ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

PROCEEDINGS

TWENTY-SIXTH ORDINARY SESSION

FIRST PART

June 1980

I

Assembly Documents

WEU

PARIS

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION
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The proceedings of the First Part of the Twenty-Sixth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes:

Volume I: Assembly Documents.

Volume II: Orders of the Day and Minutes of Proceedings, Official Report of Debates, General Index.

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LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

BELGIUM

Representatives

MM.	ADRIAENSENS Hugo	Socialist
	BONNEL Raoul	PVV
	HANIN Charles	Soc. Chr.
	MANGELSCHOTS Jan	Socialist
	PEETERS Renaat	Soc. Chr.
	TANGHE Francis	Soc. Chr.
	van WATERSCHOOT John	Soc. Chr.

Substitutes

MM.	*BRASSEUR Guy*	*FDF*
	DEJARDIN Claude	*Socialist*
	LAGNEAU André	*PRL*
	LAMBIOTTE Fortuné	*Socialist*
	MICHEL Joseph	*Soc. Chr.*
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Mr.	*VAN DER ELST Frans*	*Volksunie*

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	DESCHAMPS Bernard	Communist
	FERRETTI Henri	UDF
	GRUSSENMEYER François	RPR
	JAGER René	UCDP
	JEAMBRUN Pierre	Dem. Left
	PÉRIDIER Jean	Socialist
	PÉRONNET Gabriel	UDF (App.)
	PETIT Camille	RPR
	PIGNION Lucien	Socialist
	SCHLEITER François	Ind. Rep.
	SÉNÈS Gilbert	Socialist
	TALON Bernard	RPR
	VALLEIX Jean	RPR

Substitutes

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	COUDERC Pierre	*UDF*
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	MALVY Martin	*Socialist*
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	MERCIER Jean	*Dem. Left*
	VISSE René	*Communist*
	WARGNIES Claude	*Communist*

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Representatives

Mr.	AHRENS Karl	SPD
Mrs.	von BOTHMER Lenelotte	SPD
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	FLÄMIG Gerhard	SPD
	GESSNER Manfred-Achim	SPD
	HANDLOS Franz	CDU/CSU
	von HASSEL Kai-Uwe	CDU/CSU
	KITTELMANN Peter	CDU/CSU
	LAGERSHAUSEN Karl-Hans	CDU/CSU
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	MENDE Erich	CDU/CSU
	MILZ Peter	CDU/CSU
	MÜLLER Günther	CDU/CSU
	PAWELCZYK Alfons	SPD
	REDDEMANN Gerhard	CDU/CSU
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	VOHRER Manfred	FDP

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	SCHULTE Manfred	*SPD*
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	FORMA Renzo	Chr. Dem.
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	PETRILLI Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
	RUBBI Antonio	Communist
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	VALIANTE Mario	Chr. Dem.
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	CONTI PERSINI Gianfranco	*PSDI*
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	MARTINO Leopoldo Attilio	*Communist*
	ORIONE Franco Luigi	*Chr. Dem.*
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	STERPA Egidio	*Liberal*

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	THOSS Maurice	Soc. Workers

Substitutes

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	KRIEPS Robert	*Soc. Workers*
	MEINTZ Carlo	*Dem.*

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Representatives

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	van HULST Johan	CDA
	de KOSTER Hans	Liberal
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	TUMMERS Nicolas	Labour
	VOOGD Johan	Labour

Substitutes

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	KONINGS Martin	*Labour*
	LAMBERTS J. H.	*Labour*
	MOMMERSTEEG Joseph	*CDA*
	PORTHEINE Frederik	*Liberal*
	SCHLINGEMANN Johan	*Liberal*
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Representatives

Mr.	Alan BEITH	Liberal
Sir	Frederic BENNETT	Conservative
MM.	Thomas COX	Labour
	Anthony GRANT	Conservative
	W. Percy GRIEVE	Conservative
	Peter HARDY	Labour
	Paul HAWKINS	Conservative
Lord	HUGHES	Labour
MM.	Toby JESSEL	Conservative
	Anthony KERSHAW	Conservative
Mrs.	Jill KNIGHT	Conservative
Mr.	Michael McGUIRE	Labour
Dr.	Maurice MILLER	Labour
MM.	Fred MULLEY President of the Assembly	Labour
	Cranley ONSLOW	Conservative
	John PAGE	Conservative
Lord	REAY	Conservative
Mr.	Thomas URWIN	Labour

Substitutes

MM.	*David ATKINSON*	*Conservative*
	Robert BANKS	*Conservative*
	Ronald BROWN	*Labour*
Lord	*DUNCAN-SANDYS*	*Conservative*
MM.	*Robert EDWARDS*	*Labour*
	Thomas ELLIS	*Labour*
	Raymond FLETCHER	*Labour*
	George FOULKES	*Labour*
	Edward GARRETT	*Labour*
	James HILL	*Conservative*
Lord	*McNAIR*	*Liberal*
Lord	*NORTHFIELD*	*Labour*
MM.	*John OSBORN*	*Conservative*
	Laurence PAVITT	*Labour*
	Dudley SMITH	*Conservative*
	Keith STAINTON	*Conservative*
	John WILKINSON	*Conservative*
Sir	*Thomas WILLIAMS*	*Labour*

AGENDA

of the First Part of the Twenty-Sixth Ordinary Session
Paris, 2nd-5th June 1980

I. **Report of the Council**

Twenty-Fifth Annual Report of the Council to the Assembly	

II. **Political Questions**

1. Political developments in Europe – Reply to the Twenty-Fifth Annual Report of the Council	*Report tabled by Mr. Page on behalf of the General Affairs Committee*
2. The international situation and European security	*Report tabled by Mr. Vohrer on behalf of the General Affairs Committee*
3. Impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security	*Report tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett on behalf of the General Affairs Committee*

III. **Defence Questions**

1. Application of the Brussels Treaty – Reply to the Twenty-Fifth Annual Report of the Council	*Report tabled by Mr. Tanghe on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*
2. Nuclear, biological and chemical protection	*Report tabled by Mr. Banks on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*
3. The northern flank and the Atlantic and Channel commands	*Report tabled by Mr. Ahrens on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*

IV. **Technical and Scientific Questions**

1. State of European aerospace activities – Reply to the Twenty-Fifth Annual Report of the Council	*Report tabled by Mr. Scheffler on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions*
2. Defence-related information technology	*Report tabled by Mr. Brasseur on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions*
3. A European earth resources detection satellite programme	*Report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the Comittee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions*
4. Co-operation between WEU member countries on video communication systems	*Report tabled by Mr. Valleix on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions*

V. **Rules of Procedure**

Interpretation of Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure	*Report tabled by Mr. Grieve on behalf of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges*

VI. **Relations with Parliaments**

Relations with parliaments	*Information report tabled by Mr. Schlingemann on behalf of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments*

DRAFT ORDER OF BUSINESS

of the First Part of the Twenty-Sixth Ordinary Session Paris, 2nd-5th June 1980

MONDAY, 2nd JUNE

Beginning of the morning

Meetings of Political Groups.

11 a.m.

1. Opening of the twenty-sixth ordinary session by the Provisional President.
2. Examination of credentials.
3. Election of the President of the Assembly.
4. Address by the President of the Assembly.
5. Election of the Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.
6. Adoption of the draft Order of Business of the first part of the twenty-sixth ordinary session.
7. New weapons and defence strategy :

   Votes on the draft recommendations in Document 827 postponed from the last session.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

1. Political developments in Europe – reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council :

   presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Page on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.
2. Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council :

   presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Tanghe on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

4 p.m.

3. Twenty-fifth annual report of the Council:

   presentation by Dr. Christoph van der Klaauw, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

   Joint debate.

   Votes on the draft recommendations.
4. Impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security:

   presentation of the report tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.
5. The international situation and European security:

   presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Vohrer on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.

   Joint debate.

TUESDAY, 3rd JUNE

Morning 9 a.m.

Meetings of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and of the General Affairs Committee.

10 a.m.

1. Impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security;.

   The international situation and European security:

   Resumed joint debate.

11.30 a.m.

2. Address by the Hon. Douglas Hurd, United Kingdom Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.

Afternoon 2.30 p.m.

Meetings of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.

3 p.m.

1. Impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security;

   The international situation and European security:

   Resumed joint debate.

   Votes on the draft recommendations.

2. Interpretation of Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure:

   presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Grieve on behalf of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.

   Debate.

   Vote on the draft resolution.

3. Co-operation between WEU member countries on video communication systems:

   presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Valleix on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

   Debate.

   Vote on the draft recommendation.

At the close of the Sitting

Meetings of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

WEDNESDAY, 4th JUNE

Morning 10 a.m.

Nuclear, biological and chemical protection:

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Banks on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Debate.

Vote on the draft recommendation.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

1. The northern flank and the Atlantic and Channel commands:

   presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Ahrens on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

   Debate.

   Vote on the draft recommendation.

2. Defence-related information technology:

   presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Brasseur on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

   Debate.

   Vote on the draft recommendation.

3. State of European aerospace activities – reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council:

   presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Scheffler on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

   Debate.

THURSDAY, 5th JUNE

Morning 9 a.m.

Meeting of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

10 a.m.

1. State of European aerospace activities – reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council.

   Resumed debate.

   Vote on the draft recommendation.

2. A European earth resources detection satellite programme:

   presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

   Debate.

   Vote on the draft recommendation.

3. Relations with parliaments:

   presentation of the information report tabled by Mr. Schlingemann on behalf of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

CLOSE OF THE FIRST PART OF THE TWENTY-SIXTH ORDINARY SESSION

Twenty-Fifth Annual Report of the Council to the Assembly of Western European Union on the Council's activities for the period 1st January to 31st December 1979

INTRODUCTION

1. The Council of Western European Union transmit to the Assembly the Twenty-Fifth Annual Report on their activities, covering the period 1st January to 31st December 1979.

2. The main questions considered by the Council are dealt with in the following chapters:

CHAPTER I

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE COUNCIL AND THE ASSEMBLY

The Council again fully appreciated the Assembly's contribution to study of the problems of European security and union. They followed with particular interest the work done on defence questions by the Assembly, which is the European parliamentary body empowered by treaty to deal with them.

The Council, being concerned to maintain close and constructive relations with the Assembly, continued their dialogue with it on questions relating to the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, including those dealt with by the member governments of WEU in other international fora.

A. *Twenty-fourth annual report of the Council to the Assembly*

The Council transmitted their twenty-fourth annual report to the Assembly as early as possible. They noted with satisfaction the Assembly's appreciation of the content of this document, which gave a detailed account of the activities of the Council and its subsidiary bodies during 1978.

As in previous years, some additional information on armaments control was provided in accordance with the procedure applied since 1971 [1].

B. *Assembly recommendations to the Council and written questions put to the Council by members of the Assembly*

The Council took careful note of the reports presented by Assembly Committees during the two parts of the twenty-fifth ordinary session and of the views expressed during the debates on those reports.

The Council gave careful consideration to the fourteen recommendations [2] adopted by the Assembly during the second part of the twenty-fourth ordinary session and the first part of the twenty-fifth ordinary session and to the thirteen written questions [3] put by members of the Assembly in 1979.

They made every effort to reply in as detailed a manner as possible to all these recommendations and questions, taking into account, where appropriate, activities in which the WEU member states participate elsewhere. Thus, they gave the Assembly details of consultations in which the representatives of the WEU member states had taken part, in particular in the framework of political co-operation of the Nine and in the North Atlantic Council; on the subject of armaments co-operation, they referred several times to the work being done in the Conference of National Armaments Directors and, where possible, to that of the Independent European Programme Group.

The Council noted with satisfaction that a number of their replies were particularly appreciated by the Assembly.

C. *Meetings between the Council and Assembly bodies*

Two informal meetings took place in Rome on 16th May 1979 after the ministerial session of the Council. At a working lunch organised in accordance with the arrangements agreed in 1968 and presided over by Mr. Sanza, Under-Secretary of State at the Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, members of the Council had talks with the Presidential Committee of the Assembly. In accordance with established practice, the Minister also met the Chairman of the General Affairs Committee.

In the afternoon, the Council and the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, also meeting under the chairmanship of Mr. Sanza, discussed the subjects which had been proposed by the Committee: SALT, military balance and force reductions in Europe and the work in progress in the Standing Armaments Committee of WEU and the IEPG.

On this occasion, reference was made to progress in the Standing Armaments Committee's study of the armaments sector of industry in the member countries of WEU, which Ministers had considered during their meeting [1]. Pointing out that only the legal part of the study had so far reached the Council, Mr. Sanza, recalling the Council's earlier reply to the Assembly on the subject, told the Committee that, when the SAC's final report had

1. See Council reply to Written Question 123.
2. Nos. 322 to 335.
3. Nos. 192 to 204.

1. Cf. Chapter II, B. 3 of this report.

been submitted they would not fail to consider how the Assembly might be informed of its content and its main conclusions.

The Council continue to favour regular contacts with representatives of the Assembly. As the purpose of such contacts is to complement and expand the dialogue conducted through the written procedure, they consider that the flexible and open character of such meetings should be maintained so that each member of the Council can give his government's views. Noting the concern expressed at the Assembly's June session with regard to the procedure at joint meetings, they pointed out in their reply to Recommendation 330 that the spontaneity of the discussions allowed by the informal nature of these meetings did not prevent the Council from giving their collegiate views, provided they received prior notice of the subjects which the Committees wished to raise and could therefore concert their opinions. It was in the light of these considerations that they replied to the request for a joint meeting made by the General Affairs Committee at the end of the year.

D. *Speeches to the Assembly by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council and other Ministers of member governments*

The Council are aware of the Assembly's interest in the participation of Ministers in its discussions.

The Chairman-in-Office of the Council and other Ministers of member governments spoke during the twenty-fifth ordinary session.

In June 1979, the Chairman-in-Office, Mr. Thorn, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, introduced the twenty-fourth annual report of the Council. In the second part of his speech, he mentioned the elections to the Assembly of the European Communities which had just been held for the first time by direct universal suffrage and expressed his views on the importance of this event. He commented that the WEU Assembly was unaffected because the modified Brussels Treaty gave it clear and exclusive responsibilities in defence matters. Mr. Scholten, Netherlands Minister of Defence, outlined his government's policy in this field. Mr. Aigrain, French Secretary of State responsible to the Prime Minister for Research, dealt with problems of scientific and technical policy.

In December, Mr. Thorn, recalling that the twenty-fifth anniversary of the signing of the Paris Agreements had been celebrated on 23rd October, stressed that WEU, during its first twenty-five years of existence had encouraged efforts towards European union, which was the ultimate objective set by the authors of the modified Brussels Treaty; he remarked that to this end it had acted in various fields in which it is competent according to the circumstances and needs of the moment, taking care at all times to avoid overlapping of activities. The Chairman-in-Office paid tribute to the Assembly for its action throughout these years, noting in particular the importance of the symposium on a European armaments policy which it had organised in Brussels in October. As Foreign Minister of Luxembourg, he gave his views on the subject of East-West nuclear balance, the peaceful use of nuclear energy and relations with non-nuclear countries. Mrs. Hamm-Brücher, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, gave her government's position on problems of security and détente in Europe. Mr. Bernard-Reymond, French Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in his speech, reviewed the principles on which his government's defence policy was based and also spoke of French disarmament proposals, in particular the holding of a disarmament conference in Europe.

Following their speeches, Ministers answered numerous questions put to them by members of the Assembly.

E. *Symposium on a European armaments policy*

The Council were represented at this symposium, which was arranged by the Assembly in Brussels from 15th to 17th October 1979, and followed the work with interest. Mr. Martens, as head of the government of the host country, made a major speech and Mr. Thorn, as Chairman-in-Office of the Council, also made a speech during which he mentioned some of the conclusions of the symposium.

CHAPTER II

ACTIVITIES OF THE COUNCIL

The Council met at ministerial level in Rome on 16th May 1979 under the chairmanship of Mr. Sanza, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy.

The permanent representatives met ten times at the headquarters of the organisation in London and there were thirty-two meetings of the working group.

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* *

Introducing the twenty-fourth annual report of the Council to the Assembly on 18th June, the Chairman-in-Office, Mr. Thorn, reaffirmed the validity of all the provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty and its Protocols and also the determination of the member states of WEU to fulfil the obligations entered into for a period of fifty years. He emphasised the significance of Article V of the treaty which requires the signatory countries to afford each other mutual assistance in the event of aggression and constitutes one of the keystones of their security system.

At their meeting on 23rd October, the Council celebrated the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Protocols modifying and completing the Brussels Treaty. In a message published after that meeting it was stated that:

> "On the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the signature in Paris on 23rd October 1954 of the Protocols modifying and completing the Brussels Treaty and setting up Western European Union, the member states of the organisation wish to recall the outstanding contribution which Western European Union has made, since its foundation, to the development of co-operation between member states in accordance with the aims of the treaty, which are designed in particular ' to promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe '.
>
> They reaffirm their attachment to the fulfilment of these aims and especially their undertaking to provide for their collective self-defence in accordance with the treaty.
>
> In this regard they welcome the valuable support given by the Assembly of Western European Union, which is the European parliamentary body in which the representatives of the peoples of the member states discuss their common security problems. "

*
* *

As they recalled in their twenty-fourth annual report, the Council ensure that the treaty and its protocols are applied and observed both as part of their own activities and in connection with work in which member governments participate elsewhere, in particular, political co-operation between the Nine, the North Atlantic Council and the Independent European Programme Group. Their action is based on the dual concerns of ensuring proper implementation of the obligations of responsibilities defined by the modified Brussels Treaty and avoiding duplication of activity.

During the year under consideration, the different aspects and stages of implementation of the Paris Agreements appeared on the Council's agenda twenty-nine times.

In Rome, on 16th May, the Ministers discussed some aspects of the development of East-West relations and the progress of the study undertaken by the Standing Armaments Committee on the situation of the armaments sector of industry in the member countries.

In addition, the dialogue with the Assembly, which constitutes an important part of the Council's activity, was continued on questions relating to the implementation of the modified Brussels Treaty.

A. *Political questions*

1. *East-West relations*

In Rome on 16th May 1979, Ministers discussed East-West relations in depth.

As is customary, statements were presented on the development of bilateral relations between the member countries of WEU and the eastern countries since the previous ministerial meeting.

Information was given on the many contacts between governments with particular reference to a number of high-level visits, including visits, in 1978, by the President of Romania to the United Kingdom, the Foreign Minister of Hungary to the Netherlands, the Foreign Ministers of Romania and the German Democratic Republic to Italy, the First Party Secretary of Hungary to France, the Foreign Minister of Poland and the Prime Minister of Macedonia to the United Kingdom, the Foreign Minister of Bulgaria to Italy and Belgium, the

Deputy Foreign Minister of Hungary to Belgium and Luxembourg; by the Prince of Wales to Yugoslavia and the United Kingdom Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to Hungary and Bulgaria; visits during the early months of 1979 by the President of the French Republic to Romania and the Soviet Union, the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany to Bulgaria, the Foreign Minister of the Netherlands to Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia, the United Kingdom Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to Yugoslavia; also visits by the Foreign Minister of the USSR to Italy, the Deputy Foreign Minister of Hungary, the Prime Minister of Serbia and the Deputy Foreign Minister of Poland to the United Kingdom, the Foreign Minister of Poland to the Federal Republic of Germany, the Deputy Foreign Minister of Poland to Belgium and Luxembourg.

The German Delegation reported to the Council on the development of the various aspects of relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the member countries of the Warsaw Pact.

In their speeches, Ministers referred to the development of multilateral East-West relations, particularly in view of the CSCE follow-up meeting scheduled to take place in Madrid in November 1980. It was noted that the member countries of WEU were concerned to pursue and intensify the process initiated by the conference on security and co-operation in Europe, which was a central element of détente and this remained a priority aim of their action; they stressed that it was important for genuine and substantial progress to be made in implementing the provisions of the final act of the CSCE particularly with regard to respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, contacts between persons and the free flow of information.

The member governments of WEU took an active part in consultations held throughout the year within the framework of political co-operation between the Nine for the purpose of co-ordinating closely the position of the member countries of the European Community. In a statement published on 29th October, these countries expressed their deep concern at the course taken by the trial of six members of the Czechoslovak League for Human Rights (VONS) and the sentences handed down. It was recalled that the Nine attached great importance to full compliance with the Helsinki final act and believed that if its principles and provisions were respected, the 1980 conference in Madrid which would review its application would have a greater chance of a successful issue.

The member governments of WEU also played an active part in the work of the North Atlantic Council. In point 3 of the communiqué issued after the ministerial session of that Council held on 13th and 14th December 1979, the allies reiterated their view that " détente must be world-wide and indivisible in character ". Under point 7 it was noted that " tangible progress in implementing the principles and provisions of the final act of the CSCE and adequate preparation are of great importance for the success of the Madrid meeting ". In point 8 of the communiqué, the Alliance partners confirmed their previously-expressed intention of approaching and conducting the Madrid meeting " in a constructive frame of mind and in a manner which would permit a thorough frank and measured review of the implementation of all provisions of the final act ". Under the same point, the allies' position was set out in more detail, showing their readiness to further concrete and balanced progress in all fields covered by the final act of the CSCE.

The Soviet military action in Afghanistan at the end of the year constituted a grave threat to the world-wide and indivisible character of détente. Both individually and in a number of fora member governments of WEU were prompt to express lively concern at this action. Immediate consultations were started between the partners of the European Community and between allied governments. The North Atlantic Council held a special session on 29th December 1979 and 1st January 1980; it was agreed that close consultations on the development of the situation would continue. In a declaration published in Brussels on 15th January 1980, the Foreign Ministers of the member countries of the Community stated that while the Nine remain convinced that the process of détente is in the interest of all members of the international community they are also convinced that détente is indivisible and has a global dimension.

2. *Enlargement of the European Communities*

In their reply of March 1979 to Assembly Recommendation 322, the Council stated that they favoured the enlargement of the European Community to include Greece, Portugal and Spain as an important contribution towards ensuring a lasting stabilisation of their democracies and hence towards strengthening and safeguarding the free part of Europe as a whole.

The Council welcomed the satisfactory outcome of negotiations with Greece. As the Chairman-in-Office of the Council of the Communities stated at the signing ceremony in Athens on 28th May 1979, on the acts of

accession of the Hellenic Republic, this enlargement of the Community was an accomplishment; it was a decisive stage in the construction of Europe.

In addition, the talks on Portugal's entry opened on 17th October 1978, and negotiations on Spain's accession started on 5th February 1979.

In the field of political co-operation, contacts between the nine European Community countries and Greece, Portugal and Spain have been intensified so as to familiarise these countries with the joint positions adopted by the Nine on foreign policy issues.

3. *Situation in the Middle East*

In 1979, the member governments of WEU continued consultations on this subject with their partners in the European Community within the framework of political co-operation between the Nine and also with their allies within the North Atlantic Council.

The Council have begun their study of Recommendation 341, on the impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security, sent to them by the Assembly in December.

They recall that the member countries of the Community declared their position regarding the Israeli-Arab conflict in two statements issued in Paris on 26th March and 18th June 1979. From their point of view, which was reaffirmed by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council of the Communities in his speech to the General Assembly of the United Nations on 25th September 1979, United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 taken together with the four principles set out by the member countries of the Community in their declaration of 29th June 1977, constitute the basic framework for an overall, just and lasting peace settlement; all the parties concerned, including the Palestine Liberation Organisation, must accept them as a basis for negotiations within which they would all play their full part.

Further, the Council recall that the Nine reaffirmed their support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon in two declarations issued by the Foreign Ministers at their meetings in Paris on 18th June and Dublin on 11th September 1979.

The serious situation created by the occupation of the United States Embassy in Tehran and the holding of its staff as hostages in flagrant violation of international law was considered by the Foreign Ministers of the member countries of the Community on 20th November and by the European Council at its meeting in Dublin on 29th and 30th November. The Council of WEU fully appreciated the Assembly's concern in this regard and did not fail to draw the attention of the governments of member states to the support given by the Assembly to the declaration adopted by the heads of state or of government of the Nine at the close of their meeting. Replying to Assembly Recommendation 342, they noted that all the member states of WEU also gave their full support to the resolution unanimously adopted by the United Nations Security Council on 4th December. They added that they would continue their consultations in any appropriate frameworks. The Council recall that a declaration supported by the fifteen members of the Atlantic Alliance was published in Brussels on 13th December 1979. Further, all member countries of WEU supported the resolution adopted by the United Nations Security Council on 31st December, reiterating the request made to the Iranian authorities on 4th December for the immediate release of the United States nationals held as hostages in Iran.

The member governments of WEU were greatly concerned at the events which took place in Afghanistan at the end of 1979. The consultations started between western countries have already been mentioned under point 1. Within the United Nations, France and the United Kingdom, which are permanent members of the Security Council, voted for the draft resolution demanding immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all foreign troops from Afghanistan, which was considered by that Council on 7th January 1980. All the member countries of WEU voted for the resolution making the same demand which was adopted by the General Assembly meeting in extraordinary session on 14th January. In their declaration published in Brussels on 15th January, the Foreign Ministers of the member countries of the Community reaffirmed the grave concern of the Nine with regard to the crisis created by the military intervention of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and recalled that this action represents a serious violation of the principles of international relations enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. They urged the Soviet Union to act in conformity with the resolution adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations.

4. *Relations between European and African countries*

The governments of the member countries of WEU have played an active part in the consultations which took place within the framework of political co-operation between the Nine.

In their twenty-fourth annual report, the Council set out their views on various impor-

tant questions on which the Assembly had expressed concern. On the situation in Rhodesia, they stated that they fully supported the efforts of the British Government, in co-operation with the United States Government, to reach a settlement acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole and that they associated themselves with the position adopted by the Council of the OAU in Khartoum in July 1978. In a statement published at the conclusion of the meeting on political co-operation held on 11th September 1979, the Foreign Ministers of the member countries of the Community urged all parties to seize the opportunity provided by the Constitutional Conference which opened in London on 10th September to achieve a political solution on the basis of majority rule. The Council warmly welcomed the agreement achieved at this conference and signed in London on 21st December 1979 expressing the hope that peace would return to all the countries concerned and looking forward to the day when the independent Republic of Zimbabwe would take its place as a full member of the international community. The economic sanctions applied to Rhodesia in implementation of resolutions of the United Nations Security Council have been lifted by the member governments of WEU in accordance with the resolution adopted by the Security Council on 21st December.

Furthermore, the Council of WEU, who in their last annual report to the Assembly referred to the negotiations begun in July 1978 with a view to renewing the Lomé Convention, noted with satisfaction the signature on 31st October 1979 of the new co-operation convention concluded between the European Economic Community and fifty-seven African, Caribbean and Pacific States.

B. *Defence questions*

During 1979, defence questions have remained a central part of the Council's activities in conformity with the obligations imposed on them by the modified Brussels Treaty.

On the occasion of the presentation of the twenty-fourth annual report in June, Mr. Thorn, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, emphasised once again that the treaty, whose Article V requires the member states to afford each other mutual assistance in the event of aggression, constitutes one of the keystones of the security system of the signatory countries.

Mr. Thorn also availed himself, in October, of the opportunity offered by the symposium on a European armaments policy, organised by the Assembly, to pay tribute to the organisation's continuing rôle as regards European security.

1. *Level of forces of member states*

In application of the modified Brussels Treaty and its attendant agreements and resolutions, the Council have carried out, during 1979, all the prescribed procedures. As in former years, they have been assisted in this task by the Agency for the Control of Armaments, NATO and SHAPE.

(*a*) *Forces under NATO command*

The maximum levels of ground, air and naval forces which member states of WEU place under NATO command are fixed in Articles I and II of Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty. Article III of the Protocol provides for a special procedure, if necessary, to enable these levels to be increased above the limits specified in Articles I and II.

So that they may satisfy themselves that the limits laid down in Articles I and II of Protocol No. II are not exceeded, the Council receive information every year concerning the levels in question, in accordance with Article IV of that Protocol. This information is obtained in the course of inspections carried out by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, and is transmitted to the Council by a high-ranking officer designated by him to that end.

The information, as at the end of 1978, which was conveyed by this officer at the appropriate time, was considered by the Council on 25th April. Information indicating the status as at the end of 1979 was requested in December.

Furthermore, the Council have taken the necessary steps to implement the procedure laid down in their Resolution of 15th September 1956, whereby the levels of forces under NATO command are examined in the light of the annual review.

For the year 1978, at a meeting on 19th January 1979, in Brussels, the permanent representatives (or their substitutes) to the North Atlantic Council of the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom examined the levels of forces of WEU member states and reported to the Council. At their meeting on 22nd February 1979, the latter noted that the level of these forces, as set out in the NATO force plan, fell within the limits specified in Articles I and II of Protocol No. II. At the same meeting, the Council took note of a

declaration on French forces by the permanent representative of France.

The same procedure is under way for 1979.

(*b*) *Forces under national command*

The strength and armaments of forces of member states maintained on the mainland of Europe and remaining under national command – internal defence and police forces, forces for the defence of overseas territories, and common defence forces – are fixed each year in accordance with the procedure specified in the Agreement signed in Paris on 14th December 1957, in implementation of Article V of Protocol No. II.

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By means of the methods set out in paragraphs (*a*) and (*b*) above, the Council have been able, in 1979, to carry out their obligations under Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty concerning levels of forces.

2. *United Kingdom forces stationed on the continent of Europe*

In accordance with the Council's reply to Assembly Recommendation 331, the Government of the United Kingdom have informed the Council that the average number of British land forces stationed on the mainland of Europe in accordance with the commitment in Article VI of Protocol No. II of the modified Brussels Treaty during 1979 was 55,650.

3. *Study of the armaments industries in member countries* [1]

During 1979, the Council followed closely the progress made by the Standing Armaments Committee with its study of the armaments industries in member countries, and in particular the economic chapter of this study.

On 25th April, in preparation for the meeting of the Ministerial Council of 16th May, the Head of the International Secretariat of the SAC presented to the Council an interim report by the Committee on the progress of its work.

At the end of their exchange of views in Rome, Ministers confirmed the mandate given to the SAC and agreed that the first part of the economic study should be completed both swiftly and to best effect with the co-operation of the administrations concerned.

As stated in their reply to Assembly Recommendation 335, the Council have not yet had occasion to express a view on the practical follow-up action to be taken on this study but they consider that it may enable governments for the first time to have a detailed and comparative analysis of the armaments industries in the member countries and assist them to direct their choices and their programmes towards increased co-operation.

As to future projects, the Council declared in reply to Recommendation 331 that they would consider the possibility of entrusting the SAC with work on other subjects which might be suggested. Decisions would be made on a case-by-case basis and bearing in mind the SAC's other tasks and the resources at its disposal, whilst avoiding any duplication of work.

4. *Assembly recommendations and written questions*

(*a*) With regard to matters relating to the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, the Council replied to Written Questions 200 and 202 concerning the procedure laid down in Article II of Protocol No. III for amendments to Annex III to Protocol No. III. They also answered Written Questions 203 and 204 dealing with non-production controls and stocks of weapons.

(*b*) On the complicated issue of a European armaments policy, the Council gave their views in their replies to Recommendation 329 on the industrial bases of European security, to Recommendation 333 on defence procurement and to Recommendation 335 on political conditions for European armaments co-operation.

They reaffirmed the need for close co-operation in this important field, whilst acknowledging the difficulties of such an undertaking because the armaments industries of member states have widely differing structures and levels of development. They confirmed the importance they attach to the continuation of the work at present being carried out, with a view to achieving greater harmonisation of national policies leading to genuine co-operation on specific programmes.

As the Council recalled, the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD), amongst other responsibilities, endeavours to achieve interoperability in specific equipment areas within the Alliance as a whole and the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) concentrates on identifying opportunities for collaboration in the design and production of defence equipment between European member countries. The Council noted that wherever potential common interests are identified, detailed arrangements are made to exploit

1. See also Chapters I and IV.

as far as possible the opportunities arising for collaboration in development or production of equipment.

Observing that the real problems of trying to set up collaborative projects relate to issues of requirements, costs and industrial arrangements, the Council envisaged that permanent industrial consortia may well be established as an effective means of undertaking such projects in the armaments field, but industrial and management structures would need to be tailored to the circumstances of particular projects where the interests and requirements of the governments concerned appear to be in sufficient conformity.

The Council also mentioned the dialogue started with the United States with a view to the production of certain types of armaments.

(*c*) The security of member countries of the Alliance was a matter of paramount concern to member governments during 1979. In the face of the steady build-up of Warsaw Pact forces and armaments, both conventional and nuclear, member governments stated their resolve, in answering Recommendation 324, to devote the resources necessary to modernise and strengthen allied capabilities to the extent required for deterrence and defence.

In addition, in the communiqué issued at the conclusion of the ministerial session of the North Atlantic Council of 13th and 14th December 1979, Ministers of member countries belonging to the integrated military structure, in outlining a comprehensive programme of action comprising measures to reduce the military imbalance through concrete improvement and modernisation of long-range theatre nuclear and conventional forces, undertook to improve their military capabilities and thus maintain an adequate level of deterrence and defence across the whole spectrum.

(*d*) The Council confirmed, in answering Recommendation 323, their full support for all efforts to further progress towards general and complete disarmament under close and effective international control. They added that the member states will make every effort to ensure that the objectives laid down by the tenth special session on disarmament of the United Nations General Assembly are fulfilled as far as possible before the next special session fixed for 1982.

Furthermore, the Council gave their opinion on the SALT II Agreement, and its implications for member countries, particularly when replying to Recommendation 324 and Written Question 192.

(*e*) The Council's views on the question of limiting trade in arms, which involves both importing and exporting countries, were given in the replies to Recommendations 322, 323 and 335, as well as Written Question 194.

5. *Assembly symposium on a European armaments policy*

As mentioned in Chapter I, E of this report, the Council's representatives who attended this symposium, held from 15th-17th October 1979, in Brussels, followed its debates with keen interest. The Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Mr. Thorn, noted that the Assembly had intended, through the organisation of the symposium, to make a positive and a most important contribution to European co-operation in their specific field and that, in doing so, they had shown how much importance the modified Brussels Treaty still has today for the European union of tomorrow.

C. *Scientific, technological and aerospace questions*

The Council followed closely the Assembly's debates on the questions dealt with in detail in the reports produced by the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions in 1979.

Appreciating the interest expressed by the Assembly in the continuation of the dialogue between the two organs of WEU regarding the policies of European countries on scientific, technological and aerospace questions, the Council again provided the Assembly with a substantial amount of information on the subject in their detailed replies to the recommendations and written questions submitted to them.

1. *Energy problems*

The Council, recognising the urgent need for an intensified collective effort to meet current and future energy problems, recalled in their reply to Recommendation 332 the great importance which they attach to continuous co-ordination of the energy policy measures of the member states of WEU and of all their research and development efforts.

During 1979, member states increased their co-operation in the field of energy policy both within the European Communities and in the OECD, particularly as regards energy saving and the use of sources of energy other than oil.

At the meeting of the European Council held in Strasbourg on 21st and 22nd June, it was decided:

- to increase the use of coal in power stations and industry and to give special attention to the development of new

technologies for the extraction, transport and processing of coal ;

- to step up national and Community research and development efforts in the energy sector so that more tangible prospects may shortly be found for the economic use of new resources, especially geothermal and solar energy ;
- to maintain Community imports between 1980 and 1985 at an annual level not higher than that for 1978 ;
- to strengthen national and Community programmes in energy conservation ;
- to give a strong fresh impetus to nuclear programmes, while ensuring that nuclear energy is used under conditions guaranteeing the safety of the population.

Recalling these decisions in their reply to Written Question 198, the Council of WEU observed that the Community's efforts should make a contribution towards ensuring Western Europe's future energy supplies, but that problems of energy supply and demand had to be dealt with on a world-wide basis. They therefore expressed the hope that other industrialised consumer countries would be prepared to undertake similar efforts of energy conservation and development and that it would prove possible for the industrialised consumers to establish contacts with producing countries and with oil-importing developing countries in order to analyse supply and demand prospects and to work out ways and means of remedying the difficulties identified. This view was confirmed in the Council's replies to Recommendation 332 (point 4) and 334 (point 5).

At its session on 11th September, the Council of the Communities adopted a four-year programme for the period 1979-1983 for indirect-action research and development in the energy sector.

At the meeting of the European Council held in Dublin on 29th and 30th November, the heads of state or government again discussed the world energy situation. Noting that it remained very serious, they agreed on the urgent need for the Community to develop a more effective energy policy.

At their request, the Energy Ministers, meeting on 4th December, fixed national oil import objectives totalling 472 million tonnes for the Community for 1980. They also decided to set up a quarterly monitoring procedure to check on the implementation of these objectives and on the application of the medium and long-term measures needed in order to meet the Community's targets for 1985.

In addition, the European Council confirmed its resolve to develop the indigenous energy resources of the member states of the Community, in particular coal, nuclear power and hydrocarbons, and to promote research and development programmes in the energy field, with particular regard to renewable energy sources.

The European Council concluded, however, that as energy problems affect all countries in the world, no lasting solution can be achieved without closer understanding and co-operation between the industrialised, the oil-producing and the non-oil-producing, developing countries. They added that efforts should be made to promote discussion with the oil-producing countries with the object of adopting policies, in both consumer and producer countries, which would allow the transition to a better-balanced market without serious damage to the economy of the world as a whole. The European Council considered it most desirable that further significant and rapid progress should be made in all international fora where energy is discussed, i.e. the United Nations, OECD/IEA and the Economic Commission for Europe, with a view to establishing a consensus and co-operation on the adjustments required by the changing situation in the world.

2. *European aircraft industry*

In their twenty-fourth annual report, the Council noted that the member states of WEU were seeking to promote the best employment of their respective industrial resources and production capacities in order to achieve a strong and competitive aircraft industry in Europe.

They were pleased to note that, in its reply to this report, the Assembly welcomed the progress already achieved towards strengthening European co-operation in the production of civil aircraft and in particular the Airbus.

Regarding the development of European co-operation on the production of fighter aircraft and helicopters, the Council wish to recall the details given to the Assembly in the reply to Recommendation 332.

The appropriate government departments in France, the United Kingdom, and the Federal Republic of Germany are firmly resolved to develop a joint European tactical fighter aircraft for the nineties. Such a complex venture which will involve the most modern technologies, poses many difficult problems which the countries concerned have already begun to study. For instance, they will endeavour to harmonise their respective operational requirements and the time factors, in order to find a configuration which will satisfy all concerned. In the course of these deliberations, the work

will be apportioned between the countries concerned, an industrial partnership established and the most expedient form of management agreed.

In addition, the governments of France, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy have set up a joint steering committee on the helicopter industry. This committee has concluded its studies on expected military requirements into the nineties. It is now working on a common technology programme which will form the basis for joint action with regard to military helicopters. Only when that programme is ready will it be possible to decide what orders can be provided for the European helicopter industry.

3. *Space questions*

In their reply to Recommendation 332, the Council recalled that the European Space Agency had declared themselves in favour of the industrial production of the Ariane launcher. They warmly welcomed the first launching of Ariane at Kourou (French Guiana) on 24th December 1979.

The Council gave very careful consideration to Assembly Recommendations 326 on application satellites and 328 on weather forecasting.

Answering the first of these recommendations, they observed that the medium-term objectives of the European Space Agency were clearly defined by the agreements and undertakings entered into by the member states in the context of the numerous optional programmes approved for both application satellites and launchers. They further noted that the Agency has funds available in its own general studies budget to finance preparatory work on the desirable aim of formulating a coherent programme setting long-term goals.

On the subject of co-operation between the European countries and the United States, the Council stated that the European Space Agency was examining the possibility of collaborating with NASA in the contemplated construction of a power module for space flight functions which could also be used for subsequent Spacelab flights. They added that during its discussions on future ESA programmes and their financial implications, the Council of the Agency would also decide whether the draft Spacelab follow-on development programme, or elements of it, should be carried out.

The following points from the very detailed reply given by the Council to Recommendation 328 call for special mention.

The Council welcome and recommend the active participation of member states in both regional and world-wide efforts to maintain and improve the meteorological observation and data collection systems now available for the North Atlantic and for North and Central Africa. They also drew the attention of member states to the need for close co-operation in the evaluation of new observation techniques and to the need for integration of those systems which prove to be cost-effective in the longer term.

The Council recognise the importance of continued close co-ordination between military and civil meteorological authorities in order to ensure an optimal use of the available systems. They also welcome all initiatives to incorporate meteorological forecasting between army, navy and air forces for combined operations both national and international.

Recognising the threat to mankind resulting from human activities which may cause alterations in world-wide climatic conditions, the Council believe that joint research must be undertaken and that joint action programmes should be worked out. They therefore welcome the proposed second four-year climatology research programme to be carried out in the framework of the co-ordinated research and development activities of the European Community and of the world climate programme which the World Meteorological Organisation has proposed to launch. They hope that the member states of WEU will participate actively in these programmes.

D. *Secretariat-General*

The Secretary-General and his principal officers attended the symposium on a European armaments policy organised by the Assembly in Brussels in October 1979.

During the year, the Secretary-General and his principal officers, representing Western European Union, attended a number of meetings of other international organisations, as observers, when questions of concern to WEU were under consideration. As in previous years the most frequent of these contacts were with authorities of the Atlantic Alliance and the Council of Europe.

CHAPTER III

ARMAMENTS CONTROL AGENCY

A. *Introduction*

Under the terms of Article VII of Protocol No. IV, the Agency is required :

- firstly, to control the level of stocks of armaments held by member countries on the mainland of Europe, this control extending to production and imports to the extent required to make the control of stocks effective ;
- secondly, to satisfy itself that the undertakings given by the Federal Republic of Germany not to manufacture certain types of armaments on its territory are being observed.

In 1979, the Agency's activities continued very much along the same lines and at the same rate as in previous years.

Subject to the comments made under point B.2 below, the programme drawn up by the Agency for 1979, the twenty-fourth year of control, was carried out satisfactorily.

B. *General remarks on control activities*

1. *General operating methods*

The methods used by the Agency are determined by the provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty and by Council decisions on the subject. During the year under review they remained basically unchanged.

Within the Agency's terms of reference, controls from documentary sources serve mainly for checking levels of armaments as a whole. They also contribute to the preparation of field measures for the control of levels and of the non-production of certain categories of armaments. This aspect covers all activities concerned with processing, for the purposes defined above, any useful documentary material including, in particular, countries' replies to the Agency questionnaire, and the results of field control measures carried out earlier.

The execution of test checks, visits and inspections, and all that is linked with these functions, constitutes that part of control carried out physically wherever there are activities and stocks subject to control and, more generally, wherever this is necessary to ensure that the information supplied is correct and that undertakings are observed.

The control system is based primarily on controls from documentary sources, the purpose of field control measures being to verify, physically, the accuracy of all the information collected in implementation of Part III of Protocol No. IV.

Documentary and field control measures are complementary, and equally essential for the accomplishment of the Agency's task.

Traditionally, the annual report has always presented documentary and field control measures separately, in the interest of both convenience and clarity. However, it must not be forgotten that these measures together make up a single control function.

The Agency draws great benefit from the continuity of its methods; by its steadily-growing knowledge of the organisation of the forces of each member state, of the progress of armaments production or procurement programmes, the Agency develops its control activity efficiently and logically, both in the fixing of levels and quantities of armaments and in the choice and assessment of its control measures.

However, in implementing the methods outlined above, the Agency, as it is permitted, continued in 1979 to look for possible improvements, particularly to the questionnaire to member states, to the inspection programmes making due allowance for changes in force structures and logistic organisations and to its time-table of field control measures and technical information visits, in order to reduce distances travelled and expenditure.

The Agency began consideration of minor adjustments to the layout of the questionnaire which now seem desirable after twenty-four years of activity, in order to simplify and facilitate the submission of data by national authorities, their processing by the Agency and the subsequent control operations.

2. *Atomic, chemical and biological weapons*

The position described in earlier annual reports remained basically unchanged.

The activities of the Agency do not extend to nuclear weapons. The non-nuclear components of such weapons (namely the missiles themselves and other specially designed equipment) are subject to control except as regards the weapons qualified as " strategic " by one

member state. Furthermore, as this state has declared that its nuclear capability as a whole is directed to one and the same objective of deterrence, its missiles with nuclear capability and tracked launchers are no longer subject to control.

Nor does the Agency apply any controls to biological weapons.

The control activities dealt with in this chapter do not, therefore, concern these two categories of armaments.

In the case of chemical weapons, only non-production controls take place; no quantitative controls are made since none of the member states have declared possessing such armaments.

C. *Controls from documentary sources*

In this field of control, the Agency studies the relevant documents with the main purpose of comparing the quantities of armaments held by the member states with the levels fixed by the Council and thus establishing whether these constitute appropriate levels within the terms of the modified Brussels Treaty.

1. *Information processed by the Agency*

During 1979 documentary controls were carried out in the normal way by studying, processing and collating documents and information obtained from various sources.

The main source consists of member states' replies to the Agency's annual questionnaire and levels are determined by processing the information supplied, taking into account the material supplied by NATO regarding in particular the forces placed under NATO authority.

The second source of information is provided by national defence budgets which, examined in conjunction with the data already supplied by each member state in its reply to the annual questionnaire, enables defence expenditure to be evaluated and the financing of programmes to be followed.

Finally, information from the media, assembled and circulated by the Agency's Central Documentation Office, is a third useful source from which official data can be cross-checked, developments in the situation can be followed and the knowledge of Agency experts can be kept up to date.

(a) Annual Agency questionnaire and replies by member states

Follow-up action on the replies to the questionnaire sent to member states as in all previous years was twofold. It is recalled that some of the facts reported are checked physically by means of field control measures. In addition, all the replies are studied by the Agency experts, and compared with the other sources of information available, including member countries' earlier replies to Agency or NATO questionnaires and budgetary documents.

(b) Request for annual information

Control of undertakings by one of the member states regarding the non-production of certain types of armaments takes the form of field control measures.

These measures are partly prepared from a study of documents based on the replies of the country concerned to the annual questionnaire and to the Agency's requests for annual information.

As in previous years, the replies received from the country concerned in 1979 were taken into consideration for selecting and preparing visits, inspections and agreed control measures for inclusion in the Agency's programme of control measures.

(c) Information provided by NATO

See point 2 (*a*) below.

(d) Information provided by the United States of America and Canada (Article XXIII of Protocol No. IV)

The Agency received, through the Council, information supplied by the Governments of the United States and Canada concerning their programmes of external aid in military equipment to the forces of member states stationed on the mainland of Europe. Since 1966, these countries have provided no aid to the forces concerned.

(e) Scrutiny of budgetary information (Article VII, 2 (a) of Protocol No. IV)

The study of budgetary and financial documents is one aspect of the continuing control of armaments. It is an important additional feature of the procedure applied for the determination of armament stock levels.

In 1979, as in all previous years, the Agency studied the defence budgets of member

states as well as the budget section of their replies to its questionnaire. In addition, its experts had consultations with the appropriate departments in the defence ministries of member countries.

The study of credit forecasts and real expenditure confirmed the findings of the Agency's studies on armaments levels forming part of controls from documentary sources.

(f) Use of published material

By systematic study of the daily press, of specialised magazines and periodicals and of books and catalogues published in the WEU member countries and in the United States, the Agency's Central Documentation Office provided the Directorate and its experts with a great deal of useful information.

In addition, special attention was again paid to sources of information and bulletins from other international organisations.

2. Verification of appropriate levels of armaments

(a) Appropriate levels of armaments for forces placed under NATO command

After receiving and processing the member states' replies to the annual questionnaire and studying the statistical reports furnished by the authorities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Article VII, 2(*a*) of Protocol No. IV) and, in particular, by the NATO international staff, the Agency arranged, as each year, for the annual consultations with the NATO military authorities called for by Article XIV of Protocol No. IV.

As in previous years, these consultations included a joint study session at Casteau, on 30th November 1979, attended by Agency experts and the appropriate officers of SHAPE, and concluded with a meeting in Paris on 14th December 1979; at this meeting, which was attended by the representatives of the Agency, of SHAPE and of the International Military Staff of NATO, it was concluded that the levels of armaments for the forces of member states placed under NATO authority and stationed on the mainland of Europe represented appropriate levels for the control year 1979 within the terms of Article XIX of Protocol No. IV, for those armaments over which the Agency has so far been placed in a position to exercise its mandate of controlling levels.

(b) Appropriate levels of armaments for forces maintained under national command on the mainland of Europe

The quantities of armaments declared to the Agency by the member states as being required on 31st December 1979 for their forces maintained under national command on the mainland of Europe have been accepted or approved by the Council, who have taken note of these figures of maximum levels of armaments for these forces in 1979.

D. *Field control measures*

1. Principles governing the application of field control measures and general methods of execution

As recalled in the introduction to this chapter, the treaty requires the Agency:

- to satisfy itself that the undertakings not to manufacture certain types of armaments are being observed;
- to control the level of stocks of certain armaments.

Field control measures continued during 1979 on the same basis as during previous years, as an essential part of the Agency's work, in accordance with Article VII of Protocol No. IV.

(a) Initial studies

When drawing up its programme of control measures, the Agency again worked on the basic assumption, which is supported by the observations of previous years, that the undertakings and declarations of member countries are being honoured.

For non-production field control measures, the Agency, as usual, began by reviewing all the information available to it, including that obtained from the 1978 and earlier inspection programmes, its progressive analysis of budgetary and other data and particularly the replies of the country concerned to the Agency's requests for information. At the conclusion of this review, the Agency decided that a limited programme of control measures similar to those of recent years would allow acceptable verification of the undertaking not to manufacture specified armaments.

With regard to the control of levels of stocks of armaments declared by member states, sampling techniques were again deemed to be adequate for verifying member countries' declarations with the requisite level of confidence. A programme on the scale of

those of recent years was considered adequate to ensure an acceptable level of confidence in the correctness of the various declarations of stocks and production. No significant changes in the distribution of inspections between member states were envisaged but shifts in emphasis towards naval and air armaments were considered timely. As in 1978, a relatively small number of control measures at factories was considered to be adequate.

(*b*) *Programme definition*

Initial proposals for all quantitative field control measures were assessed in the light of announced re-equipment programmes, of organisation changes and, in particular, of the development of computerised stock accounting centres. These considerations applied principally to the majority of control measures, i.e. those taking place in depots and units. However, where it was considered necessary to extend such controls to factories, their production plans were reviewed to ensure that as far as possible such inspections could be made at the most informative phase of their production programmes. Where possible, non-production, production and factory repair depot inspections were co-ordinated – so keeping to a minimum consistent with its responsibilities, the frequency of the Agency's measures at these concerns.

As the Convention for the due process of law[1] has not yet entered into force, the control measures carried out by the Agency at private concerns had, in 1979, as in previous years, to take the form of " agreed control measures ".

One consequence of this situation is that, in order to obtain the agreement of the firms concerned, the Agency has to give a few weeks' notice. This agreement has never been withheld. The 1979 programme of control measures at privately-owned plants was therefore drawn up with full confidence that it could be implemented as in previous years.

To avoid duplication of activities, Article VIII of Protocol No. IV provides that control measures relating to the forces under NATO authority shall be carried out by the appropriate NATO authorities. The forces subject to the Agency's control measures therefore vary in percentage and type from country to country, and this is an important factor in the Agency's programme considerations. Article VIII also affects depot inspections, but in a different manner. Since the logistic support of forces under NATO authority remains a wholly national responsibility in peacetime, difficulties can occur in defining which matériel and munitions in depots are, or will be, assigned to forces under national command. Such problems were again avoided in 1979 by the renewed approval of the system of joint Agency/SHAPE inspections introduced in 1957. A number of the depots in question were therefore included in the programme and inspected by the Agency/SHAPE group.

On the basis of the foregoing considerations and the information already available, the Agency was able to define its 1979 programme with sufficient certainty for the Director to outline it to the Council in March. After subsequent discussions and analysis of member countries' replies to the questionnaire a few changes were made to the programme.

2. *Type and extent of field control measures*

In 1979, no major changes were made in the Agency's established procedure for the conduct of its field control measures.

The total number of control measures was seventy. It should be noted, in this connection, that this pattern of control activities carried out by the Agency is satisfactory: it enables some 80 % of existing armaments to be checked in four years for the air force, five years for the navy and six to seven years for army munitions.

These measures fall broadly into the following categories:

(*a*) quantitative control measures at depots;

(*b*) quantitative control measures at units for forces under national command;

(*c*) control measures at production plants:

(*i*) quantitative control measures:

In 1979, these control measures were carried out at plants manufacturing armoured matériel, manufacturing ammunition and missiles, and at one shipyard;

(*ii*) non-production control measures:

These control measures related to chemicals and warships.

It should be stressed that the reports on field control measures are protected by the most stringent security measures at all stages of their preparation, custody and analysis.

1. Convention concerning measures to be taken by member states of Western European Union in order to enable the Agency for the Control of Armaments to carry out its control effectively and making provision for due process of law, in accordance with Protocol No. IV of the Brussels Treaty, as modified by the Protocols signed in Paris on 23rd October 1954 (signed in Paris on 14th December 1957).

3. *Conclusions*

(*a*) In the fields where it is authorised to exercise its mandate, the Agency was able effectively to carry out its tasks of applying control measures. Such problems as arose in this very complex field of inspections were dealt with satisfactorily through the excellent relations maintained with the national authorities.

(*b*) On the basis of all the field control measures carried out in 1979, the Agency was able to report to the Council:

- the measures taken for the control of the stocks of armaments at depots, units under national command and production plants confirmed the data obtained from documentary control measures ;
- the measures taken for the control of non-production revealed no production contrary to undertakings.

E. *State and problems of control in certain particular fields*

1. *Armaments for land forces*

(*a*) *Current production and purchases*

All member countries are continuing to modernise their land armaments as they restructure their forces.

It may be noted that several countries are adopting armaments produced by one of them (for example, the Leopard tank produced in the Federal Republic of Germany and adopted by Belgium and the Netherlands and, in the case of Mark I, by Italy; the anti-aircraft Guépard tank produced in the Federal Republic of Germany and adopted by Belgium and the Netherlands), and the co-production by several countries of certain weapons (such as the 155 mm FH-70 towed howitzer co-produced by Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom).

The stage reached with the major programmes is as follows:

The Federal Republic of Germany has ordered Leopard II tanks for its armoured divisions and production of the armoured transport vehicle is progressing. Belgium has decided to replace its VTT M-75 and AMX-31 tracked armoured vehicles by M-113 vehicles over the next few years. France is continuing to equip its units with AMX-10 armoured vehicles to replace its AMX-13 and EBR matériel; deliveries of the VAB have started. Italy is continuing to produce Leopard I battle tanks under licence. The Netherlands are replacing their VTT AMX-13 armoured vehicles by the YPR-765 developed from the M-113. The United Kingdom had almost completed replacement of the Centurion tank by the Chieftain.

The Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom are working on the trilateral 155 mm FH-70 towed howitzer production programme and the first of these new weapons are in service in the three countries. The Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands have already received a number of 30 mm twin-gun anti-aircraft Guépard tanks, which are being produced according to plan in the Federal Republic of Germany.

The Lance acquisition programme has been completed and this weapons system is operational in all member countries where it has been adopted.

(*b*) *Control activity in 1979*

Control measures were carried out at several depots, at a number of units under national command and at plants manufacturing armaments for land forces.

2. *Guided missiles and other self-propelled missiles*

(*a*) *Current production*

During 1979, the member states of WEU continued to modernise their guided missiles and to increase their stocks within the limits allowed by the modified Brussels Treaty and Council decisions. For example, Belgium is now participating in the Helip programme and has added the Exocet MM-38 to its naval armoury. The Federal Republic of Germany has started to take delivery of the Hot anti-tank missile and the Netherlands have received their first Lance missiles. In France production of the improved Hawk has resumed and full-scale production of Roland surface-to-air missiles has begun.

The following modern guided missiles are now being manufactured in the member countries: the anti-tank missiles Milan and Hot (produced jointly by the Federal Republic of Germany and France) and Mamba (Federal Republic of Germany); the surface-to-air missiles Roland (produced jointly by the Federal Republic of Germany and France), Hawk (Helip) XM1M23B (produced jointly by France and Italy), Matra R-440 Crotale (France); the ship-to-ship missiles Exocet MM-38 (produced jointly by France and the United Kingdom) and Otomat (Italy); the air-to-surface missiles Exocet AM-39 (France) and Kormoran (Federal Republic of Germany); the surface-to-air

missile Masurca (France); the surface-to-air and air-to-air missile Aspide (Italy); the anti-submarine missile Malafon (France); the air-to-air missiles Matra Magic R-550 and Matra R-530 (France).

In addition to the above guided missiles, a number of unguided missiles were produced by member states of WEU and, in particular, the Zuni air-to-ground rocket in Belgium and a number of 110 mm rockets in the Federal Republic of Germany.

(b) Control activity in 1979

Quantitative control measures were carried out at a number of depots containing guided and other self-propelled missiles or launchers at several units under national command equipped with these weapons and at plants manufacturing guided missiles.

3. *Air force armaments*

(a) Current production and purchases

1979 was marked by the beginning of full-scale production of new aircraft and by their delivery to most countries of WEU, as well as by the emergence of promising prototypes.

Under the Tornado programme, the first full production aircraft were delivered in the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom; in Italy, three of these aircraft are continuing their test programme.

Work continued in France and the United Kingdom on the Jaguar joint production programme, as it did in France on production of the Mirage F-1, and on the Mirage 2000 trials programme; in addition, the Mirage 4000 was shown at the Le Bourget Air Show.

Deliveries of Alpha-Jet aircraft in the Federal Republic of Germany and in Belgium, and of the F-16 in Belgium and the Netherlands should also be noted.

(b) Control activity in 1979

Control measures were carried out at several aircraft and aircraft engine depots and at a number of air force units under national command.

4. *Naval armaments*

(a) Current production

Member countries pursued their respective construction programmes with a view to maintaining the size of their navies while phasing out ships of an earlier generation. The building effort was concentrated on frigates, conventional submarines and fast-attack craft.

In the Federal Republic of Germany, construction of the F-122 class of frigates – a modification of the Netherlands Kortenaer class frigate – is continuing. Modernisation of the Lutjens class missile destroyers has begun. Fast-attack craft of the 143-A type are under construction.

In France, work is continuing on the Meuse, a second replenishment tanker of the Durance class and on the Georges Leygues class of corvettes, the first of which is already operational. Attack submarines with nuclear propulsion are under construction and one has already been launched. Modernisation of the aircraft carrier Foch began in 1979. Development of the Atlantic NG (new generation) aircraft is continuing. Finally, deliveries of the Super Etendard aircraft continued in 1979.

In Italy, a new 13,000-ton helicopter carrier Giuseppe Garibaldi was laid down in 1979. The Lupo class frigate programme was almost completed and work was started on the Maestrale class of frigates. The Sparviero hydrofoil missile boat programme is progressing; the first of the class was completed in 1974 and further units will come into service in 1980-81. Submarines of the Sauro class were completed. Finally, the new replenishment tanker Vesuvio joined the fleet.

In the Netherlands, the construction of Kortenaer class frigates, to replace destroyers of the Holland and Friesland classes, is continuing. The Van Speyk class frigates are being modernised and construction of a submarine of the new generation is in progress.

As examples of co-operation between member states, mention should be made, in addition to the adoption by the Federal Republic of Germany of a Dutch-designed frigate referred to above, of the tripartite minesweeper co-production programme (Belgium, France, Netherlands).

(b) Control activity in 1979

Two quantitative control measures were carried out at naval shipyards, one being combined with a non-production control measure.

5. *Chemical weapons*

(a) List of chemical weapons subject to control

As in previous years, the Agency asked member countries whether they wished to

renew in 1979 the list of chemical weapons subject to control.

The member countries agreed to this renewal. This was reported to the Council, who noted the fact.

The Agency therefore continued to use this list for its control activities during 1979.

(*b*) *Control activity in 1979*

In application of Article III of Protocol No. III which lays down conditions to enable the Council to fix the levels of chemical weapons that may be held on the mainland of Europe by those countries which have not given up the right to produce them, the Agency asked the countries concerned in its questionnaire, whether production of chemical weapons on their mainland territory had passed the experimental stage and entered the effective production stage.

In 1979 as in the past, the member states concerned replied in the negative.

As every year, the Agency requested all member states in the corresponding sections of its annual questionnaire to state whether they held any stocks of chemical weapons, whatever their origin. In the reply to this questionnaire, no member state declared holding any chemical weapons during the current control year.

As in previous years, the Agency addressed to the appropriate authorities of the state concerned a " request for annual information to facilitate the non-production control of chemical weapons ". A precise and detailed reply was received in answer to this request. In addition, the temporary procedure applied with these authorities since 1973 was again used with success in 1979. All the information supplied in this way was a major factor in selecting chemical plants at which to carry out agreed control measures in 1979.

For each control measure carried out, a delegation from the national authorities was present.

None of these measures revealed any indication of production of chemical weapons within the terms of Annex II to Protocol No. III.

6. *Biological weapons*

All member countries reported their agreement to renew in 1979 the list of biological weapons subject to control. The Council noted the fact.

However, it will be recalled (see point B.2 of the present chapter) that the Agency exercises no control in the field of biological weapons.

7. *Atomic weapons*

Since the situation remained the same as in previous years, the Agency is unable, as stated in point B.2 of this chapter, to exercise any control in the atomic field.

F. *Technical information visits and other means of improving the efficiency of the experts* [1]

In 1979, as in previous years, technical information visits were arranged to enable the Agency's experts to keep their knowledge up to date in the fields of armaments research, development and production.

The land force experts visited the exhibition of land force matériel at Satory in France and, in Italy, the Scuola Militare Alpina at Aosta. They were also invited to a Harte Faust firing exercise by the Bundeswehr.

The naval experts attended a symposium in the Netherlands, organised by the Royal Netherlands Navy, on West European navies and the future; in the United Kingdom, they visited the exhibition of naval equipment at Portsmouth.

The experts in aeronautical and guided missiles visited the Le Bourget Air Show and a wind tunnel at Modane, in France, Erprobungsstelle 61 in the Federal Republic of Germany and the National Gas Turbine Establishment in the United Kingdom.

In the field of chemistry and biology, the Agency experts obtained a wealth of valuable information in the course of discussions with military and civilian experts and when visiting industrial and scientific installations. In the Federal Republic of Germany, they visited the Max Planck Institut für Immunbiologie at Freiburg and in the United Kingdom, the Centre for Applied Microbiology and Research at Porton; they also had the opportunity to visit two private plants in the United Kingdom.

An expert from the Agency attended a session of the NATO Committee on nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) defence as an observer.

G. *Miscellaneous contacts*

1. For the satisfactory conduct of its mission, the Agency must carry out its duties in an atmosphere of trust and close co-operation

1. See also point C. 1 (*f*).

with the national authorities. To this end, the Director and the principal members of his staff, in 1979, as in previous years maintained frequent contacts with these authorities.

On 21st March 1979, the Director presented the Agency's report on its activities in 1978 to the Council.

2. As laid down in the modified Brussels Treaty, the Agency has maintained close contacts with the appropriate NATO authorities.

In this connection, mention should be made in particular of the two meetings held to fix the level of armaments of the forces under NATO command, already referred to in point C.2 (*a*) of this chapter and of the implementation of the system of combined Agency/SHAPE inspections mentioned in point D.1(*b*).

The Director and the principal members of his staff also had meetings in Brussels with, among others, the Deputy Secretary-General of NATO, the Chief of Staff and the Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics and Armaments Division, SHAPE.

3. The Director and the principal members of his staff attended the symposium on a European armaments policy, organised by the Assembly in Brussels in October.

H. *General conclusions*

In accordance with Article XIX of Protocol No. IV, the Agency was able to report to the Council that, as a result of the control exercised in 1979, the figures obtained in accordance with Article XIII of Protocol No. IV:

- for armaments of forces under NATO command under the terms of Article XIV of Protocol No. IV; and
- for armaments of forces maintained under national command under the terms of Articles XV, XVI and XVII of Protocol No. IV and the Agreement of 14th December 1957, concluded in execution of Article V of Protocol No. II,

represented for the control year 1979 and for each of the member states, the appropriate levels of armaments subject to control for those categories of armaments over which the Agency has so far been enabled to exercise its mandate.

As required by Article XX of Protocol No. IV, the Agency confirmed that, in the course of field control measures at production plants, it did not detect for the categories of armaments which it controls:

- either the manufacture in these establishments on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany of a category of armaments that the government of this member state has undertaken not to manufacture;
- or the existence, on the mainland of Europe, of stocks of armaments in excess of the appropriate levels (Article XIX of Protocol No. IV) or not justified by export requirements (Article XXII of Protocol No. IV).

In 1979, the Agency again applied controls effectively in those fields which are open to it.

As in the past, the atmosphere of co-operation prevailing in relations between the Agency and the authorities of the member countries and of NATO, as well as those with members of private firms, played an important part.

CHAPTER IV

STANDING ARMAMENTS COMMITTEE

A. *Activities of the Standing Armaments Committee*

The Standing Armaments Committee met four times in normal session, on 29th January, 18th May, 21st September and 23rd November 1979. It also met four times as an ad hoc group to consider the study in progress on the situation of the armaments sector of industry in the member countries of WEU.

Apart from this study, the main items on the SAC's agenda were WEU Agreement 4.FT.6 and the activities of the Committee's two working groups dealing respectively with operational research and the evaluation of military equipment.

In June, members of the Committee, accompanied by members of the International Secretariat, visited the 33rd International Air Show at Le Bourget and the exhibition of army weapons and equipment at Satory. In October, members of the Committee attended the symposium on a European armaments policy organised in Brussels by the Assembly.

1. *Study of the armaments sector of industry in the member countries of WEU* [1]

In 1979, as requested by the Standing Armaments Committee at its last meeting in 1978, the International Secretariat continued to prepare the economic chapter of the study which, as stated in the twenty-fourth annual report to the Assembly, will comprise a general economic and financial presentation of the armaments industries together with an analytical description of those industries.

When starting to work on the first part of this chapter, the SAC decided to divide it into three sections, to be devoted successively to general considerations on defence and armaments expenditure, to the presentation of basic industrial data separately for each country and to the comparisons and syntheses laid down in the detailed outline programme approved by the Council in 1977. The Committee instructed the international secretariat to continue collecting the necessary information from national authorities. As this task proved more difficult than expected, the SAC was unable to present a final document to the Council in time for the ministerial meeting of 16th May 1979. An interim progress report was submitted in April.

The conclusions of the Minister's exchange of views on this subject were reported to the Standing Armaments Committee by the Head of the International Secretariat on 18th May. The Committee noted that Ministers had confirmed the SAC's mandate and that, while agreeing to extend the time-table for completion of the study, they had expressed the wish that the first part of the economic chapter should be completed as quickly as possible and to best effect, with the help of the administrations concerned.

In addition, the Head of the International Secretariat, who attended the joint meeting between the Council and the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, informed the SAC of the views there expressed concerning the work of the Committee and, in particular, of the comments made on behalf of the Council by Mr. Sanza, who had confirmed the reply given to Assembly Recommendation 325.

During the second quarter of 1979, drafting of the first section of the first part of the economic chapter reached the final stage. The SAC expected to complete the second section of this part early in 1980. The preparation of the third section depended on the progress of the two others and the SAC had not reached the point of discussing it. However, at the end of the year it hoped to be able to submit a complete report to the Council for the meeting to be held at ministerial level in the spring of 1980.

2. *WEU Agreement 4.FT.6*

At its meeting on 18th May 1979, the SAC was informed that a group of experts from the United States army had recently visited Europe to study the possible standardisation of equipment trial methods in NATO. The head of this group had asked the pilot country coordinator (United Kingdom) if they could have a copy of WEU Agreement 4.FT.6 for detailed study, to enable the American authorities to choose two trial methods for wheeled vehicles.

At its meeting on 21st September, the SAC approved the annual report on the updating of WEU Agreement 4.FT.6.

The SAC also authorised the International Secretariat to release two trial methods con-

1. See also Chapter I, C and Chapter II, B. 3, second paragraph.

tained in that agreement to the American authorities, who were asked to supply similar information on a reciprocal basis.

B. *Activities of the working groups*

1. *Working Group No. 8 on operational research*

Working Group No. 8 met twice, in Paris in March and in Rome in October.

Information was exchanged in accordance with the normal procedure: several new or updated forms on operational research studies were submitted by delegations.

Two reports dealing respectively with " Mathematical models for calculating batches of spare parts " and a " Detection model for ground combat ", were received during the year by the WEU library which now holds some seventy studies on operational research. In addition, bilateral exchanges of reports continued normally.

The group, which has been following work on editing the five-language glossary of operational research terms, noted at its last meeting that the work was almost finished. The French Inter-service Centre for Operational Research (*Centre français interarmées de recherche opérationnelle*) had agreed to prepare the relevant magnetic tapes which would be handed over to the government's Documentation Centre for preparation of the final edition. The glossary was expected to appear early in 1980.

The meeting held by Working Group No. 8 in March was combined with a symposium on methodology, when five studies were introduced. Presentation by the delegations responsible was followed by thorough discussion.

The group's second meeting in October was combined with a visit to Rome at the invitation of the Italian Defence Staff. The military and civilian experts attending visited the statistical, data-handling and operational research section of the IVth Bureau of the Defence Staff. A series of operational research studies, introduced by the head of the section, were presented and formed the subject of detailed discussions. Participants also visited the Selenia Company where they were greatly interested by the firm's developments on radar and weapons systems and particularly by the presentation of a study on " The use of life-cycle cost-effectiveness programmes for third-line maintenance design ".

2. *Group of experts on the evaluation of military equipment*

The group of experts, which comes under Working Group No. 8, completed its report on the evaluation of a recovery vehicle, which was submitted to the Standing Armaments Committee at its meeting on 21st September 1979. This report is the product of the first comparative approach to a method of selecting military equipment : acting on a German initiative in the specific case of a recovery vehicle, national experts compared the various practical and theoretical methods of assessing equipment according to the specific criteria of each user. The group's work showed that, while approaches to the problem may differ according to national requirements useful lessons can be drawn by comparing the various available mathematical methods. Even if the national authorities do not succeed in deciding on a joint evaluation method, they will be able to select the most reliable methods for each item of equipment and to apply them uniformly. This offers the possibilities of achieving an important step towards pragmatic co-operation on armaments between the member countries of the organisation.

As the first stage of the work of the group of experts has now been completed, transition to the second phase depends on a proposal from one or other member country for a study of some unevaluated new equipment.

C. *International Secretariat*

1. *Contacts with the Council*

On 25th April, the Assistant Secretary-General, Head of the International Secretariat of the SAC, submitted to the Council the Committee's interim progress report on the study of the armaments sector of industry in the member countries of WEU. On 7th June he made a verbal report to the Council on the other activities of the SAC.

2. *WEU Assembly and symposium on a European armaments policy*

The Head of the International Secretariat reported to the Standing Armaments Committee on the debates on armaments questions which took place during the second part of the twenty-fourth ordinary session and the first part of the twenty-fifth ordinary session of the Assembly. Extracts from speeches, reports, debates and recommendations on these questions were brought together in two documents which were circulated to the members of the Committee.

Members of the International Secretariat attended the symposium on a European armaments policy organised by the Assembly in Brussels in October. On a personal basis, the Head of the International Secretariat presented two reports, one written on " The juridical conditions of defence procurement " and the other verbal on " The armaments market ".

3. *Relations with NATO*

The International Secretariat of the SAC was represented, as observer, at the meetings of the Conference of National Armaments Directors, held at NATO Headquarters in Brussels in April and October.

A member of the Secretariat also attended two meetings of the NATO Naval Armaments Group.

4. *Relations with FINABEL*

In accordance with the arrangements which have governed relations between the International Secretariat of the SAC and the FINABEL Secretariat since 1973, the Head of the FINABEL Secretariat attended the SAC's meeting on 29th January 1979 when details were given of the results of the meeting of the FINABEL Co-ordinating Committee, at which a member of the International Secretariat of the SAC had been present. The Head of the FINABEL Secretariat also attended the end-of-year meeting of the SAC on 23rd November when he informed the Committee of the present status of the former WEU Agreements in the series FT.1, 5 and 6 which, apart from 4.FT.6, had been taken over by FINABEL when the ad hoc group was disbanded.

As in former years, a representative of the International Secretariat of the SAC attended the meeting of the FINABEL Co-ordinating Committee held in Brussels at the end of November 1979.

CHAPTER V

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE

A. *Meetings of the Committee*

In 1979, the Public Administration Committee's two annual meetings, which are held in each of the member countries in turn, took place at Villeneuve-lès-Avignon from 6th to 8th June and at Luxembourg from 24th to 26th October.

These meetings are devoted mainly to exchanges of information about significant administrative developments in the member countries during the preceding six months and the preparation of the next year's multilateral course for government officials to be held under the Committee's auspices.

During the year under consideration, the Committee discussed a number of administrative problems common to the majority of the member countries. As has been the case for several years, many of these problems are directly related to the conditions which, for the countries as a whole and consequently for their administrations, result from a difficult economic and financial situation: efforts to bring down unemployment by means which varied from country to country (shorter working week, early retirement, part-time working, creation of new jobs, etc.); the position of civil servants and their unions in relation to wage restraint policies; the policy of a number of the member countries seeking to bring about considerable reductions in public expenditure; efforts to deal with the increasing difficulty of financing social security; the effects of the economic situation on training and refresher courses for civil servants, etc.

Committee members are also kept informed of the various modifications introduced into the state and administrative machinery of their countries as a result of government changes or reorganisations. The principal new laws of significant importance on the administrative front are reported and, where appropriate, their texts circulated.

With regard to the course for government officials to be organised in 1980, the Committee agreed in principle to return, after an interval of two years, to the instructional type of course designed for young civil servants.

B. *1979 course for government officials*

The twenty-eighth multilateral course for government officials organised by the Public Administration Committee was held in the Netherlands, from 19th to 23rd November.

The aim of the course was to enable experienced civil servants to exchange information and compare experiences in the member states regarding the actual development of employment in the public sector over the last ten years; to compare specific reasons for these developments; to compare the relation between the number of jobs in the public sector and the development of the nature and scope of the rôle of government; to identify future possible growth sectors in connection with growth and composition of unemployment.

Participants were asked to prepare beforehand a note describing the situation in their own country regarding:

- increase in employment over a ten-year period, at the level of central government, local government and other public bodies;
- the relative importance of public sector employment in connection with total employment in the same period and the effect of possible decentralisation of tasks;
- real growth in government spending per sector in the last ten years, checking whether it is possible to link budget priorities with increases in employment in the public sector;
- development of size and composition of national unemployment over the same period.

The course brought together eighteen participants, fairly high-level officials, from the administrations of the member countries. Their discussions throughout the five days' work were directed to the following three major themes, each of which was introduced by a senior civil servant of the Netherlands administration who was an expert in that particular field: participants first studied the increase of employment in the public sector in connection with decentralisation. They then considered the widening of scope of government activities and its consequence for employment in the public sector. Finally they studied changes in size and composition of unemployment in connection with the increase of employment in the public sector.

The last day of the course was devoted to a summing up of the main results of the discussions and to drafting conclusions.

As the course was held fairly late in the year, national delegations' comments have not yet been received. However, from impressions obtained at the end of the course, it may be concluded that participants were well satisfied with this multilateral course which enabled them to study a subject of great importance to the majority of the member countries.

C. *Study visits*

Study visits arranged under the auspices of the Public Administration Committee enable an official to spend one or two weeks in the administration of one of the other member countries, studying his own speciality.

Consequently these visits cover a wide variety of subjects as is shown by the following few examples of visits carried out during the year under consideration: industrial democracy; social assistance for the unemployed (subjects studied in the Federal Republic of Germany); employment of women in industry (studied in France); taxes on personal capital (studied in Italy); health education; alternatives to prosecution; prison security (studied in the Netherlands); relations between government and local communities; compatibility of decentralisation and autonomy on the one hand and government supervision on the other (studied in Belgium).

It will be recalled that, on returning from a visit to a foreign administration, each official prepares a report which is sent to the Committee and, of course, to the administration visited.

CHAPTER VI

BUDGETARY AND ADMINISTRATIVE QUESTIONS

A. *Budget*

Summaries of the main budgets for 1979 and 1980 are shown in the Appendices to this report. The proposed budgets for 1980 have again remained within the boundaries of inflation, compared with those of 1979.

During 1979, the outstanding problem relating to the pension scheme, of granting survivors' pensions to widowers of female staff was resolved. After appropriate amendments to the pension scheme rules had been incorporated, the option was reopened for female staff who had remained in the provident fund. Only two female staff members changed their original option and chose to join the pension scheme as a result.

The other outstanding problem of affiliation to the United Kingdom social security legislation has not, however, been solved.

This last uncertainty means that figures showing the results of the pensions' option could not be finalised, but the preliminary figures as at 31st December 1979 are given in the Appendix. The sums due to member governments as a result of validation could not be finally calculated, therefore, but an interim indication is also given in the Appendix.

The contributions to the United Kingdom social security scheme, by both staff members and the organisation, are still being held in a suspense account in the organisation's budget, pending the final outcome of the current negotiations.

B. *WEU administrative meetings*

Officials of the Secretariat-General, the Armaments Control Agency, the Standing Armaments Committee and the Office of the Clerk, responsible for administrative matters, continued as in previous years to meet periodically thus ensuring co-ordination while at the same time reviewing administrative matters of common concern to all departments of the organisation.

Co-operation with the WEU Staff Association has continued.

C. *WEU provident fund*

Of the monies that have become due to governments as a result of the validation process, and had been invested by the organisation in the same way as the provident fund, 90 % have now been reimbursed to governments. The remaining 10 % will remain invested in French francs but will not necessarily follow the same investment pattern as the provident fund.

Still under discussion in the framework of the co-ordinated organisations remains the question whether staff members who have fully validated and staff members who have retired from the organisation, may leave any balances in the provident fund and, if so, under what conditions.

The advisory panel on the provident fund considered that the interests of staff and governments were best served by continuing the short-term policy of investment in French francs, the unit of account.

D. *Activities in the framework of the co-ordinated organisations*

1. *Committee of Secretaries-General*

The Secretaries/Director-General of the five co-ordinated organisations met once during the year to discuss administrative problems mainly concerned with :

- the application of the implementing instructions to the pension scheme rules ;
- means of improving the machinery of co-ordination ;
- the 1979 triennial general review of salaries ;
- relations with staff associations.

2. *Standing Committee of Secretaries-General, Committee of Heads of Administration*

These Committees met as a rule every month in conjunction with the meetings of the Co-ordinating Committee, whilst several special sessions were held to deal with specific problems.

On these occasions joint meetings with the Standing Committee of Staff Associations are also frequently held.

3. *Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts*

The Co-ordinating Committee met eight times in 1979 and issued ten reports, Nos. 159-169 in the course of the year.

These reports dealt with the following subjects:

159th report: Revision of the remuneration adjustment procedure (for A, L, and B and C staff), effective from 1st July 1978, approved by the Council on 21st March 1979.

160th report: 1978 general review of remuneration of category A and L staff (see also 157th report), approved by the Council on 21st March 1979.

161st report: Reversion of rights to a survivor's pension to widowers of female staff, approved by the Council on 21st March 1979.

162nd report: Periodical updating of the daily subsistence allowances for staff travelling on official missions, with effect from 1st May 1979 ; approved by the Council on 21st March 1979.

163rd report: Adjustment of remuneration to compensate for the increase in cost of living over the second half 1978 ; approved by the Council on 25th April 1979.

164th report: Arrangements for the affiliation of NATO staff employed in Germany to the pension scheme following ratification of the agreement between NATO and the Federal Republic of Germany ; approved by the Council on 4th July 1979.

165th report: Exceptional adjustment of remuneration of staff serving in Turkey ; approved by the Council on 19th September 1979.

166th report: Exceptional adjustment of remuneration of staff serving in Turkey ; approved by the Council on 21st November 1979.

167th report: Daily subsistence allowance of non-resident auxiliary/temporary staff approved by the Council on 14th December 1979.

168th report: 1979 triennial review of remuneration of staff, category B and C ; approved by the Council on 14th December 1979.

169th report: Exceptional adjustment of remuneration of staff serving in Turkey ; approved by the Council on 23rd January 1980.

APPENDIX

Summary of revised WEU budget for 1979

	A *	B *	C *	Total B + C
	£	Frs	Frs	Frs
Salaries and allowances	889,285	6,905,400	14,263,600	21,169,000
Pensions	66,420	421,200	2,007,400	2,428,600
Travel	34,715	84,500	346,000	430,500
Other operating costs	125,995	443,765	546,430	990,195
Purchase of furniture, etc.	4,040	8,500	24,900	33,400
Buildings	–	132,000	241,700	373,700
TOTAL EXPENDITURE	1,120,455	7,995,365	17,430,030	25,425,395
WEU tax	304,290	2,389,500	4,893,500	7,283,000
Other receipts	9,650	50,500	95,000	145,500
Pension receipts	19,855	255,500	512,600	768,100
TOTAL INCOME	333,795	2,695,500	5,501,100	8,196,600
NET TOTAL	786,660	5,299,865	11,928,930	17,228,795

National contributions called for under the revised WEU budget for 1979

	600ths	£	F. frs.
Belgium	59	77,354.90	1,694,164.84
France	120	157,332.00	3,445,759.00
Germany	120	157,332.00	3,445,759.00
Italy	120	157,332.00	3,445,759.00
Luxembourg	2	2,622.20	57,429.32
Netherlands	59	77,354.90	1,694,164.84
United Kingdom	120	157,332.00	3,445,759.00
TOTAL	600	786,660.00	17,228,795.00

* A Secretariat-General.
B International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee.
C Armaments Control Agency.

Summary of WEU main budget for 1980

	A *	B *	C *	Total B + C
	£	Frs.	Frs.	Frs.
Salaries and allowances	1,001,217	7,814,300	16,223,000	24,037,300
Pensions	81,500	602,000	1,905,000	2,507,000
Travel	36,885	93,700	380,900	474,600
Other operating costs	155,575	427,620	613,520	1,041,140
Purchase of furniture, etc.	10,465	13,075	28,935	42,010
Buildings	–	68,000	123,000	191,000
TOTAL EXPENDITURE	1,285,642	9,018,695	19,274,355	28,293,050
WEU tax	350,322	2,712,800	5,562,400	8,275,200
Other receipts	15,590	55,950	95,800	151,750
Pension receipts	24,130	274,000	603,000	877,000
TOTAL INCOME	390,042	3,042,750	6,261,200	9,303,950
NET TOTAL	895,600	5,975,945	13,013,155	18,989,100

National contributions called for under the WEU main budget for 1980

	600ths	£	F. frs.
Belgium	59	88,067.33	1,867,261.50
France	120	179,120.00	3,797,820.00
Germany	120	179,120.00	3,797,820.00
Italy	120	179,120.00	3,797,820.00
Luxembourg	2	2,985.34	63,297.00
Netherlands	59	88,067.33	1,867,261.50
United Kingdom	120	179,120.00	3,797,820.00
TOTAL	600	895,600.00	18,989,100.00

* A Secretariat-General.
B International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee.
C Armaments Control Agency.

Pension Scheme

	Numbers opting as from 1st July 1974	Numbers opting for full validation of service	Numbers opting to retain provident fund	Staff recruited since 1st July 1974	Pensions being paid	Hors grades
	Option No. 1	Option No. 2	Option No. 3			
Secretariat-General ...	2	15	20 [1]	4	8	2
Armaments Control Agency	2	33	6	8	25	1
Standing Armaments Committee	–	16	6	6	10	1
Office of the Clerk of the Assembly.....	1	19	2	4	4	2
TOTAL	5	83	34	22	47	6

1. Subject to amendment when the outstanding problem of United Kingdom social security is resolved.

Provisional statement of WEU pensions validations at 31st December 1979

Expressed in accounting units (1 AU = 1 F. franc)

	Total sums due for validation	Amounts withheld for pension arrears payable (–)	Amounts credited to budgets to offset further pension arrears to be paid (–)	Deducted for 5.5512 % write-down (–)	Loan balances repayable over five years and credited to budgets (–)	Net sums credited to validation accounts P.V.1 and P.V.2
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Secretariat-General	4,499,856.00	31,060.29	–	116,463.36	24,965.34	4,327,367.01
Standing Armaments Committee	4,513,382.36	472,547.52	221,872.39	87,744.35	227,564.03	3,503,654.07
Armaments Control Agency	10,228,601.16	1,184,603.40	1,095,836.16	177,014.04	688,638.00	7,082,509.56
Assembly	5,750,034.77	–	43,960.25	131,194.81	264,034.54	5,310,845.17
TOTALS	24,991,874.29	1,688,211.21	1,361,668.80	512,416.56	1,205,201.91	20,224,375.81

Notes. 1. This statement does not include interest earned on these monies whilst on deposit in the WEU provident fund a/c.
2. Of the total in column 6 an amount of 17,699,000 francs was paid over to governments in 1979.

Political developments in Europe – Reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council

REPORT[1]

submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee[2]
by Mr. Page, Rapporteur

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee.* Mrs. *von Bothmer* (Chairman); MM. De Poi (Alternate: *Cavaliere*), *Portheine* (Vice-Chairmen); *Sir Frederic Bennett*, MM. Berrier (Alternate: *Talon*), Brugnon, *Conti Persini*, Deschamps, Druon, Gessner (Alternate: *von Hassel*), Hanin, *Hardy*, Lagneau, *Lord McNair*, MM. Mangelschots, Mende, Mommersteeg (Alternate: *Stoffelen*), *Müller*, Péridier, *Lord Reay*, MM. Reddemann, *Talamona*, Thoss (Alternate: *Glesener*), *Urwin*, Valiante, Vecchietti, Voogd.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

on political developments in Europe – reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council

The Assembly,

Remembering that the year 1980 marks the beginning of the second half of the application of the modified Brussels Treaty and welcoming the fact that the relationship between the WEU Council and the Assembly rests on a sound basis;

Noting with appreciation that the Council has again shown its intention to continue the dialogue with the Assembly on the various questions relating to the application of the modified Brussels Treaty and also the flexible and effective manner in which it has generally provided information, particularly concerning the results of the study being carried out by the Standing Armaments Committee;

Considering that while Article I of the modified Brussels Treaty is opposed to duplication of work, it also advocates affording the most effective assistance to " the work of other economic organisations in which the High Contracting Parties are or may be represented ";

Welcoming the fact that at its joint meetings with Assembly Committees the Council proposes to incorporate an informal procedure " so that each member of the Council can give his government's views " along with the expression of its collective views;

Anticipating that, in due course, WEU may be expected to participate in a wider framework of European co-operation and that the General Affairs Committee should examine any consequential changes in the organisation of WEU;

Aware that Europe, in order to be master of its destiny, would have to be politically organised, based on genuinely integrated and co-ordinated foreign and defence policies,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Continue its effort to keep the Assembly regularly informed, by all appropriate means, about:

   (*a*) the progress of work in the Independent European Programme Group, particularly in the Assembly's specific fields of interest;

   (*b*) those parts of the study undertaken by the Standing Armaments Committee which have been completed and which are not covered by military secrecy;

   (*c*) matters important to the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, even when they are dealt with by the member governments within other organisations;

2. Should not omit, in informing the Assembly of the results of political co-operation between member states, to report also on subjects on which satisfactory results have not been obtained or even sought;

3. To this end, seek better liaison both between governments and between NATO and other relevant organisations, so that questions not dealt with in these organisations may be the subject of exchanges of views within the framework of the WEU Council;

4. Examine, with the President of the Assembly, the ways in which questions to be raised in joint meetings by members of relevant Committees may receive " collective " answers;

5. Examine the organisational measures to be taken now so that, when the time is ripe, WEU may be prepared to take its place in a wider framework of European co-operation.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Page, Rapporteur)

I. *WEU at the half-way stage*

1. In its twenty-fifth annual report, the WEU Council recalls the celebration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the modified Brussels Treaty on 23rd October 1979. The Assembly for its part celebrated this anniversary at its symposium in Brussels. In effect, since the treaty was concluded for a period of fifty years it now has exactly half its history behind it. It is naturally impossible to foresee now what our governments will wish to do in 2004 with an institution and a treaty which will maybe not have lost all their justification, but the twenty-fifth report should perhaps be viewed in the context of developments in both Europe and WEU in the last twenty-five years. It is in fact quite clear that the enlargement of the European Communities and the growth in their activities have led those of their members who are also members of Western European Union to transfer to the Communities the exercise of some of the responsibilities which the modified Brussels Treaty had assigned to WEU. But at the same time, as Mr. Thorn, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg and Chairman-in-Office of the Council, said in his address at the Brussels symposium:

> "... we all know that it will take an indefinite length of time to make the notions of Community Europe coincide, in composition and in structure, with the less clearly-defined notions of European union. The substance of this notion is proving far more difficult to define by common agreement than had been foreseen by the Six, and then the Nine, at the beginning of this decade."

2. Following the accession of the United Kingdom to the European Communities, concomitant with the development of nine-power political consultations, WEU took a number of measures designed to adapt itself to the new situation. Instead of meetings of the Council of Ministers being held quarterly they started to be held annually, the "economic day" which followed the "political day" disappeared and the agenda of meetings became decidedly more meagre both at ambassadorial and at ministerial level. Moreover, meetings with representatives of the seven governments to prepare for debates in the United Nations General Assembly, FAO and ECOSOC were abolished. It is not surprising that the Assembly was concerned at this development and that relations between the Council and the Assembly were somewhat uneasy for several years.

3. For instance, joint meetings between Assembly Committees and the Council became less frequent, particularly where the General Affairs Committee was concerned. Recommendations adopted by the Assembly, like the report of its debates, showed that parliamentarians had some doubt about the will of the governments to keep WEU alive. One of the questions then put by parliamentarians concerned the extent to which the undertakings entered into by the signatories of the modified Brussels Treaty, particularly the automatic assistance provision in Article V, would continue to be applied in spite of the reduction in the Council's activities. The deterioration of relations between France and NATO therefore made this a matter of particularly keen concern.

4. Anxious to react against this uneasiness, the Council endeavoured to meet the Assembly's wishes as to both the substance and the form.

5. Where the substance is concerned, the Council has underlined that it will continue to ensure the full application of the modified Brussels Treaty and that it has lost none of its responsibilities, even if some of them are being exercised by other bodies. However, in accordance with Article I of the treaty, it does not intend to duplicate the work of other organisations.

6. It should be noted however that the same article also calls upon the Council to "assist the work of those organisations". It may be wondered whether the activities of the Council really meet this commitment. It might do so however, whilst remaining strictly within its field of activity, by taking the initiative of exchanges of views between member countries on questions that the EEC does not seem prepared to tackle in the immediate future but which are of interest to all its members, as would be the case for co-operation in civil defence matters or the co-ordination of defence measures outside the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty. That would meet a need as well as a matter of topical concern for most of the governments.

7. The Council has also underlined on many occasions that it considers the WEU Assembly to be "the only assembly with defence responsibilities" and that it would continue to keep it informed of the application of the treaty, even if such application were carried out by other bodies.

8. Where the form is concerned, the Council has agreed to a resumption of joint meetings with Assembly Committees on an annual basis. It has ensured that a sufficient number of members of governments of member countries take part in Assembly sessions and has effectively supplied the Assembly with information about the activities of other organisations, whether European or not.

9. There is no doubt that the Assembly has warmly welcomed these initiatives by the Council and that relations between the two WEU organs have improved considerably.

10. Nevertheless, in recent years the Assembly has noted a number of points on which it felt the Council was not entirely fulfilling its commitments, particularly with regard to the application of Article XI of the treaty, the possible participation of non-member countries of WEU in the work of the Standing Armaments Committee in accordance with paragraph 10 of the Council's decision of 7th May 1955 setting up the SAC, keeping parliamentarians informed about the work of the Independent European Programme Group or even the Standing Armaments Committee. Finally, the Assembly has noted that the presence of full-ranking ministers at its sessions or even at meetings of the Council of Ministers is becoming rarer.

11. Then there was the question whether the European Communities would develop to the detriment of Western European Union in areas outside the responsibilities of the Communities but more specifically within those of WEU. On several occasions, the WEU Assembly has expressed the idea that the future European union could not be simply a Community extended to areas not covered by the Rome Treaty but that it could but exist side by side with Community bodies and inter-state bodies such as WEU as long as there was no single treaty covering all European activities and establishing close co-operation between them.

12. By discussing without hesitation a question put by Mr. Ferguson and Mr. von Hassel on European industrial policy in the armaments field, the newly-elected European Parliament aroused certain reactions. This question in fact appeared to imply that the European Parliament intended to link the question of armaments with that of defence since it asked the Commission to contact NATO to promote an industrial policy in the field of armaments.

13. Speaking at the Brussels symposium, Viscount Davignon underlined that the Communities have wide responsibilities relating to member countries' industrial activities which, in view of the fact that many arms-producing firms also manufacture other products, precluded leaving the armaments industry out of its purview. But he did not refer to relations between the Commission and NATO.

14. The WEU Assembly has constantly shown an active interest in armaments matters and has a good partner in the Council since, through Mr. Thorn, it expressed its approval of the course followed in the Assembly's work. There is nothing to prevent it continuing along this course. The question of responsibilities remains a very delicate one but from the standpoint of what has actually been studied and achieved, avoiding any discussion about principles and procedure, it seems that in present circumstances the WEU Assembly has no need to fear competition from the European Parliament in matters relating to defence.

15. It should be added that the composition of the Assembly, different in nature from that of the European Parliament, makes it representative in a different way in the defence field, as Mr. Thorn further indicated:

> " The close links associating you with the parliaments of your respective countries in any case give your work a dimension which is not the same as that of the deliberations of a European parliament elected by universal suffrage. If that assembly seems destined to play a driving rôle in the Europe of tomorrow, because it is the product of a vote intended to represent the common will of a European people, the fact that you are an emanation of the national parliaments gives you, here and now, authority of another kind and makes you, so to speak, a federal assembly of Europe required likewise to express *hic et nunc* the opinions of the European nations on matters which are your responsibility. In many sectors, these opinions are essential when any common decisions are taken, particularly those relating to defence questions and armaments. "

16. If this twenty-fifth annual report is compared closely with Mr. Thorn's address in Brussels and the statements of several members of the Council, it can thus be seen that WEU's twenty-fifth anniversary helped to clarify a situation which had for quite a long time been out of focus. It shows relatively clearly the admittedly modest but nevertheless essential place occupied by WEU and its activities in a Europe aiming at the enlargement of the Communities and the progressive establishment of a framework of wider European co-operation.

II. *Relations between the Council and the Assembly*

1. *Basis of the dialogue*

17. In his reply to the twenty-fourth annual report, Senator Minnocci, Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee, had already noted a number of points on which the Council had met the Assembly's wishes by specifying the nature of its responsibilities.

18. There have been at least two further ministerial statements in the same sense: one by Mr. Thorn, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, when presenting the twenty-fourth annual report to the Assembly at the June 1979 session, who, in the words of the twenty-fifth annual report, commented that:

> " the WEU Assembly was unaffected because the modified Brussels Treaty gave it clear and exclusive responsibilities in defence matters ",

and the other by Mr. Ruffini, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, who, during the debate in the Italian Chamber of Deputies on 23rd January 1980 on the activities of the European Communities, said:

> " The Council continued to ensure the application of the Brussels Treaty and its protocols, underlining the importance which member states attach to the commitments thus assumed. The Italian Government considers that the Assembly, the only European parliamentary body authorised by virtue of its constitution to discuss defence matters, retains its full importance. "

19. The Council and member countries therefore clearly recognise the Assembly's exclusive responsibility for defence matters as the Council repeats, in the phrase in Chapter I of the twenty-fifth annual report, that the Assembly " is the European parliamentary body empowered by treaty to deal with " defence matters.

20. Secondly, the Council pointedly recalls its wish to continue its dialogue with the Assembly " on questions relating to the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, including those dealt with by the member governments of WEU in other international fora ". It specifies moreover that in 1979 it gave the Assembly " details of consultations in which the representatives of the WEU member states had taken part, in particular in the framework of political co-operation of the Nine and in the North Atlantic Council " and also referred " to the work being done in the Conference of National Armaments Directors and, where possible, to that of the Independent European Programme Group ".

21. The Assembly for its part, by organising the Brussels symposium on a European armaments policy, showed that it still considered the question of the joint production of armaments to be in the forefront of its responsibilities, even if some of its members expressed the wish to have the European Parliament deal with this matter as well within the framework of industrial policy. As Mr. Thorn wisely remarked when speaking on behalf of the Council at the Brussels symposium:

> " This work in no way challenges the responsibilities, the powers or the authority of other European institutions but is absolutely in line with your own task, which the WEU Council has always acknowledged in recognising that your Assembly is the only European parliamentary assembly with defence responsibilities. "

22. Finally, the Assembly can only welcome the fact that, in his address to the Assembly at its December 1979 session, Mr. Thorn underlined, to use the words of the annual report of the Council, " that WEU, during its first twenty-five years of existence, had encouraged efforts made towards European union, which was the ultimate objective set by the authors of the modified Brussels Treaty... to this end it had acted in various fields in which it is competent according to the circumstances and needs of the moment, taking care at all times to avoid overlapping activities ". Thus Mr. Thorn followed a line very often stressed by the Assembly that relations between WEU and the European Communities are in no way competitive but should converge in a future European union whose exact nature cannot yet be specified.

23. The decision of the governments to take appropriate steps within the framework of the Nine (no doubt soon the Twelve or the Thirteen), even if WEU may have legitimate claims to act itself, is common sense and corresponds to the essential facts of life which the Assembly has always recognised.

2. *Joint meetings*

24. The procedure for joint meetings between Assembly Committees and the Council was designed to allow a confidential dialogue between the two WEU organs. It was customary at one time for the Chairman-in-Office of the Council alone to speak in reply to questions put by parliamentarians. Speaking on behalf of the Council as a whole, he had to ascertain the positions of the various governments on many questions which had not previously been discussed by the Council. The procedure was thus a cumbersome one and parliamentarians

quite rightly complained about the resulting absence of dialogue.

25. In 1972, the Council proposed a new procedure, drawing a distinction between a formal stage during which questions put beforehand by the Committees were the subject of replies adopted unanimously by the Council and a second stage, of which no minutes were to be taken, during which all members of the Council could be asked to reply, each in his own name, to supplementary questions put by parliamentarians. However, this procedure has never been applied in spite of requests by the Assembly.

26. At present, joint meetings are held in accordance with an informal procedure, which allows the Chairman-in-Office either to speak on behalf of the Council as a whole, but without the possibility of consulting it, or to ask the representatives of the various governments to speak. Without being opposed to this method, the Assembly has often drawn attention to the fact that it was speaking less with the Council than with the representatives of individual governments and that it no longer had any real means of knowing the position of the Council as such on the questions it put.

27. In its twenty-fifth annual report, the Council replies as follows to these remarks:

> " As the purpose of such contacts is to complement and expand the dialogue conducted through the written procedure, they consider that the flexible and open character of such meetings should be maintained so that each member of the Council can give his government's views. "

28. It is clear that if the Council were effectively to apply the procedure as defined in the above quotation, i.e. if the representative of each member country was indeed asked to give his government's opinion on questions put by members of the Assembly, the Committee could but welcome such procedure. It must however note that so far a number of governments have been represented at joint meetings, when they did not have the Chairmanship-in-Office of the Council, only by their ambassadors and that the latter have rarely spoken on questions put by parliamentarians. More widespread ministerial participation seems essential if the " informal " procedure chosen by the Council is to be applied properly.

29. It should also be noted that the Council specifies that:

> " ... the informal nature of these meetings did not prevent the Council from giving their collegiate views, provided they received prior notice of the subjects which the Committees wished to raise and could therefore concert their opinions. "

30. Your Rapporteur wonders whether it would not be in the interest of the Assembly to take advantage of this statement by the Council to put questions in writing so that the Council would be in a position to give collective answers at joint meetings. This very point has been one of the Assembly's constant aims. But the conditions in which this procedure can be used should be specified beforehand by agreement between the Council and the Assembly, since there is every chance that it will amount to almost the same procedure as that proposed by the Council in 1972.

3. *Recommendations and written questions*

31. In 1978, the Assembly noted an improvement in the standard of the Council's replies to Assembly recommendations. It realises that the effort then made by the Council has been continued in 1979. However, where written questions are concerned, your Rapporteur notes that there have been very few and that the Assembly has not taken advantage of this opportunity of obtaining a collective reply by the seven countries on matters within its purview. Nevertheless, it is disappointing to note that the Council's replies rarely reach the Assembly within the prescribed time limit and are often rather sketchy and disappointing, which no doubt explains why members of the Assembly make only limited use of this means of pursuing the dialogue with the Council.

4. *Government participation in Assembly sessions*

32. It is certainly to be welcomed that the Council has continued to ensure that there has been a good attendance by ministers at Assembly sessions and the Brussels symposium. However, your Rapporteur wishes to point out, as Mr. Minnocci did last year, the importance which the Assembly attaches to the presence of more full-ranking ministers, particularly where foreign affairs and defence are concerned.

III. *Activities of the Council*

33. The Council clearly informed the Assembly in its twenty-fifth annual report of the principal external policy problems facing Europe, whether or not they were dealt with in the framework of the WEU Council. Your Rapporteur believes it did so in order to take account of current events and to allow a dialogue with the Assembly, particularly in connection with the subjects of reports recently adopted by its Committees.

34. However, a simple list of visits by ministers from Eastern Europe to the West and ministers from our countries to Eastern Europe does not provide a very interesting picture of the trend of bilateral relations between members of WEU and the eastern countries. Since this seems to be the field in which the WEU Council has specialised, would it not be particularly appropriate to allow the Assembly to participate more fully in such matters, which take up the major part of its ministerial meetings? Is the information exchanged at these meetings really so secret that it cannot be summarised in the Council's report rather than be discussed in a confidential manner? The Assembly hopes that the Council at ministerial level will spend more time on WEU's own activities.

35. The reference to multilateral relations with a view to the CSCE follow-up meeting scheduled to be held in Madrid in November 1980, which takes into account the work of both the Nine and the North Atlantic Council and the possible effects of the invasion of Afghanistan on East-West relations, is a piece of information for which the Assembly can only congratulate the Council. The Assembly has very often underlined that "full compliance with the Helsinki final act" was in its view a fundamental aim and welcomes the fact that the Council holds the same views. It would however have appreciated more details about the consequences which the Council considers the invasion of Afghanistan will have for the preparation of the Madrid meeting, particularly in the defence field where WEU has special responsibility.

36. Where the enlargement of the European Communities is concerned, it would have been more interesting if the Council had not confined itself to mentioning matters relating to Greece, Portugal and Spain, which have now been settled, but had referred in the annual report or by any other means it deemed appropriate to problems raised by developments in the talks with Portugal and Spain.

37. There have in fact been press reports of negative reactions by several of the nine governments towards these candidatures, one of them being afraid of Spain's accession because of its agriculture, another Portugal's accession because it wishes to protect its textile industries. Turkey's possible accession, because of fears that the labour market may be saturated, is also a cause of concern. Such concerns are quite legitimate, even if when all is said and done they should be secondary to the concern to enlarge and deepen Community Europe. When referring to such a matter your Rapporteur believes that the Council should not merely list the results achieved but also indicate the difficulties encountered and the reasons why it has been impossible to overcome some of them, provided, of course, that this does not inhibit the governments' freedom of action.

38. Where the situation in the Near and Middle East is concerned, there is real substance for a European policy in the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council and this conforms to the proposals made by the General Affairs Committee last December when adopting a report by Sir Frederic Bennett on the impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security. One is happy to note a convergence between the views of the Council and the Assembly where this policy is concerned. However, the two points which still pose major problems for Europe – the recognition of the right of Palestinians to self-determination and the joint attitude of European countries towards Israeli settlements on the West Bank, on the one hand, and the no less significant extent of sanctions which might be taken against the Soviet Union following the invasion of Afghanistan, on the other – are not mentioned in this chapter which therefore loses much of its interest. Admittedly, the Nine do not seem to have achieved very positive results in these two fields: does the Council consider that omission is the best information it can give the Assembly in such cases?

39. For the Assembly's future activity, it is essential for it to know the Council's point of view on these matters and the latter's answers to Written Questions 205 to 214 put by Sir Frederic Bennett offer little further information. Should it be concluded that the Council could not achieve unanimity in answering these questions or drafting a more substantial account of joint positions in its annual report? If so, the Council would already be rendering the Assembly a service by saying so instead of systematically avoiding all reference to matters on which its members are not unanimous. A few examples in the past have shown that it could take this liberty – for instance, when France did not follow the same course as the members of the NATO integrated military organisation. It should find an appropriate way in each event as it did in that case.

40. However, your Rapporteur is bold enough to reflect that all members of the Council were not apparently as pleased as the twenty-fifth annual report implies with the nine-power consultations following the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. For instance, Mr. Simonet, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, told the Belgian Senate on 28th February 1980 that he was not satisfied with these consultations because it had taken the Nine two weeks to adopt a joint position, because information

from and consultations with the United States in the framework of NATO were less than satisfactory and also because it had not been possible to hold the proposed meeting in Bonn between the United States and certain European powers. There are still manifest divergences between our countries on the steps to be taken, in spite of the endorsement of Lord Carrington's suggested policy for the neutralisation of Afghanistan. In short, it may be wondered whether the Council, in painting the picture of European co-operation over Afghanistan, has shown altogether too much sunlight and has removed rather too many clouds and shadows! Members of the Assembly should make use of joint meetings and written questions to urge it to give a more accurate account of the facts of the situation. And even so it must not take the way out it took for Questions 205 to 214; it must give proper answers within reasonable time limits when questions are put to it.

41. One can only hope that African questions may now present fewer problems than in the past for the cohesion of Europe and the report on decisions taken within the framework of nine-power political co-operation with regard to Rhodesia and in the framework of the Communities proper with regard to the Lomé Convention call for no special comment.

IV. *Conclusions*

42. In its reply to the twenty-fourth annual report of the Council, the General Affairs Committee noted that there had been definite progress in co-ordination between the various European institutions, in relations between the Council and the Assembly and also in the co-ordination of the foreign policies of member countries. Recent events in Iran and Afghanistan, however, indicate that this co-operation is far from perfect. The twenty-fifth annual report confirms this impression and also shows a close convergence between the views of the Council and those of the Assembly on many matters, inside or outside Western Europe. This similarity of approach, if continued, should allow further consolidation during 1980 of what now seem to be established practices. Your Rapporteur believes that there is a strong desire in the Assembly that the Council and the Assembly should make further efforts to have the work and the achievements of WEU better known in member parliaments and with the public as a whole.

43. Your Rapporteur therefore proposes that the Assembly adopt the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council. However, at the close of this study and as we embark upon the second half of the period of history which began with the signature of the Paris Agreements in 1954, your Rapporteur wishes to underline a few points which he feels should not only govern relations between the Council and the Assembly during the second half of this period of our history but also allow WEU to make a greater contribution to the building of a European union.

44. First, if the Assembly is to be asked to accept the *de facto* limitation of the Council's activities, it should be on the express condition that the latter continues to keep it fully informed of the way in which the modified Brussels Treaty is applied. It is understandable that the Council should have expressed some reservations about the way in which it would inform the Assembly of the work of the Independent European Programme Group, although it is unacceptable for it to doubt the principle of communicating such information on the grounds that it has no organic links with the IEPG. It is also conceivable that as long as the study undertaken by the Standing Armaments Committee is not completed it does not wish to divulge the text of each chapter. But these reservations would be acceptable *only* if the Council for its part, in accordance with its earlier promises, really does its utmost to give the Assembly the best possible information about these matters, as it did, for example, when it authorised Mr. Plantey to address the Brussels symposium on the juridical aspects of European armaments co-operation. In the case of the IEPG, the Assembly should put specific questions to the Council on the progress of the group's work in order to put its good will to the test to better effect than any declaration of good intentions.

45. The second point is the assurance that the Council really believes (as indicated by Mr. Thorn, its Chairman-in-Office, in 1979) that WEU, as a body, would not be foreign to a newly-structured Europe but that it has a special place to fill in the European union of tomorrow. To this end it is probable that there will have to be some relaxation of the commitments imposed upon its members by the protocols annexed to the treaty, and your Rapporteur thinks there is no need to show a radically hostile attitude towards any liberalisation of these commitments which corresponded to the realities of 1954 but not of 1980. Conversely, but in the same context, by applying Article XI and other measures, the

Council must still be prepared to apply the treaty in full and use it as a worthwhile instrument for closer co-operation between all countries willing to take part in a future European union.

46. A third point would be the way in which the Council applies Article I, not just to relieve itself of some of its activities as it has done fairly consistently up to now, but to assist the work of other economic organisations in which the member countries are represented.

47. If the Council proves willing to show a sufficiently positive attitude towards these various points, it would augur well for the development of relations between the Council and the Assembly in coming years, as we enter the second half of WEU's life leading up to its golden jubilee in 2004!

Relations with other European assemblies and with parliaments of member countries

INFORMATION REPORT [1]

submitted on behalf of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments [2]
by Mr. Schlingemann, Rapporteur

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1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee:* Mr. *Jeambrun* (Alternate for Mr. Visse) (Chairman); Mr. *Schlingemann* (Vice-Chairman); MM. *Agrimi, Bohm, Bonnel, Enders, Glesener, Hill,* Meintz, Lord Northfield (Alternate: *Miller*), MM. Rubbi, Stoffelen, Tanghe.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Information Report

(submitted by Mr. Schlingemann, Rapporteur)

I. *Relations with other European assemblies*

1. Since its formation, the WEU Assembly has always had contacts with the other two European assemblies through members of parliament or officials of the Offices of the Clerk. For the Council of Europe, the seven countries common to both assemblies are represented by the same members. For the assembly of the European Communities, about 5 % of its members have always been members of the WEU Assembly at the same time; the other 95 % met members of WEU in their respective parliaments.

2. The June 1979 elections radically changed this situation: the assembly of the European Communities now has more than twice as many members, only half of whom are now members of national parliaments [1], and these figures may change yet again at the next elections. The final result will be an assembly of 410 members practically none of whom will be members of national parliaments.

3. Up to July 1979, the WEU Assembly was able to contact all members of the European assemblies through written or oral questions put in the parliaments of member countries, by statements in the permanent committees of these parliaments and by speeches in plenary sittings.

4. Since then, the situation has changed. The Committee therefore decided that henceforth the orange booklet containing the texts adopted and a brief account of the session should be sent to the Office of the Clerk of the assembly of the European Communities for distribution to members and senior officials. The Office of the Clerk of the WEU Assembly transmitted this proposal and has just received an affirmative answer.

5. On the problem of communicating or exchanging documents and official reports of debates, your Rapporteur was initially rather surprised at the situation as it now stands.

6. From the assembly of the European Communities, the Office of the Clerk of the WEU Assembly receives all documents relating to sessions, printed proceedings, questions put to the Council of Ministers or to the Commission, publications on specific subjects and, on microfiches, the official reports (series L and C) and proceedings.

7. From the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the Office of the Clerk receives documents relating to sessions, committee documents provided they are not confidential, volumes of documents and proceedings, texts adopted and minutes.

8. Conversely, the WEU Assembly sends its proceedings, information booklets and documentation to the libraries of the other two assemblies and also to certain officials. It should be noted that committee documents are also exchanged between the two Committees for Relations with Parliaments.

9. This widespread exchange of documentation is obviously very useful: the secretariats of the three assemblies may at any time refer to what has been or is being done in the other assemblies, but in practice these archives are only too rarely consulted by officials or secretaries of parliamentary committees, and virtually never by members of parliament themselves.

10. Year after year, all these documents pile up on shelves and the Offices of the Clerk have already had to start replacing documents on paper by documents on microfiches (about a hundred pages fit on a fiche measuring 7 x 10 cm).

11. Texts or documents may be communicated in several ways:

(*i*) at the top official level between Presidents;

(*ii*) by the Clerk to specific committees;

(*iii*) between officials in the Offices of the Clerk;

(*iv*) officially to assembly libraries;

(*v*) to the political groups of the assemblies (since the same officials often provide the secretariats for these groups in all three assemblies, there has been an automatic exchange for a long time);

(*vi*) to national delegations (for the Assembly of the Council of Europe, the exchange is automatic since the seven delegations are identical; the assembly of the European Communities no longer has national delegations but only political groups which, in 1980, had a staff of 180);

1. To be absolutely clear, your Rapporteur has used the official terminology: member of parliament = member of a national parliament (consisting of one or two chambers); representative = member of a European assembly who is not a member of his national parliament.

(*vii*) through other intermediaries such as national political parties or similar bodies.

II. *Activities of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments*

12. The Committee for Relations with Parliaments must shape its rôle and methods of work in accordance with the aims of the Assembly.

13. The modified Brussels Treaty made the WEU Assembly the only European assembly with responsibility for defence and security matters.

14. It is therefore for the Assembly to air our countries' problems in this respect, compare their options and determine the areas in which a common approach is desirable and possible in order to promote closer European solidarity. This is the goal of our debates and the purpose of the recommendations which we address to the Council.

15. However, the consultative nature of our Assembly's deliberations and the fact that only a small number of matters covered by its recommendations are actually handled by the Council should prompt the Assembly to pursue its work in other forums and by other methods. This justifies the task of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments whose present report recapitulates the methods of work with a view to improving results.

16. The methods of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments may be divided into two categories.

17. First, the Committee extends the dialogue between the Assembly and the Council through approaches to member governments of WEU in accordance with appropriate procedure in each parliament.

18. Second, the Committee concerns itself with certain practical aspects of relations between European assemblies and seeks to bring the work of the Assembly to the attention of those who shape public opinion.

19. Whereas methods in the first category rely on specific parliamentary procedure under the rules governing each parliament, the second category calls for an all-round spirit of initiative and imagination. In both cases, the results obtained should be reviewed and an assessment made of future prospects.

I

20. Composed of representatives of the parliaments of member countries, the WEU Assembly can and must, through its national delegations, pursue its direct action towards each government using the appropriate procedure in each parliament. It should therefore be underlined how much the very composition of the WEU Assembly can facilitate the pursuit of its aims. The security questions dealt with in its debates are essentially a matter of national sovereignty and never the subject of a Community approach. Whereas the assembly of the European Communities, elected by direct universal suffrage, can elicit replies on matters within its purview, it is powerless in fields relating directly to defence. Conversely, the WEU Assembly can promote concerted action by the governments which have the last word in taking decisions on how to ensure our security.

21. In the longer term, your Rapporteur could perhaps envisage some kind of two chamber system in the framework of a European union to take account of the difference in membership of the economic and political organisation and of the organisation responsible for security matters and also of the diversity of methods used in handling these questions: Community methods or consultations without relinquishment of sovereignty, integration or co-operation.

22. After underlining the importance of action in parliaments, it is to be regretted that there seems to have been a marked reduction in such action, as may be seen from the table at appendix. Committee members should above all recall that their rôle is to be played mainly in the national parliaments and that committee meetings are useful only insofar as they prepare for such concerted action.

23. Whether in the form of written or oral questions or statements during a foreign policy debate, the number of actions is not all that counts. They must be effective and to that end have a bearing on matters which are worthy of debate or stimulate interest. Twice a year, the Committee for Relations with Parliaments selects from among the Assembly's recommendations those which are particularly suitable for action in national parliaments. Assembly recommendations can attract the attention of parliaments and elicit meaningful answers from governments because of their political interest and the depth of the thoughts they express. Members of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments have a modest but important rôle to play and that is to explain the concerns behind these texts and thus to facilitate a convergence of European views on the crucial

subjects which may normally be a subject of division.

24. The Committee's task may be made easier by the summary of reports which the Presidential Committee has decided to have prepared by the Committees as from this year. These summaries are to highlight the main lines of the problem, possible options and the Committee's suggestions so that members of parliament snowed under by too many documents may immediately identify the texts which interest them.

25. In this connection, it should be pointed out that for the first time a parliamentary committee has adopted a position after studying a text adopted by the WEU Assembly: the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Italian Chamber of Deputies discussed Resolution 63 on parliaments and defence procurement and wound up its discussions by adopting an opinion incorporating the ideas contained in the resolution. A short summary of this meeting and the text adopted are appended to this report (see Appendix III).

26. The Committee's action in national parliaments is not only a matter of applying parliamentary procedure or publicising certain documents, it is perhaps rather more a matter of establishing human contacts. In the past year, there has been no meeting between a WEU Assembly Committee and a committee of a national parliament, but the Defence Committee has established a welcome practice in inviting the chairmen of parliamentary defence committees to one of its meetings each year in order to study jointly a topic of common interest. Thus the participation of chairmen of defence committees in the visit by the WEU Assembly Defence Committee to the United States was considered most rewarding.

II

27. The WEU Assembly is not concerned only with the institutional dialogue between parliaments and governments ; it can and must concern itself with the work of the other European assemblies and with the opinions of influential persons working on one or other aspect of the building of Europe.

28. Shortcomings have often been noted in the co-ordination of the work of the European assemblies because in the foreign policy field the three assemblies have often tackled identical subjects. There is a natural convergence in this field: whatever may be the specialisation of the three assemblies in their own specific areas, some subjects will necessarily be tackled successively in reports by their committees with the difference that they will not be presented at the same time and each assembly will examine its own particular angle depending on its membership and responsibilities.

29. This does not mean that efforts to co-ordinate should be abandoned but above all that an attempt must be made to improve mutual information on work conducted in the three bodies. Information may be exchanged at several levels.

30. First, it should be possible for the Presidents of the assemblies to exchange views on matters of concern to their respective assemblies. The Conference of Presidents of European Parliamentary Assemblies provides an excellent opportunity for organising such meetings. Mr. de Koster, President of the Assembly of the Council of Europe, is to be congratulated for having taken the initiative of organising such a meeting during the Conference of Presidents held in The Hague in June 1978. A similar meeting will perhaps be held in Madrid during the Conference of Presidents to be held at the end of May.

31. Conferences of Presidents and meetings of the Interparliamentary Union also provide an opportunity for the three Clerks to meet. These informal and unofficial contacts should allow a solution to be found to problems stemming from possible overlapping in the type of work undertaken by the assemblies and their committees and in the dates of certain meetings. This area is not precisely within the purview of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, whose Chairman should simply draw the attention of the Presidential Committee to the value the Committee attaches to maintaining an effective exchange of information between the various organs of the European assemblies.

32. At the staff level, for more than two years there has been a European centre for parliamentary research and documentation, a network to facilitate the exchange of information between the staffs of thirty-five national parliaments and European assemblies. The Secretary of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments represents the WEU Assembly at this centre and is therefore able to acquaint other parliaments and assemblies with the Assembly's work. The Conference of Presidents to be held in Madrid on 30th and 31st May 1980 will discuss the future of the centre which it set up in 1977.

33. In the same spirit, the Presidential Committee might examine the contacts established between committees of the European assemblies conducting similar work, and particularly between the Political Committee of the Council of Europe, on the one hand, and the General Affairs Committee and Scientific Committee of

the WEU Assembly on the other. It will probably wish to be informed of the type of work carried out by the Political Committee of the assembly of the European Communities.

34. The WEU Assembly has also endeavoured to draw the attention of public opinion to certain fundamental conditions of European security. This is partly why it has organised symposia on problems of co-operation in the aeronautical and arms production fields, the last of which was held in Brussels on 15th, 16th and 17th October 1979 and with which the Committee for Relations with Parliaments was associated. The Committee should ascertain that the recommendations based on an analysis of papers presented at this symposium are examined with due attention by all concerned. Committee members may promote a common approach to questions on which there has proved to be sufficient convergence of the views of those concerned. They must bring such possibilities of co-operation to the attention of their colleagues who do not have the benefit of the same international experience.

35. Your Rapporteur apologises in advance for repeating what has already been said on many occasions by other Rapporteurs: all members must play their part if the Assembly is to exercise an influence. Including both representatives and substitutes, almost 180 members of parliament attend the WEU Assembly. Your Rapporteur wonders how many of them refer to its recommendations after leaving the Palais d'Iéna.

36. Yet members have so many opportunities of referring to our work: debates on the defence and foreign affairs budgets, procurement of military equipment, policy debates on specific questions or on the building of Europe in general. Nor should we forget the possibility of putting oral or written questions with or without debate.

37. The Committee for Relations with Parliaments therefore urges all members of the Assembly to consider that they have the task of strengthening, in their national parliaments, the idea of European solidarity when confronted with problems affecting our security.

APPENDIX I

Table of action in the parliaments of member countries

(Totals by country for each session)

Recommendations adopted in	Member countries							
	Belgium	France	Federal Republic of Germany	Italy	Luxembourg	Netherlands	United Kingdom	Total
1956	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	3
1957	4	0	1	0	0	5	2	12
1958	2	0	3	0	0	4	3	12
1959	0	0	9	0	0	0	0	9
1960	3	12	2	8	0	3	1	29
1961	0	2	0	3	0	6	0	11
1962	2	4	4	6	2	3	10	31
1963	0	0	13	22	1	2	3	41
1964	4	14	9	11	1	5	2	46
1965	0	11	12	24	0	5	28	80
1966	2	12	12	49	1	4	18	98
1967	14	9	22	29	2	6	16	98
1968	6	14	20	22	1	16	47	126
1969	11	15	17	8	0	4	36	91
1970	3	15	15	7	2	3	10	55
1971	0	4	19	9	0	6	10	48
1972	0	6	2	1	0	1	0	10
1973	0	4	2	6	1	0	0	13
1974	0	1	3	13	2	0	0	19
1975	10	28	8	19	3	11	3	82
1976	16	40	13	14	2	3	8	96
1977	4	18	4	15	1	1	14	57
1978	17	49	12	21	4	10	14	127
1979	9	45	12	10	10	1	10	97
Total	107	303	217	297	33	99	235	1291
Annual average	4.46	12.63	9.04	12.33	1.37	4.12	9.80	7.64

APPENDIX II

Table of interventions (debates, questions, replies, etc.) on texts adopted since June 1978

Session	Recommendation	Transmitted to parliaments	Belgium	France	Federal Republic of Germany	Italy	Luxembourg	Netherlands	United Kingdom	Total	Total for each part session
June 1978	312									–	33
	313	×	2	2					2	6	
	314	×	2	2		1	2	3	2	12	
	315		2			2				4	
	316									–	
	317		2			1				3	
	318	×	3	1		1			2	7	
	319									–	
	320									–	
	321					1				1	
Nov. 1978	322					1				1	94
	323	×		6		1				7	
	324					1				1	
	325			7	2	1		2		12	
	326	×	2		4	3			2	11	
	327									–	
	328	×		2	2	4	2	2	4	16	
Other action			7	26	4	4		3	2	46	
June 1979	329	×	2	2	2		2		2	10	36
	330									–	
	331			2						2	
	332									–	
	333	×	2	2					2	6	
	334									–	
	335	×	2	5	2				6	15	
Resolution 63						3				3	
Dec. 1979	336									–	61
	337	×			2		2			4	
	338	×		1						1	
	339	×		1						1	
	340									–	
	341	×		1			6			7	
	342									–	
	343									–	
	344									–	
Other action			3	31	6	7		1		48	

APPENDIX III

Discussion on Resolution 63 of the WEU Assembly by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Italian Chamber of Deputies, 17th October 1979

The Rapporteur, Mr. De Poi, noted that examination of the resolution on the agenda raised problems of substance and procedure, the latter being mainly due to the fact that it was the first time that the procedure under Article 125 had been applied. The first problem was the right to examine such matters. He considered the Foreign Affairs Committee should claim this right each time overall international policy problems were examined in various fields. This was partly the case for the present resolution concerning which he did not propose to become involved in a fight over responsibilities insofar as the Defence Committee had already started (and perhaps completed) its discussion on this subject. He would keep to general principles. Turning to the matter in hand, he described the contents of the WEU resolution, expressing his support for the requests and the proposed ways and means which were not contrary to the principles of Italy's Constitution. Just when Europe had to face up to military requirements, even though not militaristic, the parliamentary debate on this matter would help to maintain peace and not build up tension in international relations. These were valid reasons for approving the resolution, and he proposed that the Committee express a favourable opinion on the points which he read out. He recalled that such an opinion would not be useless since the Committee concerned had not yet managed to approve the resolution.

Mr. Cerquetti endorsed these views on the question of responsibilities and specified, where the substance was concerned, that the Communist Group had completed its discussion on this decision and others taken in international parliamentary bodies with a view to asking the national parliament to co-operate in decisions on military policy. This debate was set in an international context of almost generalised rearmament and deteriorating détente between the blocs, accompanied by a possibility of conflicts over energy supplies; if to this were added the difficulties encountered in ratifying the SALT treaty and the Vienna agreements, the importance of the question of parliamentary supervision of armaments policy could be understood. As for the motion for an opinion read out by the Rapporteur, he noted that it should provide for approval of specific standards for the control of trade in armaments and for military expenditure programmes, corroborated by appropriate statements on international agreements on the subject which, although not covered by the provisions of Article 80 of the Constitution, should be subject to parliamentary assessment. Finally, he asked that the Foreign Affairs Committee also propose a parliamentary discussion with the government before the NATO meeting planned for December in order to examine the subjects to be discussed there.

After further statements by the Rapporteur and the Chairman, the Committee approved the following opinion:

The Foreign Affairs Committee,

Having examined Resolution 63 of the WEU Assembly;

Considering that the principles it sets out comply fully with the Italian constitutional system;

Noting as worthy of consideration its assertions on the expediency of promoting, in the framework of the laws in force, and with a view to updating them, a more continuous flow of information on internal and international defence policy problems,

Expresses a favourable opinion on Resolution 63, emphasising the expediency of studying possible changes in the rules of procedure of the Chamber which may make its studies more punctilious and more efficient;

Recognises the need to promote a political debate with the government before NATO's December meeting on the approach the executive intends to adopt at that meeting, and to be kept informed subsequently;

Notes finally the expediency of communicating to parliament in due course all international agreements which, although not covered by Article 80 of the Constitution, have major repercussions on Italy's military policy.

Application of the Brussels Treaty

Reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council

REPORT [1]

submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments [2]
by Mr. Tanghe, Rapporteur

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1. Adopted in Committee by 14 votes to 0 with 1 abstention.

2. *Members of the Committee:* Mr. *Bonnel* (Acting Chairman); MM. *Ahrens,* Banks, *Baumel,* Bechter (Alternate: *Schleiter*), van den Bergh, Bernini, Boucheny (Alternate: *Jung*), *Cavaliere,* Cox (Alternate: *Brown*), *Dejardin, Edwards,* Fosson (Alternate: *Talamona*), Grant, Handlos, de Koster, Labriola, Lemmrich, Meintz, Ménard (Alternate: *Bozzi*), Onslow (Alternate: *Sir Frederic Bennett*), *Pawelczyk,* Pecchioli, Péronnet, Hermann Schmidt, Scholten (Alternate: *van Hulst*), *Tanghe.*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

on the application of the Brussels Treaty following the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union

The Assembly,

(*i*) Considering that at a time when the forces of the Soviet Union have just invaded a non-member country of the Warsaw Pact it is essential to reaffirm the mutual defence obligations of Articles IV, V and VIII.3 of the modified Brussels Treaty;

(*ii*) Recalling the recommendations in the report on strategic mobility prepared by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments *;

(*iii*) Considering that no provision of the modified Brussels Treaty should jeopardise the security of the Alliance and noting that the Council applies only partially the controls provided for in Protocol No. III;

(*iv*) Anxious to clarify the state of commitments entered into in the framework of the treaty,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Consider that consultations in the North Atlantic Council may supplement, where appropriate, those provided for in Article VIII.3 of the modified Brussels Treaty, thus reaffirming the proper responsibilities of each of the seven member countries and the respective provisions of the Brussels and North Atlantic Treaties;

2. Call for the strengthening of the defence of all member states through the urgent implementation by the states concerned of measures of the long-term defence programme to take account in particular of the situation in the Middle East;

3. Approve, in the appropriate NATO bodies, the assignment of German naval forces to SACLANT and to SACEUR with the sole aim of making the best use of all available allied forces for the common defence;

4. Delete paragraph V of Annex III to Protocol No. III of the modified Brussels Treaty;

5. Make use of the procedure whereby NATO may provide material for replies to appropriate Assembly recommendations;

6. Amplify, in future annual reports, the present reference to United Kingdom land forces stationed on the mainland of Europe by a corresponding reference to the United Kingdom's Second Tactical Air Force and any redeployment of such forces liable to affect the accuracy of the figures given;

7. Clarify, in its twenty-sixth annual report, the present situation as regards stocks of chemical weapons held by member countries and publish in it the list approved by the Council, currently in force, of chemical products to be controlled by the Agency.

* Document 758.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Tanghe, Rapporteur)

I. *Introduction and relations with the Council*

1.1. Meeting shortly after the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, the Presidential Committee of the Assembly instructed the General Affairs Committee to submit a report to the Assembly analysing the political aspects of the invasion, and at the same time instructed the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to examine, in the framework of its report replying to the annual report of the Council, the state of European security in the light of the invasion. This examination is undertaken in the context of defence matters handled by the WEU Council in accordance with the mutual defence provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty: Article IV calling for close co-operation with NATO and its military staffs; Article V on mutual military assistance in the event of an armed attack in Europe on one of the member states; and Article VIII.3 providing for the immediate convocation of the Council at the request of a member state to allow consultations " with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise, or a danger to economic stability ".

1.2. In Chapter II (*b*) of this report the Committee therefore reviews the state of European security in the light of the invasion of Afghanistan and draws a few conclusions relevant to the application of the modified Brussels Treaty. Otherwise, the structure of this report follows the broad lines of those of previous years.

1.3. As in the past, the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council to the Assembly recognises that the latter " is the European parliamentary assembly empowered by treaty " to deal with defence questions. " The Council... continued their dialogue with [the Assembly] on questions relating to the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, including those dealt with by the member governments of WEU in other international fora. " But in its replies to recommendations adopted by the Assembly in 1979 the Council does not seem to have had recourse to the procedure whereby NATO may, in appropriate cases, provide material for replies to Assembly recommendations.

1.4. This procedure was worked out by the Council in liaison with the North Atlantic Council precisely in order to meet the wishes expressed by the Assembly to discuss defence questions dealt with by member governments in the framework of NATO in accordance with Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty. In Recommendation 320, the Assembly recalled *inter alia* the existence of this procedure, and in its reply the Council recognised that it followed it " whenever they consider this to be necessary and, in particular, when the questions raised relate to matters within the competence of the integrated command structures of NATO ". Since the Council has not applied this procedure since 1977, the Committee urges the Council to do so again in case it should fall into disuse.

1.5. The Committee takes this opportunity of thanking the Council for the informal meeting held with the Committee in Rome on 16th May 1979. The Committee notes with satisfaction that the Council's report refers to the statement made by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Mr. Sanza, at this meeting according to which " when the SAC's final report[1] had been submitted [the Council] would not fail to consider how the Assembly might be informed of its content and its main conclusions ".

1.6. In its report replying to the Council's report for the previous year[2], the Committee had to complain about the fact that the chapters of the Council's report concerning defence questions did not reach the Office of the Clerk until the end of March. This year again the Committee has to record the same delay, these chapters not having reached the Office of the Clerk until 28th March 1980. The Committee urges the Council to revert to the procedure applied in 1975 and 1976 which allowed the report to be communicated in February.

II. *Activities of the Council and state of European security*

(*a*) *Defence questions dealt with in the Council*

2.1. The Council's report first refers to its statutory activities in accordance, *inter alia*, with Protocols Nos. II, III and IV of the modified Brussels Treaty.

(i) Level of forces of member states

2.2. Protocol No. II of the treaty makes it incumbent upon the Council each year to determine, or to note in certain cases, the level

1. Study on the armaments sector of industries in WEU member countries.

2. Document 808.

of forces of member states under the headings " Forces under NATO command " and " Forces under national command ". For land and air forces of member countries, Protocol No. II provides that for Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands the levels assigned to SACEUR shall not exceed the maxima laid down in the special agreement annexed to the 1952 treaty on the establishment of a European Defence Community. For naval forces assigned to NATO command, levels shall be determined each year in the course of the NATO annual review, the level of German naval forces being limited to the level laid down in the abovementioned special agreement. If, however, at any time during the annual review it is proposed that forces assigned to NATO should exceed the limits laid down in Protocol No. II, acceptance by the country concerned of such increases shall be subject to the unanimous approval of WEU members expressed either in the WEU Council *or in NATO*. The Committee refers to this question again in paragraph 2.14 of the present report.

2.3. The Council's report asserts that " they have been able, in 1979, to carry out their obligations under Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty concerning levels of forces ".

(*ii*) *United Kingdom forces stationed on the continent of Europe*

2.4. Under Article VI of Protocol No. II, the United Kingdom has to maintain a minimum level of forces on the mainland of Europe; this minimum has been fixed by the Council at 55,000 land forces plus one tactical air force. This year, for the first time, the Council's report declares that " the average number of British land forces stationed on the mainland of Europe in accordance with the commitment in Article VI of Protocol No. II of the modified Brussels Treaty during 1979 was 55,650 ". The Assembly is therefore able to note that the commitment entered into by the United Kingdom was respected in 1979. The Council thus met the wishes often expressed by the Assembly in its recommendations that this figure be included in the Council's report. The Committee thanks the Council for withdrawing its previous refusal.

2.5. However, unlike Council reports for earlier years, the present report makes no reference to the presence of the United Kingdom's Second Tactical Air Force and does not clarify the situation concerning the redeployment of units of the British Army of the Rhine from Germany towards Northern Ireland. The Committee insists that the Council's reports should not omit to mention the tactical air force, which is still included in the United Kingdom's commitment, and that the reports should clarify the situation concerning forces in Northern Ireland. The previous report specified that " at 31st December 1978 there were 3,243 men from BAOR in Northern Ireland ". The Committee wishes the Assembly to be informed whether a like figure is still to be deducted from the figure of 55,650 men referred to in the present report.

(*iii*) *Study of the armaments industries in member countries*

2.6. The Council's report informs the Assembly that the economic chapter of this study, which the Council instructed the WEU Standing Armaments Committee to start in 1977, has not yet been completed; this is the only chapter still to be done. However, the Committee welcomes the fact that in its reply to Recommendation 331 the Council agreed to " consider the possibility of entrusting the SAC with work on subjects which may be suggested by the Assembly "[1].

Amendments to the lists of prohibited weapons

2.7 Since the modified Brussels Treaty was signed in 1954, the Council has amended a dozen times the list given in Annex III to Protocol No. III which defines the conventional weapons which the Federal Republic of Germany undertakes not to manufacture on its territory. No amendment to this list was communicated by the Council in the present annual report. The Committee returns to this question in paragraph 2.18.

(b) State of European security in the light of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan

2.8. The Committee is not making a detailed study of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan since the General Affairs Committee has been instructed to prepare a report on this question. But the Defence Committee briefly reviews here the repercussions of the invasion on European security.

2.9. The Soviet forces now in Afghanistan, with the possible exception of certain command elements, were not withdrawn from the forces facing Europe on the northern, central or southern fronts, except perhaps for certain units which have to be taken into account in establishing the balance in Eastern Turkey. The asymmetry in the forces facing one another, particularly on the central front, remains unchanged and the superiority of Warsaw Pact forces, particularly in tanks and troops, is not modified. Mr. Brezhnev's statement on 6th

1. See paragraphs 4.1 and 4.2.

October 1979 that up to 20,000 Soviet troops and 1,000 tanks would be withdrawn from Eastern Germany in 1980 could have but a minor effect on the balance; it would appear that the return of troops to the Soviet Union shown on television was solely for publicity purposes and covered only a small proportion of the numbers announced by Mr. Brezhnev.

2.10. The introduction of the SS-20 missile by the Soviet Union in 1977 continues to place NATO at a disadvantage. Soviet medium-range missiles aimed at the European allied countries now include 500 SS-4 and 90 SS-5 missiles, all with warheads of a yield of one megaton, plus some 90 SS-20 missiles each with three 50 kiloton warheads. The number of SS-20s is increasing at the rate of about five per month.

2.11. In Afghanistan there are at present an estimated 80,000 to 100,000 Soviet forces with modern equipment. Although the occupation places the most advanced Soviet forces only 600 km from the Strait of Hormuz, the poor lines of communication through Afghanistan make a direct military action across Iran from Afghanistan rather unlikely. The Soviet territory of Azerbaidjan is 800 km from the Abadan oilfields and the lines of communication inside the Soviet Union leading to Azerbaidjan are infinitely better than those across Afghanistan.

2.12. The most significant aspect of the occupation of Afghanistan is the military precedent it sets. It is the first time since the second world war that complete units of the Red Army have invaded a non-member country of the Warsaw Pact. This is the main reason why it is essential for countries of the Alliance to react strongly.

2.13. One consequence of the invasion is already becoming evident in the Indian Ocean. In 1978, as pointed out by the Committee at the time[1], the Soviet Union maintained some eight to ten warships and the same number of support units in the Indian Ocean; the United States had a permanent force of some three surface combat vessels plus an aircraft-carrier group which visited the area every three months. In March 1980, the total number of Soviet naval ships in the area reached twenty-nine, including thirteen combat vessels, and the United States had twenty-two combat units plus seven support vessels. The French presence, with its principal base in Reunion in the southern area, consisted of the command ship/tanker *La Charente,* accompanied by a destroyer, four frigates and a few smaller vessels. Two German destroyers, accompanied by two support vessels, are on a routine courtesy visit to ports in the Indian Ocean arranged some time ago; they are not calling at ports in the area of tension.

2.14. The Committee welcomes the fact that the United States and some of its allies having appropriate resources are reacting in this way, thus proving their ability to resist by force any possible use of force by the Soviet Union against the vital interests of the western countries in this part of the world. The Committee recalls the draft recommendation in its report on strategic mobility[1] which stressed " the need for the armed forces of certain allied countries to have ready access to areas of the world where those countries exercise responsibilities ".

2.15. The first conclusion to be drawn for European security at the present juncture is the need to underline the solidarity of the Alliance by stressing the provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty which concern mutual defence, i.e. Articles IV, V and VIII.3 already referred to in paragraph 1.10. As the annual report states under " Activities of the Council " " the Council ensure that the Treaty and its protocols are applied and observed both as part of their own activities and in connection with work in which member governments participate elsewhere, in particular, political co-operation between the Nine, the North Atlantic Council and the Independent European Programme Group. Their action is based on the dual concerns of ensuring proper implementation of the obligations or responsibilities defined by the modified Brussels Treaty and avoiding duplication of activity ". In application of the three mutual defence articles, the Council might very well specify in future annual reports that decisions taken by WEU member governments in the North Atlantic Council bind their countries under the terms of the more stringent Brussels Treaty as well as the North Atlantic Treaty. Already in Article III of Protocol No. II of the modified Brussels Treaty there is the formula cited in paragraph 2.2 above whereby the seven countries may approve, in the North Atlantic Council, decisions modifying the scope of this Protocol No. II. Paragraph 2 of Recommendation 342 of the Assembly proposes similarly that decisions taken by the seven countries at meetings of bodies of the European Community might well constitute the consultations provided for in the modified Brussels Treaty.

2.16. The second conclusion relating to European security is the absolute need to maintain a military balance in Europe, *inter alia* by pur-

1. Document 776, security in the Mediterranean, Rapporteur Mr. Grant.

1. Document 758, Rapporteur Mr. Tanghe, adopted on 4th November 1977.

suing the long-term defence programme approved in NATO, referred to in the next paragraph, and the programme for the deployment of cruise and Pershing missiles in Europe to counterbalance the SS-20 until such time as the negotiations with the Soviet Union lead to a dismantling of existing SS-20 missiles.

2.17. A third conclusion is that the countries of the Alliance with appropriate means should be prepared to back the United States in protecting Europe's interests outside the North Atlantic Treaty area and to take over from the United States in European waters when certain American ships leave for the Middle East. In the context of the situation in the Middle East in general, the North Atlantic Council was warned on 14th April 1980 by Mr. Robert Komer, the United States Under-Secretary of Defence, that American reserve forces now earmarked for Europe and some ammunition and equipment stockpiled there, might have to be committed in the Middle East. The European allies were asked to expedite implementation of certain measures under the long-term defence programme, in particular to increase stocks of ammunition and war reserves, and to earmark civil aircraft for military purposes in Europe in case the United States military airlift capability had to be committed to the Middle East.

2.18. Some provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty are involved in this last conclusion. According to Article II of Protocol No. II, " the naval forces of the Federal Republic of Germany [assigned to NATO commands] shall consist of the vessels and formations necessary for the defensive missions assigned to it by NATO within the limits laid down in the special agreement... [annexed to the treaty of the European Defence Community], or equivalent fighting capacity ". But Article III of the same protocol provides that " if at any time during the [NATO] annual review recommendations are put forward, the effect of which would be to increase the level of forces above the limits specified in Articles I and II, the acceptance by the country concerned of such recommended increases shall be subject to the unanimous approval of the high contracting parties to the present protocol expressed either in the Council of Western European Union or in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation ".

2.19. In another report[1], the Committee has noted that to date German naval forces, with the exception of a destroyer assigned to STANAVFORLANT, had been assigned only to SACEUR, which in fact limited them to the Baltic Sea or the west coast of Denmark. The Committee recommends that German naval forces be henceforth assigned to all NATO commands, to make the best use of resources according to the capabilities of German ships.

2.20. Later in Protocol No. III, in Annex III, paragraph V " Warships, with the exception of smaller ships for defence purposes ", the modified Brussels Treaty limits naval shipbuilding in Germany to eight 6,000-ton destroyers, other surface combat vessels being limited to 3,000 tons and auxiliary vessels to 6,000 tons. Submarines are at present limited to 1,800 tons and nuclear propulsion is forbidden. The Committee proposes that the Council, as it is entitled to do under Article V of Protocol No. III, quite simply arrange paragraph V of Annex III to Protocol No. III which imposes limits on naval shipbuilding in Germany since such restrictions have become detrimental to European security.

2.21. In Recommendation 320, adopted last year on the Committee's report replying to the annual report of the Council, the Assembly has already recommended that the Council " 3. Delete the reference to naval auxiliary vessels from the list of conventional armaments which may not be produced on German territory ". Informed of the contents of paragraph 3 of Recommendation 320, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, in his letter to the Chairman of the Committee dated 27th July 1978, declared: " I welcome the recommendation of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to delete the restriction on the construction of permanent auxiliary vessels imposed on the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). The lifting of these restrictions would not only better serve the needs of the FRG navy but also would be of considerable benefit to the Alliance. In view of the recommendation by the Assembly of WEU, I am prepared to support a request to the Council by the Federal Republic of Germany to delete the restrictions on the construction of naval auxiliary vessels of more than 6,000 tons displacement ".

III. *Agency for the Control of Armaments*

(a) Non-application of controls

3.1. The present annual report announces no progress in the control of armaments in member states in accordance with the treaty; there has on the contrary been a slight regression. As the Committee pointed out in its reply to the 1978 report, the usefulness of these controls is now disputed. The Committee has always underlined the major shortcomings in the Council's application of the provisions of Protocols Nos. III and IV of the modified Brussels Treaty – the basic texts for the control of armaments of member states on the mainland of

1. Document 837, the northern flank and the Atlantic and Channel commands, Rapporteur Mr. Ahrens.

Europe; these controls do not apply to the territory of the United Kingdom. Like earlier reports, the Council's present report refers to fields where the Agency does not exercise its activities. Under the heading entitled in earlier reports " Fields where the Agency is or is not authorised to exercise its mandate ", the following may be found in the present report:

> " *Atomic, chemical and biological weapons*
>
> The position described in earlier annual reports remained basically unchanged.
>
> The activities of the Agency do not extend to nuclear weapons. The non-nuclear components of such weapons (namely the missiles themselves and other specially designed equipment) are subject to control except as regards the weapons qualified as " strategic " by one member state. *Furthermore, as this state has declared that its nuclear capability as a whole is directed to one and the same objective of deterrence, its missiles with nuclear capability and its tracked launchers are no longer subject to control.* "[1]

3.2. The Assembly was thus informed for the first time that French Pluton tactical nuclear missiles had just been withdrawn from Agency control. Hitherto these missiles (but not their nuclear warheads) were controlled by the Agency as is still the case for Lance missiles and other similar missiles equipping Belgian, German, Italian, Netherlands and United Kingdom forces on the mainland of Europe. (Nuclear warheads for these missiles, which are American property held in American depots, are not subject to the controls provided for in the treaty.)

3.3. If the provisions of Protocol No. III of the modified Brussels Treaty were applied, it would be the WEU Council, deciding by a majority vote, that would fix the level of stocks France would be allowed to hold on the mainland of Europe (Article III of Protocol No. III) and the Agency for the Control of Armaments that would verify this level. Nuclear non-production controls would also be applied in Germany. In reality, because France has not informed the WEU Council that the " effective production " of nuclear weapons has begun on its territory, the Council has never sought to apply the provisions of the treaty concerning nuclear weapons. As the Committee pointed out in earlier reports, the " strategic " forces not covered by the Agency's activities include not only the nuclear warheads of the French strategic forces but also their means of delivery (nuclear submarines, strategic missiles, and Mirage IV aircraft).

3.4. The Committee having examined in another report[1] the problems of protection against biological and chemical weapons, it has considered in greater detail than usual the situation relating to these weapons, control of which is provided for in the modified Brussels Treaty in very much the same conditions as for nuclear weapons. The Council's present report, like its predecessors, states:

> " Nor does the Agency apply any controls to biological weapons.
>
> The control activities dealt with in this chapter do not, therefore, concern these two categories of armaments [biological and nuclear].
>
> In the case of chemical weapons, only non-production controls take place; no quantitative controls are made since none of the member states have declared possessing such armaments. "

It subsequently states:

> " As the Convention for the due process of law[2] has not yet entered into force, the control measures carried out by the Agency at private concerns had, in 1979, as in previous years, to take the form of ' agreed control measures '.
>
> One consequence of this situation is that, in order to obtain the agreement of the firms concerned, the Agency has to give a few weeks' notice. This agreement has never been withheld. "

3.5. Further on, the annual report specifies:

> " In application of Article III of Protocol No. III which lays down conditions to enable the Council to fix the levels of chemical weapons that may be held on the mainland of Europe by those countries which have not given up the right to produce them, the Agency asked the countries concerned, in its questionnaire, whether production of chemical weapons on their mainland territory had passed the experimental

1. Rapporteur's italics.

1. Document 838, nuclear, biological and chemical protection, Rapporteur Mr. Banks.

2. Convention concerning measures to be taken by member states of Western European Union in order to enable the Agency for the Control of Armaments to carry out its control effectively and making provision for due process of law, in accordance with Protocol No. IV of the Brussels Treaty, as modified by the Protocols signed in Paris on 23rd October 1954 (signed in Paris on 14th December 1957 but ratified by only six states: Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom).

stage and entered the effective production stage.

In 1979 as in the past, the member states concerned replied in the negative.

As every year, the Agency requested all member states in the corresponding sections of its annual questionnaire to state whether they held any stocks of chemical weapons, whatever their origin. In the reply to this questionnaire, no member state declared holding any chemical weapons during the current control year.

3.6. However, the Committee notes that according to government statements or reliable publications certain member countries hold, or have held in the recent past, stocks of chemical weapons. At its specialised plant in Nancekuke, the United Kingdom has produced sarin nerve gas (GB) at the rate of 6 kg per hour and small quantities of VX. The dismantling of the plant was announced in 1976 and it was opened to inspection to experts from some twenty foreign countries in March 1979. In France, no official statement has been made, but there are reports that the pilot production of nerve gases near Toulouse may have reached a few hundred tons[1]. The factory of the *Service des Poudres* at Pont-de-Claix specialises in chemical weapons[2]. In Germany, apart from American stocks, a few second world war munitions continue to be discovered and the Council has recently had to reply to two written questions on this subject:

Reply of the Council to Written Question 203 (Mr. Boucheny):

" The modified Brussels Treaty permits no derogation from the undertakings entered into regarding the non-production of chemical weapons. As to the Stolzenberg factory, the Agency, following press allegations, carried out, with the support of the authorities concerned, an agreed non-production control of chemical weapons at the plant in Hamburg on 7th December 1970.

This control measure revealed no indication of production of chemical weapons within the terms of Annex II to Protocol No. III, as was clear, moreover, from the passages on the control activities of the Agency in the Council's annual report to the Assembly for 1970. "[3]

Reply of the Council to Written Question 204 (Mr. Banks):

" According to information given to the Council, the chemical substances and waste found, although partly poisonous or otherwise dangerous, do not constitute stocks of chemical weapons. Article XIII of Protocol No. IV to the modified Brussels Treaty would not therefore appear to apply. "[1]

3.7. These facts in themselves are not disturbing; preparations being made by France and the United Kingdom are part of the legitimate defence effort. But it would be good for the Council's report to make the situation clear.

3.8. Where non-production controls of chemical weapons in Germany are concerned, in the absence of the guarantees provided for in the convention mentioned in paragraph 3.4, the Agency is not authorised to take samples – essential for any control worthy of the name. The list of chemical products drawn up by the Council for the application of controls was brought to the notice of the Assembly in the fifth annual report of the Council, dated March 1960 (Document 159):

" List of chemical products (chemical weapons) approved by the Council for Agency control:

Section I: Chemical products which *cannot* be used for civilian purposes:

(1) Alkyl alkylphosphonofluoridates.
(2) Alkyl N-dialkyl phosphoramidocyanidates.
(3) Mustard gas.
(4) Nitrogen mustards.
(5) Lewisites.

Section II: Chemical products which can be used for civilian purposes:

(1) Hydrocyanic acid.
(2) Cyanogen chloride.
(3) Parachlorphenyldimethylurea.
(4) Maleic hydrazide. "

In Section I, the first and second are nerve gases of the G family; the third, fourth and fifth are blister gases. In Section II, the first and second are blood gases; the third and fourth are defoliants. Missing from the list are the category of V-agent nerve gases and the defoliants used for military purposes by the United States in Vietnam: 2, 4-D and 2, 4, 5-T.

1. See e.g. The problem of chemical and biological warfare, Volume II: CB weapons today, page 217, SIPRI, 1973.

2. See *Le service des poudres*, Jacques Pergent, *Forces aériennes françaises*, No. 24, 1970, page 96.

3. Communicated to the Assembly on 30th November 1979.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 30th November 1979.

3.9. In subsequent reports of the Council, it was stated in 1971 (Document 193) that towards the end of 1960 " it was unanimously proposed that the list be amended to include a new group of highly toxic substances and this proposal will be submitted to the Council ", but it was only from a publication of the Stockholm International Peace Reseach Institute that it was learned that the group in question was the V-agent nerve gases:

> " ... the only substantial change came in 1960, when the family of O-alkyl S-2-NN-alkylalkylaminoethyl alkylphosphonothiolates was added "[1]

but it is not clear at what point the Council agreed to this amendment. In 1962, the annual report (Document 225) stated that " the list of chemical equipment and products to be regarded as chemical weapons during the year was approved by the Council early in 1961 ". Only in 1963 did the annual report (Document 265) indicate that " at the end of 1961, the Agency... carried out studies... The main points considered were the revision and bringing up to date of the list of chemical weapons to be controlled in 1962 (subsequently approved by the Council)... ". A further change is referred to in the annual report for 1965 (Document 364):

> " The list of chemical weapons for control in 1965 was modified by the Council by the addition of chemical formulae to define the tabun, sarin and amiton families. "

But again it was SIPRI that published the details and omissions:

> " Other amendments to the list comprise the incorporation of structural formulae for chemicals listed in Section I. These are as follows:
>
> (1) R'O.RP(O)F, where R is a C_{1-3} alkyl group, and R' a linear or branched alkyl or cycloalkyl group of unspecified size.
>
> (2) MeRN.P(O)CN.OR', where R is a methyl or ethyl group and R' a linear or branched alkyl or cycloalkyl group of unspecified size.
>
> (3) $S(CH_2CH_2Cl)_2$.
>
> (4) $N(CH_2CH_2Cl)_3$.
>
> (5) $(ClCH=CH)_nAsCl_m$, where $n+m=3$, and $n=0$.
>
> And, for the V-agents added in 1960: RO.R'P(O)$SCH_2NR''R'''$, where R' is a methyl or ethyl group, and R, R'' and R''' are alkyl or cycloalkyl groups of unspecified size. R'' and R''' may also be linked into a single cyclic radical, and the ethylene linkage between the nitrogen and sulphur atoms can be methyl-substituted.
>
> These structural formulae are notable for the extent to which they exclude important members of the sulphur and nitrogen mustard gas families from the Agency's control. "[1]

3.10. Since then the list of chemical products to be controlled does not appear to have been changed, successive annual reports stating like the present one:

> " As in previous years, the Agency asked member countries whether they wished to renew in 1979 the list of chemical weapons subject to control.
>
> The member countries agreed to this renewal. This was reported to the Council, who noted the fact. "

3.11. The Committee asks the Council to publish the full list now in force in its next annual report and to keep the Assembly informed of any subsequent change.

(*b*) *Activities of the Agency for the Control of Armaments*

3.12. Although the usefulness of WEU controls is no longer evident and the Agency's true areas of activity remain limited solely to conventional weapons, the number of inspections carried out by the Agency each year shows that generally speaking there has been no reduction in its activities, as may be seen from the following table.

3.13. Once again, the Committee finds particularly useful the lists of armaments currently being produced, set out in parts 1 to 4 of Section E " State and problems of control in certain particular fields " which is a summary of all current armaments production programmes in member countries. It may be seen from the very full list now given that production under licence of Hawk surface-to-air missiles (Helip) is being pursued with the participation of Belgium, France and Italy.

Conclusion on the control of armaments

3.14. In conclusion, the Committee believes it can assert that the controls provided for in the modified Brussels Treaty are being applied on the mainland of Europe in respect of most conventional weapons subject to control and the non-production of chemical weapons in Germany. As the annual report states:

1. The problem of chemical and biological warfare, Volume V: The prevention of CBW, SIPRI, 1971.

1. The problem of chemical and biological warfare, Volume V: The prevention of CBW, SIPRI, 1971.

Numbers and types of inspections carried out by the Agency for the Control of Armaments

	Control measures at depots	Control measures at units under national command	Control measures at production plants (quantitative control measures)	Total quantitative control measures	Control measures at production plants (non-production control measures)	(of which non-production of chemical weapons)	Total control measures (all categories)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
1961	29	15	12	66	7	(2)	63
2	26	20	11	57	7	(2)	65
3	35	13	13	61	10	(4)	74
4	39	19	13	71	9	(4)	80
5	26	16	11	53	7	n.a.	60
6	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	78
7	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	70
8	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	79
9	*	*	*	*	*	(3)	77
	a *b*	*a* *b*	*a* *b*	*a* *b*	*a* *b*		*a* *b*
1970	* *	* *	* *	* *	* *	n.a.	82 72
1	* *	* *	* *	* *	* *	n.a.	82 72
2	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	66
3	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	66
4	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	71
5	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	72
6	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	71
7	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	70
8	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	68
9	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	70

Note a, b: From 1971 onwards the Agency adopted a new system of presenting its summary table of inspections, thenceforth counting inspections of several small grouped ammunition depots as a single inspection. An apparent reduction in numbers of inspections in fact reflects no reduction in the activities of the Agency. For comparison, the Council reported both sets of figures (old and new style – *a* and *b*) for the years 1970 and 1971.

n.a.: Information not available.

Sources: Figures for total control measures (all categories) given in column 7 are derived from published annual reports of the Council. With regard to the various categories of controls (columns 1 to 6), figures for 1961-65 are also derived from the published annual reports of the Council. Those for 1966 to 1969 have never been made available to the Committee. Those for 1970 to 1979 have been communicated to the Assembly by the Council in response to Recommendation 213, but permission to publish them has been withheld. Minor discrepancies in some totals result from differences of definition of visit and are without significance.

* Confidential information available to the Committee deleted from the published report.

> " When drawing up its programme of control measures the Agency again worked on the basic assumption, which is supported by the observations of previous years, that the undertakings and declarations of member countries are being honoured. "

The annual report for 1976 added:

> " Clearly, if any doubt existed on this point, control measures would have to be increased. "

3.15. The Committee has already noted that the usefulness of the few controls still applied is not disputed, particularly in the case of restrictions on the production of conventional weapons in Germany which the Committee now proposes should be removed.

IV. *Standing Armaments Committee*

4.1. The Committee's report notes above that the economic chapter of the study of the armaments industries in member countries which the Council instructed the WEU Standing Armaments Committee to prepare in 1977 has not yet been completed (paragraph 2.6 above). In paragraph 1.5 above, the Committee also welcomed the statement by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council that " when the SAC's final

report had been submitted [the Council] would not fail to consider how the Assembly might be informed of its content and its main conclusions ". The Committee expects further information from the Council at the joint meetings arranged to follow the Ministerial Council meeting in Luxembourg on 14th May 1980.

4.2. The Council also met the Assembly's wishes in its reply to Recommendation 331, adopted on the basis of the report by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments replying to the annual report of the Council in 1979. In its reply the Council agreed to consider " the possibility of entrusting the SAC with work on subjects which may be suggested by the Assembly ". The Committee will not fail to consider appropriate subjects to be proposed to the Council when the study on the situation of the armaments sector has been completed.

V. *Conclusions*

5.1. The Committee's principal conclusions are set forth in the draft recommendation. Preambular paragraph (*i*) and operative paragraphs 1 and 2 stress the relevance of the mutual defence obligations of the modified Brussels Treaty, described in paragraphs 1.1 and 2.15 of this explanatory memorandum, in the light of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and improvements needed in allied defence effort dealt with in paragraphs 2.8 to 2.17. Preambular paragraph (*ii*) recalls the Committee's previous recommendation concerning strategic mobility mentioned in paragraph 2.14. Preambular paragraph (*iii*) and operative paragraphs 3 and 4 refer to certain limitations imposed by the treaty which the Committee in paragraphs 2.7 and 2.17 to 2.21 proposes should be removed.

5.2. Preambular paragraph (*iv*) and operative paragraphs 6 and 7 refer to shortcomings perceived by the Committee in the Council's report on the application of specific provisions of the Brussels Treaty concerning troop levels (see paragraphs 2.4 and 2.5 of this explanatory memorandum) and arms control (paragraphs 3.1 to 3.11). Operative paragraph 5 calls for the maintenance of the useful procedure referred to in paragraph 1.3.

Application of the Brussels Treaty –
reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council

AMENDMENT 1[1]

tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett

1. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out " Arrange " and insert " Delete ".

Signed: Bennett

1. See 2nd Sitting, 2nd June 1980 (Amendment agreed to).

Application of the Brussels Treaty –
reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council

AMENDMENT 2[1]

tabled by Mr. Ahrens

2. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out " elsewhere ".

Signed: Ahrens

1. See 2nd Sitting, 2nd June 1980 (Amendment agreed to).

Application of the Brussels Treaty –
reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council

AMENDMENTS 3, 4 and 5[1]
tabled by Mr. Bozzi

3. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out " supplement " and insert " be preceded " and, at the beginning of line 2, insert " by ".

4. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, at the beginning insert " Invite the states concerned, subject to the agreement of the Federal Republic of Germany, to ".

5. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out " Arrange " and insert " Examine the possibility of arranging ".

Signed: Bozzi

1. See 2nd Sitting, 2nd June 1980 (Amendments 3 and 4 negatived; Amendment 5 not moved).

Application of the Brussels Treaty –
reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council

AMENDMENT 6[1]

tabled by Mr. van den Bergh

6. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out " urgent ".

Signed: van den Bergh

1. See 2nd Sitting, 2nd June 1980 (Amendment not moved).

The northern flank and the Atlantic and Channel commands

REPORT[1]

submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments[2]
by Mr. Ahrens, Rapporteur

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee:* Mr. *Bonnel* (Acting Chairman); MM. *Ahrens, Banks, Baumel,* Bechter (Alternate: *Schleiter*), van den Bergh, Bernini, Boucheny (Alternate: *Jung*), *Cavaliere, Cox, Dejardin, Edwards,* Fosson (Alternate: *Talamona*), Grant (Alternate: *Jessel*), Handlos, de Koster, Labriola, Lemmrich, Meintz, Ménard (Alternate: *Bozzi*), Onslow (Alternate: *Sir Frederic Bennett*), *Pawelczyk,* Pecchioli, Péronnet, Hermann Schmidt, Scholten (Alternate: *van Hulst*), Tanghe.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Introductory Note

In preparing this report the Rapporteur had an interview at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 9th July 1979, with Vice-Admiral Sir James Jungius, KBE, SACLANT Representative in Europe.

In preparing this report the Committee as a whole met at combined Headquarters Allied Command Channel, and Eastern Atlantic Area, on 12th September 1978, where it was briefed by Allied Commander-in-Chief Channel, Admiral Sir Henry Leach, RN; Commander Maritime Air Channel, Air Marshal Sir Robert Freer, RAF; and their principal staff including Admiral Krijker, Royal Netherlands Navy, Chief of Allied Staff; Commodore Harvey, Royal Navy, Deputy Chief of Allied Staff (Plans); Commander Crosbie, United States Navy, of the Staff of Commander Submarines Eastern Atlantic; Commander Donaldson, Royal Navy (Operations); Group Captain Donnovan, Royal Air Force (Air Plans and Exercises) and Air Commodore Bush, Royal Air Force.

It met subsequently in Norway, calling at Headquarters Allied Forces Northern Europe, Kolsås, on 13th February 1979, where it was briefed by General J. Brodersen, Danish Air Force, Deputy Commander-in-Chief AFNORTH; Major General O. Miøen, Norwegian Army; Rear Admiral O. F. Berg, Norwegian Navy; Rear Admiral E.K.E. Noodt, Germany Navy, and Lt. Colonel Hunt, Canadian Forces. The Committee inspected the AFNORTH war headquarters and was briefed by Wing Commander Fauchon, Royal Air Force, on the air defence operations centre.

The same day the Committee met in the Norwegian Ministry of Defence where it was briefed by Mr. C. Stephansen, Secretary General; General S. A. Hauge, Chief of Staff; Mr. Omreng, Head of Construction, Ministry of Defence, and Mr. Engby of the Ministry of Defence staff. Mr. Knutsen, member of the Defence Committee of the Storting, took part in the discussion.

On 14th February 1979 the Committee met at Headquarters 45 Commando Group United Kingdom Royal Marines, Elveg, near Elvergårdsmoen, where it was briefed by Admiral J. Meyer, Royal Norwegian Navy, Commander Naval Forces North Norway; Major General Sir Steuart R. Pringle, Bt., Major General Royal Marines Commando Forces, and Lt. Colonel R.H.B. Learoyd, Commanding Officer 45 Commando Group.

On 15th February 1979 the Committee visited Headquarters " Z " Company, 45 Commando Royal Marines, Malm, where it was briefed by Captain J. E. Haycock RM, Officer Commanding " Z " Company; Major Leo Don, Officer Commanding " W " Company (13th Infantry Company, Royal Netherlands Marine Corps), and Captain R. van Lierob, Second in Command, " W " Company. The Committee witnessed demonstrations by " Z " Company RM and by " W " Company, Royal Netherlands Marines.

The Committee met subsequently at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 9th July 1979, where it was briefed by General H. F. Zeiner-Gundersen, Chairman of the NATO Military Committee. On 10th July 1979 the Committee boarded the Belgian frigate " Wielingen " moored in Zeebrugge, where it was briefed by Captain Troispont, Commander Naval Operations, and Commander de Maesschalck, Commanding Officer of the " Wielingen ".

The Committee met subsequently in the Bundeshaus, Bonn, on 25th September 1979, where it was briefed by Mr. Andreas von Bülow, German Parliamentary Secretary of State for Defence, and Admiral Klaus J. Steindorff, Chief of Organisation and Leadership Department of the German Naval Staff. On 26th September 1979 the Committee visited Eggebek military airfield where it was briefed by Rear Admiral R. Deckert, Commander, German Naval Air Arm. The Committee visited reconnaissance and attack aircraft of the naval air arm. It then visited Naval Headquarters, Glücksburg, where it was briefed by Admiral Fromm, Commander-in-Chief German Fleet, and staff officers. It then visited fast patrol boats of class 143 and 148 and minesweeper class 340 and 341 moored at Flensburg Mürwik.

From 25th February to 5th March 1980 the Committee met in the United States where it was briefed in the State Department and Department of Defence, and met with members of both Houses of Congress. Of particular relevance to this report were the briefings in the Brookings Institution on 28th February by Mr. Michael McGwire; the visit to Norfolk, Virginia, on 29th February, where the Committee toured the naval base and was received on board the nuclear-propelled guided-missile cruiser USS Mississippi by Captain Peter Heckman, Commanding Officer, and other ship's officers, and on board the multi-purpose amphibious assault ship USS Nassau by Captain William A. Kearns, Commanding Officer, and other ship's officers. The Committee then met at Headquarters Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic where it was briefed by Admiral Harry D. Train II, USN, Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic; Vice-Admiral Sir Cameron Rusby, RN, Deputy Supreme Allied

Commander Atlantic, and staff officers. On 5th March the Committee met at the base of Submarine Group II, Groton, Connecticut, where it was briefed by Rear Admiral Scott, Commander Submarine Group II, and Captain Hay, Chief of Staff. The Committee then toured the submarine base aboard United States navy tugs.

The Committee considered the general terms of the present report at its meetings on 25th September 1979 and 18th March 1980. The report as a whole was discussed and adopted by the Committee at its meeting in the Bundeshaus, Bonn, on 29th April 1980.

The Committee and the Rapporteur express their thanks to the Ministers, officials and senior officers who received the Rapporteur or addressed the Committee and replied to questions. The views expressed in the report, unless expressly otherwise attributed, are those of the Committee.

Draft Recommendation

on the northern flank and the Atlantic and Channel commands

The Assembly,

(*i*) Considering that the defence of the northern flank is inextricably linked to the defence of the adjoining seas and Atlantic Ocean;

(*ii*) Believing that defence of the northern flank must be based on the early arrival of adequately-prepared reinforcements to meet an attack because geographical and political factors impose an imbalance in permanently-stationed forces;

(*iii*) Believing further that geographical factors and the present qualities of the naval forces of most NATO countries provide a reasonable measure of naval capabilities at the present time, although specific deficiencies need to be urgently remedied and future trends in the size of Soviet naval ships will require to be offset in long-term NATO naval construction programmes;

(*iv*) Calling for better use to be made of existing allied naval resources;

(*v*) Noting that the reference to the Tropic of Cancer in Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty imposes no geographical limitations on the responsibilities of NATO naval commands;

(*vi*) Recalling that by virtue of Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty the WEU Council relies on the North Atlantic Council for information and advice,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge the North Atlantic Council:

1. To improve allied naval capabilities in the Atlantic and Channel areas and in sea areas adjacent to the northern flank:

   (*a*) by calling for long-term national naval construction programmes to maintain the strength and average hull age of naval vessels, and to keep abreast of any further increase in Soviet naval capabilities;

   (*b*) by calling for urgent steps to remedy specific deficiencies especially of escort forces, mine counter-measure vessels and maritime patrol aircraft, and to improve interoperability of weapons and communications and transmission equipment;

   (*c*) by making better use of existing naval resources forthwith, as recommended by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments:

      (*i*) through the improvement of joint naval operations planning and control in the Atlantic and Channel areas and the sea areas adjacent to the northern flank;

      (*ii*) through flexible use of naval forces, irrespective of command boundaries, including appropriate German naval forces, to ensure that the necessary ships are available at earlier stages of alert;

      (*iii*) by calling on France to allocate naval forces to SACLANT on the same basis as other WEU countries;

   (*d*) by establishing at appropriate naval headquarters a daily record of the location of all Warsaw Pact merchant ships in port or at sea in the NATO area;

2. To improve the defence of the northern flank:

   (*a*) by calling on all allied governments to provide political support for the Danish and Norwegian Governments to resist constant pressure from the Soviet Union designed to prevent legitimate defence arrangements;

   (*b*) by calling for mountain and arctic warfare training in the area to be extended to all troops likely to be available as reinforcements, and for standardised equipment to be provided for units of ACE mobile force;

(*c*) by urging the governments concerned to conclude urgently agreements on stockpiling in the area ammunition and heavy equipment for reinforcements;

(*d*) by calling for those improvements in the direct defence capabilities of indigenous forces which are required for the area to be defended until reinforcements arrive, and to provide for the reception and deployment of these reinforcements;

(*e*) by calling for the air defence of Danish territory to be placed on the same basis as that of neighbouring allied countries.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Ahrens, Rapporteur)

I. *Introduction*

1.1. This report investigates the problems of defending the northern flank and of the naval commands in the eastern Atlantic, Channel and North Sea. The defence problems of these widely dispersed areas are closely related firstly because the land areas control the access to the ocean for the Soviet naval forces and, secondly, because control of the sea approaches to the area is vital for reinforcement in a crisis or in war of the very sparsely populated and thinly-held land areas concerned.

1.2. On the central front the largest ever peacetime concentrations of land and air forces confront one another across a land boundary which clearly delimits territory of countries belonging unambiguously to NATO on the one hand and to the Warsaw Pact on the other. On the northern flank the situation is strikingly different.

1.3. There are political differences, leading to a more ambiguous defence situation, which arise first from the presence of neutral Sweden and in particular Finland with its special relationship with the Soviet Union. Secondly, in part because of the close relations between the Nordic countries, of which only Norway and Denmark are members of NATO, there is a special political basis for the participation of these last two countries in the Alliance which provides that except in times of military attack or threatened attack, there are no permanent bases for foreign troops and no stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of these countries.

1.4. The striking climatic difference of the northern front does not need to be stressed. Curiously, while the eastern Baltic is ice-bound in winter, the waters of the Norwegian coast and adjoining Kola peninsula coastline of the Soviet Union remain ice-free. Geographically, Norwegian territory presents great difficulties both for a defender and for an attacker. The small population of Norway, and its extremely sparse distribution along the remote northern part of the country, provides a basis for only a small defence force. In contrast, the adjoining Kola peninsula provides the Soviet Union's most important naval base and is also an area of growing economic importance to the Soviet Union.

1.5. As a consequence, in military terms, the tiny Norwegian garrison confronts the sizable Soviet military establishment in the Kola peninsula.

1.6. The problems of the allied naval commands arise less from numerical inferiority – overall the NATO navies still possess considerable capabilities – but from the large number of competing tasks which the naval forces would have to perform in a conflict. In particular, operations in the Norwegian sea including the reinforcement of Norway and defeat of Soviet naval forces north of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap would compete for the finite naval resources of the Alliance with operations in the Atlantic concerned essentially with maintaining the sea-lanes of communication between North America and Europe. The continued improvement in Soviet naval capabilities in particular has made a report on the northern flank and NATO maritime commands particularly opportune; the Committee last reported on the area in any detail in 1972[1].

II. *The threat*

(a) The Soviet navy and the naval balance

(i) Overall

2.1. A principal characteristic of naval force is its world-wide mobility. Hence, in a first appraisal, it is useful to compare the total size of the Soviet navy on the one hand with the combined navies of the NATO countries on the other. For the purposes of this comparison "general purpose" forces are considered – i.e. strategic missile launching submarines are excluded from both totals. Appendix I shows a comparison by numbers and categories of vessels of each of the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries compiled from Jane's Fighting Ships; Appendix II reproduces the tabular comparison given in the United States Department of Defence annual report for fiscal year 1981.

2.2. This comparison reveals first of all substantial NATO superiority when total tonnage is the basis of comparison, and when deep-water ocean-going navies are considered. The comparison also reveals, however, striking asymmetries in the forces. In total tonnage the NATO superiority is more than two to one overall, and is particularly marked in the categories of aircraft-carriers, amphibious vessels, major surface combatants, and mobile logistics vessels; on a tonnage basis there is superiority

1. Defence on the northern and southern flanks, Document 568, 25th April 1972, Rapporteur Mr. Vedovato.

in fact in all categories except patrol craft and fast attack craft (all vessels with a displacement less than 500 tons).

2.3. The NATO-Warsaw Pact comparison on a number of ships basis shows a 19 % Warsaw Pact superiority overall, but even on this numerical basis NATO still has overwhelming superiority in aircraft-carriers, and a significant lead in major surface combatants and a slight lead in nuclear-propelled attack submarines. The Warsaw Pact advantage again is overwhelmingly in small craft under 500 tons, but also in conventionally-propelled attack submarines.

2.4. In terms of capabilities, on evidence given to the Committee, the United States carrier capability is still overwhelming. The United States has 13 operational aircraft-carriers, three of them nuclear-propelled, with displacements ranging from 40,000 to over 80,000 tons, offering flight decks 300-330 metres in length, and embarking high-performance aircraft weighing 25-30 tons capable of speeds to Mach 2.5. The Soviet Union has just introduced its first two aircraft-carriers, the Kiev and the Minsk, while a third, Kharkov, is expected to enter service in 1980. A fourth is reported to be building. These are vessels of 38,000 tons displacement with flight decks only 189 metres in length, capable of operating helicopters, and a fixed-wing aircraft of the first generation, the VSTOL Yak 36, of about 10 tons weight, credited with a maximum speed of Mach 1.3.

2.5. The anti-submarine warfare capability of NATO navies is regarded to be significantly superior to that of the Soviet Union, both as regards performance of sonar of various types and the anti-submarine weapons available for both aircraft, surface ships and attack submarines, and especially in the numbers of anti-submarine helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft that can be deployed over the ocean.

2.6. In specially-trained amphibious forces NATO remains well ahead with a United States marine corps of three divisions totalling 184,000 men compared with the Soviet naval infantry of 12,000 men.

2.7. Most major NATO vessels have better sea-keeping capabilities with a larger provision for ammunition and other storage and better crew quarters, enabling the ships to remain at sea for longer periods.

2.8. A particular area of Soviet superiority, however, may be perceived in some of the lighter patrol craft of the Osa class fitted with the Styx surface-to-surface missile which won fame in sinking an Israeli destroyer, Eilat, during the Middle East hostilities.

2.9. A final feature of the overall naval balance to be noted is that the Soviet Union is virtually the sole contributor to naval force of the Warsaw Pact. In vessels over 500 tons the four other maritime Warsaw Pact countries, East Germany, Poland, Bulgaria and Romania, contribute only 11 vessels compared with the Soviet Union's 452 over this tonnage. There are many NATO countries with a strong naval tradition which make a very significant contribution to NATO naval forces, the strength of the United States navy being less than half the total except for nuclear-propelled submarines and aircraft-carriers.

2.10. As far as the overall naval balance is concerned, present figures may appear favourable to NATO. The naval problem, however, for NATO commanders is in coping with many different tasks which may have to be performed simultaneously and would call for much larger numbers of vessels than those of an adversary who was prepared to initiate hostilities.

2.11. The phenomenon of the Soviet navy today is one which very rapidly – since 1963 – has developed from a purely coastal and submarine force which virtually did not exist in the major oceans of the world, to one which now has a fully ocean-going capability and is able to exert Soviet influence in peacetime in any corner of the world, but one which in the present state of the naval balance would be likely to prove a "one shot" navy if general hostilities broke out. That one shot could, however, inflict considerable damage, depending on the positioning of Soviet vessels prior to the outbreak of hostilities. A more serious longer-term threat may, however, be in the making as Soviet naval ship-building continues.

2.12. Thus there are reports, said to have been confirmed by Admiral Gorshkov in private conversation, that a nuclear-powered aircraft-carrier is now under construction in the Soviet Union which United States experts expect to be in service in 1987 and be of 50,000 tons displacement, approaching the size of United States nuclear-powered carriers – about 78,000 tons displacement and capable of carrying up to 80 aircraft. In 1978 the Soviet Union introduced its largest yet amphibious ship, the Ivan Rogov, of 13,000 tons capable of carrying landing craft in a docking bay. Capable of carrying a battalion of naval infantry, two of these vessels are now in service and a further one may be building. This ship is still small compared with the most modern amphibious assault ships of the United States, such as the Nassau, visited by the Committee, of some 40,000 tons displacement with a through-deck capability for VSTOL aircraft as well as helicopters. They are capable of landing 1,800 troops with tanks and artillery, and carry 4 landing craft in their docking bay.

2.13. The Soviet Union also continues to develop its afloat support capability with the

replenishment ship, Berezina, of 35-40,000 tons displacement which entered service in 1979 and is larger than any previous support ship – it would be fully capable of servicing the Kiev and Minsk aircraft-carriers at sea. The Soviet Union also ordered a large floating dock from Sweden of some 330 metres in length capable of taking an 80,000 ton ship. On tow from Gothenburg in Sweden to Murmansk it ran aground off the north Russian coast not far from the Norwegian frontier and had to be salvaged by tugs supplied by the Netherlands, which towed it to Stored in Norway for repair. A similar dock has been ordered by the Soviet Union from a Japanese shipyard.

2.14. The overall naval balance is only the background to the naval problem studied in this report which is concerned with the regional balance in the Atlantic, Channel, North Sea and the northern flank in general.

(ii) Soviet naval forces – the regional balance

2.15. The major handicap confronting the Soviet navy is of course its division into four fleets which cannot be mutually supporting, each having to pass through narrow waters bordered by NATO countries or other allied countries. *The Northern Fleet*, with ice-free ports at Murmansk, Severomorsk and Pechenga, enjoys the best access to the Atlantic through the relatively large gap between the Norwegian North Cape and Bear Island, although even this gap, being relatively shallow water, must be assumed to be covered by the United States Sosus fixed underwater submarine detection system which will reveal the passage of all Soviet submarines. The Northern Fleet is clearly configured for operations in the Norwegian Sea and the Atlantic, and various estimates of its strength are available, the largest of which[1] is quoted here.

1. R.D.M. Furlong: The Strategic Situation in Northern Europe, International Defence Review No. 6/1979.

Soviet Northern Fleet

Nuclear-propelled ballistic missile submarines	50
Nuclear-propelled cruise missile submarines (anti-shipping)	44
Nuclear-propelled hunter-killer submarines	29
Conventionally-propelled control submarines	74
Cruisers and destroyers	32
Frigates and corvettes	70

2.16. This is a formidable fleet. In the event of hostilities it can be expected to deploy 4-6 battle groups of surface vessels and submarines to invest the Norwegian Sea providing collectively anti-submarine, anti-aircraft and surface-to-surface missile capability. Additionally, 5-7 groups of nuclear-propelled cruise missile or torpedo submarines would endeavour to penetrate the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap to operate in the Atlantic sea-lanes against allied shipping. Another priority task for the nuclear-propelled attack submarines would be to attempt the detection and destruction of the allied strategic submarines with shorter-range missiles, such as the United States Poseidon and the British and French strategic submarine forces for which the Norwegian Sea, or even the Barents Sea, must be supposed by the Soviet Union to be possible areas of patrol as submarines in these areas would be in range of the whole of the Soviet territory west of the Urals and a good deal of the territory beyond. Some of the Soviet surface vessel battle groups might attempt to penetrate into the North Sea where they would certainly divert a proportion of the allied tactical air forces in the vicinity, although the vessels themselves would be extremely vulnerable in this area.

2.17. Against these forces NATO countries would have available for deployment in the

Naval forces of NATO countries available for operation in the Atlantic, North Sea, Norwegian Sea and Channel areas

(excluding ballistic missile submarines)

	United States 2nd fleet	United Kingdom	Netherlands	Belgium	Norway	Germany	(France)	Total
Aircraft-carriers	5	2	–	–	–	–	(1)	8
Major surface combatants	61	65	18	4	5	17	(22)	192
Nuclear-propelled attack submarines	40	11	–	–	–	–	–	51
Conventionally-propelled attack submarines	–	16	6	–	15	–	(12)	49

whole of the Atlantic, Channel, North Sea and Norwegian Seas, including the coastal waters of the states concerned, the 2nd United States Fleet, the British and Netherlands navies (less a small number of vessels which may operate outside these areas) plus the Belgian, German and Norwegian navies. To this can be added about half the French navy if it were operating with the NATO forces as it could be assumed to be in the event of general hostilities.

2.18. The Soviet Baltic Fleet, together with the much smaller East German and Polish fleets, is clearly configured first for operations in the shallower Baltic waters with its relatively large numbers of the smaller conventionally-propelled attack submarines, patrol craft and fast attack craft and landing ships and landing craft of various types. There are some discrepancies in the published estimates of these strengths available.

Some recent published estimates of Soviet, East German and Polish naval forces in the Baltic

Source	Furlong	Military Balance	Jane's
Conventionally-propelled ballistic missile submarines	6	n.a.	6
Conventional attack submarines	50	34	57
Cruisers and destroyers	27	53	23
Frigates and corvettes	25		55
Large patrol craft and fast attack craft	260	n.a.	159
Amphibious ships and landing craft	120	n.a.	78

Furlong: R.D.M. Furlong: The Strategic Situation in Northern Europe, International Defence Review No. 6/1979.

Military Balance: Military Balance 1979-80 IISS London.

Jane's: Jane's Fighting Ships 1979-80.

n.a.: information not given.

2.19. These naval forces are clearly superior to those of the NATO countries, Denmark and Germany, which are maintained in the Baltic. The Warsaw Pact forces could dominate the eastern Baltic. For their larger vessels, which include three cruisers and one guided missile cruiser, to be put to maximum use they would be expected to force the passage of the Danish Straits to operate in the open seas, and to succeed in doing this it is expected that the Baltic Fleet would support amphibious landings on some of the Danish islands. The same amphibious capability could be used along the north German coast, and amphibious landings are regularly practised in East Germany, not very far from the border with the Federal Republic.

2.20. Although NATO naval forces in the Baltic are inferior in numbers, the narrow Danish Straits can be successfully mined and the minefields defended by the German and Danish naval forces. The threat of air attack would also be considerable for any Soviet forces attempting to pass through the Danish Straits.

2.21. The forces of Denmark and Germany available for operations in the BALTAP area are as follows:

Conventionally-propelled attack submarines	30
Destroyers	11
Frigates and corvettes	20
Fast attack craft	56
Large patrol craft	23
Amphibious ships and landing craft	47

2.22. It should be noted, however, that the destroyers, contributed by the German navy, are responsible for operations in the North Sea and also contribute a vessel to the Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT), so that these forces are not available for operations in the Baltic.

(b) Soviet land and air forces

2.23. In the Kola peninsula, adjoining the Norwegian frontier, the Soviet Union maintains considerable land, air and missile forces. The presence of many of these forces can be explained by the strategic and growing commercial importance of the area for the Soviet Union but they represent an overwhelming military force which could be used to overrun north Norway very rapidly.

2.24. Forces are said to comprise two motorised infantry divisions of some 14,000 men and 250 tanks each with tactical nuclear missiles SCUD-B. Tactical air support is said mostly to be based in the Leningrad military district, to the south of Leningrad. Reconnaissance and transport aircraft are stationed permanently in the Kola peninsula but there are many airfields in the area so that reinforcement by tactical strike aircraft could be carried out without warning. The more important aviation in the area is the part of the naval aviation assigned to the northern fleet. This is reported to include sixty attack aircraft with anti-shipping air-to-surface missiles, mostly the Badger medium

	East Germany	(Poland)	Soviet Union Baltic military district
Indigenous forces	2 tank divisions 4 motorised rifle divisions	3 tank divisions 8 motorised rifle divisions 1 amphibious division 1 airborne division	3 tank divisions 4 motorised rifle divisions
Soviet forces	10 motorised rifle divisions 10 tank divisions	2 tank divisions	

bomber but some of the new longer-range Backfire, some 55 ASW aircraft and 75 maritime reconnaissance aircraft, both Badger and the longer-range Bear. Lastly, there are reported to be ten SS-5 medium-range ballistic missiles with a range of some 2,300 nautical miles, putting them in range of all European NATO territory including Iceland.

2.25. Soviet naval infantry maintains one regiment comprising one tank battalion and three infantry battalions in the area; it has practised amphibious landings in the area of the naval port Pechenga, which is within 15 kilometres of the Norwegian frontier.

2.26. In the Baltic area it is not possible to deal in isolation with Warsaw Pact forces which might be used to seize the exits to the Danish Straits, because the same forces are those which confront NATO on the central front. Of particular importance, however, are the considerable amphibious forces maintained in the Baltic which comprise one Soviet naval infantry regiment – again comprising one tank battalion and three infantry battalions – one Polish amphibious division and one airborne division, and an East German motorised infantry division which has been specially trained in amphibious operations. The total Warsaw Pact ground forces in the area are shown in the table above, but not all Polish and East German divisions are at full strength.

III. *The Soviet Union and the Nordic countries*

3.1. The political basis of the defence situation in the northern area rests on a delicate balance of relations, especially those between the Soviet Union and its neighbours Finland and Norway on the one hand and those between Norway and its NATO allies on the other. As practised for the last thirty years, the underlying assumption for all the players has been that any shift in the military relationship on one side could result in shifts on the other.

(a) Finland

3.2. Under the terms of the Paris Peace Treaty of 10th February 1947, Finland confirmed the accession of certain territory to the Soviet Union originally included in the September 1944 armistice when Finnish-Soviet hostilities had ceased. Acceded territories include the Pechenga province on the Arctic Ocean, accession of which created the common Soviet-Norwegian frontier, and territory around the area of Lake Ladoga and Ziborg. Finland was to remain a neutral country, entering into no alliances against any of the wartime allies. Its armed forces were to be limited as follows:

Navy: 4,500 men ; ships 10,000 tons ;
Army: 34,400 men ;
Air force: 3,000 men ; 60 aircraft.

Finland would acquire no nuclear weapons or missiles. These limits are the present-day limits of the Finnish armed forces except for the navy which has only 2,500 men.

3.3. On 6th April 1948 under pressure from the Soviet Union the Finnish-Soviet friendship and mutual assistance treaty was signed in Moscow, Article I of which provides that if Finland, or the Soviet Union through Finnish territory, are attacked by Germany or an ally of Germany, Finland will fight to resist the aggression, assisted " if necessary " by the Soviet Union, such assistance to be " subject to mutual agreement ". Article II provides that there will be consultation between the two countries if a threat of such aggression is determined to exist. Finnish defence equipment is largely supplied by the Soviet Union with limited amounts from Sweden and NATO countries. In November 1978 the Finnish parliament approved $75m expenditure for procurement of new Soviet defence equipment to include SAM-3 surface-to-air missiles and possibly replacements for the MiG-21 combat aircraft, but details of equipment to be procured remain secret as in the past.

3.4. Finland's relations with the Soviet Union remain ambiguous, and subject to a good deal of secrecy which leads at times to alarmist speculation. In July 1978, during a visit to Finland, Marshal Ustinov, the Soviet Defence Minister, suggested to the Finnish Government that joint manoeuvres should be held. The proposal was rejected by the Finnish Government without publicity but the incident subsequently leaked to the press and led to an official statement being made by Mr. Tähkämaa, the Finnish Defence Minister, to the effect that no " official " proposals had been made for joint manoeuvres. He added " The treaty of friendship and mutual assistance between the two countries, which Finland scrupulously respects, makes such military co-operation possible in the crisis situation specified with precision in that document. Joint military manoeuvres in peacetime, or any other co-operation of the same sort in the military field, would not be in harmony with the international status of Finland... Any speculation on the organisation of joint military manoeuvres could generate a climate of uncertainty as far as the maintenance of the state of peace and stability in the north is concerned, and such circumstances would be in contradiction with the interest of the countries in the region. "[1]

3.5. While Finland thus has succeeded so far in excluding Soviet troops from its territory in peacetime, it is nevertheless subject to continuous Soviet pressure, much of which has not become publicly known. It has often made representation to its neighbours, Norway and Denmark, about the extent of their participation in NATO defence arrangements, and, in so doing, it may not be consciously acting as the intermediary of the Soviet Union, but its interventions may be seen in that light by other countries.

3.6. On 19th February 1980 the newspaper Suomenmah of the Finnish centre party criticised the negotiations for the stockpiling of American equipment in Norway (referred to below) adding:

> " Without exaggerating the present situation we could have expected the two prime ministers of the neutral Nordic countries, Sweden and Finland, to express their anxiety over the trends of the situation in the Nordic countries members of NATO... The United States, the directing country of NATO, have undertaken to disturb the balance not only in the Persian Gulf and the Caribbean, but also in northern Europe. "[2]

1. Le Monde, 17th October 1978.
2. Quoted in Le Monde, 23rd February 1980.

3.7. Certainly Finnish territory would provide an easy access route for Soviet troops wishing to seize north Norway – the tongue of Finnish territory opposite Tromsö in north Norway leaves a strip of Norwegian territory only 25 kilometres wide between the Finnish frontier and the sea. The belief that in certain circumstances the Soviet Union might station military forces in Finland in peacetime is obviously a factor taken into account in the defence policy of Norway and Denmark.

(b) Sweden

3.8. The only country of the region not to be involved in hostilities in World War II, a fact which no doubt colours its view of the viability of neutrality, Sweden since has pursued a policy of well-armed neutrality. In 1948, when Soviet pressure led to the conclusion of the Soviet-Finnish friendship and mutual assistance treaty, and when there were rumours of similar Soviet approaches to Norway, Sweden did participate in initial discussions with Denmark and Norway on a possible Scandinavian military alliance culminating in a summit meeting of the three countries in January 1949. The talks failed to reach agreement because of Swedish insistence that any Scandinavian alliance should remain neutral, without any links with the North Atlantic Treaty for which preliminary negotiations were then in hand.

3.9. Unlike Finland, Sweden has not acted even indirectly as an intermediary for the Soviet Union in approaching the Scandinavian NATO members in connection with their military relationship with the Alliance. Sweden does, however, take a relatively relaxed view of the concentration of Soviet force in the Kola peninsula, considering it in relationship to global strategic interest to the Soviet Union, rather than as a direct threat to the Nordic countries. Sweden could be expected to regret any allied attempt to establish a numerical military balance in the northern region.

3.10. Swedish policy of armed neutrality involves it in defence expenditure amounting currently to 3.8 % of its GNP, compared with 2.4 % and 3.2 % spent by Denmark and Norway respectively. Sweden maintains total armed forces of 65,900 men which, on mobilisation, can be brought up to 750,000 within 72 hours. It has a vigorous defence industry which has developed the successful Viggen and Draken tactical aircraft (the Draken has also been sold to Denmark), otherwise its defence equipment has been procured from NATO countries.

(c) Norway

3.11. From the months preceding Norway's signature of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 Norway has been under constant pressure from

the Soviet Union first to reject the Alliance and subsequently to refuse active participation in the mutual defence arrangements practised by other NATO countries. Other bilateral disagreements with the Soviet Union surface from time to time. These include operations on Svalbard – territory under Norwegian sovereignty but which is " demilitarised " and open to the economic activities of the 41 other parties to the 1920 Svalbard Treaty which recognised Norway's full sovereignty. The other area of disagreement is the division of the seabed and fishing rights in the area to the north of the Norwegian-Soviet frontier. Norway declared a 200-mile economic zone in 1977 and the Soviet Union claimed fisheries jurisdiction. The Soviet Union has now proposed that the bilateral negotiations on the delimitation of the waters of the economic zone should reopen in April 1980.

3.12. At the same time there are mutually-advantageous economic agreements between the two countries, notably the construction by Norway of four hydroelectric power plants on the Pasvik River which forms much of the boundary between the two countries.

3.13. Norwegian " base " policy on mutual defence arrangements was formulated in various statements from the period of the signature of the North Atlantic Treaty when Norway declared that except in cases of attack, or threat of attack, there would be no permanent stationing of foreign troops on Norwegian territory. When, in the second half of the 1950s, arrangements were being made for the stockpiling of tactical nuclear weapons on the territory of non-nuclear NATO countries, Norway declared again that in similar circumstances nuclear weapons would not be stationed on its territory.

3.14. In taking these decisions, Norway has undoubtedly had in mind the likelihood that any large build-up of allied forces or nuclear weapons on Norwegian territory might very well lead to occupation of Finland by the Soviet Union, or at least the stationing of Soviet forces in that country. While allied troops are not permanently based on Norwegian territory in peacetime, there is a permanent incentive for the Soviet Union to refrain from taking any such action in Finland which the NATO countries could clearly interpret as a threat to peace.

3.15. At the same time, Norway has firmly resisted Soviet pressure to refuse to participate in mutual defence arrangements. Norwegian defence policy does not preclude the participation of allied forces in training and exercises on Norwegian territory ; it does not now preclude the stockpiling of equipment for allied reinforcements that could arrive in the event of aggression or of threat of aggression. It does not preclude the operation of Headquarters Allied Forces Northern Europe outside Oslo or the operation of Norwegian air defence under NATO command in peacetime. Norway is a full participant in the integrated military structure of NATO including the Nuclear Planning Group.

3.16. Soviet pressure remains a constant feature today. On 7th October 1979, Pravda carried a warning to Norway against permitting the stockpiling of equipment for allied forces in its territory ; on 18th February 1980, the Soviet Union accused Norway of " anti-Soviet action " in permitting the NATO exercise " Anorak Express " on its territory – an exercise involving some 24,000 men from Canada, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States.

3.17. Despite its resistance to Soviet pressure, Norway does sometimes appear to modify its policy as a result. The participation of German forces in exercises on Norwegian territory has always been a sensitive political issue. German officers assigned to NATO are, however, permanently stationed in Headquarters AFNORTH. Then in June 1976, Mr. Hansen, the Defence Minister, stated that German forces would be fully integrated into the ACE mobile force deployment in Norway from 1980 onwards – implying the participation of 1,500 German troops including an infantry battalion. Following objections both from the Soviet Union and Finland, however, Mr. Hansen stated on 9th January 1978 that German participation in ACE mobile force would continue to be limited to 480 men providing a field hospital, a communications unit and a helicopter unit.

(d) Denmark

3.18. Denmark's participation in the integrated military structure of NATO reflects the political limitations of Norway's participation as far as the European territory of Denmark is concerned. Nuclear weapons are not stockpiled on Danish territory in the absence of aggression or a threat of aggression, nor are allied forces stationed there permanently. But, despite Soviet pressure, Denmark like Norway acceded to the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 and abandoned its requests for abrogation of the 1941 treaty between the United States and the representative of free Denmark which provided for the installation of United States bases in Greenland – part of Danish territory, which, since 1979, has had autonomy in domestic affairs.

IV. *Allied forces*

(a) Norway

4.1. With a population of little more than four million for a country 1,800 kilometres in length with a coastline of 2,650 kilometres when the fjords and bays are excluded, the indi-

genous defences of Norway are inevitably sparse, particularly when compared with the concentration of military force in the Kola peninsula with which Norway has a common frontier of 196 kilometres.

4.2. North Norway – the country north of 65° N latitude including the districts of Finmark, Troms and Nordland – accounting for more than half the length of the country has a population of only 450,000. Norwegian forces in the area amount to about 10,000 men, comprising a small infantry battalion in the neighbourhood of the frontier itself supported by a stronger battalion group of some 1,000 men 150 kilometres to the west at Portsangen. The main defensive position of north Norway is based on Brigade North of 5,000 men and a squadron of Leopard tanks in the Troms area opposite the " Finnish finger " which, as pointed out above, leaves a strip of Norwegian territory only 25 kilometres wide between the Finnish frontier and the sea. Forces deployed to the north and west of this position would inevitably be in danger of being cut off in the event of a Soviet move through Finland.

4.3. Norwegian air defences in the north are based on the NATO infrastructure financed airfields at Bodo and Bardufoss and comprise F-104 G combat aircraft being replaced by the newer F-16.

4.4. Norway has well-developed coastal defences, especially in the Tromsö-Narvik area, which include coastal artillery with radar fire control and coastal mounted torpedo batteries and arrangements for mining the entrances to the fjords, some of which have been pre-mined with systems that can be remotely armed in an emergency.

4.5. Air and sea surveillance is reasonably well developed with the NATO Air Defence Ground Environment (NADGE) radar stations distributed from North Cape southwards and Orion maritime control aircraft operating chiefly from Andoya which patrol the Barents Sea between North Cape and Bear Island.

4.6. Norway relies heavily on the mobilisation of reserves in an emergency. Together with its military air transport aircraft, designated civilian aircraft of the Scandinavian Airline System, with Norwegian crews, are earmarked for immediate use in an emergency to transport reinforcements north. It is claimed that three additional brigades can be mobilised and moved to the north Norway area within five days, the first battalion-sized units arriving within twenty-four hours. Some equipment is pre-positioned in the north.

4.7. South Norway – the area from 65° N latitude southwards, including Trondelag area – is more thinly held in peacetime because it is less exposed to surprise attack and because it is much easier to reinforce through mobilisation because of the local concentration of population. Peacetime forces include a battalion group of 1,200 men and a Leopard tank squadron.

4.8. On mobilisation, the land forces in south Norway can be increased to 150,000 within three days providing the basis for some seven brigades.

4.9. In 1974, Norway established a defence review commission including representatives of all political parties in the parliament and of the three armed services. The commission reported on 31st March 1978. Among its conclusions were that continued membership of the common western defence was the best contribution to avoiding conflict, that existing " base policy " and atomic policy (i.e. no stationing of foreign troops or nuclear weapons on Norwegian territory in the absence of aggression or a threat of aggression) should be continued, recognising that that policy would impose a greater demand on Norwegian defence and on Norwegian ability to receive and support reinforcements from abroad rapidly, and also that it would require the political authorities to react in time in a crisis situation (paragraph 21.2.6). The report further concluded that the Norwegian defence must be able to face an attack in north Norway on short warning while in view of the increased Soviet capability for operations along the whole of the Norwegian coast, it must also be prepared for an attack on the country as a whole. The commission confirmed the policy of continuing to maintain peacetime defensive power concentrated in north Norway but " At the same time we should strengthen the defence in other parts of the country especially in Trondelag " (paragraph 21.4.10). In order to prevent a surprise attack on north Norway " We must maintain a reasonable force of standing units in north Norway... An invasion of south Norway is not as probable until an attacker has secured control over the outlets to the Baltic. Therefore in south Norway... a reasonable defence is essentially based on mobilisation forces " (paragraph 21.2.11).

4.10. Thus defence in Norway is based on three phases. Small, but well-trained, forces in position in the north, those on the Soviet frontier acting as an observation and early-warning force that would act as a trip-wire and would prevent unopposed occupation of Norwegian territory, while the larger force in the Troms area would be able to resist an attack long enough for the first reinforcements to arrive from south Norway. This second phase would be based on the reinforced defence available from mobilisation within the country and the transport of extra brigades northwards, while

NATO as a whole reacted to Soviet aggression against one of its members. The third phase would then be based on the arrival of external reinforcements by air and sea, and training for this phase of Norwegian defence is an essential part of NATO peacetime preparations.

4.11. ACE mobile force – the brigade-size air transportable force available to SACEUR composed of infantry battalions and supporting units from many different NATO countries – is specially trained in mountain and arctic warfare and practises deployment in the Troms area each year. Over the last five years, Norway has been steadily moving to improve its capability of receiving reinforcements in an emergency.

4.12. Since 1972, the United Kingdom 45 Commando Group Royal Marines has been training each year in mountain and arctic warfare conditions in Norway. In 1976, the commitment was increased to two commandos – 42 and 45 – together with a commando brigade headquarters and logistics support units. In an interesting development of integrated allied forces, one independent company (Whisky Company) of the Royal Netherlands Marines regularly undertakes training with 45 Commando in Norway and in an emergency that company together with an amphibious combat group of the Royal Netherlands Marines form part of the United Kingdom RM commitment to Norway. The Committee was privileged to visit 45 Commando Group and the Netherlands Whisky Company on training in Norway in February 1979 and was impressed by the standard of skill and training achieved by these units who are now fully capable of surviving, moving and conducting military operations in the extreme climatic conditions of north Norway. Some equipment for these units is now prestocked in Norway in peacetime.

4.13. Recently, Canada has also earmarked an air-sea transportable brigade group for the reinforcement of north Norway and elements of the United States Marine Corps 2nd Marine amphibious brigade also exercise there.

4.14. It is understood that arrangements are being made for the stockpiling of fuel and ammunition for reinforcement forces in north Norway. In February 1980 reports from Oslo said that negotiations were in their final stages for the stockpiling of weapons and equipment for the United States Marine Corps brigade; in early April an outline agreement covering practical problems of the movement of United States reinforcements was signed in Oslo.

4.15. In March of this year, an impressive exercise "Anorak Express" was conducted in the Troms area by 24,000 troops from Britain, the Netherlands and the United States together with ACE mobile force comprising units from Canada, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. General Rogers, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, stressed at the time of the exercise the need for the pre-positioning of heavy equipment in Norway for the use of reinforcements in an emergency.

(b) The Baltic exits

4.16. The command responsibilities of Allied Forces Northern Europe, with its headquarters at Kolsas outside Oslo, extend as far south as the River Elbe in Germany for land forces, so that the German provinces of Schleswig and Holstein form part of that command. The defence command responsibility does not, however, extend beyond the Danish-German frontier, air defence responsibility for Schleswig-Holstein resting with Headquarters Allied Air Forces Central Europe under the Central European Command.

4.17. Denmark, as explained above, has a policy similar in many respects to that of Norway as far as its participation in integrated NATO defence is concerned. Thus, foreign troops are not based on Danish territory in the absence of aggression or a threat of aggression.

4.18. The land defence of the Baltic exits comprises first the Jutland Command with Headquarters Land Forces Jutland at Rendsburg on the Kiel Canal which has available the Danish Jutland Division comprising in peacetime two armoured brigades; and the German 6th armoured infantry division comprising the 16th, 17th and 18th brigades; and units of the German home defence forces. The command of the Danish island of Zeeland with headquarters at Copenhagen has a Zeeland Division available comprising two armoured brigades in peacetime and a battalion on the Danish island of Bornholm, one hundred kilometres to the east, where radar installations provide important early-warning information to the NATO air defence system.

4.19. On mobilisation, the two Danish divisions can be reinforced within twenty-four hours with a third brigade each while longer-term mobilisation further strengthens these divisions and provides, at a later stage, up to twenty-one further infantry battalions.

4.20. It appears that air defence responsibility of Danish territory is not under NATO command in peacetime, being the only part of European NATO territory to have opted out. It comes under AFNORTH only at a late stage of alert. The Danish air force comprises one squadron of twenty Swedish Draken and two squadrons comprising twenty-four F-100D and fourteen TF-100F fighter bomber squad-

rons and two interceptor squadrons equipped with thirty-nine F-104Gs. F-16 aircraft are on order to replace the F-100s.

4.21. As in Norway, effective defence of the vital Baltic exits comprising the land areas Jutland, Zeeland and Schleswig-Holstein, would depend in the event of aggression on the arrival of sufficient external reinforcements. Earmarked for this purpose are the United Kingdom 6th field force comprising a reinforced brigade including a tank battalion and a parachute battalion. The latter could be deployed within thirty-six hours'while the 6th field force would take up to a week to arrive if air transport were available, the Chieftain tank battalion taking longer as it would have to come by surface transport. The United States Marine Corps 4th marine amphibious brigade complete with M-60 tanks is also earmarked for reinforcement of the area but would arrive by sea from the United States in up to a month. ACE mobile force, referred to under Norway above, also practises deployment in the Baltic area.

4.22. On retiring as Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Northern Europe in 1979, General Sir Peter Whiteley proposed that the rôle of the British Army in NATO should be changed, with British army units in Germany being progressively reduced, perhaps to two divisions, and that forces thus withdrawn should be held in Britain for rapid reinforcement of the Baltic area or Norway where he considered they would be more likely to be required. The British defence white paper published on 2nd April 1980 notes that the cost of stationing British troops in Germany has risen by 3.5 % annually in real terms over the last twenty years and now accounts for three-quarters of invisible overseas defence expenditure.

4.23. The Committee notes that any proposal to reduce British forces on the mainland of Europe below their present size would require the approval of the Council of WEU by majority vote under the terms of Article VI of Protocol No. II of the modified Brussels Treaty.

(c) *Naval commands*

(i) *Command boundaries*

4.24. Air defence forces of NATO countries are under NATO command in peacetime; most regular units of the land forces are " assigned " to NATO command – giving NATO commanders some say in the training and stationing of the units that pass under their command at a given stage of alert. Naval forces are not under NATO command in peacetime – NATO naval commanders are informed of the forces that will be available within a specified time in the event of alert being ordered. The only exceptions in peacetime are the Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT), a composite group of some half dozen frigates or destroyers supplied each by a different NATO country, and the Standing Naval Force Channel (STANAVFORCHAN) consisting of mine-hunters and mine-sweepers from Belgium, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. These standing forces are assigned to NATO commanders in peacetime for operations, exercises and goodwill visits. STANAVFORCHAN also conducts route surveys and in a period of tension would provide the first mine counter-measure vessels to be used for NATO operations.

4.25. Thus NATO naval commands, to a greater extent than their land and air counterparts, remain planning commands in peacetime which, by agreement with participating countries, can conduct periodic exercises and coordinate surveillance by national units of Soviet warships. The NATO naval commands and their boundaries still reflect the national interests and relative force contributions of the early 1950s when they were first established. Some of these are felt not to correspond with the present situation.

4.26. The Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, with his headquarters in Norfolk, Virginia, visited by the Committee at the end of February 1980, commands the whole of the Atlantic area up to the Channel[1]. The area includes the Norwegian Sea and the northern North Sea. It is divided into three regional commands, WESTLANT, EASTLANT and IBERLANT, together with various island commands covering territory of NATO countries in the area of the Atlantic north of the Tropic of Cancer[2].

4.27. The area of the Channel – including the southern portion of the North Sea – is the responsibility of Allied Commander-in-Chief Channel, a major NATO commander who comes directly under the NATO Military Committee together with the two supreme commanders, SACLANT and SACEUR. CINCCHAN'S headquarters are in Northwood, to the north of London. As a legacy from the organisation agreed in the 1950s, a " Channel Committee ", composed of the chiefs of naval staff of Belgium, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, meets occasionally in London. It is described as an " advisory and consultative body to the Commander-in-Chief, Channel ". Origi-

1. Naval command boundaries at Appendix III.

2. It is pointed out that in Article VI of the North Atlantic Treaty the reference to the Tropic of Cancer relates only to the definition of an armed attack for the purposes of Article V. Thus the treaty does not restrict NATO planning or command responsibilities to the area north of the Tropic of Cancer.

nally designed as a counterpart to the NATO Military Committee and military Standing Group (since abolished) to which the two supreme commanders are responsible, the Committee understands that the Channel Committee now rarely meets. Its remaining functions could more efficiently be shared between the Military Committee and national military representatives to CINCCHAN.

4.28. The functions of SACLANT's subordinate commander, Commander-in-Chief Eastern Atlantic, are performed by the same person as the Commander-in-Chief Channel from the same headquarters. This political arrangement gives a British admiral considerable responsibility for the whole of the sea area east of Greenland through which United States naval battle groups would move in the event of hostilities to engage the Soviet northern fleet in the area of the Norwegian Sea and to protect the arrival in Norway of reinforcements from the United States and the United Kingdom.

4.29. The Baltic, including the North Sea waters immediately to the west of Jutland, come under Commander Baltic Approaches with headquarters at Karup, Denmark – a subordinate commander to CINCNORTH at Kolsas who is himself subordinate to SACEUR.

(ii) Pattern of naval operations

4.30. In considering the sort of operations allied naval forces would be called upon to carry out in war, possible scenarios have to be considered. The pattern of Soviet naval movements is more limited than those of the major NATO navies. Soviet vessels spend more time in port, even the strategic ballistic missile submarines. When compared with the United States and British ballistic missile submarine forces, at any given moment a significantly smaller proportion of the Soviet ballistic missile submarine fleet is at sea. Consequently, if the Soviet Union were to prepare for general hostilities at sea, a very likely sign would be movements of large proportions of the vessels composing the Northern and Baltic fleets into the Norwegian Sea and the Atlantic. NATO's surveillance capabilities are certain to identify such movements, including the movements of submarines, but of course in peacetime no steps could be taken to prevent such moves, and the continued surveillance of large numbers of vessels distributed round the oceans would then impose a severe strain on NATO surveillance capabilities, particularly on maritime patrol aircraft. Once at sea, moreover, the staying power of the Soviet fleet is limited compared with that of most NATO vessels, and the initiation of limited hostilities at sea would not be an attractive option for the Soviet Union because part of its strategic missile submarine fleet would be at risk because of NATO's anti-submarine capability.

4.31. If, on the other hand, hostilities break out without any obvious significant prior moves to the open seas by the Soviet fleets, NATO naval forces would then be involved in a race to keep the Soviet fleets out of the Atlantic. As far as the northern fleet is concerned, the race would be between the United States and Soviet naval forces to reach the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap, with an advantage to United Kingdom based nuclear-propelled submarines which can reach the area in advance of comparable United States forces.

4.32. Soviet strategy is likely to be to attempt to maintain a strong naval presence in the Norwegian Sea during hostilities, partly to protect its ballistic missile submarines operating in the Barents and Norwegian Seas, regarded as a last strategic reserve, and partly to isolate Norway. In an ensuing battle for the control of the Norwegian Sea, the geographical distribution of airfields, and the existence of the United States carrierborne aircraft will provide an advantage to NATO forces so long as the airfields remain intact and Norway, the Faroes, Iceland and Greenland remain in allied hands. If the decision is taken in time, the early use of mines including mines laid by aircraft could delay or prevent movement of Soviet vessels through the Spitzbergen-North Cape gap which they must pass to reach the Norwegian Sea.

4.33. As far as the Baltic is concerned, the exits can be effectively closed by mines as long as Danish territory and Schleswig-Holstein remain in allied hands, and as long as the German and Danish naval forces can defend the area. The greatest threat in this area is probably amphibious landing by Soviet forces which would seem to be a necessary precursor to any attempt to move the Soviet Baltic fleet into open waters after hostilities have broken out.

V. *Conclusions*

(a) Conclusions on naval commands and forces

5.1. The days of "comfortable superiority" for the NATO navies are over; the Soviet Union, since at least the Cuban missile crisis, is clearly resolved to build and maintain an ocean-going navy enabling it to exert its political influence on a world-wide basis in peacetime on comparable terms to the United States. That does not mean that the Soviet fleet is as yet the equal of the NATO navies in war. Overall, geography combined with the size and quality of the fleets of many of the NATO countries, and especially their anti-submarine

warfare capabilities, still give NATO superiority in general terms. The naval problem, however, for NATO and national commanders is in coping with many different tasks, including tasks outside the NATO area, which may have to be performed simultaneously, and would call for many more vessels than those of an adversary who prepared to initiate hostilities. While the numerical size of the Soviet fleet, like that of NATO navies, has declined slightly in recent years, its quality, and in particular the size of individual ships and their ocean-going capability, has been steadily increasing. In the future, NATO may have to face a Soviet generation of genuine aircraft-carriers, larger than the Minsk, and more amphibious warfare ships of the size of the Ivan Rogov.

5.2. *In the long term* the need for NATO naval construction programmes is to maintain the existing strength and quality of its naval forces, through a continual building programme, to ensure that the average age of the ships in service does not increase, and to ensure that the NATO navies keep abreast of future trends to bigger Soviet ships. This is particularly important with respect to naval operations outside the NATO area, the importance of which is highlighted by recent events in Afghanistan and Iran and is dealt with by the Committee in another report[1]. But a massive increase in NATO naval forces would not be possible because of financial constraints.

5.3. Despite the general overall superiority of NATO navies however, many different naval tasks to be carried out simultaneously compete for the services of the finite NATO naval forces, and these forces show shortages in particular areas.

5.4. *In the shorter term*, therefore, NATO shipbuilding must remedy specific deficiencies in its present forces, especially in the field of escorts and mine counter-measure vessels. More escorts are required to protect the sea lines of communication, more mine counter-measure vessels are urgently required to keep the seas and ports of the Alliance free of mines. An additional requirement is for more maritime patrol aircraft; existing resources are not enough for peacetime surveillance requirements; they would be strained to breaking point in a crisis if the Soviet northern and Baltic fleets were simultaneously to put to sea.

5.5. *Today better use should be made of existing naval resources.* Joint NATO naval planning and control must be improved; existing naval forces must be employed and controlled more flexibly, irrespective of command boundaries, so as to make the best use of the forces.

5.6. NATO naval headquarters must be able to plan for operations against hostile forces wherever they may be required. The Committee points out in this connection that Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which refers to " the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer " is concerned only with the definition of armed attack for the purposes of Article 5 of the treaty. The treaty in itself does not restrict the area of the authority of NATO commands.

5.7. The German navy is at present allocated entirely to SACEUR; appropriate ships should be made available for the whole area of the northern flank. The destroyers and frigates would make a valuable contribution both to the striking fleet Atlantic and to the escort forces which NATO naval commanders claim are in short supply in the Eastern Atlantic and Channel areas[1]. And great improvements in the use of existing resources will come from greater interoperability of equipment, especially of communications and digital transmission equipment of all kinds, and ammunition.

5.8. Lastly, as several NATO commanders have pointed out to the Committee, a centralised NATO reporting system should be established to maintain an up-to-date register, on a day-to-day basis, of the location of all Warsaw Pact merchant shipping in the NATO area. In the present area of Channel Command alone on any one day there may be 80-100 merchant ships of Warsaw Pact countries in the ports of NATO countries while a further 40 such ships are at sea in the area. The national arrangements for keeping tabs on the location of these vessels are good in Germany, Norway and the United States; they need to be improved in Belgium and the United Kingdom; at the same time, national policies must ensure that such ships are never berthed in particularly sensitive port areas. The necessary machinery then needs to be introduced so that each national authority reports locations on a daily basis to SACLANT headquarters and appropriate subordinate naval commands.

5.9. The Committee is aware that co-operation between French naval forces and the NATO naval commands is good; French naval missions are maintained at the NATO headquarters. But all NATO commanders who have addressed the Committee have stressed that, while they understand the limitations imposed by national policy on French co-

1. Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council, Rapporteur Mr. Tanghe.

1. The Committee examines in another report the provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty as they affect this proposal. See Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council, Rapporteur Mr. Tanghe.

operation with NATO, they would far prefer to be able to place the same reliance on the excellent French naval forces as they are presently able to place on the naval forces of the other WEU countries which are earmarked for NATO. The Committee recalls that by virtue of Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty WEU relies only on the NATO military authorities for the implementation of the mutual defence obligations of Article V. The earmarking of French naval forces for NATO commands (on the same basis as the naval forces of the other WEU countries) would not amount to reintegration into the military structure.

5.10. Of paramount importance is the proper use of warning time by political authorities, possibly combined with reallocation of earmarked naval units so that they may be assigned to NATO command at an earlier stage of alert than presently planned. It is essential that co-ordinated NATO command of naval movements should begin immediately there is any sign of a concerted significant move of the Soviet northern and Baltic fleets towards the open sea.

(b) Conclusions on Norway

5.11. Despite the imbalance of forces permanently stationed in Norway and the Kola peninsula the Committee believes the present defence policy to be basically sound. At the political level it is important that there should be full allied support for Norway to resist the never-ending pressure exerted on it by the Soviet Union aimed at preventing perfectly legitimate plans for the rapid reinforcement of Norway in a period of tension or hostilities. That political support should not overlook other Soviet pressures concerning economic rights in Svalbard and in the sea areas off the common frontier.

5.12. It is important that all units of allied countries likely to be used for the reinforcement of Norway in a period of tension or hostilities should receive proper mountain and arctic training in peacetime. The Committee welcomes the scope of training undertaken by the British marine commandos with a Netherlands marines element and by Canadian forces. It appears that more units of the United States Marine Corps are in need of such training.

5.13. The assignment of ACE mobile force to the support of Norway in one deployment mode is a valuable means of identifying the whole Alliance with the defence of the country and the Committee welcomes the contribution made by the participating countries, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. While that force provides important political support for a threatened country, its military effectiveness would be greatly increased if the different units could be provided with entirely standardised equipment compatible with local stocks of ammunition and spares. It is not militarily realistic for a force of only brigade size to be composed of battalions of different nationality equipped on a purely national and non-compatible basis.

5.14. Plans for the rapid reinforcement of Norway must necessarily include the stockpiling of ammunition and heavy equipment and the Committee notes the progress being made in this direction. A counterpart to allied support for the defence of Norway is Norwegian readiness to make the necessary provisions to receive reinforcements rapidly in a period of tension. Without modification to the existing "base policy", pending agreements on stockpiling of ammunition and heavy equipment should be concluded as rapidly as possible and there should be no discrimination between the nationality of forces conducting reinforcement exercises on Norwegian territory.

5.15. Norwegian ability to resist any surprise attack long enough for reserves to arrive is a necessary precondition of the reinforcement policy. Some armoured force in the Porsanger area would greatly improve the capacity of existing forces to deter and delay any invasion. At the same time the air defence of the vital five airfields in north Norway requires strengthening.

(c) Conclusions on the Baltic area

5.16. The Committee concludes that while it should be feasible to block the Baltic exits in wartime so as to prevent the exit of the Soviet Baltic fleet, the defence of the land areas by air and land forces will be vitally important. The air defence of Denmark like that of all other NATO territory should be under NATO command in peacetime. The NATO policy not to conduct joint NATO naval operations in the Baltic east of Bornholm should be revised, or at the least naval vessels of NATO countries must regularly exercise their rights under the law of the sea to operate in all areas of the Baltic despite the establishment of exclusive economic zones in the area.

APPENDIX I

The overall naval balance – NATO and Warsaw Pact vessels over 500 tons, excluding ballistic missile submarines

Country	SSGN & SSG	SSN	SS	Aircraft-carriers	Cruisers	Destroyers	Over 1,100 tons Frigates	500-1,100 tons Corvettes
Belgium						4		
Canada			3			4	16	
Denmark			6				7	2
France			23	2	2	20	23	
Germany			24			11	6	5
Greece			9			12	4	5
Italy			10		3	7	14	8
Netherlands			6			10	8	6
Norway			15				5	3
Portugal			4			1		
Turkey			12			12	2	
United Kingdom		11	16	3	8	8	51	
United States		72	8	13	28	96	65	
NATO	–	83	136	18	41	185	201	29
Warsaw Pact	69	42	153	2	39	115	112	122
USSR	69	42	147	2	39	114	108	116
East Germany							2	
Poland			4			1		
Bulgaria			2				2	3
Romania								3

Source: Jane's Fighting Ships 1979-80.
SSGN = nuclear-propelled cruise-missile submarines.
SSG = conventionally-propelled cruise-missile submarines.
SSN = nuclear-propelled attack submarines.
SS = conventionally-propelled attack submarines.
Cruisers: includes helicopter cruisers.

APPENDIX II

General purpose naval forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact





Notes :

1. Mobile logistic ships include only those auxiliaries which provide underway replenishment or direct material support to units operating away from home base. A number of other auxiliary types are not included in these totals.
2. Displacements shown are full load for surface ships and submerged for submarines.

Source: United States Department of Defence Annual Report, fiscal year 1981.

APPENDIX III

NATO navals commands

COMPARATIVE TABLE OF DEFENCE EFFORT 1975-1979

FINANCIAL EFFORT

Country	National currency unit	Defence expenditure (national currency) current prices					Defence expenditure (US $ million) *a*					GDP in purchasers' values (US $ million) *a*					Population (thousand)					Defence expenditure as % of GDP in purchasers' values *a*					Defence expenditure per head (US $) *a*					Defence expenditure as % of total WEU				
		1975	1976	1977	1978	1979 *f*	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979 *f*	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979 *e*	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979 *e*	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979 *ef*	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979 *ef*	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979 *f*
(0)	(1)	(— 5)	(— 4)	(— 3)	(— 2)	(— 1)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)	(26)	(27)	(28)	(29)	(30)
Belgium	Million Frs.	70,899	81,444	89,480	99,726	109,467	1,928	2,110	2,497	3,175	3,734	62,880	68,104	79,189	96,905	111,635	9,801	9,818	9,830	9,841	9,868	3.1	3.1	3.2	3.3	3.3	197	215	254	323	378	3.91	4.28	4.50	4.64	4.53
France	Million Frs.	55,872	63,899	73,097	84,042	94,926	13,035	13,369	14,877	18,623	22,324	338,833	349,895	381,644	471,588	568,350	52,705	52,893	53,079	53,278	53,500	3.8	3.8	3.9	3.9	3.9	247	253	280	350	417	26.41	27.10	26.80	27.21	27.06
Germany	Million DM	37,589	38,922	40,184	43,019	45,414	15,267	15,457	17,308	21,417	24,777	419,986	445,918	515,591	638,879	758,472	59,825	59,564	59,462	59,409	59,439	3.6	3.5	3.4	3.4	3.3	255	259	291	361	417	30.93	31.34	31.19	31.31	30.03
Italy	Million Lire	3,104	3,608	4,533	5,301	6,119	4,756	4,335	5,137	6,246	7,365	192,057	188,225	215,300	260,107	323,511	55,812	56,156	56,446	56,697	56,888	2.5	2.3	2.4	2.4	2.3	85	77	91	110	129	9.64	8.79	9.25	9.13	8.93
Luxembourg	Million Frs.	836	983	1,029	1,154	1,229	23	26	29	37	42	2,298	2,533	2,823	3,509	4,086	358	357	358	358	358	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	64	73	81	103	117	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
Netherlands	Million Guilders	7,246	7,817	9,260	9,317	10,001	2,865	2,957	3,773	4,307	4,985	82,802	90,837	106,919	130,778	151,510	13,654	13,770	13,853	13,937	14,030	3.5	3.3	3.5	3.3	3.3	210	215	272	309	355	5.81	5.99	6.80	6.29	6.04
United Kingdom	Million £	5,165	6,132	6,810	7,620	9,085	11,476	11,075	11,887	14,627	19,275	230,418	222,309	247,473	309,529	389,491	55,981	55,959	55,919	55,902	55,846	5.0	5.0	4.8	4.7	4.9	205	198	213	262	345	23.25	22.45	21.41	21.37	23.36
TOTAL WEU							49,350	49,329	55,508	68,432	82,502	1,329,274	1,367,821	1,548,939	1,911,295	2,307,055	248,136	248,517	248,947	249,422	249,929	3.7	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6	199	198	223	274	330	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
Canada	Million $	3,127	3,589	4,124	4,662	4,799	3,075	3,640	3,878	4,087	4,097	163,937	195,818	199,681	205,321	222,906	22,727	23,025	23,280	23,499	23,691	1.9	1.9	1.9	2.0	1.8	135	158	167	174	173	6.23	7.38	6.99	5.97	4.97
Denmark	Million Kr.	5,281	5,680	6,343	7,250	8,000	918	940	1,057	1,315	1,521	37,669	41,371	46,363	55,892	65,459	5,060	5,073	5,089	5,105	5,122	2.4	2.3	2.3	2.4	2.3	181	185	208	258	297	1.86	1.91	1.90	1.92	1.82
Greece	Million Drachmas	43,917	..	..	..	..	1,360	..	..	..	..	20,818	22,553	26,157	31,589	37,376	9,046	9,167	9,268	9,360	9,426	6.5	..	..	..	..	150	..	..	..	..	2.76	..	..	..	..
Norway	Million Kr.	4,771	5,333	5,934	6,854	7,394	910	977	1,115	1,307	1,460	28,362	31,285	35,769	39,979	45,706	4,007	4,026	4,043	4,060	4,074	3.2	3.1	3.1	3.3	3.2	227	243	276	322	358	1.84	1.98	2.01	1.91	1.77
Portugal	Million Escudos	19,898	18,845	22,082	27,354	37,733	780	624	577	623	771	14,754	15,476	16,359	17,795	20,248	9,633	9,694	9,773	9,820	9,923	5.3	4.0	3.5	3.5	3.8	81	64	59	63	78	1.58	1.26	1.04	0.91	0.93
Turkey	Million L.	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	36,008	41,051	47,789	52,471	66,135	40,025	41,039	42,078	43,144	44,236	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
United States	Million $	90,948	91,013	100,928	108,357	122,261	90,948	91,013	100,928	108,357	122,261	1,526,508	1,695,526	1,889,157	2,112,365	2,348,527	213,559	215,152	216,863	218,548	220,415	6.0	5.4	5.3	5.1	5.2	426	423	465	496	555	184.29	184.50	181.83	158.34	148.19
TOTAL NON-WEU *b*							96,631	97,194	107,555	115,689	130,110	1,771,230	1,979,476	2,187,329	2,431,352	2,702,846	254,986	256,970	259,048	261,032	263,225	5.5	4.9	4.9	4.8	4.8	379	378	415	443	494	..	..	..	..	..
TOTAL NATO *b*							145,981	146,523	163,063	184,121	212,612	3,100,504	3,347,297	3,736,268	4,342,647	5,009,901	503,122	505,487	507,995	510,454	513,154	4.7	4.4	4.4	4.2	4.2	290	290	321	361	414	..	..	..	..	..

(Appendix made public on the authority of the Chairman of the Committee.)

Note a: GDP and defence expenditures are calculated in national currency and converted to United States $ at the rates shown below. Figures in columns (1) to (10) and (21) to (30) are affected by change in exchange rates and are not therefore always comparable between countries, whereas figures of defence expenditures as % of GDP in columns (16) to (20) do not involve currency conversion.

Prior to 1977, tables of defence statistics published in reports of the Committee used gross national product (GNP) as a measure of national wealth. In line with the practice of other international organisations, the tables are now given in terms of GDP which is somewhat higher than GNP. Consequently, the figures for defence expenditure as a percentage of GDP are slightly lower than the percentages of GNP previously published.

For the period 1975-1979 the following rates of exchange have been applied:

Country	*Unit*	*US $ per unit*	*Units per US $*
Belgium and Luxembourg	Franc		
— 1975		0.02719	36.78
— 1976		0.02590	38.60
— 1977		0.02790	35.84
— 1978		0.03184	31.41
— 1979		0.03411	29.32
Canada	Canadian Dollar		
— 1975		0.98313	1.01716
— 1976		1.01416	0.98604
— 1977		0.94034	1.06345
— 1978		0.87664	1.14073
— 1979		0.85371	1.17136
Denmark	D. Kroner		
— 1975		0.17392	5.7499
— 1976		0.16543	6.0450
— 1977		0.16658	6.0032
— 1978		0.18134	5.5146
— 1979		0.19008	5.2610
France	Franc		
— 1975		0.23331	4.286
— 1976		0.20922	4.780
— 1977		0.20352	4.913
— 1978		0.22159	4.513
— 1979		0.23517	4.252
Fed. Rep. of Germany	Deutschmark		
— 1975		0.40616	2.46
— 1976		0.39714	2.52
— 1977		0.43070	2.32
— 1978		0.49785	2.01
— 1979		0.54559	1.83
Greece	Drachma		
— 1975		0.03097	32.29
— 1976		0.02734	36.58
— 1977		0.02714	36.84
— 1978		0.02729	36.65
— 1979		0.02696	37.10
Italy	1,000 Lire		
— 1975		1.53183	0.65282
— 1976		1.20151	0.83229
— 1977		1.13329	0.88239
— 1978		1.17832	0.84866
— 1979		1.20357	0.83086
Netherlands	Guilder		
— 1975		0.39539	2.53
— 1976		0.37822	2.64
— 1977		0.40745	2.45
— 1978		0.46224	2.16
— 1979		0.49849	2.01
Norway	N. Kroner		
— 1975		0.19073	5.24
— 1976		0.18327	5.46
— 1977		0.18785	5.32
— 1978		0.19076	5.24
— 1979		0.19747	5.06
Portugal	Escudo		
— 1975		0.03922	25.50
— 1976		0.03309	30.22
— 1977		0.02613	38.28
— 1978		0.02276	43.94
— 1979		0.02044	48.92
Turkey	T. Lira		
— 1975		0.06936	14.42
— 1976		0.06229	16.05
— 1977		0.05555	18.00
— 1978		0.04118	24.28
— 1979		0.03218	31.08
United Kingdom	£		
— 1975		2.2219	0.450
— 1976		1.8062	0.554
— 1977		1.7455	0.573
— 1978		1.9195	0.521
— 1979		2.1216	0.471

Note b: Defence expenditure figures for Greece and Turkey are not available for the most recent years; for purposes of comparison all data relating to these two countries have been therefore excluded throughout from Total non-WEU and Total NATO.

e = Preliminary estimate.

f = Forecast.

GDP (p.v.) = Gross domestic product in purchasers' values, current prices.

Source: Defence expenditures (NATO definition), from NATO press release M-DPC-2(79)21.

The northern flank and the Atlantic and Channel commands

AMENDMENT 1[1]
tabled by Mr. Hardy

1. In paragraph (*vi*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out " North Atlantic Council " and insert " appropriate military authorities of NATO ".

Signed: Hardy

1. See 6th Sitting, 4th June 1980 (Amendment agreed to).

Nuclear, biological and chemical protection

REPORT[1]

submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments[2]
by Mr. Banks, Rapporteur

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Adopted in Committee by 13 votes to 1 with 0 abstentions.

2. *Members of the Committee:* Mr. *Bonnel* (Acting Chairman); MM. *Ahrens, Banks,* Baumel, Bechter (Alternate: *Schleiter*), van den Bergh, Bernini, Boucheny (Alternate: *Jung*), *Cavaliere, Cox, Dejardin, Edwards,* Fosson (Alternate: *Talamona*), Grant (Alternate: *Wilkinson*) Handlos, de Koster, Labriola, Lemmrich, Meintz, Ménard, Onslow (Alternate: *Sir Frederic Bennett*), Pawelczyk, Pecchioli, Péronnet, Hermann Schmidt, Scholten (Alternate: *van Hulst*), *Tanghe.*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics*

Introductory Note

In preparing this report the Rapporteur had interviews, examined equipment and witnessed demonstrations as follows :

16th February 1979 – Oslo, Ministry of Defence

Mr. Finn Valem, Director, Directorate of Civil Defence and Emergency Planning ;

Mr. Haakon Harbek, Head of Warnings Section, Directorate of Civil Defence and Emergency Planning ;

Lt. Col. Oddvar Tjøm, NBC Expert, Adviser to the Directorate of Civil Defence and Emergency Planning, representing Chief of Defence.

9th July 1979 – NATO Headquarters

The late Mr. W. E. Farrant, Director of Civil Emergency Planning ;

Mr. G. Potter, Civil Defence.

19th July 1979 – London, Ministry of Defence

Lt. Col. R. Glazebrook, MBE, Directorate of Army Requirements 2 (Army) (GS(OR)4) ;

Mr. J. E. Walsh, DS 12 ;

Lt. Col. P. M. R. Stacpoole, Senior Military Representative AWRE ;

Major J. G. Rogers, MO 4 ;

Captain R. P. Harrison, MO 4 ;

Display of NBC defence equipement.

19th September 1979 – ABC & Selbstschutzschule, Sonthofen, Germany

Colonel Krause, School Commander ;

Colonel Störmer, Deputy Commander ;

Major Ufererkamp, Ministry of Defence, Bonn ;

Dr. Hausser, Expert ;

Display of NBC defence equipment.

24th September 1979 – HQ 5 US Corps and 3 US Armoured Division, NBC Defence Company, Frankfurt

Lt. General Berry, Commanding General 5 US Corps ;

Brigadier General Kennedy, Second-in-Command US 3rd Armoured Division ;

Lt. Col. Garner, US 3rd Armoured Division Chemical Officer and 22nd Chemical Company ;

Demonstration of NBC defence equipment.

22nd November 1979 – Établissement technique central de l'armement, Arcueil, France

Ing. Gén. Ricaud, Directeur de l'Établissement ;

Colonel J.-L. Lagabrielle, Division Plans, Programmes, Budget, État-major des Armées ;

Officers representing the army, navy and air force ;

Displays of NBC defence equipment.

23rd November 1979 – Direction de la Sécurité Civile, Levallois-Perret, France

Mr. Marcel Flutre, Directeur du Cabinet, Relations Internationales ;

Colonel Patoureau, Emergency Measures Planning Group ;

Commandant Bonal, CODISC ;

Visit to national civil protection operations centre CODISC (Centre opérationnel de la Direction de la Sécurité civile).

6th February 1980 – Walem, Belgium

Mr. André Caussin, Inspecteur Général de la Protection Civile ;

Mr. Thaels, Service de la Protection Civile ;

Mr. Vermuelen, Service de la Protection Civile ;

Visit to national Civil Defence Command Post.

6th February 1980 – École du Génie, Jambes, Belgium

Colonel Timmerman, School Commandant ;

Major Pecheux, Commandant of the Centre d'Études NBC ;

Commandant Dobbelaere, Centre d'Études NBC ;

Display of NBC defence equipment.

7th February 1980 – The Hague, Ministry of the Interior

Mr. J. Toet, Director of Civil Defence ;

Mr. Th. E. van de Leur, Head of Operations ;

Mr. J. P. M. Ruijters, Head of Protective Structures ;

Mr. Evers, NBC Expert.

7th February 1980 – Ministry of Defence, Prinses Juliana Kazerne, The Hague

Colonel J. P. Verheyen, ACOS Operations, Army Staff ;

Lt. Commander F. Logeman, Royal Netherlands Navy ;

Lt. Col. C.E.A. Wegman, Royal Netherlands Army ;

Lt. Col. H. M. Mulder, Royal Netherlands Air Force ;

Capt. Pharmacologist Dr. D. A. Ligtenstein, CDE and Direction of Military Medical Services.

14th February 1980 – The Home Office, London

Mr. J. A. Howard, Assistant Secretary F6 Division ;

Mr. J. K. S. Clayton, Deputy Chief Scientific Officer ;

Mr. J. C. Cotterill, Senior Scientific Officer ;

Mr. F. J. Woodland, Principal of F6 Division ;

Mr. R. C. Morris, Principal of F6 Division.

6th March 1980 – Department of Defence, Pentagon, Washington

Mr. Mike MacDonald, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary, Policy ;

Lt. Col. Harry Wilson, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ;

Mr. Tom Dashiell, Assistant Director, Environmental and Life Sciences, Office of Defence Research and Engineering ;

Mr. D. Gasbarri, Defence Intelligence Agency ;

Mr. E. Henderson, Defence Intelligence Agency ;

Lt. Col. Mountel, US Army Chemical Corps.

6th March 1980 – Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington

Mr. Lowell Fleischer.

6th March 1980 – Government Preparedness Office, Washington

Mr. William Chipman, Director, Population Protection Division.

27th March 1980 – Defence NBC Centre, Winterbourne Gunner

Colonel A. G. Vicary, Commandant ;

Wing Commander G. J. Wilson, MC, RAF, Deputy Commandant ;

Wing Commander B. R. Barry, RAF ;

Colonel P. D. Hidalgo, USA, GS01 (W) ;

Lt. Colonel T. D. Bordass, Royal Artillery, CI ;

and other staff.

The Rapporteur was also provided with official information for the report by :

Dr. Diekmann, Regierungsdirektor, Ministry of the Interior, Bonn ;

Mr. Gaetano Spirito, Head of the Civil Defence Service, Rome ;

The Director of the Service National de la Protection Civile, Luxembourg ;

The Ministry of the Force Publique, Luxembourg.

Further information was provided by Dr. J. P. Perry-Robinson, Senior Fellow, University of Sussex Science Policy Research Unit.

The Committee as a whole met in Paris on 18th March 1980 when it discussed a first draft of this report. It met again in Bonn on 29th April 1980 when it discussed and adopted the report as a whole.

The Committee and the Rapporteur express their thanks to the officials, senior officers and experts who received the Rapporteur, or otherwise provided information. The views expressed in the report, unless expressly otherwise attributed, are those of the Committee.

Draft Recommendation
on nuclear, biological and chemical protection

The Assembly,

(*i*) Considering that whilst international agreements have banned the production, stockpiling and use of biological weapons, few limitations have been imposed on stocks of nuclear and chemical weapons ;

(*ii*) Aware that a complete ban on the use of nuclear weapons may not be attainable in the short term and that it is essential to world peace that NATO nuclear forces should balance those of the Warsaw Pact, while negotiations continue to secure mutual reductions in their numbers ;

(*iii*) Recognising that adequate on-site verification procedures must be an essential part of any agreement to eliminate and ban the use of chemical weapons, but that such procedures still remain to be negotiated with the Soviet Union, and believing that until present negotiations reach a conclusion, stocks and types of chemical weapons held by NATO partners should be brought up to sufficient levels to provide any necessary deterrent and retaliatory capability ;

(*iv*) Further believing that the non-use of chemical weapons is best ensured by an equality of retaliatory and defensive capability between NATO and the Warsaw Pact whilst awaiting agreements to prohibit such weapons ;

(*v*) Considering that whilst nuclear and chemical weapons remain in existence military personnel and civilian populations remain exposed to the threat and consequences of their use ;

(*vi*) Convinced that effective NBC defence equipment and procedures for all allied forces can drastically reduce casualties ;

(*vii*) Believing that whilst allied governments must vigorously pursue mutual and balanced force reductions, they also have a moral duty in peacetime to keep their populations objectively informed of the consequences of nuclear, biological and chemical attacks and to implement civil defence programmes for the survival of their people,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member governments, acting where appropriate through the North Atlantic Council :

1. To recognise the full implications of the threat of battlefield chemical and nuclear attacks and to take immediate steps :

   (*a*) to improve protective and decontamination equipment and procedures for military personnel, to protect electronic and communications equipment against electromagnetic pulse effects, and to remedy the other deficiencies identified by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments in its report* ;

   (*b*) to achieve better co-operation for research, development and the production of equipment and its interoperability ;

2. To review existing usable stocks of chemical weapons and to take steps to ensure that the NATO deterrent and retaliatory capability is equal to the estimated offensive capability of the Warsaw Pact ;

3. Actively to encourage bilateral and multilateral negotiations to ban the production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons with adequate verification ;

4. To implement urgently a co-ordinated and common " stay-at-home " civil defence programme in peacetime to include essentially the provision of :

   (*a*) objective information to the public on survival in conventional, nuclear, biological and chemical war ;

   (*b*) an organisation with protected and up-dated communications to provide warning and monitoring services for nuclear, biological and chemical attacks, fully co-ordinated within NATO ;

   (*c*) plans for the co-ordinated use of military reservists, the police, fire brigade, Red Cross, similar organisations, and civilian volunteers in a war alert, attack and post-attack period ;

* Document 838, paragraph 5.8.

(*d*) fall-out shelters in public buildings and in the home ;

(*e*) self-help equipment for sale to the public including home shelters, protective clothing, respirators, dosimeters, etc. ;

5. To call' for NATO to publish annually comparable statistics, to an agreed common definition, of national expenditure on civil defence.

Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr. Banks, Rapporteur)

I. *Introduction*

1.1. "The sharpness of our swords, our valour and our strength will come to nought if we allow our camp to be surprised and unprotected as we await the call to fight the battle yet to come." Antonius (an officer of the Roman legions)

1.2. The brutal occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union with a massive force of men and armaments is not only a tragedy for a defenceless and freedom-loving people, but a warning signal for the West.

1.3. The check on an aggressive nation is not only the counter-balance of an equal force of arms and men, but also the visible and inherent determination of a people to survive and defend themselves.

1.4. This report is concerned therefore both with the individual protection from fallout of people in the armed forces in Western Europe and the families at home for whom they stand guard.

1.5. At a time when Europe is exposed to a serious threat from both nuclear and chemical weapons from the Soviet Union, coupled with the realisation that there is no longer a NATO capability for a prolonged conventional war, it has now become essential for Europe to face the consequences of a war in which chemical and nuclear weapons could be used.

1.6. This report identifies weaknesses which require urgent remedies. It calls for a fresh look at the need fully to equip and protect our military forces from the effects of chemical and nuclear warfare. It urges radical action to initiate the provision of shelters and self-help information for our populations, and the co-ordination of civil defence plans in member states. Above all people must be told what is involved and the action needed for survival.

1.7. In this world made smaller by speed of communication, we strive only to live at peace with the Soviet Union in the understanding that different political ideas and philosophies can coexist. The terms for that understanding rest on the axiom that rejects armed force as a means of persuasion and directs all our efforts to the improvement of mankind.

1.8. We must and will pursue mutual and balanced reduction in forces with the Soviet Union but let us not wait unprotected.

*
* *

1.9. This report investigates the requirement for and the feasibility of providing protection for military personnel and civilians against the radiation effects that may be expected in nuclear warfare and against biological and chemical weapons.

1.10. Previous reports have not been concerned exclusively with the problems of individual protection, but several earlier reports have dealt with civil defence[1] and one has dealt in particular with the effects of nuclear weapons[2]. The absence of any report from the Committee on protection of the civil population for the last fifteen years reflects a similar waning interest on the part of many governments ; the Committee in this report stresses that a balanced defence policy must concern itself with protection of civilians as well as of military personnel.

II. *The threat*

(a) General

2.1. In this section of the report a general description from open literature is given firstly of the types of weapon which are known to exist or to have existed in both allied and Warsaw Pact countries, secondly the characteristics and effects of the weapons are described and, lastly, present levels of stockpiles for such weapons are estimated from available information.

(b) Nuclear weapons

(i) General

2.2. There is a good deal of published information concerning present numbers of nuclear weapons possessed by the nuclear weapons powers of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The yields of warheads range from 1 kiloton up to probably 100 kilotons for the shorter-range battlefield nuclear weapons, and up to a maximum of some 25 megatons for the larger single warhead strategic missiles possessed by the Soviet Union. Individual warheads in multiple warhead missiles, whether MIRV or MRV, have lower yields ranging from 50 kilo-

1. Civil emergency planning, Document 170, 30th April 1960 (Rapporteur: Admiral Heye) – Recommendation 47.
Public survival and civil defence, Document 247, 16th October 1962 (Rapporteur: Mr. Wienand) – Recommendation 84.
Public survival and civil defence, Document 303, 27th February 1964 (Rapporteur: Mr. Wienand) – Recommendation 107.

2. The state of European security, Document 169, 30th April 1960 (Rapporteur: Mr. Mulley).

tons to a few hundred kilotons each. For comparison, the original fission bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were variously reported to have yields in the range 12.5 to 20 kilotons [1]. The present section is therefore limited to a brief summary of the effects of nuclear weapons which have perhaps been less widely publicised in recent years [2], although, in this instance, very detailed technical information on almost all aspects of the effects of nuclear explosions is available in public literature [3].

2.3. Of the total energy released in a nuclear explosion in the atmosphere about 50 % is in the form of the blast wave; about 35 % is released in the form of radiant thermal energy or heat; about 5 % is in the form of initial nuclear radiation, chiefly gamma rays and neutrons; the remaining 10 % comes from the later decay of radioactive fission products (i.e. "ashes" of the bomb) released over a period of time. Further effects of a nuclear explosion may be the generation of an electromagnetic pulse or modification to the ionised layers of the atmosphere; in certain cases these effects can seriously interfere with radio communications and radar, or may destroy electronic equipment used for these purposes. All these different effects are described under the separate headings below. The effects of a nuclear explosion vary considerably depending on where they occur – whether underwater, underground, on the surface, in the atmosphere or in outer space. For most uses of nuclear weapons explosions in the atmosphere can be considered airbursts if the fireball from the explosion does not touch the ground. Airbursts, therefore, involve the detonation of weapons at a height exceeding 30 metres for a weapon of 1 kiloton, and over 1,000 metres for a 5 megaton warhead. For attacking special targets earth penetrator nuclear weapons may be employed, the effects of which will be largely those of underground nuclear explosions.

1. Yields of nuclear weapons are measured in kilotons (or megatons) of conventional explosive (TNT) equivalent, 1 kt being taken as 4.2×10^{12} joules or 1.15×10^{6} kW hours (1 kiloton = 1,000 tons; 1 megaton = 10^{6} tons).

2. It is 20 years since the Committee reported in detail on the effects of nuclear weapons explosions in its report on "The state of European security", Document 169, adopted on 30th April 1960 (Rapporteur: Mr. Mulley). See Appendix II thereto.

3. Nuclear weapons, United Kingdom HMSO 1959.

Biological and environmental effects of nuclear war, Hearings before the special Sub-Committee on Radiation of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Congress of the United States, June 1959.

The effects of nuclear war, United States Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1979, in two volumes.

Long-term worldwide effects of multiple nuclear-weapons detonations, Washington D.C.: United States National Academy of Sciences, 1975.

The effects of nuclear weapons, S. Glasstone and P. J. Dolan (editors), United States Departments of Defence and Energy, 1977 (3rd edition).

(ii) Blast

2.4. Most of the damage to structures and equipment caused by nuclear weapons will be due to blast, which is not different in kind from the blast from conventional weapons. The magnitude of the effect is vastly greater. The largest bombs dropped in the second world war contained only a few tons of TNT. The blast energy of a 10 kiloton nuclear weapon is therefore some thousands of times greater and that of a 10 megaton weapon some millions of times greater. The original blast wave from the explosion and the reflected wave from the ground combine to produce what is known as a Mach wave which travels outwards faster than sound in a direction parallel to the ground. As the air is heated with the passage of the wave, energy is dissipated in the volume of the atmosphere traversed by a Mach wave so that the peak overpressure by which blast can be measured falls off more rapidly with distance than would be the case with an inverse square law.

2.5. A higher yield weapon will produce a given blast effect at a greater distance from the point of the explosion, but the increase in distance achieved is proportional only to the cube root of the yield. A 10 kiloton weapon will inflict given damage over a distance 2.15 times that of a 1 kiloton weapon. A 1 megaton weapon will inflict the same degree of damage at a distance 10 times greater than a 1 kiloton weapon. For an airburst explosion, there is an optimum height at which a given peak overpressure will extend to the greatest distance. The following table showing distances for severe and moderate damage to brick houses and locomotives assumes an optimum height of burst to achieve the specified damage in each case. A "locomotive" is used here to illustrate the likely distances at which military targets involving heavy equipment will be damaged. Tanks could be expected to fare rather better. "Severe" damage means virtually total destruction, "moderate" damage means damage beyond economic repair for a house, or requiring major reconstruction for a locomotive.

2.6. The area over which given damage is inflicted is of course proportional to the square of the above distances. Thus a 1 megaton bomb would destroy houses over an area 100 times that of a 1 kiloton bomb.

2.7. Figures are not quoted for casualties to personnel through blast. Very large overpressures are required to inflict serious injury by blast alone. In practice, personnel become casualties due to other effects of nuclear weapons (thermal flash; initial nuclear radiation; effects of flying missiles from destroyed property and fire).

Distances from ground zero at which effects are produced

(metres)

Damage	Brick houses		Locomotives	
	Severe	Moderate	Severe	Moderate
Peak overpressure kg/cm^{-2}	0.5	0.3	3.0	1.5
Distance for 1 kiloton	550	800	170	300
Distance for 10 kilotons	1,200	1,600	360	600
Distance for 10 megatons	12,000	16,000	3,600	6,000

(iii) Cratering and ground shock

2.8. A high yield nuclear explosion at ground level will produce a considerable crater. Beyond the boundary of the crater itself a further volume of earth is ruptured by the explosion (rupture zone) and beyond that a still further volume is distorted (plastic zone). Underground structures within any of these zones will be destroyed. A ground shock wave will travel beyond the plastic zone but damage caused by this will fall off much more rapidly than damage from blast in the atmosphere above the ground at the same distance.

2.9. Strongly-built structures, buried to a depth which provides a thickness of earth cover between the level surface of the ground and the roof of the structure greater than the span of the structure, will be damaged out to a distance from the point of the explosion equal to 2.5 times the radius of the crater. Personnel in such structures may become casualties at distances beyond those at which the structure is damaged, because of the ground shock effect.

2.10. For bursts above the surface of the ground the size of the crater falls off very rapidly with height of burst. No crater is formed when the height exceeds one-tenth of the fireball diameter. Airbursts, which are bursts at a height greater than the radius of the fireball, do not produce craters. In particular nuclear explosions at optimum height to produce maximum blast damage would not produce significant damage to substantial underground structures. The blast wave in the atmosphere does, however, exert ground pressure which can damage lightly-protected underground structures.

2.11. The following table shows typical crater size and damage distance for substantial underground structures for surface explosions on dry earth. Crater dimensions will be somewhat greater in wet earth, and slightly less in rock.

Damage by ground burst

(metres)

Yield	Crater diameter	Limit of damage to substantial underground structure – distance from point of explosion
10 kilotons	85	210
10 megatons	820	2,000

(iv) Thermal radiation

2.12. The fireball resulting from a nuclear explosion in the atmosphere is intensely luminous, radiating thermal energy in two pulses at an interval of a fraction of a second, corresponding to maximum temperatures of 15,000 degrees centigrade and 8,000 degrees centigrade for a 20 kiloton explosion ; 99 % of this thermal energy is radiated in the second pulse lasting about 1 second for a 10 kiloton explosion (10 seconds for a 1 megaton explosion). Thermal radiation will cause casualties to personnel at greater distances than blast. The flash can cause temporary blindness, but if the eye happens to be looking at the fireball at the time of the explosion permanent blindness can result at distances up to 60 kilometres.

2.13. The thermal energy received by surfaces exposed to the radiation decreases with the square of the distance from the explosion. Poor visibility does not attenuate the radiation as much as had been assumed from early tests. In good visibility all thermal radiation will follow a straight line so that any solid object will create a "shadow" within which burning will not occur. In moderate visibility heat received may be diminished by about 35 %,

scattered heat will be received from all directions in the atmosphere so that the screening effect of obstacles will be diminished.

2.14. Thermal radiation can also cause widespread fires. The following table shows the slant distances from the point of explosion for second-degree burns to personnel and for the ignition of light kindling material which is likely to be found in a built-up area. These effects occur when the fireball is directly visible from the point concerned. A relatively high airburst will cause more thermal damage than a groundburst, due to the "shadow" cast by intervening obstacles in the latter case.

Damage due to thermal flash

Yield	Maximum slant distance for :	
	Second-degree burns to exposed skin	Ignition of kindling
10 kilotons	2.5 km	1.5 km
10 megatons	40 km	40 km

(*v*) *Nuclear radiation*

2.15. A nuclear explosion differs entirely from a conventional explosion in the emission of nuclear radiation. This expression covers four different types of radiation : alpha and beta radiation (which are charged particles travelling at high speed), gamma radiation which is electromagnetic radiation of shorter wavelength than X-rays, and neutrons which are uncharged fundamental particles. All forms of nuclear radiation are harmful to living organisms, yet none of them can be detected by the senses. Such radiation is therefore potentially very dangerous. In describing the effects of a nuclear explosion it is convenient to distinguish between initial nuclear radiation emitted during the first minute from the fireball and radioactive cloud caused by the explosion. Nuclear radiation continues to be emitted for a long time thereafter from the products of the explosion. The source of this radiation moves away from the point of the explosion, and is termed radioactive fallout described below.

2.16. Initial nuclear radiation within the fireball comprises all forms of alpha, beta and gamma radiation together with neutron emission. However, alpha and beta particles are stopped within a metre or so. Only gamma rays and neutrons are of concern in discussing initial radiation (beta radiation can however be important when fallout is considered). Nuclear radiation is much more penetrating than thermal radiation discussed above, so that protective shielding is a bigger problem. On the other hand, nuclear radiation affects only living organisms, producing casualties to personnel ; it does not affect equipment (except for the effects of EMP on electronic and electrical equipment mentioned in paragraphs 2.33. *et seq*).

2.17. Gamma rays and neutrons produce very similar effects on living organisms, but are propagated somewhat differently, and differ also in their ability to penetrate shielding material. The amounts and range of energies of neutrons and gamma radiation emitted from an explosion are highly dependent on the design of the weapon. They depend on the proportion of the fission process and fusion process, if any, in a particular weapon. They therefore vary even with weapons of the same yield but of different design. The proportion of high energy radiation increases with distance because the lower energies are attenuated more in the atmosphere. Attenuation in the atmosphere is also dependent on the air density, which varies with weather conditions and height above sea level, and which may be affected by other effects of the explosion itself.

2.18. For all these reasons predictions about radiation doses received at a particular distance from an explosion of a given yield are only approximate, especially as far as the defender is concerned who must be assumed to be unaware of the design of the weapon used against him. The uncertainty is said to be a factor of 2 for weapons up to 100 kilotons and as much as a factor of 10 for weapons of 1 megaton. This implies that radiation damage for certain weapons may be 10 times greater or smaller than suggested in tables below. Presumably an attacker, aware of the design of the weapon he is using, will be better able to make accurate predictions about the casualties it will cause through nuclear radiation.

2.19. Gamma rays, unlike neutrons, are electromagnetic radiation. They travel, like light and thermal radiation, in straight lines, but are also scattered by oxygen and nitrogen in the air. Neutrons which are captured by nitrogen nuclei in the air can also cause further emission of particularly high energy gamma rays. In practice, therefore, although substantial obstacles such as hills or earth embankments provide some protection to personnel in their "shadow" from the initial source of gamma radiation, they provide no shelter from the scattered radiation emanating from all points in the atmosphere. Protection of personnel therefore requires substantial overhead cover.

2.20. The shielding effects of various materials against gamma rays are roughly proportional to the mass of material, so that high density sub-

stances such as lead would provide the same shielding with smaller thicknesses than concrete or earth. A rough approximation to the shielding properties of various materials is given by the "tenth-value thickness" of the material – that thickness which will attenuate gamma radiation by a factor of 10. Thus, twice that thickness will reduce gamma radiation to one-hundredth of its incident value.

Approximate tenth-value thickness for high energy gamma rays

Steel	13 cm
Concrete	46 cm
Earth	66 cm

2.21. Neutrons, like gamma rays, are scattered in the atmosphere, so that neutrons affecting personnel at a moderate distance from the point of the explosion may reach them from any point in the atmosphere. Nearer to the source of an explosion a hill or earth embankment will of course provide greater proportional protection, but for an effective shelter overhead protection is essential. The shielding effect against neutrons of various materials depends on the properties of the material, not only on its density as in the case of gamma rays. Materials which capture neutrons will, however, give rise to gamma radiation from the capture reaction. Shielding from these secondary gamma rays must be provided in addition to the materials which are good at slowing and capturing neutrons. The thicknesses of earth and concrete shown in the table above for gamma ray shielding should normally attenuate neutron radiation by more than a factor of 10, but the performance of concrete as a neutron shield can be greatly improved by the incorporation of iron, barium and boron.

2.22. The amounts of gamma radiation received by a target are measured in roentgens. Amounts of neutron radiation are measured in neutron flux per square centimetre. Effects on personnel are measured in "roentgen equivalent man" or rem which is the measure of the amount of a particular radiation which will produce a given biological effect in man. The following table shows the cumulative effects of initial gamma and neutron radiation at varying distances from a 10 kiloton and 10 megaton explosion. The neutrons have a preponderant effect at short distances from low yield weapons; gamma radiation becomes increasingly important as distance and yield increase.

Effects on man

5 rem	maximum permitted annual occupational exposure (United States regulations)
10 rem	total life exposure expected from natural radiation
100 rem	no casualties expected, blood change can be detected
100-200 rem	mild symptoms nausea, few casualties, none (or very few) lethal
200-600 rem	vomiting in 2 hours, some deaths in 1 to 12 months
600-1,000 rem	incapacitated within 1 hour, 80 %-100 % lethal in 4-6 weeks
over 1,000 rem	incapacitated within 30 minutes, mostly lethal in 2 weeks.

Combined neutron and gamma doses from initial nuclear radiation
(see limitations in paragraph 2.18 above)
(metres)

	1,000 rem	600 rem	100 rem
10 kt	1,100	1,200	1,600
10 mt	3,100	3,200	

(*vi*) *Radioactive fallout*

2.23. Residual nuclear radiation, emitted after the first minute of a nuclear explosion, can be divided into the effects of early fallout. from material falling to the ground within 24 hours, and delayed fallout from the very fine particles of fission products from bomb material carried high into the atmosphere which fall to the earth continually from the end of the first day for a period of up to several years. Delayed fallout is thus deposited over large areas of the earth's surface, possibly the whole hemisphere in which the explosion occurs, but in concentrations too low to be considered a serious risk. Hazards lie chiefly in the isotopes Strontium 90 and Caesium 137 with half-lives of 27.7 and 30.5 years respectively which may enter into the human food cycle and thus into body tissues to cause cancer-type disease or genetic damage. In the absence of obvious protective measures against delayed fallout this aspect of nuclear weapons effects is not discussed in this report.

2.24. Significant radioactive early fallout, comprising radioactive particles reaching the ground within the first 24 hours after an explosion, will occur only with surface bursts (including airbursts low enough for the fireball to touch the ground) and underground or underwater bursts. This fallout is composed of the residue of the bomb materials themselves condensed on soil and other debris from the ground, and may also comprise material from the environment of the explosion made radioactive by capture of

neutrons from the explosions. The radioactive fission products themselves amount to some 57 kg per megaton of weapon yield composed of more than 200 isotopes of 36 different elements with widely differing half-lives. Most will emit beta and many gamma radiation. The nuclear weapon itself may be "salted" with the specific material designed to increase the amount and nature of radioactivity in fallout.

2.25. The amount of early radioactive fallout to be expected from a nuclear explosion cannot be predicted in advance. It can vary hugely from one to another. It depends on the yield of the explosion, the design of the weapon, the height of burst, the nature of the ground in the vicinity and the weather conditions, especially wind and rain.

2.26. Various mathematical or empirical models exist however to give rough predictions of the area and intensity of fallout after an explosion has occurred once the location of ground zero, the height of burst, yield of explosion and the prevailing meteorological conditions have been determined. The prediction will however be very approximate because of the remaining unknown factors including the design of the weapon and the fine details of wind speed and direction at different heights from the ground. Although predictions may be wrong by a factor of 2 or even 10 as far as dose rate at a particular time and place is concerned, they are nevertheless useful for overall planning purposes as they will give an indication of the total area of ground likely to be seriously contaminated and numbers of casualties to be expected.

2.27. Typically, fallout from a single 1 megaton groundburst with 25 kph wind can be expected to produce 20 % deaths in unprotected persons in an area 20 km wide extending to 100 km downwind from the point of explosion, clinical effects would be observable (dose of 100 rads) in persons exposed up to 200 km downwind, and radiation from fallout would be measurable over more than twice that distance. The dose rate would reach a maximum in one hour to one day, depending on distance from the explosion, and would decline thereafter due to radioactive decay, falling to one-thousandth of the initial maximum in two weeks, by which time the dose received by an exposed person would be 90 % of the total dose to be expected from a permanent stay at the same spot. Two weeks is a rule of thumb period during which civilian populations would be expected to remain in fallout shelters.

2.28. The radiation emitted by fallout is chiefly gamma radiation, and some beta radiation from fallout particles actually in contact with the skin, but the energies are generally less than for initial nuclear radiation described in paragraph 2.16. Thus shielding is more effective. However, the radiation is emitted from the whole ground surface contaminated by fallout, including roofs of buildings, and the skin and clothing of exposed persons.

(vii) Electromagnetic pulse and atmospheric ionisation

2.29. Two more effects of nuclear explosions must be mentioned – the generation of an electromagnetic pulse which can damage electrical and, in particular, electronic equipment, and the ionisation of the atmosphere which can interfere with radio communications and the operation of radar. These phenomena have no direct effects on personnel.

2.30. A nuclear explosion occurring at a boundary – a surface burst at the ground/air boundary, or one at the upper edge of the atmosphere on the space/air boundary – can generate a short pulse of radio wave of a few milliseconds duration over a range of frequencies from 10 KiloHerz up to 100 MegaHerz, with some similarities to the radio pulse associated with a flash of lightning. A much more important effect is produced by a nuclear explosion above the atmosphere which will distort the earth's magnetic field in space and in turn generate an intense pulse of radio energy in the atmosphere. This effect was referred to in open literature at least as early as 1964 following observations of interference with electrical and radio equipment at very great distances following some experimental explosions in outer space shortly before the signature of the partial test ban treaty in 1963. Lesser effects of EMP had been noted even in early tests which are reported to have triggered burglar alarms in Honolulu.

2.31. It is now believed that a single nuclear explosion above the atmosphere over the centre of Western Europe could have damaging effects to unprotected electrical and electronic equipment over much of the NATO area, generating a field of 1,000 volts per square metre which can induce currents of up to 100 amps in electrical or electronic circuits including transmission lines and even metal pipes.

2.32. Another effect on electronic equipment in the vicinity of low yield nuclear explosions, known as the "tree" effect, which makes materials momentarily conducting, can cause malfunctioning of equipment such as the rotation of a tank turret.

2.33. The second important electromagnetic effect of nuclear explosions is the general ionisation of the atmosphere and ionosphere (atmosphere above about 60 km) which can cause serious interference with radio communi-

cations and the functioning of radar when burst height is above 15 km, the effects increasing with height of burst above 15 km. The high frequency and very high frequency radio bands are most affected; other frequencies are unlikely to be disturbed for very long.

Radio frequency	Likely duration of blackout from high-altitude nuclear explosion
HF (3–30 MHz)	17 minutes to 3 hours or more
VHF (30–300 MHz)	4 hours to 20 hours

(c) *Biological weapons*

2.34. Possible agents for use in biological warfare have been reported. The United Nations study[1] includes the following list :

1. Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and the effects of their possible use, United Nations, 1969.

Examples of agents that might be used to cause death

Agents	Diseases	Incubation period (days)	Effect of specific therapy	Likelihood of spread from man to man
Viruses	Eastern equine encephalitis	5-15	Nil	Nil [a]
	Tick-borne encephalitis	7-14	Nil	Nil [a]
	Yellow fever	3-6	Nil	Nil [a]
Rickettsiae	Rocky Mountain spotted fever	3-10	Good	Nil [a]
	Epidemic typhus	6-15	Good	Nil [a]
Bacteria	Anthrax	1-5	Moderate	Low
	Cholera	1-5	Good	High
	Plague, pneumonic	2-5	Moderate	High
	Tularaemia	1-10	Good	Low
	Typhoid	7-21	Good	High

[a] Unless vector present.

Examples of agents that might be used to cause incapacitation

Agents	Diseases	Incubation period (days)	Effect of specific therapy	Likelihood of spread from man to man
Viruses	Chikungunya fever	2-6	Nil	Nil [a]
	Dengue fever	5-8	Nil	Nil [a]
	Venezuelan equine encephalitis	2-5	Nil	Nil [a]
Rickettsiae	Q-fever	10-21	Good	Low
Bacteria	Brucellosis	7-21	Moderate	Nil
Fungi	Coccidioidomycosis	7-21	Poor	Nil

[a] Unless mosquito vector present.

The Council of WEU has approved the following list for control by the WEU Agency for the Control of Armaments [1], although it has not authorised the Agency actually to apply controls in this field [2]:

"Section I: Biological products which cannot be used for civilian purposes: Nil

Section II: Biological products which can be used for civilian purposes:

(1) Botulic toxins;
(2) Malleomyces mallei (glanders);
(3) Malleomyces whitmori (melioidosis);
(4) Bacillus anthracis (anthrax);
(5) Brucella;
(6) Pasteurella tularensis (tularaemia);
(7) Rickettsia burneti (Q-fever);
(8) Pasteurella pestis;
(9) Pestis bovina (cattle plague or rinderpest)."

2.35. NATO has approached the prospects of biological warfare very differently from the way in which it has approached the prospects of chemical warfare. No strategic requirement for a retaliatory capability in the case of biological warfare has ever been formulated by NATO collectively. There may be two reasons for this: the military effects of a biological attack would necessarily be delayed by at least the incubation period of the disease; secondly, a new and virulent strain of a biological agent, against which there was no natural immunity or vaccine available, could eventually be expected to spread to populations very far from those originally infected and could eventually prove as lethal to the population of the country employing it as to that of the country attacked.

2.36. With the conclusion in 1972 of the Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological Warfare signed by all Warsaw Pact and NATO countries (except France), biological warfare does not seem a likely threat today. The convention entered into force on 26th March 1975 [3]. Under its terms all stocks of biological toxin weapons were to be destroyed within nine months of that date. France, although not a party, enacted in 1972 a domestic law prohibiting the production or stockpiling of biological or toxin weapons.

1. Fifth Annual Report of the Council, Document 159, 7th March 1960.

2. Twenty-fourth Annual Report of the Council, Document 799, Chapter III B.2, 26th March 1979.

3. But has yet to be ratified by Germany and the Netherlands, among the NATO countries.

(d) Chemical weapons

(i) General

2.37. There is little recent experience of the use of lethal chemical weapons. Large-scale chemical warfare was first resorted to in 1915 in the course of World War I. After the initial use of industrial chemicals such as chlorine and carbonyl chloride (phosgene) special compounds were later manufactured, in particular "mustard", a blister gas effective through the skin.

2.38. The first large-scale use of poison gas in 1915 killed some 5,000 troops and total gas casualties on both sides in that war are reported to have been 1,300,000 of which 100,000 were killed. Between the world wars the chief reported uses of lethal gases were during the Italian campaign in Ethiopia and the Japanese campaign in China.

2.39. In between the two world wars new blister and tear gases were produced. In the 1930s great progress in synthetic chemistry and its application to insecticides led to the synthesis of new agents which would be lethal in much smaller concentrations and were potentially useful as military weapons. These are known as the nerve gases. The fact that gas was used by neither side in World War II probably resulted not so much from the existence of the Geneva Convention [1], as from a military assessment that no clear military advantage could be obtained when the adversary had a retaliatory capacity and when both sides possessed protective equipment. After World War II more lethal nerve gases were produced, and non-lethal harassing agents were developed (CS) which have been used for riot control.

(ii) Types of chemical warfare agents

2.40. Vast numbers of potentially toxic compounds are described in open scientific literature, but of these only some two dozen have been considered suitable for military purposes. These are described in several authoritative works such as those of the United Nations [2], the World Health Organisation [3], and the WEU Agency for the Control of Armaments [4]. There are in addition many well researched publications of SIPRI. The following table lists most of the agents which have been used for military purposes, or are today stockpiled for such use.

1. See paragraph 3.17.

2. Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and the effects of their possible use, United Nations, New York, 1969.

3. Aspects of health, chemical and biological weapons, WHO, Geneva, 1970.

4. *La guerre chimique et son évolution à travers le temps*, Col. Professor L. Mammarella, WEU Agency for the Control of Armaments, Paris, February 1979.

Principal categories of chemical warfare agents designedly lethal or incapacitating agents

Choking : chlorine ; phosgene ; diphosgene ;

Vesicants (blister gases) : mustard or derivatives, lewisite ;

Blood gases : hydrocyanic acid ("prussic acid") ; cyanogen chloride ;

Nerve gases : organo-phosphorus compounds "G" and "V" series include GA (tabun), GB (sarin), GD (soman), and VX ;

Harassing agents : tear gases (chloroacetone, etc.), vomiting agents (DM, etc.), CS riot control agent.

2.41. There has been some discussion of a possible use of psychologically active drugs such as LSD, but this does not appear to have a military application. A further class of compound many times more toxic than any of the foregoing, the toxins produced by bacteria, are strictly speaking chemical compounds, rather than biological compounds, in that they do not reproduce themselves. The stockpiling or use of these compounds, however, has been outlawed by the 1972 convention [1], signed by all members of NATO (except France) and the Warsaw Pact. Any stocks of toxins, under the terms of that convention, had to be destroyed within nine months of its entry into force.

2.42. The following list of chemical products was approved by the Council of WEU for control by the Agency for the Control of Armaments under the terms of Protocols No. III and No. IV of the modified Brussels Treaty [2] :

Section I : Chemical products which cannot be used for civilian purposes :

(1) Alkyl alkylphosphonofluoridates ;

(2) Alkyl N-dialkyl phosphoramidocyanidates ;

(3) Mustard gas ;

(4) Nitrogen mustards ;

(5) Lewisites.

Section II : Chemical products which can be used for civilian purposes :

(1) Hydrocyanic acid ;

(2) Cyanogen chloride ;

(3) Parachlorophenyldimethylurea ;

(4) Maleic hydrazide.

1. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, 10th April 1972, entered into force on 26th March 1975.

2. Fifth annual report of the Council, Document 159, 7th March 1960.

A group of experts recommended in 1960 the inclusion of a "new group of highly toxic substances", reported elsewhere to be the V-agents, and the Council approved a new list in 1961 [1] but it is not clear from annual reports whether the Council has since made any further additions to this list [2]. In Section I of this list, items (1) and (2) correspond to the G nerve gases, items (3) to (5) are the vesicants. In Section II, items (1) and (2) are blood gases, item (3) appears to be known only as a soil sterilising agent used for the permanent destruction of all forms of vegetation.

2.43. It appears that the substances most likely to be used today for chemical warfare would be the nerve gases (particularly some form of soman or the V-agents) or the vesicants ; and possibly the blood agents. The extreme toxicity of the nerve gases, compared with all earlier products used for military purposes, has now led to research into "binary" products which are referred to below.

(iii) Military characteristics of chemical agents

2.44. Apart from the physiological effects under which chemical agents have been broadly classified above, there are other factors with which a military commander using such weapons is primarily concerned : the probability of inflicting a required proportion of casualties in the target area ; the tonnage of weapons which will be required to produce the desired effect ; the duration of the effects in the area attacked.

2.45. The probability of producing casualties is of course a function of the toxicity of the agent employed ; the ability of weapons systems under field conditions to generate an effective concentration of the agent for sufficient time in the area attacked ; and lastly the effectiveness (or rather lack of effectiveness) of the enemy's protective equipment against that particular agent. The effects depend also on the persistency of the chemical agent. A military commander employing chemical weapons may desire the effects to be only fleeting – if his own troops will require to pass through the area attacked – or he may require long duration if ground is to be denied to enemy occupation.

2.46. The major difficulty in the employment of chemical weapons is the large uncertainty

1. Sixth and seventh annual reports of the Council: Document 193, 3rd March 1961; Document 225, 15th March 1962.

2. The Committee comments elsewhere on the incomplete information included in the Council's annual reports, compared with information on WEU chemical controls published elsewhere: Application of the Brussels Treaty – Reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council, Document 836.

imposed by variable weather conditions in many cases. High wind and heavy rain obviously disperse chemical agents, but some agents will also break down into relatively harmless substances when in contact with air or water, and will do so more rapidly at higher temperature. With some substances the toxic effects in the target area can last three thousand times longer in snow at – 10 °C with no wind, than with light rain and wind at + 10 °C. Any change in wind direction can immediately endanger friendly troops many kilometres away. The United Nations study quoted above shows for example that an attack by 500 kilograms of the nerve gas sarin on a target 1 kilometre in diameter could, under some weather conditions, produce a cloud still toxic 80 kilometres away some 10 hours later, or even 100 kilometers away under exceptional weather conditions. Only on a very sunny and windless day would the toxic effect remain within the target area, yet this is a relatively low intensity of attack (637 kg per sq. km) compared with concentrations considered necessary to give a high probability of producing the desired casualties within the target area.

2.47. From the foregoing considerations it may be deduced that the most likely agents for use in chemical warfare would be the nerve gases, probably VX (lethal at concentrations as low as 0.5 mg minutes per cubic metre if inhaled, or in quantities of 6 mg if in contact with the skin, the lethal dose when absorbed into the body through either route being about 1 mg), or soman, and mustard gas which can produce incapacitating blisters in milligram quantities on the skin, although it is less frequently lethal. Both are liquid at ordinary temperatures and would produce persistent effects in a target area lasting from one hour to 16 weeks for VX depending on weather conditions, or from 12 hours to 8 weeks for mustard [1]. Both can produce casualties through contact with the skin as well as through inhalation. There remains the possibility of attack by blood gases such as hydrogen cyanide which is lighter than oxygen and not readily stopped by respirators except for short periods of time. For the same reason, however, an effective concentration in the field could be produced for only a few minutes, if that, and its low toxicity compared with nerve gases means that a very large tonnage would have to be delivered. However, hydrogen cyanide is very cheap and widely available in industry and its military use in the future cannot be ruled out.

1. According to the United Nations publication: Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and the effects of their possible use, 1969. But there are reports of blister injuries recently incurred in a trench in Belgium contaminated with mustard gas more than 60 years earlier.

(iv) Present stocks of chemical weapons

2.48. Soman, VX and mustard mentioned above are liquid at normal temperatures; so is hydrogen cyanide although it is so very volatile that it may be considered a gas for practical purposes. A suitable chemical weapons system delivering these agents is designed to break them up into vapour or a fine aerosol of micron-sized particles if they are to be absorbed through the lungs, or rather larger droplets if skin contamination is intended. This can be achieved by spraying from aircraft or by disruptive explosive charge in aircraft bombs, artillery shells, rockets or emplaced land mines. All these systems have been employed in the past and are assumed to be still in use. When considering the chemical warfare capability of a country, account must therefore be taken both of bulk stocks of chemical agents concerned as well as the stocks of filled chemical ammunition.

2.49. Standard reference sources on defence matters give very little or no information on actual quantities of chemical weapons stockpiles. Tentative figures for the sizes of chemical weapons stockpiles come chiefly from SIPRI or from less reliable press reports. This situation contrasts sharply with the wealth of information available about levels of other weapons systems, nuclear and conventional, in both allied and Warsaw Pact countries which is to be found in western governmental defence white papers, especially in the United States Department of Defence annual report, and in the IISS publications.

Soviet Union

2.50. There are no recent authoritative quantified western estimates of Soviet chemical weapons stockpiles; most reports come from United States sources. In a recent briefing in the United States Department of Defence the Rapporteur was given to understand that the United States today claims simply that Soviet stocks of chemical weapons are "sufficient for their requirements" and are made up of agents developed in the two world wars including thickened soman (GD), a nerve gas. It is not known whether the Soviet forces possess any V-agent capability. The large numbers (100,000 men according to the briefing, 60,000 men according to United States official reports) of chemical troops in the Soviet forces do not have responsibility for offensive use of chemical weapons; they are said to have similar chemical defence functions to those of the smaller (about 4,000 men) United States chemical corps. The 1980 United Kingdom defence white paper claims that "unlike NATO, the Soviet Union has a major capability for offensive chemical warfare. Soviet forces maintain large stocks of chemical munitions

Chemical properties, formulations and toxicities of lethal chemical agents [1]
(Excerpt from material supplied by the World Health Organisation)

1	Sarin	VX	Hydrogen cyanide	Cyanogen chloride	Phosgene	Mustard gas	Botulinal toxin A
2	Lethal agent (nerve gas)	Lethal agent (nerve gas)	Lethal agent (blood gas)	Lethal agent (blood gas)	Lethal agent (lung irritant)	Lethal agent (vesicant)	Lethal agent
3	100 %	1-5 %	100 %	6-7 %	Hydrolysed	0.05 %	Soluble
4	12,100 mg/m^3	3-18 mg/m^3	873,000 mg/m^3	3,300,000 mg/m^3	6,370,000 mg/m^3	630 mg/m^3	Negligible
5 (*a*)	Liquid	Liquid	Liquid	Solid	Liquid	Solid	Solid
5 (*b*)	Liquid	Liquid	Liquid	Vapour	Vapour	Liquid	Solid
6 (*a*)	1/4-1 hr	1-12 hrs	Few minutes	Few minutes	Few minutes	12-48 hrs	–
6 (*b*)	1/4-4 hrs	3-21 days	Few minutes	Few minutes	Few minutes	2-7 days	–
6 (*c*)	1-2 days	1-16 weeks	1-4 hrs	1/4-4 hrs	1/4-1 hr	2-8 weeks	–
7	> 5 $mg\text{-}min/m^3$	> 0,5 $mg\text{-}min/m^3$	> 2,000 $mg\text{-}min/m^3$	> 7,000 $mg\text{-}min/m^3$	> 1,600 $mg\text{-}min/m^3$	> 100 $mg\text{-}min/m^3$	0,001 mg (oral)
8	100 $mg\text{-}min/m^3$	10 $mg\text{-}min/m^3$*	5,000 $mg\text{-}min/m^3$	11,000 $mg\text{-}min/m^3$	3,200 $mg\text{-}min/m^3$	1,500 $mg\text{-}min/m^3$	0,02 $mg\text{-}min/m^3$
9	1,500 mg/man	6 mg/man*	–	–	–	4,500 mg/man[a]	–

[a] A drop of mustard weighing a few mgs can produce a serious blister which will be incapacitating if it interferes with the normal activities of an individual.

Key to table :

1. Trivial name.
2. Military classification.
3. Approximate solubility in water at 20° C.
4. Volatility at 20° C.
5. Physical state (*a*) at –10° C ; (*b*) at 20° C.
6. Approximate duration of hazard (contact or airborne following evaporation) to be expected from ground contamination :
   (*a*) 10° C, rainy, moderate wind ;
   (*b*) 15° C, sunny, light breeze ;
   (*c*) –10° C, sunny, no wind, settled snow.
7. Casualty producing dosages (lethal or significant incapacitating effects).
8. Estimated human respiratory LCt_{50} (mild activity : breathing rate *ca.* 15 litres/min.).
9. Estimated human percutaneous toxicity.

* Figures now believed to be slightly too low.

1. From : Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and the effects of their possible use, United Nations, 1969.

and are fully equipped and trained to operate in a chemical environment".

2.51. The distinction between offensive and defensive chemical capabilities is important in interpreting official statements which cover both without differentiating between them. Thus the latest United States Department of Defence Report [1], which makes only fleeting reference to chemical weapons, states that :

> "The USSR is better equipped than any other nation to conduct chemical warfare. There are about 60,000 chemical troops in divisional and non-divisional units, and this number could double after mobilisation. Practical field training significantly increases their readiness." (page 102)

The corresponding Military Posture Statement [2] states simply :

> "The Soviets, who already have the world's best trained and equipped chemical warfare (CW) force, continue to improve their offensive and defensive chemical capabilities. The Soviets have developed a variety of modern agents, multiple delivery systems, and the tactical doctrine for large-scale employment. Although political leaders continue negotiations to prohibit CW development, production and stockpiling, there is no evidence of restraint in efforts to maintain superiority."

A lengthier statement on Soviet offensive and defensive capability was contained in the Military Posture Statement three years ago [3], but still did not offer figures :

> "The Soviet/Warsaw Pact forces continue to maintain a superior capability to operate in toxic environments. They are the best equipped and prepared forces in the world to employ chemical weapons and to operate under chemical, biological and radiological (CBR) warfare conditions...
>
> While the Soviet leaders are currently pursuing a total ban on the development, production, and stockpile of chemical weapons, their military efforts in the chemical warfare (CW) area continue unabated. CBR training areas are becoming more sophisticated, improved training methods are being developed, and equipment is being improved and fielded at an increasing rate.
>
> There is no evidence to suggest slowdown in their efforts to improve troop operations in toxic environments. Warsaw Pact doctrine and plans envision the employment of these weapons in conjunction with either conventional or nuclear weapons. A variety of delivery systems and chemical agents for use against any tactical target in the battle area is available to front commanders.
>
> The Soviets have the capability to use CW weapons in a war with NATO forces, even on a first strike surprise basis.
>
> A large, well-equipped and well-trained CBR organisation is organic to the Warsaw Pact force structure. In addition to the CBR troops, all other combat and combat support forces receive CBR training. They are unsurpassed in their capability to protect themselves and to conduct offensive and defensive tactical operations when such weapons are used. Personnel protection equipment is available to all fighting forces and support personnel.
>
> Chemical specialists and units exist in all formations down to regiment. Their importance has been emphasised through unit reorganisation and enlargement. They are responsible for technical advice, decontamination, reconnaissance and the operation of all specialised equipment and vehicles. Combat and combat support units are well trained in protective and decontamination techniques. In addition, all medical support units train to care for the mass casualties expected from nuclear, chemical or biological warfare. Increasing numbers of combat and combat support vehicles with integrated CBR collective protection systems are appearing throughout the Warsaw Pact area.
>
> Interwoven throughout all of the formidable efforts being put forth by the Soviets and other [2]. Warsaw Pact forces is the tenet that a viable CBR protection posture is a prerequisite to employment of mass destruction weapons whether nuclear, chemical or biological."

2.52. Prior to the Nixon administration change of policy on chemical weapons in 1969 (paragraph 2.56 below) the Department of Defence offered Congress rather large numerical estimates of Soviet offensive chemical capabilities : "We know that the Soviets are putting a high priority on development of lethal and non-lethal weapons and that their stockpile consists of about one-sixth chemical munitions." [1] And

1. Dated 29th January 1980, for fiscal year 1981.

2. Military Posture, supplement to the Chairman's overview prepared by the JCS organisation for fiscal year 1981.

3. For fiscal year 1978.

1. Department of Defence appropriations for 1961, part 6: Hearings before the sub-committee of the Committee on Appropriations, United States House of Representatives, Washington 1960, page 181 – evidence of General Trudeau, Head of United States Army Research and Development.

a later article in a United States military journal claimed that the Soviet Union "had 106 chemical plants in operation, of which one half were either producing or were capable of producing the latest war gases. His stocks greatly exceed the combined stocks of the free world, but are quite sufficient for three or four major offensives on a wide front. His present stockpile is reported as enormous, comprising fully 15 % of the total of the Russian military munitions ".[1]

2.53. Since that time estimates that Soviet chemical weapons stocks comprised one-fifth or one-sixth of total ammunition stocks have been repeated from time to time in newspaper articles in European NATO countries, but have been abandoned in official United States publications. The press reported in 1969 that the estimate had been derived from aerial photographs of Russian storage sheds, which had been compared with similar sheds in the United States used for storing chemical weapons. The evidence had been adduced in support of a United States army request for a shipment of chemical weapons stockpiles to Germany [2].

2.54. There is however plenty of evidence in open scientific literature that the Soviet Union has developed G-series nerve gases, and, as noted above, it is known to have captured a German nerve gas plar t at the end of World War II. The Soviet Union is believed to have chemical projectiles available for its 122 mm and 152 mm artillery and 122 mm multi-barrel rocket, as well as for the FROG 7 and SCUD-A tactical missiles and aircraft munitions.

2.55. There were press reports in late January that Afghan refugees claimed that Soviet forces had used chemical agents in the north-east of Afghanistan and in Bamiyan and Takhar provinces. United States officials have been unable to confirm or deny these reports, and later United States press reports repeating the claim have been discredited as inspired by the chemical weapons lobby in the Pentagon [3], but it remains possible that Soviet forces used a riot control agent like CS used by western police forces. The Soviet Union must be assumed to possess a considerable offensive chemical warfare capability and clearly, too, Soviet forces are well equipped and trained to operate in conditions of chemical warfare, but some protective equiment is inferior to current equipment with NATO forces. Protective clothing is impermeable, making it difficult to perform combat duties for long periods, whereas NATO forces are now equipped with permeable charcoal-impregnated foam garments.

United States

2.56. On 25th November 1969 President Nixon made a new policy statement, renouncing the first use of chemical weapons in war : "As to our chemical warfare programme, the United States reaffirms its often repeated renunciation of the first use of lethal chemical weapons ; extends this renunciation to the first use of incapacitating chemicals." From 1956 the policy had been use at Presidential discretion ; previously it had been retaliatory use only [1].

2.57. By the close of World War II the United States is known to have manufactured about 135,000 tons of chemical warfare agents all of which have since been disposed of as the agents concerned were considered obsolete or were becoming dangerous. Production of modern nerve gases began in the 1950s and full-scale production of VX was undertaken from April 1961 to June 1968 at the Newport chemical plant in Indiana. These plants are now in a stand-by status. Present stockpiles have not been published systematically, but many isolated statements have been made to Congress committees, and further information is available from the Department of Defence Procurement reports. It is clear that, apart from incapacitating agents (CS ; tear gas) and small residual stocks of obsolete agents awaiting destruction, the present stockpile is composed of mustard blister gas and the two nerve gases GB (sarin) and VX. The academic estimate in the table hereafter has been made of quantities and locations in 1976 [2]. The filled munitions include projectiles for the 105 mm, 155 mm, and 8 inch cannon, land mines, aircraft spray tanks, bombs and cluster bombs. Nerve gas warheads for the obsolete tactical missile Honest John have been destroyed since

1. The author claimed that the stockpile included 50,000 tons of nerve gas (Soviet forces had captured the German tabun factory at Wroclow after World War II). " Is Russia outstripping us in weapons of mass destruction ? ", Armed Forces Chemical Journal 17 (3) 1963, article by Admiral Coggins, former Chief of ABC Warfare in the United States navy.

2. Washington Post, 29th June 1969, S. M. Hersh: Pentagon's gas plans spring a leak.

3. See in particular: Poisoned gas or poisoned propaganda, The Guardian, 18th April 1980; Sussex University Armament and Disarmament Information Unit Occasional Paper No. 1, March 1980: Alleged Soviet chemical warfare in Afghanistan.

1. Letter from the Department of Defence to the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 29th March 1960.

Headquarters United States Department of the Army: United States army activities in the United States biological warfare programme, 24th February 1977, Volume 1, pages 4-2 and 5-2.

2. Should NATO keep chemical weapons ? A framework for considering policy alternatives, J. P. Perry Robinson, Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex, August 1977. Figures converted to metric tons.

1973. A development programme for a chemical warhead for the current missile Lance was curtailed in 1970, but is now continuing.

(*thousands of tons*)

	Nerve gas	Mustard gas
Total stockpile	16-18	16-18
In bulk storage	2-5	11-16
Contained in filled munitions	11-16	2-5
Stored in United States	11-16	16-18
Stored in Germany	2-4	Nil

2.58. The expected storage life of chemical warfare agents was 15 to 20 years, but since July 1969 the United States has manufactured no chemical weapons. The intense toxicity of the nerve agents has led to public demands for their destruction, and research has been concentrated on "binary" agents which, themselves relatively harmless, would produce a lethal agent only when mixed within a chemical weapons system after launch. At the same time policy has been affected by the bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union on a convention completely banning chemical weapons, which have made some progress [1]. The Department of Defence annual report for fiscal year 1981 says:

> "We continue to strive for an agreement with the USSR banning offensive CW weapons. However, in the absence of an adequate agreement eliminating the threat of chemical warfare and in view of the improving Soviet CW capabilities, we must maintain a credible chemical warfare retaliatory capability to ensure that there are no real or perceived advantages to them in initiating a chemical attack.
>
> Our CW planning places primary emphasis on the protection of our forces... We also intend to maintain a stockpile of CW munitions. Toward this end, we are requesting $4.2 million for maintenance of the deterrent stockpile in fiscal year 1981. In addition, research and development continues on binary chemical munitions. A binary munition consists of two chemical agents that are harmless when separated, but when mixed become toxic. These agents would be mixed during the delivery phase (i.e. after a shell is fired, or a bomb is dropped). A facility that will have the capability to build binary chemical bombs, warheads and projectiles is being designed."

2.59. The report of the Under-Secretary of Defence for Research and Development and Acquisition for fiscal year 1980 reported that:

> "Our retaliatory stockpile has deteriorated to less than prudent level. The principal deficiencies are the number of usable munitions and the mix of artillery and aeriel systems. There is a serious lack of modern air-deliverable munitions to provide full tactical support and about half of the current stockpile consists of mustard agent which is less effective than nerve agents... Advanced development will begin on a lethal binary warhead for the general support rocket system and engineering development will be completed on the 8 inch binary VX projectile to provide significant safety advantage in retaliatory, storage, transportation and disposal operations."

2.60. There is clearly a continuing debate, both within the armed forces, and between the Department of Defence and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, as to whether a pilot plant for the production of a binary artillery projectile should be built now as the first step in a programme to replace a deteriorating stockpile with a range of binary weapons, or whether production of binary weapons should be further deferred in the hope that agreement can be reached with the Soviet Union on a verifiable chemical ban that would obviate the need for such a programme. Construction of the pilot plant is not included in the fiscal year 1981 budget.

2.61. It should be noted that the United States provides information to the forces of certain other NATO countries on the use of United States chemical weapons which could be made available to them if the requirement for retaliatory use arose. These forces receive appropriate training [1]. Apart from the United Kingdom, it is not clear which other NATO countries are involved in these arrangements. The only others not to have renounced the retaliatory use of chemical weapons are Belgium, Canada, France, the Netherlands and Portugal (paragraph 3.17.)

1. Paragraph 3.18 *et seq*

1. Letter from Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff dated 22nd April 1975. House Defence Appropriations Sub-Committee report.

WEU countries

Germany

2.62. Germany is in a special position among the WEU countries in that it has unilaterally undertaken in the framework of the modified Brussels Treaty not to produce chemical weapons on its territory, and has made it clear that its forces are not trained in their use :

> "The Federal Republic neither possesses nor does she store any... chemical weapons ; she does not seek possession of, or control over, weapons of that kind, she has made no preparation for using them, does not train military personnel for that purpose, and will abstain from doing so in the future. " [1].

2.63. Under the terms of the treaty the WEU Council is required to fix the levels of chemical weapons stockpiles that may be held by any other WEU countries undertaking effective production of chemical weapons on the continent of Europe. In its annual report covering the year 1959 [2], the Council referring to the Agency for the Control of Armaments questionnaire to member countries said : "In July the Council sent this enquiry to the countries concerned who replied either that they were not producing chemical weapons or that the production of these weapons had not gone beyond the experimental stage." Thus at least one WEU country on the continent was involved in the experimental stage at that time. Since that time, the form of the question has been modified to read : "Has the production of chemical weapons on the mainland territory of... (member state) passed the experimental stage and entered the effective production stage ?" The negative replies universally received do not now reveal whether experimental work is undertaken.

France

2.64. The Pont de Claix ordnance factory, near Grenoble (Isère), said in 1970 to have a maximum of 1,700 workers, is described as "specialised in chemical weapons" [3], the Le Bouchet research establishment near Paris as specialising in chemical substances among other activities, but little other information is available about French work on chemical weapons beyond reports of pilot production of nerve gases. The Swiss press in 1974 quoted Professor Dubois, its Director, as saying that the DRME was interested in binary chemical weapons because of their intrinsic safety, and because, politically, it could be claimed that poison gas was not being manufactured (the binary constituents not themselves being toxic) [1].

United Kingdom

2.65. The United Kingdom is not subject to the control provisions of the Brussels Treaty which apply only to the mainland of Europe. Wartime stocks of chemical agents were disposed of following the decision in the 1950s not to construct a full-scale nerve gas plant. The pilot plant at Nancekuke in Cornwall which produced sarin at a rate of 5.5 kg per hour was closed down and dismantled, and in March 1979 was shown to international observers as a confidence-building measure to demonstrate verification of closure and dismantling. Small quantities of VX had also been produced at Nancekuke. British policy was described by Mr. Healey, the then Secretary of Defence, in 1970 :

> "NATO as a whole has chemical weapons available to it because the United States maintains an offensive chemical capability. However, I believe that both the former and the present government in Britain were right not to stockpile offensive chemical weapons in the United Kingdom. If the House really considers the situation, I believe that it will recognise that it is almost inconceivable that enemy forces would use chemical weapons against NATO forces except in circumstances of a mass invasion – in which event even more terrible weapons would surely come into play. " [2]

But recently Mr. Pym, the present Secretary of Defence, appeared to imply that the policy might be reviewed :

> "I am not able to confirm or deny whether chemical weapons were used in Afghanistan. The protection of our own forces against this horrific type of warfare is thought to be certainly as good as, and perhaps better than, any army in Europe. That is some reassurance but what is alarming is the existence of a chemical capability by the Warsaw Pact countries.
>
> It is a horrific weapon, something that gives us anxiety and something that is not sufficiently criticised. We are considering at present what our attitude to it ought to be." [3]

The most recent statement of United Kingdom policy was given by Lord Strathcona, Minister

1. Defence white paper 1970.
2. Document 159, 7th March 1960.
3. "*Le Service des Poudres*" Jacques Pergent, *Forces aériennes françaises*, No. 24, 1970, page 96.

1. *La Suisse*, 4th May 1974, page 41.
2. Hansard for 6th May 1970.
3. Hansard for 12th February 1980.

of State for Defence, in answer to a question in the House of Lords on 24th April 1980 :

> "What we are considering is the Soviet chemical warfare threat and our ability to meet it. The United Kingdom already occupies a leading position in the field of defensive equipment designed to withstand a chemical warfare attack. We have no plans for acquiring an offensive capability but it would be wrong for the West to ignore the massive Soviet stock of chemical weapons and the issues these raise." [1]

2.66. Other WEU countries are not understood to maintain stocks of chemical weapons.

III. *International agreements*

(*a*) *General*

3.1. This section describes the status of international agreements in the field of arms control which may be held to limit or remove the threat of attack by nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. The provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty of 1954 are described in each case – the arms control provisions of the treaty establishing WEU are, of course, of particular interest to the Assembly whose only statutory duty defined in the treaty itself is to receive an annual report from the Council "... on its activities and in particular concerning the control of armaments...".

(*b*) *Nuclear weapons*

3.2. No international agreement in force prohibits the use of nuclear weapons as explosive devices in war. The consistent position of the NATO countries in fact has been to resist proposals for "no first use" agreements because of the agreed NATO strategy which relies on the use of nuclear weapons if necessary to retaliate in the event of an overwhelming conventional attack. Some agreements or negotiations should however be mentioned in this context.

(*i*) *Convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons*

3.3. Sporadically for the last ten years, proposals had been put forward in the United Nations framework for a ban on "radiological weapons" defined as weapons designed to scatter radioactive substances without using a nuclear explosion. It was suggested that radioactive waste from nuclear reactors could be incorporated into a weapon employing a conventional explosive which would scatter radioactive contamination in the area of a target. The effects would be similar to those of local fallout described in Section II (*vi*) above. It was not suggested that such weapons had ever been used or even produced; problems of shielding might make them impracticable.

3.4. The United States and the Soviet Union set up a special group to draft a treaty banning such weapons following the March 1977 agreement which established eight different working groups on various aspects of arms control, and an agreed joint United States-Soviet Union proposal on major elements of such a treaty was submitted to the Geneva Committee on Disarmament on 9th July 1979, providing for a complete ban on the production, acquisition, stockpiling or use of such weapons. Agreement in the Disarmament Committee on the text of such a treaty remains to be reached. The present session of that Committee resumed on 5th February 1980.

(*ii*) *Other agreements*

3.5. Reference should be made to five other treaties which restrict the environments or geographical areas in which nuclear weapons may be used. The "treaty on principles governing the activities of states in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies" which was signed in 1967 and entered into force on 10th October 1967, provides in Article IV that parties undertake "not to place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass-destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner". All NATO and Warsaw Pact countries are parties to this agreement, but any country may withdraw at one year's notice.

3.6. The "treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the sub-soil thereof" which was signed in 1971 and entered into force on 18th May 1972, provides in Articles I and II that parties shall not implant nuclear weapons on the seabed and ocean floor and sub-soil thereof beyond the limit of the territorial sea (12 miles). All Warsaw Pact and NATO countries (except France) are parties to the treaty, and parties may withdraw from the treaty only if they decide "that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this treaty have jeopardised the supreme interests of its country", on giving three months' notice to the United Nations Security Council including a statement of the extraordinary events concerned – a withdrawal provision to be found in most arms control agreements concluded since 1968.

1. Hansard, House of Lords, for 24th April 1980.

3.7. The 1967 "treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America" has additional procotols to which the nuclear weapons powers have subscribed, but the complicated provisions of the treaty, and the restrictive terms on which countries such as Argentina and Brazil have adhered to it, make it unlikely that this treaty alone would prevent the introduction of nuclear weapons into Latin America.

3.8. The 1968 "treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons", which entered into force on 5th March 1970, prohibits the transfer of nuclear weapons, or control over them, to any power that was a non-nuclear weapon power at the date of signature of the treaty. All Warsaw Pact and NATO countries except France are parties to the treaty, and France has stated that it will behave as if it were a party to the treaty. This treaty, which has a similar withdrawal clause to that referred to under the seabed treaty above, effectively prevents the transfer of nuclear warheads into the hands of the non-nuclear members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact; it does not prevent possession of the means of delivery by non-nuclear weapons countries, nor the stockpiling on their territory of nuclear warheads over which nuclear powers retain control; it will not prevent the transfer of warheads in war as the United States has declared that it will not then be bound by the treaty. The treaty does not prohibit assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons being given by one nuclear weapon power to another – thus the co-operation between the United Kingdom and the United States in this field, which includes the transfer of fissile material for the fabrication of warheads, is not in breach of the treaty.

3.9. The "treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water" concluded in 1963, to which all Warsaw Pact and NATO countries, except France, are parties, has not inhibited the development of nuclear weapons through underground test explosions, but has prevented any more information being gathered on the effects of nuclear weapons explosions in the other environments. In practice, the nuclear weapons powers party to the threaty undoubtedly obtained complete information on underground and underwater explosions and explosions in the atmosphere prior to the entry into force of the treaty. Very few nuclear explosions in outer space were however conducted, and experimental data on explosions in that environment may be lacking.

3.10. The 1974 bilateral threshold test-ban treaty and the 1976 peaceful nuclear explosions treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union, imposing an upper limit on the yield of underground nuclear explosions, although not yet ratified have been respected by both parties and have reduced the yield of weapons which may henceforth be tested in underground explosions. Negotiations are continuing on a comprehensive test ban which will prohibit any further testing of nuclear weapons.

(iii) Brussels Treaty provisions

3.11. It is recalled that under the terms of Protocol No. III to the Brussels Treaty as modified in 1954, "when the development of atomic, biological and chemical weapons in the territory on the mainland of Europe of the high contracting parties who have not given up the right to produce them has passed the experimental stage and effective production of them has started there, the level of stocks that the high contracting parties concerned will be allowed to hold on the mainland of Europe shall be decided by a majority vote of the Council of Western European Union". The Federal Republic, in an annex to Protocol No. III, undertakes "not to manufacture in its territory any atomic weapons, chemical weapons or biological weapons..." [1]

3.12. It may be concluded that international arms control agreements at present in force do not remove or significantly limit the nuclear weapons threat to which NATO forces and civilian populations are exposed.

(c) Biological weapons

(i) The 1972 convention

3.13. The 1925 Geneva Protocol referred to in the following section sought to prohibit the use of bacteriological methods of warfare, as well as chemical warfare, but was of limited value in banning these weapons. Most parties had reserved the right of retaliatory use, and the United States did not ratify it until 1975. But significant progress in banning biological warfare was made with the "convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin [2] weapons and on their destruction" negotiated at the Geneva Disarmament Conference. The convention was signed on 10th April 1972 and entered into force on 26th

1. The status of application of these provisions is described in annual reports of the Council and reports of the Committee in reply thereto, entitled "Application of the Brussels Treaty".

2. "Toxins" are highly poisonous chemical agents produced by certain bacteria and other living organisms. As toxins are not themselves living matter, since they do not reproduce themselves, they could have been classed as chemical weapons; however, the fact that they could be produced only by the use of biological processes indistinguishable from those required for the production of bacteriological weapons led to the ban being included in the biological weapons convention.

March 1975. The treaty prohibits the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or use of biological or toxin weapons. The only verification provision is through a complaint to the Security Council (Article 6) and an obligation on the state against which a complaint is lodged to co-operate in any investigation ordered by the Security Council – which would be subject to the veto of any permanent member. The right of withdrawal from the convention if a state "... decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the convention have jeopardised the supreme interests of its country..." is in line with that of the treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons on the seabed referred to above. All Warsaw Pact and NATO countries, with the exception of France, have signed the convention [1] and France has enacted domestic legislation prohibiting the manufacture of biological and toxin weapons. The first review conference on the application of the convention, held in Geneva from 3rd to 21st March 1980, reaffirmed support for the provisions of the convention and noted that no party had invoked the complaints procedure of Article 6. The United States has however consulted the Soviet Union as provided in Article 5 of the convention concerning reports of an anthrax outbreak near Sverdlovsk ; these consultations are continuing.

3.14. The conclusion of an international agreement prohibiting the use of bacteriological weapons but which does not contain stringent measures for verification became possible because the major military powers had concluded that they did not require a retaliatory capability even if such weapons were used against them. When all factors are taken into consideration, the military effects of such weapons were uncertain and in any case unpredictable ; the danger of infection spreading to the population of a user country was such that biological weapons were not an attractive choice for retaliation even against their use by an adversary.

(ii) The Brussels Treaty

3.15. The provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty and Protocols relating to biological weapons are identical to those relating to nuclear weapons quoted in paragraph 3.11 above. In 1959, the WEU Council approved a list of biological agents for control by the Agency for the Control of Armaments [2]. There are no reasons to believe that since the entry into force of the 1972 convention there are any biological weapons on the territory of the WEU countries.

3.16. It may be concluded that although a certain danger of attack by biological weapons may exist, there is no military threat in any real sense. The Soviet Union is not reliably reported to have stockpiles of biological weapons.

(d) Chemical weapons

(i) Geneva Protocol of 1925

3.17. The "Protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare" was signed in Geneva on 17th June 1925 and entered into force on 8th February 1928. All NATO and Warsaw Pact countries are parties to this protocol. The United States, which signed the protocol in 1925, ratified it only in 1975 however, and two others acceded only since the second world war (Hungary 1952, Iceland 1967). Among these countries, Belgium, Canada, France, the Netherlands, Portugal, the United Kingdom, the United States, as well as Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Romania and the Soviet Union among the Warsaw Pact countries, have made reservations reserving the right to use chemical weapons in retaliation should their use be initiated by an aggressor. The remaining NATO countries – Denmark, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway and Turkey – have thus renounced even the retaliatory use of chemical weapons, as have East Germany, Hungary and Poland among the Warsaw Pact countries. The protocol does not ban the manufacture or stockpiling of chemical weapons.

(ii) United States-Soviet Union bilateral negotiations

3.18. Since the conclusion of the biological weapons convention, the United States and the Soviet Union have been engaged in bilateral talks to produce a treaty prohibiting the manufacture, stockpiling or use of chemical weapons which would be open to accession by all countries. Reporting to the United Nations General Assembly in October 1979, Mr. Seignious, Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, said that progress in the bilateral talks had been slow but "substantial" ; if agreement were reached on such a treaty it would ban an entire class of weapons that had been used in a major conflict and the international community would be participating in co-operative measures of verification.

3.19. The United States and the Soviet Union submitted a joint report on the progress of their bilateral talks to the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva on 7th August 1979. They had agreed on the concept of prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling or acquisition of "super-toxic lethal chemicals, other

1. And all except the German Federal Republic and the Netherlands have ratified it.
2. See paragraph 2.41.

lethal or highly toxic chemicals or their precursors". Exceptions would be chemicals intended for industrial, medical or law-enforcement purposes as well as for the development and testing of equipment for protection against chemical weapons. It was agreed that on accession to the convention states would declare their stocks of chemical weapons and production plants, and would announce plans for their destruction to be completed within ten years. The parties are agreed that verification should be based on a combination of national and international measures; international measures would include the right to request an on-site inspection but parties would have the right to refuse such a request; parties could also complain to the Security Council. However, "the question of other international verification measures remains unresolved".

3.20. The United States Department of Defence annual report for fiscal year 1981 says of these bilateral negotiations : "Some progress... has been made towards the control of chemical and radiological weapons. Although we and the Soviets agree that we should control chemical weapons, we have not yet resolved the issues of how to specify stocks of weapons and facilities, how to verify any controls we impose, or when any agreement should enter into force." The bilateral negotiations resumed in Geneva on 11th February 1980, and it has also been agreed, at the suggestion of Canada, France and the Netherlands in particular, that multilateral negotiation will begin in the framework of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva which is to set up a working group which, during 1980, is to define the topics to be included in a multilateral convention banning chemical weapons. United States negotiators remain reasonably hopeful that agreement with the Soviet Union will be reached in time, and feel that multilateral discussion, generating more pressure from world opinion, will help the bilateral negotiations. However, an effective ban on chemical weapons remains some years away, and even after the entry into force of any such agreement, destruction of existing stocks would be phased over ten years. The military threat from chemical weapons will remain for more than a decade at least.

(iii) Brussels Treaty provisions

3.21. The provisions of the Brussels Treaty governing chemical weapons are again identical to those governing nuclear weapons described in paragraph 3.9 above. As far as application of the provisions is concerned, the Council of WEU in 1959 approved a list of chemical products for control by the Agency for the Control of Armaments (see paragraph 2.49 above). In July 1959, the Council sent a first questionnaire to the governments of member countries which had not given up the right to produce chemical weapons, in order to ascertain whether they had started effective production; they replied "either that they were not producing chemical weapons or that the production of these weapons had not gone beyond the experimental stage" [1]. According to successive annual reports of the Council, "effective production" of chemical weapons has never been reported by any member state, and the Agency for the Control of Armaments has not therefore been called upon to carry out production controls in this field. The non-production controls consist of "agreed control measures" in private plants in Germany.

Conclusion on chemical weapon controls

3.22. There is no international agreement in force prohibiting the manufacture or stockpiling of chemical weapons [2]. The 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibits only the use of chemical weapons, many countries party to it have reserved the right of retaliatory use, and stockpiles are known to be held by both Warsaw Pact and NATO countries. A military threat from chemical weapons certainly exists. Progress towards agreement has however been made by the United States and the Soviet Union on a comprehensive chemical weapons ban, although "the question of other international verification measures remains unresolved". Future progress in these bilateral talks which were resumed on 11th February 1980 will affect any decision by the United States as to whether to begin production of a new generation of binary chemical weapons referred to in Chapter II (*d*) (*iv*).

IV. *Protective measures*

(*a*) *General principles*

4.1. Protective measures against many of the effects of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons are possible. The extent to which preparations have been made and equipment provided to afford proper protection varies from one country to another, and between the armed services on the one hand and the civilian population on the other. Appropriate protection for military personnel, who will be required to continue to conduct military operations despite NBC attacks, are obviously different from those that will be appropriate for the civilian population. Their chief concern will be to survive until the effects of an attack have been dissipated. In this section the principles of protection

1. Fifth annual report of the Council, Document 159, 7th March 1960.

2. Except for the provisions of the Brussels Treaty described above.

and, where applicable, of therapy are first considered separately for each of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Lastly, the extent to which protective measures have been taken by the various countries is described first for military personnel and secondly for the civilian population. In compiling this information the Rapporteur visited Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States, where he was briefed both by the military and civil defence authorities, and in many cases saw examples of the protective equipment provided.

(i) Protection against nuclear weapons

4.2. Protection against blast and ground shock from nuclear explosions can be provided by substantially-built underground shelters. Protection cannot be provided within the distance 2.5 times the diameter of the crater produced by a surface explosion [1]. Protection from thermal radiation will be provided by almost any structure intervening between personnel and the point of the explosion. Protective clothing issued for protection against chemical weapons will also provide substantial protection against thermal flash at distances at which exposure of the bare skin would lead to casualties. A curious feature of nuclear weapons is that the duration of the flash increases with the yield, lasting up to 10 seconds for a 1 megaton explosion. Thus personnel at a distance where they could become casualties from thermal flash from a 1 megaton explosion would have time to take cover by lying prone behind any obstacle within a metre or two of their position.

4.3. The best protection against nuclear radiation is provided by underground structures similar to those for protection against blast and ground shock [2]. Protection will be afforded against both initial nuclear radiation from the explosion and from local fallout. Armoured vehicles will also provide good protection.

4.4. Protection against nuclear radiation from fallout cannot be provided for personnel required to operate in contaminated areas, because gamma radiation will penetrate protective clothing, although there will be some attenuation of beta radiation. Protective measures here must be limited to evacuation from heavily contaminated areas; decontamination of the body from radioactive dust; measurement of the dose of radiation received by personnel; and a survey of the area to find the limits of contamination by means of dose rate meters. Protective clothing issued for protection against chemical warfare will of course completely protect the skin from coming into contact with the radioactive dust while the respirator will similarly protect the respiratory tract. Decontamination on departure from a contaminated area is a matter of physically removing any dust from the skin with soap and changing into contamination-free clothing.

4.5. Individual dosimeters can be carried by personnel which will indicate the total amount of radiation they have received. Most of those on issue at present are of a direct reading quartz fibre type which reads only exposure from gamma rays. This is effective in determining exposure from fallout but will ignore any exposure that personnel may receive from neutrons from initial nuclear radiation.

4.6. Dose rate meters can be used to measure the limits of ground contamination from radioactive fallout. It is usual to plot the boundary of zones within which the radioactivity exceeds 1 rad per hour.

4.7. Under NATO standards (Stanag 2083) records are to be kept of the radiation exposure of military personnel in the ranges : level 1 – 0-70 rads; level 2 – 70-150 rads; level 3 – over 150 rads. When the level of activity in a contaminated area is known in rads per hour, the length of time that military personnel can remain in a position for military purposes can then be determined in terms of the operational requirements. Although a total exposure at level 2 would result in only very few casualties (see paragraph 2.2 above) personnel so exposed could not be subsequently exposed to a similar dose of radiation, even for periods of up to a year, without there being a high probability of their becoming casualties.

4.8. A little research is being done on possible medical prophylaxis measures to provide some protection against the effects of radiation but there are no foreseeable applications in the immediate future. Iodine salts might be taken if there is a danger of food being contaminated with fallout, so as to reduce the amount of radioactive iodine that might be concentrated within the body. Medical therapy is possible for hospitalised casualties from nuclear radiation including blood transfusion and the use of antibiotics to prevent infection when the body's defence mechanism has been destroyed by radiation.

4.9. As in the case of protection against chemical weapons, a warning and reporting system can enable personnel to take shelter prior to an attack, or prior to the arrival of radioactive fallout after the distant explosion of nuclear weapons.

1. Figures are given in paragraph 2.11 above.

2. Shielding properties are described in paragraphs 2.20 and 2.21.

(*ii*) *Protection against biological weapons*

4.10. For the reasons discussed in other parts of this report, biological weapons are not regarded as an immediate military threat, although some danger of exposure to them may exist. Respirators and protective clothing issued for protection against chemical weapons will protect the body from airborne aerosols in which form biological agents might be released. Detection of the use of such weapons before their effects become apparent would be very difficult. Antibiotic therapy and prophylactic measures such as vaccination or innoculation would be effective against some biological agents.

(*iii*) *Protection against chemical weapons*

4.11. A modern respirator and protective clothing can provide complete protection against chemical weapons in virtually all situations provided the equipment is put on in time. Collective shelters, if fitted with proper air filters, are effective provided there is time to enter them. Thus early warning of an attack is a vital additional protective measure. Decontamination of persons and equipment is of equal importance together with means for detecting contaminated areas.

4.12. All NATO forces visited by the Rapporteur are equipped with impregnated active charcoal filter respirators which will provide protection against all chemical weapons, but for a limited period of time. The period will be shorter with lighter-than-air agents such as hydrogen cyanide, but a majority of experts feel that that agent is unlikely to be used because of the difficulty in maintaining a lethal concentration. In any case, canisters for respirators have to be provided on a scale of several per man and NATO Stanag 4155 agreed in September 1979 (but not yet ratified) provides for a standard thread so that different national patterns of canister can be interchangeable – a provision that is not yet met by all countries.

4.13. Most NATO forces visited have protective clothing made from permeable material incorporating active carbon into a lining, sometimes into an impregnated foam. Different types of fabric have been developed in different countries. These suits permit personnel to continue to perform military duties without too much internal condensation. Impermeable suits can provide heavier protection for decontamination teams operating for short periods. In any case, suits will require to be changed when contaminated, and stocks should allow for several suits per man.

4.14. Means of detecting and identifying chemical agents are more complicated and are far less satisfactory than those for detecting gamma radiation, because of the wide range of different chemical agents that may be encountered. There are test papers which change colour for detecting persistent contamination on equipment or the ground. There are detection kits based on a pump to draw samples of air through a series of reagents designed to detect a different chemical substance. An automatic detection alarm for a chemical attack is being introduced into some forces. In general detection and early warning of chemical attack appear to be major problems.

4.15. Chemical therapy against some of the effects of the most toxic chemical-warfare agents – the nerve gases – is possible through the use of atropine or related drugs,[2] and may be extended by means of supplementary oxime therapy. Automatic self-injecting hypodermic syringes charged with atropine, and in some cases with oxime as well, are on issue to NATO forces. This therapy is, however, less effective against soman than it is against most other nerve gases, but improved antidotes are in development.

4.16. Provision for decontamination of persons and equipment is an important part of protective measures against chemical warfare. All forces have individual protection kits which include decontamination powders or ointments for use on the skin, cloths for wiping, and soap. Decontamination of equipment and vehicles is still based on the use of a hypochlorite or chloride of lime solution as well as a special decontaminant produced by the United States known as DS2. The extent to which sprays of different types and sizes are provided varies considerably among different NATO countries and there is some argument as to whether spraying alone is sufficient or whether brushing is a necessary part of a decontamination process.

(*b*) *National protective measures for military personnel*

4.17. In the armed forces the army is the largest user of NBC protective measures, and is usually the service that "leads"; the marines and air forces tend to use army equipment, adapted to their particular uses where necessary. In the following section the practice of the armies is therefore described in some detail. Rudimentary treatment of navies and air forces is provided where information was to hand.

(*i*) *Belgium*

4.18. Belgium follows the recommendations of NATO and FINABEL working groups on protection against chemical warfare but, as in all countries, implementation is a matter of national decision. A threat of nuclear or chemical attack is taken seriously, but no direct biological military threat is considered to exist.

4.19. Belgium does not have a special NBC defence corps, but provides specially-trained engineer personnel. The engineering school also runs training courses for future NBC defence specialists drawn from all arms in the Belgian army. From company to brigade level there is one officer and a small NBC control party who are specially trained to perform NBC protection duties in addition to their normal duties in the unit concerned. At division and corps headquarters there would be a full-time staff of 3 officers, 3 NCOs and 3 draughtsmen specialised in NBC duties under wartime establishment. Belgian military specialists in NBC protection have attended courses in other NATO countries including Grenoble in France, Sonthofen in Germany, Winterbourne Gunner in the United Kingdom and CFB Borden in Canada.

4.20. Individual protection for the individual soldier in the Belgian army follows NATO Stanag 2352. Each soldier is issued with a respirator and 2 spare canisters with threads conforming to the NATO standard.

4.21. A complete set of NBC protective clothing is issued to all combatants with spare suits held in reserve at various echelons. Manufactured in Belgium, there is a permeable suit with an active carbon impregnated foam lining. This suit will later be procured by the Netherlands which considered that it can be worn for longer without the need for decontamination. The complete suit comprises a coat with hood; trousers; overboots and a pair of gloves.

4.22. Each man is issued with 2 atropine self-injectors (it is hoped that combined atropine/oxime injectors will become available later); an individual dosimeter recording gamma-ray dose only; detection papers which would detect liquid G and V type nerve agents and liquid mustard; 100 tablets for water purification against biological agents; 2 absorbent powder (fuller's earth) impregnated chemical decontamination gloves for chemical decontamination of the skin, together with impregnated paper towels; powder and bandage for dealing with burns complete the individual equipment of each man.

4.23. Belgian medical units and detachments are equipped with a special boxed gas kit for therapeutic treatment of gas casaulties.

4.24. It is understood that the Belgian forces hope to obtain an improved respirator providing better visibility and voice transmission, and enabling the wearer to drink without losing protection.

4.25. It is hoped that future generations of combat vehicles will be provided with centrally filtered piped air supplied to each crew member. This would probably not be an overpressure system for the whole vehicle because of the problem of getting in and out when the air seal would be broken. So far, NBC environment protection is available only in the Leopard tank and CVRT and JPK tank-hunters. There is no provision for collective protection in transportable shelters although this is considered highly desirable especially for command posts and medical units.

4.26. Observation, warning, detection and NBC reconnaissance is provided at company level by a 2-man NBC observation and detection post and a chemical and radiological reconnaissance group of 1 NCO and 4 men mounted in an armoured combat vehicle. They are provided with dosimeters, dose rate meters, chemical detection papers, an NBC marking set and air pump type test sets for atmospheric contamination by chemical agents. They would normally travel in an armoured combat vehicle. No automatic chemical alarm system is as yet available but it is hoped to provide it down to company level in the future.

4.27. In addition to the individual decontamination equipment described above each vehicle is provided with a small M111 spray cylinder containing about 1.1 litres of DS2 liquid pressurised by a nitrogen cartridge. It is intended for limited emergency chemical decontamination of contact areas such as door handles, steps, tailboards, etc. Each platoon has the larger (11 litres) M1 spray and drums of 30 kg of hypochlorite powder used with this device. At corps level there is more NBC decontamination equipment and a movable carwash-type spray using hypochlorite solution for treating vehicles. Under war establishment, 6 NBC platoons would be formed at corps level for decontamination, each platoon having a decontamination capability of 40 vehicles per hour.

(ii) France

4.28. France devotes considerable attention to NBC defence. Its policy in this field is adapted to that of its allies with which it co-operates actively both bilaterally and multilaterally in NATO and FINABEL bodies. The organisation of specially trained NBC protection units in peace will amount to one company in each of the First and Second Corps. In war there will be three NBC protection regiments – 1 per corps – each composed of 3 chemical decontamination companies; 1 nuclear decontamination company and 1 NBC reconnaissance company. A few individuals in all units will have received special NBC protection training. There is a training school at Grenoble.

4.29. The individual protective equipment issued to each soldier includes a gas mask and a powder decontamination glove. At the present

time, protective clothing is a 1963 model issued to all units on a scale of 2 per man. It will be supplemented shortly by an overgarment which can be worn for 3 weeks, the SP3, which will be issued at first on a scale of 1 per man in all units.

4.30. For chemical detection and warning, France uses an individual nerve gas detector using a buffered solution on an enzyme impregnated paper to detect nerve gas through the biochemical inhibition of cholinesterases. Simple manipulation of the detector requires some 7 minutes after which nerve gases in the atmosphere can be revealed in the following concentrations : sarin – 10 micrograms per cubic metre ; soman – 20 micrograms per cubic metre ; tabun – 50 micrograms per cubic metre. France has developed an automatic chemical agent detector, the Detalac model F1, which can give audible and luminous alarm in the event of attack by chemical agents. 18 kg in weight, this can be placed on the ground or mounted on a vehicle and will sound an alarm within 2 seconds when the concentration of non-persistent nerve gases reaches 2 milligrams per cubic metre, or within 2 minutes when the concentration reaches 100 micrograms per cubic metre. France has a range of individual dosimeters to measure the gamma rays exposure received by an individual based on the direct reading quartz fibre principle as issued to most NATO forces. A photo-luminescent dose meter sensitive to gamma rays only is also in service which can be read only indirectly with a collective reading unit kept at company headquarters to prevent erroneous interpretation by individuals.

4.31. France has developed a range of radiac meters, including systems that can be mounted on helicopters and vehicles, for conducting radioactive fallout surveys. The helicopter-mounted radiac meter provides a printed read-out of dose rate as the ground is surveyed. France, Germany and Italy have produced and are developing an airborne radiological reconnaissance set, ERRA. French equipment policy has first provided for the detection of nuclear contamination, and is now turning to the detection of chemical attack.

4.32. Special decontamination equipment includes a mobile field shower for personnel at battalion level. Small and large motorised pump spray units for decontamination have also been developed but the scale of issue in the French forces is not clear.

4.33. The French air force is beginning a programme for the construction of personnel shelters and protected command posts on airfields. Protection of aircraft is in mini-hangars. Decontamination facilities are provided only for the most used equipment.

4.34. The operational forces of the French navy are equipped for NBC protection and the ships have external sensors for radioactive contamination. Naval bases are well protected with underground installations.

(iii) Germany

4.35. The German armed forces include a special NBC defence corps, which provides company- and battalion-sized units for warning, decontamination and survey functions to all three services. In addition, individuals in all units are specially trained. Troops of both the NBC defence corps and the ordinary unit specialists are trained in the NBC defence and self-protection school at Sonthofen which was established in 1956. It has now trained over 90,000 students including 400 from abroad.

4.36. Each platoon in the German army (*Bundeswehr*) will have 2 to 3 specially trained NBC defence teams of three men who will perform other duties. At each company there is a sergeant additionally with special NBC training (in independent companies both a sergeant and a corporal). There is an officer and a sergeant at battalion level, a head of decontamination station with a decontamination team in some regiments and battalions at corps or division level and a special equipment mechanic for NBC equipment at battalion level. At brigade level there is an NBC defence officer with 4 special decontamination teams and an NBC collection centre. At division headquarters there is an NBC defence officer of field rank with a small staff and collection centre and 3 special decontamination teams.

4.37. The NBC defence corps itself provides, in addition to the foregoing unit personnel, specialised units for decontamination of personnel and equipment, roads and military installations ; and for reconnaissance of contaminated terrain for nuclear radiation and chemical agents. It also has the capability of generating smoke screens. The NBC corps provides a company of 145 men of all ranks for each division of the German army. This company provides 3 platoons, one for reconnaissance and 2 for decontamination of personnel and equipment. In addition each corps will have one NBC defence battalion, which will be made up in wartime of the personnel of the Sonthofen NBC defence and self-protection school. There are 6 independent companies and 7 battalions within the territorial command, most of them activated only in time of war.

4.38. Individual NBC protective equipment is issued to all soldiers in the German army and comprises the usual respirator with standard NATO thread on the canister ; a permeable overgarment of water-repellent cloth lined with charcoal impregnated foam ; protective gloves

and overboots. The charcoal impregnated material absorbs gases and vapours while drops of liquid spread on the repellent surface of the garment and eventually evaporate. The individual kit for decontamination comprises decontamination powder for chemical agents, soft soap and cotton pads for washing and removal of decontamination powder or radioactive dust; adhesive dressing for minor injuries and earplugs for use in the event of damage to the eardrums; 3 automatic atropine injectors; detection paper to detect liquid nerve and blister agents.

4.39. Survey and monitoring equipment for chemical contamination and nuclear radiation includes the usual quartz fibre dosimeter issued on the scale of one per section (of 6-10 men). NBC trained personnel in German units keep a daily exposure chart for all individuals in a section (based on the reading of a dosimeter on issue to the section) classing them in the level 1-3 for exposure levels on the same scale as laid down in NATO Stanag 2083 referred to in paragraph 4.7 above.

4.40. Germany has a new wristwatch dosimeter on trial which will detect both gamma rays and initial nuclear radiation. This is based on a silver phosphate plate for gamma radiation and a silicon diode for neutron flux determination. If tests are satisfactory, it is planned to produce and issue this universally on a scale of 1 per man. Its advantage is that it will indicate neutron doses that might be received, for example by tank crews in the vicinity of low-yield tactical nuclear weapons.

4.41. Each German company has 2 to 3 NBC defence teams which can conduct a nuclear contamination survey, either on foot or from a vehicle, using a dose rate meter. These teams are trained to peg out the 1 rad per hour contour line surrounding a contaminated area and other dose rates.

4.42. In the early 1980s, Germany is planning to introduce special reconnaissance vehicles for conducting nuclear radiation and chemical contamination surveys permitting the personnel to remain inside. They will be equipped to give an automatic printout of dose rates and chemical contamination coupled with the map reference of the vehicle's position from an automatic navigator. It is claimed that surveys can be carried out at a rate of 40-60 km an hour. The chemical analysis will be based on a mass spectrometer. The *ensemble de reconnaissance radiologique aérienne* (ERRA) model JUK450 (airborne radiological reconnaissance system) has been developed by Germany working jointly with France and Italy. It can be mounted on helicopters for conducting radiological surveys when in flight. The equipment provides an automatic printout showing the co-ordinates of the position at which the reading is taken, the height of the vehicle, the dose rate in the range 0.02-250 rads per hour which can be expressed as the equivalent dose rate at a height of 1 metre above the ground. This permits the helicopter to operate at a height exceeding 10 metres above the ground.

4.43. The long-term goal for vehicles is to provide an NBC filter system on all of them. Only partial systems are as yet in service on Leopard and other tanks. It was stressed that chemical warning systems are not yet satisfactory.

4.44. Decontamination follows a similar pattern to that described in the Belgian army. All vehicle crews are equipped to provide limited immediate decontamination of points of contact on their vehicles. Heavy decontamination equipment, including pumps, hoses and water containers, is carried in all units at battalion level and above; this supplements the emergency decontamination provided by vehicle crews.

4.45. The special decontamination platoon of the NBC corps can establish decontamination stations for both vehicles and men equipped with water carriers, motorised pumps, and heaters. The personnel decontamination station works on similar lines to those of the specialist units of the United States forces. In effect, a production line is established where personnel first clean their footgear, then remove contaminated clothing, placing it in bins, then clean the outside of their respirators and finally remove their underclothing and respirators prior to entering the shower, after which they are checked for radiological or chemical contamination as the case may be and issued with new non-contaminated clothing. The sort of decontamination station that can be established in each battalion of the army will treat 10 vehicles per hour and 60 personnel. In 1981 a new, more effective agent for chemical decontamination will be introduced. The 4 decontamination vehicles deployed by each platoon of the special NBC defence corps can decontaminate roads and ground as well as major items of equipment. It can also be used for fire-fighting.

4.46. NBC defence specialists provide teams for decontamination of aircraft of the *Luftwaffe*. Dry fallout may be removed with the aid of a soft broom and a vacuum cleaner; when wet it is a delicate operation as all openings and crevices in the fuselage and engines have first to be sealed with tape. Aircraft are sprayed first with water then with detergent solution or with A/C cleaning compound, vigorously scrubbed and then rinsed in the case of radiological contamination. In the case of chemicals, ordinary

decontaminants cannot be used as they would attack the structure of the aircraft, especially skin, canopy roof and gaskets, but special solvents are available and apparently fire-fighting foam or a steam-cleaning device is also used for the purpose, after sealing openings and crevices, followed by vigorous scrubbing from the top downward, followed by a rinse with clear water. In each case the last step is to remove sealings and to decontaminate previously covered parts with moistened rags and detergent solution or absorbents.

(iv) Luxembourg

4.47. The Rapporteur has not called on the Luxembourg military authorities, but they have kindly supplied the following information concerning their forces. As the whole Luxembourg army is barely the size of a normal battalion, it does not have a specialised NBC defense service, but has personnel speically trained in the Belgian engineering school and elsewhere. At all levels there are personnel, who normally perform other duties, who are specially trained in NBC protection.

4.48. Individual NBC protection equipment of the Luxembourg army conforms to NATO Stanag 2352. Each soldier is provided with a respirator – a recently acquired United Kingdom model conforming to NATO standards – and 2 spare canisters. Each man has a full suit of protective clothing and a spare suit is planned. These suits are the British permeable type with active carbon impregnated foam lining comprising a coat and hood, trousers, overboots and a pair of gloves.

4.49. Each man also receives 2 automatic atropine injectors (it is hoped to procure atropine and oxime injectors later); an individual dosimeter recording gamma radiation; detector papers for liquid nerve gas and mustard gas; United States water purification tablets against biological agents; chemical decontamination powder for the skin; impregnated paper towels, powder and bandages for burns.

4.50. At company and higher level there are 10 special decontamination suits. The Luxembourg medical unit has a special kit for treatment of gas casualties (Belgian origin).

4.51. Alert and monitoring at platoon level is carried out by a reconnaissance group of variable size in a jeep. It is provided with dosimeters, detector papers and pump-operated air sampling devices for detecting chemical agents in the atmosphere. The United States M8 automatic chemical warning system is available at platoon level.

4.52. In addition to individual decontamination equipment, each vehicle is provided with a small N3 cylindrical spray containing DS2 liquid for the limiting decontamination of contact surfaces such as doorknobs, steps, etc. Each platoon has a larger N1 spray containing 30 kg of hypochlorite solution. The Luxembourg battalion for ACE mobile force (land) and territorial units have French decontamination trailers for washing vehicles with hypochlorite solution.

(v) Netherlands

4.53. In the Netherlands armed forces the threat of chemical warfare is considered to be a very real one, especially in the present period of nuclear stalemate. While most countries visited pointed out that the Soviet armed forces had a very large chemical corps organised to provide 1 chemical company at the level of each brigade or regimental combat team, the Netherlands assessment confirmed, from other sources, that the protective equipment of the Soviet forces was inferior to that of NATO forces. The Netherlands followed the principles of the NATO Stanags on chemical protection, the aim of which was to ensure the survival of the individual soldier and to enable him to operate in a contaminated environment.

4.54. Specially trained NBC protection troops in the Netherlands amount to 1 NBC defence company comprising 3 platoons for the Netherlands corps of 10 brigades (4 armoured and 6 armoured infantry) which is assigned to NATO. Within the ordinary units of the Netherlands army there is a full-time NBC NCO at the level of battalion headquarters. In brigade, division and corps headquarters there is an NBC staff with a full-time NBC officer in charge. The NBC officers and NCOs are trained at the army NBC defence school in Breda which also trains personnel performing NBC duties as an additional task.

4.55. Individual equipment at present issued to each Netherlands soldier is the Canadian C3 respirator; a set of protective clothing (British Mark II) with overboots and gloves; an atropine auto-injector; a bottle of decontamination powder and a chemical test button. The protective clothing is to be replaced in 1980 by the new Belgian suit lined with active charcoal impregnated foam which has better permeability and is longer wearing than the British Mark II suit.

4.56. Only the Leopard tank and the Gepard anti-aircraft tank with which some of the tank battalions in the armoured brigade are equipped have some built-in NBC protection. Future acquisition of fighting vehicles will incorporate NBC protection which is estimated to add 30-40 % to the cost. The Netherlands is deve-

loping a collective shelter for protection against chemical weapons and fallout dust which can be carried on vehicles and used for command posts or communication centres.

4.57. Policy in the Netherlands army is based on a capability to operate for 48 hours in contaminated clothing in chemical warfare conditions. At corps level the 3 platoons of the NBC defence company can each establish 3 lanes equipped with hand-held wash nozzles providing a total capability of 45 tanks an hour. Each lane is also equipped with showers for personnel. Decontamination points are available in small towns and in the countryside where the Netherlands corps is deployed in Germany; these have been identified and their use by the Netherlands corps in war has been agreed with the German authorities.

4.58. As far as detection, survey and alarm is concerned, in addition to the individual chemical detector, gamma-ray dose meters are carried on a scale of 1 per section of 6-10 men which, as usual with present equipment, will not measure neutron flux. The Netherlands is developing an automatic chemical alarm and is still seeking a satisfactory test for residual contamination vehicles. It is considered that the decontamination of contamination with thickened soman is very difficult particularly if the decontamination cannot take place immediately after the contamination. For that reason all vehicles and major equipment are to be provided with decontamination apparatus which can be connected to the vehicle engine, in addition to the DS2 apparatus already issued to each vehicle for emergency decontamination. Dose rate meters for survey purposes are carried in each company; the corps NBC defence company is to acquire a chemical and radiological survey capability but does not as yet possess it.

4.59. The Netherlands is developing paint resistant to chemical weapons for use on military vehicles and considers that it is more advanced than other countries in this field. Development is nearly complete but it is thought unlikely that the paint would be suitable for aircraft.

4.60. The Royal Netherlands Navy NBC protection follows Stanag 2352 Annex B, and all personnel are equipped with a rather old model respirator. They will be re-equipped with the British S6 model perhaps in 1983. It is already on issue to operational units of the Netherlands marines who also have 4 sets of protective clothing per man.

4.61. All new ships coming into service with the Netherlands navy have a pressurised citadel, and by 1985 all older ships which do not have it will be out of commission. All ships have external sprinklers. New constructions have a radiac alarm system and it is planned to introduce an automatic chemical alarm into Netherlands' vessels by 1983-85.

4.62. NBC protected shelters ashore provide cover for 60 % of military personnel and the naval airbase at Valkenburg is to be equipped with a "contamination controlled area" (CCA) for its control rooms, and aircrew will have British-type aircrew protective equipment. Ship-borne helicopter pilots are first priority for equipping with aircrew NBC protective ensemble in order to preserve ASW capability even under chemical attack.

4.63. The Netherlands navy has an NBC school at its Den Helder base from which teams of inspectors can cover exercises on board ships and are also sent on loan to Belgian and Indonesian ships.

4.64. Chemical attack against naval vessels is always considered a possibility in the confined waters in which the Netherlands navy operates.

4.65. All personnel of the Netherlands air force are issued with the Canadian C3 gas mask and two Mark III NBC suits. Collective protection is provided for about 50 % of on-base personnel in shelters and about 70 % of aircraft are protected in blast shelters. Thus briefing rooms and control rooms are already protected and protected transport is to be acquired to enable pilots to proceed from briefing rooms to their aircraft in the aircraft shelters where they would not be contaminated in chemical attacks.

4.66. Equipment for pilot protection in aircraft has not yet been selected despite 5 years of study within NATO. United Kingdom and United States equipment are considered possible candidates.

4.67. There is an NBC subcollection centre on each airbase to deal with NBC defence matters in the region. From the subcollection centres all data on N, B or C attacks are transmitted to CC 19, the Netherlands collection centre in 2nd Ataf. All NBC defence personnel are trained at the air force NBC school at Gilze-Rijen airbase. Within the organisation of the airbases there are several NBC sections tasked with the warning of the local military population and with decontamination. With the equipment they are able to decontaminate the weapon systems available, aircraft included, and other material. New German decontamination emulsion is available; however, a method for rapid application is still under study. Pre-prepared decontamination stations are available for the decontamination of personnel; also mobile decontamination stations are under consideration. The RNAF adheres to the principles on chemical protection laid down in Stanags.

(*vi*) *Norway*

4.68. Norway follows NATO Stanags all of which have been ratified but, as in most countries, not yet implemented.

4.69. Organisation of NBC protection follows that of most countries other than the United Kingdom in that a few special NBC defence platoons exist specially trained and equipped to carry out nuclear and chemical decontamination.

4.70. Almost all personnel in the 3 services and the home guard are issued with the United States modified respirator; some detection equipment – paper and powder – and 2 or 3 automatic atropine injectors. Not all personnel have protective clothing. There is unit NBC equipment in addition.

4.71. For decontamination the NBC defence platoons are mobile, equipped with vehicles and motorised pumps, and can undertake fire-fighting as a secondary rôle as do similar units in Germany. Equipment has been tested in Sweden and can operate to – 40° centigrade with the use of glycol.

4.72. Collective protection for both nuclear and chemical attack is provided for major headquarters which in Norway are built into the mountains and are also protected against ground shock and electromagnetic pulse effects (EMP). Norway has a good deal of concrete-protected field fortifications and in the field cover against radiation is also sought in shelters with 1.4 metres of earth cover overhead.

4.73. Details were not obtained of detection and warning equipment in Norway but it is understood that the country as a whole has a military organisation for predicting fallout and chemical contamination which follows Stanag 2103.

4.74. The Norwegian air force tries to follow NATO criteria for protection and some hangars and "hangarettes" have been provided together with plans for the relocation of squadrons. Norway has been examining air crew protection equipment in the United Kingdom and plans to adopt that equipment in principle.

4.75. As far as training is concerned, Norway stresses the importance of good NBC protection training in all services, especially the army and the air force. Specialists have also been sent to study in Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States and the NATO school.

(*vii*) *United Kingdom*

4.76. The United Kingdom believes that its armed services are among the best equipped for NBC protection and plays an active rôle in NATO Panel 7 on this subject as well as in the corresponding FINABEL panel. As in most countries, the army in the United Kingdom plays a lead rôle in the development of equipment and training for NBC protection, as it is inevitably the largest user of equipment compared with the other 2 services.

4.77. Individual equipment issued to all personnel serving in Germany includes the S6 respirator with 1 spare canister carried on the man and another spare in unit transport. This is considered to provide excellent protection against all known chemical agents and nuclear fallout. The canister thread is NATO standard. The NBC protection suit is the Mark III two-piece with a tetlon/nylon outer surface and an inner non-woven lining made of nylon with active charcoal. This suit has a four-year shelf life, is flame resistant and water repellent. It will provide protection up to 24 hours against gross chemical contamination and has a four-week wearing life and will also provide additional protection against thermal flash from nuclear explosions. It is issued upon a scale of 3 per soldier. Protection is completed with overboots and neoprene rubber gloves worn over inner cotton gloves. Individual equipment also includes oxime tablets for nerve gas prophylaxis (to be taken before an attack) and atropine sulphate auto-injectors. For decontamination all personnel have fuller's earth puffer bottles and pads for personal cleansing. 2 types of detector paper enable the soldier to detect the presence of chemical agents and to categorise them.

4.78. British troops serving in the United Kingdom are not issued with protective clothing for various policy reasons. The civilian population of course is not so equipped.

4.79. Collective protection policy in vehicles in the United Kingdom has been studied. It is held that central filters with overpressure in sealed vehicles may be satisfactory for tanks but not for most command vehicles and personnel carriers where provision must constantly be made for personnel entering and leaving. Here equipment for central filtration to provide an air supply to each man by pipe which can be plugged into the respirator is being developed. All armoured vehicles have collective chemical protection but the central distribution system is installed on only 1 type of vehicle.

4.80. Decontamination policy in the British forces differs from that in all other forces visited by the Rapporteur. The United Kingdom claims that time and weathering are the only wholly reliable methods of decontamination. As a result, the United Kingdom concentrates upon the protection of the individual and accepts that his equipment may become contaminated. This philosophy is termed "the ability to fight dirty". Consequently there are no

specially equipped and trained decontamination units for vehicles or personnel[1]. Individual decontamination can be carried out by each man with his own equipment. All units in the British army carry bleaching powder for neutralising blister agents and all armoured vehicles and the larger B vehicles carry a 9 litre fire extinguisher type spray with a brush on the end.

4.81. For detection and alarm, United Kingdom forces possess the usual quartz fibre individual dose meter with a slow response which will measure gamma radiation only. A "wristwatch" type dose meter capable of measuring both gamma radiation and neutron flux from initial nuclear radiation is being developed. It will not be a direct-reading type. Special readout equipment is used to measure the dose received. The dosimeter is not then set back to zero, but maintains a permanent record of total radiation received by the individual. Accuracy is a problem with all neutron dosimeters. The new United Kingdom meter, inaccurate at doses below 10 rads which are not militarily significant, reaches 90 % accuracy at 100 rads. For dose rate meters a new radiac meter has been acquired, issued down to platoon level, which will detect gamma and beta radiation. Another type of instrument can be mounted with a probe on a vehicle to conduct radioactive surveys. A special Canadian airborne detector is used in helicopters. It appears to be similar to the German/French/Italian ERRA equipment already mentioned. Britain has developed an automatic chemical attack warning device NAIAD "nerve agent immobilised enzyme alarm and detector" – a battery-operated device which provides an audiovisual warning when offensive chemical agents are present in the atmosphere. It is believed to be a very sensitive automatic alarm.

4.82. As far as medical treatment of chemical casualties is concerned, the issue of oxime tablets has already been mentioned. In addition, portable resuscitators are issued to stimulate breathing in nerve gas casualties. Enveloping casualty bags can be used to cover gas casualties either to carry a contaminated casualty to a clean area, without his presenting a nerve gas risk to neighbouring bases, or to carry non-contaminated casualties through contaminated areas.

4.83. For the past 10 years, the United Kingdom has operated a policy whereby all military equipment entering service must embody a measure of protection against all nuclear weapons effects. Protection against EMP[1] is included in the British Army's "nuclear survivability" package. Equipment which has been in service longer than 10 years does not have this protection. The United Kingdom claims that on the whole modern equipment with modern electronics is more vulnerable and therefore older equipment was less vulnerable to start with.

4.84. The Royal Navy introduced the "citadel" concept of NBC protection in its ships and considered itself the best protected navy in NATO. The RAF aircrew protection equipment has been adopted in some other NATO countries, and it has pioneered collective protection both on static airfields and on mobile Harrier and helicopter operations.

(viii) United States

4.85. Organisation of NBC protection in the United States army centres around the Chemical Corps which has chemical offensive as well as defensive responsibility. When the programme of destruction of dangerous chemical weapons stocks was initiated it had been decided in principle to disband the Chemical Corps as such. The policy is said to have been reversed following the 1973 Middle East war when Soviet equipment was found to be specially protected against chemical attack. At the present time the Chemical Corps provides a specially organised and equipped chemical defence company of 114 all ranks as an organic part of each division responsible for major decontamination and survey duties. A further rôle of the chemical defence company is to assist in individual training of all men in the division – each man is supposed to receive 4-6 hours' NBC protection training in the course of his basic combat training. This organisation corresponds to that of the German army.

4.86. Within army units, there are 1 officer and 2 NCOs who receive special training in each company and they in turn train company teams to provide a radiological survey party, a chemical detection party and a decontamination team. These teams can be drawn from personnel normally performing other duties in each company. Personnel assigned full-time to NBC protection duties are 1 NCO at battalion level and an officer and NCO at the level of brigade. An NCO is currently being added at

1. The United Kingdom claims that trials at its chemical defence establishment at Porton suggest that unless decontamination is carried out within 2 minutes of an attack, persistent agent will have crept into cracks and joints and will not be removed by current decontamination methods (including the use of jet engines, which was tried at CDE in the early 1960s). The United Kingdom fears that adoption of such techniques will give vehicle crews a false sense of security, they will remove their respirators "because the vehicle has been decontaminated" and then fall victim to the residual vapour hazard as heat from the engine or a sunny day causes the agent to be desorbed from the cracks.

1. See paragraphs 2.33 *et seq.*

company level, and officers are being added to infantry and armour battalions.

4.87. Individual equipment issued to all United States army personnel include a respirator with internal absorption pads replacing the traditional external canister. This is to NATO Stanag 2352, but it does not have the standard NATO thread now specified in the yet-to-be ratified Stanag 4155, and it takes 20 minutes to replace the absorption pads; it is to be replaced with a canister respirator (XM30) to Stanag 4155, hopefully in 1985. The present respirator does provide facilities for personnel to drink, and artificial respiration by means of a resuscitation tube can be given while the mask is worn. Individual equipment includes a special three-factor nerve agent automatic injector (TAB)[1] and supplies of amylnitrite which can be inhaled as an antidote to blood gases.

4.88. Importance is attached to the provision of relatively large-scale decontamination equipment in the United States army. The chemical defence company at divisional level referred to above is organised in 3 platoons, each of which can provide 3 decontamination squads and 1 reconnaissance squad. The decontamination squads are fully-equipped with lorry-borne pumps, mobile water tanks, and water heaters, to provide both brush and spray decontamination of vehicles, and a decontamination line for personnel terminating in a hot shower on the lines described for the German army above. A full-scale demonstration of this equipment was put on by United States Army Europe for the benefit of the Rapporteur. At unit level, all vehicles carry a vehicle decontamination spray (with limited capability) and some further decontamination supplies are carried in each company.

4.89. For detection monitoring and warning, the United States has on issue an automatic chemical agent warning device operating on an electro-chemical principle. It is designed to be deployed 400 metres up-wind and provides audible warning of a chemical attack. Similar equipment has also been described for the French army above. Individual dosimeters are still of the quartz fibre, gamma ray only, type. The reconnaissance squad of the chemical defence company referred to above is fully equipped with dose rate meters to carry out radiological contamination surveys.

1. The components of TAB include:
   (*i*) 39 mg of N, N'-trimethylene-bis (pyrimidinium-4-aldoxime) propane tribromide (TMB-4);
   (*ii*) 1 mg of atropine SO_4;
   (*iii*) 4 mg of benactyzine HCl.

(*c*) *National protective measures for the civilian population*

(*i*) *NATO and general considerations*

4.90. Through its Civil Emergency Planning Committee, composed of senior representatives from the member countries, mostly from the Ministries of the Interior, NATO endeavours to co-ordinate a whole range of national civil activities needed to mobilise the resources of a country in war. These include the preservation of the machinery of government; the preparation and exercise of emergency powers; civil support for military preparedness and operations; organisation of services such as transport, food, agriculture, industry, energy, manpower and communications; security and protection of populations. Civil defence in the narrower sense – the protection of the population against the effects of weapons considered in this report – is an exclusively national responsibility, but NATO attempts to provide guidance through its Civil Defence Committee (a committee subordinate to the Civil Emergency Planning Committee), composed of senior representatives from Ministries of the Interior, although the level of representation varies from one country to another.

4.91. In February 1979 the North Atlantic Council received from the Civil Emergency Planning Committee an internal report on the current state of civilian preparedness in the NATO countries. This showed that a northern tier of countries comprising Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands were ahead of other NATO countries in their preparations. Two years earlier, the North Atlantic Council approved ministerial guidance to the NATO countries calling for improved public awareness of the needs for civil defence and better arrangements for the physical protection of the population against the effects of nuclear and chemical weapons (but not biological weapons which were no longer considered a military threat). A questionnaire was sent to member governments on the status of their preparations. It has proved impossible, on the basis of the replies, to compile comparable figures for national expenditure on civil defence.

4.92. The NATO staff responsible feel that national information policy on civil defence should be vastly improved to make the public aware both of the threat and of the measures that can be taken to improve the prospects of survival. Most governments have refrained from taking action in peacetime, partly because the subject is politically unpopular, partly from a fear that publicity for the sort of damage that would be inflicted by a nuclear attack would either stimulate demand for uneconomic blast shelters or, by reaction, encourage political opposition to defence expenditure as a whole.

4.93. It is nevertheless stressed that even in a total nuclear exchange something over one-half of the population of the industrialised countries could be expected to survive the initial exchange, but will be in urgent need of civil defence measures to prolong their survival despite the effects of fallout. Casualties will be considerably reduced by civil defence measures.

4.94. Although NATO gave civil defence guidance to member countries up to the early 1960s, it has no currently-agreed "doctrine". Most energy is being devoted today to discussion of "crisis management" for handling situations during a phase of crisis and conventional war. Experts feel that civil defence planning should cover a whole range of possible situations from crisis up to a total nuclear exchange.

4.95. As far as monitoring and warning is concerned, NATO would not be directly involved in the communication of fallout data and prediction, which is arranged on a bilateral basis between the civil defence organisations of member countries. NATO responsibility would be limited to an upward reporting of the general situation in member countries up to the North Atlantic Council.

4.96. As far as shelter policy is concerned, it is pointed out by NATO experts that the provision of substantial nuclear blast-resistant shelters for any significant proportion of the population would be expensive – perhaps prohibitively expensive. But the provision of fallout shelters can be arranged on a "do-it-yourself" basis provided there is advanced planning and the population is informed. Nuclear radiation from radioactive fallout can be reduced by a factor of 100 by selecting a central internal area in an ordinary two-storey house with makeshift additional protection. Bungalows would offer less protection than two-storey houses, and a protection factor of perhaps only 10 times could be aimed at. It is important to provide all necessities for 15 days' uninterrupted occupation of the shelter, as that is the period during which nuclear radiation from fallout would be dangerously intense.

4.97. Figures were quoted for the proportion of the population for which shelters were available, ranging from 70 % in Norway and 60 % in Denmark to less than 10 % for most other countries.

4.98. As far as protection against chemical warfare is concerned, there is no policy for the whole population in most countries. The provision of respirators today is generally ruled out for economic reasons even by some countries that procured them in 1939. Compared with the threat from fallout, the chemical threat would be only a transient one and expenditure on fallout shelters would therefore be more cost-effective than expenditure on respirators. Some countries have however provided chemical filters in collective shelters and Denmark is believed to be considering providing respirators for the population as a whole. It was suggested that consideration should be given to providing chemical protection for workers in certain key sectors such as ports.

4.99. Every two years, NATO conducts its "WINTEX" exercise which involves both crisis management procedures with the participation of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels and the civil defence and military planning staffs in the member countries. The level and scope of participation in the civil emergency planning aspects of the exercise varies considerably from country to country. Denmark, Norway and Germany take it most seriously, the United Kingdom participates to a limited extent, but other countries less completely.

(ii) Belgium

4.100. The organisation of civil defence in Belgium as in other countries comes under the Ministry of the Interior. The annual budget is BF 880 million ($29 million)[1] to which, it was pointed out, should be added local government budgets of BF 4 billion ($132 million) for the command fire brigades. Much of this budget covers peacetime civil accident services (for instance motorway accident and flood defences) which are provided by the Belgian civil defence organisation.

4.101. It has been pointed out above that comparable figures for civil defence expenditure in different NATO countries are not available; the Belgian authorities believed national annual per capita expenditure on civil defence to be (Belgian Francs): Belgium – 71; Netherlands – 80; Sweden, Switzerland, Norway – 320; Soviet Union – 247.

4.102. The Belgian civil defence organisation has 700 full-time personnel and 10,000 volunteers who man in particular 5 mobile rescue columns comprising 80-90 vehicles each and a few helicopters. Conscientious objectors to national service are required to do 20 months' service in the civil defence organisation (instead of 10 months in the armed forces).

4.103. Belgium does not yet have a protected seat of government, but construction of one is under consideration. It has a national civil defence headquarters post at Walem, between Brussels and Antwerp. It is located in a 19th century fort which has been given additional roof protection and is to be still further strengthened. The communications network

1. $1 = BF 30.4.

centre is housed on the second floor with exterior windows through which pass communications lines.

4.104. The monitoring, warning and communication and alert system in Belgium is based on 147 monitoring posts located in each of the geo-reference grid rectangles into which the territory is divided for control purposes. Each post is equipped with fallout detectors, to the standards of NATO Stanag 2103, and a ground zero indicator and flash-to-bang meter. These two instruments enable the location of nuclear explosions to be determined. Monitoring posts report upwards to transmission centres of which there are about 5 in each of the 9 provinces and the province command posts report directly to the national command post at Walem.

4.105. Communications are largely by telephone at the lower end of the chain with wireless and multiplex higher up. It will be linked to the NATO NICS communications system by the end of 1980. The investment programme in these communications is BF 85 million ($3 million).

4.106. The national civil defence command post at Walem maintains bilateral communications with neighbouring countries – United Kingdom, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Germany, France – each of which country will maintain a liaison officer at Walem in war, while Belgium will maintain liaison officers in the corresponding command posts of these countries.

4.107. The alert in Belgium can be given by sounding sirens which can be controlled directly both from monitoring posts and from transmission centres. There are 1,187 throughout the country which are regularly tested at 12.30 on the first Thursday of each month.

4.108. Public information policy in Belgium is being reviewed at the present time. The issue of a new pamphlet to the population is being considered. It would probably warn the population of the need to "stay put" in the event of a nuclear threat and would contain information on simple fallout shelter construction. The emphasis in this pamphlet will be on protection both against nuclear attacks in war, and against possible nuclear or chemical disaster in peacetime in the neighbourhood of nuclear power plants or dangerous chemical factories.

4.109. Although NATO policy is to recommend that the population be advised to "stay put" rather than to seek to evacuate towns, because a moving population would be at far greater risk from fallout than if it remains at home in fallout shelters, Belgium already makes an exception for areas around nuclear power stations and dangerous chemical plants, where local evacuation plans will exist for situations where advanced warning of possible radioactive or chemical contamination may be available. Wider plans, for the possible evacuation of towns in the event of war, are also being studied within the administration. Refugees from other countries in the event of a war are considered a considerable potential problem in Belgium.

4.110. Although a few above-ground fallout shelters were built in the Antwerp area in the years 1952-53, Belgium has no current policy for the construction of collective shelters for civilians. No legislation was reported for the mandatory construction of shelters in any new buildings.

4.111. There is no policy for protecting the population as a whole from any threat of attack by chemical weapons. Protective clothing is to be procured for the civil defence personnel jointly with the army. These personnel are already issued with respirators.

(iii) France

4.112. In France the *Direction de la Sécurité civile* comes under the Ministry of the Interior. It is a substantial organisation with a wide range of peacetime responsibilities as well as civil defence proper in war. Branches of the organisation are responsible, for example, for anti-pollution measures on beaches, forest fire fighting and road safety. The *Centre Opérationel Direction Sécurité Civile* (CODISC), housed in an unprotected industrial building in Paris, provides a command post for supervision of civil protection activities in peacetime.

4.113. French civil defence policy was completely overhauled following the creation of the French nuclear striking force. It is considered that the nuclear submarine base in Brittany, the surface missile base in Provence, and Paris would be three likely targets for a nuclear strike. Estimates of a strike by 14 weapons of megaton size employed in a ground burst rôle against these 3 targets predicted 0.4 million dead in the first minute and a further 6.5 million dead from fallout over the following few months, as the fallout patterns from the 3 targets would be expected to spread in 3 strips across the whole breadth of French territory.

4.114. The warning, monitoring and alert system in France is fully organised, based on joint air force-civil fallout warning posts. The main post for the whole country is based in a protected site at Taverny to the north of Paris (which was visited by the Committee in 1971) and there are 6 further centres known as *Bureau général d'alerte* in 6 regional air force warning centres. There are monitoring posts throughout the country. The alert system has 4,000 warning sirens sited in all towns with more

than 4,000 inhabitants. They are tested at noon on the first Thursday of each month[1].

4.115. Public information policy so far appears to have been limited to the distribution of technical advisory information about the fallout protection provided by buildings, referred to below. But a very informative pamphlet on providing fallout shelter protection has been prepared for issue to every dwelling in France giving instructions about how to survive in a fallout shelter for 14 days. This pamphlet is to be distributed as soon as the four-year shelter programme referred to in the next paragraph has been completed. To be kept in each dwelling, it will list the occupants of the dwelling and the place of fallout shelter assigned to the occupants.

4.116. French protection policy is based on the "stay put" principle, but consideration is being given to planning evacuation for particularly threatened areas such as West Brittany, and possibly for the partial reduction of the populations of towns so as to reduce the demographic target offered to an adversary.

4.117. The provision of shelters is seen in France as the necessary counterpart of its policy of nuclear deterrence. A census has been undertaken over the last 2 years of existing premises offering fallout protection throughout the country. It has revealed a reasonable situation in towns and a 10 % shortage of shelters in the countryside. A shelter building programme costing FF 1 million ($0.24 million) was carried out in 7 *départements*[2] in 1979 and is to be extended over the next 4 years beginning in 1980 to 25 *départements* at a cost of FF 5 million ($1.2 million). Very good technical building literature is available showing the amount of protection from fallout that can be provided in different locations in different types of buildings. It is pointed out that the inner areas of the middle floors of tall apartment blocks will provide protection, when the ground floor would not because of radiation from fallout on the ground outside. Since 1978 building regulations have required cellars of apartment blocks to be strong enough to resist the collapse of the building.

4.118. This project will have covered a quarter of France in the next 4 years and the policy eventually is to allocate a shelter position for each person in the country. Implementation of this shelter policy, however, is carried out through local government, down to down halls in each commune, acting only on government encouragement. The degree of co-operation is not uniform.

1. Personal observation by the Office of the Clerk.

2. A *département* is a French administrative district of some 700,000 inhabitants on average.

4.119. There is no policy at present to provide air filters for shelters. The policy is to close all apertures at the time that fallout arrives.

4.120. France has no policy to provide protection against chemical warfare for the population as a whole, considering that it is not possible with normal means to provide protection against nerve gases.

(iv) Germany

4.121. The Rapporteur has not called on the civil defence authorities in Germany, but they have kindly supplied documentation providing the basis of this section. The act of 9th July 1968 on the extension of disaster control made the Federal Government responsible for the extended use of the peacetime disaster control units and services which are maintained by the *Länder* as agents of the Federal Government. This extended use will include civil defence duties in war, for which purpose the units and services were to be augmented by the Federal Government and provided with additional equipment and training. The peacetime disaster control units and services, including voluntary helpers, amount to a total of 1.2 million throughout Germany, including 135,000 augmentation personnel from various public services and voluntary organisations who are financed and accommodated by the Federal Government as follows :

	Municipal fire brigades	36,000
Voluntary organisations	*Arbeiter-Samariter-Bund*	2,500
	Deutsches Rotes Kreuz	23,000
	Johanniter-Unfall-Hilfe	3,000
	Malteser-Hilfdienst	5,500
	Technisches Hilfswerk	42,000
	Units under the direct control of the chief executive officer of the local authority	23,000

These units, including in particular the *Technisches Hilfswerk* (technical support service), function also in the event of natural disasters in peacetime such as the earthquake in Baden-Württemburg in 1978 and the severe snowfalls of 1979.

4.122. The 1979 civil defence budget was DM 583 million ($332 million) and in 1980 DM

625 million ($356 million) out of total civil emergency planning budgets of DM 731 million ($417 million) and DM 740 million ($422 million).

4.123. The warning system for the population is based on sirens and radio to give warning of air raids, radioactive fallout, or dangers from biological or chemical agents. There are separate siren signals used in peacetime to mean "listen on the radio for an important message" and for a fire alarm. There are separate wartime signals warning of air attack, radioactive fallout or biological or chemical attack, and all-clear. The sirens are tested twice a year.

4.124. Monitoring of the NBC situation is the responsibility of 1,000 unmanned warning service monitoring posts and about 560 manned observation and monitoring posts. The territory of Germany is divided into 10 warning districts in each of which there are 3 to 5 warning service monitoring centres which collate and transmit reports from the monitoring posts as well as collecting their own data locally. Communications are provided by permanently leased PTT circuits for the warning network; it is planned to establish a VHF radio network. The warning service at present comprises 350 full-time personnel, 230 part-time and approximately 1,500 voluntary helpers. In peacetime the warning and monitoring service undertakes the monitoring of air pollution in the atmosphere.

4.125. Information policy stresses the normality in peacetime of civil defence services which in Germany are used to deal with peacetime disasters as well as wartime situations. "Self-protection" measures are stressed and it is planned to provide 1 self-protection adviser per 6,000-10,000 inhabitants with offices in information centres which are to be established by local authorities in peacetime. The *Bundesverband für den Selbstschutz* (BVS – Federal Association for Self-Protection) organises meetings of various sorts to inform the public about self-protection measures including the construction of fallout shelters and measures of protection against NBC weapons.

4.126. "Stay put" remains the basis of German policy for protection of the civilian population in war and legal powers are provided in the act on the extension of disaster control quoted above for persons to be ordered not to leave their usual place of residence without permission. However, the same act makes provision for the evacuation of populations from particularly exposed areas.

4.127. The shelter programme provided for in the Shelter Construction Act of 1965 distinguished between domestic shelters in residential buildings and places of work on the one hand, and public shelters to be provided by renovating World War II air-raid shelters and the construction of dual-purpose installations with peacetime functions such as underground car parks or other underground structures, with provision for rapid conversion to shelter use. Since 1950 the construction of 1,874,000 shelter places has been subsidised. The 1965 act was to have made the provision of shelters in new constructions a legal obligation, but this provision was suspended the same year for financial reasons. Official encouragement of voluntary shelter construction was suspended in 1975 because the specifications, providing for maximum protection, had made construction too expensive. Official encouragement was, however, resumed late in 1977 on the basis of reduced specifications. The government is renovating certain World War II shelters; central government financial assistance is available for approved projects for the provision of public shelters in underground public buildings and in schools. Grants are also available to private builders for the installation of shelters in new buildings. An increased depreciation allowance of 10 % per annum for a period of 10 years, subject to a ceiling, is available for shelter construction costs not covered by other subsidies.

(*v*) *Italy*

4.128. In Italy a distinction is made between "civil protection" and "civil defence". While both concern activities in aid of the civil population, the first is concerned with natural disasters in peacetime, the second with wartime, when "civil protection" is only one of the aspects of "civil defence" activity. Civil protection is the responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior, civil defence of all ministries, each according to its functions. There is close co-operation between the military authorities and the national civil defence organisation both in current planning, during exercises and when natural disasters occur.

4.129. The first legislative provision in this field is Act 469, issued in 1961, which entrusts the Ministry of the Interior with the establishment and operation of special units for the protection of the civil population, known as "mobile columns". The same act also makes the Ministry of the Interior responsible for the protection of the civil population from dangers connected with the civil use of nuclear power. Consequently the "national radioactivity monitoring network" was established, based on 1,625 monitoring stations distributed over the whole national territory. A second legislative provision, Act 996, issued in 1970, makes the Minister of the Interior responsible for the co-ordination of rescue activity of all civilian and military, national, regional and local organisations.

4.130. Co-ordination of civil defence has been delegated to the Ministry of the Interior. To provide for the maintenance of government and information of the political authority, an unprotected decision centre has been constructed at an alternate site with telecommunications including a secure voice link to NATO headquarters. As a protected decision centre will not be ready in the near future, a couple of rooms will be available in the alarm centre to provide a protected centre for the authorities directly involved with civil protection.

4.131. Fallout monitoring is the responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior; monitoring of enemy or unknown aircraft flying on the national territory is the responsibility of the air force. All pertinent data from the fallout monitoring network and from the air force are sent to the alarm centre. A warning system is under consideration but will be constructed only after the alarm centre and its peripheral connections are completed.

4.132. Public information policy is to inform the population on the effects of offensive weapons especially nuclear weapons and on the possibilities of self-protection measures. Action is restricted to the collection of information.

4.133. Stay-put policy. Evacuation of the population from big urban centres is not contemplated except for the non-active population. There are plans for the control of refugees and the evacuation of populations in particular areas, in order not to interfere with military operations.

4.134. The main protected shelters dating back to the second world war (mainly underground air-raid shelters) and all areas involved have been acquired by the state. Some have been repaired; all are closed and protected. But no supplementary measures are contemplated either for the construction of new public shelters or to require or encourage the construction of private shelters by grants to private house-owners. A law of 1940 requires all tube tunnels and stations to be constructed so as to be readily adapted to shelters. Every possible effort is made to secure the application of this law by the municipalities.

(*vi*) *Luxembourg*

4.135. Under the organic law of 11th November 1976, civil defence includes all measures designed to protect and assist the public and property in the event of accidents and disasters in peacetime and in war. Civil defence is the responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior, which is assisted by a special department, the national civil defence service.

4.136. There is a 2,200 strong grand-ducal brigade of civil defence volunteers deployed in 23 regional intervention centres. In peacetime it provides ambulance service and lifesaving facilities for the whole country except the capital. A special unit of frogmen and another responsible for intervening in the event of nuclear accidents form part of this brigade. Fire-fighting, the responsibility of the local authorities, is handled by 7,500 voluntary firemen.

4.137. The warning, monitoring and alert network includes 240 sirens capable of alerting about 87 % of the population. Sirens are operated from the national alert centre which is also linked with Radio-Télé-Luxembourg so that it is possible to remain in contact with the public in time of crisis. Measurement of radioactivity is conducted by 12 detection and recording posts; data are transmitted on request to the national alert centre.

4.138. Until 1967 traditional methods of public information were used to inform the public about the possibilities of self-preservation in case of war. Booklets sent to every household made the public aware of the dangers of nuclear weapons and the possibilities of protection. Similarly, booklets sent to farms give instructions about measures to be taken in agriculture in the event of radioactive fallout. Other methods of information used are press articles for publication in emergencies and films and slides which can be projected on television screens.

4.139. Because of its geographical position the Grand Duchy has a definite interest in the NATO "stay put" policy which has been adopted. It may be difficult to apply in practice because the police force might be insufficient. There is no policy for providing shelters for the whole population in peacetime. Measures have been taken to instruct the population in emergencies about improvising fallout shelters and how to improve the protection afforded by cellars of private homes. No plan for protecting the population against chemical agents exists at present.

(*vii*) *Netherlands*

4.140. In the Netherlands, the broad functions of civil emergency planning are all co-ordinated by the Minister of the Interior. The Queen's Commissioner (provincial governor) is responsible in each of the 11 provinces. The organisation of civil defence proper comes within the civil emergency planning arrangement. The Civil Defence Act provides for each burgomaster to be responsible for the organisation of civil defence in his community but communities under the act have been grouped into 45 civil defence districts covering the whole of the Netherlands. The burgomasters from the communities within each district form the civil

defence district council which administers civil defence in the district. Each burgomaster remains entitled to amplify the decisions of the district council within his own communities.

4.141. The district council has a civil defence controller with a full-time staff. There are 57 civil defence control centres which are manned in an emergency, housed in concrete bunkers.

4.142. Below the district civil defence system citizens are encouraged to operate self-help groups and in urban communities there is a district warden per 15,000 inhabitants and a block warden per 200 inhabitants.

4.143. Within each district civil defence command, the following services are provided: warning; advanced assistance; fire-fighting; rescue; medical; NBC monitoring and decontamination, communications; and supply.

4.144. On mobilisation, the Royal Netherlands Army provides staff and equipment for mobile columns which are made available to the Minister of the Interior. These provide 12 fire-fighting mobile columns, each of 808 men equipped with 48 fire engines and 163 motor vehicles. There are 12 rescue/medical mobile columns, each of 893 men with 195 motor vehicles and 2 overhead loaders.

4.145. Civil defence personnel are of 4 categories : full-time staff officers; local government officials; volunteers; conscripts (national service personnel who have not been called up into the armed services).

4.146. The total wartime establishment of the civil defence service once mobilised is 117,800 plus a further 58,400 in "self-help groups", making a grand total of about 176,200 personnel.

4.147. The civil defence budget of the Netherlands for 1980 amounts to Guilders 116.5 million ($60.4 million) made up as follows :

(Dollars million)

Ministry of the Interior	5.0
Telecommunications	3.1
Grants to provinces	3.7
Grants to districts	36.0
Training	1.4
Exercises	0.1
Civil Defence College	1.6
Stores	2.8
Others	0.2
	54.0
Construction including shelters	6.4
	60.4 (Guilders 116.5 million)

4.148. The warning, monitoring and alarm system in the Netherlands is well organised and makes provision for warning of both fallout and chemical attack. Throughout the country there are 300 fixed monitoring posts equipped to measure fallout and to locate the point of nuclear explosions and their yield by means of ground zero indicators and flash-to-bang meters. There are 900 mobile monitoring groups in the NBC service which man and also provide a decontamination service.

4.149. The warning service itself has a section in the military control and reporting centre of the air defence system and also receives information upwards from the 300 monitoring stations located at distances 10-15 km apart (the "coarse network"). There are an additional 500 B monitoring stations at 5-7 km intervals forming the "fine network".

4.150. To disseminate warning there are some 4,000 sirens throughout the Netherlands which with different signals can provide warning of air attack; all-clear; black warning (fallout imminent); yellow warning (chemical attack imminent). A further grey warning (fallout expected within 1 hour) can be given by radio as can also the black and yellow warnings.

4.151. Public information policy in the Netherlands on civil defence measures is conservative. Leaflets have not been issued to the public as a whole since 1961. The text of emergency instructions for the population is at present kept up to date under the responsibility of the burgomaster in each community, with information relevant to the particular community. The plan is to print these instructions on local newspaper presses in an emergency and to broadcast them on television.

4.152. Protection policy in the Netherlands is the "stay put" system and a shelter programme is in hand. A survey was carried out in 1972 to determine the availability of fallout shelters within domestic dwellings which showed that simple self-help measures could provide a protection factor of 30 in 30 % of homes; that 24 % of the population could be sheltered in large buildings if makeshift protection measures were taken; 46 % of the population would be without shelter. As however not all shelter spaces are located where they are needed, the real shortfall is greater than the survey revealed.

4.153. Legislation and regulations have provided since 1956 for all new two-storey houses to provide protection in the basement and since 1968 for them to provide fallout protection as well. Since 1958 initial shelter provision had to be provided in work places where more than 30 persons were employed. In 1970, the Shelter Committee proposed further measures which would increase the production of dual-purpose

shelters and "slanting" of new construction. Dual-purpose shelters are underground structures with peacetime purposes, such as underground garages, which are specially constructed with additional facilities to serve as shelters in war. These additional facilities include blast-proof sliding doors; alternative entrances through air-locks; the provision of air filters proof against both radioactive fallout and chemical weapons; toilet facilities; bunks and bedding. "Slanting" of new construction means the deliberate adoption in new buildings of materials and design techniques which will enhance the protection they will provide from radioactive fallout.

4.154. The shelter programme recommended by the Shelter Committee to the government would involve an expenditure at 1978 prices of Guilders 27 million ($14 million) per year for the next 20 years 1980-2000.

4.155. Protection of the population agains chemical attack is taken more seriously in the Netherlands than in most other countries. As pointed out above, some dual-purpose shelters have been provided with chemical air filters. The monitoring and warning system in the Netherlands includes provision for detection and warning of chemical attack, and the surveying of chemically contaminated areas. Self-help fallout shelters are intended to be sealed in the event of chemical attack so that the air change is reduced to zero during the passage of a gas cloud. In addition, a number of designs of rudimentary respirator based on active carbon impregnated pads to cover the nose and mouth are being considered for issue to the whole population.

(viii) Norway

4.156. In Norway the civil defence organisation is understood to come under the Ministry of Justice; it is among the most developed in NATO countries. There are 53 local civil defence organisations coming under the local chief constable throughout the country and a total strength of 60,000 persons including 10,000 in mobile columns.

4.157. Those liable to national service may elect to serve in civil defence, when they undergo only 2 weeks' training but have a longer reserve liability (18-65 years compared with an upper age limit of 45 in the armed forces). Both sexes are liable for compulsory service in the civil defence, but service is not unpopular with the population as a whole.

4.158. There is a central civil defence training school and 3 district schools for training specialists and officers of the civil defence corps. The remaining personnel are trained in their own towns. Norway regularly organises national civil defence training exercises, aiming to involve all reservists in an exercise once every 3 years. The annual civil defence budget proper is something over Norwegian Kroner 100 million ($20 million) and a similar sum is devoted to the shelter construction programme.

4.159. The monitoring and warning system is based on 400 monitoring posts located all over Norway, some in local telegraph offices. Civil defence communications employ both land lines and radio. A dedicated civil defence network of PTT lines becomes available on the alert, and the PTT cable system is highly redundant with nodes in hardened sites built into the rock. Considerable attention is said to have been given to protection against electromagnetic pulse. There is also a radio network.

4.160. The warning system relies on sirens as a signal to the population to listen to the radio when more detailed information can be given. The system is tested twice a year. The civil defence organisation provides some decontamination squads.

4.161. Peacetime public information policy in Norway is less restricted than in most countries. Some leaflets have been distributed to interested organisations, giving information in particular on how to build fallout shelters. Large stocks of leaflets are held for distribution in an emergency. Full information on evacuation routes in the major towns is printed in all telephone directories[1]. In addition, during siren tests civil defence information programmes are run on television.

4.162. The protection policy for the population has in the past been based on two pre-attack evacuation plans for the cities – a limited plan to evacuate half the population and a total evacuation plan. But with the improvement of shelter space availability, the evacuation plan is being rethought. Meanwhile full details of it are to be found in all local telephone directories.

4.163. Norway has an active shelter policy, the provision of shelters of various categories being compulsory in all new buildings with certain exceptions. The emphasis is on collective shelters. There are now places for about half the population, more in the densely-populated areas, and the number of places available increases each year.

4.164. Norway imposes 3 different shelter specifications for different scheduled areas, the better shelters being provided in the more densely-populated urban areas:

Area A – Built to withstand blast over pressure of 2 atmospheres. Fitted with chemical and nuclear fallout filters; pro-

1. See Appendix I.

tection factor against radiation – 100 or 40.

Area B – Blast protection 1 atmosphere over pressure; chemical and radioactive fallout filters fitted; radiation protection factor – 100 or 40.

Area C – Fallout shelters only; protection factor against radiation generally 10 or 20.

Remote country areas – no shelters required.

4.165. These criteria have been in force for the last 2 years only but apply to both private and municipal shelters. The requirement for the provision of a shelter in new private construction applies only to houses over a specified ground area. Norway has no final target for shelter spaces as a percent of the population.

4.166. The policy on protection against chemical attack is centred on the collective shelters in the larger urban areas which are fitted with chemical filters. A respirator programme for the whole population has been stopped. There is a stockpile of respirators for rather less than 10 % of the population. Civil defence decontamination squads are of course equipped with both respirators and protective clothing.

(*ix*) *United Kingdom*

4.167. In 1968 Britain's Civil Defence Corps of volunteers was disbanded and civil defence was put on a care and maintenance basis. There are 24 sub-regional headquarters which in theory should be secure underground shelters. From a total civil emergency planning expenditure, inclusive of emergency food stockpiles, of £25.8 million a year ($58.6 million), a sum of £4.7 million ($10.7 million) covers departmental staff and the warning and monitoring organisation.

4.168. The monitoring and warning system is based on 873 protected underground monitoring posts, all equipped with ground zero and weapon yield indicators and fallout measurement equipment. They are manned by voluntary Royal Observer Corps personnel who regularly participate in exercises. The warning system is based on the ability to interrupt radio and television programmes and 7,000 power sirens in range of 85 % of the population, supplemented by 11,000 hand-operated sirens in rural areas.

4.169. The public information policy in peacetime has been restricted to a pamphlet entitled "Nuclear Weapons" which provides technical information on the effects of nuclear explosions and gives protective factors. The government have recently made available a pamphlet "Protect and Survive" intended for distribution only a few days before an anticipated attack and giving instructions for making a refuge in the home. An updated version of "Protect and Survive" is being prepared and will be available for sale shortly. There are additionally television films prepared for release in the weeks preceding an attack which will also give information on the preparation of fallout shelters and emphasise the "stay put" policy which is now that for the whole population. Limited evacuation plans for certain urban areas drawn up in 1963-65 have been scrapped.

4.170. There is no peacetime shelter policy in the United Kingdom for the population as a whole. Present plans are to rely solely on the preparation of fallout shelters by the population itself in the days preceding any emergency. There are no plans to provide protection against chemical attack.

4.171. The government is reviewing home defence plans in the United Kingdom and an announcement is expected shortly.

V. Conclusions

5.1. The Committee's principal conclusions are set forth in the draft recommendation.

5.2. *Paragraphs (i) to (iii) of the preamble* summarise the position concerning the arms control agreements in force and in the course of negotiation as far as NBC weapons are concerned. These have been described in detail in Chapter III of this explanatory memorandum. NATO strategy relies on maintaining a balance with the Warsaw Pact in nuclear weapons and the Committee has always endorsed this strategy.

5.3. As parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol on chemical weapons, however, all NATO (and Warsaw Pact) countries have renounced the use of chemical weapons, although seven of the former and four of the latter, including the United States and the Soviet Union, have reserved the right of retaliatory use. Of the NATO countries only the United States today possesses stocks of chemical weapons, albeit obsolescent, which could be used for retaliatory purposes; current United States policy has been described (Chapter II above, paragraphs 2.56-2.61); France is understood to hold smaller quantities (Chapter II, paragraph 2.64).

5.4. *At the end of paragraph (iii) and in paragraph (iv) of the preamble* the Committee states its belief that, pending the outcome of current negotiations on an effective and verifiable ban on chemical weapons as a whole, the non-use of chemical weapons is best ensured by maintaining a balance in deterrent, retaliatory and defensive capability in such weapons between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

5.5. *Paragraph (v) of the preamble* simply stresses that the threat of nuclear and chemical weapons continues to hang over military personnel and the civilian population alike.

5.6. In *paragraph (vi) of the preamble* the Committee stresses the need for adequate protective equipment and procedures (described in Chapter IV of this explanatory memorandum), which can be proof against any known chemical weapon. If coupled with adequate warning, such equipment can nullify most of the military effects of chemical attack to the point where the use of chemical weapons may appear an unattractive option to an adversary. As pointed out in paragraph 2.46 there is in any case a huge uncertainty, imposed especially by variable weather conditions, about the effects of a chemical weapons attack as far as the user is concerned.

5.7. *Paragraph (vii) of the preamble* asserts that it is the moral duty of governments to inform their populations in peacetime of the dangers of nuclear, biological and chemical attack – as explained in Chapter IV (*c*) not all governments have so far conducted a public information programme in peacetime. The Committee stresses the need for certain minimum civil defence measures in peacetime which are listed in operative paragraph 4 of the recommendation.

5.8. In *paragraph 1 of the operative text* the Committee calls for the full implications of chemical and nuclear attack to be recognised, and stresses the great importance of proper training and equipment for the armed forces to provide for nuclear, biological and chemical defence. National protective measures for military personnel are described in Chapter IV (*d*) of this explanatory memorandum. The Committee has noted the following deficiencies:

(*i*) Detection of chemical attack. Most allied units are still equipped with chemical detection devices which involve the tedious and lengthy manipulation of chemical agents. Automatic black box warning devices, such as the British NAIAD, where available, still have their limitations; automatic distant-warning devices, which could prevent initial casualties to unprotected personnel at the outset of a nerve agent attack, have not yet been developed. More co-ordinated research is needed, and the best equipment introduced into service.

(*ii*) Dosimeters to detect the amount of nuclear radiation received by personnel are mostly issued on the scale of only 1 per squad of 6 or 10 men, and for the most part do not measure any exposure to neutrons. Individual dosimeters should be more widely issued, and neutron-sensitive dosimeters should be available at least on a scale of 1 per armoured fighting vehicle, where they would be of most use.

(*iii*) Protective clothing, effective in particular against chemical attack but which also provides some protection against thermal flash from nuclear weapons, is not issued to all personnel in all forces. Modern protective clothing with improved wearability in combat conditions is available and should be procured and issued on a scale of 1 or 2 spares per man for front-line forces. Appropriate protection for aircrew is still a subject of debate and appears to the Committee to require urgent action.

(*iv*) While effective respirators appear to be universally issued to the armed forces, it is essential that canisters should be interoperable with a screw thread conforming to NATO Stanags, and sufficient spare canisters readily available. The United States current respirator does not meet the Stanag.

(*v*) All new models of closed vehicles, whether armoured or not, should be fitted with an individual piped supply of filtered air for all crew, and similar provision should be made for command posts and medical centres in the field.

(*vi*) While all military personnel appear to be issued with individual decontamination material, it is essential that proper provision should be made for part decontamination of vehicles on the battlefield and for full decontamination of vehicles and heavy equipment by trained teams in the rear area. Proper equipment must be available and local resources in the corps area, such as car washes, should be surveyed and earmarked in peacetime.

(*vii*) The Committee recognises that the problem of decontaminating relatively fragile equipment such as aircraft does not appear to have been completely solved, presents a considerable problem for service and repair, and calls for urgent action to correct this weakness.

(*viii*) The development of a self-decontaminating paint for army vehicles appears to be a possibility although in some quarters it is believed that such paint would be so toxic as to make its general use more harmful than beneficial. More research is required.

(*ix*) All electronic equipment – communications and radar – must be protected against the effects of electromagnetic pulse (EMP) that may be associated with a high-altitude nuclear explosion (described in Chapter II (*b*) (*vii*). Although described in open literature at least since 1964, the decision to provide protection in new equipment appears to have been taken by NATO countries at various times between 1970 and 1978.

5.9. In *operative paragraph 1 (b)* the Committee stresses the need for co-operation in research and the production of interoperable equipment. While there are many international committees and panels attempting to co-ordinate research into protection against chemical weapons, both in the NATO and FINABEL frameworks and elsewhere, it appears that the results of pharmacological research are not always comparable between countries, and, as noted above in the case of the United States gas mask, essential interoperability has not yet been achieved. Research into a range of antidotes for chemical weapons should be given priority.

5.10. In *paragraph 2 of the operative text* the Committee calls for steps to ensure that the chemical deterrent and retaliatory capability of NATO countries is equal to the estimated offensive chemical capability of the Warsaw Pact. Information concerning present stocks of chemical weapons held by the United States and the Soviet Union, and pilot production in France, is given in Chapter II (*d*)(*iv*) of this explanatory memorandum. Other NATO and Warsaw Pact countries are understood not to hold stocks of chemical weapons.

5.11. In *paragraph 3 of the operative text* the Committee calls for more active encouragement on the part of governments for the bilateral and multilateral negotiations on a convention for a total properly-verified ban on chemical weapons. If these negotiations are conducted in parallel in both the forum of the Disarmament Committee in Geneva as well as in the bilateral United States-Soviet Union talks, there will be greater international public pressure on the Soviet Union to agree the necessary measures of verification. The status of the negotiations is described in Chapter III (*d*) (*ii*) of this explanatory memorandum.

5.12. In *paragraph 4 of the operative text* the Committee enumerates the five main points of what it considers should be a minimal civil defence programme in peacetime. The extent to which member countries meet this programme is described in Chapter IV (*c*) of this explanatory memorandum and the Committee is greatly concerned at the deficiencies in the majority of the civil defence programmes that have been examined.

5.13. In *paragraph 5 of the operative text* the Committee calls for the publication by NATO, each year, of comparable statistics of national expenditure on civil defence. The absence of any such comparable figures is noted in paragraph 4.91. An agreed common definition of items to be included in "civil defence" expenditure is required.

VI. *Opinion of the minority*

6.1. The report as a whole was adopted in Committee by 13 votes to 1 with 0 abstentions. A minority of the Committee, larger than the vote would suggest, while supporting much of the rest of the report, would have deleted in the draft recommendation the last part of paragraph (*iii*) and the whole of paragraph (*iv*) of the preamble, and operative paragraph 2. They were opposed to any country holding stocks of chemical weapons, did not believe such weapons were a deterrent, and believed their absence would contribute to détente.

6.2. A minority did not support the proposals for a civil defence programme in paragraph (*vii*) of the preamble and in operative paragraph 4 because they considered that such a programme would be of uncertain value, and could be held to weaken deterrence. They would have preferred the following wording: "to investigate the possibility of civil defence programmes for survival".

6.3. The minority would have deleted operative paragraph 4 (*e*) because they were opposed to entrepreneurial methods for providing protective equipment for the population.

APPENDIX I

Civil defence information in the Norwegian telephone directory

Sivilforsvaret skal hjelpe sivilbefolkningen under krig og ved katastrofer i fred.

Det ledes av Direktoratet for sivilt beredskap under Justisdepartementet.

I lokale sivilforsvar og noen andre steder kan lydgivere gi tre signaler: Viktig melding – lytt på radio, Flyalarm og Faren over. Se neste side i katalogen!



Krigsutflytting og evakuering er planlagt for byer, tettbebyggelser og andre utsatte områder. Planene omfatter først og fremst barn under 18 år, uføre, gamle over 70 år, omsorgspersonell, gravide og enkelte andre.
Pålegg om krigsutflytting gis som regel av Regjeringen, hvis landet blir trukket inn i krig eller krig truer. Hensikten vil være å få utflytterne til tryggere steder. Varsel vil bli gitt bl.a. ved bruk av signalet «Viktig melding – lytt på radio».

Pr. 1. januar 1975 er det anlagt **offentlige** tilfluktsrom for i alt 180 000 personer.
Pr. 1. januar 1975 er det anlagt **private** tilfluktsrom for i alt ca. 1 400 000 personer. Vi har altså ca. 1,6 millioner plasser i tilfluktsrom.

Kvinner og menn kan pålegges tjeneste i sivilforsvaret. Styrkene er fordelt på brannvern, redning, sanitet osv.
I fredstid holdes kortvarige kurs.

Befolkningen trenger kunnskap for å kunne møte katastrofer. Folk må vite hvordan de skal samarbeide med sivilforsvaret i en krisesituasjon. Direktoratet for sivilt beredskap opplyser om dette.

NÆRMERE ORIENTERING OM KRIGSUTFLYTTING.

I Oslo og omland er krigsutflytting planlagt for Oslo (se kart), Asker og Bærum (se kart) og Lillestrøm (se kart).

Utflytting vil bli satt i verk **dersom** det i den situasjon som foreligger, må ansees som det beste beskyttelsestiltak. Befolkningen vil straks få beskjed, hvis et pålegg om utflytting blir gitt.

Melding vil bli gitt ved alle tilgjengelige midler. Signalet «Viktig melding – lytt på radio» kan bli gitt, hvoretter det vil bli gitt orientering i radio.

Det vil i alle tilfelle bli gitt beskjed om hvilke befolkningsgrupper som skal evakuere. Politi og sivilforsvarsstyrker vil hjelpe og veilede under utflyttingen.

NOEN FORHOLDSREGLER:

- Egne personkjøretøy som ikke er rekvirert av offentlig myndighet, bør brukes.
- Hjelp andre.
- De som ikke kan flytte ved egen eller andres hjelp, møter opp på nærmeste venteplass som blir opprettet.
- Forlat hjemmet som om De skal på en lang tur.
- Ta med utstyr for en lang tur, bl.a. mat for to dager, sovepose/ulltepper, batteriradio, verdipapirer, eventuelle rasjoneringskort osv. Sløyf unødvendige ting.
- De som har eget innkvarteringssted i de tillatte tilflyttingsområder, kjører direkte dit. Andre får anvist sted å bo når de kommer frem. Det kan senere bli anledning til å flytte videre til egne hytter m.v. i andre områder.

Direktoratet for sivilt beredskap.

Krigsutflyttingsplan for Oslo



Venteplasser

AVSNITT 1:
Messehallen, Skøyen.
Ullern skole, Ullernchausséen 56.
Smestad skole, Konventveien 27.
Persbråten skole, Hovseterveien 1.

AVSNITT 2:
Røa kirke, Nordengveien 5/7.
Voksen skole, Ankerveien 56.
Ris skole, Torgny Segerstedts vei 17.

AVSNITT 3:
Tåsen skole, Nordbergveien 15.
Kjelsås skole, Asbjørnsens vei 3.
Hasle skole, Haralds vei 1.
Årvoll skole, Bård skolemesters vei 1.
Veitvet skole, Veitvetveien.
Grorud skole, Grorudveien 4.

AVSNITT 4:
Hovin skole, Strømsveien 110.
Østensjø skole, Østensjøveien 112.
Oppsal skole, Vetlandsveien 79.
Ekeberg skole, Stamhusveien 79.

AVSNITT 5:
Nedre Bekkelaget skole, Ormsundv. 2.
Abildsø skole, Enebakkveien 264.
Lambertseter skole, Glimmerveien 42.
Nordstrand barneskole, Nordstr.vn. 27.
Ljan skole, Gladvollveien 35.

Opplysninger gis også fra
Oslo Sivilforsvar
Tlf. 33 08 85

Offentlige tilfluktsrom i Oslo



Offentlige tilfluktsrom

1 Akershus, Akershusstranda
2 Youngstorget
3 Abelhaugen, Munkedamsveien
4 Maridalsveien 14
5 St. Hanshaugen, Ullevålsveien
6 Undergrunnsbanen,
Nasjonalteatret stasjon
Oscars gate 19
Valkyrie plass stasjon
7 Stensparken
8 Tunnelbanen, Grønland stasjon
Enerhaugen
Carl Berners plass
9 Sjursøytunnelen, Mosseveien
10 Nedre Vollgate/Tollbugata
11 Akersgata 41
12 Fred Olsens gate 11/15
13 Cort Adelers gate 30
14 Haakon VII's gate 1
15 Tullins gate 2
16 Wergelandsveien 15
17 Filipstadveien 15
18 Drammensveien 60
19 Erling Skjalgssons gate 25
20 Balders gate 2
21 Sommerrogata 1
22 Hegdehaugsveien 36
23 Bogstadveien 30
24 Hegdehaugsveien 31/33
25 Majorstuveien 38
26 Schwensens gate 3/5
27 Vøyensvingen 4/6
28 Bentsegata 21
29 Thv. Meyers gate 7
30 Fagerheimsgata 22
31 Olaf Schous vei 2/8
32 Trondheinsveien 80

Opplysninger gis også fra
Oslo Sivilforsvar
Tlf. 33 08 85

Krigsutflyttingsplan for Asker og Bærum



Venteplasser

Bryn skole, Bryn Skolev. 7
Kadettangen, Sandvika
Ramstad skole, Høvikvn. 30
Nadderud h. skole, Gl. Ringeriksvn. 59
Stabekk skole, Gl. Ringeriksvn. 24
Eikeli skole, Nadderudvn. 110
Lysaker skole, Gl. Drammensvn. 7

Offentlige tilfluktsrom

Eiksmarka Velferdshus,
Nils Leuchsvei 48.
Katolske kapell,
Nadderudvn. 67, Hosle.
Strandvn. 6, Lysaker.
Trygdekassebygget, Sandvika.
Bjerkelundsveien 18

Opplysninger gis også fra
Asker og Bærum sivilforsvarskrets
Tlf. 54 01 86

Krigsutflyttingsplan for Lillestrøm sivilforsvar



KRIGSUTFLYTTING

Krigsutflyttingspåbudet vil gjelde områdene Kjeller, Lillestrøm, Øvre Rælingen, Løvenstad, Strømmen og Skjetten innenfor følgende grenselinjer:

Fetveien – Isakbekken – Ødegården – Bårli – Steinbekk – Melby – Fetveien/ Mosesvingen – Kjeller – Nitteberg – Dovrebanen v/Sørum – Lundsovergangen – Fetveien/Isakbekken, se kartet.

Utflytterne fra Kjeller reiser til Gjerdrum/ Hurdal. Utflytterne fra Øvre Rælingen reiser Øvre Rælingsveien til Marikollen ungdomsskole, hvor de blir fordelt til skolekretsene Holt og Nordby i Rælingen.

Utflytterne fra Skjetten og Strømmen reiser over Stav – Kjellerholen – Brånåsdalen til Skedsmokorset og videre Gjerdrumsv.,

Utflytterne fra Strømmen og Lillestrøm fordeles fra Lillestrøm til Blaker, Gjerdrum og Hurdal. Ca. 1500 utflyttere fra Strømmen fordeles N. Rælingsveien til Enebakk. Kollektive busstransporter fra venteplassene til Gjerdrum.
Se utflyttingsveiene på kartet.

Følgende kjøreveier skal nyttes ut fra Lillestrøm LS:

1. **Fetveien** mot Fetsund av folk med egne kjøretøyer i Lillestrøm.
2. **Brøterbakken – Skedsmokorset** av folk med egne kjøretøyer i Kjeller-området.
3. **Nordbyveien – Brånåsdalen – Skedsmokorset** av folk med egne kjøretøyer på Skjetten og Strømmen.
4. **Øvre Rælingsvei** i retning Enebakk av folk med egne kjøretøyer i Øvre Rælingen.
5. **Nedre Rælingsvei** i retning Enebakk av folk med egne kjøretøyer i Strømmen.
6. **Brøterbakken – Skedsmokorset** av kollektive busstransporter fra Lillestrøm.
7. **Rolf Olsensvei – Asak i Leirsund** – av folk fra Vesleenga og Lillestrøm.

VENTEPLASSER:

1. Sagdalen skole, Strømmen,
2. Vigernes skole, Lillestrøm,
3. Lillestrøm Gymnas,
4. Stav Ungdomsskole,
5. Løvenstad skole.

OFFENTLIGE TILFLUKTSROM

1. Vassøyhoftet, Strømsveien 15, Strømmen,
2. Rådhuset, Strømsveien 74, Strømmen,
3. Jenseberget, Strandveien, Rælingen,
4. Brandvoldgaten 11, Lillestrøm,
5. Nittedalsgaten 2 b, Lillestrøm,
6. A. Kiellands gate 7, Lillestrøm,
7. Vigernes skole, Lillestrøm,
8. Vigernes skole, Lillestrøm,
9. Strandveien, tunnellen Rælingen.

Opplysninger gis også fra Lillestrøm Sivilforsvar tlf. 71 20 22.

Sivilforsvarets varslingssignaler

Sivilforsvaret har i de fleste større tettbygde strøk tyfoner og sirener som kan gi signalene:

«VIKTIG MELDING - LYTT PÅ RADIO»

«FLYALARM»

«FAREN OVER»

Signalet «VIKTIG MELDING - LYTT PÅ RADIO» gis med kirkeklokkene der det ikke er tyfoner og sirener.

Bruk av telefonen i nødssituasjoner

Fra signalet «VIKTIG MELDING - LYTT PÅ RADIO» blir gitt,

er det forbudt i en time å bruke telefonen til annet enn viktige samtaler som gjelder offentlig tjeneste, liv eller velferd.

Under «FLYALARM» gjelder samme forbud. I den første timen etter at signalet «FAREN OVER» er gitt, må telefonen bare brukes til korte samtaler. Dersom diese forskriftene blir overtrådt av abonnenten eller andre som bruker telefonen hans, kan Televerket stenge telefonen for en tid eller oppheve abonnementet straks, jfr. Norsk telefonreglement art. 58.

Vis måtehold i bruk av telefonen i nødsituasjoner.

TELEDIREKTORATET

Viktig melding — Lytt på radio



Gis med tyfoner og sirener slik:
3 signalserier med 1 minutts opphold mellom seriene.
Gis med kirkeklokker slik:
Ringing i 3 serier med 1 minutts opphold mellom seriene.
Betyr: Viktig melding, lytt på radio for nærmere orientering.
Signalet vil kunne bli brukt både i fred og krig.

Flyalarm

Gis med tyfoner og sirener slik:
Korte støt i ca. 1 minutt.
Betyr: Fare for angrep — søk dekning!

Faren over

Gis med tyfoner og sirener slik:
1 støt i ca. ½ minutt.
Betyr: Faren eller angrepet er over.

DIREKTORATET FOR SIVILT BEREDSKAP

APPENDIX II

Effects of a 1 megaton explosion at a height of 2,000 metres above the Empire State Building, New York



Source: The prompt and delayed effects of nuclear weapons, Kevin N. Lewis, Scientific American, July 1979.

Nuclear, biological and chemical protection

AMENDMENTS 1, 2, 3 and 4[1]
tabled by MM. Ahrens and Büchner

1. In paragraph (*iii*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, line 2, leave out " use " and insert " production ".

2. In paragraph (*iv*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out " an equality of retaliatory and defensive capability between NATO and the Warsaw Pact " and insert " maintaining a complete deterrent and defensive capability as required by MC 14/3 ".

3. Leave out paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

" 2. To investigate within NATO the requirement for a deterrent and retaliatory capability consisting of chemical weapons and the legal limitations with respect to their use ".

4. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out " use " and insert " transfer ".

Signed: Ahrens, Büchner

1. See 5th Sitting, 4th June 1980 (Amendments 1 and 4 amended and agreed to; Amendments 2 and 3 negatived).

Nuclear, biological and chemical protection

AMENDMENT 5[1]

tabled by Mr. Brown and others

5. Leave out paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper.

Signed: Brown, Büchner, Pignion, Dejardin, Stoffelen

1. See 5th Sitting, 4th June 1980 (Amendment negatived).

Co-operation between WEU member countries on video communication systems

REPORT [1]

submitted on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions [2]
by Mr. Valleix, Rapporteur

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee:* Mr. *Valleix* (Chairman); MM. *Lenzer, Wilkinson* (Vice-Chairmen); MM. *Adriaensens,* Antoni, Cornelissen (Alternate: *Portheine*), Fiandrotti, *Forma,* Foschi, Garrett (Alternate: *Lord Hughes*), *Hawkins, Konings,* McGuire (Alternate: *Jessel*), Malvy, Mart, *Müller,* Péronnet (Alternate: *Petit*), *Scheffler, Talon,* Ueberhorst (Alternate: *Flämig*), van Waterschoot (Alternate: *Brasseur*).

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics*

Draft Recommendation

on co-operation between WEU member countries on video communication systems

The Assembly,

Having become acquainted with recent developments in the United Kingdom with the Prestel view-data system, in France with the Antiope videotex system and in other member countries in this field;

Aware that in the absence of appropriate American developments in this area the United States Federal Communications Committee is studying the abovementioned and similar systems and is considering their adaptability for the American market;

Recalling that current developments are sponsored jointly by government departments and private enterprises;

Convinced that these new communications systems will also have a significant impact on military communications systems;

Seeking to promote co-operation among European countries so as to foster the possibility of gaining access to American and world markets,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL INVITE GOVERNMENTS OF MEMBER COUNTRIES

1. To concert their efforts to establish European standards for video communication systems applicable to world markets through the CEPT and, to this end, to approach the bodies or firms concerned;

2. To urge all authorities and industries concerned to promote co-operation with each other in these matters.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Valleix, Rapporteur)

Introduction

1. In this report on the industrial bases of European security – guidelines drawn from the symposium on 15th, 16th and 17th October 1979 [1], your Rapporteur pointed to the possibilities and difficulties of the electronic communications industries in Europe; he specified that Europe should not remain dependent on imported parts for the new information technology which were practically not produced at all at the present time in Europe. In order to be better informed on some aspects of these technologies, the Committee was briefed on Prestel, the British Post Office view-data system, on 4th April 1979, and on Antiope [2], the French Sofratev system, on 7th November 1979.

2. Telematics is the umbrella term for all information technologies such as data banks, computers and accessories, advanced components – in particular microprocessors – and, finally, the new transmission techniques with fibre transmission cables and satellites.

3. The world telematics market is growing very quickly and although Europe itself is a large market its share in production is not satisfactory. Moreover, its position may further deteriorate: the United States is the main supplier for the world market but Japan, because of its formidable design and marketing skills, may prove to be an increasingly powerful force. In the electronics field Japan is bound to become a major competitor when its mass-produced products arrive on the market.

4. In Europe industry supplies scarcely 10 % of its own requirements for advanced components. There are hardly any data banks at Community level. Conversely, Europe is better placed in the data-processing and software areas. Europe can meet the challenge however if it proves really capable of using the larger Community market which is equal in size to that of the United States. However, certain exclusively national preferences should be set aside, together with technical barriers, special regulations and national monopolies in the telecommunications field, which would hardly be inclined to co-operate and develop interlinking services.

5. *The Prestel view-data system* was developed by the British Post Office in its research establishment. The Post Office rôle is to provide a utility using the computer and the telephone network in order to disseminate information of whatever kind to the general public, the business community, specialist clients and government or international organisations. Within the public system it is possible to restrict access to certain parts of the data base to specific terminals.

6. In the defence field it could be possible to collate information and then disseminate it to particular terminals for items of a relatively low level of security or to a higher level.

7. A body of users of the Prestel view-data system has been built up in the London area; a wider geographical coverage will be established in a later period.

8. *The Antiope system,* developed by the joint studies centre of the French Post Office and the TDF (*Télédiffusion de France*), has a dual system of transmitting information, i.e. by conventional television transmitters or by telephone. It can be very easily adapted to all means of communications and different transmission standards such as telephone and television; data can also be transmitted by sound broadcasting. The principle adopted is to separate completely the transmission aspects from the display aspects. Current market research has shown that television cable networks have the capacity to transmit full-channel information; in the same cable ten or twenty channels can be added, each capable of transmitting 4,000 pages of text.

9. With the co-operation of the Paris Stock Exchange, a pre-operational service has started of daily stock exchange information with transmitters in Paris and Lyons. From the end of 1980 equipment will be available to the general public.

10. The French and British systems are different in that Antiope was developed as a mixed system, both telephone and broadcast, whereas Prestel is a telephone system. Studies have been conducted by the CCETT (*Centre commun d'Études de Télévision et Télécommunications*) on standardisation of the systems used.

1. Document 823.

2. Antiope: *Acquisition numérique et télévisualisation d'images organisées en pages d'écriture* (Digital acquisition and teledisplay of pictures arranged in the form of written pages).

Conclusion

11. Your Rapporteur is convinced that European standards for video communication systems applicable to world markets could be defined if the postal authorities and the governments in general, as well as industries, would co-operate sufficiently. One should not forget that in Western Europe sizable public contracts will be placed by the governments concerned and they could enable the market to be developed to the benefit of European consumers and introduce an element of Community preference for European manufacturers of telematic products and services. The effectiveness of national development programmes could be multiplied with some elementary co-ordination to avoid duplication of effort and systematic rivalry.

12. The information technology revolution has started and will spread. If European nations agree to work together they will be able to handle the risks definitely involved in the technological breakthroughs and it should be possible for their products to supply an important part of the world market.

Defence-related information technology

REPORT[1]

submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions[2]
by Mr. Brasseur, Rapporteur

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee:* Mr. *Valleix* (Chairman); MM. *Lenzer, Wilkinson* (Vice-Chairmen); MM. *Adriaensens,* Antoni, Cornelissen, Fiandrotti, *Forma,* Foschi, *Garrett,* Hawkins (Alternate: *Lord Hughes*), *Konings, McGuire,* Malvy, Mart, *Müller,* Péronnet (Alternate: *Petit*), *Scheffler, Talon,* Ueberhorst (Alternate: *Flämig*), van Waterschoot (Alternate: *Brasseur*).

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

on defence-related information technology

The Assembly,

Conscious that in the crucial sector of microelectronic components Europe imports more than 80 % of its requirements in integrated circuits;

Aware that European computer firms supply only 16 % of the world market and that Japan has made remarkable progress in this field;

Regretting that Europe has not so far exploited the fact that it itself constitutes a continental-size market and has not followed Japan in pursuing a coherent policy and commercial strategy to capture part of the world market;

Considering the link between telecommunications equipment for civil and military purposes,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member governments:

1. To promote European collaboration at governmental level and between European industries concerned with microelectronics, communications and telematics, computers and software, and the production of interface equipment with users so as to ensure the establishment of a sound European industrial base in this field to counter American and Japanese activities in European and world markets;

2. To establish a truly homogenous European market for telematic equipment and services for both civil and military uses;

3. To make an effort to co-ordinate orders from both civil and military public authorities so as *inter alia* to allow interoperability of equipment when justified.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Brasseur, Rapporteur)

I. *Introduction*

1. On 29th November 1977, the Assembly adopted Recommendation 308 on communications and crisis management in the Alliance. This recommendation was accompanied by an explanatory memorandum submitted by Mr. Watkinson on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments[1]. In the recommendation the Assembly called on all NATO countries to participate fully in the early completion of the NATO integrated communications system. It also called on the North Atlantic Council to study the possibility of establishing a permanent teleprinter link between NATO headquarters and the Government of the Soviet Union and of appointing an authorised NATO spokesman to use the link on appropriate occasions.

2. In answer to this recommendation, the Council did not discuss any specific aspect but merely declared that it had taken note of the suggestions and would submit the text concerned to the NATO authorities.

3. Your Rapporteur considers this type of answer most unsatisfactory since the report contains many useful elements including considerable information on NATO communications, the French national system and mention of the situation in other countries, with particular reference to the United Kingdom communications system outside Europe. Your Rapporteur hopes this report and recommendation will receive more detailed attention from the Council and that its answer will include sufficient information to sustain parliamentary work in a national or international framework.

4. There have been many developments in world communications in both the civil and military fields. In the 1980s, present systems might well be revolutionised through the use of full lines of digital switching and transmission equipment which will greatly increase the capacity of the communications systems. Moreover, the accuracy of digital technology is the highest available. Development of large-scale integrated circuits in the past decade has made the digital switch possible and launched a major competitive race for business among telecommunication equipment companies. In addition, digital and switching centres occupy one-quarter of the space needed for electromechanical exchanges, require one-third of the maintenance and less power to operate. The switches can be used with video, computer data, facsimile and telex transmission systems.

5. In his abovementioned report, Mr. Watkinson stated that the first politically-oriented communications system was established in 1967. It was known as the NATO-wide communications system and used various existing and planned communication links to provide a teletype network linking NATO headquarters to the national governments as well as providing links to major NATO commanders, and a parallel system to national ministries of defence. At the same time a modern satellite communications system was established with twelve ground stations located in nearly all NATO countries using the Satcom geostationary satellites.

6. In the 1970s it was decided to establish a single new system, known as the NATO integrated communication system, to be jointly funded and owned by the NATO countries.

7. It was soon realised that such an integrated overall system would be extremely expensive and could not be implemented fully during the 1970s because of technical, financial and other limitations. It was therefore decided to divide the project into two stages, the first to be completed in 1981.

8. Communications, command and control are essential elements in the long-term NATO defence programme.

9. The major aims of the second stage of the programme are: integration of the stage 1 separate sub-systems into one overall system which will, to the maximum extent possible, operate in digital mode ; expansion and improvement of the quantity and quality of the NATO-wide integrated communications system to all its users ; enhanced survivability through better protection of the communication sites ; achievement of a complete degree of interoperability with national tactical and strategic communication systems through the use of common standards, equipment and procedures, thereby progressively introducing digitalisation of the equipment and the transmission network ; increased security with the introduction of new cryptographic equipment.

1. Document 757.

10. The capital cost of the second phase of the programme is estimated at $ 1.5 billion. The programme should be fully operational in 1995.

11. The NATO-wide integrated communication system is the largest infrastructure project financed on a fourteen-power basis that the allies have ever undertaken. If completed it will greatly improve the allies' capability for crisis management and for the command and control of NATO forces. The communications system is also an essential element of the strategy of flexible response.

II. *General remarks*

12. Throughout the world, many sectors are still turning on the fringe of major potential resources. The recent emergence of data-processing and telecommunications will allow electronic data systems to be developed capable of meeting the various requirements of a growing number of users, applications and areas.

13. Distribution systems will allow data to be shared and decentralised. It will be possible to form networks for the harmonious processing of various types of data from many sources commensurate with the diversity of human organisations. Applications involving the creation and distribution of documents will call for the introduction of new types of networks and will have to be capable of handling " documents " in the form of data, texts, images and vocal elements.

14. The interlinking of such networks at international level, the promotion of innovations in technology and applications and co-operation with developing countries are all elements which call for the closest attention from our governments.

15. In this connection, it will be noted that the conference on science and technology for development organised by the United Nations in 1979 emphasised the importance of technological potential and local resources but set the problem in a global context. There should in fact be a sort of " give and take " understanding between nations embracing the world-wide level of knowledge and experience and also the data networks through which this knowledge is distributed. Such possibilities of access to data and their use are determining factors in the maturity of this science which goes much farther than telecommunications.

16. Your Rapporteur wishes to start by examining some of the trends in four technological areas: microelectronics, communications, interfaces with users and, finally, systems and software.

17. Microelectronic technology opens up interesting prospects for storage and the logical or intelligent handling of the flow of data. This is a field in which there has been an extraordinary trend towards lower costs. In the case of digital magnetic recordings, there has been a compound annual reduction in the cost of storing an element of data of some 40 % within two decades. The cost of semi-conductor computer storage has also dropped. Within barely six years, the improvement factor has been about ten. The cost of the logic unit of an electronic computer has fallen at a slightly slower rate in view of the fact that as the number of elements in a unit increases its design and testing become more arduous. However this may be, even before the introduction of microprocessors, which has greatly simplified the problems of input and output electric connections in the processing unit, the overall cost of operations, including the logical part and storage, has fallen in two and a half decades at an annual rate of about 25 % (compound annual rate).

18. There are good reasons to expect that this trend will continue at the same rate until the late eighties. Microminiaturisation will also bring improved speeds and lower costs.

19. In a world where energy is becoming scarce, there is no doubt that demand continues to grow insofar as lower costs make new applications a paying proposition. In recent decades, the cost of surface communications has fallen by about 11 % per year.

20. Optical fibre cables, production of which has just begun on a large scale, should allow this trend to continue. But the most extraordinary event in transmission productivity came with satellites. Satellites supply channels at a cost which falls each year by about 40 %, representing a degree of productivity comparable to that noted for data storage by magnetic recordings.

21. A third trend emerging in the field of transmission technology is the influence of digital equipment and recorded programme control on line switching. This technology is widespread in central switching systems. Digital switches may in fact be more reliable, cheaper to maintain and furnish a functionally greater output than their analogue predecessors.

22. Previously, the term " telecommunication " was used for all data transmissions outside the premises in which the central computer

was located. The term "communication" by computer channels was used for all transmissions within the premises. In the meantime, the link-up of a teleprocessing installation has been progressively developed with the introduction of automatic digital exchanges.

23. A future aim is therefore to allow the user to employ the same procedure for sending messages to different destinations whether on the spot or further afield.

24. Technological progress has also had repercussions on the instruments available to users by making them much easier to handle.

25. In the eighties, advances will be made in voice processing so that verbal messages may be translated into texts and processed directly.

26. The most difficult challenge to meet if the growth of computer systems is to continue is in developing simple and effective methods of data input.

27. Once data are in electronic form, they must be stored so that they may be reused without further manual handling. This will be far easier when electric typewriters are replaced by electronic typewriters, a development which is already well advanced. The second solution is to abolish the keyboard either by using pick-up devices to receive data directly in electronic form (optical reading of codes from selling points, direct reception of surface data from observation satellites) or by making use of optical reading of characters and the reception of data backed up by images for reading data direct from typed or manuscript texts. Such applications stem from the immense progress made in electronic display processing.

28. The fourth technological sector is systems and software. This is the most sensitive aspect inasmuch as it is more complex to manage and requires the use of vast professional resources.

29. Systems will be introduced allowing both the distribution and sharing of resources and data. Similarly, it should be possible for different types of data networks to coexist even within a single organisation and for them to exchange messages simultaneously.

30. The problem for the future is therefore not so much whether data can be protected and made accessible selectively but to decide what regulations are required in the national and international context. These technological developments give us a glimpse of the future trend of telecommunications.

31. It may be expected that a feature of the equipment needed will be its great diversity. To meet the requirements of applications, modern telecommunication technology will offer exceptional band widths (satellites and optical fibres, for instance). But these means will of course have to coexist with medium- or narrow-band equipment which are more economical to use in their range of applications. We shall also witness the emergence and interlinking of networks with different control structures.

32. At present, most work on research and the development of applications for advanced-type networks has been carried out in firms using ground installations. This situation will continue and a large number of these applications have given rise to many requirements in respect of availability control. Another area of innovation is with high-frequency transmission satellites allowing a large number of small ground stations at relatively low cost. Even small countries with little traffic might take part on payment of a modest fee. Such networks are now at the experimental stage and have aroused the interest of authorities in many countries.

33. An important technical test has been carried out at European level using the Symphonie satellite with the participation of the French and German postal and telecommunications services.

34. Many new attitudes are taking shape and institutions are changing as the major rôle played in the world by overall data resources becomes clearer. This trend is accompanied by new political principles: the right of citizens to privacy, the right of access to data in data banks, information and relevant rights, the new international order in the field of information and the goal of free circulation of electronic data across frontiers in the same way as there is free movement of mail.

35. The development of these principles and the technology on which they are based will be more evident in an atmosphere of co-operation between nations and between private and public bodies. This means an all-round determination to conduct tests and to learn from them. It is most important for all countries to be able to participate. The International Telecommunications Union and other international bodies have special responsibility in this respect.

III. *Command, control and communications*

36. Computerisation of army data started some ten years ago. It has since been perfected

and now covers three different fields: budget and finance, logistics, and personnel, all of which are concerned with the running of the army. In addition, specific systems are installed in weapons systems and are used for communications and are directly related to command and control.

37. With regard to weapons systems, the F-104 fighter-bomber for instance has seven computers on board; modern artillery also requires computerisation of many types of data; the NATO air defence system, NADGE, could not exist without computers; warships have them on board. The modern command and control system computers have taken over some of the executive tasks of staff officers.

38. Command and control require the use of all information resources with regard to the enemy in general and to particular situations in combat. Computerisation allows all kinds of precise information to be classified for use in and facilitation of the decision-making process. The means of destruction, the arms, aircraft, vehicles or warships to be used all depend on the type of information processed in computers.

39. The new communications system also allows certains types of weapons systems and weapons to be fired automatically. A headquarters is therefore able to retaliate immediately in certain situations.

40. Different telecommunication systems and networks exist in order to avoid the destruction of one part resulting in a breakdown of the whole system. The systems consist of satellites, mobile communication centres, radio communications, etc. During the six-day war in the Middle East it was established that telecommunication networks are quite vulnerable and in the course of a few days the system was downgraded and worked at only 25 % of its capacity.

41. Much information could be obtained by photography which has become so accurate that clear pictures can now be taken with a resolution of two square metres.

42. In order to process all the data, large computers are installed and, of course, they have to be protected in bunkers or under ground. The evolution of new material in this field is quite fast and requires the continuous training of personnel. Automation is also steadily improving but the army has to reckon with the possibility of some systems collapsing during emergencies, thus requiring its personnel to handle information by less sophisticated systems.

43. The security and viability of a system are aspects which require continuous consideration. In civilian life these aspects are of course also very important, as can be seen from the parliamentary enquiry now being conducted in Sweden where the population has become very worried by the fact that all types of personal data are now stored in computers and might constitute a threat to the private lives of many people.

44. Civil and military computers are to be dispersed geographically and according to the type of data treated. The disadvantage of course is that this means installing more giant computers, most of which are now in administrative or population centres. Dispersing computers will also mean dispersing personnel and hence more staff.

45. It is not certain whether the Russian communication systems are as sophisticated as those of NATO. However, in the military field they should not be underestimated; for instance, Russian satellites are able to handle very sophisticated communication systems.

46. There is a NATO communications system as well as several national communications systems. These systems are interlinked depending on the countries concerned. There is not just one general linking arrangement but several.

47. The NATO-funded systems are used to link the different NATO headquarters to the highest command in the national armies, i.e. mostly up to corps level. Only in Turkey are the communications systems linked to lower levels. The NATO system is funded by the NATO nations which want an integrated communications system and a control system called the ADP (automatic data processing). The NATO command and control information system is mainly for the central region, whereas the world-wide communication system is the United States military command control system.

48. The systems in the various countries and the NATO system, although different, are to be made interoperable and in the future all systems will be digitalised. The system is primarily used to provide commanders-in-chief and commanders with all the information necessary to enable them to take decisions. This means that the information has to arrive on time in order to allow correct analysis. It includes, of course, logistics as well as intelligence information. The systems used in the military field are not basically different from those used by banking consortia, big international corporations such as Shell, the airlines,

etc. The main difference is the speed with which the military have to take decisions, an obvious necessity in view of the speed of aircraft and missiles.

49. Interoperability between the NATO and the national systems is essential as the NATO headquarters will have operational command over national forces in times of crisis or war.

50. CINCENT has direct command and control over the central region, over the two army groups: the northern and central army groups, and in some cases over three or four army corps commands. There is no direct information flow from company or battalion level to SHAPE headquarters; information is filtered and evaluated at the intermediate command headquarters.

51. Interoperability, although a necessity, is not very easy to achieve since each country has its own communications systems and the interfaces between the national systems and the NATO system should not be too expensive or complicated. Standards here have been developed by NATO and the national authorities, but not without difficulties and financial problems. The so-called " standardisation agreement " leads to a long-term programme where it is hoped that all systems will be developed according to common design principles. Standardisation is also being achieved in the civil field.

52. National intelligence data are provided through the NATO command but national authorities take the ultimate decision as to which data are forwarded to NATO headquarters. Information remains under national jurisdiction and sovereignty.

53. NATO will never be able to work under one joint system as this would mean all countries being obliged to use the same supplier, for instance, to buy American. This is unacceptable for sovereign NATO nations and therefore one has to accept different systems and different methods of command and control exercise. Nevertheless, full use is made of the experience of the different nations and this has led to a certain amount of competition and sometimes co-operative development. This is also true in respect of telecommunications satellite equipment. We are living in a free economy which means competition and different systems.

54. Nuclear weapons remain under national control and NATO communications procedures have been established to avoid time-consuming consultations. Several countries have special " red lines " with Moscow and the information acquired through these systems is also divulged to other countries but, of course, at the discretion of the country which receives the information. Many exercises have been conducted to reach speedy decisions after quick consultations. There are several large computers, used mainly for civil purposes at present, but which are for use in the NATO system in times of crisis.

55. It is unlikely that the present-day command structure will be changed in the near future, although a continuous study is being made to achieve the most efficient command and control system. Formerly the communications element was separate from the command and control system, but now in many countries these three elements are looked upon as an entity since it is becoming increasingly difficult to separate the handling of information from command and control.

56. There are two schools of thought on how to use the information. One is that everything should be received at the high command which would then take the appropriate steps. This means a highly centralised command system. The second is that the lower commands should analyse the data to work out particular missions, the decision-making also being left to the appropriate lower command. This means a decentralised system. Once an operation has taken place it should be monitored and reported back to the high command.

57. The real question is rather to ensure that computers are at the service of commands and are adapted to their organisation. There is therefore no need to wonder whether it will still be necessary to have battalion, division, army and army corps command systems.

IV. *Naval communications*

58. In spite of recent independent technological advances in communications these are still linked with naval command and control. One result of improved communications is the enhancement of centralised command by which is meant any level of command and control above the tactical level including fleet, theatre and national commands.

59. For mainly historical reasons western navies are organised to operate more or less independently. However, the Soviet navy started to become important only in the 1960s and from the very beginning its command, control and communications were far more integrated and organised for future combat applications in accordance with instructions from the central naval headquarters in Moscow. In the West a new system will be set up in order to support both centralised and

decentralised control, even though the present tendency is to favour centralisation.

60. NATO has adopted the principle of integration between communications and command and control and once the NATO countries' systems are interoperable among NATO navies a centralised command system will certainly follow. Modern weapon technology has greatly increased the degree of destructive force of even smaller combat units. Naval engagements can no longer be fought in splendid isolation but will be subject to forces which may even be many hundreds of miles away; weapon ranges too make this inevitable.

61. Discussions are now taking place within NATO on the advantages and disadvantages of centralised control since the technological capability is available. To what extent should central control be exerted in order to make the best use of both local initiative and central co-ordination?

62. Sophisticated communications technology can enable a theatre level commander to be in direct touch with each unit under his command. However, in order to filter the flow of data and to provide a flow of detailed instructions subordinate intermediate commands have to be maintained. Their number depends on the volume of incoming and outgoing tactical message traffic and data with which they have to cope.

63. Technical saturation of communication channels is unlikely, especially in the light of potential new transmission media which will improve the data-carrying capacity of the system. On the other hand, however, human ability to assimilate information rapidly becomes saturated.

64. In order to ensure optimum use of the technical system the conditions under which central control can best be exercised should be carefully determined and procedures for rapid and efficient transfer of control from local to intermediate and central commands must be established by the new system's design.

65. The communications network is divided into two main parts: tactical and strategic. Tactical communications are mainly between ships and between ships and supporting aircraft. The link is by radio.

66. The strategic network includes coastal stations which are nearly always sited at fixed locations; equipment and facilities are housed in concrete accommodations. The communications network might be shared by the other armed forces. The coastal radio stations are connected with the various maritime headquarters and support facilities in harbours or maritime airfields. Requirements for strategic networks can be met by standard professional telecommunications equipment, which will be computer-controlled, digital and secure.

67. The navy's tactical area is at sea and in coastal waters. Two types of communication systems can be distinguished: the so-called external communications between ships as opposed to internal communications on board ship. Within a ship a number of operational disciplines, as for anti-submarine warfare or tactical air defence, are interconnected. In order to provide command and control with all essential information, computer-assisted remote control might be necessary. For the co-ordinated fighting rôle, frequent interchange of data giving the tactical situation and the availability of many weapons systems makes an integrated internal communications network a necessity.

V. *Army communications*

68. Any modern army has an increasing use for communications. The mobility of troops, fast reaction to changing situations, the increased volume of logistic requirements and the longer range of modern weapons all demand a communications network capable of carrying a large amount of information quickly and securely over a large area. Such a network is now becoming increasingly integrated for all types of information such as the spoken word, teletype, facsimile and computer data. It is generally recognised that only digital information can be made secure with a high degree of safety, and secure digital information exchange from user to user is the ultimate goal.

69. In the army, as in the navy, there is a sub-division into tactical and strategic networks. In the army the tactical network is generally used by the fighting forces in the front line needing a combat radio and a tactical area communications network.

70. The strategic network is at the rear area and comprises fixed communication centres. Transmission and switching equipment is housed in reinforced concrete bunkers; the strategic communications network links the strategic headquarters as well as supply centres for logistics, national air defence centres, military meteorological observations and data-processing stations, etc. The strategic communications facilities are or will be computer-controlled. Satellite systems and telegraphic and radio networks, either NATO or national, are being used to ensure communications between the civil and military authorities and the high com-

mands. The military network is also often connected with the national civil telecommunications network.

71. In some NATO countries a tactical satellite communications system is either in operation or being considered, assuming the availability of a national satellite.

72. As mentioned earlier, a complete renewal of the tactical area communications system is now being considered in order to fulfil the requirements of digitalisation, automation, and security proofing.

VI. *Air force communications*

73. The air force strategic network mainly consists of large communication centres at air bases or air defence centres and, for smaller air forces, this network can be partly integrated with the tactical network. The strategic network is also installed in reinforced concrete accommodation which might be shared by the other armed forces. It serves all kinds of information on logistical, strategic command, meteorological and intelligence data. Often such data take the form of teletyped messages, but telephone conversations also form part of the system. Here the trend towards digitalisation is obvious as is the use of satellite equipment, computer control switches, etc.

74. The air force-owned, ground-based tactical radio communications equipment is mainly situated at air bases, but also at air defence and fighter control centres. It is also linked to the radar sites. Due to speed of operation, telephone messages are predominant and are backed up or confirmed by teletyped messages. Fast switching times are therefore necessary. It is anticipated that in the near future digital speech and time division switching techniques will be introduced. At the same time it is expected that there will be integration of teletype and data with the digital telephone network. Computer-controlled switching systems are fast becoming operational in the air forces.

75. The various tactical communication systems will be different for each of the three forces although they might have several parts in common.

76. For the strategic communications system a general trend can be recognised, namely the wish to integrate the networks of the three forces into a common integrated network that will be computer-controlled, digital and secure. Each force could have its own access, distribution and control, but the switching systems and the transmission system could be shared.

77. In view of the high cost of the equipment and its large capacity, such a trend is quite logical from a cost-effectiveness point of view.

VII. *Special systems*

78. As mentioned earlier, Mr. Watkinson, in his report on communications and crisis management in the Alliance[1], explained in paragraphs 130 et seq the special position of the French communications network. Your Rapporteur does not wish to reiterate the French position, but merely mentions that France has accepted the common need for interoperability with the NATO agencies. Therefore, contracts have been drawn up and conventions agreed to for establishing contact at various levels: between SACEUR and the Chiefs of the French General Staffs; between authorised allied and French high commands (first army, tactical air force, Commander-in-Chief Atlantic, etc.).

79. France also has bilateral relations with all neighbouring countries and with the United States.

80. The technological aspects are very important as the protocols of transmission and of the interfaces should be concluded for ten to fifteen years, otherwise the problem of interoperability cannot be solved.

81. In its relationship with NATO, France wishes to limit standardisation for fear that otherwise all equipment used would be American and in the end it would be impossible to compete with the American giants. French policy is to favour French and, secondly, European equipment.

82. The French forces have three different systems of telecommunications, one for each arm. This is for geographical as well as operational reasons. The three systems on which depends the transmission system of the high command will be increasingly interoperable. The military will participate in the French Telecom I satellite to be launched in 1983; until then Intelsat is also being used for worldwide military communications.

83. In 1962, the French high command decided that an inter-armed force telecommuni-

1. Document 757.

cations, electronics and cypher commission should be set up (know in short as CITEC).

84. In the framework of the responsibilities of the chiefs of staff and the director of the gendarmerie, the rôle of CITEC was to study, define and propose principles and practical measures allowing the necessary co-ordination between the three services and the gendarmerie in the following fields:

- transmissions of all kinds (written, displays, signs, data, sound);
- teleinformatics;
- protection of data transmitted, in particular by cypher;
- electronic warfare;
- electromagnetic detection and identification;
- radioelectric navigational aids.

85. In 1978 the French Minister of Defence ordered that a general computer commission and a specific computer commission be set up at the Ministry for the Armed Forces.

86. The general computer commission was to be responsible for projects involving the use of data-processing equipment (central and peripheral units and associated equipment) marketed and sold by catalogue for whatever purpose they may be intended (management, scientific and technical calculations, industrial control, etc.) with the exception however of equipment used in weapons and command systems.

87. The specific computer commission was to be responsible for projects involving the use of data-processing equipment (central and peripheral units and associated equipment) designed in accordance with military or non-commercial specifications and, in general, all computer equipment for weapons and command systems.

88. The specific computer commission should also work out and submit for the Minister's approval an industrial policy for the Ministry relating to equipment within its purview, propagate and implement the elements of this industrial policy, examine and keep up to date a medium-term (five-year) equipment plan for the whole department.

VIII. *Conclusions*

89. Your Rapporteur has tried to give an insight into the problems inherent in the new type of telecommunications now being introduced. He is convinced that present systems will very soon become obsolete and be replaced by completely new types of communications systems based on new electronic technologies.

90. He has to leave all options open as to what might happen in the civil and military communications field since even the most experienced experts are unable to make an accurate forecast. An earlier example of the wide range of choices was the development of the gramophone record, which, when invented, was thought of as a means of passing a souvenir of a dead person's voice on to his descendants. It was also thought that recorded messages might replace letters. However, records were hardly ever put to these uses but musical recordings became and still are, to say the least, highly popular. It is therefore of little wonder that your Rapporteur dare do no more than merely describe the processes now being developed.

91. The new family of electronic technologies will bring a considerable reduction in the price of communications by introducing numerical systems (electronic computers) and new transmission techniques (satellites and optical fibres) in the telecommunications network. At the same time, microprocessors and silicon chips could reduce the need for large computers.

92. Military equipment is somewhat different from civil equipment as it has to be more secure in a hardware sense as well as keeping the messages secret. Military hardware has to be sturdier as it is submitted to different climatological conditions. Nevertheless, systems for the military are basically the same, for example, as those for the International Society of Aeronautical Telecommunications or for the Shell communications network. For quality, NATO requirements form a good yardstick if the communications hardware is to be exported, for instance to Brazil which imported from Europe a network for banking, institutions, business organisations and government administrations and which wanted the same standards as NATO.

93. Inside Europe, however, different postal authorities have different requirements, mainly because the postal administrations want to protect their home markets. It is most regrettable that so far no European firms can be established under European law. The Community is now trying to promote a decision of the Council of Ministers to achieve consultation between postal authorities before introducing new services. From 1983 onwards the different systems of telematics now being developed should achieve compatibility. The CEPT in Geneva is trying to promote this co-ordination.

94. The European armies are in the process of converting to computerised telecommunications. This type of communications started with the space ventures of the United States and later on in Europe. It is now gradually being introduced in the armed forces and in other large governmental or private organisations.

95. Microprocessors make it possible to set up different centres of telecommunications which are far less vulnerable than the large communications centres established earlier. The strategic networks of the armed forces were originally installed in reinforced concrete accommodations which housed the equipment and facilities. The new miniaturised systems of telecommunications are organised so that even if one centre fails the others can take over immediately. This provides greater security and with microprocessors and special fibres a very heavy traffic can nevertheless be channelled through small installations.

96. New view-data techniques allow such records as a complete telephone directory, for instance, to be put on very small microprocessors. The same will happen with newspaper facsimiles and many other matters. It is a great pity that Unidata, set up some years ago, was not a success because European firms such as Siemens, AEG-Telefunken, ITT, Thomson-CSF, Honeywell-Bull, CII and Philips will have to come together again if they really want to survive the American and Japanese onslaught.

97. Software science should be studied at European schools and universities and the technicians to handle software should be formed at specialised technical schools.

98. If the Europeans unite they still have a chance to keep abreast with the Japanese and Americans in this field. Moreover, Europe should not channel its capital to dying industries rather than to new growing industries. Until now the industries which have stopped growing, like steel, textiles, shoes and automobiles, have special financial advantages accorded them by governments. The development of new industries such as that of telecommunications should be stimulated instead in order to gain a dominant position in semi-conductors, microelectronic components and audio and video components. In civil market terms Europe represents one-third of the world market for telecommunications equipment, i.e. $ 33 billion, with a growth rate of some 7 % per year. It also represents 26 % of the world market in informatics, i.e. nearly $ 70 billion, with a growth rate of 17 % per year. In integrated circuits it represents 19 % of the world market, i.e. $7.5 billion, with a growth rate of 25 % per year. The question is whether this European market will be supplied by European firms or is it more likely to be supplied by American and Japanese firms?

Document 841 **29th April 1980**

State of European aerospace activities
Reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council

REPORT[1]

submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions[2]
by Mr. Scheffler, Rapporteur

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1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee:* Mr. *Valleix* (Chairman); MM. *Lenzer, Wilkinson* (Vice-Chairmen); MM. *Adriaensens,* Antoni, Cornelissen, Fiandrotti, *Forma,* Foschi, *Garrett, Hawkins, Konings, McGuire,* Malvy, Mart, *Müller,* Péronnet (Alternate: *Petit*), *Scheffler, Talon,* Ueberhorst (Alternate: *Flämig*), van Waterschoot (Alternate: *Brasseur*).

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

on the state of European aerospace activities – reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council

The Assembly,

Considering that the ESA convention has been in existence since 30th May 1975 and that France, although playing an important rôle in the Agency which has its seat in Paris, has still not yet ratified the convention;

Considering the separate development of French and German national direct broadcasting spacecraft and ESA's large satellite;

Agreeing with the Council on the European industry's need to receive a fair share of orders for military application satellites;

Aware of the deteriorating situation with regard to Western Europe's energy supplies and the consequent threat to Europe's political and military posture;

Gratified that several member countries are nearing agreement on a development plan for a tactical fighter aircraft – the European combat aircraft – for the 1990s;

Welcoming the establishment of a European Airbus family of aircraft, but regretting that the Fokker-29 development programme is not yet associated with the Airbus programme,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Urge the French Government to ratify the ESA convention in 1980;

2. Invite the governments of the member states of the European Space Agency to take appropriate steps to ensure a close link between the French and German national programmes for direct broadcasting spacecraft and the ESA L-sat programme so that European space interests will not be divided on the world scene and in the world market;

3. Invite the governments of the member states of ESA to consider the political importance of space co-operation for Europe and the need to take decisions concerning the future of the Agency at an appropriate political level;

4. In view of the threat to Europe's security, urge member governments to decide on the necessary practical application measures further to the resolution adopted in Dublin in November 1979 to develop a more effective energy policy for the European Community and to elaborate a common European energy plan up to 1990;

5. Invite

   (*a*) the governments of France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom to ensure the implementation of the industrial feasibility study which has been carried out on the European combat aircraft; and

   (*b*) the other member countries to be associated with this important European venture and to participate in the production of this aircraft;

6. Invite the Netherlands Government to use its political and financial influence to promote a European solution associating the Fokker-29 programme with the Airbus programme.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Scheffler, Rapporteur)

1. Your Rapporteur appreciates the Council's efforts in the last year to provide the Assembly with a significant volume of information on energy problems, the European aircraft industry, space developments and, in general, on subjects mentioned in recommendations and written questions.

I. *Energy problems*

2. The Committee has often proposed that member governments try harder to make a greater collective effort to meet current and especially future energy problems. It sincerely regrets that hardly any progress towards a common energy policy has been made in the Community. In April 1980, the Commission produced a document proposing that the Council arrange for a study to be made on radioactive waste, fast-breeder reactors and uranium enrichment facilities. It is disappointing that since 1977 no elements of joint action have been proposed but only studies on subjects, as mentioned above, which can lead to meetings but not to action.

3. In Dublin, in November 1979, the heads of state and government again agreed on the urgent need for the Community to develop a more effective energy policy, but the Community document now before the Council recommends in fact only greater harmonisation of pricing policies for energy. Several times the Committee and your Rapporteur have underlined that energy conservation is not the only answer to Europe's threat of being deprived of oil or gas supplies.

4. Moreover, in the document released by the European Communities on 8th April 1980, it was shown that oil consumption in the Community rose by 2.7 % in 1979; in other words, consumption rose to 525 million metric tonnes, 25 million over the target set by the governments of member states. Admittedly the Community made some progress in reducing its dependence on oil in relation to other forms of energy: in 1978 oil was used for 54.5 % of the Community's energy requirements, the figure for 1979 being 53.3 %.

5. In the continuing American-Iranian crisis the European position will therefore remain extremely weak as all countries are concerned by the potential disruption of their economies should Iran retaliate by cutting its oil supplies.

6. The political situation is even more difficult as natural gas will increase in importance as a Community energy source, thus creating a greater dependence on imported gas. About 38 % of the EEC gas comes from the Soviet Union with further supplies from Arabian countries; the possible consequences of the Afghan crisis are therefore obvious.

7. The Council states in its report that the EEC should develop its indigenous energy resources, in particular coal, nuclear power and hydrocarbon, and promote research and development programmes in the energy field with particular regard to renewable energy resources. In the member countries, however, the funding of the different energy sources fluctuates considerably. All governments are convinced that nuclear energy would take an important part of the funding but further studies, however necessary, will not be of great help to Europe in reducing its dependence on imported energy sources. What is needed is a common energy policy which can be implemented only if common action is taken on nuclear energy which, for the moment, is the only source of energy capable of reducing Europe's dependence on imported energy.

8. The Commission document proposed investing 400 billion units of account in the ten-year period 1980-90 to be spent in the field of energy. However, funding by the Community itself will be minimal and national funds will be required.

9. If decisions are not taken quickly the economic question will arise as to whether the industrial base in Europe, which probably still exists at the moment, will disappear for lack of orders. In most Community member states, apart from France, the nuclear reactor industry is at a standstill. A consequence of this is, of course, that the industry is trying to build nuclear reactors for export markets such as Brazil, Argentina, Iraq, etc. This leads to political friction between the member countries and between European countries and the United States and weakens the whole western world.

II. *European aircraft industry*

10. The Assembly welcomes the progress already achieved towards strengthening European co-operation in the production of civil aircraft and in particular the Airbus, and also with regard to fighter aircraft and helicopters.

Airbus

11. From the start of the development of the Airbus A-300, Airbus Industrie planned not to build one single type of aircraft but a family of aircraft. The A-300, a two-engined, wide-bodied aircraft with some 250 seats for short and medium distances, is the basic version of the Airbus family. In 1969, the French-German government agreement was signed. The first flight was in October 1972 and six years ago, in May 1974, came the first operational flight of the Airbus when Air France used it on one of its short-haul services. Since then several versions have been developed from the A-300, i.e. the A-300 B-4, C-4 and F-4.

12. The airlines, which have now been using the A-300 for some years, have come to the conclusion that on short and medium distances the Airbus is one of the most economical aircraft. This is not only because it uses less fuel but also because maintenance costs are lower than for comparable aircraft.

13. In 1978, airlines such as Lufthansa and Swissair contacted Airbus Industrie requesting the development of a smaller type of Airbus with some 220 seats. In the spring of 1979 five airlines concluded agreements and took options on more than 100 aircraft of the A-310 type. This was the first time in the history of the European civil aircraft industry that an aircraft had been bought and options taken although the construction of a prototype had not even begun. The A-310 should provide the same economies for fuel and maintenance as the larger A-300. There are plans to equip the aircraft with General Electric, Pratt and Whitney or Rolls-Royce engines. The first prototype of the A-310 is scheduled to fly in 1982 and the first operational aircraft will be delivered to the airlines in 1983.

14. Rolls-Royce is still making efforts to have its engines installed in the Airbus A-300 and A-310. So far no agreement has been reached, mainly because British Airways has concluded a contract with Boeing for the 757 which will be equipped with Rolls-Royce engines. Some British airlines like British Caledonian and Laker have ordered Airbuses, but not British Airways. The Boeing 757 would of course be in direct competition with the Airbus A-310. The opinion of Airbus Industrie is that the airlines themselves should decide which engines they want in their Airbuses.

15. The Fokker F-29 project, a successor to the F-28, is a new project with a seating capacity of 120-150. It could join the Airbus family as the smallest member. However, Fokker is trying to interest the Americans and Japanese in this project: it is asking to use the body of the Boeing 737 and proposes that the Japanese manufacture the wings; Fokker wishes to remain the leading partner. Fokker is of course also associated with Airbus Industrie but does not want to hand over the F-29 project unless it remains the leading partner. It is difficult to say what the outcome will be because the development cost might rise to as much as $ 1 billion and it is not at all sure that Fokker will be able to raise such a sum. A compromise is still possible with Airbus Industrie.

16. The United States already has about a 30 % participation in the Airbus since it provides the engines and the avionics.

17. The present members of Airbus Industrie are: Aérospatiale (France) with 37.9 %, Deutsche Airbus Industrie (Germany) also with 37.9 %, British Aerospace (United Kingdom) with 20 % and CASA (Spain) with 4.2 %; Fokker (Netherlands) and Belairbus (Belgium) are associated manufacturers, Belairbus only for the A-310.

18. The success of Airbus Industrie means that Boeing's share of the world market has shrunk from 94 % to 64 %. The fact that Boeing is building an aircraft similar to the Airbus with its 767 is proof that the Europeans have produced a plane at the right time and in accordance with the airlines' requirements.

19. Apart from the A-310, which will be a narrow-bodied aircraft and will compete with the Boeing 757, Airbus Industrie hopes to produce the A-300 B-9, also called A-300-TA, a widebodied aircraft for 350 passengers. Finally, there might be the A-300 B-11 which would be a long-distance aircraft with three or four engines. However, it is doubtful whether there will be a big market for this as the Boeing 747 has already gained a good foothold everywhere.

20. At the end of this year a definite decision will be taken on which of these versions will be developed. Research and development costs for the A-300 were $ 1 billion; development started in 1969. The development cost of the A-310 will also be $ 1 billion and similar costs might be expected for the A-300 B-11.

21. In Germany, about 20 % of the overall aeronautical industry works for the Airbus. In France the figure is about 15 %, in the United Kingdom 6-7 %, and in the Netherlands 5 %. As the assembly plant is in Toulouse, the French receive rather more than their share of the returns according to their contribution, while the British receive rather less and the Germans receive their correct share. The main result of Airbus collaboration is that, for the first time, such a project has been of benefit to all the partners and it is therefore very success-

ful. Airbus Industrie now employs 17,000 people and produces three Airbuses a month. In 1985, when production is expected to reach ten Airbuses a month, 40-45,000 employees will be needed. By 1993, 918 Airbuses will have been built, i.e. 592 A-300s and 326 A-310s.

European combat aircraft (ECA)

22. Your Rapporteur is convinced that in the 1980s all three armed services will need new weapons systems. Research and development will certainly be extremely costly, which means that no individual European country will be able to provide all the necessary funds. Of course research and development should be considered an insurance for future employment and are necessary for industrial products of advanced technology, but even so the new weapons systems require such huge sums that European collaboration is essential.

23. Your Rapporteur is pleased to learn that the appropriate government departments in France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom are firmly resolved to develop a joint European tactical fighter aircraft for the 1990s. It seems impossible to meet all the requirements of the air forces with missiles and therefore a new manned combat aircraft is needed.

24. The tactical fighter aircraft will be a successor to the F-4F Phantom for the German air force and the Franco-British Jaguar for the French and British air forces.

25. Three types of national specifications have been established for the new future combat aircraft: the AST.403 (air staff target) for the Royal Air Force, the ACT.92 (*avion de combat tactique* for the year 1992) for the French air force, and the TKF.90 (*Taktisches Kampf Flugzeug*) for the German air force. The national industries involved are British Aerospace, Dassault-Bréguet, MBB and Dornier.

26. The German fighter requirements are for an air-to-air rôle in the following missions: air superiority, all-weather air defence operations, area defence, long-range combat radius, interception of cruise missiles, remotely-piloted vehicles and helicopters and, finally, as an escort for the Tornado and Alpha-Jet which will be used as ground attack aircraft by the German air force.

27. The French and British Jaguar replacement programme calls for an aircraft with an air-to-ground primary mission: close air support, battlefield interdiction and battlefield surveillance.

28. The new aircraft will have to be equipped with the most advanced techniques, have great manoeuvrability and be able to fly at supersonic speed at an altitude of less than 150 metres. As the future combat aircraft has to be very light it will probably have to be manufactured with the new carbon fibres. New engines will have to be developed, probably at a cost of $ 2,000 million; the radar has to be able to distinguish between a friendly or enemy plane at a distance of 400 km and this will mean a further development of radar techniqués. The new avionics to be installed will mean new microprocessors to make the aircraft as light as possible. Great technological strides will therefore be necessary in all three main areas of the future aircraft: engines, electronics and airframe.

29. Several billion dollars will be needed for the development of such an aircraft which will give all participating countries the possibility of acquiring the technological know-how in building it. If a joint programme is established, 700 of the so-called European combat aircraft will have to be built.

30. There have been more than two years of discussions at governmental and industrial level. A preliminary company-level agreement has now been reached on the results of the feasibility studies.

Helicopters

31. In the field of helicopters four programmes are being considered and negotiations are being held between France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. The outcome might make France the leading partner in a programme for a light transport helicopter derived from the French Puma helicopter, Germany the leading nation in an anti-tank helicopter programme and the United Kingdom in an 8-ton heavy transport helicopter programme. Italy will produce important parts for all three types of helicopters and might be the leading nation in the development of a special helicopter for use in the Mediterranean area.

III. *Space questions*

Ariane

32. Your Rapporteur wishes to begin this chapter by congratulating ESA on the successful Ariane developments in 1979 since they form the basis for any European aerospace policy and programme.

33. In the report on Brazilian-European collaborative ventures and the consequences for

Europe[1] your Rapporteur submitted a chapter on the Ariane launch base at Kourou in which he mentioned that the first launch of Ariane would take place in November 1979. The same date was given in Appendix IV of the report. In the end, Ariane was launched successfully on 24th December 1979 after launch campaign delays totalling nine days. Originally the launch was planned for 15th December, but during the countdown a problem arose due to incorrect information on pressure in one of the Viking engines. The second problem arose on 23rd December when a wrong indication was registered on the state of the batteries needed for telemetry. This led to a third problem involving the third stage helium pressurisation system which resulted in a one-day delay.

34. Your Rapporteur and the Committee are very pleased that the first of the four test flights of the Ariane launcher was completely successful. The launcher placed a test capsule in orbit as planned. It also placed in orbit aluminium alloy ballast, and the total mass orbited was 1,602 kg plus the mass of the expanded third stage of the launch vehicle. The test capsule contained vibration, acceleration, acoustic and pollution sensors. Since the launch all data transmitted have been checked and it has been proved that guidance and control as well as the separation procedures were performed as planned.

35. The first successful Ariane launch will now be followed by three other test launches in 1980 and operational firings will start in the first half of 1981. Appendix IV of Document 817 lists the satellites which will be placed in orbit during the test launching programme.

36. In Appendix IV there is also a chapter on the potential market for the Ariane launcher; however, in order to capture this market Ariane should be developed in new versions called Ariane 2 and Ariane 3. This development was approved by the ESA Council on 26th July 1979.

37. The Ariane 2 version will have first and second stage engines which will be 9 % or 10 % more powerful than the existing engines. The third stage fuel tanks will be lengthened to contain 25 % more fuel. With these improvements Ariane 2 will be able to place in transfer orbit a payload of 2,050 kg.

38. The Ariane 3 version will incorporate the improvements of Ariane 2 plus two small solid boosters which will increase take-off thrust by 60 %. The payload will then be 2,420 kg in transfer orbit. The Ariane 2 and 3 launchers will be ready in three years. They will offer an improvement of 18 % and 42 % respectively on the present performance. This will be possible with development costs of some F 410 million. The cost-performance ratio can be further improved if it is possible to make the first stage of the launcher recuperable. Development costs for this improvement are estimated to be F 95 million. This new proposal was made to the board of the Ariane programme during its meetings in Paris on 20th and 21st March 1980.

39. The cost for ESA member states will be F 175 million for a full launch and F 95 million if use is being made of only half of the launcher's payload.

40. In the medium term for 1985 an Ariane 4 can be developed to raise the payload to 3,500 kg. Such a launcher will be able to orbit the biggest Intelsat VI satellite or several medium-weight satellites. If it is decided to build the Ariane 4 launcher, the base at Kourou will need a new launch pad.

41. In the long term for 1990, it will be possible to build an all-purpose launcher, Ariane 5, with a performance 60 % greater than that of Ariane 4 with a capacity for placing into transfer orbit some 5,500 kg. This could be used for both manned and unmanned space flight.

42. During the meeting of the ESA Council on 23rd and 24th January 1980 the proposal to create an industrial commercial organisation called Arianespace was agreed to by all member countries except the Federal Republic of Germany. This country was expected to give its agreement later once France had agreed to pay its share of the additional expenses incurred for spacelab. The creation of Arianespace implies the participation of the member states and will necessitate negotiations between ESA and Arianespace on the Ariane installations owned by ESA, ownership of the technical know-how of Ariane and licences, and finally ESA's use of the Ariane launcher for its programmes.

43. The French company Arianespace was formed on 26th March 1980 in Paris by its forty-seven shareholders in order to produce, launch and sell the European launcher on the world market. It is a limited company under French law with an international status. The director-general is the ex-CNES director of launchers; the administrative board, including the director-general, has twelve members: seven French, two German, one Belgian (representing Belgium, Denmark and Italy), one Swiss (representing Switzerland, the Netherlands and Spain) and one Swede (representing Sweden, Ireland and the United Kingdom). France holds the majority of the shares, 59.25 %, followed by Germany, 19.6 %, and the rest are divided among the other nine countries.

1. Document 817.

44. The first launch by Arianespace will be at the end of 1982; the three test launches foreseen for this year and the six Ariane promotional launchings will still be conducted under the responsibility of ESA.

45. Arianespace is obliged to give ESA and states participating in the Ariane programme priority over other clients.

46. According to CNES the commercialisation of Ariane might lead to a turnover of about F 1 billion in 1983.

47. A convention between ESA and Arianespace will be concluded in June or July 1980. ESA will help Arianespace in promoting the launcher for export, especially for use by international organisations such as Intelsat. The participating states will share the further funding of the Ariane launch base at Kourou. Arianespace will have to launch some thirty launchers between 1983 and 1990 in order to show a profit.

Communication satellites

48. At the Franco-German summit conference in Paris in February 1980, discussions were held between the responsible ministers on the establishment of a joint project for direct television satellites. This Franco-German bilateral project was mentioned for the first time in October 1979 during the Franco-German summit in Bonn. The French satellite is called TDF-1 and the German TV-SAT. The convention between the two countries calls for a common development phase and shared technology, and will be followed by a production phase during which each nation will build its own satellite. The new consortium will be an extension of the Franco-German Eurosatellite consortium created three years ago by Aérospatiale and MBB, and Thomson-CSF and AEG-Telefunken will be asked to join the project.

49. The financial protocol of the intergovernmental convention anticipates a cost of F 1,300 million, but as the satellites will be launched by Ariane the industrial return for Germany for the programme will be 54 % and for France 46 %. The two pre-operational satellites will be launched in 1983 and the two operational ones two years later. The electronics of the satellites will be different as they will have to be compatible with the different national systems. France and Germany believe it is now time to start building a pre-operational satellite as experience with Symphonie is sufficient and conclusive and therefore no further experiments should be undertaken. They are also afraid that they will lose the advance they now have in telecommunication satellites and that they will not reach the world market for this type of satellite in time.

50. Most of the other members of ESA have decided to continue to develop this type of activity in the framework of the Agency. They have undertaken the L-sat project which is presently sponsored by eight countries (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom). Austria will join the programme in the near future.

51. This large satellite will be launched in the first half of 1984 by Ariane. It will also be pre-operational for direct-to-home television and will be used by the Italian Broadcasting Organisation RAI-TV and by the European Broadcasting Union.

52. Only a part of the satellite will be devoted to direct broadcasting and the satellite will carry a payload for business communications and experiments in the 20/30 Ghz frequency band needed for a second-generation European regional system will also be performed. Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom are the main contributors. The satellite will be built under the leadership of a British firm, British Aerospace. The Italian firm Selenia will be responsible for the direct television equipment on board the satellite and the Netherlands will receive the contracts for communications systems work (Philips). The cost of the programme in 1980 will be F 55.5 million, shared as follows: Belgium 3 %, Canada 5 %, Denmark 3 %, Italy 23 %, Netherlands 23 %, Spain 1 %, Switzerland 6.5 % and the United Kingdom 35.5 %.

53. It is hoped that the two programmes undertaken, one in the ESA framework and one on a bilateral basis, will be sufficiently harmonised to avoid undue competition between Europeans on the world-wide market for the sole benefit of non-European manufacturers.

54. The need for such harmonisation at political level has become evident and it would be useful to consider applying the rules of the ESA convention regarding the meeting of the ESA Council at ministerial level.

55. To conclude, your Rapporteur wishes to express his appreciation that the Council recognises the importance of continued close co-ordination between military and civil meteorological authorities in order to ensure an optimal use of the available system. He hopes that the same will be true with regard to communications and earth resources detection satellites.

IV. *Conclusions*

56. In his June 1978 report on application satellites[1] your Rapporteur indicated that the ESA convention was signed on 30th May 1975

1. Document 766.

but that several member countries had not yet ratified the convention. In its reply to the accompanying recommendation, the Council stated that the ratification process was following its normal course in member countries where it had not yet been completed and that these ratifications would be forthcoming in a reasonable time. Now, two years later, France is the only country which still has to ratify this convention. This is all the more regrettable since decisions have been taken on the industrial development of Arianespace and ESA should be able to act as a juridical entity. It might also be useful if French members of the Committee put written questions to the French Government on this matter.

57. Your Rapporteur is convinced that it is now necessary to accept the decision on the French and German national programmes for direct broadcasting spacecraft and the establishment of the ESA L-sat programme by other ESA member states. He trusts there will be no recurrence of any such incident and that the European states will once again all collaborate for the further exploitation of communication satellite technology, in particular in implementing advanced business systems satellite communications. In the meantime, close links should be established between the two programmes in order to avoid European interests adopting contradictory approaches to the world market. This might be possible if France and Germany were to participate in some way in L-sat, for instance for specific items of equipment which will be necessary for the L-sat mission and which might otherwise have to be purchased in the United States.

58. On energy questions your Rapporteur is disillusioned that still no decision has been taken on a worthwhile European energy programme. Nevertheless he again has to draw the attention of the countries concerned to the fact that Europe's political and military posture will be seriously threatened if no action is taken in this field. The situation in Iran and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan will present a difficult choice for the European Community which is largely dependent on Soviet gas supplies and Iranian oil.

59. Your Rapporteur is happy that representatives of West German, French and British aerospace companies have reached tentative agreement on the definition, design, cost and time schedule for the joint development of the European combat aircraft. He hopes that the lack of unanimity amongst air force staffs of the three countries in defining the final requirements for the future fighter aircraft will be overcome and that the defence ministers will commit themselves to funding a development programme. He also expresses the hope that other member countries will be associated with this important European venture.

60. The establishment of a European Airbus family of aircraft is now well on the way and further developments for a smaller Airbus are being planned. However, no decision has been reached on a 130-150 seat aircraft. Here the Fokker-29 might find a place as a member of the Airbus family.

61. The recommendation is self-explanatory.

A European earth resources detection satellite programme

REPORT[1]

submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions[2]
by Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur

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1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee:* Mr. *Valleix* (Chairman); MM. *Lenzer, Wilkinson* (Vice-Chairmen); MM. *Adriaensens,* Antoni, Cornelissen, Fiandrotti, *Forma,* Foschi, *Garrett,* Hawkins (Alternate: *Jessel*), *Konings, McGuire,* Malvy, Mart, *Müller,* Péronnet (Alternate: *Petit*), *Scheffler, Talon,* Ueberhorst (Alternate: *Flämig*), van Waterschoot (Alternate: *Brasseur*).

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

on a European earth resources detection satellite programme

The Assembly,

Aware of the success of the United States Landsat, Seasat, Nimbus and Goes satellite programmes in the earth resources, oceanographic and meteorological fields respectively;

Conscious of the important infrastructure for the acquisition and dissemination of remote-sensing satellite data which exists in a number of European countries under the ESA Earthnet and Meteosat programmes and the success of a number of ESA-sponsored space projects to date;

Believing that European experience through the first Meteosat meteorological satellite points to the positive benefits derived from further European remote-sensing satellite programmes;

Considering that current developments within Europe through the Spacelab and French Spot programmes should be regarded as the foundation for further endeavours on a European collaborative basis in the realm of earth resources satellite programmes;

Confident that the studies so far undertaken within and on behalf of the European Space Agency, especially regarding land applications satellite systems (LASS) and coastal ocean monitoring satellite systems (COMSS), indicate both technical feasibility within the resources potentially available to Europe and worthwhile returns for these projects;

Mindful of the military surveillance and reconnaissance implications which in addition to the long-term commercial desirability of a European remote-sensing satellite programme enhance its strategic importance to European nations,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge the member states:

1. To put greater political emphasis on the final definition and initiation of an agreed earth resources satellite programme and on the continuation of the Meteosat meteorological programme;

2. To co-ordinate their efforts in remote sensing by satellite through the European Space Agency, for which they should evolve a European space policy and a more closely involved political direction of the Agency, and invite the Italian Minister in charge of space questions, Chairman-in-Office of the ESA Ministerial Council, to prepare and convene a Council meeting in the near future to establish that European policy since ESA is at a crossroad for its new programmes;

3. To build on existing national programmes such as the French Spot system, either by a renewed effort at their Europeanisation or by integrating such programmes with an approved ESA schedule of compatible earth resources satellite launches;

4. To devote adequate funding for a worthwhile European earth resources satellite programme through the European Space Agency as being the most cost-effective instrument for its development so as to be able to exploit the industrial, technical, environmental and strategic benefits of a substantial and carefully prepared remote-sensing satellite programme;

5. To evolve the most appropriate mechanisms both for the practical application of remote-sensing satellite observations and the commercial exploitation of such satellite systems;

6. To encourage within the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) the concerted study of the military requirements for remote-sensing satellites on a European basis, the definition of any resulting satellite projects and their economic and efficient procurement;

7. To urge the Councils of the European Communities and the Council of Europe to co-ordinate the possible application of European earth resources satellite programmes to the benefit of European overseas aid programmes and the economic development of poorer countries of the third world.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur)

I. *Introduction*

1. In Recommendation 317 adopted on the report on application satellites submitted by Mr. Scheffler, the Assembly recommended the further development of European activities in earth observation, including meteorology and remote sensing by satellites. It also suggested the Europeanisation of the French project Spot. In its reply to this recommendation the Council noted the Assembly's interest in the pursuit of European activities in this field. In its reply to Recommendation 316 on United States-European co-operation and competition in advanced technology it mentioned the Earthnet programme designed to set up a European network of receiving, processing and distributing stations for data and images transmitted by earth observation satellites. ESA was then examining the need for European remote-sensing satellites.

2. Earthnet was the first step towards the establishment of a European remote-sensing space programme and was approved at the ESA Council meeting at ministerial level in February 1977. Your Rapporteur wishes to point out here that this ESA ministerial meeting was the only one ever held.

3. Monitoring the earth's resources would allow Europe three main land applications: geological, agriculture (crop inventory and forecasting) and forestry, water resources and development aid; three principal global ocean applications: air-sea interaction, circulation and polar ice surveys; and four main coastal ocean applications: fisheries, environmental monitoring, surveillance of the economic zone and continental shelf operations.

4. In Recommendation 326 in its second report on application satellites submitted by Mr. Scheffler, the Assembly proposed that ESA should study the establishment of a more sophisticated global communications network in which the data gathered by remote-sensing, environmental and meteorological satellites could be combined. The Council replied that ESA should collaborate with the World Meteorological Organisation in carrying out a preliminary study examining both the user requirements and the advantages and drawbacks of the technical possibilities.

5. In Recommendation 328 adopted on the report on weather forecasting submitted by Mr. Cavaliere and Mr. Hawkins, the Assembly recommended the promotion of an organisation by the European meteorological services or institutes to start the operational phase of a European meteorological satellite system. In reply, the Council stated on 11th June 1979:

> " ...Recently WMO has initiated a study on an integrated observing system over the oceans in which special attention will be given to factors such as reliability and cost-effectiveness.
>
> The results of the first global atmospheric research programme (GARP) experiment which is taking place in 1979 and is also being co-ordinated by WMO, will form an important contribution to the study.
>
> It is likely that this study will result in a recommendation for the introduction of an 'optimum mix' of observing systems, containing many components, such as satellites, buoys, ships and aircraft. Polar and geostationary satellites might form an integrated component in such a system, and in this connection it should be noted that by their nature, polar satellites have an observation capacity which is not restricted to certain (limited) areas. Hence these satellites derive their importance from their usefulness for both land and sea areas all over the world. The Council are aware that the realisation of an optimal meteorological observing system depends on close co-operation between all countries in and around the areas and regions involved. The Council hence welcome and recommend the active participation of the member states in both regional and world-wide efforts in the maintenance and improvement of observation and data collection systems now available for the North Atlantic and for North and Central Africa.
>
> Moreover, the Council draw the attention of member states to the need for close co-operation in the evaluation of new observing techniques and to the need for integration of those systems which prove to be cost-effective in the longer term. "

6. It is important now to define accurately the political and institutional implications of the Agency's decision to embark on a remote-sensing satellite programme. It is important also to define the relationship between the French national programme and the ESA initiatives in this field. The delegations to ESA have on several occasions indicated that they were aware of the need for an examination in

depth, but the political impetus to the necessary decision-making has so far been inadequate.

7. At present, ideas abound, and proposals can be expected, aiming at concerting efforts at international level. Europe can either play a passive rôle and accept the decisions or *de facto* situations originating elsewhere or – if the states that compose " Space Europe " so wish – initiate actions and make the contribution which it has the means – technical, intellectual, financial and political – to supply.

8. It is the view of your Rapporteur that Europe should assume a dynamic attitude, and adopt an agreed European earth resources satellite programme tailored to match the particular requirements of Europe in choice of such things as sensors and orbits which are significantly different from, for example, those required by the United States.

II. *Remote sensing – a background*

9. In 1972 NASA launched the first Landsat spacecraft. This was designed to acquire imagery of the planet's land surfaces for earth resources research and applications. The experiment was successful, and very large areas of the world now have pictorial coverage obtained by the satellite and its successors, Landsat 2 and 3.

10. Landsat is one of several types of remote-sensing satellite, all of which exploit a spacecraft's capability of repetitively and reliably viewing almost any region of interest on the earth's surface or atmosphere. Such satellites form part of the progression that man has made in the surveillance of his environment from continuously improving vantage points – from tree top to hill top, then to balloon and aircraft, and now to space. The method of recording the scene has made parallel advances – from visual observations and memory to snapshot photography, then to systematic airborne photography, infrared photography, false colour photography, multispectral scanners and imaging radars, all of which are remote-sensing techniques.

11. The extensive adoption of digital recording techniques and the wide availability of fast computers have enabled complex image processing methods to be developed, which considerably assist in image interpretation. In addition, it is now possible to combine images derived from different sensors, allowing even more complex phenomena to be observed and understood.

12. Meteorology has provided a fruitful field for remote-sensing satellite applications. American examples are the Tiros, NOAA and Nimbus meteorological spacecraft. These are inserted into near-polar orbits, with altitudes of 600 to 1,200 km. Visible and infrared sensors give a resolution of up to 1.1 km at the centre of a swath width of over 2,000 km. A European example is the Meteosat geostationary meteorological spacecraft. This images the earth in both infrared and visible bands at half-hourly intervals. The resolution is about 5 km at the equator.

13. Oceanography too is a prime field for the application of remote-sensing satellite techniques. The American Seasat satellite is an example. Placed in a near-polar, 800 km altitude orbit, it carried microwave sensors, including a synthetic aperture imaging radar with a nominal 25 m resolution and a 100 km swath width. Unfortunately it operated for only three months in 1978.

14. Remote-sensing satellites are proving increasingly useful in mineral exploration. In geology the basic questions that remote-sensing satellites help to answer are: " What occurs and where, and what are its structural relationships with other rock bodies? ". In arid and semi-arid areas, especially where the object of interest (rock body; alteration associated with mineralisation) is exposed at the surface, it may be possible to delimit the areas of interest automatically by suitable classification of the spectral reflectance data. In most cases, however, mineral deposits are hidden by superficial deposits, soils and vegetation. In these cases where the deposit cannot usually be detected directly, the remote-sensing data are used to produce optimum human interpretations of the regional geology as the starting point for rationalising exploration programmes.

15. Although many benefits of remote-sensing spacecraft, such as improved weather forecasting, more efficient exploration for mineral deposits and accurate crop yield predictions, are widely known and documented, it is less easy to quantify financial estimates. Some examples quoted by the Remote Sensing Unit of the British Royal Aircraft Establishment are:

(*i*) correctly forecasting frost-free nights in Florida can save $ 6 million per night, by allowing open-air heating to be turned off in citrus fruit growing areas;

(*ii*) accurate measurements of wave size over long periods of time in the North Sea can save £1 million for each foot designed out of the height of an oil production platform;

(*iii*) accurate plotting of storms, icebergs and currents can save £10,000 for every day by which the duration of the voyage of a large ship is reduced;

(*iv*) an accurate world-wide crop yield forecast for wheat will benefit the United States economy alone by $ 260 million per annum.

16. Interest in Europe in the use of remotely-sensed data from space has increased following the start of the Landsat programme and may continue as users explore the opportunities and refine the applications of the data for their particular requirements.

17. Events have moved forward on the broader international front and also on the European front. Internationally other countries beside the United States and USSR are developing remote-sensing satellite systems, e.g. Japan, for launch in 1985, India for launch in 1986-87, France for launch perhaps in 1984. Approximately seven Landsat ground stations have been established in parts of the world outside the United States giving some indication of the global interest in the reception of multispectral scanner data from Landsat. On the European front the member states of the European Space Agency have established the Earthnet programme for the reception and dissemination of data to the user community. Stations in Italy and Sweden receive Landsat data with distribution through the national points of contact in each member state.

18. For the past five years the European Space Agency has been engaged in study activities to define the European requirements as a basis for a possible European remote-sensing satellite system. Any purely European system might be integrated into an international framework of remote-sensing satellites and should aim to be complementary to, rather than a duplication of, other satellite systems.

19. Approval was given in 1979 for ESA to start a preparatory support technology programme which will serve to define the technical means of meeting the European user requirements. This programme will be completed in 1981. In the medium term it is therefore likely that the member states of ESA will need to decide whether to proceed with the full development of a European remote-sensing satellite system. For the ESA programme, consisting of the development, launch and operation of two satellites, the cost has been estimated at approximately 460 MAU (£270 m) over a nine-year period.

III. *National activities with remote-sensing satellites*

20. In the United States major advances in spaceborne remote sensing have resulted from the NASA programme. Key elements of this programme have been:

- the Landsat series of satellites starting in 1972 with the launch of Landsat 1. The last satellite in this series (Landsat 3) was launched in 1978;
- the experimental remote-sensing satellites aimed at a number of land, ocean and atmospheric missions (e.g. Nimbus, Seasat, HCMM).

New remote-sensing space systems are presently under development in the United States; these include:

- Landsat D, a more advanced satellite version of the Landsat 1-3 series which includes a high-resolution multispectral imaging instrument (thematic mapper);
- Operational satellites for land and ocean applications for introduction in the mid-1980 time period once satisfactory institutional arrangements for these satellites have been agreed.

On a national basis in the United States various groups and task forces have been studying the framework for a national operational remote-sensing organisation.

On an international basis preliminary discussions have started between the United States, Canada, France, India, Japan and ESA with a view to establishing arrangements for a co-ordination of remote-sensing satellite systems.

At the recent United Nations Conference on Science and Technology for Development held in Vienna, August 1979, it was announced by the United States Delegation that " the United States will take the initiative to bring together the operators of remote-sensing satellites as well as the users to develop an international system ". The statement underlined that the United States believed that satellites should be operated so that all can have easy access to the data and so that information can be collected without unnecessary duplication and for maximum mutual benefit.

21. Canada might join the ESA remote-sensing programme and also develop Sursat either alone or in co-operation with other interested states. Canada has also stated that it is prepared to hold a multilateral meeting in September next year to discuss the possibilities of co-ordination among space segment owners.

22. India launched its first experimental remote-sensing satellite (SEO) earlier this year and will start work on the development of IRS (Indian remote-sensing satellite). The Indian Space Research Organisation has indicated its readiness to have discussions with ESA to

maximise the benefits to be obtained from ESA's remote-sensing satellites and IRS.

23. Japan has recently decided to go ahead with an ambitious remote-sensing programme comprising both land and ocean remote-sensing satellites. The necessary finances for the first satellite have been allocated and it is expected that the first remote-sensing satellite (MOS-1) will be launched in 1985. It will be a 750 kg sun synchronous polar orbiting satellite for " observation of oceanic colour and temperature and establishment of technology common to a number of earth observation satellites ". This satellite will be followed by a geodesy satellite to be launched in 1985 and by other satellites with remote-sensing applications currently in the course of definition.

24. In the USSR remotely-sensed data is collected on a routine basis from the Meteor satellites, and from the manned spacecraft. The data collected by the USSR is supplied to a number of countries on the basis of bilateral agreements.

25. In the majority of cases European national activities have concentrated on airborne remote-sensing systems. Two recent exceptions are:

(*i*) the French Spot (*Système probatoire d'observation de la terre*) programme for the development and launch by Ariane in 1984 of an automatic remote-sensing satellite comprising two high-resolution optical imaging instruments. This programme is being developed by France in co-operation with Belgium and Sweden. Bilateral discussions are under way with NASA to ensure compatibility with future satellite systems, in particular Landsat D, with ESA on the question of the acquisition of Spot data by Earthnet, and with other operators of data acquisition stations;

(*ii*) the Spacelab remote-sensing experiments (high-resolution mapping camera and microwave remote-sensing experiment) provided by Germany for flight in the first Spacelab payload in 1982, and the development and flight by Germany of a high-performance synthetic aperture radar (SAR) on Spacelab in 1985.

26. For the Landsat series of satellites ground stations exist in the United States, Canada, Sweden, Italy, Brazil, Japan and are planned or in the process of being built in Argentina, Chile, Australia, China, India, Kenya, Upper Volta and Zaire. These stations could be adapted to receive remotely-sensed data from European satellites.

IV. *Origins of European earth resources satellite programme*

27. The European remote-sensing satellite programme started with Earthnet which receives and distributes remote-sensing data from the NASA Landsat satellite. The second phase would be the use of Spacelab for remote-sensing experiments and the third phase would be preparation for the utilisation of European automatic remote-sensing satellites. Earthnet has stations in Lannion (France), Kiruna (Sweden), Oakhanger (Britain), and Fucino (Italy); another is under construction in Mas Palomas (Canaria) and will become operational in August 1980. The network is managed by ESRIN, in Frascati; this centre also deals with the distribution of Earthnet data.

28. A major objective of Earthnet is to provide European investigators with early access to remote-sensing satellite data, to allow promising applications to be identified and valuable experience to be gained in the use of these new techniques for European problems and situations. Earthnet comprises a number of data-reception and preprocessing facilities located in Europe that acquire, preprocess, distribute and archive satellite remote-sensing data. The network operates at present with data from NASA satellites (Landsat, Seasat, HCMM and Nimbus-G), but is expected to form the basic elements for the acquisition of data from the European remote-sensing satellites once these are developed. The various elements of the Earthnet network are shown in Appendix I.

29. There are two main and interrelated objectives associated with any experimental earth observation programme using advanced sensing methods:

- to understand the capabilities and limitations of the various sensor systems proposed and to develop measurement techniques that can be applied to the different areas of application under investigation;
- using the proven remote-sensing instruments and methods derived above, to conduct experiments in the earth observation disciplines aimed either at purely scientific objectives or at perfecting measurement methods for later applications oriented missions.

30. Many of the contributions required to achieve these two objectives will come from careful and exhaustive ground-based and airborne measurement programmes. These measurements are, however, not in themselves sufficient to define and specify later automatic satellite systems completely. An intermediate orbital phase will often be required relying on the

flexibility and increased capabilities of manned space programmes such as Spacelab.

31. The rôle of Spacelab in meeting the two objectives is illustrated in Appendix II which shows how the manned space laboratory can act as a bridge between the initial ground and airborne measurements and final systems based on long life, automatic satellites.

32. It is planned to fly two remote-sensing experiments, the metric camera, and the microwave remote-sensing experiment, as part of the first Spacelab payload (FSLP), presently scheduled for launch by the space shuttle in 1982. Both experiments are provided to the Agency by the Federal Republic of Germany, as general instrumentation for the FSLP.

33. (*a*) The primary objective of the metric camera experiment is to test the mapping capabilities of high-resolution space photography on large film format (23 cm × 23 cm). The high resolution data will also be evaluated for other thermatic applications, such as land-use studies and geology.

(*b*) The microwave remote-sensing experiment (MRSE) represents one element in the development of a microwave all-weather sensing capability for a European remote-sensing space programme. The MRSE instrument is designed to operate in three different modes:

(*i*) two-frequency scatterometer (for measurement of ocean wave spectra at wavelengths in the range 5-500 m);

(*ii*) synthetic-aperture radar (for high-resolution imaging of the earth's surface);

(*iii*) passive microwave radiometer (for measurement of the naturally-emitted microwave energy from the earth).

34. Further flights of remote-sensing instruments on Spacelab are planned following the FSLP mission. In addition to reflying the metric camera and MRSE instruments, studies are presently under way to include a high-performance synthetic aperture radar in a later Spacelab flight as an intermediate step towards incorporating radar sensors on future automatic remote-sensing satellites.

V. *Meteosat*

35. ESA entered the field of earth observation with the Meteosat programme. The programme covers two identical satellites: the first was launched on 23rd November 1977 and the second will be launched at the end of this year. They are still experimental satellites but the configuration is the same as that of a future operational satellite. The primary objectives immediately after the first launch were to provide European participation in the first global atmospheric research programme and to contribute to the WMO World Weather Watch programme.

36. Meteosat itself forms part of a global network of five geostationary satellites in equatorial orbit. The missions and performances of the five satellites are being co-ordinated by a committee of representatives from the countries or organisations which provided the satellites and from the World Meteorological Organisation. Apart from ESA the other participants are the United States (with three satellites) and Japan. The European system is compatible with their systems.

37. In the framework of the global atmospheric research programme the Soviet Union also promised to supply a satellite but has so far not done so. One of the reasons is that the Soviet Union needs a high-powered launcher to bring the satellite into the required orbit over the equator. It is now able to do this, but at high cost, and so far only communication satellites have been placed in geostationary orbit over the equator. Moreover, in order to handle the data flow involved in such a meteorological satellite the Soviet Union needs a computer of a type which it is unable to manufacture itself and which the United States promised to deliver but has not done so.

38. The Meteosat programme was started by French space and meteorological organisations and in 1972 the programme was Europeanised through legal arrangements between ESA and eight of its members: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Its protocol covering the operations came into effect in 1978. ESA controls the satellite and is also responsible for processing and handling the data.

39. The satellite's fixed location with respect to the earth allows it to fulfil its three main mission objectives: (*i*) to take images of the earth's surface and cloud formations at half-hourly intervals, (*ii*) to disseminate images and other data sent to the satellite by the Meteosat ground facilities, (*iii*) to collect data from fixed stations such as buoys or from moving platforms such as ships or aircraft and transmit them to the ESA centre at Darmstadt.

40. The Meteosat programme might be continued until 1993-94. The ground equipment, of which the main components are the

data acquisition, telemetry and tracking station, and the Meteosat ground computer system, represents a very high investment and the meteorological services are therefore reluctant to change their equipment unless absolutely necessary. In order to assist developing countries which cannot afford a sophisticated receiving station, which costs about $ 3-400,000, the Meteosat images are cut up and only the parts of interest to the countries concerned are disseminated every three hours instead of every half-hour. These sectorised images can then be received by cheap ground stations.

41. The processing associated with the three missions described – data extraction from imagery, dissemination and data collection – is implemented by the operators in the Meteosat control centre at Darmstadt. There, day and night, six operators perform the analysis, follow up the dissemination and the data collection. In order to work at the necessary speed they use the large Meteosat ground computer system.

42. The information provided by Meteosat gives the meteorologists fresh insight into the behaviour of the atmosphere as a whole and of regional and local phenomena. Although the meteorological services were sceptical at the beginning of the Meteosat programme they are now convinced that these satellites enhance the accuracy of their weather forecasting services.

43. However, on 24th November 1979 Meteosat's primary function, to take pictures of the earth's surface and cloud formations, became unreliable as the satellite stopped transmitting the pictures. ESA technicians tried to rectify the technical problems of the satellite but did not succeed. This is highly regrettable as the other functions of the satellite are being performed satisfactorily. The meteorological services which had just become used to the benefits of Meteosat will have to do without its data until a new satellite (Meteosat 2) is put into orbit at the end of 1980.

VI. *The European remote-sensing satellite programme*

44. ESA has been extremely interested in various aspects of remote sensing since the beginning of this decade. A great deal of this interest, particularly in the early days, has taken the form of studies in which the physics and technology of various remote-sensing techniques have been examined. In addition, the implications of incorporating such techniques within the context of space missions designed to satisfy the remote-sensing requirements of a wide body of European and other users have been assessed. Since 1976, ESA has been increasingly directing these and other activities towards preparation of a full-scale remote-sensing programme due to start with launch of the first satellite in the mid-1980s. Within the context of the above, the Agency's present efforts are concentrating on the following items:

- activities directly related to the design and implementation of the full-scale remote-sensing programme. This currently involves various systems studies and technology developments;
- the programme called Earthnet, in which various ground stations in Europe are being used to receive, preprocess and disseminate remote-sensing data from various United States satellites. This programme is serving as a baseline for definition of ground facilities for the full European programme;
- various remote-sensing experiments for the first Spacelab mission(s).

The remote-sensing programme

Mission objectives and requirements

45. ESA has indicated that the key themes of the European remote-sensing programme should meet the observational requisites of:

- European regional needs;
- development aid programmes.

Within these themes, major mission applications have been identified as:

- agricultural monitoring, e.g. inventory, yield prediction;
- land use monitoring, e.g. classification and mapping;
- water resources management, e.g. snow/ice surveys, soil moisture;
- coastal ocean surveys, e.g. sea ice, continental shelf monitoring;
- monitoring of polar regions, e.g. Greenland, ice surveys;
- development aid, e.g. monitoring of production of biomass, disaster assessment;
- mineral resources and dynamic geology, e.g. detection of lineaments and mineral concentrations.

ESA considers that the mission requirements can be best covered by a set of satellite payloads tailored in design and operation for observations within the following areas:

- land applications;
- coastal ocean monitoring;
- global ocean monitoring.

Of the above, the first two are regarded as having the higher priority. In addition, analysis of European needs has led to the conclusion that for the two priority missions, microwave sensing is particularly desirable for continuous, repetitive imaging of the earth's surface in the presence of cloud cover, which is rather high in Europe. Furthermore, the average field size in European agricultural areas is small and requires a high spatial resolution, higher than the 80 m provided by the MSS of the current Landsat satellites.

Selected satellite systems

46. In order to meet the above mission requirements, ESA has proposed the remote-sensing programme should involve the satellite systems as given below:

- coastal ocean monitoring satellite system (COMSS);
- land applications satellite system (LASS).

A third system, designed to meet the global ocean monitoring mission requirement mentioned above, has been discussed (GOMSS – global ocean monitoring satellite system). However, it is now recognised that the required functions of such a system may, with suitable design, be incorporated within those of the COMSS system. As a result, the concept of GOMSS as a separate entity appears, therefore, to be in abeyance at the present time. Present considerations intend that the programme commences with first launch in the mid-1980s. The launch vehicle will be Ariane and it is proposed that the space segment be based upon the use of a satellite platform of existing design. Phase A examinations of the COMSS and LASS missions began in September 1978[1] and are continuing at the present time with various studies of important elements of system design. The design situation is, therefore, an evolving one. The present key characteristics of COMSS and LASS are contained in Appendices III and IV respectively.

The preparatory programme

47. ESA has concluded that before starting a detailed definition of the various systems, in-depth studies of various critical factors have to be performed. These involve various elements within the microwave and optical-sensing systems and certain aspects associated with data handling. This "preparatory" programme commenced in March 1979 and will extend over two years. In addition to the above, various experimental programmes based upon extensive ground and airborne measurements are intended. These will be used to familiarise potential users of remote-sensing data and to develop analytical techniques. It is expected that this programme will be carried out within existing, national facilities in Europe (and Canada).

Programme time-scales[1]

48. The main elements of the proposed programme are:

- the launch of two satellites, ERS-1 and ERS-2, planned for end 1985/early 1986 and end 1987/early 1988 respectively. ERS-1 will very likely be the COMSS mission;
- programme approval, expected in 1980;
- Phase B for ERS-1, to be carried out until mid-1982;
- Phase C/D to start end 1982;
- for ERS-2, the planning will be almost identical but delayed in time by a period of about two years;
- studies on the adaptations required to make the present Earthnet system compatible with the space segment will be undertaken in the programme. As much as possible, ERS-1 and ERS-2 will ensure compatibility with other major remote-sensing satellites (e.g. Landsat D, Spot, etc.);
- in addition, Spacelab will be used to the maximum possible extent as a test bed for synthetic aperture radar of design similar to that proposed for ERS.

VII. *ESA studies in the definition of remote-sensing satellite systems*

49. Key missions in the context of a European remote-sensing satellite programme were briefly discussed. It is important to consider further the studies that are under way relating to the definition of satellite systems for the land applications and coastal ocean monitoring missions. These studies can be classified into three categories:

- satellite systems studies (phase A studies),
- instrument definition studies, based on specifications derived from user requirements,
- sub-system studies.

1. COMSS – contract awarded to British Aerospace Dynamics Group, Bristol; LASS – contract awarded to Dornier Systems, Federal Republic of Germany.

1. See Appendix V.

In addition to the remote-sensing instrumentation, each payload will include a data-collection platform (DCP) sub-system. In the case of the synthetic aperture radars (SAR), specific studies (phase A) have been carried out, whereas for the optical imaging instrument (OII), the imaging microwave radiometer (IMR), and the ocean colour monitor (OCM) instrument definition will form one (major) element of the satellite systems studies[1].

50. Synthetic-aperture radar phase A studies: Two parallel industrial phase A studies on SAR systems, initiated by the Agency in March 1978 were completed in October 1978 (prime contractors Thomson-CSF(F) and Marconi Research Laboratories (UK)). The aim of both studies was the definition of a single-frequency, single-polarisation SAR system that would form one element of a remote-sensing payload to be carried by a spacecraft platform suitable for launch on the Agency's Ariane vehicle.

51. Solar-array feasibility studies: Two studies have been carried out (initiated May 1978) involving assessment of the feasibility of two flexible-solar-array concepts (one per study). The two concepts, which differed in deployment (roll-out and fold-out) and storage mechanisms, have been analysed in relation to the Ariane-compatible platform used in the SAR and satellite system studies.

52. Satellite system phase A studies: In May 1978, two calls for tender were issued by ESA relating to phase A studies of:

- a land applications satellite system (LASS);
- a coastal ocean monitoring satellite system (COMSS).

The main objectives were:

- to establish a feasible baseline system concept, the main elements of which will be:
- (*i*) the payloads specified;
  (*ii*) an Ariane-compatible platform (specification provided to contractors);
  (*iii*) a ground segment (based on an extension of Earthnet for the European coverage zone);
- to establish development and cost plans for the implied programme assuming the launch of a first satellite in the mid-1980s;
- to identify critical areas in overall systems development and in sub-systems technology, and to provide recommendations for the definition of an appropriate supporting research and technology plan;
- to identify the necessary growth potential in order to fulfil the mission requirements to the greatest possible extent, and to develop a follow-on programme plan relating to evolution of system capability.

53. The two studies were initiated on 31st August (LASS) and on 1st September (COMSS) 1978. Each satellite will, as discussed earlier, carry an optical imaging instrument (OII)[1] and a synthetic aperture radar (SAR), the instrument specifications differing for each mission. The coastal ocean monitoring payload will also contain an imaging microwave radiometer (IMR). Whereas the OII(s) and IMR definitions will form major elements of the system studies, the specifications for the SARs (plus costing and SRT plan data) are being drawn from the radar studies conducted by Thomson-CSF and Marconi. Further study inputs are being derived from the solar-array studies.

54. Your Rapporteur has outlined the main European interest and objectives in spaceborne remote sensing, and has described the action (Earthnet, Spacelab experiments) and studies presently under way or planned which should lead to the implementation of a European remote-sensing satellite programme by the mid-1980s. It seems clear that Europe and, indeed, the rest of the world, with their increasing requirements for accurate and timely information on the earth's resources and environment, need the new data that can be supplied by remote-sensing satellites. Although many problems still need to be resolved concerning the use of the data and the technical elements to be developed, it is firmly believed that Europe has the experience and capability to overcome them. Perhaps the greatest challenge we face in incorporating this new technology into our daily lives is the more abstract one of convincing Europe that it cannot afford to abstain from making its proper contribution to this original and exciting space applications activity.

VIII. *Système probatoire d'observation de la terre (Spot)*

55. The French Government decided in February 1978 to undertake the development of

1. It was recognised after completion of these studies that the depth of the analysis for the instruments was not sufficient and therefore separate definition studies were initiated for the OII, IMR and OCM and are in progress.

1. In the case of COMSS, this OII is called OCM.

the Spot system, the earth observation test system as a contribution to a global resources and environment management system in which meteorological, geological, geographical and ecological information would be constantly updated. CNES started its studies in 1975 and in 1976 a programme was prepared and submitted to the ESA Council defined in accordance with the ESA convention. The French have always been active in observation and optical techniques and it was therefore logical to prepare such a programme as a follow-up and a complement to the Landsat programme. Although originally the programme was favourably received in Europe, Sweden was the only ESA member country inclined to invest in it. Belgium was neutral at first but later supported the programme for industrial reasons. Both countries are therefore contributing some space- or ground-based hardware, but the ESA member states as a whole did not wish to participate.

56. One of the difficulties was that three major programmes were going on in ESA which required all the money earmarked for space activities. It is also possible that high resolution visible range instruments were not considered practical by a number of ESA members for Northern European countries, many of which are often cloud-covered. However, from the very beginning it was pointed out that visible observation was of great importance to underdeveloped countries, especially in Africa.

57. Italy and Switzerland were not very interested since the Spot system had been designed as the forerunner of a series of earth-oriented Ariane launch missions in low orbit. The management of Ariane is not considered by those countries to be really European but more as a French project. When the ESA Council turned down the French offer, the French Government decided to continue alone because it thought that earth observation would have a big potential in terms of technological fallout and financial returns. The programme would cost some F 1,000 million and would therefore be less expensive than the development of Meteosat.

58. The system comprises a multi-mission platform or bus and a mission-specific payload, which together constitute the Spot satellite, plus a ground segment. The multi-mission platform or bus carries mission-independent subsystems: attitude and orbit control, power supplies, on-board computers, telemetry and command equipment. The bus might also serve French military requirements although a decision has not been taken to start intelligence gathering through surveillance satellites using the Spot bus. The platform equipment is basically reusable for other earth observation missions.

59. The payload includes two identical cameras, which are also able to take stereoscopic views, and the payload telemetry. For the satellite, Sweden will build the computer and Belgium the power supply sub-system. The satellite is land-oriented and therefore not equipped for ocean surveillance. Detailed observation will be used for land management and geological exploration.

60. After the French decision there was automatically a delay in the European programme which however poses no serious problem for ESA. For Europe it is important to know what American policy will be and only recently there have been clear indications that NOAA will manage the operational programme which will have to pay for itself, and this means that customers will have to pay the real price for services.

61. The first generation of earth detection satellites was the Landsat 1, 2, 3 series of which only Landsat 3 is still working. In 1982 Landsat D will become operational and will have a ground resolution of 30 metres. The first series has a ground resolution of 80 metres. In 1984-85 Landsat D prime will be operational; the full system will work from 1988 onwards. Then the customers will not only have to pay for the operating cost but also for the cost of the spacecraft. The French system will have the following time-table: the first Spot will be launched in 1984, the second flight model could be launched in 1986, the third in 1989 and the fourth in 1991 if a decision for an operational system is taken. The satellites would therefore be launched at intervals of two-and-a-half years.

62. There will be three main differences between Spot and Landsat D:

(*i*) Spot will have improved resolution up to 10 metres and 20 metres in three colours; it will therefore be better adapted to mapping. It will produce maps of 1/100,000 whereas the Landsat will make its map at scale of 1/200,000. Once the Spot system is fully operational it will be able to produce cartographic updating of 1/50,000;

(*ii*) by using a system of mirrors, the cameras will be able to take photographs at different angles and make stereoscopic pictures. As the satellite will move over the same area every four days, it can observe growing crops regularly;

(*iii*) finally, with stereoscopic observation, altitude profiles can be established and this is of great importance for geologists.

In the United States there is a lobby in Congress to produce research and development money for a stereoscopic satellite, Stereosat, but no decision has yet been taken. Although there is some competition between Landsat and Spot, the main performances are so different that in fact they do not compete for the same clientèle.

63. The French Government is still interested in a possible European programme for earth detection as this would be achieved mainly through radar observation, the satellite using a synthetic aperture antenna. If a decision were taken in favour of a European programme the Spot platform would probably be used. The mission of such a programme might well be able to map the depth of shallow seas and also the velocity of waves. However, it should be taken into consideration that this type of observation would need a high power output on board the satellite, as shown by Seasat.

64. A European programme should be an experimental one as enough experience has not yet been gained with this type of earth observation. ESA is studying the problem and a mission definition might be arrived at by the end of this year or early 1981. The European system might be complementary to the French Spot system. The main decision would be whether to try for an early launch and use proven technology, which would mean that the first satellite could be launched in 1985, or to develop new technology and therefore have a launch in 1987. NASA is developing a national ocean surveillance satellite, NOSS, which will be derived from Seasat and which will be paid for by NASA (25 %), NOAA (25 %) and the Department of Defence (50 %).

65. The Germans are very interested in microwave detection equipment for ocean-oriented research. The United Kingdom is also interested in an oceanographic programme, but Italy and Switzerland prefer land observation. The ESA programme might include satellites for both types of observation but then the programme would cost 460 million units of account. Whether this money will be made available by the governments is of course highly questionable. One of the major advantages of the proposed ESA programme is the inclusion of a number of microwave instruments which will penetrate the European cloud cover.

66. There is a great difference for Europe in analysing data from satellites such as Landsat and data acquired by a European system. A European system could provide at least 50 % more data than if another system is used. In the long term, Spot might well generate sufficient financial returns to make it cost-effective. Both direct and indirect returns should be considered.

IX. *Coastal ocean monitoring*

67. Coastal areas comprise 20 % of the earth's surface and from the human and economic viewpoints are one of the most important zones on our planet. There is an increasing need, therefore, for efficient and detailed surveillance to provide the information needed to manage human activities in these areas and to monitor the marine environment in general.

68. The key themes of the above surveillance requirement lie in the fields of industrial exploration and exploitation, environmental monitoring and scientific research. In particular, it is expected that the following application areas will benefit from the proposed COMSS:

- forecasting of sea state, storms and currents;
- surveillance of icebergs for navigation and the protection of oil rigs;
- improvement of medium-term weather forecasting;
- routing and regulation of sea traffic in channels and the approaches to ports;
- assistance to oil exploration;
- optimisation of coastal constructions or construction at sea;
- evaluation of primary production;
- forecasting the location of surface fish;
- surveillance of oil or chemical pollution.

X. *The institutional framework*

69. Through conventions and intergovernmental agreements, space Europe in the form of the European Space Agency has established such activities as the scientific programme, the communications programme – which led to the creation of Eutelsat grouping European postal and telecommunication administrations – ESA's direct television broadcast satellite programme, the L- (large) Sat, Spacelab, the Ariane programme – which led to Arianespace, the industrial group responsible for building the launcher – and the earth observation programme.

70. If ultimately adopted by the ESA Council, the latter programme will dominate ESA's activities in the near future, but there are fears that in this field France's national programme could complicate what the majority of European Space Agency member states believe should be a European effort. Fears of a Franco-German bilateral arrangement as with the television satellite programme exist.

71. They were well expressed by a previous Rapporteur, Mr. Scheffler, in paragraph 40 of Document 766:

> " In the absence of a positive decision by the ESA Council, the CNES (*Centre national d'études spatiales*) has taken up contact with NASA and an agreement has been concluded by which the future French satellite would use the same type of images as NASA's Landsat D. It is to be hoped that a European programme will finally emerge from this national activity following the terms of the ESA convention under which national programmes are to be Europeanised progressively to the greatest possible extent. "

72. ESA is a technical organisation with many technical facilities but it lacks political guidance. There is no real common European space policy and therefore ESA operates in a partial political vacuum. For example, the budget of the Joint Research Centre at Ispra was approved by the Ministers of the Common Market whereas the ESA budget of some $ 700 million per year, nearly four times the JRC budget, was approved by civil servants only. The last ESA ministerial meeting took place in 1977. ESA is an ideal mechanism for the development of new space technologies but not for their commercial exploitation.

73. The important immediate problems are not institutional in the sense of the relationship between ESA and the EEC but are questions of commercial application and industrial work sharing. In these fields political guidance is of major importance if a common European effort is to be assured. The most important applications for the earth resources detection satellite would be fishing, agricultural land use and aid to developing countries. As far as agriculture is concerned this means especially monitoring of crops and of renewable resources in general. All these are areas of EEC interest.

74. Document 650 (26th November 1979) of the Commission of the European Communities expressed it well (paragraph 3.5.2):

> " Several policies managed or monitored at Community level (agricultural policy, fisheries, environmental policy, regional policy, etc.) would be strengthened by advance objective information on the state of earth resources. Remote sensing can already provide this type of information, the political and economic importance of which is fundamental and whose impact on integration is substantial.
>
> In this area the Community is already developing pilot projects for research and co-ordination with national programmes. Accordingly, the Community has a specific rôle to play both by optimising the R & D effort (setting-up of a forum for end-users, in most cases public administrations, on a sector-by-sector basis) and by helping to create a market by making the Community institutions' particular needs known.
>
> Using this data, and in order to overcome obstacles and to create the necessary spin-off effect, the Community could decide to launch pilot projects aimed at improving the operation of certain of its policies (forestry and/or agricultural inventory, natural resources, etc.). "

75. Remote-sensing satellites can also provide extremely valuable military information which is a crucial reason why Europe should develop this capability. The intelligence obtained from remote-sensing satellite systems can be so important that direct access to it is an entirely justified investment for the European nations which would otherwise remain in a position of dependence inappropriate to Europe's growing economic and political power.

XI. *Conclusion*

76. At their conference in Bonn in July 1978, the heads of state and government of the Community recognised the need to identify new sources of growth and employment to offset the difficult adjustments that traditional industries such as coal, steel, shipbuilding and textiles are being forced to undergo. At Strasbourg they agreed that the dynamic complex of information industries based on the new electronic technologies offered a major source of such economic growth and social development and invited the Commission to study the matter and report.

77. It is the belief of your Rapporteur that the space industry could provide Europe with that major source of economic growth and social development. Accordingly the heads of government of the Western European nations should implement the ESA remote-sensing satellite programme as a matter of high priority.

78. Finally, your Rapporteur wishes to refer to the symposium held in Toulouse in March 1978 under the auspices of ESA, CNES, the Council of Europe and the Town of Toulouse.

APPENDIX I

Main elements of the Earthnet programme



APPENDIX II

Rôle of Spacelab in the development of remote-sensing instruments and techniques



APPENDIX III

COMSS : Present key characteristics

Payload :	(1) Ocean colour monitor (OCM) (visible/infrared imager)
	(2) Synthetic aperture radar (SAR)
	(3) Imaging microwave radiometer (IMR)
Orbit :	Low altitude circular, sun-synchronous (repetition period four days)
Launch vehicle :	Ariane
Platform :	Spot multi-mission platform
Ground system :	Earthnet
	Data collection platforms

APPENDIX IV

LASS : Present key characteristics

Payload :	(1) Optical imaging instrument (OII) (visible/infrared imager)
	(2) Synthetic aperture radar (SAR)
Orbit :	Low altitude, circular, sun-synchronous (repetition period seventeen days)
Launch vehicle :	As COMSS
Platform :	As COMSS
Ground system :	Earthnet

APPENDIX V

Programme current status



Interpretation of Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure

REPORT [1]

submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges [2]
by Mr. Grieve, Chairman and Rapporteur

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee:* Mr. *Grieve* (Chairman); MM. *Bozzi,* Cornelissen (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Battaglia (Alternate: *Cavaliere*), Brasseur, *Edwards, Giust, Glesener,* van Hulst (Alternate: *Portheine*), Mrs. Knight (Alternate: *Jessel*), MM. Lagourgue, Lemaire, Maravalle (Alternate: *Talamona*), *Marquardt,* Michel, Mulley (Alternate: *Sir Thomas Williams*), Pignion (Alternate: *Talon*), Schäuble (Alternate: *Müller*), Sterpa, Voogd (Alternate: *Stoffelen*), Zebisch (Alternate: *Mrs. von Bothmer*).

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Resolution

to amend Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly

The Assembly,

Considering it necessary to amend Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure as follows:

1. The heading for this rule becomes: " Substitutes and alternates ".
2. In paragraph 1, replace the words " may arrange to be replaced " by " may be replaced ".
   Delete the last sentence.
3. In paragraph 2, replace the words " nominated in due form " by the words " duly registered in accordance with Rule 24 ".
   At the beginning of the second sentence, replace the word " They " by the word " Substitutes ".
4. Paragraph 3 becomes paragraph 4 and reads as follows:
   " Any full member of a Committee who is prevented from attending a meeting of that Committee shall, as a rule, arrange to be replaced by the Representative or Substitute appointed for the purpose. In special cases, he may, with the consent of the Chairman of the Committee, be replaced by another Representative or Substitute of the same nationality as himself.
   Such an alternate nominated in due form shall have the same rights in the Committee as the member himself. "
5. Delete paragraph 4.
6. Paragraph 5 becomes paragraph 3,

DECIDES

To replace former Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure by the following:

" *Substitutes and Alternates*

1. Any Representative prevented from attending a sitting of the Assembly may be replaced by a Substitute.

2. Substitutes duly registered in accordance with Rule 24 have the same rights as Representatives in the Assembly.

Substitutes may not, however, be elected to the Bureau of the Assembly.

3. A substitute who is a Committee Chairman or Rapporteur may speak in that capacity, even if he is not sitting in place of a Representative. In the latter case, however, he shall not be entitled to vote.

4. Any full member of a Committee who is prevented from attending a meeting of that Committee shall, as a rule, arrange to be replaced by the Representative or Substitute appointed for the purpose. In special cases, he may, with the consent of the Chairman of the Committee, be replaced by another Representative or Substitute of the same nationality as himself.

Such an alternate nominated in due form shall have the same rights in the Committee as the member himself. "

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Grieve, Chairman and Rapporteur)

1. The appointment of substitutes is provided for in Article II (*b*) of the Charter in order to allow enough members to be present for the Assembly to proceed with its work in spite of the hazards of parliamentary life which too often prevent some members taking their seats. This paragraph reads as follows:

> " Substitutes of the representatives of the Brussels Treaty powers to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe may sit, speak and vote in the place of representatives prevented from attending a sitting of the Assembly. "

2. The conditions in which substitution is organised in the Assembly and its Committees are set out in Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure.

3. These provisions seem clear. However, members of the Assembly have on several occasions noted certain difficulties in applying them, particularly during the June 1979 session. On that occasion, Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, stated that the interpretation of Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure should be examined in detail. He noted in fact that there was some question as to the moment from which substitution became effective. Was it when the President made his customary announcement to the Assembly at the start of a sitting? Was it still possible to sign on as a substitute after this announcement? Did substitution apply to the whole sitting? Could a substitute replace more than one representative at the same sitting? Could a representative speak but leave his substitute to vote?

4. In order to remove all uncertainty about methods of applying Rule 7, the Presidential Committee asked the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges to submit the present report to the Assembly.

5. In fact, Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure may be interpreted differently according to whether the aim is to draw up a clear, final and unquestionable list of seats filled by representatives and those assigned to substitutes for each sitting or rather to assemble the largest possible number of members when votes are taken.

6. If the expression " prevented from attending a sitting " is interpreted strictly, the provisions of Rule 7 in fact allow it to be determined at the beginning of each sitting which titular members and substitutes have the right to speak and vote. However, they prevent titular members or substitutes included in the attendance register and obliged to be absent when votes are taken from being replaced. Their effect is therefore to facilitate roll-call votes but to make it more difficult to obtain a quorum.

7. Presidents of the Assembly had therefore been led to interpret the rules more flexibly to allow a representative and his substitute to fill a seat in turn at the same sitting and consequently to have the right to speak and vote successively. It was thus easier to avoid vacant seats when votes were taken. Conversely, it could arise that there was doubt as to which member of the Assembly should be called during a roll-call vote.

8. Hence, it should be determined:

(*i*) when a substitute has signed the attendance register, whether he is to replace the titular member and exercise all the latter's duties throughout the sitting, or whether he should withdraw in the event of the titular member wishing to resume his place during the sitting:

(*ii*) when a titular member has signed the attendance register, whether he is still entitled to have himself replaced in the event of other commitments compelling him to absent himself during the same sitting.

9. The Committee was almost unanimous in considering that the expression " prevented from attending a sitting " should be interpreted strictly and that it was for each delegation to ensure the necessary discipline among its members so that representatives and substitutes whose names appeared on the attendance register exercised their rights throughout the sitting, except in unavoidable circumstances.

10. However, a small minority of the Committee felt that the aim of Rule 7 in making provision for substitutes was to allow delegations to fill all seats available to them. It therefore feels that too much importance should not be attached to the duration of the sitting. It should be possible for a representative to arrange to be replaced at any time. Moreover, it may happen that a representative and his substitute are both absent at the same time. In that event, another member of the delegation should be able to fill the vacant seat. In short, the minority considered that the provisions of Rule 7 should be applied flexibly in order to ensure that a quorum was obtained and recalled that this was what Presidents of the Assembly had done hitherto.

11. The majority of the Committee preferred to give priority to the need for clarity and discipline rather than to obtaining a quorum, pointing out that members of the Assembly would be present in greater numbers when votes were taken precisely if there was more discipline in the delegations.

12. However, the Committee voted in favour of a more flexible interpretation of the Rules of Procedure where the right to speak was concerned in order to allow a member of the Assembly who had already put his name down to speak and whose speech had had to be postponed until a subsequent sitting to speak even if replaced.

13. The Committee pointed out moreover that by calling for discipline within the delegations it removed the personal nature of substitution which had seemed to apply under the present wording of paragraph 1 of Rule 7. In short, it considered that strict interpretation of the expression " prevented from attending a sitting " meant amending the expression " may arrange to be replaced " insofar as the decision to appoint a specific substitute should be taken by the delegation organising its representation in the Assembly rather than by the representative prevented from attending.

14. The Committee therefore felt that in paragraph 1 of Rule 7 the expression " may arrange to be replaced " should read " may be replaced ".

15. Furthermore, in practice, it was not the representative prevented from attending who informed the President of the Assembly but the Office of the Clerk which communicated a list of representatives and substitutes present to the President on the basis of the attendance register and then to the Assembly in an appendix to the minutes of the sitting. The words " He must give notice thereof to the President, who will in turn inform the Assembly " should therefore be deleted and replaced by a reference in paragraph 2 to registration of substitutes according to Rule 24.

16. Rule 7 also deals, in paragraphs 3 and 4, with replacement in Committees.

17. The text of the present paragraph 3 should be drawn up in the light of the provisions of Rule 45, paragraph 6, of the Rules of Procedure of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe which are both more precise and more in conformity with current practice than those laid down in paragraphs 3 and 4 of Rule 7 of our Rules of Procedure. However, the new text could improve even further on that of the Rules of Procedure of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe by taking account of the fact that the replacement is effected often without the personal intervention of the titular member.

18. The following text is proposed:

> " Any full member of a Committee who is prevented from attending a meeting of that Committee shall, as a rule, arrange to be replaced by the Representative or Substitute appointed for the purpose. In special cases, he may, with the consent of the Chairman of the Committee, be replaced by another Representative or Substitute of the same nationality as himself.
>
> Such an alternate nominated in due form shall have the same rights in the Committee as the member himself. "

19. Paragraph 4, the text of which was unsatisfactory, should be deleted since the new paragraph 3 renders it irrelevant.

20. Paragraph 5, relating to procedure for replacement in plenary sittings, should follow straight on from the first two paragraphs and become paragraph 3.

21. Finally, the heading for Rule 7 should now be " Substitutes and alternates ".

22. The Committee therefore proposes that the Assembly adopt the attached draft resolution to amend Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure and apply the provisions of the rule thus amended strictly.

Document 844

14th May 1980

Impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security

REPORT [1]

submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee [2]
by Sir Frederic Bennett, Rapporteur

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Adopted in Committee by 16 votes to 0 with 4 abstentions.

2. *Members of the Committee:* Mrs. *von Bothmer* (Chairman); MM. *De Poi,* Portheine (Alternate: *Schlingemann*) (Vice-Chairmen); *Sir Frederic Bennett,* MM. *Berrier, Brugnon,* Conti Persini, Deschamps, Druon (Alternate: *Bozzi*), *Gessner,* Hanin (Alternate: *Michel*), *Hardy,* Lagneau, *Lord McNair,* MM. Mangelschots (Alternate: *van Waterschoot*), *Mende,* Mommersteeg, *Müller,* Péridier, *Lord Reay,* MM. Reddemann (Alternate: *Vohrer*), *Talamona, Thoss, Urwin,* Valiante, Vecchietti (Alternate: *Antoni*), Voogd.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

on the impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security

The Assembly,

Considering that the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan is a threat to the fundamental principles of international law and is a serious threat to the balance and peace in an area which is vital for the security of the western world;

Believing that this intervention makes it essential to take urgent measures to guarantee the maintenance of peace in the Middle East;

Considering furthermore that democratic countries must make use of all the peaceful means at their disposal to demonstrate their non-acceptance of the fait accompli;

Considering also that the holding of United States diplomats as hostages in Tehran is an intolerable violation of international law and a threat to peace in Asia and prevents the improvement of relations with Iran;

Believing that the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan makes it essential to strengthen without delay the defence means of the members of the Atlantic Alliance and considering that in this context the establishment of just and lasting peace in Palestine is essential for stability in the area;

Recalling that in their declaration of 29th June 1977 the Nine said that fair and lasting peace could only be established in the Middle East in an overall context. Such a settlement must be based on relevant resolutions of the Security Council and establish the right of the Palestinian people to a homeland, through self-determination, without prejudicing the existence of Israel as an independent state within internationally secure and recognised boundaries;

Recalling that the Nine deplored the policy of settlements pursued by the Israeli Government in the occupied territories, which is illegal from the point of view of international law and contrary to decisions of the Security Council in its most recent resolution;

Noting that the Palestine Liberation Organisation is the only body recognised as representing the Palestinian people by the Arab states as early as in 1974;

Noting that an increasing number of western countries, including several WEU member states, have acknowledged that a solution of the Palestine problem is difficult, if not impossible, to attain without the participation of the PLO;

Considering that Europe, when it manages to speak with a single voice, could be in a position to make an effective contribution to the maintenance of peace with justice in the Near and Middle East;

Recalling and reiterating all the as yet unfulfilled and still relevant recommendations in Recommendation 341, approved by the Assembly of WEU in December 1979 ;

Noting with approval the declaration on the international situation adopted by the Nine on 28th April 1980 affecting the matters raised in the present document,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Intensify consultations between its members on all questions concerning the balance and security in areas not covered by the Brussels Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty with a view to agreeing on joint action whenever and wherever possible;

2. Develop forthwith the means of defence at Europe's disposal and reinforce, on the most appropriate basis, the capacity of Pakistan and other threatened countries in the region to defend their territorial integrity;

3. Make use of all means at the disposal of member countries without resort to military measures to demonstrate collectively their non-acceptance of the fait accompli by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan;

4. Demonstrate their solidarity in requiring Iran to free the United States diplomats now being held hostage;

5. Supply Turkey with economic support to assist in overcoming the difficulties it is encountering and for associating that country as closely as possible with the economy of Western Europe;

6. Initiate, after 26th May 1980, new steps necessary to contribute to the establishment of a just and lasting peace in Palestine;

7. Urge the Security Council either to review and supplement Resolution 242 to express beyond argument the original fundamental purposes and scope of that resolution; or else to consider and declare a new composite resolution on the one hand designed to provide adequate security for the integrity of Israel within secure and internationally-recognised boundaries whilst on the other hand assuring Palestinians of an inherent right of self-determination on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip to establish their own homeland;

8. Propose, thereafter, the preparation of a conference between Israel, all adjacent Arab countries, a delegation truly representative of the Palestinian people, the United States and Western European countries in a position to contribute to its success;

9. To this end, endeavour to secure before that conference unequivocal declarations by the Arab participants in this settlement recognising Israel's right to exist and by Israel recognising the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Sir Frederic Bennett, Rapporteur)

Preface

1. This report is not intended to be an overall fundamental and detailed historic analysis of the situation in the Middle East and South-West Asia as was Document 820 approved by the Assembly of WEU last December.

2. It is an attempt to trace objectively the course of events in the area since then, but of course quite extensive mention has to be made of background developments. This is especially so in regard to Pakistan and Turkey, which only received comparatively brief attention in the last report, being then peripheral subjects, but now, of course, central to the whole purport of this renewed attempt to point to the dangers to peace, European security – political and economic – and to suggest how best to meet the challenges now facing us.

*
* *

I. *Introduction*

3. The West certainly reacted more strongly – as indeed did the great majority of third world countries – to the news of the massive Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan on 28th December 1979 than to all previous post-war instances of Soviet expansionism. Yet it has to be admitted there was, and is, a sad lack of unity in the scope and function of the reaction within Europe and across the Atlantic.

4. The far greater sense of outrage that was caused probably arose from two factors. The first was because, up to the invasion of Afghanistan, all other take-over bids by force in Africa and elsewhere were not undertaken by Russian troops as such, but by surrogate, political mercenary forces, e.g. Cubans and East Germans aided in varying degree by Soviet " advisers ". Secondly, where Russian military power had previously been directly involved in the post-war era, e.g. in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, a claim, albeit a specious one, had always been made by the Kremlin that it was only acting in defence of its generally-accepted " spheres of interest ", however immorally conceived.

5. Lacking resort to either of these two excuses for their continuing hegemonistic ventures – a disclaimer for responsibility by the use of surrogate forces, or the operation of the Brezhnev doctrine as originally enunciated, i.e. the retention of the Yalta carve-up of spheres of interest in Europe, the men in the Kremlin have had to resort to one of the most bogus propaganda exercises in history. This was the pretence that the Afghan Prime Minister they murdered as their first act of state following on the military invasion of his country had invited them to carry out the invasion in order to protect the Afghans from a non-existent threat to the country's independence by the CIA!

6. Perhaps the most surprising feature of the whole grim tragedy is that anyone should have been surprised at the Russian action, even in the absence of assumed intelligence reports and supposed technical surveillance facilities available, at least to the United States if no other western power.

7. There had, after all, already been a *de facto* Soviet presence with a large number of Soviet forces in Afghanistan since 7th December and a communist régime since April 1978, followed by the signing of a Soviet-Afghan treaty of friendship and mutual assistance in December 1978 establishing the Soviet Union in a pre-eminent political, economic and military position. However, the arrival of strong Soviet reinforcements apparently revealed to the West the seriousness of three major facts of which it must have been aware but whose significance it had not hitherto grasped.

8 (*i*) First, there was the Soviet Union's steady thrust into Asia since the second world war, not to speak of earlier examples of Russian expansion in Asia in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The 1917 revolution did not halt a movement which had begun in the days of Peter the Great. But, to concentrate now on events since 1945, the perio concentrate now on events since 1945, the period of understanding between Russia and China should be recalled during which, one by one, North Korea in 1945, China in 1949 and North Vietnam in 1954 came under communist domination. The break between the Soviet Union and China which came about progressively after the death of Stalin in March 1953 means that China can certainly no longer be considered part of the vast Soviet-dominated empire! This has not prevented the Soviet Union from backing subversive and revolutionary movements which, one after the other, have seized power in South Vietnam and Laos followed by Cambodia and Afghanistan and which are now also established in certain areas of Thailand and have

periodically surfaced actively in India and even in Malaysia.

9. In some respects, the re-election of Mrs. Gandhi as head of the Indian Union at the end of 1979 could be considered a benefit for the Soviet Union to which the Indian Prime Minister, despite her avowed attachment to principles of non-alignment, is sometimes accused of giving preference, even after the invasion of Afghanistan, in regard to some controversial international issues.

10. Seen from this standpoint, events in Afghanistan between April 1978 and December 1979 seem part of a vast movement which seems dedicated to bringing the whole of Asia into the grasp of the Soviet Union, isolating China and jeopardising relations between the western countries and Eastern or Southern Asia as a whole. This expansion of Soviet influence has been helped by a series of events which may not be clearly linked but which have inevitably resulted in the weakening or overthrowing of political régimes which maintained close links with the West, while pursuing their national interests.

11. Foremost remains the unresolved and worsening Arab-Israeli dispute. The Arab countries, because of their continuing territorial dispute with Israel, are experiencing internal disruption and even disintegration in varying degree, which constitute a threat even to the survival of several of them. For instance, Lebanon is still in the throes of a causeless civil war which only the presence of Syrian occupation forces in the north, and a small United Nations force in the south, prevents from repeating the same tragic events of 1978. But mention should also be made of the war in Yemen which led to the country being divided into two states, one of which does not conceal its leaning towards Moscow, the other being on very shaky foundations, despite recent more positive developments. In the Oman war, Sultan Qaboos managed to put down the Dhofar revolt only with the assistance of Iran. Events in Saudi Arabia are particularly disturbing, the most recent being the occupation of the Great Mosque in Mecca by a large, well-organised armed group in summer 1979. It took several days' fighting entailing several hundred, if not thousand, casualties before the mosque was cleared. Certainly, too, many of the revolutionaries escaped and are still at large. Then there was the attack in Gafsa, in Tunisia, in January 1980, by commando forces trained in Libya which quite clearly sought to destabilise the Tunisian state.

12. Apart from the Arab countries, Turkey has been seriously weakened by internal unrest which none of the parties struggling for power yet seems capable of overcoming although there are some encouraging indications of a decline in politically-motivated terrorist violence, because of a new more resolute attitude by police and troops by direction of the present government. Also although, as only to be expected, what has been offered by concerned western powers to bolster up the economy and strengthen the ill-equipped army is not yet regarded by the Turks as fully adequate, such aid is sufficient to provide a valuable stabilising factor in the Turkish scene. West Germany in particular in the economic field and the United States and the United Kingdom in the military, in both cases with full NATO support, are playing a notable rôle in this context. In Iran, the Shah's régime was overthrown at the beginning of 1979. Although its methods were questionable, to say the least, this régime had been doing its best to maintain the unity, economic development and social advancement of the country in spite of particularly difficult circumstances.

13. All these events, whether or not directly stimulated, if not caused, by the Soviet Union or its allies, have helped to weaken the will and capability of states to defend themselves in an area which, even five years ago, might have seemed staunchly determined to resist Soviet imperialism. In view of the progress of this imperialism and the weakness of the states liable to be affected in the next few years, and if it continues to develop in the same way, one cannot but be struck by the magnitude of the threat to the whole Middle East.

14 (*ii*) This is not the only threat, however, since it coexists with a remarkable reawakening of the most fundamentalist factions of Islam which are often also the most hostile to the West. This movement is now spreading to all Moslem countries, where it takes on many forms, thus making it difficult to assess its exact extent. There are the heirs to the old conservative religious organisations such as the Moslem Brothers, once powerful particularly in Egypt, an organisation which seems to have extended its area of activity to a large part of the Middle East, including the Palestinian inhabitants of the state of Israel and Israeli-occupied territories. At present, the Moslem Brothers seem to be exerting especially threatening pressure on the Baathist Government in Syria. Associated with this traditionalist trend are movements purporting to be Arab socialism, which has little in common with western socialism or communism but feels it can find, in the origins of Islamic society, the basis of an egalitarianism which is hostile both to technical progress and to the western materialist way of life. This Arab socialism is itself intermingled with more or less marxist tendencies, widespread above all among Middle East students in a large number of universities throughout the

world. Finally, at least one state, Colonel Kadhafi's Libya, is deliberately exploiting this Moslem revival, with the intention of displacing Sadat's Egypt, reinstating radical, xenophobic Nasserism there and reuniting the Arab or Moslem world around Tripoli.

15. In any event, this fundamentalist movement provides grist to the mill for a violently anti-western stand and has a considerable hold on a society where it is capable of imposing certain life styles traditional in Islam, which were tending to disappear in the more developed Moslem countries, e.g. in regard to the emancipation of women. One sign of the expansion of this new fundamentalism is the return of the chador from North Africa to Pakistan.

16. Events in Iran in recent years have of course provided a measure of the extent of this movement since it was indeed the Ayatollah Khomeini who overthrew the Shah's régime and established a resolutely Islamic régime in the country. His ideas are not yet predominant elsewhere but play a decisive rôle in the challenge to established authorities, particularly in Tunisia and Saudi Arabia and probably also in Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Syria, the Emirates, and even in Pakistan and Turkey. He seems to have had a fair degree of responsibility for the Afghan insurrection which gave an excuse if it did not contribute to the direct Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, because of the Kremlin's fears that Islamic fundamentalist fervour might spread across the borders of Russia's own south Asian Moslem empire.

17. It would obviously be fallacious to consider that there was a direct link between the Soviet thrust towards the Moslem areas of Asia and this revival of Moslem fundamentalism. But the rôle played by events in Iran in provoking direct military Soviet intervention in Afghanistan should not be disregarded. Nor should one forget Soviet assistance, particularly military, to Colonel Kadhafi's régime, South Yemen, Ethiopia and many other states or uprisings in Africa and Asia.

18. Thus the resumption of Moslem fundamentalism is an important factor in developments in the Middle East and, in general, it has so far served Soviet interests in the area, either by curtailing western influence, or by facilitating Soviet intervention. The question is whether the invasion of Afghanistan has or has not reversed this trend, or at least temporarily halted it.

19 (*iii*) The oil crisis, too, which has been practically continuous since October 1973, is a further reason for the worsening of the international situation. Since the closing of the Suez Canal, which followed the closing of the majority of the pipelines bringing oil from the far end of the Persian Gulf to Mediterranean ports, most Middle East oil has been shipped to Western Europe through the Strait of Hormuz and the Indian Ocean and round the Cape of Good Hope. It would be catastrophic for the West if the Cape route were closed and repercussions would be widespread. Whatever the reasons for the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, it brought Soviet divisions more than 1,000 km closer to the Strait of Hormuz. They are now separated from the strait by only about 500 km of territory inhabited by the Baluchis of Pakistan and Iran. Despite difficulties of terrain, this is no longer a serious impediment to further Soviet expansion towards the Indian Ocean.

20. The closing of the Strait of Hormuz would cut off most of Western Europe's oil supplies, forcing drastic reductions in industrial output and making it incapable of waging a long war. The Soviet Union therefore now seems to have the means of reducing Europe to a position of material inferiority making it increasingly difficult to resist clearly-expressed Soviet demands and threats.

21. Moreover there are indications that in the Soviet Union where, for a long time, enough oil was produced for domestic needs and those of a large part of the eastern countries, home-produced oil output is no longer keeping pace with consumption and the USSR is now facing a relative oil shortage. Henceforth the Soviet Union can therefore offer the producing countries an alternative market for the oil which the Middle East currently ships to the West, especially since the new value of gold as a medium of exchange.

22. The interconnection of these various factors makes the current situation particularly complex and it is very difficult to foresee the outcome. A new distribution of wealth and power is nevertheless to be noted, not only between the West, on the one hand, the Soviet Union and its allies, on the other, and thirdly the developing countries, but also between the developing countries themselves. It is difficult to assess this distribution since yardsticks such as gross national product per capita do not give a true picture of the situation in societies in which very great wealth coexists with equally great poverty and where the state may appropriate, particularly for the defence budget, a far higher proportion of the gross national product than could be the case in Europe or the United States where there is a greater spread of wealth and régimes are less authoritarian, and consequently less able to enforce a policy of " guns rather than butter ".

23. Most Near East oil countries spend more than 10 %, and sometimes more than

15 %, of their gross national product on defence, whereas the figure for most Western European countries is only just over 3 %. But these are the countries that, together with the Soviet Union, supply the Middle East countries with most of their armaments, and this is particularly important in that their aim is to use every possible means to avoid, thanks to their exports, an over-massive transfer of wealth towards the oil-producing countries.

24. This new distribution of wealth and power means that it is very difficult to find, or even envisage, an overall solution to the problems raised by instability in the Middle East. Each country has its own particular position in a balance which takes account of the nature of the threat represented by the Soviet Union, the importance of the various Islamic sects and the resources, particularly oil, which it possesses.

25. These are the reasons why your Rapporteur, anxious to study developments in the Middle East situation as objectively as possible with a view to drawing the political conclusions which should command Western Europe's attention, will examine successively the cases of Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, Iran, the Arab world and Turkey.

II. *Afghanistan*

26. Rather than reproduce a wholly new section on Afghanistan this chapter should serve rather to concentrate on the course and trend of events which have occurred since Document 820 was adopted on 5th November 1979.

27. After the overthrow of President Daoud in April 1978, it appeared in fact that a growing proportion of the Afghan people found it hard to support each new successive régime. Insurrections broke out in many provinces and 50 % of the country was in a position of insecurity whereas 30 % was actually controlled by the rebels. The government was unable to control more than the towns and the main road from Kabul to the Soviet Union.

28. The post-Daoud régime would not have survived this rebellion, in which elements of the Afghan army took part on several occasions, without Soviet military assistance, which was constantly increasing. Large numbers of Soviet air force units took part in quelling the rebellion, as well as several thousand Soviet advisers, with or without uniform. Well before December 1979 these forces were guilty of actual crimes against humanity with the destruction of whole villages and the massacre of their inhabitants.

29. Furthermore, the government was already pursuing an extremely harsh policy of repression aimed *inter alia* at the Moslem clergy, accused of connivance with the new Iranian Government and the army. Thus the whole Pathan territory was in the grips of the rebellion except for a few towns. The centre, east and south of the country were also suffering serious unrest and in July fighting broke out near Kabul, where there had already been armed clashes in April.

30. In such circumstances, the Afghan economy was in particularly dire straits since internal communications, inadequate at the best of times, were practically cut off. The agrarian reform was carried out in very poor conditions, the threatened landowners having stopped sowing their crops, and the Soviet Union was also having to keep the country supplied. Well before December 1979, it was therefore directly involved in a struggle where there was every indication that it was in confrontation with the large majority of the Afghan population.

31. The coup d'état on 14th September 1979 may perhaps be explained by the deterioration of the internal situation, the spread of the rebellion to sixteen of the country's twenty-one provinces and the flight into exile of some 200,000 Afghans, not to speak of the victims of repression and the some 12,000 persons who – according to Amnesty International – were imprisoned. Available information does not allow a very clear picture to be formed of events leading up to the death of President Taraki and his replacement by a Khalq leader, Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin.

32. The massive arrival of Soviet forces at the end of December 1979 did not in fact represent a very great change in the course of Soviet policy. Possibly the coup d'état of 14th December 1979 was effected without Moscow's agreement. In any event, far from ending the rebellion, it fanned the flames with the result that the Soviet Union had to increase the number of its military advisers at the beginning of December. Still achieving no results, it sent large numbers of forces to Afghanistan on 28th December by land and air, and it was under their " protection " that President Amin was immediately assassinated and replaced by a representative of the Parcham, Babrak Kamal, brought in by air from the Soviet Union, while on 7th February 1980 Tass accused President Amin of having been an agent of China and the United States determined to organise a counter-revolutionary putsch in order to concentrate power in the hands of his family. For a long time the Soviet Union had been trying to impose and maintain a régime subordinate to it, but a large part of the Afghan population has

found this concept unacceptable. On the one hand it was too visibly supported by a dangerous neighbour. Secondly, in a country with a very strong Moslem tradition, communism was considered a foreign element difficult to assimilate. Finally it relied almost exclusively on the Pashtun majority of the population which was difficult for the other peoples to accept.

33. The access to power of a resolutely Moslem régime in Iran heralded the possibility of Afghan communism foundering in turn before the same sort of Moslem revival; and the Soviet Government might have had reason to fear a rapid extension of this new Islamic fundamentalism within its frontiers. Nevertheless, Soviet statements that the Soviet Union had intervened in force in Afghanistan at the request of Mr. Amin's government are wholly unconvincing since the first Soviet move was to arrange for the assassination of the leader who was supposed to have called for their assistance.

34. Since 28th December, increasing numbers of reinforcements have been brought in by land and air and at the end of February it was estimated that there were between 70,000 and 100,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan. In spite of the deployment of modern weaponry, they do not yet seem to have achieved anything more than a semblance of control over the main roads round the country and those leading to the Soviet Union. On 22nd February, Kabul was paralysed by an almost general strike. A number of statements by Afghan refugees in Pakistan refer to the use of chemical weapons and particularly toxic gases by the Soviet forces in the month of February. In the absence of a detailed enquiry by bodies of recognised impartiality, there must be some doubt about the value of such declarations, but the increasing obstacles being placed by Soviet and Afghan authorities in the way of enquiries by western journalists help, to say the least, to substantiate such rumours since they cannot be disproved in such conditions.

35. According to certain reports, the first contingents sent are believed to have consisted mainly of troops from Central Asia, but they were replaced a few weeks later by European Russian troops; perhaps because the Soviet Union was not sure of the loyalty of its own Moslem population. It should be added that the Afghan army which was fighting the rebellion before the arrival of Soviet troops seems to have broken up and very largely joined the rebels, sometimes after massacring its officers. All information received from Afghanistan is fragmentary and questionable, the Soviet Union itself claiming to have only about 10,000 troops in the country, which seems quite unrealistic since in mid-March 1980 the Soviets claimed to be controlling most of the frontiers around the country, which would imply far greater numbers.

36. It has been a matter of conjecture why the Soviet Union undertook this massive intervention with all the diplomatic and military risks involved, the example of Vietnam having shown that even the most sophisticated equipment is not always enough to quell a rebellion by a nation determined to defend its independence.

37. Among the theories put forward, some attribute the invasion to a purely defensive policy. This is naturally the reason given by the Soviet Union which claims, *inter alia* in a long dispatch from Tass published in certain western papers on 7th February at its own expense, that the Afghan insurrection was started by Pakistan with American assistance. It is probably true that some of the rebels' weapons came from Pakistan but the very mediocrity of these weapons is a clear indication that there was no American participation in a rebellion whose national character was evident.

38. A second interpretation is to underline the danger to the Soviet Union itself of an extension of the Islamic revival shown, in particular during 1979, by the establishment of an Islamic republic in Iran. There are more than 70 million Soviet Moslems, mainly in the south of the Asian provinces, i.e. on the frontiers of Iran, Afghanistan and China. An extension of the Moslem revival in these areas could endanger the unity of the Soviet state and the maintenance of the communist régime there. According to this theory, it was to defend itself against this threat that the Soviet Union did its utmost to prevent the establishment of an Islamic republic in Afghanistan.

39. Mention has also been made of the application of the infamous Brezhnev doctrine, under which the Soviet Union believes it has a right and duty to intervene in communist countries should the régime be threatened, albeit by domestic, popular choice. In the case of Asia, there has admittedly not been a division into zones of occupation as in Europe after the second world war, and in spite of the communist nature of the régime established in April 1978 it might have been thought that the Brezhnev doctrine would not be applied as in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. However, it should be recalled that, in 1978, Afghanistan signed a treaty of friendship and co-operation with the Soviet Union associating it with the Soviet bloc.

40. A fourth theory is that the invasion of Afghanistan was due to China's militant policy towards the Soviet Union and the assistance which the Afghans received from Pakistan,

itself threatened by India's ambitions. Hence, it is believed that it was with the connivance of India that the Soviet Union stationed its forces on the frontiers of Pakistan so as to bring about the liquidation of that state, already seriously threatened and weakened since the 1971 war. So far, no evidence has been offered in support of this theory.

41. Finally, it has of course been underlined, and must be emphasised, that the invasion of Afghanistan brings Soviet forces to less than 500 km from the Gulf of Oman, i.e. the route from the Arab-Persian Gulf to the Indian Ocean. From there, it is easy for Soviet tanks to reach the shores of the Gulf of Oman quickly and for the naval bases which Russia has always dreamt of to be set up in this warm and open sea. Although a direct invasion of Pakistan and Iran may seem rather unlikely, because of the risk of the third world countries uniting against the Soviet Union, a Baluchi revolt against either Pakistan or Iran could well provide an opportunity for the Soviet Union to seem to promote the formation of a Baluchi state under its protection. In this way, the Soviet Union could, through the intermediary of this state of the shore of the Gulf of Oman, control the route through which passes most of the West's and particularly Western Europe's oil supplies and thus have the whole western world at its mercy because it would be able to cut this route whenever it thought fit.

42. To all these reasons should perhaps be added possible errors of calculation by Soviet leaders who may have underestimated the Afghans' will to resist and that of the whole Moslem world then deeply disturbed by the development of the conflict between the new Iranian republic and the United States and the western countries' will to react.

43. However this may be, any or all of these various explanations are possible, and whatever the Soviet leaders' intentions may have been when they decided to take large-scale action in Afghanistan, they certainly opened new and threatening vistas in Iran, Pakistan and the region of the Gulf. This *de facto* situation must obviously form the basis of our reasoning rather than possible suppositions regarding the intentions of the masters of the Kremlin.

44. The present situation is particularly confused, both militarily and diplomatically. Militarily, a strong Soviet presence in the area is undeniable. However, despite the growth in its naval forces in the Indian Ocean, the Soviet Union does not yet command the seas where American fleets have been considerably strengthened by the arrival of aircraft-carriers and reinforcements from several European countries. But the United States' decision to send a force of 1,800 marines to Oman is not likely to disturb the Soviet Union's overwhelming preponderance in land forces. Similarly, United States supplies of arms to Pakistan are not likely to be enough for it to resist a Soviet attack, particularly if, as is probable, India gave its backing to the Soviet move.

45. The fact that a large number of Afghans took refuge in Pakistan (it is estimated that they numbered about 600,000 at the beginning of 1980) has serious implications. It is quite clear that these refugees form a reserve on which the Afghan rebels may draw and that Soviet forces are incapable of making the frontiers between Afghanistan and Pakistan airtight because of the terrain. Should the crisis worsen it is difficult to see how Pakistan could not be involved. The threat *is* very serious.

46. The Soviet Union has not concealed the fact that it intends to keep its forces in Afghanistan until order is firmly restored. None of the sanctions conjured up against the Soviet Union after its invasion of Afghanistan seems to have weakened its determination which has been firmly expressed and implemented by Soviet leaders. Everything indicates that Afghanistan will, for a long time to come, be an area of tension and threat and that the maintenance of the present *status quo,* however unsatisfactory to the West, will mean it making an effort in the military field and in assistance to the countries threatened, foremost being Pakistan, but certainly also Iran and Turkey and probably others. It will be possible to make this effort only if the western world as a whole clearly realises what is at stake and has the firm determination to do something about it.

47. First reactions to the invasion of Afghanistan make one wonder about the realism of this apprehension and determination. Although all western countries and many third world countries have condemned the Soviet intervention, the proposals for retaliatory measures against the Soviet Union made by the United States Government have so far received but limited response, even from certain members of the Atlantic Alliance.

48. This is why the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Carrington, made a proposal to members of the European Community at the ministerial meeting in Rome on 19th February 1980, which the Nine adopted, as shown in the communiqué issued on that occasion, in which they state *inter alia:*

> "
> .....
>
> 4. It is also their (the Nine's) desire to seek out ways and means of restoring a situation in line with the resolution of the General Assembly of the United

Nations of 14th January, which appeals to all states to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and non-aligned character of Afghanistan and to refrain from any interference in the internal affairs of that country.

5. They take the view that, in this spirit, the crisis could be overcome constructively through an arrangement which allows a neutral Afghanistan to be outside competition among the powers.

6. Accordingly, they have decided to go into this point more thoroughly and to concert their position on the subject with all allied and friendly countries and with all countries having an interest in the equilibrium and stability of the region."

49. The Americans had some reservations about this proposal; but on the whole there is every indication that the United States Government shares the point of view of most European governments that an attempt should be made to ensure the early withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan.

50. In the Soviet Union, the Nine's proposal first met with an indignant refusal on the curious pretext that the Afghanistan. It is quite evident that if the Soviet position were to remain the same and if the invasion of Afghanistan by a strong armed force is not an intrusion in the internal affairs of this country while a reasonable compromise proposal allowing it to be evacuated without the Soviet Union losing face is an intolerable intervention, no dialogue is possible between the Soviet Union and the western countries. However, subsequent statements by Soviet leaders show that they might be prepared to negotiate on the basis of the Nine's proposal.

51. It is not impossible that the continued resistance of the Afghan people, which still makes it impossible for the Soviet army to control the country, in spite of the destruction and massacres which are apparently on the increase, might make the Soviet Union less uncompromising, particularly since a firm policy pursued by the West would have every chance of being followed by all Moslem countries and probably by many other non-aligned countries, which would place the Soviet Union in an untenable international, and perhaps also internal, situation.

52. Your Rapporteur is therefore convinced that only a very firm and sustained stand can help to solve the problem raised by the invasion of Afghanistan and he welcomes the fact that at the meeting of the European Council on 28th April the Nine at least managed to adopt a joint declaration on the international situation, the text of which is given at Appendix I.

III. *India and Pakistan*

53. In the sixteenth century, the conquest of the Indian sub-continent by the Mogul dynasty brought political unity to this vast area. The dynasty's tolerance allowed very different ethnic and religious groups to live side by side in relative peace, among which the Moslem faction played an essential rôle in terms of civilisation, economy and administration, but without dominating in an unacceptable manner the Hindu population which was in the majority in the area. When the British Empire took over from the Moguls in the eighteenth century, it was possible to maintain the political unity of the Indian sub-continent until 1947.

54. With the departure of the British came civil war between part of the Moslem population and the Hindus, leading inevitably to partition between the Indian Union and Pakistan in two parts, one in the Ganges delta, the other in the Indus valley. While Pakistan had a very large Moslem majority, India retained a large number of Moslems within its predominantly Hindu population. Today, some 100 million of the 800 million Indians are believed to be Moslem; whereas in present-day Pakistan there are believed to be more than 80 million Moslems out of a total population of less than 90 million.

55. Pakistan's unity as initially conceived was based essentially on the Islamic faith; but the distance between the then two parts of the country and the fact that its inhabitants were of very different ethnic origins made it difficult for them to cohabit in a fairly centralised state. The 1971 war between India and Pakistan led to the separation of the eastern part of Pakistan, which became Bangladesh. But there are still tensions even in the remaining western part of the country, as initially established.

56. Although free elections were held in 1973, this was exceptional, and today there is again an authoritative government in Islamabad which seized power in 1977 in a coup d'état. Its authority is not easily accepted, particularly in the south of the country, inhabited by Baluchis, where there is permanent unrest.

57. It was probably inevitable that the Indian Union should aim at reunifying the former Indian empire. Hence Pakistan has constantly proved to be its principal adversary, India having apparently found the territorial annexations which followed the Chinese offensive in the Himalayas in 1961 more acceptable than the partition of 1947, even after India's victory

in 1971. As Pakistan has always felt threatened by Indian claims, particularly during the governments of Pandit Nehru and his daughter, Mrs. Gandhi, who were born in the disputed and divided province of Kashmir, it has been natural for it to seek alliance with India's other adversary, China, and to join a coalition with Middle East countries and the United States in SEATO in 1954 and accede to the Baghdad Pact, which became CENTO. Pakistan left CENTO in 1978 in protest at the absence of American action against the establishment of a communist régime in Afghanistan. But in spite of a difficult relationship with the United States, which refused to supply it with arms, objected to the 1977 coup d'état, and opposed the building of nuclear power stations in Pakistan, the latter is still allied with the United States under a bilateral agreement concluded in 1959 and also with China; while India, per contra, has sought the assistance and support of the Soviet Union. It is very difficult to determine what assistance Pakistan actually gave the Afghans rebelling against the communist government with effect from 1978, and what part the United States played in such assistance. But nothing in the information gathered by your Rapporteur confirms the Soviet assertion that the Afghan refugee camps which are increasing in numbers along the Afghan-Pakistan frontier have been or are military training camps. Whether real or alleged, the question of assistance provided a pretext, but only a pretext, for the Soviet Union to maintain that the Afghan insurrection was due to foreign intervention provoked by the United States.

58. Since the invasion of Afghanistan, the United States Government has increased co-operation with Pakistan, stressing its " vital interests " in the area and its will to " use force if necessary " to protect these interests. The transformation of the 1959 agreements into a full-blown treaty of alliance is however encountering difficulties because General Zia ul-Haq will not agree to the establishment of American bases on Pakistani territory, but the United States has agreed to a major quantitative and qualitative increase in its arms deliveries to Pakistan on favourable credit terms. Similarly, China increased its economic and military assistance to Pakistan considerably at the beginning of 1980.

59. However, it is to be regretted that India seems ready to react negatively to this assistance. Since 1947, the Indian Union has been steadily bringing together very varied ethnic, religious and linguistic groups and a federal status allows it to maintain a régime which, if not perfectly democratic, at least allows free elections and an alternance of power. This political organisation probably makes it possible for very different groups of humanity to live together far more easily than in Pakistan. But today there is every indication that India considers Pakistan as its principal opponent, together with China. Admittedly, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan caused concern in India and Mrs. Gandhi, just elected Prime Minister, voiced her condemnation of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan both during President Giscard d'Estaing's visit in January 1980 and in subsequent declarations. However, she later condemned no less forcefully deliveries of American weapons to Pakistan. The course of Indian foreign policy is still far from clear.

60. It would therefore seem to be in the West's interests to do the maximum to obtain a reconciliation between India and Pakistan as the best means of limiting tension, the effects of which can but be disastrous for the security of the whole region in face of an undoubted Soviet threat. Reconciliation would have the advantage of removing any pretext for intervention by the Soviet Union in a region which is now particularly threatened.

61. Pakistani Baluchistan is now the last obstacle separating Soviet forces from the Indian Ocean. There is a more or less permanent rebellion in the area against the government in Islamabad, just as Iranian Baluchistan is in permanent conflict with Tehran and Afghan Baluchistan's relations with Kabul have always been strained. It now seems to be the part of the country where resistance to the Soviet invasion is the least active.

62. These disturbances might serve as a pretext for Soviet intervention in Baluchistan and, ultimately, for the Soviet armies to seize bases near the mouth of the Strait of Hormuz, whence they could seriously threaten the West's oil supplies from the further reaches of the Persian Gulf. The main problem now facing the West seems to be to avoid the occurrence of such a combination of circumstances and to obtain reconciliation between India and Pakistan as an essential condition for the establishment and maintenance of lasting peace in southern Asia. It is perhaps not impossible to achieve this in view of India's economic dependence on western aid, the weakness of the Pakistani state, and the concern that might arise in India at the approach of Soviet armies to its frontiers. The recent visit by Mr. Swaram Singh, former Minister of Pakistan, to New Delhi and the welcome he received show that General Zia is aware of the need for reconciliation and point to hopes for a rapprochement between New Delhi and Islamabad.

63. Moreover, from the Indian point of view, long-term certainly, it cannot be in that country's best interest to block or seek to block western initiatives to strengthen Pakistan's

defensive capacity. For the only effect of denying such arrangements would be to force General Zia or any successor into ever-closer political and military co-operation with China which is already unhappy, to put it mildly, about the existence of a Delhi-Warsaw axis. Peking, rightly or wrongly but certainly understandably, sees the Indo-Soviet friendship treaty of August 1971 as another step forward in what the Chinese regard as a deliberate, steady process of encirclement of China within a growing Soviet Asian hegemony. With Afghanistan now absorbed in the USSR and Iran in danger of disintegration, Pakistan is, in the eyes of Peking, the only non-Soviet influence or controlled outlet to the rest of the world except for China's limited Far Eastern sea coast. So surely it must be for the benefit of the stability of the sub-continent, including especially that of India, that Pakistan is not driven to look only to an increasingly concerned China to help to preserve its own identity.

64. Already a framework of co-operation to this same end does exist, in regard to the United States, despite the total erosion of the CENTO and SEATO arrangements, via the provisions of the Pakistan-United States bilateral agreement of 1959; but as Mr. Brzezinski found out on his recent visit to Islamabad, this agreement in its present form does not involve the necessary basic ingredients of confidence-building, which Pakistan requires from the West, if the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan is not to lead to fresh crises in the not-too-distant future in a region of the world of vital importance to western economic as well as political security.

65. For the United States State Department has always maintained that the 1959 agreement is only an executive agreement, and consequently of less weight and sanctity than an international treaty. The difference between the two is that while a treaty by virtue of its ratification by the United States Senate is binding on successive governments, an executive agreement which lacks such ratification is binding primarily on the administration which enters into it. Furthermore, United States assistance by way of armed force is conditional on consent of the Congress of the United States which may or may not be forthcoming. Also the agreement does not make it mandatory for the United States President to provide assistance by way of armed force, but only discretionary.

66. Moreover, the United States has shown reluctance to Pakistan's request to convert the agreement into a treaty with Senate ratifications in order to give it more credibility. They have proposed that there could be a Congressional reaffirmation of the agreement. On this score, visiting Congressmen to Islamabad, even since the invasion of Afghanistan, have informed that prior Congressional reaffirmation of the 1959 agreement would be no assurance that the Congress would support the President if he decided to despatch United States forces to help Pakistan repel Soviet aggression, direct or directed. Congressional concurrence, according to them, would depend upon the political climate of opinion at that time.

67. The agreement in its preamble and Article I refers to the "joint resolution to promote peace and stability in the Middle East". This reference is to the so-called Eisenhower doctrine. In its preamble and Article IV the agreement also refers to the London declaration of 28th July 1958. Under paragraph 4 of the London declaration, United States military assistance is made subject to "existing Congressional authorisation".

68. Thus the Eisenhower doctrine and the London declaration clearly limit the effectiveness of the 1959 agreement, to an extent unacceptable to the rebuilding of confidence in the West's will as well as its capacity to prevent further Soviet-inspired political eruptions.

IV. *Iran*

69. Your Rapporteur examined the questions raised by developments in Iran in 1978 and 1979 in the report adopted by the Assembly in December 1979. He described the revolutionary movement which, on 1st February 1979, led to the fall of the Shah's régime and its replacement by an Islamic republic which, having brought to power the more reactionary elements among students, was already encountering opposition from numerous ethnic minorities, including the Kurds in western Iran, the Azerbaijanis in the north and the Baluchis in the south-east with the risk not only of total anarchy but of a dismemberment of the country. It has proved to be a political system which gave power to religious leaders without responsibility and brutally repressed the former heads of the administration and the army, economic leaders and liberal intellectuals. Force has been its only answer to autonomist claims. In the name of the Islamic faith it has conducted subversive activities which remain a threat to its neighbours and the Gulf states, has spread hostile propaganda about the West throughout the Moslem world and has helped to worsen the world economic crisis by cutting the country's oil output which it was anyhow quickly ruining, causing too sharp a rise in the price of this essential source of energy, of which, hitherto, Iran was the world's fourth producer and second exporter.

70. The fact that the West has been apathetic and powerless in watching the " red and black revolution " take over certainly helped to convince the Soviet Union that a take-over in Afghanistan would not meet with greater opposition. It was also disturbing for its traditional allies in the Near and Middle East who may well wonder whether it would make a greater effort to support them in case of urgent danger than it did for its Iranian ally.

71. However, three events have profoundly changed the relationship between Iran and the West since November 1979. The first was of course the invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet forces. No one in Iran could be unaware of the threat represented by the Soviet Union, Iran's neighbour on both shores of the Caspian. In the new circumstances, isolation, both local and international, became a major danger, which incited Iran to be more cautious in its relations with the rest of the world, to stand aloof from the Soviet Union, to draw closer to Iraq and the Gulf countries and to seek arrangements with the West with a view *inter alia* to obtaining technical assistance and armaments which had become essential. This attempt has been made immeasurably more difficult by the direct intervention of Iranian " students " in the political life of the country.

72. First, there was a show of force by these so-called students, more or less tolerated if not encouraged by the Council of the Iranian revolution and its leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, at the United States Embassy on 4th November 1979. Some fifty members of the embassy staff were confined to the building and have since been held hostage by the Iranian students who are asking for the former Shah, who had taken refuge in the United States, to be handed over to them in exchange for their liberation. It was quite evident that the United States Government could not hand over the former head of a friendly state who had taken refuge in the United States. It therefore merely arranged for the Shah to leave American territory. Since then negotiations, both long and complicated, have been conducted between the United States Government, the Iranian authorities, the students occupying the United States Embassy and a number of other countries, not to mention the United Nations and various unofficial organisations, in order to find a solution to this affair in view of the Iranian Government's need to strengthen its international position, when the Soviet Union occupied Afghanistan. In February there were signs that progress was being made towards the liberation of the hostages in exchange for the creation of an international committee to enquire into the Shah's so-called " crimes " and also for some form of recognition by the United States of the mistake it had made in supporting the former Iranian régime. This hope faded in March when the decision about the fate of the hostages was deferred to the future Iranian National Assembly and after a first round of fairly doubtful elections in terms of democratic practice gave the advantage to supporters of the Ayatollah.

73. There is little doubt that the Soviet Union is encouraging, if not directly, through influence on the Iranian Tudeh Party, the extremist students who are defying the authority of the government by keeping these hostages in the United States Embassy in Tehran. Although there may not be any absolute proof of collusion, the backing afforded by the Tudeh Party (Communist) to the students allows this to be safely presumed. Moreover, the fact is that the students are serving the interests of the Soviet Union by turning Iranian opinion against the United States which otherwise might have shown far greater solidarity with the Afghan people in the teeth of Soviet invasion and by preventing a closer rapprochement between the cause of Islam and that of the West, both being threatened by the USSR. The United States for its part has to wage a battle on two fronts in the Middle East since it cannot bow to blackmail based on its diplomats being taken hostage any more than it can agree to Afghanistan being invaded and occupied. If the saying *fecit cui prodest* constituted proof, it could well apply to the Soviet Union's rôle in the problem of the hostages in Tehran as it now stands.

74. The diversity of the ongoing negotiations, the secrecy about some of their aspects and the false rumours which are being spread make it extremely difficult to assess the true situation. It is quite certain that the Iranian Government under Mr. Bani Sadr seems clearly to wish to terminate a crisis which is poisoning its relations with the rest of the world and leaving Iran in a state of extreme weakness in face of the Soviet threat and the internal difficulties it is encountering with the uprisings by the Kurds, Azerbaijis and Baluchis.

75. The western powers for their part seem to have every interest in being patient, however intolerable this may be for the American Government and specifically for the members of the United States Embassy who have now been kept hostage for several months and although patience cannot be said ethically to be the right response to the challenge to human rights represented by accredited diplomats being taken hostage.

76. In the international situation created by the invasion of Afghanistan, the fundamental interests of the Islamic countries, concerned about their independence and security, correspond to those of the West, i.e. above all to maintain balance and peace in Asia and

throughout the world and to ensure the freedom and independence of nations.

77. The other important event in Iran at the beginning of 1980 was the formation of a legal government after the election of Mr. Bani Sadr as President of the Republic on 28th January 1980. This election, which seems to have been held in fairly satisfactory conditions, is to be followed shortly by legislative elections which should complete the establishment of a constitutional régime. The age and ill-health of Ayatollah Khomeini can but help to weaken the authority of irresponsible, religious elements in face of stable civil authorities responsible to the electorate.

78. There is – or should be – now a person of responsibility in Iran who has been legally elected by a clear majority of the Iranian people, whose authority is at least partially recognised by Ayatollah Khomeini, and who seems to have the wish if not yet the power needed to restore internal order and guide Iran back to its due place on the international scene. It is certainly not in the interests of the western countries to weaken Mr. Bani Sadr's position. On the contrary, they would surely be well advised in helping him to restore state authority in Iran.

79. The moderation shown by the United States and the European countries in the affair of the hostages seems to indicate that they fully understand the position. There is certainly no question of doing other than continue to show disapproval of those who have so seriously attacked one of the essential principles of international law. Yet only a strong-enough government can make this principle prevail among those who are holding the Americans hostage. The weakness of states bordering on the Soviet Union is certainly no guarantee of peace or lawfulness. The unfortunate United States attempt to rescue the hostages on 24th April did nothing to change the nature of the problem, nor did it change the position of the Nine, as shown by their declaration on 28th April.

V. *The Arab-Israeli dispute*

80. The events in Afghanistan occurred at a time when the Arab world was already profoundly disturbed and divided, firstly by the signing and application of the Camp David agreements between Egypt and Israel, secondly by a series of economic differences relating mainly to the fixing of oil prices, and thirdly by the implications of the reawakening of Moslem fundamentalism.

81. There is no clearly-defined separation between the two sides. Where Palestine is concerned Egypt seems totally isolated in the Arab world. But there are also major differences between countries which, like Libya, seem to want no form of peace between the Arab world and Israel, and others which, like Jordan and Saudi Arabia, are doing their utmost to find an acceptable settlement for all the peoples concerned including the Palestinians.

82. The question of oil prices naturally involves contradictions between exporting and importing countries whose interests would be diametrically opposed if certain exporting countries such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were not contributing to the Arab fund and the Kuwait fund in order to afford assistance in the development of Arab countries without oil.

83. The reawakening of Moslem fundamentalism appears to have affected almost all Arab countries, but some states are trying to use it principally as a basis for increasing their own national influence within the Arab world. This is the case of Colonel Kadhafi's Libya; whereas others, such as Saudi Arabia, see it as a threat to their own internal stability. It should be added that the Shi'ites, who form a large proportion of the population of the Gulf countries (60 % in Bahrein, 33 % in Kuwait), have sadly become an element of discord in the eyes of the Sunnite governments of these countries since the Iranian revolution.

84. This extremely confused situation quite clearly facilitated the Soviet operation in Afghanistan. In general, the operation was condemned by all Moslem countries. But it has been reported that several countries such as South Yemen and Syria and the Palestine Liberation Organisation were nevertheless determined not to jeopardise their friendly relations with the Soviet Union, probably because of the assistance which they expect from it in support of their cause in the war between the two Yemens, in the Palestinian affair or in Lebanon, respectively. Only the Gulf countries reacted strongly to the threat since, admittedly, they were in the front line. Their governments have planned various means of political and military rapprochement and strengthened their armies in order to counter internal subversion, as in Oman, Saudi Arabia, Bahrein and Qatar in 1979, and in respect of aggression from abroad, possibly from Iran or from protégés of the Soviet Union.

85. The Arab countries' front in face of the invasion of Afghanistan does not therefore seem to be a united one and the Egyptian newspaper Al Ahram even claimed, in February, that two infantry battalions from South Yemen had been sent to co-operate with the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Although this news was not confirmed, it is a sign of the prevailing uncertainly about the attitude of several Arab count-

ries. Nor is there any doubt that Libya took advantage of the situation created by the invasion of Afghanistan to attempt a show of force against the Tunisian Government in Gafsa and that Syria, which had seemed about to evacuate Lebanon, has at least delayed its decision.

86. Developments in the Yemen are even more disturbing insofar as there has been a rapprochement between North and South Yemen in favour of the government in Aden, which is heavily armed by the Soviet Union and backed by a Soviet presence in Ethiopia. It has been reliably reported that six Soviet troop carriers crossed the Suez Canal in mid-February, two of which left contingents of troops from Eastern Europe in Hodeida and the four others in Aden, where Soviet instructors have already been training South Yemenite troops for several months in the use of recently-delivered MiG-21 aircraft. Latest developments following on increased Saudi financial support of North Yemen are a little more encouraging.

87. One of the first aims of the two Yemeni Governments in their negotiations since the 1978 war was, in theory, the creation of a joint armed force to be used to promote a policy of non-alignment. In fact, the reunification of the Yemen on the basis of military decisions would, if confirmed, be a serious threat to the Sultanate of Oman. The United States and Saudi Arabia, which have made considerable military efforts to ensure the security of North Yemen, would thus witness the collapse of one of the states on which their policy was based and would have to make even greater efforts to maintain the independence of the Sultanate of Oman which would be in considerable danger if another rebellion in the Dhofar region were to be backed by a reunified Yemenite army equipped with Soviet arms.

88. Currently the strength of the Omani army, air force and navy, although being augmented as rapidly as the nation's economic resources permit, is adequate only to maintain internal security, coastal surveillance duties, and to hold at bay an attack from its well-armed hostile neighbour, South Yemen, whose domestic military capability is heavily reinforced by Cuban troops, East German military advisers and maybe even some Soviet officers and skilled personnel to help to handle the sophisticated weaponry the USSR has seen fit to supply to this small country in such bountiful measure.

89. The only immediate external help the Sultan has at his disposal is about 600 British individual contract officers whose obligations are primarily designated in a training rôle in the Omani national armed forces.

90. It is evident that even if the limited deterrent effect of this small indirect British presence in Oman should be augmented in due course by an American force of 1,800 marines on permanent alert stand-by at sea or on Diego Garcia, this would not be sufficient, particularly since this latter element might have to handle difficulties in all the countries round the Gulf let alone Pakistan. Therefore the important proposal for setting up a 110,000-strong intervention force ready to move anywhere in the world at short notice, announced by the United States at the beginning of 1979, will have to be implemented quickly if confidence is to be restored in an area which, it should be recalled, contains half the known oil reserves.

91. Present divisions and conflicts throughout the Arab world obviously help Soviet operations in the area. The fact that the Soviet army has moved closer to the Strait of Hormuz can but heighten the threat of Soviet intrusion in the affairs of Arab countries and strengthen "red" or "black" subversion such as already made many of these countries tremble in 1979, including the most powerful, Saudi Arabia, at a time when the health of its Sovereign was a matter of concern.

92. It is quite evident that the West has no interest in intervening directly in the internal affairs of the Arab world, but it has even less interest in siding with the opponents of the Arab countries. Today, its obvious interest is definitely to maintain peace and relative unity in the Arab world so as, on the one hand, to ensure a normal flow of its oil supplies and, on the other, to avoid the Soviet Union finding further opportunities for intervening in the area and setting up bases near the oil route.

93. This is a measure of the West's interest in re-establishing progress towards durable peace in Palestine because, as long as Israel is in a position to use the Camp David agreements as a basis for continuing to pursue an expansionist policy, particularly on the West Bank, the Arab countries most interested in destroying the established order in the Middle East will continue to call on the Soviet Union to support their cause, and the more moderate Arab leaders will find themselves increasingly isolated and threatened.

94. In the report which he submitted to the Assembly in November 1979, your Rapporteur referred to the need, embodying effective guarantees for Israel's own security, for the West to restore peace based on the effective right of the peoples of the Israeli-occupied territories to self-determination in conditions which might be those proposed by the Jordanian Government and which Egypt – but not Israel – has apparently just endorsed. The restoration of peace in Palestine would place the West in a much

better position to help the Arab governments to deploy, with popular support, the forces needed for deterring the Soviet Union from intervening in the region.

95. Indeed it cannot be too often stressed that whereas a generally acceptable solution to the Palestinian problem is not a panacea which will cause all other causes of friction to fall away, no solution can ever be reached which does *not* include a Palestinian settlement. Both the French and British Governments have taken the lead in the face of the likelihood of the Camp David agreements failing to produce any definitive advancement by the time the tripartite agreement of 26th May lapses, partly because of Mr. Begin's obduracy and partly because of the all too clearly and recently illustrated inability of any American initiative to break the deadlock in an election year. It would not be right to omit mention of the encouraging fact that there are growing signs that Mr. Begin's hard-line approach to the whole problem is by no means endorsed by significant sections of the Israeli people.

96. Your Rapporteur has to note that since November 1979 marked progress has been made in the directions suggested by the WEU Assembly when it adopted the draft recommendation presented on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.

97. During a visit to several Arab capitals in March 1979, the French President, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, made a number of statements and was party to several joint communiqués, the main terms of which may be found in the Franco-Jordanian communiqué of 11th March:

> " .....
> The two heads of state agreed that the quest for a peace settlement guaranteeing the legitimate rights and aspirations of all parties concerned was more than ever indispensable, and they noted that the international community was now aware of the need to find an international solution to the Middle East crisis, based on the United Nations Charter, on the Security Council resolutions and hence on the following principles: withdrawal of the Israelis from the Arab territories occupied in 1967, recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people including their right to a homeland on these territories, and recognition of the right of all the states of the area to live in peace within secure, recognised and guaranteed frontiers.
>
> The two heads of state acknowledged the crucial nature of the Palestinian problem. They expressed their belief that this was not a problem of refugees, but of a people who legitimately aspire to exist as such and who must be in a position to exercise their right to self-determination in the framework of the peace settlement.
>
> The two heads of state agreed to direct every effort towards opening up the prospect of genuine peace. They considered that the principles of the global settlement applied to all parties involved. These should therefore be associated in the negotiations, in particular the Palestinian people, which presupposed the participation of the Palestine Liberation Organisation.
>
> ..... "

98. The British Government, for its part, described its attitude towards the PLO in a statement by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Carrington, in the House of Commons on 17th March:

> " ...We continue to believe that the PLO is an important factor, and will have to be involved at some stage in the peace process. At the same time we urge them to accept Israel's right to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries.
>
> ...I do not think that any progress in Middle East peace efforts is possible without an acceptance and a recognition by the Palestinians, and therefore by the PLO as well, of the state of Israel as a state. That is absolutely essential. Equally, I do not think it is possible to get peace in the Middle East without some recognition on the part of Israel of the rights of the Palestinians.
>
> ...I do not think that the PLO, as such, is a terrorist organisation. There are some elements of the PLO which in the past have been associated with the terrorists; but it would be a great mistake to assume that it is possible to get a settlement in the area without taking into account the PLO... "

99. Already one country of Western Europe, Austria, has recognised the PLO on 13th March 1980 as the legal representative of the Palestinian people, as Portugal also did. The Belgian Government has recalled that in February 1978 it had advocated recognising the PLO and the Palestinians' right to self-determination which, moreover, had been approved by the Nine as a whole in the United Nations.

100. However, the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs made a statement in Cairo on

11th March 1980 which seems to describe the present position of the Nine when he said:

> " The European Community will take no initiative on the settlement of the Middle East problem before 26th May next when the negotiations on independence are to be concluded. Europe has no plans for an initiative for the time being. We all agreed not to take a decision before this important date. Subsequently we shall study whether a European initiative will be useful or not. "

101. In its declaration of 28th April, the European Council specified that it had instructed the nine Ministers for Foreign Affairs to submit a report to it on these problems at its next meeting.

102. It was to try to break the deadlock in the negotiations between Egypt and Israel that President Carter, on 19th March, invited King Hussein of Jordan, Mr. Begin and Mr. Sadat to go to Washington to discuss the situation with him. Probably for the same reasons, on 1st March, the United States Representative to the Security Council voted for a resolution presented by Morocco and Jordan condemning Israeli settlements in occupied territories. This resolution was thus adopted unanimously. President Carter subsequently said that this vote was due to a breakdown in communications and the United States had intended to abstain. This means however that it would not have opposed the resolution, which was therefore, and is, a valid, lawful Security Council document. Moreover the reasons put forward by President Carter to justify this abstention were *solely* concerned with Jerusalem and not the condemnation of settlements in occupied territories, which condemnation the United States therefore endorsed, and presumably still endorses.

103. It therefore has to be faced that, in spite of Israel's evacuation of Sinai, the negotiations between Egypt and Israel will not, unless a near miracle intervenes, be terminated before 26th May. The time will then surely be ripe for Europe to initiate steps for the debate on Palestine to be opened in another framework and with the participation of all concerned, especially the neighbouring states most directly affected by the present impasse, and usefully too, your Rapporteur suggests apart from the United States because of its particular ties with Israel, by France and the United Kingdom because of their close historic ties and obligations in the area.

104. In the naval field, the growth of the Soviet fleet in the Indian Ocean has been accompanied by an at least equivalent if not greater increase in western forces in the area, where the American fleet has already been strengthened and the United Kingdom, France, Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany sent warships in January or February 1980. But the deterrent effect of the West's apparent naval superiority is not sufficient to guarantee the maintenance of peace in the Middle East. It is essential to deploy large contingents within speedy reach of, if not in, the area capable of meeting large-scale Soviet military action. But it seems clear that the United States does not at present have the logistic means and air transport for sending such a force to the Middle East.

105. However, although the United States and the Soviet Union are not yet in direct confrontation they are both present in force near the Strait of Hormuz, with the danger of the Middle East conflict being internationalised on a scale unknown in this region since the second world war, and this at a time when, in spite of the prodigious growth in their wealth, a number of Arab countries are being considerably weakened by the reawakening of Islamic fundamentalism which seems to be increasingly exploited by countries such as Libya and, more and more, by revolutionary Iran.

VI. *Turkey*

106. A review of the situation in the Near and Middle East would not be complete without mention of the present position in Turkey. At the junction of Europe and the Middle East, the Soviet Union and the Arab world, Turkey occupies a key position. The size of its population which, if the present rate continues, will have increased by 168 % between 1950 and 1990, making Turkey one of the most densely-populated countries in Europe, its strong military traditions and its deliberate choice since 1921 to belong to the western world and to have a democratic régime now make it an essential part of the West's security arrangements in the Near East.

107. However, in the past ten years there have been very serious economic difficulties in Turkey since it has not yet been able to make much progress in economic development, and there have also been serious internal political problems of which the Soviet Union has frequently tried to take advantage. The democratic régime set up by Ataturk is experiencing difficulties. Moslem fundamentalism has made great strides and links up with extreme left-wing or communist factions to create an atmosphere of terror and disorder. Each month, there are hundreds of victims of internal

disturbances in Turkey, the situation being particularly serious in Izmir as recently as in January 1980.

108. The return to power in 1978 of the People's Republican Party led by Mr. Ecevit did nothing to alleviate the situation. On the contrary, it has grown worse because of Turkey's underdevelopment, its meagre resources of energy which it has to import at ever-higher prices and dwindling western assistance due to the economic crisis and the poor functioning of the association between Turkey and the EEC. This led, at the beginning of 1979, to the return to power of the Justice Party with Mr. Demirel at the head of a minority government which is still far from having the situation in hand.

109. In the military field, the Cyprus affair in 1975 led the United States to place a unilateral embargo on arms supplies to Turkey although it was a member of NATO. The result was that when the United States decided to resume supplies in 1979 the Turkish army's equipment had become obsolescent and needed to be replaced very quickly. Moreover, Turkey had retaliated against the United States measures by banning observation stations directed at the Soviet Union from its territory.

110. There have already been extensive negotiations with the Turkish Government and more will probably be necessary before there is a return to an acceptable situation. In the circumstances, the West has no choice. Turkey must be helped to rebuild a modern army. It must be given means of extricating itself from its present serious economic crisis and also be offered sounder prospects of integration in the western world than heretofore. While the Americans and the British to a lesser extent seem prepared to supply the arms needed by the Turkish forces, the Federal Republic of Germany, particularly concerned by the fate of Turkey because of long-standing traditions and also the presence of more than a million Turkish workers in Germany, instructed Mr. Matthoeffer, its Minister of Finance, in January 1980, to assess the amount of assistance Turkey needed and to organise cooperation between the western countries to provide this assistance which initial estimates place at about $3,500 million over a period of three years.

111. In February 1980, the European Communities for their part decided to reactivate procedure for association with Turkey in conditions which would ensure better employment possibilities for Turkish workers and a better market for Turkey's agricultural and textile products, with the prospect of earlier accession to the Community than previously envisaged. Although these measures call for major financial sacrifices by the whole Community, are contrary to the Federal Republic's employment policy, run counter to the interests of the Mediterranean members of the Community and cause political concern in Greece, they must be taken and their urgency cannot be overemphasised. With a praiseworthy degree of statesmanship the Greek Government has shown its realisation of this, particularly in the context of Mr. Matthoeffer's mission, and of West Germany's continuing concern. There is no reason to doubt that this is so for all the western countries.

VII. *Conclusions*

112. In occupying Afghanistan the Soviet Union has seized an essential strategic point in an area where the West's position had been particularly undermined by the expansion of Vietnam, the weakening of Pakistan, the Iranian revolution, the crisis in Turkey and the general uncertainty prevailing in the Arab world. The signs of weakness shown by the West itself in recent years, in both the economic and the foreign policy fields, have only allowed the Soviet leaders to think that everything was now possible for them.

113. Admittedly, the extent of reactions to the Kabul affair and the ferocious resistance of the Afghans may have led the Kremlin to wonder whether their calculations, in this particular instance, were correct.

114. Be that as it may, to have a lasting deterrent effect vis-à-vis future Soviet adventurism western reactions must be backed up by a tangible demonstration of the West's military capability – and will power – in the threatened area and its determination to use this capability and will power, if need be. The gathering of a large fleet in the Indian Ocean, where European ships will be alongside American ships, is already a significant deterrent, but to be fully effective in the continental Middle East territories there is a need for land and air forces within striking distance of the threatened areas. Despite the increased Soviet threat there is certainly not yet any readiness in Oman to permit the permanent stationing on land of any external armed forces. This reluctance of even the countries most friendly to the West derives from three considerations, not each of course to the same extent in each case.

115. Firstly, fear of neo-colonialism reasserting itself, in whatever context, is still very real. Secondly, there is a fear that in the context of the present credibility gap of an effective western deterrent to, and, if need be, response to any further Soviet advances, there is an understandable apprehension that to accept new obligations implying commitment to the West could endanger rather than improve their chances of avoiding an Afghan fate. Thirdly,

particularly applicable to Moslem countries, even extending to Pakistan and beyond, the existence of a serious irritant dimension in regard to the Arab-Israeli dispute sours the whole situation.

116. The provision of base facilities as opposed to a physical presence, except by agreement, at a time of crisis is another and much more promising possibility.

117. It is perfectly clear that the Soviet Union has not yet suffered a setback by the extent of western reaction likely to achieve either of these aspirations. The outcome of the Afghan operation may certainly be considered negative in some important respects in that the result has been condemnation by 108 members of the United Nations and by the conference of Islamic countries meeting in Islamabad, a deterioration in Soviet relations with non-aligned countries, including Mrs. Gandhi's India, non-ratification by the United States of the SALT II agreement, difficulties with its foreign trade and grain supplies, the compromising of the Olympic Games in Moscow and much closer Sino-American ties, without so far at least even managing to gain real control of Afghanistan. However, even if the Soviet Government wishes to return to the situation prior to 27th December 1979, it cannot be hoped that it will capitulate publicly.

118. The purpose of Lord Carrington's proposal, adopted by the Nine and accepted by the United States, was to allow the Soviet Union, thanks to the neutralisation of Afghanistan, to withdraw honourably from the situation in which it had placed itself and to demonstrate that it was not the West that sought a show of strength. Opinions differ as to whether the Soviet Union seems to have understood the situation and is showing a desire to take the way out proposed. Even on the most optimistic appraisal it remains to reach agreement on the possible meaning of " neutralisation ", which obviously includes, in western and third world eyes at least, the Afghans having the right to determine the internal régime of their country without intervention from outside.

119. Unless and until such time as an effective result has been achieved, the West will have no solution other than to set up a defence system to ensure the security of what is a vital area, and hence its own security, in the Middle East.

120. In closing, your Rapporteur does not apologise for emphasising yet again that this security cannot be guaranteed until a solution has been found to the Palestinian question which is acceptable to all concerned, so that it will stop poisoning the atmosphere of relations between Moslem and western countries, thus increasing opportunities and pretexts for direct or indirect intervention by the Soviet Union in the Near and Middle East. That is why the influence of Europe, which alone is now capable of advancing a fair and reasonable solution, is essential for the establishment of a just and lasting peace guaranteeing Israel's right to exist and the Palestinians' right to self-determination. There is every indication that the beginning of summer 1980 is to be the decisive time when a European initiative in this direction could at last set in motion a process leading towards peace, since the date of 26th May will allow a final opinion to be reached on the possible outcome of the Camp David agreements, in this context.

Postscript

121. It would be inappropriate to end this report, and in particular the immediately preceding chapter " Conclusions ", without reference to several highly relevant, additional considerations in the context of European security that came to the notice of the Rapporteur during an unexpected but very valuable visit by himself to Muscat and Oman, Pakistan and Turkey during April, after the main text of this report had already been drafted.

122. Firstly, there is no doubt at all that Oman's earlier faith in, and support of, the Camp David accords as a contribution to a solution of the Palestinian problem have fast faded. Although Palestinian, or should one say PLO, direct influence in the Sultanate is still insignificant, the same can certainly not be said of other Gulf states including Kuwait, Qatar, Abu Dhabi and Dubai. Hence Oman is finding its lone stance, as an Arab state, in support of Camp David and maintaining diplomatic relations with Egypt an increasingly lonely one ; especially because of the fact, too, that Saudi Arabia is now becoming more and more hard-line on the subject. These trends are in their turn making it more and more difficult for President Sadat of Egypt to persuade the Israeli Government that any settlement acceptable to Mr. Begin that could be reached between Cairo and Tel Aviv could be other than illusory.

123. Secondly, the lack of confidence referred to earlier in the report on the part of Pakistan to believe that any reliance can be placed on western, and in particular on American, pledges of effective support if the Afghan invasion spills over into their country, either directly or indirectly through a fragmentation of Baluchistan, has serious implications in strategic terms on how essential western interests in the whole Gulf area and the adjoining Indian Ocean can be safeguarded. Quite clearly, since regional

friends of the West are either unwilling or unlikely to make any significant contribution to their own, collective security, the growing gap in the East-West balance in the area will have to be filled, and this means of course, except for some limited European naval contributions, by the United States. While it seems evident that the Americans are quite prepared to face up to this challenge, some sacrifices will have to be made elsewhere. Your Rapporteur has been assured at a very authoritative American level indeed that the naval, air and marine reinforcements required can be found without depleting the resources devoted to the Euro-Atlantic NATO theatre. However, it does mean that a cost will have to be paid in terms of much-needed anticipated reinforcement of America's NATO contribution that will at best have to be deferred for some considerable time. This means that, since the Soviet military threat in Europe and the Atlantic is growing daily, the European countries involved will have themselves to make extra efforts towards their own self-defence other than those already projected and in the pipeline.

124. Thirdly, there is certainly not yet sufficient awareness of the full extent and implications of the Afghan refugee problem. The plight of refugees as such is normally rather a matter for study by the Council of Europe and other pertinent bodies concerned with humanitarian issues rather than that of a defence organisation such as WEU. However, this particular refugee problem is quite different from most others in that it contains highly explosive political elements. At the most recent count there were at least three-quarters of a million men, women and children who had crossed the long border of Pakistan to find sanctuary mainly in the North-West Frontier Province but also in Baluchistan, and to a small extent even in Sind. It is estimated that there are probably up to a quarter of a million more who have escaped into Pakistan and are staying privately with fellow-tribesmen and members of their own families but who do not want to register with the United Nations, probably because they feel that such a step could interfere with their freedom to return to a never-ending battle whenever the opportunity occurs, in order to harass the Russians and the pro-Russian Afghan soldiers in their homelands. Indeed, it is this desire of the refugees not to be regarded as such, but simply to be treated as soldiers needing an opportunity to recoup and obtain new arms and equipment, which is shared by *all* Afghan refugees and which involves such embarrassment for the Pakistanis. For these latter, while entirely sympathetic to their fellow Moslems and entirely hostile to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, have no wish to provoke punitive Russian raids against which they do not have the power to retaliate – certainly without much greater external support than they can as yet envisage as being likely to be forthcoming.

125. Your Rapporteur, who spoke to hundreds of these same refugees, was struck by one fact. What was needed, it was said, more than food and shelter, was more guns to help them to renew the fight for their homeland and in particular for weapons capable of bringing down the helicopter gun-ships which represent Russia's only effective method of keeping even a limited measure of control over the mountainous areas outside the urban centres such as Kabul.

126. There are two other truly dangerous situations that are arising which could cause internal disorder in Pakistan to an extent where Russian exploitation must seem tempting to the Kremlin.

127. Virtually all the refugees bring with them not only their families but all their livestock too, which has to share the already all too sparse grazing available in the impoverished provinces of the North-West Frontier and Baluchistan.

128. Up to now, religious ties and strict disciplinary control by the Pakistani authorities have prevented local grievances from manifesting themselves; but the long-term social consequences of hundreds of thousands of people having to endure further deprivation of their own scant means of livelihood in order to accommodate the refugees are not difficult to envisage. Also there are about 80,000 nomads who for thousands of years have regularly crossed from the mountainous slopes of Afghanistan to graze their herds in Pakistan then to return to the hills again when the temperature in the plains becomes too hot for them. This year, for the first time in history, the nomads seem disinclined to undertake their annual historic trek, which once again adds to the explosive potentialities that are involved in a region where inter-tribal tensions are a part of life.

129. It is of course true that if Pakistan is to receive all the support, politically, economically and militarily, that it needs from the West to preserve its national integrity, this would be easier to achieve in terms of public support on both sides of the Atlantic if Pakistan could be seen to be moving away from a rigorous military rule to a more democratic form of government, appropriate to the particular problems of an unevenly divided ethnic population in regard to resources as well as numbers of people – not an easy solution to find.

130. Yet it is fair to note that General Zia has made a start in the right dirction – Mrs.

Bhutto and her daughter have been released from house arrest. More civilians are being attracted into the cabinet rather than military personnel. Last but not least at local level elected district and municipal councils are now in being and functioning quite well, albeit in a restricted field of responsibilities.

131. It is good to be able to end on another encouraging note. As your Rapporteur left Turkey, news had just arrived of the substantial economic and military western help proffered by NATO, the United States, West Germany and Britain. This has undoubtedly led to a revival of Turkish morale just at a time when an uplift was desperately needed and a renewed faith in the benefits of being a member state of the western comity of nations.

APPENDIX I

European Council declaration on the international situation

Luxembourg, 28th April 1980

1. The heads of state and government and the foreign ministers examined the international situation. They expressed grave concern at the trend of recent events, especially in Afghanistan, Iran and the Middle East. They considered that these events now more than ever require of the member states of the European Community that they show their cohesion.

2. The European Council noted with deep concern that Soviet military forces have not been withdrawn from Afghanistan despite the condemnation of the international community expressed by the General Assembly of the United Nations and despite the repeated calls of the Nine and of the Islamic conference and the ASEAN countries.

The European Council reaffirmed the view of the Nine that a solution in accordance with the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly could be found in an arrangement which allowed Afghanistan to remain outside competition among the powers and to return to its traditional position as a neutral and non-aligned state. Respecting the right of the Afghan people freely to determine their own future, they believe that to this end the great powers and the neighbouring states should undertake to respect the sovereignty and integrity of Afghanistan, to refrain from interference in its internal affairs and to renounce all forms of military presence or association with it.

The Nine are ready to support, in concert with friendly and allied countries, any initiative designed to promote such a solution, emphasising that their own proposal is neither rigid nor exclusive. In this connection they believe that the Islamic and non-aligned countries have a particularly significant rôle to play.

3. Since the occupation of the United States Embassy in Tehran and the seizure of its staff as hostages, the Nine have repeatedly condemned this inadmissible violation of international law. They reaffirm their solidarity with the government and people of the United States in their present time of trial.

They consider that the situation created by this violation opens the door to developments fraught with serious consequences. A return to a state of legality is the only way to ensure peace and security.

The European Council reaffirms the decisions taken by the foreign ministers of the Nine on 22nd April in Luxembourg.

The Nine declare their full support for the steps which the Secretary-General of the United Nations intends to take to secure the release of the hostages.

4. The Nine reiterated their belief that only a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement can bring true peace to the Middle East.

The European Council, conscious that Europe may in due course have a rôle to play, instructed foreign ministers to submit a report on this problem on the occasion of its next session in Venice.

5. The European Council denounces the acts of violence committed in southern Lebanon against members of UNIFIL and demands that they should cease immediately, and that the force be permitted to carry out in full its mandate from the Security Council.

6. At this time of crisis in world affairs the European Council believes that it is vital that international procedures for the management of crisis and the easing of tensions be used to the full and that the United Nations Charter and international law be fully upheld.

APPENDIX II

Recommendation 341

on the impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security

The Assembly,

Considering that the maintenance of peace in the Near and Middle East is essential for Western Europe's security and economic prosperity ;

Regretting that Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, far from establishing internal peace, political stability and a resumption of economic activity in that country, has led to intercommunal and religious strife and created yet another difficult refugee problem ;

Considering that the upheaval in Iran in 1978, inspired by revolutionary principles, has further delayed the introduction of democracy and the restoration of national unity;

Concerned that by taking and detaining employees of the United States Embassy, in violation of all principles of international law, Iran may endanger world peace ;

Noting that the Camp David agreements, while establishing peace between Israel and Egypt, have so far provided no solution to the main problems in the Middle East, especially the Palestine question ;

Considering that solutions which exclude participation by the Palestinian people do not offer them the possibility of exercising their right to self-determination and militate against the underlying causes of the conflict ;

Considering that the positions adopted by Jordan and expressed by His Majesty King Hussein in the United Nations on 25th September 1979 constitute a positive step towards peace ;

Deploring that the continuing establishment of Israeli settlements on the West Bank only makes more difficult a just and lasting solution to the Palestinian problem ;

Welcoming the fact that the Nine have been able to speak with a single voice on Middle Eastern matters on several occasions, particularly on 25th September 1979 in the United Nations General Assembly,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Either directly or where more appropriate indirectly through the participation of its membership in European political co-operation among the Nine, ensure that consultation between its members is extended to cover matters relating to Afghanistan and Iran ;

2. Ensure that its members refrain from selling arms to Iran as long as internal strife and armed repression continue in that country and call upon all other arms-supplying countries to impose a similar moratorium ;

3. Ask Iran to free immediately the hostages held in the United States Embassy ;

4. Continue to co-ordinate the positions of its members in the United Nations and call for a clarification from the Security Council of the actual implications of Resolution 242 ;

5. Ask Egypt, Israel and the United States urgently to consult with a view to reaching agreement on a mutually accepted interpretation of the implications of the Camp David agreements ;

6. Ask its members to urge Israel immediately to accept the existence of the Palestinian people and to renounce its policy of settlements on the West Bank and commence negotiations with valid Palestinian representatives to achieve self-determination, including the inhabitants of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip ;

7. Ask its members to urge the PLO, also immediately, to declare its acceptance of an independent Israeli state within internationally agreed and defined borders ;

8. Ask its members to urge upon both sides a total abandonment of all acts of violence, which call into question the validity of any such declarations ;

9. Use its best endeavours, if these preconditions are met, to promote a broader-based conference than Camp David including representation from all the countries directly involved in the Palestinian dispute.

Reply of the Council [1]

1. The Nine stated their views on Afghanistan on 15th January, 5th February and, through the Chair, on 19th February 1980.

As regards Iran, the heads of state and government and the foreign ministers of the Nine stated their views on 30th November 1979. The ambassadors of the Nine in Tehran have remained in very active and close consultation since the start of the crisis.

2. Also as regards Iran, the Council condemn the taking as hostages of members of the staff of the United States Embassy in Tehran, contrary to international practice and law, and call urgently on the Iranian Government to put an end to this situation immediately. They recall that the governments of member states have supported all moves, both in the United Nations Security Council and in the European Communities, to secure the immediate and unconditional release of these hostages.

Accordingly, the Council recommend that until such time as the hostages are actually released, member states should refrain from selling arms to Iran, provided this kind of sanction is effectively applied by the United States Government itself. The Council have no knowledge that member states are at present delivering armaments to Iran.

In any case, the Council do not intend to express an opinion on the strictly internal aspects of the Iranian revolution.

3. As regards the Middle East conflict, the Council recall the position adopted by each of the member states and formulated in agreed terms by the nine countries of the European Community, as in fact mentioned in Recommendation 341.

The Council agree with the Assembly that a just and lasting peace can be established only on the basis of a comprehensive settlement in accordance with Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and on:

- the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force;
- the need for Israel to end the territorial occupation which it has maintained since the conflict of 1967;
- respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries;
- recognition that in the establishment of a just and lasting peace account must be taken of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians, including their right to a homeland.

The Council recall the terms of the statement issued by the Nine on 18th June 1979 deploring "any action or statement which could constitute an obstacle to the pursuit of peace" and, in particular, Israel's claim to eventual sovereignty over the occupied territories and its policy of establishing settlements.

They consider that all the parties involved should be called on to participate in working out and implementing such a settlement, and in particular the Palestinian people who, as the Chairman of the Nine declared at the last General Assembly of the United Nations, "are entitled within the framework set by a peace settlement, to exercise their right to determine their future as a people" and, through their representatives, to play their full part in the negotiations.

The Council note that the member states are determined to continue their efforts to further the search for an overall settlement of the Middle East conflict.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 26th March 1980.

Impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security

AMENDMENT 1[1]

tabled by MM. Hardy and Stoffelen

1. In paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out " the economic assistance necessary for " and insert " economic support to assist in ".

Signed: Hardy, Stoffelen

1. See 4th Sitting, 3rd June 1980 (Amendment agreed to).

Impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security

AMENDMENT 2[1]

tabled by MM. Urwin and Hardy

2. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, line 1, after " every " insert " peaceful " and in line 2 leave out " intervention in " and insert " invasion of ".

Signed: Urwin, Hardy

1. See 4th Sitting, 3rd June 1980 (Amendment amended and agreed to).

Impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security

AMENDMENTS 3, 4 and 5[1]

tabled by Mr. Valleix

3. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out " on the most appropriate basis ".

4. Leave out paragraph 8 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

" 8. Propose that the United Nations Security Council guarantee respect for an overall settlement ensuring *inter alia* the security of Israel in a specific, concrete and binding manner ".

5. In paragraph 9 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out " before that conference " and insert " prior "; after " participants " insert " in this settlement ".

1. See 4th Sitting, 3rd June 1980 (Amendment 3 withdrawn; Amendment 4 negatived; Amendment 5, Part 1 not moved, Part 2 agreed to).

The international situation and European security

REPORT[1]

submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee[2]
by Mr. Vohrer, Rapporteur

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Adopted in Committee by 16 votes to 0 with 2 abstentions.

2. *Members of the Committee:* Mrs. *von Bothmer* (Chairman); MM. *De Poi,* Portheine (Alternate: *Schlingemann*) (Vice-Chairmen); *Sir Frederic Bennett,* MM. *Berrier, Brugnon,* Conti Persini, Deschamps, Druon (Alternate: *Bozzi*), Gessner, Hanin, *Hardy,* Lagneau, *Lord McNair,* MM. Mangelschots (Alternate: *van Waterschoot*), *Mende,* Mommersteeg, *Müller,* Péridier, *Lord Reay,* MM. Reddemann (Alternate: *Vohrer*), *Talamona, Thoss, Urwin,* Valiante, Vecchietti (Alternate: *Antoni*), Voogd.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

on the international situation and European security

The Assembly,

Considering that the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan is a pure violation of the law of nations as defined *inter alia* in the Charter of the United Nations and the final act signed in Helsinki;

Considering that Soviet expansion in the Middle East is a threat to stability in that area which is of vital interest to the West;

Considering that the deployment of new weapons in Eastern Europe is also liable to upset the balance on which peace depends;

Considering that consultations between members of the Atlantic Alliance were not held quickly enough or in sufficient detail to allow a joint policy to be drawn up in face of these threats;

Deploring in particular that these countries were not in a position to define jointly the measures made necessary by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan;

Recognising nevertheless the need for the decision taken by the members of NATO to increase progressively the proportion of their expenditure allocated to joint defence;

Endorsing the proposal by the Nine to seek the departure of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, a status of neutrality and non-alignment being conferred on that country by agreement between the parties;

Considering that the search for a balance of forces and armaments in Europe at the lowest possible level, even if this cannot be achieved in the short term, is still in conformity with the interests of the West;

Considering that it is in the interest of all to develop contacts and exchanges of all kinds between Eastern and Western Europe;

Considering that the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms in all countries is still one of the West's major objectives,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Ensure that the European members of the Atlantic Alliance concert regularly and efficiently the policies they pursue outside the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty;

2. Ensure that the members of the Atlantic Alliance agree on effective measures to be taken to convince the Soviet Union of their unanimous condemnation of the invasion of Afghanistan;

3. Ensure that its members pursue their efforts to sustain the defensive capacity of the Atlantic Alliance in face of new Soviet weapons;

4. Ensure the pursuit of negotiations with the Soviet Union and its allies to achieve a limitation and reduction of forces and armaments to establish a true balance in forces and in conventional weapons and continental-range nuclear missiles at the lowest possible level;

5. Ensure that the application of the final act signed in Helsinki is the subject of strict and exhaustive scrutiny at the Madrid conference.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Vohrer, Rapporteur)

I. *Introduction*

1. When the General Affairs Committee drew up its programme of work for the first part of the twenty-sixth session of the Assembly at the beginning of December 1979, it suggested presenting a report on European security, détente and disarmament, and this proposal was agreed to by the Presidential Committee. At its meeting on 25th January 1980, however, the latter decided that the subject should be changed to the present title. This decision was not taken lightly but because it recognised that there had been a radical change in the international situation, further to which neither détente nor disarmament seemed quite so evident but became goals more open to discussion.

2. Largely contributory to this change was the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan on 28th December 1979 which aroused sharp reactions among certain western countries first and subsequently throughout the Moslem world and many other countries. One of the main consequences was to raise doubts about détente. Reactions were exacerbated by the fact that the West had already been witness to interventions by Cuba, allied with the Soviet Union, in Angola, Ethiopia and Aden and by Vietnam, also allied with the Soviet Union, in Cambodia, which encouraged thoughts of widespread manoeuvres to weaken and isolate countries which were determined to oppose further Soviet expansion, although the direct and large-scale intervention by Soviet forces in Afghanistan introduced a new element.

3. In the month after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the United States Government decided to halt certain forthcoming trade programmes with the Soviet Union, particularly supplies of grain, to stop supplies to Afghanistan, to stop Americans taking part in the Olympic Games to be held in Moscow in summer 1980, to suspend procedure for ratifying the SALT II agreement in the United States Senate, to increase its defence appropriations for both nuclear and conventional arms and to authorise the President to register those liable for call-up so as to be able to increase the level of American forces. In addition, on 24th January President Carter announced a policy for supplying military equipment to China, Pakistan and Turkey.

4. These measures were accompanied or followed by a number of similar decisions in certain member countries of the Atlantic Alliance and also in Moslem countries. There was therefore ample justification for wondering how far détente was still a practical proposition and whether in 1980 the problem of European security could still be envisaged in terms of détente and disarmament.

5. The question facing the Committee is therefore no longer first and foremost to determine how to pursue détente but to see whether détente still has a place in the world today and what remains of it following the tension aroused by the invasion of Afghanistan.

6. It has often been wondered, and not without reason, whether the word " détente " is appropriate for defining the trend of East-West relations since the death of Stalin in 1953. It is, however, a convenient way of describing a certain form of relationship, even if its meaning is not always very precise, although its significance has been more or less pin-pointed and defined in the texts of agreements, in two fields at least: the limitation of strategic arms and the recognition of states and frontiers in Western Europe. However, the Soviet side has always stressed that there could be no " ideological détente ", which means that détente may come into play in the means employed in the struggle between the capitalist and communist worlds but not in the fundamental reasons for the struggle. Again, the West has always held that any improvement in relations between states on either side depended on respect for the sovereignty of national states and human rights which, in a manner of speaking, constituted a guarantee for the changes of method on both sides.

7. This fundamental difference largely explains the difficulties of promoting détente, particularly each time the Soviet Union considered its security or the ideological cohesion of the communist world obliged it to bring to heel, if necessary by force, countries or individuals which it considered, rightly or wrongly, to constitute a threat. At international level, the interventions in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1967 gave shape to the Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty for socialist bloc countries. This concept probably explains, at least partly, the military intervention in Afghanistan in 1979. Where the freedom of persons is concerned, there seems to have been a sharp upturn in recent months in the many infringements of human rights in respect of real or imaginary " opponents " or " dissidents ", perhaps because the Soviet Union thus hoped to prevent the Olympic

Games to be held in Moscow in summer 1980 providing dissidents with a means of contacting westerners and giving widespread publicity to their views.

8. It is therefore necessary to examine how far these Soviet actions are compatible with the pursuit of détente as it had developed in the last quarter of a century, whether they make it incumbent on the West to adopt a completely new policy in its relations with the East and how far the West can relax its insistence on respect for human rights and the independence of states and acquiesce in a form of " realism " which would encourage it to turn a blind eye to the excesses committed by the Soviet Union in order to preserve the main part of " détente ".

9. Finally, it is hardly possible to speak of détente and disarmament without referring to a balance of forces which is probably the main guarantee for the maintenance of peace. It is clear that the deployment of SS-20 missiles and Backfire bombers[1] and the stationing of Soviet armed forces near the routes along which most of the oil imported by Western Europe is shipped from the Persian Gulf are a serious challenge to this balance since the Soviet Union henceforth has the wherewithal to threaten Western Europe with the almost total destruction of its armed forces and even its inhabitants and with economic asphyxia by closing the Strait of Hormuz. Even if the Soviet Union does not use these arms directly, it can now bring so much pressure to bear on Western Europe that the latter can no longer consider effective resistance by its own means. In such a weak position, and if deprived of effective support from the United States, Europe would have such a great handicap in continuing the talks on which détente was based that it is hard to see how it could resist Soviet pressure and not have to accept Soviet-imposed conditions for reverting to peaceful coexistence. In such circumstances, Europe has even less means of pursuing a policy that would isolate it from its American ally on which, more than in periods of calm, depend its security and its survival as a group of independent states.

10. The disparities which have been noted in theatre nuclear weapons require the implementation of NATO decisions with regard both to the modernisation of long-range theatre nuclear weapons and to the limitation of armaments. This is not in order to bring about a parity of nuclear weapons systems but to increase the credibility of the Alliance's deterrent strategy by making good a weak spot in its possibilities of escalation, where the medium-range missile system is concerned, and introducing a larger number of options for limited and controlled reactions.

II. *Is there still room for détente ?*

1. *The state of détente prior to the invasion of Afghanistan*

11. Even if the scope of the word détente is not very clearly defined, there are nevertheless four areas in which considerable strides have been made in recent years in East-West relations towards a reduction of tension and the peaceful organisation of international society where improved relations have provided a framework for peace.

(*a*) *Relations between the Soviet Union and the United States*

12. The improvement of relations between the two great powers is an essential part, if not the basis, of any policy of détente for, if relations are based on mistrust, threats and tension, none of the countries can take steps to improve relations with the others. In the name of common interests, they are condemned to complete alignment with the power which might guarantee their security. In the Eastern European countries in particular there is no possibility of liberal movements at domestic level or of greater national independence while there is tension between the two great powers. It is for the two leading powers above all to establish the structure for international peace because they are the principal powers able to negotiate all matters connected with the production, deployment and possible use of nuclear weapons.

13. Thus, the limitation of nuclear weapons has been the cornerstone of the development of détente in the last decade. For instance, a number of agreements have been prepared by the two great powers, although they have sometimes subsequently been negotiated and signed in a wider framework and many other countries have later acceded to them. Some of these agreements are of especial importance, such as the treaty imposing a partial ban on nuclear tests, the non-proliferation treaty, the agreement on installing a " red " teleprinter between Moscow and Washington and, above all, the SALT I agreements on the limitation of nuclear weapons.

14. In June 1979, the two great powers managed to prepare and sign a SALT II agreement limiting the deployment of strategic nuclear weapons. At its session in December

1. These bombers have a much wider range of action than earlier Soviet bombers and can carry a larger number of weapons Their ability to break through anti-aircraft barrages has been enhanced by a sophisticated electronic system and the fact that they are able to fly at very high speeds at low altitude.

1979, the WEU Assembly took note of this agreement and, in the resolution in the report on SALT II and its implications for European security submitted by Mr. Cook, expressed the hope that the United States Senate would approve the early ratification of the SALT II agreement. In taking this step, it is clear that the Assembly expressed the wishes of a very large section of European public opinion, whose approbation was perhaps less related to the content of the SALT agreements themselves than to the process launched by the negotiations between the two great powers on strategic weapons, seen as a consolidation of peace and the promise of continued détente and disarmament.

15. Overall, the measures agreed upon by the two great powers seem to form a true framework for peace, particularly the red teleprinter intended in principle to avoid war due to an accident being misinterpreted by one of the partners, but useful above all for exchanging information between the two great powers in the event of a crisis liable to endanger peace.

16. One of the provisions of the SALT II agreement included a promise to start SALT III negotiations with the aim of extending to nuclear weapons deployed in Europe the limitation imposed by the SALT II agreements on intercontinental weapons. Such negotiations therefore implied the participation, indirect at least, of those European powers having nuclear weapons. The results of the negotiations and agreements were of course questioned by some and attempts have been made to assess the advantages which one or other of the two great powers might obtain from the standpoint of its own security and also the possible effects on the solidarity of the members of the two alliances. However this may be, the establishment and development of a continuing dialogue between the two great powers could but help to avert the threat of war.

(*b*) *Disarmament*

17. It cannot yet be said that a start has been made on real disarmament. Agreed, for more than twenty years the Disarmament Committee has been meeting in Geneva and has made a major contribution to preparing texts such as the treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under the sea and the non-proliferation treaty, but these are measures for limiting but not actually reducing armaments.

18. In July 1978, a special session of the United Nations on disarmament allowed new ideas to be aired such as the enlargement of the Committee, accompanied by a system of rotation allowing all its members to participate and take the chairmanship in turn. The aims of its work were spelled out and the possibilities of reaching agreements on various aspects of conventional or nuclear disarmament were explored.

19. It is to be regretted that the decisions taken by the United Nations General Assembly have not been followed up more quickly, but a process leading towards disarmament may be on the way and defence appropriations in national budgets have risen less steeply in recent years than other appropriations. There have even been marked and probably undue reductions in most western countries with defence appropriations of no more than 2 to 6 % of their GNP with the result that their armaments are not being modernised or replaced quickly enough whereas the Soviet Union is still allocating more than 11 % of its GNP to defence and is building up greater quantities and more varied and sophisticated armaments, particularly in Western Europe, thus gaining a clear lead in most fields.

20. However, there is no need to be pessimistic or to give up hope where the evolution of disarmament is concerned. Although it might be thought that no true disarmament has begun, the armaments race, at least between the two alliances, is slowing down and both sides are intent on seeking, and not without success, ways of directing negotiations towards a reduction in the level of forces deployed by both sides, for instance in the framework of the MBFR talks in Vienna.

(*c*) *Security and co-operation in Europe*

21. The holding in Helsinki of a conference on security and co-operation in Europe in summer 1975 gave the impression, at least in Europe, that détente was going to lead to far more positive results than had been achieved by the two great powers in the field of disarmament. This conference had been prepared by negotiations and bilateral agreements, particularly between the Federal Republic of Germany and several Eastern European countries such as the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia, in order to settle differences still remaining from the second world war and by very numerous contacts between Eastern and Western European countries and a considerable increase in trade between these countries.

22. In accordance with the recommendations of the preliminary Helsinki conference, adopted by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the participating countries on 3rd July 1973, during the first stage of the conference, the final act included chapters on :

- questions relating to security in Europe ;

- co-operation in the fields of economics, of science and technology and of the environment;
- questions relating to security and co-operation in the Mediterranean;
- co-operation in humanitarian and other fields.

23. Of course, the line taken at the Helsinki conference did not mean there were no mental reservations on either side. In the West, there was probably some expectation of even more concrete results in respect of freedom of trade, ideas and persons and of the Soviet Union's agreement to the notion of human rights leading to hopes that there might be a change in political customs in the countries of Eastern Europe or even in the régime of those countries. Neverless, the results achieved with the third basket already represent a substantial success.

24. But in Eastern Europe some of the principles accepted at Helsinki, such as the maintenance of the status quo and the intangibility of frontiers, served to strengthen the positions acquired by the Soviet Union after the second world war and its domination over a large number of Central and Eastern European countries.

25. It should be noted that the Helsinki final act has had positive effects as regards relations between states in Europe.

26. However, western complaints that the human rights aspects of the Helsinki agreements are not being respected correctly, particularly as regards the free movement of persons, are not unfounded. The Helsinki final act furnished hope and a juridical basis for the protests of many persons in the Eastern European countries who found it difficult to accept the control over society exercised by the Soviet Union or the state or party authorities. They used the final act to assert their right to a certain degree of freedom from the national or Soviet authorities. Although the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries leave much to be desired in their application of the Helsinki commitments, they have nevertheless shown greater moderation than heretofore in imposing sanctions on those who act by them.

27. Disagreements emerged during the 1977-78 Belgrade meeting, which produced few results. The Soviet Union was already experiencing considerable difficulty in respecting its Helsinki undertakings and was reluctant to enter into any more where its domestic régime was concerned.

(*d*) *Development of bilateral relations*

28. The development of economic and trade relations between Eastern and Western European countries advocated at the Helsinki conference has been mainly bilateral. Although France, in the days of General de Gaulle, then the Federal Republic, when Chancellor Brandt defined his *Ostpolitik*, opened the way for their European partners to establish and develop bilateral relations, nowadays all the Western European countries, in one way or another, co-operate actively with the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries in the economic field. This co-operation, while remaining the individual responsibility of each state, concerns the whole of Western Europe and the WEU Council continues to play an important rôle in the co-ordination of such bilateral relations between each of its members and the Eastern European countries and this has been the main item on the agenda of all meetings of the WEU Council of Ministers for several years.

29. The development of bilateral relations has been of particular importance since the 1973 crisis since, in a time of recession, the development of external trade is a means of reviving the economy of each country by helping to maintain the level of employment. Economic co-operation with the Soviet Union and with Eastern Europe is not just a matter of trade. In view of the nature of a planned economy, such trade has to be conducted in the framework of a long-term policy providing for investments and organising a credit system acceptable to both parties.

30. Western governments have sometimes been criticised for granting unduly beneficial credit terms to their Eastern European partners and making excessive sacrifices in order to develop their trade with the East. But they derive benefits from this trade which compensate for any financial sacrifices they may have to make. For instance, considerable investment has been needed in the past few years to allow Soviet natural gas to be brought to Western Europe where it is in the process of replacing other sources of energy, as is now the case in the Federal Republic of Germany and, more recently, France. For the investment required for constructing the pipelines to be profitable, it will have to make a worthwhile contribution to the economy of Western Europe for at least twenty years. But it should be noted that the Federal Government for its part grants no credits to Warsaw Pact member countries but merely affords banks granting such credits guarantees for the political risks.

31. There are therefore many aspects to détente affecting a variety of fields and of considerable importance for East-West relations and for helping our countries to face the crisis, limit its effects and view their own future with more confidence. The nature of the threats hanging over or calling in question détente

must therefore be examined attentively to see whether they justify a radical review of a political course chosen freely by the West a long time ago.

2. *What is détente ?*

32. Among the factors considered not so long ago as part of détente, several are now being called in question with the result that no one now knows exactly what the term covers.

(*a*) *Human rights*

33. In the West at least it has always been considered that détente did not concern only relations between states but also respect for individual rights. At the Helsinki conference on security and co-operation in Europe, the western powers managed to ensure that commitments relating to human rights were given a prominent place in the final act, and since that time they have been disappointed at the way in which the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries have applied the text they had just signed. One of the most important points was the possibility for people to leave their country if they were not satisfied with their living conditions. It is certain that the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries, which were very restrictive in allowing emigration, have been more liberal than in the past, and it has been possible to discuss more or less long-term programmes with them with a view to allowing emigration for national, religious or ideological minorities which felt they were persecuted in countries with communist régimes. Following the Helsinki final act, they proved far more willing to allow emigration.

34. Thus, many Soviet dissidents have now taken refuge in Western Europe or in the United States. However, more recently there seem to be restrictions on the possibility for citizens of the Soviet Union and the peoples' democracies to emigrate and hence the application of the Helsinki final act in this respect seems less satisfactory.

35. The Helsinki final act has been quoted frequently by opposition political circles, particularly in the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, in calling for liberalisation, but there has been no response. However, it should be noted that the most obvious excesses have been toned down. On the one hand, the works of many Soviet dissidents are now published, translated and known in the West, and on the other hand repression is certainly less brutal but also less effective than before Helsinki. The results obtained at Helsinki may therefore be considered in two ways: in absolute terms to underline their faulty application by the Soviet Union and its allies, or from a more historical point of view, noting that there has been a positive trend which the improvement in East-West relations has encouraged considerably. However, this trend is by no means steady and news from the Soviet Union heralds a new wave of repression, the most striking example of which is the internal exile of the Academician, Andrei Sakharov, in Gorki, merely because of his opinions. But many other persons, such as Father Dudko, have experienced repressive measures in recent months. There is therefore justification for indignance about the non-respect of many provisions of the Helsinki agreements and at the same time satisfaction towards a trend which is a tangible result of these agreements.

(*b*) *Security of states and non-intervention in their internal affairs*

36. Even more than the question of human rights, the application of what is known as the Brezhnev doctrine, i.e. the right of the Soviet Union to intervene in the internal affairs of socialist bloc countries, raises problems which periodically detract from détente. The most recent case was the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, starting on 27th December 1979. It should be noted that this intervention does not directly involve the application of the Helsinki final act, which concerned only European countries, nor can any specific guarantees be invoked since no western country has given Afghanistan any. No one complained when a pro-Soviet régime was set up in Afghanistan in April 1978 by typical force of arms. However, the Soviet intervention brings into play the application of the United Nations Charter to which both the Soviet Union and Afghanistan have acceded.

37. The invasion was not a bolt from the blue, an unheralded occurrence in a country where the Soviet Union had never shown any claims. The régime in Afghanistan since 1978 was dominated by an Afghan Communist Party and linked to the Soviet Union by a treaty of assistance and co-operation which already made it to some extent a satellite of the Soviet Union. However, following an internal coup d'état, the Afghan leaders were no longer those whom the Soviet Union had helped to bring to power but a team whose authority was accepted neither by the Soviet Union nor by the majority of the Afghan people who had launched a rebellion which, in December 1979, controlled the major part of Afghanistan.

38. The Soviet intervention did not therefore change the communist nature of the régime. In a particularly brutal manner, it replaced one communist government by another,

perhaps because it considered the new one more docile, probably because it hoped it would be better able to put down the rebellion by authoritative measures and by concessions to the Islamic traditions of the Afghan people.

39. Apart from infringing international law by violating the United Nations Charter, this action brought the West face to face with a whole series of problems.

40. The first was to decide whether the occupation of Afghanistan was a serious blow to the East-West balance. It is clear that the presence of Soviet troops on the frontiers of Eastern Iran and Pakistan gives the Soviet Union a means of intervening in those countries, both weakened, Pakistan by its recent war against India, and Iran by the 1979 revolution and the ensuing period of unrest and international isolation. Moreover, only a territory dominated by the Baluchis whom neither Iran, Afghanistan nor Pakistan has ever been able to control effectively, now separates the Soviet Union from the shores of the Indian Ocean near the Strait of Hormuz through which most of Western Europe's oil supplies passes.

41. But sending a large military force to a mountainous area in the centre of Asia is a heavy burden for the Soviet Union, comparable in many respects with that of the United States' engagement in Vietnam, and consequently it is weakened far more than it is strengthened by the occupation of a vast territory which is difficult to control, particularly as the 400 km of arid and sparsely-populated country separating the south of Afghanistan from the shores of the Indian Ocean are difficult to cross and it seems impossible for the Soviet Union, at the present time, to open up a road. Moreover, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan has incurred the almost unanimous opposition of the Moslem countries, expressed at the Islamabad summit meeting at the end of January 1980. Even India, hostile to Pakistan, seems to be worried about the Soviet foothold in Afghanistan.

42. The Soviets probably thought they could take advantage of the situation – favourable to them – created by the tension between the United States and the new Iranian Government, worsened by members of the United States Embassy in Tehran being taken hostage, to risk an attack on a Moslem country. Were this so, the calculation has now proved wrong.

43. The occupation of Afghan territory by a Soviet armed force, now apparently exceeding 100,000 men, equipped with the most up-to-date weapons, thus has negative consequences for the Soviet Union which seem to offset the territorial advantages obtained.

44. The West has naturally never recognised the principles underlying the Brezhnev doctrine. It has always considered that countries with communist régimes were entitled to independence just like other countries and it cannot agree to any party taking power being considered unassailable once and for all. However, in affairs such as that of Hungary in 1956 or Czechoslovakia in 1968, the West in fact recognised that it was possible for the Soviet Union to pursue a policy which conformed to this doctrine without risk of armed reaction from the West, which certainly protested and took measures to strengthen its security but did not seriously consider resorting to force.

45. However, the invasion of Afghanistan was almost unanimously condemned by public opinion not only in the West but throughout the non-communist world. The Soviet Union seems to have realised the extent of this condemnation because it was apparently of its own accord that it postponed the Bolchoi theatre's planned tour of several countries including Japan and France in spring 1980 for fear of hostile demonstrations. Moreover, the new situation calls for security measures to prevent the stationing of Soviet forces on Afghan territory endangering the security and territorial integrity of neighbouring countries, particularly Pakistan and Iran, and to prevent the Soviet Union from believing that it has the tacit consent of international society to ride roughshod over the independence of states. The case of Yugoslavia comes to mind in the event of a leadership crisis in the near future.

46. However, the question is whether the invasion of Afghanistan justifies an overall reappraisal of the process of détente and what remains of it. In particular, no decisions must be taken on possible sanctions without carefully considering the full implications. First, there is no question of sanctioning a fait accompli, but, on the contrary, of refusing to do so by insisting on the early evacuation of Afghanistan by Soviet forces. This requirement justifies steps to exert pressure as effectively as possible and is just the opposite of recognising the fait accompli.

47. In the weeks following the invasion of Afghanistan, the governments of western countries, third world countries and even some communist countries discussed and from time to time consulted each other on the steps to take as a result of this event.

48(*i*) Although most of the Soviet Union's allies endorsed the official assertion that action launched from Pakistan, armed by the United States, had led to the Afghan revolt against the communist régime set up in the country in April 1978, thus compelling the Soviet Union to react, two allies, Romania and North Korea, did not subscribe to the motion endorsing the new Afghan régime adopted by the representa-

tives of parliamentary groups from socialist countries in Sofia on 8th February, hence, implicitly and to the extent allowed by their dependence on the Soviet Union, recognising Soviet responsibility. Other eastern countries such as Czechoslovakia, Poland and even the German Democratic Republic showed reluctance towards the Soviet assertions.

49(*ii*) After a Soviet veto had prevented the Security Council taking a decision, the United Nations General Assembly met in special session on 14th January and, by 104 votes to 18 with 18 abstentions, adopted a resolution tabled by twenty-four non-aligned countries calling for the " immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of the foreign troops from Afghanistan ".

50(*iii*) Meeting in Islamabad from 27th to 29th January 1980, the Islamic Conference adopted a resolution which " condemns the Soviet military aggression against the Afghan people, denounces and deplores it as a flagrant violation of international laws, covenants and norms, primarily the Charter of the United Nations... demands the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Soviet troops... suspends the membership of Afghanistan in the organisation of the Islamic Conference " and " solemnly declares its complete solidarity with the Islamic countries neighbouring Afghanistan ".

51(*iv*) The United States for its part, through the intermediary of President Carter, not only condemned the Soviet intervention but also decided to take immediate steps to show its disapproval of the Soviet Union. However, the effectiveness of these steps depends on the other members of the Atlantic Alliance following suit, since no boycott can be effective unless it is respected by all the western countries. Not all the European countries have yet adopted a position on the series of measures decided upon by the United States, but it may be noted that :

(*a*) As of 15th May 1980, the governments or Olympic Committees of forty-three countries, whether members of the Atlantic Alliance or not, have decided to boycott the Olympic Games in Moscow. At the request of the Soviet Olympic Committee, the International Olympic Committee met several times prior to the winter games at Lake Placid and, on 12th February 1980, decided unanimously that the games should still be held in Moscow. However, national committees have until 23rd May to answer the invitation and several of them are still uncertain about their answers. At its meeting on 17th March, the General Affairs Committee seemed divided over the question of boycotting the Olympic Games. Several members thought that a boycott would warn the Soviet population that the West was firmly resolved to oppose the policy of the Soviet leaders and wished everyone to follow this course. Others feared on the contrary that it might tighten solidarity between Soviet public opinion and their leaders against what might appear to be a unilateral measure taken by opponents of the USSR. Two points of convergence emerged however : one around the need for a truly collective attitude on the part of the West without which any retaliation to the invasion of Afghanistan would prové the weakness and not the strength of the Atlantic Alliance, the other around the fact that a possible boycott of the Olympic Games would be meaningful only if it was part of an overall policy and in no case could it be the western countries' only response to the invasion of Afghanistan.

(*b*) While retaining their freedom of action in other areas, the members of the EEC have decided not to increase supplies of products to the Soviet Union on which the United States has placed an embargo.

(*c*) The selective nature of the boycott decided upon by the United States Government without consulting its allies beforehand nevertheless raises a particular problem. A boycott undertaken without consultation and detailed agreement between the countries taking part is probably bound to be ineffective.

52(*v*) After the Franco-German meeting on 4th and 5th February 1980, a communiqué was issued setting out the joint positions of the two countries, *inter alia :*

" They reached the following conclusions which define both countries' policy in the present circumstances :

1. They consider that the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan is unacceptable and creates grave dangers for the stability of the region and for peace. They consider it essential that it be ended without delay, as demanded by a large majority of the United Nations General Assembly. This is the only way to re-establish a situation in accordance with the rights of the Afghan people and which meets the requirements of international peace.

2. They consider that the present crisis is likely to trigger off a process which, by degrees, and whatever the intentions, could have the most serious consequences for the world. In these circumstances they wish to reaffirm both their countries' fidelity to the Atlantic Alliance and their determination to honour their engagements to it.

3. They take note of the fact that due to the Afghanistan events détente has become more difficult and more uncertain and that consequently the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan is necessary. They declare that détente could not bear a further shock of the same kind. In that case France and the Federal Republic of Germany would take, in liaison with their allies, the measures required in that circumstance to guarantee their security and defend international stability.

4. They understand the concern shown by countries authentically attached to non-alignment and they affirm that these countries have their part to play as regards world peace and stability. Moreover they agree that the East-West confrontation must not spread to the third world... "

53. This communiqué has since been the subject of rather divergent comments since the French head of state said the Federal Republic of Germany and France still wished to try to protect what had been gained in recent years with regard to peace and the maintenance of détente, while the German Chancellor emphasised that, for the first time in Franco-German meetings, a communiqué proclaimed unequivocally the loyalty of the European partners to the Atlantic Alliance and underlined their solidarity with the United States.

54. However, it should be noted that these two interpretations in no way affect the two countries' very firm condemnation of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

55. After the Franco-German meeting, the United States Government proposed holding a meeting in Bonn of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Italy in order to discuss a joint position. The French Government did not accept this proposal, fearing that American views might prevail. Mr. Vance, United States Secretary of State, therefore decided to visit each of the European capitals concerned in order to hold the consultations which were not possible in the form he had planned.

56(*vi*) On 15th January, the North Atlantic Council authorised the Secretary-General, Mr. Luns, to make the following statement:

"The North Atlantic Council joined by senior representatives from capitals met today as part of the Alliance's continuing consultations on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and its consequences for the East-West relations and for the Alliance. They expressed full support for the United Nations General Assembly resolution of 14th January last and denounced the Soviet action. The Soviet invasion contravenes fundamental principles of international behaviour and represents a serious blow to the Alliance efforts to build a framework of constructive relations with the Soviet Union.

Allied governments have taken and are considering measures to make clear to the Soviet Union : – the deep concern with which they view the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan ; – their belief that détente is indivisible and must be reciprocal, and – their conviction that actions of this sort cannot be taken with impunity.

The members of the Council stated their conviction that efforts in the pursuit of détente to which they remain committed will be gravely undermined so long as Soviet forces occupy Afghanistan. Each member state will take appropriate individual measures and steps, and all agreed that actions taken by one should be taken into account by other member states.

The situation created by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan will remain at the centre of allied concern and consultation. "

57(*vii*) The Nine, for their part, without subscribing to American decisions on a possible boycott of the Soviet Union, decided to stop granting the Soviet Union preferential credit terms, to stop selling it agricultural produce, particularly butter, at a loss and not to increase their sales of wheat to the Soviet Union so as not to undermine the effects of the American boycott decisions. They also stopped all food assistance to the Afghan Government and diverted it to Afghan refugees in Pakistan.

58(*viii*) President Giscard d'Estaing's visit to India allowed him to join Mrs. Indira Gandhi in expressing, on 27th January 1980, their condemnation of the invasion of Afghanistan and the two countries' concern for détente to be pursued. In the joint statement, they declared:

" 1. .....

(1) Any situation arising out of the use of force in international relations and

intervention or interference in internal affairs of sovereign states is inadmissible.

(2) In order to stop further escalation, all states should refrain from any action which could intensify great power rivalry and bring back the cold war, especially through dangerous arms build-up liable to threaten peace and stability in sensitive regions.

(3) It is necessary to restore conditions in which the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states can be preserved and the right of their peoples to freely determine their own destiny without outside interference assured.

(4) Respect for and implementation of these principles do not prejudice any state's legitimate security interests and would, in fact, go a long way towards safeguarding them.

2. Accordingly, the President and the Prime Minister have decided to take all necessary initiatives to defuse present tensions and to help create a climate of mutual trust and confidence. To this end, they will remain in close consultation with each other.

3. The President and the Prime Minister appeal to all states, particularly the most powerful ones, to recognise the gravity of the danger and to bend all their efforts to avert it."

59. It can be seen on the one hand that the Soviet Union's action has very seriously jeopardised two of the basic principles of the final act of the Helsinki conference and affected the balance whose maintenance is still essential for any true détente. Soviet intervention in Afghanistan has made it impossible for the West to close its eyes to these facts and, however varied, its reactions show that all the western countries and almost all the non-aligned countries have had to work out what is left of détente after these events.

60. The continuation of détente, its possible forms and retaliatory measures and necessary defence and security measures still divide all these countries. Their division is probably only provisional for the many talks between heads of state and government, western and non-aligned, which have been held since the invasion of Afghanistan indicate that most governments have not had time to define a new policy or, *a fortiori,* concert their views sufficiently with their partners to be able to implement a policy or even less to make a detailed examination of the full consequences, even if they are unanimous in condemning the Soviet action.

61. In the Afghanistan affair, it was evident that western reactions were not sufficiently concerted. Either the Americans took decisions before consulting their allies at all, as for boycotting the Olympic Games or the embargo on certain products, or the Europeans were in no position to draw up a joint policy. This situation calls for two series of measures. First and foremost, the damage done must be repaired by seeking, together with the Americans, positions around which it is possible to repair the cracks in western cohesion, particularly in areas where the divisions are most marked. In the longer term, machinery for consultation in Europe and in NATO will have to be strengthened, particularly for the discussion of questions not connected with the areas directly covered by the commitments entered into under the North Atlantic Treaty. Is it not one of WEU's main tasks to hold such consultations? In this respect, the nine-power political consultations from which emerged the proposal to neutralise Afghanistan presented by Lord Carrington in February are a success, at least for Europe.

III. *Security and détente after the invasion of Afghanistan*

62. Uncertainty about the immediate future means that, for the reasons just given, your Rapporteur feels that statements by governmental or other authorities in most western countries have caused misunderstandings which are now being corrected but which for some time will probably overshadow relations between these countries.

1. *Deterrence*

63. It is in any case evident that the invasion of Afghanistan, together with other disturbing facts such as, in particular, the speedy deployment of continental-range SS-20 missiles in the Soviet Union, gives Western Europe a particularly acute security problem. On the one hand, the proximity of large numbers of well-armed Soviet forces to the shores of the Indian Ocean only a short distance from the Strait of Hormuz through which passes almost 80 % of Europe's oil makes it possible for the Soviet Union to cut off the West's supplies without risk of effective retaliation at present. The Soviet Union can now hope to tackle future negotiations on oil supplies or problems relating to the Middle or Near East from a position of strength.

64. On the other hand, possession of the SS-20 missile with its three nuclear warheads on a mobile launcher allows military targets

throughout Western Europe to be reached from Soviet territory with extreme accuracy. This gives the Soviet Union overwhelming superiority. It is now estimated that there are about one hundred SS-20 missiles deployed in Europe but, at the present rate, there will probably be about a thousand during the eighties. The Soviet Union will then have the means of destroying the whole western defence system in Europe in a first strike, without having to use weapons of mass destruction against the populations. The absence of equivalent means in the West would then place the United States before the extremely difficult choice between either not retaliating to such an attack or triggering off an all-out nuclear war which would almost certainly lead to the destruction of its own territory at the same time as that of its European allies. The United States is naturally trying to develop weapons capable of countering the SS-20: cruise and Pershing II missiles. But they cannot be brought into service before 1983 or be deployed in sufficient numbers in Europe before 1985.

65. Here again, what is to be feared is probably not so much an unexpected Soviet attack, which would involve too great a risk of a nuclear hecatomb, as the use of the eminently favourable, but temporary, situation in which the Soviet Union now finds itself to impose on the West conditions for peaceful coexistence which Europe is probably not prepared to accept today. The only way of countering such nuclear blackmail is the presence of American forces on the mainland of Europe and their amalgamation with those of the European members of NATO to the greatest extent possible so that the Soviet Union cannot threaten a selective nuclear attack against European forces, speculating on a differentiation between Europe and the United States. In the longer term, the maintenance of a high-enough degree of deterrence to evade nuclear or military blackmail by the Soviet Union requires a considerable military and hence financial effort, starting now in order to avoid an even greater nuclear imbalance than at present.

66. Even before the invasion of Afghanistan, there was some acceleration in the effort made by certain western countries, particularly the United States, to replace and modernise their means of defence. After the event, President Carter even took the first steps to prepare for a possible reintroduction of compulsory military service in his country.

67. Aware of the relative weakening and obsolescence of its armaments, Europe for its part undertook several years ago to try to increase the proportion of the defence appropriations in its total budget. However, the increase, which was in principle to have been 3 % per year for the members of NATO, fell far short and the common effort should be stepped up considerably in the next few years.

2. *Security*

68. Although most probably the Soviet Union's aim is not to unleash its divisions on Western Europe, in present circumstances at least, one may nevertheless wonder what its aims are.

69. The goal is perhaps to increase the territory in the grip of Soviet communism or to achieve a kind of neutralisation or Finlandisation of the whole of Western Europe so as to make it incapable of having an independent foreign and defence policy and opposing the Soviet Union's manoeuvring.

70. In the first case, the most serious threat is probably now to Yugoslavia where it may be feared that the death of Marshal Tito will give rise to a problem of succession quite soon. This problem may assume dangerous proportions if Yugoslav elements, particularly communists who took refuge in the Soviet Union after the break between Tito and Stalin, call for Soviet assistance. There is no doubt that the Yugoslav leaders and people are keenly aware of this danger. They have done their utmost to demonstrate in no uncertain manner national cohesion and a desire to defend the integrity of Yugoslav territory and the independence of its political régime. The West has no special interests to defend in Yugoslavia, but it could not condone the Soviet Union taking over the country by force, be it for reasons of the West's security or to uphold the credibility of its attachment to democracy and the right of peoples to self-determination. It must therefore show its firm intention here and now to support the Yugoslav people's desire for independence. Any sign of weakness on the part of a new Yugoslav Government would allow appeals to be made to the outside world which might provide an opportunity or a pretext for Soviet intervention. An assurance that any violation of the integrity of Yugoslav territory would be considered a serious threat to western security should prevent the Soviet Union gambling on a weakening in Yugoslavia. But the credibility of such firmness depends on the West having means of countering a conflict in Europe or elsewhere. The Afghanistan affair has shown that this is not so and the small infantry unit of American marines sent to Oman on 13th February 1980 is far from constituting a truly deterrent military presence. The Afghanistan affair would probably not have happened if the West had been more firm towards interventions by the Soviet Union's allies in Africa and Asia, whether Cuba in Angola and Ethiopia or

Vietnam in Laos and Cambodia. In future, therefore, the West must show that it has both the strength and the determination to react against any further attack on the balance of forces in the world.

71. Whether in Afghanistan or Yugoslavia, Europe cannot hope to make its weight felt in the settlement of problems unless it has the means necessary for taking action, which implies that all the countries of Western Europe should build up their defence equipment in the conventional field in accordance with the NATO decisions and perhaps, also, for France and the United Kingdom, in the nuclear field. It should be noted that most members of the Atlantic Alliance have started, each one in the manner it considered most appropriate.

72. Today these countries should also define jointly the measures they would take in the event of an emergency in Yugoslavia in order to give their military effort the maximum effect in the political order.

3. *Détente*

73. After the invasion of Afghanistan, certain western countries expressed the conviction that this would put a permanent or temporary end to all the machinery grouped under the heading of détente and they considered breaking off all negotiations on disarmament, the control of armaments and security and co-operation in Europe. while at the same time thinking of placing strict limits on economic, cultural and other exchanges with the Soviet Union and its allies. They believed détente to be indivisible and based on a high degree of mutual confidence.

74. Conversely, others expressed the conviction that détente was not monolithic and, while not excluding widespread strengthening of security and defence measures, it could continue or even develop in fields not directly affected by the Afghanistan affair. Their reasoning was based on several considerations. First, many aspects of détente benefited both the West and the Soviet Union and, in spite of everything, helped to give slightly more freedom to countries under Soviet rule and to individuals in the Soviet Union itself. The emergence of a public opinion in the eastern countries should put a brake on the expansionist aims of Soviet leaders. It was therefore not for the West to discourage them. This is particularly so for trade, the West being short of certain raw materials or energy products and lacking adequate outlets for its industrial and agricultural products. To lose the advantages accruing from the opening of frontiers to the economies of the western world could but weaken the West at the present juncture and might considerably worsen the current crisis.

75. Finally, some feel that the cause of the invasion of Afghanistan, like many disturbances throughout the world in recent years, does not lie solely in Soviet expansionism but also in what is know as the bloc system. They therefore consider that if the crisis stemming from the invasion of Afghanistan were to lead to a strengthening of the alliance systems, it would in the long run generate other, more serious crises in the future. Consequently they consider it essential at one and the same time to pursue the West's armaments efforts and to increase action designed, eventually, to terminate the military blocs.

76. This last consideration cannot be shared by countries which are still members of NATO insofar as they consider that only the United States ensures the security of Western Europe. This does not necessarily mean that they endorse the idea that détente is ended once and for all since the invasion of Afghanistan. For the Western European countries, there are two main sides to détente, not counting armaments questions. One concerns economic and trade relations and is mainly dealt with in a bilateral framework or, for nine-power Europe, in a Community framework. The other relates to political problems and is mainly considered in the multilateral framework of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe.

(*a*) *The CSCE*

77. In autumn 1980, a conference is to be held to verify the application of the Helsinki agreements by signatory countries and to examine what further developments are possible. The Madrid conference is being prepared with the greatest care through numerous meetings of committees, sub-committees, committees of experts, etc. Neither the Soviet Union nor the West has so far wished to stop the work of these bodies. However, there has been every reason to question the significance of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe in view of the violations of the Helsinki agreement represented by the measures contrary to human rights taken by the Soviet Union and its allies and the fact that the guarantees given in respect of states and frontiers in Europe seem to encourage the Soviet Union to show even less respect than in the past for states and frontiers outside Europe, although the Helsinki final act included a preamble setting out principles of international law whose scope was obviously not limited to Europe.

78. Should we therefore pretend to believe that Helsinki and its follow-up are likely to transform international relations or, in any event, relations between the countries of Eastern and Western Europe? Your Rappor-

teur is inclined to think that, despite the above-mentioned shortcomings, the pursuit of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe is still a positive factor. He thinks that in a period of tension human rights would be respected even less by the Soviet Union and that the margin of independence of its allies would be narrower than at present. This does not mean that a blind eye should be turned to violations of the Helsinki final act but, on the contrary, they should be denounced and the Soviet Union warned to mend its ways.

79. All the participating states have expressed their wish to hold the Madrid conference as agreed in Belgrade. Preparation continues at multilateral level in the various groups within the CSCE and at bilateral level. The proceedings and results of the CSCE scientific forum held in Hamburg show the importance of having a framework in which the East-West dialogue may continue.

(*b*) *Economic relations*

80. Where economic relations are concerned, your Rapporteur considers account should be taken of the possible impact of certain boycott measures compared with the interest, for the West and for détente, of maintaining and even developing trade with Eastern Europe. Here a distinction should be drawn between the case of Afghanistan proper, that of the Soviet Union and that of the other communist countries which have no direct responsibility in events in Afghanistan and whose *a posteriori* endorsement of the Soviet undertaking cannot be considered wholly free and sincere. Moreover, several of them have shown signs of disapproval, as transpired from the communiqués issued after the Polish-Czechoslovak, Romanian-Soviet and Bulgarian-Soviet meetings in January 1980 and from Mr. Gierek's speech to his party congress on 12th February.

81. Where Afghanistan proper is concerned, it seems difficult to envisage any kind of relations with a government imposed by a foreign country and kept in power by the presence of Soviet forces. On the contrary, economic assistance to countries taking in Afghan refugees is the only possible way of demonstrating a refusal to bow to a fait accompli. This is the attitude adopted by the EEC and it seems unlikely that it will meet with many objections.

82. For the Soviet Union's allies which did not take part in the invasion of Afghanistan, the only reason which might justify a restriction of trade with them is that they would very probably have to let the Soviet Union benefit from the advantages accorded to them. This may lead to certain specific restrictions on exports of equipment essential for the Soviet military effort to which all the western countries should agree. But it is hardly possible to envisage going further.

83. Where the Soviet Union itself is concerned, the matter is obviously far more tricky. So far, unilateral measures have been taken by a few countries, particularly the United States, with regard to a few products. Yet the United States did not wish to break current contracts but simply announced that it would not agree to the conclusion of new contracts for certain products such as wheat and subsequently phosphates. The EEC, for its part, decided not to offset the American boycott by supplies from Europe but was against an economic boycott of its own. Application of this doctrine can but encounter difficulties of interpretation and mutual grievances among the western allies if a code of conduct towards the Soviet Union is not negotiated and freely accepted by all the partners. The United States must not expect the Europeans to subscribe to or *ipso facto* participate in any boycott measure on which it may decide unilaterally. Such measures must therefore be worked out and agreed upon in close consultation.

84. However, past experience indicates that, generally speaking, such measures have only a very limited practical effect and although it may be useful to demonstrate symbolically the West's objection to the invasion of Afghanistan, i.e. by measures designed to reach public opinion in the Soviet Union, economic boycott is not an effective weapon. It gives rise to as many disadvantages, if not more, for those practising it than for the intended victims and, when a state the size of the Soviet Union is involved, there is very little chance of such means making it repent.

4. *Control of armaments*

85. The invasion of Afghanistan came at the right time to remind the West of the Soviet Union's increasing military lead. This might result in all negotiations on disarmament being halted to allow the West to make the necessary effort to reinforce its position without delay.

86. However, so far there is nothing to show that the Soviet Union has violated its disarmament undertakings and it is probably not in the West's interest to throw itself headlong into the armaments race when it is not even sure that it will manage to catch up with the Soviet Union or prevent the Soviet Union from further increasing its superiority.

(*a*) *SALT*

87. Where the control of armaments is concerned, it should be noted that neither the

SALT I nor the SALT II agreement places the West directly in a position of inferiority. The balance of intercontinental nuclear missiles is maintained and there is no reason to denounce the SALT I agreement or to refuse to ratify the SALT II agreement other than as a symbolic gesture to show the West's objection to the invasion of Afghanistan.

88. The same is not true of the SALT III negotiations in their present terms. The aim of SALT III being mainly to limit continental-range nuclear weapons in Europe, it seems difficult to reach agreement as long as Soviet superiority in this field remains at the present level. It is now no longer possible to accept the fait accompli of the deployment of SS-20s unless they are offset by weapons of equivalent effect.

89. This does not mean that the SALT III negotiations must not be held but merely that they may be held only if they seek to achieve overall parity in this type of weapon, failing which Europe's very security may be jeopardised.

(b) MBFR

90. The Federal German Government considers that the overall results of these negotiations may be considered positive, although nothing final can yet be expected. Indeed:

- The MBFR talks constitute the start of a multilateral dialogue on security policy which complements the bilateral negotiations in SALT. Both East and West have recognised the stabilising effect of this form of contact and have an interest in continuing and using it.
- NATO has proved itself capable of taking united action on the basis of a joint concept. This experience has an integrating effect on the Alliance.
- After the establishment of strategic nuclear parity, the MBFR offer a means of achieving controlled parity in conventional weapons within a limited geographical area.
- The MBFR negotiations have made public opinion more keenly aware of security matters and the importance of force ratios. Since the beginning of MBFR, there has been no unilateral reduction by the western participants, yet the MBFR have already had a stabilising effect.
- In the past year of negotiations, concepts have drawn closer, particularly with regard to the aim of parity. There has also been some progress towards defining joint collective ceilings and concentrating on the question of troop levels with some selectivity where armaments are concerned.

91. Although concepts have drawn closer, decisive questions fundamental to the negotiations remain unsolved:

- Public disagreement about troop levels in the East, on the one hand, and views about parity on the other demonstrate the significance for security policy of discussing data and defining the results to be obtained.
- Joint collective ceilings are a fundamental factor which the West cannot give up. They cannot be associated with questions of national obligations with regard to the reduction of forces and the fixing of maximum levels of forces for direct participants other than the United States. The West's insistence on a specific limitation on Soviet troops in the force reduction area is due to geographical conditions and the consequences of the MBFR agreements which are not the same for Soviet forces as for forces of European direct participants. This requirement implies no discrimination against the Soviet Union and must be maintained.
- As a consequence of MBFR being limited to Eastern Europe and the ensuing advantages for the Soviet Union, the West wishes the negotiations to be concentrated on reducing troop levels with only selective reduction of armaments. The East maintains the principle of a general limitation of armaments by all direct participants. For geographical reasons, this would not be to the advantage of the western countries where reductions are concerned.

92. The Federal Government is convinced that these difficulties can be solved if both sides are prepared to seek a truly balanced result which takes account of geographical requirements and leaves aside political considerations unconnected with MBFR. As in the past, it is determined to contribute to the success of the MBFR negotiations in agreement with the other members of the Alliance.

(c) Disarmament

93. It is well known that no worthwhile results have been achieved so far in disarmament proper and there is little likelihood of greater progress being made in this period of tension than was possible when circumstances were more favourable. Admittedly, the MBFR negotiations were not broken off with the invasion of Afghanistan, but it is hardly necessary to underline that there can be no question of a successful conclusion unless Europe's security is guaranteed in face of the Warsaw Pact's large-scale deployment of conventional forces.

94. This is not so for the negotiations being held in the United Nations following the

General Assembly's special session on disarmament held in 1978. Here, the discussions are no longer of a specifically East-West nature but concern the world as a whole. They have moreover moved far too slowly for it to be possible to expect practical conclusions in the near future. But, faced with the invasion of a third world country, the United Nations should pull together bringing about a rapprochement of the interests of the third world and of the West since, for all, it is a matter of establishing an international order in which the direct intervention of a great power to impose a political régime on a smaller power by force would be absolutely banned.

95. The West has no reason therefore not to play an active part in encouraging negotiations likely to achieve this result.

IV. *Conclusions*

96. At the time of drafting, there can be no question of other than provisional conclusions. Nevertheless, your Rapporteur wishes to submit a few remarks for the Committee to discuss which, although not conclusive, should allow a worthwhile comparison to be made of each member's interpretation of a highly fluid situation.

97(*i*) Without claiming to pierce the inner thoughts of the Soviet leaders, it is not difficult to see that by entering Afghanistan the Soviet armed forces came closer to the Indian Ocean, which may be considered as a first sign of a possible threat to the main transit route for oil from the Gulf.

98(*ii*) The Soviet Union has thus, no less clearly, violated some of the fundamental principles underlying the United Nations Charter and the final act of the Helsinki conference, which raises doubts about that country's alleged wish to give priority to respecting its undertakings to international society rather than, as appears to be the case, applying a narrow concept of national interests or pursuing an aggressive and triumphant view of the revolutionary vocation which it has allotted to itself.

99(*iii*) This twofold observation, interpreted in the light of calculations which may be made as a result of the sudden deployment of continental-range missiles on Soviet territory, points to the conclusion that the West, and particularly its European element, should pay very strong attention to the military and particularly nuclear aspects of its security.

100(*iv*) Although such considerations may lead some to make what might be called an " agonising " reappraisal of everything covered by the word détente, it is most probably not so for those who perceive, behind this phenomenon, merely a deliberate choice by all concerned to limit and spell out the range of means which they might have to use in a confrontation where the stake has not substantially changed since a time which may go back as far as the reign of Peter the Great, the 1917 revolution or the Stalin era.

101(*v*) For anyone who holds such views, highly symbolic measures designed to show, in the eyes of public opinion in the eastern countries in particular, the firmest and most widespread disapproval possible of the Soviet operation in Afghanistan may be of undeniable value, although there may be no hope of any far-reaching change in Soviet policy.

102(*vi*) The military efforts which are essential if the West is to be able to meet the challenge to its security through the deployment of continental missiles in Europe and the massive movement of Soviet forces towards the Strait of Hormuz have quite different aims and are an urgent necessity.

103(*vii*) However useful or essential they may be, these measures preclude only to a limited degree the pursuit of negotiations to find a balance of forces and armaments in Europe at the lowest possible level.

104(*viii*) Nor do they preclude the search for a harmonious development of exchanges of all kinds between East and West except insofar as such as a search might be hampered by symbolic measures such as those mentioned in paragraph (*v*) above.

105(*ix*) In any event, it is not for the West to terminate the efforts made at the Helsinki conference to improve, however unsatisfactorily, the material, moral and intellectual lot of individuals in the Soviet Union and in the countries under its hegemony.

106(*x*) These various considerations seem appropriate for the establishment of a policy, provided however that there is sufficiently wide agreement for them to be acted upon, if not jointly at least in parallel by the member countries of WEU, the European Community and NATO and also by countries which, although claiming to be non-aligned, have as their aims international order, peace and the freedom of individuals and peoples, the only basis on which a peaceful, stable and open international society may be built.

Replies of the Council to Recommendations 336 to 344

RECOMMENDATION 336 [1]

on the balance of force [2]

The Assembly,

Aware that different political assumptions used in interpreting information can lead to widely differing assessments of adversary capabilities and of the balance of force ;

Believing that the overall East-West economic and military balance is favourable to the West, but that the Warsaw Pact's superiority in several fields on the central front, combined with the Soviet military doctrine of " daring thrusts " against NATO forces, can be perceived as a substantial threat by the NATO countries ;

Regretting the slow progress of the MBFR negotiations, and the failure so far to elucidate differences in the conflicting assessments of present force levels, but noting with satisfaction that there is some advance towards agreement on the concepts of parity and common collective ceilings;

Believing that European security can be based only on an approximate balance of forces in the area, and that security will be enhanced if, once a balance is achieved, the collective ceilings on each side are lowered, and associated measures are introduced to increase confidence through improved warning and verification facilities,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member governments :

1. To take account of both Soviet and western perceptions of objectives, military capabilities and resulting threats, and to reject worst-case analysis as the only basis of assessment;

2. To concentrate allied defence improvement plans accordingly on maintaining military capabilities required for credible deterrence;

3. To pursue vigorously the MBFR negotiations, and encourage the mutual exchange of more detailed information, with a view to securing agreement on:

(*i*) the assessment of present force levels in the area;

(*ii*) initial reductions designed especially to redress imbalances;

(*iii*) the introduction of associated measures to stabilise mutual security by providing better warning and verification facilities;

4. To examine the possibility of promoting the early start of negotiations between all states concerned with European security with a view to reducing conventional weapons and introducing confidence-building measures covering the whole European continent.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 3rd December 1979 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Fifth Ordinary Session (8th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Pawelczyk on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 809).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL [1]

to Recommendation 336

1. The Council wish to underline member states' awareness that a realistic security policy must be based on objective assessment of the situation, taking into account all relevant factors possibly bearing on security. A comparison of the military capabilities of the East with those of the Alliance remains a focal element in any assessment of the security situation, and should continue to be one.

In the Council's opinion, responsible security policy must avoid the danger of underestimating the military capabilities of the Warsaw Pact, in particular at a time when security policy is determined by the twin policies of maintaining a credible defence posture and at the same time furthering arms control. The resolve to resist external pressure remains an essential prerequisite for the pursuit of détente.

2. The member countries of WEU remain convinced of the importance of maintaining credible deterrence which continues to be the fundamental strategic concept of allied defence.

In particular the member countries of the integrated military structure are also convinced that they should react to any possible aggression according to the doctrine of forward defence and flexible response. Therefore they undertook, in view of the changing strategic situation in Europe, to contribute their share of the necessary resources for a wide-ranging action programme and to implement with determination, step by step, the NATO long-term defence plan.

3. The member states involved in the negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions have re-emphasised their determination to work for a successful outcome which would contribute to a more stable relationship and to the strengthening of peace and security in Europe.

The countries consider that agreement on the starting size for forces to be reduced is an essential prerequisite for any reduction. In order to advance the negotiations towards an early result, they have tabled a proposal in Vienna for a simplified interim phase I agreement which focuses on United States and Soviet manpower withdrawals and limitations based on agreed United States–Soviet data. The manpower withdrawals would be a first agreed step towards reducing the existing disparity and towards achieving the objective of establishing parity in the form of a common collective ceiling on ground force manpower and agreement on a combined common collective ceiling on ground and air force manpower in the area of reductions.

A package of associated measures forming an integral part of that proposal are designed to promote military stability and confidence, to ensure adequate verification of an MBFR agreement, and to help safeguard undiminished security for flank countries.

4. At the CSCE follow-up meeting due to be held in Madrid at the end of 1980, member states will ensure that the balance between all sections of the final act is maintained and will work towards the adoption, as part of this balanced outcome, of a mandate for further negotiations under the aegis of the CSCE on militarily significant and verifiable confidence-building measures, which would apply to the entire continent of Europe, and should help to create conditions conducive to limitation and reduction of arms in the same geographical framework.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 12th March 1980.

RECOMMENDATION 337 [1]

on political conditions for European armaments co-operation [2]

The Assembly,

Noting with interest the work of the symposium on a European armaments policy held in Brussels from 15th to 17th October 1979;

Noting that in the opinion of most of the experts consulted only a pragmatic approach is likely to advance European armaments co-operation in the future;

Convinced, however, that Europe will have to assume increasing responsibility for its own security, particularly insofar as this involves conventional weapons;

Considering that the production of armaments brings into play a broad spectrum of unequal interests in the various member countries;

Thanking the Council for having authorised the Head of the International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee to present to the Assembly his conclusions on the juridical obstacles to co-operation reached as a result of the enquiry conducted by the Standing Armaments Committee in accordance with a wish often expressed by the Assembly;

Recalling its Recommendation 335;

Rejecting the assertions in paragraph 4 of the reply of the Council to Recommendation 331 and in the corresponding paragraphs of the replies to Recommendations 325 and 330 ;

Recalling that the WEU Assembly is, as explicitly admitted by the Council, the only European assembly with defence responsibilities,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Use every means at its disposal to promote co-operation between its members in the production of armaments;

2. Examine, *inter alia* on the basis of the work of the Standing Armaments Committee, by what means it would be possible to establish in Western Europe, account being taken of the specific responsibilities of each institution:

(*a*) an organisation responsible for gathering and circulating all necessary information on European supply and demand in the field of armaments;

(*b*) a body responsible for analysing choices of armaments programmes and their overall financial, technical, economic and social repercussions;

(*c*) appropriate customs legislation for transfers of armaments between Western European states;

(*d*) appropriate legislation for transnational bodies producing armaments;

(*e*) legislation designed to promote exchanges of technology between European industries;

(*f*) legislation and effective action against the illicit production of and traffic in armaments;

3. Encourage all member states to co-operate by communicating all the information needed to facilitate this work;

4. Re-examine and explain the positions expressed in paragraph 4 of its replies to Recommendations 325 and 331 and inform the Assembly of developments in the work of the IEPG as it undertook to do in its reply to Recommendation 298.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 3rd December 1979 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Fifth Ordinary Session (9th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. van Waterschoot on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 819).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL[1]

to Recommendation 337

1. The Council agree that all efforts should be made to promote co-operation in the defence equipment field and to exploit suitable opportunities in the interests of member countries.

2 (*a*) All members of WEU contribute, together with the five other members of the group, to the annual IEPG equipment replacement schedule. By cataloguing replacement intentions for a period of some fifteen years ahead this provides a comprehensive description of the demand side of the European armaments market. On the supply side mention should be made of the SAC's continuing work in this direction and of the studies undertaken in the IEPG Panel III. However, the present system of armaments co-operation in Europe is a sequential process in which matching national requirements (demands) are considered against production possibilities (supplies) in participating countries or elsewhere. " Supply " in this context is a complex matter since substantial development work and new production investment are required for many modern weapons. The Council do not consider that the cause of equipment co-operation would in practice be greatly advanced by formalising the collection of " supply " information through an international organisation.

2 (*b*) There are formidable theoretical and practical difficulties in devising methods suitable to the needs of different governments for analysing choices of international armaments programmes from even the most comprehensive information. The technical, economic and social issues are very complex, and the nature of national interests involved do not lend themselves to uniform evaluation. Collective international analysis of such information, leading to agreed conclusions which are capable of implementation, is unlikely to be feasible at present. Furthermore, compromises on national equipment requirements are often necessary to secure agreement in collaborative projects: national governments alone have to take the decisions. The Council are doubtful of the value of creating further international machinery to supplement national policy makers' analysis of alternative methods of meeting equipment needs.

2 (*c*) No customs duties are payable on the transfer of armaments or any other manufactured goods between WEU countries, or other EEC states.

2 (*d*) The Council do not believe that specific legislation is required to facilitate the formation of transnational bodies producing armaments. As the Assembly is aware, several consortia, such as Euromissile and Panavia, already exist. Moreover, in the Council's view, legislation governing international bodies producing armaments should not be separated from the general body of national and EEC company law.

2 (*e*) The Council do not believe that transfer of technology between industries in member states of WEU can be significantly improved by legislation. In their view the primary requirement is the agreement of acceptable transfer terms within specific projects.

2 (*f*) Sharing the concern expressed by the Assembly, the Council agree that every effort should continue to be made to halt the illegal trading of arms.

3. The WEU Council are not empowered to make any statement to the Assembly on behalf of the IEPG, but will continue to encourage appropriate exchanges of information. There are five members of the IEPG who are not members of WEU. Formally therefore the making of a report on its activities to the WEU Assembly is a matter for the Chairman and wider membership of the IEPG to consider. It is, however, open to members of the Assembly to question their own governments about developments in the IEPG through their national parliaments.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 12th March 1980.

RECOMMENDATION 338 [1]

on the definition of armaments requirements and procurement in Western Europe [2]

The Assembly,

Stressing the important rôle it can play in ensuring parliamentary supervision at European level of collective defence arrangements of the Alliance;

Considering the proceedings of the recent symposium on a European armaments policy, and in particular its Working Group I;

Expressing its thanks to all authors of papers and Rapporteurs who contributed to its success,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member governments:

1. To encourage, through their defence procurement policies, the restructuring of the European armaments industry through the creation of permanent international consortia in Europe leading eventually to fully European corporations for the production of the more sophisticated defence equipment;

2. (*a*) To foster a policy of European preference for bi- or multilateral European defence equipment projects duly examined by the IEPG;

(*b*) To foster creation of an Alliance-wide market for defence equipment so that dependence upon exports to third countries can be reduced;

3. (*a*) To keep their national parliamentary defence committees fully informed about future national and allied defence equipment requirements and projects, in particular through the communication to them of the equipment replacement schedules prepared by Panel I of the IEPG and completed by the Conference of National Armaments Directors;

(*b*) To request the Chairman of Panel I to communicate these schedules to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments of the WEU Assembly.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 3rd December 1979 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Fifth Ordinary Session (9th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Meintz on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 821).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL[1]

to Recommendation 338

1. The Council consider that the creation of a number of international consortia for the production of defence equipment has been a useful contribution to a better organisation of armaments co-operation in Europe. In order to preserve the technological know-how and experience in management techniques gained by such co-operation when a continuing need is foreseen, these consortia, which might be opened to firms from other member countries, should be encouraged to bid for further co-operative projects and to adopt an appropriate structure; this would not of itself rule out the possibility of competition. Successful projects, such as the production of the Hot, Milan and Roland missiles and the Tornado aircraft clearly point the way to this new form of co-operation. The Council are of the opinion that if, in the context of their efforts towards harmonisation, member countries reach agreement on common requirements, this may stimulate the formation of such international consortia. Such agreement would provide opportunities for the industries to try to meet those common requirements by proposals for producing the necessary equipment jointly. It should nevertheless be left to the industries concerned to organise themselves and to choose the type of co-operation which best suits their requirements.

Although the Assembly recommendation and the points made in the previous paragraph primarily concern European armaments industries, the Council observe that this form of co-operation does not exclude joint production by European and North American firms together.

2(*a*) As the Assembly is aware, the member states of IEPG already undertook at the meeting of Armaments Directors in September 1977 to give preference to future collaborative equipment selected for production in the framework of the IEPG rather than non-European equipment in competition. The countries represented in the IEPG agreed not to depart from this preference unless for overriding reasons, particularly performance, price and delivery date.

2(*b*) The Council are fully aware of the advantages of an Alliance-wide market for defence equipment. Much work is this respect has already been done. Already in 1975, in this spirit, two member countries which had developed the Roland weapons system, granted the licence for that system to the United States on favourable terms. Furthermore, the proposals forwarded to CNAD by the United States representative constitute in the opinion of the Council a significant step towards achieving the goal of greater co-operation within the Alliance and a " two-way street " in defence equipment with the United States insofar as this is consistent with the guidelines recalled in paragraph 2(*a*) above. In this respect, it may be recalled that the member countries of the IEPG have given a favourable reception to the proposals mentioned above, which are designed to bring about an Alliance-wide co-operation in the defence equipment field through bilateral memoranda of understanding, dual production of defence equipment and the concept of families of weapons. Greater co-operation between the allies and a better division of the production of defence equipment will indeed reduce the economic importance of exports to third countries, a consideration which certainly has the sympathy of the Council.

3(*a*) As stated by the Council in their reply to Assembly Recommendation 333, paragraph A, national parliamentary defence committees are generally kept informed on national defence budgets. However, it should be left to the governments of individual member states to decide within the context of existing national laws and procedures to what extent detailed information can be given about future national defence equipment requirements. The annual equipment replacement schedules prepared by the IEPG and completed by CNAD, which bring together the equipment requirements of the Alliance as a whole, and, as a consequence, contain very sensitive information, are classified " confidential ", and the Council are not in a position to request member governments to communicate these documents to national defence committees.

3(*b*) For the same reasons, the Council see no possibility of requesting the Chairman of Panel I of the IEPG to communicate these schedules to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments of the Assembly. The Council, though fully appreciating the wish of the Assembly to be kept informed, cannot ignore the difficulties encountered by some countries which are members of the IEPG, but not of WEU with regard to informing the Assembly or its Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments about the work undertaken by the IEPG and consequently have to leave it to the member governments to brief their national delegates on IEPG activities.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 30th April 1980.

RECOMMENDATION 339 [1]

on the industrial bases of European security – guidelines drawn from the symposium on 15th, 16th and 17th October 1979 [2]

The Assembly,

Considering that only governments can give the necessary impetus to joint European armaments production and procurement;

Regretting the failure in the mid-1960s and mid-1970s to agree on a joint concept for a European battle tank;

Aware of the risk that if discussions on the future combat aircraft are too protracted, European nations might be forced, for reasons of a credible defence, to buy a ready-made American aircraft such as the Northrop F-18L;

Considering the serious crisis in the European ship-building industries and the possible technological decline as a result;

Welcoming the achievements of existing co-operation in the manufacture of missiles;

Aware that in tele-informatics – telecommunications, computers, advanced components and data banks – European industry is largely being outsold by the Americans and Japanese;

Recalling that WEU is the only European organisation with defence and armaments responsibilities,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Invite member governments:

1. To promote a continuous dialogue between their commanders-in-chief, lower echelon commanders, armaments directors and industrialists in the most suitable framework, and related to the Independent European Programme Group insofar as this is compatible with the Atlantic Alliance ;

2. To start discussions now on the battle tank of the 1990s;

3. To bring to a successful conclusion without delay discussions on the successor, for the 1990s, to the Franco-British Jaguar, the F-4F Phantom of the Federal German air force and the further development of the British Harrier;

4. To maintain Europe's warship building capability, to agree on the production of interchangeable components and to promote containerisation;

5. To continue European co-operation in the production of missiles and to promote specialisation by ordering several versions of the same type of missile;

6. To promote greater standardisation of telecommunications equipment and to create a joint integrated digital system for the new command communications which are to be developed;

7. To pursue research and development in such branches of advanced technology as integrated circuits, microprocessors, radar systems, lasers and infrared sensors for weapons systems;

8. To afford support to co-operation in their countries by maintaining existing structures, particularly in the form of permanent European consortia and, whenever possible, by setting up new ones.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 3rd December 1979 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Fifth Ordinary Session (9th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by MM. Onslow and Valleix on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 823).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL[1]

to Recommendation 339

The Council welcome the interest which the Assembly as the only European assembly with defence responsibilities, takes in the future of the European industries and of the co-operation which must be established between them.

1. With regard to the framework and form of such co-operation, they consider that the most effective use should be made of existing machinery for concerting measures in the armaments field, in particular the IEPG and the Conference of National Armaments Directors. This co-operation, which involves many interests, is a complicated, large-scale undertaking.

2. The Assembly will be aware that, in the spirit of its recommendation, the French and German Governments have recently decided to develop jointly a battle tank for the 1990s and that other countries have expressed interest in this programme.

3. The IEPG is currently examining the problems connected with the future combat aircraft which is also the subject of intense tripartite discussions between the French, German and United Kingdom Governments. The Council share the Assembly's concern that these efforts to co-operate should produce European successors for the Jaguar, Harrier and Phantom F-4F.

4. The position of the European shipbuilding industries is a matter for concern but this state of affairs is not confined to Europe. The production of interchangeable components and standardisation would be very difficult in practice, firstly, because warships are not mass-produced and secondly, because they vary considerably in both design and type of service from country to country. In this particular field individual economic problems add further to the differences between states and supply and demand vary in the same way.

5. Co-operation on missiles through bilateral programmes or the Euromissile consortium is already producing very satisfactory results. The expediency of producing several versions of the same missile must be dictated by the operational requirements of the different armed forces; these requirements are taken into account, together with a number of constraints, particularly of a financial nature. The necessary choices must therefore be based on the findings of studies on the subject.

6. The Council are aware of the military requirements for joint communications in the field of command and control. On this point, as on the subject of advanced technology, it should be noted that several member countries of WEU have industries capable of competing with the industries named by the Assembly in the fields of telecommunications and lasers for example. However, the Council are not convinced that the standardisation of telecommunications equipment would help, in the immediate future, to promote the European equipment which they have already declared to be necessary. Governments are aware of the importance for the future of the armaments industries of mastering these techniques in a European context and of what has to be done to achieve this.

7. The creation of consortia forms the subject of Recommandation 338 to which the Council have replied separately.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 30th April 1980.

RECOMMENDATION 340 [1]

on improving the status of WEU staff [2]

The Assembly,

Welcoming the decision of the councils of the co-ordinated organisations to grant a reversionary pension to widowers of female staff in the same conditions as for widows of male staff;

Considering that the establishment of a single appeals board would be the logical follow-up to the establishment of a joint section for the administration of pensions;

Again regretting that the Council has still not answered the Assembly's recommendation to set up a committee of senior experts to plan and promote a personnel policy,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

I. Promote in the framework of the co-ordinated organisations*:

1. The creation of a single appeals board as soon as possible;

2. The creation before 1983 of a joint body for the administration of pensions for staff of the co-ordinated organisations;

3. The establishment of a committee of senior experts to plan and promote a personnel policy and in particular:
   - to review the structure of grades;
   - to study the possibility of introducing a dual grading system at every level of the hierarchy;
   - to study the type and length of contracts;
   - to co-ordinate staff rules;
   - to review the indemnity for loss of job;
   - to study methods of transferring an official from one co-ordinated organisation to another;
   - to make clear the financial consequences of their proposals;

II. Invite the Secretary-General to inform WEU officials of all staff vacancies so that they may take advantage of all possibilities for promotion which may arise within the organisation.

* OECD, NATO, WEU, Council of Europe, ESA.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1979 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Fifth Ordinary Session (11th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Kershaw on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration (Document 824).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL [1]

to Recommendation 340

Member governments have always been concerned that the pension scheme should be applied with maximum uniformity in all the co-ordinated organisations.

I. 1 and 2. However, the creation of a single appeals board specifically to deal with matters concerning pensions would only be feasible if the joint pensions administrative section were to be given the power to take decisions.

As it is, this body which started its operational work on 1st January 1980 and was set up with a view to achieving maximum uniformity in the implementation of the pension scheme is only an advisory body to the co-ordinated organisations. It should be noted therefore that final responsibility for the uniform application, entitlement and subsequent payment of pensions rests with each organisation and its Secretary/Director-General.

Commensurate therefore with the responsibility of each Secretary-General and each autonomous organisation is the institution of an appeals board for each of those organisations with responsibilities covering all appeals arising out of the application of the staff rules.

The creation of a single appeals board to deal with pension matters and, even more, the establishment of a joint body for the administration of pensions as a legal entity could, in the interests of the staff, only be considered and gone into after an adequate running-in period – the length of which cannot be assessed at this stage – and in the light of experience.

Whilst not rejecting the idea of developments along the lines suggested by the Assembly, the Council therefore feel that any initiative of this nature would, in present circumstances, be premature. In this context it is recalled however that the Co-ordinating Committee, in its 149th report, recommended that a system of mutual information and concertation should be established among the appeals boards of the co-ordinated organisations in order to avoid their reaching different decisions regarding similar cases.

3. The Council have considered the possibility of setting up a committee of senior experts, but have come to the conclusion that the problems which such a group of experts would be qualified to consider should be discussed beforehand between the co-ordinated organisations themselves and, in the framework of the Co-ordinating Committee, with experts from the member governments.

Certain co-ordinating agencies are looking at the problem and any conclusions which may emerge from this consultation should be awaited.

In these circumstances, the Council recognise that the specific problems listed by the Assembly in point I.3. of its recommendation should receive the attention of the organisation and, in particular, of its Secretary-General:

(*a*) With regard to the grading system and the introduction of a dual grading system the problems are still under consideration at the administrative level.

(*b*) The staff rules of each of the organisations contain many provisions, in particular regarding types and duration of contracts, which all have to take into account the specific circumstances of each organisation; nevertheless, those responsible within the organisation make every effort to harmonise these provisions wherever possible.

(*c*) The Council consider that the indemnity for loss of job is satisfactorily dealt with by the staff rules, particularly for staff members with long service in the organisation.

(*d*) The methods of transferring an official from one co-ordinated organisation to another are governed by both the staff rules and the pension scheme rules of each of the organisations concerned; as far as the Council are aware, this problem has given rise to little difficulty; only experience will show whether it will be possible in the future to consider simplifying these rules.

II. The Council can inform the Assembly that the Secretary-General has taken all the necessary measures to ensure that all members of staff are informed of vacancies within the organisation. It should be recalled in this connection that WEU policy is to take account first of the possibilities for promotion within the organisation, before turning to the other co-ordinated organisations and, finally, to the open market. Moreover, selection of candidates is made in such a way that, as vacancies are filled, equitable proportions of nationals of the member states are observed, although this rule is not applied with such mathematical rigidity as to impair its implementation.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 14th May 1980.

RECOMMENDATION 341 [1]

on the impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security [2]

The Assembly,

Considering that the maintenance of peace in the Near and Middle East is essential for Western Europe's security and economic prosperity;

Regretting that Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, far from establishing internal peace, political stability and a resumption of economic activity in that country, has led to intercommunal and religious strife and created yet another difficult refugee problem;

Considering that the upheaval in Iran in 1978, inspired by revolutionary principles, has further delayed the introduction of democracy and the restoration of national unity;

Concerned that by taking and detaining employees of the United States Embassy, in violation of all principles of international law, Iran may endanger world peace;

Noting that the Camp David agreements, while establishing peace between Israel and Egypt, have so far provided no solution to the main problems in the Middle East, especially the Palestine question;

Considering that solutions which exclude participation by the Palestinian people do not offer them the possibility of exercising their right to self-determination and militate against the underlying causes of the conflict;

Considering that the positions adopted by Jordan and expressed by His Majesty King Hussein in the United Nations on 25th September 1979 constitute a positive step towards peace;

Deploring that the continuing establishment of Israeli settlements on the West Bank only makes more difficult a just and lasting solution to the Palestinian problem;

Welcoming the fact that the Nine have been able to speak with a single voice on Middle Eastern matters on several occasions, particularly on 25th September 1979 in the United Nations General Assembly,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Either directly or where more appropriate indirectly through the participation of its membership in European political co-operation among the Nine, ensure that consultation between its members is extended to cover matters relating to Afghanistan and Iran ;

2. Ensure that its members refrain from selling arms to Iran as long as internal strife and armed repression continue in that country and call upon all other arms-supplying countries to impose a similar moratorium;

3. Ask Iran to free immediately the hostages held in the United States Embassy;

4. Continue to co-ordinate the positions of its members in the United Nations and call for a clarification from the Security Council of the actual implications of Resolution 242;

5. Ask Egypt, Israel and the United States urgently to consult with a view to reaching agreement on a mutually accepted interpretation of the implications of the Camp David agreements;

6. Ask its members to urge Israel immediately to accept the existence of the Palestinian people and to renounce its policy of settlements on the West Bank and commence negotiations with valid

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1979 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Fifth Ordinary Session (11th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 820).

Palestinian representatives to achieve self-determination, including the inhabitants of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip;

7. Ask its members to urge the PLO, also immediately, to declare its acceptance of an independent Israeli state within internationally agreed and defined borders;

8. Ask its members to urge upon both sides a total abandonment of all acts of violence, which call into question the validity of any such declarations;

9. Use its best endeavours, if these preconditions are met, to promote a broader-based conference than Camp David including representation from all the countries directly involved in the Palestinian dispute.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL[1]

to Recommendation 341

1. The Nine stated their views on Afghanistan on 15th January, 5th February and, through the chair, on 19th February 1980.

As regards Iran, the heads of state and government and the foreign ministers of the Nine stated their views on 30th November 1979. The ambassadors of the Nine in Tehran have remained in very active and close consultation since the start of the crisis.

2. Also as regards Iran, the Council condemn the taking as hostages of members of the staff of the United States Embassy in Tehran, contrary to international practice and law, and call urgently on the Iranian Government to put an end to this situation immediately. They recall that the governments of member states have supported all moves, both in the United Nations Security Council and in the European Communities, to secure the immediate and unconditional release of these hostages.

Accordingly, the Council recommend that until such time as the hostages are actually released, member states should refrain from selling arms to Iran, provided this kind of sanction is effectively applied by the United States Government itself. The Council have no knowledge that member states are at present delivering armaments to Iran.

In any case, the Council do not intend to express an opinion on the strictly internal aspects of the Iranian revolution.

3. As regards the Middle East conflict, the Council recall the position adopted by each of the member states and formulated in agreed terms by the nine countries of the European Community, as in fact mentioned in Recommendation 341.

The Council agree with the Assembly that a just and lasting peace can be established only on the basis of a comprehensive settlement in accordance with Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and on :

- the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force ;
- the need for Israel to end the territorial occupation which it has maintained since the conflict of 1967 ;
- respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries ;
- recognition that in the establishment of a just and lasting peace account must be taken of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians, including their right to a homeland.

The Council recall the terms of the statement issued by the Nine on 18th June 1979 deploring " any action or statement which could constitute an obstacle to the pursuit of peace " and, in particular, Israel's claim to eventual sovereignty over the occupied territories and its policy of establishing settlements.

They consider that all the parties involved should be called on to participate in working out and implementing such a settlement, and in particular the Palestinian people who, as the Chairman of the Nine declared at the last General Assembly of the United Nations, " are entitled within the framework set by a peace settlement, to exercise their right to determine their future as a people " and, through their representatives, to play their full part in the negotiations.

The Council note that the member states are determined to continue their efforts to further the search for an overall settlement of the Middle East conflict.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 26th March 1980.

RECOMMENDATION 342 [1]

on the situation in Iran [2]

The Assembly,

Considering that the detention of members of the United States Embassy in Tehran constitutes an unacceptable violation of international law and a dangerous precedent for the maintenance of peace;

Expressing its deep sympathy and solidarity with the government and people of the United States in the emergency thus created;

Considering the grave economic and strategic consequences which the events now occurring in Iran could entail for European security;

Noting that the heads of state and government of the member states, meeting in Dublin in the framework of the European Council on 29th and 30th November, issued a statement concerning the situation in Iran,

RECOMMENDS TO THE COUNCIL

1. That it draw urgently to the attention of the governments of the member states the Assembly's support for the European Council's declaration;

2. That the consultations should take place either within the framework of the WEU Council or, where more appropriate, through the participation of its members in European political co-operation among the Nine to determine action on this problem.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 5th December 1979 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Fifth Ordinary Session (12th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the draft recommendation tabled by Mr. Grieve on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 830).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL[1]

to Recommendation 342

As the Chairman-in-Office, Mr. Thorn, stated when addressing the Assembly on 5th December 1979, the Council fully appreciate the concern expressed by the Assembly regarding the situation in Iran.

The Council have drawn the attention of member governments of WEU to the support given by the Assembly to the declaration adopted by the European Council at its meeting held in Dublin on 29th and 30th November 1979. They note, further, that a resolution was unanimously adopted by the United Nations Security Council on 4th December 1979, and has the full support of all member states of WEU.

For the future, member states will continue their consultations in any appropriate frameworks.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 20th December 1979.

RECOMMENDATION 343 [1]

on Arctic technology [2]

The Assembly,

Considering that the peoples of the world are justified in examining the use of the earth's natural resources with due regard for the political, technological, economic and ecological implications;

Aware that decisions on exploration and exploitation can be taken only after solutions have been found to human and technological problems in the polar regions;

Conscious of the sustained efforts of the Soviet Union and the United States in this field compared to the lack of progress by the Western European countries in spite of their early start and wide experience of polar technology in the past;

Aware that the WEU member countries have already worked with the Soviet Union and the United States in the framework of the Antarctic Treaty and on certain specified subjects, and would welcome help and assistance from these countries and closer liaison in this field of activity between the USSR, the United States and the WEU member countries;

Considering that several European countries and industries, working in collaboration, have gained vast experience of various aspects of offshore technology;

Considering the Antarctic Treaty to be an excellent example of an actively applied treaty for ensuring and verifying a weapons-free area and therefore of major significance for WEU member countries;

Considering the present state of the Law of the Sea Conference and its possible conclusion in the early 1980s,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Draw the attention of member governments to the need for a wide-ranging programme of collaboration in Western Europe for the development of Arctic technology;

2. Invite member governments:

(*a*) to ensure that Europe plays its part in developing the polar regions;

(*b*) To welcome and support the draft convention on the conservation of Antartic marine living resources;

(*c*) to make every effort to ensure that the content of the Antartic Treaty is not changed, distorted of prematurely terminated at the Law of the Sea Conference, thus preserving an important treaty which ensures and allows verification of a weapons-free area;

(*d*) to adopt a common position at meetings of Antartic Treaty member states dealing with the exploration for and exploitation of mineral and fish resources.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 5th December 1979 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Fifth Ordinary Session (13th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Spies von Büllesheim on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 822).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL [1]

to Recommendation 343

1. The Council, who have carefully considered this recommendation, welcome the constructive manner in which it draws attention to the opportunities for economic activity in both polar regions and supports the Antarctic Treaty system as well as the work of member governments who participate in the Antarctic Treaty.

2. The Assembly will be aware that in many ways the Arctic and Antarctic are the antithesis of one another. Geographically the Arctic is an ocean, covered for the most part with pack ice about two metres thick, practically surrounded by continental land masses, large areas of which are subject to seasonally severe Arctic environmental conditions. The Antarctic is a continent, all but 5 % of which is covered by a continental ice sheet up to four kilometres in thickness, entirely surrounded by a vast ocean, large areas of which are encumbered with icebergs and seasonally fluctuating sea ice.

3. The pace and direction of economic developments in the Arctic, both on shore and within the maritime jurisdiction of the Arctic Ocean littoral states, is very much a matter for the individual states to decide subject of course to the provisions of existing treaties, such as the Spitzbergen Treaty, which have special bearing on some parts of the area. The Council are aware that developments in the Arctic Ocean, particularly those related to oil exploitation, could have environmental effects of consequence far beyond the borders of the Arctic and express the hope that this consideration will be constantly borne in mind in reaching decisions about such developments. Nevertheless, the member governments will bear in mind that future developments in the Arctic may well be such as would indicate the desirability of closer collaboration both between themselves and between them and the Arctic littoral states.

4. In the Antarctic some member governments take the view that economic developments are subject to the same underlying considerations as in the Arctic; other member governments do not agree with this view. This difference of view did not prevent three member governments (of Belgium, France and the United Kingdom) from participating in the initiative which led to the Antarctic Treaty of 1959. The treaty, which was the first to denuclearise a specific region, has not only maintained the peace in the area but has also nurtured scientific research of importance to the whole world and taken initiatives such as the agreed measures for the conservation of Antarctic fauna and flora and the convention for the conservation of Antarctic seals which have ensured that potential threats to parts of the Antarctic ecosystem were dealt with before they became real. In this connection the Council are glad to note the Assembly's welcome and support for the draft convention for the conservation of Antarctic marine living resources which it is hoped will ensure the conservation of the Antarctic marine ecosystem as a whole in a manner acceptable to all member countries of the organisation. This convention aims at the conservation of the living resources of the Antarctic in a manner which is in accord with the world conservation strategy recently communicated to governments by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources.

5. In relation to non-living resources, the consultative parties to the Antarctic Treaty are engaged in exploratory discussions of arrangements under which it might be possible for Antarctic minerals to be exploited (if any in commercial quantity are found) in a manner consistent with the care which these states have extended to the Antarctic environment. The Council are aware that the exploitation of non-living resources in the Antarctic could have consequences both in the Antarctic ecosystem and far beyond it and thus is a matter of concern also to states other than the consultative parties to the Antarctic Treaty.

6. In the Council's opinion, there should be no conflict between a future law of the sea convention and the Antarctic Treaty system. Indeed, Article VI of the treaty, which specifies that its provisions apply to the area south of 60° south latitude stipulates that " nothing in the present treaty shall prejudice or in any way affect the rights, or the exercise of the rights, of any state under international law with regard to the high seas within the area ". Consequently, if the Law of the Sea Conference reaches an agreement setting up an international authority for the exploitation of the

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 27th May 1980.

seabed, the sphere of competence of that authority will, by virtue of the provisions of the Antarctic Treaty itself, include the seabed to the south of the 60th parallel lying beyond the outer limit of the continental shelf. None of the provisions of the " unofficial negotiating text " on which the work of the conference is based refers to the Antarctic.

7. The member governments who are also consultative parties to the Antarctic Treaty, have shown their practical willingness to adopt positions which have given rise to a unique set of recommendations on matters of common concern to them in the Antarctic.

RECOMMENDATION 344 [1]

on Brazilian-European collaborative ventures and the consequences for Europe [2]

The Assembly,

Considering the wishes expressed by the Brazilian Senate and Government officials to strengthen scientific and technological co-operation between Brazil and the countries of Western Europe;

Convinced that greater international co-operation in advanced technology can but be beneficial for both Brazil and the countries of Western Europe and will help to advance their political and economic positions;

Aware that in recent years Brazil has advanced more quickly than some Western European countries in finding alternative energy resources;

Impressed by the progress of technical development plans in Brazil concerning meteorology and communications;

Conscious of the mutual advantages of collaboration between Brazil and Western Europe in:

(*a*) nuclear research and development;

(*b*) alternative energy resources;

(*c*) space research and development;

(*d*) aircraft development,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Invite member governments:

1. To improve European co-ordination in respect of existing nuclear research and development programmes in Brazil, with special emphasis on safeguards against the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and on security and safety problems;

2. To co-operate with the Brazilian Government on alternative energy resources;

3. To instruct the European Space Agency to develop closer relations with Brazil with a view to concluding a co-operation agreement with particular regard to the joint use of launch and tracking facilities and the development of remote sensing and direct television satellites;

4. To encourage industrial collaboration with Brazil in developing its next generation of aircraft;

5. To increase exchanges of experts with Brazil in the field of research and the application of technology.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 6th December 1979 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Fifth Ordinary Session (14th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by MM. Lewis, Adriaensens, Scheffler and Cornelissen on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 817).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL[1]

to Recommendation 344

The Council consider that economic, scientific and technical co-operation between Brazil and the member countries of Western European Union should be developed, with the additional purpose of strengthening the political links between Europe and Latin America.

1. In the matter of scientific collaboration between Europe and Brazil on nuclear research and development, the member countries of WEU have always attached particular importance to the conduct of all international co-operation under effective safeguards against the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and appropriate levels of physical protection and standards of safety. Regardless of whether they are parties to the non-proliferation treaty or not the member countries of WEU accept IAEA (and where appropriate Euratom) safeguards, and almost all of them have unilaterally undertaken to base their policies on the guidelines agreed between the principal nuclear exporting countries circulated in the IAEA document INFCIRC/254. These considerations are already being scrupulously observed by those member countries of WEU which are already co-operating with Brazil in the development of her nuclear energy programme. They will in future be followed by other member countries which may collaborate with her for exclusively peaceful and non-explosive purposes on a non-discriminatory basis.

2. In view of the notable progress achieved by Brazil with alternative energy resources, the Council are of the opinion that co-operation with Brazil in the field should be increased. Some specific developments such as the Brazilian " gasohol " project are of immediate interest to Europe and are being followed with the closest attention.

3. The European Space Agency should strengthen collaboration with Brazil with a view to establishing patterns of co-operation and further exchanges of information between European countries and Brazil on the use of the most advanced space technologies including telecommunications and remote sensing technology.

4. As regards industrial collaboration in the aircraft sector, the Council believe that there are many interesting prospects in this direction. The Brazilian state aircraft corporation – Empresa Brasileira de Aeronautica SA (EMBRAER) – has in recent years increased its output considerably and is seeking co-operation with the European countries with a view to improving the next generation of civilian and military aircraft. The long-established co-operation between the Brazilian industry and the aircraft industries of the WEU countries offers considerable scope for further development.

5. Finally the Council believe that relations in the field of research and the application of technology should be strengthened, so that increasingly profitable exchanges of experts and transfers of technical knowledge between the two geographical areas can be developed.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 26th March 1980.

The northern flank and the Atlantic and Channel commands

PREVIOUS QUESTION[1]

moved by Mr. Boucheny and others under Rule 32 of the Rules of Procedure

The Assembly,

Considering that the modified Brussels Treaty commits it to respect the ideals proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations and particularly the sovereignty and independence of the nations it represents;

Deploring that one of the aims of the report presented by Mr. Ahrens on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments is to bring French naval forces back into the NATO integrated command, at the same time increasing West German naval intervention capabilities;

Recalling that in 1966 the Government of the French Republic took the sovereign decision to resume full control of its military means;

Condemning any attempt to question the freedom of action and of decision of the European states;

Emphasising that the report by Mr. Ahrens might call in question the special status of Norway and Denmark in respect of the holding and stockpiling of nuclear weapons and seeks to constitute, under the aegis of the United States, a European military bloc directed against the Soviet Union,

DECIDES that there are no grounds for debating the draft recommendation on the northern flank and the Atlantic and Channel commands.

Signed: Boucheny, Depietri, Visse, Deschamps, Wargnies

1. See 6th Sitting, 4th June 1980 (Previous question negatived).

FD IMPRIMERIE ALENÇONNAISE
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Dépôt légal : 3e trimestre 1980
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