greek forces to the NATO integrated military structure;
- (vi) Considering that as long as the process which should lead to the creation of new democratic parliamentary institutions in Turkey is not placed in doubt, the interests of that country and of the Alliance presuppose the maintenance, even the strengthening of the links which now exist between Turkey and the various Atlantic and European institutions;
- (vii) Believing however that European security depends also on diplomatic efforts to reduce the many local causes of tension, and on arms control measures,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL,

Call for concerted action, where appropriate, in the North Atlantic Council or other bodies:

1. To establish more clearly the indivisibility of the Alliance and the will of all members to maintain security in the Mediterranean area;
2. To increase mutual assistance for the modernisation of the military potential of Greece, and even more urgently Turkey, for the purpose of fulfilling their contribution to NATO with particular regard to the quality and level of armaments of neighbouring countries;
3. To improve communications and air defence installations in the Mediterranean area;
4. To take diplomatic action to deter non-member countries of NATO from allowing bases or other military installations on their territory to be used by Warsaw Pact armed forces;
5. To develop reasonably flexible defence arrangements to counter rapidly any unexpected threats to peace in the area, and to diversify the ability to bring in reinforcements to replace those currently earmarked that may prove to be required outside the NATO area;
6. To encourage Greece and Turkey to reach an early settlement of their disputes and to expedite the command reorganisation in the Aegean area;
7. To consider arrangements to permit Spain to participate in NATO exercises and defence planning pending a possible completely independent decision by Spain to apply to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty;
8. To promote diplomatic efforts with a view both to endeavouring to reduce local causes of tension, and to expediting the convening of the Conference on Disarmament in Europe.

## *Explanatory Memorandum*

(submitted by Mr. Bozzi, Rapporteur)

### I. Introduction

1.1. It is three years since the Committee last reported specifically on security in the Mediterranean area<sup>1</sup>. In the interval there have been many significant political changes in the area, which are described in the various sections below.

1.2. Despite the continuous increase in the overall Soviet defence effort, manifested most visibly in the continued deployment of the SS-20 missile and the Backfire bomber, and the introduction of several new types of large ocean-going naval vessel, the direct military threat from the Soviet Union in the Mediterranean area has not significantly increased – it is still less in relative terms than in the 1960s when important air and naval bases were available to the Soviet Union in Egypt.

1.3. On the other hand, the danger of conflict breaking out in the area, conflict that could directly involve allied interests, has increased in the last three years. With its invasion of Afghanistan, the Soviet Union has demonstrated its readiness to employ its own military forces to secure political aims beyond its own boundaries and beyond those of the Warsaw Pact countries. The pro-western régime of the Shah has fallen and Muslim fundamentalism offers Iran an uncertain future. CENTO, the mutual defence organisation linking Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States, has finally ceased to exist. Conflict has broken out between Iraq and Iran; relations between the Soviet Union and Syria have improved, and the level of armaments of these countries, all with a common frontier with Turkey, a NATO country, has risen considerably; they all have more modern equipment than Turkey. The Israeli-Arab dispute remains unsettled and a permanent source of potential conflict. Lebanon, struggling for its survival, has again become an area of dangerous instability. In Libya, the unpredictable Colonel Kadhafi is a cause of deep concern to all his neighbours and has succeeded for the time being in dominating Chad with Libyan military forces.

1.4. There are, however, positive developments for the Alliance, particularly the Greek decision to reintegrate its forces into NATO, and the improved prospects of Greek-Turkish

negotiations to settle outstanding differences which were a long-standing source of weakness to the Alliance. The prospects of a resolution have improved rather than diminished with the Generals' seizure of power in Turkey. In Yugoslavia, the succession to Marshal Tito has been in accordance with the constitution, which the Committee described in some detail in its previous report, and there has been no change in the orientation of that country or any attempt at outside interference. Malta, another country with unpredictable leadership, has concluded a mutual security agreement with Italy. Finally, in the Western Mediterranean, since the last report of the Committee, Spain has adopted its new constitution providing for parliamentary government, and its government continues from time to time to allude to the possibility of joining NATO.

1.5. These and other changes are reported on by the Committee in the following chapters, and conclusions finally drawn, the principle ones of which are embodied in the draft recommendation.

### II. *The Soviet Union and threats to security in the Mediterranean*

#### (a) *General*

2.1. The Soviet military presence in the Mediterranean itself exists only in the form of the Soviet Mediterranean naval squadron. It is not large in comparison with the combined fleets maintained by NATO countries in the sea. Moreover, apart from limited facilities in Tartus, Syria, it has no proper base in the Mediterranean itself. But a study of security in the Mediterranean must consider the security of all NATO countries in the area and the interests of the whole Alliance in freedom of passage for ships and aircraft. Thus, in addition to the study in this chapter on the status of Soviet forces and those of other Warsaw Pact countries in the area, the report considers also in Chapter IV the situation in the other riparian countries and those which are neighbours of the NATO countries, including the extent of Soviet influence in certain of these countries, the facilities they may provide for Soviet forces, and the armed forces and equipment of the countries themselves, some of which could be a potential threat to certain allied countries if the pattern of alignment changed as it has done so often and abruptly in the past.

<sup>1</sup> Security in the Mediterranean, Document 776, 31st May 1978, Rapporteur: Mr. Grant.

*(b) Present Soviet military effort*

2.2. The Committee has recently devoted a report to an analysis of the trends in the military balance of the last twenty years<sup>1</sup>. The present report devoted particularly to the Mediterranean area does not therefore examine in detail the overall Soviet defence effort, but its continued growth must be borne in mind as the latest NATO communiqués have stressed:

“6. The enormous growth over a number of years of Warsaw Pact and in particular Soviet military power gives rise to legitimate concern in Europe and throughout the world. This build-up contradicts the frequent assurances by the Warsaw Pact countries that their aim is not military superiority.”<sup>2</sup>

“4. Ministers noted that in spite of the slow-down in economic growth and increasing difficulties in the energy sector, Soviet defence expenditure still amounted to 11-13 % of its GDP and was growing annually at 4-5 % in real terms. It continued to receive top priority despite the needs of the civil economy. In the past year the Soviet nuclear and conventional posture has been enhanced markedly by continuing deployments of many sophisticated systems. These developments cover the strategic nuclear field; the theatre nuclear field...; and all aspects of conventional forces at sea, on land and in the air. No abatement of these programmes was foreseen in future years. Ministers expressed concern over the implications of this unabated growth of Warsaw Pact capability for the balance of forces between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.”<sup>3</sup>

2.3. The most spectacular advance in the Soviet defence effort is the very recent launching of large naval vessels belonging to several entirely new classes. The new battle cruiser Kirov deployed last year is variously reported to be between 32,000 and 25,000 tons, equipped with guided missiles. The follow-on ship, the Sovremenny, has been reported already launched. Four new anti-submarine warfare ships of an 8,500 ton class and a 12,500 ton

missile cruiser are reported building in the Black Sea and a new cruise missile submarine, with the NATO code name Oscar, of 10,000 tons is nearing completion at Severodvinsk on the White Sea. This large-scale new naval construction is undoubtedly intended to enable the Soviet Union to operate in any of the oceans of the world. The existence of a much larger class of supply vessel, the Berezina of 40,000 tons supports this hypothesis. Although these new and larger vessels will not be available in substantial numbers for another seven or eight years, they will then provide the Soviet Union with a capability of operating in oceans of the world in a way in which only the major NATO naval powers have been able to hitherto. This is a new fact of real strategic significance.

2.4. It is unlikely that these new and larger vessels have been specifically designed for service in the Mediterranean, but of course the mobility of naval power would always provide the Soviet Union with this option.

*(c) Warsaw Pact land forces*

2.5. In previous reports, the Committee has considered Warsaw Pact land forces which are a potential threat to NATO countries of the region or to non-aligned countries such as Yugoslavia, whose continued non-alignment is vital to the peace and security of the area. Taking the southern region of NATO as a whole, the Warsaw Pact land forces to be taken into account are those of Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria and the Soviet forces stationed in Hungary and in the Odessa, North Caucasus and Trans-Caucasus military districts of the Soviet Union. No Soviet forces are stationed in Romania or Bulgaria.

2.6. In reviewing the force balance in the present report, the Committee has at its disposal unclassified information provided by NATO headquarters where the Committee was briefed, as well as the current edition of the authoritative Military Balance of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, whose figures for Warsaw Pact forces the Committee has normally found to be slightly lower than those provided in unclassified NATO briefings.

2.7. The following table, showing balance of ground forces in the Southern Europe area as a whole, is derived from the current IISS Military Balance; it shows forces available without mobilisation, but apparently excludes Soviet divisions in the Trans-Caucasus military district which is in direct contact with Eastern Turkey.

1. State of European security, Document 858, 17th November 1980, Rapporteur: Mr. Brown.

2. Final communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, 12th December 1980.

3. Final communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of the NATO Defence Planning Committee, 10th December 1980. (France participates in meetings of the North Atlantic Council, but not of the DPC.)

*Balance of land forces in Southern Europe<sup>1</sup>*  
(without mobilisation)

		NATO	Warsaw Pact	(of which USSR)	Derived ratio
Ground forces available in peacetime (division equivalents)	Armoured Mechanised infantry and airborne	5 <sup>2</sup> / <sub>3</sub>	6	(2)	1 : 1.06
		38 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>3</sub>	15	(2)	1 : 0.4
Total		44	21	(4)	1 : 0.5
Operational main battle tanks		4,000	6,700	(2,500)	1 : 1.7

1. Stated to include Italian, Greek and Turkish land forces; and Category I land forces of Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria and Soviet units stationed in Hungary.

*Balance of land forces in Southern Europe*  
(all categories of Warsaw Pact divisions including those at cadre strength)

		NATO	Warsaw Pact	(of which USSR)
Ground forces available in peacetime (division equivalents)	Armoured Mechanised infantry etc. Airborne	5 <sup>2</sup> / <sub>3</sub>	6 <sup>2</sup> / <sub>3</sub>	(3)
		37 <sup>1</sup> / <sub>3</sub>	46	(24)
Total		44	54 <sup>2</sup> / <sub>3</sub>	(29)


2.8. When all categories of Warsaw Pact divisions are counted, together with Soviet divisions stationed in the Odessa military district (adjoining Romania) and in the Trans-Caucasus military district (adjoining Eastern Turkey) and Northern Caucasus military district (immediately to the north of the Trans-Caucasus district) the numerical balance of divisions appears much less favourable to NATO.

2.9. The areas in the southern region, where land combat could occur if hostilities broke out, are in the three theatres of North-East Italy; the area of Greek and Turkish Thrace and the Turkish Straits; and Eastern Turkey. These are widely separated areas with difficult communications between them for both Warsaw Pact and the NATO forces, so that the balance of ground forces must really be examined for each of them separately.

2.10. The Warsaw Pact forces to be considered a threat to North-East Italy are those based in Hungary, from which Italian territory can be approached through the Ljubljana Gap in Yugoslavia. The distance is some 250 km measured in a straight line, and thus plenty of warning can be expected of any ground attack in this area.

2.11. According to the IISS, Hungarian land forces of all categories amount to one tank and

five motorised rifle divisions, plus one airborne battalion. Stationed in the territory are two Soviet tank divisions and two motorised rifle divisions. NATO headquarters provide the following unclassified figures for the ground force balance in the theatre.




2.12. Since the Committee last reported, Warsaw Pact armour in this theatre has improved with the addition of sixty modern T-72 tanks to the Hungarian inventory, but Italy during the same period has increased its holding of Leopard I medium tanks from 600 to 745.

2.13. In the area of Greek and Turkish Thrace and the Turkish Straits, the ground force situa-

tion is more uncertain. The strip of Greek territory between the Bulgarian frontier and the Aegean Sea is in parts only 30 km wide. But Bulgarian forces amount only to 1<sup>2</sup>/<sub>3</sub> tank divisions and eight motorised rifle divisions of all categories; it is cut off from Soviet territory by Romania which, in the past, has refused to allow Soviet troops to transit its territory and, in 1968, refused to allow the Bulgarian battalion involved to cross its territory to participate in the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Black Sea ferry services have been improved between Soviet and Bulgarian ports and the Bulgarian battalion involved in 1968 followed this route first before crossing Soviet territory to reach Czechoslovakia. No Soviet units are stationed in either Bulgaria or Romania. On a worst-case assumption, however, and in the light of the extremely important strategic objective which the Turkish Straits would represent to the Soviet Union, the ground forces of Bulgaria and Romania, together with Soviet ground forces in the adjoining Odessa military district, are taken into account.

2.14. According to IISS, divisions of all categories in Bulgaria amount to 1<sup>2</sup>/<sub>3</sub> equivalent tank divisions and eight motorised rifle divisions; in Romania two tank, eight motorised rifle divisions, one mountain division and one airborne brigade. Soviet forces in the Odessa military district amount to six motorised rifle divisions and one airborne division. The corresponding unclassified information from NATO headquarters is presented in the following table.




2.15. The manpower ratio in this theatre is not unfavourable to NATO, but the overwhelming Warsaw Pact superiority in armour is present here as in most theatres. Since the Committee last reported, the relative armour situation for NATO has deteriorated with the appearance in Bulgarian tank divisions of 100 modern T-62 and T-72 medium tanks, and the appearance

of some T-72 tanks in Romania. Over the same three-year period, Greek armour has improved with the addition of 100 AMX-30 tanks to make a total of 170 of this model, but all other tanks in service with the Greek and Turkish forces are obsolete or obsolescent M-47 and M-48s.

2.16. However, because of the geographical implantation of ground forces in this theatre, considerable warning would be available of any preparations for an attack under the worst case assumption discussed here.

2.17. Eastern Turkey, where it borders on the Soviet Union, presents a different picture from either of the other two theatres. Less warning might be expected in the event of an offensive being launched by Soviet forces in this area; on the other hand, the immediate strategic objective of such an attack is less evident, and the terrain provides opportunity for defending forces to trade ground in order to gain time. According to the IISS Military Balance, Soviet forces in the Trans-Caucasus military district, immediately adjacent to Turkey, amount to eleven motorised rifle divisions in various categories from one to three, representing different states of readiness, plus one airborne division. The unclassified information provided by NATO headquarters for the ground force balance in this theatre is as follows:



2.18. Turkey's South-Eastern frontier also adjoins Iran, Iraq and Syria, and is an area of extreme instability. Iran and Iraq are currently at war. A new friendship treaty between the Soviet Union and Syria has been signed. Although Turkey is at pains to explain that it maintains friendly relations with its neighbours, the military balance in the area has to be considered especially in the light of the modern armaments which have been acquired by all these three neighbours of Turkey, whose military equipment is now far superior to that

of the Warsaw Pact countries Bulgaria and Romania considered above. It is not possible to assess reliably the state of the Iranian armed forces after the turmoil which followed the fall of the Shah's régime. Prior to 1979, Iran was stated by the IISS to have three armoured divisions, three infantry divisions and four independent brigades, equipped with 875 Chieftain tanks, 460 M-60 medium tanks and 400 obsolescent M-47 and M-48s. Iraq, prior to the outbreak of hostilities with Iran, had four armoured divisions, four mechanised divisions and four mountain infantry divisions, equipped with 2,500 tanks including some T-62s and fifty of the most recent Soviet T-72 tank as well as 100 French AMX-30 tanks, others of which are on order. Since the Committee last reported three years ago, the Iraqi tank inventory has doubled and the T-72s have entered it.

2.19. Syria has the equivalent of about four armoured divisions and 3.5 mechanised divisions equipped with 2,200 older T-54 and T-55 tanks, 600 T-62s and 170 T-72s, which latter have appeared in the three years since the Committee last reported, the total tank inventory having increased by 400 in that period.

2.20. The terrain of South-Eastern Turkey, unlike that on the Soviet frontier, offers good going for tanks and modern armour has not yet reached the Turkish armed forces.


(e) *Warsaw Pact air forces in the southern region*

2.21. The inherent mobility of air forces and widely differing aircraft ranges extending from the strategic bomber to the air defence fighter makes the choice of aircraft for inclusion in a review of the balance of air forces in the southern region problematical. In the following analysis, long-range aviation has been excluded because it can be used against any major military or civil target anywhere in the NATO area. "Forward aviation" carries out close support ground attack, local air defence and reconnaissance. Within the Soviet Union, air defence aircraft are in a special command (PVO) separate from the other formations. It is the aircraft of the latter two commands which are considered here.

2.22. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies' Military Balance, the balance of tactical aviation in the Southern European region is as follows:


	NATO	Warsaw Pact	(of which USSR)
Fighter/ground attack	612	325	(70)
Interceptors	202	1,000	(400)
Reconnaissance	106	200	(125)

2.23. As for the three theatres of operation considered above, Northern Italy is within range of aircraft based in Hungary, which include 20 MiG-23 ground attack fighters plus 150 MiG-21 interceptor defence aircraft. In addition, one Soviet tactical air army is deployed in Hungary. The following table was presented to the Committee by NATO AFSOUTH headquarters:




2.24. In the area of Thrace and the Turkish Straits, account has to be taken of the Bulgarian and Romanian air forces. There are no Soviet air force units based in these two countries but the Soviet tactical aviation in the Odessa military district must be included. The Bulgarian air force now consists of some 64 MiG-17 ground attack aircraft plus several MiG-23s. Interceptor fighters are made up of 80 MiG-21s and 36 MiG-17s.

2.25. The Romanian air force consists of 70 MiG-17 ground attack aircraft and some 240 MiG-21 interceptor fighters. The following table was presented to the Committee by NATO headquarters, showing the balance in the region:



2.26. In Turkey's eastern frontier area, account has to be taken of the Soviet tactical air army

in the Trans-Caucasus and Northern Caucasus military districts. The following table was presented to the Committee, showing the situation:



2.27. Although Bulgarian and Romanian offensive aviation has undergone little modernisation since the Committee's last report three years ago, it is more difficult to know whether the modern aircraft continually being introduced by the Soviet air force are assigned to the southern region. It is thought that one-third of the Backfire medium bombers – i.e. 260 aircraft – might be so assigned and that one of the tactical air armies in the region might be equipped with the new Su-19 bomber. But generally speaking it is estimated that only 60 % of the aircraft of the Soviet Union and its allies in the southern region represent a major threat because of the limits imposed on older types of aircraft. However, a new element is the growing number of Soviet helicopters in the region – some 470 – capable of supplying close support for the army, thus freeing tactical aviation for longer-range operations.

*(f) Air forces of other countries in the region*

2.28. The Committee's attention was drawn in particular to the build-up of military aircraft of Soviet origin in Syria and Libya; in the latter country, there are now at least one MiG-23 regiment, one Tu-22 squadron and one Foxbat MiG-25 squadron whose crews are believed to be Soviet. If ever the many airfields existing in Algeria, Libya, Syria and Iraq were made available to the Soviet Union, the air threat would be much greater. But at the present time the

Soviet Union has no air bases in these countries.

*(g) Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean*

2.29. In the Committee's last report, a detailed examination was made of the historical pattern of Soviet naval deployment in the Mediterranean since the second world war. Virtually nil before 1964, the number of Soviet warships has risen progressively, reaching a peak on one day during the Middle East war in 1973, with 98 vessels of all kinds. This number fell rapidly following the closure of Soviet bases in Egypt, which became definite on 15th March 1976 when President Sadat abrogated the Egypto-Soviet friendship treaty. Since then, there has been a daily average of between 40 and 50 Soviet naval vessels, a quarter of which are surface combatants.

*Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean*  
*1964-80*

Year	Annual ship days	Average daily strength
1964	1,500	5
1965	2,800	8
1966	4,400	12
1967	8,100	22
1968	11,000	30
1969	15,000	41
1970	16,500	45
1971	19,000	52
1972	18,000	49
1973	20,600	56
1974	20,200	55
1975	20,000	55
1976	18,600	50
1977	17,747	48
1978	17,320	48
1979	17,364	47
1980	17,146	46

The average daily strength of the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron (SOVMEDRON) in 1980 was made up as follows:

9	Submarines
11	Surface combatants
23	Auxiliary vessels
3	Intelligence and special purpose vessels
46	AVERAGE TOTAL

The following comparative table was presented to the Committee by NATO headquarters:



*Naval vessels in the Mediterranean*

	Soviet Union	United States	Other NATO <sup>2</sup>	France	Total NATO
Carriers	-	2 <sup>1</sup>	2	2	6
Cruisers	3	1	6	1	8
Frigates and destroyers	8	14	60	13	87
Sub-total - Major surface combatants	11	17	68	16	101
Submarines	8	5	37	11	53
Amphibious vessels	2	6	24	-	30
Auxiliaries	27	11	70	19	100
Total	48	39 <sup>1</sup>	199	46	284

1. When only 1 carrier present in Mediterranean (as on 16th February 1981) the United States total of 39 falls to 33.

2. Total of Greece, Italy and Turkey.

2.30. As a basis for comparison with the fleets of NATO countries as a whole in the Mediterranean, however, consideration should rather be given to the entire Soviet Black Sea fleet which, including vessels of the Mediterranean squadron, consists of 85 surface combatants and 25 submarines.

2.31. However, there are several restrictions on operations by the Soviet squadron in the Mediterranean. The surface ships are detached from the Black Sea fleet, but transit through the Straits connecting the Black Sea with the Mediterranean is governed by the Montreux Convention, signed in 1936, which limits to 9 the number of foreign ships authorised to use the Straits at a given moment. Black Sea powers have to give prior notice to Turkey when requesting authorisation for naval vessels to pass through the Straits, and under the convention Turkey prepares an annual report on the number of warships having passed through the Straits, specifying the name, tonnage and date of passage of each ship. Transit of submarines through the Straits is forbidden, except for repairs outside the Black Sea. Soviet submarines in the Mediterranean come therefore not from the Black Sea fleet but from the Soviet northern or Baltic fleets.

2.32. The following table showing Soviet naval transits of the Straits was drawn up on the basis of Turkey's annual reports:

*Soviet naval transits of the Turkish Straits 1964-80*

Year	Auxiliary transits	Surface combatant transits	Total
1964	56	39	95
1965	80	49	129
1966	71	82	153
1967	149	93	242
1968	113	117	230
1969	142	121	263
1970	149	122	271
1971	154	123	277
1972	140	114	254
1973	159	126	285
1974	145	93	238
1975	146	79	225
1976	63	69	132
1977	103	82	185
1978	121	107	228
1979	129	94	223
1980	124	111	235

The increase in total transits in the last three years reflects not an increase in the Soviet Mediterranean squadron, but increased deployment in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean.

2.33. The Soviet Mediterranean squadron has no major support base in this sea. Limited

facilities are available at Tartus (Syria) and, under commercial agreements, at Bizerta (Tunisia) and Tivat (Yugoslavia). These limited support availabilities are not sufficient to allow the Soviet squadron to be kept at its pre-1974 level.

2.34. For supplies, the Soviet navy is compelled to anchor in international waters off the territorial sea of various states. At various times, the following anchorages have been notified to the Committee: Cythera (Greece), the Gulf of Bunbah, the Gulf of Sollum, the Gulf of Hammamet, Cape Andreas (Cyprus), Melilla (a Spanish enclave in Morocco) and the Spanish island of Alboran. There are permanent anchorages in some of these places.

*Soviet fleet anchorages-ports typical day*

Port of Annaba (Algeria)	1 SS (submarine) 2 Auxiliaries (repair ships)
Hammamet (Tunisia) (Chief anchorage)	2 FF (frigates) 1 AO (tanker) 1 SS 1 Auxiliary (submarine support) 1 AGI
Port of Tivat (Yugoslavia)	1 SS 1 Auxiliary (submarine support)
Port of Syros (Greece)	2 Auxiliaries (supply)
Kithira Anchorage (Greece)	1 CG (missile cruiser) 2 DE (destroyer) 1 AO 1 AGI
Sollum Anchorage (Libya)	1 CG 3 DE 1 AO 3 Auxiliaries (supply)
Cape Gata (South of Cyprus)	1 MSF 1 LST
Port of Tartus (Syria)	1 Floating dock 1 SS 4 Auxiliaries (supply/ barge) 1 Auxiliary

2.35. Today, the Soviet Mediterranean squadron is definitely smaller than fleets of the NATO countries in the same region. If the Soviet Union tried to bring in more surface units from its Black Sea fleet, NATO would have a few weeks' notice because of the limits imposed by the Montreux Convention on the number of warships which may transit the Straits at the same time. Nor would the Soviet Union be able to maintain a large fleet in the sea for very long.

2.36. However, the situation would be entirely different should one of the coastal states again make large naval bases available to the Soviet Union.

### III. *The Alliance*

#### (a) *The countries of the Alliance*

3.1. Four countries, signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty, border the Mediterranean – France, Italy, Greece and Turkey; the United States also maintains significant air and naval forces in the area based both in NATO countries and in Spain. The United Kingdom has a much smaller permanent presence in the Mediterranean area both in the sovereign base areas on the island of Cyprus and in Gibraltar; other NATO countries undertake limited deployments in the Mediterranean area from time to time, particularly through their contributions to the air and land elements of ACE mobile force referred to below.

3.2. Only the air defence forces of Italy, Greece and Turkey in the Mediterranean area are under NATO command in peacetime. The assigned ground and tactical air forces of these countries would come under NATO command at a specified level of alert; naval forces are earmarked for assignment to NATO.

#### (i) *France*

3.3. Although France withdrew from the integrated military structure of NATO in 1966, and had in fact stopped earmarking its Mediterranean naval forces for NATO some two years earlier, France never terminated its participation in other NATO activities. It remains a full participant in the North Atlantic Council, the supreme political organ of the Alliance, and those aspects of the integrated military structure in which France does not participate have since 1966 been dealt with in the NATO Defence Planning Committee on which France is not represented. France continued to participate in subordinate organs of the North Atlantic Council concerned, for example, with political consultation, infrastructure and the production of armaments. The extent of French participation in allied defence planning is illustrated by two items, released for publication, from the minutes of the last ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 12th December 1980 but which were omitted from the official communiqué:

“Ministers noted the report on the situation in the Mediterranean prepared on their instructions and underlined again the necessity of maintaining the balance

of forces in the whole area. They requested the Council in permanent session to continue to consult on the question and submit a further report at their next meeting...

Recognising the importance of a co-ordinated air defence programme to the defensive posture of the Alliance, Ministers welcomed with satisfaction the establishment for this purpose of a NATO air defence committee under the Council."

3.4. With 4 % of its GDP devoted to defence, France has one of the largest defence budgets of any European member of the Alliance. In the Mediterranean in particular, French naval forces, including maritime patrol aircraft, make an important contribution to the balance of force in the area. Conditions under which French naval forces would operate with NATO forces in the event of a French political decision to do so following the outbreak of hostilities, have been spelt out in detailed agreements negotiated with Commander-in-Chief Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe in 1972 and 1976. The Chief of Staff of the French Armed Services maintains a military mission at the headquarters of Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe in Naples which includes two liaison officers from the French Commander-in-Chief for the Mediterranean in Toulon, attached to the headquarters of the Commander Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe also in Naples; inversely that Commander maintains two liaison officers at the French Toulon headquarters.

3.5. In 1980, French naval forces in the Mediterranean participated in three organised NATO exercises and several dozen minor exercises known as Passex. French maritime patrol aircraft co-operate on the same basis as those of the other NATO countries concerned with Commander Maritime Air Forces Mediterranean in Naples who co-ordinates the programmes of all allied maritime patrol aircraft in the Mediterranean in order to provide continuous surveillance of Soviet fleet movements.

3.6. French naval forces in the Mediterranean amount to 16 major surface combatants, including two aircraft carriers, a cruiser and two large destroyers of the Suffren class, and 11 submarines. In an important modernisation programme, covering both weapons, data acquisition and ECM, the two aircraft carriers are undergoing refit, partly to receive tactical nuclear weapons and the new Super Étendard carrier-borne strike aircraft. A new class of destroyer of the C-70 Georges Leygues class (so-called corvette) is being built. New versions of the Atlantic maritime patrol aircraft are also entering service. As with all other navies at

the present time, the modernisation programme will lead in the course of this decade to a reduction in the total number of ships at sea but will significantly improve the effectiveness of the fleet.

#### (ii) Italy

3.7. Italy makes a major contribution to allied defence in the Mediterranean both through the size and quality of its armed forces; by its strategic geographical position in the centre of the Mediterranean effectively dividing it into two basins, and by the facilities it provides for various NATO military headquarters at three separate locations, a vital part of the NATO NADGE air defence radar chain. It also provides facilities and bases for United States forces, which would come under the NATO integrated command at specified stages of alert.

3.8. Italy has revised its defence policy in recent years with a reduction in the manpower in its armed services, chiefly the army which was reduced from 306,000 men five years ago to 218,000 in 1977, but which has increased again to the present 253,000. Three special promotional laws were promulgated to provide \$ 1 billion for the navy and \$ 1.3 billion for each of the army and air force in an equipment modernisation programme including new vessels for the navy, new aircraft such as the Tornado for the air force, and more new Leopard tanks for the army. Inflation has halved the funds originally made available and more finance will be required to meet the equipment modernisation programme and with only 2.3 % of its gross domestic product spent on defence Italy, by this measure, makes the smallest effort of any NATO country except Luxembourg and Canada<sup>1</sup>

3.9. Increasingly aware of the instability of the Mediterranean region, Italy, in revising its defence policy, has called for a new NATO strategy to pay more attention to the southern flank and to arrange closer links with the Greek and Turkish armed forces. The NATO report on the situation in the Mediterranean called for by the North Atlantic Council has been referred to in paragraph 3.3 above.

3.10. Italy's north-eastern frontier is possibly vulnerable to land attack by Warsaw Pact forces through the Ljubljana gap in Yugoslavia as pointed out above in paragraphs 2.10 et seq. which show the balance of force in that area. The Italian ground forces amount to some eight divisional equivalents including one armoured and three mechanised divisions equipped with

1. See Appendix I, comparative table of defence effort 1976-80.

1,300 modern Leopard I and M-60 tanks and 550 obsolescent M-47s. 100 more Leopard tanks are on order. Nuclear support is provided with six Lance surface-to-surface missiles as well as the nuclear support provided by United States army units in Italy referred to below.

3.11. The Italian air force comprises some seventeen tactical squadrons, including nine fighter ground attack; two reconnaissance and six all-weather fighter squadrons equipped with F-104 and some G-91 aircraft. 100 Tornado are on order.

3.12. The Italian navy comprises thirty-one main surface combatants and nine submarines, the former including a helicopter cruiser, Vittorio Veneto, and two other cruisers, nine destroyers and eighteen frigates. Three maritime patrol squadrons, which in Italy come under the air force, are equipped with eighteen Atlantic aircraft, others with the S-2 Tracker.

3.13. Under the bilateral mutual security agreement with the United States of January 1952, with various subsequent additions, Italy provides United States forces with some 58 different facilities and bases in Italy for purposes directly related to allied defence under Article III of the North Atlantic Treaty. The United States army has about one thousand men in the Southern European Task Force based in Livorno and Vicenza which, on the one hand, provide units for tactical nuclear support of the Italian ground forces in addition to the Lance missiles of the Italian army, and also provide basic logistics support facilities. The Italian air force has an important base at Aviano in North-East Italy from which tactical aircraft can operate on a rotational basis, from other United States airfields in Spain. Sigonella air base in Sicily provides most important facilities for the long-range Orion maritime patrol aircraft which can operate the whole length of the Mediterranean from this very central position. The United States 6th fleet has naval facilities at Catania in Sicily, at Naples and at Gaeta further north where the flagship of the 6th fleet is based. United States Task Force 69 of nuclear-propelled hunter-killer submarines has its headquarters at Naples and base facilities provided by a tender on the island of La Maddalena to the north-east of Sardinia. There is an important electronic intelligence gathering facility at San Vito in South-East Italy and some fourteen other communications facilities or stations elsewhere.

(iii) *Greece*

3.14. The Committee welcomed the increased cohesion of the Alliance which resulted from the accession of Greece to the European

Community from 1st January this year, and most particularly the return of Greek forces to the integrated military structure of NATO which took effect on 20th October 1980 under an agreement in principle that left many details to be settled by subsequent negotiations with Turkey and the NATO authorities. Previous reports of the Committee have recounted in some detail the reasons which led Greece to withdraw its forces from NATO command in 1974; it is recalled that there was never a complete withdrawal from the integrated military structure of NATO; in particular Greek staff officers continued to serve both in some posts in the international military staff in NATO and in NATO military headquarters other than that at Izmir in Turkey.

3.15. In practice, a great deal of detail concerning Greece's relations with the NATO military structure remain to be negotiated as the whole NATO command structure in the area is being revised, and this aspect is discussed under the heading Greek-Turkish relations below. Greece will have resumed its reporting to NATO headquarters on various aspects of defence policy, but after the lapse of seven years, during which most of the staff directly concerned both in the Greek Ministry of Defence and armed forces, and in NATO headquarters, have changed, particular effort will be needed to re-establish the necessary close relations with NATO defence planning staff.

3.16. An indirect effect of the 1974 events was to stimulate Greek defence expenditure which rose from 4.1 % of GDP in 1973 to 6.5 % in 1975 and to a peak of 6.8 % in 1977, to fall in 1980 to 5.2 %, a figure which reflects normalisation of relations with Turkey rather than a reassessment of the Soviet threat or of the danger of hostilities breaking out in the unstable Eastern Mediterranean area. The reappearance of Greek (and Turkish) defence statistics in the table at Appendix I, after a four year absence, is one direct and welcome consequence of the normalisation of Greek relations with NATO.

3.17. The Greek equipment modernisation programme has included the acquisition of AMX-30 tanks and Milan anti-tank guided weapons, fast patrol boats with Exocet anti-ship missiles and aircraft such as the A-7 and Mirage F-1. Greek armed forces provide a total of some 17 divisions, including one armoured division, but about 11 of these are at cadre strength. Pending deliveries of further AMX-30 tanks, the present establishment is 60 of these, together with 500 M-48s and 300 obsolescent M-47s. There are two Honest John battalions with eight missiles for tactical nuclear support. The navy provides seven submarines and some fifteen major surface combatants, together with coastal patrol vessels

and a growing number of fast patrol craft, and fourteen amphibious landing ships. The air force comprises three strike squadrons with 57 A-7 aircraft, five fighter-bomber squadrons with 50 Phantoms and 33 F-104s, five interceptor squadrons with 43 F-5s and 38 Mirage F-1s. It was pointed out to the Committee that the large Greek merchant fleet represented a valuable asset for NATO to which 1,700 ships can be assigned in war.

3.18. As well as providing the important links in the NATO NADGE air defence chain, which has five early warning sites in Greece, the country makes another most important contribution to the defence of the Alliance through the excellent facilities provided at the NATO air missile firing installation near Chania in Crete, which was visited by the Committee. Originally established in June 1964 under a multilateral agreement signed by Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Norway and the United States, the installations since 1971 have been run by the five present user countries, Denmark, France and Norway having withdrawn over the previous twelve months. The installations provide training principally for Hawk and some Nike surface-to-air missile units from the user countries, but in addition anti-aircraft guns, surface-to-surface missiles, naval missiles of various types as well as air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles have been tested on range which has also occasionally been used by British and Italian forces.

3.19. Greece has a long, exposed frontier with Bulgaria in the north, with very little depth of territory between it and the Aegean Sea, as has been pointed out in describing the balance of force in the area of Thrace and the Turkish Straits in paragraph 2.13 above. In peacetime, Greek forces alone may provide an adequate balance with those of Bulgaria, particularly since improved relations with Yugoslavia have led to a mutual reduction of forces on each side of the Greek-Yugoslav frontier. In any period of tension, however, in which a concerted attack by reinforced Warsaw Pact forces on Thrace and the Turkish Straits became likely, external reinforcements would be vital to defend the area. The ACE mobile force of brigade size constituted from specially equipped battalions made available by Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom and the United States, with associated artillery and logistics support units can deploy fairly rapidly in the area supported by the air element comprising squadrons of tactical aircraft supplied also by Canada and the Netherlands. This is essentially, however, a token force to demonstrate the cohesion of the Alliance.

3.20. Under a bilateral United States-Greek military facilities agreement of 12th October

1953, supplemented by several subsequent technical implementing agreements, the United States has a number of defence bases and installations in Greece for the purposes of NATO defence under Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty. These include an important naval base for the 6th Fleet in Suda Bay on Crete; the airfield at Chania and Iraklion in Crete, and Hellenikon near Athens; some eight major communications facilities, including the Nea Makri naval communications facility; an electronic intelligence gathering facility at Iraklion, Crete, and nuclear weapons storage installations for support of both United States and Greek forces.

3.21. For several years, Greece and the United States have sought to renegotiate the terms of the 1953 agreement. In April 1976, a number of "principles to guide future US-Greek defence co-operation" were signed by the two countries as a basis for negotiations, which were completed with the initialling of a mutual defence agreement on 28th July 1977. Linked by Greece with negotiations on the return to the NATO structure, however, that agreement never entered into force and bilateral negotiations were resumed in Athens on 28th January this year. Greece is understood to insist that all bases should be under Greek command and should be used for purposes "limited to obligations arising out of the North Atlantic Treaty" with a Greek right to close bases in certain circumstances. Greece is understood to have wished to see the text of a comparable United States-Turkey mutual defence agreement signed in March 1980 and to want a guarantee that United States military assistance to Greece and Turkey shall be in the ratio of 7:10 respectively and that American assurances be provided to ensure a military balance in the Aegean. The United States, particularly in the light of its current plans for a rapid deployment force for the Middle East or South-East Asian area, would prefer that bases be available more generally for mutual defence purposes as agreed between the two governments. Greece has urged that agreement be concluded before the Easter recess of parliament in the third week of April, failing which negotiations might be postponed until after the general elections which must be held by November 1981 at the latest.

3.22. The Committee visited Greece from 18th-21st February where it was most courteously received by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Defence, the General Staff, the Commander of the NAMFI installation referred to above, and also held a most useful discussion with the defence committee of the Greek Chamber of Representatives under the Chairmanship of Admiral Mineos. The Committee was most impressed by the realistic Greek assessment of the defence problems in

the area, the invaluable contribution which the Greek armed forces make to mutual defence and the willingness of the country to co-operate fully with NATO mutual defence plans. It can only regret, however, that whereas mutual defence arrangements within the framework of the Alliance enjoy the support of a broad spectrum of political opinion in all allied countries, in Greece the opposition Pasok party should have called for withdrawal from NATO. While the Committee welcomes very much the improved prospects of agreement between Greece and Turkey on outstanding issues, discussed below, and the realistic attempts by both governments to reach agreement in a spirit of mutual understanding, it regrets at the same time a highly distorted view of Turkish policy that appears to be held by certain politicians and even in certain military quarters in Greece, and for which it is unable to find any basis in reality.

(iv) *Turkey*

3.23. The Committee noted in its last report the trend of Turkish defence policy under the then government of Mr. Eçevit, a trend which had had its roots in events related to Cyprus in 1964 and 1974 followed by the United States arms embargo which led Turkey actively to seek to diversify sources of military equipment. At the same time, without ever contemplating withdrawal from NATO, Turkey sought to improve relations with the Soviet Union; in April 1978 there was the first visit to Turkey for forty-five years of the Soviet Chief of Staff. Under Mr. Demirel's Justice Party government which took office in November 1979, however, faced with a rapid succession of disturbing, destabilising events on or near its eastern frontiers including the fall of the Shah's régime, the final collapse of the Central Treaty Organisation<sup>1</sup>, a resurgence of Muslim fundamentalist movements, which inevitably found some echo in certain sections of Turkish society, the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, the new friendship treaty between the Soviet Union and Syria and finally the outbreak of hostilities between Iraq and Iran, Turkey has again moved to place emphasis on the NATO Alliance and the need for cohesion in allied policies in the area. This trend has been unaffected or even strengthened since the military authorities assumed power in September 1980. Turkey pursues an active foreign policy aimed at maintaining friendly and mutually beneficial relations with all neighbouring countries. Thus it purchases electricity in the frontier areas from both Bulgaria and the Soviet Union, is particularly distressed by the Iran-

Iraq conflict with both of which countries it has a common frontier and remains strictly neutral in the conflict. Turkey is critical of certain aspects of Israeli policy and supports the participation of the PLO in peace negotiations, on an equal footing with other interested parties.

3.24. With 4.7 % of its GDP devoted to defence, the Turkish defence effort is one of the largest of any European country, and can be held to be proportionately the largest when it is recalled that the GDP per capita is the smallest of any NATO country. The Turkish armed forces are large and well trained but lacking in modern equipment which the country cannot afford to procure. The army provides 23 division equivalents including some three armoured division equivalents and two mechanised infantry divisions. It is equipped with some 3,000 largely obsolete M-47 tanks and 500 M-48s, while 193 Leopard medium tanks are on order. Tactical nuclear support is provided with four battalions of eighteen Honest John surface-to-surface missiles. Some Tow anti-tank guided weapons have been procured and more Tow and Milan are on order. The Turkish first army is deployed in the area of Turkish Thrace and the Straits; the third army in the mountainous north-eastern area adjacent to the Soviet frontier, and the second army in the flatter, open terrain of South Turkey adjacent to Iraq and Syria.

3.25. The Turkish air force comprises a total of eighteen squadrons distributed between the first tactical air force at Eskisehir in north-western Turkey and Diyarbakir in eastern Turkey respectively. The fighter ground attack squadrons are equipped with some 70 Phantoms and 46 F-5As, 50 F-100s and 26 F-104s. The interceptor squadrons are equipped with 20 F-5As and 20 F-104s. The Turkish navy provides fourteen submarines and some fourteen major surface combatants, together with fast attack craft.

3.26. One most important contribution which Turkey makes to allied defence is through the exercise of its responsibilities under the 1936 Montreux Convention<sup>1</sup> to regulate the passage of warships through the Turkish Straits between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean – the Soviet Union accounts for 90 % of all transits by naval ships through these Straits. Soviet demands in 1946 for drastic revision of the Convention, to give the Soviet Union effective control over the Black Sea exits, were rejected by Turkey and have not been revived. The Convention prohibits the passage of submarines

1. The parties are Bulgaria, France, Greece, Romania, Turkey, the USSR and Yugoslavia. Japan ceased to be a party after the second world war.

(except for repair outside the Black Sea); limits the number of foreign naval vessels that may be in the Straits at any one time to nine (but cruisers must pass through singly); and requires eight days prior notice of passage to be given to the Turkish authorities. Turkey prepares an annual report on all such passages through the Straits and information from past reports has been quoted in paragraph 2.32 above.

3.27. Turkey applies this Convention in a flexible manner which takes account of developments in naval architecture. Questions have been raised when the first of the Soviet helicopter carriers, Moskva and Leningrad, passed through the Straits, and more recently when the vertical take off aircraft carriers of the Kiev class were allowed to pass – the convention prohibits the passage of all ships designed for the operation of aircraft at sea, but the description “cruiser” applied to the vessels by the Soviet Union was accepted by Turkey. Some question has also arisen over the passage of Soviet vessels equipped with missiles of various sorts because the Montreux Convention makes no reference to such weapons which, of course, were unknown at the time of its signature. Although the convention places more severe restrictions on the passage of naval vessels of non-Black Sea powers into the Black Sea, such passage is not a fundamental NATO requirement, and on balance the convention, as currently applied by Turkey, offers many advantages to NATO, both through the prohibition of movements of Soviet submarines from the Black Sea fleet into the Mediterranean and through the considerable delay it would impose on any attempted sudden large-scale transfer of naval vessels out of the Black Sea.

3.28. Under a number of secret and public bilateral agreements between Turkey and the United States, the most important of which was the military facilities agreement of June 1954, subsequently codified in the Defence Co-operation Agreement of 3rd July 1969, the United States maintained a number of military installations in Turkey, use of which was severely restricted by Turkey during the period of the United States arms embargo from 1974 to 1978, the agreement being denounced by Turkey on 5th July 1975. On 29th March 1980 a new economic and defence co-operation agreement was signed under the terms of which the United States provides military and economic aid reported to have been \$450 million in 1980; the United States assists Turkey to produce military equipment and to sell it to the allies; Turkey makes available to the United States a major air base at Incirlik in southern Turkey (the most easterly available for the forward deployment of United States tactical air support on a rotational basis from Torrejon in Spain), four interception installations Pirinlik,

Sinop, Kargabarun and Belbasi (the latter is a seismic station near Ankara for detecting Soviet nuclear explosions) and seven communications centres. All installations remain under Turkish command and their use is restricted to NATO purposes. Nuclear weapons are stored in Turkey for the use of both Turkish and United States forces.

3.29. The very large Turkish defence effort in relation to its economic resources has been noted above. But the very serious economic situation in the country deserves to be emphasised. Inflation in the twelve months prior to the provisional assumption of power by the military authorities was 150 % and the present target for the next twelve months is to reduce that rate to “only” 40 %. The population has grown more rapidly than that of any other European country; at 45 millions today it is two and a half times the size at the end of the second world war. The population growth has more than absorbed the limited growth of the Turkish economy and now poses problems for the principle of universal military service referred to below. The Committee stresses the vital need for substantial economic assistance in the framework of the Alliance and the European Community, and the importance of Turkey enjoying for its exports to the European Community no less favourable treatment than that received by other countries having association agreements.

3.30. Turkey is a country of great cultural diversity and in a report devoted to defence it is worth pointing out that the armed services still play an important educational and vocational training rôle in Turkey as they have done since the days of Atatürk. Universal military service is not a political issue in the country, except for a few fringe elements of politics, nor is it rejected by the youth of the country to the extent that it may be in some Western European countries. Up to one-third of those called up in some areas may still be illiterate, although their proportion is falling, and basic education as well as technical instruction is part of initial training; there is a deliberate policy of posting after initial training to enable servicemen to serve away from their home towns – those from the east serving in western Turkey and vice-versa.

(v) *The political situation in Turkey*

3.31. The Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments in a report devoted to security in the Mediterranean is not primarily concerned with the political situation in the country, but at the same time a report considering the mutual defence arrangements of an alliance of democracies cannot ignore the political basis of

Turkish participation in the Alliance. Secondly, because of the identity of the national parliamentary delegations to the Assemblies of WEU and the Council of Europe, members cannot be unaware of other issues which properly belong to the Council of Europe, especially since the Committee's Turkish hosts during its visit to that country from 21st to 25th February were clearly at pains to receive the Committee at the highest level and to state their case with other matters in mind besides those to which the Committee was officially addressing itself.

3.32. The Committee had the honour of being received by General Kenan Evren, the present Head of State and President of the National Security Council, who delivered an address on the internal situation in Turkey before and after 12th September 1980, the date on which the present régime assumed power. The Committee was also received most courteously by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Defence, and the Turkish General Staff, all of whom answered the Committee's questions at the conclusion of briefings. The Committee also welcomed the frank exchange of views it held first with Mr. Demirel, former Prime Minister, in the presence of many other distinguished former parliamentarians of the Justice Party, and secondly with Mr. Üstündağ, acting president of the Republican People's Party, and with many equally eminent former parliamentarians of that party; these two separate meetings were arranged by the Office of the Clerk and the members of the parties concerned without objection from the Turkish authorities. The names of everyone the Committee met are included in the introductory note to this report; the texts of General Evren's address to the Committee and of a briefing on the extent of terrorism in Turkey are attached at Appendix II.

3.33. The Committee was provided with considerable statistical and other information by the Turkish authorities on the internal situation before and after 12th September 1980, the validity of which was not challenged by anyone the Committee met. The most tragic feature of the internal situation was the extent of terrorism which had led, in General Evren's words, to an atmosphere of anarchy, and which, during the twenty-one months preceding 12th September, in the twenty-one provinces then under martial law, had led to 25,350 incidents leading to 3,710 killed, culminating in a last violent week of 639 incidents which left 71 dead, the vast majority being civilians. In the five months since the military authorities assumed power, terrorist incidents throughout the 67 provinces of Turkey, to all of which martial law was extended, fell to 3,771 accounting for 306 dead. On the basis of daily average killing, the

figures fell from 6 for the twenty-one months before the military intervention, to 1.9 in the five subsequent months, falling again to 1.2 in the week immediately preceding the Committee's visit. After 12th September, over 160,000 pistols and rifles of all types were surrendered to the military authorities and a further 18,000 were confiscated by them. The Turkish authorities claimed that there are links between elements of the large population of emigrant Turkish workers in certain Western European countries, and terrorist organisations in those countries.

3.34. At the same time as the level of terrorism was growing, the Turkish economy was coming near to collapse with 150 % inflation during the twelve months before 12th September. The party balance in parliament and the state of relations between the two main parties was such that although martial law was operating in twenty-one provinces, agreement could not be reached on certain extensions to martial law powers, nor was a majority secured for the election of a new President of the Republic in the course of more than 100 separate rounds of voting. The military authorities now claim that government officials and the police had become polarised by the two political parties who, when in office, had sought to appoint their own protégés.

3.35. The authorities informed the Committee that at the time of the visit there were 5,788 persons detained in Turkey, 15,929 under arrest of which 78 % were characterised as extreme leftists, 12 % as extreme rightists, and 10 % separatists. These numbers included 33 former parliamentarians (10 Nationalist Movement, 16 National Salvation Party, 7 Republic People's Party) and 302 Trade Unionists (290 from the Communist Union DISK, 12 independants). Some cases of torture by the police since the military takeover were not denied, but many allegations were said to be exaggerated. Of 58 cases involving 84 persons, 32 cases were under investigation and 26 had been settled, leading to 26 convictions and one acquittal.

3.36. On 12th September 1980, the military authorities constituted the National Security Council which assumed both legislative and executive power in the country, exercised however in accordance with the rule of the law, albeit martial law in many cases. The declared intention of the new authorities is to stamp out terrorism and to transfer the political and administrative powers which they have provisionally assumed to a democratically-elected new administration. General Evren has announced that a Constituent Assembly will be set up between 30th August and 29th October 1981. Its members will be co-opted by the National Security Council and it will be empowered to



propose legislation subject to amendment and approval by the National Security Council. The tasks of the Constituent Assembly will be to prepare a new constitution, a new electoral law and a new law on political parties. In his speech announcing this on 15th January 1981, General Evren added:

“ We shall not choose as members of that Assembly persons belonging to the traditional political parties. When the parliamentary system is able to function again, we shall not allow the fate of Turkey to be put back into the hands of those who got the country into the present situation...”

3.37. Clearly, the military authorities had come to believe that the functioning of the political parties in Turkey, the state of relations between the two main parties, and the parliamentary majorities produced by the electoral system did not permit the effective working of parliamentary democracy in the country. There is a long tradition of military intervention followed by the orderly return of power to a parliamentary government in Turkey.

3.38. In this report on security in the Mediterranean, the Committee does not make formal recommendations concerning the internal political situation in Turkey. Following its visit to the country, however, it feels able to record the following conclusions: there is no reason at the present time to doubt the sincerity of the National Security Council in its statement that it will transfer its responsibilities to a democratically elected new administration, and the Committee was particularly struck by a remark made to it by the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs to the effect that there was no comparison at all between the régime of the Greek Colonels and that of the Turkish Generals. The *de facto* situation is accepted at present by the two main political parties and apparently by the vast majority of the Turkish population. However, the Committee is concerned to note that no time-table has been put forward for the return to parliamentary democracy, and that it is entirely unclear how the proposed Constituent Assembly will be composed or how representative it will be.

3.39. Turkey is a land of great cultural diversity; of extremes of wealth and poverty. In the longer term, the root causes of terrorism will be eradicated only by further progress in modernising the social and economic structure of the country. Historically the armed services have played, and they will continue to play, a rôle in this process. But the task can only be fully accomplished by democratic government based on strong parliamentary institutions.

3.40. At the present time, the Committee believes that as long as the process which should lead to the creation of new democratic parliamentary institutions is not placed in doubt, the best interests, both of Turkey and the Alliance, will be served by maintaining and strengthening the links which now exist between Turkey and the various Atlantic and European institutions.

(vi) *Greek-Turkish relations*

3.41. The Committee has reported no fewer than five times<sup>1</sup> on the state of Greek-Turkish relations following the events of 1974, which the Committee deplored in themselves and which led to a breakdown in relations between the two countries with a severely detrimental effect on Alliance defence arrangements in the area. Greek forces were withdrawn from NATO command; Greek offers were withdrawn from the NATO headquarters in Izmir; and there was a corresponding limitation on Turkish reporting to certain NATO headquarters. For a number of years thereafter a chief defence preoccupation of these two countries became the perceived threat from the other. The following table of *defence expenditure as percent of gross domestic product* reflects reduced tension between the two countries in the last three years, not a reduction in the threat from Warsaw Pact forces:

Percentage

	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
Greece	4.1	4.2	6.5	5.9	6.8	6.6	5.8	5.2e
Turkey	4.1	3.9	n.a.	6.2	5.8	5.2	4.6	4.7e

e = estimate ; n.a. = not available.

3.42. Izmir houses two NATO headquarters, which, since their establishment in 1952 and 1953, were designed to control Greek and Turkish land and air forces and other reinforcement forces, chiefly United States, that were assigned to NATO. LANDSOUTHEAST is a principal subordinate command coming directly under CINCSOUTH in Naples which, on alert or in hostilities, would have assumed command of the First Hellenic army with its headquarters in Larissa, Greece; the Turkish first army, headquarters Istanbul, the Turkish third army, with headquarters in Erzincan; and Turkish second army, with headquarters in Konya.

1. Document 651, 14th November 1974, Rapporteur Mr. Critchley; Document 671, 29th April 1975, Rapporteur for Chapter IV Mr. Duvieusart; Document 682, 10th November 1975, Rapporteur Mr. Critchley; Document 708, 19th May 1976, Rapporteur Mr. Buck; Document 776, 31st May 1978, Rapporteur Mr. Grant.

The air headquarters – 6th Allied Tactical Air Force – comes directly under AIRSOUTH, a principal subordinate command of CINCSOUTH, also located in Naples. This would have assumed command of the Hellenic 28th Tactical Air Force with headquarters in Larissa; the Turkish First Tactical Air Force, with headquarters at Eskisehir; and the Turkish Second Tactical Air Force, with headquarters at Diyarbakir. Like other NATO air headquarters, it is in permanent command of air defence in peacetime as well.

3.43. With the withdrawal of Greek forces from the NATO structure in 1974, the two Izmir headquarters, each with an American commander, were in an anomalous situation in that only Turkish forces were assigned to them. By 1978 it had become accepted that arrangements for the return of Greek forces to NATO, which were then being negotiated, would have to involve the establishment of a “Greek-NATO” headquarters at Larissa in Greece. Accordingly, the Izmir headquarters became “Turkish-NATO” headquarters and Turkish generals were appointed to command them from 1st July 1978.

3.44. Successive SACEURs had been involved with negotiations with the Greek and Turkish military authorities to secure the return of Greece and Greek forces to the integrated military structure and, while a number of details remain to be negotiated, these efforts were finally successful with the acceptance by the NATO Defence Planning Committee of arrangements for the reintegration of Greece into the integrated military structure of NATO on 20th October 1980. When the subsequent detailed negotiations have been completed, it is understood that these arrangements will provide for the establishment at Larissa in Greece of the “Greece-NATO” headquarters LANDSOUTH-CENTRE to command the Greek land forces previously under LANDSOUTHEAST; and 7th ATAF commanding the Hellenic 28th TAF.

3.45. The events of 1974 had led virtually to the closure of Aegean air space to civilian air traffic with the issue of NOTAM 714 by Turkey on 4th August, requiring aircraft flying in the eastern half of the Aegean to report their locations to Turkish air traffic control, while Greece issued a NOTAM 1157 on 13th September, declaring the Aegean a danger zone and virtually forbidding air movements in the area. The Committee’s previous report<sup>1</sup> described the history of demarcation lines between the Hellenic 28th Tactical Air Force and the Turkish 1st Tactical Air Force which, in 1964, had been moved from the line down the centre of the Aegean to coincide with the civil aviation

flight information region boundary between the Athens and Istanbul FIR. As all islands in the Aegean, with the exception of two at the entrance to the Turkish Straits, are Greek territory, the international boundary hugs the Turkish Aegean coast. While both Greek and Turkish air forces were under the same NATO command prior to 1974, this demarcation of military air space did not present problems for Turkey. In the new situation following 1974, however, Turkey found the civil FIR boundary unacceptable for military aircraft.

3.46 It is understood that the establishment of a new air headquarters, 7th ATAF, will not involve a “new geographic boundary” between 6th and 7th ATAF, but instead an integrated system for the defence of the whole area based on the technical capabilities of the Greek and Turkish air forces and facilities assigned. The splitting of the previously integrated command into two is obviously unfortunate from a military standpoint, but has become necessary for political reasons. The military authorities are anxious to ensure the closest possible relationships between 6th and 7th ATAF with the exchange of liaison officers, and arrangements for “cross-tasking” of sorties which will not take account of theoretical geographical boundaries.

3.47. The establishment of a separate land force headquarters of course does not present anything like the same problems because the land forces in any case are operating in distinct theatres, except for the small region in the area of Thrace. The two naval commands in the region have always been separate – COMEDEAST, with headquarters in Athens, covering part of the Ionian Sea, and the Crete and the Aegean seas; and COMEDNOREAST, a Turkish command with headquarters in Ankara, covering the Black Sea and the Turkish Mediterranean seaboard.

3.48. Apart from the problems of military cooperation, a number of concrete points can be cited showing the general improvement in Greek-Turkish relations since the Committee last reported in 1978. On 22nd February 1980, the Turkish government withdrew NOTAM 714 referred to above and Greece lifted in turn the corresponding NOTAM 1157. As a consequence, limited civil air traffic was resumed across the Aegean thereafter. On 6th March 1981, Greece announced a number of further measures to facilitate air traffic over the Aegean, in particular the elimination, except for special occasions, of the air corridor W-14 which Greece had established between the Dodecanese and northern Greece, and which had previously obstructed Turkish access to the international Aegean airspace from the Turkish mainland. Six other air

1. Document 776, paragraph 3.49 et seq.

corridors were re-opened to Turkish traffic and a large area around Lemnos island was returned to international air space. Arrangements also were announced for co-ordinating with Turkey the use of part of the Aegean international airspace for air exercises.

3.49. Gradual progress appears to be being made in Greek-Turkish relations through the periodical meetings between the Secretaries-General of the two foreign ministries, Mr. Stavros Roussos of Greece and Mr. Kamuran Gürün of Turkey. Their last meeting in Ankara lasted from 16th to 20th March 1981 when it was agreed that the air traffic services of the two countries would meet to discuss a letter of agreement to regulate the exchange of flight data on civil air routes between the two countries. In the field of cultural relations, a number of topics were agreed on for future discussions.

3.50. But on the remaining central issue, the sharing of the rights to the Aegean seabed, it does not appear that substantive progress has yet been made and the Committee concludes from the talks its members had in the two capitals that this problem appears to be the most difficult to solve. The Greek authorities do not consider the Aegean to be a "Greek sea" as Turkey at one time had come to fear. The territorial sea claimed by Greece (and, in the Aegean, by Turkey) extends to 6 nautical miles around its coast and all Greek islands; the remaining waters being international. As far as economic rights to the seabed are concerned, Greece has consistently sought to submit the matter to international arbitration of the International Court of Justice whereas Turkey has always maintained that the Aegean is a special case which should be settled through bilateral political negotiations on the basis of equity.

3.51. It is hoped that at the meeting between the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers arranged for early May in Rome further progress may be made, although the attitude of the Greek opposition party, Pasok, would appear to complicate the efforts of the two governments to normalise relations. Pasok deputies have claimed that Greek air space has been violated on a number of occasions - in 1981 - by RAF maritime patrol aircraft on 20th and 21st February (described by Lady Fleming as "provocations which reveal further designs for the violation of Greek sovereign rights") and by Turkish military aircraft on 8th April (described by Mr. Papandreou as "provocative" when he called for the talks between the Greek and Turkish air traffic services fixed for 13th April to be postponed). In the European Parliament on 10th April, 12 Pasok members voted for a resolution, adopted by 51 votes to 45 with 8 abstentions, calling for European Community association agreement with Turkey

to be suspended if the country did not return to democracy within two months.

3.52. Strictly speaking, Greece and Turkey are not directly involved in the negotiations between the two communities in Cyprus, under the auspices of the United Nations Secretary General, to establish a new constitution settling relations between the communities. But Greece and Turkey are each in a position to exert great influence on the community of corresponding culture. This is particularly true of Turkey which still has two divisions totalling 25,000 men and 180 tanks on the island supporting the Turkish community; all international communications to the Turkish community are still routed through Turkey. Inversely a settlement in Cyprus would greatly improve the atmosphere of Greek-Turkish relations.

3.53. The events of 1974 have left 40 % of the territory occupied by the Turkish Cypriot community which amounts to only 18 % of the total population, and which declared itself to be the "Turkish Federated State of Cyprus" in 1975, with the Greek Cypriot community living entirely in the remaining 60 %. If the principle of a federal constitution for the whole republic, embracing two federated states, has been tacitly accepted, negotiations concern on the one hand the precise allocation of powers between a federal government and the two states, with the Greek Cypriots calling for stronger federal powers than the Turkish Cypriots have so far been prepared to concede, and on the other the areas of territory to be ceded to the future Greek Cypriot state. There appear better prospects of a settlement now than in the recent past. The Committee gained the impression that Athens believes a more realistic offer from the Turkish Cypriot side is now possible, and that the present Turkish authorities could, in the event, exercise a more positive influence than that of the previous governments who were in a weak political position.

(vii) *United States*

3.54. The United States maintains powerful forces in the Mediterranean area including considerable nuclear capability both in the carrier-borne strike aircraft and in the warheads provided for the tactical missile systems of the land forces of Italy, Greece and Turkey. United States tactical air support is provided by the 16th Air Force with 6,650 air force personnel. The headquarters is at Torrejon in Spain, where a tactical air wing is maintained. This is capable of carrying out attack missions through forward-staging airfields, chiefly Incirlik in Turkey and Aviano in Italy, and is equipped with some 200 tactical aircraft with others

on early call from the United States. The United States 6th Fleet normally comprises two aircraft carriers, 12 surface combatants and five submarines. Its headquarters flagship is normally moored off Gaeta in Italy, north of Naples, and its chief bases are Suda Bay in Crete and Rota in Spain some 70 nautical miles west of Gibraltar. The 5 nuclear-propelled attack submarines have a tender off north Sardinia. Long-range Orion maritime patrol aircraft based in Rota, Spain, and Sigonella, in Sicily, provide surveillance and anti-submarine warfare capability throughout the Mediterranean and the western approaches to Gibraltar.

3.55. With the increased United States naval presence in the Indian Ocean, however, there has been a redeployment of one aircraft carrier and accompanying surface combatants from the 6th Fleet to that area.

3.56. The United States maintains important electronic surveillance and communications facilities throughout the Mediterranean which in practice provide an important backup to the NATO communications system. Details of United States bases and installations in Spain, Italy, Greece and Turkey are described under the sections dealing with those countries.

*(vii) United Kingdom*

3.57. The permanent United Kingdom presence in the Mediterranean has been considerably reduced during the past decade, but naval vessels, including an assault ship and frigates, make periodical visits and normally participate in NATO exercises when they do. The Rapporteur visited the through-deck cruiser *Invincible* when in port in Toulon. In Gibraltar, a British colony, there is a garrison of about a battalion with naval personnel who man the naval base and air force personnel who operate the airfield used for both civilian and military aircraft, but operational aircraft and naval vessels are no longer maintained permanently in Gibraltar although a destroyer or frigate is always held on call. Gibraltar houses a subordinate NATO headquarters that would be activated in war to control the Gibraltar area of the Mediterranean.

3.58. In the British sovereign base areas on the island of Cyprus, which were excluded from the territory of the Republic of Cyprus when it became independent in 1960, there is a major airfield and important communications and electronic intelligence facilities. The army maintains the equivalent of about two battalions and a flight of the army air corps; the Royal Air Force maintains helicopters in a general support and search and rescue rôle. Cyprus remains strategically important as an air

staging base for possible deployment of forces anywhere in the eastern Mediterranean or Middle East, and as a communications and electronic intelligence centre.

3.59. The United Kingdom also provides support for the United Nations force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) to which it contributes a contingent of one armoured reconnaissance squadron, one infantry company and a flight of helicopters. The sovereign base areas are also used for infantry and air force training for units which may come from British forces in Germany or from the United Kingdom.

*(ix) Other NATO countries*

3.60. Other NATO countries, apart from the six mentioned above, occasionally deploy forces for exercise purposes to the Mediterranean area. Belgium, Germany and Luxembourg, as well as Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States, participate in Allied Command Europe mobile force land element, and Canada and the Netherlands also participate in the air component of the mobile force which deploys periodically in the area of Thrace and in eastern Turkey.

*(b) NATO command structure and common arrangements*

3.61. The command structure established by NATO in the Mediterranean area, and its relationship to the overall military command and the North Atlantic Council, is shown diagrammatically at Appendix II. Responsibility for the whole of the NATO area south of the Alps to the eastern frontier of Turkey, including the land area of Italy, Greece and Turkey, and the Mediterranean Sea itself, comes under the authority of Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe with his headquarters, and a number of subordinate headquarters, located at Naples. Prior to visiting Greece and Turkey in February, the Committee was briefed at the Naples headquarters by AFSOUTH staff and by the staffs of the naval and air headquarters located there. This proved to be an invaluable introduction to the Committee's visit to the eastern Mediterranean. At the conclusion of its visit to Turkey, the Committee was again briefed at the subordinate NATO headquarters located in Izmir. The problem of command in the eastern Mediterranean has been referred to in paragraphs 3.41 et seq.

3.62. NATO headquarters forming part of the integrated military structure have operational control in peacetime only of the assigned air defence forces of the member countries. Other

air forces, and the land and naval forces, are under national command in peacetime and come under the operational control of the NATO command structure only in war or in an advanced state of alert. However, the Commander of Maritime Air Forces in the southern region, one of the subordinate commands located in Naples, co-ordinates in peacetime the national patrol programmes of maritime patrol aircraft of the member countries and produces a co-ordinated picture of all Soviet naval movements in the area. This is one of five NATO surveillance co-ordinating centres which cover the whole of the NATO area<sup>1</sup>.

3.63. Otherwise the peacetime rôle of NATO headquarters is essentially one of planning and co-operation with national military authorities to ensure that proper states of readiness and training are maintained by all assigned forces. The organisation and conduct of exercises involving forces from several NATO countries is one of the more important functions. Lastly, the NATO command is involved in the provision of commonly-financed infrastructure projects throughout the NATO region. These include the early-warning radar systems, with associated communications forming the Allied Command Europe air defence ground environment, and the communications systems between the NATO headquarters. Other commonly-financed infrastructure projects include storage for fuel and ammunition, including naval facilities, and airfields.

3.64. There are certain joint forces which have been organised in the NATO framework in addition to the purely national forces which are assigned or earmarked for NATO command. These, in the southern region, include the naval on-call force in the Mediterranean (NAVOCFORMED), composed of one ship from each of the contributing countries - Greece, Italy, Turkey, United Kingdom and the United States - which are brought together for a period of one month twice every year, under a commander appointed by SACEUR. NAVOCFORMED will be activated for the twenty-first time in the spring of 1981 under a Greek commodore and will make about five port calls in the Mediterranean. This is a useful concept for demonstrating NATO solidarity in periods of crisis or tension and is a force that would be available to the NATO commander well before any formal alert had been decided on by the North Atlantic Council.

3.65. The mobile force of Allied Command Europe has a land component of brigade group size and an air component comprising squadrons of tactical aircraft. It comes directly

under SACEUR's command and operates as a political deterrent force which can be deployed at short notice in a period of tension and would demonstrate the solidarity of the Alliance, particularly in the areas of the northern and southern flanks where forces of only one member country might otherwise be exposed to a threat. The land component is drawn when required from specially trained and equipped battalions with associated artillery companies made available by Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom and the United States. The air component squadrons are supplied also by Canada and the Netherlands. This force has been successfully deployed on many occasions in the area of north-east Italy, in Greek and Turkish Thrace and in eastern Turkey, and has acquired experience in working in liaison with national forces in the area.

3.66. A number of the NATO commanders of American nationality have dual peacetime responsibility in that they are simultaneously functioning as national American commanders of United States forces. Thus SACEUR, in his national capacity as Commander of United States forces in Europe, exercises operational control in peacetime of all American forces in Europe, before they come under NATO command. In the southern region the Commander of Allied Air Forces Southern Europe, a subordinate commander located in Naples, is simultaneously commander of the United States 16th Air Force in peacetime and thus exercises operational control of United States tactical air forces throughout the Mediterranean. The commander of the United States 6th Fleet is simultaneously, in his NATO capacity as Commander Naval Striking and Support Forces Southern Europe, a subordinate of CINCSOUTH.

3.67. The Committee noted a number of weaknesses perceived by NATO commanders, in addition to the problems of modernisation of the equipment of certain countries which have been referred to in the foregoing sections. It is felt that reinforcement tactical aircraft for the region should be available earlier, and that there is a case for longer range aircraft such as the F-111 to be allocated to the southern region as a way of making more flexible use of such aircraft which can still reach central front targets from southern region bases. As far as commonly-financed NATO projects are concerned, greater priority should be given to the communications of the southern region, which could be unable to handle all traffic generated in a crisis situation. In view of the many uncertainties of the Mediterranean region to which the Committee draws attention elsewhere, it is felt that all-round radar coverage is important as well as modernisation of existing

1. Others at Kolsas, Norway; Northwood, United Kingdom; Norfolk, Va.; and Lisbon.

systems. Some improvement will be provided by the AWACS aircraft when they become available. They will provide a flexible extra radar coverage which can be quickly re-allocated to different parts of the NATO front to deal with different threats.

*(c) Defence arrangements beyond the NATO area;  
United States policy*

3.68. It is beyond the scope of this report to discuss in any detail defence arrangements being discussed by the allied powers for the region of the Gulf and the Indian Ocean, but certain features must be mentioned, especially as they interact particularly with defence in the Mediterranean area.

3.69. The new United States administration has yet to settle the details of its foreign policy; it has shown a tendency, that is not shared by all its allies, to see the hand of the Soviet Union behind any inconvenient event occurring in any part of the world; it may already be turning away from its initial reluctance to seek early negotiations with the Soviet Union on arms control and other problems, as the present attempt to involve the Soviet Union in efforts to prevent further escalation of the conflict in the Lebanon would suggest. Unquestionably, however, the present administration attaches less importance to arms control proposals, and more to defence spending, than its predecessor. In March President Reagan sent to Congress a request for a defence budget of \$ 222.8 billion for next year, compared with \$ 140.5 billion in 1980.

3.70. As far as the Gulf and Indian Ocean is concerned, an outline of policy was given by Mr. Richard Burt, the new director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs in State Department, addressing the International Security Sub-committee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on 23rd March. He said in part:

“We will make known our view that present arms control proposals for the Indian Ocean area offer little prospect for enhancing security ... Our allies' stake in the region is at least as great as our own and we are asking them to contribute more to its security and stability. For obvious reasons we are not seeking a formal NATO rôle. ... Increased defence efforts in Western Europe and Japan can improve United States flexibility to meet emergencies in South-West Asia ... Force deployments in South-West Asia by some European states can be strengthened and co-ordinated with United States military activities in the region. In addition allies with important facilities, both en route to and in the region, can

ease United States deployments and planning by granting us access to these facilities as needed.”

A large politico-strategic theatre was defined as “the region bounded by Turkey, Pakistan and the Horn of Africa”.

3.71. The rapid deployment force established by the Carter administration based on an air force station in Florida has some 250,000 men designated by all four services. It is now to be enlarged with the assignment of two airborne divisions together with marine, army and air force units, and will come under a new unified command to be established independently of the existing United States European and Pacific commands, the boundaries of which at present meet in the area. The United States has secured facilities in Oman, Somalia, Kenya and Egypt to permit the rapid deployment of the force and is extending its permanent facilities in Diego Garcia by lengthening the runway, installing navigational aids and storage. Countries in the area of the Gulf have made it clear that they would not welcome a permanent military presence of outside powers.

3.72. In an interview with Time magazine of 9th February, the British Prime Minister, Mrs. Thatcher, said “I do think that it is time to see whether NATO should extend its sphere of influence”. She referred to troubles “below the NATO belt. Vietnam and Cambodia, Iran and Iraq, Ethiopia, Somalia and Angola. Central America and the Caribbean.”. Speaking in a BBC interview in March, Lord Carrington, the Foreign Secretary, is reported as saying that the 1980 defence white paper had said that the government would look into the question as to whether it was possible for Britain to equip and earmark troops for deployment in South-West Asia if requested by the governments concerned, but there had been no talks with the Gulf countries on the issue since the force had not been set up. The 1981 defence white paper issued in April points out that on the outbreak of hostilities between Iraq and Iran Britain was able to maintain a two ship naval patrol with supply ships in the Gulf of Oman, but that “415. The military power which Britain alone could bring to bear in any of these contingencies is limited. Resource constraints and our primary commitment to NATO rule out any idea of creating a substantial standing intervention force. In any serious overseas emergency, we would in any case expect to concert our actions with other allies ... we have it in mind to establish a special equipment stockpile for limited operations overseas and to restore a limited parachute assault capability ... to drop an entire battalion group if necessary within fifteen minutes”. In addition to a parachute battalion, the 1980 white paper spoke of “improvements to the manpower and equip-

ment of the headquarters of the 8th field force ... which would also be capable if necessary of undertaking world-wide tasks”.

3.73. France maintains a permanent naval presence of from 10 to 20 vessels of all sizes in the Indian Ocean and has an aircraft carrier in the area of the Persian Gulf at present. France uses afloat support in the area, and still has access to the Mayotte harbour and facilities in Djibouti.

3.74. Concerting allied defence arrangements outside the NATO area raises problems over the proper framework of consultations. It is an accepted fact that despite the geographical limitations in the North Atlantic Treaty concerning the area within which mutual defence arrangements apply, the North Atlantic Council can discuss events anywhere in the world that affect the interests of the Alliance – but that consultation does not extend to defence planning. In an interesting policy paper entitled “Western security: what has changed? What should be done?” published jointly on 25th February 1981 by the United States Council on Foreign Relations, the British Royal Institute of International Affairs, the *Institut français des relations internationales* and the *Deutsche Gesellschaft für auswärtige politik*, the interesting proposal is advanced that:

“The West needs to create new mechanisms for truly collective decision-making and make them efficient. This requires sensitivity to the interests of all western nations, particularly some of the smaller members of the Alliance which will not always be included. ... NATO should not be altered institutionally but should expand the process of joint assessments and consultations on those third world developments which directly affect the security interests of its member states. ... The seven nation summits<sup>1</sup> should from now on be devoted as much to political and security concerns as to economic ones; ... The primary mechanisms for dealing with political/security issues in the third world should be a small group of principal nations. The organising principle would be to include only those countries able and willing to accept concrete obligations within the troubled area. ... They should be flexibly organised and keep interested partners informed. They should maintain secrecy of discussions, but should be visible in practice so that western publics and parliaments understand that the responsible nations are dealing jointly with political/security

1. Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, United States.

issues outside the NATO area. The principal nations will vary according to the issue at hand. The core group will usually include the United States, Britain, France, Germany and Japan. ... A principal nations group should be established immediately to deal with developments in the Gulf and South-West Asia, consisting of the United States, Britain, France, Germany and Japan ...”.

#### IV. *Non-member countries of NATO*

##### (a) *Yugoslavia*

4.1. In its last report<sup>1</sup>, the Committee reported in detail on the situation in Yugoslavia. In the intervening three years, there has been an orderly transfer of power in accordance with the constitution on the passing of President Tito, to a collective leadership representative of the six republics and two autonomous regions that make up the country. There is no evidence of external pressure from the Soviet Union to attempt to impose a new leadership or to establish any closer relations with the Soviet Union.

4.2. It is to be noted, however, that, in the Albanian-speaking autonomous region of Kosovo, demonstrations in favour of a constituent republic status for Kosovo, independent of Serbia led to riots on 1st April in which 11 people, including two security officers, were killed and 57 injured. This led the following week to tension with Albania when the Albanian party newspaper, *Zeri I Popullit*, called the demands of the Albanian-speaking demonstrators in Kosovo “legitimate” and gave full support to the establishment of a Kosovo republic. The Kosovo Albanian language paper termed the article a “flagrant interference” in Yugoslavia’s internal affairs. The Yugoslav authorities have made it clear that a change in the status of Kosovo would be a violation of Yugoslavia’s federal constitution and lead, in the long run, to the disintegration of Yugoslavia.

4.3. The Council of WEU in its reply to Recommendation 313 adopted by the Assembly on the Committee’s previous report on the Mediterranean, declared, as the Assembly’s recommendation had requested, that “the Council support unequivocally the independence, territorial integrity and unity of Yugoslavia and its continued non-aligned status”.

1. Document 776, 31st May 1978, paragraphs 4.1 et seq.

*(b) Malta*

4.4 A NATO naval headquarters was maintained on Malta from 1952 until 1971 when the Malta Labour Party, under Mr. Mintoff, won the elections. From March 1972 to 31st March 1979, a defence agreement was in force between Malta and the United Kingdom whereby the United Kingdom continued to use military facilities in Malta for NATO purposes against payment of £ 14 million of which £ 8.75 million was provided by NATO. Under that agreement, Malta undertook not to permit the forces of any party to the Warsaw Pact to be stationed in Malta or to use the military facilities there. There was no attempt by either side to renew the agreement in view of Mr. Mintoff's declared non-aligned policy, and all British forces were withdrawn from Malta on its expiry.

4.5. The Maltese economy is very dependent on external trade and assistance and Malta has successfully secured investment from both China and Libya, but relations with Libya became strained because of disagreement over oil in the continental shelf which had also been claimed by Libya. In 1980, Italy concluded an agreement with Malta whereby Italy provides the country with economic development aid including the construction of civilian airports, hospitals and loans to create new employment, and provides military guarantees for the neutrality and non-alignment of Malta. In return, Malta agreed to forbid the use of military bases in Malta to any country except Italy, which would have the right to use them for the purposes of defending Maltese neutrality. The agreement was ratified in the Italian Chamber of Deputies in March 1981.

4.6. On 26th January, however, an agreement was signed between Mr. Adela, the Maltese Development Minister, and Mr. Guzhenko, the Soviet Minister for Merchant Marine, allowing the Soviet Union to use half of the Has Saptain underground oil storage which had been built as part of the NATO infrastructure programme in the 1950s. The total capacity is reported to be 50,000 tons of diesel oil, 90,000 tons of fuel oil and 40,000 tons of jet oil. The remaining half of storage capacity remains available to an Italian company. It is not clear to what extent that agreement with the Soviet Union can be reconciled with the neutrality agreement concluded with Italy.

*(c) Gibraltar*

4.7. Administratively, Gibraltar has been a British colony since 1713 but Spanish claims to the territory are of long standing. For some time the colony has had internal autonomy and a referendum in September 1967 resulted in

12,762 votes in favour of retaining the existing links with the United Kingdom, to 44 votes against. Successive British governments have refused to agree to any change in the status of Gibraltar against the wishes of the population, which numbers 30,000.

4.8. Gibraltar is entirely dependent on imports for its food supply and, prior to the closure of the frontier with Spain in 1969, employed a good deal of Spanish labour, chiefly in the dockyard. Since then, however, alternative labour has been recruited from other Mediterranean countries.

4.9. Since 1978, there have been periodical talks between the British and Spanish Foreign Ministers on the status of Gibraltar, which have been attended also by the Chief Minister of Gibraltar, Sir Joshua Hassan, and the leader of the opposition, Mr. Maurice Xiberras. In Lisbon in April 1980, Spain and the United Kingdom reached an agreement whereby the Gibraltar-Spanish border would be reopened, and the two countries would open negotiations on the future of Gibraltar, but since Spain has insisted that Spanish nationals should have the same rights in Gibraltar as nationals of European Community countries, the border has remained closed. Members of the British House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee visited Madrid on 29th April 1981 for talks with officials and the Spanish parliamentary foreign affairs committee to discuss Gibraltar.

4.10. As long as Spain continues to provide naval base facilities for United States forces in Rota, or if Spain acceded to NATO, the military significance of Gibraltar itself is not indispensable as far as NATO is concerned, and in any case there is no reason to believe that the same facilities would not be provided by Spain. A negotiated settlement acceptable both to the population of Gibraltar and to a democratic Spain would be universally welcomed. When Spain accedes to the European Community the question of rights of Spanish nationals in Gibraltar will be automatically settled

*(d) Spain*

4.11. For a number of years now, reports of the Committee have drawn attention to the advantages that would result from the accession of Spain to NATO once that country had become a parliamentary democracy. For some time Spanish governments have sought recognition of the contribution Spain already makes to western defence, in particular through its defence agreements with the United States and also with other countries of the Alliance, Portugal and France. Since the adoption of the new constitution in the autumn of 1978, Spanish accession has become a political possibility and the



new Prime Minister, Mr. Calvo Sotelo, in his inaugural speech on 19th February 1981, referred to the question of accession to NATO and said that consultations with the opposition on this subject would be undertaken. Following the visit to Madrid by the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Haig, on 9th April this year, the press speculated that before the end of 1981 Spain would make formal application for membership of NATO so that accession could take effect before the parliamentary elections due to be held in the beginning of 1983. Mr. Haig also had a meeting with Mr. Felipe Gonzales, leader of the opposition Spanish Socialist Party. The government parties of the UCD favour accession to NATO; it is very likely that there would be a majority in parliament, but the opposition socialist and communist parties have not yet supported accession, although the latter at least has supported the defence agreement with the United States.

4.12. At the end of his talks in Madrid, Mr. Haig said that negotiations between the two countries would begin almost immediately on a new bilateral treaty to replace the existing treaty of friendship and co-operation between Spain and the United States signed in 1976 which will expire in September 1981.

4.13. Under that treaty, and previous executive agreements dating back to 1953, the United States has enjoyed the use of extensive military facilities in Spain where the bulk of United States shore-based naval and air force personnel in the Mediterranean region are stationed. The most important facility is the Rota naval base, near Cadiz, in which the Polaris and Poseidon ballistic missile submarines were based until their final withdrawal by 1st July 1979 under the terms of the 1976 agreement. The Rota airfield is the base of United States maritime patrol aircraft and anti-submarine warfare aircraft. The United States air force has airfields at Moron, near Seville, at Torrejon, near Madrid, and at Zaragoza, with a fuel pipeline running right across Spain from Cadiz to Zaragoza. Zaragoza is used chiefly for training and as a tanker aircraft base for in-flight refuelling of aircraft transiting from the United States to destinations further east. Torrejon is the headquarters of the United States 16th Air Force referred to above and the bulk of United States tactical aircraft in the Mediterranean region are normally based there, but rotate periodically to other United States airfields in Italy, Greece and Turkey. Moron was used as a tanker aircraft base up to 1970 when it was reduced to stand-by status. The United States has important communications terminals at four points on the Spanish mainland and two in the Balearic Islands. There are also navigational installations.

4.14. Under the United States-Spanish agreement of 1976, there is a Spanish-United States council to monitor the functioning of the treaty and a Military Committee on which the United States is normally represented by SACEUR in his national capacity as Commander of United States Forces in Europe. The treaty defines a "geographical area of common interest" covering the western Mediterranean, Spain and the eastern Atlantic approaches to Spain. This is the area within which there is joint planning for operations by the armed forces of the two countries for mutual defence purposes. The United States can use the facilities only for purposes of "western defence" and Spain denied their use for United States support of Israel in the 1973 Middle East conflict, when in-flight refuelling from tankers based in Spain could have assisted the United States airlift.

4.15. The Spanish forces in their own right could make a valuable contribution to NATO and would be a useful source of external reinforcements for the more exposed countries at the eastern end of the Mediterranean. The army of 255,000 men is now equipped with 275 AMX-30 tanks which are now produced under licence in Spain as well as 480 older M-47 and M-48 medium tanks and 180 M-41 light tanks. The navy includes 8 submarines, 1 aircraft carrier, 11 destroyers and 16 frigates. The navy is now equipped with numbers of United States supplied surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles. The air force includes 5 interceptor squadrons with 36 F-4 aircraft, 26 Mirage IIIs and 24 Mirage F-1s. The tactical air command has some thirty fighter bombers including F-5s and a Spanish Super Saeta. There is a maritime reconnaissance squadron with 6 long-range United States Orion aircraft.

4.16. The failure of the attempted coup on 23rd February was a triumph for democracy in Spain. The Committee welcomes the decision of the Spanish Government to hold consultations with the opposition parties on accession to NATO and looks forward to an application being made by that country for accession to NATO. Meanwhile, it proposes that arrangements should be made to permit Spain to participate in NATO defence planning and Spanish forces to participate in appropriate NATO exercises.

*(e) The eastern Mediterranean*

4.17. Since 1978, and particularly since the Camp David agreements were signed, an additional division has been added to the age-old divisions of the Arab and Moslem world, exemplified in the Iraqi-Iranian war, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan. However, contrary to the opinion

expressed by Mr. Haig<sup>1</sup>, the United States Secretary of State, during his visit to the Middle East in April of this year, the Palestinian problem and hence the settlement of the Israeli-Arab conflict remains at the top of the list of priorities for the Arab countries in that part of the world. The Soviet threat, in spite of the invasion of Afghanistan and its condemnation by the Islamabad Islamic Conference of 29th January 1980, takes second place among the concerns of the Mediterranean and Gulf coastal states, which do not want a permanent western military presence.

(i) *Iraq*

4.18. Iraq, because it is a neighbour of Turkey, although not on the Mediterranean, should appropriately be included among the eastern Mediterranean countries. Since the election of President Hussein in July 1979, in order to maintain its leading rôle, the Arab socialist party Ba'ath has had to come to grips with a period of agitation and a plot which led to violent repression within the party in August 1979. This agitation, which has grown since the Iranian revolution, has demonstrated the persistence of internal tension due to the Kurds, the communists (the Iraqi Communist Party was restrained and then excluded from the Progressive National Front in 1979) and the Shi'ite population which is in the majority in the country. In addition to a regular army of 242,250 men, who are well indoctrinated and armed, President Hussein therefore also has a people's army of 60,000 men to provide an effective rampart against any enemy, whether internal or external.

4.19. Iraq, which has been involved since September 1980 in a war with Iran, the end of which is not yet in sight, has not obtained the results it expected and has only half-hearted support from the Gulf coastal states: only Jordan and Kuwait grant it full support. Its currency reserves (\$30,000 million) have allowed it to procure and order new arms, particularly from Italy for its navy, France for its air force and anti-aircraft missiles, Egypt for munitions and the Soviet Union for tanks (see paragraph 2.18). Before the war with Iran, its air force included bombers (12 Tu-22s, 10 Il-28s) and fighter bombers (80 MiG-23s, 40 Su-7Bs, 60 Su-20s). Four of the 60 F-1s ordered from France were delivered, as were Alouette, Super Frelon, Gazelle Puma and Wessex helicopters; its

1. "The purpose of my trip here is to discuss with our friends how we can meet the threat posed by the Soviet Union and its surrogates in the entire area... But we are equally interested in an exchange of views on how to advance the peace process." Tel Aviv, 5th April 1981.

Milan and Hot anti-tank missiles (on order) and Hunter aircraft are of French and British origin.

4.20. The Soviet Union, Iraq's leading arms supplier and partner since the 1972 friendship treaty, and the United States, with which Iraq has growing economic relations and will soon have normal diplomatic relations, have kept strictly outside the war.

(ii) *Syria*

4.21. Under President Assad and the Ba'ath Party, which has an Alawite majority, the Syrian Arab Republic has been subjected to violent internal disturbances since 1978-79, the connecting thread being the participation of fundamentalist Moslems (Moslem Brotherhood) and recourse to individual or mass assassination (Aleppo massacres in June 1979). In March-June 1980, the régime took widespread military action to stamp out what was in fact a league of all the opposition elements from the extreme right-wing fundamentalists to the progressives. However, for the time being, the Syrian régime seems relatively stable.

4.22. Militarily, Syria earmarks more than a quarter of its budget for defence and has a large army (200,000 ground forces, 45,000 in the air force and 2,500 in the navy), with sophisticated Soviet equipment (see paragraph 2.18). One of its tasks since 1976 is to maintain civil peace in Lebanon (between 20,000 and 30,000 troops). In addition to 3,000 tanks (paragraph 2.18), its up-to-date Soviet military equipment includes ground attack fighters (60 MiG-23s, 30 Su-20s) and interceptors (25 MiG-25 Foxbats, 200 MiG-21s plus older MiG-17s and Su-7s). However, Hot and Milan anti-tank missiles and Gazelle helicopters have been procured from France and Super Frelon helicopters are on order.

4.23. The treaty of friendship and co-operation between Syria and the Soviet Union, signed on 8th October 1980 for a period of twenty years, following on the 1979 arms agreements, came at a time when Syria was being increasingly isolated in the Arab world and subjected to internal threats. The acknowledged aim of this co-operation was to restore a strategic balance between Syria and Israel. The signing of the treaty allowed the number of Soviet military experts to be increased from 2,500 to 3,500, but the Soviet Union has no military bases in Syria apart from mooring and repair facilities in the military port of Tartus.

4.24. Despite present appearances, President Assad and most of the Ba'ath leaders are

reputed to be ideologically pro-western and anti-communist. In accordance with its policy of non-alignment, Syria accepts American assistance and has relations with Washington in spite of deep disagreement over Camp David.

(iii) *Lebanon*

4.25. Lebanon is the point of encounter between the twofold confrontation between the Arab-Moslem world and Israel on the one hand and the most westernised Christian communities in the Middle East on the other hand. Israel's only real enemy at present – the Palestinian resistance movement – operates from southern Lebanon. This was the area occupied by the Israelis from 14th to 19th March in retaliation against an attack. On a decision of the Security Council, the Israelis were relieved not by UNIFIL but by local militia who on the one hand owe allegiance to Israel and on the other have links with the Lebanese National Front (whose present leader is Camille Chamoun) which groups the conservative Christian parties in Beirut. The rest of the country is divided into three zones: progressive-Palestinian in the south-west, Christian in the centre (including Beirut) and Syrian everywhere else. In 1976, certain Arab countries gave the Syrian President the task of safeguarding the identity of the Lebanese state and containing the separatist factions of the Christian activists. The present conflict between the 32,000 Syrians of the Arab deterrent force and the Christian militia (28,000 well-armed men), not to speak of the Lebanese army dispersed around the country, raises acutely the problem of Syria's intentions in Lebanon, the existence of which it has never truly recognised, the possibility of Israeli raids and the occupation of southern Lebanon and an internationalisation of the crisis demanded by the Christians and rejected by the Arab countries. The very existence of Lebanon seems likely to remain threatened as long as a solution to the Israeli-Arab conflict is not found which can be accepted by all the Arab countries and hence by the Palestinians.

(iv) *Israel*

4.26. Mr. Begin, Prime Minister of Israel since 1977 and leader of the Likud, has applied the Camp David agreements signed by Mr. Sadat, Mr. Carter and himself on 26th March 1979. But, where the settlement of the Palestinian question is concerned, he has been intractable, in particular by pursuing a policy of colonising occupied Palestinian territory. The next legislative elections are to be

held on 30th June 1981. A labour victory – which current polls do not foresee – might change this policy.

4.27. In January 1980, Israel's military occupation, in accordance with the Camp David agreements, covered only one-third of the Sinai Peninsula and the bilateral aspects of the agreements will be applied in full, or at least the first stage (normalisation of relations between Egypt and Israel with an exchange of ambassadors, movement of persons, return of the Al Tur oil field, respect for a buffer zone and limitation of the Egyptian forces in the Sinai). The final withdrawal from the Sinai is to take place in April 1982. The situation is quite different as regards the settlement of the Palestinian question, which is merely the subject of a joint letter annexed to the treaty. The negotiations on the independence of the West Bank and Gaza are marking time and are at present a stake in the Israeli electoral campaign. Egyptian and Israeli interpretations have differed completely over the form of independence and the meaning of the five-year interim period leading up to it. Relations between Israel and the United States are still close. Thus, Israel receives \$1,400 million of American military assistance each year, \$500 million of which does not have to be reimbursed. However, the sale of 60 F-15s by the United States to Saudi Arabia and the decision to sell it 5 AWACS met with opposition from Israel which seeks compensation, although the Reagan Administration has granted it additional economic and military assistance of \$300 million per year in 1983 and 1984 (plus 25 F-15s) so as to ensure some balance between friendly Arab countries and Israel. Apart from 1,000 British Centurion tanks, 30 Mirage IIIs and 30 Super Frelon and Alouette helicopters from France, its military equipment (3,050 tanks, 480 combat aircraft, numerous anti-tank, surface-to-air and surface-to-surface missiles) is entirely of American origin, nationally produced or of Soviet origin from spoils of war.

(v) *Egypt*

4.28. By effectively returning the Sinai to Egypt, the Camp David peace agreements strengthened Mr. Sadat as head of state. He therefore seized the opportunity to have political and constitutional reforms adopted by referendum to strengthen democracy in Egypt (April 1979), to allow him to be re-elected President for an unlimited number of times and to impose Islamic law as the main basis of legislation (in order to slow down the growing opposition of Islamic fundamentalist groups) in May 1980.

4.29. Mr. Sadat's foreign policy is centred mainly on the application of the Camp David agreements, including Palestinian independence, and thus on Egypt's relations with the United States. It is also on a lookout for any opportunity of joining up again with the Arab countries, which unanimously rejected it and isolated it diplomatically and economically after the Israeli-Egyptian peace settlement. The United States has therefore considerably increased its military and economic assistance since 1978: in 1979, annual economic assistance was fixed at \$1,250 million and military assistance at \$1,500 million, used for the purchase of front-line armoured vehicles and 35 Phantom F-4Es. President Reagan raised assistance for 1981-82 by \$1,250 million (for the payment of 244 M-60 armoured vehicles, 40 F-16 fighters and 11 Hawk surface-to-air missile batteries), not counting assistance for reconstructing Egypt's armaments industry. Military co-operation consists of American weapons and a few hundred troops being stationed permanently in Egypt and manœuvres to test the rapid deployment force and intervention facilities in the Middle East. But the Egyptians have no wish to be aligned militarily with a great power and repeat that there are no American bases in Egypt. Hence their opposition to the Israeli-American proposals concerning the international peacekeeping force in the Sinai, the final Israeli withdrawal being planned for April 1982, and their refusal to allow the Americans to occupy the two air bases in the Sinai (which are to be evacuated by the Israelis) or the naval and air base at Ras Bana. Finally, Egypt is trying to increase its military industrial production in conjunction with the United Kingdom (for guns) and France (Alpha-Jet) and considers it is nearly self-sufficient in light arms and munitions (which it exports to Arab and African countries, most recently to Iraq). Most military equipment is still of Soviet origin for which spare parts are in short supply (850 T-54/55 and 750 T-62 tanks; anti-tank, surface-to-air and surface-to-surface missiles; 23 Tu-16s, 50 MiG-21s, 30 MiG-17s, 60 Su-7s and 18 Su-20s, 45 MiG-21 interceptors) but it is becoming western (M-113 front-line armoured vehicles; Milan, Swingfire, Tow anti-tank missiles; surface-to-air Hawk missiles; helicopters; Mirage III and Mirage V aircraft).

(f) *North Africa*

(i) *Libya*

4.30. Some experts are now worried about the possible use of Libyan bases by the Soviet air force. Because of this threat of military imba-

lance in the Mediterranean, the report examines Libya's position in an international context, its successful military action in Chad having brought it into the limelight.

*The domestic situation*

4.31. Libya is almost four times the size of France but has only 2,933,000 inhabitants: scattered nomads in the south, villagers more or less isolated in oases and city-dwellers in towns along the Mediterranean, a fertile strip no more than 100 km wide stretching from Egypt to Tunisia. The "Libyan paradise" covers only 5% of the total area of the country. It was the discovery of oil in 1959 that completely reversed the position of Libya, switching it from the poorest state in the Arab world to one of the wealthiest.

4.32. When Kadhafi came to power in 1969, his first concern was independence and national sovereignty: British training installations and the United States air base had to be evacuated in 1970, large quantities of military equipment were purchased from the Soviet Union and in 1971 Libya started taking control of its oil industry, the process being practically complete by December 1973. It thus became the world's third producer/ exporter, while reducing quantities and raising prices (1972). The money earned serves to finance Kadhafi's external policy and also development projects in order to have a sound, durable economy in which agriculture plays an important part - making the desert fertile - and industrialisation is based on local resources. However, there are two major obstacles: the lack of managerial staff and too few workers whether trained or untrained, hence the need for foreign co-operation from both East and West (particularly in the army), the accent placed on training technicians and experts and the use of Egyptian and Tunisian labour since traditionally Libyans are neither workers nor peasants (hence the desire for a union with Egypt).

4.33. Politically speaking, Kadhafi does not seem particularly vulnerable although there were reports of an attempted mutiny involving the army in Tobruk in summer 1980. There are regular purges and eliminations of "enemies of the Republic", the most recent having been in March 1981. It is consequently difficult to contemplate a succession (other than military) and thus any continuity in external policy considering how very personal it is.

*Foreign policy*

4.34. In view of Libya's geographical and historical position, Kadhafi defined four areas of action: the Arab world, which has priority, the

Moslem world, the African continent and the Mediterranean. As soon as he came to power, Kadhafi declared himself the champion of Arab unity and defender of Islamic socialism, rejecting atheist communism and western capitalism alike; his many challenges have surprised the Arabs as much as the West. Libya projects itself on the international screen as "activist"; it is highly regarded by minorities among Arabs (Palestinians), Moslems (black Moslems in the United States) colonial emancipation movements (Angola, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique) and revolutionary freedom movements (Eritrea, IRA), all of which organisations it finances.

4.35. For instance, in the last fifteen months, Kadhafi has financed an uprising in Tunisia, remote-controlled a putsch in Gambia, encouraged a conspiracy in Ghana, financed and guided a religious riot in Nigeria, hatched a plot in Mauritania and invaded Chad. Finally, he continues to support the Polisario revolutionaries who are still fighting the Moroccan army and is trying to destabilise Egypt, Somalia and the Sultanate of Oman.

#### *Relations between Libya and its geographical neighbours*

4.36. From the very beginning Colonel Kadhafi's grand design has been Arab unity; as early as in 1970 he turned towards the Mashrek - the eastern Arab world - relations with the Magreb in the West being viewed merely as personalised or bilateral contacts depending on the political régimes. However, his attempts at union with Egypt, Sudan and Syria in 1971 and then with Egypt in 1973 and Tunisia in 1974 all met with failure and since the end of 1974 his views have left him increasingly isolated within the Arab world and have even encountered hostility due to his attempts to destabilise neighbouring Arab countries (financing opposition movements and military training on Libyan bases).

4.37. Relations between Libya and Egypt have been rather cool, not to say hostile, since the failure of the union in 1973. Kadhafi believes Sadat supports American imperialism. In July 1977, there was a three-day conventional war between the Egyptian and Libyan armies. Recent years have been marked by the severing of diplomatic relations in December 1977, denunciations of and measures taken by Sadat against Libyan military frontier operations (proclamation of a state of emergency in the frontier province; 100,000 Egyptians along the frontier). With regard to the proposed merger with Chad, Egypt's main concern is the threat of the Sudan being destabilised by Libya. Egypt considers the Sudan to be part and parcel

of its own security arrangements, hence the mutual defence pact signed after an attempted coup d'état against Nemery in July 1976 with Libyan backing. However, Egypt does not wish to compromise itself in Chad by supporting Hissène Habré in order to be in a better position to launch a diplomatic offensive in the OAU. Libya for its part has been trying to foster some degree of détente with its neighbours since its intervention in Chad.

#### *Relations between Libya and the Sudan*

4.38. Diplomatic relations were re-established in November but have never been very warm (attempted coup d'état in 1976). Major-General Nemery has been wary since the intervention in Chad and has in fact accused Kadhafi of coveting the Sudan. He has therefore closed his frontiers to all foreigners and moved in troops to strengthen the frontier with Chad.

#### *Relations between Libya and Tunisia*

4.39. Here the situation fluctuates. Relations were strained after the failure of the 1974 merger, were re-established at economic level with the signature of a trade agreement in October 1977 and were broken off again over the Gafsa disturbances in January 1980, when an unsuccessful attempt was made to provoke a general uprising. Shortly afterwards there was a reconciliation followed by a further development in November 1980 when the Tunisian Secretary-General for Foreign Affairs accused the Libyans of an armed intrusion in Tunisia. Finally, since January 1981 Tunisia and Libya have been moving towards normal diplomatic and economic relations, the first step having been taken by the Head of the Tunisian Government with a view to terminating the almost permanent tension which had prevailed along their frontier since 1974.

#### *Relations between Libya and Algeria*

4.40. Relations are good; there was some reserve with a hint of disapproval about the intervention in Chad and recently Algeria has been keeping its distances because diplomatic circles believe that Kadhafi has been trying to short-circuit Algeria within the Polisario.

#### *Relations between Libya and its black African neighbours*

4.41. President Senghor and other African Presidents believe Libya is dreaming of gaining political hegemony over the Sahel states and

even, if possible, an overall regrouping of the Sahara under its direction – hence its policy of systematic support for the Islamic peoples in the northern parts of these states against the black population to the south. Yet in 1979 Libya intervened in Uganda to save Amin Dada, the result of which was a failure. In Central Africa, Libya supplied Bokassa with military equipment and instructors in September 1979. There is a long list of Libyan interventions aimed at taking advantage of divisions and political vacuums among the fragile African régimes. The last striking example, a success for the first time, was Libya's action in Chad which triggered off a call to arms and uneasiness among the African states.

4.42. Moreover, Kadhafi has accused the heads of the French-speaking states of taking too many orders from the Elysée (May 1980). After invading Chad, he said he would stay there until the French forces left Central Africa and would consider reviewing his programmes of assistance to any African countries which criticised him.

#### *Immediate neighbours*

4.43. Libya's relatively friendly relations with Niger have been broken off. Relations with Chad have been close and eventful since 1969 with *inter alia* Libya's annexation of the Aozou strip and support for the various leaders of the rebellion in Chad. It was under a treaty for material and moral support signed with Goukouni in June 1980 that 4,000 to 5,000 Libyan soldiers and troops of the Islamic Legion entered Chad in November 1980 and conquered Djamena. Subsequently the statement of intention to merge the two countries proclaimed in January 1981 was denied by the President of Chad shortly afterwards for lack of support in Chad.

4.44. The future of relations between Libya and Chad is therefore uncertain and the conflict far from over. Many states accuse the Soviet Union of being behind Libya in this successful action, in spite of many statements by Kadhafi asserting that he receives neither assistance nor advice from Moscow. A first contingent of 200 Libyan soldiers was withdrawn at the end of March 1981.

#### *Relations with the Soviet Union*

4.45. For some time Libya has been accused of offering the Soviet Union a means of wielding a tremendous military threat over the Mediterranean area. These accusations are based on certain statements by Kadhafi who is on good terms with the Soviet Union because it supports the Arab cause and on bad terms with the United States because of its support for Israel.

They are also based on the fact that Kadhafi supports the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, obtains Soviet logistic support for the regular Libyan army and the Islamic Legion, and has stocks of Soviet weapons. Since 1970, the Soviet Union has been supplying Libya with tanks and artillery and shortly afterwards with aircraft, missiles and the most sophisticated weapons, in all an arsenal worth about \$12 billion. Finally, more than 5,000 military and civil personnel from the eastern bloc, including Cuba, provide the backbone of the army and secret service, of which 1,000 to 2,000 are Soviet. Between 600 and 1,000 Cubans carry out military and civil work (roads, buildings) and 1,500 to 2,000 East Germans are in the secret service. Combat aircraft pilots include North Koreans (20) and Soviets (for Foxbat), with Czech technical staff.

4.46. Although Kadhafi's policy of destabilisation and struggle against western influence in the third world suits the Kremlin, the Soviet navy has no bases in Libya. What is to be feared rather is the use of Libyan air bases by the Soviet Union (there are 19 airfields with concrete runways, 2 more than 8 km long), which would significantly change the balance of East-West forces in the Mediterranean and on the African continent.

#### *Relations with Mediterranean NATO countries (Italy, France)*

4.47. Libya formerly has mainly had relations with France because of its policy of national independence, its position towards the Israeli-Arab conflict and its rôle in Africa. Kadhafi ordered 110 Mirage aircraft from France in 1972-73 but the once friendly relationship deteriorated because of French policy in Africa, particularly in Chad. Libya accused France of aggression in Africa in December 1977 and denounced its policy in Africa in June 1978. In February 1980, the French Embassy in Tripoli was broken into and burnt down. Referring to the Gafsa incident at the same time, Kadhafi spoke of the French invasion of Tunisia. The same tension was maintained throughout the year and culminated with the victory of Libyan troops in Djamena in November 1980.

4.48. France did not intervene in the conflict in Chad in November 1980, but after the announcement of the prospect of a merger, France voiced its opposition in accordance with international regulations and the 1979 Lagos agreements, placed its Mediterranean fleet in a state of alert and sent reinforcements to Africa. The government said it would intervene at the request of the African nations concerned in the event of the Libyan troops stationed in Chad making a move to invade another African state.

### *Relations between Libya and Italy*

4.49. Libya is on good terms with Italy which seeks closer economic relations and hopes to obtain worthwhile contracts for Italian firms in exchange for regular supplies of oil and gas. Contracts worth 700 million lire are already being carried out and 15,000 Italians are working in Libya which is Italy's fourth oil supplier and has a 9.1 % share in Fiat, rising to 13.4 % in 1982, thus giving it direct access to Italy's arms industry. Italy sells Libya warships, guns, automatic and light weapons, radar and other electronic equipment plus transport and combat aircraft.

4.50. However, certain politicians are worried about the strength of the Libyan lobby in Sicily (infiltration of the media, political support for the socialists) and the percentage of the territory of the island of Pantelleria (10 %), mid-way between Africa and Italy, owned by Libyans. So far, however, there have been no clashes and Italy did not show as much concern as France about the proposed union between Libya and Chad.

### *Libyan defence policy*

4.51. The Libyan armed forces have 53,000 men, 2,400 Soviet medium tanks, including the more recent T-62 and T-72, 287 combat aircraft, including the most recent MiG-23 and 25 (Foxbat), plus Mirage IIIs. Libya thus has the best air force in North Africa, but its effectiveness is doubtful as shown *inter alia* by operations in Angola. However, it has an enormous stock of modern equipment maintained by East German and Czechoslovak technicians.

4.52. In addition to this army, whose operational capability is, for the time being, modest (it is not considered capable of deploying more than 400 or 500 tanks and about 50 aircraft), Kadhafi has set up a Pan-African (or Islamic) Legion, trained for operations abroad and formed of other Arabs and Africans as well as Libyans. He intends to increase the number of legionnaires to half a million in keeping with the arsenal built up since 1969. They played a significant rôle in the victory in Chad.

4.53. Kadhafi's policy is offensive and subversive rather than defensive and includes assistance to terrorism and the Islamic revolution. His army is less dangerous than the ideas he proclaims and his indirect support for minorities and opposition movements in Arab and African countries or on other continents. Colonel Kadhafi is seen by some to be seeking a zone of political influence rather than territorial conquest. What preoccupies the Committee, and the West, the most is whether Libya will remain neutral or one day side with the Soviet Union. Following his visit to Mos-

cow on 28th April, however, there was no treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union.

### *(ii) Tunisia*

4.54. Since 1980 (and particularly since the attack on Gafsa in January 1980), the Tunisian political régime, dominated by the historical personality of President Bourguiba – elected for life – and by the Destour Socialist Party, has become progressively more democratic. There was provision for democratisation in the 1959 constitution but little had in fact been done. The extraordinary congress of the DSP which opened in Tunis on 10th April has just given the green light to the introduction of a multi-party system and recognised the *de facto* right of trade unions to be independent. However, while strengthening the liberal element in the government (formation of the Mazali Government in April 1980) and releasing the leaders of the Tunisian General Workers' Union (in May-August 1980), President Bourguiba maintains a very firm stand towards Islamic fundamentalists and any attempt at subversion.

4.55. Tunisia's relations with Libya, which had already been poor since 1974, grew even worse after the attack on Gafsa which, according to the Tunisian authorities, was backed and prepared by Libya. This event led to a rapprochement between France and Tunisia, which subsequently continued, *inter alia* by the sending of French military advisers and transport aircraft, which were withdrawn in February 1980. Tunisia also arranged for the Americans to speed up deliveries of military equipment worth \$100 million originally planned for 1981. Limited repair facilities for unarmed Soviet vessels such as support ships are offered at Bizerta subject to agreement on a case-by-case basis.

4.56. Tunisia is determined to remain a crossroads open to all beneficial influences from the West, Africa and the Arab world: the Arab League has had its seat in Tunis since the exclusion of Egypt and the Islamic Conference has also chosen it for its seat and appointed a former Tunisian Foreign Minister as Secretary-General. It has resumed close contacts with Algeria but backs Morocco in the conflict over the western Sahara. Its armed forces are the smallest of all the Arab countries considered in this report (28,600 in all of which 24,000 in the army) and have French, American, Italian and British equipment. Tunisia has undertaken an urgent programme to provide radar coverage of the country; it also hopes to acquire anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles, interceptor fighters with some retaliatory capability, helicopters to improve army mobility, and fast patrol boats to secure its coast against possible incursions from its neighbours, but will require specially favourable financial terms.

*(iii) Algeria*

4.57. After the death on 27th December 1978 of Mr. Houari Boumediene, President of Algeria for thirteen years, Colonel Bendjedid Chadli, member of the Political Bureau, was elected President-Secretary General of the National Liberation Front on 7th February 1979 in accordance with the 1976 constitution. While respecting the principle of a single party system, President Chadli, a moderate, confirmed the socialist line but introduced gradual liberalisation (freeing of Ben Bella, amnesty, a more liberal and private sector economy). Finally, internal security problems are settled firmly but less drastically than before. It therefore seems that the régime in Algeria is stable and normally should remain so at least until the next presidential elections in 1984.

4.58. From a diplomatic point of view, Algeria is adhering to President Boumediene's principles, particularly his twofold African and Arab vocation. It is still wearing the laurels won during its successful mediation in the affair of the American hostages. Three themes dominate this policy: the need to promote non-alignment at a time of renewed tension between the blocs, the development of intra-African economic co-operation and the revival of the North-South dialogue and, finally, support for liberation movements, including the PLO and the Polisario in the western Sahara. This is the framework for its relations with the United States and the Soviet Union. From the military point of view, Algeria's main supplier is the Soviet Union, but diplomatically its leaders wish to remain on friendly terms with the United States in spite of recent criticism of American policy in Africa including sales of arms to Morocco. The modern naval base at Mers el-Kébir has never been made available to the Soviet Union and it is not expected to be.

4.59. Its armed forces (101,000 of which 90,000 in the army) have 600 Soviet tanks, including T-62s and T-72s, 50 French AMX-13s, 278 combat aircraft of which 90 MiG-21 interceptors, and 20 Su-20 and MiG-23 ground attack aircraft.

*(iv) Morocco*

4.60. Since 1977 and the attempts on his life, King Hassan has been pursuing a policy of consolidating his power whilst preparing for his succession (referendum in May 1980) and controlled political and social liberalisation (amnesty of political prisoners, end of censorship in March 1977). However, Morocco's economy and finances have steadily deteriorated under the combined effects of the war in the Sahara and world inflation: for instance, its military budget has been increased threefold from 1975 to 1978 (\$676 million in 1980).

4.61. Strengthened by the success of the "green march" and the Madrid agreement whereby it was granted half the Spanish Sahara, Morocco, which had had a good start in 1975, is now in a bad position. In the Saharan dispute with the Polisario (10-12,000 men) and Algeria (Mauritania having withdrawn from the dispute in August 1979), it has the military backing of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iraq, not to speak of sales of arms from France (50 Mirage F-1s in 1978, 10 Mirage F-1CHs in 1979 plus, according to the Polisario, 250 military advisers) and the United States. In fact, after much hesitation, in January 1980 the United States sold Morocco aircraft and helicopters worth \$235 million, i.e. 20 F-5E fighters and 10 OV-10 Bronco reconnaissance aircraft, with a clause linking their delivery to the negotiations between Morocco and the Polisario. These are the arms which President Reagan decided to deliver unconditionally in March 1981 with 108 M-60 tanks in addition, while affirming United States neutrality in the dispute. The Soviet Union for its part is well aware that Libya is supplying the Polisario with Soviet arms, but it does not recognise the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic. The latter obtained a simple majority vote of twenty-six countries for its admission to the OAU on 4th July 1980 and since mid-1980 it has been recognised by about forty countries. In the United Nations, the resolution naming the Polisario front as representative of the Saharan people and urging Morocco to negotiate with it after evacuating its territory was adopted in 1980. In any event, Morocco will have to adopt an official position on the resolutions of the OAU Committee of Wise Men which met in Freetown in September 1980 as a result of a referendum organised under the auspices of the OAU prior to the summit meeting of the organisation in July 1981. In the meantime, the war is spreading.

**V. Conclusions**

5.1. In the foregoing sections, the Committee has reviewed the balance of force in the areas of potential threat from the Warsaw Pact countries in the Mediterranean region. While the Committee continues to deplore the unabated growth in Soviet military expenditure and notes with particular concern the appearance of a number of new classes of larger Soviet naval vessels, it concludes that in the southern region the threat of direct conventional military attack by Warsaw Pact forces has not significantly increased over the three years since the Committee last reported. There has been some limited modernisation of Bulgarian military equipment, but as in the past Soviet forces are not stationed in either Bulgaria or Roma-



nia. Present Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces could not successfully launch an attack to seize the Turkish Straits – the most important conceivable Soviet objective in the area – without a large-scale prior reinforcement with Soviet forces from other areas of which the Alliance would inevitably have advance warning. A surprise attack against north-east Italy by Warsaw Pact forces from Hungary passing through Yugoslavia is a very unlikely scenario in the absence of generalised hostilities involving other NATO fronts.

5.2. In the Mediterranean itself, the Soviet naval squadron maintained there remains outnumbered and is largely deprived of base facilities. Because of the regulated passages through the Turkish Straits, there would be considerable advance warning of any attempt to move the Black Sea fleet as a whole into the Mediterranean, and in the absence of base facilities it could not be maintained there for very long. This threat is less today than in the early 1970s when Soviet forces had access to extensive naval and air bases in Egypt.

5.3. The Committee is very much more concerned at the increased danger of the outbreak of local hostilities which could directly involve allied interests in certain parts of the eastern, or possibly southern, Mediterranean. The situation in these areas remains highly unpredictable, characterised in some cases by potentially unstable or irresponsible régimes which can lead to rapid and unexpected shifts of alliances, which, in certain circumstances, could again lead to the reappearance of Soviet bases in the Mediterranean. The last ten years has seen the Soviet Union removed from Egypt and Somalia, and installed instead in Ethiopia. By no means all potential or actual local conflicts, however, are incited by the Soviet Union; there are very many local causes of tension between neighbouring countries in the area and the situation has been made more dangerous by the unprecedented levels of armaments which, in many cases, are more modern and sophisticated than those possessed by some NATO countries in the area, and which, in many cases, have been supplied both by the Soviet Union and by several NATO countries. The large increase in petroleum revenues of oil-producing countries accounts in part for the present levels of their armaments.

5.4. The Committee believes that the solidarity and cohesion of the whole Alliance in the Mediterranean region is not always sufficiently stressed; local mutual defence arrangements appear too often to be a purely bilateral arrangement between the country concerned and the United States. There is a need for all other allied countries to be more visibly identified with the defence of the area, arrangements should be developed to provide other sources of

reinforcements for certain contingencies, in case currently earmarked reinforcements of the United States in particular should be diverted further east. Spain, whose government has alluded to the possibility of accession to NATO on a number of occasions in recent years, is an obvious potential source of extra forces in the Mediterranean area and the Committee would welcome their participation in NATO exercises and defence planning while it is clearly understood that a decision to apply to accede to NATO is a matter for Spain alone and one which would have to be seen to have the approval of the democratically elected Spanish parliament. Turkey makes a large and valuable contribution to allied defence in the eastern Mediterranean region, but will require continued bilateral assistance for the modernisation of much of its military equipment, particularly armour, anti-armour weapons and vehicles to provide better mobility. The importance of this is clearly seen when present Turkish equipment is compared with that now possessed by many countries of the eastern and southern Mediterranean to which attention has been drawn above.

5.5. NATO communications and air defence equipment in the area is in need of modernisation and, in view of the dangers of unexpected events, should be given greater priority. Some aspects of air defence arrangements appear to the Committee to be based on a Maginot Line philosophy, providing a screen in one particular direction. Southward-facing protection is also necessary to provide all-round defence as an insurance against unexpected developments in the region.

5.6. The foregoing conclusions are incorporated in the draft recommendation attached to this report. Further conclusions concerning the political situation in Turkey will be found in paragraphs 3.39 to 3.41 of this explanatory memorandum.

#### VI. *Opinion of the minority*

6.1. The report as a whole was adopted by the Committee by 14 votes to one with one abstention. A minority of the Committee opposed the report on the grounds that it was too oriented to military measures of security instead of dealing with the dangers of the arms race and the rôle of the countries which the minority held to be responsible for the arms trade. The report should have dealt with means of settling disputes in the Mediterranean area through multilateral agreement and have called for the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe to be responsible for security in the Mediterranean by removing the causes of tension. The minority did not agree with the Committee's conclusions on the political situation in Turkey.



**B. MANPOWER EFFORT - 1980**

	Period of compulsory <sup>1</sup> military service (months)			Total in armed forces <sup>2</sup> military personnel (thousands)	Total armed forces <sup>2</sup> (military and civilian) as percentage of active population
	Army	Navy	Air force	(e)	(e)
Belgium	10 <sup>3</sup>	10 <sup>3</sup>	10 <sup>3</sup>	109	2.8
France	12	12	12	575	3.1
Germany	15	15	15	495	2.5
Italy	12	18	12	500	2.5
Luxembourg		voluntary		1	0.9
Netherlands	14	14-17	14-17	107	2.7
United Kingdom		voluntary		328	2.2
<b>TOTAL WEU</b>				<b>2,115</b>	<b>2.6</b>
Canada		voluntary		80	1.0
Denmark	9	9	9	35	1.7
Greece	24-32	24-32	24-32	495	6.4
Norway	12	15	15	39	2.6
Portugal	16	24	21-24	83	2.2
Turkey	20	20	20	717	4.3
United States		voluntary		2,047	2.9
<b>TOTAL NON-WEU</b>				<b>3,496</b>	<b>3.2</b>
<b>TOTAL NATO</b>				<b>5,611</b>	<b>2.9</b>

*Sources:*

1. IISS Military Balance, 1980-81.
2. NATO press communiqué, M-DPC-2 (80) 26, 9th December 1980.
3. Eight months if served in Germany.

*e* = estimate.

## APPENDIX II

*Documents concerning the political situation in Turkey**(i) Address to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments by General Kenan Evren, Turkish Head of State**Ankara, 24th February 1981*

I am pleased to receive here today the honourable members of the Western European Union Assembly's Defence and Armaments Committee. There is no doubt that the honourable members, while visiting Turkey, on one hand complete their information with regard to defence requirements and problems of the eastern Mediterranean member countries in general, on the other hand show interest to Turkey's unique situation and problems in particular.

In yesterday's meetings and discussions all your questions were answered and all technical data were given. My colleagues and members of the cabinet will certainly continue today to provide you with additional information.

I, here today, will touch briefly on Turkey's internal situation before and after 12th September 1980, which you also know to a great extent.

As a matter of fact, it is quite impossible to claim that there existed a real democracy in Turkey before 12th September. In those days vicious disputes and its inciting effect upon well organised and armed terrorist sources resulted in the culmination of a complete anarchy atmosphere in the country. It was unthinkable to mention democracy in such an atmosphere where even individuals' right of living was not secure. After 12th September we have intensified all our efforts to speedily establish a medium in which real democracy, which we for a very long time yearned for, shall be reconstructed and revitalised.

In a country, if the citizens fear for their lives, if they do not have most basic rights like working and travelling, if they feel the fear of death while going from their homes to their jobs, then to talk about human rights would not be anything more than to force one's imagination. This was the situation in Turkey before 12th September. We, today, have completely reversed this situation and made a great progress in bringing back all the rights of the citi-

zens. We are determined, as we have promised from the very first day, to bring a complete democratic life to this country and no one should doubt that we will fulfil our pledge and transfer our duty to a democratically elected new administration. We pursue our efforts in accordance with a plan and programme and determine the timing within them.

We follow with interest the activity and declarations of some parliamentarians within the Council of Europe and European countries' parliaments with regard to the situation in Turkey. We receive with profound regret the allegations of some of the parliamentarians; such as human rights and freedoms in Turkey are restricted or detainees are tortured. What I would like to emphasise to you is that all our actions are carried out within the context of supremacy of law. Our constitution and rules of law categorically prohibit torture. Allegations to this effect are accepted as informing and inquiry is initiated without waiting for the complainants' application. The last example of this is the relevant authorities' investigation, on their own initiative, of the allegations with regard to an ex-mayor of one of our major cities. During the investigation which public opinion closely followed through mass media, the said person openly declared that he was not subjected to any torture and indicated that such allegations were manufactured intentionally by certain persons in his circle. Consequently, the real context of a completely baseless issue born out of ill-intended allegations which occupied some foreign press for a long time has come to daylight.

During our investigations of allegations with regard to torture, it has been ascertained that some are unfortunately true and legal action has immediately been initiated against the responsables.

We wish our friends to trust us and help Turkey in her endeavour to return democracy. Turkey is an indivisible and inseparable part of democratic and free Europe and wishes to stay so. However, I am sure you will appreciate that this cannot be realised solely with our efforts and you will direct your activities in an objective and constructive manner.

I wish that your visit to our country will be fruitful and useful.

**(ii) Briefing on terrorism  
in Turkey given to the Committee on Defence  
Questions and Armaments by Colonel Özalp  
of the Turkish General Staff**

*Ankara, 23rd February 1981*

Table 1 shows anarchist and terrorist incidents.

In the first column, you see the number of terrorist incidents in a period of 21 months, in 20 provinces under martial law, before the 12th September operation conducted by the Turkish armed forces.

In the second column, the total number and daily averages of the terrorist incidents are seen in the 5 month period in 67 provinces.

If you compare the daily averages, you easily see the drop in the number of incidents.

On the right of the table, you find the total number of incidents and the daily averages in the week before 12th September and the last week for the purpose of comparison; in each group of incidents, a sharp drop is observed. Against 220 armed assaults, the daily average of which was 31.4, we have 16 incidents in the last week, the daily average is 1.6. A 95 % decrease is observed in this type of incident. Certainly, the total number of incidents in the last week involves the whole of Turkey, whereas the week compared involves only 20 provinces under martial law at the time.

In explosive throwings (bombing assaults), we have again a 95 % decrease.

In graffiti and leaflet distribution, the decrease is 84 %.

In armed robberies (usurpation), we have a 49 % drop.

The total number of incidents had a drop of 86 %.

In the first column of Table 2 we see the total number of dead and injured in the terrorist incidents during the martial law implementation in 20 provinces in 21 months. 3,710 individuals lost their lives in terrorist incidents during this period. 3,399 civilians died; in other words, 3,399 families were left in distress and sorrow.

On the right of Table 2, the total number of dead and injured are seen in the 5 months after the 12th September operation in 67 provinces.

A sharp drop in the number of dead and injured is observed in this period.

If you compare the daily averages in these two periods, you easily observe that the number of terrorists that died has increased three and a half times. That proves the effectiveness of the state security forces in the period after 12th September. In this period, as a total the daily averages of deaths dropped from 6 to 1.9, and of those injured from 17 to 3.2. Instead of 5.5, only 0.9 civilians died daily in this period.

You still observe the drop in the number of dead and injured when you compare the numbers of the week before 12th September and the last week. The effectiveness of the state security forces is increasing. To sum up, instead of 10.2 people daily, 1.2 die nowadays, including terrorists.

TABLE 1

*Anarchist and terrorist incidents*

Terrorist incidents	In 20 provinces in 21 months 26.12.78 to 11.9.80		In 67 provinces in 5 months 12.9.80 to 16.2.81		In the week before 12.9.80 in 20 provinces		In the last week in 67 provinces		The decrease in the number of incidents %
	Total	Daily average	Total	Daily average	Total	Daily average	Total	Daily average	
Armed assault	9,085	15	464	2.9	220	31.4	11	1.6	95
Explosive throwing	6,365	10	311	2	127	18.1	6	0.9	95
Graffiti and leaflet distribution	6,893	11	2,300	14.6	225	32.1	37	5.2	84
Armed robbery	3,014	5	696	4.4	67	9.6	34	4.8	49
TOTAL	25,357	41	3,771	23.9	639	91.2	88	12.5	86

TABLE 2

Deaths	In 20 provinces in 20 months 26.12.78 to 11.9.80				In 67 provinces in 5 months 12.9.80 to 16.2.81		In the last week in 67 provinces	
	Total	Daily average	In the week before 12.9.80		Total	Daily average	Total	Daily average
			Total	Daily average				
State security forces	164	0.3	6	0.9	42	0.3	-	-
Terrorists	147	0.2	5	0.7	115	0.7	4	0.6
Civilians	3,399	5.5	60	8.6	149	0.9	4	0.6
TOTAL	3,710	6	71	10.2	306	1.9	8	1.2
Wounded	10,417	17	142	20.3	507	3.2	13	1.9

At the top of Table 3, you see the number of detainees, arrested and sentenced in the periods before and after 12th September.

In the last week, 1,588 people were detained, 1,180 arrested. The number sentenced is 227.

TABLE 3

	In 20 provinces in 20 months 26.12.78 to 11.9.80	In 67 provinces in 5 months 12.9.80 to 16.2.81	In the last week
Detained	62,100	46,833	1,588
Arrested	21,205	14,505	1,180
Sentenced	6,097	3,480	227

*At present:*

Detained	5,788	Extreme leftists	78 %
		Extreme rightists	12 %
Arrested	15,929	Separatists	10 %

Arrested	Parliamentarians	33
	Unionists	302

At present, we have 5,788 detainees and 15,929 under arrest. 78 % of these are extreme leftists, 12 % are extreme rightists and 10 % separatists.

The number of arrested parliamentarians is 33 (10 Nationalist Movement, 16 National Salvation Party, 7 Republican People's Party).

302 unionists have been arrested because of their involvement with the extreme leftists and rightists (290 DISK, 12 Independents).

TABLE 4

*Allegations of torture and violence*

Number of	Cases	58
	People involved	84
Number of cases under investigation		32
Number of cases decided on		26
No need for initiating criminal proceedings		13
Criminal proceedings initiated		13
Number of people prosecuted		27
Arrested		11
Summoned		15
Acquitted		1

In Table 4, you see that the number of torture and violence allegations reached 58. Of these cases, 32 are under investigation, 26 have been decided on. The Public Prosecutor ruled that there was no need to initiate criminal pro-

ceedings on 13 cases. Criminal proceedings have been initiated on the other 13 cases; because of their involvement, 27 people have been prosecuted. Of these, 11 were arrested, 15 summoned, 1 found not guilty.

TABLE 5

Weapons and explosives	Handed over to the authorities	Confiscated by the authorities	
	In the period between 12.9.80 and 17.10.80	In the period between 12.9.80 and 16.2.81	In the last week
Pistols	132,552	12,633	1,485
Automatic pistols	2,474	220	14
Rifles	25,144	3,883	181
Ammunition	635,707	425,784	23,410
Explosives (in kg)	2,977	3,338	592
Hand grenades, bombs	21	-	-
Powder (in kg)	2,110	-	-
Ignition cords (in m)	1,569	-	-
Fuses	18,647	-	-
Mortars	1	1	-
Cutting and prodding weapons	17,495	653	14

In the first column of Table 5, you see the number of weapons and explosives handed over to the authorities by the people in observance of a law passed after 12th September concerning the weapons and explosives without a warrant.

In the second column, you observe the number of weapons and explosives confiscated after 12th September.

On the right, you may observe the number of weapons and ammunition confiscated in the last week.

You can easily equip an army with the weapons, ammunition and explosives on this chart.

The aims of the anarchist and terrorist activities in Turkey is to weaken and divide the country, to separate it from NATO and join it with another bloc.

Anarchy and terrorism in Turkey to a great extent are being fed and led by similar organisations outside of Turkey. The similar terrorist organisations aiming at the destruction of the country are formed in the countries where the majority of the Turkish workers live.

These organisations have been formed with the financial support of the similar international terrorist organisations and continue their activities with their help. Certainly, they are under the directions of these international terrorist organisations in return.

The Turkish workers and their families and the students, the majority of whom live in the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium, are being indoctrinated in these countries by the terrorist organisations and sent to Turkey for terrorist activities. The terrorists who have committed crimes and are pursued by the Turkish security forces are being protected and solicited by these organisations outside of the country.

Unfounded or small-scale terrorist incidents in Turkey have been exaggerated by similar terrorist organisations and world public opinion has been deceived.

The leaflets and documents aimed at terrorist activities have been smuggled into the country by these organisations. Subversive propaganda broadcasts have been directed to Turkey by their radios. For examples, Radio


Moscow, the Voice of Turkish Communist Party Radio Tiran, Communist Bizim Radio located in the German Democratic Republic have 86 hours of Turkish broadcasts monthly.

It is a pity that some documents and letters confiscated from the terrorists show some kind of a tie between some parliamentarians of the European countries and the terrorists in Turkey, especially in the field of allegations of torture and violence.



APPENDIX III

*NATO military command structure — Elements in the Mediterranean and adjoining area*



*European security and the Mediterranean*

AMENDMENTS 1, 2, 3 and 4<sup>1</sup>  
*tabled by Mr. Dejardin*

1. Before paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert:  
“ (i) Reaffirming its unswerving attachment to the values of parliamentary and pluralist democracy, the result of free elections by universal suffrage, and to the fundamental freedoms set out in the European Convention of Human Rights ; ”.
2. Replace paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation by the following:  
“ (vi) Believing that the maintenance and the strengthening of present links between Turkey and the various Atlantic and European institutions depend on true and steady progress being made towards the early restoration of democracy in Turkey in the interests of that country and of the Alliance, ”.
3. Leave out paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:  
“ 2. To increase mutual assistance for the modernisation of the military potential of the Alliance in the eastern area of the Mediterranean with particular regard to the quality and level of armaments of neighbouring countries ; ”.
4. Delete paragraph 7 of the draft recommendation proper.

*Signed: Dejardin*

1. See 3rd Sitting, 16th June 1981 (Amendments negatived).

*European security and the Mediterranean*

AMENDMENT 5<sup>1</sup>

*tabled by MM. Gessner, Stoffelen and Urwin*

5. In paragraph 7 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “ and defence planning ”.

*Signed: Gessner, Stoffelen, Urwin*

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1. See 3rd Sitting, 16th June 1981 (Amendment agreed to).

*European security and the Mediterranean*

AMENDMENT 6<sup>1</sup>  
*tabled by Mr. Cavaliere*

6. After paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph :  
“ To concert allied policy on the supply of armaments to third countries ; ”.

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1. See 3rd Sitting, 16th June 1981 (Amendment agreed to).

*European security and the Mediterranean*

AMENDMENT 7<sup>1</sup>  
*tabled by MM. Urwin, Stoffelen and Hardy*

7. In paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “even the strengthening”.

*Signed: Urwin, Stoffelen, Hardy*

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1. See 3rd Sitting, 16th June 1981 (Amendment agreed to).

*European security and the Mediterranean*

**AMENDMENTS 8, 9 and 10<sup>1</sup>**  
*tabled by MM. Bernini, Martino and Antoni*

8. After paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert a new paragraph:  
“Considering that the serious bombardment of the nuclear plant in Iraq by the Israelis is an act to be condemned and which increases the danger of war in the Middle East and that the justifications invoked by the Israeli authorities are unfounded ;”.
9. After paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, insert:  
“To encourage international and regional agreements, with the participation of the great powers, to restrict and control sales of arms to countries in the area, particularly those at war, to facilitate the peaceful settlement of disputes between states, respecting their independence and interests and guaranteeing mutual security ;”.
10. After paragraph 7 of the draft recommendation proper, insert:  
“To support the immediate resumption of negotiations on the Middle East which have become even more urgent after the Israeli attack on the nuclear plant in Iraq, in order to find a fair solution to the crisis based on sure and guaranteed frontiers for all states, including the state of Israel, on the right of the Palestinian people to a homeland and on the unity and independence of Lebanon ;”.

*Signed: Bernini, Martino, Antoni*

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1. See 3rd Sitting, 16th June 1981 (Amendments negatived).

*Revision of the Charter and of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly*

REPORT<sup>1</sup>

*submitted on behalf of the  
Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges<sup>2</sup>  
by Mr. Grieve, Chairman and Rapporteur*

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DRAFT RESOLUTION

on the revision of the Charter and of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Mr. Grieve, Chairman and Rapporteur

*Draft Resolution*

*on the revision of the Charter and of the Rules of Procedure  
of the Assembly*

The Assembly,

DECIDES

To adopt the revision of the Charter and of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly as set out in Document 877 presented by the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.

1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee:* Mr. Grieve (Chairman); MM. Cornelissen (Alternate), Stoffelen (Alternate) (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Battaglia, Bozzi (Alternate: *Grussenmeyer*), Brasseur, Edwards (Alternate: *Cox*), Giust, *Glesener*, Lord Hughes (Alternate: *Durant*), Mr. van Hulst, Mrs.

Knight (Alternate: *Osborn*), MM. Lagourgue, Michel (Alternate: *Tanghe*), Mondino, Pignion, Schmidt (Alternate: *Vohrer*), *Schulte*, *Spies von Büllesheim*, Sterpa, *Unland*, Voogd.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

### *Explanatory Memorandum*

*(submitted by Mr. Grieve, Chairman and Rapporteur)*

1. The provisions of Article III, paragraph (a), of the Charter and of Rule 2, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Procedure, which link WEU Assembly sessions with those of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, have become obsolete.

2. The same is true of the provisions of Article V, paragraphs (d) and (e), of the Charter and Rule 27, paragraphs 1 and 3, of the Rules of Procedure on certain time limits.

3. The Committee considered that Rules 26 and 27 on the order of debates and the debate on the annual report should be revised in the light of current procedure.

In practice, the general debate does not precede but follows examination in Committee.

4. The revision of the Rules of Procedure includes a more detailed definition of the rules relating to amendments (Rule 29) and procedural motions (Rule 32).

#### *Rule 29*

5. This rule has been completely rewritten but the new text contains only two additions of substance:

- it is specified that amendments shall relate to only one paragraph at a time (paragraph 3);

- the notion of amendments to amendments is introduced and rules given (paragraph 7).

#### *Rule 32*

6. This rule has been completely rewritten. The new text contains the following changes:

- the previous question and points of order are defined and rules given;
- in addition to matters previously provided for, procedural motions may also be tabled to move the suspension of the sitting and reference back to Committee;
- it is specified that no procedural motion may be moved more than once during the course of a debate.

7. Most of the other changes adopted are purely matters of form or are self-explanatory.

8. In the new text, the word "Representative" is used only in the strict sense. Whenever appropriate, the text uses the expression "Representative or Substitute".

9. Finally, for the sake of clarity, the expression "absolute majority of Representatives" has been replaced by the full definition of this majority.



CHARTER OF THE ASSEMBLY  
(Articles III and V)

III. *Sessions of the Assembly*

(a) The Assembly shall meet in Ordinary Session as often as the fulfilment of its functions may require, and not less than once in the course of any calendar year.

The dates and duration of sessions shall be fixed, wherever possible, either immediately to precede or immediately to follow the sessions of the Consultative Assembly.

(b) The Assembly may be convened in Extraordinary Session by the President, either on his own initiative or following a request by the Council or by not less than a quarter of the Representatives.

V. *Powers of the Assembly*

(a) The Assembly may make Recommendations or transmit Opinions to the Council on any matter consonant with the aims and falling within the terms of reference of Western European Union. Resolutions may be adopted in cases where this form is considered more appropriate. When so directed by the Assembly, the President shall transmit such Resolutions to international organisations, Governments and national parliaments.

(b) The Assembly shall consider reports transmitted to it by the Council, in particular concerning the activities of the Agency for the Control of Armaments and of the Standing Armaments Committee.

CHANGES PROPOSED

*Paragraph (a), second sub-paragraph, read:*

“ The dates and duration of sessions or part-sessions shall be fixed by the Presidential Committee and immediately brought to the attention of Representatives and Substitutes. ”

(c) The report from the Council on the activities of Western European Union in other spheres dealt with in the annual report transmitted to the Consultative Assembly shall be considered by the Western European Union Assembly in cases where this is considered necessary.

(d) The Clerk shall communicate the reports mentioned in paragraph (b) above, together with the necessary documentation relating to the detailed subjects with which they deal, to all Representatives at least six weeks before the opening of the session at which they are to be considered.

(e) Meetings of the appropriate Committees shall be held four weeks before the opening of the Session. These Committees may formulate questions, which shall be transmitted by the President of the Assembly to the Council.

A reply may be postponed or omitted for reasons of European public interest. The text of the questions put to the Council and of the replies thereto shall be included in the preliminary reports of the Committees to the Assembly.

(f) The Chairman of the Council shall be invited by the President to make an oral presentation of the report to the Assembly. After presentation of the report, Representatives may raise matters in the course of debate, to which the Chairman of the Council may reply.

(g) The reply of the Assembly to the report shall be adopted by simple majority. It may include Recommendations to the Council.

*Paragraph (d), read:*

“(d) The Clerk shall send a copy of the Annual Report of the Council of Western European Union to each Representative and Substitute, together with related documents.”

*Paragraph (e), read:*

“(e) Meetings of the appropriate Committees shall be held before the opening or resumption of the Session.

These Committees may formulate questions, which shall be transmitted by the President of the Assembly to the Council. The text of the questions put to the Council and of the replies thereto shall be included in reports of the Committees to the Assembly.

If a reply is postponed or omitted for reasons of European public interest, the question shall be published with a statement of the reasons given by the Council which deferred or prevented the publication of a reply.”

(h) A motion to disagree to the content of the report, or to a part of the report, shall be tabled in writing by at least ten Representatives.

The adoption of such a motion, which shall not be put to the vote until at least 24 hours after it has been tabled, shall require a majority of the Representatives to the Assembly.

(i) In addition to the provisions laid down in paragraph (f) above Representatives may, through the President, put questions in writing to the Council on any matter relevant to the Brussels Treaty, to the Protocols thereto and on any matter submitted to the Assembly for an Opinion. The text of such questions and of the replies thereto shall be printed and circulated as Assembly papers.

## RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE ASSEMBLY

## PART I

*Composition of the Assembly*

## RULE 1

1. The Assembly shall be composed of Representatives of the Brussels Treaty Powers to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe.

2. In accordance with Article 26 of the Statute of the Council of Europe, seats are allocated in the Assembly as follows:

Belgium:	7
France:	18
Federal Republic of Germany:	18
Italy:	18
Luxembourg:	3
Netherlands:	7
United Kingdom:	18

## PART II

*Sessions of the Assembly*

## RULE 2

*Date and duration of Sessions*

1. The Assembly shall meet in Ordinary Session as often as the fulfilment of its functions may require, and not less than once in the course of any calendar year.

2. An Ordinary Session may be divided into two or more parts.

## CHANGES PROPOSED

*Paragraph 1, first line, read:*

“...composed of the Representatives...”.

*Second line, read:*

“Parliamentary” instead of “Consultative”.

3. The dates and duration of sessions or part-sessions shall be fixed, wherever possible, either immediately to precede or immediately to follow the sessions of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe.

4. The Bureau shall inform Representatives and Substitutes of the dates of the opening or resumption of an Ordinary Session not less than six weeks beforehand.

### RULE 3

#### *Extraordinary Sessions*

The Assembly may be convened in Extraordinary Session by the President, either on his own initiative or following a request by the Council or by not less than a quarter of the Representatives.

### RULE 4<sup>1</sup>

#### *Seat of the Assembly*

(a) The seat of the Assembly is at Paris.

(b) Sessions of the Assembly shall be held at the seat of the Assembly unless the Bureau of the Assembly decides otherwise.

### RULE 5

#### *Provisional President*

1. At the beginning of each Ordinary Session the oldest Representative present shall discharge the duties of President until the election of the President has been announced.

<sup>1</sup> Rule amended on 4th December 1963 (Resolution 22 of the Assembly).

*Paragraphs 3 and 4, read:*

“3. The dates and duration of sessions or part-sessions shall be fixed by the Presidential Committee and immediately brought to the attention of members of the Assembly.

4. The Presidential Committee shall inform Representatives and Substitutes of the dates of the opening or resumption of an Ordinary Session not less than six weeks beforehand.”

*Paragraph 1, second line, read:*

“oldest Representative or Substitute present shall...”.

2. No discussion may take place while the oldest Representative is in the Chair unless it is concerned with the election of the President, or with the election or the report of the Credentials Committee.

#### RULE 6<sup>1</sup>

##### *Ratification of Credentials*

1. In a session beginning after that of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, the credentials of Representatives and Substitutes shall be attested by the statement of the ratification of credentials formally communicated to the President of the Assembly by the President of the Consultative Assembly.

2. In a session beginning before that of the Consultative Assembly, the credentials shall be ratified by the Assembly subject to conformity with the subsequent ratification by the Consultative Assembly, on the basis of the official documents supplied either by the President of the Consultative Assembly or by the Governments of Member States.

3. A Committee of five Representatives chosen by lot shall examine these credentials and shall report at once to the Assembly.

<sup>1</sup> Rule amended on 5th July 1958 (Resolution 10 of the Assembly).

*English only, paragraph 2, second line, read:*

“Representative or Substitute is in the Chair...”.

*Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3, read:*

“1. The credentials of Representatives and Substitutes shall be attested by the statement of the ratification of credentials formally communicated to the President of the Assembly by the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

2. If the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has been unable to ratify the credentials, the WEU Assembly shall ratify them on the basis of the official documents supplied either by the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe or by the Parliaments or Governments of member States subject to conformity with the subsequent ratification by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

3. A Committee of five Representatives or Substitutes chosen by lot may examine these credentials and report at once to the Assembly.”

4. Any Representative or Substitute whose credentials are contested may take his seat provisionally with the same rights as other Representatives and Substitutes until the Assembly has made a decision on his case.

#### RULE 7<sup>1</sup>

##### *Substitutes and Alternates*

1. Any Representative prevented from attending a sitting of the Assembly may be replaced by a Substitute.

2. Substitutes duly registered in accordance with Rule 24 have the same rights as Representatives in the Assembly.

Substitutes may not, however, be elected to the Bureau of the Assembly.

3. A Substitute who is a Committee Chairman or Rapporteur may speak in that capacity, even if he is not sitting in place of a Representative. In the latter case, however, he shall not be entitled to vote.

4. Representatives and Substitutes may sit on Committees either as titular members or as alternates.

Any titular member who is prevented from attending a meeting may appoint an alternate from among the alternate members of the Committee of the same natio-

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1. Rule amended on 1st December 1980 (Resolution 65 of the Assembly).

*Add at the end of paragraph 4:*

“...Alternates may not however be elected to the Bureau of a Committee.”

nality as himself. With the consent of the Chairman of the Committee, he may also be replaced by any other Representative or Substitute of the same nationality as himself.

The alternate so appointed shall have the same rights as the titular member.

#### RULE 8<sup>1</sup>

##### *Duration of term of office of Representatives and Substitutes*

1. The term of office of Representatives and Substitutes shall take effect from the date of the communication of the statement of the ratification of the credentials by the President of the Consultative Assembly, or from the date of their appointment by Member States if the Session of the Assembly precedes that of the Consultative Assembly and subject to the ratification of the credentials by the Consultative Assembly.

2. The term of office shall end in accordance with the rules of the Consultative Assembly whether a seat is vacated through parliamentary elections or through death, or resignation or through invalidation by the Consultative Assembly.

3. The Presidential Committee may, during the periods between sessions or part-sessions, provisionally fill the seats which have fallen vacant in committees with Representatives or Substitutes. These appointments must be ratified at the first session of the Assembly.

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1. Rule amended on 5th July 1958 (Resolution 10 of the Assembly).

*Paragraph 1, fourth, sixth and eighth lines, read:*

“Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe” instead of “Consultative Assembly”.

*Paragraph 2, second line, read:*

“Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe” instead of “Consultative Assembly”.



RULE 9

*Bureau of the Assembly*

1. The Bureau of the Assembly shall consist of the President and six Vice-Presidents.
2. The Bureau shall be elected after the credentials of the Representatives and Substitutes have been examined in accordance with the provisions of Rule 6.

RULE 10

*Election of the Bureau*

1. The Bureau shall be elected once a year at the beginning of each Ordinary Session.
2. No Representative may stand as a candidate for the offices of President or Vice-President unless a proposal for his candidature has been sponsored in writing by three or more Representatives.
3. The President and Vice-Presidents shall be elected by secret ballot. Two tellers chosen by lot shall count the votes cast.
4. The President shall first be elected. If after two ballots no candidate has obtained an absolute majority of the Representatives to the Assembly, the candidate who on the third ballot receives the greatest number of votes shall be declared elected. In the event of a tie, the candidate senior in age shall be declared elected.
5. As soon as the President has been elected, the oldest Representative shall leave the Chair.
6. The six Vice-Presidents shall then be elected on the same ballot paper. Those who on the first ballot

*Add at the beginning of paragraph 3:*

“Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 4 and 6 below,…”

*Add at the end of paragraph 4:*

“If there is only one candidate and there are no objections, the single candidate shall be declared elected.”

*English only, paragraph 5, second line, read:*

“oldest Representative or Substitute shall leave the Chair.”

obtain a majority of the Representatives to the Assembly shall be declared elected. If the number of those elected is less than the number of vacancies to be filled, a second ballot for the candidates not elected shall be held following the same procedure. If a third ballot is necessary, those candidates who then receive the greatest number of votes cast shall be declared elected to the vacancies still to be filled. In the event of a tie, the candidates senior in age shall be declared elected.

7. The Vice-Presidents shall take precedence in accordance with the order in which they have been elected and, in the event of a tie, by age.

8. The President and Vice-Presidents shall remain in office until the opening of the next Ordinary Session.

9. (a) Should it be necessary for the President or a Vice-President to be replaced when the Assembly is in session, his successor shall be elected in accordance with the above provisions.

(b) Should it be necessary for the President or a Vice-President to be replaced when the Assembly is not in session, the following procedure shall be followed until the election provided for in sub-paragraph (a) can take place.

If it is the chair of the President of the Assembly which becomes vacant, the senior Vice-President shall exercise the functions of the President.

The national group of Representatives to which the Representative who has ceased to be the President, or a Vice-President, belonged shall be invited to nominate a candidate of the same political tendency as his predecessor. This candidature shall be ratified by the Presidential

*Paragraph 6, ninth and tenth lines, delete:*

“to the vacancies still to be filled”.

*At the end of paragraph 6, add:*

“If the number of candidates does not exceed the number of posts to be filled and there are no objections, the candidates shall be declared elected.”

Committee, which shall for this purpose include the Chairmen of the political groups which have been formed in accordance with the provisions of Rule 38. After such ratification, the Representative in question shall become a member of the Bureau and shall sit with the same rights as a Vice-President of the Assembly.

10. Representatives who are members of Governments are not eligible for nomination for the Bureau.

### PART III

#### *Duties of the President and maintenance of order*

#### RULE 11

#### *President*

1. The duties of the President shall be: to open, suspend and close sittings, to propose at the end of each sitting the date, time and Orders of the Day of the next sitting, to guide the debates of the Assembly, to ensure the observance of the Rules, to maintain order, to call on speakers, to close debates, to put questions to the vote and announce the result of votes, and to refer communications to the appropriate committees.

2. The President shall neither speak in debate nor vote; his Substitute may sit, speak and vote in his place.

3. When so directed by the Assembly, the President shall transmit Resolutions to international organisations, Governments and national parliaments.

*Paragraph 10, read:*

“10. Representatives who are members of Governments shall not be members of the Bureau.”

## RULE 12

*Vice-Presidents*

1. If the President is absent or unable to discharge his duties, he shall be replaced by one of the Vice-Presidents.

2. The Substitute of the Vice-President who is acting as President may sit in the Assembly and speak and vote in his place.

## RULE 13

*Maintenance of Order*

1. The President shall call to order any Representative who departs from it.

2. If the offence is repeated, the President shall again call the Representative to order and cause the fact to be recorded in the Minutes of Proceedings.

3. In the event of a further offence, the President may exclude the offender from the Chamber for the remainder of the sitting.

4. In serious cases the President may propose that the Assembly pass a vote of censure, which shall involve immediate exclusion from the Chamber for a period from two to five days. The Representative upon whom a vote of censure is proposed shall always have the right to be heard.

5. The vote of censure shall be taken without debate.

6. It shall be forbidden to make use of words or expressions which are contrary to the good conduct of debates. Without prejudice to his other rights for the maintenance of order, the President may cause such

*Paragraph 1, end of first line, read:*

“...Representative or Substitute who...”.

*Paragraph 2, second line, read:*

“call the Representative or Substitute to order...”.

*Paragraphs 3, 4 and 5, read:*

“3. In the event of a further offence (other than an offence to which Rule 31 (4) applies), the President may exclude the offender from the Chamber for the remainder of the sitting.

4. In serious cases the President may propose that the Representative or Substitute who committed the offence be censured and excluded from the Chamber for a period not exceeding four days. The Representative or Substitute upon whom a vote of censure is proposed shall always have the right to be heard.

5. After the Representative or Substitute concerned has been heard, if he has exercised his right, the vote of censure shall be taken without debate.”

words to be deleted from the Official Report of debates. He shall have similar power as regards any intervention by a Representative who has not obtained prior permission to speak or who exceeds the time that may have been allotted to speakers.

#### RULE 14

##### *The Presidential Committee*

1. The Presidential Committee shall consist of the President of the Assembly, who shall be Chairman *ex officio*, former Presidents of the Assembly who are Representatives to the Assembly, the Vice-Presidents, and the Chairmen of the permanent Committees. If absent, or unable to discharge his duties, the President may be replaced by one of the Vice-Presidents of the Assembly, and the Chairman of a permanent Committee by a Vice-Chairman of that Committee. The President may invite the Chairmen of the political groups to attend meetings of the Presidential Committee<sup>1</sup>.

2. In between sessions or part-sessions and subject to subsequent ratification by the Assembly, the Presidential Committee shall take all such measures as it considers necessary for the activities of the Assembly to be properly carried on<sup>2</sup>.

#### RULE 15

##### *Public order in the Chamber and Galleries*

1. No person shall enter the Chamber for any reason except Representatives and Substitutes, Ministers who

1. Paragraph amended on 10th December 1969 (Resolution 44 of the Assembly).

2. Paragraph added on 5th July 1958 (Resolution 10 of the Assembly).

*Paragraph 6, third line before the end, read:*

“by a Representative or Substitute who has not...”.

*Paragraph 1, fourth line, read:*

“Representatives or Substitutes to the Assembly,...”.

are members of the Council of Western European Union, other Ministers of Member States and officials whose duties require their presence there.

2. Only persons provided with a card granting right of access duly issued by the Clerk may be admitted to the Galleries.

3. Members of the public admitted to the Galleries shall remain seated and in silence. Any person expressing approval or disapproval shall be ejected at once by the ushers.

#### PART IV

##### *Agenda of Sessions*

##### RULE 16

##### *Register of items submitted to the Assembly*

1. There shall be a Register of the Assembly which shall contain the following items:

- (a) The Reports of the Council of Western European Union;
- (b) Communications from the Council;
- (c) Communications addressed to the Assembly by national, supranational or international organisations;
- (d) Motions accepted for inclusion in the Register in accordance with the provisions of Rule 28 below.

2. Any item referred to a Committee shall also be included in the Assembly's Register.

3. Subject to the provisions of Rule 26 below, the Presidential Committee shall refer the documents mentioned in paragraph 1 of this Rule to the appropriate Committee for examination; the President shall submit

##### *Paragraphs 2 and 3, read:*

"2. Any item referred to a Committee by decision of the Assembly or of the Presidential Committee shall also be included in the Assembly's Register.

3. The Presidential Committee shall refer the documents mentioned in paragraph 1 of this rule to the appropriate Committee for examination. Such documents may be referred to any other Committee for an opinion."

such reference for ratification by the Assembly at its next sitting. Such documents may be referred to any other Committee for an opinion.

4. The Assembly may, at the request of the Committee concerned, remove an item from its Register.

5. The Assembly shall determine its agenda, having due regard to the provisions of Article I of the Charter.

#### RULE 17

##### *Settlement of the Agenda*

1. The Bureau shall prepare for each Session or part-Session a draft Agenda which it shall submit to the Presidential Committee.

2. Any item on the Assembly's Register may be placed on the draft Agenda.

3. On the basis of the draft prepared by the Bureau, the Presidential Committee shall adopt the Agenda for the next Session or part-Session and fix the date of the opening or resumption of the Session. The Agenda shall be communicated to Representatives and Substitutes at the same time as the date of the opening or resumption of the Session.

4. The Agenda thus adopted may only be altered in accordance with the provisions of Rule 43 below.

#### RULE 18

##### *Order of business*

1. So far as circumstances permit, the Bureau shall draw up a draft order of business for each Session or part-Session showing at which sittings the various items on the Agenda will be discussed.

*English only, paragraph 5, first line, read:*

“Register” instead of “agenda”.

*Delete paragraphs 1 and 2.*

*Paragraph 3 becomes paragraph 1 and reads:*

“1. Taking into consideration the register of items submitted to the Assembly, the Presidential Committee shall adopt the Agenda for the next part-session and have it communicated to the Representatives and Substitutes forthwith.”

*Paragraph 4 becomes paragraph 2 and reads:*

“2. The Agenda thus adopted may be altered by the Presidential Committee prior to the opening of the session or by the Assembly during the session in accordance with Rules 32 and 43 below. Any change in the Agenda made before the opening of the session shall be brought immediately to the attention of Representatives and Substitutes.”

*Paragraph 1, read:*

“1. So far as circumstances permit, the Presidential Committee shall, not less than two weeks before each session or part-session, draw up a draft order of business showing at which sittings the various items on the Agenda will be discussed.”

2. The draft order of business shall be sent to Representatives and Substitutes and shall be submitted to the Assembly at its first Sitting.

PART V

*Use of languages and publicity of debates*

RULE 19

*Languages of the Assembly*

1. (a) Speeches in the Assembly may be made in the official languages of Member States. The Secretariat shall provide simultaneous interpretation of these speeches into the other official languages.

(b) Speeches in Committee may be made in the official languages of Member States. The Secretariat shall provide simultaneous interpretation of these speeches into French and English.

2. Documents of the Assembly and its Committees shall be published in French and English.

3. Documents of the Assembly and its Committees possessing exceptional public interest shall be published in languages other than French and English, if the Assembly so decides.

RULE 20

*Publicity of Debates*

Debates of the Assembly shall be held in public, unless the Assembly decides otherwise.

RULE 21

*Minutes of Proceedings*

1. The Minutes of Proceedings of each sitting containing the decisions of the Assembly and the names of

*Paragraph 2, read:*

“2. The draft order of business shall be sent immediately to Representatives and Substitutes and shall be submitted to the Assembly at its first sitting for its approval, with or without amendment.”

*Delete paragraphs 1 and 2.*



speakers shall be distributed at least half-an-hour before the opening of the following sitting.

2. At the beginning of each sitting the President shall lay before the Assembly the Minutes of Proceedings of the preceding sitting. The Minutes of Proceedings of the last sitting of a session shall be submitted to the Assembly for approval before the close of the Session. If no objection is raised to the Minutes of Proceedings, they shall be declared agreed to.

3. If the Minutes of Proceedings are challenged, the Assembly shall, if necessary, vote on the changes requested. Should any such change be agreed to, a statement shall be made thereof in the Minutes of Proceedings of the current sitting.

4. The Minutes of Proceedings shall be printed, signed by the President and the Clerk and preserved in the archives of the Assembly.

## RULE 22

### *Reports of Debates*

1. A report of debates at each Sitting shall be compiled in French and English and distributed within as short a period as possible. A speech delivered in French or English shall be reproduced verbatim in the report compiled in the language in which the speech was delivered; a summary report of the simultaneous interpretation of the speech shall be incorporated in the report compiled in the other language. When a speech is delivered in an official language of a Member State other than French or English, a summary report of its simultaneous interpretation shall be incorporated in the reports compiled in French and English.

*New paragraph 1, read:*

“1. As soon as convenient after the opening of each sitting, the President shall submit to the Assembly the Minutes of Proceedings of the preceding sitting containing the decisions of the Assembly and the names of speakers. If no objection is raised to the Minutes of Proceedings, they shall be declared agreed to.”

*Former paragraph 3 becomes paragraph 2.*

*New paragraphs 3 and 4, read:*

“3. The Minutes of Proceedings of the last sitting of a session shall be submitted to the Presidential Committee at its next meeting for approval.

4. The Minutes of Proceedings shall be printed and preserved in the archives of the Assembly.”

2. Speakers are required to return the reports of their speeches to the Office of the Clerk not later than the day after that on which the reports were communicated to them.

3. After each Session or part-Session the reports of debates shall be published in full in French and English.

## PART VI

### *Holding of Sittings and Rules concerning the Proceedings*

#### RULE 23

##### *Time-table of Sittings and Orders of the Day*

1. Unless the Assembly shall otherwise decide, morning sittings shall be opened at ten o'clock and closed not later than one o'clock, and afternoon sittings shall be opened at three o'clock and closed not later than half-past six.

2. At the end of each sitting, the Assembly shall, on the proposal of the President, fix the date and the Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

3. The Orders of the Day of such sittings shall be determined having regard to the priority of questions included in the Agenda of the Session, unless the Assembly applies urgent procedure in accordance with the provisions of Rule 43 below.

#### RULE 24

##### *Register of Attendance*

Each Representative shall sign the register of attendance at each sitting before taking his place.

*Paragraph 1, third line, read:*

“...closed at one o'clock” instead of “...closed not later than one o'clock”.

*Fourth line, read:*

“...closed at half-past six” instead of “...closed not later than half-past six”.

*Delete paragraph 3.*

*Rule 24, read:*

“At each morning and afternoon sitting, each Representative or his Substitute shall sign the register of attendance in accordance with Rule 7 before taking his place.”

RULE 25

*Communications to the Assembly*

Immediately after the adoption of the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous sitting, and before passing to the Orders of the Day, the President shall inform the Assembly of any communications which concern it.

RULE 26

*Order of Debates*

1. Unless the Assembly decides otherwise, the examination of a particular matter in Committee shall be preceded by a general debate.

2. The general debate shall deal with the matter as a whole and with the principle involved only.

3. At the end of the general debate, or after having decided not to hold such a debate, the Assembly shall refer the matter to the competent Committee, together with any motions relating thereto. Should the Assembly decide, after taking a vote by roll-call, that a matter shall not be referred to a Committee, consideration thereof shall lapse.

4. After a matter has been referred to a Committee, no text relative thereto may be adopted by the Assembly except on the basis of the text of the Committee to which the matter has been referred.

5. An examination of the text in detail shall take place on the Report of the Committee to which the matter has been referred. It shall not begin sooner than one clear day after the distribution of the Report unless

*Delete:*

“Immediately after the adoption of the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous sitting, and”

*Rule 26, read:*

“1. A general debate and the examination of a text shall take place on the Report of the Committee to which the matter has been referred and not sooner than twenty-four hours after the distribution of the Report unless the Assembly decides to apply the provisions of Rule 43 below.

2. When examination of and voting on a text as a whole have been concluded and the results announced, Representatives or Substitutes may present explanations of votes lasting not more than three minutes.”

the Assembly applies the provisions for urgent procedure contained in Rule 43 below.

6. When the examination of the text has been concluded, only explanations of vote may be made before the vote is taken on the text as a whole.

#### RULE 27

##### *Debate on the Annual Report*

1. The Clerk shall send a copy of the Annual Report of the Council of Western European Union to each Representative and Substitute, together with related documents, not later than forty-eight hours after its publication by the Council and at least six weeks before the opening or resumption of the Session.

2. The Presidential Committee shall refer the Annual Report, if necessary by chapters, to the competent Committees.

3. Meetings of the appropriate Committees shall be held four weeks before the opening or resumption of the Session.

These Committees may formulate questions, which shall be transmitted by the President of the Assembly to the Council. The text of the questions put to the Council and of the replies thereto shall be included in preliminary reports of the Committees to the Assembly.

If a reply is postponed or omitted for reasons of European public interest, the question shall be published, with a statement of the reasons given by the Council which deferred or prevented the publication of a reply.

4. The Chairman of the Council shall present the Report verbally to the Assembly, and a general debate

*Paragraphs 1 and 2, read:*

“1. The Clerk shall send a copy of the Annual Report of the Council of Western European Union to each Representative and Substitute, together with related documents.

2. The Presidential Committee shall refer to the competent committees the relevant chapters of the Annual Report of the Council of Western European Union.”

*Paragraph 3, first sub-paragraph, second line, delete:*

“four weeks”.

*Second sub-paragraph, fifth line, delete:*

“preliminary”.

*English only, paragraph 4, read:*

“4. The Chairman of the Council may present the Report orally to the Assembly, and a general debate...”

take place on the Annual Report and on the message of the Chairman of the Council.

5. At the end of the general debate, the Assembly shall refer the Annual Report, if necessary by chapters, to the competent Committees, which shall make a final report thereon to the Assembly as soon as possible, and, at the latest, before the end of the Session <sup>1</sup>.

6. An examination in detail of the texts submitted by the Committees shall begin not earlier than one clear day after the distribution of their reports.

7. A motion to disagree to the content of the Annual Report, or any part of the Report, must be signed by at least ten Representatives. The adoption of such a motion, which shall not be put to the vote until at least twenty-four hours after it has been tabled, shall require support from a majority of the Representatives to the Assembly <sup>2</sup>.

## RULE 28

### *Motions*

1. Motions may be tabled by Representatives on any matter within the aim and scope of the Assembly as defined in Article I of the Charter.

2. Motions must embody a concise summary of the subject raised and take the form of a Recommendation, Opinion or Resolution. They may be accompanied by an Explanatory Memorandum. They shall be submitted in writing, and be signed by at least ten Representatives.

<sup>1</sup> Paragraph amended on 14th October 1957 (Resolution 7 of the Assembly).

<sup>2</sup> Former paragraph 8 (see Resolution 7 of the Assembly).

*Delete paragraph 5.*

*Paragraph 6 becomes paragraph 5 and, in second line, read:*

“twenty-four hours” instead of “one clear day”.

*Paragraph 7 becomes paragraph 6 and reads:*

“6. A motion to disagree to the content of the Annual Report, or any part of the Report, must be signed by at least ten Representatives or Substitutes. The adoption of such a motion, which shall not be put to the vote until at least twenty-four hours after it has been tabled, shall require support from a number of Representatives or Substitutes equal to more than half the number of the Representatives to the Assembly.”

*Paragraph 1, first line, read:*

“...by Representatives or Substitutes” instead of “by Representatives”.

*Paragraph 2, read:*

“2. Motions must embody a concise summary of the subject raised and take the form of a Recommendation, Opinion or Resolution. They shall be submitted in writing and be signed by at least ten Representatives or Substitutes.”

3. The President shall decide whether such motions are in order. He may, if he thinks fit, refer the matter to the Assembly or to the Presidential Committee.

Motions which are in order shall be printed and distributed immediately.

4. When the question of including such a motion in the Register is put to the Assembly, the following only shall be heard: one speaker for the motion, one speaker against and the Chairman of any Committee concerned<sup>1</sup>.

RULE 29  
*Amendments*

1. Any Representative may propose and speak to amendments.

2. Amendments shall relate directly to the text which it is sought to alter. The President shall decide whether they are in order. Amendments should relate only to the substantive text; they must be signed by their author and, unless proposed in the course of a debate, laid on the Table of the Assembly so as to leave sufficient time for them to be printed and distributed before they are discussed.

3. Amendments shall have priority over the text to which they relate and shall be put to the vote before the text itself.

4. If two or more contradictory amendments relate to the same paragraph, the amendment which differs most from the text of the Committee's Report shall have priority over the others and shall be put to the vote first.

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<sup>1</sup> Paragraph amended on 10th December 1969 (Resolution 44 of the Assembly).

*English only, paragraph 4, third line, read:*

“may be heard” instead of “shall be heard”.

*Rule 29, read:*

“1. Any Representative or Substitute may propose and speak to amendments. The President shall decide whether they are in order.

2. Amendments must be signed by their author. Amendments tabled before the end of a sitting to a text which is to be debated on a future day shall be printed and distributed at the beginning of the next sitting. Amendments to a text which is to be debated or is being debated during the sitting of the day on which they are tabled shall be printed and distributed, if time permits, before they are due to be considered. The President shall have the power not to select amendments for consideration if, in his opinion, there has not been adequate time for members of the Assembly to study such amendments.

3. Amendments shall relate directly to the text which it is sought to alter. They shall relate to only one paragraph at a time.

4. Amendments shall be put to the vote before the text to which they relate.

If it is agreed to, the other amendments shall be considered as having been thereby negated; if it is negated, the amendment next in priority shall be put to the vote and likewise for each of the remaining amendments. If the degree of priority is in doubt, the President shall give a ruling.

5. Reference back to Committee may always be requested and shall be obligatory if requested by the Chairman or Rapporteur of the Committee.

6. The reference of an amendment to Committee shall not necessarily interrupt the debate. The Assembly may fix a time-limit within which the Committee shall report its conclusions on the amendments which have been referred to it.

### RULE 30

#### *Orders of the Assembly*

1. Any Representative or Substitute may lay on the table of the Assembly a motion for an Order of the Assembly. The President shall decide whether such motions are in order.

2. Such a motion may be put to the vote without being referred to Committee.

5. If two or more amendments relate to the same paragraph, the amendment which differs most from the original text shall be put to the vote first.

6. When several contradictory amendments are tabled, the President may rule that they be debated together, their authors speaking in turn before the amendments are put to the vote one by one.

7. Amendments to amendments are in order only if they do not contradict the amendment; they may not be amended. They shall be debated after and put to the vote before the amendment to which they relate.

8. Reference back to Committee may always be requested and shall be obligatory if requested by the Chairman or Rapporteur of the Committee.

9. The reference back of an amendment to Committee shall not necessarily interrupt the debate. The Assembly may fix a time-limit within which the Committee shall report its conclusions on the amendments which have been referred to it."

## RULE 31

*Right to speak*

1. No Representative may speak unless called upon to do so by the President. Representatives shall speak from their place and shall address the Chair; the President may invite them to come to the rostrum.

2. Representatives wishing to speak shall either enter their names before the opening of the sitting in a register provided for the purpose or ask for the right to speak in the course of the sitting. The President may, in the interests of the debate, depart from the order in which Representatives have entered their names or have asked to speak. As far as possible he shall endeavour to call alternately upon speakers for and against the matter under discussion. Once begun, a speech may not be interrupted and resumed at the following sitting.

3. A speaker may not be interrupted except on a point of order. He may, however, with the permission of the President, give way during his speech to allow another Representative to put to him a question on a particular point in his speech.

4. If a speaker is irrelevant, the President shall call him to order. If a speaker has already been called to order twice in the same debate, the President may, on the third occasion, forbid him to speak during the remainder of the debate on the same subject.

5. Members of the Council and Rapporteurs on a question under discussion shall be allowed to speak whenever they wish.

*Paragraph 1, read:*

“1. No Representative or Substitute may speak unless called upon to do so by the President. Representatives or Substitutes shall speak...”

*Paragraph 2, first line, read:*

“2. Representatives or Substitutes wishing to...”.

*Sixth line, read:*

“ which Representatives or Substitutes have... ”.

*Paragraph 3, fourth line, read:*

“ another Representative or Substitute to put... ”.



6. A Representative who wishes to make a personal statement shall be heard, but only at the end of a sitting.

7. No Representative may speak for more than five minutes on any of the following: explanations of vote, personal statements, comments on the adoption of the Minutes of Proceedings of the preceding sitting, determining of the Orders of the Day of a sitting and all questions of procedure.

## RULE 32

### *Procedural Motions*

1. A Representative shall have a prior right to speak if he asks leave:

- (a) to call the attention of the Chair to a breach of order or an abuse of the Rules of the Assembly;
- (b) to move the previous question or a dilatory motion;
- (c) to move the adjournment of a debate;
- (d) to move the closure of a debate.

2. The above matters shall take precedence over the main question, the discussion of which shall be suspended while they are being considered.

*Paragraph 6, first line, read:*

“ 6. A Representative or Substitute who wishes... ”.

*Paragraph 7, first line, read:*

“ 7. No Representative or Substitute may speak... ”.

*Rule 32, read:*

1. A Representative or Substitute shall have a prior right to speak if he asks leave:

- (a) to move the previous question which, if adopted, results in the subject of the debate being removed from the agenda and from the register of the Assembly;
- (b) to move the suspension of the sitting or the adjournment of the debate;
- (c) to move the closure of the debate;
- (d) to move reference back to Committee.

—Previous questions shall be notified to the President before the opening of the sitting and put to the vote immediately after the presentation of the relevant Committee report.

None of these procedural motions may be moved more than once during the course of a debate.

3. In debate on the above matters, the following only shall be heard: the proposer of the motion, one speaker against the motion, the Rapporteur and the Chairman of any Committee concerned.

#### RULE 33

##### *Organisation of debates*

1. The Bureau may at its discretion propose to the Assembly a programme and time-table for a specific debate.

2. The Assembly shall vote on such proposals without debate.

2. The above matters shall take precedence over the main question, the debate on which shall be suspended while they are being considered.

3. In debate on the above matters, the following only shall be heard: the proposer of the motion, one speaker against the motion, and the Rapporteur or the Chairman of any Committee concerned.

4. In addition, a Representative or Substitute shall have a prior right to speak if he asks leave to raise a point of order. A point of order must be confined to raising questions of procedure for a ruling from the Chair.

##### *Paragraph 1, read:*

“ 1. The President may, at his discretion, propose to the Assembly a programme and time-table for a specific debate or time limits on speeches.”

PART VII

*Voting*

RULE 34

*Methods of voting*

1. Normally the Assembly shall vote by sitting and standing.

2. Whenever ten or more Representatives so desire, the vote shall be taken by roll-call.

The roll shall begin with the names of those requesting a roll-call vote. Should there be less than seven of them present to answer when their names are called, the roll-call shall be stopped and the vote taken by sitting and standing<sup>1</sup>.

3. The vote on the draft reply to the Annual Report, on a motion to disagree to the Annual Report, or to any part of it, and on a draft Recommendation or Opinion considered as a whole, shall be taken by roll-call.

4. The roll shall be called in alphabetical order, beginning with the name of a Representative drawn by lot. Voting shall be by word of mouth and shall be expressed by "Yes", "No", or "I abstain". Only affirmative and negative votes shall count in calculating the number of votes cast. The President shall be responsible for the counting of votes and shall announce the result. The votes shall be recorded in the Minutes of Proceedings of the sitting in the alphabetical order of Representatives' names.

5. Voting on nominations shall take place by secret ballot. Only those ballot papers bearing the names of

1. Paragraph amended on 1st December 1980 (Resolution 66 of the Assembly).

*Paragraph 2, first line, read:*

"2. Whenever ten or more Representatives or Substitutes so desire,..."

*Paragraph 4, first line, read:*

"4. Subject to the second sub-paragraph of paragraph 2 above, the roll shall be called ..."

persons who have been duly entered as candidates shall be taken into account for the purpose of calculating the number of votes cast.

#### RULE 35

##### *Majorities*

The majorities required are the following:

(a) for the amendment of the Charter and for the adoption of a motion to disagree to the Annual Report, or to any part of the Report: a majority of the Representatives to the Assembly;

(b) for any other decision: an absolute majority of the votes cast;

(c) for appointments, subject to the provisions of Rule 10 above: an absolute majority of votes cast at the first ballot and a relative majority at the second ballot.

#### RULE 36<sup>1</sup>

##### *Quorum*

1. The Assembly shall not take any decision by roll-call unless more than half the Representatives or their Substitutes have signed the Register of Attendance provided for in Rule 24 above.

2. All votes other than votes by roll-call shall be valid, whatever the number of Representatives present, unless, before the voting has begun, the President has been requested to ascertain the number of those Representatives or their Substitutes who have signed the Register of Attendance provided for in Rule 24 above.

<sup>1</sup> Rule amended on 1st December 1980 (Resolution 66 of the Assembly).

*Rule 35, sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c), read:*

“(a) for the amendment of the Charter and for the adoption of a motion to disagree to the Annual Report, or to any part of the Report: a number of Representatives or Substitutes equal to more than half the number of the Representatives to the Assembly;

(b) for any other decision: a majority of the votes cast;

(c) for appointments other than those provided for in Rule 10 above: an absolute majority of votes cast at the first ballot and a relative majority at the second ballot;”

*New sub-paragraph (d)*

“(d) only affirmative and negative votes shall count in calculating the number of votes cast.”

*Paragraph 2, last line, delete:*

“... provided for in Rule 24 above.”

3. A vote by roll-call shall in no circumstances be valid, nor the result be made public, if the vote shows that a majority of the Representatives or their Substitutes has not signed the Register provided for in Rule 24 above.

4. In the absence of a quorum, the vote shall be postponed until a subsequent sitting of the same part-session. Any matter on which it has not been possible to vote before the end of the said part-session in the absence of a quorum shall be referred to the Presidential Committee, which shall decide whether the text should be put to the vote at the next part-session of the Assembly or referred back to Committee.

#### RULE 37

##### *Right to vote*

1. The right to vote is an individual one. Voting by proxy is prohibited.

2. A Substitute authorised to sit in place of a Representative who is absent or prevented from taking his seat shall vote in his own name.

### PART VIII

#### *Political Groups and Committees*

#### RULE 38

##### *Political groups*

1. Representatives may form political groups.

2. Such groups shall be formed after the President of the Assembly has received a declaration that the group

*Paragraph 3, last line, delete:*

“ ... provided for in Rule 24 above. ”

*Paragraph 2, read:*

“ 2. A Substitute, duly registered in accordance with Rules 7, 24 and 36 above, shall vote in his own name. ”

*Paragraph 1, first line, read:*

“ 1. Representatives and Substitutes may... ”.

has been formed. This declaration shall contain the title of the group, the signature of its members and the names of the members of its Bureau.

3. A Representative may belong to one group only.

4. A group shall consist of not less than nine Representatives.

#### RULE 39<sup>1</sup>

##### *Appointment of Committees*

1. At the beginning of each Ordinary Session the Assembly shall set up the following permanent committees:

- (i) Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments;
- (ii) General Affairs Committee;
- (iii) Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions;
- (iv) Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration;
- (v) Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.

2. The first and second of the permanent committees shall be composed of twenty-seven members divided as follows: Belgium (3); France (5); the Federal Republic of Germany (5); Italy (5); Luxembourg (1); the Netherlands (3); the United Kingdom (5).

The third, fourth and fifth permanent committees shall be composed of twenty-one members divided as follows: Belgium (2); France (4); the Federal Republic of Germany (4); Italy (4); Luxembourg (1); the Netherlands (2); the United Kingdom (4).

<sup>1</sup> Rule amended on 13th June 1967 (Resolution 32 of the Assembly).

*Paragraph 3, read:*

“ 3. A Representative or Substitute may belong to one group only. ”

*Paragraph 4, last line, read:*

“ Representatives or Substitutes. ”

3. The Assembly may set up special Committees during the session, which may be re-appointed at the beginning of subsequent sessions. The Assembly shall fix the total number of seats in such Committees and the number of seats to be allotted to each Member State.

4. When setting up Committees in accordance with the provisions of the preceding paragraph, the Assembly shall have regard to the activities of other European organisations.

5. With the approval of the Council, the Assembly may appoint Committees of investigation as provided for in Article VII (f) of the Charter, the composition, terms of reference and duration of which shall be defined in a Resolution.

6. Candidatures for membership of Committees shall be addressed to the Bureau which shall submit to the Assembly, or in the cases provided for in Rule 8, paragraph 3, to the Presidential Committee, proposals for their composition taking into account the representation of political tendencies. The President of the Assembly may invite the Chairmen of the political groups to attend the appropriate meetings of the Bureau. The Assembly, or the Presidential Committee, shall decide by secret vote disputed nominations for one or more seats in a Committee<sup>1</sup>.

7. The Bureau of each Committee shall be composed of a Chairman and two Vice-Chairmen. Representatives of the Assembly who are members of Governments are not eligible for membership of the Bureau of a Committee.

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1. Paragraph amended on 5th July 1958 (Resolution 10 of the Assembly).

*Paragraph 7, third and fourth lines, read:*

“ shall not be members ” instead of “ are not eligible for membership ”.

RULE 40

*Powers of Committees*

- 1. Committees shall examine questions and documents which are referred to them by the Assembly.
- 2. Committees shall also examine the action taken on Recommendations and Resolutions adopted by the Assembly.
- 3. Should a Committee declare itself not competent to consider a question, or should a conflict arise over the competence of two or more committees, the question of competence shall be submitted to the Assembly.
- 4. Committees of the Assembly may request the Council to communicate documents or information necessary for their enquiries.
- 5. A Committee may, with the approval of the Bureau of the Assembly, appoint one or several of its members to undertake a mission for purposes of information or study.

RULE 41

*Procedure in Committees*

- 1. A Committee shall meet when convened by its Chairman or at the request of the President of the Assembly, either during or between sessions.
- 2. A Committee may, in the interest of its work, appoint one or more sub-committees, of which it shall at the same time determine the composition and competence.

*Add at the end of paragraph 2:*

“ ... on their reports. ”

*Paragraph 3, fourth line, read:*

“ competence shall be submitted to the Presidential Committee or the Assembly. ”

*Add at the end of paragraph 2:*

“ However, the number of members of a sub-Committee may not exceed a third of the membership of the full Committee. ”



3. Any two or more Committees or sub-committees may hold a joint meeting for the examination of subjects coming within their competence, but may not reach a joint decision.

4. The Rules adopted for the Assembly concerning the election of the President and Vice-Presidents (Rules 5 and 10), the Minutes of Proceedings (Rule 21), amendments (Rule 29), the right to speak (Rule 31), procedural motions (Rule 32), and methods of voting (Rule 34), shall apply to the proceedings of committees, subject to the following provisions:

- (a) A Committee shall vote by show of hands, unless any Representative requests a vote by roll-call. The vote on any text which is to be tabled in the Assembly shall be taken by roll-call. The roll shall be called alphabetically beginning with the letter "A". Election shall take place by secret ballot. The formal proposal of candidates is optional.
- (b) Voting in committee shall be by absolute majority of the votes cast; provided that election shall be by relative majority at the second ballot, if necessary.
- (c) A Committee may deliberate when one-third of its members are present, but the vote on a report as a whole shall not be valid unless the majority of the members of the Committee are present.

5. The Chairman of the Committee may take part in discussions and may vote, but without having a casting vote.

6. Committee meetings shall be held in private. Unless a Committee decides otherwise, Representatives

*Paragraph 4, sub-paragraph (a), second line, read:*

“ any Representative or Substitute requests... ”

*At the end of sub-paragraph (b) add:*

“ ... In the event of a tie, the candidate senior in age shall be declared elected. ”

and Substitutes may attend meetings of that Committee even though they are not members, but they may not take part in its discussions.

A Representative or Substitute who has moved a motion which has been referred to a Committee may, however, be invited by that Committee to take part in its discussions in an advisory capacity.

7. The conditions in which any person who is not a Representative or Substitute may be heard by a Committee shall be decided by that Committee. If the Committee agrees, such a person may take part in the discussions at the discretion of the Chairman.

8. The conditions in which the officials of Western European Union and experts are heard by a Committee shall be determined in each case after agreement with the Council.

9. Minutes of Proceedings shall be drawn up for each Committee meeting. In addition, a Summary Report of proceedings shall be compiled, to which any Representative may have access, but which he cannot take away.

10. Unless a Committee decides otherwise, and subject to the confidential character of information communicated by the Council, the only texts which shall be made public shall be the reports that have been agreed to, or statements issued on the responsibility of the Chairman.

#### RULE 42

##### *Reports of Committees*

1. The Committees shall each appoint a rapporteur for each subject, who shall be responsible for the prepa-

*Paragraph 9, read:*

“9. Minutes of Proceedings shall be drawn up for each Committee meeting.”

*English only, paragraph 1, first line, read:*

“The Committees shall appoint”.

ration of the report of the Committee and for introducing it to the Assembly. The final report of a Committee shall comprise an explanatory memorandum and a substantive text.

2. The explanatory memorandum shall, in particular, state the result of the vote taken in Committee on the report as a whole and, if the Committee's opinion is not unanimous, it must also state the opinion of the minority.

3. Only the substantive text is voted upon by the Assembly. It must be presented in the form of a draft Recommendation or Opinion addressed to the Council, a draft Resolution or a draft Order of the Assembly.

RULE 42 *bis*<sup>1</sup>

*Committee for Relations with Parliaments*

1. At the beginning of each ordinary session, the Assembly shall also set up a Committee for Relations with Parliaments composed of 14 members (2 for each member country).

2. The provisions of paragraphs 6 and 7 of Rule 39 on candidatures for membership of committees and the composition of their bureaux shall apply to this Committee.

3. From the texts adopted by the Assembly, this Committee shall select those which, in its opinion, should be debated in the parliaments.

4. It shall make all necessary arrangements with a view to calling the parliaments' attention to the work of the Assembly and inviting them to follow up this work.

<sup>1</sup> New Rule adopted on 21st February 1969 (Resolution 40 of the Assembly).

*English only, paragraph 3, last line, delete:*

“ of the Assembly ”.

5. It may invite to its meetings the administrative secretaries of national delegations.

6. It shall submit to the Assembly, twice each year, a report on its activities.

## PART IX

### *Urgent Procedure*

#### RULE 43<sup>1</sup>

### *Urgent Procedure*

1. At the request of the Council, of the Committee concerned, or of ten or more Representatives, a debate may be held on an item which has not been placed on the Agenda.

2. As soon as a request for urgent procedure is received, the President shall communicate it orally to the Assembly. The request shall then be posted up and the relevant text circulated. The Assembly shall decide on the request for urgent procedure at the earliest after the first vote included in the Orders of the Day of the sitting at which the request for urgent procedure was communicated to the Assembly.

3. The debate on a request for urgent procedure shall not enter into the substance of the question other than to justify the request or to reject the urgent procedure. In connection with a request for urgent procedure, the following only shall be heard: one speaker for the request, one speaker against, the Chairman of the Committee concerned and a representative of the Bureau speaking in its name.

<sup>1</sup> Rule amended on 10th December 1969 (Resolution 44 of the Assembly).

*Paragraph 1, second line, read:*

“concerned, or of ten or more Representatives or Substitutes, a debate...”.

*Add at the end of paragraph 2:*

“... and at the latest at the beginning of the next sitting.”

*English only, paragraph 3, fifth line, read:*

“may be heard” instead of “shall be heard”.

*Seventh line, read:*

“one representative” instead of “a representative”.

4. If the Assembly decides against urgent procedure, another request concerning the same question may not be placed before it during the same part-session.

5. If urgent procedure is adopted, the Assembly may, notwithstanding the provisions of Rule 26 (5), decide that the debate on the substance of the text shall be held on an oral report of the appropriate Committee, either at the beginning of the Orders of the Day of the next sitting or at a later date during the current part-session.

6. Exceptionally, when urgent procedure is adopted by an absolute majority of representatives to the Assembly, the motion may be debated without prior reference to a Committee.

## PART X

### *Relations between the Council and the Assembly*

#### RULE 44

##### *Access of Ministers to the Assembly and its Committees*

Ministers who are members of the Council or any other Minister of the Government of a Member State shall have the right of access to the Assembly and its Committees. They may not vote.

#### RULE 45

##### *Written Questions*

1. Any Representative may put written questions to the Council. The text of such questions shall be transmitted by the President to the Chairman of the

##### *Paragraph 6, read:*

“6. Exceptionally, when urgent procedure is adopted by a number of Representatives or Substitutes equal to more than half the number of the Representatives to the Assembly, the motion may be debated without prior reference to a Committee.”

##### *Paragraph 1, read:*

“1. Any Representative or Substitute may put written questions to the Council in accordance with Article V (i) of the Charter. The text...”

Council. Questions and answers shall be published by the Clerk of the Assembly.

2. All questions governed by this rule to which an answer has not been given within a period of one month shall be published, together with a statement that no reply has been received.

## PART XI

### *Petitions*

#### RULE 46

##### *Admissibility and examination of petitions*

1. Petitions must be addressed to the President.
2. To be in order they must:
  - (a) show the names, attributes and domicile of each of the petitioners. The petitioners must cause their signatures to be authenticated in accordance with the internal legislation of the State in which they reside;
  - (b) bear on questions which fall within the competence of Western European Union.
3. The Bureau of the Assembly shall examine the admissibility of petitions with the Clerk of the Assembly.
4. Petitions which are in order shall be referred to the competent committees.

## PART XII

### *The Office of the Clerk of the Assembly*

#### RULE 47

##### *Office of the Clerk of the Assembly*

1. The Clerk shall be appointed by the Assembly, on the proposal of the Bureau. He shall provide the Assembly and its Committees with such Secretariat and other assistance as they may require.

Upon appointment, the Clerk shall make a solemn declaration before the Assembly that he will perform his duties in complete independence and uninfluenced by national considerations, that he will neither seek nor receive indications concerning the performance of his duties from any Government or authority other than the Assembly, and will refrain from any action incompatible with his position as a European civil servant.

2. The Clerk shall, in consultation with the Bureau, appoint officials on a permanent or temporary basis as members of the Office of the Clerk.

3. The Clerk shall establish close co-operation with the Secretary-General of Western European Union, the secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments.

## PART XIII

*Budgetary questions*

## RULE 48

*Draft Budget*

1. Each year, following a report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration drawn up in collaboration with the Presidential Committee, the Assembly shall approve a provisional statement of its expenditure, divided into Heads and Sub-Heads.

2. The Assembly may, if necessary, approve supplementary estimates of expenditure.

3. The President shall communicate these documents to the Council.

4. The President of the Assembly shall be responsible for authorising expenditure on behalf of the Assembly within the limits of the credits specified in the budget, once the latter has been approved by the Council.

5. In the course of its first session following the end of each financial year, the Assembly shall express its approval or disapproval of the accounts for that year, on a motion tabled by a member of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.

## RULE 49

*Budget of Western European Union*

The Assembly shall express its views in the form of an Opinion or Recommendation on the annual budget of Western European Union as soon as it has been communicated.



PART XIV

*Other provisions*

RULE 50

*Waiver of the Immunity of Representatives  
and Substitutes*

1. Any request addressed to the President by the competent authority of a Member State for the waiver of the immunity of a Representative or Substitute shall be transmitted to the Assembly and then referred without prior discussion to the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.

2. The Committee shall immediately consider the request, but shall not make any examination of the merits of the case in question. The Representative or Substitute concerned may, if he so wishes, be heard by the Committee. The Report of the Committee shall conclude with a draft Resolution for the retention or the waiver of the immunity.

3. The report of the Committee shall automatically be included as the first item of the Orders of the Day for the first day on which the Assembly sits after the report has been laid upon the Table of the Assembly.

4. The debate on the report shall be confined to arguments for or against the waiver of the immunity.

5. The President shall immediately inform the authority which submitted the request of the decision of the Assembly.

RULE 51

*Revision of the Rules of Procedure*

1. Motions to amend the Rules of Procedure must be supported by ten or more Representatives. They shall be referred without debate to the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, which shall report on them, as provided by Rule 42 above.

2. The examination of the Report of the Committee shall be included in the Orders of the Day in accordance with the provisions of Rule 17 above.

3. The debate shall be concerned only with the relevant texts.

*Paragraph 1, second line, read:*

“supported by ten or more Representatives or Substitutes. They shall be...”.

*Revision of the Charter and of the Rules  
of Procedure of the Assembly*

AMENDMENT 1<sup>1</sup>  
*tabled by Mr. Voogd and Mr. Stoffelen*

1. In Rule 14, third line, leave out “ former Presidents of the Assembly who are representatives to the Assembly ”.

*Signed: Voogd, Stoffelen*

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1. See 6th Sitting, 18th June 1981 (Amendment withdrawn).

*Presentation of the economic study<sup>1</sup>  
of the armaments sector of industry  
in the WEU member countries*

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### **Introduction**

#### **A. Presentation**

1. The present report, which deals with the economic study of the armaments sector of industry in the WEU member countries, is based on a definition of the terms "armaments" and "armaments industry" which is common to the SAC and the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG). It has been drawn up in accordance with the Council's wishes.

2. It contains budgetary and economic information, divided into two chapters. The first is devoted to general considerations on defence, armaments, research and development and maintenance expenditure. The second contains economic data on armaments production, manpower, exports and imports. Finally, general conclusions set out some considerations in the form of a synthesis.

#### **B. Terminology**

3. "The armaments industry" or, more precisely, "the armaments sector of industry" covers all the industrial units adapted and/or designed for the study, development, production, trials and repair by industry of specifically military equipment. It is obvious that this definition refers to a theoretical requirement, and, in real economic terms, it is often difficult, if not impossible, to dissociate production intended for the military sector from that intended for the civilian sector.

4. According to the above definition, the term "military equipment" or "armaments" designates all equipment which is specially designed for military application. It excludes civil or commercial-type equipment or supplies used by the services, such as clothing, food, medical supplies, fuel, commercial vehicles and civil-type aircraft. On the other hand, military equipment for the "gendarmerie" must be included when it comes under the Ministry of Defence, as it does in France.

5. A fundamental aspect of this part of the study must be stressed: all the information

contained therein comes from available official sources.

6. The data collected are not always complete or homogeneous between one country and another; this makes comparisons between countries difficult. For these reasons, the study generally gives only the situation for the WEU member countries as a whole. It should also be noted that the financial year coincides with the calendar year for all the member countries except the United Kingdom, where it covers the period from 1st April to 31st March of the following year.

7. According to NATO documents, the definition of defence expenditure is as follows: "National military expenditures are current and capital expenditures to meet the needs of the armed forces". They include military assistance to foreign countries and the military components of nuclear, space, and research and development programmes. By custom and accounting practice, national military budgets usually do not include expenditures for veterans' benefits, interest on war debts, civil defence and outlays for strategic industrial stockpiling. Adding these items to regular defence budgets would greatly enlarge the total of annual public expenditures which are military-related, but adequate information to determine precisely how such costs affect various national expenditures and their overall size worldwide is not available at present. There are also substantial social costs which are extra-budgetary, including manpower, under-priced because of conscription. As national accounting systems differ in their treatment of military budgets, adjustments are required to bring national figures to the standard concept.

8. Estimates based on national data are generally lower than those published by NATO, which are calculated according to its own criteria and which take account of, in particular:

- military aid expenditure, including equipment;
- the contribution of the member countries to the NATO civil budget;
- military retirement pensions;

<sup>1</sup> Standing Armaments Committee Document SAC (81) IA-D/20 dated 8th May 1981.

- the funds allocated to the national gendarmerie for frontier duties and to various other departments.

This type of expenditure is not normally included in the defence budgets of member countries. On the other hand, these budgets include other data which vary from country to country.

#### *Research and development*

9. Within the scope of this study, the term "research and development" only includes government funds assigned to programmes for the research and development of military equipment which are conducted by the government alone or with the help of private industry or research institutes. At this stage it was not possible to obtain information on the amounts spent by private firms from their own funds for military research and development. In certain countries these amounts could be considerable.

#### *Production*

10. The methods of drawing up statistics of military production vary from country to country, which means that it has not always been possible, according to the definition given above, to dissociate armaments production from the overall production of military equipment and supplies. In addition, it will be noted that certain countries have no statistics on their armaments production.

#### *Maintenance*

11. For most of the member countries, this term covers all the operations which help to keep the equipment of the armed forces in good condition for fulfilling their rôle, together with the purchase of the spare parts required in these operations. Conversely, in the United Kingdom, military maintenance also includes supplies of fuels and lubricants.

12. There are two forms of maintenance: servicing and industrial maintenance. Industrial maintenance normally occurs - except for accidents - at a certain period in the lifetime of the equipment. It aims at renewing or partially or completely rebuilding certain types of equipment. The cost is generally high because large technical facilities are required and it is carried out in private industry or in government establishments or workshops. With regard to normal servicing, it is based on the manufacturer's specifications and is carried out directly by the users or in unit workshops for repairs which do not require large-scale facilities.

13. In view of the subject of the study, the present report only deals with industrial maintenance.

#### *Manpower*

14. In some cases, the information obtained includes all personnel employed in the armaments sector of industry (research and development, production and maintenance); in others, the corresponding figures are confined to the public sector only. Certain approximations are due to the fact that, in general, it has been difficult to distinguish the number of persons employed in the armaments sector from those employed in civil production.

#### *Exports and imports*

15. Where statistics are available - which is not the case for all the member countries - on exports of military equipment, they are not all drawn up on the same basis. For most of the countries, the data in question concern deliveries actually made, whereas for some others only export licences granted are taken into account, which do not seem to be too far removed from actual deliveries. Since no statistics on the export of military equipment are kept in certain countries, the information studied is the result of bringing data together from various sources.

16. With regard to imports, direct exchanges between industries are not always listed.

17. Moreover, it is impossible to distinguish transfers, whether exports or imports, carried out in the framework of co-operative programmes, since transnational co-operation is not usually singled out in the statistics.

18. In addition, the information on exports and imports for the member countries as a whole covers transactions carried out within WEU, since these could not be individually identified. Consequently, it is impossible to add up the national data and hence to know the transfers of military equipment between WEU taken as a whole and the outside world.

\*  
\* \*

N.B. National data have been converted into European currency units in order that they may be added up and have been deflated by the GDP price index (1972=100) to arrive at constant prices.

## CHAPTER I

*Presentation of budgetary data**(a) Defence expenditure*

19. The definition of defence expenditure on which the NATO studies are based offers the advantage of giving harmonised data. On the other hand, it differs considerably from national definitions. The data may vary considerably from the corresponding data in national budget documents on account of differences between national definitions and the NATO definition of defence expenditure.

20. Calculated in 1972 prices and exchange rates, defence expenditure for WEU as a whole, according to NATO estimates, has increased at a fairly moderate rate. According to these calculations, in 1977 (i.e. at the end of the study period), WEU defence expenditure was 9.5 % higher than in 1972, a total which corresponds to an annual growth rate of 1.8 %. It should be stressed that, in addition to personnel expenditure, defence expenditure includes items subject to specific inflation which is well above that of the GNP (fuels, servicing of sophisticated equipment, infrastructure, re-equipment, etc.). This remark is all the more meaningful since the period in question (1972-77) is marked by the steep rise in the cost of fuels and raw materials in general.

21. Tables I(a) and I(b) annexed to the present document show that the situation varies for the different countries. The figures for France, Belgium and Luxembourg show a steady increase in defence expenditure at constant prices. The average annual growth rate for France was 3.6 % between 1972 and 1977. In Belgium, defence expenditure showed an average growth rate of 5.5 % for the same period, and in Luxembourg 7.0 %; in Belgium and Luxembourg these growth rates are chiefly due to the funding of special programmes in 1975 and 1976. In other countries, the effects of the economic recession of 1974 and 1975 are clearly reflected in the figures. In the United Kingdom, there was an almost complete stagnation in defence expenditure in the period under consideration (annual rate +0.5 %). In the Federal Republic of Germany, defence expenditure increased by an annual average rate of 2.0 %, although this levelled off from 1974. In Italy, there was a definite drop between 1972 and 1976; 1977 was higher but did not, however, reach the 1972 level and the average annual rate for the period was, therefore, negative (-0.6 %). Defence expenditure in the Netherlands showed an average annual growth of 3.9 % between 1972 and 1977.

22. In most countries, the ratio between defence expenditure and gross domestic product has remained fairly constant. In 1977, this ratio varied approximately from 1 to 5 %, according to the countries concerned.

23. According to national budgets, the evolution of defence expenditure at constant prices for the whole of WEU is nearly the same as that based on the NATO figures. In the single case of Italy, however, there was a 13.6 % reduction in defence expenditure in real terms in 1977 as compared with 1972. As far as the other countries are concerned, the average annual growth rate for the period 1972 to 1977 was as follows: Federal Republic of Germany 1.3 %; the Netherlands 3.9 %, and between 2.7 % and 3.2 % in the other member countries (see Tables II (a) and II (b)). It is obvious that these differences are mainly due to carrying out large armament programmes which are, however, rarely implemented at the same time.

*(b) Expenditure on major equipment*

24. In its statistics, NATO identifies expenditure on major equipment and particularly expenditure on weapon systems. These statistics, based on NATO definitions and calculated in 1972 prices and rates of exchange, show that, for the totality of the WEU countries, excluding France, expenditure on major items of equipment amounted to about 17 % more in 1977 than in 1972 (see Table III). This is mainly due to the increasing complexity of such equipment.

25. Although national data cannot be compared with NATO information, they confirm this development. One may therefore conclude that the percentage expenditure on major equipment tends to increase in the defence budgets of most member countries. This is mainly due to the increasing complexity of such equipment and to the choice of new major programmes. The difference in percentages between the various WEU countries remains considerable.

26. In 1977, the contribution of France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom to the total defence expenditure of the WEU member countries came to 86.4 % and this figure remained fairly stable over the whole period under consideration. The rest was divided between Italy, the Netherlands and Belgium with Italy alone accounting for a good half (see Tables IV (a) and IV (b)). It may also be noted that, according to national budgets, the percentage of these three countries in total defence expenditure is greater than their percentage of armaments expenditure for the whole of WEU.

*(c) Research and development*

27. Research and development expenditure comprises only public funds devoted to programmes carried out by the state on its own or with the help of private industry and research institutes. The SAC does not have any exact information concerning the expenditure of firms in this area.

28. A comparison between this expenditure and total defence expenditure shows that the member countries are divided into two categories. The Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany, France and the United Kingdom are the most active in the area of research and development. They devote the highest amounts, in relation to total defence expenditure, to research and development and to armaments production (respectively 5 %, 10 % and more than 13 % of the total defence expenditure; these figures hardly varied at all during the period covered by the study). In the other member countries, these ratios are relatively low (compare with Tables V (a) and V (b)).

*(d) Maintenance*

29. Maintenance is an important factor in the total defence expenditure of all the member countries. Compared with armaments expenditure, the proportion varies from one quarter to more than a half.

30. The ratio of maintenance to armaments expenditure shows a downward trend in most of the countries. In constant prices, this expenditure even seems to have declined in some countries (see Tables VI (a) and VI (b)).

31. The very nature of military requirements explains why users of equipment demand high reliability which might lead to heavy maintenance costs and regular servicing. In certain cases, these costs can be explained by the sophistication of the military equipment used, in others by its wear-and-tear or age, by the lack of centralised stocks of spares or maintenance workshops, or the poor distribution of technicians.

## CHAPTER II

*Presentation of economic data**(a) Production*

32. During the period under study (1972-77) armaments production increased in all the member countries. This is true if 1972 prices and exchange rates are applied. The evolution of the data in constant prices can be adopted

with some caution because the deflator, which is based on the evolution of the GDP price index, only enables an approximate correction to be made to the data in current prices in the sector under consideration (see Table VII).

33. Taking account of the above, armaments production at constant prices was approximately 32 % higher in 1977 than in 1972 for the WEU countries as a whole (average annual rate 5.7 %).

34. However, the ratio of armaments production to that of the whole of the manufacturing industry is small: between about 2 and 8 % for the different member countries. These ratios generally show a relative upward trend as between "armaments" and the manufacturing industry as a whole, for a variety of reasons.

35. According to data expressed in constant prices, France, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy alone cover about 95 % of WEU's armaments production.

*(b) Manpower*

36. The statistical data on manpower comprise in certain cases all the people employed in the armaments sector of industry and in other cases only those working in the public sector. According to these estimates, the armament industries of the member countries offer about one million jobs, this figure being based on full-time labour.

37. The number of people employed in the armaments sector of industry is low in comparison to production. The ratio of manpower used in the armaments sector to that of industry as a whole is, in all member countries, less than that of production of armaments to production by manufacturing industry as a whole.

*(c) Exports*

38. At 1972 prices and exchange rates, armaments exports have progressed to a somewhat different extent in all the member countries. In the WEU member countries taken together, these exports, including intra-European exchanges, increased by an average rate of 16.5 % per year between 1972 and 1977. At this rate of growth, armaments exports increased in more or less the same way as the total exports of the member countries, so that their share in the export market has hardly changed, since a drop in certain countries was compensated for by a rise in others. The share of armaments exports in the commerce of the countries concerned remains low [1 to 5 % of total exports, depending on the country].

39. Among the member countries, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom are by far the biggest exporters of armaments. These four countries cover about 95 % of the armaments exports of the WEU countries, which corresponds to their share of production (see Table VIII).

40. The ratio of armaments exports, including co-operation, to armaments production varies according to country and year. It represents between 20 % and 60 % of the total production of military equipment. These rates are mainly due to the fact that export data include exchanges carried out in the context of co-operation and compensation between countries, together with other intra-European exchanges.

41. In relation to the total export of goods, the proportion of armament exports for the whole of the WEU countries varies between 1 % and 5 %. This ratio is, therefore, even lower than that of armaments production to the total production of the manufacturing industry.

42. It must once more be stressed that this information should be used with caution, since national statistics on foreign trade do not allow comparisons in the strict sense of the word. This quantified information is not always uniform on account of differences in the definitions and the ways of drawing up statistics.

#### *(d) Imports*

43. While underlining the nature of the statistical information on foreign trade (see paragraph 42 above), it should be noted that, as far as imports are concerned, the data are even less comparable than those relating to exports. The definitions used are not the same in all the member countries, nor do they correspond with those used for exports. This is why it is impossible to compare export and import figures. They may or may not include figures on compensation and co-operation, as the case

may be, and it is impossible to determine to what extent they include armaments imports in the form of semi-finished products.

44. If these restrictions are kept in mind, import figures at constant prices (1972 = 100) show a fairly irregular evolution, with a downward trend for the WEU member countries as a whole in the period under study. In 1977, armaments imports in the WEU member countries were about 10 % lower than in 1972, using constant prices and exchange rates as a basis for comparison (see Table IX).

#### *Conclusions*

45. It may be noted from the economic study that, during the reference period, both defence expenditure and the armaments sector of industry steadily developed in all the WEU member countries, although at a moderate pace. Production and exports also followed this trend. These general conclusions are chiefly confirmed by budgetary and economic observations.

46. From 1972 to 1977, defence expenditure in the WEU member countries increased in real values and at an average rate of 2.0 %. With regard to major equipment, the increase equals 2.1 %.

47. As far as the evaluation of armaments production is concerned, it is characterised by an annual average rise of 5.7 % during the reference period. This production provides work for about one million salaried employees in the seven WEU countries.

48. The available data on armaments imports and exports do not allow accurate conclusions to be made. Statistics do not single out, with any certainty, exchanges between WEU member countries, particularly where co-operative armaments production is concerned. Consequently, the foreign armaments trade of WEU, taken as a whole, cannot be estimated.



## ANNEX

*Statistics*

- I (a) Total defence expenditure in European currency units of the WEU member countries according to the statistics published by NATO.
- I (b) Total defence expenditure of the WEU member countries expressed in percentages according to the statistics published by NATO.
- II (a) Total defence expenditure in European currency units of the WEU member countries according to their national budgets and statistics.
- II (b) Total defence expenditure of the WEU member countries expressed in percentages according to their national budgets and statistics.
- III. Major equipment expenditure in European currency units according to the statistics published by NATO.
- IV (a) Total armaments expenditure in European currency units of the WEU member countries according to their national budgets.
- IV (b) Total armaments expenditure of the WEU member countries expressed in percentages according to their national budgets.
- V (a) Research and development expenditure in the WEU member countries taken from their national budgets and expressed in European currency units.
- V (b) Research and development expenditure in the WEU member countries taken from their national budgets and expressed in percentages.
- VI (a) Maintenance expenditure in the WEU member countries taken from their national budgets and expressed in European currency units.
- VI (b) Maintenance expenditure in the WEU member countries taken from their national budgets and expressed in percentages.
- VII. Armaments production in European currency units for the totality of the WEU member countries.
- VIII. Armaments exports in European currency units for the totality of the WEU member countries.
- IX. Armaments imports in European currency units for the totality of the WEU member countries.
- X. GDP price indices (at market prices).
- XI. Rates of exchange in European currency units (ECU).

TABLE I (a)  
**Total defence expenditure in European currency units**  
**of the WEU member countries according to the statistics published by NATO**  
**1972-77**  
(at 1972 prices and exchange rates)

Country	1972		1973		1974		1975		1976		1977	
	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B
Belgium	894	100	929	103.9	971	108.6	1,051	117.6	1,138	127.3	1,170	130.9
France	6,716	100	6,940	103.3	7,064	105.2	7,289	108.5	7,576	112.8	8,028	119.5
Federal Republic of Germany	8,030	100	8,424	104.9	8,796	109.5	8,692	108.2	8,706	108.4	8,675	108.0
Italy	3,304	100	3,271	99.0	3,301	99.9	3,065	92.8	3,014	91.2	3,202	96.9
Luxembourg	10	100	11	110.0	11	110.0	13	130.0	14	140.0	14	140.0
Netherlands	1,382	100	1,401	101.4	1,467	106.2	1,527	110.5	1,518	109.8	1,677	121.3
United Kingdom	7,257	100	7,331	101.0	7,533	103.8	7,342	101.2	7,576	104.4	7,444	102.6
WEU total	27,593	100	28,307	102.6	29,143	105.6	28,978	105.0	29,542	107.0	30,210	109.5

A - in millions of European currency units (ECU).  
B - 1972 = 100.

TABLE I (b)  
**Total defence expenditure of the WEU member countries**  
**expressed in percentages according to the statistics published by NATO**  
**1972-77**  
 (at 1972 prices and exchange rates)

Country	1972		1973		1974		1975		1976		1977	
	C	D	C	D	C	D	C	D	C	D	C	D
Belgium	3.3	-	3.3	+ 3.9	3.3	+4.5	3.6	+ 8.2	3.9	+8.3	3.9	+ 2.8
France	24.4	-	24.5	+ 3.3	24.2	+1.8	25.2	+ 3.2	25.6	+3.9	26.6	+ 6.0
Federal Republic of Germany	29.0	-	29.8	+ 4.9	30.3	+4.4	30.0	- 1.2	29.5	+0.2	28.7	- 0.4
Italy	12.0	-	11.6	- 1.0	11.3	+0.9	10.6	- 7.1	10.2	-1.7	10.6	+ 6.2
Luxembourg	0.0	-	0.0	+10.0	0.0	+0.0	0.1	+18.2	0.1	+7.7	0.1	+ 0.0
Netherlands	5.0	-	4.9	+ 1.4	5.0	+4.7	5.2	+ 1.3	5.1	+2.2	5.5	+10.5
United Kingdom	26.3	-	25.9	+ 1.0	25.9	+2.8	25.3	- 2.5	25.6	+3.2	24.6	- 1.7
WEU total	100	-	100	+ 2.6	100	+3.0	100	- 0.6	100	+2.0	100	+ 2.3

C - percentage (WEU = 100).  
 D - annual percentage variation.

TABLE II (a)  
*Total defence expenditure in European currency units  
of the WEU member countries according to their national budgets and statistics  
1972-77*  
(at 1972 prices and exchange rates)

Country	1972		1973		1974		1975		1976		1977	
	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B
Belgium	719	100	697	96.9	719	100	770	107.1	812	112.9	843	117.3
France	5,600	100	5,774	103.1	5,833	104.1	6,020	107.5	6,200	110.7	6,398	114.2
Federal Republic of Germany	6,792	100	7,069	104.0	7,374	108.5	7,225	106.4	7,242	106.7	7,241	106.6
Italy	2,886	100	3,137	108.7	2,748	95.2	2,420	83.9	2,469	85.6	2,494	86.4
Luxembourg	10	100	10	100	10	100	11	110	12	120	13	130
Netherlands	1,382	100	1,401	101.4	1,467	106.2	1,527	110.5	1,518	109.8	1,677	121.3
United Kingdom	6,351	100	6,649	104.7	7,505	118.2	7,555	119.0	7,569	119.2	7,374	116.1
WEU total	23,740	100	24,737	104.1	25,656	108.1	25,528	107.6	25,822	109.1	26,040	109.9

A - in millions of European currency units (ECU).  
B - 1972 = 100.

TABLE II (b)  
*Total defence expenditure of the WEU member countries  
expressed in percentages according to their national budgets and statistics  
1972-77*  
(at 1972 prices and exchange rates)

Country	1972		1973		1974		1975		1976		1977	
	C	D	C	D	C	D	C	D	C	D	C	D
Belgium	3.0	-	2.8	-3.1	2.8	+ 3.2	3.0	+ 7.1	3.2	+5.5	3.2	+ 3.8
France	23.6	-	23.3	+3.1	22.7	+ 1.0	23.6	+ 3.2	24.0	+2.9	24.6	+ 3.2
Federal Republic of Germany	28.6	-	28.6	+4.1	28.8	+ 4.3	28.3	- 2.1	28.0	+0.2	27.8	- 0.1
Italy	12.1	-	12.7	+8.7	10.7	-12.4	9.5	-12.0	9.6	+2.0	9.6	+ 1.0
Luxembourg	0.0	-	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	+10.0	0.0	+9.1	0.0	+ 8.3
Netherlands	5.9	-	5.7	+1.4	5.7	+ 4.7	6.0	+ 4.1	5.9	-0.6	6.5	+10.5
United Kingdom	26.8	-	26.9	+4.7	29.3	+12.9	29.6	+ 0.6	29.3	+0.2	28.3	- 2.6
WEU total	100	-	100	+4.2	100	+ 3.7	100	- 0.5	100	+1.2	100	+ 0.8

C - percentage (WEU = 100).  
D - annual percentage variation.

TABLE III  
**Major equipment expenditure in European currency units**  
*according to the statistics published by NATO*<sup>1</sup>  
**1972-77**  
 (at 1972 prices and exchange rates)

Country	1972		1973		1974		1975		1976		1977	
	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B
Belgium	102	100	78	76.5	86	84.3	96	94.1	125	122.5	139	136.3
France <sup>2</sup>												
Federal Republic of Germany	988	100	1,019	103.1	1,047	106.0	1,026	103.8	1,149	116.3	1,084	109.7
Italy	558	100	497	89.1	502	90.0	426	76.3	395	70.8	490	87.8
Netherlands	148	100	158	106.8	194	131.1	240	162.1	231	156.1	345	233.1
United Kingdom <sup>3</sup>	1,350	100	1,415	104.8	1,296	96.0	1,417	105.0	1,561	115.6	1,638	121.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>3,146</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>3,167</b>	<b>100.7</b>	<b>3,125</b>	<b>99.3</b>	<b>3,205</b>	<b>101.9</b>	<b>3,461</b>	<b>110.0</b>	<b>3,696</b>	<b>117.4</b>

A - in millions of European currency units (ECU).

B - 1972 = 100.

1. Based on national data and definitions relative only to equipment considered to be major.

2. The figures for France are not given in the statistics published by NATO and are not available.

3. Financial year: from 1st April to 31st March.

TABLE IV (a)  
**Total armaments expenditure in European currency units  
of the WEU member countries according to their national budgets  
1972-77**  
(at 1972 prices and exchange rates)

Country	1972		1973		1974		1975		1976		1977	
	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B
Belgium	105	100	81	77.1	89	84.8	102	97.1	133	126.7	144	137.1
France	2,304	100	2,350	102.0	2,364	102.6	2,238	97.1	2,218	96.3	2,333	101.2
Federal Republic of Germany	2,348	100	2,422	103.2	2,409	102.6	2,350	100.1	2,466	105.0	2,466	105.0
Italy	560	100	657	117.3	530	94.6	488	87.1	539	96.3	624	111.4
Netherlands	193	100	192	99.5	217	112.4	267	138.3	264	136.8	393	203.6
United Kingdom	2,147	100	2,605	121.3	2,332	108.6	2,173	101.2	2,458	114.5	2,565	119.5
WEU total	7,657	100	8,307	108.5	7,941	103.7	7,618	99.5	8,078	105.5	8,525	111.3

A - in millions of European currency units (ECU).

B - 1972 = 100.

Sources: National budgets.

TABLE IV (b)

**Total armaments expenditure of the WEU member countries  
expressed in percentages according to their national budgets  
1972-77**

(at 1972 prices and exchange rates)

Country	1972		1973		1974		1975		1976		1977	
	C	D	C	D	C	D	C	D	C	D	C	D
Belgium	1.4	-	1.0	-22.9	1.1	+ 9.9	1.3	+14.6	1.6	+30.4	1.7	+ 8.3
France	30.1	-	28.3	+ 2.0	29.8	+ 0.6	29.4	- 5.3	27.5	- 0.9	27.4	+ 5.2
Federal Republic of Germany	30.6	-	29.2	+ 3.2	30.3	- 0.5	30.9	- 2.5	30.5	+ 4.9	28.9	0.0
Italy	7.3	-	7.9	+17.3	6.7	-19.3	6.4	- 7.9	6.7	+10.5	7.3	+15.8
Netherlands	2.5	-	2.3	- 0.5	2.8	+13.0	3.5	+23.0	3.2	- 0.1	4.6	+48.9
United Kingdom	28.0	-	31.3	+21.3	29.3	-10.5	28.5	- 6.8 <sup>†</sup>	30.5	+13.1	30.1	+ 4.4
WEU total	100	-	100	+ 8.5	100	- 4.4	100	- 0.4	100	+ 6.0	100	+ 5.5

C - percentage (WEU = 100).  
D - annual percentage variation.  
Source: National budgets.



TABLE V (a)  
*Research and development expenditure in the WEU member countries taken from  
 their national budgets and expressed in European currency units  
 1972-77*  
 (at 1972 prices and exchange rates)

Country	1972		1973		1974		1975		1976		1977	
	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B
Belgium	0.2	100	0	–	0	–	0.8	309.8	0.4	148.4	1.1	437.7
France	633.4	100	699.8	110.5	669.9	105.8	642.9	101.5	643.6	101.6	649.6	102.6
Federal Republic of Germany	364.0	100	361.5	99.3	346.4	95.2	334.9	92.0	358.7	98.5	343.9	94.5
Italy	23.9	100	35.8	150.9	29.6	124.1	43.0	180.0	52.4	219.3	19.4	81.3
Netherlands	12.5	100	12.6	101.1	13.4	107.8	13.8	110.7	15.3	122.3	14.5	116.3
United Kingdom	891.0	100	991.2	111.3	968.9	108.8	977.9	109.8	993.4	111.5	1,002.4	112.5
WEU total	1,925.0	100	2,100.9	109.1	2,028.2	105.4	2,013.3	104.6	2,063.8	107.2	2,030.9	105.5

A – in millions of European currency units (ECU).  
 B – 1972 = 100.

TABLE V (b)  
*Research and development expenditure in the WEU member countries taken from  
 their national budgets and expressed in percentages  
 1972-77*

(at 1972 prices and exchange rates)

Country	1972		1973		1974		1975		1976		1977	
	C	D	C	D	C	D	C	D	C	D	C	D
Belgium	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-	0.0	-52.1	0.1	+295.0
France	32.9	-	33.3	+10.5	33.0	-4.3	31.9	-4.0	31.2	+0.1	32.0	+0.9
Federal Republic of Germany	18.9	-	17.2	-0.7	17.1	-4.2	16.7	-3.3	17.4	+7.1	16.9	-4.1
Italy	1.3	-	1.7	+50.9	1.5	-17.8	2.1	+45.1	2.4	+21.8	1.0	-62.9
Netherlands	0.6	-	0.6	+1.1	0.7	+6.6	0.7	+2.7	0.8	+10.5	0.7	-4.9
United Kingdom	46.3	-	47.2	+11.3	47.7	-2.2	48.6	+0.9	48.2	+2.5	49.3	+0.9
WEU total	100	-	100	+9.1	100	-4.5	100	-0.7	100	+2.5	100	-1.6

C - percentage proportion (WEU = 100).  
 D - percentage annual variation.

TABLE VI (a)

*Maintenance expenditure in the WEU member countries taken from  
their national budgets and expressed in European currency units  
1972-77*

(at 1972 prices and exchange rates)

Country	1972		1973		1974		1975		1976		1977	
	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B
Belgium	36.6	100	37.4	102.2	36.2	98.8	41.6	113.5	40.9	111.6	44.1	120.3
France	966.0	100	990.6	102.5	1,008.5	104.4	1,026.8	106.3	1,053.7	109.1	1,053.0	109.0
Federal Republic of Germany	756.3	100	761.6	100.7	719.6	95.2	694.8	91.9	682.5	90.2	673.2	89.0
Italy	134.5	100	151.7	111.3	133.3	99.1	127.0	94.4	129.2	96.0	133.7	99.5
Netherlands	110.2	100	99.4	90.1	101.5	92.1	94.5	85.7	90.8	82.4	90.0	81.6
United Kingdom	919.9	100	1,006.8	109.4	1,238.5	134.6	1,156.1	125.7	1,080.3	117.3	1,020.2	110.9
WEU total	2,932.5	100	3,047.5	103.9	3,237.6	110.4	3,140.8	107.1	3,077.4	104.9	3,014.2	102.8

A - in millions of European currency units (ECU).

B - 1972 = 100.

TABLE VI (b)

*Maintenance expenditure in the WEU member countries taken from  
their national budgets and expressed in percentages  
1972-77*

(at 1972 prices and exchange rates)

Country	1972		1973		1974		1975		1976		1977	
	C	D	C	D	C	D	C	D	C	D	C	D
Belgium	1.2	-	1.2	+ 2.2	1.1	- 3.3	1.3	+14.8	1.3	-1.7	1.5	+7.9
France	32.9	-	32.5	+ 2.5	31.2	+ 1.8	32.7	+ 1.8	34.2	+2.6	34.9	-0.1
Federal Republic of Germany	25.8	-	25.0	+ 0.7	22.2	- 5.5	22.1	- 3.5	22.2	-1.8	22.3	-1.4
Italy	4.6	-	5.0	+11.3	4.1	-10.9	4.1	- 4.7	4.2	+1.7	4.5	+3.6
Netherlands	3.7	-	3.3	- 9.9	3.1	+ 2.2	3.0	- 6.9	3.0	-3.9	3.0	-0.9
United Kingdom	31.3	-	33.0	+ 9.4	38.3	+23.0	36.8	- 6.7	35.1	-6.6	33.8	-5.6
WEU total	100	-	100	+ 3.9	100	+ 6.2	100	- 3.0	100	-2.0	100	-2.1

C - percentage proportion (WEU = 100).  
D - percentage annual variation.

**TABLE VII**  
**Armaments production in European currency units**  
**for the totality of the WEU member countries**  
**1972-77**  
 (at 1972 prices and exchange rates)

WEU total	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977
A	9,167	10,263	10,171	10,404	11,138	12,053
B	100	112.0	111.0	113.5	121.5	131.5
C	-	+12.0	-0.9	+2.3	+7.1	+8.2

A - in millions of European currency units (ECU).

B - 1972 = 100.

C - annual percentage variation.

Sources : National information.

**TABLE VIII**  
**Armaments exports in European currency units**  
**for the totality of the WEU member countries**  
 (including intra-WEU exchanges)  
**1972-77**  
 (at 1972 prices and exchange rates)

WEU total	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976 <sup>1</sup>	1977 <sup>1</sup>
A	1,998	2,589	2,983	3,405	(3,542)	(4,322)
B	100	129.6	149.3	170.4	(177.3)	(216.3)
C	-	+29.6	+15.2	+14.1	(+4.0)	(+22.0)

A - in millions of European currency units (ECU).

B - 1972 = 100.

C - annual percentage variation.

1. These figures do not include data from one of the member countries whose proportion of the total varied from 2.2 % to 3.7 % between 1972 and 1975.

Sources : National information.

TABLE IX

**Armaments imports in European currency units  
for the totality of the WEU member countries**  
(including intra-WEU exchanges but not including co-operative projects)  
**1972-77**  
(at 1972 prices and exchange rates)

WEU total	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977
A	1,247	1,176	1,075	1,169	1,315	1,127
B	100	94.3	86.2	93.7	105.5	90.4
C	-	- 5.7	- 8.6	+ 8.7	+12.5	-14.3

A - in millions of European currency units (ECU).

B - 1972 = 100.

C - annual percentage variation.

Sources : National information.

TABLE X

**GDP price indices (at market prices)**

Country	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977
Belgium	100	106.7	119.7	134.8	145.0	155.0
France	100	107.7	119.8	135.5	149.1	161.9
Federal Republic of Germany	100	105.9	113.3	120.9	125.0	129.5
Italy	100	111.8	132.0	154.8	183.0	216.4
Luxembourg	100	111.4	129.3	132.1	141.7	148.7
Netherlands	100	108.4	118.4	131.8	143.1	153.4
United Kingdom	100	106.7	123.0	156.7	180.3	204.1

Source . OECD national accounts 1972-77 (volume figures based on 1975 readjusted to a 1972 base).

TABLE XI  
*Rates of exchange in European currency units (ECU)*  
 (Yearly averages)

National currency	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977
B.Frs L.Frs	49.3611	47.8009	46.3994	45.5690	43.1654	40.8026
F.Frs	5.65717	5.46775	5.73386	5.31923	5.34486	5.60607
DM	3.57681	3.27644	3.08352	3.04939	2.81545	2.64831
L.It.	654.264	716.460	775.743	809.545	930.150	1006.785
HFL	3.59991	3.42853	3.20224	3.13490	2.95515	2.80010
£	0.448941	0.502321	0.509803	0.560026	0.621578	0.653701

Source: Eurostatistics.

*Talks on the reduction of long-range theatre nuclear forces in Europe*

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REPORT <sup>1</sup>

*submitted on behalf of the  
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments <sup>2</sup>  
by Mr. Mommersteeg, Rapporteur*

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on talks on the reduction of long-range theatre nuclear forces in Europe

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1. Adopted in Committee by 12 votes to 0 with 2 abstentions.

2. *Members of the Committee:* Mr. Cavaliere (Chairman); MM. Bozzi, van den Bergh (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Bahr, Sir Frederic Bennett (Alternate: *Grieve*), MM. Bernini, Blaauw (Alternate: *Mommersteeg*), Bonnel (Alternate: *van der Elst*), Bozzi, Cox, Dejardin (Alternate: *Peeters*), Edwards,

Fosson, Grant (Alternate: *Urwin*), Kittelmann, Lemmrich, Maravalle, Ménard (Alternate: *Jung*), Pecchioli, Péronnet, Prussen (Alternate: *Berchem*), Schmidt, Scholten (Alternate: *van Hulst*), Smith (Alternate: *Mulley*), Tanghe, Vohrer.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*



**Draft Recommendation**

*on talks on the reduction of long-range theatre nuclear forces in Europe*

The Assembly,

- (i) Believing that the broad economic and cultural interdependence of Europe and the United States, and their shared concept of an open society, make a frank dialogue between the two both possible and desirable, especially on mutual security ;
- (ii) Considering it desirable for the European countries of the Alliance to adopt a common constructive position in that dialogue, the better to influence the United States, in particular on security matters such as long-range theatre nuclear forces ;
- (iii) Noting with concern the vast modernisation of Soviet forces, both conventional and nuclear, and in particular the continued deployment of SS-20 missiles at the rate foreseen in Recommendation 360;
- (iv) Reiterating its support for the twofold NATO decision of 12th December 1979 on LRTNF as a realistic basis for negotiating seriously on reductions in the levels of these weapons;
- (v) Believing that such negotiations should provide the political impetus for broad negotiations on the limitation and reduction of all nuclear weapons, strategic and tactical, long-range and battlefield so as to forestall an unrestricted nuclear arms race in an already too dangerous world;
- (vi) Stressing the urgent need for the LRTNF negotiations with the Soviet Union to begin and to be pursued in the general SALT framework, taking into account the whole continuum of nuclear weapons on which deterrence depends, with a view to securing agreement on broad parity with reduced levels of all such weapons in an overall military balance;
- (vii) Aware of the Warsaw Pact superiority in conventional forces on the central front ;
- (viii) Aware that all defence policy must rely on the trust and support of properly-informed public opinion, that that opinion is both concerned and confused about nuclear weapons and calling therefore for objective comparable information to be published on the nuclear balance as a whole as perceived both by NATO and the Warsaw Pact;
- (ix) Welcoming the decision of the United States to embark on negotiations on LRTNF with the Soviet Union before the end of the year ;
- (x) Welcoming in particular the readiness of the United States to consult its allies on nuclear policy, in particular in the framework of the Nuclear Planning Group, the Special Consultative Group, and the High Level Group, which enable their European members to participate constructively in formulating nuclear strategy and in the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Call on member governments to urge the North Atlantic Council:

1. To ensure that negotiations on LRTNF reductions in the framework of SALT begin without further delay;
2. To call for the earliest resumption of negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms as a whole with a view to securing broad parity at lower levels of the nuclear weapons concerned ;
3. To call meanwhile for the continued mutual respect of the SALT II limits and of the SALT I agreement and ABM treaty;
4. To call subsequently for negotiations to secure a balance at lower levels of battlefield nuclear and conventional weapons ;
5. To provide an objective and comparable assessment of the nuclear balance as a whole.

**Explanatory Memorandum**  
(submitted by Mr. Mommersteeg, Rapporteur)

### I. Introduction

1.1. In submitting this short report, the Committee is acting on its intentions noted by the Assembly in Recommendation 360, adopted on 3rd December 1980: "To follow closely the SALT process and report regularly to the Assembly on this vital subject", with particular reference to the problems of long-range theatre nuclear forces. In that recommendation<sup>1</sup>, the Assembly *inter alia* considered "the twofold decision of the special meeting of NATO Foreign and Defence Ministers of 12th December 1979 to be a realistic basis for negotiating reductions of long-range theatre nuclear forces with the Soviet Union...", noted that "the Soviet Union is now deploying SS-20 missiles at a rate which would provide 250-300 with 750-900 warheads by the end of 1981...", welcomed "the opening of preliminary bilateral talks on LRTNF reductions...", expressed its belief that SALT II was "to the mutual advantage of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact" and called on member governments "to urge the North Atlantic Council to call for the observance of the SALT II limits and the earliest resumption of the SALT process". In its earlier Recommendation 345, adopted on 2nd June 1980, the Assembly had called for reliance to be placed "on the whole range of existing weapons systems based in Europe, at sea and in the United States to counter the threat posed by present levels of Soviet weapons".

1.2. Regrettably, at the time that this report is drafted, over five months since the adoption of Recommendation 360 by the Assembly, no reply to it has been received from the Council, although in reply to Recommendation 359, adopted by the Assembly on 2nd December 1980:

"The Council note with satisfaction the close and fruitful consultations which have taken place among the allies who participated in the decision of 12th December 1979 on theatre nuclear forces (TNF) ... The Council welcome the fact that, as a result of the continuous implementation of both elements of the December decision, serious preliminary discussions towards agreed limitations of TNF could be started between the Soviet Union and the United States and will be resumed at a date to be set through

mutual consultations. These discussions serve to continue the SALT process which is of great importance for the achievement of a stable balance in the nuclear field and for the stabilisation of East-West relations in general."

1.3. The present report summarises events since the Committee adopted its previous report "SALT and the British and French nuclear forces" (Document 859) on 17th November 1980, on the basis of which Recommendation 360 was subsequently adopted by the Assembly. As they affect LRTNF in particular, these events concern: the evolution of the policy of President Reagan's administration in the United States; the evolution of Soviet policy and the proposed moratorium on the deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe; the change in levels of nuclear forces and the problems encountered in developing the new United States LRTNF; the growth of opposition in Europe to the principle of nuclear weapons deployment.

1.4. The report concludes by calling for an early resumption of the SALT process, including LRTNF talks, and stresses that it must be a continuing process.

### II. Trends of United States and NATO policy

2.1. As the Committee pointed out in its previous report<sup>1</sup>, President Reagan, in the course of his election campaign in 1980, had first opposed SALT II, but later committed himself to continuation of the SALT process. In November he was quoted as saying about the SALT dialogue:

"We could open it by telling them that we have to renegotiate SALT II. We could take what is usable out of SALT II and then tell them that we are not going to ratify the treaty the way it is... There has to be linkage between arms control and other areas of difference..."<sup>2</sup>

Since taking office, the new administration has given priority to economic policy, and has been slow to formulate foreign policy and arms control policy; at times it has appeared publicly divided on these latter issues.

1. Text at appendix.

1. Document 859.

2. Sunday Times, 9th November 1980.

2.2. General Edward Rowley, a former joint representative on the SALT negotiations team, has been appointed chief negotiator for SALT, reporting directly to Mr. Eugene Rostow, Head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. On 3rd March, following a statement by Mr. John Lehman, the new Navy Secretary, to the effect that the United States should not feel bound by SALT I and SALT II limitations, the State Department's spokesman, Mr. William Dyess, issued an official statement:

"This administration is reviewing its overall SALT policy. No decision has yet been taken on our adherence to existing SALT agreements. John Lehman's statements on SALT, as reported in the press, were not authorised, nor did they reflect administration policy. While we are reviewing our SALT policy, we will take no action that would undercut existing agreements so long as the Soviet Union exercises the same restraint."

It is not to be excluded that the United States, when ready to embark on a renegotiation of SALT II, will decide to seek reductions in the SALT II ceilings.

2.3. On 31st March, after pressure from several European members, the NATO Special Consultative Group (on LRTNF arms control policy) finally met in Brussels under the chairmanship of Mr. Lawrence Eagleburger, the new United States Deputy Secretary of State for European Affairs. The group came to the conclusion that Mr. Brezhnev's proposed moratorium was unacceptable, despite the clarification provided by Mr. Arbatov in Bonn referred to below, but decided to continue its work energetically. The United States was urged by its partners to resume the LRTNF negotiations with the Soviet Union, which had been moribund since the first exploratory round under the Carter administration from mid-October to mid-November 1980 in Geneva. The half-yearly meeting of the United States-Soviet Union Standing Consultative Commission on SALT opened in Geneva on 27th May 1981.

2.4. On his return from a visit to Moscow on 2nd and 3rd April, the German Foreign Minister, Mr. Genscher, reported that the Soviet Union, as already reported during Chancellor Schmidt's visit to Moscow in June 1980, was ready to enter into talks on reduction of LRTNF without preconditions – prior to Chancellor Schmidt's visit, the Soviet Union had ruled out talks on the reduction of such weapons unless NATO rescinded its decision of December 1979 on deployment. Partly as a result of its consultations with its United States European allies, both bilaterally and multilaterally, the United States has undertaken to begin formal negotiations with the Soviet Union on

LRTNF reductions before the end of the year. This decision was announced in the final communiqué of the ministerial session of the North Atlantic Council on 4th and 5th May:

"The allies who participated in the December 1979 NATO decision on LRTNF modernisation and arms control reaffirmed their commitment to that decision. They emphasised that in light of increasing Soviet LRTNF deployments which in the case of the SS-20 already exceed the total LRTNF deployment planned by NATO, the modernising of NATO's LRTNF is more essential than ever, and offers the only realistic basis for parallel TNF arms control. Since the December 1979 decision, Soviet threats and efforts to divide the allies have only strengthened their resolve to take the steps necessary to maintain deterrence, redress the imbalance in LRTNF, and ensure their security. The latest Soviet proposal for a moratorium on LRTNF deployments is wholly unacceptable to these allies. It would freeze them into inferiority by blocking the NATO modernisation programme altogether. Moreover, the proposal would permit the Soviets to increase the threat to NATO by failing to limit systems capable of striking allied territory from east of the Urals.

These allies welcomed the intention of the United States to begin negotiations with the Soviet Union on TNF arms control within the SALT framework by the end of the year. The American Secretary of State intends to discuss the timing and procedures for these negotiations with Foreign Minister Gromyko in September at the United Nations. These negotiations will rely on an updated Alliance threat assessment and a study of functional requirements for NATO TNF to be undertaken within the framework of the Special Consultative Group and the High Level Group as matters of immediate priority."

2.5. In a press conference in Rome on 5th May, the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Haig, is quoted as commenting on the North Atlantic Council agreement as follows:

"I would anticipate some preliminary talks at the ambassadorial level designed to put together a framework which would permit the meeting of the foreign ministers in the fall to proceed promptly to the agreement for negotiations – formal negotiations – with the Soviet Union by the end of the year."

It emerged from the Council meeting that President Reagan had written a personal letter to Mr. Brezhnev confirming United States readiness to negotiate directly with the Soviet Union on specified issues, but details of that letter have not been disclosed. At the same press conference, asked whether there was a timetable for SALT negotiations with the Soviet Union, Mr. Haig said:

“No ... Clearly President Reagan has reiterated his willingness and desire to engage in a full range of negotiations that are necessary to provide equitable balanced reductions in nuclear weaponry, and I emphasise reductions.<sup>1</sup> This is a problem associated with a host of technical issues associated with the arms control of central strategic systems themselves, but it is also clearly related to Soviet international behaviour and overall relationships between East and West. And I do not foresee in the immediate future a resumption of those talks.”

2.6. Mr. Haig here is calling, albeit in vague terms, for the concept of linkage between SALT and Soviet behaviour in international relations as a whole. In the opinion of your Rapporteur, such linkage is a vague concept which can be interpreted in various ways. The Assembly, in adopting Recommendation 360 on 3rd December 1980, expressed itself in the following terms:

“(ix) Considering that despite an inevitable interaction between Soviet actions and arms control negotiations in many fora, there should be no formal linkage with specific agreements when these are to the mutual advantage of the parties;”

2.7. Noting that the North Atlantic Council communiqué referred to “negotiations with the Soviet Union on TNF arms control within the SALT framework...”, Mr. Haig said:

“It suggests that all nuclear systems represent somewhat of a continuum whether they be theatre based – and to our European partners it makes very little difference whether it is a theatre system or a central strategic system – theatre missiles from the Soviet side represent a strategic importance to our Western European partners. So it suggests a continuum and, if you will, confirms that there are no separate theatres of nuclear concern. ... Second, clearly the inter-relationship between theatre systems – LRTNF – and central strategic systems is blurred and a grey area in many respects. So coherent arms control nego-

tiations in the theatre area should always be conducted in the light of strategic balances and long-term objectives in arms control in that regard. It does not mean that the resumption of the initiation of our talks with the Soviet Union and formal negotiations by the end of this year would have to bring with it discussions of central strategic systems in the American sense – they can proceed separately but in full cognisance of the interrelationship one with the other.”

2.8. A very positive feature of new United States policy is the undoubted commitment to closer consultations in the Alliance.

### III. Trends of Soviet policy

3.1. In his address to the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on 23rd February 1981, Mr. Brezhnev spoke at some length on the problems of arms control. Extracts from the speech, which merit examination, are at Appendix II. In particular, he said:

“The limitation and reduction of strategic armaments is a paramount problem.

For our part we are prepared to continue the relevant negotiations with the United States without delay, preserving all the positive elements which have so far been achieved in this area.

It goes without saying that the negotiations can be conducted only on the basis of equality and equal security. We will not consent to any agreement that gives a unilateral advantage to the United States. There must be no illusions on this score. In our opinion, all the other nuclear powers should join these negotiations at the appropriate time.

The USSR is prepared to negotiate the limitation of any type of weapon. At one time we offered a ban on the development of the naval Trident missile system in the United States and of the corresponding system in our country. The proposal was not accepted. As a result the United States has built the new Ohio submarine fitted with Trident I missiles, while an analogous system, the Typhoon, was built in our country. So who has gained?...

Now, about the nuclear missile weapons in Europe...

We suggest coming to terms that already now a moratorium should be set on the

1. Rapporteur's italics.

deployment in Europe of new medium-range nuclear missile weapons of the NATO countries and the Soviet Union, that is to freeze the existing quantitative and qualitative level of these weapons, naturally including the United States forward-based nuclear weapons in this region.

The moratorium could enter into force at once, the moment negotiations begin on this score, and could operate until a permanent treaty is concluded on limiting or, still better, reducing such nuclear weapons in Europe. In making this proposal we expect the two sides to stop all preparations for the deployment of corresponding additional weapons, including United States Pershing II missiles and land-based strategic cruise missiles."

3.2. On the question of nuclear balance, Mr. Brezhnev said:

"The military and strategic equilibrium prevailing between the Soviet Union and the United States, between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO, is objectively a safeguard for world peace. We have not sought, and do not now seek, military superiority over the other side. That is not our policy. But neither will we allow such superiority over us to be built up. Attempts of that kind, and talking to us from positions of strength, are absolutely futile.

Let us look at the true state of affairs.

Whether we take strategic nuclear arms or medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe, in both cases there is approximate parity between the sides. In the case of some weapons, the West has a certain advantage, and we have in the case of others. This parity could be more enduring if appropriate treaties and agreements were to be concluded."

3.3. Mr. Brezhnev's proposals for a moratorium were briefly elaborated by Mr. Georgij Arbatov, Director of the Soviet institute for the study of the United States and Canada, speaking in Bonn in mid-March, who said the proposals were intended to bring about an agreement on the employment of medium-range nuclear missiles and not a total halt in western production of these weapons; the moratorium was not intended to "freeze for ever" Soviet superiority in such weapons<sup>1</sup>.

3.4. The Brezhnev speech was followed by unpublished messages from the Soviet leader to

most NATO governments, which were compared and studied in NATO without revealing more than was contained in the speech.

#### IV. *Perceptions of the nuclear balance*

4.1. In its previous report<sup>1</sup>, the Committee examined the nuclear balance as it existed in mid-1980. Since Mr. Brezhnev called for a moratorium, there have been comments from both the East and West on different perceptions of the nuclear balance, with particular reference to the problem of nuclear weapons in Europe.

4.2. The communiqué issued after the ministerial meeting of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group in Bonn on 7th and 8th April 1981 made the following point:

"Ministers reiterated their regret that the Soviet superiority in the long-range theatre nuclear forces continues to grow by increases in the already large numbers of SS-20 multiple warhead missiles and Backfire bombers. Due to their extended range, up to 5,000 km, Soviet SS-20 missiles deployed in some areas of the non-European part of the Soviet Union nevertheless threaten NATO Europe. While still maintaining some 380 SS-4 and SS-5 missiles, the Soviet Union presently deploys about 220 launchers for SS-20 MIRVed missiles. With their SS-20 missiles alone, the Soviets have already deployed some 660 warheads – more warheads than are planned for NATO's long-range nuclear force modernisation programme (the first systems of which will not begin to be deployed until late 1983). They are continuing these deployments at a rapid pace.

In addition, Ministers also noted this situation has been exacerbated by the development of several new shorter-range missile systems with nuclear warheads and further by the fact that Soviet tactical nuclear-capable air forces were being substantially modernised with the production in 1980 alone of over 1,000 aircraft of the new Su-17, Su-24, MiG-23 and MiG-25 varieties."

4.3. These NATO figures show further reductions in the number of SS-4 and SS-5 missiles from 440, reported by the Committee last year, to 380 today, while deployment of the SS-20 has continued rapidly. However, although the NPG communiqué makes the point that some SS-20 missiles in non-European parts of the Soviet Union can threaten NATO Europe, as the Committee pointed out about one-third of the total of SS-20 missiles are deployed against

1. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 17th March 1981.

1. Document 859.

China so that probably only 150 are in range of Europe, although with three warheads each this represents 450 warheads which, combined with the 380 remaining SS-4s and SS-5s, represents some increase in the threat from this type of weapon system compared with the 700 SS-4s and SS-5s which were operational ten years ago. Western sources have frequently drawn attention to the Backfire bomber in the context of the nuclear balance in Europe but production of this swingwing strategic aircraft, a prototype of which was first seen in 1970, and which began to enter service in 1974, is limited by SALT II to 30 a year. The last figure published by IISS for the nuclear-capable Backfire bombers is 145 including naval aviation.

4.4. For the first time, the NPG communiqué draws attention to the production figures for the latest Soviet tactical nuclear-capable combat aircraft. Not all of those produced in 1980 have been deployed against Europe; in addition to those deployed in the Far East, a number are known to have been exported to third world countries. The IISS Military Balance for 1980-81 shows a slight NATO superiority in the fighter/ground attack combat aircraft in northern and central Europe with 1,602 NATO aircraft compared with 1,350 for the Warsaw Pact, but not all of these aircraft on either side will be nuclear-capable. The overwhelming Warsaw Pact superiority in tactical combat aircraft is in defensive interceptor aircraft where the corresponding numbers are 386 for NATO compared with 2,050 for the Warsaw Pact. The considerable improvement in Warsaw Pact air defence capability, both in interceptors and in air defence missiles, of course reduces the effect of NATO numerical superiority in attack aircraft.

4.5. Comments by Lieutenant General N. Petrov quoted by Novosti<sup>1</sup> deal with Soviet perceptions of the balance:

“If they install another 572 new American medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe, the West will have a superiority of more than 1.5 times over the Warsaw Pact countries, both in delivery vehicles and in nuclear warheads. The leaders of the United States and the NATO countries know this well. On the other hand, it can be asserted that the Soviet SS-20 missiles do not disturb the balance of force because they are opposed by NATO medium-range weapons and by American forward-based systems.

At the present time, there is in the neighbourhood of the Soviet Union a large number of United States and NATO nuclear missiles which can reach

Soviet territory and that of its allies. These are the nuclear-capable aircraft based on airfields in certain Western European countries. They are the carrier-borne nuclear-capable aircraft on American aircraft carriers. They are the long-range land-based ballistic missiles. They are missile-carrying submarines, etc.

It would be naïve to think that the Soviet Union does not take account of all these nuclear capabilities which influence the strategic system in Europe and which directly concern the security of the Soviet Union and its allies. The fuss made by the West about Soviet SS-20 missiles is intended to deceive public opinion. The Soviet Union is merely undertaking a modernisation as the United States and NATO have done more than once. Each new SS-20 missile replaces several obsolete missiles which are withdrawn from service... For ten years the number of medium-range nuclear delivery vehicles has not increased by a single missile or a single aircraft in the European part of the Soviet Union. On the contrary, the number of medium-range missile launchers, and the yield of the nuclear warheads which they carry, has even been slightly reduced.”

4.6. Some of these assertions, although at first sight apparently totally at variance with NATO claims, can in fact be justified if particular definitions of weapons systems are adopted. Thus, as pointed out above, the number of Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe, on the basis of NATO figures, has fallen from the 700 SS-4s and SS-5s in service ten years ago to 600 for the total of SS-20s, SS-4s and SS-5s cited in the Nuclear Planning Group communiqué above. Similarly, the yield of the warheads has also fallen from 1 megaton for the SS-4 and SS-5 to 150 kilotons for each of the three warheads fitted to the SS-20. These figures of course mask the increase in total number of warheads over the same time from 700 to about 830 today if missiles deployed against Europe are counted.

4.7. Meanwhile, a study published by the United States General Accounting Office on 5th March 1981 revealed that development of the Pershing II ballistic missile and the ground-launched cruise missiles for deployment in Europe were subject to “many critical unknown factors”. There had been insufficient test firings of Pershing II to determine whether it could meet performance objectives for initial deployment in December 1983 as scheduled. And the terrain-following guidance system of the GLCM “must still be demonstrated in a realistic operational environment”.

1. See *Actualités Soviétiques* published by the Soviet Information Bureau in Paris, 29th April 1981.

## V. Conclusions

5.1. There is growing opposition to nuclear weapons in Europe, which is not analysed in this report because of the short time available for its preparation. This analysis is limited to the most recent events. Growing opposition to LRTNF deployment led Chancellor Schmidt, before leaving for talks in Washington where LRTNF was a major issue, to threaten to resign if he did not receive wholehearted support for the double NATO decision of December 1979. The communiqué issued on 22nd May after his talks with President Reagan said in part:

“ The President and the Federal Chancellor affirmed... their resolve to implement both elements of the NATO decision of December 1979 and to give equal weight to both elements. The Federal Chancellor welcomed the United States decision to begin negotiations with the Soviet Union on the limitation of theatre nuclear weapons within the SALT framework by the end of this year. He also welcomed the fact that the United States Secretary of State has initiated preparatory discussions on theatre nuclear forces with the Soviet Union, looking toward an agreement to begin formal negotiations. The President and the Federal Chancellor agreed that TNF modernisation is essential for alliance security and as a basis for parallel negotiations leading to concrete results on limitations of theatre nuclear forces. They further agreed that the preparatory studies called for in the Rome communiqué<sup>1</sup> should be undertaken as matters of immediate priority by the relevant NATO bodies. ”

5.2. On returning from Washington, Chancellor Schmidt called on the newly-elected President Mitterrand on 24th May when, according to German sources, they reached “total and clear agreement” on Euromissiles, considering that “the balance of forces” should be re-established in Europe, but that simultaneously negotiations should be undertaken with the Soviet Union to ensure that the level would be as low as possible. President Mitterrand said that “problems of armament, disarmament, the control of armaments around the well known questions raised by the installation of Euro-missiles” had been discussed, and French sources noted that the joint position referred to by German sources corresponded to President Mitterrand’s remarks during the election campaign.

1. See Appendix III (b), North Atlantic Council communiqué, 5th May 1981, paragraph 12, last sentence.

5.3. On 25th May, Chancellor Schmidt reported to the Bundestag on his talks with President Reagan and President Mitterrand, and an SPD-FDP resolution confirming the double NATO decision of December 1979 secured a majority of 254 votes to 236 – six SPD members voted against and four abstained. The opposition CDU, whilst voting against the SPD-FDP resolution, supported the principle of LRTNF deployment.

5.4. Some reports from Washington suggest that the Reagan administration would prefer to seek *reductions* of nuclear weapons rather than limitations, and rename the talks SART accordingly. A senior official briefing the press on 22nd May, on the meeting between President Reagan and Chancellor Schmidt said the President had referred to “arms reduction talks”<sup>1</sup>.

5.5. It goes without saying that sufficient political support for the allied decision to deploy theatre nuclear weapons in Europe has to be based on informed debate. It is regrettable that full information about the state of the overall nuclear balance is not released officially in properly comparable form. The Soviet Union of course never provides information on Soviet weapons systems. Individual NATO governments do provide considerable information on both NATO and Warsaw Pact weapons, but NATO collectively has not attempted to publish properly comparable figures on the balance of nuclear weapons systems. The Committee concludes that there should be a detailed NATO statement of the present balance of nuclear forces ranging from the longest-range strategic forces to battlefield weapons, including those such as tactical strike aircraft and carrier-borne aircraft which the Soviet Union obviously takes into account, as well as those which NATO chooses to take into account.

5.6. Obviously, any agreement on reducing theatre nuclear weapons will be an extremely complex undertaking because perceptions on both sides differ significantly concerning the weapons systems which must be taken into account. The first objective of LRTNF negotiations must be an attempt to define weapons systems to be included in any regional interim agreement; it must be strictly within the SALT process because, as the Committee has often stressed, there could be no question of seeking a theatre balance of nuclear weapons independently of United States strategic weapons. Otherwise essential linkage with the main deterrent would be lost and the danger of nuclear war in Europe would increase. Deterrence relies on a continuum of weapons systems.

1. International Herald Tribune, 25th May 1981.

5.7. By the end of this year two years will have elapsed since the December 1979 decision without any effective negotiations beginning with the Soviet Union. The Committee regrets this delay. The preliminary talks in Geneva in October and November last year with an outgoing United States administration could not be expected to make much progress. The Committee reiterates the view expressed in several previous reports that the SALT II limits are to the mutual advantage of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. It is important that the SALT negotiations as a whole be resumed urgently

and proceed in parallel with negotiations on theatre nuclear weapons. The Committee calls for the limits laid down in SALT II to be respected by the signatories as they have been so far, and for the SALT I agreements including the anti-ballistic missile treaty, which is due for review in 1982, to be maintained. The only alternative would be a massive arms race into totally new weapons systems by both the United States and the Soviet Union, the outcome of which cannot be predicted, but which cannot be expected to provide any greater security for either side.



## APPENDIX I

RECOMMENDATION 360 <sup>1</sup>*on SALT and the British and French nuclear forces* <sup>2</sup>

The Assembly,

- (i) Believing that armaments and arms control-disarmament are two sides of one coin: security;
- (ii) Noting that its Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments intends to follow closely the SALT process and report regularly to the Assembly on this vital subject;
- (iii) Considering the twofold decision of the special meeting of NATO Foreign and Defence Ministers of 12th December 1979 to be a realistic basis for negotiating reductions of long-range theatre nuclear forces with the Soviet Union;
- (iv) Noting that the 572 United States missiles to be deployed from 1983 will be accommodated within the reduced ceiling of United States nuclear warheads in Europe resulting from the unilateral reduction of 1,000, whereas the Soviet Union is now deploying SS-20 missiles at a rate which would provide 250-300 with 750-900 warheads by the end of 1981;
- (v) Welcoming the opening of preliminary bilateral talks on LRTNF reductions, believing that they should aim to establish a balance at the lowest possible level, as part of the global strategic nuclear balance;
- (vi) Stressing that nuclear forces are only a part, although a very important part, of the deterrent and that sufficient conventional forces form an equally essential part;
- (vii) Recalling that the 1974 Ottawa declaration recognised that the British and French nuclear forces were "capable of playing a deterrent rôle of their own contributing to the overall strengthening of the deterrence of the Alliance", and noting that, if there is no reduction in the conventional defence, the view is held in the Alliance that the independent centres of decision add to the uncertainty facing Soviet planners, which is an essential factor of deterrence;
- (viii) Believing SALT II to be to the mutual advantage of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact;
- (ix) Considering that despite an inevitable interaction between Soviet actions and arms control negotiations in many fora, there should be no formal linkage with specific agreements when these are to the mutual advantage of the parties;
- (x) Recalling paragraph B.2. of Recommendation 346, urging member governments to submit annually to their parliaments reports on the arms control implications of all new defence equipment programmes,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Call on member governments to urge the North Atlantic Council:

1. To call for the observance of the SALT II limits and the earliest resumption of the SALT process;
2. To recommend that any modernisation plans for British and French nuclear forces should not lead to the diversion of resources from conventional defence;
3. To call on the governments of NATO countries, in consultation with their national parliaments, to study the possibility:
  - (a) of improving nationally as well as in the framework of NATO methods of linking both armaments and arms control with security planning;
  - (b) of arrangements for continuously informing and consulting parliament, on a confidential basis where necessary, on these two sides of security planning and on progress of arms control negotiations.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 3rd December 1980 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Sixth Ordinary Session (13th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Mommersteeg on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 859).

## APPENDIX II

*Address by Mr. Brezhnev to the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*<sup>1</sup>

23rd February 1981

(Extracts)

“ .....

Military expenditures are rising in an unprecedented way.

A considerable portion of these tremendous sums is being spent on the crash development of new types of strategic nuclear weapons. Their appearance is accompanied by the creation of military doctrines dangerous to peace, like the notorious Carter doctrine. They want people to believe that nuclear war can be limited, they want to reconcile them with the idea that war of that kind is tolerable.

But that is out-and-out deception of the peoples! A ‘limited’ nuclear war as conceived by the Americans in, say, Europe would from the outset mean certain destruction of European civilisation. And, of course, the United States, too, would not be able to escape the flames of war. Clearly, such plans and ‘doctrines’ are a grave threat to all nations, including the people of the USA. They are being condemned all over the world. The peoples say an emphatic ‘No’ to them.

.....

In our relations with the United States we have all these years, as previously, followed a principled and constructive line. It is only to be regretted that the former administration in Washington put its stakes on something other than developing relations or on mutual understanding. Trying to exert pressure on us, it set out to destroy the positive elements that had been achieved with no small effort in Soviet-American relations over the preceding years.

As a result, our bilateral ties in a number of fields were flung back. The entry into force of the SALT II treaty was deferred.

Unfortunately, since the change of leadership in the White House as well, openly belligerent calls and statements have resounded from Washington, specially designed, as it were, to poison the atmosphere of relations between our countries. We would like to hope, however, that those who are shaping United States policy today will ultimately manage to see things in a more realistic light. The military and strategic

equilibrium prevailing between the USSR and the USA, between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO, is objectively a safeguard for world peace. We have not sought, and do not now seek, military superiority over the other side. That is not our policy. But neither will we allow such superiority over us to be built up. Attempts of that kind, and talking to us from positions of strength, are absolutely futile.

Let us look at the true state of affairs.

Whether we take strategic nuclear arms or medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe, in both cases there is approximate parity between the sides. In the case of some weapons the West has a certain advantage, and we have in the case of others. This parity could be more enduring if appropriate treaties and agreements were to be concluded.

There is also talk about tanks. It is true that the Soviet Union has more of them. But the NATO countries, too, have a large number. Besides, they have considerably more anti-tank weapons.

The tale of Soviet superiority in the strength of armed forces does not match the facts either. Combined with the other NATO countries, the United States has even slightly more troops than the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Treaty countries.

So, what talk can there be of any Soviet military superiority?

A war danger does exist for the United States, as it does for all the other countries of the world. But it originates, not from the Soviet Union, not from any mythical Soviet superiority, but from the arms race and from the tension that still exists in the world. We are prepared to combat this true and not imaginary danger hand in hand with the United States, with the countries of Europe, with all countries in the world. To try to outstrip each other in the arms race, or to expect to win a nuclear war, is dangerous madness.

It is universally recognised that in many ways the international situation depends on the policy of the USSR and the USA. As we see

1. Soviet News, 24th February 1981.

it, the state of relations between them at present and the acuteness of the international problems requiring a solution necessitate a dialogue, and an active dialogue, at all levels. We are prepared to have this dialogue.

Experience shows that the crucial link here is meetings at summit level. This was true yesterday and is still true today.

The USSR wants normal relations with the USA. There is simply no other sensible way from the point of view of the interests of both our states, and mankind as a whole.

.....

Let me begin with the problem of limiting nuclear armaments, which are the most dangerous to mankind. All these years the Soviet Union has worked perseveringly to put an end to the race in such armaments and to stop their further spread across the world. A tremendous amount of work has been done, as you know, in preparing a treaty with the United States on limiting strategic arms. Much has been done during the negotiations with the United States and Britain on the complete prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. We made an important move by declaring and reaffirming that we would not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries that did not permit their deployment on their territories. But we have also offered something more: to stop manufacturing nuclear weapons and to begin reducing the stockpiles of those weapons until they are completely eliminated.

The Soviet Union has also actively sought the prohibition of all other types of weapons of mass destruction. And we have managed to achieve a few things in this field during the period under review.

The Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Treaty countries have come forward with a number of concrete proposals on military détente in Europe.

The Soviet Union and its allies have proposed that a European conference be convened to discuss and settle questions of military détente and disarmament in Europe. That question is in the centre of attention at the Madrid conference.

Nor have we slackened our efforts to secure progress at the Vienna negotiations on reducing armed forces and armaments in Central Europe.

.....

In recent years, as you know, flashpoints of military conflict, often threatening to grow into a major conflagration, flared up, now in one and now in another region of the world. Experience has shown that it is not easy to

extinguish them. It would be far better to take preventive measures, or forestall them.

In Europe, for example, this purpose is to some extent served – and fairly well on the whole – by the confidence-building measures carried out in the military field by decision of the European conference. They include advance notification of military exercises of ground troops, and the inviting to them of observers from other countries. At present, these measures apply to the territory of the European states, including the western regions of the USSR. We have already said that we are prepared to go further and to give notice of naval and air exercises. We have proposed – and propose again – that there should also be advance notification of large-scale troop movements.

*And now we want to propose that the zone for these measures should be substantially extended. We are prepared to apply them to the entire European part of the USSR, provided the western states extend the confidence zone accordingly.*<sup>1</sup>

There is a region where the working out and use of confidence-building measures – naturally, with due consideration for its specific features – could not only defuse the situation locally, but also contribute very usefully to the consolidation of the pillars of world peace. That region is the Far East, where such powers as the Soviet Union, China and Japan border on each other and where there are also US military bases.

*The Soviet Union would be prepared to hold concrete negotiations on confidence-building measures in the Far East with all interested countries.*<sup>1</sup>

.....

Once again, we insistently call for restraint in the field of strategic armaments. It should not be tolerated that the nations of the world live in the shadow of the threat of nuclear war.

The limitation and reduction of strategic armaments is a paramount problem.

*For our part, we are prepared to continue the relevant negotiations with the United States without delay, preserving all the positive elements which have so far been achieved in this area.*<sup>1</sup>

It goes without saying that the negotiations can be conducted only on the basis of equality and equal security. We will not consent to any agreement that gives a unilateral advantage to the USA. There must be no illusions on this

1. Soviet News italics.

score. In our opinion, all the other nuclear powers should join these negotiations at the appropriate time.

The USSR is prepared to negotiate the limitation of any type of weapon. At one time we offered a ban on the development of the naval Trident missile system in the United States and of a corresponding system in our country. The proposal was not accepted. As a result, the United States has built the new Ohio submarine armed with Trident-I missiles, while an analogous system, the Typhoon, was built in our country. So, who has gained?

*We are prepared to come to terms on limiting the deployment of the new submarines – the Ohio type by the USA, and similar ones by the USSR. We could also agree to banning the modernisation of existing and the development of new ballistic missiles for these submarines.*<sup>1</sup>

Now about the nuclear-missile weapons in Europe. An ever more dangerous stockpiling of them is in progress. A kind of vicious circle

has arisen, with the actions of one side precipitating counter-measures by the other. How is this chain to be broken?

*We suggest coming to terms that already now a moratorium should be set on the deployment in Europe of new medium-range nuclear-missile weapons of the NATO countries and the Soviet Union, that is, to freeze the existing quantitative and qualitative level of these weapons, naturally including the US forward-based nuclear weapons in this region.*<sup>1</sup>

The moratorium could enter into force at once, the moment negotiations begin on this score, and could operate until a permanent treaty is concluded on limiting or, still better, reducing such nuclear weapons in Europe. In making this proposal, we expect the two sides to stop all preparations for the deployment of corresponding additional weapons, including US Pershing II missiles and land-based strategic cruise missiles.

.....”

1. Soviet News italics.

1. Soviet News italics.

## APPENDIX III

*Extracts from recent NATO communiqués**(a) Final communiqué of the  
NATO Nuclear Planning Group**Bonn, 8th April 1981*

The Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), which is the principal NATO forum for the development of Alliance nuclear defence policy, held its twenty-ninth ministerial meeting in Bonn on 7th and 8th April 1981.

After receiving a briefing on the status of nuclear forces by the United States Secretary of Defence, ministers emphasised their concern about the unrelenting Soviet build-up and improvements in the whole range of their nuclear forces and discussed the consequences of these developments for the East-West balance. Ministers noting the ongoing and newly expanded United States efforts to strengthen their strategic forces, expressed their support for all steps necessary to ensure an adequate balance of these forces.

This continued growth in Soviet forces, and in particular their preponderance of theatre nuclear forces, is potentially destabilising. Ministers reiterated their regret that the Soviet superiority in the long-range theatre nuclear forces continues to grow by increases in the already large numbers of SS-20 multiple warhead missiles and Backfire bombers. Due to their extended range, up to 5,000 km, Soviet SS-20 missiles deployed in some areas of the non-European part of the Soviet Union nevertheless threaten NATO Europe. While still maintaining some 380 SS-4 and SS-5 missiles, the Soviet Union presently deploys about 220 launchers for SS-20 MIRVed missiles. With their SS-20 missiles alone, the Soviets have already deployed some 660 warheads – more warheads than are planned for NATO's long-range nuclear force modernisation programme (the first systems of which will not begin to be deployed until late 1983). They are continuing these deployments at a rapid pace.

In addition, ministers also noted this situation had been exacerbated by the development of several new shorter-range missile systems with nuclear warheads and further by the fact that Soviet tactical nuclear-capable air forces were being substantially modernised with the production in 1980 alone of over 1,000 aircraft of the new Su-17, Su-24, MiG-23, and MiG-25 varieties.

Ministers agreed that the need to restore and maintain an overall military balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact is funda-

mental to the security of the Alliance and the maintenance of peace. The primary aims of TNF policy are deterrence and stability based on the NATO triad of forces, the coupling between them and on the important political principle of the strategic unity of the Alliance. Ministers reiterated the necessity for NATO to maintain strong, diverse and flexible theatre nuclear forces as part of this triad and thereby to ensure deterrence. Ministers emphasised that NATO will move ahead with its planned schedule of long-range theatre nuclear force modernisation while at the same time making efforts to reach balanced, equitable, and verifiable arms control agreements limiting such forces, as was decided on 12th December 1979. They expressed the hope that the balance could be achieved at lower levels of armaments. Ministers stressed the importance of meaningful strategic arms limitations and, in the same vein, reiterated the value of continued close consultation within NATO including NATO's Special Consultative Group, which had recently met in Brussels. This meeting was part of the process of implementation of the 12th December decision, as a step towards further United States-Soviet exchanges on LRTNF.

Ministers emphasised that the recent Soviet proposal for a moratorium would not address the fundamental problems caused by the momentous build-up of Soviet arms, especially in long-range theatre nuclear forces, this is even more true today than in 1979. While recognising an expressed Soviet interest in arms control, ministers noted that this proposal could only perpetuate an imbalance unacceptable to the Alliance contrary to the principle of equality established in the December decision as essential to LRTNF arms control.

Ministers discussed the ongoing work of the High Level Group, which is responsible to the Nuclear Planning Group for nuclear aspects of the long-term defence programme. They reiterated the importance of the High Level Group's contribution to the task of examining the precise nature, scope and basis of the adjustments which would be required by the LRTNF deployments, as well as the possible implications for the balance of rôles and systems in NATO's nuclear armoury as a whole. Ministers received with appreciation an invitation by the Secretary of State for Defence, Mr. John Nott, to hold the 30th meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group in the United Kingdom in autumn 1981.

**(b) Final communiqué of the North Atlantic Council**

5th May 1981

1. The strength and cohesion of the Alliance remain indispensable to guarantee the security of its members and thereby to foster stable international relations. This stability requires that all nations act with restraint and responsibility. Claims by the Soviet Union that it too subscribes to such policies are not borne out by Soviet deeds. The more constructive East-West relationship which the allies seek requires tangible signs that the Soviet Union is prepared to abandon the disturbing build-up of its military strength, to desist from resorting to force and intimidation and to cease creating or exploiting situations of crisis and instability in the third world

.....

4. In this situation, the allies will strengthen their capability to deter aggression and act, individually or collectively, to encourage Soviet restraint and responsibility in international affairs with the goal of laying a stable basis for East-West relations. In pursuance of the established policies of the Alliance they will seek these objectives in particular in the following areas:

.....

6. In the area of military capability, the increase in Warsaw Pact military power has created a disturbingly adverse trend in the military balance between East and West, particularly in Europe. The allies agree that assuring an overall military balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact is fundamental to the security of the Alliance, the enforcement of restraint and the maintenance of peace. They are resolved to make available all the resources needed to provide the requisite strengthening of their deterrent and defence forces.

.....

9. Arms control and disarmament, together with deterrence and defence, are integral parts of Alliance security policy. The allies support negotiations to achieve meaningful restraints on Soviet military power and to improve security. The object of this policy is a stable military balance, if possible at reduced levels of forces. The allies stress the value of stabilising, equitable and verifiable arms control through limitations on Soviet and United States strategic arms. They recognise that arms control negotiations can only lead to fruitful results in an international climate of confidence.

.....

12. The allies who participated in the December 1979 NATO decision on LRTNF modernisation and arms control reaffirmed their commitment to that decision. They emphasised

that in light of increasing Soviet LRTNF deployments which in the case of the SS-20 already exceed the total LRTNF deployment planned by NATO, the modernising of NATO's LRTNF is more essential than ever, and offers the only realistic basis for parallel TNF arms control. Since the December 1979 decision, Soviet threats and efforts to divide the allies have only strengthened their resolve to take the steps necessary to maintain deterrence, redress the imbalance in LRTNF, and ensure their security. The latest Soviet proposal for a moratorium on LRTNF deployments is wholly unacceptable to these allies. It would freeze them into inferiority by blocking the NATO modernisation programme altogether. Moreover, the proposal would permit the Soviets to increase the threat to NATO by failing to limit systems capable of striking allied territory from east of the Urals.

These allies welcomed the intention of the United States to begin negotiations with the Soviet Union on TNF arms control within the SALT framework by the end of the year. The American Secretary of State intends to discuss the timing and procedures for these negotiations with Foreign Minister Gromyko in September at the United Nations. These negotiations will rely on an updated Alliance threat assessment and a study of functional requirements for NATO TNF to be undertaken within the framework of the Special Consultative Group and the High Level Group as matters of immediate priority...

**(c) Final communiqué of the Defence Planning Committee**

13th May 1981

.....

3. For their part, Defence Ministers agreed that the past decade has seen an unrelenting build-up of Soviet military strength across the complete spectrum of capabilities encompassing the strategic, theatre nuclear and conventional fields. This is in contrast to numerous Soviet statements advocating peace and disarmament. This disturbing growth in military strength allows the Soviet Union to exert pressure in many parts of the world, particularly through the increasing global mobility of its forces and the development of a major maritime capability. All this has been in parallel with continuing improvements in the forces confronting the Alliance in Europe and the Atlantic. These steady increases in Soviet military power over the past decade, despite unreciprocated Alliance restraint, have created for NATO a situation demanding intensified action to ensure an adequate future deterrence. The prospects for continued peace and stable political relations between East and West depend on the requisite strengthening of NATO's deterrent

and defence forces and on the maintenance of an overall military balance, if possible at a lower level, between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

.....

7. NATO will continue to seek to negotiate equitable, militarily significant, binding and fully verifiable arms control agreements in order to achieve a balance of forces at lower levels and provide better security. The allies recognise that arms control negotiations can only lead to fruitful results in an international climate of confidence.

.....

12. There is a continuing necessity for NATO to maintain strong, diverse and flexible nuclear forces as part of the NATO triad and thereby to ensure deterrence. NATO will move ahead with its planned schedule of long-range theatre nuclear force (LRTNF) modernisation whilst at the same time making efforts to reach balanced, equitable and verifiable arms control agreements limiting such forces as was decided on 12th December 1979. In this respect, Ministers welcomed the intention of the United States to begin negotiations with the Soviet Union by the end of the year on theatre nuclear force arms control within the SALT framework as declared in Rome, and endorsed plans for the High Level Group and the Special Consultative Group to undertake urgently the agreed studies...

**(d) Communiqué of the Military Committee**

*14th May 1981*

*The growing Warsaw Pact threat*

The changes toward increased modernisation and improvement of the effectiveness of Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces which occurred in the decade between 1970 and 1980 did not abate perceptibly in 1981. Although it has been noted that the nations of the Warsaw Pact declined in their economic growth rate as the 1970s progressed, and economic experts project an even lower growth rate during the 1980s, most knowledgeable observers come to the conclusion that the Warsaw Pact, as a whole, will be able to support a continued real growth in defence spending for the foreseeable future. For example, the defence growth rate of the USSR, in real terms, has been about 4 % annually during the 1970s and, during that period, absorbed from 11 to 13 % of the gross national product. By 1980, because of the decline of GNP, this figure has increased to 12 to 14 %. It is generally conceded that because the USSR has a large number of weapons development and deployment programmes already underway, together with continuing capital investment in defence industries as well

as the increased costs related to the complexity of advanced military hardware, defence spending in the USSR will continue to grow at approximately the same rate of the 1970s at least up to 1985. This factor alone will result in a continuing improvement of military capabilities.

Despite the trends noted in Soviet and Warsaw Pact military capabilities, Soviet published military doctrine has not accepted the western concepts of deterrence, and in both public and private commentary it is noted that the Soviets continue to reject western notions of strategic sufficiency and the concept of mutual assured destruction. Instead, they have indicated that they prefer a strategic relationship in which the outbreak of war or its escalation is deterred by Soviet possession of war-winning capabilities.

.....

The Soviet Union's progressive tactical aviation modernisation programme continues unabated. Not only has there been a significant increase in numbers: the introduction of modern aircraft has more than tripled range and payload of fighter and ground attack aircraft and has greatly boosted the combat potential of Soviet frontal aviation. The so-called third generation of Soviet fighter aircraft, the Foxbat, the Flogger, the Fitter and the Fencer (of which the last 3 are nuclear-capable) are all being produced at a remarkable pace. The Fencer, which is the first modern Soviet fighter designed specifically for ground attack, has range capability which enables it to reach any target in Central Europe from readily-available forward deployment bases. Upgraded avionics make ordnance deliveries very accurate. The continued production and deployment of the Backfire provides the Soviets with a strategic and tactical offensive weapon directed at NATO in Europe, and against maritime reinforcement routes across the Atlantic. The Pacific Ocean too is subject to Backfire coverage.

.....

The strategic missile capability of the Soviets continues the long-term trend toward improvement in capability and modernisation and most authorities accept that within a short period the older missile systems will be replaced by new, multiple re-entry vehicle systems. More than half of the ICBM force of about 1,400 missiles is now less than 10 years old. In particular, the rapid deployment of the SS-20 system with over 220 missiles, each with three warheads, has been noted and published reports indicate that the SS-20 has been deployed faster than the older SS-4 and SS-5 have been phased out. This polyphased action has produced a redundancy effect which, while it exists, greatly increases the warhead total...

*Talks on the reduction of long-range theatre nuclear forces in Europe*

**AMENDMENTS 1, 2, 3 and 4<sup>1</sup>**  
*tabled by MM. Hardy, Bahr and Stoffelen*

1. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “ earliest ” and insert “ urgent ”.
2. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from “ at ” to the end of the paragraph and insert “ greatly reduced levels of nuclear weapons ”.
3. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, after “ at ” insert “ much ”.
4. After paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph:  
“ 6. To call for immediate pursuit of the proposal for a disarmament conference for Europe. ”

*Signed: Hardy, Bahr, Stoffelen*

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1. See 3rd Sitting, 16th June 1981 (Amendments agreed to).



*Talks on the reduction of long-range theatre nuclear forces in Europe*

AMENDMENT 5<sup>1</sup>  
*tabled by Mr. van den Bergh and others*

5. In the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out paragraph (iv).

*Signed: van den Bergh, Konings, Tummers, Stoffelen*

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1. See 3rd Sitting, 16th June 1981 (Amendment negatived).

*Political activities of the Council –  
Reply to the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council*

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**REPORT<sup>1</sup>**

*submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee<sup>2</sup>  
by Mr. Page, Rapporteur*

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1. Adopted in Committee by 13 votes to 0 with 1 abstention.

2. *Members of the Committee:* Sir Frederic Bennett (Alternate: *Mrs. Knight*) (Chairman); MM. De Poi (Alternate: *Cavaliere*), Portheine (Alternate: *Schlingemann*) (Vice-Chairmen); MM. *Ahrens*, Berrier, Mrs. Boniver, MM. *Brugnon*, Conti Persini, Deschamps, Druon, Gessner, Hanin

(Alternate: *Michel*), Hardy, Jung, Lagneau, Lord McNair (Alternate: *Atkinson*), MM. Mangelschots, *Mommersteeg*, Müller, *Lord Reay*, MM. Reddemann, *Thoss*, *Urwin*, *Valiante*, *Vecchietti* (Alternate: *Martino*), Voogd.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

**Draft Recommendation**

*on the political activities of the Council –  
reply to the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council*

The Assembly,

Considering that the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council demonstrates its wish to inform the Assembly of co-operation between member states in foreign policy matters even when such co-operation has been pursued outside the framework of WEU ;

Considering that the dialogue between the Council and the Assembly has improved in recent years ;

Considering however that in several areas the Council does not provide the Assembly with the information to which it has a right, particularly on questions connected with the actual work of some organs of the Council ;

Considering that for the Assembly's work to be effective it must be able to have a genuine dialogue with the Council at all times ;

Considering that the efforts to rationalise the organs of WEU undertaken by the Council, together with its efforts to limit non-essential expenditure, must in no case compromise the future of an organisation which may be called upon to play an essential rôle for the security of Europe,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. Reduce the time taken to prepare texts for transmission to the Assembly, be it the annual report or replies to recommendations and written questions ;
2. Improve the clarity of the drafting of its annual report by including in an appropriate manner the texts referred to in the report ;
3. Ensure a high-level ministerial presence on each day of sessions and arrange for Ministers to give collective views on the texts which are being debated ;
4. Communicate to the Assembly as full information as feasible about the activities of all the organs of WEU ;
5. Strengthen its arrangements for giving the media regular information on its activities ;
6. Ensure that in everything it undertakes, while rationalising the work of WEU and maintaining the budget of the ministerial organs within acceptable limits, the present and future opportunities for action by WEU are in no way compromised ;
7. Ensure that budgetary preoccupations, however legitimate they may be, in no way diminish the means available to the only European assembly with responsibility in defence questions.

## *Explanatory Memorandum*

*(submitted by Mr. Page, Rapporteur)*

### I. Introduction

1. In answering the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council last year, your Rapporteur underlined that at its half-way stage, as foreseen by the modified Brussels Treaty, the WEU Council was faced with the need to adopt a clear approach to determine what it could and should be and do in the coming years, even if it is not evident that such an approach must be maintained for the whole of the next twenty-five years. Indeed, circumstances may lead it to choose another type – and above all another level – of activity in due course. Moreover, it says this itself in the introduction to Chapter II of the twenty-sixth report.

2. In many respects, the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council meets the wish expressed by the General Affairs Committee since, for the first time, the report seems to take account of the fact that the Council is no longer playing a major rôle in Europe and that its responsibilities have not changed. For the latter reason, WEU remains the guarantor of the future shape of Europe in the foreign policy and defence fields and also of the fact that its Council can, if circumstances require, constitute the recourse referred to by several governments in answer to written questions put by members of the Assembly. It must therefore retain the ability to resume the activities whose exercise it left to other organisations<sup>1</sup>.

3. Thus the WEU Assembly, which all the governments recognise as fulfilling satisfactorily the rôle assigned to it under the treaty, must take account of the way the Council intends to fulfil its own rôle to maintain a dialogue which, in present circumstances, is a central aspect of WEU's activities. However, certain governments attribute considerable importance to the Assembly in present-day Europe, as instanced by the Italian Government when Mr. Speranza, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, speaking on behalf of the Minister of Defence on 10th January 1981, answered a written question put by Mr. Maravalle, Vice-President of the WEU Assembly :

1. In particular, the exercise of WEU's military responsibilities passed to NATO under Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty, that of its cultural and social responsibilities transferred to the Council of Europe and its economic responsibilities left to the EEC following the accession of the United Kingdom and the practice of holding nine- and subsequently ten-power political consultations which has developed in the last ten years.

“ The Italian Government is aware of the importance of the rôle of the WEU Assembly, which exercises specific and exclusive responsibilities in military and other matters connected with European defence. Moreover, the Assembly has always shown the keenest interest in international political events and, as a forum for discussion, is appreciated by members of parliament and representatives of governments in the seven member countries.

Because of the Assembly's defence and security responsibilities under the modified Brussels Treaty and taking due account of its past and present activities, Italy, *inter alia* by taking steps to strengthen the rôle of the organisation, has taken every opportunity of confirming its interest in the WEU Assembly whose usefulness it appreciates, in particular as a parliamentary institution in which it is possible to go into proposals in detail and reflect upon forms of co-operation designed to allow Europe to assume its own defence as fully and directly as possible.

The Italian Government has constantly done its utmost in the WEU Council of Ministers and confirms its determination to establish *increasingly direct relations with the Assembly to ensure that it is kept regularly informed of matters within its competence, with due respect for appropriate procedures...* the Italian Government reiterates its conviction that it is necessary to adapt the instruments and procedures governing replies to Assembly recommendations and questions, the annual report of the Council to the Assembly and statements by representatives of member states taking part in the Assembly's plenary sessions and informal joint meetings.

Finally, Italy will certainly not fail to follow with the greatest attention the proposals made for promoting a reform of the structure of WEU with a view to strengthening the organisation's duties by adapting them to the present need to intensify European co-operation.”

4. Hence the work actually accomplished by the Council is obviously out of step with the activities exercised by the Assembly with the agreement and support of the governments.

Both sides should take account of this and for the first time the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council seems to have faced up to the main consequences of this situation.

5. This on the whole favourable opinion, not of the Council's activities but of its annual report, calls for two immediate reservations.

6(i) The fact that the full annual report did not reach the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly until 1st April placed the General Affairs Committee in an embarrassing situation. Whereas it had been planned for your Rapporteur to prepare his report during the second half of March, he was unable to do so because of this delay and, as prior commitments prevented him from devoting the necessary time in April, the Committee, which has to fix the dates of its meetings a long time ahead because of its members' many commitments, was unable to examine the present report until 4th June, i.e. the eve of the Assembly's session.

7. Considering that the annual report of the Council is an important part of the dialogue with the Assembly which the Council claims to want, such delays are a serious drawback in that they slow down considerably the tempo of exchanges between the two WEU bodies.

8. It should be recalled that usually replies to recommendations only reach the Assembly five or six months after the recommendations were adopted and that the time-limits laid down for the Council to answer written questions are rarely respected. All this means that if, for instance, the Assembly prepares a report on a topical subject during one half-year, it is only at the end of the following half-year that it receives a first reply from the Council. If it wishes to pursue the dialogue, it will take many months longer for the Council's reaction to written questions to reach it. Finally, only in April of the following year, which may mean almost a year afterwards, can the Assembly expect an answer to questions it has studied in the context of more general thoughts on Western European policy. If all these delays are added up, two years may elapse between the time an Assembly Committee considers a matter and the time it is informed of the governments' relevant views.

9. Although he realises the difficulties involved in reaching unanimous agreement between representatives of seven governments on a specific text, your Rapporteur wishes to draw the Council's attention to the inconvenience caused by such slowness and urges it to try to find a solution.

10(ii) The second matter to which your Rapporteur wishes to draw the Council's attention relates to the style of the annual report and in particular Chapter II A on the political activities of the Council. He welcomes the fact that this year on four essential questions the Council has better succeeded in giving an overall picture of European policy as set out or developed in various forums, while managing to refer constantly to WEU's own activities, i.e. to the Council's replies to recommendations or written questions emanating from the Assembly.

11. Chapter II A should be worthy of attentive study by all members of the Assembly and also by the press and public opinion. But since it refers to questions or recommendations solely by their numbers, which mean little to members of Assembly and certainly nothing at all to non-members, in order to understand the text various documents have to be consulted which are not always easy to find and consequently it is practically impossible to read the text without considerable work. Could the Council not be asked – and this is a very specific suggestion – either to quote in full the texts to which it refers or (and this would probably be the best solution) to append them to the annual report? This would obviously make the report longer but would require far less time to read.

12. Finally, it is recalled that in 1980 the Presidential Committee of the Assembly decided to indicate which parts of the Council's annual report should be answered by the General Affairs Committee, thus settling a problem which had previously been unclear. On the one hand, the General Affairs Committee is responsible, as in the past, for replying to Chapters I and II A of the annual report, i.e. on relations between the Council and the Assembly and on the political activities of the Council. But it has also been decided to make the General Affairs Committee responsible for replying to Chapters V and VI of the annual report on the Public Administration Committee and budgetary questions. This decision should be welcomed insofar as it does not compel the General Affairs Committee to discuss these parts of the annual report each year but implies recognition of the political nature of any decisions which the Council may take in these two fields.

13. Your Rapporteur will follow this principle and not go into the detail of these matters since it is quite clear that relations between the Council and the Assembly in budgetary matters are in fact handled by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and he will give only a political, and moreover very brief, glance at these two chapters.

## II. Relations between the Council and the Assembly

14. The twenty-sixth annual report of the Council rightly underlines a steady improvement in relations between the Council and the Assembly in recent years. The standard of the dialogue has in fact improved considerably after a period of particular difficulty. The reason is that a new fact has been recognised by both sides, i.e. that the Council was no longer playing the rôle it had prior to the development of nine- and subsequently ten-power political consultations, but that at the same time the Council and the Assembly still retained their full responsibilities. This implied a principle which the Council recognised but from which it did not always draw the full consequences: that it had to report on the application of the modified Brussels Treaty even when this was carried out in the framework of institutions other than the WEU Council.

15. It is to be hoped that the twenty-sixth annual report will allow the implications of the new situation to be spelt out better than in the past. This hope seems particularly well-founded since, apart from the annual report itself, replies to recommendations have been more substantial than in recent years and have frequently referred to many factors outside the Council's activities. Written questions put by members of the Assembly have been numerous and generally speaking the Council has answered satisfactorily, although it has respected the statutory time-limits even less than in the past.

16. The presence of Ministers at Assembly sessions has been regular, although it should be recalled how much importance the Assembly has always attached to the presence of full-ranking Ministers rather than Secretaries of State, particularly because of the question and answer period which follows ministerial addresses. It is no insult to Secretaries of State to say that full-ranking Ministers have greater authority to speak of their countries' policies of which, because of their duties, they have a broader view. The absence of Defence Ministers during the Assembly's recent sessions has moreover been difficult to accept by an assembly which the Council constantly recognises to be the only European assembly with defence responsibilities.

17. Furthermore, the improvement has extended to most at least of the member governments which, in answering the particularly numerous and pertinent written questions put recently in several national parliaments, have been far more explicit than in the past about the policies they intend to pursue in the framework of WEU, and these answers throw

very precious light on European activities as a whole in the political and defence fields. All the WEU governments seem more responsive to questions put in a national framework than they are, collectively, to those put to them in the framework of WEU. It is for the Assembly to associate its work in the framework of WEU more closely than in the past with work in the national parliaments.

18. Nevertheless, relations between the Council and the Assembly suffer from the fact that in two respects the Council has still not met the Assembly's wishes although the questions are very definitely within WEU's responsibilities.

19. The first is providing the Assembly with information about the study conducted in the framework of the Standing Armaments Committee. It is known that the Standing Armaments Committee, as Chapter I of the annual report confirms, has already handed the Council two main chapters of its study, but also that other sections of this study have not been completed and it is to be feared that they will not be for a long time. Therefore, the Council's decision to inform the Assembly of the SAC's study only once it was complete might have made the Assembly wait even longer before reading texts which have already been drafted, some of them three years ago. It is therefore gratifying that in May 1980 the Council decided to transmit to the Assembly a declassified version of the economic chapter of the study.

20. However, it should be recalled that although it is likely that Mr. Plantey's address at the Brussels symposium in October 1979 was largely based on the SAC's work in the legal field, the Council informed the Assembly that it considered the head of the permanent secretariat of the SAC was speaking in a personal capacity and this address did not constitute a communication of information from the Council to the Assembly. The Assembly is therefore entitled to expect the Council to send it a version - declassified if necessary - of this chapter of the SAC's study.

21. What makes the situation worse is the fact that in January 1981 Mr. Davignon, member of the Commission of the Communities, handed the European Parliament, which has no defence responsibilities, as Mr. Davignon moreover recalled, a report on "The policy to be followed to promote political and technological co-operation between the countries of Western Europe", prepared by Professor Greenwood, Director of the Centre for Defence Studies of Aberdeen University. This means that the governments refuse to give the WEU Assembly, which they assert to be the only assembly with defence responsibilities, information which, on the other hand, they

allow to be given through Community sources to the European Parliament which has no such responsibilities. Mr. Davignon underlined moreover that application of the conclusions of this report concerned the SAC or the IEPG and not the Communities except from the standpoint of industrial policy.

22. Thus it is no longer a matter of how the Council reports to the Assembly on questions within its competence handled by other organisations but of activities which are specifically WEU's and in some respects WEU's only achievement in recent years. Yet this is just where the Council is slow in fulfilling its obligation to keep the Assembly informed, a task which it fulfils only in part.

23. The second shortcoming is in a related field but one which, it must be recognised, the Council does not cover, i.e. the work of the IEPG. The Assembly has already underlined that it could not endorse the Council's view that because there were no organic links between the IEPG and WEU the Assembly could not be informed about the work of the IEPG. There are many other European organisations with which WEU does not have organic links but regarding which the Council does not make this objection. Nor is the argument used in the reply to Recommendation 362 of any greater value :

“2. As the Council have in the past made clear to the Assembly, not all the member states of the IEPG are members of WEU. Consequently, it does not seem logical to establish the proposed link between the IEPG and the Assembly as this would imply that the latter would be supplied with information by nations that are not members of both institutions. Such information, therefore, can only be transmitted to the WEU parliamentarians within a national framework and insofar as their governments participate in the IEPG.”

24. In fact, if each government has the right to inform the parliamentarians of its country of the IEPG's work, its share being less than that of the governments of seven countries, it is difficult to see why these seven countries, all members of the IEPG, could not together inform the WEU Assembly.

25. Information your Rapporteur has managed to obtain makes him wonder whether it is not simply a question of the difficulties encountered by the IEPG in its work, precisely because of the governments, which make the Council evade its duty to inform the Assembly. He wonders, too, whether this same reason might not explain the Council's elusiveness about the SAC since it is known that the SAC

depends to a large extent on the IEPG for obtaining facts which are essential for conducting its inquiry. If this is really the case, does the Council believe this refusal to provide information will for long be able to conceal from public opinion a fact which it more than suspects? That difficulties exist is quite understandable, but it is not the practice of secrecy, in violation of the modified Brussels Treaty, that will do anything at all to arrange matters.

26. Finally, the so-called “informal” procedure adopted by the Council for joint meetings seems to correspond quite well to the Council's non-activity as a body for European co-operation, while recognising its rôle as the interlocutor of an assembly with defence and foreign policy responsibilities. Here again, there would be little to object to if it was not tantamount to the effective failure of the Council to fulfil its task of speaking on behalf of seven member countries. The informality of its meetings often allows the Chairman-in-Office to reply spiritedly to questions put by members of the Assembly but without it ever being possible to know on whose behalf he is speaking. The almost total silence of the other members of the Council makes one wonder whether these meetings are really joint meetings between the Council and the Assembly. They would play their due rôle far better if the delegations took a more active part in the discussion.

27. Your Rapporteur has been informed that at its meeting on 28th April the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, which is not entitled to adopt recommendations, expressed the wish that the General Affairs Committee take account, in the recommendation in the present report, of the views expressed by Mrs. Knight, author of the Committee's information report on the WEU Assembly and the press. Your Rapporteur is particularly willing to accede to this wish since he very largely shares the ideas expressed by Mrs. Knight and the Committee.

28. Without wishing to reproduce Mrs. Knight's information report, since it will be available to the Assembly, your Rapporteur will merely recall here the conclusions concerning the Council's relations with the Assembly :

(i) In view of the inadequacy of the information the Council gives to the press, the Council was asked to issue a communiqué after each of its meetings in order to announce its agenda and the conclusions reached.

(ii) On ministerial participation in Assembly sessions, the Council was asked :

(a) to ensure that a cabinet minister addressed the Assembly each day of the session ;

- (b) to ask ministers to make their speeches have a direct bearing on one or more reports on the agenda of the session in question ;
- (c) to concert their views so that, as far as possible, the ministers spoke on behalf of the Council ;
- (d) in view of the nature of the Assembly's responsibilities, to ask Ministers of Defence to take part in its debates more often.

29. As the other proposals in Mrs. Knight's report concern the Assembly alone there is no need for them to be included in a recommendation for transmission to the WEU Council, and the Committee for Relations with Parliaments is able to promote them without using the General Affairs Committee as an intermediary.

### III. Political activities of the Council

#### 1. Application of the modified Brussels Treaty

30. The introduction to Chapter II of the annual report probably gives the clearest picture the Council has ever given of how the governments of member countries view WEU's rôle at the present juncture.

31. First, "they are concerned both to ensure proper implementation of the obligations and responsibilities defined by the treaty", particularly Article V, which "remained one of the central elements of the security system of the signatory countries".

32. Here it should be noted that the French Government at least has given its views on how Article V should be applied in the answer given by its Minister for Foreign Affairs to a written question put by a member of the Assembly, Mr. Berrier, on 19th December 1980 :

"1. The WEU treaty is not automatic in the way the honourable member would wish in that it is for each high contracting party to decide whether the conditions of *casus foederis* exist. This is a sovereign decision which France, because it has withdrawn from the NATO integrated military organisation, is now in a position to exercise with full independence.

2. If France considers that the conditions laid down in Article V exist, it would be committed, with all the military and other means in its power, in accordance with the same article. This is what General de Gaulle underlined in 1966 when expressing France's determination

to fight at the side of its allies in the event of one of them being the object of an unprovoked attack.

3. France would naturally retain control of the procedure whereby these means would be implemented by the national military authorities concerned. Where nuclear weapons are concerned, the doctrine and decision governing their use are the responsibility of the President of the Republic, the supreme head of the army. From this point of view, the strategy of nuclear deterrence raises no new problem as regards Article V of the WEU treaty."

33. Coming from France, whose forces are not integrated in the NATO military command, this interpretation is of particular importance since the modified Brussels Treaty is the most binding element of France's commitment to the common defence system of the western powers in Europe.

34. It would be interesting and important to know whether the other six governments have the same view of the obligations imposed on each of the signatories under the modified Brussels Treaty and in particular to what extent the WEU Council's being dormant, as may be deduced from the introduction to Chapter II of the annual report, allows WEU to play its rôle under Article VIII of the treaty since, if the automaticity of the alliance created by the modified Brussels Treaty is not recognised, the Council's rôle, which is to co-ordinate the defence policies of member countries, becomes primordial. If the Council fails to play this rôle, it is to be feared that one day it may be realised that the various WEU member countries' views on the circumstances in which Article V of the treaty should be applied will follow divergent courses and this would significantly weaken the deterrent, not to say military, value of the whole treaty.

35. Secondly, the Council underlines that the limitation of its field of action is due to the legitimate concern which the Assembly has always accepted to avoid the duplication of activities between the various bodies for political and military co-operation. At the same time the Council defines its self-attributed rôle as a forum "for exchanging views on defence problems not dealt with elsewhere". But it should be noted that although the Council has noted the Assembly's wish "that organisational measures be considered for possible future tasks of the organisation", it fails to give its views on this point.

36. This is particularly annoying since, in due course the Council is to be able to fulfil the tasks the governments of member countries



may intend to assign it, it must retain an efficient structure. Several members of the Assembly have expressed concern about this, as shown by a written question put in most member countries at the suggestion of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments in connection with Recommendation 358 in the report by Mr. von Hassel on the future of European security.

37. So far, only one answer has been brought to the attention of your Rapporteur: that of the British Government on 2nd March 1981 to the question put by Lord Northfield. Lord Carrington wrote:

“All member governments of Western European Union are aiming at limiting the 1981 budget to zero growth in real terms at most. Her Majesty's Government believe that it will be possible to accommodate this without loss of efficiency and that it will not affect the continued implementation of the tasks required of WEU under the modified Brussels Treaty.”

38. It would be most desirable for all governments to give such positive answers about WEU's tasks and also to ensure that the principles set out in this answer are applied in practice.

## 2. East-West relations

39. East-West relations have for a long time been central to the Council's discussions at its ministerial meetings, and in 1980 they clearly occupied a prominent place in the affairs of the western world. The exchange of communications on bilateral relations and the report presented by the German Delegation fully accord with WEU's vocation.

40. One may nevertheless wonder about the reality of the determination of the seven governments to work for détente “in consultation and jointly with their partners of the European Community and the Atlantic Alliance”. The reactions of various governments to the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union do not seem to concord with this solidarity, at least where economic and other sanctions are concerned. Suffice it here to recall the spectacular splintering of western positions towards the Olympic Games in Moscow.

41. It is not for the present report to say to what extent the Western European countries were or were not consulted prior to American decisions on sanctions or to what extent they refused to hold true consultations or to apply the Alliance's decisions, but it is clear that the policy of sanctions was a fiasco, particularly

since the world economic situation made it extremely tempting for some countries to take advantage of the deterioration of other countries' economic relations with the eastern countries.

42. Conversely, western solidarity seems to have played its part in the framework of the CSCE in Madrid with the probable result that the conference will achieve only very limited results, except perhaps for the decision to convene without delay a general conference on disarmament in Europe since the Soviet Union seems to have made a major concession in this respect by agreeing that the negotiations should also cover the Soviet Union's European territory, which was a prior and basic condition for holding such a conference.

43. However this may be, at the time of writing the Polish affair may still undermine all the possible results of the Madrid conference and here too it is gratifying that the western powers have on the one hand proved active and united in meeting “the requests for economic aid which had been made to them by Poland” and, on the other hand, in underlining that if the Helsinki final act was not applied by the Soviet Union with regard to Poland, this attitude “would have very serious consequences for the future of international relations in Europe and throughout the world”. Emphasis should be placed here on the complete convergence between the views of the General Affairs Committee expressed in the draft recommendation in Mr. Hanin's report on developments in Poland, to be presented to the Assembly at its June session, and the views expressed by the Council on the same subject.

## 3. Afghanistan

44. Chapter II A 2 of the annual report of the Council gives a detailed picture of measures taken by western countries in response to the invasion of Afghanistan, although, as your Rapporteur noted, it makes no mention of the divergences which emerged in the application of the principle of sanctions, particularly economic sanctions, against the Soviet Union. Thus, while all member countries agree “that the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan was unacceptable”, the ways and means envisaged for bringing it to an end are far less clear. Admittedly, the annual report recalls that on 19th February 1980, the Nine, in response to a proposal by Lord Carrington, “gave support to an arrangement that would allow a neutral Afghanistan to be outside competition among the powers”. However, since then France has also made proposals, particularly for convening a conference between Afghanistan's neighbouring countries and a number of other

countries directly concerned by the fate of Afghanistan. But the indications are that this proposal has not met with the unanimous approval of the countries concerned nor of France's partners and it would be interesting if the Council could explain just how far the Seven agreed on this question.

45. Finally, it should be recalled that in December 1980 the Assembly adopted Recommendation 361 on the political implications for Europe of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan which recommended *inter alia* that the Council:

“ 10. Examine the possibility of full financial assistance and, if necessary, supplies of military equipment to the Afghan resistance movements until the USSR proves it is ready to negotiate the withdrawal of its forces from Afghanistan. ”

46. Since then, none of the member countries has made a clear statement about the type of aid it was prepared to grant Afghanistan, unlike the United States Government, since President Reagan has announced that he is prepared to supply arms to the Afghan resistance movements. Your Rapporteur can but hope that in its reply to Recommendation 361 the Council will soon inform the Assembly of how far it is prepared to go in the direction proposed.

#### 4. Iran

47. Where Iran is concerned, 1980 was certainly marked by full western solidarity for obtaining the liberation of the American diplomats taken hostage in that country. It cannot be said to what extent this solidarity helped the diplomats to be freed, but it was probably not without avail. Here too the concordance between the policy described by the Council and that recommended by the Assembly is worthy of emphasis.

48. However, with the hostages freed and the war which broke out between Iran and Iraq at the end of 1980, the Council should not have confined itself to describing its policy on the question of the hostages but should also have indicated its present policy towards future relations with Iran and measures to foster the restoration of peace between Iran and Iraq.

#### 5. Situation in the Middle East

49. In this chapter too, the views expressed by the Council are very close to those of the Assembly, particularly as set out in the report presented by Sir Frederic Bennett on behalf of the General Affairs Committee in June 1980. In this connection, the Assembly can

take credit for indicating the path which was followed by the governments of the Seven, and even the Ten, thanks to the determination of the Assembly and in particular some of its members in maintaining a dialogue between the two organs of WEU.

50. Indeed, as a sequel to Recommendation 341, a number of written questions was put at the beginning of 1980, especially by Sir Frederic Bennett, and the Council's answers may be considered satisfactory. The fact that the convergence between the Council's and the Assembly's concerns led to the European Council deciding to instruct its Presidency to implement an action programme based on the principles set out in the Venice declaration and increase its contacts with the parties concerned is obviously a sign of Europe's reappearance on a stage from which it had been too often absent in the past twenty-five years.

51. The threats now hanging over the Gulf area and détente in general must not be allowed to obscure the urgency of a global settlement to the Palestinian affair, which the Council asserts to be one of the essential aims of European diplomacy. It is not by maintaining an explosive situation in the Middle East that one can hope to maintain peace in the Gulf area.

#### IV. Chapters V and VI of the annual report

52. These chapters deal respectively with the Public Administration Committee and budgetary and administrative questions. They are referred to the General Affairs Committee for whatever political implications they may have. They are mainly of a technical nature and Chapter VI is examined in detail by the Assembly's Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration. There can be no question of the General Affairs Committee encroaching on its territory.

53. The point in respect of which political questions arise is to be found in two passages in these chapters, one in Chapter V, where it is indicated that:

“ ... their concern to beat inflation has led most of the governments to adopt a policy of reducing public expenditure, the effects of which have been felt on the personnel front: limitation of appointments, even a standstill on recruitment or reduction of staffs to a greater or lesser extent.

In the administrative field, the need to economise public funds is also apparent in other areas, depending on the country: measures designed to increase the effi-

ciency of the administrative machine, efforts to limit the field and extent of state intervention ...”

and in Chapter VI which specifies that:

“... The proposed budgets for 1981 have not yet been approved and are still a matter of discussion in the Council; the delay is due to the need which has arisen to revise the various budgets in order to achieve, wherever possible, maximum economy.”

54. It is worth considering these two passages together, because they show a degree of coherence on the part of the governments between their general policy and the one they pursue in the framework of WEU. Apparently in the early months of 1981 a committee was set up to examine the structure of the ministerial organs of WEU with a view to rationalising them. However, the Council has not yet informed the Assembly of its decision or, *a fortiori*, communicated the text of the mandate given to this committee.

55. In any case, just like any well-organised firm, it is normal for the Council to re-examine the activities and methods of its dependent bodies in order to improve efficiency and to take account of requirements for future action. It is equally normal for it to do this with a view to rationalising its efforts, which does not necessarily mean with a view to making savings in the budget, although in the circumstances mentioned in the annual report a desire to economise public funds is perfectly justified. But the WEU budget is so small that the European taxpayer could never notice the effect of any reductions that might be made. If savings are to be made at the expense of the European organisations, the reduction for each one should be in direct proportion to the volume of its budget. Similarly, budgetary cuts should not be allowed to jeopardise the maintenance of the activities of each organisation in full. This means that in the specific case of WEU cuts should in no case be allowed to jeopardise the ability of the Council and the organisation as a whole to fulfil the tasks incumbent upon them under the modified Brussels Treaty. The instances of the organisation must therefore retain all the means necessary for adapting themselves to whatever circumstances may

make it necessary for the organisation to resume the activities now entrusted to others.

56. For lack of adequate information, your Rapporteur must consider that if the Assembly has not been apprised of the instructions the Council has given to the committee mentioned above, it is because it can but be a step of minor importance, i.e. which will have no impact on the structure of the organisation. He is encouraged in this sense by what he has learnt of the attitude of member governments towards WEU, as in Lord Carrington's answer to Lord Northfield mentioned earlier and an answer given by Mr. van der Klaauw, Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs, to a question put on 2nd April last in the First Chamber of the States General:

“In accordance with Article V of the Brussels Treaty as amended in 1954, the countries of WEU have pledged themselves to afford automatic aid and assistance should any of the parties be the object of an armed attack in Europe.

In the same treaty (Article IV), the WEU countries state that in implementation of the treaty they shall work in close co-operation with NATO. The assistance referred to in Article V will therefore be effected mainly within the framework of NATO.

The Netherlands Government has noted with interest the proposals set out in Recommendation 358 of the WEU Assembly. The government is of the opinion that WEU duly fulfils its tasks as laid down in the modified Brussels Treaty. The abovementioned close link with NATO is a decisive factor in determining this opinion regarding co-operation within WEU.”

57. If it were otherwise, i.e. if the measures taken by the Council sought to change the structure or tasks of the organisation, the Assembly would be unable to understand how the Council could not even inform it of its decision. However this may be, it is determined to be informed of the results of the work of this committee and to be called upon to give an opinion on them as is normal in an institution with a parliamentary body.

*Replies of the Council to Recommendations 355 to 363*RECOMMENDATION 355<sup>1</sup>*on the northern flank and the Atlantic and Channel commands*<sup>2</sup>

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that the defence of the northern flank is inextricably linked to the defence of the adjoining seas and Atlantic Ocean;
- (ii) Believing that defence of the northern flank must be based on the early arrival of adequately-prepared reinforcements to meet an attack because geographical and political factors impose an imbalance in permanently-stationed forces;
- (iii) Believing further that geographical factors and the present qualities of the naval forces of most NATO countries provide a reasonable measure of naval capabilities at the present time, although specific deficiencies need to be urgently remedied and future trends in the size of Soviet naval ships will require to be offset in long-term NATO naval construction programmes;
- (iv) Calling for better use to be made of existing allied naval resources;
- (v) Noting that the reference to the Tropic of Cancer in Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty imposes no geographical limitations on the responsibilities of NATO naval commands;
- (vi) Recalling that by virtue of Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty the WEU Council relies on the appropriate military authorities of NATO for information and advice,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge the North Atlantic Council:

1. To improve allied naval capabilities in the Atlantic and Channel areas and in sea areas adjacent to the northern flank:
  - (a) by calling for long-term national naval construction programmes to maintain the strength and average hull age of naval vessels, and to keep abreast of any further increase in Soviet naval capabilities;
  - (b) by calling for urgent steps to remedy specific deficiencies especially of escort forces, mine counter-measure vessels and maritime patrol aircraft, and to improve interoperability of weapons and communications and transmission equipment;
  - (c) by making better use of existing naval resources forthwith, as recommended by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments:
    - (i) through the improvement of joint naval operations planning and control in the Atlantic and Channel areas and the sea areas adjacent to the northern flank;
    - (ii) through flexible use of naval forces, irrespective of command boundaries, including appropriate German naval forces, to ensure that the necessary ships are available at earlier stages of alert;
    - (iii) by calling on France to allocate naval forces to SACLANT on the same basis as other WEU countries;
  - (d) by establishing at appropriate naval headquarters a daily record of the location of all Warsaw Pact merchant ships in port or at sea in the NATO area;
2. To improve the defence of the northern flank:

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 1st December 1980 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Sixth Ordinary Session (8th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr Ahrens on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 837).

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- (a) by calling on all allied governments to provide political support for the Danish and Norwegian Governments to resist constant pressure from the Soviet Union designed to prevent legitimate defence arrangements;
  - (b) by calling for mountain and arctic warfare training in the area to be extended to all troops likely to be available as reinforcements, and for standardised equipment to be provided for units of ACE mobile force;
  - (c) by urging the governments concerned to conclude urgently agreements on stockpiling in the area ammunition and heavy equipment for reinforcements;
  - (d) by calling for those improvements in the direct defence capabilities of indigenous forces which are required for the area to be defended until reinforcements arrive, and to provide for the reception and deployment of these reinforcements;
  - (e) by calling for the air defence of Danish territory to be placed on the same basis as that of neighbouring allied countries.

**REPLY OF THE COUNCIL<sup>1</sup>**  
***to Recommendation 355***

1. The Council welcome the report and its recognition of the importance to western defence of the northern flank and of the significance of the northern flank for the defence of the Eastern Atlantic and the importance of outside reinforcements for the defence of the northern flank in view of the imbalance of local forces. Furthermore, the Council acknowledge the vital rôle of naval forces in the defence of this area and welcome the attention which the report focuses on the rapidly-increasing maritime capability of the Soviet forces. In response to recommendations of the report, the Council:

(a) (b) acknowledge the value of long-term national naval construction programmes to the extent that resources permit. They also call attention to recent improvements, both in quality and quantity, to the fleets of member countries;

(c) (i) and (ii) point out that it is inevitable that NATO naval commands in peacetime should take account of peacetime requirements. NATO naval forces operate in areas to which their forces are best suited by their ships' capabilities and operating characteristics. NATO commanders however are currently considering the question of improving flexibility of operations across command boundaries;

(c) (iii) have noted the recommendation that the Council urge the North Atlantic Council to call on France to allocate naval forces to SACLANT which is a matter for France but recall that such allocation cannot be envisaged because of the step taken by that country in 1966, namely to leave the integrated NATO military structure, and to reserve its position in any event on any decision of this nature;

(d) agree that there would be value in the proposal that a daily record should be established of the location of all Warsaw Pact merchant ships in port or at sea in the NATO area.

2. The Council:

(a) confirm the political support already given by allied governments to the Governments of Denmark and Norway to resist the pressures on them from the Soviet Union in the field of security policy, just as such support is given to other allied governments coming under such pressure;

(b) agree that in principle mountain and arctic warfare training should be given to all forces likely to be used for reinforcements, but points out the many constraints (financial and physical) on the capacity of both the host country and the reinforcing countries to provide the necessary facilities;

(c) endorse the value of agreements between host and reinforcing governments for stockpiling ammunition and heavy equipment but point to the fact that equipment for the United Kingdom/Netherlands amphibious force is already prestocked in Norway and to other achievements in this field, in particular the United States/Norwegian stockpiling agreement signed on 16th January;

(d) have noted the recommendation that the Council urge the North Atlantic Council to call for improvements in the direct defence capabilities of the indigenous forces in the area and in the reception and deployment of reinforcements;

(e) point out that it is for the Danish Government to decide whether to place the air defence of Danish territory under NATO command in peacetime.

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1. Communicated to the Assembly on 15th April 1981.

RECOMMENDATION 356 <sup>1</sup>*on nuclear, biological and chemical protection* <sup>2</sup>

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that whilst international agreements have banned the production, stockpiling and use of biological weapons, few limitations have been imposed on stocks of nuclear and chemical weapons ;
- (ii) Aware that a complete ban on the use of nuclear weapons may not be attainable in the short term and that it is essential to world peace that NATO nuclear forces should balance those of the Warsaw Pact, while negotiations continue to secure mutual reductions in their numbers ;
- (iii) Recognising that adequate on-site verification procedures must be an essential part of any agreement to eliminate and ban the manufacture, stockpiling or use of chemical weapons, but that such procedures still remain to be negotiated with the Soviet Union, and believing that until present negotiations reach a conclusion, stocks and types of chemical weapons held by NATO partners should be brought up to sufficient levels to provide any necessary deterrent and retaliatory capability ;
- (iv) Further believing that the non-use of chemical weapons is best ensured by an equality of retaliatory and defensive capability between NATO and the Warsaw Pact whilst awaiting agreements to prohibit such weapons ;
- (v) Considering that whilst nuclear and chemical weapons remain in existence military personnel and civilian populations remain exposed to the threat and consequences of their use ;
- (vi) Convinced that effective NBC defence equipment and procedures for all allied forces can drastically reduce casualties ;
- (vii) Believing that whilst allied governments must vigorously pursue mutual and balanced force reductions, they also have a moral duty in peacetime to keep their populations objectively informed of the consequences of nuclear, biological and chemical attacks and to implement civil defence programmes for the survival of their people,

## RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member governments, acting where appropriate through the North Atlantic Council :

1. To recognise the full implications of the threat of battlefield chemical and nuclear attacks and to take immediate steps :
  - (a) to improve protective and decontamination equipment and procedures for military personnel, to protect electronic and communications equipment against electromagnetic pulse effects, and to remedy the other deficiencies identified by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments in its report\* ;
  - (b) to achieve better co-operation for research, development and the production of equipment and its interoperability ;
2. To review existing usable stocks of chemical weapons and to take steps to ensure that the NATO deterrent and retaliatory capability is equal to the estimated offensive capability of the Warsaw Pact ;
3. Actively to encourage bilateral and multilateral negotiations to ban the production, stockpiling, transfer and use of chemical weapons with adequate verification ;

\* Document 838, paragraph 5.8.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 1st December 1980 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Sixth Ordinary Session (8th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Banks on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 838).

4. To implement urgently a co-ordinated and common "stay-at-home" civil defence programme in peacetime to include essentially the provision of:
  - (a) objective information to the public on survival in conventional, nuclear, biological and chemical war ;
  - (b) an organisation with protected and up-dated communications to provide warning and monitoring services for nuclear, biological and chemical attacks, fully co-ordinated within NATO ;
  - (c) plans for the co-ordinated use of military reservists, the police, fire brigade, Red Cross, similar organisations, and civilian volunteers in a war alert, attack and post-attack period ;
  - (d) fall out shelters in public buildings and in the home ;
  - (e) self-help equipment for sale to the public including home shelters, protective clothing, respirators, dosimeters, etc. ;
5. To call for NATO to publish annually comparable statistics, to an agreed common definition, of national expenditure on civil defence.



**REPLY OF THE COUNCIL <sup>1</sup>*****to Recommendation 356***

1. With great interest the Council have taken note of the report by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on nuclear, biological and chemical protection.

The report contains an impressive amount of useful material and therefore makes an important contribution to the discussion on nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.

The Council are well aware of the important implications of chemical and nuclear attacks and they realise the need for a proper defensive capability in order to deal effectively with these implications. They agree with the report in the sense that detection, protection and decontamination are important elements of this defensive capability.

Although limited chemical detection equipment is already available, there is an urgent need for distant warning devices and more refined equipment. The same holds true for the individual protection against chemical attacks; this aspect is being given much consideration during the development and acquisition of new fighting equipment, e.g. the new Leopard tank offers reasonable protection against chemical attacks. New, and more effective decontamination equipment is being developed, especially regarding individual decontamination as well as part-decontamination of vehicles.

The Council are of the opinion that the abovementioned development of new equipment deserves their full encouragement, taking into consideration the conclusions of the report by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

The Council share the concern expressed in the report about the protection of electronic and communication equipment against electromagnetic pulse effects. On the basis of cost-effectiveness, measures are being taken to ensure the protection of the relevant equipment against the effects of EMP.

To ensure co-operation in research, development and the production of interoperable equipment is one of the tasks of NATO. In fact co-operation is ensured within NATO.

2. Though warning devices and equipment giving protection against chemical weapons might reduce casualties enormously, foolproof protection is not possible. No member country of WEU is in possession of chemical weapons. The Council share the Assembly's concern about the imbalance between the chemical weapons capabilities of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, which might have a serious impact on the overall balance of forces.

However, it should be noted that NATO relies principally upon its conventional and nuclear forces for deterrence. In the meantime, an effective international agreement to ban the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons should be sought with great vigour.

3. During its 35th Session, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted with consensus Resolution 35/144 b. In this resolution it is stated, *inter alia*, that the General Assembly takes note of the joint progress report of the USSR and the United States to the Committee on Disarmament on 7th July 1980 on their bilateral negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons which have not yet led to a result.

Furthermore, it is stated that the General Assembly of the United Nations urges the Committee on Disarmament to continue, as of the beginning of its 1981 session, negotiations on a multilateral convention on chemical weapons as a matter of high priority.

The Council fully agree with this resolution and member governments attach great importance to the bilateral and multilateral negotiations to ban the production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons with effective verification.

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1. Communicated to the Assembly on 10th June 1981.

4. The Council fully recognise the importance of co-ordination within the Alliance of programmes in the field of civil defence. The Council recall, however, that whilst the Alliance is responsible for co-ordination of the programmes in this area, these programmes are matters falling under the national responsibility of each individual member country.

5. The Council are aware of the attention that should be given to the question of civil defence. Therefore, having regard to the considerations set out above, the Council note the Assembly's desire for the provision of fuller information on civil defence matters.

**RECOMMENDATION 357<sup>1</sup>**  
***on improving the status of WEU staff<sup>2</sup>***

The Assembly,

Conscious of the fact that despite the many years' existence of the majority of the co-ordinated organisations problems affecting the careers of officials in these organisations still remain unresolved ;

Regretting the necessity to revert to its Recommendation 340 ;

Regretting also the element of stagnation manifest in the Council's reply to this recommendation and previous recommendations submitted on identical matters,

I. REQUESTS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Appoint an expert, within the framework of the co-ordinated organisations, to study the desirability of setting up an independent body for the administration of pensions as a natural follow-on from the joint pensions administrative section and to make proposals ;

2. Continue to review the possibility of creating a single appeals board for pensions in the light of experience in view of the possibly divergent views taken by appeals boards of the various co-ordinated organisations and the inherent risk of prejudice for officials in these organisations ;

3. Transmit any conclusions which the various co-ordinating agencies may have come to on the problems outlined in paragraph 3 of Recommendation 340 and request these agencies to continue their studies and to report without avoidable delay ;

4. Provide information concerning the number of meetings held by the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts in 1980, the duration of these meetings, the subjects discussed and the positive decisions which resulted ;

II. Invites the Secretary-General to ensure that notice of all staff vacancies of A, L, B and C grades arising in the co-ordinated organisations be circulated to the staff of the others.

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1. Adopted by the Assembly on 2nd December 1980 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Sixth Ordinary Session (10th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Kershaw on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration (Document 862).

**REPLY OF THE COUNCIL<sup>1</sup>*****to Recommendation 357***

I.1. The Council recognise that the setting-up of an independent international body for the administration of pensions for the co-ordinated organisations could be desirable in the long term.

However, the joint pensions administrative section, set up and organised as a result of the 149th report of the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts, is a purely consultative body which only started its operational work on 1st January 1980. In accordance with the aim which led to its establishment, namely uniformity in the implementation of the pension scheme, valuable experience is being gained, the scope of its work expanded and new fields of co-operation and exchange explored under the initiative, guidance and supervision of the co-ordinated organisations.

The Council consider it preferable that during this formative phase, the existing organisational structure should be maintained. However, they are following developments closely so as to be able to judge, together with the other co-ordinated organisations, if and when they should study arrangements for modifying the existing structure of the joint pensions administrative section.

2. As already explained in the reply to Recommendation 340, the creation of a single appeals board to deal with matters concerning pensions depends on the developments referred to in paragraph 1 above. But as things stand at present, namely decisions on the implementation of the pension scheme being taken by the Secretary-General of each co-ordinated organisation, the appeals board of each organisation should retain its full responsibility, particularly in the matter of pensions.

This being so, and in keeping with the concern expressed by the Assembly, every effort has been made to avoid divergent decisions being taken by appeals boards with respect to similar cases. Accordingly, the CAPOC\* is generally consulted before the confirmation of any decision that might give rise to an appeal and the boards inform each other of their decisions, always providing reasons in full.

3. The Council will keep the Assembly informed of tangible progress made with the matters raised under point 3 of Recommendation 340, which are still under discussion between the various co-ordinated organisations.

4. Details of the meetings of the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts held in 1980 are provided in Chapter VI of the twenty-sixth annual report.

II. Notices about staff vacancies are being exchanged with other organisations whenever vacancies cannot be filled by promotion from within the organisation concerned.

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\* The Administrative Committee on Pensions of the Co-ordinated Organisations (CAPOC) was set up by the Standing Committee of Secretaries-General on 11th September 1974 in implementation of Article 52 of the pension scheme rules. The CAPOC is assisted in its work by the staff of the joint pensions administrative section.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 20th May 1981.

**RECOMMENDATION 358<sup>1</sup>**  
***on the future of European security***<sup>2</sup>

The Assembly,

Considering that the joint interest of all its members is to promote collective security so as to consolidate peace and promote détente and disarmament;

Considering that Europe has to face a threat that is now formidable because of the Soviet Union's superiority in many fields;

Considering that the Soviet Union's operations beyond the European continent extend this threat to the economic and political fields;

Considering that Europe's security can be guaranteed only by the cohesion and strength of the Atlantic Alliance and the resolve of its members;

Considering that the fulfilment of this requirement calls for close agreement between the European and American members of the Atlantic Alliance on their joint defence policy;

Considering that the situation requires the European element of the Alliance to make a greater effort to take part in joint defence and disarmament initiatives, particularly with regard to conventional weapons;

Considering that, to be effective, this effort implies close co-operation in the production of armaments;

Considering that the European Community has established solidarity between most European members of the Atlantic Alliance so that on many matters they are in a position to express joint views on questions which are outside the Community's purview;

Considering that the modified Brussels Treaty, with the North Atlantic Treaty, constitutes the basis of European security;

Considering that the European Community is not in a position to replace WEU in exercising that organisation's defence and armaments responsibilities but that steps should be taken here and now to face up to the requirements of European security,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

Set up a working group to examine measures to be taken by all member countries to adapt WEU to the present requirements of European defence and instruct it to study in particular:

- (a) the co-ordination of member countries' policies in its areas of responsibility, namely defence, armaments and disarmament;
- (b) the participation of Ministers of Defence or their representatives in its meetings when matters which concern them are discussed;
- (c) the convening of meetings before those of the North Atlantic Council with a view to identifying the joint views of its members on matters relating to Europe's security;
- (d) the question of inviting all countries which are members of the EEC, have applied for membership or are European members of NATO to take all steps and measures likely to promote the closest possible participation of their activities in the achievement of the aims of the modified Brussels Treaty ;
- (e) the action to be taken on the study being conducted by the Standing Armaments Committee so that the outcome may be a true European armaments policy.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 2nd December 1980 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Sixth Ordinary Session (10th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. von Hassel on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 854).

**REPLY OF THE COUNCIL<sup>1</sup>**

***to Recommendation 358***

The Council have noted with interest the report on the future of European security presented on behalf of the General Affairs Committee, and have examined very attentively the contents of the Assembly's recommendation.

Among the various suggestions put forward by the Assembly in its proposal to set up a working group, two are matters of constant concern to the Council :

- the co-ordination of member countries' policies in its areas of responsibility is one of the reasons for the Council's existence. Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty gives the Council adequate scope to discuss a wide variety of subjects. The Council continue to be flexible and have sufficiently wide powers to embrace any debate relevant to the application of the treaty;
- the question of any follow-up to the study being conducted by the Standing Armaments Committee and which is to make a descriptive analysis of the armaments industry in member countries has yet to be considered by the Council. In any case, the Council are still willing to improve European consultation and co-operation in the sphere of armaments, "with a view to finding joint solutions which would assist governments of member countries in meeting their equipment requirements" (Article 10 of the decision of the Council of 7th May 1955 setting up the Standing Armaments Committee).

The three other suggestions introduce new elements, which the Council analyse as follows :

- the participation of Ministers of Defence, or their representatives, in Council meetings would certainly not be without its value. This would be possible where matters which are the direct responsibility of Defence Ministers were to be discussed. Where this is not the case, their participation in essentially political discussions would not appear to be strictly necessary;
- the systematic convening of Council meetings before those of the North Atlantic Council would scarcely appear to offer any new advantages over the current practice;
- the participation of other countries in the achievement of the aims of the treaty is in the first place a matter for those countries themselves, since the treaty sets out procedures for that purpose.

For all these reasons, the Council consider that the setting up of a working group as recommended by the Assembly is not a necessity in present circumstances.

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1. Communicated to the Assembly on 8th May 1981.

**RECOMMENDATION 359<sup>1</sup>**  
***on the state of European security*<sup>2</sup>**

The Assembly,

- (i) Observing that the trend of the East-West military balance over the last two decades has been towards rough equivalence in many sectors following the disproportionately large Soviet allocation of technological resources to defence, but that the disturbing superior Soviet concentration of tanks and divisions on the central front still exists ;
- (ii) Noting that the nature of the Soviet challenge is no longer exclusively a military threat to Europe, but has become a world-wide search for influence, backed by the use of military force, either directly or by proxy ;
- (iii) Deploring the outbreak of hostilities between Iraq and Iran, but noting with satisfaction that external powers have refrained from intervening ;
- (iv) Believing that independently of the withdrawal of France from the integrated military structure the cohesion of the Alliance has improved over the last two decades with more joint planning and better provision for consultation and collective decision-making, but regretting the weakness of allied consultation in particular cases ;
- (v) Noting that so far arms control agreements and current negotiations have not reduced levels of forces and armaments, but have contributed to better understanding of the military balance in certain areas ;
- (vi) Believing that European security can be ensured only in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance ; and that to maintain it continued and equal emphasis must be placed on allocating adequate resources to defence, on the one hand, and on pursuing negotiations on arms control and disarmament on the other,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Urge member governments to impress on the United States, at the highest level, the need for continuous awareness of the allied dimension of all security issues and the overriding need for prior consultation in the North Atlantic Council ;
2. Urge member governments to maintain and improve their contribution to allied defence, with particular provisions to enable certain United States resources to be devoted to defensive operations outside the Atlantic area from time to time ;
3. Urge member governments to call in the North Atlantic Council for no less emphasis to be placed on arms control and disarmament negotiations with a view to improving security and reducing forces and armaments ;
4. Urge member governments at the Madrid meeting to seek to negotiate the mandate of a conference on disarmament in Europe in the framework of the CSCE.

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1. Adopted by the Assembly on 2nd December 1980 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Sixth Ordinary Session (11th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Brown on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 858).

**REPLY OF THE COUNCIL<sup>1</sup>**  
**to Recommendation 359**

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1. The Council wish to underline their continuous awareness of the allied dimension of all security issues. It is their common judgment that the security of Western Europe and North America can be adversely affected by the situation developing outside the NATO treaty area, such as Afghanistan and the Middle East. Alliance members have accepted the new challenge, which poses a threat to their strategic and vital economic interests. Hence, at their meeting in Brussels in December 1980, the ministers of the member countries of the integrated military structure endeavoured to draw the consequences applicable as regards the sharing of defence efforts within the zone defined by the North Atlantic Treaty. The foreign ministers of the Alliance, meeting in Brussels on 11th and 12th December, recalled that "genuine détente must be worldwide in scope and indivisible". A still greater cohesion and awareness within the Atlantic Alliance was thus reached and the practice of frank and timely consultations on a broad range of issues was strengthened.

2. The Council, further, wish to emphasise that a number of events, among them the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, have led the members of the Alliance to agree on several measures to strengthen their defence posture. The capability of the Alliance to deter any aggression was thereby considerably improved. In particular, NATO members declared their readiness to take the necessary steps in case NATO-allocated forces of the United States or other member countries had to be diverted elsewhere with a view to safeguarding vital interests of the Alliance outside its treaty area. Provisions are being made in order to improve host nation support by member countries and facilitate the reception of reinforcement forces.

3. The Council share in general the intentions and underlying concerns of the Assembly's recommendation. In particular the Council note the importance which the Assembly rightly attached to the close and intensive consultations provided for by the allied countries which participated in the decision of 12th December 1979 in the field of both defence and arms control and disarmament. The cohesion, solidarity and resolve thus achieved in the field of security policy are particularly indispensable against the background of the Soviet Union's demonstrated lack of restraint in the use of military force and its continued build-up of military capabilities. They represent, at the same time, the necessary prerequisite for the success of arms control negotiations, the aim of which is to improve security by attaining a stable balance at the lowest possible level.

In this context, the Council note with satisfaction the close and fruitful consultations which have taken place among the allies who participated in the decision of 12th December 1979 on theatre nuclear forces (TNF). This decision, combining in a parallel and complementary approach both modernisation and an arms control offer, highlights the conviction of member states as enunciated in the Harmel report, that peace and stability are best preserved by a policy based on deterrence, defence and détente. The Council welcome the fact that, as a result of the continuous implementation of both elements of the December decision, serious preliminary discussions towards agreed limitations of TNF could be started between the Soviet Union and the United States and will be resumed at a date to be set through mutual consultations. These discussions serve to continue the SALT process which is of great importance for the achievement of a stable balance in the nuclear field and for the stabilisation of East-West relations in general.

In view of the challenge to international peace and security and of the need to preserve the basis for détente, member States expressed their particular satisfaction about the new United States Administration's resolve to even further intensify and strengthen the machinery of consultation between the United States and its European allies, especially on security-related issues.

4. The Council reaffirm the support given by member governments to the proposal submitted by the French Delegation in Madrid on 9th December 1980, which aims at the adoption by the Madrid follow-up meeting to the CSCE of a concrete and substantial mandate for a conference on disarmament in Europe to be held in the framework of the CSCE.

The objective of this conference will be, in a first phase, to agree upon new militarily significant, verifiable and binding confidence-building measures, applicable to the whole of the European continent from the Atlantic to the Urals and thereby to contribute to the improvement of the security of states in Europe.

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1. Communicated to the Assembly on 29th April 1981.



RECOMMENDATION 360 <sup>1</sup>*on SALT and the British and French nuclear forces* <sup>2</sup>

The Assembly,

- (i) Believing that armaments and arms control-disarmament are two sides of one coin: security;
- (ii) Noting that its Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments intends to follow closely the SALT process and report regularly to the Assembly on this vital subject;
- (iii) Considering the twofold decision of the special meeting of NATO Foreign and Defence Ministers of 12th December 1979 to be a realistic basis for negotiating reductions of long-range theatre nuclear forces with the Soviet Union;
- (iv) Noting that the 572 United States missiles to be deployed from 1983 will be accommodated within the reduced ceiling of United States nuclear warheads in Europe resulting from the unilateral reduction of 1,000, whereas the Soviet Union is now deploying SS-20 missiles at a rate which would provide 250-300 with 750-900 warheads by the end of 1981;
- (v) Welcoming the opening of preliminary bilateral talks on LRTNF reductions, believing that they should aim to establish a balance at the lowest possible level, as part of the global strategic nuclear balance;
- (vi) Stressing that nuclear forces are only a part, although a very important part, of the deterrent and that sufficient conventional forces form an equally essential part;
- (vii) Recalling that the 1974 Ottawa declaration recognised that the British and French nuclear forces were "capable of playing a deterrent rôle of their own contributing to the overall strengthening of the deterrence of the Alliance", and noting that, if there is no reduction in the conventional defence, the view is held in the Alliance that the independent centres of decision add to the uncertainty facing Soviet planners, which is an essential factor of deterrence;
- (viii) Believing SALT II to be to the mutual advantage of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact;
- (ix) Considering that despite an inevitable interaction between Soviet actions and arms control negotiations in many fora, there should be no formal linkage with specific agreements when these are to the mutual advantage of the parties;
- (x) Recalling paragraph B.2. of Recommendation 346, urging member governments to submit annually to their parliaments reports on the arms control implications of all new defence equipment programmes,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Call on member governments to urge the North Atlantic Council:

1. To call for the observance of the SALT II limits and the earliest resumption of the SALT process;
2. To recommend that any modernisation plans for British and French nuclear forces should not lead to the diversion of resources from conventional defence;
3. To call on the governments of NATO countries, in consultation with their national parliaments, to study the possibility:
  - (a) of improving nationally as well as in the framework of NATO methods of linking both armaments and arms control with security planning;
  - (b) of arrangements for continuously informing and consulting parliament, on a confidential basis where necessary, on these two sides of security planning and on progress of arms control negotiations.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 3rd December 1980 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Sixth Ordinary Session (13th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Mommersteeg on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 859).

**REPLY OF THE COUNCIL <sup>1</sup>**

***to Recommendation 360***

1. The Council fully support the idea that NATO's defence and arms control policies should complement each other in our efforts to maintain peace and enhance our security. The Alliance has long recognised the importance of maintaining deterrence through political determination, adequate military strength and cohesion, whilst at the same time pursuing effective balanced and verifiable measures of arms control and disarmament. The decision taken on 12th December 1979 at the special meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers of member countries of the integrated military structure to modernise its long-range theatre nuclear forces whilst offering in parallel to open talks with the Soviet Union on arms control involving theatre nuclear forces is an important example of this approach.

2. The Council recall that in addition to the declarations on this subject made individually by the seven WEU member governments, the member states of the Alliance stated at the conclusion of the meeting on 11th and 12th December last that the Alliance "supports further negotiations and remains deeply committed to the SALT process as a way of achieving meaningful mutual limitations on United States and Soviet strategic nuclear forces that will help enhance western security and preserve East/West stability".

3. The Ottawa declaration by heads of government in 1974 recognises that the British and French nuclear forces are "capable of playing a deterrent rôle of their own, contributing to the overall strengthening of the deterrence of the Alliance". The members of the integrated military structure agree on the continuing importance of improving the effectiveness of the full spectrum of allied forces, i.e. conventional, theatre nuclear and strategic, and of maintaining the essential linkage between these elements of the NATO triad.

At the same time the Council are of the opinion that the arms control policy can also contribute to ensuring a military balance which would enhance international security.

4. The Council agree with the Assembly that the member countries of the integrated military structure should continue to concert their defence and arms control policy, it being noted that progress in arms control negotiations is, to a great extent, affected by the actual level of international security, the latter being itself enhanced by any progress being made in the context of these negotiations.

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1. Communicated to the Assembly on 10th June 1981.

RECOMMENDATION 361 <sup>1</sup>*on the political implications for Europe of  
the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan* <sup>2</sup>

The Assembly,

Considering the invasion of Afghanistan to be a challenge to international law and a violation of the final act of the Helsinki conference, particularly paragraphs II and VIII of the declaration on principles;

Considering that security and co-operation in Europe require respect for human rights within each of the countries taking part in the conference on security and co-operation in Europe;

Considering therefore that the verifications to be effected at the meeting of the CSCE in Madrid and the decisions it will take must concern to an equal degree the fields of security, economic co-operation and guarantees granted to persons;

Considering moreover that the balance of forces which ensures peace in Europe is threatened by the superiority acquired by the Soviet Union in both conventional forces and continental-range nuclear weapons, that the limitation of armaments and the reduction of forces and weapons, provided this helps to restore the balance, are still an essential means of ensuring Europe's security and that realistic proposals made by several countries for limiting or reducing forces and armaments or for confidence-building measures should allow significant progress to be made in this field in the coming years;

Considering that application of the right of the Afghan people to self-determination, independence and territorial integrity remains a basic aim to which the West must give priority in its relations with the Soviet Union,

## RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Urge and remind the governments of member states to emphasise that the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan is a continuing unacceptable violation of international law and human rights and call for the removal of these troops;
2. Follow attentively developments at the CSCE meeting in Madrid and ensure close consultations between its members so as to allow substantial and a comparable degree of progress to be made with all the various items on the agenda;
3. Urge all participants in the CSCE to apply the provisions of the Helsinki final act in full;
4. Endeavour to ensure that the subsequent meeting of a conference on disarmament in Europe proceeds without serious delay;
5. At the same time pursue consideration of developments in the MBFR talks and encourage ratification of SALT II and the opening of SALT III with the aim of achieving true parity of forces and armaments in Europe and an overall nuclear balance;
6. Ask the governments of member countries to respect undertakings they have entered into, particularly in the framework of NATO, with a view to improving the West's defensive potential in Europe in both conventional and nuclear fields should progress in the achievement of disarmament not be made;
7. Continue and intensify the assistance which the EEC grants Yugoslavia;
8. Encourage application of the agreements between the Polish state and strikers of September 1980 by affording Poland economic and food assistance;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 3rd December 1980 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Sixth Ordinary Session (13th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Hardy on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 855).

9. Pursue efforts undertaken in the framework of nine-power consultations to promote the establishment of a just peace in the Middle East;
10. Examine the possibility of full financial assistance and, if necessary, supplies of military equipment to the Afghan resistance movements until the USSR proves it is ready to negotiate the withdrawal of its forces from Afghanistan;
11. Together with all the arms-exporting countries, seek to confine deliveries of military equipment within the obligations of member states under the Charter of the United Nations;
12. Show its determination to use all necessary means to keep the Strait of Hormuz open to shipping;
13. Do its utmost to circumscribe the conflict between Iran and Iraq, to obtain a cease-fire and to seek the conditions for a fair and lasting peace between these two countries;
14. Maintain its support for the efforts of the United States with a view to obtaining the liberation of the American diplomats being held hostage in Tehran.

**REPLY OF THE COUNCIL<sup>1</sup>*****to Recommendation 361***

1. The member states of WEU have always considered détente to be a worldwide, indivisible and general process implying, *inter alia*, respect for the principles of international law and peaceful coexistence among states. Since the invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet troops, they have unceasingly and vigorously denounced this act of intervention which has been condemned by the great majority of the international community and which constitutes an unacceptable violation of the United Nations Charter and the principles enshrined in the final act of Helsinki. The WEU member states call for an immediate withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan, and call upon all parties concerned to work for the urgent achievement of a political solution and the creation of the necessary conditions which would enable the Afghan refugees to return voluntarily to their homes in safety and honour. The WEU member states reconfirm the right of the Afghan people to determine their own form of government and to choose their economic, political and social system free from outside intervention, subversion, coercion or constraint of any kind whatsoever. The WEU member states repeat that preservation of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and neutral and non-aligned character of Afghanistan is essential for a peaceful solution of the problem.

2. The governments of the WEU member states, concerned to seek in the appropriate institutions the broadest possible consultations, have on numerous occasions expressed their determination to do their utmost to bring about full implementation of the provisions of the Helsinki final act by all the signatory countries. During the first phase of the Madrid meeting, devoted to reviewing the implementation of the final act in the past two years since the Belgrade review meeting, the delegations of the signatory countries of the Paris Agreements made firm statements to this effect.

3. During the second phase devoted to the discussion of new proposals they are striving to bring about a substantial and balanced final document with concrete decisions in all spheres of the final act and in particular in the field of human rights, human contacts, information and military aspects of security.

4. As to the latter field, they fully support the proposal of one of the WEU member states for a conference on disarmament in Europe to negotiate initially militarily significant verifiable and binding confidence-building measures applying to the whole of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.

5. With regard to MBFR, those member countries participating in these negotiations tabled on 20th December 1979 new constructive proposals for a simplified phase I agreement designed to contribute to the early conclusion of such an agreement and thus open the way towards the establishment of parity in military manpower in Central Europe.

The Council reiterate their support for the SALT process. In this connection, they welcome the new United States Administration's intention to continue the SALT process. They also note that preliminary conversations took place in Geneva last autumn between the United States and the Soviet Union on medium-range nuclear weapons.

The withdrawal from Europe of 1,000 United States nuclear warheads in accordance with the decision taken at the special meeting of NATO Foreign and Defence Ministers on 12th December 1979 has been completed.

6. The Council recall that at the ministerial meeting of the Defence Planning Committee in December 1980 NATO clearly showed its will to improve its military potential, particularly following the events in Afghanistan and the Gulf. A statement along the same lines was made by the North Atlantic Council. It is now recognised by all that the efforts and sacrifices necessary for deterrence and defence at both conventional and nuclear level must be made. On this last point, the Council note that the implementation of the modernisation part of the decision of 12th December 1979 about theatre nuclear weapons in Europe is being continued by the countries concerned in line with the timetable designed to see the entry into service of the first systems by the end of 1983. The countries concerned again stress the importance of pursuing armaments modernisation and arms control negotiations as a parallel and complementary approach.

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1. Communicated to the Assembly on 8th May 1981.

7. The member countries of the European Community intend to maintain and deepen their close relations with Yugoslavia, with which they already have links through a trade and co-operation agreement.

8. At the conclusion of the meeting of the European Council in Luxembourg in December 1980, the Nine expressed their intention, in their relations with Poland, to conform strictly to the United Nations Charter and to the principles of the Helsinki final act.

In this context, they pointed out that in subscribing to these principles, the states signatory to the final act had undertaken in particular to:

- respect the right of every country to choose and freely develop its own political, social, economic and cultural system as well as to determine its own laws and regulations;
- refrain from any direct or indirect, individual or collective intervention in internal or external affairs which fall within the national competence of another signatory state regardless of their mutual relations;
- recognise the right of all people to pursue their own political, economic, social and cultural development as they see fit and without external interference.

The Nine accordingly called upon all the signatory states to abide by these principles with regard to Poland and to the Polish people. They emphasised that any other attitude would have very serious consequences for the future of international relations in Europe and throughout the world.

They forthwith took a series of measures designed to meet the requests for economic aid which had been made to them by Poland.

9. In accordance with their intention, clearly expressed in their declaration of 13th June 1980, issued at Venice, to work more positively for peace and to make the necessary contacts with all parties concerned, the Nine entrusted the Presidency of the Council with a contact-making mission which was carried out by Mr. Thorn during the second half of 1980.

A report was prepared in the framework of political co-operation, designed to give a positive content to the principles of the Venice declaration, in accordance with the instructions of the Foreign Ministers of the Nine, given on 15th September 1980.

This work was approved by the Foreign Ministers of the Nine in Brussels on 24th and 25th November and by the European Council in Luxembourg on 1st and 2nd December.

To ensure a more thorough consideration of the formulae set out in the report thus approved and with a view to encouraging a climate more favourable to negotiations, the European Council decided to make further contacts with the parties concerned at the same time as the report was considered within their own group.

The Foreign Ministers of the Ten, meeting in Brussels on 20th January 1981, instructed the Netherlands Presidency to continue this European action.

10. Member countries are aware that the occupation of Afghanistan by Soviet troops brings severe hardship to the Afghan people and causes a massive outflow of refugees. They express once again their readiness to take and to support any initiative designed to promote a political solution which would provide for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan, ensure the free exercise by the Afghan people of the right of self-determination and enable Afghanistan to recover its traditional position as an independent, neutral and non-aligned state. It is in this spirit that they welcome the initiative which formed the subject of the United Nations resolution of 20th November 1980, and that recently put forward by France.

11. Each government intends, for its own part, scrupulously to comply with the provisions of the United Nations Charter, including those concerning international security, and binding decisions of the Security Council taken in accordance with Chapter VII.

12. On 23rd September 1980, the Foreign Ministers of the Nine, meeting in New York, in a statement on the conflict between Iran and Iraq, emphasised "the vital importance for the entire international community of freedom of navigation in the Gulf, with which it is imperative not to interfere".

13. In the same statement, the Nine expressed their deep concern at the military confrontation between Iraq and Iran. Noting the bilateral nature of the current conflict, they emphasised the need to avoid any action which could lead to its escalation. In this connection, they trusted that

other states, notably the major powers, would continue to show restraint. They endorsed the appeal by the Secretary-General of the Islamic Conference for an immediate cease-fire and, with reference to the consultations initiated by Mr. Waldheim, Secretary-General of the United Nations, declared their willingness to support any international initiative that could lead to a political settlement of the dispute.

14. On 20th January 1981, the Ten expressed their great satisfaction at the decision of the Iranian authorities to free, safe and sound, the members of the staff of the United States Embassy in Tehran who had been held hostage for more than a year.

The Ten therefore considered that measures taken against Iran following their declarations of 22nd April and 18th May 1980 were no longer necessary and that each member state should take steps it considered appropriate to re-establish satisfactory relations.

In the same context, the Ten also appealed to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to hasten the freeing of the four British nationals still held in that country. Three of these hostages have subsequently been released.

**RECOMMENDATION 362<sup>1</sup>**

***on international industrial consortia  
and collaborative arrangements for the  
production of high technology military equipment<sup>2</sup>***

The Assembly,

Aware that in spite of repeated political recommendations and constant efforts at an official level progress towards the standardisation and interoperability of defence equipment within the western Alliance remains inadequate;

Conscious that as economic recession and the growth in the price of petroleum products limit resources for defence and place additional constraints upon national defence budgets, improved cost-effectiveness in weapon procurement will become even more necessary;

Believing that collaborative definition, development and production of high technology defence equipment can bring substantial benefits of commonality between the procuring services in Europe as well as important savings in development costs, and a larger assured market for the participating industrial companies;

Understanding the need to preserve as widely as possible within the European armaments industry an independent capability to design, develop and build high technology weapons systems;

Realising that the impetus towards collaborative defence equipment projects should be commercial and industrial as well as military and logistic;

Considering that differences in operational requirements and procurement time-scales continue to be an unnecessarily major obstacle to effective international collaboration in the field of military equipment in Europe;

Convinced that progress towards more effective collaboration in the high technology military equipment sector lies not through the evolution of new bureaucratic structures but by a practical and pragmatic approach at an industrial level, allied to the closest co-operation between national military staffs and above all a common political will shared at the highest level in Europe to see joint collaborative solutions to the individual requirements of Alliance nations,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Monitor on a regular basis through the Standing Armaments Committee progress towards achieving the interoperability and standardisation of defence equipment within the Alliance, and encourage where practical Western European industrial collaboration to achieve these objectives;
2. Persuade the governments of the Western European Union countries to establish a link whereby the Assembly of Western European Union is kept regularly informed of the work of the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) as this Assembly is the only European parliamentary assembly with a *locus standi* established by treaty on defence matters, and has invaluable connections with national parliaments and ministers;
3. Invite the governments of member countries to convene a West European strategic summit at the earliest practical opportunity to seek agreement at the highest political level on the collaborative definition and development of the next generation of military projects such as a new European combat aircraft (ECA) to replace the Jaguar in the French and British air forces and to replace the Phantom in the German air force;

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1. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1980 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Sixth Ordinary Session (14th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 863).



4. Promote a European policy for high technology weapons with a view to ensuring the development of a genuinely balanced transatlantic market whereby the standardisation of equipment within the North Atlantic Alliance as a whole would be enhanced: such a two-way street on a strictly equitable basis between the United States and Western Europe should involve on an increasing scale co-operative production programmes and the placing of offset work rather than outright purchases of equipment "off the shelf";
5. Press the member nations to ensure that when their military staffs issue requests for proposals (RFPs) to industrial manufacturers to meet a specified military requirement, they issue RFPs to existing industrial consortia as well as to individual firms;
6. Continue to press member countries working through the Independent European Programme Group to harmonise to the maximum extent possible the requirements of their armed forces and the joint phasing of their re-equipment plans.

**REPLY OF THE COUNCIL<sup>1</sup>**

***to Recommendation 362***

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1. In view of the specific tasks of WEU and NATO, it would be difficult to entrust the SAC with the task of "monitoring" the progress towards achieving the interoperability and standardisation of defence equipment within the Alliance. The Alliance, in fact, has its own structures for fulfilling this task and they do not need to be "overseen", as it were, by the SAC.

2. As the Council have in the past made clear to the Assembly, not all the member states of the IEPG are members of WEU. Consequently, it does not seem logical to establish the proposed link between the IEPG and the Assembly as this would imply that the latter would be supplied with information by nations that are not members of both institutions. Such information, therefore, can only be transmitted to the WEU parliamentarians within a national framework and insofar as their governments participate in the IEPG.

3. As the Assembly is aware, the development of co-operative armaments programmes is, moreover, a long and arduous task requiring, in the countries concerned, consensus with regard to industrial, economic, military and political interests. Co-operation in the matter of armaments is more readily achieved by pragmatic and patient endeavour than by declarations of principle, whose limitations have been shown by past experience.

4. The "transatlantic dialogue" and the "two-way street" are necessities. In order to implement them, two conditions must be met:

- European co-operation in the matter of armaments must first have acquired sufficient weight for the dialogue to be a balanced one;
- the problem of harmonising the standards in force on both sides of the Atlantic should be satisfactorily solved, as recently exemplified by the transfer of the Roland licence to the United States.

It should be emphasised in this context that the IEPG is striving to implement the transatlantic dialogue and has recently intensified its efforts in this direction.

5. The problem of "requests for proposals" issued by military staffs touches on an area of national prerogative that is very sensitive. It is up to member countries to decide the ways in which requests for proposals are passed on to industry.

6. The member states are in fact maintaining their efforts through the IEPG to harmonise to the maximum extent possible the requirements of their armies and their re-equipment plans. They clearly intend to continue these efforts.

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1. Communicated to the Assembly on 3rd April 1981.

RECOMMENDATION 363 <sup>1</sup>*on energy and security* <sup>2</sup>

The Assembly,

Convinced that the most important aim of any European energy policy should be to achieve maximum independence from imported oil in the shortest possible time;

Noting that costly long-term structural changes are needed to make a considerable reduction in oil consumption and Western Europe's dependence on imported energy for 63 % of its requirements;

Seriously concerned that since 1973 neither the Western European countries nor the western world as a whole has been able to implement proposals and decisions agreed upon either by the European Council or by the leaders of the main industrialised countries;

Endorsing the statement of the Venice summit conference of June 1980 in favour of the development of new coal and nuclear energy programmes as the only medium-term solutions to the energy problem;

Aware that while oil and raw materials, sea lanes for their transport and markets are becoming increasingly important strategically, Western European economies are becoming ever more dependent on trade with the East;

Conscious of the strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz, particularly in the light of the war between Iraq and Iran, especially for Western European oil imports from Persian Gulf states,

## RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member governments:

1. To adopt, in the absence of agreement to implement a stringent Western European policy, convergent energy measures, and, together with the United States, Canada and Japan, formulate a co-operative global economic strategy, and also provide the necessary financial means for their implementation;
2. To establish and implement common plans for energy self-sufficiency and common guidelines for better use and conservation of energy, and to encourage lower oil consumption and the use of other energy resources such as coal, nuclear means and renewable energy resources;
3. To implement the coal objectives formulated by the International Energy Agency coal industry advisory board;
4. To agree, for Western Europe's electricity requirements, on common plans for better use of the scarce uranium resources of the western world through increasingly widespread use of fast-breeder reactors which would consequently mean recycling spent fuel elements in order to recuperate uranium and to obtain plutonium for fast-breeder reactors or, in a mixture with uranium, for light-water reactors;
5. To determine the acceptable threshold of safety and security for imports of energy or rare raw materials by the western world from the eastern bloc countries;
6. To participate in contingency plans for keeping open all international shipping lanes, such as the Strait of Hormuz.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1980 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Sixth Ordinary Session (14th Sitting).

2 Explanatory Memorandum, see the Report tabled by Mr. Flämig on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 856).

**REPLY OF THE COUNCIL<sup>1</sup>*****to Recommendation 363***

The Council share the views expressed and the concern shown by the Assembly in the preamble to Recommendation 363. The following observations can be made about the individual points in the recommendation:

1. The member countries, fully aware of the practical constraints on the development of an energy policy common to all western countries, are making the maximum effort, both in the European Community and together with other western countries including the United States, Canada and Japan, in the framework of the IEA towards the adoption of convergent energy measures and a common economic strategy. In this connection, it is sufficient to quote, in addition to the summit meetings of the seven main industrialised countries, the measures agreed by the energy ministers of the European Community on 27th November 1980 and those adopted by the International Energy Agency on 9th December 1980.

2. The member states have acknowledged the need to move towards energy self-sufficiency by reducing dependence on imported oil, more rational and efficient use of energy, and where possible the development of alternative sources such as coal, nuclear energy or other sources of renewable energy. To this end, they have agreed energy policy guidelines for the decade to 1990 and they have agreed action on energy conservation. Member states are also pursuing research and development activity in the energy sector. The key rôle of economic energy pricing in achieving agreed objectives has been recognised. In addition to existing schemes for dealing with a situation of oil supply crisis, member states are currently considering the possibility of arrangements which will alleviate difficulties in the event of temporary or less serious oil supply shortfall.

3. The energy ministers of the member countries of the International Energy Agency (IEA), as reported in the communiqué resulting from their meeting of 9th December 1980, agreed with the main conclusions of the Coal Industry Advisory Board (CIAB) and undertook to examine closely the recommendations put forward and adopt, if appropriate, the required measures.

4. In line with the results of the international nuclear fuel cycle evaluation (INFCE) study, which highlighted the need to apply techniques leading to the maximum economies in the use of uranium, most member countries agreed on the need for wider use of fast-breeder reactors and on making provision also for the possibility of thermal recycling of plutonium. The EEC also demonstrated its sympathy with this orientation by approving the three-point nuclear plan.

5. In order to ensure the continuity of supply of energy and raw materials as much as possible, the Council consider diversification of sources of supply to be desirable. The question of imports of energy from Eastern European countries is to be carefully examined.

6. The member countries, in the European political co-operation (EPC) framework, and through the declaration in New-York by the foreign ministers of the Nine on 23rd September 1980, immediately after the worsening of the dispute between Iran and Iraq and its extension into a general conflict, stated the following:

- deep concern about a military confrontation in a region of vital importance to the whole international community ;
- the need to ensure freedom of navigation in the Gulf ;
- their endorsement of the appeal by the Secretary-General of the Islamic Conference and the action of the Secretary-General of the United Nations with a view to an immediate cease-fire and avoidance of any escalation of the conflict ;
- the willingness of the Nine to support any international initiative that could lead to a settlement of the dispute and to assist in the search for a solution.

The action of the member countries, therefore, appears to have been based so far on two considerations: first, to achieve an early cease-fire that would spare the population both grief and suffering and facilitate a negotiated settlement of the conflict in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations ; secondly to safeguard the interests of the entire international community by ensuring freedom of navigation in the Gulf, which must not in any way be threatened or impeded.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 29th April 1981.

*Written Questions 224 and 225 and the replies of the Council***QUESTION 224**

*put by Mr. Wilkinson  
on 25th February 1981*

224. Can the Council confirm that the new Social Security Agreement to be signed between Western European Union and the United Kingdom Government will allow members of the staff to be affiliated with effect from 1975 to Class 1 of the British National Insurance Scheme on the same basis as staff of other diplomatic missions, that is without contributions from the member governments as employers?

Can the Council confirm that, in the case of Western European Union staff members exempted from Class 1 affiliation, the contributions paid by the employer and employee since the introduction of a new scheme in 1975 will be refunded?

**REPLY OF THE COUNCIL**

*communicated to the Assembly  
on 8th May 1981*

224. Western European Union, as an international organisation comprising the Council, its subsidiary bodies and the Assembly, is governed by the "Agreement on the status of Western European Union, national representatives and international staff" signed in Paris by the member states on 11th May 1955.

As regards the social security scheme applicable to WEU staff serving in the United Kingdom, the staff rules, as approved by the Council, stipulate that staff members shall contribute to the social security scheme of the host country "in accordance with the agreements concluded between WEU and the country concerned".

Following the introduction of a new social security scheme in the United Kingdom in 1975, on the one hand, and the entry into force of the pension scheme rules of the co-ordinated organisations, on the other hand, negotiations were started, and are still being pursued, between the Council and the United Kingdom authorities.

The agreement to be concluded will of course be based on the whole of the principles enunciated in the abovementioned texts.

**QUESTION 225**

*put by Sir Frederic Bennett  
on 3rd March 1981*

225. Would the Council indicate what measures WEU member countries have taken or are contemplating taking to assist the Afghan resistance movements?

Have some of these countries delivered, or are they planning to deliver, the weapons which the resistance movements urgently require?

**REPLY OF THE COUNCIL**

*communicated to the Assembly  
on 29th April 1981*

225. The WEU member countries recognise in the Afghan people's resistance an essential factor in the crisis brought about by the Soviet military intervention. They consider that any true political settlement of this crisis must take this reality into account.

Naturally, the WEU member countries are concerned to act at the level where they could be effective, namely by organising international humanitarian aid to the peoples of Afghanistan driven from their country by the hunger and fighting.

*Future of European space activities –  
reply to the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council*

**REPORT<sup>1</sup>**

*submitted on behalf of the  
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions<sup>2</sup>  
by Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur*

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APPENDIX

The space shuttle

1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee:* Mr. Valleix (Chairman); MM. Lenzer, Wilkinson (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Adriaensens, Amadei, Antoni, Cornelissen (Alternate: *Portheine*), Fiandrotti (Alternate: *Orione*), Forma (Alternate: *Spitella*),

Garrett (Alternate: *Gourlay*), Hawkins, Konings, McGuire (Alternate: *Hill*), Malvy, Manning (Alternate: *Pensky*), Péronnet, Prussen, Spies von Büllenheim, Topmann, van Waterschoot (Alternate: Mrs. *Staels-Dompas*).

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

***Draft Recommendation***

*on the future of European space activities –  
reply to the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council*

The Assembly,

Considering the continuous efforts of the Soviet Union and the United States in the field of civil and military space research and applications;

Considering also the growing space budgets of Japan, Brazil, India and other non-European countries;

Concerned about the slow progress in establishing a new European space programme and the low total budget proposed;

Regretting that too many parts of this programme are optional, not mandatory;

Welcoming the successful test-flight of the shuttle Columbia which will allow full use to be made of the European Spacelab;

Regretting the reluctance to prepare and convene a meeting of the ESA Ministerial Council to give political impetus, direction and commitment to the European Space Agency,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge the governments of member states :

1. To elaborate long-term European space planning : to identify a space strategy for Europe and the related technical, industrial and commercial objectives to be met;
2. To ensure that Spacelab's potential is fully utilised for scientific trials and experiments in such areas as earth and stellar observation and microgravity research in life sciences and materials processing;
3. To pursue the further development of Ariane up to Ariane 4;
4. To agree on an earth resources satellite programme further to the Meteosat meteorological programme and to intensify the telecommunications technology programme;
5. To promote, in a North Atlantic Alliance context, the exploitation of European military communication and observation satellites and the investigation of the military implications of space technology;
6. To mobilise political and public opinion for an expanded European space programme in view of the scientific and industrial benefits to be derived from such potential future programmes as inter-planetary missions and manned space flight.

## *Explanatory Memorandum*

*(submitted by Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur)*

### I. *General remarks*

1. Since 1978, the Assembly's reports have placed great emphasis on the need to prepare a policy defining the medium- and long-term goals of the European Space Agency and their financial implications. Several times the Assembly has recommended setting up a study group to define a coherent programme. Now, nearly three years later, the authorities have to admit that the Agency lacks such goals. There are two reasons for this. First, the Agency has two major programmes – Ariane and Spacelab – for which France and Germany respectively provide most of the financial backing. In view of the high cost of these programmes, considerable emphasis has been placed on them; somewhat to the detriment of long-term planning. The second reason is that one of the larger member countries complained that its industrial return was not sufficient, and this problem was not solved until the beginning of 1980, thus blocking the definition and elaboration of future goals.

2. The Assembly has also suggested on several occasions that the Agency needed more closely involved political guidance and, more recently, in its report on a European earth resources detection satellite programme, the Assembly recommended that the Chairman-in-Office of the ESA Ministerial Council should prepare and convene a Council meeting in the near future to establish a European space policy since ESA was at a crossroads for its new programmes.

3. In its May 1980 proposals for a European long-term space policy, Eurospace strongly recommended forming a ministerial-level body similar to the European Space Conference. It proposed that a more effective decision-taking procedure should be adopted. Major long-term objectives should be proposed and the Chairman-in-Office should take the necessary steps to obtain general consensus on future plans.

4. Ministerial backing is of course necessary to promote ESA's work and a uniform space policy for Europe, but this calls for a minimum level of resources for the Agency and here the picture is also rather dark. Although it is true that at the end of 1980, for the first time in four years ESA's budget was approved before the new year started, the 1981 budget has been reduced from some 730 MAU to some 610 MAU and further cuts might be imposed by ESA's member countries. This, of course, is

extremely serious as it will mean reductions in ESA's work programme.

5. The basic reason for the existence of ESA was that no European country alone was able to invest enough money in space activities to play a worthwhile rôle. Individually, European countries are too small to be able to compete with the two superpowers, but if they are not capable of adopting a sufficient number of major joint programmes, ESA's very existence will be in jeopardy. There is already a split within ESA in the telecommunications field, with France and Germany versus the other countries. If the main European countries cannot achieve their ambitions in the framework of ESA they may seek bilateral arrangements or participation in programmes of the two world powers. Space is of course not the only branch that suffers from a lack of European ambition and organisation; the same is true for nuclear matters, defence research and research on computers and telematics.

6. From the very beginning the European countries have had contradictory motives for starting space activities and research. In the 1960s the main motive was science and technology. However, participation in space research very soon became so expensive that governments could be persuaded to invest only if returns could be guaranteed for their industries in employment and in balance of payment terms. Thus, other motives began playing important rôles alongside scientific research. There was also the political view that Europe should not be obliged to use American satellites for its scientific research. Moreover, it soon became apparent that to gain the maximum scientific and technological expertise and to exploit it to the full, Europe had to build its own satellites. Once this had been decided, the question of course arose as to whether Europe should build its own launcher.

7. In the early 1970s it became plain that the American Government, although willing to let Europe in on the scientific side, was far less generous once industrial and economic considerations came into play. This came very much to the fore during the Intelsat negotiations. Statements by the Nixon government added to the fear that, once the Americans had a monopoly, Europe would have to pay a high price for American services in telecommunications, meteorology, earth resources and other application satellites.



8. All these considerations played a rôle in the setting up of ESA. It was decided that all member states of the future European Space Agency would be obliged to pay their part of the budget covering the scientific work and the general budget essential to the existence of the Agency, i.e. about 27% of the overall budget. Apart from that there were three optional programmes: one backed by France for the European launcher, another backed by Germany – Spacelab – which would assure transatlantic collaboration with the United States, and a third backed by the United Kingdom for maritime satellites which were of great importance for the United Kingdom's industry and its worldwide communications.

9. In addition to these three optional programmes, three other optional programmes were agreed to: Meteosat, European telecommunications satellite system (OTS, ECS), and Aerosat in conjunction with the United States and Canada. The last was abandoned as United States interest waned fast when budgetary problems arose in the United States and it became clear that North Atlantic air space would not become saturated since the introduction of wide-bodied aircraft had restricted the growth of aircraft movements and the introduction of inertial navigating systems had reduced the problems of navigation and transatlantic air traffic management.

10. With the increased success of meteorological and telecommunications satellites, an additional difficulty arose for ESA because of the need to find an outlet for the industrial products it had promoted. Several countries were of the opinion that ESA's rôle lay in research and development and not in operating or even developing commercial systems. Some of the smaller countries were inclined to leave ESA a greater rôle in this field but the more important member states believed that, especially when export propositions were made, the political complications were far too great to be handled by such an intergovernmental organisation.

11. The same difficulty had arisen in NASA in the field of telecommunications. Here, too, once the satellites were developed NASA was requested to hand them over to industry and governmental organisations. However, it soon became evident that research and development in building satellites was extremely expensive and as developments in telecommunications techniques were so rapid NASA was again given a major rôle in this field. For instance, in two years its budget has increased from some \$275 million to \$382 million for space applications.

12. There is no doubt that the rôle of ESA will have to be redefined in terms of its contacts with the user communities. In certain cases,

such as telecommunications, where the national states have a monopoly position through their postal administrations, user communities can be clearly established. This is the case with Eutelsat. In 1977, an agreement on the constitution of a provisional European telecommunications satellite organisation "Interim Eutelsat" was drawn up. There were twenty-six European signatories to the agreement. The aims of the Eutelsat organisation were laid down in the preamble of the agreement which stated that it was desirable to establish a provisional organisation, pending the working out of the final organisation, for operating commercial satellite telecommunications systems, including all telecommunications services established by the European telecommunications administrations. The rights and obligations with regard to the Intelsat system, established in 1973, were taken into consideration as well as those of the Inmarsat system, resulting from the 1976 convention on the international maritime satellite organisation. An arrangement between ESA and Interim Eutelsat on the setting up of a European regional communications satellite system, ECS, entered into force on 15th May 1979. Special provisions have also been adopted with regard to activities relating to the orbital test satellite (OTS).

13. In January 1981, a conference attended by the meteorological authorities and/or institutes of seventeen European countries was held to discuss the formation of Eumetsat. In this respect your Rapporteur wishes to refer to Recommendation 328 in which the Assembly recommended the "formation of an organisation by the European meteorological services or institutes to start the operational phase of a European meteorological satellite system 'Eurometsat' similar to the 'Eutelsat' of the European postal authorities;". The results of this meeting have not yet been transformed into a formal organisation and plan, but it is thought that an operational European meteorological satellite capability would imply the building of four or five meteorological satellites. Here too a users' entity ought to be established, and ESA could play a promotional rôle.

14. In the field of earth resources satellites users' interests are far more difficult to classify. In the framework of the European Communities the Ispra joint research centre (JRC) is doing important work on the applications of remote sensing. They are assessing and defining the scientific and commercial requirements of potential user groups in both land and ocean resources. However, even in contact with user groups, it will be extremely difficult to predict the scientific and commercial requirements for remote sensing satellite systems over the next ten to fifteen years. There is every reason to suppose that investment costs and exploitation

will rise steeply. Competition will increase, especially from the United States where satellites are being produced in greater numbers than in Europe. ESA is at present working on its first remote-sensing satellite ERS-I, intended for ocean applications and planned for launch in 1986-87. The project will be submitted for formal approval in June of this year.

15. In some ways one might say that Europe can learn something from America about users' needs and the possibility of meeting them but, on the other hand, conditions in Europe are so different that European requirements are also quite different from those in the United States.

16. In the field of telecommunications there is the language barrier which is an obstacle to progress in Europe. For the Americans there is no hindrance to heavy traffic between Los Angeles and New York, whereas there is hardly any traffic between Rome and Oslo. Often the language barrier is also a national barrier, which means the development of communications for medium-range or even short distances. In the United States, for instance, there is a free enterprise system for television, but the situation in Europe is very different as practically everywhere public authorities have a monopoly or near monopoly.

17. Europe should also learn from NASA's experiences with the shuttle programme. Assuming the shuttle is a success, the United States will have a revolutionary means of space travel, but for what purpose? NASA developed the shuttle<sup>1</sup> without a detailed long-range programme for its use. In fact, during the decade of shuttle development NASA was expressly forbidden to commit itself to any specific major projects for using the shuttle's special capabilities.

18. The shuttles will not lack applications when they become operational. NASA reports that it already has commitments for cargoes on the first sixty or so shuttle missions. About one-third of these missions have been reserved by the United States air force for deploying its communications, navigation, weather and surveillance satellites. Most of the other future missions have been spoken for by domestic and international communications operators, the one really profitable activity in space to date.

19. Even though these activities promise the most certain short-term return on investment, the shuttle constitutes for them little more than a more efficient substitute for conventional and expendable rocket launching systems.

20. One exception is the giant space telescope, which is supposed to be deployed in

earth orbit by the shuttle in 1985. This 96-inch telescope, operating high above the distorting effect of the atmosphere, should enable astronomers for the first time to see any planets around nearby stars, to observe objects 100 times dimmer than those that can be seen through ground-based telescopes and perhaps to detect light emanating from the very edge of the visible universe. Not only would the telescope be larger than anything that could be launched by conventional rockets, but its orbital lifetime should extend into the next century because of periodic visits by shuttle astronauts bringing up replacement parts and fuel.

21. In recent years, since the Apollo programme, American scientific space exploration has in some respects been more hurt than helped by the shuttle. Its development cost of \$10 billion siphoned off money that might have gone to new scientific projects, and its many delays caused costly postponements in those few projects that were initiated.

## II. *Military aspects of space*

22. In his book "US-Soviet Military Balance, Concepts and Capabilities 1960-1980", Mr. John M. Collins, a senior specialist in national defence at the United States Library of Congress, wrote about space defence as follows:

"The treaty on principles governing the activities of states in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies was signed in Washington, London and Moscow on January 27, 1967. Article IV obligates signatories 'not to place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner... The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies shall be forbidden.'

Whether space really will remain a sanctuary is still to be seen, since both sides are experimenting with 'Star Wars' systems which, if successfully deployed, could decisively tip the US/Soviet balance. Neither side seems in any position to do so soon, but Soviet activities with military potential far exceed US programmes.

The United States only now is beginning to develop military space doctrine that formulates requirements and recommends a structure to organise, train, equip, and

1. See Appendix.

sustain forces as yet unformed. A major military space command appears to be a possibility, but lacks a potent sponsor. Stress at this stage is on communications satellites, space sensors, and passive protection for such products. Active defence is scarcely a concept, except for ASAT (anti-satellite satellite), where one or more options being explored may produce a prototype. Space-based defence against ballistic missiles incites mild interest, but not enough to push the priority.

The Soviets, who excelled in space until Sputnik spurred US science in 1957, still suffer from serious technological flaws. Once again, however, they are outstripping the United States in important respects, such as manned flights and space medicine. Interceptor satellite systems in gestation are attracting US attention. So are laser and beam weapon applications, which could pay off unexpectedly.

Present space trends thus could cause this country to play 'catchup' again with less leeway than conditions allowed before, unless we take positive steps to stay ahead of the Soviet power curve."

23. One such step is the development of the new space transportation system of which the space shuttle is the key element. The development of the shuttle has been delayed for about three years and further operational test flights will now take place in the autumn of 1981. It will be the first reusable space vehicle and is designed to carry many different types of payload to and from low earth orbit. It will be able to retrieve payloads from orbit for reuse, service and repair satellites in space and carry space laboratories into orbit, operate them and bring them back. The shuttle will consist of a reusable delta-wing orbiter vehicle with three main engines, an expendable propellant tank and reusable twin solid rocket boosters.

24. The shuttle's capabilities will lower the costs of space operations and lead to savings in the cost of payloads. Anticipated savings reside in the repair and reuse of payloads and fewer weight and size constraints.

25. The shuttle development programme is making good progress following the vehicle's spectacular first test flight from 12th to 14th April 1981. The main emphasis now is on preparation for the second manned orbital flight.

26. The second orbiter will be virtually completed this summer and production of the third and fourth orbiter vehicles will be stepped up for delivery in support of defence missions at Vandenberg air force base.

27. Department of Defence space systems are increasingly important for support of United States military forces. Evidence of this growing importance of space activities is seen in the fact that annual funding for all space-related defence efforts has doubled over the past five years and further increases are planned for the future.

28. The space shuttle programme will be used for defence purposes from 1983 onwards, with the first operational shuttle launch. The transition will be completed in 1986 and from then onwards national security space missions will become almost totally dependent on the shuttle. The main areas of interest are communications, navigation, early warning, surveillance and weather forecasting. Compared with existing launchers the shuttle will offer increased reliability, increased payload weight and volume capacity. It will provide a capability to recover and refurbish spacecraft or experiments and assemble large structures in space. The most important advantage of the shuttle is increased flexibility.

29. In fiscal year 1980 the United States Defence Department paid some \$470 million for the shuttle's development, and in fiscal year 1981 this will be \$512 million. The total amount for aeronautical research and development to be spent by the Department of Defence in fiscal year 1981 will be \$2,233 million. This research and development is concerned with technology for tactical and strategic aircraft, cruise missiles, early warning aircraft, ground and ocean surveillance, amphibious and air assault mobility and air mobile command, control, and communications. The principal objectives are to achieve new operational concepts and capabilities and to replace and modernise the operational aircraft inventory.

30. Document 773 of 17th May 1978 on United States-European co-operation and competition in advanced technology, written after the Committee's visit to the United States, mentioned new developments in the United States defence satellite communication system. The system is a high-capacity super-high frequency system intended to satisfy American national communications requirements for worldwide military command and control, intelligence and information transfer. Apart from the requirements of the highest civil and military authorities, it also covers diplomatic telecommunication needs. Since 1968, the year in which the system was approved, a whole series of communications satellites has been placed in orbit.

31. The air force satellite communications system has been developed gradually and now consists of some sixteen satellites, the first of which was launched in 1971. The system will

be completed in 1983. At the same time a memorandum of understanding on satellite communications was signed between the United States and British Governments and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. A number of NATO Satcom-III A and B satellites have been launched and incorporated in the American system.

32. The fleet satellite communications system which is now in production will improve naval communications to meet the needs of the fleet in the early 1980s. High frequency radio communications have served for years but are vulnerable to jamming. Natural phenomena can cause interruptions. The new system provides protection against jamming for fleet broadcast transmissions, for instance from shore commands to ships, is highly available and allows link-ups between ships and other naval elements in an ocean area. The fleet satellite communications system can also be made to fit into the air force system. Terminal equipment will be installed on board ships and the installation programme will continue through the 1980s. Three satellites were launched in 1979 and 1980 to provide ultra-high frequency service over the continental United States, the Atlantic Ocean and Indian Ocean areas. The fourth and fifth spacecraft will be launched in fiscal year 1981.

33. The search and rescue mission project is based on this type of satellite which has become an aid in detecting and locating distress beacons carried by aircraft and ships. It is of great importance during emergencies and the project is planned as an international co-operative effort which will include Canada and France, and eventually other countries.

34. The United States depends primarily on its satellite early warning system for alert in case of a ballistic missile attack. The satellite system consists of three satellites deployed in orbit over the eastern and western hemispheres to cover the Soviet ballistic missile launch areas. In 1981 and 1982 the accuracy and operational life of the system in orbit will be improved.

35. The defence meteorological satellite programme supports a wide variety of defence activities from special strategic missions to tactical air operations and anti-submarine warfare to global weather analysis. The programme is a joint service programme with the air force acting as the executive service. The navy has established terminals on all major aircraft carriers. Land-based versions of the equipment are operating at San Diego and Rota in Spain. The two-satellite constellation provides global data coverage four times a day. The civil and military satellite weather programmes use the same basic satellite structure but are main-

tained and operated separately. The present type of satellite can be modified in order to be launched by the shuttle.

36. The development of a long-range worldwide ocean surveillance capability was begun in 1980 in order to meet the requirements for global surveillance in the 1980s and perhaps the 1990s. The navy is evaluating the airborne warning and control system (AWACS) as a complementary ocean surveillance and over-the-horizon targeting system.

37. The United States is therefore becoming increasingly dependent on space systems for the effective use of its military forces. The four principal elements of the United States space development programme are improved space surveillance, increased satellite system survivability, development of anti-satellite capabilities and command, control and communications support.

38. The Soviets have developed and tested an anti-satellite interceptor which may have an operational capability against United States satellites. These developments represent a threat to the continued use of space by United States military satellites. The primary United States anti-satellite effort is the development of a high-technology interceptor using a miniature vehicle which directly impacts the satellite. The aircraft to be used will be the F-15 equipped with a two-stage booster to launch the vehicle.

39. The Soviet space programme continues to be more military in character than that of the United States and it appears to be improving in operational capability as well as reliability. The improvements of the last years represent significant advances in both technology and operations to support their military and civilian objectives. They have achieved mature operational capabilities in space communications, meteorology, navigation, surveillance and manned orbital flight.

40. The latest Soviet test of an anti-satellite interceptor took place on 14th March 1981 and, according to the American Defence Department, it used a radar seeker to attack the target vehicle. The interceptor exploded and damaged the target vehicle. The Soviets have also used infrared seekers for their anti-satellite system.

41. As soon as the shuttle becomes operational the American Defence Department will launch an elaborate observation satellite system which will be much larger than existing satellites. The satellites, equipped with infrared sensors, will be used to monitor Soviet space objects. However, until the shuttle has proved itself, the Defence Department will probably avoid any change in satellite design unless

called for by a change in military technology. At present the main problem is that nobody can be sure when it will be possible to drop designs compatible with conventional launchers.

42. However, if the shuttle proves successful, the American military authorities may wish to develop and establish a military space station. This could be a permanent multi-man command centre in orbit, using the shuttle to ferry both equipment and personnel. Military astronauts could keep track of troopship and aircraft movements, monitor missile deployment and testing, and inspect potentially hostile satellites, destroying them if necessary.

### **III. Aspects of co-operation between the United States and Europe**

43. In 1980 the European Space Agency spent well over \$ 700 million on space applications and space science programmes, including the development and successful first flight of the European Ariane launcher. If national space programmes are included, Western Europe currently spends over \$ 1 billion per year on space activities.

44. The result of these substantial and sustained investments is that important space capabilities now exist or are rapidly emerging in Western Europe. Europe's major investment in the Ariane launcher was prompted by a desire for autonomy vis-à-vis the United States and to be able to offer its satellite customers a full service, including a launch capability. The question remains as to whether this capability can become economically viable compared to the space shuttle.

45. The same enhanced capabilities could also make Europe a more productive, co-operative partner of the United States. For example, ESA's considerable and very successful experience with scientific satellites has opened the way for United States-European joint research projects. A good example of this was the international solar-polar mission in which ESA and NASA were each to produce almost identical spacecraft that would operate on the opposite poles of the sun and could be of great scientific benefit. This would have been the first time the sun would have been observed from above its polar regions. The mission could have greatly increased knowledge of the sun which today is based on observation from earth or earth orbit. ESA's contribution was estimated at about \$ 100 million – a significant part of its overall science budget for the next few years.

46. The joint mission was expected to take place in 1985. However, President Reagan's new administration reduced the NASA budget to \$ 6.1 billion which meant that the United States solar-polar spacecraft, worth \$ 53 million in fiscal year 1982, had to be cancelled. The estimate for the whole project as far as the United States was concerned was \$ 230-280 million. The financing of other new applications programmes and space science was also suspended or cancelled.

47. ESA had already accepted costly changes in other joint programmes and it was therefore extremely disappointed in the proposals of the new administration. This unilateral American action reduces this mission to a single European Space Agency spacecraft which will now probably be launched in 1986 by a shuttle with a Centaur upper stage, unless the United States authorities reverse their position on the joint mission in the near future due to concerted pressure of ESA and its member states.

48. The shuttle is the centrepiece of the overall space transportation system. Three test flights are foreseen for 1981 and one test flight in the beginning of 1982. If these are successful, operational flights will start in September 1982. The space transportation system involves important direct foreign and especially ESA contributions. Again for reasons of economy, NASA has decided to cancel the planetary version of Boeing's inertial upper stage (IUS), and instead proposes to develop General Dynamics' Centaur upper stage. NASA's change in programme for the upper stage involves several changes in mission planning involving revision and re-evaluation of the ESA satellite. Design changes made early in the programme are relatively easy and cheap, but with the solar-polar programme the cost increase will be about \$ 20 million. It might even affect United States-European space co-operation.

49. ESA has invested some \$ 850 million in the development and production of the first Spacelab which is now being delivered. Under the NASA-ESA memorandum of understanding signed in 1973 the United States agreed to buy a second flight unit. This was done in January 1981. For the first time NASA bought an important piece of hardware from Europe. Its cost is \$ 120 million. The first Spacelab flight will be a joint ESA-NASA mission and will carry scientific experiments presently being developed in Europe and the United States. Originally it was planned that by 1986 there would be approximately twelve flights per year for Spacelab experiments. Under President Carter's administration this was reduced to four or five missions in the 1986 period and the new administration is reducing it to as little as one or two missions per year in the 1980s.

50. On 28th November 1980 the engineering mock-up of Spacelab was delivered to NASA. This is an engineering model of Spacelab, but it is not intended for flight. Europe will deliver flight units 1 and 2, FU-1 and FU-2, in June and September 1981 respectively. The delivery of the engineering model was the first major transfer of Spacelab hardware to NASA under the ESA-NASA memorandum of understanding signed in 1973. The first Spacelab flights are currently scheduled by NASA for September 1983 and August 1984.

51. On a number of occasions in the past, NASA has provided ESA with limited technical assistance in the development of the Spacelab. At one time eleven NASA civil service personnel were working on Spacelab in Europe. NASA's investment in the Spacelab development programme is estimated at some \$155 million. The principal elements of this estimate are the hardware and software elements to be used for mating the Spacelab with the space shuttle orbiter, the ground support equipment for processing Spacelab between missions, and the preparation of procedures and training of personnel for operating the system. NASA plans to conduct operations with two Spacelabs. The need for more Spacelabs will be evaluated when experience has been gained with the use of two.

52. Most probably NASA budgets for the next four years will be similarly restricted. Only the space shuttle is exempt from significant cuts for reasons of national security. Specific plans are being drawn up for shuttle operations related to American national security in order to ensure that it is properly employed to enhance the defence of the United States. One obvious consequence of this drip-feed funding is to attenuate Spacelab's potential value as its construction was considered to be Europe's means of becoming a full partner in the United States manned space flight programme.

53. Although the future of new co-operative efforts with the United States has become darker, there will still be a growing need for co-operation between Western Europe and the United States in the coming years, especially in the light of growing budgetary constraints on both sides of the Atlantic. International co-operation in scientific experiments is moreover not only necessary for financial reasons but also for the scientific benefits derived which enable a country to remain in the forefront of scientific developments.

54. If the decision to abandon its part of the solar-polar mission is not reversed either by the United States administration or by Congress, several questions will have to be evaluated by ESA in its consideration of a single probe

mission. ESA might also revise its policies towards future ESA-NASA co-operative ventures.

55. The European Space Agency is planning a scientific mission for 1985 which calls for a European Geos-type spacecraft to be placed on a course which will take it to within 1,000 km of the Halley comet when it next approaches earth. The spacecraft being developed from Geos is called Giotto. The Halley comet approaches earth once in every 75 years, the last approach being in 1910. As NASA did not have enough financial resources to undertake the Venus imaging radar mission (another inter-planetary mission) as well as the Halley observation, it made the proposal to ESA for a joint mission.

56. ESA's science programme committee wanted to use Europe's Ariane launcher as the NASA proposal to use an American Delta launcher could not be made a firm commitment. The United States had asked for more than one principal scientist to be chosen and the Europeans considered this too large a share for the Americans. Nevertheless, the United States is still expected to play a rôle in this European venture by providing some scientific experiments and also by renting to ESA the tracking and telemetry services of the deep space network.

#### IV. *A European space programme for the 1980s*

57. It is clear that space techniques can contribute to the fulfilment of European interests in a great many fields such as warning of natural disasters, monitoring world resources, pollution and many others. For instance, the use of telecommunication satellites and remote-sensing satellites can help very effectively in the fight against poverty and educational problems in the third world. The use of Spacelab can allow better pharmaceutical products to be prepared, thus helping in the field of medical care. Development of direct television satellites can lead to an increasing awareness of belonging to the Western European community. Earth resources satellites can clearly help in locating mineral resources and profitable fishing areas and in monitoring crops.

58. It is also imperative for Europe to have a say in space developments within the United Nations and other worldwide forums. European expenditure on space compared to that of the United States is 1 to 8; total European space expenditure – national and through ESA – is some \$1,000 million per year, total American expenditure is eight times this amount and that of NASA six times. Europe will therefore

never be fully competitive with the United States but it should aim to reach a competitive standard in a number of clearly-defined areas and become a qualified partner in specific major international ventures.

59. In order to make the most economic use of limited resources, the major portion of the totality of the European space budgets should be integrated in the ESA budget as stipulated in the ESA convention, now ratified, since October 1980, by all ESA member countries. Your Rapporteur has the clear impression, however, that in several countries there are pressures to spend an increasingly high proportion of national resources earmarked for space on national objectives. It would be extremely dangerous for such a trend to develop further. The Agency should remain the principal research and development organisation for all the main activities in the space field and national projects should be complementary to ESA programmes. Moreover in many fields, even in telecommunications, a central research and development organisation remains essential if Europe is to compete with the United States and Japan. The example of NASA which recently has again been given a major rôle in telecommunications should remain uppermost in the minds of European governments.

60. The programme now under discussion in ESA is a so-called baseline programme with a budget of some 450 million accounting units a year<sup>1</sup>, which is the absolute minimum programme to maintain Western Europe as a significant space partner in the 1980s. Whether even this minimum of 450 million accounting units will prove adequate is difficult to judge as it depends on how future programmes are defined, adopted and executed.

#### 1. *Space transportation systems*

61. In this programme there are two basic uncertainties: first, with regard to the space transportation system on which no definite decisions can be taken as long as Ariane is not operational and, second, in respect of Spacelab which, because of a two-and-a-half-year delay in the shuttle programme, will not be flown until 1983. Only experience can teach the lessons to be drawn from these two transportation systems. Whatever the results, preparatory efforts will be necessary to reach a definite decision on them by 1984-85.

62. A further development of the Ariane launcher, up to Ariane 4 in 1985-86, seems necessary in order to place in orbit new types of telecommunication satellites weighing 3,500 to

4,000 kilos. The need for Ariane 4 is therefore directly related to the size of the communications platforms envisaged for the 1985-90 period.

63. The cost-effectiveness of Ariane will also have to be improved in order to compete with launch vehicles of other countries, especially of the United States.

64. With regard to Spacelab, the main emphasis will have to be on the maximum use of its potential. Scientific experiments in the field of materials and life sciences will have to be pursued, several of them in co-operation with NASA. The Spacelab user community might grow as Spacelab demonstrates its operational usefulness.

65. From the very beginning the Spacelab development was meant to demonstrate Europe's ability to collaborate with the United States on a permanent basis – in a way, a ticket for a place in manned space flight. This made the high cost of Spacelab development acceptable for several European countries. It would be logical to continue the Spacelab development in order to achieve a better and more sophisticated type of space vehicle to be used for various types of missions. The length of its missions should be extended to up to twenty days and the second and third steps should seek to increase the autonomy of Spacelab within the framework of shuttle missions and, later, even lead to autonomous free-flying Spacelabs. In this way it would be able to serve as a platform for building sections for future space stations or service platforms. A long-term Spacelab programme, e.g. over a ten-year period, seems necessary in the light of the history of building launchers and spacecraft.

66. European Spacelab engineering expertise should be kept up to scratch and this will require continuous participation in the use of future Spacelab manned systems. It is noteworthy in this regard that West European scientists will fly on Spacelab missions, the only West Europeans to fly into space other than two French military officers scheduled to participate in a Soviet Salyut mission.

67. To remain competitive, European industry should stay in close touch with NASA and its plans by taking an active part in the activities of ESA. After 1983 it will be possible to draw on the experience of both Ariane and Spacelab and major decisions could then be taken by the governments concerned.

#### 2. *Space sciences*

68. The Agency's science programme has been blocked at a certain level of expenditure since the early 1970s due to the so-called pack-

1. At 1979 prices.

age deal on Ariane, Spacelab and Marecs. However, experiments conducted in scientific satellites tend to become more expensive and, at the same time, new areas of science such as microgravity are difficult to accommodate in the science budget.

69. A level of funding has to be reached adequate to support a European space programme which will enable related industries to develop their technologies while maintaining public interest in European space efforts through European participation in spectacular missions such as planetary missions. Such missions can be executed only by ESA as they cannot be planned other than at European level. National activities should therefore be such as to complement the European programmes.

### 3. *Microgravity research*

70. Materials processing in space has been of special interest since the early Apollo missions. For instance, within the framework of the Spacelab experiments there will be a fluid experiment to determine density gradients and fluid flows during crystal growth, and a solidification experiment in which a wide range of controlled high temperature melting and freezing experiments will be performed. The main driving force is a desire to learn more of the underlying mechanisms and phenomena occurring under microgravity conditions which are otherwise obscured by the ever-present pull of gravity on earth.

71. The Federal Republic of Germany, which took the lead in developing and building the Spacelab, also committed itself to complete a comprehensive round of generic research. This will be complemented by low gravity materials science research. France also has been active in materials research in space having flown many experiments aboard the Soviet Union's Salyut 6. Many other European countries are also preparing experiments to be carried out in Spacelab as many industrialists are deeply concerned about their ability to keep pace with developments in materials science. It is therefore highly important to find funds for a microgravity research programme, initially for scientific reasons, but later for commercial applications also.

72. Many interesting developments in this field are taking place in the United States and Japan; in Japan the main interest is in glasses, optics and semi-conductors. Therefore no future European space programme will be acceptable if microgravity research is not included. User communities in microgravity, as in other fields, should be developed to back up the European Space Agency in the technological preparation of a number of instruments

and support equipment such as ovens for materials processing and incubators for life sciences experiments.

### 4. *The earth observation programme*

73. In its twenty-sixth annual report the Council stated under the sub-heading "Space questions" that it considered the European remote-sensing programme an important vehicle for European scientific and economic co-operation and that it should become one of ESA's major application programmes in the years to come. The Council indicated that the political will existed for the development of such a programme to be implemented through the European Space Agency. The first stage of this programme provided for the improvement of data-processing techniques at ground stations where the Agency would operate through Earthnet and the ESRIN data bank at Frascati. The governments of the member countries would do their best to provide adequate funds for ESA's programme, which would include the launching of one or two satellites developed within ESA such as the projected ERS-1 remote-sensing satellite system for oceanic observation and also ERS-2 for land applications. There is a growing feeling that a worldwide earth resources observation programme will have to be established in the 1990s.

74. The Landsat satellites 1, 2 and 3 as well as the aerial remote-sensing programme have already provided the basic research data for a more detailed programme for developing and developed countries. Space-based observation is the only economic approach for fuels and minerals exploration and mineral resources mapping programmes. It is of great value for water management and monitoring the environment. The long-term scientific aim is to add to our basic knowledge of the earth.

75. The report on a European earth resources detection satellite programme<sup>1</sup> described the development of experimental preoperational satellites for a land applications satellite system LASS and a coastal ocean monitoring satellite system COMSS. Further details on these can be found in the abovementioned report.

76. A substantial proportion of the ESA budget will be involved in these programmes as well as in the continuation of the Meteosat programme and a plan to improve arrangements for the distribution of meteorological data, including the use of a special relay satellite, Sirio II. The ERS-1 programme should be started this year and at a later stage a decision will have to be taken on the development of a

1. Document 842.



large low earth orbit (LEO) platform. This of course will also depend on the demands of the user community.

##### 5. *The telecommunications programme*

77. The first generation of ESA and national communication satellites is now in operation and governments as well as industry are convinced that considerable financial rewards are to be reaped in this field. The United States programme is geared to the development of a strong technology basis, particularly in multi-beam antennae and on-board switching techniques, from which future plans for new capabilities and flight test programmes can be developed. It will also concentrate on the definition of new systems which provide data to users in a more timely and usable manner. NASA wants to maintain United States leadership in communication satellite systems. Capabilities in Europe and elsewhere are growing and the fact that Intelsat has already approached other nations for hardware supplies has given new impetus to communication research and development efforts in the United States.

78. In developing and developed countries alike there is a great interest in new telecommunications developments.

79. Space communications are a priority goal of the Japanese who are developing a series of satellites for mobile communications and navigation, communications techniques for small craft and satellites for communicating with mobile objects on land or with unmanned observation instruments. At the same time special attention is being paid to the establishment of inter-satellite communication techniques and to the corresponding improvement of telecommunication methods.

80. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that in India there is a national communications satellite development programme. It started in 1967 with an experiment which involved placing community television receiving sets in eighty villages around New Delhi. This experiment showed that the most cost-effective method would be one using a satellite for direct broadcasting to remote villages and also retransmission through ground-based television transmitters. Such a system could provide television services for all of India's 560,000 villages. The Indian space research organisation will set up a national television network based on synchronous satellites which will provide benefits by promoting education, agricultural productivity, communications, etc.

81. When the Committee visited Italy in March 1981, the Minister for the Co-ordination of Scientific Research and Technology, Mr.

Romita, said that as far as the growth industries were concerned Italy would concentrate on the development of new electronic technologies for telecommunications. The visit to Telespazio confirmed that this industry will have an important future and that telecommunications will benefit greatly from space development.

82. A new generation of operational systems should therefore be prepared and European industry should realise that if it wants to take a share of the world market for large complex communication satellite systems it will have to make an important research and development effort. However, the far-reaching programmes necessary cannot be financed by industry alone because of the inherent high risks and cost. The national PTT authorities do not consider advanced space research and development as part of their responsibilities and budget. The European Space Agency is therefore the most suitable organisation to help industry to meet competition successfully through the execution of an appropriate ESA programme, as well as through the harmonisation of additional national efforts.

83. The programme should include the building of a large multipurpose geostationary platform weighing some two tons in orbit and which should be launched in the second half of the 1980s. Such a platform would allow experimental applications in aircraft communications, links between satellites and direct radio broadcasts and transmission experiments.

84. After the L-Sat programme, new advanced technologies should be tested by an advanced orbital test system. Here too new communication systems will be developed between satellites and mobile craft. They will result in data relay and dissemination systems, land and advanced sea mobile systems designed for very low-cost terminals and active or passive navigation systems. During the 1990s large orbital assembly systems will presumably provide the most cost-effective and attractive support for several types of telecommunication missions. These systems will consist either of large space stations – 3,000 to 6,000 kilos – or will be clusters of smaller individual vehicles interconnected with radio waves.

85. A supplementary programme will consist of a second generation of communication payloads for Inmarsat or Eutelsat. At the same time a preparation should be made for European participation in Intelsat VII.

##### 6. *Space research and technology*

86. The aims of a space research and technology programme are to provide a technology base which will adequately support current and

future space activities and implement means of making maximum reductions in the cost of future space activities by improving components. Such a technology programme should provide the basic expertise in the areas of materials, structures, sensing and detection, guidance and control, data processing and distribution, chemical and electric propulsion, space energy systems and aerothermodynamics.

87. The technology programme should support the space programmes in order to ensure that the technology required is available in due time and to maintain a high level of competence in space technology in Europe. Technology utilisation activities are also designed to accelerate the transfer to industries, other than the aerospace industry, of new knowledge and innovative technology.

88. There will have to be a basic technology research programme and a support technology programme. The latter, especially geared to telecommunications and earth observation programmes, is also necessary for the science, Spacelab and microgravity programmes.

89. Technology verification missions are needed to test the technology in flight before incorporation into operational spacecraft.

90. Of special importance for any technology programme are the data management and the applications data services. In the 1980s the era of exploration will become an era of application. A modern data network providing a common service will be required by multiple users.

91. The technological research programme should be structured so that the technology can be fully used in present and future European programmes.

## ***V. Activities of the Council – scientific, technological and aerospace questions***

### ***1. Energy problems***

92. Your Rapporteur appreciates the Council's great interest in the reports and recommendations submitted by the Committee. Although many of the replies are substantial, your Rapporteur nevertheless has the feeling that difficult problems are treated so as to give a superficial impression that the problems are close to solution. In fact temporary solutions might sometimes be found, but a common short- or medium-term policy is far from being formulated, let alone executed. This is particularly true for energy problems on which the Councils of Ministers of the EEC and the OECD have been trying to reach agreement since 1973.

93. When the Committee met in Italy earlier this year the question was asked whether Italy's national energy policy would be geared to an EEC common energy policy. The competent authorities answered that there was no question of Italy's energy policy being placed in a European framework since member countries' attitudes were so different that the EEC had not been able to implement a common energy policy.

94. The Council however mentioned a list of statements, made since 1979 and 1980 at meetings of the European Council or of the EEC Council of Energy Ministers, which might give the impression that they are following a course which might lead to the formulation of a common policy. This, however, is not the opinion of your Rapporteur. At its last session on 3rd March 1981 the EEC Council of Energy Ministers failed to agree on a short- or medium-term energy programme, but expressed a number of vague proposals for an energy policy for the 1990s.

95. In order to achieve such a policy member states are invited to convert their electricity power stations now running on oil or gas to operate on coal or lignite. The Council has also indicated that new sources of energy should be developed, but the money to carry out these proposals might simply not be available.

96. In this context, your Rapporteur might again refer to the Italian authorities who pointed out that the Italian industrial base was becoming increasingly vulnerable because of the steady rise in oil prices. Even its most modern industry had to be subsidised as otherwise it would not be able to compete with industries of other countries which can rely on cheaper energy supplies. Up to 1985, Italy would have to pay \$ 10 billion in subsidies. This was the cost to the nation for not having invested properly in energy developments. In comparison, your Rapporteur would mention that the Japanese government intends to spend \$ 12.6 billion over the next decade in order to make a significant reduction in its oil consumption and this sum will be concentrated mainly on research into and the development of renewable energy sources, solar or geothermal.

97. Our Committee is convinced that nuclear energy should be accorded a large share of the appropriations earmarked for energy programmes but, with the exception of France, many governments seem to have not progressed beyond studies on how Western Europe is to reduce its dangerous dependence on imported energy. Only if joint action is taken on nuclear power and alternative energy sources will it be possible to achieve an effective European energy policy.

98. On the question of buying natural gas from the Soviet Union, the European Commission declared recently in answer to a question by Mr. C. Berkhouwer in the European Parliament that there was a serious danger here as Western Europe became more and more dependent on supplies of energy from the Soviet Union but it saw no other solution for diversifying, geographically speaking, the supply of gas and oil. It said that diversification might have a certain number of advantages, but without explaining them further.

99. This shows clearly how dangerous the present situation is, not only economically and industrially but also in terms of security. Nor did the Council offer any further explanation in its reply on 29th April 1981 to Recommendation 363 on energy and security; it merely indicated that the question of imports of energy from Eastern European countries was to be carefully examined.

#### 2. *European aircraft industry*

100. On the civil side of developments in the European aircraft industry, your Rapporteur is happy to note the steady progress in Airbus Industrie. With the production of the A-300 now firmly established, its first derivative, the A-310, will make its maiden flight in May 1982 and will go into production in September 1983. A family of aircraft is being developed with a stretched version of the Airbus, the TA-9 (more than 300 seats) and the foreshortened, narrower Airbus 320-100 (130 seats) together with the A-320-200 (160 seats) being considered. The latter might replace the B-727-200 and the DC-9-80 from 1985 onwards if a decision to produce this version is taken in 1981. A choice still has to be made between engines such as the SNECMA-General Electric CFM-56X, the British-Japanese RJ-500, the Pratt and Whitney PW-2000 or a new General Electric engine. With these new developments, Airbus Industrie could offer a family of aircraft for short and medium distances. If so, the European civil aircraft industry could again become a growth industry, offering jobs for some 40-45,000 people. The civil situation might however be prejudiced by the decision of the Dutch aircraft company, Fokker, to collaborate with the United States manufacturer, McDonnell Douglas, over the design of a new 130-150 seat airliner, the MDF-100.

101. On the military side, your Rapporteur refers to the report by Mr. Brasseur on the European combat aircraft and other aeronautical developments<sup>1</sup>. He wishes however to draw attention to the need for all Western

European governments to formulate a long-term procurement policy to allow their military forces to have the equipment they need without exceeding the expenditure limits they have set. In the United Kingdom there have been major defence spending over-runs with consequent cuts in equipment programmes, and in Germany the defence ministry budget is largely frozen until 1984-85 for the same reason.

102. The long-term review should consider both the equipment needs of the armed forces of the countries concerned and the rôles, missions and strategy of the armed forces in the context of European defence as well as of the Atlantic Alliance, rather than in the more narrowly national perspective of the current British defence review.

103. The operational needs of the Western European armed forces in pursuing a policy of deterrence to counter the military threat should be planned for a seven to fifteen year period.

104. The European industrial base should be capable of supporting the overall needs of the armed forces and management procedures should be harmonised within a European framework in order to stay within the financial constraints imposed by the governments. The research and development efforts of each member country should be geared to these Western European long-term defence procurement policies.

105. A symposium on collaborative aeronautical projects, to be sponsored by this Committee early next year, should contribute to the improvement of the European industrial base.

106. With regard to helicopters, four programmes are now being considered and France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom are consulting each other on future plans and developments, and it is important that this collaboration be maintained and safeguarded from budgetary cuts. For example, on the United Kingdom-Italian programme your Rapporteur is happy to mention that a basic agreement has been concluded between Fiat Aviazione and Agusta on the one hand and Westland in the United Kingdom on the other. The new helicopter project called the EH-101 will replace the SH-3 of the Italian navy and the Sea King of the Royal Navy, designed for anti-submarine warfare. An industrial company, EH Industries Ltd., has been established in London to co-ordinate the research, development and production which will be executed by the abovementioned companies. There is a further important possibility of collaboration between the French aero-engine company Turbomeca and the British company Rolls-Royce to develop a new helicopter powerplant for this project.

1. See Document 874.

3. *Space questions*

107. As your Rapporteur has discussed the state of European space activities in earlier chapters of his report, he does not wish to go into further detail here.

108. To conclude this chapter, he hopes that the Council recognises the importance of conti-

nuous close co-operation between military and civil authorities with regard to meteorological, communications and earth resources detection satellites in order to ensure an optimal use of the satellites and space systems manufactured by European industries; in particular, he wishes to emphasise the commercial, industrial and military benefits from an expanded European space programme.

## APPENDIX

*The space shuttle*

After the series of Apollo spacecraft, NASA wanted to create a comfortable work place in space. For this it needed a vehicle with powerful, yet small, lightweight and durable engines to carry heavy cargo into space. The craft needed a lightweight but reusable heat shield to withstand temperatures in the thousands of degrees Fahrenheit during re-entry into the earth's atmosphere. Its systems had to operate in weightlessness, in the thin upper atmosphere and in the denser lower atmosphere. Its shape had to fly reasonably well in four different aerodynamic régimes : acting at launch as a thin projectile; in space as a spacecraft; at re-entry as a smooth, blunted capsule; and in the atmosphere as a gliding aeroplane. The entire machine had to be able to "fly by itself", freeing people in space to do creative research and eliminating the expense of employing hundreds of people back on earth to monitor all the systems constantly.

NASA had to do all this for one-fifth the cost of the Apollo moon landing programme, and reuse all the equipment 50 to 100 times, further cutting the costs of each trip to space.

Since no one had ever tried to do this, NASA started from scratch.

By far the largest technical challenge were the orbiter's three main engines used at lift-off. The engines, the most powerful, most fuel-efficient and compact chemical engines in the world, represent a major advance in the state of the art that will eventually be seen in other applications in other fields.

Super-cold liquid oxygen and hydrogen (both minus several hundred degrees) flow to the engines from a 154.2 foot (47 metre) external tank that forms the backbone of the system. Oxygen enters one side of each engine, hydrogen, the other; and each gas goes through similar processes.

The engines are designed to produce the maximum of power with the minimum of weight and size. For example, one scientist compared the high-pressure fuel turbopump to three 707 aircraft engines compressed into a garbage can. The pump weighs only 700 pounds (317 kilos), but produces 62,000 horsepower, or 88 horsepower per pound. In any other application an engine equivalent to the orbiter's would be about ten times larger.

The heat shield of the orbiter has been an enormous challenge. The orbiter re-enters

from the cold of space (minus 250°F) and plunges through the atmosphere at speeds up to 16,820 miles per hour (27,069 kilometres per hour). Friction with the atmosphere creates enormous heat – up to 3,000°F (1,648 °C) on the leading edges of the wings and on the nose cap. The underbelly is a little "cooler", and the upper payload bay doors may be as "cool" as 700°F (371 °C). Thus, three types of insulation are required, one for each heating régime.

The orbiter is 122.17 feet (37.24 metres) long with a wing span of 78.06 feet (23.79 metres). So NASA came up with the idea of individual panels or tiles – 35,000 of them, each about 6 inches by 6 inches (15.24 centimetres by 15.24 centimetres). Each tile can be individually replaced if damaged during re-entry, without replacing the entire shield.

The tiles vary in composition and density. The hottest portions, such as the leading edges of the wings, have material made of an extra strong form of carbon. Very lightweight ceramic tiles cover areas that do not get as hot, such as the underbelly, and a special coated felt material covers the "coolest" areas. The tiles vary in weight from 9 to 20 pounds per cubic foot.

Sensors and systems are scattered all over the orbiter from the front to the rear. At front is the three-storeyed deck, with the cockpit on top, the kitchen, bath and sleeping area at mid-deck, and an equipment area on the lower deck. Behind the cockpit is the "trunk" – the 60 foot (18.2 metre) long cargo bay, covered by two doors, which are made of graphite epoxy. The doors give strength to the otherwise flimsy aluminium fuselage and prevent twisting and flexing.

At the rear of the orbiter's wings are the elevators. At the rear of the orbiter are the engines, above which is the tail with the vertical stabiliser that has a rudder. The wings' elevators, the body flap and the rudder control the orbiter's movements in pitch, roll and yaw in the atmosphere, whereas engines control the orbiter's position in space.

All of the shuttle's parts and systems are totally dependent upon, and controlled by, computers. The shuttle can be operated completely by computers, from the checkout of all systems on the launch pad, through launch, to re-entry and landing. The job of the astronauts will largely be monitoring what the computers are doing through an array of instruments on the cockpit's panel.

Although he does not have to, the commander will take over the orbiter's controls during the final phase of landing. In front of him are computer display screens, television-like devices called cathode ray tubes that provide information from the computers. The computers will calculate how the commander is flying the machine – if he is coming in too fast or too slow, and where he is in relation to the landing strip. On the cockpit panel are also standard aircraft instruments such as altimeters.

To appreciate the difficulty of landing the heavy orbiter, one can compare it with the high-performance jet, the F-15, which flies at speeds 2.5 times the speed of sound (the shuttle re-enters at speeds 25 times the speed of sound). The F-15 lands at speeds of 125 knots (nautical miles per hour). The orbiter lands at speeds of 196 knots. The F-15 weighs 13,608 kilos; the orbiter weighs 97,524 kilos. The F-15 stops within 762 metres; the orbiter requires about 3,047 metres.

The first flight, which took place from 12th to 14th April 1981, was the most serious and risky as the orbiting vehicle Columbia is the first of its kind.

NASA has scheduled some 1,108 tests for four flights. The shuttle will carry about 3,500 sensors, such as microphones, strain gauges, and meters to measure velocities, pressures, temperatures, noises, gases coming out of the systems, and creaks and flexes of the fuselage.

On the first two flights, the Columbia will fly in an orbit that puts less demand on the engine at launch. On the third and fourth test

flights, the orbit will require more power output for the engines.

The first flight lasted 54 hours and 20 minutes. The second, in September 1981, will last four days, and the last two, in 1982, will last seven days each.

On the first flight the astronauts landed Columbia themselves. On the second flight, part of the landing will be controlled by the computer. On the third and fourth flights, the computer will control the vehicle from re-entry and landing through “wheels stop”.

The first flight carried mainly instruments to measure the system's performances. The second flight will carry scientific instruments and will test some aspects of the “space arm”. The space arm is a 50 foot (15 metre) long instrument with shoulder, elbow and wrist joints and a “hand” to grapple satellites and lift them out of the cargo bay. On the third test flight a test arm will actually lift a payload out of the cargo bay and then put it back inside.

Two pilots will fly each of the four test flights. After that NASA will begin the operational phase of the shuttle in which it hauls satellites and other equipment into space for paying customers. At that time the new breed of astronauts – the diverse group of men and women who have degrees ranging from engineering to medicine – will fly in space. They will operate the scientific experiments and the space arm and perform many tasks while the pilots monitor the orbiter's system.

*Future of European space activities –  
reply to the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council*

**AMENDMENT 1<sup>1</sup>**  
*tabled by Mr. Topmann*

1. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:  
“3. To pursue the further development of the Ariane programme, taking into account an established demand for it;”.

*Signed: Topmann*

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1. See 4th Sitting, 17th June 1981 (Amendment agreed to).

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