

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

PROCEEDINGS

THIRTY-SECOND ORDINARY SESSION

SECOND PART

December 1986

III

Assembly Documents

WEU

PARIS

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III

Assembly Documents

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The proceedings of the second part of the thirty-second ordinary session of the Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes:

Volume III: Assembly documents.

Volume IV: Orders of the day and minutes of proceedings, official report of debates, general index.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
List of representatives and substitutes	8
Documents :	
1067. Agenda of the second part of the thirty-second ordinary session, Paris, 1st-4th December 1986	10
1068. Order of business of the second part of the thirty-second ordinary session, Paris, 1st-4th December 1986	11
1069. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1985 – the auditor’s report	14
1069 Add. Motion to approve the final accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1985	28
1070. Meeting between the Committee for Relations with the Council and the Chairman-in-Office of the Council – Memorandum by Mr. Jean-Marie Caro, President of the Assembly, adopted by the Presidential Committee on 15th September 1986	29
1071. Revised draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1986 – Report submitted on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration by Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteur	33
1071 Add. Revised draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1986 – Opinion of the Council	45
1072. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1987 – Report submitted on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration by Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteur	50
1072 Add. I. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1987 – Opinion of the Council	75
1072 Add. II. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1987 – Draft order submitted by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration	80
1073. European security and the Mediterranean – Revised report submitted on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments by Mr. Kittelmann, Chairman and Rapporteur	81
1074. First part of the thirty-second annual report of the Council to the Assembly of Western European Union	130
1075. Disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council – Revised report submitted on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments by Mr. Amadei, Rapporteur	138
23 amendments	170
1076. Threat assessment – Preliminary report submitted on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments by Mr. Stokes, Rapporteur	179
3 amendments	195

1077.	European helicopters for the 1990s – Report submitted on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions by Mr. Wilkinson, Chairman and Rapporteur	198
	2 amendments	211
1078.	Political activities of the Council – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council – Report submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee by Mr. Bianco, Rapporteur	212
	1 amendment	223
1079.	Developments in the Soviet Union and East-West relations – Report submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee by Mr. Close, Rapporteur	224
1080.	Parliamentary and public relations – Report submitted on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations by Mr. Terlezki, Rapporteur	247
1081.	Outline of a new booklet on Western European Union – Information report submitted on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations by Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges, Rapporteur	258
1082.	Replies of the Council to Recommendations 432 to 437	259
1083.	Action by the Presidential Committee – Report submitted on behalf of the Presidential Committee by Mr. Goerens, Rapporteur	275
1084.	Written Questions 265, 267 to 273 and replies of the Council to Written Questions 265 and 267 to 272	280

LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

BELGIUM

Representatives

MM. ADRIAENSSENS Hugo	SP	
BOGAERTS August	SP	
DECLERCQ Tijl	CVP	
DEJARDIN Claude	PS	
PECRIAUX Nestor	PS	
Mrs. STAELS-DOMPAS Nora	CVP	
Mr. STEVERLYNCK Antoon	CVP	

Substitutes

MM. BEYSEN Edward	PVV	
CEREXHE Etienne	PSC	
CLOSE Robert	PRL	
DE BONDT Ferdinand	CVP	
DE DECKER Armand	PRL	
NOERENS René	PVV	
N...		

FRANCE

Representatives

MM. BASSINET Philippe	Socialist	
BAUMEL Jacques	RPR	
BERRIER Noël	Socialist	
CARO Jean-Marie	UDF-CDS	
de CHAMBRUN Charles	National Front	
COLLETTE Henri	RPR	
CROZE Pierre	Ind. Rep.	
GALLEY Robert	RPR	
GREMETZ Maxime	Communist	
JEAMBRUN Pierre	Dem. Left	
JUNG Louis	UCDP	
KOEHL Emile	UDF	
Mrs. LALUMIÈRE Catherine	Socialist	
MM. MERMAZ Louis	Socialist	
OEHLER Jean	Socialist	
PORTIER Henri	RPR	
SEITLINGER Jean	UDF-CDS	
VALLEIX Jean	RPR	

Substitutes

MM. ALLONCLE Michel	RPR	
ANDRE René	RPR	
BICHET Jacques	UDF	
BOHL André	UCDP	
BORDU Gérard	Communist	
CHARTRON Jacques	RPR	
CHENARD Alain	Socialist	

MM. DHAILLE Paul	Socialist	
FOURRE Jean-Pierre	Socialist	
GRUSSENMEYER François	RPR	
HUNAULT Xavier	UDF (App.)	
LACOUR Pierre	UCDP	
MATRAJA Pierre	Socialist	
MONTASTRUC Pierre	UDF	
PRAT Henri	Socialist	
RUET Roland	Ind. Rep.	
SIRGUE Pierre	National Front	
SOUVET Louis	RPR	

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Representatives

MM. AHRENS Karl	SPD	
ANTRETTNER Robert	SPD	
BERGER Markus	CDU/CSU	
BÖHM Wilfried	CDU/CSU	
ENDERS Wendelin	SPD	
HAASE Horst	SPD	
Mrs. KELLY Petra	Die Grünen	
MM. KITTELMANN Peter	CDU/CSU	
MÜLLER Günther	CDU/CSU	
NEUMANN Volker	SPD	
REDDEMANN Gerhard	CDU/CSU	
RUMPF Wolfgang	FDP	
SCHULTE Manfred	SPD	
SCHWARZ Heinz	CDU/CSU	
SOELL Hartmut	SPD	
SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM Adolf	CDU/CSU	
UNLAND Hermann Josef	CDU/CSU	
ZIERER Benno	CDU/CSU	

Substitutes

MM. ABELEIN Manfred	CDU/CSU	
BÜCHNER Peter	SPD	
ERTL Josef	FDP	
Mrs. FISCHER Leni	CDU/CSU	
MM. FISCHER Ulrich	Die Grünen	
GANSEL Norbert	SPD	
GERSTL Friedrich	SPD	
GLOS Michael	CDU/CSU	
HOLTZ Uwe	SPD	
JÄGER Claus	CDU/CSU	
KLEJDZINSKI Karl-Heinz	SPD	
LEMMRICH Karl Heinz	CDU/CSU	
LENZER Christian	CDU/CSU	
Mrs. PACK Doris	CDU/CSU	
MM. PFENNIG Gero	CDU/CSU	
SCHAEER Hermann	SPD	
SCHMIDT Manfred	SPD	
WULFF Otto	CDU/CSU	

ITALY

Representatives

MM.	AMADEI Giuseppe	PSDI
	ANTONI Varese	Communist
	BIANCO Gerardo	Chr. Dem.
	CAVALIERE Stefano	Chr. Dem.
	CIFARELLI Michele	Republican
	FERRARI AGGRADI Mario	Chr. Dem.
	FIANDROTTI Filippo	Socialist
	FRASCA Salvatore	Socialist
	GIANOTTI Lorenzo	Communist
	GIUST Bruno	Chr. Dem.
	MEZZAPESA Pietro	Chr. Dem.
	MILANI Eliseo	PDUP
	PECCHIOLO Ugo	Communist
	RAUTI Giuseppe	MSI-DN
	RUBBI Antonio	Communist
	SARTI Adolfo	Chr. Dem.
	SINESIO Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
	VECCHIETTI Tullio	Communist

Substitutes

MM.	ACCILI Achille	Chr. Dem.
	ALBERINI Guido	Socialist
	COLAJANNI Napoleone	Communist
	FOSCHI Franco	Chr. Dem.
Mrs.	FRANCESE Angela	Communist
MM.	GORLA Massimo	Prol. Dem.
	LAPENTA Nicola	Chr. Dem.
	MARCHIO Michele	MSI-DN
	MARTINO Guido	Republican
	MASCIADRI Cornelio	Socialist
	MITTERDORFER Karl	SVP
	PALUMBO Vincenzo	Liberal
	POLLIDORO Carlo	Communist
	RIZZI Enrico	PSDI
	RODOTA Stefano	Ind. Left
	SPITELLA Giorgio	Chr. Dem.
	STEGAGNINI Bruno	Chr. Dem.
	TEODORI Massimo	Radical

LUXEMBOURG

Representatives

MM.	BURGER René	Soc. Chr.
	GOERENS Charles	Dem.
	HENGEL René	Soc. Workers

Substitutes

Mrs.	HENNICOT-SCHOEPGES Erna	Soc. Chr.
MM.	KONEN René	Dem.
	LINSTER Roger	Soc. Workers

NETHERLANDS

Representatives

MM.	AARTS Harry	CDA
	van den BERGH Harry	Labour
	de KWAADSTENIET Willem	CDA
	STOFFELEN Pieter	Labour
	TUMMERS Nicolas	Labour
Mrs.	van der WERF-TERPSTRA Anne Maria	CDA
Mr.	van der WERFF Ymenus	Liberal

Substitutes

MM.	de BEER Leopold	Liberal
	EISMA Doeke	D66
	EYSINK Rudolf	CDA
Mrs.	HERFKENS Eveline	Labour
MM.	van der SANDEN Piet	CDA
	van TETS Govert	Liberal
	WORRELL Joop	Labour

UNITED KINGDOM

Representatives

Sir	Frederic BENNETT	Conservative
Mr.	Donald COLEMAN	Labour
Sir	Geoffrey FINSBERG	Conservative
Mr.	Edward GARRETT	Labour
Sir	Anthony GRANT	Conservative
Mr.	Peter HARDY	Labour
Sir	Paul HAWKINS	Conservative
Mr.	James HILL	Conservative
Lord	HUGHES	Labour
Mr.	Toby JESSEL	Conservative
Earl	of KINNOULL	Conservative
Lady	Jill KNIGHT	Conservative
Dr.	Maurice MILLER	Labour
Sir	John OSBORN	Conservative
Sir	John PAGE	Conservative
Mr.	Stephen ROSS	Liberal
Sir	Dudley SMITH	Conservative
Mr.	John WILKINSON	Conservative

Substitutes

MM.	Robert BROWN	Labour
	John CORRIE	Conservative
	Thomas COX	Labour
	Robert EDWARDS	Labour
	Reginald FREESON	Labour
	Michael McGUIRE	Labour
Lord	MACKIE	Liberal
MM.	Bruce MILLAN	Labour
	Michael MORRIS	Conservative
	Christopher MURPHY	Conservative
Lord	NEWALL	Conservative
MM.	Robert PARRY	Labour
	Peter REES	Conservative
Lord	RODNEY	Conservative
MM.	John STOKES	Conservative
	Stefan TERLEZKI	Conservative
	John WARD	Conservative
	Alec WOODALL	Labour

AGENDA

**of the second part of the thirty-second ordinary session
Paris, 1st-4th December 1986**

I. Political questions

- | | |
|---|---|
| 1. Political activities of the Council – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Bianco on behalf of the General Affairs Committee</i> |
| 2. Developments in the Soviet Union and East-West relations | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Close on behalf of the General Affairs Committee</i> |

II. Defence questions

- | | |
|---|--|
| 1. Threat assessment | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Stokes on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments</i> |
| 2. Disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Amadei on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments</i> |
| 3. European security and the Mediterranean | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Kittelmann on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments</i> |

III. Technical and scientific questions

- | | |
|------------------------------------|---|
| European helicopters for the 1990s | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions</i> |
|------------------------------------|---|

IV. Budgetary and administrative questions

- | | |
|---|---|
| 1. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1985 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts | <i>Report tabled by Sir Dudley Smith on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration</i> |
| 2. Revised draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1986 | <i>Report tabled by Sir Dudley Smith on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration</i> |
| 3. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1987 | <i>Report tabled by Sir Dudley Smith on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration</i> |

V. Parliamentary and public relations

- | | |
|---|---|
| 1. Outline of a new booklet on Western European Union | <i>Report tabled by Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations</i> |
| 2. Parliamentary and public relations | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Terlezki on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations</i> |

ORDER OF BUSINESS

*of the second part of the thirty-second ordinary session
Paris, 1st-4th December 1986*

MONDAY, 1st DECEMBER

Morning

Meetings of political groups

Afternoon 3 p.m.

1. Opening of the second part of the thirty-second ordinary session.
2. Examination of credentials.
3. Address by the President of the Assembly.
4. Adoption of the draft order of business of the second part of the thirty-second ordinary session (Document 1068).
5. Action by the Presidential Committee (Document 1083):
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Goerens, Vice-President of the Assembly.
6. Address by Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU.

3.45 p.m.

7. Address by Mr. Möllemann, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.
8. Threat assessment (Document 1076):
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Stokes on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.
Debate.

4.30 p.m.

9. Address by Lord Carrington, Secretary-General of NATO.
10. Threat assessment:
Resumed debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.

TUESDAY, 2nd DECEMBER

Morning 9.30 a.m.

1. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1985 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts (Document 1069):
presentation of the report tabled by Sir Dudley Smith on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.
Debate.
2. Revised draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1986 (Document 1071):
presentation of the report tabled by Sir Dudley Smith on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.
Debate.

3. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1987 (Document 1072):
presentation of the report tabled by Sir Dudley Smith on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.
Debate.

10.30 a.m.

4. Presentation of the first part of the thirty-second annual report of the Council by Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council (Document 1074).
5. Political activities of the Council – reply to the thirty-first annual report (Document 1078):
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Bianco on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.
Debate.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

1. Political activities of the Council – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council:
Resumed debate.

3.30 p.m.

2. Address by Mr. Chirac, Prime Minister of France.
3. Disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council (Document 1075):
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Amadei on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.
Debate.
4. Political activities of the Council – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council;
Disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council:
Votes on the draft recommendations.
5. Revised draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1986;
Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1987:
Votes on the draft budgets.
6. Accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1985 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts:
Vote on the motion to approve the final accounts.

WEDNESDAY, 3rd DECEMBER

Morning 9.30 a.m.

1. European helicopters for the 1990s (Document 1077):
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

10 a.m.

2. Address by Mr. Fischbach, Minister of Defence of Luxembourg.

11 a.m.

3. Address by Lord Trefgarne, Minister of State for Defence Procurement of the United Kingdom.
4. European helicopters for the 1990s:
Debate.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

1. European helicopters for the 1990s:
Resumed debate.

3.30 p.m.

2. Address by Mr. Spadolini, Minister of Defence of Italy.
3. European helicopters for the 1990s:
Vote on the draft recommendation.
4. Outline of a new booklet on Western European Union (Document 1081):
presentation of the report tabled by Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations.
Debate.
Vote on the draft order.
5. Parliamentary and public relations (Document 1080):
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Terlezki on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations.
Debate.
Vote on the draft resolution.
6. Developments in the Soviet Union and East-West relations (Document 1079):
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Close on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.
Debate.

THURSDAY, 4th DECEMBER

Morning 10 a.m.

- Developments in the Soviet Union and East-West relations:
Resumed debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

- European security and the Mediterranean (Document 1073):
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Kittelmann on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.

CLOSE OF THE THIRTY-SECOND ORDINARY SESSION

*Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly
for the financial year 1985*

THE AUDITOR'S REPORT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY TO THE AUDITOR SUBMITTING THE ACCOUNTS OF THE ASSEMBLY FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1985 - 23rd June 1986.

LETTER FROM THE EXTERNAL AUDITOR TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY SUBMITTING THE ACCOUNTS OF THE ASSEMBLY FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1985 - 14th August 1986.

REPORT OF THE EXTERNAL AUDITOR TO THE ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION ON THE ACCOUNTS FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1985 - 14th August 1986.

FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF THE ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION FOR THE YEAR ENDED 31ST DECEMBER 1985 - AUDIT OPINION - 14th August 1986.

APPENDICES

- I. Summary of income and expenditure for the financial year 1985.
Financial position as at 31st December 1985.
- II. Statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits for the financial year 1985.
- III. Statement of sums due and received from the Secretary-General of WEU, London, in respect of contributions to the WEU Assembly budget for 1985.
- IV. Provident fund — Account for the financial year ended 31st December 1985.

*Letter from the President of the Assembly
to the Auditor submitting the accounts
of the Assembly for the financial year 1985*
23rd June 1986

Sir,

In accordance with Article 13 of the Financial Regulations of the WEU Assembly, I have the honour to submit to you the accounts for the financial year 1985 in accordance with the statements attached hereto which refer to:

1. (a) Summary of income and expenditure - financial position as at 31st December 1985 (Appendix I);
- (b) Statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits (Appendix II);
- (c) Contributions (Appendix III);
- (d) Provident fund (Appendix IV).

2. The statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits shows a deficit of F 136 098, whereas the summary of income and expenditure shows an excess of expenditure of F 151 463. The difference between these two figures, F 15 365, represents the deficit of receipts over those estimated made up as follows:

	F	F
– Bank interest	265 145	
– Sundry receipts	64 695	
– Sale of publications	33 541	
– Levy on the salaries of Grade A staff	64 284	
– Contributions 7%	<u>397 970</u>	
		825 635
– Receipts for 1985 estimated in the budget		<u>841 000</u>
		<u>– 15 365</u>

3. Excess expenditure under Heads II and V of the operating budget and under Head I of the pensions budget amounting to F 277 610 has been met by transfers from other heads of the budget.

4. All contributions were received from the Secretary-General WEU London before 31st December 1985.

5. Amounts in the Assembly's provident fund are incorporated with those of the other organs of WEU and the entire fund is administered by the Secretary-General in consultation with the Clerk of the Assembly.

On 31st December 1985 these amounts totalled F 3 222 858 as shown at Appendix IV. On that date there remained two loans to two staff members amounting to F 453 144.

The Secretary-General has continued to receive advice from the advisory panel set up within WEU and from outside bankers on the investment of the funds. On 31st December 1985 the fund was held by Montagu Investment Management Limited in London.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
J.-M. CARO
President of the Assembly

Sir Gordon DOWNEY, K.C.B.
National Audit Office
Audit House
Victoria Embankment
LONDON EC4Y 0DS

Letter from the external Auditor to the President of the Assembly submitting the accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1985

14th August 1986

Dear Monsieur Caro,

I have the honour to submit the accounts of the Assembly of Western European Union for the financial year 1985, together with my opinion thereon.

As required by Article 15 of the Financial Regulations, I also enclose my report which takes into account the comments made in your letter of 11th July 1986.

Yours sincerely,
Gordon DOWNEY

Monsieur Jean-Marie CARO
President of the Assembly
Western European Union
43, avenue du Président Wilson
75775 PARIS Cedex 16

Report of the external Auditor to the Assembly of Western European Union on the accounts for the financial year 1985

1. I have audited the accounts of the Assembly of Western European Union for the financial year 1985 in accordance with Article 14 of the Financial Regulations of the Assembly. My examination included an appraisal of the Assembly's financial procedures and was supported by such tests of the records and transactions as appeared to me to be necessary.

Budgetary out-turn

2. The budget provided for expenditure of F 16 311 900 of which F 841 000 was expected to be covered by miscellaneous receipts and the balance by contributions. Actual expenditure in the year amounted to F 16 447 998. Income amounted to F 16 296 535 comprising F 15 470 900 from contributions and F 825 635 from miscellaneous receipts. There was thus an excess of expenditure over income of F 151 463 arising from a budgetary over-spend of F 136 098 (as shown at Appendix II) and shortfall in miscellaneous receipts of F 15 365.

3. The budgetary over-spend of F 136 098 comprised over-spends on Part I Head II (F 89 307), Head III (F 141 735), Head V (F 77 520) and Part II Head I (F 110 783), totalling F 419 345 of which F 283 247 was met from savings on other heads. The Financial Regulations do not provide for budget transfers between heads of expenditure but I note that the Western European Council, who sets the Assembly's budget, was notified of the transfers in May 1986 in accordance with the usual procedure.

4. The over-spend is attributable to the cost (F 151 463) of the Assembly's share of security improvement work at the Paris headquarters. This work was approved by the Council of the Western European Union but there was no provision for its cost in the Assembly's budget for 1985 and a supplementary budget was not sought. The Council was informed of this situation and agreed in March 1986 that the Assembly's 1984 budget surplus of F 168 190 could be retained to meet the cost of this work in order to avoid the need to call for additional budget contributions. I have therefore accepted without qualification of my certificate the position where, contrary to Article 5 of the Financial Regulations, the Assembly incurred expenditure in excess of the budgetary credits

approved but I trust that should a similar situation arise in the future a supplementary budget will be submitted to the Council for approval.

5. I also draw attention to the treatment of the cost (F 223 158) of a 1985 pay award for Grade A officials which was paid in March 1986. F 145 352 of this was charged to the 1985 budget and the balance, F 80 806 to the 1986 budget. The Council approved this accounting treatment in March 1986 on the basis that the Assembly will submit a supplementary budget for 1986 to regularise the situation. This supplementary budget will also modify the salary estimates for 1986 to take account of the higher than expected pay award.

6. I wish to record my appreciation for the co-operation and assistance extended by the President and staff of the Assembly during my tenure of office as the external Auditor of the Assembly.

Gordon DOWNEY
*(Comptroller and Auditor General,
United Kingdom)
External Auditor*

14th August 1986

*Financial statements of the Assembly of
Western European Union for the year ended
31st December 1985*

Audit opinion

I have examined the appended financial statements (Appendix I) of the Assembly of Western European Union, comprising the summary of income and expenditure and the statement of assets and liabilities for the year ended 31st December 1985, in accordance with Article 14 of the Financial Regulations of the Assembly. As a result of the examination I am of the opinion that the financial statements present fairly the financial position of the Assembly as at 31st December 1985 and the results of its operations for the period then ended; and that the transactions were in accordance with the Financial Regulations and legislative authority.

Gordon DOWNEY
*(Comptroller and Auditor General,
United Kingdom)
External Auditor*

14th August 1986

APPENDIX I

Summary of income and expenditure for the financial year 1985

(in French francs)

Per attached statement

Assessments of member states (see Appendix III)	15 470 900
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Miscellaneous

(A) Sundry receipts

Bank interest	265 145
Sundry receipts	64 695
Sale of publications	33 541
Levy on salaries of grade A officials	64 284

(B) Pensions

Contributions (7%)	397 970
Reimbursement of provident fund withdrawals (loans, etc.)	—

825 635

16 296 535

Expenditure under budget authorisation	16 311 900
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Expenditure in excess of budget authorisation on Heads II, III, V and Part II, I	<u>136 098</u>
---	----------------

Total expenditure (see Appendix II)	<u>16 447 998</u>
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Excess of income over expenditure	<u>F — 151 463</u>
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*Financial position as at 31st December 1985**Assets*

Cash at bank	190 718
Sundry advances	538 735
Accounts receivable	<u>128 210</u>

F 857 663*Liabilities*

Accounts payable	1 009 126
Excess expenditure over income	<u>— 151 463</u>

F 857 663*Certified correct :*

Jean-Marie CARO
President of the Assembly

Georges MOULIAS
Clerk of the Assembly

Dudley SMITH
*Chairman of the Committee
on Budgetary Affairs
and Administration*

STATEMENT OF BUDGET AUTHORISATIONS, EXPENDITURE
(in ECU)

PART I : OPERATING BUDGET		Total budget for 1985 ¹
HEAD I - PERMANENT STAFF		
<i>Sub-Head 1</i>	Basic salaries	6 330 000
<i>Sub-Head 2</i>	Allowances	
2.1.	Expatriation allowance	555 000
2.2.	Household allowance	253 000
2.3.	Allowance for children and other dependent persons	200 000
2.4.	Rent allowance	25 000
2.5.	Education allowance	90 000
2.6.	Allowance for language courses	2 000
2.7.	Overtime	50 000
2.8.	Home leave	20 000
<i>Sub-Head 3</i>	Social charges	
3.1.	Social security	845 000
3.2.	Supplementary insurance	227 000
3.3.	Provident fund	120 000
<i>Sub-Head 4</i>	Expenses relating to the recruitment and departure of permanent officials	
4.1.	Travelling expenses of candidatures for vacant posts	
4.2.	Travelling expenses on arrival and departure of permanent officials and their families	
4.3.	Removal expenses	
4.4.	Installation allowance	
<i>Sub-Head 5</i>	Medical examination	8 000
Total of Head I		8 725 000

1. Documents 1001 and A/WEU/BA (85) 7.

K II

D UNEXPENDED CREDITS FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1985

s)

	Transfers		Total after transfers	Total expenditure	Unexpended credits
	+	-			
		3 678	6 326 322	6 307 484	18 838
	7 774		562 774	562 774	-
		2 542	250 458	250 458	-
	1 634		201 634	201 634	-
	3 192		28 192	28 192	-
		8 849	81 151	81 151	-
	4 506		6 506	6 506	-
	13 860		63 860	63 860	-
		5 519	14 481	14 481	-
		6 317	838 683	838 683	-
		12 633	214 367	214 367	-
	3 662		123 662	123 662	-
	658		658	658	-
	4 947		4 947	4 947	-
		695	7 305	7 305	-
	40 233	40 233	8 725 000	8 706 162	18 838

PART I : OPERATING BUDGET		Total budget for 1985
HEAD II - TEMPORARY STAFF		
<i>Sub-Head 6</i>	Staff recruited for sessions of the Assembly	
6.1.	Sittings service	868 000
6.2.	Interpretation service	298 000
6.3.	Translation service	634 000
6.4.	Other services	50 000
<i>Sub-Head 7</i>	Interpretation staff required for Assembly work between sessions	350 000
<i>Sub-Head 8</i>	Temporary staff for the Office of the Clerk	60 000
<i>Sub-Head 9</i>	Social charges	
9.1.	Insurance for temporary staff other than interpreters	4 000
9.2.	Provident fund for interpreters	83 000
9.3.	Insurance for interpreters	2 800
Total of Head II		2 349 800
HEAD III - EXPENDITURE ON PREMISES AND EQUIPMENT		
<i>Sub-Head 10</i>	Share of joint expenditure on the Paris premises	430 000
<i>Sub-Head 11</i>	Hire of committee rooms	15 000
<i>Sub-Head 12</i>	Technical and other installations for Assembly sessions	315 000
<i>Sub-Head 13</i>	Various services for the organisation of sessions	27 000
<i>Sub-Head 14</i>	Maintenance of the premises of the Office of the Clerk	15 000
<i>Sub-Head 15</i>	Purchase or repair of office furniture	10 000
<i>Sub-Head 16</i>	Purchase of reproduction and other office equipment	75 000
<i>Sub-Head 17</i>	Hire and maintenance of reproduction and other office equipment	272 000
Total of Head III		1 159 000

	Transfers		Total after transfers	Total expenditure	Unexpended credits
	+	-			
	39 275		907 275	908 667	- 1 392
		3 440	294 560	294 560	-
		17 334	616 666	616 666	-
		15 646	34 354	34 354	-
			350 000	437 915	- 87 915
	2 726		62 726	62 726	-
		295	3 705	3 705	-
		4 957	78 043	78 043	-
		329	2 471	2 471	-
	42 001	42 001	2 349 800	2 439 107	- 89 307
			430 000	539 357	- 109 357
		10 889	4 111	4 111	-
	10 093		325 093	325 093	-
	5 348		32 348	38 392	- 6 044
	2 222		17 222	17 222	-
			10 000	36 334	- 26 334
		3 003	71 997	71 997	-
		3 771	268 229	268 229	-
	17 663	17 663	1 159 000	1 300 735	- 141 735

PART I : OPERATING BUDGET		Total budget for 1985	
HEAD IV - GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS			
<i>Sub-Head 18</i>	Postage, telephone, telex and transport of documents	480 000	
<i>Sub-Head 19</i>	Duplication paper, headed writing paper and other office supplies	238 000	
<i>Sub-Head 20</i>	Printing and publication of documents	1 318 000	
<i>Sub-Head 21</i>	Purchase of documents	44 800	
<i>Sub-Head 22</i>	Official cars	60 000	
<i>Sub-Head 23</i>	Bank charges	500	
Total of Head IV		2 141 300	
HEAD V - OTHER EXPENDITURE			
<i>Sub-Head 24</i>	Travelling and subsistence allowances and insurance for the President of the Assembly, chairmen of committees and rapporteurs	139 000	
<i>Sub-Head 25</i>	Expenses for representation	160 000	
<i>Sub-Head 26</i>	Committee study missions	3 300	
<i>Sub-Head 27</i>	Official journeys of members of the Office the Clerk	310 000	
<i>Sub-Head 28</i>	Expenses of experts and the auditor	70 000	
<i>Sub-Head 29</i>	Expenditure on information	275 000	
<i>Sub-Head 30</i>	Expenses for political groups	273 000	
<i>Sub-Head 31</i>	Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere provided for	3 000	
<i>Sub-Head 32</i>	Non-recoverable taxes	20 000	
Total of Head V		1 253 300	
Total		15 628 400	

	Transfers		Total after transfers	Total expenditure	Unexpended credits
	+	-			
			480 000	469 188	10 812
	13 573		251 573	251 573	-
		68 523	1 249 477	996 382	253 095
	1 301		46 101	46 101	-
	53 649		113 649	113 649	-
			500	- 2	502
	68 523	68 523	2 141 300	1 876 891	264 409
		32 828	106 172	106 172	-
	27 433		187 433	187 433	-
		2 181	1 119	1 119	-
	29 701		339 701	417 221	- 77 520
	34 679		104 679	104 679	-
		49 894	225 106	225 106	-
			273 000	273 000	
		600	2 400	2 400	-
		6 310	13 690	13 690	-
	91 813	91 813	1 253 300	1 330 820	- 77 520
	260 233	260 233	15 628 400	15 653 715	- 25 315

PART II : PENSIONS BUDGET		Total budget for 1985	
HEAD I - PENSIONS, ALLOWANCES AND SOCIAL CHARGES			
<i>Sub-Head 1</i>	Pensions and leaving allowances		
1.1.	Retirement pensions	402 000	
1.2.	Invalidity pensions	181 000	
1.3.	Survivors' pensions	43 500	
1.4.	Orphans' or dependants' pensions		
1.5.	Leaving allowances		
<i>Sub-Head 2</i>	Family allowances		
2.1.	Household allowances	18 000	
2.2.	Children's and dependants' allowances	22 000	
2.3.	Education allowances	5 000	
<i>Sub-Head 3</i>	Supplementary insurance	12 000	
Total of Head I		683 500	
Total		16 311 900	

The expenditure figures include charges for goods delivered and services rendered by 31st December 1985, and paid for up

Jean-Marie CARO
President of the Assembly

Georges
Clerk of

	Transfers		Total after transfers	Total expenditure	Unexpended credits
	+	-			
			402 000	418 287	- 16 287
			181 000	186 928	- 5 928
		64	43 436	43 436	-
				79 751	- 79 751
		23	17 977	17 977	-
			22 000	23 016	- 1 016
			5 000	12 495	- 7 495
	87		12 087	12 393	- 306
	87	87	683 500	794 283	- 110 783
	260 320	260 320	16 311 900	16 447 998	- 136 098

March 1986, in accordance with the Financial Regulations of the Assembly.

ULIAS
embly

Dudley SMITH
*Chairman of the Committee on
Budgetary Affairs and Administration*

APPENDIX III

**STATEMENT OF SUMS RECEIVED FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
OF WEU LONDON IN RESPECT OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE WEU ASSEMBLY
BUDGET FOR 1985**

Member states	600ths	Contributions overpaid in 1984	Budget surplus 1984	Budget for 1985 (Revised)	Net contributions required
		F	F	F	F
Belgium	59	508 744	(-) 16 539	1 521 305	2 013 510
France	120	(-) 350 967	(-) 33 638	3 094 180	2 709 575
Federal Republic of Germany	120	(-) 350 967	(-) 33 638	3 094 180	2 709 575
Italy	120	(-) 350 967	(-) 33 638	3 094 180	2 709 575
Luxembourg	2	(-) 5 849	(-) 560	51 570	45 161
Netherlands	59	(-) 172 560	(-) 16 539	1 521 305	1 332 206
United Kingdom	120	(-) 350 967	(-) 33 638	3 094 180	2 709 575
	600	(-) 1 073 533	(-) 168 190	15 470 900	14 229 177

Amounts paid by the Secretariat-General to the Assembly 15 302 710

1984 budget surplus 168 190

1985 budget 15 470 900

APPENDIX IV
PROVIDENT FUND
ACCOUNT FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR ENDED 31st DECEMBER 1985

in French francs

	F		F
<i>Balance brought forward:</i>			
Accounts of staff members as at 1st January 1985	2 761 413	Management fee	15 394
Contributions of staff members and of the Assembly of Western European Union	182 337	Withdrawals	8 300
Repayments of loans by staff members	80 946	Loss on valuation at 31st December 1985	10 186
Interest received during the year	232 042	Accounts of existing staff members as at 31st December 1985	<u>3 222 858</u>
	<u>3 256 738</u>		<u>3 256 738</u>

Jean-Marie CARO
President of the Assembly

Georges MOULIAS
Clerk of the Assembly

Dudley SMITH
*Chairman of the Committee on
Budgetary Affairs and Administration*

I have examined the foregoing account. In my opinion the account presents fairly the financial position of the provident fund at 31st December 1985.

Gordon DOWNEY
*Comptroller and Auditor General, United Kingdom
External Auditor*

14th August 1986

*Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly
for the financial year 1985*

**MOTION TO APPROVE THE FINAL ACCOUNTS OF THE ASSEMBLY
FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1985¹**

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration²
by Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteur*

The Assembly,

Having examined the final accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1985, together with the auditor's report, in accordance with Article 16 of the financial regulations,

Approves the accounts as submitted and discharges the President of the Assembly of his financial responsibility.

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee : Sir Dudley Smith (Chairman); MM. Sinesio, Bohl (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Beysen, Chartron, Declercq, Dhaille, Enders, Ferrari Aggradi (Alternate : Giust), Freeson, Haase, Linster (Alternate : Hengel), Morris, Oehler, Mrs. Pack, MM. Pollidoro, Rauti, Stokes (Alternate : Rees), van Tets, de Vries, Zierer.*

N.B. : *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

*Meeting between the Committee for Relations with the Council
and the Chairman-in-Office of the Council*

MEMORANDUM

*by Mr. Jean-Marie Caro, President of the Assembly,
adopted by the Presidential Committee on 15th September 1986*

1. Almost two years after the Rome declaration, much uncertainty or obscurity still surrounds the nature, extent and scope the seven governments intend to accord to the reactivation of WEU. On the occasion of the meeting between the Council and the Assembly in Venice and again at the first part of the thirty-second session of the Assembly, this uncertainty and obscurity caused some doubt to be voiced, particularly in the press, about whether the Seven were truly determined to give WEU new tasks. The Chairman-in-Office of the Council, the Secretary-General of WEU and the ministers who spoke during the session nevertheless reaffirmed this determination, and the Assembly's Presidential Committee for its part wishes to convey to the Council its opinion on the steps it believes the latter should take to carry it into effect.

2. In any event, the Assembly wishes to be given a prior assurance that the aims of the reactivation of WEU remain unchanged in the Council's political programme.

1. Promotion of a European political area

3. The Rome declaration made it clear, on the one hand, that it was towards the political area that the Seven intended to direct the activities of WEU and, on the other hand, that WEU should not duplicate the work of other bodies, thus allowing a wider base to be given to the building of a European union. Inter alia, this implied that the WEU Council would not interfere in matters handled by the Twelve.

4. While admitting that it should be ensured that each institution keeps to its own area of responsibility, it must be noted that this fear of duplication is voiced almost only in regard to WEU although so far it has hardly impinged upon other European organisations. In many cases, therefore, it may be wondered whether this does not conceal a bias against the reactivation of WEU, i.e. the existence of Europe in the areas for which WEU is responsible.

5. In any event, the application of these principles shows that there is some uncertainty about which matters should be tackled by the Seven and which by the Twelve. As a result, no satisfactory action has yet been taken on some questions because twelve-power political consultations associate countries whose security policies are not homogenous enough and because their discussions are not followed up by an international secretariat.

6. If it is accepted that the Twelve now form the area in which a European political union is to be set up, it must be noted that they are not able to ensure application of the modified Brussels Treaty which is the basis of Europe in security matters. Hence the European political area has to be organised, account being taken of these facts and maximum use being made of the possibilities offered by WEU to give Europe a content which cannot now be defined in the framework of the Twelve.

7. This means applying the principle of avoiding duplication among the European institutions not by a division of work between the Seven and the Twelve but by reasonable co-ordination between them. Keeping the Twelve informed of WEU's activities is one way of doing this but it must not remain the only one and in order to produce more convincing results for European political co-operation the WEU Council must not hesitate to take up matters tackled in a wider framework, particularly when it is a matter of contributing to Europe's security, as the Assembly proposed in response to the development of international terrorism. The decision taken by the Public Administration Committee in May 1986 to follow up the Italian proposal to study "the organisation of government in the face of terrorism" in 1987 shows that there are areas in which WEU can play this rôle.

8. The present recrudescence of international terrorism emphasises the permanent nature of this threat to our civilisation. It is for the Council, under Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty, to ensure that the WEU member countries co-ordinate the measures of prevention and

repression they have to take to counter it. This situation can but add weight to the proposal addressed by the President of the Assembly to the Council on 17th April 1986, which the Assembly endorsed by adopting Recommendation 435, to "concert the action taken by member countries so as to deter effectively any country from affording assistance or encouragement to organisations practising terrorism".

9. The development of meetings of political directors from the ministries for foreign affairs of the Seven at the close of meetings of the Twelve on political co-operation would be one means of moving in this direction. This should be practised in particular in the event of serious threats to international peace and in any case communiqués should be issued about meetings held in the context of WEU. The participation of the Secretary-General of WEU in twelve-power political consultations might also promote fruitful co-operation between the two bodies.

10. In accordance with the wishes expressed by the Council, the Assembly for its part has started to develop its relations with the European Parliament and with the North Atlantic Assembly, as well as with the parliaments of the European member countries of the Atlantic Alliance, with a view to improving the organisation of the European political area at parliamentary level.

2. Promotion of a European policy on defence and armaments, the limitation of armaments and the military use of space

11. This was the main aim which the seven governments assumed in the Rome declaration. Since then, the Council's activities have fallen well short of this goal. While welcoming the fact that the Council's thirty-first annual report refers to its conclusions on the American strategic defence initiative, the Assembly has asked the Council to direct its work in a number of directions, with the assistance of its specialised agencies. These would include:

- promoting European co-operation in research on and development and production of defence equipment involving use of advanced technology (Recommendations 416, 419, 423, 436 and 437);
- promoting a true European policy on the limitation of armaments;
- developing research to master the space dimension with a view to starting a European programme for Europe to increase its capabilities in space matters where progress with the SDI might give the United States an overwhelming lead (Recommendations 413 and 414);

- following up the report on WEU and public awareness (Recommendation 411);
- stipulating the specific rôle of each of the bodies responsible for promoting European armaments co-operation on the basis of agreements between chiefs-of-staff on tactical requirements, common logistical requirements and the technical details of interoperability based on an analysis of the threat adopted by the Seven (Recommendations 416 and 423);
- in the countries concerned, co-ordinating the measures of deterrence, prevention and repression which have had to be taken because of the development of terrorism (Recommendation 435).

3. Co-operation with the United States

12. The major rôle played by the United States in ensuring Western Europe's security makes it essential to determine Europe's requirements in order to hold a continuing dialogue between the United States and a European partner. This is being conducted mainly in NATO and in the context of bilateral relations which allows the United States to obtain too many economic advantages thanks to its military strength. However, if, in the Atlantic Alliance and in areas not covered by the alliance, Europe wishes to play a rôle which corresponds to its geographical situation, its economic resources, its ability to defend itself and its efforts for joint security, it must, in external policy and defence and disarmament matters provide itself with the wherewithal to define and defend its interests through collective action, as it has succeeded in doing in the Community's area of responsibility.

13. WEU cannot claim to be a European pillar of the alliance if the Council does not assert itself as the United States' partner by voicing Europe's view both on matters tackled in the framework of NATO, including alliance strategy, armaments, arms limitation and disarmament, and in regard to the threats to international peace arising outside the North Atlantic Treaty area. With this in mind, the Assembly has proposed several times that the Council meet prior to meetings of the North Atlantic Council. It has also stressed the importance it attaches to ministers of defence regularly attending Council meetings.

14. The Council should develop its activities in regard to the American authorities to show them that WEU's work is in the interests of the alliance as a whole and of the United States itself

by allowing Europe to express itself with a single voice capable of warning the United States Government about any measures which might divide the members of the Atlantic Alliance or jeopardise Europe's fundamental interests in all areas.

4. *The enlargement of WEU*

15. At the request of the Council, the Assembly is developing its relations with the parliaments of European countries members of the Atlantic Alliance, several of which send observers to its sessions. However, it is evident that for countries which have applied for membership of WEU and those showing a real interest in its activities, this method of participation can but be a transitional measure. The Assembly expects the Council to say forthwith what action it intends to take on Portugal's application for membership and on the results of the Spanish referendum. Its decisions on these matters will give public opinion a better idea of its views on the rôle WEU is destined to play in setting up a European union associating WEU's security and defence responsibilities with the Communities' economic responsibilities (Recommendation 432).

16. The Council's favourable response to the enlargement of WEU, in accordance with the Assembly's expectations, will show whether the Council is still attached to the reactivation of WEU as provided for in the Rome declaration.

5. *The Secretariat-General and the agencies*

17. While there is no doubt that the Secretariat-General, as a consequence of the Rome declaration, has extended its field of action considerably, it is not so clear that the new agencies have so far had to play a rôle corresponding to WEU's operational requirements as envisaged in the Rome declaration. The creation of such agencies implied that WEU effectively exercised certain responsibilities and also that the Council left them a free enough hand to allow them to take meaningful action in the areas assigned to them.

18. (a) For the reports to be really useful, the task of reporting at short notice on the various subjects assigned to them by the Council implies certain requirements which do not yet seem to be fully met.

1. The Council must first develop definite tasks before asking the agencies for assistance. The reports submitted to it

should be considered and effectively followed up in the context of its normal work.

2. The agencies must be required to follow continuously the matters they have to study so as to build up the necessary documentation and competence to be able to work to good avail. They must have the means necessary for acquiring information in member countries and international organisations and for processing it. In particular, NATO and the IEPG should be instructed to give them all necessary support.
3. The Council must inform the Assembly and public opinion of the content of these reports without delay, subject only to the restrictions imposed by classified defence information (Recommendation 432).

19. (b) The necessary continuity of the agencies' action means that, in addition to their task of keeping the Council informed, they must have permanent tasks in the context of WEU's general vocation (Recommendation 432).

1. Agency I for disarmament questions should be instructed to assist the delegations of all member countries in disarmament negotiations in which they take part, particularly in the United Nations and the CSCE. It should take part in preparing directives for the negotiations and should follow official and unofficial negotiation sessions in order to be able to play an effective rôle. This means the agency giving member countries every guarantee that the secrecy of information communicated to it is respected and that the basis of any co-operation between the agencies and the Assembly must be clear enough to ensure that the latter cannot be suspected of leaks.
2. Agency II for defence questions should be instructed to co-ordinate work undertaken in the various member countries to keep public opinion informed of defence problems with a view to making it better aware of their European dimension. The Assembly has often stressed the interest of this task which corresponds to views endorsed by the Seven in the Rome declaration. While giving favourable answers to Assembly recommendations, the Council has so far done nothing to follow them up (Recommendations 429 and 432).

3. Agency III for the development of armaments co-operation differs from the others in that its research rôle is a secondary one. It is responsible for following the progress of European armaments co-operation. Where necessary, it has to follow and analyse work conducted elsewhere on the comparison of equipment requirements and relevant specifications and on the present situation. Finally, it has to study the armaments sector of industries in member countries. For this purpose, it should first continue the work undertaken by the international secretariat of the SAC and ensure that governments follow up their conclusions, which has not so far been the case, some of these studies, particularly the one on legal obstacles to co-operation, involving legislative decisions. Just as, generally speaking, American legislation reserves the United States army's procurement for the country's own industries, principles should similarly be defined for European preference without any protectionist policy. Agency III should also be given the permanent task of studying all matters raised by the transfer between allies of armaments-related technology. Finally, the 1955 text setting up the SAC should be re-examined to ensure that that body's new terms of reference take account of the vocation of the IEPG and of the fact that WEU has a political vocation: preparation of the European union.

6. Council and Assembly

20. The Assembly is gratified that the Luxembourg presidency has agreed to maintain a ministerial presence throughout the second part of the thirty-second session. It trusts this will allow the Chairman-in-Office of the Council to speak during each debate in order to present the Council's view. Above all, it trusts that this experience will be continued to allow a non-stop dialogue between Council and Assembly on the principal matters on the agenda of sessions.

21. Conversely, the Assembly was not very satisfied with its exchanges with the Council in the first half of 1986, mainly because of the inadequate use the Council made of its thirty-first annual report to inform the Assembly of its activities. It can but repeat its requests for fuller, more frequent and more systematic information and for the press to be kept regularly and fully informed of Council meetings.

22. Finally, it has to recall that the reactivation of WEU and the new interest shown in the organisation by certain countries and many associations have already led to a considerable increase in the work incumbent on the Office of the Clerk and in the Assembly's budgetary constraints. The prospects of WEU being enlarged will add to this. Consideration must be given to the requirements which these new burdens already represent and which will become even greater for the Assembly's staff, equipment, premises and budget, and a remedy must first of all be found to a trend which has led to the resources available to the Assembly diminishing just when its work is increasing.

REVISED DRAFT BUDGET OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE
OF THE ASSEMBLY FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1986¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration²
by Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteur*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteur

REVISED DRAFT BUDGET OF THE ASSEMBLY FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1986

APPENDICES

- I. Recommendation 433 – 4th June 1986.
- II. Recapitulation of changes in the staff of the Office of the Clerk proposed in the 1986 budget (revised).
- III. Secretary-General's note – Assembly budget – 1985 – Document C-B (86) 3 of 17th February 1986.
- IV. Secretary-General's note – Assembly budget – 1985 – Document C-B (86) 3 – Confirmation – 26th March 1986.
- V. Comparison between estimates for expenditure on grade A salaries calculated on the basis of scales as at 1st July 1985 and sums granted for this purpose in the 1986 budget.
- VI. Comparison between estimates for expenditure on grade A pensions calculated on the basis of scales as at 1st July 1985 and sums granted for this purpose in the 1986 budget.

1. Adopted in committee by 8 votes to 0 with 3 abstentions.

2. *Members of the committee: Sir Dudley Smith (Chairman); MM. Sinesio, Bohl (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Beysen, Chartron, Declercq, Dhaille, Enders, Ferrari Aggradi (Alternate: Giust), Freeson, Haase, Linster (Alternate: Hengel), Morris, Oehler, Mrs. Pack, MM. Pollidoro, Rauti, Stokes (Alternate: Rees), van Tets, de Vries, Zierer.*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

*Explanatory Memorandum**(submitted by Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteur)*

1. There are several reasons for having to revise the budget for the financial year 1986: some are due to political decisions of the Assembly or its organs, others stem from decisions of the Council concerning in particular the financial regulation of expenditure through the application of the 215th report of the Co-ordinating Committee.

A specific reference must therefore be made to the documents which reflect these decisions in order to justify the request for additional credits in the draft revised budget for 1986.

2. During the first part of the thirty-second ordinary session, the Assembly recommended that the Council "give favourable consideration to the proposals to create two new grade B3 posts which are given top priority in the Assembly's draft budget for 1986" (cf. Recommendation 433, paragraph 4, Appendix I).

Further to this recommendation, this draft revised budget repeats the proposal to create these two new posts, the need for which is still a top priority. It suffices to recall that one of these two posts is to strengthen the administrative and accounts service of the Office of the Clerk – which at the moment has only one grade B6 official – and the other will allow the secretary of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations (whose responsibilities within this committee have been increased and above all he is now responsible for the research service) to be helped by an assistant specifically assigned to this sector of work.

In view of the necessary administrative time-lag in procedure for approving this draft revised budget, the creation of these two new posts cannot take effect before December 1986. The financial repercussions have therefore been calculated on the basis of one month's salary and allowances, i.e. F 25 000 (Sub-Heads 1, 2 and 3 of Head I).

3. At its meeting on 29th April 1986, the Bureau of the Assembly decided inter alia to give Mr. Burchard the task of head of the research service in addition to his present duties and to ask for his promotion to grade A4. In a letter of 18th June 1986, the President of the Assembly informed the Secretary-General, underlining that it was both a matter of recognising the increased responsibilities of this official and of fulfilling an undertaking towards the German Delegation. This promotion, which would take effect as from 1st July 1986, had a financial implication of F 4 800.

It should be specified that the other promotions considered by the Bureau will be examined in the near future by the Presidential Committee in the context of a full study of the restructuration of the Office of the Clerk.

The new list of staff of the Office of the Clerk as at 1st September 1986 is given in the table at Appendix II.

4. In application of the measures approved by the Council (cf. documents CB (86) 3 of 17th February 1986, Appendix III, and CB (86) 3, confirmation of 26th March 1986, Appendix IV), the following additional sums are requested:

(a) In Head I of the operating budget

F 80 800 (rounded down) to finance the part of the salary adjustments of A grades which could not be met from the 1985 budget and was attributed to the 1986 budget;

F 200 000 for the amended salary estimates for 1986 which had been calculated at a level lower than the one subsequently agreed upon on the basis of the 215th report of the Co-ordinating Committee;

(b) In Head I of the pensions budget

F 43 000 for the amended estimates of pensions for 1986 as a consequence of the application of the report of the abovementioned Co-ordinating Committee.

However, this expenditure is partly offset by increased receipts from contributions to the pension scheme of permanent staff assessed at F 15 000.

Appendices V and VI show the calculations made to assess these additional appropriations.

5. Conversely, no amounts are requested under the same head for salaries of interpreters and temporary sittings staff recruited for sessions at A level since it is possible to offset excess expenditure by budgetary savings.

6. Finally an additional amount of F 80 000 is requested under Sub-Head 7 of Head II – Interpreters. This amount is essential for carrying out the programme of committee meetings outside Paris.

It is underlined that the initial sum of F 400 000 granted by the Council was largely taken up by the organisation of the committee session in Venice and by various study journeys by committees to the United States, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, the United Kingdom, etc. Without this amount, the Presidential Committee would be obliged to revise the programme of work of each committee and cancel journeys already authorised.

Furthermore, it will not be possible to organise a second committee session in the autumn or other meetings outside Paris in 1986.

7. In conclusion, the total supplementary credits requested amount to F 418 600, i.e. 2.49% of the net total initial budget for 1986.

Revised draft budget of the Assembly for the financial year 1986

Heads and Sub-Heads	Draft budget for 1986 (initial)	Draft budget for 1986 (revised)	Difference
<i>Head I – Permanent staff</i>			
SUB-HEAD :			
1 – Basic salaries	6 690 000	6 897 800	207 800
2 – Allowances	1 300 000	1 337 400	37 400
3 – Social charges	1 250 000	1 315 400	65 400
4 – Expenses relating to the recruitment and departure of permanent officials	180 000	180 000	
5 – Medical examination	8 000	8 000	
Total	9 428 000	9 738 600	310 600
<i>Head II – Temporary staff</i>			
SUB-HEAD :			
6 – Staff recruited for sessions	1 950 000	1 950 000	
7 – Interpretation staff required for Assembly work between sessions	400 000	480 000	80 000
8 – Temporary staff for the Office of the Clerk .	80 000	80 000	
9 – Social charges	81 000	81 000	
Total	2 511 000	2 591 000	80 000
<i>Head III – Expenditure on premises and equipment</i>			
SUB-HEAD :			
10 – Share of joint expenditure on the Paris pre- mises	430 000	430 000	
11 – Hire of committee rooms	15 000	15 000	
12 – Technical and other installations for Assem- bly sessions	340 000	340 000	
13 – Various services for the organisation of ses- sions	45 000	45 000	
14 – Maintenance of the premises of the Office of the Clerk	15 000	15 000	
15 – Purchase or repair of office furniture	25 500	25 500	
16 – Purchase of reproduction and other office equipment	94 800	94 800	
17 – Hire and maintenance of reproduction and other office equipment	390 800	390 800	
Total	1 356 100	1 356 100	

Heads and Sub-Heads	Draft budget for 1986 (initial)	Draft budget for 1986 (revised)	Difference
<i>Head IV – General administrative costs</i>			
SUB-HEAD :			
18 – Postage, telephone, telex and transport of documents	480 000	480 000	
19 – Duplication paper, headed writing paper and other office supplies	250 000	250 000	
20 – Printing and publication of documents ...	1 150 000	1 150 000	
21 – Purchase of documents	50 000	50 000	
22 – Official cars	100 000	100 000	
23 – Bank charges	500	500	
Total	2 030 500	2 030 500	
<i>Head V – Other expenditure</i>			
SUB-HEAD :			
24 – Travelling and subsistence allowances and insurance for the President of the Assembly, chairmen of committees and rapporteurs ..	150 000	150 000	
25 – Expenses for representation	170 000	170 000	
26 – Committee study missions	3 300	3 300	
27 – Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk	350 000	350 000	
28 – Expenses of experts and the auditor	70 000	70 000	
29 – Expenditure on information	300 000	300 000	
30 – Expenses for political groups	300 000	300 000	
31 – Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere provided for	3 000	3 000	
32 – Non-recoverable taxes	20 000	20 000	
Total	1 366 300	1 366 300	
OPERATING BUDGET	16 691 900	17 082 500	390 600
RECEIPTS	400 000	400 000	–
NET TOTAL OPERATING BUDGET	16 291 900	16 682 500	390 600
PENSIONS	928 000	971 000	43 000
RECEIPTS	410 000	425 000	15 000
NET TOTAL PENSIONS BUDGET	518 000	546 000	28 000
NET GRAND TOTAL	16 809 900	17 228 500	418 600

APPENDIX I

RECOMMENDATION 433 ¹*on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union
for the financial years 1985 (revised) and 1986* ²

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting that, in communicating the budgets of Western European Union for 1985 (revised) and 1986, the Council has complied with the provisions of Article VIII (c) of the Charter;
- (ii) Considering that:
 - (a) the budgets for 1985 (revised) and 1986 take account of the new structure of the ministerial organs of WEU achieved in conformity with the directives set out in the Rome declaration;
 - (b) each of these budgets is the subject of an initial three-part document (recapitulation, explanatory memorandum and pensions) for the WEU Budget and Organisation Committee and of a document revised on the basis of the recommendations adopted by that committee and transmitted to the Council;
 - (c) examination of the budgets consequently requires knowledge of the abovementioned documents and of the others produced during the year but which are not sent to the Assembly on a regular basis;
 - (d) the way WEU budgets are now presented draws no distinction between ordinary and extraordinary expenditure although the latter may have a considerable effect on statistics on the evolution of budgets and consequently detract from the objective application of the zero growth criterion or of any other criterion for budgetary trends agreed by the governments;
 - (e) the 1985 budget allowed considerable excess resources to be built up which were used for the sole purpose of restructuring the ministerial organs, no account being taken in this context of the requirements of the Assembly although the ministers expressed their wish in Rome in October 1984 to have the Assembly "play a growing rôle";
 - (f) the new breakdown of duties shown in the recent establishment tables of the ministerial organs increases the need to review procedure for approving Assembly budgets in order to provide a better guarantee of its autonomy and independence;
 - (g) the task of managing pensions in WEU has grown to such an extent that an independent body should be given responsibility for this task;
- (iii) Regretting that:
 - (a) two Grade B posts are shown as vacant in the budget of the Paris agencies whereas the Assembly's proposal to create two new Grade B posts in the Office of the Clerk has been rejected;
 - (b) the programme for the modernisation of equipment makes no provision for purchasing a telex, the lack of which is keenly felt by all the services of WEU as well as by parliamentarians;
- (iv) Welcoming the fact that the Council, in attributing grades to the various types of duty, has adopted the dual-grading criterion which the Assembly has often recommended in the past,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Examine the possibility of:
 - (a) combining in a single budgetary document all the information now given in many different documents;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th June 1986 during the first part of the thirty-second ordinary session (6th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Sinesio on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration (Document 1054).

- (b) showing in the two parts of the budget (operating budget and pensions budget) two categories of expenditure: ordinary and extraordinary expenditure, to make it easier to follow the evolution of these budgets;
2. Transmit to the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly all budgetary documents relating to its budgetary decisions;
 3. In consultation with the appropriate Assembly bodies, review procedure for approving Assembly budgets so that it corresponds better to the principle of its autonomy and independence;
 4. Give favourable consideration to the proposals to create two new Grade B3 posts which are given top priority in the Assembly's draft budget for 1986;
 5. Further to Assembly Recommendation 357, promote the creation of an independent body for the administration of pensions and, to this end, organise consultations with the other co-ordinated organisations;
 6. Study the problem of dual-grading at every level of the hierarchy and lay down a general rule on the subject applicable to all WEU staff;
 7. Authorise the installation of a telex in the London and Paris offices, it being understood that the telex installed in Paris would be available to all WEU organs in accordance with methods of use and cost-sharing to be agreed among them;
 8. Promote harmonisation of the technical equipment of the organs of WEU to achieve future cost-saving and engage a management consultant from a member government or private industry to investigate this matter and make recommendations.

APPENDIX II

*Recapitulation of changes
in the staff of the Office of the Clerk
proposed in the 1986 budget (revised)*

Grade	Duties	Draft budget for 1986 (revised)	Draft budget for 1986 (initial)	+ or -
H.C.	Clerk	1	1	-
A6	Senior counsellor	0	1	- 1
A5	Counsellors	5 ¹	4	+ 1
A4	First secretaries	3	2	+ 1
A3	Secretaries	0	1	- 1
A2	Translators, documentalist	3	3	-
B6	Chief accountant	1	1	-
B4	Personal assistants	5	5	-
B3	Bilingual shorthand-typists	6	5	+ 1
B3	Accountant	1	-	+ 1
B3	Switchboard operator	1	1	-
C6	Head of reproduction department	1	1	-
C4	Assistants in reproduction department	2	2	-
		29	27	+ 2

1. One of these 5 posts is now grade A4.

APPENDIX III

*Secretary-General's note*¹*Assembly budget – 1985*
(C-B (86) 2)

1. The Secretary-General refers to document C-B (86) 2 dated 29th January 1986 in which delegations were advised that the Assembly's budget for 1985 may not have sufficient funds to cover the cost of the Assembly's share of security work carried out at the Paris offices of WEU in 1985. It is recalled that the Council gave its approval for this work on 13th February 1985 (CR (85) 3, V, 3). The Assembly's share of the cost amounted to F 151 463.45.
2. Document C-B (86) 2 noted that a possible consequence of this situation could be that the Assembly's accounts for the financial year 1985 would show a deficit instead of the customary surplus. It was also pointed out that so long as the deficit did not exceed the amount mentioned above, the need to call for additional budget contributions to cover the deficit could be avoided if delegations would agree that the Assembly's budget surplus from 1984 (F 168 189.58) could be retained.
3. Delegations are now asked to note that the Assembly is faced with further unforeseen expenditure, that will affect both the 1985 and 1986 budgets, arising from the 1985 annual review of emoluments and the recommendations for that review contained in the Co-ordinating Committee's 215th report (C (86) 2 and addendum). The increases proposed in the report are higher than were anticipated both for the Assembly and the other offices of WEU. This situation has been foreseen by the members of the Co-ordinating Committee and is mentioned in paragraph 4 on page (ii) of the addendum to the report:

“ The attention of national delegations was drawn to the fact that some organisations – due to the late submission of the second part of the proposals... might not have been able to take into account completely the financial consequences of the present report in their budgetary estimates. Certain rearrangements might therefore be necessary within such budgets. ”
4. The Office of the Clerk of the Assembly proposes to overcome this latest problem by charging the salary arrears payments for 1985 that cannot be met from the 1985 budget to the budget for 1986. It will submit in due course a supplementary budget for 1986 to regularise this situation. That budget will also have to modify the salary estimates for 1986 which were also calculated at a lower level than is proposed in the 215th report.
5. In passing, the Secretary-General must inform delegations that the 215th report will mean an adjustment to the budgets of the ministerial organs. The increases proposed for A and L staff in London are interim figures (see paragraph 2 of the addendum to the report) and it may be some time, therefore, before the full financial consequences can be calculated.
6. Insofar as the Assembly is concerned, the Council's approval of the measures proposed in paragraphs 2 and 4 above will be assumed if no written objections are received by 26th February 1986.

1. Document C-B (86) 3, 17th February 1986.

APPENDIX IV

*Secretary-General's note*¹*Assembly budget – 1985*
(C-B (86) 2)

The Secretary-General confirms that the Council has now approved the measures proposed by the Assembly in paragraphs 2 and 4 of document C-B (86) 3.

1. Document C-B (86) 3 – Confirmation – 26th March 1986.

APPENDIX V

*Comparison between estimates for expenditure on grade A salaries
calculated on the basis of scales as at 1st July 1985
and sums granted for this purpose in the 1986 budget*

Sub-Heads	1986 budget	Estimates based on scales as at 1st July 1985 ¹	Difference
SUB-HEAD 1 – Basic salaries	4 280 000	4 470 500	– 190 500
SUB-HEAD 2 – Allowances			
2.1. Expatriation allowance	465 700	483 900	– 18 200
2.2. Household allowance	190 400	199 200	– 8 800
2.3. Allowance for children, etc.	116 400	122 200	– 5 800
2.4. Rent allowance	–	–	–
2.5. Education allowance	90 000	91 500	– 1 500
SUB-HEAD 3 – Social charges			
3.1. Social security	556 800	581 000	– 24 200
3.2. Supplementary insurance	151 000	182 400	– 31 400
3.3. Provident fund	125 400	131 000	– 5 700
	5 975 700	6 261 800	– 286 100
Foreseeable savings in the salaries of grade B and C staff under Head I			86 100
Additional sum			– 200 000

1. Adjusted on the basis of a 1.5% rate of increase to take account of foreseeable increases as from 1st July 1986.

APPENDIX VI

*Comparison between estimates for expenditure on grade A pensions calculated
on the basis of scales as at 1st July 1985
and sums granted for this purpose in the 1986 budget*

Sub-Heads	1986 budget	Estimates based on scales as at 1st July 1985 ¹	Difference
SUB-HEAD 1 – Pensions and leaving allowances			
1.1. Retirement pensions	508 300	532 000	– 23 700
1.2. Invalidity pensions	190 000	198 000	– 8 000
SUB-HEAD 2 – Family allowances			
2.1. Household allowances	19 600	20 500	– 900
2.2. Children's and other dependants' allowances	11 700	12 300	– 600
2.3. Education allowances	4 500	10 400	– 5 900
SUB-HEAD 3 – Supplementary insurance	12 200	16 100	– 3 900
	746 300	789 300	– 43 000

1. Adjusted on the basis of a 1.5% rate of increase to take account of foreseeable increases as from 1st July 1986.

*Revised draft budget of the administrative expenditure
of the Assembly for the financial year 1986*

Opinion of the Council

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Opinion of the WEU Budget and Organisation Committee
(Document C-B (86) 14)

Opinion of the Council (Letter from the Secretary-General
of WEU dated 27th November 1986)

Table showing reductions approved by the Council

Secretary-General's note¹

WEU Assembly revised budget for 1986

1. The WEU Assembly revised budget for 1986 was circulated under reference B (86) 24 (Assembly Document 1071) and was considered by the Budget and Organisation Committee at its meeting in London on 23rd and 24th October 1986 (BR (86) 2, III - to be circulated).

2. The total of the approved 1986 budget was F 16 809 900. An additional sum of F 418 600 was requested in the revised budget, bringing the total for the year to F 17 228 500. That total would represent an increase over 1985 of 11.36% (originally 8.65%) or, without pensions, 9.97% (originally 7.39%).

3. The additional amount of F 418 600 was made up as follows:

<i>Head I - Permanent staff</i>	F
Creation of two new posts in grade B3	25 000
Cost in 1986 of a promotion to an existing vacant post (A3 to A4)	4 800
To meet, in 1986, costs from salary increase awarded in 1985 for which there were insufficient funds in the 1985 budget	80 800
Extra cost in 1986 of salary increase awarded in 1985 for which the original estimates were insufficient	<u>200 000</u>
	310 600

Head II - Temporary staff

Additional funds for the recruitment of interpreters to serve committee meetings ...	<u>80 000</u>
	390 600

Pensions

F 43 000 required for higher pensions costs as a result of the salary adjustment mentioned above, less F 15 000 additional contribution income arising from the same adjustment, making a net increase of	<u>28 000</u>
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Total	<u>418 600</u>
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4. In the committee's debate on this budget, several delegations observed that they would have difficulties finding extra money to meet a call for supplementary contributions. They urged that savings be found elsewhere in the budget. It was acknowledged, however, that the salary adjustment procedure imposed unavoidable financial obligations on the co-ordinated organisations. This was especially true in 1985 when the increase for A and L staff had been higher than anticipated because of an adjustment

1. Document C-B (86) 14, 31st October 1986.

to the purchasing power parity factor. Expenditure that was clearly within the control of the organisation was another matter and, in this area, the committee agreed that economies would have to be made.

Head I

The proposal to create two new B3 posts could not be agreed, and delegations also felt that the amount of F 4 800 should not feature in this budget. It was recommended, therefore, that a total of F 29 800 should be deleted from this head.

Head II

The committee took the view that meetings of various committees, etc., should be organised and financed within the limits of the credits approved in the main budget. A proposal supported by three delegations to reduce the increase sought by half was not approved as two other delegations could accept no increase under this head (F 80 000).

At this point, therefore, the committee had effectively applied reductions of F 109 800, reducing the total increase of the revised budget from F 418 600 to F 308 800.

Additional economies were sought by members of the committee. The Assembly's representative offered a further reduction of F 50 000 that would reduce the total increase from F 308 800 to F 258 800, but this remained unacceptable and, after further discussion, the committee agreed (subject to a United Kingdom reserve) that the increase of the revised budget should not exceed F 250 000, a reduction of F 168 600.

5. The committee's recommendations would amend the 1986 budget as follows:

	F
Main budget	16 809 900
Revised budget	<u>250 000</u>
Total for 1986	<u>17 059 900</u>

The increase over 1985 would be 10.27% in total or 8.86% without pensions.

6. It is noted that the increase proposed, namely F 250 000, is below the amount sought by the Assembly to compensate for the higher salary costs arising from the Co-ordinating Committee's 215th report (F 280 800 in Head I plus F 28 000 for pensions, making a total of F 308 800).

7. Subject to the amendments proposed above, the Budget and Organisation Committee (but United Kingdom reserve) could recommend the Council to give a favourable opinion on the revised budget of the WEU Assembly for 1986.

8. That opinion has to be conveyed to the Assembly before the opening of the second part of the thirty-second session on 1st December 1986. After the budget has been adopted during the session, it will be returned to the Council for final approval (see Annex).

9. The Council's opinion will be sought at a forthcoming meeting in November.

*
* *

London, 27th November 1986

Dear Mr. Moulias,

1. At its meeting on 26th November 1986, the Council discussed in depth the Assembly's budgets for 1986 and 1987 on the basis of the recommendations of the Budget and Organisation Committee set out in documents CB (86) 14 and CB (86) 15.

2. In the case of the *revised budget for 1986*, and notwithstanding the recommended reductions, the Council decided to grant the Assembly a sum of F 58 800 to allow it to fulfil its commitments in regard to the payment of salaries and pensions.

The total budget would thus amount to F 17 118 700; the percentage increase compared with the 1985 budget would therefore be 10.65% including pensions and 9.24% without them.

3. The Council will be able to express a favourable opinion on the revised budget for 1986, the abovementioned changes being made.

4. The Council also examined the *Assembly's budget for 1987* with special care.

There was a consensus in favour of a limited increase in this budget and the Council decided, notwithstanding the recommended reductions, to grant the following sums:

- F 24 875 under Sub-Head 6 of Head II;
- F 40 000 under Sub-Head 7 of Head II;
- F 15 000 under Head IV.

The total budget will thus amount to F 17 596 375 and the percentage increase compared with the revised budget for 1986, as amended, will therefore be 2.79% including pensions and 0.49% without them.

The Council will be able to express a favourable opinion on the budget for 1987, the abovementioned changes being made.

5. The Council also examined the place of pensions in the organisation's budget.

It intends to pursue its detailed study of this matter on the basis of the various budgetary implications involved and in the light of the position of the co-ordinated organisations in this connection.

6. Moreover, it took note of the proposals relating to the restructuring of the Office of the Clerk which have just been submitted to it.

It will, as soon as possible, study these in detail on the basis of the opinions of national experts who have already had the matter placed before them.

Yours sincerely,
Alfred CAHEN
Secretary-General of WEU

Mr. Georges MOULIAS,
Clerk of the Assembly of WEU

**Revised draft budget of the administrative expenditure
of the Assembly for the financial year 1986**

Heads and Sub-Heads	Draft revised budget for 1986 (initial)	Reductions in accordance with the Council's opinion	Draft revised budget for 1986 (reduced)
<i>Head I – Permanent staff</i>			
SUB-HEAD:			
1 – Basic salaries	6 897 800	20 000	6 877 800
2 – Allowances	1 337 400	5 500	1 331 900
3 – Social charges	1 315 400	5 000	1 310 400
4 – Expenses relating to the recruitment and departure of permanent officials	180 000	–	180 000
5 – Medical examination	8 000	–	8 000
Total	9 738 600	30 500	9 708 100
<i>Head II – Temporary staff</i>			
SUB-HEAD:			
6 – Staff recruited for sessions	1 950 000	–	1 950 000
7 – Interpretation staff required for Assembly work between sessions	480 000	80 000	400 000
8 – Temporary staff for the Office of the Clerk .	80 000	–	80 000
9 – Social charges	81 000	–	81 000
Total	2 591 000	80 000	2 511 000
<i>Head III – Expenditure on premises and equipment</i>			
SUB-HEAD:			
10 – Share of joint expenditure on the Paris premises	430 000	–	430 000
11 – Hire of committee rooms	15 000	–	15 000
12 – Technical and other installations for Assembly sessions	340 000	–	340 000
13 – Various services for the organisation of ses- sions	45 000	–	45 000
14 – Maintenance of the premises of the Office of the Clerk	15 000	–	15 000
15 – Purchase or repair of office furniture	25 500	–	25 500
16 – Purchase of reproduction and other office equipment	94 800	–	94 800
17 – Hire and maintenance of reproduction and other office equipment	390 800	–	390 800
Total	1 356 100	–	1 356 100

Heads and Sub-Heads	Draft revised budget for 1986 (initial)	Reductions in accordance with the Council's opinion	Draft revised budget for 1986 (reduced)
<i>Head IV – General administrative costs</i>			
SUB-HEAD:			
18 – Postage, telephone, telex and transport of documents	480 000	–	480 000
19 – Duplication paper, headed writing paper and other office supplies	250 000	–	250 000
20 – Printing and publication of documents ...	1 150 000	–	1 150 000
21 – Purchase of documents	50 000	–	50 000
22 – Official cars	100 000	–	100 000
23 – Bank charges	500	–	500
Total	2 030 500	–	2 030 500
<i>Head V – Other expenditure</i>			
SUB-HEAD:			
24 – Travelling and subsistence allowances and insurance for the President of the Assembly, chairmen of committees and rapporteurs ..	150 000	–	150 000
25 – Expenses for representation	170 000	–	170 000
26 – Committee study missions	3 300	–	3 300
27 – Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk	350 000	–	350 000
28 – Expenses of experts and the auditor	70 000	–	70 000
29 – Expenditure on information	300 000	–	300 000
30 – Expenses for political groups	300 000	–	300 000
31 – Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere provided for	3 000	–	3 000
32 – Non-recoverable taxes	20 000	–	20 000
Total	1 366 300	–	1 366 300
OPERATING BUDGET	17 082 500	110 500	16 972 000
RECEIPTS	400 000	–	400 000
NET TOTAL OPERATING BUDGET	16 682 500	110 500	16 572 000
PENSIONS	971 000	–	971 000
RECEIPTS	425 000	700	424 300
NET TOTAL PENSIONS BUDGET	546 000	700	546 700
NET GRAND TOTAL	17 228 500	109 800	17 118 700

**DRAFT BUDGET OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE
OF THE ASSEMBLY FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1987 ¹**

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration ²
by Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteur*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteur

1. General and political considerations
2. Restructuration of the Office of the Clerk
3. Operational expenditure
4. Modernisation of equipment
5. Pensions
6. Summary of operating budget estimates

SUMMARY OF ESTIMATES OF EXPENDITURE AND RECEIPTS FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1987

BUDGET ESTIMATES

Part I: Operating budget

Section A: Expenditure

Section B: Receipts

Part II: Pensions budget

Section A: Expenditure

Section B: Receipts

APPENDICES

- I. Organogram of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly
- II. Recapitulation of changes in the staff of the Office of the Clerk proposed in the 1987 budget
- III. Salaries of staff recruited for Assembly sessions
- IV. Three-year modernisation and maintenance programme for the equipment of the Office of the Clerk
- V. Trend of the Assembly budget from 1986 to 1987
- VI. Percentage of credits under the various heads of the operating budgets for 1986 (revised) and 1987 compared with the total of these budgets

1. Adopted in committee by 8 votes to 0 with 3 abstentions.

2. *Members of the committee: Sir Dudley Smith (Chairman); MM. Snesio, Bohl (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Beysen, Chartron, Declercq, Dhaille, Enders, Ferrari Aggradi (Alternate: Giust), Freeson, Haase, Linster (Alternate: Hengel), Morris, Oehler, Mrs. Pack, MM. Pollidoro, Rauti, Stokes (Alternate: Rees), van Tets, de Vries, Zierer.*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteur)

1. General and political considerations

1. When presenting its budget for the financial year 1986, the Assembly underlined that in the context of the reactivation of WEU it had set itself the aim of affording the Council its full support in the fundamental task of creating the political conditions for asserting a European personality in the various bodies contributing to Europe's security. To this end, it asked the Council for the means to pursue fruitful co-operation with it. However, the Council did not accept the Assembly's budget proposals and, by a unilateral decision of which the Presidential Committee could but take note, it set the rate of increase at 8.6% for the 1986 budget compared with the 1985 budget, thus forcing the Assembly to withdraw from its budget, among other items, the proposals relating to the restructuration of the Office of the Clerk.

2. As the Secretary-General wrote to the President of the Assembly on 17th January 1986:

“First and foremost, the Council wishes to call the Assembly's attention to the need, in view of the budgetary conditions prevailing in all the member states, to adhere to the zero growth principle.”

On this specific point, the President of the Assembly told the Secretary-General that:

“Application of the zero growth criterion will be possible only when the Assembly's means have been adapted to its tasks, as has been done for the ministerial organs, and, in particular, once a solution has been found to the recent reduction in the staff of the Assembly and to the shortcomings which henceforth jeopardise the smooth conduct of its work.”

3. The draft budget for 1987 merely takes account of this clearly-expressed position. It is also worth pointing out that the present unfavourable economic circumstances to which the Council referred in order to justify maintaining the zero growth criterion has improved considerably in the meantime due to the sharp fall in the price of oil and lower inflation rates with the result that all the WEU countries at present have the benefit of a clear reversal of the economic situation.

4. Circumstances therefore seem favourable for the Assembly's requirements, as set out in its draft budget, to be taken into consideration by the governments. In this connection, it should be stressed that the Assembly is not asking for dispensation from the need to apply a strict policy of economy – which moreover it steadfastly respects in the management of its budget. What it wants is to be allowed, once and for all, to revise the structure of the Office of the Clerk to adapt it to the tasks it has to fulfil and to provide it with the means necessary for developing its political activities in accordance with the programmes proposed by the committees and approved by the Presidential Committee. This is therefore an exceptional requirement of the same nature and scope as was necessary for restructuring the Secretariat-General and the Paris agencies a year ago already. Once this restructuration has been accomplished and appropriations adjusted on the basis of real requirements, budgets would again evolve normally and thus remain within the limits of the zero growth criterion applicable to all the WEU organs.

5. However, the problem relating to the methods of applying this criteria still exists. The Assembly has often referred to the principal aspects, proposing that it be applied only to the operating budget and not to the pensions budget and that a specific rate of increase be fixed for each category of expenditure whereas at present a single rate of increase is applied to the total net budget (cf. *inter alia* Assembly Recommendations 409 of 21st June 1984 and 426 of 4th December 1985). In this connection, it is important to point out – as shown in the table at Appendix V – that the growth rate of the Assembly's draft budget for 1987 compared with the previous budget (revised 1986 budget) varies between 4.90% and 6.85% depending on whether or not pensions are taken into account. In fact, the pensions budget alone shows an increase of 66.57% due to the payment of two new pensions to grade A officials. This rate will increase as and when members of the Office of the Clerk retire, as will be the case for two further grade A officials in 1988.

6. In spite of its exceptional nature, the Assembly's draft budget for 1987 therefore does not show a very high rate of increase. In studying its budget estimates, the Assembly has in fact endeavoured to be

as rigorous and as cost effective as possible. The following paragraphs describe the conclusions of this study. To allow a fuller analysis, they are set out under the following three headings:

- restructuring of the Office of the Clerk;
- operational expenditure;
- modernisation of equipment.

2. Restructuration of the Office of the Clerk

7. In its report of 28th May 1986 (Document 1063), the Presidential Committee informed the Assembly that:

“ The Presidential Committee notes with regret that it has been impossible to strengthen the structure of the Office of the Clerk by the recruitment of officials in spite of the urgency of the matter and previous reductions in the Assembly secretariat. The problem of the structure of the Office of the Clerk should therefore be raised again and will be materialised in a draft supplementary budget for the financial year 1986 and in the draft budget for the financial year 1987. ”

8. In accordance with this guideline, the restructuring of the Office of the Clerk was started in 1986. The relevant Assembly bodies reserve the right to complete the study on the restructuring of the Office of the Clerk in the coming months. All the proposals should be summed up here so as better to understand the nature of and reasons for the changes which are the subject of the two abovementioned budgets.

9. As shown in the organogram at Appendix I, the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly has six services:

- committee service;
- administration and finance service;
- press and external relations service;
- translations and publications service;
- research service;
- sittings service.

10. The position of the *committee* and *administration services* has already been the subject of many communications from the Assembly and its organs to the Council and the Secretariat-General. It should be recalled that in 1981, following the suppression of the hors grade post of Clerk Assistant, the Bureau decided, because of their responsibilities, to regrade to grade A6 the posts of officials assisting the Clerk, one for co-ordinating the work of all the committees (except the Budget Committee) and the other for administrative matters in the widest meaning of the term¹, including the secretariat of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.

11. However, the Council accepted this regrading on a personal basis only. Consequently, one of the two grade A6 posts was lost in 1983 and the other might also be lost this year when both the officials concerned will have retired. The Presidential Committee has reserved the right to return to this point later.

12. In the *committee service*, the Bureau also decided to give priority in the revised draft budget for 1986 to:

- regrading to A4 the grade A3 post held by the secretary of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations in order to take account of the extension of that committee's duties to relations with the public and of the attribution to its holder of responsibility for the new *research service* set up in 1986;
- creating a post of assistant for the secretariat of that committee and for the research service which now have to resort to the services of the Clerk's assistant who already has many other duties.

1. The main responsibilities of this service may be summed up as follows: working out budget estimates, financial management, bookkeeping, staff management (including the recruitment of hundreds of temporary or free-lance staff for Assembly sessions and committee meetings), general services, security, protocol and organisation of Assembly sessions and other parliamentary meetings.

13. It should also be stressed that the duties of secretary and assistant to the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges continue to be carried out by the Clerk and his assistant since the Bureau did not consider it necessary at the present juncture to ask for the creation of two new posts.

14. The organisation of the *administration service* should be completed in 1987 with the creation of a post of deputy to the head of service made necessary by the multiplicity and complexity of his tasks. At institutional level, this need was also recognised by the auditors who, during a recent audit, said:

“As a part of our audit we carried out a review of internal controls, including segregation of duties between individuals. While I appreciate that a high level of control is not always practical or possible in a small organisation, it seems to me that certain improvements are none the less desirable. I would suggest that the office accountant should not at the same time be responsible for bank reconciliations, pay-roll preparation, bookkeeping and handling and recording receipts. Allocating these duties between two or more individuals would, I think, greatly enhance internal control.”

The creation of a grade B3 post of bookkeeper, already the subject of earlier budget proposals for which abundant reasons were given, was again requested in the revised 1986 budget in accordance with Recommendation 433 adopted by the Assembly on 4th June 1986.

15. *The press and external relations service* and the *translation and publications service* will be studied subsequently on the basis of the respective competence and responsibility of the officials concerned.

16. *The sittings service* is formed twice a year for Assembly sessions. It works under the authority of the Clerk and requires considerable organisation and co-ordination by the head of administration both for recruiting the several dozen persons in this service and for organising their offices in the Wilson wing and in the premises made available to the Assembly by the French Economic and Social Council. Budget estimates for these services (under Heads II (temporary staff) and III (expenditure on premises and equipment)) are worked out in real terms, it being considered that each-part session lasts four days (from Monday to Thursday) and that sittings do not last more than eight hours a day. It should also be pointed out that this method, which allows very accurate estimates to be made, leaves no room for flexibility in the organisation of sessions and sittings; for instance, a night sitting or the prolongation of a session until Friday would be impossible because of budgetary constraints.

17. The financial implications of the possible restructuring of the Office of the Clerk as proposed in the revised draft budget for 1986 and the 1987 budget are as follows:

Grade		1986 (revised)	1987
A4	Secretary to the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and head of the research service (regrading)	4 800	10 000
A2	Deputy to the head of the administration service – controller (new post)	–	276 000
B3	Bookkeeper (new post)	13 000	162 000
B3	Assistant to the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and the research service (new post)	12 000	148 000
		<u>29 800</u>	<u>596 000</u>

3. Operational expenditure

18. In the new political context created by the Rome declaration, the Assembly has developed its relations with the Council and the other parliamentary assemblies and has intensified its activities. Consequently, the number of committee meetings and study visits has increased. The same is true for the President's contacts with the authorities of member countries and contacts established by rapporteurs with political and scientific circles in various countries for the preparation of their reports.

19. With particular regard to relations with the Council, the proposed timetable of meetings includes:

- a meeting of the Committee for Relations with the Council prior to each ministerial meeting;
- a meeting between the Council and the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the General Affairs Committee at the close of the spring ministerial meeting;
- a meeting with the Presidential Committee on the occasion of each ministerial meeting;
- a twice-yearly meeting between the Permanent Council and the Presidential Committee.

20. In addition, during the first half of each year, grouped meetings are held of all committees, if possible to coincide with the meeting of the Council of Ministers and in the same place (such as the meeting held in Venice in April 1986). It would be desirable to hold a second grouped meeting if the budget allows.

21. Intensification of the Assembly's activities has considerable financial repercussions, and in particular on those sub-heads which cover interpreters' salaries (Sub-Head 7), travelling expenses of the President of the Assembly, committee chairmen and rapporteurs (Sub-Head 24), official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk (Sub-Head 27) and representation expenses (Sub-Head 25).

22. For the interpretation service (Sub-Head 7), it should be pointed out that already in 1985 actual expenditure easily exceeded the budget (F 437 915 compared with F 350 000), the surplus being met from savings under other heads of the budget, and estimated expenditure in 1986 amounts to F 480 000 compared with a budget of F 400 000. In the revised budget for 1986 an extra F 80 000 was therefore requested. Estimates for 1987 (F 496 000) therefore take account of the experience of the two previous financial years and will allow a comparable programme to be carried out. Furthermore, everything has been done to ensure that, thanks to a strict recruitment policy, the cost of interpretation is kept as low as possible while guaranteeing efficient service. It should also be specified that, for budgetary reasons, rapporteurs' requests to be accompanied by an interpreter when they visit a country whose language they do not speak fluently cannot be met.

23. *Travelling expenses of the President of the Assembly and of committee chairmen* can be estimated only very approximately since even in the short term programmes may be changed considerably in the light of economic and political circumstances. For rapporteurs, the Presidential Committee authorises them to travel on the basis of a working programme submitted to it at each part-session by the committees as a whole. Estimates under Sub-Head 24 take account of this particular point and are the same as in 1986.

24. *Travelling expenses of officials of the Office of the Clerk* are linked strictly with parliamentary activities outside Paris. Thus, because of the increase in such activities, the sum under Sub-Head 27 was exceeded by about F 100 000 in 1985 and in 1986 it is expected to be difficult to remain within the limits of the budget of F 350 000. Estimated travelling expenses for 1987 have therefore been based on experience in the last two years; it also takes account of the foreseeable trend of allowances and travelling expenses.

25. *Representation expenses* are also linked with Assembly activities. The more assiduous presence of members of governments of WEU countries at Assembly sessions, visits by the President of the Assembly to members of governments and representatives of parliamentary assemblies, committee meetings held in Paris and elsewhere and the traditional receptions given during sessions – to give but a few examples – involve commitments dictated by hospitality and courtesy. In spite of constant efforts to economise in this sector of expenditure, an increase, albeit modest, has to be requested in comparison with sums granted for this purpose in 1986.

4. Modernisation of equipment

26. The programme for modernising the equipment of the Office of the Clerk is given at Appendix IV. Apart from the renewal of current hire and maintenance contracts, the 1987 programme includes:

- the purchase of an offset machine. This proposal was included in the 1986 budget but was withdrawn in the context of the reductions imposed by the Council;
- the replacement of four typewriters as the second stage of a programme spread over several years and drawn up in 1986;
- the replacement of the present scales used for calculating postal charges by a new, more accurate electronic model;
- the replacement of a few desks and other pieces of furniture which have become unusable because of their poor condition;
- the purchase of cupboards and computer desks for staff operating word processors;
- the hire of a telex.

27. The telex has already been the subject of a specific proposal in recent years which was turned down by the Council. It has often been regretted that this convenient, very widespread means of communication was not available. The matter was therefore placed before the Assembly again in Recom-

mentation 433, adopted on 4th June 1986. This recommendation should be referred to in support of the proposal, which is renewed in this draft budget.

28. In regard to the programme for modernising the equipment of the Office of the Clerk drawn up in 1985, it may be noted that in the last two years it has been possible to apply it regularly thanks to sums granted by the governments and also to the very considerable savings made possible under other heads of expenditure through the introduction of word processors.

29. However, the future development of this programme has come up against an obstacle which it seems impossible to overcome at present, i.e. the impossibility of finding more space in the premises now available to the Office of the Clerk. This has, for instance, prevented consideration being given to the purchase of a film setter for the direct printing of documents, although this would have considerable advantages from the point of view of the cost and speed of printing.

30. The problem raised by the need to have larger premises for the requirements of the Assembly is not a new one. If it is raised here, it is to express the wish that the initiatives taken in this connection by the President of the Assembly and the Clerk will be pursued with perseverance. If other premises were made available to the Assembly, the programme for modernising equipment could but be facilitated and this would allow the sums the governments of member countries grant to the Assembly to be used rationally and ever more efficiently.

5. Pensions

31. The problem of pensions was already referred to at the beginning of this explanatory memorandum (cf. paragraph 5). It should be added that in 1986 the net total pensions budget was 3.08% of the net grand total budget; in 1987 this percentage will be 4.94% and it will rise progressively in future years. The operating budget could absorb this increase only to the detriment of the Assembly's work. The Assembly has considered this problem and sent the Council many recommendations on the matter. A solution should be sought as a matter of urgency. As the Assembly suggested in Recommendation 433 adopted on 4th June 1986, priority should be given to setting up an independent body to manage pensions.

6. Summary of operating budget estimates

32. A summary of operating budget estimates for 1987 (expenditure and receipts) is given at Appendix VI. The implications of each head for total expenditure and the total net budget (expenditure less receipts) are shown. For the purposes of comparison, data relating to the revised budget for 1986 are given in the same table.

*Summary of estimates of expenditure and receipts
for the financial year 1987*

Details	Expenditure	Receipts
PART I Operating budget		
<i>Section A:</i> Expenditure		
<i>Head I:</i> Permanent staff	10 042 000	
<i>Head II:</i> Temporary staff	2 751 000	
<i>Head III:</i> Expenditure on premises and equipment	1 396 300	
<i>Head IV:</i> General administrative costs	2 133 500	
<i>Head V:</i> Other expenditure	1 488 000	
<i>Section B:</i> Receipts		310 000
	17 810 800	310 000
NET TOTAL		17 500 800
	17 810 800	17 810 800
PART II Pensions budget		
<i>Section A:</i> Expenditure		
<i>Head I:</i> Pensions, allowances and social charges	1 351 000	
<i>Section B:</i> Receipts		441 500
	1 351 000	441 500
NET TOTAL		909 500
	1 351 000	1 351 000
NET TOTAL BUDGET		18 410 300

Budget estimates
PART I: OPERATING BUDGET

Section A – Expenditure

Head I – Permanent staff

Sub-Heads	Estimates for 1987	Revised budget for 1986	Expected expenditure in 1986	Actual expenditure in 1985
Sub-Head 1 – Basic salaries	7 270 000	6 897 800	6 897 800	6 307 484
Sub-Head 2 – Allowances:				
2.1. Expatriation allowance	595 000			
2.2. Household allowance	287 000			
2.3. Allowance for children and other dependent persons	290 000			
2.4. Rent allowance	30 000			
2.5. Education allowance	90 000			
2.6. Allowance for language courses	2 000			
2.7. Overtime	50 000			
2.8. Home leave	<u>20 000</u>			
	1 364 000	1 337 400	1 337 400	1 209 056
Sub-Head 3 – Social charges:				
3.1. Social security	976 000			
3.2. Supplementary insurance	289 000			
3.3. Provident fund	<u>135 000</u>			
	1 400 000	1 315 400	1 315 400	1 176 712
Sub-Head 4 – Expenses relating to the recruit- ment and departure of permanent officials				
4.1. Travelling expenses of candi- dates for vacant posts	p.m.			
4.2. Travelling expenses on arrival and departure of permanent officials and their families	p.m.			
4.3. Removal expenses	p.m.			
4.4. Installation allowance	<u>p.m.</u>			
	p.m.	180 000	180 000	5 605
Sub-Head 5 – Medical examination	8 000	8 000	8 000	7 305
TOTAL OF HEAD I	10 042 000	9 738 600	9 738 600	8 706 162

Explanations

Sub-Heads 1 and 2

Estimates under these two sub-heads cover emoluments (basic salary and allowances) paid to permanent staff in accordance with Chapter III of the Staff Rules of the Office of the Clerk of the WEU Assembly. They are calculated on the basis of global salaries in application of the scales in force on 1st January 1985², adjusted in accordance with an expected increase of 4.5%. Adjustments taken into account amount to F 428 000.

2. These scales are worked out by the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts and approved by the WEU Council and the councils of the other co-ordinated organisations (NATO, OECD, Council of Europe, ESA). In accordance with the committee's 159th report, salaries are adjusted with effect from 1st July of each year. Furthermore, should the cost of living between 1st July and 31st December rise by more than 3% a corresponding percentage adjustment is made. (This threshold, initially 2%, was raised to 3% in the 191st report.)

A list of staff of the Office of the Clerk, showing their grades and duties, is given at Appendix II. This appendix also shows proposed changes compared with the financial year 1986. Justification for these changes is given in the explanatory memorandum.

Sub-Head 3

Estimated expenditure for "Social charges" is based on commitments stemming from:

- application of the social security agreement signed between Western European Union and the Government of the French Republic on 2nd June 1979 (Sub-Head 3.1)³;
- application of the convention on complementary collective insurance (Sub-Head 3.2)⁴;
- application of Article 27 of the Staff Rules providing for the employer's contribution to the Provident Fund, amounting to 14% of basic salary, for staff not affiliated to the pension scheme (Sub-Head 3.3).

Sub-Head 4

No retirements are expected in 1987. The new grade A2 official would probably be recruited in Paris, thus avoiding travelling, removal and installation allowances. This sub-head is therefore shown pro mem.

Sub-Head 5

The sum requested is to cover the cost of the medical check-up which all members of the staff must undergo under Article 9 of the Staff Rules. Medical check-ups for WEU staff in Paris are carried out at the OECD medical centre.

Head II - Temporary staff

Sub-Heads	Estimates for 1987	Revised budget for 1986	Expected expenditure in 1986	Actual expenditure in 1985
Sub-Head 6 - Staff recruited for sessions of the Assembly				
6.1. Sitings service	1 023 000			
6.2. Interpretation service	350 000			
6.3. Translation service	700 000			
6.4. Other services	40 000			
	2 113 000	1 950 000	1 950 000	1 854 247
Sub-Head 7 - Interpretation staff required for Assembly work between sessions	496 000	480 000	480 000	437 915
Sub-Head 8 - Temporary staff for the Office of the Clerk	50 000	80 000	80 000	62 726
Sub-Head 9 - Social charges				
9.1. Insurance for temporary staff other than interpreters	4 000			
9.2. Provident fund for interpreters	85 000			
9.3. Insurance for interpreters	3 000			
	92 000	81 000	81 000	84 219
TOTAL OF HEAD II	2 751 000	2 591 000	2 591 000	2 439 107

3. Under this agreement, WEU staff benefit from the French general scheme, with the exception of family allowances and old-age pensions.

4. Under this convention, WEU staff benefit from complementary insurance in the event of sickness or temporary or permanent disability. Furthermore, in the event of the death of an insured person, the insurance company pays a lump sum to the beneficiaries he has nominated.

Explanations

Sub-Head 6

Estimates under this sub-head relate to:

(a) Salaries and, where appropriate, per diem allowances, allowances for travelling time and the reimbursement of travelling expenses of temporary staff recruited for sessions (sittings, interpretation and translation services). A list of such staff, showing their respective duties and salaries, is given at Appendix III.

Salaries are calculated in accordance with scales in force on 1st July 1985 in the co-ordinated organisations (on the basis of salaries paid to permanent staff of comparable grades), adjusted in the same way as for permanent staff, the rate of increase being 4.5%. These adjustments amount to F 77 416.

In application of the agreement signed between the co-ordinated organisations and the International Association of Conference Interpreters (IACI), the salaries of interpreters are calculated on the basis of the scale in force for Grade L4.8 staff, plus 6%.

(b) Lump-sum payments made to staff recruited for various services during sessions (doctor, post office technician, typewriter mechanic, etc.).

Sub-Head 7

This sub-head shows the sums paid to interpreters recruited for simultaneous interpretation at meetings of parliamentarians between sessions (salaries and where appropriate per diem allowances, travelling time and travelling expenses).

Estimates are based on a total of 150 working days (of which 100 in Paris and 50 elsewhere). Salaries and working conditions are the same as for interpreters recruited for sessions (cf. Sub-Head 6). Their salary adjustment for 1987 amounts to F 17 265.

Sub-Head 8

Estimates under this sub-head relate to the salaries of additional staff of all grades which the Office of the Clerk may have to recruit in 1987. They include an overall sum for salaries, possible travelling expenses and insurance. The sum requested is F 30 000 less than the 1986 figure since it is expected that fewer staff will have to be recruited from outside due to the creation of two new grade B3 posts proposed in the revised 1986 budget.

Sub-Head 9

Estimates under this sub-head correspond to the following social charges:

Insurance for temporary staff other than interpreters

Staff recruited for the Assembly sessions are insured with the Van Breda insurance company against the risks of death, accident or sickness, 60% of the premium being paid by the Office of the Clerk and 40% by staff.

Provident fund for interpreters

In accordance with the agreement between the co-ordinated organisations and the IACI, WEU has to pay into the conference interpreters' provident fund or, where appropriate, another provident fund, a contribution of 14%, which is added to a contribution of 7% by interpreters.

Insurance for interpreters

A Lloyds insurance policy, taken out through the intermediary of Stewart Wrightson in London, covers interpreters for accidents, sickness and temporary or permanent disability preventing them from working. The premium of 1.1% of their fees (lower rate) is divided between the Office of the Clerk (0.7%) and the interpreters (0.4%).

Head III – Expenditure on premises and equipment

Sub-Heads	Estimates for 1987	Revised budget for 1986	Expected expenditure in 1986	Actual expenditure in 1985
Sub-Head 10 – Share of joint expenditure on the Paris premises	450 000	430 000	430 000	539 357
Sub-Head 11 – Hire of committee rooms	15 000	15 000	8 000	4 111
Sub-Head 12 – Technical and other installations for Assembly sessions	345 000	340 000	330 000	325 093
Sub-Head 13 – Various services for the organisation of sessions	45 000	45 000	45 000	38 392
Sub-Head 14 – Maintenance of the premises of the Office of the Clerk	18 000	15 000	15 000	17 222
Sub-Head 15 – Purchase or repair of office furniture	28 000	25 500	33 000	36 334
Sub-Head 16 – Purchase of reproduction and other office equipment	104 600	94 800	94 800	71 997
Sub-Head 17 – Hire and maintenance of reproduction and other office equipment	390 700	390 800	390 800	268 229
TOTAL OF HEAD III	1 396 300	1 356 100	1 346 600	1 300 735

*Explanations**Sub-Head 10*

Sums requested under this sub-head cover the Assembly's share of joint expenditure on the Paris premises. They include the fixed annual sum of F 30 000 which the Assembly has to pay until 1987 as its share of the cost of replacing the telephone switchboard.

The director responsible for co-ordinating the Paris agencies manages the programme for such expenditure to which the Assembly contributes 30%, 70% being met by the agencies.

Sub-Head 11

For meetings outside Paris, Assembly bodies normally have committee rooms with simultaneous interpretation equipment made available to them by the national delegations concerned. However, in certain cases it is to be expected that the Assembly will have to pay for the hire of a room or the cost of installing portable interpretation equipment in rooms not so equipped. Sums requested under this sub-head are to cover such expenditure if necessary.

Sub-Head 12

As its title indicates, this sub-head relates to expenditure for the installation of simultaneous interpretation equipment, telephone booths, metal-detecting equipment necessary for improving security measures, screens, etc., in the premises of the Economic and Social Council during Assembly sessions.

Estimates take account of the foreseeable rise in the cost of services.

Sub-Head 13

Expenditure under this sub-head relates to contracts for the provision of various services during Assembly sessions (removal of equipment, cleaning of premises loaned by the Economic and Social Council, etc.).

Estimates take account of the foreseeable rise in the cost of services.

Sub-Head 14

An increase of F 30 000 over the sum granted in 1985 and 1986 is requested for 1987 to allow minor repairs to be carried out to the premises of the Office of the Clerk.

Sub-Heads 15, 16 and 17

Sums under these sub-heads are justified by the three-year modernisation and maintenance programme for equipment given at Appendix IV to this budget. Criteria governing the preparation of this programme are shown in the explanatory memorandum.

Head IV – General administrative costs

Sub-Heads	Estimates for 1987	Revised budget for 1986	Expected expenditure in 1986	Actual expenditure in 1985
Sub-Head 18 – Postage, telephone, telex and transport of documents	495 000	480 000	480 000	469 188
Sub-Head 19 – Duplication paper, headed writing paper and other office supplies	258 000	250 000	250 000	251 573
Sub-Head 20 – Printing and publication of documents	1 190 000	1 150 000	1 150 000	996 382
Sub-Head 21 – Purchase of documents	60 000	50 000	50 000	46 101
Sub-Head 22 – Official cars	130 000	100 000	119 500	113 649
Sub-Head 23 – Bank charges	500	500	500	(-) 2
TOTAL OF HEAD IV	2 133 500	2 030 500	2 050 000	1 876 891

*Explanations**Sub-Head 18*

The increase of F 15 000 as compared with 1986 is calculated on the basis of an average inflation of 3%, this being the minimum foreseeable, and takes account of the fact that the increase in the Assembly's work will involve a considerable increase in the cost of the various means of communication. Moreover, expenditure relating to the use of a telex in 1987 will be charged to this sub-head.

Sub-Head 19

In spite of the considerable increase in reproduction work and the purchase of a third offset machine, the increase in the estimate as compared with 1986 is slight and is mainly due to the variation of prices in this sector.

Sub-Head 20

Estimates under this sub-head take into account the expected increase in costs (3%).

Sub-Head 21

The 20% increase takes account of a slight increase recorded in the INSEE index for books and newspapers for the most recent twelve-month period at the time this budget was drawn up and requirements for setting up a new research service in the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly.

Sub-Head 22

Estimates under this sub-head show an increase of 30% over 1986. This is based on experience in recent years. The hire of a chauffeur-driven car when the President is present at the Assembly takes up most of this amount (approximately F 80 000). The remainder is used for foreseeable repairs to the official car, insurance, garage, petrol, etc.

Sub-Head 23

The estimate of F 500 remains unchanged.

Head V – Other expenditure

Sub-Heads	Estimates for 1987	Revised budget for 1986	Expected expenditure in 1986	Actual expenditure in 1985
Sub-Head 24 – Travelling and subsistence allowances and insurance for the President of the Assembly, chairmen of committees and rapporteurs	150 000	150 000	120 000	106 172
Sub-Head 25 – Expenses for representation	200 000	170 000	190 000	187 433
Sub-Head 26 – Committee study missions	5 000	3 300	3 300	1 119
Sub-Head 27 – Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk	380 000	350 000	350 000	417 221
Sub-Head 28 – Expenses of experts and the auditor	100 000	70 000	70 000	104 679
Sub-Head 29 – Expenditure on information	315 000	300 000	300 000	225 106
Sub-Head 30 – Expenses for political groups	315 000	300 000	300 000	273 000
Sub-Head 31 – Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere provided for	3 000	3 000	3 000	2 400
Sub-Head 32 – Non-recoverable taxes	20 000	20 000	20 000	13 690
TOTAL OF HEAD V	1 488 000	1 366 300	1 356 300	1 330 820

*Explanations**Sub-Head 24*

The cost of travelling and subsistence allowances for members of the Assembly is borne by governments, as are those of members of the Bureau and Presidential Committee.

The Assembly bears the cost of travelling and subsistence allowances for the President of the Assembly on official visits and of rapporteurs and, when appropriate, committee chairmen insofar as these visits are connected with the preparation of a report or the running of the Assembly. Journeys by committee chairmen and rapporteurs are subject to approval by the Presidential Committee.

Estimates take account of the expected increase in the Assembly's work in 1987 (see explanatory memorandum) and of the foreseeable rise in per diem allowances and travelling expenses.

Sub-Head 25

The increase of 17.64% compared with the 1986 budget, based on experience, is due to the rise in the cost of meals in restaurants in the Paris area and to greater requirements due to the increased activities of the various Assembly organs.

Sub-Head 26

Sums under this sub-head are to cover extraordinary expenditure linked with committee study missions.

On the basis of experience, the same amount has been requested as last year.

Sub-Head 27

The 9% increase in sums requested for 1987 compared with last year is justified by:

- the increase in per diem allowances approved by the Council with effect from 1st July 1986 (218th report of the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts);
- the increased activities of the Assembly which require more frequent travel by members of the Office of the Clerk for organising and holding meetings and visits of the various Assembly committees.

Sub-Head 28

It is to be expected that the type of studies to be carried out in the framework of the reactivation of WEU will require greater recourse to experts in various areas. An increase in auditors' fees has also been noted in recent years. An increase of F 30 000 in estimates under this sub-head is therefore requested.

Sub-Head 29

An increase of 5% over sums granted in 1985 has been included to take account of the increase in representation and travelling expenses.

Sub-Head 30

The estimate under this sub-head is divided between the political groups. By decision of the Presidential Committee, each group has an equal fixed share and a further sum in proportion to the number of members listed.

Sub-Head 31

There is no change in the estimate for this sub-head as compared with 1986.

Sub-Head 32

The same amount is requested as in 1986.

PART I: OPERATING BUDGET

Section B - Receipts

	Estimates for 1987	Revised budget for 1986	Expected receipts in 1986	Actual receipts in 1985
Sales of publications	50 000	110 000	40 000	33 541
Bank interest	250 000	250 000	250 000	265 145
Social security reimbursements	10 000	8 000	8 000	64 695
Levy on basic salaries of Grade A officials	—	32 000	35 600	64 284
TOTAL RECEIPTS	310 000	400 000	333 600	427 665

Explanations

Estimates for the sale of publications, bank interest and social security reimbursements are calculated on the basis of experience.

In accordance with the decisions of the Council, no levies are planned on the basic salaries of grade A officials.

PART II: PENSIONS BUDGET

*Section A – Expenditure**Head I – Pensions, allowances and social charges*

Sub-Heads	Estimates for 1987	Revised budget for 1986	Expected expenditure in 1986	Actual expenditure in 1985
Sub-Head 1 – Pensions and leaving allowances				
1.1. Retirement pensions	998 000			
1.2. Invalidity pensions	204 000			
1.3. Survivors' pensions	47 000			
1.4. Orphans' or dependants' pensions	–			
1.5. Leaving allowances	–			
	1 249 000	889 200	889 200	728 402
Sub-Head 2 – Family allowances				
2.1. Household allowances	37 000			
2.2. Children's and other dependants' allowances	26 000			
2.3. Education allowances	11 000			
	74 000	62 400	62 400	53 488
Sub-Head 3 – Supplementary insurance	28 000	19 400	19 400	12 393
TOTAL OF HEAD I	1 351 000	971 000	971 000	794 283

*Explanations**Sub-Heads 1 and 2*

In 1987, the Assembly will be paying six pensions, as follows:

- four old-age pensions;
- one invalidity pension;
- one survivor's pension.

Estimates for expenditure under these two sub-heads are calculated in accordance with the provisions of the pension scheme rules.

Sub-Head 3

Pensioners are insured against the risk of sickness in accordance with Article 19*bis* of the collective convention in force.

Estimates for expenditure under this sub-head correspond to the proportion of the premium paid by the Assembly.

PART II: PENSIONS BUDGET

Section B - Receipts


	Estimates for 1987	Revised budget for 1986	Expected receipts in 1986	Actual receipts in 1985
Contributions by permanent officials	441 500	425 000	425 000	397 970
	441 500	425 000	425 000	397 970

Explanations

Estimated receipts have been calculated on the basis of contributions to the pension scheme paid by permanent staff of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly (7% of basic salary) affiliated to the pension scheme.

Organogram of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly

APPENDIX I



APPENDIX II

*Recapitulation of changes in the staff of the Office of the Clerk
proposed in the 1987 budget*

Grade	Duties	1987 budget	Revised budget for 1986	+ or -
H.C.	Clerk	1	1	-
A5	Counsellors	5 ¹	5	-
A4	First secretaries	3	3	-
A2	Controller	1	0	+ 1
A2	Translators	3	3	-
B6	Chief accountant	1	1	-
B4	Personal assistants	5	5	-
B3	Bilingual shorthand-typists	6	6	-
B3	Accountant	1	1	-
B3	Switchboard operator	1	1	-
C6	Head of reproduction department	1	1	-
C4	Assistants in reproduction department	2	2	-
		30	29	+ 1

1. One of these five posts is now a grade A4.

APPENDIX III

*Salaries of staff recruited for Assembly sessions**1. Sitings service*

Duties	Number	No. of days	Daily remuneration F*	Total F	Total F
Counsellors to the President of Assembly	1 a	16	1 344	21 504	45 696
	1 b	18	1 344	24 192	
Heads of sections	1 a	8	875	7 000	41 608
	2 b	10	1 236	24 720	
	1 a	8	1 236	9 888	
Sergeant-at-arms	1 b	16	1 101	17 616	17 616
Parliamentary secretaries	2 a	8	751	12 016	34 036
	2 b	10	1 101	22 020	
Précis writers	3 a	8	751	18 024	51 054
	3 b	10	1 101	33 030	
Verbatim reporters	7 a	8	1 101	61 656	215 796
	14 b	10	1 101	154 140	
Assistants	10 a	8	341	27 280	248 754
	2 a	16	341	10 912	
	1 a	22	341	7 502	
	1 b	18	625	11 250	
	1 b	12	625	7 500	
	23 b	10	625	143 750	
	6 b	10	676	40 560	
Head ushers	1 a	10	322	3 220	6 440
	1 a	12	322	3 220	
Ushers:					
Security control	4 a	8	292	9 344	
Sittings office	1 a	12	322	3 864	
	4 a	8	292	9 344	
	4 b	10	576	23 040	
Messengers	3 a	10	292	8 760	
Cloakroom attendant	1 a	8	292	2 336	56 688
Offset-assemblers	13 a	10	292	37 960	
mechanic	1 a	8	392	3 136	41 096
	115				758 784
Adjustment for 1987 (+ 4.5 %)					34 145
					792 929
Travelling expenses					230 000
					1 022 929
				Rounded up to	1 023 000

* In accordance with scales in force on 1st July 1985.

a. Recruited locally.

b. Recruited outside Paris.

2. Interpretation service

Duties	Number	No. of days	Total F
Interpreters	8 a	8	315 644
	6 b	10	
	14		315 644
Adjustment for 1987			14 203
			329 847
Travelling expenses			20 000
			349 847
		Rounded up to	350 000

a. Recruited locally.

b. Recruited outside Paris.

N.B.: On 1st July 1985, the daily remuneration of interpreters amounted to F 2 316.57. In addition, interpreters recruited outside Paris are entitled to payment for time spent in travelling (half a day each way), a daily allowance (per diem) corresponding to that of a Grade L4 permanent official, plus reimbursement of their travelling expenses.

3. Translation service

Duties	Number	Daily remuneration F	Estimate ¹	Total F
Revisers	3 a	915	68 625	212 525
	4 b	1 439	143 900	
Translators	3 a	370	54 750	211 500
	5 b	1 254	156 750	
Assistants	5 a	341	59 675	221 935
	2 a	392	27 440	
	4 b	625	87 500	
	2 b	676	47 320	
	28		645 960	645 960
Adjustment for 1987				29 068
				675 028
Travelling expenses				25 000
				700 028
			Rounded up to	700 000

1. Based on 25 days for revisers and translators and 35 days for assistants.

a. Recruited locally.

b. Recruited outside Paris.

APPENDIX IV

Three-year modernisation and maintenance programme for the equipment of the Office of the Clerk*(The estimates given may fluctuate with the trend of prices)*

Ref. No.	Equipment	Explanations	Budgets		
			1987	1988	1989
	<i>A. Reproduction equipment</i>				
1	1 RX 1045 photocopier	Hire (blocked rate): F 1 713 per month Maintenance (indexed rate) F 2 100 per month F 45 756 (rounded up)	45 800	45 800	45 800
2	1 RX 3107 photocopier	Maintenance (indexed rate): F 1 650 per quarter.	6 600	6 600	6 600
3	2 Gestetner offset machines	1 type 311, purchased in 1984: maintenance (indexed rate). 1 type 329, purchased in 1985: maintenance (indexed rate).	6 500	6 500	6 500
3 bis	1 Gestetner offset machine	1 type 329, purchase price maintenance (indexed rate).	65 000 4 000	4 000	4 000
4	3 Gestetner electrostatic stereotypers	1 Gestetner PM/9, purchased in 1980: maintenance (indexed rate). 1 Gestetner DT 1, purchased in 1985: maintenance (indexed rate). 1 Gestetner 100 PM, purchased in 1986: maintenance (indexed rate).	1 200 1 300 2 700	1 200 1 300 2 700	1 200 1 300 2 700
5	1 Gestetner 100 binding machine	Purchased in 1978, this machine is in good condition. The maintenance contract has to be confirmed (indexed rate).	1 100	1 100	1 000
6	1 Logabas-Ordina 7630 assembling machine with stapling machine	Purchased in 1977, this machine is serviced when required, since the cost of a maintenance contract is exorbitant. The estimate is based on experience.	4 000	4 000	4 000
7	1 AM International addressograph 5000	On 1st July 1986, this machine became the property of the Assembly. The estimate concerns the maintenance contract which became effective on that date.	3 500	3 500	3 500
8	1 Fortematic 655 paper-cutting machine	This machine is serviced when required. A single annual service is enough to keep it in good working order.	700	700	700
9	1 Orpo-Planax binding machine	Purchased in 1964 } These machines are in good working order and no maintenance contract seems necessary. Purchased in 1974 }			
10	1 Orpo-Thermomatic binding machine				
	<i>B. Typewriters and calculators</i>				
	<i>(a) Office of the Clerk</i>				
11	8 Olivetti ET 121 electronic typewriters	Purchased between 1981 and 1983, these typewriters are in very good condition.			
12	1 Olivetti ET 221 electronic typewriter	Purchased in 1983, this typewriter is in very good condition.			
13	3 Olympia SGE 51 electric typewriters (1 with English keyboard and 2 with French keyboards)	These machines are part of the old stock now being replaced in accordance with the programme referred to in 18 bis below. In 1986, one machine with English keyboard included in the 1986 budget had to be scrapped.			

Ref. No.	Equipment	Explanations	Budgets														
			1987	1988	1989												
14	2 IBM electric typewriter with a French keyboard	These machines are part of the old stock now being replaced in accordance with the programme referred to in 18 <i>bis</i> below.															
15	3 Olivetti calculating machines	These machines are in good working order. The most recent was purchased in 1986.															
	<i>(b) For use during sessions</i>																
16	4 Olympia SGE 51 electric typewriters (1 with an English keyboard and 3 with French keyboards)	The typewriters, the same model as those under 13 above are assigned to national delegations. They will be replaced gradually in accordance with the programme referred to in 18 <i>bis</i> below.															
17	4 RX 6015 typewriters	These typewriters were purchased in accordance with the modernisation programme given in the 1986 budget. The four IBM electric typewriters shown under item 17 of the 1986 programme have been scrapped.															
18	3 Olivetti Editor electric typewriters (with Italian keyboards)	Purchased secondhand in 1980, these typewriters are assigned to the Italian Delegation and the Italian summary reporters. They will be replaced in accordance with the programme referred to in 18 <i>bis</i> below.															
18 <i>bis</i>		Replacement of 13 typewriters under 13, 14, 16 and 18 above at a rate of 4 per year for 2 years and 5 in 1989.	26 000	26 000	32 500												
19	21 Olympia mechanical typewriters (19 with English keyboards and 2 with French keyboards)	Purchased between 1966 and 1979, these typewriters are used only occasionally because they are old models and staff are no longer used to working on such machines. It is planned to keep the best of them in reserve in case of electricity cuts.															
20	Electronic typewriters	To meet the requirements of the various services during Assembly sessions, and subject to the purchase of the 13 typewriters mentioned in 18 <i>bis</i> above, the following hire programme is envisaged for each session: <table style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th>1987</th> <th>1988</th> <th>1989</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>English keyboards ...</td> <td>12</td> <td>10</td> <td>7</td> </tr> <tr> <td>French keyboards ...</td> <td>11</td> <td>9</td> <td>7</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> The rates indicated relate to electronic typewriters, the electric ones hired until now no longer being available.		1987	1988	1989	English keyboards ...	12	10	7	French keyboards ...	11	9	7	13 200 12 100	11 000 9 900	7 700 7 700
	1987	1988	1989														
English keyboards ...	12	10	7														
French keyboards ...	11	9	7														
21	<i>(c) Maintenance and repairs</i>	All typewriters and calculators are serviced twice a year, before each session, by a mechanic recruited for this purpose. However, a lump sum should be earmarked for possible repairs at other times.	7 000	7 000	7 000												
22	<i>C. Miscellaneous equipment</i> 2 UHER 5000 dictaphones	Purchased in 1971 and 1980, these dictaphones are in good condition. It is not planned to replace them in the period 1987-89.															
23	11 Grundig Stenorette dictaphones	Purchased between 1963 and 1983, the dictaphones are in good condition. It is not planned to replace them in the period 1987-89.															

Ref. No.	Equipment	Explanations	Budgets		
			1987	1988	1989
24	1 Grandjean stenotyping machine	Purchased in 1974, this machine is in good working order. It is planned to keep it in use for the next four years.			
25		Overall estimate for possible repairs to equipment in this category.	4 000	4 000	4 000
25 bis	Alcatel CT3 electronic scales	These scales will replace the very old Testut-Dayton scales, which are inaccurate, and will allow postal charges to be calculated far more accurately.	13 600		
	<i>D. Word processors and computers</i>				
26	8 Word processors/ Computers 7 Olivetti ETS 2010 1 Olivetti M 24	These have been hired on a five-year leasing basis. Cost of hire. Indexed maintenance contract.	210 000 43 000	210 000 48 000	210 000 48 000
27	Telex	Hire	20 000	20 000	20 000
	<i>E. Office furniture</i>				
28	Various offices	Purchase of computer desks for staff using word processors.	18 000	9 000	-
29	Various offices	Replacement of various items of furniture	10 000	15 000	20 000

Breakdown by budget classification

Budget classification		Ref. No. in programme	Budgets		
Head	Sub-Head		1987	1988	1989
III	15. Purchase or repair of office furniture	28	18 000	9 000	-
		29	10 000	15 000	20 000
			28 000	24 000	20 000
III	16. Purchase of reproduction and other office equipment	3 bis	65 000	-	-
		18 bis	26 000	26 000	32 500
		25 bis	13 600	-	-
			104 600	26 000	32 500
III	17. Hire and maintenance of reproduction and other office equipment	1	45 800	45 800	45 800
		2	6 600	6 600	6 600
		3	10 500	10 500	10 500
		3 bis	4 000	4 000	4 000
		4	5 200	5 200	5 200
		5	1 100	1 100	1 100
		6	4 000	4 000	4 000
		7	3 500	3 500	3 500
		8	700	700	700
		20	25 300	20 900	15 400
		21	7 000	7 000	7 000
		25	4 000	4 000	4 000
		26	253 000	258 000	258 000
		27	20 000	20 000	20 000
		390 700	391 300	385 800	

APPENDIX V

Trend of the Assembly budget from 1986 to 1987

	1986 a	1986 revised b	% $\frac{b}{a}$	1987 c	% $\frac{c}{a+b}$
A. Operating budget					
Head I. Permanent staff	9 428 000	+ 310 600	3.29	+ 303 400	3.11
Head II. Temporary staff	2 511 000	+ 80 000	3.18	+ 160 000	6.17
Head III. Expenditure premises and equipment	1 356 100	-	-	+ 40 200	2.96
Head IV. General administrative costs	2 030 500	-	-	+ 103 000	5.07
Head V. Other expenditure	1 366 300	-	-	+ 121 700	8.90
Total expenditure	16 691 900	+ 390 600	2.34	+ 728 300	4.26
Receipts	400 000	-	-	- 90 000	- 22.50
Net Total	16 291 900	+ 390 600	2.39	+ 818 300	4.90
B. Pensions budget					
Pensions and leaving allowances	928 000	+ 43 000	4.63	+ 380 000	39.13
Receipts	410 000	+ 15 000	3.65	+ 16 500	3.88
Net Total	518 000	+ 28 000	5.40	+ 363 500	66.57
GRAND NET TOTAL (A + B)	16 809 900	+ 418 600	2.49	+ 1 181 800	6.85

APPENDIX VI

Percentage of credits under the various heads of the operating budgets for 1986 (revised) and 1987 compared with the total of these budgets

	Revised budget for 1986			1987		
	Amount	% of		Amount	% of	
		A	B		A	B
A. Operating budget						
Head I. - Permanent staff	9 738 600	57.00	58.37	10 042 000	56.38	57.38
Head II. - Temporary staff	2 591 000	15.17	15.53	2 751 000	15.45	15.72
Head III. - Premises and equipment	1 356 100	7.94	8.13	1 396 300	7.84	7.98
Head IV. - General administrative costs	2 030 500	11.89	12.17	2 133 500	11.98	12.19
Head V. - Other expenditure	1 366 300	8.00	8.19	1 488 000	8.35	8.50
TOTAL A (expenditure)	17 082 500	100.00	102.39	17 810 800	100.00	101.77
Receipts	400 000		- 2.39	310 000		- 1.77
TOTAL B (net)	16 682 500		100.00	17 500 800		100.00

*Draft budget of the administrative expenditure
of the Assembly for the financial year 1987*

Opinion of the Council

TABLE OF CONTENTS

- Opinion of the WEU Budget and Organisation Committee (Document C-B (16) 15)
Opinion of the Council (Letter from the Secretary-General of WEU dated 27th November 1986)
Table showing reductions approved by the Council

*Secretary-General's note*¹

WEU Assembly budget for 1987

1. The WEU Assembly budget for 1987 was circulated under reference B (86) 25 (Assembly Document 1072) on 2nd October and was examined by the Budget and Organisation Committee at its meeting on 23rd and 24th October 1986 (BR (82) 2, IV – to be circulated).
2. The customary procedure for the approval of Assembly budgets requires the Council to convey its opinion on those budgets to the Assembly before the second part of the annual session at which they will be approved by the Assembly itself. Insofar as this budget is concerned, that opinion should be transmitted to the Assembly for 1st December 1986. The full procedure is given in the annex to C-B (86) 14 (Revised budget of the WEU Assembly for 1986).
3. The Budget and Organisation Committee's conclusions and recommendations in respect of this budget are summarised below.

General observations

All delegations reaffirmed their commitment to "zero growth" as the guiding principle. There was some doubt, however, as to how this should be interpreted; should pensions be included or not? Should the national inflation rate of the host country, approximately 2% in the case of France, be applied to an international organisation or not? Should zero growth be applied to the original budget for 1986 or to the revised budget total for 1986 to establish a level for 1987?

It was noted that the 1987 budget total was increased by 6.8% (or 4.9% without pensions) over the revised budget submitted for 1986. One delegate pointed out, however, that his government would base its judgment of zero growth on a comparison with the original budget for 1986, which showed increases of 9.5% and 7.4% respectively. He would seek reductions totalling F 1 250 000.

Head I – Permanent staff

The estimates included provisions for three new posts: one A2 and the two B3s sought in the revised 1986 budget from December of that year. The cost was shown to be F 586 000 in 1987. One delegate felt that proposals of this nature should be postponed for another year when there would be a major re-examination of the staffing needs of WEU as a whole. The committee concluded that these proposals should be withdrawn, with some delegations suggesting that better use should be made of existing staff.

Head II – Temporary staff

Sub-Head 6 – Staff recruited for sessions

Several delegates sought economies under this sub-head. The need for two counsellors to the President of the Assembly was questioned as was the need to recruit assistants from abroad. A reduction of F 24 875 was agreed, this representing 10% of the cost of the assistants.

Sub-Head 7 – Interpretation staff

Noting that the 1986 revised credit of F 80 000 had been refused, delegations insisted that a similar reduction be made in 1987.

1. Document C-B (86) 15, 31st October 1986.

Sub-Head 8 – Temporary staff for the Office of the Clerk

The representative of the Assembly drew attention to the comment on page 16 of the budget in which it was stated that a saving of F 30 000 had been made as a result of the appointment of two new B3 staff members. The fact that the committee had rejected those appointments would make it necessary to *increase* this item by F 30 000. The committee took note.

The savings achieved to this point were insufficient for at least one delegate who suggested that the total for Head II be reduced by F 111 000, leaving it to the Assembly to decide on the sub-heads to be modified. The committee agreed, although one delegation was reluctant.

*Head III – Expenditure on premises and equipment**Sub-Head 16 – Purchase of reproduction and other office equipment*

This item included credits for the purchase (and maintenance) of a new offset machine at F 69 000 and for the replacement of typewriters at F 26 000. Delegations sought to delete these credits to save F 95 000.

Sub-Head 17 – Hire and maintenance of reproduction and other equipment

Delegations insisted on the withdrawal of F 20 000 from this item for the hiring of a telex machine, noting that telex was expensive to operate and that the budget gave no indication of likely running costs.

The abovementioned reductions totalled F 115 000, but, in the light of arguments advanced by the Assembly's representative, a compromise reduction of F 96 300 was agreed subject to a reserve figure. All delegations agreed that telex should *not* be installed.

*Head IV – General administrative costs**Sub-Head 18 – Postage, telephone, telex, etc.**Sub-Head 20 – Printing and publication of documents**Sub-Head 21 – Purchase of documents**Sub-Head 22 – Official cars*

One delegation insisted on reductions for all of these items (18 especially, as the telex had been deleted). Detailed discussion led to reductions totalling F 63 000 but some members of the committee could accept a lower figure (F 33 500). A compromise was agreed at F 45 000 from the total of Head IV. One delegation still sought a higher reduction.

Head V – Other expenditure

A proposal to reduce the total of this head by F 68 000 was amended to bring that figure to F 88 000 to satisfy, partly, one delegation's request for greater savings in Head IV. It was noted that the savings on both Heads IV and V would then total F 133 000. That total still did not meet the dissenting delegate's target and he reserved his position though all other members of the committee accepted a reduction of F 88 000 for Head V coupled with the abovementioned reduction of F 45 000 for Head IV.

4. The total of the reductions agreed by a majority of delegations, as described above, is F 926 300. However, the refusal to agree to the new posts proposed under Head I means that pension income (staff members' 7% contributions to the scheme) will have to be reduced by F 32 500. The final total of the reductions is, therefore, F 926 300 less F 32 500 making a net total of F 893 800.

5. The committee's recommendations have amended the budget as follows:

	<i>Operating budget</i> F	<i>Pensions budget</i> F	<i>Total</i> F
Initial estimates (B (86) 25)	17 500 800	909 500	18 410 300
Amendments proposed	(–) <u>926 300</u>	(+) <u>32 500</u>	(–) <u>893 800</u>
Amended totals	<u>16 574 500</u>	<u>942 000</u>	<u>17 516 500</u>
Increase over 1986 original budget	1.73%	81.85%	4.20%
Increase over 1986 revised budget (C-B (86) 14)	0.37%	72.53%	2.68%

6. Subject to the reductions proposed above, the Budget and Organisation Committee could recommend the Council to give a favourable opinion on the budget of the WEU Assembly for 1987 subject to reserves on the part of Italy (which favoured a more generous approach) and the United Kingdom (which sought greater reductions).

7. The Council's opinion will be sought at a forthcoming meeting in November 1986.

*
* *

London, 27th November 1986

Dear Mr. Moulias,

1. At its meeting on 26th November 1986, the Council discussed in depth the Assembly's budgets for 1986 and 1987 on the basis of the recommendations of the Budget and Organisation Committee set out in documents CB (86) 14 and CB (86) 15.

2. In the case of the *revised budget for 1986*, and notwithstanding the recommended reductions, the Council decided to grant the Assembly a sum of F 58 800 to allow it to fulfil its commitments in regard to the payment of salaries and pensions.

The total budget would thus amount to F 17 118 700; the percentage increase compared with the 1985 budget would therefore be 10.65% including pensions and 9.24% without them.

3. The Council will be able to express a favourable opinion on the revised budget for 1986, the abovementioned changes being made.

4. The Council also examined the *Assembly's budget for 1987* with special care.

There was a consensus in favour of a limited increase in this budget and the Council decided, notwithstanding the recommended reductions, to grant the following sums:

- F 24 875 under Sub-Head 6 of Head II;
- F 40 000 under Sub-Head 7 of Head II;
- F 15 000 under Head IV.

The total budget will thus amount to F 17 596 375 and the percentage increase compared with the revised budget for 1986, as amended, will therefore be 2.79% including pensions and 0.49% without them.

The Council will be able to express a favourable opinion on the budget for 1987, the abovementioned changes being made.

5. The Council also examined the place of pensions in the organisation's budget.

It intends to pursue its detailed study of this matter on the basis of the various budgetary implications involved and in the light of the position of the co-ordinated organisations in this connection.

6. Moreover, it took note of the proposals relating to the restructuring of the Office of the Clerk which have just been submitted to it.

It will, as soon as possible, study these in detail on the basis of the opinions of national experts who have already had the matter placed before them.

Yours sincerely,
Alfred CAHEN
Secretary-General of WEU

Mr. Georges MOULIAS,
Clerk of the Assembly of WEU

***Draft budget of the administrative expenditure
of the Assembly for the financial year 1987***

Heads and Sub-Heads	Draft budget for 1987 (initial)	Reductions in accordance with the Council's opinion	Draft budget for 1987 (reduced)
<i>Head I – Permanent staff</i>			
SUB-HEAD:			
1 – Basic salaries	7 270 000	440 000	6 830 000
2 – Allowances	1 364 000	64 000	1 300 000
3 – Social charges	1 400 000	82 000	1 318 000
4 – Expenses relating to the recruitment and departure of permanent officials	–	–	–
5 – Medical examination	8 000	–	8 000
Total	10 042 000	586 000	9 456 000
<i>Head II – Temporary staff</i>			
SUB-HEAD:			
6 – Staff recruited for sessions	2 113 000	1 125	21 111 875
7 – Interpretation staff required for Assembly work between sessions	496 000	40 000	456 000
8 – Temporary staff for the Office of the Clerk .	50 000	–	50 000
9 – Social charges	92 000	5 000	87 000
Total	2 751 000	46 125	2 704 875
<i>Head III – Expenditure on premises and equipment</i>			
SUB-HEAD:			
10 – Share of joint expenditure on the Paris premises	450 000	–	450 000
11 – Hire of committee rooms	15 000	–	15 000
12 – Technical and other installations for Assembly sessions	345 000	–	345 000
13 – Various services for the organisation of ses- sions	45 000	–	45 000
14 – Maintenance of the premises of the Office of the Clerk	18 000	–	18 000
15 – Purchase or repair of office furniture	28 000	–	28 000
16 – Purchase of reproduction and other office equipment	104 600	72 300	32 300
17 – Hire and maintenance of reproduction and other office equipment	390 700	24 000	366 700
Total	1 396 300	96 300	1 300 000

Heads and Sub-Heads	Draft budget for 1987 (initial)	Reductions in accordance with the Council's opinion	Draft budget for 1987 (reduced)
<i>Head IV – General administrative costs</i>			
SUB-HEAD:			
18 – Postage, telephone, telex and transport of documents	495 000	15 000	480 000
19 – Duplication paper, headed writing paper and other office supplies	258 000	–	258 000
20 – Printing and publication of documents ...	1 190 000	–	1 190 000
21 – Purchase of documents	60 000	–	60 000
22 – Official cars	130 000	15 000	115 000
23 – Bank charges	500	–	500
Total	2 133 500	30 000	2 103 500
<i>Head V – Other expenditure</i>			
SUB-HEAD:			
24 – Travelling and subsistence allowances and insurance for the President of the Assembly, chairmen of committees and rapporteurs ..	150 000	20 000	130 000
25 – Expenses for representation	200 000	–	200 000
26 – Committee study missions	5 000	–	5 000
27 – Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk	380 000	30 000	350 000
28 – Expenses of experts and the auditor	100 000	30 000	70 000
29 – Expenditure on information	315 000	4 000	311 000
30 – Expenses for political groups	315 000	4 000	311 000
31 – Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere provided for	3 000	–	3 000
32 – Non-recoverable taxes	20 000	–	20 000
Total	1 488 000	88 000	1 400 000
OPERATING BUDGET	17 810 800	846 425	16 964 375
RECEIPTS	– 310 000	–	– 310 000
NET TOTAL OPERATING BUDGET	17 500 800	846 425	16 654 375
PENSIONS	1 351 000	–	1 351 000
RECEIPTS	441 500	32 500	409 000
NET TOTAL PENSIONS BUDGET	909 500	32 500	942 000
NET GRAND TOTAL	18 410 300	813 925	17 596 375

*Draft budget of the administrative expenditure
of the Assembly for the financial year 1987*

Draft Order

*on the draft budget of the administrative expenditure
of the Assembly for the financial year 1987
submitted by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration*

The Assembly,

Noting that the Council, in communicating its prior opinion, has explained that it was continuing to study in detail the problem of the place of pensions in the budget of the organisation and that it will study in detail the restructuring of the Office of the Clerk as soon as possible,

1. DECIDES, therefore, to adopt in the course of the present session its draft budget, as amended by the Council, on condition that within a maximum of three months a supplementary budget for 1987 be established taking into consideration the requirements of the Assembly as set out in the documents already submitted to the Council;
2. Consequently INSTRUCTS the Presidential Committee to negotiate with the Council to this end.

European security and the Mediterranean

REVISED REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments ²
by Mr. Kittelmann, Chairman and Rapporteur*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

REVISED DRAFT RECOMMENDATION

on European security and the Mediterranean

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Mr. Kittelmann, Chairman and Rapporteur

I. Introduction

II. The Mediterranean and European security

(a) General

(b) Threats to security

III. Soviet Union and the Mediterranean

(a) Possible strategic and political objective of the Soviet Union

(b) Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean

(c) Warsaw Pact forces in proximity to NATO countries

(i) The Black Sea fleet

(ii) Land forces

(iii) Air forces

(iv) General

IV. The NATO countries in the Mediterranean

(a) Defence policy and armed forces

(i) Portugal

(ii) Spain

(iii) Gibraltar

(iv) France

(v) Italy

(vi) Greece

(vii) Turkey

(viii) Greek-Turkish relations

(ix) United States

1. Adopted in committee by 13 votes to 1 with 0 abstentions.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Kittelmann (Chairman); Mr. Cifarelli, Dr. Müller (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Amadei, Sir Frederic Bennett (Alternate: Lord Newall), MM. Bérégovoy, van den Bergh, Bourges, De Decker (Alternate: Declercq), Dejardin, Edwards, Ertl, Galley (Alternate: Baumel), Gerstl, Giust, Konen, de Kwaadsteniet, Lemmrich, Matraja, Pecchioli, Sarti, Scheer (Alternate: Gansel), Sir Dudley Smith, MM. Steverlynck, Stokes (Alternate: Wilkinson), Wirth (Alternate: Jeambrun), N... (vacant seat).

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

(b) Collective defence arrangements under NATO

- (i) NATO command structure
- (ii) Joint forces
- (iii) Infrastructure

V. The non-aligned countries of the Mediterranean

(a) Yugoslavia

(b) Albania

(c) Cyprus

- (i) General
- (ii) Present situation
- (iii) Greek, Turkish and Cypriot military forces in Cyprus
- (iv) United Nations force in Cyprus
- (v) British sovereign base area
- (vi) The Cyprus problem

(d) Syria

(e) Lebanon

(f) Israel

(g) Egypt

(h) Libya

(i) Malta

(j) Rest of the Maghreb

VI. Summary and conclusions

VII. Opinion of the minority

APPENDICES

I. Articles 5 and 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty

II. Comparative table of defence effort 1981-1985

- A. Financial effort
- B. Manpower effort – 1985

III. United States military assistance – Department of Defence proposals for Financial Year 1986

IV. Diagram showing NATO military command structure – elements in the Mediterranean and adjoining area

V. Documents concerning the financing of the United Nations force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)

VI. Source of armaments of Middle Eastern and North African Mediterranean countries

- A. Apparent source of selected major equipment currently in service
- B. Equipment reported to be on order or under delivery in 1985

Introductory Note

In preparing this report, *the Rapporteur* had interviews as follows:

3rd March-6th March 1986 – Cyprus

3rd March

British Sovereign Base, Episkopi

Mr. David Reynolds, Chief Officer;
Brigadier Andrew Myrtle, Deputy Commander, British Forces;
Air Vice-Marshal K.W. Hayr, Commander, British Forces.

UNFICYP Headquarters, Nicosia

Major-General Günther G. Greindl, Commander, United Nations Force in Cyprus;
Major Roderick MacArthur, Military Public Information Officer.

4th March

H.E. Mr. W.J.A. Wilberforce, CMG, British High Commissioner;
Mr. George Iacovou, Minister for Foreign Affairs;
President Rauf Denktash;
Dr. V. Lyssarides, President of the House of Representatives.

5th March

Mr. Spyros Kyprianou, President of the Republic of Cyprus;
Mr. Elias Eliades, Minister of Defence;
Mr. George Anastadiades, Director-General of the Ministry of Defence;
Mr. James Holger, Acting Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations;
Mr. Gustave Feissel, Director of the Office of the Under-Secretaries-General;
Mr. Glafcos Clerides, Member of the House of Representatives.

6th March

H.E. Mr. Richard Boem, United States Ambassador;
Mr. Richard Hoover, United States Embassy;
Mr. Thomas Carolan, United States Embassy;
H.E. Dr. Thilo Rötger, German Ambassador.

21st March 1986 – Rome

Mr. Giulio Andreotti, Minister for Foreign Affairs;
Mr. Carmelo Liotta, Head Middle East and North Africa Desk, Ministry for Foreign Affairs;
Mr. Fernando Lay, WEU Affairs;
Mr. Vittorio Olcese, Secretary of State for Defence.

20th March 1986 – Naples

Information was gathered on behalf of the Rapporteur in interviews at Headquarters Allied Forces Southern Europe with:

Admiral S. Morean, United States Navy, CINCSOUTH;
Lt. General Thomas F. Healy, United States Army, Chief-of-Staff;
Mr. Donald A. Kruse, Special Assistant for International Affairs;
Brigadier General Carlo Parodi Dandini, Italian Army, Assistant Chief-of-Staff, Operations;

Brigadier General Dimitrios Avgouropoulos, Hellenic Army, Assistant Chief-of-Staff, Personnel and Administration;

Commodore Keith Estlin, Royal Navy, Assistant Chief-of-Staff, Communications and Information Systems;

Admiral André Deloinde, French Navy, Head of French Military Mission, and Staff Officers.

The committee as a whole met in Paris on 19th February 1986 when it discussed Mr. Kittelmann's draft outline report.

The committee met again in Venice on 29th April 1986 when it discussed and adopted the present report.

The Rapporteur expresses his thanks to all those persons who discussed the subject of the report with him or provided information for it.

The views expressed in the report, unless otherwise attributed, are those of the committee.

Revised Draft Recommendation
on European security and the Mediterranean

The Assembly,

- (i) Convinced that the long-term political objective of the Soviet Union towards the Middle East region and the Mediterranean area has not changed;
- (ii) Believing however that the military threat from Warsaw Pact forces in the Mediterranean area has not increased since the committee's last report;
- (iii) Condemning the continued Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan and the perpetration of atrocities against the Afghan resistance forces and population;
- (iv) Concerned at the latent dangers arising from conflicts and crises particularly in the eastern and southern parts of the Mediterranean area which exert direct or indirect influence upon the interests and positions of allied countries;
- (v) Drawing particular attention to the political and military instability in the Middle East region caused by the unsolved Arab-Israeli dispute, Arab disunity, Libyan and Syrian involvement in world terrorism and, last but not least, by Islamic belligerent fundamentalism in some countries of the region;
- (vi) Welcoming Spain's decision to remain a member of NATO;
- (vii) Believing that European security and security in the Mediterranean area depend also on appropriate diplomatic efforts to reach agreed and verifiable arms control measures,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Establish common adequate and convincing policies, which it should implement and publicise, when and where appropriate, and which should be defined and intended:

1. To demonstrate more publicly the collective responsibility of the western alliances for defence in the Mediterranean area:
 - (i) by supporting joint NATO forces and their exercises in the region and co-ordinating maritime surveillance under COMMARAIMED;
 - (ii) by recommending that peacetime actions of forces of NATO countries in the areas covered by Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty should be oriented towards NATO policies;
 - (iii) by making all efforts to secure and maintain the operational freedom of forces of NATO countries in the Mediterranean area, in full accordance with international law and the principle of the freedom of the seas;
 - (iv) by emphasising the need for the continued presence of United States forces in the area thus helping to improve European defence capability in this particular part of the continent;
2. To stress the absolute need to maintain proper military stability in the region, particularly by providing military aid for the modernisation of the equipment of the Portuguese, Greek and Turkish armed forces;
3. To persuade Spain to co-operate to the fullest possible extent with ACE mobile force, the naval on-call force Mediterranean, Commander Maritime Air Forces Mediterranean, and by contributing a mobile force for reinforcement of allied contingents in the Mediterranean, as well as by reporting defence data to NATO as customary with all other NATO members;
4. To pay proper attention and give due consideration to Turkey's key political and strategic position on the Middle East land bridge and to its important defence assignments in NATO's south-eastern flank;
5. To persuade Greece and Turkey to resume bilateral negotiations to solve their Aegean issues, inter alia with a view to permitting normal co-operation of Greek forces with NATO plans and to completing the NATO command structure in the area;
6. To persuade all relevant parties in the Arab-Israeli dispute, and especially in the disturbing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, to find a lasting and peaceful solution, thereby removing the inspiration and causes of terrorism, and reducing one peripheral threat to the region;

7. To continue to support the United Nations peace-keeping forces in Lebanon and Cyprus;
8. To encourage the two communities in Cyprus to resume direct contacts to discuss all issues which will assist in finding an agreed solution to the political problem through the good offices of the United Nations Secretary-General;
9. To recall Egypt's commitment to pursue the search for a peace settlement between the Arab world and Israel and, by political support, economic assistance and due consideration for its security problems, to encourage that country to continue relevant efforts in that direction;
10. To encourage appropriate measures to improve the economic and social situation of the peoples of the less-developed countries in order to create more stability in the region.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Kittelmann, Chairman and Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1.1. The committee has regularly reported on the security situation in the Mediterranean, the three most recent reports to be devoted exclusively to the region being those by Mr. Bozzi in May 1981¹, Mr. Grant in May 1978², and Mr. Buck in May and June 1976³. Most recently, however, Sir Dudley Smith's report of May 1984⁴ paid particular attention to the western Mediterranean and the position of Spain within NATO, drawing in particular on information gathered during the committee's visit to that country in October 1983, and the Rapporteur's subsequent visit to Gibraltar.

1.2. On this occasion, therefore, the committee in the terms of reference asked the Rapporteur to deal with "the defence situation throughout the Mediterranean, in particular the eastern part". In this connection, the committee visited Greece and Turkey in October 1985 and the Rapporteur visited Cyprus and Rome in March this year.

1.3. Nevertheless, the successful outcome of the referendum in Spain on continued membership of NATO held on 12th March makes it appropriate to review the situation in that country also in the present report.

1.4. As the General Affairs Committee is preparing a report on terrorism and on security outside the area of the alliance⁵, this report does not deal in detail with security problems arising from conflicts in the Middle East and Persian Gulf except to the extent that the levels of armaments and armed forces of the immediate neighbours of Turkey, or the risk of "...armed attack...on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the parties, when in or over...the Mediterranean Sea..."⁶, make the security problem an "in-area" one for NATO.

1.5. This report was originally adopted by the committee on 29th April 1986 by 16 votes to 0 with 3 abstentions, but after debate on it in the Assembly on 4th June, it was referred back to the committee, the only explicit argument advanced

in favour of the reference back being that the report omitted to refer to the important rôle played by several industrial countries as a source of armaments supplied to Middle Eastern countries. The Rapporteur doubts whether that was in fact the real motive of all those supporting the reference back; there had in fact been a rather acrimonious exchange in the Assembly between the observers from Greece and Turkey, in which other speakers did not join. But as a gesture to consensus in the Assembly at the next session, the Rapporteur has now included at Appendix VI factual information from reliable sources concerning the origin of certain major items of military equipment held by the armed forces of the Middle Eastern and North African Mediterranean countries.

1.6. Three amendments to the draft recommendation were tabled in the Assembly in June which were not discussed because of the reference back. The committee has incorporated one of these amendments in the draft recommendation which now refers in paragraph (v) to both Libyan and Syrian involvement in world terrorism. The committee stresses that this is a report which deals with the security interests of NATO countries in the Mediterranean area, and not one which addresses the problems either of world terrorism or of the various disputes and conflicts of the Middle East, except in passing to the extent that they impinge on allied security in the Mediterranean. These other problems have been dealt with in many other reports submitted to the Assembly in the past, mostly from the General Affairs Committee. As far as the problems of security in the Mediterranean are concerned the committee continues to believe that the report as it stands, with the minor additions referred to above, remains a balanced report that is fair to the various interests concerned. It accordingly resubmits it to the Assembly without other change.

II. The Mediterranean and European security

(a) General

2.1. The welcome confirmation of continued Spanish membership of NATO consolidates, in theory at least, the stabilising influence of NATO in the Mediterranean basin, where all countries on the northern shore are members, with the sole exception of Yugoslavia and Albania. Despite the long-standing and still unresolved disputes between Greece and Turkey which seriously wea-

1. European security and the Mediterranean, Document 876.

2. Security in the Mediterranean, Document 776.

3. Security in the Mediterranean, Documents 708 and 712.

4. State of European security, Document 971.

5. Security and terrorism - the implications for Europe of crises in other parts of the world, Rapporteur: Mr. van der Werff.

6. Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty - full text of Articles 5 and 6 at Appendix I.

ken the eastern flank, the countries of the alliance, through the frequent ministerial meetings and lower level working groups of NATO, as well as of the European Community to which all except Turkey now belong, are much better placed to co-ordinate their policies to their mutual benefit than the countries on the eastern and southern shores of the Mediterranean despite the fact, that with the exception of Israel, the latter are all members of the Arab League.

2.2. Within both main groups there are wide variations in standards of living with GDP per capita in the NATO Mediterranean countries ranging from little more than \$1,100 (Turkey) to over \$8,500 (France). Even wider variations among the Arab League countries are accounted for mostly by petroleum or natural gas resources of Libya and Algeria with per capita incomes of \$8,400 and \$2,200 respectively compared with Morocco and Egypt with per capita incomes of \$600 and \$700 respectively. Israel, and to a lesser extent the islands of Cyprus and Malta, stand out as countries with essentially European standards of living. Another common feature of many countries in the southern and eastern Mediterranean areas is the extreme youth of the population – in Libya more than half the population is under fifteen.

2.3. The Mediterranean Sea itself is of vital economic importance to all countries in the Mediterranean and in the Black Sea. At any one time some 2,000 merchant vessels, including 250 to 300 belonging to the Soviet Union, are under way in the Mediterranean. Between 300 and 400 of these are tankers carrying up to 30 million barrels of petroleum or petroleum products. All imports of petroleum into Italy and Greece pass through the Mediterranean as do 50% of those of France, Spain and Germany.

2.4. There is thus a strong mutual interest for countries of both alliances, and all other Mediterranean countries, to ensure that the freedom of the sea is maintained.

2.5. There are considerable forces belonging to NATO countries permanently stationed in the Mediterranean area. In addition to those of Spain, France, Italy, Greece and Turkey, the United States maintains powerful naval and air forces and some army units under bilateral basing agreements with Spain, Italy, Greece and Turkey. Portugal has earmarked certain units as reinforcements for northern Italy in the event of hostilities. Forces from other NATO countries take part in NATO exercises in the Mediterranean area on a sporadic basis. Belgian, German and United Kingdom contingents form the land component of ACE mobile force when deployed in the Mediterranean, and Belgium, Germany and Italy contribute squadrons to the air component. In addition, the United Kingdom and the United States contribute a ship to

the naval on-call force Mediterranean when activated.

2.6. In contrast the permanent military presence of the Soviet Union in the Mediterranean, described in Chapter III, is modest, comprising the Mediterranean squadron of the Soviet fleet and an occasional reconnaissance aircraft.

(b) *Threats to security*

2.7. The largest *potential* threat to NATO countries in the Mediterranean region comes from the very large land and air forces of the Soviet Union and its allies in three main areas. Eastern Turkey has a common frontier with the Soviet Union, but access to the Mediterranean from this remote and mountainous region with poor road communications would be difficult. Greece and Turkish Thrace have a common frontier with Bulgaria, but there are no Soviet forces stationed in Bulgaria. In addition, however, there is a significant, but not large, Soviet amphibious capability which could threaten the Turkish Straits. There are at present only four Soviet divisions in Hungary, the nearest Warsaw Pact territory to north-eastern Italy, but separated from it by non-aligned Yugoslavia which would provide some warning time of any approach to the Mediterranean in this area. This potential threat is described in the next chapter.

2.8. Access to the Mediterranean itself for the Soviet navy involves passage either through the Turkish Straits or Gibraltar, both of which are controlled by NATO countries. Access for military aircraft to the Mediterranean, without overflying NATO territory, involves overflight of Yugoslavia – which appears to be granted – and a circuitous flight path down the Adriatic. Since Soviet military base rights in Egypt were revoked by that country in 1972, Soviet naval forces have had relatively little access to port facilities in the Mediterranean, and Soviet air forces have not been based in the Mediterranean area at all.

2.9. The more immediate, but smaller-scale, threat to the security of allied countries in the Mediterranean area arises from existing or potential local conflicts among certain non-aligned countries, with an inherent risk of involvement of the superpowers, or from the anarchic behaviour of a country such as Libya. The political stability of certain countries in the eastern Mediterranean and along the North African coast is uncertain. Any abrupt change of régime may lead to a change in political alignment favouring the Soviet Union and posing the direct threat of Soviet naval and air bases once again on the shores of the Mediterranean – although since its unfortunate experience in Egypt in 1972 the Soviet Union does not appear to have sought

very actively to reinstall its forces on Mediterranean shores.

2.10. Security in the Mediterranean itself therefore depends very much on the maintenance of good relations with all the non-aligned countries of the area and the pursuit of a negotiated settlement to all actual or potential conflicts. Success in these aims will depend very much more on diplomatic and economic relations than on traditional military power. Permanent and lasting solutions to some of the local disputes or conflicts in the area may not always be in reach. Deficiencies can be found in the military readiness of the NATO forces available for use in the Mediterranean area. But the cohesion of the alliance and the pursuit of co-ordinated policies by the NATO and European Community countries are more important for the preservation of peaceful and stable conditions in an inherently unpredictable future than any purely military measures.

III. Soviet Union and the Mediterranean

(a) Possible strategic and political objectives of the Soviet Union

3.1. Historically Russia for 300 years had fought a series of wars with Turkey but the aim of gaining direct access to the Mediterranean through the possession of Constantinople and control of the Turkish Straits was never fulfilled. Relations between the two countries were normalised in 1925 with the signature of a treaty of friendship between Lenin and Kemal Atatürk, at least until the signature of the non-aggression treaty between the Soviet Union and the Third Reich in August 1939. Relations were again strained during World War II when Turkey, a non-belligerent, as it was entitled to do under the terms of the 1936 Montreux Convention, closed the Turkish Black Sea Straits to the passage of warships of any belligerent – which included the Soviet Union and the western allies.

3.2. Although Turkey finally declared war on 23rd February 1945, the Soviet Union on 20th March that year denounced the 1925 treaty of friendship with Turkey which was not due to expire until December, demanded a revision of the Montreux Convention, and renewed certain historical territorial claims concerning eastern Turkey. In a subsequent note the Soviet Union demanded revision of the Montreux Convention as far as the passage of warships was concerned so as to permit the free transit of warships of Black Sea powers; to prohibit the transit of warships of non-Black Sea powers except in certain cases; the right for Black Sea powers to share jointly with Turkey responsibility for applying the transit régime; and the right for the Soviet Union to participate jointly with Turkey in the defence of the straits. Turkey at the time indi-

cated a willingness to consider the first three proposals but refused to consider Soviet participation in defence of the straits. Turkey insisted that the Montreux Convention could be revised only by agreement among the signatories.

3.3. Soviet territorial claims against eastern Turkey were renounced only on 30th May 1953, some eighteen months after Turkey had acceded to the North Atlantic Treaty. In a note recalling also its earlier demands for revision of the Montreux Convention, the Soviet Union stated that it had reconsidered its position and considered that mutually agreeable conditions could be found to ensure its security. Turkey reasserted its position that it stood by the 1936 Montreux Convention.

3.4. After 1953 the Soviet Union, having failed to secure a modification of the Montreux Convention, sought naval and air bases elsewhere in the Mediterranean. A squadron of submarines was based in Albania until the withdrawal of that country from the Warsaw Pact in 1962 when the Soviet submarines were removed with the exception of two which were reported to have been seized by Albania at the time. After the 1956 Suez fiasco the Soviet Union was able to develop close relations with President Nasser of Egypt which enabled the Soviet Union to develop an important naval base in Alexandria, and to establish military air bases in Egypt. In 1972 however the new President Sadat expelled Soviet military personnel acting as advisers to the Egyptian armed forces, and following abrogation of the bilateral treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union in March 1976, the naval and air bases were closed to the Soviet Union, a move which particularly hampered the operation of Soviet submarines in the Mediterranean.

3.5. Since 1976 the Soviet Union has not been successful in securing the use of additional major naval or air facilities on the shores of the Mediterranean. It appears likely, in fact, that in the light of its experience with Egypt, it has not actively sought to invest major military resources in another Mediterranean country, fearing the possible loss of substantial investments in the long term through unpredictable changes in political leaderships and policies of alignment in the countries of the area.

(b) Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean

3.6. In an earlier report⁷ the committee examined in some detail the trend of Soviet naval deployment in the Mediterranean from the end of the second world war onwards. Very small in the 1950s the Soviet Union began to maintain a permanent presence of naval vessels reaching an average daily strength of about 20 inclusive of

7. Security in the Mediterranean, Document 776, 31st May 1978, Rapporteur: Mr. Grant.

auxiliary vessels by 1964 or 1965 rising to an average of about 40 by 1969 – a level which has remained roughly constant since then, except for the big build-up to a total of 100 ships, including 73 combatants, for a brief period at the peak of the 1973 Yom Kippur war. Even in that year the average daily strength only reached 56. A typical presence on any day in the last 12 months might have been:

Surface combatants	6
Submarines	6
Intelligence collectors	2
Naval auxiliaries	25
Miscellaneous	
(minesweepers/research, etc.)	5
<u>Total</u>	<u>44</u>

Of these not more than one or two are modern ships with long-range anti-ship surface-to-surface missile capability. The remainder of the Soviet Mediterranean squadron tends to be older on average than ships of the other Soviet fleets.

3.7. The Soviet Mediterranean squadron is maintained for the most part by rotation of surface ships from the Black Sea fleet, with submarines transiting from the Northern and Baltic fleets because the Montreux Convention prohibits the transit of submarines from the Black Sea except for major repair (or on first delivery of a new submarine constructed outside the Black Sea). In the absence of major naval bases within the Mediterranean, the Soviet Mediterranean squadron leads a relatively uncomfortable existence at anchorages in a few sheltered spots in the open sea off the coasts of various countries, but beyond the limits of the territorial sea. The main anchorages include the Gulf of Hammamet off the Tunisian coast; the Gulf of Sollum off Libya; an area to the east of Crete; and another off Lemnos Island in the North Aegean. Anchorages off Kithera, southern Greece and south of Cape Passero, off Sicily, are also used during exercises. Surface combatants spend three-quarters of their time in the open sea at these anchorages. A quarter of their time is spent under way on exercises or surveillance operations. On the other hand Soviet submarines when in the Mediterranean spend 90% of their time at sea.

3.8. For repair and maintenance purposes the Soviet Union has obtained the permission of the Syrian Government to use the port of Latakia, and Tartus where both submarines and surface ships rotate for maintenance periods usually of about 30 days. There are usually 6 to 8 repair ships in that port. The Soviet navy uses repair facilities at a number of other points in the Mediterranean. One submarine is always undergoing overhaul in Tivat, Yugoslavia, for 6 months at a time with a Soviet repair ship always present.

Commercial repair facilities are also used in Bizerta in Tunisia and minor auxiliaries are usually to be found in the Greek shipyard on the island of Syros. Soviet naval visits to the Libyan ports of Tripoli and Tobruk have increased somewhat over the last 3 years; earlier in 1986 a command ship was to be found in Tripoli. Annaba in Algeria has been used for repair work.

3.9. It is of course open to the Soviet Union to make normal commercial arrangements for supplies in the Mediterranean. Soviet supply ships regularly visit the Italian ports of Palermo, Naples and Genoa to take on fresh foodstuffs, and also to purchase various items of tools and hardware that are available on the open market. On 26th January 1981 an agreement was signed between the Soviet Union and the Maltese Government allowing the Soviet Union to use half of the Has Saptain underground oil storage facilities in Malta which had been built as part of the NATO infrastructure programme in the 1950s. Its total capacity was then reported to be 50,000 tonnes of diesel oil, 90,000 tonnes of other fuel oil and 40,000 tonnes of jet fuel. Soviet surface auxiliary vessels spend 95% of their time in the anchorages and ports mentioned above as being normally used by the Soviet Mediterranean squadron.

3.10. The historical level of Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean is illustrated in the following table for the period 1964 to 1977, since when it can be regarded as substantially unchanged:

*Historical trend of
Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean
1964-77*

Year	Annual ship days	Average daily strength
1964	1,500	5
1965	2,800	8
1966	4,400	12
1967	8,100	22
1968	11,000	30
1969	15,000	41
1970	16,500	45
1971	19,000	52
1972	18,000	49
1973	20,600	56
1974	20,200	55
1975	20,000	55
1976	18,600	50
1977	17,747	48

The Soviet presence was negligible before 1964 and has remained constant at 46-48 since 1977.

3.11. Under the terms of the Montreux Convention Turkey reports each year to the parties to that convention on transits of all naval vessels

through the Turkish Straits. The following table shows the pattern of Soviet naval transits through the Turkish Straits since 1964:

*Soviet naval transits of the Turkish Straits
1964-85*

Year	Auxiliary transits	Surface combatant transits	Total
1964	56	39	95
1965	80	49	129
1966	71	82	153
1967	149	93	242
1968	113	117	230
1969	142	121	263
1970	149	122	271
1971	154	123	277
1972	140	114	254
1973	159	126	285
1974	145	93	238
1975	146	79	225
1976	63	69	132
1977	103	82	185
1978	121	107	228
1979	129	94	223
1980	124	111	235
1982	134	94	228
1983	132	113	245
1984	137	86	223

3.12. Thus, compared with the naval forces maintained by other NATO countries in the Mediterranean, the Soviet presence is modest. The Soviet squadron can of course be substantially increased by reinforcement from the Black Sea fleet described in the next section, but given the formalities of passage through the Turkish Straits this would take a certain time, and thus provide warning. Naval experts feel it unlikely that in the event of hostilities the Soviet Union would in fact expose major surface naval forces to the risks of operations in the Mediterranean which would inevitably be controlled by NATO countries. The Black Sea fleet would be more likely to be used in defence of the Warsaw Pact southern flank. There are also important Soviet naval shipbuilding yards in the Black Sea, and it forms the main base for Soviet naval units operating in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean.

3.13. Major Soviet naval vessels including the Kiev-class VTOL aircraft carriers and the helicopter carriers Moskva and Leningrad are reported to transit the Turkish Straits from time to time on their way to deployment in other ocean areas after transiting the Mediterranean. They do not appear to be deployed operationally within the Mediterranean. It is expected that the full-sized aircraft carrier now under construction in Sebastopol will not be operational until the early 1990s. It is however anticipated that it

Naval vessels in the Mediterranean

	Soviet Union	United States	Other NATO ⁹	France	Spain ⁸	NATO
Carriers	—	2 ¹⁰	2	2	—	6
Cruisers	3	1	6	1	—	8
Frigates and destroyers	8	14	60	13	7	94
Sub-total — Major surface combatants	11	17	68	16	7	108
Submarines	8	5	37	11	8	61
Amphibious vessels	2	6	24	—	—	30
Auxiliaries	27	11	70	19	17	117
Total	48	39 ¹⁰	199	46	32	316

will then leave the Black Sea, declared to Turkey as a cruiser because the Montreux Convention prohibits the transit of aircraft carriers, and will then be deployed with the Northern or Pacific fleet for use in more distant oceans.

*(c) Warsaw Pact forces
in proximity to NATO countries*

(i) The Black Sea fleet

3.14. As least as important as the Black Sea fleet itself are the naval shipbuilding yards at Nikolaiev where at the present time the first proper Soviet aircraft carrier is under construction.

Reported to be nuclear-propelled, between 65,000 and 75,000 tonnes, some 300 m overall and to be equipped with steam catapults, this carrier when operational will for the first time permit the Soviet Union to operate fixed-wing aircraft at sea. First announced publicly by Admiral Gorshkov in 1979 the carrier has been under construction since 1983 but is not expected to undergo sea trials before 1988. Given the

8. Spain also has 1 aircraft carrier (2 in 1986) and escorts at Rota, west of the Straits of Gibraltar.

9. Total of Greece, Italy and Turkey.

10. When only 1 carrier present in Mediterranean the United States total of 39 falls to 33.

time it has taken other navies to acquire the necessary skills, the carrier is not expected to be fully operational in the oceans of the world until the early 1990s. It is not yet clear what aircraft will operate from it; there are reports that a new naval aircraft is being specially developed for the vessel.

3.15. When operational it is expected that the aircraft carrier will operate with the Soviet Northern or Pacific fleet, rather than in the Mediterranean itself.

3.16. The operational Black Sea fleet comprises first some 28 submarines (not nuclear-propelled – construction of nuclear-propelled submarines does not appear to be carried out at the Nikolaiev Black Sea shipyards). One of the Kiev-class aircraft carriers is normally based with the Black Sea fleet but operates usually beyond the Mediterranean. Of 37,000 tonnes displacement, 270 m length overall, this class operates vertical take-off aircraft and helicopters. The smaller helicopter carriers Moskva and Leningrad are also assigned to the Black Sea fleet. The total of 48 main surface combatants is completed with 9 cruisers, 21 destroyers and 15 frigates. There are in addition 25 lighter corvette-class vessels.

3.17. The amphibious capabilities of the Black Sea fleet is represented by 21 amphibious ships, including 5 landing ship tanks, and 5 battalions of naval infantry totalling 3,000 men.

3.18. Since the committee last reported five years ago, the Soviet Black Sea fleet naval aviation has been strengthened and now includes 100 bombers including the Tu-22M Backfire bomber as well as the older Tu-16 Badger.

(ii) *Land forces*

3.19. If NATO countries on the southern flank sometimes feel themselves the poor relations, with older equipment than that on the central front, the same is true of the Warsaw Pact's southern tier, Bulgaria and Hungary and Romania, if the latter country can still be considered as participating militarily in the pact. Both tanks and aircraft in these countries' forces tend to be older models than in the centre.

3.20. There are three widely separated areas of NATO territory to which the threat of Warsaw Pact land forces has to be considered. North-eastern Italy is possibly the most remote threat, being separated from the nearest Warsaw Pact forces in Hungary by the neutral territory of Yugoslavia and Austria. These Warsaw Pact forces comprise a total of 4 Soviet divisions and 6 Hungarian divisions, the latter at a lower state of readiness than those of the Soviet Union. A further 7 Soviet divisions at a lower state of readiness in the Kiev military district, the other side of the Carpathians, represent a reinforcement capability against north-eastern Italy. The War-

saw Pact forces stationed in Hungary are equipped with 2,340 tanks and 1,560 artillery pieces. Against this Italy has 8 divisional equivalents with 1,250 tanks and 1,400 artillery and mortar pieces. Portugal provides a reinforcement brigade for deployment in northern Italy.

3.21. Against Greek and Turkish Thrace there is an immediate threat from the Bulgarian army comprising some 7 divisional equivalents at category 1 and 2 and a further 3 cadre divisions. Romania further away provides 2 tank divisions and 4 motorised rifle divisions and one mountain division equivalent together with a further 4 cadre divisions. No Soviet forces are stationed in Bulgaria or Romania in peacetime, and Romania has not normally permitted the passage of Soviet forces for exercise purposes. In the Odessa military district in the Soviet Union there are a further 8 motorised rifle divisions and 1 airborne division. Of a total of 34 divisions the Italian 1985 white paper on defence estimates that just over 22 are at a high state of readiness with 3,680 tanks and 2,940 artillery and mortar pieces. Against these there are a total of 22 Greek and Turkish divisions available in the area, but account has also to be taken of the amphibious forces of the Soviet Black Sea fleet listed above.

3.22. In the area of eastern Turkey along its common border with the Soviet Union there are 12 Soviet divisions deployed forward with 2,400 tanks and 1,700 artillery pieces. A further 8 divisions with proportional numbers of tanks and artillery are available as reinforcements in the southern Soviet military districts. The Turkish army has some 8 divisions in north-eastern Turkey and a further 4 in south-eastern Turkey protecting its other borders which could be used as reinforcements in the event of an attack in the north.

(iii) *Air forces*

3.23. The extreme mobility of air forces makes it misleading to count numbers of aircraft based in particular countries in peacetime. The Italian white paper on defence quoted above shows, in the whole of the southern region, some 695 Warsaw Pact fighter bomber/ground attack aircraft, 1,560 interceptors and 195 reconnaissance. Corresponding numbers for NATO are 615, 295, and 90. The situation on the NATO side has somewhat improved since the committee last reported with a modernisation programme under way in the three NATO countries concerned with three squadrons of Tornado aircraft being phased in in Italy and plans for Greece and Turkey to acquire F-16 aircraft.

(iv) *General*

3.24. Official NATO briefings speak in general terms of unfavourable force ratios in the sou-

thern region of 3 to 1 in north-eastern Italy, 2 to 1 in Thrace, and 3 to 1 in eastern Turkey. There are however considerable United States air forces available for rapid reinforcement from their normal bases in Spain and from the United States, and there are defensive advantages of both terrain and warning time in north-eastern Italy and of terrain in eastern Turkey.

IV. The NATO countries in the Mediterranean

(a) Defence policy and armed forces

(i) Portugal

4.1. Although Portugal is not strictly a Mediterranean country it is mentioned in this report in part because of its commitment to a reinforcement rôle in north-eastern Italy. The committee reported in some detail on the Portuguese defence effort as a whole following its visit to that country in October 1982¹¹.

4.2. Portugal's main contribution to collective NATO defence is to the Atlantic command, Portugal forming part of SACLANT's area of responsibility. The important IBERLANT subordinate command is assigned to a Portuguese admiral and is responsible for the sea area comprising the western Atlantic south of the Portuguese/Spanish frontier as far east as the approaches to the Straits of Gibraltar.

4.3. The Portuguese army has undergone considerable reorganisation over the last ten years having been reduced in size from 190,000 to 45,740 today, organised into the equivalent of some 7 or 8 brigades.

4.4. One mobile armoured brigade is earmarked for deployment in north-eastern Italy and has practised this deployment during NATO exercises. On one occasion Portugal has contributed an artillery battery to ACE mobile force referred to below.

4.5. With the second lowest per capita income among the NATO countries, Portugal's chief problem is with modernisation of equipment. As far as the army is concerned, this is reflected in its armour which still consists of some outdated M-48 tanks and light armoured cars. As in the case of Greece and Turkey, NATO commanders lay stress on the need for Portugal to receive defence assistance from other countries of the alliance. For the time being the United States, Germany and the Netherlands provide military aid to Portugal. The Assembly has noted and welcomed, in the context of a number of other committee reports, Portugal's application to accede to the Brussels Treaty which has been under consideration by the WEU Council since October 1984.

11. State of European security, Document 936, 8th November 1982, Rapporteur: Mr. Blaauw.

(ii) Spain

4.6. The committee last visited Spain in October 1983 and reported on that visit in the framework of its report the following year¹².

4.7. Spain became a full party to the North Atlantic Treaty on 30th May 1982, but the socialist party then in opposition had pledged that it would hold a referendum on Spanish membership of NATO if it came to power, as it did in November 1982.

4.8. The promised referendum was held only on 12th March 1986, in political conditions rather different from those during the debate on Spanish accession to NATO. The socialist government, and the Prime Minister, Mr. Gonzalez, in person, campaigned vigorously for a "yes" vote on the carefully drafted question put to the electorate with three pre-conditions in the following terms:

"The government regards it in the national interest that Spain remain within the Atlantic Alliance and considers that permanency of membership should be established according to the following terms:

1. Spain's participation in the Atlantic Alliance does not include its incorporation in the integrated military structure.
2. The prohibition concerning the installing, stocking or introducing of nuclear weapons on Spanish territory, will be upheld.
3. Gradual steps will be taken towards a progressive reduction of the United States military presence in Spain.

Are you in favour of Spain being part of the Atlantic Alliance within the framework set out by the government?"

4.9. The centre and right-wing opposition led by Mr. Fraga, which has supported membership of NATO, opposed the holding of the referendum on principle, and called on voters to abstain. The communist party called for a "no" vote.

4.10. The results of the referendum on 12th March were considered an outstanding victory for the government:

Yes	8,987,525	52.54%
No	6,815,173	39.83%
Blank votes	1,119,202	6.54%
Spoiled papers	187,219	1.09%

Turn-out was put at: 17,109,118 (59.71%); abstentions: 11,542,410 (40.29%)¹³.

12. State of European security, Document 971, 15th May 1984, Rapporteur: Sir Dudley Smith.

13. Atlantic News, 14th March 1986.

4.11. The result was welcomed in particular by the Secretary-General of NATO, Lord Carrington, at a press conference on 13th March when he noted that it would be simpler if all NATO member countries enjoyed the same status in the organisation. He recognised however that NATO had lived for many years with the particular problems of the 16 sovereign independent countries who were members and "we accommodate with this".

4.12. In a previous report¹⁴ the committee pointed out the anomalies of present Spanish membership of NATO. Following ratification of Spain's accession to the North Atlantic Treaty in May 1982 negotiations had begun on the integration of Spain into the NATO military structure. The progress of the talks has not been made public but they were known to have run into difficulties over the allocation of command responsibilities in the Iberian area, because of differences of opinion between Spain and Portugal which has exercised an important command responsibility in the Atlantic for many years. These negotiations were frozen with the change in government in Spain in November 1984. Spain from the outset of its membership of the organisation has however participated fully in all NATO committees including in particular the Defence Planning Committee, the Military Committee, and, as an observer, the Nuclear Planning Group. At the last meeting of the NPG on 21st March 1986, the Spanish Ambassador announced that Spain henceforth would participate as a full member; the communiqué of the meeting no longer carried the customary reservation, "Spain attended as an observer", of previous communiqués. Spain also attends meetings of Eurogroup. France, in contrast, since withdrawing from the integrated military structure in 1966, has not been represented on any of those bodies. France, on the other hand, since withdrawing its officers from the integrated staffs of the various NATO military headquarters has maintained military missions at these headquarters and also continues to report the various statistics concerning its defence effort which NATO publishes each year¹⁵. Spanish statistics are not yet included in the NATO figures. In confirming its membership of NATO, Spain continues its policy of not allowing nuclear weapons to be stationed on its territory – a policy it has maintained since the accident with the United States aircraft in the 1960s when a nuclear bomb, which did not explode, burst open on contact with the ground causing radioactive contamination. The same policy with respect to nuclear weapons has always been pursued by Denmark and Norway. The consequences for the stationing of United States forces in Spain

and the bilateral defence treaty are discussed in section 4.68 et seq. below.

4.13. It appears to be generally recognised in NATO circles that in view of the terms of the referendum question, and while the present government remains in power, there will be no further discussion on the integration of Spanish forces into NATO. In the view of the committee however it would be undesirable for there to be any reduction in the present level of Spanish participation in NATO committees – which is mutually beneficial – and Spain should be urged to appoint military missions to the various NATO headquarters concerned which must include SHAPE, SACLANT and CINCHAN as well as subordinate headquarters including EASTLANT (co-located at Channel Command), IBERLANT as well as AFSOUTH and its subordinate headquarters AIRSOUTH and NAVSOUTH.

4.14. Since acceding to the North Atlantic Treaty, elements of the Spanish Mediterranean fleet (shown in the table in paragraph 3.12 above) have been participating on a bilateral basis in naval exercises in the Mediterranean with various other NATO countries. Spanish submarines in the past have acted as hypothetical "hostile" forces in anti-submarine exercises, and recently Spanish surface units have participated in such exercises for the first time. Without prejudging the question of permanent integration into the NATO military structure, it is felt that Spanish forces could make a useful military contribution to NATO's various multilateral collective defence arrangements described in a later chapter. These could include:

- periodical exercises with naval on-call force Mediterranean;
- provision of reinforcement units for deployment in the Mediterranean area, and practising such deployments on exercises;
- participation of maritime patrol aircraft in co-ordinated surveillance activities in the Mediterranean through bilateral arrangement with COMMARAIMED in Naples (as France already does).

4.15. The committee notes with satisfaction that Mr. Alfred Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU, visited Spain for talks with ministers at the invitation of the Spanish Government in January 1986, and that at that time the government spokesman announced that Spain would apply for membership of the Brussels Treaty. It was understood that an application would be made once the results of the referendum were known.

(iii) *Gibraltar*

4.16. The British colony of Gibraltar houses a small naval and air headquarters which when

14. Document 971, op. cit.

15. See Appendix II, derived from NATO statistics.

activated during exercises or emergencies become a NATO naval command subordinate to NAVSOUTH in Naples – Commander Gibraltar Mediterranean, subordinate to Commander Naval Forces Mediterranean in Naples, and Commander Maritime Air Forces Gibraltar, subordinate to Commander Allied Air Forces Southern Europe in Naples.

4.17. Rapporteurs of the committee have visited Gibraltar from time to time, most recently in March 1984, and the committee at that time reported in some detail on the situation on the rock¹⁶.

4.18. British forces permanently stationed in Gibraltar are small. They amount to one battalion and some artillery the historical rôle of which is to defend the territory against any threat from Spain – a surely anomalous rôle now that Spain has become a democracy and is a member of NATO and of the European Community. There are normally 2 Jaguar fighter aircraft on rotation from the United Kingdom which can perform a useful reconnaissance function in obtaining close-up photographs of Soviet naval units transiting the straits. British Nimrod maritime reconnaissance aircraft operate out of Gibraltar from time to time. Britain does not now station naval vessels in Gibraltar permanently but a guard ship – usually a frigate – based in the United Kingdom is available at short notice.

4.19. Other NATO countries including Canada, the Netherlands and the United States operate ships and aircraft out of Gibraltar during NATO exercises. In the event of hostilities naval vessels from the United Kingdom, the United States and Italy would operate under the Gibraltar NATO command. If Spain does not join the integrated military structure of NATO, Gibraltar will obviously continue to provide a useful base for a NATO naval headquarters from where control of the Gibraltar Straits can be exercised.

4.20. As far as the political situation in Gibraltar is concerned Spain recognises British sovereignty over “the town and castle of Gibraltar, together with the port, fortifications and forts” in accordance with the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht; successive Spanish governments have campaigned to “re-establish the territorial integrity of Spain” through the return of Gibraltar to Spanish sovereignty. After imposing a series of restrictions on Gibraltar the Spanish authorities closed the frontier in 1969. An Anglo-Spanish agreement was reached in Brussels on 27th November 1984 as a result of which the frontier was reopened in February 1985 while reciprocity of rights for Spa-

niards in Gibraltar and Gibraltarians in Spain was agreed, together with the establishment of “a negotiating process aimed at overcoming all the differences between them over Gibraltar... both sides accept that the issues of sovereignty will be discussed in that process. The British Government will fully maintain its commitment to honour the wishes of the people of Gibraltar as set out in the preamble of the 1969 constitution”. The British commitment remains to respect the wishes of Gibraltarians who in a 1967 referendum voted by 12,138 to 44 in favour of retaining the link with Britain.

4.21. Following the passage of the Spanish aircraft carrier, *Dedalo*, within 1 mile of the Gibraltar dockyard and the launching of 2 helicopters from its flight deck in the vicinity of Gibraltar airport on the night of 20th/21st September 1985, Britain lodged an official protest which was rejected by the Spanish Government. A Spanish Foreign Ministry official was quoted as saying: “Spain only ceded the waters within the actual port of Gibraltar to Great Britain...consequently the remaining waters adjacent to the rock come under Spanish sovereignty”¹⁷. Britain claims territorial waters up to 3 miles or the median line around Gibraltar whereas Spain claims territorial waters up to 6 miles from its coast – or up to the median line with Morocco in the case of the Straits of Gibraltar. For some time Spain has maintained a prohibited area for aircraft stretching some 30 miles in the vicinity of the Straits of Gibraltar. Airspace up to 3 nautical miles around Gibraltar is however excluded from this prohibited area, permitting aircraft to operate in and out of the Gibraltar airfield. The question of the territorial sea is discussed in paragraph 4.74 below.

(iv) *France*

4.22. France has not been part of the integrated military structure of NATO since 1966 but maintains substantial naval and other forces in the Mediterranean; NATO commanders express confidence that these forces would be available to NATO in the event of hostilities.

4.23. France maintains a permanent military mission at the headquarters of CINCSOUTH in Naples, which includes 2 liaison officers from the French Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean in Toulon who are attached to the subordinate NATO Commander Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe, also in Naples, who in turn maintains two NATO liaison officers at the French naval headquarters in Toulon. Arrangements for the co-operation of French naval forces with NATO forces in the event of hostilities are covered in detailed agreements negotiated between the NATO and French commanders-in-chief concerned in 1972 and 1976.

16. State of European security, Document 971, 15th May 1984, Rapporteur: Sir Dudley Smith – explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3.98 et seq.

17. The Guardian, 3rd April 1986.

4.24. French naval forces in the Mediterranean are listed in the table in paragraph 3.12. They normally include 2 aircraft carriers carrying Super-Etendard nuclear capable strike aircraft equipped with the AN-52 nuclear bomb. Two of the 11 submarines are nuclear-propelled – the Rubis and Saphir. Part of the 27 Atlantique maritime patrol aircraft are based in the Mediterranean.

4.25. French naval vessels participate in NATO naval exercises occasionally, and more frequently in joint exercises with allied navies on a bilateral basis. French maritime patrol aircraft on request from the NATO Commander Maritime Air Forces Mediterranean in Naples will participate in surveillance of Soviet naval vessels in the Mediterranean. The Atlantique, of somewhat shorter range than the Orion reconnaissance aircraft of some other navies, can on these occasions land at NATO airfields in Italy for refuelling before returning to its French base.

4.26. In May and early June 1985 the French Mediterranean fleet with some 14 vessels including the 2 aircraft carriers carried out a major cruise in the eastern and central Mediterranean, with port calls in Egypt and Greece, participating on the way in a series of allied and national naval exercises. The French Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean, Vice-Admiral Claude Gagliardi, was quoted at the time as saying of the French fleet: "It is the military tool of an autonomous French policy in the Mediterranean, which was for a long time an American 'lake'. France is trying to catch up in this area vital for it, by demonstrating its military capability in the event of a crisis"¹⁸. At the conclusion of that exercise, one of the aircraft carriers, the Clemenceau, went into refit for 18 months which will include the fitting of Crotale missiles in an anti-missile rôle.

4.27. It is suggested that, in line with the committee's proposals concerning Spain, it would be useful if a French vessel were to be made available in the future for service with the naval on-call force Mediterranean during its periodic activations.

(v) *Italy*

4.28. Italy is the major NATO participant in the Mediterranean area, the whole of its armed forces being based on its own territory bounded only by the Mediterranean and the Alps in the north. In recent years the Italian Parliament has led in a process of opening up discussion of defence policy in Italy to parliamentary and public debate. This led to the publication on 16th November 1984 (in English as well as in Italian) of the Defence White Paper 1985 presented by the Minister of Defence, Mr. Spadolini. Later than most NATO countries, Italy is also in

the process of establishing a central defence secretariat with the Chief of Defence Staff controlling overall defence policy and operations. The traditional three services in Italy had been too autonomous in the past. Mr. Spadolini's introduction to the white paper reflects both of these processes:

"The time is ripe for an exchange of opinions between the civilian and the military society in order to arrive at a common assessment of problems that cannot in any way be considered in an exclusive or separate way or covered by an impenetrable technicism. This is proved by the heated debates which are going on in parliament and all over the country. Italy's defence policy cannot be defined in the abstract but it must be agreed upon by a large majority of the population. Therefore this white paper on defence is at midway in a complex process of analysis and reorganisation started by parliament and based on a constant dialogue...

The choice made by this white paper...consists in a defence structure based on mission needs with interrelations between the armed forces...

The problem is to reach a greater integration of the forces as regards operations, weapons and budget without in any way damaging the historical heritage of experiences and traditions of the individual services...

The administrative, industrial and military structures should be better co-ordinated with a consequent strengthening of the tasks of the Chief of Defence Staff in the military field and of those of the Secretary-General for Defence, and a national armaments director, in the administrative sector."

4.29. The Italian Ministry of Defence is seeking also to modernise the structure of the army by reducing the number of conscripts to provide a more efficient and more professional army and reducing the inefficient administrative burden of the territorial recruiting structure which has not been reorganised since the 19th century.

4.30. The potential military threat to north-eastern Italy from Warsaw Pact forces has been the basis of Italian defence planning for a long time, but in recent years more attention is paid to possible threats to the rest of the territory arising from the inherently unstable conditions in many Mediterranean countries. The white paper refers obliquely to these problems:

"In particular some conceptual and operational certainties that had been a major factor in the functioning of the internatio-

18. Le Monde, 6th May 1985.

nal system (deterrence/parity/superiority) for more than ten years, have been undermined and the proportion and weights of power among regional and subregional areas have changed (Mediterranean/Persian Gulf/Africa). The increased tension between the United States and the Soviet Union and the ever-changing complexity of the southern area have entailed a parallel increase both in the threat, diversified as to forms and instruments, and in the tasks which Italy will have to fulfil for her security...

Any part of national territory can be exposed to air and naval bombings and to attacks (small-scale seaborne and air landings) aimed at either damaging the lines of communication between the northern and southern areas of the peninsula or seizing areas of limited size but - particularly on the islands - of politico-strategical importance. Most of these actions would be characterised by short warning times and would rely on the element of surprise."

4.31: The Italian forces available to meet the threat in the north-east include 20 brigades organised in 3 army corps based in Milan, Bolzano, and Vittorio Veneto. The total tank inventory includes 500 obsolete M-47, 300 M-60 approaching the end of their useful life and 970 Leopard 1 tanks. Support weapons include 6 Lance tactical missile launchers for which the United States retains the nuclear warheads. Air forces assigned to the north-eastern region comprise 4 fighter bomber squadrons, 2 reconnaissance squadrons and 3 squadrons of light fighter bombers. 3 of these squadrons are now beginning to be equipped with the new Tornado aircraft, the remainder with older F-104s and G-91s, but a new fighter is being developed to replace them.

4.32: Air forces available for defence of the southern part of the country, based there in peacetime, amount to a total of 7 squadrons of fighter bombers, interceptors, and light fighter bombers. There are 2 squadrons of Atlantic maritime reconnaissance aircraft.

4.33: The maritime reconnaissance squadrons are operated by the air force, but the defence white paper envisages the creation of a naval air arm. There is a political debate in Italy about equipping the through-deck cruiser, Garibaldi, which entered service in 1985, with vertical take-off aircraft to provide an aircraft carrier of the type in service with the United Kingdom navy. The Garibaldi was designed and built with that possibility in mind. The Italian navy would be responsible for patrolling the central Mediterranean area in the event of overall hostilities co-ordinated by NATO. In addition to the Garibaldi, the Italian fleet comprises the helicop-

ter carrier, Vittorio Veneto, 2 cruisers/helicopter carriers, 4 destroyers, 16 frigates, 8 corvettes and 10 submarines.

(vi) Greece

4.34: In preparing the present report the committee visited Greece in October 1985 where it was briefed by ministers and senior staff in the Ministries for Foreign Affairs and of Defence.

4.35: The Greek defence effort is substantial when compared with the size and wealth of the country. To NATO definition the defence expenditure is 7.1% of the gross domestic product - the highest in NATO; it may be compared with 6.9% for the United States. The total armed forces of 206,000 represent 6.2% of the active population - again the highest for NATO, Turkey coming next at 4.6%. In the early 1970s defence expenditure was only 4.1% of GDP and the armed forces numbered only 160,000. Paradoxically therefore the Greek defence effort today under a parliamentary democracy is significantly higher than during the dictatorship of the colonels.

4.36: What Greece claims to perceive as a threat from Turkey, in particular following Turkish occupation of northern Cyprus in 1974, rather than any recent increase in the threat from Bulgaria or from Warsaw Pact forces in general, lies behind this increased emphasis on defence.

4.37: Greece and Turkey have been members of NATO since 1952. Thereafter two subordinate NATO headquarters were established in Izmir - LANDSOUTHEAST and Sixth Allied Tactical Air Force - which under United States commanders with Greek and Turkish deputies were designed to co-ordinate the land and air battle in the Greek-Turkish area in the event of hostilities. In the period from 1953 to 1974 Greek officers were withdrawn from the Izmir headquarters on a number of occasions; their presence in Izmir could have served as a barometer to the state of Greek-Turkish relations. They departed finally following the events of 1974 when Greece claimed to have withdrawn from the integrated military structure of NATO. In practice, the withdrawal was less than complete - in particular Greek officers continued to serve both in the NATO international military staff in Brussels and in other NATO military headquarters outside Turkey. The Greek forces were nominally returned to the NATO military structure on 20th October 1980 under the "Rogers plan" negotiated largely by the Supreme Allied Commander, which was an agreement in principle, leaving many details to be settled by subsequent negotiations with Turkey and the various NATO authorities. The committee understands that resumed co-operation with NATO is effective in practice only in the case of the Greek navy. Although Greece has sought to "assign"

to NATO more forces than hitherto, in more than one case NATO has not been able to accept because the proposed declaration included forces on Lemnos. Furthermore, the present deployment of the Greek army and air force units is not in accordance with NATO policy. On 8th January 1985 a Greek Government statement was issued according to which:

“ The Foreign Affairs and Defence Council of the cabinet met today with the participation of the leadership of the armed forces and approved the policy of national defence. The basic objective of our national defence policy is the safeguarding of national independence and territorial integrity of the country. ”

The announcement did not name Turkey, but in December 1984 the Greek Government had stated that its new defence policy would be the basis for deploying Greek armed forces towards Turkey rather than Bulgaria¹⁹. In January 1986, the Greek Deputy Defence Minister was reported as saying that Greece was to deploy a new defence system along its borders, in particular in the Aegean area, involving 600,000 men, as a “ purely preventive ” measure. The move was said to be supported by the opposition New Democracy Party²⁰.

4.38. The Greek forces, if fully co-operating with the co-ordinated NATO plans, would make an important contribution to defence in the southern region, but as in the case of Portugal and Turkey, the financial resources of the country alone do not permit sufficient modernisation of equipment. The 1,600 tanks in service include 320 obsolete M-47 and 380 elderly M-48, together with 106 more modern Leopard; support weapons include 8 Honest John tactical missile launchers for which the United States retains the nuclear warheads. The air force is equipped with F-104 and A-7 fighter bombers as well as F-4 and F-5A interceptors. Greece has announced its intention of acquiring F-16s and Mirage 2000s. Modernisation of Greek forces is supported through defence aid from the United States and Germany.

4.39. The total Greek forces assigned to NATO amount to 13 divisions (including 1 armoured division, 1 mechanised division as well as 5 armoured brigades and 2 mechanised brigades) with 1,050 tanks, 27 warships (the total fleet includes 10 submarines, 14 destroyers, 7 frigates, 16 fast-attack craft, and an amphibious force of 13 landing ships and a number of landing craft) and 310 combat aircraft.

4.40. The problems of Greek-Turkish relations and United States assistance are discussed below.

(vii) *Turkey*

4.41. The committee visited Turkey in October 1985 for the first time since 1981 – a time when parliamentary government had been suspended. Mr. Turgut Ozal took office as Prime Minister in December 1983 following elections the previous month in which his Motherland Party had won a clear majority over the Nationalist Democracy Party which had been favoured by the military authorities. Only parties approved by the military authorities were allowed to contest the elections; 243 former deputies had been banned from political activity for 10 years. Martial law was ended in Ankara and 6 other provinces in July 1985. At present martial law remains in force in 5 provinces along the eastern frontier.

4.42. Mr. Ozal's government has pursued an active policy to strengthen its links with European countries and European institutions. Mr. Halefoglu, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, has recently referred to Turkey's “ contractual right ” under the terms of the 1963 agreement on associate membership of the European Community, to “ apply for full membership in due time ”.

4.43. With a defence expenditure of 4.4% of the GDP, Turkey's is among the highest defence efforts in NATO, comparing favourably with the larger WEU countries; with 4.6% of the active population in the armed forces, Turkey is second only to Greece among the NATO countries. In a country where illiteracy is still 30%, affecting twice as many women as men, the 20 months' compulsory military service has an important educational as well as a defence function in Turkey. Great importance is attached to training; there is a deliberate policy of posting troops for service to areas of the country away from their home province.

4.44. While emphasising first and foremost its ties with NATO and the Western European institutions including the Council of Europe and the European Communities with a view to eventual full membership of the latter, Turkey maintains neighbourly relations with the Soviet Union and the Balkan countries, and would seek to improve economic relations with them – some electricity in the frontier regions is already supplied by the Soviet Union and Bulgaria. Relations with Bulgaria are however strained at the present time because of the repression of the Turkish minority in that country. Amnesty International reported in the week of 31st March that 100 ethnic Turks had been killed in clashes with the Bulgarian police during the 1985 campaign to oblige the minority to change their names to Bulgarian ones, stop the use of Turkish, and close the mosques. Turkey seeks the support of its allies as well as Islamic countries and the Soviet Union to stop Bulgarian atrocities. Turkey sees itself enjoying a special relationship with Islamic

19. International Herald Tribune, 9th January 1985.

20. Atlantic News, 8th January 1986.

countries, especially the Arab countries. Nevertheless, a Turkish view of security has to take account not only of the obvious Warsaw Pact threat in Thrace and eastern Turkey, but of the level of armaments, largely supplied by the Soviet Union, of neighbours in the south-east.

4.45. Iran and Iraq, neighbours of Turkey but not Mediterranean countries, at war with each other since September 1980, present a problem to Turkey which seeks normal relations with both and co-operation in dealing with the Kurdish minority in the frontier area of all three countries. From the military equipment standpoint they are rather different. Iran, with regular forces of 305,000, has relied on its young revolutionary guards, reportedly 250,000, to supplement its 250,000 army in its offensive against Iraq. It has received limited supplies of modern equipment from the Soviet Union since the fall of the Shah in early 1979. It is reputed to have 1,000 tanks of which only 150 are relatively modern Soviet T-62 and T-72, 300 obsolescent T-54, and 500 British and American Chieftain and M-60 left from the Shah's régime. The air force now of dubious quality and training under the Khomeini régime is reported to have possibly 80 serviceable American aircraft F-4s and F-14s; it has not been re-equipped by the Soviet Union.

4.46. Iraq on the other hand has an army of 475,000 in 20 divisions equipped with some 2,900 tanks which also include some modern T-62 and T-72 and a sizable air force equipped with modern Soviet aircraft such as the Tu-22, MiG-23 and Su-20.

4.47. Syria has 9 divisions with much more modern armour including 1,300 T-62 and 1,100 T-72 tanks. Its air force with 9 attack squadrons again has much modern equipment including 40 Su-20 and 50 MiG-23. Much of this equipment of Turkey's immediate neighbours appears superior to the bulk of that in service in the Turkish armed forces. Turkey is simultaneously in the uncomfortable position of sharing common frontiers with the two present belligerents, Iran and Iraq.

4.48. The Turkish army of 540,000 men is organised in 12 infantry divisions, 1 armoured division and 2 mechanised divisions with a further 6 armoured, 4 mechanised, and 10 infantry brigades plus a parachute brigade and a commando brigade. The bulk of the 2,900 tanks are still the obsolescent M-48, but 200 more modern M-48A and 77 Leopard I have recently been acquired. Support weapons include 18 Honest John tactical nuclear missile launchers for which the United States holds nuclear warheads.

4.49. The Turkish land forces are organised first in 3 field armies. The Turkish first army with headquarters in Istanbul is responsible for the

area of the Turkish Straits where NATO briefings in the past concerning the overall area of Greek and Turkish Thrace have suggested that manpower is about evenly balanced at some 350,000 men on each side, but with a 2 to 1 adverse ratio for NATO in tanks. The Turkish third army with headquarters at Erzincan has 8 divisions responsible for the defence of the eastern frontier with the Soviet Union where NATO briefings have suggested a 2 to 1 adverse ratio in manpower with about 152,500 men on the Turkish side, and an adverse ratio of up to 7 to 1 in tanks of which Turkey deploys some 900 in a region that is not particularly favourable for armour. Turkish second army with headquarters in Malatya has 4 divisions responsible for the southern border with Syria and Iraq and is, according to Turkish estimates, not capable of coping with the threat in this particular area.

4.50. A fourth army, the Aegean army, in south-western Turkey with its headquarters in Izmir is described by Turkey as comprising training units. It has been described by Greek authorities as a threat to Greece; they have claimed that it contains 140,000 men. No other authorities have supported that claim. Independent observers in Turkey believe that there might be some 50,000 men, largely in training units, in the Aegean army.

4.51. Since the 1974 landings, Turkey has maintained troops in Cyprus which at present amount to 17,000 men organised in 2 infantry divisions with 150 M-47 and M-48 tanks.

4.52. The Turkish navy makes an important contribution to NATO both in the Black Sea and in the eastern Mediterranean. Its 130 ships comprise 15 destroyers, 2 escorts and 16 submarines as well as a number of fast patrol craft, but as in the case of much other Turkish equipment, many are obsolescent.

4.53. The Turkish air force of 19 fighter squadrons and 4 transport squadrons with 8 Nike Hercules air defence squadrons is organised into the 1st and 2nd tactical air forces with headquarters at Eskisehir and Diyarbakir, responsible for the defence of north-western and eastern Turkey respectively. The fighter squadrons are equipped with F-5s, F-100s and F-4s. 7 of the squadrons have been equipped with F-104Gs supplied as part of German and some Netherlands assistance.

4.54. The chronic problem facing the Turkish armed forces is always one of modernising their equipment which lags one generation behind that of most other NATO countries, and is now inferior even to some modern equipment in the Bulgarian army. United States and German defence aid is promised to Turkey to assist in modernisation.

(viii) Greek-Turkish relations

4.55. Since the events of 1974 the committee has reported on six occasions on the state of Greek-Turkish relations which continue to affect adversely collective defence arrangements in the area. It is not the purpose of the present report concerned with European security to examine these in any detail, far less to suggest a solution. The salient features are merely recalled for the record.

4.56. Apart from Cyprus, described separately below, Greek-Turkish differences concern to some extent ethnic minorities in each country, but for the most part the problem of the Aegean Sea where history has bequeathed to the two countries an extremely complex situation. Following the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne and the 1947 peace treaty with Italy, virtually all islands in the sea, with the exception of 2 at the entrance to the Dardanelles and a few minor islands within 3 nautical miles of the Turkish coast, are Greek territory and inhabited largely by a Greek population. Several are within 5 nautical miles or less of the Turkish coast.

4.57. With the 6 nautical mile territorial sea at present claimed by both countries about 40% of the Aegean remains high seas, with a few high seas passages between islands providing uninterrupted high seas passage in and out of the Aegean, used also, of course, by all shipping between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. Normal shipping lanes pass nevertheless through the Greek territorial sea in many places. With a general trend in the world towards a maximum territorial sea of 12 nautical miles, enshrined in the United Nations 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, Turkey has found it necessary to assert on many occasions that it could not accept such an extension of the territorial sea by Greece which would leave no high seas passages between the Greek islands, and reduce the high seas area within the Aegean to less than 20%. Greece has not claimed a 12 nautical mile territorial sea; on occasion it appears to have reserved the right to do so however. An extension of Greek territorial waters to 12 nautical miles would also leave the Soviet Union cut off from free passage into the Mediterranean which adds an East-West dimension to the problem.

4.58. The problem of the high seas is reflected in the airspace. In the 1950s, ICAO drew the boundary between the Athens and Ankara flight information regions (FIRs) largely along the median line between the Greek islands and the Turkish coast, leaving the Aegean entirely within the Athens FIR. Until 1964 the NATO air operations boundary between Greek and Turkish air forces was more nearly a median line down the centre of the Aegean Sea. The NATO air command boundary was moved by consensus in 1964 to coincide with the FIR line. In 1974 the

Aegean became closed to civilian air traffic with the issue of conflicting NOTAMS by Turkey and Greece concerning the reporting of aircraft locations to Turkish and Greek air traffic control; they were withdrawn only in 1980 to permit limited civil and military air traffic across the Aegean. Until 1981 Greece however had maintained an air corridor W14 between northern Greece and the Dodecanese which Turkey claimed obstructed Turkish access to international Aegean airspace.

4.59. Economic rights to the seabed of the Aegean remain one of the most difficult problems. Turkey has claimed an equitable share on the basis of the extension of the continental shelf of the Turkish land mass under the Aegean; Greece has claimed a division based in principle on a median line between the Greek islands and the Turkish mainland. In a resolution of 25th August 1976 the United Nations Security Council called on the two countries to negotiate a settlement. Negotiations between the two countries were duly held until the Greek elections in October 1981, but have not been resumed since Mr. Papandreu came to power in Greece. The Greek position has been to prefer to refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice, although the court in 1976 recognised the existence of a dispute over the area and does not appear to have accepted jurisdiction.

4.60. The direct and indirect consequences of these differences for collective NATO arrangements in the area are considerable. After the partial withdrawal of Greek forces from the integrated military structure of NATO in 1974, the NATO military authorities had to negotiate new arrangements culminating in the Rogers plan accepted by the NATO Defence Planning Committee on 20th October 1980. This provided for the return of Greek forces to the integrated military structure of NATO but left details to be settled by subsequent negotiations. Before 1974 the integrated NATO military headquarters at Izmir in Turkey contained the headquarters of Sixth ATAF and of land forces south-eastern Europe which, in the event of hostilities, would have controlled operations by Greek and Turkish forces and by external reinforcements, in particular United States air forces, that might be operating in the area. Under the Rogers plan Izmir became a purely Turkish-NATO headquarters from 1st July 1978 on the understanding that a separate Greek-NATO headquarters would be established at Larissa in Greece. The Larissa headquarters has not however been established because Greece and Turkey have not solved the problem of the control of military aircraft operating in the Aegean. Turkey reserves the right for its military aircraft to operate in international airspace over the Aegean without reporting to Greek air control. Greece demands that all aircraft operating within the Athens FIR report to Greek air control.

4.61. A further problem arises over the militarisation of certain Greek islands, in particular Lemnos. Under the Treaty of Lausanne, Lemnos was to be demilitarised, as were the Dodecanese under the Italian peace treaty. For some years Greece has stationed troops on Lemnos, claiming in part that there is a military threat from the Turkish mainland, and in part that the demilitarisation of the Lausanne Treaty was superseded by the Montreux Convention of 1936. Because of the disputed nature of Lemnos it has never been included in joint exercises arranged by NATO but in recent years Greece has attempted to declare its troops on Lemnos to NATO as part of its contributed forces and has refused to participate in exercises that do not include the island.

4.62. As a consequence of these disagreements, the committee understands that reintegration of Greek forces can be said to be effective to some extent only in the case of the Greek navy, which participates in some NATO exercises. The full co-operation of Greek air and land forces in NATO defence plans, and the establishment of a new NATO headquarters in Larissa remain essential.

(ix) United States

4.63. As the only non-riparian NATO country with a major military presence in the Mediterranean today, the United States makes an important contribution to NATO defence in the area not only by the size of its forces – important though they are – but as a link between the local NATO countries in the area which are largely separated by sea as well as by history. As well as participating in the NATO collective defence arrangements to which all the local NATO countries subscribe, the United States has bilateral mutual defence agreements with all the Mediterranean NATO countries (except France) whereby the United States enjoys the use of various military base and other facilities, while it provides military assistance to Portugal, Spain, Greece and Turkey. In addition, United States officers in senior positions of command – in particular Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH) himself – have been better placed to generate co-operation between the military forces of the different NATO countries in the area than might officers from those countries because of certain historical rivalries.

4.64. At the same time, certain operations conducted by United States forces in the Mediterranean, which like forces of all NATO countries operate under national command in peacetime, have been the subject of some criticism by European NATO countries from time to time. Increasingly the host countries have insisted that the military installations they make available to United States forces shall be used for

NATO purposes only – or for purposes approved by the host country. Periodical renewal of the bilateral agreements is the subject of negotiations, sometimes lengthy negotiations.

4.65. The United States sixth fleet in the Mediterranean will normally comprise up to 6 nuclear-propelled attack submarines, 1 or 2 (rarely 3) aircraft carriers, 12 other major surface combatants, 11 support ships and a marine unit of battalion size or larger embarked on 3 amphibious landing ships. Normally based in the area of Naples and Catania in Sicily, the sixth fleet also uses the important large anchorage at Suda Bay in Crete. The United States air force in the Mediterranean area is largely based in Spain where there are 3 squadrons with 72 F-16 which rotate to United States air bases further east in the Mediterranean in Italy, Greece and Turkey. The United States naval aviation operates P-3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft chiefly out of Sigonella in Sicily.

4.66. United States army units in the Mediterranean theatre are smaller but there are some 4,000 army personnel in Italy mostly comprising the Southern European Task Force responsible for providing logistical and nuclear fire support to Italian forces.

4.67. The United States basing agreement with Portugal originated in a bilateral executive agreement of September 1931, modified, extended and amplified in various formal and informal arrangements since then. The agreement provides for the use of 3 airfields and 3 naval facilities in the Azores as well as communication facilities, radio relays and navigational aids. Submarine surveillance facilities in the Azores are capable of tracking Soviet submarines as far away as the Straits of Gibraltar. In April 1975 the then Portuguese Government declared that the Azores air base could not be used by the United States for supplying Israel in the course of any new war in the Middle East.

4.68. As in the case of Portugal, United States defence agreements with Spain were first concluded with a dictatorship and extended on a five-yearly basis. Under a 1976 treaty which replaced earlier agreements, most tanker aircraft (used for refuelling transport aircraft en route to Israel) were withdrawn from Spain, and strategic submarines were removed from Rota from 1979. A new agreement was signed in July 1982, a month after Spain's accession to the North Atlantic Treaty. For the first time this agreement provided that the overflight and use of Spanish airspace was subject to Spanish control; it maintained Spanish policy, since the accident in the 1960s which caused radioactive contamination, of excluding nuclear weapons from Spanish territory. The major bases available to the United States are the naval base at Rota near Cadiz and air bases at Torrejon near

Madrid, Saragossa north-east of Madrid and Moron near Seville in the south. There is also a naval air base at Rota used chiefly for maritime surveillance. A United States petroleum pipeline stretches nearly 800 km from Cadiz to Saragossa providing aviation and other fuel to the United States air bases. There are 6 major communications centres at various points in Spain and on the Balearic islands and 2 LORAN stations. The government of Mr. Gonzalez took office on 1st December 1982, not long after the conclusion of the July agreement with the United States which the socialist party in opposition had criticised. The agreement was ratified in April 1983 with an additional protocol providing that Spain's membership of NATO did not imply participation in the integrated military structure. As already pointed out, one of the conditions put to the Spanish population in the referendum on membership of NATO held on 12th March 1986 was that "gradual steps will be taken towards the progressive reduction of United States military presence in Spain". The United States agreed in December 1985 to negotiate reductions in its forces when renewal of the 1982 agreement was discussed. At the time of the referendum there were press reports that the United States forces in Spain had been quietly reduced from 12,600 to 9,500, partly by replacement of United States by Spanish personnel. It was suggested that the lower figure would become the official ceiling when negotiations were completed.

4.69. The United States military presence in Italy dates in practice from World War II but was first formalised by an exchange of notes in January 1952 followed by an agreement signed in October 1954 with subsequent additions. The Italian Defence White Paper 1985 makes virtually no reference to the presence or rôle of United States forces in Italy. There is a total of some 58 various installations and bases available to the United States in Italy, some quite small such as radio relay stations, and some larger bases. The United States army presence of 4,000 men in Italy is the largest in any of the Mediterranean countries, most of it concentrated in the Southern European Task Force with headquarters in Vicenza, with a logistic base in the port of Livorno which both provides logistical support as well as nuclear fire support for the Italian army. The United States air force has 5,800 men in Italy; the main base is at Aviano in north-eastern Italy from which tactical squadrons operate on rotation from the main bases in Spain. Naples airfield is also available to the United States air force and United States naval aviation operates maritime surveillance aircraft out of Sigonella airfield near the port of Catania in Sicily. The United States sixth fleet is based in part in Naples, with its headquarters-ship anchored off Gaeta to the north, and also uses the port of Catania in Sicily. The nuclear-

propelled attack submarines in the Mediterranean are serviced at La Maddalena, an island off the north of Sardinia. There are 5,250 United States naval personnel in Italy. The United States operates some 15 radio communications stations located in various parts of Italy as well as the important intelligence-gathering centre at San Vito in the south-east near Brindisi.

4.70. Agreements on United States military facilities in Greece date from a first bilateral agreement of October 1953 authorising the construction of military and supporting facilities in Greece such as the two governments should agree to be necessary "for the implementation of, or in furtherance of, approved NATO plans". Following the events of 1974 there were long-drawn-out negotiations over a new agreement in which Greece sought guarantees that military assistance to Greece and Turkey would henceforth be in the ratio of 7 to 10 respectively, and in which Greece sought assurances concerning a military balance in the Aegean, and the use to which United States bases would be put. After Mr. Papandreou's government came to power in 1981, a new five-year base agreement was signed in 1983, providing specifically that the facilities provided could not be used against countries friendly to Greece, including Libya. Despite PASOK pre-election rhetoric calling for the removal of United States bases and nuclear weapons from Greek territory, the bases were reprieved. The most important from the United States point of view is probably the naval base in Suda Bay, Crete, an enclosed deepwater natural anchorage large enough to take the whole of the sixth fleet. The Suda Bay complex includes ammunitions storage sites and an airfield used by the United States air force for staging reconnaissance missions. There is a second air base at Hellenikon near Athens. There are in addition some eight major military communications facilities in various parts of Greece and a major intelligence-gathering centre at Iraklion in Crete. The present bilateral base agreement expires in December 1988 and the United States has been anxious to secure assurances that it will be extended beyond that date. Apparently during Mr. Shultz's visit to Athens at the end of March the subject was not officially raised, but the Prime Minister, Mr. Papandreou, was reported as saying that Greece was satisfied with the agreement. The base agreement has always been closely linked to United States defence aid which in fiscal year 1986 is reported to be some \$500 million in the form of credits - the breakdown of United States defence aid to 52 countries worldwide, including 10 in the Mediterranean area, is shown at Appendix III. United States forces in Greece number 3,500, mostly air force.

4.71. United States basing arrangements in Turkey were first formalised in a number of secret

agreements after Turkey's accession to the North Atlantic Treaty in 1952, the most important being the military facilities agreement of June 1954. A defence co-operation agreement was signed in 1969 which apparently codified numerous earlier agreements. Although classified, apparently for political reasons at Turkey's request, the contents were publicised by Mr. Demirel, then Prime Minister, in February 1970 who pointed out that activities under joint defence co-operation were based on Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty and would never exceed the limits of NATO commitments. In July 1975, when the United States Congress suspended military assistance sales to Turkey, Turkey assumed full control of United States installations, leading inter alia to the suspension of intelligence-gathering activities at 4 sites. A new four-year agreement was signed in March 1976 which provided more specifically than the previous agreements that "the installations shall not be used for, nor shall the activities serve, purposes other than those authorised by the Government of the Republic of Turkey". Under the agreement the Turkish Government has the right to appoint 50% of the personnel engaged in technical operations and related maintenance services and activities in the authorised installations which "shall be carried out jointly". Difficulties with Congress prevented the arms embargo being lifted before 1978 and prevented the new agreement entering into force. A similar agreement was concluded in March 1980 which expired in December 1985, remaining tacitly in force while the Turkish Government of Mr. Ozal has notified the United States that it wishes to renegotiate its terms. The most important United States military facilities in Turkey are the strategic airfield at Incirlik in south-central Turkey from which United States squadrons can operate on rotation from Spain and Italy, and 4 important intelligence-gathering facilities located in eastern Turkey, 2 on the Black Sea coast and 1 in the Sea of Marmara. In addition, there are naval facilities at Kargaburun in the Sea of Marmara and at Izmir, further airfields at Izmir and Ankara and some 16 major communications facilities in various parts of Turkey. During his visit to Turkey at the end of March the United States Secretary of State failed to renegotiate the base agreement, which is closely linked to the question of military assistance and, apparently, an attempt by Turkey to link agreement with its textile exports to the United States. General Rogers, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, is reported as estimating that \$1.4 billion a year is needed to upgrade Turkish military equipment²¹. Turkey is reported to have requested military assistance from the United States of \$1.2 billion a year whereas United States proposals for fiscal year

1986 amounted to \$714 million military assistance only - respecting the 7 to 10 ratio with Greece. As shown at Appendix III, assistance to Turkey would be about half in cheap loans and one-quarter in grants. United States forces in Turkey number 5,000 of which 3,800 are air force.

4.72. Operations by United States forces in the Mediterranean serve both national and NATO purposes. The maritime surveillance operation conducted largely by aircraft but also by reports from surface ships is a continuous activity throughout the year. Information on the locations and movements of Soviet naval vessels is in part a co-ordinated NATO activity run by Commander Maritime Air Forces, a United States admiral based in Naples. The United States sixth fleet conducts NATO exercises in co-ordination with vessels of other NATO navies from time to time. The very large electronic intelligence-gathering operation operated by the United States in the Mediterranean area, particularly in Turkey, is essentially a national defence function the fruits of which are certainly not circulated on a NATO-wide basis, although one or two allies have access to selected United States intelligence data through bilateral agreements. Nevertheless, the general picture of Soviet military capability and activities which is built up from many different sources of raw intelligence data is undoubtedly of value to the alliance as a whole.

4.73. However, certain military activities conducted by the United States in the Mediterranean area, which have not in any way been co-ordinated with NATO, have been the cause of concern to NATO allies. Two recent events are analysed separately here, because they raise different issues.

United States warships in the Black Sea

4.74. In the week of 10th March 2 United States warships cruising in the Black Sea sailed to within 6 miles of the Soviet coast in the Crimean peninsula. The Soviet Union claims a 12 mile territorial sea and lodged an official protest with the United States over the incident. The United States claims that it was merely exercising the right of "innocent passage". Under the 1936 Treaty of Montreux, naval vessels of non-Black Sea powers are entitled to pass through the Turkish Straits and to cruise in the Black Sea under certain restrictions. Eight days' notice, preferably 15, of passage through the straits must be given to Turkey, there must not be more than an aggregate total of 45,000 tonnes of non-Black Sea power naval ships in the Black Sea at any one time, and not more than 30,000 tonnes belonging to any one non-Black Sea power. In practice, the United States navy exercises this right of non-Black Sea powers more than any other. An

21. Time, 7th April 1986.

Warships of non-Black Sea powers visiting the Black Sea

Country	1983			1984		
	Type of warship	No. of days in Black Sea	Total No. of ship-days 1983	Type of warship	No. of days in Black Sea	Total No. of ship-days 1984
United States	Destroyer Frigate Destroyer Frigate Destroyer Frigate Auxiliary	3 3 3 3 3 3 3	46	Cruiser Frigate Destroyer Destroyer	1 3 3 3	40
Netherlands	Destroyer Frigate	6 6	12	=	=	=
Greece	Training ship	13	13	Frigate	7	7
Italy	=	=	=	Training ship	8	8
Brazil	Training ship	6	6	=	=	=
Egypt	=	=	=	Destroyer	5	5
German DR	=	=	=	Training ship Auxiliary	9 9	18
Libya	=	=	=	Landing ship Landing ship Landing ship	6 6 6	18
Poland	=	=	=	Training ship	10	10

Source : Rapport annuel sur le mouvement des navires à travers les détroits turcs, drawn up each year by the Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs in accordance with the 1938 Montreux Convention.

analysis of all passages by naval vessels through the Turkish Straits is given in the table above. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of December 1982, now signed by 159 nations including all NATO countries except Germany, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States, provides for the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea "so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal state". Article 19 specifically precludes "any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defence or security of the coastal state". (The convention requires 60 ratifications to enter into force; so far only 25 mainly third world countries have ratified; the United States is seeking amendments chiefly to the economic provisions of the convention. So entry into force is not an immediate prospect.) The United Nations convention has largely codified previous usage in the matter of innocent passage. The spokesman for the Soviet Foreign Ministry, Mr. Lomeiko, on 20th March asserted that: "what was involved here was not innocent passage, but a clearly provocative passage in clear violation of the state border of the Soviet Union and including an attempt to conduct espionage...". It had taken place "in the vicinity of the Soviet coast, where there are

no traditional seaways"²². Press enquiries of the Department of Defence in Washington apparently elicited the information that the Soviet Union had exercised a similar right to sail warships near to American overseas territories, but not to the coast of the mainland²³.

United States warships in the Gulf of Sirte

4.75. The United States navy had exercised its right to sail in the Gulf of Sirte off the Libyan coast on 7 occasions since 1981²⁴. This is a different issue which does not involve the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea. Libya claims a territorial sea of 12 miles but in 1973 declared a base line across the Gulf of Sirte at 32°30' north latitude, claiming the waters to the landward as "internal waters". The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea permits such base lines to be drawn across bays only if the length of the straight line needed to enclose

22. The Guardian, 21st March 1986.

23. Dangerous games at sea, International Herald Tribune, 25th March 1986.

24. Statement by the United States Secretary of Defence, Mr. Weinberger. Television interview on 23rd March 1986 quoted in Guardian, 24th March 1986.

the bay does not exceed 24 nautical miles. The length of the Libyan base line across the Gulf of Sirte is some 270 nautical miles long, in parts more than 100 nautical miles distant from the coast. The Libyan claim has not been recognised by any country except Burkina. In December 1985 Colonel Kadhafi began referring to the Libyan base line as "the line of death".

4.76. In March 1986, with a third aircraft carrier being brought into the Mediterranean for the purpose and early-warning Hawkeye aircraft both from the carriers and apparently from bases in Egypt providing radar cover, the United States task force of 30 ships began to fly a number of aircraft sorties over the disputed area of the gulf, correctly informing Libyan air traffic control on 19th March that carrier flight operations were being carried out within its area of air control. Other press reports say that the Soviet Union was warned of United States intentions; Soviet technicians were said to have been withdrawn from Libyan missile sites at the time, and a Soviet intelligence-gathering ship within the Gulf of Sirte took care to identify itself by keeping all its lights on. The United States claimed that on 24th March Libya fired 6 surface-to-air SAM-5 missiles from a base near to the town of Sirte, all of which missed their targets. In retaliation, United States aircraft destroyed the missile radars with two Harm missiles designed to home in on hostile radar emission. In the course of 24th and 25th March, United States aircraft launched a further attack on the missile site, sank 3 Libyan patrol boats, and left a fourth damaged. The United States had issued a warning that any Libyan forces more than 12 miles from the Libyan coast in the Gulf of Sirte would be considered hostile targets. The United States force then withdrew to Sicily.

4.77. Later press reports from Washington²⁵ said that planning for the operation began shortly after the terrorist attacks at Rome and Vienna airports on 27th December 1985, and was designed in part to offer opportunity for reprisal against Libya which the United States blamed for the airport attacks. The SAM-5 missile targets in Libya were ideal from the United States point of view as the installation of those Soviet missiles in late 1985 had been denounced by United States spokesmen as exceeding any legitimate security requirement of Libya.

4.78. All NATO countries have of course joined in affirming the right of all countries to enjoy the freedom of the high seas, including the waters of the Gulf of Sirte, but the reactions of the Mediterranean NATO countries to the United States operations were reserved or critical. Typical was the comment by Mr. Craxi, the Italian Prime Minister, on 25th March, after an emergency cabinet meeting:

25. International Herald Tribune, 26th March 1986.

"We do not want a war on our doorstep... war games in an area of such high tension do not appear to be the most appropriate to resolve a question of principle and of international law."²⁶

Italy told the United States that it hoped operations would not be conducted from bases in Italy:

4.79. General Secretary Gorbachev in a speech on 26th March, distributed by Tass, predictably condemned United States actions against Libya, but added:

"If the United States, which is situated thousands of miles from the Mediterranean, pulled its fleet out of there, the Soviet Union would simultaneously do the same."

4.80. Article 6²⁷ of the North Atlantic Treaty provides that:

"For the purpose of Article 5 an armed attack on one or more of the parties is deemed to include an armed attack...on the forces, vessels or aircraft of any of these parties when in or over...the Mediterranean Sea..."

It was therefore open to the United States when its aircraft were attacked by Libya on 24th March to invoke Article 5 and call on all other NATO countries to assist by taking action "including the use of armed force"²⁸.

United States attack on targets in Libya

4.81. The United States attack on targets in Libya on 13th April and subsequent events are not dealt with in the present report. The committee intends to refer to them in a report expressing its opinion on the report of the General Affairs Committee on security and terrorism – the implications for Europe of crises in other parts of the world.

(b) Collective defence arrangements under NATO

4.82. Collective defence arrangements under NATO in the Mediterranean can be described under three main headings: command structure; joint forces; infrastructure.

(i) NATO command structure

4.83. In peacetime forces which are assigned to NATO or earmarked for assignment in the event

26. Daily Telegraph, 26th March 1986.

27. As modified on the accession of Greece and Turkey in 1952.

28. Text of Articles 5 and 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty at Appendix I.

of hostilities remain under purely national command except for certain air defence forces kept on permanent alert. NATO maintains a number of jointly staffed military headquarters which in peacetime have a planning function, including the right to inspect the readiness of forces assigned to NATO, and practise the control of forces during periodical NATO exercises.

4.84. The NATO Commander-in-Chief for the whole of the Mediterranean area, immediately subordinate to SACEUR, is Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe, a United States admiral with headquarters in Naples where a number of immediately subordinate headquarters are also housed. Details of the chain of command and subordinate NATO headquarters are shown at Appendix IV. Reference has been made to the COMGIBMED headquarters in paragraph 4.16, and the problems of the Izmir headquarters and the planned headquarters at Larissa in Greece have been referred to in paragraph 4.60 above.

4.85. Of particular importance in peacetime are the air defence headquarters which are permanently manned and which receive information from the NADGE (NATO air defence ground environment) radar chain which, in the Mediterranean area, comprises 9 radar stations in Italy, 4 in Greece and 14 in Turkey. NATO airborne early warning aircraft are now operational in the Mediterranean, operating already out of northern Italy and Turkey, and are scheduled to be operational out of airfields in Greece by 1987. This considerably improves early warning in the area, especially for low-flying aircraft.

4.86. Surveillance by maritime reconnaissance aircraft from all the NATO countries in the area, with good French co-operation, is co-ordinated by Commander Maritime Air Forces Mediterranean also located in Naples.

(ii) Joint forces

4.87. While NATO forces remain under national command in peacetime, two joint international forces are activated periodically in the Mediterranean area which serve a politically valuable purpose in demonstrating the practical workings of NATO. The naval on-call force Mediterranean (NAVOCFORMED) is normally assembled for a month twice a year for training when it makes a point of making port calls in various Mediterranean NATO countries. It is composed of one vessel contributed by each of Italy, Greece, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States; Spain has been invited to contribute a vessel. When in being the force is controlled by Commander Naval Forces Southern Europe from Naples. As with so many NATO arrangements in the Mediterranean the Greek-Turkey dispute has partly affected the operation of NAVOCFORMED.

4.88. ACE mobile force, comprising both a land and an air element, is a multinational force of brigade group size supported by 3 or 4 squadrons of aircraft which can deploy on demand to the NATO flanks. In the Mediterranean area it is regularly exercised in northern Italy, in Thrace, and in eastern Turkey. In any period of tension on one of the NATO flanks, ACE mobile force, once the governmental decisions are taken, can be rapidly moved to the area concerned providing not only small but militarily useful reinforcements but, politically more important, a demonstration of the solidarity of the alliance, demonstrating that any use of force by the Warsaw Pact would involve not only the flank country immediately threatened, but all other countries represented in the mobile force.

(iii) Infrastructure

4.89. NATO commonly-financed infrastructure has made an important contribution in improving the defence capabilities of the countries of the Mediterranean area. In the last 35 years it has funded the construction of airfields, now with hardened aircraft shelters, radar stations, fuel storage and communications systems. In the past priority has been given to the central region; the southern region lags badly behind as far as communications are concerned and the provision of aircraft shelters. NATO's latest six-year infrastructure programme was finally agreed by the Defence Planning Committee on 5th December 1984 after nearly a year of difficult negotiations. It provides a total of 3 billion international accounting units (\$7.85 billion) for the period 1985 to 1991 which will provide in particular for much of the outstanding facilities, including hardened aircraft shelters, necessary to receive United States air force reinforcements in Europe. As the United States provides 27% of infrastructure funds and the Federal Republic of Germany 26%, those two countries were primarily concerned in the negotiations, but the United States exerted considerable pressure in an attempt to secure a higher expenditure ceiling. The programme will provide several hundred hardened aircraft shelters, improved communications and improvements to existing oil depots and pipelines. For the first time the southern region has been allocated more than 33% of expenditure, but existing deficiencies will not be remedied until towards the end of the programme in the early 1990s.

V. The non-aligned countries of the Mediterranean

(a) Yugoslavia

5.1. The pessimistic scenario occasionally put forward before the death of President Tito in 1980, according to which the Soviet Union might

on such an occasion attempt to assert the Brezhnev doctrine of the "socialist commonwealth" elaborated at the time of the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, was not borne out. As the committee noted in its previous report there was an orderly transfer of power on President Tito's death to the rotating collective leadership representative of the 6 republics and 2 autonomous regions provided for in the 1974 constitution that had been specially drawn up to prepare the way for the post-Tito period. There has been no evidence of external pressure from the Soviet Union to attempt to impose any particular new leadership or to establish closer relations. At the same time, the very provisions of the 1974 constitution, designed to prevent domination of national politics by any one of the constituent parts of the country, have not made for strong central government. The present Prime Minister, Mr. Branko Mikulic, on taking office in January 1986, complained that the most able leaders were not being put forward by the provinces to serve in the Federal Government. Much real power remains in the hands of the separate republics.

5.2. Yugoslavia has severe economic problems at the present time, made worse by the great disparities in standards of living between the different constituent republics. There are severe public order problems in the province of Kosovo bordering Albania, where the majority Albanian-speaking muslim population is slowly succeeding in expelling the minority Serbian population from the province. It is claimed that most of the 2,000 political prisoners held in Yugoslavia are held in connection with disturbances in Kosovo.

5.3. President Tito broke away from Stalinist Russia as long ago as 1948 since when Yugoslavia has pursued an independent foreign policy, having played in the past an important rôle in the world non-aligned movement. Nevertheless, the country maintains correct relations with the Soviet Union and Soviet military aircraft on reconnaissance missions are able to overfly the country – the only access route to the Mediterranean that is normally open to Soviet military aircraft – and the provision of submarine repair facilities at Tivat has been noted above.

5.4. Italy maintains good relations with Yugoslavia. From the standpoint of European security it is certain that the neutral and non-aligned status of the country would provide very substantial warning time to NATO of any movement by Warsaw Pact forces towards north-eastern Italy. Italy believes that the European Community should play a leading rôle in helping Yugoslavia with its economic problems.

5.5. Yugoslavia is regarded as having effective armed forces of 241,000 with nearly 1,000 tanks, mostly T-54/55, but including 100 T-74, and

over 400 combat aircraft which include MiG-21 and the Yugoslav ORAO produced jointly with Romania using British engines. Yugoslavia exported \$2 billion of armaments in 1985. Following a visit to Yugoslavia by a Rapporteur in 1978, the committee reported²⁹ on Yugoslav plans for "all-people's defence" which would involve most of the population in resistance if the country were invaded by any country.

(b) *Albania*

5.6. For decades a completely self-isolated country since its break with the Soviet Union in the 1950s Albania had received some economic and military assistance from China until the end of the Mao régime and had acted as an occasional spokesman for that country before it was admitted to the United Nations. After the admission of China, the isolation of Albania became complete.

5.7. With the death of Enver Hoxha in April 1985 there has naturally been speculation as to whether his successor, Mr. Ramiz Alia, would continue to follow Hoxha's rigid Stalinist and isolationist policy. There are a few tentative signs that this very backward underdeveloped country, where there are still no private cars, is taking a few tentative steps to establish some relations with European countries. It is understood that the Soviet Union has attempted to improve its relations with the country, but with no sign of the Soviet approaches being reciprocated. The Norwegian deputy Foreign Minister has recently paid a visit to the country, presumably at the invitation of Albania. Italy, which of the western countries naturally takes the lead in attempting to maintain friendly relations, has established a commercial airlink between Bari, Brindisi and Tirana. Italy, however, has a problem with a number of local families that have taken refuge in the Italian Embassy in Tirana against state repression and is endeavouring to secure safe passage for them. From the end of March 1986 there will be two weekly flights by Swissair from Zürich to Tirana – on the initiative of Albania. Some limited tourism for 40 visitors a week has been arranged with the United Kingdom from October, and a larger company, Cooks Tours, is reported to be arranging weekend visits from 1987.

5.8. Albanian armed forces total 40,000. The army of 30,000 has 100 mostly obsolete T-34, T-54 and T-59 tanks and an equally obsolete air force of 80 MiG-15, MiG-17 and MiG-19 combat aircraft.

²⁹. Security in the Mediterranean, Document 776, 31st May 1978, Rapporteur: Mr. Grant.

(c) Cyprus

(i) General

5.9. Since 1974 the committee has frequently reported on the situation in Cyprus because it is an important factor in Greek-Turkish relations and consequently affects the cohesion of NATO and European security. For the first time the committee's Rapporteur was able to visit the island in March 1986, and to meet all the leading figures concerned. Previous reports of the committee have described the events from independence in 1960 up to the 1974 coup d'état by the Greek-officered national guard organised by the colonels' regime in Athens, which briefly replaced President Makarios by the former terrorist Nikos Sampson, and the subsequent military intervention by Turkey, which led to the present de facto division of the island with the United Nations force in Cyprus maintaining a buffer zone between the two communities. The past events are not described again in the present report, nor is it its purpose, much less the rôle of WEU, to seek to propose any solutions to a problem that must be settled between the two communities concerned, through the good offices of the United Nations Secretary-General, with as little interference from outside powers as possible. The purpose of the Rapporteur's visit was fact-finding; the committee's interest flows from its concern with European security.

(ii) Present situation

5.10. The events in 1974 transformed the situation in Cyprus in one significant way in that the two ethnic communities of Turkish-speaking Cypriots and Greek-speaking Cypriots are now physically separated by the cease-fire line. Previously, although a majority of the Turkish Cypriot population lived in the northern and eastern part of the island, the two communities had in practice been inextricably mixed with Turkish Cypriot agricultural communities in many villages throughout the island, and many Greek Cypriots in the north.

5.11. The Turkish Cypriot northern part of the island today comprises about one-third of the land area. Population figures in Cyprus are in dispute; there has been immigration to both parts of the island since 1974, and the situation is obscured to some extent by the large number of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots resident in the United Kingdom. Turkish Cypriots accounted for some 18% of the total population of 632,000 in 1973. Independent observers believe that about 30,000 agricultural workers from Turkish Anatolia were then settled in the north in 1975, some of whom have since returned. Some Turkish Cypriots have returned to Cyprus both from the United Kingdom and from Australia. Economically northern Cyprus is almost entirely dependent on Turkey for its trade and external

relations; and communications with Turkey are being improved through the enlargement of the port of Kyrenia and the construction of a new airport at Lefkoniko to the north-east of Nicosia which was opened on 7th March. Mr. Rauf Denktash, the undisputed leader of the Turkish community, announced the formation of a "Turkish Cypriot federated state" in 1975 which was designed to form one part of a federal republic of Cyprus; he did not claim international recognition as an independent state, but the title was recognised only by Turkey. In 1983, however, Mr. Denktash went further in proclaiming a "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus", although reiterating his readiness to continue negotiations for the creation of a federal state in Cyprus. Only Turkey has accorded recognition to the proclaimed republic; so far neither Mr. Denktash nor Turkey has sought particularly actively to secure recognition for it. A draft constitution was approved by referendum on 5th May 1985; under it Mr. Denktash was elected President on 9th June that year by 70.3% of the votes against the Marxist CTP candidate, Mr. Ozgur, who obtained 18.4% of the votes and Mr. Durduran of the left wing communal liberation party (TKP) who obtained 9.2%. Legislative elections on 23rd June 1985 led to the following results:

*23rd June 1985 = elections
to the Northern Cyprus Assembly*

UBP (National Unity, Mr. Denktash)	37%	24 seats
CTP (Marxist; Mr. Ozgur)	21%	12 seats
TKP (Left; Mr. Durduran)	18%	10 seats
New Dawn (centre-right)	9%	4 seats

5.12. The Greek Cypriot two-thirds of the island had an estimated 550,000 population but there is understood to have been some limited immigration from Greece and favourable economic conditions have attracted Cypriots from the United Kingdom and elsewhere. Unlike the north, the south has a strong economy with very little unemployment and has enjoyed an unprecedented building boom both of hotels and offices in large part because of the move of various commercial interests from the Lebanon and elsewhere in the Middle East. There are signs however that this growth is coming to a halt.

5.13. The present government of the Republic of Cyprus, internationally recognised as such, is still conducted under the independence constitution of 1960 although there has been no Turkish Cypriot participation in government since 1963. The de facto jurisdiction of the government is today limited to the Greek Cypriot part of the island.

5.14. At the end of December 1984, President Kyprianou terminated a co-operation agreement

between his Democratic Party (DIKO) and the pro-communist AKEL. In early 1985, the opposition Democratic Rally (DISY) led by Mr. Glafcos Clerides called for President Kyprianou's resignation because of his obstruction of an intercommunal agreement, and were joined by the AKEL Party in their opposition. The social-

ist EDEK party has continued to support Mr. Kyprianou. The AKEL and DISY Parties lack the two-thirds majority in the chamber necessary to unseat President Kyprianou, but on 1st November 1985 the chamber agreed unanimously to hold premature elections on 8th December which led to the following results:

Republic of Cyprus elections - 8th December 1985

	%		Seats	
	1981	1985	1981	1985
AKEL (pro-Communist)	33.0	27.4	1	1
DISY (Democratic Rally, Clerides)	22.1	23.6	1	1
DIKO (Democratic Party, Kyprianou)	19.6	27.7	1	1
EDEK (Socialist)	25.3	11.1	1	1
Total Greek Cypriot (Reserved for Turkish Cypriots)			35 (15)	36 (24)
Total seats			40	80

5.15. Although the separation of the two communities is virtually complete = the United Nations estimate only 1,100 Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in the north and approximately 300 Turkish Cypriots in the south = the two zones are still interdependent for various services including water supplies, electricity and telephone although with the construction of new water catchment facilities in the south, the dependence on water supplies from the north will decrease.

(iii) Greek, Turkish and Cypriot military forces in Cyprus

5.16. Independent observers estimate that today Turkey maintains 17,000 men in northern Cyprus organised in 2 divisions with some 150 battle tanks, artillery and armoured carriers. In addition, northern Cyprus has a militia of 4,500 men based on a 2-year period of conscription at age 18, but the militia has little equipment of its own.

5.17. In the south, Greece maintains one infantry battalion of 950 men and 1 commando of 350. In addition, 450 Greek officers and NCOs are serving with the Greek Cypriot national guard.

5.18. The national guard of 10,000 men is based on compulsory service of 26 months. It is organised in 1 armoured battalion and 2 reconnaissance/mechanised infantry battalions, some 20 ordinary infantry battalions and artillery support. It has a number of armoured carriers but lacks other armour.

(iv) United Nations force in Cyprus

5.19. The United Nations peace-keeping force in Cyprus was established by resolution of the

Security Council on 4th March 1964 with a mandate to prevent the recurrence of intercommunal fighting that had broken out in the island. The mandate has since been extended by the Security Council for successive periods of 6 months, most recently in December 1985. Because of the intercommunal nature of the fighting in 1964 the force was originally deployed in towns and villages throughout the island. Following the outbreak of hostilities in 1974 and the eventual establishment of a cease-fire called for by the Security Council on 16th August 1974 the force was substantially redeployed to man observation posts and patrols along the buffer zone which was then created between the cease-fire lines of the opposing forces. The zone crosses the island from north-west to south-east, is 217 km long and varies in width from 7 km at its widest to 10 m at points within the old city of Nicosia which it traverses. The force has established 141 observation posts along the buffer zone, of which 60 are permanently manned 24 hours a day. In addition to patrolling the buffer zone and maintaining the military status quo as established at the time of the 1974 cease-fire, the force has humanitarian responsibilities to the small remaining minority populations living on the other side of the cease-fire line as well as sole administrative and police responsibility for the population living actually within the buffer zone where there are several villages, including Pyla, the only village with a mixed community remaining on the island. UNFICYP also maintains a presence in Varosha, the former Greek-Cypriot suburb of Famagusta on the Turkish side of the cease-fire line, but now abandoned.

5.20. The force as constituted by the United Nations Security Council in 1964 is composed of military contingents from Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and the United

Kingdom together with civilian police detachments from Australia and Sweden. From a maximum size of 6,500 men, UNFICYP has now been reduced to 2,300 soldiers provided by the following contingents:

Denmark	341
United Kingdom	741
Canada	515
Sweden	376
Austria	301

These five contingents man the buffer zone in that order from west to east. The Finnish and Irish military contingents have now been reduced to a token 10 and 8 respectively, but battalions from these countries could be brought back at any time if necessary as the Security Council mandate remains valid. The force is supported by 35 international civilian staff of the United Nations of 21 different nationalities and 400 local employees. Most of the logistical support for the force including transport, communications and rations is supplied by the British contingent. The force is commanded by Major-General Günther G. Greindl, seconded from the Austrian army, who is directly responsible to the Secretary-General.

5.21. In 1984 the annual operating cost of the United Nations force was a little over US\$100 million a year. This is met first by the countries contributing contingents which, under United Nations regulations, are not reimbursed for troops' pay and allowances and normal material costs, and which have also agreed to meet certain of the extra costs involved in maintaining their troops in Cyprus. These contributions account for about two-thirds of the total cost. The remaining third is the direct cost to the United Nations which is financed through voluntary contributions from 71 countries including Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands and the United Kingdom from the WEU countries, but the voluntary Special Account had a cumulative deficit of \$127.7 million by the end of 1984, provisionally made up by the troop-contributing countries. None of the Warsaw Pact countries contributes. Details of financial contributions are shown at Appendix V.

(v) *British sovereign base area*

5.22. Cyprus was under the Ottoman Empire for 300 years from 1570 until 1878 when the Sultan in an agreement with Britain consented "to assign the island of Cyprus to be occupied and administered by England"³⁰. Britain used the island as a military base to provide assistance to the Ottoman Empire against Russia. With the outbreak of war in 1914 and Turkey an enemy, Britain annexed the island which became a Bri-

tish crown colony under the Treaty of Lausanne in 1924. After withdrawal of British forces from the Suez Canal zone in the early 1950s, Cyprus became the headquarters of British forces in the Middle East and Vulcan strategic bombers were based there in support of the CENTO commitment to Turkey, Iran and Pakistan.

5.23. Under the Treaty of Establishment signed by the United Kingdom, Greece, Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus in July 1960, as part of the arrangements providing for the independence of Cyprus, the United Kingdom was provided with the present two sovereign base areas totalling 253 sq. km which do not form part of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus. The United Kingdom also retained the use of various other sites, installations and training areas including port areas in Limasol and Famagusta and an area in Nicosia airport (disused since 1974) with the right to use the runway.

5.24. British forces in Cyprus have never been assigned to NATO. Until 1976 it housed the headquarters British forces Near East, but since 1960 the numbers of forces have been considerably reduced and in 1976 the title of the headquarters was changed to "British forces Cyprus". Today there are about 2,500 men organised in one and a half infantry battalions, one armoured reconnaissance battalion and some support units and a Wessex helicopter squadron. Phantom and Lightning tactical aircraft are based at the Akrotiri airfield.

5.25. Britain maintains an important communications and electronic intelligence-gathering facility in Cyprus which, together with a similar installation in Hong Kong, provides raw material to the communications intelligence centre in Cheltenham in the United Kingdom. Information derived from this source provides much of the basis for bilateral exchange of intelligence information with the United States. The sovereign base areas provide the United Kingdom with a useful forward air base which can be used by aircraft in transit to any points further east. It has been used in support of peace-keeping forces in the Lebanon and in the evacuation of residents from Yemen. With the knowledge of the Cyprus authorities, United States U-2 reconnaissance aircraft operate from the Akrotiri airfield carrying out observation duties over the demilitarised Sinai in a peace-keeping rôle.

5.26. Cyprus also provides British army and air force units with ideal training areas, with the advantage of a Mediterranean climate. The sovereign base areas have played an important rôle in peace-keeping arrangements in Cyprus, providing logistics support to the United Nations peace-keeping force referred to above.

5.27. Politically the presence of the sovereign base area is not an issue with the main political

30. The Cyprus Convention between Britain and the Ottoman Empire signed in Constantinople on 4th June 1878.

parties of either community in Cyprus. The Soviet Union on a number of occasions, most recently in 1985, in seeking to involve itself in the solution to the Cyprus problem has included proposals for the removal of all armed forces from the island.

(vi) The Cyprus problem

5.28. Since the events of 1974 there have been many years of abortive negotiations on a new constitution for Cyprus, in the course of which the Greek Cypriot side has come to concede the principle of a federal state while the Turkish Cypriot side as lately as November 1984 announced territorial concessions which would reduce the proportion of the island to be included in a Turkish Cypriot federated state to 29%. The most recent round of intercommunity negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations Secretary-General in New York from 17th to 21st January 1985 broke down through the refusal of President Kyprianou to consider the Secretary-General's proposals as more than an agenda for negotiation whereas President Denktash considered them to be an outline agreement.

5.29. In March 1986 the Secretary-General completed a "draft framework agreement" which, while not being made public, is understood to embody simply a listing of most agreed issues, and an identification of areas of disagreement. The main unresolved points between the two communities appeared to be first the timetable for the withdrawal of Turkish forces, with the Greek Cypriot side insisting on withdrawal before any agreement enters into force, whereas the Turkish Cypriot side is unlikely to agree to complete withdrawal until such time as the Turkish Cypriot community has acquired confidence in the working of any new federal system. While the actual extent of territory to be included within each of the two future federated states is no longer a significant issue, the economic rights to be enjoyed by each community within the territory of the other remains to be settled. The Turkish Cypriot side is anxious to retain the homogeneity of its own community within the area of its own administration - a homogeneity that the 1974 events established for the first time. The Greek Cypriot side insists on the right of any Cypriots to engage in economic activities in any part of the island, which in practice, as the Greek Cypriots are the most entrepreneurial-minded, amounts to the right for the Greek Cypriots to own property and conduct business in the area administered by the Turkish Cypriot community, although without any right to secure electoral representation outside their own area. The question of any guarantees by external powers also remains to be settled.

5.30. By the 21st April, the date on which the Secretary-General had asked for replies to his

draft, the press was reporting that the draft had been accepted by the Turkish Cypriot side, but that a formal reply had not been sent by the Greek Cypriot side. Mr. George Iacovou, the Greek Cypriot Foreign Minister, is reported to have visited Moscow on 28th April to discuss the convening of an international conference to consider the four issues they considered had not been adequately dealt with in the Secretary-General's draft. This move was seen in allied circles as an attempt to force western allied countries to seek to persuade Turkey to persuade in turn Mr. Denktash to make more concessions to the Greek Cypriot position. The Soviet Union in January 1986 had renewed its proposals for an international conference on Cyprus which would seek to remove "all foreign forces" from the island - including by inference the British sovereign bases.

5.31. It is not the purpose of this report to make any specific proposals about internal Cyprus proposals. The committee nevertheless regrets the absence of direct contacts between the two Cyprus communities in the last 12 years. It will be difficult to resolve outstanding problems while intercommunity relations are limited to the present slender and indirect political contacts.

(d) Syria

5.32. Syria, with an army of 270,000 men and 4,200 tanks - 2,400 of them modern T-62 and T-72 - has the largest and most modern armoured force in the Middle East. Its air force of 500 combat aircraft includes modern Soviet MiG-25 and MiG-23 interceptors and 50 MiG-23 ground attack aircraft. It maintains some 3 armoured divisions with 800 battle tanks in Lebanon. Its navy is mainly based on 22 fast attack craft equipped with missiles. Israel claimed in February that the Soviet Union had supplied the first submarines.

5.33. Massively supplied with modern military equipment by the Soviet Union, Syria nevertheless cannot be counted as a Soviet ally. President Assad, re-elected in February 1985 for a third 7-year term since he took office in March 1971, and his Baath party have an overriding preoccupation with the restoration of the Palestinian state and the removal of Israel from other occupied territories. Deeply involved in Lebanon since it sent its forces in 1976, Syria supports PLO factions opposed to Yasser Arafat, and some of the militia forces. While within the last 18 months President Assad has visited Moscow where he received assurances of continued military and economic support, western leaders have also visited Damascus including President Mitterrand and Prime Minister Papandreou, both in November 1984. Almost overlooked among the panoply of Soviet equipment in the

Syrian armed forces are some Milan anti-tank missiles and 33 Gazelle helicopters supplied by France of which 13 destroyed in fighting have been replaced.

5.34. Observers attribute the naval facilities and port rights granted to the Soviet Union in the Syrian port of Tartus and Latakia more to Syrian dependence on the Soviet Union for its equipment, than on political alignment. The number of Soviet military technicians and advisers was reported in 1984 to have been reduced by about a third to some 3,000. While harbouring the Abu Nidal Palestinian faction, Syria has denied that it actively supports terrorism in third countries, and has assisted western countries in negotiations to free hostages taken by various armed factions in the Lebanon.

5.35. While Turkey is naturally preoccupied by the large and modern Syrian armoured divisions on its frontier, and has an outstanding dispute over territorial waters, relations between the two countries remain correct.

(c) Lebanon

5.36. The state of armed anarchy in Lebanon is not examined in the present report. Far from presenting any military threat of its own, Lebanon is a victim of Middle East conflicts not of its making. Its air force is virtually non-existent. Its army has some 30 tanks and a further 60 AMX-13 light tanks. Control of the country is largely exercised at present by the rival militias supported by Syria and Israel, and Syrian-backed PLO factions. Unidentified groups have seized hostages from several western countries, but there is no identifiable authority to which to turn to secure their release.

(d) Israel³¹

5.37. Relying heavily on the United States for military equipment (which in financial year 1986 is providing more military assistance to Israel than to any other country³²) and surrounded by potential adversaries, Israel has no alternative foreign policies open to it. The primary interest of all western countries is to seek a solution to the particular Middle East conflict that involves Israel and the Palestinians, but the prospect of a solution is no nearer.

5.38. The highly efficient Israeli regular force of 142,000 men are backed by well-trained rapidly mobilisable reserves of 370,000. Well supplied

by equipment, chiefly from the United States, Israel has its own important arms industry and is an exporter of equipment to countries which include South Africa. Israel's 3,600 tanks include 1,200 modern M-60 and its over 600 combat aircraft include F-15 and F-16.

(e) Egypt

5.39. Following the United States-sponsored Camp David agreement that sought to solve the Israeli-Egypt conflict in 1978, Egypt has become the largest single recipient after Israel of American military aid, entirely in the form of "forgiven credits"³³. The settlement has given Egypt and Israel a firm sense of security on their common frontier; the demilitarisation of Sinai is guaranteed by the United States which, with the other countries in the multilateral observer force, assists in peace-keeping surveillance of the area. The Egyptian leadership and any foreseeable alternative leadership from the middle classes accept the peace treaty with Israel as the only realistic policy for Egypt. The establishment in 1985 of close links between Libya and the new regime in the Sudan is particularly disturbing for Egypt.

5.40. Economically, disparity of the distribution of wealth among Egypt's large and growing population has become progressively worse. A large proportion of Egypt's relatively skilled labour force has been employed in the oil-producing Arab countries and remittances have provided an important addition to resources of the poorer section of the community. But that source is drying up with the falling price of oil, reduced production and the return home of Egyptian workers, in particular from Libya.

5.41. The riot in March by the central security forces is seen as a spontaneous demonstration by the lowest paid sector of the population against extremes of wealth flaunted in the luxury hotels in proximity to the barracks. Also muslim fundamentalism, building on deep-rooted opposition to the Israel peace treaty among the masses, which led to the assassination of President Sadat, remains a threat to the present regime.

5.42. In Egypt, as in much of the Middle East, a settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute would do much to ensure the stability of the present Egyptian Government and its present western-oriented policy.

5.43. In military terms, Egypt now provides the United States with a small but strategically important forward base, through which rapid deployment forces assigned to the new United States central command established in 1983 could be deployed for possible operations in the

31. The General Affairs Committee has regularly reported on the situation in Israel, most recently in the situation in the Middle East and European security, Document 978, 23th May 1984, Rapporteur: Lord Reay.

32. Appendix III.

33. See Appendix III.

Persian Gulf. About 1,200 United States army personnel are stationed in Egypt.

5.44. One consequence of the change in alliances for Egypt is the impact on equipment. Some 1,500 Egyptian tanks are Soviet models which it will be increasingly difficult to maintain; 660 M-60s have so far been supplied by the United States. The air force of some 430 combat aircraft in service has been largely re-equipped with French and United States aircraft since its losses in the Yom Kippur conflict, but still retains 100 MiG interceptors.

(h) Libya

5.45. In its previous report the committee dealt at some length with Libya and the problems which its behaviour on the international scene poses not only to the western world but to its neighbours and nominal allies. Despite its conflict with Chad, the northern part of which is at present occupied by part of the Libyan army, Libya itself does not represent a serious military threat to the western world. Its armed forces are relatively small with an army of 58,000 providing perhaps the equivalent of two-and-a-half divisions. With its oil wealth, Libya has however purchased massive amounts of military equipment, mostly from the Soviet Union, but also from France, Italy and the United Kingdom. But of its 2,500 battle tanks and over 500 combat aircraft, much is reported to be in storage; the limited extent of skills among the Libyan population has obliged Colonel Kadhafi to rely on foreigners for technical support of sophisticated equipment while the air force reportedly relies on Soviet, Syrian, Pakistani, North Korean and Palestinian pilots.

5.46. Libya could of course provide the Soviet Union with important strategic bases in the Mediterranean as it has done in the past for western countries. Libya is reported to have constructed new airfields and to be constructing a new naval base beyond any possible national requirement, and vessels of the Soviet Mediterranean squadron have spent more time in Tripoli in the past year than hitherto. But there are no signs of the Soviet Union establishing any significant military base of its own in the country. Indeed, during Colonel Kadhafi's visit to Moscow in October 1985 relations with the Soviet Union were reported to have become strained. He failed to attend the Kremlin reception in his honour and the forecast treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union did not materialise although an economic agreement was extended. General Secretary Gorbachev was reported to have strongly criticised Libyan support for international terrorism including the seizing of the Achille Lauro liner by Palestinian guerrillas. Nevertheless, in December 1985 the

Soviet Union supplied Libya with long-range SA-5 surface-to-air missiles which were described by a United States State Department spokesman as "clearly exceeding any legitimate security interests which the Libyans may have".

5.47. Libyan relationships with the rest of the Arab and muslim world vary from time to time. Colonel Kadhafi has been consistently hostile to his immediate neighbours, Tunisia and Egypt, as well as to Jordan. He has attempted to maintain good relations especially with Syria, and, surprisingly, in September 1984 signed a treaty of union with Morocco, but which does not appear to have had concrete results beyond indicating an end of Libyan support for the Polisario forces opposing Morocco in the western Sahara.

5.48. The problem of Libyan-sponsored terrorism abroad, the different interests and reactions of the European allies and the United States has been described in paragraphs 4.75 et seq. above.

5.49. Libya's unprecedented wealth giving it one of the highest per capita incomes on the southern shore of the Mediterranean has arisen for more than 90% from its petroleum exports. With the slump in the price of oil to one-third of the price of only a few years ago, Libya is facing an inevitable and severe economic crisis. It is interested in closer economic links with the European Community and the majority view among European countries is undoubtedly in favour of leaving the country through its excesses to isolate itself from the more moderate Arab world, while maintaining a dialogue through countries best placed to communicate with Libya and seeking to influence its policy by economic means. The consequence of military action against Libya may for some time increase support for the country in much of the Arab world.

(i) Malta

5.50. Malta had been an important British naval base from the beginning of the 19th century and a NATO naval headquarters for the Mediterranean was maintained there from 1952 until 1971. Malta became independent in September 1964 and in 1971 when the Malta Labour Party under Mr. Mintoff won the elections, it followed a policy of non-alignment which led to the removal of the NATO naval headquarters to Naples. The United Kingdom continued to maintain naval and air forces on the island from 1972 to 1979 under a bilateral defence agreement which was not subsequently renewed, the last British forces being withdrawn in 1979. In 1980 Italy concluded a bilateral agreement with Malta providing for economic assistance and military guarantees for the neutrality and non-alignment of Malta. In return, Malta agreed to forbid the

use of military bases in Malta to any country except Italy which would have the right to use them for defending Maltese neutrality.

5.51. In December 1984 Mr. Mintoff, seeking renewal of economic assistance, announced that the treaty with Italy had not been renewed, but Italy pointed out that the Maltese neutrality clauses of the agreement had not expired.

5.52. Mr. Mintoff's government had seen Malta as a link between Europe and the North African countries, in particular Libya. Colonel Kadhafi signed a five-year "economic and security co-operation agreement" during a visit to Malta in November 1984 which also provided for the non-establishment of military bases on Malta, but contained offers of Libyan assistance with military training and of Libyan military assistance if Malta were attacked. Malta had earlier signed an agreement with the Soviet Union in October 1981 whereby the latter recognised Maltese neutrality. Because of the conduct of internal policy under Mr. Mintoff which denied democratic rights to the opposition, relations with the Council of Europe and the European Community were strained, and the European Community in 1983 suspended aid because of human rights abuses.

5.53. With the resignation of Mr. Mintoff, his former deputy Dr. Mifsud Bonnici became Prime Minister on 22nd December 1984. Since then relations with European countries and the Community have improved. The opposition Nationalist Party is again represented in the Maltese Delegation to the Council of Europe.

5.54. While Malta can provide an important naval and air base strategically located in the centre of the Mediterranean, there are plenty of other naval bases available to NATO forces. The interests of European security are therefore not opposed to Malta's own declared policy of neutrality and non-alignment.

(j) Rest of the Maghreb

5.55. Despite anxiety at times in the past about possible Soviet access to important naval bases in the western part of the North African coast, especially Bizerta in Tunisia and Mers-el-Kebir in Algeria, there has been no increased presence since the committee last reported. The Soviet Union continues to use commercial repair facilities for naval vessels in Bizerta and Annaba in Algeria.

5.56. The political future of Tunisia is perhaps the most unpredictable at the present time with the danger of a pro-Libyan government assuming power when President Bourguiba, perhaps the last French-educated ruler, eventually leaves the scene.

5.57. Algeria is seen as a more stable régime with a not unhelpful attitude to western interests,

but its economy unfavourably affected by the fall in the price of natural gas.

5.58. Morocco surprised western countries with the August 1984 declaration of union with Libya, but that appears in retrospect to have amounted to little more than an ending of Libyan support for the Polisaria guerrillas in the western Sahara in exchange for Moroccan non-intervention in Chad. Morocco appears to have stabilised the situation in the western Sahara by constructing a defensive ditch with electronic sensors. Morocco's long-standing claim to the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla were renewed in 1985 when Spain announced the opening of negotiations with the United Kingdom about the future of Gibraltar.

VI. Summary and conclusions

6.1. The security of the Atlantic Alliance is based on the principle of political and strategic unity of the NATO area and the functional interdependence of the whole military apparatus. Therefore, the NATO southern flank should not be considered "peripheral". In practice, in the event of the flanks being lost, the central region itself could no longer be defended. The need to pay greater attention to this part of the NATO area is justified by:

- the danger for the alliance of possible encirclement, and local sources of conflict;
- defence requirements; military equipment of some of the countries in the area is still insufficient in some cases;
- the economic weakness of NATO partners in the area;
- the important contribution which the southern flank countries make to defence and détente.

The key position of NATO's southern flank is determined by the strategic importance of the Mediterranean which is crossed by heavily used merchant shipping lanes, which in particular provide the main routes for supplying Europe with petroleum from North Africa and the Near East. The central power which exercised hegemony in the Mediterranean area in the past has now disappeared and has not been replaced by a politico-strategic balance of force on which future security could be based. The distribution of power and the ratio of forces in general remains unstable and changing.

6.2. The Soviet Union also considers itself a Mediterranean power and conducts a policy aimed at neutralising western influences, especially that of the United States, and at increasing its own influence. It endeavours in this way to exploit for its own benefit the political heteroge-

neity, the lack of geo-strategic unity and the regional instabilities characteristic of this region.

6.3. The stationing in the Mediterranean of the third squadron of the Soviet Black Sea fleet has weakened the domination of the United States Sixth fleet in the region. The mission of the Soviet squadron is both political and military. In political terms it seeks:

- to demonstrate the maritime presence of the Soviet Union as a power factor in this region and to provide a military guarantee for Soviet policy;
- to increase Soviet influence in the Arab states;
- to present the Soviet Union as a potential protecting power;
- to demonstrate that the Mediterranean should no longer be considered the exclusive domain of the West and that the Soviet Union should itself be regarded as a legitimate Mediterranean power.

In military terms it is designed:

- to conduct peacetime surveillance of the activities of the United States Sixth fleet, to reduce its freedom of manoeuvre to prevent it from intervening in time of crisis and to increase the risk of actions against countries friendly to the Soviet Union;
- in the event of a conflict to undertake a rapid offensive against units of the Sixth fleet.

Admittedly the Mediterranean has not become a "red sea" - Moscow has achieved only a few of its aims in the Mediterranean area, especially as concerns access to support points and base rights. Nevertheless it has imposed itself in the region as an important influence. However, it must be remembered that the Soviet Union fleet in the Mediterranean encounters some difficulties which limits its scope and the speed with which it could be reinforced (for example the restrictions concerning passage through the Turkish Straits resulting from the provisions of the Montreux Convention, and the absence of proper bases on the Mediterranean shore).

6.4. On the whole the politico-military situation in the Mediterranean area is characterised by contradictory tendencies in the western and eastern parts where international European influences are at play, as well as in the Near East and North African area which create an unstable and disturbing situation.

6.5. Apart from the area of interest to Europe in order to assess the regional situation in the Mediterranean area, account must also be taken

of events in the Near and Middle East as well as in North Africa:

- the still unforeseeable consequences of Egyptian policy which is tending to rapprochement with the Arab world;
- the uncertain outcome of the war between Iran and Iraq and the relations maintained by Iran with the big powers;
- the Near East problem which remains unsolved and the tense situation still prevailing in the area;
- the problem still pending of the western Sahara;
- the radical policy conducted by Libya, based on revolutionary principles which constitute an unpredictable factor of instability;
- the economically oriented policy of neutrality conducted by Malta which in 1981 permitted Soviet merchant vessels access to its protected petroleum stores and which in 1984 signed an agreement with Libya, the consequences of which are still not entirely foreseeable.

6.6. The whole of the foregoing shows clearly that the Soviet Union poses more than a purely "conventional" threat to western security in the Mediterranean area and to the stability of the southern flank of NATO. Thus, the very mixed southern region of NATO, from a security standpoint, is subject at any moment to changes which are difficult to foresee. The political unity of the alliance, especially on the southern flank, is not assured from the standpoint of security. The gravity of this situation is not reduced by attempts to co-ordinate military plans for the southern flank. To this, on the periphery of the southern flank, is to be added the risk of conflicts with different possible causes and consequences.

6.7. As far as East-West antagonisms are concerned, the southern flank offers the Warsaw Pact many more possibilities to test the political cohesion of the alliance and the danger always remains of a conflict in this important area for NATO.

6.8. It is therefore in the western interest to strengthen, through carefully judged political, economic and military aid, the cohesion of the southern NATO countries, and to provide political, economic and development aid with a view to stabilising the periphery of NATO's southern flank.

6.9. The committee's principal conclusions are set forth in the draft recommendation, the substantive paragraphs of which relate to the present explanatory memorandum as follows:

<i>Draft Recommendation</i>	<i>Explanatory Memorandum</i>
1(i)	4.82-4.89.
1(ii)	4.80.
1(iii), (iv)	4.74-4.89.
2	Chapters III and IV: paragraphs 4.5, 4.38, 4.54.
3	4.6-4.14.
4	4.41-4.54.
5	4.55-4.62.
6	5.37-5.44.
7	5.19-5.21.
8	5.9-5.21, 5.28-5.31.
9	5.39.
10	2.1-2.10.

VII. Opinion of the minority

7.1. The revised report was adopted in committee by 13 votes to 1 with 0 abstentions.

7.2. The member who voted against voiced the following objections to the draft recommendation. In the preamble, paragraph (i) the Soviet Union's objectives cannot be assessed accurately; (iii) Afghanistan is beyond the scope of the report which concerns the Mediterranean; (v) terrorism is a worldwide phenomenon, not confined to the two countries cited whose involvement might not be proved. In the operative text, paragraph 1(iii) should call for any relevant disputes to be referred to the International Court.

APPENDIX I

*The North Atlantic Treaty**Washington DC, 4th April 1949**(Extracts)**Article 5*

The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the party or parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Article 6

For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the parties is deemed to include an armed attack:

- (i) on the territory of any of the parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian departments of France, on the territory of Turkey or on the islands under the jurisdiction of any of the parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;
- (ii) on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the parties were stationed on the date when the treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.

COMPARATIVE TABLE OF DEFENCE EFFORT 1981-1985
A. FINANCIAL EFFORT

Country	National currency unit	Defence expenditure (national currency, current prices) <i>d</i>					Defence expenditure (current prices - US \$ million) <i>a</i>					GDP in purchasers' values (current prices - US \$ million) <i>a</i>					Population (thousand)					Defence expenditure as % of GDP in purchasers' values					Defence expenditure per head (current prices - US \$) <i>a</i>					Defence expenditure as % of total WEU				
		1981	1982	1983	1984	1985 <i>f</i>	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985 <i>f</i>	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985 <i>f</i>	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985 <i>f</i>	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985 <i>f</i>	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985 <i>f</i>	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985 <i>f</i>
(0)	(1)	(- 5)	(- 4)	(- 3)	(- 2)	(- 1)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)	(26)	(27)	(28)	(29)	(30)
Belgium	Million B. Frs.	125,689	132,127	136,853	141,676	155,668	3,385	2,892	2,676	2,452	2,241	95,730	84,251	80,087	76,046	73,586	9,852	9,856	9,856	9,852	9,852	3.5	3.4	3.3	3.2	3.3	344	293	272	249	248	3.84	3.38	3.17	3.11	3.25
France (c)	Million F. Frs.	129,708	148,021	165,029	176,638	186,242	23,867	22,523	21,654	20,212	19,233	572,371	542,746	516,317	489,428	472,025	54,182	54,480	54,729	54,947	55,222	4.2	4.1	4.2	4.1	4.1	440	413	396	368	348	27.05	26.31	25.65	25.66	25.57
Germany	Million DM	52,193	54,234	56,496	57,274	59,737	23,094	22,350	22,127	20,125	18,835	683,239	659,849	653,883	613,159	576,699	59,790	59,761	59,562	59,336	59,217	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.3	3.3	386	374	371	339	318	26.18	26.11	26.21	25.55	25.04
Italy	Milliard Lire	9,868	12,294	14,400	16,433	18,059	8,681	9,090	9,481	9,353	9,048	353,254	347,862	354,884	348,385	336,357	56,502	56,639	56,825	56,983	57,154	2.5	2.6	2.7	2.7	2.7	154	160	167	164	158	9.84	10.62	11.23	11.87	12.03
Luxembourg	Million L. Frs.	1,715	1,893	2,104	2,234	2,317	46	41	41	39	36	3,818	3,437	3,374	3,235	3,123	366	366	366	366	366	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	126	113	112	106	99	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
Netherlands	Million Guilders	11,296	11,921	12,149	12,765	12,885	4,527	4,464	4,257	3,978	3,595	141,412	138,139	132,595	123,059	115,138	14,247	14,310	14,362	14,420	14,492	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.1	318	312	296	276	248	5.13	5.22	5.04	5.05	4.78
United Kingdom	Million £ Sterling	12,144	13,849	15,952	16,923	18,572	24,627	24,242	24,198	22,614	22,034	513,978	483,864	455,443	424,679	409,567	56,379	56,335	56,377	56,488	56,544	4.8	5.0	5.3	5.3	5.4	437	430	429	400	390	27.91	28.32	28.66	28.71	29.29
TOTAL WEU							88,228	85,602	84,434	78,773	75,222	2,363,802	2,260,149	2,196,584	2,077,991	1,986,494	251,318	251,747	252,077	252,392	252,847	3.7	3.8	3.8	3.8	3.8	351	340	335	312	298	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
Canada	Million C. \$	6,289	7,655	8,086	9,320	10,253	5,245	6,205	6,561	7,196	7,539	291,539	299,061	324,003	332,492	338,035	24,366	24,657	24,904	25,150	25,427	1.8	2.1	2.0	2.2	2.2	215	252	263	286	297	5.95	7.25	7.77	9.14	10.02
Denmark	Million D. Kr.	10,301	11,669	12,574	13,045	13,750	1,446	1,400	1,375	1,260	1,210	57,247	56,003	56,321	54,635	53,343	5,122	5,119	5,114	5,111	5,104	2.5	2.5	2.4	2.3	2.3	282	274	269	246	237	1.64	1.64	1.63	1.60	1.61
Greece	Million Drachmas	142,865	176,270	193,340	271,922	321,722	2,578	2,639	2,195	2,412	2,379	36,941	38,140	34,813	33,466	33,509	9,790	9,790	9,848	9,910	9,989	7.0	6.9	6.3	7.2	7.1	265	270	223	243	238	2.92	3.08	2.60	3.06	3.16
Norway	Million N. Kr.	9,468	10,956	12,395	12,688	15,431	1,650	1,698	1,699	1,555	1,690	57,091	56,277	55,064	54,736	52,772	4,100	4,116	4,130	4,141	4,153	2.9	3.0	3.1	2.8	3.2	402	412	411	375	407	1.87	1.98	2.01	1.97	2.25
Portugal	Million Escudos	51,917	63,817	76,765	92,009	111,322	844	803	693	629	635	23,928	23,365	20,668	19,310	19,624	9,970	10,030	10,099	10,170	10,231	3.5	3.4	3.4	3.3	3.2	85	80	69	62	62	0.96	0.94	0.82	0.80	0.84
Turkey	Millions L.	313,067	447,790	556,738	803,044	1,198,125	2,815	2,755	2,469	2,190	2,422	57,666	53,032	51,147	49,858	55,144	45,757	46,780	47,804	48,720	49,792	4.9	5.2	4.8	4.4	4.4	62	59	52	45	49	3.19	3.22	2.92	2.78	3.22
United States	Million US \$	169,888	196,390	217,198	277,052	266,442	169,888	196,390	217,198	237,052	266,642	2,934,911	3,045,279	3,275,728	3,634,522	3,870,830	230,043	232,345	234,538	236,681	239,048	5.8	6.4	6.6	6.5	6.9	739	845	926	1,002	1,115	192.56	229.42	257.24	300.93	354.47
TOTAL NON-WEU							184,466	211,889	232,190	252,293	282,518	3,459,322	3,571,157	3,817,743	4,179,079	4,423,257	329,088	332,837	336,437	339,883	343,744	5.3	5.9	6.1	6.0	6.4	561	637	690	742	822	209.08	247.53	275.00	320.28	375.58
TOTAL NATO (d)							272,694	297,491	316,625	331,066	357,740	5,823,124	5,831,306	6,014,327	6,257,070	6,409,751	580,406	584,584	588,514	592,275	596,591	4.7	5.1	5.3	5.3	5.6	470	509	538	559	600	309.08	347.53	375.00	420.28	475.58

Note a : GDP and defence expenditures are calculated in national currency and converted to United States \$ at the rates shown below. Figures in columns (1) to (10) and (21) to (30) are affected by change in exchange rates and are not therefore always comparable between countries, whereas figures of defence expenditures as % of GDP in columns (16) to (20) do not involve currency conversion.

For the period 1981-1985, the following rates of exchange have been applied:

		Units per US \$				
Country	National currency unit	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985 <i>b</i>
(0)	(1)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Belgium	Million B. Frs.	37.12900	45.69100	51.13200	57.78400	63.76700
France	Million F. Frs.	5.43460	6.57210	7.62130	8.73910	9.68360
Germany	Million DM	2.26000	2.42660	2.55330	2.84590	3.17150
Italy	Milliard Lire	1.13680	1.35250	1.51880	1.75700	1.99590
Luxembourg	Million L. Frs.	37.12900	45.69100	51.13200	57.78400	63.76700
Netherlands	Million Guilders	2.49520	2.67020	2.85410	3.20870	3.58440
United Kingdom	Million Pound Sterling	0.49312	0.57127	0.65920	0.74833	0.84289
Canada	Million C. \$	1.19890	1.23370	1.23240	1.29510	1.36130
Denmark	Million D. Kr.	7.12340	8.33240	9.14500	10.35660	11.36200
Greece	Million Drachmas	55.40800	66.80300	88.06400	112.72000	135.23000
Norway	Million N. Kr.	5.73950	6.45400	7.29640	8.16150	9.13020
Portugal	Million Escudos	61.54600	79.47300	110.78000	146.39000	175.62000
Turkey	Million Turkish Lira	111.22000	162.55000	225.46000	366.68000	494.64000
United States	Million US \$	1.00000	1.00000	1.00000	1.00000	1.00000

Note b : 6 months' average.

Note c : France is a member of the alliance without belonging to the integrated military structure; the relevant figures for defence expenditures are indicative only.

Note d : The corresponding statistical data for Spain are not available.

e - Preliminary estimate.

f - Forecast.

* - WEU Office of the Clerk estimates.

Source : Defence expenditures (NATO definition), from NATO press release M-DPC-2(85)25.

B. MANPOWER EFFORT - 1985

	Period of compulsory ¹ military service (months)			Total in armed forces ² military personnel (thousands) (e)	Total armed forces ² (military and civilian) as percentage of active population (e)
	Army	Navy	Air force		
Belgium	10 ³	10 ³	10 ³	108	2.7
France	12	12	12	563	2.9
Germany	15 ⁴	15 ⁴	15 ⁴	495	2.4
Italy	12	18	12	531	2.5
Luxembourg		voluntary		1	0.9
Netherlands	14-16	14-17	14-17	103	2.1
United Kingdom		voluntary		335	2.0
TOTAL WEU				2,136	2.5
Canada		voluntary		83	1.0
Denmark	9 ⁵	9 ⁵	9 ⁵	29	1.4
Greece	22	26	24	206	6.2
Norway	12	15	15	41	2.5
Portugal	16	24	21-24	101	2.6
Turkey	18	18	18	825	4.6
United States		voluntary		2,289	2.9
TOTAL NON-WEU				3,574	3.1
TOTAL NATO				5,710	2.8


Sources:

1. IISS, Military Balance, 1985-86.
2. NATO press release M-DPC-2 (85) 25 of 3rd December 1985.
3. Eight months if served in Germany.
4. To be eighteen months from 1989.
5. To be twelve months in combat arms.

e = estimate.

APPENDIX III


*United States military assistance
Department of Defence proposals FY 1986*



Source: United States Secretary of Defence annual report to Congress, fiscal year 1986, 4th February 1985.

APPENDIX IV

NATO military command structure - Elements in the Mediterranean and adjoining area



APPENDIX V

*United Nations force in Cyprus**Background information**Finances*

UNFICYP is the only current United Nations peace-keeping operation financed solely by voluntary contributions. Funding comes from two sources:

- about one-third of the costs are met by a special fund, the UNFICYP special account, to which 71 countries have contributed since 1964;
- approximately two-thirds of the costs are absorbed voluntarily by troop-contributing countries.

In order to provide contingents for UNFICYP, the troop-contributing governments divert from national duty troops and other resources at an ongoing cost to them estimated by them at present at \$36.2 million for each six-month period. This figure includes (a) the troops' regular pay and allowances and normal matériel expenses for which, under existing arrangements, the United Nations is not required by the troop-contributors to reimburse them: these therefore constitute costs of maintaining the force which are being financed directly by the troop-contributing governments; and (b) certain extra and extraordinary costs that they incur in respect of UNFICYP for which, under existing arrangements, the troop-contributors would be entitled to claim reimbursement from the United Nations, but which they have to finance at their own expense as a further contribution to the United Nations operation in Cyprus.

Including the above two elements of costs, the actual cost of financing the United Nations operation in Cyprus for the six-month period ending 15th December 1984 totals approximately \$50.4 million, estimated as follows:

	US\$ (in millions)
1. (a) Regular troops' pay and allowances and normal matériel costs	
(b) Certain extra and extraordinary costs of the troop-contributing governments that are financed directly by them	36.2

2. Direct costs to the United Nations which the organisation is required to meet (including the extra and extraordinary costs of governments providing contingents for which they seek to be reimbursed), financed through voluntary contributions	14.2
Total costs	50.4

Voluntary contributions from governments are required to finance the second of these cost elements through the medium of the special account.

The special account

The special account was established to "finance direct costs to the United Nations which the organisation is required to meet (including the extra and extraordinary costs of governments providing contingents for which they seek reimbursement)". In the six-month mandate to 15th December 1984 these costs were \$14.2 million.

In the period since the inception of UNFICYP on 27th March 1964 to 15th December 1984, costs under this item have been US\$470.5 million. However, to the latter date, voluntary contributions to the special account have only totalled US\$342.8 million. In December 1984, therefore, the account was in a deficit by \$127.7 million, a sum which has temporarily been absorbed by troop-contributing countries until sufficient funding becomes available through the special account. The Secretary-General regularly draws the attention of United Nations member nations to the deficit, which is currently growing by about \$5 to 6 million for each six-month mandate. The Government of the Republic of Cyprus is contributing the equivalent of more than US\$1 million a year in finances and services.

Costs absorbed by contingent-contributing countries

Since 1964 troop-contributing countries have voluntarily absorbed about two-thirds of the costs of UNFICYP. These costs consist of "regular troops' pay, allowances, normal

matériel costs, plus certain extra and extraordinary costs of the troop-contributing governments that are financed directly by them". In the six-month mandate to December 1984, these costs were \$36.2 million, made up as follows:

	US\$ (in millions)
Australia	0.5
Austria	1.9
Canada	10.7
Denmark	0.6
Sweden	3.5
United Kingdom	19.0

By extrapolation it is estimated that the sum absorbed voluntarily by troop-contributing nations since 1964 is in the order of US\$870 million. In addition, as described earlier, these nations are also temporarily shouldering the special account deficit which stood at US\$127.7 million in December 1984. Due to this deficit, the latest payment in respect of claims by troop-contributing nations (which in some cases represent only a fraction of the actual costs incurred by them in maintaining their contingents) was made in January 1984 and met those claims only up to December 1977.

Taking into consideration both the special account and the voluntarily absorbed amounts, UNFICYP has cost about US\$1,400 million up to the end of 1984. At the present time, UNFICYP costs about US\$100 million annually.

Voluntary contributions

To 15th December 1984, the voluntary contributors to the UNFICYP special account have been:

<i>Principal contributors</i>	<i>% of total</i>
United States	46.8
United Kingdom	21.4
Federal Republic of Germany	7.1
Greece	6.1
Norway	2.5
Sweden	2.4
Italy	2.3
Switzerland	1.9
Denmark	1.4
Japan	1.3
Belgium	1.3
Austria	1.2
Cyprus	1.0
Australia	0.9
Netherlands	0.8

Turkey	0.6
Finland	0.3
Others (see below)	0.7
	<u>100.00</u>

Other contributors

Bahamas
Barbados
Botswana
Democratic Cambodia
Ghana
Guyana
Iceland
India
Iran
Iraq
Ireland
Israel
Ivory Coast
Jamaica
Kuwait
Lao People's Democratic Republic
Lebanon
Liberia
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
Luxembourg
Malawi
Malaysia
Malta
Mauritania
Morocco
Nepal
New Zealand
Niger
Nigeria
Oman
Pakistan
Panama
Philippines
Portugal
Qatar
Republic of Korea
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Singapore
Somalia
Sri Lanka
Thailand
Togo
Trinidad and Tobago
United Arab Emirates
United Republic of Cameroon
United Republic of Tanzania
Uruguay
Venezuela
Vietnam
Yugoslavia
Zaire
Zambia
Zimbabwe

APPENDIX VI

*Source of armaments of Middle Eastern
and North African Mediterranean countries**A. Apparent source of selected major equipment
currently in service¹*

	Main battle tanks	Combat aircraft	Combat ships	Other supplying countries
Syria	4 200 USSR	500 USSR	30 USSR	France (helicopters, patrol craft)
Lebanon ..	50 US 60 France	7 UK	3 France	
Israel	1 100 UK 1 800 US 400 USSR 250 ind.*	390 US 150 ind.*	75 ind.*	France (helicopters)
Egypt	1 500 USSR 659 US	140 USSR 65 US 79 France	46 USSR 10 China 12 ind.*	Spain (2 destroyers) UK (3 frigates, 1 destroyer)
Libya	2 800 USSR	390 USSR 90 France	22 USSR 10 France	UK (1 frigate, 1 corvette)
Tunisia ...	68 US	12 US	6 France 2 China 1 US	
Algeria	700 USSR	260 USSR	11 USSR	France (helicopters)
Morocco ..	120 US	77 France	6 France 1 Spain	France (light tanks)

Source: The Military Balance 1985-86, IISS.

1. Table shows country of origin of equipment, not necessarily the supplying country, e.g. Israel has captured Soviet tanks; other equipment may be acquired via third countries.

*ind. = indigenous production.

B. Equipment reported to be on order or under delivery in 1985

Recipient	Supplier	No. ordered	Weapon designation	Weapon description	Year of order	Year of delivery	No. delivered	Comments
Syria	France	15	SA-342K Gazelle	Hel.	1984			Replacing losses in Lebanon War; to be armed with Hot ATMs
		(180)	HOT	ATM	1984			Arming 15 Gazelle helicopters
	Italy	18	AB-212ASW	Hel.	(1986)			Order pending
		6	CH-47C Chinook	Hel.	(1986)			Order pending
		12	SH-3D Sea King	Hel.	(1986)			Order pending
	Poland	3	Polnocny Class	LS	(1983)	1984	1	
						1985	2	
	USSR	(35)	Mi-24 Hind-D	Hel.	(1983)	(1983)	(12)	
						(1984)	(12)	
						(1985)	(11)	
		..	MiG-23M	Fighter/interceptor	1981	1982	(15)	Incl some MiG-23BNs (ground attack version)
						1983	(30)	
						1984	(30)	
						(1985)	(30)	
		..	MiG-25 Foxhound	Fighter	(1984)	1981	(6)	Unconfirmed
		..	MiG-27	Fighter/strike	(1980)	1982	(6)	
						1983	(6)	
						1984	(6)	
						1985	(6)	
		..	MiG-29	Fighter	(1984)			Unconfirmed
		2	Tu-126	AEW	(1981)			Unconfirmed
		(800)	BMP-1	MICV	1981	1982	(100)	
						1983	(100)	
						1984	(100)	
						1985	(100)	
		(36)	BTR-40PB Gaskin	AAV (M)	1978	(1981)	(6)	
						(1982)	(6)	
						(1983)	(6)	
						(1984)	(6)	
						(1985)	(6)	
		(200)	M-1973 152 mm	SPG	1981	1982	(50)	Designation unconfirmed
						1983	(50)	
					1984	(50)		
					1985	(50)		
	(500)	M-1974 122 mm	SPH	1981	1982	(100)	Designation unconfirmed	
					1983	(100)		
					1984	(100)		
					1985	(100)		
	..	SA-13 TELAR	AAV (M)	(1984)	1981	(150)	Unconfirmed	
	..	T-72	MBT	1980	1982	(150)		
					1983	(200)		
					1984	(200)		
					1985	(200)		
	(250)	T-74	MBT	(1985)	(1985)	(100)	Unconfirmed reports of deliveries of up to 250	
	..	ZSU-23-4 Shilka	AAV	1981	(1982)	(25)		
					(1983)	(25)		
					(1984)	(25)		
					(1985)	(25)		
	(1 380)	AA-2 Atoll	AAM	(1979)	1981	(120)	Arming MiG-23/25/27s	
					1982	(120)		
					1983	(330)		
					1984	(270)		
					1985	(210)		
	..	AA-6 Acrid	AAM	(1984)	(1984)	(50)	Unconfirmed: arming MiG-25s	
					(1985)	(50)		
	..	AA-7 Apex	AAM	(1984)	(1984)	(50)	Unconfirmed: arming MiG-21s and MiG-23s	
					(1985)	(50)		
	..	AA-8 Aphid	AAM	(1984)	(1984)	(20)	Unconfirmed: arming MiG-21s and MiG-23s	
					(1985)	(20)		
	..	AT-4 Spigot	ATM	(1980)	(1981)	(50)	Captured by Israeli forces in Lebanon	
					(1982)	(50)		
					(1983)	(100)		
					(1984)	(100)		
					(1985)	(100)		
	..	AT-5 Spandrel	ATM	(1984)	(1984)	(100)	Unconfirmed	
					(1985)	(100)		
	..	SA-13 Gopher	Landmob SAM	(1984)			Acc to Israeli reports: to replace SA-9s	
	..	SA-7 Grail	Port SAM	1978	(1981)	(25)		
					(1982)	(25)		
					(1983)	(50)		
					(1984)	(50)		
					(1985)	(50)		
	..	SA-8 Gecko	Landmob SAM	1982	(1982)	(64)	Designation unconfirmed: part of upgrading of SAM network around major Syrian cities: deal incl MiG-27 fighter aircraft	
					(1983)	(64)		
					(1984)	(64)		
					(1985)	(64)		

Recipient	Supplier	No. ordered	Weapon designation	Weapon description	Year of order	Year of delivery	No. delivered	Comments	
Syria (continued)		..	SA-9 Gaskin	Landmob SAM	1978	(1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985)	(48) (48) (48) (48) (48)		
		(12) 1 2	SSN-2 Styx Naty Class Osa-2 Class	ShShM MSO FAC	(1985) (1984) (1985)	1985 1985 1985	(12) 1 2	Arming Osa-2 Class FACs	
	Lebanon Syria	2 18 (50)	EDIC/EDA Type D-74 122 mm T-54	LS TG MBT	(1982) (1985) (1985)	1985 (1985) (1985)	2 (18) (50)	For Amal militia: unconfirmed For Amal militia: acc to Phalangist reports: 18 122 mm artillery pieces and some rocket launchers reportedly also received US LoO 1984	
	USA	35	M-60 A-3	MBT	(1984)				
Israel	USA	11	F-15A Eagle	Fighter	1982			Compensatory offer due to sale of extra equipment for Saudi F-15s: order incl 22 fuel tanks, 6 spare engines and support equipment	
		75	F-16C	Fighter/strike	1983			In addition to 75 in service: total cost: \$2 700 m. of which half is grant and half is credit: offset purchases of F-16 components in Israel valued at \$300 m.: for delivery 1985/88	
		(10) 2	Model 209 AH-1S SA-366	Hel. Hel.	(1985) (1985)	(1985) 1985	(10) 2	In addition to 36 delivered earlier Ex-US Coast Guard: for evaluation: require- ment for 16-20	
		300	M-60-A3	MBT	1979	1981 1982 1983 1984 1985	(50) (65) (50) (50) (35)		
		150	AIM-7M Sparrow	AAM/SAM	1983			Arming F-15s: US LoO Jul 1983; total cost: \$52 m.	
		200 ..	AIM-9L RGM-84A Harpoon	AAM ShShM	1983 (1978)	(1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985)	(20) (20) (20) (20) (20)	US LoO Mar 1983 At least 100 ordered to complement Gabriel ShShM; ASHM version for F-4 probably also ordered	
Egypt	China	(110)	F-7	Fighter	1980	1983 1984 1985	(10) (35) (35)	Last 80 assembled in Egypt	
		(2)	Jianghu Class	Frigate	1983	1984 1985	1 1		
		.. 2 20 (20)	Luda Class Romeo Class Mirage-2000 Mirage-2000	Destroyer Submarine Fighter/strike Fighter/strike	(1985) (1984) 1981 (1985)	(1985) (1985) (1986)	(2) (20)	Unconfirmed Third pair of ex-Chinese navy submarines Ordered Dec 1981, total cost: \$1000 m. Option on 16-20 more taken up 1984 but still under discussion: assembly in Egypt possi- ble	
	(60) .. (288)	ARMAT AS-30L HOT	ARM ASM ATM	1984 1983 1981	(1985) (1985) 1984 1985	(20) (50) (240) (48)	Arming Mirage-2000s Arming Mirage-2000s Arming 24 of 36 Gazelle helicopters ordered 1981		
	R-440 Crotale R-550 Magic Super-530	Landmob SAM AAM AAM	(1984) 1983 1983	(1985) (1985) (1985)	(48) (60) (60)	Third order Arming Mirage-2000s Arming Mirage-2000s		
	Netherlands	2	Alkmaar Class	Minehunter	(1986)			Tripartite type: negotiating; total cost approx.: \$80 m.	
	Spain	600	BMR-600	ICV	1982	1984	(250)	Total cost incl 3 000 trucks and 700 coaches: \$400 m.	
		6	Cormoran Class	FAC	(1986)			Negotiating; competing with shipyards in South Korea, Italy, UK and USA	
	USA	4	S-70 Class	Submarine	(1986)			Negotiating	
		6 4	Commuter-1900 E-2C Hawkeye	Transport AEW	(1985) 1983	1985 (1986)	1 (1)	For electronic surveillance First 2 for delivery 1985-6; total cost for 4 aircraft: \$689 m.; remaining 2 for delivery 1987 along with fifth aircraft ordered 1984	
		1	E-2C Hawkeye	AEW	1984			In addition to 4 on order: for delivery May 1987; total cost incl spares: \$50 m.	
			34	F-16C	Fighter/strike	1982	(1986)	(8)	Agreement in principle for a total of 150 air- craft: total cost incl 6 F-16D trainers: \$1.2 b.
			6 3 48 472	F-16D Gulfstream-3 M-109-A2 155 mm M-113-A2	Fighter/trainer Transport SPH APC	1982 (1983) (1985) (1984)	(1986) 1985	(6) 3	For VIP use In addition to 100 supplied in 1984 US LoO Mar 1984; 354 A2s, 43 M-806 ARVs, 52 fitter vehicles and 23 ambulance vehicles; total value incl M-125-A2-M577- A2s and M-548s: \$157 m.
			19 42	M-125-A2 M-198 155 mm	APC TH	1984 1983		US LoO Mar 1984 US LoO Oct 1983	

Recipient	Supplier	No. ordered	Weapon designation	Weapon description	Year of order	Year of delivery	No. delivered	Comments
Egypt (continued)		33	M-548	APC	1984			US LoO Mar 1984 US LoO Mar 1984 In addition to 439 already on order: for delivery from 1984; deal incl 23 M-88-A1 ARVs Exempted from temporary US ban on arms sales to Middle East imposed Jan 1985 US LoO Dec 1985; pending congressional approval; in addition to 94 ordered earlier 1985 Total cost: \$63 m. To arm Skyguard air defence system; US LoO Feb 1984 In addition to 300 delivered Apr 1983 Order incl 24 launch units in 4 bty: in addition to 12 bty ordered 1979 Third order Total cost incl 26 towed launchers: \$160 m.; total requirement to replace Soviet systems: about 60 launchers
		13	M-577-A2	CPC	1984			
		220	M-60-A3	MBT	1982	1984 1985	(100) (120)	
		94	M-60-A3	MBT	1985			
		36	M-60-A3	MBT	(1985)			
		23	M-88-A1	ARV	1982	(1984) (1985)	(11) (12)	
		56	M-88-A1	ARV	1984	1984		
		424	AIM-7M Sparrow	AAM/SAM	(1984)	1985 (1986)	(48) (144)	
		150	AIM-9L	AAM	1983	(1984) (1985)	(75) (75)	
		72	MIM-23B Hawk	Landmob SAM	1982	(1985) (1986)	(36) (36)	
	(120) 483	MIM-23B Hawk MIM-72F	Landmob SAM SAM/ShAM	(1985) 1984				
Libya	Brazil	(8)	EMB-111	Mar patrol	(1986)			Negotiating Negotiating Negotiating for 100-150 aircraft Negotiating Negotiating Negotiating Ordered Jun 1985; in addition to 12 in service Negotiating To arm 4 new Wadi Class corvettes In addition to 4 in service; to be armed with Otomat-2 ShShMs; named Assad Class Spanish offer renewed Unconfirmed Some systems reportedly delivered Nov 1985 Arming Nanuchka Class corvettes Arming Nanuchka Class corvettes Land-based version for protection of Gulf of Sirte Armed with SSN-2 Styx, ShShM and SA-N4 SAMs In addition to 6 in service Unspecified number ordered; in addition to some in service Reconfirmed 1985; based on Swedish Spica design; armed with 4 Styx ShShMs and 76 mm, 40 mm and 30 mm guns
		25	EMB-121 Xingu	Transport	(1986)			
		(100)	EMB-312 Tucano	Trainer	(1986)			
		..	EE-11 Urutu	APC	(1986)			
		..	EE-9 Cascavel	AC	(1986)			
		..	EE-T1 Osorio	MBT	(1986)			
	Czechoslovakia	6	Let L-410	Transport	1985			
	Greece	..	Steyr-4K 7FA	APC	(1986)			
	Italy	210	Palmaria 155 mm	SPH	1981	1982 1983 1984 1985	12 (50) (80) (68)	
	..	4	Otomat-2 Wadi Class	ShShM Corvette	(1985) (1985)			
	Spain	4	S-70 Class	Submarine	(1986)			
	USSR	(15)	An-26 Curl	Light plane	(1985)	(1985)	(15)	
	SA-5 Gammon	SAM	(1985)	(1985)	(30)	
	..	(12)	SA-N-4	ShAM	1980	1981 1983 1984 1985	(3) (3) (3) (3)	
	..	(48)	SSN-2 Styx	ShShM	1980	1981 1983 1984 1985	(12) (12) (12) (12)	
	SSN-2 Styx	ShShM	(1982)	1983 1984 1985	(36) (36) (36)	
	..	4	Nanuchka Class	Corvette	1980	1981 1983 1984 1985	1 1 1 1	
	Yugoslavia	1	Natya Class	MSO	1984	1985	1	
	G-2AE Galeb	Jet trainer	(1983)	(1984) (1985)	(6) (6)	
	..	4	Koncar Class	FAC	1981			
Tunisia	Brazil	..	EE-3 Jararaca	SC	(1984)			Unconfirmed To replace old transport aircraft Order number reportedly changed from 6
	USA	2	C-130H Hercules	Transport	1984	(1985)	(2)	
	..	(8)	F-5E Tiger-2	Fighter	1982	(1984) (1985)	(1) (7)	
Algeria	Brazil	..	EE-9 Cascavel	AC	(1986)			Negotiating package incl Urutu APCs, trucks and technology transfers; total value: approx. \$400 m. Reportedly ordered Negotiating
	France	(4 000)	VP-2000	APC	1983	(1984) (1985)	(500) (1 000)	
	UK	(16)	Hawk	Jet trainer/strike	(1985)			
	USSR	..	D-30 122 mm	TH	(1982)	(1983) (1984) (1985)	(50) (50) (50)	
..	Yugoslavia	..	G-4 Super Galeb	Jet trainer	(1986)			
Morocco	Argentina	(20)	IA-58A Pucara	COIN	(1985)			17 on loan from Libya for training prior to delivery from Brazil Negotiating
	Brazil	60	EE-11 Urutu	APC	(1985)			
	France	24	Mirage-2000	Fighter/strike	(1986)			

Recipient	Supplier	No. ordered	Weapon designation	Weapon description	Year of order	Year of delivery	No. delivered	Comments
Morocco (continued)		..	AML-90	AC	(1978)	(1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985)	(20) (30) (30) (30) (30)	
		108	AMX-10RC	Recce AC	1978	1982 1983 (1984)	(10) (20) (10)	Delivery started 1982 but stopped in 1984 due to funding problems
		423	VAB	APC	1975	1981 1982 1983 1984	(75) (75) (75) (75)	Several versions; last 32 (VAB Mephisto) held up for financial reasons
	Spain USA	3 1	Lazaga Class KC-130H	PC/FAC Tanker/transport	(1985) (1985)			Option on 3 more In addition to 4 in service

Source: Extracted from SIPRI "World Armaments and Disarmament 1986", Appendix 17B.

Note to original table

This appendix lists major weapons on order or under delivery during 1985. Certain deals close to finalisation by early 1986 are included with order year (1986). Deliveries made before 1981 for the same sales agreement have been excluded for space reasons.

The following conventions are used in the arms trade registers:

.. Information not available.

() Uncertain data or SIPRI estimate.

Abbreviations and acronyms

AA	Anti-aircraft	LoO	Letter of Offer
AAG	Anti-aircraft gun	MAP	Military Assistance Programme
AAM	Air-to-air missile	Mar patrol	Maritime patrol aircraft
AAV	Anti-aircraft vehicle (gun-armed)	MBT	Main battle tank
AAV(M)	Anti-aircraft vehicle (missile-armed)	MG	Machine-gun
AC	Armoured car	MICV	Mechanised infantry combat vehicle
Acc to	According to	Mk	Mark
ADV	Air defence version	MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
Adv	Advanced	MRCA	Multi-rôle combat aircraft
AEW	Airborne early-warning system	MRL	Multiple rocket launcher
AF	Air Force	MSC	Minesweeper, coastal
APC	Armoured personnel carrier	MSO	Minesweeper, ocean
ARM	Anti-radar missile	MT	Medium tank
ARV	Armoured recovery vehicle	OPV	Offshore patrol vessel
AShM	Air-to-ship missile	PC	Patrol craft (gun-armed/unarmed)
ASM	Air-to-surface missile	PDM	Point defence missile
ASSV	Assault vehicle	Port	Portable
ASW	Anti-submarine warfare	RAF	Royal Air Force (UK)
ATM	Anti-tank missile	RAAF	Royal Australian Air Force
AV	Armoured vehicle	Recce	Reconnaissance (aircraft/vehicle)
BL	Bridge-layer	SAM	Surface-to-air missile
Bty	Battery	SAR	Search and rescue
COIN	Counter-insurgency	SC	Scout car
CPC	Command post carrier	SEK	Swedish crowns
DoD	Department of Defence (USA)	ShAM	Ship-to-air missile
FAC	Fast attack craft (missile/torpedo-armed)	ShShM	Ship-to-ship missile
FY	Fiscal year	SLBM	Submarine-launched ballistic missile
Grd	Ground	SPG	Self-propelled gun
Hel	Helicopter	SPH	Self-propelled howitzer
ICV	Infantry combat vehicle	SShM	Surface-to-ship missile
IDS	Interdictor/strike version	SSM	Surface-to-surface missile
Incl	Including/includes	SuShM	Submarine-to-ship missile
Landmob	Land-mobile (missile)	TD	Tank destroyer (gun-armed)
LC	Landing craft (< 600 t displacement)	TD(M)	Tank destroyer (missile-armed)
LS	Landing ship (> 600 t displacement)	TG	Towed gun
LT	Light tank	TH	Towed howitzer
		Trpt	Transport
		VIP	Very important person

*First part of the thirty-second annual report of the Council
to the Assembly of Western European Union*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction

I. Activities of the Council

1. East-West relations and European security
2. SDI
3. Armaments co-operation
4. Enlargement
5. Security in the Mediterranean
6. International terrorism
7. Co-operation between European security and defence research institutes

II. Ministerial organs

1. The WEU Council
2. Activities of the ministerial organs in Paris
3. Strengthening of the Secretariat-General in London

III. Relations between the Council and the Assembly

1. General considerations
2. The various aspects of the dialogue between the Council and the Assembly in the first half of 1986

APPENDICES

- I. Communiqué issued after the ministerial meeting of the Council of Western European Union, Venice, 29th-30th April 1986
- II. Establishment tables for the Secretariat-General and for the agencies

Introduction

In the first half of 1986 the Council, with the participation of Foreign and Defence Ministers, met on 29th and 30th April in Venice under the chairmanship of Mr. Andreotti, the Italian Foreign Minister.

In the communiqué issued after this ministerial meeting, the Ministers recalled the important rôle of WEU in the process of European construction. They reaffirmed their attachment to WEU as a forum in which the governments concerned could address specific European concerns in the security field within the framework of their membership of the Atlantic Alliance. In so doing, the Ministers endorsed the principle set out in the Rome declaration.

In presenting the results of the Ministerial Council, the Chairman-in-Office of the Council

recalled at the Assembly on 3rd June in Paris the rôle WEU should play in reinforcing European security, strengthening Atlantic solidarity and promoting the process of European integration.

Addressing the Assembly on these various points, Mr. Tindemans, Belgian Minister for External Relations, stressed the complementary nature of the work done by WEU and within the framework of European political co-operation, a reality which has, moreover, been enshrined in the single European act.

Mr. Andreotti expressed the satisfaction of the Foreign and Defence Ministers at the Venice discussions on questions concerning the United States-Soviet negotiations in Geneva and other important aspects of the disarmament process.

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I. Activities of the Council

The following points relate to the Council's discussions, in particular at ministerial level in Venice and at the first part of the thirty-second session of the Assembly, as well as to the positions expressed by the Council in its replies to the Assembly's recommendations and written questions.

1. East-West relations and European security

During the first half of 1986, the Council discussed, on several occasions, developments regarding East-West relations, particularly from the arms control and disarmament point of view.

In Venice the Ministers recalled that the fundamental objective of arms control, both conventional and nuclear, must be to strengthen security and stability at the lowest possible level of forces.

(a) Negotiations between the United States and the USSR (nuclear forces)

Through the Ministers in Venice, at the Assembly and in its reply to Recommendation 425, the Council expressed its support for the efforts made by the United States in the talks with the Soviet Union about their nuclear weapons and space. It welcomed the various ongoing and close consultations among the allies and the American resolve to take European concerns fully into consideration.

With regard to nuclear forces, WEU member states recall the position put forward by the alliance at the ministerial meeting held in Halifax on 29th and 30th May 1986; on this occasion, the Ministers expressed their support for the United States efforts to achieve deep cuts in Soviet and United States nuclear forces. They added that in all negotiating fora in which they were engaged, the participating allies had presented detailed proposals directed at enhancing stability and security. They awaited an equally constructive response at the negotiating table from the Soviet Union and other members of the Warsaw Pact. Public statements alone were not enough.

(b) Multilateral negotiations (conventional forces)

The Council was concerned at the imbalance in conventional forces throughout Europe in favour of the Warsaw Pact; in Venice, the Ministers underlined the factor of instability that it represents and stated that progress towards balanced and verifiable reductions of conventional forces would represent a very significant contribution to the strengthening of security and peace in Europe. They hoped that in this field,

as in the nuclear field, the Soviet Union would translate its words into deeds at the negotiating table.

They underlined their countries' continued efforts in the context of negotiations in multilateral fora such as those on a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons in Geneva (CD) or those in Vienna on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR). The Ministers considered it necessary to intensify the negotiations at the conference on confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe (CDE) taking place in Stockholm, in order that substantial results could be achieved before the third CSCE follow-up conference in the autumn of 1986.

The concern of the WEU member states at the imbalance in conventional forces in Europe was shared by all the allies who, on 30th May 1986 in Halifax, decided to set up a high-level task-force on conventional arms control.

2. SDI

SDI is a topic on which there has been an exchange of views between the Council and the Assembly principally through Recommendations 428 and 430, Written Questions 263 and 266 and their respective replies.

At their meeting in Bonn on 22nd and 23rd April 1985, the Ministers agreed to achieve as far as possible a co-ordinated reaction of their governments to the invitation of the United States to participate in the research programme, without thereby setting as an aim the adoption of a common stance on SDI in view of the different approaches adopted by member governments towards their possible participation.

The special working group set up following the Bonn decision has presented two interim reports to the Ministers, one at their meeting in Rome on 14th November 1985 and the other at their meeting in Venice on 29th and 30th April 1986.

At this last meeting, the Ministers decided that the work of WEU should continue to deal with questions of technology, principally those concerned with possible participation in the SDI research programme and the politico-strategic implications of possible developments in the field of ballistic missile defence.

The group has therefore devoted its time to defining and pursuing a long-term programme of work covering the technological, technico-military and politico-military aspects of the subject.

Each meeting has also provided an opportunity for an exchange of information between the member governments.

3. Armaments co-operation

The Council has discussed European armaments co-operation on several occasions.

In order to avoid duplication with the competent institutions in this field, the Council saw the rôle of WEU as a complementary one providing political impetus to the various efforts undertaken in the field of armaments co-operation, including those of the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG). Speaking on 2nd June to the parliamentarians, the Secretary-General said that contacts had already been made with the IEPG to prevent any duplication and to promote a regular exchange of information.

Recalling the cost of research, development and production of weapons systems, particularly those involving emerging technology, the Ministers in Venice welcomed the progress which had been made in the IEPG on harmonising military requirements and in launching co-operative research projects. They requested that studies be undertaken on the management of resources and the implications of rising defence costs.

4. Enlargement

The Council examined on several occasions, and in particular at ministerial level in Venice, the question of enlargement.

It considers that possible enlargement would involve prior completion of several stages, i.e. the consolidation of the reactivation process and the confirmation of the tasks and new structures of WEU, as well as the in-depth examination of the political conditions and legal implications of accession, in particular the applicability to new members of all the provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty and its additional protocols.

The Council has begun this twofold process which should be accomplished by the end of the transitional period on 31st December 1987. Indeed, with the Ministers having agreed in Venice that preliminary contacts should be made with the interested countries, the Secretary-General has already held talks on 26th May 1986 in Lisbon with the Portuguese authorities.

5. Security in the Mediterranean

Security in the Mediterranean continued to be one of the most sensitive aspects of the European dimension of common security. At their meeting in Venice the Ministers discussed the risks of destabilisation in this region. They paid close attention to the unstable situation pre-

vailing in the Mediterranean area. They stressed the rôle which Western European countries could continue to play in order to reduce tension in the area and agreed to examine this point in greater depth. The countries of Western Europe should continue to promote understanding and co-operation among countries in the Mediterranean area.

6. International terrorism

At their meeting in Venice, the Ministers considered the problem of international terrorism. They stated that terrorism constituted a serious threat to security and underlined the importance of early and effective action to implement the measures that the countries of Western Europe had agreed upon to combat this scourge.

The Council has stated its position on this matter in its reply to Written Question 269, in which it stressed the importance of the declaration of the Foreign Ministers of the Twelve on 14th April 1986 on international terrorism and of the Halifax declaration of 30th May 1986 by the Ministers of the alliance. In its reply to Written Question 268, the Council considered that not only those countries belonging to WEU but as many countries as possible should co-operate in the fight against terrorism and that anti-terrorist action was already being co-ordinated in other fora, in particular by the Twelve, which had already adopted significant measures in this sphere.

7. Co-operation between European security and defence research institutes

At their meeting in Venice, the Ministers mandated the Permanent Council to look for ways of strengthening co-operation between existing European academic and research institutions in the field of security and defence. The contacts made confirmed the interest aroused by this project which forms part of the process of increasing public awareness of European security requirements.

To this end, the Secretary-General has sought expert advice. In pursuing its reflection on the subject, the Council will, of course, take possible budgetary implications into account.

II. Ministerial organs

1. The WEU Council

The process of WEU reactivation has been reflected in the increased work rate of the Council and the other ministerial organs.

During the period under review, the Council met thirteen times at permanent representa-

tive level, one meeting being attended by the political directors or their representatives (enlarged Council of 19th March 1986).

It was assisted in its work by its working group which met twenty-three times. It was also assisted by an SDI special working group (five meetings) composed of experts from the capitals, members of the London embassies and the staff of the Secretariat-General.

2. Activities of the ministerial organs in Paris

The Assembly was informed in March, in a letter from the Secretary-General to President Caro, of the activities of the new agencies for security questions which, as indicated in the Bonn communiqué, were to carry out studies requested by the Council. In the first half of 1986 the agencies began their work, the results of which will constitute internal working documents intended to contribute to the Council's reflection on the subjects addressed.

In order to acquire the information necessary for their activities, the agencies are establishing links with relevant international bodies and national administrations. Any classified information released to the WEU ministerial organs will be restricted to their exclusive use.

3. Strengthening of the Secretariat-General in London

The definite establishment table for the Secretariat-General in London, as approved by the Ministers on 14th November in Rome, is now in the process of being completed following recruitment of staff. In recruiting, attention was paid to efficiency and optimum output, on the one hand, and the aim of achieving the fairest national balance of posts, on the other.

III. Relations between the Council and the Assembly

1. The various forms of the dialogue may be summarised as follows

The Council has recognised the value of informal meetings similar to the one held on 21st January 1986 in Paris and on 8th April in Rome and is prepared to have further meetings of this kind, in particular before the Assembly's sessions.

The Council will present its report in two half-yearly parts and transmit, if appropriate, written information concerning certain of its activities. Clearly, this would have to be subject to the standards of confidentiality imposed on the Council by the very nature of its work.

The Council's replies to the Assembly's recommendations and written questions would of course remain the normal channel for an offi-

cial communication of the Council's standpoint on specific issues raised by the Assembly.

2. The various aspects of the dialogue between the Council and the Assembly in the first half of 1986

(a) The following documents were transmitted to the Assembly:

- (i) the thirty-first annual report of the Council on its activities for the period 1st January to 31st December 1985 communicated in implementation of Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty;
- (ii) the Council's replies to Recommendations 425 to 431 which the Assembly had adopted during the second part of its thirty-first ordinary session;
- (iii) the Council's replies to Written Questions 262 to 264, 266 and 268 posed by members of the Assembly;
- (iv) the declassified version of the report drawn up by the international secretariat of the SAC on the prospects for future developments in the Japanese armaments industry and the possible repercussions for Europe.

(b) There were several contacts between the Council and the Assembly bodies:

- (i) 21st January in Paris: meeting between the Permanent Council, under the chairmanship of Mr. Corti, Italian State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, representing the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, and the Presidential Committee of the Assembly to discuss relations between the Council and the Assembly;
- (ii) 8th April in Rome: meeting between the Council, under the chairmanship of Mr. Andreotti, Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Chairman-in-Office of the Council, and the Assembly Committee for Relations with the Council to discuss several topical questions and the preparation of the ministerial meeting in Venice;
- (iii) 30th April in Venice: presentation of the conclusions of the ministerial meeting by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Mr. Andreotti, to the President of the Assembly accompanied by parliamentarians;
- (iv) 4th June in Paris: Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General, was received by the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations.

APPENDIX I

*Communiqué issued after the ministerial meeting
of the Council of Western European Union**Venice, 29th-30th April 1986*

1. Foreign and Defence Ministers of Western European Union met in Venice on 29th and 30th April 1986. They recalled the important rôle of WEU in the process of European construction. They reaffirmed their attachment to WEU as a forum in which the governments concerned can address specific European concerns in the security field within the framework of their membership of the Atlantic Alliance. These concerns relate both to the need for effective and appropriate defence capabilities and to the specific implications for security and stability in Europe of developments in the various arms control negotiations.

2. The Ministers stressed the importance of the contribution to common security made by the member states and expressed their appreciation of the contribution which the independent nuclear forces of France and the United Kingdom make to deterrence. They recalled the indivisible nature of western security and their firm determination to strengthen the ties and the solidarity which bind them together and to the other members of the alliance.

3. The Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to the improvement of East-West relations through the promotion of contact and dialogue. In this respect they recalled the importance of the CSCE process.

They emphasised that a climate of confidence is important for progress in the field of arms control and disarmament. They noted the need to find solutions in all negotiating fora that take full account of the security interests of their countries.

The Ministers recalled that the fundamental objective of arms control, both conventional and nuclear, must be to strengthen security and stability at the lowest possible level of forces.

4. The Ministers expressed their support for the efforts made by the United States in the talks with the Soviet Union about their nuclear weapons and space. They welcomed the various ongoing and close consultations among the allies and the American resolve to take European concerns fully into consideration.

The expressed the hope that the Soviet Union would give practical effect at the negotiating table to its stated intention to reach equitable and verifiable arms control agreements.

5. The Ministers stressed that the ongoing negotiations on United States and Soviet longer-

range intermediate nuclear forces are of particular interest to Europe. They recalled the importance they attach to the objective of progressive reductions leading to the global elimination of this category of weapons within the framework of effectively verifiable agreements. In this context the emergence of new areas of instability should be prevented by adequate measures.

6. The Ministers underlined that imbalances in the field of conventional forces throughout Europe equally constitute a factor of instability. Progress towards balanced and verifiable reductions of conventional forces would thus represent a very significant contribution to the strengthening of security and peace in Europe. The Ministers hope that, in this field, the Soviet Union will translate into deeds at the negotiating table its recent statements. They underlined their countries' continued efforts in the context of negotiations in multilateral fora such as those on a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons in Geneva (CD) and on mutual and balanced force reductions in Vienna (MBFR). The Ministers considered it necessary to intensify the negotiations at the conference on confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe (CDE) taking place in Stockholm, in order that substantial results can be achieved before the third CSCE follow-up conference in the autumn of this year.

7. The Ministers recalled the increasingly complex problems caused by the cost of research, development and production of weapons systems, particularly those involving emerging technology. They underlined the importance of co-operative efforts designed to help strengthen their defence capabilities.

The Ministers welcomed the progress which had been made in the IEPG on harmonising military requirements and in launching co-operative research projects. They particularly welcomed the decision taken in Madrid on 28th April concerning co-operation in the military aeronautics sector.

The Ministers requested that studies be undertaken on the management of resources and the implications of rising defence costs.

8. The Ministers also considered an up-to-date report on issues relating to the SDI research programme provided by a working group of the Permanent Council. They decided that the work of WEU should continue to deal with questions related to participation in the SDI research programme and the politico-strategic implica-


tions for Europe of possible developments in the field of ballistic missile defence.

9. The Ministers exchanged views on security in the Mediterranean and the risks of destabilisation in this region. They stressed the rôle which Western European countries can continue to play in order to reduce tension in the area. They agreed to examine this point in greater depth.


10. They gave special attention to the threat to security posed by international terrorism and underlined the importance of early and effective action to implement the measures that the countries of Western Europe have agreed upon to combat this scourge.

11. The Ministers also reviewed the progress made since the October 1984 meeting in Rome in relaunching the organisation and exchanged views on its future prospects. In this spirit, they recognised the importance of good co-ordination among the various institutions capable of contributing to a Western European dimension of common security.

12. The Ministers mandated the Permanent Council to make proposals, at their next meeting, on ways of strengthening co-operation between existing European academic and research institutions in the field of security and defence, thus improving the quality of their research relevant to WEU.



Establishment table of the agencies for security questions



137

* Double function : Director of Agency I and Director of A.C.A.
 ** Double function : Staff member of Agency I and Deputy Director of A.C.A.

Head, Finance and Admin.	1 A.4/5
Dep. Finance and Admin.	1 A.3/4
Dep. Legal Adviser	1 A.3/4
	5 B.4
	2 B.3
	1 B.2
	1 C.5
	2 C.4

Disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council

REVISED REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments ²
by Mr. Amadei, Rapporteur*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

REVISED DRAFT RECOMMENDATION

on disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Mr. Amadei, Rapporteur

I. Introduction

II. Activities of the Council

III. Agency for the Control of Armaments

(a) Conventional weapons

(b) ABC weapons

IV. Standing Armaments Committee

V. International negotiations on the control of armaments

(a) General

(b) Bilateral negotiations

(i) Intermediate-range nuclear forces

(ii) Strategic nuclear weapons

(iii) Space weapons

(iv) Consequences of the Reykjavik summit meeting

(c) Mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe

(i) The western initiative of 5th December 1985

(ii) Immediate Warsaw Pact reactions and its written answer of
20th February 1986

(iii) Present situation

(iv) The future: from the Atlantic to the Urals?

(d) The conference on disarmament in Europe

– Refraining from the threat or use of force

– Prior notification of certain military activities

– Observation of certain military activities

1. Adopted in committee by 8 votes to 7 with 0 abstentions.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Kittelmann (Alternate: *Lenzer*) (Chairman); Mr. Cifarelli, Dr. Miller (Alternate: *Brown*) (Vice-Chairmen); MM. *Amadei*, de Beer, *Sir Frederic Bennett*, MM. *Bérégovoy*, van den Bergh, Bourges, *De Decker*, *Dejardin*, *Edwards*, Ertl, Galley, *Gerstl*, Giust, Konen, de Kwaadsteniet, *Lemmrich*, *Matraja*, Pecchioli (Alternate: *Antoni*), Sarti, *Scheer*, *Sir Dudley Smith*, MM. *Steverlynck* (Alternate: *Close*), *Stokes*, *Wirth*.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

- Annual calendars
- Constraining provisions
- Compliance and verification
- Annexes

(e) Comprehensive nuclear test ban

(f) Chemical weapons

(g) Space weapons

VI. Conclusions

VII. Opinion of the minority

APPENDICES

- I. Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Assembly – 17th March 1986 (Extract)
- II. Appeal by the Warsaw Treaty member states to the member states of NATO and to all European countries for a programme to reduce armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe – Budapest, 10th-11th June 1986
- III. North Atlantic Council statement on conventional arms control – Halifax, 29th-30th May 1986

Introductory Note

In preparing this report *the Rapporteur* arranged for the following representatives to the MBFR talks in Vienna to be interviewed on his behalf on 7th and 8th March 1986:

Mr. Jozef Sestak, Deputy Head, Delegation of Czechoslovakia, and Dr. Lenka Novotna;
H.E. Mr. J.H.L. van de Mortel, Ambassador, Head of the Netherlands Delegation, and Mr. Pieter Jan Wolthers;

Mr. Kent Brown, Adviser, US Delegation;

H.E. Mr. Michael Alexander, Ambassador, Head of the UK Delegation;

H.E. Mr. Valerian Mikhailov, Ambassador, Head of the Delegation of the USSR;

Dr. Jürgen Pöhlmann, Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany;

Mr. Krzysztof Stronczynski, member of the Polish Delegation.

The committee as a whole adopted the first version of this report at its meeting in Venice on 29th April 1986. It subsequently met in Washington DC and Norfolk, Virginia, from 16th to 20th June 1986, when it was addressed by or met with:

16th June 1986

State Department, Washington DC

Ms. Rozanne Ridgway, Ambassador, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs;

Mr. Charles Thomas, Ambassador, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs;

Mr. John Hawes, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political Military Affairs;

Mr. Edward Rowny, Ambassador, Special Representative for Strategic Arms Negotiations.

Congressional Research Service, Washington DC

Mr. Stanley Sloan, Specialist in US Alliance Relations;

Mr. Paul Gallis, Analyst in West European Affairs;

Mr. Charles Gellner, Senior Specialist, International Affairs;

Mr. Stuart Goldman, Analyst in Soviet Affairs;

Mr. Steven Hildreth, Analyst in National Defence;

Mr. Francis Miko, Specialist in International Relations;

Ms. Charlotte Preece, Specialist in West European Affairs;

Mr. Dagnija Sterste-Perkins, Foreign Affairs Analyst;

Ms. Jeanette Voas, Arms Control Analyst;

Mr. Paul Zinsmeister, Specialist in National Defence.

Brookings Institution, Washington DC

Mr. Joshua Epstein, Research Associate in the Brookings Foreign Policy Studies Programme.

17th June 1986

Department of Defence, Washington DC

Mr. Fred Iklé, Undersecretary of Defence for Policy;

Dr. Winfred Joshua and Colonel Don Scott, Defence Intelligence Agency;

Mr. Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of Defence;

Mr. Frank Gaffney, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for Nuclear Forces and Arms Control Policy;

Mr. Douglas Feith, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for Negotiations, Policy;

Mr. Frank Cevasco, Director NATO Affairs, Defence Research and Engineering;

Mr. Robert Mullen, Assistant Deputy Under-Secretary for Trade Security Policy.

18th June 1986

United States House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services

Mr. Samuel Stratton, Representative of New York, and members of the committee:

Democrats

Mr. Melvin Price;

Mr. Charles E. Bennett;

Mr. G.V. (Sonny) Montgomery;

Mr. Earl Hutto;

Mr. Ike Skelton;

Mr. Thomas M. Foglietta;

Mr. Richard Ray;

Mr. Solomon P. Ortiz;

Mr. Albert G. Bustamante;

Republicans

Mr. G. William Whitehurst;

Mr. Robert E. Badham.

19th June 1986

Headquarters Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, Norfolk, Virginia

Admiral Lee Baggett, US Navy, Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, and staff;

Vice-Admiral Sir Geoffrey Dolton, RN, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic;

Vice-Admiral Bernard Cauderer, US Navy, Commander Submarine Force US Atlantic Fleet;

Rear-Admiral Jerry Tuttle, US Navy, Deputy and Chief-of-Staff for the Commander-in-Chief US Atlantic Fleet, and staff.

20th June 1986

Arms Control Association, Washington DC

Mr. Paul Warnke, former Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency;

Mr. Spurgeon Keeny, President of the Arms Control Association.

It met subsequently in Geneva on 24th and 25th July 1986, when it was addressed by the following representatives to the Conference on Disarmament:

H.E. Mr. Victor Issraelyan, Ambassador, Representative of the Soviet Union;

H.E. Mr. Robert van Schaik, Ambassador, Representative of the Netherlands;

H.E. Mr. Donald Lowitz, Ambassador, Representative of the United States;

H.E. Mr. Rolf Ekeus, Ambassador, Head of the Swedish Delegation;

H.E. Mr. Ian Cromartie, Ambassador, Leader of the United Kingdom Delegation and Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Chemical Weapons Ban;

H.E. Dr. Henning Wegener, Ambassador, Head of the Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany;

H.E. Mr. Mansur Ahmad, Ambassador, Head of the Delegation of Pakistan.

The committee subsequently discussed and adopted the present report at its meeting at the seat of the Assembly, Paris, on 3rd November 1986.

The committee and the Rapporteur express their thanks to the Ministers, members of Congress, officials and senior officers who met the Rapporteur or committee and replied to questions. In particular the Rapporteur thanks those members of the staff of the WEU agency for the study of arms control and disarmament who assisted in the preparation of the report.

The views expressed in the report, unless otherwise attributed, are those of the committee.

Revised draft Recommendation

on disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council

The Assembly,

- (i) Regretting the serious delay in the communication of the Council's annual report and the omission of information concerning one important meeting, but welcoming the communication of the first part of the report for 1986;
- (ii) Considering that the absence of agreement on certain matters should not prevent the Council from presenting its report in time;
- (iii) Welcoming the fact that the Council remains determined to discuss and harmonise the views of the Seven on disarmament and the control of armaments;
- (iv) Welcoming the position adopted by the Council in its report on the whole range of arms control negotiations, in particular the importance Ministers attach "to respect for existing treaty obligations";
- (v) Considering that it is more than ever essential for the Seven to seek a common position on all aspects of the control of armaments and disarmament and to maintain their own bilateral relations with the Soviet Union;
- (vi) Welcoming the considerable progress towards eventual agreement on treaties to reduce nuclear weapons and to limit space weapons made at the Reykjavik summit;
- (vii) Welcoming also the considerable improvement in confidence-building measures included in the document of the Stockholm conference on disarmament in Europe;
- (viii) Noting with interest the proposal in the Budapest appeal of the Warsaw Pact countries of 11th June 1986 for reductions of land and air forces and armaments from the Atlantic to the Urals, but believing that agreement on initial reductions in the MBFR framework can be reached immediately the Soviet Union accepts the necessary verification measures;
- (ix) Welcoming the steady progress of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to ban all chemical weapons, but believing that a comprehensive nuclear test ban should also be negotiated, and welcoming therefore the continued Soviet moratorium which it believes should be reciprocated by the United States,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Ensure that in future the whole of the annual report on its activities reaches the Assembly before the end of February of the following year and that it contain a complete account of activities arranged by the Council;
2. Take into consideration both the strategic and political aspects when discussing the enlargement of WEU;
3. Urge the Seven, in their consultations on the bilateral negotiations on strategic and space weapons, to urge both parties to pursue the considerable progress made at the Reykjavik summit and to insist on the treaties already signed being respected, in particular SALT I, SALT II and the ABM treaty on the understanding that both parties continue laboratory research on strategic defence, without undertaking tests in space;
4. Until it becomes clear whether fruitful negotiations on mutual and balanced reductions of forces and armaments from the Atlantic to the Urals are possible in the CSCE/CDE framework, urge governments participating in the MBFR negotiations to press for the earliest agreement on initial reductions, including the right of automatic inspections and the obligation for all troops entering or leaving the reductions zone to pass at all times through recognised entry-exit points with permanent observers;
5. Urge participating governments to pursue actively the improved prospects for a chemical weapons ban in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, to press the Soviet Union to accept the compromise proposal for challenge inspection put forward by the United Kingdom in July and, pending the outcome of these negotiations in 1987, not to approve as a NATO force goal the deployment of further chemical weapons in Europe;

6. (a) Urge the Soviet Union and the United States to agree to the mutual exchange of official technical teams both for the verification of a nuclear test ban when negotiated and meanwhile for the calibration of the yield of nuclear tests;

(b) Press for the ratification by the United States of the treaties on a threshold test ban and on peaceful nuclear explosions and for the opening of negotiations on a comprehensive test ban in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Amadei, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1.1. The committee adopted the first version of this report on 29th April by 13 votes to 0 with 7 abstentions. The debate on the report during the Assembly session which opened on 3rd June 1986 unfortunately had to be adjourned on several occasions, partly because of the large number of addresses by ministers. Finally, it was towards the end of the session on Thursday, 5th June, after thirteen amendments had been tabled, that the Assembly voted to refer it back to committee.

1.2. At the time of drafting the first report the Rapporteur had in his possession only Chapters III and IV of the annual report of the Council. The complete report did not reach the Assembly until after 20th May. Moreover, on 24th October the Council communicated to the Assembly the first part of its report for 1986. The Rapporteur has therefore taken advantage of the intervening period to complete this revised report, commenting on the one hand on the annual report of the Council as a whole and taking account on the other hand of several major developments in the arms control area.

1.3. In accordance with the terms of reference given to the Rapporteur for his report, the committee noted that "as the internal WEU conventional arms control functions are terminated at the end of 1985, while three new agencies are created, including the agency for the study of arms control and disarmament questions, the report replying to the annual report of the Council can conveniently be combined with a follow-up report on disarmament which, in view of the impulse given by the Reagan-Gorbachev summit, will follow negotiations on the most topical or urgent disarmament problems, without however covering all the topics dealt with in the information report of 4th November (Document 1040) or the report of 22nd November (Document 1043)".

II. Activities of the Council

2.1. The annual report of the Council for the year 1985, which should normally reach the Assembly towards the end of February, was dated 20th May, although Chapters III and IV on the last activities up to 31st December 1985 of the former international secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee and of the Agency for the Control of Armaments reached the Office of the Clerk in March. It would in fact appear

that the Council had the greatest difficulty in reaching agreement on a simple account of its own activities in 1985. The committee welcomes however the communication on 24th October of the first part of the Council's report for 1986, covering the first half of the year, and the Council's intention announced therein to "present its report in two half-yearly parts and transmit, if appropriate, written information concerning certain of its activities" (Chapter III, 1).

2.2. Where these activities of the Council are concerned, the committee is gratified to see the large section devoted to disarmament negotiations and the fact that the Council discussed these negotiations at both permanent and ministerial level. An important passage from Chapter I is worth quoting:

"The Ministers expressed the hope that the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union would make possible radical reductions in their strategic and medium-range nuclear armaments and agreements aimed at ending the arms race on earth and preventing an arms race in space. They underlined in this regard the importance they attached to respect for existing treaty obligations."

This was an important statement that the committee will refer to below.

2.3. However, the committee notes a curious gap in the Council's report – there is no reference to the important meeting organised by the German Government, which had the Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council at the time, of experts on disarmament questions from the seven ministries for foreign affairs and held in Bonn on 11th February 1985 under the chairmanship of Ambassador Ruth. At the time the press reported that Mr. Richard Burt, then American Assistant Secretary of State, had sent a letter to certain ministries for foreign affairs of WEU countries according to which this meeting of experts was thought to be inappropriate.

2.4. The committee considers it important for the WEU countries to adopt joint positions on major disarmament questions. It is therefore regrettable that the Council makes no reference to one of its most successful initiatives in this sense.

2.5. It is not surprising that the Council was unable to reach agreement on two specific points on which the positions of the seven governments still seem to differ. These are Portugal's application for membership of WEU made in October

1984 and the attempt to co-ordinate the reactions of WEU countries to the United States invitation to take part in research for strategic defence purposes.

2.6. In regard to the accession of new states to the Brussels Treaty, Article XI of the treaty provides that "the high contracting parties may, by agreement, invite any other state to accede to the present treaty on conditions to be agreed between them and the state so invited". The Seven seem to have been unprepared for Portugal's application in 1984 which in a way anticipated their invitation. In this connection, another letter from the WEU Secretary-General on 26th February 1986 informing the President of the Assembly of his visit to Spain on 28th and 29th January reports in regard to Spain that:

"On relations between Spain and Western European Union, those to whom I spoke confirmed Spain's interest in acceding to WEU. How do they view such accession? They are aware that accession to WEU is at the invitation of the WEU Council. They will therefore await this invitation in due course, i.e. after the major debate on the problem of security raised by the referendum on 12th March has come to a conclusion."

The Secretary-General concluded:

"Still in my personal capacity, I concluded that it was politically desirable, if a state wished to join WEU, for it:

- to be a member of the Communities and of political co-operation;
- to be a member of the Atlantic Alliance; and
- to have a real desire to promote a European security dimension."

2.7. The Council's report for the first part of 1986 now makes it clear that the accession of Portugal will not now be considered until 1988, after the "transitional period" up to the end of 1987 when the new structures of WEU resulting from the 1984 reactivation are to be reviewed, and after "the applicability to new members of all the provisions of the modified Brussel Treaty and its additional protocols" have been examined in depth. (The application of Protocols Nos. II and III is discussed below in paragraphs 2.10 et seq. and 3.1 et seq.). While it is certain that the accession of Portugal and Spain would be very warmly welcomed from a purely political standpoint, certain WEU countries consider that at the same time it is essential not to isolate the European allied countries on the two flanks which are of vital strategic importance for European security. Should not a simultaneous invi-

tation therefore also be made to all the allied European countries members of NATO to join WEU?

2.8. In regard to the American invitation to European firms to take part in research for strategic defence purposes, the bilateral negotiations held by the United States with each of the European allied countries are making slow progress. Memoranda of understanding have been signed by the United Kingdom, Germany and, on 19th September, by Italy but with the reservation that signature did not imply that government's political or military support for the SDI¹. Exceptionally for this type of document, their content has not been published, which is arousing concern about the extent of the American technical know-how to which European industries taking part in the research would have access. Government reservations about the SDI were referred to very recently by Baroness Young, British Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, when she addressed the Assembly on 3rd June 1986:

"We shall in particular look from a European perspective at certain aspects of European participation in the SDI research programme, and at the politico/strategic implications of SDI for Europe itself. Many of these questions, as Geoffrey Howe made clear in his speech in March 1985 to the Royal United Services Institute, are unanswerable, and will be so for a long time to come. And differences in perception and perspective between our member governments have already limited the possible extent of co-ordination or participation in the SDI research programme."

The many questions and reservations referred to by Sir Geoffrey Howe in this speech of 15th March 1985 were quoted in an earlier report by the committee².

2.9. Where the future activities of the three new Council agencies are concerned, a letter³ from the Secretary-General dated 17th March 1986 gives some information. Inter alia, it reports that:

"Agency I is to study Soviet tactics vis-à-vis the countries of Western Europe in regard to questions of the control of armaments and disarmament. In the future it will also have to take an interest in the control of conventional armaments and the essential problem of verification."

1. The Times, 20th September 1986.

2. Document 1033, WEU and the strategic defence initiative, 4th November 1985, Rapporteur: Mr. van den Bergh - explanatory memorandum, paragraph 4.2.

3. Text at Appendix I.

Application of Protocol No. II on forces of Western European Union

2.10. In 1985, the Council duly carried out the formalities provided for in Protocol No. II of the modified Brussels Treaty to ensure that the forces maintained by member countries on the mainland of Europe did not exceed the agreed levels.

2.11. In regard to the forces which the United Kingdom has undertaken to station on the mainland of Europe in accordance with Article VI of Protocol No. II, fixed by the Council at 55 000 men plus a tactical air force, the committee notes with satisfaction that, according to the Council's report, in 1985 the number of British forces concerned was 56 005, of which 814 were redeployed in Northern Ireland for short tours of duty. These figures compare with 56 467 on the mainland of Europe of which 972 in Northern Ireland in 1984, according to the Council's previous report. The British tactical air force stationed on the mainland of Europe in 1985 was the same as in the previous year, i.e.:

Rôle	Aircraft/Equipment	Squadrons
Strike/Attack	Jaguar	1
	Tornado	4
Offensive support	Harrier	2
Reconnaissance	Jaguar	1
Air defence	Phantom	2
	Rapier surface-to-air missiles	1
Air transport	Puma	1
	Chinook	1
Ground defence	RAF regiment	1

III. Agency for the Control of Armaments

(a) Conventional weapons

3.1. In its 1984 report⁴, the committee examined the history of the rather incomplete application of controls of member countries' weapons provided for in the Brussels Treaty as modified in 1954. There is no need to return to controls of conventional weapons – and the gaps in their application – since the Council, in accordance with several Assembly recommendations, decided to abolish them completely as from 1st January 1986. In 1985, in accordance with the decision of principle taken by the Council in Rome in October 1984, supplemented by its resolution of 23rd January 1985, controls were applied to only about half the conventional

weapons subject to control under the modified Brussels Treaty and its Protocols Nos. III and IV. By pursuing documentary controls – which represented most of the Agency's work in the past – in 1985 and carrying out thirty-four field control measures in the same year, the Agency for the Control of Armaments duly carried out its duties until the last day of its existence with a full staff. The table hereafter gives a breakdown of field control measures.

3.2. The Council's decision to control in 1985 only half the number of conventional weapons formerly controlled, pending the complete abolition of such controls as from 1st July 1986, seems curious, not to say aberrant.

(b) ABC weapons

3.3. The situation is different in regard to atomic, biological and chemical weapons. The Rome declaration adopted by the Council on 27th October 1984 asserted that "the commitments and controls concerning ABC weapons would be maintained at the existing level and in accordance with the procedures agreed up to the present time". But, as in previous years, the annual report of the Council for 1985 states that "since the situation has remained the same as in previous years, the Agency did not exercise any control in the field of atomic weapons" and the list of biological weapons subject to control accepted by the Council in 1981 having been renewed by the latter for 1985 "as in previous years... the Agency did not exercise any control in the field of biological weapons".

3.4. There remain chemical weapons. As for atomic and biological weapons, there are two aspects to controls of chemical weapons provided for in the Brussels Treaty:

- (i) control of any production in countries not having renounced the right to produce chemical weapons;
- (ii) verification of undertakings made by the country which renounced the right to produce such weapons.

3.5. As in past years, in 1985 the Council first renewed the list of chemical weapons subject to control which it had previously approved. Then, according to the annual report, the questionnaire which the Agency sends the six countries which have not renounced the right to produce such chemical weapons asked:

"... whether production of chemical weapons on their mainland territory had passed the experimental stage and entered the effective production stage. As in the past, all these states replied in the negative.

4. Thirty years of the modified Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council, Document 973, 15th May 1984, Rapporteur: Mr. De Decker.

Numbers and types of inspections carried out by the Agency for the Control of Armaments – 1961-85

	Quantitative control measures				Non-production control measures		Total control measures (all categories)	
	at depots	at units under national command	at production plants	Sub-total	at production plants	(of which non-production of chemical weapons)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	
1961	29	15	12	66	7	(2)	63	
2	26	20	11	57	7	(2)	65	
3	35	13	13	61	10	(4)	74	
4	39	19	13	71	9	(4)	80	
5	26	16	11	53	7	n.a.	60	
6	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	78	
7	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	70	
8	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	79	
9	*	*	*	*	*	(3)	77	
1970	<i>a</i> *	<i>b</i> *	<i>a</i> *	<i>b</i> *	<i>a</i> *	<i>b</i> *	<i>a</i> 82	<i>b</i> 72
1	*	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	82
2	*	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	—
3	*	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	66
4	*	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	66
5	*	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	71
6	*	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	—
7	*	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	71
8	*	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	70
9	*	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	68
1980	*	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	70
1	*	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	70
2	*	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	69
3	*	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	72
4	*	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	66
5	*	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	34

Notes *a, b*: From 1971 onwards the Agency adopted a new system of presenting its summary table of inspections, thenceforth counting inspections of several small grouped ammunition depots as a single inspection. An apparent reduction in numbers of inspections in fact reflects no reduction in the activities of the Agency. For comparison, the Council reported both sets of figures (old and new style – *a* and *b*) for the years 1970 and 1971.

n.a.: Information not available.

Sources: Figures for total control measures (all categories) given in column 7 are derived from published annual reports of the Council. With regard to the variable categories of controls (columns 1 to 6), figures for 1961-65 are also derived from the published annual reports of the Council. Those for 1966 to 1969 have never been made available to the committee. Those for 1970 to 1985 have been communicated to the Assembly by the Council in response to Recommendation 213, but permission to publish them has been withheld. Minor discrepancies in some totals result from differences of definition of visit and are without significance.

* Confidential information available to the committee deleted from the published report.

In addition, the Agency asked all the member states to declare any chemical weapons that they might hold. Since all the member states replied in the negative, the Agency carried out no quantitative controls of chemical weapons in 1985.”

3.6. In the case of the seventh country, which has renounced the right to produce chemical weapons on its territory, the annual report states that:

“ The competent authorities of the country concerned provided the Agency with a

detailed, precise and complete reply to the request for information – aimed at facilitating the control of non-production of chemical weapons – which was sent to them by the Agency in accordance with the resolution adopted by the Council in 1959 and with the directive received from the Council in 1960. In addition, the procedure applied with these authorities since 1973 was again used.”

3.7. In regard to field control measures, the Agency each year conducts agreed verification of non-production in plants. But reports of the

Council prior to 1983 contained the following reservation:

“As the convention for the due process of law⁵ has not yet entered into force, the control measures carried out by the Agency at private concerns had, in 1982, as in previous years, to take the form of agreed control measures.

One consequence of this situation is that, in order to obtain the agreement of the firms concerned, the Agency has to give a few weeks' notice. Since this agreement has never been withheld, the 1982 programme of control measures at privately-owned plants was therefore drawn up with full confidence that it could be implemented as in previous years.”

3.8. In future, therefore, WEU's activities in regard to the internal control of armaments will be limited in fact to this procedure for controlling chemical weapons. The Agency for the Control of Armaments has not been disbanded altogether, but its staff has been reduced to one person, an expert in chemical weapons.

IV. Standing Armaments Committee

4.1. In the chapter of the annual report on the activities of the Standing Armaments Committee in 1985, it is stated that the committee:

“having noted the ministerial decisions taken in regard to it and in regard to the establishment of the ‘agencies for security questions’, addressed the problem of co-operation in the field of armaments and research, and that of its own future.”

Delegates' opinions appear to have been divided as to the expediency of convening the committee in the future. The new Agency III which is replacing the former international secretariat of the SAC is now working directly for the Council and, according to the letter of the Secretary-General of 17th March 1986:

“will study certain aspects of competitiveness in the armaments industry in Europe and the implications of the evolution of the world arms market, together with the problems of technological transfers between European allies.”

5. Convention concerning measures to be taken by member states of Western European Union in order to enable the Agency for the Control of Armaments to carry out its control effectively and making provision for due process of law, in accordance with Protocol No. IV of the Brussels Treaty, as modified by the protocols signed in Paris on 23rd October 1954 (signed in Paris on 14th December 1957 but so far ratified by only six countries: Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom).

V. International negotiations on the control of armaments

(a) General

5.1. The committee welcomed the fact that the Council decided in the Rome declaration of October 1984:

“... to hold comprehensive discussions and to seek to harmonise their views on the specific conditions of security in Europe, in particular:

.....

– arms control and disarmament.”

5.2. The committee, for its part, studied in detail last year the progress of negotiations on the control of armaments in four international forums: the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on nuclear and space weapons, the mutual and balanced force reduction negotiations in Vienna, the conference on disarmament in Europe in Stockholm and the Geneva disarmament conference.⁶

5.3. At the close of the summit meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva from 19th to 21st November 1985, the committee was able inter alia to welcome “the positive fresh start to bilateral relations between the United States and the Soviet Union ... and the constructive references to most arms control issues in the agreed statement including the principle of a 50% reduction in nuclear arms, the general and complete prohibition of chemical weapons, and the idea of an interim INF agreement, while noting the absence of specific agreements”. The very positive impetus given to the negotiations was enhanced shortly afterwards by the long statement on disarmament made by General Secretary Gorbachev in Moscow on 15th January 1986 which contained six proposals, including a fifteen-year programme leading in three stages to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons throughout the world before the end of the century and a three-month prolongation of the moratorium on nuclear tests initially declared by the Soviet Union as from 6th August 1985 immediately after it had carried out a programme of nuclear test explosions.

5.4. However, in spite of these two auspicious events, it appears that until spring meaningful progress in the various negotiations has been slight or nil. While Mr. Gorbachev's public statements seem promising, the actual proposals made by his delegates in the privacy of negotiations have apparently not come up to expect-

6. Disarmament, information report, Document 1040, 4th November 1985, Rapporteur: Mr. Blaauw; Disarmament, Document 1043, 22nd November 1985, Rapporteur: Mr. Blaauw.

ations. At the same time, certain western reactions to the Soviet proposals seem to have taken a step backwards compared with some earlier positions.

5.5. Since spring, however, several mainly positive events have occurred which change the prospects for almost all the various negotiations on arms control. The impromptu summit meeting in Reykjavik was the most recent to attract worldwide attention but consideration should also be given to the consequences of President Reagan's speech on 27th May about SALT II, the appeal of the member states of the Warsaw Pact of 11th June relating to the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Europe, certain concessions announced by the Soviet Union on 22nd April concerning verification in the context of a ban on chemical weapons and the new British proposals of 15th July and, finally, the document of the Stockholm conference adopted on 19th September relating to confidence-building measures. The committee examines these developments under the following heads.

(b) Bilateral negotiations

(i) Intermediate-range nuclear forces

5.6. In the bilateral negotiations in Geneva between the United States and the Soviet Union on strategic nuclear weapons, intermediate-range nuclear forces and space weapons, particular attention was paid to intermediate-range weapons because of the new proposals put forward by Mr. Gorbachev in his statement of 15th January and the terms of the West's answer. Details of the proposals made by each side's negotiators in Geneva are obviously not known. But since the Soviet Union in particular has developed the habit of negotiating more publicly than in the past, the public is most probably aware of the major elements of the proposals exchanged.

5.7. The rather spectacular language used by Mr. Gorbachev in his address was certainly intended to impress world public opinion:

“ The Soviet Union is proposing a step-by-step and consistent process of ridding the earth of nuclear weapons, to be implemented and completed within the next fifteen years, before the end of this century. ”

Nevertheless, for intermediate-range weapons, this address contains at least the outline of certain tangible proposals. The first stage would last from five to eight years:

“ The first stage will include the adoption and implementation of the decision on the complete elimination of intermediate-range missiles of the USSR and the United

States in the European zone, both ballistic and cruise missiles, as a first step towards ridding the European continent of nuclear weapons.

At the same time the United States should undertake not to transfer its strategic and medium-range missiles to other countries, while Britain and France should pledge not to build up their respective nuclear arms. ”

During the second stage, starting in 1990 and spread over a period of five to seven years:

“ ... the other nuclear powers will begin to engage in nuclear disarmament. To begin with, they would pledge to freeze all their nuclear arms and not to have them in the territories of other countries.

In this period the USSR and the United States will go on with the reductions agreed upon during the first stage and also carry out further measures designed to eliminate their medium-range nuclear weapons and freeze their tactical nuclear systems. ”

Further details were given on 12th February during an interview granted to West German television by General Nikolai Chervov, Soviet spokesman on disarmament. He defined the “ European zone ” as being the area extending as far as longitude 80° east, i.e. a line some 1 300 km to the east of the Urals, beyond which SS-20 missiles are out of range of Europe. SS-20 missiles west of that line would be destroyed:

“ We do not propose to move these SS-20 missiles somewhere else. They will be destroyed under painstaking and reliable national and international control, including inspections on site and on the spot. ”

5.8. The detailed Soviet proposals tabled at the Geneva negotiations on 16th January were completed by letters to the British and French Governments, not represented at the negotiations.

5.9. There were two new and positive elements in these Soviet proposals. British and French nuclear forces would no longer be taken into account in the negotiations but merely frozen at their present level. Secondly, the Soviet Union at that time no longer seemed to be seeking a link with space weapons, a ban on which was previously to have formed part of any agreement on other weapons systems. This point was confirmed publicly by Mr. Gorbachev in an interview which he granted to United States Senator Edward Kennedy in Moscow on 6th February when Mr. Gorbachev said that his proposal to withdraw SS-20s from Europe if the Americans did the same with their Pershing IIs depended solely on the United Kingdom and France refraining from increasing their corresponding

nuclear weapons and the United States not supplying such weapons to other countries.

5.10. While the United States was holding consultations with its allies, particularly during Mr. Paul Nitze's visit to Europe in February, the press on 8th February reported an American counter-proposal approved by Mr. Reagan subject to consultations with the allies. It is believed this plan accepted the elimination of all intermediate-range American and Soviet missiles stationed in Europe but also insisted on a 50% reduction in Soviet SS-20 missiles in Asia. However, no ceiling was said to be placed on British or French forces, nor were there to be limitations on the supply of American missiles to the allies.

5.11. This time it was the European allies that had reservations about the first American proposals, considering that the complete elimination of nuclear weapons stationed in Europe would leave western forces at the mercy of the conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact forces, particularly in Central Europe. The American answer finally communicated to the Soviet Union on 23rd February returned rather to the "global zero-zero" position already defined in 1981. The United States therefore proposed as a target the elimination of SS-20 and cruise missiles in both Europe and Asia, but as a first stage the reduction to 140 of the SS-20 launchers in Europe, with a proportional reduction in Asia; only in the second and third stages would the United States agree to a reduction of its own missiles parallel with Soviet reductions; short-range missiles were also to be taken into account. Proposals relating to British and French forces were rejected since the Geneva negotiations are purely bilateral. French and British answers to Mr. Gorbachev also rejected his proposal, France recalling its well-known position that it is in favour of all reductions in nuclear weapons but the arsenals of the superpowers must be reduced significantly before reductions in the relatively small French forces can be considered; in any event, priority was to be given to reducing conventional weapons.

5.12. In previous reports, the committee recalled that the existence of British and French forces had in fact been taken into account already in the SALT I and SALT II bilateral agreements. In the first case, the Soviet unilateral declaration accompanying the agreement stated that the Soviet Union could increase the number of its strategic missile launching submarines in the event of the United States allies doing likewise. In the case of SALT II, it has been known for a long time that the concession which allowed the Soviet Union to retain 308 heavy ICBMs (SS-9s and SS-18s) was made in compensation for British and French nuclear forces and the deployment of American nuclear systems in Europe.

5.13. While the committee has always rejected any proposal to reduce British and French nuclear forces at a time when the superpowers have thousands of nuclear warheads, it has nevertheless drawn attention to the problems which would arise for the negotiations on the control of armaments if European forces were equipped with multiple-warhead missiles. The Trident missile, intended to come into service with the British force in the nineties, is designed to carry up to eight warheads. The possibility of a British force eight times its present size obviously raises a problem for the Soviet Union in the current negotiations.

5.14. During the summer there was a fairly intensive bilateral dialogue with exchanges of letters between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in June and July, a last answer to a letter from President Reagan dated 25th July being delivered personally by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Shevardnadze, in Washington on 19th September, followed shortly afterwards by the announcement of a meeting between the two leaders in Reykjavik on 11th and 12th October. The initiative for this meeting came from the Soviet Union; it was to be a preparatory meeting for a true summit meeting and was not to lead to the signing of a final agreement.

5.15. Before the meeting, the press was already reporting new American proposals for reducing INF in Europe to 100 warheads on each side (and hence only 33 SS-20 missiles for the Soviet Union) and 100 warheads in the Asian part of the Soviet Union, which would be offset by 100 cruise missiles based in the United States. At the close of the meeting, at which it is known that no agreement was reached because the Soviet Union insisted on a link with a ban on testing all strategic defence systems, the press reported a new proposal for INF missiles to be reduced to zero in both parts of Europe, but still with 100 warheads in the Asian part of the Soviet Union, offset by an equal number in the United States. As for the Soviet short-range nuclear missiles deployed in East Germany and Czechoslovakia during the years following the deployment of cruise missiles by NATO, their number would first be frozen pending negotiations on their reduction.

(ii) Strategic nuclear weapons

5.16. Referring to strategic weapons in his major statement of 15th January on the elimination of nuclear weapons before the end of the century, Mr. Gorbachev said:

"Stage one. Within the next five to eight years the USSR and the United States will reduce by one half the nuclear arms that can reach each other's territory. On the

remaining delivery vehicles of this kind each side will retain no more than 6 000 warheads.

It stands to reason that such a reduction is possible only if the USSR and the United States mutually renounce the development, testing and deployment of space strike weapons.”

In stage two, as from 1990 and for a period of five to seven years, the United States and the Soviet Union would have completed the 50% reduction in their strategic weapons; at the same stage, the prohibition of space strike weapons would have to become multilateral, with the participation of major industrial powers. There would be a ban on the development of non-nuclear weapons based on new physical principles, with a destructive power close to that of nuclear arms or other weapons of mass destruction. Finally, in stage three as from 1995 the elimination of all remaining nuclear weapons would be completed. Mr. Gorbachev then made a few comments about verification:

“ We have in mind that special procedures will be worked out for the destruction of nuclear weapons as well as the dismantling, re-equipment or destruction of delivery vehicles. In the process, agreement will be reached on the numbers of weapons to be destroyed at each stage, the sites of their destruction and so on.

Verification with regard to the weapons that are destroyed or limited would be carried out both by national technical means and through on-site inspections. The USSR is ready to reach agreement on any other additional verification measures.”

5.17. In his answer communicated to the Soviet Union on 23rd February, President Reagan reconfirmed the American proposal to reduce strategic nuclear weapons by half. In an address on 24th February on the eve of the opening of the twenty-seventh congress of the Soviet Communist Party, President Reagan expressed reservations about the rather publicity-seeking aspects of Mr. Gorbachev's proposals:

“ On the other hand, many of the specific details proposed in the subsequent phases of the Soviet 'plan' are clearly not appropriate for consideration at this time. In our view, the total elimination of nuclear weapons will require, at the same time, the correction of the conventional and other force imbalances, full compliance with existing and future treaty obligations, peaceful resolution of regional conflicts... Unfortunately, the details of the Soviet 'plan' do not address these equally vital requirements.”

5.18. Towards 20th May, the United States had to face the problem of respecting the SALT II treaty when the strategic submarine Nevada started sea-trials with a load of 24 missiles. To respect the treaty limits, the United States then had to dismantle two old Poseidon submarines (with 16 launchers each) or reduce the number of its Minuteman ICBMs. On 14th April, 52 of the 100 senators wrote to President Reagan asking him to take the necessary steps to respect the treaty.

5.19. On 27th May 1986 President Reagan made a major speech on his intention to consider himself no longer bound by the SALT II treaty, the key passage of which reads as follows:

“ ... I have determined that, in the future, the United States must base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces, and not on standards contained in the SALT structure which has been undermined by Soviet non-compliance, and especially in a flawed SALT II treaty which was never ratified, would have expired if it had been ratified, and has been violated by the Soviet Union.

Since the United States will retire and dismantle two Poseidon submarines this summer, we will remain technically in observance of the terms of the SALT II treaty until the United States equips its 131st B-52 heavy bomber for cruise missile carriage near the end of this year. However, given the decision that I have been forced to make, I intend at that time to continue deployment of US B-52 heavy bombers with cruise missiles beyond the 131st aircraft as an appropriate response without dismantling additional US systems as compensation under the terms of the SALT II treaty. Of course, since we will remain in technical compliance with the terms of the expired SALT II treaty for some months, I continue to hope that the Soviet Union will use this time to take the constructive steps necessary to alter the current situation. Should they do so, we will certainly take this into account.”

5.20. There was much comment about this speech in divergent statements by various members of the American administration and the public. On 19th June the United States House of Representatives passed by 256 votes to 145 a non-binding resolution calling on the President to “ continue to adhere to the provisions of the SALT agreements as long as the Soviet Union does likewise”. At its meeting in Washington from 16th to 20th June, the committee also heard diverging opinions about the themes of

this speech. As far as the actual terms of the speech are concerned, it is clear that the President did not say, as some members of his administration would have liked, that SALT II is dead.

5.21. A key argument relates to possible violations of the SALT II treaty by the Soviet Union. As the committee has already underlined, the only case of violation of the SALT II treaty specifically endorsed by the NATO countries was the introduction of two "new" missiles – the SS-X24 and SS-25 – by the Soviet Union⁷ when under the treaty it is allowed only one. It should be stressed that to date neither the United States nor the Soviet Union has violated the numerical ceilings imposed by SALT II and the United States is not accusing the Soviet Union of doing so. Although it has deployed improved models of strategic missiles, the Soviet Union, like the United States, simultaneously destroyed or withdrew from service other missiles so as to respect the ceilings. According to the definitions used, the number of missiles thus destroyed or withdrawn by the Soviet Union is believed to be between 600 and 1300, plus 14 nuclear-propelled submarines.

5.22. The question whether or not the SS-25 is a new missile within the meaning of SALT II (i.e. whether its diameter, launching weight or throw weight exceed those of its predecessor by more than 5%) is highly complex and depends inter alia on the components to be included in the expression "throw weight". If the violation is proved, as the NATO countries seem to believe, an appropriate response would be to deploy "new" missiles such as the Midgetman envisaged by the United States, but not to exceed ceilings hitherto respected by both superpowers.

5.23. Nevertheless, the 27th May speech does not seem to have held up bilateral negotiations on strategic weapons too much. At the close of the Reykjavik summit meeting, the press reported on proposals for the total elimination of strategic ballistic missiles within ten years, with a reduction of 50% during an initial five-year period in the number of nuclear warheads in each of the three categories: ICBMs, missiles on submarines, and the nuclear payloads of strategic bombers. President Reagan in his televised press conference of 14th October said:

"For the first time on the highest level we and the Soviets came close to an agreement on real reductions of both strategic and intermediate-range weapons... For the first time we began to hammer out details of a 50% cut in strategic forces over five years..."

7. See Document 1040, Disarmament, information report, 4th November 1985, Rapporteur: Mr. Blaauw – paragraphs 4.25 to 4.27.

...And maybe most important, we were just in sight of an historic agreement on completely eliminating the threat of offensive ballistic missiles by 1996."

The United States position on eliminating strategic missiles in ten years is limited to "ballistic missiles" – ICBMs and SLBMs – but would not cover cruise missiles or other weapons carried by bombers – a point on which the Soviet spokesman after the summit appeared to disagree, claiming that the elimination of "all strategic nuclear weapons" had been discussed at the summit, but the United States has denied that this was formally proposed, although tacitly accepting that the elimination of "all strategic nuclear weapons" may have been discussed in conversation.⁸ At Reykjavik once again the Soviet Union abandoned its request to offset the medium-range American systems based outside American territory, nor did it ask to offset British and French forces. But again the Soviet Union made agreement on strategic weapons depend on an agreement limiting research on SDI systems.

(iii) Space weapons

5.24. In his references to space weapons in his address on 15th January, Mr. Gorbachev maintained his total opposition: "We are against weapons in space." But for the first time he seemed to consider the possibility of space research not leading to the deployment of offensive weapons in space:

"Space must remain peaceful, strike weapons should not be deployed there. Neither should they be developed. And let there also be a most rigorous control, including opening the relevant laboratories for inspection."

5.25. If there has been a specific answer from the United States to this request to open laboratories engaged in space research for inspection, it has not been made public. In his 24th February address, President Reagan merely welcomed the Soviet Union's acceptance of the principle of verification:

"We intend to pursue in specific terms at the negotiating table General Secretary Gorbachev's public offer to resolve any necessary verification issues."

5.26. At his press conference in Reykjavik at the close of the summit meeting on 12th October, General Secretary Gorbachev, having first confirmed the Soviet concessions in regard to intermediate-range and strategic nuclear weapons,

8. International Herald Tribune, 28th October 1986, "US denies Pact account", and 29th October 1986, "New US orders for arms talks..."

pons referred to above, reaffirmed the Soviet Union's request that the ABM treaty be of indefinite duration and that the two parties undertake not to abrogate it for at least ten years. "Simultaneously, we suggested that all the ABM requirements be strictly observed within these ten years, that the development and testing of space weapons be banned and only research and testing in laboratories be allowed." Mr. Gorbachev continued: "We are aware of the commitment of the American administration and the President to SDI. Apparently, our consent to its continuation and to laboratory tests offers the President an opportunity to go through with research and eventually to get clear what SDI is, what it is about. Although it is already clear to many people, ourselves included."

5.27. President Reagan did not hold a press conference until 14th October on returning to Washington, when he expressed his determination to proceed to actual testing of SDI, and appeared to belittle the ABM treaty:

"I offered to delay deployment of advanced strategic defence for ten years while both sides eliminated all ballistic missiles, but General Secretary Gorbachev said that his demand that we give up all but laboratory research on SDI – in effect kill the programme – was non-negotiable..."

Now the ABM treaty, which he kept referring to as if it was the Holy Grail, I asked him once what was so great about a treaty that had our governments saying to our people, we won't protect you from a nuclear attack? That's basically what the ABM treaty says...

I told him that what we were proposing with SDI was that once we reached the testing stage we would – well, before that, that right now we were ready and willing to sign a treaty – a binding treaty that said when we reached the testing stage that both sides would proceed, because we told him frankly that we knew they were researching also on defence, nor was that ever denied. And we said we both will go forward with what we are doing. When we reach the testing stage, if it's us, we'll invite you to participate and see the test... and I said or if you have perfected a system that can be this kind of defence that we're talking about, then we share, so that there won't be one side having this plus offensive weapons, but that we eliminate the offensive weapons and then we make available to all who feel a need for it or want it this defence system so that safety is guaranteed for the future."

On 15th October, in approving a defence budget

of \$292 billion for FY 1987, the US Congress reduced the Administration's request of \$5.3 billion for SDI to only \$3.5 billion.

5.28. In contrast to President Reagan's commitment to testing and, apparently, deployment of SDI, allied support for the United States position on SDI has been limited to support for "research", and has specifically stressed the importance of maintaining the ABM treaty. Thus Baroness Young, United Kingdom Minister of State for Foreign Affairs speaking of the Reykjavik summit in the House of Lords on 15th October said:

"Perhaps I can confirm... as President Reagan has repeatedly confirmed, that SDI research is consistent with the present treaty obligations, including the ABM treaty. He recently reaffirmed that SDI will be conducted in conformity with a strict interpretation of the treaty. The Government have repeatedly made it clear that we regard the treaty as an important element in preserving international peace and stability and want to see it reaffirmed and strengthened. Any suspicion of violations should be pursued according to the mechanisms provided in the treaty."

(The reservations of WEU governments concerning SDI are referred to in paragraph 2.8 above.) The communiqué of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group meeting in Gleneagles on 21st and 22nd October similarly said "We strongly support the United States exploration of space and defence systems, as is permitted by the ABM treaty."

(iv) Consequences of the Reykjavik summit meeting

5.29. In the days following the summit that was not a summit, not only the United States but also the Soviet Union sent senior officials to the western capitals to inform the governments of the NATO countries of the positions of their respective countries. Thus, in London Mr. Viktor Karpov, head of the Soviet Delegation to the Geneva bilateral negotiations, said on 14th October: "We do not deny the possibility of finding a solution on medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe separately from space and nuclear offensive arms." This interpretation was formally denied in Moscow two days later by Mr. Karpov himself who, in a statement which went back on his statement in London, explained that an agreement on INF might well be negotiated separately but that signature would depend on an agreement banning the testing of anti-ballistic weapons in space. In Moscow on 21st October, Mr. Gerasimov, spokesman of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, said: "We will allow for research and testing in the laboratory. This is a major concession on our part but the American side

wants to test SDI in space. As to the specific interpretation as to what we mean under 'laboratory testing', our experts do not yet agree but, anyway, any interpretation of testing in the laboratory must exclude any testing in outer space."⁹

5.30. Since the initiative for the Reykjavik summit meeting came from the Soviet Union, it would appear that Mr. Gorbachev was seeking by this means to attract world attention to the importance the Soviet Union attached to limiting the SDI programme and to show that in order to obtain this the Soviet Union was prepared to make every concession on nuclear weapons.

5.31. In their statements endorsing the United States position, the European allies all expressed the hope that the two superpowers would continue in the detailed negotiations in Geneva along the course laid down in Reykjavik. But there were reservations in Europe about the expediency of an agreement eliminating all American nuclear weapons in Europe while the Soviet Union retained considerable conventional superiority as well as several hundred so-called short-range missiles (but with ranges of 500 km) deployed in East Germany and Czechoslovakia and which would merely be frozen in the event of an agreement eliminating INF pending subsequent negotiations on their reduction. The main thrust of the allied position now seems to be to give priority to an INF agreement, and to persuade the Soviet Union to revert to its pre-Reykjavik position according to which an INF agreement could be signed independently of any agreement on SDI. Thus the communiqué of the meeting of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group in Gleneagles on 21st and 22nd October stated:

"Noting that the Soviet side has agreed last year to conclude a separate INF agreement, Ministers called on the Soviet leadership to reaffirm its commitments not to hold an INF agreement hostage to any other agreement. A failure to do so would destroy the credibility of the highest Soviet assurances."

(c) Mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe

(i) The western initiative of 5th December 1985

5.32. On 5th December 1985, western participants in the MBFR negotiations in Vienna put forward new proposals which they said were intended to allow a first, albeit modest, agreement to be reached quickly. To this end, they accepted the general framework and main provi-

sions of the Warsaw Pact proposal of 14th February 1985, but proposed making only half the initial reductions set out in that proposal. On 30th January 1986, the western proposals were supplemented by an outline text accompanied by a table of associated measures.

5.33. The western initiative provided for an initial cutback of 5 000 American and 11 500 Soviet troops in the reduction zone. It provided for a no-increase commitment relating to NATO, the Warsaw Pact and American and Soviet troops stationed in that zone which was to come into force immediately after the reductions. The agreement and its various provisions were to be valid for a period of three years following the completion of the initial reductions. This period was to be used to pursue negotiations and prepare for further reductions.

5.34. Since the new proposals no longer insisted on prior agreement on levels of troops now present in the reduction zone (the data problem), they were intended, in the mind of the West, to allow speedy progress to be made. It was also believed that acceptance, during the period of the agreement, of the first stage of transitional force ceilings relating, on the one hand, to each alliance and, on the other hand, to the United States and the Soviet Union separately was also a favourable factor for advancing the negotiations.

5.35. Nevertheless, NATO maintained and to a certain extent strengthened the verification system hitherto envisaged.

5.36. The associated measures included:

- setting up permanent entry and exit points with observers through which all personnel of land and air forces of participating countries would leave or enter the reduction zone;
- notification and observation of withdrawals;
- notification of out-of-garrison activities;
- exchange of observers on the occasion of such activities;
- notification of ground force movements in the reduction zone;
- the right for each side to conduct thirty inspections each year to verify the no-increase undertaking;
- exchange of information up to battalion level;
- the free use of national technical means.

5.37. The only position adopted in the western proposal on what was to happen to the weapons

9. International Herald Tribune, 22nd October 1986.

of units withdrawn was to say that it was for each side to decide on the destination of the equipment concerned. However, the proposal increased from 18 to 30, as compared with previous proposals, the number of annual inspections required, and made the provisions relating to out-of-garrison activities apply also to the western part of Soviet territory, outside the reduction zone.

(ii) Immediate Warsaw Pact reactions and its written answer of 20th February 1986

5.38. The first Warsaw Pact reactions were rather encouraging. At a press conference in Moscow on 17th December 1986, Mr. Mikhailov, Soviet Ambassador to the MBFR talks, said that the western proposals were in line with the spirit of Geneva but were still very divergent. He criticised however the associated measures, which he considered to be deliberately excessive, and also the fact that the reduction figures proposed by NATO were not significant and the 5th December proposal did not include the equipment of troops withdrawn.

5.39. Even Mr. Gorbachev's statement of 15th January gave an encouraging impression; he said he was prepared for "reasonable verification" of troop reductions, including the establishment of permanent verification posts at the points of passage of troops withdrawn.

5.40. The Warsaw Pact counter-proposal of 20th February 1986 entitled "draft agreement on the initial reduction by the Soviet Union and the United States of ground forces and armaments and on the subsequent no-increase of forces and armaments of the sides and associated measures in Central Europe" could not therefore fail to be very disappointing to the western allies.

5.41. Although it accepts the principle of permanent verification posts at points where troops enter or leave the reduction zone, this proposal is negative in several respects:

- while the reductions proposed by NATO were not militarily significant, the Pact would nevertheless agree to similar figures: 6 500 American and 11 500 Soviet troops, which, for the West, did not correspond to the disparity between American and Soviet troops stationed in the reduction zone;
- the verification measures proposed were termed excessive and a kind of legalised spying. It was unacceptable to extend the area of verification to cover part of Soviet territory as NATO had requested for out-of-garrison activities.

5.42. Furthermore, the question of the destination of the weapons of troops withdrawn remained at the heart of the East-West controversy.

5.43. In greater detail, the seventeen articles in the document, which the Warsaw Pact describes as intended to guide the negotiations towards a favourable outcome, may be summarised as follows:

- in the course of one year, the USSR and the United States will withdraw behind their national boundaries 11 500 and 6 500 men respectively from their ground forces stationed in Central Europe, together with their armaments and combat equipment;
- information on the military units reduced will be exchanged prior to the beginning of the withdrawals;
- the eleven direct participants in the negotiations will undertake not to increase the levels of their ground and air forces in the reduction zone for a period of three years after the completion of the Soviet-American reductions;
- as from the same date, updated figures on forces remaining in the reduction zone will be exchanged each year;
- when the agreement comes into force, three or four observation posts will be established on each side;
- units and subunits of the ground forces of all signatories of the agreement must enter or leave the reduction zone via these posts;
- observation posts will be manned by representatives of both sides;
- military activities (movements, exercises, call-up of reservists) involving more than 20 000 men must be notified beforehand;
- in addition to the obligation not to interfere with implementation of national technical means, requests for on-site verification may be made if well-founded. As a rule, such requests should be granted. A refusal must be accompanied by a sufficiently convincing explanation;
- a consultative commission will be established to settle disputes which may arise when the agreement is implemented.

Finally, on the basis of these proposals, the East offered to join in the drafting of a joint agreement, in the course of which the utmost should be done to overcome remaining difficulties.

(iii) Present situation

5.44. Since the Warsaw Pact proposals of 14th February 1985 and the western answer of 5th

December 1985, the negotiations seem to have made little progress in spite of the concessions made by both sides.

5.45. The East has mainly kept to its earlier proposals, i.e. withdrawal in combat or combat support units, establishment of permanent entry and exit points, immediate freeze of troop levels in the reduction zone on a collective basis and without national sub-ceilings for a period of three years after the completion of initial withdrawals under the control of observers from both sides. The NATO countries for their part have agreed to abandon their data requirements and, as a whole, have linked their proposals with the plan proposed by the Warsaw Pact. There are still major points of disagreement, however, and these explain the disappointment felt on both sides.

5.46. Differences between East and West have crystallised around verification. While the Pact has now agreed to the permanent presence of observers at entry and exit posts, during and after the reductions, it has not accepted western requirements concerning larger-scale inspections in the reduction zone, which, for the Pact, can take place only after a well-founded and justified request and with the prior consent of the country concerned. The NATO partners are calling for thirty inspections each year for both sides, at short prior notice.

5.47. The other point at issue is the destination of equipment of units withdrawn. The West wishes to have a free hand in stockpiling such equipment as the country concerned sees fit, but the East on the contrary insists on it being destroyed or returned to the country of origin. The geographical asymmetry between the parties to the negotiations prevents NATO from accepting this position.

5.48. In its previous report, the committee pointed out with regard to the unresolved problem of equipment that "NATO could however accept the withdrawal, to a depot in some rear area in Europe to be designated, of the equipment of American units to be withdrawn from the zone".

5.49. Still to be settled is the fate of rotations of individuals relieving troops in the reduction zone which the Soviet Union refuses to have pass through the official entry and exit points. As for the strengths to be notified before their withdrawal, the West is calling for them to be reported down to battalion level whereas the East does not wish to go lower than divisional level. Finally, the delicate problem of notification of exercises and possible inspections in the two western districts of the Soviet Union, measures which the West considers essential for the security of the countries on the alliance's flanks, has not been solved.

(iv) The future: from the Atlantic to the Urals?

5.50. The foregoing explains why the thirty-eighth session of the MBFR talks came to an end without any progress having been made and in an atmosphere of disappointment which was particularly bitter since both sides had cherished hopes of success.

5.51. The Warsaw Pact criticises the West for the intransigence of the "legalised spying" verification system.

5.52. NATO for its part considers that the eastern countries' proposal of 20th February 1986 merely reiterates the Warsaw Pact's requests of February 1985, fails to take seriously the question of verification and tries to deny the reality and importance of geography.

5.53. Nevertheless, by proposing far smaller reductions than before (half), at the same time increasing from eighteen to thirty the number of annual inspections called for, NATO has gone against the conventional Soviet position that any verification must be commensurate with the magnitude of the reductions involved.

5.54. Some confusion arises over Mr. Gorbachev's speech in East Berlin on 18th April where he said:

"The USSR proposes substantial reduction of all components of land forces and tactical aircraft based in Europe, including the relevant parts of American and Canadian forces deployed there.

The military units should be dissolved and their armaments either destroyed or put into storage on their national territories. The scope of the reductions must obviously cover the whole of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals,"¹⁰.

5.55. On 11th June, the theme of Mr. Gorbachev's speech was taken further in the Budapest appeal by the Warsaw Pact member states to the NATO member states and all European countries for a programme to reduce armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe¹¹. As a first stage, this appeal proposes, in an area extending from the Atlantic to the Urals, a reduction of 100 000 to 150 000 in the forces of the two alliances followed by other reductions so that in the early nineties the land and tactical air forces of the two alliances would be reduced by 25% as compared with present levels. Conventional weapons and nuclear missiles with a range of less than 1 000 km would be included in the reductions; equipment withdrawn would either be destroyed or stockpiled on national territory. Verification measures are envisaged in the

10. International Herald Tribune, 22nd April 1986.

11. See Appendix II.

third part of the appeal while the fourth part states that negotiations on implementing the proposals might be held either in a first stage of the conference on disarmament in Europe (Stockholm) or in a special forum with the participation of the European states, the United States and Canada, or in the context of the Vienna MBFR negotiations enlarged to include other European states.

5.56. Meeting in Halifax, Canada, on 29th and 30th May, the North Atlantic Council in ministerial session issued a declaration on the control of conventional weapons¹² which refers inter alia to the setting up of a high-level working group on mastering conventional weapons designed to take advantage of the western proposals already presented at the Stockholm conference on disarmament in Europe and the Vienna MBFR negotiations and to take account of Mr. Gorbachev's statement on 18th April. This working group is also studying the Budapest appeal.

5.57. The alliance must now decide whether it wishes to pursue negotiations on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe in the framework of the MBFR talks or whether this aim should be sought in the wider framework of a second conference on disarmament in Europe, the first of which completed its work in Stockholm on 19th September with the signing of a document on confidence- and security-building measures referred to below.

5.58. While the proposals in the Budapest appeal seem interesting, the committee is for the time being sceptical about the possibility of concluding an agreement on reducing conventional forces with adequate verification measures in a wider framework when, after twelve years of negotiations in Vienna in a more restricted framework, the Soviet Union has still not accepted the necessary verification measures. If the Soviet Union accepted the commitment of a number of annual inspections and the obligation for all troops entering or leaving the reduction zone to pass through entry and exit checkpoints, a first agreement could be reached in Vienna immediately. With the experience acquired in the more restricted framework, consideration might then be given to wider negotiations.

(d) The conference on disarmament in Europe

5.59. The spring session of the conference on disarmament in Europe being held in Stockholm was adjourned on 14th March. The heads of the United States and Soviet Delegations stressed that it had been possible to start work on drafting the final document, but that the agreement so far concerned only matters of secondary importance.

12. See Appendix III.

5.60. At the next session, only in August were major concessions made by both sides which on 19th September finally allowed publication of the "Document of the Stockholm conference on confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe...". Comprising 104 paragraphs with four annexes, this document is clearly different from the Helsinki final act of 1975, on the one hand because "the measures adopted in this document are politically binding..." (whereas application of the confidence-building measures in the final act were always optional) and on the other because the confidence-building measures accepted in Stockholm:

"will cover the whole of Europe as well as the adjoining sea area"

* In this context, the notion of adjoining sea area is understood to refer also to ocean areas adjoining Europe."

In other words, the new area of application extends from the Atlantic to the Urals while the Helsinki measures applied in the Soviet Union only to a 250 km wide strip of territory along its western frontier.

5.61. The Stockholm document has six sections and four annexes.

Refraining from the threat or use of force

5.62. Paragraphs 9 to 28 recall the obligation of participating states to refrain "from the threat or use of force" on which the Soviet Union insisted, but in exchange participating states also "reconfirm their commitment to the basic principle of the sovereign equality of states and stress that all states have equal rights and duties within the framework of international law" and "the universal significance of human rights and fundamental freedoms..." - principles dear to the West.

Prior notification of certain military activities

5.63. Paragraphs 29 to 37 govern notification of military activities which must be given at least 42 days in advance if they involve at least 13 000 troops or 300 tanks (or at least 3 000 troops in the case of amphibious or parachute exercises), and notification must include air forces if the exercise involves 200 or more sorties. Activities carried out without advance notice will be notified at the time the troops involved commence such activities. (See constraining provisions below.) Notification must include details of the principal weapons systems involved, by category.

Observation of certain military activities

5.64. Paragraphs 38 to 54 contain an obligation to invite observers to all exercises involving

more than 17 000 troops (or more than 5 000 in the case of amphibious or parachute exercises). It is generally estimated that some ten exercises by each military alliance will exceed this ceiling each year. Each state has the right to send two observers who may use their own maps, photographic equipment, binoculars, etc.

Annual calendars

5.65. Paragraphs 55 to 58 provide for the exchange by each state with all other states, not later than 15th November each year, of a calendar of all exercises notifiable under the document for the following year.

Constraining provisions

5.66. Paragraphs 59 to 62, enhancing the provisions for prior notification, provide for notification two years in advance of any activity involving more than 40 000 troops and an absolute ban on military activities involving more than 75 000 troops which have not been notified two years in advance or more than 40 000 troops not notified one year in advance.

Compliance and verification

5.67. The thirty-six paragraphs numbered 63 to 98 contain key provisions relating to verification rights. Each state is entitled to ask for one inspection per year and each state is bound to accept up to three requests for inspection per year in the case of notifiable activities being suspected of having taken place without being notified in accordance with the provisions of the document. The inspected state has no right to refuse such inspections "except for areas or sensitive points to which access is normally denied or restricted, military and other defence installations, as well as naval vessels, military vehicles and aircraft". In contrast, the Soviet Union has never accepted automatic verification obligations in the framework of the MBFR talks.

5.68. The inspected state must answer the request within twenty-four hours, and the state requesting an inspection may send four observers who must arrive on the territory within thirty-six hours of the request. Inspection may be conducted using a land vehicle, helicopter or aircraft according to the wishes of the state requesting the inspection, but the two states must choose by mutual agreement which of them will provide the vehicles, i.e. the inspected state may insist on its own vehicles being used, but the inspectors may oversee navigation, etc.

5.69. The request for inspection must specify the area within which the inspection will be conducted which must not exceed that required for an army level military activity. The inspection must be terminated within forty-eight hours of the arrival of the inspection team.

Annexes

5.70. The four annexes relate to:

- I. the zone of application;
- II. the date of notification (15th December 1986 for the first year of application);
- III. the right to raise any matter relating to confidence-building measures at the Vienna meeting;
- IV. the obligation not to take advantage of the alliances to circumvent the inspection system, i.e. a state belonging to one of the alliances must not exercise its right of inspection on the territory of a state belonging to the same alliance in order to exhaust the quota of three annual inspections.

The document comes into force on 1st January 1987.

5.71. Although in the negotiations the NATO member countries asked that notification relate to exercises involving more than 6 000 troops and confer on inspectors the right to overfly territory in their own aircraft, the provisions of the Stockholm document show real improvement in confidence-building measures. The committee has reported several times on the application of confidence-building measures in the context of the Helsinki final act¹³. The effectiveness of the new measures will be established only after several years of application. It will certainly have to be seen how the Soviet Union interprets the expression "areas or sensitive points to which access is normally denied or restricted" within which any state is entitled to refuse inspection. The committee will not fail to follow application of this important document very closely.

(e) Comprehensive nuclear test ban

5.72. At the fortieth session of the United Nations Assembly which ended in December 1985, very particular attention was once again paid to a ban on all nuclear tests. Three separate resolutions¹⁴ were devoted to the matter, the first of which urged the three depositary powers of the partial test ban treaty to promote, at the Geneva disarmament conference, the creation of a special committee to negotiate a treaty on a complete halt to nuclear test explosions.

5.73. In his speech on 15th January, Mr. Gorbachev prolonged by three months, until

13. See the committee's information report, Disarmament, Document 1040, 4th November 1985, Appendix IV, Rapporteur: Mr. Blaauw.

14. 40/80A; 40/81; 40/88.

31st March 1986, the unilateral moratorium declared by the Soviet Union in August 1985. The United States maintained the position held by the Reagan administration for the past two years according to which nuclear tests had become necessary to guarantee the effectiveness of nuclear weapons in storage. For the first time since the Soviet moratorium was declared, the United States carried out a test on 22nd March and there have been several more since. At Easter Mr. Gorbachev proposed an emergency meeting in a European city to discuss a moratorium on nuclear tests but the United States having conducted a second test on 10th April, Marshal Akhromeyev, Chief-of-Staff of the Soviet armed forces, stated at a press conference in Moscow on 14th April that the Soviet moratorium had been terminated as from 11th April and that Soviet tests would be resumed. Mr. Gorbachev has nevertheless maintained the moratorium for the time being.

5.74. In the meantime, a United States spokesman had announced on 14th March that Mr. Reagan had proposed in a direct communication to Mr. Gorbachev that an assessment be made of a new seismic technique which he called Corrtex designed to measure the yield of nuclear tests. For this purpose, the Soviet Union was invited to send scientists to the American test site in Nevada in the third week of April to test this new system when a nuclear explosion was planned. President Reagan thus renewed earlier American proposals and asked the Soviet Union to hold negotiations on improving verification measures provided for in the treaties on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and on nuclear tests below a threshold of 150 kilotonnes signed by both countries but not ratified by the United States.

5.75. At the Geneva disarmament conference it has still not been possible to set up a special committee to negotiate a treaty on banning nuclear tests as called for in United Nations General Assembly resolutions and proposed in Geneva by the non-aligned and Warsaw Pact countries. As in previous years, the western powers have maintained their opposition to terms of reference which would allow a treaty to be negotiated, considering that the terms of reference of a special committee should be limited to examining problems.

5.76. In a letter addressed to the conference on 20th February, General Secretary Gorbachev said:

“ The Soviet Union, for its part, has been doing all it can to help achieve this goal. In particular, it is agreeable to the strictest control over a ban on nuclear-weapon tests, including on-site inspections and the use of all the latest developments in seismology. ”

The Soviet Union had also announced that it would agree to the establishment of regional seismological networks on its territory to verify that a treaty banning nuclear tests was respected.

5.77. Finally, at the disarmament conference the ad hoc group of experts on seismic measuring systems submitted a report on its technical tests in 1984 in the framework of international co-operation for recording and analysing seismic phenomena with a view to verifying an agreement banning nuclear tests.

5.78. The western countries' position, which is well known, has not changed. The United States has asserted several times that it intended to pursue a nuclear test programme designed above all to ensure the reliability of American nuclear weapons. This was a break from the earlier policy of pursuing trilateral negotiations on a complete suspension, these negotiations having been suspended in 1980. It is known that the present test programme also covers research on a possible X-ray laser for strategic defence systems and on new nuclear warheads for the Midgetman missile. The press has now quoted scientists at the United States Los Alamos nuclear weapons laboratories as saying that new generations of nuclear weapons under development, understood to be part of the SDI programme, would require at least 100 test explosions per weapon compared with six for earlier weapons¹⁵. The United Kingdom for its part continues to assert that it is prepared to accede to a treaty banning tests if the verification problem is solved. On this latter point, the United Kingdom and the United States seem to be the only countries to consider that existing seismic networks, particularly if supplemented by regional systems on the territory of nuclear weapon countries, are not enough to verify such a treaty. France's policy in the matter is apparently not to become involved in the public debate.

5.79. The Prime Minister of China, Mr. Zhao, in his address of 20th March marking international peace year, announced that China was henceforth renouncing tests in the atmosphere; it had not conducted any since 1980. At the Geneva disarmament conference, China has declared that it is prepared to play an active part in negotiations to draft a total test ban treaty.

5.80. The other European allied countries represented at the disarmament conference at the moment are supporting United States opposition to the creation of a special committee in Geneva to draft a test ban treaty. However, in their public statements and in their affirmative votes on United Nations resolutions on the suspension of nuclear tests, they have shown they were in

15. The Times, 19th April 1986.

favour of a test ban treaty. For instance, the communiqué issued by the Federal German Ministry for Foreign Affairs on 2nd April at the close of Mr. Papandreou's visit to Bonn indicated that there was a chance of starting negotiations intended first to limit and then to stop nuclear tests.

5.81. However, during the summer and autumn the Soviet Union agreed to negotiate with the United States a limitation of nuclear tests without immediate total suspension being an aim, in the hope that the United States would agree to ratify the two treaties on a threshold test ban and on peaceful nuclear explosions signed in 1974 and 1976. These negotiations were held in the framework of the bilateral talks in Geneva which started on 18th September.

5.82. At the close of the Reykjavik summit meeting, Mr. Gorbachev made the following concessions in his press conference:

"... we proposed that ... we could examine at some stage ... also the question of thresholds, and the nuclear blast yield, and the number of nuclear explosions per year, and the fate of the 1974 and 1976 treaties, and would move further towards the elaboration of a comprehensive treaty banning all nuclear explosions... We do not demand that you introduce a moratorium. It is up to you. You report to your Congress, to the people on how you will continue nuclear explosions or whether you will join our moratorium during the talks that we will start. But let us sit down for full-scale talks to work out an agreement on the total and final prohibition of nuclear explosions. In passing, we will also consider the questions that you mention: verification, thresholds, number of nuclear explosions, and the 1974 and 1976 treaties."

5.83. The committee referred in its previous report to scientific evidence that underground nuclear explosions could be adequately monitored down to the smallest yields. As in its last report, the committee asks that priority be given to negotiating a complete nuclear test ban treaty and that the Soviet Union be urged most strongly to accept the United States' invitation to participate in the testing of the new verification system at the United States test site.

(f) Chemical weapons

5.84. The emphasis on the need for an agreement banning chemical weapons in the summit communiqué of 21st November 1985 led to the belief that progress was possible in the negotiations being held on this subject at the Geneva disarmament conference. The communiqué also announced the start of a bilateral dialogue

on measures to be taken to prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons as follows:

"We are prepared for a timely declaration of the location of enterprises producing chemical weapons and for the cessation of their production, and are ready to start developing procedures for destroying the relevant industrial base and to proceed, soon after the convention enters into force, to eliminating the stockpiles of chemical weapons. All these measures would be carried out under strict control including international on-site inspections."

Referring to certain interim measures, it said:

"For example, agreement could be achieved on a multilateral basis not to transfer chemical weapons to anyone and not to deploy them in the territories of other states."

5.85. At the Geneva disarmament conference on 11th February, the United States representative, Mr. Lowitz, while his country gave priority to a comprehensive treaty eliminating chemical weapons, said:

"However, the United States is opposed to a formal treaty – as some have suggested – such as one that would mirror the nuclear non-proliferation treaty for nuclear weapons."

At the session of the conference this spring, the United States also made it clear that in the American draft treaty banning chemical weapons tabled in 1984 the inspections called for would apply to all establishments capable of manufacturing chemical products, and not solely to state enterprises, as the wording of the draft had initially indicated.

5.86. The special ad hoc committee, under United Kingdom chairmanship this year, and its three subgroups are continuing their work but little progress had been made until 22nd April when the representative of the Soviet Union introduced some significant new proposals which in particular moved further towards the western position on some aspects of destruction of chemical weapon facilities and verification:

- destruction of chemical weapon stocks would begin within six months and be completed within 10 years of entry into force of a convention;
- within 30 days of entry into force the number, capability and precise location of all plants capable of producing chemical weapons would be declared;
- destruction or dismantling of such production facilities would begin within one year of entry into force;

- all production activities would cease immediately on entry into force and measures to ensure their close-down, including disconnection from any non-military chemical production facilities the operation of which would be authorised under a convention, would be completed within three months;
- fairly detailed provisions were described for destruction of production equipment, or the dismantling of equipment which could be used for authorised civilian chemical production;
- verification measures were provided for: "including systematic on-site inspections, such as the verification of the accuracy of declarations, the sealing by inspectors of the facility to be closed, the periodic checking of preservation of seals up to the moment the seals are removed and the destruction or the dismantling of the facility is initiated... the final international verification would be carried out upon the full termination of the process of the elimination or the dismantling of the entire facility".

5.87. The detailed nature of the Soviet proposals, which are obviously based on the design of existing chemical production plants where no doubt legitimate civilian chemical processes are also carried out, makes these proposals a convincing attempt at progress. The proposals do not however go into detail about subsequent verification measures after destruction of existing and declared chemical weapon production plants has been completed, merely asserting that "the convention should envisage measures ensuring its strict observance... first of all the prevention of the use of the commercial chemical industry for the development and production of chemical weapons". Nevertheless they seem to offer a solid basis for active negotiation of a treaty leading to a complete and verified ban on chemical weapons.

5.88. In the light of the important Soviet statement, it can be seen that there is now a wide consensus in the negotiations on the routine verification system which would be applied for the destruction of declared stocks of chemical weapons, the dismantling of production plants and declared installations of the legal civil chemical industry whose products could be used for the production of chemical weapons. A point still at issue is the concept of challenge inspections which would allow inspection of an undeclared chemical installation suspected of manufacturing forbidden products. Until now the Soviet Union has insisted on the right of any state to refuse requests for challenge inspections if they were considered abusive - if, for instance, they sought to inspect other secret military installa-

tions on the pretext of so-called chemical production. The United States proposals concerning challenge inspection, contained in the draft treaty it tabled in 1984, were considered too intrusive by the Soviet Union and also by certain western allied countries with large-scale chemical industries.

5.89. On 15th July 1986, the United Kingdom tabled a document containing new proposals for challenge inspections¹⁶. This text provides that each state party to the convention would have the right directly to request an inspection of another party. This inspection would be carried out impartially by members of the international technical secretariat that would be set up by the convention. They would be required to reach the location not later than seventy-two hours from the issue of a challenge. Normally, any state receiving a request for inspection would authorise the team to conduct a detailed inquiry in order to establish the facts. But if in exceptional circumstances the state considered that its security would be threatened by the inspection requested, it would have the right to propose alternative measures to provide sufficient information for the matter under consideration to be resolved. The time-limit for this process would be a maximum of seven days and during that time the requested state would be obliged to take sufficient steps to enable its compliance to be demonstrated.

5.90. If, following an inspection or refusal of an inspection, the requesting state was not satisfied that the requested state was respecting the convention, the Executive Council set up under the convention would take collective measures which might include withdrawal of rights and privileges under the convention. Such measures would be without prejudice to the right of the other states to take unilateral action up to and including withdrawal from the convention - the ultimate sanction.

5.91. When the disarmament conference held its last sitting for 1986 on 29th August, neither the Soviet Union nor the United States had said whether they agreed to the terms of the British proposal. Nevertheless, the ad hoc committee on chemical weapons set up by the conference continued its work of drafting the actual text of the convention on chemical weapons. Its report dated 21st August 1986 contains the text of the articles on which agreement has been reached, consisting largely of the technical aspects of chemical product definition which would be covered by the convention, by category: supertoxic lethal products, other lethal chemical products and other harmful chemical products, and the restrictions applying to each product.

16. Document CD/715, 15th July 1986.

5.92. Sessions of the disarmament conference are normally suspended at the end of August to allow delegates to take part in debates on disarmament in the United Nations General Assembly in New York during the autumn. They are resumed only in February of the following year. In view of the urgency of drafting the convention on chemical weapons, however, this year it was agreed that informal consultations would be continued in Geneva during autumn 1986 and that a meeting of the ad hoc committee would be convened in January 1987.

5.93. In parallel with these multilateral negotiations, the United States and the Soviet Union have, since the Geneva summit meeting, been holding bilateral negotiations whose results have not been made public. But at its meeting in Geneva in July, when it was addressed by representatives of several delegations to the conference, the committee noted that the general opinion was that it would be possible to conclude a convention in 1987 if the main stumbling-block, i.e. challenge verification, could be overcome. This agreement could thus be reached before the production of binary chemical weapons began in the United States as planned at the end of 1987.

5.94. Once again there is reason to deplore the use of chemical weapons by Iraq against Iran in February 1986. For the first time, the United Nations group of experts investigating the incident mentioned Iraq by name: "The agent used has mainly been mustard gas although on some occasions nerve gas was also employed... On many occasions, Iraqi forces have used chemical weapons against Iranian forces." This shows the importance of a multilateral convention – which must be a worldwide one – banning chemical weapons.

5.95. In the meantime, on 18th February the NATO Supreme Commander, General Rogers, made an important statement to the French Institute for International Relations in Paris about stocks of chemical weapons. For the first time since 1969, he was expecting NATO to approve American plans concerning the production of chemical weapons. He outlined a plan providing for the transfer of chemical weapons to Europe in the event of crisis and after consultation with the European allies. He considered the stockpiling of chemical weapons should be approved as a force goal by the Defence Planning Committee at ministerial level. When voting funds in 1985 for the production of chemical weapons for the first time since 1969, the United States Congress had made production subject to the prior acceptance by the European allies of plans providing for the stockpiling of chemical weapons in Europe.

5.96. The communiqué of the NATO Defence Planning Committee dated 22nd May refers to "the 1987-1992 force goals which reflect the pri-

orities we have identified for improving conventional defence" without making it clear that, for the United States, the force goals include production of the new generation of so-called "binary" chemical weapons. Three countries – Greece, Norway and Denmark – appended a reservation concerning the text of the communiqué. At the same time the representatives of Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands made it known that they did not approve of the American decision. At all events, the ministerial meeting merely noted, without approving, a force goal affecting only the United States. Since then, Germany and the United Kingdom have indicated that the new chemical weapons would not be deployed in Europe in peacetime and that each country would have the right to veto their possible deployment on its territory in times of crisis. This possible deployment seems to have been discussed bilaterally with Germany and the United Kingdom and Germany has obtained a compensatory assurance that the stocks of American chemical weapons now stationed on its territory will be withdrawn by 1990.

5.97. The committee repeats the conclusions it reached in its last report, considering that chemical weapons now stockpiled in Germany were sufficiently effective to deter an enemy from using such weapons. It consequently recommends that the United States be urged not to resume the production of chemical weapons at the present time and to make all necessary efforts to ensure real progress in 1987 in the negotiation of a treaty banning such weapons. While underlining the importance of realistic verification measures, the committee asks that the situation be re-examined at the end of 1987. In the meantime, it considers there is no need to approve the deployment of further chemical weapons in Europe as a NATO force goal.

(g) Space weapons

5.98. At the Geneva disarmament conference, the ad hoc committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space has only just been reconstituted. The Soviet Union proposed to the conference that an international agreement be prepared guaranteeing the immunity of artificial earth satellites, banning the creation, testing and deployment of new anti-satellite systems and making it compulsory to destroy old ones. It proposed that partial measures be taken urgently to enhance confidence between states in space activities pending a solution to the problem of preventing an arms race in space with all that implies.

VI. Conclusions

6.1. The committee's conclusions are set forth in the draft recommendation, the substantive

paragraphs of which relate to this explanatory memorandum as follows:

<i>Recommendation</i>	<i>Explanatory memorandum</i>
1	1.2 and 2.1
2	2.6 to 2.7
3	5.6 to 5.31 and 5.98
4	5.32 to 5.71
5	5.84 to 5.97
6(a) and (b)	5.72 to 5.83

VII. Opinion of the minority

7.1. The report as a whole was adopted in committee by 8 votes to 7 without abstentions.

7.2. The objections of the minority centred on the demand in paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation for both parties "to pursue the con-

siderable progress made at the Reykjavik summit...". Some members of the minority felt that the Reykjavik summit was a near disaster, from which Europe was saved only by the United States stand on SDI. The minority felt in particular that the proposal to reduce long-range intermediate nuclear forces in range of Europe to zero on each side was dangerous because it would leave Western Europe vulnerable to the large Soviet superiority in conventional forces and chemical weapons as well as in shorter-range nuclear weapons deployed in Czechoslovakia and East Germany and because of the possible return of SS-20 missiles from the Asian part of the Soviet Union. The minority felt that in the defence of Europe the United States might then be left with no choice other than to use its strategic nuclear forces.

7.3. The minority also voiced objections to the limitation of SDI to "laboratory research" in paragraph 3 and also had unspecified objections to paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation.

APPENDIX I

*Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Assembly**17th March 1986**(Extract)*

.....

The Council has instructed me to give you the following information concerning the staff and activities of the new agencies responsible for security questions.

Since 1st January, each of these agencies has a director: General E. Rambaldi directs the agency for the study of arms control and disarmament questions (Agency I) and the restructured ACA. The former head of the international secretariat of the SAC, Mr. E. Hintermann, is responsible for the agency for the development of co-operation in armaments (Agency III). Appointed by the ministers at their meeting in Rome on 14th November 1985, a senior United Kingdom official, Mr. I. Dawson, has taken charge of the agency for the study of security and defence problems (Agency II).

A full table of establishment will be sent to you as soon as all the posts have been filled.

As indicated in the Bonn communiqué, the rôle of these new agencies is to carry out the studies requested by the Council.

Certain studies have already been planned, all or part of which will be the subject of interim reports which might be presented to the ministers at their meeting in Venice.

Agency I is to study Soviet tactics vis-à-vis the countries of Western Europe in regard to questions of the control of armaments and disarmament. In the future it will also have to take an interest in the control of conventional armaments and the essential problem of verification.

In connection and close co-ordination with the tasks of Agency I, Agency II will have to study the assessment of the threat, and the contribution of the WEU countries to the response to this threat, and the question of management resources.

Agency III will study certain aspects of competitiveness in the armaments industry in Europe and the implications of the evolution of the world arms market, together with the problems of technological transfers between European allies.

Other tasks have been planned and will have to be undertaken during the transitional period up to the end of 1987.

All these studies constitute internal working papers for the Council intended to contribute to its process of reflection on the subjects dealt with.

In order to guarantee the availability of the information necessary for them, the agencies shall establish links with the appropriate international bodies and with national administrations. In this respect it must be noted that the latter must be assured that the classified information they transmit to the ministerial organs of WEU is handled in accordance with their security regulations and limited to the exclusive use of these organs.

The suggestion to place at the disposal of the ministerial organs a computerised documentation centre will have to be assessed in the light of budgetary priorities and will have to be examined subsequently by the Council.

(signed) A. CAHEN

APPENDIX II

*Appeal by the Warsaw Treaty member states to the member states of NATO
and to all European countries for a programme to reduce armed forces
and conventional armaments in Europe*

Budapest, 10th-11th June 1986

The Warsaw Treaty member states, being aware of their responsibility to their respective peoples and to mankind for the peace of Europe and the world at large and seeking a radical change for the better in the current complicated international situation, are of the view that now, more than ever, there is a need for taking resolute action and concrete measures aimed at ending the arms race, proceeding to effective disarmament and averting the danger of war.

They support the programme proposed by the Soviet Union for the complete and comprehensive liquidation of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction by the end of this century. They are convinced that the cessation of nuclear testing, the achievement of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of the extension of the arms race to outer space, a ban on and the liquidation of chemical weapons and other disarmament measures would be conducive to bringing about a more secure world for the peoples of Europe and the entire globe.

The allied states profess a complex approach to disarmament problems and that the liquidation of weapons of mass destruction be supported by significant cuts in armed forces and conventional armaments. Along with making Europe free of nuclear weapons, the problem of the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments is acquiring an ever greater significance for the present and future of the European continent. It is on this continent that the two largest groupings of armed forces equipped with the most up-to-date armaments face each other and the destructive power of some systems of conventional armaments is growing equal to that of mass-destruction weapons. The allied states seek to ensure that concrete nuclear disarmament measures and cuts in conventional armaments and armed forces are followed by appropriate reductions in the military spending of the states.

Guided by these considerations, the Warsaw Treaty member states present these concrete proposals to all the other European states, to the United States of America and Canada. These proposals constitute a significant supplement to the programme for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, but at the same time bear an independent character, and their realisation would substantially reduce the danger of war in Europe.

I.

The Warsaw Treaty member states propose a substantial reduction in the land and tactical air forces of European states and in the corresponding forces of the United States and Canada stationed in Europe. Simultaneously with conventional armaments, tactical nuclear weapons with a range of up to 1 000 km should also be reduced.

The geographical zone of reduction includes the whole territory of Europe, from the Atlantic Ocean to the Urals.

They propose that the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe be carried out gradually at agreed times, with the military balance maintained at ever lower levels and without jeopardising the security of any of the parties. In addition, parallel to the troops under reduction their armaments and equipment inclusive of nuclear means would also be dismantled.

As a first step, a one-time mutual reduction is proposed to be carried out in such a way that the troop strength of the countries belonging to the opposing military-political alliances be cut by 100 000-150 000 troops on each side within a year or two. Cuts in tactical air forces as part of these measures would be of great significance. Immediately afterwards, given the willingness of the NATO countries to act likewise, the Warsaw Treaty member states are ready to carry out further significant reductions, as a result of which, the land forces and tactical air forces of both military alliances in Europe would, by the early 1990s, be reduced by some 25% as compared with present levels. Such reductions would affect more than half a million troops on each side, thus the opposing armed forces in Europe would be reduced by over one million troops.

The allied socialist states stand for continuing the process of reductions in the armed forces and armaments of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty. Significant reductions in the armed forces and armaments of the two alliances would make it possible for all the other European countries to join this process.

They propose that the components of armed forces to be reduced be demobilised in the

form of equivalent larger units, units and subunits, together with their troop arms and equipment. Troops would be discharged in accordance with established procedures in the given state.

Armaments and equipment subject to reduction could be destroyed or stored on national territories in accordance with agreed procedures. Nuclear warheads should be destroyed. Certain types of military equipment could, subject to agreement, be transferred for peaceful purposes.

Funds becoming available as a result of appropriate reductions in armed forces and conventional armaments cannot be allocated to the creation of new types of weapons or to other military purposes, they should be used for the needs of economic and social development.

All the states party to an agreement on armed forces and armaments reduction would assume the commitment to keep from increasing their land forces and tactical strike aviation beyond the limits of the cut-back area.

II.

The Warsaw Treaty member states propose to work out such a system of reductions in armed forces and conventional armaments under which the process of reduction would result in a lessening of the danger of surprise attack and would contribute to the consolidation of strategic stability on the European continent. With this end in view, they propose to come to agreement at the very beginning of the process on a significant reduction in the tactical air forces of the two military-political alliances in Europe and on lowering the level of the concentration of troops along the lines of contact between the two alliances.

For the same purpose, supplementary measures would be elaborated and implemented which were suitable for strengthening the conviction of the countries of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO and the other states of Europe that surprise offensive operations would not be launched against them.

They plan to reach agreement on limiting the number and size of larger military exercises and on exchanging more detailed information about the size of forces and equipment regrouped to Europe from other regions for the period of military exercises, and on other measures facilitating the increase of mutual trust.

The implementation of measures like the establishment of nuclear and chemical weapon-free zones on the European continent, gradual reduction in the military activity of the two mili-

tary alliances, the establishment of co-operation among their member states on questions of arms reduction and disarmament would facilitate the strengthening of confidence, the creation of more favourable conditions for the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Europe.

III.

The reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments would take place accompanied by reliable and effective verification through national technical means and international procedures including on-site inspection.

They propose to organise, together with measures of verification for the process of reduction, the observation of the military activities of troops remaining after reductions.

Appropriate forms of verification would be applied concerning measures strengthening mutual confidence and implemented in harmony with the agreements.

For purposes of verification the parties will exchange, at an agreed date, data on the total troop strengths of their land forces and tactical strike air forces stationed in the zone of reduction and separately on their components to be reduced and on those not affected by the reduction. They will exchange information concerning the designation of the formations to be dismantled, their troops' strength, location, and the quantity of their main types of weapons agreed upon. The parties would notify each other of the beginning and completion of the reduction.

For purposes of verification, an international consultative committee will be formed with the participation of representatives of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty as well as of interested neutral and non-aligned and other countries of Europe.

On-site inspection of the reduction of armed forces and the destruction or stockpiling of armaments could be carried out, if necessary, with the involvement of representatives of the international consultative committee. For purposes of such supervision posts of control, composed of representatives of the international consultative committee, would be set up at major railway centres, airports and harbours.

IV.

The present proposals for the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe could be the subject of concrete discussion in the second stage of the conference on con-

fidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe.

At the same time, keeping in mind the pressing urgency of taking measures to lower the level of military confrontation in Europe, the Warsaw Treaty member states would consider it possible to proceed without delay to explore the proposals presented here. To this end, they deem it possible to convene a special forum with the participation of the European states as well as the United States and Canada.

They are also prepared to widen the framework of the Vienna negotiations on the mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe through the inclusion of other European states and the corresponding modification of the terms of reference of those negotiations.

While expressing their readiness to make use of all possible channels and for mutually lowering the level of military confrontation on an all-European scale, they reaffirm their interest in reducing armaments and armed forces in Central Europe and come out once again for a successful conclusion of the first stage of the Stockholm Conference.

V.

In terms of the assessment of the real intentions of military-political groupings and individual states the question of military doctrines is no less important. The mutual suspicion and distrust accumulated over many years must be dispelled, the two sides must be thoroughly acquainted with each other's problems in

this regard, too. For the sake of European and world security the military concepts and doctrines of military alliances must be of a defensive character.

The Warsaw Treaty member states declare with full responsibility that they will never, under any circumstances, initiate military actions against any state, whether in Europe or in another region of the world, if they themselves are not victims of aggression. Their proposals stem from their consistent policy aimed at the elimination of the military threat, the creation of a stable and secure world, from the defensive character of their military doctrine which presupposes the maintenance of armed forces at the lowest possible level and the reduction of military capabilities to a level indispensable for defence.

The member states of the Warsaw Treaty were guided by the same peaceful intentions when they presented their proposal for the simultaneous dissolution of the two military alliances.

The member states of NATO also profess the defensive nature of their alliance. Consequently there can be no obstacle to the mutual and significant reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe.

In presenting this appeal, the Warsaw Treaty member states set no preliminary conditions for starting the objective discussion of the proposals contained therein. They are ready to consider, in a creative spirit, other relevant proposals formulated either by the NATO member states, by the neutral and non-aligned or the other states of Europe.

APPENDIX III

*North Atlantic Council statement on conventional arms control**Halifax, 29th-30th May 1986*

Within the alliance, we cherish the ideal that all the peoples of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals, should live in peace, freedom and security. To achieve that ideal, bold new steps are required in the field of conventional arms control.

Our objective is the strengthening of stability and security in the whole of Europe, through increased openness and the establishment of a verifiable, comprehensive and stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels.

To work urgently towards the achievement of this objective, we have decided to set up a high level task force on conventional arms control.

It will build on the western proposals at the CDE conference in Stockholm and at the MBFR negotiations in Vienna, in both of which participating allied countries are determined to achieve early agreement.

It will take account of Mr. Gorbachev's statement of 18th April expressing, in particular, Soviet readiness to pursue conventional force reductions from the Atlantic to the Urals.

An interim report will be presented to the Council in October, and a final report will be discussed at our next meeting in December.

Our aim is a radical improvement in East-West relations in which more confidence, greater openness, and increased security will benefit all.

Disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council

AMENDMENTS 1 and 2¹

tabled by Mr. Hardy

1. In paragraph 3, line 2, of the revised draft recommendation proper, after “insist” insert “firmly”.
2. In paragraph 6 (b), line 1, of the revised draft recommendation proper, after “press” insert “vigorously”.

Signed: Hardy

1. See 11th sitting, 2nd December 1986 (report referred back to committee).

Disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council

AMENDMENT 3¹

tabled by MM. Kittelmann and Berger

3. After paragraph 2 of the revised draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:
- “ Urge on allied governments the need to ensure that negotiations on the reduction of nuclear forces and on the reduction of conventional forces make parallel progress, so that the NATO strategy of forward defence and flexible response can remain based on a range of nuclear systems as well as conventional arms;”

Signed: Kittelmann, Berger

1. See 11th sitting, 2nd December 1986 (report referred back to committee).

Disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council

AMENDMENTS 4, 5 and 6¹

tabled by Mr. Wilkinson

4. In paragraph 3 of the revised draft recommendation proper, leave out from “ the treaties ” to the end of the paragraph and insert “ the abandonment by the USSR of its demand for the termination of the SDI as a precondition towards progress on INF and strategic arms control agreements with the United States ”.
5. In paragraph 5 of the revised draft recommendation proper, leave out from “ pending ” to the end of the paragraph and add “ make progress towards satisfactory, verifiable control of chemical weapons as a precondition towards any INF arms control agreement with the USSR ”.
6. Leave out paragraph 6 of the revised draft recommendation proper.

Signed: Wilkinson

1. See 11th sitting, 2nd December 1986 (report referred back to committee).

Disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council

AMENDMENTS 7, 8 and 9¹

tabled by Sir Anthony Grant and others

7. Leave out paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the revised draft recommendation and insert:
“ Considering that real progress can lead to agreement on treaties to reduce nuclear weapons and to limit space weapons only if parallel negotiations result in a balance in conventional weapons and the level of forces, short-range nuclear weapons and chemical weapons and verification measures offering effective guarantees; ”
8. In paragraph 3 of the revised draft recommendation proper, leave out from “ both parties ” to the end of the paragraph and insert:
“ the United States to pursue its negotiations with the Soviet Union on the reduction of nuclear weapons taking account of the security requirements of its European partners which are ensured only through mutual deterrence; ”
9. In paragraph 5 of the revised draft recommendation proper, leave out from “ , pending the outcome ” to the end of the paragraph and insert:
“ to ensure that chemical weapons are maintained in Western Europe as long as the Soviet Union has not subscribed to a treaty banning them and whose application would be duly verified; ”

Signed: Grant, Bennett, Ward

1. See 11th sitting, 2nd December 1986 (report referred back to committee).

Disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council

AMENDMENT 10¹

tabled by Mr. Pollidoro and others

10. After paragraph (ix) of the preamble to the revised draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows:

“ Regretting the United States decision to consider the SALT II treaty as non-existent, ”

Signed: Pollidoro, Colajanni, Rubbi, Antoni

1. See 11th sitting, 2nd December 1986 (report referred back to committee).

Disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council

AMENDMENTS 11 and 12¹

tabled by Mr. Rubbi and others

11. In paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the revised draft recommendation, leave out from “ considerable progress ” to the end of the paragraph and insert “ possibilities evident at the Reykjavik summit of eventual agreement on treaties to reduce nuclear weapons and to limit space weapons; ”.
12. In paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the revised draft recommendation, leave out “ limit ” and insert “ ban ”.

Signed: Rubbi, Antoni, Colajanni, Pollidoro

1. See 11th sitting, 2nd December 1986 (report referred back to committee).

Disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council

AMENDMENTS 13 and 14¹

tabled by Mr. Antoni and others

13. In paragraph (ix) of the preamble to the revised draft recommendation, after “continued” add “unilateral”.
14. In paragraph 3 of the revised draft recommendation proper, after “strategic defence” add “strictly within the context of the ABM treaty”.

Signed: Antoni, Rubbi, Colajanni, Pollidoro

1. See 11th sitting, 2nd December 1986 (report referred back to committee).

Disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council

AMENDMENTS 15, 16, 17 and 18¹

tabled by Mr. Palumbo

15. Leave out paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the revised draft recommendation and insert:
“ Taking note of the state of the discussion in Reykjavik which might lead in the future to agreement on treaties to reduce nuclear weapons and to limit space weapons; ”
16. In paragraph 3 of the revised draft recommendation proper, leave out “ considerable progress made ” and insert “ negotiations ”.
17. In paragraph 3 of the revised draft recommendation proper, leave out “ laboratory ”.
18. In paragraph 3 of the revised draft recommendation proper, leave out “ without undertaking tests in space ”.

Signed: Palumbo

1. See 11th sitting, 2nd December 1986 (report referred back to committee).

Disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council

AMENDMENTS 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23¹

tabled by Mr. Valleix

19. In paragraph (v) of the preamble to the revised draft recommendation, leave out “and to maintain their own bilateral relations with the Soviet Union”.
20. Leave out paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the revised draft recommendation.
21. In paragraph (ix) of the preamble to the revised draft recommendation, leave out from “but believing” to the end of the paragraph.
22. In paragraph 3 of the revised draft recommendation proper, leave out “to urge both parties to pursue the considerable progress made at the Reykjavik summit”.
23. In paragraph 3 of the revised draft recommendation proper, leave out from “on the understanding” to the end of the paragraph.

Signed: Valleix

1. See 11th sitting, 2nd December 1986 (report referred back to committee).

Threat assessment

PRELIMINARY REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments ²
by Mr. Stokes, Rapporteur*

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION
on threat assessment

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Mr. Stokes, Rapporteur

- I. Introduction
- II. Intentions
- III. What comparison – what viewpoint?
- IV What to measure?
- V. Sources of information
- VI. Chemical weapons – A specific case
- VII. Conclusions

APPENDICES

- I. A. United States and Soviet Union – historical levels of strategic nuclear weapons
- B. United States and Soviet Union – historical trend of total numbers of strategic nuclear weapons 1960-1985
- II. Ratio of strategic indicators for different assumptions – 1983

1. Adopted in committee by 9 votes to 0 with 6 abstentions.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Kittelmann (Alternate: *Lenzer*) (Chairman); Mr. Cifarelli, Dr. Miller (Alternate: *Brown*) (Vice-Chairmen); MM. *Amadei*, de Beer, *Sir Frederic Bennett*, MM. *Bérégovoy*, van den Bergh, *Bourges*, *De Decker*, *Dejardin*, *Edwards*, Ertl, Galley (Alternate: *Baumel*), *Gerstl*, Giust, Konen, de Kwaadsteniet, *Lemmrich*, *Matraja*, Pecchioli (Alternate: *Antoni*), Sarti, *Scheer*, *Sir Dudley Smith*, MM. *Steverlynck*, *Stokes*, *Wirth*.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Introductory Note

In preparing this report *the Rapporteur* had interviews as follows:

IISS, London, 26th August 1986

Mr. Robert Elliot, Information Officer.

Ministry of Defence, London, 26th August 1986

Mr. David Nicholls, Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Policy and Programmes;
Brigadier the Hon. T.P.J. Boyd-Carpenter, Director of Defence Policy;
Miss G.L. Franklin, Head of Secretariat (Policy Studies).

Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 12th September 1986

Mr. David Ratford, Assistant Under-Secretary of State;
Mr. John Barrass, Defence Department;
Mr. Martin Nicholson, Research Department.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Bonn, 29th September 1986

Dr. von Plötz, Political Director for European, North American and Atlantic Alliance Affairs;
Dr. von Kitlitz, NATO Affairs.

Ministry of Defence, Bonn, 29th September 1986

Colonel Pohlmann, German Army, Intelligence Division;
Colonel Farwick, German Army, Public Information, Planning Staff;
Captain Günther, German Navy, Military Relations NATO/WEU;
Lt. Col. Meyer, German Air Force, Military Relations NATO/WEU;
Lt. Col. Keller, German Air Force, Military Policy, Eurogroup and European Affairs;
Mr. Ysker, National Defence Staff, Economic Affairs.

NATO, Brussels, 30th September 1986

Maj. Gen. Christie, UK Army, Assistant Director, Plans and Policy Division, International Military Staff;
Rear Admiral van Idsinga, RNLN, Assistant Director, Intelligence Division;
Colonel Malcolm Hunt, Royal Marines, Plans and Policy Division;
Colonel Harry Sloan, UK Army, Public Information Adviser;
Dr. Murray Feshbach, Sovietologist-in-residence, International Staff;
Mr. Simon Lunn, Head of Plans and Policy Section, Defence Planning and Policy Division of International Staff;
Mr. Jean-Claude Renaud, Director, Economic Directorate;
Mr. Brian Field, Assistant Director, Political Affairs Division, International Staff.

The committee as a whole met in Washington DC and Norfolk, Virginia, from 16th to 20th June 1986, when it was addressed by or met with:

16th June 1986

State Department, Washington DC

Ms. Rozanne Ridgway, Ambassador, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs;

Mr. Charles Thomas, Ambassador, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs;

Mr. John Hawes, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political Military Affairs;

Mr. Edward Rowny, Ambassador, Special Representative for Strategic Arms Negotiations;

Congressional Research Service, Washington DC

Mr. Stanley Sloan, Specialist in US Alliance Relations;

Mr. Paul Gallis, Analyst in West European Affairs;

Mr. Charles Gellner, Senior Specialist, International Affairs;

Mr. Stuart Goldman, Analyst in Soviet Affairs;

Mr. Steven Hildreth, Analyst in National Defence;

Mr. Francis Miko, Specialist in International Relations;

Ms. Charlotte Preece, Specialist in West European Affairs;

Mr. Dagnija Sterste-Perkins, Foreign Affairs Analyst;

Ms. Jeanette Voas, Arms Control Analyst;

Mr. Paul Zinsmeister, Specialist in National Defence.

Brookings Institution, Washington DC

Mr. Joshua Epstein, Research Associate in the Brookings Foreign Policy Studies Programme.

17th June 1986

Department of Defence, Washington DC

Mr. Fred Ikle, Undersecretary of Defence for Policy;

Dr. Winfred Joshua and Colonel Don Scott, Defence Intelligence Agency;

Mr. Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of Defence;

Mr. Frank Gaffney, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for Nuclear Forces and Arms Control Policy;

Mr. Douglas Feith, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for Negotiations Policy;

Mr. Frank Cevasco, Director NATO Affairs, Defence Research and Engineering;

Mr. Robert Mullen, Assistant Deputy Undersecretary for Trade Security Policy.

18th June 1986

United States House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services

Mr. Samuel Stratton, Representative of New York, and members of the committee:

Democrats

Mr. Melvin Price;

Mr. Charles E. Bennett;

Mr. G.V. (Sonny) Montgomery;

Mr. Earl Hutto;

Mr. Ike Skelton;

Mr. Thomas M. Foglietta;

Mr. Richard Ray;

Mr. Solomon P. Ortiz;

Mr. Albert G. Bustamante;

Republicans

Mr. G. William Whitehurst;

Mr. Robert E. Badham.

19th June 1986

Headquarters Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, Norfolk, Virginia

Admiral Lee Baggett, US Navy, Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, and staff;
Vice-Admiral Sir Geoffrey Dolton, RN, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic;
Vice-Admiral Bernard Cauderer, US Navy, Commander Submarine Force US Atlantic Fleet;
Rear-Admiral Jerry Tuttle, US Navy, Deputy and Chief-of-Staff for the Commander-in-Chief US Atlantic Fleet, and staff.

20th June 1986

Arms Control Association, Washington DC

Mr. Paul Warnke, former Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency;
Mr. Spurgeon Keeny, President of the Arms Control Association.

It subsequently met in the United Kingdom on 13th and 14th October 1986.

13th October 1986

The committee made an underway visit to *HMS Ark Royal, Portsmouth*, when it was addressed by:

Captain J.L. Weatherall, RN, Commanding Officer;
Commander Fraser Hutchison, Commander (Air).

14th October 1986

The committee met at *Headquarters Allied Commander-in-Chief Channel, Northwood*, when it was addressed by:

Admiral Sir Nicholas Hunt, RN, Commander-in-Chief Channel;
Rear-Admiral R. den Boeft, RNLN, Chief of Allied Staff;
Air-Vice Marshal Derek Hann, RAF, Chief-of-Staff Maritime Air Forces, Eastern Atlantic;
Commander Nillesen, RNLN;
Captain Whitfield, US Navy, representative of Commander Striking Fleet Atlantic.

At a meeting in London that day the committee discussed a first draft of the report.

It met subsequently at the seat of the Assembly in Paris on 3rd November 1986 when it adopted the report.

The committee and the Rapporteur express their thanks to the Ministers, members of Congress, officials and senior officers who met the Rapporteur or committee and replied to questions.

The views expressed in the report, unless otherwise attributed, are those of the committee.

Draft Recommendation
on threat assessment

The Assembly,

- (i) Reiterating the importance of public support for the necessary allied defence effort, which must be seen to be based on a credible comparison of the forces of a potential adversary with those of the alliance;
- (ii) Noting the unremitting growth in Soviet nuclear and naval forces in the last twenty-five years as the Soviet Union has striven to achieve parity with the United States and aware that the Soviet Union has retained numerical superiority in submarines and in conventional forces in the central region;
- (iii) Believing that the sometimes divergent, even contradictory, estimates of Soviet forces or equipment used in some public statements by different national authorities can only detract from their credibility;
- (iv) Aware that internal political disputes are preventing the further publication of the agreed NATO force comparisons on which consistent public statements can be based;
- (v) Believing that there is a clear political case for independent European sources of technical data;
- (vi) Noting that the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments intends to report further to the Assembly on threat assessment at the next part-session,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Impress on governments the need for defence policy to be based on a credible, objective and consistent assessment of the threat:
 - (a) which takes account of both allied and Soviet perceptions of security requirements;
 - (b) which takes account of both qualitative and numerical factors;
 - (c) which compares the forces of the Soviet Union and its allies with comparable allied forces;
2. Urge allied governments:
 - (a) to draw as far as possible on the agreed NATO force comparisons in their public statements, so as to present a more consistent picture of the size and capabilities of Soviet forces compared with those of the alliance;
 - (b) to press for further improvements in the scope of the agreed force comparisons published by NATO, and for the inclusion of all relevant allied forces in addition to the integrated forces which alone are listed at present;
 - (c) to seek an urgent resolution of the petty dispute currently preventing the publication of a revised version of these NATO force comparisons;
3. Give active consideration to the possible need for European technical sources of information such as observation satellites and electronic listening posts.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Stokes, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1.1. When the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was first set up thirty years ago to examine the security requirements of Europe and the alliance, the first problem it faced was the acquisition of information to provide a basis for its discussions. Perhaps coincidentally, the years that followed saw growing interest in informed public discussion of defence issues and the establishment of many more independent academic institutions devoted to defence studies. In addition to a number of national institutes, and specialised departments within universities, two international institutes were set up which have since acquired a considerable reputation in their particular fields: the International Institute for Strategic Studies based in London, founded in 1958 and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute founded in 1966, financed by the Swedish Government. Since 1959, the first of these has published each year its now substantial and authoritative Military Balance, and the second, since 1968, its well-known yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament.

1.2. Especially in the early 1980s there was a marked increase also in the public information effort devoted by certain countries to publicising the military capabilities of potential adversaries. In September 1981 the United States Department of Defence published for the first time in English, and through United States Embassies in other languages, its illustrated brochure Soviet Military Power which provided considerable information about Soviet military forces, their equipment, and the Soviet defence production effort. The Soviet Union responded remarkably promptly with two editions the following year of its publication Whence the threat to peace?, in English and French as well as the original Russian, a skilful rejoinder to the United States publication, which described United States military capability, but also drew one or two comparisons with the Soviet Union's own military capability. Later the same year the NATO international staff produced for the first time its own publication NATO and the Warsaw Pact – force comparisons which made objective comparisons between the collective forces of the two military pacts, representing an agreed view of the NATO countries. These publications have appeared in revised form at varying intervals since.

1.3. As far as the United States was concerned, this public relations exercise of the early 1980s sought to bring to the notice of a wider public, in

more popular, indeed dramatic form, information much of which had been available for many years in official governmental publications such as the annual report to Congress of the United States Secretary of Defence, the chiefs-of-staff military posture statement, as well as the voluminous congressional hearings. But it was supplemented by some newly declassified information on Soviet weapons systems. For the Soviet Union, the glossy publication Whence the threat to peace? was an innovation in public relations – it drew on many western sources, at least for its illustrations, as it duly acknowledged, but some of the themes were not new.

1.4. Other notable official sources which nowadays provide a comparison of forces include the annual United Kingdom white paper, Statement on the Defence Estimates, and the less frequent white papers published by the Federal Republic of Germany in English and French, as well as German.

1.5. Thus, the committee's information problem today is one of selection rather than acquisition. In his initial discussions with officials the Rapporteur has become aware of the volume of material which merits more study than could be undertaken in the time available for a report to be submitted to the Assembly at the end of 1986. Accordingly the committee intends to report more fully to the first part of the 1987 session, and presents only its initial conclusions in the present preliminary report.

1.6. In 1979 the committee prepared a first report on the balance of force, dealing with much the same subject as the present report¹. On that report, the Assembly adopted Recommendation 336. The preamble began:

“Aware that different political assumptions used in interpreting information can lead to widely differing assessments of adversary capabilities and of the balance of force;”

and recommended that the Council:

“Urge member governments:

1. To take account of both Soviet and western perceptions of objectives, military capabilities and resulting threats, and to reject worst-case analysis as the only basis of assessment;”

¹ Document 809, 22nd May 1979, Rapporteur: Mr. Pawelczyk.

1.7. The present report eschews the word "balance" because it implies judgment in comparing many unlike quantities in the asymmetrical forces concerned. The purpose of the report is to examine some of the difficulties of force comparisons and to draw attention to the need in the alliance for objective and consistent official information.

II. Intentions

2.1. Most of the present report is concerned with attempts at the quantitative assessment of military capability, compared with which any attempt to guess the underlying intentions of a potential adversary is fraught with uncertainty. Intentions can change overnight; military capability only slowly over five, ten or twenty years. The intentions of the leaders who took the decisions that led to the acquisition of certain equipment may not be those of the leaders in power when that equipment enters service. Individual members of a collective leadership, whether democratic or not, will often have different reasons for supporting particular executive decisions.

2.2. As far as the general objectives of the new leadership of the Soviet Union under General Secretary Gorbachev are concerned, the Rapporteur found remarkable unanimity among persons he interviewed in preparing this report, most of whom considered that the primary objective at home is the modernisation and strengthening of the Soviet economy, while externally the primary objective is to be seen to be able to deal with the United States on a basis of equality, and not to allow the United States to dictate to the Soviet Union from a position of strength. At home, the Soviet leadership is deeply conscious that the Soviet Union is a world power only on the basis of its defence effort, while its economy in many ways suffers from the shortcomings of those of the third world countries. Thus, the first objective of defence (and arms control) planning in the Soviet Union today is to achieve or retain a semblance of parity with the United States.

2.3. While no responsible western authorities today believe that the Soviet Union is actively planning aggression against any NATO country, that does not mean that the Soviet Union will cease to be opportunist in its attempts around the world to bolster or install régimes friendly to the Soviet Union in third world countries, nor would it be wise to assume that circumstances may not again arise in which the Soviet Union will resort to the open use of force in territory contiguous to the Soviet Union, where it is best placed to apply its considerable military force, and as it did most recently in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and in Afghanistan in 1978.

2.4. In the words of recent United Kingdom white papers on defence:

"The challenge for NATO is not simply a military one. Soviet leaders have never renounced the 'ideological struggle' and have used every means available to propagate their own brand of Marxism, taking full advantage of the freedoms that exist in western societies to further Soviet aims. These activities are designed to weaken the cohesion of NATO..."²

and again:

"The Soviet Union inherited the product of many centuries of Russian expansion; it is a country obsessed with its own security but insensitive to the security concerns of others. These traditions, and the great importance given to military power that goes with them, have been combined with an ideology dedicated to the ultimate victory of communism. The evidence suggests that these ideological goals will be pursued with caution and discretion, but that opportunities will be grasped if the price is limited and acceptable. Given the present scale of NATO's defences, we have no reason to believe that Soviet leaders have any immediate intention of attacking NATO countries; but we cannot ignore the fact that those same leaders continue to improve the Soviet capability for such an attack. Moreover, the size and reach of the Warsaw Pact's forces make them a potent political weapon. If they were not counter-balanced by an adequate military capability, they could be exploited to bring unwelcome influence to bear on the domestic and foreign policies of other countries."³

2.5. Outside observers have always been notoriously bad at assessing the intentions of potential adversaries in times of tension – bluff, intimidation or bent on aggression? The externally observable signs are the same. Two recent examples are the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, when military intelligence accurately reported concentrations of Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces on the frontiers of Czechoslovakia, but when the majority of western political assessment was that the Soviet Union at that time, in a period of improving relations with the West, when ratification of the recently signed non-proliferation treaty was pending, when there were prospects of a conference on security and co-operation in Europe, would not resort to the use of force against an ally as it had done in Hun-

2. Statement on the Defence Estimates 1986, paragraph 109.

3. Statement on the Defence Estimates 1986, paragraph 105.

gary twelve years earlier. An equally valid but different example involving different adversaries was the invasion of the Falklands by Argentina in April 1982. Openly belligerent language had been used by Argentine leaders for many years, but always dismissed as bluff in diplomatic assessments.

2.6. Thus to say merely that Soviet defence planning aims at maintaining parity with the United States does not provide any useful indication of the way the Soviet Union might employ its armed forces in particular circumstances. Despite the inherent uncertainties, the Rapporteur will attempt in the final report to assemble a range of official opinion on Soviet intentions by addressing the following specific questions to national and allied authorities:

- (a) What intentions lie, or lay, behind the acquisition of the present forces and armaments of the Soviet Union:
 - (i) territorial expansion?
 - (ii) global power/influence projection?
 - (iii) defence of its own and Warsaw Pact territory?
- (b) What opportunities does the Soviet Union believe its military capability gives it today:
 - (i) in Europe?
 - (ii) vis-à-vis the United States?
 - (iii) globally for power/influence projection?

2.7. Meanwhile in this preliminary report some initial general conclusions are drawn concerning Soviet intentions underlying the acquisition of present forces and armaments.

2.8. Separate answers must be given to this question in respect of different classes of forces. On its northern and western European fronts the Soviet Union has overwhelming conventional superiority in such equipment as artillery, tanks and aggregate numbers of combat aircraft, although the disadvantage to NATO is considerably attenuated when factors such as quality and training are applied to the crude numerical ratios. In this enormous armament effort, which can be traced back without interruption to the end of World War II, the Soviet Union is generally believed to have been motivated by its experiences then, when its western territory was overrun nearly to the Black Sea and the Caspian in battles which, as the leadership consistently dips into the heads of the younger generations, cost the Soviet Union 20 million dead. But the numbers of men and weapons have been built up far beyond the levels the Soviet Union would require to hold its protec-

tive glacis of satellite Warsaw Pact states against the numerically inferior NATO forces on the central and northern fronts.

2.9. Improbable though it seems to some western observers, it is possible that at the time these forces and armaments were being acquired, elements in the Soviet leadership may have believed in the possibility of an attack launched by NATO forces which possessed considerable strategic and tactical nuclear superiority at the time the decisions were taken that led to the acquisition of the existing Soviet defence forces in Europe. It is now likely, as Soviet military doctrine prescribes, that in these superior forces the Soviet military leadership believes it has the capability to strike offensively if hostilities broke out, and to penetrate NATO defences to a sufficient depth to seize and destroy many airfields and nuclear weapons stockpiles in the more advanced parts of the NATO front, hoping to do so before a political decision was taken by NATO to employ tactical nuclear weapons. This is not to say that the Soviet military leadership believes it has the ability to overcome in a few days or weeks the far from negligible NATO forces which in the event of hostilities would be rapidly reinforced with the considerable reserves of tactical aviation from the United States.

2.10. As far as its strategic nuclear forces are concerned, Soviet intentions in acquiring them can be assumed to be reaction to acquisition of such weapons systems by the United States, as shown by the timescale of numbers and entry into service of the different weapons systems shown in Appendix I. While a comparison of United States and Soviet strategic forces shows considerable asymmetry in different components, showing in particular large Soviet superiority in numbers of ICBMs, the United States has at all times maintained superiority, today modest, but at times in the past overwhelming, in total numbers of strategic warheads. The situation today remains one of rough and fragile parity.

2.11. It is unlikely that the Soviet military leadership sees this situation as providing it with any more than the means of mutual assured destruction to deter a United States first strike.

2.12. As far as the Soviet naval forces are concerned, which since 1963 have expanded dramatically from an essentially coastal force capable of protecting the seaward flanks of the land armies, to a force today equipped with modern vessels capable of operating anywhere in the oceans, albeit as yet in small numbers, the naval construction programme dates very clearly to the Cuban missile crisis with the United States. On this basis, the intention again is seen as a reaction to the size of the United States fleet (and possibly to a lesser extent to the fleets of a few other NATO countries), and the options with

which the fleet certainly provided President Kennedy at the time of the crisis.

2.13. The major units of the Soviet surface fleet today would certainly enable the Soviet leadership to provide escorts for its shipping in most parts of the world, and thus place the onus for initiating the use of force on its opponents, if they sought to prevent the Soviet Union delivering supplies to any of its allies. But the Soviet surface fleet is far from being able to initiate general naval hostilities against the combined fleets of the NATO countries with any hope of survival, let alone success – it has as yet no aircraft-carriers for fixed-wing aircraft in service while the United States maintains some fourteen or fifteen. The fact that the first such Soviet aircraft-carrier is nearing completion in the Black Sea conforms with the view that the Soviet Union is striving to acquire a degree of parity with the United States.

2.14. As far as submarines are concerned, however, the considerable Soviet superiority and heavy investment in nuclear-propelled submarines must reflect an intention to disrupt allied shipping in the oceans in the event of hostilities and to interfere with the NATO reinforcement convoys across the Atlantic. The large Soviet mining capability similarly poses a threat in European parts if not countered with more mine countermeasure vessels than the alliance now has.

III. What comparison – what viewpoint?

3.1. Significantly different conclusions can be drawn from a comparison of the United States with the Soviet Union on the one hand or of the whole of NATO with the Warsaw Pact on the other. The fifteen NATO allies of the United States make a much larger contribution in manpower, economic strength and military forces and equipment than do the six Warsaw Pact allies of the Soviet Union. Again the viewpoint will affect the countries to be taken into account in a force comparison. Viewed from Washington or any European country, the Soviet Union is the major, if not the only, potential adversary. Viewed from Moscow, the Soviet Union with its long land and sea frontiers must take account of China, other neighbours, and also Japan as well as the NATO countries in its force comparisons. The Soviet Union also sees itself confronted by four independent nuclear weapon powers.

3.2. At Appendix II are tabular comparisons of some main strategic indicators considered in the next chapter. It is seen that depending on the groups of potential adversaries compared, very different ratios of advantage or inferiority could be adduced. Thus, in population terms, the Soviet Union is larger than the United States in

the ratio 1 to 0.9 whereas the Warsaw Pact as a whole is inferior to the whole of NATO in the ratio of 1 to 1.5, and when the remaining potential adversaries of the Soviet Union are added to the NATO total, the Warsaw Pact is inferior in the ratio of nearly 1 to 5. Using the same comparisons for GNP expressed in dollars (with the reservations involved in the conversion process) the Soviet Union is inferior to the United States in the ratio of 1 to 1.8; the Warsaw Pact is inferior to NATO as a whole in the ratio of 1 to 2.4, and inferior to NATO and all other potential adversaries of the Soviet Union in the ratio of 1 to 3.1.

3.3. When the defence efforts are compared in the same way, the Soviet Union has a superiority over the United States in the ratio of 1 to 0.5 for armed forces and 1 to 0.8 for defence expenditure. But the same ratios for the Warsaw Pact as a whole to NATO show the Warsaw Pact equal or inferior in the ratios 1 to 1.0 and 1 to 1.1 respectively, and inferior to all potential adversaries of the Soviet Union in the ratio of 1 to 1.9 and 1 to 1.3.

3.4. These comparisons are for 1983 and are based solely on official United States figures published annually in *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers* with the reservations inherent in the dollar assessments of GNP and defence expenditure of the various countries concerned, discussed in the next chapter. While Soviet perceptions of security requirements must be borne in mind, “equal security” cannot be allowed to mean force levels comparable to the sum of those of all possible adversaries as the Soviet Union has at times claimed.

IV. What to measure?

(Chapter in outline only,
to be drafted for final report)

4.1. Resources (manpower and gross domestic product) can be measured as can defence input (the resources devoted to defence) and defence output (numbers of men and weapons systems). Although there are difficulties in comparing the essentially capitalist economies of the West with the centrally directed economies of the Warsaw Pact, especially as the official statistics of the latter may be suspect, nevertheless an attempt can be made to measure these quantities objectively. There remain other important factors such as geography and the quality of equipment which are more difficult to quantify, but are still important in making a comparison of forces.

4.2. Again, the date of introduction or rate of increase of particular weapons systems is often significant, especially in the arms control context. If one side is five years later than the

other in introducing a particular weapons system, it will seek to complete its planned deployment before accepting any proposals to limit numbers of such systems.

4.3. The report to be submitted to the next part-session will discuss these various factors and compare the existing force levels as revealed in national governmental and NATO publications as well as academic sources, stressing the importance of the agreed NATO assessments.

V. Sources of information

(Chapter in outline only,
to be drafted for final report)

5.1. With the development of surveillance technology involving both satellites and ground or ship based radio interception, what has become known as "national means of verification" in the arms control context, coupled with such official publications as are available, have become by far the most important source of information for measuring the military capability of an adversary. But the raw information derived from technological sources remains as closely guarded a national secret as that derived from traditional espionage. Only one or two countries enjoy extensive resources for acquiring such information; it is not distributed throughout the alliance, but there is some selective exchange of information on a bilateral basis between a few of the NATO countries. Overwhelmingly, the United States has privileged access to raw information, but some other NATO countries are in a position to make significant contributions of their own. This situation raises some problems concerning the reliance that can be placed on information disseminated by one country which other countries are unable to confirm independently.

5.2. Secondly, interpretation of raw data is a separate process, an inexact science that can offer different conclusions from the same data.

5.3. The committee has stressed on a number of occasions the need for the European countries to possess better technological resources of their own for collecting raw information concerning military capabilities of an adversary, especially through observation satellites, so as to be able to make their own interpretations of the data collected.

VI. Chemical weapons – a specific case

6.1. The committee could not fail to notice over the years the way in which official statements concerning levels of some weapons systems held by the Soviet Union have lacked consistency, and in some cases have ranged so

widely that their credibility is jeopardised. The size of the Soviet Union's chemical weapons stockpile is a case in point.

6.2. In an earlier report the committee has chronicled United States statements concerning Soviet stockpiles of chemical weapons in the years preceding President Nixon's decision in November 1969 to cease any further production of chemical weapons. Prior to that decision, United States estimates of the corresponding Soviet stockpile had ranged from one-fifth or one-sixth of the total Soviet ammunition stocks, but such claims were abandoned after the 1969 decision, press reports then revealing that aerial photographs of storage sheds in the Soviet Union had been wrongly interpreted as chemical weapons stores.⁴ In that earlier report the Rapporteur noted simply that "in a recent briefing in the United States Department of Defence, the Rapporteur was given to understand that the United States today claims simply that Soviet stocks of chemical weapons are 'sufficient for their requirements'...".⁵

6.3. Similarly the present Rapporteur in the course of the discussions he held in preparing the report was informed by one authority that the country concerned did not know the levels of Soviet chemical stockpiles, and accordingly did not make any public statement concerning those levels. This attitude corresponds to that of the United States in official statements, as in the evidence given by Mr. David Abshire, United States Permanent Representative to NATO, to the Strategic and Theatre Nuclear Forces Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Forces Committee on 10th April 1986:

"The size of the Soviet chemical weapons stockpile is a point on which intelligence experts do not agree. That disagreement, however, should not be allowed to overshadow the fact that even the most conservative estimates indicate Soviet stocks are several times greater than the usable portion of the United States inventory."

What the "usable portion" of the United States inventory is here taken to be is not known.⁶

6.4. Despite this official caution in putting a figure to the size of the Soviet chemical weapons stockpile, in recent months the committee itself has heard from different officials estimates which have ranged from 100 000 tonnes (an unattributable remark in closed hearing) through the higher levels claimed in British public state-

4. Nuclear, chemical and biological protection, report submitted on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments by Mr. Banks, Rapporteur, Document 838, 29th April 1980. See explanatory memorandum, paragraphs 2.50 et seq.

5. *Idem*, explanatory memorandum paragraph 2.50.

6. See paragraphs 6.8 to 6.10 below.

ments of 300 000 tonnes of chemical weapons⁷ to the almost certainly exaggerated claim made by Mr. Timothy Renton, United Kingdom Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, in his address to the public session of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on 15th July 1986 according to which:

“ The Soviet Union has responded by building up a truly massive stockpile of chemical weapons, possibly approaching in total all chemical weapons produced by all other nations ever since chemical warfare first began... ”⁸

6.5. Estimates of chemical weapons stockpiles are further complicated by the distinction that must be drawn between the weight of chemical agent and the weight of filled ammunition which will range from 6.7 times (aircraft bombs) to 20 times (artillery shells) the weight of chemical agent contained in them⁹. The figure of 300 000 tonnes most frequently quoted in recent years originally applied to filled ammunition and would correspond to something like 30 000 tonnes of contained agent, but this distinction is not always made, perhaps not always understood, by ministers in their public statements. Even official reports, updated presumably by civil servants, reveal this confusion because British defence white papers, which in 1983 referred to Soviet “ chemical weapons... already assessed to be over 300 000 tonnes... ”, have since 1984 referred to “ 300 000 tonnes of nerve agent... ”¹⁰. This could correspond to something like 3 million tonnes or more of filled ammunition equivalent.

6.6. Of course, the Soviet Union has provided no public information of its own on the levels of chemical stockpiles, and indeed has only recently admitted publicly that it possessed any at all – and then only tacitly in accepting proposals for destruction of its existing stockpiles in the course of negotiations on a chemical weapons ban. Unlike strategic nuclear missiles, chemical weapons do not lend themselves to identification by observation satellite. It is therefore very difficult to assess levels of Soviet chemical weapons, but it appears that several different approaches have been used to produce the divergent figures of the previous paragraphs. One approach is through assumptions concerning the proportion

7. See for example Mr. Luce, United Kingdom Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, in his address to the Assembly on 4th December 1984, official report, page 117.

8. Final record of the 307th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament, CD/PV 370, page 8, 15th July 1986.

9. See for example Red God of War, Soviet Artillery and Rocket Forces, Chris Bellamy, Publ. Brassey's 1986, pages 172-3.

10. Statement on the Defence Estimates 1986, Volume 1, Annex A, paragraph 14, (Cmnd. 9763-1). Compare with 1983 edition, paragraph 408 (Cmnd. 8951-1).

of chemical weapons held in the total Soviet ammunition stockpiles. The other approach is to assess assumed Soviet requirements for offensive operations based on available literature on Soviet artillery applications which discusses quantities of chemical weapons which would be required to attack particular targets. Yet another is to try to assess the likely production capacity of known chemical weapon production plants and then to calculate the maximum amount of chemical agent that could have been produced if the plants had been run at full capacity from the date of their construction to the present time.

6.7. Official allied statements about Soviet stockpiles would be more credible if they were more consistent; if they made some reference to the assumptions on which the assessment was based; and probably if they were expressed as a possible range between a high and a low limit. The committee feels that ministers should resist the temptation to call for spectacular estimates in order to make a political point – it is not disputed that the Soviet Union holds stocks of chemical weapons that could be quite large; the unvarnished facts concerning the effects of nerve gases are stark enough in themselves.

6.8. In contrast to the speculation about Soviet stockpiles, the level of existing United States chemical weapons has not recently been publicised in terms of total stockpile, but over the years considerable information has been made public officially, in particular in congressional hearings. The committee has previously drawn attention to the academic estimate, shown in the table, of United States stockpiles based on such public information.

6.9. The table shows a total of 30 880 tonnes of chemical agent in existence (not counting the planned binary production). If the multipliers referred to above concerning the amount of chemical agent contained respectively in artillery shells, aircraft bombs, etc., is applied to that figure an estimate of the United States stockpile is then 342 000 tonnes of filled ammunition equivalent, inclusive of the weight of ammunition that could be filled from the chemical agent in bulk storage.

6.10. Some of this stockpile is known to be obsolete at the present time, not so much because of deterioration of the chemical agent, but because the weapons systems for which it was designed have largely been withdrawn from service – this applies particularly to 105 mm Howitzer rounds. Thus adjusted for obsolete and deteriorated ammunition shown in the table, and deducting all 105 mm rounds, the operationally usable United States stockpile is probably 282 000 tonnes of filled ammunition equivalent.

American chemical weapons: estimates from open sources

Item	Number held	Tons of agent fill
<i>GB nerve-gas munitions for in-service weapons</i>		
105 mm howitzer rounds	900 000	750
155 mm and 8 in howitzer rounds	200 000	850
500 lb and 70 lb aircraft bombs	13 000	1 300
<i>VX nerve-gas munitions for in-service weapons</i>		
155 mm and 8 in howitzer rounds	300 000	950
2 000 lb aircraft spraytanks	900	630
<i>Mustard gas munitions for in-service weapons</i>		
4.2 in mortar rounds	470 000	1 400
105 mm howitzer rounds	480 000	700
155 mm howitzer rounds	300 000	1 700
<i>Munitions deteriorated beyond repair, obsoleted, or for weapons no longer in service</i>		
115 mm rockets	480 000	2 500
Leakers, land-mines and 155 mm gun rounds	320 000	1 400
<i>Unweaponised agent held in bulk storage</i>		
1 ton drums of GB nerve gas	5 700	4 300
1 ton drums of VX nerve gas	2 300	1 800
1 ton drums of mustard gas	14 000	12 600
<i>Planned binary-munition acquisition quantities</i>		
155 mm howitzer rounds, binary GB	410 000	1 700
500 lb aircraft spraybombs, binary VX	44 000	4 100
227 mm MLRS rocket warheads, binary GD (?)	?	?

Note: Of the total tonnage held of mustard and nerve gases, 93.3% is in the United States, 1.4% in West Germany, and 5.3% on Johnston Atoll in the Pacific. The holdings in Germany constitute some 17% by agent weight of all of the available nerve-gas howitzer ammunition.
Source: Julian Perry Robinson in Sussex University ADIU report, September-October 1985.

VII. Conclusions

7.1. In conclusion in this preliminary report the committee notes that many governmental and NATO publications provide a sound basis of force comparison, but that on some particular points, such as that examined in Chapter VI, statements by national authorities can be inconsistent if not contradictory. The alliance needs an agreed consistent policy on threat assessment, and in particular on the public presentation of it. There is much information available for those who seek it on the levels of allied forces and equipment, but the inherent secrecy of the Soviet Union about all aspects of government, but more particularly about its military forces, means that the alliance must devote some effort to publicising also the levels of Soviet forces and equipment. NATO itself does not possess any intelligence sources of its own, being dependent solely on national inputs.

7.2. The committee stresses the need for public presentation of the Soviet defence effort to be consistent and objective. Without concealing the large numerical superiority of certain Soviet forces, it must take account of Soviet perceptions both of the threat the Soviet Union believes it faces, and of the capabilities it believes its own forces to possess in the face of those of potential adversaries. It must take account of the historical reasons which led to the present accumulation of Soviet forces and armaments.

7.3. Although the committee does not believe that the Soviet Union is bent on aggression today, it also believes that the numerical superio-

riety of the conventional forces of the Soviet Union in the Central European region is designed to give them the ability to advance into NATO-held territory and to seize at least key objectives; similarly, the numerical superiority of the Soviet submarine fleet must give it a significant capability to disrupt allied shipping in the event of hostilities. On the other hand, the unremitting growth in Soviet strategic nuclear forces and surface naval forces, appears to result from Soviet reaction to historically larger western forces. These forces are unlikely to be seen by the Soviet Union as giving it more than an ability on the one hand to deter an initial strike by western nuclear forces and on the other to demonstrate the right of the Soviet Union to be present in the oceans of the world.

7.4. Within NATO there are agreed procedures for presenting a reasonably objective picture of force comparisons between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. But a Greek-Turkish dispute involving the declaration of Greek forces on one Aegean island has prevented any revision of the NATO publication since 1984. Moreover the exclusion of French and Spanish forces detracts from the objectivity of the publication. While those forces are not now in the integrated military structure of NATO, both governments maintain they would be available to the alliance in the event of Soviet aggression. Objectivity thus requires their inclusion in NATO force comparisons.

7.5. In the preliminary draft recommendation the committee urges that the Assembly recommend that allied governments in their public pre-

sentation of the threat should draw on the agreed NATO force comparisons to give a more consistent presentation of the levels of Soviet forces compared objectively with corresponding allied forces, and that the political obstacles to a more useful and objective presentation of force comparisons by NATO should be removed.

7.6. The committee finds a clear political case for independent European technical data sources

such as observation satellites and electronic listening posts, but recognises that the opinion of defence ministries is divided. It recommends therefore that the Council give active consideration to this need.

7.7. The committee intends to report further on the subject of the present report to the first part-session of the Assembly in 1987.

APPENDIX I

*A. United States and Soviet Union
historical levels of strategic nuclear weapons*

	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1973	1975	1977	1979	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
<i>United States</i>																					
ICBMs	18	63	294	424	834	854	904	1 054	1 054	1 054	1 054	1 054	1 054	1 054	1 054	1 054	1 052	1 049	1 040	1 030	1 026
SLBMs	32	96	144	224	416	496	592	656	656	656	656	656	656	656	656	656	512	520	568	592	616
Heavy bombers ..	450	550	600	630	630	630	600	540	545	450	465	435	397	330	316	316	316	299	241	241	241
Total vehicles	500	709	1 038	1 278	1 880	1 980	2 096	2 250	2 255	2 160	2 175	2 145	2 107	2 040	2 026	2 026	1 880	1 868	1 849	1 863	1 883
Warheads:																					
on ICBMs	18	63	294	424	834	854	904	1 054	1 054	1 054	1 074	1 274	1 754	2 154	2 154	2 154	2 152	2 149	2 140	2 130	2 126
on SLBMs	32	96	144	224	416	496	592	656	656	656	800	1 664	3 824	4 688	5 120	5 120	4 752	4 800	5 152	5 344	5 536
on bombers	1 800	2 200	2 400	2 520	2 520	2 520	2 400	2 160	2 180	1 800	1 860	1 740	2 088	2 220	2 414	2 414	3 372	3 304	3 200	3 744	3 792
Total weapons ...	1 850	2 359	2 838	3 168	3 770	3 870	3 896	3 870	3 890	3 510	3 734	4 678	7 666	9 062	9 688	9 688	10 276	10 253	10 492	11 218	11 454
<i>Soviet Union</i>																					
ICBMs	35	50	75	100	200	270	300	460	800	1 050	1 427	1 489	1 547	1 607	1 477	1 398	1 398	1 398	1 398	1 398	1 398
SLBMs	0	(20)*	(50)*	100	120	120	125	130	130	160	289	401	589	741	970	989	1 017	969	961	946	979
Heavy bombers ..	175	190	190	190	190	190	200	210	150	150	145	145	145	145	145	145	145	145	145	173	170
Total vehicles	210	260	315	390	510	580	625	800	1 080	1 360	1 861	2 035	2 281	2 493	2 592	2 532	2 560	2 512	2 504	2 517	2 547
Warheads:																					
on ICBMs	35	50	75	100	200	270	300	460	800	1 050	1 427	1 489	1 547	1 937	2 407	4 187	5 302	5 862	6 420	6 420	6 420
on SLBMs	0	(20)*	(50)*	100	120	120	125	130	130	160	289	401	589	741	1 130	1 309	1 849	1 865	1 957	2 122	2 787
on bombers	175	190	190	190	190	190	200	210	150	150	145	145	145	145	145	145	580	580	580	792	780
Total weapons ...	210	260	315	390	510	580	625	800	1 080	1 360	1 861	2 035	2 281	2 823	3 682	5 641	7 731	8 307	8 957	9 334	9 987
Related events ...										(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		(5)	(6)	(7)			(8)	(9)

* Figures in brackets are approximate interpolations.

Related events

- (1) SALT negotiations begin 17th November 1969
- (2) Initial United States deployment MIRVs on ICBMs and SLBMs
- (3) Initial United States deployment SRAM on bombers
- (4) SALT I and ABM treaty signed 26th May 1972
- (5) Initial Soviet deployment MIRV on ICBMs
- (6) Initial Soviet deployment MIRV on SLBMs
- (7) SALT II signed 18th June 1979
- (8) Initial United States deployment ALCMs on bombers
- (9) Initial Soviet deployment ALCMs on bombers

Sources.

- 1960-1969; 1985 - various editions of IISS Military Balance
 1970-1979 - US-Soviet Military Balance 1970-1981, John M. Collins, United States Congressional Research Service, October 1981
 1981-1984 - US-Soviet Military Balance 1980-1985, John M. Collins, United States Congressional Research Service, March 1985

Notes on counting rules

Only weapons counted in the SALT treaties are included: ICBMs; SLBMs; United States B-52 and Soviet Tu-95 and Mya-4 bombers. All such bombers in service are counted as carrying nuclear weapons, even if operationally assigned to a non-nuclear rôle (as 61 B-52s are), because they are counted as nuclear-capable for the purposes of the treaties.

Data from the different sources are fairly consistent for numbers of missiles and their warheads. The numbers of nuclear weapons carried on a bomber can vary widely however, and have increased with the introduction of the United States SRAM and ALCM, and the Soviet equivalent. Weapon-counting rules applied to all data for bombers are as follows:


Aircraft	Total number of nuclear weapons per aircraft		
	1960-1971	1972-1982	1983-1985
B-52 (all other)	4	4	—
B-52G with SRAM	—	12	12
B-52G with ALCM	—	—	20
B-52H with SRAM	—	14	14
Tu-95	1	4	4
Tu-95 (Bear H) with ALCM	—	—	8
Mya-4	1	4	4

These counting rules are those used by Collins in the sources quoted, except for 1983 to 1985 for which IISS Military Balance 1985-86 is the source for United States ALCMs.

The effect of these rules is to overstate the numbers of nuclear weapons that could be delivered operationally, but they derive implicitly from the SALT treaties and provide an objective basis of comparison.

**B. United States and Soviet Union
historical trend of total numbers of strategic nuclear weapons 1960-1985**

Numbers of weapons



- Related events**
- (1) SALT negotiations begin 17th November 1969
 - (2) Initial United States deployment MIRVs on ICBMs and SLBMs
 - (3) Initial United States deployment SRAM on bombers
 - (4) SALT I and ABM treaty signed 26th May 1972
 - (5) Initial Soviet deployment MIRV on ICBMs
 - (6) Initial Soviet deployment MIRV on SLBMs
 - (7) SALT II signed 18th June 1979
 - (8) Initial United States deployment ALCMs on bombers
 - (9) Initial Soviet deployment ALCMs on bombers

APPENDIX II

Ratio of strategic indicators for different assumptions - 1983

	Resources		Defence effort	
	Population m.	GNP \$.	Armed forces thousands	Defence expenditure \$b.
United States	234.5	3 298	2 222	217.2
WEU	253.7	2 357.4	2 119	92.0
Rest of NATO	103.4	538.6	1 246	15.9
Total NATO	591.6	6 194	5 587	325.1
Other potential adversaries of USSR				
Iran	42.5	110.1	470	5.5
Pakistan	94.1	36.6	584	2.0
China	1 020.9	401.0	4 100	34.5
Japan	119.3	1 137.8	241	11.5
Total other potential adversaries	1 276.8	1 685.5	5 395	53.5
Total NATO and other potential adversaries	1 868.4	7 879.5	10 982	378.6
USSR	272.5	1 843.4	4 400	258.0
Rest of Warsaw Pact	110.9	720.6	1 410	41.8
Total Warsaw Pact	383.4	2 564	5 810	299.8
Mongolia	1.8	1.9	38	0.2
Total Warsaw Pact + Mongolia	385.2	2 566	5 848	300.0
<i>Ratios:</i>				
USSR: United States	1:0.9	1:1.8	1:0.5	1:0.8
Warsaw Pact: NATO	1:1.5	1:2.4	1:1.0	1:1.1
Warsaw Pact + Mongolia:				
NATO + other potential adversaries	1:4.9	1:3.1	1:1.9	1:1.3

Source : Absolute data from World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers 1985, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (except defence expenditure and GNP for Mongolia from IISS Military Balance 1986).

Threat assessment

AMENDMENT 1¹

tabled by Mr. Antoni and others

1. In paragraph (ii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out from “aware that the Soviet Union” to the end of the paragraph and insert:

“assuming that the Soviet Union has retained numerical superiority in submarines and in conventional forces in the central region, but that it has more recently agreed to the mass destruction of nuclear weapons and the zero option for medium-range weapons in Europe and that it has withdrawn a large number of missiles and destroyed launchers in Northern Europe;”

Signed: Antoni, Rubbi, Pollidoro, Gianotti

1. See 9th sitting, 1st December 1986 (consideration of the report deferred).

Threat assessment

AMENDMENT 2¹

tabled by Mr. Dejardin

2. Redraft the beginning of paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper as follows:
 - “ 2. Urge the governments of member countries:
 - (a) to draw as far possible, in their public statements on the balance of forces, on analyses based on objective studies such as those published by specialised institutions such as SIPRI and the IISS as much as those of NATO;”

Signed: Dejardin

1. See 9th sitting, 1st December 1986 (consideration of the report deferred).

Threat assessment

AMENDMENT 3¹

tabled by MM. Hardy and Stoffelen

3. After paragraph 2 (c) of the draft recommendation proper, add a new sub-paragraph as follows:
“ to ensure that the Assembly and individual member states refuse to endorse or approve of any disregard of the obligations contained in existing international agreements or those which are embodied in draft agreements which could assist in the pursuit of reduced tension; ”

Signed: Hardy, Stoffelen

1. See 9th sitting, 1st December 1986 (consideration of the report deferred).

European helicopters for the 1990s

REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions²
by Mr. Wilkinson, Chairman and Rapporteur*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

NOTE OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION

on European helicopters for the 1990s

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Mr. Wilkinson, Chairman and Rapporteur

- I. Soviet threat and battlefield experience
- II. Helicopters now in service due for replacement in the near future
- III. The European helicopter market and its future prospects
- IV. Co-operation in arms production
- V. Helicopter programmes now under development in Europe
- VI. Developments in United States technology for the 1990s
- VII. Future rotorcraft development and their significance for Europe
- VIII. Should the WEU nations meet their helicopter needs on an alliance basis or on a basis of European autonomy?
- IX. The Westland affair and its aftermath
- X. Conclusions

1. Adopted in committee by 15 votes to 0 with 1 abstention.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Wilkinson (Chairman); MM. Bassinet, Beysen (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Aarts, Adriaensens, Bohm, Colajanni (Alternate: *Gianotti*), Fiandrotti, Fourré (Alternate: *Prat*), Garrett (Alternate: *Parry*), Sir Paul Hawkins, MM. Hengel, Lenzer, McGuire (Alternate: *Sir John Osborn*), Mezzapesa, Schmidt, Sinesio (Alternate: *Cavaliere*), Souvet, Spies von Bullesheim, Mrs. Staels-Dompas, MM. Valleix, Worrell.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Note of Acknowledgment

In preparing his report, your Rapporteur met the following persons to whom he expresses his sincere gratitude:

- Lord Trefgarne
Minister of State for Defence
Procurement
Ministry of Defence
United Kingdom
- Captain W. Gueterbock
Director - Public affairs
Westland Helicopters
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Federal Republic of Germany
- Mr. Joachim Heyden,
Mr. Weiss and
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- Mr. Gennaro Sergio
Engineer
Helicopter Division
Agusta S.p.A.
Milan
Italy

Draft Recommendation
on European helicopters for the 1990s

The Assembly,

- (i) Recognising the failure of West European armies to exploit fully the military potential of the helicopter, especially compared to the emphasis placed upon helicopter operations by the armies of the United States and the Soviet Union;
- (ii) Aware of the need to harmonise more closely operational doctrines for the utilisation of helicopters in Western Europe and to meet more effectively the challenge posed by the helicopter preponderance of the Warsaw Pact forces;
- (iii) Stressing the need for harmonising the requirements and re-equipment timescales for helicopters by NATO;
- (iv) Conscious of the commercial difficulties of helicopter manufacturers in Western Europe and the negligible market for civil helicopters in Europe compared to the United States;
- (v) Concerned at the relative industrial and technical advantages enjoyed by the United States helicopter industry owing to the economies of scale of the large military market for helicopters within the United States;
- (vi) Regretting that European co-operation in the helicopter field has not been more successful,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Concert a strategy for the future of the helicopter industry in the member states of WEU based on transnational co-operation;
2. Impress forcefully upon the western alliance the benefits of firepower against armour, mobility, surprise and flexibility of operation inherent in the helicopter;
3. Tackle vigorously the problems of overcapacity, short production runs for military helicopters and poor profitability which characterise the West European helicopter industry;
4. Secure a co-ordinated programme through the IEPG, but reporting progress to this Assembly, to harmonise helicopter doctrines and operational requirements with a view to ensuring the joint procurement within the alliance of more helicopters, but of fewer types;
5. Meet the industrial and technical challenge to European helicopter manufacturers posed by the United States, not by a policy of exclusion of American rotorcraft or investment, but by encouraging the governments of WEU member countries to give the European helicopter industry adequate support in terms of orders;
6. Work with the Assembly to create a political will within the member states favourable to international and especially European collaboration and against the protectionist and parochial nationalistic pressures in the helicopter field as in other key areas of high technology and industry of strategic importance.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur)

I. Soviet threat and battlefield experience

1. Since the introduction of the helicopter into military aviation in large numbers in the Korean war and full exploitation in the Vietnam conflict, there has never been any doubt about its practical usefulness for many purposes. Nevertheless, for a long time Western European countries have been very slow to appreciate the potential of the helicopter and for far too long they have been reluctant to assign front-line battle missions to helicopters. Not altogether without reason, they were considered too vulnerable, especially in the European theatre, and consequently they were to be used primarily for secondary missions such as transport, casualty evacuation and troop supply in the battlefield area. The European members of NATO have yet to develop and deploy dedicated anti-tank helicopters in large numbers, even though the main threat they face is from the armoured divisions of the Warsaw Pact.

2. In recent years, developments in Soviet military doctrine and the outcome of several recent conflicts have forcibly made these countries change their point of view. However, it is a belated conversion. Both industrially and militarily the West Europeans have much ground to catch up in this field.

Soviet military doctrine

3. On the one hand, Soviet military doctrine, considering mobility as one of the key elements in any future major land battle, has increasingly been widening the variety of operations in which helicopters play a decisive part. Full use of helicopters is especially made in combating tanks, providing air transport capability and assisting with flexible fire support in the battlefield and beyond. The number of helicopters possessed by the Soviet Union has been estimated at 7 050 of which some 760 are deployed in East Germany.

4. Consequently, Soviet helicopters have nearly always been armed. Nowadays, all Soviet helicopters can be considered to be general purpose machines which can be used for troop/cargo carrying, observation, in ground-attack modes and in anti-tank operations without any change or addition to their inbuilt basic were able to reinforce their land forces, flying very low and undetected by enemy radar. British helicopters not only performed their classical anti-submarine rôle but also played a key rôle in

air to enable crews to operate for a short time in contaminated areas.

5. The main combat helicopters currently in service in the Warsaw pact forces are the Mi-8 Hip and the Mi-24 Hind in various configurations. Most of them are armed with AT-2, AT-3 and AT-6 anti-armour missiles, rockets and various calibres of gun or cannon. Of these two, the Hind is not only an effective anti-tank weapon, but can also be used as a high-speed nap-of-the-earth tank and is capable of destroying opposing helicopters in air-to-air combat also.

6. The new Soviet attack helicopter Mi-28 Havoc, currently entering limited service, is smaller and lighter than the Mi-24 Hind, has considerably improved agility and survivability and is specifically armed for air-to-air combat. This helicopter matches the United States army's AH-64A Apache, which entered service in 1984.

7. The Soviet Union is now testing the new Kamov Hokum combat helicopter with coaxial contrarotating main rotors whose duties include attack and air-to-air anti-helicopter combat. The West has no comparable helicopters exactly in this class.

Outcome of recent conflicts

8. Some of the most interesting early lessons of the military potential of helicopters were derived in jungle warfare in Malaya and Borneo as well as in other decolonisation conflicts such as Oman. However, in recent years helicopters have been engaged in conventional combat between regular armies during the Falklands war, the conflict between Syria and Israel in Lebanon in 1982 and the Iran-Iraq war. Although all these conflicts have been of a very different nature there is no disagreement that the helicopter has had an important rôle to play, particularly so in Operation Corporate in the South Atlantic in 1982.

Falklands conflict

9. In the Falklands war, helicopters proved to be extremely useful as a means of transportation – very often the only one. During the British blockade of the islands, Argentine helicopters were able to reinforce their land forces, flying very low and undetected by enemy radar. British helicopters not only performed their classical anti-submarine rôle but also played a key rôle in

transport missions, initially for reconnaissance and sabotage squads which prepared landings and later for amphibious operations, when they helped troops land beyond natural obstacles which would have prevented such operations if helicopters had not been available. Owing to the boggy and undulating nature of the ground and lack of roads, helicopters were practically the only means of tactical and logistic transportation. Half of all the missions took place at night time because of the serious anti-air threat. Even the artillery barrage before the final assault on Port Stanley was made possible only by virtue of the helicopter-borne supply of shells.

10. The main lessons drawn by the British were that helicopter crews should preferably be issued with equipment for night operations and that the aircraft should be better protected against portable ground-air missiles and anti-aircraft artillery. A friend-or-foe identification system was considered to be very useful. The question of which service actually operates the helicopter is of less importance than availability and numbers. The loss of all the British Chinook medium-lift helicopters except one when the Atlantic Conveyor transport was sunk was a serious blow to the campaign.

Lebanon

11. During the first days of the Israeli advance in the Bekaa valley, Syrian Gazelle helicopters successfully engaged Israeli armoured vehicles with Hot missiles. It is estimated that in these surprise attacks the 40 Syrian Gazelles destroyed between 50 and 100 armoured vehicles. Later, the Israeli forces were better prepared against this threat and destroyed some 30 Gazelles in air-ground attacks and with shoulder-launched Redeye missiles and 12.7mm or 20mm calibre weapons. The Gazelle was vulnerable to a vigilant enemy air defence, particularly because of its significant infrared signature. Furthermore the crew needed better armour protection. Israeli forces have used Tow missiles fired from helicopters against tanks and armoured vehicles. On hilly ground, however, use of the AH-1 G/S Huey Cobra's 20mm rotating gun proved to be even more effective. In this campaign logistic transport by helicopter and heli-borne resupply were very important as well.

Iraq-Iran

12. At the beginning of the war in 1984, both Iraq and Iran had a large helicopter force at their disposal which proved effective in destroying enemy tanks with Hot and Tow missiles. So dominant proved these helicopter-launched mis-

siles that it was soon found that tanks could safely advance only at night. Again the 20mm rotating gun of the Cobra has proved to be a considerable anti-tank weapon. Iraq's Gazelles and Iran's Cobras have also been engaged in air-to-air combat.

Conclusions

13. In all the conflicts mentioned, several types of helicopters have been employed under differing weather conditions and in a variety of terrain for a wide range of missions.

14. The helicopter has once again confirmed its position as a very important if not indispensable means of personnel and logistic support transport. However, the vulnerability of transport helicopters, in particular to ground-air missiles and other anti-aircraft defence in the frontal zone, is significant. This vulnerability has to be diminished by tactical operation and technical means.

15. Anti-tank helicopters, armoured with second-generation Hot and Tow missiles are very effective in the framework of a surprise attack, counter attack or against disorganised enemy units. However, once the enemy adopts an active response or the front stabilises, most existent utility helicopters with a secondary anti-tank capability are very vulnerable and their efficiency diminishes. Specialised anti-tank helicopters such as the AH-1 Cobra with a rapid-firing cannon and missiles are far superior to anti-tank modifications of utility helicopters such as the Alouette III, Gazelle, BO-105 and Lynx, which are not armoured, have no cannon and a considerable infrared signature. The specialised attack helicopter can easily thwart the use of anti-tank helicopters which are not equipped with protection or self-defence.

16. In the immediate future, all existing light scout, liaison, utility and attack helicopters should be equipped with self-defence weapons.

17. In general, new helicopters now under development should be capable of operating at night and in poor visibility. They should be equipped with advanced systems for navigation, observation and fire control. A friend-or-foe identification system, armour for the most vulnerable parts and weaponry for self-defence are indispensable. Attack helicopters should be equipped with weapons other than anti-tank missiles for attacking ground targets. It may even be necessary to use air-support helicopters to accompany anti-tank helicopters in battle. Traditional air force doctrines of air superiority are not fully applicable to the rotary-wing air-land battle. The Soviets in particular recognise the merits of dedicated anti-helicopter helicopters.

II. Helicopters now in service due for replacement in the near future

18. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies' latest assessment (The Military

Balance 1985-86), a wide variety of helicopters is currently in service in Western European countries. The following table gives the figures for the member states of WEU:

Countries	Army	Navy	Air force
Belgium	61 Alouette II	3 Alouette III	5 Sea King 3 HSS-1 (S58)
Great Britain	40 Scout; 9 Alouette HC, 155 Gazelle AH-1, 110 Lynx AH-1, 4 Agusta A-109	104 Sea King 46 Lynx 32 Wasp 41 Wessex 19 Gazelle	56 Wessex 30 Chinook 31 Puma 14 Sea King 22 Gazelle 5 Whirlwind
France	187 Alouette II 68 Alouette III 130 Puma SA-330 162 SA-341F Gazelle 109 SA-342M Gazelle	26 Lynx 15 Super Frelon 38 Alouette	72 Alouette 27 Puma 15 Dauphin
Federal Republic of Germany	187 UH-1D 148 Alouette III 211 PAH-1 (BO-105P with Hot) 96 BO-105M 105 CH-53G	12 Sea Lynx 22 Sea King	96 UH-1D
Italy	70 AB-47G/J 5 AB-109 18 AB-204B 100 AB-205A 140 AB-206A/A1 Hirundo 14 AB-212 24 CH-47C Chinook on order: 60 A-129 Mongoose	30 SH-3D Sea King 53 AB-212	20 CH-3 2 SH-3D 23 AB-204 18 AB-212 20 AB-47
Luxembourg	-	-	-
Netherlands	64 Alouette III 29 BO-105	22 Lynx	4 Alouette

With the exception of the A-129 Mongoose combat helicopter coming into service in the Italian army from the beginning of 1987, practically all helicopters now in service in WEU member countries no longer fully meet the requirements for successful operation on the contemporary battlefield. The majority are Alouettes, Lynxes and Gazelles in various configurations, while a considerable number of BO-105, AB-205 and 206 helicopters can also be found. In fact they all lack one or more of the essential operational qualities and technical characteristics mentioned in the conclusions in the previous chapter. Furthermore, there are differences of tradition within the western alliance on service responsibility for the operation of helicopters. Most NATO nations assign all battlefield helicopters to the army. Canada and Norway do so to the air force (as do the Soviet Union and Israel). The United Kingdom and Greece have a split system with the allocation of battlefield support helicopters divided between the air force and army. Unity of command and control of all rotorcraft assets is certainly advantageous, but this has to be set against ensuring the most cost-effective

arrangements between the services for manning, training and logistic support.

19. The main categories of helicopters for which large production orders can be expected are:

- (i) battlefield helicopters for anti-armour warfare and air-to-air combat;
- (ii) support helicopters for transport, observation, reconnaissance, casualty evacuation and troop supply in the battlefield area;
- (iii) naval helicopters for anti-submarine and anti-surface-vessel warfare, surveillance and tracking, search and rescue and amphibious operations.¹

1. Other important tasks which can be assigned to helicopters are: airborne early warning, rapid movement of weapons systems about the battlefield, logistics and resupply, surveillance and swift concentration of troops and firepower in out-of-area operations.

III. The European helicopter market and its future prospects

20. At the moment the helicopter industry is far from flourishing owing to a serious recession in the market for civil helicopters not compensated for by extra military orders. The offshore section is feeling the full effect of the Gulf war, the fall in the price of oil and the inevitable drop in oil and gas exploration work. Alternative promising developments in the Indian Ocean and South China Seas have not been fulfilled. Onshore, the development of passenger-carrying helicopter traffic continues to stagnate because many people believe that the creation of public heliports, especially in densely-populated areas, will increase noise, disturbance and public safety risks. Many business users do not yet feel the need for helicopter point-to-point travel, while city planners do not want to give away expensive real estate for landing pads in the city centre.

21. In these adverse commercial circumstances, helicopter manufacturers have seriously begun to address the problem of noise and to make the helicopter more acceptable in the eyes of the public. There is still an expanding market for emergency medical service, but the economics of helicopter transport operations are not so clearly favourable as to outweigh the benefits of high-speed rail and motorway links in Europe or even conventional short-haul airliner services.

22. Taking all this into account, it is obvious that the helicopter industry is eagerly looking forward to future military orders involving some 1 700 helicopters in Western Europe. However, problems of agreeing specifications, research and development costs, and filling spare helicopter manufacturing capacity now are exceedingly pressing.

Helicopter re-equipment requirements

23. Practically all the countries mentioned above are engaged in programmes for replacement of helicopters for their armed forces. As a result European helicopter manufacturers will undoubtedly have to adjust themselves to the new market situation. In view of the extremely high research and development costs of any programme for an entirely new helicopter, European industry will have to work more coherently. Even though plain statistics do not reveal the whole truth, it might be mentioned that the United States company Sikorsky, a subsidiary of the large United Technologies Corporation, is employing 12 400 persons and has more business than all the European manufacturers together who employ about 25 000 in all.

24. High development costs are forcing manufacturers to design helicopters around a "family" concept and civil-military joint ventures. The manufacturer is then able to take certain existing, well proven components such as the dynamic units, all or most of the same avionics and other essential structures of the helicopter, and then set about optimising the ancillary structures according to rôle. The core of new military helicopters, for which all or part of the development will in fact be wholly or partly funded with government money, could be adapted to commercial rôles. Only if the European helicopter industry can break into the commercial market, worldwide and particularly in the United States, will it flourish. This is a daunting task against United States competition. A more realistic objective is rationalisation around European and overseas military markets. It is not credible that Europe should retain four principal helicopter companies all with excess capacity and yielding poor results (Aérospatiale, Agusta, MBB and Westland) – the same number as the United States (Bell, Boeing Vertol, Hughes and Sikorsky) – and two principal engine manufacturers (Rolls-Royce and Turbomeca) both of whom are of great importance industrially in Europe.

IV. Co-operation in arms production

25. At least six Western European nations, all members of WEU as well as of the EEC, are on the verge of renewing their military helicopter fleet. At the moment they have some twenty different helicopters in service in various configurations of both European and United States origin. Some of the latter, such as the Sea King and Chinook, have been built under licence in Europe by Westland and Agusta respectively.

26. Their requirements for new helicopters are roughly the same: light and medium-sized helicopters for a number of different tasks to enter into service between the years 1986 and 2000. The total number required can be estimated at 1 700. Potential manufacturers might easily find a wider market. An objective business manager confronted with the question of how to fulfil these needs, starting from scratch, while spending his budget as cost-effectively as possible, would most probably answer that the countries involved should pool all their efforts in a development programme for one light attack helicopter and one medium-sized transport helicopter. All specific national variants could then be derivatives from these two main types. The ministers of defence who have to make the decisions do not start from scratch at all and they are first and foremost political managers. However eager they may be to spend their budgets cost-effectively, they operate in a confusing jungle of political, financial and eco-

conomic considerations and of national, regional and even narrower interests. They have to deal with many political lobbies as well as service loyalties and partisan industrial and national positions.

27. The main reasons for close co-operation and consequently standardisation in arms production are so well-known that it is almost platitudinous to reiterate them. From the military point of view greater standardisation will enhance combat-effectiveness and interoperability. From the financial-economic point of view cost savings are achieved through longer production runs and maximised use of research and development funds. The guidelines should be:

- (a) competition – because it contributes to keen pricing and also strengthens industry by promoting innovation and enterprise;
- (b) marketability of defence products – which benefits industry and also reduces costs to defence ministries through longer production runs;
- (c) collaboration – carries this process further forward. It is certainly not new, but given special emphasis by the IEPG's ministerial declaration at The Hague in November 1984. Its value for money justification lies in:
 - (i) longer production runs;
 - (ii) sharing of development costs among partners;
 - (iii) military advantages of standardisation and interoperability.

28. In general, though with exceptions, governments tend to leave it to industry to organise collaboration in the way they think most efficient, within cost- and work-sharing formulae laid down by the participating governments.

29. In the helicopter field European collaboration has had a long and generally successful history. Mention should be made of the Anglo-French programme, which began in 1967 and by the end of 1985 had produced over 2 500 Gazelle, Lynx and Puma helicopters.

30. Furthermore there is the declaration of principles at Ditchley Park (United Kingdom), signed by France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom in 1978, where it is stated that these nations should work together to develop and produce new helicopters, their engines and equipment. In 1980, Italy and the United Kingdom set up the EH-101 project, a particularly interesting example because, although the United Kingdom and Italian requirements were naval, passenger and utility versions are also being produced to make the

product more marketable. The design of this military aircraft was deliberately adjusted with commercial and civil sales in mind.

31. Nevertheless, in the case of helicopter requirements, European ministers of defence attach importance to criteria of a different socio-political nature. For various reasons they all seek to support their national helicopter industry with employment, the national balance of trade and technological considerations very much in mind.

32. This process of identifying requirements and seeking collaborative solutions is by no means complete. Yet four principal projects, NH-90, PAH-2/HAP/HAC-3G, Agusta A-129 Mk 2 (LAH or Tonal) and EH-101 have emerged, and it is worth examining these in some detail.

V. Helicopter programmes now under development in Europe

Agusta A-129 Mk 2

33. In the early 1980s the Italian and British general staffs started negotiations to harmonise their requirements for a light attack helicopter for the mid-1990s. At a later stage, the Dutch and Spanish general staffs joined in. On 8th October 1986, the national armaments directors of Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom agreed to go ahead with a feasibility study for an advanced multi-rôle combat helicopter to enter into service in 1995.

34. The main structure of the new helicopter will be derived from the Agusta A-129 Mon-goose, an anti-tank helicopter to be delivered to the Italian army from 1987.

35. The participants have set up an Italian joint stock company, the Joint European Helicopter Company, based in Rome, with Agusta taking 38%, Westland 38%, Fokker 19% and Casa 5% of the stock. Two memoranda of understanding have been signed, the first covering the overall development and manufacture of the helicopter, while the second will deal specifically with the project feasibility and predefinition stage, in order to reach full development. The Italian Minister of Defence will let contracts on behalf of the partners.

36. During the two-year feasibility and predefinition phase, studies will be conducted into areas where further developments are expected. In this context a wider use of composites, fly-by-wire and fly-by-light flight control systems, aerodynamically more efficient blades, instrument panels with a greater number of

multifunction displays and adoption of third-generation weapon systems will be investigated. The new Franco-German-British fire-and-forget third-generation anti-tank missile (TRIGAT) should be the basic armament, probably with Italian participation.

37. The United Kingdom has indicated that it would need some 125 of these helicopters, Italy about 90 and the Netherlands and Spain each about 70. Although the British army has agreed to the Italian general staff's basic philosophy in favour of a dedicated light attack helicopter (LAH) in the anti-armour rôle, basic decisions still need to be made, for example on the number of crew and engines.

NH-90 – NATO helicopter programme

38. Between 1981 and 1984, studies were carried out and negotiations held within NATO, the European aerospace industry and the defence ministries concerned with the aim of possible co-operation in the development and production of an 8 to 9 tonne transport and naval helicopter. There should be two basic versions: a tactical transport helicopter (TTH) and a ship-based helicopter for the new NATO frigate programme (NFH). The latter would not involve the United Kingdom.

39. As a result of these studies and negotiations, on 19th September 1985, government representatives from France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Britain and the Netherlands signed a memorandum of understanding, thus commissioning a consortium to develop a common helicopter. The requirement represents a total of 700 helicopters in the 9 tonne class with primary rôles for the air forces, armies and navies such as transport, search and rescue service, air mobile assault and troop supply in the battlefield area and anti-submarine and surface vessel warfare.

40. The leading technology features of the helicopter have been defined as: a four-bladed main rotor and four-bladed anti-torque tail rotor, using composite blades of advanced airfoil sections and tip plan form; twin-engined, semi-pod arrangement; higher harmonic control; tricycle undercarriage to meet crashworthiness requirements; a high level of composite materials in the fuselage and reduced detectability; flexible system layout for mission equipment.

41. The navy variant will offer autonomy in anti-submarine warfare operations and be designed for an all-weather, severe ship-motion environment. The payload capacity will meet a wide range of national requirements in respect of naval mission fits. The Italian and German navies in particular will need the NFH by 1993.

42. The army/air force variant will offer a range of defensive weapons with low pilot workload. The urgency of procuring this aeroplane may not be so great especially as derivatives of similar categories of aircraft such as the Super Puma and Black Hawk could be available.

43. The consortium, consisting of Aérospatiale, Agusta, MBB, Westland and Fokker is actually at the feasibility predefinition study stage, the aim being to design an overall system enabling the weaponry required for different missions to be integrated as early as possible thanks to maximum flexibility in both the helicopter and the equipment. The results of the study were submitted to the governments at the end of October 1986. A project definition contract should commence in early 1987.

EH-101

44. In 1980, Agusta and Westland decided to combine forces on a 50-50 basis for the joint development, production and marketing of a new anti-submarine warfare helicopter, the EH-101 which would meet the requirements of the Italian and British navies. In addition to the naval version, commercial transport and utility versions are planned from the very beginning. In January 1984, the British and Italian Governments announced the start of the full programme, while a formal contract for their naval version was signed in March 1984. The initial requirements are reportedly 50 for the Royal Navy and 38 for the Italian navy.

45. The naval version is designed for fully autonomous all-weather day and night operations. Its primary rôles will be anti-submarine warfare, anti-ship surveillance and tracking, anti-surface vessel, amphibious operations and search and rescue. Other possible rôles include airborne early warning, vertical loading and electronic countermeasures.

46. The design work is aimed at providing significant improvements in safety, availability, operating costs and performance. All this will be achieved through the use of three engines and higher power margins, damage tolerant airframe and dynamic structure, the use of composite materials, the latest available electronics and data-handling systems, greater system redundancy and onboard health monitoring systems.

47. To rationalise production costs to the full, an integrated programme has been designed under which the naval, commercial and utility versions of the EH-101 will be developed at the same time and in parallel in an interdependent programme. The engine choice is not yet settled. The prototypes will fly with the GE T700

powerplant. For production aircraft, the Anglo-French RTM-322 should be available.

48. The first of nine preproduction aircraft is scheduled to fly in early 1987. The commercial version is expected to enter service first, in 1990, followed shortly afterwards by the naval version. The EH-101 is the only new large helicopter under full-scale development in the West. Parallel work in the United States has been pre-empted by the existence of the Bell/Boeing Vertol V-22 Osprey development programme for a tilt rotor aircraft with very similar payload and much longer range.

European HAP/PAH-2/HAC-3G

49. By late 1975/beginning 1976 the Governments of France and the Federal Republic of Germany started exchanging letters about their joint requirements for a day-and-night capable anti-tank helicopter. After many years of difficult negotiations and near-failures to keep the project going, having fears for the future of the European helicopter industry, MBB and Aérospatiale made technical and financial proposals covering the three helicopter versions now under development.

50. On the basis of this proposal, the Defence Ministers of the Federal Republic of Germany and France in May 1984 signed a memorandum of understanding covering the development of a new anti-tank helicopter for service with their two armies in the 1990s.

51. Prime contractor for the co-operation programme is Eurocopter GmbH, which distributes the work equally between MBB and Aérospatiale.

52. The co-operation programme involves a single basic helicopter design, from which three versions will be developed:

HAP (Hélicoptère d'appui et de protection) escort and fire support version for the French army, 75 required, first delivery in 1991;

PAH-2 (Panzerabwehrhubschrauber 2nd generation), anti-tank version for the West German army, 212 required, first delivery in 1992;

HAC-3G (Hélicoptère anti-char 3rd generation), anti-tank version for the French army, 140 required, first delivery in 1995.

53. In this helicopter programme, latest technologies will be applied. Fibre composites are combined with aluminium alloys for the airframe configuration. Extremely effective infrared suppression is ensured through installation of two MTM-385 1R engines. The structural design of the airframe and landing gear

takes into account criteria such as safety, crash behaviour and resistance to gunfire without neglecting ease of repair, weight and costs. It will be equipped with the most sophisticated visionics system to provide night and reduced-visibility capability for the pilot. It will also allow the gunner to identify his targets and to guide his weapons.

54. After the meeting between the French Defence Minister and his former counterpart last July, there seemed to be serious doubts about the feasibility of the programme. The May 1984 memorandum is certainly no longer applicable and serious delays are now inevitable. There are still fundamental differences in operational doctrines and requirements between the French and German general staffs as well as over equipment specifications which put in doubt the future of this project.

55. The French National Assembly commissioned a select committee report into this programme to investigate the serious delays and cost overruns on this project. Efforts are being made to reduce the cost estimates for the programme and final agreement is being sought on such questions as engine and visionics, the aim being to select equipment of European manufacture. Nevertheless, the desire of the German general staff for a more sophisticated, heavier aircraft for operations on the central front, right forward in the front line, will be difficult to reconcile with the French requirement for a lighter aeroplane to destroy Warsaw Pact armour which has broken through the front, supported by a separate version of the same helicopter optimised specifically for anti-helicopter operations.

Schedule of helicopter co-operation in Europe

	NH-90	HAP/ PAH-2/ HAC-3G	EH-101	Tonal LAH-129 Mk2
France	X	X		
Federal Republic of Germany	X	X		
Italy	X		X	X
Netherlands	X			X
Spain				X
United Kingdom	X		X	X

VI. Developments in United States technology for the 1990s

56. While Europe is now working on programmes for a new generation of helicopters of a more or less conventional type, of which the most ambitious and – ironically enough – the

least likely to succeed is the Franco-German effort to develop an advanced attack helicopter, United States helicopter manufacturers are pushing ahead with completely new aircraft families. Work is in full progress on three different projects of the greatest importance; the LHX, a new family of light scout/attack/utility helicopters, the advanced vertical lift-off aircraft, a tilt-rotor vehicle, and the X-wing, a vertical take-off and landing concept, which uses a four-blade rotor system for rotary and fixed-wing flight.

LHX

57. The United States army is generating a vast development programme for the LHX, its new family of advanced light scout/attack/utility helicopters, mainly to replace the different versions of the Bell UH-1, AH-1 and the A and C versions of the OH-58. There are very high capability requirements for this helicopter. The army wants the scout/attack version to be designed as a single-pilot helicopter, which means that significant advances will have to be made in automated controls to reduce the pilot's workload while he is performing the scout mission or fighting air-to-ground or air-to-air engagements. The army attaches much importance to this single pilot issue estimating that it will reduce considerably both aircraft costs and the costs of attracting, training and sustaining crews for the aircraft. Important stress is laid on enhanced survivability, including reduced radar, infrared, visual and acoustic signatures, increased nuclear, biological and chemical warfare protection. Improved crashworthiness and air-to-air self-defence capabilities, greater agility and small size are among the other important requirements.

58. Compared with previous light attack and utility helicopters, the LHX is expected to be powered by 60% smaller engines, to use 52% less fuel per equivalent mission, to have a 48% lower airframe empty weight and to provide a 45% improvement in payload per gross weight ratio. The scout/attack and utility versions should have a high degree of commonality in dynamic components such as the engines, transmission and rotor system.

59. Originally a precursor to, but later directly connected with the LXH programme is the ARTI (advanced rotorcraft technology integration) programme, launched in December 1983. Its purpose was to examine how the technology options expected over the next few years could be combined to produce a rotorcraft that is operationally capable and supportable and at the same time effective in the scout/attack mission environment with a single crew member. Among issues of greatest interest

under consideration are the incorporation of automatic navigation, automatic targeting and digital map systems, interactive voice controls, sensor fusion to reduce the need for individual interpretation of data from each sensor and the application of voice-activated controls.

60. The recently-completed ARTI study has concluded that single-pilot operation of the scout/attack version of the LHX is feasible, but further work is needed in the areas of voice recognition, wide-field-of-view helmet and automatic target recognition. According to the present schedule, the army will buy at least 4 500 LHX in various versions, the first to be delivered in the late 1990s.

X-Wing

61. Since 1984, Sikorsky, NASA and DARPA (defence advanced research projects agency) are working on the development of an X-wing vertical take-off and landing aircraft which combines the hover efficiency of a helicopter and the high speed of a fixed-wing aircraft by using a rotor that can be stopped in flight at approximately 230 mph for use as a wing for high-speed flight up to about mach 0.8.

62. In several areas, important new technology had to be developed for the X-wing. Since the X-wing does not rotate around a rotor hub in wing-borne flight, it cannot rely on centrifugal force to stiffen it. Consequently, very stiff composite structures had to be developed to eliminate these aeroelastic problems, while at the same time not exceeding an acceptable weight. To allow airborne conversion from rotor to fixed-wing flight, digital fly-by-wire systems were required. Convertible propulsion systems for rotor and forward flight also had to be developed.

63. An X-wing/rotor system research aircraft (RSRA) is being tested at the moment. Powered rotor flights are scheduled for mid-1987. Transition from rotary to fixed-wing flight testing is scheduled for late 1988. Successful performance of the RSRA could lead to the development of an X-wing demonstrator by 1990. A production version could follow in the year 2000.

Advanced vertical lift aircraft (tilt-rotor)

64. For some years now, NASA and the United States army and navy together with Bell Helicopter have been testing extensively the Bell XV-15, a twin-engine tilt-rotor vehicle, which is able to take off vertically like a helicopter, and then change to forward flight as a high-speed fixed-wing turboprop aircraft. The XV-15 has successfully shown potentially strong capabilities in a number of traditional helicopter rôles, and

also the additional benefits of higher speeds, greater range, lower noise levels and improved manoeuvrability. In 1983 the United States military services selected Bell Helicopter Textron and Boeing Vertol to develop a larger operational tilt rotor to meet their requirements. These requirements cover a wide range from combat and troop-carrying assault rôles for the Marine Corps to replace its Boeing Vertol CH-46s as well as some of its heavy-lift Sikorsky CH-53s via combat search and rescue for the navy and long-range special operations for the air force to combat support and cargo airlift for the army.

65. To give an indication of the size and performance of this aircraft, it is noted that the Marine Corps version is required to carry 24 combat-equipped marines at a speed of 250 knots (463 km/h) over an operational radius of 370 km. Altogether, the United States armed services will need approximately 1 050 of these aircraft. The first flight of the Bell-Boeing Vertol V-22 Osprey, as it is named now, is anticipated in 1988, while the first deliveries to the Marine Corps could begin in 1991.

VII. Future rotorcraft development and their significance for Europe

66. It is most likely that for use over relatively short distances (up to 200 miles) at speeds not in excess of 200 knots, and where rôles dictate several landings and take-offs or time in the hover within one sortie, the conventional helicopter will be retained. Certainly there will be technological improvements to blade design (such as those studied in BERP, British experimental rotor programme), controls, further use of composite materials and advanced anti-torque devices, but the basic helicopter configuration will remain.

67. However, where higher speeds over long distances are dominant factors, current technological developments such as the Bell-Boeing Vertol tilt-wing Osprey project, the Sikorsky X-wing programme and the five-nation, six-company European future advanced rotorcraft will markedly change the design and shape of future rotorcraft. In the main such technology is aimed at combining the advantages of fixed-wing and helicopter flight into a hybrid rotorcraft. The aim is to produce a fast (some 300-400 knots) rotorcraft, with long range and endurance, whilst giving the aircraft a vertical take-off/landing and hover capability. In short, to produce an aircraft with similar characteristics to the Harrier, albeit with much less speed, but at very much less cost.

68. Such hybrids are likely to be even more expensive than traditional helicopters. In the United Kingdom and North-West Europe the

rôles and employment of helicopters almost certainly would not warrant the advantages of speed and distance to be set against this additional expense for the foreseeable future. In summary, service helicopters are likely to remain of a conventional design rather than an advanced hybrid rotorcraft. In this context, it is worth noting that the LHX, the United States army's future light scout, attack and utility helicopter, is most probably to be of traditional design. On the other hand, advanced alternatives have not yet been discarded.

VIII. Should the WEU nations meet their helicopter needs on an alliance basis or on a basis of European autonomy?

69. The IEPG statement issued on the occasion of its revitalisation in November 1984 was by definition concerned with European collaboration, and the 1978 declaration of principles was explicitly European.

70. But collaboration in the alliance is not exclusively European; a number of projects are transatlantic: the NATO frigate NFR-90, Sea Gnat, multiple-launch rocket-system (MLRS), Phases I and III (both of which include France and Germany) and the Harrier GR-Mk 5.

71. In the market sector for heavy helicopters, Europe has not attempted to duplicate what the United States has done successfully but has bought the Chinook (United Kingdom) or manufactured it under licence (Agusta in Italy). The Federal Republic of Germany manufactured the CH-53 under licence. Furthermore, European helicopters contain United States equipment.

72. So it is not a black and white choice. A sensible industrial objective must be to strengthen European collaboration without spurning the benefits which wider alliance involvement can bring.

IX. The Westland affair and its aftermath

73. The Westland affair caused an unprecedented political crisis in the United Kingdom including the resignation of two cabinet ministers, the Secretary of State for Defence, Michael Heseltine, and the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Leon Brittain. Now that the dust has settled it may be useful, without venturing into the political debate, to try to assess the possible repercussions on the helicopter industry in Europe as a whole. The facts may be considered too well known to repeat them in detail. Bankruptcy was impending for Westland owing to an important gap between present production, primarily of Lynx and Sea King aircraft and potential orders and production, primarily of EH-101 aircraft. The United

States Sikorsky Company and Italy's Fiat together took a 14.8% stake in Westland, thus solving its immediate financial problems. They may increase their stake to 29.9% if they take up their options in full. Although the companies concerned have guaranteed two million man hours of work, this is concerned with design and production work per se and is not linked to any particular project.

74. Westland, like the Italian company Agusta, has made a success over the years of building Sikorsky designs under licence. It sold many aircraft like the Sea King in export markets.

75. For Sikorsky, a subsidiary company to United Technologies, it was a logical and well-considered step. It intended to continue its strategy of global expansion and to extend its penetration of the European market. It is especially interested in Westland's possession of specific engineering expertise in composite blades, rotor tip aerodynamics and avionics integration. Westland could also provide access to certain export markets, such as in the Arab world, South and South-East Asia where for historic reasons British commercial and political influences are strong.

76. Sikorsky felt that the position of the European industry in the NH-90 project was vulnerable, but that this project may yet prove to be Europe's biggest commercial threat to its own Black Hawk. The world market, leaving out of account the United States and the Soviet Union, is estimated at some 1 700 to 2 000 for these medium-sized support helicopters.

77. The Black Hawk as a proven design could be enhanced with the adoption of the new Rolls-Royce/Turbomeca 322 engine and offer benefits of interoperability and standardisation within NATO.

78. Until now, however, there are no signs of slackening in the NH-90 project, with Aérospatiale as the major driving force and Westland still a member of the five nation industrial grouping whose feasibility and project definition study is due to be completed before the end of 1986. Nevertheless, with an improved Black Hawk available, the NH-90 will have to offer major performance benefits to be cost effective.

79. In this situation, prospects for the Agusta-Westland EH-101 could be good, because it covers a section of the market where virtually no

other products exist. Westland has predicted no less than 1 000 orders for both military and civil configurations together, which seems wildly over-optimistic. Sikorsky might even provide a foothold in the United States military market if, for some reason, the tilt rotor programme fails to meet all requirements. Through Sikorsky, Westland might conceivably secure a rôle in the vast LHX programme and later even try to bring the LHX to the attention of the British Government for its future anti-armour and scout needs. Meanwhile, Westland will press ahead with its Italian, Dutch and Spanish partners in the A-129 Mk 2 LAH feasibility study, or even an amalgamated LAH/PAH-2 programme (although quite how that could be achieved is very much open to doubt).

X. Conclusions

80. Apart from the short- and medium-term questions raised in the preceding chapter, it is debatable what will happen to the European helicopter industry after the present production and development programmes. It is very difficult to predict the future, but the situation seems fluid. With the increasingly new and more demanding requirements of customers, military and civil alike, research and development costs will rise substantially. Manufacturers will have to act together, but it is doubtful whether they will always feel they have to keep to purely European co-operation.

81. Finally, the financial figures will be a determining factor. No manufacturer can afford to remain in the red for long, even if it is state-owned or government-supported. Consequently it is unreasonable to expect a manufacturer to maintain its commitment to Europe when an agreement outside is financially to its advantage. The results of the NH-90 programme might be an important touchstone because virtually all the European manufacturers of any importance are involved, airframe and engine alike. If it succeeds, hopefully with a derivative commercial variant, it may set the framework for future co-operation. Only by pooling its resources can the European helicopter industry hope to keep pace with technological advance. Let no one deceive himself into thinking that it can afford to remain fragmented in a field where the much larger United States manufacturers have such advantages of scale and vast assured military home market.

European helicopters for the 1990s

AMENDMENTS 1 and 2¹

tabled by Sir John Osborn

1. After paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows:

“Aware that the rôle of the helicopter in modern warfare is influenced by the use of anti-helicopter missiles such as the ‘Stinger’ and by the use of ‘anti-helicopter’ helicopters,”

2. After paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows:

“Bearing in mind the rôle of the EEC in co-ordinating manufacturing capacity, including that of the aircraft industry and, in particular, the helicopter industry;”

Signed: Osborn

1. See 12th sitting, 3rd December 1986 (amendment 1 negatived; amendment 2 withdrawn).

*Political activities of the Council –
reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council*

REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee ²
by Mr. Bianco, Rapporteur*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION

on the political activities of the Council – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Mr. Bianco, Rapporteur

- I. Introduction
- II. Relations between the Council and the Assembly and with the public
- III. The political activities of the Council
- IV. The functioning of WEU
- V. Conclusions

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee: Mr. Berrier (Chairman); MM. Close, Martino (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Ahrens, Baumel, Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Bianco, Bogaerts, Burger, Sir Anthony Grant, Mr. Hardy (Alternate: Lord Hughes), Mrs. Herfkens, Mr. Hill (Alternate: Murphy), Mrs. Kelly, Mr. Koehl, Lord Mackie, MM. Masciadri, Mermaz, Muller, Reddemann, Ruet, Rumpf, van der Sanden, Spitella (Alternate: Amadei), Vecchietti (Alternate: Antoni), van der Werff, N... (Vacant seat).*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

*on the political activities of the Council –
reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council*

The Assembly,

- (i) Emphasising that the explanatory memorandum to the present report is an essential factor that cannot be separated from the recommendation;
- (ii) Noting that the Council's replies to Recommendations 432, 433 and 435 reached the Assembly in time to allow a true dialogue with the Council;
- (iii) Welcoming the intention expressed by the Council henceforth to report on its activities twice a year;
- (iv) Noting that the thirty-first annual report of the Council reports on the definition of a European position towards the United States strategic defence initiative;
- (v) Regretting however that the report makes no mention of decisions on other important matters;
- (vi) Considering that the harmonisation of European positions on disarmament and the limitation of armaments has assumed new importance since the Reykjavik meeting;
- (vii) Recalling that, if Europe is to speak with one voice, it is essential for all member countries of WEU to take part on an equal footing in defining a European position on disarmament and the limitation of armaments;
- (viii) Recalling the importance of official procedure in regard to the Council's own activities and also exchanges between the Council and the Assembly;
- (ix) Still unaware of the action the Council has taken on its document on WEU and public awareness;
- (x) Noting that the Council has not yet followed up its promise to communicate to the Assembly, insofar as the needs of secrecy allow, the reports the new agencies submit to it;
- (xi) Considering that the Council gives no information about the rôle it assigns to the Standing Armaments Committee or the activities of that body;
- (xii) Noting that the Council makes no mention of any action taken on studies by the SAC, its international secretariat or the three agencies set up in 1985;
- (xiii) Noting that the Council recognises that the WEU agencies as well as other bodies " must also take account of terrorism when analysing the different threats facing Europe " but that the Council itself has not followed up this recognition;
- (xiv) Emphasising that these failings are making the press, public opinion and the WEU countries' partners in the Atlantic Alliance express ever stronger doubts about the governments' will to follow up the Rome declaration;
- (xv) Recalling that any lapse by WEU in areas for which it is responsible will jeopardise the present and future of Western Europe as a whole and that no institution is able to take over the place the modified Brussels Treaty reserves for WEU;
- (xvi) Considering that the principle of zero growth as interpreted and practised is progressively preventing the Assembly from taking part in the reactivation of WEU,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Confirm its intention to apply in full the decisions in the Rome declaration;
2. Say whether the composition of the Permanent Council allows it to apply these decisions and indicate what steps it intends to take to this end;
3. Make official all the information it transmits to the Assembly, even if such information has previously been given in informal communications to some of its organs;
4. Inform the Assembly about the purpose and methods of ministers of defence attending its meetings at ministerial level and the results thus obtained;

5. Inform the Assembly about its activities at its meetings at the level of political directors;
6. Communicate to the Assembly the conclusions it has drawn from its work on disarmament, account being taken of the studies submitted to it by Agency I;
7. Integrate in WEU the working group on security in Europe set up by France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom, in order to ensure the homogenous participation of all member countries;
8. Explain the action it intends to take on the observation in its reply to Recommendation 435 that the terrorist threat forms part of the matters for which it is responsible and whose study can be assigned to the agencies;
9. Ensure that the WEU agencies receive the information they need to carry out their mandates effectively;
10. Inform the Assembly in detail of the tasks assigned to the SAC on the one hand and the IEPG on the other in the light of each group's specific characteristics;
11. Specify in particular what conclusions the IEPG reached on the economic inquiry into the European armaments industries which, according to the note from the Council transmitted to the Assembly on 23rd February 1978 (Document 769), it was asked to prepare in 1977;
12. Tell the Assembly how it intends to follow up the studies on the European armaments industries carried out by the SAC;
13. Provide the Assembly with detailed information on the steps it has taken to strengthen "co-operation between existing European institutes for security studies";
14. Explain to the Assembly how it intends to keep the press informed of each of its activities;
15. Give a positive answer without further delay to Portugal's application to join WEU;
16. Stop depriving the Assembly of the material means essential for the exercise and development of its work.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Bianco, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. In view of the date on which the thirty-first annual report of the Council reached the Assembly, the General Affairs Committee was unable to answer this report at the June session as is customary and therefore prolonged the mandate of your Rapporteur.

2. It would obviously be inappropriate to pick a quarrel with the Council over a few weeks' delay in adopting its report. However, it is to be deplored insofar as it contradicts the Council's statements that it is prepared to intensify its relations with the Assembly and even report on its activities twice a year. This is far from the case! Your Rapporteur has no need to dwell on the obstacles to a true dialogue between the two WEU organs or on the fact that only in December 1986 is the Assembly able to give its views on the activities of the Council prior to 31st December 1985.

3. The present report therefore seeks merely to complete the one submitted to the Assembly in June 1986 (Document 1058), the draft recommendation in which was then adopted. Since then, certain new information has reached the Assembly on the Council's activities with the replies to Recommendations 432, 433 and 435 whose arrival at the Office of the Clerk on 15th October is likely to facilitate a half-yearly exchange between the Council and the Assembly. Furthermore, a report on the Council's activities in the first half of 1986 (Document 1074) reached the Office of the Clerk on 20th October as the Council promised and this represents a considerable improvement in its exchanges with the Assembly. Your Rapporteur has been able to take it into account.

4. A preparatory working paper was submitted to the General Affairs Committee on 15th October 1986 and this allowed your Rapporteur to take the fullest account of the opinions expressed at that meeting. While the views of committee members differed to some extent, particularly on the expediency of taking steps to enlarge WEU and on the future prospects the governments were effectively prepared to offer the organisation, your Rapporteur is nevertheless gratified to record a very wide consensus on most of the report.

5. The documents he has since received from the Council have, however, led your Rapporteur to modify some of his views.

II. Relations between the Council and the Assembly and with the public

6. If international treaties – including, among many others, the Paris Agreements modifying the Brussels Treaty – are ratified by national parliaments, it is to ensure that these treaties are not considered as the short-lived work of passing governments and that legislation gives them a guarantee of continuity in their application. This essential consideration shows the full impact of Article IX of the treaty obliging the Council to submit an annual report to the WEU Assembly; it is the latter which, formed of politicians from the national parliaments, gives the whole organisation a guarantee that the changing concerns of the governments do not impinge upon the intentions of the signatories of the treaty. In this connection, the fact that the WEU Assembly is composed of the delegations of the parliaments of member countries to the Council of Europe and not of representatives elected directly to the European Parliament is an advantage which should not be relinquished for the sake of a geometrical rather than realistic idea of European union, at least as long as defence questions remain primarily the province of states, even if it is considered that the future of WEU is to take its place in this union, when the time is ripe, alongside the European Communities.

7. The Council constantly evokes the ever-increasing number of meetings between representatives of the Council and the Assembly: participation of ministers and the Secretary-General in sessions, joint meetings with the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the General Affairs Committee, meetings between the Council of Ministers – and also, since 1985, the Permanent Council – and the Presidential Committee, meetings between the Chairman-in-Office of the Council and the President of the Assembly and meetings of the Committee for Relations with the Council.

8. The Assembly of course welcomes these various contacts with the Council, but it cannot overlook certain drawbacks and, above all, their unofficial nature.

9. (i) The presence of ministers at Assembly sessions and their pronouncements, in particular those of the Chairman-in-Office and the Secretary-General, and their answers to questions put by parliamentarians correspond perfectly to the Assembly's needs because the former speak with the necessary authority on behalf of their govern-

ments while the latter two are empowered to speak on behalf of the Council and their words are recorded and included in the proceedings of sessions. It is for them to assume this responsibility, particularly when answering questions, and they have always done so. In several cases, however, it has been noted either that the Council took no effective follow-up action on their remarks, which was tantamount to contradicting them – this has happened several times since October 1984, inter alia for the communication of information about the Council's activities, disarmament and the creation of a European institute for defence research – or that chairmen-in-office were ultra-conscientious about their responsibility to the Council and took refuge behind vague utterances to avoid giving precise answers to questions put by parliamentarians. In short, both the ministers and the Secretary-General are constantly faced with the difficulty of having to speak on behalf of a Council whose views are not well known to them. In the next chapter, your Rapporteur will examine what he believes are the reasons for this.

10. (ii) Meetings between organs of the Assembly and the Council, whatever their form, suffer, on the one hand, from the fact that it is difficult for a parliamentary assembly to delegate its powers to anyone and, on the other, from the fact that the informal character the Council wishes these meetings to have – particularly joint meetings for which the Council itself proposed official procedure which it has never wanted to apply – prevents minutes being taken and the dialogue, however interesting, being really binding on the Council. Efforts by the Assembly, and first and foremost by its President, who has endeavoured to prepare memoranda, to have them examined by the Presidential Committee and to distribute them to members of the Assembly so that the Assembly's point of view may be clearly expressed at such meetings, have never received any real response from the Council, even when these memoranda reached it well before its meetings.

11. The Council could alleviate these difficulties if it adopted a different policy towards public opinion and the media. It is obvious that prior to 1984 it had to be discreet because of the part played by armaments controls in its activities. But this is no longer so and it is hard to imagine why the Council persists in communicating nothing to the press except on the occasion of ministerial meetings. Thus, the principles it adopted on the SDI are set out only in the thirty-first annual report. Would it not have been preferable for their adoption to be the subject of a communiqué which would have been an event, attracted general attention and shown at one and the same time that the reactivation of WEU was really tangible and that Europe was capable of expressing at least the principles of a joint posi-

tion on a matter of such importance? Drowning such a political fact in an administrative report, published tardily and by the Assembly, brings grist to the feeling that the press is expressing with growing frequency that the Seven have in fact abandoned the intentions they voiced in the Rome declaration. It is a renunciation of the principal aim of the reactivation of WEU: to arouse a spirit of defence among the nations of Western Europe which seemed to be dying away with the pacifist demonstrations which followed NATO's twofold decision of December 1979.

12. Did the Council not decide to set up a press service in the Secretariat-General? What steps have been taken to implement this decision? Is it merely, as the Secretary-General said, the difficulty of finding a suitable official that is holding it up? There is no doubt that the sparseness of the information it gives about its activities gives credit to all those who doubted its intentions to follow up the Rome declaration and even the text on WEU and public awareness appended to the thirty-first annual report in which the following conclusion is to be found:

“Success in achieving the objectives of the Rome declaration will depend on many factors, a major one of which will be the stimulation of public interest in WEU and the generation of greater public awareness of policies which WEU members follow. Maintenance of the higher political profile of WEU will enable the organisation to play a part in helping the cause of European security and transatlantic unity.”

13. Why did the Council have to repeat such an obvious fact eighteen months after the Rome declaration? Above all, why has it done nothing to carry out this excellent intention? The text in question is full of practical suggestions for informing the public about all the activities of WEU. None of them has yet been followed up. The press articles to which the Secretary-General refers, and of which he was often the signatory, certainly help to make the public aware of WEU, but they are not properly speaking information about what it is actually doing.

14. The Council must not claim that the Assembly is unfavourably prejudiced against it, pursuing pointless quarrels, moved by narrow political ulterior motives or aiming to occupy more than its due share of the stage and overshadowing the Council: all that is needed is a glance at the many references in the international press to the activities of the WEU Council to note that for months not one observer outside the organisation has expressed the slightest belief in the reactivation of WEU, assuming that the newspapers still consent to devote a few lines to the organisation's activities. Moreover, all the

parliamentarians know full well that there can be no real parliamentary life without an executive and that the Assembly itself is nothing and can expect no hearing from public opinion without a dialogue with the Council.

15. If an inventory were made of the information the Council should give the Assembly – in several cases, it has definitely committed itself to doing so – and where it has been silent, it would read as follows:

16. (i) Everything relating to meetings of the Council at the level of political directors of the ministries for foreign affairs. Have they been limited to meetings of the Permanent Council enlarged to include these directors, as the Secretary-General said? Have there been no meetings specifically of political directors in the context of WEU? Is it once again their informal nature that has led the Council to say nothing about them?

17. (ii) Everything relating to disarmament and the limitation of armaments. Those who have had to speak on behalf of the Council on this matter have merely been evasive or denied the evidence, which is that following an approach by the United States to the WEU member countries the Council in fact gave up discussing this matter just when, following Mr. Gorbachev's proposals on 15th January 1986, it was becoming a key element of international relations. Your Rapporteur awaits with interest the Council's delayed answer to Written Question 270. If the Council is effectively examining these questions, particularly on the basis of reports submitted to it by Agency II, your Rapporteur expects above all that the Council will inform the Assembly of the relevant conclusions it reaches, as it did in the case of the SDI.

18. It is in fact typical that the paragraphs of the thirty-first annual report of the Council on East-West relations, most of which are about disarmament, consist only of extracts from the address by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council to the Assembly and of summaries of replies to Assembly recommendations. They reveal nothing about the action of the WEU Council itself during a period in which the question of disarmament has been highly topical and when it would have been essential for Europe to make its views known. In this connection, the report on the Council's activities in the first half of 1986 is no more satisfactory since it says nothing about a possible joint European position.

19. (iii) Although the Council has said that it is prepared to inform the Assembly of the reports prepared by the three new agencies provided there are no special reasons for not doing so, it has so far done absolutely nothing in this sense. But in this case it is a well-known fact

that the reports were transmitted to the Council several months ago.

20. (iv) Everything relating to action taken on these reports, as well as on earlier studies by the Standing Armaments Committee on European armaments industries. Has it to be concluded that neither these reports nor the studies were intended to be followed up? Your Rapporteur reserves the right to return to this matter in his remarks about the agencies.

21. The annual report refers to a study which the Council is said to be preparing on the effectiveness of proposals to improve procedure for answering the Assembly. The Assembly knows nothing about these proposals although there seems to be no reason why it should not be informed of them before any decision is taken. Yet it has to note that in recent years the Council has been taking more and more time to reply to recommendations and written questions, that all the rules on the subject, particularly the one allowing the Council one month to answer written questions, are less and less respected by the Council and that the content of replies has steadily dwindled. All this tends to make the relationship between the Council and the Assembly look more like aimless chatter than a real exchange of views and helps to cast increasingly explicit doubt in the minds of observers of the activities of WEU about the will of the Council and the real bearing of what ministers say to the Assembly.

22. The Assembly has often given its views on its relations with the Council. Except perhaps for budgetary matters, these present no particular problem. They depend mainly on what the Council is and does. Yet in the last two years it has appeared only too often that the Council viewed these relations merely as a means of calming the Assembly each time it expressed discontent at the Council's shortcomings but the latter has never really sought to give the Assembly satisfaction by following up its recommendations.

23. But the Council cannot continue to act in such a way for very long since in the Rome declaration it set itself a programme and a timetable for implementing its aims. Speeches by ministers do little to conceal – and soon will not conceal at all – the shortcomings of the Council, which is in the process of losing all credit. The Assembly cannot hope to retain the credit hitherto accorded to it if it cannot ensure that real substance is given to the reactivation of WEU. This has now become truly urgent if we are to avoid any future initiative relating to WEU being discredited in advance, because one cannot claim indefinitely to be wanting to give new life to an organisation which, in fact, is still not very efficient.

III. The political activities of the Council

24. The first question is whether the Council had any real political activity in 1985. Close scrutiny of the thirty-first annual report of the Council allows a positive answer to be given to one point, i.e. "space and related activities", but only one. This is in fact the only chapter of the annual report to show action by the Council leading to relatively detailed political conclusions committing all the governments and defining joint concerns and aims.

25. It should be recalled that the then Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Mr. Andreotti, undertook to ensure that the Assembly was informed, in an appropriate manner, of the terms of the document drawn up by the working group responsible for studying the matter and adopted by the Council of Ministers. The inclusion of this chapter in the annual report of the Council is therefore merely a delayed follow-up of this promise and it may be wondered whether the Council was not thus brought face to face with the need to meet the Assembly's wishes and whether it is not in point of fact an attempt to honour the word of the minister at least cost, i.e. with a minimum of substance and above all a minimum of publicity.

26. However, the chapter as such gives important information not only about the extent of the consensus among the Seven on the SDI – and it went quite a long way – but also about the procedure which allowed a consensus to be reached: meetings of government experts and adoption of their conclusions at ministerial level. This means that the Permanent Council had little to do with the preparation of this text. This is probably to be welcomed, since it is unlikely that that body would have been able to work out such a positive agreement on the principles of the seven member countries' policies, judging by the total absence of political initiative by the Permanent Council to which the thirty-first annual report of the Council once again testifies.

27. Finally, the new half-yearly report describes the guidelines the Council intends to follow as a result of the work of its group on the SDI: technological questions and the politico-strategic implications of developments started off by the SDI. The question is to what extent it intends to include disarmament-related matters in these studies in view of the fact that the SDI seems to be at the centre of American-Soviet disarmament negotiations.

28. All the other chapters of the annual report merely repeat texts already communicated to the Assembly. They show only the Council's administrative activity and no real political action.

29. One may thus wonder about the real reasons for this absence of initiative. Is it because

of a deliberate will on the part of the governments to abandon the aims they drew up in Rome less than two years ago? Is it due to one or other government blocking decisions which the others would have been prepared to take? Is the reason the composition of the Permanent Council which is no longer effectively empowered to take political initiatives? The fact that a working group of representatives specially appointed by the ministries was able to work out an altogether acceptable joint position on such a delicate matter as the SDI indicates that the last of these explanations is not irrelevant, even if not the only one.

30. If this is the case, we should therefore wonder whether it is possible to reactivate WEU in the context of the institutions set up in 1954. The Assembly has asked several times whether the ambassadors in London were best placed to give WEU the political impetus it needs. Quoting the Rome declaration, the thirty-first annual report confirms that this is indeed the Council's vocation. The composition of the Permanent Council, intended to manage a system mainly concerned with armaments control, seems to give it little chance of fulfilling this vocation. Should it be maintained?

31. It may therefore be wondered whether the Council has adequately defined the rôle WEU should play and whether it has not been concerned more with structures than with activities. Account being taken of what is done in NATO or in twelve-power political consultations, your Rapporteur feels these activities should be exercised in a number of directions:

32. (i) Consideration of the evolution of American strategic concepts – which are not limited to the SDI – and their implications for Europe's security so as to:

- (a) strengthen Europe's position in the alliance;
- (b) determine in which areas European initiatives are necessary, in particular in regard to modern armaments, so that Europe may retain its political rôle in the world and a technological and industrial capability adapted to its security requirements.

33. (ii) Study of the threats to Europe. These obviously include the threat represented by the deployment of Warsaw Pact forces and the operations of member countries of that pact and also those which may originate elsewhere, for instance in the Mediterranean area. Agency II has been instructed to study the threat. Such a study has no meaning unless the Council draws consequences from it, which, to the best of the Assembly's knowledge, it has never done.

34. (iii) The Assembly has also drawn the Council's attention to the threat of international terrorism to European society. Insofar as it seems increasingly that military means will be needed to counter terrorism, WEU can no longer turn a blind eye to this question although it is desirable that other aspects be examined in wider forums, as Mr. Andreotti said at the joint meetings in Venice in April 1986. The fact that the question of terrorism has to be tackled in 1987 in the framework of the WEU Public Administration Committee shows that WEU cannot be left outside. The question is whether the ministers will continue to ignore it at their Luxembourg meeting in November 1986. Your Rapporteur is gratified that in its reply to Recommendation 435 the Council endorsed the point of view expressed by the Assembly on the rôle which should be played by Agency II in this connection. But he would like to know how the Council has effectively followed up this endorsement. The disagreement which emerged among the Twelve in October 1986 over measures to be taken against Syria, proved to bear considerable responsibility in the organisation of an operation which might have been very serious had it succeeded, shows that concerted action cannot be expected of the governments without serious preparation. Is this not specifically the task of the agencies?

35. (iv) Nor, as far as the Assembly knows, has the study of disarmament and arms limitation questions, entrusted to Agency I, led to practical conclusions being drawn by the Council. The Assembly undoubtedly shares the views set out in the half-yearly report on conventional disarmament, but it considers that a collective expression of the European point of view in these matters should not encounter fundamental difficulties but would strengthen the account taken of the preoccupations expressed by the Council.

36. (v) Examination of threats to international peace emanating from areas outside the North Atlantic Treaty area. Many recent events have shown that more searching consultations on the matter are essential because, increasingly, it is instability in these areas that might lead to major hostilities which Europe will not be able to escape.

37. (vi) The search for political impetus which the Council can give to European armaments co-operation. The Council has been proclaiming that this is its aim ever since the Rome declaration, and in particular in the Bonn communiqué. What has it done to attain it?

38. It is obviously the presence of ministers of defence at Council meetings that should allow impetus to be given to the bodies responsible for making concrete contributions. The annual report is not very explicit about the participation

of these ministers, although since 1985 they have also been meeting in the IEPG, which seems to indicate that the latter is also destined to give political impetus.

39. The informal nature of the IEPG means that it is not a decision-taking body and that is what should distinguish it from the WEU Council. However, one may wonder why the ministers labelled "informal" one of their two annual meetings in 1985 and 1986. Was the purpose not once again to evade decisions and responsibilities? This also diminishes WEU and glosses over that which distinguishes it from the IEPG. It is remarkable that in its reply to Recommendation 432 the Council states that its "objective is to help maintain the political impetus for the work of the IEPG" and does not even mention the Standing Armaments Committee. Does this mean it no longer sees it as a living body? In that case, it should say what action it intends to take on its 1955 decision setting up the SAC.

40. It is essential for the Council to explain to the Assembly and to the public what rôle it assigns to WEU, the IEPG and the CNAD respectively in regard to armaments co-operation and what is the impact of the participation of ministers of defence in WEU Council meetings. The half-yearly report is far from giving the Assembly the full satisfaction it is entitled to expect in this matter.

41. (vii) Examination of the possibility of enlarging WEU to the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance and of the European Communities which have so requested. The Council has asked the Assembly to ensure links between WEU and the parliaments of those countries. The Assembly has endeavoured to do so, and not unsuccessfully, but it has always held that while its initiatives could precede those of the Council they would be significant only provided they did not give the Council a pretext to avoid giving its views. If this were the case, it would find itself in a particularly delicate position vis-à-vis its partners. There are signs that this matter too is becoming urgent.

42. During its visit to Denmark in October 1986, as during its visit to Norway in February, the committee noted that these countries were anxious to be kept informed about WEU's activities. The Assembly for its part has taken all the steps necessary to allow parliamentary observers from European member countries of the Atlantic Alliance so wishing to take part in sessions and even in meetings of some of its committees. But it is not its rôle to inform the governments of these countries of the activities of the WEU Council and it is essential for the Council itself to provide this information.

43. Having been unable to visit Spain, the committee has no first-hand information about

that country's views following the referendum in June 1986 the results of which should bring it closer to WEU. But it must be recalled that the Assembly voted in favour of Portugal's application for membership and has shown its support by inviting the Portuguese Delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe to take part in all its activities as observers. According to the reply to Written Question 265, only on 26th May 1986 did the Council have preliminary contacts with the Portuguese authorities following Portugal's application for membership on 27th October 1984. For the other possible candidate countries, such contacts are still at the planning stage.

44. The committee's discussion on this subject showed that while some members considered the revitalisation of WEU should be given priority, in time, over enlargement, others on the contrary considered that acceptance of enlargement was a touchstone for testing the governments' will to reactivate WEU. If it came to the test, an indication is to be found in the answer to Written Question 265: the Council will do nothing before December 1987. The half-yearly report takes up this point. Yet unless the Council has changed its mind it meant 31st December 1987 to be the time-limit only for the organisation of the agencies. Is this matter so important that it must have decisive repercussions on the enlargement of WEU? Is it not rather a pretext for postponing decisions which should not be very difficult to take if there is a minimum of political will among the governments?

45. None of these proposals is new: they have all already been the subject of Assembly recommendations on many occasions. Indeed, the underlying principle is defined in the modified Brussels Treaty and the Council reiterated or stipulated the principles in the Rome declaration and in subsequent texts or statements. So far, it has taken no effective action on them.

46. Some committee members expressed the opinion that the ministerial meeting to be held in Luxembourg on 13th and 14th November 1986 will be something of a last chance to reactivate WEU. Should the meeting be unproductive in spite of the efforts of the Luxembourg Government and the specific proposals of the Assembly, the governments' only remaining means of action would be to promote co-operation in the framework of the Twelve. However, the obstacles to introducing defence questions into this framework make one wonder whether Europe would not find it easier at present to express itself in another framework.

IV. The functioning of WEU

47. The new structures of the ministerial organs of WEU should obviously be examined from the standpoint of the political orientation

of the Council. However, a few preliminary remarks are called for before starting this chapter:

48. (i) The procedure adopted by the Council for abolishing limits on conventional armaments having been to delete the lists appended to the protocols, the tasks of the Agency for the Control of Armaments were reduced to very little, but the agency was maintained. It is gratifying that the thirty-first annual report continues to report on its activities, as stipulated by the treaty.

49. (ii) In the same way, the 1955 decision setting up the SAC is still in force and although its international secretariat was terminated it was simultaneously transferred to the new Agency III, which did not mean a major change in the activities of WEU. However, the SAC has apparently not been convened in 1986, which is absolutely contrary to the 1955 decision. Putting Written Question 271 to the Council in July 1986, our colleague Mr. van der Werff rightly insisted on the Council explaining this matter. No reply to this question has yet been received by the Assembly. It is clear that a de facto abolition of the activities of the SAC would make it pointless to transfer the activities of its international secretariat to Agency III. How does the Council explain the concomitance between this transfer and the de facto suspension of SAC meetings? How does it intend to respect the SAC's obligation to submit a half-yearly report on its activities when there have been none in 1986?

50. (iii) The structures of WEU must be reconsidered after the end of 1987 so that an assessment may be made of their performance, which means that the new agencies should be judged on the results of their work. But the Council seems to be doing everything to ensure that results are slender and that the newly-created agencies are therefore destined to be condemned. There is every indication that the Council has merely taken note of the reports the agencies have submitted to it without making the slightest political use of them.

51. One may therefore wonder whether the creation of these agencies met a real Council requirement or whether it was not rather aimed at concealing the abolition of the international secretariat of the SAC and the reduction of the ACA to practically naught. The Council's inertia makes the new agencies hardly credible. The information the Assembly has received does not allow it to form an opinion on the documents the agencies have submitted to the Council, but it can nevertheless note that:

52. (a) The agencies are guaranteed no meaningful source of information from the governments or larger international organisations better placed than WEU to keep the agencies informed, such as NATO. They therefore have to venture

on to the thin ice of creating for themselves procedure for acceding to such sources of information. Information obtained in this connection indicates that this is a difficult long-term task. Precedents give grounds for wondering about the kind of information that even the IEPG, of which all the WEU countries are members, is prepared to transmit to Agency III.

53. (b) The agencies have no means of processing the information they are able to obtain, and in particular have no computer of adequate capacity. They are therefore reduced to using makeshift methods of examining the documentation they obtain for preparing the studies which should provide material for the Council's work.

54. (c) The Council merely notes the studies submitted to it but has so far done nothing to draw political conclusions from them.

55. In the circumstances, if an objective opinion had to be expressed on the work of the agencies, it would probably be that the agencies produce perfectly useless studies on the basis of mediocre information processed by archaic methods. Were two years needed to show this? Was it not possible in 1985 to foresee that, however carefully the agencies carried out the tasks assigned to them, such premises would lead to their being condemned at the end of the two years they were allowed to prove their worth? Was the 1987 time-limit anything other than a false pretence camouflaging the decision taken at the outset to put a rapid end to the existence of the agencies the Council was creating?

56. The memorandum by the President of the Assembly, adopted by the Presidential Committee on 15th September 1986 and sent immediately to the Council, set out the Assembly's position regarding the agencies as follows:

"While there is no doubt that the Secretariat-General, as a consequence of the Rome declaration, has extended its field of action considerably, it is not so clear that the new agencies have so far had to play a rôle corresponding to WEU's operational requirements as envisaged in the Rome declaration. The creation of such agencies implied that WEU effectively exercised certain responsibilities and also that the Council left them a free enough hand to allow them to take meaningful action in the areas assigned to them.

(a) For the reports to be really useful, the task of reporting at short notice on the various subjects assigned to them by the Council implies certain requirements which do not yet seem to be fully met.

1. The Council must first develop definite tasks before asking the agencies for

assistance. The reports submitted to it should be considered and effectively followed up in the context of its normal work.

2. The agencies must be required to follow continuously the matters they have to study so as to build up the necessary documentation and competence to be able to work to good avail. They must have the means necessary for acquiring information in member countries and international organisations and for processing it. In particular, NATO and the IEPG should be instructed to give them all necessary support.

3. The Council must inform the Assembly and public opinion of the content of these reports without delay, subject only to the restrictions imposed by classified defence information (Recommendation 432).

(b) The necessary continuity of the agencies' action means that, in addition to their task of keeping the Council informed, they must have permanent tasks in the context of WEU's general vocation (Recommendation 432).

1. Agency I for disarmament questions should be instructed to assist the delegations of all member countries in disarmament negotiations in which they take part, particularly in the United Nations and the CSCE. It should take part in preparing directives for the negotiations and should follow official and unofficial negotiation sessions in order to be able to play an effective rôle. This means the agency giving member countries every guarantee that the secrecy of information communicated to it is respected and that the basis of any co-operation between the agencies and the Assembly must be clear enough to ensure that the latter cannot be suspected of leaks.

2. Agency II for defence questions should be instructed to co-ordinate work undertaken in the various member countries to keep public opinion informed of defence problems with a view to making it better aware of their European dimension. The Assembly has often stressed the interest of this task which corresponds to views endorsed by the Seven in the Rome declaration. While giving favourable answers to Assembly recommendations, the Council has so far done nothing to follow them up (Recommendations 429 and 432).

3. Agency III for the development of armaments co-operation differs from the others in that its research rôle is a secondary one. It is responsible for following the progress of European armaments co-operation. Where necessary, it has to follow and analyse work conducted elsewhere on the comparison of equipment requirements and relevant specifications and on the present situation. Finally, it has to study the armaments sector of industries in member countries. For this purpose, it should first continue the work undertaken by the international secretariat of the SAC and ensure that governments follow up their conclusions, which has not so far been the case, some of these studies, particularly the one on legal obstacles to co-operation, involving legislative decisions. Just as, generally speaking, American legislation reserves the United States army's procurement for the country's own industries, principles should similarly be defined for European preference without any protectionist policy. Agency III should also be given the permanent task of studying all matters raised by the transfer between allies of armaments-related technology. Finally, the 1955 text setting up the SAC should be re-examined to ensure that that body's new terms of reference take account of the vocation of the IEPG and of the fact that WEU has a political vocation: preparation of the European union."

57. Since your Rapporteur fully endorses the opinion of the Presidential Committee on this matter, he has little to add to this text, other than to say that he has learned, once again through the reply to Recommendation 432, that the Council has taken preliminary steps to implement paragraph (b) 2 above by promoting co-operation between European study and research institutes. Finally, the half-yearly report refers to this matter but the terms used leave room for doubt about the intentions of the Council which apparently makes no distinction between research work and study, although they are quite different when it is a matter of security and defence. After the inquiry instigated by Mr. Genscher into the possibility of setting up a

research institute for such matters had reached negative results, the Assembly proposed giving a European dimension to the activities of the study institutes by organising regular international training courses. The Council's statements are too vague to ascertain what action it intends to take on this recommendation.

V. Conclusions

58. The thirty-first annual report of the Council is not likely to calm but, on the contrary, to revive the misgivings your Rapporteur expressed in his previous report. However, he hopes the coming weeks will throw more light on the Council's true intentions, inter alia through the answers to Written Questions 270 and 271 and the report on the activities of the Council in the first half of 1986. He regrets that the dates fixed for the session did not allow him to wait until after the ministerial meeting to be held in Luxembourg on 14th November before submitting his report to the committee for adoption. He reserves the right to add the necessary finishing touches when he presents it during the session.

59. Conversely, the first reading of the present document by the General Affairs Committee showed that committee members were increasingly doubtful about the governments' intention to follow up the Rome declaration. A recent debate in the European Parliament on the potentialities of the single European act have again just shown the narrow limits within which any defence activities by the Twelve will always be confined. If WEU were to fail in its area of responsibility it would be a failure for Europe in a vital area. The stalemate at the Reykjavik summit meeting should, more than ever, encourage European governments to face up to the seriousness of this situation.

60. Finally, the report on the Council's activities in the first half of 1986 gives no information about the activities of the Council's subsidiary organs: the ACA and the SAC. The reduced activity of the ACA certainly does not justify the Council reporting on it twice a year, but the Assembly has to recall that it is a statutory obligation for the Council to report on it annually. As for the SAC, there are ample grounds for wondering how the Council intends to apply its 1955 resolution. This is a point on which the Council's explanations are awaited.

*Political activities of the Council –
reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council*

AMENDMENT 1¹

tabled by Mr. Bianco

1. After paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:
“ Instruct its Chairman-in-Office to submit, at the next meeting of the North Atlantic Council to be held in Brussels on 11th December 1986, the joint views of the Council on the implications of the Reykjavik meeting; ”

Signed: Bianco

1. See 11th sitting, 2nd December 1986 (amendment agreed to).

Developments in the Soviet Union and East-West relations

REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee ²
by Mr. Close, Rapporteur*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION

on developments in the Soviet Union and East-West relations

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Mr. Close, Rapporteur

Introduction

I. The Soviet Union's internal situation

(i) Economic problems

(ii) Internal problems

II. Soviet external policy

(i) Armaments

(ii) External policy

III. Western Europe's position

(i) European security and Mr. Gorbachev's disarmament proposals

(ii) East-West civil co-operation

IV. Conclusions

1. Adopted in committee by 10 votes to 1 with 3 abstentions.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Berrier (Chairman); MM. *Close, Martino* (Vice-Chairmen); MM. *Ahrens, Baumel, Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Bianco, Bogaerts, Burger, Sir Anthony Grant, Mr. Hardy, Mrs. Herfkens, Mr. Hill* (Alternate: *Murphy*), Mrs. Kelly, Mr. Koehl, *Lord Mackie*, MM. *Masciadri, Mermaz, Muller, Reddemann, Ruet, Rumpf, van der Sanden, Spitella* (Alternate: *Amadei*), *Vecchietti* (Alternate: *Antoni*), *van der Werff, N...*(Vacant seat).

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation*on developments in the Soviet Union and East-West relations*

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that for forty years the Soviet Union has constantly pursued a degree of military deployment not justified by the requirements of its security;
- (ii) Considering that, in spite of the Helsinki final act, the measures taken in the name of détente have led to no true alleviation of the internal dictatorship in the USSR nor to an improvement in the situation in the peoples' democracies;
- (iii) Noting that the size of the amounts the Soviet Union allocates to defence is one of the fundamental reasons for the persistence of economic difficulties and that any true transformation in the Soviet Union requires a reduction in its military effort;
- (iv) Considering that the new Soviet authorities seem aware of the need to make this reduction;
- (v) Considering in particular that the progress the latter have made in informing the Soviet and foreign public in 1986 may be the start of an important new turn in Soviet internal policy and in that country's external relations;
- (vi) Considering that the determination shown by the Soviet Government to improve the standard of living of the population should lead it to seek agreements allowing it to reduce its military expenditure;
- (vii) Noting in fact that since 15th January 1986 the highest Soviet authorities have presented many proposals which could allow meaningful negotiations to be started on the limitation of armaments;
- (viii) Welcoming in particular the results obtained at the Stockholm conference on the verification of confidence-building measures;
- (ix) Regretting however that the speeches of Soviet leaders have not always resulted in effective concessions in international negotiations;
- (x) Regretting that the Reykjavik meeting did not allow the bases for these negotiations to be fixed, but trusting that it nevertheless allowed a substantial rapprochement of views likely to lead, in the near future, to agreement between the United States and Soviet Union on the goal of true negotiations which would take account of the strategy now in force and of which deterrence is the keystone at every level;
- (xi) Recalling that western security is ensured by a relative balance in forces – which should be brought to the lowest possible level – in all areas and that at the present time this balance has not been achieved in Europe in the conventional field and particularly in that of chemical weapons where the Soviet Union has a near monopoly in Europe;
- (xii) Considering it is essential for the countries of Western Europe to harmonise their views on questions concerning the limitation of armaments and to make them known to their American partners;
- (xiii) Considering that the WEU Council has a decisive rôle to play in this matter and gratified that it has instructed one of the new agencies to study Soviet proposals;
- (xiv) Considering that the requirements of European security must also guide relations of all kinds between the West and the Soviet Union,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Develop as a matter of urgency its consultations and work with a view to defining European positions on disarmament and the limitation of armaments as it has done for the strategic defence initiative;
2. Convey these positions to the United States before negotiations on the limitation of armaments are started;
3. Proceed in like manner to study the Soviet Union's attempts to transfer to the countries of the third world the struggle it calls "anti-imperialist";

4. Seek an agreement between all the western countries to avoid undue competition continuing to allow the Soviet Union to have the West contribute, even indirectly, to the development of its military effort;
5. Ask the member countries to increase their effort to ensure a balance of conventional forces in Europe in order to facilitate an agreement on the reduction of the number of Euromissiles without jeopardising the security of Europe as it now is by the deployment of Soviet short-range Euromissiles, including SS-21s, SS-23s and SS-24s;
6. Make every effort to ensure that the current negotiations in Geneva result without delay in an agreement on a verified worldwide ban on chemical weapons.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Close, Rapporteur)

Introduction

1. Throughout the ages, man has wondered about the rôle played in the evolution of history and the ensuing irreversible trends by those whom Grousset called figureheads and whose influence Jakob Burckhardt tried to define in his chapter entitled "Die Historische Grösse"¹.
2. This is precisely the fundamental question your Rapporteur put to himself when he started to tackle East-West relations as they are now in the light of the coming to supreme power of a new leader, Mr. Gorbachev.
3. Could he be the providential instrument of destiny and radically influence the future of the planet through the sole impact of his personality, or will he merely continue a long-term strategy aimed at ensuring the primacy of communist ideology by profoundly changing methods, but without diverging one iota from the Soviet Union's fundamental objectives?
4. After a long period during which Soviet policy seems to have followed, rather unimaginatively, a fairly steady course, using proven methods and pursuing not very mysterious aims, although relevant information seeped out sparingly, the arrival of Mr. Gorbachev at the head of the Soviet Union together with a new, or at least younger, team of leaders compared with their predecessors marks a distinct change. The West now has to determine what this new course is. It is clearly a matter of style, particularly in regard to information. There is also a change in the volume of activity and the number of initiatives. Your Rapporteur has therefore tried to draw up an inventory of proposals put forward by Soviet leaders since the beginning of 1986. The list is long but probably not complete. To what extent does the policy inaugurated by Mr. Gorbachev go beyond the activity relayed by the media and imply a revision of medium- and long-term goals? What is just tactics and what is political strategy in the new Soviet proclamations? What rôle does revolutionary ideology still play in the reasoning of the leaders? These questions are inevitably being raised in the West. It is not easy to know and even less easy to deduce what policy should be followed in face of this evolution.
5. It was therefore normal for the Assembly, which has been constantly concerned with the

1. In which he says true greatness is a mystery. Sometimes the decisive element is above all one of personality and sometimes rather the work left behind; often too, judgment cannot prevail in face of stronger prejudice. J. Burckhardt: *Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen*.

trend of East-West relations, to take up this question again today. However welcome this may be to your Rapporteur, he well realises the uncertainty of the conclusions he has managed to draw from considerations based on an enormous mass of various publications from which it is not possible to bring out a very coherent interpretation of recent events.

6. Another major obstacle stemmed from the acceleration of events which forced your Rapporteur to revise almost daily a report which was intended to be objective, exhaustive and topical. The Reykjavik meeting on 11th and 12th October 1986, the hopes placed in it and the ensuing disillusion are but one example among others.

7. Before pondering on developments in the Soviet Union, one basic assumption should probably be borne in mind, as well as the fundamental aims of a superpower which also considers itself to be the bastion of Marxist-Leninist ideology. The assumption has never been called in question: it is the final triumph of communism on a world scale. The duality of the Soviet Union, at one and the same time possessor of the supreme weapon and doctrinal driving force, sometimes leads to conflicting situations. Indeed, it is necessary to guarantee security and promote expansion. Direct and indirect strategy, the latter very often by "proxy", complement each other and interpenetrate each other with remarkable continuity on the basis of a variety of means ranging from military power in its purest form to economic, political and psychological aspects with a view, while always being prepared to defend the sanctuary, to pursuing territorial or ideological expansionism. The battle of ideas and the conquest of minds, with the assistance of structural themes and peerless organisation, are among its preferred means of achieving the final aim. To ensure the success of these strategies, it is essential to separate Europe from the United States, that Europe which Alain Minc said shone like a dead star and, unless it became aware of its strong and weak points it would in the long run become the lung of Moscow, but in a near-protectorate situation. Such an evolution would be fostered by the asymmetry of geostrategic positions.

8. Although it may not be possible to assess the true impact of Soviet initiatives, two factors perhaps demonstrate their sincerity: on the one hand, known facts about the internal situation and the direction in which Mr. Gorbachev is guiding his economic and sociological policy and, on the other hand, the conviction that the leaders

of such a vast, developed and inflexible country as the Soviet Union cannot suddenly take decisions which would imply radical conversions. This means that at the very best it is only the start of a trend which will probably be very slow and might be revised by the very persons who seem most determined to bring it to fruition. One way or another, it is therefore in our interest to be cautious in our approach to the new Soviet proclamations.

9. In view of the above, the report will therefore be divided into three principal sections:

10. *I. The Soviet Union's internal situation* will cover *economic problems*, a fundamental factor in understanding the whole, and *internal problems*, including the constraining weight which the demographic increase in non-Russians, above all in the Asian republics, will eventually bring to bear.

11. *II. Soviet external policy* will review successively:

- the growth in Soviet strength at every level of armaments;
- external policy inside and outside Europe as it results from a worldwide strategy and the most recent initiatives taken in this area.

12. *III. Western Europe's position.* Western Europe is still incapable of speaking with a single voice. It is interested in and highly concerned by the dialogue between the two great powers. Its uncertainty - not to say confusion - results from the precariousness of its position in defence and security matters and from the still minor rôle it plays in settling major problems at world level.

13. Has East-West co-operation in civil matters been beneficial for Europe? Is it adult enough to define a security policy which takes account of its own interests, while fitting into the framework of the Atlantic Alliance?

14. These are the principal questions that we shall have to raise although without exhausting this vast and complex subject on which our future destiny depends and of which East-West relations are the cornerstone.

15. If it is not present in this great worldwide debate, Europe will be condemned to remain a non-person. Finally, to use well-known words: as long as we have not built the United States of Europe, we shall remain the Europe of the United States.

I. The Soviet Union's internal situation

16. From the fall of Khrushchev in 1964 up to the death of Chernenko on 11th March 1985, there was very little change in the Soviet Union,

either because its principal leaders, particularly Mr. Brezhnev and Mr. Chernenko, had been chosen by the group which decided Soviet policy because they did not in fact threaten the established situation, as Khrushchev had done, or because the only General Secretary of the Communist Party who seems to have tried, on 10th November 1982, to introduce certain reforms in the country's leadership, Mr. Andropov, was soon struck by an illness from which he died after fifteen months in office, without having had the time to achieve major reforms.

17. The appointment of Mr. Gorbachev to lead the Soviet Union certainly showed a desire, or at least resignation, of the same group to open the way to a number of changes which had in fact been necessary for a long time. Mr. Gorbachev's age and personality bear witness to this. Moreover, the death of Mikhail Suslov, who had clearly played a dominating rôle in the last twenty years by refusing to deviate from a very conservative ideological course, probably weakened the position of those who were opposed to change. It is quite likely, however, that the new General Secretary of the Bolshevik Communist Party, in the dealings leading up to his appointment, had to agree to certain limits, at least for the time being, to his freedom of action. The memory of how Mr. Khrushchev was rebuffed must also encourage him to be cautious. Moreover, when he was responsible for ideological questions during Mr. Chernenko's term as General Secretary of the party, Mr. Gorbachev was extremely conservative in ideological matters and it is difficult to say how far he still adheres to the positions he then held.

18. It is therefore already possible to discern a new style of government and some rejuvenation among the country's leaders and their methods, but it is not yet possible to be sure how the new team of leaders sees the future of the Soviet Union and its relations with the rest of the world and how far it intends to conduct the reforms undertaken. Are they purely formal changes, designed to give a more modern appearance to the administration of the Soviet Union, or are they the start of deeper changes which, if successful and if the new leaders remain in power, would be able to transform international relations fundamentally in the next ten years? It is too soon to say.

19. It would therefore be extremely dangerous for the West to count on a radical change in the nature of East-West relations and to allow any weakening of its positions in Europe and the world. Conversely, it might perhaps to a certain extent encourage a trend in the Soviet Union towards placing international peace on sounder bases than at present.

20. Thus it is not on the basis of the real or presumed intentions of the new Soviet leaders

that an idea should be formed of what a European policy might be but on the facts of the situation in the Soviet Union insofar as they can be determined and on their implications in foreign and defence policy matters. Naturally, for ideological considerations the action of Soviet leaders might not conform to what objective analysis might show to be required by the situation. However, it seems that whatever part ideological concerns may have played in Mr. Gorbachev's past, since the death of Mr. Suslov on 25th January 1982 they have no longer played such an important rôle in the determination of Soviet policy. The new generation of leaders seems infinitely more aware than the previous one of the weight of realities and it is perhaps not unduly daring to think that the latter will eventually take precedence over ideological considerations among Soviet leaders.

(i) Economic problems

21. Since the failure of Mr. Khrushchev's attempt to develop all sectors of the Soviet economy in order to shift competition between the communist and capitalist worlds from the threat of armed conflict to competition in economic efficiency and social welfare, the Soviet leaders had reverted to the old Stalinist options which gave absolute priority to investment for defence purposes at the expense of investment which, directly or indirectly, could have allowed consumption to rise.

22. The impact of this choice was considerable. From a purely economic standpoint, it led to much wastage of natural and human resources in the Soviet Union, delayed progress in all civil technology and maintained a shortage of many consumer goods, with all that implied: rationing and black market. Socially, it kept the standard of living of most of the population fairly low with the result that it was – and still is – necessary to do the utmost to close the country off from outside influences and even from independent information about the true situation in the Soviet Union and in capitalist countries so that Soviet public opinion cannot make comparisons which would be unflattering for the way the country is managed. There is a close link between economic choices and political dictatorship.

23. It seems that changes in the leadership of the Soviet Union in the last three years, while not representing a radical upheaval in the aims the country has set itself, nevertheless imply an infinitely more realistic analysis of the problems than in the past.

24. The Soviet Union seems to have become aware of the permanent nature of a number of problems which it had thought it could solve by voluntarist state action.

(a) In spite of heavy investment to allow new land to be cultivated, agriculture, apart from occasional improvements, has been an ever-present problem since the second world war, with grave agricultural deficits, a disastrous level of income from labour and mediocre use of the soil resulting in the need to import large quantities of foodstuffs, including grain.

(b) The inadequacy of industries producing consumer goods, their poor equipment and their low productivity are an increasing burden on the Soviet economy and society.

25. It is difficult to assess the magnitude of the military effort in financial terms since Soviet statistics and even the budget are not presented in a manner which allows a comparison to be made with western countries. It is impossible to ascertain the proportion of the Soviet GNP earmarked for defence although most economists have, for a long time, been denouncing the burden of military expenditure which is far too heavy for the Soviet economy in which many sectors have been stagnating or even regressing for many years. Furthermore, the prospects of using new technology for defence purposes which have emerged in the last decade have brought the Soviet Union to grips with the need to increase its defence budget even more so as not to lag behind the United States and the western countries and it has consequently had to give up the idea of more productive investment.

26. To the permanent difficulties facing the Soviet economy, a further one has been added since 1985, i.e. the fall in the price of natural gas and oil. These two products represent 60% of Soviet exports outside the communist bloc. The price of oil, which was about \$27.5 per barrel in the third quarter of 1985, fell to between \$10 and 12 per barrel in July 1986 and the price of gas changed in parallel. At the same time, the dollar, which is quoted for oil prices, was devalued in terms of the currencies of Western Europe, the region which provides most of Soviet imports from outside the communist bloc. Finally, the market for oil products was saturated, which made a quantitative increase of Soviet exports difficult. In fact, oil production, like coal and electricity, in the first half of 1986 was far lower than estimates in the plan and even actual production in 1984 (616 million tonnes but only 595 million in 1985). This threefold phenomenon led to a serious trade imbalance in the Soviet Union and made it more difficult to pursue economic development for which the import of durable goods remained essential. The Soviet balance of trade with the industrialised western countries, which had been positive until 1984, registered a deficit of \$2 500 million in 1985 and this situation worsened at the beginning of 1986.

27. The new General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party tried to face up to all these problems when he presented the five-year plan for the period 1986-90 to the twenty-seventh party congress in February and March 1986. The main aim Mr. Gorbachev assigned to this plan, according to his speech in Khabarovsk in August 1986, is a restructuration of Soviet society with both social and economic implications. In itself, the priority given to the reorganisation of living conditions is already an innovation and requires a major increase in the growth rate: 22.1% in five years and 4.1% in 1986, whereas the increase was only 2.6% in 1984 and 2.9% in 1985. Industrial production should rise by 25% thanks to an equivalent increase in productivity.

28. If we are to believe the explanatory memorandum to the plan presented by Mr. Nikolai Ryzhkov, Prime Minister, on 18th June 1986, the emphasis is on the renewal of industrial equipment. Today, 29% of machines used are of international standard. This figure should rise to 80 or 85% in 1990. By 1990, computer output should be multiplied by 2.4. Civil nuclear power, which represents 10% of today's energy output, should provide 20% in 1990. This aim remains unchanged in spite of the Chernobyl disaster, and the nuclear programme should follow the course set out in the plan.

29. To achieve these results, Mr. Gorbachev proposed a number of reforms: thus, he attacked the excessive centralisation of the economy and proposed studying the possibility of passing some economic powers to the authorities of the main regions which in those matters may be destined to replace the republics which were too unequal in terms of area, population and wealth. The purpose is not to call in question the state management system but merely to rectify some of its weaknesses. To the same end, he expressed his intention of making firms more independent, for instance by making them independent for their accountancy, and developing the idea of profit-sharing within certain limits: people must not be paid to do nothing so the creation of superfluous jobs must be avoided. He even envisaged the privatisation of certain economic sectors, particularly that of services. The General Secretary also proposed to foster links between research and production.

30. In agriculture, the plan provides for the production of 250 to 255 million tons of grain and 21 million tons of meat in 1990 instead of 182 million tons of grain and 16.2 million tons of meat in 1985. To this end, two series of measures are to be taken. First, there is to be a structural reorganisation of the agricultural and food complex. The six ministries concerned and a state committee are grouped in a single agro-industrial state committee, the Gosagroprom.

The aim of this measure is to put an end to ministerial supervision. Second, there is to be more material encouragement to stimulate productivity. Agricultural concerns are urged to do better than the plan thanks to various kinds of bonus. The income of those in charge of kolkhozes and sovkhozes will depend on turnover. The best agricultural workers will be paid bonuses up to twice their basic salaries.

31. In a speech in Vladivostok in August 1986, Mr. Gorbachev said it was necessary to work out a special economic development programme for the Soviet Far East. The region should no longer be considered just a source of raw materials; it should process them on the spot instead of sending them west.

32. Finally, an agreement concluded with the United Kingdom in July 1986 on the reimbursement of pre-1917 Russian loans should allow the Soviet Union to have access to the London financial market. This is probably a first step towards a policy designed to give the Soviet economy access to the Euromarket and financing for investments, which are sorely needed since the fall in oil prices in the first half of 1986 limited its possibilities of obtaining foreign currency.

33. This step should probably be linked with a request by the Soviet Union to take part in the activities of GATT at that organisation's ministerial conference in Punta del Este on 15th September 1986. Although since 1983 the Soviet Union had been showing interest in that organisation, its new approach evokes the possibility of accession to GATT and indicates its intention to make changes in foreign trade procedure and management methods of Soviet firms to make this possible. This step may also reveal or confirm a real intention on the part of the Soviet Union, in order to remedy weaknesses in its economy, to adopt a more open attitude to international trade and certain forms of competition which the country renounced in 1924. The evolution of the Soviet Union towards an economy more open to the international market is, however, not yet sufficiently clear or significant for the members of GATT to consider that they could accept this proposal without reservation.

34. Finally, since spring 1986, several plans for setting up mixed economy projects in the Soviet Union associating Soviet and capitalist firms have been the subject of negotiations or contracts. It is clear that such associations, if they succeed, are likely to have considerable repercussions on the basic principles of the Soviet economy and at the same time inject new life into it.

35. Clearly the new Soviet leaders have assessed the serious problems which have in fact existed for a long time but which their predecessors preferred to ignore. The question is whether

they will be sufficiently realistic, clear-sighted and tenacious to rectify the situation, since this would obviously require far-reaching changes in Soviet internal and external policy. There are signs that they are considering making these reforms.

(ii) Internal problems

36. The trend of Soviet internal policy is far more a test of the will of the new team of leaders to carry out reforms than decisions relating to defence, disarmament, foreign policy or the economy because it involves forces which it is not easy to juggle with in the short term. A five-year plan can be modified, proposals for negotiations can be abandoned and military investments can be concealed. But it is far more difficult and dangerous to go back on public undertakings or measures relating to the day-to-day life of people, their well-being and their freedom. These undertakings and measures hence prejudice the continuity of Soviet policy as a whole.

37. Conversely, in a country where the conditions of the struggle for power are kept as secret as in the Soviet Union, it is difficult to discern what is at stake in the struggle, the parties involved and the forces they represent in a society in which the true tendencies of public opinion can hardly be expressed. It is therefore a matter of interpreting signs which are sometimes not very explicit.

38. It is evident that Soviet society has been deeply marked by the fact that an authoritarian régime has remained in power for several decades, determined to impose its policy without taking account of the reactions of the people, to prevent public opinion being expressed, to control information and to use terror as much as conviction to this end. It was impossible to redirect the economy validly and lastingly without at the same time attempting to correct a number of problems within society which were evident a long time ago but which seem to have grown considerably in the past decade.

39. *(i)* Lack of economic motivation led to poor labour productivity, a lack of dynamism in firms and serious weaknesses in their management, as underlined in the Soviet reports on responsibility for the Chernobyl nuclear disaster in April 1986.

40. *(ii)* Maintaining the same people in political and economic positions of power for too long and the absence of sanctions against leaders who failed to give satisfaction had led to posts of responsibility remaining perpetually in the hands of a social élite which had become conservative and opposed to change known as the *nomenklatura*. Their misuse of public property and the

privileges they enjoyed led to corruption extending to a large part of the administration and managerial staff throughout the economy.

41. *(iii)* While in principle the Soviet economic system ensures full employment, the continual denunciation of idleness and a study of published vacancies and applications for employment lead to the conclusion that in spite of poor labour productivity many Soviet citizens of working age are unable to find employment.

42. *(iv)* The feeling of frustration felt by society as a whole in face of this social conservatism led to the extension of serious scourges: alcoholism, which had caused havoc in Russia for a very long time, spread still further, and drug-taking which had on the contrary been almost unknown emerged and is now a matter of concern for the authorities, as are the signs of revolt denounced by the Soviets for a long time under the name of hooliganism.

43. *(v)* Excessive centralisation led to uncontrolled growth of the large cities where there are housing, transport and supply problems which the administration cannot manage to control. For instance, Moscow is now believed to have 8 700 000 inhabitants, whereas the plan anticipated a rise to only 7 600 000 in 1990, and 60 km of underground railway line planned for 1986 are not yet built, according to the head of the party organisation in Moscow in an interview with Mr. Amalric published in *Le Monde* on 16th July 1986.

44. *(vi)* Many observers refer to the persistence of racist feelings against the Jewish minority, few in number since the second world war, and the Moslem elements of the population, on the contrary, very numerous, close to 75 million. Due to a high birth rate, the Moslem population is increasing rapidly, whereas the birth rate of the European population has fallen in recent decades and is now at a very low rate equivalent to that of the Western European nations. This is a particularly serious problem since the revival of Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East now appears to be making itself felt among Soviet Moslems among whom Islamic secret sects and societies are believed to be making great strides, in spite of a ban on them and an increasing number of repressive measures. In a book which has left its mark, *L'Empire éclaté*, Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, the Soviet expert, showed the magnitude of the problem which already existed and which is liable in the near future to become even more difficult to solve, i.e. the cohabitation in the Soviet Union of peoples with different languages, cultures, religions and ethnic particularities. In particular, the Afghan war seems to have accentuated Moslem opposition which refuses both communist ideology and Slav domination.

45. (vii) The development of many opposition movements representing very varied trends is no longer in any doubt. Some are linked with national claims, particularly in the Baltic provinces, in spite of the measures taken to settle a Russian population in these areas and to disperse many of the former inhabitants of the three Baltic countries throughout Soviet territory. Others are of a religious nature, not only Moslems, and are outside the official orthodox church, too well controlled by the state. The sects seem to have made considerable progress in spite of persecution. Yet others are more clearly political, whether supporters of a return to the old régime, democrats, reformist socialists or anarchists, or even quite simply groups of young people who seek greater freedom and take western protest movements as a model. Although the Soviet press made no mention of them until very recently, it is known that there have been terrorist attacks in the Soviet Union.

46. The Guardian of 22nd July 1986 published an interesting article summarising a seventeen-page manifesto issued in Leningrad by the Movement for Socialist Renewal in November 1985, which seems to emanate from liberal sections of the Soviet administration and calls for far more radical reforms than those announced or embarked upon by Mr. Gorbachev, particularly in the sense of freedom of information and political discussion, including television. One may wonder whether the distribution of this document was not intended precisely as provocation by the opponents of the General Secretary of the party in order to show that his reformist intentions were endangering the bases of the régime, or whether it really did emanate from a group of civil servants who found Mr. Gorbachev's initiatives insufficient.

47. Admittedly, Mr. Gorbachev's proclaimed intentions of fighting alcoholism, drug-taking, idleness and criminality seem to have been warmly welcomed by Soviet leaders, but less so regarding his intention to wage all-out war on corruption and "undue acquisition of wealth". The General Secretary announced in Kuybyshev on 7th April 1986 that laws were going to be promulgated against those who acquired undue wealth. On 28th May, Pravda published on its first page a resolution by the Central Committee and a decree by the Soviet Supreme increasing penalties for all economic crimes. These measures were in fact aimed mainly at the spread of the black market and moonlighting experienced in the Soviet Union in the last decade and sought to strengthen state controls over the entire economy. One may wonder to what extent they will be effective and above all whether they do not run counter to the wish for economic liberalisation expressed elsewhere.

48. At the same time as he announced his wish to strengthen discipline at work, Mr. Gorbachev said he intended to fight corruption at every level. This fight affects both workers and members of the nomenklatura. Thus, after the Chernobyl disaster, a search was made for those responsible. Their punishment was announced to the public and persons relatively high in the administrative hierarchy were concerned.

49. Thus, the social policy started by Mr. Gorbachev and leaders supporting him, such as Mr. Eltsin, head of the party in Moscow, and Mr. Ryzhkov, head of the government, seems to have reached the nomenklatura. An opposition seems to be forming round certain persons such as Mr. Ligachev, who effectively occupies second place in the régime and is secretary to the party organisation, whom foreign observers think represents bureaucracy clinging to its security and privileges.

50. There have been signs of a political struggle. Following the twenty-seventh party congress, many members of managing bodies in the party, Soviet Supreme and government were replaced. There was something of an accelerated changeover in party officials (eight of the eleven members of the secretariat have been replaced since 1981, 40% of the members of the Central Committee, 50% of party leaders in the republics and regions and almost 70% of ministers). The Rector of the Institute for International Relations (MGIMO), a diplomatic school which was one of the bastions of the nomenklatura, was removed, according to Pravda of 23rd July 1986. A reshuffle in the military high command, which began in September 1984 with the departure of the chief of general staff, Marshal Ogarkov, continued in 1986 with the replacement of General Luchev at the head of the group of Soviet armed forces in Germany, the Soviet forces' most important command.

51. It is perhaps in the sector of culture and the media that measures already taken have been the most significant because they are likely to lead to far-reaching changes in society's attitude towards political problems to the extent that any return to former practices will be difficult. Thus, the congress of Soviet film workers managed to have more candidates than posts available in the elections to its board. The results were distinctive because they led to the elimination of most of the former members and allowed new leaders to emerge in the film world, now promoted to official recognition. At the congress of the writers' union, the same procedure obliged most of the former leaders to make way for new ones. It is clear that such a revolution in the sensitive area of culture could not occur without the agreement of the Kremlin, which has thus tolerated the formation of a sizeable breach in an area in which the political authorities had hitherto been in full control.

52. In the case of the press, Mr. Gorbachev said in a speech to the plenum of the Central Committee on 10th March 1985 that the transparency of information must be enhanced and its truth guaranteed. There is every reason to think that this speech has already been given tangible effect. For instance, in May 1986 Pravda criticised Soviet television, accusing it of using too many read-out texts, not enough pictures and too many prearranged, polished-up interviews. In regard to its foreign news, Pravda considered that information about the capitalist world was monotonous, that preference was given to meetings, demonstrations and protest marches. There was rarely any reference to scientific and technical achievements. Television seems to have understood the message because on 6th August 1986, for the first time, Soviet television showed a parliamentary debate in the Soviet Supreme during which the Minister for the Coal Industry was asked to answer questions by members criticising his ministry, and this programme was shown two weeks after the session was held, which by Soviet standards is quite quick.

53. However, it was in the case of five disasters which occurred in spring and summer 1986 that there was the most noticeable progress in speed and honesty of information, compared with earlier practice of concealing such accidents as completely and for as long as possible, to minimise their extent and to gloss over state responsibility for them. These were the explosion at the Chernobyl nuclear power station in the Ukraine on 26th April 1986, the earthquake which devastated Soviet Moldavia on 30th August, the sinking of the liner Admiral Nakhimov in the night of 31st August to 1st September, the hijacking of an aircraft on a Soviet domestic flight on 24th September by two Soviet nationals which caused six victims and the total loss of a Yankee class nuclear submarine off Bermuda on 6th October 1986.

54. It was admittedly only on 6th May, i.e. ten days later, that an official press conference was given on the Chernobyl accident, and after it had been announced by the western press.

55. But as from 6th May there was a reversal of traditional policy relating to information. The effort deployed by the Soviet media in regard to an unforeseen event which was rather disagreeable for the authorities was unprecedented for tens of years. In two months, dozens of articles and accounts have been published in Moscow and the provinces. The television has reported on the spot. Nevertheless, it is clear that bureaucratic habits and sluggishness have not disappeared and it is significant to note that negative phenomena are referred to in the Moscow press rather than in the provincial press, which is visibly still very sensitive to pressure from local authorities or less aware of the liberal measures taken by the Kremlin.

56. However, for ten days after the accident the authorities were relatively mute. The first communiqué from the government on 28th April was censored for the people concerned since two phrases announcing that there were victims and that a government commission was to be set up did not appear in the Ukraine Pravda. Only on 5th May was a series of protective health measures announced to the people of Kiev. But subsequently the transparency called for by Mr. Gorbachev was far better respected. Thus, during Mr. Mitterrand's visit to Moscow, Mr. Gorbachev recognised that the situation round Chernobyl was disastrous and that first aid had been a matter of dramatic improvisation. In the following days, various information given by the Soviet press, radio and television progressively revealed that the danger of nuclear radiation had been seriously underestimated by the local authorities. Only on 27th April was a start made with evacuating the people. Administrative partitions were such that villages in Bielorussia, as close to the power station as those in the Ukraine, were not evacuated until six days later because of the administrative boundaries between the two republics.

57. The second major innovation after the accident in Chernobyl was the announcement that a number of people had been dismissed. It was announced that action had been taken against high-level members of the hierarchy as well as workers. The director and head engineer of the power station were dismissed for irresponsibility and incompetence, as well as the Chairman of the State Committee for Security in the Nuclear Industry and the first deputy Ministers of Energy and Electrification and of Mechanical Construction. The Minister of Energy and Electrification was severely reprimanded.

58. If, according to the inquiry of the Political Bureau of the Soviet Communist Party, the disaster was due to a human error, the consequences were drawn: it was realised that there was effectively a lack of discipline which Mr. Gorbachev had already denounced in other circumstances, for certain members of the staff had abandoned their posts at the time of the accident. In fact, it was just as if Chernobyl had provided an opportunity for Mr. Gorbachev to illustrate the speech he had been making for some time. It was also an opportunity of showing his determination to fight lack of discipline and carelessness and to ensure the transparency of information. However, one may wonder whether the Soviets announced the accident at Chernobyl because they had no alternative in view of information from western countries or whether the new Soviet information policy merely conformed with a decision to promote a change in society.

59. While Mr. Gorbachev made use of Chernobyl at home, he also made use of it internatio-

nally by proposing to strengthen co-operation to handle nuclear accidents on the one hand and to prevent the premeditated destruction of nuclear power stations by conventional weapons on the other, which was one of his arguments in calling for disarmament. This led the Soviet Government to provide detailed analyses during the summer of the causes of the accident and assessments of its consequences which foreign observers sometimes found unduly alarming, particularly about the probable number of cases of cancer caused by the accident. One may also note the purposeful use of Chernobyl to strengthen the great fear of all things nuclear among Western European public opinion and to give new strength to pacifist movements.

60. The speed with which the Soviet media gave the news of the natural disaster in Moldavia – which it is true did not involve government responsibility – and then the accident in the Black Sea – following which the Minister for the Merchant Navy, Mr. Gujenko, was forced to retire on 27th September – and finally the hijacking shows that the practice which started with the Chernobyl affair has been continued, which is a real revolution if it is recalled that hitherto most facts of this kind – including a nuclear accident and a serious fire in the Moscow underground and several hijackings – were completely concealed from Soviet and international public opinion.

61. Thus, facts which are hard to deny testify to a significant evolution in the priorities set by the Soviet authorities, the revival of a routine, unprofitable economy taking precedence over the development of the defence effort, and the search for new living conditions for the people eclipsing the fight against capitalism. Recognition of certain freedoms, concern for less selective information and the replacement of many officials allow it to be hoped that this trend will be continued.

62. But there must be no misunderstanding. The ideology governing the Soviet Union since 1917 has in no way been called in question by Mr. Gorbachev and his team. The Soviet leaders have in no way renounced the conquest of the world by communism, although they no longer seem to think that this conquest requires a direct military confrontation between the two great powers. It is the methods used from Stalin to Chernenko that are subject to revision, not the final goal. The past of Mr. Gorbachev, quite recently responsible for ideological matters in the party's Central Committee, leaves little doubt on this point. It is in the tactical field that the changes now visible are to be found, not in revolutionary strategy. Just as Mr. Khrushchev's attempts to relaunch the Soviet economy with liberal reforms in no way detracted from the domination exercised over the people's democracies or the use of indirect strategy in the fight

against capitalism, those of Mr. Gorbachev so far leave only very limited room for détente in international relations.

63. Moreover, it seems certain that Mr. Gorbachev has not overcome all opposition and that his foreign and internal policies are encountering obstacles in the Soviet Union itself. Thus, the dubious arrest of the American journalist Nicholas Daniloff, accused of spying and infringing customs regulations, on 1st September 1986 and his being held in a state of arrest for a month in spite of American protests were considered by certain western analysts to be an attempt by KGB leaders to prevent the holding of a Soviet-American summit meeting which had been planned for the last months of 1986, thus jeopardising the policy of détente, essential for the achievement of Mr. Gorbachev's economic and social programme.

64. It is therefore impossible to deduce from an analysis of this programme what Soviet foreign policy will be in future years. Mr. Gorbachev has at least linked his personal authority sufficiently with the reforms it involves to be able to credit him with a real will to achieve them, i.e. to assume their implications in terms of external and defence policy.

II. Soviet external policy

65. Mr. Brezhnev and his successors left Mr. Gorbachev an external situation which, although not as bad as the situation inside the Soviet Union, nevertheless kept the country involved in matters the outcome of which was, to say the least, uncertain in view of the implications for internal matters.

(i) Armaments

66. The Soviet Union had to take delicate decisions at short notice in armaments questions.

67. (a) Admittedly, de facto respect by both parties of the numerical ceilings fixed by the SALT II agreements for intercontinental missiles, although these agreements have not been ratified by the United States Congress, allowed the Soviet Union to have more strategic ballistic missiles than the Americans. But MIRVing and the deployment of air-to-surface cruise missiles on bombers still leaves the United States slight superiority in the number of nuclear warheads. The initial deployment of MXs as from the end of 1986 and the possibility of adapting the second series of 50 MX missiles to mobile launchers, probably in 1989, will to some extent improve the American position.

68. (b) President Reagan's announcement in March 1983 of a major investment programme for research into ways of ensuring the defence of American territory against Soviet ballistic missiles forced the Soviet Union either to intensify its research programme, which would then become very costly, or, at less cost, to increase the number of warheads deployed on its strategic nuclear weapons. President Reagan stood very firm against Soviet attempts to make him block the SDI programme in exchange for minor sacrifices in the limitation of nuclear weapons. He was prepared to agree to the opening of negotiations on new weapons only if the Soviet Union at the same time negotiated a significant limitation of nuclear and conventional weapons.

69. (c) The increase in Soviet nuclear power thanks to the deployment of SS-20 missiles with three nuclear warheads in Eastern Europe and Central Asia forced the United States to deploy Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe, with the result that the Soviet lead in continental-range weapons was undermined.

70. Soviet attempts to take advantage of pacifist agitation in certain Western European countries at that time or even to stir it up in order to prevent these missiles being deployed had failed even before 1984 and the NATO twofold decision of December 1979 was implemented.

71. (d) In tactical nuclear weapons, development of the neutron bomb by the United States was likely to give the West a lead once it was decided to deploy it and above all to eliminate the Soviet lead in conventional arms.

72. (e) The Soviet Union has always blocked the negotiations on the mutual and balanced reduction of conventional forces in Europe, in particular by opposing any valid form of inspection, thus allowing it to retain an overwhelming conventional superiority over the forces deployed by NATO. In the event of hostilities, this superiority would make NATO face a difficult choice between total, almost immediate defeat and recourse to nuclear escalation. The SDI, intended to give the United States a far freer hand if faced with such a choice by sheltering American territory from Soviet missiles, could deprive the Soviet Union of most of the advantage of being able to conquer Western Europe very quickly.

73. (f) The remarkably fast expansion of Soviet naval power revived the fear of Soviet imperialism in several regions of the world, particularly the Far East, where Japan has started to build up a considerable defence capability. Soviet positions in that area are liable to be weakened if Japan joins the worldwide arms race.

74. The Soviet Union was thus faced with a choice between a further major financial effort to catch up with the technological benefits the SDI

would give the United States in the next few years or significant concessions with a view to reaching agreements limiting armaments at all levels.

(ii) *External policy*

75. (a) As long as the western deterrent system retains its effectiveness, the Soviet Union will probably not give priority to action in Europe, which would involve too many risks. It will be content to ensure its considerable superiority in conventional forces which not only gives it a guarantee against any conventional western reaction but also allows it to exert fairly strong pressure on the countries of the West. Thus it will be able to pursue without risk a far more active policy outside Europe either through direct expansion, as in Afghanistan, or by more indirect action, particularly in Africa and Latin America with the support of its naval presence. The main aim will be to weaken the influence of the West and threaten its supplies of natural resources and lines of communication by outflanking them from the south. For this purpose, it often makes use of so-called liberation movements which exist in Africa and Latin America – and now above all in Central America – and when intervention seems necessary it prefers to leave such action to its "allies" – such as Cuba – so as not to become involved in a possible setback.

76. At the same time, exploiting differences emerging between Europe and the United States, either about defence and disarmament matters concerning the security of the North Atlantic Treaty area or on the occasion of conflicts outside that area, which are on the increase, it is waging an intensive propaganda campaign throughout the world with the principal aim of uncoupling Europe from the United States. While this psychological action has not yet achieved major results, it is leaving traces and the effects must not be minimised.

77. (b) The advantages of the Soviet Union's continued domination over the *Eastern European countries* are obviously not negligible. It can plan to ensure its defence several hundreds of kilometres from its own territory which is thus sheltered from any conventional surprise attack. It benefits considerably from its trade with those countries, which are forced to buy its oil and industrial products whatever the cost and to supply it with low-cost agricultural produce and raw materials. However, this systematic exploitation is not to the credit of the régimes supported by the Soviet Union and fans the flames of revolt which are unpleasant when they find political expression, as in Poland, and dangerous in the event of a serious conflict with the West since the Soviet Union cannot be sure of the reactions of

the forces of its allies and the populations of the territories where its troops would be deployed.

78. (c) Relations between the Soviet Union and the *People's Republic of China*, very bad since 1960, have not improved because China made the evacuation of Cambodia by Vietnam and of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union and a reduction in Soviet military and nuclear deployment in Central Asia prior conditions for the normalisation of relations between the two countries.

79. (d) In *Europe*, the Soviet Union has steadily tried to consolidate the situation established after the second world war by moving its frontiers westward and by establishing friendly régimes in the territories occupied by the Red Army in 1945. For many years, it proposed an all-European conference which became the conference on security and co-operation in Europe and met for the first time in Helsinki in 1973. To obtain recognition of the Eastern European régimes and frontiers, together with its protégés, it had to agree to enter into a number of commitments relating to exchanges of all kinds and public and individual freedoms. However, application of the Helsinki final act ran up against considerable difficulties because rejection of the régimes imposed and perhaps also of certain frontiers by the populations concerned, including several sections of the Soviet people, made it impossible to allow much freedom. In these conditions, the process started in Helsinki has not made as much progress as many had hoped, except perhaps in confidence-building measures, although it has allowed relations between the two German states to be developed to some extent and a few liberal measures to be taken in the people's democracies. Détente in Europe has reached a point beyond which it can hardly go without endangering Soviet domination.

80. (e) Soviet diplomacy, which was effective as long as the purpose was to encourage *third-world countries* to rebel against western colonisation or American power, was unable to make the links thus created permanent, except perhaps in Cuba. President Sadat's dismissal of Soviet advisers called in by his predecessor, Nasser, was a turning point in the history of Soviet-Arab relations. Since then, the Soviet Union has found only fickle allies in the Near and Middle East. It had to take military action to support a military putsch in South Yemen in 1985 in order to replace one allied régime by another. Its assistance has not allowed Iraq to beat Iran after six years of war. On the contrary, the Iranians seem to have improved their positions and strengthened the cohesion of their people while in the Soviet Union itself there are signs of sympathy for them among the Moslem population.

81. (f) The Soviet Union is seriously handicapped by the situation in *Afghanistan*, where, for the last seven years, it has been involved in a deadlocked war in support of a government that is rejected by most of the population. Every success in the field is quickly countered by the local resistance movement. This war is an obstacle to friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Moslem countries; it is forced to deploy more than a hundred thousand men and vast quantities of equipment in Afghanistan, it suffers considerable losses, and finds itself in the disagreeable position of a great power which cannot halt a poorly-armed guerrilla movement. Even in the Soviet Union, it has caused reactions whose extent it is difficult to assess, particularly in areas near the Afghan frontier. The invasion of Afghanistan has isolated the Soviet Union to some extent, led to a few, admittedly very limited, sanctions being taken by the western countries but, above all, it has created a situation in which it is difficult for the Soviet Union to withdraw without serious loss of prestige, although events show little promise of decisive victory for the Soviet cause.

82. (g) These various circumstances have induced the Soviet Union to adopt a more cautious attitude to international matters than in the past. This caution is obviously most noticeable in the *Near and Middle East*: Iraq's main supplier of arms, the Soviet Union has been careful not to adopt a clearly anti-Iranian position. It has avoided being compromised by its other customers, Libya and Syria, by supporting terrorist organisations and taking a definite stand in Lebanese affairs. The United States' determination not to allow the Soviet Union to intervene in that region seems to have had a sufficiently deterrent effect. Even its support for certain régimes or opposition movements in Africa and Latin America has been kept to a level which avoided a clash between the two great powers.

83. There is no doubt that Mr. Gorbachev intends to rectify this situation, on the one hand because he cannot make Soviet public opinion accept a disputed internal policy if his external policy is also subject to keen criticism and, on the other, because the maintenance of tension might limit his scope for action in economic and social questions. He has therefore had to make everyone understand that his diplomacy is based on new foundations.

84. He showed this first by changing all the leaders of the Soviet diplomatic service and the officials of the foreign affairs department (MID). Thus, Mr. Gromyko, who had run this department for many years, was replaced by Mr. Shevardnadze. Under Mr. Gorbachev, this ministry has changed more than any other branch of the government: six new deputy ministers, two new first deputy ministers and many

changes in the department and at the head of the principal embassies. Moreover, whereas when he was head of this ministry Mr. Gromyko took sovereign decisions on everything, a feature of the present period is the return of foreign affairs to control by the party, Politburo and General Secretary. Mr. Dobrynin, new party secretary and head of its international department, ensures maintenance of this control. Mr. Shevardnadze implements Mr. Gorbachev's directives. It has been seen that a large number of experts on America have joined the MID and relations with the United States are given greater prominence than in the past.

85. A new department responsible for armaments negotiations has also been set up in this ministry. It is believed that the Ministry of Defence, hitherto the only judge in the matter, has thus been deprived of many of its tasks in this area.

86. In June 1986, Mr. Dobrynin wrote an article in the review *Kommunist* which apparently defined the principles of the new Soviet foreign policy. First, there was to be a global diplomatic approach which must take account of all the fundamental aspects of world policy: military, political, economic and humanitarian. The newest element is the humanitarian aspect in which Mr. Dobrynin visibly includes the human rights problem. Mr. Gorbachev stressed this point during the visit by Mr. Mitterrand, President of the French Republic, to Moscow. Mr. Dobrynin also stressed that the rôle of the military factor in international relations had changed. On 6th March 1986, Mr. Gorbachev said security was increasingly a political task which could be accomplished only by political means. It was time to place relations between states on a sounder basis than armaments. While under Brezhnev the Soviet Union's security was based above all on the balance of military forces, although the importance of maintaining the military balance is still emphasised, that is the limit and it seems to be taking second place to the survival of all mankind in the face of modern weapons. Mr. Dobrynin wrote that international relations must be tackled not on the basis of a narrow understanding of the interests which oppose the two sides but on joint interests and aspirations.

87. These new ideas on the balance of forces seem to have been followed up in the many proposals made by Mr. Gorbachev on disarmament since the beginning of 1986. But they are not confined to this area and a number of statements have been made and measures taken to reorient Soviet external policy.

88. In a speech in Vladivostok on 28th July 1986, Mr. Gorbachev traced the broad lines of a new policy in *Asia and the Pacific*. He announ-

ced the withdrawal of six Soviet regiments from Afghanistan before the end of 1986: one armoured regiment, two mechanised infantry regiments and three air force regiments, i.e. a total of 6 to 8 000 men. This number is not very great since the Soviet Union is believed to have about 120 000 men in Afghanistan. It is more an indication of intentions than a real reduction in the Soviet presence. It is quite clear, however, that Soviet disengagement from Afghanistan cannot be effected by progressive withdrawals of forces. It requires political measures such as the establishment of a government acceptable to at least part of the opposition and it is not certain that Mr. Gorbachev can go so far in his concessions at present, always assuming that he intends to do so.

89. But the full meaning of this sign can be seen if set in the context of the other intentions voiced in the Vladivostok speech. It is first a question of allowing a rapprochement between the Soviet Union and China. The withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan is one of three conditions laid down by China for normalising its relations with the Soviet Union. In the same speech Mr. Gorbachev announced a unilateral reduction of 75 000 Soviet troops stationed in Mongolia, which is far more significant and meets China's second condition. Finally, a Soviet First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Mr. Arkhipov, visited Beijing in August, probably to give details of these proposals, and another First Deputy Chairman, Mr. Talyzin, followed him on 8th September to discuss economic matters but probably also the main issue in the Sino-Soviet dispute, the occupation of Cambodia by the Vietnamese army. The Cambodian affair seemed insoluble until at the beginning of September Deng Xiaoping said in an interview granted to the American CBS television channel that he was prepared to visit Moscow to meet Mr. Gorbachev if the latter brought pressure to bear on Vietnam to withdraw its troops from Cambodia, meaning that China was no longer making their actual withdrawal a condition for normalising Sino-Soviet relations. It is clear that to re-establish these relations would be a considerable success for Mr. Gorbachev and enhance Soviet influence in the Far East and the personal authority of the General Secretary of the party.

90. But his purpose is apparently not to revert to the pre-1960 situation, which the Chinese would not in any case want, but rather to allow the Soviet Union to take a new place on the western shore of the Pacific. His speech in Vladivostok and the new Soviet manner of speaking testify to this. Efforts to improve relations between the Soviet Union and Japan, North Korea and even the Association of South-East Asian Nations, now recognised by the Soviet Union,

have opened the door to the proposals made by Mr. Gorbachev in Vladivostok, i.e.:

- (i) for the Soviet Union to take part in the conference on economic co-operation in the Pacific to be held in Vancouver in November 1986;
- (ii) to hold a conference on security and co-operation in the Pacific;
- (iii) to close the military bases of the two great powers on foreign territories (mainly the Soviet base in Cam Ranh in Vietnam and American bases in the Philippines);
- (iv) to hold a conference in Hiroshima on the denuclearisation of the Pacific;
- (v) to hold negotiations on the limitation of naval forces in the Pacific.

91. These various proposals show that it is intended to recover political and economic influence in Eastern Asia and the Pacific which the Soviet Union had progressively lost since its break with China. But they in no way preclude an effort to play a military rôle in the region, too.

92. Thus, there has been a steady build-up in the Soviet Pacific fleet in recent years. It is now believed to have about ninety major warships; it has considerable nuclear capability and two of three Soviet Kiev-class aircraft-carriers are assigned to it. In addition to Soviet ports, it has the former American base at Cam Ranh in Vietnam, whose berthing capacity has been trebled. It is reported to have 25 surface craft, 5 attack submarines and 38 aircraft there at present which could threaten the entire South-East Pacific. Furthermore, land, air, naval and nuclear forces in the Soviet Far East have been increased very considerably since they are now believed to include 80 long-range Backfire bombers with a cruise missile-launching capability and 165 SS-20 missiles with three nuclear warheads each. In summer 1986, the fleet conducted the most important naval exercises ever carried out by the Soviet Union on its eastern shores.

93. Although the naval superiority of the United States and its allies seems assured in case of war thanks to the presence of the Seventh Fleet in the Far East and above all the Third Fleet in the Western Pacific, American leaders are disturbed at the build-up of Soviet strength in that ocean. The Soviet Union is already exercising some political influence on the Pacific powers: whereas the Soviet Union is strengthening its links with its Vietnamese ally, has signed an agreement granting it port facilities at Kiribati (Gilbert Islands) and is negotiating another with Vanuatu (New Hebrides), some of the United States' allies, such as New Zealand, are proving reticent, particularly about the presence of

nuclear-propelled ships in their waters, and the new President of the Philippines, Mrs. Aquino, has indicated that she will perhaps not renew the agreement allowing the United States to maintain bases in her country when it expires in 1991. In present circumstances, the loss of these two bases would be a disaster for the American presence in a large part of the Pacific.

94. The guidelines presented by Mr. Gorbachev in Vladivostok cannot be interpreted without taking account of this military deployment. For the Soviet Union, it is obviously a matter of establishing itself in an area where recent economic developments show that it will play a vital rôle in the next few decades and where the situation is less stable than in Europe, which allows political and military action to be conducted which the Soviet leaders consider to be more fruitful.

95. Although Mr. Gorbachev has not defined his overall intentions for the *Near and Middle East*, as he did for the Far East in Vladivostok, there are signs that after a long period of dormancy following the break between the Soviet Union and Anwar el Sadat's Egypt, Mr. Gorbachev is also thinking of playing a greater rôle in that area although no final decisions on how to do so have yet been taken. However, observers have noted that:

- (i) talks have been opened with *Israel* for re-establishing consular relations between the two countries. This is significant because relations were broken off in 1967 and the existence in the Soviet Union of several hundreds of thousands of candidates for emigration to Israel gives a special tint to these relations;
- (ii) the message of sympathy addressed to *Libya* after the American bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi in April 1986 in fact carried a veiled warning that Libya would be promised no support if it continued to encourage terrorist activities;
- (iii) Soviet military assistance to *Iraq* is probably mainly aimed at containing the Islamic revolution propagated by Khomeini's Iran. It thus brings the Soviet Union, which, moreover, is supporting its Syrian ally – itself fairly favourably inclined towards Iran – closer to the large majority of Arab governments which also fear an Iranian victory;
- (iv) the great discretion shown by the Soviet Union in recent months about the *Lebanese problem* and its public disavowal of outrages committed in the West by terrorist groups from

Lebanon are no doubt intended to show that the Soviet Union is keeping a free hand in the Middle East and is seeking to restore peace in the region.

96. Thus, after having endorsed the cause of the most destabilising fractions in the region for some twenty years, the Soviet Union is now taking on a far more moderate and peaceful attitude, probably with the intention of resuming the place it lost, taking part in any negotiations to restore peace and preventing the United States from playing a preponderant rôle.

97. It is in *Africa* that Soviet policy has had the most obvious success in the last decade. Whereas during the preceding period it had tried to replace the western countries and exercise direct economic, political and military influence in certain African countries such as Guinea and Mali, it suffered serious setbacks because it was unable to define, or in any event apply, a policy adapted to African requirements. It therefore subsequently resorted to other methods, particularly after the unrest following the decolonisation of the Portuguese empire. Admittedly, it still sends Soviet "advisers" to certain countries such as *Angola and Mozambique*, but in small numbers. The Cubans, themselves armed by the Soviet Union, sent armed forces which now form the main support for the Government of Angola, which is apparently not accepted by the great majority of the people. Nevertheless, Angola served as a base for operations against Namibia and Zaïre. Moreover, the Soviet Union has established friendly relations with the Government of Mozambique with the result that *South Africa* is now surrounded by states under Soviet influence which encourage, arm and assist subversion in South Africa and provide refuge for the organisations propagating unrest in the country. The policy of segregation pursued by the South African Government makes African public opinion particularly sensitive to propaganda against that state, which controls sea and air lanes essential for the West. It is also clear that the development of subversion in South Africa and unrest along its frontiers do not make it easy for that country to adopt an internal policy showing greater recognition of human rights.

98. Similarly, the collapse of the *Abyssinian empire* and the agitation which developed in neighbouring countries allowed Cuban forces to be sent to Ethiopia and led to an interminable civil war in some of its provinces. This too is a vital region for international communications, through the Strait of Bab al Mandab and the southern exit from the Red Sea through which most Gulf oil passes on its way to Europe. The Soviet Union already controls *South Yemen* on the eastern shore of the strait and the activities of its allies are a threat to the western shore.

99. Support for the régime in *Nicaragua* stemming from a recent revolution and Soviet and above all Cuban assistance to subversive movements in neighbouring countries and other Latin American countries are probably aimed less at controlling lines of communication than at creating a maximum number of difficulties for the United States in the region, spreading a feeling that the latter is the oppressor of free peoples and finally weakening American positions in the world.

100. It is however in *relations with the West* and with the United States that Mr. Gorbachev has shown most clearly that he wishes to change the aims of Soviet diplomacy and achieve tangible results. The principal decisions, particularly those which led to the opening of the Geneva negotiations on the limitation of armaments, were certainly taken at the end of the period when Mr. Brezhnev led the Soviet Union. However, they have been reaffirmed and explained particularly clearly in recent months. It may naturally be wondered whether they are not merely intended to leave Soviet diplomacy and armed forces a freer hand in Asia, to consolidate advantages already acquired, whether they are sheer propaganda or, in the last resort, do they really seek to make world peace more stable.

101. On 15th January 1986, on the eve of the opening of the twenty-seventh party congress and on the resumption of the Geneva negotiations on the limitation of armaments, Mr. Gorbachev made a statement on behalf of the Soviet party and government which contained a far-reaching nuclear disarmament plan. It was a three-stage plan to be completed at the turn of the century:

102. (i) In the immediate future:

- (a) the two great powers would put an end to all nuclear tests and call on the other powers to do likewise. The Soviet Union for its part would prolong by three months its unilateral moratorium which was to have ended on 31st December 1985;
- (b) within the next five to eight years, the two great powers would reduce by half the nuclear arms capable of reaching each other's territory;
- (c) they would renounce the development, testing and deployment of space strike weapons;
- (d) they would limit the number of their nuclear warheads to 6 000;
- (e) they would remove all intermediate-range missiles from the European theatre;

(f) they would undertake not to deliver intermediate-range missiles to other powers;

(g) the United Kingdom and France would pledge not to build up their respective nuclear weapons.

103. (ii) As from 1990, all the nuclear powers would pledge to freeze all their nuclear weapons, stop all tests and destroy tactical nuclear weapons. All the industrial powers should subscribe to the ban on space strike weapons and renounce the production of weapons of mass destruction based on new principles of physics.

104. (iii) The third stage would begin at the latest in 1995: all nuclear weapons would have to be destroyed by the end of 1999, while a universal agreement would guarantee that nuclear weapons would never return.

105. The destruction and limitation of armaments would be effected by national technical means and with on-site inspections.

106. Mr. Gorbachev also proposed terminating the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons under international on-site inspections, a reduction in conventional weapons and the level of armed forces with reasonable verification in the framework of the MBFR talks in Vienna, the development of confidence-building measures at the Stockholm conference and the progressive lowering of the levels with effect from which manoeuvres should be notified.

107. This statement formed the basis of a long series of diplomatic approaches to NATO countries, speeches, additional proposals and answers to western objections or counter-proposals emanating from very varied Soviet authorities. They allowed the resumption of all negotiations on disarmament or the limitation of armaments which had been flagging, sometimes, like the MBFR talks, for many years.

108. However, it very quickly became apparent to the western negotiators that the proposals confirmed by their opposite numbers in necessarily secret negotiations differed considerably from public statements by Soviet leaders. Without these statements being openly called in question, many of the promised concessions did not reach the negotiating table. The Soviet leaders for their part continually accused the United States of refusing to take any effective disarmament measures in view of the fact that it was not interested in statements which would not lead to proposals for agreements including absolutely reliable verification measures.

109. These American reservations led the Soviet leaders on several occasions to give more details and add to certain points in Mr. Gorbachev's statement. Soviet proposals made after the statement on 15th January 1986 include:

110. (a) During a visit to Moscow on 28th January of a delegation from the Italian Communist Party led by Mr. Natta, Mr. Gorbachev reverted to the old Soviet proposal for creating nuclear-free zones in Western and Eastern Europe.

111. (b) Mr. Boris Rauschenbach, Soviet academician, stated on 29th January that the Soviet Union would be prepared to introduce the strictest verifications and open up the laboratories concerned for inspection for everything relating to the military use of space.

112. (c) In answer to western proposals at the MBFR negotiations, on 6th February the Soviet Union agreed to an initial reduction of 11 500 men for the Soviet Union compared with 6 500 for the United States, as well as the establishment of checkpoints at the entrance to and exit from the area in which forces would be limited, although they refused to allow the area of verification to be extended to Soviet territory.

113. (d) In his report to the twenty-seventh party congress on 24th February, Mr. Gorbachev reverted to earlier Soviet proposals, including:

- renunciation by the nuclear powers of any kind of warfare;
- a strictly controlled reduction in the level of states' military potentials to a reasonable level;
- the termination of military blocs, starting with an undertaking not to enlarge them or to form new groups;
- a proportional and balanced reduction in military budgets.

114. (e) Receiving Mr. Chadli Bendjedid, President of the Algerian Republic, on 28th March immediately after the bombing of Tripoli by the American air force, Mr. Gorbachev extended to the Mediterranean a number of proposals he had made in relation to Central Europe, i.e.:

- extension to that area of concerted confidence-building measures;
- the reduction of armed forces;
- the withdrawal of ships carrying nuclear weapons;
- a ban on the deployment of nuclear weapons in non-nuclear Mediterranean countries;
- maintenance of the undertaking not to use such weapons against any country which refused to accept such deployment;
- the simultaneous withdrawal of Soviet and American ships, with no immediate restriction.

115. (f) Finally, several times since the beginning of 1986 Mr. Gorbachev has recalled the importance he attaches to holding a summit meeting with President Reagan. One of its main aims was obviously to revive the negotiations on disarmament. The meeting between Mr. Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev in Reykjavik in October might have helped. Its failure will probably lead to the more important meeting which was to have been held in the United States before the end of the year being postponed. This summit meeting has been called in question twice, following the bombing of Tripoli in March and the arrest by Soviet police of the American journalist Daniloff in September, but each time both the Soviet Union and the United States have sought compromise ways of allowing it to be held.

116. The obvious question is which of these many proposals constitute serious bases for negotiations and which are propaganda to make public opinion attribute to the United States and its allies responsibility for any delays or the breakdown of talks. Western negotiators in Geneva, Vienna and Stockholm have noted *inter alia* that the words of their Soviet or Warsaw Pact opposite numbers differed considerably from those of Mr. Gorbachev. From the moment it was a matter of spelling out the nature of verifications and inspections, effective Soviet concessions fell far short of what might have been expected from the words of the General Secretary of the party during summer 1986.

117. It is clear that effective, rigorous verification is the cornerstone of any disarmament agreement. Nuclear tests can be detected from remote seismic observatories with little sacrifice of state sovereignty. The same is not true for missile deployment which requires very accurate air reconnaissance by inspectors enjoying the full confidence of all concerned. Verification of conventional force deployment raises even more tricky problems since it requires inspectors to be stationed permanently on the territory subject to a limitation agreement. Finally, any agreement banning the production of certain weapons, particularly chemical weapons, means inspectors must have full freedom of movement and be able to enter factories. In the latter two cases, in any event, the proposals made by Mr. Gorbachev during the summer still seem inadequate. However, it is clear that these proposals are merely overtures for future negotiations and hence call for further concessions or greater details. In any case, it is to be noted that in September 1986 the Stockholm negotiations on confidence-building measures conducted in the framework of the CSCE reached a compromise on the question of verification which was acceptable to both sides.

118. If, moreover, Mr. Gorbachev's proposals are considered as a whole, it is evident that they

are mainly designed to slow down, if not halt, the American SDI programme. This seems to concord perfectly with the logic of Soviet interests and it is clear that the Soviet authorities are prepared to make major concessions in order to achieve this result. Henceforth it is for the West – and first the Americans – to say what price, in disarmament terms, they intend to charge for relinquishing the considerable strategic advantage they might derive from developing the SDI programme. As for the Europeans, they must be clear about their security requirements and explain them to their allies so that progress towards the controlled limitation of armaments will not lead to a situation which is dangerous for Europe's security.

119. Admittedly, on 21st September the first stage of the Stockholm conference on confidence-building measures closed with the adoption of a final document including renunciation of the threat or use of force in relations between signatory states, the notification of military exercises, the transfer and movement of troops, an annual exchange of plans for military activities, sending invitations to observers to attend manoeuvres and limiting military activity on the continent with a system of verification being replaced by on-site inspections. But this was a minor matter.

120. The meeting between Mr. Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev in Reykjavik from 7th to 9th October on the contrary appeared to be a failure because the two participants were unable to adopt a joint text. Undue importance should perhaps not be attached to this improvised and thus ill-prepared summit meeting intended to prepare the way for more detailed talks between the American and Soviet leaders which were to be held at the end of the year but which will probably be delayed by the Reykjavik setback.

121. On the whole, the failure at Reykjavik seems due to Soviet insistence on a close link between nuclear disarmament and a halt to the strategic defence initiative. The Soviet Union proposed abolishing, in two five-year stages, all the nuclear armaments of the two great powers and prolonging for ten years the ABM treaty and the nuclear test ban. What the Soviet Union in fact wanted to obtain, in exchange for concessions in other areas, was the abandonment of the strategic defence initiative while the United States considered there could be no question of doing this before nuclear disarmament had been achieved.

122. Moreover, the Soviet proposals for nuclear disarmament raise a number of questions that Europe must examine very closely. In fact, Europe would have every reason to fear the signing of agreements limited to what President Reagan once called the zero option, which the Soviet Union now seems to be endorsing. This

would mean the total removal, from Europe at least, of SS-20 missiles on the one hand and of Pershing II and cruise missiles on the other. Certain facts must not be forgotten:

123. (i) In order to be satisfactory, total removal should apply to the whole of Soviet territory because it would be easy for Soviet forces to bring Euromissiles redeployed in Asia back to Europe at short notice, while the United States would take too long to redeploy in Europe weapons stockpiled in America. Hence, there must be total, controlled destruction of all these weapons, including those in East Asia.

124. (ii) Secondly, the recent deployment of shorter-range Soviet SS-21, SS-22 and SS-23 missiles no longer allows the West to draw a parallel only between SS-20s and Pershing II and cruise missiles, but an attempt must be made to reach agreement covering all these weapons. In 1986, the zero option can no longer be what it was in 1979. Mr. Gorbachev's proposals, which separate the case of the SS-20s from that of shorter-range nuclear weapons, could not be accepted by the West as they stand. It is true that on this point Mr. Gorbachev seemed prepared to make major concessions, i.e. to freeze immediately the deployment of short-range nuclear weapons and to negotiate their reduction.

125. (iii) It seems increasingly clear that the disappearance of nuclear weapons from Western Europe would leave our continent defenceless in face of a Soviet military aggression using only conventional forces, very superior in number and armaments to those of NATO. It is precisely a conventional attack or the use of pressure based on the threat to use conventional weapons, that the American presence in Europe and the Atlantic Alliance are designed to avoid. An agreement relating solely to medium- or short-range nuclear weapons would thus seriously affect European security by creating a situation in which Europe's security was uncoupled from that of the United States.

126. (iv) Mr. Gorbachev was able to offer himself the luxury of taking up the very words Mr. Reagan used in March 1983 to announce the SDI to the world to propose the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. But we must not be taken in by this tactical skill: whereas the United States President referred to elimination only in a context which, thanks to the SDI, would ensure the security of the United States and consequently the fullest possible deterrence from which Europe would have benefited, what Mr. Gorbachev offered was the abolition of deterrence in favour of the conventional superiority exercised by the Soviet Union in Europe.

127. (v) Generalised nuclear disarmament as advocated by Mr. Gorbachev is certainly an aim for Europe. But its first effect would be to

reduce to naught the principal element of the policy of deterrence pursued by the Atlantic Alliance for almost forty years. It would therefore require a guarantee relating to the level of forces and conventional weapons and a major effort by Western Europe to obtain a credible conventional force. Has it the will to make this effort?

128. In the circumstances, Reykjavik should probably be considered as a step towards the long-planned summit meeting at which disarmament problems will at last be tackled realistically, i.e. the maintenance or restoration at the lowest possible level of a balance of security on both sides. There is no doubt that the Reykjavik meeting allowed some narrowing of views in nuclear disarmament matters. The two great powers must now reach agreement on the overall conditions for joint security in the event of a drastic reduction, or even the abolition of all or certain categories of nuclear weapons. This matter is of vital importance for Europe and its silence since 15th January about Mr. Gorbachev's proposals has helped to make it a simple pawn in a game where its security is at stake.

III. Western Europe's position

129. The WEU Council is assessing the possible consequences for Europe of developing the SDI and, in its thirty-first annual report, it reports on the principles it has defined on this question.

130. Conversely, the Council has been incapable of informing the Assembly of what it has done to define a European point of view on disarmament-related matters. When it visited Washington in June 1985, the committee was informed that the United States authorities did not wish WEU to express its views on the subject and that Mr. Richard Burt, an Under-Secretary of State, had conveyed this to the governments concerned. Remarks by members of the Council on their reaction to this approach were cryptic, indicating that the Council has done little in the area apart from instructing the agency for the study of arms control and disarmament questions to study Soviet tactics and analyse Soviet proposals on the matter. The Assembly has no idea at all of the action the Council has taken or intends to take on this work which should be communicated to it insofar as it does not have to remain confidential for security reasons. In view of the subject, this seems hardly probable.

131. But the impact of a new Soviet policy on Western European security is not confined to matters relating to the SDI and disarmament. Your Rapporteur has referred to certain aspects of this policy outside the North Atlantic Treaty area, particularly in the Mediterranean and the Pacific, which quite clearly concern international

peace and Europe's security in accordance with Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty. Yet the Council hardly seems to have examined them in recent years whereas it has continued to deal regularly with East-West relations in Europe. Even here, the Assembly is not kept well-enough informed to be able to assess the depth or extent of the exchanges of views which have been held. At most it may be deduced that no collective guideline has been laid down and it is to be feared that the ministers have remained fairly close to the diplomatic surface of the situation.

(i) European security and Mr. Gorbachev's disarmament proposals

132. The breadth of Mr. Gorbachev's proposals is encouraging for Europe because it proves that Soviet leaders have grasped the fact that security is a whole. Admittedly, Soviet diatribe against nuclear weapons and the emphasis on arms limitation or nuclear disarmament measures, and above all on halting nuclear tests – the true Soviet leitmotiv – may imply that this is the point they intend to emphasise, as well as the abandonment of the SDI, probably their major aim. But it must also be recalled that the sensitiveness of a section of European public opinion in recent years about anything nuclear provided fertile ground for propaganda by the Soviet Union which could thus promote its direct disarmament interests and attempt to weaken western cohesion.

133. As matters now stand, it is evident that Europe cannot accept the idea of disarmament applying to nuclear weapons alone. This is an area in which parity between the two great powers has almost been reached whereas for conventional weapons the overwhelming superiority of the Soviet Union and its allies in the European theatre might encourage them to act dangerously from the moment they no longer have to fear nuclear retaliation from the West. It should not be forgotten that western defence policy is aimed solely at keeping the peace and that this is ensured by a worldwide deterrent system within which both conventional and nuclear weapons play a rôle. The presence of American forces on the European continent and of the British Army of the Rhine and the French First Army in the Federal Republic guarantees that the nuclear forces of these three countries would be used in the event of an outside aggressor attacking Western Europe, even if only conventional forces were used.

134. Thus the European members of the Atlantic Alliance cannot be satisfied with the priority the Soviet Union accords to the nuclear aspect of disarmament. They could not subscribe to serious nuclear disarmament proposals without

relative parity in the conventional field. Hence, before accepting firm steps towards nuclear disarmament, they must either obtain, through negotiations, permanent, controlled parity with the Soviet Union, or make the necessary financial and technological efforts to raise their conventional strength to that of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is well aware of these requirements and has stated that it is prepared to take them partly into account in the MBFR talks. However, so far the conventional force reductions they propose have not been significant enough to form a basis for valid negotiations holding promise of real progress towards nuclear disarmament. It should be added that the problem of bringing in United States reinforcements to Europe in the event of a serious crisis is still very difficult to solve because of the threat to allied maritime transport of Soviet navy shipping deployed in the North Atlantic. This means that there will be no real balance of forces if MBFR apply only to Central Europe where the Soviet Union is able to bring in reinforcements at short notice.

135. The problem raised by chemical weapons should also be stressed. Unless an agreement is reached in the near future on the radical, verified renunciation of all chemical weapons by both sides, the Soviet Union might, within two years, have a near monopoly in this area in view of the United States decision to withdraw its chemical weapons from Europe. In the event of hostilities in which the Soviet Union used or threatened to use chemical weapons, it would take a long time and be difficult to redeploy in Europe those which had been withdrawn. Chemical deterrence, achieved through the presence of American weapons, will therefore no longer apply and European countries might start producing such weapons, as the French Government has just been authorised to do by parliament.

136. As long as there is no satisfactory agreement on the reduction of conventional forces, the main problem for Europe will continue to be the maintenance, or rather restoration, of a conventional defence capability which it now lacks. Efforts by certain European members of the Atlantic Alliance to reinforce their conventional forces are not enough and, in the event of a purely conventional war, western defences – as your Rapporteur has shown elsewhere – would be able to ward off for only a very brief period an offensive in which the Soviet Union and its allies mobilised their full potential. In other words, the best means of avoiding nuclear escalation in hostilities in Europe and of holding successful negotiations on a balanced limitation of forces is not to anticipate the possible outcome of negotiations but to restore a balance from which equivalent reductions might be envisaged by both sides. Only on the basis of a real balance of conventional forces can large-scale reductions be

made in nuclear weapons without endangering Europe's security.

137. If, as seems evident, the forthcoming meeting between President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev still gives priority to the limitation of nuclear weapons, it is urgent for Europe to remind the United States President of this aspect of the situation, and it is regrettable that WEU was not used for defining a European position on the matter. This meeting should induce Europe to call for equality in security which would imply the establishment of a clear link between nuclear and conventional disarmament.

138. Moreover, Europe cannot ignore the fact that its security, like that of the United States, is not ensured only along the Elbe and that freezing the conventional and nuclear balance in Europe would be dangerous if it were to allow a further expansion of Soviet military strength in Asia, the Pacific or the Mediterranean. This is due to the ability of the Soviet Union – but not the United States – to move its land and air forces quickly from one front to another, to the vital importance of the Pacific and the Mediterranean for the West and to Europe's position which would not allow it to escape a clash between the two great powers even if it originated in another part of the world.

139. This is tantamount to saying that European security is not a regional matter but is linked to the establishment of a world balance. This is why all measures to limit forces or armaments on the European continent or to create denuclearised zones in Europe, far from consolidating peace, are liable to make it more uncertain if they are not part of efforts to organise world peace. This is precisely what the signatories of the Paris Agreements had in mind when, in 1954, they set up the WEU Council to be responsible for dealing with all threats to international peace wherever they may arise, and it is regrettable that the Council has always been so restrictive about applying Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty. Thus, the Council should pay heed to Mr. Gorbachev's proposal to extend to the Mediterranean the disarmament measures which he was proposing for Europe and define a European position on the matter.

140. Mr. Gorbachev's other main goal is obviously to halt the American SDI programme or, in any event, to divide the western allies on the matter by accusing the United States of opposing any serious disarmament negotiations through their obstinacy on this point. The moratorium on Soviet nuclear tests, accompanied by incessant appeals for priority to be given to an agreement on a generalised end to such tests, seems to be aimed mainly at inducing the United States to give up research in the context of the SDI since this inevitably includes experiments requiring nuclear tests. Soviet propa-

ganda on the subject might be further boosted by the fact that the American authorities, in order to obtain the approval of Congress for the sums needed for work on the SDI, spoke of the absolute security this programme might one day give the American continent, which hardly seems to correspond to foreseeable facts, but which could be disturbing for European public opinion in the knowledge that its security is guaranteed by the solidarity between the destinies of Europe and of the United States.

141. There is little doubt that the SDI has already had one result, which is to make the Soviet Union seek effective disarmament and for this purpose to suggest giving up some of the advantages it enjoys at the present juncture in order not to embark upon a further stage in the armaments race where it might get out of its depth for economic and technological reasons. It seems hardly thinkable for the United States to abandon the SDI research programme, nor would this be likely to facilitate the success of future negotiations.

142. Conversely, Europe cannot overlook the fact that until now its security has depended on the deployment of offensive nuclear weapons by the Atlantic Alliance and that if foreseeable progress with the SDI leads to American strategic nuclear weapons being better protected this should not noticeably affect the priority given to offensive weapons. It should therefore not play into the hands of the Soviet Union by opposing the American programme, which would be in vain moreover, but examine the consequences its results may have for European security. In this connection, the attitude adopted by the WEU Council, as defined in its thirty-first annual report, corresponds perfectly to WEU's vocation. While accepting that the deployment of new defence systems may be the subject of negotiations in the context of the worldwide search to limit armaments, neither Europe nor the United States can accept Mr. Gorbachev's proposals that the total abandonment of the SDI, including current research, should be a kind of prior condition for disarmament negotiations.

143. Europe must not consider Mr. Gorbachev's appeals for disarmament as just propaganda manoeuvres to isolate the United States from its European allies and the non-aligned countries and to crown the Soviet Union with glory for having a monopoly of action in favour of peace and disarmament. Nor must it close its eyes to this aspect of the Soviet approach. On the contrary, it must maintain and strengthen its co-operation with the United States. This is more than ever essential for its security now that disarmament negotiations will probably be starting up again, the aim being to avoid the outcome of these negotiations being detrimental to Europe's security. With this in

mind, there seems no reason for the WEU Council not to hold consultations on all the problems raised by Mr. Gorbachev's proposals, as it did on the SDI. By instructing one of its agencies to study Soviet disarmament proposals, the Council has shown some inclination to do so. As far as the Assembly knows, this is as far as it has gone.

(ii) East-West civil co-operation

144. Since the days Khrushchev presided over the destiny of the Soviet Union, it has been trying to develop co-operation with the West in many areas, particularly the economic area. At that time, its main aim was probably to obtain at least de facto recognition of the régimes and frontiers of Central and Eastern Europe. To a large extent, it has succeeded with the final act of the Helsinki conference. It is therefore for other reasons that this process has been pursued relentlessly ever since.

145. It is also obvious that truly economic reasons have played a major rôle in the trend of Soviet policy: obtaining credit, acquiring advanced technology and finding outlets for Soviet exports have played a part. Mr. Gorbachev added further reasons, particularly the wish to take advantage of certain aspects of a market economy to make Soviet firms more dynamic.

146. Western European countries have often been tempted to give priority to this aspect of détente, either because they saw it as a means of furthering their own interests or because they considered they would be better able to draw closer to the populations of the Soviet Union and its allies by increasing relations of all kinds. These are reasons which guided most countries' diplomacy in Helsinki and subsequently, in particular when work started on the great Siberian gas pipeline to enable many European countries to import Soviet gas.

147. This policy encountered certain setbacks, however. First, neither Helsinki nor contracts with the East brought the slightest change in the deployment and modernisation of Soviet forces. There was no reduction in military expenditure. They did not slow down the rapid development of Soviet naval strength or prevent the Soviet Union from deploying its SS-20s and then its SS-21s, SS-22s and SS-23s targeted on Western Europe. Nor did they prevent the deployment of anti-missile defence systems on Soviet territory. There is no reason to think that the decisions just taken at the Stockholm conference on the notification and international supervision of manoeuvres will do much to change this situation, although agreements on inspections may create useful precedents for more significant agreements.

148. Conversely, Western Europe now has to purchase Soviet gas and oil at a time when it would be more advantageous to buy on the international market because of the fall in energy prices. It is in competition with the United States for the supply, at a loss, of the agricultural produce the Soviet Union needs. In other words, from this form of détente it has been able to derive neither the economic nor the military benefits it might have expected. As for the concessions in terms of freedom made by the Soviet Union and its allies in Helsinki, they have in fact hardly been applied, as proved by the situation in Poland and the fate of Soviet dissidents.

149. There is no doubt that the new course Mr. Gorbachev intends the Soviet economy to follow is already directing it towards the development of East-West economic relations and this will be increasingly so. It will no longer be possible for the West to delude itself as in 1973. Only insofar as it is possible to conclude balanced, controlled disarmament negotiations will Europe and the United States be able to consider that the development of trade with the East will not primarily serve Soviet armaments policy, as has been the case in the last ten years.

IV. Conclusions

150. A link can be discerned between Mr. Gorbachev's economic, social and domestic policy initiatives and his disarmament proposals since it seems essential to put a brake on military expenditure if the other aims are to be attained. It may therefore understandably seem to be in the interests of the West to encourage all these aims by making the Soviet Union's policy of economic overtures easier and adopting a conciliatory attitude towards disarmament.

151. However, it is not certain that all the proclaimed aims are actually being pursued. The successes and failures of economic and social policy and action by those in favour of liberalisation or the restoration of bureaucracy may lead to a change of tactics in both domestic policy and foreign, defence and disarmament policy. The crisis triggered off by the arrest of an American journalist, Mr. Daniloff, by Soviet police in September 1986 showed, if proof were needed, that there are still forces in the Soviet Union determined to impede dialogue with the United States. The West cannot allow its security to depend on such hazards or on the possible length of Mr. Gorbachev's political life. Admittedly, it has no interest, by being radically uncompromising, in making it more difficult for him to apply a new policy which it can but hope will be successful, but it cannot ignore the fact that, if fully successful, this would mean the triumph of the Soviet cause in the world.

152. Your Rapporteur believes this means that the West must assess Mr. Gorbachev's proposals on their own merits, i.e. in terms of the guarantees they offer for its security and Europe, which does not play a direct part in the most important negotiations, cannot determine its defence policy in the light of speeches by the General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party. Yet it cannot turn a deaf ear to what he says. His words must be studied carefully so that Europe can give its American ally its views on economic matters, for which it is the responsibility of the Twelve to define a European policy, and on security,

defence and disarmament matters where it is for the WEU Council to try to harmonise the views of the Seven for their weight to be brought to bear in bilateral relations with the United States and in the various NATO bodies. The Reykjavik summit meeting and its impact on world public opinion provided a unique opportunity of showing that the revitalisation of WEU is not meaningless and that it would be unacceptable for the European point of view to remain a dead letter just when nuclear deterrence seems to be called in question, thus jeopardising the security of Western Europe.

Parliamentary and public relations

REPORT¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations²
by Mr. Terlezki, Rapporteur*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DRAFT RESOLUTION

on parliamentary and public relations

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Mr. Terlezki, Rapporteur

- I. Introduction
- II. Action taken in parliaments on recommendations adopted by the WEU Assembly
- III. Activities of the committee
- IV. Parliamentary and public relations activities of the Council and member governments
- V. Means of improving action in parliaments
- VI. Means of improving relations with the public
- VII. Conclusions

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee: Lady Jill Knight (Chairman); MM. Frasca, Enders (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Cavaliere (Alternate: Giust), De Bondt, Mrs. Fischer, Mr. Goerens, Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges, Mr. Mercier, Dr. Miller (Alternate: Coleman), MM. Noerens, Seitlinger (Alternate: de Chambrun), Tummers (Alternate: Eysink), Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra.*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Resolution
on parliamentary and public relations

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming the frequent mention of the reactivation of WEU in debates in some member parliaments;
- (ii) Convinced, however, that still more parliamentarians should take an active part in such debates in all member parliaments;
- (iii) Welcoming the United Kingdom Government's initiative in presenting a written report to parliament on the activities of the Council of WEU and its ministerial organs,

INVITES national delegations

1. To seize every opportunity to discuss the rôle of Western European Union in parliamentary and public debates on security and defence matters;
2. To urge the other governments of member countries to follow the example of those of Germany and the United Kingdom and produce regular written reports to parliament on the activities of WEU;
3. To approach their national parliaments and governments to ensure that they acknowledge the due central and priority rôle of the Assembly, which is the most direct expression of the political and democratic will of member countries;
4. To continue impressing upon the governments of member countries the need to allocate to the Assembly the financial and technical means essential for the effective pursuit of its public relations activities.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Terlezki, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. The purpose of the present report is to inform the Assembly about action taken in parliaments on recommendations adopted by the WEU Assembly and about the committee's activities in the period between June and December 1986. Furthermore, the report will examine the public relations activities of the Council and the WEU member governments. Finally, it will consider means of improving parliamentary action and relations with the public in member countries.

II. Action taken in parliaments on recommendations adopted by the WEU Assembly

2. At its meeting in Paris on 4th June 1986 during the first part of the thirty-second ordinary session of the Assembly, the committee, in accordance with Rule 42,3 (a), selected the following recommendations for debate in national parliaments:

- 432 on the reactivation of WEU – its tasks, structure and place in Europe, and
- 435 on security and terrorism – the implications for Europe of crises in other parts of the world.

The texts of these recommendations were transmitted as usual with a letter from the President of the Assembly dated 10th June 1986 to the presidents of member parliaments expressing the hope that they would be of interest and provide subject matter for speeches or questions to ministers.

3. In a letter addressed to committee members, Lady Jill Knight, Chairman of the committee, sent a number of draft questions relating to the subjects covered in the selected recommendations asking them to send her, through the intermediary of the secretariat, the text of the questions they actually put, the dates on which they were put and the text of the answers obtained.

4. As proposed in the report on parliaments, public opinion and defence, adopted by the Assembly on 3rd June 1986, the Chairman sent copies of these letters together with the model questions also to the rapporteurs of the two selected recommendations as well as to the chairmen of delegations, and commented as follows:

“In order to enhance the Assembly's efforts to bring its work to the attention of national parliaments and urge them to follow it up, and recalling Resolution 71 on parliaments, public opinion and defence and Resolution 72 on the promotion of parliamentary and public interest in WEU matters, the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations considers it important that the rapporteurs of recommendations adopted and the chairmen of national delegations participate to a greater extent in parliamentary follow-up action.

I therefore enclose a copy of my letter of today's date to the members of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations together with a number of draft questions relating to the subjects covered by the recommendations selected for debate in parliaments.

I would be grateful if you would use your influence and take every opportunity of encouraging your colleagues on the delegation to put questions in your parliament on the relevant Assembly recommendations.”

5. This initiative was followed up in the Bundestag in October 1986 when Mrs. Fischer, MM. Zierer, Reddemann, Unland and Böhm put ten questions to the Federal Government.

6. Apart from an initiative by Mr. Dejardin in the Belgian Chamber of Representatives, it is not yet clear whether successful action was taken in other member parliaments too since parliamentary activities were reduced during the summer period and the dates for resuming parliamentary activities after the summer recess differ somewhat from country to country. But it should be recalled that there are specific reasons for putting questions to governments on Assembly recommendations at a given time. It is also most important for members and national delegations to improve the communication of information about their activities in national parliaments to the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations through the intermediary of the Office of the Clerk. At the moment only the Italian Delegation does this regularly.

7. Since the problem of terrorism continues to be a matter of major concern in all member countries it is still appropriate to use the relevant recommendation for interventions in parliaments. Some important interventions have been made already. In a discussion on terrorist

problems during a meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the French National Assembly on 17th April 1986, Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly of WEU, recalled Articles V and VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty. He then asked to what extent and as from when the French Government considered a terrorist act to be a threat to peace in view of the very special nature of that type of act. He asked whether these articles were inapplicable in view of the fact that there had just been an aggression against Italy. Resuming the debate, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs made no special reference to these questions.

8. In a debate on crime prevention in the House of Commons on 8th May 1986, Mr. Murphy spoke about the initiative for international co-operation which had been put forward by the Assembly of WEU for a European group to co-ordinate the fight against terrorism.

9. In a debate on foreign affairs in the House of Commons on 18th June 1986, Sir Anthony Grant made a comprehensive statement about the activities and developments of Western European Union. Turning to questions of terrorism, he said:

“The President of WEU, Mr. Caro, of France, proposed a powerful initiative for WEU to help in the battle against terrorism.

In the Assembly of WEU we spend hours debating this subject, condemning it, regretting it and deploring it, but nothing happens in the way of practical results. President Caro produced helpful ideas for the seven nations to co-ordinate their actions against this beastly modern scourge, but once again buckets of cold water were immediately poured on his idea by the Ministers. They said that they preferred to deal through the EEC, despite the fact that the EEC has shown remarkably little enterprise in this respect.”

10. Conversely, on 20th June 1986 a question was put by Mr. Pepermans in the Belgian Chamber of Representatives on anti-terrorist co-operation in which he made reference only to co-operation within the European Communities and the Council of Europe.

11. In a debate in the Bundestag on 16th April 1986 concerning international terrorism, the German Chancellor underlined in a government statement that the Europe of the Twelve was able to contribute considerably to the battle against terrorism. He added that Europe had not always used its possibilities in this respect in the past. In the ensuing discussion the question of involvement of the European Community,

NATO and the Interparliamentary Union was debated several times but the rôle of WEU in this respect was not mentioned.

12. In the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies on 29th May 1986, a motion on the strengthening of European and Atlantic co-operation in the fight against international terrorism was debated and voted upon. In this motion the government was encouraged to finalise the INGEPOL project in regard to national legislation and recommendations of the Council of Europe and was asked to continue its consideration and to propose measures in order to strengthen European and Atlantic co-operation in the fight against international terrorism. There was no reference to WEU in that motion.

13. On Recommendation 432 on the reactivation of WEU – its tasks, structure and place in Europe, Mr. Masciadri put a written question to the Italian Government on 31st July 1986 in which he took up much of the recommendation. No answer has yet been received from the Italian Government.

14. Mr. Masciadri also put questions on Recommendations 433, 434, 436 and 437. Answers have not yet been received.

15. In the Belgian Chamber of Representatives on 2nd October 1986, Mr. Dejardin put two questions related to Recommendation 432 to the Minister for External Relations. Answers have not yet been received.

16. In a meeting of the Defence and Armed Forces Committee of the French National Assembly on 15th May 1986, Mrs. Edwige Avice, who is not a member of the WEU Assembly, asked the Minister for Foreign Affairs, after recalling France's initiative to reactivate Western European Union in 1984, about the government's intentions in regard to the rôle it wished that institution to play.

17. Mr. Jean-Bernard Raimond, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, answered that reactivation of WEU offered Europeans the possibility of discussing among themselves fundamental matters such as East-West relations, and matters relating to co-operation on armaments were also discussed there.

18. In the French National Assembly on 16th June 1986, Mr. Stirbois put a written question on the absence of French ministers at the last session of the WEU Assembly.

19. On 28th July 1986, Mr. Jean-Bernard Raimond, Minister for Foreign Affairs, transmitted the following answer:

“The government attaches great importance to the work of Western European Union and was represented by two of its ministers, the Minister for Foreign Affairs

and the Minister of Defence, at the recent meeting in Venice in April. In regard to the annual sessions of the WEU Assembly, it should be specified that they are held in two parts, one in spring and the other in autumn. At the spring meeting, only the government of the country having the chairmanship-in-office of the WEU Council represents the latter and addresses the Assembly in its name. It was in this capacity alone that the French Minister for External Relations addressed the Assembly exceptionally in June 1983. Conversely, it is customary for the French Government to delegate one of its members to address the Assembly at the second part of the latter's annual session in December."

20. In his speech in the House of Commons on 18th June 1986 mentioned above Sir Anthony Grant referred to parts of Recommendation 432. He regretted that in his nine years in WEU he could not recall a British Defence Minister coming to address the Assembly. He went on:

"Defence is a fundamental subject. Other nations manage to field their top Defence Ministers. Why do we not do as well?"

21. Turning to the problem of enlargement, he said:

"I should have thought it was obvious that the inclusion of Portugal, which is keen to join and is a member of NATO, and later that of Spain, would enhance the interests of WEU. It was most creditable of the Spanish people, so wisely led by the moderate labour government, to decide quite firmly that they wish to remain in NATO. In addition, Denmark, Norway and even Turkey, if they so wished, could make a contribution to WEU.

Such an enlargement is opposed by Ministers on the astonishing ground that in some way the political will of the Seven might be jeopardised by the accession of new candidates. What nonsense. What great political will does WEU exercise now that would be disturbed by the presence of our oldest ally, Portugal? All that will be disturbed is the comfortable lethargy of the Council of Ministers.

Mr. Tindemans, the Belgian Foreign Minister, described what, in his view, were the three main obstacles to the enlargement or revitalisation of WEU, all of which were completely inexplicable. The first was: 'the instinctive feelings of national and cultural identity that had to be overcome'. What does that mean? The second obstacle was: 'The post-war political

consensus in many European countries was in danger of breaking down'. How will that be made worse by other nations joining WEU? Thirdly, he said: 'Matters relating to security have to be dealt with in a discreet way and should not be shouted from the rooftops.' We all know that from our own parliaments. At least he went on to say: 'WEU could make a significant contribution to the cause of European unity, especially as its expertise encompasses the vital field of defence policy.' So it can.

Ministers of WEU, and that includes ours, must show a great deal more drive and determination to make this organisation work in the interests of the defence of the West. I have no doubt about the commitment of my right hon. and learned friends to the European cause or to the defence of our nation and of the West. However, I should like my hon. friend the Minister of State to give an absolute assurance that the government wholly support WEU and its revitalisation and will do all that they can to encourage the lethargic other Ministers in WEU to secure its advancement as rapidly as possible."

22. In a statement on 19th June 1986, Mr. Renton, Minister for Overseas Development, referring to the remarks by Sir Anthony Grant, said:

"As hon. members on both sides of the House acknowledge, Europe must pull its weight in East-West affairs generally and in the western defence effort in particular. WEU helps in that process. The government took a leading part in the reactivation of WEU and we regard it as a significant forum for European political contribution to security. We have endeavoured consistently to ensure that Foreign and Defence Ministers attend WEU meetings and Assembly sessions."

23. Answering a written question put by Sir Anthony Grant on 3rd June 1986 on the policy of the British Government towards enlargement of Western European Union, Mr. Eggar, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, said:

"At their meeting in Venice on 29th-30th April, WEU Ministers agreed that the new institutional arrangements approved at the Council meeting in Bonn in April 1985 should be allowed to run until the end of 1987, when a review of the structure and operation of the organisation will take place. At that time member governments will be able to assess the achievements of WEU's reactivation and the way ahead. We support this approach."

24. During a debate in the Belgian Senate on 8th July 1986 on the bill adjusting the budget of the Ministry of Defence for the financial year 1985, Mr. Dehousse asked the government about reactivation of Western European Union. Mr. de Donnée, Minister of Defence and Minister of the Brussels Region, answered that he had put forward the idea in the Council of WEU that this organisation should have a special interest in the problems of peace and security in Africa and particularly in the southern Sahara. WEU should think about what a Euro-African alliance might be in matters of peace and security.

25. Furthermore, the Minister emphasised that WEU was being reactivated and that its Secretary-General was imparting considerable momentum. At the same time this institution was also working out its true tasks. The problem was to avoid duplication of work between WEU, the IEPG and Eurogroup.

26. In a debate in the Belgian Chamber of Representatives on 16th July 1986, WEU's rôle in Euro-African relations was discussed with the participation of Mr. Vanvelthoven and Mr. De Decker. Both Mr. Tindemans, Minister for External Relations, and Mr. de Donnée, Minister of Defence and of the Brussels Region, spoke in the debate.

27. On 24th July 1986 the bill concerning the approval of the single European act was discussed and voted on in the Belgian Senate. During the debate, Mr. Close underlined the importance of improving co-operation between the Assembly of WEU, the European Parliament and the North Atlantic Assembly. He also expressed the wish that Belgium play a crucial rôle in supporting the idea of creating a European research institute. In the same debate, Mr. Pécriaux asked about the government's position towards WEU in the framework of the request to ratify the single European act.

28. In a government statement, Mr. Tindemans, Belgian Minister for External Relations, said there was no doubt that member countries of WEU had to decide in the near future about candidatures for membership. He confirmed the importance of better co-ordination between the three assemblies. He said consideration might be given to the Assembly of Western European Union playing the rôle of committee for security questions of the European Parliament, for instance, presuming that a parliamentary group could specialise in security questions. One could also envisage the European Parliament requesting reports from the Assembly of WEU or from the North Atlantic Assembly. But these were only thoughts. Definite conclusions had not yet been reached.

29. On 5th June 1986, a special debate was held in the Bundestag when a motion by the

Greens asking the government to call for the reintroduction of the arms control provisions of WEU was discussed and rejected. In the debate, Mr. Gansel underlined the importance of Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty which implies a functioning NATO.

III. Activities of the committee

30. The previous paragraphs show intense activity by members of the Assembly in several national parliaments in order to follow up Assembly recommendations and to propagate knowledge of its work. Nevertheless it seems that in every parliament only a few and almost always the same members are really active in this respect. Your Rapporteur has information about special initiatives by committee members, for instance by Mr. Antretter, Mrs. Fischer and Mr. Dejardin, who put several questions which will be quoted below. Conversely it is encouraging that in some countries even parliamentarians who are not members of the Assembly show a special interest in WEU matters.

31. Since it is the special duty of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations to make arrangements for bringing to the attention of parliaments the work of the Assembly and inviting them to follow up this work, committee members first should feel bound to set a good example by putting questions or intervening in other ways.

32. The committee's intention to increase visits to member parliaments in order to enhance contacts and information between parliaments failed because of the Assembly's difficult financial situation. Consequently the Presidential Committee asked the committee to postpone until the autumn its information meeting planned to be held in London in May. This information meeting was held at the House of Commons on 17th November 1986 with the participation of the Secretary-General of WEU.

IV. Parliamentary and public relations activities of the Council and member governments

33. In the previous report on the promotion of parliamentary and public interest in WEU matters, the committee suggested that the annual report of the Council contain a special section dealing with public relations. It is therefore to be welcomed that the thirty-first annual report of the Council to the Assembly on the Council's activities for the period 1st January to 31st December 1985 contains, in part one, a paragraph on WEU and public awareness. In this very short paragraph the Council said:

“ On several occasions, and notably in its reply to Recommendation 411, the Council stressed the need to ensure that European opinion was informed as completely as possible about the threats to our continent and about the security and defence policy adopted by the member countries and the Atlantic Alliance to counter these threats. ”

34. Unfortunately, the annual report says nothing about the Council's special activities with a view to achieving these aims. But taking into account that a special unit for public relations is to be created within the Secretariat-General in London, it was hoped that the next annual report would contain more substantial information in this respect. Unfortunately this does not appear to be the case.

35. With regard to the information activities of member governments, Mr. Antretter put a question to the German Government on 6th June 1986 asking what concrete steps it had undertaken in order to improve information communicated to the public in the Federal Republic of Germany on the activities of the Council and on those of the other ministerial organs of WEU.

36. In his answer, Mr. Möllemann, Minister of State in the Foreign Office, stressed that the Federal Government was the only government among the seven WEU member countries to provide regular half-yearly reports since 1967 on the activities of WEU. Secondly, he referred to the creation of a public relations unit in the Secretariat-General in London which had started work on 1st January 1986. The Federal Government consequently expected the public to be better informed about the activities of the Council and of the other ministerial organs of WEU. Finally, the minister stressed that the Federal Government would continue to provide information in an appropriate manner, for instance by press statements and speeches about WEU and the activities of its ministerial organs.

37. Thanks to the initiatives of Mr. Murphy and Mr. Roy Hughes in the House of Commons, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is no longer the only WEU member government to provide information about WEU activities at national level. When Mr. Roy Hughes, on 15th July 1986, asked the Secretary of State for Defence what new defence initiatives he was proposing within the ambit of Western European Union, Mr. Younger, United Kingdom Secretary of State for Defence, answered:

“ A report on the work of WEU was placed in the library at the end of May. The United Kingdom has played a full part in the development of a programme of work for WEU and, for example, supports the

areas of study described in the communiqué of the meeting at ministerial level in Venice on 29th-30th April. A copy of this communiqué is also in the library. ”

38. In implementing a decision made known in answer to an earlier question put by Mr. Murphy, the United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office drew up an interesting report on the activities of Western European Union dated 21st May 1986. This was a most welcome new initiative and it is to be hoped that it will become a permanent feature. Your Rapporteur particularly asks his British colleagues to make use of this report in order to carry further their dialogue on WEU matters with Her Majesty's Government. Similarly he asks his other Assembly colleagues to urge their governments to follow this example.

39. The subject has already been raised in Belgium. In the Belgian Chamber of Representatives on 2nd October 1986, Mr. Dejardin put the following questions to the Minister for External Relations:

“ Information given to the public on the rôle and duties of WEU and its political activities is obviously insufficient.

However, this European institution, the only one with security and defence responsibilities, should play an ever more decisive rôle in the process of European integration and the development of European convictions among the people.

It is obviously for the governments of the seven member countries of Western European Union, and its parliamentary Assembly, to make public opinion aware of this fact.

How does the government inform the public about the rôle, duties and activities of WEU in the framework of the alliance and its importance in the government's security policy?

How much does the government spend each year on giving the public such information? ”

40. He received the following answer:

As the honourable member so pertinently remarks, it is for the governments of the seven member countries of Western European Union but also – and perhaps even more directly – its Assembly to have the privileged task of conveying to public opinion the importance of the work of WEU.

Arrangements have been made by members of the Council to ensure that their press attachés keep in regular touch with

journalists to inform them on the spot or in the capitals of the results of discussions at WEU ministerial meetings and of the work of the organisation.

The same is true for ministerial addresses to the Assembly, the texts of which are transmitted to the media.

The energetic and noteworthy efforts of the Secretary-General of WEU should also be recalled. The secretariat has a press unit responsible for propagating all useful information about reactivation.

Furthermore, the Permanent Council is at the moment considering means of associating those responsible for European research institutes with the attempt to make public opinion aware of the terms of European security. It is studying the possibilities of organising in each member state, including Belgium, WEU-sponsored seminars open to journalists, experts and representative sectors of public opinion to study these matters.

Neither the Minister for External Relations nor the Minister of Defence ever fails, when speaking in public, to emphasise the importance, place and rôle of WEU in Belgium's external relations and security policy.

At colloquies in which they are invited to participate, officials in my department more particularly responsible for security questions describe the activities of WEU. When the occasion arises and with my authorisation, they co-operate in the drafting of articles on WEU in specialised reviews or more general publications.

Booklets and information documents on Belgium's external policy never fail to stress the rôle and vocation of WEU and developments which have taken place or are expected in the context of the reactivation of that organisation."

41. It is also worthy of note that the German Government reports annually on the situation regarding disarmament and the control of armaments as well as on the military balance in a written document to the Bundestag which publishes it as an official Bundestag document. The last report, published on 25th June 1986, contains for the first time several references to the activities of Western European Union with regard to disarmament and the control of armaments, and it can be used by our German colleagues as a sound basis for putting questions on these matters.

V. Means of improving action in national parliaments

42. In August 1986 the French *Revue de Défense nationale* published a summary about WEU and especially the results of the thirty-second ordinary session of its Assembly. In the article reference was made to several subjects discussed there such as terrorism, security, regional conflicts and the situation in the Mediterranean. But the author came to the conclusion that with modern means of communication and crisis management governments could react so promptly that democratic parliamentary supervision could not be exercised until it was too late.

43. Without wishing to comment on this article, your Rapporteur draws attention to the fact that action taken in parliaments on recommendations adopted by the WEU Assembly can be successful only if it is carried out promptly in all member parliaments. To this end, an effective system of interparliamentary information and communication must be established.

44. All WEU member parliaments with the exception of Luxembourg have permanent telexes. So have the Council of Europe and the European Parliament, but not the Assembly of Western European Union. Without such facilities quick co-ordination of parliamentary follow-up action will still be difficult and the communication of information to the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations about parliamentary activities in member countries remains limited.

45. In the Council's reply to Recommendation 433, it pointed out that:

"Recognising the importance of effective communication between the various organs of WEU, the Council is currently studying the possibilities for improving the present practices; a number of suggestions may be contemplated, including that put forward by the Assembly for the installation of a telex, or the use of facsimile equipment or even the installation of a system which could be based on the ones used by other bodies such as European political co-operation.

The final choice would of course depend on requirements, the versatility of the equipment and the budgetary implications. The installation of new equipment should therefore be examined by the appropriate bodies in this light, and in the context of budgetary considerations on the whole."

But for the time being the Assembly of Western European Union remains the only European

assembly working without these important technical means.

46. Many member parliaments have computer-controlled documentation systems, but the Assembly of WEU has no such system. Since, with the small staff in the Office of the Clerk it is very difficult to select from the vast number of documents being sent by member parliaments the relevant texts which might be of special interest for the Assembly of Western European Union, the secretariats of national delegations should be asked to provide their help in this work using the computer systems of their parliaments.

47. Another problem is that there are difficulties in providing without delay the representatives in all member countries with all the necessary documentation and texts which might be helpful for action in parliament and also for public information. In almost every member parliament written reports from the Assembly delegations are published but in very different ways. These reports mostly take account first and foremost of the interventions of the delegation members.

48. The only document provided under the responsibility of the Assembly and intended to be used in all member countries is the orange booklet entitled "Texts adopted and brief account of the session", published by the Assembly twice a year since November 1965 after every ordinary part-session. This document is published in the five languages of the WEU member countries.

49. The publication of this booklet is very important since it is the only regular information provided about the activities of the Assembly that is available in the languages of all member countries. Various factors, however, detract from its usefulness in practice.

50. First, the document takes too long to publish. The printed texts in French and English are available only several weeks after the close of the session. The translation into the other official languages of member countries takes even longer because the Office of the Clerk's translation service has to work with a very small staff. As a result the Italian, German and Netherlands versions of the document can be sent to these countries often only some months after the close of the session. For instance, when the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations held its information meeting in Bonn on 20th February 1986, a German version of the document with the texts adopted and the brief account of the December session was still not available, almost three months later.

51. Every effort should be made to accelerate the publication of these texts.

52. Again, in its present form the booklet has another disadvantage. Its presentation does not stimulate the interest of a reader in the Assembly's activities. At present, the results of every ordinary part-session are presented in the following way: First, the text of recommendations adopted during the session are given in numerical order. Then comes a brief account of the session in which the different speeches, reports and debates are summarised. There follows a list of speakers and a list of Assembly documents prepared for the relevant session.

53. For a reader not familiar with WEU matters it is rather difficult to derive from this very formal and dry manner of presentation an idea about the Assembly's work and objectives. Moreover, the booklet does not include certain important information.

54. Your Rapporteur therefore wishes to submit a few proposals and suggestions to improve the usefulness of this document:

- (i) Every issue should start with a very brief introduction describing the origins and aims of WEU and its Assembly. It might be worded as follows:

"Western European Union is a defensive alliance founded by the modified Brussels Treaty signed at Paris on 23rd October 1954. The member states are Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

The Assembly of Western European Union, the inter-parliamentary organisation of Western European Union, is composed of representatives of the Brussels Treaty powers to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. The seat of the Assembly is at Paris. Each year the Assembly holds an ordinary session divided into two parts.

This booklet includes the text of all recommendations adopted during the session held in..."

- (ii) So far the booklet has not included the text of any replies of the Council to Assembly recommendations. According to established procedure, the Council transmits these texts to the Clerk of the Assembly who sends them immediately to the representatives in English and French. They are also reproduced in Volumes I and III of the Assembly proceedings. But these volumes contain many other documents. Decades ago, the Assembly published the texts of

recommendations and the replies of the Council in a separate document entitled "Collected texts adopted and replies of the Council". But these special publications were issued only once a year and had no great practical use for actual political work. In 1974, this publication was abandoned.

It would be useful, and could be done without any great difficulty, if the booklet could also contain the Council's replies to recommendations adopted at the previous session. The advantage would be that these texts would be available in all languages of member countries.

- (iii) The booklet should also contain a short calendar or timetable of future events and meetings in order to convey information about activities of the Assembly and its committees in between sessions. Apart from the press releases distributed only in English and French to a limited number of journalists, and consequently not available in all capitals of the member countries, there is so far no regular and topical information about forthcoming Assembly activities.

55. Finally, it would be worth considering whether the booklet, published at present twice a year, should not appear at least every three months. If there are not insurmountable financial objections this could allow the Assembly to provide more regular information on its activities and those of its committees.

VI. Means of improving relations with the public

56. During the debate at the last ordinary session of the Assembly on Mrs. Fischer's report on the promotion of parliamentary and public interest in WEU matters, Mr. Tummers emphasised that WEU should not only inform the public about its work but also learn from the public. He asked that closer links be established with the public in order to achieve an active exchange of views with the public.

57. Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges underlined several times the importance of studying the ways in which WEU is treated in school textbooks used in the different member countries.

58. Sometimes it might be useful to learn from the activities and experiences of similar international organisations in the area of public relations, for instance from those of NATO. In this connection an interesting article by Mr. Corrier, member of the Bundestag and immediate

past President of the Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA), published under the title "The ATA and a new approach to NATO information" in the April 1986 issue of the NATO Review, is worthy of study because it deals with many problems facing WEU in a very similar way.

59. In 1954, an Atlantic Treaty Association was created as an international non-governmental organisation composed by the national member associations existing in all NATO member countries on a voluntary private basis with the following purpose:

- to educate and inform the public about the aims and goals of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation;
- to conduct research on the various tasks and activities related to that organisation;
- to promote the solidarity of the peoples of the North Atlantic area;
- to develop permanent relations and co-operation between its national member committees or associations.

60. The ATA is an umbrella organisation with its headquarters in Paris whose purpose is to co-ordinate and stimulate the work of national Atlantic committees in each of the member countries. It created special programmes such as the Atlantic Education Committee and the Atlantic Association of Young Political Leaders. The former, for example, has been concerned with the way NATO is treated in school textbooks.

61. In the abovementioned article, Mr. Corrier explains that almost all the national Atlantic committees host seminars and conferences and devote a great deal of their attention to educational institutions. Thus, the Netherlands Atlantic Committee co-operates closely with the two national teachers' organisations, resulting in joint conferences and projects. The British Atlantic Committee has formed two subcommittees for its work in this area. The first deals with pupils aged eleven to nineteen and concentrates on briefings at NATO in Brussels or at military headquarters in the United Kingdom for headmasters or heads of school departments. The second subcommittee concentrates on academic staff from universities and polytechnics as well as interested members of the student body through departments and non-political unions and societies.

62. In line with increased concern about later generations, a pilot seminar for teachers of history is being considered by ATA to compare western values with those of the Soviet Union.

63. It is obvious that the conferences of these Atlantic committees are successful in attracting

important political personalities. For instance, in May 1985, Mr. Kissinger addressed the Netherlands Atlantic Committee at a symposium on the future of the defence of Europe. At a meeting of the General Assembly of the Atlantic Treaty Association held in the Federal Republic of Germany on 17th September 1986 speakers were Chancellor Kohl, Lord Carrington and General Rogers.

64. It seems that there is no comparable forum for discussing the problems of a European defence dimension with the public. Of course many national and international movements have been created in order to spread the idea of European unity in public opinion. The European movement, for instance, founded in Paris in 1947; is a non-governmental organisation with national councils in most of the Western European countries. Its aim is to inform and lead public opinion, to study the political, economic and technical problems of European union or integration and to suggest how they can be solved; to promote a sense of Europeanism and a common loyalty to Europe; to mobilise public opinion behind the policy of unity or integration and provide a medium through which supporters of this cause can make their influence felt.

65. But these private organisations are not especially familiar with European security and defence issues. It was therefore important that the President of the Maison de l'Europe in Paris and the President of the European Movement invited the Secretary-General of Western European Union to speak on Western European Union in its European and Atlantic dimension at a conference organised on 5th May 1986. In order to enlarge the forums in which European security and defence problems might be discussed with the public, parliamentarians should support all efforts to introduce these subjects into existing private associations or to create new associations or foundations dealing especially with European defence problems.

66. Last but not least, your Rapporteur is convinced that political groups and political parties could do more to intensify information and discussions on European security matters in member countries. Some major political parties, for instance in the Federal Republic of Germany, but also in other countries, have created political foundations with considerable funds which regularly organise seminars and conferences. In establishing the working programmes of these foundations questions of European security and defence and the rôle of Western European Union should not be forgotten.

VII. Conclusions

67. It is obvious that the problems of WEU's reactivation and its functions in security and defence questions, as well as subjects covered in Assembly recommendations, played a considerable rôle in the parliamentary debates in several member countries throughout the last six months. But the intensity of these debates varied from country to country. Your Rapporteur has no information about such debates in the Netherlands, where parliament had to be reconstituted after the general election.

68. Nevertheless, without presuming to have full information about debates in parliaments, your Rapporteur has the impression that only a few and often the same members are really active for WEU in their parliaments. The present report can refer to parliamentary action by fifteen representatives. This is not very encouraging taking into account that the WEU Assembly is composed of eighty-nine representatives plus an equal number of substitutes.

69. The Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations appeals to all members to let it know more about their activities. The national delegations, and particularly the secretaries who attend meetings of the committee, are invited to provide the committee, through the Office of the Clerk, with early information about defence and security debates in their parliaments.

70. For the first time, on 21st May 1986, the United Kingdom Government produced a written report to parliament on the activities of the Council of WEU and its ministerial organs. This initiative is to be warmly welcomed and will hopefully become permanent practice. Conversely, the first part of the thirty-second annual report of the Council to the Assembly says nothing about its activities in informing the public.

71. The publication of the orange booklet with the texts adopted and the brief account of the session should be accelerated. Its contents and presentation should be improved.

72. In order to enlarge the forums in which European security and defence problems might be explained and discussed with the public, members of the Assembly should endeavour to interest appropriate private associations in these matters or instigate the creation of associations dealing especially with European defence problems.

Outline of a new booklet on Western European Union

INFORMATION REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations ²
by Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges, Rapporteur*

This report has been circulated separately as a booklet.

Draft Order

*on the outline of a new booklet on
Western European Union*

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting the report on the outline of a new booklet on WEU submitted by its Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations;
- (ii) Considering that this text is an appropriate basis for the general information of parliamentarians and the public in member countries,

INSTRUCTS its Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations

1. To ensure that a booklet based on the text submitted is published as soon as possible in the five languages of the WEU member countries;
2. To ensure that the text of this booklet is regularly brought up to date.

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee: Lady Jill Knight (Chairman); MM. Frasca, Enders (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Cavaliere (Alternate: Giust), De Bondt, Mrs. Fischer, Mr. Goerens, Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges, Mr. Mercier, Dr. Miller (Alternate: Coleman), MM. Noerens, Seitlinger (Alternate: de Chambrun), Tummers (Alternate: Eysink), Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra.*

N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.

Replies of the Council to Recommendations 432 to 437

RECOMMENDATION 432 ¹

*on the reactivation of WEU –
its tasks, structure and place in Europe ²*

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting the interest in the reactivation of WEU shown by several European member countries of the Atlantic Alliance;
- (ii) Stressing that the interest in the activities of WEU shown by many European member countries of the Atlantic Alliance is closely linked with the effectiveness of the Council's political activities;
- (iii) Considering that abolition of the lists of armaments subject to control and the new direction given to WEU following the Rome declaration will allow consideration to be given to enlarging WEU once it has been given definite terms of reference;
- (iv) Recalling Portugal's application for membership of WEU and welcoming the results of the referendum held in Spain on 12th March 1986;
- (v) Considering that the delay in transmitting the thirty-first annual report of the Council to the Assembly makes it impossible to adopt an answer to that report in time for the first part of the thirty-second session of the Assembly;
- (vi) Welcoming the efforts made by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council and the Secretary-General to develop a dialogue with the Assembly;
- (vii) Recalling that information which cannot be given officially to all members of the Assembly cannot be counted as part of this dialogue;
- (viii) Noting that many texts which the Council promised the Assembly have not been sent and that the Assembly is therefore not kept properly informed of the activities of the Permanent Council, the working groups and the agencies;
- (ix) Regretting that the permanent tasks assigned to the agencies are inadequate and vague;
- (x) Considering that in these circumstances the Assembly's tasks of supervision, criticism and censure of the Council remain fundamental, which means that the Assembly must remain completely independent of the Council,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Keep the European member countries of the Atlantic Alliance informed of and associated with its activities insofar as the modified Brussels Treaty allows this, particularly in regard to co-operation in armaments matters, in the hope that it will be possible to achieve greater rationalisation and overall harmonisation in this area;
2. Study the consequences of the possible accession of Spain and Portugal to WEU so as to take favourable action without delay on Portugal's application and to propose that Spain accede to the modified Brussels Treaty;
3. Ensure that the Assembly is kept regularly informed of all the Council's activities at a frequency and in time to allow a fruitful dialogue between the two organs of WEU;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 3rd June 1986 during the first part of the thirty-second ordinary session (4th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Bianco on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.

4. Present the information which it itself, its Chairman-in-Office or the Secretary-General give the Assembly in such a way that it may be transmitted to all members of the Assembly;
5. Within reasonable time-limits, allow the Assembly to benefit from the studies conducted by the agencies and working groups after expurgating those parts which are classified secret;
6. Ensure that, in addition to the conjunctural studies requested by the Council, the agencies have permanent tasks with due independence of action for implementing them;
7. Inter alia, instruct Agency II to organise a European institute for advanced defence studies, whose tasks will have been defined by the Council, in accordance with paragraph 5(b) of Recommendation 429.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹***to Recommendation 432***

1. The Council stated after its meeting in Rome on 27th October 1984 that a better utilisation of WEU would not only contribute to the security of Western Europe but also to an improvement in the common defence of all the countries of the Atlantic Alliance and to greater solidarity among its members. In the field of arms co-operation, WEU's objective is to help maintain the political impetus for the work of the IEPG and to contribute substantively in support of it wherever possible. The IEPG, which comprises all the European member states of NATO, is the main forum through which European collaboration in the field of armaments is organised. The aim of such collaboration is the creation of a genuine two-way street and better defence at lower cost through the rationalisation and harmonisation of European defence industries, and the creation of more competitive European defence industries and the creation of a more competitive European defence/industrial base.

2. On the question of enlargement, the Council's position at present remains as stated in its reply to Written Question 265, which was sent to the Assembly on 30th July 1986.

3. The Council is convinced that a fruitful dialogue with the Assembly involving a regular exchange of information and a better co-ordination of objectives and work programmes is an essential prerequisite for the proper functioning of WEU. To speed up the flow of information, the Council is to present its report in two six-monthly parts and will provide, if appropriate, written information on certain of its activities, with due regard of course for the rules of confidentiality to which it is subject.

4. The Council would like to point out that the tasks it assigns to the agencies are of two types, namely ad hoc studies on the one hand and monitoring studies and periodic reports on the other.

At their meeting in Rome in November 1985, the Ministers of WEU approved a number of tasks for the three agencies. These agencies were set up to provide specific technical contributions to the work of the Council to enable it, as the competent political organ of WEU, to make analyses and draw conclusions. All these studies will therefore be internal working documents for the Council for its reflection on the subjects addressed.

5. The Council is convinced that a commitment to reflection, research and training in the field of strategic studies is very important for the future of European security. Ministers at Venice instructed the Permanent Council to make proposals on ways of strengthening co-operation between existing European institutes for security studies. To this end, the Secretary-General has sought expert advice. In pursuing its reflection on this subject, the Council will of course take budgetary implications into account.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 17th October 1986 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 20th October 1986.

RECOMMENDATION 433 ¹*on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union
for the financial years 1985 (revised) and 1986* ²

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting that, in communicating the budgets of Western European Union for 1985 (revised) and 1986, the Council has complied with the provisions of Article VIII (c) of the Charter;
- (ii) Considering that:
- (a) the budgets for 1985 (revised) and 1986 take account of the new structure of the ministerial organs of WEU achieved in conformity with the directives set out in the Rome declaration;
 - (b) each of these budgets is the subject of an initial three-part document (recapitulation, explanatory memorandum and pensions) for the WEU Budget and Organisation Committee and of a document revised on the basis of the recommendations adopted by that committee and transmitted to the Council;
 - (c) examination of the budgets consequently requires knowledge of the abovementioned documents and of the others produced during the year but which are not sent to the Assembly on a regular basis;
 - (d) the way WEU budgets are now presented draws no distinction between ordinary and extraordinary expenditure although the latter may have a considerable effect on statistics on the evolution of budgets and consequently detract from the objective application of the zero growth criterion or of any other criterion for budgetary trends agreed by the governments;
 - (e) the 1985 budget allowed considerable excess resources to be built up which were used for the sole purpose of restructuring the ministerial organs, no account being taken in this context of the requirements of the Assembly although the ministers expressed their wish in Rome in October 1984 to have the Assembly "play a growing rôle";
 - (f) the new breakdown of duties shown in the recent establishment tables of the ministerial organs increases the need to review procedure for approving Assembly budgets in order to provide a better guarantee of its autonomy and independence;
 - (g) the task of managing pensions in WEU has grown to such an extent that an independent body should be given responsibility for this task;
- (iii) Regretting that:
- (a) two Grade B posts are shown as vacant in the budget of the Paris agencies whereas the Assembly's proposal to create two new Grade B posts in the Office of the Clerk has been rejected;
 - (b) the programme for the modernisation of equipment makes no provision for purchasing a telex, the lack of which is keenly felt by all the services of WEU as well as by parliamentarians;
- (iv) Welcoming the fact that the Council, in attributing grades to the various types of duty, has adopted the dual-grading criterion which the Assembly has often recommended in the past,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL:

1. Examine the possibility of:
 - (a) combining in a single budgetary document all the information now given in many different documents;
 - (b) showing in the two parts of the budget (operating budget and pensions budget) two categories of expenditure: ordinary and extraordinary expenditure, to make it easier to follow the evolution of these budgets;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th June 1986 during the first part of the thirty-second ordinary session (6th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Sinesio on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration (Document 1054).

2. Transmit to the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly all budgetary documents relating to its budgetary decisions;
3. In consultation with the appropriate Assembly bodies, review procedure for approving Assembly budgets so that it corresponds better to the principle of its autonomy and independence;
4. Give favourable consideration to the proposals to create two new Grade B3 posts which are given top priority in the Assembly's draft budget for 1986;
5. Further to Assembly Recommendation 357, promote the creation of an independent body for the administration of pensions and, to this end, organise consultations with the other co-ordinated organisations;
6. Study the problem of dual-grading at every level of the hierarchy and lay down a general rule on the subject applicable to all WEU staff;
7. Authorise the installation of a telex in the London and Paris offices, it being understood that the telex installed in Paris would be available to all WEU organs in accordance with methods of use and cost-sharing to be agreed among them;
8. Promote harmonisation of the technical equipment of the organs of WEU to achieve future cost-saving and engage a management consultant from a member government or private industry to investigate this matter and make recommendations.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹
to Recommendation 433

1. (a) The form in which the budget of the ministerial organs is presented is the outcome of careful study by the Budget and Organisation Committee. It has been reviewed and amended during the past two years. The intention is to submit to governments in one document all the information necessary to form a judgment. This same document, once approved by the Council, is made available to the Assembly.

Because of the evolving process of reform, the documentary aspect has been, exceptionally, more complex. A number of documents were necessary as adjustments were made to take account in particular of staff changes. Equally, certain aspects of the budgets involved classified material which could not be made generally available.

(b) A subdivision into ordinary and extraordinary expenditure and income has been considered in previous years several times by the Budget and Organisation Committee. It was concluded however that such a presentation would not be satisfactory in the case of the WEU budget where so clear a distinction between these categories of expenditure cannot be made. Governments have preferred to maintain the present system on the assumption that a substantial and detailed explanation for each item of expenditure is given in Part II of the budget.

2. The Council will ensure that documents relating to budgetary decisions affecting all parts of the organisation or matters of budgetary policy will be transmitted to the Office of the Clerk where no problems of confidentiality or security classification are involved.

3. The Council at present applies the procedures established under the Financial Regulations and the agreements reached previously between the Council and the Assembly, by which the Council is required to examine and express an opinion on the Assembly's budget before it can be finally adopted. The question of amending this procedure has been raised in the past. There has frequently been formal and informal consultation at joint meetings and in the course of contacts between representatives of the Presidential Committee, the President of the Council and the Secretary-General.

As the Council stated in paragraph 6 of its reply to Recommendation 429, it has noted the Assembly's wish for greater autonomy. However, it would be difficult to meet this wish because of different budget control procedures in member countries. Nevertheless, the Council has approved some simplifications – along the lines desired by the Assembly – in the way the ministerial organs' budget is presented, which the Assembly might find appropriate for its own budget.

4. The creation of two new B3 grade posts must be seen in the light of detailed job requirements, not only in the context of the Assembly itself, but also in the wider context of WEU as a whole and the overall budgetary limits required by governments.

5. The creation of an independent body for the administration of pensions would involve the co-operation of other international organisations and would have to take account of complex legal and managerial considerations. It is a matter which the Council will pursue having due regard to the evolving situation regarding pensions.

6. The general principle of dual grading is that the higher of the two grades represents the approved position in the establishment table. The lower of the two grades is added to enable the organisation to recruit staff who are judged to possess the basic qualifications called for but may not have had previous experience.

Dual grading, therefore, is not intended to create promotion possibilities over and beyond the approved establishment table, but to facilitate recruitment.

7. Recognising the importance of effective communication between the various organs of WEU, the Council is currently studying the possibilities for improving the present practices; a number of suggestions may be contemplated, including that put forward by the Assembly for the installation of a telex, or the use of facsimile equipment or even the installation of a system which could be based on the ones used by other bodies such as European political co-operation.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 14th October 1986 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 20th October 1986.

The final choice would of course depend on requirements, the versatility of the equipment and the budgetary implications. The installation of new equipment should therefore be examined by the appropriate bodies in this light, and in the context of budgetary considerations on the whole.

8. The approach to the use of a private consultant should not be piecemeal, particularly in view of the cost of consultancy. In the Council's opinion, a management consultant would be cost-effective only in the context of a comprehensive analysis of the effectiveness of the whole institutional structure of WEU and in view of the budgetary constraints arising from the application of the principle of zero growth.

RECOMMENDATION 434¹

on Canadian-European co-operation in high technology²

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming Canada's participation in NATO, OECD, ESA and other international organisations and conferences together with WEU member countries;
- (ii) Considering Canada's achievements in the scientific, technological and aerospace sectors such as V-STOL aircraft, the Canadarm, the Candu nuclear reactor, energy from conventional and non-conventional sources, polar ocean research and communication techniques;
- (iii) Considering that Canada is an associated member of ESA and that a new agreement will have to be signed in 1988;
- (iv) Considering Canada's wish to develop further its high technology industries and also its close industrial and political relations with several Western European countries,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member states:

1. To study the possibilities of Canada participating in projects of the Independent European Programme Group and other high technology European ventures provided there is reciprocity and that Canada likewise adopts a most-favoured attitude to European research, development and production;
2. To promote closer collaboration with Canada in the European Space Agency by:
 - (a) extending its associate membership from five to ten years;
 - (b) widening the range of programmes in which Canada should participate to include new application programmes such as ERS-II and TDRSS and also scientific programmes;
 - (c) asking the Canadian authorities to use European hardware such as Ariane in joint ventures;
 - (d) inviting the Canadian space authorities to participate in European manned space programmes such as Hermes and Hotol;
3. To consider favourably connections of Canadian firms and research institutions with Eureka projects;
4. To approach the Canadian authorities for the promotion of European hardware in the international organisations in which they participate.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th June 1986 during the first part of the thirty-second ordinary session (6th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Hill on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 1053).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ¹***to Recommendation 434***

1. The Council recognises the vital rôle played by Canada within the western community by virtue of its geostrategic situation and its political commitment. The Atlantic dimension of defence equipment co-operation is, of course, covered by the NATO Conference of National Armaments Directors.

As regards possible participation by Canada in the IEPG's projects, the Council recalls that the IEPG is, as its name suggests, a grouping of European member countries which seeks to strengthen the alliance through improved armaments co-operation. In October 1984, the IEPG's Chairman visited Canada. It was agreed that close ties between Canada and the Independent European Programme Group would be of mutual interest. Such ties should be encouraged whenever possible.

2. The European Space Agency (ESA) concluded a co-operation agreement with Canada in 1978; this agreement will expire in 1988 but is open to extension, renewal or amendment by mutual agreement. Canada contributes to the general ESA budget and to two programmes, Olympus (large communication satellites) and ERS-1 (earth resources remote-sensing satellite). The Canadian agency, Telesat, is proposing to use Ariane to launch an Anik E satellite in the 1990s. Canada is currently studying the possibility of participation in the Hermes project. A continuation of the present co-operation and an involvement in new projects is to be expected.

3. At the ministerial conference on 30th June 1986 in London, the ministers agreed not to increase for the time being the number of countries participating in the Eureka programme. The ministers noted, however, that participation in Eureka projects by enterprises or institutes from third countries is not excluded. Governments do not invite participants; only the companies. Interested Canadian enterprises or research institutes are therefore free to contact project partners from Eureka countries with regard to their participation in specific projects. In accordance with the flexible character of the Eureka concept, the final decision on project participation will be taken by the project partners.

4. The Council is convinced that the strengthening of links between Canada and the Western European countries can only be to their mutual benefit.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 21st October 1986 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 27th October 1986.

RECOMMENDATION 435 ¹*on security and terrorism –
the implications for Europe of crises in other parts of the world* ²

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty is an essential basis for European co-operation in external policy matters;
- (ii) Considering that in certain areas no western organisation is able to replace the WEU Council for the application of this article of the treaty;
- (iii) Deploring the fact that the seven governments have not yet made use of the WEU Council to examine matters which constitute a threat to international peace and stability;
- (iv) Recalling however its Recommendation 396 concerning the alliance machinery for dealing with developments beyond the NATO area, and reiterating its belief “ that in the case of such developments which the allies jointly recognise as directly threatening the vital interests of the alliance the ready assistance of all allies must be forthcoming within the area to facilitate United States deployments beyond the area ”;
- (v) Recalling that the Rome declaration confirmed the WEU Council’s vocation to play an active part in the application of Article VIII;
- (vi) Recalling that relations between certain member countries and countries outside Europe call for continuous exchanges of views between the WEU countries;
- (vii) Considering that the pursuit of the war between Iran and Iraq is a serious threat to international peace and security;
- (viii) Considering that the recrudescence of international terrorism is also a serious threat to international peace and security and may seriously unsettle western society if effective countermeasures are not taken;
- (ix) Welcoming the fact that international society has started to take up the challenge of terrorism, but regretting the absence of any significant agreement about the means to be used to this end and deploring the consequences of this division, considering how essential it is to agree on the measures to be taken;
- (x) Regretting that no effective co-ordinated measures, whether preventive or repressive, have been taken against terrorist actions before the United States action against Libya, but recalling that the members of the Assembly give preference to political and diplomatic channels for solving the problem of international terrorism, while not precluding any other appropriate measures if it proves impossible to succeed by negotiation;
- (xi) Welcoming as a modest step forward the intentions announced by the Twelve on 27th January, and 14th and 22nd April 1986 and the firm diplomatic and juridical measures agreed at the Tokyo summit on 5th May 1986;
- (xii) Considering that only the co-ordination of measures taken by the states in question can meet the situation created by international terrorism;
- (xiii) Recalling that this co-ordination is all the more necessary after the launching by Libya of two missiles towards the island of Lampedusa, which constituted a true act of war against a member country of WEU,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

I.1. Effectively apply Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty as it planned when adopting paragraph 8 of the Rome declaration in October 1984 and, in particular, meet each time crises outside the North Atlantic Treaty area require it to do so and whenever consultations among the Twelve seem unlikely to meet the situation;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 5th June 1986 during the first part of the thirty-second ordinary session (7th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. van der Werff on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 1057).

2. Follow attentively developments in the war between Iraq and Iran and:
 - (a) promote the return to a fair, lasting peace;
 - (b) strongly denounce any violation of the laws of war by either side;
 - (c) concert action by member countries to prevent any extension of the war and to ensure the safety of navigation in the Gulf;
 3. Confirm that the development of international terrorism brings into play the application of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty and, in this context:
 - (a) promote and participate effectively in international consultations to counter terrorist action;
 - (b) apply systematically the decisions set out in the twelve-power declaration of 27th January, and 14th and 22nd April 1986;
 - (c) draw up a charter specifying the principles which its signatories would undertake to follow in the event of terrorist action;
 - (d) co-ordinate the preventive and repressive measures which member countries are obliged to take because of the development of terrorist operations;
 - (e) concert the action taken by member countries so as to deter effectively any country from affording assistance or encouragement to organisations practising terrorism;
 - (f) seek an agreement between member countries that their courts will not refuse extradition applications for convicted terrorists on the grounds that the act (or acts) of terrorism was carried out from political motives.
- II. For these purposes, the Assembly endorses the call for action its President addressed to the Council and recommends that the Council instruct the appropriate WEU agencies to report without delay on the various aspects of the threat international terrorism constitutes for the western defence system, individuals and public freedoms and define the measures which member countries should take to counter terrorism effectively.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ¹***to Recommendation 435***

1. Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels Treaty stipulates that, at the request of any of the member states, the Council shall be immediately convened in order to permit them to consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise, or a danger to economic stability. As stated in the Rome declaration of October 1984, the member states of WEU may consider the implications for Europe of crises in other regions of the world. The ministerial meetings and the regular meetings of the WEU Council at Permanent Representative level provide the Council with an opportunity for discussing questions of this nature.

2. The Council is aware of the potentially serious consequences of the Iran/Iraq conflict for the security of the entire region. This war could indeed create an even greater polarisation among the countries concerned which would not only further complicate the search for a peace settlement but could also have serious repercussions more widely.

The Council is extremely concerned at the violations of the rules of war which have occurred during this conflict and which have led to additional suffering, thus further diminishing the chances of a peaceful settlement. However, the Council supports the efforts being made, particularly by the United Nations, the non-aligned states and the Islamic Conference, to find a solution, as well as the démarches of the Twelve in this respect.

3. The Council reiterates that, at their meeting in Venice on 29th and 30th April 1986, the Ministers underlined the importance of early and effective action to implement the measures that the countries of Western Europe had agreed upon to combat the scourge of international terrorism. It also points to the establishment by the Twelve, at their meeting in Brussels on 27th January 1986, of a permanent working group on terrorism questions and the decision taken at that meeting not to export arms or any other military equipment to countries which were clearly implicated in the support of terrorism. It welcomes the measures announced at the Tokyo summit on 5th and 6th May 1986 covering, inter alia, restrictions on the diplomatic missions of states which engage in terrorist activities, improved extradition procedures and the closest possible bilateral and multilateral co-operation between police and security organisations. This willingness for greater international co-operation to eliminate terrorism was also evident in the Halifax declaration of 30th May 1986 by the North Atlantic Council.

The Council firmly supports the efforts by the Council of Europe, by NATO and by the Twelve, particularly – as regards the latter – within the framework of political co-operation and the Trevi group. In this context, the Council would recall the emergency meeting of European Community interior and justice ministers on 25th September 1986 in London, at which further counter-terrorism measures were agreed. As regards the problem of extraditing persons convicted of acts of terrorism, the Council would refer to the European convention on the suppression of terrorism, signed in Strasbourg on 27th January 1977. The purpose of this convention is to overcome the difficulties that may arise in the case of extradition and mutual legal assistance with respect to persons charged with or convicted of acts of terrorism.

4. The Council takes the view that the WEU agencies, particularly the agency for the study of security and defence questions, must also take account of terrorism when analysing the different threats facing Europe. In so doing, any duplication of what is already being done in other fora should be avoided.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 16th October 1986 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 20th October 1986.

RECOMMENDATION 436¹*on scientific, technological and aerospace questions and
Western European defence*²

The Assembly,

- (i) Aware that by the 1990s information technology might become the largest manufacturing activity in the West;
- (ii) Considering that Western Europe's industrial success in this technology will probably depend on the promotion of a European civil and military computer market;
- (iii) Aware of the report on the armaments sector of industry in the member countries prepared by the WEU Standing Armaments Committee and the Council's answer on 20th March 1986 to Written Question 262 put by Mr. Lenzer on the activities of that committee complementary to those of the Independent European Programme Group;
- (iv) Disappointed by the Council's answer on the lack of practical steps to be taken to enhance the competitiveness of the European defence industry in general and of information technology in particular;
- (v) Considering Europe's important rôle in space and its activities in space transportation, satellites and scientific matters such as the Giotto programme;
- (vi) Considering that the importance of this rôle demands an independent European effort within the framework of certain activities such as those relating to the space station but also requires effective co-operation with the United States;
- (vii) Considering the need for co-operation between NASA and Arianespace on worldwide launch price policies;
- (viii) Considering that the agency for the development of co-operation in armaments should play a well-defined intermediary rôle in co-operation on weapons development projects such as the European fighter aircraft;
- (ix) Noting with concern differences in policies of member countries with regard to armament exports to non-member countries, especially those in conflict areas and even those which support international terrorism, which may seriously obstruct progress towards improved defence co-operation;
- (x) Deploring the Council's lack of political will in not preparing its thirty-first annual report on its activities which cannot now be taken into account in preparing the present report,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Instruct Agency III, i.e. the agency for the development of co-operation in armaments, to initiate studies on:
 - (a) the establishment of a European civil and military computer market;
 - (b) the possibilities of creating networks of supercomputers in Europe for civil as well as military purposes;
2. Define, in co-operative weapons development projects such as the European fighter aircraft, a useful co-ordinating rôle for the agency for the development of co-operation in armaments, with particular regard to European military industrial matters, taking into account the activities of the NATO Conference of National Armaments Directors and the Independent European Programme Group;
3. Provide the Assembly with full details of this rôle in the thirty-second annual report.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 5th June 1986 during the first part of the thirty-second ordinary session (7th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Fourré on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 1055).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ¹

to Recommendation 436

1. The Council agrees with the Assembly on the importance of information technology for Europe's future industrial position in the world. Information technology plays a crucial rôle in modern defence systems particularly in the field of command, control and communications (C 3). As far as co-operation between armed forces is concerned, and as the Council indicated in its reply to Recommendation 419, data-processing systems should be interoperable, the prerequisite being the early harmonisation of national operational requirements in the relevant bodies. Some member countries of WEU have in fact already favoured the interoperability of data-processing systems in the armed forces by selecting the common computer language known as ADA.

It is certain that European industry will not be able to compete in world markets unless it is in the forefront of progress in information technology. For this to happen, Europeans will have to create a structured and highly efficient European market for computers which is capable of meeting the challenges from outside.

The Council has noted the Assembly's interest in the activities of the agencies.

It has examined the tasks that are to be assigned to the agencies and considers that the current priorities as defined by the Council are such that it is not possible at present to charge Agency III with a study on the establishment of a European civil and military computer market, or with a study of the possibilities of creating a supercomputer network.

2. The Council draws attention to the wide-ranging activities of the IEPG and the CNAD (Conference of the National Armaments Directors) regarding the joint development of armaments production. Agency III should maintain contact with these groups in order to be able to draw on their analyses and conclusions in its own studies, and to avoid unnecessarily duplicating their work. The agency will thus contribute to the rôle recognised for WEU by the ministers, namely, to provide political impetus to bodies concerned with arms co-operation such as the IEPG and the CNAD.

3. The Council will, in its future reports to the Assembly, continue to provide information as appropriate on the activities of Agency III.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 18th November 1986 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 20th November 1986.

RECOMMENDATION 437¹*on emerging technology and military strategy*²

The Assembly,

- (i) Aware of a number of projects in the NATO and IEPG frameworks involving the application of the most recent technology to weapons and defence equipment, arising in particular from the United States emerging technology proposal, and SACEUR's follow-on forces attack concept;
- (ii) Considering that in many cases NATO countries could advantageously introduce modern technology more rapidly into conventional weapons systems to help offset Warsaw Pact numerical superiority in tanks, guns, and aircraft;
- (iii) Believing that the European allies must examine all such proposals carefully, and that the introduction of modern technology into defence equipment must satisfy the criteria of this recommendation;
- (iv) Calling for the possible arms control implications of the introduction of emerging technology into conventional weapons systems to be more closely studied,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Ensure that current proposals for the introduction of emerging technology into conventional weapons systems or for the follow-on forces attack concept meet the following criteria:
 - (a) they should fit the conceptual framework being developed by the NATO Military Committee, and take account of North Atlantic Council recommendations bearing in mind the need for deterrence to maintain peace and security both in Europe and in the world;
 - (b) they should be cost-effective and affordable within the limits of national defence budgets;
 - (c) they should emphasise again the need for standardisation and co-operation at European level which is also a precondition of co-operation between the European allies and the United States;
 - (d) they should lead to a balanced and just transatlantic sharing and transfer of technology, research and production, and improve interoperability;
 - (e) they should be capable of being taken into account in current and future arms control negotiations;
2. Report annually to the Assembly on the progress being made on the list of priority projects selected by the IEPG;
3. Instruct the agency for the study of arms control and disarmament questions to report annually to the Assembly on the arms control implications of the foregoing proposals.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 5th June 1986 during the first part of the thirty-second ordinary session (8th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. van den Bergh on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 1052).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ¹

to Recommendation 437

1. The member countries of the integrated military structure of the alliance have sought to adapt their long-term defence planning in view of the changing nature of the threat and of new technological potentialities. Thus, the NATO Defence Planning Committee, meeting on 9th November 1984, approved the follow-on forces attack (FOFA) long-term planning guideline which is designed to enhance NATO's long-standing conventional capability to strike against the second echelons of an aggressor. The Defence Planning Committee, at its meeting on 3rd and 4th December 1985, took note of the conceptual military framework and in this context also stressed the importance of emerging technologies for long-term defence planning.

2. The introduction of new weapon systems incorporating sophisticated technology entails additional cost. This does not necessarily mean an automatic increase in the overall costs of defence provided that a qualitative improvement in the weapon systems makes a quantitative reduction possible. The criterion of financial feasibility is a key factor in the choices made by the governments concerned; they also take steps to ensure that other components of defence are not weakened by the introduction of new conventional technologies.

3. In the area of new technologies, the setting up of co-operative programmes from the outset is the best way of helping to ensure that projects are carried out on financially acceptable bases and under conditions that guarantee maximum operational effectiveness.

4. As the Council stated in its reply to Recommendation 414, it would like to see the establishment of a balanced two-way street in arms procurement between the United States and Europe.

5. The introduction of new conventional weapon systems corresponds to operational criteria and technological developments which the alliance could not disregard without jeopardising its security and deterrence credibility.

It remains the aim of the alliance to provide increased security and stability, if possible at a lower level of forces.

The allied countries concerned will take account of technological developments in formulating their policies in conventional arms control negotiations.

6. With regard to the exchange of information and the concertation of activities described in its reply to Written Question 262, the Council is willing to inform the Assembly of WEU activities with respect to the enhancement of the competitiveness of the European defence industry. As stated in its reply to Recommendation 414, the Council cannot provide detailed information on current or planned activities of the IEPG as this information involves a number of non-WEU members.

7. As part of its examination of the arms control efforts being made at various levels and in various fora, the agency for the study of arms control and disarmament questions should also bear in mind the effects of the introduction of new conventional technologies on these efforts.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 11th November 1986 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 13th November 1986.

*Action by the Presidential Committee***REPORT**

*submitted on behalf of the Presidential Committee
by Mr. Goerens, Rapporteur*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

- I. Introduction
- II. The Assembly's relations with the Council
- III. Administrative action

APPENDICES

- I. Methods of voting
- II. Auditing funds granted to political groups

I. Introduction

1. The Presidential Committee, composed in such a way as to represent the various Assembly bodies and political tendencies, is responsible for expressing agreement on the fundamental lines of conduct which must ensure the political cohesion of the Assembly. By adopting positions on topical matters, it takes account of the evolution of the international situation and thus guarantees continuity in the political dialogue between the Council and the Assembly. In recent months, this task has been of particular importance because of the meeting between Mr. Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev in Reykjavik and the thaw in the armaments control negotiations.

2. In the context of its budgetary and administrative responsibilities, the Presidential Committee also has maintained, vis-à-vis the Council, its defence of the financial arrangements necessary for the Assembly to accomplish its task and has worked out a number of measures designed to allow the Assembly to have better control over its voting procedure and the management of its budget.

3. The Presidential Committee, the Assembly's steering body, has thus fulfilled its duty to ensure the continuity of the Assembly's action between sessions at both political and administrative level.

II. The Assembly's relations with the Council

4. The Presidential Committee is gratified to have found the presidency of the Council most co-operative. There have been very regular

contacts. Meeting the wish expressed by the Presidential Committee, the Luxembourg Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Defence welcomed in turn the President of the Assembly on 17th July, the Committee for Relations with the Council (enlarged Bureau) on 16th October and the Presidential Committee on 14th November at the close of the informal meeting of the Council of Ministers. Still in the same spirit, the presidency of the Council will for the first time be represented throughout the forthcoming session by a member of the Luxembourg Government.

5. Thus, following the decision taken in Rome to reactivate WEU, a new standard of relations is being developed between the governmental and parliamentary bodies of the organisation.

6. The Assembly is trying to establish a true dialogue with the Council. So that they may carry out their mandate, parliamentarians wish to be heard as well as informed. Their ambition is less to criticise than to encourage. Informed by the President of the Assembly of the readiness of the presidency of the Council, the Presidential Committee decided to afford it its full support by informing the Council of the value the Assembly attaches to Europe making its voice heard in East-West negotiations since the Reykjavik meeting. This is indeed the condition on which it will be possible to answer the questions raised by this meeting and to ensure that Europe's security interests are taken into account.

7. In the same spirit, the Presidential Committee, anxious to inform the Council before its ministerial meeting in November of the Assembly's position on the matters it was to discuss,

adopted, after a detailed discussion, a memorandum submitted to it by the President of the Assembly. This text, transmitted to both the Council and the Assembly, provided important points for discussion at the ministerial meeting held in Luxembourg on 3rd and 4th November. Having received general approbation, it will form a basis for discussion with a view to decisions which will have to be taken by the Council at the ministerial meeting on 29th and 30th April 1987.

8. It is not for the Rapporteur of the Presidential Committee to analyse the results of the informal meeting of ministers for foreign affairs and defence held in Luxembourg on 13th and 14th November. It will be the task of committee rapporteurs and members of the Assembly to draw conclusions from the information received from the presidency of the Council, to express an opinion on the amount of work accomplished and to assess how much ground still has to be covered before the establishment of true European co-ordination on security matters, thus asserting Europe's views in the international forums in which problems relating to its own security are discussed.

9. I merely wish to express my personal satisfaction that, without having yet adopted final positions on the serious problems of the day, the Council has defined principles and made plans which should give it the wherewithal to discuss security matters, thus allowing WEU, in parallel with twelve-power political co-operation, to establish in a smaller framework co-operation on security matters which could be extended to other members of the Communities signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty when the process of reactivating WEU is completed next year.

10. It would thus appear that the convergence of views between the presidency of the Council and that of the Assembly has allowed the dialogue between the governmental and parliamentary bodies of WEU to be extended with a view to strengthening the reactivation of the organisation. This convergence was shown inter alia in the proposal by the President of the Assembly for creating a European political area by co-ordinating twelve-power political co-operation and the work of the Seven. A common will has emerged which culminated in the decision of principle taken by the Council in Luxembourg to give a European security policy committee formed of the political directors of the ministries for foreign affairs, and possibly representatives of ministries of defence, the task of voicing Europe's views in security matters.

11. Furthermore, the presidency-in-office has stated that it agrees with the President of the Assembly in emphasising that the dialogue between Europe and the United States is essential. WEU should be an instrument of this dia-

logue. The Assembly, like the Council, will endeavour to show the United States that work accomplished in WEU, by giving Europeans a chance of speaking with a single voice, is in the overall interest of the alliance and of the United States itself.

12. The Presidential Committee has said how much value it attaches to the enlargement of WEU. The Council for its part apparently wishes to re-examine this matter at the close of the reactivation process. The Presidential Committee hopes that the tasks of WEU and of the bodies which will have to carry them out will be clearly defined in the course of next year and that consequently a positive decision will not be postponed indefinitely.

13. Finally, while it has been agreed that terrorism could not be countered by seven-power action, a clear, definite decision should be taken on the framework in which Europe must tackle this serious problem.

14. In short, the Presidential Committee considers that the Council, instead of passing its tasks over to other bodies, should itself fulfil its mandate under the modified Brussels Treaty. Indeed, it is the only body in a position to define Europe's security interests. Following the Luxembourg meeting, there would seem to be every hope of this.

15. It is all the more important for the Assembly to be able to play its rôle in a reactivated WEU.

III. Administrative action

16. In the management of the Assembly's work, the Presidential Committee's first concern was to ensure that the Assembly has the wherewithal to take part in reactivation without being hampered by the inadequate means at its disposal.

17. In agreement with the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, the Presidential Committee first wished to rectify the precarious conditions in which the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly is working by including three new posts in the draft budget, two of which being for the administrative service. Provision was also made for obtaining sufficient funds to allow the implementation of the programme of meetings and visits planned by the committees and approved by the Presidential Committee in the light of the agenda of the session.

18. Unfortunately, the Presidential Committee has had to note that the experts meeting in London in the framework of the WEU Budget and Organisation Committee were above all see-

king to reduce the estimates in the Assembly's budget without taking into account the specific requirements of parliamentary work. Thus, in view of the increasingly heavy burden of pensions with the retirement of officials recruited when the Office of the Clerk was set up, the reductions requested do not produce zero growth but a reduction in real terms in the amounts available to the Assembly for pursuing its action. The experts were probably not unanimous, but as is the rule in such cases the committee aligned itself on the most restrictive positions.

19. After detailed consideration of the positions adopted by the experts, the Presidential Committee felt the conclusions they had reached were unacceptable to the Assembly and that there could thus be no question of negotiating with the Council on the basis of a draft budget resulting from application of the budget reductions proposed in London. Expressing the unanimous position of the Presidential Committee, the President of the Assembly wrote to the Chairman of the Council to invite the Council not to follow the excessively negative approach of the Budget and Organisation Committee's recommendations but to adopt a position in conformity with the Assembly's wish to exercise its duties in the framework of a strict budget, but unhampered by an effective reduction in the financial resources at its disposal and by staff shortages.

20. The Council having postponed the meeting at which it was to give its opinion on the Assembly's budget, its position is not yet known at the time of writing this report. The Presidential Committee hopes that with the support of the presidency-in-office of the Council, in which it renews the expression of its confidence, the modest budget it has prepared for 1987 will obtain the final approval of the Council.

21. The Presidential Committee has also endeavoured to improve the conditions in which the Assembly works.

22. Anxious to allow substitutes to attend debates, even if they have not signed the register of attendance, and to ensure that votes by sitting and standing are in order, it decided to propose that on a trial basis at the part-session starting on 1st December the Assembly introduce the use of voting cards. They will be handed to members signing the register of attendance and will confer the right to take part in all votes by sitting and standing during the relevant sitting. Clearly, votes by roll-call, which are inherently unambiguous, will not require the use of voting cards. But, as specified in the note sent to all members of the Assembly, all participants in a vote by sitting and standing will have to show that they have the voting card they have been given which is proof that the provisions of Rule 24 governing the exercise of the powers of representatives and substitutes have indeed been applied.

23. Anxious for everything relating to its own activities to be as clear and stringent as possible, the Presidential Committee considered it desirable for the credits available to political groups to be included in the audit procedures applying to other sub-heads of the budget, it being understood that there must be full respect for the independence of action by political groups. For this, too, there is an information note for all members of the Assembly.

24. All in all, the Presidential Committee has endeavoured to provide the Assembly with the political and technical means of fulfilling its task. It is now for the Assembly to contribute, in agreement with the Council, to the expansion of the dialogue between the two parts of the organisation during the present session and, in so doing, to the strengthening of Europe's voice in the concert of nations.

APPENDIX I

Methods of voting

The Presidential Committee recalls that during a sitting the exercise of powers by representatives or their substitutes is linked with their signing the register of attendance. It considers nevertheless that all members of the Assembly should be allowed to attend debates, even if they have renounced the right to vote by instructing one of their colleagues to sign the register of attendance in their stead. They might otherwise be denied a right which is granted to parliamentary observers.

The Presidential Committee also notes that it is extremely difficult for the presidency and sittings service to ensure that only parliamentarians who have duly signed the register of attendance take part in votes.

Consequently, after consulting the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, the Presidential Committee considered there should be flexibility in allowing parliamentarians who do not have the possibility of signing the register

of attendance to attend a debate in the chamber and, second, strict application of the rules when the Assembly has to take a decision or vote on a text. It therefore wishes to implement on a trial basis at the next part-session, which is to start on 1st December 1986, the following provisions:

The Office of the Clerk will be responsible for handing a voting card, at the moment of signing the register of attendance, to each representative, or the substitute replacing him at a given sitting. Voting cards will be approximately the size of a post card and the colour will be changed for each sitting.

Only members of the Assembly able to show their voting cards will be entitled to take part in votes by sitting and standing.

Votes by roll-call will still be conducted by calling out the names of representatives or their substitutes who have signed the register of attendance.

APPENDIX II

Auditing funds granted to political groups

1. Since 1960 Assembly budgets have included a sub-head for the expenses of political groups. In 1986, the amount was F 300 000, shared between the four existing political groups in accordance with provisions in force since 1965 (cf. document A/WEU/CP (64) PV 4), as follows:

- a fixed subsidy of F 18 700 per group (making a total of F 74 800);
- the remaining amount (F 225 200) being shared in proportion to the number of members in each group.

2. There has so far been no check on the way these sums are used. However, at its meeting on 3rd November 1986 the Presidential Committee considered it necessary to introduce procedure for verifying the use of sums granted to political groups. (This has been done in the Council of Europe since 1983.) After verbal and written consultation, it approved the following regulations proposed by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration:

- (a) the chairman and treasurer of each group shall guarantee control of the use of the funds;

(b) in each political group, two auditors appointed by the group from among its members will verify that the entries in the accounts have been properly made;

(c) each year the political groups will issue a report on the use of the funds during the previous financial year in accordance with the model balance sheet appended hereto;

(d) before the end of March, this report shall be sent to the Office of the Clerk which will append it to the Assembly's accounts for submission first to the Assembly's auditor (Article 13 of the Financial Regulations) and then to the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration (Article 15 of the Financial Regulations);

(e) no payment shall be made to a group until the accounts for the previous year have been received by the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly.

*Balance sheet to be furnished by Assembly political groups
on the use made of Assembly of Western European Union allocations*

Assets

1. Surplus at 31st December 19.. (bank accounts, cash)	...
2. Interest	...
3. Appropriations granted by the Assembly of WEU for 19..	...

Signatures of the treasurer and two auditors of the group:

Liabilities

I. Expenditure	
1. Secretarial staff (salaries, insurance)	...
2. Administrative expenses (postage, telephone, office supplies)	...
3. Seminars and meetings	...
4. Travel and subsistence (members and secretarial staff)	...
5. Interpretation costs	...
6. Representational expenses (receptions, dinners)	...
7. Sundry expenses	...
II. Surplus at 31st December 19.. (bank accounts, cash)	...

*Written Questions 265, 267 to 273 and replies of the Council
to Written Questions 265 and 267 to 272*

QUESTION 265

*put by Sir Frederic Bennett,
MM. De Decker, Ferrari Aggradi,
Kittelmann, Stoffelen and Vecchiatti
on 8th April 1986*

To ask the Council of Ministers what progress has been achieved in responding positively to paragraph 8 of Recommendation 429 in regard to enlargement of WEU and when can the Assembly hope to expect a definitive reaction with most immediate regard to the application of Portugal which has already been submitted as long ago as 19th October 1984.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
on 30th July 1986*

1. The Council considers that the interest expressed by certain states in becoming members of WEU is an encouragement to the efforts which have been undertaken to reactivate the organisation.

2. However, possible enlargement of WEU would involve the prior completion of several stages:

- the reactivation process should be consolidated and the tasks and new structures of WEU confirmed. This will only be accomplished by the end of the transitional period on 31st December 1987;
- the Council should also examine in depth the political conditions and legal implications of accession, in particular the applicability to new members of all the provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty and its additional protocols.

The Council has begun this process.

3. At the ministerial meeting in Venice on 29th and 30th April, it was agreed that preliminary contacts would be made with interested countries. In this context, the Secretary-General held talks on 26th May in Lisbon with the Portuguese authorities.

QUESTION 267

*put by Sir Frederic Bennett,
MM. Caro, Ferrari Aggradi,
Sir Anthony Grant, Lady Jill Knight,
MM. Murphy, Schulte, Sir Dudley Smith,
MM. Stoffelen and van der Werff
on 30th April 1986*

Has the Council under consideration on a continuing basis all aspects of present arms control and disarmament negotiations; and in particular has it agreed positions on:

- (a) the MBFR negotiations in Vienna;
- (b) the discussions in the conference on disarmament in Geneva on:
 - (i) a comprehensive, verifiable nuclear test ban;
 - (ii) a chemical weapons ban?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
on 26th November 1986*

The Council confirms its interest, as already indicated in its reply to Recommendation 425, in the ongoing negotiations on arms control and disarmament.

The Seven, aware of the difficulties of the East-West dialogue, wish to see this dialogue make progress towards the goal of disarmament and arms control. They support the efforts made by the United States with whom they regularly have close consultations.

Concerning conventional forces, they wish to see the East-West dialogue lead to the strengthening of stability and security in the whole of Europe, through increased openness and the establishment of a verifiable, comprehensive and stable balance at lower levels.

Those nations of the Seven participating at the mutual and balanced force reduction talks (MBFR) in Vienna continue to promote the western proposal of December 1985. This sought to break a long-standing deadlock on data by offering to postpone agreement on force levels until after reductions had taken place. As far as future development of policy is concerned, the Council draws the Assembly's attention to the Halifax statement of 30th May where the countries of the alliance decided to set up a high-level task force on conventional arms control. This

task force is building on the western policies that have been pursued at the CDE in Stockholm and at the MBFR negotiations in Vienna and is taking account of the document agreed at the CDE on 21st September 1986, as well as the recent eastern conventional arms control proposals.

Although the question of a comprehensive nuclear test ban is on the agenda of the disarmament conference, it has not been possible to achieve a consensus there on how this question could be tackled.

Concurrently with these discussions, the group of scientific experts mandated to examine international co-operation measures with a view to the detection and identification of seismic movements has continued its work on the various international co-operation measures which could, if necessary, be applied to the verification of a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing.

The Seven are also committed to the urgent conclusion of a comprehensive and verifiable worldwide ban on the development, production, possession and use of chemical weapons. They fully support the negotiations to that end at the conference on disarmament in Geneva and welcome the many contributions made by delegations from member countries of WEU. They are looking for a constructive Soviet response on the key verification issues, especially on challenge inspection.

QUESTION 268

*put by Sir Frederic Bennett,
MM. Caro, Ferrari Aggradi,
Sir Anthony Grant, Lady Jill Knight,
MM. Murphy, Schulte, Sir Dudley Smith,
MM. Stoffelen and van der Werff
on 30th April 1986*

Since the fundamental *raison d'être* of WEU's existence as expressed in the modified Brussels Treaty is to maintain the defence and security of Western Europe, what collaborative action can the Council of Ministers and other relevant organs of WEU institute and support to take positive steps to establish joint machinery to combat government-sponsored and government-supported terrorism inside and outside Western Europe?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
on 19th June 1986*

At their meeting in Venice on 29th and 30th April, foreign and defence ministers of WEU exchanged views on the threat to security

posed by international terrorism and underlined the importance of early and effective action to implement the measures that the countries of Western Europe had agreed upon to combat this scourge.

QUESTION 269

*put by Mr. van der Werff
on 30th April 1986*

Like everyone, the General Affairs Committee has dealt extensively with terrorism, wondering whether it might be preferable, when necessary, to counter it in the framework of WEU rather than in that of the Twelve. Furthermore, such activity would improve WEU's position whose reactivation, since the Rome declaration, I feel has been marking time.

The new form of terrorism, clearly aimed at our societies, seems to be coming from Libya and also from Syria and even Algeria and it is impossible for the terrorists themselves not to have the full support of the governments of some at least of these countries, particularly Colonel Kadhafi.

Preventive and repressive measures must of course be taken without delay, but that is not all: we must above all see how to encourage forces against the practice of terrorism in the Arab countries. We should also ascertain how to deter the Soviet Union from affording large-scale assistance to the governments of these countries and perhaps also examine how it might be possible to oppose such support.

1. Does the Council intend to start such political activities? If WEU decides not to do so, will it really be done among the Twelve or in NATO?
2. Who will take the initiative?
3. Who will be responsible and how and when will the Assembly be informed of progress achieved, if any?
4. Does the WEU Council intend to examine the decisions taken in Tokyo to fight terrorism and ensure that they are applied in Europe?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
on 30th July 1986*

The Council hopes that the statement by ministers at the last session of the Assembly will have reassured the honourable parliamentarian about the progress of the revival of WEU.

The WEU member countries are greatly preoccupied by the development of international terrorism. As stated in the Council's reply to Written Question 268, they take the view that this question is already being tackled in other fora, where significant measures have been agreed.

The Council points to the Halifax statement of 30th May 1986, in which the ministers of the alliance resolved to work together to eradicate the scourge of terrorism, and urged closer international co-operation in this effort.

The Council also draws attention to the declaration made in The Hague on 14th April 1986 by the foreign ministers of the Twelve on international terrorism and the crisis in the Mediterranean, paragraphs 9 and 10 of which refer specifically to the contacts which the Twelve may have with those states concerned.

QUESTION 270

*put by Mr. van den Sanden
on 30th June 1986*

Answering a question put by Dr. Miller on 4th June 1986 on the Council's silence about the meeting of disarmament experts held in Bonn on 11th February 1985, the Chairman-in-Office said it was because the meeting "was in a sense considered informal". Can the fact that a meeting - which the Chairman-in-Office of the Council had announced to the Assembly in December 1984 - was thus considered informal be attributed to an intervention by American diplomacy with a view to dissuading WEU from handling disarmament matters, as suggested by a statement by a member of the WEU secretariat reported in the New York City Tribune of 6th June 1986?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
on 26th November 1986*

The proceedings of the Council of WEU and of other meetings held under its auspices are not made public because of their confidential nature. The meeting held in Bonn on 11th February 1985 falls within this category. Therefore, the Council is not in a position to give further information.

QUESTION 271

*put by Mr. van der Werff
on 15th July 1986*

According to paragraph 9 of the communiqué issued at the close of the ministerial meeting held in Bonn in April 1985, the Permanent Council was instructed to present proposals with a view to promoting European co-operation in armaments matters.

At the same meeting, in addition to creating a specialised agency (Agency III) in WEU, the ministers decided to maintain the activities of the Standing Armaments Committee and to convene it henceforth at an appropriate level.

Paragraph 7 of the communiqué issued in Venice on 27th April 1986 shows that the ministers' interest in this matter has not diminished.

To ask the Council:

1. Whether it has managed to define the specific rôle of WEU and of its agency in relation to that of the various interallied bodies responsible for examining such co-operation, promoting it and, more rarely, implementing it? Can it define its doctrine in the matter?
2. Whether the mandate it gave the SAC in its decision of 7th May 1955 has to be changed?
3. Whether the SAC submitted a report to the Council on its activities at the end of the first half of 1986 in accordance with paragraph 11 of the 1955 decision?
4. Whether the SAC will be convened during the second half of this year? At what level?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
on 17th November 1986*

In the Rome declaration of October 1984, the ministers stated that WEU should play an active rôle in providing political impetus to armaments co-operation by supporting all co-operative efforts, including those of the IEPG and the CNAD.

The Council has been reflecting on ways of translating this decision into concrete actions. All partners agree that this exercise is proving difficult because of the need to avoid overlapping the activities of WEU with those of the IEPG and the CNAD. This has already been indicated in the answer to Written Question 262. However, this effort will be continued.

In the meantime, bearing in mind the above-mentioned rôle, the Council has decided to undertake a process of reflection on ways of enhancing collaboration between the SAC and Agency III, so that the Committee can help to identify areas of research relevant to WEU – approval of which would be the responsibility of the Council – and to outline, when necessary, the national positions of the Seven in this field.

This process of reflection must be set in the current context of the transitional period and it will be only at the end of this period, i.e. 31st December 1987, that any final conclusions can be drawn.

The SAC will meet in the not too distant future. Each member state has nominated its representative in accordance with its own criteria bearing in mind the decision taken at the ministerial meeting in Bonn in April 1985 that the SAC should meet at the appropriate level.

Furthermore, the Council would inform the honourable member that it took note of the half-yearly report of the SAC for the period 1st December 1985 to 31st May 1986, which was submitted to it in accordance with Article II of the decision of 7th May 1955.

QUESTION 272

*put by Mr. Antoni, Sir Frederic Bennett,
MM. Caro, Ferrari Aggradi, Goerens,
Lady Jill Knight, MM. Pécriaux, Schulte,
Sir Dudley Smith,
MM. Soell and Wilkinson
on 3rd November 1986*

Considering that Portugal is already a valued member state of NATO and the European Economic Community, as well as being a country which has clearly demonstrated its active interest in all western defence arenas, what obstacles still stand in the way of acceptance of its formal application made on 27th October 1984 to join WEU?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
on 1st December 1986*

At their meeting in Luxembourg on 13th and 14th November 1986, ministers confirmed that the WEU reactivation process should be completed before a position on the question of enlargement could be adopted. The Council's view has not changed from that stated in its reply to Written Question 265.

QUESTION 273

*put by Mr. Close
on 26th November 1986*

In the discussions between President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev in Reykjavik, consideration was given to eliminating intermediate-range missiles (cruise and Pershing II missiles on one side, SS-20s on the other), with the exception of a hundred SS-20s based in the Asian part of the Soviet Union and a hundred missiles of an equivalent type *based in the United States*.

This preagreement said nothing about the SS-21s, SS-22s and SS-23s deployed by the Soviet Union in the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia.

Can the Council answer the following questions:

1. Since the SS-21s, SS-22s and SS-23s remain in place and the hundred SS-20s deployed in Asia are mobile and can be brought back to Europe at very short notice, what is left of deterrence at European level and the coupling between the United States and Europe so widely evoked to justify undeniably the deployment of Euromissiles in five European countries?

2. Even if these agreements take no tangible form in view of the impossibility of agreeing on the question of the strategic defence initiative, it can be seen that the Soviet Union is conducting a vast psychological offensive to bring European and American points of view into conflict, which is their major strategic goal.

What is Europe's answer to this point in NATO and above all in Western European Union?

3. Why did the Council not define a joint European position taking account of the requirements of a strategy based on nuclear deterrence and the security of Europe before the Reykjavik talks started?

4. In what I consider to be the unlikely event of a five- and ten-year timetable leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons, can it reasonably be expected that the United States space system would be set up and operational in such a short lapse of time? If not, does the Council not consider that Europe would be in the position of a hostage in view of the considerable Soviet superiority in conventional forces and chemical weapons?

5. In view of the lessons to be learned from the "truncated summit meeting", does the Council not consider that the strengthening of the European pillar of the alliance in WEU

should be effected urgently in a spirit of political and military co-operation which is lacking at present? What steps does it intend to take to bring about this strengthening?

6. Is it not therefore essential to conduct a vast information campaign among public opinion and to make it aware of the conditions necessary for guaranteeing Europe's security and warding off the risks of a third world war? Is

the Council prepared to grant the Assembly the means necessary for taking part in this information campaign? Is it determined to take part in the campaign itself and by what means?

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No reply has yet been received from the Council.