

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

PROCEEDINGS

THIRTY-FIRST ORDINARY SESSION

FIRST PART

May 1985

II

Minutes
Official Report of Debates

WEU

PARIS

202.1.22

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II

Minutes
Official Report of Debates

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The proceedings of the first part of the thirty-first ordinary session of the Assembly of WEU
comprise two volumes :

Volume I : Assembly documents.

Volume II : Orders of the day and minutes of proceedings, official report of debates, general
index.

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LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

BELGIUM

Representatives

MM. ADRIAENSSENS Hugo	SP	
BOGAERTS August	SP	
DE DECKER Armand	PRL	
DEJARDIN Claude	PS	
MICHEL Joseph	PSC	
NOERENS René	PVV	
Mrs. STAELS-DOMPAS Nora	CVP	

Substitutes

MM. BIEFNOT Yvon	PS	
BONNEL Raoul	PVV	
DE BONDT Ferdinand	CVP	
LAGNEAU André	PRL	
PECRIAUX Nestor	PS	
STEVERLYNCK Antoon	CVP	
VAN DER ELST Frans	VU	

FRANCE

Representatives

MM. BASSINET Philippe	Socialist	
BAUMEL Jacques	RPR	
BEIX Roland	Socialist	
BERRIER Noël	Socialist	
BOURGES Yvon	RPR	
CARO Jean-Marie	UDF-CDS	
President of the Assembly		
FOURRE Jean-Pierre	Socialist	
JEAMBRUN Pierre	Dem. Left	
JUNG Louis	UCDP	
LAGORGE Pierre	Socialist	
MAYOUD Alain	UDF	
PIGNION Lucien	Socialist	
RUET Roland	Ind. Rep.	
SENES Gilbert	Socialist	
VALLEIX Jean	RPR	
VIAL-MASSAT Théo	Communist	
WILQUIN Claude	Socialist	
WIRTH Frédéric	UCDP	

Substitutes

MM. BARTHE Jean-Jacques	Communist	
BOHL André	UCDP	
CROZE Pierre	Ind. Rep.	
DELEHEDDE André	Socialist	
DHAILLE Paul	Socialist	
DREYFUS-SCHMIDT Michel	Socialist	

MM. GALLEY Robert	RPR	
GRUSSENMEYER François	RPR	
HUYGHUES des ETAGES Jacques	Socialist	
KOEHL Emile	UDF	
MATRAJA Pierre	Socialist	
MERCIER Jean	Dem. Left	
NATIEZ Jean	Socialist	
OEHLEL Jean-André	Socialist	
PROUVOST Pierre	Socialist	
ROSSINOT André	UDF	
SOUVET Louis	RPR	
VERDON Marc	Socialist	

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Representatives

MM. AHRENS Karl	SPD	
ANTRETTNER Robert	SPD	
BÖHM Wilfried	CDU/CSU	
ENDERS Wendelin	SPD	
GERSTL Friedrich	SPD	
HAASE Horst	SPD	
HORNHUES Karl-Heinz	CDU/CSU	
Mrs. KELLY Petra	Die Grünen	
MM. KITTELMANN Peter	CDU/CSU	
MÜLLER Günther	CDU/CSU	
NEUMANN Volker	SPD	
REDDEMANN Gerhard	CDU/CSU	
RUMPF Wolfgang	FDP	
SCHULTE Manfred	SPD	
SCHWARZ Heinz	CDU/CSU	
SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM Adolf	CDU/CSU	
UNLAND Hermann Josef	CDU/CSU	
ZIERER Benno	CDU/CSU	

Substitutes

MM. BÜCHNER Peter	SPD	
ERTL Josef	FDP	
Mrs. FISCHER Leni	CDU/CSU	
MM. GANSEL Norbert	SPD	
GLOS Michael	CDU/CSU	
HACKEL Wolfgang	CDU/CSU	
HOLTZ Uwe	SPD	
HORACEK Milan	Die Grünen	
JÄGER Claus	CDU/CSU	
KLEJDZINSKI Karl-Heinz	SPD	
LEMMRICH Karl Heinz	CDU/CSU	
LENZER Christian	CDU/CSU	
SCHEER Hermann	SPD	
SCHMIDT Manfred	SPD	
SCHMITZ Hans Peter	CDU/CSU	
SOELL Hartmut	SPD	
STAVENHAGEN Lutz	CDU/CSU	
WULFF Otto	CDU/CSU	

ITALY

Representatives

MM.	AMADEI Giuseppe	PSDI
	ANTONI Varese	Communist
	BIANCO Gerardo	Chr. Dem.
	CAVALIERE Stefano	Chr. Dem.
	CIFARELLI Michele	Republican
	FERRARI AGGRADI Mario	Chr. Dem.
	FIANDROTTI Filippo	Socialist
	FRASCA Salvatore	Socialist
	GIANOTTI Lorenzo	Communist
	GIUST Bruno	Chr. Dem.
	MEZZAPEZA Pietro	Chr. Dem.
	MILANI Eliseo	PDUP
	PECCHIOLI Ugo	Communist
	RAUTI Giuseppe	MSI-DN
	RUBBI Antonio	Communist
	SARTI Adolfo	Chr. Dem.
	SINESIO Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
	VECCHIETTI Tullio	Communist

Substitutes

MM.	ACCILI Achille	Chr. Dem.
	ALBERINI Guido	Socialist
	BONALUMI Gilberto	Chr. Dem.
	COLAJANNI Napoleone	Communist
	FOSCHI Franco	Chr. Dem.
Mrs.	FRANCESE Angela	Communist
MM.	GORLA Massimo	Prol. Dem.
	LAPENTA Nicola	Chr. Dem.
	MARCHIO Michele	MSI-DN
	MARTINO Guido	Republican
	MASCIADRI Cornelio	Socialist
	MITTERDORFER Karl	SVP
	PALUMBO Vincenzo	Liberal
	POLLIDORO Carlo	Communist
	RIZZI Enrico	PSDI
	RODOTA Stefano	Ind. Left
	SPITELLA Giorgio	Chr. Dem.
	TEODORI Massimo	Radical

LUXEMBOURG

Representatives

MM.	BURGER René	Soc. Chr.
	GOERENS Charles	Dem.
	HENGEL René	Soc. Workers

Substitutes

Mrs.	HENNICOT-SCHOEPGES Erna	Soc. Chr.
MM.	KONEN René	Dem.
	LINSTER Roger	Soc. Workers

NETHERLANDS

Representatives

MM.	AARTS Harry	CDA
	van den BERGH Harry	Labour
	BLAAUW Jan Dirk	Liberal
	de KWAADSTENIET Willem	CDA
	STOFFELEN Pieter	Labour
Mrs.	van der WERF-TERPSTRA Anne Maria	CDA
Mr.	van der WERFF Ymenus	Liberal

Substitutes

Mr.	EYSINK Rudolf	CDA
Mrs.	den OUDEN-DEKKERS Greetje	Liberal
MM.	van der SANDEN Piet	CDA
	van TETS Govert	Liberal
	TUMMERS Nicolas	Labour
	de VRIES Klaas	Labour
	WORRELL Joop	Labour

UNITED KINGDOM

Representatives

Sir	Frederic BENNETT	Conservative
Mr.	Thomas COX	Labour
Sir	Geoffrey FINSBERG	Conservative
Sir	Anthony GRANT	Conservative
Mr.	Peter HARDY	Labour
Sir	Paul HAWKINS	Conservative
Mr.	James HILL	Conservative
Lord	HUGHES	Labour
MM.	Toby JESSEL	Conservative
	Russell JOHNSTON	Liberal
Mrs.	Jill KNIGHT	Conservative
Mr.	Michael McGUIRE	Labour
Dr.	Maurice MILLER	Labour
Sir	John OSBORN	Conservative
Sir	John PAGE	Conservative
Lord	REAY	Conservative
Sir	Dudley SMITH	Conservative
Mr.	John WILKINSON	Conservative

Substitutes

Mr.	David ATKINSON	Conservative
Sir	John BIGGS-DAVISON	Conservative
MM.	Robert BROWN	Labour
	Donald COLEMAN	Labour
	John CORRIE	Conservative
	Robert EDWARDS	Labour
	Reginald FREESON	Labour
	Edward GARRETT	Labour
Earl of	KINNOULL	Conservative
MM.	Bruce MILLAN	Labour
	Michael MORRIS	Conservative
	Christopher MURPHY	Conservative
Lord	NEWALL	Conservative
MM.	Robert PARRY	Labour
	Stephen ROSS	Liberal
	John STOKES	Conservative
	John WARD	Conservative
	Alec WOODALL	Labour

I

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

FIRST SITTING

Monday, 20th May 1985

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Opening of the thirty-first ordinary session of the Assembly.
2. Examination of credentials.
3. Election of the President of the Assembly.
4. Address by the President of the Assembly.
5. Election of six Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.
6. Adoption of the draft order of business for the first part of the thirty-first ordinary session (Doc. 1005).
7. Nomination of members to committees.
8. Action by the Presidential Committee (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Presidential Committee and vote on the motion for an order on the budget of the Assembly, Docs. 1017 and 1015 and amendment*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Lord Hughes, Provisional President, in the Chair.

1. Opening of the session

In accordance with Article III (a) of the Charter and Rules 2 and 5 of the Rules of Procedure, the Provisional President declared open the thirty-first ordinary session of the Assembly of WEU.

2. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

3. Address by the Provisional President

The Provisional President addressed the Assembly.

4. Examination of credentials

In accordance with Rule 6 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly took note of the letter from the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe informing the Assembly that the credentials of the representatives and substitutes listed in Notice No. 1 had been ratified by that Assembly with the exception of Mr. Horacek, substitute member for the Federal Republic of Germany.

In accordance with Rule 6 (2) of the Rules of Procedure and subject to subsequent ratification by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the Assembly unanimously ratified the credentials of the above.

5. Election of the President of the Assembly

Only one candidate was proposed for the post of President, namely Mr. Caro.

The Assembly decided unanimously not to have a secret ballot but to elect the President by acclamation.

Mr. Caro was elected President by acclamation.

At the invitation of the Provisional President, Mr. Caro took the Chair.

6. Address by the President of the Assembly

The President addressed the Assembly.

7. Election of six Vice-Presidents of the Assembly

Six candidates had been proposed for six posts of Vice-President, namely Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Blaauw, De Decker, Ferrari Aggradi, Goerens and Reddemann.

The Assembly decided not to have a secret ballot but to elect the Vice-Presidents by acclamation.

Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Reddemann, Blaauw, De Decker and Goerens were elected Vice-Presidents by acclamation.

8. Adoption of the draft order of business for the first part of the session

(Doc. 1005)

The President proposed the adoption of the draft order of business for the first part of the session.

Speakers : MM. Pignion and Schulte ; (points of order) : Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Blaauw, Spies von Büllesheim, Dreyfus-Schmidt and Stoffelen.

The draft order of business for the first part of the session was amended and adopted.

Speakers (points of order) : Dr. Miller and Mr. Milani.

9. Nomination of members to committees

In accordance with Rules 39 (6) and 42 *bis* of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly ratified the membership of the six committees as follows :

1. COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE QUESTIONS AND ARMAMENTS (27 seats)

	<i>Members</i>	<i>Alternates</i>
<i>Belgium:</i>	MM. Bonnel Dejardin Steverlynck	MM. De Decker Van der Elst Noerens
<i>France:</i>	MM. Bourges Galley Huyghues des Etages Natiez Pignion	MM. Matraja Jung Baumel Wirth Verdon
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany:</i>	MM. Ertl Gerstl Kittelmann Lemmrich Scheer	MM. Rumpf Klejdzinski Lenzer Glos Gansel
<i>Italy:</i>	MM. Alberini Amadei Giust Pecchioli Sarti	MM. Milani Cifarelli Palumbo Antoni Rauti
<i>Luxembourg:</i>	Mr. Konen	Mr. Goerens
<i>Netherlands:</i>	MM. van den Bergh Blaauw de Kwaadsteniet	MM. de Vries van Tets Aarts
<i>United Kingdom:</i>	MM. Brown Cox Sir Anthony Grant Sir Dudley Smith Mr. Stokes	Dr. Miller MM. Edwards Ross Lord Newall Mr. Wilkinson

2. GENERAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE (27 seats)

<i>Belgium:</i>	MM. Bogaerts Lagneau Michel	MM. Van der Elst Péciaux De Bondt
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	<i>Members</i>	<i>Alternates</i>
<i>France:</i>	MM. Berrier Koehl Lagorce Prouvost Ruet	MM. Baumel Dreyfus-Schmidt Mayoud Grussenmeyer Wilquin
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany:</i>	MM. Ahrens Müller Reddemann Rumpf Mrs. Kelly	MM. Haase Kittelmann Böhm Ertl Horacek
<i>Italy:</i>	MM. Bianco Martino Masciadri Spitella Vecchiatti	MM. Cavaliere Teodori Frasca Amadei Rubbi
<i>Luxembourg:</i>	Mr. Burger	Mr. Konen
<i>Netherlands:</i>	MM. van der Sanden de Vries van der Werff	Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra MM. Tummers Blaauw
<i>United Kingdom:</i>	Sir Frederic Bennett MM. Hardy Hill Johnston Lord Reay	Mrs. Knight Lord Hughes Sir John Biggs-Davison MM. Millan Atkinson

3. COMMITTEE ON SCIENTIFIC, TECHNOLOGICAL AND AEROSPACE QUESTIONS (21 seats)

<i>Belgium:</i>	Mr. Adriaensens Mrs. Staels-Dompas	MM. Biefnot De Bondt
<i>France:</i>	MM. Bassinet Fourré Souvet Valleix	MM. Lagorce Croze Barthe Galley
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany:</i>	MM. Böhm Lenzer Schmidt Spies von Büllesheim	MM. Müller Schwarz Klejdzinski Stavenhagen
<i>Italy:</i>	MM. Colajanni Fiandrotti Mezzapesa Rizzi	MM. Gianotti Masciadri Cavaliere Sarti
<i>Luxembourg:</i>	Mr. Hengel	Mr. Linster
<i>Netherlands:</i>	MM. Aarts Worrell	Mrs. den Ouden-Dekkers Mr. Tummers
<i>United Kingdom:</i>	Mr. Garrett Sir Paul Hawkins MM. McGuire Wilkinson	MM. Parry Hill Sir John Osborn Mr. Ward

*Members**Alternates*

4. COMMITTEE ON BUDGETARY AFFAIRS AND ADMINISTRATION (21 seats)

<i>Belgium:</i>	MM. Adriaensens Biefnot	MM. Steverlynck Bogaerts
<i>France:</i>	MM. Beix Bohl Jeambrun Oehler	MM. Dhaille Rossinot Delehedde Ruet
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany:</i>	MM. Enders Haase Schmitz Zierer	MM. Büchner Ahrens Hornhues Lemmrich
<i>Italy:</i>	MM. Ferrari Aggradi Foschi Pollidoro Rauti	MM. Accili Giust Alberini Mitterdorfer
<i>Luxembourg:</i>	Mr. Linster	Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges
<i>Netherlands:</i>	MM. van Tets de Vries	Mr. van den Bergh Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra
<i>United Kingdom:</i>	MM. Freeson Morris Sir Dudley Smith Mr. Stokes	MM. Woodall Johnston Sir Geoffrey Finsberg Sir Paul Hawkins

5. COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PROCEDURE AND PRIVILEGES (21 seats)

<i>Belgium:</i>	MM. Michel Péciaux	MM. Lagneau De Decker
<i>France:</i>	MM. Delehedde Koehl Vial-Massat Wilquin	MM. Sénès Beix Bohl Prouvost
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany:</i>	MM. Antretter Schulte Spies von Büllenheim Unland	MM. Büchner Schmidt Jäger Wulff
<i>Italy:</i>	MM. Antoni Gorla Lapenta Marchio	MM. Fiandrotti Sinesio Bonalumi Palumbo
<i>Luxembourg:</i>	Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges	Mr. Burger
<i>Netherlands:</i>	MM. Eysink van der Werff	MM. van der Sanden Stoffelen
<i>United Kingdom:</i>	MM. Coleman Corrie Sir Geoffrey Finsberg Mr. Woodall	MM. Jessel Cox Earl of Kinnoull Mr. Edwards

*Members**Alternates*

6. COMMITTEE FOR RELATIONS WITH PARLIAMENTS (14 seats)

<i>Belgium:</i>	MM. Bonnel Noerens	Mr. Dejardin Mrs. Staels-Dompas
<i>France:</i>	MM. Mercier Sénès	MM. Verdon Jung
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany:</i>	MM. Enders Hackel	MM. Antretter Glos
<i>Italy:</i>	MM. Cavaliere Frasca	Mr. Giust Mrs. Francese
<i>Luxembourg:</i>	Mr. Goerens Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges	MM. Hengel Linster
<i>Netherlands:</i>	Mr. Stoffelen Mrs. van der Werf- Terpstra	Mr. Eysink Mrs. den Ouden-Dekkers
<i>United Kingdom:</i>	Dr. Miller Mrs. Knight	Mr. Coleman Sir John Page

10. Action by the Presidential Committee

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Presidential Committee and vote on the motion for an order on the budget of the Assembly, Docs. 1017 and 1015 and amendment)

The report of the Presidential Committee was presented by Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, Vice-President of the Assembly.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: Sir Dudley Smith, Sir John Page, MM. Wilkinson, Murphy and Cavaliere.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, Vice-President of the Assembly, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly took note of the report of the Presidential Committee.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the motion for an order.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Ferrari Aggradi.

1. Redraft the motion for an order proper as follows :

“ To invite the Council, in the light of the above, to give favourable consideration to the proposals the Assembly is soon to make for improving its conditions of work. ”

The amendment was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended motion for an order.

The amended motion for an order was agreed to. (This order will be published as No. 59) ¹.

11. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for Tuesday, 21st May, at 10 a.m.

The sitting was closed at 5.15 p.m.

¹. See page 18.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	MM. Kittelmann Müller Reddemann Rumpf Schulte Spies von Bülesheim Unland <i>Lemmrich (Zierer)</i>	Netherlands
MM. <i>De Bondt</i> (Adriaensens) Bogaerts <i>Pécriaux</i> (Dejardin) Mrs. Staels-Dompas		MM. Aarts van den Bergh Blaauw de Kwaadsteniet Stoffelen <i>van der Sanden</i> (Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra) Mrs. <i>den Ouden-Deckers</i> (van der Werff)
France	Italy	United Kingdom
MM. Bassinet Beix Berrier Caro Fourré Lagorce Pignion Valleix <i>Dreyfus-Schmidt</i> (Wilquin)	MM. Bianco Cavaliere Cifarelli Ferrari Aggradi <i>Foschi</i> (Fiandrotti) <i>Mitterdorfer</i> (Frasca) Giust Mezzapesa Milani Rauti Sarti Sinesio Vecchietti	Sir Frederic Bennett Mr. <i>Parry</i> (Cox) Sir Geoffrey Finsberg MM. <i>Murphy</i> (Sir Anthony Grant) <i>Brown</i> (Hardy) Sir Paul Hawkins Mr. Hill Lord Hughes MM. Jessel Johnston Mrs. Knight Mr. <i>Garrett</i> (McGuire) Dr. Miller Sir John Osborn Sir John Page Lord Reay Sir Dudley Smith Mr. Wilkinson
Federal Republic of Germany	Luxembourg	
MM. <i>Gansel</i> (Ahrens) Böhm Enders Gerstl Hornhues Mrs. Kelly	Mr. <i>Linster</i> (Hengel)	

The following representatives apologised for their absence :

Belgium	MM. Mayoud Ruet Sénès Vial-Massat Wirth	Italy
MM. De Decker Michel Noerens		MM. Amadei Antoni Gianotti Pecchioli Rubbi
France	Federal Republic of Germany	Luxembourg
MM. Baumel Bourges Jeambrun Jung	MM. Antretter Haase Neumann Schwarz	MM. Burger Goerens

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

ORDER 59***on the budget of the Assembly for the financial year 1985***

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering it essential that its needs be considered in the context of the revision of the budget of the whole organisation ;
- (ii) Taking account of the urgency of the problems facing the Assembly and the time necessary for the work of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration ;
- (iii) Noting that the measures which need to be taken cannot be long delayed,

DIRECTS THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMITTEE

To invite the Council, in the light of the above, to give favourable consideration to the proposals the Assembly is soon to make for improving its conditions of work.

SECOND SITTING

Tuesday, 21st May 1985

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. East-West relations ten years after the Helsinki final act (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1013 and amendments*).
2. Cyprus and European security (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1008 and amendments*).
3. Military use of computers – reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1007*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Blaauw, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

2. Attendance register

The names of representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

3. Organisation of the work of the Assembly and of its committees

The President gave notice of a proposal by the Bureau regarding the organisation of the work of the Assembly and of its committees.

Speakers: Mr. de Vries, Sir Dudley Smith, Mr. Cifarelli, Mr. de Vries; (point of order): Mr. Jessel.

4. East-West relations ten years after the Helsinki final act

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 1013 and amendments)

The report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mr. Haase, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Bianco, Atkinson, Cifarelli, Gianotti, Müller, Lagorce, Lord Reay and Sir Frederic Bennett.

Mr. Reddemann, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Speakers: MM. Hill, Cavaliere, de Vries, Kittekmann and Johnston.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Haase, Rapporteur, and Mr. Michel, Chairman of the committee, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Lagorce:

2. After paragraph (viii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph:

“Considering that WEU’s action should allow the CSCE process to be strengthened and in particular the views of the European pillar of the alliance to be heard at the Stockholm conference on disarmament in Europe;”.

Speaker: Mr. Lagorce.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 4) was tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett and Lord Reay:

4. In the draft recommendation proper, at the end of paragraph 2(d), add “with immediate application to Afghanistan”.

Speakers: Lord Reay; (points of order): MM. de Vries and Hardy. | Consideration of the draft recommendation was adjourned.

5. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

The sitting was closed at 12.45 p.m.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance¹ :

Belgium	MM. Neumann Reddemann Rumpf Schulte <i>Hackel</i> (Schwarz) Spies von Büllesheim Unland <i>Lemmrich</i> (Zierer)	Netherlands
MM. <i>De Bondt</i> (Adriaensens) Bogaerts De Decker <i>Pécriaux</i> (Dejardin) Michel <i>Steverlynck</i> (Noerens) Mrs. Staels-Dompas		MM. Aarts <i>de Vries</i> (van den Bergh) Blaauw de Kwaadsteniet Stoffelen <i>van der Sanden</i> (Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra) Mrs. <i>den Ouden-Dekkers</i> (van der Werff)
France	Italy	United Kingdom
MM. Beix Berrier Fourré Jung Lagorce Pignion Sénès Valleix <i>Natiez</i> (Wilquin)	MM. Amadei Bianco Cavaliere Cifarelli Ferrari Aggradi <i>Martino</i> (Fiandrotti) Gianotti Giust Mezzapesa Milani Rauti Rubbi Sarti Sinesio Vecchiatti	Sir Frederic Bennett Mr. Cox Sir Geoffrey Finsberg MM. <i>Atkinson</i> (Sir Anthony Grant) Hardy Sir Paul Hawkins Mr. Hill Lord Hughes MM. <i>Morris</i> (Jessel) Johnston Mrs. Knight Mr. <i>Millan</i> (McGuire) Dr. Miller Mr. <i>Murphy</i> (Sir John Osborn) Sir John Page Lord Reay Sir Dudley Smith Lord <i>Newall</i> (Wilkinson)
Federal Republic of Germany	Luxembourg	
MM. Ahrens Antretter Böhm Enders Gerstl Haase Mrs. Kelly MM. Kittelmann Müller	MM. <i>Konen</i> (Burger) Goerens Hengel	

The following representatives apologised for their absence :

France	MM. Ruet Vial-Massat Wirth	Italy
MM. Bassinet Baumel Bourges Jeambrun Mayoud	Federal Republic of Germany	MM. Antoni Frasca Pecchioli
	Mr. Hornhues	

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

THIRD SITTING

Tuesday, 21st May 1985

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. East-West relations ten years after the Helsinki final act (*Resumed vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1013 and amendments*).
2. Address by Baroness Young, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom.
3. Cyprus and European security (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1008 and amendments*).
4. Military use of computers – reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1007 and amendment*).
5. Revision and interpretation of the Rules of Procedure – Terms of reference of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and vote on the draft resolution, Doc. 1020*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

2. Attendance register

The names of representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

Speakers (points of order): Mr. Atkinson and Mrs. Knight.

3. East-West relations ten years after the Helsinki final act

(Resumed vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1013 and amendments)

The Assembly resumed consideration of Amendment 4 tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett and Lord Reay.

Speakers: Lord Reay and Mr. Haase.

The amendment was agreed to.

Amendments (Nos. 1 and 3) were tabled by Lord Reay and Mr. Lagorce respectively:

1. At the end of paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, add:

“while bearing in mind that any reaffirmation of the non-use of force should be accompanied

by an agreed confirmation of the need to respect human rights.”

3. At the end of paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, add:

“while preparing and implementing specific mutual measures of confidence and confirming by common agreement the need to respect human rights.”

Speakers: Lord Reay, MM. Lagorce and Haase.

Amendments 1 and 3 were consolidated and agreed to.

Speaker (explanation of vote): Mr. Cifarelli.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 417)¹.

4. Address by Baroness Young, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom

Baroness Young, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, addressed the Assembly.

Baroness Young replied to questions put by Sir Dudley Smith, MM. Pignion, Cifarelli, de

¹. See page 25.

Vries, Wilkinson, Lord Reay, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, MM. Gianotti, Hardy, Scheer, De Decker and Rubbi.

5. Cyprus and European security

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1008 and amendments)

The report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Sir Frederic Bennett, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers : Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Lagorce, Sir Dudley Smith, MM. Hardy, Cavaliere, Rubbi, Cox, Corrie and Michel.

The debate was closed.

Sir Frederic Bennett, Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Rubbi :

2. In paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "to the maintenance of the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance in the Eastern Mediterranean" and insert "to the country's sovereignty and the security of the Eastern Mediterranean and of Europe".

Speakers : Mr. Rubbi, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg and Sir Frederic Bennett.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Cavaliere :

1. Redraft paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation as follows :

"Considering that the conclusions drawn by the Secretary-General of the United Nations from the negotiations held between 1977 and 1984 are the best possible basis for the restoration of national unity in Cyprus;".

Speakers : MM. Cavaliere, Corrie, Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Cavaliere and Michel.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Rubbi :

3. In paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "the restoration of peace in Cyprus" and insert "re-establishing the integrity and independence of a neutral, non-aligned Cyprus".

Speakers : Mr. Rubbi, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg and Sir Frederic Bennett.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 5) was tabled by MM. Beix and Pignion :

5. In the draft recommendation proper, leave out "the Greek, Turkish and both Cypriot authorities" and insert "the parties concerned".

Speakers : Mr. Pignion, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Pignion.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 4) was tabled by Mr. Rubbi :

4. Redraft paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation as follows :

"(iv) Wishing the two Cypriot communities to pursue their negotiations in spite of the initial setback,".

Speakers : MM. Rubbi, Corrie and Sir Frederic Bennett.

The amendment was negatived.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 418)¹.

Speaker (explanation of vote) : Mr. Rubbi.

The President welcomed Mr. Inan, observer from Turkey.

Speaker : Mr. Inan.

6. Revision and interpretation of the Rules of Procedure - Terms of reference of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments

(Presentation of the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, Doc. 1020)

The report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges was presented by Mr. Jessel, Rapporteur.

7. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for Wednesday, 22nd May, at 9.30 a.m.

The sitting was closed at 6.25 p.m.

1. See page 27.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹ :

Belgium	MM. Schulte <i>Hackel</i> (Schwarz) Spies von Büllenheim Unland	Netherlands
MM. <i>De Bondt</i> (Adriaensens) Bogaerts De Decker <i>Pécriaux</i> (Dejardin) Michel <i>Steverlynck</i> (Noerens) Mrs. Staels-Dompas	Italy	MM. Aarts <i>de Vries</i> (van den Bergh) Blaauw de Kwaadsteniet Stoffelen <i>van der Sanden</i> (Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra) Mrs. <i>den Ouden-Dekkers</i> (van der Werff)
France	MM. Amadei Bianco Cavaliere Cifarelli Ferrari Aggradi <i>Martino</i> (Fiandrotti) Gianotti Giust Mezzapesa Milani Rauti Rubbi Sarti Sinesio Vecchiatti	United Kingdom
MM. <i>Verdon</i> (Fourré) Lagorce Pignion	Luxembourg	Sir Frederic Bennett Mr. Cox Sir Geoffrey Finsberg MM. <i>Atkinson</i> (Sir Anthony Grant) Hardy <i>Stokes</i> (Sir Paul Hawkins) <i>Corrie</i> (Hill) Lord Hughes MM. Jessel Johnston Mrs. Knight Mr. <i>Brown</i> (McGuire) Dr. Miller Mr. <i>Murphy</i> (Sir John Osborn) Sir John Page Lord Reay Sir Dudley Smith Mr. Wilkinson
Federal Republic of Germany	MM. <i>Konen</i> (Burger) Goerens Hengel	
MM. Ahrens Böhm Enders Gerstl Haase Mrs. Kelly MM. Kittelmann Müller Reddemann Rumpf		

The following representatives apologised for their absence :

France	MM. Jung Mayoud Ruet Sénès Valleix Vial-Massat Wilquin Wirth	Federal Republic of Germany
MM. Bassinet Baumel Beix Berrier Bourges Jeambrun		MM. Antretter Hornhues Neumann Zierer
		Italy
		MM. Antoni Frasca Pecchioli

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 417***on East-West relations
ten years after the Helsinki final act***

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that close co-operation between the American and European members of the Atlantic Alliance is the basis of Western European security and the maintenance of peace ;
- (ii) Considering that Western Europe's security means protecting it against local or global attacks ;
- (iii) Considering that in many cases in Eastern Europe human rights have not been respected and that this has not facilitated efforts for peace ;
- (iv) Welcoming the meeting between the United States and the Soviet Union with a view to reaching agreements to terminate the armaments race ;
- (v) Considering that the development of exchanges between East and West is likely to contribute to the reduction of tension ;
- (vi) Considering that the final act of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe, signed in Helsinki on 1st August 1975, is the essential charter for the reduction of tension in Europe, but that the principles it defines are still far from being applied everywhere, particularly where human rights are concerned ;
- (vii) Considering that the tenth anniversary of the Helsinki final act provides an opportunity to review its effectiveness as a contribution to peaceful coexistence in Europe ;
- (viii) Considering that WEU's rôle is to take the necessary steps to make the voice of the European pillar of the alliance heard on matters relating to security, as specified in the Rome Declaration ;
- (ix) Considering that WEU's action should allow the CSCE process to be strengthened and in particular the views of the European pillar of the alliance to be heard at the Stockholm conference on disarmament in Europe ;
- (x) Considering that a dialogue with members of the United States Congress is essential for the information and deliberations of members of the WEU Assembly on matters of this kind,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Regularly examine the state of all negotiations on disarmament and the limitation of armaments with a view *inter alia* to achieving through joint action :
 - (a) agreement with the eastern countries to specify the implications of the principles set out in the final act of the Helsinki conference ;
 - (b) more confidence-building measures, particularly through the presence of observers at military manoeuvres, in the context of the negotiations now being held in Stockholm ;
 - (c) the definition of a joint position on matters discussed by the United States and the Soviet Union at the Geneva conference with a view to agreement on the conditions for limiting the armaments race ;
2. Make use of the tenth anniversary of the Helsinki conference to obtain confirmation by all the signatory powers of their determination to apply effectively all the principles contained in the final act, particularly those relating to :
 - (a) respect for human rights ;
 - (b) the inviolability of frontiers ;
 - (c) the territorial integrity of states ;
 - (d) non-interference in the internal affairs of another state with immediate application to Afghanistan ;

- (e)* equality of treatment between nations and their right to self-determination ;
 - (f)* co-operation between states ;
 - (g)* the establishment of confidence-building measures ;
3. In the appropriate forums, actively promote :
- (a)* the development of trade between eastern and western countries ;
 - (b)* the adaptation of Cocom practice and lists to an increase in trade which does not jeopardise the West's security;
 - (c)* in agreement with the United States, the participation of Europe in space research of a scientific nature ;
 - (d)* agreement between Western and Eastern European countries on improving protection of the environment ;
4. On the occasion of the renewal of the Warsaw Pact, seek agreement between the Atlantic Alliance and WEU countries on the one hand and the Warsaw Pact countries on the other in order to define the principle of non-recourse to the threat or use of force as set out in the Helsinki final act, while preparing and implementing specific mutual measures of confidence and bearing in mind that any reaffirmation of the non-use of force should be accompanied by an agreed confirmation of the need to respect human rights.

RECOMMENDATION 418***on Cyprus and European security***

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that the situation in Cyprus is a serious threat to the maintenance of the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance in the Eastern Mediterranean ;
- (ii) Considering that the association of the Republic of Cyprus with the European Community, its participation in the Council of Europe and that of Greece and Turkey in the Atlantic Alliance give the member countries of WEU the right and duty to do their utmost to promote the establishment of lasting peace on the island ;
- (iii) Considering that the conclusions drawn by the Secretary-General of the United Nations from the inter-community negotiations held between 1977 and 1984 are the best possible basis for the restoration of peace in Cyprus ;
- (iv) Welcoming the decision taken by the two Cypriot communities to pursue their negotiations in spite of the initial setback,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Express its support for the proposals by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and use all the influence it may have with the Greek, Turkish and both Cypriot authorities to promote the conclusion of a final agreement on this basis.

FOURTH SITTING

Wednesday, 22nd May 1985

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Military use of computers – reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 1007 and amendment).
2. New outlook for WEU – reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee*, Doc. 1012 and amendments).
3. Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*, Doc. 1019 and amendments).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 9.30 a.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

2. Attendance register

The names of representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

3. Organisation of the work of the Assembly and of its committees

(Motion for an order in implementation of a proposal by the Bureau, Doc. 1024)

The President announced that a motion for an order on the organisation of the work of the Assembly and of its committees in implementation of a proposal of the Bureau had been tabled.

The motion for an order was agreed to. (This order will be published as No. 60)¹.

4. Situation in Lebanon

(Motion for a recommendation with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 1023)

The President announced that a motion for a recommendation on the situation in Lebanon had been tabled by Mr. Martino and others with a request for urgent procedure.

In accordance with Rule 43 (2) of the Rules of Procedure this would be put to the Assembly after the vote on the draft recommendation on the military use of computers.

5. Iran-Iraq war

(Motion for a recommendation, Doc. 1022)

The President announced that a motion for a recommendation on the Iran-Iraq war had been tabled by Mr. Hardy and others.

In accordance with Rule 28 (4) of the Rules of Procedure, the question of including the motion in the register was put to the Assembly.

The Assembly agreed to include the motion in the register.

Speaker (point of order) : Dr. Miller.

6. Military use of computers – reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1007 and amendment)

The report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions was presented by Mr. Fourré, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers : Mrs. den Ouden-Dekkers, MM. Milani, Rauti and Hill.

The debate was closed.

1. See page 31.

Mr. Fourré, Rapporteur, and Mr. Wilkinson, Vice-Chairman of the committee, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mrs. den Ouden-Dekkers :

1. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "Standing Armaments Committee" and insert "the Agency for the development of co-operation in the field of armaments".

Speakers : Mrs. den Ouden-Dekkers and Mr. Wilkinson.

The amendment was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 419)¹.

Speakers (points of order) : Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Spies von Büllenheim, Milani, Pignion, Milani, Stoffelen, Lord Hughes, Mr. Cavaliere and Sir Dudley Smith.

7. Situation in Lebanon

(Motion for a recommendation with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 1023)

In accordance with Rule 43 (3) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly proceeded to consider the request for urgent procedure on the motion for a recommendation on the situation in Lebanon.

Speakers : MM. Martino and Michel.

The request for urgent procedure was agreed to and the draft recommendation was referred to the General Affairs Committee.

8. New outlook for WEU - reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council

Application of the Brussels Treaty - reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council

(Presentation of and joint debate on the reports of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Docs. 1012 and amendments and 1019 and amendments)

The report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mr. van der Sanden, Rapporteur.

Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

The report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. Scheer, Rapporteur.

The joint debate was opened.

Speakers : Mrs. Kelly, MM. Wilkinson, Müller, Bianco, Vecchiotti and Moreira (*Observer from Portugal*).

The joint debate was adjourned.

9. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

The sitting was closed at 1.10 p.m.

1. See page 32.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance¹ :

Belgium	MM. <i>Schmidt</i> (Neumann) Rumpf Schulte Spies von Bülesheim Unland	Netherlands
MM. Bogaerts De Decker Michel Mrs. Staels-Dompas		MM. Aarts <i>Tummers</i> (van den Bergh) Blaauw de Kwaadsteniet Stoffelen <i>van der Sanden</i> (Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra) Mrs. <i>den Ouden-Dekkers</i> (van der Werff)
France	Italy	
MM. Berrier Fourré Jung Lagorce Pignion Sénès	MM. Bianco Cavaliere Ferrari Aggradi <i>Martino</i> (Fiandrotti) Gianotti Giust Mezzapesa Milani Rauti Sarti Sinesio Vecchietti	United Kingdom
Federal Republic of Germany		Sir Frederic Bennett MM. <i>Brown</i> (Cox) <i>Atkinson</i> (Sir Anthony Grant) Hardy Sir Paul Hawkins Mr. Hill Lord Hughes MM. Johnston <i>Corrie</i> (Mrs. Knight) <i>Millan</i> (McGuire) Dr. Miller Lord Reay Sir Dudley Smith Mr. Wilkinson
MM. Ahrens Antretter Enders Gerstl Mrs. Kelly MM. Kittelmann Müller	Luxembourg	
	MM. <i>Linster</i> (Goerens) Hengel	

The following representatives apologised for their absence :

Belgium	MM. Ruet Valleix Vial-Massat Wilquin Wirth	Italy
MM. Adriaensens Dejardin Noerens		MM. Amadei Antoni Cifarelli Frasca Pecchioli Rubbi
France	Federal Republic of Germany	Luxembourg
MM. Bassinet Baumel Beix Bourges Jeambrun Mayoud	MM. Böhm Haase Hornhues Reddemann Schwarz Zierer	Mr. Burger
		United Kingdom
		Sir Geoffrey Finsberg Mr. Jessel Sir John Osborn Sir John Page

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

ORDER 60***on the organisation of the work of the Assembly
and of its committees***

The Assembly,

- (i) Having noted the proposal by the Bureau communicated at the beginning of the morning sitting on 21st May 1985 ;
- (ii) Recalling its commitment to the reinvigoration of WEU and particularly its recent agreement to the report on action by the Presidential Committee ;
- (iii) Concerned to improve the efficiency of its operations, so as to ensure that committee reports are available for a reasonable period before the Assembly comes to debate them, and that the order of business agreed by the Presidential Committee should not normally need serious adjustment at the first sitting of the Assembly,

INSTRUCTS THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMITTEE

To consider and discuss with the chairmen of the permanent committees the organisation of a mini-session of committee meetings to be held before the December part-session, in sufficient time to allow reports to be circulated two weeks before the Assembly first sits.

RECOMMENDATION 419***on the military use of computers –
reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council***

The Assembly,

- (i) Aware of the preponderant importance of computers for the defence of the western world, whether they are incorporated in weapons systems or used for command, control, communications and intelligence ;
- (ii) Considering the importance of military computers which have been prime movers for the development of civil computer industries for the last twenty years ;
- (iii) Considering also that, since the failure of Unidata – Philips, Siemens and CII – Western Europe has had no common co-ordinated policy and is only now starting the Esprit programme which covers no military use ;
- (iv) Considering the United States and Japanese challenge in the world computer market and Western Europe's backwardness that involves serious drawbacks owing to excessive dependency on the United States and Japan and which, on the one hand, requires a common European policy and, on the other hand, co-operative action with American and eventually Japanese firms ;
- (v) Considering the extremely fast development of computer technology ;
- (vi) Considering the need to face up to this phenomenon and, to this end, instructing its Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions to prepare a supplementary report on this important question in order to keep the Assembly informed of the evolution of the situation in the economic, technological and military sectors,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Urge the member governments to stimulate and co-ordinate research and development of basic technologies for manufacturing very-high-speed integrated circuits and provide the funds necessary to encourage the industries concerned ;
2. Draw up a common policy in a Western European framework based on a co-ordinated strategy to be worked out by the Agency for the development of co-operation in the field of armaments for the military applications of computer systems ;
3. Prepare the ground for the next generation of military computers in weapon systems which will be interchangeable and interoperational between units of European forces assigned for the common defence ;
4. Promote a single European market for military computers, and particularly supercomputers, which will stimulate the civil market ;
5. Advocate a common computer language to facilitate the interoperability of all systems used by the armed forces of Western Europe ;
6. Call for the standardisation of computer components such as very-high-speed integrated circuits;
7. Reflect on the impact on European computer industries due to the research and development to be undertaken in connection with the American strategic defence initiative and European-American co-operation on the space station.

FIFTH SITTING

Wednesday, 22nd May 1985

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Thirtieth annual report of the Council (*Presentation by Mr. Genscher, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Doc. 1006.*)
(*Resumed joint debate on the reports of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and votes on the draft recommendations and draft order, Docs. 1012 and amendments and 1019 and amendments.*)
2. New outlook for WEU – reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council ; Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council
3. Withdrawal of a report from the agenda (*Motion for an order tabled by Dr. Miller and others, Doc. 1021.*)

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

2. Attendance register

The names of representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

3. Thirtieth annual report of the Council

(Presentation by Mr. Genscher, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Doc. 1006)

The report of the Council to the Assembly was presented by Mr. Genscher, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. Genscher replied to questions put by Mrs. den Ouden-Dekkers, MM. van Tets, Spies von Bülesheim, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mrs. Kelly, MM. Lagorce, Pignion, Blaauw, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Lord Reay, MM. Ferrari Aggradi, Gianotti, Milani, Sir Dudley Smith, MM. Enders, Hill and de Vries.

The sitting was suspended at 4.55 p.m. and resumed at 5.15 p.m.

4. New outlook for WEU – reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council

Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council

(Resumed joint debate on the reports of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and votes on the draft recommendations and draft order, Docs. 1012 and amendments and 1019 and amendments)

The joint debate was resumed.

Speakers: Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Hardy, Antretter, Blaauw, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg (point of order), MM. Mezzapesa, Tummers and Verdon.

The joint debate was closed.

Mr. Pignion, Chairman, and Mr. Scheer, Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, and Mr. van der Sanden, Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation on the new outlook for WEU – reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council, Document 1012 and amendments.

Amendments (Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 6) were tabled by MM. De Decker, Blaauw and Wilkinson :

3. After paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert the following new paragraph :

“(iv) Noting that the United States invitation to the European states to take part in the

research programme relating to the strategic defence initiative is raising many questions in Europe ; ”.

4. After paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert the following new paragraph :

“ (v) Stressing that Europe must make every effort to ensure its technological independence whilst safeguarding its strategic interests ; ”.

5. After paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert the following new paragraph :

“ (vi) Stressing that only by collaborating in the research stage of the SDI can Europe influence this programme whilst ensuring that account is taken of the specifically European aspects and requirements of its security ; ”.

6. After paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert the following new paragraph :

“ (vii) Stressing that it is essential for the European states to respond collectively as a political entity to the American SDI proposals ; ”.

Speakers : MM. Blaauw and van der Sanden.

Amendment 3 was agreed to.

Amendments 4, 5 and 6 were negated.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Cavaliere :

1. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, after “ collective ” insert “ and positive ”.

The amendment was not spoken to.

The amendment was withdrawn.

Amendments (Nos. 7 and 8) were tabled by MM. De Decker, Blaauw and Wilkinson :

7. After paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, insert the following new paragraph :

“ 2. Make every effort to protect Europe’s strategic interests while maintaining its technological independence, in particular by developing a European space defence programme in conjunction with the SDI ; ”.

8. After paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, insert the following new paragraph :

“ 3. In co-operation with the United States Government, study every aspect of the consequences for Europe’s security of the deployment of an SDI system ; ”.

Speakers : MM. Blaauw and van der Sanden.

Amendments 7 and 8 were negated.

An amendment (No. 9) was tabled by Mr. Verdon :

9. Leave out paragraph 7 of the draft recommendation proper and insert :

“ 7. Consider Portugal becoming a member of WEU once the latter has effectively embarked upon the process of revitalisation. ”

The amendment was not spoken to.

The amendment was withdrawn.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 420) ¹.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft order on the new outlook for WEU – reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council, Document 1012 and amendment.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Blaauw :

2. In the draft order, leave out paragraph 3 and insert :

“ REQUESTS

The Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, the General Affairs Committee and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions to consider inviting observers from this delegation to attend their meetings. ”

Speakers : MM. Blaauw and van der Sanden.

The amendment was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the amended draft order.

The amended draft order was agreed to. (This order will be published as No. 61) ².

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation on the application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council, Document 1019 and amendments.

Amendments (Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4) were tabled by Mr. Verdon :

1. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from “ attaching ” to the end of the paragraph, and insert :

“ underlining the importance the Council attaches to respect of commitments under existing

1. See page 37.

2. See page 39.

bilateral treaties and endorsing the determination of the countries participating in the CSCE to bring about an East-West rapprochement in the long term so that the WEU member countries adopt a co-ordinated reaction to : ”.

2. Leave out paragraph 2(a) of the draft recommendation proper and insert :

“ (a) President Reagan’s strategic defence initiative in response to the invitation from Mr. Weinberger, Secretary of Defence, to take part, while confirming that the growing importance of technology should lead to Europe’s own capability being strengthened, with a view to creating a European technological community ; ”.

3. Leave out paragraph 2(c) of the draft recommendation proper.

4. Leave out paragraph 2(d) of the draft recommendation proper.

Speakers : MM. Verdon and Scheer.

Amendment 1 was negatived.

Speakers : MM. Scheer and Verdon (point of order).

Amendment 2 was negatived.

Speaker : Mr. Scheer.

Amendment 3 was negatived.

Speaker : Mr. Scheer.

Amendment 4 was negatived.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 421) ¹.

Speaker : Mr. Pignion.

5. Withdrawal of a report from the agenda

(Motion for an order tabled by Dr. Miller and others, Doc. 1021)

In accordance with Rule 30 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly proceeded to consider the motion for an order tabled by Dr. Miller and others.

The motion for an order was moved by Mr. Brown.

Speakers : Sir Geoffrey Finsberg ; (points of order) : MM. Brown, Hardy, Woodall and Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the motion for an order.

The motion for an order was agreed to. (This order will be published as No. 62) ¹.

6. Situation in Lebanon

(Presentation of the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1025)

The report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mr. Martino, Rapporteur.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 422) ².

7. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for Thursday, 23rd May, at 10 a.m.

The sitting was closed at 7.20 p.m.

1. See page 40.

1. See page 41.
2. See page 42.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹ :

Belgium	MM. Kittelmann Neumann Rumpf Schulte Mrs. <i>Fischer</i> (Schwarz) MM. Spies von Büllenheim Unland	Netherlands
MM. Bogaerts Michel Mrs. Staels-Dompas		MM. <i>Eysink</i> (Aarts) <i>Tummers</i> (van den Bergh) Blaauw de Kwaadsteniet Stoffelen <i>van der Sanden</i> (Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra) <i>van Tets</i> (van der Werff)
France	Italy	United Kingdom
MM. Bassinet <i>Souvet</i> (Bourges) <i>Verdon</i> (Jeambrun) Lagorce Pignion Valleix	MM. Cavaliere Ferrari Aggradi <i>Martino</i> (Fiandrotti) Gianotti Giust Mezzapesa Rauti Sarti Sinesio	Sir Frederic Bennett Mr. <i>Brown</i> (Cox) Sir Geoffrey Finsberg MM. <i>Corrie</i> (Sir Anthony Grant) Hardy Sir Paul Hawkins MM. Hill <i>Woodall</i> (Lord Hughes) <i>Parry</i> (McGuire) Dr. Miller Lord Reay Sir Dudley Smith Mr. Wilkinson
Federal Republic of Germany	Luxembourg	
MM. Ahrens Antretter Enders Gerstl <i>Schmidt</i> (Haase) <i>Scheer</i> (Hornhues) Mrs. Kelly	MM. <i>Linster</i> (Goerens) Hengel	

The following representatives apologised for their absence :

Belgium	MM. Vial-Massat Wilquin Wirth	MM. Cifarelli Frasca Milani Pecchioli Rubbi Vecchietti
MM. Adriaensens De Decker Dejardin Noerens	Federal Republic of Germany	Luxembourg
France	MM. Böhm Müller Reddemann Zierer	Mr. Burger
MM. Baumel Beix Berrier Fourré Jung Mayoud Ruet Sénès	Italy	United Kingdom
	MM. Amadei Antoni Bianco	MM. Jessel Johnston Mrs. Knight Sir John Osborn Sir John Page

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 420***on the new outlook for WEU -
reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council***

The Assembly,

- (i) Taking cognisance of the thirtieth annual report of the Council, the Rome Declaration of 27th October 1984 and the Bonn communiqué of 23rd April 1985 ;
- (ii) Noting that the information the Council has thus given to the Assembly regarding its activities is incomplete and inadequate ;
- (iii) Noting that the activities organised by the presidency of the Council have been developed significantly, that the treaty makes it incumbent on the Council to inform the Assembly but that present procedure is inadequate ;
- (iv) Noting that the United States invitation to the European states to take part in the research programme relating to the strategic defence initiative is raising many questions in Europe ;
- (v) Underlining that the Assembly's activities make a major contribution to the cohesion of the European peoples for their joint security and therefore help to deter destabilising operations against the western defence system ;
- (vi) Recalling that the Assembly can play the rôle assigned to it in the Rome Declaration only if it has precise information and satisfactory co-operation from the Council, the material means it needs for its work and if it remains totally independent from the Council, particularly when involving public opinion ;
- (vii) Welcoming the initiative taken by the Committee for Relations with Parliaments for making the consequences of the reactivation of WEU better known in the parliaments of member countries ;
- (viii) Recalling that only the national delegations are in a position to give this work the necessary continuity ;
- (ix) Welcoming the fact that the Council for its part has decided to inform the public about its activities but recalling that the Assembly alone is responsible for information about its own work ;
- (x) Welcoming the endeavours to reactivate WEU because they promise to provide a forum for European countries to discuss among themselves matters affecting their own security and defence ;
- (xi) Welcoming the decisions taken by the Council to support the efforts of the United States to reach agreement with the Soviet Union on the limitation of armaments, to pursue its own efforts to give the United States a co-ordinated answer from the seven governments on the strategic defence initiative and to stress the importance it attaches to respect for commitments set out in the treaties in force ;
- (xii) Recalling that Portugal's application for membership of WEU is in complete conformity with the joint interest of the Western European countries and the guidelines decided by WEU in the Rome Declaration,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Continue its work until it obtains a collective answer from the seven governments to the American invitation to take part in the United States research programme relating to the strategic defence initiative ;
2. Ensure the full participation of the Chairman-in-Office of the Council throughout the parliamentary debate on the Assembly's reply to the annual report of the Council so that he may, in particular, make known his opinion on the report of the General Affairs Committee examined by the Assembly ;

3. Submit to the Assembly a report by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council on the activities of the presidency at the same time as the report on the organisation adopted by the Permanent Council ;
4. Ensure that the Assembly is effectively informed of all joint activities by the Seven, including meetings of Ministers of Defence and meetings organised by the presidency of the Council ;
5. Inform the public and press about its own activities ;
6. Define without delay the attributions of the three agencies which it has decided to set up, particularly so as to allow the Assembly to act accordingly ;
7. Take a favourable decision as soon as possible on Portugal's application for membership of WEU in application of Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty.

ORDER 61

*on the new outlook for WEU -
reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council*

The Assembly,

Anxious to show its support for Portugal's application for membership of WEU,

INSTRUCTS ITS PRESIDENT

1. To invite the Portuguese Parliament to send its delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe to the Assembly of WEU as observers ;
2. To have this delegation attend all plenary sessions ;

REQUESTS

The Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, the General Affairs Committee and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions to consider inviting observers from this delegation to attend their meetings.

RECOMMENDATION 421***on the application of the Brussels Treaty -
reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council***

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming the recent steps taken by the Council to implement the Assembly's demand that WEU should be adapted to meet the requirements of the 1980s ;
- (ii) Expressing its appreciation of the successfully completed work of the Agency for the Control of Armaments over the last thirty years, which has contributed to the present solidarity of Europe ;
- (iii) Welcoming in particular the Rome Declaration of 27th October 1984 providing for all aspects of European security to be discussed in the WEU Council and for the ministerial organs of WEU to be reorganised to provide institutions, available to the Council and to the Assembly, to study these questions ;
- (iv) Welcoming the references in the communiqué of the Bonn ministerial meeting of the Council on 22nd and 23rd April which show that Ministers discussed questions of European security, disarmament, armaments co-operation and research and the creation of a technological community within the European Communities ;
- (v) Welcoming in particular the emphasis placed in the communiqué on the need for " agreements aimed at ending the arms race on earth and preventing an arms race in space " and the importance attached " to respect for existing treaty obligations " ;
- (vi) Welcoming the establishment of the three agencies for security questions as evidence of the Council's determination to continue active study of all the foregoing questions ;
- (vii) Calling for the provisions of the Rome Declaration to be fully and continuously implemented,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Keep under continuous study at permanent and ministerial level all major problems affecting European security ;
2. In particular continue to keep under continuous review all outstanding East-West arms control and disarmament questions, attaching equal importance to those negotiated in a multilateral and in a bilateral framework, with a view to reaching a common position on :
 - (a) President Reagan's strategic defence initiative and a reply to Secretary Weinberger's invitation for allied participation, in order to prevent an arms race in outer space and ensure respect for existing treaty obligations ;
 - (b) the treaty to ban chemical weapons being negotiated in the forty-nation Conference on Disarmament in Geneva ;
 - (c) General Secretary Gorbachev's declaration of a six-month unilateral freeze on the deployment of Soviet nuclear missiles in Europe ;
 - (d) a comprehensive nuclear test ban and the reported Soviet offer to accept a moratorium on all nuclear testing from the fortieth anniversary of the Hiroshima bomb ;
3. Entrust the new WEU agencies for security questions with the tasks identified in the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, including an urgent study of the cost of the joint production by Western Europe Union of observation satellites to provide independent intelligence relevant to arms control and security ;
4. Subject to reciprocity by Warsaw Pact countries, declare the levels of forces, and in the future the levels of nuclear weapons, stationed on the territory of all WEU countries, as a contribution to confidence-building measures ;
5. Make material provision to ensure that the new agencies for security questions will be able to provide more fully effective assistance to Assembly committees than the international secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee has been in a position to provide in the past ;
6. Make adequate budgetary provision to enable all WEU organs to carry out their respective tasks.

ORDER 62***on the withdrawal of a report from the agenda***

The Assembly,

- (i) Regretting that the vote in the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments will defer consideration of Mr. van den Bergh's report on emerging technology and military strategy, dealing inter alia with the strategic defence initiative, since this decision denies to the Assembly an early opportunity of discussing matters of great importance and prevents the only European assembly specifically empowered by treaty to discuss defence and security issues from fulfilling its obligation ;
- (ii) Believing that the decision calls in question the meaningful reactivation of the organisation,

INSTRUCTS THE COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE QUESTIONS AND ARMAMENTS

To report on this subject without fail to the second part of the thirty-first session.

RECOMMENDATION 422***on the situation in Lebanon***

The Assembly,

Greatly disturbed by the situation in Lebanon, which is disrupted by internal warfare accompanied by killing, bloodshed and genocide,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Call upon its Chairman-in-Office and all member governments to use all the means at their disposal to help to restore peace by acting directly, as well as in the framework of international organisations likely to exert an influence in favour of peace ;
2. Instruct its Chairman-in-Office to make a solemn appeal to the Government of Lebanon and all the internal parties concerned and to the governments of neighbouring countries to respect human rights for all Lebanese, whatever their race or creed ;
3. Urge the United Nations to undertake immediately an examination of the situation in Lebanon with a view to promoting a transitional solution guaranteeing the population against a resumption of the massacres ;
4. Ask all member countries of Western European Union to associate themselves with these steps.

SIXTH SITTING

Thursday, 23rd May 1985

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Revision and interpretation of the Rules of Procedure – Terms of reference of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments (*Debate on the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and vote on the draft resolution, Doc. 1020*).
2. State of European security – the central region (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on*
- Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1018 and amendment*).
3. Activities of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments – parliamentary debates on the evolution of WEU (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 1010*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Sir Frederic Bennett, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

2. Attendance register

The names of representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

3. Revision and interpretation of the Rules of Procedure – Terms of reference of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments

(Debate on the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and vote on the draft resolution, Doc. 1020)

The debate was opened.

Speaker : Mrs. Knight.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Schulte, Chairman of the committee, replied to the speaker.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft resolution.

The draft resolution was agreed to. (This resolution will be published as No. 70)¹.

1. See page 46.

4. State of European security – the central region

(Presentation of the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1018 and amendment)

The report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Dr. Miller, Rapporteur.

Speaker : Mr. Pignion, Chairman of the committee.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Verdon :

1. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper.

Speakers : Mr. Pignion and Dr. Miller.

The amendment was negatived.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 423)¹.

5. Activities of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments – parliamentary debates on the evolution of WEU

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 1010)

The report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments was presented by Mr. Giust, Rapporteur.

1. See page 47.

The debate was opened.

Speaker : Mr. Eysink.

The debate was closed.

Mrs. Knight, Chairman of the committee, replied to the speaker.

The Assembly took note of the report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

6. Institutional connection of the Assembly with other organs of WEU

(Motion for an order tabled by Mr. Spies von Büllenheim and others, Doc. 1026)

In accordance with Rule 30 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly proceeded to consider

the motion for an order tabled by Mr. Spies von Büllenheim and others.

The motion for an order was moved by Mr. Eysink.

Speakers : MM. Ferrari Aggradi and Rauti (point of order).

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft order.

The draft order was agreed to. (This order will be published as No. 63) ¹.

7. Adjournment of the session

The President adjourned the thirty-first ordinary session of the Assembly.

The sitting was closed at 11.25 a.m.

¹. See page 48.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹ :

Belgium	Italy	MM. Stoffelen <i>van der Sanden</i> (Mrs. <i>van der Werf-Terpstra</i>)
Mr. Bogaerts	MM. Ferrari Aggradi Giust Rauti Sarti Sinesio	
France		United Kingdom
Mr. Pignion		Sir Frederic Bennett Mr. Cox Sir Geoffrey Finsberg Mr. Woodall Sir Paul Hawkins Lord Hughes Mrs. Knight Mr. <i>Brown</i> (McGuire) Dr. Miller Lord Reay Sir Dudley Smith Mr. Wilkinson
Federal Republic of Germany	Luxembourg	
MM. Ahrens Enders Mrs. Kelly MM. Reddemann Rumpf Schulte Mrs. <i>Fischer</i> (Schwarz) MM. Spies von Bülesheim Unland	Mr. Hengel	
	Netherlands	
	MM. <i>Eysink</i> (Aarts) <i>de Vries</i> (van den Bergh) Blaauw de Kwadsteniet	

The following representatives apologised for their absence :

Belgium	Federal Republic of Germany	MM. Pecchioli Rubbi Vecchietti
MM. Adriaensens De Decker Dejardin Michel Noerens Mrs. Staels-Dompas	MM. Antretter Böhm Gerstl Haase Hornhues Kittelmann Müller Neumann Zierer	Luxembourg
France		MM. Burger Goerens
MM. Bassinet Baumel Beix Berrier Bourges Fourré Jeambrun Jung Lagorce Mayoud Ruet Sénès Valleix Vial-Massat Wilquin Wirth	Italy	Netherlands
	MM. Amadei Antoni Bianco Cavaliere Cifarelli Fiandrotti Frasca Gianotti Mezzapesa Milani	Mr. van der Werff
		United Kingdom
		Sir Anthony Grant MM. Hill Jessel Johnston Sir John Osborn Sir John Page

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RESOLUTION 70***on the amendment of Rule 42 bis to enlarge the competence of
the Committee for Relations with Parliaments***

The Assembly,

DECIDES

To amend Rule 42 *bis* of the Rules of Procedure as follows :

1. *Title*

Leave out “ Committee for Relations with Parliaments ” and insert “ Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations ”.

2. *Paragraphs 3 and 4*

Leave out paragraphs 3 and 4 and insert :

“ 3. The committee shall :

- (a) select from the texts adopted by the Assembly those which, in its opinion, should be debated in national parliaments ;
- (b) make all necessary arrangements with a view to bringing the work of the Assembly to the attention of national parliaments and inviting them to follow it up; and
- (c) make all necessary proposals with a view to bringing the work of the Assembly to the attention of the public and the press in member countries. ”

3. *Paragraph 5*

Leave out “ It ” and insert “ In the exercise of its functions under paragraphs 3(a) and 3(b), the committee ”.

4. *Paragraph 6*

At the end add “ including any draft orders or resolutions ”.

5. Renumber the paragraphs accordingly.

RECOMMENDATION 423***on the state of European security - the central region***

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting that the long-standing Warsaw Pact superiority in numbers of men, tanks, guns and aircraft in the central region has not diminished ;
- (ii) Aware however that with the improved defence effort made by most NATO countries in the last five years more modern equipment is now reaching NATO forces which still enjoy some qualitative advantages in training and equipment ;
- (iii) Stressing that the European countries provide some 80 to 90% of the ready forces and equipment in place in Europe ;
- (iv) Welcoming the important contribution to allied defence made by the French conventional forces stationed in Germany and in France which in the event of hostilities, should the French President so decide, could be placed under the operational control of NATO commanders ;
- (v) Noting that a referendum on continued Spanish membership of NATO is expected to be held in March 1986 ;
- (vi) Recognising that the stationing of over 400,000 allied troops on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany represents a considerable social burden borne by that country in the interests of allied defence ;
- (vii) Recalling that considerable further improvement in the effectiveness of the allied defence effort can be made at no additional cost through standardisation and interoperability of equipment, and that logistic arrangements are still in need of improvement,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge in the North Atlantic Council :

1. That a renewed effort be made to establish a genuine European defence industry with a view to improving standardisation and interoperability ;
2. That advantage be taken of any opportunities to reposition forces stationed in Germany to alleviate the present unsatisfactory deployment ;
3. That published NATO force comparisons take account of French and Spanish forces ;
4. That Spain be requested to assign to SACEUR a modern mobile force of at least one division as an early reserve for the central region, and that Spain be asked to respond to the NATO annual review questionnaire as is the custom of all other NATO countries.

ORDER 63***on the institutional connection of the Assembly
with other organs of WEU***

The Assembly,

Endeavouring a closer co-ordination of the defence policies of its member states,

INSTRUCTS ITS PRESIDENTIAL COMMITTEE

To ask the competent committee for the preparation of a report on the possibilities, conditions and consequences of a closer institutional connection of the Assembly with other organs of WEU. The report should consider also the following possibilities :

- (a) responsibility of the Secretary-General of WEU also with respect to the Assembly ;
- (b) responsibility of the different expert secretariats for both the Assembly and the other organs of WEU ;
- (c) one single budget for all WEU organs including the Assembly ;
- (d) centralisation of all WEU organs in one place ;
- (e) consideration of all other possibilities suitable further to promote the cause of WEU.

This report should restrict itself to a presentation of the factual conditions and legal possibilities as a basis for the necessary political follow-up and an eventual decision by the competent bodies according to the Brussels Treaty.

II

OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES

FIRST SITTING

Monday, 20th May 1985

SUMMARY

1. Opening of the session.
2. Attendance register.
3. Address by the Provisional President.
4. Examination of credentials.
5. Election of the President of the Assembly.
6. Address by the President of the Assembly.
7. Election of six Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.
8. Adoption of the draft order of business for the first part of the session (Doc. 1005).

Speakers: Mr. Pignion, Mr. Schulte; (points of order): Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Blaauw, Mr. Spies von Büllesheim, Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt, Mr. Stoffelen, Dr. Miller, Mr. Milani.

9. Nomination of members to committees.
10. Action by the Presidential Committee (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Presidential Committee and vote on the motion for an order on the budget of the Assembly, Docs. 1017 and 1015 and amendment*).
Speakers: Mr. Ferrari Aggradi (*Vice-President*), Sir Dudley Smith, Sir John Page, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Ferrari Aggradi (*Vice-President*).
11. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Lord Hughes, Provisional President, in the Chair.

1. Opening of the session

The PRESIDENT. – The sitting is open.

In accordance with Article III (a) of the Charter and Rules 2, 5 and 17 of the Rules of Procedure, I declare open the thirty-first ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union.

2. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT. – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

3. Address by the Provisional President

The PRESIDENT. – We have been so accustomed to seeing my British colleague, Mr. Edwards, in the Chair at this stage that I almost feel that I am trespassing on his territory by being here. I do not propose, therefore, to trespass further by making the sort of speech which we are so accustomed to hearing from Mr.

Edwards and to which we enjoy listening. That being said, there is a great deal of formal material that I have been unable to avoid.

4. Examination of credentials

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the examination of credentials.

The list of representatives and substitutes attending the thirty-first ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union has been published in Notice No. 1.

In accordance with Rule 6(1) of the Rules of Procedure, all these credentials were ratified by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and are attested by a statement of ratification which has been addressed to the President, with the exception of Mr. Horacek, a substitute in the Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany, who has been nominated since the conclusion of the meeting of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

It is now for the Assembly to ratify his credentials in accordance with Rule 6(2) of the Rules of Procedure.

The nomination is in proper form. No objection has been raised.

1. See page 17.

The President (continued)

If the Assembly is unanimous, we may proceed to ratification without prior referral to a credentials committee.

Is there any opposition?...

The credentials of Mr. Horacek are ratified by the Assembly, subject to subsequent ratification by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

May I take the opportunity, as the oldest member present, of welcoming our colleagues and looking forward to their contribution to our work?

5. Election of the President of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the election of the President of the Assembly.

Under Rules 7(2), 10(2) and 10(10), only a representative, who may not be a member of his national government, may stand as a candidate for the office of President, and his candidature must be sponsored by three or more representatives.

I have received only one nomination, that of Mr. Caro.

The nomination has been properly made and is in the form prescribed by the rules.

If there is no objection, I may declare Mr. Caro elected by acclamation in accordance with Rule 10(4).

Is there any opposition to the sole nominee?...

I believe the Assembly is unanimous.

I proclaim Mr. Caro President of the Assembly of Western European Union. I congratulate him and invite him to take the Chair.

(Mr. Caro then took the Chair)

6. Address by the President of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Members of the Permanent Council, Secretary-General, Ladies and Gentlemen and colleagues, my first duty in opening the first part of the thirty-first session of our Assembly is to thank our Provisional President, Lord Hughes, for his kindness and, above all, his assiduous participation in the work of our Assembly. I am most grateful, Lord Hughes, and hope you will be able to continue working with us together with our friend Bob Edwards whom we did not have the pleasure of seeing amongst us at the opening of this session.

My next duty is to thank you very warmly, my dear colleagues, for the confidence you have again shown in me. This confidence was not automatic after a year in office because circumstances forced me to take the initiative in a number of areas far exceeding the measures my predecessors had to take, particularly in regard to the Assembly's relations with the Council.

Decisions adopted by the Council in the past year under the general heading of the reactivation of WEU forced your President to embark upon new courses with no material possibility of consulting the Presidential Committee or, a fortiori, the Assembly beforehand. I therefore had to explain to the Council and, in particular, to Mr. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Vice-Chancellor of the Federal Republic, who was Chairman-in-Office throughout the year, our Assembly's views on the reactivation of WEU on the basis of recommendations adopted by you over the last thirty years. This task was greatly facilitated first by your work at the extraordinary session in Rome last October and at our last session in Paris in December and then by the assistance constantly afforded me by the Presidential Committee which took very prompt action in following up the order presented on behalf of the General Affairs Committee by Lord Reay at the last session and in setting up a committee for liaison with the Council.

I realise that some of you may find this new procedure somewhat unsatisfactory since it is difficult for a parliamentary assembly to delegate powers and rights, particularly the essential right to be informed. That is why the Presidential Committee asked one of its most eminent members, Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, a Vice-President, to present a report to you on its activities. It was difficult to do more in view of the fact that the Council did not wish, and in any case was unable, to have the entire Assembly as a partner in a dialogue which it wished to remain confidential. We respected its view, whatever reservations we may have had, and I can but consider my re-election today as an overall endorsement of the position adopted by the Presidential Committee and myself. I therefore wish to thank you very sincerely for this demonstration of confidence which will enhance the Assembly's authority in the pursuit of its dialogue with the Council.

Naturally, the reactivation of WEU will remain central to our work during the present session, particularly as it is closely linked with highly topical matters.

As you know, the WEU Council decided at its ministerial meeting on 22nd and 23rd April to do its utmost to co-ordinate the response of our seven countries to the United States President's proposal to involve them in the research programmes grouped under the general heading of

The President (continued)

strategic defence initiative. I consider this to be a major decision for, at a time when the world is tackling the problems of the post-nuclear era, WEU is emerging as the only European organisation capable of addressing the implications for European security of this extremely important qualitative leap forward.

It is no secret for anyone that the nuclear issue has been a problem for our organisation over the thirty years of its existence and has been largely responsible for diverting government activity away from WEU and that governments have turned towards collective defence in the framework of NATO or else towards national defence with each country remaining its own master. Nuclear matters have been a major obstacle for WEU. In spite of the differences, albeit temporary, which it is stirring up among our leaders, the advent of the post-nuclear era may be the basis for a reactivation of WEU which is not just the rejuvenation of a few technical bodies but a first step along a really new path. The post-nuclear era is now the present and future of WEU even if we do not emerge from the nuclear era for many years to come.

Once again the United States has presented Europe with a challenge that it can and must overcome if it wishes to exist. Just as in 1954 WEU was born of an American challenge which forced Europe to spend four years looking for a way to find its place in a western defence system so as to benefit from the American nuclear guarantee, it must now find a new way to meet a challenge which is at one and the same time technological, military and political, i.e. the challenge of President Reagan's strategic defence initiative.

It may be hoped that the decision taken in Bonn on 23rd April to allow each country enough time to review its technological capabilities before jointly examining what answer each of them will give to the American proposal is not just a way of putting off a difficult decision which has to be taken but the first step towards developing a European technological community which our seven governments very naturally wished to place in the context of the Communities and towards the preparation of a European concept of Europe's security and defence in the post-nuclear era.

By deciding at its meeting in Paris in June 1984 that Ministers of Defence should play an effective part in meetings of the WEU Council, the latter gave itself the means of tackling these problems. At the same time, it showed that it intended to secure its own place in the European union in the process of formation. Thanks to the presence of these ministers, the WEU Council will not be a seven-power extension of

ten- and soon twelve-power political consultations but will be the nucleus of European co-operation on security and defence matters. This in no way prevents NATO remaining the political and military organisation for defending Europe with an army in which the United States and Canada have a prominent place. Since, according to the Rome Declaration, WEU is to be the European pillar of the alliance, this implies a rôle in preparing decisions prior to meetings of the North Atlantic Council. The WEU Council will clearly have to adapt its methods of work to this new requirement. But for this our seven governments will have to show that they are truly convinced of the need to use the procedure afforded by WEU for Europe to speak with one and the same voice.

Consideration of the three areas in which the Council intends to make use of specialised agencies shows that all three depend mainly on the Ministers of Defence, although negotiations on disarmament are handled by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs. The purpose is therefore to give concrete shape to the decisions taken in Rome by arranging, under the general responsibility of the European heads of state or of government, for the Ministers of Defence and their representatives to occupy their due place in the WEU Council and in its dependent organs. The report which our colleague, Mr. van der Sanden, is to present on Wednesday on behalf of the General Affairs Committee offers new and interesting proposals in this connection.

But we all know that there is a great distance between Assembly proposals and Council decisions and that the main strength of our Assembly stems less from what we adopt here than from the action we are able to take when following up those decisions in the context of our work in the national parliaments. I therefore unreservedly welcome the initiatives taken by our Committee for Relations with Parliaments, and in particular its Chairman, Mrs. Knight, to make WEU's activities better known in the parliaments of member countries. Nearly all these parliaments now receive a national report on our sessions.

However, WEU is not only an assembly, whose powers are extremely limited as we know too well, but also and above all a council. It is therefore to the activities of the Council that the attention of our countries' parliaments needs to be drawn and in this connection I wish to emphasise the importance of the initiative taken by Vice-Chancellor Genscher in reporting to the Bundestag on the Council's activities and holding a debate on the report. I should also note that the decisions taken in Bonn were debated in both houses of the British Parliament. Our seven governments must report, each in its own parliament, on the positions they have adopted in the WEU Council and members

The President (continued)

of our Assembly must use the time spent examining these reports to voice, in the national parliamentary context, the views which we express in the WEU context. Ensuring that this is done is a matter for our Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

I have been given the impression that our governments, just when they were at last following up the views expressed by the Assembly, were rather disappointed or even bitter, that there was little response to their initiatives in the parliaments and, a fortiori, among public opinion in their countries. If our Assembly is to remain credible, it is obviously essential for it to support government action whenever it considers this possible but above all it must make known its own views on these initiatives, in particular by taking the floor in the parliaments of member states.

Indeed, we are able to exercise powers that the modified Brussels Treaty does not give us. We have already done so to a certain extent – witness the reactivation of WEU – by addressing ourselves to public opinion and to the press which both informs and represents that public opinion. The fact that the Council has at last declared itself willing to adopt a policy of openness, frankness and informativeness can in no way be detrimental to the Assembly's influence. On the contrary, informing the public of the Council's activities lends a new interest to our debates for, in this respect as in so many others, there is close solidarity between the WEU Assembly and Council. Only when the reactivation of WEU becomes a reality for public opinion will it really become a fact and the efforts of all concerned by this reactivation must now be combined to this end.

But it is mainly the specific content of the Council's work that is capable of drawing the public's attention to its activities. Its views will be heard when it effectively deals with matters of interest to the public, in other words when its agendas systematically cover topical questions. Experience has often shown that the Assembly's speed of decision and adaptability to new situations have largely contributed to the interest of its work and to the response its debates have received. The most encouraging sign of the will shared by the seven member countries to form a true European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance is the fact that the Council has started examining, among Europeans, the implications of current negotiations on disarmament and, probably still more, the answers the seven member countries will be giving to President Reagan's invitation to take part in his great strategic defence initiative. The verdict of public opinion and, first and foremost, of the Assembly regarding a reactivation that has been announced but not yet really

carried into effect, will depend on the outcome of these decisions.

There is still a long way to go and it is not just a matter of drafting communiqués after meetings of the Permanent Council. It is a far-reaching undertaking and it is gratifying to record that the new Secretary-General of WEU, Mr. Alfred Cahen, has shown that he is resolved to work to that end even before taking up his duties. He should understand that if our Assembly has often asked the ministers to appoint a politician to head the Secretariat-General, it was for the specific purpose of making the Council better able to take initiatives in regard to its own activities and to public opinion. If he really intends to persevere in this direction, he will be able to rely on the Assembly's support in the knowledge that the latter, in its absolute freedom as a parliamentary body, must be able to exercise effective supervision over its executive.

That does not mean that we have no regrets over the retirement of the present Secretary-General, Mr. Edouard Longestaey – to whom I would again like to pay a personal tribute. He took up this post at a time when the Council's inertia was making relations between the two sides of WEU very difficult and, not without success, he has spent much time and care – for which I would give him every credit – improving these relations. We can assure him that although the Assembly has often criticised the absence of initiative on the part of the Council it has always known that he was the first to suffer from this situation. It has appreciated his great ability in maintaining a dialogue between the Council and the Assembly in spite of the many difficulties and it is gratified that his term of office is culminating in a major step forward towards the common aim which, for both the Secretary-General and the Assembly, is the reactivation of Western European Union as a whole. *(Applause)*

In conclusion, I would like to recall the principal difficulty facing the Assembly itself – its budget. Whether we like it or not, it is a fact that the mere announcement of reactivation of WEU has already increased very considerably the burden on its secretariat, which has to meet an increasingly large number of calls from other quarters. There are many more meetings with the Council. The more open policy towards European countries not members of WEU and other international assemblies entails new forms of expenditure which the meagre budget so far allotted to us no longer allows us to meet.

Finally, as we all know, the response to the reactivation of WEU has forced us to take unpleasant and costly, but unfortunately essential, security measures. I shall not dwell on this painful subject. Our colleague, Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman of the Committee on Budget-

The President (continued)

ary Affairs and Administration will be making this the subject of his address. But I have to stress that, from the standpoint of the Assembly, the problem has now become critical and that, if a solution is not found to this situation very quickly, it will be unable to play its rôle in a reactivated WEU.

It remains for me to urge very strongly that the name of our organisation be changed to give public opinion a clearer notion of what we are. Our responsibility being Europe's security, we need to have a title and an identity which says so and shows clearly that Europe's security as seen by Europeans justifies our activities. Our task is to debate security in European terms and it is essential that everyone be aware of this.

Thank you, Ladies and Gentlemen. We will now go on to the other orders of the day.

7. Election of six Vice-Presidents of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the election of six Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.

Rule 7(2) of the Rules of Procedure lays down that substitutes may not be elected to the Bureau of the Assembly.

In addition, Rule 10 of the Rules of Procedure states that no representative may stand as a candidate for the office of Vice-President unless a proposal for his candidature has been sponsored in writing by three or more representatives and representatives who are members of governments may not be members of the Bureau.

The nominations have been submitted in the prescribed form.

The candidates are, in alphabetical order, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Blaauw, Mr. De Decker, Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, Mr. Goerens and Mr. Reddemann.

If there are no objections, I propose that the Vice-Presidents be elected by acclamation.

Is there any objection?...

I note that the Assembly is unanimous.

I therefore declare Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Reddemann, Mr. Blaauw, Mr. De Decker and Mr. Goerens elected as Vice-Presidents of the Assembly, and congratulate them.

8. Adoption of the draft order of business for the first part of the session

(Doc. 1005)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the adoption of the draft order of business for the first part of the session.

The draft order of business is contained in Document 1005 dated 10th May 1985.

However we have to abide by the Rules of Procedure and the decisions taken by the Presidential Committee earlier this year which were issued in the form of a memorandum approved by the Presidential Committee. They lay down that documents must be deposited at least a fortnight in advance if they are to be validly discussed by the Assembly. They then have to be referred in good time to the Council, with which we have to co-operate and to which we must also allow time to form its views. I note that some documents have not yet been distributed. These are reports by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.

I call the Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to put the viewpoint of that committee.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I shall refrain from any personal judgments. This morning, the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments decided not to include in the proceedings of this session the draft report on emerging technology and military strategy submitted by Mr. van den Bergh. The committee requested that it should be postponed to a later session.

With regard to the reports by Mr. Scheer and Dr. Miller, these and their recommendations were adopted by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Schulte, Chairman of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, to give that committee's views.

Mr. SCHULTE (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges sat this morning and reached the conclusion that the reports by Mr. Spies von Büllesheim, Mr. Eysink and Mr. Unland could not be taken this session and would have to be postponed until the next plenary session. However, we request that a debate be held and a vote taken on Mr. Jessel's report on Thursday morning.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. I have no quarrel with the decisions that have been announced to you but I hope that we shall not be put in this position again at the end of November when we meet here. As you have said, it is a fact that the Presidential Committee reached a nearly unanimous agreement that reports that were not approved with fourteen days' prior notice to the Assembly should not be discussed.

It is fortunate, from my point of view, that today I do not have to approach the question in terms of any political consideration, because I have no quarrel with the statements made by those whose reports have not received the fourteen days' notice. However, Mr. President, I stress to you – with, I think, the support of almost everyone present – that, if we are to have a rule that reports must be adopted fourteen days before a session, everyone here should be put on notice that, irrespective of party political considerations, that rule will be applied rigorously in the future, for otherwise there will be difficulties with the interpretation of the rule.

Therefore, Mr. President, I ask you to ensure that by the time we meet here in November the rule that was passed by the Presidential Committee will have been endorsed by the Committee on Rules of Procedure, so that none of us will be put in the position of having to take exception to a report presented at the very last minute.

In Bonn, Mr. President, you and I were among those who urged our ministers that they should pay us the courtesy of giving us some notice of what they intended to say, and we reciprocated by saying that we would give them the same courtesy. It is not fair to have reports presented to us for approval only twenty-four hours or less before they are put before the Assembly. The next time we meet, if any of us takes exception to a report, from whatever source it comes, if it has not received the agreed fourteen days' notice, then, without argument, it should not be discussed by the Assembly. I say that with equal force to my own conservative colleagues and to anyone else. We must not have rules that can be bent because any particular political party may be upset.

Therefore, Mr. President, I ask you, in your reply to my point of order, to assure us that, although we have been lenient on this occasion, in future, if we pass a rule, it will be adhered to, irrespective of the committee that it may offend. If the agreed fourteen days' notice has not been given, the report should not be adopted.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Blaauw.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – Notwithstanding what Sir Frederic Bennett said about applying the rules, which I support, I should like to say something on behalf of the Liberal Group about Mr. van den Bergh's report. The report has been lengthily discussed in committee but not by all the members of the committee. It has been decided, as a result, that the report is not fully qualified to be the subject of discussion in the plenary session of the Assembly.

We have also to deplore that, because of our rules, we are now unable to discuss the huge problems arising from the strategic defence initiative. As we all know, some attention was given to the subject at the ministerial session in Bonn. At the end of that consideration, it was felt that more time was needed before taking a decision. It is deplorable that, four weeks later, we should have to decide that we also cannot discuss the issue. How and why that happened are questions open for discussion in the corridors. Every individual has his own perceptions of how that discussion went.

Is it possible that some time this week on some subject we can have an open debate about the European answer to the question posed and the challenge made by the United States regarding a common thought about an allied strategy and answer to strategic options such as mass mutually-assured destruction or, probably, mutually-assured defence? I deplore that we cannot properly talk about this subject. Is there any way in which we can?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Spies von Büllesheim.

Mr. SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, in principle I go along with Sir Frederic Bennett's argument but I would point out that there is nothing in our Rules of Procedure saying in so many words that we may not consider an item on the agenda unless the documents have been tabled fourteen days before. Nor do I think that we should alter our Rules of Procedure in that sense. This Assembly is free – and should remain free – to decide what its agenda shall be. It should so decide on a case-by-case basis. If a problem to be considered is particularly difficult and particularly contentious and if new aspects have arisen, then the Assembly has good grounds, to my mind, to postpone an item of business because of the non-availability of the documents, but if a problem is simple and not contentious and if no new problems have arisen and the committee has reached agreement then we should have the freedom to discuss the particular item of business even if the documents have not been tabled fourteen days before.

Mr. Spies von Büllesheim (continued)

Today, for example, in the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, we deferred discussion of the reports by Mr. Eysink, myself and Mr. Unland with everyone's agreement because of the presence of one of these grounds – contentiousness, new aspects or difficulty. The same, to my mind, applies to the report by Mr. van den Bergh. I would like to recommend that the Assembly should not impose unnecessary restrictions on itself by means of new rules of procedure, just because of this agenda, for which many reports are not available. It should always be free to decide at the start of each session which items it is going to deal with and which it is not. The discussion of Mr. van den Bergh's report – here I agree with Sir Frederic Bennett – should be put off, as should that of the reports by Mr. Unland, myself and Mr. Eysink, at least if the Assembly agrees with the decision reached by the committee concerned.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Dreyfus-Schmidt.

Mr. DREYFUS-SCHMIDT (*France*) (Translation). – Sir Frederic Bennett asked to speak on a point of order but he referred to the Rules of Procedure, asking that they be observed and that, therefore, a report of which we had no knowledge a fortnight ago should not be discussed. The Rules of Procedure lay down that we have two or five minutes speaking time on a point of order but Sir Frederic Bennett spoke for ten. That proves that breaking the rules is quite acceptable when it is in a good cause, as he has just demonstrated.

I support the previous speaker and believe there is no point in wasting time. Let us wait for the report to be issued; when we have it we will be able to decide, in all sovereignty, whether we can discuss it or not.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Stoffelen.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – I want to follow the same point of order as Sir Frederic Bennett. I should make it clear that we all know – and please confirm, Mr. President – that we do not have a rule stating that documents should be presented at least fourteen days in advance of the session or otherwise the Assembly will not be able to discuss them. In my view, there is no such rule. The authority for changing the rule is neither the Presidential Committee nor the Committee on Rules of Procedure but only this Assembly.

Apparently, the majority on the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, for purely political reasons, made a decision that can only cause problems for all members. I have discus-

sed the wisdom of changing the rules. No one can understand why the Assembly, the only body that has the competence to discuss defence matters, should have this problem. This is vital politically. What we are about to do now, unless the majority decides otherwise, is to diminish the credibility of the Assembly. It is ridiculous that, after the meeting of the Council of Ministers, with the promise to see whether a common position could be formulated, this representative body of the people of Western Europe should not be willing to have a discussion on the matter. The only way that we can have a discussion is to debate the report. Every member is free to vote down the draft recommendation or to adopt or amend it.

I sincerely hope that the Assembly will not change the rules in such a way as to make our position as a parliament any weaker than it is now.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I note that five members of the Assembly wish to speak but we cannot go on with this discussion on procedure. I am sorry, Ladies and Gentlemen, but we have to adopt the draft order of business for this session. If we want to add any items to the order of business this can be done by way of the urgent procedure; the other problems raised are the province of the Committee on Rules of Procedure. The presidency will, for its part, ensure that deadlines for the presentation of documents are observed without imposing a "guillotine" rule. This may involve reorganising the work of the committees so that they can produce their reports without losing sight of time constraints.

In reply to Mr. Blaauw, it seems to me, that as things are, the only opportunity for this debate on the strategic defence initiative would be on Wednesday when the order of business calls for the presentation of Mr. van der Sanden's report and the address by the Chairman-in-Office, Mr. Genscher.

In view of the decisions taken by the committees, I propose that the Assembly approve the order of business as set out with the following amendments: deletion on Tuesday of the report tabled by Mr. van den Bergh on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on emerging technology and military strategy; because of the late presentation of the document, postponement, to Thursday morning, as the first order of the day, of the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on the state of European security – the central region, tabled by Dr. Miller, originally listed for Tuesday afternoon; on Wednesday, retention of the report tabled by Mr. Scheer on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on the reply to the Council; on Thursday, deletion of the reports of the

The President (continued)

Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, except that by Mr. Jessel.

Are there any objections to this new order of business?...

The draft order of business, with these amendments, is adopted.

I call Dr. Miller on a point of order.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – I should like to raise a different point of order. Is it in order for the General Affairs Committee to go to the United States on a fact-finding mission associated with the strategic defence initiative when the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments has appointed a rapporteur to do that? Was it made clear to the Presidential Committee that Mr. van den Bergh, the Rapporteur, had been to the United States to find out the facts about the strategic defence initiative? If that was not made clear to the committee, would the Presidential Committee's decision have been different, and would permission to travel to the United States and expend a large amount of money have been denied?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Milani.

Mr. MILANI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, a point of order to say that I do not agree with your proposal, because it means in substance omitting Mr. van den Bergh's report from the order of business and retaining another item, also included in the order of business, namely the report presented by Mr. Fourné on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

In my view such an order of business has little sense because the military use of European computers can only be discussed if the general problems considered in Mr. van den Bergh's report are discussed first. If that report is not taken there is little point in keeping the other one on the agenda. As the subject is the development of technologies which even if they are military are also civilian and therefore to be applied in the civilian sector, I consider that Europe is refusing to discuss the question and is prepared to trail behind the United States.

I repeat, Mr. President, that your proposal means removing an important and decisive item from the order of business. It is a complete contradiction to retain it in the form you have suggested.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – You may be perfectly right, Mr. Milani, but the Assembly has so decided in the light of the situation in which it is placed and for which, as a plenary assembly, it is in no way responsible. It is a question of organising our work.

I have noted the comment made by Dr. Miller and I can assure him that the question that concerns him will be considered, both as to its substance and its financial implications, at the meeting of the Presidential Committee on Thursday. The fact remains that we have to coordinate our activities as best we can.

I now propose that we take the next order of the day and bring this discussion on procedure to a close. I apologise to members who would have liked to speak.

9. Nomination of members to committees

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the nomination of members to committees.

The candidates for the five permanent committees and the Committee for Relations with Parliaments have been published in an Annex to Notice No. 1, which has been distributed.

In accordance with Rule 39(6) and Rule 42 *bis* these nominations are submitted to the Assembly.

Are there any objections?...

The nominations are agreed to.

10. Action by the Presidential Committee

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Presidential Committee and vote on the motion for an order on the budget of the Assembly, Docs. 1017 and 1015 and amendment)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report on action by the Presidential Committee and vote on the motion for an order on the budget of the Assembly, Documents 1017 and 1015 and amendment.

I call the Vice-President and Rapporteur, Mr. Ferrari Aggradi.

Mr. FERRARI AGGRADI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, for the first time, a report is being presented to the Assembly on the activities of the Presidential Committee. This innovation deserves some explanation.

We all believe the Assembly must not only be informed but also heard. As the parliamentary body of the Western European Union political organisation, it is indeed essential for it to be able to express its options based on a general strategic view and propose courses of action to the governments. It will thus be able to make a particularly important contribution to the reacti-

Mr. Ferrari Aggradi (continued)

vation of Western European Union since this raises highly complex and far-reaching problems for the governments.

In a period of intensive activity, however, the Assembly cannot confine itself to communicating recommendations and criticism to the Council twice a year. It must be associated in its own manner with the Council's deliberations and, where appropriate, its decisions. This is the spirit in which the Assembly in Order 58 instructed the Presidential Committee at the last session:

" To establish permanent liaison arrangements with the Council or its presidency and to see that the Assembly is enabled to bring to a successful conclusion its mission in working out a new and more important rôle for WEU. "

To be able to carry out this mission, which is not merely one of supervision but also of encouragement, the Assembly needs to be organised, like the Council, in such a way as to be able to exercise its duties continuously. This is indeed the rôle of the Presidential Committee which, under Rule 14 of the Rules of Procedure, must " take all such measures as it considers necessary for the activities of the Assembly to be properly carried on ".

While endeavouring to give more political substance to the dialogue with the Council, the Presidential Committee is trying to give the Assembly the means it needs to conduct its work effectively. The Committee's action has already produced positive political results. It is to be hoped that the same will be true in budgetary matters.

I would like to recall that since the ministerial meeting in Paris on 12th June of last year, Western European Union has entered a period of reactivation and restructuration, the Council having at last followed up the recommendations so often formulated by the Assembly.

It is above all essential for the Assembly to be directly associated with the examination of the reform of Western European Union. This is essential, and to provide food for thought prior to the Rome meeting, the President of the Assembly therefore transmitted a memorandum to the Council setting out his views on the rôle of WEU in the establishment of a European pillar of the alliance and as an instrument for harmonising views on defence matters.

In this context, the Presidential Committee took part in a meeting with the Council at the close of the Rome ministerial meeting and convened an extraordinary session of the Assembly to start an immediate dialogue on the results

of the Council's work and on the future of our organisation. This session was possible thanks to the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Mr. Genscher, who agreed, in spite of many difficulties, to present the Council's conclusions. The Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Defence of Italy, by answering questions and remarks made by members of the Assembly, allowed a particularly searching study to be made of the results obtained at the Rome meeting.

This extraordinary session had been prepared by a meeting at Gymnich on 9th October 1984 between the Chairman-in-Office of the Council and a liaison group appointed by the Presidential Committee composed of the members of the Bureau of the Assembly and representatives of political groups not represented in the Bureau so that all shades of opinion in the Assembly were represented. A similar meeting was held on 19th November 1984 in preparation for the December session at which the Assembly drew conclusions concerning the reactivation of WEU. On this occasion, the Assembly, in Order 58, instructed the Presidential Committee to institutionalise and legalise the liaison group, which had been set up more or less on a trial basis. By approving the memorandum on the Assembly's methods of work, the Presidential Committee defined the membership and terms of reference of the Committee for Relations with the Council which henceforth has the status of a subcommittee of the Presidential Committee, to which it will report.

This new body had hardly been set up before having to tackle a new problem: the time fixed for the ministerial meeting of the Council coincided with the spring session of the Assembly of the Council of Europe. This year, therefore, it has not been possible to organise the traditional meetings with the Presidential Committee, Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and General Affairs Committee. The Committee for Relations with the Council thus seemed to be the most appropriate instrument for consultations with the Council in exceptional circumstances.

The President of the Assembly had prepared this meeting by discussing with the Chairman-in-Office of the Council the main topics on which we consider an attempt should be made to harmonise European positions.

The agenda of the meeting of the Committee for Relations with the Council covered the principal subjects of concern to the Assembly. Particular mention was made of problems relating to the strategic defence initiative and Europe's possible response to the United States, the French proposal for co-operation in advanced technology, the various problems connected with the future of the organisation, its enlargement and external reactions to its reactivation,

Mr. Ferrari Aggradi (continued)

particularly in the United States. It will be for members of the Assembly to question the Chairman-in-Office of the Council about the positions adopted at the Bonn meeting. I would simply say here that the answers received to our questions are not yet very specific, but this is perhaps not so much a lack of trust in us on the part of the Council as an indication of the rather tenuous nature of the conclusions reached by the ministers.

It must be recognised that we are still far from a decision on the fundamental problem of strategic defence. We do not really understand whether and to what extent all the states are in favour of it or not; we have no very clear view of what strategic defence really represents, nor what it will cost. No agreement has been reached on the participation of European states and we do not know whether they are to participate on a collective or individual basis.

These problems should be taken as an invitation to continue our efforts to induce the Council to forge ahead with its task of harmonising the views of members on the questions which are crucial for Europe's security. The Assembly should therefore express the wish, and the Presidential Committee should ask the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, that a further meeting be organised with the Committee for Relations with the Council to prepare for the next meeting in Rome in November. The Council should be further encouraged, after completing its restructuration work, to make meaningful progress towards union and to assign tasks to the ministerial organs commensurate with the problems encountered.

At the Bonn meeting, it was not possible for the committees to hold a meeting with the Council. The obstacles which arose last April should not, however, recur this autumn. The committees concerned should decide how they wish their participation in the meeting with the ministers to be organised so that constructive work can be done and we can explain our ideas and make our contribution.

The Assembly's work on defence matters and the dialogue with the Council are set in a European and Atlantic context. The Presidential Committee therefore considered it necessary to associate other parliamentary bodies with the Assembly's deliberations in an appropriate manner. According to an already well-established tradition, observers from the parliaments of member countries of the alliance have been invited, at their request, to attend our debates. They should be thanked for their interest in our work. We are particularly happy to welcome a delegation from Portugal since that country has applied to join our organisation and

a draft resolution to that end has been presented by the General Affairs Committee. Denmark, Norway and Turkey have also asked to be represented by parliamentary observers. I would add that following a talk between the President of our Assembly and the President of the European Parliament the principle of an exchange of observers between our Defence Committee and a subcommittee of the Committee on Political Affairs of the European Parliament has been agreed upon and a start has been made with implementing it.

Relations with other parliaments are a complex matter because of the different position of each of the parliamentary bodies concerned which must be taken into account. All these points should therefore be studied in detail in the light of experience and the conclusions of the study submitted to the Assembly in a future report, in order to have clear, well-considered and uniform ideas on the future line to be taken on the question.

I conclude this part of my report with a mention of the financial implications of the Assembly's political ambitions. To carry out its tasks, the Assembly needs the assistance of a specially qualified, duly equipped, secretariat and the assistance of experts from the agencies of the Council of Ministers. It should also have the resources needed for organising its meetings, journeys by committees and public relations. We are confident that the Council will adopt a favourable attitude towards our requirements.

Statutorily, the Presidential Committee and the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration work together in establishing the Assembly's budget. It had been agreed with the latter committee that a minimum, interim draft budget would be presented at the session last December. However, this budget, which simply renewed the previous one, left out-standing the question of adapting the Assembly's means to the tasks assigned to it in the context of the reactivation of WEU. At the beginning of the year, the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration underlined the need to reconsider the means available to the Assembly and planned to request an increase in budgetary appropriations.

The Presidential Committee was informed of the wish expressed by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and decided to submit a motion for an order to the Assembly instructing it to impress upon the Council the urgency of the measures and decisions to be taken for the Assembly to carry out its work in an appropriate manner in less precarious conditions. I therefore hope, and I support the request, that it will be possible to bring home the truly disturbing position of the Assembly, whose budgetary prob-

Mr. Ferrari Aggradi (continued)

lems differ substantially from those of the Council.

The new structures of the ministerial organs were defined on 23rd April 1985 and specific tasks should be assigned to them in the near future. The financial implications of reforming WEU must be stressed. Due to a reduction in the duties of the Agency for the Control of Armaments, resources are available for new tasks without any increase in the organisation's overall budget.

I apologise, Ladies and Gentlemen, but I think this important aspect needs to be emphasised. The Assembly for its part has increased its activities without changing the number of its staff or its duties. Like the Council organs, it will have to re-examine its budget. It would indeed be paradoxical to consider that only the Assembly's tasks remain unaffected by the reactivation of WEU. In the Rome Declaration, the Council itself recognised that the Assembly is called upon to play a decisive rôle.

But the Assembly's action is hindered by the inadequacy of its secretariat for the tasks incumbent upon it and by the reduction, which must be stressed, in real terms of its operating budget.

In Rome, the governments decided by common agreement to give their support to the Assembly. The Assembly is in fact encountering growing difficulties and is liable to have to reduce its activities because of the reduction in its financial resources. Its staff is working harder and harder but is finding it increasingly difficult to fulfil the tasks entrusted to it.

At this point I have to explain what may appear to be a technical point but is really political. The Council laid down the principle of "zero growth", but the way it has been applied has led to a considerable reduction in resources in real terms: first, for several years, the level of inflation has been higher than expected; second, the cost of services and equipment has increased more than the average rate of inflation; third, the incidence of the cost of pensions on the budget has increased sharply, thus reducing resources available for running the organisation; fourth, over the years, the cumulative effect of these reductions has considerably reduced the funds available to the Assembly.

A particularly troublesome aspect of the matter, which seems to correspond to no rational reasoning, stems from the desire to impose on the Assembly from outside the way it should use the resources allocated to it and, further, to interfere in the use of means available and the choice of equipment which it considers it should procure. It is out of the question that, when we decide something should be bought,

someone should decide that we should buy something else. I believe that the Assembly should have at least that degree of autonomy.

For all these reasons, the Assembly is forced to limit projects which it considers politically essential. This year the General Affairs Committee's visit to the United States has had to be shortened and its complete cancellation was even considered, with psychological consequences that are easy to imagine. The Assembly has even found it impossible to apply its own Rules of Procedure which provide that speeches in committee may be made in the official languages of member states. In these circumstances, I do not think that the Assembly can carry out projects to which it attaches importance and which it proposes to cost very carefully; but it would be a great pity if such important projects could not be carried out when relatively modest sums are involved. I have been able to follow the work of the Permanent Council, I know its commitment to that work and I am confident that agreement will be reached in the near future.

The Assembly's dialogue with the Council will be even more productive if the Council is more active politically. The Presidential Committee for its part will continue to foster its ambition and its determination to act. We consider that after fixing the principles for the reactivation of WEU in Rome last year and the necessary supporting structure in Bonn this year, the Council can and will make full use of the vast possibilities of the organisation at its meeting in Rome next autumn.

WEU, which is a vital part of Europe's identity, is not a military organisation but it is incumbent upon it to bring about the political conditions for asserting a European personality in the various bodies contributing to Europe's security and, to this end, to harmonise views and co-ordinate efforts. The parliamentary Assembly intends to give the Council its full support in this fundamental task and expects the Council to give it the means, including the necessary funds, to pursue fruitful co-operation with it.

In this spirit, the Presidential Committee submits to the Assembly the motion for an order in Document 1015, instructing it to draw the Council's attention to the problems just mentioned and, in the light of the views set out above, to ask it to give favourable consideration to the proposals the Assembly is soon to make for improving its conditions of work.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Thank you very much, Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, for the trouble you have taken in presenting to the Assembly the report on the activities of the Presidential Committee.

The President (continued)

As you will appreciate, Ladies and Gentlemen, this is a very full report. I feel therefore that a document of this kind needs to be presented at each of our sessions, given the fields of responsibility of our presidential body which are now turning into a fairly wide-ranging and heavy workload.

I call Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – No one who has listened to the wide-ranging review presented by Mr. Ferrari Aggradi could be in any doubt that the Assembly faces many complex and difficult decisions. The tasks facing the Assembly are formidable and the difficulties ranged against us are considerable. With his diplomatic language and his experience in statesmanship, Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, to use an American colloquialism, pitched his speech fairly low. For that reason, it was that much more effective in stressing to the Assembly the position in which we now find ourselves and the very great difficulties that will face us in the months and years to come unless something is done.

The declaration at the Rome Assembly charged us with the task of playing our part in reactivating WEU. We accepted that willingly because, like many other people, we felt that WEU had been slumbering in recent years. As Mr. Ferrari Aggradi reminded us, at the beginning of the year the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, of which I have the honour to be Chairman, underlined the need to reconsider the means available to the Assembly, and requested that there should be an increase in budgetary appropriations. Mr. Ferrari Aggradi has reminded us that there was, in effect, a fairly stoical response to the efforts that were made as a result of the Rome Declaration.

In your presidential address, Mr. President, you told us that the situation was critical, and that is the right word for it. I know that Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, who was charged with reviewing the activities of the Presidential Committee, has, as always, taken his duties very seriously and has been extremely worried. He has had many conversations with me about the position of the WEU Assembly, given the state of our finances. I am not ashamed to say that a large number of governments of member countries seem to be ranged against us in this respect, with perhaps the noble exception of Mr. Ferrari Aggradi's own country, which seems to be a little more understanding than the others. But I shall not be selective or try to indicate which countries are in favour and which are against. As he makes very clear in his report, which bears

detailed study, the Assembly has for its part increased its activities without increasing the number of its staff, so it will have to re-examine its budget. Indeed, he says that it would be paradoxical to consider that only the Assembly's task remains unaffected by the recommendation. He reminds us that in the Rome Declaration the Council itself recognised that the Assembly is called upon to play a guiding rôle.

I should like to make two or three brief points which I hope and believe are pertinent – and I speak as a politician who has been in the business for twenty-three years. We are the only assembly in the whole of free democratic Western Europe whose elected representatives are in a position to discuss defence. The European Parliament cannot discuss defence; the Council of Europe cannot discuss defence. Apart from WEU, no body that I know – other than national parliaments – can discuss defence. But we can.

In our various ways, whether we are communists, extreme right-wingers, or whatever, we are the elected representatives of the people.

We are sent here by our governments to represent not only our own countries but – I have always thought of us as being some kind of collective will – the people of Europe who believe in defence and who believe that it is very important that we should be able to push forward our admittedly diverse views, our own political interpretations of what is going on. Nonetheless, on behalf of the people of Europe, we are here to represent our feelings about defence and the need in the latter part of the twentieth century for the defence of Western Europe against whatever threat may be posed against it.

As a British politician and member of this Assembly and temporarily as the transient – we are all transients – Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, I view the current position with great anxiety. I would tell the officials and the ambassadors who are here today – because, I hope, they will inform the ministers who make up the Council of Ministers – that we are the elected representatives of the people. The other arms of WEU are not elected; they are appointed. They make the decisions; they are part of the bureaucracy. Bureaucracies are much damned, and sometimes they deserve to be so damned. We can operate without them, but they cannot operate without the elected representatives of the people. If we allow them to do so, we eschew the whole basis of what we stand for. Right or wrong, efficient or inefficient, unless we have elected representatives who can put forward the ideas so necessary to a European understanding, we are nothing and we shall slide into the same kind of abyss as some of those whom we

Sir Dudley Smith (continued)

deplorable. The Council of Ministers needs reminding that its members are elected by their own parliaments and governments. They are representatives of the people, but perhaps they may be a little more out of touch than we are on matters like this.

I say to the officials and to the representatives of the Council of Ministers who are present: abolish us if you will, but please do it soon; if you do not want us, get rid of us, tell us there is no place for an Assembly, and at least we shall know where we are; tell us that we can go, but do not starve us to death so that gradually we become more impotent and less effective until we fade into the sunset with only the bureaucracy left to run the organs of WEU; it is your prerogative to dispossess us if you want to do so, but, if you do, you do so at your peril.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Sir Dudley Smith, and the committee of which you are Chairman for your support.

Mr. Ferrari Aggradi is speaking to a motion for an order, following on his report. It is the intention of the Presidential Committee to hold discussions and to maintain extremely close relations with the Council so that preparations for the important financial year ahead of us can be made on an agreed basis.

I call Sir John Page.

Sir John PAGE (*United Kingdom*). – I am moved by the idea of watching my old friend Dudley Smith riding off into the sunset like a cowboy. However, I am sure that when dawn breaks he will be seen on a new charger coming back to the attack.

I congratulate our Rapporteur, Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, on his excellent report. He lived up to an Englishman's idea of his name. A Ferrari is well designed, well researched and exciting. So was Mr. Ferrari Aggradi's speech today. Pushing it a little, Aggradi sounds as though it may have something to do with agriculture. Today, that good farmer has sown the seed for the future of WEU. I hope that this innovation of a report from the Presidential Committee will come at the beginning of our sessions on future occasions. I think that it is an extremely valuable innovation.

The Council of Ministers has given us new duties to perform. Like the housewife who has been given new responsibilities by her husband in connection with entertaining for his business and who must be given the housekeeping money to do it, I make much the same kind of plea here. I support the motion on which we shall be voting. In the words of Winston Churchill – or, if not, President Roosevelt – give us the tools and we will finish the job.

In your speech, Mr. President, you said that it was important that the work of our union should be better known in parliaments and by the public in Europe and elsewhere. I agree. I think that our press officer, almost single handed, does a marvellous job in presenting the work that we do. I do not worry greatly if the work of WEU is not mentioned every day in the newspapers. I believe that the North Atlantic Assembly spends ten or fifteen times as much as we do on public and press relations, but there is very little mention – at any rate, in the British papers – of the North Atlantic Assembly. It is important that our work should be known by the specialist organisations for defence within our own countries and parliaments. That is why we need not worry about not hitting the front pages. All we have to care about is that the specialists in our different countries know about our work.

One of the ways of improving the work of our union was the creation of the liaison group, now called the Committee for Relations with the Council. I am a little worried that we need a committee to improve our relations with the Council. It is rather like a married couple needing to have a marriage guidance counsellor always living in the spare bedroom. It may be necessary for us to do this, but there is a danger. If we have a subcommittee of the Presidential Committee, there is a danger of creating an élite within an élite. The old private soldier, like myself, slogging it out day after day at the front line will not know what this essential inner committee of the chiefs of staff will be deciding at headquarters miles behind the line.

I believe that there is a way of getting over this problem. It may be that the Committee for Relations with Parliaments has already transmitted this suggestion to the Presidential Committee. The task of the Chairman of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments should be to report to the committee what activities have taken place. That is important and valuable. It is only through that committee that we can press the right decisions to go to our parliaments.

No speech nowadays is complete without the inclusion of a Chinese proverb. The Chinese proverb that I choose for today is that every beautiful flower needs the support of green leaves. The beautiful flowers with which we in WEU are concerned are European defence and security. Let us see that WEU is the strong green leaf to support it in its work.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I shall not follow my friend and colleague, Sir John

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

Page, down his flowery path, nor can I imitate his graphic language, but I should like to bring home a few home truths towards the end of this important debate. The first thing that must be said is that our organisation will be only as good as the people who serve it. There are three aspects of that. The first is that our Assembly must try to attract more of the younger members of parliament. There are few political bodies that give a young member of parliament the opportunity to learn the trade of foreign affairs and defence policy.

A rapporteur of this Assembly has an incomparable opportunity to do research with the assistance of a qualified clerk, to interview ministers of defence, to meet leading officials in national defence ministries and to obtain an overall view of the Western European defence scene. Likewise, the work of the secretariat of our Assembly should be highly regarded. We are extremely fortunate in having a number of well-qualified and experienced clerks and other officials. There again, we need an infusion of new and expert specialists. We need people who have up-to-date experience in industrial affairs, the armed services and current diplomatic work who comprehend how the latest technical developments affect strategy.

Last but not least, we need ministers on our Council who regard the work of WEU as not just another chore but an important means of forging greater European identity in western defence.

The thinking of WEU at all levels has become ossified. By themselves the countries of Western Europe count for nothing in defence. Frontiers are close to one another. It is easy to cross from one country to another in a jet aeroplane in a matter of minutes, and the formulation of national defence can be seen only in a transnational and international context. The work of our Assembly has become more important than ever since our American friends have become increasingly worried by our apparent lack of commitment to the joint security of Western Europe.

The degree to which we can successfully revivify this organisation will be seen as a touchstone of our genuine commitment to European defence. If we are to make it an active, forward-looking and vigorous body, it must be the kind of body that non-members will seek to join. I hope that we shall be able positively to accede to Portugal's request to join. If WEU means business, I see no reason why we should not be in the business of attracting new members. Likewise, it is important that we extend every facility not just to the Portuguese observers during this interim period but to our Norwegian, Danish and Turkish friends.

If we mean business, we must provide funds for us to do the job. Sir Dudley Smith made a forthright speech. He has correctly commented that there does not yet seem to be a willingness to provide the means necessary for this Assembly to fulfil its expanded responsibilities. If the responsibilities are not expanded, the organisation will gradually wither and die.

Let us take two aspects. Mr. Ferrari Aggradi referred to one of them in his excellent report – the visit to the United States of the General Affairs Committee. It is a visit of the utmost importance. We have been proclaiming abroad how, after the Rome meeting last October, we were a new organisation with more exciting objectives and with a purpose that was endorsed by our governments. If we can go to the United States with a budget so paltry that we can afford a mere three- or four-day excursion, and only to Washington, that does not give the impression of being an up and coming organisation at the heart of European defence.

The Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions is due to go to Canada in the autumn. I am glad about that, because it is important that we discuss with our Canadian friends, for example, what our respective attitudes to the strategic defence initiative should be. We have been inhibited because we shall not have the translation facilities that we normally have. Those matters may appear to be details, but they are symptomatic of an official attitude that is not good enough. I know that you, Mr. President, in your opening remarks and everyone who has contributed to the debate have sought to bring home the genuine commitment that we in this Assembly have to this organisation.

I hope that our Council, which started with good intentions, can build up some positive successes. It was unfortunate that the Bonn meeting of the Council coincided with the Council of Europe spring session. I know that that difficulty was overcome to some extent by allowing us helicopter facilities and so on. The spring session of the Council of Europe could have been foreseen. That sort of double booking should not happen again. I hope that we shall be able to plan the meetings of our Council to prevent that sort of problem.

Since March 1983 we have had ample warning of the importance of the strategic defence initiative for the alliance's strategy and for the future of western deterrence. The two reports that I had the honour to present last year were endorsed and passed by substantial majorities in this Assembly. There is no doubt that the American administration is completely committed to the strategic defence initiative. If Europe does not present a joint approach to that important aspect of our overall security, our American

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

friends will have every reason to be impatient with us.

I am pleased with the modest progress that we made at Bonn, but, my goodness, it was modest! There is no area in which strategy is more comprehensive and transnational than in the implications of military space technology for western defence. It is an issue on which this Assembly has been pre-eminent in trying to achieve a joint European position as it has been with questions of standardisation and interoperability in armaments.

We have everything to play for. We must revivify our work here by appointing new and more expert people to the secretariat of the Assembly. We must have an infusion of new blood in the national delegations and a more positive approach from the Council. Above all, it must be the kind of body that the non-members in Western Europe who belong to NATO should ultimately seek to join. If that is the case, we shall have done our work well.

Mr. Ferrari Aggradi has set us off on the right road with a useful and constructive report. I applaud the modest progress that the Council has made so far. I want to help it, as we all do, in its important work, but it will be difficult for us to do so if we are starved of the necessary resources.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY (*United Kingdom*). – As a preface, I add my voice to the call in the President's address for a new name for WEU that better describes our task in relation to defence and security. A revised and better rôle for the Assembly means that the Assembly itself deserves a revised and better title, which should go hand in hand with the proposals to be put forward for improving the conditions of work.

I support the motion on the basis that the work of the Assembly must now be viewed in the light of the Rome Declaration and the concept of WEU as the European pillar of the North Atlantic Alliance. This leads to the conclusion that for the organisation to be effective it must consider further the areas about which it should deliberate and the resources that it should have available.

In the light of the renewal of the Warsaw Pact, it is clearly imperative for us all to preserve at minimum a balance of power and at maximum an irreversible lead in matters of security. But, regrettably, it must be recognised that such objectives may fail, and the preparation of the civilian population would then be vital.

All member states of WEU must beware of the consequences of left-wing local authorities – unfortunately, I have one in my constituency – that refuse to make adequate preparations. These councils should be thoroughly ashamed that, as a result of their misguided attempts to make political demonstrations to the Soviet bloc, their own citizens are left the more vulnerable. That is surely a subject to which a revitalised WEU should be able to address itself, and that in itself is a reason to support the motion before us.

Citizens' lives could be jeopardised, because civil defence would be essential should there be a nuclear war, conventional warfare, or, indeed, a natural disaster or a major accident. The advent of the nuclear deterrent has proved to be exactly what the term implies – a deterrent.

Since the last world war, conflicts have been carried on without such weapons. All such conflicts are tragic, but it is surely incumbent upon us to reduce tragedy to the minimum. The governments of Western Europe rightly seek true multilateral disarmament, and we must ensure peace through security. Civil defence is part of that approach.

It is worth remembering that nuclear protection covers the possibility of a nuclear war involving Western Europe and defence against accidents in nuclear installations, terrorist attack with nuclear devices, and fallout from large-scale or more limited wars between other countries fought elsewhere. All these possibilities threaten life, freedom and prosperity. They also threaten property.

Left-wing gimmickry in declaring nuclear-free zones will do nothing to prevent the awesome consequences such as those to which I have referred; nor can it achieve a certainty of freedom from attack. The key to survival is preparation. The community's well-being is such that necessary protection should be provided in the event of any form of warfare or disaster. That well-being should not be disregarded by a policy of doing as little as possible.

To deny the maximum number of the population the opportunity to survive because of a belief that services such as civil defence encourage nuclear attack must surely be wrong. Civil defence is about saving lives, not destroying them. All countries, neutral as well as aligned, that accept humanitarian principles have proper civil defence organisations. Past studies by WEU have given evidence enough that for a council to take as little action as possible for defence against nuclear attack is both irresponsible and an example of a local authority failing its people. It is to be hoped that, as a consequence of this debate, WEU will regard civil defence as another aspect of co-operation

Mr. Murphy (continued)

that the organisation can do much to promote. Support for the motion would assist WEU in that important task.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). - Mr. President, the introduction of the practice of presenting a report on the activities of the Presidential Committee is an excellent innovation and I am sure that it will be most successful. I would at once add that Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, who has submitted the first such report, has acquitted himself of his task in a masterly and effective manner. He has given us a very detailed account of the activities of the Presidential Committee, has considered what our tasks should be and has indicated the most appropriate ways of achieving more effective collaboration between the Assembly and the Council, so that each plays its rôle in WEU in accordance with the Brussels Treaty. He also makes special mention, repeating what has been said on other occasions, of the difficulties which the Assembly encounters in carrying out its duties. Sir Dudley Smith caused some excitement by questioning the representatives of the Permanent Council and through them the Council of Ministers; in a very insistent and convincing manner he did what I have perhaps done too impetuously and less effectively on other occasions.

But the problem is how do the members of the secretariat understand the functions of the Assembly? If they think that it has important functions and is essential, they should abandon their tendency to ignore its needs. Without the Assembly, WEU has no reason to exist, just as the democracies cannot exist without their national parliaments and governments cannot carry out their functions, so that the whole system falls. If this is accepted as true for a democracy, attitudes to the Assembly must change.

In present circumstances, it is no use harbouring illusions; we cannot do our work. You can restructure the Agency, the other organs and the secretariats but if you ignore the Assembly and do not give it the consideration it deserves, WEU will never be reactivated, but is fated to die.

Ladies and Gentlemen, may I say, with some pride, that the reason all this has not happened and that WEU is not dead, is not to be found in the efforts of the Council of Ministers, of other assemblies or of the secretariats but in those of the Assembly which has shown the will, has believed, has worked and has kept the organisation alive.

I consider that the time has now come for the governments to take account of all this and for the Council of Ministers to take account of the Assembly's needs. No progress can be made with the reactivation of WEU with a ridiculous budget. It must be possible to ensure that the committees can do their work and make appropriate and necessary visits. They must be given the means they need in order to present their reports. They must also have the staff they need in order to do the work I have described. This is the only way in which WEU can be reactivated. I say this quite simply and in all modesty but I believe that the conditions are at last right for all of us to do our duty; the Assembly has always done so and is prepared to continue doing so soundly and effectively. Let the Council of Ministers and the governments follow suit. In this way we shall be able to satisfy the inevitably ever-increasing needs.

It should be mentioned, Mr. President, that many other countries have believed and believe in our activities. Portugal, for example, has asked to be allowed to send a representative to attend meetings of the Assembly. I believe that such contacts with the WEU member countries are to be welcomed, because they respond to the needs of European defence and security in these days of ever-growing difficulty.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - No one else is down to speak.

Does anyone else wish to speak?...

I call Mr. Ferrari Aggradi to reply to speakers.

Mr. FERRARI AGGRADI (*Italy*) (Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should like to begin by thanking speakers for their kind words which I think are due to all members of the Presidential Committee for their unstinting efforts.

I take this opportunity to pay tribute to you, Mr. President, as the driving force behind this work and to express my personal appreciation of the great wisdom of Sir Dudley Smith, who is the Chairman of the committee of which I am a member. He has not only made some very apposite remarks, which I endorse, but he has done so in most enthusiastic terms, which is a quite exceptional occurrence as compared with his normally very reserved behaviour but proves how serious he is about these problems.

It has rarely happened to me, as it has today, to say how much I agree with what I have heard. I look upon what has been said as complementing what I was trying to say more briefly; it goes further and adds ideas following the same line on the same aspects of the great problem of making better use of our Assembly in order to collaborate actively with the Council in working together, in fulfilment of our political

Mr. Ferrari Aggradi (continued)

responsibilities with a view to co-ordinating efforts to identify problems and bring positions closer together.

The political inference I draw from this is that there is no criticism of the constitution of this important body or of its work. The congratulations we have received – the “we” is not royal but is used to include in my thoughts all the members of the Presidential Committee and of the Committee for Relations with the Council – should act as a spur to continue the work along the same lines and with the same commitment, in the awareness that what lies ahead is not easy and demands a high sense of responsibility and a firm political will.

In the report, I referred to the strategy we plan to follow, to the rôle we intend to play and to the important problems to be faced; and I said that we must equip ourselves to do all that. For this purpose, our methods of work are fundamental but the means are also necessary. It would be inappropriate to say that we want only material resources; there are other more important things, and we must in practical terms put ourselves into a position where we can do what is necessary for leading parliamentarians to make their maximum contribution.

Furthermore, I have reason to believe that the parliamentarians sent here by their national parliaments are without doubt the best qualified. We must help them to make the vital contribution which has been stated in clear terms and forms the basis of our commitment.

To this end we have tabled the following motion for an order:

“ The Assembly,

(i) Considering it essential that its needs be considered in the context of the revision of the budget of the whole organisation;

(ii) Taking account of the urgency of the problems facing the Assembly and the time necessary for the work of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration;

(iii) Noting that the measures which need to be taken cannot be long delayed,

DIRECTS THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMITTEE

To submit these comments to the Council. ”

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, for the care you have taken in presenting this report which is admittedly

rather complex because of the great variety of subjects dealt with.

I propose that the Assembly take note of the report of the Presidential Committee presented by Mr. Ferrari Aggradi.

Are there any objections?...

The Assembly takes note of the report.

The Presidential Committee has tabled a motion for an order.

I have received an amendment, Amendment 1, tabled by Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, to this motion for an order, as follows:

1. Redraft the motion for an order proper as follows:

“ To invite the Council, in the light of the above, to give favourable consideration to the proposals the Assembly is soon to make for improving its conditions of work. ”

I call Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, Vice-President of the Assembly.

Mr. FERRARI AGGRADI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, may I, in order to make the text easier to understand, replace “ comments to the Council ” with the following wording: “ To invite the Council in the light of the above to give favourable consideration to the proposals the Assembly is soon to make for improving its conditions of work. ”

If we do this we are not making general declarations but are retaining the right to go further into the matter and to resubmit it with greater authority.

Mr. President, even if all this modifies the proposal substantially, I think that this wording is effective and I would like to recommend that it be approved.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I now put Amendment 1, tabled by Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, to the vote.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

The amendment is agreed to.

We shall now vote on the amended motion for an order.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

*The amended motion for an order is adopted*¹.

1. See page 18.

**11. Date, time and orders of the day
of the next sitting**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Tuesday, 21st May, at 10 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. East-West relations ten years after the Helsinki final act (Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1013 and amendments).
2. Cyprus and European security (Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the

draft recommendation, Document 1008 and amendments).

3. Military use of computers – reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1007).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 5.15 p.m.)

SECOND SITTING

Tuesday, 21st May 1985

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the minutes.
2. Attendance register.
3. Organisation of the work of the Assembly and of its committees.
Speakers: Mr. de Vries, Sir Dudley Smith, Mr. Cifarelli, Mr. de Vries; (point of order): Mr. Jessel.
4. East-West relations ten years after the Helsinki final act
5. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 1013 and amendments).

Speakers: Mr. Haase (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Bianco, Mr. Atkinson, Mr. Cifarelli, Mr. Gianotti, Mr. Müller, Mr. Lagorce, Lord Reay, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Hill, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. de Vries, Mr. Kittelmann, Mr. Johnston, Mr. Haase (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Michel (*Chairman of the committee*), Mr. Lagorce, Lord Reay; (points of order): Mr. de Vries, Mr. Hardy.

The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Blaauw, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT. – The sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT. – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT. – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

3. Organisation of the work of the Assembly and of its committees

The PRESIDENT. – Following discussions in the Bureau this morning, I wish to make a proposal to the Assembly about the organisation of

its work and that of its committees. Our agreement yesterday to the report of Mr. Ferrari Aggradi shows how concerned the Assembly is about the efficiency of its operations as a contribution towards the reinvigoration of WEU.

Most of us would agree that there would be a significant improvement if committee reports were available for a reasonable period prior to the Assembly debating them and session agendas agreed to by the Presidential Committee did not need adjustment at our first sitting. It has been proposed, pending consideration of formal changes in the rules by the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and the Assembly, that we should now agree to hold a mini-session of committees before our December part-session with sufficient time to allow reports to be dispatched two weeks before the Assembly meets. We shall need to discuss precise details, but it is tentatively proposed that the meetings be held in the week beginning 4th November and that they take place in London.

If the Assembly agrees in principle, it will be for the Presidential Committee to discuss the details with the chairmen of the permanent committees. Is the Assembly content with the proposal that a committee mini-session should precede our December session?

I call Mr. de Vries.

Mr. de VRIES (*Netherlands*). – At first sight this seems an attractive proposal, but would it not be wise to have it in writing so that it can be discussed after consultation among representatives?

¹. See page 21.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Sir Dudley Smith.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – That proposition is new, Mr. President, in as much as I heard rumours about it only a little while ago. I hope that we shall have an opportunity to go into the budgetary implications before a final decision is made.

As representatives know, their member governments pay their fares when they go to Paris or, indeed, anywhere else, and the staff costs are reasonably minimal, apart from the supporting costs when we have an assembly such as this. I just wonder what the cost will be if we have to transport a fair number of WEU staff to London along with the other ancillary services, compared with the cost if such a mini-session were held in Paris. I do not want to be a spoilsport, but at the moment there are extreme pressures on our budget. Until we get that sorted out and, as I tried to explain in my speech yesterday, until we get some kind of extra and sensible support from the Council of Ministers, it behoves us to be very rigid about transporting members of this establishment around and about, as that immediately adds cost to WEU's bill.

The PRESIDENT. – I appreciate the anxiety of the Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration. His ideas will be taken into account in the discussions in the Presidential Committee if this proposal goes through.

I call Mr. Cifarelli.

Mr. CIFARELLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I am fully aware of the financial and budgetary needs. I recognise that we must always pay attention to this aspect of decisions. I must add, however, that as between a committee meeting in one or other of the places possible for meetings of Assembly committees, and a mini-session in London, I feel that the political arguments favour the latter course of a meeting in London.

For historical but undoubtedly illogical reasons, we have the strange situation that we are a parliament meeting in one place while the more important body, in this case the Council of Ministers, meets in London. This situation could be resolved in part at least by holding a meeting of the committee and, therefore, a mini-session in London.

One last word. I would add that basically we are following Mohammed's principle. When Mohammed asked the mountain to come to him the historical solution was that Mohammed went to the mountain.

Thank you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. – The idea behind the proposal to have the grouped meeting of committees in London is that many committees need contact with the permanent representatives of the Council. Unfortunately, the Council still sits in London. The proposed number of committee meetings should not be in excess of the usual number, and the idea is that they should be grouped so that there will always be a quorum. That would avoid the problem that reports that are properly debated are not voted on simply because a quorum does not exist.

Mr. de Vries requires an answer from me. What I have said to the Assembly will be circulated, and everyone will then be able to consider the proposal. After thinking about it, a proper in-depth discussion can then take place in the Presidential Committee.

I call Mr. de Vries.

Mr. de VRIES (*Netherlands*). – I think that it would be reasonable to circulate this proposal and perhaps have a debate tomorrow or on Thursday morning so that we can consider all the implications of the proposal and then decide. I do not say that it is an unattractive proposition. It is an attractive idea but it has implications.

The PRESIDENT. – We shall follow your advice, Mr. de Vries, and find a place on the agenda to discuss it when the document has been circulated. Does anyone else wish to speak on this subject? If not, I propose...

Mr. JESSEL (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order Mr. President. May I refer to my report, which is due for debate on Thursday morning, from the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges concerning the terms of reference and powers of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments. Unfortunately – I knew about this only half an hour ago – there is to be a funeral on Thursday morning which I feel obliged to attend. It is the funeral of the general who was the head of the main institution in my constituency – Hampton Court royal palace. I feel that I cannot do other than attend.

I therefore approached the President of the Assembly outside the hemicycle ten minutes ago and asked him whether, in these special circumstances, he would be willing to sanction an alteration of the time of Thursday's debate. He said that, provided you were willing, he would be prepared so to sanction it, and I would have to return to London tomorrow. I therefore hope, Mr. President, that you will be able to find a slot for this debate some time this afternoon.

The PRESIDENT. – I was already intending to propose that we should try to finish our business this afternoon at 6 p.m. sharp, but on your

The President (continued)

proposal, Mr. Jessel, I shall contact the President and see whether we can find somewhere in the agenda a possibility of acceding to your request so that you will be free to leave the session earlier.

4. East-West relations ten years after the Helsinki final act

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 1013 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT. – The orders of the day now provide for the presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on East-West relations ten years after the Helsinki final act, Document 1013 and amendments.

I call the Rapporteur, Mr. Haase.

Mr. HAASE (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should like to make a few comments on the report before you without going into it in any depth. But I will begin by saying that in my opinion the public should be reminded of three matters which induced the Assembly to express its views on so important a subject in public: first, the Rome Declaration, which gives the Assembly a far greater rôle, second, the tenth anniversary of the Helsinki final act on 1st August and, third, the extension of the Warsaw Pact. If the world is to be kept in economic, social and military balance, the West needs, first, an inner cohesion among the European allies and, second, a close relationship with the United States based on mutual trust. It needs a common strategy – I repeat, a common strategy – to counter Soviet expansionism; it needs a coherent concept for its own continued economic development. Western Europe's solidarity with the United States in recent years has been very successful particularly in the context of efforts within the CSCE framework.

What objectives should we now be pursuing with this recommendation? In the political sphere we should above all try to ensure respect for human rights. I have stated my opinion on this subject in detail in paragraphs 5, 78, 85 and 87, but there are two more specific comments I wish to make. The obstacles the Soviet Union places in the path of Soviet Jews wanting to emigrate must be seen as a serious infringement of Basket III of the CSCE final act. The same is true of other would-be emigrant groups, such as ethnic Germans in Eastern European countries. The Soviet Union and the Polish Government must be made to understand that we shall always regard the treatment of Polish trade

unionists, priests and Catholics as a touchstone of progress towards respect for human rights in compliance with the CSCE final act.

I have no wish to conceal the positive aspects, such as the trial of the murderers of Father Popieluszko and easier travel for Hungarians, Czechs, Poles and, soon I hope, citizens of the German Democratic Republic. Without the CSCE even this limited progress would not have been possible.

Another crucial area of the political aspect of this report is the equality and self-determination of the peoples including the Germans. I say this as a social democratic member of parliament in view of the debate on amendments to the provisions contained in the preamble to the German basic law. I believe it is still true to say that all nations have the right to decide how they want to live in future and whether they want to live together. This is a very important provision of the Helsinki final act, and we should recall it distinctly.

WEU should also express its views clearly on the economic sphere. I believe the provisions of the treaty allow this and it would contribute both to détente and to better understanding between the nations.

I feel the Europeans must insist on increased trade between the blocs. This is a political question, in which the European view should be made clear to our American friends and allies as well. Another important point that I want to re-emphasise is that, as it says in the recommendation, agreement should be reached with the United States on the participation of Europe in space research of a scientific nature. I would add that this is not necessarily a statement on the SDI. But I should like to begin with a point that has become particularly clear to me in the last two weeks. As a German social democrat I appeal to the French not to be distrustful or annoyed because of political misunderstandings that may arise in this connection. What German parliamentarians want above all else is European co-operation. The wording I have used in the recommendation is designed to indicate the political priority of this area of research. In other words, this is a European priority. Of course, it needs to be itemised and expanded, but that is not the task of the report, though I think this is the place to point it out.

Another comment on armaments co-operation with the United States. The need to strengthen the western alliance will entail co-operation in armaments policy between the United States and Western Europe, which means a division of labour between the United States and Western Europe in the manufacture of armaments to meet the aggregate requirements of the alliance. The alliance will also have to establish a

Mr. Haase (continued)

system of joint research and development for purely defensive weapons systems, both in the conventional sphere – intelligent missiles, for example – and in the sphere of research. From the outset the political goal must be to create systems to safeguard Europe against both limited, regional and nuclear attack with the umbrella which the United States holds over Europe.

In view of its mandate to encourage disarmament, WEU should participate in this debate. During its visit to America the General Affairs Committee should have further talks and gather information on this specific aspect so that we can make our position clear to our American friends too.

The protection of the environment seems to me to be a new area for exchanges between the eastern bloc and the western part of Europe. It is a subject of the utmost importance to us all, and this would be a good opportunity for co-operation and the continuation of the CSCE.

In the area of security, what is needed is a more accurate definition of non-aggression, and here, Ladies and Gentlemen, we are on the offensive. It is not enough to say that we have a ruling in the United Nations charter: until these provisions are defined in detail, we shall never know whether East and West mean the same thing. We should also remind the eastern bloc again and again that the policy of détente will not become credible in western eyes unless we are sure of agreement on the definition of non-aggression.

To conclude, I should like to mention yet another aspect of the reinforcement of the European part of the alliance. With specific reference to Article V of the WEU treaty, we should invite France to reorganise its conventional forces for the purposes of forward defence in Europe. Again as a German member of parliament, I believe this could be done with a French officer as supreme commander. This can only be a passing reference, of course, as regards the report, but it would be a good way of achieving a balance of the treaties between East and West and would amplify the European pillar. I feel there should be specific discussion of this subject by the Assembly in the near future. A balance between the blocs and an easier understanding in areas not covered by the Helsinki final act will not be achieved unless the balance is also strengthened by European solidarity.

I will close by reverting to the idea of greater security for our peoples. The reduction of tension would then become a decisive criterion for further developments in Europe. We all know that the CSCE has not yet been a major break-

through, but it has had positive effects which are described in the report, and I believe we are all aware of them. Many people, particularly in Eastern Europe, are full of hope. After the CSCE final act was signed committees were set up in the eastern bloc to ensure respect for human rights and promote détente among the nations, and the West too is conscious that there is no alternative to the policy of détente. I believe this to be the crucial standpoint for the Assembly: there is no alternative to a policy of détente that seeks to make peace in Europe more secure. That, Ladies and Gentlemen, is what we should be working for.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Bianco.

Mr. BIANCO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, we must be grateful to Mr. Haase for his full and important report, which I think I can largely endorse. It covers the whole problem facing us today, ten years after the signature of the Helsinki final act. I shall therefore confine myself to a few brief comments.

After the final act was signed ten years ago, what was referred to as the Helsinki spirit spread throughout the world. Great hopes were born and it was believed that one phase of East-West relations had come to an end and that, after signature of the final act, a new era of closer, positive relations could begin, guaranteeing world peace for many years ahead.

Unfortunately, after this length of time, we have to acknowledge that we are faced by two parallel developments: on the one hand, for example, East-West relations have continued to experience ups and downs while, on the other, these ten years have been marked by acute tension. But if history is to teach us anything, I believe that the main emphasis should be laid on the positive aspects of relations which have run into some difficulties, as at Belgrade, but have also had positive moments as at Madrid. This shows that the spirit which reigned when the Helsinki final act was signed must somehow be maintained in our countries. The conviction that negotiations with the eastern countries must be continued untiringly should be stressed over and over again. Politicians, in their parliaments and in international organisations such as the WEU Assembly, must insist on the need to maintain relations, not in a purely unilateral, pacifist spirit, as in the case of some political groups, but from a realistic standpoint, taking into account the problems of western security, the problem of the balance of forces and, in any case, the need to look to the future, bearing in mind at all times the possibility of reaching agreement and not seeking to block the scientific and technological progress which some countries are achieving.

Mr. Bianco (continued)

I should like, however, to stress one specific point; as the Rapporteur indicates, the Helsinki final act makes no provision for sanctions. It is in practice an agreement which can only make progress in a climate of positive international relations. It is difficult to imagine sanctions being taken against any country. In order to exert a positive influence, however, continuous attention must be paid to the frequent clear violations of human rights and to other unresolved issues.

Too often it happens in the western countries that problems treated as urgent because they are at an acute stage – I am thinking of Afghanistan, for example – are later forgotten by the mass media and the politicians. But we should keep these questions in mind until they are resolved or have moved towards a peaceful solution; they should be the subject of constant attention, but all this should not, as the report proposes, prevent the maintenance of relations and the continuation of negotiations at all levels.

Today, there are both hopes and fears surrounding East-West relations. We know that negotiations with a country like the Soviet Union are not easy and that they cannot be carried forward purely on the basis of surrender but must be conducted in realistic terms. In my country, when we ratified the treaty for the deployment of Pershing and cruise missiles, in response to the SS-20s, it was believed that this would make the chances of peace more remote. On the contrary, we saw, after a few months, that this decision had helped the resumption of negotiations, and had provided a basis for reflection and for the re-establishment of relations. I do not think it can be denied that the resumption of the Geneva negotiations has also been spurred on by the decisions taken by the western countries for restoring the balance of forces. Of necessity, there are differences of psychology. But one of the points highlighted by the Helsinki final act was the development of economic and cultural relations. I think that, from this standpoint, the western countries, the WEU countries, have perhaps not done much. There are strategic, political and commercial problems where security is involved but I think that Italy, for example, did well not to accept the call to stop further deliveries of methane and, therefore, completion of the gas pipeline, although proper concern should be shown on such points as over-dependence on Russian energy.

I think that the development by some countries of economic contacts and trade, together with the expansion of cultural relations, is an important move which should be backed.

From this standpoint, the countries could jointly pursue an active policy not only towards

the Soviet Union but also towards each of the eastern countries. We should for example, find out what political line the new Soviet leaders are taking. The appointment of the new secretary gives the eastern countries space and room to manoeuvre in the attempt to keep open the dialogue between the eastern and western countries. I do not think, therefore, that a strictly rigid condition can be maintained. I do not think that Honecker can be banned for ever from having active relations with the western countries.

The visit by the President of the German Democratic Republic to Italy seems to me to be evidence of the resumption of some kind of initiative. This is important; we must explore fully the possibility of economic and commercial relations with those countries.

Finally, Mr. President, the countries meeting in the WEU Assembly have a positive word to say. And this word will be even more positive if the various countries co-ordinate their policies and if they speak together, even if they act separately. In my opinion, the shift towards individualism and nationalism cannot continue. If the nationalism of any country is to produce results it should, in my view, be channelled into a European spirit. In too many cases statements by politicians reported in the press can nurture over-nationalistic policies. Frequently, the policies of some countries are concerned more with party interests than with consolidating the situation I have mentioned.

It would certainly be more fruitful, important and positive for Europe as a whole if the Council of Ministers and the Assembly could find common ground for uniting the separate policies and for advancing a single Western European policy, exploring and maintaining the Helsinki spirit to the full. And the Helsinki spirit is the spirit of freedom, the spirit of human rights and of free trade on a large scale. This I believe is the policy which should be pursued.

In this context, I think that the report before us is a positive contribution.

The PRESIDENT. – I draw the attention of all speakers to the fact that we should like to finish at 6 p.m. today. If we have lengthy speeches, although they are full and worthwhile, we shall not finish this subject by 6 p.m.

I call Mr. Atkinson.

Mr. ATKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I wish to congratulate the Rapporteur on the wide scope of his report and its recommendations. I want, however, to concentrate upon what I regard as the inadequacy of the report's second recommendation. After ten years, it is not enough to use the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki final act to

Mr. Atkinson (continued)

seek confirmation by all the signatory powers of their determination effectively to apply all the principles contained in that act.

Opportunities for embracing confirmation have occurred in every review conference since the final act was signed – Belgrade in 1978 and Madrid between 1980 and 1982. On each occasion the Soviet Union and its allies have proved to be unaccountable and evasive about human rights and fundamental freedoms. It is not good enough to allow ourselves to be lulled by the undoubted charms of Mr. and Mrs. Gorbachev whose image creation in the western media is fast rivalling that of Hollywood and, indeed, of Dallas.

As a member of the Politburo, Mr. Gorbachev must accept collective responsibility for the most serious clampdown on human rights in his country since Stalin. It appears to be continuing as ruthlessly following his elevation to the leadership, notwithstanding the modest increase in the issuing of exit visas last month to Jewish refuseniks. I accept that any new leader will have new ambitions for his people and that he must be given the benefit of time to change the existing policy of repressing all known opposition. No, ten years after the Helsinki act we must seek to strengthen it and to put more pressure on the signatory states to implement it.

As you may know, Mr. President, the Legal Affairs Committee of the Council of Europe, supported by the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, suggested that the time had now come for the terms of the final act to be legally binding upon the states that signed it as other international treaties are legally enforced by international law. By elevating the terms of the Helsinki act in that way certain action follows, such as the establishment of machinery to investigate violations. That is an initiative for which many of us have called for many years.

I hope that such a suggestion will be considered by the current meeting of the experts on human rights taking place in Ottawa. It would be given more impetus if the WEU Assembly could commit itself to it in principle today.

I am sorry that parliamentary duties at Westminster yesterday prevented me from being able to attend the Assembly to table an appropriate amendment for debate today. I should be pleased to hear the Rapporteur's comments on the suggestion that the Helsinki final act should now be legally binding on its members before I can support recommendations which, in my view, represent a missed opportunity.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Cifarelli.

Mr. CIFARELLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should first like to offer the Rapporteur more than conventional thanks because his report is full, well-argued and balanced and avoids the danger of a discussion of past history. Italian lawyers say *in praeteritum non vivitur*. It is not enough merely to discuss the past which belongs to the historians; we have to make political assessments.

In preparing to speak in this important debate on behalf of my political associates, I gave most attention to the draft recommendation on the proposals before us. I cannot, however, state a position without first stressing that, in this recollection of the drafting of the Helsinki final act, one basic point has to be highlighted. I am referring to the fact that the original idea, dear to Moscow, of reaching agreement between all the European countries was – rightly – opposed and successfully opposed, in the form given to the Helsinki final act in which the United States and Canada participated both originally and in subsequent developments. That is, the attempt to lump together the European countries, almost all very weak in face of the colossal strength of the Soviet superpower, was successfully met – and this is the result of the long peace since the second world war and of the maintenance of peace – by a solution involving the full participation of the United States and Canada in the final act. This is a point we must never forget because peace is built upon it; it must continue to be borne in mind.

I have to say, however, that these hopes were badly dashed very quickly. We remember Afghanistan, Poland, Sakharov, who is still a prisoner in exile – we do not know where. We remember the Jews who cannot get out of the Soviet Union and who, when they ask to do so, are persecuted, deprived of work and of all opportunities to worship. At the same time, however, we must remember that great hopes were reposed in the Helsinki final act, translated into terms which could be presented as rights. And when we regret – as we certainly do – that sanctions cannot be applied in respect of the Helsinki final act, we must not forget that in history, as in life, the fact of having signed a treaty is already a benchmark of great political value. Disappointment at Belgrade and at Madrid, but we must accept that the act in question must above all be seen in terms of the future. I shall try to give my views on these problems, first stressing and supporting the Rapporteur's suggestion to seek and specify more measures designed to restore confidence between the states taking part in the conference. Let us remember that this was one of the aims of the Helsinki proposal and then of the drafting of the Helsinki final act; by accepting the countries as they emerged from the second world war, with their frontiers – disputed and only endured in

Mr. Cifarelli (continued)

many cases – all we Europeans were seeking to make a fresh start, to provide the basis for subsequent confidence and to ensure that every military manœuvre could not be interpreted as they all have been interpreted, correctly, in the case of the manœuvres around Poland and even on Polish territory when Solidarity became the main problem.

To specify, as the Rapporteur suggests, that provision should be made for the presence of more observers in order to increase confidence between the different countries means turning again to something which is in fact the leitmotiv of every attempt to establish balanced and controlled disarmament – and control is a most important and significant term. I also support the proposal that we Europeans should work out a joint position for the Geneva conference. The inference is that there can be no disagreement; but the fact that there is no dissenting voice does not mean that agreement can be reached quickly. I will not repeat what Mr. Bianco said in his total rejection of selfish nationalism. Let the words be said by the representative of a political doctrine based on the assertion of national unity; on this point the German and Italian members understand each other very well, because they both represent countries brought into being during the 19th century under the inspiration of national liberty. We know the great harm that nationalism can cause, we know that respect for national rights, when it degenerates into nationalism and becomes *Deutschland über alles*, makes it very difficult to work anything out; but it must be done. I therefore agree with Mr. Bianco on this point.

Turning to paragraph 3, I can accept subparagraphs (a), (b) and (d) but regarding subparagraph (c) I note that the Rapporteur here gives an acceptable form of words: the participation of Europe, in agreement with the United States, in space research of a scientific nature. We must all agree, unless we are mad and want to reduce Europe to a society of shepherds, left behind by history and a society not in the forefront of scientific progress and missing all the opportunities offered in all areas, including defence. A state which does not defend itself is a non-state. I should like to say, in passing, that the economic picture of Europe over the last ten years, as painted in the report, is one of its significant features; but we must not adopt a position of scandalised opposition to the various needs. Those who know understand that it is not only the United States which is considering and working for this research; at major scientific meetings I have listened to Soviet and American scientists, for example, the summer meetings at Erice. The subject under discussion was “You are engaged in this research and have not

achieved any results”. The reply was “You are engaged in research based on a premise you cannot establish in practice”. These are facts for the scientists; what concerns us politicians, who speak for the democracies, is that we cannot adopt a captious and unconstructive attitude. “Get thee behind me Satan; we must not talk about such things”. Nothing of the kind: there is a scientific aspect and Europe must be present. Let us remember that in forecasts concerning the growth of the most highly industrialised countries in the world, Europe as a whole is not even to be considered as compared with Japan and the United States. We should be particularly concerned to remember that progress also means economic growth, civilian involvement and political development.

I agree with Lord Reay's amendment to paragraph 4 but I believe that we are faced with one of those formulations in which we should ask: is it an ideological illusion or a guideline to advocate the inclusion in documents, including the modified Brussels Treaty, on which this Assembly is founded, the section relating to non-recourse to threat as embodied in the Helsinki final act? Does this mean repeating something already subscribed to by all the states which took part in the Helsinki conference? Shall we succeed or not? The Assembly should not lack the courage to propose and insist.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Gianotti.

Mr. GIANOTTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, we appreciate Mr. Haase's report and the draft recommendation. The latter starts, however, with the assertion that the Atlantic Alliance between Europeans and Americans is the basis of European security and peace.

In our view, there is a more general prior issue: what is fundamental for Europe – both East and West – is the improvement of East-West relations. If, as stated in other parts of the report, there is no détente, Europe's fate is greater subordination on one side and division on the other. Furthermore, the arms race – and events over the last ten years have amply demonstrated this – hardens the internal régimes of the East European countries. And, lastly, we continue to believe that Europe does not end at the frontiers between the two blocs and that it is essential to adapt our own attitudes to this idea.

We feel that if this is not taken as the starting point, the only way to achieve the security of Western Europe is by increasing armaments. We also feel that if we do not start from the general idea that détente is essential for Europe, the proposal in paragraph 1 (c) for the definition of a joint position on matters discussed by the United States and the Soviet Union at the Geneva conference may prove a foolish hope.

Mr. Gianotti (continued)

The Helsinki final act, of which we are celebrating the tenth anniversary, declares that respect for human rights and freedom is essential. We can only reiterate that this is true. Paragraph 9 of the report states that factors such as those relating to security and human rights cannot be bargained against concessions in other directions – in economic matters, for example. This seems to me to be a correct but abstract statement. It is true that the negotiations must not be a matter of mere bargaining but it must be understood that they require better relations between the parties round all the tables, as otherwise it will be difficult to establish the climate of confidence which we call for; in other words the various negotiating groups can help each other and prevent hitches. It is also essential that each side should abandon all preconditions.

Paragraph (iii) of the recommendation should also mention that the same thing has happened and is happening in Turkey.

Paragraph 3 (c) speaks of European participation, in agreement with the United States, in space research of a scientific nature. This is a reference to the strategic defence initiative. I have one reservation: this, as we all know, is the area where the arms race is fiercest and it is one of the main obstacles to the East-West negotiations. We believe that this is the area for moving towards agreement.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the historical background to the CSCE conference in Helsinki was dominated by two hopes. The West hoped it would enable the process of détente that had developed in the late 1960s and early 1970s to continue, while the Soviet Union hoped above all else that it would establish once and for all the position resulting from the second world war. Quite obviously, such disparate hopes lead to different interpretations of the consequences of the Helsinki final act. I believe the Soviet Union's desire to see the results of its 1945 policy confirmed has been fulfilled in every way.

As so much has recently been said in Europe about the events of 8th May 1945, let me remind you that those events resulted in part from the fact that the pact between Hitler and Stalin and the secret supplementary agreements of August 1939 anticipated what actually occurred in 1945. We know, of course, that even more extensive demands regarding the partition of Europe were made in November 1940 during the visit by the then Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov to Berlin than had been made in 1939,

and we know that the Soviet Union was also demanding the August 1939 version of the partition of Europe before war broke out between Adolf Hitler's German Reich and Stalin's Soviet Union in 1941. The Soviet Union not only recovered parts of the tsarist empire it had lost in 1918 but seized a great deal more besides. I would merely remind you of the ultimatum to Romania, demanding the return not only of the area formerly known as Bessarabia, which had formed part of tsarist Russia, but also parts of Bucovina, including Cernowitz, which had never belonged to Russia.

As Mr. Gianotti has just brought Turkey into the debate, I should perhaps point out that Turkey has inevitably always felt threatened by the Soviet Union, which even during the war demanded military bases on the Bosphorus. It repeated this demand at the conferences of foreign ministers held after 1945. For example, its demands for a naval base at Massawa and for disposal rights over the Italian colonies after 1945 reveal the long-term strategy of Soviet policy.

Where the rôle of the Soviet Union and communist policy is concerned, I might add, incidentally, that we must never forget, even now, what a miserable part the French communists played between 1939 and 1941, when they fully endorsed the policy of Adolf Hitler and Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin.

The hopes attached to the decisions on human rights in the Helsinki final act have not been fulfilled. I should like to quote from an article in an American magazine of 17th May of this year, in which a number of leading human rights activists in the Soviet Union call on the western countries to declare the CSCE final act null and void because its provisions on human rights have not been met. They include such people as Bukovsky, Ginsburg, Maximov, Grigorenko and Plutsch, to name but a few of the most familiar names.

I was also very surprised to hear Mr. Gianotti saying just now that Turkey should similarly be called upon to respect human rights. I am prepared to do so, Mr. Gianotti – unfortunately he is no longer here – when the same democratic development is initiated in the Soviet Union and the satellite countries as has been initiated in Turkey, resulting in the restoration of democracy in that country. I hope I shall live to see the day when this happens in the Soviet Union and the other communist dictatorships of Eastern Europe.

I should like to underline one idea with regard to the West's position in the CSCE process. I am grateful to Mr. Haase for expressing it so clearly in his report. Unless our policy is coordinated with the policy of the United States and unless the West remains firm, it will be

Mr. Müller (continued)

absolutely impossible to initiate a process of détente because that would endanger security and also because the Soviet Union would no longer be interested in détente and could continue its pursuit of hegemony.

A few weeks ago I and some of the people here present were able to talk to a delegation from the Supreme Soviet visiting Bonn. What Mr. Simyatin, the representative of the Central Committee, said on that occasion was so clear and unequivocal that the only proper response, given by one of our delegates, was this: "Mr. Simyatin, I wonder how you would talk to us if we were not allies of the United States!" I feel that was a most revealing remark, showing how much the security of the West depends on our being unified.

The same applies to the internal disputes in our countries, because there is always a fifth column - to use a term from the Spanish civil war - representing Soviet interests in our countries. In this respect there is no equality of opportunity, since, conversely, specific interests cannot be defended in the communist countries.

I am also very grateful to Mr. Haase for stressing that our activities with respect to the SDI should be co-ordinated with the United States. I have a quite specific personal interest in this, because I know that the Soviet Union has long been carrying out military research and conducting military experiments in space. It was over my constituency in southern Lower Bavaria that that famous first use of a killer satellite to eliminate another satellite took place in large-scale Soviet manoeuvres. So we know what we are talking about.

I am grateful to Mr. Bianco for emphasising that the debate on the arms build-up, on Pershing missiles, has in fact assisted the process of détente: when the Soviet Union saw the determination of the western countries, it was prepared to return to the negotiating table.

Finally, I should like to see the parliamentarians in this Assembly, who represent the member states of Western European Union, becoming even more conscious of their value in co-operation with the United States when it comes to maintaining European positions with a view to the further development of policy on our security and on détente. If that is the conclusion we draw ten years after Helsinki, we are on the right track.

The PRESIDENT. - I call Mr. Lagorce.

Mr. LAGORCE (*France*) (Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, in his very detailed, full and clear report, which I approve without reservation, Mr. Haase goes

back over what has happened in Europe in the ten years now coming to an end and describes the disturbing limits and exciting hopes of those paradoxical events.

In the draft recommendation he tells us, on the one hand, that the Helsinki final act is the charter for any reduction of tension in Europe - and therefore essential to the world - and, on the other, that its principles are still far from being implemented. In other words we planned détente but have not been able to put it into effect. There is the basic paradox.

The truth of this statement is evident. Too little progress has been made. It is also certain that in this crucial field, we have to move from words to deeds or, if I may put it this way, from the ideal to the real as quickly and as effectively as possible. The report makes it abundantly clear that the task is difficult and complex and at the same time affirms the need for commitment and the obligation to succeed.

In this case the truth is a truism. Whilst not forgetting the dozens of what are coyly called "regional" conflicts, the major world problem is the East-West dichotomy, i.e. the different way the Soviet Union and the United States look at their own and each other's security and their apprehension about the resources the other already has or is planning to acquire to imperil that security. That is the main fact about the gap between reality and the Helsinki principles. Everyone, here and elsewhere, knows this, just as we all know the uncomfortable position of Europe which, in the awful event of a third world conflict, would be the inevitable battlefield. These further truths threaten us and at the same time fill our minds. But it would be a disaster were they to paralyse us. We have to fight despair however it shows itself in order to make conflict more remote and to encourage all useful dialogue between the countries concerned without, at the same time, leaving the western camp to which, for reasons of sentiment and advantage, we belong. It is vital that we should, actively and effectively, follow this road mapped out by Mr. Haase to international stability, to security for all and therefore, to peace.

This concerted action is necessary even if differences still divide our countries and the members of our alliance.

To quote Mr. Haase once again, one of the surest contributions to détente and world peace is understanding and concerted action in Europe and more particularly understanding between the seven countries of WEU.

In spite of regrettable, almost legitimate and unavoidable but minor intra-European differences and in the face of the danger of a world

Mr. Lagorce (continued)

war which would inevitably destroy our countries, we have to give reality to the union of our countries, which history has already united, to the defence of identical values and to the upholding of the same desire for peace.

The report makes the point that these differences should not be such as to prevent the representatives of the seven member states from meeting at the appropriate level and in the framework of WEU in order to try to overcome them and to present, in our relations with our American allies and those other Europeans, the Russians, the highest possible degree of unity in support of the essential requirements of security in Europe, one of the guarantees of world peace.

There is no question, of course, of going back on the Canossa or Munich alliances or of sacrificing our friendships or our interests. Western Europe has to proclaim through WEU the continuity, importance and political, economic, cultural, financial and military strength of a united, mutually-supportive and independent Europe that is neither aggressive nor compliant, and bring to bear the real weight of a Europe determined and able to voice its opinion and at the same time to understand the legitimate ideas and positions of the Americans and the Russians without yielding to those features of either that may or might be too self-centred or dangerous.

For this to be, Europe has to be morally and politically united. None of our countries on its own can reach the necessary level. What I would call our family disagreements have so far prevented us from raising our natural solidarity to the level of these essential requirements. They will not go away by magic. We have to bear with them and strive to bring them if not completely then at least sufficiently under control to achieve the great goal of peace.

We have to strive for speedier success in achieving practical unity in the day-to-day international situation so that, together, we may improve East-West relations in accordance with the principles of the Helsinki final act and in preparation for the gradual construction at the earliest possible date of the North-South axis whose successful realisation is imposed upon us by the same basic necessity.

Using the various means set out so realistically by Mr. Haase we have to do all we can to bring about this essential transition from words to deeds, from wishes to action and from principles to reality. The Helsinki final act is not a fairy tale. In the interest of the world it is the duty of Europe, and WEU in particular, to further the practical implementation of the final act during the next ten years.

The PRESIDENT. – The Assembly will recall that in replying to the point of order raised by Mr. Jessel the presidency undertook to look into the possibility of bringing forward the report from the Committee on Rules of Procedure, of which Mr. Jessel is Rapporteur.

I propose that the report be considered immediately after the speech by Baroness Young and replies to questions this afternoon. Thereafter we shall return to any of this morning's orders of the day which have not been disposed of.

It is understood, however, that we shall end this afternoon's sitting at 6 p.m.

I call Lord Reay.

Lord REAY (*United Kingdom*). – The report was passed by the committee without any great enthusiasm. Those abstaining were only one fewer than those voting in favour. My main criticism is that insufficient weight is given to the importance of the need to respect human rights – the old Basket III at Helsinki.

The first recommendation in the report deals with the first two baskets – arms control and security – but makes no mention of human rights, which is relegated to the second recommendation, on a level equal with six other general principles. Similarly, the last recommendation, paragraph 4, expresses a desire for another declaration on the non-use of force, which is a Soviet proposal, without balancing this by asking for a declaration on human rights. I have tabled an amendment to introduce a request for such a declaration.

The report seems to reveal an erosion in the western position on human rights. That erosion is to be seen also in the world outside. Originally, the West agreed to enter the CSCE talks at Helsinki only because the question of human rights was to be included. Now human rights have to be separated from arms control and security matters and are being discussed in Ottawa while the others are being discussed in Stockholm. The communist régimes do not want to discuss human rights, although they want to discuss arms control and security, where they can feel that they may be able to gain something. They do not feel that they can gain from any discussion of human rights.

This compliance by the West in an erosion of its previous position on human rights has been accompanied, not unsurprisingly, by a deterioration in communist countries of respect for freedom. In the Soviet Union almost all those who announced that they would monitor the Helsinki agreement have been either imprisoned or exiled, which is an eloquent commentary on the disrespect that the Soviet Union is capable of showing for international treaties. Very few exit visas are granted by the Soviet

Lord Reay (continued)

Union. Dissent has been virtually silenced by oppression.

It is true that the following words are included in the draft recommendation as paragraph (iii) of the preamble:

“ Considering that in many cases in Eastern Europe human rights have not been respected and that this has not facilitated efforts for peace; ”

That is, of course, an understatement. The violation of human rights and freedoms is systematically practised by communist régimes. Indeed, it is the foundation on which the Soviet empire is and perhaps has to be based.

Soviet expansionism is only an extension of Soviet imperialism, which is based on oppression. It is this expansionism which is the root cause of tension in the world between East and West. It is an illusion to suppose that there can ever be détente or peaceful coexistence or, indeed, even a stable military balance between East and West as long as the Soviet Union and the satellite countries of its empire base their political power at home on ever-severer repression and on constant dreams of expansion abroad. I agree with the Rapporteur that we should maintain trade and other exchanges. I think that lack of contact between East and West is much more dangerous than contact, but not at the price of silent acquiescence in the crimes and cruelties practised on other peoples by Soviet imperialists and their agents, whether in Poland, Afghanistan or Cambodia.

For these reasons, I shall seek to introduce the amendment to which I referred, which asks that any agreement at Stockholm on the non-use of force, as requested in paragraph 4, should be linked to an agreement in Ottawa on the need to confirm respect for human rights. That would help to prevent human rights from being pushed off the stage entirely, as is happening today, and was, I believe, put forward as a proposal by the Swiss Government in Stockholm. It would also serve as a reminder that human rights and security cannot be separated.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – Lord Reay rightly pointed out that there was a lack of enthusiasm about this report. That is because there is in many respects a lack of reality about it. I was one of those who abstained then, and I shall certainly abstain today. I could not vote against such a report, because it puts forward a number of good proposals, but I cannot vote for a report that lacks realism about the world as it is as opposed to what we should like it to be.

It is worth recalling that it is not only ten years after Helsinki but forty years after our so-called victory. I felt, in conscience, unable to attend any of the victory celebrations. As one who, as a young man, took an active part in the last war, I thought that we were fighting to end tyranny and oppression in Europe and to restore the freedom and sovereignty of those countries that were being either attacked or repressed by Nazi Germany and at that time, so far as Poland was concerned, the Soviet Union, which was then a partner in crime and only subsequently became a reluctant ally when it was attacked. Now, forty years after our so-called victory and all that we suffered in the last war, including millions of Russians and all the rest, and after so many sacrifices, we have ended up seeing one oppressive tyranny in Europe being replaced by another, even larger and more dangerous. As an ex-soldier, I find it difficult to find anything satisfactory about that in terms of a victory.

It is also not only ten years after Helsinki but forty years after Yalta. Today we see the result of Yalta. Large areas of Europe that previously were free are now occupied virtually indefinitely by the country supposed to be joining us in our efforts to restore freedom and territorial integrity within Europe. I do not see much to commemorate about that.

Going through the three items, there is no evidence that human rights in the Soviet Union are any better now than they were ten years ago and that Helsinki has had any beneficial effect. I still get as many representations as I did ten years ago about the treatment of the Jewish and other religious and ethnic minorities in the Soviet Union. In some respects, I get more.

The provisions in the Helsinki final act on non-interference in the internal affairs of other states have been flagrantly breached in the past ten years, and they are being flagrantly breached today. If the aggression against Afghanistan and indulgence in genocide against a neighbour are not interference in the internal affairs of another state, it would be hard to define what is.

In South-East Asia we have a Soviet-backed tyranny in Vietnam seeking to establish a system not only for itself but in aggression against Cambodia. In Africa, South Yemen, Ethiopia, Angola and Mozambique, Soviet imperialism continues on its march, using Cuban mercenaries to perpetuate and further its expansionist aims. Is that anything much to commemorate ten years after Helsinki? There are now more instances of gross Soviet interference in the internal affairs of other states than there were ten years ago.

All I can say about the provisions hoping for disarmament is that with conventional arms, nuclear weapons and chemical warfare, the

Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)

Soviet Union has pursued an endless and continuing stance in favour of increasing each element within its armoury. I would ask those who suggest that we should set an example by unilateral disarmament to look at what has happened in the context of chemical warfare.

There are no grounds for euphoria. The latest bout of euphoria is that Mr. Gorbachev, who has a charming wife, has taken over the leadership in Russia and that that in itself, because she smiles and wears a fur coat and prefers looking at the crown jewels to seeing Karl Marx's tomb, is some reason to believe that better times lie ahead. There is some evidence that it may be dangerous for a much younger man to take office because Mr. Gorbachev does not remember what many of us in this room remember – the last war and the agonies caused by aggressive imperialism. He has no such memories. I do not find the fact that he is a much younger man of itself encouraging.

We make the mistake over and over again in the West – we want peace and security so much that we cling at any straw that we think will justify our belief that we are accomplishing our aims. Whoever takes over in the Soviet Union, that tyranny, like all other totalitarian systems, will have a momentum of its own. It cannot stand still or it will fall. That, the Soviet leaders, I know, have no intention of allowing. To imagine that at some stage a totalitarian system that lives by oppression will change its spots and conform with the Helsinki provisions is a grotesque fantasy.

(Mr. Reddemann, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Hill.

Mr. HILL (*United Kingdom*). – We should liken the present position between the East and the West as a global poker game. Anyone who has played poker knows that it is dangerous to give one's opponent sight of one's cards. Russia plays the game to its own rules. It keeps its cards well hidden. We, on the other hand, are dealing with democratic media and people who believe that there is no harm in the Russian bear, and we lay our cards completely on the table. We have freedom of expression and debate. In my country, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament has complete freedom of expression and can march through the City of London to express its views. We are beginning to lose the global poker game.

There is an English expression that I hope the Rapporteur has heard. I shall explain it to him if he has not. It is "to use a sprat to catch a mackerel". A sprat is a small fish. A mackerel is an acceptable fish for the table. In all the

various *détentes*, agreements and getting together of people who wish to find a solution, the Russians have always adopted a policy of using a sprat to catch a mackerel.

As previous speakers have said, the smiling face of mother Russia is even more hideous than that of Stalin. We in London were bowled over by Mr. Gorbachev and his very attractive wife. The media almost gave them Hollywood treatment. My Prime Minister has said that she can do business with Mr. Gorbachev. By that she meant trade. She does not mean that she would in any way desert President Reagan and United States policies.

We are talking about the Helsinki agreement. Shall we be sitting here in another ten years talking about the failure of human rights and hoping that we shall get another sprat if we use a mackerel? That may well be the case. None of the dialogues is based on trust. Each side of the table has a different expectation.

Most of the dialogue that is revealed to the public is based on suspicion alone. There seems to be no way in which to impress our USSR colleagues that we are sitting down in complete trust. European politicians, perhaps over-civilised in many cases and over-democratised, are prepared to believe good of anyone without any proof. Any USSR fellow travellers will know what I mean. I have no doubt that human rights have not improved.

There is no doubt that President Reagan's statement about the SDI and his well-forecasted landslide victory in November 1984 made the Russians anxious to get back to the table. After all, for nearly ten years they have been experimenting with SDI and have made practically no progress. Suddenly, they saw research and development taking off on something with which they had failed. That caused a shiver of suspicion and of fear that perhaps they were going to lose the lead in star wars development.

I tabled an early-day motion in my House of Commons. I hope that many members in other parliaments will do the same to give some guidance to those who want to alert their fellow parliamentarians. My early-day motion stated:

"That this House continues to support President Reagan's strategic defence initiative as the only viable alternative to world peace not based on a strategy of mutually assured destruction; notes the statement by President Reagan's Scientific Adviser, Dr. Keyworth, that within three years development could be completed of a ground-based laser weapon unaffected by normal atmospheric interference and capable of destroying a ballistic missile in launch phase; emphasises the potential technological advantages to Europe of participation in strategic defence initiative research;

Mr. Hill (continued)

accepts France's misgivings that, unless there is co-ordination in Europe's approach to strategic defence initiative research, there is a danger that United Kingdom industries may fail to reap the real long-term technological benefits; and therefore calls on the Secretary of State for Defence to take full advantage of his membership of the Ministerial Council of Western European Union actively to promote in full consultation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation a united European position on the research contracts using the machinery of Western European Union with its long-established expertise in European defence affairs."

When the Rapporteur mentions space research in paragraph 3 (c), he was naturally including the space platform. There is another interesting aspect of research in space. French and British members remember our co-operation on the wonderful Concorde aircraft. Many nations benefited from its spin-off - the new metal, the first Mach 2 flight. Other people have enjoyed those spin-offs without paying a penny. There will be similar spin-offs from the \$27 billion research programme.

I believe that the Rapporteur had the feeling wrong in his report when he said in paragraph 29 that President Reagan had advocated the destruction of any ballistic missile in flight towards United States territory... to ensure protection of American territory. I do not believe that that was the theme. President Reagan has already offered European participation and a balanced defence mechanism if research goes the way we all believe it will. We must stop thinking that President Reagan or future United States presidents will not protect Europe as hard as they can with our co-operation through NATO and especially through WEU.

The PRESIDENT. - I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I can agree generally with the report and the draft recommendation presented by Mr. Haase. But I am not very enthusiastic about the results said to have been achieved over the ten years since the Helsinki final act was signed nor am I optimistic about future development and results. The desired increases in trade and cultural relations, and Stockholm, Vienna and Geneva would have taken place in any case, without Helsinki; and I recall that meetings had started even before the final act. These are all things which are bound to happen between blocs and states.

I believe, therefore, that we should take a realistic look at the results of these ten years

without counting as results events which are the natural consequence of the development of relations between the blocs and the nations.

What have we had? Which of the Helsinki baskets has really been implemented and respected? If I have to list what has happened in fact, I have to say bitterly that the answer is "Nothing". Indeed, when I think of Afghanistan, Poland, the Soviet Union's aggressive policy and the restriction of the internal sovereignty of countries throughout the world, I am bound to say that the Soviet Union has perhaps sought to profit from the good faith and the hopes which other countries nourished after the signature of the Helsinki final act, but that nothing positive has been achieved. When I think of the massacres and genocide which have taken place and are continuing in Afghanistan I have to say that to harbour illusions or to be enthusiastic about the ten years since the Helsinki final act is folly and ignores the facts. I wonder whether we may not be partly responsible, not in the sense that we have collaborated and allowed these things to happen, but in the sense that we have done nothing to stop them. I remember the hopes which we raised in the Afghan resistance here in this Assembly, with our declarations and recommendations and elsewhere at meetings with representatives of the Afghan resistance; today we have stopped talking about this, and in consequence we have in fact become accessories. I cannot accept the line taken as regards respect for human rights in either the draft recommendation or the report, out of concern that it might constitute interference in the internal affairs of countries where human rights are of no account. Reference is made to this problem in the final draft only and I hope that the Assembly will approve Lord Reay's amendment to remedy this unfortunate omission.

But what has happened as regards respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms? Perhaps what the Rapporteur hints at in paragraph 84 where he says that it seems that since the Helsinki final act there has been some improvement in respect for human rights in the Warsaw Pact countries or in countries ruled by a dictatorship which signed the Helsinki final act, I think quite the opposite because the Helsinki final act, the Helsinki spirit raised so many hopes and encouraged dissent. I should just like to mention Charter 77. Well, what has happened? The dissent which revived and spread to the various eastern countries with the hope that the signatories of the final act would implement the commitment of the third basket has been met by more violent repression than ever; and we who with our tolerant attitude have helped to make relations even worse, are accessories to the killing of dissent.

Mr. Cavaliere (continued)

We did do much for Poland, we were so enthusiastic about Solidarity, but we have done nothing since. War cannot of course be declared because human rights are trampled on and dissent is cruelly repressed, but if we want East-West relations to improve some firmness is essential and the countries of Europe and the free world, including the United States and Canada, must agree on their approach and on a political line to be taken towards the Soviet Union and all the Warsaw Pact countries. The Soviet Union's aim is to split the European countries from the United States and Canada. We must not lend ourselves to that. If we respond to Soviet aggression and behaviour with competition between countries to purchase or sell particular products or to obtain economic and commercial advantages, we shall have failed completely and we shall be able to say that Helsinki unfortunately means nothing and will mean less and less as time passes.

The PRESIDENT. - I call Mr. de Vries.

Mr. de VRIES (*Netherlands*). - With your permission, Mr. President, I will use the English and Dutch languages.

I should like to start on the report by quoting from a recent book written by an American analyst named Stanley R. Sloan on "NATO's future".

Mr. Sloan observes in his book:

"Through a new western policy of active engagement, the NATO countries could provide defences that deter Soviet aggression and deny Moscow special political advantage, while at the same time encouraging good neighbourly relations. But it remains an open question whether the United States and its allies can renew their consensus on how high or thick the protective wall needs to be and where the gate for East-West co-operation and arms control should be constructed."

(The speaker continued in Dutch)

(Translation). - Mr. President, it seems to me that Mr. Sloan has put his finger on a sore spot in western defence policy. In the past we managed, with great difficulty, to reach some kind of consensus in our ideas about what should be done to ensure security in Europe.

In 1967, the allies reached agreement on the Harmel report which stated, for the first time, that defence and détente belonged together and were indissociable, not contradictory but complementary. The question is whether we, in the West, have been able to make productive use of this concept. True enough, Helsinki was one attempt to fill in the détente chapter of relations with the eastern bloc. The Helsinki final

act is also concerned with security problems but, to my mind, it is only recently that security in the military sense can be said to be receiving any attention.

Have we achieved any results?

My view is that those of us who have said that Helsinki supplies no ready-made solutions are right and I also think that those who were hoping and believing, at the time, that Helsinki would be the answer to all the problems dividing East and West based their expectations on completely false premises.

There is no way, Mr. President, that détente between the East and West can be anything but a long and difficult process. The question is whether we in the West will be able to pursue a policy enabling us to preserve our security and freedom while continuing at one and the same time to hold out the hand of constructive co-operation to the peoples of Eastern Europe. It seems to me that it is to this task that we are summoned by our Rapporteur, whom I would like to congratulate on his report.

With hindsight, I feel it would have been wiser not to make a selection from the ten principles of the Helsinki final act in the recommendation, but to have listed them all. In paragraph 2, the Rapporteur sets out seven principles, but there were ten. It was also agreed in Helsinki at the time that these principles should be pursued and implemented in mutual collaboration.

It would seem to me unwise to make a selection now, when Helsinki is going to keep us busy for many years to come. At the same time we are faced with the problem of defining what we want for the future. The results so far are not impressive - none of us can be satisfied on that score - but the question is: how do we continue the process?

Some members have rightly drawn attention to a period that came long before Helsinki but could be described as one reason for the necessity of Helsinki. They were referring to the second world war. As someone not involved in that war, it seems to me very important to take account of what took place during and also before that period. I think Mr. Müller is right when he says that many people made mistakes in Europe. With the privilege of hindsight I find it easy to agree with him. What happened in Munich was, of course, a mistake. I am thinking of Chamberlain's attitude. Stalin and Hitler were wrong, too, to sign a treaty with each other. Communists in France and in Italy probably did not always get it right, either, but the real problem of the second world war - which I am of course quite willing to link with the first world war - was that we in Western Europe saw a power developing that tried to trample everything we now term "western values" underfoot.

Mr. de Vries (continued)

When we speak today about the Helsinki final act and western values, let us, in any case, have the courage – even when we look towards Eastern Europe, where we find much to dislike – to recognise that less than forty years ago a form of barbarism without precedent in the history of the world arose in our own western civilisation. I believe that it is only by recognising these facts, which we all have to live with in our own way, that we shall be able to shape a rational policy for the future.

It will not be easy. As Sir Frederic Bennett pointed out, all kinds of things happened: there was Yalta, there was Tehran, Potsdam and much more besides. Clearly it would be wrong to say that one side wanted the division and the other did not. For example, there are some very interesting pre-Yalta comments by Mr. Churchill to be found in the history books on the subject of the division of Europe, but that is not, in itself, particularly relevant. In my view, after the second world war, the division of Europe was regarded as an almost unavoidable necessity by all those trying to bring the war to an end. What we have to attempt as regards Helsinki is to discover whether this division is becoming less significant.

I think it would be wrong, for example, in this process of détente, to aim for a reunified Germany appearing as a single country, without having regard to the need for security that exists in both West and East.

Let us be realistic. I believe we shall be needing walls and boundaries separating East from West for a long time to come. Perhaps the only thing we can achieve, by operating a sensible defence and détente policy, is to make these boundaries less relevant in the long term, both to us and to other people in the world, and particularly in Eastern Europe, without sacrificing our concepts of freedom and security.

If we move in this direction and recognise the need to secure our own defence we may arrive at the conditions necessary for real détente, bearing in mind – I repeat, even after Lord Reay's remarks – all the principles of the Helsinki final act, now and for a long time to come.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Kittelmann.

Mr. KITTELMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, if I may say this to Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Cavaliere, I believe today's debate has demonstrated something positive that is of common importance to us all for the future. In the analysis of East-West relations and above all relations with the eastern bloc countries, we are more or less agreed despite our

party political affiliations. This is not always the case in bodies outside WEU.

Ten years have now passed since Helsinki. Nowadays ten years is not as long a period as it may have been in previous historical eras. To be critical – and I take the liberty of repeating what other speakers may have said before me – very few of the Helsinki resolutions have been implemented in the last ten years, apart from the West's constant willingness to emphasise what we want and what we expect. The Soviet Union has almost achieved its three objectives, the first being recognition of its post-war conquests and the second the erosion of the alliance between the free countries of Europe and the United States. We need only read the newspaper every day to know from the debates of the last few years that the Soviet Union has been extremely successful in this respect. Its third objective is the dissolution of the European Community and the elimination of the existing co-operation in many sectors in Europe, and here again the Soviet Union has been largely successful. Although human rights were successfully made a part of the final act which can be invoked by people in the socialist countries, we know that in practice this has met with only limited success.

Ladies and Gentlemen, we must never forget that we succumbed to an illusion in Helsinki, since the system instituted in the Soviet Union and its satellites, which the Soviet Union itself calls a dictatorship of the proletariat, is mainly used to keep control at home and it will repeatedly take the offensive in the drive to expand the present socialist-communist sphere of influence. My thanks to Mr. Haase for mentioning this at the beginning of his statement. It is therefore essential to bear the Soviet Union's ideology constantly in mind. Hence the need to make this clear particularly to younger people, who have little personal experience of the actual conflict of the post-war years. We must give examples of, say, the situation in Poland or Czechoslovakia and remind people again and again what is happening in Afghanistan. Even as we speak, hundreds of people are dying somewhere in the world, a great many of them because of Soviet action, in Afghanistan for example. I say this because the Soviet Union has managed to begin a new cold war era in the last few years by meddling in our decisions in problem areas with complete disregard for the principle of non-interference in other countries' internal affairs. I would also remind you of its intervention in the debate on the NATO twofold decision.

It is normal practice in a democracy to argue about issues like the NATO twofold decision which had its supporters and its opponents in our countries. But the way in which the Soviet Union has tried to exert pressure on our decision

Mr. Kittelmann (continued)

has shown that it is prepared to spark off a psychological cold war whose dimensions have changed and become more dangerous.

I believe we shall be faced with a debate on the SDI which, to judge by the debate on equivalent armament, will include a Soviet attempt to influence our decision. Groups in our countries will be persuaded to implement the Soviet Union's policy here. We must bear all this in mind.

In our countries there is some primitive anti-American feeling, not only in small pressure groups but also in political groups that have considerable influence in the western democracies. We can only issue a warning against this tendency. I welcome the report's statement that Europe cannot separate its defence from that of the United States. If we realise this and establish each year that without the United States we are incapable of defending ourselves against Soviet expansionism, we must stop condemning the United States and join with it in a fairer debate within the Atlantic Alliance. A fair debate does not mean that the United States cannot or must not be criticised, just as the United States criticises us, but we should not do it in the emotional way we so often do now. This sometimes results in the fronts becoming inverted, so that certain documents we read in Europe leave us in doubt as to who is the real opponent of the western democracies, the Soviet Union or the United States.

We shall be debating the SDI. It is claimed in some quarters that we cannot discuss the SDI because a report has been removed from the agenda. I do not understand that, because it can be discussed under this item of the agenda. Mr. Haase expresses a view on the SDI in his report, and anyone could have asked to say something about it and would not have been prevented from doing so. I say this because some people have been disappointed that WEU was not seizing this opportunity to discuss the SDI. The strategic defence initiative will be the dominant security issue in the years ahead, and will have a decisive influence on East-West relations. But as we now see every day, the relationship between the United States and Western Europe is also being affected.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I appeal to you as members of the parliamentary Assembly of WEU to do what you can, not only here but also in your national parliaments, to ensure that we have a fair debate, in which the pros and cons are weighed up and the SDI is not rejected in a polemical, aggressive way at this early stage, when we know so little about it, in order to pursue a different policy.

I thank the Rapporteur for his report, and I am glad that today's debate has shown that we are more united on many matters than is sometimes outwardly evident. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Johnston.

Mr. JOHNSTON (*United Kingdom*). – I congratulate Mr. Haase on his report, on the effort that he put into it, and on his willingness to find solutions where problems of interpretation and emphasis arose. That willingness has reflected itself in the kind of response that he has had during the debate.

I should like, on behalf of the Liberal Group, to make a short comment on his report. There can be no doubt that there is no area where the ordinary member of the public feels more important than the arms race. Where Mr. Haase remarks that many in the West now consider that security is as much threatened by the build-up of nuclear weapons or the prospects of an extension of defence systems in space as by Soviet policy, I do not think that he is expressing his own view – nor is he expressing mine – but he is properly articulating an opinion that is held by very many. One hopes for progress at Geneva, but as one hopes one remembers the MBFR talks in Vienna, which have laboured for twelve years without outcome. It is when the experts fail to break the deadlock in negotiations that many are understandably driven to perhaps simplistic impatience. I greatly regret the failure of the walk in the woods compromise for which my German colleague, Mr. Genscher, pressed so hard. It would have been a start.

Mr. Haase is right when he refers at various stages throughout his memorandum to the futurity and danger of escalation. I quote with approbation paragraph 22 (*iii*), where he says:

“While moderate nuclear armament by the two great powers ensured enough mutual deterrence to guarantee peace, the accumulation of nuclear weapons in no way enhances deterrence but increases the risk of accident or of someone gambling that a limited nuclear war is possible.”

The challenge for Europe is to find some way effectively to contribute to the beginning of the process of de-escalation against a background of past failure and increased concern.

There seem to me to be two principal areas where we ought to be able to make progress if we proceed with determination. First, there is communication. One cannot fully appreciate the closed and secretive nature of Soviet society unless one goes there. To be in Moscow is in many respects for a westerner to be on another planet. There is no free interchange of information in the way to which we have become accustomed.

Mr. Johnston (continued)

Mr. Bianco earlier referred to the fact that many people thought that the Helsinki agreement meant a new page. Mr. Kittelmann said that perhaps many people expected too much of Helsinki. I never conceived that there would be anything other than the slowest and most cautious change within the Soviet bloc. A totalitarian state cannot change in any other way. Incidentally, to suggest, as some have, that we should introduce some kind of legal statement saying that they are legally compelled to do this, that and the next thing is a waste of time. It is impractical. It will not get us anywhere. The important thing about Helsinki was that a dialogue was commenced in an area in which it had previously been denied that any problems existed.

Where I feel that the West subsequently made a mistake was in not pressing strongly to develop contact. Indeed, we saw a quite marked lessening in contact. We should seek to develop contacts at all levels – cultural and trade. Mr. Haase also referred to the opportunities and the need for co-operation in environmental and ecological areas. We also need educational and political contacts. Such contacts can do nothing but good and reduce suspicion and misunderstanding. As it were, to write the Ostpolitik of social democrats and free democrats in Germany – dramatic in its day – Europe-wide should be our objective. In the end, for liberals and democrats, there is no choice but to talk. Talking does not imply weakness. However, unless we have more regular contact, I do not believe that we can manage our differences. As I have said, that is what détente is about. Again, we must face the fact that many of these differences are irreconcilable.

I do not believe that any such approach demonstrates any reduction in concern for human rights, as was suggested by Lord Reay. For the Liberal Group, the expansion of human rights lies at the core of our political creed. Contact does not imply silent acquiescence. Certainly when with David Steel, the British liberal leader, I met Mr. Ponomarev in Moscow last year and Mr. Gorbachev in London this year, the area of human rights was brought forward forcefully with individual examples of repressive treatment. We condemned the war in Afghanistan unequivocally. To do this persistently at all levels must advance freedom.

Secondly, much greater cohesion is necessary in the West. Cohesion will always be difficult in democracies. Indeed, one can argue that cohesion of thought and democracy are intrinsically contradictory. But both from our political standpoints, whether left, centre or right – which increasingly overlap national boundaries in

democratic Western Europe – and from our national standpoints, if these remain pre-eminent, we must give priority to reaching common positions and adhering to them.

Europe will not have an effective influence on the United States unless it acts coherently. Whatever differences we may have with the United States at any time – and we have some – in Mr. Haase's words in paragraph 14, Europe cannot:

“ separate its defence from that of the United States which alone is capable of guaranteeing Europe's security in face of Soviet military strength. It cannot therefore have a policy towards Eastern Europe which is not concerted with that of its American allies. ”

Especially when one takes account of the different political complexions of our various governments, it is not easy; but in the end, across the political spectrum, it is to the benefit of all, except perhaps those at the margins.

It seems to me as a liberal that the basic perception visible in Mr. Haase's report and set out in the draft recommendations is that Europe must play a much fuller part in both East-West dialogue and West-West dialogue. If we do not, events will anyway proceed and we shall still be affected by what happens, but we shall be denied the major contribution of which we are capable.

The PRESIDENT. – That concludes the list of speakers.

The debate is closed.

I call Mr. Haase.

Mr. HAASE (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I am particularly grateful for the criticisms I have heard here. I regard them all as positive, showing as they do that the members of this Assembly, the members of the national parliaments, are not blind but fully aware that the CSCE did not change the world when the Helsinki final act was adopted, but that its adoption in fact marked the beginning of a slow process of development, still discernible today. We now have to decide whether we intend to continue down this road or to stop here. I believe those are the options that must be considered.

Ladies and Gentlemen, our view of Soviet expansionist ideology can surely not be the only yardstick of our reactions and attitudes! If we made it the yardstick, it would bring any kind of development to an absolute standstill, particularly in the eastern bloc, with a hardening of positions and reversion to a situation we once knew as the cold war. This cannot be, and is not, in the interests of the Europeans. It is certainly not in the interests of the peoples, nor

Mr. Haase (continued)

of the United States. Policy is made by forcing others to react to ideas which one tries to put into effect little by little.

I was slightly surprised to hear a number of reputable conservative members speaking here in a way that I find puzzling when I consider that their Foreign Minister undoubtedly shares the opinion I have outlined in this report. The fact of the matter is that we are making progress towards détente little by little. Anyone who says nothing has changed has not observed the facts objectively in the last ten years. I think we should realise what might have happened if the Solidarity trade union had been formed and risen in revolt ten years ago. What would have happened to those people? Would it have been possible to put the murderers of Father Popieluszko on trial? Would it have been possible for groups based on the CSCE final act to form in Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic? Is that nothing? It is not a great deal. Many people may have dreamed of the world changing overnight. But, Ladies and Gentlemen, we are all practical politicians. We sit in our parliaments. We know how difficult it is to move a million, whether in deutschmarks or sterling or francs, from one item of the budget to another. That is what experience has repeatedly shown us in the years we have sat in our parliaments: it is incredibly difficult to effect changes, but it can be done, and above all it can be done with perseverance. I just wanted to point that out again. I feel that what has been said here must be considered in these terms.

The criticisms are right. They are levelled at those responsible for so little progress having been made, that is, the Soviet Union. But this cannot lead to the conclusion that we have to stop and throw the whole thing overboard as worthless. That is not the image I wanted to present – using a sprat to catch a mackerel – that is certainly not the right image. We should realise that it takes more than a day, or even ten years of CSCE to change the world into a paradise in which there are no weapons and people all live together in peace and happiness.

I hope this Assembly will set a good example, that it will show itself to be largely united and that the fronts will not harden here to such an extent that we come to be seen as a model of confrontation. I think we should bear that in mind during our debate.

Let me add two more points. Pressure on the eastern bloc? Of course, but I would be very interested to know what we are going to use to exert pressure. Pressure to impose human rights? All right. What with? In Basket III of the Helsinki final act we have the lever and the

means to make constant reference to these things in public, in the United Nations, before the international community. I have again made clear reference in my report today to the things that happen to the Soviet Jews and minorities, in violation of their human rights.

I also disagree with Mr. Gianotti. Détente is based on a balance of forces between the two major blocs. This balance can be achieved only by maintaining a firm alliance with the United States. Then détente will indeed be possible, because we shall have the same forces and the same orders of magnitude on both sides. We must ensure that the balance does not shift.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I cannot reply in detail to every statement that has been made here today. The President and you would not thank me for that, because time is getting on. To conclude, however, I should like, in my capacity as Rapporteur, to express my thanks for the fairness with which these questions have been discussed and decided, both in the General Affairs Committee and here. I should also like to thank the Chairman of the committee, Mr. Michel, for his kind support.

I should be grateful if in the vote on this report we could clearly and distinctly demonstrate our firmness, coupled with our determination to pursue the goal of détente. I hope I can count on your support.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Michel.

Mr. MICHEL (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I would like to thank the Rapporteur for his thorough work and for his determinedly informative approach during the period of preparation of this report which is on a difficult subject.

Today it is not a question of commemorating an anniversary but simply of taking stock, ten years after, of the positive aspects and the disappointments to which the Helsinki final act has given rise. We are jointly searching our consciences and the two possible attitudes, disappointment or, on the contrary, a positive view, are not mutually exclusive because it is perfectly possible to express our disappointment at the results but to be positive in approving Mr. Haase's report and in particular the recommendation adopted by the General Affairs Committee.

The signing of the agreement, regarded at the time as something of a miracle, raised hopes for great progress in the cause of peace and freedom in Europe and in particular the freedom of expression of many peoples expecting great things of the spin-off from the Helsinki final act. The presence of the United States and

Mr. Michel (continued)

Canada increased the credibility of an agreement in which the whole world placed high hopes.

In fact, this did not happen. Politically, there has been the great disappointment of the war in Afghanistan when the whole world rightly accused the Soviet Union of breaking the most solemn undertakings contained in the Helsinki final act. In the matter of human rights, blatant violations continue to be committed in all the East European countries, where Poland, after the events in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, has been the victim since 1981.

Unquestionably we have to make known our disappointment but, at the same time, we would be wrong not to point to a number of positive aspects stemming from this Helsinki final act. One example is the striking change in attitude in some countries of Eastern Europe. It must also be said that the distressing events observed in some East European countries have been less serious than might have been feared had they occurred prior to the solemn signature of this international treaty. You will argue that the hope is slender and the consolation slight but this is a realistic finding that we should all concede because it unquestionably represents a step forward in the atmosphere created by the Helsinki conference.

For these reasons, and speaking not so much optimistically as realistically, I urge the members of the Assembly to approve the report and its preamble.

The rôle of WEU with regard to the Helsinki final act is essential. Our Assembly has a duty to recall the undertakings that were entered into. Paragraph 2 of the recommendation to our Council, to which some members have referred, sums up the fears and regrets of some of us and the great hopes of others wishing to bring back to mind certain principles that may have been forgotten. The fact that the committee has adopted this section proposing that the tenth anniversary of the Helsinki conference be used to obtain confirmation by all the signatory powers of their determination to apply effectively all the principles embodied in the final act is clear proof that they have not been applied in a satisfactory manner.

This appears in the recommendation and, since the statements by members of the Assembly constitute a reminder of the report that we approved in the General Affairs Committee, I hope that those who showed their misgivings by saying they would abstain from voting on the recommendation will think again and join us in voting for it.

We do not ask the members of the Assembly to vote with any enthusiasm for a motion which

is necessarily severe and, to some extent, a record of failure. We have to recognise that the Helsinki final act has not led on to success in our relations with the countries of Eastern Europe, but after recalling these essential principles and basing our hope on their "effective" application, as stated in the recommendation, we can join together in a proposal that is realistic and devoid of illusions and asks all the signatories to apply - I repeat - more effectively a treaty to which we are attached.

The text of this treaty seems to me irreplaceable and no criticism is made of its terms. It has weakness to the extent that it makes no provision for monitoring, competent authority or penalties to bring home to those who violate it what they are doing. We note these shortcomings but it is with a wish for progress and improvement in mind that we can approve Mr. Haase's report and the recommendation he proposes. I therefore urge members of the Assembly to take that direction which seems to me the only possible one because I cannot imagine how such a recommendation can be rejected.

The PRESIDENT. - The General Affairs Committee has produced Document 1013 and a draft recommendation to which four amendments have been tabled. They will be called in the order in which they relate to the text: Amendments 2, 4, 1 and 3. If Amendment 1 is carried, I cannot call Amendment 3.

I call Mr. Lagorce to support Amendment 2 which reads:

2. After paragraph (viii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph:

"Considering that WEU's action should allow the CSCE process to be strengthened and in particular the views of the European pillar of the alliance to be heard at the Stockholm conference on disarmament in Europe;".

Mr. LAGORCE (*France*) (Translation). - The purpose of Amendment 2 is to spell out the rôle of WEU. This requires a reference both to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Stockholm conference because these, more than others, involve not only the two great powers but also all the European countries. Furthermore, Mr. Haase develops this idea in his explanatory memorandum. This seems to me sufficiently important to warrant its inclusion in the preamble to the draft recommendation.

The PRESIDENT. - Does anyone wish to oppose the amendment?...

If not, I shall now put it to the vote.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 2 is agreed to.

The President (continued)

We now come to Amendment 4 tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett:

4. In the draft recommendation proper, at the end of paragraph 2(d), add "with immediate application to Afghanistan".

I call Lord Reay.

Lord REAY (*United Kingdom*). – It is also tabled in my name, Mr. President, and I shall speak to it.

As the amendment may not have been circulated to members, perhaps I can read what it says. It seeks to add to sub-paragraph (d) to paragraph 2 of the recommendation proper the words "with immediate application to Afghanistan". The sub-paragraph would then read:

"non-interference in the internal affairs of another state with immediate application to Afghanistan".

We felt that there should be some reference in the resolution to Afghanistan if our discussions on the need to respect human rights in an East-West context, as well as the need to respect the principle of non-interference in another state's affairs, were to have any meaning.

At present in Afghanistan one of the greatest crimes of this century is being carried out – greater than anything since the days of Hitler and Stalin. A quarter to a third of the population have fled from the country and two-thirds have fled from their homes. A deliberate policy of unbelievable cruelty and lack of restraint is being pursued against the people of Afghanistan by Soviet troops in an attempt to get control of a previously independent country for a puppet Marxist régime.

Atrocities on the scale of Lidice, My Lai and Oradour are being carried out every day. There is a policy of the extermination of villages and villagers, of terrorism by means of butterfly bombs and of starvation through the mass destruction of crops. The evidence for that is available in United Nations reports. Moreover, far from expecting improvements, we hear only of the likelihood of the Soviet Union being obliged to increase the number of its troops, from their present level of 120,000, in order to effect the subjugation of that country. The Soviet Union should withdraw from Afghanistan and restore that country's independence, and we should make it plain that we think so.

Mr. de VRIES (*Netherlands*). – On a point of order, Mr. President, I have gone outside twice during the debate to see whether any amendments were tabled. On the first occasion I picked up one, but only thirty seconds ago I picked up another three. I now understand that

there is another one. What kind of procedures do we have?

The PRESIDENT. – I think that the amendment is in order.

Mr. de VRIES (*Netherlands*). – How can we consider an amendment if the text is not available?

The PRESIDENT. – The text is available and there is no time-limit for the tabling of amendments.

Mr. de VRIES (*Netherlands*). – I understand that, Mr. President, but it is rather troublesome if, thirty seconds after I have been to the table to look at amendments, I come into the hall and another amendment is being presented orally.

I think that we should review that kind of procedure. We have agreed that reports should be available for study fourteen days before a session. Now, even during the voting, we do not have the text of amendments. This is a ridiculous procedure.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – Further to the point of order, Mr. President. Mr. de Vries has spoken of seconds. May I speak of minutes? I have been in the chamber forty-five minutes and I was not aware of some of the amendments that have recently been tabled. I am sure that Mr. de Vries would wish to be as helpful as I am. It may be that the rules of the Assembly allow such an absurd procedure to apply, but I hope that at least the Chair will say that this matter will be considered by the appropriate committee so that such an absurdity will not recur.

I also suggest, however, that, as the report is important, we should not have amendments that the majority of members have not seen blocking our consideration of an important report. If people have submitted amendments, although it may be within the rules, within the last few minutes, perhaps they could at least consider withdrawing them in the interests of seeing general progress made.

The PRESIDENT. – I understand the opinions of Mr. de Vries and Mr. Hardy. I think that we shall adjourn the sitting and continue the vote at 3 p.m.

5. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT. – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. East-West relations ten years after the Helsinki final act (Resumed vote on the

The President (continued)

- draft recommendation, Document 1013 and amendments).
2. Address by Baroness Young, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom.
 3. Cyprus and European security (Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1008 and amendments).
 4. Military use of computers – reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the

draft recommendation, Document 1007 and amendment).

5. Revision and interpretation of the Rules of Procedure – Terms of reference of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and vote on the draft resolution, Document 1020).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 12. 45 p.m.)

THIRD SITTING

Tuesday, 21st May 1985

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the minutes.
2. Attendance register.
Speakers (points of order): Mr. Atkinson, Mrs. Knight.
3. East-West relations ten years after the Helsinki final act (*Resumed vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 1013 and amendments).
Speakers: Lord Reay, Mr. Haase, Lord Reay, Mr. Lagorce, Mr. Haase, Mr. Cifarelli.
4. Address by Baroness Young, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom.
Replies by Baroness Young to questions put by: Sir Dudley Smith, Mr. Pignion, Mr. Cifarelli, Mr. de Vries, Mr. Wilkinson, Lord Reay, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Gianotti, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Scheer, Mr. De Decker, Mr. Rubbi.
5. Cyprus and European security (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 1008 and amendments).
6. Revision and interpretation of the Rules of Procedure – Terms of reference of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments (*Presentation of the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges*, Doc. 1020).
Speaker: Mr. Jessel (*Rapporteur*).
7. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

Bearing in mind the delay in our deliberations, I suggest to the Assembly that under

Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure the time allowed to speakers, with the exception of committee chairmen and rapporteurs, should be limited to five minutes in all the debates.

I remind you that, under the same rule, the Assembly has to vote on this proposal without debate.

Is there any opposition?...

The proposal is agreed to.

In accordance with the memorandum on the Assembly's conditions of work, I invite you to confirm the rule that speakers put their names down and that amendments be tabled before the end of the sitting preceding the opening of the debate. I would point out that we adopted this procedure at the previous session and it proved satisfactory to all members.

The orders of the day which we have before us cover a number of points to which I wish to refer briefly.

I remind you of the decision that we should first of all finish discussing Mr. Haase's report. We shall then be addressed by Baroness Young, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom,

1. See page 24.

The President (continued)

to be followed by the report on Cyprus presented by Sir Frederic Bennett. Last will come the discussion on the military use of computers – reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council.

It was also decided this morning that we should arrange to hear at least the presentation of Mr. Jessel's report on behalf of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges. I must make it clear, as I promised Mr. Jessel, that this order of the day will be dealt with as time permits before the sitting is closed punctually at 6 p.m.

In these circumstances, consideration of the report on the military use of computers will, with Mr. Fourré's kind consent, be deferred to tomorrow morning's sitting. So that the sitting can proceed normally, I suggest to the Assembly that tomorrow morning's sitting should start at 9.30 a.m. I trust that the committees intending to meet tomorrow morning will not find this change unduly inconvenient.

Is there any opposition?...

The proposal is agreed to.

Mr. ATKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I understand that the General Affairs Committee is due to meet tomorrow morning at 9.30 a.m. Is there not a problem there?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The General Affairs Committee planned to meet at 9 a.m. tomorrow morning. When I made my proposal, I saw no signs of dissent, and I therefore regard it as accepted.

I call Mrs. Knight.

Mrs. KNIGHT (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. This matter affects not only the General Affairs Committee. The Committee for Relations with Parliaments meets at 9 a.m. Of course, we must finish by 9.30 a.m. if that is your ruling.

The PRESIDENT. – Is it possible?

Mrs. KNIGHT (*United Kingdom*). – We will try very hard.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much.

(The President continued in French)

(Translation). – We will do what we can, but committees should keep their meetings short so that the Assembly can work smoothly. It would be helpful if the Chairman of the General Affairs Committee could fix the committee meeting for 8.45 a.m. instead of 9 a.m.

Mrs. KNIGHT (*United Kingdom*). – If that is your wish, Mr. President. We have a lot of

complicated matters to decide, so if it could be 8.30 a.m. that would suit me.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We “suggest” that the committee chairmen concerned should convene their meetings tomorrow morning at 8.30 a.m.

The Assembly itself will meet at 9.30 a.m.

Is there any objection?...

The proposal is agreed to.

3. *East-West relations ten years after the Helsinki final act*

(Resumed vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1013 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and Gentlemen, the next order of the day is the resumed vote on the draft recommendation on East-West relations ten years after the Helsinki final act; we shall now resume consideration of the amendments to Document 1013.

Three amendments have been tabled: Amendment 4 by Lord Reay, Amendment 1 by Lord Reay and Amendment 3 by Mr. Lagorce. The last two can be discussed jointly. Amendment 4 tabled by Lord Reay is worded as follows:

4. In the draft recommendation proper, at the end of paragraph 2(d), add “with immediate application to Afghanistan”.

I call Lord Reay.

Lord REAY (*United Kingdom*). – I spoke in favour of this amendment this morning. I do not need to repeat what I said then. Following my speech, an objection was raised to the fact that insufficient time had been given for members of the Assembly to consider this amendment, and the acting President suspended the voting until this afternoon. That is the point at which we have resumed.

It has been suggested to me that as a compromise it might say instead “for example, Afghanistan”. However, that wording will not meet the case.

As I argued this morning, the situation in Afghanistan is comparable with nothing else going on in the world. I compared it with what happened in parts of the world in the 1930s and 1940s. There is nothing today that could be cited as another example of what is happening in Afghanistan. It is unique. It is *sui generis*.

As I said this morning, we should be failing in our duty if we did not draw attention to the appalling events in Afghanistan. We should call on the Soviet Union to withdraw from Afghanistan and allow that country to return to its own independent existence.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

What is the committee's view?

Mr. HAASE (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, Lord Reay has already referred to the suggestion made to him that his amendment should include the words "for example" before the words "with immediate reference to Afghanistan". If Lord Reay is prepared to accept this suggestion, I will agree to the amendment. If not, I shall recommend that the amendment be rejected. We are all well aware just how intolerable and degrading the Afghanistan situation is, but paragraph 2 of the recommendation reads: "... to apply effectively all the principles contained in the final act, particularly those relating to: ... (e) equality of treatment between nations and their right to self-determination ;".

It follows that, if we mention only Afghanistan, without prefacing it with the words "for example", we automatically and crucially diminish all other violations of the national right to self-determination, including for instance that of the Poles, but also that of other peoples. It cannot have been intended that a phrase formulated on such general lines should be confined to a single instance. We would have less than we have already, and that is why I say that "for example" could solve the matter. Without this, I believe the Assembly should reject the amendment, as seriously reducing the scope of the present wording.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – It can be said that one speaker has now spoken for and one against the amendment, and the Rapporteur has expressed his committee's opinion.

We shall now vote on Amendment 4 tabled by Lord Reay.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 4 is agreed to.

Lord Reay has tabled Amendment 1, which reads:

1. At the end of paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, add:

"while bearing in mind that any reaffirmation of the non-use of force should be accompanied by an agreed confirmation of the need to respect human rights."

Mr. Lagorce has tabled Amendment 3, which reads:

3. At the end of paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, add:

"while preparing and implementing specific mutual measures of confidence and confirm-

ing by common agreement the need to respect human rights."

These two amendments can be discussed together.

If Amendment 1 is adopted, Amendment 3 falls.

I call Lord Reay to speak in support of Amendment 1.

Lord REAY (*United Kingdom*). – I tabled the amendment because I do not believe that the recommendation sufficiently emphasises human rights. They are not treated as one of the three equal baskets of the CSCE as they were in Helsinki. We seem to have forgotten that the West entered into the CSCE process at Helsinki only because human rights were to be discussed. They have been shuffled off to separate consideration in Ottawa, no doubt much to the relief of the Soviet Union, while security and arms control are being discussed in Stockholm.

The amendment proposes the reunification of the two processes in the sense that any declaration at the meeting in Stockholm on the non-use of force would have to be accompanied by a declaration in Ottawa on the need to respect human rights. That proposal has been put forward in Stockholm by a western government, and it is one that we should adopt.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Lagorce to support Amendment 3.

Mr. LAGORCE (*France*) (Translation). – Lord Reay is right to raise the issue of the respect for human rights. I endorse this principle, which I have also incorporated into my own amendment complementing that tabled by Lord Reay.

A reaffirmation of the non-use of force seems to me inadequate, and I would point out that France would like specific confidence-building measures to be established first, in preference to immediate declamatory statements on such matters as the non-use of force.

Proposals for non-recourse to threats have to come from the stronger, not the weaker party, and I will therefore surprise nobody by emphasising my country's opposition to any commitment regarding no-first-use of nuclear force.

What the demand for non-recourse to force actually amounts to is pressure exerted by the Soviet Union on those taking part in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe – a pressure which is incompatible with the parliamentary spirit of that organisation which places the thirty-five states concerned on an equal footing.

The logic of the approach adopted by the Soviet Union in its draft treaty plays down the

Mr. Lagorce (continued)

rôle of the neutral and non-aligned countries, whereas we, on the contrary, take for granted the important contribution these countries have to make to the work of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.

That is the thinking behind the amendment which I ask you to approve.

Perhaps I may point out, Mr. President, that my amendment does not automatically fall if Lord Reay's is adopted. It will then be sufficient to add to Amendment 1 the words which it does not contain.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The solution you suggest is also acceptable, Mr. Lagorce.

Does anyone wish to speak against Amendments 1 and 3?...

What is the committee's view?...

Mr. HAASE (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I have no quarrel with Lord Reay's amendment. It is substantially in line with what is already contained in the report, and there is no reason why it should not be repeated in paragraph 4.

I do feel, however, that in one respect Mr. Lagorce's amendment calls for clarification, in the sense that paragraph 4 is the express concern of all the western states, including France, taking part in the Stockholm conference on confidence-building measures, security and arms control. That is why the matter is raised again here.

I therefore propose that Lord Reay's amendment should be accepted.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We will now vote on Amendment 1 tabled by Lord Reay.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 1 is agreed to.

On reading the two amendments, I find that the wording suggested by Mr. Lagorce does indeed form a useful addition to Lord Reay's amendment without altering the sense.

If Lord Reay has no objection, the amendment he has tabled and which the Assembly has agreed to could be expanded in this way.

We will now vote on Amendment 3 tabled by Mr. Lagorce.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 3 is agreed to.

The wording of Amendment 3 is therefore added to that of Amendment 1.

I call Mr. Cifarelli.

Mr. CIFARELLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I did not vote for Mr. Lagorce's amendment because it seems to me to be an unnecessary complication. What Lord Reay's proposal really means is that everything which can be done to further and reaffirm the aims of the Helsinki agreement must be preceded by a confirmation of human rights. This is a clear and politically important point. It goes without saying that the necessary action can then be taken to strengthen confidence and overcome doubts and this is in fact stated in the report. I voted against what I regard as an unnecessary elaboration – and I hope Mr. Lagorce will not hold this against me.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Your statement has been noted, Mr. Cifarelli.

We shall now vote on the amended draft recommendation in Document 1013 as a whole.

A vote by roll-call has not been requested.

I now put the text as a whole to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The amended draft recommendation is adopted¹.

***4. Address by Baroness Young,
Minister of State for Foreign
and Commonwealth Affairs
of the United Kingdom***

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the address by Baroness Young, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, and I thank her in anticipation for replying to the questions which will be put.

I should like to take this opportunity, Lady Young, of reiterating the Assembly's gratitude to you not only for being here with us but also for the particularly constructive and positive attitude of Her Majesty's Government as manifested by your presence. In the specially critical security problems at present facing Europe we certainly need reassurance and it is right and proper that governments should keep us informed not only of their national positions but also about how they propose working together to implement the important decisions taken at ministerial meetings, including in particular the most recent meeting held in Bonn.

I now invite you to take the floor, Lady Young, and thank you again for sharing in our deliberations.

¹. See page 25.

Baroness YOUNG (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen. It is a pleasure to be addressing the Assembly again, and I am happy to congratulate you, Mr. President, and the Assembly on the work that you have done in the past year.

WEU has had an unusually full and important year since I was here last summer. The first two joint meetings of Foreign and Defence Ministers – a unique format within Europe – have taken place as the beginning of a regular pattern which we hope will flourish and continue. We have made considerable progress on the restructuring and revitalisation of the WEU institutions “in order to bring [them] into line with the changed tasks of the organisation”, as mandated in the Rome Declaration. The Assembly has accompanied this process with helpful debate and encouragement, and WEU has taken a prominent place as a major forum for political debate about the central issues of European defence and security.

Presiding over all these great changes has been the retiring Secretary-General, Mr. Longestaey. As Chairman of the Permanent Council, he has exerted considerable influence over WEU's direction. This new organisation owes much to his energy and his rôle in strengthening and deepening relations between the Council, Assembly and agencies during his period of office, so that we have had a solid foundation on which to build. I was glad that this was acknowledged in the report by Mr. van der Sanden for the General Affairs Committee. It has been an honour for us in the United Kingdom to act as Mr. Longestaey's home for the past eight years, and I take the opportunity – the last Assembly plenary that he will attend in his official capacity – to thank him warmly on behalf of Her Majesty's Government for his services and to wish him well in his retirement.

WEU has now become a vital organisation in which European governments can discuss questions relating to their defence and security. In this important development I believe that at least four basic elements are involved. First, during the past year the drive by all of us towards the building of Europe has taken on a new lease of life. In this process we have begun to recognise more clearly that security questions must play an important part, a point acknowledged in the security chapter of the Dooge committee report. In the search for a forum for us to exchange views on security issues, and develop a more harmonised European perspective, our attention naturally focused on WEU, with its founding treaty and ready-made ministerial and parliamentary institutions.

The British Prime Minister foreshadowed this development in the paper on “Europe, the

future”, which she presented to other European Community heads of government last June. She wrote:

“Most work to co-ordinate European positions on [security] so far has been done in the NATO framework, particularly in the Eurogroup and the IEPG (which has the merit of including France), and there is still more that could be done to exploit the potential of these groupings... But if we want early progress, and an early chance to demonstrate our seriousness, we must be willing to look at new openings, including those offered by WEU.”

Secondly, the short, sharp shock of aspects of the transatlantic debate about burden-sharing reminded us of the continuing importance of Europeans' efforts to strengthen our own distinctively European contribution to the alliance. It encouraged us to reaffirm the fundamental nature of the alliance as the cornerstone of our security, and drew attention to the irreplaceable United States commitment and contribution to the protection of Europe. There are also certain other advantages of the alliance, including an operational capability, an integrated military structure, and seven other European member nations, two of whom share strategically important borders with the Soviet Union – and have, as it happens, observers present at our session here today. This reminds us of the obligation we owe in the light of the Rome Declaration to keep our allies fully informed of the activities of WEU, and closely to consult them. It clearly makes sense for Europeans to consider among themselves the potential threat to their security and the ways in which they intend to respond to it within the alliance. WEU provides one very good forum for just such exchanges of views.

Thirdly, the problem of rising defence costs is not going to go away, although with good management it can be contained. In the United Kingdom the recently published defence white paper has shown how we can achieve this and sustain our various commitments. But high technology is expensive and will get more so. We need to consider more closely what is necessary to maintain the alliance's posture of defence and deterrence and how best to achieve it. That means looking carefully at priorities and getting maximum value for money.

Finally, we must not fall into complacency, as we were prone to do in the 1970s, about getting public support for our defence policies. The public in each of our countries – and particularly the younger generation – have both a right and a need to have the rationale for the alliance and its strategy convincingly and carefully explained. A short phrase from the WEU Council's public awareness paper, which was handed to the Assembly at the end of the Bonn meeting on 23rd April, noting how we need to

Baroness Young (continued)

explain that, says security has to be won, and that it should never be taken for granted.

We in the United Kingdom believe that this Assembly has a special rôle to play in that area.

In none of the areas I have mentioned can WEU claim an exclusive rôle; nor should it. The detailed work of defence planning will continue to take place only in the alliance and there is no intention to endow WEU with a military structure of its own. Institutions such as the IEPG and the Eurogroup with their wider membership make an important contribution in their respective areas. It would be strange for us to stress efficiency and resource management on the one hand and to indulge in duplication of activities elsewhere on the other. We might then be falling into the trap identified by the Secretary-General of NATO in a speech in this city just over a month ago when he said: "it seems at first sight to be a case of mismanagement on an epic scale". But I believe that there is a real rôle for WEU that avoids both that pitfall and the comparable one of allowing our governments to be seen as a formal caucus or grouping within NATO. When we started restructuring WEU a year ago, one of our main objects was to find a home for European consultations on defence and security as part of the process of constructing Europe. By the time of the Rome ministerial meeting last October, the institutional reform to allow WEU to play a new rôle in this context had been mapped out. A declaration was made on the contribution that a revitalised WEU could make to encouraging consensus, strengthening the alliance, and increasing co-operation among member states. At Bonn six months later, important institutional changes were endorsed, with the promise of more to come. The communiqué spoke of areas in which our efforts towards joint security could be further harmonised. It also referred to questions concerning East-West relations and the European contribution to the alliance, as well as the European technological community.

In short, the rôle of WEU has evolved in the last year. It no longer deals solely with its own internal affairs but is now a body in which collective consideration of political and security questions has real meaning. At the least, it can act as a clearing house for our ideas and views in this area, both at the ministerial meetings and in the Permanent Council. It can help us together to act as a ginger group on issues of interest and importance in other forums although, to quote Lord Carrington, again, it must in this "observe the first law of productive motion, which is to point in the right direction first and apply the ginger thereafter".

The Paris-based institutions represent an important asset and, as the reorganisation agreed at Bonn works through, they should be able to make a creative input to the work and discussions of WEU.

For this, it is essential that the tasks which they are to perform should now be defined without further delay. We in the United Kingdom believe that is now one of the most important immediate objectives confronting us and it is one to which Sir Geoffrey Howe and Michael Heseltine both made contributions in their proposals at Bonn. The sort of things we have in mind are, in general terms, for example, a look at the long-term aspects of conventional arms control in Europe, or an examination of questions associated with verification in some of the disarmament talks; and, of course, we fully support the work on a WEU rôle in armaments co-operation as proposed in paragraph 9 of the Bonn communiqué.

Last but not least, the Assembly has a significant function, together with the member governments, in the process of improving public information and generating what has been called "reassurance" about our defence policies. This is made clear by the paper on public awareness remitted to the Assembly by ministers, in the preparation of which the United Kingdom played a prominent part. As representatives of the public, and with obligations towards them, parliamentarians have a most important part to play in this process. The main aim of debate in the Assembly is to develop ideas and proposals in defence and security and to keep governments up to the mark. In so far as is possible, however, we in the United Kingdom believe that it should also be to create and expand a consensus within our countries, cutting across party political boundaries, about the need for the alliance and the defensive nature of its purpose and strategies as well as those of its member states. We in the Council are indebted to the Assembly for its work in developing the thrust behind the renewal process and for the critical exchange of views which has such importance in our daily work as we governments account for ourselves in responding to Assembly recommendations and questions. But let us also become indebted for the development of public understanding of the defence and security options open to us as Council members.

Let me now turn to the broader political context in which all this work has to be set. The opening of the Geneva negotiations and the Gorbachev succession in Moscow are both significant shifts in the international scenery. But we must be realistic: we are only at the beginning of a long road. We must increase the frequency and range of our contacts with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. We must work to build up an East-West dialogue sufficient to

Baroness Young (continued)

generate the mutual confidence without which it is that much more difficult for arms control talks to succeed. So far, changes in the Soviet position are of presentation only, not substance. We have to expect that the Russians will continue to probe extensively alliance cohesion and unity. We must show that our solidarity, reaffirmed, tried, and tested in the last few years, still holds good. We must make clear to the Warsaw Pact that rhetoric and declaratory proposals are not enough. Our goal is to seek real and verifiable reductions in the levels of forces and strategic balance and stability at lower levels of armaments. What we are looking for from the other side is an equally substantive and serious response.

Western governments must also make it clear that they are willing to be patient and consistent in the search for better understanding between them and members of the Warsaw Pact of each other's mutual concerns. To this end, we need to continue the task of building personal contacts at all levels across the divide in Europe. But there should be no illusion that dramatic breakthroughs are likely.

United Kingdom ministers have been playing their part in this. In the last six months Sir Geoffrey Howe has met political leaders from every Warsaw Pact country. His discussions and those of other United Kingdom ministers have confirmed to us that it is both possible and desirable, without compromising our own positions, to conduct regular wide-ranging exchanges with the East. We have emphasised our determination to protect our own security, but that this is entirely compatible with the determination to seek better relations. That will require consistent and predictable action where the essentials of that relationship are concerned.

In this process we must always remember that we are dealing with fellow Europeans. We belong to different alliances but we have in many cases similar cultural traditions and common roots. We must continue - in the CSCE process and in our bilateral relationships - to emphasise the interests, traditions and values that are common. We must recognise that, in the end, politics is about people - there is the need for contact between individuals as well as governments if we are to achieve real understanding between East and West.

We should also give due weight to those international forums in which European governments of East and West sit together. The MBFR negotiations in Vienna represent a joint search for the way to establish a balance in the levels of conventional forces in Europe at significantly lower levels than today. The CDE negotiations in Stockholm provide a forum in which

all the states of Europe can search, in accordance with the Madrid mandate, for ways to enhance confidence, and diminish the risk of misunderstanding and of possible conflict.

At the same time, we must accept that the crucial issues of the nuclear balance are rightly the subject of negotiation between the United States and the Soviet Union. We warmly welcome the January Geneva communiqué and the resumption of the arms control negotiations. We fully support United States objectives in those negotiations and we are engaged in an intensive process of discussion and consultation with the Americans in NATO. We believe that progress should be sought in each of the three areas under negotiation on its merits, whilst recognising their interrelationship. We very much hope that the Soviet Union will move beyond the public diplomacy which has marked the first round to build on the 1983 START and INF negotiations and - to use a British idiom - get down to brass tacks.

Finally, may I say something of how we in the United Kingdom see the strategic defence initiative and the discussion of the prevention of an arms race in space. We believe that we must be sure to get the issues in perspective. The Soviet Union has major research programmes of its own in this area. It is hard to understand in those circumstances how they can realistically argue for a unilateral ban on United States research. We support that research, which is specifically allowed under current treaty obligations.

As the Prime Minister has made clear, we hope that British scientists will share in the SDI research programme.

Accordingly, the United Kingdom intends to respond soon, and to respond positively, to the United States invitation to its allies to participate in the programme. There remain a number of practical questions to be answered, however, and we shall continue to consult our allies closely.

But it is clearly recognised on both sides of the Atlantic that any steps towards deployment must be a matter of the most careful consultation. Our position is founded on the four points agreed between the Prime Minister and President Reagan at Camp David: first, that the United States and western aim is not to achieve superiority but to maintain balance, taking account of Soviet developments; second, that SDI-related deployment would, in view of treaty obligations, have to be a matter for negotiation; third, that the overall aim is to enhance, not undercut, deterrence; and, fourth, that East-West negotiations should aim to achieve security with reduced levels of offensive systems on both sides.

Baroness Young (continued)

Whilst the research continues and its implications are assessed we have to ensure that there is no public misunderstanding of the timescale within which any radical change is conceivable. As Secretary Shultz stated in his Austin speech on 28th March, deterrence will have to be based for years to come on the ultimate threat of nuclear retaliation. That means that, whilst continuing the active search for reductions in offensive systems, modernisation programmes must go forward on the western side to ensure that our forces continue to provide the full spectrum of deterrence capability.

In the search for security and stability in Europe we must be both patient and tireless. That security will continue to depend, as a fundamental component, on the United States contribution. But that contribution is provided in partnership with the efforts of the European governments and nations. The image of the alliance as an arch supported by twin pillars is apposite. It is natural that as part of the European pillar WEU members should come together to discuss the issues of defence and security. It is equally vital that their efforts within the alliance should be, and are seen to be, appropriate, credible, and publicly accepted. Governments themselves bear a high responsibility for this. But I am also convinced that all the institutions of WEU – the Ministerial Council, the Permanent Council, the permanent institutions in Paris and London, and the Assembly – have, and will continue to have, a major rôle.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Lady Young. The Assembly has listened to your address with very great interest, and I know that you are ready to answer questions. A number of delegates have put their names down, and I will ask them to keep their questions short.

Before we proceed, Ladies and Gentlemen, I must point out that some of you have not signed the register of attendance at the entrance to the chamber so that it is very difficult for the Chair to establish that there is a quorum should the need arise.

I call Sir Dudley Smith.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – I tabled my question before I had the advantage of hearing Lady Young's speech. Therefore, perhaps I may amend it slightly by asking whether there is anything further that she would like to add by way of clarification of the United Kingdom Government's attitude towards President Reagan's proposals for continuing research into the strategic defence initiative, particularly with regard to the Assembly members and the WEU countries.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Lady Young.

Baroness YOUNG (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – In my original remarks I think I answered Sir Dudley Smith's question.

With regard to the British Government's attitude, as the Prime Minister, Mrs. Thatcher, said, we intend to take part in the research into SDI, and we intend to respond positively to the proposals that the United States Government has made.

I can only add that we believe that the SDI and the parallel Soviet research are both permitted under the existing agreements and that there is a clear need for the United States to match the Soviet efforts. During her recent visit to Washington the Prime Minister reaffirmed her support for research, but the implications for the future are far-reaching. The Americans agree that any deployment would have to be a matter for negotiation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Pignion.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – Lady Young, on 18th May the French press reported a preliminary agreement concerning the weight and certain technical characteristics of the projected European combat aircraft. The ministers concerned are to meet in London on 17th June, but it will be remembered that the five Defence Ministers gave their blessing to the project in Madrid on 9th July 1984, so it would seem that progress is slow.

Can you confirm, Lady Young, that nothing will be allowed to undermine the declared political will to bring the planned European combat aircraft into being at an early date? I would also like to ask whether any steps are to be taken to follow up Mr. Hernu's suggestion of a study agency involving the five countries, if only to advance work on the project and ensure that the combat aircraft is eventually built.

For all our countries, as members of WEU devoted to the cause of European co-operation on arms matters, such an achievement would represent a crucial step forward and enjoy the additional merit of being an unqualified success.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Lady Young.

Baroness YOUNG (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – As I understand the position on this matter, the question was assessed positively at the meeting in Rome, and we look forward to continuing that consideration at the meeting to be held in London in June. We have been encouraged by the progress. As I am

Baroness Young (continued)

sure Mr. Pignion will understand, there are still difficult problems to be resolved, but, as I said at the beginning of the answer, we believe that the consideration will be continued at the meeting in London and will be continued positively.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Cifarelli.

Mr. CIFARELLI (*Italy*) (Translation). - I should like to ask the Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs whether she can confirm or deny an unfortunate impression I have gained from her speech.

In the plans for the restructuration of WEU, the rôle reserved for this parliamentary Assembly is largely to serve as a sounding box for ministers' ideas and decisions and as a means of explaining what is involved to the general public.

Apart from the fact that these explanations are given to the public immediately by the mass media, whereas we shall be following months later, I should like to stress that a parliamentary assembly cannot be satisfied to serve as a mere sounding box or as a means of publicising decisions taken elsewhere.

I know that the following principle applies in the British parliamentary system: any parliament can do anything which it is not expressly forbidden to do. I ask whether the Council's line may not be to forbid this Assembly to examine proposals, initiatives and questions concerning problems relating to the great task of ensuring European security.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Lady Young.

Baroness YOUNG (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). - I thank the questioner for the point that he has raised because it gives me an opportunity to say that quite the contrary, the WEU Assembly has a very important rôle. Of course it is free to debate any matters that it wishes. It makes a most valuable contribution by bringing together parliamentarians from all the member countries of WEU, and it will continue to do that. That must be of considerable importance as the importance of WEU grows. I see that as a valuable rôle.

I would not in any way discount the rôle of WEU, which I outlined in my speech, as a forum for continuing to explain to and educate public opinion about the need for defence. I see that as becoming increasingly important, particularly as those who remember the last war grow older, when there will be opportunities for the Soviet Union to try to divide Western European countries from America. When the public are asked

to pay through their taxes for defence expenditure, it is always important to explain the rationale for the need for defence.

There is a line that is frequently quoted from a British poet, Alexander Pope: "The price of liberty is eternal vigilance." It is true that if we want to remain free we have constantly to explain to everybody the measures that we need to take to remain free. I see the function of the WEU Assembly as being very important in that context.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. de Vries.

Mr. de VRIES (*Netherlands*). - The Minister informed us that the United Kingdom intended to participate in SDI. I should like to know on what basis the United Kingdom will participate in that effort. Will it finance part of the research, will it merely allow scientists to participate, or will it allow firms to act as subcontractors to American firms? On what basis will the participation take place?

Secondly, what is the view of the United Kingdom Government on the French Government's proposals to co-operate in the Eureka project?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Lady Young.

Baroness YOUNG (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). - Perhaps I could make two points in answer to that question. First, how do we see British participation in research? It is very early days to give any kind of detailed answer to that. Clearly it could assume a number of forms. For example, it might simply involve British and American research institutes getting together to tackle a particular theoretical problem. It could entail a British company tendering, either on its own or in association with other companies, to undertake a discrete element of the research programme. British scientists and engineers have a wide variety of talent and experience.

In answer to the second part of the question, I should say that WEU is a forum where members need to develop a dialogue with the United States in order to establish a factual basis on which participation in the research programme might be possible. It is somewhat early to say what co-ordination of European reactions might be possible. Having developed a dialogue with the United States, it might be possible for the European countries to discuss how that co-ordination might be utilised. Further discussions on our response can only be considered when that is completed.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – The Minister's very interesting speech continued the primarily interrogative remarks made by the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, on the strategic defence initiative at the Royal United Services Institution. Can the Minister say whether the British Government support the strategic objectives which underline the SDI and whether she believes the purposes are sound and correct and will enhance deterrence and our overall security?

Will the Minister make clear how she sees the rôle of this organisation? We see it as playing a very important part. The Dutch Foreign Minister, Mr. van den Broek, in his statement yesterday, said that he saw WEU as the ideal forum for concerting European technology in the high tech areas that will form an essential constituent of the SDI.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Lady Young.

Baroness YOUNG (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – The answer to the first part of the question is contained in the four points which I made in my speech, which were the points of agreement between Mrs. Thatcher and President Reagan at Camp David just before Christmas. That is our position. It would not be appropriate for me to say anything further at this stage.

I hope that my answer to an earlier question on the importance of WEU, and particularly the need for members to develop a dialogue with the United States in order to establish a basis on which participation in the research programme might be possible, indicates an important rôle for WEU.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Lord Reay.

Lord REAY (*United Kingdom*). – I was interested in the question that Mr. de Vries asked: how can the American offer to participate in the SDI research be turned into reality? How can the American administration make an offer when the research will be carried out by large private commercial firms and consortia of firms in the United States, and how can European governments accept such an offer when European firms and consortia of firms will be involved? Does the Minister agree that there could be a danger of repeating the debacle that the United Kingdom had with Trident, where, after very high initial hopes, in the end only a very small fraction of the work went to British manufacturers? There is the danger of raising high expectations that could end in disappointment and disillusion. Does the Minister agree that that must be avoided at all cost?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Lady Young.

Baroness YOUNG (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – My friend, Lord Reay, will know that I cannot go beyond what I said when answering earlier questions, because it is early days to discuss the whole subject of research into SDI, about which many fundamental questions are being asked. One would be ill-advised to speculate upon the answers. The benefits of co-operation and research, not just strategic but civilian, are matters that must be considered in the discussions that we are currently having amongst ourselves and will need to have between ourselves and the Americans. The problems that Lord Reay has identified might be considered and account might be taken of them.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – May I preface my question to Lady Young by saying that I am a dry and a monetarist? She has spoken, as indeed has the Council of Ministers, about the major rôle that this Assembly should and is expected to play in the revitalisation of Western European Union. The documentation that we have so far been privileged to have, however, makes it clear that a mass of words are being said but not a penny piece, or should I say franc, is being offered. The rising cost of pensions that we have to pay and the worn-out equipment and our inability to send members of the Assembly overseas to study important projects stretch credibility rather far and make it difficult to believe that governments are serious in their intentions unless they are prepared to will the means. Are governments serious in their intentions to will WEU the means or might this organisation gradually wither on the vine despite all the nice words that we have heard?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Lady Young.

Baroness YOUNG (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – I do not know whether I should congratulate Sir Geoffrey on being a dry, but he has made an important point about the WEU budget. I am aware of how strongly the Assembly feels about budgetary resources. That point has been brought home to me since I arrived in Paris today. I sympathise with those feelings at a time of reactivation and when there is considerable pressure for extra work and responsibilities to be undertaken; for example, pensions have been mentioned. That is a subject of which ministers in the British Government are only too painfully aware. It comes to our notice all the time. The pressure

Baroness Young (continued)

is naturally translated into a wish for extra resources to meet all the claims.

We must examine the Assembly's budgetary requirements in the context of overall WEU resources and the competing claims from each of WEU's institutions. As I understand it, the Council is still considering the relative weight to be given to each body. I can perhaps do no more than take note of the important point that Sir Geoffrey made. It is a matter that is still being considered within WEU. He will not be surprised to hear me say that at home we have often found that by re-establishing the way in which one spends money, and by giving up some of those functions that have been useful in the past but that have served their purpose, it has been found that money can be applied to new functions.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Gianotti.

Mr. GIANOTTI (*Italy*) (Translation). - Mr. President, I was greatly interested by the Minister's remarks on East-West relations which - if she does not think me impolite - revealed a different and more acceptable tone than that adopted by her conservative colleagues in this Assembly.

After marking my natural appreciation on this point, I should like to ask the Minister the following question. You spoke of the availability of Great Britain to take part in the American SDI project but did not mention the French Eureka project. In answering Mr. de Vries you avoided the point. You will have to agree that the pessimism expressed concerning the future of European co-operation in many of the questions asked here is not wholly unjustified. Or am I mistaken?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Lady Young.

Baroness YOUNG (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). - I hope that I shall be able to convince Mr. Gianotti that the point that he made at the end of his question is not a fair reflection of the British Government's position on this matter. I am pleased to have the opportunity to say something about our view of the French proposal known as Eureka. In the margins of the Bonn WEU meeting, ministers discussed the recent French proposal to set up a European research co-ordination agency. They endorsed the general principle of a European technological community.

The United Kingdom is fully committed to finding ways with Europe to meet the technological challenge from the United States and

Japan. That is the principle lying behind the Eureka proposal. The United Kingdom is closely involved in discussions on how best to take matters forward. We do not at the moment see a formal rôle for WEU. I hope that I have said enough to show our view of the French Eureka proposal.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). - I hesitate to inject a discordant note into the afternoon's proceedings. I do not wish to be unfair, but is Lady Young aware that during the past half an hour we have had something which, if it is not an unfortunate paradox, is a rather disreputable inconsistency in that conservative and christian democrat member after member have been raising the subject of SDI although yesterday their groups prevented the Assembly from considering Mr. van den Bergh's report on that subject. (*Interruption*) Sir Dudley Smith is becoming accustomed to interrupt members of my group or myself. I wish that he would learn to exercise control and tolerance, if he has any. This afternoon he and his group have indulged in consideration of a subject that they stopped the Assembly debating earlier.

I do not wish to involve Lady Young in the Assembly's squabbles, but the point was worth making. Has she considered Mr. van den Bergh's report? If it is so ominous to western defence, do the Conservative and Christian Democrat Groups act on the advice of ministers involved in the Assembly? Does she feel that the deactivation of WEU was as deserved as the reception afforded to Mr. van den Bergh's report appears to show?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Lady Young.

Baroness YOUNG (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). - My friend, Mr. Hardy, has posed one of those questions which I would be very ill-advised to answer in the terms in which he put it. As I understand the position, the Assembly considered this matter and referred it back, and it is not for me to comment on the actions of the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Scheer.

Mr. SCHEER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). - I have four short, interconnected questions, Minister. The first concerns a notable speech made a few weeks ago by the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, in which, referring to the SDI project, he warned of the danger of an orgy of competitive arming and posed a total of twenty-nine questions with a critical bearing on the SDI project, which have

Mr. Scheer (continued)

not yet been answered. My question to you is this: how can the British be prepared to participate in the SDI before a single one of Sir Geoffrey's twenty-nine questions has been answered?

My second question is: would the British Government be prepared to discuss the Eureka project with the same commitment, the same readiness to participate as evinced in the case of the SDI?

A third question: for what political reasons, in the present situation, do initiatives such as the Eureka project, which affect the states of Western Europe, originate with France? When, and in what circumstances, could Great Britain produce its own, not necessarily very different, European initiative?

My last question is as follows: given the principles governing financial management and given also the debates in various European countries about the future of their defence budgets, what priorities would be imposed on the British budget by participation in the SDI – extending possibly beyond the research stage, because that must also be included in the calculation or at least taken into account – when the fact is that it is already difficult to secure the future maintenance at an undiminished level of the three bulwarks of British defence – Trident, the British contribution to naval defence and BAOR? What would happen if a fourth element were to be added?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Lady Young.

Baroness YOUNG (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – I shall do my best to answer those four questions. The first related to Sir Geoffrey Howe's speech at the Royal United Services Institute when he posed a number of serious questions about SDI. As the speech made clear, the questions were not a priori judgments about what might happen. They were indeed questions. Everyone who has considered them agrees that there is a need to address ourselves to those questions as the research continues.

I hope that I stated the British point of view on Eureka when answering an earlier question. In a sense, that tied up with whether the United Kingdom would take a European initiative in this area. We are still studying the Eureka proposals just as we are continuing a study of what is happening under the SDI proposals. Much is going on at present in this regard.

The last question concerned finance. Clearly, one of the issues that must be resolved is that of

SDI's enormous cost and, no doubt, the cost of any contemplated related research. We must address ourselves to this question not only in relation to SDI but in relation to other defence costs and, indeed, other costs with which governments are faced. These are vital matters that must be considered, and while consideration of them is taking place it is not possible to answer the many questions that each poses. We shall have to confront them as we come to them.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. De Decker.

Mr. DE DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – In your address, Minister, you indicated that your government considered it essential that strictly military matters relating to European defence should continue to be handled within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance. You particularly stressed the important rôle of the Eurogroup and of the IEPG and noted that any duplication between NATO and WEU should be avoided.

In this context, could you tell us what rôle is to be played by the three new agencies which the WEU Council of Ministers decided to set up in Bonn a few weeks ago and in which the Assembly is placing a great deal of hope?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Lady Young.

Baroness YOUNG (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – Thank you for that question. As you rightly said, these new structures were set up at the Bonn meeting. It is still very early days to be considering what all their functions might be, and discussion is still taking place. As I said in my speech, the new structures and how they will work is clearly one of the most urgent jobs in front of us. In fact, I gave two examples. The first was a look at the long-term aspects of conventional arms control in Europe and the other was an examination of questions associated with verification in some of the disarmament talks. They are examples of what might be done. However, other matters will be considered and, as I have said, it is still early days in relation to working out these proposals.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Rubbi. This will be the last question as Lady Young has to leave us.

Mr. RUBBI (*Italy*) (Translation). – May I ask the representative of the British Government to clarify one point. Speaking of the Geneva negotiations, you said that the British Government "supports" the American initiative there. Since this was not the term used by the Foreign Ministers at the Bonn meeting last month, I

Mr. Rubbi (continued)

should like to ask if this is a mis-translation or if it is the position of the British Government, which in that case would not be the same as their view stated in the Council of Ministers.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Lady Young.

Baroness YOUNG (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – I am very sorry if in my earlier remarks I did not make clear what I meant when I said that we warmly welcomed the January Geneva communiqué. That was on the resumption of arms control negotiations, in which I said that we fully supported the United States' objectives in these negotiations and were engaged in an intensive process of discussion and consultation with the Americans in NATO. We have said, of course, that we support the proposals on research into SDI but that, at the same time, we believe – and the Americans have agreed – that it is essential that before deployment there would be full consultation, as is necessary under the ABM treaty.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Minister. On behalf of the Assembly, I thank you for attending and for your careful answers to the questions, most of which bear on a current problem, that is, the United States proposal regarding the strategic defence initiative.

The rôle which you ascribe to WEU confirms that this is the proper forum for addressing such an issue. On behalf of the Assembly I express the hope that our parliamentary organ may be able to provide the Council with the support, encouragement, guidance, and even the criticism necessary to ensure that the European attitude to this question is as constructive as possible.

We are most grateful for your contribution. As you know, we shall be addressed tomorrow by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Mr. Genscher, and we shall shortly be in a position to evaluate the outcome of the present session which looks promising in spite of everything.

Thank you again, Minister. (*Applause*)

5. Cyprus and European security

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1008 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Com-

mittee on Cyprus and European security and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1008 and amendments.

I call Sir Frederic Bennett, the Rapporteur of the committee.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – This is a difficult moment in which to begin a debate on an altogether different subject from that in which we have been engaged in something like a kind of battling position for the last two days. As one who has no reluctance to enter into a battling position, I hope I can assure all concerned that, on this occasion, at least, I have, from the very first moment that I have been entrusted with a rather difficult task, done my best not to think in terms of one point of view or another held by different sections of people or parties but to see what can be done to meet and overcome one of the most intractable problems of our time and, indeed, at present the most intractable problem within Europe itself.

There is a strange contradiction here in that if an institution like this says nothing when a serious danger to our overall security arises, it will afterwards be accused of neglect or not making its position clear. On the other hand, there is plain evidence that if those outside Cyprus who seek to tell those within the island what to do persist, the situation only worsens. This is a contradiction that any rapporteur has to face.

At many times I have felt that perhaps it would be better at this stage on my own initiative to refer the report back for a further occasion, and I gave a great deal of thought to doing so. On the other hand, I have felt persuaded that that would be for WEU to renounce one of its main functions, which is to try to reduce dangers to European security, especially those from within Europe itself, while at the same time we feel ourselves able in our discussions to roam over the impact of events in quite different parts of the world, including developments in China, as having some effect on European security when in our own back yard we have a grave problem that could become even graver if we do nothing.

Thus, after consultation and very deep reflection, I have decided that the only course at this stage is to let the outside world interested in what WEU does know that we are worried about what is going on in Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean but that we do not wish in any way to prejudice the possibility of success by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

If the Secretary-General of the United Nations succeeds in his effort it will be the biggest gem in his crown when he ceases to be Secretary-General, because this problem has bedevilled the international scene for far too long. If by

Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)

his patient, tireless efforts and the co-operation of both communities he can reach a solution, the thanks of not only the people of Cyprus but the whole of Europe and elsewhere ought to go to him.

Therefore, nothing that I say today in a short introductory speech is meant other than to say "Thank you for what you are doing. Please carry on with what you are doing" and, as this is really an interim report, to hope that by the time we reassemble in December he will have achieved what he so very nearly achieved in the last round of negotiations.

Without going into the pros and cons of why failure occurred, I will simply say that it was a very narrow bridge that still had to be crossed. It is remarkable that the two sides, meeting in New York under the purview and responsibility of the Secretary-General, came closer than ever before to reaching some form of understanding that would enable the island to have its own separate, non-aligned sovereign status within Europe.

It is not for me to seek to attribute blame. On the contrary, praise should go to the Secretary-General and those who negotiated with him for coming closer than ever before to a resolution of the conflict. They came closer than I had ever imagined possible in my most optimistic moments. Indeed, when Mr. Kyprianou went back to Cyprus, an unlikely majority in his own parliament, composed of conservatives and communists, voted that he should have accepted the solution put forward by the Secretary-General and thus brought about a resolution of the problem that would have made today's debate unnecessary. The fact that Mr. Kyprianou's failure to sign an agreement was repudiated by his own parliament is remarkable.

I have just heard today that the Secretary-General, undeterred, is now putting forward revised plans that will put the matter back to where it was when, unfortunately, the failure occurred at the last meeting.

Therefore, it would be irresponsible for me – and, if I may say so, for anyone who follows me in the debate – to play one side against the other. I have studiously avoided doing that today. In response to my objective report, I have received some representations saying that I have not been fair and that blame should be attached to one side or the other, but I am sure that anyone who reads my report will agree that that accusation cannot be fairly made against it.

There is now, apparently, an opportunity for renewed representations to be made by the Secretary-General to both sides, and one can

only hope that on this occasion there will not be a slip at the eleventh hour. Otherwise, we shall have to return to the question in December, because there is a grave danger to security and peace in Eastern Europe as long as the problem remains unresolved.

What is the alternative that faces us if the Secretary-General does not succeed in what he has put forward? Here I cannot do better than quote a paragraph from my own text:

"The only alternative would be the maintenance of the status quo, with, in the long run, a de facto partition of the zones now controlled by the two communities, implying the perpetuation of tension which would be dangerous for both Europe and the Atlantic Alliance. Moreover, there is little chance of such a development remaining peaceful because any tension which might also emerge between Greece and Turkey would inevitably have repercussions in Cyprus and because it is not possible to consider a United Nations force remaining on the island indefinitely."

I used to be a Latin scholar. I am afraid that I cannot now remember the exact words in Latin, but it was the great Roman scholar, Horace, who once said – I will paraphrase it in English – that if a family grows three annual crops on the land, that land is its home. We have had many crops that have been grown in Cyprus and the problem of peaceful redistribution of the population grows daily ever more difficult. The same has been seen in many other parts of the world. Once groups establish themselves in the home of someone else, it becomes almost impossible for a sovereign democratic power to make them give up what they regard as their home.

I say very solemnly that time is not on our side in this matter. We must hope that before the de facto partition becomes permanent it will be possible to reach a solution that will result in a peaceful, federal, non-aligned, democratic state of Cyprus being established in the Eastern Mediterranean. That is why, in supporting the Secretary-General, I have taken the liberty of presenting the subject to you today. If members of the Assembly have partisan points to make on one side or the other, I hope that they will resist the temptation, as I have, because nothing but harm can flow from this Assembly supporting one side or the other in the dispute.

I also appeal to the two communities not to allow themselves to be pressed by the powers that support their case but to continue their negotiations on the basis of their sovereign status, for Cyprus is neither part of Turkey nor part of Greece. The whole purpose of the report is to ensure the maximum support for the Secretary-General in continuing his work on the Cyprus problem.

Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)

In the General Affairs Committee there was a unanimous vote in favour of the report. There was not a single dissenting voice. I do not think that there was even one abstention. I hope that today we can achieve the same unanimity, irrespective of party and ideology, in pursuit of a common aim.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Sir Frederic, for the painstaking work you have performed on behalf of the General Affairs Committee. Knowing your special interest in security problems in the Mediterranean, and in the Middle East in particular, I am sure that your views are very much appreciated.

In the general debate I now call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I think that we have heard a rather unusual Sir Frederic. It shows the seriousness with which we ought to treat this subject.

One of the advantages of the present Secretary-General and his efforts to bring peace to this beautiful, troubled island is the fact that he was a former Secretary-General's special emissary to Cyprus. Therefore, he knows the problem perhaps better than anybody else.

I have had the privilege of going to Cyprus on four occasions – three on behalf of the British Parliament as a member of its External Affairs Committee and once as a British Minister. I have had the opportunity of seeing all over Cyprus – on the first occasion before the green line was drawn and on other occasions afterwards. However, with the aid of the High Commissioner I was able to go to both sides.

I know that in this Assembly we have some most passionate pro-Greeks and pro-Turks. Their words today could sabotage the efforts of Mr. Perez de Cuellar if we are not careful, because each of the communities will draw upon any partisanship to believe that they have an element of support irrespective of whether the case is good. Therefore, I echo Sir Frederic in hoping that those well-known partisans on one side or the other – I have very decided views, but today is not the day to express them – will not create further problems.

Looking at the island of Cyprus – which, after all, is a member of the Commonwealth – one sees the most appalling wasted opportunities. Were it possible for Mr. Perez de Cuellar to bring the two communities together – without the pressures of those who like to believe that they are their masters but who between them have caused more trouble for the poor people of Cyprus – and get them to work out an understanding and an agreement, the prosperity of

that Commonwealth member would be fabulous. There are opportunities in tourism and – dare I say in this country which is the heart of those who love wine – in the produce of its better vineyards. Indeed, much of it is better than some *vin de pays* and *Tafelwein* and wines from the rest of the Common Market. The opportunity for Cyprus to increase its exports is enormous.

If, as Sir Frederic said, it were possible for agreement to be reached, we, as WEU, and the United Nations would have played a part in solving one of the two most intractable problems facing the world. One, to which we have addressed ourselves many times, is the Arab-Israeli conflict and the other is the internal problem of Cyprus. Perhaps we could make a start by clearing this one from the agenda.

Upon the basis of this factual report, it would be so easy for anyone to write three different reports. I can think of members here who, acting as rapporteurs, could produce a report that would throw all the blame on one side, others who could throw it on the other side, and yet others in a third scenario who could apportion blame to both. However, that would not achieve what we want to do today.

Having heard Sir Frederic, realising that it is hoped that the talks are about to start and knowing that we can come back to this subject in December, I should have thought that those who have inscribed their names on the list might reconsider whether they wish to remain on the list and possibly make remarks that might, to use an English term, upset the applecart. Anyone who does that will have a very bad conscience and will perhaps be responsible for the deaths of many more.

I urge this Assembly to accept with as little debate as possible the report that Sir Frederic has put before us. I think that the report is constructive and I believe that the Secretary-General could find it of some use.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Lagorce.

Mr. LAGORCE (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I recently had occasion to go to Cyprus and study the political situation there. The current position presents a very real danger to the security of the Eastern Mediterranean, and any sharp increase of tension between Greeks and Turks in the island would threaten the peace of the world. This fact naturally precludes any facile phraseology, otherwise one might be tempted to describe the Cypriot problem as a graveyard of missed opportunities.

Sir Frederic's report, which clearly requires no gloss, is precise and clear enough to need no

Mr. Lagorce (continued)

paraphrasing by me. He very properly alludes to the moments when a solution might reasonably have been hoped for. Unfortunately, fresh obstacles have so far arisen to every solution just when an acceptable accord looked set to save the situation. This was the position on 17th January last, when it seemed that Mr. Perez de Cuellar's draft agreement was likely to succeed.

We may perhaps regret that Sir Frederic has passed over somewhat in silence the United Nations comments about a referendum and an election but in any event, such uncertainty holds grave dangers which WEU must help to overcome by supporting the unremitting and positive efforts made by the United Nations Secretary-General. This is the course which Sir Frederic advocates in his conclusions and draft recommendation. In my view this provides the only reasonable response to the problem and the single practicable solution in the short, medium and long term.

Although in theory, there are three alternatives, in fact only one of these has any validity.

The first is to maintain the present position in regard to institutions, territory and ethnic groups. Not only Cyprus, but the world at large is aware of the poverty of this solution. Sooner or later, after a period during which current tensions would continue unabated, the latent antagonisms would be bound to lead, as in 1963-64, to an armed conflict, which the presence of thousands of Turkish and Greek soldiers would escalate into a war of international proportions, thereby destabilising European security and possibly triggering a global conflict. While we may console ourselves with the reflection that the status quo is currently free from conflict, it cannot continue without ultimately producing an explosion.

We should therefore, at the earliest possible moment, devise some suitable method of defusing the present situation. Here we have two possible solutions: legally sanctioned partition or the creation of a federal state.

The former solution would do no more than aggravate the present unacceptable and dangerous situation. As the report says, legalisation of the present de facto partition would imply "the perpetuation of tension which would be dangerous for both Europe and the Atlantic Alliance". This solution should therefore be rejected; all the more so as the United Nations forces on Cyprus cannot be kept there indefinitely, as Sir Frederic has justly commented.

The only other solution is therefore the creation of a federal Cypriot state of the kind favoured by Mr. Perez de Cuellar.

Our Assembly should support this initiative to its satisfactory conclusion. Without prejudice to the responsibilities, rights and concerns of the parties directly involved, WEU should apply itself to ensuring that the Greeks finally adopt a positive approach which discards the unattainable desire for Enosis and admits recognition of their legitimate demands without at the same time placing the Turks in the position of having to reject an institutional framework contrary to their racial, religious, civic and human rights, which must be secured in the normal way.

We must therefore welcome Sir Frederic's report when it calls for support for the United Nations Secretary-General's proposal. The rôle of the WEU member countries is to concern themselves more closely than in the past with respect for democratic principles and human rights and with banning the use of force by one community against another. We should acknowledge the fact, perhaps insufficiently stressed by the Rapporteur, that we have failed to do this in the past.

In spite of the recent breakdown of negotiations, I still think it possible to devise a constitutional structure acceptable to both sides. Turkey must agree to the proposal that its troops and nationals be withdrawn by a fixed date.

An accommodation could then be based on the following three principles: first, a return to a compensation agreement covering questions of property; second, an endeavour to reach an understanding on territorial divisions; and third, the solution of questions connected with reoccupation and re-establishment.

We are concerned here not with ideology but with a pragmatic approach which may perhaps achieve a generally satisfactory solution in a part of Europe where, I am convinced, Greece and Turkey and above all Cyprus, north as well as south, all want to live in peace at last.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Dudley Smith.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – The title of this debate is Cyprus and European security. The WEU Assembly's interest must always be security. That is its remit. It is a defence organisation. It wishes to see peace preserved in our immediate hemisphere and in the Mediterranean and to see that its influence spreads widely.

I doubt whether there is anyone present in the Assembly today, whatever his political views, who does not agree that even with modern warfare techniques Cyprus occupies a unique strategic position. It is an important island and will remain so for a long time. That must be our first consideration. I hope – this is confirmed by what is said in other debates – that we are not

Sir Dudley Smith (continued)

unconscious of human rights and the need to preserve them in all countries that are members of our Assembly or that play an ancillary rôle.

Like Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, I have decided views on the subject that we are debating and I agree with him that Sir Frederic Bennett has made a sober, sensible and detailed analysis, and that today is not the day to go into polemical arguments of one side or the other. It would be profitless and would probably antagonise one side or other and make no contribution to achieving a worthwhile solution.

In those circumstances, I subscribe to what Sir Frederic said – that this should be a low-key debate and that our job should be to encourage the solution that we should like to see.

I am sure that members have read the conclusions contained in the report. I recommend that somehow those conclusions are conveyed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and to the participatory parties on the Greek and Turkish side. The conclusions are relevant. Paragraph 37 states: "For the Greek Cypriots, it must mean clear, outright and permanent renunciation of Enosis." That is a serious point bearing in mind the history.

It continues: "For the Turkish Cypriots, it would mean renouncing the guarantee afforded by the presence of the Turkish army, as well as giving up more than a quarter of the territory they now occupy." We must remember Cyprus's geographical position and how near it is to the Turkish mainland.

The important point is: "These sacrifices are acceptable only if the new Cypriot state is capable of giving the two communities guarantees of security and promises of peace, civil equality and economic development." That is true. In paragraph 38 the report states: "The process of returning to peace will probably still be a long one, but if it does not start soon there is every reason to believe that it never will."

I share that view. I am pessimistic, and have been for some time, having visited the island twice within the past two or three years.

It is incumbent upon us in a democratic assembly, on behalf of the people whom we represent, to bring about a settlement that will be just to the people who live on that island and help to preserve the peace of Europe and the world. That is relevant because of the strategic significance of that part of the globe.

The Turkish Cypriot elections will take place next month. I do not know what bearing that will have on the final outcome of the problem but they should be taken into account. Some people have said that they are undemocratic, but

I understand that they are completely democratic. They may change the kind of representation that the Turkish Cypriots have.

We are all aware that a Greek general election is taking place. It has been alleged that some influences have been at work on the Greek Cypriots from the Greek mainland. If the election results in a different government, one wonders whether that will have a bearing on future negotiations.

The talks probably cannot be resumed until both those elections are out of the way. We hope that the talks will take place fairly quickly afterwards.

It would be irresponsible of us at this stage to say where we feel that the fault lies. Many of us believe that we know where it lies. It is our job to urge the Secretary-General of the United Nations to get the parties together again, and to prevail upon them, in their own interests and those of other people throughout Europe, including the Mediterranean, to reach an honourable settlement, because otherwise the two sides will undoubtedly suffer and there will be increasing difficulties.

It cannot be in anyone's interests to have that happen on so small an island and within such a small community.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – May I first assure the Assembly that I believe that the report should secure the broad endorsement of the Assembly and be acceptable to all our member states? That must be said at the outset because the report is presented by the leader of the British Conservative Delegation, and members of the Assembly will have perceived that from time to time my colleagues in the British Labour Delegation and I express an almost vehement disapproval of our colleagues' assessments and activities.

On this occasion, serious exception cannot be taken to the recommendations contained in the report. We accept that the continuing division in Cyprus presents a threat to stability in the Eastern Mediterranean and provides embarrassment for the western alliance because it engenders a further cause to the historic discord between Greece and Turkey. Continuing divisions present the risk of a crisis at any time. There are sufficient difficulties in the Mediterranean and elsewhere in the world already. Cyprus is close to current and horrifying instability. That should be adequately recognised and our commitment should commend any effort to reduce regional and Cypriot vulnerability.

Mr. Hardy (continued)

I do not dissent from the view that the United Nations' initiative has provided the best possible basis for the promotion of peace. I trust that it will further develop, although alternative or complementary approaches should not be automatically dismissed in the face of any continuing stalemate.

I certainly do not oppose the report. However, one or two further comments of qualification may be appropriate. The first paragraph of the preamble to the recommendation refers to the Atlantic Alliance. That is not helped by the present division and uncertainty, but the West should not expose itself to the charge that Cyprus is only to be seen as an instrument of our own strategic interest. There are many in southern Cyprus who wish their island to be entirely neutral and wholly unaligned, and many express a marked reluctance to Cyprus serving as a military base. If our concern is expressed only in terms of military or tactical advantage, that could be utterly counter-productive. If the cause of political stability is to be served our approaches must always reflect a sensitivity to Cypriot opinion.

Responsibility for the failure of recent diplomatic efforts should not be too readily apportioned. Perhaps the Greek Cypriots could have provided a more generous, even more eager, response to the apparent gestures of Mr. Denktash, but there is no value in post mortems of that sort. Turkey's approach could have provided a more expansive concession in relation to early, substantial military withdrawal, but present need rather than recent or long-past record should concern us.

Given the British Government's very considerable support for Turkey and the backing which Turkey's generals have received from conservative politicians – even at the risk of embarrassment over the principles of human rights – there are grounds for asking Turkey to offer greater concessionary gestures. As for the United Kingdom, the recent disappointment over the Bosphorus bridge contract might be entered into the political balance sheet. Of course Turkey must maintain its interests. Proximity does not suggest that any other attitude or condition could be sustained, but international assurance can make distance a little less meaningful, and in no way would the report inhibit that view.

Sir Frederic also recognises that Greece could exercise helpful influence, especially within an agreed international framework. Obviously, Greece faces difficulty because populist politics can exert severe effect there just as much as anywhere else, but there must either be a tacit, or at the very worst a clearly implicit, rejection

of Enosis. I hope that any helpful initiative will win support in our countries and secure the support of Western Europe's socialist parties. We have maintained a very close interest. The Socialist Group in the Council of Europe sent a mission to Greek Cyprus earlier this year, and a major conclusion was reached which may be relevant to our debate today.

In many past and, perhaps, contemporary cases where majority and minority relationships present serious problems, the most difficult hurdle on the path to peace has been the achievement of a constitutional agreement. This scarcely presents an overwhelming problem in Cyprus today, as the basis of an acceptable constitutional settlement exists. The social and economic problems involving material, settlement and compensation remain. Perhaps our countries could perceive there an opportunity to help towards the construction of the peaceful conditions which we wish to see.

Once again I stress that there is substantial cause for bipartisan agreement in this Assembly. I welcome the Rapporteur's view that this present report should be seen almost as an interim one. There should be a reappraisal in twelve or eighteen months. I hope that there is, and I trust that when it takes place, it will present a perception or demonstration either that enormous progress has been made or that it is manifestly imminent.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I have no wish to support anything which the socialists have said up to now, but I shall take up the appeal made by the Rapporteur, Sir Frederic Bennett, because to go into detail would draw attention to the different aspects of the question and would therefore create an atmosphere which would certainly not be favourable to the solution everyone wants.

This is why I shall merely observe that the unity and independence of Cyprus are of great concern to us not only for the sake of the whole population of Cyprus, which has suffered a great deal – and I shall not go into the reasons and responsibility for that – but also because, as Europeans and members of the western world, we cannot remain indifferent when we look at Cyprus's strategic position which is so important to western security and therefore to the security and peace of the whole world.

For that reason, we must support all efforts to resolve the present difficulties and to reach as quickly as possible a just solution which will guarantee the national unity of Cyprus and end its de facto partition, which is of concern to us and might be an obstacle to peace and security.

Mr. Cavaliere (continued)

As I say, we must support all efforts to restore unity. In this context, I think that the action taken by the United Nations Secretary-General is responsible, praiseworthy and deserving of support and encouragement, as Sir Frederic Bennett said.

Beyond actual events and the forthcoming elections in the Turkish part of Cyprus – which will not in any case be any obstacle to the peaceful solution and unification which we all want – there is a point which needs stressing and which should persuade us not to decide for or against one side or the other. This is the fact that after many talks the United Nations Secretary-General prepared a draft written agreement. The Turkish Cypriot side declared itself willing to examine it and immediately said it was in favour of the agreement as drafted by the United Nations Secretary-General.

Another element which should persuade us not to take up set positions and should give us some real hope of a genuinely constructive outcome is the fact that, in addition to the statement made by President Kyprianou, the Cypriot parliament adopted a resolution by twenty-three votes to twelve on 22nd February 1985, instructing the Cypriot head of state to sign the agreements which the Turkish Cypriots had said they were prepared to accept. All this should lead us to conclude that the two communities have understood that an agreement must be reached and national unity must be restored.

I should also like to say that no one in Greece or Turkey has any interest in maintaining the present position. It is certainly not in Turkey's interest to continue financing a military contingent in the Turkish part of Cyprus. Thus, if, as we all hope and argue, the solution prepared by the United Nations Secretary-General becomes fact as quickly as possible, these troops, which may be called foreign, will disappear from the island and Cyprus will be one of the Mediterranean nations and countries contributing to the maintenance of world peace, as it in fact did in the past.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Rubbi.

Mr. RUBBI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, although we appreciate Sir Frederic Bennett's efforts and thank him for his report we have to refer to a number of contradictory features which we cannot accept. Today, for example we have heard a passionate appeal which we could endorse at once; if this is the position to be taken we can support it unhesitatingly. But this has absolutely nothing to do with the two official texts before us – the report and the draft recommendation. I ask the President, therefore, to say how the debate

should proceed. I will continue to speak to the official documents submitted, adding that if we are finally to make a recommendation based on Sir Frederic Bennett's appeal, we can agree. As to the two documents, the Rapporteur's underlying intention seems to have been to examine the situation in Cyprus solely from the standpoint of its effects on the Atlantic Alliance and on NATO strategy and interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. This is clear from the wording of the draft recommendation which nowhere includes Sir Frederic's words "sovereign, non-aligned state".

Everyone is aware of the threat which the situation in Cyprus poses for the security of the Mediterranean and of Europe. And I believe that everyone is concerned to defuse this stray mine in an area so dangerously beset by conflict and tension. But I think that this can only be achieved by going back to the root causes of this situation in Cyprus and seeking to remove them. Here, we believe that the prime cause is the attack on the island's unity and integrity, on its independence and on its status as a neutral, non-aligned country.

From this standpoint, some details need to be added to Sir Frederic Bennett's historical account. I shall not go back over the Turkish occupation since July 1974 or to the many United Nations resolutions which have not been implemented over a period of ten years. In passing, I should just like to observe that the Rapporteur might at least have mentioned the two hundred thousand Greek Cypriots expelled from their property and forced to leave home and live as refugees in their own country.

I shall confine myself to more recent events. The unilateral proclamation in November 1983 of a self-styled Turkish Republic of North Cyprus. This was a clearly secessionist act, recognised therefore by no one and condemned by everyone starting with the United Nations and the European Community, which for that reason refused the financial aid which had been requested. This is a first cause which must be removed but there is no reference to it. It seems possible that the negotiations started by the United Nations Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar had already identified some ways of resolving this new situation, but the Turkish community has once again made a move which is liable to thwart the praiseworthy efforts of the United Nations Secretary-General and make the partition of the island irreversible. I am referring to the decision to hold a referendum in the Turkish sector for the approval of its constitution and to hold elections on 23rd June next to establish a separatist parliament.

These latest moves by an illegal state recognised by no one are not only contrary to the precise rules of international law but are also a

Mr. Rubbi (continued)

severe blow to the possibility of further negotiations. This point, which obviously could not be covered by the report when it was written, cannot however be ignored in the draft recommendation.

We request that an appropriate paragraph mentioning this point should be included and we also wish to propose a number of amendments to the draft, hoping that they will be accepted. The intention is not to interfere in negotiations involving other parties but to promote the conditions in which they can take place. On this point, we must be heard because the way in which the Cypriot crisis is solved directly involves the independence of a friendly country and the peace of all of us.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Cox.

Mr. COX (*United Kingdom*). – The last speaker has touched on many of the points that need to be made in this debate, in which none of us, whatever side we may possibly lean towards, wishes to say anything that will in any way antagonise the other side.

In view of the negotiations which have taken place, and which, one hopes, will recommence in the near future, it would have been far better not to have had the report presented here today because, with great respect to Sir Frederic Bennett, it is not any good his making that plea when within his report there are comments – I refer to paragraph 37 – in which he says: “For the Greek Cypriots, it must mean clear, outright and permanent renunciation of Enosis.” I hope that he will tell the Assembly when he last heard a major political leader in the Greek Cypriot community making that call. That, however, is the kind of thing that causes great damage within the context of Cyprus.

I often speak on Cyprus, both at the Council of Europe and at many meetings in the United Kingdom, and I always make my position clear: that I want a united Cyprus in which the rights of both the Greek and the Turkish communities are of paramount importance, because undoubtedly there is an enormous future for that island and I want to see that kind of future start developing as soon as possible.

If, however, this report – I realise that it is a WEU report – is principally concerned with European security and the NATO influence in the Eastern Mediterranean, I have to say to the Rapporteur that until certain fundamental achievements are made in Cyprus towards meeting the rights and the desires of the island and its people, there will be many problems.

I could make a great many comments but I will simply say to Sir Frederic that the events in northern Cyprus earlier this month have in no way helped the Secretary-General. As politicians we cannot close our eyes to issues that we know are causing stumbling blocks to be placed in the way of meaningful progress. If we had seen in Cyprus a meaningful reduction in troop numbers, that would have created a wonderful atmosphere in which real progress could take place. The Middle East has been mentioned in the debate. We all know that the stumbling block, certainly in Lebanon, has been the unwillingness to see foreign troops withdrawn. That point applies equally in Cyprus.

In Sir Frederic’s report, in paragraph 19, there is a reference to 1,600 missing people. That is a major issue in Cyprus, and it would be interesting to know to whom Sir Frederic spoke within the community on that specific issue. If he really wants to see progress, I beg him to give that matter very serious consideration.

In paragraph 38, Sir Frederic refers to territorial adjustment. If we as parliamentarians, from whatever country, had part of our country taken as a result of actions to which we were opposed, we would want to have some, if not all, of that territory returned.

Many Greek Cypriots have been forced out of their homes. Whatever Sir Frederic or other members of the Assembly may say about discussions that took place in the House of Representatives in Nicosia, it is clear that any political party in Cyprus which tried to reach an agreement without that issue being investigated would be doomed to failure, and I can understand why. To know that, one has only to speak to men and women in Cyprus about the refugee question.

Several speakers have said that time is not on our side, and I fully agree. Under successive governments in the United Kingdom, we have had for many years to live with the tragedy and problems of Northern Ireland. They were caused many years ago as a result of a divided island. We live with those problems today.

Next month, eleven years will have passed since the division of Cyprus. I do not think that any of us, whatever our attitude, wish to see that position continuing a day longer than it should. Therefore, I fully support those colleagues who have expressed appreciation of the efforts of the Secretary-General. I wish him well but I hope that those of us who want to see that kind of settlement arrived at will use, within the communities with which we associate, the kind of influence that many of us have. I am sure that my parliamentary colleague, Mr. Corrie, has such influence, and I have great respect for him. I hope that neither side in Cyprus will do anything to hinder the progress

Mr. Cox (continued)

that the Secretary-General is trying to make. When he is able to make progress, it will not only benefit Cyprus and its people; it will benefit the whole of that part of the Mediterranean. The sooner that day comes, the happier I shall be.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Corrie.

Mr. CORRIE (*United Kingdom*). - Much as I should like to follow the speech of my colleague, Mr. Cox, and answer some of his points, I shall not do so.

I congratulate Sir Frederic on his very low-key presentation in the debate. I welcome the report, as many others have done, with caution. An enormous amount of work has gone into it, but we should not, as many other speakers have said, be saying or doing anything that could in any way upset the delicate situation in Cyprus. Therefore, I am glad that the recommendation is short.

The report is an extensive and fair account of recent history in Cyprus. Rightly, it does not lay blame but it makes sad and disturbing reading. It is sad because Cyprus is split. It is disturbing in that it is taking so long to find a peaceful solution. The communities, it would appear, can live together apart but cannot live apart together. Therefore, a bi-zonal federal state seems to be the only solution within, of course, a non-aligned, independent Cyprus. But, like Mr. Cox, I hope that, after any peace agreement is reached, those who want to inter-mingle will be allowed to do so freely.

I have visited both sides in the past few months. There is now a genuine wish among the people themselves of both communities to find a just and fair solution. There is no animosity between the two peoples. A new generation has grown up. But a settlement must be found by negotiation between the two communities themselves, based on the proposals of the United Nations Secretary-General, with the least possible interference from any outside parties, including WEU. Both sides, in different ways, must concede much, and in the end no one will be completely satisfied, but that is the price that will have to be paid for a lasting settlement. It is a small price to pay for peace and prosperity in that island.

It is sad that the New York talks failed in January. It shows the importance of having complete understanding between the parties, before they meet, of what is to be agreed and accepted. I think the Secretary-General perhaps thought that if he could get both sides together, a settlement would be inevitable, and that the momentum would carry it forward. That was

not to be. As has been said already, it is now unlikely that there will be any high-level meeting until after the Greek elections and the Turkish-Cypriot community elections in June. Community elections were allowed under the 1960 agreement. However, I am pleased to hear that even in the past few days both sides have been saying that they will be prepared to return to the negotiating table after things have settled down. But this time there must be no misunderstandings. Both sides must go to the next summit absolutely clear beforehand on what has been discussed and agreed. There must be no more false starts, otherwise the long-term consequences could be disastrous for the people of Cyprus.

Cyprus is vital to the stability of the Eastern Mediterranean. There are very few stable areas left in that part of the world. My colleague, Sir Dudley Smith, said that he was pessimistic. I am the opposite. I am supremely optimistic. I am sure that by the next time we meet here in the autumn there will have been a peaceful settlement bringing peace and prosperity to all the people of Cyprus.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the Chairman of the General Affairs Committee.

Mr. MICHEL (*Belgium*) (Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, in entrusting the preparation of this report to Sir Frederic Bennett, the General Affairs Committee chose a Rapporteur who combined the qualities of wisdom, experience and prudence. Sir Frederic has met the challenge of this very difficult task with great objectivity, and I thank him once again on behalf of the committee.

In his introductory remarks he advised us that we should "resist temptation" when considering the report. He himself has resisted the temptation to take sides or analyse too minutely the complaints which might be lodged by one community against the other. He has limited himself to a historical survey to be submitted to the United Nations Secretary-General with the suggestion that he should pursue his initiative to a successful conclusion. This was the proper approach to the report and to the debate in this Assembly.

I join with the Rapporteur and other speakers in hoping that peace may be re-established and that Western European security may be strengthened by the peace agreement which must be signed in the Eastern Mediterranean. Until this agreement has been concluded, and I hope that it may be on the lines proposed by the United Nations Secretary-General, security and peace in the West will continue to give cause for concern.

That is all that needed to be said in the report, the recommendation and the order. To have said more would have been highly injudicious.

Mr. Michel (continued)

It might have irreparably damaged a situation which we believe to be promising.

I am very grateful to the Rapporteur for his objectivity and caution. In arguing a case, it is sometimes better to hold one's peace and listen to what others have to say rather than attempt to say it all, and say it badly. In the present instance we have profited from the efforts of a man of unique experience, and we are duly grateful to him. It is my belief that this report will be approved by our Assembly, and I trust that the order will be unanimously adopted.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Michel.

I call the Rapporteur to reply to the points raised.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – I shall try to deal with the comments without breaking my pledge not to increase the temperature. It is not from lack of courage but more from an excess of discretion that I do not develop counter-arguments to some that I have heard. Having said at the beginning that I did not intend to raise the temperature, I shall endeavour to keep my pledge during the winding-up.

I value Mr. Hardy's comment to me. He referred to me as the leader of the British conservatives. In fact, he is constitutionally incorrect. I am the leader of the British Delegation. I remember that when Mr. Urwin was the leader of the British Delegation there were occasions when I did not find any embarrassment in agreeing with him on a matter about which I felt we had interests in common, such as the preservation of peace and security. Mr. Hardy need not be too worried about finding himself for once in bed with me.

On a lighter note, I have been reminded that I was incorrect when I said that it was Horace who stated that once you had a farm for three years and three crops, it was your home and the difficulties of being moved were enormous. My friend Mr. Michel has reminded me – and I have to say this because of Sir Geoffrey Finsberg's intervention – that it was vineyards, not farms, to which Horace was referring. Perhaps he had Cyprus in mind.

I have been asked about the words at the beginning of the report: "that the situation in Cyprus is a serious threat to the maintenance of the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance in the Eastern Mediterranean".

From the very start I have been restricted by the fact that this is a defence assembly. Defence is the interest of WEU and the Atlantic Alliance, literally the forerunner, and the reason

for our discussing this matter. This is not the Council of Europe; this is not the United Nations. Therefore, the General Affairs Committee accepted from the start that, if we were to debate this matter within WEU, it would be in the context of the impact of events in Cyprus on European security. I do not ignore any of the other matters relating to peace, security, freedom, and so on.

I think it was right to bring this draft recommendation within our purview as a defence assembly. It was accepted 100% by the committee that this debate related to the "maintenance of the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance in the Eastern Mediterranean" and the continuing threat to peace and security in Europe if the present situation continues.

I have also been asked – there are some amendments on this matter – about the attitude that a future Cyprus will adopt. With respect, it is not for Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Michel or this Assembly to tell Cyprus what attitude it will adopt towards international affairs. That would be a new form of neo-colonialism. We are saying that we believe that it is in the best interests of Cyprus that it should be sovereign, independent and non-aligned. It is not for me or for this Assembly to tell a future Cyprus Government what attitude it should adopt in world affairs. It may decide to adopt quite a different attitude – which would not please me – but we are not entitled to dictate to a future united federal Cyprus Government what attitude it should adopt. We can only hope that it will do what we think is best for its future, which is that it should be sovereign and non-aligned.

The General Affairs Committee agreed that this report should be accepted with unanimity. Otherwise, I would not have brought it forward. If it had been contested, I should have found a reason for putting it off. However, the agreement was unanimous. It would be a great pity if we were to split an entity and an agreement reached in committee on a certain basis by suddenly taking new amendments. I say that from whichever side they come and from whatever source they derive. There is one exception – a printing error that Mr. Cavaliere has rightly pointed out. It refers to negotiations, but it should have referred to negotiations held between 1977 and 1984. Of course, the most productive negotiations have been conducted between the two communities without outside interference, and that is the whole theme of the report.

In seeking to answer the points which have been raised, except those which I think go against the sense of our discussions, I should like to leave the matter there and ask for the judgment of the Assembly in favour of the report. I do not pretend that it is perfect or that it could

Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)

not have been better written. Indeed, as Mr. Hardy said, we may have to come back to it, with possibly another rapporteur, in six or twelve months from now. For the moment, we have taken the opportunity, as WEU, to say that we are worried about peace and security in Europe while the problem of Cyprus remains unresolved. I suggest that we leave it at that, and I hope that will be the result of the votes to follow.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Sir Frederic, for replying so concisely to the various points raised.

Before voting on the draft recommendation, we have to consider the amendments.

Five amendments have been tabled. They will be taken in the order in which they refer to the text. They are: Amendment 2 tabled by Mr. Rubbi, Amendment 1 tabled by Mr. Cavaliere, Amendment 3 tabled by Mr. Rubbi, Amendment 4 tabled by Mr. Rubbi and Amendment 5 tabled by Mr. Beix.

If Amendment 1 by Mr. Cavaliere is agreed to, Amendment 3 by Mr. Rubbi falls.

I remind the Assembly that, under the normal procedure, the time allowed to speakers for and against amendments is limited to two minutes each, with one speaker in favour and one against.

Mr. Rubbi has tabled Amendment 2 which reads:

2. In paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “to the maintenance of the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance in the Eastern Mediterranean” and insert “to the country’s sovereignty and the security of the Eastern Mediterranean and of Europe”.

I call Mr. Rubbi to support his amendment.

Mr. RUBBI (*Italy*) (Translation). – As I said in my earlier short speech, I repeat that the reason for the amendment is that I find unacceptable the arguments which Sir Frederic reiterates in the conclusions, namely that we should look upon Cyprus as a possible threat to Atlantic cohesion. This I cannot accept because Cyprus is not a member of the Atlantic Alliance but a neutral, non-aligned country, and in my view we have no right here to treat a neutral country as if it were involved in our strategy and in some way subject to our law.

Sir Frederic says he does not wish to say what Cyprus will be tomorrow but we have no need to say anything because Cyprus has already said it in its constitution; it wants to be a neutral, non-aligned country. We have the right to allow this to Cyprus and the duty to respect it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – Amendment 2 is not sensible because Mr. Rubbi has failed to understand that when one talks of the maintenance of the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance one must remember that two of the members of that alliance are Greece and Turkey. As Sir Frederic Bennett and many others have said, any increase in tension that may arise from the problems in Cyprus may spill over into the alliance and into those two nations.

From the conversations that I have had in Cyprus, it is clear, as Mr. Cox said, that the ordinary people genuinely welcome the presence of the two sovereign bases, because they provide security and employment.

It would not be helpful to remove the wording which Sir Frederic Bennett has proposed and substitute what Mr. Rubbi suggests. Sir Frederic’s proposal is right. The report received unanimous agreement in committee, and it would be wrong to destroy that important cohesion by removing little bits of the report. I hope that the Assembly will reject the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the committee’s view?

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – I echo what Sir Geoffrey has said, I do not want to make piecemeal changes to matters that were considered fully in committee. If one starts on the type of analysis suggested by Mr. Rubbi, one destroys a carefully built balance. No one suggested such amendments in committee. The amendments are new, and have plainly been tabled with different thoughts in mind. I have kept my white sheet clean today and I therefore hope that none of the amendments will be accepted, not because I do not necessarily agree with them, but because they undermine the fair balance. We have heard the speeches today, and they show how difficult it was to achieve that balance. I hope that, on reflection, the amendment will not be accepted.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I put Amendment 2 to the vote.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 2 is negatived.

Mr. Cavaliere has tabled Amendment 1 which reads:

1. Redraft paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation as follows:

“Considering that the conclusions drawn by the Secretary-General of the United Nations

The President (continued)

from the negotiations held between 1977 and 1984 are the best possible basis for the restoration of national unity in Cyprus; ”.

I call Mr. Cavaliere to support his amendment.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, this is a simple amendment. The third paragraph of the preamble refers to the inter-community negotiations held between 1977 and 1982. The reason for my amendment is that the negotiations continued until 1984 and, we hope, will be resumed as soon as possible; the amendment, which is complemented by the last paragraph, according to which the question is not the restoration of peace in Cyprus, because, praise be, it is not at war, but of national unity which is in fact threatened.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment ?...

Mr. CORRIE (*United Kingdom*). – I object to the amendment and hope that it will be defeated. The two vital words that Mr. Cavaliere has missed out are “inter-community negotiations”. It is vital that negotiations take place between the two parties on the island. That has been agreed by every country and organisation, including the United Nations. The Cypriot people should decide. I accept that we should accept “1984”, but the two words to which I have referred are not in the amendment. That may be a mistake, or it may have been done deliberately, but I do not support the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the committee’s view ?

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – The last point made by Mr. Corrie is the overriding one. I have already accepted that I think it sensible to refer to 1984, because the negotiations are continuing. History has shown that the best chance of a solution lies in inter-community negotiations, and not in introducing outside powers.

I hope that the word “inter-community” is left in. I fully accept Mr. Cavaliere’s suggestion that “1982” should be altered to “1984”. If it helps him, “and continuing” could be included because the negotiations are going on. He then might withdraw his amendment. The news today is that negotiations have reopened. I hope that my suggestion is acceptable, and I ask Mr. Cavaliere not to press his amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – I can agree because the amendment seeks to include

the negotiations which have taken place up to 1984. But, may I remind Sir Frederic Bennett that I suggested replacing the word “peace” by “national unity” which I feel is more realistic and more accurate.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – We cannot do that.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – As Mr. Cavaliere has felt unable to accept your suggestion, I take it you agree only with part of his amendment. As I cannot split the amendment, the Assembly in its wisdom will take due account of the Rapporteur’s partial support.

I call the committee Chairman.

Mr. MICHEL (*Belgium*) (Translation). – The correction of the factual error is, of course, accepted, and does not call for the tabling and approval of an amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – “1984” simply has to be substituted for “1982”.

Mr. MICHEL (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Quite so !

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put to the vote Amendment 1 tabled by Mr. Cavaliere.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 1 is negated.

Mr. Rubbi has tabled Amendment 3 which reads:

3. In paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “the restoration of peace in Cyprus” and insert “re-establishing the integrity and independence of a neutral, non-aligned Cyprus”.

I call Mr. Rubbi.

Mr. RUBBI (*Italy*) (Translation). – The purpose of this amendment is to stress that what is needed in Cyprus is not the restoration of peace, which fortunately prevails there, but the restoration of what is lacking, namely the integrity and independence of a neutral, non-aligned Cyprus.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment ?...

I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I am sorry, but I do not understand Mr. Rubbi. He is playing with words by trying to take out “the restoration of peace in Cyprus” and inserting “re-establishing the integrity and independence”. If Mr. Rubbi really meant that to be a constructive way forward, he would surely be urging “the restoration of peace in Cyprus by re-establishing the integrity of Cyprus”.

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg (continued)

By removing "the restoration of peace" and putting in the alternative wording, I do not believe that he is being at all helpful. I suggest that he withdraw the amendment, because it does not go to the heart of the matter, which must be the restoration of peace as that is the major thing that the people of Cyprus want.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the committee's view?

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – As I said when endorsing what Sir Geoffrey had previously said, I do not think that this amendment carries us forward. Mr. Rubbi seeks to say that instead of "peace", we should have "the integrity and independence of a neutral non-aligned Cyprus". That shows that we are trying to prejudice the ultimate attitudes which the state of Cyprus should adopt. That is not our rôle. Given that two ethnic minorities are divided by a "Berlin wall" stretching from one side of the island to the other, one cannot call that peace in the accepted sense of the word. I therefore ask that the amendment be rejected.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put to the vote Amendment 3 tabled by Mr. Rubbi.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 3 is negatived.

Mr. Beix and Mr. Pignion have tabled Amendment 5 which reads:

5. In the draft recommendation proper, leave out "the Greek, Turkish and both Cypriot authorities" and insert "the parties concerned".

I call Mr. Pignion to support the amendment.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – I preface my remarks by saying that, when our Assembly submits a recommendation, I take it it does so in the expectation that it will be implemented to the letter!

It is my view that mention of the authorities renders the recommendation vague and is at the same time restrictive. Instead, therefore, of listing names and at the risk of appearing vague, I would prefer to leave the United Nations Secretary-General completely free to make contacts and consider information supplied by any interested party.

Instead of mentioning the Turkish Government, with its seat in the north of Turkey, or the government of Mr. Kyprianou, which is a legal entity, Sir Frederic has been careful to make no formal reference to these authorities. Rather than designating authorities by name, we suggest that the words "the parties concerned" should be substituted.

As long as the treaties remain in force, the United Kingdom may also be involved! The proposed wording has, in fact, been carefully chosen to give the United Nations Secretary-General complete freedom of action.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – There will be certain problems if we accept this amendment and talk about "the parties concerned". Some people will say that there are not, as it were, both Cypriot authorities. One side may say that the other side is not a legal body. By accepting the report and listing these four bodies – the Greek, Turkish and both Cypriot authorities – we continue the flow which Sir Frederic has tried to achieve. I am sure that Mr. Pignion did not mean it, but by inserting "the parties concerned" he is making the recommendation unnecessarily restrictive. If we are to follow the flow of the report through, we must specify those four bodies, which are the only four which are concerned in the way in which the report suggests. I would not support the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the committee's view?

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – I again endorse Sir Geoffrey's general remarks about the amendment. This is a fundamental amendment. I have tried as discreetly as possible to point to the fact that the only advances which have been made so far have occurred when the Cypriots themselves have been involved in the negotiations. This is a very gentle way of saying that the Secretary-General should do his best to ensure that those Cypriot authorities are involved. I have deliberately used the word "authority" so that I do not tread on corns about whether it is a régime or a government. In effect we are saying: "We will leave it to you, Mr. Secretary-General, to use all the influence you can to restrict outside interference from any source in the talks which we hope you will have with the bodies which will ultimately have to live with this problem – the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots." For that reason, and for the reasons advanced by Sir Geoffrey, I ask the Assembly not to accept the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The Assembly will have to vote on Amendment 5.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – May I intervene?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I cannot refuse, but I give you the floor as Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – In the interest of brevity, I will not develop my argument but simply point out that, if we use the words “the parties concerned”, the Security Council and the United Nations Organisation, where this problem has been raised, are included, whereas they are excluded from the debate by the specific reference to the Greek, Cypriot and Turkish authorities.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put to the vote Amendment 5 tabled by Mr. Beix and supported by Mr. Pignion.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 5 is negatived.

Mr. Rubbi has tabled Amendment 4 which reads:

4. Redraft paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation as follows:

“ (iv) Wishing the two Cypriot communities to pursue their negotiations in spite of the initial setback, ”.

I call Mr. Rubbi to support his amendment.

Mr. RUBBI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should just like to point out that this text was most probably drafted before the new move for a referendum by the Turkish Cypriots, which has cast fresh doubts on the understandings already reached between the two sides. I think, therefore, that we cannot say that we welcome the decision taken because it has been superseded. We can at most hope that fresh agreement will be reached. This is the purpose of the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment ?...

I call Mr. Corrie.

Mr. CORRIE (*United Kingdom*). – I hope that the wording will be left as it is. Since the presidential elections, both communities have said that they will go back to the negotiating table. That should be welcomed and the text should be left as it stands.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the committee's view ?

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – I welcome the decision because, despite everything that has happened, and despite the setbacks, it is only today that it has been learnt that the Secretary-General is sending to both parties for their consideration revised proposals which they have agreed to consider. Therefore, rather than rake up what may or may not happen, we should today welcome their decision to go back to the negotiating table. We should welcome that and leave the text as it is.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put to the vote Amendment 4 tabled by Mr. Rubbi.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 4 is negatived.

We will now vote on the draft recommendation in Document 1008 as a whole.

A vote by roll-call has not been requested.

The Assembly will therefore vote by sitting and standing.

I now put the text as a whole to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The draft recommendation is adopted¹.

I call Mr. Rubbi for an explanation of vote.

Mr. RUBBI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should like to give a very brief explanation of vote. I must say that we would have wished to approve a recommendation on Cyprus and we therefore requested – but unfortunately the rules do not allow it – that we should at least be able to approve the recommendation to the Council, with which we are in agreement.

Having said this, I should like to state briefly that no one here has been making a play on words and that those who have been doing so are those who have made the comment. In both speeches and the draft recommendation we have insisted on treating Cyprus, which is an independent subject in international law, as an integral part of an alliance to which it does not belong; in my view, this is wrong and offends against both international law and international relations. The report is neither balanced nor impartial; it favours Turkey and the Turkish community, to the extent that, while it refers to the Turkish Cypriots who were expelled from the Greek sector, it makes no mention of the two hundred thousand Greek Cypriots who were driven from the community territory.

A last word on the subject of peace. Peace is precarious, very precarious, because this country has for ten years been under military occupation which threatens its integrity and independence.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and Gentlemen, Mr. Inan, a member of the Turkish Parliament, who has been invited to attend this session as an observer, has asked to address the Assembly.

I call Mr. Inan.

Mr. INAN (*Observer from Turkey*) (Translation). – I thank you, Mr. President, for allowing me to speak, and wish to say how pleased and

1. See page 27.

Mr. Inan (continued)

honoured I am to be present at your meeting and to address your Assembly.

While we are not, legally speaking, members of your organisation, you may be assured that we are with you in spirit, and that everything European is of direct concern to us.

The quality, depth and objectivity of the report and the ensuing debate have impressed me greatly. I congratulate both the Rapporteur and your organisation. If all the interested parties and international organisations approached the problem with your objectivity – apart from a few exaggerations which are to be expected in a political debate – I do not doubt that a solution would be close at hand.

Mr. President, I wish to leave your organisation and your Assembly in no doubt about the will, the desire and the determination of the Turkish Government, parliament and people to see this problem resolved as quickly as possible. We are sufficiently well aware of the problems existing throughout the world and, unfortunately, in areas close to home to desire earnestly that our own communities should not be rent by difficulties. I am convinced that, with your support and that of the Turkish nation as well as with the efforts made by the United Nations Secretary-General and the co-operation of all the parties concerned, we shall succeed in finding a solution which will bring this conflict to an end. None of us, least of all myself, wishes to grow old with this problem.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Inan. I have exercised my right to defer calling the Turkish parliamentary observer invited to attend our Assembly until after the vote. By proceeding in this way we shall gradually be able to establish the rôle to be played in our deliberations by parliamentary observers from countries which, though not members of WEU, do belong to the Atlantic Alliance and are regularly invited to attend our debates without their direct intervention in the main debates conducted by the parliamentary delegations of the member countries.

**6. Revision and interpretation
of the Rules of Procedure –
Terms of reference of the Committee
for Relations with Parliaments**

*(Presentation of the report of the Committee on Rules
of Procedure and Privileges, Doc. 1020)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges on the revision and interpretation of the Rules of Procedure – terms of reference of

the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Document 1020.

As Mr. Jessel has to leave because of other commitments in his own country, I call him to present his report now, although the debate and vote will take place on Thursday, as scheduled. The Chairman of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges will take the necessary steps to enable the debate to be conducted in the absence of the Rapporteur.

I call Mr. Jessel.

Mr. JESSEL (*United Kingdom*). – I wish to thank you, Mr. President, for the endless courtesy and patience you have shown personally in trying to slot in my speech today in view of the peculiar circumstances of my returning home and being at a funeral on Thursday. I shall not take more than five minutes, but I wanted to place on record my conviction about the need for this report from the point of view of all members of the Assembly. Its purpose is quite simple – to try to get more publicity for and public awareness of our work in the Assembly of WEU.

The Presidential Committee instructed the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges to examine the terms of reference of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments. That was on the initiative of Mr. Stoffelen, and it was no less than two years ago. Since then, the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges has discussed the matter four times and has adopted my report by a large majority.

The Assembly produces many reports of considerable quality – often of high quality – but we all know that not enough people know about them. The members of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments are now supposed to promulgate the work of the Assembly in national parliaments. That is necessary, and that would continue.

The proposed change in rule would not compel but permit the Committee for Relations with Parliaments to dedicate a proportion of its time and attention to the work of improving public relations with WEU through the media.

Specifically, the recommendations in the short report – apart from drafting and consequential amendments to the rules – are two.

The first is to change the name from Committee for Relations with Parliaments to Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations. The second change is to insert as a term of reference the words:

“ make all necessary proposals with a view to bringing the work of the Assembly to the attention of the public and the press in member countries. ”

Mr. Jessel (continued)

I stress that the proposed change would do nothing to stop individual members of the Assembly – from yourself, Mr. President, down through your committee chairmen and all the individual members – from publicising what they want to publicise, through official statements or their own speeches, in their own way, but it would have the effect of enabling one committee of this Assembly to direct concentrated attention to what needs to be done, to make recommendations and, if necessary, to assist in the process.

The only objection of any significance that I have heard is a budgetary one, but there are no specific budgetary implications in a mere change of the rules; indeed, I understand from the present Chairman of the committee, Mrs. Knight, and from her predecessor as Chairman, Mr. Stoffelen, that they do not foresee any substantial expenditure of funds. But even if there were a small expenditure of funds, it would be up to the committee to make its case, as against the claims of all the other committees, to the Budgetary Committee. If its case were found to be wanting, those funds would not be supplied.

I repeat that the change in the rules is permissive. It allows but does not compel the Committee for Relations with Parliaments to direct its attention to public relations in the ways suggested.

I hope that the Assembly will decide to give a fair wind to the report and that when the debate continues on Thursday it will pass the resolution and accept the report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I congratulate you, Mr. Jessel, on your conscientious work as Rapporteur. You have greatly assisted the Assembly on this very important subject.

7. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Wednesday, 22nd May, at 9.30 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Military use of computers – reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1007 and amendment).
2. New outlook for WEU – reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council (Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Document 1012 and amendments).
3. Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Document 1019 and amendments).

Are there any objections ?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak ?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 6.25 p.m.)

FOURTH SITTING

Wednesday, 22nd May 1985

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the minutes.
 2. Attendance register.
 3. Organisation of the work of the Assembly and of its committees (*Motion for an order in implementation of a proposal by the Bureau*, Doc. 1024).
 4. Situation in Lebanon (*Motion for a recommendation with a request for urgent procedure*, Doc. 1023).
 5. Iran-Iraq war (*Motion for a recommendation*, Doc. 1022).
Speaker: Dr. Miller (point of order).
 6. Military use of computers – reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 1007 and amendment).
Speakers: Mr. Fourré (*Rapporteur*), Mrs. den Ouden-Dekkers, Mr. Milani, Mr. Rauti, Mr. Hill, Mr. Fourré (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Wilkinson (*Vice-Chairman of the committee*), Mrs. den Ouden-Dekkers, Mr. Wilkinson;
- (points of order): Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Spies von Büllenheim, Mr. Milani, Mr. Pignion, Mr. Milani, Mr. Stoffelen, Lord Hughes, Mr. Cavaliere, Sir Dudley Smith.
7. Situation in Lebanon (*Motion for a recommendation with a request for urgent procedure*, Doc. 1023).
Speakers: Mr. Martino, Mr. Michel.
 8. New outlook for WEU – reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council; Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council (*Presentation of and joint debate on the reports of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*, Docs. 1012 and amendments and 1019 and amendments).
Speakers: Mr. van der Sanden (*Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee*), Mr. Scheer (*Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*), Mrs. Kelly, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Müller, Mr. Bianco, Mr. Vecchietti, Mr. Moreira (*Observer from Portugal*).
 9. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 9. 30 a.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

I must remind you, Ladies and Gentlemen, that you should sign the attendance register. Some important votes will be taken during the

day, and your signatures are absolutely essential to establish that we have a quorum.

Before we begin our debates, I should like to welcome Mr. Alfred Cahen who has been appointed Secretary-General by the Council and is honouring us with his presence at this sitting.

Mr. Secretary-General, you will shortly be taking over from Mr. Longestaey, with whom we have had confident and very friendly relations. In welcoming you, I should like to repeat, through you, that the Assembly wishes to maintain with the secretariat and the Council, and especially the Permanent Council, a productive working relationship furthering the revitalisation of WEU, which is the earnest desire of us all. (*Applause*)

3. Organisation of the work of the Assembly and of its committees

(Motion for an order in implementation of a proposal by the Bureau, Doc. 1024)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The first order of the day is the motion for an order in implementation of a proposal by the Bureau on

1. See page 30.

The President (continued)

the organisation of the work of the Assembly and its committees, Document 1024.

Ladies and Gentlemen, at the opening of yesterday's sitting you were informed of discussions in the Bureau concerning the organisation of our work and aimed essentially at avoiding any repetition of the problems we have had in connection with quorums in committees and more especially with the time-limit for lodging documents with both the Assembly and the Council. In accordance with the ruling by the Presidential Committee, the minimum is two weeks in advance. This is a matter for the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges which will present draft revised Rules of Procedure at the December session. The Rapporteur is Mr. Spies von Büllenheim, and the proposal will be ratified at that time.

This being the case, and following the statement made yesterday by my colleague, Jan Blaauw, who was in the Chair, as well as the comments made during the sitting, an order was drafted, based on, and incorporating, the Bureau's suggestions. This document was translated into both languages and distributed during the day.

The document provides for all committees to meet in the same place about a month prior to the session of the Assembly. The budgetary implications are a matter for the Presidential Committee which, in accordance with the Bureau's wishes, is instructed to organise this session of committee meetings. We have expressed the wish, which I now support personally, that it should, if possible, be held in London. From the point of view of both Western European Union and the increasing interest which member countries will have to take in our organisation, it is advantageous that the Assembly should meet in the capitals of member countries. As London is also the headquarters of WEU, it seems quite reasonable and politically appropriate that such a session should be held there. What is more, we will be able to use the opportunity to promote even closer relations with the Permanent Council.

I therefore put this proposal to the Assembly.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The motion for an order is agreed to¹.

4. Situation in Lebanon

(Motion for a recommendation with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 1023)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is a motion for a recommendation with a request for urgent procedure on the

1. See page 31.

situation in Lebanon, Document 1023, which I have received from Mr. Martino and others.

The motion has been posted up and the relevant document distributed.

The Assembly will later be asked to vote on the request for urgent procedure.

In accordance with the Rules of Procedure, this vote will take place after the vote on the draft recommendation on the military use of computers – reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council.

I thank Mr. Fourré, Rapporteur of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, for having yesterday allowed the Assembly to change its orders of the day at the end of the sitting so that Mr. Jessel could present his report on behalf of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges. As you know, Mr. Jessel was called away to attend to duties in his constituency.

5. Iran-Iraq war

(Motion for a recommendation, Doc. 1022)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is a motion for a recommendation on the Iran-Iraq war, Document 1022, which I have received from Mr. Hardy and others.

In accordance with Rule 28(4) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly has to vote on the inclusion of the motion in the register. One speaker in favour, one against, and the chairman of the committee concerned may have the floor.

Does Mr. Hardy wish to speak?

He does not.

Does no one wish to speak?...

We will now vote on the inclusion of the motion in the register.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The motion for a recommendation is included in the register.

I call Dr. Miller on a point of order.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. Are you in a position to indicate that the motion for an order on the withdrawal of a report from the order paper, which I have tabled, together with several of my friends, will come before the Assembly?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The motion for an order which you tabled, Dr. Miller, will be taken in conjunction with Mr. van der Sanden's report which, if all goes well, we shall be consi-

The President (continued)

dering this morning. The necessary arrangements have therefore been made to enable you to speak in support of your motion.

6. Military use of computers – reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1007 and amendment)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on the military use of computers – reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1007 and amendment.

I call Mr. Fourré, Rapporteur of the Committee on Scientific Technological and Aerospace Questions.

Mr. FOURRÉ (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, in the next few years we shall have to answer two vital questions concerning the production of computers and their use in the military sphere. First question: Is a technological gap opening up between Europe on the one hand and Japan and America on the other? Second question: Can Europe catch up and, if so, how should it set about it?

Before attempting a reply, I will quickly sketch the present situation with emphasis on the difference which exists between Europe and the United States.

It seems essential at this point to quote a few facts. The EEC countries' overall balance of electronic strength was already \$9 billion in deficit last year, whereas in the 1970 American defence budget, 20% of the Pentagon's procurement was in electronics. This percentage will rise to 40% at the end of the 1980s. In 1985, \$6.5 billion will be spent on the promotion of industrial research and development.

Another example of Europe's lack of progress is its consumption of what are called semiconductor chips which are the basis of all other electronic production. This has fallen in the past ten years from 30% to 19% of the world total. European production of chips has fallen in ten years from 14.5% to 9.5%. Another example is that the life cycle of microelectronic-related products has shrunk from eight to ten years to three years on average.

Information technology companies in Europe have only between 35% and 40% of their own

domestic markets. It is an interesting fact that IBM sells as much in Europe as its nearest nine competitors combined, which include of course other United States companies as well as an increasing proportion of Japanese firms.

By 1986, the balance of trade specifically in information technology products will show a deficit of some \$5 billion.

There have been few European initiatives in response to this situation except for the Esprit plan whose purpose, as everyone knows, is to enhance the competitiveness of the ten member states, especially vis-à-vis the United States and Japan. This Community programme is parallel with those of individual nations, and it must be admitted that the fragmentation of the European markets causes an appalling waste of resources.

We may ask ourselves why Europe is unable to capitalise and commercialise the products developed by its scientific laboratories, the quality of whose research staff is the envy of the world.

Public opinion – and this is also true of our assemblies – knows little, or is indeed misinformed about the military side of computer applications. The fact remains that, in the military sphere, computers have become an essential part of weapons systems, and there is a defence-related information technology. Computers can be used for applications in logistics, supplies, strategic planning, detection of communications systems, simulation processes and so forth.

This problem has not escaped the attention of our Assembly, as on 29th April 1980 Mr. Brasseur submitted a report – Document 840 – in which he stated that communications, command, control and intelligence were essential elements in the defence programme. He emphasised the need to consider the European dimension of this market and advocated the introduction of a coherent policy and commercial strategy aimed at winning the European share of the market.

On 24th October 1980, Council replied as follows:

“ The Council share the concern expressed by the Assembly that European firms have so far failed to capture a satisfactory share of the European and world markets for microelectronics and associated equipment. The Council favours practical international action which offers the prospect of assisting European firms to win a larger share of the international market. The defence world has a particularly acute awareness of the benefits of common standards. The Assembly has rightly drawn attention to these matters, which it can be assured the WEU governments intend to take into account. ”

Mr. Fourré (continued)

While this interesting declaration of intent was in line with the wish expressed by the Assembly, we shall shortly see that it has failed to produce any great practical results or initiatives considering that it was made four years ago.

In the military sphere, computers call for a range of characteristics and features vital to their existence. These include such requirements as reliability, security, operating security and survivability. In fact, every army imposes its own specifications on the application of information systems.

I will now explain very briefly why computers are essential in the military sphere and will quickly review their main applications.

Computers are used in military communications. Here there are two complementary technologies: that of the long-distance communications themselves, and secondly the technology concerned with the protection of such communications. Each of these applications requires very specific means which become increasingly expensive when one passes from tactical requirements to space applications.

Much work has recently been done on techniques for protecting communications – safety, security – against natural or man-made interference – jamming, tapping, etc. – to which military communications are exposed.

Computer technology is also used in weapons systems. There is a great difference between computers installed on board ships, aircraft, tanks, etc. or integrated in weapons systems and the large computers used to mastermind nuclear weapons, for example. However, contrary to the position in the United States, computers on board French vehicles or ships and incorporated in weapons systems such as missiles are all derived from computers for civil use specially modified and reinforced to meet military requirements but with specially developed software. Like their civil counterparts, these computers are also used for simulation in the training of military personnel. Computers are also used for logistical purposes, and here again the hardware consists mostly of modified and adapted civil computers, as is done for any major client. When computers started to be used, the military were often the main customers!

The chief question for the future concerns what are commonly called supercomputers.

The future of technological evolution lies in the fifth-generation computer, which will be able to execute many different orders at the same time and at a speed well in excess of present performances. The very large computers needed to carry out digital simulation work, now

essential for the design of sophisticated weapons, are of American origin. Japan may also be producing them soon.

In the United States, many supercomputer programmes are now actively under way. The Cray Company has announced its plan for multicomputers which, in the second half of the decade, should be ten to fifty times more powerful than present equipment. Control Data is planning similar development of Cyber 205, and NASA has started research on a very ambitious multicomputer programme. IBM changed its supercomputer policy significantly at the end of the 1970s by planning to market equipment which would be competitive with that of other manufacturers, particularly the Japanese. Two types of supercomputer are planned.

In Japan, research has also started in the framework of a major fifth-generation computer programme on parallel machines – multicomputers and vectorials – capable of carrying out more than 1,000 million effective floating point operations per second by the end of the decade.

In view of this critically dependent situation, the French Ministry of Defence is studying the possibility of developing a large scientific installation on a national basis. The French Government has invited three computer industrialists to make a collaborative effort to meet the future computer requirements of the armed forces. The government has also launched a large vectorial computer programme whose code name is Isis which will be used by the civil and military departments. If successful, it will be possible to use the same type of software on all the computers. This is extremely important when one considers that the software accounts for about 80% to 85% of the total price of computer systems.

This study led to the decision to ask Bull to build a large prototype computer. Bull started the development of this computer in 1981 and will produce the first prototypes in 1986. If the results are satisfactory, the company will build four large computers of this type between 1986 and 1990, reaching a total of twenty machines in 1991. In order to build the prototype, Bull has found an associate in Siemens in the Federal Republic of Germany, which handles the technological aspects, while Bull retains the design leadership. The industrial purpose of Bull and Siemens might be to develop a large computer for a series after Isis.

Competition for the Isis computer will again come from the United States and Japan. In the United States, the Defence Department has earmarked large sums for developing computers for military purposes and once the research and development costs have been amortised by the military user, the same type of computer will be

Mr. Fourré (continued)

transferred to the civil market. In Japan, the method is opposite. Computers are built for the civil government market, the ministries and state industries, but the ultimate purpose is to conquer the world market, with subsequent systems to be offered to the general public.

As I have said, the United States Defence Department earmarks a very large part of its budget for the promotion of industrial research and development and, as Mr. Hill pointed out in his report following our mission to the United States last year, computers are given absolute priority in this area. The research programmes encompass a wide range of technologies. One of them is concerned with strategic calculations, and a complementary programme relates to the development of a class of "super-intelligent" computers capable of being integrated into advanced defence systems by 1990. Parallel with this, work is being carried out on the development of a family of computers a thousand times faster than existing machines, using multiprocessor structures and very highly integrated components.

Yet another programme concerns VHSIC or very-high-speed integrated circuits. The Defence Department wishes to increase the United States lead in integrated circuit technology applied to weapons systems and to reduce the lag between the development of this technology and its practical application.

In the Soviet Union, the problem is fundamentally different. Substantially all research and development on computers has been directed towards military applications and the civil field has been almost completely neglected, with the result that Soviet forces now have great problems in training their military personnel who, apart from a few experts, have absolutely no experience in the use of civil microcomputers. It should also be noted that, while the research and development laboratories may be of international standard, problems become acute when it comes to launching production on an industrial basis.

The fact is that the Soviet Union has excellent researchers, possibly the best in the world according to some western experts. They often win the admiration of their foreign colleagues by their speed in assimilating new techniques, mostly originating from the United States. But the specialised industry fails to follow suit. In the Soviet Union there is nothing equivalent to the two large United States companies, Intel and Motorola, which turn silicon into those famous chips which are the basic elements of integrated circuits. Almost without exception, Soviet information technology has been copied from western countries, legally or otherwise. The

needs of the defence industry and of the centralised management of the economy under the Gosplan have caused priority to be given to very large computers. In this area the Soviet Union is consequently not so far behind, though it lags by at least ten years in the field of microcomputers.

In this situation, how do we stand with European co-operation?

In point of fact, there is hardly any collaboration at all within the European framework. It is difficult to ensure collaboration within NATO, because of the preponderant position of the United States. Nevertheless, Europe has joint requirements which could and should be met. This would mean the joint funding of research, and joint characteristics would also have to be defined. Moreover, a computer is only a small part of a weapons system, and it would be very difficult to undertake joint research on a small part without procuring the complete weapons system. Here progress has to be made step by step. There would have to be a joint strategic concept, far greater standardisation of armaments and a collaborative effort by European industries.

From the point of view of European co-operation, it would be extremely helpful to finding a joint solution to begin by studying the problem of interoperability. This is certainly a problem which will not be easy to solve without progress towards European unification. In the meantime, it should nevertheless be possible to achieve a common European research effort, especially in communications and fifth-generation computers with artificial intelligence. Much joint research could, and should, be undertaken.

In its reply to the thirtieth annual report, the Council, having noted that the traditional form of presentation should be altered, has provided a number of answers concerning, specifically, matters of civil and military high technology.

It was my hope that genuine answers would be given to the questions and recommendations made by the committees of the Assembly, but I am sorry to have to tell you that, as in previous years, the answers are superficial and incomplete. An initiative by the Council on the harmonisation of research in the field of high technology would, for instance, have been very welcome. However, while the Council acknowledges shortcomings and examines the institutional frameworks, there is no sign of any real progress. Everybody is well aware that NATO, IEPG and WEU, for a great variety of reasons, fall short of providing an ideal framework, but in that case why not choose an existing framework for certain activities and a different one for others? It is all very well to recognise the importance of preference for Europe, but

Mr. Fourré (continued)

Europe's technological development should not lag too far behind that of United States equipment.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, in the light of this initial brief survey, which may appear somewhat technical but which does highlight a number of factors essential to the future of European co-operation in the military field, it is clear that we still have the whole task before us if such co-operation is to be achieved. Sometimes, from ignorance of the nature of computer technology, those in political authority restrict their thoughts on co-operation to systems, while neglecting the importance of sub-assemblies and sometimes even of basic elements. Technical, and therefore economic, dependence is actually linked to political attitudes to the United States and, in future, to Japan, and also to authorisation by the United States to export certain equipment. Even though American policy became much more liberal in 1976, certain restrictions remain which are regretted in some quarters. In some areas, the American monopoly is tending to be eroded by the advent of Japanese competition and by Japanese collaboration with European industry – the cases of Nippon Electric and Bull and Fujitsu and Siemens are examples. It therefore seems that there are improved prospects of co-operation with American industries, although, in this area as in many others, Europe has common requirements for which we could, and should, find a solution.

The dominant position of the United States calls for the development of European co-operation extending beyond bilateral relations. This entails the joint funding of research and the definition of joint specifications and clearly specified aims.

In the component field, Europe must cooperate far more actively in research and development work.

For basic software, in addition to the standardisation of products, to be technically competitive co-operation requires joint support in three areas: the improvement of operating systems; research on data structures, and the development of software with new methods and better instruments.

Europe has become aware of the need for co-operation in the face of two computer giants: the United States and Japan. While welcoming support for the Esprit programme, it should be pointed out that this will not enable European industry to make up for lost time, particularly as regards co-operation in the area of military applications.

The French proposal for the Eureka project shows that its prime interest is the creation of a European agency concerned with new technologies and providing a channel for co-operation between Europeans and, possibly, between Europe and the United States. However, even this project fails to meet our requirements fully. There is no doubt that technological Europe is necessary, with or without the SDI, and we must, indeed, mobilise the reserves of know-how and expertise available in Europe in the key technologies which control the future of our countries.

The present debate – beyond political, diplomatic or strategic discussions of the SDI – and Europe's possible participation in this project may, together with the first part of this report, provide a context for the practical evaluation of the effort which needs to be made if we are to stay in the technological race. The European research effort is half that of the Americans and, owing to the lack of co-ordination, the yield is less. If Europe does not reassert itself in the face of the strenuous United States efforts, it will be outdistanced for good.

The SDI is a research programme, and it is difficult as yet to assess what it will produce. Here, no doubt, we should differentiate between political declarations and the realities of the programme.

The report which I am presenting should provide practical help here, but it is also my intention to sound a serious note of alarm. Confronted by a vital defence issue, all of us who are here engaged in discussing defence questions with an eye to today's and tomorrow's needs should accept the simple principle that without computer technology no force can be truly deterrent.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – On behalf of the Assembly I thank you, Mr. Fourré, and congratulate you on the quality of your report.

My thanks also go to the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions for the excellent work it is doing. We shall have the opportunity of assessing one of its extremely important consequences on the occasion of the colloquy on the space challenge for Europe which is to take place on 18th, 19th and 20th September in Munich.

The subject now under discussion, the strategic defence initiative with particular reference to its technological implications for Europe, has an importance which places your report in the mainstream of the deliberations of our Assembly, which is fulfilling a rôle central to its task in conducting today's debate.

The President (continued)

Four members have put their names down to speak, and I remind the Assembly that each speaker is allowed only five minutes.

I call Mrs. den Ouden-Dekkers.

Mrs. den OUDEN-DEKKERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, on behalf of the Liberal Group I should like to say a few words about this report on the military use of computers. In the introduction the Rapporteur concentrates on the gap between Europe on the one hand and America and Japan on the other. The question whether this gap is developing, which is asked in paragraph 1, can be regarded as rhetorical, because in paragraph 4 the Rapporteur asks whether Europe can overcome its backwardness, and goes straight on to ask how, if so, it should proceed.

Information technology and the information industry are becoming, or are already, the pivot of economic activities at world level. The spread of microelectronics and optical telecommunications is leading to major changes in products and production systems. Anyone wanting to hold his own in an open market system must be able to keep up with the developments and to market competitive products. The rapid technological changes therefore call for the equally rapid input of sufficient venture capital to enable the right investments to be made at the right time. We therefore find it alarming that European information technology companies command only 35% to 40% of their domestic markets. Most of the European demand for hardware and software is met by American and Japanese industries. As the Rapporteur himself indicates, this has serious consequences for employment in Europe, in terms not only of numbers of jobs but also of the nature of employment.

An increase in industrial activities in the field of information technology in a co-ordinated European context will undoubtedly prove advantageous for Europe at macro level. However, it will give rise to structural changes and problems at micro level, both for the individual countries and for the various European companies involved in the information technology field. Does Europe have enough highly qualified personnel for the development of computers, for computer-aided design, for computer-aided manufacturing and computerised data management and task allocation? What will happen, on the other hand, if Europe misses the boat in the information technology field? The Rapporteur suggests a follow-up report. I think that is a good idea, if only because of the various concepts that are bandied about. Will the follow-up report examine in depth the economic implications for the various European countries?

On the basis of such a thorough study, I would expect the follow-up report to indicate the specific economic consequences for the various European countries and the viability of the various major European companies concerned. The findings of this study must then be set against the waste of financial resources and manpower due to the fragmented markets in Europe. The lack of industrial clout in Europe will undoubtedly result in a brain drain from Europe to those parts of the world where information technology is expanding rapidly. This is particularly true of America, where the strategic defence initiative will entail advanced research and development activity. Both politically and economically, these considerations are crucial to Europe.

The political will to achieve a united European effort and market for information technology largely depends on the economic effects at micro level, including the labour market. The crucial question is then whether a common, open European market can be developed for information technology within the complex of a social market economy at European level. I should like to hear what the Rapporteur has to say about this.

The Rapporteur bases his general description of the problems facing Europe on the European Community. He places the military aspects – not explicitly but in fact – mainly within the smaller framework of Western European Union. The relationship with NATO and thus with America is not clear.

It is no longer possible to think of the various weapons systems without computer technology. A derivative of this is defence-related information technology in such areas as logistics, strategies to resist nuclear and/or conventional threats, communications systems and, above all, the training of military staff. Research and development in the areas of defence occupy a central place here, with major implications for the volume of the defence budget and for defence spending.

Western Europe seeks its security within the North Atlantic Alliance. Communications, command, control and intelligence have always been essential elements of NATO's long-term defence programme. It is here in particular that computer and information technology play an important rôle. The communications system is designed to give commanders-in-chief and lower-level commanders the information necessary to enable them to take the right decision at the right time. The national systems must therefore be completely compatible with the overall NATO system, to achieve integrated operation in times of emergency or war.

Weapons systems without built-in information technology components are no longer

Mrs. den Ouden-Dekkers (continued)

conceivable. This makes great demands on military computers. The various armed forces – the army, air force and navy – also have specific requirements related to their respective defence areas.

Having reached the subject of military matters, the Rapporteur abandons both the very wide area of the European Community and the area of Western European Union and focuses on the small area of France and the question whether France should launch a major fifth-generation computer programme on parallel machines, multicomputers and vectorials, which must be capable of carrying out 1,000 million effective floating point operations per second. France wants to develop this system. Paragraph 93 then poses the crucial question whether France alone should bear the technological and financial burden of this development programme or whether it should be shared by all the member states of the European Community or Western European Union. France now has to decide which computer systems it is going to use. It must also take decisions on the production of weapons systems and a new range of computers which will be in service up to the year 2000.

In fact, this is primarily a French military problem. In the past France chose to go its own way in military terms to avoid becoming dependent on America. This also meant that it missed the opportunity for co-operation on a broader basis. The Rapporteur again underlines the French position in paragraph 94, where he says that it is difficult to ensure European collaboration within NATO because of the preponderant position of the United States. On what considerations other than French military nuclear independence is this statement based? In the context of the proposed European co-operation, can the same objection not be raised to France, which will occupy a dominant position at European level, given the plans for the Isis programme? Does co-operation outside the wider context of NATO mean that the other European countries must take the same course as France? When he refers to funding joint research and the definition of joint characteristics, is the Rapporteur taking account of the fact that other European countries would like to see European military co-operation based on the principles underlying the North Atlantic Alliance, and that research funds must therefore be established and joint characteristics defined in the NATO context?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I am sorry, Mrs. den Ouden-Dekkers, the Rules of Procedure make no provision for allowing extra time to those speaking on behalf of political groups.

I am pleased, however, to have been able to allow you time to finish your speech.

I call Mr. Milani.

Mr. MILANI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should like to make two points. First, to stress the serious mistake in failing to present and therefore to discuss Mr. van den Bergh's report on emerging technology and military strategy. Second, to mention the mistake of seeking to invite the European countries to collaborate in research on the new technologies, on grounds of the need to define new weapons systems, that is to engage in collaboration based on the need to renew not industrial but military structures, although the two cannot be separated where the new technologies are concerned.

On the first point, everyone can see that it is a political mistake to prevent discussion of Mr. van den Bergh's report. In one way or another, the question of the SDI has been discussed – yesterday afternoon, for example, when questions were put to the United Kingdom Minister of State on the subject. I believe that it will be discussed again today when questions are put to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, as Chairman-in-Office of the Council of Ministers of Western European Union.

But the more serious point is that this Assembly has not been allowed to discuss a matter on which the European countries as yet have no definite position. In my view there has never been a better opportunity for the Assembly to demonstrate its vitality, with the real, material possibility of moving towards the reactivation of WEU. In the Atlantic Assembly, on the other hand, the subject was discussed when questions were put to the American representative – the secretary of the committee appointed by President Reagan to define the SDI strategy.

The conceptual approach was also wrong, so to speak. A weapons system cannot in fact be discussed before consideration has been given to the strategic pattern into which the individual choice of armaments policy has to fit. In so far as the SDI project becomes feasible, it is obvious to everyone that the complex and interconnected relationships between new technologies, weapons systems and production requirements will have to be defined by that strategy. I would also emphasise that the SDI involves formidable intervention by the American Government – despite its enthusiasm for the market economy – to boost the productive activity of American private industry in open competition with Europe. Without this overemphasis on the military threat, it would have been difficult, I think, for the Americans to win acceptance of state finance for private industry for technological research of this kind.

Mr. Milani (continued)

Whether or not SDI is feasible, it is clear that the American Government is financing American industry or at least research on new technologies which can be applied immediately by private producers.

This is the direction in which Europe should move. Hence the importance of the Eureka project which, without emphasis of any kind on the military threat, represents for me a serious opportunity for European collaboration on the new technologies.

The idea of a European computer has sense in this context, where it is in Europe's interests to define new basic technologies which are essential if it wants to produce both the computer and the processor.

The main lines of the new technologies are involved in both the SDI and the Eureka project. I am referring to direct production of very small integrated circuits – third-generation chips. On this point, I should like to read from an article which I believe is already known to members, because reference has already been made to it in connection with the subject I raised a moment ago. On 16th April 1985, the *Corriere della Sera* wrote: "Another frontier of the infinitely small has fallen. A chip has now been made with connections half one-thousandth of a millimetre in width. The result is the most compact integrated circuit ever made, containing one hundred thousand logic elements capable of storing sixteen million data bits."

On the subject of third-generation chips, reference must also be made to gallium arsenide as a basic element for the definition of this strategy. And also the definition of fifth-generation computers – forty million operations per second; the use of light beams, optronics, for the computer of the future – two hundred million operations per second; lasers and so on.

I am therefore happy at the idea of a European computer. I am less happy that such collaboration should be geared to military requirements.

In my view, Europe cannot work in the same way as America, that is stressing the military threat to persuade the various countries to provide funds for technological and scientific research. On the contrary – in a previous speech there were some hints of nationalisms which have little meaning at this point – Europe should reverse the terms of the equation and should therefore accept that without technological research the inevitable result is that Europe will gradually be left behind in future. Naturally, because of the very high cost, there can be no research unless all the European countries or at least the biggest of them act together and co-ordinate their efforts.

These, Ladies and Gentlemen, are the true and genuine reasons, which I have explained, for my appreciation of Mr. Fourré's report; they are also my reasons for abstaining on the draft in question. I am opposed to the discussion of new technologies in a direction set by the Americans, with specific emphasis on the military threat as a means of putting pressure on public opinion.

In conclusion, I repeat that unless the question is approached in the way I have indicated we Europeans risk being left behind. We should start by understanding this so that we can work in the right direction.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Rauti.

Mr. RAUTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Ladies and Gentlemen, if this organisation had all the funds it needs – whereas, I would stress, we are, in fact, "suspiciously" shorter and shorter of money, as was made amply clear yesterday – I would have made a practical proposal that tens of thousands of copies of the report under discussion should be printed in all the European languages. But as I expect and fear – from what has happened and always happens to our work – that very little or nothing will be heard about this report, I would instead like to ask the presidency to do everything possible – with the press which can be reached through our services – to have the text we are considering circulated, possibly with the addition of a suitable brochure reporting all speeches in this debate.

The Rapporteur, whom I compliment on his excellent work, said a short time ago when introducing his report, that it is likely to be little understood because it is highly technical. I would like to reassure him on that point; although many of us are neither technicians nor specialists on the subject, I know that everyone has read the report with great interest.

There are very good reasons for this.

Because, Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, if there is a truly important and even essential "nodal point" for so many of Western Europe's social and economic problems, if there is anything which can be described as a key to these problems, by which I mean easy access to some means of making a clear and definite analysis, it is precisely the Fourré report: or rather the subject which it covers with a valuable wealth of data and references. The whole text should be analysed, taken further and expanded.

However, as the time allowed for our debates is always strictly limited, I should like to highlight one particular point, which in my view calls for more emphasis than the others; it is the point considered in paragraphs 16 and 17 which describe the consequences of the present frag-

Mr. Rauti (continued)

mentation in Europe of a sector which in broad terms comes under the heading of information technology.

I would say that the Fourré report puts its finger on the spot. These two paragraphs summarise what is wrong in Europe and is driving it down to a level which looks like becoming the same as that of the third world.

It is not only a question of waste, which the Rapporteur qualifies as appalling; balkanisation might be a better description. Europe spends much more than Japan and the United States – just think, five times as much as Japan and even three times more than the United States – and employs three times as many specialist engineers as the United States and Japan, but achieved much less than those two countries and is even falling further and further behind.

What is needed, therefore, and should be pressed for is a new technological policy which Europe could easily have – because it has the necessary resources, brains and basic structures – and should, therefore, have if it is not to fall behind. A united Europe, of course, because, as the figures and statistics dramatically prove, our aberrations are the “black hole” which is draining away our strength even as we continue to advance very slowly and ever more painfully.

I hope and trust that all members of the WEU Assembly will – after seeing and understanding the gravity of the situation and the decisive importance of taking action – work vigorously in their parliaments and will take up, amplify and repeat this warning in their own countries so that it becomes a positive instrument for revival and recovery.

Europe is not doing very much to meet this challenge; as in many cases, the expression so frequently used as to be almost a commonplace is that Europe is doing everything possible and is wholly committed.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Hill.

Mr. HILL (*United Kingdom*). – I congratulate Mr. Fourré on the report. He admits that he has not had sufficient time to study the subject, but it is a very good starter for our debate. I am sure that in the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions we shall produce many more reports, because most of the debate seems to be centering on the strategic defence initiative, of which the computer is a basic element.

Mr. Fourré makes recommendations aimed at achieving co-operation within Europe in the development of computers, computer components and software for military application. He

also describes graphically the growing gap between Europe on the one hand and the United States and Japan on the other in the civil exploitation of information technology.

Efforts are being made in the civil context – for example, the Esprit programme and the United Kingdom's Alvey programme are acknowledged in this document. It is not so much a matter of shortage of resources, of which Europe, as has been shown by the figures in the documents, contributes more, both financially and in terms of manpower, than its competitors, as of the wasteful use of resources caused by fragmented European markets.

The paper states in detail the increasingly important military application of computers. Examples quoted include the NATO-wide integrated communications system planned for completion in 1995, but there is no mention in this considerable work, which includes weapons applications of computers, of the work being carried out in the United Kingdom. As I said earlier, it is the Rapporteur's lack of time which has made for this omission.

Except in this forum, I would hesitate to say that there has been hardly any European collaboration on the military use of computers, that, given shared European interests, such co-operation, although difficult, should be possible, that defence ministers should provide the funding, and that collaboration in weapons systems, such as the European fighter aircraft, could lead to co-operation in computers associated with those systems.

The document claims that no real progress has been made in existing frameworks – NATO, IEPG and WEU – but it does not define a rôle for WEU. It goes on to point to the lack of information provided by the Council on armaments co-operation in Europe.

In my own report, I point out that the United States is spending about \$6.5 billion on promoting industrial research and development this year.

One of the most telling statements that is made in the report is where it describes computers for logistic reasons. The Rapporteur points out that they are civil computers with special modifications to adapt them for military use, that in the Soviet Union all research and development on computers has been directed mainly to military applications and that the civil line of computers has been almost completely left aside. That raises a doubt, certainly, in the minds of the Americans, whether many of these civil computers, designed, marketed, traded and sold within the European scene, could somehow mysteriously appear over the borders of the iron curtain. I think that will limit the free exchange

Mr. Hill (continued)

– the two-way street, as the Americans call it – or the sharing of highly classified information.

The United Kingdom has played a leading part in the efforts in the IEPG aimed at producing more effective armaments co-operation in Europe and aimed not least at producing a more effective and competitive European defence industrial and technological base. I do not think that our efforts so far have been very outstanding. Nevertheless, there has been a proposal to establish co-operative technology projects in order to develop European collaboration in research on technologies with military applications. Of course, the main frame of a massive computer, such as the Control Data Cyber 205, is completely dependent on the software. Software research and development must go hand in hand with the enormous development that there has been in mainframes.

My main interest in computers stems from the fact that for eighteen months I was associated with Control Data in Minneapolis. I know that Europe has little or no chance of catching up with the American mainframe computer giant. If we accept that at the beginning and stop wasting resources on trying to duplicate what is already there, I am sure that we shall be a very useful partner in what is, after all, European defence.

The majority of these computers are essentially for the simplest defence mechanisms these days. I think that Mr. Fourré in his report mentions the Eureka system, which naturally France would like us to join and to progress. However, it is like asking someone in a bath chair to catch up with a four-minute miler. That is not the way to go about it.

I suggest – this can be examined by WEU – that there will need to be greater co-operation and liaison with the United States, certainly in the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions. If we prove once and for all that it is a partnership in an overall defence system, I am sure that that will be a far better way of achieving what we all want than setting up a separate organisation, whatever its name. Of course, Eureka is a very good name. However, at the end of the day these ideals have to be paid for, and paid for on a massive scale. Therefore, I say to the Rapporteur that in his next report, which I am sure will not be all that distant, there should be more emphasis on complete collaboration with the already well advanced computer industry of the United States.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

I call the Rapporteur to reply to the points raised.

Mr. FOURRÉ (*France*) (Translation). – Mrs. den Ouden-Dekkers has pointed out that the great issue at present is information technology. The coverage in my report is fairly condensed and there are a number of points which need to be added if the problem is to be properly assessed. I have noted Mrs. den Ouden-Dekkers' wish that the next, complementary, report should deal with the impact of the new technologies on employment in Europe. She has also questioned, without expressing an opinion, our intellectual ability to meet the challenge presented by high technology. I am convinced that Europe possesses the qualified engineers and researchers needed to respond to the challenge but, both in Europe and outside the EEC and its structures, we must turn our minds to the opening up of semi-national markets and to the ability of our national or multinational companies to adapt to what is needed.

As I pointed out in my report, given the time available for its preparation and the importance and scope of the subject matter, I was unable to meet other European partners as I would have wished, in order to familiarise myself in greater depth with their attitudes and objectives in this area.

As everyone will have noted, I concentrate therefore on the French point of view, although this should not lead to the assumption that the only path to European co-operation is through acceptance of the French solution by the other European partners.

There is no doubt that France's position is determined by its special attitude to NATO and its concept of its own defence system. These factors have led it to make choices which include the development of a supercomputer, to which I have already referred. Apart from this example, a number of other areas involving the military use of computers call for European co-operation.

Mr. Milani has expressed his reservations, and has told us that he would abstain on the report, as it takes a military situation as the starting point for research on the development of computer technology, with the emphasis of course on the military use of such technology. He argued that Mr. van den Bergh's report should have been discussed before mine, and this alteration has taken him somewhat aback. I cannot entirely accept his reasoning. No doubt, like him, I would have preferred my colleague's report to have been discussed, but, in keeping with the logic of his argument, is it not acceptable that all those who are now trying to grasp the scope and significance of the SDI should be permitted to make a practical

Mr. Fourré (continued)

assessment of what it means in terms of computer technology? Repeating a recent comment in a French weekly, I would reply to Mr. Rauti that the matter receives some attention in the press.

The author of the article makes clear that, beyond the political, diplomatic and strategic treatment of the subject, the debate on the SDI still cruelly lacks the technical frame of reference required for a proper appreciation of what it entails in military and industrial terms. He therefore finds it worth while to comment on the report which I have presented on the basis of its specific technical content rather than consider it as a document from which a second report will follow. The document presented by me should be regarded as complementary to Mr. van den Bergh's report, and it would have been interesting to examine them together during this session.

I thank Mr. Rauti for his comments. Like him, I wonder how we can bring home not only to our parliamentary colleagues but also to the public at large, the importance of information technology in the civil as well as in the military sphere. No doubt the problem is the same here as in our national parliaments. This technological revolution affects us all, as there are some aspects of technology which, in addition to placing difficulties in the way of progress, also have fundamental political implications.

Some have already turned their attention to the liberty of the individual. Today, we have another debate on the actual use of computers and on the concept of defence strategy and tactics as conceived by our western, and more especially European, countries. Everyone must give thought to this and must take a more active part in the work following the presentation of this first report.

To Mr. Hill I would say that his intervention bears the stamp of the specialist. As he says, this report is merely a starting point. It is my hope, accepted by the committee, to present a follow-up document. As we have all noted, my chief aim in the present report was to summarise the military applications of computers so as to establish the degree to which information technology is already rooted in this particular area. However, beyond this description and the emphasis on the specific question of supercomputers, a second report must aim at a better assessment of what is being done in each WEU member country.

You are right, Mr. Hill, that I have so far limited myself to visits in this country and have not met the national authorities in the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and elsewhere. It is, however, necessary to have an

overall picture in order to determine, perhaps more precisely than I have been able to do in the draft recommendation, just what can and cannot be achieved jointly. It is very possible that on the question of what is feasible and the Eureka project our opinions differ widely. For me, I must say, this is an eminently feasible project, given our own investment potential and our research and development capabilities, and it would surely have an economic spin-off. The prospect represents a chance for Europe which should not be neglected.

In the second report, closer attention must therefore be given to our collaboration with the United States. Here, I am in full agreement, and everyone will have noted the final paragraph of the recommendation. As far as I am concerned, there is no question of isolating ourselves inside a Europe which possesses very great potential in relation to the United States and Japan. On the contrary, we should seek maximum benefit from what is being done elsewhere. To ensure our independence and benefit from the spin-off in employment potential as well as to demonstrate our ability to decide our own future, such European collaboration should be repeated with the United States and Japan.

Mr. President, those are the comments I wish to make in reply to the points raised.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does the Vice-Chairman of the committee wish to speak?

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I have nothing further of great significance to add, except to say that this preliminary report – because we have approved a follow-on report from Mr. Fourré – has the wholehearted endorsement of our committee. We are deeply appreciative of Mr. Fourré's work and his particular expertise in this area.

There is a small point of detail that I wish to bring to your attention. In the preamble to the recommendation, in paragraph (iv), there is a divergence between the French text and the English. On 11th April 1985 in committee, I tried to bring the two into line by suggesting that the English text should read as follows:

“(iv) Considering the United States and Japanese challenge in the world computer market and Western Europe's backwardness that involves serious drawbacks owing to excessive dependency on the United States and Japan and which, on the one hand, requires a common European policy and, on the other hand, co-operative action with American and eventually Japanese firms;”

That more accurate translation was approved by our committee, and was minuted as being approved. But owing to some printer's error, it was not incorporated in the report. With your permission, Mr. President, I ask that that correc-

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

tion be made. Otherwise I merely repeat the committee's wholehearted congratulations to Mr. Fourré on his most excellent report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Your remarks will be noted and the necessary corrections made to the document.

Ladies and Gentlemen, before voting on the draft recommendation we have one amendment to consider.

Mrs. den Ouden-Dekkers has tabled Amendment 1 worded as follows:

1. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "Standing Armaments Committee" and insert "the Agency for the development of co-operation in the field of armaments".

I call Mrs. den Ouden-Dekkers and remind her that she has two minutes to speak.

Mrs. den OUDEN-DEKKERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, this amendment seeks to bring the text of the recommendation into line with the press communiqué released by the Council in Bonn after the meeting of 23rd April 1985, which refers to the various agencies with which Western European Union is to be equipped.

The Agency for the development of co-operation in the field of armaments seems to me to be the most suitable agency for the implementation of the task referred to in Mr. Fourré's recommendation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

What is the committee's view?

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – The committee sees no objection to accepting the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put Amendment 1 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 1 is agreed to.

We shall now vote on the amended draft recommendation.

A vote by roll-call has not been requested.

The Assembly will therefore vote by sitting and standing.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The amended draft recommendation is adopted¹.

I call Sir Frederic Bennett on a point of order.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – I have, Mr. President, a serious point of order to raise with you, of which I have already given you notice. I shall be as brief as possible, and I have no pleasure in raising this matter. Believe it or not, I do not raise it in any partisan frame of mind.

It is a fact that yesterday there was a serious breach of the rules, conventions and regulations governing the conduct of our Assembly. I raise this point of order with three hats on – those of leader of the British Delegation, Vice-President of the Assembly, and Chairman of the Federated Group of Christian Democrats and European Democrats.

It has always been understood that a draft report remains the property of the committee, and is stamped "Restricted" and remains restricted – and should not go to the press or anyone else – until it has either been approved or rejected. If a report is approved, it becomes a public document. If it is rejected, its contents become the property of the unsuccessful rapporteur, who can make what use he likes of his own point of view.

A draft report on the SDI was placed before the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, and remained the property of that committee. It was subject to restriction and was not public property or the property of the Rapporteur. Neither case would be so until the report was ultimately approved or rejected. Instead, we had a referral back to the committee, yet what happened was entirely contrary to all our arrangements over many years, certainly for as long as I can remember.

Yesterday a colleague brought to my attention the matter that I am now raising. I raise it because, left as it is, the incident is a possible reflection on our staff, who may or may not have broken the rules by issuing the document in the way that I have described. I do not expect you, Mr. President, to reply fully today, but it is only fair to all concerned that you should look into the matter and report to the Assembly in due course when you have made your inquiries.

What happened clearly shows that there was a breach of our rules and agreements, because a document was handed to me yesterday emanating from Reuters, and it states: "The report, a copy of which was made available to Reuters". That report should not have been released because of the circumstances I have described. They are undeniable. Indeed, I consulted the secretariat before raising this point of order. It is clear, therefore, that there was a leak but it is not clear who made the leak and who broke the rules.

1. See page 32.

Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)

The second part of the same Reuters report and another one says that the Assembly's Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments voted by eleven to seven to put off until December discussion of a highly critical report on SDI which was to have been one of the main agenda items for this week's session. The voting also on this report, since the document itself was restricted, was also restricted. I would not even have mentioned these figures today had they not already been published.

It then goes on - I am referring also to my German christian democrat colleagues - to say that Mr. van den Bergh blamed British conservatives and West German christian democrats for shelving the draft report on military technology and strategy. Therefore, whoever leaked the report, at least we know that Mr. van den Bergh certainly spoke about the voting, which was part of the restricted contents of the document. In any case it is absurd, because he, having first said that the Assembly's Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments voted by eleven to seven, then proceeds to blame a union between British conservatives and West German christian democrats. There is a total of only five on the committee in any case, so it is hard to find out how a conspiracy of five could achieve the result of a vote of eleven to seven.

I do not want to make heavy weather of this, Mr. President, but it can have serious consequences. I will recall to your mind an incident which occurred, I think, even before you came to the Assembly, when I was a rapporteur and similar action was taken during discussion of a report. In that case it was one about lack of observance of human rights within the Soviet Union and elsewhere of which I and, oddly enough, an Italian communist were co-rapporteurs. That restricted report, during a very critical and delicate stage of the committee's consideration, was on that occasion not leaked to Reuters but was handed over to a Soviet Ambassador, who then got in touch with the Soviet Ambassador in London, who then went to my own Foreign Office and made serious representations to the British Government - it was at the time a Labour Government who supported our position here completely - who could not possibly reply because, naturally, they had not seen the report and should not have seen it because it was a restricted document and, therefore, because I abided by our rules, I had not shown it to my own Foreign Office.

All that I am asking you to do today, Mr. President, is, first, to reaffirm that my understanding of the situation is correct; secondly, to look into this matter and tell us how this situation arose; and, thirdly, to take the opportunity as widely as possible to let all know of the rules of

the Assembly, because if they are not observed, that will make collaboration in producing agreed reports impossible in the face of premature and unauthorised leakages of such reports.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - Your point of order is noted, Sir Frederic. Your interpretation of the Rules of Procedure coincides with that of the Chair. I have already asked the Clerk of the Assembly to undertake the enquiry usual in a case of this kind. I consider that your remarks, which are entirely justified, are addressed to responsible people, and this responsibility extends of course, not only to Assembly members but also to the observers and those who report our debates.

A confidential document, distributed to committee members only, must remain a working document of the committee, and can therefore neither be distributed to persons outside nor made known publicly. This is a question of ethics and compliance with the Rules of Procedure, which is confidently demanded at all times and without exception of those engaged in the work of the Assembly. I can therefore only express my deep regret at what has occurred. As it is assumed, by custom, that everyone knows the law, in this case the rules of the Assembly which apply to all, I shall not insult members by sending them an extract from the Rules of Procedure, thereby suggesting that their memory needs jogging. It is up to WEU to see that the greatest care is taken both by the secretariat and by parliamentary members. This point is all the more important since, if WEU is revitalised, the arrangements we have agreed for relations with the Council, particularly through the committee, are, with the Assembly's approval, confidential, so that it will henceforth become increasingly important to comply with the rules to which we have jointly agreed.

That is the comment I wish to make, while avoiding in the common interest any overdramatisation of what would appear at present to be no more than an isolated incident. By keeping to the orders of the day, the Assembly should be able to demonstrate its ability to take the incident in its stride.

I call Mr. Spies von Büllesheim on a point of order.

Mr. SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). - Mr. President, can I assume, or may I ask, that this serious matter be reconsidered by the Bureau of the Presidential Committee and that the President then inform the Assembly of the outcome of these deliberations? I do not think this matter can be dealt with by a single mention here, when only half the members of the Assembly are present. In my opinion, the matter is important enough for our Bureau or Presidential

Mr. Spies von Büllenheim (continued)

Committee to consider it once again and report to the Assembly.

I should also like to point out that the Reuters report you undoubtedly have before you says that the conservatives and German Christian democrats had prevented further discussion without mentioning what we all know: if anything, the majority of the Assembly is responsible for the prevention simply because the papers were not available, and this was only one of five reports that were not available and could not therefore be considered. This too has obviously been covered up by Mr. van den Bergh in his communication to the press.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and Gentlemen, Mr. Pignion, Mr. Milani, Mr. Stoffelen and Lord Hughes have asked to speak.

Comment of this kind invariably triggers a debate.

Mr. MILANI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I wish to speak both for personal reasons and for the Communist Group. I am not a member of the Communist Party; I note that you accept the wisdom of the remarks made by the Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and of the idea of an enquiry into the facts. I personally reject the insinuation, where my involvement in the affair is concerned both here and also over the last few days, with the press attending, at the Atlantic Assembly in Stuttgart. When, however, a member of this Assembly speaks and makes a specific accusation referring to the "Italian communists", his first duty is to name names; otherwise I can only regard it as provocation and slander against the Communist Party, its representatives and myself.

I therefore reject the charge. Sir Frederic Bennett has raised the question and it is for him to furnish proof; otherwise I consider it to be provocative and slanderous. This being so I am not prepared to take a calmer line and I must ask you, Mr. President, to set matters to rights. Accusations cannot be levelled in this Assembly without proof.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Milani, you do not have the floor!

A political debate is about to start and each of you will have the chance to speak, although it would have been better if the political groups had agreed to appoint one speaker each, so as to avoid a generalised debate.

Although this is not an organised debate, it is not my intention to prevent anyone who wishes to do so from speaking. I therefore ask you to be very brief and accept a time-limit of two minutes for each speaker.

Is anybody against?...

The proposal is agreed to.

I shall now call the following speakers in the order stated: Mr. Pignion, Mr. Milani, Mr. Stoffelen, Lord Hughes, Mr. Cavaliere and Sir Dudley Smith.

I wish to add that the President has to reply on each point of order, but there is no debate.

Mr. Spies von Büllenheim, the Chair has taken the necessary steps to institute an enquiry. The Bureau or the Presidential Committee will deliberate and I give you my assurance that the Assembly will be informed. However, in view of your statement, I advise you we shall restrict ourselves to the actual incident involving the law, as laid down in the Rules of Procedure, under which a restricted document shall not be communicated to those not entitled to receive it. The Reuters communiqué is a matter for which Reuters is responsible, and it is not up to the presidency or anyone else to pass judgment on comment made by a press agency.

I call Mr. Pignion.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – The problem raised by Sir Frederic concerns the committee of which I am Chairman.

I must tell you that I feel entirely untouched by the incident. I do not make the rounds of the embassies, nor do I frequent the press. In my records, I have fifteen press cuttings about our work, which is exceptional. The articles in question appeared before or during the session, and I am happy to note that WEU arouses press interest. That at least is a point in our favour!

I would like to add that in the twelve years I have been a member of this Assembly and of the Assembly of the Council of Europe nobody has ever heard me refer to any particular political movement or apply any particular political label to one or other of my colleagues.

I therefore concur with the need for an enquiry. If we really wish to pursue the objectives appropriate to our Assembly we must, as I reminded the Assembly of the Council of Europe at its last session, endeavour to retain our human dignity intact without always bringing general or domestic politics into our discussions.

In conclusion, Mr. President, you said that the matter should not be dramatised, and I simply have to state the Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments has passed on no information on any of the reports under consideration; he has never done so in the past and will never do so in the future.

That is all I wish to say, Mr. President. The rest is your responsibility and a matter for your services.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you for your judicious remarks. I repeat that an enquiry will be conducted into the incident known to everybody and raised by Sir Frederic. If possible, I hope the Assembly in its debates will be able to rise above what should be no more than an isolated incident.

I call Mr. Milani.

Mr. MILANI (*Italy*) (Translation). – In that case, Mr. President, I request you to ask Sir Frederic Bennett to withdraw the charge if he cannot provide evidence.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Milani, the Chair is entirely at your service to record a complaint if you personally or the group which you represent consider that an aspersion has been cast. For the time being, I propose simply to note an exchange of political utterances for which each bears responsibility in accordance with the entirely normal parliamentary process. Yesterday, also, certain exchanges took place of which the Chair simply took note and no more.

I repeat however that I am entirely at your service. It is my duty to see that delegates to this Assembly are not subjected to any attack or prejudice and that their rights are fully protected. If such a thing were to occur, we should take appropriate steps.

Mr. Milani, please. For the moment, you have addressed yourself to the Chair, which has jurisdiction. I shall keep in touch with you and your colleagues, and have noted your comment.

I call Mr. Stoffelen.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – I should like to make some remarks relating to the point of order on the possible breach of rules. It is unfortunate that we are spending a lot of time not on a problem of major importance, namely, the strategic defence initiative, but on a possible breach of rules.

I take it that Sir Frederic Bennett had the decency to inform the colleague mentioned by him of his possible attack. It would be interesting to have information about that. We cannot have a situation in which any member of the Assembly can be accused of something without our at least hearing the comments of that colleague.

I fully agree that it is up to the Presidential Committee to study the facts of the matter. The Presidential Committee will no doubt hear the comments of the persons concerned and make its decision about the secrecy or otherwise of reports. But I cannot imagine that any rules of this Assembly can possibly prevent members from having free discussion with free citizens, including journalists, in free Europe.

I agree that the Presidential Committee should study the problem without emotion. When investigating the facts it should bear in mind that we must have freedom of speech as well as obedience to the rules.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Stoffelen, I share your view. It is for the Bureau and the Presidential Committee to oversee matters affecting the Assembly in accordance with their respective areas of competence.

With regard to the confidentiality and public communication of documents, I simply refer the Assembly to Rule 41 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly which states quite unequivocally:

“ 10. Unless a committee decides otherwise, and subject to the confidential character of information communicated by the Council, the only texts which shall be made public shall be the reports that have been agreed to, or statements issued on the responsibility of the chairman.”

We are guided by this statement.

Excuse me, Mr. Scheer, for not giving you the floor but, as Rapporteur, you will have an opportunity to speak in a moment. I have decided that Sir Dudley Smith shall be the last to speak on a point of order.

I call Lord Hughes.

Lord HUGHES (*United Kingdom*). – I doubt very much whether any member of this Assembly is familiar with all the rules, even that important rule, the existence of which, Mr. President, you have now confirmed by reading. A new member might be forgiven for not being aware of that rule.

There is nothing on the document to indicate that it is restricted in any way. I have looked at all the documents before us. I do not say that it does not exist in the document somewhere, but it certainly is not on the front page. As parliamentarians, we are accustomed to receiving papers that are restricted. I suggest that if this rule is to be obvious to people, in future on the front of the document there should be printed the words “Restricted. Not to be published before approval by the Assembly”.

That is my point of order. It is nothing to do with the debate.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Your proposal, which might be paraphrased in the words: “What is understood is better made explicit”, will be considered for consequent action.

I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I would not have spoken if I had not

Mr. Cavaliere (continued)

heard the last speaker. I do not think that unofficial documents should be treated as "official"; it is the duty of each one of us, as a member of the Assembly, to know the regulations, which forbid the divulgence of documents which have not been approved by committees and are not therefore for publication. This is enough for me to say that the person who released to the press was in serious breach...

Mr. MILANI (*Italy*) (Translation). – We are talking about something which does not exist! It must first be proved; then we can talk about the regulations.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – You do not have the floor, Mr. Milani! I have never stopped anyone speaking, quite the contrary, but I demand that everyone's right to speak should be respected, and at the moment it is Mr. Cavaliere who has the floor.

I see that this is a burning issue, and I hope your own reactivation heralds that of WEU, which could not be more effectively demonstrated.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – I am not accusing anyone. I should like to know, Mr. Milani, why you are protesting. I have not accused you or anyone else.

Mr. MILANI (*Italy*) (Translation). – That is not true. Mr. President, you must not allow members of the Assembly to be slandered.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Milani, I shall have to call you to order.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – I am very sorry, but if anyone thinks the cap fits, I can do nothing about it, because I have not accused anyone.

Mr. MILANI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Not me.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – I repeat that I have not accused anyone; all I said was that what happened is very serious.

Mr. MILANI (*Italy*) (Translation). – What did happen?

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – I should like to know why Mr. Milani is protesting on behalf of the Italian communists. No one else is protesting, so why are you?

Mr. MILANI (*Italy*) (Translation). – You are insinuating!

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – I am making no insinuations. Either I cannot make myself clear or you are unable this morning to understand what is being said. I had no intention of making insinuations against anyone. I must observe however that these most ill-

mannered interruptions, which I reject, may be significant.

Mr. MILANI (*Italy*) (Translation). – You are a vile slanderer!

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – This is the last time I shall speak to you, Mr. Milani, before calling you to order.

I call Sir Dudley Smith.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – I should like to take up the point made by Lord Hughes. In committee on Monday I am sure that my document was marked "Restricted". There may be some copies without such a mark, but, as far as the committee was concerned, the documents were unequivocally restricted.

I appreciate that all members have their own political viewpoints. The point that I want to make is that it is necessary to have this enquiry for the protection of members in committee. I am sure that everyone, whatever his viewpoint in any debate, would agree that to have his comments referred to later is undesirable and, indeed, unfair. I am sure that from time to time we all make remarks in committee – the proceedings are conducted on a much more informal basis than in the Assembly; we may speak or even vote against our own party on a specific issue – that we would not necessarily want reported outside. If we make such remarks in public session in the hemicycle, so be it; it is upon our own heads. However, there should be some understanding and protection for committees and their reports.

As a result of this document being leaked, I was approached by a Reuters reporter, because I was identified as one of those who had spoken and voted against a particular section of the report, and I found myself forced into answering questions and trying to defend my political view. Normally, of course, if I were approached and the document had not been leaked, I could say: "I cannot comment on it. The document is confidential. You will have to await the debate in plenary session."

This kind of situation puts people in an almost impossible position. There are those who go riding off, wanting to make comments about a matter on which they feel strongly and are naturally upset if a document has been rejected or withdrawn, but they should still obey the rules that such matters remain confidential until they are discussed and put forward for adoption or rejection in this Assembly.

I believe that for the future, irrespective of what the report is or whichever side may be affected, that must be the case. Unless that is the case, we shall create difficulty and confusion for ourselves and we shall not be able to trust one another.

7. *Situation in Lebanon*

(Motion for a recommendation with a request for urgent procedure, Document 1023)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is consideration of the motion for a recommendation on the situation in Lebanon with a request for urgent procedure, Document 1023, tabled by Mr. Martino and others.

Under Rule 43 of the Rules of Procedure, this request is made by at least ten representatives or substitutes.

I remind the Assembly that only one speaker for, one speaker against, the chairman of the committee concerned and, if necessary, a representative of the Bureau of the Assembly speaking on behalf of the Bureau, may take the floor.

In addition, under Rule 31 (7), no speaker may speak for more than five minutes on questions of procedure.

I propose to organise the debate as follows: after Mr. Martino has spoken I shall ask for the views of the General Affairs Committee. Thereafter, as Mr. Martino has requested that his motion for a recommendation be referred back to committee in accordance with the Rules of Procedure, we shall vote on the reference back to committee by sitting and standing.

I call Mr. Martino to give his reasons for this request for urgent procedure.

Mr. MARTINO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, is there any need to explain and demonstrate the urgency of a motion of the kind I have tabled concerning the situation in Lebanon? When an issue referred to the Assembly concerns the loss of more lives hourly, I do not believe that there is any room for delay. The *de jure* urgency stems from a *de facto* urgency, created by the tragic catalogue of already broken lives and of lives which are being inexorably destroyed from minute to minute.

There lies the urgency, Mr. President.

Should we perhaps decide that any immediate intervention in the tragic events in Lebanon is pointless and accept the idea that only a painful process of self-destruction will reduce the problem to its lowest terms or even resolve it, with the numerous different factors in that problem being cancelled out from time to time in the lake of blood spilled in the fratricidal civil war? A cynical approach is no longer possible.

The motion has been tabled in accordance with Rule 43 of the Rules of Procedure and has been signed by many members of the Assembly. I should like to think, Mr. President, that

all members might perhaps have signed if it had been presented to them.

According to the rules, there is now the formal question of substance as to whether or not the matter is urgent. Mr. President, I am certain that the answer to the question concerning the rules will be given by our hearts rather than by our heads.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to oppose the request?...

I call Mr. Michel, Chairman of the General Affairs Committee.

Mr. MICHEL (*Belgium*) (Translation). – It is appropriate that the Assembly should recognise the urgency of this issue. If it does so, I propose that the committee should meet this afternoon at about 2.30 p.m. to consider the motion for a recommendation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I shall now put to the Assembly the request for urgent procedure on the motion for a recommendation, tabled by Mr. Martino.

The Assembly will vote by sitting and standing.

If the request is agreed to, in accordance with the comments made by the Chairman of the committee supporting the motion the General Affairs Committee will meet this afternoon at 2.30 p.m.

The Assembly would then be in a position to vote on this draft recommendation early this afternoon or tomorrow when the sitting opens.

I now put to the vote the request for urgent procedure.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The request for urgent procedure is agreed to unanimously.

8. *New outlook for WEU – reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council* ***Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council***

(Presentation of and joint debate on the reports of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Docs. 1012 and amendments and 1019 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and joint debate on the reports of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on the new outlook for WEU – reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council, and application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the thirtieth annual report of

The President (continued)

the Council, Documents 1012 and amendments and 1019 and amendments.

Following agreement between the Chairmen of the two committees concerned and their Rapporteurs, I propose that both reports be dealt with in a single debate.

If the Assembly has no objection, I shall first call the Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee and then the Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. We shall then proceed to a joint debate before considering the amendments which have been tabled, together, as I promised Dr. Miller this morning, with the draft order which has been tabled by himself and others, and was notified to the Chair yesterday evening.

Are there any objections?...

The proposal is agreed to.

I call Mr. van der Sanden, Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee.

Mr. van der SANDEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, on behalf of the General Affairs Committee I wish to submit to the Assembly a report in reply to the Council's thirtieth annual report. The committee also submits for approval a recommendation and an order aimed at ensuring effective preparation for the enhanced activities which WEU must offer. These prospects are opened up by the Rome Declaration of October 1984, the ensuing deliberations of the Permanent Council in London and the discussions of the Council of Ministers in Bonn on 22nd and 23rd April 1985.

Although the objectives of the reactivation of WEU have found widespread approval, my report contains a number of criticisms that I intend to explain and defend not only on behalf of the General Affairs Committee but also out of personal conviction. It is remarkable that since October 1984 various paths have been pursued to achieve the aims of reactivation. The question that then arises is whether these paths can lead to the same goal. Let me explain. Under the WEU treaty we have five organs: the Assembly, the Council of Ministers, the Secretariat-General, the Permanent Council and the agencies. I shall not discuss the agencies today. What I am mainly interested in is the relationship between the Assembly and the two Councils. I am also interested in the relations between the Permanent Council in London, which in any case functions under the responsibility of the Council of Ministers, and this Council of Ministers in general, and more specifically in the relationship between London and the presidency. After all, the presidency has

been strengthened and formally extended to a year so that the objectives we are pursuing may be achieved. I think it is essential for there to be sufficient consultation between the presidency and the Permanent Council and a strong enough link between their activities. When I hear, for example, that meetings in Bonn on 11th February and in Rome in early March, both directly associated with reactivation, were attended by the presidency but not by the Permanent Council, I wonder whether the Council can pursue a sufficiently consistent policy. The fact that the Assembly was not informed of the meetings of 11th February and 1st March also reveals that the representatives of the people in our seven countries cannot tell precisely how the Council of Ministers is in fact setting about the reactivation of WEU.

Let me give you another example. The Council's thirtieth annual report, which reached the Assembly in early March, is in fact no more than a summary of events in the last twelve months. This annual report does not elaborate on the political impetus needed if WEU is to become the body in which the European view of European security is harmonised. It confines itself to stating that working groups set up by the Permanent Council are looking very closely at these new developments. Of course, the annual report also refers to many positive developments. But here again, I have a criticism to make, as befits a representative of the people. I will give you an example:

"In order to improve the contacts between the Council and the Assembly... there are a number of options... among which are: a substantial improvement in the existing procedures for giving written replies to Assembly recommendations and questions..."

May I, Mr. President, make it absolutely clear today that what the Assembly needs is not only improved procedures but, most emphatically, an improvement in the substance of the replies we receive, which are all too often evasive or non-committal. Something will definitely have to be done about this, since the Assembly - according to the Council of Ministers - "as the only European parliamentary body mandated by treaty to discuss defence matters, is called upon to play a growing rôle". I will not add anything to this for the moment. The WEU Assembly is regarded by the Council of Ministers as a whole, a body of representatives of the people, which makes statements on security and peace in Europe. But is it not then true to say that the Council of Ministers should be more than a council expressing the political will of individual governments? This Council must surely also act as the Council of a Western European *union* and as such be prepared to take decisions to the benefit of the alliance as a whole and then to defend these decisions before the governments

Mr. van der Sanden (continued)

of the seven countries. The attempt to harmonise the positions of the seven governments is, in itself, laudable. To adopt a common stance is naturally preferable: after all, if it is harmonisation the Council of Ministers wants, the weakest link in the alliance will determine the political line and the alliance can never be more than the sum of national interests. The object must be – and the political will should be found to achieve it – to bring a common standpoint to the one and to my mind indivisible Atlantic Alliance.

Seven countries are also represented in our Assembly, but even more shades of political opinion. Yet the Council of Ministers expects the Assembly to adopt a common stance. I feel that, if the Assembly and the Council of Ministers can agree on a position that is in the interests of peace and security in Europe and also of unity within the Atlantic Alliance, it is for the Council of Ministers to defend the common stance adopted by WEU vis-à-vis the governments of the member countries and to put it into effect. National views cannot prevail in a union. The one, decisive criterion should be the common will to join in ensuring the security of the member countries. We know that it is impossible for any one of these countries to defend its own territory and the actions of the Council of Ministers and the Assembly should make this evident. Hence the inclusion in the recommendation which the General Affairs Committee submits to the Assembly today of the proposal that the Chairman-in-Office should participate fully in the Assembly's debate on the annual report, acting on behalf of the whole Council. If a jointly supported European security and peace policy of this kind is put to the governments and parliaments of the seven countries by both the Assembly and the Council of Ministers, I am convinced that one of the objectives of the Rome Declaration can be achieved.

But there is more. We are concerned about the sentence included under paragraph 1.4 of the declaration by the Foreign Ministers, meeting in Paris on 12th June 1984, which reads:

“ A reactivation of WEU would serve as an example of what can be achieved through co-operation on the European plane... which the Community and the Ten are at present unable to exploit to the extent that some of them would wish. ”

Mr. President, this statement includes the words “ at present ”. Temporary reactivation – is that all WEU is good for? Are the ministers proposing, as soon as European political co-operation, for example, is working well again, to throw out the whole operation now initiated, in which the Assembly is ready to participate

with enthusiasm and commitment? Is reactivation, without restrictions, perhaps intended as a rejuvenating element of European co-operation with a view to strengthening our security and maintaining peace in Europe? The Assembly is entitled to replies to these questions from the Council of Ministers. I make no secret of my firm conviction that a good, clear reply is essential, if the Council of Ministers wants to retain this Assembly's full co-operation in a joint effort.

The Assembly is not, and must not be, a sounding-board for ministerial decisions to be subsequently passed on to our national parliaments and the public. We reject the view that the Assembly might be a supporting element of the Council of Ministers in influencing public opinion, as the thirtieth annual report and the Rome Declaration might seem to indicate. Responsibility for this is shared equally by the Council and the Assembly. The Assembly expects the Council to state its views on this as well, defining the responsibility each party bears.

Mr. President, I shall not discuss the deplorable activities of terrorists, designed to undermine the West's readiness to defend itself against external threats at the very time when the free world is confronted with a qualitative and quantitative increase in Soviet military forces. This development is not justified by security considerations on that side. I will say only that those who believe they can threaten the democratic institutions of the free world with violence grossly underestimate our strength and our resolve to defend freedom for our children. In a democracy political goals are pursued by political means. Violence has no place in this and should therefore be combated with all the strength at our disposal.

Mr. President, a young democracy is knocking at WEU's door. Portugal wants to be let in. The Chairman-in-Office, Mr. Genscher, told us in Bonn on 23rd April that the Council of Ministers had not yet taken a decision and that further study was needed. We can appreciate that. What this Assembly and the Council of Ministers are together trying to do is to strengthen WEU. There can therefore be – and I say this without hesitation – no question of enlargement that may weaken the alliance. I therefore think it advisable for the Assembly to confine itself for the moment to the application from Portugal. It is within the Assembly's power to take a decision on your Rapporteur's proposal, which was approved by the General Affairs Committee, that Portugal should be admitted to the Assembly and certain committees as an observer and that our Portuguese friends should be given the right to speak there. I hope the Assembly will approve this proposal.

Mr. van der Sanden (continued)

Mr. President, forty years ago the second world war ended and with it a period of tyranny, brute force and oppression. In the present circumstances in the world, a reactivated and strengthened WEU should help to ensure that peace is maintained and the security of the West guaranteed. It is therefore a hopeful sign that the Council of Ministers of WEU decided in Bonn to continue their collective efforts to give Washington a co-ordinated reaction to its invitation to participate in the SDI research programme. Crucial to this is the general objective, in the context of maintaining world peace, as Mr. Genscher said, centred on the hope that the negotiations in Geneva will be so successful that they will put an end to the arms race on earth and prevent it from developing in space. NATO's aims have always been defensive, fostering peace and security. Within the unity of NATO, the European pillar, which will take shape in a reactivated WEU, must not stand for any other objective.

(Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Scheer, Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Mr. SCHEER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, it is my task to present at the beginning of the debate, a report that was unanimously adopted by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. The previous speaker, the Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee, said we were discussing the reactivation of Western European Union. I personally would define what is happening and what has been planned as the reform of WEU or a change in its function under the existing treaty. On closer examination this must be so, since the term "reactivation" implies that at some time in its thirty years WEU was a particularly lively international organisation. We know this is not true, because the development of NATO since 1955 and military integration resulted in the transfer to NATO of many of the tasks originally intended for the Brussels Treaty Organisation. WEU's function has been virtually confined to internal arms control in accordance with the appropriate treaty provisions and protocols.

So we are discussing a change of function under existing treaties. The Assembly will have to play an active part of its own in the development of ideas and proposals for this activation of WEU. As the Assembly – and let us not deceive ourselves here – has little to say to the Council of Ministers, thanks to the treaty and the powers of the governments or the Council of Ministers, the Assembly's effect on this develop-

ment will depend on the quality of its proposals, which must approach the problems realistically, demonstrating how a European identity can be achieved in security policy. This European identity should have a twofold effect: an alliance in the North Atlantic context, in which at the same time Western Europe's own interests are emphasised. The Assembly must then discuss this against the backdrop of an internal Western European policy, and this discussion should differ from the usual pattern of intergovernmental discussions. In other words, the debate must be genuinely supranational. If we can develop new ideas here, the Assembly may assume an additional function. If it simply repeats work already done by others, the Assembly will have no special function.

That is why it is particularly important to stress three points made in my report. One is that adequate budgetary resources must be made available for the Assembly. As my report says, it is not enough simply to ask the Council of Ministers for these resources, because the WEU Assembly is an assembly of parliamentarians who are responsible to their governments for budgets of their respective countries, and it is scarcely expressive of parliamentary self-confidence if parliamentarians at WEU level merely ask the governments to be kind enough to provide more budgetary resources for their parliamentary work. If we take this demand and the function of the parliamentary Assembly seriously, the individual parliamentarians will have to make a co-ordinated approach to the national parliaments to obtain an increase in budgetary resources for the parliamentary Assembly of WEU.

The second point is that the new agencies to be created, whose tasks, principally concerned with research and studies, will have to be defined more accurately, must be directly available to the Assembly as well. They will thus be of real assistance to the Assembly.

Another point I wish to make in this context is that it is incompatible with WEU's future active rôle and the Assembly's function for a representative of the Council of Ministers to address us occasionally for an hour, answer a few questions and then leave again. If there is to be a genuine convergence of the political ideas and debates here with the debates and decisions in the Council of Ministers, a representative of the Council of Ministers with the rank of minister can surely be expected to attend and take part in all our debates in addition to the Permanent Council. Where relations with the Council of Ministers are concerned, this would be a parliamentary practice evincing the necessary respect. So much for the Assembly's rôle.

I will now comment on the contents of the report. In it I have stressed the need for WEU's

Mr. Scheer (continued)

past experience of arms control in its member countries to be used to political ends. WEU is the only international body with experience of arms control. It will therefore be useful if the internal functions exercised for the past thirty years are now exercised externally as well. I therefore propose – and the committee unanimously approved this proposal – that advantage should be taken of the WEU institutions' experience for a programme of confidence-building measures in European East-West relations, with a view to progressing from internal controls on force levels to a declaration of levels of conventional and nuclear weapons vis-à-vis the Warsaw Pact countries, subject to an agreement on reciprocity, as a contribution to confidence-building over and above what is now being discussed in Stockholm. Our task is to point to developments which it may not be possible to put to political use for three, four or five years, but which must be planned now. In other words, our experience must now be channelled into a new concept, and in a completely new way.

I attach considerable importance in the report to WEU's arms control activities. This is an area in which major differences have emerged within the North Atlantic Alliance in recent months, which should be discussed here. They arose when the WEU member countries began to develop their own co-ordinated position in relation to arms control requirements, possibly involving the formulation of some objectives of their own.

We learn, for example, that Assistant Secretary Burt sent a kind of protest letter to European governments, stressing that the United States alone was responsible for arms control. The European governments concerned were right to remain unmoved by this and, of course, to emphasise the importance of their own arms control initiatives, not least in the communiqué issued by the Council of Ministers. These are initiatives that should take place in WEU, alongside those of armaments co-operation and the further development of East-West relations in Europe. In other words, there is a particularly urgent need for Western Europe, a continent with the largest arsenal, even of nuclear weapons, that has ever existed in peacetime, to stress and extend its own responsibility for arms control within the North Atlantic Alliance. In my recommendations I have therefore referred to a number of points where this is especially urgent at present.

One of these is a common response to the proposal for participation in the SDI, a response that should be based on definite political criteria, which should have priority over other political criteria. The criterion must be a reply concerted

“in order to prevent an arms race in outer space and ensure respect for existing treaty obligations”. This criterion must be considered in relation to opinions on other reports on the SDI in this Assembly, and when certain amendments are being discussed.

I shall be returning to this point. In the report I have said what I think about a common position on the negotiations on a nuclear test ban. I recommend a common position on the reply to the Soviet Union's proposal of a six-month freeze on the deployment of its nuclear missiles. The importance of a treaty on chemical weapons is also emphasised.

In paragraph 3 of my recommendation I have stressed the need for the production of a Western European observation satellite to provide independent intelligence relevant to arms control prospects and the assessment of developments in arms control policy. There is a pressing need for both, because at the moment we depend on others for information on these vital questions, and despite our solidarity with the United States as fellow members of the alliance, this information is remarkably changeable, frequently contradictory and its validity and credibility cannot be checked. The same, of course, very definitely applies to the Soviet Union, where propaganda methods are often used when it comes to describing the West's arms potential. It is imperative that the Western European countries should have their own intelligence sources, as a technical and political basis for their own observations and the formation of their own positions on arms control.

This brings me to the point that has attracted most attention in the last few days, although no official report has been submitted to the Assembly on the subject. I am talking about the SDI. I have already quoted the criteria recommended – and unanimously approved in the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments – to govern the drafting of a common response. The criterion here is that priority must be given to preventing an arms race in space while respecting existing treaties in every way.

In conclusion, I should like to explain to the Assembly precisely what this means in political terms. In plain terms, it means that we should adopt a clear-cut position on this whole SDI issue, that is, whether there should be weapons in outer space that can reach targets in space itself, in the atmosphere or on earth or whether there should be additional weapons that can reach targets in space from earth and, of course, destroy them. If my recommendation is adopted, priority will be given to the proposal that an appropriate treaty should be signed at the Geneva conference, preventing this kind of arma-

Mr. Scheer (continued)

ment. This takes priority over participation in the SDI, at least until every attempt has been made, with our urgent support, to reach an agreement of this kind in Geneva. I say this quite deliberately, because what we must avoid today is adopting two recommendations of conflicting import. Hence the need to emphasise this point.

It also means remembering that we have a chance of finding a solution backed by a treaty and including verification only as long as no test programmes for these weapons have been implemented. Once tests have taken place and been successfully concluded, there will be little chance of signing a treaty preventing the arms race in space. This chance will exist only as long as the tests, which can be checked and verified with existing observation media, have not been completed. We have two years perhaps in the case of anti-satellite weapons and five or six years, possibly a little longer, in the case of BMD weapons to reach such an agreement. This recommendation gives priority to the prevention of an arms race in space.

It also refers to a second priority: the reply should take account of existing treaties. Which treaties? The ABM treaty, the 1967 treaty on space and the 1963 limited test ban treaty. Why? Space weapons, BMD weapons mean that the energy generated by nuclear explosions must be used in order to achieve the necessary radiation effect for an SDI system. In other words, if this weapon system is developed, a given phase of development is bound ultimately to result in the limited test ban treaty being disregarded.

The space treaty prohibits the deployment of nuclear weapons on natural or artificial celestial bodies. This treaty will also be affected.

The treaty principally involved, however, is the ABM treaty, prohibiting the introduction and deployment of ABM systems in space as well as the development, production and introduction of components of such systems and, of course, their deployment.

If, then, we intend to respect existing treaties, we must consider even now – and this is not a polemical but a legally accurate interpretation – whether European participation, which would, of course, entail the deployment of components from a given time onwards, would violate the ABM treaty.

We may enquire whether development and testing are not in themselves a part of the research programmes: how can the usefulness of a new weapon system be examined without developing and testing some components at least?

If the conditions of the ABM treaty are accepted as worded in my recommendation – this is not a new wording I have thought up: I have merely stated what the wording from the Council of Ministers means in political terms – and if they are taken seriously, I would remind the Assembly before the debate begins that we cannot simultaneously call for European participation in the SDI programme. The two are incompatible.

I call on the Assembly to support the obligations of the Council of Ministers in this matter and not to start disregarding these obligations, since this would make the establishment of a European identity even more difficult than it is already.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In the joint debate I now call Mrs. Kelly.

I remind speakers that in accordance with yesterday's ruling by the Presidential Committee they may not speak for more than five minutes, and I ask them to adhere to that time-limit.

Mrs. KELLY (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I am speaking to you here today for the first time, as a committed pacifist, not as a member of some fifth column, as someone said yesterday, but as a person who condemns militarism and the violation of human rights equally in the East and West. From this standpoint I found it very depressing to catch the tones of the cold war again and again, in speeches by this almost impotent Assembly.

We must make it perfectly clear and obvious – do not forget, I am alone here, there is no political group behind me – that the Europe we have in mind not only comprises the western part of the continent but must also include those countries which have been separated from their natural neighbours in the most unnatural way, by the tragic and enduring confrontation between blocs. We call for a policy in the context of the European institutions whose aim is the non-violent termination of this division, instead of its reinforcement by demands for more and more nuclear and conventional armaments and European participation in crazy armament programmes such as the so-called SDI project.

The idea is to make Europe palatable, by means of military integration, to its citizens, unnerved as they are by butter mountains and milk lakes. “Europeanisation of security policy” – that is the phrase used to wheedle sensible Western Europeans, who want to free themselves from the two superpowers. But this concept suppresses both the militarist past of Western Europe and colonialism. That word “Europeanisation”, far from being a way out of the arms race or the policy of suicidal deter-

Mrs. Kelly (continued)

rence, is simply the continuation of the old policy in European dress.

If we want more responsibility for the defence of Europe – and the question is: what defence? – it cannot be simply a matter of more armament; it cannot be simply a question of the Federal Republic's trying to procure for itself missiles with a range of more than 70 km and even up to 600 km, which were forbidden according to the old WEU arms limitations. Now they are actually legitimising the development of a missile with a range of up to 600 km.

We have no taste for a European Europe which is deprived of its autonomy, its self-determination, its sovereignty, its independence – both nuclear and conventional. The appeal by Giscard d'Estaing in the summer of 1984 as well as that of Christian politicians in Europe for a council of European headquarters and a European corps of "green helmets" troubles us, as does the demand by many conservative politicians, who are in favour of pooling the British, French and American nuclear arsenals, for a unified command of a single European nuclear defence council, in which the Federal Republic, which allegedly has a non-nuclear policy, is supposed to participate.

And it is in this circle of the many men and WEU officials who are very highly paid for their work here, that we are supposed to debate whether, by means of the concept and the realisation of a European union, a reactivated WEU, it might also be possible to achieve a European nuclear armed force through the back door.

I am very worried about what people in this Assembly in particular mean by the revitalisation of WEU. In the document by Dr. Miller on the state of European security, we hear of the efforts to create a genuine European defence industry, emphasising the successes of international co-operation in armaments. Projects in which the Federal Republic participates are referred to, although until recently they were still under the WEU production ban.

It was suggested that the space flight potential should play a key rôle in future warfare. What an utter mockery! Civil space flight has also to play a part in warfare.

Efforts are being made, in this parliamentary Assembly, to harmonise industrial co-operation in the area of the military exploitation of space – that was a recommendation by this Assembly – and to develop a Western European arms control policy. And the idea is, by means of all the necessary measures within the area of the treaty, to enable the forces of any NATO country to be moved outside that area. What a mockery this makes of "peace policy", when the

Assembly is considering – it says so here – developments outside the NATO area which affect their vital interests!

The Assembly is doing its best to achieve enhanced co-operation in armaments between the Western European NATO countries, especially with regard to the French and West German arms industry and armament companies. Efforts are being made to find new outlets independent of the United States, in order to become more competitive vis-à-vis the third world. This has nothing to do with peace.

If I have understood paragraph 27 of Mr. van der Sanden's report correctly, even the neutral status of Ireland is to be weakened. All the countries of the European Community are supposed to become part of the European security organisation.

When we talk about the reactivation of WEU, in my view the original functions of WEU should first be properly fulfilled.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – You are the first speaker to take the floor in the joint debate and I would remind you of the Presidential Committee's ruling. If you have anything to add would you please be brief.

Mrs. KELLY (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I note that the French and Italian speakers spoke for more than five minutes.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In this debate speakers are limited to five minutes, as I pointed out before calling you.

Mrs. KELLY (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – The five-minute limit applied yesterday as well.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – It is my duty to uphold Assembly decisions and the Assembly has voted to limit the time allowed to speakers.

Please be good enough to finish what you have to say.

Mrs. KELLY (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Now that we are talking about the revitalisation of WEU, I believe the original functions of WEU should at last be revealed.

One may therefore wonder whether the WEU Agency for the Control of Armaments has, up to now, done any work at all. I am about to conclude but should just like to finish this idea. The control of British and French nuclear weapons provided for in the WEU treaty, the overall levels of which were to be determined by the WEU Council, has, in any case, never been carried into effect. Although the numbers of British and French nuclear weapons have multiplied many times since the treaty was concluded

Mrs. Kelly (continued)

in 1954, contrary to the treaty there has never been a single vote on this matter in the WEU Council. Although this WEU Agency for the Control of Armaments should verify the level of forces not integrated in NATO, nothing has been published about French levels and plans for restructuring the army and the creation of the rapid deployment force since France's withdrawal from the military structure of NATO. I therefore think one should speak honestly about WEU's rôle in the past, since it has hardly exercised any controls of armaments in the areas where verification was most necessary. This Assembly should have the honesty to recognise that. Before speaking about the revitalisation of its activities, WEU should first take care of the work it had already.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). - I shall not follow the lines developed by Mrs. Kelly in her maiden speech, but I should like to take the opportunity to congratulate the two Rapporteurs, Mr. van der Sanden and Mr. Scheer, on their constructive and well-researched reports. I hope most earnestly, however, that we shall soon be able to cease looking at our own entrails and address ourselves more to the problems that confront West European security than to our organisation and way of doing business. I trust that shortly WEU will be reorganised to the satisfaction of all and that we shall be able to work together and with the Council to formulate the crucial policies that will be essential for ensuring WEU's identity within the NATO Alliance.

I should like to discuss briefly recommendation 1 contained in Mr. van der Sanden's report which states that the Council should:

"Continue its work until it obtains a collective answer from the seven governments to the American invitation to take part in the United States research programme relating to the strategic defence initiative".

In my view, Mr. van den Bergh's report was rightly referred back by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments because, first, it pre-empted the visit of the General Affairs Committee to Washington where members of that committee would have learnt a great deal about SDI from specialists and experts and, secondly, because the report as it was originally drafted contradicted the overwhelming majority verdict of this Assembly which supported my recommendations of December last year contained in my report on the military uses of space technology that broadly endorse the objectives of the SDI. It would have looked decidedly

strange if within six months a committee of this Assembly had sought to overturn that judgment of the plenary Assembly as a whole.

I hope that we shall seriously address ourselves to the issue of SDI as an Assembly and as a Council. Mr. De Decker, Mr. Blaauw and I have tabled a series of amendments to Mr. van der Sanden's report that will emphasise the need for WEU to reach a joint position on the SDI on behalf of member governments.

If we cannot come to a joint conclusion on such a strategic matter, that will demonstrate the vociferous contention that still persists within Western Europe that our alliance is not very meaningful. We also point out the importance of an active military space programme and the need for us to collaborate with the United States in military space technology. I trust that those amendments will receive the Assembly's support.

Many people fear that the SDI, if carried to fruition, will somehow lead to a reduction in the linkage between the United States and Western Europe. The contrary is true. If our North American friends in the United States feel more secure in their homeland with a measure of ballistic missile defence, they are more likely to invoke the nuclear guarantee on behalf of Western Europe. As a consequence of that increased likelihood, the western alliance's overall deterrence will be improved. In other words, a consequence of the North American homeland's greater security is that a potential aggressor is less likely to attack Western Europe in such a way as to provoke an American nuclear response.

I hope that people will not feel that the SDI is a unilateral American initiative. It concerns us all. If it is successfully concluded it should be to the benefit of us all. We must react positively to the American Government's invitation to European industry to participate. If we do not participate, we shall fall further and further behind. I am glad therefore that the British Government - if the press reports of Sir Geoffrey Howe's meeting yesterday with the French Foreign Minister are true - at least recognise the importance of the Eureka programme and Britain's participation in it. I see the development of the technologies within Eureka as the building block of European capability to collaborate as equals with the United States.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, when the Assembly and the Council of Ministers of WEU met in Rome in the autumn of 1984 to consider new prospects for

Mr. Müller (continued)

Western European Union, many people hoped that there might actually be a fresh development. This hope has been followed by widespread scepticism, however, since, for example, the communiqué issued after the last meeting of the Council of Ministers in Bonn is not exactly clear as to what this Western European Union is supposed to become. I sometimes have the feeling that some communiqués are little more than a façade and use a language that might be called United Nations Assembly speech.

Nor is the information we as an Assembly receive as extensive as one might expect. As Mr. van der Sanden has already said, the thirtieth annual report is little more than a list of events which could just as well have been compiled by a historian and no information at all has been provided on the meetings of 11th February and 1st March.

If we really want Western European Union to be activated and its self-image reinterpreted, it will be crucially important for the parliamentary element of this Assembly to be strengthened, because I believe there is a grave danger today that neither the national parliaments nor a supranational assembly such as WEU are adequately debating and deciding on a common defence policy in Europe.

Ladies and Gentlemen, we are constantly told that there are other opportunities for discussing these questions, within the framework of the European Community, for instance. I doubt that, because the European Community includes three countries – Greece, Ireland and Denmark – whose views on these matters differ from the position of the seven member countries of WEU. I therefore consider it vital that the importance of this Assembly be reinforced so that it can in reality be what President Kennedy once called with such emphasis the second pillar of the North Atlantic Alliance, the European pillar. But this pillar cannot consist of headquarters and generals, of governments and ministers. As NATO is an alliance of democratic countries, it is absolutely essential for the emphasis to be placed on parliamentary responsibility.

I therefore endorse what Mr. Scheer said about this Assembly's financial resources and what Mr. van der Sanden said about the way this Assembly's questions are answered. There is a great opportunity here to give this Assembly more rights and more powers.

I should just like to add a few words to Mr. Scheer. I cannot unfortunately go into detail because time is short: we have only five minutes, while he spoke for twenty-five, which was not quite right, I agree with Mrs. Kelly

there. But I would issue a stern warning to the Assembly against adopting Mr. Scheer's extensive interpretation of, say, the ABM treaty. That would be a dangerous line for us to adopt. If we did, we might as well immediately stop all computer research, at Siemens or Philips in the Federal Republic of Germany or the Netherlands, for example, because it would allegedly violate certain treaties. After hearing what Mr. Scheer had to say, I am very concerned that the Europeans, including the Assembly of Western European Union, fail to appreciate the major challenge represented by the American proposal for research on the SDI. As I have already said, there is no time now to discuss this in detail. I would simply like to make my objections known, because we shall undoubtedly be reverting to the subject in the future.

Unfortunately, I must also address a remark to Mrs. Kelly. I was sorry she could not speak longer, because what she had to say was an object lesson for many members who are unable to witness at first hand what is happening in the Federal Republic as compared to all the other European countries. The reference in the report drawn up by our socialist colleague, Mr. Lagorce, to the threat to Europe's security of neutralist attitudes in the Federal Republic has been borne out by Mrs. Kelly's speech in which she asks, for example, what there is to defend, and peppers her questions with ancient clichés about colonialism and militarism.

I do not propose to discuss the background to the second world war – after all, we all know who was really to blame – not so much the militarists as those who failed to take the militarists seriously. That is the situation again today, Ladies and Gentlemen. It would be very dangerous for the Assembly of Western European Union not to take the threats to freedom seriously. As these threats exist, it is of paramount importance for this parliamentary assembly to be strengthened in order to do justice to these tasks.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Bianco.

Mr. BIANCO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I think we are still far from resolving the crisis regarding the identity of the WEU Assembly. Nor do I think that the hopes aroused in Rome have produced any positive response. The report presented by Mr. van der Sanden contains a long list of non-fulfilment and shortcomings which have not been corrected in any way. I believe that an old popular saying that the road to hell is paved with good intentions, commonly heard in Southern Italy, also applies to WEU. WEU is also full of good intentions.

We must try to get to the heart of this crisis and to understand why, despite the declarations

Mr. Bianco (continued)

of certain ministers of Western European Union countries, our Assembly and its work are not being reactivated. We are caught between the European Community which wants to deal with security problems and – a point of particular importance for this Assembly – is tending towards a policy of transferring all security problems to the European union, and the Atlantic Alliance with its weight and significance and the more important rôle which some WEU member countries attach to it.

These are the limits within which we have to work. If we wish to be more than people who approve reports to which little attention is paid afterwards, the most important problem is to determine, in close consultation with the Chairman-in-Office of the Council of Ministers, what the functions of WEU should be. Action must be taken to ensure that this Assembly is not reduced to the somewhat limited rôle, which the Rapporteur quite rightly criticised, of a kind of sounding box for the decisions which the Council of Ministers plans to adopt. We cannot be reduced to that rôle. We must try to explain to colleagues in the different political parties and in the various countries our Assembly's position, which should be as closely aligned as possible with that of the member countries of WEU on security questions, with the aim of giving joint replies as far as possible. This point must be highlighted; equally, we must not throw away the strategic knowledge and accumulated experience of Western European Union on the most valuable part of our work, namely the control of armaments.

I should like to say a few words – I do not wish to encroach on the points made by our German colleague; one often attributes the actions of others to oneself – in favour of the entry of Portugal which has applied to join. I think this is another very important question.

I think that more thought needs to be given to the problem of participation in the SDI project. We should concentrate our attention on the problems of security in Central Europe rather than discuss research and studies which are still at the earliest stage and will in any case take a very long time. In this context, Dr. Miller's report could well have been joined to the reports now before us. It is pointless to deceive ourselves and to hide behind treaty commitments. The United States will go ahead with their research which will probably alter the whole strategic pattern. The questions for Europe should be: should Europe merely be carried along or should it be a full participant, so that it can play a significant major rôle in the defence of peace in our part of the world, in stating our points of view, and as a genuine partner in the Atlantic Alliance?

These are the policy issues to be considered. If Europe really wants to be involved in scientific research, I believe it to be most important that it should state an agreed, joint view on some of the points involved in all areas. I also think that the proposal made by Mr. Genscher at the last Paris session for an institute to study the problems jointly should go ahead.

These are the directions in which I believe the WEU countries can strengthen their co-operation and develop an effort which will not be passive but active, within the overall context of the defence of the West and of the European theatre.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Vecchiatti.

Mr. VECCHIETTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I must first apologise to Mr. Scheer for not speaking to his report but it is impossible to deal with two such important and interesting reports in five minutes. We approve them, but would once again observe that when important questions come up in this Assembly, there is never enough time whereas a great deal is lost on less important matters.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We are governed by an Assembly ruling. Any comments should have been made yesterday.

Mr. VECCHIETTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – We decided to revitalise WEU by giving this debate political significance.

(The speaker continued in Italian)

Mr. President, I consider Mr. van der Sanden's report to be a brave attempt to examine the facts concerning the reactivation of WEU, at least over the months since the Rome decisions. I think we must all be grateful to him for his major contribution to our discussions.

In his speech to the Assembly, quoted in the report before us, Mr. Genscher stressed the need for a specifically European contribution to the East-West dialogue, saying that the value of that contribution would be enhanced if the seven European countries adopted a joint position.

Mr. van der Sanden notes that as things are moving at present, it looks as if the Council of Ministers is confirming its determination to go ahead with the Rome decisions, but is in fact refusing to say how that policy is to be implemented. In his conclusions, he observes that there is still no European reaction to the proposed American strategic defence initiative and that no European position has been worked out on disarmament in NATO.

The wide-ranging nature of the Council of Minister's decisions concerning the control of

Mr. Vecchiatti (continued)

armaments and disarmament, security and defence confirm that it will be difficult for WEU to comply with the instruction to reply on these points.

It is a gap which explains why there is no serious consultation between the Council of Ministers and the WEU Assembly.

This alarming picture may mirror the reality of relations between the WEU countries, of their difficulty in adopting a joint policy on essential problems affecting the future of Europe, but it is also a picture which above all does not mirror the reality of the individual European countries which are going ahead alone.

It is not only because I believe in Europe that I say this; it is because no single European country, however strong, can effectively take the place of Europe and its common interest in a policy for security and peace.

I think that two facts emerged clearly from the Bonn meeting of the industrialised countries. First, that Reagan's policy has created a crisis for American supremacy; second, that Europe can stop Reagan but cannot offer an alternative policy. Europe has from time to time expressed doubts and criticism concerning economic relations, Nicaragua, Reagan's plans for celebrating the fortieth anniversary of the end of the world war and the so-called star wars issue. In the case of the Geneva negotiations Reagan managed to extract no more than understanding of the American position from the allied governments. Neither Reagan nor Mitterrand won; but neither did Europe.

Europe did not win because it was unable to offer any alternative to Reagan's attitudes which are based solely on fear of the Soviet Union. What alternative are we preparing in case this fear should prove unfounded and Gorbachev adopts a flexible policy? To hope that it will happen means helping to create the conditions and the praiseworthy efforts of some European countries to discover the Soviet Union's real intentions are not enough to achieve this.

So far there has been no reply to all this. And this to me is the basic reason for our own and the Council's failure to move, which is liable to nullify any effort to reactivate WEU.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you for keeping carefully to the time allowed. Before closing the sitting, and at the request of the President of the Assembly, I shall, by way of an exception, call the Portuguese observer, Mr. Adriano Moreira.

Mr. MOREIRA (*Observer from Portugal*) (Translation). – Mr. President, parliamentary

delegates of Western European Union, I must start by saying that the delegation of Portuguese observers to the Assembly, for whom I have the honour to speak at this session, shares both the concerns and the hopes expressed by the European delegations meeting here in this year which marks the anniversary of a number of events of vital significance in our recent history. Forty years have passed since the end of world war two and ten years since the signing of the Helsinki final act.

However, after all our efforts and all our economic, financial and social sacrifices aimed at guaranteeing peace in both thought and action, President Reagan addressed the following words to Congress in January 1984:

“Soviet non-compliance is a serious matter. It deprives us of important security benefits from arms control, and could create new security risks. It undermines the confidence needed to achieve effective arms control in the future. It increases doubts about the reliability of the USSR as a negotiating partner, and thus damages the chances for establishing a more constructive Soviet relationship.”

At issue here is the ABM treaty – on the limitation of anti-ballistic-missile systems, the Helsinki final act, the Geneva protocol on chemical weapons, the convention on biological and toxic weapons and the SALT II agreement – on strategic arms limitation.

It is our view that, quite apart from the difficulty of obtaining clear and adequate proof, the ambiguity of treaty provisions often leads to contentious or inconclusive cases of violation. While subjective assessments are involved here, it is also increasingly clear that objectivity will be strengthened and will breed more confidence if Europe finally proves capable of adopting a global European stance, not only in economic matters but also in the areas of defence and, more especially, politics.

It is precisely because we share this concern that we wish to become full members not only of NATO but also of the European Economic Community and Western European Union.

There is a danger threatening the whole of Europe, and we consider it neither fair nor acceptable that a European country should share the common danger without having a voice in European decision-making institutions. We sometimes have the feeling that Europe forgets the existence of the southern area and that, in defence questions especially, some experts argue as though it were an uninhabited strategic theatre.

Quite the contrary, for the last eight centuries we who live there have been not an island but a rampart serving the defence and the cultural

Mr. Moreira (continued)

expansion of Europe. We have shared in Europe's greatness and, with Europe, we have experienced the consequences of the changes wrought mainly by Europeans in the international scene. It is therefore in the full conviction that we are exercising a right and fulfilling a duty that we wish to share in the efforts of Western European Union and to call your attention to the southern region, whose countries are less prosperous and whose GDP is of a more modest order. It has already been shown that, because of these circumstances, the countries in question bear some of heaviest burdens in terms of the proportion of GDP allocated to defence.

While we need the help of a large number of countries, it is our view that Europe is thereby helping itself. Without a southern region capable of meeting its commitments, the divided Europe created by the peace concluded forty years ago cannot be sure of maintaining indefinitely the area of western freedom which you, Ladies and Gentlemen, represent in Western European Union, of which we shortly hope to become a full member with all the risks and responsibilities that that implies.

In saying this, we are mindful of those Europeans who have lost their national and civil liberty. It is to be noted that this year also marks the centenary of the death of Marshal Pilsudski, who is the symbol of independence and, perhaps, of the impossible.

We also have in mind the arms race in space which divides European political groups into those favourable to the SDI and those wishing to debate the Eureka project, which is presented as a non-strategic alternative to star wars directed towards civil, technological and industrial objectives. We do not yet know enough about the implications of this other alternative, and it demands further careful reflection unfettered by the emotions and worries engendered by the distrust between Europe and the United States.

But we are nonetheless in favour of strengthening the second pillar of the alliance. We appreciate the European efforts made by France and Germany in their quest for a solution which is neither Gaullist nor socialist but European in character and is aimed at restoring to Europe the influential voice to which it is fully entitled and to which the world looks as a means for achieving security, hope and a constructive peace.

Successive generations of Europeans have had the task of building the world which it is our lot to inhabit in circumstances somewhat different from the Utopia envisaged by our ancestors. They have handed on to us the exciting challenge of rebuilding this small portion of the world, which was formerly the seat of world poli-

tical power and is now a focus of hope for millions upon millions of people who have not forgotten that this is the cradle of wisdom, human rights and peace under the law. I think of Aldo Moro, the victim of violence, and of John-Paul II, who never gives up hope.

We shall take our place amongst you in opposing violence and injustice and in promoting hope and peace for the generations to come, and we will play our part in sustaining a Europe of renewed authority, without which the world will achieve neither balance nor the ability to replace the arms race with an urgent policy of help for the poor of this world, who cannot be left with the conviction that the book which summarises our culture is, after all, "In Praise of Folly".

Mr. President, we warmly welcome the general report, and we have also studied the amendments which have been tabled. We note that the report and the amendments take the same line and we are therefore convinced that we should be well received in your organisation. Although not present at its inception, we want to be there when it is revitalised. (*Applause*)

9. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Thirtieth annual report of the Council (Presentation by Mr. Genscher, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Document 1006).
2. New outlook for WEU - reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council; Application of the Brussels Treaty - reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council (Resumed joint debate on the reports of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and votes on the draft recommendations and draft order, Documents 1012 and amendments and 1019 and amendments).
3. Withdrawal of a report from the agenda (Motion for an order tabled by Dr. Miller and others, Document 1021).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(*The sitting was closed at 1.10 p.m.*)

FIFTH SITTING

Wednesday, 22nd May 1985

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the minutes.
 2. Attendance register.
 3. Thirtieth annual report of the Council (*Presentation by Mr. Genscher, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Doc. 1006*).
Replies by Mr. Genscher to questions put by: Mrs. den Ouden-Dekkers, Mr. van Tets, Mr. Spies von Bülesheim, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mrs. Kelly, Mr. Lagorce, Mr. Pignion, Mr. Blaauw, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Lord Reay, Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, Mr. Gianotti, Mr. Milani, Sir Dudley Smith, Mr. Enders, Mr. Hill, Mr. de Vries.
 4. New outlook for WEU – reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council; Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council (*Resumed joint debate on the reports of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and votes on the draft recommendations and draft order, Docs. 1012 and amendments and 1019 and amendments*).
- Speakers:* Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Antretter, Mr. Blaauw, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg (point of order), Mr. Mezzapesa, Mr. Tummers, Mr. Verdon, Mr. Pignion (*Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*), Mr. Scheer (*Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*), Mr. van der Sanden (*Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee*), Mr. Blaauw, Mr. van der Sanden, Mr. Verdon, Mr. Scheer, Mr. Verdon (point of order), Mr. Scheer, Mr. Pignion.
5. Withdrawal of a report from the agenda (*Motion for an order tabled by Dr. Miller and others, Doc. 1021*).
Speakers: Mr. Brown, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg; (points of order): Mr. Brown, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Woodall, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.
 6. Situation in Lebanon (*Presentation of the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1025*).
Speaker: Mr. Martino (*Rapporteur*).
 7. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings ¹.

¹. See page 36.

3. Thirtieth annual report of the Council

(Presentation by Mr. Genscher, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Doc. 1006)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The orders of the day call for the presentation by Mr. Genscher, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, of the thirtieth annual report of the Council, Document 1006.

On your behalf, Ladies and Gentlemen, I offer our respectful and cordial greetings to Mr. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany and Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. Minister, it is always a pleasure and an honour to welcome you, especially on this important occasion in the work of our Assembly.

I now invite you to address the Assembly.

Mr. GENSCHER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, it is an

Mr. Genscher (continued)

honour for me to be addressing the Assembly of Western European Union today and to present a progress report in my capacity as Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

In my opinion, 1984 was a successful year for WEU. In June, the Council, sitting here in Paris, created the preliminary conditions for the better use of WEU. Then, at the anniversary meeting in Rome in October, fundamental decisions were taken for the revitalisation of our organisation. The first regular meeting of the Council of fourteen Foreign and Defence Ministers, which produced results of great political significance, took place in Bonn on 22nd and 23rd April this year. In Rome we had laid the foundations for a reactivated WEU: in Bonn we built the first visible part of the structure. The communiqué adopted in Bonn reaffirms the fundamental goals that we jointly pursue with WEU, namely the creation of a new dimension in the process of European unification and the strengthening of the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and hence of the alliance as a whole.

A "new" WEU has taken shape. Its members are resolved to co-ordinate their positions with regard to the real security situation in Europe.

Ladies and Gentlemen, the Atlantic Alliance is and continues to be the basis of our security. Speaking on this subject in Rome on 26th October 1984, I said: "Just as we need a strong America in the alliance, America needs a confident Europe capable of action. It is not a case of the United States being too strong in the alliance but of Europe not bringing its weight to bear sufficiently."

WEU sees itself as the European pillar of the Euro-American alliance. It strengthens NATO and ensures that Europe's voice is heard in the dialogue between partners that gives this alliance with our North American friends its special quality. President Reagan pledged in Strasbourg that America "remains dedicated to the unity of Europe". His words, "We continue to see a strong and unified Europe not as a rival but as an even stronger partner" confirm that our efforts in WEU serve the common cause. This is also reflected in the substantial contribution made by the European countries to the joint security of Europe and North America. One of WEU's future tasks will be to remind the public of this constantly on both sides of the Atlantic. It is also in the interest of the alliance as a whole that the public should be left in no doubt about the essential need, now and in the future, for our defence efforts.

The discussions in Bonn focused on three main subjects: European defence questions, East-West relations and their effects on Europe in terms of security, arms control and disarmament and European armaments co-operation.

In its discussion of European defence questions, the Council of Ministers noted that, in view of the continuing Soviet arms build-up, deterrence based on credible nuclear and conventional capabilities continued to be indispensable. This conclusion, in the context of the recent public debate on strategy, is of considerable significance.

The alliance's flexible response strategy has proved its worth as a policy for preventing war. It is morally justified because it safeguards peace. It must continue to prevail as long as there is no better means of preventing war. We should not arouse hopes that such better means will soon be available in finished form.

Ladies and Gentlemen, the world is on the threshold of new developments in security policy that are of the highest importance for the destiny of Europe. The success or failure of the arms control talks between the United States and the Soviet Union will have direct repercussions on Europe's security. Questions concerning possible forms of effective strategic defence will be a prominent topic in the years ahead.

Both of these subjects influence East-West relations: they also affect the relationship between the United States and Europe and they have a bearing on our security. The discussion in the Council on strategic defence questions has demonstrated the urgent need for opinion-forming at European level in the dynamic thinking on strategy - a process in which all countries, including the United States and no doubt the Soviet Union too, are still only at the beginning.

The ministers welcomed the resumption of United States-Soviet talks at Geneva and declared their support for the American efforts to achieve a more stable strategic relationship at the lowest possible balanced level of forces. They expressed the hope that the Geneva negotiations would lead to radical reductions of United States and Soviet intercontinental strategic and intermediate-range nuclear armaments and that agreements would be reached, aimed at ending the arms race on earth and preventing another in space. These comments relate to the United States-Soviet agreement of 8th January 1985 on the substance and goals of the Geneva talks, a document of great political significance. The goal of strengthening strategic stability is a key element of that document. It contains the essence of a concept for ensuring lasting peace. It expresses the idea that, in this nuclear age, reliable security cannot be attained

Mr. Genscher (continued)

single-handedly through autonomous decisions but calls for co-operation in security policy. The link between security on earth and security in space, as embodied in the Geneva statement, is obvious.

Also of significance is the reference in the Bonn communiqué to the importance that the ministers attach to observance of existing treaty obligations. The Council decided that the deliberations should be continued within WEU. The aim of these deliberations is to achieve, as far as possible, a co-ordinated response by the governments of the member states to the United States' invitation to participate in the research programme which is still being considered on the European and the American side. The understanding reached by all participants at the conference was that the possibilities of participating in the research should be established at national level. On the basis of this national stocktaking, we then intend to co-ordinate our responses within WEU. The Permanent Council, which was instructed by the ministers to carry out this co-ordination, has already started its deliberations.

The decision by the ministerial meeting in Bonn is evidence that revitalisation of WEU is bringing concrete results: we have started to act in unison. The dynamics of technological development must not be allowed to have an automatic effect on developments in security policy. Since the European nations' security interests are identical, we Europeans need to give the United States a co-ordinated reply to the offer of co-operation. No country should isolate itself, or be isolated from the rest.

The ideas contained in WEU's Bonn communiqué are in line with the position of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany as reiterated on 20th May by Chancellor Kohl in his speech to the North Atlantic Assembly, namely that Europe's security must not be delinked from that of the United States; that NATO's flexible response strategy will remain fully valid as long as there is no more promising method of preventing war and that concrete research results must be incorporated into co-operative solutions.

The Chancellor also drew attention to the various declarations by the United States to the effect that its efforts for any future development and deployment of strategic defence systems would be a part of co-operative solutions with the Soviet Union. There is no reason to doubt the United States' intentions. Chancellor Kohl made it clear that the Federal Government would take up the American suggestion and examine the possibility of participation in the research programme. German and European

interests and those of the Atlantic Alliance remain our guiding principles. In taking our decision we will also pay due regard to our interests in the context of the efforts for a stable East-West relationship.

The Council held an extensive exchange of views on the increasing pace of technological development in the world. The basic situation may be described as follows. First, Europe owes its economic strength and prosperity to the fact that it has always held a leading position in industrial development. Second, the United States and Japan have gained a considerable edge over Europe in a number of fields. Third, Europe is nevertheless capable of outstanding achievements when it pools its resources. The Airbus, Ariane and Spacelab are such examples. Fourth, these efforts are, even so, far from sufficient to meet the technological challenges of the future.

Europe cannot afford to fall behind in high-technology development. It must not be relegated to the position of licensee or supplier, but must pool its technological capabilities in order to remain a partner of the United States on equal terms. We must arrive at a European response to the global technological challenge.

At our meeting we therefore discussed at length the French Government's proposal for close European co-operation in the field of high technology. France and the six other WEU members take the same stance: Europe must strengthen its own technological capabilities with a view to creating a technological community.

This intention of seven member countries of the European Community to pool their efforts is in line with the work already being done in the Community in the field of technology. The ad hoc Committee on Institutional Affairs submitted a proposal for the creation of a European technological community to the last European Council and stated in its report: "The growth capacity of Europe will have to be based, *inter alia*, on wholehearted participation in technological innovation, and must result in the creation of a technological community. This process must enable European industry to become a powerful competitor internationally in the field of production and application of advanced technologies."

As the next major step, it will be necessary to define the research areas and projects to be promoted in a technological community. Duplication of effort must be avoided and optimum use made of limited resources. The various initiatives must be co-ordinated with programmes already in progress, for example in ESA.

The tasks ahead are huge. Nonetheless, I am confident that we shall find a European solution.

Mr. Genscher (continued)

At their meeting in Bonn, the ministers were also agreed that the East-West relationship must not be confined to matters of defence and arms control. Only a broad-based policy can bring about improved East-West relations. It must include co-operation in political, economic, cultural and humanitarian issues.

In the final communiqué particular mention is made of the undertakings entered into in Helsinki and Madrid in the framework of the CSCE. Full advantage must be taken of the opportunities implicit in the CSCE process. This applies particularly to the areas of co-operation in Basket II, with its considerable dynamic potential. Advantage should be taken of all the conferences instituted in the framework of the CSCE process such as the Stockholm conference on confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe, the Ottawa meeting on human rights, the cultural forum in Budapest, the Bern meeting of experts on human contacts and the next CSCE follow-up meeting in Vienna. What are urgently needed in these forums are contributions from Europeans conscious of their cultural identity, their complementary economic interests, the dangers threatening their common environment and humanitarian concerns.

Mr. President, armaments co-operation is playing an increasingly important rôle in security policy. The mounting cost of modern arms technology on the one hand and limitations on resources on the other create major problems. The defence of Western Europe cannot be ensured unless it has its own competitive industrial base. At the same time it is clear that military research also enriches advanced civil technology in diverse ways.

On the basis of this assessment, the ministers meeting in Bonn decided that a careful analysis should be made of the basic political conditions for armaments co-operation. Harmonisation of national and sectoral interests within a common political framework can considerably facilitate co-operation in individual armaments fields. The ministers decided to provide the impetus required for improved co-operation in the alliance in this field.

Lastly, the ministers considered the mandates issued in Rome with the aim of adapting WEU to its new responsibilities. They decided that the Agency for the Control of Armaments and the Standing Armaments Committee should be reorganised. The Assembly has received the report approved by the Council of WEU.

Three new structures have been created under the collective title of "Agencies for Security Questions": the agency for the study of arms

control and disarmament questions, the agency for the study of security and defence questions and the agency for the development of co-operation in the field of armaments.

These agencies will assist the ministers in meeting their future responsibilities by preparing studies and analyses. The reorganisation is to be put in hand immediately so that the agencies may be fully operational at an early date.

Finally, the ministers elected Mr. Alfred Cahen from Belgium as the new Secretary-General. He will shortly be taking over from the present Secretary-General, Mr. Edouard Longestaey. With his many years of experience, Mr. Cahen has all the qualifications necessary for his political rôle in the new WEU.

At this point, I should like, in the presence of the Assembly, to express my thanks to the retiring Secretary-General. Mr. Longestaey has performed his highly responsible duties with discretion, commitment and skill. On behalf of my colleagues on the Council, I extend to him our sincere thanks for his work in the cause of Europe and our best wishes for the future.

To his successor, Mr. Alfred Cahen, we wish every success in his efforts on behalf of our organisation.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the annual report of the Council for 1984 which you have before you reflects the focal points of Council activities. In the forefront are questions of security and defence, disarmament and arms control, and co-operation in the field of armaments. The report also contains an impressive section on relations between the Council and the Assembly, which highlights the great improvement of late in the co-operation and dialogue between the two. This, for example, is the fourth opportunity I have had in my term as Chairman-in-Office of the Council to address the honourable members of this chamber. Since the meeting of the Council in Rome last October, a number of proposals for further improvements in the contacts between Council and Assembly have been put into effect. The Council agreed on a better and quicker procedure for answering written recommendations and questions from the Assembly. Informal contacts with the Assembly have been reinforced by a series of informal meetings with the Bureau of the Assembly under the chairmanship of Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, an innovation that has proved its worth.

The Assembly itself has set up a special committee for relations with the Council, thereby making a major contribution of its own to the intensification of the necessary contacts with that institution.

Mr. Genscher (continued)

The Federal Government takes the view that this fruitful dialogue should be conducted not only in the meetings of the WEU Assembly but also in the national parliaments of the seven member states. Accordingly, I made a policy statement in the German Bundestag on 8th November 1984 on the extraordinary meeting of Western European Union in Rome. In addition, twice each year the Federal Government produces a report for the Bundestag on the activities of WEU and its organs and keeps the Bundestag Committee on Foreign Affairs continuously informed.

The wide range of forms of dialogue that have now been developed between the Council and the Assembly underline the responsibility of the two bodies for co-operation amongst the seven in security policy. A major duty falling upon the Assembly concerns the democratic legitimisation of our endeavours. The Assembly represents democracy in practice at international level on matters of security policy.

At this point I should like to express to President Caro and also to every one of you present my gratitude and thanks for your co-operation over the past year. During all the phases of the reactivation of WEU, the Assembly has provided an effective impetus. It has played a decisive part in our success. I also congratulate Mr. Caro on his re-election as President of the WEU Assembly. On behalf of the Council, I wish him continued success in his high office.

Ladies and Gentlemen, within just over a year we have succeeded in giving WEU a new look, but we are only at the beginning of the road. We shall be successful in the long term only if we, the Council and the Assembly together, continue resolutely with our efforts.

The following points seem to me to be particularly important.

First, the Council must face up courageously to all the security problems of our time, as it did successfully in Bonn. In future, we must do more than simply co-ordinate our stances on security policy issues; we must work out common European positions.

Second, the Permanent Council in London must adapt to the new rôle devolving upon it. It is responsible for preparing Council meetings, it is a channel for feed-back to the national capitals and it carries out the practical work that has to be done between ministerial meetings.

Third, the Council needs the assistance of the new agencies for security questions. The seven member states must therefore put the agreed reorganisation of the agencies in Paris into effect

as soon as possible. For these agencies we need qualified experts who can produce the required studies and data on specific security matters speedily and accurately.

Fourth, the Council needs a strong Secretariat-General. We await early proposals from the new Secretary-General on how, in present circumstances, the necessary streamlining can be brought about and efficiency increased.

Fifth, in future the Permanent Council will not always be in a position to conduct the complex discussions on its own, i.e. without experts from the national administrations. It will need the expertise available in the capitals. We do not need any new bodies for this purpose; instead, the Council should call in experts from the capitals on a case-by-case basis.

Sixth, the formal and informal contacts between Council and Assembly have already been significantly improved, but are still insufficient. The Assembly rightly makes this observation in the report it has submitted on new prospects for WEU. The adaptation of the organs of WEU to their new responsibilities and the establishment by the Assembly of a committee for relations with the Council have laid the basis for a fruitful dialogue. In the future, Council and Assembly should continue to take advantage of every opportunity for constructive co-operation. WEU will work successfully in future only if Council and Assembly act in close co-operation.

Last, in the long term we must address the question of whether we could not improve WEU's efficiency by locating the various bodies in one capital. This is a difficult and delicate question, for which there is no ready-made answer. But in an active WEU it cannot, to my mind, be made taboo. We should tackle it at the appropriate time.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, WEU has long been working out of the limelight and yet, in terms of its importance to Europe and to our contractual commitment to the Atlantic Alliance, it has been carrying out an important task. By reactivating Western European Union last year we adapted the organisation to the new political developments.

After the Bonn meeting and the results achieved there I observe that the reactivation of WEU is paying off. The "new" WEU has passed its first test. Fourteen European Foreign and Defence Ministers discussed the issues affecting our security and co-ordinated their positions in a spirit of mutual confidence. This means that we have taken a step forward in the process of European unification. We have made a qualitative contribution to co-operation within the Atlantic Alliance. The success we

Mr. Genscher (continued)

have achieved, Mr. President, sets obligations for our future work.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, with your permission I shall add a personal comment. Regardless of the fact that the German presidency of the Council is coming to an end, I would like you to know that my wish is to go further along the path that I have trodden as Chairman-in-Office of the Council and that I shall apply my best endeavours to ensure that our Western European Union achieves the goals it has set itself and that we do this together – you, the Assembly, and we, the Council. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Minister. Your very full statement has undoubtedly aroused the interest of all the members of this Assembly and the dynamism that you continue to display is an example to us all.

Since you have kindly offered to answer questions, I call Mrs. den Ouden-Dekkers.

Mrs. den OUDEN-DEKKERS (*Netherlands*). – My question concerns European co-operation. Will European union and European security be discussed during the European summit in Milan at the end of June? If so, what rôle will WEU play in those developments? In discussing European co-operation, especially in technological and military facets of the American strategic defence initiative, it must be quite clear within which European framework that co-operation will take place.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. GENSCHER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – Mrs. den Ouden-Dekkers, the documents on which the negotiations in Milan will be based include a special section on the question of defence and security. In other words, this will be an important issue, although I would not venture to say at this point whether we shall succeed in reaching agreement there. We have been disappointed before, when we have tried to include security policy in European political co-operation. I do not want to sound pessimistic by mentioning disappointing instances, but I have to point out that there has been resistance in the past to the inclusion of security policy.

I am quite sure that regardless of the progress we make in Milan, WEU will retain its rôle and I think that discussion of security matters within the European Communities as well should provide the occasion for acting as pace-setters, leading the way more dynamically than before. As we know, in the EEC there is also a

country that does not belong to the alliance and if only for that reason, progress there cannot be as great as what we hope to achieve here. But there is no doubt that the relationship between co-operation on security policy in the European Communities and the work of WEU will also be discussed in Milan.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. van Tets.

Mr. van TETS (*Netherlands*). – Should not the Rome Declaration on the relaunching of WEU affect the integration of the work of this Assembly and the work of the agencies operating under the aegis of the Council of Ministers? Is it not unsatisfactory that this Assembly discusses the budget of the total organisation only after the event, whereas it is one of the fundamental prerogatives of a parliamentary assembly to discuss an organisation's budget, as it is well known that in the national parliaments such items are submerged entirely in wider issues? Should not the streamlining of the organisation also provide for a closer link between the work of the Council and the work of the Assembly through a Secretary-General, as is the case with the Council of Europe?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. GENSCHER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – It is easiest to answer your second question, Mr. van Tets. Of course, co-operation can and should always be improved.

As regards your first question, the order of debate corresponds to that in force in other international organisations. I can appreciate that you find this unsatisfactory, but on the other hand, I believe the procedure adopted is more likely to overcome resistance and reservations in the governments concerned. It is not only here that we should be confronting governments with our expectations, however; we must remember that at home, in our own parliaments, there are opportunities for influencing the conduct of governments. What I am now saying is a kind of invitation, and in issuing it I have to accept the risk that it may happen, not only in six other parliaments, but in the German Bundestag as well!

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Spies von Büllesheim.

Mr. SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. Chairman-in-Office, my questions have been submitted to you in writing. I will therefore reduce them to the bare essentials.

Mr. Spies von Büllenheim (continued)

My first question asks what the Council of Ministers would think of the proposal that the Secretary-General of WEU should be responsible not only for the secretariat as such but also for this Assembly, in roughly the same way as the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe.

My second question asks about the possibilities you see of increasing the attendance rate of members of the governments of member states at this Assembly and whether you yourself, having spoken here so often as Chairman-in-Office, are consequently more interested and will be prepared to appear here from time to time even when you are no longer Chairman.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. GENSCHER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – If the Assembly expresses a desire to see the responsibilities and duties of the Secretary-General extended in the way you have suggested, I shall do my best to ensure that this proposal is accepted by my fellow ministers.

As regards my presence here in the future, I can promise you that I shall be here more often than I was before I became Chairman-in-Office.

As regards the presence of my fellow ministers, I should like to give you a piece of advice you can read in the prelude to Goethe's Faust. The manager of the theatre tells the actors – I am not comparing you to actors; this is just a symbolic comparison – “Make sure that a great deal happens!” That is my advice to you too. Then the ministers will come.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – Although we are to limit our time to questions, it would be ungenerous if someone from another delegation were not to pay tribute to the quite exceptional rôle that you, Mr. Genscher, have played in what we like to call the revitalisation of WEU. Whatever the ultimate outcome, we should at least be able to say that if it does fail, it will not be due to any lack of enthusiasm or effort by you. I am sure that we shall all remember that.

The question that I want to ask is the one I asked in Bonn. There is an increasing tendency, which I welcome, to refer to WEU not as WEU but as the European pillar of defence. We all accept that the European pillar of defence, compared with the American colossus, will be an uneven pillar for a very long time to come. But it can never be a pillar if it is exclusive in the sense that it contains only seven of

the European members of NATO, as it does at the moment.

In Bonn you were able to give a positive answer to the effect that the Council of Ministers understands this fact and that at the appropriate moment you will adopt a positive attitude with your colleagues towards the expansion of the European pillar by including a number of other potential members who would make it into a real pillar instead of a small element of only seven countries. I should like you to repeat here, as forcefully as you did in Bonn, what you said there.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. GENSCHER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – I fail to see why a pillar comprising 260 to 280 million Europeans in the western alliance should not be just as strong as a pillar consisting of about the same number of North Americans. It is more a matter of our will, our determination, our capacity for united action. I feel Western European Union has a special duty to ensure that the European partners in the alliance increase their efforts in this respect. This is a responsibility which extends beyond the territory of the seven member states and which we bear on behalf of the alliance as a whole and its European members in particular. We must always keep this responsibility in mind in the organs of Western European Union. It is a duty we must not shirk.

Another reason why we must not shirk this duty is that we want to see the relationship of trust between the European and North American partners in the alliance strengthened rather than weakened. The European sense of inequality, lack of influence and unfair discrimination is, of course, a feeling of inferiority which derives from our own, European attitudes, not from American attitudes. In all these matters we really should not be pointing the finger at the Americans but at ourselves. Let us get organised. Let us make up our minds. Let us combine our efforts better. We shall then be taken as seriously as we should be. In essence, everyone decides for himself how seriously he is taken. So let us set about giving the Americans cause to take Europe as seriously as the size of its population merits.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mrs. Kelly.

Mrs. KELLY (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I have two questions. The first concerns the SDI, which we have not managed to discuss here. Mr. Genscher, you said a few days ago that the SDI project was not entirely compatible with the policy of détente. In the

Mrs. Kelly (continued)

meantime the Institute for Strategic Studies in London has described the SDI plans of the Reagan administration as largely undesirable and destabilising. How do you assess the danger of a nuclear first strike when one side has a defence capability that the other side does not have?

My second question is this: I have the feeling that Europeanisation of security policy is in fact an old policy in European dress: arms race, arms build-up, arms control, armament co-operation. I wonder how it looks in the Council of Ministers, if WEU's Agency for the Control of Armaments has so far failed to carry out the prescribed checks on British and French nuclear weapons. As you know, British and French nuclear weapons have multiplied since October 1954. But I believe it was completely in violation of the treaty that not one vote was taken on this in the WEU Council. It worries me that we are talking about the reactivation of WEU, when WEU has so far not even carried out its original tasks.

I also consider it ridiculous that there were fifty-two people in the former Agency for the Control of Armaments, of whom only fifteen were concerned with the overall task of verification, despite the fact that 2.5 million soldiers, the arms industries of seven countries and the budgets of seven member states were supposed to be verified. How could this be done with fifteen people?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. GENSCHER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – Our common goal of making the work more effective refers, of course, to this institution, Western European Union. I believe we shall make progress here with our efforts to achieve greater effectiveness.

The words you attributed to me in your first question are not correct. I must set the record straight. In the statement to which you referred I expressed an opinion on the compatibility of the policy of détente with an arms race in space, not with the SDI programme. I recalled in this context that in their declaration of 8th January 1985 the United States and the Soviet Union not only agreed to begin negotiations, to fix a date and to announce the subjects to be covered by the negotiations, but also agreed on the objectives of these negotiations. One of these objectives is the prevention of an arms race in space – and if you prevent something, then it does not take place – and an end to the arms race on earth.

Then it was agreed that strategic stability should be consolidated. In other words, the two sides undertook in the statement of 8th January 1985 – as I said in my speech just now – to see to it that results achieved in the defensive weapons sector are followed by co-operative solutions. This in fact means renouncing any aspirations to superiority, because such aspirations, linked with offensive and defensive weapons, would indeed have a destabilising effect.

Against the background of your question and your reference to the statement of 8th January, I think you can well appreciate that this statement is an important political document, as I have just said in my speech, because it contains an agreement between the two superpowers, an undertaking by them to achieve certain objectives during their negotiations. This has never happened before the beginning of negotiations on disarmament, where the usual formula has been: we intend to meet at such and such a time at such and such a place to discuss such and such. This time qualitative targets have been set.

I believe we all have reason to welcome the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed that they want to consolidate strategic stability, and at a lower level, and that they want to prevent an arms race in space and to end the arms race on earth. This is a goal which we Europeans can but endorse and which seeks to avoid precisely the dangers that you have indicated: destabilisation through superiority.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Lagorce.

Mr. LAGORCE (*France*) (Translation). – Can the Chairman of the Council of Ministers say how paragraph 10 of the communiqué issued at the close of the ministerial meeting held on 22nd and 23rd April in Bonn is to be interpreted? Does the expression “take the necessary measures within the European Communities to... achieve the creation of a technological community” reflect any reticence with regard to the French proposal that an ad hoc agency be set up to co-ordinate advanced research programmes?

Does the German Government share the French conviction that the research to be carried out is too specific to be undertaken by the regular Community structures?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. GENSCHER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – Paragraph 10 of the Bonn declaration contains a term that we did not invent in Bonn, neither us Germans nor the seven governments repre-

Mr. Genscher (continued)

sented at the Bonn meeting. Paragraph 10 refers to the final report of what was known as the Dooge committee, which was set up by the heads of state or government to prepare the Milan summit meeting. Paragraph 10 talks about the need to create a European technological community. There are in fact quite a number of essential decisions that can only be taken in the European Community.

I will give you an example. We have a common market – or at least we think we have – but this common market is split by differing standards. For instance, the safety requirements relating to wall sockets in the Federal Republic and the United Kingdom differ. I am not sure whether one can say that the requirements are more stringent in the Federal Republic or in Britain, but they are certainly different, and this difference ensures that manufacturers in both countries keep the domestic market to themselves. Reason tells us this is not reasonable. We can just about get by with different sockets in Europe, but for any technological products more sophisticated than sockets the whole strength of the European market must be applied, in the same way as the Americans apply the whole strength of the American market. In other words, we must remove the non-tariff barriers that result from the differences in standards. This is an important point.

Another important point is that we should Europeanise the procurement practices of the national governments. I say “Europeanise” out of respect for certain political families represented here. I would normally say “liberalise”, but that causes some people problems!

As a rule, key technological advances are in fact paid for by governments, or institutions directly dependent on governments. In the Federal Republic, for example, one of the largest customers is the Federal post office. The situation is similar in other countries. As long as each of these institutions gives preference to national products, regardless of quality and price, the strength of the European market remains ineffectual. A further step therefore needs to be taken to Europeanise procurement practices.

We must remove the legal barriers to the formation of transfrontier European companies. We must remove the barriers caused by the failure to recognise diplomas and certificates, so that the staffs of research institutions become more flexible. We must remove the barriers that continue to deny foreigners access to chairs at various universities, so that we have a wider exchange: we should stop trying to assemble the best people in any given field at one university in our own country and instead assemble the

best Europeans at one university. What I am saying is that there is a very great deal to be done, and it can only be done in the European Community.

Now we have the French suggestion that the countries which are willing to commit themselves to specific, practical projects should join forces in Eureka. I hope this will go through without the veto, on the principle of “he who pays the piper calls the tune”. In another words, the say each participant has in a project is determined by his contribution. I have just talked to the French Foreign Minister about this, and I must say that I came to you in a very good mood because my meeting with him was very reassuring.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Pignion.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. Minister, the question I wanted to ask has already been answered but I would also like to take the opportunity, by still raising it myself, of explaining my reasons and also, of course, expressing our pleasure in having you amongst us.

It is a question of the future of WEU and the reason for the question, Mr. Minister, is that you – and Mr. Colombo – have put your name to a draft European instrument providing for joint action in the field of security policy. The first reason I put the question is that, in June 1983, the Ten adopted a declaration on European union stressing the need for co-ordination of member states’ positions on the political and economic aspects of security. My second reason – and you have already replied – is that when the European Council in Fontainebleau set up the Dooge committee, it gave the Council an opportunity to study the report to be put before you at the European Council meeting in Milan. This Dooge report has a whole chapter concerning the powers of the European Community with regard to security and defence. My final reason is that the committee of which I have the honour to be Chairman has begun to establish relations with the Community via the sub-committee of the European Parliament’s Political Committee. I have taken the liberty of explaining these reasons, Mr. Minister, although you have already replied in part, in order – because I know you have a wealth of ideas – to ask you what you think is the long-term future of WEU.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. GENSCHER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – As I have said in my statement and in an answer to a previous question I am convinced that Western

Mr. Genscher (continued)

European Union is gaining in importance in precisely this phase of international developments. It is not gaining in importance in some kind of conflict, or in competition with the United States, but by increasing the weight Europe carries. You need only think of the debate on strategy necessitated by technological developments, for example, and it becomes obvious that at present there is no better, no more effective body in which the Europeans can first co-ordinate their views and then introduce them into the alliance. I am thus convinced that Western European Union will become more, not less important in the years to come. But we must all be prepared to act accordingly. In other words, we members of the Council of Ministers and you members of the Assembly must be prepared to take full advantage of Western European Union and the opportunities it has to offer.

The PRESIDENT (Translation).— I call Mr. Blaauw.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*).— Given the way in which Mr. Genscher has answered our questions, I am sure that I speak for everyone, and not only on behalf of the Liberal Group, when I say that it is sad to have him with us as Chairman-in-Office for the last time — or at any rate for a couple of years. Perhaps the future will bring him back to our Assembly in that capacity.

However, I listened with joy to his promise that from now on he would be with us more than in the past, and I recalled that at informal meetings he has said that on many of the questions we debate there should be a minister or secretary of state on our benches who could participate in our discussions. That would permit a true dialogue between the Council of Ministers and this Assembly. I hope that Mr. Genscher will be able to make that a reality.

Just because the Italians have the Chair does not mean that we would no longer wish to have a German Foreign Minister answering our questions, and I hope that in the near future we shall have the participation of a representative from the Council of Ministers, irrespective of nationality, so that we can have a real dialogue. That can only lead to a real revitalisation of WEU, a revitalisation that is demonstrated by these question-and-answer sessions. As Chairman of the Liberal Group, it is with sadness that I say goodbye to one of the most outstanding liberals in Europe, but I hope that he will come back often.

I have some questions for Mr. Genscher as well as praise. The world's press reported differences of view between Chancellor Kohl and

President Mitterrand at the Bonn summit. What action has already been taken to bring those views into line, and to what extent are differences of view on security policy a focal point in the talks between those two honourable gentlemen?

My next question relates to President Mitterrand's initiative at The Hague for a real European satellite survey system. Is it possible that such a system could be part of Eureka?

Unfortunately, I was unable to make this intervention this morning during Mr. van der Sanden's report, but what is the Minister's opinion on real participation in the SDI? Does he think that we could have a European aerospace defence initiative that would bring together all the European technologies?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Minister.

Mr. GENSCHER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). — I will try to answer your exhaustive questions with the necessary brevity and concentration. Your question concerning alleged differences of opinion between Federal Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterrand prompts me to make a general statement. I was glad that you, being neither a German nor a French member, asked about this, because your question expresses something that I have noted with satisfaction in the press and in other statements in various European countries in recent days.

In the past some of our partners often expressed concern about too close a Franco-German relationship. Today we are pleased to observe that for many of our partners this relationship cannot be close enough. I think this is very encouraging, because we have always taken the view that the Franco-German relationship, Franco-German cohesion, is the very core of European unification. By definition, therefore, it cannot be directed against the other partners, and in fact the more closely the Germans and French work together for Europe, the better it will be for all the European countries. I believe we should all note the awareness of the importance of Franco-German co-operation that is evident from your question and from your comments in the last few days.

The discussions at the world economic summit in Bonn under German chairmanship naturally enabled the host country to bring all the participants together wherever possible. This may sometimes have given the impression that full agreement was not reached in one case or another. But I can tell you that the Federal Republic of Germany and France act in the knowledge that they have security interests in common. President Mitterrand made this

Mr. Genscher (continued)

abundantly clear when he came to the Federal Republic in January 1983 and, in a speech to the German Bundestag, welcomed the Federal Government's security policy and our resolve to implement the twofold decision. He was not rushing to the aid of a given political movement in the Federal Republic. He did what he did because he wanted to make it clear that France, which is not a party to the twofold NATO decision, nonetheless considers it necessary for the decision to be implemented because our security interests are identical. Awareness of the identity of security interests must also apply today when we discuss other aspects of strategic stability and security.

The Franco-German treaty contains a passage that provides for consultations between the Foreign and Defence Ministers on security. It was not implemented for many years. In the summer of 1982 we then agreed that we should resume these consultations on security, and they began later that year. I mention the time because it shows that the political forces in power in the Federal Republic agree on this. They do not agree on all security questions, but we do agree that co-operation with France in the area of security policy is important.

You may be sure that my presence here and the meeting between the Federal Chancellor and the French President next week will contribute to the definition of an agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and France, in the now crucial preparations for the meeting of the Council of Europe, in the preparations for the conference of NATO Foreign Ministers and in the present debate in the alliance. There is thus no cause for concern here.

As for the question about a military, non-commercial observation satellite, what is being discussed at the moment is whether the Federal Republic is interested and can participate. I shall be joining in these discussions during my stay here. We have not yet concluded our deliberations. Without doubt a satellite of this kind, whether it was Franco-German or the outcome of a project in which other Europeans also participated, would be an interesting high-tech project, and it would also demonstrate that we are interested in a common stock of knowledge relating specifically to Europe.

The reference to a military observation satellite also provides the answer to another question that is being discussed rather superficially at the moment. In some debates the question is asked: are you for or against the military use of space? I must say in reply: space is already being used for military purposes, because the military observation satellites already in space naturally constitute a military use of space. But

this military use of space is desirable and represents a contribution to strategic stability, because greater transparency, more knowledge about the other side is always a contribution to strategic stability. It is not the observation satellites but the killer satellites that have a destabilising effect and are likely to prevent observation satellites from doing their beneficial work. They must go. There cannot be enough transparency. Anything that prevents transparency must be prevented. A European observation satellite would therefore be a European contribution to strategic stability. No one can yet say whether it will come about, but I have tried to describe the background against which the approval or rejection of a European satellite of this kind will have to be considered.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – In his answer to an earlier question, Mr. Genscher spoke about he who pays the piper calling the tune and said that it was a German proverb. It is, I think, a universal proverb. The piper – namely, the Council of WEU – has called the tune and said that WEU and its Assembly are to do more.

May I remind Mr. Genscher of the tale of the pied piper of Hamelin? When he was not paid, the children were taken away and disappeared. Can Mr. Genscher perhaps tell us how he expects these children to do the job that the Council is asking us to do with no increase in funds? If the Chairman-in-Office of the Council said to his colleagues: "Gentlemen, we have asked the Assembly to do a proper job of work at last and in order to do this I suggest that we give them an increase of 5% in real terms in their budget", does he really think that the Chairman-in-Office could not get that through? Is he not enough of a President to take a "liberal" view?

If one tries to raise this matter in one's own parliament, the opportunities are limited and governments will frequently veto it, whereas if the Council of Ministers were to say that it shall be done Mr. Genscher knows that the Foreign Minister of each country would say to the Chancellor: "This is what is asked for. Please provide it". Mr. Genscher is a realist. Could he not be realistic with us?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. GENSCHER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – We are all subject to restrictions, even at home, and we know that it is very difficult to obtain approval for additional funds. The Council has also tried to use resources more effectively by restructuring its various institutions. We would be grateful if

Mr. Genscher (continued)

in this case the members of the Assembly tried to find support in their national parliaments for an increase in the Assembly's resources. That will make it easier for action to be taken. Moreover, I have so much confidence in the Assembly that I am sure the children of Hamelin will not suffer as a result. Nor is money everything. As I have said before, increasing the revenue of the church will not increase the piety of the community. It is the same with the Assembly. I am well aware that the budget is very tight. My advice is not only to discuss this question here but to make use of the national parliaments and so launch a pincer attack, as it were.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Lord Reay.

Lord REAY (*United Kingdom*). - In paragraph 8 of the Bonn communiqué the ministers reaffirmed their determination to continue, in the words of the paragraph, contributing towards progress in the negotiations on a comprehensive and verifiable ban on chemical weapons in the conference at Geneva.

Does the Chairman-in-Office really believe that there is the slightest chance of an agreed ban when, on the one hand, the Soviet Union has a very full chemical weapon capability ready for use in the field and, on the other hand, NATO to all intents and purposes has nothing whatever in place?

Does not the Chairman-in-Office think that the real interest in the Soviet Union lies in drawing out the negotiations, which it has done very successfully for fifteen years, and giving the illusion of progress in order that NATO will delay the deployment of a suitable chemical retaliatory capacity of its own?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the Minister.

Mr. GENSCHER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). - There is no denying the considerable interest in outlawing chemical weapons. The current negotiations in the disarmament committee in Geneva have not yet produced a result because the Soviet Union is not yet sufficiently prepared to accept verification measures.

This raises one of the main problems encountered in all disarmament negotiations, because in the final analysis all disarmament negotiations are hampered by distrust. Distrust can be overcome only by confidence-building, or in this case verification. In other words, the sooner the Soviet Union is prepared to agree to verification, the better, although one point must be made

absolutely clear: chemical weapons can and must be outlawed worldwide, because the more regional restrictions to which the ban is subject, the greater the problems connected with verification. It is easier to find out whether or not someone has chemical weapons than to find out whether he has them for one area and not for another. Nor would I know how to explain to the third world countries that we in Europe feel we do not want any chemical weapons here, but we are going to leave the other nations of the world exposed, as they are now, to the threat of such weapons. That cannot possibly be called a responsible policy.

I therefore intend to stick to our goal of a verifiable ban on chemical weapons throughout the world. The sooner the Soviet Union agrees to a worldwide ban and to verification, the better. I believe what we have here is a very clear and unmistakable, basic western proposal which now awaits the other side's acceptance.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Ferrari Aggradi.

Mr. FERRARI AGGRADI (*Italy*) (Translation). - Mr. Genscher, you are entitled to the gratitude, appreciation and confidence of all of us and it is precisely in that spirit that I wish to ask you two questions on points I regard as essential and also sensitive.

First and foremost, the strategic defence system: to my mind, this is based on the extremely interesting and important concept that, instead of stockpiling destructive armaments, a system should be set up to prevent their use, destroying them in the sky before they explode and thus rendering them useless. If this really were achieved we would be at the dawn of a new era. But would the European area, Europe, our Community, be covered and guaranteed by such a system? And during the time it takes to bring this system into being - years, I would imagine - will equilibrium be maintained or is there a danger that America, or others, will reduce their commitment to the conventional defence system as a whole?

My second question concerns Europe. I was very pleased, when you were talking about the Council, to hear you repeat: action, action. I must say, frankly, that it sometimes seems to us that there is a lack of action and initiative and that, above all, some effort needs to be made to harmonise the various standpoints. It is true that this effort is particularly incumbent upon us in the Assembly because we certainly have a major responsibility for harmonising the differing viewpoints of groups and countries but we expect this in a special way from the ministers.

Lastly, I would like to have your personal views on attempts to consider individual coun-

Mr. Ferrari Aggradi (continued)

tries in isolation. Do we really want to tackle problems as a community?

With your permission, let me recall one personal memory. President De Gasperi, to whom I one day commented, with reference to an aid programme, that our country had possibly gained from dealing directly with the United States of America, was extremely concerned and said that that was the one way to weaken Europe and, in a particular way, our own country and gave extremely precise and strict instructions to operate always from a multilateral, never bilateral, position.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the Minister.

Mr. GENSCHER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). - In assessing this strategic defence initiative, we must make a distinction between the strategic effects and the technological aspects. During the debate of recent weeks and months I feel that rather too little attention has been paid to the strategic effects and too much emphasis has been placed on the technological possibilities. In the end strategic considerations must be decisive. No one can assess the strategic effects yet, because no one knows what findings the research will produce. No one in the United States, here or elsewhere can assess these effects yet. It is therefore all the more gratifying that the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed in their statement of 8th January to negotiate on this subject straight away and that these negotiations should cover intermediate-range weapons, strategic weapons and the military use of space. This communiqué makes it clear that co-operative solutions are to be sought.

In view of the weapons that have been developed in the past and the technological possibilities that are emerging, security can no longer be guaranteed by eye contact, as it were: co-operative solutions are needed. It is crucial to recognise this. Consequently, it will also be important for the negotiations in Geneva not to follow the old pattern of one side saying, we have so-and-so many systems, you have so-and-so many systems, and together we are going to have so-and-so many. What will be needed is a debate on security philosophies, because "co-operative solutions" implies that both sides work on the basis of the same fundamental ideas, the same philosophies. This only goes to show how complex these negotiations are.

Of course, in view of the problems connected with the use of space, there cannot be a separate German, a separate Luxembourg, a separate Italian or even a separate French answer: what

we have here, in contrast to most other sectors, is an identity of security interests. The Europeans would therefore do well to try to define these interests and put them into effect together.

The same is, of course, true of technological co-operation: no one can yet say whether or not it will come about. During the talks in Bonn we said we would begin by examining the possibilities at national level. When we have drawn our conclusions, we shall exchange views and try to arrive at a co-ordinated response. No one can foresee now what the results will be. They depend, among other things, on the transfer of technology. The Federal Chancellor has drawn up a number of conditions. It will depend on the level of participation. Various forms are conceivable. I therefore feel that many of the statements made in various countries in recent months have perhaps failed to take full account of the complexity of the issue. This is as true of a categorical "no" as it is of a categorical "yes". All that has to be done here is first to consider and then to decide. That has nothing to do with weakness or an aversion to taking decisions. It is a reflection of a responsible attitude towards preparing for very important decisions both for the security and for the technological future of our alliance and Europe.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Gianotti.

Mr. GIANOTTI (*Italy*) (Translation). - You will not be surprised, Mr. Minister, at our insistence on the subject of "space defence" because attached to it is concern about the division of Europe. There is a French proposal called Eureka. Yesterday we heard Lady Young, the British Minister of State, say that her government was on the point of entering into collaboration with the United States on the strategic defence initiative.

You have just uttered fiercely critical words, which I share, about the killer satellites.

My question is this: when do you think we are going to find a way out of this European Tower of Babel in the direction of technological co-operation or of peace?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call the Minister.

Mr. GENSCHER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). - Your question touches a number of different levels. First, we would have to discuss Europe as a technological community and also the French Eureka project, even if there were no such thing as the SDI. Basically, this has nothing at all to do with the SDI, because, with or without SDI, it is vital for us to be technologically competitive with the United States and Japan in every sec-

Mr. Genscher (continued)

tor. The SDI has probably simply increased awareness of the need for European co-operation, but it is not the reason for that need. If Europe is to be fully effective, no one should single himself out, nor should we single anyone out: we should concentrate on finding European solutions. This applies to technological co-operation and to our response to the American invitation to participate in their research project, though what "participation" means in this context has not been clarified, either by the Europeans or by the Americans. The American Government is still discussing this question itself. Orders may be placed with European companies. That will happen whether governments like it nor not. My country's constitution and our understanding of a free market economy leave no room – nor would we have it otherwise – for a German company to be prevented from participating in any project elsewhere.

The same is true of the siphoning-off of research capacities. However, it is interesting to find out here what is being said about the technological community and what the French President has in mind with the Eureka project. One thing surely cannot be in our interests, and that is that the best brains in Europe should believe that key research is now confined to the United States and no longer carried out in Europe. If we allow a situation in which the best brains have to leave Europe and go to America to achieve the best results, Europe will become a technological backwater. We must therefore show our best brains that it is worth staying here because Europe is itself researching key technologies. All this has absolutely nothing to do with the SDI. It concerns key technologies per se. That, then, is an important question.

And since you also mentioned measures to safeguard peace, there is a third aspect to be considered: co-operation between East and West. According to some theories, the West should starve the East out, technologically speaking. All I can say is that the West would be making a serious mistake if it adopted that approach. The new technological advances represent major challenges for our western systems. The new technologies, progress towards the information society, mean decentralisation of work processes, the separation of working time and the task to be performed, the separation of the performance of the work and the central location. This will fundamentally change our society, resulting in greater individuality, greater independence for the individual. We are still going through a period of social development, in which the workers are faced with a discrepancy. On the one hand, they have a wide range of choice in

the disposal of their leisure, of which they now have more than ever before; on the other, they have less say in the work process. A great deal of frustration stems from the resultant tension. The new technologies will eliminate this tension, because the decentralisation of work will also give the worker a greater say. In other words, there are incredible, dynamic advances in terms of freedom, to which neither employers nor trade unions nor politicians have yet adjusted.

Dramatic as this may sound for our societies, just think how dramatic the challenge is for a bureaucratic system like the one in the Soviet Union! We have a duty to offer the Soviet Union co-operation as an alternative to the arms race. It is then for the Soviet Union to decide if it wants to exclude itself from new technological developments or to accept the highly dynamic challenge they represent on behalf of its own society. We must not be the ones to install the barriers; we must be the ones who make this dynamic change possible. Whether the challenge is accepted will be decided in Moscow, not in Paris or Bonn, but to refuse it would be a political and strategic mistake.

I must say that I am very pleased to have learned in the last few days that despite murmurs of protest from an American ministry – you can guess which one – the American President has sent his Secretary of Commerce, Mr. Baldrige, to Moscow to improve economic co-operation with the Soviet Union. That is precisely what we Europeans have been suggesting, as I have said here.

So let us use every means at our disposal to improve East-West relations. Many discussions on East-West relations leave me with the impression that some western politicians act like a sportsman who is a world-class high-jumper, a world-class long-jumper and a world-class sprinter, but instead of competing in those disciplines he enters himself for fencing, in which his competitors are as good as he is. Let us make use of everything we have, our better cause, freedom, our better economic order, our more highly developed technologies – all these are part of the competition between the systems and we can make a good showing here. I am confident about the world of tomorrow. We here in western society have no reason to be faint-hearted.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – It was planned to suspend the sitting at 4.45 p.m. In any case, we want to have a few minutes to meet Mr. Genscher informally before he leaves the Assembly.

I would therefore ask everyone to be as brief as possible.

The President (continued)

I shall call Mr. Milani, Sir Dudley Smith, Mr. Enders, Mr. de Vries, Mr. Hill, Mr. Scheer and Mr. Hardy, in that order.

I call Mr. Milani.

Mr. MILANI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. Genscher, I will try to comply with the President's request and the limits he has laid down. That said, the reply you gave to Mr. Gianotti has to a large extent satisfied me, in other words I think, like you do, that the SDI affair is, so to speak, an invitation to Europe to enter the realm of wonderland. The situation of Europe was not particularly brilliant because every time it met it debated how much sugar you could put in wine: problems of any importance were not talked about.

I do not want to go back to the SDI but to raise an entirely political question. We had the opportunity for a debate in this Assembly and then, for reasons of political short-sightedness or to some extent political will, the debate was not held. I do not ask you, as someone yesterday asked Lady Young, to give your opinion as to whether such a debate would have been right or wrong because you would say that is our business and that we, as the Assembly, should have done what we intended to do. Instead I will ask you whether, before reaching a conclusion or defining a European position on questions concerning the SDI as a whole – questions of military strategy, technology and so on – the Council of Ministers does not think it would be wise to ask for some sort of meeting with the Assembly, over and above the dates that the Assembly may schedule for itself in this matter, and thus help to reactivate the Assembly.

This is intended not as an invitation to interfere in the work of the Assembly but as a request for the adoption of a political position on the advisability of a debate on this question at the request of the Council of Ministers.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. GENSCHER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – The Assembly decides for itself what subjects it debates. On behalf of the Council of Ministers I can say that we want a dialogue with the Assembly on any subject it wishes to discuss and that we shall take seriously what it has to say.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Dudley Smith.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – I wish to ask two short questions which are both different but nonetheless important. Will Mr.

Genscher ask his officials to mark up for him the report of the debate that we had on Monday afternoon initiated by Mr. Ferrari Aggradi on the Assembly's difficult budget position? Will he note the strong feelings that there are across the spectrum of countries and political parties about that? As Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, may I ask him to confirm what he hinted to some of us in Bonn a few weeks ago – that with the reorganisation of the various WEU agencies, the Assembly might be helped?

Secondly, will he say something about the Council's attitude towards the future membership of WEU, in particular that of Portugal?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. GENSCHER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – As regards the second question, although we have discussed the Portuguese application, we have not yet reached a final decision. You know from previous meetings of this kind that I myself am favourably disposed to this application.

I can answer your first question with an unconditional "Yes".

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Manfred Schmidt.

I see that Mr. Schmidt has left the chamber. I have been told that he was displeased at not hearing his name on the list I read out a moment ago although it does, in fact, include his name. I wanted to explain that it was simply an omission but to no avail because he refuses to return to the chamber.

The President so notes.

I call Mr. Enders.

Mr. ENDERS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – May I ask the Minister briefly to state his view on a problem that lies in the military sphere and recently attracted a great deal of attention in the Federal Republic. I am referring to the electronic recognition system for military flying objects. The Federal Defence Minister was accused of having been much too ready to yield to political, military and economic interests in the United States instead of speaking up for the system developed in the Federal Republic, which the experts say is better than the American system. Is Mr. Genscher not afraid that European interests have been neglected as well as the Federal Republic's, and how does he view this in relation to his position on the new technologies as outlined in his speech?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. GENSCHER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – I do not think the criticism of the Federal Defence Minister was justified. It was not that the Federal Defence Minister was too submissive, but that Europe was not sufficiently united in this matter. If all the Europeans had opted for what I am convinced is the better, German system we should have carried more weight in the negotiations with the Americans. I therefore believe we can learn from this project how important co-ordination is. If it had been a joint project, the Europeans would have been more united. That is the first lesson to be learnt.

The second lesson is this: if we take a look at past experience of armament co-operation with the United States it becomes obvious straight away why the Federal Government has enunciated very clear-cut conditions with respect to the SDI, which must be satisfied in order to meet the requirements of equal rights and the two-way street.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Hill.

Mr. HILL (*United Kingdom*). – I have listened most carefully to Mr. Genschler's answers, in particular, when he said that Europe had the best research brains. That is true. If we do not participate with America in the SDI programme, those "best brains" will rapidly take up contracts in the United States. We must be clear about what we say. Senior and junior politicians cannot at this stage begin to make platitudinous press releases. This is a most serious situation. We have a once and for all chance to co-operate with the United States. The document this morning on the military use of computers was clear. The United States of America is streets ahead with its mainframe computers. There is no way in which Eureka, or anyone else, can catch the United States' or Japan's mainframe computers. If we tell our voters otherwise, we are being hypocritical.

I am sure that Mr. Genschler will be able to reassure me that WEU has a function. It is foggy at the moment. The budget has been mentioned a couple of times. I am not worried about it, because there is a great deal of dead wood that we could cut out. We have a job to do. We must do it in the 1985 technological era. We cannot do that if we are tied to a 1960 budget. The Eureka project will be a non-starter. We should co-operate more with the United States in high technology. Will Mr. Genschler outline the rôle that WEU will have in pulling that all together and presenting worthwhile reports to the Council of Ministers on which it can take action?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. GENSCHER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – I will ensure that this is done, and I think that the improvement in armament co-operation in and through Western European Union will also act as an incentive to Europeans capable of contributing to new technological developments to stay in Europe.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. de Vries.

Mr. de VRIES (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. Genschler, twice today you have advocated a co-ordinated reply by the Europeans to the invitation to participate in the SDI. You have also said that no one has any idea what is being discussed at the moment, co-operation between companies or something else. What is the specific question at issue to which a co-ordinated answer is being sought? Does it concern expenditure from the budgets of the various countries, or political approval, or a positive statement on technology without further implications? What exactly is going on?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. GENSCHER (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – As you know, the American Secretary of Defence sent a letter to various governments. Of course, we all agreed not to answer before day sixty-one! But irrespective of this deadline, which the Americans themselves regard as having been met, the letter does not say exactly what is meant by participation. It may be an invitation to firms to accept orders, or to individual research workers to participate in research projects without the governments being involved in any way. But it may also mean that the governments should sign agreements establishing a framework for such participation, aimed perhaps at ensuring the transfer of technology. It may also mean governments participating financially, and their financial participation might take the form of contributing resources to the American fund or of financing parts of the SDI that are important to Europe and would be carried out here.

The American Government has not yet made up its mind about this. Information coming out of the Pentagon indicates a preference for participation at the lowest possible level, which means the first of the options I have just mentioned. No one can say if that is the final American position and until we know that, we cannot

Mr. Genscher (continued)

say what we think about it. When we do know, we Europeans can then co-ordinate our views. So the answer to your question is this: what we want to co-ordinate is our response to the American invitation. No statements can be made as to the form of this response until we know what the invitation entails, and not even Washington has decided that yet. As you can imagine, we took advantage of the presence of American Government representatives at the world economic summit in Bonn to discuss the subject with them. It became clear then that the American Government as a whole had not yet made up its mind.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Scheer.

Mr. SCHEER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I do not wish to speak.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I should now call Mr. Hardy but I see that he is not in the chamber.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

Mr. Minister, I have to thank you on behalf of all the members of the Assembly for once again being so ready to come among us.

We are living in somewhat special times but, with you, Mr. Minister, we have always shared such times, marking the road of Western European Union with a number of quite remarkable events.

At the next session, one of your colleagues from another member state – it is the turn of the Italian Government – will be Chairman of the Council. From the outset, you have been an inspiring and imaginative travelling companion and ready, what is more, to take risks, because intergovernmental co-operation is no easy matter particularly in the face of such major problems as national sovereignty, defence and security. On behalf of the Assembly I am very grateful to you.

I invite you to join us for a few moments in the hall of the Assembly where we can thank you once again in a more relaxed and informal fashion than at an official meeting. (*Applause*)

I therefore suspend the sitting until 5.15 p.m.

The sitting is suspended.

(*The sitting was suspended at 4.55 p.m. and resumed at 5.15 p.m.*)

The sitting is resumed.

4. New outlook for WEU – reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council

Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council

(*Resumed joint debate on the reports of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and votes on the draft recommendations and draft order, Docs. 1012 and amendments and 1019 and amendments*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the resumed joint debate on the reports of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on the new outlook for WEU – reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council and the application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council and votes on the draft recommendations and draft order, Documents 1012 and amendments and 1019 and amendments.

We still have to hear eight speakers in the general debate. Then there will be the votes on the amendments and the draft recommendations and order. If we still have time we shall, as I promised Mr. Martino, deal with the motion for a recommendation he has tabled.

I would remind all speakers that speaking time is limited to five minutes.

I call Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – We have had an unusual procedure this afternoon – one which I shall try to introduce into the House of Commons when I get back – because we broke for cocktails at about quarter to five and renewed our proceedings later. I think that would lead to perhaps more conciliatory attitudes in our parliament than have been portrayed here earlier today.

Within those constraints, I would have withdrawn my wish to speak because I am tired of my own voice, let alone how anybody else may feel. Nevertheless, I feel that in two respects I have to put what I regard as a reasonable point of view from the government of the country that my colleagues and I represent.

I think that I can speak as the leader of the British Delegation rather than as representing a particular party. I think that I have all-party agreement to say that we wish Mr. Genscher had been more forthcoming about the future admission of countries not currently members of WEU but European members of the Atlantic Alliance, including Portugal, which has applied for membership. Today we should put on record that there is a genuine majority within this Assembly who, irrespective of party, think that it would be wrong to have an American pillar of defence, a European pillar of defence limited for

Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)

ever to seven countries, and some strange extraneous body composed of countries that we had refused to accept in our midst but that were members of the European section of the Atlantic Alliance.

I know that I speak with the concurrence of Mr. Michel when I say that when we went to Lisbon, under his chairmanship of the General Affairs Committee, it was astonishing that right across the political spectrum, from right to left, we found a desire by all shades of Portuguese public opinion to become associated with and ultimately members of this Assembly. No contrary voice was raised. That example is bound to be followed by others.

There is one danger that we must avoid. The danger is that we shall have not two pillars of the Atlantic Alliance but one and two halves – the one being American and the halves being those members within WEU and those European members not members of WEU. That would be divisive for the future, and it should be avoided.

Although in his final words Mr. Genscher replied to my colleague, Sir Dudley Smith, reasonably constructively, it is our duty to put down questions asking ministers to give their views more fully than hitherto on whether we favour the expansion possibilities envisaged in the Brussels Treaty for other European countries to join WEU. I do not mind what the answer is, but we want an answer one way or the other, or we shall create a deep division within Europe.

I turn briefly to the SDI. I would have withdrawn my name from the list of speakers had it not been for the skilful ability of some of my colleagues to table certain amendments. I do not condemn the efforts of those of my colleagues who feel that we should be failing in our duty if we did not bring some aspect of SDI under critical examination. Therefore, I find it difficult to go against those members who have found a method of bringing some kind of SDI debate into this Assembly.

I wish that it could have been otherwise; if we do not have a proper SDI debate, it will not be the responsibility of most of those who are here today; it will be the responsibility of those who have put forward a report that is unacceptable to the majority of those present today. We cannot accept responsibility for those who put forward controversial reports and expect to get agreement at the eleventh hour. I shall not breach security on this matter. However, the report that was before us was referred back and will come back to us at our next meeting in November-December. It would therefore be improper to comment on it today.

I shall content myself with pointing out only one thing. Whatever we say in this Assembly, in the European Parliament, in our national parliaments, or in the Council of Europe, we cannot pretend that, in a policy supported not just by the administration but in public opinion polls by 80% to 90% of the population, the United States will give up the SDI research programme. We are living in another world of fantasy – I referred to one yesterday and I refer to another today – if we think that by making our protest today Washington will suddenly have a change of mind and say: “Because the Europeans do not like the SDI, we shall give it up.” That will not happen. The American Government are backed by a majority of public opinion and they will go ahead.

I should like to recall a historical perception. In my many researches I have not found any occasion in history when any country, or group of countries, has abandoned a weapon because of negotiations. However, I have found many occasions on which weapons have been abandoned because they have become obsolete. When the countries of the then mediaeval world gave up bows and arrows, it was not because of a meeting between heads of state; it was because someone invented armour, and bows and arrows became singularly ineffective. When, for all practical purposes, in the first world war we abandoned rifles and machine guns, it was not because of meetings of heads of state or negotiations, but because someone invented the tank. When we had the catastrophe of Pearl Harbour, what happened was not that there was a failure to realise the negotiations by which Japan, America and Britain shared the world fleets and agreed that that would be a contribution to peace but that air power took over and big battleships became obsolete.

The Americans are trying to make nuclear weapons obsolete so that we no longer rely upon a policy and a declaration of mutually assured destruction as a method of defence – retaliation and revenge – but find some way to render those terrible weapons obsolete and futile. That is what SDI is about. That is what the Americans think that it is all about. Whether or not we go with them, that is the course that they will pursue.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I expected to speak this morning but the order was changed. My speech would then have taken little more than five minutes. I shall try to keep within five minutes but I hope that I shall enjoy the same latitude as that given to Sir Frederic Bennett.

I congratulate Mr. van der Sanden on his report because it contains justifiably frank

Mr. Hardy (continued)

comment. Forthright words are justified as in paragraph (ii) of the preamble. The Council's relationship with the Assembly has been inadequate. The information provided seems to have been incomplete. In paragraph (iii) Mr. van der Sanden rightly describes the present procedures as inadequate. In the following paragraph, however, he describes the Assembly as making a major contribution to European security. The Assembly may wish to make a major contribution – it may be desirable – but it has not yet been made.

Paragraph (v) returns to a somewhat more realistic view. It refers to the need for the Assembly to be adequately supported. An occasional anodyne contribution from a minister does not suffice. Courtesy does not necessarily mean serious consideration.

I refer also to paragraph (x). The Council and each member state should support American efforts to reach agreement on arms limitation with the Soviet Union. I should have preferred to read not just that we support it, but that member states positively and robustly encourage such an approach. The rest of the paragraph refers to SDI. I cannot endorse that reference as warmly as other members of the Assembly have.

I view the recommendations with considerable anxiety. Most members of the Assembly may hope for a rapid decision and a rapid collective answer but I am not sure that the answer that they wish to hear is universally shared. Collective answers and action may be desirable but they must follow mature consideration.

I noticed in the report that the American Under-Secretary of State urged member states not to take separate decisions on arms control policy because they should be taken by the alliance. That is not an inappropriate request provided that the policy extends across the alliance. It needs to be managed in such a way that we do not see the hasty steam-rolling through of SDI policy. That must be considered. Some amendments have been tabled to which members have referred. It is unfortunate that we shall consider SDI in the context of short-notice amendments rather than in the light of a report to which many members may not have objected and which the Assembly would have had the opportunity to amend.

I wish to say a word about my party's defence policy. It is relevant. It has been subject to serious distortion. It is rather more realistic than many members may suspect. We are enjoined to be realistically concerned with defence. My party's defence policy is realistic.

It is committed to our membership of NATO. It recognises the need for the western alliance and recognises the Warsaw Pact's military capacity. It also recognises the enormous consumption of the world's resources by East and West to provide us with ever more sophisticated defence capacity – a capacity now not to be restricted just to our planet but widened to its stratospheric environment. My party increasingly believes that that capacity and demands for more threaten not merely the peace of the world but the proper political balance. The Labour Party considers that the tendency and demand for ever more sophisticated defence systems will cause genuine peril. If we cannot defend ourselves by conventional means, we may bring forward the day when holocaust descends upon us. It is therefore essential that the western alliance, although wooed by talk of SDI and the rest, does not overlook that our purse is limited and that our highest priority must be to buy time for sense to reign and holocaust to be avoided.

Above all, my party perceives that a nuclear arsenal might be swiftly unleashed because the first-strike doctrine still applies. That is clinging to a commitment which a generation ago would have caused genocide and which today and in the years ahead might provide a greater horror. We should therefore ensure – the Assembly should consider this – that Europe has sufficient defence capacity. We must maintain that conventional capacity to avoid the need for a nuclear response in the event of a conventional defeat.

That is not an unrealistic policy. It is one that should not easily be thrown aside because of the attractions of the computer-game approach. I prefer conflict to be stemmed – horrifying though conventional conflict may be – to moving too easily and too immaturely in a way that was so strongly endorsed by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on Monday.

Political reality suggests that we consider the matter maturely. For that reason, considering SDI through short-notice amendments is scarcely appropriate. The point that I should have made had I been called to ask Mr. Genscher a question was that many parts of the western alliance make increasing demands for ever greater military expenditure – conventional, nuclear, or, as Lord Reay suggested in his question, chemical, on this planet or outside it – and the problem is that that rapacity is bound to increase its voracious consumption as each year passes. Other needs within our society are now increasingly so ill met that the furnishings, fabric, values and quality of many of the societies within the alliance are threatened. We must consider whether we can meet the ever increasing demand for greater defence provision

Mr. Hardy (continued)

when we do not meet the increasing aspirations of the societies that we represent.

In the light of that, we must consider at what point our societies will begin to say that we so lack quality, values and furnishings that we are no longer worth defending.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Antretter.

Mr. ANTRETTER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the reports by Mr. van der Sanden and Mr. Scheer also discuss the outcome of the meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers in April of this year and the Chairman-in-Office has referred to the subject as well. Although there were a good many conflicting elements and much that was unsatisfactory at this meeting, certain agreements were reached and should be welcomed by us. One such agreement was undoubtedly that concerning the establishment of an agency for the study of arms control and disarmament questions in the WEU organisation.

However, we must endorse the doubts expressed about the two-way street in armament co-operation between the United States and Europe, described as more wishful thinking than reality, since it is a fact that for every \$7 spent by the Western European NATO countries in the United States on armaments the United States spends only \$1 in Western Europe. We must therefore start by stepping up co-operation among the Western European NATO countries. The new WEU must take the offensive in accepting the American challenge. It must be more than a European NATO which – if Henry Kissinger, for example, had his way – would itself assume responsibility for the defence of the continent of Europe. It is high time, he always argues, that the military burden was fairly shared. In plain terms, this means that we Western Europeans should pay even more for armaments and be even more ruthless in paring our social services.

Mr. President, we must undoubtedly take a critical view of such forms of armament co-operation. Our scepticism in the Federal Republic was, moreover, increased by the recent dispute over the introduction of the American friend-foe recognition system. We must also make sure in WEU that the Europeanisation of security policy is not used to start a new arms race aimed, as it were, at making Europe into the third superpower.

We social democrats therefore believe that the French proposals for close technological co-operation among the Western Europeans, which President Mitterrand again underlined at the WEU meeting and the economic summit,

should be favourably considered, adopted if possible and vigorously followed. What is more, the programme proposed by the Commission of the European Communities has the same objectives.

A great deal has been said about the SDI here today, but always in the context of reports on other subjects. It would have been very helpful if the Assembly had had an opportunity of discussing the SDI on the basis of a separate report. I believe the Assembly has missed a chance here, because we cannot meet every week and the next opportunity we have may be too late for a European agreement. What practical research findings the American strategic defence initiative will produce no one can yet say, quite apart from the undeniable inherent military and strategic risks. I therefore think we would do well to hold back and to continue working towards a common European response in WEU and the European Community. It seems quite clear at least that the Western Europeans must invest sufficient financial resources to support the necessary improvements to the conventional defence capability in NATO. That is why even General Rogers advised the Europeans against massive participation in the SDI programme.

I might add that as long ago as 1979 my party proposed at its congress in Berlin that the world powers should negotiate a ban on these space weapons. The Soviet Union, which is now actually suggesting a moratorium on research, despite its many years of intensive research into space armament, did not take up this proposal at the time. Its campaign against the militarisation of space did not in fact begin until signs of a future American lead in this field began to emerge.

The American President has now declared the development of the strategic defence initiative to be one of the alliance's main tasks. I feel that, just as we have always criticised the Soviet Union for its excessively high force levels, we cannot accept the American programme for a strategic defence initiative unchallenged. It is particularly important that we should arrive at a common European response – I stress, a common European response – unconnected with co-operation in the military use of space. I feel we should remember above all that the Europeans never discussed these questions before the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles, although the then President Giscard d'Estaing did make a move in this direction. I do not think we should repeat that mistake with the SDI. I repeat: the parliamentary Assembly missed a good opportunity of avoiding it today.

To conclude, Mr. President, I do not think we should be making a self-fulfilling prophecy. Europe must not allow itself to be persuaded that it lags behind in technological development.

Mr. Antretter (continued)

In many areas Western European research and technology lead the world. We have no reason to hide our light under a bushel when it comes to such key technological fields as aircraft construction, sensor technology, optics or materials. It is strange that those who say we shall miss the technological boat unless we participate in the SDI also admit, after they have spoken to American politicians, that what the Americans want is to participate in European know-how.

If Europe is to hold its own, however, it must also fiercely resist the restrictions the Americans impose on the transfer of technology. Restrictions on trade with Eastern Europe and protectionism to defend the domestic market must also be discussed in WEU. If the Assembly and Council co-operate closely, WEU's possible future vitality – to use Mr. Scheer's words – may prove fruitful in every respect. But we must resist any attempt to develop a European nuclear power. What we need are parliamentary control and further democratisation of security policy, if WEU is really to become an independent European force to strengthen the Atlantic Alliance, as the Chairman-in-Office has said several times today.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Blaauw.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – Given the time, I can speak about only SDI, and I do so on behalf of my political group. President Reagan's March 1983 address initially evoked critical reaction from European politicians, but very shortly afterwards Europe kept silent on the whole subject. Was there a hope that it would simply fade away? It did not, and we must now admit that the leaders of the major Western European countries – perhaps with the exception of France – now publicly support the American research programme, although not without conditions.

Because of conflicting feelings over SDI, Western European politicians are probably unable to weigh up the pros and cons, and have preferred to continue the policy of giving support to the project while at the same time expressing doubts. Nevertheless, it is quite clear that the Western European allies must formulate a clear response to the SDI challenge, not only because of the letter from the United States Secretary of Defence, Mr. Weinberger, but also because of Europe's own responsibility for its defence and its solidarity in the North Atlantic Alliance.

The WEU summit held in Bonn in April did not result in a co-ordinated response to the American offer. It is quite clear that policy circles in the different capitals are still trying to

find an answer to the following questions – can we do it; should we do it; and, if so, how should we do it.

Yes, we can do it. In fact, SDI is a super high technology research programme and, according to United Nations sources, European countries have not fared too badly in the high tech trade. Indeed, WEU countries produce high technology products that account for 39.1% of international trade compared with 17.8% for the United States and 17.4% for Japan. In some areas, such as optical sensors and high-frequency techniques, which are also essential in laser production, European research may be even more advanced than that in the United States.

The second question, "Should we do it?" is more difficult to answer. However, it could be argued that the balance points to security policy advantage. Co-operation in principle, both politically and technically, in the research programme will strengthen the cohesion of the alliance. That would be very welcome after a period of transatlantic political differences over, for instance, the neutron warhead, Afghanistan, Poland, the gas pipeline, and even cruise missiles. Secondly, it would undoubtedly strengthen the American position at the talks in Geneva.

Militarily, co-operation with the United States on ballistic missile defence looks rather attractive. Analysis has shown that a defence against shorter-range ballistic missiles could enhance NATO's non-nuclear and nuclear force posture quite considerably. Moreover, one of the special interest groups formed around the different SDI components deals with anti-tactical ballistic missiles (ATBM).

Western Europe should step in on this item. A multilateral Western European study group needs to be set up to work out a conceptual framework for a ballistic missile defence against shorter-range ballistic missiles in Western Europe, that is to say, the SS-21, SS-22 and SS-23. That would form the basis for a joint co-ordinated United States-Western European concept. We now have the agency to carry out this work. Western European security aspects could then be fully incorporated into the overall SDI project. Co-ordination with other NATO plans would of course be essential, but it would be important that the study first be conducted by Western Europeans as that would give it a Western European identity that NATO plans sometimes lack.

In this context, the opportunities for Western European companies would be more promising. It means not only co-operation with the Americans but, parallel with it, the setting up of a special research programme of their own. Instead of duplicating alliance research efforts we would reach a true division of labour with

Mr. Blaauw (continued)

mutually supportive programmes. Perhaps this is what Lord Carrington had in mind when he said on 10th April 1985 that a collective European response should be made to the invitation of the United States to join the research programme for the strategic defence initiative. And in *The Times* of 11th April 1985: "The field of arms production and procurement is the key to a stronger European defence identity... I passionately believe that Europe needs to be, and needs to be seen to be, more energetic in its own defence."

There is a more general feeling that Western European co-operation in armaments is needed. A Western European effort on SDI-related research could be an effective catalyst in this respect. Research in advanced electronics, laser and particle beam technology and space technology will encourage progress in biotechnology and industrial high tech and will raise the level of basic science. That leads to the Western European answer to the American SDI offer – that is, for instance, the establishing of a European aerospace defence initiative (EADI). This can be seen as the European component in the overall alliance defence initiative in which Americans and Europeans will work together and share their technological achievements.

Does Western Europe need an armaments programme to stimulate technology, as we already have Esprit, ESA and the so-called possible technological community of the EEC? It is fairly logical to state that laser and particle beam technology research cannot be stimulated by funding programmes solely for civilian applications. Without military technology impetus, Western Europe will soon lag behind in these important technology areas and in this respect will become still more dependent on the United States. A parallel European aerospace defence initiative such as I have mentioned would also appear to be the best means of preventing a so-called decoupling of the United States and Western Europe, a decoupling not only on the level of security and defence but also technologically and economically.

The third question, "How should we do it?", can now be answered quite easily. Successful bids by European enterprise in the American SDI proper will probably be very few and co-operation on a bilateral American-European company basis is not likely to yield an interesting result. A collective response in the form of a European aerospace defence initiative would appear to offer better prospects. As the participation of France in a European aerospace defence initiative is vital, Eurogroup is ruled out as a forum for its co-ordination. Although France does participate in the Independent European Programme Group, this group, which

has the disadvantage of being focused on technical matters, is not equipped to deal with operational concepts. The best forum, therefore, appears to be WEU.

With the establishment of the new WEU agencies, we shall have the framework for the study of the aforementioned European aerospace defence initiative. Of course, when the study is in progress, close co-operation with the American SDI structure, together with information exchange, will be necessary.

That answers the question of how it could be done. In the near future we shall see how it is done. I believe that Europe has an important rôle to play through the framework of WEU. I will answer Mr. Hardy, who is not present, by saying that the amendments put forward on Mr. van der Sanden's report are not scathing or sketchy. They go to the heart of what I said, which is, I think, the only way for real European participation in this field.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg on a point of order.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. We have now had four speakers, who should have taken twenty minutes. They have taken thirty-three minutes, the last taking ten minutes. Either we have a rule or we do not. The clock did not begin to operate until after seven and a half minutes. That is no criticism of the speaker. Either there is a rule or there is not.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – You are right, Sir Geoffrey. I would point out that the red light only comes on after five minutes. Most speakers go on for two or three minutes after it comes on whilst others stop precisely at five. When it flashes it means that at least six minutes have passed. The red light comes on, not after four, but after five minutes.

From the start of the political debate, the Chair has felt it should show some indulgence towards the heads of the political groups. This was done this morning for the head of the Communist Group and again, now, for Mr. Blaauw, Chairman of the Liberal Group. I am trying to be as strict as possible and will make a special effort following your wholly warranted comment, Sir Geoffrey.

I call Mr. Mezzapesa.

Mr. MEZZAPESA (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, it is not very uplifting, especially after the hopes raised in Rome, that today, once again, our speeches in this chamber, regarding the rôle of the Assembly of Western European Union, should read like a catalogue of complaints about the Council of Ministers. I shall not be talking about the technical and financial aspects because Mr. Ferrari

Mr. Mezzapesa (continued)

Aggradi gave an excellent account of this subject the other day. Instead I shall dwell on the political aspects of the matter. The WEU parliamentary assembly is the political forum in which the common problems of Europe's defence and security and therefore the safeguarding of world peace are discussed publicly as befits a democratic assembly of parliamentarians from democratic states.

Either this rôle of the Assembly is recognised and the decisions that come out of it are observed or else it is not recognised and in that case we have to ask ourselves why we keep in being a representative structure that could well become representative purely in stage terms – like certain parliaments in non-democratic countries – and not at political level.

This I believe to be the focal point of our debate and it comes out clearly in the commendable report by Mr. van der Sanden, which I support. It is not just a question of the Council meeting its obligation to provide information under certain clauses of the amended Brussels Treaty. A duty of this kind would be purely formal and when a duty is formal and not backed by strong political convictions, it is easily emptied of any real content and the present de facto situation of partial and insufficient information – deplored by the Rapporteur – because the procedures are inadequate and nothing is done to change them, is easily arrived at.

Yet there is no shortage of declarations of good will on the subject. In paragraph 11 of his explanatory memorandum, the Rapporteur quotes the reply to Recommendation 396 in which the Council recognises the vital rôle of the Assembly “in putting across to the European and American public the scale and effectiveness of both the European defence effort and transatlantic co-operation”.

Again, paragraph 4 of the Bonn meeting communiqué recalls “the contribution that WEU can make in particular to achieve wider consensus” on defence problems. Lastly, in the document approved by the Council on relations with public opinion, one of the objectives set is that of “promoting a better-informed public debate on defence and security policy”, in particular in order to make it clear that “security is won day by day and never completely”.

But the point is this. The Council cannot confine itself to assigning the WEU Assembly the rôle of a sounding-box like that of a press or public relations office in a ministry or government agency. This Assembly can – and should – become a sounding-box but only to the extent that its independence and, with that independence, its credibility are ensured and guaran-

teed. The media will not be encouraged to be interested in the work of the Assembly if they consider it as a kind of executive arm and not an independent political body, because the conferences of the Chairman-in-Office, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, are sufficient to meet the needs of the newsmongers who, on top of that, would have the advantage of getting their information first hand.

The only way to restore vigour to the work of this Assembly is to renew the liveliness and originality of our debates in which criticism can also serve a purpose because it is against the background of critical positions that the fundamental unifying objectives we have set ourselves, and which the Bonn communiqué has confirmed, will emerge better, more clearly and more strongly.

We hope, Mr. President, that the Council of Ministers and the Permanent Council will see the point of these arguments and act accordingly.

In his report, Mr. van der Sanden refers to the issue of the Secretary-General. I must say frankly that I am not one of those who attribute miracle-working capacities to the politician taking on this post. Experience tells us that there are politicians who resign themselves to bureaucratic routine and there are bureaucrats, or diplomats, who show exceptional political sensitivity and that is the kind of sensitivity that is needed. I am gratified by Mr. Cahen's statements in *Le Monde* of 24th April last. Let us hope that his resolve to give real impetus to WEU – and for it to be real it cannot but be political – will not be frustrated by the imposition of negative conditions. He will certainly not find them in this Assembly.

At this point, Mr. President, I feel I must stress the importance of paragraph 7 in Mr. van der Sanden's recommendation, which concerns Portugal's application for membership of WEU. On the merits of the question, I fully agree with Sir Frederic Bennett that it would be absurd to close the doors of WEU, the European pillar of Atlantic defence, and not agree to the accession of a European country which has always been a member of the Atlantic Alliance. I would add that, at a time when we deplore shortcomings and inadequacies in the activity of this union, to find other states wanting to join because they recognise the validity of the political needs justifying its rôle of itself gives us very good reason for comfort and hope.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Tummers.

Mr. TUMMERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, this is a strange situation this afternoon. We are talking about various technological developments which we hope will bear

Mr. Tummers (continued)

fruit, and yet we are not able to keep the working atmosphere in this chamber up to scratch. It is rather like a cave-dweller thinking about the washing-machine before he has invented clothes. But that is not the main thing I want to talk about. Nor shall I be discussing the SDI, because I want to avoid repetition. I agree with Peter Hardy, and I feel the picture Sir Frederic Bennett has drawn is a distortion of the truth. It is inappropriate that we should adopt for Mr. van der Sanden's report the same procedure as was used for Mr. van den Bergh's report and the amendments.

I want to talk about paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, which reads: "Inform the public and press about its own activities", "its own" being a reference to the Assembly, of course.

Mr. President, there was a market outside this building this morning. If you had gone into the market and asked the people there what WEU was, no-one could have given you an answer. If you had said: "WEU is meeting within 150 metres of here", they would not have known in which direction to look. If you had asked: "What is NATO?" they would have said they knew something about that. If you had been lucky enough to find someone who knew that WEU was the European pillar of NATO, you would probably have had to explain what "pillar" meant in this context. We say airily that we must inform the public, and we make all kinds of demands on communication with the outside world - as indeed we have an obligation to do, just as we should ensure that the public know what we do here - but we do nothing about it.

I will give another example to show how badly and inadequately we inform the public. During the last part-session I submitted a document, Document 1003, on WEU's third decade, in which it was suggested that a proper historical survey should be made, as a manual, with a special edition for the general public, for distribution, I would recommend, down to primary school level. That could have been done, but on 19th February the Presidential Committee decided that there was not enough money for a project of this kind. It said this in two lines without giving any reasons. This was a slap in the face for you. If you keep this up, you will not be able to show your face as President for long.

I insist, Mr. President, that you reconsider your decision or recommend Mr. van der Sanden to withdraw paragraph 5 of his recommendation because, nice though it may look, it cannot be implemented if it is approved. I assume that is not what is intended and that is

not the kind of order that you above all must have at heart. The obverse of this is that if we approve paragraph 5, you cannot uphold your decision of 19th February. You will have to revise it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Verdon.

Mr. VERDON (*France*) (Translation). - Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, before going on to the French Delegation's thoughts prompted by the draft recommendation before us, I would like to add my voice to those of members deploring the opposition in this Assembly to Mr. van den Bergh's report on emerging technology.

Has not the withdrawal of this report robbed us of a real debate on the strategic defence initiative? Yet that initiative is designed to set up a long-term research programme whose results it will hardly be possible to assess before the end of the century.

In the meantime, the United States is itself taking decisions ensuring its own nuclear deterrent capability in the long term, through, for example, the Trident and MX programmes. In this way it is forearming itself against the risk of its deterrent capability becoming obsolescent as a result of the new trends in United States space strategy and the steps the Soviet Union will unfailingly take in reply.

France, for its part, considers that the maintenance of deterrence is one of the conditions for peace in Europe, as stressed in the final communiqué of the ministerial meeting in Bonn. It is necessary for the balance of offensive forces. That is why France is modernising its deterrent capability as the best possible guarantee of its security because it can strike back and also retain a second strike capability.

Another aspect of our thinking about SDI concerns the danger of destabilising treaties, in particular the ABM treaty of 1972, and of speeding up the arms race through the militarisation of space because this would go far beyond the provision of military observation and control systems whose positive nature and compatibility with existing treaties is recognised by my country.

On this subject, paragraph 3 of the recommendation which Mr. Scheer proposes addresses the subject of the reactivation of the Agency for the Control of Armaments. Fully approving this provision, we would like the new agency for the study of arms control and disarmament questions to give its consideration to France's proposals to the disarmament conference in Geneva.

These proposals are now widely known and so I shall confine myself to recalling their main lines: very strict limitation of anti-satellite systems, moratorium on the testing and deploy-

Mr. Verdon (continued)

ment of directed-energy weapons systems capable of destroying ballistic missiles and satellites from long range, strengthening of the notification system set up by the convention of 14th June 1975, undertakings by the two superpowers to extend to third countries' satellites the provisions concerning the immunity of certain space objects on which they are already mutually agreed.

If the debate on SDI could have been held it would have been easier for us to show how this programme of military research with potential civil spin-off differs from the Eureka project which is a civil programme not necessarily ruling out military spin-off.

Through Airbus, Esprit, and Jet, the Europeans have shown that Europe could, if it pooled its skills and resources, meet the technological challenge, co-operate with its great partners on an equal footing and avoid becoming a mere subcontractor. Eureka, a plan for systematic co-operation among Europeans in all advanced technologies, was born of this realisation. Once established, with all the necessary flexibility, but run by an ad hoc organisation to be defined jointly, Eureka should have three functions: policy guidance and decision-making at the ministerial level, the stimulation of research and development at the level of the Commission and the responsible bodies, and programmes for action finalised by a co-ordinating body.

In the light of preliminary consultations with the countries concerned, particularly at the informal meeting of research ministers in Rome, it has been possible to identify ten major research subjects as a result of work done in a climate of co-operation, and I insist on this point, as the approach holds promise for the remainder of the project.

In conclusion I would like to correct a misunderstanding. The Eureka project is in a different dimension from the SDI, which is a military project mobilising the whole of American research. It is not an imitation of SDI nor, in any way, a reply to Mr. Weinberger's letter. Instead, by increasing the awareness of European research workers and producers, it should facilitate the co-ordinated formulation of a European reply to Mr. Weinberger's proposals.

The point is that, for both projects, it will be necessary to take stock of Europe's capacities and requirements, and of its own interests and goals in the high technology field. Thus, when President Mitterrand stated at the Bonn summit: "We are not, in present circumstances, ready to participate in this American project", the words "in present circumstances" were undoubtedly of a special importance because they possibly

meant that Europe had to think and to equip itself with the means for its own technological progress before going to the negotiating table, together and on an equal footing, with our American partners and allies.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - The joint debate is closed.

In the absence of the Chairman of the General Affairs Committee I call the Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). - I shall be very brief, Mr. President, because the Rapporteurs for the two committees will be able to answer speakers.

I should like to apologise for Mr. Michel, Chairman of the General Affairs Committee, who had to leave at 6 p.m. without being able to speak.

I am pleased that the two reports are being considered together, since they form a whole deserving of our attention, both having been approved by the two committees.

Over and above what has been said for and against, the debate has made members of the Assembly aware of their responsibilities and has highlighted those of the Council. Perhaps it is from this realisation that WEU will draw the substance of its reactivation. It is important and urgent for WEU to shoulder its own responsibilities in the fields that concern our Assembly and the Council.

Mr. Bianco has spoken of a "crisis of identity". This aspect needs to be taken into account. Indeed, if we realise what we can do and if we have the resolve to will what we should do, all that has been done since 1984 to reactivate WEU will bear fruit.

I thank Mr. Blaauw for his remarks. He went very far in the wishes he expressed and I hope they will come true.

I am sorry that Sir Frederic Bennett is not present because I would have liked to know the points he disagreed about, particularly since he likes to speak as though he has the gift of infallibility in this chamber. I suspect that he has not perhaps read the report concerned. I would have liked to question him - a professional quirk for which I apologise.

It is true, Mr. Tummers, that we have many times regretted that our Assembly does not do more to let the public know about the work it does. But I think things are changing. Judging by the thickness of my press file, WEU is making progress in the field of information and relations with public opinion.

Mr. Pignion (continued)

Several speakers, including Mr. Verdon and Mr. Bianco, referred to the 1963 treaty. Mr. Verdon's clarification was essential for the complete knowledge and understanding of our projects.

I leave the Rapporteurs the task of replying in greater detail than I have to the various points raised in the debate.

In conclusion, it will give me great pleasure to see the two draft texts approved unanimously as was the case in committee.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. Scheer, Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Mr. SCHEER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). - Mr. President, I will make my answer quite brief, without taking up every point, and I shall try to reply to speakers in one or two sentences each.

First to Mr. Wilkinson, who is unfortunately no longer here. He said that America would feel more secure if the SDI project were implemented and that this would benefit Europe and the American defence contribution in Europe. I believe there is a lot of wishful thinking here. The SDI programme will be so costly that we should heed the warnings of General Rogers and many American senators to the effect that it will detract from the United States defence contribution in conventional weapons, with consequences for Europe. This must be thought about, not simply ignored in an act of political irresponsibility.

Mr. Müller, also unfortunately absent, has said that the ABM treaties should not be interpreted too strictly. I cannot share this view. As regards the transfer of technology, I refer you to the problem described by Mr. Genscher, which arises from the risk of European technology being siphoned off if we participate and join in everything without political safeguards. This must be clearly stated and underpinned by decisions of our own. Even the rules governing the external economic policy of the European community are affected.

Mr. Antretter referred to the American debate on burden-sharing. Here we should point out that information available from many sources, including British white papers, shows that as far as NATO's defence contribution in Europe is concerned, the European share in terms of ships, aircraft and tanks amounts in each case to between 70% and 85%, so that in any analysis of NATO burdens the Europeans do not show up as badly as some American sources maintain. This needs to be stressed repeatedly, as does the burden of risk borne by the European countries.

Mr. Blaauw, who is still with us - many thanks, that's parliamentary discipline for you - has pointed to a link between the SDI and an appropriate European response. I can only repeat what I said this morning, to the effect that the efforts in Geneva to reach agreement on the limitation of space weapons and hence achieve renunciation of an active arms build-up in space must have priority. I would say to Mr. Blaauw that the more substance there is in statements that the Soviet Union has already made considerable progress in active space armament, research and development, the more necessary such agreement becomes. The more advanced the Soviet Union is, the greater must be our concern for the early conclusion of a treaty.

As regards European developments, I see our defence problems as in some measure complementary to the American SDI project. The more attractive the defence potential sounds in theory, the more fraught with problems - and probably the more costly - it becomes, especially if a reasonably plausible guarantee of security is to be provided against weapons with very short early warning times. In Europe, where the SS-21, 22 and 23 missiles have early warning times of only one-and-a-half to three minutes, this means that instead of accepting them and trying to devise a defensive system absolute priority must be given to an arms control initiative which provides for the removal from Europe of weapons with such short early warning times.

This must be the priority and - this is my last sentence, Mr. President, and I trust I have been brief enough - it will be politically attainable only if Western European countries are able to remove this crucial threat by negotiation. In my view, the SS-22 represents a much greater threat than the SS-20. Western European countries must develop their own arms control mechanism on the lines of the recommendations made in the December report, which I also supported. We must not forget this. That, Mr. President, is my reply.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). - I call Mr. van der Sanden, Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee.

Mr. van der SANDEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). - Mr. President. I should like to thank members for the support they have given to this report today. Support from the Assembly has been fairly widespread. The criticisms that have been voiced mainly concerned another point, the SDI. I will come back to that in a moment.

I had not expected to be grateful for what Mr. Genscher came to tell us this afternoon. I said in the Assembly this morning that the Council of Ministers must not only co-ordinate its views

Mr. van der Sanden (continued)

but must also adopt common positions, so it will be obvious that I am pleased with what Mr. Genscher said. As I said, I did not expect him to react so soon and so positively to my statement this morning. I therefore hope that the position adopted today by the outgoing Chairman-in-Office of the Council of Ministers will continue to be the Council's position in the future. This position must thus be as acceptable in London, Rome, The Hague, Paris, Brussels and Luxembourg as it is in Bonn. So much for my general introduction.

Like Mr. Scheer, I will just touch on what the various speakers said. I see Mrs. Kelly is no longer here. What she did this morning was more or less to testify to her views. Mrs. Kelly has a perfect right, of course, to express her opinion, but I cannot share it in any way. In view of the contents of my report, I can only take note of what Mrs. Kelly had to say.

Mr. Müller, Mr. Bianco and Mr. Vecchietti also supported the report and the recommendations, saying that they shared the concerns I have expressed in the report. It was said that reactivation had begun and must now be sustained. We should persevere. All this clearly corresponds with what I have tried to say in the report and with its thrust as regards the near future.

Mr. Bianco and Mr. Mezzapesa pointed out that the Assembly was not a sounding-board for the Council of Ministers. The Assembly must be responsible in its own right. Mr. Müller also spoke along these lines. I entirely agree, of course. I also agree with what Mr. Mezzapesa said. Progress will be made only if the Assembly continues to play the rôle of critic.

I now come to the problems connected with the SDI, to which Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Tummers, Mr. Blaauw, Mr. Antretter, Mr. Verdon and Sir Frederic Bennett have all referred. As Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee, I should like to make the following absolutely clear: I have, of course, noted that opinions differ in this Assembly on the SDI project as such, but I was also pleased to see that the comments on the SDI and the recommendations in the report were not disputed. On the one hand, I naturally appreciate this very much and, on the other, I consider it only logical, since my report on the SDI does not directly concern the present situation but refers to the reactivation of WEU as such, in the light of the thirtieth annual report of the Council of Ministers. This also puts a constraint on me. In view of the mandate I received from the General Affairs Committee, I shall confine myself to the comment that I sincerely hope the Council of Ministers will succeed in finding a

common response to the United States invitation.

Mr. President, two other points were raised. Mr. Bianco and Sir Frederic Bennett referred to Portugal. I do not intend to comment on their remarks, since I believe they support my own point of view.

To conclude, I turn to the comments made by Mr. Tummers, which were addressed more specifically to you, Mr. President, and the Presidential Committee. The general tenor of Mr. Tummers's remarks was that, in view of our mandate, we must ensure that the public is informed of what we stand for. He referred in this context to paragraph 5 of my recommendation. I feel that he and I are of one mind in this. I have nothing further to add. Mr. President, I hope the Assembly will adopt this report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. van der Sanden and Mr. Scheer, and the General Affairs Committee and the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments for your work. It has provided solid material for this debate which has been of very high quality.

My compliments also go to you, Mr. Pignion, and our colleague Mr. Michel; I should be grateful if you would convey them to him, together with my regrets at not having called him to speak in time as I had promised.

Before proceeding to vote on the draft recommendations and order, we have to consider the amendments.

The General Affairs Committee has tabled a draft recommendation on the new outlook for WEU – reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council, Document 1012, to which eight amendments have been tabled.

They will be discussed in the order in which they refer to the text. They are: Amendments 3, 4, 5 and 6 tabled by Mr. De Decker; Amendment 1 tabled by Mr. Cavaliere; Amendments 7 and 8 tabled by Mr. De Decker and Amendment 9 tabled by Mr. Verdon.

Mr. De Decker and others have tabled four amendments which can be taken together.

Amendment 3 reads:

3. After paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert the following new paragraph:

“(iv) Noting that the United States invitation to the European states to take part in the research programme relating to the strategic defence initiative is raising many questions in Europe;”.

The President (continued)

Amendment 4 reads :

4. After paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert the following new paragraph:

“(v) Stressing that Europe must make every effort to ensure its technological independence whilst safeguarding its strategic interests;”.

Amendment 5 reads:

5. After paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert the following new paragraph:

“(vi) Stressing that only by collaborating in the research stage of the SDI can Europe influence this programme whilst ensuring that account is taken of the specifically European aspects and requirements of its security;”.

Amendment 6 reads:

6. After paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert the following new paragraph:

“(vii) Stressing that it is essential for the European states to respond collectively as a political entity to the American SDI proposals;”.

I call Mr. Blaauw to support all these amendments.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – Although I shall refer to Amendments 3, 4, 5 and 6 together, I hope that the Assembly will vote separately on them, because their contents are different.

There is nothing further to say on Amendment 3. I made it clear in my speech that we must have an answer from WEU and from Europe as a whole.

As to Amendment 4, we in Europe should not simply be a colony of the United States. We must retain our technological independence, because although European strategic interests are embedded in the Atlantic Alliance, they sometimes differ from the strategic interests of the United States.

Amendment 5 merely restates what I said in my speech. If we want to be equal partners with the United States, and talk to them as equals, we must retain our own influence and do what needs to be done for Europe. We must also have an equal footing in discussions on the future of the SDI and the implementation of the results of the research which will have an impact not only on the overall security of the alliance but also on European security.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I take it that Amendments 3, 4, 5 and 6 have now been moved.

Does anyone wish to speak against the amendments?...

What is the committee's view?

Mr. van der SANDEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I have just said that these amendments were not in fact considered by the General Affairs Committee. The committee feels that these amendments should be rejected. I have already said why. In essence, they were not discussed, either when the report was drawn up or when the recommendation was made to the Assembly. This has nothing to do with whether the committee or members of the committee are for or against these amendments. They do not fit into the report which the General Affairs Committee has submitted to the Assembly. This is the opinion the committee has expressed.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We will now vote on Amendment 3.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 3 is agreed to.

We will now vote on Amendment 4.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 4 is negated.

We will now vote on Amendment 5.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 5 is negated.

We will now vote on Amendment 6.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 6 is negated.

Mr. Cavaliere has tabled Amendment 1 which reads:

1. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, after “collective” insert “and positive”.

Since Mr. Cavaliere is not here does someone wish to speak in support of his amendment?...

No one does. The amendment is not supported and is therefore withdrawn.

Mr. De Decker, Mr. Blaauw and Mr. Wilkinson have tabled Amendment 7 which reads:

7. After paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, insert the following new paragraph:

“2. Make every effort to protect Europe's strategic interests while maintaining its technological independence, in particular by developing a European space defence programme in conjunction with the SDI;”.

The President (continued)

and Amendment 8 which reads:

8. After paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, insert the following new paragraph:

“ 3. In co-operation with the United States Government, study every aspect of the consequences for Europe’s security of the deployment of an SDI system; ”.

I call Mr. Blaauw to support Amendments 7 and 8 together.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – Amendments 7 and 8 bring into operation what was said in the previous amendments which were not adopted, and I shall be happy for the Assembly to vote on them together.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you. I have to take two votes, one after the other, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure.

Does anyone wish to speak against Amendments 7 and 8?...

What is the committee’s view?

Mr. van der SANDEN (*Netherlands*). – This is the same story. The committee does not recommend acceptance of the amendments for reasons which I have mentioned before on Amendments 3, 4 and 5.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put Amendment 7 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 7 is negatived.

I now put Amendment 8 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 8 is negatived.

Mr. Verdon has tabled Amendment 9 which reads:

9. Leave out paragraph 7 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

“ 7. Consider Portugal becoming a member of WEU once the latter has effectively embarked upon the process of revitalisation. ”

Mr. Verdon is not here. The amendment is not supported and is therefore withdrawn.

We shall now vote on the whole of the draft recommendation in Document 1012, as amended.

No one has asked for a vote by roll call.

The Assembly will therefore vote by sitting and standing.

I put the text as a whole to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

*The amended draft recommendation is adopted unanimously*¹.

The General Affairs Committee has tabled a draft order in Document 1012.

Before proceeding to vote on this draft order we have to consider Amendment 2 tabled by Mr. Blaauw which reads:

2. In the draft order, leave out paragraph 3 and insert:

“ REQUESTS

The Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, the General Affairs Committee and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions to consider inviting observers from this delegation to attend their meetings. ”

I call Mr. Blaauw to support the amendment.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – This is only a kind of technical amendment because in the original draft order the presidency is instructed to invite the committees to do something. In my opinion – and, I hope, in the opinion of the majority of the Assembly – it is the Assembly itself which requests the committees to do something.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

What is the committee’s view?

Mr. van der SANDEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the committee has no objection to this amendment, because it really concerns a technicality. It is quite content for the Assembly to decide.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put Amendment 2 to the vote, the committee leaving this to the Assembly to decide.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 2 is agreed to.

We shall now vote on the whole of the draft order as amended.

No one has asked for a vote by roll call.

The Assembly will therefore vote by sitting and standing.

I now put the text as a whole to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

*The amended draft order is agreed to*².

1. See page 37.

2. See page 39.

The President (continued)

The Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments has tabled a draft recommendation in Document 1019.

I have received four amendments to this draft recommendation. They will be taken in the order in which they refer to the text. They are Amendments 1 to 4 tabled by Mr. Verdon.

Amendment 1 reads :

1. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from " attaching " to the end of the paragraph, and insert:

" underlining the importance the Council attaches to respect of commitments under existing bilateral treaties and endorsing the determination of the countries participating in the CSCE to bring about an East-West rapprochement in the long term so that the WEU member countries adopt a co-ordinated reaction to: "

Amendment 2 reads:

2. Leave out paragraph 2(a) of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

" (a) President Reagan's strategic defence initiative in response to the invitation from Mr. Weinberger, Secretary of Defence, to take part, while confirming that the growing importance of technology should lead to Europe's own capability being strengthened, with a view to creating a European technological community; "

Amendment 3 reads:

3. Leave out paragraph 2(c) of the draft recommendation proper.

Amendment 4 reads:

4. Leave out paragraph 2(d) of the draft recommendation proper.

Mr. Verdon, do you wish to present your amendments all together?

Mr. VERDON (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I have tabled these four amendments on behalf of the French Delegation.

Amendment 1 relates to paragraph 2 of the recommendation. Its purpose is to distinguish between commitments under bilateral treaties and those entered into in a multilateral framework. The point is that, without wishing to minimise the efforts the two superpowers may make to reduce tension, it seems to me that the context is always that of negotiations between the two blocs. It was therefore necessary to underline the contribution of other countries,

including those of WEU, in the efforts to reduce tension. That is why I proposed this amendment which states that we endorse the determination of the countries participating in the CSCE to bring about an East-West rapprochement in the long term so that WEU member countries adopt a co-ordinated reaction.

Amendment 2 refers to the strategic defence initiative and the response we should give. I indicated a moment ago the importance that France attaches to a concerted approach by Europeans and the need to develop Europe's own capabilities in order to create a European technological community. I shall not go over that again, because it is the basis of the amendment I propose.

Amendment 3 relates to paragraph 2 (c) which alludes to General Secretary Gorbachev's declaration regarding a six-month unilateral freeze. We all know the fictional nature of this freeze which, in reality, would result in holding the balance of forces at a level favourable to the Soviet Union, so that it is largely a propaganda manoeuvre. In my view this is not something that the ministers concerned should have permanently present in their mind.

Amendment 4 would delete paragraph 2 (d). We cannot agree to a total ban on nuclear tests. Actually, as I argued in the general debate, we believe that in the new situation created by the American strategic defence initiative proposal we should continue to improve our deterrent capability and particularly its power of penetration. We cannot drop our guard in the face of the Soviet threat which remains as real as ever.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against Amendment 1 tabled by Mr. Verdon?...

What is the committee's view?

Mr. SCHEER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I propose that I should say one or two sentences about each amendment and that a vote should be taken before passing on to the next. The procedure will not take any longer, and will be more concise.

I recommend that Amendment 1 be rejected because the conference on confidence-building measures in Europe is considered elsewhere in this report and because the deletion of multinational negotiations would substantially negate the efforts of the forty-nation disarmament conference in Geneva where, for example, France has tabled a draft treaty banning an active arms build-up in space. I frankly fail to understand why this amendment has been tabled by a French delegate.

Mr. Scheer (continued)

Furthermore, the matter would also have to be discussed in committee. This is the same argument as Mr. van der Sanden's.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I put Amendment 1 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 1 is negatived.

Does anyone wish to speak against Amendment 2?...

What is the committee's view?

Mr. SCHEER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Again, I recommend rejection because the amendment is badly worded. I personally share the basic objective of an avowedly European effort in the technological field, but the wording of the amendment is misleading. It contains the expression "to take part", and as far as the SDI is concerned this conflicts with the remaining text of the amendment. The matter needs to be discussed in greater depth in committee.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Verdon on a point of order.

Mr. VERDON (*France*) (Translation). – Nowhere does it read "to take part" but "with a view to creating".

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We note the comment made by the author of the amendment.

I put Amendment 2 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 2 is negatived.

Does anyone wish to speak against Amendment 3?...

What is the committee's view?

Mr. SCHEER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I once more recommend rejection, because the reference to Mr. Gorbachev's declaration – like references to other matters such as the SDI and so on – in no way implies acceptance of his proposal. The plain fact is that we should not always allow the Soviets to keep the initiative while we stand virtually mute and let the other side score propaganda successes. What we have to do is come up with some counter-proposals, and subparagraph (c) says just that, which is why I recommend rejection.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I put Amendment 3 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 3 is negatived.

Does anyone wish to speak against Amendment 4?...

What is the committee's view?

Mr. SCHEER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Again, I recommend rejection because it has always been the position of all WEU countries except France to support a comprehensive test ban agreement. Such an agreement is called for here in connection with 6th August 1945 and the fortieth anniversary of the Hiroshima bomb. Furthermore, the wording takes account of the French position in that it is primarily addressed to the two nuclear superpowers. If they were to agree on a comprehensive test ban, all the statements make it quite clear that this would have automatic consequences for the other nuclear powers. Those addressed are the two nuclear superpowers, and I therefore move that the amendment be rejected.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I put Amendment 4 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 4 is negatived.

We shall now vote on the whole of the draft recommendation in Document 1019.

No one has requested a vote by roll call.

The Assembly will therefore vote by sitting and standing.

I put the text as a whole to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The draft recommendation is adopted¹.

I call Mr. Pignion.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, at the close of this debate I have a duty to perform on Mr. Michel's behalf and for myself and it is to compliment the Rapporteur, which I do most sincerely.

I suppose my attitude must have surprised some members. As a Frenchman it was difficult for me not to approve the amendments tabled by Mr. Verdon, but as Chairman and since – as you know Mr. President – 1985 is Victor Hugo Year, I have just, like him, experienced the "storms of soul-searching". I have grown in stature, not perhaps by the way I have voted, but I wanted to explain why so that Mr. Scheer should know I wholly approve his work.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you Mr. Pignion. Against that kind of "storm" the

1. See page 40.

The President (continued)

President's duties are sometimes an excellent lightning conductor.

5. Withdrawal of a report from the agenda

(Motion for an order tabled by Dr. Miller and others, Doc. 1021)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is a motion for an order on the withdrawal of a report from the agenda tabled by Dr. Miller and others, Document 1021.

I remind members that, in accordance with Rule 30 of the Rules of Procedure, this motion can be voted on without prior reference to the committee.

As Dr. Miller is not here, I call Mr. Brown, his substitute, to give the reasons for the motion.

Mr. BROWN (*United Kingdom*). – Before I speak to the motion, Mr. President, may I make a brief personal statement?

When I went to that delightful reception at the Eiffel Tower on Monday night, I decided to support the French economy, paid twelve francs and took the lift to the top of the tower. When I arrived, a colleague, Sir John Page, was there, and I said to John: "I suppose that this is the nearest I shall ever be to heaven." Having suffered for three days in this chamber, I hope that this is the nearest I shall ever be to hell. But in case it is not, I want to make a pledge now that I shall leave Paris this week to lead a purer life, in case hell is hotter than this chamber, because I could never live there. Therefore, may I make a serious plea to you, Mr. President, on behalf of my colleagues, to do something about the heating before we come here for the next session, because it has been all but unbearable.

The motion in Document 1021 stands in the name of my colleague Dr. Miller and others. I greatly regret the need for the motion. The facts are that the report on emerging technology and military strategy, prepared by Mr. van den Bergh, should have given rise this week to the key debate of our proceedings. With great respect to the authors of other reports, there can be no matter of greater importance to the members of the Assembly than the issues raised in Mr. van den Bergh's report, not least that relating to star wars or President Reagan's strategic defence initiative.

This paper had been extensively debated in the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, and it was further debated in two sessions of the committee on Monday of this week when, regrettably, a majority of members in the committee, for reasons best known to

themselves, refused to provide the necessary majority which would have given the Assembly the right to debate the report.

We have all complained from time to time of the lateness of delivery of papers for debate here. In the case of the paper under discussion, the committee met many weeks ago to finalise the paper. Regrettably, because a quorum was not maintained, the paper could not be circulated to all members of the Assembly.

Having said that, I feel it to be an outrage that a majority on the Defence Committee have deprived this Assembly of an opportunity for discussion. If this session had decided that the issue was too important to hold a debate because of the short time for which the paper had been available, that would have been understandable and acceptable. But for two handfuls of members to deprive us of the right to debate is clearly scandalous, not least at a time when we talk of a reactivation of this Assembly.

Indeed, in the draft recommendations in Document 1012 – Mr. van der Sanden's report – there is a reference to:

"welcoming the initiative taken by the Committee for Relations with Parliaments for making the consequences for the reactivation of WEU better known in the parliaments of member countries",

and to

"welcoming the endeavours to reactivate WEU because they promise to provide a forum for European countries to discuss among themselves matters affecting their own security and defence".

In paragraph 5 of this excellent document, we read:

"This being so, your Rapporteur wonders why the Assembly should continue to work on reports on subjects extending well outside the defence and security areas. The direct political influence of the Assembly would be enhanced if it produced less recommendations and otherwise worked harder to reactivate WEU as an organisation oriented towards defence policy."

I support that fully.

These are all fine-sounding phrases, to which we are all happy to subscribe. Yet, when we have an outstanding opportunity to have a debate with purpose this week, we are, as I have said, denied the right to do so. We have lost a superb opportunity to put some flesh on the bones of reactivation.

I feel particularly annoyed by the events of this week, since the one committee of this organisation which is not duplicated in the Council

Mr. Brown (continued)

of Europe is the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments – none more important, and none more justifying our existence as an organisation.

The Chairman-in-Office of the Council of Ministers, in reply to a question this afternoon, intimated to this Assembly that he felt that WEU should be the opinion leader in strategic events. Let us take up the torch. I hope that the motion will be carried enthusiastically, without dissent. I commend it to you in that spirit.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg to speak against the motion for an order.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I should like to begin by supporting the first words of Mr. Brown. I hope that the secretariat will take notice of them. It would have been easy to hire twelve fans for the three days that we have been sweltering here. A bit of common sense could have led to that being done. I hope that proper note will be taken of that, because we have been asked to work in the most intolerable conditions.

I deal with the motion as an individual. I could have got my colleagues together and arranged for a roll call to be called, in which case there would have been no quorum.

There are greater rights than the right of debate in this Assembly. The greater right is for the membership to have documents on such a desperately important subject as this in plenty of time. I am not concerned that a quorum was not possible in the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. That happens in other committees. Indeed, it may call for a change in the rules.

The fact is that those who are not privileged to serve on the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments have not yet seen this document. However, I observe that somebody has given a copy of it to the press. I do not know what is in the document. I do not know whether it is true that the author had views and wrote his report to fit those views. I would have been opposed to having this document inscribed on the order of business, because it had not been circulated or even finalised before this part-session started.

The reason why I object to Dr. Miller's motion is simple. In the motion, which has been signed by others, Dr. Miller is asking the committee to report without fail to the second part of the thirty-first session. I regard the motion as foolishly worded. If the signatories to the motion fail to get a quorum again they

cannot report to the Assembly. Had Dr. Miller said that every effort should be made to report to the next part-session and, at the same time, said that they would comply with the precedents and courtesies of this organisation, I would have supported the motion. However, the motion as it is is impossible. If there is not a quorum, Dr. Miller will put down another motion like this, because it will be wholly inoperative to achieve what he wants.

I sympathise with Dr. Miller. I, too, would have liked to discuss the matter. However, we must be realistic. We must remember that some of us would have liked to know the views of our governments on this matter. It was monstrous of Mr. Hardy yesterday to make that snide remark to Baroness Young, assuming that the government knew all about the report, when members of the Assembly had not even had the opportunity to read it. I should have liked to know my government's view on Mr. van den Bergh's report.

Mr. BROWN (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I should have liked to take into account...

Mr. BROWN (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I did not interrupt Mr. Brown.

Mr. BROWN (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – Perhaps Mr. Brown will wait until the end to make his point of order.

I should have liked to know the views of my government on the report, which I have not seen. That is why I object to the motion. That is why I could have arranged for four others to be present and to have a roll call to defeat the whole thing. I did not want to do that. I wanted to show that I genuinely feel that the members of this Assembly have a right to documentation in plenty of time to consider it. I shall vote against the motion. I do not mind if others do not. However, it is a point of principle which is an even greater point of principle than the right to debate. It is the right to debate on adequate documentation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Brown on a point of order.

Mr. BROWN (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. Is it not cant and hypocrisy for a member of the Conservative Group to talk in such terms when an American general, working on the star wars project, arrived in the lobby of this Assembly on Monday, intro-

Mr. Brown (continued)

duced himself to me, and said, "I have read with interest Mr. van den Bergh's report", and then went on to discuss the issue from an American point of view? That general also arrived to speak to the Conservative and CDU Group last night.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Hardy on a point of order.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – On another point of order, Mr. President. I think it should be on record that I made my point to Baroness Young – I hope I did not do it with discourtesy – because the Foreign Office had seen that report and issued an advice note on it and because conservative members, who were opposed to us considering Mr. van den Bergh's report this week, had been airing the same subject in public.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Woodall on a point of order.

Mr. WOODALL (*United Kingdom*). – Further to that point of order, Mr. President. Will you take the problem of committees not being able to raise and maintain a quorum to the Presidential Committee? Will you recommend to that committee that it instruct the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges to consider that problem because the procedure is open to abuse? Members can stop a report from going through by walking out of the committee.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I will reply to the speakers after the vote has been taken on the motion for an order in Document 1021.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. Has the bell been rung for the vote, because I did not hear it?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – No one has asked for a vote by roll call.

The Assembly will therefore vote by sitting and standing.

I put the text as a whole to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

*The motion for an order is adopted*¹.

First of all, I would answer Sir Geoffrey Finsberg that the bell was indeed rung. Kindly accept my reply, Sir Geoffrey.

On the other points, the presidency has been concerned, from the start of this session, about the major problem created for the Assembly by the late arrival of documents, on which a debate has to be held and a vote taken and of the late

transmission of documents to the Council. We have to remember that the work of the Assembly is not solely for our own purposes but should also contribute to maximum effectiveness in our working relations with the Council.

As President, I cannot imagine that satisfactory work can be done on the basis of an agenda that includes a number of documents not yet approved by the committees when the session opens. Documents not prepared in advance – and that is the basic problem – can only be dealt with under the urgent procedure.

I very much regret that deadlines were not met because then we would not have the confusion that seems to have arisen, at least in certain minds, with some of us protesting in their speeches about the lateness and others speaking on the substance of the issue.

Throughout the session, there has been a mixture of the two lines of argument and that is not a sound way for us to work.

I shall therefore give my second reply which will close this incident, hoping that we shall do better the next time.

As has been said, I attended the meeting of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges on this subject and, as you know, this morning we agreed to the Bureau's proposal seeking to put an end to situations of this kind. We shall therefore be holding a session of committee meetings all in the same week, one month before the next Assembly session in December which will help to make sure there is a quorum and also to make sure which documents will be ready for distribution within the set time-limit of a fortnight in advance. Failing which, documents supposedly on the agenda will be purely and simply withdrawn so that the Assembly's decisions are logical and any repetition of the events like those we have just experienced is prevented.

I would once again appeal to the wisdom of the Assembly. I know the affair is political and important but, as we are all interested in the reactivation of the Assembly of Western European Union, the responsibility of each of its members is involved.

I do not see why we must constantly be compelled to have stricter rules when a number of situations reveal the unfortunate absence of a quorum in committee meetings which, for the Assembly's sake, I very much regret.

I must tell you that the Presidential Committee – you have all this in writing – has requested the General Affairs Committee to present a report on national representation in this Assembly in time for the next session in order to offer some useful advice on achieving better attendance and participation, possibly with nomination procedures we will have to

1. See page 41.

The President (continued)

discuss together and on which the national parliaments alone have the power of decision.

The set of problems before us is fairly complex. I hope that, in its wisdom, the Assembly will tolerate the incidents it encounters in the course of its work.

The incident is therefore closed.

6. Situation in Lebanon

(Presentation of the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1025)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of the report of the General Affairs Committee on the situation in Lebanon and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1025.

In accordance with the decision taken by the Assembly this morning, the General Affairs Committee met in the early afternoon and agreed to a draft recommendation on the situation in Lebanon.

I call Mr. Martino, Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee.

Mr. MARTINO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, to my mind there is a potential problem in the time it takes Assembly committees to deal with issues which the turn of events makes or may make urgent. This applies to this draft recommendation on the present situation in Lebanon. The presentation of the request in the Assembly, the debate and decision on urgent procedure, the referral to the General Affairs Committee, the debate in that committee and the discussion that has now begun in this chamber were all pushed through with maximum speed.

Speed: with your permission, Mr. President, and that of the members here, I shall keep what I have to say to the minimum, not merely to reinforce my point. Let me say above all that I have too great a regard for the efforts made by everyone in these rounds of work to trespass further on their patience and I have too great a regard for their intelligence to recount what is now going on in Lebanon with which we are all familiar. This may be unusual but in the General Affairs Committee the text that has now reached the Assembly was approved unanimously so why waste further words, particularly on my part? The General Affairs Committee has presented a text to which we can all agree. In it we make an appeal for good

will. We cannot believe naïvely in political “certainties” but we want, more strongly than ever, to preserve firm, human hope.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Martino, for the brevity of your statement.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

In that case we shall vote on the draft recommendation as a whole.

No one has requested a vote by roll call.

The Assembly will therefore vote by sitting and standing.

I put the text as a whole to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The draft recommendation is adopted unanimously¹.

7. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Thursday, 23rd May, at 10 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Revision and interpretation of the Rules of Procedure – Terms of reference of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments (Debate on the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and vote on the draft resolution, Document 1020).
2. State of European security – the central region (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1018 and amendment).
3. Activities of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments – parliamentary debates on the evolution of WEU (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Document 1010).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 7.20 p.m.)

1. See page 42.

SIXTH SITTING

Thursday, 23rd May 1985

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the minutes.
Speakers: Dr. Miller (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Pignion (*Chairman of the committee*), Dr. Miller.
2. Attendance register.
3. Revision and interpretation of the Rules of Procedure – Terms of reference of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments (*Debate on the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and vote on the draft resolution, Doc. 1020*).
Speakers: Mrs. Knight, Mr. Schulte (*Chairman of the committee*).
4. State of European security – the central region (*Presentation of the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1018 and amendment*).
5. Activities of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments – parliamentary debates on the evolution of WEU (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 1010*).
Speakers: Mr. Giust (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Eysink, Mrs. Knight (*Chairman of the committee*).
6. Institutional connection of the Assembly with other organs of WEU (*Motion for an order tabled by Mr. Spies von Büllesheim and others, Doc. 1026*).
Speakers: Mr. Eysink, Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, Mr. Rauti (*point of order*).
7. Adjournment of the session.

The sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Sir Frederic Bennet, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT. – The sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT. – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments ?...

The minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT. – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings ¹.

It is appropriate at this moment to mention the need to have a quorum if our proceedings are to continue satisfactorily today. As members of the Assembly are aware, the quorum

depends on the number of signatures rather than on the number of members present in the hemicycle. Therefore, I appeal to members, whether they are present or outside, to sign the register, or the time will come when we shall not be able to take our decisions.

3. Revision and interpretation of the Rules of Procedure – Terms of reference of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments

(Debate on the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and vote on the draft resolution, Doc. 1020)

The PRESIDENT. – The orders of the day now provide for the debate on the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges on the revision and interpretation of the Rules of Procedure – terms of reference of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments and vote on the draft resolution, Document 1020.

Members will recall that on Tuesday afternoon Mr. Jessel, Rapporteur of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, presented his report on the revision and interpretation of the Rules of Procedure, Document 1020. The debate and vote on the draft resolution were

¹. See page 45.

The President (continued)

deferred until the beginning of this morning's sitting.

The debate is now open.

I call Mrs. Knight.

Mrs. KNIGHT (*United Kingdom*). – I felt that it was important to make a brief statement about the change of name of my committee from the “Committee for Relations with Parliaments” to the “Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations”.

It is generally understood and recognised that for WEU to be wholly and properly revitalised there must be greater knowledge outside of the work of our Assembly. It is no use working in a cupboard; we have to work on a stage. But unless there are people attending the show, perhaps even working on a stage will not help very much.

Many excellent reports are written with great care and attention to detail but they are hardly ever heard of outside this Assembly. It is important for us to have relations with parliaments and our committee has embarked on a positive campaign to extend the knowledge of WEU within the parliaments of member countries. But it is also important to extend knowledge of WEU to the public as a whole. If that can be done, it will be to the benefit of every member of the Assembly.

Some budgetary anxieties have been expressed. We do not have to do anything that would cost money. If we wished to spend money, it would have to be approved by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration. That committee could reject any suggestion that our committee might make. The change in name is permissive rather than mandatory. We are glad that the Committee on Budgetary Affairs has permitted us, as a special experiment, to have the advice, guidance and help of a trained press man, particularly at the end of this year and the beginning of next year, to help us in our duties.

I welcome the report and hope that the Assembly will accept it.

The PRESIDENT. – Does the Chairman of the committee wish to speak?

Mr. SCHULTE (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, as Chairman of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges I have no cause to amplify or add anything to Mr. Jessel's very good, comprehensive and detailed report. I must, however, make it clear that this subject aroused critical and controversial discussion in committee. We all took the view that public relations work was of great importance to

our Assembly and to WEU as a whole, particularly if we intend to increase public awareness of WEU.

The question was whether a committee could do this. I believe a few critical remarks are in order here, especially if we want to communicate with the press and the public in the member countries and not simply to make contact with their parliaments. This presents an enormous linguistic problem. As far as the Federal German press is concerned, for example, I can state that it will take no notice of any document which is not presented in German, and I can imagine that the same goes for Italy and the Netherlands. Texts are not normally available to us, and I am therefore afraid that if the committee wishes to take action in this area there will be financial implications. This was why the Presidential Committee asked for another consultation with the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration before proceeding to alter the Rules of Procedure and to change the name, and hence the functions, of the committee. That did not happen, and the committee therefore decided by a large majority that a decision should be reached today. The report and recommendation now await your decision, Ladies and Gentlemen.

I think it will be important to read the text correctly, and I am quite certain that Mrs. Knight will give due attention to this point. The wording is: “... make all necessary proposals with a view to bringing the work of the Assembly to the attention of the public and the press in member countries.” The word “proposals” in this context is very important. It will then be a question of how this change in the Rules of Procedure operates in practice.

The PRESIDENT. – The Chairman of the committee having spoken and there being no other speakers – the Rapporteur has already left for London, as I made clear – the debate is closed.

We shall now vote on the draft resolution contained in Document 1020.

Under Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure, as amended on 29th November 1982, if ten or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber so desire, the Assembly shall vote by roll-call on a draft resolution.

Does any member wish to propose a vote by roll-call?

That is not the case. We will vote by sitting and standing.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

*The draft resolution is adopted*¹.

1. See page 46.

4. *State of European security - the central region*

(Presentation of the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1018 and amendment)

The PRESIDENT. - The orders of the day now provide for the presentation of the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on the state of European security - the central region with debate and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1018 and amendment.

I call Dr. Miller, Rapporteur of the committee, to present the report.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). - I shall not detain the Assembly for too long at this somewhat late stage in our proceedings this week. We would not be part of this organisation if we were not convinced of the need to be prepared to defend ourselves in this imperfect world. None of us is ashamed of our stated intention to do so if we are attacked. While I believe that it is perfectly feasible and, indeed, necessary to make constant judgments if and when risks occur, part of that assessment is to be prepared for an attack upon us.

The report, which is not highly controversial, deals with what we all perceive as the factual situation of European security in the central region. It draws together a few matters of considerable importance.

The first main point deals with the continued numerical superiority of Warsaw Pact countries. Secondly, there is a reference to the maldeployment of allied forces. Thirdly, the report emphasises what I term the European input. Fourthly, it deals with the French position. Last, but not least, it mentions the need for a European defence industry.

Comparisons continue to show a two to one advantage in favour of the Warsaw Pact in air forces and about the same in land forces. That advantage would increase initially in the event of hostilities until United States reinforcements could arrive or until the possible deployment of French forces. But Warsaw Pact superiority - numerically, at any rate - is even more marked in tanks, armoured personnel carriers and artillery. Paragraph 2.9 is an indication of that.

Section III of the report details the disposition of allied forces in the central region. I draw attention to the fact that the concentration of ground and air forces on each side of the NATO-Warsaw Pact boundary is far greater in the central region than in any other part of that boundary. The forces of more allied countries are stationed in West Germany than in any other NATO country. I do not say that those

countries are different in outlook. Section III of the report describes the forces of the Netherlands, Belgium, the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, France and Germany. There is no great difficulty about assimilating the statistics in this section.

I come now to maldeployment - in other words, the locations of forces. The peacetime locations of forces assigned to NATO in the central region are somewhat unsatisfactory. They still largely reflect the locations that they occupied when the defence of NATO was based on the Rhine in a period before the German armed forces had joined their allies in NATO. The present NATO strategy of forward defence requires those forces to take up defence positions in a period of alert close to the East-West boundary. Apparently, with the exception of the first United States armoured division and another United States regiment, today only elements of the various German corps are located in forward positions in peacetime. That is partly for historical reasons, because when the German forces were created all appropriate accommodation for military units in areas further west was already occupied by the forces of other allies. The committee believes that allied forces on the central front should be relocated.

European input is the third subject. There is no doubt that United States forces make an invaluable contribution to defence in the central region. We are indebted to the United States for that. One would think, according to some United States sources, that that was the major input into the area, but the major input is from European allies.

European forces account for 90% of the ground forces, 80% of the combat aircraft, and 80% of the tanks in the area and 70% of the ships in European waters. To summarise, 71% of the ground and air forces stationed in the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany in peacetime are provided by the European countries. That is a figure that we should remember when we discuss our defences with our American allies.

I wish to say just a word about the French position. Although France is not part of the integrated military structure of NATO, the committee is in no doubt of the willingness of French forces, not just those stationed in Germany in peacetime, to be available for allied defence in the event of hostilities or even in the period of tension immediately before hostilities could commence. No doubt the Soviet Union also sees French forces in that light. Those French forces would add to the deterrent. They could provide useful reserve forces for NATO commanders because of their geographical location. The Committee on Defence Questions

Dr. Miller (continued)

and Armaments welcomes the contingency plans that would enable French forces to act under the operational control of NATO commanders. Paragraphs 3.22 to 3.24 show that.

The last point that the report mentions – it is not why it was put last – relates to one of the most important aspects of our defence on that front, which is, I believe, and the committee believes, the need to develop a meaningful defence industry. We know that for years we have been bogged down by our inability to develop a system whereby we would have either interoperability or standardisation of all the various essentials in the event of attack. Standardisation is an almost impossible aim. It is something that gives the Warsaw Pact countries an enormous advantage, for obvious reasons. Most of its arms are provided by the Soviet Union and therefore there is no problem with standardisation. Our forces do not have that.

One further difficulty that we have encountered – I do not believe that we have solved it – is the possibility of a two-way street between Europe and the United States. We do not have a two-way street. I do not blame our American allies. It is up to us to push for a greater input of material in the other direction, but that has not worked. There is no point in pretending that there is an effective two-way street when there is not.

We have tried to produce at least some kind of interoperability of our systems, but even that is difficult. It would be possible to do repairs on aircraft and some other essential work, although not the main aspects of defending ourselves, on an international basis between ourselves in Europe and the United States. I commend the recommendation that we should seriously consider the possibility of a European industry in that respect.

It is not a big report. It brings together the available information. It is a factual account.

The committee is indebted to the French first army in Strasbourg and the French forces in Germany for the visit that it paid to the headquarters of both. I draw attention to that in paragraphs 3.15 and 3.16 of the report. It was the first such visit to French forces since France withdrew from the military structure in 1966. The committee was well briefed and I was impressed by the steps that the French forces have taken to make themselves ready to join their allies if difficulties occur. We are indebted to them and we are grateful to the French Minister of Defence for arranging visits.

I wish to express the committee's sincere thanks to Mr. Whyte without whom the report

would not have been possible. The committee accepted the report unanimously. There were no abstentions.

On behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, I commend the report to the Assembly. I hope that it will be adopted with as little dissension as possible. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Dr. Miller, for your objective and informative introduction.

Three other speakers are listed. The first is Mr. Bianco, but I do not see him in the Assembly. It would be only fair therefore to go to the second speaker. As there are so few speakers, Mr. Bianco can speak if he comes in. I therefore call the next speaker, Mr. Gianotti. He is not here either. The third speaker is Mr. Cavaliere, but I do not see him.

I do not imagine that the Rapporteur wishes to reply to himself, and I therefore ask the Chairman whether he wishes to comment. There is one amendment, which I shall call in due course.

I call Mr. Pignion.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – On behalf of the committee, I should like to congratulate our Rapporteur and our counsellor, Mr. Whyte, on the quality of this report. I feel that I should almost apologise for pointing out to you, Mr. President and members of the Assembly, that the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments has aimed at a measure of unity in the reports it had to present at the session, comprising the reports by Mr. van der Sanden, who was assisted by Mr. Scheer, by Mr. van den Bergh and Dr. Miller. In their treatment of the facts and their evaluation of needs they could be regarded as complementing each other.

Dr. Miller's introduction was completely in line with the committee's discussions. Like the report, his comments were concise and to the point. For this he has my thanks.

However, even though the draft recommendation does not call for many reserves or comments, I must now step down as chairman in order to speak for Mr. Verdon who is at a committee meeting and has not yet been able to join us.

I regret that such a draft and debate should be ignored to this extent and that there have been no criticisms or further explanations, particularly as the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments will now be quite logically taking up the problems of security in the Mediterranean.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Pignion.

The President (continued)

The committee has produced Document 1018 and a draft recommendation to which one amendment has been tabled. I shall, of course, call the Chairman to speak to that amendment, but I am advised that someone must first move it to enable the Chairman to speak to it.

Does anyone else wish to move Amendment 1, submitted by Mr. Verdon?...

It states:

1. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper.

I call Mr. Pignion.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – I am sorry that we were unable to discuss this amendment in committee, because I am almost sure – everyone is entitled to have illusions – that I could perhaps have had it withdrawn. I even said to the other members of the committee: “You are making me suffer, because I am French and you are aware of France’s special position on this issue.”

We are for ever reiterating and justifying that special position, if any justification is needed. I admit that I am not very happy about the inclusion of paragraph 3 in the recommendation, because the request did not come jointly from the United States and the Soviet Union in the course of the negotiations.

I hope therefore that Mr. Verdon’s request for the deletion of paragraph 3 will be approved. It adds almost nothing to the preamble. It may please enemies and not friends.

If we wish to remain united, in spite of such attitudes, our Rapporteur should, Mr. President, accept this argument, or alternatively we might consider tabling an amendment to the amendment because I do not think that the British position on this point differs so greatly from the French, at least in official statements.

However that may be, as the deletion of this paragraph in no way destroys the unity of the recommendation, I would like Mr. Verdon’s amendment to be accepted. In any case, I would ask my fellow members of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to excuse this intervention by their Chairman in a debate from which he would have preferred to abstain, but events sometimes make such action necessary.

The PRESIDENT. – I appreciate your difficulty Mr. Pignion, but I must now ask whether anyone wishes to speak against the amendment.

If that is not the case, I call the Rapporteur for his comments.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – I can appreciate the difficulty of our French colleagues. However, the paragraph does not refer only to French forces, because in due course it will apply to Spanish forces. While our French colleagues can speak for themselves, they should not speak for our Spanish allies when they join us.

In any case, the committee, as I have already said, was most impressed by the obvious intention of the French forces to be involved. The recommendation does not make any kind of commitment, other than to publish what we already know.

The document “Force comparisons: NATO and the Warsaw Pact”, produced by the NATO information service, does not publish these figures, and it seems logical – given that France is an important component of our defence – that French forces allotted to the area, and Spanish forces in due course, should be taken into account and included.

The Chairman of the committee hit the nail on the head when he said that this was part of the deterrent. It would be some consolation, for what it was worth, to our potential enemies if it were thought that there was any kind of division of opinion between France and the rest of our NATO allies. Frankly, I see no problem whatever in including these figures in our document, which the rest of the world can see when we give permission to release it to the press. I really do not believe that any problem or even embarrassment will be caused to France. As I have already said, the French forces know that this is the situation, and we should make it clear that we accept what they say and include that in the document before us.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Dr. Miller.

First, no question arises about confidentiality of this report, because once it was passed by the committee it became, as was pointed out yesterday, public property.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – May I add one point? The recommendation is that the French force details should be published and they should appear eventually in the NATO publication.

The PRESIDENT. – I appreciate the point. I was dealing with the other point you made about when permission is given to distribute the document. It has already existed from the moment when it was passed by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. It does not arise from our sitting here today.

As regards the point in question, this is not particularly easy for the Chair because I have to take Mr. Pignion as speaking for the amendment and Dr. Miller as speaking against it. It is on

The President (continued)

that basis that I shall have to ask for a vote by sitting and standing.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 1 is negatived.

Now we have to vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1018. Under Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure, as amended on 29th November 1982, if five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber so desire, the Assembly shall vote by roll-call on a draft recommendation.

Does any member wish to propose a vote by roll-call?

It would not appear so. We shall therefore now proceed to vote by sitting and standing.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The draft recommendation is adopted¹.

I congratulate the Rapporteur.

5. Activities of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments - parliamentary debates on the evolution of WEU

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 1010)

The PRESIDENT. - The orders of the day now provide for the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments on the activities of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments - parliamentary debates on the evolution of WEU, Document 1010.

I call Mr. Giust, Rapporteur of the committee, to present the report.

Mr. GIUST (*Italy*) (Translation). - I shall divide this presentation of my report into two parts, the first dealing with the activities of the committee and the second giving a first analysis of the debates in national parliaments on the evolution of WEU following the Rome Declaration of October 1984 on the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of the organisation.

As regards the activities of the committee, under Rule 42 *bis*, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Procedure, the committee selected from the texts adopted by the Assembly Recommendation 413 on the military use of space, Recommendation 415 on the control of armaments and disarmament, and Recommendation 416 on WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance to be

transmitted officially to the national parliaments in the hope that they would provide subject matter for debate, questions or speeches. The committee also asked that the conversion of the texts adopted by the WEU Assembly into questions or speeches in the various national parliaments should be done as quickly as possible so as to enhance relations between WEU and the individual parliaments, thus making the work of our organisation better known and, as a consequence, enabling the positions of individual governments on these subjects of such importance to be more effectively compared.

Particular efforts under this heading were made by Senators Masciadri and Frasca in the Italian parliament and by Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges and Mr. Hengel in the Luxembourg parliament.

Replying to a question by Mr. Hengel on Recommendation 416 relating to Senator Masciadri's report on WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance, Mr. Poos, Luxembourg Minister for Foreign Affairs, addressed the problem of the rôle of the WEU Secretary-General and stated that a special working group of experts from the various WEU member states was in the process of preparing firm proposals on the overall operation of the organisation and its specialised agencies and also concerning the future rôle of the Secretary-General.

Enhancement of relations between WEU and the national parliaments depends upon the reactivation of the organisation. The Committee for Relations with Parliaments decided to work for the reactivation of WEU through a series of information meetings in member countries to be attended by representatives of the national parliament and the press, in the course of which committee members would explain the work of WEU.

The first information meeting was held in the French Senate in Paris on 17th April 1985 when the committee met representatives of both chambers of the French parliament and of the press. At this meeting, briefings were given by members of the committee on the following subjects: the revival of Western European Union, the WEU organs and their duties, the activities of the Assembly and how they are followed up in parliaments, the present activities of the Assembly and relations between Western European Union, NATO and other Western European organisations and countries.

This first meeting was a success, attracting considerable attention and being attended, as I said, by prominent parliamentarians from the French Government and our own Assembly including our President, Mr. Caro, and the President of the French Senate.

1. See page 47.

Mr. Giust (continued)

On the future of WEU, the Council and Assembly are now at the discussion and reflection stage. This subject has been fully discussed both positively and critically during our present session. I need only recall the report by the Vice-President, Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, and the clarifications he gave and yesterday's speech to this Assembly by Mr. Genscher, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.

The President of the Assembly, Mr. Caro, sent a memorandum to the Council and the governments of the member states containing specific proposals on the future of the Council and its organs. As for the Council, the Rome Declaration of 27th October 1984 summarises its position. During our committee's meeting on 6th November 1984, Mrs. Knight, our Chairman, asked members of the committee to put questions to their own governments on this declaration. It will be the task of our committee to inform the Assembly on the position of the individual governments with regard to this document of vital importance for the future of WEU.

I now move on to the analysis of parliamentary debates on the evolution of WEU.

With regard to the follow-up to the Rome decisions in the individual parliaments I shall take each member country in turn.

In the Netherlands, a written report in the form of a letter was sent by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Second Chamber of the States-General on 16th November 1984. This document was published by the States-General. In addition, the Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs took the opportunity of informing the Second Chamber of the States-General of their position on 5th and 6th March 1985 following the tabling of motions on Netherlands membership of WEU, establishing a joint WEU naval patrol and a joint European position towards the SDI.

In Germany, the Minister for Foreign Affairs made an oral report to the Bundestag on 8th November 1984 which was followed by speeches by parliamentarians, all members of the German Delegation.

In the United Kingdom parliament, Baroness Young, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, was particularly active, giving an oral report in the House of Lords on 29th October 1984 which was followed by a debate in the House of Commons in the presence of Sir Geoffrey Howe. There was also a large number of written and oral questions.

In Belgium the main debate was in the Chamber of Representatives when the 1985 budget was discussed.

In France, too, the debate was mainly associated with a discussion of the 1985 Finance Bill, speeches being made by Mr. Cheysson, then Minister for External Relations, Mr. Hernu, Minister of Defence, and other members of parliament. Questions were also put.

In Italy, considerable activity was shown by parliamentarians in the form of questions and a resolution adopted by the Defence Committee of the Chamber of Deputies urging the Italian Government to promote, with other members of WEU, various concrete steps in security policy.

In Luxembourg a number of questions were put.

I will now deal with the various positions taken by the governments of member countries on the evolution of WEU.

The French Government was one of those giving the most significant details on the prospect and future of WEU, stating that it should be better used for discussing Europe's security problems. Mr. Hernu, Minister of Defence, also said that WEU could not be a forum for military decisions nor a body for defence planning or co-ordination. The Minister for External Relations had earlier stated that strategic discussions were not confined to conventional armament but necessarily embraced nuclear weapons and had recalled that France did not belong to the integrated NATO system. Mr. Cheysson, then Minister for External Relations, had also said that WEU could not discuss global strategy because the Federal Republic of Germany could not and did not at present wish to have responsibilities in this area.

The United Kingdom Government also made significant statements, stressing that reactivation of WEU could not change two essential realities: British national defence was assured through NATO, and Eurogroup and IEPG were the best forums for European defence co-operation and for strengthening the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.

NATO, however, remained the foundation of Europe's security, having its own general staff and armed forces. The United Kingdom view was that WEU had three essential features: it was bound to the North Atlantic Treaty, it provided the legal basis for the British commitment to station substantial land and air forces on the mainland of Europe as a vital element in joint European defence and it had the only European parliamentary forum empowered by treaty to discuss security and defence questions.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, too, referred to the close relations,

Mr. Giust (continued)

stemming from the treaty, between WEU and NATO which it said were essential for Europe's security and defence. The Luxembourg Government urged that there be closer links between WEU and NATO member countries.

The German Government reiterated that the Council's decision to remove the last controls on conventional weapons had no connection with any firm plans of the Federal Republic of Germany which had no intention of producing or exporting long-range missiles or strategic bombers. The German Government repeated its proposal that a European research institute be set up to study security policy. This proposal was criticised by Mr. Vogt who called for the creation of a European disarmament agency.

In Italy, in the resolution approved on 24th October 1984, the Defence Committee of the Chamber of Deputies urged the government to set up a "European agency responsible for security and defence industrial policy" which, under the direction of the Council of Ministers and in consultation with the WEU parliamentary Assembly, would promote the co-ordination of the policies of WEU governments in research, development and production of defence means and in procurement and sales, possibly in relation with other similar European or NATO bodies.

In November 1984, Mr. Cheysson, then French Minister for External Relations, said that the Agency for the Control of Armaments would need to reflect on the major problems of the limitation and control of armaments. German parliamentarians made proposals for the conversion of the agency into an organ responsible for the control of disarmament and arms exports.

Relations between the Council and the Assembly were dealt with more particularly by Mr. Genscher, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, who, on many occasions, reiterated the need for closer collaboration between Assembly and Council.

On 12th December 1984, Mr. De Ruyter, Netherlands Minister of Defence, also said that all European frameworks should be taken at their own value and used according to their own possibilities. This was true for European political co-operation as well as for the Eurogroup of NATO.

The important problems of the status of the Secretary-General of WEU, the seat of the organisation and the dual representation of parliamentarians in the Council of Europe and WEU were raised in certain parliaments. No specific answers were given by governments to these questions.

The problem of the enlargement of WEU was considered, in particular in Italy, in connection with the resolution of the Chamber of Deputies already referred to, urging the Italian Government to promote the accession to WEU of all the other Community countries or European members of NATO or at least an appropriate form of co-operation.

Conversely, Mr. Hernu, French Minister of Defence, said it was not desirable to enlarge WEU for the time being.

A similarly reserved position was taken by Lord Reay in the House of Lords.

The same resolution of the Italian Chamber of Deputies includes a proposal that WEU countries study possibilities of setting up military combat units under integrated command.

Overall I have to find that Ministers of Defence still play too minor a rôle in these debates on WEU in the national parliaments. It is interesting to observe, however, that parliamentarians who are not members of the national delegations are also beginning to take an interest in WEU.

The governments have not yet taken up definite positions on the reactivation of WEU. This should be no surprise in view of the fact that the results arrived at by the working parties set up following the Rome Declaration have not yet been submitted to or assessed by the Council. It is also necessary for governments to inform their own parliamentarians more fully by means of regular reports on the activities of the Council and its organs. These reports should clarify the positions of individual governments on present WEU problems. At the moment, it would seem that the German Government is the only one to present half-yearly reports to its parliament on the activities of WEU and its organs. All delegations should recommend that their own governments follow suit.

As regards the extent to which members and non-members of the Assembly participate in national debates on matters relating to WEU, our committee's meetings with parliamentarians from member countries will provide an opportunity for encouraging non-members to increase their participation. I should also stress the importance of the resolution approved by the Defence Committee of the Italian Chamber of Deputies on 24th October 1984 to which I have referred several times. It is to be hoped that this example will be followed and also that there will be an increase in questions and speeches in the national parliaments on the subject of the texts adopted by WEU.

It is also extremely important to stimulate public interest in the evolution of WEU.

Mr. Giust (continued)

Every parliamentarian who is a member of the WEU Assembly has a highly important task to perform. Some subjects which seem to me to merit particular interest and on which it would be highly useful to ask the various governments to give their opinion are the following. Does the modified Brussels Treaty allow WEU to conduct strategic or conclusive discussions on defence? Can it address nuclear problems? How can the WEU Assembly perform a more significant rôle if it remains a purely consultative body? How can Council meetings be prevented from being no more than an exchange of views with no specific commitment at the end?

I would like to conclude by stressing the rôle of our Assembly and therefore its need of the necessary financial resources. On this point we need to ask the governments for explanations about the Council's position, namely its excessive restrictions on Assembly expenditure which are completely incompatible with the Assembly's increased responsibilities. There also needs to be greater collaboration between Council and Assembly in terms of subject matter.

With regard to the future activities of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, the importance of making European public opinion aware of security problems means that this committee has to be given commensurate powers for fulfilling its new tasks falling in the context of the revival of WEU. That is why, Mr. President, I put before you the committee's suggestion, included in my report, regarding a change in its name. The request is that it should be called Committee for Relations with Parliaments and the Public, so that it can discharge its duties in a more effective manner.

To carry out these new tasks, it is desirable or rather essential, that the Committee for Relations with Parliaments be kept fully informed of developments in WEU at all times. Here, Sir John Page underlined that it is desirable for the Chairman of this committee to be made a permanent member of the Committee for Relations with the Council set up by the Presidential Committee on 19th February 1985 to maintain regular contacts with the Council.

It also seems to me that the relevant WEU committees should make an in-depth study of two proposals put forward by the Defence Committee of the Italian Chamber of Deputies, namely that a European agency be set up to study security and defence industrial policy and that another study be made on the possibility of forming military units under integrated command among WEU countries.

As regards the first proposal, the European agency responsible for security and defence

industrial policy would have to act in accordance with the Council's instructions and in close liaison with the Assembly in order to facilitate co-ordination of the policies of WEU governments in the area of research, development and production of defence means and in procurement and sales, possibly in relation with other similar European or NATO bodies. It would be useful for the relevant committee to look into the possibility of harmonising these proposals, and perhaps combining them, with the German proposal for the setting up of a European research institute to study security policy.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, that is the report on the activities of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments. It is my duty, in conclusion, to thank the Chairman of the committee, Mrs. Knight, for the sensitivity of her approach to the problem and the close attention she has paid to it. In particular I would like to thank the Secretary, Mr. Burchard, for his great help in the drafting of the report.

The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. Giust, for a comprehensive introduction to the report.

I have only one speaker on my list, Mr. Eysink. I have pleasure in calling him.

Mr. EYSINK (*Netherlands*) (Translation). - Mr. President, I would like to congratulate the Rapporteur on two counts: first on his report, and second on his summary which matches the report in both content and presentation.

Tasks of the kind undertaken by the Rapporteur are often highly disagreeable, involving as they do the enumeration of facts about the debates in the various parliaments, leading to the conclusion that WEU has made little progress in this area. This year the Rapporteur is in luck because things have been better. There has been more reaction, and the committee has taken some new initiatives, including in particular the establishment of a direct information link with the French parliament. The intention is to introduce a similar link with the Italian parliament next year and then pursue the policy further. This can be regarded as a means of bringing members of the WEU Assembly and members of parliament of the member states face to face, in the interests of improved, open and direct information, which must have the effect of enhancing both the depth of our work and its breadth in terms of the public.

Mr. President, I shall make no attempt to summarise the report for a third time. I have already mentioned how well the Rapporteur has done this on two occasions. A third would be superfluous.

However, there is one thing I wish to mention specifically and that is the good example set by

Mr. Eysink (continued)

the Federal Republic of Germany in submitting a half-yearly report to the Bundestag on the activities of WEU, so as to initiate discussion of the work and potential of WEU. In his conclusions the Rapporteur has made it quite clear that this example deserves to be emulated. It would be a good idea to take this matter up directly and ask governments to follow suit.

Mr. President, the Rapporteur could not have chosen a better moment to present his report. Mr. Genscher yesterday made the following remark, repeated twice in his address and four times in his replies to interventions: "What do you expect? Go to your own parliaments and put your questions there!" Our Rapporteur could not have asked for better support!

I still have one more remark and one question. From politeness, I shall start with the remark. I wish to congratulate the committee Chairman on expanding not only the name but also the function of the committee. However, I support the view of the Rapporteur and Mr. Schulte that, while this is all very significant, we must also ensure that funds are available to carry out these activities. After all, what's in a name - an empty title - if the resources are not there to fund the activities of the organisation and the committee itself?

If we really propose to do something on two fronts, that is, awaken interest in our work and bring home to the public what we are doing on its behalf and for European security, then the appropriate resources must be made available.

Mr. President, this morning we were talking about the simplification of the penal code, the reduction of the range of punitive measures in France. I would like to mount a modest "punitive expedition" in the form of a question to the Rapporteur. Could he not suggest to the committee that a future report, to be presented at the end of next year, should contain some statistics indicating the questions asked in the various parliaments and the answers given by governments. Perhaps that would help!

The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. Eysink.

As there are no other speakers on the list, I do not imagine that the Rapporteur will wish to reply. As he does not, it is only courteous to ask the Chairman whether she would like to say something to end the debate.

Mrs. KNIGHT (*United Kingdom*). - I can do that in one sentence, Mr. President, by expressing my full support and that of my committee for the Rapporteur who has been most painstaking in all that he has done and all that he has said.

The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mrs. Knight.

There are no amendments.

Apparently, we do not vote on a "Take note", unlike our parliament. The Assembly has taken note of the excellent work done by the Rapporteur.

6. Institutional connection of the Assembly with other organs of WEU

*(Motion for an order tabled
by Mr. Spies von Büllesheim and others,
Doc. 1026)*

The PRESIDENT. - The next order of the day is a motion for an order on the institutional connection of the Assembly with other organs of WEU tabled by Mr. Spies von Büllesheim and others, Document 1026.

The motion is in order.

Rule 30 provides that such motions may be put to the vote without being referred to a committee.

I call Mr. Eysink to move the motion for an order.

Mr. EYSINK (*Netherlands*) (Translation). - Mr. President, as Mr. Spies von Büllesheim unfortunately had to leave, he asked me not only to move this motion for an order but also to ask you to give it your wholehearted support. As the request was made by a German, a Dutchman naturally presents it in German.

Mr. President, this is not just something old in new wrapping; it represents a fresh attempt to explore every possibility for developing and strengthening the position of WEU. The order asks for a report and discussion in committee to discuss all the possibilities open to WEU.

As you can see, the whole idea enjoys very wide support, and only three names are now missing, those of Mr. Ahrens, Sir Frederic Bennett and Lord Reay. They too are signatories to this motion for an order as officially shown on the document. Thank you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. Eysink.

Does anyone present wish to speak against the motion?...

I call Mr. Ferrari Aggradi.

Mr. FERRARI AGGRADI (*Italy*) (Translation). - Mr. President, I asked to speak in order to express my view about the problems that are set out but also to make a recommendation. I consider that the problems raised need to be tackled responsibly so as to arrive at

Mr. Ferrari Aggradi (continued)

definite conclusions. I must say frankly that I would not want any hasty assumption to be drawn that guidelines are being laid down because I have serious misgivings on a number of points.

So if what is said here constitutes a recommendation that the question be studied I agree and am grateful but if it is to be interpreted as a set of predetermined solutions I really think that, for the type of work we are doing, we cannot decide here. A single headquarters and a single budget are very important issues that need careful thought. I therefore believe that we should study them in depth and should refrain, for the moment, from laying down any guidelines. In the case of a complex problem like this we have to know that the level of debate will match the importance of the subject.

Mr. President, I hope that my remarks have helped to make the seriousness of our task quite clear.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Ferrari Aggradi.

Much as I should like to call you, Mr. Rauti, under the rules... Will you kindly hold on for a moment? Not for the first time I have received conflicting advice. Initially I was told that there could be only one speaker for and one against, but I now happily call you on a point of order.

Mr. RAUTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I would like to raise a point of order because I think that, given the extreme importance and sensitivity of the subjects raised in the document, we cannot – and to my mind should

not – enter into the substance of the debate for three reasons: the number present in the Assembly is very small, this document has been tabled at a very late stage in our present proceedings and, lastly, the vote, whether for or against, could prejudice the subsequent study of the problems raised. I therefore propose that the document be referred, as it is, to the Presidential Committee which should decide, on the basis of the arguments set out, where it should go from there.

The PRESIDENT. – I share that view, but I must formally put the motion to a vote. If it is carried, the document will go to the Presidential Committee for examination. That will happen if there is now a favourable vote, but I must first get the agreement of the Assembly to its going to the Presidential Committee. It is on that, and not on the merits of the document, that we shall vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The motion for an order is agreed to¹.

7. Adjournment of the session

The PRESIDENT. – We have now reached the end of our business, and I thank you all for your attendance and help this morning.

I declare the thirty-first ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union adjourned.

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 11. 25 a.m.)

1. See page 48.

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