

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

# PROCEEDINGS

THIRTY-FIRST ORDINARY SESSION

SECOND PART

December 1985

IV

Minutes

Official Report of Debates

WEU

PARIS

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

43, avenue du Président-Wilson, 75775 Paris Cedex 16 – Tel. 47.23.54.32

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**December 1985**

IV

**Minutes**

**Official Report of Debates**

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The proceedings of the second part of the thirty-first ordinary session of the Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes:

Volume III: Assembly documents.

Volume IV: Orders of the day and minutes of proceedings, official report of debates, general index.



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## LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

### BELGIUM

#### Representatives

MM.	ADRIAENSSENS Hugo	SP
	BOGAERTS August	SP
	DE DECKER Armand	PRL
	DEJARDIN Claude	PS
	MICHEL Joseph	PSC
	NOERENS René	PVV
Mrs.	STAELS-DOMPAS Nora	CVP

#### Substitutes

MM.	BIEFNOT Yvon	PS
	BONNEL Raoul	PVV
	DE BONDT Ferdinand	CVP
	LAGNEAU André	PRL
	PECRIAUX Nestor	PS
	STEVERLYNCK Antoon	CVP
	VAN DER ELST Frans	VU

### FRANCE

#### Representatives

MM.	BASSINET Philippe	Socialist
	BAUMEL Jacques	RPR
	BEIX Roland	Socialist
	BERRIER Noël	Socialist
	BOURGES Yvon	RPR
	CARO Jean-Marie	UDF-CDS
	President of the Assembly	
	FOURRE Jean-Pierre	Socialist
	JEAMBRUN Pierre	Dem. Left
	JUNG Louis	UCDP
	LAGORGE Pierre	Socialist
	MAYOUD Alain	UDF
	PIGNION Lucien	Socialist
	RUET Roland	Ind. Rep.
	SENES Gilbert	Socialist
	VALLEIX Jean	RPR
	VIAL-MASSAT Théo	Communist
	WILQUIN Claude	Socialist
	WIRTH Frédéric	UCDP

#### Substitutes

MM.	BARTHE Jean-Jacques	Communist
	BOHL André	UCDP
	CROZE Pierre	Ind. Rep.
	DELEHEDDE André	Socialist
	DHAILE Paul	Socialist
	DREYFUS-SCHMIDT Michel	Socialist

MM.	GALLEY Robert	RPR
	GRUSSENMEYER François	RPR
	HUYGHUES des ETAGES Jacques	Socialist
	KOEHL Emile	UDF
	MATRAJA Pierre	Socialist
	MERCIER Jean	Dem. Left
	NATIEZ Jean	Socialist
	OEHLER Jean André	Socialist
	PROUVOST Pierre	Socialist
	ROSSINOT André	UDF
	SOUVET Louis	RPR
	VERDON Marc	Socialist

### FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

#### Representatives

MM.	AHRENS Karl	SPD
	ANTRETTNER Robert	SPD
	BERGER Markus	CDU/CSU
	BÖHM Wilfried	CDU/CSU
	ENDERS Wendelin	SPD
	GERSTL Friedrich	SPD
	HAASE Horst	SPD
Mrs.	KELLY Petra	Die Grünen
MM.	KITTELMANN Peter	CDU/CSU
	MÜLLER Günther	CDU/CSU
	NEUMANN Volker	SPD
	REDDEMANN Gerhard	CDU/CSU
	RUMPF Wolfgang	FDP
	SCHULTE Mandred	SPD
	SCHWARZ Heinz	CDU/CSU
	SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM Adolf	CDU/CSU
	UNLAND Hermann Josef	CDU/CSU
	ZIERER Benno	CDU/CSU

#### Substitutes

MM.	ABELEIN Manfred	CDU/CSU
	BÜCHNER Peter	SPD
	ERTL Josef	FDP
Mrs.	FISCHER Leni	CDU/CSU
MM.	GANSEL Norbert	SPD
	GLOS Michael	CDU/CSU
	HACKEL Wolfgang	CDU/CSU
	HOLTZ Uwe	SPD
	HORACEK Milan	Die Grünen
	JÄGER Claus	CDU/CSU
	KLEJDZINSKI Karl-Heinz	SPD
	LEMMRICH Kark Heinz	CDU/CSU
	LENZER Christian	CDU/CSU
Mrs.	PACK Doris	CDU/CSU
MM.	SCHEER Hermann	SPD
	SCHMIDT Manfred	SPD
	SOELL Hartmut	SPD
	WULFF Otto	CDU/CSU



## ITALY

## Representatives

MM.	AMADEI Giuseppe	PSDI
	ANTONI Varese	Communist
	BIANCO Gerardo	Chr. Dem.
	CAVALIERE Stefano	Chr. Dem.
	CIFARELLI Michele	Republican
	FERRARI AGGRADI Mario	Chr. Dem.
	FIANDROTTI Filippo	Socialist
	FRASCA Salvatore	Socialist
	GIANOTTI Lorenzo	Communist
	GIUST Bruno	Chr. Dem.
	MEZZAPEZA Pietro	Chr. Dem.
	MILANI Eliseo	PDUP
	PECCHIOLI Ugo	Communist
	RAUTI Giuseppe	MSI-DN
	RUBBI Antonio	Communist
	SARTI Adolfo	Chr. Dem.
	SINESIO Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
	VECCHIETTI Tullio	Communist

## Substitutes

MM.	ACCILI Achille	Chr. Dem.
	ALBERINI Guido	Socialist
	BONALUMI Gilberto	Chr. Dem.
	COLAJANNI Napoleone	Communist
	FOSCHI Franco	Chr. Dem.
Mrs.	FRANCESE Angela	Communist
MM.	GORLA Massimo	Prol. Dem.
	LAPENTA Nicola	Chr. Dem.
	MARCHIO Michele	MSI-DN
	MARTINO Guido	Republican
	MASCIADRI Cornelio	Socialist
	MITTERDORFER Karl	SVP
	PALUMBO Vincenzo	Liberal
	POLLIDORO Carlo	Communist
	RIZZI Enrico	PSDI
	RODOTA Stefano	Ind. Left
	SPITELLA Giorgio	Chr. Dem.
	TEODORI Massimo	Radical

## LUXEMBOURG

## Representatives

MM.	BURGER René	Soc. Chr.
	GOERENS Charles	Dem.
	HENGEL René	Soc. Workers

## Substitutes

Mrs.	HENNICOT-SCHOEPGES Erna	Soc. Chr.
MM.	KONEN René	Dem.
	LINSTER Roger	Soc. Workers

## NETHERLANDS

## Representatives

MM.	AARTS Harry	CDA
	van den BERGH Harry	Labour
	BLAAUW Jan Dirk	Liberal
	de KWAADSTENIET	
	Willem	CDA
	STOFFELEN Pieter	Labour
Mrs.	van der WERF-TERPSTRA	
	Anne Maria	CDA
Mr.	van der WERFF Ymenus	Liberal

## Substitutes

Mr.	EYSINK Rudolf	CDA
Mrs.	den OUDEN-DEKKERS	
	Greetje	Liberal
MM.	van der SANDEN Piet	CDA
	van TETS Govert	Liberal
	TUMMERS Nicolas	Labour
	de VRIES Klaas	Labour
	WORRELL Joop	Labour

## UNITED KINGDOM

## Representatives

Sir	Frederic BENNETT	Conservative
Mr.	Thomas COX	Labour
Sir	Geoffrey FINSBERG	Conservative
Sir	Anthony GRANT	Conservative
Mr.	Peter HARDY	Labour
Sir	Paul HAWKINS	Conservative
Mr.	James HILL	Conservative
Lord	HUGHES	Labour
Mr.	Toby JESSEL	Conservative
Sir	Russell JOHNSTON	Liberal
Dame	Jill KNIGHT	Conservative
Mr.	Michael McGUIRE	Labour
Dr.	Maurice MILLER	Labour
Sir	John OSBORN	Conservative
Sir	John PAGE	Conservative
Lord	REAY	Conservative
Sir	Dudley SMITH	Conservative
Mr.	John WILKINSON	Conservative

## Substitutes

Mr.	David ATKINSON	Conservative
Sir	John BIGGS-DAVISON	Conservative
MM.	Robert BROWN	Labour
	Donald COLEMAN	Labour
	John CORRIE	Conservative
	Robert EDWARDS	Labour
	Reginald FREESON	Labour
	Edward GARRETT	Labour
Earl of	KINNOULL	Conservative
MM.	Bruce MILLAN	Labour
	Michael MORRIS	Conservative
	Christopher MURPHY	Conservative
Lord	NEWALL	Conservative
MM.	Robert PARRY	Labour
	Stephen ROSS	Liberal
	John STOKES	Conservative
	John WARD	Conservative
	Alec WOODALL	Labour



**I**

**MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS**

## SEVENTH SITTING

Monday, 2nd December 1985

### ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Resumption of the session.
2. Examination of credentials.
3. Address by the President of the Assembly.
4. Adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the session (Doc. 1028).
5. Action by the Presidential Committee (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Presidential Committee*, Doc. 1045).
6. Address by Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU.
7. Disarmament (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation*, Docs. 1040 and 1043 and amendments).

### MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

*The sitting was opened at 2.45 p.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

#### **1. Resumption of the session**

The President declared the thirty-first ordinary session of the Assembly resumed.

#### **2. Attendance register**

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

#### **3. Examination of credentials**

In accordance with Rule 6 (1) of the Rules of Procedure the Assembly took note of the letter from the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe informing the Assembly that the credentials of the representatives and substitutes listed in Notice No. 7 had been ratified by that Assembly.

#### **4. Address by the President of the Assembly**

The President addressed the Assembly and invited members to observe a minute's silence for the victims of the recent Mexican and Colombian disasters.

#### **5. Observers**

The President welcomed as observers Mr. Fernando Cardoso from Portugal, Mr.

Rafael Estrella Pedrola, Mr. Manuel Medina and Mr. Manuel Cantarero from Spain, Mr. Jan Petersen and Mr. Gunnar Berge from Norway and Mr. Lasse Budtz and Mr. Peder Sonderby from Denmark.

#### **6. Adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the session**

*(Doc. 1028)*

The President proposed the adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the session.

*Speaker* (point of order): Sir Dudley Smith.

*The sitting was suspended at 3.20 p.m. and resumed at 4 p.m.*

Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, informed the Assembly that his committee had unanimously resolved to move the previous question with a view to withdrawing the draft budget from the order of business of the session.

The Assembly agreed to consider this question on the morning of Wednesday, 4th December.

*Speakers:* MM. Pignion, Blaauw, van den Bergh, Hill, Blaauw, the President, MM. van den Bergh, Blaauw, Dreyfus-Schmidt, Lagorce, Stoffelen, Cavaliere, Antoni, the President, Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Antoni.

The draft order of business for the second part of the session was amended and adopted.

### 7. Action by the Presidential Committee

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Presidential Committee, Doc. 1045)*

The report of the Presidential Committee was presented by Mr. Reddemann, Vice-President of the Assembly.

The debate was opened.

*Speaker:* Mr. Gansel.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Reddemann replied to the speaker.

The Assembly ratified the action of the Presidential Committee. (The recommendation adopted by the Presidential Committee has been published as No. 424)<sup>1</sup>.

### 8. Address by Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU

Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU, addressed the Assembly.

### 9. Disarmament

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Docs. 1040 and 1043 and amendments)*

The report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. Blaauw, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

*Speaker:* Mr. Giust.

*Mr. Reddemann, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.*

*Speakers:* MM. Murphy, de Vries, Berger, Sinesio, Dreyfus-Schmidt, Antoni, Müller, Cavaliere and Cifarelli.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Blaauw, Rapporteur, and Mr. Pignion, Chairman of the committee, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Antoni and others:

1. At the end of paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, add:

“, prevent the sovereignty of each member country being violated and ensure that in any event the standards of treaties and of international law are respected;”.

*Speakers:* MM. Antoni, Blaauw, Cavaliere, Antoni and Pignion.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Cavaliere:

2. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “the United States to examine with the utmost attention the recent proposals” and insert “the United States and the Soviet Union to examine with the utmost attention the reciprocal proposals”.

*Speakers:* MM. Cavaliere and Blaauw.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Cavaliere:

3. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “in which full verification of withdrawals could obviate the need for prior agreement on data, as outlined in the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments” and insert “providing for the full verification of withdrawals”.

*Speakers:* MM. Cavaliere and Blaauw.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 4) was tabled by Mr. Antoni and others:

4. Leave out paragraph 6(b) of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

“Urge the nuclear countries to apply Resolution 49/1952 of the United Nations and the resolution of the European Parliament of 12th September 1985 on the urgency of promoting negotiations on the conclusion of a treaty totally banning nuclear tests, urge the United States itself to apply the moratorium decided by the Soviet Union and urge the Soviet Union and the United States to ratify the threshold test ban and peaceful nuclear explosions treaties;”.

The amendment was withdrawn.

An amendment (No. 5) was tabled by Mr. Antoni and others:

5. Leave out paragraph 7(d) of the draft recommendation and insert:

“Urge member governments to ensure that as far as possible Cocom restrictions no longer concern nuclear material and installations, while respecting defence guarantees.”

1. See page 16.

*Speakers:* MM. Antoni, Unland and Blaauw.

The amendment was negatived.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 425) <sup>1</sup>.

***10. Date, time and orders of the day  
of the next sitting***

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for Tuesday, 3rd December, at 9.30 a.m.

*The sitting was closed at 7.25 p.m.*

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1. See page 17.

## APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance<sup>1</sup>:

<b>Belgium</b>	MM. Reddemann Schulte <i>Lemmrich</i> (Schwarz) Spies von Büllenheim Unland Mrs. <i>Fischer</i> (Zierer)	<b>Netherlands</b>
MM. Adriaensens Bogaerts <i>Steverlynck</i> (De Decker) Dejardin Michel Noerens Mrs. Staels-Dompas		MM. Aarts <i>de Vries</i> (van den Bergh) Blaauw de Kwaadsteniet Stoffelen <i>van der Sanden</i> (Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra)
	<b>Italy</b>	
<b>France</b>	MM. Amadei Antoni Bianco Cavaliere Cifarelli <i>Mitterdorfer</i> (Ferrari Aggradi) <i>Martino</i> (Fiandrotti) Giust Mezzapesa Rauti Sarti Sinesio Mrs. <i>Francesca</i> (Vecchietti)	<b>United Kingdom</b>
MM. Berrier Fourré Jung Lagorce Pignion <i>Dreyfus-Schmidt</i> (Wilquin)		Sir Frederic Bennett Mr. <i>Freeson</i> (Cox) Earl of <i>Kinnoull</i> (Sir Anthony Grant) Mr. Hardy Sir Paul Hawkins Mr. Hill Lord Hughes MM. Jessel <i>Atkinson</i> (Sir Russell Johnston) <i>Ward</i> (Dame Jill Knight) McGuire Dr. Miller Sir John Osborn Mr. <i>Murphy</i> (Sir John Page) Lord Reay Sir Dudley Smith Mr. <i>Corrie</i> (Wilkinson)
<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	<b>Luxembourg</b>	
MM. <i>Holtz</i> (Ahrens) Antretter Berger Enders <i>Gansel</i> (Gerstl) Haase Kittelmann Müller <i>Büchner</i> (Neumann)	MM. Burger Goerens <i>Linster</i> (Hengel)	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

<b>France</b>	<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	MM. Pecchioli Rubbi
MM. Bassinet Baumel Beix Bourges Jeambrun Mayoud Ruet Sénès Valleix Vial-Massat Wirth	Mr. Böhm Mrs. Kelly Mr. Rumpf	<b>Netherlands</b>
	<b>Italy</b>	Mr. van der Werff
	MM. Frasca Gianotti Milani	<b>United Kingdom</b>
		Sir Geoffrey Finsberg

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

**RECOMMENDATION 424**<sup>1</sup>***on the disaster in Mexico***

The Assembly,

Deeply moved by the disaster which has struck Mexico;

Anxious to demonstrate the active sympathy of Europeans towards the Mexican people,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member governments to express their solidarity through action to help victims by affording them humanitarian, material and financial assistance, using the most appropriate framework for this purpose.

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1. Adopted on behalf of the Assembly by the Presidential Committee at its meeting on Tuesday, 24th September 1985 (Document 1032).



**RECOMMENDATION 425*****on disarmament***

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming the positive fresh start to bilateral relations between the United States and the Soviet Union that has resulted from the summit meeting in Geneva from 19th to 21st November 1985, the agreement to hold further summit meetings as well as meetings of ministers and experts on various issues, and the constructive references to most arms control issues in the agreed statement including the principle of a 50% reduction in nuclear arms, the general and complete prohibition of chemical weapons, and the idea of an interim INF agreement, while noting the absence of specific agreements;
- (ii) Considering the present status of negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions in Vienna, in the Conference on Disarmament in Europe in Stockholm, in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, and of the bilateral negotiations between the United States and Soviet Union on nuclear and space weapons in Geneva;
- (iii) Considering the conclusions of the third review conference on the non-proliferation treaty held in Geneva;
- (iv) Stressing the importance of a concerted European position on all issues discussed in these forums in order to ensure that proper weight is attached to the requirements of European security,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. Ensure that the machinery and practice of consultation in NATO attaches full weight to the views of the European allies on all disarmament and arms control issues;
2. Hold preliminary discussions itself on disarmament and arms control issues whenever a member government feels that proper weight is not being given to the European position in NATO or that European political co-operation has been unable to discuss an issue;
3. Request the United States to examine with the utmost attention the recent proposals of the Soviet Union in the bilateral negotiations on nuclear and space weapons, and to seek an early interim agreement on INF systems providing for the lowest levels compatible with the interests of allied security of United States systems based in Europe and comparable Soviet systems;
4. Request countries participating in the mutual and balanced force reduction negotiations to press for an early first phase agreement in which full verification of withdrawals could obviate the need for prior agreement on data, as outlined in the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments;
5. (a) Pending agreement in the Conference on Disarmament in Europe on improved compulsory confidence-building measures, urge the Warsaw Pact to extend regular invitations to manoeuvres to observers from NATO countries under the terms of the Helsinki final act;
- (b) Instruct the Agency for the Study of Arms Control and Disarmament Questions to study the verification and observer régime which should be agreed in the Conference on Disarmament in Europe, and to co-ordinate the activities of observers from WEU countries invited to Warsaw Pact manoeuvres;
6. (a) Urge member countries in the Conference on Disarmament to give priority to the urgent negotiation of treaties to ban chemical weapons and all nuclear tests;
- (b) Urge the Soviet Union to accept the United States invitation to observe United States nuclear test explosions with a view to establishing reliable seismic calibration data and urge the Soviet Union and the United States to ratify the threshold test ban and peaceful nuclear explosions treaties;
7. (a) Request nuclear countries, and in the first place the two most powerful, to make arrangements as soon as possible to make significant and substantial reductions in their nuclear weapons as mentioned in the Reagan-Gorbachev summit statement, which would facilitate the desirable accession to the non-proliferation treaty of many countries which have not signed it;

- 
- (b) Urge all members of IAEA to further improve its safeguards and to establish arrangements for international plutonium storage and spent fuel management;
- (c) Urge all parties to the London nuclear suppliers' group guidelines for nuclear transfers to continue co-operation and improve the application of the guidelines;
- (d) Urge member governments to insist on the full application of IAEA safeguards on all nuclear material and installations in recipient countries before authorising the export of civilian nuclear material or facilities.

## EIGHTH SITTING

Tuesday, 3rd December 1985

### ORDERS OF THE DAY

WEU and the strategic defence initiative: (a) The strategic defence initiative (Defence aspects); (b) The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance; (c) Guidelines drawn from the colloquy on the space challenge for Europe (Proposals) (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on*

*Defence Questions and Armaments and the SDI aspects of the reports of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Docs. 1033 and amendments, 1034 and amendments and 1036 and amendments).*

### MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

*The sitting was opened at 9.45 a.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

#### **1. Adoption of the minutes**

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

#### **2. Attendance register**

The names of representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

#### **3. WEU and the strategic defence initiative**

##### **(a) The strategic defence initiative (Defence aspects)**

##### **(b) The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance**

##### **(c) Guidelines drawn from the colloquy on the space challenge for Europe (Proposals)**

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the SDI aspects of the reports of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Docs 1033 and amendments, 1034 and amendments and 1036 and amendments)*

The report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. van den Bergh, Rapporteur.

Mr. Michel, Chairman of the General Affairs Committee, moved the previous question in respect of the draft resolution in Document 1033.

*Speakers:* Mr. Pignion, Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Mr. Lenzer, Chairman of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, and Mr. van den Bergh.

The previous question was withdrawn.

The Assembly decided, in accordance with Mr. Pignion's proposal, that the draft resolution in Document 1033 should be withdrawn from the debate in the current part-session, leaving it to the committee to propose how it should be reconsidered.

The report of the General Affairs Committee (SDI aspects) was presented by Mr. Berrier, Rapporteur.

The report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (SDI aspects) was presented by Mr. Lenzer, Chairman and Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

*Speakers:* MM. Hill, Aarts, Dr. Miller, MM. Lagorce and de Vries.

*Mr. Goerens, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.*

*Speakers:* Sir John Osborn, MM. Berger, Tummers, Lord Reay, MM. Bianco, Gansel, Spies von Büllesheim, Antoni, Reddemann, Cavaliere, Kittelmann, Hardy and Wilkinson.

*Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.*

*Speakers:* Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Millan, Gorla and Atkinson.

The debate was adjourned.

#### **4. Changes in the membership of committees**

In accordance with Rules 8 (3), 39 (6) and 42(bis) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following changes in the member-

ship of committees proposed by the Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany: Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments: Mr. Berger as an alternate member in place of Mr. Glos; Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions: Mr. Hackel as an alternate member in place of Mr. Schwarz, Mr. Schwarz as an alternate member in place of Mr. Stavenhagen; Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration: Mrs. Pack as a titular member in place of Mr. Schmitz, Mr. Glos as an alternate member in place of Mr. Hornhues; Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations: Mrs. Fischer as a titular member in place of Mr. Hackel, Mr. Hackel as an alternate member in place of Mr. Glos; and proposed by the Italian Delegation: Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace

Questions: Mr. Sinesio as a titular member in place of Mr. Rizzi; Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration: Mr. Sinesio as a titular member in place of Mr. Foschi; Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges: Mr. Foschi as an alternate member in place of Mr. Sinesio.

***5. Date, time and orders of the day  
of the next sitting***

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 2.30 p.m.

*The sitting was closed at 1.10 p.m.*

## APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance<sup>1</sup>:

<b>Belgium</b>	MM. Reddemann Schulte <i>Lenzer (Schwarz)</i> Spies von Büllesheim Unland	<b>Netherlands</b>
MM. Adriaensens Bogaerts <i>Steverlynck (De Decker)</i> Dejardin Michel Noerens Mrs. Staels-Dompas		MM. Aarts van den Bergh Blaauw de Kwaadsteniet <i>de Vries (Stoffelen)</i> <i>van der Sanden (Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra)</i> <i>Tummers (van der Werff)</i>
	<b>Italy</b>	
<b>France</b>	MM. Amadei Antoni Bianco Cavaliere Cifarelli <i>Mitterdorfer (Ferrari Aggradi)</i> <i>Martino (Fiandrotti)</i> <i>Masciadri (Frasca)</i> Giust Mezzapesa <i>Gorla (Milani)</i> Rauti Sinesio	<b>United Kingdom</b>
MM. Bassinet Baumel Berrier Lagorce Pignon Vial-Massat <i>Dreyfus-Schmidt (Wilquin)</i>		Sir Frederic Bennett MM. <i>Millan (Cox)</i> <i>Ward (Sir Geoffrey Finsberg)</i> Earl of <i>Kinnoull (Sir Anthony Grant)</i> MM. Hardy <i>Atkinson (Sir Paul Hawkins)</i> Hill Lord Hughes MM. Jessel <i>Corrie (Dame Jill Knight)</i> <i>Freeson (McGuire)</i> Dr. Miller Sir John Osborn Mr. Murphy Lord Reay Sir Dudley Smith Mr. Wilkinson
<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>		
MM. Ahrens <i>Gansel (Antretter)</i> Berger Enders <i>Büchner (Gerstl)</i> Haase Kittelmann Müller <i>Soell (Neumann)</i>	<b>Luxembourg</b>	
	MM. Burger Goerens Hengel	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

<b>France</b>	<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	<b>Italy</b>
MM. Beix Bourges Fourré Jeambrun Jung Mayoud Ruet Sénès Valleix Wirth	Mr. Böhm Mrs. Kelly MM. Rumpf Zierer	MM. Gianotti Pecchioli Rubbi Sarti Vecchiatti
		<b>United Kingdom</b>
		Sir Russell Johnston

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

## NINTH SITTING

Tuesday, 3rd December 1985

### ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. WEU and the strategic defence initiative: (a) The strategic defence initiative (Defence aspects) (*Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the SDI aspects of the reports of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Docs. 1033 and amendments, 1034 and amendments and 1036 and amendments*); (b) The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 1034 and amendments*); (c) Guidelines drawn from the colloquy on the space challenge for Europe (Proposals) (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Doc. 1036 and amendments*).
2. Address by Baroness Young, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom.

### MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 2.35 p.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

#### 1. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

#### 2. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

#### 3. WEU and the strategic defence initiative

##### (a) The strategic defence initiative (Defence aspects)

##### (b) The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance

##### (c) Guidelines drawn from the colloquy on the space challenge for Europe (Proposals)

*(Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and on the SDI aspects of the reports of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Docs. 1033 and amendments, 1034 and amendments and 1036 and amendments)*

The debate was resumed.

*Speakers:* MM. Blaauw, Soell and Freeson.

The debate was closed.

*Speakers:* Mr. van den Bergh; (points of order): MM. Hardy, Stoffelen, Hardy, Dr. Miller and Mr. Hardy.

#### (b) The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 1034 and amendments)*

The report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mr. Berrier, Rapporteur.

*Mr. Blaauw, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.*

The debate was opened.

*Speakers:* MM. Masciadri, Hill, Bianco and Spies von Büllesheim.

*Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.*

*Speaker:* Mr. Rauti.

The debate was adjourned.

#### 4. Address by Baroness Young, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom

Baroness Young, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, addressed the Assembly.

Baroness Young answered questions put by Sir Frederic Bennett, Sir John Osborn, Mr. Wilkinson, Sir Paul Hawkins, MM. Morris, Cifarelli, Berger and Gansel.

**5. WEU and the strategic defence initiative**  
**(b) The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance**

*(Resumed debate on the report  
of the General Affairs Committee,  
Doc. 1034 and amendments)*

The debate was resumed.

*Speakers:* Mr. Cifarelli, Sir Frederic Bennett,  
MM. Martino and Baumel.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Berrier, Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

**(c) Guidelines drawn from the colloquy  
on the space challenge for Europe  
(Proposals)**

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee  
on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions,  
Doc. 1036 and amendments)*

The report of the Committee on Scientific,  
Technological and Aerospace Questions was

presented by Mr. Lenzer, Chairman and Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

*Speakers:* Sir John Osborn, MM. Verdon, Hill,  
Cavaliere, Wilkinson and Palumbo.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Lenzer, Chairman and Rapporteur of the  
Committee on Scientific, Technological and  
Aerospace Questions, replied to the speakers.

**6. Date, time and orders of the day  
of the next sitting**

The orders of the day for the next sitting were  
agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for Wednesday,  
4th December, at 9.30 a.m.

*The sitting was closed at 6.25 p.m.*

## APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance<sup>1</sup>:

**Belgium**

MM. Adriaensens  
Bogaerts  
*De Bondt* (Michel)  
Noerens  
Mrs. Staels-Dompas

**France**

MM. Baumel  
Berrier  
Jung  
Lagorce  
Pignion  
*Verdon* (Sénès)  
Valleix

**Federal Republic of Germany**

MM. Ahrens  
*Gansel* (Antretter)  
Berger  
*Jäger* (Böhm)  
Enders  
*Holtz* (Gerstl)  
Kittelmann  
Reddemann

## MM. Schulte

*Lenzer* (Schwarz)  
Spies von Büllenheim  
Unland

Mrs. *Fischer* (Zierer)

**Italy**

MM. Antoni  
Bianco  
Cavaliere  
Cifarelli  
*Martino* (Fiandrotti)  
Giust  
Mezzapesa  
Rauti  
Sarti  
Mrs. *Francesca* (Vecchietti)

**Luxembourg**

MM. Burger  
*Konen* (Goerens)  
Hengel

**Netherlands**

MM. Aarts  
van den Bergh  
Blaauw  
de Kwaadsteniet  
Stoffelen  
*van der Sanden* (Mrs.  
van der Werf-Terpstra)  
*Tummers* (van der  
Werff)

**United Kingdom**

Sir Frederic Bennett  
MM. *Millan* (Cox)  
*Morris* (Sir Geoffrey  
Finsberg)  
Sir Paul Hawkins  
Mr. Hill  
Lord Hughes  
MM. Jessel  
*Atkinson* (Sir Russell  
Johnston)  
McGuire  
Dr. Miller  
Sir John Osborn  
Lord Reay  
Sir Dudley Smith  
Mr. Wilkinson

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

**Belgium**

MM. De Decker  
Dejardin

**France**

MM. Bassinet  
Beix  
Bourges  
Fourré  
Jeambrun  
Mayoud  
Ruet  
Vial-Massat  
Wilquin  
Wirth

**Federal Republic of Germany**

Mr. Haase  
Mrs. Kelly  
MM. Müller  
Neumann  
Rumpf

**Italy**

MM. Amadei  
Ferrari Aggradi  
Frasca  
Gianotti  
Milani  
Pecchioli  
Rubbi  
Sinesio

**United Kingdom**

Sir Anthony Grant  
Mr. Hardy  
Dame Jill Knight  
Sir John Page

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.



## TENTH SITTING

Wednesday, 4th December 1985

### ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1986 (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and votes on the draft texts*, Docs. 1030, 1046 and 1048).
2. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1984 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the motion to approve the final accounts*, Doc. 1029 and addendum).
3. Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial years 1984 and 1985 (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 1031).
4. Developments in China and European security (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 1035 and amendments).
5. Address by Mr. Dumas, Minister for External Relations of France.

### MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 9.35 a.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

#### 1. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

#### 2. Attendance register

The names of representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

#### 3. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1986

*(Presentation of the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and votes on the draft texts, Docs. 1030, 1046 and 1048)*

The report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration was presented by Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteur.

The previous question and motion for an order were moved by Sir Dudley Smith.

The previous question was agreed to unanimously and, in accordance with Rule 32 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration was withdrawn from the agenda and the register of the Assembly.

The motion for an order was agreed to unanimously. (This order will be published as No. 64)<sup>1</sup>.

1. See page 28.

#### 4. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1984 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts

*(Presentation of the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the motion to approve the final accounts, Doc. 1029 and addendum)*

The report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration was presented by Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteur.

The motion to approve the final accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1984 was agreed to unanimously.

#### 5. Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial years 1984 and 1985

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1031)*

The report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration was presented by Mr. van Tets, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

*Speakers:* MM. Sinesio, Morris and Sir Paul Hawkins.

The debate was closed.

Mr. van Tets, Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 426)<sup>1</sup>.

## 6. *Developments in China and European security*

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1035 and amendments)*

The report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mr. Michel, Chairman and Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

*Speakers:* Sir Dudley Smith, MM. Hill, Antoni, Cavaliere, Tummers and Cifarelli.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Michel, Chairman and Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Cavaliere:

1. After paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph:

“Concerned by the continued Soviet occupation of Afghanistan where civilians are still being massacred,”.

*Speakers:* MM. Cavaliere and Michel.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Cavaliere:

2. In paragraph 3(ii) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “the Chinese language and culture” and insert “Chinese culture”.

*Speakers:* MM. Cavaliere, Michel and Tummers.

The amendment was negated.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 427)<sup>2</sup>.

1. See page 29.

2. See page 30.

## 7. *Change in the orders of the day*

The President proposed that the Assembly proceed immediately to the presentation of the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges on the revision and interpretation of the Charter and of the Rules of Procedure.

*Speaker:* Mr. Schulte.

The proposal was agreed to.

## 8. *Revision and interpretation of the Charter and of the Rules of Procedure*

*(Presentation of the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, Doc. 1039 and amendments)*

The report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges was presented by Mr. Unland, Rapporteur.

*Mr. Goerens, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.*

Mr. Spies von Büllesheim, Rapporteur, continued the presentation of the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.

*Speakers (points of order):* MM. Schulte, Spies von Büllesheim and Lord Hughes.

*Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.*

*Speaker (point of order):* Mr. Schulte.

The debate was deferred until the morning sitting on Thursday, 5th December.

*The sitting was suspended at 12 noon and resumed at 12.45 p.m.*

## 9. *Address by Mr. Dumas, Minister for External Relations of France*

Mr. Dumas, Minister for External Relations of France, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Dumas answered questions put by MM. Gansel, Kittelmann and Cifarelli.

## 10. *Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting*

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

*The sitting was closed at 1.20 p.m.*

## APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance<sup>1</sup>:

<b>Belgium</b>	MM. <i>Abelein</i> (Reddemann) Schulte <i>Lenzer</i> (Schwarz) Spies von Büllenheim Unland Zierer	<b>Netherlands</b>
MM. Adriaensens Bogaerts De Decker Dejardin Michel Noerens Mrs. Staels-Dompas		MM. <i>Eysink</i> (Aarts) van den Bergh Blaauw de Kwaadsteniet Stoffelen <i>Tummers</i> (Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra) <i>van Tets</i> (van der Werff)
	<b>Italy</b>	
<b>France</b>	MM. Amadei Antoni Bianco Cavaliere Cifarelli <i>Mitterdorfer</i> (Ferrari Aggradi) <i>Martino</i> (Fiandrotti) <i>Palumbo</i> (Giust) Rauti Rubbi Sarti Sinesio Mrs. <i>Francesca</i> (Vecchietti)	<b>United Kingdom</b>
MM. Berrier Lagorce Pignion <i>Verdon</i> (Sénès) Valleix <i>Dreyfus-Schmidt</i> (Wilquin)		Sir Frederic Bennett MM. <i>Millan</i> (Cox) <i>Morris</i> (Sir Geoffrey Finsberg) Sir Anthony Grant Mr. <i>Woodall</i> (Hardy) Sir Paul Hawkins Mr. Hill Lord Hughes MM. <i>Jessel</i> <i>Edwards</i> (McGuire) Dr. Miller Mr. <i>Murphy</i> (Sir John Osborn) Sir John Page Lord Reay Sir Dudley Smith Mr. Wilkinson
<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>		
MM. Ahrens <i>Gansel</i> (Antretter) Berger <i>Jäger</i> (Böhm) Enders <i>Schmidt</i> (Gerstl) Kittelmann <i>Soell</i> (Neumann)	<b>Luxembourg</b>	
	MM. Burger Goerens Hengel	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

<b>France</b>	<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	<b>Italy</b>
MM. Bassinet Baumel Beix Bourges Fourré Jeambrun Jung Mayoud Ruet Vial-Massat Wirth	Mr. Haase Mrs. Kelly MM. Müller Rumpf	MM. Frasca Gianotti Mezzapesa Milani Pecchioli
		<b>United Kingdom</b>
		Sir Russell Johnston Dame Jill Knight

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

**ORDER 64*****on the draft budget of the Assembly  
for the financial year 1986***

The Assembly,

- (i) Having decided not to vote on its draft budget at the present session;
- (ii) Noting that:
  - (a) most of the Council's budget experts were in favour of strict application of the principle of zero growth to the budget of the Assembly;
  - (b) they did not take account of the fact that the reactivation of WEU has further aggravated the difficulties which the Assembly has already encountered in fulfilling its tasks, whereas they have demonstrated their intention to take into consideration the effects of reactivation on the Secretariat-General in London;
  - (c) the Council has not adopted a position on the draft budget of the Assembly;
  - (d) this draft budget provides for different options depending on the opinion of the Council and specific priorities,

**INSTRUCTS THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMITTEE**

1. To negotiate with the Council for the Assembly to be granted adequate financial means to allow it to play its rôle in a reactivated WEU;
2. In application of Rule 14, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Procedure, to take the necessary measures to finalise the Assembly's draft budget in acceptable conditions.

**RECOMMENDATION 426*****on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU  
for the financial years 1984 and 1985***

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting that in communicating the budget of Western European Union as a whole the Council has complied with the provisions of Article VIII (c) of the Charter;
- (ii) Having taken note of the contents;
- (iii) Considering that:
  - (a) the new structure of the ministerial organs of Western European Union depends essentially on the tasks devolving upon them in the framework of the institutional reform announced in the Rome declaration of 27th October 1984;
  - (b) the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for 1984 and 1985 are merely a renewal of the budget for 1983;
  - (c) it would consequently be pointless to examine these budgets on a cost-effectiveness basis;
  - (d) in preparing the budgets for the financial years 1984 and 1985 the criterion of zero growth was applied;
  - (e) since 1984 progress has been made in consultation and conciliation within the co-ordinated organisations,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. Re-examine the problem of applying the zero growth criterion with a view to specifying that this criterion is to be applied only to operating budgets and not pension budgets;
2. In order to apply this criterion correctly, establish a rate of increase for each category of expenditure instead of fixing a single rate of increase for the net total of the budget;
3. Pursue efforts to improve the status of staff in the framework of consultation and inform the Assembly of the conclusions of studies on this subject;
4. In the framework of present reorganisational studies, re-examine the possibility of a single seat for the ministerial organs of WEU in order to improve liaison between these bodies which at present have offices in London and in Paris, thus reducing costs by integrating supporting staff, and reach a decision on this matter.

**RECOMMENDATION 427*****on developments in China and European security***

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering the major part played by China in the world balance and the maintenance of peace and the even more important rôle it will have to play in the near future;
- (ii) Considering that the interests of China and of Western Europe converge in many areas and may develop independently of ideological and institutional differences;
- (iii) Considering that the major aim of the Chinese Government is the country's economic and social development;
- (iv) Considering that a condition of this development is the maintenance of peace in Asia and throughout the world and welcoming the fact that the Chinese Government clearly shares this conviction;
- (v) Welcoming the development of the Chinese economy and of trade of all kinds between China and Western Europe;
- (vi) Deploring developments in Cambodia and the loss of its independence;
- (vii) Concerned by the continued Soviet occupation of Afghanistan where civilians are still being massacred,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Encourage all possible initiatives to ensure that current negotiations on the reduction of nuclear weapons also take the Far East into consideration so as to avoid weapons deployed in Europe being moved towards that region;
2. Study and assess the extent to which Cocom restrictions hinder the continued development of the People's Republic of China;
3. Urge member governments to develop their countries' political, technological and scientific relations with the People's Republic of China, in particular by:
  - (i) increasing trade between China and Western European countries;
  - (ii) developing knowledge of the Chinese language and culture in Western Europe;
  - (iii) facilitating cultural exchanges, particularly by establishing European cultural institutes in China.

## ELEVENTH SITTING

Wednesday, 4th December 1985

### ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Address by Mr. Andreotti, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.
2. WEU and the strategic defence initiative: (a) The strategic defence initiative (Defence aspects) (*Vote on the draft recommendation of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*, Doc. 1033 and amendments); (b) The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance (*Vote on the draft recommendation of the General Affairs Committee*, Doc. 1034 and amendments); (c) Guidelines drawn from the colloquy on the space challenge for Europe (Proposals) (*Vote on the draft recommendation of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions*, Doc. 1036 and amendments).

### MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

*The sitting was opened at 3.15 p.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

#### 1. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

#### 2. Attendance register

The names of representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

#### 3. Iran-Iraq war

*(Motion for a resolution, Doc. 1047)*

The President announced that a motion for a resolution on the Iran-Iraq war had been tabled by Mr. Bianco and others.

In accordance with Rule 28 (3) of the Rules of Procedure, the motion was referred to the Presidential Committee.

#### 4. Address by Mr. Andreotti, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council

Mr. Andreotti, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Andreotti answered questions put by MM. Sarti, Gansel, Rauti, Dame Jill Knight, Mr. Rubbi, Sir John Page, MM. Michel, Berger and Bianco.

#### 5. WEU and the strategic defence initiative (a) The strategic defence initiative (Defence aspects)

*(Vote on the draft recommendation of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 1033 and amendments)*

Mr. van den Bergh, Rapporteur for the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, replied to the speakers.

*Mr. Blaauw, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.*

*Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.*

The opinion of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mr. Hill, Rapporteur.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 15) was tabled by Mr. Gansel and others:

15. Before paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert the following new paragraph:

“Believing that an extension of the arms race into space as raised by the strategic defence initiative must be prevented since it will bring only the illusion of more security and in fact will endanger strategic stability and create within the alliance zones of unequal security;”.

*Speakers:* MM. Gansel, Michel, Pignion and van den Bergh.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Hill:

1. After paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert the following new paragraph:

“(ii) Considering that the development of space defence technology means that the European allies of the United States have to make every effort to master the new technologies which might one day take their place in an effective defence system;”.

*Speakers:* Mr. Hill, Dr. Miller and Mr. van den Bergh.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Hill:

2. Leave out paragraph (ii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:

“(ii) Believing that Europe collectively must pursue the development of independent space technology both for civilian applications and for defence applications which will enhance its security and assist in verification of arms control agreements and confidence-building measures;”.

An amendment (No. 16) was tabled by Mr. Gansel and others:

16. Leave out paragraph (ii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:

“Believing that Europe collectively must give priority to developing independent space technology for civilian applications which among other things will also assist in surveillance, verification of arms control agreements and confidence-building measures;”.

*Speakers:* MM. Hill, Millan and van den Bergh.

Amendment 2 was agreed to.

Consequently, Amendment 16 was not moved.

*Speaker* (point of order): Mr. Dejardin.

An amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Hill:

3. In paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out from “stability” to the end of the paragraph and insert:

“and foster research on new defence systems without jeopardising existing arms control agreements or compromising the negotiation of future agreements;”.

*Speakers:* Mr. Hill, Dr. Miller, MM. van den Bergh and Hill.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 4) was tabled by Mr. Hill:

4. Leave out paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation.

*Speakers:* MM. Hill, Millan, van den Bergh and Pignion.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 17) was tabled by Mr. Gansel and others:

17. Leave out paragraph (v) of the preamble to the draft recommendation.

*Speakers:* Mr. Edwards, Sir Anthony Grant and Mr. van den Bergh.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 5) was tabled by Mr. Hill:

5. Leave out paragraph (v) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:

“(v) Believing that a strategic defence system might play a complementary rôle in the policy of nuclear deterrence;”.

*Speakers:* MM. Hill, Edwards, van den Bergh and Pignion.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 18) was tabled by Mr. Gansel and others:

18. In paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out from “strategic and intermediate-range” to the end of the paragraph and insert:

“noting the Council’s attitude to SDI expressed in reply to Recommendation 413 according to which ‘relevant tests or deployment will have to be a matter for negotiation under the terms of the ABM treaty’, and welcoming their further statement in that reply that ‘in view of the contribution of this treaty to stability the Council stresses the importance of preventing its erosion’;”.

*Speakers:* Mr. Millan (point of order), Mr. Gansel.

The amendment was withdrawn.

An amendment (No. 7) was tabled by Mr. Hill:

7. In paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out from “Recommendation 413” to the end of the paragraph and insert:

“considering that the American authorities have not yet explained in sufficient detail the



proposals for the United States' European allies to take part in the SDI programme,".

*Speakers:* Mr. Hill, Dr. Miller and Mr. van den Bergh.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 6) was tabled by Mr. Hill:

6. In paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert after the words "Recommendation 413" a footnote reference to refer to a footnote setting out the text of paragraph 3 of the Council's reply to Recommendation 413, which reads:

"3. The Council welcomes the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union have begun global negotiations, i.e. dealing with strategic weapons, INF missiles and defence and space weapons. It hopes that these negotiations will achieve security at the lowest possible level of forces through substantial, balanced and verifiable reductions of nuclear weapons. The Council notes that the strategic defence initiative (SDI) announced by the United States is no more than a scientific research programme and hence does not contravene the provisions of the 1972 ABM treaty. The Council also takes the view that laboratory research does not lend itself to arms control measures. On the other hand, relevant tests or deployment will have to be a matter for negotiation, under the terms of the ABM treaty. In view of the contribution of this treaty to stability, the Council stresses the importance of preventing its erosion."

*Speakers:* MM. Hill, Gansel and van den Bergh.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 8) was tabled by Mr. Hill:

8. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, after "defence initiative" insert:

"or, if that seems impossible, specify Europe's own interests in this area by harmonising as far as possible the answers of the seven WEU member countries".

*Speakers:* MM. Hill and van den Bergh.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 19) was tabled by Mr. Gansel and others:

19. Leave out paragraph 1(b) of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

"(b) not accept research incompatible with existing arms control agreements and of a nature and scale which will endanger stability and security;".

*Speakers:* MM. Gansel and van den Bergh.

The amendment was negated.

An amendment (No. 20) was tabled by Mr. Gansel and others:

20. Leave out paragraph 1(c) of the draft recommendation proper.

*Speakers:* MM. Gansel, Cavaliere and van den Bergh.

The amendment was negated.

An amendment (No. 13) was tabled by Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt:

13. Amend paragraph 1(c) of the draft recommendation proper to read:

"ensure that European industry is associated only with due respect for national interests and on mutually advantageous terms in appropriate areas of SDI research;".

The amendment was not moved.

An amendment (No. 9) was tabled by Mr. Hill:

9. In paragraph 1(c) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from "participate" to the end of the paragraph and insert:

"in all areas of SDI research on terms providing a genuine exchange of technology".

*Speakers:* Mr. Hill, Dr. Miller and Mr. van den Bergh.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 10) was tabled by Mr. Hill:

10. At the end of paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, add:

"(d) ensure that the answers of members of WEU to the American invitation do not jeopardise the development of Europe's technological capability and encourage the development of this capability, in particular through the early implementation of the Eureka programme;".

*Speakers:* MM. Hill, Gansel and van den Bergh.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 21) was tabled by Mr. Gansel and others:

21. After paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, insert the following new paragraph:

"3. Urge all states to refrain from testing and developing anti-missile and anti-satellite weapons and from preparing for an arms race in outer space;".

*Speakers:* MM. Millan, Wilkinson and van den Bergh.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 11) was tabled by Mr. Hill:

11. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

“Request all countries concerned to ensure that no obstacles will be placed in the way of balanced and verifiable agreements limiting strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons and encourage the pursuit and success of the Soviet-American negotiations in Geneva on the limitation of armaments in the three areas covered;”.

An amendment (No. 14) was tabled by Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt:

14. In the French text of paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “*De prier l’Union Soviétique et les Etats-Unis de faire en sorte que*” and insert “*D’insister auprès de l’Union Soviétique et des États-Unis pour que*”.

An amendment (No. 22) was tabled by Mr. Gansel and others:

22. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “space defensive measures of themselves do” and insert “research in space defensive measures in itself does”.

*Speakers:* MM. Hill, Gansel and van den Bergh.

Amendment 11 was agreed to.

Amendment 14 was withdrawn.

Amendment 22 was not moved.

An amendment (No. 23) was tabled by Mr. Gansel and others:

23. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “when the results become available”.

*Speakers:* Dr. Miller and Mr. van den Bergh.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 24) was tabled by Mr. Gansel and others:

24. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “possible” and insert “political as well as the”.

*Speakers:* MM. Edwards, Berger and van den Bergh.

The amendment was agreed to.

*Speaker* (point of order): Mr. Hardy.

An amendment (No. 12) was tabled by Mr. Hill:

12. After paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, add:

“6. Ensure maintenance of the nuclear deterrent capability of the Atlantic Alliance as long as Europe’s security is not effectively guaranteed by other means and consider the question of the case for adequacy in conventional defence capacity, both in the present situation and in regard to the development of the strategic defence initiative.”

*Speakers:* MM. Hill, Gansel and van den Bergh.

The amendment was agreed to.

*Speaker* (point of order): Mr. van den Bergh.

*The sitting was suspended at 6.30 p.m. and resumed at 6.50 p.m.*

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

*Speaker* (point of order): Mr. Schulte.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 428)<sup>1</sup>.

*Speakers* (explanation of vote): MM. Lenzer, Bianco, Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Antoni, Gorla, Palumbo and Rauti.

### **(b) The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance**

*(Vote on the draft recommendation of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 1034 and amendments)*

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Spies von Büllesheim:

2. Leave out paragraph (viii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:

“Referring to the fact that the report on the possibilities, conditions and consequences of a closer institutional connection of the Assembly with other organs of WEU, which is asked for in Order 63, will be prepared separately;”.

*Speakers:* MM. Spies von Büllesheim, Michel, Spies von Büllesheim and Berrier.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt:

1. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “whatever the results of its efforts to co-ordinate the answers of member

<sup>1</sup>. See page 37.

countries to the American proposal that they take part in the strategic defence initiative;”.

*Speakers:* MM. Dreyfus-Schmidt, Berrier and Michel.

The amendment was negatived.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 429)<sup>1</sup>.

**(c) Guidelines drawn from the colloquy  
on the space challenge for Europe  
(Proposals)**

*(Vote on the draft recommendation of the Committee  
on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions,  
Doc. 1036 and amendments)*

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Gansel and others:

2. Leave out paragraph (x) of the preamble to the draft recommendation.

*Speakers:* MM. Millan, Wilkinson and Lenzer.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Gansel and others:

3. In paragraph (xi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “which are to promote joint European civil and military space activities,” and insert “in so far as they are designed to promote joint European civil space activities”.

*Speakers:* Dr. Miller, MM. Wilkinson and Lenzer.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 7) was tabled by Mr. Blaauw:

7. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “To consider the adoption of a coherent space programme, composed of two main elements” and insert “To consider the adoption of a coherent space programme addressing all civil and military space activities and including space and ground segments, with emphasis on two main elements:”.

The amendment was not moved.

An amendment (No. 5) was tabled by Mr. Gansel and others:

5. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “military”.

*Speakers:* MM. Millan, Wilkinson and Lenzer.

The amendment was negatived.

Identical amendments (Nos. 1 and 4) were tabled by Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt and by Mr. Gansel and others respectively:

1 and 4. Leave out paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper.

*Speakers:* MM. Dreyfus-Schmidt, Hardy, Lenzer; (points of order): Mr. Jäger, Dr. Miller, MM. Wilkinson and Dreyfus-Schmidt.

The amendments were negatived.

An oral amendment was moved by Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt to leave out “independently or as part of SDI” in paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper.

The oral amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 6) was tabled by Mr. Gansel and others:

6. At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add a paragraph 6 as follows:

“6. To give full support to development of a Eureka programme of which space technology should be a part.”

*Speakers:* Dr. Miller and Mr. Lenzer.

The amendment was negatived.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 430)<sup>1</sup>.

**6. Date, time and orders of the day  
of the next sitting**

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for Thursday, 5th December, at 9.30 a.m.

*The sitting was closed at 8 p.m.*

1. See page 39.

1. See page 41.

## APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance <sup>1</sup>:

<b>Belgium</b>	MM. Schulte <i>Lenzer</i> (Schwarz) Spies von Büllenheim Unland Zierer	<b>Netherlands</b>
MM. Adriaensens Bogaerts De Decker Dejardin Michel <i>De Bondt</i> (Noerens)		MM. Aarts <i>Tummers</i> (van den Bergh) Blaauw de Kwaadsteniet Stoffelen <i>Eysink</i> (Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra) <i>Worrell</i> (van der Werff)
Mrs. Staels-Dompas	<b>Italy</b>	
<b>France</b>	MM. Antoni Bianco Cavaliere Cifarelli <i>Mitterdorfer</i> (Ferrari Aggradi) <i>Martino</i> (Fiandrotti) <i>Palumbo</i> (Giust) <i>Gorla</i> (Milani) Rauti Rubbi Sarti Sinesio	<b>United Kingdom</b>
MM. <i>Dreyfus-Schmidt</i> (Bassinot) Berrier Lagorce Pignion <i>Verdon</i> (Sénès) Valleix	Mrs. <i>Francesca</i> (Vecchietti)	Sir Frederic Bennett MM. <i>Millan</i> (Cox) <i>Morris</i> (Sir Geoffrey Finsberg) Sir Anthony Grant Mr. Hardy Sir Paul Hawkins MM. Hill <i>Atkinson</i> (Jessel) Dame Jill Knight Mr. <i>Edwards</i> (McGuire) Dr. Miller Sir John Osborn Sir John Page Lord Reay Sir Dudley Smith Mr. Wilkinson
<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>		
MM. Ahrens <i>Gansel</i> (Antretter) Berger <i>Jäger</i> (Böhm) Enders	<b>Luxembourg</b>	
Mrs. <i>Fischer</i> (Kittelmann) Mr. <i>Soell</i> (Neumann)	MM. Burger Goerens	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

<b>France</b>	<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	MM. Mezzapesa Pecchioli
MM. Baumel Beix Bourges Fourré Jeambrun Jung Mayoud Ruet Vial-Massat Wilquin Wirth	MM. Gerstl Haase Mrs. Kelly MM. Müller Reddemann Rumpf	<b>Luxembourg</b>
	<b>Italy</b>	Mr. Hengel
	MM. Amadei Frasca Gianotti	<b>United Kingdom</b>
		Lord Hughes Sir Russell Johnston

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

## RECOMMENDATION 428

*on WEU and the strategic defence initiative*  
*The strategic defence initiative*  
*(Defence aspects)*

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The Assembly,

- (i) Considering the strategic defence initiative announced by President Reagan in March 1983 and the invitation from the United States Secretary of Defence of March 1985 for allied countries to explore possible co-operative efforts "on data and technology short of ABM component level";
- (ii) Considering that the development of space defence technology means that the European allies of the United States have to make every effort to master the new technologies which might one day take their place in an effective defence system;
- (iii) Believing that Europe collectively must give priority to developing independent space technology both for civilian applications and for defence applications which will enhance its security and assist in verification of arms control agreements and confidence-building measures;
- (iv) Welcoming any defence technology collaboration with the United States that will enhance security and stability and foster research on new defence systems without jeopardising existing arms control agreements or compromising the negotiation of future agreements;
- (v) Expressing the hope that the SDI programme will not cast doubt on the policy of nuclear deterrence which can only strengthen the defence of Europe;
- (vi) Welcoming the better prospect of progress in the bilateral negotiations on "space and nuclear arms both strategic and intermediate range", and welcoming the Council's attitude to SDI expressed in reply to Recommendation 413\*, considering that the American authorities have not yet explained in sufficient detail the proposals for the United States' European allies to take part in the SDI programme,

## RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Agree a common response to the United States' strategic defence initiative or, if that seems impossible, specify Europe's own interests in this area by harmonising as far as possible the answers of the seven WEU member countries which should:
  - (a) stress the importance of avoiding an arms race in space;
  - (b) accept research compatible with existing arms control agreements and of a nature and scale which will enhance stability and security;
  - (c) permit European industry to participate in all areas of SDI research on terms providing a genuine exchange of technology;
  - (d) ensure that the answers of members of WEU to the American invitation do not jeopardise the development of Europe's technological capability and encourage the development of this capability, in particular through the early implementation of the Eureka programme;
2. Give priority and special emphasis to a joint European programme for defence and arms control purposes, including observation and communications satellites, and to promoting civil technological research of Eureka type within ESA and the European Communities;

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\* "3. The Council welcomes the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union have begun global negotiations, i.e. dealing with strategic weapons, INF missiles and defence and space weapons. It hopes that these negotiations will achieve security at the lowest possible level of forces through substantial, balanced and verifiable reductions of nuclear weapons. The Council notes that the strategic defence initiative (SDI) announced by the United States is no more than a scientific research programme and hence does not contravene the provisions of the 1972 ABM treaty. The Council also takes the view that laboratory research does not lend itself to arms control measures. On the other hand, relevant tests or deployment will have to be a matter for negotiation, under the terms of the ABM treaty. In view of the contribution of this treaty to stability, the Council stresses the importance of preventing its erosion."

3. Request all countries concerned to ensure that no obstacles will be placed in the way of balanced and verifiable agreements limiting strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons and encourage the pursuit and success of the Soviet-American negotiations in Geneva on the limitation of armaments in the three areas covered;
4. Emphasise the need, when the results become available, for the United States and its European partners to discuss the political as well as the military and strategic implications of research on SDI;
5. Instruct the new agency for the study of arms control and disarmament questions to report annually on the arms control impact of the SDI;
6. Ensure maintenance of the nuclear deterrent capability of the Atlantic Alliance as long as Europe's security is not effectively guaranteed by other means and consider the question of the case for adequacy in conventional defence capacity, both in the present situation and in regard to the development of the strategic defence initiative.

**RECOMMENDATION 429*****on WEU and the strategic defence initiative  
The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance***

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that Europe's security requires the European members of the Atlantic Alliance to make their views carry greater weight on matters relating to the strategy of the alliance, disarmament and allied countries' policies outside the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty;
- (ii) Considering that close, continuing co-ordination of their views is essential to achieve this end;
- (iii) Noting that the modified Brussels Treaty at present provides an ideal framework to achieve this end;
- (iv) Welcoming the intentions asserted by the Council in its Rome declaration, Bonn communiqué and reply to Recommendation 420 with a view to giving new life to WEU, but regretting the slowness with which these intentions are transformed into decisions;
- (v) Considering that it is urgent to adapt the WEU agencies to the Council's new vocation;
- (vi) Considering that keeping public opinion informed about the activities of the Council and of the Assembly is an essential part of a policy of deterrence whose real basis is the will of the people;
- (vii) Noting the very marked improvement in the information the Council gives the Assembly, but hoping that, in accordance with the intentions expressed in the Bonn communiqué, the Council will increasingly inform the press of its activities;
- (viii) Referring to the fact that the report on the possibilities, conditions and consequences of a closer institutional connection of the Assembly with other organs of WEU, which is asked for in Order 63, will be prepared separately,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. Ensure that the Ministers of Defence participate fully in its work and in its dialogue with the Assembly;
2. Have the appropriate agency conduct a continuing study of the strategic consequences of the development of new weapons, whatever the results of its efforts to co-ordinate the answers of member countries to the American proposal that they take part in the strategic defence initiative;
3. Proceed to organise the new agencies, namely the agency for the study of disarmament questions, the agency for the study of defence questions and the agency for co-operation in the field of armaments, by giving them, insofar as possible, all the necessary means to be able to co-operate in carrying out their respective tasks;
4. Specify without delay the new aims of its discussions and the scope of its action regarding disarmament and the nature of the tasks given to the agency concerned;
5. Play an active part in informing Europeans about matters relating to their security:
  - (a) by keeping the press systematically and officially informed of its own activities by all appropriate means;
  - (b) by instructing the new agency handling defence questions to promote the organisation of training courses in the defence institutes of each of the member countries for nationals of the seven countries with responsibility in defence matters or likely to have an influence on public opinion so as to allow them to have a better understanding of the European dimension of security problems;
6. Guarantee the Assembly full independence in all areas, in particular by allowing it to divide its overall budget between the various heads while respecting the regulations governing the staff of the co-ordinated organisations;

7. Pursue its effort to keep the Assembly better informed of its work by ensuring in particular the continuation of joint meetings between the Council at ministerial level and the permanent committees of the Assembly;
8. Expedite positively the examination of applications for membership from European member countries of the Atlantic Alliance with the aim of one day associating all the member countries of the European Community in a joint security policy.



**RECOMMENDATION 430*****on WEU and the strategic defence initiative  
Guidelines drawn from the colloquy on the  
space challenge for Europe  
(Proposals)***

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that it is now time to give new emphasis to a balanced, jointly-agreed European space policy and welcoming the decisions reached by the Ministerial Council of the European Space Agency in Rome on 30th and 31st January 1985;
- (ii) Aware of the need to develop markets, within Europe and worldwide, which will ensure economic returns from the large sums expended on space programmes;
- (iii) Noting that applications of space operations, for instance in telecommunications and meteorology, are hampered by over-nationalistic-minded governmental administrations and institutional monopolies;
- (iv) Considering the recognised benefits for mankind of the utilisation of space;
- (v) Considering the need to promote the manufacture in space of new products in the sectors of pharmacy, biotechnology, electronics and new materials;
- (vi) Considering that Arianespace is an example of successful marketing of space services;
- (vii) Considering also that European space industry is far more scattered and less rationalised than American industry, resulting in over-equipment and excess capacity, which will raise serious problems if the prospect of market stagnation is confirmed;
- (viii) Considering that Europe cannot remain in the van of space development if it fails to tackle the problems of a permanently-manned space station;
- (ix) Considering that the civil and military space budgets of the United States and the Soviet Union are almost seven times larger than the space budgets of the Western European countries;
- (x) Considering that Europe cannot therefore remain outside joint space defence programmes;
- (xi) Welcoming the establishment of the new space agency in Italy and the new space centre in the United Kingdom which are to promote joint European civil and military space activities,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member governments:

1. To consider the adoption of a coherent space programme, composed of two main elements: participation in the American space station and further development of the European launcher system – Ariane-5 with the HM-60 engine – leading to an independent European manned transportation system;
2. To help the European aerospace industry to start a necessary period of reorganisation to ensure its independence and competitiveness in the international market;
3. To define the co-operative framework in which the defence aspects of European space activities can be discussed and determined;
4. To accept non-aggressive applications of military space technology such as communications, surveillance, navigation and the use of satellites for crisis management and treaty verification to strengthen strategic stability in relations between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries as indicated in the NATO statement of 8th January 1985;
5. To pursue jointly research on a European anti-missile system independently or as part of SDI.

## TWELFTH SITTING

Thursday, 5th December 1985

### ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Revision and interpretation of the Charter and of the Rules of Procedure (*Debate on the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and votes on the draft resolutions, Doc. 1039 and amendments*).
2. Address by Mr. Spadolini, Minister of Defence of Italy.
3. The European fighter aircraft for the nineties (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1037 and amendments*).
4. Parliaments, public opinion and defence (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft resolution, Doc. 1038*).

### MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 9.35 a.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

#### 1. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

#### 2. Attendance register

The names of representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

#### 3. Revision and interpretation of the Charter and of the Rules of Procedure

*(Report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, Doc. 1039 and amendments)*

*Speakers* (points of order): MM. Schulte, Sinesio, Dejardin, Spies von Büllenheim, Lord Hughes and Mr. Cifarelli.

Mr. Schulte proposed that the report be referred back to committee.

The motion for reference back was agreed to and the report was accordingly referred back to the committee.

#### 4. The European fighter aircraft for the nineties

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Doc. 1037 and amendments)*

The report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions was presented by Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

*Speaker:* Sir John Osborn.

The debate was adjourned.

*The sitting was suspended at 10.35 a.m. and resumed at 10.45 a.m.*

#### 5. Address by Mr. Spadolini, Minister of Defence of Italy

Mr. Spadolini, Minister of Defence of Italy, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Spadolini answered questions put by Mr. Gorla, Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Sinesio, Berger, Cifarelli, Wilkinson, Bianco, Martino, Gansel and Jäger.

#### 6. The European fighter aircraft for the nineties

*(Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1037 and amendments)*

The debate was resumed.

*Speaker:* Mr. Hardy.

*Mr. De Decker, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.*

*Speakers:* MM. Sinesio, Pignion, Zierer and Gansel.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by MM. Pignion and Bassinet:

1. After paragraph (viii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add the following new paragraph:

“ Welcoming the French proposals made in Bonn to the four countries which have agreed to develop the European fighter aircraft that they take part in both fighter aircraft programmes and the proposal made to the Independent European Programme Group partners to start reflecting on the possibility of co-ordinating all military aircraft programmes; ”.

*Speakers:* MM. Pignion and Wilkinson.

An amendment to the amendment was proposed by Mr. Wilkinson to leave out “ Welcoming ” at the beginning of the amendment and insert “ Noting ”.

The amendment to the amendment was agreed to.

The amended amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by MM. Pignion and Bassinet:

2. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “ so as to encourage political as well as industrial integration in the defence field in Western Europe ” and insert “ to allow a larger number of European countries to take part in joint reflection on security matters ”.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 3) was tabled by MM. Pignion and Bassinet:

3. After paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, add the following new paragraph:

“ Take into consideration French proposals for France to have a 5 to 10% participation in the consortium responsible for developing the European fighter aircraft and for Europe to

participate in the programme derived from the experimental Rafale aircraft; ”.

An amendment to the amendment was proposed by Mr. Wilkinson to leave out “ for Europe to participate ” and insert “ for the four EFA partner nations to participate ”.

*Speaker:* Mr. Pignion.

The amendment to the amendment was agreed to.

The amended amendment was agreed to.

*Speaker* (point of order): Mr. Wilkinson.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 431)<sup>1</sup>.

### **7. Parliaments, public opinion and defence**

*(Report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations, Doc. 1038)*

Dame Jill Knight, Chairman of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations, proposed that the report be referred back to committee.

*Speakers:* MM. Enders, Eysink, Sir John Page, Mr. Tummers, Sir Anthony Grant, MM. Bianco and Gansel.

The Assembly agreed to refer the report back to committee.

*Speaker* (point of order): Mr. Gansel.

### **8. Close of the session**

The President declared the thirty-first ordinary session of the Assembly closed.

*The sitting was closed at 1.10 p.m.*

<sup>1</sup>. See page 45.

## APPENDIX

Names of representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance <sup>1</sup>:

<b>Belgium</b>	MM. Unland Zierer	MM. Stoffelen <i>Eysink</i> (Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra) <i>Worrell</i> (van der Werff)
MM. Adriaensens Bogaerts De Decker Dejardin Michel <i>Pécriaux</i> (Noerens) Mrs. Staels-Dompas	<b>Italy</b>  MM. Amadei Bianco Cavaliere Cifarelli Fiandrotti <i>Martino</i> (Giust) Rauti Sarti Sinesio	
<b>France</b>		<b>United Kingdom</b>
MM. Jung Pignion		Sir Frederic Bennett Mr. <i>Woodall</i> (Cox) Sir Anthony Grant Mr. Hardy Sir Paul Hawkins Mr. Hill Lord Hughes Dame Jill Knight Mr. <i>Edwards</i> (McGuire) Dr. Miller Sir John Osborn Sir John Page Lord Reay Sir Dudley Smith Mr. Wilkinson
	<b>Luxembourg</b>	
<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	Mr. Burger	
MM. Ahrens <i>Gansel</i> (Antretter) Berger <i>Jäger</i> (Böhm) Enders Schulte Spies von Büllenheim	<b>Netherlands</b>  MM. Aarts <i>Tummers</i> (van den Bergh) de Kwaadsteniet	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

<b>France</b>	Mrs. Kelly MM. Kittelmann Müller Neumann Reddemann Rumpf Schwarz	<b>Luxembourg</b>  MM. Goerens Hengel
MM. Bassinet Baumel Beix Berrier Bourges Fourré Jeambrun Lagorce Mayoud Ruet Sénès Valleix Vial-Massat Wilquin Wirth	<b>Italy</b>  MM. Antoni Ferrari Aggradi Frasca Gianotti Mezzapesa Milani Pecchioli Rubbi Vecchietti	<b>Netherlands</b>  Mr. Blaauw
<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>		<b>United Kingdom</b>
MM. Gerstl Haase		Sir Geoffrey Finsberg Mr. Jessel Sir Russell Johnston

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the later being given in brackets.

**RECOMMENDATION 431*****on the European fighter aircraft for the nineties***

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming the decision of the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom to initiate the project definition of a common Eurofighter aircraft to meet the operational requirements of their air forces from the mid-1990s;
- (ii) Understanding the reasons which led the Government of France to seek to procure an aircraft based on the Rafale experimental aircraft for the French air force and navy in the 1990s;
- (iii) Mindful of the necessity for the members of the western alliance to utilise their resources for defence as effectively as possible;
- (iv) Conscious of the calls for improved interoperability and standardisation of equipment on the part of Western European Union member nations repeatedly made by this Assembly;
- (v) Recalling the political impetus given to increased rationalisation and collaboration by the European aerospace industry at the WEU colloquy on international aeronautical consortia in London in 1982;
- (vi) Aware that such aircraft currently in service as the Jaguar, Alpha-Jet, Atlantic, Transall, and Tornado have already demonstrated the industrial, logistic and military benefits of collaborative production and joint procurement albeit with differing modes of collaboration and project management in each case;
- (vii) Eager to reform governmental and industrial structures so as to harmonise operational requirements, co-ordinate re-equipment timescales and choices and utilise industrial capacity on a collaborative basis within the WEU member countries;
- (viii) Convinced that such reforms are increasingly urgent in order to meet Western Europe's requirements for military aircraft at reasonable cost and to compete on more equal terms with United States manufacturers both within the NATO market and worldwide;
- (ix) Noting the French proposals made in Bonn to the four countries which have agreed to develop the European fighter aircraft that they take part in both fighter aircraft programmes and the proposal made to the Independent European Programme Group partners to start reflecting on the possibility of co-ordinating all military aircraft programmes;
- (x) Believing that WEU and this Assembly in particular have a vital rôle in helping to overcome national self-interests and the parochial political impediments which stand in the way of Western European integration of the procurement and production of high technology defence equipment,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge the member states to:

1. Ensure that the Independent European Programme Group issues regular reports of its proceedings to the Assembly of WEU in order that members of the Assembly may monitor more closely the progress of Western European arms co-operation;
2. Accede to requests to join WEU which have been or may be made by such non-member countries as Portugal or Spain respectively so as to encourage political as well as industrial integration in the defence field in Western Europe;
3. Utilise to the full the experience gained in the management of previous international collaborative aerospace projects, and in particular of the Panavia Tornado, in deciding the governmental and industrial management structures to be adopted for the Eurofighter;
4. Invite the governments of France on the one hand and of the four Eurofighter consortium nations on the other to request the participation of Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway in the production and procurement of their respective fighter aircraft to replace the F-16 in the late 1990s;

5. Take into consideration French proposals for France to have a 5 to 10% participation in the consortium responsible for developing the European fighter aircraft and for the four EFA partner nations to participate in the programme derived from the experimental Rafale aircraft;
6. Work vigorously towards the adoption of a similar collaborative approach towards the definition, development, production and procurement of other military aircraft for the air forces of Western Europe and in particular of a multirôle aeroplane for such missions as transport, maritime reconnaissance and in-flight refuelling;
7. Persuade the member nations of the Eurofighter consortium to standardise to the maximum extent possible weapon systems and equipment to be incorporated into the Eurofighter so as to enhance the aircraft's interoperability and facilitate its logistic support;
8. Initiate discussions both in the Independent European Programme Group and among the industrial interests concerned on making the Eurofighter consortium a durable industrial arrangement on the lines of Airbus Industrie which could produce a family of military aircraft.

**II**

**OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES**

## SEVENTH SITTING

Monday, 2nd December 1985

### SUMMARY

1. Resumption of the session.
2. Attendance register.
3. Examination of credentials.
4. Address by the President of the Assembly.
5. Observers.
6. Adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the session (Doc. 1028).  
*Speakers:* The President, Sir Dudley Smith (point of order), Mr. Pignion, Mr. Blaauw, Mr. van den Bergh, Mr. Hill, the President, Mr. Blaauw, Mr. van den Bergh, Mr. Blaauw, Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt, Mr. Lagorce, Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Antoni, the President, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Antoni.
7. Action by the Presidential Committee (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Presidential Committee*, Doc. 1045).

*Speakers:* The President, Mr. Reddemann (*Vice-President*), Mr. Gansel, Mr. Reddemann (*Vice-President*).

8. Address by Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU.
9. Disarmament (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation*, Docs. 1040 and 1043 and amendments).  
*Speakers:* The President, Mr. Blaauw (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Giust, Mr. Murphy, Mr. de Vries, Mr. Berger, Mr. Sinesio, Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt, Mr. Antoni, Mr. Müller, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Cifarelli, Mr. Blaauw (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Pignion (*Chairman of the committee*), Mr. Antoni, Mr. Blaauw, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Antoni, Mr. Pignion, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Blaauw, Mr. Antoni, Mr. Unland, Mr. Blaauw.
10. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

*The sitting was opened at 2.45 p.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

### **1. Resumption of the session**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

I declare resumed the thirty-first ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union, which was adjourned on 23rd May 1985, at the end of the sixth sitting.

### **2. Attendance register**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

### **3. Examination of credentials**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the examination of the credentials of the new representatives and substitutes nominated since our Assembly's last part-session, whose names have been published in Notice No. 7.

1. See page 15.

In accordance with Rule 6 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, all these credentials have been attested by a statement of ratification from the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

I welcome our new colleagues.

### **4. Address by the President of the Assembly**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Members of the Permanent Council, Secretary-General, Ladies and Gentlemen, in a few moments you will be asked to ratify a recommendation adopted as a matter of urgency by the Presidential Committee after the disaster in Mexico last October. Since then, there has been another disaster on a tragic scale in another Latin American country – Colombia. Faithful to the course set by the Presidential Committee, I ask you to stand for one minute's silence in memory of the Mexican and Colombian victims of these two cataclysms.

*(The Assembly stood in tribute)*

The message I have to convey to you at the opening of this second part of the thirty-first ordinary session of the Assembly is certainly far less optimistic than those we received from the



*The President (continued)*

WEU Council at our last three sessions. Last June, our seven governments, which had agreed on the Rome declaration, seemed to have the firm intention of giving new life to WEU, and on 27th June 1985 the Franco-German proposal for a treaty on the political union of Europe, published on the eve of the Milan summit meeting, presented a view of relations between WEU, the European Communities and the future European union mirroring that often expressed by our Assembly, particularly in its insistence that signatory states wishing to co-operate more closely in security matters would do so in Western European Union.

That view is that, in areas for which it is responsible and alongside the European Community, WEU should constitute the first roughing-out of what European union is eventually to be.

Indeed, from the outset, WEU materialised two intentions specifically included in the modified Brussels Treaty, i.e. to bring about a union of Europeans and to organise Europe's participation in the Atlantic Alliance. The report to be presented at this session by our colleague, Mr. Berrier, on behalf of the General Affairs Committee, defines, in a single notion, that of the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, the vocation which has always been that of WEU.

However, as we know, the conditions that would allow it to play this rôle today are no longer what they were in 1954. For one thing, the European Community has come into existence and developed in the course of these thirty years and for another, armament control, WEU's main activity, has lost all political significance. For those two reasons, the Assembly welcomed the Rome declaration of October 1984 because it swept away the encumbrances of the past and, above all, because it defined the directions in which Western European Union needed to develop its activities in order to attain the aims assigned to it by the treaty.

The manner in which the declaration did this was one we considered particularly satisfactory since, as we were able to see in the collection of documents prepared at the time by Mr. Masciadri, it reflected the views that the Assembly has been expressing for a very long time. The will expressed by the Council to develop a close relationship with the Assembly seemed to us equally satisfactory.

But today it may be wondered whether the Council has not, since early summer in 1985, been moving steadily away from the prospects it opened up at the end of 1984. The question already arose last February when the working group set up by the Council to examine disarmament

questions gave up before its work had even really got started.

But even more serious in my view is the fact that, at its meeting in Rome last October, the Council in fact abandoned its attempt to co-ordinate our countries' answers to the United States Government's proposal to take part in the strategic defence initiative, which it had undertaken to do at its April meeting in Bonn. We know a working group met during the summer to prepare this harmonisation. Varyingly well-informed press reports in July suggested the project was doomed to failure. But what were we told by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Mr. Andreotti, himself, at the Rome meeting? It was that each country would take part in the research stage of the SDI programmes as it thought fit and that the political and military implications of the American initiative would one day be studied, but he did not say when.

In other words the Council was in fact giving up the attempt to harmonise European positions on the SDI. This is a serious matter because, whether we like it or not, the American initiative implies fundamental technological and strategic changes for Europe's defence. I find it extremely disturbing that the Europeans should show themselves incapable of approaching this decisive turning point for the future of their security together.

For its part, the Presidential Committee decided to devote the major part of the session starting today to consideration of the American strategic defence initiative and its implications for Europe in the three areas of technology, defence and policy. The three committees concerned will be presenting reports to you on this subject, which we are to debate on Tuesday and Wednesday, and a major effort has been made, with some degree of success, to enable the Assembly to vote on a single draft recommendation reflecting the work of the three committees. But this debate could well be a waste of time if the Council for its part fails to fulfil its commitment to examine from the European standpoint the participation of our countries in the SDI and the consequences of this undertaking for Europe's security.

If we now consider the other aspects of the programme which the Council set itself in the Rome declaration, we have to admit that very little has been achieved in 1985. The process of setting up the three new agencies is dragging on with alarming slowness, as far as we know their remits have still not been fully defined and, if we are to believe the rumours about the staff they are to be given, it is to be feared that they will not have the means of carrying out the duties that a meaningful revival of WEU would require.

*The President (continued)*

Yet the many contacts I have made in European circles concerned with defence matters since I became President of this Assembly convince me there is a wide demand for active, efficient WEU agencies, and one has only to listen to this demand to see what an important rôle WEU can play if it is given the means.

I find it equally disturbing that, at a time when regional conflicts are increasing in number, particularly in the Middle East, and when local wars, like the fighting that has been in progress in Afghanistan for over five years and the war between Iran and Iraq, are going on and on without the faintest sign of a solution, the Council, which the treaty requires to meet to examine any threat to international peace, has not seen fit to devote a single moment to these matters. Yet the visit which the Presidential Committee recently paid to the People's Republic of China has confirmed my view, should confirmation be needed, that the rest of the world is waiting to hear Europe's views. They will be heeded if only they are voiced.

The recent resurgence of terrorism is also one of those threats to international peace and security that, according to the Brussels Treaty and, again, the Rome declaration, should oblige the WEU Council to meet and make its voice heard. How can the Council fail to see that and allow Europe to remain an absentee in world politics?

The Assembly, too, is faced with the problem of the resources the governments grant to WEU to an extent that is increasingly difficult to bear – a point I make with restraint and in keen awareness of reality and the responsibilities we all have to face. For several years the representatives of our governments seem to have been agreed on the principle of zero growth in the budget allocated to us, whereas their wish that WEU be reactivated has had a considerable impact on the Assembly's activities. The Council has encouraged us in this, particularly in regard to relations between the Assembly and the Council, our relations with countries that are members of NATO but not of WEU, and keeping the public informed. We have willingly carried out the tasks it asked us to accomplish, but neither the technical resources nor the staff available to the Office of the Clerk enable it to give the parliamentarians the assistance they require. We cannot expect to reactivate WEU without giving it the resources it needs to act. Instead, as a result of a series of circumstances and financial artifices, application of the zero growth rate has actually reduced the resources available to the Assembly. That reduction, accumulating over the years, has made a cutback in our financial resources that can now be estimated to be at least 14%.

To justify this insufficiency of resources, certain governments naturally make the excuse of national budgetary requirements. But the WEU budget is so small that such explanations cannot be taken seriously; they cannot camouflage the divide between official language and what is actually done. Let us be clear: is it possible that one or other of these seven governments is specifically intent on preventing the attainment of what they claim to want, i.e. the building of the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance? There is no need to tell you that this situation has become intolerable and that instead of reactivation we must expect a curtailment of our activities if the Council does not agree to reconsider very seriously the options it has so far chosen in regard to the Assembly's budget. It should be noted in passing that, in the case of its own secretariat, the Council has shown far greater understanding of what reactivating WEU requires.

But there is yet another reason to fear that the decisions taken in Rome will not be given effect, and that is the manifest deterioration in relations between the Council and the Assembly. It will be remembered that improving these relations and developing more contacts between the two WEU bodies were major features of the Rome declaration. I must say that the two most recent ministers to be Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Mr. Hans-Dietrich Genscher until June 1985 and Mr. Giulio Andreotti since, have done everything possible to develop relations between the Council and the Assembly, and I have been able to maintain very close contact with both. I also wish to pay tribute to what our new Secretary-General, Mr. Alfred Cahen, has done to invigorate the Permanent Council, to give public opinion a better understanding of WEU and to facilitate relations between the Council and the Assembly.

However, it also has to be noted that since the Assembly's last session it has been impossible – for reasons beyond our control – to convene the Committee for Relations with the Council which we set up specifically in response to the request made to us. Again, the Permanent Council was unable to agree to a meeting or consultation with the Presidential Committee in conditions allowing serious work to be done, i.e. with simultaneous interpretation.

There is obviously a link between the policy adopted by the Council on major questions such as the SDI, disarmament and threats to peace outside the North Atlantic Treaty area and the difficulties encountered in the dialogue between the Council and the Assembly. That dialogue cannot be just polite conversation: it must cover the Council's political activities; if there are no serious political activities, there will be no relations between the Council and the Assembly either.

*The President (continued)*

One may wonder about this curious evaporation of a European will that only a few months ago was being expressed with some force. There seems to be no new event to explain it and it all looks as though the European governments were overcome by a strange form of paralysis when it came to converting words into deeds. Clearly enough, it is difficult to take decisions that go beyond mere words when unanimity is required. But the only reason why the threshold cannot be crossed by countries which are basically in fact agreed is the absence of a real resolve.

For all those reasons there is today no avoiding a number of questions about the nature and extent of the new activities of this organisation. Our Assembly is intent on keeping its debates at the highest political level and ensuring that the full application of the modified Brussels Treaty remains at the centre of its activities. But a parliamentary assembly cannot exist on its own. If the Council is not a real partner in dialogue for us, if it fails to give us the material resources to carry out our work and if it does not tell us precisely what its political aims and programme of work are, the dialogue cannot be continued. Moreover, public opinion will no longer be interested.

It would probably be unjust to accuse the governments of having promised in Rome to take a road they intended later not to follow. It would probably not even be fair to accuse them of having given up following the road since. But it has to be said that so far they have failed to overcome the administrative and other kinds of inertia that at every step have forced them off the course they had set themselves.

It is the Assembly's proper rôle to ask them why and to remind them of the decisions they took last year. In spite of some occasional hiccups, the Assembly for its part has made a fair job of formulating from the conflicting currents that move European public opinion and very naturally divide it a certain conception of what WEU's place in Europe might be. That is what entitles me, as President of this Assembly, to put three questions in advance to the ministers who are to address us during the session.

First, I would ask them whether they are still determined to implement the decisions they took in Rome on 27th October 1984 and to organise the Council's work accordingly. Then I would like them to tell us whether they are resolved to give effective, permanent remits to the three new agencies and to provide them and the Assembly with the resources needed to put them into effect. Finally, we want to know whether they are still convinced of the need to tackle

matters relating to the security of our continent amongst ourselves as Europeans.

If their answers to these questions are negative, all we have done to improve relations between Council and Assembly will have been in vain and all that will be left for disabled WEU to do will be to vegetate and collapse amidst general indifference pending a possible new reawakening. After the repeated setbacks encountered by the Ten in setting up political Europe once again in Milan last June, and whilst not wishing to anticipate the decisions to be taken in Luxembourg today and tomorrow, it would be of most disturbing significance for the future of Europe were the Seven to abandon the Rome declaration.

But if the ministers' answers are positive, as I trust they will be, the Assembly will then need to give them no respite until they have at last turned their words into political deeds whose impact will certainly not go unobserved by European public opinion – also tired of waiting for the governments' fine words to lead at last to Europe.

It is therefore a solemn warning that I wish to convey to our governments today. I can do so because the work of the Assembly and its committees demonstrates the will of the Assembly to continue with its work and its dialogue with the Council. Today it is up to the Council to give us an answer. Not to do so would be a serious matter not only for WEU but also for Europe and for Europe's future. In so far as WEU prefigures, in its own specific areas, the European union of tomorrow, the failure of its reactivation as envisaged in 1984 would augur ill for Europe.

I conclude with the hope that the coming months will belie the fears I have expressed here. All your work, the reports of your committees and what I hear off the record have convinced me that when I address the governments in this way I am speaking for the entire Assembly, and I wish to thank you all for the support you have been good enough to afford me in this difficult period. You know as well as I do that the words of the president of a parliamentary assembly carry weight only to the extent that they are backed up by all the members of that assembly. I hope that your debates will show the governments and public opinion that this is indeed the case. The issue for us is one of political will.

**5. Observers**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I have to inform the Assembly of the presence at our debates of the following observers: Mr. Fernando Cardoso from Portugal, Mr. Rafael Estrella Pedrola, Chairman of the Foreign

*The President (continued)*

Affairs Committee of the Spanish Senate, Mr. Manuel Medina, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Spanish Chamber of Deputies, Mr. Manuel Cantarero, member of the Spanish Chamber of Deputies, Mr. Jan Petersen, Chairman of the Foreign and Constitutional Affairs Committee of the Norwegian Storting, Mr. Gunnar Berge, member of the Norwegian Delegation to the North Atlantic Assembly, and Mr. Lasse Budtz and Mr. Peder Sonderby, members of the Danish Folketing.

I welcome also members of the Permanent Council present at this part-session.

**6. Adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the session**

(Doc. 1028)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the session, Document 1028.

I call Sir Dudley Smith on a point of order.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. I wish to detain the Assembly for a short time on a point of order of some consequence, particularly in view of the important remarks that you have just made and in view of the press conference that you held this morning, the report of which some members have had the opportunity to read.

The Assembly will recall that the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, of which I am the Chairman, with the sanction of the Presidential Committee and its full agreement, as is usual, submitted its budget to the Council of WEU on 30th September of this year. We have been told informally that that budget was roundly rejected. We have been waiting since to hear the proposals that the Council is putting forward to us for what may or may not be done in the coming financial year. Until this morning I had been expecting to receive an answer but I have to tell the Assembly that so far no response has been received from the Council.

In view of your remarks and the whole operation of this organisation, I certainly regard that as an act of gross discourtesy to fully elected representatives of the people, which we are. It is sometimes said in my country that when the Inland Revenue writes to you it expects a reply by return of post but it is very negligent when it comes to answering letters. It is rather like that with the Council, because if we do not respond when it contacts us for information we are reprimanded.

We have had that before with the previous Secretary-General. However, it does not extend to us the courtesy of replying in respect of the budget that we have submitted.

Even more important than the amour-propre of this situation is the problem that we, as elected representatives, face in trying to formulate our programmes, proposals and activities as an elected organisation in the course of the next twelve months. With the greatest good will in the world, that is almost impossible because of the situation in which we find ourselves.

Echoing your words, and going even further, it makes reactivation of Western European Union, certainly where this Assembly is concerned, a hollow sham. It means that, far from doing extra work and engaging in increased activities, we are being subjected to conditions that mean that we shall wither away, having our life-blood cut off by at least five or six representatives of the seven countries forming WEU.

In those circumstances, and because of the importance of this matter, I believe that the Assembly ought to bear in mind that, while we have the report of the Budget Committee in relation to the budget that has been submitted, there is no budget at the moment. I do not believe that we can adopt the agenda for this important meeting without there being a full consideration by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs of the exact position, with the committee making a direct recommendation to the Assembly.

I apologise to those who seek to take part in our debates and I stress that no discourtesy is intended when I move that we adjourn the sitting for a short while – I hope no longer than half an hour – for the Committee on Budgetary Affairs to convene and consider the position and to return with a recommendation to the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I believe I speak for the Assembly in accepting this request. It seems to me well founded. I shall therefore suspend the sitting for about twenty minutes to enable the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration to hold an extraordinary meeting.

The sitting is suspended.

(*The sitting was suspended at 3.20 p.m. and resumed at 4 p.m.*)

The sitting is resumed.

I call Sir Dudley Smith.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – I am glad to tell you, Mr. President, that the Committee on Budgetary Affairs has concluded its meeting and is of the unanimous opinion – I empha-

*Sir Dudley Smith (continued)*

size the unanimity – that the following resolution should be put before the Assembly:

“ The Assembly,

(i) Considering the procedure for approving Assembly budgets as set out in the attached note;”

– that relates to the rule that I can submit to you in writing –

“ (ii) Considering that the opinion of the Council has not yet been communicated to the Assembly;

(iii) Considering that the Assembly is therefore unable to vote in full knowledge of the facts on a budget which provides for various options and sets priorities,

DECIDES

That the draft budget is withdrawn from the agenda of the session. ”

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly and in particular Rule 32, I declare that I have received your proposals, unanimously adopted by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration. I would inform the Assembly that you, Mr. Chairman and Rapporteur, will have an opportunity to ask the Assembly to take a decision on this draft when the order of the day on the budget is discussed during our debates on Wednesday morning. In the meantime, your paper will be distributed to all members of the Assembly.

We interrupted the sitting when considering the order of business. Are there any comments?

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – With regard to Mr. van den Bergh's report, it had been agreed, following your letter of 30th August and the meeting of the Presidential Committee on 24th September 1985, that we ought to try to arrive at a single report, the General Affairs Committee and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions being given the task, as the text says, of reporting on the aspects of the SDI falling within their competence.

I would like to know, Mr. President, as would the committee, how this debate is going to proceed and whether we are indeed going to discuss just one draft recommendation at the end of the reports.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – As specified in the order of the day for Tuesday, 3rd December, at 9.30 a.m. under the general head-

ing WEU and the strategic defence initiative, we now have the presentation of the reports of the three committees that have studied this problem: first, the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, second, the General Affairs Committee and, third, the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions. That will be followed by a general debate on the three reports which have a common subject.

After the debate, the vote will be taken on the reports on Wednesday, 4th December.

With regard to the SDI project itself, which is the central theme of the report by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, it is the recommendation presented by that committee that will be used as a basis for the Assembly's debate. The intention is to adopt a text with or without amendment but it is this text which will be debated. Immediately afterwards, we shall vote on the other texts presented by the General Affairs Committee and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, with or without amendment.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We are agreed.

I call Mr. Blaauw.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – There are three sets of remarks that I want to make on the subject of the order of business. The first relates to what Mr. Pignion has said and to your reply, Mr. President. It is not the right approach that you have put forward. The main debate is on the strategic defence initiative. That was the subject that we agreed upon. If we have a mixed debate on the three reports, we shall end in chaos. I propose that we debate the strategic defence initiative issue, which is the main subject of Mr. van den Bergh's report, and take into account in that debate those parts of Mr. Berrier's and Mr. Lenzer's reports that deal with the subject. Then we should vote on the strategic defence initiative matter and proceed later to the other parts of Mr. Berrier's and Mr. Lenzer's reports. In that way we shall have a structured debate.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I will answer you in a moment, Mr. Blaauw.

I call Mr. van den Bergh.

Mr. van den BERGH (*Netherlands*). – This matter was debated by the Socialist Group this morning. We felt exactly the same as the Liberal Group. I have before me the decision of the Presidential Committee, which says that the debate should be held on the basis of a single draft recommendation, to be submitted by the

*Mr. van den Bergh (continued)*

Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. The proposal now before us will mean that three reports will be discussed at the same time. Each contains substantial draft recommendations. With respect to my colleagues who are the rapporteurs of the other committees, those reports deal with many other issues, some of which have little or nothing to do with the strategic defence initiative.

I suggest that to make it easier for us we have the first, proper, debate on the strategic defence initiative, to include the amendments drafted by the General Affairs Committee. The second part of the debate could then deal with Mr. Berrier's and Mr. Lenzer's reports as far as they reflect issues that are slightly to do with the strategic defence initiative. I share Mr. Blaauw's view that that was the impression gained in the Defence Committee. The Assembly should beware of dealing in one debate with three draft recommendations. Such a course could be confusing, to say the least.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Hill also asked to speak and then the debate on the point of order will be closed.

I call Mr. Hill.

Mr. HILL (*United Kingdom*). – My committee reluctantly had to table twelve amendments to Mr. van den Bergh's report. The three reports merge and overlap. They are not three separate pillars of defence in Europe or of our examination of European defence.

We should be wise to take the three reports together, with the amendments being taken as soon as possible after the general debate.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and Gentlemen, our problem is how our debate on the strategic defence initiative project should be organised. The Presidential Committee, anxious to have the General Affairs Committee and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions as fully involved as possible, alongside the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, had – as you know – decided there should be a joint debate, under the one heading WEU and the strategic defence initiative, covering the reports of all three committees in order to avoid too large a number of speakers in three successive and obviously inter-related debates for the reasons that have just been outlined. So I think we have two things to do: the first is to decide whether we go along with the decision of the Presidential Committee or take another, since the Assembly has supreme authority. If we agree to follow the procedure approved by the Presidential Committee I think we could find a formula that would suit everyone. The first, which seems to me perfec-

tly acceptable, would be for the three reports to be presented together. We would thus have an overall view of the problem. Next, we could organise the debate, at the request of speakers, under three separate headings: those wanting to speak on the SDI project, those simply wanting to speak on the project plus the "general affairs" report and those wanting to speak on scientific questions, in order to prevent too much overlapping. When it comes to the vote, the problem will not arise because it will be on the report of Mr. van den Bergh, of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments with or without amendment.

So the problem does not concern the voting but the organisation of the discussion, the presentation of the reports and the general debate.

I thought this arrangement would be acceptable to the majority of the members of this Assembly. The chairmen of the committees involved gave their agreement and, up to now, I had not received any objections.

The other solution is to have three successive debates, that is, first a debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments with or without amendment presented by the other committees, second a debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee regarding the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance followed by a vote with or without amendment and lastly a debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions. There is no half-way solution.

I shall now put these two solutions to the vote.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – We are discussing the order of business.

The PRESIDENT. – But you said that you had a point of order.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – No, I did not say that I had a point of order. I said that we were discussing the order of business.

Mr. van den BERGH (*Netherlands*). – There is no reason for you, Mr. President, to create more difficulties than you already face. Let us be frank.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I shall not accept a debate on a point of procedure. We have applied the decision of the Presidential Committee. The Assembly will therefore decide on one of the two formulae.

Mr. DREYFUS-SCHMIDT (*France*) (Translation). – I ask to speak on a point of order.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Points of order are out of order!

I am quite prepared for a debate on the proposals I have just made but I do not wish the Assembly to go into a debate on procedure.

*The President (continued)*

The discussion will be on the choice between the chairmen's proposal and the proposal for three separate debates.

Who wishes to speak?...

This is my final list of members wishing to speak: Mr. van den Bergh, Mr. Blaauw, Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt, Mr. Lagorce, Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. Cavaliere and Mr. Antoni.

When I said I did not want a debate on procedure I knew what I was talking about.

I ask each speaker to be as brief as possible and we shall do everything we can to satisfy everyone, if that is possible.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I would ask you to follow carefully the comments made and the answers given so as not to prolong this debate on the organisation of our debate on the SDI.

I call Mr. van den Bergh.

Mr. van den BERGH (*Netherlands*). – I was asked to ask the other committees for an opinion on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. That was done and Mr. Hill, on behalf of his committee, drafted a number of amendments, which will be part of our debate. We are following the procedure adopted by the Assembly.

The problem arises over the organisation of the debate. I have gone through the three reports and draft recommendations. The report from the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions contains only one short reference to SDI. That report, along with the report of the General Affairs Committee, deals with many other issues. Surely it is logical that we deal first with the SDI and Mr. Hill's amendments. He need not worry; he has the right to draft amendments and he is guaranteed a debate on them. We should deal subsequently with the other two reports, which cover so many other issues that I am unable – and not authorised by my committee – to give an opinion on them. They are not within the responsibilities of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. I urge you, Mr. President, to organise the debate so that we deal with SDI in depth and subsequently deal with the amendments on that report and afterwards the reports of the General Affairs Committee and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions. Your decision, Mr. President, was that we have a discussion on a single draft recommendation. Under the new proposal we shall have a discussion on three draft recommendations. That will be confusing for the Assembly. I fully support Mr. Blaauw's suggestion.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Blaauw.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – I should like formally to move my proposal, the words of which are slightly different from those proposed by Mr. van den Bergh.

I have three other suggestions. We are discussing item 4 on the order of business. Item 5 concerns the report by Mr. Reddemann, which was received by members only today. We have not been able to discuss it in my Liberal Group. For that reason I propose that we at least postpone discussion on the report to the end of the session, or that we put it on the agenda of the next session.

My group has information that a document is circulating in the Council of Ministers about the strategic defence initiative. We are devoting one and a half days to a discussion of SDI but we have no knowledge of the thoughts circulating in the Council of Ministers. I know that we cannot always have all the documents, in the possession of permanent representatives, or of the Council of Ministers, but on SDI specifically it would be useful if we knew the contents of the formal basic document.

I regret that our agenda does not include a discussion of the report about emerging technologies. This week, NATO Ministers of Defence will convene in Brussels to discuss the conceptual military framework and emerging technologies. For the first time WEU had the opportunity to discuss a subject in advance of the Council of Ministers. What is the history of the report by Mr. van den Bergh? The non-controversial part of it came out in May. The Defence Committee wanted to debate it on 22nd November.

Mr. van den BERGH (*Netherlands*). – It was finished.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – It was finished but it was not sent to members. There is no problem because the report is not controversial. It is a good report and we could have discussed it on 22nd November. Unfortunately, I was not present at the Presidential Committee meeting in London but I went home after the meeting of the Defence Committee convinced that there were no problems in connection with the item. To my astonishment I see that emerging technology is not on the agenda. I have sorrow in my heart that we have missed an opportunity.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt.

Mr. DREYFUS-SCHMIDT (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, you must have understood that, far from wanting to waste the Assembly's time, we are trying to save it.

*Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt (continued)*

The objectors are not challenging the decisions of the Presidential Committee – they are asking for them to be applied.

What, in your great wisdom, you had provided was that there should be three rapporteurs, one draft recommendation and opinions which, if there were disagreements, could be turned into amendments.

Our request is that the two draft recommendations wrongly produced by the General Affairs Committee and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions be rejected either later on or in the debate itself.

The fact is that you yourself asked that the reports by the two other committees, the General Affairs Committee and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, should deal with those aspects of the SDI that came within their field. And that was that!

It is because they are not doing so that we are in difficulty. Now it is very simple: we ask you, Mr. President, to apply the decision of the Presidential Committee and to limit the debate to the draft recommendation of the committee for which Mr. van den Bergh is Rapporteur, with the amendments of the General Affairs Committee – the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions being at liberty to submit as an amendment the only phrase in its draft recommendation that concerns the SDI and is, incidentally, in conflict with Mr. van den Bergh's draft report.

That is what we strongly request, Mr. President. We were off target; it is normal in WEU to correct our aim.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Lagorce.

Mr. LAGORCE (*France*) (Translation). – I shall be brief because Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt has made my task easier. You want three separate debates but I have prepared my speech on the basis of the three reports that I read carefully. I do not know when I will be speaking, but I shall be dealing mainly with Mr. van den Bergh's report, and making some references to the others. A single debate would have been more logical.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Stoffelen.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – The Presidential Committee decided to organise a debate on SDI and to ask the Defence Committee to prepare a report and recommendations. We also asked two other committees to prepare an opinion. I thought that, as in the Council of

Europe, we would have a debate on the draft recommendation and on amendments proposed by other committees. However, a different procedure is to be followed. We have three recommendations and many of us foresee enormous confusion if we try to debate three different recommendations at the same time.

I have come to the same conclusion as the Presidential Committee – that we should have a debate on the recommendation presented on behalf of the Defence Committee and on the amendments from the General Affairs Committee and the Scientific Committee. We can then debate the other two recommendations. I come to the same conclusion as Mr. Blaauw and many others.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen. The situation is certainly rather extraordinary, but we must debate this most important problem of the strategic defence initiative. Unlike some members I find that the first part of the title of the three reports is the same. The title of the report by the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions is WEU and the strategic defence initiative; the report by the General Affairs Committee deals with WEU and the strategic defence initiative; and the same wording is used in Mr. van den Bergh's report. We are therefore discussing a single problem. At the same time, we must remember that it takes various forms. The Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments considers aspects of the problem for which it is competent while the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and the General Affairs Committee discuss it and propose solutions in terms of their spheres of competence.

In my view, therefore, there can be no debate if we do not take the three reports together; it is out of the question that Mr. van den Bergh's draft recommendation should be discussed and voted on without hearing the views of the other two committees. The two other draft recommendations do cover other aspects but are nevertheless concerned with a subject linked with defence and security and can therefore be regarded as two very broad expressions of opinion. Take for example the view expressed by scientists and industrialists as recorded in one section of Mr. Lenzer's report. The situation is not wholly clear but I do not think we can resolve the problem by deciding to take Mr. van den Bergh's report alone and then possibly the two others. So we can discuss them all at the same time; in any case there is only one debate and the subjects are identical. Then a vote can be taken as proposed by the President.



The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and Gentlemen, I said that the list of speakers was closed. Afterwards I shall call members of the Assembly to give their views on the two solutions that seem to emerge from this discussion but I had decided that the list of speakers was closed.

I call Mr. Antoni.

Mr. ANTONI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. President. I wish to support Mr. Blaauw's proposal. In view of the way the committees did their work, we should respect what is a factual interpretation of the work of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Mr. van den Bergh's first report did not deal with SDI alone but also covered military strategies, emerging weaponry and other things.

This report was discussed and at the same time the other committees discussed other matters such as the European pillar, shortcomings in space and other subjects. Then the question of Geneva arose, requiring Europe to seek a common attitude on SDI. In the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments the Rapporteur was told that that section should be taken out of the report and the draft recommendation – I have all the information before me – or in other words everything not relating to SDI should be taken out. Emerging strategies and other ideas were to be discussed later. This was how the report on SDI was drafted; we discussed it at length in the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and reached a solution. It will be for the Assembly to decide whether it was the right one. But then it was said that the other committees should suspend consideration of the questions on their agenda, should give their view on this subject and should submit it to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, whose opinion would then be discussed in the Assembly.

Mr. President, if we were not already convinced the recent remarks of our Italian colleague confirm this approach and the proper solution is certainly not by way of an unending general debate. This is the problem to be discussed; the committees' view has been stated and embodied in amendments. I therefore ask you, Mr. President, whatever your own impression may be, to accept that this is what happened. Perhaps when you do consider the facts you may be able, as I do, to support Mr. Blaauw's proposal.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We will have to take a decision on that subject but before consulting you I would like to answer Mr. Blaauw who asked me three specific questions.

The statement by Mr. Reddemann, Vice-President of the Assembly, who will be presenting the report on the activities of the Presiden-

tial Committee in the absence of Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, is a communication to the Assembly on which there is generally no debate. When I say generally, I am very modest, Mr. Blaauw, because we introduced this method at the last session. Until now the Assembly has not been informed about the work of the Presidential Committee. This time there is a report. We call it a communication with ratification by the Assembly because no one can change the past. Be reassured, like you I am tied by an order of business that has to be kept to as strictly as possible. I shall see that all the other items on today's orders of the day are taken. Be in no doubt about my concern in that regard.

As regards information, I fully share your view. I hope that measures can be taken accordingly, in order to provide the right material for our discussions. For the moment we only have the information in the committee's reports.

Thirdly, regarding the second part of the report presented by Mr. van den Bergh on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, as it emerged from the discussions of the committee in London, only this part was communicated to the Presidential Committee at its meeting. It was simply noted. We were not informed of the other part on which the committee apparently did not vote. It is not for the Presidential Committee to interfere in committees' discussions. We noted the situation. That is why – and perhaps I agree with you on the comments to be made regarding the substance – we have only one part of Mr. van den Bergh's report at this session.

I nevertheless greatly hope that all the scientific and technological problems can be brought up and, in any case, I am sure this will unquestionably be one of our major debates of the June session. Those are my answers to the questions you asked me, Mr. Blaauw.

As to how our debate on the SDI should be organised, there is a point of common sense that I would draw from the exchange of views we have just had. We must as far as possible have a debate with clearcut boundaries on the SDI problem and avoid any overlap with matters not directly related to that problem. We also have the decision taken by the Presidential Committee on behalf of the Assembly in accordance with the powers it possesses to organise the work of the three committees concerned around the subject of WEU and the SDI. It is not for me at this point to address the problem of the way in which the Presidential Committee's decision has been applied because it is not just a question of noting the present situation as it compares with the Presidential Committee's decision; there is also the way in which the Presidential Committee's decisions have been implemented; and some of these, either because they have been

*The President (continued)*

implemented or have only been implemented in part have left us in the highly complicated situation now described.

I do not want to go into detail. The Assembly is not going to launch into retrospective analysis of this basic problem of procedures and working methods. In order to avoid having votes that could be contradictory on a problem which seems to me one of common sense, I therefore propose the following: firstly, to let the rapporteurs speak on the SDI as they think fit, in the hope that the reactions of the rapporteurs for the two other committees to the report on the SDI of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments will in fact relate to the way in which the two committees respond to Mr. van den Bergh's report; secondly, to have the debate on the European pillar and to wind up with the debate on the scientific aspects.

Would you go along with a simple solution that could, I hope, satisfy everybody? We shall have a general debate – Mr. Lagorce's comment makes sense to me too – but I am quite prepared to propose that the Assembly have a very specific discussion on the separate draft recommendations – defence, general affairs and scientific questions. The sitting will open with Mr. van den Bergh's report and then I shall call the two other committees for their opinion on the report. Then there will be a general debate. Any objections so far?...

Next, rather than take a vote, because I would like a very big majority on all these matters, we could ask the other rapporteurs to enlarge on points not directly related to the SDI but touched on in their reports. If there are any speakers on these partial reports we will give them the floor. If not, there will obviously be no debate on these two supplementary reports, and we will then go straight to the vote on the SDI project.

To my mind this would seem to meet the intentions of the Presidential Committee and to safeguard the SDI debate in the way meant by those who have spoken. I think we would probably have arrived at a solution of this kind.

I would appeal to those who have not followed this matter with the same keen interest as the speakers who have given their views and I thank them for their understanding.

I would draw the Assembly's attention to the fact – a point I made in my speech – that we are entering a period when the repercussions of WEU's political problems and of its Assembly in particular, are considerable. We cannot be offhand in the preparation of our sessions. When the Presidential Committee, wholly representative of the Assembly, takes certain deci-

sions I should like to have the unanimous support of the Assembly so that those decisions are applied without demur when it is a matter of organising the Assembly's work.

During the summer, your President found himself in situations when he was practically left to his own devices and when he tried, as often happens, to be compliant rather than firm. The debate we have just had shows that my compliance was not perhaps the best guide in the case concerned.

From now on, to avoid such debates, the Assembly must trust the Presidential Committee. If the decisions taken are to be applied in session they also have to be applied beforehand, during the preparations for the debates. I know what I am talking about and those involved in this important matter know too.

Does the Assembly agree to the proposal I have just made regarding the organisation of our debates?...

This procedure is adopted.

In order to facilitate our work, I propose that amendments to Wednesday's texts be tabled before tomorrow afternoon's sitting opens. After that deadline no amendments will be accepted. The debate has to be prepared by the President's Office and, in view of what I have just said, the voting will perhaps come a little earlier than foreseen.

Are there any objections?...

I call Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. This is simply a point of clarification. I think that I endorse the voices of those around me. I am not sure what we have decided. So far as I know, the three rapporteurs will present their views tomorrow morning.

The PRESIDENT. – Yes.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – Then we shall have a general debate. However, there are reports by two other committees with very large majorities. I do not think that it is within your power, or even that of the Presidential Committee, to prevent a vote on Wednesday either to refer those matters back to the committee, to reject them or to endorse them. I am not making a political point. May I assume that your ruling is that at some stage on Wednesday Mr. Berrier's report – that is why I say that my point is not political – and Mr. Lenzer's report will be voted on? We cannot simply pretend that those reports do not exist, because they do. We must either reject them, refer them back to a committee or vote on them. I assume that you mean that at some stage on Wednesday we shall vote on all three reports.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – You have understood perfectly, Sir Frederic. That is what the Assembly has decided.

I call Mr. Antoni.

Mr. ANTONI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I would like to be clear on one point. When will the debate on Mr. van den Bergh's proposal finish.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I cannot answer Mr. Antoni's question as to when the general debate will finish. It depends on the number of speakers and the time allowed to each. I hope that the voting can be early enough for the Assembly to be adequately informed when it moves on to the second major debate in the presence of ministers and, in particular, the Chairman-in-Office of the Council who will have a very important statement to make to us on Wednesday afternoon. With that in mind, we shall organise the debate as best we can, Ladies and Gentlemen.

Are there no further objections?...

So we are agreed on the deadline for the tabling of amendments.

Any other comments on the draft order of business?...

The order of business is adopted.

### 7. Action by the Presidential Committee

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Presidential Committee, Doc. 1045)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Presidential Committee on action by the Presidential Committee and the ratification of that action, Document 1045.

I call Mr. Reddemann, Vice-President of the Assembly.

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, as we have already lost a great deal of time through the unavoidable suspension of the sitting and the lengthy debate on the order of business, I shall reduce my statement, which I had already intended to be brief, to just five comments.

First, despite all the scepticism, the Presidential Committee of our Assembly has taken the decision of the Council of Ministers to reactivate Western European Union very seriously. It has therefore sought closer contacts with the Council of Ministers so that this reactivation might be undertaken jointly. My report is a record of the activities in this connection.

Second, contacts with the Council of Ministers were greatly assisted by the co-operative attitude of the then President of the Council of Ministers, the German Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher. The two conferences at Schloss Gymnich proved fruitful and should serve as a model for further talks between the Council of Ministers and the Assembly.

Third, the efforts to reactivate WEU have aroused the interest of third countries in this organisation. First Portugal, and now Spain, Denmark and Norway are considering the idea of co-operating with a reactivated Western European Union. Consequently, we shall very soon face the task of considering whether other countries may accede to Western European Union and under what conditions.

Fourth, the attitude taken by the Council of Ministers towards the Assembly leads us to fear that the ministers are abiding by that foolish sentence in their Rome communiqué according to which this Assembly is to be reduced to a public relations agency. It is not for me to articulate the Assembly's growing concern about the ministers' extraordinary attitude. But I would remind the ministers and members of the Permanent Council present that attempts by ministers to lead a parliamentary assembly by the nose in this city have had completely the opposite effect on more than one occasion.

Fifth, I feel we should jointly consider whether the organisation of our work and our linguistic style are not partly responsible for the failure of many of the conclusions from our long debates to reach the public. Texts apparently designed for a nineteenth century academy cannot be expected to find a place in today's press. We should not therefore always blame an indifferent public, the press office, the ministers or other institutions if our work is largely ignored by the public. We should be self-critical enough to appreciate that it is not enough to take good decisions: we should speak in a more comprehensible language in future.

Mr. President, I hope my friend Mr. Blaauw and all those who have reacted critically to the relatively sudden appearance of the report can nonetheless agree with the brief comments I have just made.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Are there any comments on this report?...

I call Mr. Gansel.

Mr. GANSEL (*Federal Republic of Germany*). – In the fourth paragraph of his report Mr. Reddemann speaks of a strange phenomenon. He says about the Presidential Committee:

“ But it is able to act because all points of view are represented in it, even if not necessarily in a balanced manner. ”

*Mr. Gansel (continued)*

Why is this? Why is there not necessarily a balance in the representation of the committee?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Reddemann.

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the imbalance in the composition of the Presidential Committee is due in part to the fact that the various national delegations have a right to nominate the members of the Bureau, for example. These nominations are, of course, accepted by the Assembly. Second, the various committee chairmen, who also belong to the Presidential Committee, are appointed by the committees. Here again, it is impossible to follow a carefully balanced programme. Elections are, as we all know, based on personalities. The result may well be imbalance from time to time. We therefore decided at a very early stage to ensure that all the groups represented in this Assembly have at least one seat on the Presidential Committee so that no group is excluded from its work. That is what I was briefly trying to say in my report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Are there any other comments?...

This is a report, Ladies and Gentlemen, and the Presidential Committee would be grateful to have your approval of its activities, subject to any errors and omissions on its part.

I therefore put the report on the activities of the Presidential Committee to the vote.

The action of the Presidential Committee is ratified unanimously<sup>1</sup>.

#### **8. Address by Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the address by Mr. Alfred Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU.

Allow me to thank you, Secretary-General, and through you the Council for kindly addressing our Assembly. This is the first time we have sat together publicly at the rostrum and I very much hope that our doing so, particularly in the period we are going through to which I referred a short time ago, constitutes real evidence of the resolve we share and which, I know, was one of the reasons why our countries and governments put their trust in you.

I am happy to give you the floor.

Mr. CAHEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*). – My renewed thanks to you, Mr. President.

Ladies and Gentlemen, members of the parliamentary Assembly of Western European Union, members of the Permanent Council and observers, may I begin by saying how greatly I am honoured by your invitation to speak from your rostrum. As the President, Mr. Caro, has just said, this is the first time such a privilege has been conferred on the Secretary-General. I am not perhaps enjoying it in the easiest of circumstances but I am not sorry on that account because plain speaking is vital to the political dialogue in progress here and the frankness that, with the speech of our President, marked the opening of our discussions is to my mind concrete expression and proof of the reactivation of our organisation. I would therefore like to express my very grateful thanks to Mr. Caro, the members of the Presidential Committee and each and every one of you for the honour you pay me.

If I am moved by this occasion it is not only because of the pride I feel – though this would be sufficient reason – in speaking before the representatives of the peoples of the seven states that make up our organisation. It is also because of the outstanding rôle played by your Assembly in the life of Western European Union. It is in you that its heart continued to beat and its spirit survived throughout its years of comparative inactivity. Thus it is thanks to you that the conditions for its revival were there when our governments initiated it. Today, among other things, you are taking on a key rôle, that of continuing, as you are about to do during the present session, the democratic and therefore public dialogue with our ministers and their Council on security matters at European level. Is it not true that this Assembly is the only competent body at the present time in such matters and is not our dialogue, in this field, more useful than ever? Public opinion in all our countries reveals the need for it. So much is clear.

That, moreover, is what Mr. Eysink forcefully recalls in his report when he quotes in this connection what Mr. Genscher and Baroness Young said a few months ago from this rostrum.

Mr. Genscher stated: “the Assembly bears great responsibility with regard to the democratic legitimation of our endeavours. It represents at an international level democracy in practice on matters of security policy”.

As for Baroness Young, she rightly asserted: “... the Assembly has a significant function, together with member governments, in the process of improving public information and generating what has been called ‘reassurance’ about our defence policies... As representatives of the

1. See page 16.

*Mr. Cahen (continued)*

public and with obligations towards them, parliamentarians have a most important part to play in this process”.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I naturally listened with very great attention to the President earlier on. I took note of the three questions he put to our ministers and the solemn warning he addressed to our governments. It is of course not up to me to answer either the questions or the warning. Mr. Andreotti, our Chairman-in-Office, will no doubt do so in the next few days with infinitely more authority and skill than I could myself. By coincidence some parts of the address I have the honour to be making to you now will, to some extent, answer these questions, for which I am only too pleased.

However, having been invited to address this gathering of political personalities and, from the very place where eminent members of our governments are to address you during the next few days, it is appropriate that your Secretary-General should remember that he is the servant of the Council and one of the servants of the organisation.

His terms of reference for this afternoon consist primarily in telling you what he, along with his colleagues of the Secretariat-General and the Paris agencies and under the authority of the Council, is endeavouring to achieve in performing the rôle assigned to him in the reactivation of Western European Union.

In so doing, if I am to believe Mr. Berrier's report, I think that I shall be meeting the concern you have voiced in the questions he has put on your behalf about the reactivation of WEU. I hope that to some extent I shall be meeting yours too Mr. President.

The reply, in my opinion, comes within two frameworks, one being the construction of Europe, the other the Atlantic Alliance.

In the three and a half decades since it was launched, the first produced, on the one hand, the Council of Europe and, on the other, what was called the Europe of the Six, then the Nine, then the Ten and then the Twelve. Within neither the first nor the second has a European security dimension so far emerged. Yet the creation of a European union is the aim set by the Twelve – including the Seven of WEU – and it would seem natural for such a union to acquire a security dimension along with those it already has – the economic dimension through the Communities and the foreign policy dimension through political co-operation. But in spite of real endeavours in this direction it has not so far been possible.

It is here that lies one of the main reasons for the reactivation of our organisation and the aim of those who launched it was undoubtedly to develop this European security dimension which they could not materialise elsewhere.

Seen in this light, the reactivated Western European Union stands as one of the elements in the process of the construction of Europe, admittedly at another level, since we are seven and not twelve, but nevertheless alongside the Community and political co-operation.

This leads to a number of consequences. They are known to you. I shall simply highlight one of them because it is highly topical and the President referred to it. If the reactivated WEU is an element in the process of constructing Europe, any development of substance, any significant change in the evolution of European integration must inevitably have consequences for WEU too. In that connection, what happens today or tomorrow in Luxembourg is important for us.

For if it proved today or tomorrow that the Twelve together were prepared without reservation to equip themselves with a true security dimension this would be a new development capable of exerting strong and immediate influence on the destiny of Western European Union, which might then have cause to ponder on its future or its very existence. But if not – and for as long as that is the case – our organisation will remain the only European forum for discussion and joint consultation on security problems and must fully assume this responsibility in close co-operation with all the other elements of Europe.

But as I said, the reactivation of WEU has another context, that of the Atlantic Alliance. Are not all its member states members of the alliance and do not all their governments agree in stating and proclaiming that there can be no credible defence of the West and hence of Western Europe without the alliance?

What is more, the reactivation of WEU, with the better balance it would bring, could not fail to strengthen the alliance significantly.

The new Western European Union, the beginning, as the President said, of a European pillar of the alliance, must therefore have close contacts and the most effective co-ordinated relations possible with the alliance as such and with each of the allies not included among the Seven.

The question which should now be asked – which is one particularly for the Secretary-General, its chief administrator – is this: does the reactivated Western European Union, as regards the ministerial bodies within its sole competence, have the tools necessary to perform

*Mr. Cahen (continued)*

its mission? This is where I partly answer the misgivings voiced by the President and the questions and concerns formulated in certain reports. My answer is yes. WEU has these tools and, to be precise, has had them since the ministerial meeting held in Rome on 14th November last.

Mr. Andreotti, our Chairman-in-Office, was then able to say so to the President and to the members of your Presidential Committee.

The ministerial decisions are now implemented with the result that the new Western European Union, at this year's end, is ready and working along the lines sought by the governments whose decision it was to restore its vitality. For this, Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, yours is the merit of having, for a very long time, shown the path to follow.

Your work is too important and your time too precious for me to burden you with administrative details. What interests you – and Mr. Berrier's report shows this clearly – are the essential political options underlying the reorganisation of the ministerial organs and the assurance that this reorganisation fully satisfies those options.

May it thus suffice for me to say that the Secretariat-General will be reshaped and henceforth have a political division alongside its administrative division. This both emphasises and implements the governments' and your desire – as expressed by the President in particular in his press conference this morning – to see the political dimension of our work clearly reinforced.

A small information and public relations unit is also planned to meet – alongside the ministerial organs – the need for an effective public information policy which has long been one of the objects of your attention, witness Mr. Eysink's report, and to whose implementation you have, on your side, applied yourselves with considerable success.

As for the agencies for security questions, each one now has a director. General Rambaldi and Mr. Eric Hintermann, whom you know well, have now been joined by a brilliant senior civil servant from the United Kingdom, Mr. Ian Dawson. General Rambaldi will head what remains of the Agency for the Control of Armaments, Agency No. 1, i.e. for arms control and disarmament questions. Mr. Hintermann is head of Agency No. 3, i.e. for the development of co-operation in the field of armaments. Mr. Ian Dawson will head the agency for the study of security and defence questions.

They will each be assisted by a small number of policy-making officials and, overall, there will be a lightweight administrative infrastructure. This is the context in which the Secretariat-General and the agencies are now getting down to work, which has incidentally already begun in the Council.

For over six months, the Council, at ministerial level and at permanent representatives level, with the assistance of experts where necessary, has been engaged in studying problems vital to each of our countries like the strategic defence initiative and the state of East-West relations.

The thinking on these subjects was sufficiently structured and detailed for conclusions to be reached at the ministerial meeting in Rome.

There, the Council noted an admittedly interim but nevertheless substantive report on the SDI embracing a whole series of problems that we all face as regards the strategic and political aspects of the SDI and a whole series of principles concerning the research aspect. The SDI, of course, is an evolving process: the Ministerial Council instructed the Permanent Council to continue its study, for which it will probably seek the assistance of experts on certain questions.

The wish of the ministers is that this study of essential problems – SDI, East-West relations etc. – should be taken further and developed. The political division of the Secretariat-General will help and the Paris agencies will supply their studies.

The choice of these studies and the date when they will need to be available will be governed by our organisation's requirements and particularly those of the Council which, in setting its priorities, will be guided by the dictates of the evolving international situation seen in the context of our member states' fundamental political options. Defining the tasks of the agencies thus becomes an evolving process: their remits have to be adaptable. This is one essential condition of their usefulness and, therefore, of the effectiveness of the organisation and another is that the agencies should work in close collaboration with each other and with the Secretariat-General.

Thus Agency No. 1 will naturally be monitoring the progress of current negotiations on the control, limitation and reduction of armaments, analysing their possible implications for European security and looking closely at the future of conventional arms control and the essential problem of verification.

Threat assessment and the contribution of WEU states to the response to that threat are necessarily tasks for Agency No. 2 together with the very important question of resource management.

*Mr. Cahen (continued)*

Agency No. 3, and here I am replying to Mr. Berrier, will primarily help our organisation perform its rôle of providing political impetus in arms co-operation and, in close co-operation with the IEPG and CNAD, will keep under review a changing world market and the situation of our industries in that respect or will study emerging technologies for example.

Obviously, depending on how their work progresses, the agencies will also be required to contribute with their studies to the discussions in Council on questions like the SDI and East-West relations.

My first concern in this field, and this will be my conclusion on this point, will be to ensure that the ministerial organs are given and maintain maximum efficacy and flexibility. The latter is essential if we want our organisation to be able to perform its rôle without being handicapped by administrative obstacles and if these organs are to be capable of smooth adaptation to the changes experience may reveal to be necessary. This could happen, more particularly, when the way in which they function is reviewed following the transitional trial period terminating at the end of 1987.

This efficacy and flexibility will be all the more necessary because the reorganisation of the Secretariat-General and the Paris agencies must not involve any increase in the budget and must be achieved solely by rational restructuring and optimisation of staff use.

I know – even more clearly after the President's address – that talking about the budget is rubbing salt in the wound but I think I must explain what the situation of the Secretary-General and the agencies is on that score. I also think I have to make it clear that the Council, whether at ministerial or permanent level, has certainly not dealt lightly with the problem of the budget of the various WEU organs and particularly the Assembly. Indeed, as I propose to show in a few moments, the Ministerial and Permanent Councils both attach extreme importance to the Assembly and if the Assembly has not yet had an answer from the Council to its proposals it is not because of any negligence, failure of effort or lack of interest on the part of the Council; it is purely because the problem needs thorough study so that the Assembly can be given the best possible reply in a situation marked, unfortunately, by tight budgetary restraint. In any case, Mr. Andreotti will be speaking on this point far more eloquently and with much more authority than I can – I simply wanted to refer to it, given the feeling that I sensed in the Assembly on this point.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I have mentioned various aspects of the key rôle which

your Assembly has played and is continuing to play in Western European Union. My remarks would be incomplete if, a propos what I have just said about the Council's work, I failed to refer to the part your Assembly – particularly its committees – plays in relation to the Council in drawing its attention to areas of special importance and in supplying it with food for thought on these matters as has been the case for so many years with the General Affairs Committee and the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, whose exceptionally high quality studies make such a contribution to the substance of the organisation's work. Their reports for the current year are a further demonstration of this fact.

One of the most recent, and in my view also striking, examples is the activity of your Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

The essential message of the important colloquy it organised on the space challenge for Europe, in which I was privileged to take part and which was exceptionally successful, and the conclusions drawn from it by Mr. Lenzer which – I can assure you – captured the Council's attention at all levels, are still very much present in its mind and will unquestionably have an important bearing on its activities.

As Chairman Genscher told you here last May and Mr. Andreotti reiterated in the meetings he has since had with the President and other members of your Assembly, the Council is aware of your Assembly's key contribution to our organisation which, thanks to you, assumes dimensions it would not otherwise have. That being so the Council wishes to develop increasingly close links and co-operation with the Assembly.

My responsibility being no more, after all, than the Council's administrative infrastructure, it is clearly not up to me to say this and eminent statesmen, including your President, will be proving the point to you during the next few days.

But, as Secretary-General, I must assure you that you will always find the ministerial organs – working closely with the Office of the Clerk – wholly available for this co-operation that is so important for all of us as Mr. Caro's address and the reports have once again demonstrated. For the desire for co-operation with the ministerial organs on your part is matched by a desire for co-operation with you on theirs. That being so, if there are misunderstandings it means we have to improve our collaboration.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I have read all the reports submitted to this session of the Assembly with great care and I have listened with even more care to Mr. Caro's address, discerning in it that note of anxiety particularly

*Mr. Cahen (continued)*

as regards the political will of the governments of our member states to promote the reactivation of our organisation with all that this logically implies.

Once again, it is not my place to give an opinion on this subject. What is certain, however, is that, as Secretary-General, I sense very clearly the political impetus coming to me from our seven countries, our seven governments, and I can assure you that, as far as I am concerned, it reassures me completely as to their political will to go through with the reactivation of WEU to the end.

The construction of Europe to which the President referred so well is like a plant finding it difficult to grow. Various obstacles, like so many stones, hold back its growth, forcing it to throw out its branches in different directions in order to climb, the supranational direction for the Communities, intergovernmental for political co-operation and the direction we are now taking in the field of security. This state of affairs naturally prompts feelings of frustration.

Such feelings are normal, but what, in the end, is important is for the plant to keep its vigour and, one way or another, continue to grow. It is in this that it needs to be helped.

As far as our organisation is concerned, the Chairman-in-Office, Mr. Andreotti, and his colleagues will be able, tomorrow and the next day, to tell you about the key measures they are taking to that end – for which I can vouch – and will tell you how much they appreciate your own indispensable efforts towards the same goal.

Mr. President, you, great European militant that you are, referred in your press conference to one of our leading lights, Mr. Jean Monnet. May I as a modest militant but an old and faithful European, quote Jean Monnet in concluding my address. In his memoirs he said that those unwilling to undertake anything because they had no guarantee that things would turn out as they planned were doomed to paralysis. No one today can predict the shape of the Europe of tomorrow because no one can foretell what changes will be begotten by change... On the path ahead new ground must be broken day after day; the vital thing is to have an objective clear enough not to be lost from sight.

That, Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, is what I want for us and, with us, for Western European Union. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Secretary-General, on behalf of the Assembly I renew our thanks for your readiness to address us this afternoon and I congratulate you on the way in which you have done so. You have furthered

the dialogue. You have just referred to the political will which Jean Monnet was able to inspire in others and in those who after the war represented a certain youth to which we belonged with enthusiasm. I hope with all my heart that, in spite of our duties which are sometimes formidable and our words which are perhaps not always what we would like to be saying, we do not forget, with the young people for whom we are working in mind, that we must all remain what we were at the start, namely European militants. I hope that this dialogue continues in that spirit.

Once again my sincere thanks, Mr. Secretary-General.

Before taking the next order of the day, I propose that, because of the volume of our work and in accordance with Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, speaking time for all debates be limited to five minutes, except for committee chairmen and rapporteurs who enjoy the usual latitude, of course, but within the desired limit of fifteen minutes.

I would remind you that, under the same Rule 33, the Assembly has to decide on this proposal without debate.

Are there no objections?...

It is so decided.

To the same end, I make the general proposal that the list of speakers for each debate be closed as and when the rapporteur is called to present his report.

Are there no objections?...

It is so decided.

## 9. Disarmament

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Docs. 1040 and 1043 and amendments)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on disarmament and vote on the draft recommendation, Documents 1040 and 1043 and amendments.

I call Mr. Blaauw, Rapporteur.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – It would be insensitive to misuse my position to comment on a speech by the Secretary-General, and I shall not do that.

This report is the first product of the close co-operation between the Agency for the Control of Armaments and the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and particularly of



*Mr. Blaauw (continued)*

the work of General Maxfield and Colonel Hugo. I thank those two distinguished gentlemen for all the help that they have given me.

It is some time since the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments undertook a comprehensive survey of all the different sets of negotiations on arms control and disarmament that are in progress. Failure to reach any agreement in recent years leads the public, and, I fear, many politicians to forget the many places where diplomats have been patiently negotiating for years. With no achievements to report, these subjects drop out of the news into oblivion.

The committee's present reports on disarmament must be taken together. The information report - Document 1040 - contains the basic facts. I am grateful to the committee for authorising me to issue it on my own responsibility so that it could be reproduced and circulated to representatives in time, because the report - Document 1043 - was agreed by the committee little more than a week ago so that we could take full account of the summit meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev. These reports cover five different sets of negotiations and more than eight different topics in arms control on which agreement is being actively sought. More than the committee could have foreseen when it instructed me to prepare such a comprehensive report, all these topics, with one notable exception, have gained at least in topicality as a result of the summit because, as is pointed out in Document 1043, the joint declaration issued by the two leaders makes specific reference to each of them - the exception being the comprehensive test ban.

Has the summit brought more than topicality to these important subjects? The committee believes that it has, but it is not under the illusion that any specific agreement is imminent. First, the summit has undoubtedly improved the atmosphere of East-West relations. It was the first time that the leaders of the two superpowers had met since June 1979, when President Carter and President Brezhnev signed the SALT II agreement in Vienna. The summit meetings will be renewed in 1986 and in 1987, and the two leaders have agreed to stay in touch in the meantime.

This minimum of mutual confidence between the two superpowers is a condition of any agreement on arms control and disarmament. The European countries, and WEU countries in particular, can take some credit for bringing about this improvement in relations. Eighteen months ago, when East-West relations were at their lowest ebb for some time, when the INF and START talks in Geneva had been broken off and there was no prospect of a summit

meeting, in Recommendation 408 the Assembly recommended that the Council urge member governments:

“ to take every initiative in seeking to restore confidence in East-West relations, as a precondition of any arms control agreement, by promoting personal contact at the highest level between member governments and the new Soviet and other eastern bloc leaderships ”.

I note that this anxiety of the Assembly to promote direct East-West contacts between all member countries of WEU and of the Warsaw Pact is reflected in the communiqué of the recent Warsaw Pact summit meeting in Sofia on 23rd October which says, unusually I think for a Warsaw Treaty communiqué:

“ at this stage, it is highly important for all countries on the continent and for the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries in particular, to contribute actively to the efforts for reducing and eliminating the nuclear weapons from Europe, for attaining success at the negotiations on these matters, for preventing nuclear war... ”.

On this issue of relations between the European countries belonging to different military blocs I should like to draw the attention of representatives to one innovation which the committee made this year which is referred to in the introductory note to the two reports. On 24th July the committee met in the United Nations building in Geneva where it was addressed by the ambassadors, permanent representatives to the Conference on Disarmament, not only from Italy, whose representative was then Chairman-in-Office of the WEU Council, but also from all groups of countries participating in that conference - which includes the western allies, the so-called socialist group of countries as well as the neutral and non-aligned countries. This was the first time that the committee as a whole had been addressed by the representatives of Poland and of the Soviet Union. I am sorry I was not able to be present myself, but I understand that the meeting was businesslike, and that both questions and answers were frank. The committee regards this as a constructive experiment which it would wish to repeat and develop in the future.

In parallel with a need to foster and maintain East-West contacts between all countries is the need constantly to improve allied consultation. The reports of the committee devote special sections to alliance consultation to which I would draw the attention of representatives. In paragraph 2.3 of the information report I point out how European views carry considerable weight in the permanent struggle within the United States administration itself between the more hawkish and the more realistic elements.

*Mr. Blaauw (continued)*

Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the draft recommendation specifically stress the need to ensure that alliance consultation: "attaches full weight to the views of the European allies on all disarmament and arms control issues", and recommends that discussions on these issues should be held in the WEU framework whenever a member government feels there is a need for it.

But we must be realistic about the results of the summit meeting and note not only the absence of specific agreement on arms control issues, but the highlighting of the biggest area of disagreement – the strategic defence initiative – about which Mr. Gorbachev in his separate press conference at Geneva said:

"we are looking for a solution that will enable the arms race to be stopped and a radical reduction brought about in nuclear weapons with the aim of approaching, at a certain stage in this process, the problem of abolishing nuclear weapons in general, with the participation of the whole world community. We assert that this is possible if, for the Soviet Union and the United States, the door to the arms race in space is slammed shut."

But I will not dwell on that aspect here, Mr. President, because it belongs to tomorrow's debate on the strategic defence initiative.

There are undeniably positive indications in the summit joint declaration for all other aspects of arms control dealt with in the committee's report except the comprehensive test ban. I wanted to deal with all those parts rapidly in turn in my initial speech but, in view of the time-frame in which we are working and in order to help the Assembly to conclude its deliberations on this subject today, I shall leave that part out. I should like to recommend one point in particular. It was what I initially had as my last point.

In paragraph 7 of the draft recommendation the committee makes specific points about the non-proliferation régime. The committee was heartened by the positive references to nuclear non-proliferation in the summit declaration, especially the commitment of the two super-powers to the non-proliferation treaty and their interest in further enhancing its effectiveness, *inter alia* by enlarging its membership. The committee worked for a long time to find a wording that was acceptable to all members present, and I hope that by a vast majority the Assembly will endorse that part of my draft recommendation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, on behalf of the Assembly, for the presentation of your report and particularly for your application in studying this problem which is part of the

balance of the Assembly's work on security. The Assembly cannot give up its interest in the subject and must continually insist that there be concern about it at all levels.

The debate is open and I call Mr. Giust.

Mr. GIUST (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should first like to repeat what I said as a member of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and to confirm that Mr. Blaauw's report on disarmament questions has my full support and will receive my vote.

I should also like to record my appreciation of all the Rapporteur's preparatory work, as described in the introductory note to his report, which involved many meetings with leading politicians and diplomats and highly experienced technical experts. It is unquestionably this very precise preliminary stage which now gives credibility to the draft report and to the committee's vote. It was also this work which enabled the arguments to be set out so clearly, leading on to the consistent conclusions in the various clauses of the recommendation proper.

As the Rapporteur reminded us a short time ago, the completion of this preparatory work unexpectedly coincided with the Geneva meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, a point which is mentioned in the introduction to Mr. Blaauw's report. Objectively nothing more could have been asked of the Rapporteur and the committee as there is no way of going beyond the clearly-imposed political limits. On the other hand the Assembly should take opportunities like the present to ask itself once again whether WEU has played and is playing an active or simply a passive routine rôle on major disarmament issues, as has emerged from what we have heard here. There are no further doubts regarding WEU's presence and rôle as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. At the same time it is the most exposed pillar in the quarrels between the two great powers. WEU cannot stand aside when interpreting the facts and events of the world situation but must play an independent rôle in these matters, separate from that of the Atlantic Alliance.

In conclusion, Mr. President, an active approach should quite clearly turn WEU towards itself. That is, towards its democratic status as a parliamentary assembly, with an increasingly commanding rôle in relation to the other institutions. It should move towards eliminating what can still be regarded as the existence of separate institutions within WEU itself, as for example the Assembly in relation to the Council. It should move towards a more active and meaningful democratic rôle for the Assembly.

*Mr. Giust (continued)*

My really final remark is that WEU should be more united when Europe's military problems are being discussed with the United States. Fewer bilateral contacts, fewer direct contacts between the United States and the individual member countries of Western European Union and more unilateral relations for WEU through its major democratic institution, the Assembly.

If this is achieved and we move gradually forward along the difficult road before us, the effort represented by Mr. Blaauw's report on disarmament and the vote taken by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments will have greater significance and will achieve greater understanding and credibility.

*(Mr. Reddemann, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)*

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY (*United Kingdom*). – I contribute to this debate on disarmament in the context of how a one-sided approach, advocated by some, could have a devastating effect on our society. All of us in our respective countries must recognise that the forces of disorder used by the enemy within can be as devastating as the forces of destruction used by the enemy without. Therefore, a tough stance is all-important. To give way to calls for unilateral disarmament would be to undermine the whole concept of upholding law and order and we should all be the losers if that became the case.

The United Kingdom Government, among others, have rightly and constantly been a proponent of firmer measures on law and order and they have both toughened sentences and strengthened the police. But, clearly, even more determined action is unfortunately called for and there can be no delay. A greater sense of responsibility inculcated in children and parents alike is also needed. Deterrence, too, is vital if this lawless outrage is to be conquered. It requires governments to give a positive lead in the interests and protection of the people we seek to serve.

Disarmament should be entered upon only if it is genuine, multilateral and balanced. I have long made clear my adherence to the concept of freedom, particularly of the individual. Once again, it should be emphasised that there is freedom from as well as freedom to, and that the word "responsibility" can never be divorced from freedom, thus giving a basis for government action. To disarm, even only in part, because of threat, without a truly enforceable agreement to ensure fairness, would also be undermining the belief in freedom and its continuing existence. Disarmament, to be successfully achieved, must be compatible with ensur-

ing the continuation of law and order while at the same time making certain that the freedom of the individual is protected.

British conservative members will know that in the anthem "Land of Hope and Glory" comes the line: "Thine equal laws, by freedom gained, have ruled thee well and long."

European governments should build upon such a basis, which will be safeguarded by a realistic policy of defence. Let us in WEU do all that we are able to contribute towards the process of achieving that genuine, multilateral and balanced disarmament of which I have spoken. For that disarmament to be truly enforceable and fair, as I have described it, we must act from a position of strength. If we do not, the peace we seek will never be found.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. de Vries.

Mr. de VRIES (*Netherlands*). – We should congratulate the Rapporteur on a fine piece of research and a good presentation of the complicated issues involved in disarmament. We are all happy that the Geneva summit took place and that there were personal discussions between the leaders of the superpowers after six and a half years during which an exchange of views seemed to be impossible. We salute the fact that both countries seem to agree that a nuclear war cannot be won, that an arms race in space must be prevented and that the arms race on earth must be terminated. We are anxious to see a follow-up to those agreements in the coming years.

Without wishing to diminish the importance of the Geneva talks, we must note that there was no specific agreement that will be helpful for disarmament in Europe. The problem of the INF negotiations was not solved, though it was said that the Soviets had agreed to an interim agreement. Possibilities for an agreement on INF are important for all Europeans. As we are all anxious to see the negotiations succeed, it is worth studying again the proposals on the table in Geneva.

The Americans proposed a stop on 31st December at a level of one hundred and forty launchers in the European zone of the Soviet Union and in Western Europe. The United States would have one hundred and eight Pershing IIs in Western Europe and thirty-two cruise missile launchers, each with four warheads. That would give the Americans two hundred and thirty-six missiles. The USSR would be allowed one hundred and forty SS-20 launchers, each with three missiles, giving a total of four hundred and twenty missiles.

At present, the Soviet Union has two hundred and forty-three launchers in the European zone. Therefore, it would have to give up one

*Mr. de Vries (continued)*

hundred and three launchers, thereby reducing its missile total by three hundred and nine. The Americans would be entitled to build up to the same number of missiles. They could exchange Pershing II missiles with one warhead for cruise missile launchers with four warheads. The Soviets would also have to reduce by 40% in Asia. Therefore, they would have to dismantle eighty launchers in Asia. In total, the Soviets would have to take out five hundred and forty-nine missiles. The Americans could build up from two hundred and thirty-six to four hundred and twenty missiles. British and French weapons would not be taken into account.

Looking at those figures, it must be clear to all members that it is highly unlikely that the INF negotiations, which were supposed to be accelerated after Geneva, will lead to specific results in the near future. That is a serious problem for Europeans who among themselves have to solve, intellectually and politically, the problem of dealing with British and French nuclear forces. The Assembly has discussed the subject many times and I do not believe that we can find a solution that will strike a balance and make possible a compromise between the Soviet Union and the United States. If we look for a solution on the basis of the package on the table at Geneva, we can rule out the possibility that the Soviets will be so benign as to ignore the presence of British and French nuclear forces. They must be taken into account.

If the Americans insist on their proposal, we shall not see an agreement. I ask the Rapporteur to examine, in the future, ways of solving – intellectually and politically – the dilemma presented by European nuclear forces in negotiations between East and West. The British and the French forces, whether independent or not, exist and constitute a reality in the world and especially in the East-West relationship. We have to come to terms with that.

Acknowledging the existence of those forces means that we should not accept as easily as we may have accepted in the past the fact that these weapons – European arsenals, by any definition – should not be taken into account in negotiations and, therefore, remain an obstacle to an agreement between the superpowers.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Bianco.

Mr. BIANCO (*Italy*) (Translation). – I waive the right to speak, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Berger.

Mr. BERGER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I welcome this report for three reasons. First, it is topical in relation to the

history of arms control efforts. Second, it takes a balanced view of the possible motives and reasons for our constant efforts to protect our peoples. It sees disarmament and arms control only as what they can and must be, part of an overriding security policy. Third, this report contains recommendations which, taking a realistic view of the possibilities, are likely to bring real progress in our efforts to achieve security with fewer rather than more weapons.

I should like to comment briefly on the report. At one point it refers to the importance of a co-ordinated European position. We have heard it said in many statements today and now in the debate on this report that even within Western European Union no such co-ordinated European position exists on major issues of security policy and arms control policy. I too believe that there is a great deal to be done and that we are in urgent need of better results than we have achieved in the past. This wide divergence between the European declarations and the facts must not continue.

The second point I wish to mention concerns the passages on chemical weapons quoted from the Geneva summit statement. Like the Geneva statement, the report stresses that the goal is to destroy stockpiles of chemical weapons throughout the world and, of course, to introduce a verification system. No one has tried harder than my government to achieve a breakthrough in this problem in the Geneva disarmament committee. In my opinion, chemical weapons can contribute neither to waging a war nor to the prevention of war. As instruments of modern security policy they are in fact obsolete. Nevertheless, these scourges of mankind exist. I therefore welcome the fact that the Geneva report and the report we are discussing today broach these problems. But let me remind you that the decision taken by the United States of America in 1969 to cease production of these weapons did not result in the Soviet Union's abandoning them or even ceasing to top up their production. We must therefore insist on the universal elimination and destruction of chemical weapons and on the introduction of appropriate verification procedures.

I also take this opportunity categorically to reject any attempt to do this only at regional level. I am personally convinced that, far from being useful, efforts to reach regional agreements in this field will in fact cause difficulties in matters of detail and might therefore hamper attempts at worldwide disarmament.

Another point is the proposal for a 50% reduction in nuclear and especially strategic weapons. I feel we should really welcome the fact that on the eve of the Geneva summit the Soviet Union should for the first time ever have taken up this kind of proposal, which the United States

*Mr. Berger (continued)*

has been making for years, and should seem prepared for an appreciable reduction in its arsenal. This is not yet the breakthrough, but it may be the first sign of one. I therefore feel that we must really concentrate on this subject, that the in-depth discussion must continue here, and that we should take the initiative now and appeal to both sides not simply to carry on as before.

One detail should be mentioned. As Europeans we cannot accept the Soviet method of counting used in this proposal, according to which all weapons capable of reaching the Soviet Union are strategic, while only Soviet weapons which could reach America are strategic. After all, we are being threatened by the SS-20 and other medium- and short-range weapons, which mean the same to us as equivalent weapons from the Soviet standpoint. We must insist on appropriate account being taken of this area of INF.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Sinesio.

Mr. SINESIO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I have the impression that we in this great Assembly are still writing sonnets and poetry while battle hymns are being sung elsewhere. I have the impression that we know how to produce the most beautiful documents in the world on defence and peacekeeping – and I can say here and now that I shall vote for Mr. Blaauw's report – but at the same time I have the feeling that all this falls on deaf ears because we are trapped by the unreal circumstance that WEU is based on nomination and not direct representation. Until we can overcome this handicap which condemns us to academic debates of assistance to pacifists only we shall be failing in our purpose.

I tend to be even more concerned, Mr. President, after hearing the speech by the Secretary-General of WEU which seemed to me to be pessimistic in tone. He spoke about a plant but said not a word about whether that plant had grown enough to bear fruit, which does not seem to be happening.

This great Assembly is becoming more and more an Assembly which wanders about the world making highly intelligent, well-prepared and very sound contributions but fails to convince anybody in charge of the political and military life of the world. The problem of defence systems which we are debating is of the very greatest importance.

Our debate today is focused on the problem of the new defence systems, by which I mean the American strategic research programme, also known as the star wars or space shield programme. These problems have made a deep impres-

sion on the public, who are asking with some anxiety what these programmes really represent and may signify. We do not have much information and the research will certainly have to continue but there are many question marks.

Over the forty years since the war, Europe has experienced one of the longest periods of peace in its history; and the general belief is that this peace has been ensured by the nuclear umbrella which has discouraged aggression because of the fearful consequences of a nuclear war.

Now the talk is of new defence systems, also based on space, which might help to give us greater security. What is involved at present is research and experiments and scientific research can certainly not be limited or opposed particularly when it is going on on both sides.

In this context I think we might remember the old saying current in our countries telling us to "leave well alone". Which means in our case that before abandoning something which has ensured peace up till now we should assess very carefully all the military, political and economic implications of new systems and new solutions. The mere fact that new systems are technologically feasible should not necessarily imply that they should be developed without full consideration of all aspects and possible consequences.

Basically I think there is general agreement that the present nuclear balance should be maintained as essential for preventing a war and that, before trusting ourselves to new systems, the present level of effectiveness must be maintained, and the new technologies must be capable of providing a stronger and better guarantee of mutual security.

At the same time, it seems to me that the real priority at present must be to seek a negotiated reduction of the existing nuclear arsenals which are now far in excess of anything required for defence purposes. The main aim of the Geneva negotiations is in fact to make a start by opening the way towards a reduction of existing nuclear weapons and thus creating a favourable atmosphere for later stages. These later stages may even look at the possibility of establishing a better balance with new systems, helping us to move towards a stable peace.

Mr. President, the WEU countries are all members of NATO and our organisation stands side by side with NATO and shares the same objectives; we are all convinced that the defensive unity of the United States and Europe is essential for peace. This defensive unity must also be ensured in order to provide equal security for both the American and the European parts of the alliance. One of the main purposes of the reactivation of WEU agreed in Rome last year was in fact to create the conditions for more co-ordination between the European countries

*Mr. Sinesio (continued)*

with regard to their common defence requirements.

The differing geographical situations of America and Europe mean that security conditions are not the same for the two continents. America is protected by two great oceans and is much less vulnerable than Europe. Today the huge intercontinental ballistic missiles are the main threat to America. But Europe is vulnerable in many other ways – to short-range missiles and to so-called conventional weapons. In the light of the new technologies likely to emerge from the American strategic defence initiative I think it is essential that the WEU countries should take account of these different situations and join together in studying the defensive technologies best suited to Europe's defence needs.

The United States has invited the European allies to take part, through their industries, in research on the space shield. This invitation relates to the technological aspects and in my view should be kept quite separate from the political and strategic issues which concern the alliance as a whole.

This should, however, be technological collaboration across the Atlantic and should be of a general character and not solely for military purposes. Such participation must help to ensure that Europe is not left behind in the general field of technological research which could also have important civilian applications.

It is therefore important that the governments of our countries, whose firms will be taking part in the technological research, shall be able to act together in order to ensure that this research does not become a one-way street but involves genuine exchanges of technology in the interests and to the advantage of both sides. European firms must be able to participate in research on the same terms and with the same rights as American firms. Any civilian applications should be to the advantage of the European countries in general.

Mr. President, our present debate is unquestionably important for two basic reasons: first because of its implications for Europe's defence and security and second because of everything that the present technological research may represent. Firstly, stable peace must be maintained and guaranteed and, secondly, Europe must not be left behind in the development of technology not only as regards its military aspects but also its wider general aspects.

In both these areas, which can be regarded as complementary, WEU will be able to play an important rôle by way of consultation and co-ordination between its members. We must keep these problems on our agenda so that we

can discuss their implications and developments from time to time.

My last point is that defence structures and technological advances do not cover the whole spectrum of our security which also depends in substantial measure on negotiations. Negotiations are not to be regarded simply as a means of reducing armaments but also more generally as a means of creating better political relationships and returning to genuine détente.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt.

Mr. DREYFUS-SCHMIDT (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I wish to speak very briefly as a socialist and more particularly a French socialist, for there is nothing to disagree with in Mr. Blaauw's excellent report. It is simply that, after this report, it might be thought better to change the committee's name from "Committee on Armaments" to "Committee on Disarmament". As our colleague just said there is certainly some contradiction in manufacturing increasingly modern weapons and still calling for disarmament.

As for us socialists, we are of course in favour of general disarmament which can only, it would seem, be gradual and simultaneous if it is to succeed. With regard to the nuclear tests some explanation may be useful.

Many of our friends – and one of the advantages of the WEU Assembly is the opportunity it gives to explain ourselves so as to understand the various positions we may have – think that the socialist government of France and French socialists have changed and that it is only since they have been in the government that they have become the supporters of the nuclear deterrent whereas previously they used to clamour for the strike capability to be given up. In reality, the change – because there was a change – does not date from 10th May 1981. It was at its congress in 1978 and in full knowledge of the facts that the socialist party effectively decided to go along with what already existed. Opposed as they originally were to the vast cost of setting up a strike force, they felt just as strongly that proliferation should not be encouraged. After all if one country has a nuclear capability why should another not want it?

The socialists, who are realists and aim at the ideal on the basis of the real, concluded in 1978 that the French deterrent existed and that it would not be sensible to want to give it up overnight, particularly since it had given French foreign policy an independence that is becoming the envy of many other European countries.

One day, this deterrent may perhaps bring Europe independence with regard to armaments.

*Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt (continued)*

Mr. Blaauw calls for a ban on chemical weapons as a matter of urgency and the negotiation of treaties to prohibit chemical weapons and all nuclear tests. This may be seen as a different approach. Why not, at the same time as a ban on chemical weapons, ask for the prohibition not of nuclear tests but of nuclear arms? Because you will not get it, I shall be told, and because chemical and nuclear weapons are not the same thing. It has to be admitted that, however horrified we may be at the destruction wrought by the nuclear weapons used in 1945, they have, through the balance of terror, given European countries a period of peace that conventional armaments failed to secure.

The Rapporteur has no great faith in the immediate cessation of nuclear tests because in paragraph 6 (b) of the draft recommendation he urges "the Soviet Union to accept the United States invitation to observe United States nuclear test explosions". He knows very well he will not get any satisfaction because he also urges the United States and the Soviet Union "to ratify the threshold test ban". So he is under no illusions.

Next time, therefore, perhaps we could ask the Rapporteur to look more deeply into the question of tests so that we may know whether they are dangerous as such for the human race, whether precautions need to be taken and whether they are in fact taken or not.

The point is that we are not indifferent to the charges laid against us on this account, sometimes regretting that they should so far exceed those laid against the United States or the Soviet Union when our experience and stock of weapons are clearly of a very different kind and infinitely smaller in scale.

So we are fully in agreement with the terms of the report but we just wanted to make sure our position was understood. It is what it is but once explained it is perfectly logical.

The PRESIDENT. - I call Mr. Antoni.

Mr. ANTONI (*Italy*) (Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, before going into any matters of substance I should like to thank our Rapporteur, Mr. Blaauw, very warmly for his efforts, his commitment and his democratic attitude in committee. The Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments did a great deal of work on the subject of disarmament, making improvements from time to time to the draft recommendation which, in the final form now before the Assembly, includes some expressions and forms of words which we proposed in association with other committee members.

This applies in particular to paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft recommendation which welcomes the outcome of the Geneva summit as regards arms control including the 50% reduction in nuclear arms and the complete prohibition of chemical weapons but nevertheless notes the absence of specific agreements. In addition to being realistic, this assessment, which the Rapporteur has repeated this afternoon, calls for the prosecution of all efforts and measures likely to increase international understanding for which all countries must work, especially to bring the Soviet Union and the United States of America closer together; and it looks to an approach by our Assembly which should be consistent and work for the establishment of such international conditions and should therefore think of western and world defence based on a gradual reduction of armaments to be achieved bilaterally and with the controls required to guarantee security.

In this politically vital context, we believe that the importance of a common European position must be emphasised as a precondition for proper consideration of security requirements; which amounts to saying that at international discussions and meetings, in the framework of the Stockholm conference on disarmament in Europe, the Geneva conference and even the direct negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States, Europe's voice can and should be heard and should be more decisive and influential in all its interests. At the same time Europe should take and play a significant rôle, as for example we ask in Amendment 1 signed by myself, Mr. Masciadri, Mr. Amadei and others, in order to defend the sovereignty of each member country and to ensure that international treaties and law are respected. The allusion to what happened to the Achille Lauro is obvious but this is not a purely Italian question; it is a general demand for all our countries concerning the way the alliance operates and therefore the need to react to any violation of national sovereignty, with treaties being respected by all the allies.

The draft recommendation makes a number of specific proposals concerning disarmament and arms control. The intention is certainly welcome although the proposals do not always seem to us to be consistent in all cases. We wish to reiterate our support for disarmament not only for humanitarian reasons but as an historic necessity for us today to be pursued in a persevering and determined manner with all concerned. Decisive steps forward must be taken, particularly by the USSR and the United States, in order to advance the process of détente started in Geneva by a significant and substantial reduction of their nuclear stockpiles which, as we say in the recommendation, would facilitate accession to the nuclear non-proliferation

*Mr. Antoni (continued)*

treaty by many countries which have not yet signed, total prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons.

The points of disagreement remaining after Geneva must unquestionably be resolved and no further disputes must be allowed to arise as a result of unilateral action, whether or not involving space. On the other hand, Europe must resist and prevent its military occupation by anyone or unilaterally by either of the great powers or by agreement between them. We therefore welcome the insistence in the draft recommendation on the need for East-West consultations, so that disarmament meetings and conferences may be resumed with greater urgency and peaceful coexistence may be consolidated. We agree concerning the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and approve paragraph 7 (a) as formulated by the committee which seems to respond well to this requirement. The Rapporteur's appeal as approved by the committee should be supported. We submitted a number of amendments which we thought gave greater weight to the idea of balanced multilateral disarmament and avoided an interpretation which we consider excessive regarding the transfer of nuclear technology for civilian purposes.

We remain wholly convinced that discussing disarmament and working to make it possible mean in the first place working for mankind, with our Assembly playing a fuller and more active rôle and exerting greater democratic influence. And, not in our view alone, this is where the reactivation of WEU lies. It is undoubtedly in this spirit and with this end in view that we participated in the committee's work and have stated our opinion here.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the road to the two great wars of this century, the first and second world wars, was paved with disarmament conferences, which preceded both these wars. This alone shows how difficult it is to discuss disarmament. The good will invested by many in such conferences does not exist all the time, or to the desired extent in all concerned. I can still remember very clearly one of the first major foreign policy statements made by the new Chancellor Adolf Hitler in the German Reichstag on 14th May 1933 – his generally complacent remarks on the current League of Nations disarmament conferences. Nevertheless, I believe that talks about disarmament are necessary.

Security in Europe today is primarily based on a balance of terror. That word is proof enough

that the situation is not pleasant, although we freely admit that it is this terror that has kept the peace. So if there is to be disarmament, there must be balanced disarmament in East and West, disarmament which can be verified and controlled. Anything else would simply give rise to fresh illusions.

Nor must we forget that dialogue and the disarmament struggle are themselves part of the international conflict. Let me remind you that immediately before the NATO twofold decision came into force, the other side conducted a kind of disguised war to prevent its implementation in some of the NATO member countries. Broadly-based "popular movements" were initiated, every effort was made to disrupt the process designed to maintain the balance. I need refer only to my own country, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries.

This shows that the concept of disarmament must be viewed with great caution and cannot be greeted with shouts of "rubbish" and the like. Those who use such words understand nothing at all about the issue.

The ice age that was predicted after the NATO twofold decision has not occurred. On the contrary, a new disarmament initiative has emerged. This shows that abiding by decisions and a policy of balance does more for peace than giving up and opting out.

The summit talks between Gorbachev and Reagan on 20th and 21st November and the other summit meetings scheduled for 1986 and 1987 demonstrate that the ice is being broken. The summit meeting was, of course, above all a spectacle for the media. But if it is in a good cause, why not have a spectacle for the media?

What is crucial now is the detailed work on the negotiations, wherever they take place, not only in Geneva but also as part of the CSCE in Stockholm and the MBFR negotiations in Vienna. I believe this must be done in order to make genuine progress.

We know we have too many nuclear weapons in the world. The number must be reduced. NATO made a positive, unilateral contribution in this respect a few years ago. We are aware of the problems surrounding chemical weapons, which must be eliminated, and above all else we must realise that all negotiations on disarmament must apply to the problem of worldwide disarmament. I do not think it helps at all for worldwide disarmament negotiations to be undermined by unilateral regional agreements on nuclear-free or chemical weapon-free zones. For a genuine disarmament policy, these are disruptive elements that have nothing to do with the supreme goal of disarmament.



*Mr. Müller (continued)*

I should like to thank the American President for informing the NATO allies immediately after his talks with Mr. Gorbachev, just as Mr. Gorbachev informed his allies. President Reagan thus made it clear that only close contact and talks among the allies and a constant supply of information will ensure that we all pull together on the road to disarmament.

As for the parliamentary side, I want to emphasise that the rôle of the WEU Assembly must be maintained as the body that comments and takes initiatives on these issues in Europe, as it has done for years. And we ourselves should have the courage to become involved in these issues as much as possible.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, Mr. Blaauw's report, which is admirable in some respects, seems to express concern that Europe's views are not given their proper importance in discussions within the Atlantic Alliance. I think this may have been true many years ago but that the situation has now changed. However, if Europe's views are sometimes not given their due weight it is our fault because we are not in agreement, there are few consultations and some or many countries take conflicting action. The overall result is that Europe appears to be non-existent.

That is why the Council of Ministers should discuss these vitally important problems in WEU, so that at least the seven member countries adopt clear and definite positions, to be pressed and put over within the Atlantic Alliance.

Above all, Ladies and Gentlemen, I must insist that we should rid ourselves of the nasty line taken by some of us to the effect that the Soviet Union wants disarmament but that the United States does not. If we do not rid ourselves of this handicap we shall have to complain more and more that our views are not given their due weight. As regards disarmament great stress must be laid on control of the implementation of agreements and observance of understandings. This is particularly important because the systems of the two groups – the Soviet Union and the United States and the Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact – are quite different.

Control is more difficult where there is no democracy, whereas in the United States and the democratic countries control is exercised through the press and in some measure by everyone. For that reason I do not agree with what the Rapporteur says about inspections in paragraph 5.2, which suggests that the Atlantic

Alliance could allow the Soviet Union to have permanent observers at depots in certain areas, in exchange for the right of the NATO countries and the Atlantic Alliance to make a number of annual inspections.

To sum up, we should allow the Warsaw Pact to have permanent watchdogs at our depots – I have already said that everybody can keep a check on our depots because information is freely available and easily disseminated on our side – whereas we would have to be satisfied with a few inspections of depots in the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries, where no one can enter and where there is no possibility of control by democratic institutions which do not exist there. I do not think that we would be helping the cause of disarmament by doing so.

Ladies and Gentlemen, all proposals are excellent, all proposals can make an impression, but it is by a serious approach to these great problems that we can hope for something concrete. So, when prior conditions such as those laid down by the Soviet Union in the case of the Pershing and cruise missiles, and there are prior conditions such as those laid down concerning the strategic defence initiative, it means that there is no wish to achieve balanced and controlled disarmament. Let us hope that the recent spirit of Geneva will give fresh impetus and create a new image of the countries' determination to reach a solution, so that the world can look forward to genuine lasting peace.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Cifarelli, who is also speaking for the Liberal Group.

Mr. CIFARELLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – As the President said I am also speaking for the Liberal Group and our usual thanks to the Rapporteur are marked by particular satisfaction that our Chairman has done excellent work, broadly approved by the committees and the Assembly.

The question of disarmament, which has so often been discussed here and was the subject of a report at the drafting stage, was approached from a particular angle as a consequence of the Geneva meeting between President Reagan and the young new leader of the Soviet Union. As a result the report starts with a favourable assessment of the atmosphere created and of some agreements on the way as indicated in the communiqués from that meeting.

I am old enough to remember that ever since 1945 when the last guns of the second world war fell silent the subject of disarmament has been a matter of agonising concern as to how it should be controlled, as Mr. Cavaliere said a moment ago. And we have always come up against persistent, unrelenting, absurd and more than absurd objections to any form of control from

*Mr. Cifarelli (continued)*

the Soviet Union. But controlled disarmament does not remove any of the grounds for concern and even creates mistrust and confrontation.

Now, Mr. Blaauw's report and its concluding draft recommendation have the virtue of providing an up-to-date review of the conferences now in progress and of the efforts which are being made on the various aspects of disarmament. We liberals can endorse the Rapporteur's proposals, which include two or three very strong points.

The first is that the subject should be discussed within WEU and that the WEU bodies should work for a result on the problem of controls. Controls which were introduced in connection with Germany's participation in the rearmament of the West when WEU came into being. Controls which are still applied because they are specialised and based on the WEU agreements.

In our view another major point in the proposals at the end of the report relates to the nuclear test ban treaty and control of its observance. And it urges very strongly that those who have not participated in that treaty should do so. Naturally there is a special reference to France; we cannot become Europe of the future if we go forward with our eyes on the past. Even today we have heard it said that these eyes on the past are still looking backwards and make it more difficult for Europe to play its rôle in the immense problem of disarmament.

I would stress, Mr. President, that when disarmament is talked of there are unquestionably many possibilities of control in the world today and politics have shown that prior conditions are disappearing at the moment. It was said when the Euromissiles were deployed that it would no longer be possible to resume a dialogue with the Soviet Union. Events have proved the contrary. It was said that the idea of strategic defence would prevent any agreement and would destroy all possibility of agreement at the summit or at least the start of discussion at the summit. This again has proved wrong. This means that when politics are approached from these angles there are no prior conditions; loud talking does not decide and profound logic, which I would call the logic of history, is rising above day to day events.

We must remember this logic of history and it seems to me that two points should be developed and should guide the details of our work. The first is the approach confirmed in Geneva by the leaders of the East and West little by little influenced, more than we realise, by public opinion in the countries concerned and by the rôle which other European forces play. Let us

remember that not only did President Reagan go to Brussels after meeting Mr. Gorbachev to speak to members of the Atlantic Alliance but also that Mr. Gorbachev went to Prague to talk to the Warsaw Pact countries. This shows that Europe, the eternal protagonist of world civilisation, is far from inert and abandoned; but Europe must find a point of contact in order to give greater weight to its rôle.

The other point, Mr. President, lies in the hope and suggestion of future agreements: ban on nuclear weapons, acceptance of proposals to reduce chemical weapons, renewal of the ban on experimental explosions for other than scientific or peaceful reasons; all this is in line with the development of the multilateral action needed to bring about this overall solution to the problems of our day.

It is said that peace is born of terror. I must repeat the opposite view that the fear of war is born of the absence of freedom. Where a country is free there can be mistakes and difficulties but what is certain is that the threat to world peace cannot come from the free democracies. Every man and woman on our planet lives on 4,000 kilograms of TNT because these are the vast reserves of explosive and destructive energy said to be represented by existing armaments. However our faith is not based on reasoned thought leading everyone to oppose this but on an assessment of the civil and democratic forces which also exist in the world.

It is said that hope is the basis of freedom and democracy. I would say that reasoned thought is the basis of many solutions which must gradually be brought about. For us Europeans this is our sovereign duty. Our continent which has contributed so much to world civilisation but also to its mistakes must act as one and to the full in order to meet the new demands of history, looking to the future and not to the past.

The PRESIDENT. - The debate is closed.

I call Mr. Blaauw, Rapporteur, to reply to the speakers.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). - I am grateful for the fact that all speakers have praised my report.

Mr. Giust, Mr. Cifarelli and Mr. Cavaliere talked about a European position in negotiations between East and West. I stress that disarmament is one issue in European co-operation. The MBFR negotiations are prepared in Brussels and the same is true of negotiations in the conference on disarmament in Europe which is held in Stockholm. The draft recommendation is aimed specifically at a situation when WEU countries feel that the European voice in negotiations between East and West is not loud enough. I share the anxiety that negotiations

*Mr. Blaauw (continued)*

could take place without a European input and I draw attention to the moves of the Foreign Ministers of Belgium and the Netherlands, Mr. Tindemans and Mr. van den Broek, following the fact that President Reagan invited only the major Western European countries for a preliminary talk about the Geneva summit. The omission has been corrected and a major signal has been sent to the American administration. I hope that it will be taken into account in future. If it is not, the countries of WEU will have to act in the same way again.

Mr. Murphy, who apologised for the fact that he would not be able to stay for the end of the debate, supported the report but drew attention to the fact that our society is not very pleasant. I agree, although some parts are pleasant because it is still a democratic society. He said that deterrence was needed. I agree. The report does not say that we do not need deterrence, but disarmament can make deterrence less menacing while still functional. All of us in WEU and other democratic countries and, I hope, in Warsaw Pact countries must work on that.

I thank Mr. de Vries for his contribution. He made an important point about the French and British nuclear forces. We could not cover that subject in this report but, as he said, we need to seek an intellectual approach to the problem in the future. I endorse his idea and draw his attention to the fact that paragraph 4.23 of the information document refers to that idea.

We have had reports from other rapporteurs on this subject. Mr. Mommersteeg's report warned that by modernising the French and British nuclear forces we may make them so large that they cannot be ignored in the East-West balance. I agree with Mr. de Vries that we should not approach the subject emotionally. We must adopt an intellectual approach and consider including the matter in a future report and recommendation.

Mr. Berger mentioned the proposal for a 50% cut in nuclear arsenals. That was one of the major parts of the summit communiqué. We mention it in the draft recommendation. I agree that the Soviet Union's strategy is not our strategy, but we hope that we can at least maintain the status quo and perhaps improve it. Discussions about strategy must take into account emerging technologies, conventional defence, FOFA (follow-on forces attack), OCA (offensive counter air), DCA (defensive counter air) and so on.

I think that I have already answered the points made by Mr. Sinesio. I agree that our purpose should be to reduce nuclear arsenals. Fortuna-

tely, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev mentioned that need. We must do what we can and, where possible, ensure a European input.

I can answer Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt easily. Because of the pressure of time, I cut part of my opening speech about treaties to ban chemical weapons and nuclear tests. I intended to say that the summit communiqué can be said to give new hope for agreement on a treaty to ban chemical weapons worldwide, but it makes no reference to a comprehensive test ban, which the Reagan administration has said is only a long-term objective.

I agree that the approaches to a chemical weapons ban and a nuclear test ban should be different. One cannot argue against a nuclear test ban by saying that explosions cannot be verified. It has been shown in Geneva that it is possible to set up a checking network. One cannot dismiss a nuclear test ban on those technical grounds. Now, it is more of an intellectual approach. The best way to get rid of nuclear weapons is to start with a comprehensive test ban. After that, it will not be possible to test new weapons.

I have no further remarks to make about Mr. Antoni's speech. In committee we debated the Achille Lauro affair but we decided that this was not the place to discuss it. I am still of that opinion. Perhaps some other committee should draft a report entitled "How to handle your allies". The Achille Lauro affair caused problems involving international terrorism and international sovereignty. I agree with what Mr. Müller said. Some might say that he was cynical and others that he was realistic. I do not like to put all peace movements together. There are some honest people in peace movements who have problems about nuclear weapons. Democratic countries must take account of their feelings and their options.

Mr. Cavaliere and Mr. Cifarelli said that Europe's views should have been reflected in Geneva. I agree that for the Euromissiles a European approach must be adopted. The more the superpowers reach agreement on disarmament, the more important it is for Europe to review its position on Euromissiles.

A common stance on European co-operation is important. Mention has been made of monitoring. The Secretary-General has introduced Agency No. 2, for monitoring and verification. I draw attention to paragraph 5.11 (iv) in which permanent entry and exit points with observers are agreed. We should not consider permanent observers at our depots. In a democratic society the location of depots is normally known, particularly because local authorities need to know.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Pignion, Chairman of the committee.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – I would like to repeat to the full Assembly what I said to the committee which, you know, did excellent work in spite of the remarks, criticisms and suggestions that have been made.

First, as is perfectly natural, I want to thank Mr. Blaauw for the quality of his report which one of our colleagues in committee described as encyclopaedic. I am all the more pleased to endorse that judgment because, for the preparation of this important report, as well as having the assistance of our Counsellor, Mr. Whyte, we had the benefit, with the agreement of the secretariat and through the restructuring of services, of the valuable help and established skills of the members of the WEU Agency for the Control of Armaments, soon to become – an important point to note – the agency for the study of arms control and disarmament questions. I would pay particular tribute to General Rambaldi, its head, and General Maxfield and Colonel Hugo who gave us the benefit of their authoritative knowledge.

Whilst regretting that some of our colleagues who will be voting will be unable to hear what is going to be said I would point out that this report was not produced without difficulty because we were just about to complete it when the announcement of the summit meeting between Mr. Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev weakened, dangerously in some cases, a number of its arguments and even its findings. It seemed imperative to wait, which is what the Rapporteur did with commendable patience.

It is important to stress that, on the occasion of our visit to Geneva on 24th July which is referred to in the report, we met a number of ambassadors at the permanent Disarmament Conference including the permanent ambassadors of the Soviet Union and the United States, together with those individually responsible for the control commissions on nuclear, chemical and other weapons. We left rather disillusioned fearing that our great-grandchildren would still be in Geneva when they reached adulthood. We had the distinct feeling that things were moving slowly. Even so, as the report states, we may perhaps have some hope in the future provided of course we do not forget that whilst we cannot tell the great powers what to do we will not fail to be ignored if we are “weak-kneed”, if I may be permitted the expression.

That means, and here I endorse what was said by the Secretary-General and our President, that if we mean to be credible we have to be strong. Building the Europe of tomorrow will be no more than a literary exercise if it is not based on something solid in the field we are concerned

with. It is right for us to have a debate on this subject because it forces us to remember that, for an Assembly like ours, there is no incompatibility in dealing at one and the same time with armaments, arms control and disarmament problems. But I would add that, to have any chance of being listened to, we must not be in a position of weakness.

I thank Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt, my colleague and friend, for having once again stressed the specific nature of the French position. We have to keep hammering in the same nail but who, in this forum, could doubt our desire to retain our deterrent and its independence. Independence means having the will and capability of pressing the button on our own like big boys, but that does not mean that this independent capability is not at the service of the European pillar we are always talking about. Can anyone seriously imagine that a potential enemy might have France in its sights to the exclusion of the other European countries and without going through the Federal Republic of Germany or another country?

We have to be serious in this field and understand, once for all that though there is this specific French position, between friends one can talk things out and understand each other.

One day or another we will have to reach an understanding and, in the light of what was said at the Geneva summit, I have to say that I found somewhat less understanding in my friend Klaas de Vries than in Mr. Gorbachev who dealt with the French and British deterrent in reasonable terms. On that point too, this is a good forum for thrashing things out and coming to an understanding. The essential thing – which is where I very greatly appreciate the report and its explanatory statement – is that nowhere is there any indication that we should be on the asking side. In other words, the strength and unity we have to demonstrate before we can achieve the construction of Europe, Secretary-General, have to rest on a solid foundation.

For a long time I believed – I even think I taught – that you must not hit an old person or an unarmed person – I am not talking about women who are always very well armed but about children and old people. Open the newspaper and you see how much the news reassures you about the future of mankind. Nor is a country, a confederation of countries, a strong and united Europe attacked if it really wants to defend itself. It is on that basis that, fearlessly and unblushingly, we can start talking credibly about disarmament and join in or ask to join in disarmament efforts. Everything else, Mr. President, is simply an exercise in style and literature.

I will wind up with a quotation. Anatole France said that we are always explaining what

*Mr. Pignion (continued)*

we mean, but never understanding each other. My hope is that tomorrow, after all our explanations, we will understand each other clearly and that the draft recommendation will be adopted unanimously. Mr. Blaauw and everyone who helped him and all those who contributed to the drafting of the report and its conclusions will be very pleased. My renewed compliments to Mr. Blaauw.

The PRESIDENT. – Five amendments have been tabled to the draft recommendation in Document 1043.

They will be called in the following order: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

I call Mr. Antoni to speak to Amendment 1 which reads:

1. At the end of paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, add:

“ , prevent the sovereignty of each member country being violated and ensure that in any event the standards of treaties and of international law are respected; ”.

Mr. ANTONI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I believe that the Rapporteur has already given his opinion on Amendment 1. As he mentioned, the question of the Achille Lauro was discussed in committee, where it was in fact stated that it would be discussed in the Assembly; now in the Assembly it is said that we shall take it separately.

I have no particular predilection for individual national questions which have no international importance and therefore do not concern our Assembly. I therefore have no difficulty in withdrawing my amendment provided the statement that the question would be examined separately is put into some official form or provided the Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments – no longer the Rapporteur in that case – undertakes to arrange that the subject be placed on the committee's agenda for the appointment of a rapporteur and a specific statement on this question.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Blaauw.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – You were not able to discuss the amendment in committee so I can give only my personal opinion. We referred the Achille Lauro affair to the plenary session as we did not think that it formed part of the report. As Rapporteur I cannot give the signatories of the amendment the assurance that it will be discussed somewhere else in WEU but there are other ways in which to bring the matter forward. The amendment does not belong to the report and I therefore propose not to vote in favour of it.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I thought for a moment that Europe or some European countries had been invaded or were about to be invaded by foreign forces from a friendly member of the Atlantic Alliance!

I am opposed to this amendment not on the procedural grounds enumerated by the Rapporteur but on the issue of substance; there has been and could be no violation of Italian sovereignty. The episode was justified by an act of international terrorism.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Antoni.

Mr. ANTONI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, please declare to the Assembly what the Chairman undertook to mention, namely that this amendment was signed not only by myself but also by Mr. Amadei of the Italian Social Democratic Party...

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Point of order. I believe I can read the signatures of those who tabled the amendment!

Mr. ANTONI (*Italy*) (Translation). – If Mr. Cavaliere wishes to take offence he is at liberty to do so, but this is a procedural matter; I have here an amendment bearing the signature Antoni only. I went to the secretariat to say that there was a mistake and I was assured there that the amendment would be reprinted with all the correct signatures. I must say, therefore, that if Mr. Cavaliere who is so sensitive on this point – and yet he claims to be understanding – saw my signature only, he should now recognise that this amendment was also signed by colleagues from at least three major Italian parties. If Mr. Cavaliere, who is in the government with two of these major parties, then wishes to level the same useless accusations at them – the Italian Socialist Party and the Italian Social Democratic Party – as at us, it is a matter for himself alone and does not concern me. My conscience is clear.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Pignion.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – I deplore the wind of passion suddenly blowing through this chamber. Mr. Antoni, my colleague and friend, knows that I have great respect for what is said and that there is no question of “combinazione”. I really did try to introduce the amendment before us into the text but found it would make it inconsistent. I clearly heard Mr. Antoni use the word “respect” in his statement a moment ago. His

*Mr. Pignion (continued)*

exact words were: "Long live the alliance for the best, in the respect of all the allies." Certainly they are somewhat obscure. In any case, Mr. Antoni thinks - and I believe I voice the thoughts of the committee as a whole when we looked at the first version - that this amendment is not consistent with the paragraph referred to and that is why we cannot accept it. The rest is a different matter.

The PRESIDENT. - I put Amendment 1 to the vote.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*Amendment 1 is negatived.*

I now call Mr. Cavaliere to speak in support of Amendment 2, which reads:

2. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "the United States to examine with the utmost attention the recent proposals" and insert "the United States and the Soviet Union to examine with the utmost attention the reciprocal proposals".

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the amendment has no need of explanation. Here an appeal is made to one side only, calling on the United States to examine Mr. Gorbachev's proposals with the utmost attention. I say however that the call should be addressed to both the Soviet Union and the United States urging them to examine with the utmost attention the reciprocal proposals. I think that in that way we can rid ourselves of our tendency to regard the United States as the enemy of disarmament and the Soviet Union as the friend.

The PRESIDENT. - Does anyone wish to oppose the amendment?...

The opinion of the committee, please?

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). - Paragraph 4.3 of the committee's report states:

"The committee hopes that each party to the bilateral negotiations will examine with the utmost attention the latest proposals of the other. Paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation is addressed to the United States as the party negotiating in the interests of the alliance."

For that reason, paragraph 3 is aimed only at the United States. I leave it to the Assembly to vote as it likes on the amendment.

The PRESIDENT. - I put Amendment 2 to the vote.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*Amendment 2 is negatived.*

I now call Mr. Cavaliere to move Amendment 3, which reads:

3. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "in which full verification of withdrawals could obviate the need for prior agreement on data, as outlined in the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments" and insert "providing for the full verification of withdrawals".

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, in view of the reactions I should withdraw the amendment but on the contrary I insist. My amendment is based on the consideration that if we implement only the first part of the Vienna negotiations on the balanced reduction of armaments without taking into account the forces deployed in the Warsaw Pact countries and in the Atlantic Alliance countries we shall not arrive at a balanced reduction but will maintain the imbalance which appears in the table in the report.

It is said that forces will be accurately assessed at a second stage but I feel bound to recall that more than fifteen years have gone by and that no progress whatever has been made in the Vienna negotiations for the balanced reduction of armaments. If we go on in the same way, another twenty years will go by without details of the forces deployed by the Soviet Union being known.

The PRESIDENT. - Does anyone wish to oppose the amendment?...

The opinion of the committee, please?

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). - I am against the amendment because it does not conform with the draft recommendation on which the committee agreed, especially with respect to its proposals concerning East-West relations. As far as I could read through the wall, there are perhaps elements of the proposals to be put by the West in December.

The PRESIDENT. - I put Amendment 3 to the vote.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*Amendment 3 is negatived.*

I now call Mr. Antoni to speak in support of Amendment 4, which reads:

4. Leave out paragraph 6 (b) of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

"Urge the nuclear countries to apply Resolution 49/1952 of the United Nations and the resolution of the European Parliament of 12th September 1985 on the urgency of promoting negotiations on the conclusion of a treaty totally banning nuclear tests, urge the United States itself to apply the moratorium decided

*The President (continued)*

by the Soviet Union and urge the Soviet Union and the United States to ratify the threshold test ban and peaceful nuclear explosions treaties; ”.

Mr. ANTONI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I withdraw it, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. – The amendment is withdrawn.

I now call Mr. Antoni to move Amendment 5, which reads:

5. Leave out paragraph 7 (*d*) of the draft recommendation and insert:

“ Urge member governments to ensure that as far as possible Cocom restrictions no longer concern nuclear material and installations, while respecting defence guarantees. ”

Does he wish also to withdraw this amendment?

Mr. ANTONI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, this is on the contrary an amendment for which I must press. As some people refer always to one side only I wish first to explain the amendment by recalling a decision taken by the United States Senate five days ago. Five days ago the United States Senate, which opposed the idea in 1981, gave its approval and authorised the United States Government to build a nuclear power station in China at a cost of \$4,000 billion. In order to avoid nuclear proliferation we request that civilian nuclear applications should also be banned as far as possible. However, the amendment which I have submitted together with other signatories seeks, with due observance of defence requirements, a less rigid application of the Cocom restrictions, which moreover the various governments apply individually when dealing with third world countries, with China and so on.

In my opinion my amendment meets these requirements better than does the text of the report.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Unland.

Mr. UNLAND (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I must oppose Mr. Antoni's amendment. He referred to a \$4,000 billion nuclear power station. I know of no plans for a nuclear power station on that scale anywhere in the world. The figure may be right in lire, but it is certainly not right in dollars.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Blaauw.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – The context of paragraph 7 (*d*) is wide enough to cover the export of civilian nuclear material, even to China. We do not need to refer to Cocom restrictions, as mentioned in the amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – I will put the amendment to the vote.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

*Amendment 5 is negatived.*

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation in Document 1043.

Under Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure as amended on 29th November 1982, if five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber so desire, the Assembly shall vote by roll-call on a draft recommendation.

Does any member wish to propose a vote by roll-call?...

That is not the case.

We shall therefore vote by sitting and standing.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

*The draft recommendation is agreed to unanimously<sup>1</sup>.*

I congratulate the committee and the Rapporteur on their excellent work.

### ***10. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting***

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Tuesday, 3rd December, at 9.30 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

WEU and the strategic defence initiative: (*a*) The strategic defence initiative (Defence aspects); (*b*) The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance; (*c*) Guidelines drawn from the colloquy on the space challenge for Europe (Proposals) (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the SDI aspects of the reports of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Documents 1033 and amendments, 1034 and amendments and 1036 and amendments).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(*The sitting was closed at 7.25 p.m.*)

1. See page 17.

## EIGHTH SITTING

Tuesday, 3rd December 1985

### SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the minutes.

2. Attendance register.

3. WEU and the strategic defence initiative : (a) The strategic defence initiative (Defence aspects); (b) The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance; (c) Guidelines drawn from the colloquy on the space challenge for Europe (Proposals) (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the SDI aspects of the reports of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions*, Docs 1033 and amendments, 1034 and amendments and 1036 and amendments).

*Speakers:* The President, Mr. van den Bergh (*Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*), Mr. Michel (*Chairman of the General Affairs Committee*),

Mr. Pignion (*Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*), Mr. Lenzer (*Chairman of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions*), Mr. van den Bergh, Mr. Berrier (*Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee*), Mr. Lenzer (*Chairman and Rapporteur of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions*), Mr. Hill, Mr. Aarts, Dr. Miller, Mr. Lagorce, Mr. de Vries, Sir John Osborn, Mr. Berger, Mr. Tummers, Lord Reay, Mr. Bianco, Mr. Gansel, Mr. Spies von Bullesheim, Mr. Antoni, Mr. Reddemann, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Kittelmann, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Wilkinson, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Millan, Mr. Gorla, Mr. Atkinson.

4. Changes in the membership of committees.

5. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

*The sitting was opened at 9. 45 a.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

#### *1. Adoption of the minutes*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

*The minutes are agreed to.*

#### *2. Attendance register*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

May I remind you that the Assembly decided yesterday afternoon that speeches in all our

debates should be limited to five minutes and to fifteen minutes in the case of rapporteurs and committee chairmen.

May I also remind you again that amendments to the texts included in tomorrow's orders of the day must be tabled before the opening of this afternoon's sitting at 2 p.m., as agreed.

I would further remind you that the list of speakers in the debate on the strategic defence initiative (defence aspects) will be closed when Mr. van den Bergh presents his report.

The list of speakers in the debates on Documents 1034 and 1036 will be closed when the two Rapporteurs have spoken for the second time.

Please bear in mind also the suggestion that speakers should indicate the main subject on which they wish to speak when putting down their names. For some speakers the choice is easy, for others not, and a third group will wish to address themselves to the subject generally. I am sure that the Assembly will be prepared to leave it to the Chair to decide the order in which speakers take the floor so that the debate flows as smoothly as possible. Thank you.

<sup>1</sup> See page 21.



### 3. WEU and the strategic defence initiative

#### (a) The strategic defence initiative (Defence aspects)

#### (b) The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance

#### (c) Guidelines drawn from the colloquy on the space challenge for Europe (Proposals)

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the SDI aspects of the reports of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Docs 1033 and amendments, 1034 and amendments and 1036 and amendments)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the SDI aspects of the reports of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on WEU and the strategic defence initiative: (a) the strategic defence initiative (defence aspects), (b) the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, (c) guidelines drawn from the colloquy on the space challenge for Europe (proposals), Documents 1033 and amendments, 1034 and amendments and 1036 and amendments.

I call the Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Mr. van den BERGH (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I am grateful that we are able to exchange views on this important subject today, even if the procedure is somewhat complicated. As you know, there have been certain problems. The subject matter after all lends itself to heated political debates, both in the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and in the other committees and this chamber. It is an intricate and politically sensitive subject, and I therefore want to tell my colleagues on the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments how grateful I am for their co-operation in the drafting of this recommendation in recent months.

Mr. President, I will briefly introduce the subject we must consider today. I say “briefly” because an awful lot has been said, though by no means everything is known, about this subject. I fear – no, I am quite sure – that a very great deal more will be said about it in the years to come. In my introduction I shall discuss a few important points in some depth.

Seen from a political viewpoint, I believe many political, strategic and industrial problems will be discussed in the debate on SDI. I have been very intrigued by the question as to the implications of the possible introduction of this system for relations between the United States and Europe, which have, of course, been under

some pressure in various respects in recent years.

Without wanting to create the impression that I intend to adopt an anti-American position, which is rather different from wanting to have a critical discussion with our ally, I believe it is justifiable to say that the Americans’ way of presenting this new, SDI concept to the world and their European allies does not deserve a beauty prize. I therefore feel that many of the discussions we have witnessed on this subject in Europe and the United States in recent months are due to the fact that our American allies have not been sufficiently thorough in their handling of this new concept. It is clear that, where a major initiative is concerned – whatever you or I may think about SDI, views in our Assembly on the subject clearly differ very widely – it is important that the dialogue between the United States and the European allies should be very thorough. We must know precisely what we are talking about. It may be superfluous to say so, but we simply must not think that the way in which the United States Secretary of Defence, Mr. Weinberger, more or less forced the European allies a few months ago to react to so complex a question within sixty days is typical of our dealings with each other. Whatever we may think of SDI, it is important to prevent a recurrence of problems between some European countries and the United States and an increase in tension. I therefore make a strong plea for a satisfactory dialogue in this respect.

I believe that the haphazard way in which this concept has been presented has to do with the different opinions within the American Government on what precisely is to be achieved with SDI. In the last two years these opinions have, moreover, changed considerably. It is therefore very important for us to have a jointly formulated European view in our dialogue with our American allies. Our view should cover the most important political, strategic and industrial issues under discussion in this context.

I shall therefore begin by discussing a number of political aspects that are of crucial importance. In the debate in WEU and in the discussions outside, in our national parliaments, the press and the public, one question that has been asked is this: whose safety will SDI benefit, if it benefits any safety objective at all? This question has not yet been answered, but the fact that it has been asked in so many places certainly indicates the thoroughness of the debate. People rightly want to know if the SDI concept can in general provide additional security beyond, beside or on behalf of the present system of mutual nuclear deterrence. If the system is technically feasible, which is still in doubt, will it be a system that primarily benefits the safety of the United States or a system that benefits the safety of the whole alliance? With

*Mr. van den Bergh (continued)*

your permission, Mr. President, I should like to say that the impression I have gained from discussions in various European capitals and the United States is that in the development of this concept the first, though perhaps not the only consideration, was the strategic interests of the two superpowers. This impression is also common in Europe, hence the bitter criticism in various European countries, and also from governments, which have in principle adopted a hesitantly positive attitude towards SDI.

Another important question is whether the SDI concept, as postulated by the American Government and as developed in certain forms in the Soviet Union, will lead to an arms race in space, with perhaps incalculable consequences. Mr. President, let me make it absolutely clear that I believe everything possible must be done to prevent an unnecessary arms race in space. Quite apart from questions of technical feasibility and political desirability, the cost on both sides would be so enormous as to constitute a major reason for saying that, come what may, we should prevent this new arms race from taking place.

A question that will undoubtedly have played a part in the very important discussions between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev is whether, in the eyes of one of the two superpowers at least, SDI will lead to nuclear dominance by one superpower and so to the increased vulnerability of one of the other powers. Mr. President, right or not, this may be the most important reason for fearing that the new initiative will spark off an arms race in space.

I believe I am rightly interpreting the resolutions on world and European security adopted here on various occasions when I say that this Assembly has always taken the view that any such development must be prevented. Incidentally, one positive aspect of the debate on SDI may be that it is leading to some reappraisal of the significance of nuclear deterrence today. The present system, which in itself is not, of course, the best conceivable, does at least offer a reasonable degree of security in Europe.

Another political issue is arms control. In committee it was agreed that, whatever their shortcomings, the arms control agreements concluded in the past must be upheld. I am, of course, referring chiefly to the ABM treaty, which the superpowers concluded in the early 1970s. In my and the committee's opinion, although this treaty cannot be regarded as ideal and more should naturally be done, this cornerstone of arms control must in no circumstances be undermined by SDI-like developments anywhere in the world.

I was therefore pleased to quote from the opinions expressed by the Council of Ministers on this important point.

I should now like to look more closely at the negotiations in Geneva. A great deal has already been said on this subject, but we cannot claim that much progress has been made. No practical results have been achieved. But I consider it extremely important that these talks took place. The European countries must do their utmost where SDI is concerned, and particularly when arms control is discussed, to provide encouragement to our ally the United States and in our contacts with the Soviet Union that may lead to progress. It would be a very significant step if the United States and the Soviet Union could agree on the future of strategic defence in space. After all, although we in Europe exert some influence in our discussions, primary responsibility for the decisions rests, of course, with Moscow and Washington.

The question of industrial participation has played a major rôle in certain European countries. Mr. President, the question whether industrial participation is possible or desirable follows on from the question whether or not SDI is desirable. It cannot be a matter of finding SDI less attractive, attractive or very attractive, depending on whether certain countries would derive industrial advantages from it. The political and strategic interests carry so much weight that industrial interests should be completely subordinated to them.

During my travels in the United States and Europe, I have encountered considerable scepticism about the openings for European industries to participate in SDI. I am afraid that American industry is not keen to let European industries in. The barriers erected by the American defence industry to keep European countries out have recently become all too evident. Major initiatives like those of the Independent European Programme Group have been the result.

I would emphasise once again that it has been said here how important it is for Europe to maintain its technology at a high level. It might therefore be argued that, if European industries are to reach and maintain the same level as those in America and Japan, they should participate as subcontractors in SDI developments, in the mistaken belief that American industry would be prepared to hand over the most advanced technologies to the Europeans. Mr. President, this will not be the case. A major aspect of the recommendation drawn up by our committee is therefore that Europe should make a collective effort to develop space technology, with various applications in mind.

I hope this Assembly will endorse the priority set in our recommendation with regard to a

*Mr. van den Bergh (continued)*

European space programme. I am convinced and the great majority of the committee believes that this is the only way to compete in the world.

The Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments has drawn up a fairly short and simple resolution, which asks something of the United States Congress. I understand the Chairman of the General Affairs Committee will be saying something about this. He believes this resolution should not be discussed in this form today. Having consulted with Lucien Pignion, Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, I can say that a little procedural mistake has in fact been made. I do not believe opinions differ on the substance. But I must admit to Mr. Michel that a little mistake has been made. The resolution will therefore be referred back to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments so that the correct procedure may be followed. It will be appreciated that the opposition from the General Affairs Committee is also political to some extent, although this has not been expressed in so many words. However, as a procedural mistake has been made, it is better to preclude differences of opinion.

Mr. President, I have not found it an easy task in recent months to be responsible for the report and recommendation. What is important for me personally in this connection is that I cannot completely endorse what the committee has decided. But what is more important is that the committee has by a large majority approved a recommendation which it also hopes will have the support of the majority in this Assembly. Each of the various political groups in the committee had its own views, of course: one was more in favour of SDI, another more opposed. But I think I am reflecting Mr. Pignion's views when I say that the committee has reached compromises on a number of points, so enabling a large majority of its members to approve the text drawn up. This text certainly does not satisfy everyone, but it does provide a political basis not only for this Assembly's prestige in this respect but also for a critical dialogue, involving the Council of Ministers, for example. As I have said, some members are not personally in complete agreement with this text but have nevertheless given the recommendation their support. I hope this Assembly will discuss the recommendation in the same spirit and adopt it with as few amendments as possible.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you for your report, Mr. van den Bergh.

I understand that Mr. Michel, Chairman of the General Affairs Committee, wishes to speak.

I call Mr. Michel.

Mr. MICHEL (*Belgium*) (Translation). – My task is made easier by the import of what Mr. van den Bergh has just said. I had advised him that Mr. Lenzer, Chairman of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, and I myself, as Chairman of the General Affairs Committee, intended this morning to move the previous question requesting that the draft resolution appended to the draft recommendation in Mr. van den Bergh's report should not be examined today but should be deferred to a later sitting.

This request for postponement rests on two arguments: in the first place the text has not been scrutinised by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and put to the normal vote of approval, and in the second place the draft resolution has not been submitted for opinion to the General Affairs Committee. While it is true that Mr. Hill has expressed a view on the draft recommendation and has tabled some amendments, I repeat that it has not been presented to the General Affairs Committee for opinion. In the circumstances, Mr. Lenzer and I considered that it would be preferable not to examine this text today in the interests of properly co-ordinated debates and effective work within the Assembly. From what Mr. van den Bergh has said, it is my understanding that this view is shared by Mr. Pignion, Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. If so, I will not labour the point and will await the general consent of the Assembly. Should I be mistaken, however, I reserve the right to return to the matter.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – Our Rapporteur, Mr. van den Bergh, has already said what was needed and I wish to add nothing except to point out to Mr. Michel that I was at first unwilling to accede to the request made yesterday because, in the view of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, it is only necessary to refer to the first pages of Mr. van den Bergh's report and remember the number of meetings needed to arrive at this draft recommendation. The final discussion on the subject was so prolonged that when we finally came to the vote we were concerned with the whole of the recommendation proper. However, let us leave things as they stand: the draft resolution is referred back to the committee for later examination. That will satisfy everyone and avoid a discussion we can do without.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Do you wish to speak again, Mr. Michel?

Mr. MICHEL (*Belgium*) (Translation). – No, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman and Rapporteur of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

Mr. LENZER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I apologise for taking the floor as Chairman of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions of this Assembly and as Rapporteur who will be presenting a report in a moment. I do so to refer to procedural matters. As Mr. Michel has decided not to say anything about this, I should like to point out that it was not our intention to be spoilsports. The Rapporteur has just referred to a “little mistake”. In other words, an attempt is being made to play it down. I should like the Assembly to know the full story. Mr. Berrier and I, as Rapporteurs on the matter being debated today, were called upon to submit proposals relating to Mr. van den Bergh’s draft recommendation. I did this in a letter dated 22nd October. It has now emerged that this letter was not presented or discussed at the meeting of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, with the rather lame justification that no one asked about it. Let us leave it at that.

That is the “little mistake”, Ladies and Gentlemen, and I feel the members of this Assembly should know about it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. van den Bergh.

Mr. van den BERGH (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I believe Mr. Lenzer is now out to spoil the vote. He ought to have found out by now what happened in the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. During our discussions in London on 4th November the contents of Mr. Lenzer’s letter were mentioned. He might have known that. All this information is to be found in the committee’s report. It was then decided not to discuss Mr. Lenzer’s letter further because he had omitted to submit amendments to the committee. I would also point out that the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments or any other committee can only discuss an opinion if it is set out in the form of an amendment. Mr. Lenzer will recall that he omitted to do this in his letter. I am also quite prepared to forward a copy of Mr. Lenzer’s letter to all members. The letter does put forward an opinion. There is also a note from the Clerk, in which he says he believes he is acting entirely in accordance with Mr. Lenzer’s wishes, although he has been unable to discuss the matter with him. But Mr. Lenzer’s letter does not contain any amendments. And that is what I told the committee. The committee therefore decided

unanimously not to discuss the letter further. Mr. Lenzer’s communication is not only prejudicial to today’s vote: it is also incorrect, completely superfluous and wide of the truth.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and Gentlemen, to dispose of the point raised first by the Rapporteur in his speech, commented on by Mr. Michel and, finally, by the Chairman of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, it appears that there is a consensus and that the previous question you were intending to move, Mr. Michel, could be withdrawn in view of the reply given by the Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Therefore, unless the Assembly objects, we can consider that the draft resolution in the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments presented by Mr. van den Bergh is withdrawn from the debate in the current part-session, leaving the committee to propose how it should be reconsidered.

Is there any objection?...

It is so decided.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I welcome the wisdom displayed by the Assembly in dealing with this question, which, quite apart from the procedural problems, had a political dimension of which everybody is aware. The Assembly’s good sense will enable us to embark on the essential discussion of the part to be played by Western European Union in relation to the strategic defence initiative and to do so in an atmosphere which is, I am pleased to say, conducive to a sincere and thoroughly straightforward exchange of our divergent views on this subject so as to arrive at a clear decision compatible with basic democratic precepts which demand respect for all shades of opinion and for the parliamentary democracy which finds its exclusive expression in the majority vote.

Turning to the procedural issue, I regret the misunderstandings which have arisen. As I said yesterday, our discussion of the orders of the day was the outcome of imperfect co-ordination between the three committees involved. I will not use this platform to lecture other people. Everyone bears a share of responsibility, and I regret the tendency in some quarters to adopt a lecturing tone. Each of us must take some of the blame while no doubt acting with the best of intentions. Clearly, in dealing with a problem as fundamental as SDI, the Presidential Committee acted properly in considering at great length the organisation of the co-ordination and consultation between the three committees concerned. The fact that it proved impossible in the event to achieve satisfactory concerted action is what has led to the complications encountered yesterday and again just now.

*The President (continued)*

Ladies and Gentlemen, you accepted yesterday your President's remarks admonishing the Council and urging it to organise a real political dialogue between itself and the Assembly. The first thing we have to achieve is to put our own house in order and demonstrate that we can do ourselves what we are asking of the Council. I hope this will be a lesson to us all in future, and that the very widely shared attribute of common sense will prevail during our discussions of this vital subject.

Continuing the general debate, I call on Mr. Berrier, the Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee, to present his report on the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.

Mr. BERRIER (*France*) (Translation). – The General Affairs Committee does not feel particularly guilty after what you have just said, as the report which it entrusted to me is concerned essentially with the reactivation of WEU and the Assembly's response to Order 63.

Of course, it was impossible to talk about the reactivation of WEU without mentioning SDI, and I shall simply inform the Assembly of the conclusions arrived at by the General Affairs Committee following its members' visit to Washington.

According to our American informants, the Soviet Union has a start in SDI technology. President Reagan has not therefore broken any new ground, although the 1983 initiative provides for a budget allocation of \$26 billion spread over five years for the research programme.

It is impossible at the present time to say how and when the objective will be achieved, and, according to our American hosts, the reliability of the system will not in any case be 100%.

However, the American decision has been taken, and the research programme depends only to a modest degree on European participation, confined to the procurement of certain high-performance technology or equipment. A large number of contracts with companies have already been signed.

Deployment of the new anti-missile defence system will depend on the progress of research, the Geneva negotiations and the measures taken by the Soviet Union. There is, therefore, no need at present for any radical re-thinking of western strategy, although there are certain steps Europe must take: it must monitor the development of SDI by the two superpowers and ensure that European participation is not limited to the export of technology and specialists to the United States.

To judge from the impression we received in our discussions, there is no doubt, however, that American wariness of poor security will certainly limit European participation.

Bearing in mind that it is American companies which will be the chief beneficiaries, it seems vital that Europe should embark on its own research effort, not necessarily tied to defence.

In April 1985 the WEU Council referred the Eureka project for examination by the Community. However, though SDI and Eureka may well be compatible on a technical level, can the same be said about the finance? That question is difficult to answer. Eureka has been well received in Europe, and there is no hostility on the part of the Americans, although they seem to have little awareness of the project. In answer to a question which I put, I was told it was important that the project should not compete with SDI in military terms.

At all events, with regard to SDI and defence we can say firstly that deployment is still far off, secondly that the degree of security which it affords has not been evaluated, and thirdly that the problem of short- and medium-range missiles persists. In these circumstances Europe cannot give up its system of deterrence based on offensive, and especially nuclear, weaponry.

I do not in any way wish to imply that Europe should decline the rôle in the SDI programme offered by President Reagan, but great caution must be exercised in pursuing this course, which must be accompanied by the simultaneous strengthening of our technological and defence potential. SDI is a purely American project, and this is a fact which makes it a matter of urgency to establish a European pillar of the alliance which takes account of the specific requirements of European security at a time when the Americans and the Russians are viewing the development of their own defence systems in relation to the Geneva negotiations and the possible deployment of new weapons.

Without wishing to retain anything already out of date, we must not abandon the strategy of deterrence. WEU ministers have decided to co-ordinate their replies to the American proposals. Any major differences between Europeans would be highly damaging to all concerned, and I believe the conditions I have just outlined are essential to a good understanding between Americans and Europeans.

According to press reports, two or three meetings of experts in 1985 have not enabled the Seven to agree a joint position, but the fact remains that the immediate necessity is that Europe should take cognisance of the militarisation of space, and that, without moving backwards, the 1972 ABM treaty should be widened.

*Mr. Berrier (continued)*

France, for its part, has made concrete proposals at Geneva, and these should be examined by our European allies with a view to arriving at a position both on participation in SDI and on the steps to be taken to prevent the balance of forces from being upset throughout the world.

While my report necessarily had to refer to SDI, that was not its sole concern.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I will call you again as Rapporteur of the committee, together with the other rapporteurs, when the vote is taken on the draft recommendation.

I call Mr. Lenzer, the Rapporteur of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, to present his report on the guidelines drawn from the colloquy on the space challenge for Europe.

Mr. LENZER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, on behalf of Western European Union's Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions I should like to comment on the general issue of SDI by reporting on the results of a colloquy held by the committee in Munich from 18th to 20th September and attended by leading scientific and economic experts.

However, as the two Rapporteurs before me began their statements with a brief preliminary remark, permit me to do the same. I would like to say that the members of the national delegations are not paid to spoil the voting atmosphere but to debate in a truthful, correct, serious and factual way.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I am very glad to be able to tell you that the public also took a great interest in the Munich colloquy. We had arranged for outside experts from many fields to attend, and I believe we politicians learnt a great deal from this colloquy. It was attended by three ministers of member states and numerous other leading government representatives, who stated their positions, some controversial and divergent, in a very frank and refreshing manner. This enriched the general discussion. As I said, we learnt a great deal.

I should like to begin by thanking all those who helped to organise this colloquy, a truly great event, achieved in the face of serious problems. You will appreciate that I am primarily grateful to the participants, particularly the scientific and industrial experts, but also the politicians who took the trouble to attend. However, I should also like to thank the administration of WEU, the committee secretariat and not least the interpreters, who did a magnificent job at tropical temperatures – the

weather was marvellous in Munich: external conditions are also important at a meeting of this kind. My thanks go also to the German Bundestag and the state government of Bavaria. Mr. Strauss, Minister President of Bavaria, was kind enough to attend the opening ceremony himself and make a speech.

Ladies and Gentlemen, there are no limits to space. Hence the need, as in scarcely any other area of high technology, for international co-operation, which does not, of course, mean that each country does not also have some kind of base load to bear, some parallel, and desirable, national programme to pursue. Gaining access to space, to space technology, does not, of course, come cheaply. It is expensive and technically demanding. But simply because it is technically demanding, it is more capable than most other key technologies of enriching and stimulating many areas of technology.

Space is gaining in importance. Space technology has now perhaps slipped into the rôle once played by the peaceful use of nuclear energy, which was once the focus of attention in the technological and scientific debate. This colloquy has given us the impression that the energy issues, which appear to have been settled for the moment – that can quickly change, of course – are giving way to space technology.

It naturally makes things easier when events are spectacular. I recall in this context the German D-1 mission, which was widely approved by the public, and the work aboard the American shuttle Atlantis, when for the first time two astronauts, attached only by a lifeline, succeeded in building a framework in space, a major prerequisite for Europe's participation in the American manned space station.

Here in Europe the crucial breakthrough perhaps occurred with the meeting of ESA's Council of Ministers in Rome in January 1985. On behalf of all the members of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions – and I am no doubt also speaking on behalf of the vast majority of those present – I should like to thank the Council of Ministers for its efforts in this respect. For the first time for many years the stagnation in the organisation of European space research and technology has been overcome. For the first time we have something to look forward to.

Europe has been active in space for some time. Following the shock of the successful launch of the Russian satellite Sputnik in 1957, the Americans began a kind of crash programme. The Europeans have had to pay heavily for their apprenticeship. There was the establishment of ESRO in 1959 and of ELDO, which developed a European launcher, and our inglorious experience with the Europa rocket. But I do not think anyone was discouraged by

*Mr. Lenzer (continued)*

this, and that was a good thing. Anyone who becomes involved with an intricate key technology simply has to pay for it at the beginning. Our American friends had exactly the same experience.

The establishment of the European Space Agency in 1975 was a decisive breakthrough. Perhaps I may follow up the results of the colloquy by exploring the question: why do we participate in space research? Why is so much money spent on it? Some people, of course, feel there are still enough problems to be solved on earth. That is quite true, but of course it does not mean that an alternative view should be taken. It is simply proof of short-sightedness when problems are offset one against the other.

We are involved in space because we believe that space research is an important form of basic research, that it has a stimulating effect on industrial structural policy and the whole management of complex systems and that major new economic fields will be opened up, new products can be developed and new services will emerge. We need only think how the development of satellite technology has progressed, from telecommunications to earth observation, to realise how much potential there is, and this extends to security policy and the use of space for defence purposes.

Ladies and Gentlemen, in this context allow me to say a few words about the view – which I am firmly convinced is a foolish one – that civil and military projects can be treated as completely separate. I will quote a scientific witness who is above suspicion: Professor Karl Kaiser, head of the research institute of the German Society for Foreign Policy. He says:

“The systems of nuclear deterrence maintained by the two world powers are partly supported by space technology. The backbone of nuclear power is the intercontinental missiles, which use space. Both powers use satellites as warning and guide systems and for the permanent observation of the other side. But space is also becoming more important to conventional warfare. By now the United States’ and NATO’s military communications are already largely satellite-based. It must be assumed that, as further advances are made in military technology, growing recourse will be had to satellite-based communications extending to new forms of ‘battle management’.

If the American President’s strategic defence initiative became reality at some time in the distant future – and that is technically and politically debatable for the moment – there would be a qualitative and quantitative leap forward in the use of space for security

purposes. Assuming that both sides installed a protective system of this kind, this would mean that each world power would deploy in various orbits above the other’s territory numerous ‘battle stations’ and observation satellites capable of processing information in a matter of seconds, taking decisions and destroying hostile missiles by one of several methods between the time they are launched and the time they re-enter the earth’s atmosphere.”

He continues:

“Space-based technology has, however, also become the most important and therefore indispensable means of monitoring disarmament agreements. Observation satellites are used by both powers as the main instrument for observing the other side’s territory and ascertaining whether arms control and disarmament agreements are being enforced and what new developments are in progress, in the area of weapons systems, for example. Satellites are therefore an essential element of nuclear stability, which has ensured world peace for the last few decades.”

He concludes:

“In the West only the United States is able to collect relevant information about the other side, using satellites. America’s allies are therefore totally dependent on American data and American willingness to disclose those data. The United States is able to influence the international debate by guiding the flow of information. The United States is the donor, the European countries are the recipients. Although Europe is directly affected by Soviet advances in weapons technology and the military field, it has no means of gathering data of its own, but it is developing a growing potential in this area.”

Ladies and Gentlemen, I apologise for quoting at such length, but sometimes I think it is better to quote a scientist or some other expert who expresses himself clearly and keeps to the point, than to indulge in flowery and longwinded statements of one’s own.

As regards the committee’s views on SDI, it was, of course, the subject that really dominated the Munich colloquy, since the topical usually overshadows the longer-term. We found it quite easy to pinpoint the different positions that exist, even within the various member states. Nonetheless, we think it very important to find a uniform answer in Europe to the American President’s offer.

We realise that for the time being this is a research programme and we assume it is compatible with the ABM treaty. We also know that there will be a considerable technological

*Mr. Lenzer (continued)*

spin-off if \$26 thousand million is spent by 1990, even assuming there will be minor cuts. This does not mean that the countries concerned have to collect the tax-payer's money, but it is already clear that there will be many forms of co-operation at industrial level. A few days ago I was in Washington in another connection and looked into this question and also the question of the transfer of technology. It has already been established in Washington that SDIO has so far concluded about eight hundred contracts with various industrial companies, and a legitimate question in this connection is undoubtedly whether the countries in which these companies have their headquarters have equal partnership agreements with one another on patent law, secrecy and the transfer of technology.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I should like to conclude by stating my views on the debate, frequently conducted as an issue of alternatives, on the relationship between SDI and Eureka. It is wrong to see any conflict between the two: Eureka has nothing at all to do with SDI. As we now know, since the conference in Hanover, Eureka calls for the concentration of European research potential, the leaders in each field joining forces with a view to competing successfully with Japan and the United States.

Ladies and Gentlemen, to conclude, I refer you to the draft recommendation. It begins by proposing the adoption of a coherent space programme; surely no one can object to that. It urges the member states to help the industry to create the industrial structures needed for this purpose. When I think of my own country, the Federal Republic of Germany, I have the feeling that this has already been very successful even without government aid, but sometimes with the persuasive powers of a prime minister, although this approach is not necessarily to be recommended everywhere.

As time is getting on, I shall not discuss the various points separately. The large measure of unanimity in the committee is evident from the fact that this draft recommendation was approved by the committee with no votes against and only a few abstentions. I would be very pleased if it were to be widely accepted here today as well.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Allow me to congratulate you and your committee, Mr. Lenzer, on the noteworthy colloquy held in Munich on the subject of the space challenge for Europe. Its success is gratifying to every member of the Assembly, and I would remind you that you will have the opportunity to present the draft recommendation when we reach that point in our debate.

I have to inform the Assembly that the list of speakers is now closed. Thirty-two speakers have put down their names, which suggests that the general debate will take over three hours. I shall make every effort to allow each speaker the maximum latitude bearing in mind that some wish to speak this morning and others this afternoon, and I trust you will leave it to the Chair to organise the general debate in the best way possible. I remind you that the time allowed to speakers is limited to five minutes, and I would be grateful if speakers would help the Chair by abiding by this limit. So that each speaker can be ready when his turn comes, I propose to announce the names of the speakers in sequences of ten at a time. The first ten are Mr. Hill, Mr. Aarts, Mr. Miller, Mr. Lagorce, Mr. de Vries, Sir John Osborn, Mr. Berger, Mr. Tummers, Lord Reay and Mr. Bianco.

The general debate is now open and I call Mr. Hill.

Mr. HILL (*United Kingdom*) - This is a most important debate because many of us have firm views on what is best for western defence. At the Guildhall banquet in London only a few days ago the British Prime Minister said that we could not have "a better or braver champion" than President Reagan in the nuclear arms negotiations with Russia and that all who truly longed for a peaceful world wished him God-speed in his forthcoming talks with President Gorbachev. We now know that the outcome is a matter of great rapport between the two heads of state. We all hope that the negotiations will conclude in a satisfactory way to alleviate most of the fears in Western Europe.

Mr. van den Bergh's report sparked this all off. We must realise that the strategic defence initiative is a young baby. It was announced by President Reagan in March 1983. The invitation by the United States Secretary of Defence in March 1985 led to our pooling our thoughts on a European concerted campaign either to participate in co-operation with the United States or to make known our reservations.

There is a great deal in Mr. van den Bergh's report which shows that Mr. van den Bergh has great reservations. We in Western Europe are concerned about a statement by my Prime Minister which she has laid on record that for some years the Soviet Union has been devoting a massive effort to defence against nuclear weapons. It is necessary to have an exchange of technology. The President has said we shall be only too pleased to give that technology to the USSR so that it may update its strategic defence initiative.

We welcome this collaboration in the technologies of defence. I believe particularly that it will bring greater stability and security. It will



*Mr. Hill (continued)*

certainly enhance the prospects of success in present and future negotiations for arms control and reductions. I particularly welcome the Council's attitude to the SDI. The recommendations in Mr. van den Bergh's report go some way to answering most of my fears that the report might not have taken a balanced view.

I accept that, if any country has a high technology exchange with the United States, there should be a two-way street. At no time should Western European industry be starved of information. That will come out clearly in the report if some of my amendments are accepted.

This is a particularly dangerous time when, throughout the world, we are watching for stability in the arms race. We are all hoping and praying that our leaders will get the balance right, that the SDI will be a fully defensive system and will not create terror among our opponents. We must say from time to time that the programme should include other matters, such as observation and communication satellites.

We must promote our own Eureka programme. We must support the European Space Agency, which at the moment is designed completely for civilian applications. However, the realists here know that civilian applications can be used for military purposes in time of war.

The message must go from here urging the Soviet Union and the United States to ensure that their discussions, which must almost inevitably remain a dialogue on the inclusion of the SDI, should be used to promote a balanced and verifiable agreement limiting nuclear weapons. At the same time, the dialogue should ensure that expenditure on the SDI and the long research programme mentioned by Mr. Lenzer will be a continuous process, uniting our universities, our industries and our governments in a progressive programme for the defence of Europe.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Before calling Mr. Aarts I have a statement to make. Earlier, I named the first ten speakers on the list, and some of them concluded that only they would be called this morning. I must point out that these are the ten speakers for the start of the morning. If the Assembly has no objection, the sitting will continue until 1 p.m. to enable us to carry the debate as far as possible.

Mr. CIFARELLI (*Italy*) (Translation). - Very good.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Aarts.

Mr. AARTS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). - Mr. President, for various reasons SDI has,

understandably, become the focus of political interest. Thanks to technological advances space has become accessible in recent years and can be used for many different human purposes. The question that naturally arises is whether advantage might be taken of this new achievement for military purposes. Might there even - and it does happen - be talk of a new dimension in the defence system? Of course, military use has been made of space technologies indirectly for many years, in communications, observation, verification, navigation and so on. But military applications in a more direct sense did not really become important in the public mind and thus in politics until President Reagan presented his plans for a space shield. In the eyes of the United States President this is a non-offensive system, a defence system, as the name itself suggests. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has serious doubts about this and is threatening countermeasures. There is a tragic element in this. Although Mr. Reagan is seeking "to eliminate the threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles" with his concept, there is every chance that this line will again lead to an upward spiral in the arms race.

Consequently, what is needed is a prudent and cautious approach, even though no more than research is contemplated at this stage. After all, the history of armaments has shown all too often that research leads on fairly automatically to development, testing and operationalisation, unless special precautions are taken. We are therefore pleased to hear that Western European allies will be involved in a step-by-step evaluation of the political, military and strategic aspects of the possible introduction of this system at a later stage. It is therefore important to be certain about the premises and criteria applicable to this evaluation. At all events it must be made clear that the provisions of the ABM treaty will be upheld and observed, especially in view of the recent signing of a joint statement, a common understanding, in which the United States and the Soviet Union state that they intend to strengthen the viability of the ABM treaty. In addition, it goes without saying that neither the defences nor the policies of the alliance may in any circumstances be weakened and there must continue to be a guarantee of Western European security. NATO's policy is geared to preventing war by means of mutual deterrence. Clearly, the development of SDI must not be allowed to thwart this policy either.

A special point to be borne in mind in this context is the concern about conventional defence. SDI is an expensive business. In the 1985-89 research period it will cost \$26 thousand million, as has already been said. It is therefore no exaggeration to say that there must be no doubt that this defensive system may not be introduced at the expense of existing commitments in the conventional sphere.

*Mr. Aarts (continued)*

To conclude, I would say this: research into SDI will certainly go ahead in America. There are no convincing arguments at present to stop it. However, there should be a more careful political and strategic evaluation, especially with regard to the implications for security policy in general and Europe's position in particular. It will be important in this connection for the European countries to develop a common or co-ordinated position as far as possible, and for there to be ongoing, intensive consultations with our American ally, aimed at achieving the greatest possible transatlantic coherence in the interests of arms control and stability.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Dr. Miller.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – As Mr. Hill said, we live in a difficult world and I am sure that everyone agrees that it is a world in which there are grave difficulties, problems and dangers.

I am not a pacifist. I believe in the principle of defence, and methods of defending ourselves from attack deserve careful scrutiny. Instead of jumping in with both feet to adopt a new method of defending ourselves, we should pause and examine the SDI carefully.

Strategic defence, as envisaged in the star wars proposal, is a good idea in theory. A defensive structure intended to counter aggression must appeal to those who, like me, feel that defence is necessary. However, there is a world of difference between the theory and the practicalities.

After much thought and analysis, no one believes in a complete defence. It will undoubtedly be possible for an enemy to deluge a country with so many missiles that some would get through. Therefore, the SDI would be only a part defence; only some areas would be defended.

Some suggest that there is unanimity about the feasibility of the SDI. That is not the case. Even in the United States many voices are raised against the concept, not only because of the cost and practicalities, but because of the greater instability that it would initiate.

Why are we being asked to embark on this programme? I believe that the reason is the anti-Soviet hysteria in the West. I am not starry-eyed about the Soviet Union. I know that the Russians support and sometimes initiate instability in various parts of the world. Of course, some other countries are not averse to doing a little of that.

The Soviet Union has much influence in the developing world. It is worrying that so many countries turn to the Soviet Union, but it is not

surprising, because there is so much poverty in many parts of the world.

A view on the SDI is a matter of balance. I have examined the concept and I believe that the balance comes down against the initiative, if only because of the cost and the fact that the money could be better used to counter Soviet influence and to render more assistance to the countries that we think are under Soviet influence.

I know how hard the Rapporteur struggled to produce his excellent report. It is worth reading thoroughly. In paragraph 4.2 it poses a key question:

“We shall have to ask ourselves not only whether the West can afford active defences against nuclear missiles. We must also ask whether the enormous funds to be devoted to such systems might be better employed... might it be better to use the available funds to improve our capability to oppose a potential aggressor at a time of crisis with a credible, sustainable and controllable mix of conventional and nuclear forces?”

We have not properly answered that question.

I end by repeating that the cost of the SDI – hundreds of billions of dollars – would be better spent countering the influence of the country that we feel is our enemy.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Lagorce.

Mr. LAGORCE (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, it has long been said that our destiny is no longer in our own hands. This situation is both humiliating and dangerous, and we should therefore take steps to see that our disadvantage is steadily reduced, especially – though not solely – in the military sphere. To this end, we now have two projects: SDI, yes – but Eureka too. In my opinion they are not incompatible and must not be allowed to become irreconcilable.

I shall not go into detail on the subject of SDI, as the three excellent reports under discussion provide ample information. I wish only to deal briefly with a number of points, in very general terms. Geographically, SDI is located on American soil. Financially, it represents an enormous effort, and its deployment will take years. It will call for extraordinarily advanced technology of a mainly, if not exclusively, military character.

As far as Europe is concerned, this initiative is of direct concern to specific industries and companies. There will be an attempt to recruit the best brains and to procure the best patents. It has been well said that SDI is charged with emotion but not exempt from

*Mr. Lagorce (continued)*

ulterior motives, and that is only natural. Who, indeed, would not try to derive some national advantage from such a colossal enterprise.

It is certain that, while SDI is primarily a military project, it will have technological spin-offs for civilian industries. American industrial output therefore stands to benefit from the spin-offs, which will of necessity be far less beneficial to us. This is a rather worrying state of affairs for a Europe whose only true riches are its grey matter.

This prospect should put us on our guard. Europe must also benefit, but Europe as a whole, not a fragmented Europe. In this context, joint research into new technologies and into the collective development of space technology, civilian as well as military, has my unqualified support.

Similarly, I welcome the call for measures for the verification of arms control agreements, the demands for compliance with existing arms agreements and the insistence that the negotiation of future agreements should not be prejudiced in any way. All that is vital, just as it is vital that our seven countries should respond, if not jointly then at least in a co-ordinated fashion, to SDI.

But I must emphasise how misguided it would be to allow the space collaboration of our countries, our industries and our specialists to be limited to second-rate technology. Participation of this kind in SDI would lead Europe directly and speedily along the path of technological, economic and financial underdevelopment to a position of irreversible decline.

As I have already pointed out, we have another programme through which we can develop our European technological capabilities fully and to the highest degree, and that is Eureka. Allow me to say a few words about this programme. I welcome the recent Frankfurt agreement, incomplete and inadequate though it may be, as this programme has, I believe, three advantages over SDI: it is European, civilian and fully capable of development.

Let us not be naive, however. It is inevitable that research for the Eureka programme will have military spin-offs since it is impossible to draw a strict dividing line between the civilian and military spheres. What is certain, however, is that the civilian emphasis of the Eureka programme will ensure that the project is, on balance, heavily slanted towards peace.

But, above all, Eureka is European. The effort which it represents, though its objectives may still be at the embryonic stage and its resources as yet inadequate, will be developed

and strengthened. Though the future prospect may now seem exaggerated, it will become reality if Europe is determined.

To this end, we really must be prepared to look beyond our narrow national prejudices. As we have been doing over the last thirty years in so many other areas of activity, we must ensure that, there too, the European will be represented by WEU – the pillar of Atlantic defence on whose revitalisation everybody is in at least verbal agreement – underpins our actions, our research and our attainments at national level.

Our fellow citizens will become truly European only to the extent that they see Europe as a concept which pays off, that is to say as a useful and powerful entity. They will support the European idea if Europe keeps up with the superpowers now and in the future, and it is a truism to point out that Europe can achieve this only if it is united and acts in concert.

The Eureka project, rather than SDI, is one way of concerting our action in technological research and of uniting as we must, while at the same time – and I emphasise the point in view of the present debate – participating on a fair basis in SDI, provided always that such participation is both useful and acceptable. But are we sure that the Americans will agree to this kind of participation, which would somewhat reduce their influence throughout the world?

Perhaps that is where the problem lies. A problem which has been posed in a competent manner but, I am afraid, without too much optimism by our three rapporteurs, whom I take this opportunity of congratulating on their observations concerning European defence and security now and in the future.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and Gentlemen. Before calling the next speaker, I will now name the next speakers on the list. They are Mr. de Vries, Sir John Osborn, Mr. Berger, Mr. Tummers, Lord Reay and Mr. Bianco. The other representatives to be called will be Mr. Gansel, Mr. Spies von Büllesheim, Mr. Antoni, Mr. Reddemann, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Kittelmann, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Hardy, Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Millan.

I call Mr. de Vries.

Mr. de VRIES (*Netherlands*). – I should like to congratulate Mr. Berrier on his report, which is enormously helpful for us in our discussions at home.

I shall concentrate my remarks on some aspects of the strategic situation. The nuclear age brings with it the possibility of a mutually assured destruction. The party that strikes first will die second.

*Mr. de Vries (continued)*

We should all like to be assured of mutual security. That is our only chance. We cannot improve our own invulnerability, because it will leave the other party in fear of the first strike to which there is no response.

We cannot return to unilateral security. Unilateral invulnerability also means offensive superiority. We must bear that truth in mind when we discuss SDI. There are no technical solutions for this political and military problem.

SDI is aimed at creating a technological breakout of our present dilemmas. It enhances the concern that a second-strike capability will become less credible.

The new generation of nuclear weapons with its precision, velocity and accuracy makes it increasingly possible to knock out missiles on the other side. This is the window of vulnerability. It is in the interests of both superpowers to discuss the possibilities of reducing the vulnerability of land-based missiles specifically. We do not need SDI or an extension of the arms race in space. We can solve the problems on earth by a reduction in the number of offensive weapons and by agreed measures to improve the survivability of land-based systems.

Counter-force strategy and capabilities have caused more problems. In the counter-force scenario there is hardly room for the consideration of "enough is enough". The number of weapons needed is dictated by the number of targets that need to be destroyed. Enough is never enough. More is always necessary.

A second consequence of the counter-force scenario is that because the second-strike capability is increasingly threatened, military planners have to concentrate on first use and first strike.

It is in the interests of both sides to improve stability, not to increase instability. In Europe we are much involved in deterrence and anything that guarantees us greater security. If the instability of weapons is increased, we in Europe will experience the consequences. We are interested in improved stability, not increased instability. Stability is important for us, for America and for the countries on the other side of the iron curtain. Security is not an illusion. Security can be achieved by reducing the number of weapons in the world, not by a technological break-out or by moving the arms race into space. Extending the arms race will be costly and will stimulate both sides to engage in a new competition. That will not improve the situation. Europeans can encourage restraint. We should discourage extending the arms race into space.

*(Mr. Goerens, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir John Osborn.

Sir John OSBORN (*United Kingdom*). – One point has not been emphasised enough – SDI is a defensive umbrella against ballistic missiles. The term star wars is therefore a misnomer because it implies offence rather than defence.

I should have preferred our having one recommendation embracing the three recommendations advanced by Mr. Michel, Mr. Pignion and Mr. Lenzer respectively. It might also have been possible to have arrived at one recommendation which embraced many of the excellent amendments tabled by Mr. Hill. I might be asking for the impossible but the Assembly of Western European Union must find a means of speaking with one voice on defence issues, especially SDI. It must at least obtain the greatest possible consensus.

Mr. Caro referred to the WEU Council. I hope that the Council of Defence Ministers rather than the Council of Foreign Ministers will begin to take positive steps towards a single line. Such a positive rôle has been achieved to some extent by the Council of Ministers in the European Economic Community and I venture to suggest that there is greater unanimity of purpose in the ministerial committees of the Council of Europe and the Assembly than has been achieved in WEU. That is the challenge facing WEU.

Western European Union should work in unity with NATO and the North Atlantic Assembly. I welcome the fact that Mr. Cahen, the Secretary-General of WEU, attended the Munich colloquy and addressed us this week. If I could have asked him a question, it would have been what dialogue he has had with Lord Carrington. It is essential that the club of seven WEU countries move towards a common policy on the scale of defence, intermediate theatre missile programmes as against intercontinental ballistic missiles, and research on SDI. Mr. van den Bergh talked of such a common rôle. I hope that the Assembly will find a means of achieving the common denominator with which we can all agree.

I should like to repeat some of my comments at the Munich colloquy. Cruise missiles are built in and supplied from factories in the United States of America. The extent to which they are being given to European countries and the extent to which Western Europe is paying for them is important. That is especially true for cruise missiles and, to some extent, for Pershing missiles. The trouble is that the people of Europe feel that American missiles for the benefit of American defence policy are being put on European soil as part of an American, let alone joint, defence policy. Polaris and Trident submarines have been built in Britain and I

*Sir John Osborn (continued)*

should like such manufacturing capacity to be extended in Europe. Being a bit mischievous, I should like to suggest Sheffield, because it was the centre of the armour plate industry, but it is unfortunately the site of the headquarters of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in Britain.

When the committees of WEU visited the United States, it was explained to them in the Pentagon and elsewhere that SDI was a research and assessment project. Mr. van den Bergh referred to an ABM system based on thirty-two Galosh missiles deployed around Moscow and affirms reports that new missiles are being deployed. Mr. Robert McFarlane, the assistant to President Reagan, said last Monday that the Soviet Union was spending \$1 billion per year on its own strategic defence initiative type space-based/directed-energy missile defence programme. I should have thought that I was right to assume that the Americans have invited European countries, including Great Britain, to participate in a research programme. I know that my country has responded favourably.

Intercontinental ballistic missiles depend on the time between launch and reaching the target over the Arctic, the North Atlantic, or the Pacific – thousands of miles. As I said at the Munich colloquy, I have my doubts about whether SDI will ever be sufficiently watertight to work over such longer ranges. The main issue is whether SDI is realistic and relevant for the European theatre as well as for ICBMs. Mr. Lenzer and his committee gave considerable thought to that matter in London in November. That is why the committee resolved to pursue a European anti-missile system independently or as part of SDI.

We are the Assembly of WEU and its committees. What we debate and the work that we have done should be communicated to our national parliaments and their committees. I hope that we can have closer co-operation with our national parliaments and the North Atlantic Assembly on this issue.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Berger.

Mr. BERGER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, Mr. van den Bergh's report gives me an opportunity to make a few basic comments on the strategic defence initiative.

There are still people who talk and behave as if the strategic defence initiative could be stopped. Let me make this clear: we cannot stop it. Mr. Gorbachev could not stop it either. I suspect that even the American President could not stop it now, unless evidence were produced by the research programme,

showing that the attempted results could not be achieved in this way. It is high time we Europeans got used to the idea. I think we should all get used to the idea.

The strategic defence initiative, as the first speaker in the debate today said, is still an infant. But this infant is now on its feet and has learnt to walk, and we Europeans must not allow it to run away from us. The programme is under way, and it affects us. Europe therefore has a vital interest in current research and the results achieved.

If achieved, the aims of this research would change the military position and strategy of the western defence alliance as a whole. The application of the research findings should therefore be the subject of joint decisions within the alliance, whose goal continues to be the prevention of war and the maintenance of national sovereignty with as few weapons as possible.

If the SDI systems envisaged are cost-effective and viable – and these are the criteria which the Americans themselves have adopted for the implementation of this programme – then the strategic defence initiative cannot possibly result in a new arms race. That would be illogical. On the contrary, the deterrence currently maintained with offensive nuclear weapons would then be replaced by the effective prevention of war by means of mutually ensured defence capabilities, accompanied by overall strategic stability. However, this presupposes closer co-operation between the two superpowers than the present arms control talks. The research being carried out by both sides into anti-missile and anti-satellite systems should then lead to joint solutions.

The treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems, or ABM treaty, allows for research activities. There is every indication that the Soviet Union has long been conducting research into new technologies that can be used as anti-missile systems. What is more, the Soviet Union has the only operational ABM system and is modernising it.

Research under the American President's strategic defence initiative is therefore justified. The American President has promised a restrictive interpretation of the ABM treaty in this context.

I would also point out that since signing the ABM treaty the Soviet Union has tripled its strategic potential in terms of both the number of warheads and their throw weight and that since this treaty was concluded the Soviet Union has deployed a completely new category of weapons against Europe, which is a particular threat to our security, aimed at splitting the alliance.

*Mr. Berger (continued)*

Of course, even if the SDI research is completely successful it will not help to solve all the security problems. Other problems, hitherto overshadowed by the nuclear issue, might become more significant. It should be remembered that the weapons systems threatening Europe and America differ in most respects.

With SDI as a complement to it, Europe must solve its own, specific military security problems, attributable to the threat from the Warsaw Pact's intermediate- and short-range systems, the numerical superiority and high quality of its air forces and its numerically far superior conventional land forces, which are, moreover, kept in a high state of readiness for attack.

Success is more likely if the European countries can influence the research objectives and substance of the strategic defence initiative and have access to the results. I therefore believe that Europe must participate as fully and consistently as possible in this SDI research, and do so under a single political umbrella, for the protection of European institutions and European industry.

This Assembly should seek to ensure that European participation in SDI is co-ordinated at European level. In the context of this initiative Europe must define its interests and where possible find joint solutions to its problems. From this standpoint, SDI is also a challenge to European unification.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Tummers.

Mr. TUMMERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). - Mr. President, the association of SDI with star wars is not welcomed by those who planned the strategic defence initiative. Defining it as "the military use of space" seems to tone down the terrifying picture of star wars. Mr. Wilkinson used this wording as the title for the reports which we adopted in 1984. At the colloquy in Munich the question of the use of space for military purposes was discussed in depth. The Assembly had previously approved an amendment tabled by me which expressed a critical reservation about such military use of space. This critical attitude was based on humanitarian and cultural views. Cultural considerations are not mentioned very often in this Assembly, either in the preparation of reports or in speeches prompted by reports. But such considerations are appropriate in this case. They are commensurate with WEU's design. Since the transfer of WEU's cultural mandate to the Council of Europe in 1959 there has been no major change, since the members of this Assembly also belong to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

At the colloquy in Munich my compatriot Professor Voûte spoke about "Space, the common heritage of mankind". SDI pretends to be quite simply a defence initiative, but in terms of the terror it is intended to cause, the burden on national budgets and the military occupation of space, it is completely hostile to "Space, the common heritage of mankind". Space forms part of the cultural heritage, since nothing in the history of mankind has so challenged the imagination. Various speakers in Munich, including the former German Defence Minister Franz-Josef Strauss, testified to this in their statements.

SDI, the military use of space, is a direct threat to space as the "common heritage of mankind". Did the launching of Sputnik mark the beginning of a new era? Not at all, Mr. President. Sputnik was the culmination of mankind's space-gazing. What then began was rivalry, the arms race in space, SDI being the most radical proposal to date. Anyone who glorifies SDI as the safest instrument for peace today is taking an unthinking and hostile view of space, the greatest heirloom of the human imagination.

Shortly after the colloquy in Munich a large number of Nobel prizewinners spoke out along these same lines. The plan to use space for military purposes must be opposed, and WEU, aware of its original purpose, which is diametrically opposed to any arms race - unlike the North Atlantic Treaty, which is essentially aimed at the continuation of the arms race - must oppose SDI.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Lord Reay.

Lord REAY (*United Kingdom*). - Both Mr. van den Bergh's report and its recommendations are imbued with a spirit of negativism towards SDI. The report contains every suspicion, every doubt, every misgiving, everything that has ever been said against SDI and yet gives none of the arguments that could be adduced in its favour. Why? It seems odd to me how anyone can be so confidently negative about the consequences of SDI. The Russians, yes - I can understand that they do not like SDI, because it will remove a measure of their capacity to threaten the West. But why should anyone who is concerned with the security of the West be so sure that SDI is a dangerous development for the West? It cannot simply be a waste of money, just a dream incapable of producing anything of value, or it would not have brought the Soviet Union back to the negotiating table.

Why is a nuclear confrontation based exclusively on offensive weapons better or inherently more stable than a confrontation that includes defensive weapons systems? If deterrence has

*Lord Reay (continued)*

been weakened in some respects – or if it might be by, for example, improvements in first-strike capability – is it not plain that some forms of defensive systems could enhance deterrence by restoring the invulnerability of retaliatory capacities? Mr. de Vries went into this matter. Although I do not share his views, I thought that his speech was intelligent and interesting. But the report does not go into this. The report and its recommendations repeatedly imply that the Americans are likely to infringe the ABM treaty. However, when the report considers whatever the Soviet Union may have already done in strategic defence, it refers to American “claims” as to what the Russians had done, implying by the use of that word that such claims should be given no credence. Yet in the final communiqué of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group, which met on 30th October this year, there was this passage:

“ We received a detailed briefing from the United States Secretary of Defence on the evidence of Soviet treaty violations. We take the most serious view of this and call on the new Soviet leadership to take the steps necessary to assure full compliance with its commitments. ”

It seems that there are some NATO members whose representatives say one thing in NATO and another in the WEU Assembly.

The communiqué went on to discuss the recent introduction of new offensive weapons by the Soviet Union. It stated:

“ We continue to be concerned by the steady build-up of Soviet nuclear forces, in particular the testing and deployment of new strategic systems, including the SS-X-24 and the recently deployed SS-25, the deployment of a new generation of air-launched cruise missiles and the preparation for deployment of ground- and sea-based versions. We also note that the total SS-20 force has further increased to 441 launchers with 1,323 warheads. Alliance policy in comparison is to maintain only the minimum number of nuclear weapons necessary for credible deterrence. ”

The report makes no mention of any of those developments. No doubt it would have detracted from the picture that the report wishes to promote of the United States, by its obstinate adherence to SDI, provoking a new race in offensive weapons by the Soviet Union – whereas in fact that race has never ceased.

The report shows no awareness of the disadvantages that the West faces in comparison with the Soviet Union in being an open, as opposed to a closed, society, from the point of

view of both weapons deployment and information availability. On the contrary, the Rapporteur seeks to exploit that openness by drawing attention to divisions within the American administration. Does he imagine that there are no divisions within the Soviet administration ?

If ABM deployment is eventually considered wise, the treaty provides both for its own amendment and for withdrawal from the treaty by either party to it. It would not need to be broken for deployment to take place. Therefore, the ABM treaty cannot be used as a veto on deployment.

I am pleased that the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments has withdrawn the draft resolution. I hope that nothing like it ever again appears at this Assembly. It read like the Kremlin's opening negotiating posture, and its production by this Assembly would have been simply scandalous.

As for the recommendations, I will support the amendments tabled by the General Affairs Committee, which are to be moved by Mr. Hill, and which, so far as I can recollect, were adopted with no dissentient votes.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Bianco.

Mr. BIANCO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I think that the worst thing that could happen would be to hold a kind of academic discussion on this problem instead of going into its true political substance. The background to our discussion was set by the Geneva meeting and its positive outcome, which gave the lie to those who prophesied that it would be difficult for the conversations between Mr. Gorbachev and Mr. Reagan to succeed because of the obstacle created by the strategic defence initiative.

The fact is that it is even possible to imagine that, after the previous difficulties it was the Soviet leadership's need to clarify exactly with the United States the state of the strategic defence initiative which accounted for the positive outcome from Geneva. If, therefore, we take a realistic view of the facts as they are we must stress that strategic defence, which is wrongly referred to as star wars, was not an obstacle to agreement in Geneva. Thus, we have the agreements into which we must fit our efforts to create a Europe which, if it is to have its proper rôle, must be involved and make its weight felt as previous speakers have already said.

It is not enough to complain about the American initiative. As Lord Reay and Mr. Berger have said, it must be appreciated that Soviet research is also moving in the same direction. I would remind the Assembly that it

*Mr. Bianco (continued)*

was not recently but some years ago that Prime Minister Kosygin told President Johnson that defensive weapons were undoubtedly better than offensive. Research on defence has gone ahead in the Soviet Union too.

On what point should we now accept that agreement was reached between the Soviet Union and the United States? First and foremost the principle of strategic parity was reiterated and respect for treaties, including the Geneva agreement, was firmly established. This will not hinder further progress nor should we as Europeans think of putting obstacles in the way of research for the strategic defence initiative. If, therefore, we want to exert any influence and not merely be the tiresome Europe more concerned with sterile political arguments about the United States, Europe should logically take its own positive initiative with a view to influencing not only the direction of research but also the line which should be taken by the United States.

At the moment our attitude is both passive and contradictory because, firstly, we like to complain that European firms are likely to be subordinate to the United States technologically and that we shall become only subcontractors for minor work that American firms are prepared to give us and, secondly, we do not wish to be involved in the major decisions. From the strategic standpoint the so-called umbrella does not cover Europe and we are not making any effort to take part in the only manner open to us namely by becoming involved while still respecting existing treaties of course.

I believe that this is the direction we should take. The fact is that Mr. van den Bergh's report contains all the contradictions resulting from our having no guidelines. The shortcomings are recorded and the contradictions are clearly expressed both in the recommendation and in the final resolution.

In my view this is a point on which we must reach agreement - Europe must speak with a single voice. We believe that the Eureka project opens the way for the organisation of joint European research; but it would be a serious mistake not to be represented, at the research stage, in general progress in the matter of strategic defence. We must be involved at world level and must apply all our cultural, scientific and technological resources if we do not wish to remain the complaining and passive Europe we have been up till now.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Gansel.

Mr. GANSEL (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). - Mr. President, Mr. van den

Bergh has submitted a good report, and he has put forward a good proposal for a very general recommendation, which might therefore have found a consensus in this Assembly. But now Mr. Hill, who is, of course, the spokesman of a group, has tabled a whole series of amendments which, if adopted, would express support for SDI in very great detail. Others like myself have found it necessary to respond by tabling very detailed amendments rejecting SDI. I do not feel very comfortable about this because I believe, whatever the outcome of the vote, this Assembly overestimates its own importance if it thinks it can adopt practical, detailed recommendations on SDI in a situation in which the governments of the WEU countries have shown themselves incapable of any kind of joint reply to the offer made by their American ally.

A great deal has been said here about the reactivation of WEU. SDI provided an opportunity, which the Council of Ministers seemed to be seizing in Bonn last April. It has since been missed, however, and we shall have to wait for the next one.

Mr. President, I am surprised that we do not at least ask questions, especially on what I see as the crucial issue of establishing the motive and goal of the American policy on SDI. Why, after the strain placed on NATO by the twofold decision two years ago, does our ally now start putting it to the test again, why do it without consulting us, why cast doubt on the deterrence theory, why threaten the modest success achieved in the past in arms control policy with the Soviet Union, why tax East-West relations, and why at such enormous cost? Why has our American ally done these things?

Not a few commentators see America's policy as pursuing the apparently conflicting objectives of encircling the Soviet Union and isolating itself. It may be that the American policy is keeping both options open. The fact is that this policy is designed to lead to a reduction in the threat to the very existence of the North American continent at a time of mutual assured destruction. American interest in this is quite legitimate. It is evident from the delinking effect of Pershing II deployment, from host-nation support programmes, from discussions on the reduction of American troops in Western Europe, from the increasingly global rôle played by the United States, from its orientation towards the Pacific region rather than Europe and, above all, from SDI. SDI clearly demonstrates that the end of "extended deterrence" has come and will not be replaced by "extended protection". The point of SDI cannot be that the Americans are opening up a defensive umbrella over us as a new method of taking on old risks.



*Mr. Gansel (continued)*

The answer cannot be a European SDI, which is neither technically nor militarily possible in Europe, when anyone crossing the frontier between East and West can carry an atom bomb in his rucksack.

What does this imply for us? Europe must try to ensure that it remains secure against attack from the Soviet Union and politically, economically and culturally independent of its American ally. Only when we are in a position to look after our own security will we also be able to remain politically, economically and culturally independent.

What form can this European security policy take after SDI? That is the decisive question. What monitoring and reconnaissance shall we have to undertake in the conventional sphere, in the nuclear sphere and in space? How can we prevent a European arms build-up from becoming a threat to the Soviet Union and so resulting in a new arms race between East and West in which Europe will perhaps be the catalyst or pacemaker? What can be negotiated with the Soviet Union in the area of security policy, and for what can our American ally provide credible military support? Those are the decisive questions this Assembly should consider.

SDI is a challenge to Europe, and the Assembly should not think it is meeting this challenge simply by rejecting or endorsing SDI. That is what I want to emphasise now. I think it is more important than haggling over this or that amendment, although I shall, of course, be taking a fervent interest in this business later on.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Spies von Büllesheim.

Mr. SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I think we are very fortunate to have three reports on the much discussed and - even among ourselves - controversial subject of SDI, each considering it from a different angle. It is also a good thing because many of us - I would even say the majority - feel that the report by Mr. van den Bergh, whose resolution has now been withdrawn, thank God, was biased against our ally the United States. But these three reports at least provide us with an overall picture.

I should like to take up what Mr. Lenzer said this morning, when he once again expressed the simple truth that space has no frontiers. Space has no frontiers, not only in terms of distance, but also, as we now realise, in terms of the technical potential that can be tapped by man in very many fields.

We surely appreciate that, if man had not made the effort to fly to the moon, our daily lives would have been different today. We would not have had computers, optics, telecommunications and much else that we now take completely for granted in our daily lives.

SDI, it is true to say, will be a new challenge. It will be a major project, and it is hardly conceivable that the objectives associated with it can actually be achieved, that it will be possible to locate approaching missiles so quickly from satellites, to give the necessary commands and simultaneously aim destructive projectiles at these missiles from other satellites. But we have become accustomed in the last few decades to meeting problems we believed to be insoluble, but which were later solved. And in every case - even from military projects - there have been substantial spin-offs for peaceful purposes.

The SDI project is very reminiscent of nuclear power, in that both have attracted considerable opposition. In the past a primitive fear experienced by mankind following the terrifying phenomena of the atom bombs prompted people, especially those unfamiliar with the technical details, to condemn nuclear power even for peaceful uses. We have a similar situation now: people believe that space is still completely peaceful now and that it is only through SDI that the military conflict will be taken into space. That dreadful phrase star wars, which is particularly catchy, has done a great deal to fuel this primitive fear. I feel we should not be using this phrase at all; semantics are important. We must constantly point out that SDI is intended to be a means of defence designed to ensure the continuation of the nuclear balance we have maintained for decades. This balance of terror has enabled us to live in peace in the last few decades.

Opponents of SDI repeatedly refer to Eureka. There simply seems to be no way of scotching the idea that the one has anything to do with the other, or that Eureka could replace SDI. It cannot therefore be said often enough - and this was made particularly clear at the conference of the European countries on Eureka in Hanover - that Eureka has nothing to do with SDI. The idea behind Eureka is that the European countries should join forces in other areas of research: pollution, AIDS, many completely different projects that have nothing to do with space. When we talk about SDI, we should leave Eureka out of it. Eureka is a completely separate, purely European project having no connection with SDI.

Mr. President, having reached the end of my allotted time I should like to sum up. There are various reasons for the participation of the European countries in SDI: economic reasons, direct

*Mr. Spies von Büllenheim (continued)*

and indirect spin-off effects. Another reason – as Mr. Berger has already said – is that we must endeavour jointly to safeguard European defence interests. In view of the economic superiority and the consequent level of expenditure in the United States and the Soviet Union, working on similar projects with almost seven times the financial resources, it is particularly important that the European countries should concentrate their efforts and co-operate. I believe and hope that this debate will make a major contribution to this objective.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Antoni.

Mr. ANTONI (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, we think that Mr. van den Bergh's report has great merit, principally because of the background material it contains. The information is objective and highlights – and this is our first political concern – the danger that, in addition to changing the terms of stability and security, SDI will trigger off a fresh arms race and will therefore increase international tension and thus make the control and reduction of armaments more difficult.

We consider this to be particularly serious and worrying in view of the fresh prospects opened by the meeting between Mr. Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev in Geneva. In the present circumstances, therefore, we should be trying to further all the positive aspects of that meeting and thus assist the success of the Geneva negotiations on strategic weapons.

We are pleased that this is also the opinion of the Rapporteur and has wide support in the Assembly but at the same time we cannot accept the view that the only action to be taken by Europe should be to approve SDI.

We feel that the amendments proposed to the recommendation presented by the Committee on Defence Questions do not help in this direction. We particularly liked the original wording which certainly avoided the contradictions of the present wording which aims at a highly improbable middle way.

We therefore cannot accept these amendments and on this point we are firmer than the Rapporteur. There are many reasons in Europe for doubting and opposing SDI and these are also to be found in America. The governments of our countries are also uncertain on the issue. Attitudes vary widely but nobody is wholly favourable and here I recall the four points in the statement made in Washington by the British Prime Minister. The Socialist International is also opposed and has recently confirmed its opposition; there is also opposition from other political movements and

parties. This morning the Rapporteur reminded us that simultaneous action by the United States and the USSR in this area will open the way to a space arms race which we must oppose. In Geneva this was the major remaining area of disagreement between Mr. Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev; the two great powers both maintained their positions but undertook to work for an agreement.

In our view all this means that our Assembly should not accept the principle of either an American or a Soviet weapons system in space. Otherwise we should be more royal than the king and all this is very far from the reactivation of WEU! De facto support as in Amendment 2 of the General Affairs Committee should therefore be refused and no choice should be made which would apparently favour détente but would in actual fact drive the USSR towards a military response and thus add to the insecurity of the whole world and of Europe in particular; and this applies equally to Amendment 5 also tabled by the General Affairs Committee. One of the basic factors in world stability is the ABM treaty – a point on which the Committee on Defence Questions unanimously agreed – but this is not covered by Amendment 6, also tabled by the General Affairs Committee, which would eliminate the reference to observance of the ABM treaty.

As regards technology, we think it is wrong to subordinate Europe to America; above all it would not, as our Rapporteur maintains, mean very much because European firms would have a subordinate rôle as subcontractors. Pressure for joint European research should therefore be supported and, if properly co-ordinated, Eureka could provide the opportunity; at the same time the rôle of the European Economic Community should not be reduced as paragraph 2 of the recommendation would appear to imply.

In any case a precise answer is required on the nature of the commitments – including those of European firms – and the limits on the testing and activation of systems.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, we are aware that we are a minority group in this Assembly but we do represent a large national party – in percentage terms the biggest in Europe – and we are finding more and more possibilities of reaching understandings with other democratic parties and parties of the left in Europe – socialist, social democratic, labour and others. In this Assembly we have previously declared the need for a strategic view of defence involving measures and initiatives aimed at establishing conditions for controlled general disarmament, the cutting of costs and the use of more of the available resources for development to bring about the great changes needed by all mankind

*Mr. Antoni (continued)*

and not only by people living in the East and the South.

Support for the substance of SDI is not the right political choice; in our view it means opening the way towards a new arms race and the creation of further dangers for Europe. This we do not want.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Reddemann.

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, when we started discussing the American SDI project in the committees of this Assembly, we sometimes had the impression that some members of the Assembly at least were convinced that it was ultimately for us to decide whether the SDI system should be researched and even whether it should be introduced. I am grateful to the Rapporteurs for making it clear with their matter-of-fact reports that all we can do here is make a few comments on a development that will go ahead as planned by the United States, irrespective of any decision this Assembly may take.

I feel it should be frankly admitted that this SDI system is basically a response to a development that has been taking place in the Soviet Union for some years now. Anyone who has familiarised himself with this subject in any way will know of the large-scale ABM system erected primarily around the Moscow command centre and to be completely renovated by 1987. Anyone who considers the subject as a whole knows that intercontinental missiles have in fact long been space-based systems, so that the claim that an SDI system would introduce a weapons system into space for the first time is simply not true.

What we have to consider here today is how European countries can co-operate with the United States in the area of SDI research. I believe we are all aware of the special defence problem that might underlie the SDI system: the danger that Europe might become a less protected zone if the United States were able to protect itself with a shield capable of diverting 80% to 90% of all possible missile attacks. If this danger exists, it is more sensible for Europe to consult closely with the United States on joint future protection by means of SDI and to try to join the United States in the development of this system so that, if only for political reasons, there will be no chance of creating zones with different levels of security within NATO. I therefore consider it more sensible to discuss the possibility of co-operating with the United States in SDI, rather than talking to the United States about the rejection of a system which, from

everything we have seen so far, will be introduced in any case, once the research phase is over.

Since, however, we do not need to decide now whether or not a system of this kind should be introduced, what we should be discussing today is the form our co-operation could take. I appeal to members not to slam the door to a room which may one day be particularly important to us all, but to be quite open in starting to co-operate with our American ally, not by participating in military research but by at least becoming involved in organising the political aspects and, of course, in the further development of peaceful uses of SDI technology.

I repeat: I appeal to members not to persist with a "No" which has no future, but to initiate a new development with a conditional "Yes".

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I wish to begin by protesting strongly at the fact that the Rapporteur has totally snubbed and overlooked Italy; he has ranged far and wide, covering France, Belgium, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States but has not felt the need or rather the duty to listen to leading Italians who have much to say and have already said a great deal about the problem we are discussing.

The Rapporteur might reply that when the Committee went to Geneva on 24th July last he talked with our Ambassador Mario Alessi. On that same occasion, however, the committee heard the views of the representatives of Mexico, Poland, Egypt and others. In other words he set us on that level; and then he carried on with his work completely ignoring Italy's views.

By contrast, I should like to thank Mr. Lenzer who highlighted Italy's very important ideas, attitudes and plans in his report.

The draft recommendation presented by Mr. van den Bergh could be acceptable with a few amendments. What we cannot accept in any way, however, is his report which is thoroughly anti-American in tone and in no way even-handed between the United States and the Soviet Union. Indeed, he tends to accept as true all the accusations made; he finds it necessary to fuel the vast number of doubts already existing and to believe Mr. Gorbachev when he describes the strategic defence initiative as an offensive system but at the same time he finds it necessary to disbelieve President Reagan when he shows that it is a defensive system.

All this puts our Assembly into a bad light and certainly does not give it greater weight or add to its prestige.

*Mr. Cavaliere (continued)*

What is happening now repeats what happened previously in the case of nuclear weapons; when the Soviet Union endangered the balance already achieved by deploying its SS-20s nobody said a word. It was only when NATO decided to modernise its nuclear missiles system precisely in order to correct the imbalance created by the Soviet Union that protests were heard, peace movements rose up and speeches of protest were heard even in this Assembly.

The same thing is now happening with the strategic defence programme; nobody was surprised in 1972 when immediately after signature of the ABM treaty, the then Soviet Defence Minister, Marshal Grechko, declared before the Supreme Soviet that that treaty imposed no limits on research and experiments aimed at resolving the problem of defending the country from nuclear attack. It was all right for the Soviet Defence Minister to say that and nobody at all expressed any concern; this was repeated when the Soviet Union went ahead and succeeded in developing the only operational anti-satellite system in the world capable of seeking out and destroying large low-level orbiting satellites. What is more, the Soviet Union has made enormous efforts to develop an anti-ballistic missile defence system and has actually developed the only operational ABM system in the world as well as a research programme. And nobody said a word when the Soviet Union set up the Krasnoyarsk radar station 3,700 kilometres from Moscow and not near to the city and in so doing violated the ABM treaty.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the subject calls for more detailed consideration but I will conclude by saying that research – and we are at the research stage – in no way conflicts with the ABM treaty and that Europe, as many other speakers have said, must not lose this opportunity of joining in the programme and of thus helping to ensure real security for the world and to push back the threat of nuclear destruction.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Kittelmann.

Mr. KITTELMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, saying what one has to say in five minutes is extremely difficult and that is almost the only thing on which I agree with Mr. Gansel.

I should like to begin by quoting from a report submitted to the United States Senate on 30th October by Lt. Gen. James Abrahamson, which I would recommend you all to read because it tells us a great deal about what the Americans at home say they expect of SDI. It is always a

good thing to study the original sources. This report closes with the following words:

“Our ultimate goal is to eliminate nuclear weapons entirely. By necessity, this is a very long-term goal, which requires, as we pursue our SDI research, equally energetic efforts to diminish the threat posed by conventional arms imbalances, both through conventional force improvements, and the negotiation of arms reductions and confidence-building measures.”

Ladies and Gentlemen, what has struck me for several months now is the fact that there is a very one-sided emotional reaction, particularly by the socialist members, against our ally the United States. I will certainly admit that the more clarity there is, the more thoughtful reactions there are to be heard. But why was there this sinister, emotional, indiscriminate outcry against the United States from the outset, over a year ago? This must surely cause us to reflect, particularly because we should all remember what happened at the time of the NATO twofold decision.

Mr. Gansel tried the dialectical trick just now of pretending the NATO twofold decision was invented by the United States. He has forgotten that there was a request from the social democrat Federal Chancellor to the United States to implement the NATO twofold decision. Here again, then – and if I wanted to be emotive I would call this historical misrepresentation – cause and effect are being confused.

I should like to remind us all of what happened at the time of the NATO twofold decision. We now have a parallel: the same circles, the same effect. With the NATO twofold decision we had emotions whipped up, a peace movement hand in hand with groups that could no longer be distinguished, backed by unlikely threats from the Soviet Union about all the things that would happen if the NATO twofold decision were implemented.

The NATO twofold decision has been implemented. And I maintain – and this is common knowledge – that the meeting between Mr. Gorbachev and Mr. Reagan could not have taken place if the NATO twofold decision had not been implemented, because the alliance has shown that it is capable of taking action. The same thing is now being tried during the preliminary phase of SDI. We surely all recognise that all we have so far is research. Everything else lies in the future.

I read the paper drawn up by the socialists in the European Community with interest. It contains a resolution seven or eight pages long explaining their attitude to SDI. They are, of course, completely opposed to it, ignoring the fact that our ally the United States has already

*Mr. Kittelmann (continued)*

decided to go ahead with SDI, so that all we have to consider now is whether or not we participate. One thing is certain: it is no longer a question of whether SDI actually takes place.

Many of the statements we have heard here today have created the impression that SDI research might still be prevented. No, Ladies and Gentlemen, the only question is whether we accept the United States' offer, or request, or willingness, to give us a share in this research. The same goes for the call to involve our industry in the civilian research, which I urgently recommend. Here again I disagree with you, Mr. Gansel. The Assembly of Western European Union has a chance simply because the Council of Ministers is still relatively divided. We of the parliamentary Assembly of Western European Union have a chance to appeal to the European governments to waste no time in agreeing on a joint concept, which has, of course, already been established in principle.

Let us be under no illusions: we shall shortly be witnessing a race among the Western European industries for a place in SDI research. We shall find almost every country prepared to conclude outline agreements. They are simply waiting for one of their number to make the first move, and then the rest will follow.

We shall have to discuss how, in complete harmony with the United States, we can ensure that once the research has been completed nothing happens without prior consultation with us.

Above all, I would ask the socialist members not to resort to an emotional poisoning of the atmosphere. Mr. Gansel has just acted as if Europe carried some weight on its own between the blocs. We are familiar with this policy, and we know it would eventually poison the relationship with the United States. It is based on the fallacy that we are capable of negotiating without the great potential of the United States within the Atlantic community.

I will conclude, since the light tells me that I have already used up my speaking time. Today's debate should be seen as a signal to the Council of Ministers: the Assembly of Western European Union is convinced that the countries of Western Europe should participate in the research and that subsequent action on SDI should be decided in close conjunction with the United States.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Since Mr. Wilkinson is not present, I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). - The importance of SDI is shown by the fact that we have before us three important reports. One would like to comment on all three, but given the limitations of time, I shall concentrate particularly on the report by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

SDI has received enormous public attention, but the subject has often been projected almost as sensationalised science fiction - attractive for its novelty and as a projection of the triumph of technological defence, and a matter for national and presidential prestige. Unfortunately, there will not be quite the desirable level of public awareness of the enormous volume of economic resources that such research and development will command, without apparently any serious consideration of the alternative which such investment would provide. This could mean that SDI itself becomes inviolable, and any comment or criticism will become almost treasonable or an insult to the United States. That would be regrettable.

Security is important, but so is the creation of wealth and the defeat of mass hunger. In a constituency such as mine, where thousands of jobs have been destroyed through the devastation of industry, I realise that economic resources and political priority need to be given to the creation of wealth on this planet now and not to providing for its dissipation in the stratosphere in the future. The spin-off effect of SDI research may be significant, but it is most unlikely to be relevant to the real needs of this century at least.

Mr. van den Bergh's report is generally commendable and shows an attachment to prudence. However, I hope that he will stress that subparagraph 1(a) of the draft recommendation is rather more important than subparagraph 1(c). Europe should not be satisfied with a few technological crumbs from the American industrial table, and those crumbs should not be a compensation for any surrender of independence and wisdom on this side of the Atlantic.

I shall no doubt be accused of excessive simplicity when I suggest that SDI should be set in its proper context. Ours is an interdependent world. The North enjoys much higher living standards than two-thirds or more of our planet's population, yet it is an interdependent world. We depend upon the material resources of the rest of the world. One day, we may have to present an account of our political and economic domination of the planet at this time.

I hope that the resources that will be devoted to SDI will not be seen as an example of recklessness or frivolity; security apart, in perhaps no other area of activity could resource

*Mr. Hardy (continued)*

consumption provide such negligible benefit for our own or the next generation. The sort of moneys that SDI will command might actually achieve a great deal more and contribute more intensively to stability.

I emphasise that we should not disdain considerations of security, but the reservation must be entered that commitment to SDI should not be so overriding as to gainsay all other international agreements now existing or the prospect of further mutual accord on arms limitation.

My remarks might suggest that I am a trifle hesitant about some of the contents of Mr. van den Bergh's report, but on balance I accept it. I certainly feel that we should give solid support to the draft resolution this afternoon.

We need to express wisdom and maturity in Western Europe. For that reason, I commend the draft resolution and say very firmly that we should welcome the comments on technological co-operation with the United States - with, however, the clear qualification that that should not undermine existing arms control agreements or hamper the negotiation of future agreements.

We should stress, as does Mr. van den Bergh, that the ABM treaty must not be embarrassed by any developments on SDI, and we should make it very clear that the last paragraph of the draft resolution is an expression of the European will that SDI should not itself become an obstacle.

SDI might be a leap from technological darkness, but it must not become a curse of economic imbalance or provide for such political instability as itself to contribute to international peril.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). - This debate, so long expected, will of course be very important for our organisation. Many people outside WEU are watching this Assembly to see whether we can concert a joint position on behalf of our respective parliaments on one of the key strategic issues of the day.

So many negative things have been said about the strategic defence initiative, by the Soviets in particular and by socialist parties in Western Europe...

Mr. van den BERGH (*Netherlands*). - And by Margaret Thatcher.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). - ...that one has to wonder what the reason is for all this criticism. The SDI is, after all, a research programme into purely defensive technology.

People complain in the Soviet Union about American attempts to militarise space, but the Soviet space effort itself has been largely financed for military reasons. If effective, the SDI will actually make the world a safer place.

The SDI is criticised in the Soviet Union because, if strategic defence were found to be technically feasible and strategic defence systems were deployed, the concerted effort by the Soviets to build up an overwhelming strategic nuclear offensive capability would be negated.

This summer, I attended an interesting conference sponsored by the Stockholm Peace Research Institute, at which I met experts and specialists in this field from all over Western Europe but also from the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries. I found it revealing that the Soviet representatives and their Eastern European friends continually complained about the SDI as if all the world's ills could be laid at its door. Not once did the Soviets or their Eastern European friends admit to the substantial efforts that the Soviets have been making in strategic defence.

If anyone doubts the seriousness of Soviet efforts in this area, he should read the interesting and recently published American publication on Soviet strategic defence programmes that was released last month by the Department of Defence and the State Department.

People also suggest that, if strategic defence proves feasible and systems are deployed, the link between the European and American components of the alliance will be weakened. Nothing could be further from the truth. If our American friends are reassured by the deployment of strategic defences and know that if they invoke nuclear retaliation in response to Warsaw Pact aggression in Western Europe they will not necessarily suffer the devastation of their homeland, they are more likely to be prepared to exercise that nuclear option on our behalf. The United States nuclear guarantee will be enhanced. The overall deterrence of the western alliance will be improved and war will be less rather than more likely in consequence.

It is noteworthy that no one complained about the deployment of fighter aircraft in the air defence rôle when the primary component of the West's strategic nuclear force was the manned bomber. It seemed reasonable then to defend bomber bases, so why should it suddenly be thought wrong to defend nuclear silos? In my view, the more awesome the weapons of mass destruction, the more important it is for our governments to offer defences for their people against those weapons.

The uses of space for military purposes have been dominated by offensive ballistic missile systems. Ever since the days of Werner von

*Mr. Wilkinson (continued)*

Braun and his team, the ballistic missile has been the primary component of military space technology. Now that we have the possibility of effective defence systems, I do not see why there is such criticism of the Americans' research efforts.

It is suggested that the deployment of strategic defences would lead to an intensification of the arms race. I do not think that that is necessarily true. I suspect that the cost of trying to outwit the defences, either by saturation methods or with penetration devices to get through the systems, will be high and I believe that there is every chance that the SDI could lead to an acceleration of the arms control process rather than the contrary. The SDI has a moral as well as a practical military dimension. It would be damaging for this alliance if it did not show solidarity and support for our American friends in their endeavours.

I hope that the Assembly will reject Mr. van den Bergh's report, which is highly critical throughout of the Americans' efforts and ignores what has been done by the Soviet Union. It is decidedly one-sided.

I hope that the Assembly supports the SDI. We have done much good work, especially through Mr. Lenzer and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, to provide good technical grounds for political support.

*(Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). - I almost raised a point of order when my friend Mr. Hardy referred three times to his hope that we would support the draft resolution. I hesitate to remind him that the draft resolution has been withdrawn and is not before the Assembly.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). - It should be.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). - Whether it should be or not, it is not before us. The decision was taken earlier by the Assembly and the draft resolution will not be before us in this session. As regards the interpretation of events, I prefer Mr. Lenzer's explanation of what happened to that given by the Rapporteur.

As Lord Reay made clear in a forceful and extremely useful speech, the report is fatally flawed. If it had been presented to us before the negotiations in Geneva, we might have been able

to attribute its faults merely to ignorance and not to prejudice. Before Geneva, there was considerable ignorance, which, I regret, was not limited to members of the public, about the amount of research into space militarism which had been going on in the USSR ever since the Soviet Union first declared that it would conduct such research when it signed the ABM treaty back in 1972. The signatories from the Soviet Ministry of Defence said that they thought it right to start immediately a research programme on space defence. That has not been referred to much.

The Soviet Union has been doing this work since 1972, but the subject only attracted wide public attention thirteen years later when the Americans stated their intention to undertake research and development. The fact that such work had been taking place behind the iron curtain since 1972 emerged clearly in Geneva and is public knowledge. Therefore, one must conclude that the report is based not only on ignorance, but on prejudice against the United States of America.

Some have said that the text of the report is unacceptable, but that the draft recommendations could be tolerable if amendments tabled by the General Affairs Committee were accepted, as I hope they will be. However, even if all the amendments were accepted by the Rapporteur - which is unlikely - we should still have to consider the report as a whole and not just the draft recommendations - I leave aside the discarded draft resolution. In that case, the report would not get a favourable vote from me.

I have done a few sums while listening to other speakers and I wonder whether the Rapporteur has noticed that his draft recommendation includes thirteen references to the United States of America and SDI and only one mention of the Soviet Union - and that was inserted only at the last minute in London as the result of an amendment submitted by me. With a 13:1 ratio of mentions of the SDI and the Soviet Union, even the draft recommendation is unacceptable to me.

The SDI will go on, because the Americans profoundly believe that there is a military as well as a pragmatic element involved. If we can remove the threat of nuclear warfare, which has hung over us all since Hiroshima, that will be a worthwhile achievement. Millions of Americans believe that and so do millions of Britons and other Europeans.

I wish the programme well and I hope that if it does not remove the threat of nuclear war, it will at least substantially reduce it. That is the view of my government, as exemplified by the Prime Minister in her most recent speech on the subject at the Lord Mayor of London's annual

*Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)*

banquet earlier this year. I hope that now that the truth is emerging about what has been going on in the Soviet Union, the Rapporteur will agree to withdraw his report. It is fatally flawed, because it is anti-American, prejudiced and takes no account of the fact that since 1972, without complaint, the USSR has been doing exactly what it says the United States should not do. It is strange, if the weapon is so costly and might not work, that the Soviet Union should take so much interest. The Russians should be delighted that the Americans plan to waste money on a worthless project.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Millan.

Mr. MILLAN (*United Kingdom*). - I take a view exactly contrary to that expressed by Sir Frederic Bennett in his typically reactionary speech. Mr. van den Bergh did a good job with his report. I wish that I could say the same for the draft recommendation, but I understand his difficulties. He will not be surprised to know that I accept parts of the draft recommendation with more enthusiasm than others.

Paragraph 1(a) of the draft recommendation stresses the importance of avoiding an arms race in space. The SDI will add another twist to the arms race. For that reason the programme is controversial, even within the United States. Listening to some of the speeches this morning one would think that there was no disagreement about the programme in the United States. That is not so. It is a highly controversial programme within the United States for a variety of reasons. It is an open secret that most Western European governments have, at best, a limited enthusiasm for the SDI.

The defenders of SDI argue that it is only a research programme, as if it were possible to draw a fine and firm line between research and development. The argument is that if it were successful it would end the nuclear threat once and for all. That seems an unrealistically optimistic view. From experience of other weapon developments we must be profoundly sceptical about such optimism.

The SDI involves an enormous cost for both the Soviet Union and the United States. It is suggested that elements in the United States Government are attracted to the programme because the cost will be so enormous that it will impose an insupportable burden on the Soviet Union's economy. Whether that is true and whatever view we take about how far the Soviet Union has gone along that road, once the arms race is extended both the Soviet Union and the United States will be compelled to attempt to move ahead of each other. The cost will be enormous.

Paragraph 3 of the recommendation talks about the programme being an obstacle to genuine negotiations on arms control and disarmament. At the Geneva summit the atmosphere was overshadowed by the SDI and it was an obstacle to agreement between the two superpowers.

In many other areas there are grounds for optimism about agreement. One fruitful aspect of the Geneva summit was that the two leaders seemed to strike a fairly amiable rapport. An agreeable and significant aspect is that both leaders agree that a nuclear war cannot be won. It is unrealistic, foolish and dangerous to consider the possibility of winning a nuclear war. It is helpful that that was expressed so clearly and unequivocally.

Despite what was said at the Geneva summit, negotiations will progress over the next few years. The fact remains that the development of the SDI is an obstacle to the success of various negotiations. For that reason, among many others - I speak for most other socialists in the Assembly - I am resolutely opposed to the development of the SDI.

Some supporters of the SDI have presented odd arguments such as that whatever our misgivings in Europe the programme will go ahead and so we might as well fall in behind the Americans. That is an extraordinary interpretation of the nature of the North Atlantic Alliance. It is demeaning to Europe's independence. It is no good talking in rhetorical terms about building up a European pillar of the alliance if in practical terms we decide that the Americans will take their own view and go ahead with the SDI regardless of what any European country says and that therefore we should simply fall into line. I take a more robust view of what should be Europe's position.

To put it no higher, there are serious misgivings among European governments about the SDI. I should like them to have the courage to express that unequivocally to the United States of America and to the Soviet Union. I do not believe that it is inevitable that the SDI will go ahead. It is in the interests of us all, of disarmament and of the defence of Europe, to stop the process now.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Gorla.

Mr. GORLA (*Italy*) (Translation). - Mr. President, while I am a convinced pacifist I will not elaborate on my reasons of principle for my firm opposition to SDI and to any European involvement in SDI; I will however make a few points of substance based on data provided by many strategic research institutes. Firstly, it is not established that the vastly expensive SDI will really reduce the need to build missiles because



*Mr. Gorla (continued)*

the cover provided by SDI is not complete; what it means is that the percentage likelihood of breaking through the SDI is reduced, thus providing an incentive for producing new missiles. These conclusions are to be found in the reports of strategic research institutes. Paradoxically therefore the effect would be to increase and not to reduce the risk of war if we move in that direction. Furthermore, costs would increase astronomically, thus reducing the resources available in the world for other purposes which, as we all know, are dramatically urgent.

A second point. Much is heard of the use of SDI for research. This is not possible because SDI research can lead to nothing without tests, by which I mean not tests of components but tests of systems. Among other things this automatically means a violation of the ABM treaty and this kind of consequence must not be ignored but clearly stated.

Again, I believe that today we should stop referring to the progress of scientific and technological research solely in terms of military research. This is not the true state of affairs because there are so many opportunities for the serious and wholly adequate development of technological research which if taken up will reduce the dependence of Europe's peoples and nations on the United States to their common advantage.

Yet another point. There are specific European factors other than those I have already mentioned which show that it is pointless to participate in SDI because, apart from the limitations already mentioned, such a system can cover only the territory of the United States and not Western Europe, which, because of its geographic position, would in the event of war or, what I hope is highly unlikely, of aggression, be exposed to nuclear cruise missiles, to aircraft carrying atomic bombs and even to nuclear cannon. Europe would not in fact be protected against these risks by the space shield and by the other elements of SDI.

For these reasons therefore, in addition to the damage we must accept that to join the United States in the direction it has taken would be completely useless.

Lastly, Mr. President, it has to be said that the problem of scientific and technological research should be approached on the quite different basis of a free choice to co-operate, starting of course in Western Europe itself. In doing so it must also be borne in mind that a European peace and development policy must of course be linked with what is happening round the Mediterranean and in the southern hemisphere. Any

option such as SDI reduces the resources available for development not only in Western Europe but throughout the system of relationships which Western Europe has to maintain. That is however just the direction in which real security and peace should be sought for Europe and the world as a whole.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Atkinson.

Mr. ATKINSON (*United Kingdom*). - Thank you for calling me, Mr. President, before we rise for lunch.

I welcome the withdrawal of the draft resolution for further consideration. It was too evasive, too woolly, too negative and falls short of what WEU should be all about.

There should be no hesitation about endorsing SDI. As the General Affairs Committee learnt when it visited Washington last March, and as we learnt from Mr. van den Bergh's explanatory memorandum, Soviet efforts in most phases of strategic defence have long been more extensive than those of the United States. The world's only operational anti-ballistic missile system defends not Paris, London or Washington but Moscow. The world's only operational anti-satellite system defends not Western Europe, NATO or the United States but the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. Such systems are based on current technology but the Soviets are undertaking extensive research into defence technologies including laser weapons, particle beam weapons and kinetic energy weapons, all of which President Reagan wants to research, indeed is proceeding to research and it would be absolute folly not to do so.

Mr. van den Bergh asked whose security would be served by SDI. When, in March 1983, President Reagan presented his dramatic new vision of a world in which we would no longer have to depend on nuclear weapons to prevent nuclear war, he referred to the destruction of Soviet missiles before they reached "our own soil - or that of our allies". The aim of SDI is to protect the entire western alliance, not just the western hemisphere. Sceptics suggest that that is technically impossible, but we do not know - we must first find out. That is why British scientists are to be involved in the SDI programme.

I understand that West Germany is also to be involved. There should be no qualms about that, especially as East Germany is involved in Soviet research into laser beam technology. It would be foolish if Europe attempted its own SDI at this stage. It would be a costly duplication of effort and resources and would encourage American mistrust about our commitment to the alliance. There is already too much mistrust in Europe about America's commitment to

*Mr. Atkinson (continued)*

European defence. The United States must give Western Europe a fair share of the cake or SDI could turn sour before even its research is over.

SDI has already succeeded in one respect – it has contributed to bringing the Soviet Union to the negotiating table and it hastened last month's summit. We must applaud President Reagan for standing firm and refusing to negotiate SDI. If Mr. Gorbachev wants to improve the lot of his people through reducing his country's enormous budgetary commitment to arms, he must come forward with realistic proposals to avoid creating a new arms race. He must be prepared, as no Soviet leader before him has, to open his country to inspection so that the reductions in levels of agreed offensive systems are completely verifiable.

After last month's summit, there is every hope that the world is about to enter a new era of peace and security for both sides. Far from abandoning SDI, to realise that hope, we should accept that it can, in fact, underpin it. That is why we in Europe should support research and participate in its development 1,000%.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We must now suspend the debate on WEU and the strategic defence initiative. We shall resume the debate this afternoon.

#### **4. Changes in the membership of committees**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I wish to draw the Assembly's attention to some changes in the membership of committees.

The Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany proposes the following changes in the membership of committees: Mr. Berger to take the place of Mr. Glos as an alternate member of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments; Mr. Hackel to take the place of Mr. Schwarz as an alternate member and Mr. Schwarz to take the place of Mr. Stavenhagen as an alternate member of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions; Mrs. Pack to take the place of Mr. Schmitz as a titular member and Mr. Glos to take the place of Mr. Hornhues as an alternate member of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration; and Mrs. Fischer to take the place of Mr. Hackel as a titular member and Mr. Hackel to take the place of Mr. Glos as an alternate

member of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations.

The Italian Delegation proposes the following changes in the membership of committees: Mr. Sinesio to take the place of Mr. Rizzi as a titular member of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions; Mr. Sinesio to take the place of Mr. Foschi as a titular member of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration; and Mr. Foschi to take the place of Mr. Sinesio as an alternate member of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.

Is there any opposition?...

*These changes are agreed to.*

#### **5. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this afternoon at 2.30 p.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. WEU and the strategic defence initiative:
  - (a) The strategic defence initiative (Defence aspects) (Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the SDI aspects of the reports of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Documents 1033 and amendments, 1034 and amendments and 1036 and amendments);
  - (b) The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance (Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Document 1034 and amendments);
  - (c) Guidelines drawn from the colloquy on the space challenge for Europe (Proposals) (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Document 1036 and amendments).
2. Address by Baroness Young, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom.

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

*(The sitting was closed at 1.10 p.m.)*

## NINTH SITTING

Tuesday, 3rd December 1985

### SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the minutes.
2. Attendance register.
3. WEU and the strategic defence initiative: (a) The strategic defence initiative (Defence aspects); (b) The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance; (c) Guidelines drawn from the colloquy on the space challenge for Europe (Proposals) (*Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and on the SDI aspects of the reports of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions*, Docs. 1033 and amendments, 1034 and amendments and 1036 and amendments).  
*Speakers:* The President, Mr. Blaauw, Mr. Soell, Mr. Free-son, Mr. van den Bergh; (points of order): Mr. Hardy, Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. Hardy, Dr. Miller, Mr. Hardy.  
(b) The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee*. Doc. 1034 and amendments).  
*Speakers:* The President, Mr. Berrier (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Masciadri, Mr. Hill, Mr. Bianco, Mr. Spies von Büllenheim, Mr. Rauti.
4. Address by Baroness Young, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom.  
*Replies by Baroness Young to questions put by:* Sir Frederic Bennett, Sir John Osborn, Mr. Wilkinson, Sir Paul Hawkins, Mr. Morris, Mr. Cifarelli, Mr. Berger, Mr. Gansel.
5. WEU and the strategic defence initiative: (b) The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance (*Resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee*, Doc. 1034 and amendments).  
*Speakers:* The President, Mr. Cifarelli, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Martino, Mr. Baumel, Mr. Berrier (*Rapporteur*).  
(c) Guidelines drawn from the colloquy on the space challenge for Europe (Proposals) (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions*, Doc. 1036 and amendments).  
*Speakers:* The President, Mr. Lenzer (*Chairman and Rapporteur*), Sir John Osborn, Mr. Verdon, Mr. Hill, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Palumbo, Mr. Lenzer (*Chairman and Rapporteur*).
6. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

*The sitting was opened at 2.35 p.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

The PRESIDENT. – The sitting is open.

#### **1. Adoption of the minutes**

The PRESIDENT. – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

*The minutes are agreed to.*

#### **2. Attendance register**

The PRESIDENT. – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup>. See page 24.

#### **3. WEU and the strategic defence initiative**

##### **(a) The strategic defence initiative (Defence aspects)**

##### **(b) The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance**

##### **(c) Guidelines drawn from the colloquy on the space challenge for Europe (Proposals)**

*(Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and on the SDI aspects of the reports of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Docs. 1033 and amendments, 1034 and amendments and 1036 and amendments)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and on the SDI aspects of the reports of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on WEU and the strategic defence initiative (a) the strategic defence initia-

*The President (continued)*

tive (Defence aspects) (b) the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance (c) guidelines drawn from the colloquy on the space challenge for Europe (Proposals), Documents 1033 and amendments, 1034 and amendments and 1036 and amendments.

I would remind you that the debate will be suspended at 4 p.m. for the address by Baroness Young, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom.

In the resumed debate I now call Mr. Blaauw.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – As a matter of general policy, I warn against overoptimistic expectations about civilian research and development, and the industrial and commercial spin-offs of the military space sector in general, and SDI research in particular, as user and market demands are divergent. The comparison with the three thousand patents exploited as a result of the Apollo moon conquest programme – Document 1036, paragraph 139 – is a wrong kind of comparison and confuses the issues. It would be better to refer to a more creative approach in the development of the civilian sector by looking at the new and unique opportunities provided by the space environment.

It is true that, in the present stage of an overdimensioned and scattered European space industry, defence orders will favour industry and will secure or increase job opportunities. However, the main emphasis should be placed on an assessment of their impact on European security, including treaty verification, crisis management and international confidence-building.

Strengthening the civilian space sector and promoting European commercial interests outside Europe, including the third world, requires separate policy considerations and decisions. Of course, strengthening Europe's economic and industrial potential will also reflect positively on its strategic strength and influence. In any case, a clear distinction must be made between the various military and civilian aspects, including a careful analysis of their relationship.

I reiterate two of Mr. Lenzer's conclusions. First, space is inherently an international matter and, for Western Europe, only joint action makes sense. Secondly, many military uses of space are obtaining United Nations endorsement under the heading of activities for peaceful purposes. Here Europe can certainly play a preponderant rôle to strengthen strategic stability in relationships between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries while highlighting European industrial interests, using Europe's civil expertise.

These general policy considerations plead in favour of a coherent European space policy and programme covering all military, security and civilian aspects, with the understanding that WEU is the only European intergovernmental body mandated to address the entire field. The European Space Agency can only address a single segment. In the international context NATO could fulfil a similar function. However, within the United Nations system there does not exist a similar body with a similar all-encompassing mandate.

In this context, I suggest that it would be interesting to explore the possibilities of expanding the draft recommendation in Document 1036, especially paragraph (xi), to include an additional recommendation that those governments who do not yet have the institutional framework to promote joint European civil and military space activities and policies should consider the desirability of undertaking steps similar to those in Italy and the United Kingdom to serve as valid national counterparts to the international/regional endeavours.

Whatever the final conclusions and recommendations of the WEU Assembly, all members should be fully aware that, perhaps for the first time in history, the long-term repercussions are liable to be irreversible for Europe, and perhaps also the world, to quote Mr. Lenzer's document. In those circumstances I advise against exploring possibilities for compromise texts for obtaining consensus support as they might obscure the true problems and issues with which we are faced. In case of divergent judgments and opinions, let us have a clear vote and not seek only general agreement.

The Liberal Group has been discussing Mr. van den Bergh's report in depth. We have concluded that the report on the strategic defence initiative is a good in-between for Europe. We should like to endorse his recommendations in full.

Mr. van den BERGH (*Netherlands*). – Finally – justice.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Soell.

Mr. SOELL (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I congratulate the Rapporteurs on their reports and observations which are both varied and well expressed.

Discussion about strategic defence systems is nothing new – the ABM treaty negotiations go back to May 1972. The novelty lies only in certain technological advances. It is also true that many of the arguments deployed earlier by the Soviet representatives have now been taken up by President Reagan, notably in his address to the United Nations in October 1985.

*Mr. Stoell (continued)*

The American President justifies the SDI programme by arguments which appear to point to a policy of progressive arms control, with the abolition of the nuclear deterrent and the destruction of nuclear weapons as the ultimate objective of SDI. He also calls for the establishment of strategic stability between the United States and the Soviet Union and offers to allow the Soviet Union access to United States technological expertise arising from the SDI project in order to avoid any destabilising effects due to technological innovations in weapons and defence strategy.

But this offer by President Reagan contains some striking contradictions. If the offer is genuine, it assumes a level of trust between the two world powers such as to prompt the immediate question why it should not be possible to eradicate nuclear weapons on both sides and why, if so, a system of strategic defence in space would not ultimately become pointless.

Some of the Soviet arguments deployed against SDI also lack credibility since they too are flawed by serious contradictions.

Until now the Soviet Union has considered treaties on scientific weapons research to be unverifiable. It has itself conducted intensive research into strategic defence systems. It has been far less ready than the United States to accept the doctrine of mutual vulnerability, and its attitudes have hitherto been characterised by ambiguity.

At present, and in future years, Western European interests have only a marginal rôle to play in the negotiations between the superpowers. This situation will change only when we establish a joint position in furtherance of our interests. Our claim to play an important rôle would carry more weight were we able to utilise space technology, say by building satellites for crisis management and the verification of arms control agreements. This would give us a seat at the negotiations on anti-satellite systems.

I therefore join Mr. van den Bergh in recommending that priority be given to a joint European arms control programme involving observation and telecommunications satellites. I also recommend that technological research of the Eureka type should be encouraged and that the United States and Soviet Union should be called on to recognise that space defence strategies do not, in themselves, preclude the conclusion of balanced and verifiable agreements limiting strategic as well as intermediate-range nuclear missiles.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I take this opportunity of welcoming a number of delegates who, like yourself, are attending a WEU session

for the first time. I thank you for taking part and hope that your activity within this Assembly will prove fruitful.

Mr. SOELL (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Freeson.

Mr. FREESON (*United Kingdom*). – First, and without any further comment, I should like to express my great regret that the resolution that was before us was withdrawn this morning. I hope that it will be back before the appropriate committee and this Assembly as speedily as possible.

Whatever misgivings some of us may have about parts of the recommendation, this is a good report – informative and stimulating. Unlike some, perhaps much, of the unquestioning support given by this Assembly to government policy, this report does something which I hope will be continued: it stimulates genuine debate and examination of other questions at a most appropriate time, when, at all levels, fundamental aspects of defence policy are being questioned.

On SDI itself, the report confirms that our defence policy increasingly lacks credibility as well as public acceptability. It represents rapid and almost revolutionary change in exploiting inventions of the 1960s and 1970s. It has to be said that, for the first time, technical advances favour cost-effective defence instead of offensive defence policy.

But SDI also represents huge expenditure, which will make it difficult to shift military, economic and bureaucratic inertia in this area. If it is embarked upon, we shall continue to lose our way and there will be more, rather than less, insecurity and instability. SDI is as likely to provoke a response that will leave us less secure as a result of an arms race in space.

It is commonly believed that nuclear weapons cancel one another out and that SDI, or the prospect of it, will be part of that process. The line can be simply put in a quotation: "They have them, so we must have them." That applies to SDI. It is increasingly accepted at all levels that nuclear weapons are operationally useless on the battlefield or as first-strike weapons. That consensus began to develop well before the SDI. With a substantial eastern build-up in Europe, capable of penetrating the West with armies and armour, what benefit would nuclear weapons and SDI be?

If there were an invasion, we should have a bad defence, because its keystone is the strategy of mutually assured destruction – known as MAD, which is an appropriate name – of which SDI is now a part. The SDI expensively side-

*Mr. Freeson (continued)*

tracks us from the fact that reliance on the MAD policy is increasingly unacceptable.

We must not lose sight, as we have tended to do in the past, of the five fundamental principles of defence which, in combination, can be the basis for reshaping our defence policy effectively. First, defence must be effective, and effective defence must provide security. The nuclear balance system is itself a source of insecurity. The proliferation of nuclear war fighting weapons and doctrine, justified by the theory that threats have to be outmatched by counter-threats at all levels, increases the possibility of nuclear war. That is not a basis for security. We must, therefore, build a new model, based on real defence objectives.

Secondly, defence must be non-provocative. It should be defence against aggression. By definition, it should be non-aggressive in intention and be clear to the other side that it is non-aggressive. That would reduce the fear which is a principal motive of the arms race.

Modern technology, especially the use of microelectronics in missile guidance and in communications, command, control and intelligence, makes it possible to achieve effective non-provocative defence against military invasion. Setting up such a defence does not depend on the theory of balance or on agreement with the other side.

Thirdly, defence should be non-nuclear. Nuclear weapons are the greatest threat to security that we have known. As any conflict between nuclear powers is likely to escalate to a nuclear war, the elimination of all nuclear weapons must become a firm policy objective. Many approaches, unilateral as well as multilateral, are relevant to that objective.

Fourthly, defence must be legitimate. Defence based on the mass killing of innocent non-combatants is contrary to legal and moral traditions and is rejected by a large and growing body of informed public and military opinion. It is contradictory to seek to defend our threatened values by such means, and they cannot be a valid and stable basis for world order.

Fifthly, defence should lead to comprehensive disarmament and world security. In the context of existing offensive weapon systems, nuclear or non-nuclear, warfare is so dangerous that it can no longer be regarded as a sane instrument of policy. There is no route to world security other than the progressive reduction and abolition of offensive weapons. The SDI is at best a provocation to create more sophisticated offensive weapons and at worst a provocation to warlike activities. We must take a stand against extending the arms race into space as part of a

policy to reduce the threat to the security of the West and to world security that would be posed by the possibility of nuclear war.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and Gentlemen, the other speakers on the list wish to have the floor later, and they will therefore be called when we consider the other reports. I would remind you that the speakers concerned are: Mr. Palumbo, Mr. Baumel, Mr. Rubbi, Sir Anthony Grant.

That being the case, the general debate on Mr. van den Bergh's report is now closed, and Mr. van den Bergh may have the floor if he wishes.

Mr. van den BERGH (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Now?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – You will in any case have an opportunity to speak when we come to discuss the draft recommendation, Mr. van den Bergh.

If you wish to add anything at the end of this debate you may have the floor. If not, we shall proceed to the next report.

I call Mr. van den Bergh.

Mr. van den BERGH (*Netherlands*). – I think that it would be appropriate for me to reply only after I have heard all the speakers.

My committee is meeting tomorrow morning at 8.30 and I should like to reply to the debate tomorrow. Perhaps that could be the first item on the agenda, though I leave that to you to decide, Mr. President. That seems to be the most logical procedure. If you decide otherwise, I am prepared to reply now, but I imagine that many speakers expect the reply to be made tomorrow morning.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Hardy on a point of order.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. I understand that a substantial number of members of the Socialist Group tabled this morning some important amendments to the report. I have just been outside and unfortunately the amendments have not yet been printed. I trust that that will strengthen the point made by Mr. van den Bergh.

Secondly, you, Mr. President, will have noted that this morning I deliberately spoke in favour of Mr. van den Bergh's draft resolution, because I gathered that his committee – I am not a member of that committee and I do not wish to be accused of trespassing on its deliberations – had not approved the withdrawal, temporary or permanent, of that draft resolution. I hope that we shall be given the opportunity tomorrow to speak to or vote in favour of that resolution. It

*Mr. Hardy (continued)*

represents to some of us what should be the essence of Western Europe's approach on this important matter.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Stoffelen.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). - Several amendments were tabled on behalf of the Socialist Group at about 12 o'clock today. I understand that for technical reasons it has not been possible to print the texts of those amendments and that they may not be available for an hour or two. That is another reason why we should follow the advice of the Rapporteur and wait for his reply.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I assure you, there is no problem. I suggested that the Rapporteur might speak if he wished, but our debate is so organised that the Rapporteur and Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments will have the opportunity to speak when the vote is taken on the very numerous amendments and on the draft recommendation. I confirm that that is the present situation, and I would remind you that there was a clear purpose in our decision that the votes would be taken tomorrow.

So that our debate may be properly conducted, it is entirely reasonable that the votes on the texts under discussion should be taken after the address by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, as the Minister definitely has to leave us at 4 p.m.

I hope that all our members will be present when these votes are taken. To make the debate as intelligible as possible for all concerned, we need a few hours to prepare the files of amendments.

The Chair takes note of your point of order, Mr. Hardy. This morning the Assembly took a decision which at once resulted in the withdrawal of the draft resolution, but you are, of course, completely free to refer to this text, which is contained in a public document distributed at the start of this sitting.

Like you, I imagine, I abide by the decisions of the Assembly.

If you agree, we shall now bring this debate to an end. The Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments will, I think, meet tomorrow for an internal discussion.

I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). - I would not dream of seeking to interfere in the work of a committee of which I was not a member. I am not a member of the Committee on Defence

Questions and Armaments but I and other members of the Assembly assumed that the request to withdraw the draft resolution met with the committee's approval and was not a decision by the Rapporteur - I have enormous regard for Mr. van den Bergh. Had we known that the decision was not taken by the committee there might have been more vociferous opposition to withdrawing the resolution. I am entitled to ask that the Assembly be allowed the opportunity to consider the future of that draft resolution.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Dr. Miller.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). - I should like your guidance on two matters, Mr. President. First, will you guide the Assembly since the debate is important and many members who put down their names to speak are not here? Secondly, am I right in thinking that when the debate is wound up you will not prolong the proceedings unnecessarily by inviting rapporteurs from all the committees to speak? If you allowed that and also invited the chairmen to speak you would create a ridiculous situation because the matter is the Defence Committee's responsibility. You should rule upon this, Mr. President, so that we know the position exactly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Ladies and Gentlemen, if necessary I shall, without actually asking for them, accept a number of points of order tomorrow morning, followed by others in the afternoon, so as to set all our minds at rest about what is to happen. I shall not therefore oppose points of order, unless they trigger a political debate.

I would merely ask you to note one fact with the Chair, and it matters little, Mr. Hardy or Dr. Miller, how the decision was taken: at a public sitting, and after this morning's exchange between the Chairman and Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, the Chairman of the General Affairs Committee and the Chairman of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, the Assembly decided that the draft resolution should be withdrawn from the texts to be voted on during the present session, and that the General Affairs Committee should decide on the future of the text.

The Chair and the Assembly will now abide by that decision.

With regard to the debate and vote on the draft recommendation and the amendments to Mr. van den Bergh's report, I repeat that the Assembly has decided unanimously that it is the text of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments presented by Mr. van den Bergh which will be put to the vote. However, as the other two committees have tabled amendments

*The President (continued)*

to this report, the procedure will be as follows: when we come to vote on the draft recommendation of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, I shall call the Rapporteur of that committee and the committee Chairman may express his views when he sees fit, and, if he asks to speak, the Chair will give him the floor.

Then, the Rapporteurs of the other two committees will give their committees' views on both the draft recommendation and the various amendments tabled, and, once more, if their chairman wishes to speak, he may do so. Subsequently, in accordance with the order to be submitted to the Assembly, we shall vote, paragraph by paragraph and then as a whole, on the text and amendments submitted to the Assembly.

I shall personally see to it that everything is done to assist those who wish, or are entitled, to speak in this important debate before the vote on this text. If, within your political groups or committees, some of your colleagues are as yet unaware of this procedure, I should be grateful if you would bring it to their notice, although I am perfectly prepared to repeat what I have just said, if questioned on the subject.

If you agree, we shall leave the matter there and pass on to the rest of the debate.

I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – You, Mr. President, have explained the only way the Assembly can proceed, but I wish to ask a question. I now agree with your approach. I assume that tomorrow we shall have an opportunity to consider the draft resolution to Mr. van den Bergh's report, but I should like you to rule upon a constitutional question. Can part of the report, whether it is a draft resolution or something else, be withdrawn without the committee first having considered that withdrawal? I understood that once a matter is presented to the Assembly it becomes the Assembly's property.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I can tell you officially, Mr. Hardy, that there are two ways in which a text may be withdrawn: either at the request of the chairman of the committee concerned, or by decision of the Assembly, which is always final. As it happens, the Assembly took a decision, which is perfectly valid and in order.

Members who have some experience of parliamentary debates are well aware that, when a text they have set their heart on no longer forms part of the texts put to the vote, there are other ways of retrieving it.

I now consider this debate to be definitely closed.

*(b) The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance*

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 1034 and amendments)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, Document 1034 and amendments.

I call Mr. Berrier, the Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee.

Mr. BERRIER (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the original title of the report entrusted to the General Affairs Committee was: "The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance". After the Chairman's words of explanation, you are aware what became of this, and I shall not labour the point.

The meeting of ministers in Bonn in April 1985 conferred official status on the American SDI proposal interposed between the activities of WEU and the European reactions. In November 1984 the Council of Ministers in Rome defined precisely the form which a European pillar of the alliance might take.

This would seem to provide the motivation for the reactivation of WEU as well as a definition of the part to be played by Europe in its defence, that is the establishment of a European pillar of the alliance.

Subsequently, on 24th September 1985, the Presidential Committee decided to instruct our committee to carry out the terms of Order 63 on the institutional connection of the Assembly with other organs of WEU. This order, adopted in May 1985, instructs the Presidential Committee to ask the competent committee to prepare a report on the possibilities, conditions and consequences of a closer institutional connection of the Assembly with other organs of WEU.

At its last meeting in Paris in September, the committee added the performance of this instruction to the present report.

The examination required was to have a chapter to itself but be limited to a presentation of the facts and the legal possibilities.

In a second chapter, the report as originally conceived addressed itself to the problems of the Atlantic Alliance and European defence, an alliance whose circumstances were altered by Soviet development of the nuclear weapon and its lead in certain military fields.

Reinforced by changing European economic conditions, differences emerged between the allies as to their defence responsibilities. France withdrew from NATO and developed its own nuclear forces. This was the first crisis, and the question of the respective parts to be played by



*Mr. Berrier (continued)*

America and Europe in their collective defence gave rise to problems which defied satisfactory solution. I shall briefly summarise these problems, which are, I think, five in number.

The first question concerns arms limitation and the relations between the members of the Atlantic Alliance and those of the Warsaw Pact. Here, the Europeans have had to take a back seat, underlining their position of dependence on the two superpowers. Concerted European action would give Europe a greater say in the alliance. The Rome declaration of October 1984 acknowledged this fact, but, in February 1985, the question of disarmament in the framework of WEU was not endorsed by the Americans, and this was confirmed when the committee visited Washington.

We must also bear in mind that, when he visited Paris, Mr. Gorbachev put forward some new proposals on arms limitations. I refer here not to the Soviet-American negotiations, but to the negotiations affecting the western nuclear powers. It is still too early to say what the outcome will be, although the initial reactions point to rejection.

The second question concerns western strategy. America has established doctrines aimed at avoiding total nuclear war, but what Europe fears is the development of a strategy which makes a radical distinction between the defence of the United States and that of Europe.

Here we must emphasise, however, that Europe plays a part in the alliance's strategy in the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty; that the United Kingdom and France possess nuclear weapons; and that France, while retaining its freedom of action, is prepared to use this capability on behalf of its partners.

But European participation in alliance strategy does not provide a solution satisfactory to everybody. The Rome declaration makes a useful contribution on this question of strategy, made all the more necessary by the development of SDI.

The third question concerns security outside the NATO area. Here, the multiplicity of situations, interests and relationships virtually precludes any undertaking requiring concerted action. All that can be hoped for is that the information available to the Council may be improved, so that questions with defence implications can be handled without detriment to European solidarity.

The fourth issue relates to arms production and the question of cost efficiency. Here there is a huge imbalance between the European and American industries. For some European

countries, arms production is a major sector of the economy, and co-operation should therefore be sought at European level. This is still an unresolved question, as the Standing Armaments Committee has never been able to ensure the permanence of European co-operation. According to the Rome declaration, its new function is to lend political impetus to co-ordinated arms production, i.e. to remove the obstacles which stand in the way of co-operation. These obstacles are, I believe, legal in character.

The fifth question concerns the reactions of the European peoples to defence issues. The peaceful demonstrations in 1979 following the decision on Euromissiles were one of the factors which prompted the Seven to promote the reactivation of WEU, and this was reinforced by the lack of enthusiasm for the Rogers plan shown by public opinion and parliaments.

There is therefore every reason for a co-ordinated, specifically European element in Atlantic defence especially since President Reagan's 1983 declaration on SDI.

The third chapter of the report dealing with Europe and SDI was covered by my remarks to the Assembly this morning, and I shall not therefore revert to the matter.

The fourth chapter of the report is concerned with the reactivation of WEU. WEU is not, and will not become, a military organisation. Its character must remain political. The Rome declaration has removed any ambiguity, and has disposed of the military obligations laid upon it by the control of armaments.

WEU can therefore form the European pillar of the alliance without taking the place of the integrated NATO commands and national military authorities.

The Council appears to be working towards a genuine political forum of this kind. This course will have its problems, as one of the shortcomings of our organisation is failure to keep the public, the press and the Assembly informed about the work of the Council.

This is exemplified by a meeting of disarmament experts in Bonn which ended in failure following intervention by the United States Under-Secretary of State, Mr. Richard Burt, as was confirmed to us in Washington.

The Assembly was not informed of this any more than it was of the meetings of experts charged with co-ordinating the response to the American proposals. One wonders in consequence what credence should be given to press reports of a stalemate.

There is therefore good cause for anxiety about the follow-up to the Rome declaration and the Bonn communiqué.

*Mr. Berrier (continued)*

A number of other questions still lacking a satisfactory answer might also be raised. These include, firstly, the meetings of experts, and secondly, the functions of the Secretariat-General and the three agencies mentioned in the Bonn communiqué.

What is the nature of the political impetus which WEU is called upon to give to joint arms production, and what would be the consequences for the Standing Armaments Committee?

The nature of the task entrusted to the disarmament agency is no more clear than that of the agency which is to study defence policies.

In this connection, Mr. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, suggested in November 1984 the creation of a European institute for research into defence questions.

Since then, the Assembly has received no further information, although some eminent people consider that Europe needs an institution capable of alerting public opinion to the scope of European security problems, which is one of the basic objectives which the Council has set itself.

It is, in fact, similar to the objective which the Council set the Assembly in its Rome declaration, and the Assembly can only achieve it by parliamentary means, that is to say by its debates and votes. An assembly subservient to the governmental organs of the organisation would be discredited, and that is why it is necessary, for the reactivation of WEU, firstly that the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly should remain entirely independent; secondly that the budget allocated to the Assembly should be adequate and that the Assembly retain responsibility for the allocation of funds within the financial envelope; and thirdly that the Assembly should be kept informed of the activities of the Council, which has not invariably been the case hitherto.

Lastly, a parliamentary assembly like ours should not countenance the proliferation of ad hoc committees and unofficial meetings as distinct from its regularly constituted and competent committees.

Apart from these negative features, we should welcome three initiatives by the Council: firstly, the speedy reply to Recommendation 420 on Mr. van den Bergh's report; secondly, the Permanent Council has submitted to Assembly members a report, unfortunately confidential, on the reorganisation of the three agencies; lastly, the Secretary-General has replied to a letter I sent him about the reactivation of WEU. He has asked that his reply should remain confidential where it relates to the restructuring of the

agencies, and, as he has already addressed the Assembly on this subject, I shall not revert to the matter. The part of the Secretary-General's letter which is not confidential appears in the written report. The reply to Recommendation 420 defines the rôle of the presidency, expresses the Council's will to improve WEU's public relations and information activities, decides to implement the setting up of the three agencies, expresses the intention of enlarging WEU while at the same time reactivating it and confirms the endeavour to produce a co-ordinated answer to the SDI proposal.

The Secretary-General has answered questions which the Assembly has long been asking itself. The creation of a European union is the objective which the Ten, shortly to be the Twelve, and therefore including the Seven of WEU, have set themselves in a number of areas, including that of security. While it is true that the Ten – the future Twelve – have succeeded in developing their economic dimension and, thanks to political co-operation, their foreign policy dimension in both the supranational and inter-governmental context, they have not succeeded in the matter of security. It is the series of failures here which indeed prompted the moves to reactivate the union. What the Ten have been unable to accomplish, the Seven have decided to do by themselves. WEU is asserting itself as an element in the construction of Europe alongside the Communities and political co-operation. This will no doubt promote co-ordination and co-operation between the Council, the Secretariat-General, the agencies and the parliamentary Assembly, of which the last named is in the front line in relation to public opinion.

There is also the problem of the accession of Spain and Portugal. Regardless of current plans, there is no reason to believe that the union will be widened to become a third element in the Europe of the Twelve. With the two other elements of European construction, it will remain the only European forum for debating and co-ordinating security policy, in collaboration both with the Atlantic Alliance, without which no credible defence of Western Europe is possible, and with those allies which do not belong to the Seven.

The new union, as the starting point of a European pillar of the alliance, should have the closest possible contact with the Council and the Secretariat-General.

I have briefly summarised the Secretary-General's letter which I considered should be drawn to the Assembly's attention, but we may ask whether the development of the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) is not likely to result in duplication through its becoming a defence organisation parallel to WEU, though outside any parliamentary control, and

*Mr. Berrier (continued)*

thereby considerably diminishing the political impetus essential to European co-operation.

I turn finally to Order 63 concerning the tightening of the institutional connection of the Assembly with other organs of WEU.

It must be recognised that the Council's attitude has been much more positive since it undertook to reactivate WEU.

The elimination of arms control has led to a change in the Council's attitude towards the Assembly. If this change is maintained, many of the reasons behind Order 63 will cease to apply. On the other hand, if we refer to paragraph (a) of the text in question, we see that it opens the door to certain dangers. Under Article IX of the Brussels Treaty, the Secretary-General can have no direct responsibility with respect to the Assembly, and this is confirmed by paragraph 3 of the reply to Recommendation 420.

It is the very nature of WEU which has made it necessary to have a dual administration, comprising the Secretariat-General, responsible only to the Council, and the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly led by a Clerk elected by the Assembly. The independence of the Office of the Clerk from the Council and the Secretariat-General is an essential guarantee of the Assembly's freedom of information and expression.

The Brussels Treaty defines the Assembly's duties as being supervisory, thereby implying total independence.

For all these reasons, while welcoming the new Secretary-General's attitude, I propose not examining the establishment of organic links between the Secretariat-General and the Assembly.

With regard to paragraph (b) of the order, the different expert secretariats are the agencies which the Council is setting up in place of the Agency for the Control of Armaments and the Standing Armaments Committee. This separation of powers means that the WEU technical organs can take part only in the preparation of documents which may be of assistance to rapporteurs. It must not lead to the agencies, which depend on the Council, taking over from the Office of the Clerk, which must remain an exclusive service of the Assembly.

Paragraph (c) of the order proposes a single budget. This is now the case. However, separate budgets for the ministerial organs and the Assembly are inevitable. It is essential, also, that the Assembly should have control of its own budget and I do not wish Order 63 to lead to the Council having an even greater right to oversee the Assembly than in the past.

This right already has serious disadvantages for the Assembly's independence; it may have an adverse effect on certain decisions taken by the Presidential Committee, disrupt the work of the Office of the Clerk and affect the careers of the Assembly officials.

In reference to paragraph (c), I underline the importance of keeping the press and public opinion better informed about WEU's work. Official information is always preferable to tendentious information resulting from leaks and, subject of course to certain conditions, the secrecy which has been an essential rule of diplomacy should give way to more open methods.

By keeping, as urged by Order 63, to a presentation of the factual conditions and legal possibilities, I have had to be rather restrictive in my answers to the questions raised in the order. Any other form of answer would be liable to call the Brussels Treaty in question.

I consider that the proposals in the draft recommendation correspond to paragraph (e) of the order since they take as a basis the present position of WEU when endeavouring to define the possibilities available for promoting the cause of WEU.

Finally, a year after the Rome declaration, the reactivation of WEU and its transformation into the European pillar of the alliance are tied to the will of the governments concerned. No other body will be able to achieve this result if the Seven fail to do so within the framework offered by a WEU freed from its former commitments.

If it is true that an American objection has put a stop to the disarmament debate, if there is no agreement on the rôle of the WEU agencies, on the co-ordination of the answers to be given to President Reagan's proposals or on a joint armaments policy, and if the means are lacking for the fulfilment of the parliamentary tasks assigned by the governments themselves, then there is every justification for doubts about the reactivation of WEU and even about Europe's participation in western defence at a time when America and Soviet Russia are considering new technologies and new developments for their own defence.

If the European members of the Atlantic Alliance do not manage to co-ordinate their views on defence matters and invest in the new technologies, they will fall so far behind that they will be unable to catch up and will certainly jeopardise their security in the very near future.

*(Mr. Blaauw, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)*

The PRESIDENT. - I call Mr. Masciadri.

Mr. MASCIADRI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I shall confine my remarks to Mr. Berrier's report because I have the impression that if I took all three subjects and reports together I should have to speak rather generally whereas I intend to be very specific.

May I say straight away that I find Mr. Berrier's report satisfactory as regards the first part which I dealt with and the part on which he has just enlarged, the philosophy of which is an established philosophy which was in fact ours until as recently as last year when I had the honour to speak on behalf of the Assembly on the report, which has largely been reproduced by Mr. Berrier.

I have no wish to engage in controversy with our colleague; it seems to me however that his report drafted a few months ago and updated, I believe, during discussion in the General Affairs Committee is rather more optimistic than I would have expected. It is true that when Mr. Berrier gave us his own conclusions a moment ago he toned down somewhat the optimism which ran through the original report; I am therefore speaking with good will and not as a critic. Nevertheless, I must say that I think he is too optimistic for the following reasons. Firstly, the Council has not fulfilled the commitments entered into in the Rome declaration of 1984; the decisions taken then have not been implemented in a number of cases I should like to enumerate; the decision on disarmament has not been implemented despite the assurances given to us here by the German Minister, Mr. Genscher, who was Chairman of the Council of Ministers at the time; no proper unanimous response has been made to the American strategic defence initiative; despite the Rome declaration, relations between the Council and the Assembly have not been intensified; the necessary resources have not been made available.

The three agencies instituted on the basis of the Rome declaration – for disarmament, armaments and industrial co-operation – have not really come into being so that on 1st January 1986, which is now just round the corner, they will have absolutely nothing to do as they have been given no remit and no permanent duties. They will therefore remain without work and I would not like to think this is due to any ill will or is done with the intention of arguing a year or two hence that they are not in a position to operate and should therefore be wound up as they have no duties.

These are my reasons for a measure of pessimism, to be set against the optimism running through the report which I approve, of course, although I disagree on a number of points. The Council must decide to implement the Rome declaration particularly as regards its own work and must take firm action regarding the duties

of the three agencies, since the seven nations represented here were unanimous.

Moreover, we must be provided with the information we require if we are to work effectively. In conclusion, we must ask for adequate resources, particularly financial, without which nothing can be done and, above all, it is impossible to continue in the special situation in which we find ourselves.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Hill.

Mr. HILL (*United Kingdom*). – I have to congratulate Mr. Berrier on this excellent report. It suggests that it deals primarily with SDI, but that forms only a small part of the paper, reviewing the outcome so far of WEU's reactivation, the problems inherent in that and the prospects.

In this survey, Mr. Berrier emphasises the need for the European members of the alliance to strengthen their contributions to NATO by improving their co-operation and consultation on security questions. He argues, quite rightly, that a more genuine partnership with the United States within NATO should be formed through better consultation and collaboration and that, in this way, European influence and the alliance itself could be strengthened.

Mr. Berrier develops his theme in the equipment collaboration sector, noting the successes achieved in the last year in the IEPG – although the biggest project of all, the European fighter aircraft, has been something of a problem – and the importance to allies on both sides of the Atlantic of a strong, viable and properly structured European defence-industrial base.

The report stresses the need for caution in handling the SDI issue. After a number of the speeches this morning, I agree with that, both from the strategic viewpoint and in terms of likely problems for Europeans participating in the research programme, as well as the brain drain and so on. It also draws attention to the idea of a WEU study of European security arrangements. Of course, the report highlights the potential importance of WEU as a forum for member nations to develop the required co-ordination and consultation, thereby strengthening both the European pillar and the Atlantic Alliance.

Mr. Berrier moves from that consideration of WEU's external environment and WEU's place in it to the assessment of internal changes in WEU since reactivation, and considers some of the continuing difficulties in this respect. The report acknowledges some of the successes which have been achieved, but highlights areas in which further improvements should be made – particularly the future rôle and tasking of the agencies, reporting by the Council to the Assem-

*Mr. Hill (continued)*

bly on its activities, the need to maintain an independent Assembly, and, of course, the budgetary implications of this. He finishes the section with lengthy quotations from the report to the Assembly by the new Secretary-General. I suppose that this report emphasises the many changes that have occurred since WEU's renewal.

Finally, in its last section, the report elaborates the details of how institutional links between the Assembly and other WEU bodies should be improved. The report is a useful summary of the issues outlined. It is particularly valuable in moving from the general to the particular, showing how the renewed WEU can best contribute to the development of European security consciousness.

Mr. Berrier is rather pessimistic in his conclusions, implying that WEU's rôle is still undetermined, which calls into question the possibility of creating the European pillar. The creation of a strong European pillar of the alliance is essential for the future of European security. WEU has a rôle to play in providing a unique forum for foreign and defence ministers to discuss security questions of topical significance and to develop a European perspective on them.

Internally, the reorganisation of WEU, in line with the October 1984 Rome ministerial mandates, has proceeded. The old Agency for the Control of Armaments and the bulk of its control functions have been more or less wound up. New agencies have been brought into being for study and research purposes. Tasks have been defined for them and we hope that new budgetary structures will soon be agreed. The second phase of reactivation, getting the work of the agencies under way, can now begin.

Meanwhile, there have been improvements in Council-Assembly relationships. Much has been achieved not only in WEU, but, more widely, in European security, in which WEU has a part to play. I would not, therefore, share Mr. Berrier's concluding pessimism. But that is not to deny that much remains to be done in WEU.

The PRESIDENT. - Thank you very much, Mr. Hill.

I call Mr. Bianco.

Mr. BIANCO (*Italy*) (Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I think that Mr. Berrier's report contains many useful ideas which will unquestionably have to be further considered and developed. Despite the pessimism expressed in some of his comments, as already mentioned, what emerges is the lasting

value of our Assembly and of the agreement between the seven countries which created WEU by amending the Brussels Treaty.

I do not think that we should try to invent an identity for ourselves because the need for collaboration and for close agreement between the member countries of WEU stems precisely from the need for a unified European view on security problems. It may be said that this need is imposed by the facts, by political requirements and by the international situation as it has gradually developed after the Geneva meeting. Unfortunately, this need which lies at the very heart of European politics is difficult to fulfil. I believe therefore that WEU as it is organised meets a historical and a political need. What has to be done is to find the means of implementing all this and much depends on the rôle which we as parliamentarians can play in this Assembly and in discussions with the Council of Ministers so that both can do what is required of them.

We have a special form of organisation. On the one side there is the Council of Ministers made up of representatives from the WEU countries and on the other we have a parliamentary body made up of freely-elected parliamentarians who can provide a democratic driving force and at the same time define the right approach to defence and security in Europe. This morning, during discussion of the controversial SDI project, in which it would be a mistake for Europe to refuse to participate provided always that international treaties are respected, everyone emphasised and the whole Assembly agreed that Europe as such must have an important rôle and share in world security.

How, I ask myself and the government representatives, is it possible to achieve this unified European position except by working out a co-ordinated common policy here in WEU? Of course each country is following its own logic but always, as though our consciences were not really clear, we say at the same time that there must be co-ordination and that we must find points of agreement. We recognise, therefore, the vital necessity of such agreement and co-operation which should be sought at all political levels so that the common defence requirements can be met through forms of organisation ranging from standardisation to agreed choice of conventional and other weapons. The possibility therefore exists of formulating a common security policy. In my opinion this is the proper way to restore an important and significant rôle to Europe so that it can carry the weight which we often complain it does not have.

We can certainly collaborate at international and European level in the Eureka project but we must keep up with all research in this sector precisely so that we can have a decisive rôle.

*Mr. Bianco (continued)*

Taking a realistic view, therefore, and without undue optimism which would be out of place at the moment but also without being pessimistic we should as Europeans work for a common policy which can start here in our organisation.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Spies von Büllesheim.

Mr. SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I shall begin by congratulating Mr. Berrier on his report. I would certainly not have taken the floor to criticise his report had it not contained Part V and had it not, as many of us discovered very late in the day, dealt there at the same time, and in a way which we cannot approve, with Document 1026, which was tabled by a fair number of members of this house from the three major political groups.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I quite appreciate that our Assembly's administration does not give undivided support to the proposal by these members that, if we are to talk about a reactivation of WEU, its structures should be examined, that is to say, a balance should be struck between the responsibilities of the Assembly, the secretariat and the Clerk and these responsibilities linked as far as possible. But I do not think we parliamentarians can simply accept that such a proposal, which, as I have said, has been signed by members of all the groups, from Mr. Stoffelen through Sir Frederic Bennett to Mr. Blaauw, should suddenly be dealt with by some kind of urgent procedure, concealed and unnoticed in a report on SDI, and that it should be referred to in only one sentence, which nobody can find: "Having carefully studied the legal implications of Order 63."

Ladies and Gentlemen, many – I would say, most – of you have been members of a national parliament for more than ten years. We all admire and appreciate the work done by the staff of our parliaments. But we also know that we must remain alert. Anyone who is a parliamentarian for any length of time knows that it does not take the administration very long, at the end of a sitting or at some other time, to push him in a direction he had no intention of taking. And suddenly it is all minuted, and things have taken a quite specific course.

I should therefore like, if you have no objection, to describe the history of Document 1026 since September. You will see that, to put it bluntly, certain developments have been initiated. Consequently, an amendment has also been tabled. No one must be allowed to deny us parliamentarians the right to have WEU's structures examined very closely. Document 1026 was quite deliberately couched in very

cautious terms. All it says is that the competent committee should investigate the possibilities and political consequences of a change in the structure of WEU in the direction we all want, namely on behalf of the reactivation of Western European Union.

And what happens to this motion for an order? It is palmed off on to Mr. Berrier's report, if I may put it that way, where all we find is the one sentence: "Having carefully studied the legal implications of Order 63." There were no recommendations, no conclusions, no thorough investigations.

I regret, Mr. President, that I have only five minutes' speaking time. But I want to begin with these criticisms and say that in this respect the report is unacceptable for several reasons. The first is that this point is discussed in Part V of the report, which was forwarded to the General Affairs Committee when the discussion was already under way – as an addition, in fact – and as I hear from the members of the General Affairs Committee, the result was that the motion for an order was not discussed at all because attention was, of course, focused on the problems connected with SDI. No one understood, and no one in the General Affairs Committee considered it possible, that Document 1026 was supposed to be discussed at that stage. So there is just this one short sentence in the draft recommendation.

We surely want WEU reactivated. I recall what Federal Minister Genscher, then Chairman-in-Office of the Council, said here. He said: "If you want something like this, the parliamentarians, not the governments, must be the driving force." If we intend to investigate this, we must do so in a report that goes into detail. We should not be afraid of treading on anybody's toes. We must first consider the technical possibilities, and the political conclusions must then be drawn. Subsequently, we must talk to the governments of our countries about possible changes in the Brussels Treaty.

I will conclude, Mr. President, because I believe I have already exceeded my speaking time by two minutes. What I want to say, then, is that this aspect of the report is unacceptable for several reasons. For one thing, it does not take due account of the concern of the authors of the motion for an order. So important a question cannot be discussed *en passant*: it must be considered at length. For another, the Presidential Committee explicitly instructed that the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges should be involved, but this did not happen.

Mr. President, I have in fact already moved my amendment. I can, of course, move it again. But I have not been able to say anything about the substance of the matter. I have not

*Mr. Spies von Büllesheim (continued)*

been able to explain that the authors of the motion – Mr. Blaauw, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Stoffelen and others – do not want to reduce the Assembly's independence, as Mr. Berrier has written in his report. Nothing is further from the truth. Could we be any more dependent, as regards the budget, for example, than we are today? What we all want is a more independent Assembly and its greater involvement in WEU activities. We fail to see why there should be secretariats in London, the results of whose work are a closed book to us. We have our own secretariat here. We want activities co-ordinated, as in the Council of Europe, so that the Assembly may have more influence over governments, in the spirit of its European orientation.

*(Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and Gentlemen, on behalf of us all I have great pleasure in welcoming Lady Young, who has just arrived. If you agree, Lady Young, I will call a final speaker before giving you the floor.

I call Mr. Rauti.

Mr. RAUTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Even though time is limited I wish first to congratulate the Rapporteur on his excellent document. But as this happens with almost all our debates I feel I should add that this report is particularly valuable because it provides a specific framework in which we can easily sum up not only our reasons for the uncertainty, doubt, dissatisfaction and sometimes frustration which we feel when we look at what is happening in WEU but also some ideas for getting away from the present situation.

That situation is certainly unsatisfactory and I do not believe that there is a single member of this Assembly who could honestly say that he is satisfied with what WEU has achieved in practice in dealing with the tangle of problems which have mounted up at an accelerating rate over the years and in particular during the last few months.

These problems are of such a nature and so numerous and complex that in order to have a clear conscience ourselves and with the public at large we must have some point from which to start. This is mentioned in paragraph 7 of Mr. Berrier's report which notes that the Atlantic Alliance is at present not well adapted to certain facets of the world today.

In clearer terms I would say that we have entered on a new phase which first and foremost concerns the European members of the alliance directly and in many respects decisively or even

dramatically. To take up one of the Rapporteur's ideas, the nature of the threats to Western Europe has changed completely. In what way are the new threats different? This brings us to the so-called "out of area" threats which are emerging particularly in the Mediterranean, Libya and the Middle East. Here the most important fact is that these threats are not posed so much or exclusively in terms of force relationships but stem mainly from politico-religious influences and motives; to quote a notable example, Khomeini had no armed forces but chased out the Shah who had the strongest army in that part of the world, over-equipped with the most sophisticated weapons. And if President Mubarak were replaced by Islamic fundamentalists the consequences would be disastrous.

What I am saying is that Europe is now living in a new setting, fraught with dangers extending beyond the old two-bloc world which led to the creation of the Atlantic Alliance; these are dangers which can only be met adequately through WEU which, as things stand, we consider must for objective reasons become the European pillar, and all the internal and external security problems facing this vital part of our continent must be dealt with through WEU. It is futile to shut our eyes to these facts; the Mediterranean is becoming a real "storm area" and – making a reference to the very recent controversy in my country – we cannot "scale the Alps" so that Italy does not remain trapped historically as well as geographically in the Mediterranean; trapped therefore – and more and more confronted with the dramatic problems of all the peoples living round the Mediterranean and their vital interests.

Continuing to summarise, we therefore want the European pillar, we want WEU to be reactivated – not simply miserable budget discussions over a few hundred million to be divided between seven countries – and we want a determination that WEU shall at last become a real force, with the new agencies which still exist only on paper.

Basically we, as a political force, favour the space shield but wish the positive response to come from all Europeans; meanwhile, however, to deal with matters of direct interest and possible dangers they have in WEU a "European shield" through which Europe with its special characteristics can meet the challenges and threats which are imminent in the Mediterranean; in addition to the Middle East we have the drama of the Palestinians, pressure from Islamic fundamentalism and religious fanaticism which is often the source of merciless terrorism; we have, as I said, tension throughout North Africa, we have Cyprus, we have the dispute between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus and the Aegean, all against the background of

*Mr. Rauti (continued)*

North-South relations and of relations between Europe and the underdeveloped countries where all the worst problems are to be found today.

**4. Address by Baroness Young, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the address by Baroness Young, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom.

Lady Young, I wish to express the Assembly's appreciation of your presence here again today. In you, we have a speaker who knows us and whom we know very well. You are the first Council member to address us during this particularly important session at a time when Europe, in both Paris and Luxembourg, is searching for the proper path in the present major confrontation.

I am sure that your participation in our debate is of great importance. Several of your colleagues will be speaking after you, and tomorrow there are votes to be taken, which will, I believe, express the political will of which Western European Union stands in such need.

I take great pleasure in giving you the floor and would ask you to come to the rostrum.

Baroness YOUNG (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – It is a very great pleasure to have the opportunity to address the Assembly once again. Thank you, Mr. President, for your very kind introductory remarks.

We met at an auspicious and hopeful moment in East-West relations. Two weeks ago today, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev were meeting at Geneva. That meeting was a success for the United States, for the western alliance, for the Soviet Union and for the international community at large. This is not to say that the summit achieved a breakthrough in arms control negotiations. We never expected that, but progress has been made by opening the door to a healthier, more stable relationship between the superpowers.

By abjuring the pursuit of military superiority and affirming that a nuclear war must never be fought, a sounder basis has been laid for relations between East and West, and for resolving some of the most difficult problems – arms control, regional issues and human rights and in bilateral United States-Soviet relations. The two sides have agreed to have meetings at all levels in the coming years, to pursue negotia-

tions on nuclear arms more vigorously and to inject new impetus into the negotiations on chemical weapons at Geneva and the MBFR and CDE negotiations at Vienna and Stockholm, all of which are of prime importance to Europe. Europe will have a part to play in this process. That was why Mrs. Thatcher agreed to Mr. Gorbachev's suggestion of talks on broad arms control issues, though she made it clear – for reasons that are well known – that there could be no question of negotiating on British nuclear forces.

We must beware of exaggerated expectations for the immediate future. The Geneva summit is only the first step in a long process of narrowing the great divide between East and West, but I am in no doubt that the meeting was an important achievement. This achievement would not have been possible, as President Reagan has himself said, without the firm, steadfast support given to the United States by its allies.

If, in the past few years, the alliance had yielded to Soviet wedge-driving, if we had bowed before Soviet pressure to abandon the 1979 decision to counter the SS-20 threat by basing United States intermediate nuclear weapons in Europe and if we had wavered in our support for the President as he prepared for the Geneva meeting, we should have lost the chance to start a new chapter in East-West relations. Indeed, the Soviet Union might never have agreed to return to the negotiating table which it abandoned so precipitously in 1983 and the precondition for the summit itself might never have existed. The fundamental importance of alliance solidarity, of effective and constant consultation and of the contribution made by the European allies has never been more evident.

In 1984, when ministers decided at Rome to revitalise WEU, they had foremost in their minds the need to give new life and a fresh form to the European contribution to the alliance. It was widely felt that the failure, so far, to grasp in European political co-operation the security issues which are so important to Europe should not be allowed to stand in the way of better European consultation and co-ordination. There were also a number of other factors such as the need to respond to the belief in the United States, voiced most conspicuously by Senator Nunn, that the United States should not maintain its commitment to European security unless the Europeans themselves were seen to contribute more to their own defence. There was a danger that, unless European governments responded by improving their already substantial contribution to the alliance, unless they made sure that that contribution was understood and acknowledged across the Atlantic, the vital United States commitment to Europe might decline. Yet that commitment is,



*Baroness Young (continued)*

and must remain, the ultimate guarantee of European security.

Of equal importance was the debate generated by the decision five out of the seven WEU members made in 1979 to station United States intermediate-range missiles on their soil, in response to the growing threat presented by Soviet SS-20s and other intermediate systems.

These issues and the threat which brought them to prominence are still very much with us. Indeed, it is barely a month since one of our number, the Netherlands, took the welcome decision to accept United States missiles in the face of the Soviet refusal to reduce its weaponry to earlier levels. Decisions on these matters, and the public concerns and debate which they have stimulated, deserve – indeed, demand – consultation and co-ordination between European governments. This applies not just to governments. The process must extend to those who represent the people of Europe – to you, the parliamentarians, chosen by your electorates to voice their aspirations, their needs and their beliefs.

WEU is well placed to meet these needs. It provides a forum permitting foreign and defence ministers to meet to harmonise views on the widest possible range of security issues. It possesses a parliamentary assembly specifically constituted to debate defence and security matters. It has at its disposal a secretariat with the necessary expertise and abilities to guide its deliberations.

Some changes were, however, necessary. The controls on armaments production, administered for more than thirty years by the Agency for the Control of Armaments, were outmoded and could be dispensed with. The agency itself needed restructuring. It is now, following the decision by ministers, to be replaced by three new agencies, with tasks and objectives set by the requirements of European security today. Some elements of the old WEU have been retained. The important controls on atomic, biological and chemical weapons will remain in place and the Council will need to decide whether to continue to establish controls on force levels each year. But I believe, and I am sure that you will agree, that, after eighteen months of hard work, the coming year will see the rapid growth of a regenerated, leaner and more effective WEU.

Some have questioned this development, arguing that the more coherent the expression of European views, the greater the risk of division within the alliance. I reject this; so, I am sure, do my ministerial colleagues; and so, I am equally sure, do you. Our security, the security of Europe, is indissolubly linked to that of

the United States. Without the guarantee provided by United States strategic forces and the contribution made by more than three hundred thousand American servicemen stationed in Europe, there could be no security for the peoples of Europe confronted by the vast and growing might of the Soviet Union. That is the reality, and that is why we have every intention of using WEU – as we use other major European organisations – to reinforce and to strengthen the vital link across the Atlantic. That is the best, indeed the only, way to ensure that a war is never again fought on European soil.

The European contribution is essential to western security. It is already substantial – 90% of the manpower on the central front, 85% of the tanks and 80% of the combat aircraft. This gives Europe a major voice in the counsels of the alliance. It is this fact, and the fact that it is in our independent interest as Europeans to debate and decide on issues affecting our security, that we must get across in our countries and to our public opinion.

I turn to the rôle of the Assembly. You represent the peoples of Europe. As their spokesmen and spokeswomen – I cannot resist interjecting that, given the importance of security issues in our lives and in the lives of generations to come, I wish there were more women among you – you have a duty to make their views and concerns known to governments. I have read with great interest the various reports that you have produced. They represent a high level of analysis and serious discussion. I was particularly interested in Mr. Berrier's report on WEU and the strategic defence initiative – the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, which discusses in some detail recent developments in WEU. This is precisely the type of exchange between parliamentarians and governments that we so badly need. I, and I am sure my colleagues in other governments, will take careful account of your views.

I welcome Mr. Berrier's acknowledgements, in the report to which I have just referred, that the Council has made an obvious effort to achieve "a significant improvement" in its relations with the Assembly and that "barriers" to satisfactory exchanges between the Council and the Assembly have been removed. I can assure you that we shall maintain this effort to remove any obstacles between the Council and the Assembly. The will to work together is there on both sides. Governments are, at the same time, conscious of the need not to compromise the Assembly's independence of action. A healthy dialogue between parliamentarians and governments, which does not seek to sidestep difficult issues, is essential to WEU's well-being and success.

*Baroness Young (continued)*

However, all of you in the Assembly have another most important task – to make the peoples of our countries aware of the realities of a nuclear world, to help them understand why governments take the difficult decisions required to ensure our collective security, and to make them aware that differences of national interest must be subsumed in, and subordinated to, a wider awareness of and loyalty to the western alliance. Parliaments and governments must share this responsibility to explain, particularly to the younger generation who know nothing of war, why we must couple strong defence with the resolute pursuit of arms control. We must get across to our young people the understanding that deterrence is fundamental to western security and that a strong defence is fundamental to deterrence.

We must explain that the peace of the past forty years has depended on the policy of deterrence and the possession of nuclear weapons which underpins it. We must explain that, so long as the Soviet Union possesses nuclear weapons, we must possess them to avert the threat of war and the threat of nuclear blackmail which could, like war, destroy our democratic way of life. We must explain that this does not run counter to the pursuit of arms control and disarmament but instead complements it. We must explain also that our defence policies, including nuclear policies, reflect European interests. We do not act at the behest of the United States, but because we see the overriding need to defend ourselves. Unless we in Europe demonstrate our resolve to hold our shield high, including, if necessary, by stationing nuclear weapons on our soil, we cannot hope to deter a potential aggressor.

There remains much that you, Mr. President, and we, the Assembly and governments, can and should do. However, much has been achieved in the short time that has elapsed since WEU was reactivated. The Secretary-General elaborated on the detail of this in his admirable and comprehensive survey yesterday afternoon. I have no wish to repeat what he said, but I should like to add a few comments.

I have already mentioned the creation of the three new agencies in Paris. The initial list of tasks for them to undertake, endorsed by ministers last month at Rome, is substantial. It includes issues of central importance to western security relating both to western defence capabilities, questions of armaments collaboration, the problems of arms control, and Europe's rôle in the management of East-West relationships.

The agencies will use existing staff as far as possible, but the recruitment of additional personnel is now under way under the guidance of the Secretary-General in London and the

three directors here in Paris. We expect these preparatory steps to be concluded this month. This will require us to decide on priorities among the agreed list of tasks. The list is too large for the agencies to deal with every item simultaneously. We must make sure this happens quickly so that the agencies can start work. They should draw wherever possible on work already under way in NATO and the IEPG so as to avoid wasteful and unnecessary duplication. We look forward to their first reports to the Permanent Council, which will continue to watch closely to ensure that the work of the agencies remains relevant to our principal security concerns.

In practice, of course, the work to be carried forward by the agencies has already begun. Ministers at Bonn agreed to "co-ordinate as far as possible" their reactions to the United States invitation to participate in the strategic defence initiative research programme. A special working group of experts has produced a preliminary assessment which formed the basis for discussion by both the Permanent Council and ministers at their recent meeting in Rome. The Chairman-in-Office has briefed you on the outcome of the discussion at the ministerial meeting. He made it clear that it is premature to speak of a "common WEU line" on SDI and participation. Each government will reach their own decision. Mrs. Thatcher has expressed the hope that a decision on British participation will be possible by the end of this year. Work will continue on the subject within WEU, although the details have still to be decided. This, as the broader work programme of the agencies unfolds, should form a part of our wider consideration and analysis of European defence problems and options. The fundamental strategic issues raised by SDI will, of course, only become clearer as the results of the research emerge in the coming years. In the meantime, we should avoid rushing to early or divisive conclusions. For the moment, the important fact is that WEU has demonstrated its ability to provide a forum for useful debate on one of the most important issues of the day. This in itself demonstrates the success of reactivation.

WEU's value as a forum for consultation has also been underlined in other ways too. Foreign and defence ministers have met twice this year, once formally at Bonn, and once more on an informal basis at Rome. In between, the Permanent Council has met regularly in London. There have been meetings involving both Council and Assembly. Through these activities, and those of our new and very active Secretary-General, Mr. Cahen, WEU has assumed a much higher profile in international affairs and in awareness of the public in all our countries.

Finally a word about resources: the intention of the Rome decision was that we should focus

*Baroness Young (continued)*

existing resources more effectively. Financial constraints remain very real, and WEU, in common with other international organisations, must be lean and efficient. But the Chairman-in-Office has already told you in Rome, Mr. President, of the recognition by ministers of the need for a serious discussion of the Assembly's resources. I hope that this week will see agreement on the early establishment of a mechanism for that purpose.

This is all to the good. It demonstrates that co-operation among European governments on defence and security issues is strong and is growing. The public debate on these issues, to which WEU is making a major contribution, reflects the vitality of our democracies. I am sure that you will continue to make your contribution. Without it, the public support for the policies of government, on which the security of Western Europe and the western alliance depends, would wither away. I am confident that this will not happen, and my confidence stems in large measure from the liveliness of your debates and the weight of your contribution to western policy-making on security issues.

I hope that it will be clear from what I have said that the British Government's answers to the three questions you posed yesterday, Mr. President, to the member governments are affirmative, and that we are more optimistic than you about what has already been done to implement the decisions reached in Rome last year. We are already deeply engaged in adapting the machinery of the organisation to its new rôles. We have a clear view of the tasks the new agencies should tackle when they come into being next month. The Council, both at ministerial and permanent levels, is addressing the key issues of European security, including SDI.

Finally, the work of strengthening relations between the Council and the Assembly has begun, but it must be pressed forward actively to enable the work of the two bodies to complement each other effectively.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I thank you for your address, Lady Young. The hopes you have expressed are in full accord with the concerns and aspirations of the Assembly.

I am sure you will now agree to the customary exchange of views with Assembly members who would like to ask you some questions. A number of members have put down their names.

I call Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – Before my brief question, I think that I will echo the feelings of everyone present if I say how glad we are that Baroness Young is back with us

again. She is rapidly becoming part of WEU institutions. We welcome her in that guise and look forward to future occasions when she brings us cheerful news about the work being done at ministerial level, and shows her appreciation of the work of the Assembly.

I know that the Minister cannot go very far today, but I hope that she can say that the more successful this club becomes the more attractive it is to potential members. I should like her to say that new and suitable applicants for membership will be considered positively. It may take some time to consider new members, particularly when only one country – Portugal – has made a formal application.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Baroness YOUNG (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – I thank Sir Frederic for his kind opening remarks. It is always a pleasure to come to the WEU Assembly, to hear its deliberations and its interests of the moment. The Assembly has a real and important rôle to play.

Sir Frederic has asked a specific question about possible applications for membership and the enlargement of WEU. This important question requires full and careful consideration and that is certainly what we shall want to give it. We have communicated that view to the Portuguese Government, who have expressed interest. I should like them to know that we are considering the matter. It becomes particularly important as we all welcome the accession of Portugal and Spain to the European Community.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Sir John Osborn.

Sir John OSBORN (*United Kingdom*). – I, too, welcome the fact that a British Foreign Office minister is speaking for the ministers of WEU. Will the Minister consider a point that worries me? It involves the feeling of European people that American missiles, for the benefit of North American defence policy, are being placed on European soil as part of an American defence policy and not even as part of a joint defence policy. What discussions, apart from those on the SDI, have foreign ministers from Europe had with the Americans about the possibility of manufacturing missiles?

Secondly, WEU and certainly the Assembly tend inadvertently to work in isolation from NATO. The Supreme Allied Commander comes here from time to time, but WEU foreign ministers must work more closely with NATO foreign ministers. Is the European arm of the North Atlantic defence policy working as well as some of us would wish?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Baroness YOUNG (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – Thank you, Sir John, for that question. You ask about consultations with the Americans over the stationing of missiles in Europe and about whether WEU is becoming isolated from NATO.

The starting point in this discussion is the dual-track decision taken in 1979 by NATO and WEU on the stationing of missiles and on pursuing concurrently arms control talks. Discussions have gone on at all levels and continue on both issues, particularly over arms control.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I associate myself with Sir Frederic Bennett's warm appreciation of Lady Young's presence and the commitment that she expressed to WEU on behalf of the British Government.

The Minister adduced a reason for the reinvigoration of WEU which intrigued me. She suggested that Senator Sam Nunn and those who have felt in the burden-sharing debate that the Europeans are not playing a sufficient part in NATO defence would moderate their complaints if we got our act together through WEU.

Can Lady Young explain how WEU is increasing its national commitment in terms of force levels and equipment? The impression is the opposite. She said that some elements of the old WEU remain. They remain in the Council as much as in the Assembly, which is often in advance of the Council. We have advocated a more unified helicopter industry and pointed out the dangers of division over airborne early warning systems and the dangers of different operational requirements of European fighter aircraft. We have sought for many years to get a concerted European space view. How is WEU leading to a bigger European commitment to allied defence in practical terms?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Baroness YOUNG (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – Thank you for your question about how our commitment to WEU is leading to a greater commitment by Europe to its own defence.

I hope that I spelt out a number of ways in which the reactivation of WEU has helped to strengthen European defence. There are two areas where that can be said to be the case.

First, the IEPG exists for European co-operation, particularly on armaments. If that has not been as successful as we might all have wished, it is at least trying to grapple with difficult problems and to get better co-operation in Europe. If it did not exist, the situation would unquestionably be more difficult.

The second way in which WEU helps is that regular meetings of defence ministers, notably that in Rome which led to the reactivation of WEU, bring together ministers from European countries who can discuss what further steps they could and should be taking.

In those two ways WEU has made a positive contribution to increasing the defence and security of Western Europe.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Sir Paul Hawkins.

Sir Paul HAWKINS (*United Kingdom*). – We are all glad to see you here again, Lady Young, and we were glad to hear your words about the need for WEU and its reactivation. We were beginning to wonder whether those words meant anything, because the Assembly has not yet seen any practical proof of the reactivation.

I wish that you, Lady Young, had been present yesterday for our President's address. I hope that you read it. You would have heard the way in which the Assembly received that address. We were unanimous in feeling great anxiety – among all parties and all nations in the Assembly. One could not appreciate that feeling without being here.

There is great worry about the discourtesy of the Council of Ministers which, having received the budget from our Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration in September, had not replied by this week, when we should have been debating the budget. We had to cancel that debate. There was a discourtesy and I hope that you will convey our feelings to the Council of Ministers.

Can Lady Young assure us that the reactivation of WEU, started in Rome at a meeting which I attended and from which I got a great feeling of hope, is to go ahead? May we have an assurance that sufficient funds will be made available for WEU to carry out the new activities that the Rome conference asked it to undertake?

We are asked to be efficient. We cannot be efficient on a shoestring. That is the Assembly's unanimous opinion.

Will Baroness Young convey to the British Foreign Secretary that we would be pleased if he could find the time to come to the Assembly in June next year to hear our opinions?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Baroness YOUNG (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – I am sorry that I was not here to listen to the President's speech yesterday. Immediately on arrival I heard that his speech made a great impression on the Assembly. I have, of course, read it today.

I hope that nothing that I have said will be taken as indicating other than the importance that we and other WEU governments attach to the reactivation of WEU. The decision to do that was taken only just over a year ago. I hope that I have explained the way in which WEU is responding and making progress. Perhaps that progress is not as complete as we would all wish, but it is progress. It would be unfortunate not to acknowledge what has been done. Ministers have made a real commitment. In all the areas identified progress is being made.

I mentioned the budget about which the Assembly feels so strongly. Sir Paul and I know from discussions at home the general climate for financial matters. I therefore welcome the possibility of discussions on the Assembly's resources. I hope that we can work out a mechanism through which these discussions can take place so that we can reach an agreed solution.

I shall convey Sir Paul's kind invitation to Sir Geoffrey Howe, who follows WEU's activities closely. I shall, of course, convey to him the remarks made today.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS (*United Kingdom*). – I welcome Britain's commitment to WEU. Baroness Young said that, fortunately, the young of Europe had not experienced war. Does she regard the education of the young and WEU's rôle a budgetary priority?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Baroness YOUNG (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – It is not for me to determine the Assembly's priorities. I should be unwise to comment on that. As I said in my speech, it is important that younger generations, who fortunately have not experienced war, recognise the importance of defending and keeping the peace. That must be taught to each succeeding generation. We should never, never forget it. I hope that that will remain an important issue for the Assembly. It asks what its rôle should be and this must surely be an important part of it.

I believe strongly that in democracies we must always take the time to explain why people enjoy

their rights and how important defence is to their continuing to enjoy those rights. The entire population must be taught that, but it is particularly important to teach those who have not suffered war or had their rights taken away from them. That is of great importance for the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Cifarelli.

Mr. CIFARELLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I too thank Lady Young for being with us and answering so many questions, which all seem to me to have been put in English as they should.

As for me, whilst paying my tribute to the diplomatic language and political responsibility of the lady speaker, I would above all like to ask whether a year in Europe is the same period of time as in normal life – because it seems to me that postponement – and our frustration – is becoming a basic feature in dealing with European affairs. My question is: are the agencies not yet in operation because they lack resources, because they lack staff or because it has not yet been decided what they are supposed to do?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Baroness YOUNG (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – Thank you for your question, Mr. Cifarelli. I shall do my best to answer it. I understand that the tasks of the agencies are now specified and will come into operation on 1st June next year. This is an example of reactivation and a new organisation starting its work. We must wish it success in its endeavours.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Berger.

Mr. BERGER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Madam, as a new member of the Assembly I admire the optimism with which you have talked about the future of Western European Union. It has, I will admit, strengthened my hopes.

So I should like to ask you: is your government prepared to define European interests in connection with the strategic defence initiative, to analyse the European options and to draw the practical conclusions with the other member states of Western European Union, so that SDI may become the subject of European and transatlantic security policy and co-operation; and does your government regard Western European Union as the appropriate instrument?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Baroness YOUNG (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – Thank you for your question about SDI. As you will know, the British Government have taken a view about joining the research into SDI and we shall announce arrangements before the end of the year, but they must be within the ABM treaty of 1972. Although not every country in WEU might take the same view about SDI, it is a good forum, as the Assembly has shown by its debate today, on what is probably the most important defence issue of the time. The fact that the WEU Assembly is giving so much time to the subject enables discussion of a common problem and airs countries' different reactions to it. That is important just as the meetings of defence ministers are important for governments and it is a good and valuable reason for the work of the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Gansel.

Mr. GANSEL (*Federal Republic of Germany*). – I also want to start with some friendly remarks and compliment Baroness Young on her endurance in coming to the WEU Assembly a second time. I should like to ask a question that I would have asked the representative of any government that came to the Assembly. What initiatives did the British Government take to achieve, as far as possible, a reaction – co-ordinated with other WEU governments – to the American invitation to participate in the research programme, as was decided in the Ministerial Council of WEU in Bonn on 23rd April?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Baroness YOUNG (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – Thank you very much for your question and your kind introduction to it. There are two ways in which the British Government could contribute to WEU's response to the invitation to participate in SDI: first, through the regular talks held between ministers and, second, through the working group. Those opportunities are open to other Western European governments.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I am most grateful to you, Lady Young, for the consideration you have again displayed in addressing our Assembly and replying to questions by members. Thank you also for explaining to us the lines along which Her Majesty's Government expects our work to proceed and in particular how it sees the political attitudes of the Council of Ministers.

As you are well aware, this dialogue, in which you always take part so willingly and with such

commitment towards the Assembly, is one of the mainstays of our activity. The co-ordination of our political choices constitutes the major element in the emergence of a European voice in the great debates of the moment. I am sure that the members of WEU will greatly benefit from what you have had to say. Perhaps you will allow me to add, for myself, that it has given me great pleasure to welcome you once more to this forum of WEU. Again, many thanks.

### 5. WEU and the strategic defence initiative (b) The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance

*(Resumed debate on the report  
of the General Affairs Committee,  
Doc. 1034 and amendments)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, Document 1034 and amendments.

In the resumed debate I call Mr. Cifarelli.

Mr. CIFARELLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, what we have heard from Baroness Young and which forms the subject of our questions makes the debate more interesting. Now when I was asked whether I intended to speak on Mr. Berrier's report and the European pillar, or on the strategic defence initiative, I said I preferred to speak on the pillar and leave aside the subject of the American President's strategic defence initiative. Why did I do that? Because of my distaste for arguments which are used to vent a certain irritation at the United States of America and to present us as being on the defensive in an alliance which has been and is still the guarantee of European security and the freedom of the West.

From this standpoint I must stress what Baroness Young said to us a moment or two ago. In my view the report by Mr. Berrier – who has been accused of being optimistic and not pessimistic enough – is extremely commendable because it organises and analyses the points about the problem under review and brings out clearly the obstacles to the realisation of common weaponry, common institutions and common defence. That is why I asked a moment ago whether, with regard to the resources that are proving hard to get and the agencies which we are told, after one year, are only now about to be set up, the problem was structural or political. I seem to understand that the ministers of the seven countries have set out on the road of a positive solution to the political problems. I can but be pleased even in my continual awareness of the strange division in

*Mr. Cifarelli (continued)*

the European assemblies that has us parliamentarians who hold sovereign power talking to the ministers as though they represented a different power beyond any possibility of change by us. However, Mr. President, I wanted to say that in substance what emerges from Mr. Berrier's report is that we have to look at the problem in concrete terms from the viewpoint of the defence of Europe and what that requires.

Someone like me, belonging to a country in which there is general support for European unification – everyone, from the right to the extreme left, agrees with it – knows that something strange is happening in such countries. Defence problems are no longer being talked about, as though a political union had already been established and could ignore security problems. Certain situations are no longer on the agenda whilst around us, especially in the Mediterranean, serious defence and security needs are emerging.

It is therefore important that, with the 1984 decision and its follow-up, we in WEU should be increasingly involved in meeting this historic requirement. We need to have faith, Mr. President, in the institutions. Sometimes a long-lived institution – and for this I have to pay tribute to the presidents and parliamentarians of past decades – may be able, at a particular moment, to provide a basis for tackling new problems. This is very important especially when we see the doubts and delays there are in transforming the present Community of twelve into a united Europe. If Europe is to be involved in tackling these fundamental needs, without which its political presence in the world is inconceivable, it is precisely the problems of defence and security that take first place. And it is precisely in relation to these problems that our new critical and control function – ours and that of the WEU agencies in London – takes on particular importance. We are all familiar with the proposals for harmonisation and great efficiency and output and therefore I shall not repeat myself. I just wanted to stress the importance of the message conveyed in the speech you made yesterday, Mr. President, which, as you have seen, had a considerable impact on the press, public opinion, parliaments and governments.

I would like to conclude by saying that what is of fundamental importance for me with regard to everything that has been and is being said about the strategic defence initiative is this: we are tired, deeply worried and full of anxiety at living in a world under the fear of reprisals and viewing peace as the daughter of terror and here we have one of the superpowers making an effort to get away from the balance of terror, from the peace of the nuclear age, and move to

another field, that of high-technology strategic defence. We Europeans obviously need to try to see more clearly and to prevent other dangers arising but we have to say yes to the SDI because defence and security is the direction we want to take, not that of perpetuating danger and destroying civilisation and the very earth we live on.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – This morning, I had the not very pleasurable task of severely criticising, without repentance, the report prepared by a Dutch socialist colleague here. I am sure that Mr. Berrier will be delighted to learn that my criticisms were not made on an ideological basis. I have nothing but praise for the report, which was warmly received by the General Affairs Committee. Perhaps I would make Mr. Berrier's position even more difficult if, having listened to the British minister, I say that Mr. Berrier and my minister must have prepared the report almost in collaboration. That is perhaps going a little far in Anglo-French co-operation. Nevertheless, there was a marked similarity between the aims that were expressed in the two documents.

I suggest that Mr. Berrier may have been a little ungenerous in the second part of draft recommendation (iv) which states: "but regretting the slowness with which these intentions are transformed into decisions". Although I share that view and voted for that measure I have become convinced this afternoon that a great deal more has been happening with respect to the Council and ministers, but they have yet to let us know about that. They are to blame.

I do not think that I could honestly go along with "regretting the slowness with which these intentions are transformed into decisions" when I listen to what is being done.

In choosing the title WEU and the strategic defence initiative – the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, Mr. Berrier has fulfilled the moral and pragmatic feelings of the Assembly without taking extremist views. I wish that others would follow his example.

The Rapporteur will have noticed that I pressed for the use of the word "positively" with respect to the examination of applications for membership from European member countries of the Atlantic Alliance. I am not satisfied that the word "positively" was included in the answer that I received. Having suggested one omission which Mr. Berrier might feel able to make in the earlier part of his recommendations, I suggest that he leave in the word "positively". I am still not satisfied that "positively" exactly describes the Council's attitude towards new members.

*Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)*

The report was meant to include a series of views expressed on the initiative of Mr. Spies von Büllenheim about WEU's internal future, the position of the Secretary-General and the Clerk of the Assembly, the responsibility of different expert secretariats for both the Assembly and the other organs of WEU, one single budget for all WEU organs and centralisation of all WEU organs in one place. I suggest that that task remains to be fulfilled. I hope that the General Affairs Committee will take that matter up in a further report.

I think that the Rapporteur would admit that he has been given an enormous task. I do not blame him for not having gone adequately into these matters. I hope that Order 63 will be given more detailed treatment in a future report.

With those reservations – they are few – I commend Mr. Berrier on the report. I hope that it will be adopted unanimously by the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Martino.

Mr. MARTINO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. President. You know that I did not want to speak in the Assembly on this subject, and I would not have done so, if what I heard this morning on the general subject of the strategic defence initiative had not induced me to ask for the floor on a topic already dealt with in the General Affairs Committee.

I refer to paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation to the Council which we are considering today. It recommends that the Council "have the appropriate agency conduct a continuing study of the strategic consequences of the development of new weapons, whatever the results of its efforts to co-ordinate the answers of member countries to the American proposal that they take part in the strategic defence initiative". Certainly this part of the otherwise commendable document has little significance, but time is passing and, as Mr. Strauss has recently been saying, the train is picking up speed while we have lost too much time. We need to act quickly and to establish, with due care but with the required realism and at the right level – the agency – what the technological spin-off might be from the strategic defence initiative for European countries' conventional defence and security. In this connection, we need to identify quickly possible common ground without forgetting the diversity of the legal systems in the various WEU countries.

We must, however, be very careful. Our political authorities, with their vacillation, indecision and instinctive improvisation, dressed for

the occasion in the sorry attire of offended national dignity, could well be paralysed when confronted with an industrial future that is beyond us and shows signs of vigorous and spontaneous effervescence in every country in our union from Italy to France, Germany and all the other nations. Let us not be overtaken by events. Let us remember that our independence, our autonomy and, ultimately, our freedom will be secured by our ability to adjust to the cultural and scientific levels of a world that is changing without waiting for us, that we must not idle in the byways of petty contention forsaking the main artery of the common European civilisation. Let us build this European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance with the necessary realism using the cement of common convictions and overcoming the thousand and one difficulties which existing economic bottlenecks continue to present.

The right to our opinions must give way only to the common duty of co-operation in a defence that will secure that active peace for which every sacrifice can and must be possible.

Once again, Mr. President, in this chamber too, I call upon men of good will, ministers and colleagues alike, to carry on the good work.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Baumel.

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, following a very lengthy debate, what I am about to say will strike a different note from what has gone before. It is my belief that we must accept three basic premisses, which, though questioned by some, obviously fit the facts.

The first of these is that SDI exists, will continue to do so in spite of the hopes cherished in some quarters and inevitably marks the start of a decisive break with the strategy we have grown accustomed to over the past thirty years. Indeed, this break is as important as the discovery of the atom bomb, which initiated the strategy which has served for the defence of Europe.

The second premiss is that SDI has, generally speaking, had a poor reception in Europe. It upsets old habits, especially in France, where, owing to the existence of national strategic nuclear weapons, there is a natural tendency to believe that what has provided protection for some time past will continue to do so indefinitely. It is the story of the knight in armour confronted by the invention of gunpowder.

Furthermore, there is in European behaviour a marked psychosomatic element. This applies to those people who are afraid when America is too weak, but are no less so when it is too strong. The result is that Europeans unfortu-



*Mr. Baumel (continued)*

nately spend their time being scared although everything points to the likelihood that the defence of Europe by Europeans would be perfectly feasible. It will pass the understanding of the historians of the year 2100 or 2200 when they find that 300 million Europeans clung to 300,000 GIs for their defence. As all the required elements are now present, Europe could, in its own fashion and as its resources permit, not simply shelter behind someone else but could provide for its own defence, always assuming of course – and that is the problem – that the Europeans actually want to defend themselves.

It must be recognised that SDI, disturbing though it is in that it upsets political and strategic dogmas, is in the final analysis an initiative favourable to the West. One dare not say so for a variety of reasons, often connected with cheap politics, but it is favourable because what strengthens our friends strengthens us. What is more, it is SDI that has brought the USSR back to the negotiating table and has led to the re-establishment of a measure of psychological equilibrium between East and West while we wait for the restoration of a strategic balance which is still far beyond the possibility of attainment.

The third point is that, faced with SDI, Europeans should behave like adults. They should not say, officially, that they want nothing to do with it while allowing the most powerful companies to try and gather a few crumbs by the back door. The reaction must be fully shared by all. This point has not been sufficiently stressed.

As the time available to me is limited, like the number of delegates in the hall following the address by the Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, I shall confine myself to essentials.

I believe that our response lacks sound reasoning and logic and is, ultimately, ineffective.

The American SDI should not worry us, even if, as British or French, we have our own nuclear forces. Come what may, the American SDI will not reduce the effectiveness of our nuclear forces. To claim otherwise is faulty reasoning. It is the Soviet SDI, which might be created in response to the American SDI, which represents a danger to the efficacy and cost effectiveness of our nuclear forces.

Faced with the American SDI, we must not respond by engaging in petty exchanges, but by evolving a global concept. I note that voices are now being heard in various quarters calling for the creation of a European SDI, and some are demanding that this step be taken because of the inadequacy of Eureka as Europe's response

or justification in this area. I shall not dwell on this problem. Eureka is not a reply to SDI, and is wrongly seen as such. It is a project born of other considerations.

I would add that France, having adopted a sulky attitude unworthy of the part it ought to play in European defence and having expressed more and more reservations about this project, will, in 1986, if everything proceeds according to plan – and I say this here officially, weighing my words – adopt a completely different attitude, as the political forces which will then take power will not in any way share the socialist government's attitude in this matter.

Let there be no mistake: on this particular point there is no consensus. We are in favour of renegotiating the problems of SDI either as a state or, if possible, as a union of European states, so that we do not become mere subcontractors. This would inevitably happen if the matter were left to private or nationalised companies, irrespective of the declared attitudes of the French Government. We must be joint contractors, that is to say partners, who, if not actually on an equal footing, are nonetheless capable of playing a useful part especially in European defence.

What European defence? Whichever is the most efficient, and hence a European defence requiring a major reform of WEU.

Mr. President, the reactivation some of us would like should go far beyond what is now envisaged. Certainly, the three agencies are a "welcome" initiative, but its effect is comparable to the effect on any army of doubling the number of infantrymen's boots! We have to go far beyond committees and agencies. Where? To the structured organisation of a permanent European defence with a joint general staff embodying a Franco-German military alliance, to be extended to the United Kingdom, if it wishes, and with the participation of other European countries, if they desire. But we cannot wait on the inclinations of people who prefer the soft option, and who want to be defended by others without really exerting themselves in the cause of European defence in a way which will enable us, in line with the hopes often expressed by yourself, Mr. President, and which I support, to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.

Of course, all these projects and initiatives must work to strengthen the Atlantic Alliance and must not on any account be seen as undermining the alliance by competition.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

I call Mr. Berrier, Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee.

Mr. BERRIER (*France*) (Translation). – I wish first to thank the speakers for their pertinent comments on this report. I have to tell Mr. Baumel that I shall not reply to him, as his remarks relate to the debate on SDI proper, which was the subject of the previous report.

Optimism and pessimism have been mentioned. Since the report was written, numerous events may have inclined some to take a pessimistic view, but many events on the other hand engender optimism, not least the noteworthy remarks made by the Secretary-General yesterday and the address by the Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom. There, certainly, we have cause for satisfaction.

Western European Union is at present the only political forum where European security problems can be discussed. It is not from one day to the next that the Europe of the Twelve will create its security dimension alongside the economic communities and political co-operation.

Mr. Spies von Bülesheim has attacked me fairly violently for my reply to Order 63. I did no more than outline the facts, and confined myself to the legal possibilities, as I was required to do. I consider that the Assembly and the organs which serve it should retain their complete independence. The independence of the Office of the Clerk guarantees that of the Assembly. We are at present in dispute over the budget. Imagine the situation if the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly depended on the Council!

In conclusion, and with ill will to no one, I should say that, if we all adhere to our allotted tasks, all is sure to be well.

**(c) Guidelines drawn from the colloquy  
on the space challenge for Europe  
(Proposals)**

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Doc. 1036 and amendments)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on guidelines drawn from the colloquy on the space challenge for Europe (proposals), Document 1036 and amendments.

I call Mr. Lenzer, Chairman and Rapporteur of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

Mr. LENZER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, as it is getting very late, I shall be quite

brief, having already had the opportunity to present the report to the Assembly this morning.

I will just remind you that this report is based on the findings of a colloquy held by our committee in Munich from 18th to 20th September 1985. At this colloquy we discussed the future prospects of European space research and technology, and a host of points emerged from the accumulated knowledge of the scientific and industrial experts present, external as well as internal. In short, we politicians learnt a great deal, and it is now up to us to draw the appropriate conclusions and convert what we heard there into policy.

To broach a topical subject that concerns us today, the American President's strategic defence initiative, which has played a major rôle in our debate here and in our member states generally in the last few months, was, of course, the dominant topic in Munich. You yourself, Mr. President, were able to attend, and you also took the trouble to address the participants at the opening and closing ceremonies. I believe we would agree that we received a great deal of stimulus for our work at this colloquy.

And so to SDI. My report, submitted on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, which I introduced here this morning, represents our specific contribution on the subject of the strategic defence initiative. First, we believe it must be appraised in terms of military strategic defence.

Second, for many different reasons the strategic defence initiative is obviously bound to have an impact on technology policy. When we hear that about \$26 thousand million is to be spent on the research phase of this project in America by 1990, we realise that this sum alone will ensure that the project has a very extensive technological spin-off in various sectors of science and industry.

Third, we are firmly convinced that the research phase of the strategic defence initiative is wholly compatible with the ABM treaty.

Fourth, we are convinced, and want to make this quite clear – which is why, if I may say so even now, I fail to understand all this excited debate – that this research phase will not in any way be automatically followed by the deployment of the system. After all, it is still completely unclear whether the system being devised is technically feasible, whether it will prove politically acceptable and whether it can be financed. These are questions we can consider now, at a very early stage. And Western European Union is the most appropriate European forum for the detailed examination of these things.

I should like, Mr. President, to comment briefly on another point, because it constantly

*Mr. Lenzer (continued)*

gives rise to misunderstandings in the debate. I want to revert to Eureka once again. A number of speakers today have again given the impression that Eureka and SDI could be regarded as alternatives, that they represent an either/or. This is most definitely not the case. While SDI is a military response to a military threat and thus a typical contribution to defence in a given military situation, Eureka has absolutely nothing to do with such things. Eureka is the combination of scientific and research forces in Europe in certain selected areas of high technology, designed to offset European disadvantages when competing with Japan and the United States, to put Europe on an equal footing in research and science and to install the appropriate industrial structures to enable it to hold its own in international competition.

It is no accident that responsibility for this has not been given to the Commission of the European Communities. The different structures of the various Community countries – with, if I may say this by the way, a combination of technically highly advanced countries and countries with a lot of ground to make up in the technical sphere – mean that Eureka will be implemented on the principle of variable geometry: those best able to contribute in view of their potential will take part in any given project. I wanted to mention that once again, just to show that these two, Eureka and SDI, cannot simply be lumped together.

So what has this colloquy taught us? First, that space is becoming increasingly important. The spectacular operations that are there for everyone to see have contributed to this: the D-1 mission, all the space shuttle missions like the recent one, Atlantis, which included the spectacular building of a tower in space, a major requirement for the future construction of a manned space station.

Second, the colloquy has also taught us – and this is always important in the assessment of a technical problem – that man must remain the master of technology, that technology is not in itself good or evil and must not be condemned out of hand, since it is for man to make responsible use of technology. Every technical problem must be considered against this background.

Third – and this is the real message of the colloquy – it is now high time for us to combine the wealth of proposals and discussion in a joint European strategy for the European conquest of space, if I may put it in such high-flown terms. What I am saying is that we Europeans can only solve the problems if, in the discussions on Ariane, Columbus, Hermes, Hotol or the various reconnaissance satellites, we consider our joint

response at the level of international competition in this key technology, which will influence our lives in the next few decades.

Thank you, Mr. President, for allowing me to give this brief summary.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I repeat my own thanks and, I believe, the unanimous thanks of the Assembly for the work performed by your committee, and especially for the effort which went into the preparation, organisation and, I sincerely hope, as you do, the exploitation of the results of the colloquy on the space challenge. It is one of the most noteworthy achievements of the WEU Assembly, and has established a future working foundation which will, we are sure, long provide a basis for endeavours which must, as you yourself have pointed out, extend far into the future.

I call Sir John Osborn.

Sir John OSBORN (*United Kingdom*). – The technical aspects of our discussion are thrilling and exciting. The schoolboys of Europe know more about the subject than either I or Mr. Lenzer. I hope that he will not regard that as an insult. I congratulate him on his leadership of the committee in a period of rapidly-changing technology which tends to overtake me, if not the committee's Chairman.

My speech this morning and my question to Baroness Young touched on the fact that missiles used in the European theatre – to balance the SS-20 and its more advanced derivative – are manufactured in the United States. I should like to see employment opportunities for those missiles come to Europe before the turn of the century.

Launchers are an important part of space policy. SDI, in contrast, is related to an anti-ballistic missile conceptual policy.

While I wish for a central outcome of the Reagan-Gorbachev talks and the later disarmament talks in Geneva, I wish to see the day, in terms of armaments, when European countries finance and provide their own defence on a greater scale and when they depend less and less on the United States of America, the American economy and the American taxpayer.

The theme of the second part of my contribution to the debate is the Munich colloquy, the space challenge for Europe and Mr. Lenzer's report. The value of the colloquy was that, besides members of parliament, those present included representatives from the space, aerospace and electronic industries in Europe – those who make the hardware for the policies and specifications of the strategists. I suggest that they include military and defence commanders as well as governments.

*Sir John Osborn (continued)*

I want to discuss space policy as it affects Europe, and to a certain extent Eureka, and the impact of certain aspects of space policy on Eureka. I agree with Mr. Lenzer that Eureka is no replacement for the technological fallout that will come from an SDI active participation.

Several ministers spoke at the conference. I appreciated in particular the contribution by Mr. Pattie, the United Kingdom Minister of State for Industry and Information Technology. He spoke about satellites for communications, the first of which was put up less than twenty years ago in 1966, due to an Englishman, Mr. Arthur C. Clarke, who identified the usefulness of geostationary orbit. That was an ingenious and novel concept then, and the key to many forms of communication, including direct broadcasting by satellite.

Mr. Pattie said that Europe was one of the "mightiest industrial and political groupings in the world". He outlined the importance of Europe acting together in high technology and the need for flexibility. He talked about the extent to which Europe's member countries had specialised - France in launchers, Germany in manned space, and Britain in satellites. Mr. Pattie also spoke about the European Space Agency, Arianespace, Inmarsat and Eutelsat, and gave the historical background. I should like to touch on some of the issues that he raised.

The articles of the treaty setting up the European Space Agency confine it to peaceful uses of space, which could well extend to surveillance and monitoring of what is going on in space. The Chairman of the Science and Technology Committee of the Council of Europe, Mr. Pettersson, hoped that ESA would obtain an agreement from the United Nations to establish a monitoring agency covering all satellites, peaceful and otherwise, including debris in space. In the defensive rôle in space, especially SDI - which I described as defensive rather than offensive - I see a limited rôle for ESA. Europe does not have an agency for covering a military rôle in space and ESA and even Arianespace are hardly the vehicles for co-ordinating an agency that will make the next generation of missiles to combat SS-20s and their advanced derivatives.

Mr. Pattie spoke about what has happened in Britain and the establishment of a British national space centre. He said:

"Rather it emphasises the government's commitment to the development of space technology for industrial, scientific and defence purposes. ESA will remain the cornerstone of our civil space activities."

The Director-General of the space centre, Mr. Roy Gibson, is a former Director-General of ESA and Rapporteur for technical questions, who wound up the debate at the Munich colloquy.

I should like to consider the draft recommendation to define a co-operative framework in which the defence aspects of European space activity can be discussed and determined. I have probably run out of time but have much more to say. I should like to continue for a minute. Please stop me, Mr. President, if I have spoken too long.

Space is the great unknown and I refer the Assembly to the paragraphs in Mr. Lenzer's report concerning the space station. What has happened in the shuttle this weekend shows that construction in space is practical and feasible. We have all seen on the television the construction of a tower in the shuttle that has been orbiting since last weekend.

Mr. Lenzer referred to the deliberations of the Council of Ministers on 31st January. The Columbus space station is a reality. People in the European space industry must be affected by the enthusiasm and optimism now to be found in the aerospace, space and aircraft industries in the United States of America. The Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions of WEU experienced that enthusiasm when it visited the Pentagon and relevant American industries last summer. There is huge investment in the unknown. In the United States, there has been confidence in the unknown following the success of the Apollo mission and it has continued with the shuttle. I was with the Science and Technology Committee, as it was then called, in 1975 when we spoke about the shuttle. It was but an ideal. I went again in 1979 and it had materialised. I am sure that the momentum will continue and that the Columbus programme will go through.

I support Mr. Lenzer and believe that, on the basis of Apollo and the shuttle, confidence will see us through the century. The challenges raised in the colloquy and examined in Mr. Lenzer's report must be taken up on a European scale and, for that matter, by the aerospace industry in my country. I hope that the Assembly welcomes the challenge and will ensure that member governments of WEU will try to achieve closer co-operation with the government, agencies and industries of the United States. Mr. Lenzer has worked hard in the colloquy and in the report to draw the attention of the parliaments and people of Europe to this issue. There is a chance that it will help provide employment. I hope that the Assembly will grasp the opportunity for Western Europe.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Verdon.

Mr. VERDON (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, at the end of the report which he presented to our Assembly, Mr. Lenzer states that the research and development work carried out within the framework of SDI could lead on to developments of major importance for our economic and industrial prosperity, with extensive civilian applications. This is a decidedly optimistic viewpoint and one which is very properly toned down by what Mr. Curien, the French Minister of Research and Technology, said at the Munich colloquy. He said “as SDI is primarily a military project, participation in SDI will not give Europe the necessary degree of independence in military and space matters because European research and development will be totally subordinated to the Pentagon, which will retain complete overall control”.

Having been relegated to the position of sub-contractors, how could the Europeans expect to gather anything more than a few economic crumbs from the cake which has been depicted?

In actual fact, the United States is throwing down a basic challenge to the older continent, and SDI is just a part of this. Can we keep up in today's technological race, be it civilian or military? It was to ensure that we should, together, still have a chance that France suggested to its partners that the Eureka project be used to co-ordinate and rationalise efforts hitherto dissipated over a number of sectors vital to the future.

Having been set up independently of the American project, this project necessarily covers some of the areas of research covered by SDI. Is it not the case that Eureka is a civilian programme capable of producing military spin-offs just as SDI, as I said before, is a military programme with potential civilian spin-offs?

As far as the American offer of participation in SDI is concerned, Europe should start by reviewing its own capabilities and mobilising its own facilities before giving what should be a co-ordinated reply.

In view of the fact that the United States seems more anxious to obtain European political support than genuinely to share with Europe the benefits of its research, France considers that caution is called for if we do not wish to prejudice the effort incumbent on us all.

This joint European effort has already borne fruit, in space especially, with the implementation of the Ariane programme.

Mr. François Mitterrand, the President of the French Republic, stressed some time ago in The Hague that Europe should provide itself with

independent means of seeing, listening and communicating in space.

Last January, the Council of the European Space Agency gave expression to the desire of European countries to go still further by drawing up a “coherent and balanced” European plan for space. This urge for independence should in due course lead to Europe's possessing an orbital station of its own. Similarly, the desired coherent plan should encompass, as well as a very extensive scientific and technological programme, the development of Ariane 5 and Columbus as well as the fulfilment of the Hermes project, on which France has embarked in co-operation with a number of European countries.

I now return to the Eureka project, whose applications will further enrich the European space venture without being limited to that area of endeavour.

Since the Hanover meeting, the situation is clear. Eureka can no longer be looked on seriously as nothing more than a European political response to SDI. The project has now become reality, and funds have been committed to it. In Hanover, six important specific projects were adopted, of which I may mention power computers, raw materials for electronic components, lasers, textile robots and filter membranes. The conditions governing approval of the projects for Community financial support have been established. A small secretariat has been set up, which is open to all the countries taking part. The purpose is to plan the project without the risk of interfering bureaucratic control. Room must be left for freedom of action on the part of companies within the framework of Eureka, which is designed to promote co-operation between them.

Finally, the question is not whether technological co-operation between Europeans will open up military or civilian applications, but whether, as Jacques Delors said in Luxembourg, Europe is going to take the necessary steps to avail itself of the large internal market vital to the financing of Eureka, which is itself a precondition of European renaissance.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Hill.

Mr. HILL (*United Kingdom*). – I had the honour of attending the colloquy in Munich. We are all grateful to Mr. Lenzer, the Chairman of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, for being a driving force. He arranged to get not only speakers of great note but an assembly of people who knew their subject. It would be remiss of me not to mention Professor Felden, who set the conference alight during the third sitting. He is a professor from Nancy University and Paris

*Mr. Hill (continued)*

University. He gave what I can only term as an imaginative, provocative and forward-looking review of how he sees the future for Europe in space. One of his remarks is worth quoting. He said :

"...whatever happens space will play an increasing rôle in the economic and political future of the entire planet. It will start becoming preponderant with the installation of permanently-manned platforms, i.e. in the last decade of this century."

All the members of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions appreciate the importance of the space platform and of the experimentation that will take place. We recognise the need for universities and industries in Europe to become part of the vanguard of the research and development of these new technologies. The colloquy pointed to the way in which Europe will move.

The United Kingdom has just established a national space centre at Farnborough, which has a history of research and development in aviation. In fact, the defects in the Comet aircraft were discovered at Farnborough. That discovery has made flying much safer at mach 1 and mach 2. The British are certainly putting their house in order. They want not only British industry but European industry to play a major rôle in the new national space centre.

We are firmly committed to the European Space Agency. The United Kingdom Minister of State for Industry and Information Technology, Mr. Geoffrey Pattie, made the commitment at the colloquy that ESA would remain the "cornerstone" of the United Kingdom's space activities and referred to Britain's rôle in ESA's future activities. There is a commitment and a gathering together of minds on this matter. The colloquy was able to produce people with great depth of vision who could focus the minds of every person, including politicians, on the future.

I was interested to see in Mr. Lenzer's document that, in 1986, the first British astronaut will be flying into space. We should consider also the launching of the Hubble space telescope. We have all watched the success of the space laboratory. We know that that is where our future lies. Experimentation in outer space has been occurring almost weekly, and Europeans would be foolish if they did not co-operate fully.

As Mr. Lenzer said in his paper, Eureka and any other European project must be kept in the vanguard of the institutions of Europe. The United Kingdom wants a balanced space programme. We are involved in ESA and in the

development of launchers and manned space vehicles. We are conducting space research and strategic defence initiative research in a large way. I am pleased that the United Kingdom has just arranged a \$1.5 billion research contract in the SDI programme.

With those few words and in view of the shortage of time, I should like to wish Mr. Lenzer every success with this document. I should be the first to vote for it and to congratulate him once again on the colloquy.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the reports of Mr. Berrier and Mr. Lenzer have restored a little calm and balance, which were lacking after the presentation of Mr. van den Bergh's report. We can now discuss these important issues in full awareness of their implications for the future of European and world society and for the future of the economy of our countries.

The Munich colloquy with regard to which I support the congratulations and praise expressed by our Chairman, Mr. Lenzer, made some truly important contributions to this very wide subject. The participation of large numbers of scientists, politicians and business representatives is evidence of the great value attached to the meeting and I believe that the representatives of the economy and industry were unanimous in their purpose and resolve, with regard to the fact that the future of mankind will largely be played out in space. Provided we succeed in being present in space and involved in all space initiatives we shall be able to meet all our countries' increasingly urgent requirements in terms of the creation of employment and policies that leave no stone unturned in satisfying man's primary need, the right to work.

But there is no hiding the fact that some discordant voices were heard at the colloquy and that the great hope which should lie on the active collaboration of all European countries in space initiatives was to some extent dashed by certain attitudes. My reference is to the French politicians who, perhaps because of some kind of superiority complex, believe that any initiative leading to wider co-operation in which France does not have a leading rôle is no good or downright fatal for Europe. Yet everyone agrees on the need for collaboration with other countries outside Europe and with the United States, where the efforts of the European countries are not enough on their own.

That is Italy's opinion. I was saddened this morning that Mr. van den Bergh completely forgot the existence of Italy and a specifically Italian policy. Let me now say that Italy is very

*Mr. Cavaliere (continued)*

much present in these programmes, that it has a very clear outlook and its own policy and that it has its part in the majority of the most important space programmes for the exploitation of space for political and even military purposes. For it is pointless to nurse any illusions: space is already and will increasingly be used for military purposes too and in particular for defence purposes.

Italy, with no ambition to be in the forefront but certainly not wishing to lag behind other countries, recently decided to set up an Italian space agency for the sole purpose of implementing the country's space programme and co-operating with all the other bilateral or multilateral bodies including the European institutions - the European Space Agency and the Hermes programme - so that it can contribute to the execution of major projects designed to guarantee the development of the European and world economies and to ensure that Europe will not come second in programmes affecting its defence.

As has already been pointed out, the SDI programme does not conflict with the Eureka programme. Whoever says otherwise either does not know the SDI or, worse, speaks in bad faith.

I would like to conclude by hoping that the sense of responsibility will finally overcome hesitation and bad faith. In other words, I hope that the seven WEU countries will recognise the importance of this problem and of the SDI and will, therefore, take the joint decision to participate in all research and all efforts aimed at developing the economy and fashioning a shield to defend the security of our peoples.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). - I should like first to thank our German hosts, who made possible this excellent colloquy in Munich. I also thank our friend and colleague, Christian Lenzer, and the Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm company, which was instrumental in making the colloquy the success it was.

I should like to draw attention to paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, in which the Rapporteur recommends that the Council urge member governments:

"To consider the adoption of a coherent space programme, composed of two main elements: participation in the American space station and further development of the European launcher system - Ariane 5 with the HM-60 engine - leading to an independent European manned transportation system".

The European space programme has made exceptional progress with the relatively small resources devoted to it. We have acquired a formidable competitive position in telecommunications. We have had an excellent scientific programme. In remote sensing, we are making great strides forward, with the imminent launch of the French Spot satellite and the ESA ERS-1 satellite. Only one element has hitherto been clearly lacking - an independent European manned transportation system.

Spacelab has been important and has made a contribution to the overall shuttle programme. From Spacelab, we are, within ESA, to develop Columbus, which will be an important European module within the overall NASA space station. However, what Europe has singularly lacked to achieve in autonomous capability is a manned space transportation system of its own.

In that regard, I wholeheartedly applaud the strategic vision of the French Government, who have been determined to ensure the culmination of the Ariane programme in the development of Ariane 5, which will be man-rated. As we saw in the development of Ariane 3, there is merit in making the Ariane launcher even more reliable. Making the system man-rated will undoubtedly have that effect.

If we are ultimately to develop our own European space station, which was the vision of President Mitterrand in his famous speech in The Hague, we must have an autonomous European manned transport system to service it. It would not be logical for us to fall short of the ultimate development of Ariane 5 as a man-rated booster. I applaud that development and wholeheartedly back the development of Hermes, which will be the logical conclusion of an evolutionary process that has lasted for a generation.

I much regret that the British Government withdrew from the Blue Streak programme. The failure of that rocket to come to fruition under the auspices of ELDO was a major setback which we surmounted with Ariane. However, it left the United Kingdom without the crucial capability to launch payloads of its own. In the distant future, we see Hotol as a revolutionary and exciting concept - a vehicle which is air-breathing within the atmosphere and, ex-atmospheric, will be a rocket-powered vehicle like a more conventional space transportation system.

We have the possibility of two generations of European manned transportation development - first with Hermes and subsequently with Hotol. Hermes will never be as effective as the shuttle, because it is a space plane rather than a booster that can be recovered on earth after use. Therefore, I doubt whether it will ever be

*Mr. Wilkinson (continued)*

as cost-effective as the shuttle, but it is a step in the right direction. I hope that Hotol will succeed it. That is the sort of revolutionary concept that will dramatically change man's utilisation of space. Not until Europe has an autonomous manned space capability of its own shall we be able fully to mobilise the idealism and commitment of our electorates for a European space programme.

That is why I wholeheartedly applaud the report that followed the excellent colloquy in Munich. The report demonstrates simply and practically how WEU can have a pathfinding rôle. I am delighted that the Rapporteur put as number one in his list of priorities the recommendation that the Council should urge member governments to participate in the American space station, which will be a technical building block towards the objective of an autonomous European space station and the development of a European launcher system, first Ariane 5 with the HM-60 cryogenic engine, and, I would add, subsequently with Hotol in the next century.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Wilkinson, I will use the occasion of your intervention to express the Assembly's gratitude for your efforts in collaboration with Mr. Lenzer. Thank you for all the work which has been done, and especially for the colloquy, on which we have every reason to congratulate ourselves.

Thank you once more, Mr. Wilkinson, for your efforts.

I call Mr. Palumbo.

Mr. PALUMBO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I agree with Mr. Cavaliere when he says that Mr. Lenzer's report, together with Mr. Berrier's, has brought us back closer to reality as compared with Mr. van den Bergh's which left me somewhat concerned. If I had been able to deal with the subject of the last of these reports I would have broadened my comments to other areas but wishing to confine myself specifically to the use of space for military purposes, discounting the propagandist distortion of the talk about star wars and focusing on the American strategic defence initiative and all the technologies connected with it, I feel we should recognise that space is already being used for military purposes. Perhaps it has not been formulated in the terms used by President Reagan in March 1983 but we must realise that today this is the reality in which we find ourselves. It certainly has negative and dangerous implications but, from the standpoint of technological innovation, it could also have important positive spin-off for the whole of Europe.

So the problem is not that space might possibly be used for defence purposes but whether we want to move, once and for all, from the balance of terror to that of security. Space can be used for that purpose. If space can render this service to mankind it will be an efficient way of doing so. Europe has before it today an historic opportunity, namely that of meeting the challenge of the advanced technologies and of the United States, Japan, and even the emerging countries of the Far East which will probably be in a position to compete with Europe and perhaps even with the United States and Japan within the next ten years. We can seize this historic opportunity or we can waste it. We will seize it if we accept the challenge that comes to us from the United States and if we agree to co-ordinate our efforts with theirs: but we will waste it if we fail to give a common answer. I hope that we are all prepared to give that answer and that it will be in the affirmative.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

Do you wish to reply to the speakers, Mr. Lenzer?

Mr. LENZER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I will be very brief. So many encouraging and friendly words have been addressed to me that I simply must express my gratitude very briefly once again. I accept them on behalf of the whole committee. I know that a task of this kind can only be performed satisfactorily if – as this committee has for years – we work together as colleagues and, I would even say, friends. We are not just colleagues. As Chairman of this committee I can say with pride that we have become friends over the years. No wonder we enjoy our work and will continue our efforts to produce good, professional results in the future.

I have no more to say on the subject in hand. But I should like to thank the committee's secretary, Mr. Huigens, for his active assistance. Last but not least, Mr. President, I wish to thank you, on behalf of the committee, for the considerable interest and good will you have always shown in our work. It is my sincere hope that this will continue in the future.

#### **6. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning at 9.30 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial



*The President (continued)*

- year 1986 (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and votes on the draft texts, Documents 1030, 1046 and 1048).
2. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1984 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the motion to approve the final accounts, Document 1029 and addendum).
  3. Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial years 1984 and 1985 (Presentation of and debate on

the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1031).

4. Developments in China and European security (Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1035 and amendments).
5. Address by Mr. Dumas, Minister for External Relations of France.

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

*The sitting was closed at 6.25 p.m.*

## TENTH SITTING

Wednesday, 4th December 1985

### SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the minutes.
2. Attendance register.
3. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1986 (*Presentation of the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and votes on the draft texts*, Docs. 1030, 1046 and 1048).  
*Speakers:* The President, Sir Dudley Smith (*Chairman and Rapporteur*).
4. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1984 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts (*Presentation of the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the motion to approve the final accounts*, Doc. 1029 and addendum).  
*Speakers:* The President, Sir Dudley Smith (*Chairman and Rapporteur*).
5. Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial years 1984 and 1985 (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 1031).  
*Speakers:* The President, Mr. van Tets (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Sinesio, Mr. Morris, Sir Paul Hawkins, Mr. van Tets (*Rapporteur*).
6. Developments in China and European security (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 1035 and amendments).  
*Speakers:* The President, Mr. Michel (*Chairman and Rapporteur*), Sir Dudley Smith, Mr. Hill, Mr. Antoni, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Tummers, Mr. Cifarelli, Mr. Michel (*Chairman and Rapporteur*), Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Michel, Mr. Tummers.
7. Change in the orders of the day.  
*Speakers:* The President, Mr. Schulte.
8. Revision and interpretation of the Charter and of the Rules of Procedure (*Presentation of the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges*, Doc. 1039 and amendments).  
*Speakers:* The President, Mr. Unland (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Spies von Büllenheim (*Rapporteur*); (points of order): Mr. Schulte, Mr. Spies von Büllenheim, Lord Hughes, Mr. Schulte.
9. Address by Mr. Dumas, Minister for External Relations of France.  
*Replies by Mr. Dumas to questions put by:* Mr. Gansel, Mr. Kittelmann, Mr. Cifarelli.
10. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

*The sitting was opened at 9.35 a.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

### **1. Adoption of the minutes**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

*The minutes are agreed to.*

### **2. Attendance register**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

1. See page 27.

### **3. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1986**

*(Presentation of the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and votes on the draft texts, Docs. 1030, 1046 and 1048)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration on the draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1986 and votes on the draft texts, Documents 1030, 1046 and 1048.

Sir Dudley Smith has tabled a previous question on this draft budget on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, Document 1046.

Rule 32(1) of the Rules of Procedure requires that the previous question be put to the vote immediately after the presentation of the relevant committee report.

I propose to the Assembly that Sir Dudley Smith be given the floor in his dual capacity of

*The President (continued)*

Rapporteur and proposer of the previous question and we shall then vote on the previous question.

Sir Dudley Smith has also tabled a motion for an order on the draft budget, Document 1048.

Sir Dudley, do you want to speak to both your previous question and your motion for an order at the same time?

You have the floor.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – As Assembly members who were present on Monday will know, I should this morning have been presenting the budget of the Assembly, as originally predicated in the Assembly's financial arrangements. As we have not received a reply from the Council of the Assembly approving our budget or making recommendations, we convened an extraordinary meeting of the committee, which decided unanimously to take the 1986 budget off the agenda.

As a result of my comments then, and what you said, Mr. President, in your speech at the opening of the Assembly and at your press conference, which has attracted a certain amount of publicity, the real anxiety of Assembly members has been expressed. The Budget Committee agreed that not only should it be taken off the agenda but that I should move a motion this morning and recommend that it be carried.

I shall recall the overall circumstances for those members who may not be cognisant of what has happened. For the 1986 financial year the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and the Presidential Committee, as the governing body, drew up a draft budget. In the usual way, it was sent to the Council on 30th September this year. The draft budget was examined by the WEU Budget Committee, which is a consultative body of the Council, in London on 24th and 25th October. However, as members of that committee, with the exception of the Italian delegate, considered that the Assembly's budget estimates considerably exceeded zero growth, the Council decided – although it had not communicated that to us – to ask the Assembly to revise those estimates to bring them down to a rate of growth not exceeding 5.9%, which is the growth rate granted to all the ministerial organs, the Secretariat-General and the three Paris agencies.

It should be noted that, by allowing the same growth rate of 5.9% for the Assembly's budget as had been adopted for the ministerial organs as a whole, the London Budget Committee automatically excluded the Assembly from the possibility of benefiting in turn from the savings that

could be made, thanks to the reorganisation of the Paris ministerial organs. We believe that those savings were transferred wholly to the Secretariat-General which consequently, and subject to the Council's decisions, will have its 1986 budget increased by 27.5% compared with 1985. That increase would be in two slices by inserting between the 1985 and 1986 budgets a revised 1985 budget which alone represented a growth rate of 11.74% compared with the initial 1985 budget.

I know that some of those on the official side say, even if they do not dispute those figures, that the figures should not be construed in that way, but that is the advice that I have received. As I explained on Monday, so far no official decision has been communicated to the Assembly. This leads me to point out that, in view of what one can only describe as the extremely negative position adopted by almost all government representatives towards the Assembly's budget, it does not seem possible for the Assembly to consider the budget in the light of its full facts. That is why I moved that it should be taken off the agenda, and it was. Pending the communication of the Budget Committee's opinion on the draft budget for 1986, the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration asked that the matter be withdrawn. I hope that the budget will be presented in the next session, and that that will still be in order, Mr. President.

Since Monday, I detect a change for the better. I believe that, as a result of informal talks which you, Mr. President, and others have been having with officials and government representatives, there is a recognition of the concern of members of the Assembly on behalf of the various parliaments that they represent. Yesterday, I saw a further chink of light in the excellent speech by Baroness Young, the British Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, when she dealt specifically with that point. She referred to the Rome declaration, and strongly stressed the need to remain lean and efficient but, on the other hand, hoped to see the establishment of a mechanism that might go some way towards ending our grievances.

This is all to the good. One should approach this matter not antagonistically but in a conciliatory manner. Undoubtedly, there have been misunderstandings on both sides. For example, I gather from talking to representatives that the Council believes that we could reactivate ourselves by reforming some of our procedures – for instance, administration – and perhaps become fitter and better.

I believe that the Council was shocked by the size of the budget that we submitted this time and that it regarded it as unrealistic. Perhaps in

*Sir Dudley Smith (continued)*

some ways it was, but, after years of starvation, we felt that we were entitled to a larger bite. Although there was not really any expectation that there would be horse trading as a result of that budget, I think that the submission reflected the frustration and the concern of members of the Assembly about not having had sufficient funds in recent years to do the Assembly's work. Undoubtedly, the feeling is that we have been treated scurvily by our various representative governments. We have been regarded very much as the poor relation of the ministerial organs. Frankly, that is not good enough. We do not pretend to be the most important element of Western European Union, but we are the only part that is democratically representative, for we are elected. Every person who sits in the Assembly has been elected by his country's electors. He comes here as a representative of his parliament, and that is so for all seven nations of WEU.

For too long we have felt that we have been treated with a certain insensitivity. I believe that there is now a better recognition of our complaints and anxieties. I hope that the impasse in these negotiations will end and that we can reach an acceptable compromise.

It is one thing to settle the matter for one year and quite another to look to the long term as we strive to reactivate this organisation and to play our part as its constituent body. I believe that in accepting the motion we can go some way towards bringing about a new understanding and spirit of co-operation between the official side, the ministerial side and ourselves as parliamentary representatives. In those circumstances, I think that we can take some comfort from the fact that preliminary soundings do not seem too antagonistic to my idea. In those circumstances, members will have a better idea of exactly what we are trying to achieve.

I should like to put the motion before the Assembly on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration. It reads:

The Assembly,

- (i) Having decided not to vote on its draft budget at the present session;
- (ii) Noting that:
  - (a) most of the Council's budget experts were in favour of strict application of the principle of zero growth to the budget of the Assembly;
  - (b) they did not take account of the fact that the reactivation of WEU has further aggravated the difficulties which the Assembly has already encountered in fulfilling its tasks,

whereas they have demonstrated their intention to take into consideration the effects of reactivation on the Secretariat-General in London;

- (c) the Council has not adopted a position on the draft budget of the Assembly;
- (d) this draft budget provides for different options depending on the opinion of the Council and specific priorities,

#### INSTRUCTS THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMITTEE

1. To negotiate with the Council for the Assembly to be granted adequate financial means to allow it to play its rôle in a reactivated WEU;
2. In application of Rule 14, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Procedure, to take the necessary measures to finalise the Assembly's draft budget in acceptable conditions.

If we pass that motion we shall have taken a useful step forward. This is something that should have happened a long time ago.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – On behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and in accordance with Rule 32 of the Rules of Procedure, Sir Dudley Smith has tabled a previous question, Document 1046.

Sir Dudley Smith has also tabled, in accordance with Rule 30, a motion for an order, Document 1048, which he has read out.

I would remind you that under Rule 32(3) of the Rules of Procedure only the proposer of the previous question, one speaker against the motion and the Rapporteur or Chairman of the committee concerned may speak.

In addition, under Rule 31(7), the time available to each speaker is limited to five minutes.

The two questions will be taken together.

Does anyone wish to speak against Sir Dudley Smith's proposal?...

In accordance with the Rules of Procedure I therefore ask the Assembly to vote by sitting and standing unless it agrees to vote by show of hands.

Are there any objections?...

That is agreed.

I therefore put Sir Dudley Smith's previous question to the vote by show of hands.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*The previous question is agreed to unanimously.*

*The President (continued)*

I also put Sir Dudley Smith's motion for an order to the vote by show of hands.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*The motion for an order is agreed to unanimously<sup>1</sup>.*

**4. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1984 - the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts**

*(Presentation of the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the motion to approve the final accounts, Doc. 1029 and addendum)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next order of the day is the presentation of the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration on the accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1984 - the auditor's report and vote on the motion to approve the final accounts, Document 1029 and addendum.

I call Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman and Rapporteur of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). - I beg to move that the accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1984 be approved.

This is largely a formal matter. The auditors have been through the accounts and have given them a clean bill of health. They have been fully approved. I do not think any special points arise.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Sir Dudley Smith on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration has tabled a motion to approve the final accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1984 contained in the addendum to Document 1029.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

I now put the motion to approve the final accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1984 to the vote by show of hands.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*The motion is agreed to unanimously.*

**5. Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial years 1984 and 1985**

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1031)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration on the opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial years 1984 and 1985 and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1031.

I call Mr. van Tets, Rapporteur of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.

Mr. van TETS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). - Mr. President, the original 1984 and 1985 budgets of the ministerial organs were simply a repeat of those of the preceding year. The Rome decisions on the revival of WEU could not be studied in time for their effects to show in the figures for those years.

The tasks of the newly created organs have been defined only very recently and even then not in detail. The same applies to the estimated staff requirements for these tasks apart from the A grades.

For this year, we therefore had to be satisfied with ad hoc measures. Not until 1986 will it be possible to draft budgets that allow for the new developments.

That being so, I shall confine myself to two general comments which, even so, have some significance in this field whatever path the organisation may choose for its future development.

All I have to say otherwise is that the draft recommendation unanimously approved by the Budget Committee reiterates a number of points already mentioned last year, namely the financial advantage of a single headquarters, the formulation of more satisfactory regulations for the staff by consultation with them and the application, in the eventuality of an increase in prices, of a rate based on real growth in each category of expenditure, rather than a blanket figure, for increases on certain items.

I shall not dwell on these points with which everyone is familiar.

My first general comment is that the almost complete abolition of the Agency for the Control of Armaments and the fundamental reform of the secretariat of the working group on military equipment should be accompanied by the departure of all staff recruited for their skills in the field of activity of the old organs of the Atlantic Alliance and the recruitment of specialists in the

1. See page 28.

*Mr. van Tets (continued)*

subjects that will have to be studied in the future. The reverse approach, in other words seeing whether some of the new missions of the organs that have been set up can at a pinch be given to existing staff so that they do not have to be dismissed, would be inadvisable. If our alliance wants revival in the real sense of the word this would be a bad beginning. This means that in some cases heavy compensation will have to be paid to avoid being hard on those who stayed in their jobs when our organisation was not uppermost in the thoughts of our respective governments. It is nevertheless my view that real revival of WEU should involve, among other things, a major reshaping of the key posts. It seems to me wise to suggest that the jobs to be created in the new organs should be given to highly-qualified and ambitious national officials for whom a post for a few years in WEU would represent not only a change and a challenge but also an introduction to international dealings which would make a positive contribution to the development of their career.

My second comment is on pensions, more particularly in connection with the application of the zero growth postulate. The application of zero growth to the whole of the budget including pensions does not fit the system that the intergovernmental organs chose after careful deliberation. If the choice had been that annual contributions should be paid into a pension fund or to an insurance company it would be reasonable to apply the zero growth principle to the whole of the budget including this part of staff remuneration; but with the option of paying pensions as soon as the need for them arises, the zero growth principle can no longer apply to this expenditure category which could fluctuate sharply due to the unexpected death of an official. The system destabilises the budget. This disadvantage was apparently accepted to avoid the complications of setting up an insurance system.

This inevitable destabilisation must not and cannot be allowed to affect the rest of the budget by causing properly estimated expenditure to be shifted unexpectedly and on a large scale. My predecessor previously drew the attention of the Assembly to this point. Having run a pension fund for twenty-five years I would like to confirm this view, with emphasis. This explains why these items are included in the first paragraph of the draft recommendation I now submit to the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is open.

I call Mr. Sinesio.

Mr. SINESIO (*Italy*) (Translation). – I should like to draw the Presidential Committee's

attention to the question of redundancies and to urge that due account be taken of the professional qualities of officials who have given of their best over the years. I believe that they still have much to offer and should retain their posts, allowing the present problems to be resolved naturally.

I would also ask the President, Mr. Caro, to use his authority, reminding him that it is right and proper that appointments to the most senior posts be made so that all member countries are properly represented, in order to achieve a balance not only of status but also of ability and intelligence which is of particular importance for those who have always believed and still believe in Europe.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS (*United Kingdom*). – The Assembly owes a debt of gratitude to Mr. van Tets and Sir Dudley Smith, who have both been tenacious in presenting the budgetary problems facing the ministerial organs and the Assembly. I am a member of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and I am not exaggerating when I say that we have had many meetings and that if it were not for the persistence of those two gentlemen, ably supported by officials, we should not be approaching the achievement of our aims.

May I ask Mr. van Tets a couple of questions? He rightly draws attention in paragraph 6 to the possibility of uniting the London and Paris headquarters. The Council of Ministers has a strange sense of priorities. It urges us to be lean, fit, hungry and executively efficient, but when the Assembly recommends that there should be a thorough review of the possibility of uniting two centres and reducing overheads, we find that the Council's aptitude for speedy assessment disappears. I hope that Mr. van Tets will tell us when he expects the further report on the possible unification of the London and Paris offices to be available so that members can give their views.

In paragraph 7 Mr. van Tets points out that recruiting policy has been frozen in the interim situation. He says that he understands that new contracts will be on a fixed-term basis. Can he assure the Assembly that all new contracts will be on that basis and not on a long-term basis? Can Mr. van Tets also assure us that the same approach towards pension contributions and their rôle within the budget will be adopted within the ministerial organs and for the staff who serve the Assembly?

Part of the report deals with budgeting for the ministerial organs. Has any estimate been made of the likely contribution by Portugal if it becomes a member of WEU? It has applied for

*Mr. Morris (continued)*

membership and presumably someone has calculated its likely contribution.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Paul Hawkins.

Sir Paul HAWKINS (*United Kingdom*). – I shall not speak as passionately as I did yesterday. I agree with Sir Dudley Smith that Lady Young made a good speech, but her answers were not in the least satisfactory. I did not get an answer to the main question I raised, which was why we had not received a response from the Council of Ministers on our draft budget. We had to cancel our debate. We had wasted our time in preparing for the debate and it did not take place because we had not received a response from the Council of Ministers. I hope that our Presidential Committee will object strongly to the Council of Ministers. I shall not feel conciliatory towards the Council until it makes a move towards us. The system must be a two-way system. The organs should be working together and we have seen little evidence of that. True revitalisation should be moving ahead far more quickly.

I know that our President has been working extremely hard all over Europe during the past year, trying to impress on the Council and its ministers the need for us to know what jobs we are wanted to do and to get us the financial sinews to be able to do those jobs. Sir Dudley Smith and Mr. van Tets have done some very good work. I support Mr. Morris in that I am prepared to agree that our organisation needs to be overhauled. I am not attacking all the civil servants, but I believe that our President has not always been supported as he should have been by some officials. That problem must be examined urgently.

I also agree with Mr. Morris that major savings could be made by the Assembly through the uniting of the two offices. The present management system seems to be extremely wasteful. I believe that contracts for officials should in future be for five years and no more. We all know that if we remain in office in an organisation for five years, we are liable to stagnate. Fixed-term contracts could do the Assembly a lot of good.

I support all the work that Sir Dudley Smith and Mr. van Tets have done. I also thank the secretary of the committee, who has worked extremely hard in difficult circumstances.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does no one else wish to speak ?...

The debate is closed.

I call Mr. van Tets, Rapporteur of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, to reply to the speakers.

Mr. van TETS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – It seems to me that the first speaker was not in agreement on one particular point, so that simply needs to be noted. The two others merely endorsed, underscored and supported what we said in the Budget Committee in various ways so there is no need for further comment there either.

Mr. Morris did, however, put a number of questions. The first concerns the single headquarters. Clearly, the choice would be a political one which the Council itself would have to make for considerations of efficiency – on which we have expressed a viewpoint – but also on other grounds. The same, indeed, applies to the terms of officials' contracts. Here too it is up to the Secretary-General himself to decide on the working conditions of the ministerial bodies. The Budget Committee has expressed a clear view. I would remind Mr. Morris that the pension scheme is definitely the same for the ministerial organs and the Assembly staff as it is for other intergovernmental organisations like the OECD, etc. This is a choice we made and we have to live with its consequences.

Lastly, regarding the possible contribution from Portugal, we have no estimate as yet but it would depend on the country's national income. In any case the amount would be small and this is not, therefore, a very important point.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now vote on the draft recommendation in Document 1031.

In accordance with Rule 34, the Assembly votes by sitting and standing unless at least five representatives or substitutes present in the chamber ask for a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call ?...

There are not.

To save time, I propose that the Assembly vote by show of hands.

Are there any objections ?...

I ask you to vote by show of hands on the draft recommendation in Document 1031.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*The draft recommendation is adopted unanimously<sup>1</sup>.*

Ladies and Gentlemen, we have finished with the order of the day on budgetary matters. May

1. See page 29.

*The President (continued)*

I, in my turn, thank the committee and its Chairman and Rapporteurs for the work they have done. I hope that the decisions that have been taken will bring about the hoped-for results, in other words, in a framework of close collaboration with the Council, and will lead to positive and useful decisions on healthy co-operation with the Council in the interests of the organisation as a whole.

**6. Developments in China and European security**

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1035 and amendments)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on developments in China and European security and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1035 and amendments.

I call Mr. Michel, Chairman of the General Affairs Committee and Rapporteur.

Mr. MICHEL (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the two Rapporteurs from the General Affairs Committee who accompanied members of the Presidential Committee on their visit to China shared the work. Mr. van der Werff reported on the tour of Chinese provinces whilst I concentrated more on the conversations held during the last week in Beijing.

This report is a sequel to those of Sir Frederic Bennett in 1978 and our President Mr. Jean-Marie Caro in 1983 and unquestionably adds fresh material following in the line of the earlier reports.

In Beijing and the environs of the capital the Presidential Committee was received by the following leading members of the Chinese hierarchy: Mr. Li Xiannian, President of the People's Republic of China, who granted us nearly two hours' audience; Mr. Zhou Nan, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Xu Xin, Vice-President of the Institute of Strategic Studies and Assistant Chief-of-Staff of the Armed Forces, and Professor Huan Xiang, Director-General of the International Study Centre.

The Presidential Committee also inspected an armoured division in the Beijing area.

The following is a summary of the main observations that the Rapporteurs arrived at, beginning with economic development.

Clearly the economic development and the liberalisation of agriculture, trade and industry

already observed by the General Affairs Committee in 1983 is continuing and not merely successfully but with remarkable results. The modernisation under four headings – the development of agriculture, of the basic industries and of science and technology, and the modernisation of the army – which Deng Xiaoping said he wanted in 1978 is enjoying spectacular success. In spite of uninterrupted, tremendous growth of the population, agriculture is already able to feed the Chinese people.

The liberalisation of the economy, however, is bringing economic and social difficulties that constitute a bottleneck and take the following main forms.

First, the vast progress in agriculture is primarily due to the liberalisation of trade in agricultural produce and the incentive to increase production that this constitutes. Investment in implements and equipment does not seem to have kept pace. Moreover, social unrest has broken out in the big towns in reaction to the higher prices of agricultural produce and the increase in the cost of living.

Second, there is already a problem of energy resources in spite of the spectacular increase in coal output from 100 to 770 million tons a year. Nuclear power is absolutely vital but obviously the capital investment has to be financed.

Third, the decentralisation policy, giving the provinces responsibility for negotiation and sales in other countries, may trigger off new centrifugal migration with unequal growth in different regions.

The basic question is whether the Chinese Government will decide to continue with its liberalisation policy, with the social and political consequences that would mean, or whether it will return to orthodox Marxism which would strengthen the political system at the cost of China's development and growth. We think there is no doubt that China has realistically opted for liberalisation in order to be able to play the part of a great world power in the twenty-first century.

Fourth, the communications network is very clearly a bottleneck given all that is required in terms of the movement of persons and goods.

The same applies to the hotel infrastructure which has to meet the needs of a tourist trade that is growing with China's mounting attraction for people in other countries. At the moment the infrastructure is inadequate.

Fifth, there is also the non-convertibility of the yuan since the government has to be able to count on the national currency if China wishes to have its place in world trade.



*Mr. Michel (continued)*

However, the sixth and most important obstacle to the liberalisation of the Chinese economy is the lack of experience and training at executive level. The younger generation suddenly having to take the place of the older generation has not been prepared by the generation in between - victim of the cultural revolution.

Next we come to political development. The spectacular changes in 1983 were taken further in September 1985 when the national conference of the communist party backed the rejuvenation of all the senior levels. The wind of rejuvenation swept through the party, the central government and the provincial governments; decentralisation was a fact and the provinces won independence and authority.

In addition, opinions can now be voiced much more freely and the people who spoke to us did not seem to want to hide anything.

Even so, though there is a general consensus on three central points, namely maintenance of national unity, the priority of the economy and the rejection of the cultural revolution, the change is not coming about without difficulty. The leaders still have the problem of coping with two opposing tendencies and fighting on two fronts.

The first obstacle is the desire to maintain the Marxist tradition present in the older generation and the army. The second is the lack of restraint of those discovering freedom for the first time who do not know how to restrain the backlash of the change.

The third point is Chinese power, i.e. the Chinese army. As guests of the foreign affairs institute, the Presidential Committee expressed its wish to have contacts with the defence forces and to study Chinese defence. Far-reaching changes are under way in this area as well. The old policy of deterrence based on numbers, space and time is quietly giving way to modernisation of the army and a reduction of one quarter in its strength. As the Chinese authorities make these savings and reduce their armed forces from four to three million men they are developing their armoured units and multiple-warhead missiles.

The conclusion is that, though Chinese troops are currently better trained and better equipped, their tasks are likely to increase and to become more varied. So questions are relevant on the future attitude of China with regard to the situation in Vietnam and Taiwan. Defence expenditure does not seem to be excessive, Chinese sources giving a figure of 1.7% of gross national product.

Whilst this assessment is approximate, the fact is that, of the four kinds of modernisation, the army comes last.

China is uncompromisingly in favour of disarmament and this is in its interest as it does not want the gap between the great powers and its own military potential to widen.

Point 4, foreign policy. The conversations between the Chinese authorities and the members of the Presidential Committee showed once again that there is a large measure of agreement and similarity of view between China and Western Europe.

China wants to become a great power but also to stay out of the competition between the United States and Russia. It holds jealously on to its frontiers and the integrity of its territory but it wants to develop its economic and other relations with every country capable of helping it develop. Chinese policy is consistent with the traditions and situation of the country.

The distinct improvement in relations between China and the Soviet Union is a reality but still hampered by a number of conditions to which the Soviets have not yet paid heed: Cambodia, Afghanistan, the presence of missiles in Central Asia and contested frontiers arising out of unfair treaties.

Mainland China's main external concerns may be summarised as follows: First, there is the problem of Cambodia and its occupation by Vietnam. Second, the announcement in September 1985 that Pol Pot, leader of the Khmer Rouge, was standing down is likely to facilitate reconciliation between the coalition parties and other countries' support for the régime opposing the occupation of Vietnam under the banner of Norodom Sihanouk. Third, the Afghanistan issue is a source of friction between China and the Soviet Union but not a major concern for China since communications between these countries are limited and difficult. Fourth, the presence of Soviet missiles in the Far East is a major concern for the Chinese. It would be a bad thing for negotiations between the two great powers to end in a reduction in armaments if that simply meant transferring missiles to the Far East.

The problem of the unequal treaties, although still the subject of a Chinese position of principle, has been put on the shelf for the time being by the makers of foreign policy.

Relations with the United States, for their part, have been considerably improved particularly since Zhao Ziyang's visit to Washington but the problem of Taiwan and the attitude of Cocom are not furthering that improvement.

To conclude, remarkable information was obtained by the Presidential Committee: it could

*Mr. Michel (continued)*

be seen that relations between the People's Republic of China and Western Europe had never been so good or so promising. The degree to which our viewpoints coincided is an important fact that needs to be stressed.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I thank you and your colleague, Mr. van der Werff, with whom you shared the task of producing the report on this important mission. Would you be kind enough to convey to him my wishes for a speedy recovery.

I call Sir Dudley Smith to speak in the debate.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President, under your admirable leadership I was fortunate to be one of the Presidential Committee members who made the journey to China and one who saw a vast amount of that extraordinarily interesting country. I should like to compliment Mr. Michel and his colleague, Mr. van der Werff, on their excellent report, which reflects our activities. I commend Mr. Michel for his remarks this morning.

I should like on a personal basis as a British politician to put on the record my thanks for the consideration, courtesy and kind hospitality of Chinese authorities at all levels – members of the provincial governments, the provincial leaders and, in Beijing, members of the national government and the President.

Many WEU members have been to China and others will go in the future. One cannot fail to be impressed by the enormous strides made by that vast country since the so-called cultural revolution. As Mr. Michel said, one of the great issues of the twentieth century or, indeed, of the twenty-first century will be whether China continues to make the progress that it is now making in a more liberal atmosphere or whether it will withdraw within itself and return to the conditions that prevailed before the early nineteen seventies. Obviously, we in the democratic West hope that China continues to progress.

China has enormous problems with one billion people and vast territories, but, nonetheless, it is extraordinarily important for the stability of the world that it should continue to make the type of progress that has occurred so far. I am optimistic. I foresee China in the next fifteen or twenty years, or perhaps within a shorter time, becoming one of the trade leaders of the Far East, representing a strong economic challenge to other parts of the world.

WEU is concerned exclusively with defence, but we wish to see countries that are stable, co-operative and friendly. It is very much in our interests for us to remain on good terms

with China, just as it is important to China that it should have good relationships with Western Europe. I am encouraged by what I saw during the visit. As the report points out, progress has been remarkable. There are still major bottlenecks. There are transport problems and the energy supply is not all that it should be. There is a tourist problem because of a shortage of hotels. All those matters can be ironed out.

The Presidential Committee and I were interested to note that there was much more open discussion on economic, social and even political matters than one would have expected. Certainly there was more discussion than would have occurred a few years ago.

The Chinese military position is intriguing. Some of their fundamental thinking has changed. The army is being modernised in a number of ways. It is a huge army because of the size of the country and the large population. When I asked one of the senior officers about conscription, he smiled and said: "If we had conscription, we would treble the size of the army. One of our aims is to reduce its size." I have been intrigued to learn since our visit that the Chinese are introducing a form of conscription, but that change has been made to bring in expertise. The Chinese army will conscript people with specialised knowledge. As the report points out, the emphasis will be less on numbers and more on skill and equipment.

It is important that we in the West realise that the Chinese are trying hard to avoid clashes with the other great world powers and to minimise the threats posed to their frontiers. China's geographical location means that there are vast frontiers. I believe that eventually China will not revert to a relationship with the Soviet Union such as it had in the 1950s. I sensed mistrust by China of Russia. China wants to live peacefully with the Soviet Union. It wants to iron out some of the border problems. The very last thing that China wants is a localised war or a conventional war with the Soviet Union. Although the position is improving, there is still tension at times. That is an important matter for the West.

The problems between the Soviets and China will remain. It is fundamental for us that the Chinese realise the importance of friendly co-operation with Western Europe. That is why our mission was one of the most positive and important events to have taken place for a long time. It emphasised our commitment to friendly relations with China in a stable world and it made the Chinese realise that we are their friends and wish to co-operate in every possible way.

We were made well aware that China does not want to enter into any treaties or deathbed

*Sir Dudley Smith (continued)*

understandings with anyone. It wants to be its own person, and that is understandable. Just as it will not wish to be too closely allied with the Soviet Union, in not wishing to ally itself with Western Europe it is important to realise that a fundamental understanding has been achieved, something that was not there before and that is on a more worthwhile plane than is the case with relations with the Soviet Union.

One of the worries concerns Taiwan, which is part of the basic concept of China. I am sorry about this. I have been to Taiwan and I understand the problems of that island. I hope that at some time in the future, perhaps not for a long time, some accommodation can be reached between mainland China and the Taiwanese. I certainly do not believe that Taiwan should be the stumbling-block that impedes good relations between China and the West.

The report makes a valuable contribution to the discussions concerning our policy on China. It must be in all of our interests that there should be a prosperous, stable and outward-looking China that continues to make the kind of progress we are witnessing. Despite all of the stops and starts along the way and all of the economic difficulties, the progress is sensational and could be even more so as the years go by.

My country welcomes the fact that we undertook this mission and that we in WEU are doing everything we can to encourage good relations between Western Europe and China. Great Britain regards China as a friend. Her Majesty, Queen Elizabeth of Great Britain, will be paying a visit to China next October, the first time that a reigning monarch of my country has ever been to China. It is a symbolic and significant move and one very much to be welcomed. We need to do all that we can to assist China in developing its economic, technological and scientific abilities. In the process we want it to establish the right kind of relations with us.

Above all, we must respect the political régime in China so that it may easily determine its own progress. We must give all the moral support that we can, bearing in mind that the Chinese are expressly friends of ours and that we would wish them to remain friends. No doubt in the years ahead there will be other visits by comparable organisations throughout Europe to China. I welcome that and I give my wholehearted support to this report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Hill.

Mr. HILL (*United Kingdom*). - I was not in the presidential party that went to China so perhaps I can give a less biased view of the

report. We have heard some platitudes about the lack of hotels and matters concerning tourism generally. We appear to be looking at this from very much a European viewpoint. I am sure that the presidential party discovered that there were many hundreds of thousands of people in China who were on the borderline of starvation.

There is a great deal of hardship for the people in China. The Chinese Government have a duty to their own population first. They must achieve correct agriculture and birth control policies to ensure that the people of their country have a worthwhile future. Without doubt a few hundred thousand tourists will not be that government's first priority. China is far too ancient a land to be turned into a leisure site for Western Europe. Politicians who travel to China and then seek to judge hotels, restaurants and living conditions generally through European eyes will be much mistaken. I hope that the presidents of this august Assembly will look a bit more deeply into the affairs of China than simply to ask whether there is hot water in their hotel rooms or recognisable food on their plates. I have heard some remarks behind the scenes to the effect that some of the presidents were more concerned about their living standards than those of the people in whose country they were travelling.

I come now to external trade. We in the United Kingdom have made a successful agreement with China about what will happen to Hong Kong in 1997. The only danger there is that the Chinese, certainly the up-and-coming young politicians, may not be aware of the capitalist way of catching a cold. One sneeze in Peking can give the whole of the Hong Kong stock market and banking world severe flu. It has happened recently and will happen again. The Chinese have to be more understanding of the curious way in which we Europeans work our capitalist system. Some of the young politicians coming up over the next ten or fifteen years may not always toe the line on that. They may have a more ideological approach to politics and may reject the western, capitalist, idea of amassing profits. Although their external trade is important, their home problems are even more so.

The updating of the Chinese armed forces is crucial. The Chinese fleet is based at Shanghai and I was privileged to see it two years ago. It needs a tremendous amount of capital spending to make it a coastal defence force, let alone a force capable of repulsing the USSR if it ever got into a militant mood. Chinese aviation links are inadequate for a country whose technology and industry will grow only as fast as its transport infrastructure. There are great factories, such as the Shanghai Tool Company, which are greatly in need of modernisation. There is

*Mr. Hill (continued)*

plenty of scope there for Western Europeans and Americans to help the Chinese establish and strengthen their industrial base.

It is important that China gets on with its neighbours. It has a duty to do so, bearing in mind this new surge of independence, this new way of approaching the rest of the world. It must be able to get on not only with Hong Kong – because that is the financial base for the future – but must be able to establish trading and other links between Shenzhen and Hong Kong. There must be cross-fertilisation in trade between Taiwan and Peking.

In today's Daily Telegraph it is said that Taiwan's deputy head of the Taiwan Board of Foreign Trade has really closed his eyes to the trading between Taiwan and China. I was in Taiwan and I know that it is still punishable by death to trade with China. I would imagine that the restrictions on trade that that will bring about will have to be cleared away. There must be trade talks between Taiwan and China and an atmosphere must be created in which all the neighbours of China can help to make it a great nation. We all want that.

The report is factual and extremely good. Perhaps it misses the points that are missed by most presidential committees and high-ranking diplomatic missions which are shown mostly the good rather than the bad, but that happens in all our countries. We are proud of our achievements, but not so proud of our deprivations, especially in urban conurbations.

The Chinese Government will be a powerful force in future, especially if they are diplomatic in their statements about Hong Kong and freer in their trading negotiations with those whom they regard as their enemies – we all trade with our enemies as well as with our friends.

The report will help many people outside the Assembly to understand China's problems. The two Rapporteurs have done very good work. As usual, Mr. Michel has proved to be an excellent Rapporteur, and the committee was well served by its secretariat.

I hope that we shall hear less from the next delegation about the problems with hotels. Perhaps one or two backbenchers could be included in the next august group that visits China.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Antoni.

Mr. ANTONI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, a few words to say that I am in favour of the draft recommendation and more generally of the recent visit to China arranged by the Presidential Commit-

tee in which I had the satisfaction, pleasure and honour to take part.

I think that the report presented by Mr. van der Werff and Mr. Michel suffers from having had to be drafted quickly after the visit to China and therefore deals with the experience on the basis of first impressions. That is why I believe the question calls for further consideration.

The move made by the Assembly to establish relations with China, its leaders and its people is certainly praiseworthy. There were many meetings, the trip was very well organised and we travelled from Southern China to the frontier areas near Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. These meetings certainly enabled us first of all to get to know the country, its leaders and its people better. The draft recommendation now before us reflects these first impressions fairly accurately.

In my view the worst mistake that can be made at the moment is to think of China as either anti-Soviet or anti-American. The Chinese head of state, whom we met, and also the military leaders including the deputy chief-of-staff of the Chinese army, stressed that China's present policy is one of non-alignment, of seeking agreement with both East and West and of offering broad friendship to everyone. At the same time they ruled out specific alliances with anyone.

Admittedly, major problems remain with both the Soviet Union and the United States. With the Soviet Union there is the problem of the missiles targeted on China, Cambodia and Afghanistan; with the United States the particular problems are Taiwan and the SDI, with the Chinese confirming their opposition to the idea and the conviction that it threatens international relations.

An organisation like ours, with responsibility in defence matters – but defence to be looked at in conjunction with the possibility of achieving international stability – could in my view achieve its institutional purposes better by developing relations with China. I believe therefore, Mr. President, that such relations should be maintained and strengthened. At this moment, Chinese interests coincide more than at any time with Europe's and there are many reasons why China shows decided preference for relations with Europe rather than with the two super-powers. It is in Europe's interests to reach agreements with China on the basis of stabilising world defence.

In my view the report and the draft recommendation to which we have made a modest contribution are well in line with this interpretation; some ideas in the report come from myself, Mr. Amadei and other members.

*Mr. Antoni (continued)*

In expressing my satisfaction and support I therefore hope that we can count in future on closer, peaceful relations between WEU and the People's Republic of China.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, our visit to this vast and widely varied country not only gave us an insight into the enormous problems facing the government but also enabled us to have direct face-to-face contacts with the worst-off elements of the population.

We saw people living in wretched conditions, particularly in country areas; sometimes we saw unbelievable sights and the Chinese authorities are well aware of this, because the Presidential Committee's visit and the many visits by all sorts of organisations to that vast country serve above all to draw the attention of Europe and the more developed countries to the need for large-scale economic aid so that the Chinese Government can carry through the reforms designed to improve the living conditions of the Chinese people. The main problem is undoubtedly economic.

I must add that such visits are also used for propaganda purposes by the single-party government, as they give the impression to the Chinese people that the more developed countries are looking at China and China's policy; they also help to show that China is not isolated but a country before the eyes of a large part of the developed world. At this point we must ask ourselves a question because what interests us is the development of China and the progress of European security. Today, China's position is clear, midway between the United States and the Soviet Union; it has relations with both and is developing ever-closer relations with Europe. China is convinced that it must solve other problems before thinking of building up its military strength. We did learn, however, that when it has solved its economic problem China's policy will be to become a great military power as well, that is a great economic power first and then a great military power.

As things stand we can certainly feel a little happier because China is looking at the Soviet Union with some suspicion as there are many border and security problems; and China feels encircled to some extent by what is happening in Cambodia and Afghanistan and by the Soviet Union's plans to establish itself in the Indian and Pacific oceans. But what is going to happen tomorrow? What will China's foreign and alliance policy be when it has become a great world power? I can offer no answer to this

question but it is there and it is in terms of that question that we must consider the problem of Taiwan.

China considers Taiwan to be one of its own provinces while Taiwan considers that it represents the whole of China. In this doubtful situation and in the hope that the problem of relations between mainland China and Taiwan will be resolved, I believe that we should give some attention to Taiwan. China has trade relations with Taiwan as government sources admitted when I asked the question; and China is aware that living standards are higher in Taiwan and that it has made great progress. I am saying that we cannot abandon Taiwan; we can at the same time have commercial relations - but not political as they would be contrary to the policy of mainland China - we can exchange technological material and we can have cultural exchanges. Why not? From the standpoint of European security, while we cannot anticipate what line and policy mainland China will follow when it becomes a great military power also, we know that we can still count on Taiwan which is extremely important because of its position and structure and because together with Japan it is a major bastion for the defence of sea trade routes essential for the survival of the western countries and for our security.

In conclusion, Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I say that it is our duty to maintain and strengthen relations with mainland China but that we must not forget Taiwan because it is a safety anchor for the West and for the whole free world.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Tummers.

Mr. TUMMERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). - Mr. President, I can be very brief and to the point in my comments on this report. I am a member of the committee that considered this document. As you have heard, it was unanimously approved, which means that I too voted for it. But that does not mean that I am not critical of various points. I regard the report as a basis for an exchange of views, of which criticism is a necessary part.

Once again we have a report in which cultural elements are discussed. That is remarkable. I would refer in this context to paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, in which WEU urges the member states to develop their cultural relations with China by developing knowledge of the Chinese language and culture in Western Europe, and to provide facilities for cultural exchanges by establishing cultural institutes in China. Mr. President, this is a programme for the member states, not for WEU itself. But WEU is an institution which is itself actively trying to achieve unity in Europe. Where

*Mr. Tummers (continued)*

relations with China are concerned, I believe that the integrality of the seven member countries of WEU may be very important.

Section III of the report concerns political developments. In paragraph 29 the Rapporteurs refer with some enthusiasm to editorials in the People's Daily, some time in December 1984 – no precise details of the source are given. What concerns me here is the phrase “the need for realism”. This careless reference to just a few words gives an impression of a particularly casual approach to an historic period in China's development. I am referring to the importance of Mao's republic and the influence it has had on the democratisation movement in Western Europe since the 1960s, and there is no blotting that out of history.

The report is extensive. It has eighty-seven paragraphs. However, I think it is opportunistic as regards liberalisation. The interpretation the Rapporteurs give to “the need for realism” – this has been fished out of Mao's writings – re-emphasises this opportunism. The analysis is superficial. Is it a matter of the China we want, or China's China?

Mr. President, the difficulties that exist between us and China are extremely serious. We simply cannot expect direct links to be forged, especially in the near future. There is the language, for example. The Chinese language has fifty thousand characters. No one in China knows them all. The leading intellectuals know twenty thousand of them, the ordinary man in the street two thousand. People in rural areas know none of these characters. If we want to change all this with the aid of computers, considerable detours via English will be necessary. It will be several decades before China can computerise anything of importance from this huge number of characters without making a detour via English. This shows that a great deal of time will be needed for this comparatively simple feature – and it is only one of many. It will be a very long time before China can have a relationship with us without being dependent on us.

If we are to make a thorough study of how we can forge good relations with China, even where very recent history is concerned, I propose that we should give serious thought to the desirability and possibility of holding a part-session here in the near future, lasting at least half a day, at which we exchange views with Chinese people on the period which this report brushes aside so casually and the period that followed, which we are so eager to seize upon.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Cifarelli.

Mr. CIFARELLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I am not one of those who went to China, so the report presented by Mr. Michel and Mr. van den Werff is of special importance for me as a source of practical information. I am also very glad to have heard in this otherwise not very well-attended sitting two different views such as those of Mr. Cavaliere and Mr. Tummers. Mr. Tummers quite rightly recalled the régime of Chairman Mao and what that meant; Mr. Cavaliere quite rightly stressed the views of the present government and the impressions which we can draw from China as it is today.

I remember that during the 1950s it was said that the world's great problem was the Stalinist empire – followed by that of his successors – which extended from East Berlin to Vladivostok. As a result of which half of the world and more lived under the dominance of an immense communist grouping, agreeing in some cases and disagreeing in others. All we free men and we Europeans in particular breathed a sigh of relief when the great break took place under Khrushchev between him and Mao. I cannot offer any judgment on what happened subsequently; but certainly there was no greater freedom nor was there anything like the fundamental changes and developments in the West and free Europe in particular.

Today China is founded on the talents of very old men – Deng for example – but also on a major drive for changes at the top and at executive level so that a new China is gradually emerging after a painful, bloody and difficult revolution, following years of waste and neglect.

But China is still China, an enormous concentration of human beings, resources, interests and possibilities; a huge market where the standard of living is rising with greater access to consumer goods; but it is also a great military unknown both from a passive standpoint – its enormously long frontiers, for example, with the Soviet Union and the military states which emerged from the Vietnam conflict – and from the standpoint of its Pacific frontiers.

I am not sure of the soundness of Mr. Cavaliere's honest views on Taiwan and of Europe's attitude to the negotiated removal of a European presence; but Mr. Cavaliere is unquestionably right when he speaks of defence requirements in the Pacific and therefore of the special rôle which Taiwan can fill in conjunction with Japan. In Europe our realism has stemmed too often from laziness and even fear. I would remind the Assembly that it was jokingly said that in Western Europe the smart people learn Russian but that the even smarter learn Chinese. Fortunately we are able to meet the Chinese and to learn that they are impatient for the unification of Europe. Indeed, the Chinese

*Mr. Cifarelli (continued)*

more than anyone else, are amazed that Europe cannot unify and this is undoubtedly based on a realistic assessment on their part. "The enemies of our enemies are our friends" and in international policy there must be a balance in both the East and the West. Unquestionably when we look at the nineteenth century history of Europe we see that whoever was to East or West of a rival, an enemy or a competitor became a friend. These thoughts can take us a very long way.

It is vital that this Assembly should discuss China's problems particularly from the standpoint of strategic and military balance and therefore of the necessary agreements. The statement in paragraph 1 of the recommendation can be regarded as a pious hope exaggerating what we can do but it is undoubtedly a requirement which should be stressed by those like ourselves who have to discuss problems with political foresight looking to the future. This excellent report also mentions the need to expand cultural exchanges. Mr. Tummers in his field of competence has called strongly for an ad hoc session. I do not know whether that will be possible. Nevertheless, despite yesterday's disappointment in Luxembourg it is my belief that in the world of today Europe must take account of the immense importance of Chinese civilisation and culture. This need must be particularly emphasised here in France which in recent centuries has given all the rest of the world an organised, comprehensive and enlightening culture. From the technological standpoint we are the link between the reference points of the past and the communication needs of the modern world.

Let us joke a little. We know that the Chinese always show a smiling and understanding face but we do not know what goes on behind the smiles. The experts say that when China speaks of empire it means rule from above capable of controlling if not dominating other eastern and western civilisations. An Italian newspaperman produced the following equation: a Chinese is to a Russian as a Neapolitan to a German. The title of one novel is "China is close". Let us pay the closest attention to China. In that sense I believe that the visit was useful, that the report is valuable and that any constructive proposals which may emerge from it are acceptable.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Does no one else wish to speak?...

The debate is closed.

I call the Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee to reply to the speakers.

Mr. MICHEL (*Belgium*) (Translation). - I note that our colleagues, who take the same general line as the report, are content at the relations established and the conversations that took place between the Chinese authorities and the Presidential Committee. Each in its own way advocated the continuance of similar relations and stressed their fruitful character.

Sir Dudley Smith underlined the challenge of the next fifteen to twenty years and the fact that mistakes had, at all costs, to be avoided on both the Chinese and the European sides during that period. He was also in favour of encouraging the satisfactory turn of events that China's leaders had initiated and avoiding what one might call clashes or accidents. The report pointed exactly in this direction and I can therefore only approve what he said.

Mr. Hill referred to the bottleneck in the tourist and hotel trade. My reply is that the report is in no way critical of those responsible in China.

Those who went on the trip saw the bottlenecks which definitely exist. If I referred to them it was not in criticism but as a way of underscoring the courageous attitude of the Chinese authorities coping in realistic fashion with a sudden about-turn in the direction of liberalism in the economy and in society.

I also listened with interest to Mr. Antoni who urges us not to get involved in any difficulties between China and the Soviet Union and between China and the United States and to remember that the country's policy is first and foremost Chinese policy. We were indeed able to see that it was primarily formulated from the Chinese standpoint.

Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Tummers and Mr. Cifarelli stressed the importance of cultural policy and pointed to a gap in the report in that respect. I agree, the Rapporteur confesses to not having thought enough about cultural matters.

The Chinese language, Mr. Tummers, is difficult. It has fifty-four thousand characters. I tried to learn some of them but to no great avail because when you are learning Chinese, the trouble is that out of the ten characters you learn one day you forget nine the next. So you see how aware your Rapporteur was of the difficulty of coming to grips with a civilisation whose language is so complicated for Europeans.

We did however note the presence there of many Europeans who make the effort to go to China and study the country's culture, economy and political life. In our own way we tried to encourage this desire on Europe's part.

With regard to the attitude to be taken towards relations between mainland China and Taiwan we have to remember that, from the

*Mr. Michel (continued)*

standpoint of the two competitors rather than adversaries, this is a Chinese matter and we must simply hope above all for relations between the two countries to develop. We naturally have interests on both sides because, whilst the official attitude means we have to recognise mainland China, for pragmatic reasons we have to maintain relations with Taiwan. Once again, the problem is primarily Chinese. It is not the Hong Kong problem, that is something else. Perhaps it is possible to see a change in mainland China's present attitude which may lead to future and very useful conversations with Taiwan but, I would repeat, this is an affair for its leaders in which WEU has no right to interfere.

I therefore thank all the speakers, none of whom criticised the report, and I shall bear in mind the further comments made by Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Tummers and Mr. Cifarelli.

As to the fruitful meeting Mr. Tummers spoke about with Chinese people the ball is back in the President of the Assembly's court. He heads the Presidential Committee. My rôle is simply that of Rapporteur which I performed because the Presidential Committee could not have one of its own.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Michel; your message is received.

Before proceeding to vote on the draft recommendation in Document 1035 we have to consider two amendments.

Mr. Cavaliere has tabled Amendment 1 which reads:

1. After paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph:

“ Concerned by the continued Soviet occupation of Afghanistan where civilians are still being massacred, ”.

I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, paragraph (vi) of the preamble to this draft recommendation refers to developments in Cambodia and the loss of its independence. Clearly this paragraph was included because all the authorities in China expressed great concern about the situation in Cambodia but I would remind the Assembly that the same authorities expressed as much concern over the situation in Afghanistan and its invasion by the Soviet Union, as well as over the possible consequences of that situation.

Consequently, if we wish to refer to developments in Cambodia we should, in my opinion, also mention Afghanistan because paragraph (vi) would otherwise serve no purpose.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the committee's opinion?

Mr. MICHEL (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Without consulting the General Affairs Committee on Mr. Cavaliere's amendment, I am in favour of this text which is in the line of the debate and the report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I put Amendment 1 to the vote.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

*Amendment 1 is agreed to.*

Mr. Cavaliere has also tabled Amendment 2 which reads:

2. In paragraph 3 (ii) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “ the Chinese language and culture ” and insert “ Chinese culture ”.

I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, stress has been laid particularly by Mr. Cifarelli on the advisability if not the absolute necessity and expediency of developing cultural relations. Paragraph 3 (ii) of the draft recommendation refers to this need and urges member governments to develop knowledge of the Chinese language and culture in Western Europe.

My amendment would delete the reference to the language, as we have relations with every country in the world including, for example, Japan but it has never occurred to anyone to propose that Japanese be studied in European countries! Moreover, it seems to me that the reference to “ Chinese ” culture says it all so that special reference to the language is superfluous.

That is why I propose deletion of the words “ the Chinese language ”.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the opinion of the committee?

Mr. MICHEL (*Belgium*) (Translation). – I feel in an awkward position because this amendment is good thinking on Mr. Cavaliere's part. However, I have already referred to the difficulty I had in my first attempt to learn Chinese and Mr. Cavaliere seems to want to put me off altogether.

I shall not vote for Amendment 2 but that is a personal attitude and the difference between our positions is in no way serious. I therefore leave it to the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Mr. Tummers.



Mr. TUMMERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – I find Mr. Cavaliere's reasons for casting aside the language of this country superficial. In my speech I tried to indicate how difficult it is to get to grips with this language. But we should not try to avoid difficulties if we want contact with a nation; one of the first conditions is the ability to speak its language. Then we can pay attention to the smile.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I put Amendment 2 to the vote.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*Amendment 2 is negated.*

We shall now proceed to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

In accordance with Rule 34, the Assembly votes by sitting and standing unless five representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

They are not.

The Assembly will therefore vote by sitting and standing.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*The draft recommendation is adopted unanimously<sup>1</sup>.*

I congratulate the Assembly on this decision. In the burgeoning history of WEU, in whose activities certain meetings have marked important occasions, the meeting which the head of state of the country with the biggest population in the world granted the WEU Assembly when receiving its Presidential Committee will no doubt stand out as one of the high points in our political action. I therefore thank the Assembly for its decision.

### **7. Change in the orders of the day**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and Gentlemen, we have a little time left before the arrival of the French Minister for External Relations. Thanks to the courtesy of the Chairman and Rapporteurs of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, whom I thank sincerely, we are in a position if the Assembly should so decide to start the debate on that committee's report on the revision and interpretation of the Charter and the Rules of Procedure.

The Rapporteurs could therefore speak now, after which we could possibly make a start on

the debate. In any case the vote will not be taken until tomorrow.

Does the Assembly agree to this change in the orders of the day?...

I call the Chairman of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.

Mr. SCHULTE (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, could you tell us how much time we have left? I was told we had to stop at 11.45 a.m. That would leave only five minutes.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – No, Mr. Chairman, I think that is a mistake. We can debate up to 12.15 p.m. which is when Mr. Dumas arrives. If you agree, the Assembly would be happy to listen to you. If not, we shall suspend the sitting. You have the last word. Do you agree to this procedure?

Mr. SCHULTE (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I think we can begin, then, although the Rapporteurs and the members of the committee would, of course, have preferred it if we could have combined the debate with the voting. But I hear that various amendments have not yet been distributed, and so I have no objections.

We should begin with our Rapporteur, Mr. Unland. I would ask you to call him first.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – With the agreement of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges we can therefore start with the presentation of the report, it being clearly understood that the discussion on the amendments to the draft resolution will take place tomorrow and that the deadline for tabling amendments is unchanged at 3 p.m. this afternoon.

Does the Assembly agree that the debate on the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges should be started now, as I have just described?...

It is so decided.

### **8. Revision and interpretation of the Charter and of the Rules of Procedure**

*(Presentation of the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges Doc. 1039 and amendments)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges on the revision and interpretation of the Charter and of the Rules of Procedure, Document 1039 and amendments.

1. See page 30.

*The President (continued)*

I call Mr. Unland, Rapporteur of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.

Mr. UNLAND (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, as amendments have been tabled in a total of twenty-six paragraphs, my two fellow-Rapporteurs have asked me to make a few introductory remarks and, in so doing, perhaps to pick out various salient points. The twenty-six amendments to the Rules of Procedure very largely concern technical provisions. I do not think I should overburden you with such matters. I will therefore give you four or five examples to illustrate what is involved.

First, we want substitutes to have the same rights as representatives under Rule 7. As things now stand, the Rules of Procedure lay down different arrangements, which has always led to difficulty over interpretation and differences of opinion. In future we should like to see this governed by a single provision, which may result in many other provisions being dropped.

Second, members who speak in German, Italian or Dutch should have the same opportunity as those who speak in English or French to see transcripts immediately after a sitting. They could then correct their speeches within twenty-four hours, as at present provided for in respect of speeches in English and French.

A very important amendment concerns Rule 28. I believe we have found better definitions here. In the past the terms "recommendation", "resolution", "opinion" and "order" have been used - how should I put it? - in riotous confusion. It has been possible to use different words for one and the same thing. We felt one word should be used for each procedure in future. You will therefore find it defined very accurately at the end of paragraph 2 of the new Rule 28 that recommendations or opinions shall be addressed to the Council, resolutions to international organisations, governments or national parliaments and orders to the President of the Assembly or to a committee, and that decisions concern the working of the Assembly itself.

I believe, Mr. President, I should add a request that the Assembly secretariat establish uniform guidelines for all the interpreters who work for us, so that a fixed terminology may be adopted for these concepts in all languages in future.

I should now like to draw your attention to a proposal for an amendment to Rule 35, which concerns elections. We had originally intended that a candidate should be declared elected if there were no other candidates and if there was

no opposition in the Assembly. In this connection I wish to anticipate an amendment tabled by Lord Hughes, which was approved by the committee this morning. We want to delete the words "and there is no opposition to it". We feel it accords with parliamentary custom for someone who is opposed to a candidate to nominate an additional candidate, and that a single candidate should not have to submit himself to an election, since it might harm his reputation outside the house.

To conclude, I will refer to Rule 47, where it is proposed that the position of the Clerk should be changed. I would emphasise, as I have done in the explanatory memorandum, that the proposed arrangement is intended for the future and will not affect the person or office of the present Clerk. Our proposals are guided by political considerations and specifically by the idea of better co-operation between the Secretariat-General, the Secretary-General and this Assembly. We felt that it should be possible in future for the Secretary-General of WEU to be elected in this Assembly.

There are various motions that concern this matter and have not yet been considered. We therefore thought it advisable that the Clerk should no longer be elected in this Assembly as a political official, as it were, but in the Presidential Committee, on which all the political groups, all the committee chairmen and so on are represented.

We also felt, in view of a decision taken by the Bureau, that the Clerk's term of office - and, I hasten to add, not the term of office of our present Clerk, but of his successors - should be limited to five years, as is usual with all other senior posts in international organisations. I would point out that the term of office of WEU's Secretary-General in London and of the heads of the three agencies is now five years. It is logical, therefore, that our Clerk's term of office should also be limited in future, with the option of re-election, of course.

It is proposed under paragraph 3 that the Clerk should be responsible to the President of this Assembly in the exercise of his duties. No provision is made for this at present. I believe we must make it clear that the Clerk is required to be answerable to the President, who represents us outside the Assembly. All the other provisions contained in Rule 47 are essentially a repetition of the present rule.

Ladies and Gentlemen, the proposed amendments to the rules mean that we shall also have to change some of the provisions of the Charter. As things now stand, the wording of the Charter is in parts identical to that of the rules. We felt that, if the Charter were to be amended, the future wording should be somewhat shorter and more concerned with the

*Mr. Unland (continued)*

principles. We are opposed to having identical wordings in the Charter and the rules. Consequently, we have proposed only a few very short passages to amend the Charter as regards the new provisions for the Clerk.

Mr. President, I shall restrict myself to these few comments. We can discuss the details later on.

*(Mr. Goerens, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Spies von Büllesheim, Rapporteur of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, to continue with the presentation of the report.

Mr. SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I have only one or two points to add to Mr. Unland's introductory statement.

First, in Rule 32 we have strengthened the President's position with regard to points of order. Rule 32 now provides for a time-limit of one minute for points of order and for the President not to give a representative the floor, or even to exclude him from the debate if the right to raise points of order is misused.

Second, I would refer to Rule 14, to which Lord Hughes has tabled Amendment 4 seeking the appointment to the Presidential Committee of one member by each political group. In other words, this is to be institutionalised. The Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges approved this amendment this morning.

I believe it is consistent with the Rules of Procedure for the position of both the President and the Presidential Committee to be strengthened.

That is all I have to say.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Eysink, also Rapporteur of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, has told me he does not wish to speak.

I call Mr. Schulte, Chairman of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.

Mr. SCHULTE (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. President. After all the work we have done, all I want as Chairman of this committee is to ensure that the debate can proceed in an orderly fashion. I would, of course, prefer it if you could now raise the various points with the corresponding amendments. I see nine amendments have again been tabled. They were all discussed this morning at a meeting of the committee. As far as I know, their author, Lord

Hughes, has withdrawn some of them, so the situation would seem to be confused. I would ask Lord Hughes to take the floor and explain the position.

I do not know how we now expect to go through the various paragraphs without taking the relevant amendments as well. Mr. Caro, the President, has just said that he cannot put the individual points to the vote, but to separate the debate from the voting will surely not be very easy. Mr. President, I beg you to reconsider, since detailed comments are possible only when the corresponding paragraphs have been called. I do not believe this can be done in a general debate.

As you see, this is a complicated matter. After all, we already have three Rapporteurs.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Spies von Büllesheim.

Mr. SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, President Caro has said we cannot vote today for two reasons: firstly, because the amendments have not yet been distributed and secondly, because there is not enough time. But the amendments have been distributed and are now before us. And we have some time left. I therefore move that we proceed to the vote on the amendments. Many members would greatly appreciate it if we did not have to go through the whole thing again tomorrow. I believe it will take far less time than expected, because all members are agreed on a number of amendments and because some amendments have been withdrawn. I think we could complete the voting in ten minutes.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Lord Hughes.

Lord HUGHES (*United Kingdom*). – At the request of the Chairman of the committee I intervene only to explain about my amendments and to confirm that Amendments 5 and 7 are probing amendments. I could not understand why the committee proposed to leave out certain sections of the rules. This morning I met members of the committee and I am satisfied that leaving out those parts is correct. I shall not move Amendments 5 and 7. Of the remaining five amendments the committee is prepared to accept four, so unless other members are opposed to them they should not take much time.

The Assembly may wish to discuss Amendments 1 and 8, both of which deal with the election of the Clerk. The committee could not accept those amendments, but I want to pursue them.

*(Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We are at the point where we could start our discussion of the amendments but we must keep to the decision we took a little while ago. We have gained time by hearing the committee Rapporteurs but clearly several of our colleagues are making preparation for the discussion on the amendments and the draft resolution which should normally take place tomorrow. Also, a number of amendments, I think, have not yet been distributed. I would therefore ask the committee whether it would not be wiser, in view of the fact that we have done everything we can up to this point, to put off discussion of the amendments till tomorrow. If so, we would then suspend the sitting for a few moments until Mr. Dumas arrives. I propose that the Assembly accept whatever the committee decides.

I call Mr. Schulte, Chairman of the committee.

Mr. SCHULTE (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, while you were briefly absent from the chamber, I said it would be difficult to discuss the report in isolation, without considering the amendments and if possible voting on them together. The procedure would be very complicated. My impression is that not many members will be speaking to the report unless it is taken together with our text and the amendments.

We have heard Mr. Unland and Mr. Spies von Büllenheim. By and large they have explained our ideas for amendments. So far no one has expressed a desire to discuss these amendments. I do not therefore know whether it is practical to continue as we are, without taking a vote on each straight away.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – That is the difficulty we are up against. We have to allow our colleagues the opportunity to speak in the debate tomorrow morning should they so wish. We cannot exclude that possibility.

I therefore thank the Rapporteurs for presenting their reports. Tomorrow, if no one has asked to speak in the debate, the committee will have to take the floor again to open the discussion on the amendments and, of course, to present general comments if there are no other speakers.

I can understand your concern that the presentation of the reports should be linked with the voting on the amendments but I cannot ask the Assembly to cut short the debate now. This is a matter of courtesy towards our colleagues not able to be present this morning.

Unless the Chairman and Rapporteurs of the committee have any objection I shall now consult the Assembly on this proposal. For once we are the victims of our own speed and efficiency.

Are there any objections?...

It is so decided.

The sitting is suspended.

*(The sitting was suspended at 12 noon and resumed at 12.45 p.m.)*

### **9. Address by Mr. Dumas, Minister for External Relations of France**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is resumed.

The next order of the day is the address by Mr. Dumas, Minister for External Relations of France.

On behalf of the Assembly I welcome Mr. Dumas and thank him for his willingness to address our Assembly.

May I say to the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Mr. Andreotti, how pleased we are to see him on the government bench of the Council; one of the wishes of the Assembly is that members of the Council at ministerial level should take part in the Assembly's debates whenever possible, and not just when they have to speak. We look forward to hearing your address this afternoon.

We all know, Minister, how busy you are at the moment. I would therefore be grateful if you would tell us, in the light of the claims on your time, whether you will have a little time left to answer a few questions.

Mr. DUMAS (*Minister for External Relations of France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, since you ask, I shall have to leave you fairly soon because, as you know, diplomatic life today is particularly busy. In addition I have to be at the French National Assembly from 3 p.m. on for Question Time.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, this is the first time I have addressed your Assembly. The occasion is an opportunity for me to reaffirm the importance my country attaches to the task of reactivating Western European Union. It also enables me to pay tribute to the rôle falling in this matter to the Assembly, as the mirror of public opinion in our countries.

Yesterday I was at the European Council of heads of state and government in Luxembourg where we worked non-stop on the construction of Europe – which President Andreotti can confirm because he shared the tough time we had. Today I would like to start by telling you of the part which WEU can play in that enterprise – I mean the construction of Europe.

When we think about the future of Europe it seems clear that the process of European construction would be incomplete if it left out the

*Mr. Dumas (continued)*

essential dimension of European security. How could economic and political co-operation between our countries assume its full significance if, at the outset, it left out so fundamental a concern.

A large measure of agreement on this point has emerged among the main partners of the Community during the last few years. This awareness of the need for such a development, quickened by the argument prompted in Europe at the time of the Euromissiles affair, led the seven WEU governments to embark on the reactivation of WEU at France's invitation. This approach obviously could only be cautious. There were limits which had to be borne in mind.

First, we are all convinced that the object or the effect or unintentional consequence of any concerted action by us on security matters must not be to call into question the conditions and framework in which each country's national defence currently operates. Second, the European Community based on the Treaty of Rome does not have the necessary powers in this field.

These are the circumstances in which we turned to the use of a politically stronger WEU, with increased resources, as the only European forum with competence for security matters. This decision does not mean that we had forgotten our undertakings under the Brussels Treaty in the years between. The solidarity binding us together for ever is unaffected and remains the central core of our union. Neither does the word "reactivation" mean that there had been the slightest failing on the part of your Assembly. The French Government has always valued your contribution over the years to the debate on European security and that debate has often inspired us.

But it seemed essential to give new life and new resources to the executive organs. Important work has been done since France circulated its memorandum in January 1984. Now, ministers for foreign affairs and defence meet twice a year. After the practical decisions taken at the last ministerial session of the Council on 14th November in Rome we may conclude that a major step has now been taken. Our institutions are now reshaped and are looking resolutely to the future.

Allow me to take this opportunity to say how important it seems to us that your Assembly and the Council and its subordinate bodies should complement each other to good effect in the task that is now being undertaken.

Much has already been done but we are still at the beginning. Now we have to demonstrate not the usefulness of our efforts, because we have no doubt on this point, but the ability of

the new WEU to organise thinking on the vital question of Europeans' specific security interests.

The point is that the reactivation of our institution is by way of being a symbol – demonstrating the recognition of a necessity – and a test: a matter of finding out what we can do in reality.

Today, thinking about Europe and security follows several paths: first and foremost here, but also in the Community and at bilateral level. To our way of thinking, all these efforts are complementary.

In WEU our priority must be to go ahead and build on what has been done already, and thus to confirm the success of our reactivation measures. This is what we have told all those, like Portugal, who have shown an interest in our activity, for which we thank them warmly.

In the Community a project was launched following the Milan meeting in June 1985. Everyone recognises that security issues cannot be kept separate from political co-operation. It would be artificial to have a watertight division and yesterday's debate in Luxembourg showed this very well. But everyone also realises that allowance has to be made for the specific situations of the different partners. That is the logic of the French project for a European act of union, which takes up some of the ideas in the proposal made by France and the Federal Republic of Germany in Milan.

I must say that the results we achieved yesterday in this debate on political co-operation were useful and fruitful. These efforts, coupled with what is being done bilaterally, certainly fit into the same overall pattern. The action of the Seven in favour of WEU has no real meaning unless buttressed by success elsewhere. In the end, therefore, the success of the reactivation of WEU should lead to it no longer being required.

After that look at the future, I am happy to note that the work of your session closely mirrors the main issues that European countries have in their minds.

The subject you have chosen – strategic developments connected with space – has been the subject of much anxious thought this year. It is good that an assembly of European parliamentarians, which welcomes, what is more, observers from non-member countries, should contribute to deeper thought on the subject and the formulation of common positions.

The various reports which have been presented and the accompanying resolutions clearly show the seriousness with which your work has been done.

You know that the SDI has been one of the Council's foremost subjects of study since the

*Mr. Dumas (continued)*

reactivation of our organisation, partly due to a French Government initiative. Early this year, it seemed to us that, taken together, the way in which the debate on the SDI had been launched, the varying and sometimes contradictory strategic positions of the different countries in relation to that initiative and the awareness that the technological and industrial stakes were very high could well cause divisions among Europeans. We saw this clearly.

It was therefore desirable that, at least at the level of the Seven, there should be some calm joint thinking to provide guidance, bring some order into the key ideas and identify the main points of concern. This is what we decided at Bonn in April, as was my country's wish, and together we were able to assess the two sides to this question: the politico-strategic considerations and the analysis of the technological potential. In Rome, at our last ministerial session, we decided to go on with this study.

From the outset, the principle of France's approach has been to distinguish the part of the American initiative that is political speech-making directed to public opinion from its technological and operational reality. France has voiced its reservation about speech-making that seemed to question the nuclear deterrent, the only foundation of our security today, in order to justify what is still a theoretical strategic concept. This is the wrong kind of signal to be sending potential enemies and a misleading message for public opinion in our own countries.

That said, we have never denied the effect that technological advances could have on strategic relations. We take it into account in our thinking but, whatever the theoretical possibilities, we maintain that technology cannot dictate strategic options.

As I recalled a moment ago, we decided at the recent WEU meeting in Rome that our study of the various issues connected specifically with the SDI should continue. In the context of those studies, it seems to us necessary to define the problems that the new technologies raise and to catalogue the relevant European capabilities and the prospects they offer.

Referring now to Europe and high technology I would like to say a few words about the Eureka project, initiated by my country, and the mobilisation in progress in the European countries under this heading.

Eureka is not a military project – that must be clear to everyone. It considerably antedates the SDI discussion but it clearly falls into the same context, namely the rapid and irreversible advance of technology. That advance is a veritable challenge for Europeans. Moreover, the

success of Eureka clearly shows that our view on this point is shared by all. Although the subject does not concern WEU it is very natural that I should mention it here because of the close connection between the subjects.

I would also like to put on record, in this same context, the proposal of the President of the French Republic to all our partners in the IEPG on co-operation in the field of European military aircraft. This may appear to be a rather narrow field compared with the general concern I have just referred to but the spirit of the approach is the same and that is the point I wanted to make.

Our concern is that Europeans should mobilise and organise their capacities to best effect in order to safeguard the long-term survival of a basic and to some extent threatened industry. Our unfortunate experience of a European strike aircraft has taught us the need for co-operation at the stage of defining requirements: in other words, long-term co-operation beginning as soon as those requirements are perceived.

But in this field, as for WEU, we wanted a pragmatic and flexible approach. The key requirement is a political commitment on the part of all governments interested in future programmes, which it should then be possible to co-ordinate at military and industrial level at a very early stage.

Once this political momentum has been generated we think that the work could be done in the appropriate European organisations, the IEPG in particular, and that is why I wanted to talk about it to you.

Our initiative, which admittedly was prompted by the circumstances, therefore stems from the general concern I mentioned a moment ago. But it could also be the first step in the real mobilisation of Europeans in the field of high – in this case military – technology. In any case to our way of thinking it is desirable that, in as symbolic a leading-edge industry as aerospace, the researchers, manufacturers, laboratories and governments of the different European states should learn to work together better.

With your permission, Mr. President, I will conclude with a more direct reference to recent events in the strategic field. Our first reaction to the Geneva summit was to welcome the fact that dialogue had been resumed between the top leaders of the United States and the USSR after a six-year break. We are unanimous in our hope that this is the first step towards a marked improvement in the international climate. It was to this improvement that we wanted to contribute by inviting Mr. Gorbachev to Paris and I hope the rest of the world understood it that way. But East-West relations are not confined to the dialogue between the super-powers. Each of our countries has to play its

*Mr. Dumas (continued)*

proper part and every forum in which we participate has to be used fully to that end.

Even so, we must, it seems to me, be careful not to entertain extravagant hopes, not to say illusions, however understandable these might be after the tension of the past years. Better relations may, it is true, develop. We hope so, it is what we want and what we are working for but our vigilance in defending our security and our interests must remain unchanged.

That is why, with regard to Europe, the President of the French Republic took the opportunity to tell Mr. Gorbachev that there was no question of having direct conversations about our forces. How, indeed, could he fail to reject the very principle of such a move which, on the pretext of a supposed Eurostrategic balance – itself an illusion incidentally – is in fact aimed at extending negotiations to arms which are the only foundation of the security of France and of Great Britain and have, in any case, a purely defensive character.

In this connection, we are very pleased at the firmness shown by the United States in bearing in mind the security interests of all its European allies and in repeating its assurances to us again in Brussels a few days ago when the President of the United States spoke to us. That firmness, moreover, is the key to success in the negotiations now in progress.

In this field, as in others, the awareness we need to have of European security interests must be our guide. It is in this light that we have to assess the changes the future brings in East-West relations. Monitoring those changes is your rôle and also ours in WEU. That was our intention when the reactivation of WEU was proposed.

Today our task must be to build on what has been started. In developments at international level my government sees nothing but incentives to continue along that road.

That is what I would invite you to do, Ladies and Gentlemen, but today I also wanted to reaffirm to you the resolve of the French Government to continue with the work that has begun.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – My sincere thanks, Minister, on behalf of the Assembly for your address. In this period of thought and reflection, which you have incidentally defined to perfection, I hope that all together and in co-operation with the Council, thanks among other things to the determination of the French Government to which you have just referred, we may be able to continue to give this reactivation, this revival of WEU, its full value in the great debates before us.

Once again, thank you for giving us your time.

As you know, Ladies and Gentlemen, the Minister has very little time available, so only one or two questions are possible.

I call Mr. Gansel.

Mr. GANSEL (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I would like to put a question, Minister, that I asked your British colleague yesterday. What concrete initiatives has your government taken to respond to this sentence in the communiqué of the WEU Council of Ministers held in Bonn on 23rd April:

“The Ministers... agreed to continue their collective consideration in order to achieve as far as possible a co-ordinated reaction of their governments to the invitation of the United States to participate in the research programme...”

Is it true that French firms have been taking part in American research programmes for several months already?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. DUMAS (*Minister for External Relations of France*) (Translation). – Mr. Gansel, I answered this question rather rapidly in my address but I am happy to return to it.

Our starting point in Bonn was the fact that the European countries were answering, or tending to answer, Mr. Weinberger's proposal separately. It was clear, from a first round of statements, that a uniform reply would be difficult to obtain but that, conversely, it would be in the interests of the European partners to try, as far as possible, to go further into the problem together and to co-ordinate their reply even if it could not be uniform.

Since your question asked what specific action has been taken, the position is that a group of experts was set up and worked during the interval between Bonn and a second meeting in Rome where Mr. Andreotti was in the chair.

There we heard a first report. It was very interesting, perhaps even more interesting than we had expected because it referred not only to the differences we already knew about, namely the fact that some countries – I am speaking for my own – had turned down the American proposal whilst others were ready to go along with it. That we knew. What we did not know so well was why each country was deciding the way it did and what we knew even less about was the reaction of those concerned, namely the firms and the research laboratories. Here we found that the studies that had been made were very informative. The report exists; I shall not comment on it, it would take too long, but you can obtain it for yourselves.

*Mr. Dumas (continued)*

It was in the light of these first findings that the Chairman, Mr. Andreotti, proposed to the partner countries, which agreed, that the group of experts be asked to pursue its work in that direction.

We shall probably not arrive at a uniform reply but it is interesting to note that, whilst some countries like France said there could not be any affirmative reply at government level, in other words no government-to-government agreement, the French Government nevertheless left French firms completely free to sign research or manufacturing agreements. That is what is happening or perhaps has already happened but the secrecy surrounding trade negotiations of this kind means that even the government, which is generally well informed, does not know everything. All in all, however, it understands that things are well advanced in this field.

This shows, therefore, that whilst, as first sight, the French position seems strongly opposed as compared with the others, it has to be qualified.

Similarly, some of the other countries inclined to give an affirmative answer in the form of a government agreement were, in reality, voicing certain reservations. Some were asking for trade reciprocity, and technology transfer on which they were not always given satisfaction. Others were concerned about what it would mean in terms of brain drain.

In the final analysis, I find that today the countries that were the most enthusiastic have not yet signed intergovernmental agreements. I am told that Great Britain, for example, is about to, but the reply is still awaited. So thanks to this study, which was extremely useful, it became clear that positions which were apparently far apart, were in fact much closer to one another.

So we have no government agreements but industry agreements on the one side and no government agreements yet but research with industry on the other. In reality, therefore, there has been a measure of harmonisation, or at least some drawing together and I think we were right, in Rome, to ask our experts, under the control of our Council of Ministers of course, to go on with these investigations. As I said a moment ago, this may open up another path among all the different paths leading to an overall and all-embracing view of the security problem in Europe.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Kittelmann.

Mr. KITTELMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). - I apologise to the

Minister for asking my question in German. Troubled minds have derived a great deal of comfort from his introductory words concerning, among other things, the importance of Western European Union. We have heard the message and hope we can believe it. This sitting in particular has shown that Western European Union is still very remote in practice from what the French and other governments would like it to be. I therefore hope the Minister's words will produce better results in terms of political implementation.

My question follows on from Mr. Gansel's. What, in the Minister's opinion, will be the central consultative body in the next few years for progress in SDI research, and the subsequent application of the results? Might Western European Union itself be the advisory body on defence policy issues in this sector, mediating between the United States and Europe? And if, as he has just implied, French industry is really to become increasingly involved in SDI research, does the Minister not agree that the French Government too will be forced to conclude outline agreements far exceeding what is currently regarded as avoidable?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the Minister.

Mr. DUMAS (*Minister for External Relations of France*) (Translation). - In a way, this question follows on the previous one and I partly answered it then. I can therefore be brief. It focuses mainly on the fact that two questions arise:

Is WEU the right forum for discussing problems like SDI? My answer was yes but I would not like to give the impression that the French Government thinks WEU should specialise on problems connected with SDI and make them its prime concern. Its field is far wider. That was what the French Government had in mind when it proposed the revival of WEU.

The second question relates to government agreements or the absence of government agreements. It takes the following form: will not the prospect of private agreements between business firms mean that we will have to change our attitude in some way and reverse our thinking from the position we have had up to now?

I do not think so. I explained a moment ago all the reasons, which include considerations of global strategy, why the French Government took the position you are aware of. It would take too long here to go back over all the familiar arguments behind the French Government's decision: overarming in space, upsetting the balance of power whereas we recommend working for the lowest level, our concern not to become involved in a world strategy, the fact



*Mr. Dumas (continued)*

that we are not directly concerned, the question mark over our deterrent, etc. But the French Government took no dictatorial action, even by roundabout ways – because there is a big public sector in France as you know – to prevent firms from continuing, I repeat continuing, in most cases their existing relations and contacts with American laboratories and companies. Many of them, among those that are technologically the most powerful and the most advanced, already have research contracts with the Americans. I am thinking of firms like Matra and Thomson.

In any case there was no question at all, in the mind of the French Government, of cutting this umbilical cord. On the contrary if such developments are possible they will proceed. But that should not have any effect on the government's position as such.

That is the distinction. There will be no governmental agreements, no specially earmarked public money, no participation at strategic and, of necessity, research policy level where the government is concerned; but every company is free to act and to negotiate. There is no major incompatibility, on the contrary.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Could you take one more question, Minister?

Mr. DUMAS (*Minister for External Relations of France*) (Translation). – It will have to be the last.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Cifarelli.

Mr. CIFARELLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – We note with satisfaction Mr. Dumas's remarks concerning the reactivation of Western European Union. My question is as follows. Will France support an institutional proposal that the President of our parliamentary Assembly should regularly attend meetings of the WEU Council of Ministers?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. DUMAS (*Minister for External Relations of France*) (Translation). – This is a very tricky question and although I was a lawyer for a long time I do not feel qualified to speak on behalf of the Chairman. With that proviso, anything that improves effectiveness is good. I wanted to try to get a message home to you on this point – and I hope I succeeded – a message of good will and willingness on the part of the French Government which took the decision to propose the reactivation of WEU and to make its contribution to the process.

I do not want to go further than that except to refer to a number of major principles and since I imagine the principles I am going to name will hardly satisfy you, I shall just say quietly: the executive and legislative powers must not be too closely mixed. That much we learned from Montesquieu. It was even said that Montesquieu invented nothing but learnt it from others. Introducing references of that kind, I will say no more today and leave you to decide whether it would contribute to effectiveness or not.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you very much, Minister. I am happy to say that relations between the Assembly and the Council, and especially between the Council and the President of this Assembly, have so far been excellent and I am glad to say so publicly.

I thank you most sincerely, Minister, for giving us your time. We have greatly valued your replies and have listened to them most carefully, particularly those to the questions from Mr. Gansel and Mr. Kittelmann.

#### *10. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Address by Mr. Andreotti, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in Office of the Council.
2. WEU and the strategic defence initiative:
  - (a) The strategic defence initiative (Defence aspects) (Vote on the draft recommendation of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Document 1033 and amendments);
  - (b) The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance (Vote on the draft recommendation of the General Affairs Committee, Document 1034 and amendments);
  - (c) Guidelines drawn from the colloquy on the space challenge for Europe (Proposals) (Vote on the draft recommendation of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Document 1036 and amendments).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(*The sitting was closed at 1.20 p.m.*)

# ELEVENTH SITTING

Wednesday, 4th December 1985

## SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the minutes.
2. Attendance register.
3. Iran-Iraq war (*Motion for a resolution, Doc. 1047*).
4. Address by Mr. Andreotti, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.  
*Replies by Mr. Andreotti to questions put by:* Mr. Sarti, Mr. Gansel, Mr. Rauti, Dame Jill Knight, Mr. Rubbi, Sir John Page, Mr. Michel, Mr. Berger, Mr. Bianco.
5. WEU and the strategic defence initiative.  
(a) The strategic defence initiative (Defence aspects) (*Vote on the draft recommendation of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 1033 and amendments*).  
*Speakers:* The President, Mr. van den Bergh (*Rapporteur for the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*), Mr. Hill (*Rapporteur for the General Affairs Committee*), Mr. Gansel, Mr. Michel, Mr. Pignion, Mr. van den Bergh, Mr. Hill, Dr. Miller, Mr. van den Bergh, Mr. Hill, Mr. Millan, Mr. van den Bergh, Mr. Dejardin (point of order), Mr. Hill, Dr. Miller, Mr. van den Bergh, Mr. Hill, Mr. Millan, Mr. van den Bergh, Mr. Pignion, Mr. Edwards, Sir Anthony Grant, Mr. van den Bergh, Mr. Hill, Mr. Edwards, Mr. van den Bergh, Mr. Pignion, Mr. Millan (point of order), Mr. Gansel, Mr. Hill, Dr. Miller, Mr. van den Bergh, Mr. Hill, Mr. Gansel, Mr. van den

Bergh, Mr. Hill, Mr. van den Bergh, Mr. Gansel, Mr. van den Bergh, Mr. Gansel, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. van den Bergh, Mr. Hill, Dr. Miller, Mr. van den Bergh, Mr. Hill, Mr. Gansel, Mr. van den Bergh, Mr. Millan, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. van den Bergh, Mr. Hill, Mr. Gansel, Mr. van den Bergh, Dr. Miller, Mr. van den Bergh, Mr. Edwards, Mr. Berger, Mr. van den Bergh, Mr. Hardy (point of order), Mr. Hill, Mr. Gansel, Mr. van den Bergh; (points of order): Mr. van den Bergh, Mr. Schulte; (explanation of vote): Mr. Lenzer, Mr. Bianco, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Antoni, Mr. Gorla, Mr. Palumbo, Mr. Rauti.

(b) The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance (*Vote on the draft recommendation of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 1034 and amendments*).

*Speakers:* The President, Mr. Spies von Büllesheim, Mr. Michel, Mr. Spies von Büllesheim, Mr. Berrier, Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt, Mr. Berrier, Mr. Michel.

(c) Guidelines drawn from the colloquy on the space challenge for Europe (Proposals) (*Vote on the draft recommendation of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Doc. 1036 and amendments*).

*Speakers:* The President, Mr. Millan, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Lenzer, Dr. Miller, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Lenzer, Mr. Millan, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Lenzer, Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Lenzer; (points of order): Mr. Jäger, Dr. Miller, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt, Dr. Miller, Mr. Lenzer.

6. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

*The sitting was opened at 3.15 p.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

### 1. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

*The minutes are agreed to.*

### 2. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

1. See page 36.

### 3. Iran-Iraq war

*(Motion for a resolution, Doc. 1047)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I have received from Mr. Bianco and others a draft resolution on the war in Iran and Iraq, Document 1047, tabled in accordance with Rule 28 of the Rules of Procedure. I propose to refer this draft resolution to the Presidential Committee in accordance with Rule 28, paragraph 3 of the Rules of Procedure.

Are there any objections?...

It is so decided.

### 4. Address by Mr. Andreotti, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the address by Mr. Andreotti, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

*The President (continued)*

I take this opportunity, Mr. Chairman, of welcoming you once more on behalf of the Assembly, of thanking you for making yourself available to address us and, in the name of the members of the Assembly and its President, for all that you have already achieved since you became Chairman of the Council of Ministers.

I now invite you to take the rostrum.

Mr. ANDREOTTI (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, this session of the Assembly falls between the Soviet-American summit in Geneva and the meeting of the European Council in Luxembourg on the one hand and the next ministerial session of the North Atlantic Council on the other, which will continue the assessment started on 21st November of the outcome of the recent meeting between Mr. Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev and of the prospects it has offered for East-West relations and the disarmament negotiations. It coincides in other words with one of the most important and vital political moments of the last few years, one of the moments when policies which are bound to have major consequences for Europe's institutions, political rôle and security are decided. It is therefore a special privilege for me to be able to speak as Chairman-in-Office of the WEU Council at the end of the debate which the Assembly has quite rightly devoted to a subject of great international immediacy, namely the rôle of anti-missile defence in future strategy. The course and results of this debate will certainly be of great importance for the governments of WEU member countries. They will contribute effectively to strengthening the links between government action and the work of the parliamentary institutions of WEU which is essential for the union to have a genuinely incisive rôle in defining European security policy, until such time as conditions are ripe for closer merging of this rôle with European political co-operation.

The weeks leading up to this subject have been dominated first by the preparation of the Soviet-American summit in Geneva and then by analysis of the results. The results are well known and I believe that there is unanimous agreement in both the West and the East that they were very positive and in many respects exceeded previous expectations. Above all, the Geneva talks laid a more permanent and stable foundation for the political dialogue, up to the highest level, between the United States and the Soviet Union with consequences which must inevitably have a positive effect on the progress of East-West relations as a whole. However, the more important fact is that the two leaders agreed when they met to work positively and constructively for solutions to outstanding problems,

with special reference to the whole range of disarmament negotiations from Geneva to the Stockholm conference and including the negotiations on chemical weapons and the reduction of conventional forces in Central Europe. There were, admittedly, no specific agreements but they could not realistically have been expected in view of the complexity of the problems and of the difficulty which even experts find in disentangling their many interlinked implications. It is also a fact, however, that while some prejudices were not completely removed they were at least reduced; the two leaders agreed on the possibility of rapid progress in the negotiations on the areas of disarmament where positions have moved closer together recently and they also agreed to maintain the momentum established in the two months of the Geneva negotiations. In other words, only partial results were achieved but a first step was taken in the right direction; it was a major step from which we can hope that the relative frequency of future summit meetings will lead on to more substantial progress when the negotiators have helped to whittle down the number of problems and to identify clearly those which require political action.

At the Brussels meeting after the summit, President Reagan reported the results to the allied heads of governments and foreign ministers and stressed the importance of the contribution which the ideas and common attitude of the NATO countries and first of all of the WEU countries had made to the success of the Geneva talks. It is a fact that perhaps for the first time since the fifties a president of the United States met his Soviet opposite number backed by a favourable overall strategic situation and such a high measure of cohesion within the Atlantic Alliance. The attention paid by the United States Government to the views of the European allies during the run up to the summit contributed in very large measure to this cohesion. In particular, the United States reaffirmed the essential part played by the agreements ratified in the Geneva communiqué of 8th January last in the process of reopening the Soviet-American dialogue and in the important decision taken on 11th October last by President Reagan concerning the interpretation of the ABM treaty. To sum up, as a result of the intense consultations which preceded the summit, the President of the United States was in a position in Geneva to express views largely shared by the European allies and for that reason the successful outcome of the meeting was also a success for Europe. This impression was reflected in the debate held in the European Council in Luxembourg on the rôle which Europe would be required to play over the coming months to advance the process started in Geneva.

I believe there is also an important lesson to be drawn from what happened in Geneva, with

*Mr. Andreotti (continued)*

specific reference to the strategic defence initiative which has been debated by the Assembly throughout this session. The lesson is that we must try not to identify our expectations regarding the course of future events with tactical, negotiating positions which are by their nature contingent and do not reflect the basic facts of the policies of the West and first and foremost of the United States on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other. The main result of Geneva was the breaking of what many regarded as the unbreakable link between the progress of the Soviet-American dialogue and the military programmes of the two sides. In fact the summit showed that even such a vital issue as the future management of American and Soviet research into anti-missile defence systems does not preclude a practical and constructive dialogue between the United States and the USSR on their overall relations. This offered much more hopeful prospects of agreement so that it will probably be less difficult to find a solution for outstanding problems such as research into defence technologies, in the context of a dialogue which is destined to develop at political level also over the forthcoming months. This was a lesson which should already have been drawn from the case of the Euromissiles and which, in my opinion, has been usefully confirmed in the case of the strategic defence initiative.

The Geneva talks in any case helped to throw a little light on the political implications of the American research programme. In my opinion they also paved the way for a detailed examination round the negotiating table of the American proposals on space weapons, which over the last few months have been acquiring a measure of substance which can no longer be ignored by the Russians and have most recently been extended to include the interesting and constructive idea of open laboratories which, may I remind you, has long been urged by Italy especially through the scientific conferences held each year at Erice in Sicily. Until the Geneva negotiations produce results, the governments and other political forces in Europe will have an opportunity, working in an atmosphere less charged with political considerations, to make a preliminary but nonetheless necessary analysis of the security implications of the strategic defence initiative for Europe and for the world as a whole.

Speaking as Chairman-in-Office of the WEU Council I realise that it may seem difficult to try to identify common elements in the attitudes of the governments of member countries to the strategic defence initiative. Nevertheless I think that there are many more points of agreement than is generally recognised between their positions and between the European and Ame-

rican positions. The reason for the widespread impression that there is no broadly-shared view of the problem probably lies in the fact that differences generally receive more attention than points of agreement. For that reason this seems to me to be the best place to emphasise the latter and to leave the former aside for once.

For Europe, the strategic defence initiative raises three kinds of problems concerning respectively the strategic concept on which the project is based, its political and security implications with particular reference to European security and participation by European firms and research centres in the research work.

The strategic concept on which SDI is based is probably the main reason for uncertainties regarding the project. The uncertainty is due mainly to the fact that the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons sometimes offered by the Americans as the ultimate object of SDI, without too much concern for the implications of this vision for conventional force balances which for obvious reasons are most important for Europe, does not coincide fully with the specific aim of the programme as at present presented, which looks to the neutralisation and subsequent elimination by negotiation of the potentially most dangerous and destabilising element in offensive nuclear arsenals, namely ballistic missiles. This amounts to asking how far the differences of view concerning the proposal are to be attributed to the substance of the American programme and how far to the fact that thoughts on SDI on both sides of the Atlantic are being carried further and clarified in a process which is not yet complete but is destined to continue for some time. My view is that if the possibility of developing defensive systems guaranteeing total protection is ruled out, defensive technologies will have the effect of introducing an element of very great uncertainty regarding the results of a missile attack and that this effect should be taken into account in working out concepts within the wider context of the strategy of deterrence which is particularly noteworthy for its uncertainty. Furthermore even the Americans now recognise that any defensive systems will have a complementary rôle and will not take the place of the nuclear deterrent strategy. My personal view is that there are good grounds for attributing the uncertainties I have mentioned to circumstances which will be largely eliminated as more knowledge emerges regarding the effective innovative effect of the strategic concept incorporated in SDI and as the limits as well as the likely potential of the initiative are recognised. I think this also because there is basic agreement between us Europeans and between ourselves and the Americans on the need to reshape the quantity, quality and rôle of the offensive nuclear arsenals which now greatly exceed any reasonable and legitimate security

*Mr. Andreotti (continued)*

requirement. The governments of member countries also agree that the best way to achieve this result is through the negotiated reduction of offensive arsenals. This, moreover, is how the relationship between offensive weapons and defence systems should be seen. The latter should not determine the level of the former because the results of such an approach would be a race in offensive weapons. It is rather the level of offensive weapons which should determine the need for and size of a defence system, allowing agreement to maintain both at the lowest possible levels.

However, the problems relating to assessment of the political and security implications of the strategic defence initiative are much more complex. At its meeting at ministerial level held in Rome on 14th November last, the WEU Council agreed that it was too early to try to answer the questions raised by such implications and that a final assessment will have to be based on consultations within the Atlantic Alliance and naturally within WEU, in the light of the results which will emerge progressively from the American research programme and the Geneva negotiations.

When I was speaking of the results of the Soviet-American summit I referred to the political implications particularly as regards East-West relations and the disarmament negotiations. It seems clear to me that only the Geneva negotiations will be able to meet the demand common to the governments of the member countries that defensive technologies should be used in such a manner that strategic stability is not prejudiced. Furthermore, it will only be as time passes that the negotiations will show the real significance of the link which the Russians made between an agreement on the strategic defence initiative and agreements to reduce offensive nuclear weapons and even after the Geneva summit there is still uncertainty about that link. I should say, however, that that link is not the only negotiating problem which will have to be resolved in Geneva, nor even the most important. In reality the first problems to be resolved in the negotiations on offensive weapons are those created by the Soviet attempt to impose a definition of strategic nuclear weapons conflicting with the one they accepted in the SALT II treaty and by the Soviet demand that the nuclear forces of third countries should be included in calculating the intermediate-range nuclear forces deployed on both sides. Both demands look for a balance of European strategic forces and seek to separate the defence of Europe from that of the United States. These therefore violate the principle of the indivisibility of alliance security and are even more unacceptable to us Europeans than to

the Americans. In practice, it is only after solutions have been found to these two problems that the question of linkage is likely to become a live issue. However, the basic approach characterising the most recent Soviet proposals demonstrates that the Soviet Union is not conducting its Geneva negotiations on offensive strategic arsenals solely in terms of the problem of SDI but on the basis of objectives which do not differ substantially from those pursued in earlier negotiations for nuclear disarmament.

The reply to the questions raised by the security implications of the strategic defence initiative also depends on factors which for the time being can only be the subject of conjecture. These include the feasibility of defensive systems, their effectiveness, their degree of invulnerability, their cost in absolute terms and in comparative terms in relation to the cost of countermeasures which might be taken to neutralise them, and their ability to ensure a uniform level of protection for the entire territory of the alliance. Clearly, these are elements with a vital bearing on the evaluation of the project, and only the results of the research now in progress will provide the data required for such an evaluation. Before that stage is reached, any positive or negative judgment would in fact be an act of faith, and it would be irresponsible to commit oneself prematurely on a subject of such intimate concern to the essential security requirements of our continent.

At the same time, the deferment of an evaluation until the data required for the formulation of a responsible assessment become available does not mean that we should not give thought to the matter or form some preliminary judgment. On the contrary, this kind of appraisal has been continuously in progress in both the Atlantic Alliance and WEU. Looking at the results of this process and at the stated positions of the various governments, I believe that there are many important points of agreement between those positions, just as there are between these and the American position. I think it may be useful to try to summarise these elements here, although I realise that not every word I utter will necessarily represent a consensus view.

The starting point for any analysis of this kind is obviously the fact that for all of us the basic objective of the alliance continues to be the safeguarding of peace and prevention of the risk of conflict by maintaining a stable strategic balance between East and West, without attempting to achieve military superiority but not ignoring the military efforts of the Soviet Union. In this context, the essential precondition for balance is a strong and credible deterrent capability and the maintenance of this capability in the foreseeable future by constant efforts to strengthen the various elements of the nuclear deterrent by

*Mr. Andreotti (continued)*

appropriate modernisation programmes. The credibility of the strategy of deterrence must be assured and the strategy itself must not be substantially modified until concrete alternatives offering better prospects of preventing a war are identified.

At the same time it would be unwise to disregard the effects on strategy of technological advances and the changing pattern of the threats which face us. In this context, the SDI project is a long-term programme whose results will have to be assessed in the process of consultation between the allies and in the light of their ability to contribute to the deterrence of a potential aggressor and to the prevention of a war.

The governments of the WEU member countries are convinced, furthermore, that the agreed provisions of the treaties in force, and primarily of the ABM treaty, allow the continuation of research into defensive systems and that the need and expediency of such activities must also be assessed in the light of parallel Soviet activities. There is substantial agreement between the governments of the WEU member countries that, given the American undertaking to negotiate and possibly to share the results of research, the present stage of the SDI project is legitimate and justified. As Mr. Dumas said to the United Nations General Assembly, the possession by one of the two superpowers of operational anti-missile and anti-satellite systems justifies the efforts of the other. At the same time, our governments attach the greatest importance to the scrupulous observation by both the Americans and the Soviets of their obligations under the existing treaties. We greatly welcomed, therefore, the American Government's decision to confine its own research activities in the field of defence technology within limits compatible with a restrictive interpretation of the ABM treaty and not to modify that decision without consulting the allies and holding discussions with the Soviets.

In our view, it must not be the purpose of the strategic defence initiative to achieve a position of superiority, and we are pleased that this principle is enshrined in the joint declaration issued at the end of the Geneva summit. The purpose of SDI must be to maintain the balance and guarantee stability in the long term. The undertaking given by the United States Government to negotiate with the Soviet Union on the outcome of its research programme was necessary in order to avoid a long period of insecurity and instability. The search for an understanding with the Soviet Union on the joint management of any results produced by the present phase of the SDI project is the proper response to certain legitimate worries expressed by the Soviet Union

regarding security and to the need to avoid as far as possible any destabilising effect.

Alongside this, the need to preserve the alliance's political and strategic cohesion must constantly be borne in mind. European security must not be separated from that of the United States and research on defensive systems must take account of all aspects of the threat at all levels, both nuclear and conventional, so as to prevent the creation of zones with different levels of security within the NATO area. In other words, the security of the alliance must remain indivisible.

As you can see, Ladies and Gentlemen, the process of thinking out the line to be taken by the WEU member countries regarding the whole range of problems posed by the strategic defence initiative is fairly well advanced. The illustration I have just given does not, I must repeat, constitute a joint platform which has already been agreed. To arrive at that point the responsible authorities of WEU will have to go into the problem more deeply. However, this involves areas which, in my opinion, offer ample prospects for agreement and where it is realistic to suppose that a genuine joint position can be worked out. Until European political co-operation is empowered to deal with these problems, co-ordination within WEU will be of primary importance in this area and will constitute one of the principal means by which the member countries can contribute to the present discussions within NATO and can at the same time use this forum to stress Europe's special security requirements.

The work of co-ordination within WEU has already proved very useful and has produced substantial results through joint discussion of the problem of participation by European research centres and companies in the research phase of the strategic defence initiative. The exercise initiated by the decision taken at the ministerial meeting of the Council in Bonn has, in fact, led to the formulation of a number of important basic positions. Furthermore, through a continuous exchange of information about the progress and growing results of the exploratory contacts between the Americans and governments which have given definite consideration to the possibility of participating in the American programme, the governments of member states have been given a constantly updated picture of the advancement of those contacts. This phase of the work of co-ordination is now approaching its natural completion. The Council of Ministers, meeting in Rome, took note of the results achieved and decided in consequence to pursue those aspects of the problem which are still immediately relevant, while at the same time allowing the governments of the member states the flexibility they need in order to take account of their own

*Mr. Andreotti (continued)*

particular internal organisation, when deciding on the forms of collaboration which will best safeguard their own interests and objectives. Some of our governments have already made their choice and have decided that, in present circumstances, it would be inappropriate to become directly involved in organising participation. Others will decide their position in the near future. Through the Permanent Council, the Chairman will not fail to keep the Assembly informed of these developments.

The rôle of WEU in defining a European security policy, to which I referred at the beginning, is widely recognised. The determination to make better use of the union to strengthen co-operation between the member states in the area of security policy and to encourage the formation of a consensus on the major issues of peace, the strengthening of deterrence and defence and the consolidation of the dialogue and co-operation as these affect our continent has been further reinforced by the Bonn meeting.

If the pivotal point of our activity continues to be the solidarity of the countries of the Atlantic Alliance, the particular rôle of WEU lies in the thrust towards the achievement of European unity. The security issue is one of the dimensions of the work of construction aimed at European union which is being carried out by the Twelve of the Community, including among their number the seven member countries of WEU.

While I believe that the Europe of the Communities is the most suitable forum for the development of an overall security dimension, it still falls short in this respect because there is no unanimity on the formulation of a common policy in this area, as in others. If progress cannot be achieved in this area within the broader context of the Community, we shall bear a heavier burden of responsibility in WEU. If we make the, certainly not merely hypothetical, assumption that the Twelve decide that the time is not yet ripe to include the security dimension in the construction of Europe, WEU is certain to remain the only European forum for debate and concerted action on these issues.

Before I finish, I would like to refer, if only briefly, to a question which I know to be close to the heart of this Assembly and which, in my opinion unjustifiably damages relations between the Assembly and the Council. I refer, as many of you will have already guessed, to the question of the Assembly budget. This issue, which is certainly of secondary importance, must be considered in the general context of the political reactivation of this organisation, and the Council is giving it its closest attention in the hope of finding a satisfactory solution. Notwithstand-

ing the very real difficulties encountered by all our governments in increasing the allocation of financial resources – difficulties of which you, as responsible representatives of your national parliaments, are all aware – there has been growing recognition by the Council that a greater effort is required to meet the acknowledged requirements of this Assembly. In this connection, it is a source of satisfaction to be able to confirm the favourable response which has been given to the request for a supplementary budget for 1985. This request was passed on to me personally by your President, Mr. Caro, when we met in Rome on 11th September last. It was against this background that the decision to reactivate the organisation was taken in Rome a year ago. The intervening period shows that we have advanced steadily along this path, and the reforms achieved have led to the present agreement.

I regard as a useful development the setting up of a contact group to bring the Assembly and the Council closer together.

Another cause for satisfaction is the agreement to create a joint ad hoc committee comprising three members of the Presidential Committee and three members of the Council. I am further convinced that it should be possible in a spirit of dialogue to find a satisfactory solution for the 1986 budget. The group in question should be instructed to evaluate procedures for settling the budget problem in that spirit of co-operation which should increasingly characterise relations between the Assembly and the Council.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Chairman, thank you once more for your observations. We have all listened with close attention throughout and, bearing in mind our contacts prior to this sitting and the very important statements you have just made both on the basic policy to be followed by Western European Union and on the introduction of new working methods, I am sure that your address will not merely be a document which we shall study with the closest attention, but also a guide which will facilitate our future activities.

Mr. Chairman, before asking you to reply to questions from some of my colleagues, may I welcome among the members of the Permanent Council Ambassador Bottai, with whom I am sure we shall have a most fruitful relationship. Your Excellency, I thank you for joining us.

I call Mr. Sarti.

Mr. SARTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – It gave us great satisfaction, Minister, to hear WEU mentioned, and not merely symbolically, in the Luxembourg communiqué. However, I would like to ask you, as Italy's Foreign Minister and

*Mr. Sarti (continued)*

our Chairman-in-Office, how you assess the outcome of the European Council meeting which you attended, and how we should interpret the reservations expressed at the end by the Italian Government.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. ANDREOTTI (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – The reference quoted by Mr. Sarti is in the document on political co-operation and occurs at the point where it is stated that the participation of Community countries in the search for a common policy – with special reference to foreign policy – does not stand in the way of some countries cultivating other relations as well – with democratic countries, of course. As is made clear in a note, this applies to Denmark in its relations with the other Scandinavian countries, but – and this is where WEU is mentioned – it is specifically stated that, in matters of European defence and security policy, it is particularly applicable to those Community countries which belong to the Atlantic Alliance and WEU.

This is the reference mentioned by Mr. Sarti.

As to my own opinion, I should forget my nationality, but, since it is I personally who am asked for my opinion about the European Council meeting in Luxembourg, I would comment as follows. It is certainly true that the Council meeting did produce positive results in that even the three countries which refused in Milan to accept the conference to modify the treaty expressed a favourable view on some points, so that the treaty will be altered. In this respect, therefore, there is no doubt that the outcome is positive. My reservations are more general in character. An intergovernmental conference is an exceptional event which cannot be repeated at short intervals and the fact that some advances were made, albeit not those we might have hoped for, means that satisfaction with what was achieved is qualified. In particular, I certainly regard as inadequate what was achieved, against our own views and those, prompted by quite opposite reasoning, of Denmark, with regard to the European Parliament. This concerns the preservation of the legislative power of the Council of Ministers. It does not involve divesting national parliaments of any powers but concerns areas of responsibility which are already within the province of the Community. Hence, the desire that the legislative power should remain practically concentrated in the Council of Ministers – except for some useful though very minor changes – does not strike me as very wise.

This morning I was pleased to hear Roland Dumas quoting Montesquieu, but here I must add that the exercise of legislative power by the Council of Ministers alone is something which would certainly not have had Montesquieu's approval.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Gansel.

Mr. GANSEL (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I should like to thank the Minister for his exceptionally informative and interesting statement. I would not be doing justice to that statement if I put the same question to him as I did to Baroness Young and Mr. Dumas, but he too referred to the report of the WEU working group on SDI, explaining why WEU had not produced a joint response to the United States offer, as announced in the Bonn communiqué. Mr. Dumas referred me to this report and said it could be inspected. I would now ask him, as the representative of the Council of Ministers, to ensure that the Assembly receives and can study this report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. ANDREOTTI (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – Personally, I see no difficulty, and it seems to me that it would be a waste of money for the Assembly to set up its own study group in addition to those already created by the Council of Ministers. For the sake of good order, I shall put to my colleagues the request, in my opinion entirely justified, that you be informed of the result of this first part of the study, which will continue.

We should emulate the example of the United States of America where, for a few dollars, one can go to Congress and buy a most impressive publication produced by the study group set up by Congress on the same subject. It is a publication which ends perhaps on a note of doubt rather than certainty.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Rauti.

Mr. RAUTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. Chairman, in expressing my own thanks for your address, I would like to ask a question: is it not the case that the caution displayed in response to the strategic defence initiative – in my opinion the excessive caution, although it seems to reflect the general position of WEU countries, is liable to cause governments to lose sight of the reality of the situation? I make this point on two grounds. First, because America will in any case proceed with the project and there is obviously no way of stopping it, and, second, because private companies with European scientific and technological expertise are, of course, at liberty to cultivate links with the United States.



*Mr. Rauti (continued)*

And, when it is finally decided what political attitude is to be adopted in a situation which has by that time crystallised, what possible value will the response then have? We shall have missed the boat with everything on board, including, I repeat, Western European scientific and technological know-how.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. ANDREOTTI (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – In the present situation I think it is wise to adopt the attitude I referred to in my address a short time ago, i.e. we should not make any political or military assessment of this project as a whole, and governments should confine themselves to agreeing with the United States that everything should be done on both sides in compliance with the ABM agreements and undertakings.

We are still at the beginning of a research programme whose ultimate objectives have yet to be defined. A whole range of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States of America await resumption and it would therefore be premature for governments to express a view which, indeed, nobody has asked us to do.

What is important now is the possibility for our companies and research centres to participate in advanced research and technology and to do so particularly with funds supplied by the United States and not by European countries. It will be necessary here to avoid creating obstacles – that much is obvious – and, should the need arise, governments must also be in a position, firstly, to guarantee the reliability of companies, including the issue of industrial confidentiality and, secondly, to give the companies themselves a legal guarantee enabling them to exploit the results of their research; and that means not just their own individual research, but all research in the industrial sector to which they belong.

These two guarantees – one active and the other passive as one might say – if needed and if demanded by the American Government or by companies themselves, will surely be provided by our governments. As far as the Italian Government is concerned, there is no doubt on that point.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Dame Jill Knight.

Dame Jill KNIGHT (*United Kingdom*). – We all appreciated what Mr. Andreotti said, especially as he paid tribute to WEU's increasing importance. No member of the Assembly is not ready and anxious to exercise any responsibilities that might be laid upon us so that we

may fulfil the increasing rôle that he described. Some of us sometimes feel that it is not possible to act as we should like because we do not know what is going on. Can Mr. Andreotti tell us more about what happened in the European Council at Luxembourg? What does he regard as the implications of the Luxembourg talks on WEU, which is the only organisation comprising European countries concerned with European defence? We are anxious to do our bit, but that is difficult if we do not know what is going on.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. ANDREOTTI (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – In view of the fact that one country, Ireland, does not belong to the Atlantic Alliance, it has been recognised by the European Council and by the Community generally that the political aspects of security come within the purview of the European Community. This is a step forward, since, although that principle was already applied in practice, it has now been made official by the introduction of these changes to the treaty.

With regard to the actual quotation which I have already referred to, it is clear in my opinion that detailed technical and military development of these political elements is not possible within the European Community. It has therefore been rightly pointed out that, for the seven member countries of WEU – and presumably for those other Community countries which wish to join WEU, and which WEU is prepared to welcome as members – Western European Union provides the forum of debate for these problems.

This leaves the Community, as such, with the task of debating the political aspects of security in general terms, while WEU provides the forum for detailed discussion of European security problems with a view to establishing a common policy in this area.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Rubbi.

Mr. RUBBI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I also wish to thank our Minister – who in this case may even be said to be doubly ours – for the trouble he has gone to and I share his views about the Geneva summit. However, I am hesitant to place too optimistic an interpretation on the results of the summit, as I personally fail to detect, either in the joint statement issued at the end or in any subsequent statements, any sign of an endorsement of the SDI project, however modest, even as regards the research stage.

Mr. Andreotti has referred to the American President's Brussels speech, but we might also

*Mr. Rubbi (continued)*

quote the speeches made by Mr. Gorbachev in Prague and to the Supreme Soviet. We should not find there any hint of an endorsement. What the understanding amounts to is therefore that all three issues already under discussion can and must be negotiated.

What is more, the American project involves the risks the Minister referred to, i.e. the danger of seriously destabilising international relations.

If, therefore, this project is at the root of the profound differences which have emerged both in the scientific world and in government circles as well as within the political forces operating in the United States and Europe, and if the project does indeed preclude serious and substantive agreements on strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons, should we not then ask our ally, the United States, to modify substantially the strategic and political objectives which prompted the project in the first place?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. ANDREOTTI (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – In adopting an optimistic tone in appraising what has happened so far, and provided always that we watch carefully the progress of the resumed relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, I am prompted by two considerations. The first is that, after not meeting for almost seven years, the leaders have now met, and further meetings have been arranged. That is certainly a positive step. The second consideration concerns President Reagan's speech, which I naturally heard, whereas, not having been present myself, I had to read in the newspapers Mr. Gorbachev's speeches to the Warsaw Pact countries and the Supreme Soviet. As a result, my basis of appraisal is somewhat different in each case. I can say, however, that that part of Mr. Reagan's speech which was negative – and it was only a small part – has now been cut out and a passage from the joint communiqué of 8th January inserted, in which the aim of avoiding an arms race in space, as established by Mr. Gromyko and Mr. Shultz, is confirmed by Mr. Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev.

I therefore think it would be difficult to ask the United States to change its position at the present stage. I can say, however, that the timetable of events, from the major annual meetings which have been agreed and the working groups which have been set up and to the negotiating forums familiar to us all, does provide the assurance that the effort to find a way of removing distrust and achieving concrete results is actually under way.

I therefore have some confidence that 1986, which the United Nations terms the year of peace, may well turn out to be just that.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir John Page.

Sir John PAGE (*United Kingdom*). – I am grateful to Mr. Andreotti for his encouraging speech. We are glad to see him in such a dynamic mood because we believe that last night he was working late in Brussels. His commitment to European co-operation and a wider world co-operation is well known. I therefore have confidence in asking him a universal question about space. I believe that the Minister senses that there is a need for an organisation to co-ordinate and to confer about European military space activities. Does the Minister consider that WEU would be an available, experienced and appropriate organ to perform that urgent purpose?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. ANDREOTTI (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – I have pleasure in replying to Sir John Page, with whom I have worked for many years in the Interparliamentary Union. It is true that we worked late into the night, due partly to the great negotiating capacity of his Prime Minister.

In answer to the question how WEU could become more involved at the present stage, when we all have to collaborate in studying the problems of defence in space, I can say that, at the next meeting of the Council of Ministers, when we shall be reviewing the Assembly's present debate on SDI, I shall try to raise the issue of how it might be possible to bring to your knowledge the activities of the working group dealing with this subject on behalf of the Council of Ministers. In the interests of all our countries, we shall see whether this Assembly can become a forum for detailed discussion and for permanent updating of consideration of the space issue in all its aspects, extending from the political to the strictly technical sphere. I shall bring the matter to the attention of my colleagues in the Council of Ministers.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Michel.

Mr. MICHEL (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Minister, at the end of your remarkable address you referred to the creation of a contact group. That is all very well, but I would like to ask you how our Assembly can exercise its powers of control under Article IX of the treaty if it is not notified directly by the Council of Ministers of all important decisions?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. ANDREOTTI (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – I can only repeat what I said before. I shall try to familiarise myself in more detail with the difficulties which have arisen in the past, and I shall then consider how, during my period of office as Chairman, contacts could be made more frequent and more effective.

The Permanent Council, on which the Chair is represented by Mr. Bottai, will certainly play a helpful rôle here, and it will also give me the opportunity of increasing my contacts with Mr. Bottai, with whom I have worked for many years at the Ministry.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Berger.

Mr. BERGER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I should like to ask the Minister a question that I put to Baroness Young yesterday and my colleague Peter Kittelmann put to the French Foreign Minister, Mr. Dumas, this morning. In yesterday's debate we agreed that Europe's interest in the strategic defence initiative had not been analysed and that we do not have a full list of the European options with respect to this American initiative. I should therefore like to ask the Minister whether his government is prepared to define European interests in the strategic defence initiative, to analyse our possible options and to join with the other Western European partners in the alliance in drawing the necessary practical conclusions. Is his government then prepared to make this the subject of transatlantic co-operation and – to revert to the original question – does he regard Western European Union as the appropriate institution for this purpose?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. ANDREOTTI (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – In answer to the question I will just say, firstly, that part of this study is in the hands of the working group referred to in replies to earlier questions, and, secondly, that we in Italy have conducted fairly detailed studies on this subject, sometimes in collaboration with other allied countries which share our aims.

If the President has no objections, I shall forward a copy of these studies, so that they can be available to any parliamentarians who may care to examine them.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Bianco.

Mr. BIANCO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Minister, your address was so concentrated and full of content that it raises numerous questions. Perhaps I may just ask two.

You stated, very rightly, that European security must remain integrated without imbalances at any level, nuclear or conventional. I should like to ask you what progress is being made in the Vienna talks on conventional weapons. Do you think that this aspect of European defence is sufficiently integrated, or could proposals be made for improving the forms of integration?

As to my second question, Mr. Dumas's address this morning on the subject of the positions gradually being reached by WEU governments seems to indicate a trend towards a situation where companies are at liberty to collaborate in the SDI project. Is this enough? Does the American Government not consider there should be greater government involvement? And, above all, if this situation is accepted by the American Government, does it not mean that Europe will be placed in a subordinate position as regards the research projects carried out by the United States?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. ANDREOTTI (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – Attention needs to be given to the political aspect of the first question. This, certainly, is within the purview of my Ministry, and the basic principle here is that no change should result in periods of exposure between one system and another. To be clear on this point – and this observation also applies to the Warsaw Pact countries apart from the Soviet Union – indivisibility means to us that any system which would provide an umbrella of nuclear protection for one country, great or small, while leaving the others exposed is inconceivable. This would not only violate a rule which has always guided the alliance in the past, i.e. the rule requiring identity of views, but would also place any country without such protection in a specially weak position.

So much, then, for the political aspect of the matter.

Where integration is concerned, you will be addressed tomorrow by the Defence Minister and I do not wish to poach on his territory. For some years it was my responsibility, but now I have retired from the post of Defence Minister and am unable to give any views on military technology. I should therefore be grateful if Mr. Bianco would repeat his question to Mr. Spadolini.

In answer to the question whether it is sufficient for the United States that companies

*Mr. Andreotti (continued)*

should be cultivating contacts with American concerns, I would say yes, given the fact that such contacts exist, have always existed and will always exist in the future. I have also said that, if the American Government required some guarantee of a company's reliability, say in connection with industrial confidentiality or for some other reason, then our own government and the other European governments would certainly be prepared to agree to this. Again, if companies, apart from the legal protection afforded by ordinary patent law, required guarantees vis-à-vis the United States covering the exploitation of the results of their research, and requested the government to stand surety for such guarantees, then the government would certainly be prepared to comply.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Chairman, that brings us to the end of the questions which the members of this Assembly wish to put to you. I would like to thank you for your replies, and I hope that we shall shortly meet again to make a favourable assessment of the situation, in accordance with the wishes we have expressed on both sides.

## **5. WEU and the strategic defence initiative**

### **(a) The strategic defence initiative (Defence aspects)**

*(Vote on the draft recommendation of the  
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments,  
Doc. 1033 and amendments)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the vote on the draft recommendation of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on WEU and the strategic defence initiative, (a) the strategic defence initiative (defence aspects), Document 1033 and amendments.

As we agreed at the end of the general debate, I would remind you, before calling the Rapporteur, that the amendments will be taken in the order in which they relate to the text of the draft recommendation, that is to say: Amendment 15 by Mr. Gansel, Amendment 1 by Mr. Hill, Amendment 2 by Mr. Hill, Amendment 16 by Mr. Gansel, Amendment 3 by Mr. Hill, Amendment 4 by Mr. Hill, Amendment 17 by Mr. Gansel, Amendment 5 by Mr. Hill, Amendment 18 by Mr. Gansel, Amendment 7 by Mr. Hill, Amendment 6 by Mr. Hill, Amendment 8 by Mr. Hill, Amendment 19 by Mr. Gansel, Amendment 20 by Mr. Gansel, Amendment 13 by Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt, Amendment 9 by Mr. Hill, Amendment 10 by Mr. Hill, Amendment 21 by Mr. Gansel, Amendment 11 by Mr. Hill, Amendment 14 by Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt,

Amendment 22 by Mr. Gansel, Amendment 23 by Mr. Gansel and Amendment 24 by Mr. Gansel.

In accordance with the customary procedure, there will be no debate on the amendments. I shall call the mover of the amendment, one speaker against and, of course, the committee, which will express its view. We shall then vote. The time available to speakers is five minutes, and I appeal to you, Ladies and Gentlemen, to be as brief as possible.

I call Mr. van den Bergh, the Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

*(Mr. Blaauw, Vice-President of the Assembly,  
took the Chair)*

Mr. van den BERGH (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I shall try to be as brief as possible in my reply to what was said yesterday. I will begin by thanking all the members for their contributions to the debate. I also noted that these contributions differed quite considerably. Some were positive and friendly, while others were critical but constructive. But certain reactions, I am sorry to say, were deplorable and unacceptable. I shall return to them.

It is always a pleasure to hear comments on a recommendation from the committee, especially if they contribute to the formulation of ideas. The debate within the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments has continued for many months and has often been lively and sometimes sharp. But at all times the discussion took place in a friendly atmosphere of mutual respect. In view of various remarks made yesterday, on the other hand, I must say that this atmosphere has certainly not obtained here. I also find it regrettable that a number of representatives have spoken in a way which, to be honest, I would not have considered possible in this Assembly. There were thirty-two speakers. I cannot, of course, respond to all their comments, but I should certainly like to thank Mr. Aarts and Mr. Lagorce for theirs. Although I do not agree with Mr. Gansel's conclusions, I value what he had to say. Mr. Reddemann was critical but he did show appreciation for the way in which the members of the committee had tried to reach agreement. I am also grateful to Mr. Hardy, who once again made it clear that precisely what an anti-American attitude is, is anything but clear. My thanks also go to Mr. Freeson for his interesting remarks on the five premises of the defence policy.

Leaving aside the positive and constructively critical comments, if I am asked how certain remarks by numerous British conservatives affected me, my answer is this: it sometimes seemed as if there were a personal feud between some British conservatives and myself. This

*Mr. van den Bergh (continued)*

was new to me. I do have the impression, of course, that the Rapporteur's political complexion affects some conservative representatives like a red rag to a bull. Perhaps this all has to do with the shades of political opinion that are involved and with which I sympathise. But it does not look as if this can be the case everywhere.

What, then, was said? Sir Frederic Bennett's and Lord Reay's comments, for example, had nothing to do with the substance of the matter. They gave the impression that the tenor of the recommendation was negativist and anti-American and would admit of no criticism of the Soviet position, and more of that kind of unseemly nonsense. I would remind you that I am talking about a recommendation that was approved by a large majority in committee.

We have just heard Mr. Andreotti's excellent statement. I heard him make a number of very critical remarks about SDI. But I did not see any British conservatives having the courage to stand up and accuse him of anti-Americanism, negativism and so on. That kind of insinuation is obviously suited to the Rapporteur and the committee he represents, but courage fails when it comes to making similar remarks about the Chairman of the Council. I have no respect for such a cowardly attitude.

I recall in this context a resolution adopted by the North Atlantic Assembly in San Francisco not so long ago. Even American senators contributed with critical remarks. Is it then anti-American to ask reasonably and honestly how our defence should best be organised? Let there be no mistake: I regard the remarks of these British conservatives as insinuations, as accusations which have no foundation and as an attempt by no matter what means - which is clearly standard practice in the British parliament, but not in the parliaments with which I am familiar - to brush aside the political opinion of a rapporteur representing a committee. I hope, of course, that they will not succeed.

On the committee's behalf I therefore reject the insinuation that the recommendation is anti-American, negativist or anything of the kind. These are comments which have no foundation and in no way reflect the discussion that took place in committee. Nor, in my view, do such remarks provide a true picture of the attitudes of any of the various members of the committee, including those who voted against the recommendation in committee. And they do not reflect the Rapporteur's opinion in this respect either.

I should like to comment specifically on what has been said. I shall begin - what else? - with

Sir Frederic Bennett's remarks on the recommendation. He said that the recommendation referred to the United States thirteen times - which is true - and to the Soviet Union only once. How surprising that there should be so many references to the United States and only one to the Soviet Union! The explanation is extremely simple. The Assembly instructed the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to draw up a report on the American initiative, partly in response to initiatives by American Secretary of State for Defence Weinberger. Is it then so strange that a report of this nature should refer to the United States more often than to the Soviet Union? Or am I being naive? If I may provide some reassurance, I do not believe the Soviet Union is a country deserving of any sympathy whatsoever.

Mr. Wilkinson's statement was in itself interesting. He told me that the recommendation was anti-SDI. Perhaps it is indiscreet to say that the members of my political group, for whom I have a great deal of sympathy, have blamed me, as Rapporteur, because they say the recommendation, which is a compromise in view of the different shades of opinion represented in the committee, is too pro-SDI. What an interesting position I find myself in today. I should also like to say this to Mr. Wilkinson and Lord Reay: in statements made by the British Foreign Minister, Sir Geoffrey Howe, and Mrs. Thatcher I have noticed some extremely critical remarks, which lead me to believe that they feel the initiative should be treated with great caution. In her statement yesterday Baroness Young made similar comments. I therefore frankly wonder how the recommendation can be called "anti-SDI". While Sir Geoffrey Howe and Mrs. Thatcher are allowed to be critical, some British conservatives expect me to be more royalist than the king, or queen, perhaps I should say in this case.

Lord Reay also made a number of derogatory remarks. As you can see, I had a rather difficult day yesterday. I also slept very badly. Lord Reay accuses me, for example, of not presenting the arguments in favour of SDI. I do not think that accusation is justified. I am afraid that Lord Reay has also failed to read the report with sufficient care, because the arguments in favour of SDI appear in paragraph 1. Reference has also been made to Mr. Blaauw's report, Document 998. This report included the recommendation adopted last year as number 415. The recommendation calls, among other things, for a "ban on space weapons, including anti-satellite systems or new ABM systems". The Assembly made that statement last year. It may have escaped some people's notice. The text drawn up by Mr. Blaauw and adopted by the Assembly was consequently included in this recommendation almost verbatim.

*Mr. van den Bergh (continued)*

Lord Reay also said that I had not made enough of the violations by the Soviet Union. That upsets me. Where there have been violations of the ABM treaty by the Soviet Union, they should be pointed out. Let there be no doubt about that. This Assembly should not handle the Soviet Union with kid gloves. Not at all! Accuracy is what is needed. Lord Reay referred to the NPG's communiqué, which mentions the violations. I have looked into all this. Mr. Weinberger mentioned a large number of violations at the time. Only one of these is mentioned in the communiqué as being presumed true. And that is the violation referred to in the committee's report.

I have just a few more comments. Sir John Osborn complained that not enough was said about the development of the Soviet ABM programme. I reject this criticism and refer to the report, which deals extensively with this point. I would also point out that the American administration is discussing the implications of the very violations referred to in the ABM treaty. It is also remarkable that this discussion began only recently. When the American President announced his programme in March 1983, nothing at all was said about it. I assume this question has been raised recently, perhaps for political reasons.

To Mr. Cavaliere I should like to say that I am sorry I said nothing about the Italian Government's position on SDI. That is an omission, but it is impossible to cover everything. In view of the very interesting, critical and constructive statement Mr. Andreotti has just made, it would certainly have been worth while considering the Italian Government's views. If I make a political comparison of what Mr. Andreotti has said and what the report and recommendations say, I feel the views expressed are very close, reflecting hesitation, doubt, a critical attitude and an extremely sharp eye for events. But I will admit to Mr. Cavaliere that it would have been preferable had the report contained these points. I should also like to thank him for the positive remarks he has made about the report and particularly the recommendation.

I should have liked to discuss the comments of various other representatives, but there is no time. I have just a few concluding remarks to make.

I hope that the Assembly will keep what I am about to say in the back of its mind or, better still, in the front of its mind when it comes to deciding how to vote. It should be realised that my personal political opinion is rather more critical than that reflected by the recommendation. I believe the crucial issue, politically speaking,

is that the process with respect to SDI that has now been set in motion must be followed up critically by the European countries, by a joint parliamentary body like the Assembly and by the Council of Ministers, in dialogue and in friendship with the United States. This should be done in such a way that security in this part of the world and the rest of the world is increased. That is the political task I set myself when acting as this committee's Rapporteur. It even resulted in my coming into conflict with other members of my group to some extent. But that is a risk I must take.

In the committee we attempted, in a friendly atmosphere, neither to condemn SDI completely – there were those who would have done so – nor to welcome it with open arms, but to indicate a course, also to be followed by the Council of Ministers, leading to a secure situation, with the appropriate systems, in line with European requirements. It is necessary for the prestige of this Assembly and in view of the importance of the political weight carried by Western European Union, that we should put forward a recommendation that is politically practicable. It may not please everyone, but it was approved by a large majority in committee.

Shortage of time prevented the committee from pronouncing on the amendments. I will leave the reasons open. I cannot say that co-operation between the various committees has been very good. These things happen and we must simply overlook them. My opinion on the amendments is in line with the ideas of the majority of the committee. For the reasons I have given, I hope the recommendation will be adopted as it stands, without the nuances or more radical views that some would have wished it to contain.

*(Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Hill, Rapporteur for the opinion of the General Affairs Committee.

Mr. HILL (*United Kingdom*). – At the mini-session in London of the General Affairs Committee, which had received the report from the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, concern was expressed about the way in which the document was written. I was appointed Rapporteur to express an opinion on Mr. van den Bergh's document.

Many of the amendments are in my name, but they express the General Affairs Committee view. Voting on the document was seven to four in favour, with five abstentions. Twelve members voted for the amendments and there were two abstentions. We went into the document in depth. I understand Mr. van den Bergh's anxiety. He had a difficult task. He

*Mr. Hill (continued)*

has been criticised by many and is under stress, but this is not the place to criticise each other. Of the twenty-four amendments to be considered today twelve were tabled by the General Affairs Committee. The amendments are not intended to be destructive. They express the views of the General Affairs Committee under the chairmanship of Mr. Michel. The committee held an emergency meeting on 22nd November in Paris. We drew up our opinion quickly. After reflection the committee came to a balanced view, which I believe will improve the document.

I do not want to delay the session but Mr. van den Bergh criticised statements by the British Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary. The first of the contracts with the United States on collaboration for research and development in the strategic defence initiative is to be signed today. Anybody who buries his head in the sand now, whether he is advising his government or advancing his own political point of view, will not stop the tide of people in universities and industries who want to join the research programme being funded by the United States Government.

We can move on to amendments if you so wish, Mr. President. I hope that Mr. van den Bergh will moderate his tone to some of my conservative colleagues. We all have our own political views but if some of my amendments are chosen, we shall have a worthwhile document to present to the public.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Lenzer, do you wish to make any comments as Rapporteur of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions?

Mr. LENZER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – No, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We have to consider the draft recommendation on which twenty-four amendments have been tabled which we shall now examine in the order I indicated just now.

On behalf of the Socialist Group, Mr. Gansel and others have tabled Amendment 15, which reads:

15. Before paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert the following new paragraph:

“Believing that an extension of the arms race into space as raised by the strategic defence initiative must be prevented since it will bring only the illusion of more security and in fact will endanger strategic stability and create within the alliance zones of unequal security;”

I call Mr. Gansel.

Mr. GANSEL (*Federal Republic of Germany*). – I have been asked whether I want to appear in the Guinness Book of Records because there are so many amendments in my name. If I had wanted to set a record, I would not have run up the hill – the Socialist Group has tabled only twelve amendments compared with Mr. Hill's thirteen.

After yesterday's discussion we can be brief as everybody knows what the amendments are about. The Defence Committee has drawn attention to the danger of an arms race in space. We believe that some of the criticism of and scepticism about the strategic defence initiative, which Mr. Andreotti also mentioned, should be expressed in the Assembly. The illusion of greater security and the danger of strategic instability create the chance of unequal security, of which Mr. Andreotti also spoke.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anybody wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Mr. Michel.

Mr. MICHEL (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, this amendment is quite unacceptable as it jeopardises the coherence of the report under examination.

It is basically inaccurate to say that “an extension of the arms race into space as raised by the strategic defence initiative... will bring only the illusion of more security”. The issue at present is a research effort, not a development of any kind. I therefore fail to understand the meaning of this amendment and I ask the Assembly to reject it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We may as well note at once that there are two series of amendments. Before we vote, I shall now call the Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, before we consider the amendments I wish to make a number of points to prevent the discussion of the draft recommendation from becoming too heated.

The draft as it now stands bears only a distant resemblance to the preliminary draft submitted by Mr. van den Bergh.

The committee has worked patiently on a task which has sometimes taxed us severely. I believe that I can say quite objectively that the Rapporteur has endeavoured to take account of all the views expressed in committee, which have culminated in a draft which is, I must say, greatly emasculated compared to the original version.

Before we start the debate, I would ask the speakers to reflect on the letter and spirit of the draft recommendation, which seems to me to be

*Mr. Pignion (continued)*

particularly apposite, especially in view of Mr. Andreotti's remarks and what we have heard today in this Assembly. Let us keep the questions and answers simple. Is the draft before us for or against SDI? Let each judge for himself. Does it take account of our worries? In other words, does it call in question once more what we have been saying here all along – and so eloquently – about the European pillar? Does this draft recommendation try to preserve the idea that Europe needs to establish itself as a significant factor in matters of security and defence? The replies are contained in the report, not explicitly, but they are there.

Are we in this Assembly in favour of abiding by treaties? Through the draft recommendation we refer to the ABM treaty, to which everybody refers.

Do we want to see the two superpowers discussing their problems without forgetting our existence? This, too, is in the draft recommendation.

In the debate which we are about to have on the amendments, I really wonder what malicious spirit could induce the Assembly as a whole to reject a draft recommendation which truly reflects a spirit of co-operation and understanding such as might not have been expected in view of Mr. van den Bergh's temperament. He will forgive me for saying this, but we are getting to know him well.

I would like the debate to be dispassionate and conducted in accordance with the guiding principles of our proceedings.

Another point: I am told that *The Times* of 14th November, which is not a particularly left-wing paper, considers this draft recommendation to be very moderate, and I bring this to the attention of my British conservative colleagues, in case they have not read it.

The Rapporteur, Mr. van den Bergh, has mentioned that the members of his party, to which I also belong, have caused us some concern. I ask for their understanding, whatever options may have been taken in some quarters. We are, after all, in WEU and not in our national parliaments.

After what we have gone through, I hope that this draft recommendation will receive proper consideration. I personally find it rather insipid, and, echoing the words of the French Minister, I am very sorry, as a Frenchman, to accept it, but accept it I do because it is consistent and the outcome of a major, reasoned debate.

I thank Mr. Michel for having noted this consistency and new contribution when the first

amendment was being moved. I would like this draft recommendation to stay as it is. It is nothing special, but it does keep our options open for the future, and we have just heard Mr. Andreotti say several times how premature it would be to take any definitive step in a matter which is subject to particularly rapid change.

It is therefore with a deep sense of conviction that I ask my fellow delegates, in the debate on the amendments, to accept this text even though it satisfies no one.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Rapporteur, Mr. van den Bergh, who has told us that he wishes to speak as an individual regarding Amendment 15 tabled by Mr. Gansel.

Mr. van den BERGH (*Netherlands*). – I did not know that I was allowed to speak as an individual. I thought that I was allowed to speak only as Rapporteur. The committee and its recommendations have been rather critical. I believe that the Assembly should vote against Amendment 15.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I said “as an individual” in the light of what you told us, but I called you of course in your capacity as Rapporteur.

We shall now vote on Amendment 15.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*Amendment 15 is negated.*

On behalf of the General Affairs Committee, Mr. Hill has tabled Amendment 1, which reads:

1. After paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert the following new paragraph:

“(ii) Considering that the development of space defence technology means that the European allies of the United States have to make every effort to master the new technologies which might one day take their place in an effective defence system;”.

I call Mr. Hill to support the amendment.

Mr. HILL (*United Kingdom*). – I have been asked to speak briefly, but this is far too important a subject to pretend that it is a shopping list or a matter of small moment. It concerns the beginning of the conflict that the General Affairs Committee had with the Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. The Chairman said that *The Times* had stated that Mr. van den Bergh's document was very moderate. I do not always agree with *The Times*, and this is another occasion when I do not. The document is not a tablet of stone. It is subject to amendment.

The General Affairs Committee has done a worthwhile, and quick, job. Committee mem-



*Mr. Hill (continued)*

bers felt that, in view of the colloquy in Munich, which I attended as a member of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, the new space defence technology which could be used for military purposes but could also have commercial spin-offs was something in which every country should do its best to become involved. It is a matter of trying to master the new technologies. They differ greatly from the old technologies of the steam engine and the electric light bulb. We must put that point in our document to reflect the view not only of the colloquy but of most European universities and industries. We must "make every effort to master the new technologies which might" – the word "might" is put in for Mr. van den Bergh – "one day take their place in an effective defence system".

That would be an admirable paragraph in the preamble. I should like the Assembly to vote in favour of it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Dr. Miller.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – I oppose the amendment on behalf of the Socialist Group. The Rapporteur was extremely careful in his speech and report to say that there were reservations, to say the least, about SDI. The amendment is jumping the gun. It is accepting that the Assembly is entirely for SDI, but I do not know whether it is. All I know is that that is not the view of the Rapporteur. The amendment is putting the cart before the horse and is assuming a situation that has not yet come to pass. I very much resent anyone making that assumption. I therefore ask the Assembly to vote against the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the view of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments?

Mr. van den BERGH (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, would you ask Mr. Gansel to stop prompting me? I am not going to listen!

But, to be serious, the amendment is not very clear. What is clear is that the committee recommends giving priority to European technological development. It therefore seems logical to me that this amendment should be rejected.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now vote on Amendment 1.

(*A vote was then taken by show of hands*)

*Amendment 1 is agreed to.*

We shall now have a joint discussion on Amendments 2 and 16. If Amendment 2 is adopted, Amendment 16 will fall.

On behalf of the General Affairs Committee, Mr. Hill, the Rapporteur, has tabled Amendment 2 which reads:

2. Leave out paragraph (ii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:

"(ii) Believing that Europe collectively must pursue the development of independent space technology both for civilian applications and for defence applications which will enhance its security and assist in verification of arms control agreements and confidence-building measures;"

On behalf of the Socialist Group, Mr. Gansel and others have tabled Amendment 16 which reads:

16. Leave out paragraph (ii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:

"Believing that Europe collectively must give priority to developing independent space technology for civilian applications which among other things will also assist in surveillance, verification of arms control agreements and confidence-building measures;"

I call Mr. Hill to speak in support of his amendment.

Mr. HILL (*United Kingdom*). – This amendment is a revamp of the draft recommendation, paragraph (ii).

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Mr. Millan.

Mr. MILLAN (*United Kingdom*). – I wish to oppose the amendment and to draw attention to Amendment 16 in the names of Mr. Gansel, myself and other members of the Socialist Group. We are dealing here with emphasis. I want emphasis upon the priority that should be accorded to developing independent space technology for civilian rather than military applications. Amendment 16 recognises that there are incidental benefits from space technology for civilian applications which can have military advantages in the same areas dealt with in the present paragraph (ii) of the recommendation and in Amendment 2, that is, verification of arms control agreements and confidence-building measures. We seek to add the word "surveillance".

I oppose Amendment 2 because it gives equal priority to civilian and military applications. My group wishes to see priority given to civilian applications and if Amendment 2 is defeated I shall seek to move Amendment 16.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the opinion of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments?

Mr. van den BERGH (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. Hill has already said that the text of his amendment is almost identical to the original text. There is no difference between the two as regards content.

Amendment 16 was tabled by the Socialist Group. The first signatory is Mr. Gansel. It says priority should be given to civilian technology. The recommendation as a whole calls on the European countries to give priority to civilian technology. I would add in all sincerity that I see no difference between technology that can be used both for civilian purposes and for military purposes, if verification, surveillance and navigation at least are also regarded as military purposes.

The present text covers all the possibilities. I therefore advise the rejection of both amendments.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now vote on Amendment 2.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*Amendment 2 is agreed to.*

Amendment 16 therefore falls.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – I wish to speak.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Dejardin.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Although I do not have the text before me, I believe that the Rules of Procedure require every member to vote from the place assigned to him in this forum. I am very surprised to see a vote cast from the Council benches and I would like to know whether a Council member is entitled to vote. I should like to see discipline being properly observed in this Assembly, otherwise it would create the impression that anyone could vote anyhow from any position.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Your remark is justified.

Mr. Sarti, you have returned to your delegates' bench, so everything is in order. We have a vigilant observer, but had there been the slightest doubt you may be sure, Mr. Dejardin, that I would have ordered the vote to be taken by sitting and standing.

The Rapporteur, Mr. Hill, has tabled Amendment 3 which reads:

3. In paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out from "stability" to the end of the paragraph and insert:

"and foster research on new defence systems without jeopardising existing arms control agreements or compromising the negotiation of future agreements;"

I call Mr. Hill.

Mr. HILL (*United Kingdom*). – The General Affairs Committee hopes that this is a useful and helpful amendment which, it seems, could be accepted by all political parties.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Dr. Miller.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – Once again, this amendment involves an assumption which it is not right to make. The context of the original is quite clear in its intention and to our minds there is no need to draw attention to new defence systems which at the moment exist only in the minds of some people in the United States and are not yet something that we in Europe have decided to adopt. On that basis I ask that the amendment be rejected.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the opinion of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments?

Mr. van den BERGH (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – The most important change proposed by the General Affairs Committee is the removal of the word "stability". Anyone who has followed the debate on SDI closely must admit, whatever his political leanings, that one of the most important points, if not the most important of all, for both advocates and opponents is the question whether the introduction of an SDI system will maintain or endanger the strategic stability of relations between East and West. I very much regret that the General Affairs Committee wants to remove the word "stability" from the text. We are in danger of crossing a line beyond which the very essence of the present recommendation is to some extent affected. As the word "stability" is so important, I must therefore advise you to vote against the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Hill, the Rapporteur for the opinion of the General Affairs Committee.

Mr. HILL (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. Mr. van den Bergh has got it wrong. The word "stability" remains in the text.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now vote on Amendment 3.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*Amendment 3 is agreed to.*

*The President (continued)*

Mr. Hill, Rapporteur on behalf of the General Affairs Committee, has tabled Amendment 4 which reads:

4. Leave out paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation.

I call Mr. Hill.

Mr. HILL (*United Kingdom*). – The General Affairs Committee felt that some statements in paragraph (iv) were hypothetical, certainly in relation to the United States administration.

The reference to Article IX of the ABM treaty will be covered if one of my later amendments is accepted. We believe that the paragraph should be deleted on the understanding that the text from the Council of Ministers on Article IX of the ABM treaty will be inserted by a later amendment. We felt that the paragraph was unnecessary.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Mr. Millan.

Mr. MILLAN (*United Kingdom*). – I ask the Assembly to oppose the amendment. An important aspect of paragraph (iv) is that it notes that “the strategic defence initiative has raised some questions both from European governments and within the United States administration”. We heard today from Mr. Andreotti that various questions have been raised by Western European governments and that there are considerable doubts about whether we should give wholehearted support to SDI. Mr. Andreotti dealt with that matter in considerable detail.

For that reason alone, it is important that we keep the paragraph in the preamble. It notes a fact; there are many questions about SDI within European governments as well as in the United States and those questions are raised even by governments who would tend to have general sympathy for the SDI. This important paragraph is needed for balance and I hope that it will not be deleted.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the view of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments?

Mr. van den BERGH (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, owing to a language problem I did not read Amendment 3 correctly. I am sorry. This sort of thing happens from time to time.

Amendment 4 is extremely important. Its adoption would substantially change the tenor of the recommendation. The committee was at pains to draw up a balanced text. Paragraph

(iv) concerns an actual fact. The vast majority of the participants in the debate on SDI say that the development of new strategic systems must not undermine existing arms control agreements. One of the most important of these is the ABM treaty. This is my personal view and that of the majority of the committee. I therefore strongly advise against the adoption of Mr. Hill's amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now vote on Amendment 4. There is some doubt.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – Do you really not want any negotiations between the two superpowers?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall therefore vote by sitting and standing.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*Amendment 4 is agreed to.*

On behalf of the Socialist Group, Mr. Gansel and others have tabled Amendment 17, which reads:

17. Leave out paragraph (v) of the preamble to the draft recommendation.

I call Mr. Edwards to speak in support of the amendment.

Mr. EDWARDS (*United Kingdom*). – I move the amendment on behalf of the Socialist Group. The rising cost of arms is bedevilling social progress in every country. It is bringing nations to the brink of bankruptcy. Further massive expenditure will not help us to solve our world's problems. The scientists who will devote their attention, work and brains to the new development in the skies should instead be discovering how best to cure cancer, clear our slums and remove poverty from the world.

I object to the complacency associated with the war in the skies. I do not know what our grandchildren will think of it when they look up and enjoy the stars. It is time that we called a halt. I hope that the amendment will be carried so that we bring some sanity to our Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Sir Anthony Grant.

Sir Anthony GRANT (*United Kingdom*). – My colleague, Bob Edwards, made a moving plea for unilateral nuclear disarmament. That is not what the report is about and it is certainly not what the amendment is about.

I defend Mr. van den Bergh and seek to retain the wording in paragraph (v). I should have preferred the words to be stronger so I hope that Mr. Hill's amendment will be accepted.

*Sir Anthony Grant (continued)*

Do Mr. Gansel, Bob Edwards or their group hope that the SDI programme will cast doubts on the nuclear deterrent? I cannot believe that they do. I should have thought that they would want to strengthen Europe's defence. That is usually their aim. Their amendment is misguided and should be rejected.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the opinion of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments?

Mr. van den BERGH (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – There have been so many discussions that sometimes I am no longer sure of myself. But if my memory of this discussion in the committee serves me right, the purpose of this paragraph was that, quite apart from the committee's opinion of whether or not SDI should be introduced, the present system of deterrence should be maintained by the NATO countries at least for the time being. I agree with Mr. Edwards that we should bear in mind that we may eventually be able to do without nuclear deterrence. I am afraid that the great majority of the committee members did not feel that the nuclear deterrence that has taken shape in NATO's strategy should be removed at this time. That is more a factual description of the present situation than a future objective. I believe very sincerely that I am reflecting the committee's opinion by advising against voting for this amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now vote on Amendment 17.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*Amendment 17 is negatived.*

On behalf of the General Affairs Committee, Mr. Hill, has tabled Amendment 5 which reads:

5. Leave out paragraph (v) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:

“(v) Believing that a strategic defence system might play a complementary rôle in the policy of nuclear deterrence;”.

I call Mr. Hill.

Mr. HILL (*United Kingdom*). – The amendment caused much discussion in committee. The draft recommendation contains a false claim and false hope. Paragraph (v) expresses “the hope that the SDI programme will not cast doubt on the policy of nuclear deterrence which can only strengthen the defence of Europe.” The General Affairs Committee thinks that SDI is one of the reasons why the disarmament talks were opened again by the USSR with the United States of America. The General Affairs Committee believes that the strategic defence system

might play a complementary rôle to the nuclear deterrence policy. The committee believes that at no time can a nuclear deterrence policy strengthen defence. We have all heard of MAD – mutually assured destruction. The nuclear deterrent cannot be qualified as a fully defensive system. I ask the Assembly to approve the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Mr. Edwards.

Mr. EDWARDS (*United Kingdom*). – I hope that whatever has happened to other amendments this dangerous amendment will be rejected. It suggests that having shot rockets and missiles into the skies and having polluted the skies we should link new weaponry with nuclear weapons that are polluting our earth. It is the nth degree of MADness. It is human stupidity at its worst. I hope that the amendment will not be accepted. Let us use a little common sense. Let us not go too far. I hope that the amendment will be defeated decisively.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the opinion of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments?

Mr. van den BERGH (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Mr. Hill and the members of the General Affairs Committee are being very hasty here. For the moment not many people believe SDI can play a complementary rôle. The amendment draws a conclusion, cautiously, about a development that is to be investigated in the next few years. I do not think it would be very wise to adopt this amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Pignion, Chairman of the committee.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – A short time ago I appealed for discretion. The paragraph which it is proposed to change was worded with a degree of caution which I shall call exemplary. It is in exactly the same spirit as Mr. Hill's amendment without the extravagance. I would ask my fellow delegates to be very careful. The logic seems at fault here, and I do not see why one need adopt an extremist position when making a point.

The paragraph written by the Rapporteur is sufficiently cautious, discreet and well-defined not to need modification. That is why, like the Rapporteur, I oppose the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now vote on Amendment 5.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*Amendment 5 is negatived.*

*The President (continued)*

On behalf of the Socialist Group, Mr. Gansel and others have tabled Amendment 18 which reads:

18. In paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out from "strategic and intermediate-range" to the end of the paragraph and insert:

"noting the Council's attitude to SDI expressed in reply to Recommendation 413 according to which 'relevant tests or deployment will have to be a matter for negotiation under the terms of the ABM treaty', and welcoming their further statement in that reply that 'in view of the contribution of this treaty to stability the Council stresses the importance of preventing its erosion',".

After this amendment, we shall examine Amendment 7 tabled by Mr. Hill. Amendment 18 by Mr. Gansel is a substitution amendment, whereas Amendment 7 tabled by Mr. Hill contains an addition.

I call Mr. Millan.

Mr. MILLAN (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. I did not follow what you said about the difference between Amendment 7 and Amendment 18. Amendment 7 is a substitution amendment and will presumably fall if Amendment 18 is carried.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – There is a contradiction between the two amendments and that is why I am calling them together, Mr. Millan. We are in complete agreement on that point.

I call Mr. Gansel to speak in support of Amendment 18.

Mr. GANSEL (*Federal Republic of Germany*). – I am not showing the white flag, but my amendment now does not fit after what has been decided, so I withdraw it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Amendment 18 is therefore withdrawn.

On behalf of the General Affairs Committee, the Rapporteur, Mr. Hill, has tabled Amendment 7 which reads:

7. In paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out from "Recommendation 413" to the end of the paragraph and insert:

"considering that the American authorities have not yet explained in sufficient detail the proposals for the United States European allies to take part in the SDI programme".

I call Mr. Hill.

Mr. HILL (*United Kingdom*). – The amendment involves some of the difficulties that Euro-

pean governments have had eliciting information from the American administration about co-operation in the SDI research programme. There have been numerous statements on the subject. I expect that Mr. Andreotti commented on that today. There are insufficient details about proposals for co-operation in the SDI programme. The amendment is a marker for the United States administration saying that it should be more forthcoming with details about how the collaboration will work.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Dr. Miller.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – This is a bit rich coming from Mr. Hill. He has today been urging colleagues to vote solidly in favour of anything to do with SDI and now he says that the American authorities – I am surprised that he did not say "American allies" – have not explained the proposals for European participation in sufficient detail. That is reason enough to reject the amendment. Indeed, Mr. Hill is asking us to reject it by saying that he is annoyed with our American allies because they have not given us enough information. We should not go ahead holus-bolus unless we have such information.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the opinion of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments?

Mr. van den BERGH (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Amendment 7 is not the most important amendment, nonetheless I have difficulty in understanding it. I had the impression that Mr. Hill was fairly sure, or perhaps knew precisely, what he thought of SDI. I assume his opinion is based on information made available by our American ally. I cannot see why this amendment was tabled. Nor, from Mr. Hill's point of view, do I find it very wise, since it conflicts with political opinions he and his political friends expressed earlier on. I therefore think it would be wise to vote against Amendment 7.

I would add that the committee has no objection to Amendment 6.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now vote on Amendment 7.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 7 is agreed to.

On behalf of the General Affairs Committee, the Rapporteur, Mr. Hill, has tabled Amendment 6 which reads:

6. In paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert after the words "Recommendation 413" a footnote reference to

*The President (continued)*

refer to a footnote setting out the text of paragraph 3 of the Council's reply to Recommendation 413, which reads:

" 3. The Council welcomes the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union have begun global negotiations, i.e. dealing with strategic weapons, INF missiles and defence and space weapons. It hopes that these negotiations will achieve security at the lowest possible level of forces through substantial, balanced and verifiable reductions of nuclear weapons. The Council notes that the strategic defence initiative (SDI) announced by the United States is no more than a scientific research programme and hence does not contravene the provisions of the 1972 ABM treaty. The Council also takes the view that laboratory research does not lend itself to arms control measures. On the other hand, relevant tests or deployment will have to be a matter for negotiation, under the terms of the ABM treaty. In view of the contribution of this treaty to stability, the Council stresses the importance of preventing its erosion. "

I call Mr. Hill.

Mr. HILL (*United Kingdom*). - I got the impression from Mr. van den Bergh's speech on Amendment 7 that his committee has more or less accepted Amendment 6. It puts clearly the Council's reply to Recommendation 413, which should be stated in its entirety.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Mr. Gansel.

Mr. GANSEL (*Federal Republic of Germany*).- To prove the spirit of co-operation and solidarity at this Assembly, I propose to vote for the amendment. We socialists are always happy about the footnotes that conservatives leave in our way.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - What is the opinion of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments?

Mr. van den BERGH (*Netherlands*) (Translation).- Mr. President, I have absolutely no objection to Amendment 6.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - We shall now vote on Amendment 6.

(*A vote was then taken by show of hands*)

*Amendment 6 is agreed to.*

On behalf of the General Affairs Committee, the Rapporteur, Mr. Hill, has tabled Amendment 8 which reads:

8. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, after " defence initiative " insert:

" or, if that seems impossible, specify Europe's own interests in this area by harmonising as far as possible the answers of the seven WEU member countries ".

I call Mr. Hill.

Mr. HILL (*United Kingdom*). - I see a great coming together of minds. Amendment 8 is one way in which we can prove conclusively that we are getting together on Mr. van den Bergh's document. After "strategic defence initiative" the amendment proposes to insert: " or, if that seems impossible, " - if there is no common response - " specify Europe's own interests in this area by harmonising as far as possible the answers of the seven WEU countries ". I do not believe that a single representative would want to vote against that.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

What is the opinion of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments?

Mr. van den BERGH (*Netherlands*) (Translation).- Mr. President, I hope that the countries of Western European Union will agree. If they do not, I am afraid the situation will be as Mr. Hill has described. There is no reason for me to advise against the adoption of this amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - We shall now vote on Amendment 8.

(*A vote was then taken by show of hands*)

*Amendment 8 is agreed to.*

On behalf of the Socialist Group, Mr. Gansel and others have tabled Amendment 19 which reads:

19. Leave out paragraph 1 (b) of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

" (b) not accept research incompatible with existing arms control agreements and of a nature and scale which will endanger stability and security; ".

I call Mr. Gansel.

Mr. GANSEL (*Federal Republic of Germany*).- I do not have to explain the amendment. The meaning is clear.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

What is the opinion of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments?

Mr. van den BERGH (*Netherlands*) (Translation).- Mr. President, when I read this amend-

*Mr. van den Bergh (continued)*

ment, I feel the vote can go ahead in a friendly way after all. As I see it, the amendment says exactly the same as the recommendation except that the wording of the amendment is negative. I therefore call on Mr. Hill and his colleagues to vote for the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now vote on Amendment 19.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*Amendment 19 is negatived.*

On behalf of the Socialist Group, Mr. Gansel and others have tabled Amendment 20 which reads:

20. Leave out paragraph 1 (c) of the draft recommendation proper.

I call Mr. Gansel.

Mr. GANSEL (*Federal Republic of Germany*).– The proposal will permit European industry to participate, and so on, in SDI research. The French Minister who addressed the Assembly today did not know what French industry was doing, so there would be no use in permitting or forbidding anything. The Italian Minister who addressed the Assembly today said that it was a problem on which governments did not want to say anything because it was a matter for industry. If that is the case, there is no reason for the Assembly to say what industry should do, especially as our friendly gesture has been rejected before. I am convinced that all those who are for free markets and want to defend capitalism will use this chance not to give orders to industry but to follow the liberal amendment of the Socialist Group to leave this question of the participation of industry unsettled.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation).– Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I think Mr. Gansel has misread paragraph 1 (c), which he wishes to delete. It is not the aim here to place any obligation on anybody, but merely to give expression to the fact that the governments have decided to allow industries which want to participate to do so. Mr. Andreotti has said as much today and, indeed, everyone has always said the same thing. No government has ever stated, or let it be understood, that it would not allow its own national industries to take part in this research. I therefore recommend that the amendment be rejected.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the opinion of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments?

Mr. van den BERGH (*Netherlands*) (Translation).– Mr. President, this is truly an extremely difficult day for this member of the social democrat group. If I compare Amendment 20 with Amendment 13, I see that both have been signed by members of the social democrat group. You can imagine how schizophrenic I feel at this moment. As it is difficult to make a choice when you are feeling schizophrenic, I believe the committee would want both Amendment 20 and Amendment 13 rejected. Amendment 13 by Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt is inseparable from Amendment 20.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now vote on Amendment 20.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*Amendment 20 is negatived.*

In view of the statement by the Rapporteur that the text of Amendment 13 only supplements a provision which has not been adopted, this amendment falls.

On behalf of the General Affairs Committee, Mr. Hill, the Rapporteur, has tabled Amendment 9 which reads:

9. In paragraph 1 (c) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from “participate” to the end of the paragraph and insert:

“in all areas of SDI research on terms providing a genuine exchange of technology”.

I call Mr. Hill.

Mr. HILL (*United Kingdom*). – I remember my original wording in the debate on this subject in the General Affairs Committee. Then we spoke about a genuine two-way street exchange of technology. “Two-way” was thought to be not sufficiently professional for this document. One of the dangers of taking part in a research programme for which we are paid is that the product of the research could become the property of the United States. The President of the United States has said that there would be a genuine attempt to exchange technology, even with the USSR. In the amendment we are saying that it should apply to all areas of SDI research on terms that provide a genuine exchange. I do not think that anyone could disagree with that.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Dr. Miller.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – The Socialist Group could hardly be in favour of this since it has voted for the deletion of the whole para-

*Dr. Miller (continued)*

graph. Dealing with the merits of the proposal, let me say that it was President Reagan who said that he would not mind the Russians coming in on this. But President Reagan is not the United States. It is the technological and scientific departments of the private firms that would be making decisions whether to provide a genuine exchange of technology, and we know how difficult that is in other areas where we believe that there should be a two-way street. It is pie in the sky to think that there will be the genuine exchange that Mr. Hill postulates.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the opinion of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments?

Mr. van den BERGH (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – I have tried to grasp the purpose of Amendment 9. Perhaps there is a linguistic problem. In my opinion, this amendment adds nothing to the recommendation. Nor does it take anything away. I leave it to the judgment of the Assembly. I myself shall abstain.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – You are relying on the wisdom of the Assembly then, Mr. van den Bergh?

We shall now vote on Amendment 9.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*Amendment 9 is agreed to.*

On behalf of the General Affairs Committee, Mr. Hill, the Rapporteur, has tabled Amendment 10 which reads:

10. At the end of paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, add:

“(d) ensure that the answers of members of WEU to the American invitation do not jeopardise the development of Europe’s technological capability and encourage the development of this capability, in particular through the early implementation of the Eureka programme;”.

I call Mr. Hill.

Mr. HILL (*United Kingdom*). – This is an additional paragraph, which we propose because we feel that there is an omission. The idea is to ensure that the response of WEU member states to the American invitation to join the research programme does not jeopardise the development of Europe’s technological capability. There must not be such an overwhelming response that we do not continue to develop the Eureka programme and any other programmes associated with it. This is by way of an insurance. There would be doubt felt if the whole weight of university and industry expertise in Europe were to turn towards the American invitation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Mr. Gansel.

Mr. GANSEL (*Federal Republic of Germany*). – As we support the Eureka programme, we will support the amendment. There is no reason to vote against it, although most of what will come out as a result of the voting will not meet with our approval.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the opinion of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments?

Mr. van den BERGH (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I see this amendment as strengthening and elaborating on the second paragraph I have here of the recommendation proper. It too gives emphasis to European technological programmes. To be honest, I find it rather unnecessary to repeat this in a new paragraph 1(d). I do not think the text conflicts with the operative paragraph of the recommendation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now vote on Amendment 10.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*Amendment 10 is agreed to.*

On behalf of the Socialist Group, Mr. Gansel and others have tabled Amendment 21 which reads:

21. After paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, insert the following new paragraph:

“ 3. Urge all states to refrain from testing and developing anti-missile and anti-satellite weapons and from preparing for an arms race in outer space;”.

I call Mr. Millan to support the amendment.

Mr. MILLAN (*United Kingdom*). – This amendment follows logically from two things. First it follows from recommendation 1 (a), which we accepted and which stresses the importance of avoiding an arms race in space. Secondly, it follows from the current ABM treaty and what the Council of Ministers said in reply to Recommendation 413, which was that, once we move past the research stage in SDI, completely new issues arise and the ABM treaty does not provide for testing or development. We are putting this in explicit terms by way of this amendment. We believe that it ought to be given additional emphasis by way of a paragraph of its own.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Mr. Wilkinson.



Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I ask the Assembly to vote against the amendment, which is defective and seriously ill-judged. First, there is nothing in the ABM treaty to preclude the deployment of anti-missile devices if they are, for example, beam energy weapons. The treaty deals with anti-missile missiles, but there is nothing about anti-missile devices.

Second, the Soviet Union has for a long time fully deployed anti-satellite weapons systems and it would be foolish for the Assembly to seek to inhibit important developments by the United States which is trying to acquire an anti-satellite capability of its own.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the opinion of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments?

Mr. van den BERGH (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I constantly wonder whether the intention is to upset once and for all the balance which we are trying to achieve.

Paragraph (iv) refers to the Council's opinion on the ABM treaty. This passage has been deleted and replaced by Mr. Hill's Amendment 6. In a footnote, reference is again made to the significance of the ABM treaty. I interpret Mr. Wilkinson's words as follows. He does not attach the same significance and weight to the ABM treaty as the committee undoubtedly seeks to attach to them. If the Assembly removes this particularly important point from the recommendation, its balance will be upset. What we are concerned with here, after all, are not "devices", Mr. Wilkinson, but "weapons". I sincerely hope the Assembly will continue to appreciate the crucial importance of the ABM treaty and everything that springs from it. I therefore hope this amendment will be rejected.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now vote on Amendment 21.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*Amendment 21 is negatived.*

We now have three amendments which can be discussed together.

Amendment 11 tabled by Mr. Hill on behalf of the General Affairs Committee reads:

11. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

"Request all countries concerned to ensure that no obstacles will be placed in the way of balanced and verifiable agreements limiting strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons and encourage the pursuit and success of the Soviet-American negotiations in Geneva on the limitation of armaments in the three areas covered;".

Amendment 14 tabled by Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt reads:

14. In the French text of paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "*De prier l'Union Soviétique et les États-Unis de faire en sorte que*" and insert "*D'insister auprès de l'Union Soviétique et des États-Unis pour que*".

Amendment 22 tabled by Mr. Gansel and others on behalf of the Socialist Group reads:

22. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "space defensive measures of themselves do" and insert "research in space defensive measures in itself does".

Amendment 14 tabled by Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt is linguistic in character and concerns the documents distributed in French. Instructions have been given to the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly for the appropriate corrections to be made to the French text. Amendment 14 is therefore withdrawn.

Amendment 22 tabled by Mr. Gansel and others will fall if Amendment 11 tabled by Mr. Hill is adopted.

I call Mr. Hill to support Amendment 11.

Mr. HILL (*United Kingdom*). – All the political parties in the General Affairs Committee support Amendment 11. It requests all countries to ensure that no obstacles are placed in the way of balanced and verifiable agreements limiting nuclear weapons. We have all agreed with that view many times. It is certainly the policy of the British Government and I am sure that it is also the policy of the other six WEU governments.

As the amendment says, we must encourage the Soviet-American negotiations in Geneva on the limitation of armaments. We are all anxious that the talks should be successful and we need to put that view in the report. We must emphasise that no country will be well thought of if it places obstacles in the way of the talks, which I hope will recommence in mid-January. I do not believe that anyone will vote against the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Mr. Gansel.

Mr. GANSEL (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, we have had a number of votes on controversial issues, and this is the last major controversial issue. What the majority wants must be accepted. This is a principle we accept. In some cases we have voted for proposals from the conservatives that we considered reasonable. If in this case we read only what Mr. Hill is proposing, we might think it was very reasonable and should also be

*Mr. Gansel (continued)*

supported. But it is easy to overlook the fact that Mr. Hill is also proposing to leave out paragraph 3.

We consider it to be an unpolitical attitude to believe in the possibility not only of conducting SDI research but also of deploying missiles and anti-satellite weapons in space with the aid of new technologies – to go as far as Mr. Wilkinson has gone in interpreting the conservative version – while still believing that arms control negotiations and verification can go on as before. We should be wary of succumbing to this illusion. Although we believe that arms control negotiations will accompany and follow SDI, they will be very, very much more difficult. The situation as a whole will become far more dangerous. That is why our Amendment 22 proposes to make it quite clear in the recommendation that serious problems will arise even during the research and development phase and thus before weapons are deployed in space.

Once again, then, we have the two conflicting opinions, and they must be voted on. We call for the rejection of Mr. Hill's amendment and for the adoption of Amendment 22.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the opinion of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments?

Mr. van den BERGH (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, compare the two texts carefully, and there is only a difference of nuance. I would prefer to see the present text retained, as would the Chairman of the committee.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now vote on Amendment 11.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*Amendment 11 is agreed to.*

Consequently, Amendment 22 tabled by Mr. Gansel and others falls.

On behalf of the Socialist Group, Mr. Gansel and others have moved Amendment 23 which reads:

23. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “when the results become available”.

I call Dr. Miller to speak in support of this amendment.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – Whether or not the results are available it is necessary for the United States of America and its European partners to discuss the possible military and strategic implications of research into SDI.

The amendment jumps the gun. It makes the assumption that in Europe we are completely

attached to the principle of SDI. As I said earlier, that decision has still to be made. We have no right to use the words “when the results become available”.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

What is the opinion of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments?

Mr. van den BERGH (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the amendment is acceptable.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I put Amendment 23 to the vote.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*Amendment 23 is negatived.*

On behalf of the Socialist Group, Mr. Gansel and others have tabled Amendment 24 which reads:

24. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “possible” and insert “political as well as the”.

I call Mr. Edwards to speak in support of this amendment.

Mr. EDWARDS (*United Kingdom*). – I move the amendment on behalf of the Socialist Group. The amendment is simple. There are enormous political consequences, particularly in terms of cost, of the new technological developments. Some countries will not be able to face anything like the cost and that will lead to political consequences for them. Nobody is opposed to discussion on the political consequences.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Mr. Berger.

Mr. BERGER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, appointing myself spokesman for the German christian democrats, I should like to say that we have so far been obliged to reject all the amendments tabled by our German socialist colleague, Mr. Gansel. To show how co-operative we can be, we shall vote for this last amendment, and I want to make it clear that, as a German, I have deliberately said this in German and not in English.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – You pose a problem for the Chair, Mr. Berger, as I called a speaker to oppose the amendment. You have therefore taken the place of that speaker.

What is the opinion of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments?

Mr. van den BERGH (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, are we really to see an

*Mr. van den Bergh (continued)*

attempt at agreement on one point at least? If German socialists and German christian democrats can agree, who am I to contradict them? I cannot therefore recommend the rejection of the amendment, Mr. President. I am proud to recommend that the Assembly vote for the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now vote on Amendment 24.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*Amendment 24 is agreed to.*

I call Mr. Hardy on a point of order.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. It is usual for the vote to follow the voice. On this occasion, no voice was heard in support of the suggestion. I am delighted at the decision but we have become too frivolous and it might be a good idea to stop our deliberations and start them again tomorrow.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I think your wishes will shortly be fulfilled, Mr. Hardy. The Assembly will have noted the manner in which the speaker called by the Chair to oppose the amendment has expressed himself! I cannot give the floor to a third speaker.

On behalf of the General Affairs Committee, the Rapporteur, Mr. Hill, has tabled Amendment 12 which reads:

12. After paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, add:

“ 6. Ensure maintenance of the nuclear deterrent capability of the Atlantic Alliance as long as Europe’s security is not effectively guaranteed by other means and consider the question of the case for adequacy in conventional defence capacity, both in the present situation and in regard to the development of the strategic defence initiative. ”

I call Mr. Hill.

Mr. HILL (*United Kingdom*). – This amendment should produce no steam. It is intended to ensure the maintenance of the nuclear deterrent capability. Before Mr. Hardy, the leader of the Labour Delegation, lets off any steam, I must tell him that the words are from the decision by the committee’s mini-session in London. Unfortunately, he could not come to the meeting on 22nd November but in courtesy to him I thought that we should put some of his views into the document. We could end on a high note by giving the amendment overwhelming support.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Mr. Gansel.

Mr. GANSEL (*Federal Republic of Germany*). – The old doctrine is valid as long as there is no new one. We said at first that we would vote for the amendment, but it speaks of “adequacy in conventional defence capacity”. It is unclear whether it seeks weaker or stronger conventional defence. The amendment is unclear, so most of the Socialist Group will probably abstain.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the opinion of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments?

Mr. van den BERGH (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I have the impression that my political colleague Mr. Gansel has had a very hard time. Ignoring my advice, the other members of my group have unfortunately voted for the deletion of paragraph (v) of the preamble, which read approximately the same as this amendment. I believe this amendment was written by Peter Hardy. The only conclusion therefore is that, if I felt paragraph (v) of the preamble should be retained, the new paragraph 6 of the recommendation proper is rather superfluous. But how can I contradict my fellow socialist Peter Hardy on this point? Although completely superfluous, I feel this amendment is in line with the committee’s thinking.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now vote on Amendment 12.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*Amendment 12 is agreed to.*

Ladies and Gentlemen, for some time past the spirit of reason has, I think, been abroad in this Assembly. Consonant with this spirit and with the advice I have received, I propose to suspend the sitting for ten minutes before the vote is taken on the draft recommendation as a whole.

I call Mr. van den Bergh.

Mr. van den BERGH (*Netherlands*). – I have a personal point to put which may not be relevant to the Assembly. I have to leave within the next three minutes. I informed you, Mr. President, that I have to catch a plane to be back in my country’s parliament tomorrow morning. If the sitting is suspended, I shall leave my vote with the Chairman of the committee with an explanation of my position.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I am extremely sorry, Mr. van den Bergh. Believe me, if you understood my motives you would certainly support the decision I have just taken. I believe I am acting in accordance with the committee’s

*The President (continued)*

position and in the interests of the Assembly, and I believe I am also correctly interpreting the wishes of the Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

I am extremely sorry, Mr. van den Bergh, but, in the interests of the Assembly, the suspension stands.

The sitting is suspended.

*(The sitting was suspended at 6.30 p.m. and resumed at 6.50 p.m.)*

The sitting is resumed.

Ladies and Gentlemen, we shall now vote on the draft recommendation in Document 1033 as amended.

In accordance with Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by sitting and standing unless five representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members present in the chamber who wish to have a vote by roll-call?...

There are not.

I would remind you that explanations of vote will take place after the vote.

Before the voting, I call Mr. Schulte on a point of order.

Mr. SCHULTE (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation).— Thank you, Mr. President. I should like to point out that we have discussed a long list of amendments, some of which have been adopted, others rejected. This has put a completely new complexion on the whole undertaking. I should like to know who in the chamber actually knows how the document now reads. I do not know what is in it. To vote now, with the original document in chaos, would be very risky. We should be able to read the whole text through from beginning to end to see if it still makes sense. I therefore think it inadvisable to vote on it now.

The PRESIDENT (Translation).— Mr. Schulte, I am obliged to adhere to the orders of the day adopted by the Assembly. We decided to consider the amendments and then to vote on the text as a whole. Furthermore, the ten-minute suspension which I allowed was not entirely without ulterior motive but was to some extent intended to meet your objection. The fact remains that the Assembly will now vote.

Is there any other point of order?...

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation as a whole contained in Document 1033, as amended.

We shall vote on the text as a whole by sitting and standing.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*The amended draft recommendation is adopted<sup>1</sup>.*

I call Mr. Lenzer for an explanation of vote.

Mr. LENZER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation).— Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, a large number of my friends and colleagues have asked me to give a brief explanation of vote.

I believe we have all witnessed a particularly interesting discussion here in the last three hours. It has shown how a parliament can have a lively and controversial debate and then take a vote. I believe this does everyone credit, whatever his political persuasion. Twenty-four amendments have been discussed here, and as I have said, we have taken about three hours to discuss them.

Although we – and I am now speaking on behalf of my political colleagues – do not approve of everything in the report, the Rapporteur bears responsibility for his report under our Rules of Procedure. The vote we have to take here as a parliament is a vote approving or rejecting the draft recommendation. By voting for it, we have made our position clear. Since the draft recommendation was so radically changed this afternoon, we regard it as quite logical that we should demonstrate, by voting for it, that we agree with the end result, the quintessence of the draft recommendation, as it now emerges from the report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation).— I call Mr. Bianco for an explanation of vote.

Mr. BIANCO (*Italy*) (Translation).— Mr. President, I believe that the very intensely argued debate we have had and the conclusions we have reached, with the adoption of some amendments, have produced a coherent text. I wish to stress that the essence of the matter is contained in Amendment 6, moved by Mr. Hill. This embodies a number of clear principles, including especially the continued validity of the agreements reached between the superpowers – the ABM treaty – and the possibility of continued research with European involvement. The issue here concerns balanced positions in line with the attitude expressed by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Mr. Andreotti, and approved by the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation).— I call Sir Frederic Bennett for an explanation of vote.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*).— I abstained in the full understanding of why all

1. See page 37.

*Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)*

my friends and colleagues voted in favour of a document which, admittedly, has been drastically amended, as we wish. I said yesterday that the whole theme and thesis of the report were unhelpful. I said that in no circumstances – whatever amendments were carried – would I vote for the report.

I may have political enemies, but at least no one ever thinks that I break my word, and I do not break my word to myself. I understand why others voted as they have, but I feel bound by what I said yesterday.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Antoni for an explanation of vote.

Mr. ANTONI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, to explain why we voted against this document, it is enough to point out that the final text just adopted is, by consent of those who voted for it, the exact opposite of what it was originally. I should just like to add a very brief comment, not in a spirit of criticism of what has taken place, but rather by way of appreciation of democracy at work in our Assembly confirming that this is perhaps the essence of democracy itself.

Our opposing vote is based on the assumption that it is impossible to produce a common European response to SDI, and not only on this but also on recognition of the fact that the Rapporteur has failed in the attempt, whatever the concessions, to reach a compromise with other positions which we, in our initial statement qualified as quite untenable. In the event, we cannot give our support to a recommendation or resolution – in any case to a decision – which, in our view, represents a disturbing response to SDI and aggravates its destabilising effects. Basically, it also fails to meet our wish that our organisation should take a stand against rearmament, and it creates risks which jeopardise some of the most important results of Geneva.

I think that the reference to the statements by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy and Chairman-in-Office of the Council is quite misplaced, and, in line with the caution with which Mr. Andreotti addressed the problem, I consider we should display greater consistency in our attitude towards any attempt, however democratic, to change the substance of the draft recommendation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Gorla for an explanation of vote.

Mr. GORLA (*Italy*) (Translation). – I have already explained in general terms the reasons for voting against when I spoke in the debate yesterday. I wish to add, however, that the conviction which made me oppose the draft

recommendation just approved is now reinforced by other arguments arising from this afternoon's votes on the amendments.

In my opinion, the amendments tabled by Mr. Hill modify this document in a way which renders it even more unbalanced and unacceptable in the light of the statements which we have heard today from Mr. Dumas, the Minister for External Relations of France, and Mr. Andreotti, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy.

I believe that the Assembly has voted here for a Pandora's box. Why? Because even those delegates who have declared themselves most in favour of accepting SDI have said they do not know enough about the actual content of the project to explain where the research really useful for development purposes begins and ends, or where everything starts to be geared to the prosecution of a most hazardous project resulting not in the reduction but in the aggravation of world tension and the risk of war. It is astonishing that those who admit to having insufficient information about the project are the very people who have modified the draft recommendation so as to make it even more unbalanced. This seems to me to be absolutely unacceptable, and that is why I voted against.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Palumbo for an explanation of vote.

Mr. PALUMBO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, when I spoke yesterday I voiced the many, well founded worries of our group concerning the recommendation of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments in its original form, and I expressed further concern and uncertainty about the text of the report. While the worries and uncertainties remain as far as Mr. van den Bergh's report is concerned, the amendments adopted this afternoon, with the sometimes decisive support of the liberal-democratic group, have, I can now say, changed our attitude as regards the recommendation as a whole.

That is why the liberal-democratic group voted for the amended version of the recommendation. It wished to say yes to scientific research, yes to collaboration with Europe and, in essence, yes to the hope that it may be possible to make the transition from a balance of terror to a balance of security.

That is the reason for my vote and that of the liberal-democratic group for which I speak.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Rauti for an explanation of vote.

Mr. RAUTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, my vote in favour is due not so much – or not solely – to the drastic changes which have been made to the original text, but to the forth-

*Mr. Rauti (continued)*

coming debates we shall each have to face in our own parliaments.

The new document now carries a message – that is the important thing – as I hold there is still a possibility and a hope that we can produce a favourable and united European response to this vast and pressing problem.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anybody else want the floor for an explanation of vote?...

We have therefore finished with this draft recommendation. Your President, who has chaired these debates without taking part but who might have expressed a view had he been seated amongst you, thanks the Assembly for the strictly proper, even cordial way in which this fundamental exchange of opinions has been conducted. In spite of the difficulties attendant upon any parliamentary undertaking, it will, I hope, provide a basis for the work to come. Thank you again, Ladies and Gentlemen.

**(b) *The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance***

*(Vote on the draft recommendation of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 1034 and amendments)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the vote on the draft recommendation of the General Affairs Committee on the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, Document 1034 and amendments.

Two amendments to this draft recommendation have been tabled. We shall consider them in the order in which they refer to the text, that is Amendment 2, tabled by Mr. Spies von Büllesheim, followed by Amendment 1, tabled by Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt.

Mr. Spies von Büllesheim has tabled Amendment 2, which reads:

2. Leave out paragraph (viii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:

“ Referring to the fact that the report on the possibilities, conditions and consequences of a closer institutional connection of the Assembly with other organs of WEU, which is asked for in Order 63, will be prepared separately; ”.

I call Mr. Spies von Büllesheim.

Mr. SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, my amendment does not concern the actual substance of this report but the fact that the motion for an order in Document 1026 on the review of WEU's structures, which was tabled by members of

several groups, is discussed only in the last chapter. The report makes some interesting comments on the subject, but these comments are based solely on the present Brussels Treaty, without considering any possible changes, even though the Brussels Treaty would need to be changed if Spain or Portugal, for example, were to join. The object of the intended report was initially no more than to describe the legal possibilities for introducing changes and then to draw the relevant political conclusions. My amendment seeks to point out that, in view of the importance of this issue, a separate report should be drawn up on it by the General Affairs Committee. I call on the Assembly to approve my amendment, which has the support of many representatives, especially the authors of the motion for an order, and so enable a separate report to be drawn up.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Mr. Michel, Chairman of the General Affairs Committee.

Mr. MICHEL (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I take the floor to speak against this amendment because I see no one else doing so. I am not necessarily opposed to this very important amendment, because it is on the right lines. I wonder, however, whether it is appropriate to this text and whether it should not rather be considered in the Presidential Committee.

That is the only point I wanted to make, because the amendment is, in itself, deserving of support and raises an extremely important problem.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – May I consider that I have asked for the committee's opinion, as this is a draft recommendation presented by the General Affairs Committee?

Mr. Berrier, as Rapporteur, would you agree to our stretching the Rules of Procedure and asking Mr. Spies von Büllesheim to reply to the committee Chairman?

Mr. BERRIER (*France*) (Translation). – I agree, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Spies von Büllesheim.

Mr. SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I believe that in essence we fully agree with Mr. Michel. I would merely point out that the Presidential Committee forwarded this motion to the General Affairs Committee with instructions that the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges should also be consulted on the matter, which could not be done because time was too short.

*Mr. Spies von Büllenheim (continued)*

If we do not delete this sentence, I do not think there will be a separate report, nor will the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges be consulted in accordance with the Presidential Committee's decision of 24th September 1985. There will thus be no alternative to drawing up a new report in the way the Presidential Committee decreed: in co-operation with the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. BERRIER (*France*) (Translation). – I am most surprised at what is going on, as the Presidential Committee instructed the Committee which appointed me, as Rapporteur, to reply to Order 63. I have done only what was asked of me, that is to say I have set out the facts and the legal possibilities, in full compliance with the amended Brussels Treaty.

Furthermore, as indicated in paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation, I maintain that the absolute independence of the bodies serving the Assembly is vital to the independence of the Assembly, which must also be absolute.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is your conclusion, Mr. Berrier?

Mr. BERRIER (*France*) (Translation). – That this amendment should be rejected, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – As Amendment 2 has not been withdrawn, notwithstanding the exchange between Mr. Michel and Mr. Spies von Büllenheim, we shall now vote on it.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*Amendment 2 is agreed to.*

Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt has tabled Amendment 1 which reads:

1. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “whatever the results of its efforts to co-ordinate the answers of member countries to the American proposal that they take part in the strategic defence initiative;”.

I call Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt.

Mr. DREYFUS-SCHMIDT (*France*) (Translation). – The purpose of my amendment is to delete any reference to SDI in this recommendation. The Assembly has discussed SDI at length and has finally adopted a recommendation expressing its outlook on the subject. It is quite pointless to have a further discussion with regard to the other two recommendations. I also tabled an amendment to Mr. Lenzer's

report with the similar purpose of deleting any reference to SDI. To complete the picture, I must make it clear that the allusion contained in the report by my colleague and friend Mr. Berrier is not very serious, as it does not affect the heart of the matter, unlike the report which we shall be considering shortly.

“Have the appropriate agency conduct a continuing study of the strategic consequences of the development of new weapons”: that is our recommendation to the Council, as everyone agrees. Need we add “whatever the results of its efforts”? It is pointless. It may be unwritten, but it is certainly what we want. This is another reason for not worrying people by talking about SDI in this recommendation, when the matter has been discussed at length in another recommendation.

I would add that we are not sure that the Council will make efforts to co-ordinate members' responses to the American offer of participation in SDI. I would remind you finally that, in the recommendation just adopted by the Assembly, against the advice of myself and others, the Council is called upon to agree a common response to the offer of participation in SDI. Only if this seems impossible should the answers be harmonised as far as possible. You cannot therefore anticipate events by saying that efforts will be made to co-ordinate the answers, when you yourself have just asked for a common response.

For all these reasons I ask your support for my amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

What is the committee's opinion?

Mr. BERRIER (*France*) (Translation). – I do not oppose Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt's amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Michel, Chairman of the committee.

Mr. MICHEL (*Belgium*) (Translation). – I ask the Assembly to vote against the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now vote on Amendment 1.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*Amendment 1 is negatived.*

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1034, as amended.

Under Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by sitting and standing unless five representatives or substitutes present in the chamber call for a vote by roll-call.

*The President (continued)*

Are there five members present in the chamber who wish to call for a vote by roll-call?...

There are not.

We shall therefore vote by sitting and standing.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*The amended draft recommendation is adopted<sup>1</sup>.*

***(c) Guidelines drawn from the colloquy  
on the space challenge for Europe  
(Proposals)***

*(Vote on the draft recommendation of the Committee  
on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions,  
Doc. 1036 and amendments)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the vote on the draft recommendation of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on the guidelines drawn from the colloquy on the space challenge for Europe (proposals), Document 1036 and amendments.

Seven amendments to the draft recommendation have been tabled. We shall consider them in the order in which they refer to the text, that is Amendments 2 and 3 tabled by Mr. Gansel, Amendment 7 tabled by Mr. Blaauw, Amendment 5 tabled by Mr. Gansel, the identical Amendments 1 and 4 tabled by Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt and Mr. Gansel and Amendment 6 tabled by Mr. Gansel.

On behalf of the Socialist Group, Mr. Gansel and others have tabled Amendment 2 which reads:

2. Leave out paragraph (x) of the preamble to the draft recommendation.

I call Mr. Millan.

Mr. MILLAN (*United Kingdom*). – The amendment would delete paragraph (x) in the preamble to the draft recommendation. I have some difficulty understanding what paragraph (x) means but it seems reasonable to interpret it as a paving paragraph for paragraph 5 in the recommendation proper. There is also an amendment to delete recommendation 5 as it would have Europe pursue an anti-ballistic missile system independently, but in addition to SDI, and the arguments that have been adduced already show that we oppose it utterly.

1. See page 39.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I should like the Assembly not to accept the amendment. Paragraph (x) of the preamble is widely drafted and leaves Europe with several important choices. It can pursue space defence programmes of almost any type, whether surveillance, telecommunications or even anti-satellite weapons. It would enable Europe to pursue such programmes itself for or in co-operation with our United States allies. The great deficiency in Europe is our small military space budget which results in our space industries being put at a competitive disadvantage against those in the United States. The amendment would be prejudicial to employment in Europe and prejudice our security and strategic defence.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the opinion of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions?

Mr. LENZER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I will be brief: I call for retention of the original version and rejection of the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now vote on Amendment 2.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*Amendment 2 is negated.*

On behalf of the Socialist Group, Mr. Gansel and others have tabled Amendment 3 which reads:

3. In paragraph (xi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “which are to promote joint European civil and military space activities,” and insert “in so far as they are designed to promote joint European civil space activities”.

I call Dr. Miller to support this amendment.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – This amendment, tabled on behalf of the Socialist Group, asks that the reference to military space activities be deleted in favour of wording that restricts space activities to civil ones. Some people in the United Kingdom, including the Secretary of State for Education and Science, make much of the fact that Britain spends almost as much of its gross national product on scientific research as most other countries. They forget, however, to say that most of that expenditure is military and that they merely hope for civil spin-offs. I should like us to concentrate on civil activities rather than hope for spin-offs from military research such as Teflon non-stick pans.



The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against this amendment?...

I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – My arguments on the previous amendment again apply. It would be foolish to accept the amendment from the Socialist Group, well-intentioned though it undoubtedly is. We on the continent have to co-exist with a major power, the Soviet Union, which has a huge military space budget, more than half its space programme being financed for military objectives. We are at a commercial disadvantage with the United States because of its huge military space investment. Therefore, it would be ill-judged for us to accept the amendment, although I understand the altruism that inspires it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the committee's opinion?

Mr. LENZER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – With all due respect, Mr. President, for the view expressed in the amendment, I nevertheless recommend that the original version be retained.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now vote on Amendment 3.

(*A vote was then taken by show of hands*)

*Amendment 3 is negatived.*

Mr. Blaauw has tabled Amendment 7 which reads:

7. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "To consider the adoption of a coherent space programme, composed of two main elements" and insert "To consider the adoption of a coherent space programme addressing all civil and military space activities and including space and ground segments, with emphasis on two main elements:".

Does nobody wish to support Mr. Blaauw's amendment?...

Amendment 7 will not therefore be discussed.

On behalf of the Socialist Group, Mr. Gansel and others have tabled Amendment 5 which reads:

5. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "military".

I call Mr. Millan to speak in support of this amendment.

Mr. MILLAN (*United Kingdom*). – The Socialist Group believes that the emphasis should be placed on civilian rather than military applications. Consequently, I propose the deletion of the word "military".

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I believe that we should oppose the amendment for the same reasons.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the committee's opinion?

Mr. LENZER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – The committee's opinion is unfavourable.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now vote on Amendment 5.

(*A vote was then taken by show of hands*)

*Amendment 5 is negatived.*

We now have two identical amendments – Amendment 1 tabled by Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt and Amendment 4 tabled by Mr. Gansel and others on behalf of the Socialist Group.

Amendment 1 reads:

1. Leave out paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper.

Amendment 4 reads:

4. Leave out paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper.

I call Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt to speak in support of his amendment.

Mr. DREYFUS-SCHMIDT (*France*) (Translation). – I should have been very embarrassed to move an amendment contrary to that tabled by the Socialist Group, but it so happens that our views concur.

What is dangerous in the field of armaments is escalation, and in a debate of this kind our Assembly must not set that example. A step in this direction has already been taken, as between Mr. van den Bergh's draft and the "recommendation amended by Mr. Hill" which has been adopted.

If paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation, whose Rapporteur is the committee Chairman, Mr. Lenzer, is allowed to stand, an additional step will have been taken and, what is more serious, an obvious contradiction will become manifest. Mr. Lenzer, the Chairman, may certainly, without explanation, express his view for or against adoption, bearing in mind that there is an automatic majority here and an amendment has only to be supported by socialists in order to be rejected. Nonetheless I am still optimistic. Hope is not essential to enterprise nor success to perseverance... and I shall therefore persevere.

I would remind you that the recommendation adopted by your Assembly states that "Europe

*Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt (continued)*

collectively must pursue the development of independent space technology...". Having voted in favour of this recommendation, the Assembly cannot now demand that we "pursue jointly research on a European anti-missile system independently or as part of SDI".

If the amendment I have tabled and the one by my colleague Mr. Gansel were to be rejected, I should like you, Mr. President, to submit a sub-amendment to delete...

SEVERAL REPRESENTATIVES (Translation). – That is impossible!

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*) (Translation). – No sub-amendment.

Mr. DREYFUS-SCHMIDT (*France*) (Translation). – The President will understand. It is up to him alone to apply the Rules of Procedure.

The purpose of the sub-amendment would be to delete the words "independently or as part of SDI".

If we can consider major amendments, we can certainly adopt minor ones. If our Assembly is able to delete the whole of the fifth paragraph of the draft recommendation, it can certainly delete the final words.

I support the call "to pursue jointly research on a European anti-missile system"; not personally, but because it is compatible with the text for which you voted a short time ago and in which you asked for joint research within the European framework and on an independent basis. If you now say that this research can be conducted as part of SDI, then it is neither independent nor joint European research.

And a final argument in support of my amendment. Such a call on the part of the Assembly is not to be taken seriously, because you know very well that our countries are not in agreement on the SDI offer. You are so well aware of it that in the previous recommendation you asked that the response should at least be harmonised, which is tantamount to a confirmation of disagreement. What is more, to ask for joint research on a European anti-missile system is to ask for the impossible, and you know it. The idea is even less feasible as part of SDI. It might perhaps be possible on an independent basis, but, as part of SDI, it is obviously impossible, as our countries have to respond differently.

We ask you to vote for this amendment for all these reasons, but especially to avoid a vote which would be in obvious contradiction to the previous vote.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Before calling Mr. Hardy to speak in support of Amend-

ment 4 moved by Mr. Gansel, I would like your confirmation, Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt, that you have tabled a sub-amendment.

Mr. DREYFUS-SCHMIDT (*France*) (Translation). – I have indeed, Mr. President, and it calls for the deletion of the last six words of paragraph 5.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you. The Assembly is, of course, the final authority, but I consider it quite acceptable in this debate that a sub-amendment should be presented orally by a member of the Assembly, which can express its view in complete freedom and with full knowledge of the case.

I call Mr. Hardy to support Mr. Gansel's amendment.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I was intending to move an amendment standing in the name of a number of my colleagues in the Socialist Group. I want to make the point that I believe Europe is being steamrolled into this foolish initiative, which will add to international instability, misuse valuable resources, weaken the possibility of international accord and arms control and bring danger in pursuit of novelty. I do not believe that Europe should be doing this. Our rôle should be mature and wise and the events of this afternoon, tolerantly though they may have been conducted, are unwise, immature and exceedingly dangerous.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The Assembly has before it two amendments calling for deletion and one sub-amendment to a deleting amendment whose purpose is to restrict the extent of the deletion. Are we agreed?

I should like to ask for the committee's opinion on this matter, but I must point out to you, Ladies and Gentlemen, that, for the purpose of voting, the procedure requires that we take the amendment which is most at variance with the text. That is the first point.

The second point is that a sub-amendment is generally taken before the amendment itself. I would therefore ask for your close attention, while at the same time requesting the committee to enlighten the Assembly on this matter. I shall follow the course of putting to the vote Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt's sub-amendment, which, if adopted, would necessarily cause the other two amendments to fall. If the mover of a deleting amendment himself asks in a sub-amendment for the retention of part of what he wished to see deleted, he cannot put himself in the position of asking for a retention and a deletion at the same time.

Mr. DREYFUS-SCHMIDT (*France*) (Translation). – He can.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I am talking about Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt's amendment, not Mr. Gansel's. However, the generosity which has characterised our proceedings today has enabled us to avoid inconsistencies and I would not wish the Assembly to go astray, seeing that it is now 7.45 p.m.

I call the committee Chairman.

Mr. LENZER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, to be brief: I am in favour of retaining paragraph 5 as it now stands. On the committee's behalf I therefore reject Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt's sub-amendment. I would ask you to proceed in such a way that rejection of this sub-amendment disposes of Amendments 1 and 4 at the same time.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall therefore take the amendments in order: the sub-amendment calling for partial deletion and Amendment 1 calling for total deletion.

I call Mr. Jäger, but let us not start a debate on procedure. We know very well what we have to do.

Mr. JÄGER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – On a point of order, Mr. President. I just wanted to point out that, while the supporters of the amendments have had an opportunity of stating their views, you have not yet asked if anyone wishes to speak against them. Only the committee has been consulted. This is a departure from the normal practice.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I take Mr. Jäger's point.

I call Dr. Miller.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. Surely you cannot conduct the vote as you have suggested. You must put the major amendment first, since it is the more radical. If that is defeated, we can move to the sub-amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and Gentlemen, we shall settle the problem one way or another without complications, even if we have one vote too many. I completely agree with Mr. Jäger. In this debate, the Chair must call a speaker to oppose this amendment. That has not been done, and I shall do so at once.

Does anyone wish to speak against Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt's amendment?...

I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – All of these amendments are equally half-baked. I do not see how perpetuating the vulnerability of Western Europe is in the interests of any of us. Let us vote against them.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I shall ask the Assembly to vote in two stages and I ask you to bear with me so that we can settle the matter clearly: firstly, partial deletion; secondly, complete deletion.

Mr. DREYFUS-SCHMIDT (*France*) (Translation). – It should be the other way round!

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – You want it the other way round? Very well. The problem as I see it is that we have two amendments, tabled by two different movers, calling for complete deletion and a request from one of them for partial deletion.

We shall vote on the proposal for complete deletion from Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt and Mr. Gansel. We shall therefore vote on the two amendments together. If they are adopted, the sub-amendment will fall.

Are we in agreement?

SEVERAL REPRESENTATIVES (Translation). – No!

Mr. DREYFUS-SCHMIDT (*France*) (Translation). – I wish to speak on a point of order.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Let us keep our tempers. I call Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt.

Mr. DREYFUS-SCHMIDT (*France*) (Translation). – I have a solution, Mr. President. Let us vote on Mr. Gansel's amendment by itself and then let us vote on my sub-amendment before my amendment. I am joking, Mr. President!

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt, let us be serious!

Forgive my interrupting you, Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt, but we have to understand each other. There are two ways of proceeding: either you sub-amend your amendment, in which case your text is different, or you table another amendment. That is the matter in a nutshell. I wish the vote to be clear. As we shall in any case have to vote on the complete deletion of the paragraph in question, and given that there is an amendment calling for the partial suppression of the paragraph, you agree that we have to take first that amendment which is most at variance with the text. Consequently, we will vote on the amendment in favour of complete deletion. Only afterwards will we vote on partial deletion, although you will have to tell me what is to be partially deleted, as the paragraph will cease to exist!

I call Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt.

Mr. DREYFUS-SCHMIDT (*France*) (Translation). – I asked to speak on a point of order, and was given the floor. The President interrupted me, and I am grateful to him, but that is no reason why I should not finish.

*Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt (continued)*

Mr. President, it seems to me perfectly logical that you should first ask for a vote on the sub-amendment. Either it is not adopted, and the fifth paragraph remains intact to be voted on later, or it is adopted, thereby leaving the first part of the sentence, the deletion of which has also been tabled.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt, Ladies and Gentlemen, kindly allow your President the freedom to organise the end of this debate as simply as possible. I appeal to your good sense. Let us forget the constraints of procedural terminology. I have to ask you to vote on complete deletion and on partial deletion. My decision is that we vote first on complete deletion, as that is the amendment most at variance with the text. If you adopt complete deletion, the matter is settled.

With your permission, I shall allow no further debate on this procedural point.

It is so decided.

We shall now vote on Amendments 1 and 4 calling for the complete deletion of paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*Amendments 1 and 4 are negatived.*

The text therefore stands.

Ladies and Gentlemen, thank you for your vote on the various amendments. I note that the reactivation which we all wish to see is reflected in your display of energy.

Mr. DREYFUS-SCHMIDT (*France*) (Translation). – My request for partial deletion still remains, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – As the document now stands, the oral amendment calling for partial deletion is in order. I remind you that this oral amendment by Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt is to leave out “independently or as part of SDI” in paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper.

We shall now vote on this amendment.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*The oral amendment is negatived.*

On behalf of the Socialist Group, Mr. Gansel and others have tabled Amendment 6 which reads:

6. At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add a paragraph 6 as follows:

“6. To give full support to development of a Eureka programme of which space technology should be a part.”

I call Dr. Miller to speak in support of the amendment.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – It seems superfluous to move the amendment, because the vote to commit the Assembly to paragraph 5 of the recommendation destroys any possibility of our voting for the report.

Perhaps it is merely academic to move an amendment that would give full support to the Eureka programme, but it is vital that the Assembly support the development of that European programme. That view should have been mentioned in the draft recommendation or the preamble to it. I am merely putting on record the view of the Socialist Group about perhaps the most important technological and scientific issue that we should discuss.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

What is the opinion of the committee?

Mr. LENZER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I call for rejection of this amendment because it concerns the very point we tried to clarify in our long debate: Eureka should not be played off against SDI or vice versa. I am quite prepared to support Eureka in committee. No one has any objection to it. We are all pleased that things are going ahead smoothly after the Paris conference on 7th July 1985 and the conference in Hanover on 5th and 6th November 1985. Ten different projects were defined. We should not water the whole thing down now. I believe that also accords with the member states' views on the subject.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now vote on Amendment 6.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*Amendment 6 is negatived.*

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation as a whole, contained in Document 1036.

Under Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by sitting and standing unless five representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members present in the chamber who request a vote by roll-call?...

There are not.

We shall vote on the draft recommendation as a whole by sitting and standing.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*The draft recommendation is adopted<sup>1</sup>.*

1. See page 41.

**6. Date, time and orders of the day  
of the next sitting**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Thursday, 5th December, at 9.30 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Revision and interpretation of the Charter and of the Rules of Procedure (Debate on the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and votes on the draft resolutions, Document 1039 and amendments).
2. Address by Mr. Spadolini, Minister of Defence of Italy.
3. The European fighter aircraft for the nineties (Presentation of and debate on the

report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1037 and amendments).

4. Parliaments, public opinion and defence (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft resolution, Document 1038).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

*(The sitting was closed at 8 p.m.)*

## TWELFTH SITTING

Thursday, 5th December 1985

### SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the minutes.
2. Attendance register.
3. Revision and interpretation of the Charter and of the Rules of Procedure (*Report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges*, Doc. 1039 and amendments).  
*Speakers:* The President; (points of order): Mr. Schulte, Mr. Sinesio, Mr. Dejardin, Mr. Spies von Büllenheim, Lord Hughes, Mr. Cifarelli; Mr. Schulte.
4. The European fighter aircraft for the nineties (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions*, Doc. 1037 and amendments).  
*Speakers:* The President, Mr. Wilkinson (*Rapporteur*), Sir John Osborn.
5. Address by Mr. Spadolini, Minister of Defence of Italy.  
*Replies by Mr. Spadolini to questions put by:* Mr. Gorla, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Sinesio, Mr. Berger, Mr. Cifarelli, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Bianco, Mr. Martino, Mr. Gansel, Mr. Jäger.
6. The European fighter aircraft for the nineties (*Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 1037 and amendments).  
*Speakers:* The President, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Sinesio, Mr. Pignion, Mr. Zierer, Mr. Gansel, Mr. Wilkinson (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Pignion, Mr. Wilkinson (point of order).
7. Parliaments, public opinion and defence (*Report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations*, Doc. 1038).  
*Speakers:* The President, Dame Jill Knight (*Chairman of the committee*), Mr. Enders, Mr. Eysink, Sir John Page, Mr. Tummers, Sir Anthony Grant, Mr. Bianco, Mr. Gansel; (point of order): Mr. Gansel.
8. Close of the session.

*The sitting was opened at 9.35 a.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

#### **1. Adoption of the minutes**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments ?...

*The minutes are agreed to.*

#### **2. Attendance register**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

I repeat my call to members of the Assembly not to forget to sign the attendance register, which is essential in order to establish the existence of a quorum.

<sup>1</sup>. See page 44.

May I welcome Mr. Jaime Gama, observer from Portugal. The Assembly is very pleased to welcome you as an observer during this morning's proceedings.

#### **3. Revision and interpretation of the Charter and of the Rules of Procedure**

*(Report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, Doc. 1039 and amendments)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the debate on the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges on the revision and interpretation of the Charter and of the Rules of Procedure, Document 1039 and amendments.

I would remind the Assembly that we completed the presentation of this report yesterday morning and that the Chairman of the committee and the Rapporteurs had an opportunity to speak. Since there are no speakers down for the general debate we will proceed to the vote.

Does the Chairman of the committee wish to speak again this morning?

Mr. SCHULTE (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, we ought to have begun our work today by referring to the draft resolution on the revision of Articles III, IV, XI and XII of the Charter on the second page of Document 1039. It is no secret – since it says so in our Rules of Procedure – that the Charter may be changed only if a majority of the members of this Assembly agrees to the revision.

Looking around the chamber, however, I very much doubt, Mr. President, that a majority of the representatives is present. The Rapporteurs on my right agree that it would be absurd to pick out and approve just a few of the points raised in this document on a revision of our rules, because we regard the contents of the whole document as a single entity.

As I have pointed out on a number of occasions, a majority of the members of the Assembly is required and, if we intend to make amendments to the charter, we must time the debate and vote in such a way that there is a chance of this majority being obtained.

I think I am right in saying that many representatives have not been following the committee's deliberations on the revision of the Charter and rules very closely. I should therefore like to point out once again that the Bureau of our Assembly put the controversial question of the Clerk, which is covered by both the Charter and the rules, to the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges some twelve months ago as a matter of extreme urgency and that we have taken a great deal of trouble to consider this matter carefully and thoroughly. I say this to prevent anyone from thinking the members of the committee derived any particular pleasure from these discussions. That was certainly not the case. We had an explicit mandate, and we wanted to carry it out. However, in view of the time and effort we have expended on this issue, we have a right to expect the Bureau and the Presidential Committee to show sufficient interest in our work for our findings to win through to the plenary Assembly. I do not see much chance of that happening this morning, Mr. President.

I would ask you to begin by establishing how many members of the Assembly have signed the attendance register, because if we cannot approve the Charter, there is no point in our discussing the rules this morning.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Chairman, as President I share your concern about today's debate and, more generally, the participation of members of the Assembly in the voting. Parliamentarians are of course free to attend the sitting or not, that is their responsibility. The fact remains that it might possibly be useful to envisage – and no doubt the Presi-

dential Committee would do well to look into this – concentrating the votes, as is done elsewhere, into the same part of the sitting to take advantage of the presence of the largest number.

Yesterday we took a big step in this direction with the political votes which were concentrated into the late afternoon and had we been able to use the whole of that sitting, perhaps we might have been able to vote on other texts as well. This is all a problem of organisation that we will be looking at, Mr. Chairman, with the assistance of your committee, which may usefully advise the Assembly on the matter.

The majority required for the revision of the Charter is not, for the moment, present. We cannot therefore proceed to vote on amendments to the Charter, but we can vote on amendments to the Rules of Procedure not connected with or consequent on an amendment to the Charter.

I could therefore meet your problem in two ways: the first would be not to take any votes, because they are interconnected, and the second would be not to vote for the moment on amendments to the Charter and amendments to the Rules of Procedure consequent on the adoption of an amendment to the Charter – and to delay this to a little later this morning – but to vote on the other amendments to the Rules of Procedure unconnected with any alteration to the Charter. We could take these votes, temporarily delayed, with the vote on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

Would you prefer to put off all the votes?

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Put them all off.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The question, Mr. Chairman, is whether we should adjourn the debate this part-session unless it proves possible to take the vote with the required majority a little later this morning.

Mr. SCHULTE (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, perhaps we could take another item of the agenda now and check the attendance register again later to see if a quorum can be achieved. If so, I should, of course, prefer to see this business completed now, during the December part-session. But that should be the requirement. I ask you to appreciate that we should not like to see our report discussed piecemeal, because there are quite a few amendments to the Charter that we want to present in context.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The problem for the Assembly is whether to adjourn the debate on the amendments to both the Charter and the Rules of Procedure for the time being

*The President (continued)*

and to resume it should we be in a position to vote this morning. If the quorum is not reached we can then decide finally not to go on with the debate this part-session and to return to it during the next.

After giving the floor to the speakers I shall take the view of the Assembly.

I call Mr. Sinesio.

Mr. SINESIO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I am a relative newcomer to this Assembly but a relatively old hand as a member of parliament in my country.

We have had a most concentrated and important session and I would call it a great opportunity – I am talking about yesterday and this morning – both for the revival that you have sought, Mr. President, which is so important for WEU and for the revival of Europe outside the well-established blocs. I feel I must make a proposal because it is not true, as might be thought, that *in cauda venenum* – we do not believe in that Latin tag. But we cannot address the subject concerned, important as it is in a practically empty chamber where, incidentally, we will have a quorum later on because Minister Spadolini will be talking about strategic defence. It is impossible to take substantial decisions which could take all significance from this Assembly that needs to remain sovereign in every way.

I do not want to anticipate what I will say if the amendments are taken but I have to say straight away that it seems more advisable to me to postpone the first order of the day to another sitting or discuss one amendment and not another. As a member of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges it seems to me wrong to proceed in that way.

I therefore ask that the consideration of this order of the day be suspended and that it be postponed to become the first order of the day at the Assembly's next part-session.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Dejardin.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – I fully share Mr. Sinesio's view.

I know the rules governing proceedings in our Assembly, so I know that the quorum is based on signatures on a list at the entrance to the chamber. This is not the time for me to comment on this system, which I oppose because it enables inattentive members and those busy elsewhere to be theoretically present without taking part in the proceedings, a situation which unfortunately occurs all too often.

This morning's debate is extremely important to the life of the Assembly, because some proposals imply asking it to give up some of its prerogatives in favour of the Bureau or the Presidential Committee and others concern the procedures for considering amendments and referring them back to committee. This may seem to be a minor point, but, in fact, it is important to the life of the Assembly.

No doubt certain members are keener than others about the system, since they proposed it, while some may be impatient to see the new rules applied. However, I appeal to your wisdom, Mr. President, because I feel it would be most regrettable if this somewhat far-fetched rule of a quorum based on an attendance register signed outside the chamber were to be used to get texts through when only a very small minority is present in the chamber.

No doubt you would be right according to the rules, but, morally and in the interests of the future of the parliamentary Assembly itself, it would be inept to seize any opportunity that offered to vote a proposal through. It would therefore be very wise to postpone consideration of this report to a later part-session as Mr. Sinesio requests, particularly, Mr. President, since experience has taught us on a Thursday morning, rightly or wrongly, the members of the Assembly unfortunately leave the chamber as time ticks away.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Spies von Büllesheim.

Mr. SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I just wanted to draw attention to an error that seems to be creeping into the debate. We have the task of amending the rules and the Charter, two completely separate documents. To amend the rules, it would be enough to establish whether a quorum exists from the attendance register outside the chamber: if forty-five representatives have signed in, we have a quorum. Even if only fifteen representatives were present in the chamber, we could take a vote. But before the Charter can be amended, forty-five representatives must vote in favour. It may be that forty-five representatives will sign the attendance register in the course of the morning, but I do not think there is any hope of forty-five representatives being present for the vote this morning. We must make a distinction between the two matters.

The Chairman of the committee has just entered an urgent and well-founded plea – and he was also speaking for the Rapporteur – that we should not discuss and vote on the Charter and rules at different times, and that they constitute a single entity. It would surely be sensible, therefore, to abide by the committee Chairman's



*Mr. Spies von Büllenheim (continued)*

proposal, with which both the Rapporteurs and the previous speakers agree. We should therefore defer this item, but put it on the next agenda at a time when we can be sure it will actually be discussed.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Lord Hughes.

Lord HUGHES (*United Kingdom*). – I agree with Mr. Spies von Büllenheim that Mr. Dejardin, who is seldom wrong, is not exactly right today. The signing of the register determines the quorum, but, as Mr. Spies von Büllenheim pointed out, it does not matter if eighty-nine people sign the register. We need forty-five members – a majority in the Assembly – to vote for the change. It will not be enough merely to have forty-five members present. We need forty-five to vote for the change.

There is an Italian amendment calling for no change to be made to the Charter. That means that not everyone present will vote for the change. At first I thought that we should deal with the rules now and the Charter afterwards. We should not commit ourselves to putting the issue off until the next session, because it is possible that the Italian Minister for Defence will attract sufficient members to the chamber to enable us to vote then. If not enough members are present then to vote for the change, we should put the matter off until the next session.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Cifarelli.

Mr. CIFARELLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, there is not much I wish to add. I agree with what Mr. Sinesio and other colleagues have said but my view would also be that this is not a meeting between lawyers, we are not here to discuss a purely legal or formal clause or point. This is a highly political subject. The President knows it, we all know it, in the sense that it reflects the efforts we are all pursuing to fit this Assembly, on the basis of its Rules of Procedure, to the ever-increasing tasks we wish to carry out and which follow the general line of reform of the Charter.

Which is why, Mr. President, I am wholly against any proposal to treat the Rules of Procedure separately from the Charter. They form a whole which should logically be discussed and considered as such. And I do not believe that this can be one of those issues for which swarms of parliamentarians need to gather at a given moment. Instead it is an important problem on which the Assembly

needs to concentrate all its attention and pass a day of intense application. The debate may be long or short but I think that it should take place on both subjects and in the proper conditions.

I think that the proposal to postpone the item to the next part-session is wise but that it should come at the strong point in the order of business, not at the beginning or at the end of the part-session but on those days when the proceedings are most concentrated, in other words, halfway through the scheduled period.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone else wish to speak?...

Ladies and Gentlemen, a consensus has emerged from all your points.

I have to tell you that when we were going to begin the vote on the amendments I realised that we had not had the bell rung as we should. I have therefore asked for the bell to be rung to call the members who are present and I propose we wait a few moments to let them join us. But if the quorum is still not reached I think the Assembly will agree to have this report and the relevant proposals postponed to the next part-session, with the debate organised along the lines I described before.

I call Mr. Schulte, Chairman of the committee.

Mr. SCHULTE (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, as Chairman of the committee I formally move that Document 1039 be referred back to the committee and would ask that it be noted in the minutes that we have been promised that this report will be included in the agenda for the next part-session at a time appropriate to the importance of the subject.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Your request complies with the Assembly's Rules of Procedure and I can but agree. However, it will never be possible to time reports coupled with important recommendations for the most propitious moment in the session as regards maximum attendance in the Assembly. Our big problem will be to have the voting concentrated at one particular time. This is a matter of organising our work for the next part-session, but unfortunately it is obvious that several committees will have to present their reports on the last day.

Since the bell has rung in the corridors as required under the Rules of Procedure and since the Chairman of the committee has presented an admissible request, I declare that the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, Document 1039 and amendments, is deferred to the next part-session.

#### 4. *The European fighter aircraft for the nineties*

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Doc. 1037 and amendments)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on the European fighter aircraft for the nineties and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1037 and amendments.

I would inform the Assembly that during this debate we shall be addressed by Mr. Spadolini, Minister of Defence of Italy.

I call Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur for the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – It is a privilege to introduce on behalf of the committee a report on the future of the European combat aircraft for the nineties. The report was agreed unanimously by the committee. The Assembly will be familiar with the theme. We dealt with the subject in 1980 when Mr. Brasseur from Belgium, the committee's then Rapporteur, sketched initial guidelines on the same theme for the Assembly.

Since then member governments have made considerable progress. In August it was decided that France should develop its own aeroplanes to meet the requirements of the French air force and navy. The United Kingdom, West Germany, Italy and Spain were to define and then develop and produce the European fighter aircraft for the nineties. That was a welcome decision to collaborate by the four governments.

For many years the Assembly has promoted the merits of collaborative programmes. In no area are they more important than in aerospace. Without such collaborative programmes individual European countries would not be able to afford the sophisticated aircraft now required. The decision by the four governments was welcomed by the committee.

The committee understood the reasons that led to the divergence between France and the four countries that are now collaborating on EFA.

The divergence occurred because the operational requirements of the French air force and navy are considerably different from those of the German, British, Italian and Spanish air forces. In December 1983, an outline staff target was agreed by the chiefs-of-air-staff of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy and Spain but, the more closely the operational requirements were examined and the more energetically the respective industries tried to define

a five-nation solution, the more apparent it became that two aircraft would have to be built. Between December 1983 and August 1985, when the ministerial decision was finally taken, my contacts in France were sceptical about whether it would be practical to harmonise the operational requirements sufficiently for a five-nation solution.

It is an axiom in this Assembly that there are economic imperatives behind, and good military reasons for, a collaborative programme. I refer to interoperability and standardisation of equipment and weapons, which enable alliance air forces to operate more efficiently and to make logistic savings and efficiencies. One of the great merits of the Tornado programme is the fact that it has brought great benefits in terms of standardisation and interoperability, although the process of standardisation has not been carried to its ultimate because there are different national equipment fits and differences of weapon system. The Assembly is deeply conscious that collaborative aircraft programmes have, by and large, been successful. They include Jaguar, Alpha-Jet, Atlantic, Transall and Tornado, which are classic examples of successful collaborative programmes although management methods are different in each case.

It is all very well to achieve industrial collaboration but it is also important to ensure that re-equipment timescales are harmonised. As with the European fighter aircraft there should be harmonisation of operational requirements as well. That harmonisation process can be proceeded with still further. The committee believes that, until progress is made with harmonisation, it will continue to be difficult for Europe to compete on equal terms with the United States. The Assembly is responsible to an international constituency of seven nations. It can therefore have a supranational view, which should diminish some of the parochialism and national self-interest that have militated against collaboration and the most effective use of our common resources on a European basis.

I should like to describe the national requirements. Our French friends want an aeroplane in the mid-1990s, primarily to replace Jaguar as their offensive support – close air support and ground attack rôles – and for the secondary air-to-air capability, and they want an aeroplane for the French fleet air arm to replace the F-8 Crusader for air defence.

The Germans want an air superiority aeroplane to replace the Phantom in the air defence rôle with a secondary air-to-ground capability. With Tornado already in service and with the Alpha-Jet in service for ground attack, the secondary air-to-ground capability is distinctly secondary for the Germans. It is noteworthy that, in the discussions which led to the minist-

*Mr. Wilkinson (continued)*

erial decision at the beginning of August, the German air staff insisted that their operational requirement for an effective air combat vehicle that could take on the latest Warsaw Pact aircraft led to the final divergence of the Panavia partners and Spain from the French.

The Italians also want an air superiority aircraft to replace the F-104S Starfighter for defence. The Spanish want an air superiority aeroplane to replace the Phantom and the Mirage F-1 in the air defence rôle, although the F-18 is coming into service in a multirôle mission. It will also supplement the European fighter aircraft.

As for the British, it has long been clear that they have lacked a dog-fighter. They will have most effective offensive and close air support capability with Tornado and the Harrier GR-5. They will need an aircraft in the air superiority rôle, however, to supplement the Tornado F-2, which is more of a long-range interceptor.

The northern tier - Norway, Denmark, Holland and Belgium - apparently operates the F-16 in multirôle missions for air defence and offensive support. The F-16 will not have to be replaced until the late 1990s at the earliest but there is a clear imperative for the Europeans to ensure that the replacement is a European aircraft. It has been presupposed to some extent in the press that the French aircraft will be more attractive to the northern tier because it is lighter than the EFA and might be cheaper. That is far from certain because the French production run is much shorter - three hundred and thirty aircraft - than the run of more than eight hundred for the four-nation EFA. It could therefore prove more expensive.

If the Assembly is to give political impetus to the essential functions of harmonising operational requirements and re-equipment time-scales, the body required to fulfil that function must be monitored by the Assembly. The Independent European Programme Group therefore reports on its deliberations to WEU. Ministers have been chary about that. I cannot understand why as it can only be beneficial to have the Assembly's support. We should encourage ministers to make IEPG answerable to us.

Much of the IEPG's work is classified but I think that the broad outlines of its deliberations should be made known to us.

It would be beneficial if we responded positively to the request by Portugal to join the Assembly. When I went to Spain as Rapporteur it was clear that our Spanish friends had a total commitment to Europe. We all hope that the referendum will confirm Spain's continued

membership of NATO. That issue apart, I can see only merit in the Iberian partners - Portugal and Spain - acceding to the Brussels Treaty and joining our organisation.

We have an immense expertise in Europe in collaboration. The Tornado programme in particular has shown how effective that collaboration can be. It was no accident that the Tornado won the Curtis Lemay bombing competition this year and last year against Strategic Air Command and Australian crews in the United States. It proves that European collaboration can produce the best aeroplanes in the world. It would be foolish if we did not build on the experience of Panavia in aircraft construction and Turbo-Union, the engine consortium.

We must not miss the second *marché du siècle* so that the Americans sell to the northern tier an aeroplane to succeed the F-16. It is not for me to say that the Scandinavians, the Belgians and the Dutch should choose the French aeroplane or the aeroplane being built by the EFA partners, but it should be one of the two.

We must build further on this collaborative experience in other relevant respects. The next relevant development is a multirôle aeroplane for missions such as transport, maritime reconnaissance and in-flight refuelling. We have seen with Airbus that collaboration on large civil airliners can prove highly effective and that we can meet the needs of the world's civil airline markets. If we produce a similar large multirôle aircraft, we shall be taking an important step towards European autonomy in military aerospace procurement.

We should carry the process of interoperability and standardisation with the European fighter further than we did with the Tornado. I understand that individual nations want to maximise the use of existing weapon stocks and that individual air forces may have especially strong views on specific equipment. Nevertheless, I think that there should be the minimum of individuality in the national specifications of the European fighter so that it can be as interoperable as possible.

Perhaps most importantly, I believe that the consortium that will build the European fighter should be the type that could produce a family of aeroplanes. Although the Panavia structure may not have been perfect, it was a good model for industrial collaboration and management, as was the intergovernmental agency, NAMMA. On the engine front, the same can be said of the industrial consortium, Turbo-Union. We should build on that experience with the European fighter so that, in effect, Panavia becomes the model for a family of military aeroplanes, just as Airbus Industrie has been in

*Mr. Wilkinson (continued)*

the civil sector. Panavia and Turbo-Union, albeit with the additional membership of Spain, should become permanent forces in world aerospace manufacturing.

This model could be extended eventually to helicopter construction. We have seen the problems that can be caused by a diversity of operational requirements in Europe and by different selections for similar missions in Europe by the four principal helicopter nations – Italy, France, Germany and the United Kingdom – even though a new joint helicopter, the NAH-90, was to be built for the 1990s with Dutch involvement.

It may, in retrospect, have been sad that we could not in practice achieve a five-nation European fighter aircraft, but there were clear operational requirement differences between the French and the other nations. Our French friends had somewhat different concepts of the collaborative process. Marcel Dassault has always believed in clear product leadership. The Spaniards said to me that, although they delayed for a fortnight – after the three Panavia partner nations decided to develop the European fighter together – before joining the four-nation EFA consortium, they believed that joining the Panavia partners would probably result in a more genuine partnership than if they had joined the French. Those are their comments and I am not in a position to judge their accuracy or veracity. I believe that there might be merit in having two competing aircraft in Europe. French genius in the design, development and production of fighter aeroplanes has made Marcel Dassault a great force in the fighter world. That company has been extremely effective in selling its aircraft overseas. For the generation to succeed EFA and the French fighter aircraft, we should concert our efforts in Europe and harmonise our re-equipment timescale and operational requirements. The next generation of EFA should be a common European programme.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Allow me to congratulate you on the remarkable quality of your report.

I call Sir John Osborn to speak in the debate.

Sir John OSBORN (*United Kingdom*). – I also congratulate Mr. Wilkinson, the Vice-Chairman of the committee, on a most informative and instructive report, primarily on the next generation of fighter aircraft in Western Europe but secondarily on the industrial organisation and configuration necessary to achieve it – necessary to construct and supply Europe's fighter needs until the turn of the century. The Assembly is fortunate in having in Mr. Wilkinson someone who keeps so closely in touch with the European

aircraft industry and the operational requirements of our respective governments.

The Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions has the opportunity from time to time to meet all western aircraft suppliers. Therefore, members of that committee can gain an insight into the significance of what Mr. Wilkinson has said. Last summer, we visited McDonnell-Douglas in the United States. Members of the committee have been given presentations and frequently attend air shows at Farnborough and Paris.

However, of course, as Mr. Wilkinson says in his report, the variety of aircraft produced by western manufacturers must worry the governments of WEU as well as NATO countries. It should also worry the Council of WEU, and the committee is very fortunate in having the opinions and guidance of Mr. Wilkinson.

Elected representatives, particularly those in WEU, must ensure that the taxpayers whom they represent obtain value for money. That is our responsibility. However, governments of member countries of WEU and NATO, for instance, have their own relationships with their own aircraft companies and with the heads of staff in their own defence ministries.

Perhaps I might be permitted a personal observation as one who, a quarter of a century ago, was general manager of a factory supplying equipment to the civil and military aircraft industry, as well as being a director of the parent company. That is that advances in technology have been remarkable, ranging from design concepts, design equipment and electronics to synthetic bonded materials. Perhaps the layman is unaware of that. The committee saw such evidence in the United States only last year, particularly at McDonnell-Douglas, and at the Dassault factory in Paris.

In his report, Mr. Wilkinson says that the next generation of combat aircraft:

“will be control configured, that is to say, inherently unstable with active computer-commanded flying control systems which ensure maximum performance at any point in the aircraft's flight envelope.”

Those words could not have been written ten years ago. It means that the modern fighter aircraft is capable, depending on its specification, of speeds from zero mach – that is, stationary – up to between 1.5 and 3 mach.

Mr. Wilkinson mentioned Airbus Industrie. That is a good example of international co-operation in civil aviation. The committee visited that company earlier this year. The Jaguar and the Tornado are also excellent examples. Mr. Wilkinson outlined the likely requirements of all WEU countries. In Britain, the

*Sir John Osborn (continued)*

EFA arises within the need to replace the Phantom and Jaguar aircraft.

Mr. Wilkinson mentioned two years ago the need for an aircraft capable of dealing with the 1990s threat from the new Russian aircraft Fulcrum and Flanker, which are probably equivalent to the F-15 and F-18 and which led to the chiefs-of-staff looking at their future requirements. It is salutary to reflect – I heard press comment on BBC radio this morning to this effect – that the Flanker was developed from drawings supplied to the Soviet Union by allied aircraft manufacturers.

The industry carried out a feasibility study in 1984 and 1985. As Mr. Wilkinson explained, the French had different requirements from the other members, and he has described the difference impressively. The French national programme would revolve around the Rafale and my information is, as he said, that the French, or Dassault, were keen on design leadership, particularly with their fly-by-wire techniques.

The EFA programme represents a major milestone in European industrial and economic co-operation. If, after the project development phase, there is agreement, it will obviously enhance NATO's air defence capability and will lead to greater equipment rationalisation, standardisation and interoperability, not only within the North Atlantic Alliance but in areas of significance to WEU. That standardisation and interoperability are surely part of the new revived rôle of WEU. The supranational view is all important in Europe's requirement for fighter aircraft for the future. I thank Mr. Wilkinson for drawing that to the attention of the committee and the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is suspended.

*(The sitting was suspended at 10.35 a.m. and resumed at 10.45 a.m.)*

The sitting is resumed.

##### **5. Address by Mr. Spadolini, Minister of Defence of Italy**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the address by Mr. Spadolini, Minister of Defence of Italy. On behalf of the Assembly, Minister, I welcome you. This is not the first time you have come to our Assembly and through you I pay tribute to the Italian Government. We all know how much you have already done and will undoubtedly continue to do for the construction of Europe, particularly in a field which concerns us.

Through the voice of its Assembly, WEU has always wanted – and its wish has been granted – the defence ministers of the organisation's member countries to participate as actively as possible. Your presence here as Minister of Defence of the country currently holding the presidency of the Council of Ministers is proof of your conviction that defence ministers must be present, to enable the Assembly to target its work on the fields proper to it.

Minister, I invite you to take the rostrum.

Mr. SPADOLINI (*Minister of Defence of Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I would like to begin by thanking you most warmly for your welcome both to me and to the Italian Government which at present holds the chair of Western European Union at a time of great fears and great hopes for Europe.

Having returned from Brussels where I attended the NATO Defence Planning Committee I am honoured to be able to speak to you and to be your guest at the height of the European debate spanning these few days. My presence adds proof of what I like to call the central position of WEU among the other European institutions at this time.

We have been fighting for this central position over the last few years with a view to reactivating an organisation performing its vital and irreplaceable rôle among the European institutions.

Because – and this has been the profound meaning of the revival of these last few years – here, in this forum, we have the specific political subject, lacking in other European institutions, and which an increasingly broad section of public opinion understands as the key subject for the construction of Europe, namely the common security of our continent.

In this Assembly there is something else which is lacking elsewhere in European co-operation and defence, essential politically and technically though they may be: I refer to the elective nature, the representative parliamentary character, of this Assembly.

Which is why I believe that, given that this Assembly stands at the crossroads between political and technical aspects of security, every member of government participating in European meetings of any kind should consider himself fortunate, as in my case and that of Lady Young, Mr. Dumas and Mr. Andreotti, to find directly in this chamber results and experience that are gained elsewhere.

The rendezvous with WEU is therefore a real opportunity for frank European consideration of security problems, by the Europe of parliaments and not the Europe of governments. And what parliamentarians must do for European

*Mr. Spadolini (continued)*

construction is far more a question for the public conscience than government technique.

With regard to the great hopes raised throughout mankind by the turning point in the dialogue between the superpowers in Geneva, Europe's weight was decisive in that development. It was decisive for the essential contribution that Western Europe – and particularly certain countries, such as Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom and later Belgium and now the Netherlands – has made to re-establishing a balance between the two blocs, made necessary by the imbalance created to the advantage of the Warsaw Pact in the years 1978-79. It was decisive for the assumption of collective responsibility within the Atlantic Alliance and, lastly, for the more pronounced shift towards common European defence for which WEU is the natural and institutional centre.

As the critical points in the construction of Europe gradually become clearer – it is sufficient to read the communiqués agreed at the Luxembourg meeting – so WEU increasingly asserts itself as the most advanced vanguard in the life of European political unity with its sights on what is apparently the most distant target in the process of unification – joint decision on security matters.

But this is precisely the reason for the present strategic value of the forum provided by WEU.

Through our reshaped institutional structure – and I am thinking particularly of the new form of the three agencies – we are striving to establish a coherent European line on defence questions through the discussions at ministerial level and in the Permanent Council and through our resolutions. And always moving slowly because of the objective complexity of the subject and also the need to maintain the connection between WEU and the other institutional processes under way, beginning with the Atlantic Alliance, it will succeed in being in the vanguard only if it maintains contact with those coming behind!

In that way we will have, if you will allow me a military metaphor, completed a kind of rolling-up manoeuvre and in fact reached an advanced target capable of drawing behind it many intermediate targets in the construction of European unity.

In reality I think that today in Europe the experience and vision of the defence ministers is somewhat more optimistic than that of their colleagues, the foreign ministers or even the prime ministers. From the standpoint of the defence ministers – who have the luck to stand on the observation point at the dual crossroads

between the European institutions and the Atlantic Alliance – the practical construction of Europe is farther ahead than its formal construction.

The industrial co-operation in the area of defence that is increasingly to be found in IEPG, CNAD, DPC and WEU has features of considerable interest for our thoughts about a Europe of the future.

This is primarily because of the high degree of structural and functional interpenetration which already exists between our national defence industries in leading-edge production sectors, handling different projects from time to time. Indeed, in the defence area, we have examples of a common European industry of considerable significance for all other co-production sectors with tremendous spin-off effects in the civil sector which make it difficult to separate the high technology defence industry from civil industry.

Secondly, there is the fact that this co-operation is proving increasingly necessary in the high technology sectors where costs exceed what individual countries can bear. Whatever the rhetoric on this subject, a specific technology pool is developing in Europe, open to everyone, and with a considerable involvement of countries from outside the Community and the alliance – examples are Sweden and Switzerland. It is this European technology pool which allows us to face the American challenge of the strategic defence initiative with some reassurance. It is European in that university, education, research and international policies and the armed forces are all involved, which makes me say that this amalgamation of logical values is a typically European blend. I believe that the philosophy of the joint European reply developing in the framework of a vast interlinking of positions, of which Mr. Andreotti speaking on behalf of the Italian Government gave us a few basic features yesterday, has its roots in these proven experiences of co-production in the high technology defence sector.

It is also this experience that the Eureka project should look to, though from the more general standpoint, beyond purely defence production. Meanwhile we note with satisfaction one point that is essentially political. The space research programme, promoted to differing degrees by the two superpowers has not been a complete or damaging obstacle to the overtures and dialogue evidenced by the Reagan/Gorbachev meeting in Geneva. It was a meeting, I repeat, that recreated hope in the heart of mankind.

All the pessimism and prophecies of doom of the long wait were set at naught. The limits of the ABM treaty – which sets precise margins of

*Mr. Spadolini (continued)*

both reciprocity and flexibility – were recognised as valid by agreement between the two super-powers. And the prospect of a global understanding on armaments, beginning with the reduction – which we all hope for and for which we are all striving in the various organisations – of nuclear arsenals to a lower, reciprocal and verifiable level will, we are sure, make it easier to resolve points of contention including those specifically related to space in the context of a dialogue which is likely to intensify in the coming months.

Meantime there is agreement on methods between Washington and Moscow as regards the principle of strategic parity between the two blocs – a parity which obviously no longer existed and which we know how much Western Europe has done to restore indirectly, I mean politically, by the run-down clause, which we have always respected and have reconfirmed here. This clause implies the absolute pointlessness of the nuclear equipment we have begun to host in our countries when among all of us, as we hope, there is to be a lowering of the level that was exceeded at the end of the last decade. I referred to the consensus on strategic parity which, looking beyond the press reports, sometimes equivocal and uncertain, of this week, gives us grounds for hope in the form of agreements designed to safeguard – in the freedom of decision of every state in the Atlantic Alliance regarding the American proposals – both scientific and technological progress and the balance of deterrence between the two blocs.

In Rome at the meeting of foreign and defence ministers of WEU on 14th November, we took up a position which I would describe as realistic and as accommodating all opinions on the strategic defence initiative, a position which was not without influence on the outcome at Geneva. We restate that position here, adding some further considerations concerning the Europe of armaments and its necessary link with technological Europe through the considerable and indispensable support that defence budgets give to advanced technological research. That kind of research cannot be left to the free play of economic forces, not even for countries like ours which believe in a competitive economy. The necessary support has to be supplied to start with by governments which, if I may say so, here in Paris look a bit like Pascal's bets. In other words something you have to bank on in the hope that science will repay the sacrifices of the people in the form of the objective yield that research guarantees to those that perform and pursue it with objective purposes in mind.

Naturally, to be consistent with everything that has been the underlying spirit of Europe's external policy over the last forty years – a year

and a half ago we celebrated the thirtieth anniversary of WEU which brought us great hope and faith in Europe and recovery from the devastation of war and totalitarianism – we cannot agree, in this field either, to autarkic protectionist or anti-American attitudes.

The same defence strategy concepts, that we partly share with the United States, would be thrown into crisis by a policy line aimed at creating watertight technological compartments. Above all it would be foolish since we all know the huge extent of American penetration of our defence industry. Although I spoke a moment ago of a common European industry – and we have done much in recent years at various levels to support it against scepticism, doubts and resistance of all kinds – it would perhaps be better to talk of common, or even Euro-American industrial sectors in the defence field.

But recognition of these links, which are objective, and of this need for collaboration must not lead Europe to give up the principle of equal contractual status, particularly with the reappearance of certain tendencies towards self-contentedness and self-congratulation in some sectors of United States politics. We can say this loud and clear now we are back from Brussels where, while the NATO Defence Planning Committee was in progress, we held a four-sided meeting attended by the defence ministers of the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, Spain and Italy to consider the United States proposal to take part in the EFA programme, which originated in Europe – in Madrid – at the wish of the five countries, in which France now clearly wishes to be an active participant, and on which this Assembly is today deliberating.

I would like to stress the importance of this last date. As a representative of Italy, the country that is most opposed to any form of directing body in the field of European defence and has worked hardest for the admission of Spain, I have been entrusted by my colleagues with the task of drafting the somewhat problematic affirmative reply to the United States Defence Secretary, Mr. Weinberger.

But beyond the forms that the co-operation to promote the fighter aircraft of the nineties may take – in which not only the United States but also France may be interested – it is important to stress the value of this fact in the framework of WEU's institutional objectives which thus relate directly to European co-production.

For the first time, a common European defence plan, anticipating the continent's future destiny beyond the stop signal in Luxembourg, has aroused the interest of the American Government and therefore of American industry which normally acts in the expectation of a kind

*Mr. Spadolini (continued)*

of superiority over European industry. This is a sign that Europe, by pooling its efforts, can become a major partner in the dialogue, even at industrial level, with the American giant without being trodden on.

The principle of the two-way street between the United States and Europe which we are labouring, not without difficulty, to maintain in the procurement field, should apply even more in the field of technological collaboration and in the contractual conditions specific to the strategic defence initiative.

We have to tell our American friends frankly that an inferior status does not interest us. The Eureka proposal, which the Italian Government does not consider to conflict with the research programme, whose objectives all need to be defined at the defence strategy level because they need many years of experimentation about which science and culture are divided, finds its value as an alternative in this "equal status" requirement. Moreover, our action to create and strengthen what we call the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance has always been inspired by this equal status, the truth being that a marked imbalance to Europe's disadvantage – which we have realised at various moments in the post-war period – also affects the security of the United States in the constant dialectical confrontation between the Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact. In the eyes and in the interests of everyone, the European pillar means that, in the task of promoting a peace based on balance, the Americans are not alone but the Europeans can in no case be sacrificed or passed over should there be any possibility or risk of American isolationism.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, it is in WEU that I feel we have to work on these concrete problems, that are also great conceptual issues about which the whole of mankind is thinking and speculating, beyond the barriers between the blocs themselves that science always transcends in its power of invention and imagination, so much greater than that possessed by us politicians.

Precisely because we believe in an integrated or unified Europe, the time has perhaps come to abandon high-sounding speeches and to adopt everywhere, including within WEU, a policy of small, strategic steps forward. Following the logic of reactivation we have to pick up the political thread of the technical, military and industrial discussion going on in many different places. In this way we shall be able to lay down the lines of a general political dialogue which cannot fail to be channelled through WEU given the obstacles that questions of common security come up against elsewhere.

In that sense I think we can call ourselves "critical but optimistic". It is an optimism nourished by our faith in the Europe of reason, that Europe which, here in Paris two centuries ago, Voltaire – the first to refer to a "Christian Europe" – defined as "*Europe raisonnable*".

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Minister, for your address. I know you are prepared to answer questions from members of the Assembly, but as its President, may I tell you how much I appreciate your important statement. It is important on two counts, first because your words convey the spirit of the enthusiastic pro-European that you are, and second because it corresponds exactly with the Assembly's concerns and work. That is why we are glad to have a defence minister present in this chamber.

I hope you will continue to be active in this field and am sure that in your address, together with that of Mr. Andreotti, whom we heard yesterday – the two dovetail into a single whole – the Assembly will find the information it so earnestly seeks and which you have today provided. I thank you most sincerely.

I call Mr. Gorla.

Mr. GORLA (*Italy*) (Translation). – I would like to ask Minister Spadolini a question which really ought to have been put in the debate which ended yesterday with the adoption of the draft recommendation on the SDI. The question was put to Mr. Andreotti who then told those asking technical questions to put them to you in order to get a more pertinent answer. You will agree with me that, to take decisions like those taken here and which the various European parliaments will have to take on a subject like the SDI, certain information about the significance, consequences and results of putting the system into effect is of considerable importance. Hence my question to which there are three parts. Firstly, in the present state of knowledge or on the basis of reasonable forecasts, what level of coverage does the space shield offer compared with missile systems? That is my first and quantitative question and, though it is a look into the future, I imagine that a study of this kind has been done.

Secondly, Italian, British and various other experts on strategic studies agree that there is no way of answering any question about the functional effectiveness of the system and the technological spin-off for other applications except by way of experiments, not of components, but of the system itself and all this raises problems with regard to the ABM treaty.

Lastly, Minister, do you think that even if the system should offer wide and more or less complete coverage the problem of Europe would be solved? The point is that, to my mind,



*Mr. Gorla (continued)*

problems like those of cruise missiles and atomic bomber planes and guns will not be solved since the system only works up to a certain ballistic level.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ten speakers are down to put questions to the Minister. I should be grateful if they would be as brief as possible in the interests of the Assembly and of the Minister.

I call the Minister.

Mr. SPADOLINI (*Minister of Defence of Italy*) (Translation). – The three points put by Mr. Gorla can, in reality, be summed up in one basic question to which my reply can but be cautious and tentative like that of any politician or scientist.

The point is that of the ability of the proposed space defence system, once installed, to meet all defence objectives – to put it like that – for which it has been conceived.

With the President's permission my answer will not be all that short given the multiple and complex nature of the questions.

I have to begin with the initial approach to the subject in President Reagan's speech of spring 1983, gradually modified thereafter by the American Government. The space shield was presented at the time as an alternative to the nuclear deterrent as a kind of limitation on the nuclear capability. There was even some religious fervour in this for a country that had had to use the atomic weapon for the first time in order to bring the war with Japan to a speedier conclusion back – yet not so long ago – in 1945. And there was wide agreement which I would call instinctive and probably also unjustified with that stance – the solution of the problem by means of a space shield that could render offensive weapons useless.

Later on, this line, with the missionary streak it implied, was corrected because no one today can say what the space shield will be at the end of the pre-experimental phase which is scheduled, in any case, to go on until the early nineties.

Through the contacts that, perhaps first among western ministers, I have had with the United States Government and with American universities, which are known to be split down the middle on this subject, I have to tell you that we are at present in a phase which cannot even be called experimental but only pre-experimental. Only when this phase, expected to last six or seven years or even more, is over will it be possible to give a precise answer to Mr. Gorla's question, in other words to say how compatible the system will be with the ABM treaty from

which at the moment we cannot exempt anyone and which – as I did in my address – we must support with all it implies in the way of limitations to space initiatives on either side. The American initiative is not in the context of complete Soviet impotence in space but of research where the Soviet Union has already advanced and in some cases is some time ahead of the United States.

The problem does not arise of what I referred to as margins of reciprocity and flexibility in my address. It is clear that if the space shield gave the United States the unilateral capability to neutralise every offensive nuclear weapon targeted on the United States or Europe, the Soviet Union's deterrent strength would be weakened and this would alter what I prefer not to call the balance of terror, but what has been an armed balance on which the peace of the world has been built for the last forty years.

This is the core of the problem that prevents me replying in specific terms because today no technical expert is in a position to answer the basic question. All I can say is that, to my mind, there are no grounds for us to say no to the development of a line of research which is universal, has been embarked upon at different times by the United States and the Soviet Union – first by the Soviet Union in some sectors – and in which there is currently a vast commitment of American industrial and financial resources. This concerns the Soviet Union for other reasons in this phase of the Gorbachev leadership, when the accent is on increasing the quantity of resources going to social consumption and reducing the immense Soviet expenditure on military equipment.

These are all problems which, I repeat, call for a great sense of responsibility and which should not be answered categorically – all good on one side and all bad on the other. Problems like these cannot be solved by fanaticism or a good versus evil approach and I cannot see how you call a halt to scientific research that is making progress even if you have doubts about achieving the final objective. Nor do I see how you can give up the existing armaments, including nuclear weapons, at a level which we would like to be very much lower with an over 50% reduction by the superpowers until it is possible to move out of the present phase and have guarantees that nuclear weapons are useless.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – My question should also attract a reasonably brief response, Mr. President, in accordance with your request

The Minister will be aware that, at the first Rome meeting, members of the Assembly

*Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)*

expressed the hope that ministers would work on a common response to the SDI problem, so that, if possible, it could be a European response. He will also know that that has not come about and that at the last meeting it had to be admitted that governments would have to pursue their own initiatives and responses while a common approach was being worked out.

Two days ago, Mr. Dumas made it clear that there was no question of France signing an inter-governmental agreement on co-operation with the United States, but that commercial firms were free to go ahead.

Mr. Spadolini will also be aware of the news from London that, over this weekend or early next week, an intergovernmental agreement is now absolutely imminent; drafted by ministers, it will set out positive steps for active inter-governmental co-operation between Britain and the United States.

We have heard the ideas of France and I have now described the latest position in Britain; how does the Minister see Italy's needs?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. SPADOLINI (*Minister of Defence of Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, before I answer the specific question about the Italian position I would like to say how important the action and presence of WEU in the new form initiated by the Rome agreements in October 1984 has been in the last year or two, not least with regard to the strategic defence initiative

On two occasions, April in Bonn and November in Rome, WEU was found to be the most appropriate forum for discussing and identifying the different positions of the various European countries. The meeting of the NATO Defence Planning Committee did not discuss the SDI and the subject was not even included in the final communiqué, which to my mind was right. Probably, too, the considerable attention that this WEU part-session is attracting in the press throughout the West, more so than in the past, is confirmation that this organisation is the most appropriate for discussion of the subject for the purpose of evaluation or consultation. This is proof of the inherent vitality of this institution.

Having said that WEU has provided a useful opportunity to note the different positions of the European governments, I will now answer the specific question on the Italian attitude now in process of definition. The Italian Government will submit the relevant decisions to parliament but it has already formulated its own position – as has already happened, incidentally, in other

countries as Mr. Heseltine of the United Kingdom confirmed to me, for example, when we met in Brussels a few days ago – which is that it is not yet possible to assess the objectives of the strategic defence system. It is not possible to talk of its ability to secure total defence or to halt a process of space research whose goals are primarily concerned with defence but which does not rule out agreements between American industry and European industry, including French firms – if it is true, as it is, that the French Government though totally rejecting the strategic aims of the initiative has not in fact, as Mr. Dumas said yesterday, ruled out the possibility of French nationalised and private companies collaborating in the research projects covered by the strategic defence initiative.

I think that this debate will be decisive for the proposal that the Italian Government will put at the right moment – not far off I would think – to its own parliament for free debate; the proposal is not to exclude, but rather to encourage co-operation agreements of a multilateral but never a subordinate character, as I said earlier, involving Italian research centres and companies in the public and private sectors, sharing that spirit of research which is the lifeblood of Europe and civilisation. At the same time it will reserve a judgment, as all other countries in Western Europe are doing though in various ways and to greater or lesser extents, which must come at a very much later stage in relation to which it would be absurd to compromise hopes for détente and coexistence in terms of missiles.

It is at this point that what I have called an agreement on the scrupulous observance by both sides of the ABM agreements throughout the phase preceding the as yet remote experimentation of these new methods becomes important.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Sinesio.

Mr. SINESIO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Minister, your position, known so well not only in our country but also in Europe, gives us grounds for hope. In particular what you have said to us this morning reassures us not only for the future of Europe, which is highly important, but also as regards the solution of some difficulties which can, to my mind, be used not to determine whether it is necessary to accept going ahead with the SDI but how to structure and design that SDI and how to address, between the states of Europe and the United States of America, the problem of the strategic defence initiative of Europe bearing in mind, Mr. Spadolini, its importance in terms of the new technologies that will emerge with vast impacts on the civil development not just of Europe but of the whole world.

I would therefore like you to answer a question which is very short but has very

*Mr. Sinesio (continued)*

important implications. May I ask you what the political consequences of SDI will be as regards the general problem of European defence?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. SPADOLINI (*Minister of Defence of Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. Sinesio's question anticipates the future stages of a European debate which has hardly begun and is so fragmentary that it is difficult to give a definite answer. I would like, for the moment, to go back to the 1979-80 period when it was Europe itself, with Chancellor Schmidt, that raised the problem of nuclear cover for Europe in relation to what was becoming a kind of American and European invulnerability to a Soviet initiative in the nuclear field.

The decision of the three countries – Italy, Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom with others joining later – to restore the balance with the East's missile system was dictated by a European defence requirement extending for the first time to nuclear cover – I remember the amazing writings of a Frenchman, Raymond Aron, the author of the most beautiful things I have ever read. Between 1979 and 1985 European defence could not ignore this fact whose political value was that it favoured or perhaps accelerated the return of the United States and the Soviet Union to the negotiating table – because there is no doubt – and Mr. Dumas the French Minister for External Relations said so – that without the firm position that Europe took, with France contributing, we would not have reached this point. There were certain things that certainly hastened the resumption of negotiations.

It is clear that European defence which is at present conditioned by the evaluation of nuclear strengths, in Europe as elsewhere, is bound to be influenced tomorrow if, at the end of this project, the conclusion reached is that, to some extent, nuclear forces do not have the same weight with regard to European defence. What seems essential to me is that, whatever happens, the cover provided by the space shield must include not only the United States but also Europe in a co-ordinated fashion and that our countries must participate in that co-ordination as independent, sovereign powers. That is my reply.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Berger.

Mr. BERGER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – In his statement and in many of his answers the Minister has said that European interests and what I would call European options

regarding the strategic defence initiative have not yet been adequately defined. I agree with him that this must be done. He has referred to Western European Union several times in this context and acknowledged that it is a forum in which these questions could have been discussed. I should like explicitly to include Western European Union and its institutions in my question: does the Minister believe that Western European Union and its institutions constitute a suitable forum for the elaboration of a joint European position on the strategic defence initiative that might lead to a joint European umbrella, with a view to Europe and the United States adopting a combined, transatlantic position on security? Does he believe this can best be done here in Western European Union?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. SPADOLINI (*Minister of Defence of Italy*) (Translation). – My praise of WEU's rôle has nothing to do with any decision-making capacity – which it does not have – but with its function as a meeting place for differing opinions and positions where vital links have been maintained between the European governments. Moving now from the statement of what is to wishes for what may be, I certainly hope that WEU, with the steady enhancement of its powers, may become a body capable of supplying a European answer to a problem that cannot fail to affect the future of Europe in ways which we have no means of foreseeing today. And, precisely because the subject of defence puts it in the centre of the struggle for the political integration of the continent, defeating plans to destroy it, I feel it right to formulate what must be more than just a sincere wish, namely that if and when experience has proved the space umbrella to be useful for the defence of the world it may have a separate expression in the form of a European umbrella.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Cifarelli.

Mr. CIFARELLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – You are a historian, Minister, and therefore the historical nature of my point will surely not displease you. WEU came into being in discouraging circumstances when the unification of Europe seemed to have been set back by the collapse of the EDC. Then WEU became one of those institutions that linger on waiting to become worthy of fresh employment. I can confirm that defence and armaments for Europe were at that time almost a damned and accursed subject, because the drive for European political unification was directly opposed to the development of the Atlantic defence alliance.

Yours is the optimism of reason. Yesterday the Assembly approved the recommendation

*Mr. Cifarelli (continued)*

which seeks to clarify the rôle of WEU in relation to the SDI. But in this connection the fact remains that, for all present problems relating to armaments, relations with the industries concerned and the possibilities of intra-European co-operation, WEU is a particularly important forum for discussion for applying controls in the new ways – disarmament, for example – and for opening the way to an informed solution of the problem of security through political unity.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. SPADOLINI (*Minister of Defence of Italy*) (Translation). – As regards what has happened in the last few years, the trend is in the direction described by Mr. Cifarelli, in other words it objectively favours greater European awareness and interdependence between the political and defence sides of the alliance.

I would like to refer again to what I said in my address about the albeit involuntary contribution that individual joint industrial initiatives in the form of European co-production have made in this direction without authoritarian intervention. With regard to the problem of the fighter aircraft of the nineties for example, the European defence industry signposted, in the agreement signed in Madrid on 8th July 1984, a road which has tremendous political importance over and above its technical aspects. WEU, with the powers it has, is to some extent lagging behind this process which went ahead far more quickly than the structures of this organisation would allow. Its rôle is more to record what is on the move in the heart of Europe. But these forms of European co-production in which so many elements, not only political but also commercial and financial, are involved put us in a position to change our policy after a few years to one in which a different approach can be taken to the relationship between the European and American pillars of the alliance. This is the special contribution WEU can make to a process which, in the context of global security between the blocs, is more particularly a matter for the Atlantic Alliance. This is why it is absurd to set WEU, which is a limited European forum, against the Atlantic forum. Ever since the Italian Government alongside the French Government took certain initiatives designed to give WEU greater power, I have said several times – as I did when I visited General Rogers in March 1984 – that there could not be any opposition between the two sides. So we therefore have to defend the view, in our own countries, too, and with public opinion, that working for more European construction and integration in the field of armaments does not mean working against the European/Atlantic link on which the

safety of this part of the world still depends in ways that will be continually changing as we go on living together.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I should like to ask Mr. Spadolini a simple question. We all welcomed his commitment to international collaborative programmes. In my judgment it is important that we collaborate further on helicopters. Does Mr. Spadolini see that collaboration primarily in a European or transatlantic context – that is, between Europe and the United States?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. SPADOLINI (*Minister of Defence of Italy*) (Translation). – During my experience as Minister of Defence, which has not been short, I am proud to have been instrumental – anticipating parliament at the time, which later ratified the government's decision – in concluding a specific agreement for co-operation between Italy and the United Kingdom on helicopters. And as far as I am concerned I would also have liked co-operation on the antitank helicopter, much wider in scope than that which the French and Germans were hoping to achieve on the basis of privileged relations between their national industries.

In principle I have no doubt about the reply I should give to Mr. Wilkinson. I consider that the way we operated for a European aircraft – successfully up to now, to the point where we even have a promise from France to rejoin the agreement – should be repeated for a European helicopter.

I remember one day joking with the French Defence Minister before the present one and proposing to call the helicopter Voltaire, not incidentally without some regard for our christian democrat colleagues because, as I said in my address, Voltaire was the first to talk about Christian Europe. So there was no streak of laicism or anticlericalism in the proposal and it got a number of mentions in the French press at the time.

All in all, I think in principle that preference should go to research on a European helicopter.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Bianco.

Mr. BIANCO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Allow me, before putting two short questions, Minister, to draw attention to your great contribution to the reactivation of our Assembly and of the international organisation of which it is part. You gave us further confirmation of this a short while ago in your important address.

*Mr. Bianco (continued)*

I feel we must be careful, with our eyes focusing exclusively on the SDI issue, not to divert too much of our attention away from the more immediate problems facing Europe, namely those of conventional armaments. Yesterday I asked Mr. Andreotti a question that I thought he could answer because it was political but he referred me to you so I therefore repeat it.

This is my question. What point has been reached in the Vienna negotiations? Do you feel the present state of defence integration in the conventional weapons sector is satisfactory? What point has been reached in achieving agreement between governments on the new technologies, the so-called intelligent weapons? Do you consider that trials with experimental forms of training with the exchange of units and groups between WEU countries could be proposed to the signatories of the Brussels Treaty? My last and more general question, Minister, concerns the SDI problem. You said correctly, and I agree with you, that Europe must not be subordinate to the United States. But can that objective be achieved if governments are not also involved and state their position? Will it not be difficult to avoid being in a subordinate position if the right to have relations with the American companies is left to European firms alone?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the Minister.

Mr. SPADOLINI (*Minister of Defence of Italy*) (Translation). - These are three important questions to which I shall reply separately after first thanking Mr. Bianco for his friendly words for which I am particularly grateful.

I will first answer the point which Mr. Andreotti asked you to refer to me, namely that about the conference on the mutual and balanced reduction of conventional forces. The conference, which is in Vienna, perhaps as a tribute to the principle of the Congress of Vienna and in memory of the considerable ability of the Austrian capital to find answers to the most thorny problems, began early in 1973 with the object, as I said, of reducing conventional forces in mutual and balanced fashion, particularly in Central Europe. However, it has not made one step forward and there have been no concrete results in spite of the many meetings that have been held. There is no doubt that first among the causes of this extraordinary and, for us frustrating, slowness has to be numbered Soviet intransigence and resistance with regard to the verification and definition of the startline statistics.

There is also no doubt that the positions of the NATO allies are always concerted, whether in

Brussels or Vienna where, prior to every round of negotiations, the delegates of the NATO countries meet in an ad hoc group. However, what is probably lacking is a truly European concerted approach because the Vienna negotiations are taking place in the context of relations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

I would reply to the second question, on the specific point of the training of military forces, by referring to a very recent experience I had as Minister of Defence on mission in Norway, which has its own special position vis-à-vis the Atlantic Alliance: it has been a founder member since 1949 but has refused from the outset - for almost constitutional reasons I would say - to have NATO bases on its own territory just as, recently, it answered the strategic defence initiative with a clear and immediate "No". Nor is it interested in forms of industrial co-operation.

In Norway I was able to appraise forms of training Atlantic Alliance units that I quote with pleasure particularly since they involve a famous Italian corps - everyone takes pleasure in remembering sources of national pride, which is not to disregard those of other countries - namely the Alpini which I refer to all the more gladly because the country in which I have the honour to be speaking has just as glorious a tradition in the same field, with its *Chasseurs alpins*. Well, in that practically arctic country, the Italian Alpini take part from time to time in joint NATO exercises in spite of the fact that Norway refuses to host alliance bases.

I give this example because it shows how right it is to look for systematic forms of training for military units which fully respect the views of the host country.

The third point is the SDI. There is no doubt that this question by Mr. Bianco concerns a matter I consider fundamental and where a clear statement is required precisely in order to avoid subordination to the United States. Some government control must exist with regard to guarantees like those that the Italian Government is presumably about to suggest. As to whether governments should exercise control over matters that may be left, in other ways, to the free initiative of private industry, I think that they must, even if only to prevent forms of subordination that might result from understandings between the economic giants in the United States and firms on our own continent. Such understandings reached outside the government's net would inevitably increase Europe's technological dependence on the United States instead of helping towards a balance. It could even accentuate the phenomenon which in recent years has affected our country as well as others, the brain drain from Italian and European universities across the Atlantic.

*Mr. Spadolini (continued)*

For these reasons, whatever the proposal the government is preparing to put to parliament, I believe that some form of control by the political authority over economic agreements must be maintained. It is not by chance that two years ago a defence-industry committee was set up in our ministry to be responsible for co-ordination; it is performing a key rôle, with the co-operation of the ministers for foreign affairs, defence and industry, stated-owned firms and scientific research bodies, which we all feel is doing valuable work in scrutinising possible space contracts.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Martino.

Mr. MARTINO (*Italy*) (Translation). - Mr. President, you asked at the beginning that questions should be kept short. I shall therefore simply ask Mr. Spadolini what foundation there is for the rumours in many European newspapers of a German proposal for a European space shield.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the Minister.

Mr. SPADOLINI (*Minister of Defence of Italy*) (Translation). - As regards the chances of a European shield within the wider Atlantic shield and the prospect of being able to check that the two systems match, I have already replied by simply expressing a hope. In answer to Mr. Martino's specific question, I have to say that I am at present unable to give the Assembly details of any move by the Federal Republic of Germany.

When I asked a specific question on the subject in Brussels two days ago, Mr. Wörner, the Defence Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, laid the main blame on the magazine *Der Spiegel* which is well known for its scoops, which I as the former editor of a newspaper appreciate more than anyone as being valuable without any fear of political consequences.

The existence of problems of European anti-missile defence which require discussion in NATO is so far beyond dispute that a European strategic defence plan would be out of place in terms of the basic need which comes within the responsibilities of NATO. The fact that the American space defence programme, which I again say is not in definite form and has strategic defence objectives which cannot be fully proven should, when it is launched with the agreement of the European countries, provide full cover for Europe is a completely different point and of such uncertainty that no one would wish to leave the matter exclusively to the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany because all the European governments would undoubtedly be involved.

It does not seem possible to me that there could be a European defence initiative alongside the American one before the latter is formulated and implemented in reality and in any case colleagues from the Federal Republic of Germany have told me that that is not the intention of their government. The wide differences of position between our countries on this problem - a point which I dealt with at length in previous replies - are such that some kind of link is necessary but I do not believe that at this stage it would serve much purpose for Europe to try to go any further.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Gansel.

Mr. GANSEL (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). - The Minister has recalled Helmut Schmidt's rôle in connection with the European strategic missiles. May I remind him that Helmut Schmidt made his move in 1977 because he believed Western Europe's security to be threatened in two ways: firstly, by the deployment of the Soviet SS-20s and secondly, by the fact that they were not taken into account in the negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States that formed part of the SALT negotiations. Helmut Schmidt therefore urged that the NATO twofold decision cover both armaments and negotiations. That is why he was so bitter about the American Government's failure to inform him of the possibility of achieving a negotiated result on the basis of the walk in the woods. The Europeans themselves have not deployed missiles. Nor have they themselves participated in negotiations. As a result, the arms build-up has continued in both East and West, the situation in Europe today is more dangerous than ever, owing to the deployment of intermediate- and short-range missiles; negotiations were broken off, and have now at last been resumed.

Helmut Schmidt's move was essentially based on doubt about "extended deterrence", militarily and geographically, where Western Europe was concerned. At present we find the ministers in a very pensive mood: Geoffrey Howe, Genscher, Dumas, Andreotti and yourself. The ministers' tone in the parliamentary assemblies nowadays differs from the one we were used to. Is this because we are beginning to realise that we will not be able to shelter under the United States' protective coat-tails again? Are we beginning to realise that it is not necessary for SDI to become fact: the idea itself is enough to change the American position on the protection of Western Europe? In the aftermath of the NATO twofold decision, with East-West tension at its peak, without consultation with its European partners and in view of all the other dangers of which the Minister and his colleagues are very well aware, does SDI not mean that so much has changed in the United

*Mr. Gansel (continued)*

States that the Europeans face the basic challenge of thinking about the maintenance of their security in both military and arms control terms? And does the ministers' pensive mood also mean that we are beginning to appreciate what the problem is but are not yet sure if we have the strength to arrive at an independent Western European response that will also enable us to stand our ground politically between the superpowers?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the Minister.

Mr. SPADOLINI (*Minister of Defence of Italy*) (Translation). - I should like to thank my German colleague for his remarks which allow me first to recall that I had the honour to be Prime Minister of my country towards the end of Chancellor Schmidt's term of office in his country. I must take the opportunity to reiterate the great esteem which eighteen months in government inspired in me for one of the statesmen of our continent who strove powerfully and with great commitment for the cause of Europe in difficult years.

What our German social democrat colleague said is true; it is true that Chancellor Schmidt pursued a policy which was implemented only to a very limited extent; it is true that it put questions to the United States which the America of President Carter was unable to answer; it is equally true however that following the breakdown of an initiative he had launched in 1977, it was Chancellor Schmidt himself who faced us Italians with the problem of being the first country to accept the deployment of Euromissiles as a precondition for the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany to take the second decisive step. If Italy had not taken on its responsibilities in December 1979 under a government headed by the present President of the Italian Republic and with the agreement of the same parties which today form the present majority with a different make up, the Federal Republic of Germany would not have agreed.

To identify within very precise limits the disappointment which Chancellor Schmidt suffered in dealing with the United States, I recall a number of summits where I was present. This policy was then followed as the least dangerous possibility and as the only policy which would mean that the United States would not be the only country to be sanctuarised in the event of a nuclear attack. Perhaps our German colleague will allow me a personal note regarding a conversation I had in Hamburg when I was the Chancellor's guest in May 1982. He welcomed me to his house with a few words which I noted even though I keep fewer diaries than Mr.

Andreotti. He said: "You see, my house is thirty miles from the border with the German Democratic Republic and when I signed the agreement I was thinking of this house too". Therefore there was a defence requirement for nuclear balance which means not that we want to win in military terms because not one of us has ever believed that a nuclear war is possible without the destruction of mankind, but in political terms because we have all believed and continue to believe that the cause of peace is advanced when there is a true balance of force and not when there is an imbalance which can lead to mistaken assessments which have often been fatal as they have been over the last hundred years.

When the problem is put in these terms we must undoubtedly reject today the negative consequences of rearmament by both sides but we must look at the realistic problem of a genuine mutual reduction of the arsenals held by the two superpowers, who must be assured that an element of deterrence is not lost. It is in fact clear that we should make no progress in this area and equally clear that unlimited nuclear rearmament at the irresponsible rate that has been kept up in recent years would produce situations completely beyond the control of our governments.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Jäger.

Mr. JÄGER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). - In his wide-ranging and comprehensive statement, the Minister also expressed the hope that there would be extensive disarmament on both sides towards the end of the century and he has just referred to this again. We all share this hope. But our problem is that we face an extremely aggressive Soviet policy, whose dangerous tendencies are most clearly demonstrated by the Soviet Union's action against Afghanistan, a small and truly non-aggressive nation. This action not only constitutes genocide but also - and in this I disagree with Mr. Gansel - brought the general policy of détente to an abrupt end in 1979 and took world politics out into the cold again.

The negotiations in Geneva, to which the Minister himself referred, have also indicated that something might change in Afghanistan and that the Soviet Union may be reconsidering its position here. I should like to ask the Minister if he or his government has any indication that this is more than a mere suggestion, mere conjecture, mere hope? Is there anything to indicate that the Soviet Union is giving serious thought to adopting a different course in Afghanistan, to making a U-turn towards a political solution and ending its terrible military occupation of the country, which has now cost almost a million lives?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. SPADOLINI (*Minister of Defence of Italy*) (Translation). – If the process of détente just initiated by an agreement on methods at the Geneva meeting is to go forward as we all hope, I am sure that the Afghanistan question is bound to have its proper place in any possible short- and medium-term agreements. I have reason to believe that Reagan and Gorbachev talked about Afghanistan; the very fact that they did talk about it, even if obviously only briefly and without reaching any decision, confirms a new departure which requires careful study and assessment because I cannot imagine that there could have been such talks between Brezhnev and Reagan in an imaginary meeting some years ago.

I consider, therefore, that it is the duty of all countries which believe in human rights and freedom to back diplomatic action for a peaceful settlement by supporting those countries, never forgetting that such problems are never solved by spectacular initiatives or more or less equally-balanced expansive gestures by individual governments but by joint action which, I repeat, must include the promotion of détente between the superpowers as a condition for a thaw so that human rights and freedom can be restored to peoples who are oppressed like the people of Afghanistan at the moment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – That brings us to the end of the questions that the members of the Assembly wished to put to you, Minister.

I am sure I speak for the whole Assembly in thanking you, firstly for giving us so much of your time and secondly for your thorough answers. Yesterday we had an extremely important debate which extended naturally into this dialogue with the Council you were representing today, satisfactorily rounding off an important occasion in the WEU sessions. We are sincerely grateful to you. I hope we shall have an opportunity to meet you again and that we may count on your participation in our work.

Thank you again, Minister.

#### **6. The European fighter aircraft for the nineties**

*(Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1037 and amendments)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We now resume the debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on the European fighter aircraft for the nineties, Document 1037 and amendments.

I call Mr. Hardy to continue the debate.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – During much of this week, the concern of the Assembly has been overwhelmingly with considerations of stratospheric strategy. Mr. Wilkinson's report brings us down to earth, and I thank him for that service. He is of course qualified for that rôle by his professional experience in aviation.

I believe that the report merits a great deal of consideration. It might have been a good idea if Mr. Spadolini, who is just departing with all his entourage, had actually listened to the debate and taken note of the support offered by the Assembly.

During yesterday's debate on a multitude of amendments, there was reference to the need for conventional capacity. Mr. Hill, one of our conservative members from Britain, made the point that I have said many times in my committee that there should be an adequate priority for conventional capacity in Europe and that that was often ignored in the pursuit of novelty, fiction and, possibly, substantial contracts. The fact remains that the report is entirely in line with the view that I have expressed and which my party has consistently extolled. Those of us who argue from that viewpoint are sometimes accused of anti-Americanism. I object to that description. We are entitled sometimes to be critical of our dominant ally, and a basis for that criticism is presented in the report.

I am critical because sometimes the economic strength of the United States creates difficulties for its allies. One reason why that strength has been so dominant and is capable of causing financial and economic embarrassment to the rest of the world is the size and earnings of the American defence industry.

The American strength has been bolstered by the long production runs that its defence industry has enjoyed and it is not before time that there is pressure for Europe to co-operate in seeking to mitigate the consequences of that economic imbalance and to assist its own economic and industrial interests. The European market is large enough to provide opportunities that have so far not been made available.

I read the report with considerable interest because I know of Mr. Wilkinson's substantial experience, both as a consumer and a producer. I suggest that the Assembly should pay considerable attention to the report.

I offer one slightly cautionary note. I should have preferred, but could not have expected, a more serious genuflection towards the need for economy. I know that Mr. Wilkinson refers in the preamble to producing at reasonable cost, but I hope that there will be an even greater eye for economy, to ensure that the industrial and economic advantages of a united and co-ordina-



*Mr. Hardy (continued)*

ted European aviation industry can be maximised.

I have one reservation. Mr. Wilkinson says that the reality of international politics and the failure so far to achieve adequate international accord on arms control might mean that his estimate of the number of fighter aircraft that Western Europe will require might rise to 1,400 or even 1,500.

I hope that further international accord will be achieved. In that case, the number of aircraft required would be lower, but even if it is at the lower level that we should all desire, it will still provide a large enough production run to give Europe reasons to believe that the developments envisaged in the report could give us an aviation industry similar in size – perhaps it will be even more successful – to the industry which our dominant partner has managed to build up as a result of European political and economic failures.

I hope that the European states that may be able to place orders for the fighter aircraft will not be reluctant to do so. I do not wish to be inflammatory, and I am sure that Mr. Wilkinson does not either, but he may agree with me that our French partners cannot be expected to be involved in the consortium and also to be its competitor. I shall say no more at this stage about the Anglo-French Jaguar and the Mirage fighter.

I note the reference in paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation to the possible accession of Spain and Portugal. I shall look kindly on that, particularly after the repeated defeats of the Socialist Group in the Assembly last night. For some years, the Assembly has been dominated by the political right. The injection of the balance that Spain and Portugal might provide makes their accession even more attractive to us.

I can only hope that the Assembly will prove efficient enough to maintain not merely an attraction to Spain and Portugal but a magnet that will keep them in membership. Unfortunately, I have serious reservations about that.

The report is interesting and deserves a response. I am grateful to Mr. Wilkinson for the work that he has done.

*(Mr. De Decker, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Sinesio.

Mr. SINESIO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I must first thank Mr. Wilkinson for his very full, important and commendable report which takes account of a number of requi-

rements. I hope that as I am shortly to become a member of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions I shall be able to acquire some of his experience so that I can look with more certainty to the future of the aircraft industry.

The European fighter aircraft for the nineties raises, in particular, important marketing questions because it would be highly competitive both in Europe and the United States of America which at present monopolise the aircraft industry.

I should like to comment on a few specific points in the draft recommendation presented by Mr. Wilkinson.

In paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation he recommends the adoption of unified procedures and methods for the definition and development of techniques for the production of an aircraft designed to meet certain common requirements. I cannot accept the stressing of this point with reference to a multirôle aircraft as virtually the only technical solution which, on the contrary, appears to have widely differing features for the individual applications.

Mr. Wilkinson used two expressions which pleased me greatly; these were “political impetus” and “harmonisation”. I agree with him on these two points but I cannot agree on standardisation. And referring to paragraph 6, I do not understand the call for standardisation; is not this perhaps intended in some way as support for the recent French proposal to participate in the EFA programme for equipment or systems? If this is the correct interpretation I cannot approve the recommendation and consider that it should be reworded.

Lastly, the idea of a highly flexible, permanent structure to implement the programmes for the production of a fighter aircraft is certainly an interesting proposal which I can accept. On the other hand I cannot accept the reference to the Airbus model, which is not applicable to the military sector where certain concepts do not necessarily apply.

To conclude, I can accept the idea of subsequent wider programmes for the production of engines in the interests of all the associated European countries.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Pignion.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – Once again we have read Mr. Wilkinson’s report with great interest. I want to give a number of explanations on the French position with regard to the problem raised – “explanations” because, between allies or friends, there is no need to talk about justifications.

*Mr. Pignion (continued)*

After what we regarded as the failure of the Turin meeting on 1st August last, France wanted to get out of the impasse and President François Mitterrand formed the idea that Europe could take its cue in military aviation from its success in the civil aviation field. I know I am in conflict with the previous speaker, but the idea is worth looking into.

The differing needs of the airline companies induced the European manufacturers of the Airbus to plan for a range or family of aircraft. Two complementary types of military aircraft could thus coexist: a heavy interceptor aircraft designed more especially for the four signatories to the Turin agreement, and a lightweight strike aircraft for the French air force.

The French proposal asks for a 5-10% share by French industry in the former programme, in exchange for allowing firms in the four European countries a share in the latter programme, initiated by France. France would contribute its avionics know-how – electronic and data-processing equipment – to the aircraft of the four partner countries. This cross-co-operation would represent a highly important political advantage for Europe, which could play an active part in its own defence by rising above national competition.

As the previous speaker said, from a technical viewpoint the French proposal would, as with the Airbus, require the existence of a multinational consortium which has not yet been decided.

Mr. Wilkinson's report, therefore, has shown up both the need for a co-operative effort among Europeans in the military aviation field and the reasons why no understanding has yet been possible between France and the other partners interested in the European fighter aircraft of the future.

That said, France, I repeat, invites all the partners concerned to organise studies on the possibility of co-ordinating all military aviation programmes. Mr. Dumas's proposal, we must surely acknowledge, reflects the French proposal from the start of negotiations on the European fighter aircraft of the future. As the Rapporteur has brought out, the conditions could now be regarded as ripe for the medium and long term.

In conclusion, regardless of the difficulties encountered, Europeans have the inescapable duty of reaching an understanding and co-operating in aviation matters. I hope – and so does the Rapporteur, it seems to me – that the active phase of co-operation will quickly come into being for the medium and long term.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Zierer.

Mr. ZIERER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, it is right and extremely important that the governments of the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom should have advocated a jointly developed European fighter aircraft. Closer co-operation is essential, if only in view of the constant rise in the cost of the development, construction and maintenance of new weapon systems. The price of the Panavia Tornado fighter system is already DM 70 million. There is a danger that it will simply be impossible to pay for new weapon systems – especially flying weapon systems. But an effective and credible deterrence requires state-of-the-art defence technology. Co-operation is therefore urgently needed.

I should like to place particular emphasis on paragraph 6 of Mr. Wilkinson's recommendation, which calls for improved interoperability and standardisation of weapon systems. If we should need to defend ourselves today, we could expect serious problems with, for example, ammunition supplies, maintenance, repairs and logistics, owing to the wide variety of present European weapon systems. Here again we must have harmonisation and close co-ordination soon.

Another point I should like to mention is this: is there any chance at all that we Europeans can play an independent rôle in the development and manufacture of weapon systems, or must we leave this field entirely to the United States? In the latter case, we, the European partners in the alliance, will be heavily dependent on the United States. Nor should the impact of military technology on the civilian technology sector – by which I mean the spin-off effects, the civilian products that originate from military research and development – be underestimated. The development and manufacture of weapon systems will also create new jobs and preserve existing ones.

But this does not mean that we want to isolate ourselves from the United States, either economically or militarily. On the other hand, it is high time for us to recall our own, European strengths if the "game over" familiar from computer games is not to become a harsh reality for us Europeans in the whole high-tech research sector.

I also endorse the reference in Mr. Wilkinson's report to the example set by the European Airbus Industrie which has almost broken the monopoly of the American Boeing company, as you know.

Similarly, Ladies and Gentlemen, I believe more European defence products should be incorporated in European defence instruments, over and above the tactical fighter aircraft for

*Mr. Zierer (continued)*

the nineties, to put a stop to the significant drain on our national economies. This might not be in all our interests.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I feel – and I stress this – that we Europeans must wake up. We must stand our ground, technologically speaking. The joint production of the tactical fighter aircraft for the nineties will also prove that Europe can hold its own.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Gansel.

Mr. GANSEL (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, as my SPD colleagues are no longer able to take part in the vote, I should like to make three brief comments. We are grateful to Mr. Wilkinson for his thoroughness, we agree with many of the points made in his recommendation, we endorse the goal of harmonisation and standardisation. But we wish to point out that we are not convinced of the inevitability of the replacement of the F-16, as paragraph 4 of the recommendation suggests. Nor do we believe that European co-operation on armaments should pursue the objective of exporting weapons, of competing on more equal terms “worldwide”, as paragraph (viii) of the preamble has it. We believe our armaments industries should be ready to meet any threat, but should not be export-oriented.

I would also point out that my group in the German Bundestag will not be taking its final decision on the fighter for the nineties until the design phase has been completed. I wanted to explain this once again since the text refers to the definition of the project, and the points of difference or agreement are unclear.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

I call Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur for the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, to reply to the speakers.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I should like to respond to several of the points that have been raised in this interesting debate.

I am grateful to my friend and colleague, Sir John Osborn, for his generous observations. He has long experience of European scientific collaboration. I was especially interested in what he said about the United States and its competitive abilities. He mentioned McDonnell-Douglas. We are all conscious of the suggestion, of which Mr. Spadolini reminded us, made by the United States Secretary for Defence, Mr. Weinberger, that the United States might be keen to take a 10% share in the production of the European fighter aircraft. That is a remarkable development if it is true and shows

how successful our collaboration in Europe has been.

With Tornado, we have won the Curtis Lemay trophy against American crews in the strategic air command bombing competition this year and last. This year, we are first and second. The same is true for the John C. Myer trophy, and we were second in the Mattis trophy. The Americans are trying to select an aeroplane for their advanced tactical fighter, which will be much heavier than the EFA, which is between the F-16 and F-18 in weight. The ATF is much more an F-15 replacement. In the light of Tornado's success, the Americans might see the merit of participating in the EFA. I hope that they will participate by purchasing the aeroplane as well as in production and the profits.

The same applies to President Mitterrand's proposal in Bonn on 8th November, which came after the report was finalised at the beginning of the month in London. The French have suggested that they would like a 5% to 10% share in the EFA. Mr. Pignion referred to that. It is a significant initiative, but it is not easy for the EFA partners to respond to it, as Peter Hardy made clear. It is difficult for the French to expect the EFA partners to welcome them with open arms as the French air force and navy requirements will be met by Marcel Dassault's Rafale derivative.

The EFA partners – the Panavia partners and Spain – wanted France to harmonise its requirements with them sufficiently so that a common aeroplane could be built. Only when harmonisation with the partners proved impossible did the divergence occur. Although Mr. Pignion and the French President stressed the benefits to EFA of French avionic technology, which I am sure is of the highest quality, there would be a reciprocal technical benefit for the French aeroplane and especially the power plant, which will be built collaboratively with the MTU company, Fiat and possibly the Spanish. That is even higher technology than the F-404, which is regarded as state of the art. It powers the F-18 and its performance is comparable to the SNECMA M-88, which is to power the Rafale derivative. Project definition has already begun.

The partners have been working to define the aeroplane since September and hope to complete project definition by June. It is industrially difficult to admit now another partner who is in a competitive position. We should recognise the political inspiration underlying the French offer. We all welcome it. I especially welcome the French concept of a family of military aeroplanes, but it can only come from one stable. That will occur in the next generation. The Airbus Industrie example is good.

I was glad to hear Mr. Hardy lay the authority of his group in favour of enhancing NATO's

*Mr. Wilkinson (continued)*

conventional capacity. He speaks with great experience as leader of the Labour Delegation from the United Kingdom. We should not allow ourselves to be too dominated by the American military and industrial complex. I agree that production of the EFA will be an important enhancement of our conventional capability.

I listened with interest to Mr. Sinesio. I suggested in paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper that the new multirôle aeroplane in transport, maritime reconnaissance and in-flight refuelling is important. That was just an example and I did not mean to exclude others such as helicopters. When Mr. Zierer from Regensburg talked about the importance of the aeroplane's cost effectiveness, he echoed what Peter Hardy rightly said. The partners stress the importance of keeping costs down. That is why they are keen that the industrial organisation should not be top-heavy and that the management agency should be "lean and efficient", to use Baroness Young's phrase. I was glad to hear him emphasise the importance of a European identity and autonomy in high technology defence equipment production. He was also right to bring home the importance of spin-offs in the civil sector.

Mr. Gansel rightly put on the record the view of the SPD in Germany. I am glad that it supports the project definition phase. He stressed also the importance of standardisation and interoperability as did his CSU colleague, Mr. Zierer. He was somewhat critical of paragraph (viii) in the preamble which refers to the importance of a worldwide market. Mr. Wörner was the first of the defence ministers to suggest that the process of compromise with France would not go further because he was not willing to see the German national operational requirement possibly prejudiced. The French operational requirement seemed, from my discussions with Marcel Dassault, to be more orientated to export sales than the EFA operational requirement. There was a slight divergence of opinion from what was implicitly behind Mr. Pignion's and Mr. Gansel's remarks. We have had a useful debate. No doubt the subject will recur.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I thank you, Mr. Wilkinson, for the detail in which you have replied to the various speakers.

We shall now proceed to vote on the draft recommendation, on which three amendments have been tabled by Mr. Pignion and Mr. Bassinet.

Mr. Pignion and Mr. Bassinet have tabled Amendment 1 which reads:

1. After paragraph (viii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add the following new paragraph:

"Welcoming the French proposals made in Bonn to the four countries which have agreed to develop the European fighter aircraft that they take part in both fighter aircraft programmes and the proposal made to the Independent European Programme Group partners to start reflecting on the possibility of co-ordinating all military aircraft programmes ;".

I call Mr. Pignion.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – The purpose of my brief statement is simply to explain the aim of the amendments. In other words, if the Rapporteur agrees, I would like the recommendation to be supplemented by the French proposals so that developments in this field are noted. The Rapporteur is sufficiently skilled in this area. May I compliment him again on his replies. The sole purpose of the amendments tabled by Mr. Bassinet and myself is to include in the draft recommendation a clarification of the French position.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment ?...

What is the opinion of the committee ?

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I would be happy to respond to all three amendments at once, if that meets with your agreement, Mr. President.

I wholeheartedly agree with what Mr. Pignion said about Amendment 1 – that it is important to bring the report up to date and to clarify it in the light of President Mitterrand's initiative in Bonn on 8th November. The trouble is that our committee finalised its report in London on 6th November. Although the committee was able to add a little to the end of the report, it was obviously not able to change the draft recommendations either in the preamble or in the recommendation proper. As this matter is before the IEPG and we do not know the views of ministers on the French initiative which is still being considered by them, and as there has been no official industrial response, I should rather say "noting". I hope that my French friend and colleague will bear that potential change in mind.

I could not accept Amendment 2. Its wording is not firm. The Brussels Treaty has a function to promote integration in defence matters in Western Europe, and "joint reflection on security matters" is not as positive as integration. That is why I used those words in paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper.

*Mr. Wilkinson (continued)*

I am prepared to accept Amendment 3, with a proviso. Instead of "for Europe" I propose that we insert "for the four EFA partner nations". According to Mr. Isnard in *Le Monde*, that is what Mr. Mitterrand proposed in Bonn. He proposed that it was not for Europe as a whole but for the four EFA nations to participate.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I shall now put Amendment 1 to the vote.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – Instead of "welcoming" I propose to insert "noting". I do not know whether Mr. Pignion on behalf of Mr. Bassinet is prepared to accept that change.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I note that Mr. Pignion agrees.

I put the amendment to Amendment 1 to the vote.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*The amendment to Amendment 1 is agreed to.*

I now put the amended amendment to the vote.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*Amendment 1, as amended, is agreed to unanimously.*

Mr. Pignion and Mr. Bassinet have tabled Amendment 2 which reads:

2. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "so as to encourage political as well as industrial integration in the defence field in Western Europe" and insert "to allow a larger number of European countries to take part in joint reflection on security matters".

Mr. Pignion has already spoken to this amendment, which is opposed by the Rapporteur.

I shall now put Amendment 2 to the vote.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*Amendment 2 is negated.*

Mr. Pignion and Mr. Bassinet have tabled Amendment 3 which reads:

3. After paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, add the following new paragraph:

"Take into consideration French proposals for France to have a 5 to 10% participation in the consortium responsible for developing the European fighter aircraft and for Europe to participate in the programme derived from the experimental Rafale aircraft";

Mr. Pignion has already spoken to this amendment.

Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

The committee has already given its opinion.

I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – Where the amendment states "for Europe" I propose that we insert "for the four EFA partner nations" because that accords with the text in *Le Monde* on what Mr. Mitterrand proposed in Bonn.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Pignion.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – And I accept the Rapporteur's proposal.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put the amendment to Amendment 3 to the vote.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*The amendment to the amendment is agreed to.*

I put Amendment 3, thus amended, to the vote.

*(A vote was then taken by show of hands)*

*Amendment 3, as amended, is agreed to.*

I call Mr. Wilkinson on a point of order.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. May I put on the record my warm appreciation for the work done by the Clerk of the committee, Mr. Huigens, and for the committee's support?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We will now vote on the draft recommendation thus amended.

In accordance with Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by sitting and standing unless five representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members present in the chamber requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not.

We shall therefore vote by sitting and standing.

I put the draft recommendation to the vote by sitting and standing.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*The amended draft recommendation is adopted<sup>1</sup>.*

I congratulate the Rapporteur on his report and his hard work.

1. See page 45.

## 7. *Parliaments, public opinion and defence*

*(Report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations, Doc. 1038)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations on parliaments, public opinion and defence and vote on the draft resolution, Document 1038.

I call Dame Jill Knight.

Dame Jill KNIGHT (*United Kingdom*). – It must be apparent to everyone present that we cannot possibly have a discussion about parliaments, public opinion and defence at 1 p.m. on the last day of our meeting. No one is here. I very much doubt whether there is a quorum, and those who are here will not be able to stay, because of luncheon engagements and so on.

I ask you, Mr. President, to allow the report to be referred back to the committee and I request that it should be discussed in a better slot at the next meeting of the Assembly. Mr. Eysink and our Clerk have done a magnificent job on an excellent report. It does not deserve to be pushed into this part of our proceedings. I make my plea because of the importance of the work of the committee. Mr. Cahen stressed recently that in the reactivation of WEU, our committee, which has the task of getting across to the public and to parliaments what we are doing and what we stand for, will be one of the most important committees of the Assembly.

The committee should not always be the Cinderella, with its reports pushed to the tail end of a session when everyone has gone home. Unless the Assembly gives its seal of approval to the committee's work, it will not be able to carry out its duties on behalf of the Assembly. I hope that at the next session we shall have a proper discussion of this vital matter.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Enders.

Mr. ENDERS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I fully support Dame Jill's request. In the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations we prepared very carefully for this debate. Mr. Eysink drew up a report. He took a great deal of trouble, and we adopted this report unanimously at joint meetings.

Now, at the time when we thought the discussion would be concluded, we have nothing. All the work we have done for today has been in vain; the representatives have gone. There is no quorum for a vote. And what we intended to say to the representatives cannot now be said.

Our efforts were geared to the improvement of activities in WEU, to an extension of what the ministers decided in Rome twelve months ago. We wanted to set up a milestone. We cannot do that now, and that is extremely regrettable.

I ask you, Mr. President – and I shall say this again this afternoon on Dame Jill's behalf in the Presidential Committee – to ensure that our proceedings are better co-ordinated in future so that time is not frittered away on unnecessary things, when there is still a major report on the agenda, and we then have to stop and no time is left for the report. Please also ensure that we have an opportunity to present and support our report at a better time in the next part-session.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Eysink.

Mr. EYSINK (*Netherlands*). – For the second time today, I need an audience. I can see hardly any parliamentarians or members of the public.

The quality of the members present – with the exception of myself – would enable me to start the discussion, but I think that we should debate the matter when there are more parliamentarians and members of the public present so that we can reach them. I support Dame Jill Knight's request.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir John Page.

Sir John PAGE (*United Kingdom*). – I strongly support the plea made by Dame Jill Knight. I ask you, Mr. President, to pass on to the Presidential Committee this afternoon the fact that members of the committee consider that they have been treated with great discourtesy.

We are constantly told that parliamentarians must do more to inform the public about the activities of WEU, but the Assembly, the diplomatic staff and the secretariat must also show their dedication. I urge that we should be given an opportunity in the next session for a proper debate in front of a proper audience.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Tummers.

Mr. TUMMERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I shall be brief because everything has been said. At the moment this Assembly could pose for one of Honoré Daumier's most gruesome cartoons. We began with the moving statement that we sit here as representatives of the people – that is what Sir Dudley Smith said – and we are sitting here now discussing how we should communicate with the public, with a handful of people who are not in a position to complete the debate on a report on this very subject. I find it shameful and disgraceful for the representatives of the people,

*Mr. Tummers (continued)*

elected representatives, that the part-session should end in this way.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Anthony Grant.

Sir Anthony GRANT (*United Kingdom*). – I support the plea of Dame Jill Knight. Members of the committee, and especially the Rapporteur, have been treated insultingly by the way in which our affairs have been arranged.

I wish to put on record the fact that every member in the chamber wishes you, Mr. President, to raise the matter with the Presidential Committee this afternoon. I hope that you will insist that this matter be the first item on the agenda at the next session.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Bianco.

Mr. BIANCO (*Italy*) (Translation). – I do not wish to over-dramatise. Of course it is unfortunate that members are not present but this has been an important session during which we have debated major issues. I agree that Dame Jill Knight's friendliness and courtesy entitled her to better treatment. In any case I can accept the proposal to postpone the subject till next session, but as the second not the first item on the agenda because it has already been agreed that the debate on the Rules of Procedure should come first.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Gansel.

Mr. GANSEL (*Federal Republic of Germany*). – We aim to create a bigger audience for our problem. A good basis for success is to start with a little group. My plane leaves at six.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The majority of the Assembly has unquestionably declared itself in favour of postponing the report.

I shall not fail to pass on your wishes this afternoon in the Presidential Committee and to request that the report be considered in a more opportune way during a future part-session.

Document 1038 is therefore referred back to the committee and will be considered at a future part-session.

I call Mr. Gansel on a point of order.

Mr. GANSEL (*Federal Republic of Germany*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. The official report is published in both French and English. The French report is very precise but there are some problems with the English. I had to make a correction yesterday because what I said about SDI was written out, contrary to what I had said. When I looked at yesterday's report I found that when I asked Mr. Andreotti whether it would be possible to give the report of the ministerial council on SDI to the Assembly Mr. Andreotti said yes. In the English report it is as if I had asked Mr. Andreotti whether he was still willing to accept the Assembly's report. This is a political point of substance, not just a synthetic problem of the reporting of my speeches.

I want to make it clear that Mr. Andreotti agreed to my proposal to give the report on SDI which the Ministerial Council has produced to the members of the Assembly.

I raise this matter because I think that these reports are of value only when we can stand for what is written here when we are asked. We must not be surprised to read what comes out of it in the end.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Your statement will be put on record.

### **8. Close of the session**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and Gentlemen, that brings us to the end of our proceedings.

I thank the members of the Assembly for their attendance and their many contributions in the course of our work, which I think was fruitful.

I also thank the press for being here and for its coverage of this part-session – playing its part in the reactivation of WEU – and the interpreters and the staff of the Assembly for the work they have done.

I declare the thirty-first ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union closed.

The sitting is closed.

*(The sitting was closed at 1.10 p.m.)*





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